My analysis is that it's not a race condition but... it's about secure memory.
It is true that we have a race condition between putting an entry to cache after pinentry interaction _and_ next examining cache to invoke pinentry. But for this test case, the gpg process of unlock the key (and cache the passphrase) is finished before running the run-threaded command.

I believe the problem was fixed in the master of pinentry with newer gpg-error-config and libassuan-config which support cross build better.

Confirmed that the support of --no-global-grab doesn't work well.

My message above is: The reported issue of ^C was fixed in pinentry-tty and GnuPG in master branch. Please test that fixes.

Please note that pinentry-tty/curses is a kind of emulation of CLI user interface, it's not the real one (I'm going to explain in the next paragraph).
It is, by any means, not robust, as users would expect, from the implementation's view. It only works specific simple use cases (while I do my best to stabilize it in master branch of GnuPG).

That is actually a GnuPG thing. We originally did it this way to help people remember their passphrase before they start using the key. I agree it is annoying and I would like to remove it too. At the same time we should really think about making no-passphrase the default and require it only with certain compliance settings.

The most plausible fix to the Y2K38 problem on 32-bit machines is to simply move to a 64-bit time_t at the same time as any other major system-wide ABI break. However, if that ABI break doesn't also change the size of long to more than 32 bits, GPGME will remain unfixed in spite of any architectural correction.

Fixed for 2.2.19 and master

I agree with everything in the previous comment. Just hoping for simple, robust UI like gpg 1.x that works over an SSH connection (no GUI) for ordinary file decryption on the command line.

@dkg I use gnupg 1.x for a very, very long time. I like the way it works. And most, I like that the terminal is not hidden from me when I type a password and that the characters in password does not appear on terminal as "*". Sometime the text in terminal is important to me. pinentry-tty have more or less the same behavior as gnupg 1.x. With pinentry-curses the terminal is hidden and there are '*' for each character in password that I type. Also, there is not GUI on my servers so no pinentry-(qt|gtk|anything else).

Very few OpenPGP data signatures have an expiration time either, fwiw. I have never actually seen one in the wild, and no one that i know uses --ask-sig-expire or --default-sig-expire (it shows up in the cupt test suite and the apt test suite, but doesn't appear to be actually used by anything).

CMS signatures do not have a expiration time. Further the meaning of the expiration time of one of the certificates also depends on the validation model (shell or chain); thus a one-to-one relationship between these times is not possible.

We will run into all kind of problems after 2038 on 32 bit boxes. 2106 is nothing to care about.

pinentry-tty is pretty fragile, and designed to be handled in a particular way. I strongly recommend a different workflow if you're using gpg secret key operations in a regular process. either:

@maiden_taiwan Thank you. Nice trick. Works fine for for one file and covers almost all of my issues.
Still, for example, when used together with rpmsign and I have to sign multiple rpms files, is inconvenient to type ctrl-D for each rpm file (for whatever reason I want to stop the signing process) . ctrl-c just stop the process.
This worked fine with gpg 1.x. Not so much with gpg2.

Thank you.

I uploaded the certificate files. For a test please do the following:

@gv: I am another user (not the developer), but here is a workaround I found. Type ctrl-D instead of ctrl-C to terminate pinentry-tty.

I'm sorry, this issue is far from fixed.

This is a support question. Please use one of the public support channels as listed at gnupg.org or ask for a quote at a commercial service (https://gnupg.org/service.html).

I am currently investigating the issue known as CVE-2019-14855 for Debian's LTS version Debian 8 "Jessie" and even Debian 7 "Wheezy".

Regression due to a faulty backport. Fixed in repo; patch is F1052802
Thanks for reporting.

There is a regression in decryption with hidden recipients; see T4762.
Patch available

Okay, I can replicate that on gnupg 2.2; it works correct on master.

I am not sure what you want you are going. I see is a verify command using an unknown file or number of files without knowing its content (using globbing (*-SOMETHING) is not a good idea). Some signature is verified okay but it is not known whether the key is trustworthy. You export a ke and then you do a verify on the key - this can't work because a key-file is not a signature.