No OneTemporary
Actions

Size

316 KB

Subscribers

None

View Options

This file is larger than 256 KB, so syntax highlighting was skipped.

	diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi
	index 1a3cb9e25..466baf3bf 100644
	--- a/doc/gpg.texi
	+++ b/doc/gpg.texi
	@@ -1,4632 +1,4632 @@
	@c Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
	@c 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	@c This is part of the GnuPG manual.
	@c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi.

	@include defs.inc

	@node Invoking GPG
	@chapter Invoking GPG
	@cindex GPG command options
	@cindex command options
	@cindex options, GPG command


	@c Begin standard stuff
	@ifclear gpgtwohack
	@manpage gpg.1
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg
	\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
	@end ifset

	@mansect synopsis
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg
	.RB [ \-\-homedir
	.IR dir ]
	.RB [ \-\-options
	.IR file ]
	.RI [ options ]
	.I command
	.RI [ args ]
	@end ifset
	@end ifclear
	@c End standard stuff

	@c Begin gpg2 hack stuff
	@ifset gpgtwohack
	@manpage gpg2.1
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
	@end ifset

	@mansect synopsis
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	.RB [ \-\-homedir
	.IR dir ]
	.RB [ \-\-options
	.IR file ]
	.RI [ options ]
	.I command
	.RI [ args ]
	@end ifset
	@end ifset
	@c End gpg2 hack stuff


	@mansect description
	@command{@gpgname} is the OpenPGP part of the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG). It
	is a tool to provide digital encryption and signing services using the
	OpenPGP standard. @command{@gpgname} features complete key management and
	all the bells and whistles you would expect from a full OpenPGP
	implementation.

	There are two main versions of GnuPG: GnuPG 1.x and GnuPG 2.x. GnuPG
	2.x supports modern encryption algorithms and thus should be preferred
	over GnuPG 1.x. You only need to use GnuPG 1.x if your platform
	doesn't support GnuPG 2.x, or you need support for some features that
	GnuPG 2.x has deprecated, e.g., decrypting data created with PGP-2
	keys.

	@ifclear gpgtwohack
	If you are looking for version 1 of GnuPG, you may find that version
	installed under the name @command{gpg1}.
	@end ifclear
	@ifset gpgtwohack
	In contrast to the standalone command @command{gpg} from GnuPG 1.x,
	the 2.x version is commonly installed under the name
	@command{@gpgname}.
	@end ifset

	@manpause

	@xref{Option Index}, for an index to @command{@gpgname}'s commands and options.
	@mancont

	@menu
	* GPG Commands:: List of all commands.
	* GPG Options:: List of all options.
	* GPG Configuration:: Configuration files.
	* GPG Examples:: Some usage examples.

	Developer information:
	* Unattended Usage of GPG:: Using @command{gpg} from other programs.
	@end menu

	@c * GPG Protocol:: The protocol the server mode uses.


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* COMMANDS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect commands
	@node GPG Commands
	@section Commands

	Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that
	only one command is allowed. Generally speaking, irrelevant options
	are silently ignored, and may not be checked for correctness.

	@command{@gpgname} may be run with no commands. In this case it will
	print a warning perform a reasonable action depending on the type of
	file it is given as input (an encrypted message is decrypted, a
	signature is verified, a file containing keys is listed, etc.).

	If you run into any problems, please add the option @option{--verbose}
	to the invocation to see more diagnostics.


	@menu
	* General GPG Commands:: Commands not specific to the functionality.
	* Operational GPG Commands:: Commands to select the type of operation.
	* OpenPGP Key Management:: How to manage your keys.
	@end menu


	@c *******************************************
	@c ******** GENERAL COMMANDS ***********
	@c *******************************************
	@node General GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands not specific to the function

	@table @gnupgtabopt
	@item --version
	@opindex version
	Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you
	cannot abbreviate this command.

	@item --help
	@itemx -h
	@opindex help
	Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command-line options.
	Note that you cannot arbitrarily abbreviate this command
	(though you can use its short form @option{-h}).

	@item --warranty
	@opindex warranty
	Print warranty information.

	@item --dump-options
	@opindex dump-options
	Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot
	abbreviate this command.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPERATIONAL COMMANDS *********
	@c *******************************************
	@node Operational GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands to select the type of operation


	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --sign
	@itemx -s
	@opindex sign
	Sign a message. This command may be combined with @option{--encrypt}
	(to sign and encrypt a message), @option{--symmetric} (to sign and
	symmetrically encrypt a message), or both @option{--encrypt} and
	@option{--symmetric} (to sign and encrypt a message that can be
	decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase). The signing key is
	chosen by default or can be set explicitly using the
	@option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key} options.

	@item --clear-sign
	@opindex clear-sign
	@itemx --clearsign
	@opindex clearsign
	Make a cleartext signature. The content in a cleartext signature is
	readable without any special software. OpenPGP software is only needed
	to verify the signature. cleartext signatures may modify end-of-line
	whitespace for platform independence and are not intended to be
	reversible. The signing key is chosen by default or can be set
	explicitly using the @option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key}
	options.


	@item --detach-sign
	@itemx -b
	@opindex detach-sign
	Make a detached signature.

	@item --encrypt
	@itemx -e
	@opindex encrypt
	Encrypt data to one or more public keys. This command may be combined
	with @option{--sign} (to sign and encrypt a message),
	@option{--symmetric} (to encrypt a message that can be decrypted using a
	secret key or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and
	@option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that can be
	decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase). @option{--recipient}
	and related options specify which public keys to use for encryption.

	@item --symmetric
	@itemx -c
	@opindex symmetric
	Encrypt with a symmetric cipher using a passphrase. The default
	symmetric cipher used is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}, but may be chosen with the
	@option{--cipher-algo} option. This command may be combined with
	@option{--sign} (for a signed and symmetrically encrypted message),
	@option{--encrypt} (for a message that may be decrypted via a secret key
	or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and @option{--encrypt} together
	(for a signed message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a
	passphrase). @command{@gpgname} caches the passphrase used for
	symmetric encryption so that a decrypt operation may not require that
	the user needs to enter the passphrase. The option
	@option{--no-symkey-cache} can be used to disable this feature.

	@item --store
	@opindex store
	Store only (make a simple literal data packet).

	@item --decrypt
	@itemx -d
	@opindex decrypt
	Decrypt the file given on the command line (or STDIN if no file
	is specified) and write it to STDOUT (or the file specified with
	@option{--output}). If the decrypted file is signed, the signature is also
	verified. This command differs from the default operation, as it never
	writes to the filename which is included in the file and it rejects
	files that don't begin with an encrypted message.

	@item --verify
	@opindex verify
	Assume that the first argument is a signed file and verify it without
	generating any output. With no arguments, the signature packet is
	read from STDIN. If only one argument is given, the specified file is
	expected to include a complete signature.

	With more than one argument, the first argument should specify a file
	with a detached signature and the remaining files should contain the
	signed data. To read the signed data from STDIN, use @samp{-} as the
	second filename. For security reasons, a detached signature will not
	read the signed material from STDIN if not explicitly specified.

	Note: If the option @option{--batch} is not used, @command{@gpgname}
	may assume that a single argument is a file with a detached signature,
	and it will try to find a matching data file by stripping certain
	suffixes. Using this historical feature to verify a detached
	signature is strongly discouraged; you should always specify the data file
	explicitly.

	Note: When verifying a cleartext signature, @command{@gpgname} verifies
	only what makes up the cleartext signed data and not any extra data
	outside of the cleartext signature or the header lines directly following
	the dash marker line. The option @code{--output} may be used to write
	out the actual signed data, but there are other pitfalls with this
	format as well. It is suggested to avoid cleartext signatures in
	favor of detached signatures.

	Note: Sometimes the use of the @command{gpgv} tool is easier than
	using the full-fledged @command{gpg} with this option. @command{gpgv}
	is designed to compare signed data against a list of trusted keys and
	returns with success only for a good signature. It has its own manual
	page.


	@item --multifile
	@opindex multifile
	This modifies certain other commands to accept multiple files for
	processing on the command line or read from STDIN with each filename on
	a separate line. This allows for many files to be processed at
	once. @option{--multifile} may currently be used along with
	@option{--verify}, @option{--encrypt}, and @option{--decrypt}. Note that
	@option{--multifile --verify} may not be used with detached signatures.

	@item --verify-files
	@opindex verify-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --verify}.

	@item --encrypt-files
	@opindex encrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --encrypt}.

	@item --decrypt-files
	@opindex decrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --decrypt}.

	@item --list-keys
	@itemx -k
	@itemx --list-public-keys
	@opindex list-keys
	List the specified keys. If no keys are specified, then all keys from
	the configured public keyrings are listed.

	Never use the output of this command in scripts or other programs.
	The output is intended only for humans and its format is likely to
	change. The @option{--with-colons} option emits the output in a
	stable, machine-parseable format, which is intended for use by scripts
	and other programs.

	@item --list-secret-keys
	@itemx -K
	@opindex list-secret-keys
	List the specified secret keys. If no keys are specified, then all
	known secret keys are listed. A @code{#} after the initial tags
	@code{sec} or @code{ssb} means that the secret key or subkey is
	currently not usable. We also say that this key has been taken
	offline (for example, a primary key can be taken offline by exporting
	the key using the command @option{--export-secret-subkeys}). A
	@code{>} after these tags indicate that the key is stored on a
	smartcard. See also @option{--list-keys}.

	@item --check-signatures
	@opindex check-signatures
	@itemx --check-sigs
	@opindex check-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the key signatures are verified and
	listed too. Note that for performance reasons the revocation status
	of a signing key is not shown. This command has the same effect as
	using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-check}.

	The status of the verification is indicated by a flag directly
	following the "sig" tag (and thus before the flags described below. A
	"!" indicates that the signature has been successfully verified, a "-"
	denotes a bad signature and a "%" is used if an error occurred while
	checking the signature (e.g. a non supported algorithm). Signatures
	where the public key is not available are not listed; to see their
	keyids the command @option{--list-sigs} can be used.

	For each signature listed, there are several flags in between the
	signature status flag and keyid. These flags give additional
	information about each key signature. From left to right, they are
	the numbers 1-3 for certificate check level (see
	@option{--ask-cert-level}), "L" for a local or non-exportable
	signature (see @option{--lsign-key}), "R" for a nonRevocable signature
	(see the @option{--edit-key} command "nrsign"), "P" for a signature
	that contains a policy URL (see @option{--cert-policy-url}), "N" for a
	signature that contains a notation (see @option{--cert-notation}), "X"
	for an eXpired signature (see @option{--ask-cert-expire}), and the
	numbers 1-9 or "T" for 10 and above to indicate trust signature levels
	(see the @option{--edit-key} command "tsign").


	@item --locate-keys
	@itemx --locate-external-keys
	@opindex locate-keys
	@opindex locate-external-keys
	Locate the keys given as arguments. This command basically uses the
	same algorithm as used when locating keys for encryption and may thus
	be used to see what keys @command{@gpgname} might use. In particular
	external methods as defined by @option{--auto-key-locate} are used to
	locate a key if the arguments comain valid mail addresses. Only
	public keys are listed.

	The variant @option{--locate-external-keys} does not consider a
	locally existing key and can thus be used to force the refresh of a
	key via the defined external methods. If a fingerprint is given and
	and the methods defined by --auto-key-locate define LDAP servers, the
	key is fetched from these resources; defined non-LDAP keyservers are
	skipped.


	@item --show-keys
	@opindex show-keys
	This commands takes OpenPGP keys as input and prints information about
	them in the same way the command @option{--list-keys} does for locally
	stored key. In addition the list options @code{show-unusable-uids},
	@code{show-unusable-subkeys}, @code{show-notations} and
	@code{show-policy-urls} are also enabled. As usual for automated
	processing, this command should be combined with the option
	@option{--with-colons}.

	@item --fingerprint
	@opindex fingerprint
	List all keys (or the specified ones) along with their
	fingerprints. This is the same output as @option{--list-keys} but with
	the additional output of a line with the fingerprint. May also be
	combined with @option{--check-signatures}. If this
	command is given twice, the fingerprints of all secondary keys are
	listed too. This command also forces pretty printing of fingerprints
	if the keyid format has been set to "none".

	@item --list-packets
	@opindex list-packets
	List only the sequence of packets. This command is only useful for
	debugging. When used with option @option{--verbose} the actual MPI
	values are dumped and not only their lengths. Note that the output of
	this command may change with new releases.


	@item --edit-card
	@opindex edit-card
	@itemx --card-edit
	@opindex card-edit
	Present a menu to work with a smartcard. The subcommand "help" provides
	an overview on available commands. For a detailed description, please
	see the Card HOWTO at
	https://gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html#GnuPG-cardHOWTO .

	@item --card-status
	@opindex card-status
	Show the content of the smart card.

	@item --change-pin
	@opindex change-pin
	Present a menu to allow changing the PIN of a smartcard. This
	functionality is also available as the subcommand "passwd" with the
	@option{--edit-card} command.

	@item --delete-keys @var{name}
	@opindex delete-keys
	Remove key from the public keyring. In batch mode either @option{--yes} is
	required or the key must be specified by fingerprint. This is a
	safeguard against accidental deletion of multiple keys. If the
	exclamation mark syntax is used with the fingerprint of a subkey only
	that subkey is deleted; if the exclamation mark is used with the
	fingerprint of the primary key the entire public key is deleted.

	@item --delete-secret-keys @var{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-keys
	Remove key from the secret keyring. In batch mode the key must be
	specified by fingerprint. The option @option{--yes} can be used to
	advise gpg-agent not to request a confirmation. This extra
	pre-caution is done because @command{@gpgname} can't be sure that the
	secret key (as controlled by gpg-agent) is only used for the given
	OpenPGP public key. If the exclamation mark syntax is used with the
	fingerprint of a subkey only the secret part of that subkey is
	deleted; if the exclamation mark is used with the fingerprint of the
	primary key only the secret part of the primary key is deleted.


	@item --delete-secret-and-public-key @var{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-and-public-key
	Same as @option{--delete-key}, but if a secret key exists, it will be
	removed first. In batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint.
	The option @option{--yes} can be used to advise gpg-agent not to
	request a confirmation.

	@item --export
	@opindex export
	Either export all keys from all keyrings (default keyring and those
	registered via option @option{--keyring}), or if at least one name is given,
	those of the given name. The exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the
	file given with option @option{--output}. Use together with
	@option{--armor} to mail those keys.

	@item --send-keys @var{keyIDs}
	@opindex send-keys
	Similar to @option{--export} but sends the keys to a keyserver.
	Fingerprints may be used instead of key IDs.
	Don't send your complete keyring to a keyserver --- select
	only those keys which are new or changed by you. If no @var{keyIDs}
	are given, @command{@gpgname} does nothing.

	Take care: Keyservers are by design write only systems and thus it is
	not possible to ever delete keys once they have been send to a
	keyserver.


	@item --export-secret-keys
	@itemx --export-secret-subkeys
	@opindex export-secret-keys
	@opindex export-secret-subkeys
	Same as @option{--export}, but exports the secret keys instead. The
	exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the file given with option
	@option{--output}. This command is often used along with the option
	@option{--armor} to allow for easy printing of the key for paper backup;
	however the external tool @command{paperkey} does a better job of
	creating backups on paper. Note that exporting a secret key can be a
	security risk if the exported keys are sent over an insecure channel.

	The second form of the command has the special property to render the
	secret part of the primary key useless; this is a GNU extension to
	OpenPGP and other implementations can not be expected to successfully
	import such a key. Its intended use is in generating a full key with
	an additional signing subkey on a dedicated machine. This command
	then exports the key without the primary key to the main machine.

	GnuPG may ask you to enter the passphrase for the key. This is
	required, because the internal protection method of the secret key is
	different from the one specified by the OpenPGP protocol.

	@item --export-ssh-key
	@opindex export-ssh-key
	This command is used to export a key in the OpenSSH public key format.
	It requires the specification of one key by the usual means and
	exports the latest valid subkey which has an authentication capability
	to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. That
	output can directly be added to ssh's @file{authorized_key} file.

	By specifying the key to export using a key ID or a fingerprint
	suffixed with an exclamation mark (!), a specific subkey or the
	primary key can be exported. This does not even require that the key
	has the authentication capability flag set.

	@item --import
	@itemx --fast-import
	@opindex import
	Import/merge keys. This adds the given keys to the
	keyring. The fast version is currently just a synonym.

	There are a few other options which control how this command works.
	Most notable here is the @option{--import-options merge-only} option
	which does not insert new keys but does only the merging of new
	signatures, user-IDs and subkeys.

	@item --receive-keys @var{keyIDs}
	@opindex receive-keys
	@itemx --recv-keys @var{keyIDs}
	@opindex recv-keys
	Import the keys with the given @var{keyIDs} from a keyserver.

	@item --refresh-keys
	@opindex refresh-keys
	Request updates from a keyserver for keys that already exist on the
	local keyring. This is useful for updating a key with the latest
	signatures, user IDs, etc. Calling this with no arguments will refresh
	the entire keyring.

	@item --search-keys @var{names}
	@opindex search-keys
	Search the keyserver for the given @var{names}. Multiple names given
	here will be joined together to create the search string for the
	keyserver. Note that keyservers search for @var{names} in a different
	and simpler way than gpg does. The best choice is to use a mail
	address. Due to data privacy reasons keyservers may even not even
	allow searching by user id or mail address and thus may only return
	results when being used with the @option{--recv-key} command to
	search by key fingerprint or keyid.

	@item --fetch-keys @var{URIs}
	@opindex fetch-keys
	Retrieve keys located at the specified @var{URIs}. Note that different
	installations of GnuPG may support different protocols (HTTP, FTP,
	LDAP, etc.). When using HTTPS the system provided root certificates
	are used by this command.

	@item --update-trustdb
	@opindex update-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance. This command iterates over all keys and
	builds the Web of Trust. This is an interactive command because it may
	have to ask for the "ownertrust" values for keys. The user has to give
	an estimation of how far she trusts the owner of the displayed key to
	correctly certify (sign) other keys. GnuPG only asks for the ownertrust
	value if it has not yet been assigned to a key. Using the
	@option{--edit-key} menu, the assigned value can be changed at any time.

	@item --check-trustdb
	@opindex check-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance without user interaction. From time to
	time the trust database must be updated so that expired keys or
	signatures and the resulting changes in the Web of Trust can be
	tracked. Normally, GnuPG will calculate when this is required and do it
	automatically unless @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} is set. This
	command can be used to force a trust database check at any time. The
	processing is identical to that of @option{--update-trustdb} but it
	skips keys with a not yet defined "ownertrust".

	For use with cron jobs, this command can be used together with
	@option{--batch} in which case the trust database check is done only if
	a check is needed. To force a run even in batch mode add the option
	@option{--yes}.

	@anchor{option --export-ownertrust}
	@item --export-ownertrust
	@opindex export-ownertrust
	Send the ownertrust values to STDOUT. This is useful for backup purposes
	as these values are the only ones which can't be re-created from a
	corrupted trustdb. Example:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	@gpgname{} --export-ownertrust > otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --import-ownertrust
	@opindex import-ownertrust
	Update the trustdb with the ownertrust values stored in @code{files} (or
	STDIN if not given); existing values will be overwritten. In case of a
	severely damaged trustdb and if you have a recent backup of the
	ownertrust values (e.g. in the file @file{otrust.txt}), you may re-create
	the trustdb using these commands:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	cd ~/.gnupg
	rm trustdb.gpg
	@gpgname{} --import-ownertrust < otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --rebuild-keydb-caches
	@opindex rebuild-keydb-caches
	When updating from version 1.0.6 to 1.0.7 this command should be used
	to create signature caches in the keyring. It might be handy in other
	situations too.

	@item --print-md @var{algo}
	@itemx --print-mds
	@opindex print-md
	Print message digest of algorithm @var{algo} for all given files or STDIN.
	With the second form (or a deprecated "*" for @var{algo}) digests for all
	available algorithms are printed.

	@item --gen-random @var{0\|1\|2\|16\|30} @var{count}
	@opindex gen-random
	Emit @var{count} random bytes of the given quality level 0, 1 or 2. If
	@var{count} is not given or zero, an endless sequence of random bytes
	will be emitted. If used with @option{--armor} the output will be
	base64 encoded. The special level 16 uses a quality level of 1 and
	outpust end endless stream of hex-encoded octets. The special level
	30 outputs random as 30 zBase-32 characters.

	@item --gen-prime @var{mode} @var{bits}
	@opindex gen-prime
	Use the source, Luke :-). The output format is subject to change
	with ant release.


	@item --enarmor
	@itemx --dearmor
	@opindex enarmor
	@opindex dearmor
	Pack or unpack an arbitrary input into/from an OpenPGP ASCII armor.
	This is a GnuPG extension to OpenPGP and in general not very useful.
	The @option{--dearmor} command can also be used to dearmor PEM armors.

	@item --unwrap
	@opindex unwrap
	This command is similar to @option{--decrypt} with the change that the
	output is not the usual plaintext but the original message with the
	decryption layer removed. Thus the output will be an OpenPGP data
	structure which often means a signed OpenPGP message. Note that this
	command may or may not remove a compression layer which is often found
	beneath the encryption layer.

	@item --tofu-policy @{auto\|good\|unknown\|bad\|ask@} @var{keys}
	@opindex tofu-policy
	Set the TOFU policy for all the bindings associated with the specified
	@var{keys}. For more information about the meaning of the policies,
	@pxref{trust-model-tofu}. The @var{keys} may be specified either by their
	fingerprint (preferred) or their keyid.

	@c @item --server
	@c @opindex server
	@c Run gpg in server mode. This feature is not yet ready for use and
	@c thus not documented.

	@end table


	@c ********************************************
	@c ***** KEY MANAGEMENT COMMANDS ********
	@c ********************************************
	@node OpenPGP Key Management
	@subsection How to manage your keys

	This section explains the main commands for key management.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --quick-generate-key @var{user-id} [@var{algo} [@var{usage} [@var{expire}]]]
	@itemx --quick-gen-key
	@opindex quick-generate-key
	@opindex quick-gen-key
	This is a simple command to generate a standard key with one user id.
	In contrast to @option{--generate-key} the key is generated directly
	without the need to answer a bunch of prompts. Unless the option
	@option{--yes} is given, the key creation will be canceled if the
	given user id already exists in the keyring.

	If invoked directly on the console without any special options an
	answer to a ``Continue?'' style confirmation prompt is required. In
	case the user id already exists in the keyring a second prompt to
	force the creation of the key will show up.

	If @var{algo} or @var{usage} are given, only the primary key is
	created and no prompts are shown. To specify an expiration date but
	still create a primary and subkey use ``default'' or
	``future-default'' for @var{algo} and ``default'' for @var{usage}.
	For a description of these optional arguments see the command
	@code{--quick-add-key}. The @var{usage} accepts also the value
	``cert'' which can be used to create a certification only primary key;
	the default is to a create certification and signing key.

	The @var{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date
	for the key. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO formats
	``YYYY-MM-DD'' or ``YYYYMMDDThhmmss'' are used. To make the key
	expire in N seconds, N days, N weeks, N months, or N years use
	``seconds=N'', ``Nd'', ``Nw'', ``Nm'', or ``Ny'' respectively. Not
	specifying a value, or using ``-'' results in a key expiring in a
	reasonable default interval. The values ``never'', ``none'' can be
	used for no expiration date.

	If this command is used with @option{--batch},
	@option{--pinentry-mode} has been set to @code{loopback}, and one of
	the passphrase options (@option{--passphrase},
	@option{--passphrase-fd}, or @option{--passphrase-file}) is used, the
	supplied passphrase is used for the new key and the agent does not ask
	for it. To create a key without any protection @code{--passphrase ''}
	may be used.

	To create an OpenPGP key from the keys available on the currently
	inserted smartcard, the special string ``card'' can be used for
	@var{algo}. If the card features an encryption and a signing key, gpg
	will figure them out and creates an OpenPGP key consisting of the
	usual primary key and one subkey. This works only with certain
	smartcards. Note that the interactive @option{--full-gen-key} command
	allows to do the same but with greater flexibility in the selection of
	the smartcard keys.

	Note that it is possible to create a primary key and a subkey using
	non-default algorithms by using ``default'' and changing the default
	parameters using the option @option{--default-new-key-algo}.

	@item --quick-set-expire @var{fpr} @var{expire} [*\|@var{subfprs}]
	@opindex quick-set-expire
	With two arguments given, directly set the expiration time of the
	primary key identified by @var{fpr} to @var{expire}. To remove the
	expiration time @code{0} can be used. With three arguments and the
	third given as an asterisk, the expiration time of all non-revoked and
	not yet expired subkeys are set to @var{expire}. With more than two
	arguments and a list of fingerprints given for @var{subfprs}, all
	non-revoked subkeys matching these fingerprints are set to
	@var{expire}.


	@item --quick-add-key @var{fpr} [@var{algo} [@var{usage} [@var{expire}]]]
	@opindex quick-add-key
	Directly add a subkey to the key identified by the fingerprint
	@var{fpr}. Without the optional arguments an encryption subkey is
	added. If any of the arguments are given a more specific subkey is
	added.

	@var{algo} may be any of the supported algorithms or curve names
	given in the format as used by key listings. To use the default
	algorithm the string ``default'' or ``-'' can be used. Supported
	algorithms are ``rsa'', ``dsa'', ``elg'', ``ed25519'', ``cv25519'',
	and other ECC curves. For example the string ``rsa'' adds an RSA key
	with the default key length; a string ``rsa4096'' requests that the
	key length is 4096 bits. The string ``future-default'' is an alias
	for the algorithm which will likely be used as default algorithm in
	future versions of gpg. To list the supported ECC curves the command
	@code{gpg --with-colons --list-config curve} can be used.

	Depending on the given @var{algo} the subkey may either be an
	encryption subkey or a signing subkey. If an algorithm is capable of
	signing and encryption and such a subkey is desired, a @var{usage}
	string must be given. This string is either ``default'' or ``-'' to
	keep the default or a comma delimited list (or space delimited list)
	of keywords: ``sign'' for a signing subkey, ``auth'' for an
	authentication subkey, and ``encr'' for an encryption subkey
	(``encrypt'' can be used as alias for ``encr''). The valid
	combinations depend on the algorithm.

	The @var{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date
	for the key. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO formats
	``YYYY-MM-DD'' or ``YYYYMMDDThhmmss'' are used. To make the key
	expire in N seconds, N days, N weeks, N months, or N years use
	``seconds=N'', ``Nd'', ``Nw'', ``Nm'', or ``Ny'' respectively. Not
	specifying a value, or using ``-'' results in a key expiring in a
	reasonable default interval. The values ``never'', ``none'' can be
	used for no expiration date.

	@item --generate-key
	@opindex generate-key
	@itemx --gen-key
	@opindex gen-key
	Generate a new key pair using the current default parameters. This is
	the standard command to create a new key. In addition to the key a
	revocation certificate is created and stored in the
	@file{openpgp-revocs.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory.

	@item --full-generate-key
	@opindex full-generate-key
	@itemx --full-gen-key
	@opindex full-gen-key
	Generate a new key pair with dialogs for all options. This is an
	extended version of @option{--generate-key}.

	There is also a feature which allows you to create keys in batch
	mode. See the manual section ``Unattended key generation'' on how
	to use this.


	@item --generate-revocation @var{name}
	@opindex generate-revocation
	@itemx --gen-revoke @var{name}
	@opindex gen-revoke
	Generate a revocation certificate for the complete key. To only revoke
	a subkey or a key signature, use the @option{--edit} command.

	This command merely creates the revocation certificate so that it can
	be used to revoke the key if that is ever needed. To actually revoke
	a key the created revocation certificate needs to be merged with the
	key to revoke. This is done by importing the revocation certificate
	using the @option{--import} command. Then the revoked key needs to be
	published, which is best done by sending the key to a keyserver
	(command @option{--send-key}) and by exporting (@option{--export}) it
	to a file which is then send to frequent communication partners.


	@item --generate-designated-revocation @var{name}
	@opindex generate-designated-revocation
	@itemx --desig-revoke @var{name}
	@opindex desig-revoke
	Generate a designated revocation certificate for a key. This allows a
	user (with the permission of the keyholder) to revoke someone else's
	key.


	@item --edit-key
	@opindex edit-key
	Present a menu which enables you to do most of the key management
	related tasks. It expects the specification of a key on the command
	line.

	@c ****** Begin Edit-key Options ********
	@table @asis

	@item uid @var{n}
	@opindex keyedit:uid
	Toggle selection of user ID or photographic user ID with index @var{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item key @var{n}
	@opindex keyedit:key
	Toggle selection of subkey with index @var{n} or key ID @var{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item sign
	@opindex keyedit:sign
	Make a signature on key of user @code{name}. If the key is not yet
	signed by the default user (or the users given with @option{-u}), the program
	displays the information of the key again, together with its
	fingerprint and asks whether it should be signed. This question is
	repeated for all users specified with
	@option{-u}.

	@item lsign
	@opindex keyedit:lsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-exportable and will
	therefore never be used by others. This may be used to make keys
	valid only in the local environment.

	@item nrsign
	@opindex keyedit:nrsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-revocable and can
	therefore never be revoked.

	@item tsign
	@opindex keyedit:tsign
	Make a trust signature. This is a signature that combines the notions
	of certification (like a regular signature), and trust (like the
	"trust" command). It is generally only useful in distinct communities
	or groups. For more information please read the sections
	``Trust Signature'' and ``Regular Expression'' in RFC-4880.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	Note that "l" (for local / non-exportable), "nr" (for non-revocable,
	and "t" (for trust) may be freely mixed and prefixed to "sign" to
	create a signature of any type desired.
	@c man:.RE

	If the option @option{--only-sign-text-ids} is specified, then any
	non-text based user ids (e.g., photo IDs) will not be selected for
	signing.

	@table @asis

	@item delsig
	@opindex keyedit:delsig
	Delete a signature. Note that it is not possible to retract a signature,
	once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case
	you better use @code{revsig}.

	@item revsig
	@opindex keyedit:revsig
	Revoke a signature. For every signature which has been generated by
	one of the secret keys, GnuPG asks whether a revocation certificate
	should be generated.

	@item check
	@opindex keyedit:check
	Check the signatures on all selected user IDs. With the extra
	option @code{selfsig} only self-signatures are shown.

	@item adduid
	@opindex keyedit:adduid
	Create an additional user ID.

	@item addphoto
	@opindex keyedit:addphoto
	Create a photographic user ID. This will prompt for a JPEG file that
	will be embedded into the user ID. Note that a very large JPEG will make
	for a very large key. Also note that some programs will display your
	JPEG unchanged (GnuPG), and some programs will scale it to fit in a
	dialog box (PGP).

	@item showphoto
	@opindex keyedit:showphoto
	Display the selected photographic user ID.

	@item deluid
	@opindex keyedit:deluid
	Delete a user ID or photographic user ID. Note that it is not
	possible to retract a user id, once it has been send to the public
	(i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revuid}.

	@item revuid
	@opindex keyedit:revuid
	Revoke a user ID or photographic user ID.

	@item primary
	@opindex keyedit:primary
	Flag the current user id as the primary one, removes the primary user
	id flag from all other user ids and sets the timestamp of all affected
	self-signatures one second ahead. Note that setting a photo user ID
	as primary makes it primary over other photo user IDs, and setting a
	regular user ID as primary makes it primary over other regular user
	IDs.

	@item keyserver
	@opindex keyedit:keyserver
	Set a preferred keyserver for the specified user ID(s). This allows
	other users to know where you prefer they get your key from. See
	@option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url} for more on how this
	works. Setting a value of "none" removes an existing preferred
	keyserver.

	@item notation
	@opindex keyedit:notation
	Set a name=value notation for the specified user ID(s). See
	@option{--cert-notation} for more on how this works. Setting a value of
	"none" removes all notations, setting a notation prefixed with a minus
	sign (-) removes that notation, and setting a notation name (without the
	=value) prefixed with a minus sign removes all notations with that name.

	@item pref
	@opindex keyedit:pref
	List preferences from the selected user ID. This shows the actual
	preferences, without including any implied preferences.

	@item showpref
	@opindex keyedit:showpref
	More verbose preferences listing for the selected user ID. This shows
	the preferences in effect by including the implied preferences of 3DES
	(cipher), SHA-1 (digest), and Uncompressed (compression) if they are
	not already included in the preference list. In addition, the
	preferred keyserver and signature notations (if any) are shown.

	@item setpref @var{string}
	@opindex keyedit:setpref
	Set the list of user ID preferences to @var{string} for all (or just
	the selected) user IDs. Calling setpref with no arguments sets the
	preference list to the default (either built-in or set via
	@option{--default-preference-list}), and calling setpref with "none"
	as the argument sets an empty preference list. Use @command{@gpgname
	--version} to get a list of available algorithms. Note that while you
	can change the preferences on an attribute user ID (aka "photo ID"),
	GnuPG does not select keys via attribute user IDs so these preferences
	will not be used by GnuPG. Note that an unattended version of this
	command is available as @option{--quick-update-pref}.

	When setting preferences, you should list the algorithms in the order
	which you'd like to see them used by someone else when encrypting a
	message to your key. If you don't include 3DES, it will be
	automatically added at the end. Note that there are many factors that
	go into choosing an algorithm (for example, your key may not be the
	only recipient), and so the remote OpenPGP application being used to
	send to you may or may not follow your exact chosen order for a given
	message. It will, however, only choose an algorithm that is present
	on the preference list of every recipient key. See also the
	INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below.

	@item addkey
	@opindex keyedit:addkey
	Add a subkey to this key.

	@item addcardkey
	@opindex keyedit:addcardkey
	Generate a subkey on a card and add it to this key.

	@item keytocard
	@opindex keyedit:keytocard
	Transfer the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey
	has been selected) to a smartcard. The secret key in the keyring will
	be replaced by a stub if the key could be stored successfully on the
	card and you use the save command later. Only certain key types may be
	transferred to the card. A sub menu allows you to select on what card
	to store the key. Note that it is not possible to get that key back
	from the card - if the card gets broken your secret key will be lost
	unless you have a backup somewhere.

	@item bkuptocard @var{file}
	@opindex keyedit:bkuptocard
	Restore the given @var{file} to a card. This command may be used to restore a
	backup key (as generated during card initialization) to a new card. In
	almost all cases this will be the encryption key. You should use this
	command only with the corresponding public key and make sure that the
	file given as argument is indeed the backup to restore. You should then
	select 2 to restore as encryption key. You will first be asked to enter
	the passphrase of the backup key and then for the Admin PIN of the card.

	@item keytotpm
	@opindex keyedit:keytotpm
	Transfer the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey
	has been selected) to TPM form. The secret key in the keyring will
	be replaced by the TPM representation of that key, which can only be
	read by the particular TPM that created it (so the keyfile now
	becomes locked to the laptop containing the TPM). Only certain key
	types may be transferred to the TPM (all TPM 2.0 systems are
	mandated to have the rsa2048 and nistp256 algorithms but newer TPMs
	may have more). Note that the key itself is not transferred into the
	TPM, merely encrypted by the TPM in-place, so if the keyfile is
	deleted, the key will be lost. Once transferred to TPM
	representation, the key file can never be converted back to non-TPM
	form and the key will die when the TPM does, so you should first
	have a backup on secure offline storage of the actual secret key
	file before conversion. It is essential to use the physical system
	TPM that you have rw permission on the TPM resource manager device
	(/dev/tpmrm0). Usually this means you must be a member of the tss
	group.

	@item delkey
	@opindex keyedit:delkey
	Remove a subkey (secondary key). Note that it is not possible to retract
	a subkey, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In
	that case you better use @code{revkey}. Also note that this only
	deletes the public part of a key.

	@item revkey
	@opindex keyedit:revkey
	Revoke a subkey.

	@item expire
	@opindex keyedit:expire
	Change the key or subkey expiration time. If a subkey is selected, the
	expiration time of this subkey will be changed. With no selection, the
	key expiration of the primary key is changed.

	@item trust
	@opindex keyedit:trust
	Change the owner trust value for the key. This updates the trust-db
	immediately and no save is required.

	@item disable
	@itemx enable
	@opindex keyedit:disable
	@opindex keyedit:enable
	Disable or enable an entire key. A disabled key can not normally be
	used for encryption.

	@item addrevoker
	@opindex keyedit:addrevoker
	Add a designated revoker to the key. This takes one optional argument:
	"sensitive". If a designated revoker is marked as sensitive, it will
	not be exported by default (see export-options).

	@item passwd
	@opindex keyedit:passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key.

	@item toggle
	@opindex keyedit:toggle
	This is dummy command which exists only for backward compatibility.

	@item clean
	@opindex keyedit:clean
	Compact (by removing all signatures except the selfsig) any user ID
	that is no longer usable (e.g. revoked, or expired). Then, remove any
	signatures that are not usable by the trust calculations.
	Specifically, this removes any signature that does not validate, any
	signature that is superseded by a later signature, revoked signatures,
	and signatures issued by keys that are not present on the keyring.

	@item minimize
	@opindex keyedit:minimize
	Make the key as small as possible. This removes all signatures from
	each user ID except for the most recent self-signature.

	@item change-usage
	@opindex keyedit:change-usage
	Change the usage flags (capabilities) of the primary key or of
	subkeys. These usage flags (e.g. Certify, Sign, Authenticate,
	Encrypt) are set during key creation. Sometimes it is useful to
	have the opportunity to change them (for example to add
	Authenticate) after they have been created. Please take care when
	doing this; the allowed usage flags depend on the key algorithm.

	@item cross-certify
	@opindex keyedit:cross-certify
	Add cross-certification signatures to signing subkeys that may not
	currently have them. Cross-certification signatures protect against a
	subtle attack against signing subkeys. See
	@option{--require-cross-certification}. All new keys generated have
	this signature by default, so this command is only useful to bring
	older keys up to date.

	@item save
	@opindex keyedit:save
	Save all changes to the keyring and quit.

	@item quit
	@opindex keyedit:quit
	Quit the program without updating the
	keyring.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	The listing shows you the key with its secondary keys and all user
	IDs. The primary user ID is indicated by a dot, and selected keys or
	user IDs are indicated by an asterisk. The trust
	value is displayed with the primary key: "trust" is the assigned owner
	trust and "validity" is the calculated validity of the key. Validity
	values are also displayed for all user IDs.
	For possible values of trust, @pxref{trust-values}.
	@c man:.RE
	@c ****** End Edit-key Options ********

	@item --sign-key @var{name}
	@opindex sign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key. This is a shortcut version of
	the subcommand "sign" from @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --lsign-key @var{name}
	@opindex lsign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key but marks it as
	non-exportable. This is a shortcut version of the subcommand "lsign"
	from @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --quick-sign-key @var{fpr} [@var{names}]
	@itemx --quick-lsign-key @var{fpr} [@var{names}]
	@opindex quick-sign-key
	@opindex quick-lsign-key
	Directly sign a key from the passphrase without any further user
	interaction. The @var{fpr} must be the verified primary fingerprint
	of a key in the local keyring. If no @var{names} are given, all
	useful user ids are signed; with given [@var{names}] only useful user
	ids matching one of these names are signed. By default, or if a name
	is prefixed with a '*', a case insensitive substring match is used.
	If a name is prefixed with a '=' a case sensitive exact match is done.

	The command @option{--quick-lsign-key} marks the signatures as
	non-exportable. If such a non-exportable signature already exists the
	@option{--quick-sign-key} turns it into a exportable signature. If
	you need to update an existing signature, for example to add or change
	notation data, you need to use the option @option{--force-sign-key}.

	This command uses reasonable defaults and thus does not provide the
	full flexibility of the "sign" subcommand from @option{--edit-key}.
	Its intended use is to help unattended key signing by utilizing a list
	of verified fingerprints.

	@item --quick-add-uid @var{user-id} @var{new-user-id}
	@opindex quick-add-uid
	This command adds a new user id to an existing key. In contrast to
	the interactive sub-command @code{adduid} of @option{--edit-key} the
	@var{new-user-id} is added verbatim with only leading and trailing
	white space removed, it is expected to be UTF-8 encoded, and no checks
	on its form are applied.

	@item --quick-revoke-uid @var{user-id} @var{user-id-to-revoke}
	@opindex quick-revoke-uid
	This command revokes a user ID on an existing key. It cannot be used
	to revoke the last user ID on key (some non-revoked user ID must
	remain), with revocation reason ``User ID is no longer valid''. If
	you want to specify a different revocation reason, or to supply
	supplementary revocation text, you should use the interactive
	sub-command @code{revuid} of @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --quick-revoke-sig @var{fpr} @var{signing-fpr} [@var{names}]
	@opindex quick-revoke-sig
	This command revokes the key signatures made by @var{signing-fpr} from
	the key specified by the fingerprint @var{fpr}. With @var{names}
	given only the signatures on user ids of the key matching any of the
	given names are affected (see @option{--quick-sign-key}). If a
	revocation already exists a notice is printed instead of creating a
	new revocation; no error is returned in this case. Note that key
	signature revocations may be superseded by a newer key signature and
	in turn again revoked.

	@item --quick-set-primary-uid @var{user-id} @var{primary-user-id}
	@opindex quick-set-primary-uid
	This command sets or updates the primary user ID flag on an existing
	key. @var{user-id} specifies the key and @var{primary-user-id} the
	user ID which shall be flagged as the primary user ID. The primary
	user ID flag is removed from all other user ids and the timestamp of
	all affected self-signatures is set one second ahead.

	@item --quick-update-pref @var{user-id}
	@opindex quick-update-pref
	This command updates the preference list of the key to the current
	default value (either built-in or set via
	@option{--default-preference-list}). This is the unattended version
	of of using "setpref" in the @option{--key-edit} menu without giving a
	list. Note that you can show the preferences in a key listing by
	using @option{--list-options show-pref} or @option{--list-options
	show-pref-verbose}. You should also re-distribute updated keys to
	your peers.

	@item --change-passphrase @var{user-id}
	@opindex change-passphrase
	@itemx --passwd @var{user-id}
	@opindex passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key belonging to the certificate
	specified as @var{user-id}. This is a shortcut for the sub-command
	@code{passwd} of the @option{--edit-key} menu. When using together with the
	option @option{--dry-run} this will not actually change the passphrase
	but check that the current passphrase is correct.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* OPTIONS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect options
	@node GPG Options
	@section Option Summary

	@command{@gpgname} features a bunch of options to control the exact
	behaviour and to change the default configuration.

	@menu
	* GPG Configuration Options:: How to change the configuration.
	* GPG Key related Options:: Key related options.
	* GPG Input and Output:: Input and Output.
	* OpenPGP Options:: OpenPGP protocol specific options.
	* Compliance Options:: Compliance options.
	* GPG Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually doesn't want to do.
	* Deprecated Options:: Deprecated options.
	@end menu

	Long options can be put in an options file (default
	"~/.gnupg/gpg.conf"). Short option names will not work - for example,
	"armor" is a valid option for the options file, while "a" is not. Do not
	write the 2 dashes, but simply the name of the option and any required
	arguments. Lines with a hash ('#') as the first non-white-space
	character are ignored. Commands may be put in this file too, but that is
	not generally useful as the command will execute automatically with
	every execution of gpg.

	Please remember that option parsing stops as soon as a non-option is
	encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by using the special option
	@option{--}.

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** CONFIGURATION OPTIONS ********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Configuration Options
	@subsection How to change the configuration

	These options are used to change the configuration and most of them
	are usually found in the option file.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --default-key @var{name}
	@opindex default-key
	Use @var{name} as the default key to sign with. If this option is not
	used, the default key is the first key found in the secret keyring.
	Note that @option{-u} or @option{--local-user} overrides this option.
	This option may be given multiple times. In this case, the last key
	for which a secret key is available is used. If there is no secret
	key available for any of the specified values, GnuPG will not emit an
	error message but continue as if this option wasn't given.

	@item --default-recipient @var{name}
	@opindex default-recipient
	Use @var{name} as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is
	not used and don't ask if this is a valid one. @var{name} must be
	non-empty.

	@item --default-recipient-self
	@opindex default-recipient-self
	Use the default key as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is not
	used and don't ask if this is a valid one. The default key is the first
	one from the secret keyring or the one set with @option{--default-key}.

	@item --no-default-recipient
	@opindex no-default-recipient
	Reset @option{--default-recipient} and @option{--default-recipient-self}.
	Should not be used in an option file.

	@item -v, --verbose
	@opindex verbose
	Give more information during processing. If used
	twice, the input data is listed in detail.

	@item --no-verbose
	@opindex no-verbose
	Reset verbose level to 0. Should not be used in an option file.

	@item -q, --quiet
	@opindex quiet
	Try to be as quiet as possible. Should not be used in an option file.

	@item --batch
	@itemx --no-batch
	@opindex batch
	@opindex no-batch
	Use batch mode. Never ask, do not allow interactive commands.
	@option{--no-batch} disables this option. Note that even with a
	filename given on the command line, gpg might still need to read from
	STDIN (in particular if gpg figures that the input is a
	detached signature and no data file has been specified). Thus if you
	do not want to feed data via STDIN, you should connect STDIN to
	@file{/dev/null}.

	It is highly recommended to use this option along with the options
	@option{--status-fd} and @option{--with-colons} for any unattended use of
	@command{gpg}. Should not be used in an option file.

	@item --no-tty
	@opindex no-tty
	Make sure that the TTY (terminal) is never used for any output.
	This option is needed in some cases because GnuPG sometimes prints
	warnings to the TTY even if @option{--batch} is used.

	@item --yes
	@opindex yes
	Assume "yes" on most questions. Should not be used in an option file.

	@item --no
	@opindex no
	Assume "no" on most questions. Should not be used in an option file.


	@item --list-filter @{select=@var{expr}@}
	@opindex list-filter
	A list filter can be used to output only certain keys during key
	-listsin command. For the availbale property names, see the description
	+listing commands. For the available property names, see the description
	of @option{--import-filter}.


	@item --list-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex list-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	listing keys and signatures (that is, @option{--list-keys},
	@option{--check-signatures}, @option{--list-public-keys},
	@option{--list-secret-keys}, and the @option{--edit-key} functions).
	Options can be prepended with a @option{no-} (after the two dashes) to
	give the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex list-options:show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--check-signatures},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, and @option{--list-secret-keys} to
	display any photo IDs attached to the key. Defaults to no. See also
	@option{--photo-viewer}. Does not work with @option{--with-colons}:
	see @option{--attribute-fd} for the appropriate way to get photo data
	for scripts and other frontends.

	@item show-usage
	@opindex list-options:show-usage
	Show usage information for keys and subkeys in the standard key
	listing. This is a list of letters indicating the allowed usage for a
	key (@code{E}=encryption, @code{S}=signing, @code{C}=certification,
	@code{A}=authentication). Defaults to yes.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--check-signatures}
	listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	@option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the
	@option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex list-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of user IDs during key listings.
	Defaults to yes.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-unusable-subkeys
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-subkeys
	Show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-keyring
	@opindex list-options:show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-expire
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-expire
	Show signature expiration dates (if any) during
	@option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-subpackets
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-subpackets
	Include signature subpackets in the key listing. This option can take an
	optional argument list of the subpackets to list. If no argument is
	passed, list all subpackets. Defaults to no. This option is only
	meaningful when using @option{--with-colons} along with
	@option{--check-signatures}.

	@item show-only-fpr-mbox
	@opindex list-options:show-only-fpr-mbox
	For each user-id which has a valid mail address print
	only the fingerprint followed by the mail address.

	@item sort-sigs
	@opindex list-options:sort-sigs
	With --list-sigs and --check-sigs sort the signatures by keyID and
	creation time to make it easier to view the history of these
	signatures. The self-signature is also listed before other
	signatures. Defaults to yes.

	@end table

	@item --verify-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex verify-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	verifying signatures. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give
	the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex verify-options:show-photos
	Display any photo IDs present on the key that issued the signature.
	Defaults to no. See also @option{--photo-viewer}.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the signature being verified. Defaults to yes.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	signature being verified. Defaults to IETF standard.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the signature being verified.
	Defaults to yes.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex verify-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of the user IDs on the key that issued
	the signature. Defaults to yes.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex verify-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs during signature verification.
	Defaults to no.

	@item show-primary-uid-only
	@opindex verify-options:show-primary-uid-only
	Show only the primary user ID during signature verification. That is
	all the AKA lines as well as photo Ids are not shown with the signature
	verification status.

	@end table

	@item --enable-large-rsa
	@itemx --disable-large-rsa
	@opindex enable-large-rsa
	@opindex disable-large-rsa
	With --generate-key and --batch, enable the creation of RSA secret keys as
	large as 8192 bit. Note: 8192 bit is more than is generally
	recommended. These large keys don't significantly improve security,
	but they are more expensive to use, and their signatures and
	certifications are larger. This option is only available if the
	binary was build with large-secmem support.

	@item --enable-dsa2
	@itemx --disable-dsa2
	@opindex enable-dsa2
	@opindex disable-dsa2
	Enable hash truncation for all DSA keys even for old DSA Keys up to
	1024 bit. This is also the default with @option{--openpgp}. Note
	that older versions of GnuPG also required this flag to allow the
	generation of DSA larger than 1024 bit.

	@item --photo-viewer @var{string}
	@opindex photo-viewer
	This is the command line that should be run to view a photo ID. "%i"
	will be expanded to a filename containing the photo. "%I" does the
	same, except the file will not be deleted once the viewer exits.
	Other flags are "%k" for the key ID, "%K" for the long key ID, "%f"
	for the key fingerprint, "%t" for the extension of the image type
	(e.g. "jpg"), "%T" for the MIME type of the image (e.g. "image/jpeg"),
	"%v" for the single-character calculated validity of the image being
	viewed (e.g. "f"), "%V" for the calculated validity as a string (e.g.
	"full"), "%U" for a base32 encoded hash of the user ID,
	and "%%" for an actual percent sign. If neither %i or %I are present,
	then the photo will be supplied to the viewer on standard input.

	On Unix the default viewer is
	@code{xloadimage -fork -quiet -title 'KeyID 0x%k' STDIN}
	with a fallback to
	@code{display -title 'KeyID 0x%k' %i}
	and finally to
	@code{xdg-open %i}.
	On Windows
	@code{!ShellExecute 400 %i} is used; here the command is a meta
	command to use that API call followed by a wait time in milliseconds
	which is used to give the viewer time to read the temporary image file
	before gpg deletes it again. Note that if your image viewer program
	is not secure, then executing it from gpg does not make it secure.

	@item --exec-path @var{string}
	@opindex exec-path
	@efindex PATH
	Sets a list of directories to search for photo viewers If not provided
	photo viewers use the @code{PATH} environment variable.

	@item --keyring @var{file}
	@opindex keyring
	Add @var{file} to the current list of keyrings. If @var{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory ("~/.gnupg" unless @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is
	used).

	Note that this adds a keyring to the current list. If the intent is to
	use the specified keyring alone, use @option{--keyring} along with
	@option{--no-default-keyring}.

	If the option @option{--no-keyring} has been used no keyrings will
	be used at all.

	Note that if the option @option{use-keyboxd} is enabled in
	@file{common.conf}, no keyrings are used at all and keys are all
	maintained by the keyboxd process in its own database.

	@item --primary-keyring @var{file}
	@opindex primary-keyring
	This is a varian of @option{--keyring} and designates @var{file} as
	the primary public keyring. This means that newly imported keys (via
	@option{--import} or keyserver @option{--recv-from}) will go to this
	keyring.


	@item --secret-keyring @var{file}
	@opindex secret-keyring
	This is an obsolete option and ignored. All secret keys are stored in
	the @file{private-keys-v1.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory.

	@item --trustdb-name @var{file}
	@opindex trustdb-name
	Use @var{file} instead of the default trustdb. If @var{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory (@file{~/.gnupg} if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is
	not used).

	@include opt-homedir.texi


	@item --display-charset @var{name}
	@opindex display-charset
	Set the name of the native character set. This is used to convert some
	informational strings like user IDs to the proper UTF-8 encoding.
	Note that this has nothing to do with the character set of data to be
	encrypted or signed; GnuPG does not recode user-supplied data. If this
	option is not used, the default character set is determined from the
	current locale. A verbosity level of 3 shows the chosen set. This
	option should not be used on Windows. Valid values for @var{name}
	are:

	@table @asis

	@item iso-8859-1
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-1
	This is the Latin 1 set.

	@item iso-8859-2
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-2
	The Latin 2 set.

	@item iso-8859-15
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-15
	This is currently an alias for
	the Latin 1 set.

	@item koi8-r
	@opindex display-charset:koi8-r
	The usual Russian set (RFC-1489).

	@item utf-8
	@opindex display-charset:utf-8
	Bypass all translations and assume
	that the OS uses native UTF-8 encoding.
	@end table

	@item --utf8-strings
	@itemx --no-utf8-strings
	@opindex utf8-strings
	Assume that command line arguments are given as UTF-8 strings. The
	default (@option{--no-utf8-strings}) is to assume that arguments are
	encoded in the character set as specified by
	@option{--display-charset}. These options affect all following
	arguments. Both options may be used multiple times.
	This option should not be used in an option file.

	This option has no effect on Windows. There the internal used UTF-8
	encoding is translated for console input and output. The command line
	arguments are expected as Unicode and translated to UTF-8. Thus when
	calling this program from another, make sure to use the Unicode
	version of CreateProcess.

	@anchor{gpg-option --options}
	@item --options @var{file}
	@opindex options
	Read options from @var{file} and do not try to read them from the
	default options file in the homedir (see @option{--homedir}). This
	option is ignored if used in an options file.

	@item --no-options
	@opindex no-options
	Shortcut for @option{--options /dev/null}. This option is detected
	before an attempt to open an option file. Using this option will also
	prevent the creation of a @file{~/.gnupg} homedir.

	@item -z @var{n}
	@itemx --compress-level @var{n}
	@itemx --bzip2-compress-level @var{n}
	@opindex compress-level
	@opindex bzip2-compress-level
	Set compression level to @var{n} for the ZIP and ZLIB compression
	algorithms. The default is to use the default compression level of zlib
	(normally 6). @option{--bzip2-compress-level} sets the compression level
	for the BZIP2 compression algorithm (defaulting to 6 as well). This is a
	different option from @option{--compress-level} since BZIP2 uses a
	significant amount of memory for each additional compression level.
	@option{-z} sets both. A value of 0 for @var{n} disables compression.

	@item --bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	@opindex bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	Use a different decompression method for BZIP2 compressed files. This
	alternate method uses a bit more than half the memory, but also runs
	at half the speed. This is useful under extreme low memory
	circumstances when the file was originally compressed at a high
	@option{--bzip2-compress-level}.


	@item --mangle-dos-filenames
	@itemx --no-mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex no-mangle-dos-filenames
	Older version of Windows cannot handle filenames with more than one
	dot. @option{--mangle-dos-filenames} causes GnuPG to replace (rather
	than add to) the extension of an output filename to avoid this
	problem. This option is off by default and has no effect on non-Windows
	platforms.

	@item --ask-cert-level
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-level
	@opindex ask-cert-level
	When making a key signature, prompt for a certification level. If this
	option is not specified, the certification level used is set via
	@option{--default-cert-level}. See @option{--default-cert-level} for
	information on the specific levels and how they are
	used. @option{--no-ask-cert-level} disables this option. This option
	defaults to no.

	@item --default-cert-level @var{n}
	@opindex default-cert-level
	The default to use for the check level when signing a key.

	0 means you make no particular claim as to how carefully you verified
	the key.

	1 means you believe the key is owned by the person who claims to own
	it but you could not, or did not verify the key at all. This is
	useful for a "persona" verification, where you sign the key of a
	pseudonymous user.

	2 means you did casual verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint and checked the
	user ID on the key against a photo ID.

	3 means you did extensive verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint with the owner of the
	key in person, and that you checked, by means of a hard to forge
	document with a photo ID (such as a passport) that the name of the key
	owner matches the name in the user ID on the key, and finally that you
	verified (by exchange of email) that the email address on the key
	belongs to the key owner.

	Note that the examples given above for levels 2 and 3 are just that:
	examples. In the end, it is up to you to decide just what "casual"
	and "extensive" mean to you.

	This option defaults to 0 (no particular claim).

	@item --min-cert-level
	@opindex min-cert-level
	When building the trust database, treat any signatures with a
	certification level below this as invalid. Defaults to 2, which
	disregards level 1 signatures. Note that level 0 "no particular
	claim" signatures are always accepted.

	@item --trusted-key @var{long key ID or fingerprint}
	@opindex trusted-key
	Assume that the specified key (which should be given as fingerprint)
	is as trustworthy as one of your own secret keys. This option is
	useful if you don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them)
	online but still want to be able to check the validity of a given
	recipient's or signator's key. If the given key is not locally
	available but an LDAP keyserver is configured the missing key is
	imported from that server.

	@item --trust-model @{pgp\|classic\|tofu\|tofu+pgp\|direct\|always\|auto@}
	@opindex trust-model
	Set what trust model GnuPG should follow. The models are:

	@table @asis

	@item pgp
	@opindex trust-model:pgp
	This is the Web of Trust combined with trust signatures as used in PGP
	5.x and later. This is the default trust model when creating a new
	trust database.

	@item classic
	@opindex trust-model:classic
	This is the standard Web of Trust as introduced by PGP 2.

	@item tofu
	@opindex trust-model:tofu
	@anchor{trust-model-tofu}
	TOFU stands for Trust On First Use. In this trust model, the first
	time a key is seen, it is memorized. If later another key with a
	user id with the same email address is seen, both keys are marked as
	suspect. In that case, the next time either is used, a warning is
	displayed describing the conflict, why it might have occurred
	(either the user generated a new key and failed to cross sign the
	old and new keys, the key is forgery, or a man-in-the-middle attack
	is being attempted), and the user is prompted to manually confirm
	the validity of the key in question.

	Because a potential attacker is able to control the email address
	and thereby circumvent the conflict detection algorithm by using an
	email address that is similar in appearance to a trusted email
	address, whenever a message is verified, statistics about the number
	of messages signed with the key are shown. In this way, a user can
	easily identify attacks using fake keys for regular correspondents.

	When compared with the Web of Trust, TOFU offers significantly
	weaker security guarantees. In particular, TOFU only helps ensure
	consistency (that is, that the binding between a key and email
	address doesn't change). A major advantage of TOFU is that it
	requires little maintenance to use correctly. To use the web of
	trust properly, you need to actively sign keys and mark users as
	trusted introducers. This is a time-consuming process and anecdotal
	evidence suggests that even security-conscious users rarely take the
	time to do this thoroughly and instead rely on an ad-hoc TOFU
	process.

	In the TOFU model, policies are associated with bindings between
	keys and email addresses (which are extracted from user ids and
	normalized). There are five policies, which can be set manually
	using the @option{--tofu-policy} option. The default policy can be
	set using the @option{--tofu-default-policy} option.

	The TOFU policies are: @code{auto}, @code{good}, @code{unknown},
	@code{bad} and @code{ask}. The @code{auto} policy is used by
	default (unless overridden by @option{--tofu-default-policy}) and
	marks a binding as marginally trusted. The @code{good},
	@code{unknown} and @code{bad} policies mark a binding as fully
	trusted, as having unknown trust or as having trust never,
	respectively. The @code{unknown} policy is useful for just using
	TOFU to detect conflicts, but to never assign positive trust to a
	binding. The final policy, @code{ask} prompts the user to indicate
	the binding's trust. If batch mode is enabled (or input is
	inappropriate in the context), then the user is not prompted and the
	@code{undefined} trust level is returned.

	@item tofu+pgp
	@opindex trust-model:tofu+pgp
	This trust model combines TOFU with the Web of Trust. This is done
	by computing the trust level for each model and then taking the
	maximum trust level where the trust levels are ordered as follows:
	@code{unknown < undefined < marginal < fully < ultimate < expired <
	never}.

	By setting @option{--tofu-default-policy=unknown}, this model can be
	used to implement the web of trust with TOFU's conflict detection
	algorithm, but without its assignment of positive trust values,
	which some security-conscious users don't like.

	@item direct
	@opindex trust-model:direct
	Key validity is set directly by the user and not calculated via the
	Web of Trust. This model is solely based on the key and does
	not distinguish user IDs. Note that when changing to another trust
	model the trust values assigned to a key are transformed into
	ownertrust values, which also indicate how you trust the owner of
	the key to sign other keys.

	@item always
	@opindex trust-model:always
	Skip key validation and assume that used keys are always fully
	valid. You generally won't use this unless you are using some
	external validation scheme. This option also suppresses the
	"[uncertain]" tag printed with signature checks when there is no
	evidence that the user ID is bound to the key. Note that this
	trust model still does not allow the use of expired, revoked, or
	disabled keys.

	@item auto
	@opindex trust-model:auto
	Select the trust model depending on whatever the internal trust
	database says. This is the default model if such a database already
	exists. Note that a tofu trust model is not considered here and
	must be enabled explicitly.
	@end table


	@item --auto-key-locate @var{mechanisms}
	@itemx --no-auto-key-locate
	@opindex auto-key-locate
	GnuPG can automatically locate and retrieve keys as needed using this
	option. This happens when encrypting to an email address (in the
	"user@@example.com" form), and there are no "user@@example.com" keys
	on the local keyring. This option takes any number of the mechanisms
	listed below, in the order they are to be tried. Instead of listing
	the mechanisms as comma delimited arguments, the option may also be
	given several times to add more mechanism. The option
	@option{--no-auto-key-locate} or the mechanism "clear" resets the
	list. The default is "local,wkd".

	@table @asis

	@item cert
	Locate a key using DNS CERT, as specified in RFC-4398.

	@item dane
	Locate a key using DANE, as specified
	in draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-05.txt.

	@item wkd
	Locate a key using the Web Key Directory protocol.

	@item ldap
	Using DNS Service Discovery, check the domain in question for any LDAP
	keyservers to use. If this fails, attempt to locate the key using the
	PGP Universal method of checking @samp{ldap://keys.(thedomain)}.

	@item ntds
	Locate the key using the Active Directory (Windows only). This
	method also allows to search by fingerprint using the command
	@option{--locate-external-key}. Note that this mechanism is
	actually a shortcut for the mechanism @samp{keyserver} but using
	"ldap:///" as the keyserver.

	@item keyserver
	Locate a key using a keyserver. This method also allows to search
	by fingerprint using the command @option{--locate-external-key} if
	any of the configured keyservers is an LDAP server.

	@item keyserver-URL
	In addition, a keyserver URL as used in the @command{dirmngr}
	configuration may be used here to query that particular keyserver.
	This method also allows to search by fingerprint using the command
	@option{--locate-external-key} if the URL specifies an LDAP server.

	@item local
	Locate the key using the local keyrings. This mechanism allows the user to
	select the order a local key lookup is done. Thus using
	@samp{--auto-key-locate local} is identical to
	@option{--no-auto-key-locate}.

	@item nodefault
	This flag disables the standard local key lookup, done before any of the
	mechanisms defined by the @option{--auto-key-locate} are tried. The
	position of this mechanism in the list does not matter. It is not
	required if @code{local} is also used.

	@item clear
	Clear all defined mechanisms. This is useful to override
	mechanisms given in a config file. Note that a @code{nodefault} in
	@var{mechanisms} will also be cleared unless it is given after the
	@code{clear}.

	@end table


	@item --auto-key-import
	@itemx --no-auto-key-import
	@opindex auto-key-import
	@opindex no-auto-key-import
	This is an offline mechanism to get a missing key for signature
	verification and for later encryption to this key. If this option is
	enabled and a signature includes an embedded key, that key is
	used to verify the signature and on verification success the key is
	imported. The default is @option{--no-auto-key-import}.

	On the sender (signing) site the option @option{--include-key-block}
	needs to be used to put the public part of the signing key as “Key
	Block subpacket” into the signature.

	@item --auto-key-retrieve
	@itemx --no-auto-key-retrieve
	@opindex auto-key-retrieve
	@opindex no-auto-key-retrieve
	These options enable or disable the automatic retrieving of keys from
	a keyserver when verifying signatures made by keys that are not on the
	local keyring. The default is @option{--no-auto-key-retrieve}.

	The order of methods tried to lookup the key is:

	1. If the option @option{--auto-key-import} is set and the signatures
	includes an embedded key, that key is used to verify the signature and
	on verification success that key is imported.

	2. If a preferred keyserver is specified in the signature and the
	option @option{honor-keyserver-url} is active (which is not the
	default), that keyserver is tried. Note that the creator of the
	signature uses the option @option{--sig-keyserver-url} to specify the
	preferred keyserver for data signatures.

	3. If the signature has the Signer's UID set (e.g. using
	@option{--sender} while creating the signature) a Web Key Directory
	(WKD) lookup is done. This is the default configuration but can be
	disabled by removing WKD from the auto-key-locate list or by using the
	option @option{--disable-signer-uid}.

	4. If any keyserver is configured and the Issuer Fingerprint is part
	of the signature (since GnuPG 2.1.16), the configured keyservers are
	tried.

	Note that this option makes a "web bug" like behavior possible.
	Keyserver or Web Key Directory operators can see which keys you
	request, so by sending you a message signed by a brand new key (which
	you naturally will not have on your local keyring), the operator can
	tell both your IP address and the time when you verified the
	signature.

	@item --keyid-format @{none\|short\|0xshort\|long\|0xlong@}
	@opindex keyid-format
	Select how to display key IDs. "none" does not show the key ID at all
	but shows the fingerprint in a separate line. "short" is the
	traditional 8-character key ID. "long" is the more accurate (but less
	convenient) 16-character key ID. Add an "0x" to either to include an
	"0x" at the beginning of the key ID, as in 0x99242560. Note that this
	option is ignored if the option @option{--with-colons} is used.

	@item --keyserver @var{name}
	@opindex keyserver
	This option is deprecated - please use the @option{--keyserver} in
	@file{dirmngr.conf} instead.

	Use @var{name} as your keyserver. This is the server that
	@option{--receive-keys}, @option{--send-keys}, and @option{--search-keys}
	will communicate with to receive keys from, send keys to, and search for
	keys on. The format of the @var{name} is a URI:
	`scheme:[//]keyservername[:port]' The scheme is the type of keyserver:
	"hkp"/"hkps" for the HTTP (or compatible) keyservers or "ldap"/"ldaps"
	for the LDAP keyservers. Note that your particular installation of
	GnuPG may have other keyserver types available as well. Keyserver
	schemes are case-insensitive.

	Most keyservers synchronize with each other, so there is generally no
	need to send keys to more than one server. The keyserver
	@code{hkp://keys.gnupg.net} uses round robin DNS to give a different
	keyserver each time you use it.

	@item --keyserver-options @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@opindex keyserver-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for the
	keyserver. Options can be prefixed with a `no-' to give the opposite
	meaning. Valid import-options or export-options may be used here as
	well to apply to importing (@option{--recv-key}) or exporting
	(@option{--send-key}) a key from a keyserver. While not all options
	are available for all keyserver types, some common options are:

	@table @asis

	@item include-revoked
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as revoked. Note that not all keyservers
	differentiate between revoked and unrevoked keys, and for such
	keyservers this option is meaningless. Note also that most keyservers do
	not have cryptographic verification of key revocations, and so turning
	this option off may result in skipping keys that are incorrectly marked
	as revoked.

	@item include-disabled
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as disabled. Note that this option is not
	used with HKP keyservers.

	@item auto-key-retrieve
	This is an obsolete alias for the option @option{auto-key-retrieve}.
	Please do not use it; it will be removed in future versions..

	@item honor-keyserver-url
	When using @option{--refresh-keys}, if the key in question has a preferred
	keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to refresh the key
	from. In addition, if auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature
	being verified has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred
	keyserver to fetch the key from. Note that this option introduces a
	"web bug": The creator of the key can see when the keys is
	refreshed. Thus this option is not enabled by default.

	@item include-subkeys
	When receiving a key, include subkeys as potential targets. Note that
	this option is not used with HKP keyservers, as they do not support
	retrieving keys by subkey id.

	@item timeout
	@itemx http-proxy=@var{value}
	@itemx verbose
	@itemx debug
	@itemx check-cert
	@item ca-cert-file
	These options have no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@end table

	The default list of options is: "self-sigs-only, import-clean,
	repair-keys, repair-pks-subkey-bug, export-attributes". However, if
	the actual used source is an LDAP server "no-self-sigs-only" is
	assumed unless "self-sigs-only" has been explictly configured.


	@item --completes-needed @var{n}
	@opindex compliant-needed
	Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 1).

	@item --marginals-needed @var{n}
	@opindex marginals-needed
	Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 3)

	@item --tofu-default-policy @{auto\|good\|unknown\|bad\|ask@}
	@opindex tofu-default-policy
	The default TOFU policy (defaults to @code{auto}). For more
	information about the meaning of this option, @pxref{trust-model-tofu}.

	@item --max-cert-depth @var{n}
	@opindex max-cert-depth
	Maximum depth of a certification chain (default is 5).

	@item --no-sig-cache
	@opindex no-sig-cache
	Do not cache the verification status of key signatures.
	Caching gives a much better performance in key listings. However, if
	you suspect that your public keyring is not safe against write
	modifications, you can use this option to disable the caching. It
	probably does not make sense to disable it because all kind of damage
	can be done if someone else has write access to your public keyring.

	@item --auto-check-trustdb
	@itemx --no-auto-check-trustdb
	@opindex auto-check-trustdb
	If GnuPG feels that its information about the Web of Trust has to be
	updated, it automatically runs the @option{--check-trustdb} command
	internally. This may be a time consuming
	process. @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} disables this option.

	@item --use-agent
	@itemx --no-use-agent
	@opindex use-agent
	This is dummy option. @command{@gpgname} always requires the agent.

	@item --gpg-agent-info
	@opindex gpg-agent-info
	This is dummy option. It has no effect when used with @command{@gpgname}.


	@item --agent-program @var{file}
	@opindex agent-program
	Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The
	default value is determined by running @command{gpgconf} with the
	option @option{--list-dirs}. Note that the pipe symbol (@code{\|}) is
	used for a regression test suite hack and may thus not be used in the
	file name.

	@item --dirmngr-program @var{file}
	@opindex dirmngr-program
	Specify a dirmngr program to be used for keyserver access. The
	default value is @file{@value{BINDIR}/dirmngr}.

	@item --disable-dirmngr
	Entirely disable the use of the Dirmngr.

	@item --no-autostart
	@opindex no-autostart
	Do not start the gpg-agent or the dirmngr if it has not yet been
	started and its service is required. This option is mostly useful on
	machines where the connection to gpg-agent has been redirected to
	another machines. If dirmngr is required on the remote machine, it
	may be started manually using @command{gpgconf --launch dirmngr}.

	@item --lock-once
	@opindex lock-once
	Lock the databases the first time a lock is requested
	and do not release the lock until the process
	terminates.

	@item --lock-multiple
	@opindex lock-multiple
	Release the locks every time a lock is no longer
	needed. Use this to override a previous @option{--lock-once}
	from a config file.

	@item --lock-never
	@opindex lock-never
	Disable locking entirely. This option should be used only in very
	special environments, where it can be assured that only one process
	is accessing those files. A bootable floppy with a stand-alone
	encryption system will probably use this. Improper usage of this
	option may lead to data and key corruption.

	@item --exit-on-status-write-error
	@opindex exit-on-status-write-error
	This option will cause write errors on the status FD to immediately
	terminate the process. That should in fact be the default but it never
	worked this way and thus we need an option to enable this, so that the
	change won't break applications which close their end of a status fd
	connected pipe too early. Using this option along with
	@option{--enable-progress-filter} may be used to cleanly cancel long
	running gpg operations.

	@item --limit-card-insert-tries @var{n}
	@opindex limit-card-insert-tries
	With @var{n} greater than 0 the number of prompts asking to insert a
	smartcard gets limited to N-1. Thus with a value of 1 gpg won't at
	all ask to insert a card if none has been inserted at startup. This
	option is useful in the configuration file in case an application does
	not know about the smartcard support and waits ad infinitum for an
	inserted card.

	@item --no-random-seed-file
	@opindex no-random-seed-file
	GnuPG uses a file to store its internal random pool over invocations.
	This makes random generation faster; however sometimes write operations
	are not desired. This option can be used to achieve that with the cost of
	slower random generation.

	@item --no-greeting
	@opindex no-greeting
	Suppress the initial copyright message.

	@item --no-secmem-warning
	@opindex no-secmem-warning
	Suppress the warning about "using insecure memory".

	@item --no-permission-warning
	@opindex permission-warning
	Suppress the warning about unsafe file and home directory (@option{--homedir})
	permissions. Note that the permission checks that GnuPG performs are
	not intended to be authoritative, but rather they simply warn about
	certain common permission problems. Do not assume that the lack of a
	warning means that your system is secure.

	Note that the warning for unsafe @option{--homedir} permissions cannot be
	suppressed in the gpg.conf file, as this would allow an attacker to
	place an unsafe gpg.conf file in place, and use this file to suppress
	warnings about itself. The @option{--homedir} permissions warning may only be
	suppressed on the command line.

	@item --require-secmem
	@itemx --no-require-secmem
	@opindex require-secmem
	Refuse to run if GnuPG cannot get secure memory. Defaults to no
	(i.e. run, but give a warning).


	@item --require-cross-certification
	@itemx --no-require-cross-certification
	@opindex require-cross-certification
	When verifying a signature made from a subkey, ensure that the cross
	certification "back signature" on the subkey is present and valid. This
	protects against a subtle attack against subkeys that can sign.
	Defaults to @option{--require-cross-certification} for
	@command{@gpgname}.

	@item --expert
	@itemx --no-expert
	@opindex expert
	Allow the user to do certain nonsensical or "silly" things like
	signing an expired or revoked key, or certain potentially incompatible
	things like generating unusual key types. This also disables certain
	warning messages about potentially incompatible actions. As the name
	implies, this option is for experts only. If you don't fully
	understand the implications of what it allows you to do, leave this
	off. @option{--no-expert} disables this option.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** KEY RELATED OPTIONS **********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Key related Options
	@subsection Key related options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -r
	@opindex recipient
	Encrypt for user id @var{name}. If this option or
	@option{--hidden-recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user-id
	unless @option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --hidden-recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -R
	@opindex hidden-recipient
	Encrypt for user ID @var{name}, but hide the key ID of this user's
	key. This option helps to hide the receiver of the message and is a
	limited countermeasure against traffic analysis. If this option or
	@option{--recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user ID unless
	@option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --recipient-file @var{file}
	@itemx -f
	@opindex recipient-file
	This option is similar to @option{--recipient} except that it
	encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the
	name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{@gpgname} assumes that
	the key in this file is fully valid.

	@item --hidden-recipient-file @var{file}
	@itemx -F
	@opindex hidden-recipient-file
	This option is similar to @option{--hidden-recipient} except that it
	encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the
	name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{@gpgname} assumes that
	the key in this file is fully valid.

	@item --encrypt-to @var{name}
	@opindex encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as an
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked
	user id. No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even
	disabled keys can be used.

	@item --hidden-encrypt-to @var{name}
	@opindex hidden-encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--hidden-recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as a hidden
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked user id.
	No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even disabled
	keys can be used.

	@item --no-encrypt-to
	@opindex no-encrypt-to
	Disable the use of all @option{--encrypt-to} and
	@option{--hidden-encrypt-to} keys.

	@item --group @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@opindex group
	Sets up a named group, which is similar to aliases in email programs.
	Any time the group name is a recipient (@option{-r} or
	@option{--recipient}), it will be expanded to the values
	specified. Multiple groups with the same name are automatically merged
	into a single group.

	The values are @code{key IDs} or fingerprints, but any key description
	is accepted. Note that a value with spaces in it will be treated as
	two different values. Note also there is only one level of expansion
	--- you cannot make an group that points to another group. When used
	from the command line, it may be necessary to quote the argument to
	this option to prevent the shell from treating it as multiple
	arguments.

	@item --ungroup @var{name}
	@opindex ungroup
	Remove a given entry from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --no-groups
	@opindex no-groups
	Remove all entries from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --local-user @var{name}
	@itemx -u
	@opindex local-user
	Use @var{name} as the key to sign with. Note that this option overrides
	@option{--default-key}.

	@item --sender @var{mbox}
	@opindex sender
	This option has two purposes. @var{mbox} must either be a complete
	user ID containing a proper mail address or just a plain mail address.
	The option can be given multiple times.

	When creating a signature this option tells gpg the signing key's user
	id used to make the signature and embeds that user ID into the created
	signature (using OpenPGP's ``Signer's User ID'' subpacket). If the
	option is given multiple times a suitable user ID is picked. However,
	if the signing key was specified directly by using a mail address
	(i.e. not by using a fingerprint or key ID) this option is used and
	the mail address is embedded in the created signature.

	When verifying a signature @var{mbox} is used to restrict the
	information printed by the TOFU code to matching user IDs. If the
	option is used and the signature contains a ``Signer's User ID''
	subpacket that information is is also used to restrict the printed
	information. Note that GnuPG considers only the mail address part of
	a User ID.

	If this option or the said subpacket is available the TRUST lines as
	printed by option @option{status-fd} correspond to the corresponding
	User ID; if no User ID is known the TRUST lines are computed directly
	on the key and do not give any information about the User ID. In the
	latter case it his highly recommended to scripts and other frontends
	to evaluate the VALIDSIG line, retrieve the key and print all User IDs
	along with their validity (trust) information.


	@item --try-secret-key @var{name}
	@opindex try-secret-key
	For hidden recipients GPG needs to know the keys to use for trial
	decryption. The key set with @option{--default-key} is always tried
	first, but this is often not sufficient. This option allows setting more
	keys to be used for trial decryption. Although any valid user-id
	specification may be used for @var{name} it makes sense to use at least
	the long keyid to avoid ambiguities. Note that gpg-agent might pop up a
	pinentry for a lot keys to do the trial decryption. If you want to stop
	all further trial decryption you may use close-window button instead of
	the cancel button.

	@item --try-all-secrets
	@opindex try-all-secrets
	Don't look at the key ID as stored in the message but try all secret
	keys in turn to find the right decryption key. This option forces the
	behaviour as used by anonymous recipients (created by using
	@option{--throw-keyids} or @option{--hidden-recipient}) and might come
	handy in case where an encrypted message contains a bogus key ID.

	@item --skip-hidden-recipients
	@itemx --no-skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex no-skip-hidden-recipients
	During decryption skip all anonymous recipients. This option helps in
	the case that people use the hidden recipients feature to hide their
	own encrypt-to key from others. If one has many secret keys this
	may lead to a major annoyance because all keys are tried in turn to
	decrypt something which was not really intended for it. The drawback
	of this option is that it is currently not possible to decrypt a
	message which includes real anonymous recipients.


	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** INPUT AND OUTPUT *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Input and Output
	@subsection Input and Output

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --armor
	@itemx -a
	@opindex armor
	Create ASCII armored output. The default is to create the binary
	OpenPGP format.

	@item --no-armor
	@opindex no-armor
	Assume the input data is not in ASCII armored format.

	@item --output @var{file}
	@itemx -o @var{file}
	@opindex output
	Write output to @var{file}. To write to stdout use @code{-} as the
	filename.

	@item --max-output @var{n}
	@opindex max-output
	This option sets a limit on the number of bytes that will be generated
	when processing a file. Since OpenPGP supports various levels of
	compression, it is possible that the plaintext of a given message may be
	significantly larger than the original OpenPGP message. While GnuPG
	works properly with such messages, there is often a desire to set a
	maximum file size that will be generated before processing is forced to
	stop by the OS limits. Defaults to 0, which means "no limit".

	@item --chunk-size @var{n}
	@opindex chunk-size
	The AEAD encryption mode encrypts the data in chunks so that a
	receiving side can check for transmission errors or tampering at the
	end of each chunk and does not need to delay this until all data has
	been received. The used chunk size is 2^@var{n} byte. The lowest
	allowed value for @var{n} is 6 (64 byte) and the largest is the
	default of 22 which creates chunks not larger than 4 MiB.

	@item --input-size-hint @var{n}
	@opindex input-size-hint
	This option can be used to tell GPG the size of the input data in
	bytes. @var{n} must be a positive base-10 number. This option is
	only useful if the input is not taken from a file. GPG may use this
	hint to optimize its buffer allocation strategy. It is also used by
	the @option{--status-fd} line ``PROGRESS'' to provide a value for
	``total'' if that is not available by other means.

	@item --key-origin @var{string}[,@var{url}]
	@opindex key-origin
	gpg can track the origin of a key. Certain origins are implicitly
	known (e.g. keyserver, web key directory) and set. For a standard
	import the origin of the keys imported can be set with this option.
	To list the possible values use "help" for @var{string}. Some origins
	can store an optional @var{url} argument. That URL can appended to
	@var{string} after a comma.

	@item --import-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex import-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	importing keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item import-local-sigs
	Allow importing key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	@item keep-ownertrust
	Normally possible still existing ownertrust values of a key are
	cleared if a key is imported. This is in general desirable so that
	a formerly deleted key does not automatically gain an ownertrust
	values merely due to import. On the other hand it is sometimes
	necessary to re-import a trusted set of keys again but keeping
	already assigned ownertrust values. This can be achieved by using
	this option.

	@item repair-pks-subkey-bug
	During import, attempt to repair the damage caused by the PKS keyserver
	bug (pre version 0.9.6) that mangles keys with multiple subkeys. Note
	that this cannot completely repair the damaged key as some crucial data
	is removed by the keyserver, but it does at least give you back one
	subkey. Defaults to no for regular @option{--import} and to yes for
	keyserver @option{--receive-keys}.

	@item import-show
	@itemx show-only
	Show a listing of the key as imported right before it is stored.
	This can be combined with the option @option{--dry-run} to only look
	at keys; the option @option{show-only} is a shortcut for this
	combination. The command @option{--show-keys} is another shortcut
	for this. Note that suffixes like '#' for "sec" and "sbb" lines
	may or may not be printed.

	@item import-export
	Run the entire import code but instead of storing the key to the
	local keyring write it to the output. The export option
	@option{export-dane} affect the output. This option can for example
	be used to remove all invalid parts from a key without the
	need to store it.

	@item merge-only
	During import, allow key updates to existing keys, but do not allow
	any new keys to be imported. Defaults to no.

	@item import-clean
	After import, compact (remove all signatures except the
	self-signature) any user IDs from the new key that are not usable.
	Then, remove any signatures from the new key that are not usable.
	This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are not present
	on the keyring. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key}
	command "clean" after import. Defaults to no.

	@item self-sigs-only
	Accept only self-signatures while importing a key. All other key
	signatures are skipped at an early import stage. This option can be
	used with @code{keyserver-options} to mitigate attempts to flood a
	key with bogus signatures from a keyserver. The drawback is that
	all other valid key signatures, as required by the Web of Trust are
	also not imported. Note that when using this option along with
	import-clean it suppresses the final clean step after merging the
	imported key into the existing key.

	@item repair-keys
	After import, fix various problems with the
	keys. For example, this reorders signatures, and strips duplicate
	signatures. Defaults to yes.

	@item bulk-import
	When used the keyboxd (option @option{use-keyboxd} in @file{common.conf})
	does the import within a single
	transaction.

	@item import-minimal
	Import the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except
	the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the
	same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" after import.
	Defaults to no.

	@item restore
	@itemx import-restore
	Import in key restore mode. This imports all data which is usually
	skipped during import; including all GnuPG specific data. All other
	contradicting options are overridden.
	@end table

	@item --import-filter @{@var{name}=@var{expr}@}
	@itemx --export-filter @{@var{name}=@var{expr}@}
	@opindex import-filter
	@opindex export-filter
	These options define an import/export filter which are applied to the
	imported/exported keyblock right before it will be stored/written.
	@var{name} defines the type of filter to use, @var{expr} the
	expression to evaluate. The option can be used several times which
	then appends more expression to the same @var{name}.

	@noindent
	The available filter types are:

	@table @asis

	@item keep-uid
	This filter will keep a user id packet and its dependent packets in
	the keyblock if the expression evaluates to true.

	@item drop-subkey
	This filter drops the selected subkeys.
	Currently only implemented for --export-filter.

	@item drop-sig
	This filter drops the selected key signatures on user ids.
	Self-signatures are not considered.
	Currently only implemented for --import-filter.

	@item select
	This filter is only implemented by @option{--list-filter}. All
	property names may be used.

	@end table

	For the syntax of the expression see the chapter "FILTER EXPRESSIONS".
	The property names for the expressions depend on the actual filter
	type and are indicated in the following table. Note that all property
	names may also be used by @option{--list-filter}.

	Property names may be prefix with a scope delimited by a slash. Valid
	scopes are "pub" for public and secret primary keys, "sub" for public
	and secret subkeys, "uid" for for user-ID packets, and "sig" for
	signature packets. Invalid scopes are currently ignored.

	The available properties are:

	@table @asis

	@item uid
	A string with the user id. (keep-uid)

	@item mbox
	The addr-spec part of a user id with mailbox or the empty string.
	(keep-uid)

	@item algostr
	A string with the key algorithm description. For example "rsa3072"
	or "ed25519".

	@item key_algo
	A number with the public key algorithm of a key or subkey packet.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item key_size
	A number with the effective key size of a key or subkey packet.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item key_created
	@itemx key_created_d
	The first is the timestamp a public key or subkey packet was
	created. The second is the same but given as an ISO string,
	e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-subkey)

	@item fpr
	The hexified fingerprint of the current subkey or primary key.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item primary
	Boolean indicating whether the user id is the primary one. (keep-uid)

	@item expired
	Boolean indicating whether a user id (keep-uid), a key (drop-subkey), or a
	signature (drop-sig) expired.

	@item revoked
	Boolean indicating whether a user id (keep-uid) or a key (drop-subkey) has
	been revoked.

	@item disabled
	Boolean indicating whether a primary key is disabled.

	@item secret
	Boolean indicating whether a key or subkey is a secret one.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item usage
	A string indicating the usage flags for the subkey, from the
	sequence ``ecsa?''. For example, a subkey capable of just signing
	and authentication would be an exact match for ``sa''. (drop-subkey)

	@item sig_created
	@itemx sig_created_d
	The first is the timestamp a signature packet was created. The
	second is the same but given as an ISO date string,
	e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-sig)

	@item sig_algo
	A number with the public key algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig)

	@item sig_digest_algo
	A number with the digest algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig)

	@item origin
	A string with the key origin or a question mark. For example the
	string ``wkd'' is used if a key originated from a Web Key Directory
	lookup.

	@item lastupd
	The timestamp the key was last updated from a keyserver or the Web
	Key Directory.

	@item url
	A string with the the URL associated wit the last key lookup.

	@end table

	@item --export-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex export-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	exporting keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item export-local-sigs
	Allow exporting key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	@item export-attributes
	Include attribute user IDs (photo IDs) while exporting. Not
	including attribute user IDs is useful to export keys that are going
	to be used by an OpenPGP program that does not accept attribute user
	IDs. Defaults to yes.

	@item export-sensitive-revkeys
	Include designated revoker information that was marked as
	"sensitive". Defaults to no.

	@c Since GnuPG 2.1 gpg-agent manages the secret key and thus the
	@c export-reset-subkey-passwd hack is not anymore justified. Such use
	@c cases may be implemented using a specialized secret key export
	@c tool.
	@c @item export-reset-subkey-passwd
	@c When using the @option{--export-secret-subkeys} command, this option resets
	@c the passphrases for all exported subkeys to empty. This is useful
	@c when the exported subkey is to be used on an unattended machine where
	@c a passphrase doesn't necessarily make sense. Defaults to no.

	@item backup
	@itemx export-backup
	Export for use as a backup. The exported data includes all data
	which is needed to restore the key or keys later with GnuPG. The
	format is basically the OpenPGP format but enhanced with GnuPG
	specific data. All other contradicting options are overridden.

	@item export-clean
	Compact (remove all signatures from) user IDs on the key being
	exported if the user IDs are not usable. Also, do not export any
	signatures that are not usable. This includes signatures that were
	issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. This option is
	the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "clean" before export
	except that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to
	no.

	@item export-minimal
	Export the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except the
	most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the same as
	running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" before export except
	that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to no.

	@item export-revocs
	Export only standalone revocation certificates of the key. This
	option does not export revocations of 3rd party certificate
	revocations.

	@item export-dane
	Instead of outputting the key material output OpenPGP DANE records
	suitable to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before
	each record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone
	file.

	@item mode1003
	Enable the use of a new secret key export format. This format
	avoids the re-encryption as required with the current OpenPGP format
	and also improves the security of the secret key if it has been
	protected with a passphrase. Note that an unprotected key is
	exported as-is and thus not secure; the general rule to convey
	secret keys in an OpenPGP encrypted file still applies with this
	mode. Versions of GnuPG before 2.4.0 are not able to import such a
	secret file.

	@end table

	@item --with-colons
	@opindex with-colons
	Print key listings delimited by colons. Note that the output will be
	encoded in UTF-8 regardless of any @option{--display-charset} setting. This
	format is useful when GnuPG is called from scripts and other programs
	as it is easily machine parsed. The details of this format are
	documented in the file @file{doc/DETAILS}, which is included in the GnuPG
	source distribution.

	@item --fixed-list-mode
	@opindex fixed-list-mode
	Do not merge primary user ID and primary key in @option{--with-colon}
	listing mode and print all timestamps as seconds since 1970-01-01.
	Since GnuPG 2.0.10, this mode is always used and thus this option is
	obsolete; it does not harm to use it though.

	@item --legacy-list-mode
	@opindex legacy-list-mode
	Revert to the pre-2.1 public key list mode. This only affects the
	human readable output and not the machine interface
	(i.e. @code{--with-colons}). Note that the legacy format does not
	convey suitable information for elliptic curves.

	@item --with-fingerprint
	@opindex with-fingerprint
	Same as the command @option{--fingerprint} but changes only the format
	of the output and may be used together with another command.

	@item --with-subkey-fingerprint
	@opindex with-subkey-fingerprint
	If a fingerprint is printed for the primary key, this option forces
	printing of the fingerprint for all subkeys. This could also be
	achieved by using the @option{--with-fingerprint} twice but by using
	this option along with keyid-format "none" a compact fingerprint is
	printed.

	@item --with-icao-spelling
	@opindex with-icao-spelling
	Print the ICAO spelling of the fingerprint in addition to the hex digits.

	@item --with-keygrip
	@opindex with-keygrip
	Include the keygrip in the key listings. In @code{--with-colons} mode
	this is implicitly enable for secret keys.

	@item --with-key-origin
	@opindex with-key-origin
	Include the locally held information on the origin and last update of
	a key in a key listing. In @code{--with-colons} mode this is always
	printed. This data is currently experimental and shall not be
	considered part of the stable API.

	@item --with-wkd-hash
	@opindex with-wkd-hash
	Print a Web Key Directory identifier along with each user ID in key
	listings. This is an experimental feature and semantics may change.

	@item --with-secret
	@opindex with-secret
	Include info about the presence of a secret key in public key listings
	done with @code{--with-colons}.

	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPENPGP OPTIONS **************
	@c *******************************************
	@node OpenPGP Options
	@subsection OpenPGP protocol specific options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -t, --textmode
	@itemx --no-textmode
	@opindex textmode
	Treat input files as text and store them in the OpenPGP canonical text
	form with standard "CRLF" line endings. This also sets the necessary
	flags to inform the recipient that the encrypted or signed data is text
	and may need its line endings converted back to whatever the local
	system uses. This option is useful when communicating between two
	platforms that have different line ending conventions (UNIX-like to Mac,
	Mac to Windows, etc). @option{--no-textmode} disables this option, and
	is the default.

	@item --force-v3-sigs
	@itemx --no-force-v3-sigs
	@item --force-v4-certs
	@itemx --no-force-v4-certs
	These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.1.

	@item --force-ocb
	@itemx --force-aead
	@opindex force-ocb
	@opindex force-aead
	Force the use of AEAD encryption over MDC encryption. AEAD is a
	modern and faster way to do authenticated encryption than the old MDC
	method. @option{--force-aead} is an alias and deprecated. See also
	option @option{--chunk-size}.

	@item --force-mdc
	@itemx --disable-mdc
	@opindex force-mdc
	@opindex disable-mdc
	These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.2.8. The
	MDC is always used unless the keys indicate that an AEAD algorithm can
	be used in which case AEAD is used. But note: If the creation of a
	legacy non-MDC message is exceptionally required, the option
	@option{--rfc2440} allows for this.

	@item --disable-signer-uid
	@opindex disable-signer-uid
	By default the user ID of the signing key is embedded in the data signature.
	As of now this is only done if the signing key has been specified with
	@option{local-user} using a mail address, or with @option{sender}. This
	information can be helpful for verifier to locate the key; see option
	@option{--auto-key-retrieve}.

	@item --include-key-block
	@itemx --no-include-key-block
	@opindex include-key-block
	@opindex no-include-key-block
	This option is used to embed the actual signing key into a data
	signature. The embedded key is stripped down to a single user id and
	includes only the signing subkey used to create the signature as well
	as as valid encryption subkeys. All other info is removed from the
	key to keep it and thus the signature small. This option is the
	OpenPGP counterpart to the @command{gpgsm} option
	@option{--include-certs} and allows the recipient of a signed message
	to reply encrypted to the sender without using any online directories
	to lookup the key. The default is @option{--no-include-key-block}.
	See also the option @option{--auto-key-import}.

	@item --personal-cipher-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-cipher-preferences
	Set the list of personal cipher preferences to @var{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also
	used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command.

	@item --personal-digest-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-digest-preferences
	Set the list of personal digest preferences to @var{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked digest algorithm in this list
	is also used when signing without encryption
	(e.g. @option{--clear-sign} or @option{--sign}).

	@item --personal-compress-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-compress-preferences
	Set the list of personal compression preferences to @var{string}.
	Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available
	algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This
	allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the
	recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that
	is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked compression
	algorithm in this list is also used when there are no recipient keys
	to consider (e.g. @option{--symmetric}).

	@item --s2k-cipher-algo @var{name}
	@opindex s2k-cipher-algo
	Use @var{name} as the cipher algorithm for symmetric encryption with
	a passphrase if @option{--personal-cipher-preferences} and
	@option{--cipher-algo} are not given. The default is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}.

	@item --s2k-digest-algo @var{name}
	@opindex s2k-digest-algo
	Use @var{name} as the digest algorithm used to mangle the passphrases
	for symmetric encryption. The default is SHA-1.

	@item --s2k-mode @var{n}
	@opindex s2k-mode
	Selects how passphrases for symmetric encryption are mangled. If
	@var{n} is 0 a plain passphrase (which is in general not recommended)
	will be used, a 1 adds a salt (which should not be used) to the
	passphrase and a 3 (the default) iterates the whole process a number
	of times (see @option{--s2k-count}).

	@item --s2k-count @var{n}
	@opindex s2k-count
	Specify how many times the passphrases mangling for symmetric
	encryption is repeated. This value may range between 1024 and
	65011712 inclusive. The default is inquired from gpg-agent. Note
	that not all values in the 1024-65011712 range are legal and if an
	illegal value is selected, GnuPG will round up to the nearest legal
	value. This option is only meaningful if @option{--s2k-mode} is set
	to the default of 3.


	@end table

	@c ***************************
	@c ***** Compliance ******
	@c ***************************
	@node Compliance Options
	@subsection Compliance options

	These options control what GnuPG is compliant to. Only one of these
	options may be active at a time. Note that the default setting of
	this is nearly always the correct one. See the INTEROPERABILITY WITH
	OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below before using one of these
	options.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --gnupg
	@opindex gnupg
	Use standard GnuPG behavior. This is essentially OpenPGP behavior (see
	@option{--openpgp}), but with extension from the proposed update to
	OpenPGP and with some additional workarounds for common compatibility
	problems in different versions of PGP. This is the default option, so
	it is not generally needed, but it may be useful to override a
	different compliance option in the gpg.conf file.

	@item --openpgp
	@opindex openpgp
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict OpenPGP
	behavior. This option implies @option{--allow-old-cipher-algos}. Use
	this option to reset all previous options like @option{--s2k-*},
	@option{--cipher-algo}, @option{--digest-algo} and
	@option{--compress-algo} to OpenPGP compliant values. All PGP
	workarounds are disabled.

	@item --rfc4880
	@opindex rfc4880
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-4880
	behavior. This option implies @option{--allow-old-cipher-algos}.
	Note that this is currently the same thing as @option{--openpgp}.

	@item --rfc4880bis
	@opindex rfc4880bis
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict according to the
	proposed updates of RFC-4880.

	@item --rfc2440
	@opindex rfc2440
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-2440
	behavior. Note that by using this option encryption packets are
	created in a legacy mode without MDC protection. This is dangerous
	and should thus only be used for experiments. This option implies
	@option{--allow-old-cipher-algos}. See also option
	@option{--ignore-mdc-error}.

	@item --pgp6
	@opindex pgp6
	This option is obsolete; it is handled as an alias for @option{--pgp7}

	@item --pgp7
	@opindex pgp7
	Set up all options to be as PGP 7 compliant as possible. This allowed
	the ciphers IDEA, 3DES, CAST5,AES128, AES192, AES256, and TWOFISH.,
	the hashes MD5, SHA1 and RIPEMD160, and the compression algorithms
	none and ZIP. This option implies @option{--escape-from-lines} and
	disables @option{--throw-keyids},

	@item --pgp8
	@opindex pgp8
	Set up all options to be as PGP 8 compliant as possible. PGP 8 is a lot
	closer to the OpenPGP standard than previous versions of PGP, so all
	this does is disable @option{--throw-keyids} and set
	@option{--escape-from-lines}. All algorithms are allowed except for the
	SHA224, SHA384, and SHA512 digests.

	@item --compliance @var{string}
	@opindex compliance
	This option can be used instead of one of the options above. Valid
	values for @var{string} are the above option names (without the double
	dash) and possibly others as shown when using "help" for @var{string}.

	@item --min-rsa-length @var{n}
	@opindex min-rsa-length
	This option adjusts the compliance mode "de-vs" for stricter key size
	requirements. For example, a value of 3000 turns rsa2048 and dsa2048
	keys into non-VS-NfD compliant keys.

	@item --require-compliance
	@opindex require-compliance
	To check that data has been encrypted according to the rules of the
	current compliance mode, a gpg user needs to evaluate the status
	lines. This is allows frontends to handle compliance check in a more
	flexible way. However, for scripted use the required evaluation of
	the status-line requires quite some effort; this option can be used
	instead to make sure that the gpg process exits with a failure if the
	compliance rules are not fulfilled. Note that this option has
	currently an effect only in "de-vs" mode.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** ESOTERIC OPTIONS *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Esoteric Options
	@subsection Doing things one usually doesn't want to do

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -n
	@itemx --dry-run
	@opindex dry-run
	Don't make any changes (this is not completely implemented).

	@item --list-only
	@opindex list-only
	Changes the behaviour of some commands. This is like @option{--dry-run} but
	different in some cases. The semantic of this option may be extended in
	the future. Currently it only skips the actual decryption pass and
	therefore enables a fast listing of the encryption keys.

	@item -i
	@itemx --interactive
	@opindex interactive
	Prompt before overwriting any files.

	@item --compatibility-flags @var{flags}
	@opindex compatibility-flags
	Set compatibility flags to work around problems due to non-compliant
	keys or data. The @var{flags} are given as a comma separated
	list of flag names and are OR-ed together. The special flag "none"
	clears the list and allows to start over with an empty list. To get a
	list of available flags the sole word "help" can be used.

	@item --debug-level @var{level}
	@opindex debug-level
	Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be
	a numeric value or by a keyword:

	@table @code
	@item none
	No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of
	the keyword.
	@item basic
	Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item advanced
	More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item expert
	Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item guru
	All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be
	used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is
	only enabled if the keyword is used.
	@end table

	How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not
	specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are
	however carefully selected to best aid in debugging.

	@item --debug @var{flags}
	@opindex debug
	Set debug flags. All flags are or-ed and @var{flags} may be given
	in C syntax (e.g. 0x0042) or as a comma separated list of flag names.
	To get a list of all supported flags the single word "help" can be
	used. This option is only useful for debugging and the behavior may
	change at any time without notice.

	@item --debug-all
	@opindex debug-all
	Set all useful debugging flags.

	@item --debug-iolbf
	@opindex debug-iolbf
	Set stdout into line buffered mode. This option is only honored when
	given on the command line.

	@item --debug-set-iobuf-size @var{n}
	@opindex debug-iolbf
	Change the buffer size of the IOBUFs to @var{n} kilobyte. Using 0
	prints the current size. Note well: This is a maintainer only option
	and may thus be changed or removed at any time without notice.

	@item --debug-allow-large-chunks
	@opindex debug-allow-large-chunks
	To facilitate software tests and experiments this option allows to
	specify a limit of up to 4 EiB (@code{--chunk-size 62}).

	@item --faked-system-time @var{epoch}
	@opindex faked-system-time
	This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back or
	forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since the year
	1970. Alternatively @var{epoch} may be given as a full ISO time string
	(e.g. "20070924T154812").

	If you suffix @var{epoch} with an exclamation mark (!), the system time
	will appear to be frozen at the specified time.

	@item --full-timestrings
	@opindex full-timestrings
	Change the format of printed creation and expiration times from just
	the date to the date and time. This is in general not useful and the
	same information is anyway available in @option{--with-colons} mode.
	These longer strings are also not well aligned with other printed
	data.

	@item --enable-progress-filter
	@opindex enable-progress-filter
	Enable certain PROGRESS status outputs. This option allows frontends
	to display a progress indicator while gpg is processing larger files.
	There is a slight performance overhead using it.

	@item --status-fd @var{n}
	@opindex status-fd
	Write special status strings to the file descriptor @var{n}.
	See the file DETAILS in the documentation for a listing of them.

	@item --status-file @var{file}
	@opindex status-file
	Same as @option{--status-fd}, except the status data is written to file
	@var{file}.

	@item --logger-fd @var{n}
	@opindex logger-fd
	Write log output to file descriptor @var{n} and not to STDERR.

	@item --log-file @var{file}
	@itemx --logger-file @var{file}
	@opindex log-file
	Same as @option{--logger-fd}, except the logger data is written to
	file @var{file}. Use @file{socket://} to log to s socket.

	@item --attribute-fd @var{n}
	@opindex attribute-fd
	Write attribute subpackets to the file descriptor @var{n}. This is most
	useful for use with @option{--status-fd}, since the status messages are
	needed to separate out the various subpackets from the stream delivered
	to the file descriptor.

	@item --attribute-file @var{file}
	@opindex attribute-file
	Same as @option{--attribute-fd}, except the attribute data is written to
	file @var{file}.

	@item --comment @var{string}
	@itemx --no-comments
	@opindex comment
	Use @var{string} as a comment string in cleartext signatures and ASCII
	armored messages or keys (see @option{--armor}). The default behavior is
	not to use a comment string. @option{--comment} may be repeated multiple
	times to get multiple comment strings. @option{--no-comments} removes
	all comments. It is a good idea to keep the length of a single comment
	below 60 characters to avoid problems with mail programs wrapping such
	lines. Note that comment lines, like all other header lines, are not
	protected by the signature.

	@item --emit-version
	@itemx --no-emit-version
	@opindex emit-version
	Force inclusion of the version string in ASCII armored output. If
	given once only the name of the program and the major number is
	emitted, given twice the minor is also emitted, given thrice
	the micro is added, and given four times an operating system identification
	is also emitted. @option{--no-emit-version} (default) disables the version
	line.

	@item --sig-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@itemx --cert-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@itemx -N, --set-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@opindex sig-notation
	@opindex cert-notation
	@opindex set-notation
	Put the name value pair into the signature as notation data.
	@var{name} must consist only of printable characters or spaces, and
	must contain a '@@' character in the form keyname@@domain.example.com
	(substituting the appropriate keyname and domain name, of course). This
	is to help prevent pollution of the IETF reserved notation
	namespace. The @option{--expert} flag overrides the '@@'
	check. @var{value} may be any printable string; it will be encoded in
	UTF-8, so you should check that your @option{--display-charset} is set
	correctly. If you prefix @var{name} with an exclamation mark (!), the
	notation data will be flagged as critical
	(rfc4880:5.2.3.16). @option{--sig-notation} sets a notation for data
	signatures. @option{--cert-notation} sets a notation for key signatures
	(certifications). @option{--set-notation} sets both.

	There are special codes that may be used in notation names. "%k" will
	be expanded into the key ID of the key being signed, "%K" into the
	long key ID of the key being signed, "%f" into the fingerprint of the
	key being signed, "%s" into the key ID of the key making the
	signature, "%S" into the long key ID of the key making the signature,
	"%g" into the fingerprint of the key making the signature (which might
	be a subkey), "%p" into the fingerprint of the primary key of the key
	making the signature, "%c" into the signature count from the OpenPGP
	smartcard, and "%%" results in a single "%". %k, %K, and %f are only
	meaningful when making a key signature (certification), and %c is only
	meaningful when using the OpenPGP smartcard.

	@item --known-notation @var{name}
	@opindex known-notation
	Adds @var{name} to a list of known critical signature notations. The
	effect of this is that gpg will not mark a signature with a critical
	signature notation of that name as bad. Note that gpg already knows
	by default about a few critical signatures notation names.

	@item --sig-policy-url @var{string}
	@itemx --cert-policy-url @var{string}
	@itemx --set-policy-url @var{string}
	@opindex sig-policy-url
	@opindex cert-policy-url
	@opindex set-policy-url
	Use @var{string} as a Policy URL for signatures (rfc4880:5.2.3.20). If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the policy URL packet will
	be flagged as critical. @option{--sig-policy-url} sets a policy url for
	data signatures. @option{--cert-policy-url} sets a policy url for key
	signatures (certifications). @option{--set-policy-url} sets both.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --sig-keyserver-url @var{string}
	@opindex sig-keyserver-url
	Use @var{string} as a preferred keyserver URL for data signatures. If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the keyserver URL packet
	will be flagged as critical.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --set-filename @var{string}
	@opindex set-filename
	Use @var{string} as the filename which is stored inside messages.
	This overrides the default, which is to use the actual filename of the
	file being encrypted. Using the empty string for @var{string}
	effectively removes the filename from the output.

	@item --for-your-eyes-only
	@itemx --no-for-your-eyes-only
	@opindex for-your-eyes-only
	Set the `for your eyes only' flag in the message. This causes GnuPG to
	refuse to save the file unless the @option{--output} option is given,
	and PGP to use a "secure viewer" with a claimed Tempest-resistant font
	to display the message. This option overrides @option{--set-filename}.
	@option{--no-for-your-eyes-only} disables this option.

	@item --use-embedded-filename
	@itemx --no-use-embedded-filename
	@opindex use-embedded-filename
	Try to create a file with a name as embedded in the data. This can be
	a dangerous option as it enables overwriting files. Defaults to no.
	Note that the option @option{--output} overrides this option.

	@item --cipher-algo @var{name}
	@opindex cipher-algo
	Use @var{name} as cipher algorithm. Running the program with the
	command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. If
	this is not used the cipher algorithm is selected from the preferences
	stored with the key. In general, you do not want to use this option as
	it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option
	@option{--personal-cipher-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the
	same thing.

	@item --digest-algo @var{name}
	@opindex digest-algo
	Use @var{name} as the message digest algorithm. Running the program
	with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported
	algorithms. In general, you do not want to use this option as it
	allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option
	@option{--personal-digest-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish
	the same thing.

	@item --compress-algo @var{name}
	@opindex compress-algo
	Use compression algorithm @var{name}. "zlib" is RFC-1950 ZLIB
	compression. "zip" is RFC-1951 ZIP compression which is used by PGP.
	"bzip2" is a more modern compression scheme that can compress some
	things better than zip or zlib, but at the cost of more memory used
	during compression and decompression. "uncompressed" or "none"
	disables compression. If this option is not used, the default
	behavior is to examine the recipient key preferences to see which
	algorithms the recipient supports. If all else fails, ZIP is used for
	maximum compatibility.

	ZLIB may give better compression results than ZIP, as the compression
	window size is not limited to 8k. BZIP2 may give even better
	compression results than that, but will use a significantly larger
	amount of memory while compressing and decompressing. This may be
	significant in low memory situations. Note, however, that PGP (all
	versions) only supports ZIP compression. Using any algorithm other
	than ZIP or "none" will make the message unreadable with PGP. In
	general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to
	violate the OpenPGP standard. The option
	@option{--personal-compress-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish
	the same thing.

	@item --cert-digest-algo @var{name}
	@opindex cert-digest-algo
	Use @var{name} as the message digest algorithm used when signing a
	key. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a
	list of supported algorithms. Be aware that if you choose an
	algorithm that GnuPG supports but other OpenPGP implementations do
	not, then some users will not be able to use the key signatures you
	make, or quite possibly your entire key. Note also that a public key
	algorithm must be compatible with the specified digest algorithm; thus
	selecting an arbitrary digest algorithm may result in error messages
	from lower crypto layers or lead to security flaws.


	@item --disable-cipher-algo @var{name}
	@opindex disable-cipher-algo
	Never allow the use of @var{name} as cipher algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --disable-pubkey-algo @var{name}
	@opindex disable-pubkey-algo
	Never allow the use of @var{name} as public key algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --throw-keyids
	@itemx --no-throw-keyids
	@opindex throw-keyids
	Do not put the recipient key IDs into encrypted messages. This helps to
	hide the receivers of the message and is a limited countermeasure
	against traffic analysis.@footnote{Using a little social engineering
	anyone who is able to decrypt the message can check whether one of the
	other recipients is the one he suspects.} On the receiving side, it may
	slow down the decryption process because all available secret keys must
	be tried. @option{--no-throw-keyids} disables this option. This option
	is essentially the same as using @option{--hidden-recipient} for all
	recipients.

	@item --not-dash-escaped
	@opindex not-dash-escaped
	This option changes the behavior of cleartext signatures
	so that they can be used for patch files. You should not
	send such an armored file via email because all spaces
	and line endings are hashed too. You can not use this
	option for data which has 5 dashes at the beginning of a
	line, patch files don't have this. A special armor header
	line tells GnuPG about this cleartext signature option.

	@item --escape-from-lines
	@itemx --no-escape-from-lines
	@opindex escape-from-lines
	Because some mailers change lines starting with "From " to ">From " it
	is good to handle such lines in a special way when creating cleartext
	signatures to prevent the mail system from breaking the signature. Note
	that all other PGP versions do it this way too. Enabled by
	default. @option{--no-escape-from-lines} disables this option.

	@item --passphrase-repeat @var{n}
	@opindex passphrase-repeat
	Specify how many times @command{@gpgname} will request a new
	passphrase be repeated. This is useful for helping memorize a
	passphrase. Defaults to 1 repetition; can be set to 0 to disable any
	passphrase repetition. Note that a @var{n} greater than 1 will pop up
	the pinentry window @var{n}+1 times even if a modern pinentry with
	two entry fields is used.

	@item --passphrase-fd @var{n}
	@opindex passphrase-fd
	Read the passphrase from file descriptor @var{n}. Only the first line
	will be read from file descriptor @var{n}. If you use 0 for @var{n},
	the passphrase will be read from STDIN. This can only be used if only
	one passphrase is supplied.

	Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the
	option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1
	the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}.

	@item --passphrase-file @var{file}
	@opindex passphrase-file
	Read the passphrase from file @var{file}. Only the first line will
	be read from file @var{file}. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, a passphrase stored in a file is
	of questionable security if other users can read this file. Don't use
	this option if you can avoid it.

	Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the
	option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1
	the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}.

	@item --passphrase @var{string}
	@opindex passphrase
	Use @var{string} as the passphrase. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, this is of very questionable
	security on a multi-user system. Don't use this option if you can
	avoid it.

	Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the
	option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1
	the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}.

	@item --pinentry-mode @var{mode}
	@opindex pinentry-mode
	Set the pinentry mode to @var{mode}. Allowed values for @var{mode}
	are:
	@table @asis
	@item default
	Use the default of the agent, which is @code{ask}.
	@item ask
	Force the use of the Pinentry.
	@item cancel
	Emulate use of Pinentry's cancel button.
	@item error
	Return a Pinentry error (``No Pinentry'').
	@item loopback
	Redirect Pinentry queries to the caller. Note that in contrast to
	Pinentry the user is not prompted again if he enters a bad password.
	@end table

	@item --no-symkey-cache
	@opindex no-symkey-cache
	Disable the passphrase cache used for symmetrical en- and decryption.
	This cache is based on the message specific salt value
	(cf. @option{--s2k-mode}).

	@item --request-origin @var{origin}
	@opindex request-origin
	Tell gpg to assume that the operation ultimately originated at
	@var{origin}. Depending on the origin certain restrictions are applied
	and the Pinentry may include an extra note on the origin. Supported
	values for @var{origin} are: @code{local} which is the default,
	@code{remote} to indicate a remote origin or @code{browser} for an
	operation requested by a web browser.

	@item --command-fd @var{n}
	@opindex command-fd
	This is a replacement for the deprecated shared-memory IPC mode.
	If this option is enabled, user input on questions is not expected
	from the TTY but from the given file descriptor. It should be used
	together with @option{--status-fd}. See the file doc/DETAILS in the source
	distribution for details on how to use it.

	@item --command-file @var{file}
	@opindex command-file
	Same as @option{--command-fd}, except the commands are read out of file
	@var{file}

	@item --allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@itemx --no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@opindex allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	Allow the import and use of keys with user IDs which are not
	self-signed. This is not recommended, as a non self-signed user ID is
	trivial to forge. @option{--no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid} disables.

	@item --allow-freeform-uid
	@opindex allow-freeform-uid
	Disable all checks on the form of the user ID while generating a new
	one. This option should only be used in very special environments as
	it does not ensure the de-facto standard format of user IDs.

	@item --ignore-time-conflict
	@opindex ignore-time-conflict
	GnuPG normally checks that the timestamps associated with keys and
	signatures have plausible values. However, sometimes a signature
	seems to be older than the key due to clock problems. This option
	makes these checks just a warning. See also @option{--ignore-valid-from} for
	timestamp issues on subkeys.

	@item --ignore-valid-from
	@opindex ignore-valid-from
	GnuPG normally does not select and use subkeys created in the future.
	This option allows the use of such keys and thus exhibits the
	pre-1.0.7 behaviour. You should not use this option unless there
	is some clock problem. See also @option{--ignore-time-conflict} for timestamp
	issues with signatures.

	@item --ignore-crc-error
	@opindex ignore-crc-error
	The ASCII armor used by OpenPGP is protected by a CRC checksum against
	transmission errors. Occasionally the CRC gets mangled somewhere on
	the transmission channel but the actual content (which is protected by
	the OpenPGP protocol anyway) is still okay. This option allows GnuPG
	to ignore CRC errors.

	@item --ignore-mdc-error
	@opindex ignore-mdc-error
	This option changes a MDC integrity protection failure into a warning.
	It is required to decrypt old messages which did not use an MDC. It
	may also be useful if a message is partially garbled, but it is
	necessary to get as much data as possible out of that garbled message.
	Be aware that a missing or failed MDC can be an indication of an
	attack. Use with great caution; see also option @option{--rfc2440}.

	@item --allow-old-cipher-algos
	@opindex allow-old-cipher-algos
	Old cipher algorithms like 3DES, IDEA, or CAST5 encrypt data using
	blocks of 64 bits; modern algorithms use blocks of 128 bit instead.
	To avoid certain attack on these old algorithms it is suggested not to
	encrypt more than 150 MiByte using the same key. For this reason gpg
	does not allow the use of 64 bit block size algorithms for encryption
	unless this option is specified.

	@item --allow-weak-digest-algos
	@opindex allow-weak-digest-algos
	Signatures made with known-weak digest algorithms are normally
	rejected with an ``invalid digest algorithm'' message. This option
	allows the verification of signatures made with such weak algorithms.
	MD5 is the only digest algorithm considered weak by default. See also
	@option{--weak-digest} to reject other digest algorithms.

	@item --weak-digest @var{name}
	@opindex weak-digest
	Treat the specified digest algorithm as weak. Signatures made over
	weak digests algorithms are normally rejected. This option can be
	supplied multiple times if multiple algorithms should be considered
	weak. See also @option{--allow-weak-digest-algos} to disable
	rejection of weak digests. MD5 is always considered weak, and does
	not need to be listed explicitly.

	@item --allow-weak-key-signatures
	@opindex allow-weak-key-signatures
	To avoid a minor risk of collision attacks on third-party key
	signatures made using SHA-1, those key signatures are considered
	invalid. This options allows to override this restriction.

	@item --override-compliance-check
	@opindex --override-compliance-check
	The signature verification only allows the use of keys suitable in the
	current compliance mode. If the compliance mode has been forced by a
	global option, there might be no way to check certain signature. This
	option allows to override this and prints an extra warning in such a
	case. This option is ignored in --batch mode so that no accidental
	unattended verification may happen.

	@item --no-default-keyring
	@opindex no-default-keyring
	Do not add the default keyring to the list of keyrings. Note that
	GnuPG needs for almost all operations a keyring. Thus if you use this
	option and do not provide alternate keyrings via @option{--keyring},
	then GnuPG will still use the default keyring.

	Note that if the option @option{use-keyboxd} is enabled in
	@file{common.conf}, no keyrings are used at all and keys are all
	maintained by the keyboxd process in its own database.

	@item --no-keyring
	@opindex no-keyring
	Do not use any keyring at all. This overrides the default and all
	options which specify keyrings.

	@item --skip-verify
	@opindex skip-verify
	Skip the signature verification step. This may be
	used to make the decryption faster if the signature
	verification is not needed.

	@item --with-key-data
	@opindex with-key-data
	Print key listings delimited by colons (like @option{--with-colons}) and
	print the public key data.

	@item --list-signatures
	@opindex list-signatures
	@itemx --list-sigs
	@opindex list-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the signatures are listed too. This
	command has the same effect as using @option{--list-keys} with
	@option{--with-sig-list}. Note that in contrast to
	@option{--check-signatures} the key signatures are not verified. This
	command can be used to create a list of signing keys missing in the
	local keyring; for example:

	@example
	gpg --list-sigs --with-colons USERID \| \
	awk -F: '$1=="sig" && $2=="?" @{if($13)@{print $13@}else@{print $5@}@}'
	@end example

	@item --fast-list-mode
	@opindex fast-list-mode
	Changes the output of the list commands to work faster; this is achieved
	by leaving some parts empty. Some applications don't need the user ID
	and the trust information given in the listings. By using this options
	they can get a faster listing. The exact behaviour of this option may
	change in future versions. If you are missing some information, don't
	use this option.

	@item --no-literal
	@opindex no-literal
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --set-filesize
	@opindex set-filesize
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --show-session-key
	@opindex show-session-key
	Display the session key used for one message. See
	@option{--override-session-key} for the counterpart of this option.

	We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing; however the user should have
	the freedom to decide whether to go to prison or to reveal the content
	of one specific message without compromising all messages ever
	encrypted for one secret key.

	You can also use this option if you receive an encrypted message which
	is abusive or offensive, to prove to the administrators of the
	messaging system that the ciphertext transmitted corresponds to an
	inappropriate plaintext so they can take action against the offending
	user.

	@item --override-session-key @var{string}
	@itemx --override-session-key-fd @var{fd}
	@opindex override-session-key
	Don't use the public key but the session key @var{string} respective
	the session key taken from the first line read from file descriptor
	@var{fd}. The format of this string is the same as the one printed by
	@option{--show-session-key}. This option is normally not used but
	comes handy in case someone forces you to reveal the content of an
	encrypted message; using this option you can do this without handing
	out the secret key. Note that using @option{--override-session-key}
	may reveal the session key to all local users via the global process
	table. Often it is useful to combine this option with
	@option{--no-keyring}.

	@item --ask-sig-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-sig-expire
	@opindex ask-sig-expire
	When making a data signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-sig-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-sig-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-sig-expire
	@opindex default-sig-expire
	The default expiration time to use for signature expiration. Valid
	values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d
	(for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for
	example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an absolute
	date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --ask-cert-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-expire
	@opindex ask-cert-expire
	When making a key signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-cert-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-cert-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-cert-expire
	@opindex default-cert-expire
	The default expiration time to use for key signature expiration.
	Valid values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the
	letter d (for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years)
	(for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an
	absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --default-new-key-algo @var{string}
	@opindex default-new-key-algo @var{string}
	This option can be used to change the default algorithms for key
	generation. The @var{string} is similar to the arguments required for
	the command @option{--quick-add-key} but slightly different. For
	example the current default of @code{"rsa2048/cert,sign+rsa2048/encr"}
	(or @code{"rsa3072"}) can be changed to the value of what we currently
	call future default, which is @code{"ed25519/cert,sign+cv25519/encr"}.
	You need to consult the source code to learn the details. Note that
	the advanced key generation commands can always be used to specify a
	key algorithm directly.

	@item --no-auto-trust-new-key
	@opindex no-auto-trust-new-key
	When creating a new key the ownertrust of the new key is set to
	ultimate. This option disables this and the user needs to manually
	assign an ownertrust value.

	@item --force-sign-key
	@opindex force-sign-key
	This option modifies the behaviour of the commands
	@option{--quick-sign-key}, @option{--quick-lsign-key}, and the "sign"
	sub-commands of @option{--edit-key} by forcing the creation of a key
	signature, even if one already exists.

	@item --forbid-gen-key
	@opindex forbid-gen-key
	This option is intended for use in the global config file to disallow
	the use of generate key commands. Those commands will then fail with
	the error code for Not Enabled.

	@item --allow-secret-key-import
	@opindex allow-secret-key-import
	This is an obsolete option and is not used anywhere.

	@item --allow-multiple-messages
	@item --no-allow-multiple-messages
	These are obsolete options; they have no more effect since GnuPG 2.2.8.

	@item --enable-special-filenames
	@opindex enable-special-filenames
	This option enables a mode in which filenames of the form
	@file{-&n}, where n is a non-negative decimal number,
	refer to the file descriptor n and not to a file with that name.

	@item --no-expensive-trust-checks
	@opindex no-expensive-trust-checks
	Experimental use only.

	@item --preserve-permissions
	@opindex preserve-permissions
	Don't change the permissions of a secret keyring back to user
	read/write only. Use this option only if you really know what you are doing.

	@item --default-preference-list @var{string}
	@opindex default-preference-list
	Set the list of default preferences to @var{string}. This preference
	list is used for new keys and becomes the default for "setpref" in the
	@option{--edit-key} menu.

	@item --default-keyserver-url @var{name}
	@opindex default-keyserver-url
	Set the default keyserver URL to @var{name}. This keyserver will be
	used as the keyserver URL when writing a new self-signature on a key,
	which includes key generation and changing preferences.

	@item --list-config
	@opindex list-config
	Display various internal configuration parameters of GnuPG. This option
	is intended for external programs that call GnuPG to perform tasks, and
	is thus not generally useful. See the file @file{doc/DETAILS} in the
	source distribution for the details of which configuration items may be
	listed. @option{--list-config} is only usable with
	@option{--with-colons} set.

	@item --list-gcrypt-config
	@opindex list-gcrypt-config
	Display various internal configuration parameters of Libgcrypt.

	@item --gpgconf-list
	@opindex gpgconf-list
	This command is similar to @option{--list-config} but in general only
	internally used by the @command{gpgconf} tool.

	@item --gpgconf-test
	@opindex gpgconf-test
	This is more or less dummy action. However it parses the configuration
	file and returns with failure if the configuration file would prevent
	@command{@gpgname} from startup. Thus it may be used to run a syntax check
	on the configuration file.

	@c @item --use-only-openpgp-card
	@c @opindex use-only-openpgp-card
	@c Only access OpenPGP card's and no other cards. This is a hidden
	@c option which could be used in case an old use case required the
	@c OpenPGP card while several cards are available. This option might be
	@c removed if it turns out that nobody requires it.

	@item --chuid @var{uid}
	@opindex chuid
	Change the current user to @var{uid} which may either be a number or a
	name. This can be used from the root account to run gpg for
	another user. If @var{uid} is not the current UID a standard PATH is
	set and the envvar GNUPGHOME is unset. To override the latter the
	option @option{--homedir} can be used. This option has only an effect
	when used on the command line. This option has currently no effect at
	all on Windows.

	@end table

	@c *******************************
	@c ***** Deprecated **********
	@c *******************************
	@node Deprecated Options
	@subsection Deprecated options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --show-photos
	@itemx --no-show-photos
	@opindex show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-signatures},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, @option{--list-secret-keys}, and verifying
	a signature to also display the photo ID attached to the key, if
	any. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. These options are deprecated. Use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-photos} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-photos} instead.

	@item --show-keyring
	@opindex show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. This option is deprecated: use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-keyring} instead.

	@item --always-trust
	@opindex always-trust
	Identical to @option{--trust-model always}. This option is deprecated.

	@item --show-notation
	@itemx --no-show-notation
	@opindex show-notation
	Show signature notations in the @option{--list-signatures} or @option{--check-signatures} listings
	as well as when verifying a signature with a notation in it. These
	options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-notation}
	and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-notation} instead.

	@item --show-policy-url
	@itemx --no-show-policy-url
	@opindex show-policy-url
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-signatures} or @option{--check-signatures}
	listings as well as when verifying a signature with a policy URL in
	it. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} instead.

	@item --personal-aead-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-aead-preferences
	This option is deprecated and has no more effect since version 2.3.9.

	@item --aead-algo @var{name}
	This option is deprecated and has no more effect since version 2.3.9.


	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* FILES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect files
	@node GPG Configuration
	@section Configuration files

	There are a few configuration files to control certain aspects of
	@command{@gpgname}'s operation. Unless noted, they are expected in the
	current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}).

	@table @file

	@item gpg.conf
	@efindex gpg.conf
	This is the standard configuration file read by @command{@gpgname} on
	startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes
	may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated. This default
	name may be changed on the command line (@pxref{gpg-option --options}).
	You should backup this file.

	@item common.conf
	@efindex common.conf
	This is an optional configuration file read by @command{@gpgname} on
	startup. It may contain options pertaining to all components of
	GnuPG. Its current main use is for the "use-keyboxd" option.

	@end table

	Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files
	into the directory @file{@value{SYSCONFSKELDIR}} so that
	newly created users start up with a working configuration.
	For existing users a small
	helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}).

	For internal purposes @command{@gpgname} creates and maintains a few other
	files; They all live in the current home directory (@pxref{option
	--homedir}). Only the @command{@gpgname} program may modify these files.


	@table @file
	@item ~/.gnupg
	@efindex ~/.gnupg
	This is the default home directory which is used if neither the
	environment variable @code{GNUPGHOME} nor the option
	@option{--homedir} is given.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg
	@efindex pubring.gpg
	The public keyring using a legacy format. You should backup this file.

	If this file is not available, @command{gpg} defaults to the new
	keybox format and creates a file @file{pubring.kbx} unless that file
	already exists in which case that file will also be used for OpenPGP
	keys.

	Note that in the case that both files, @file{pubring.gpg} and
	@file{pubring.kbx} exists but the latter has no OpenPGP keys, the
	legacy file @file{pubring.gpg} will be used. Take care: GnuPG
	versions before 2.1 will always use the file @file{pubring.gpg}
	because they do not know about the new keybox format. In the case
	that you have to use GnuPG 1.4 to decrypt archived data you should
	keep this file.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the public keyring.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
	@efindex pubring.kbx
	The public keyring using the new keybox format. This file is shared
	with @command{gpgsm}. You should backup this file. See above for
	the relation between this file and it predecessor.

	To convert an existing @file{pubring.gpg} file to the keybox format, you
	first backup the ownertrust values, then rename @file{pubring.gpg} to
	@file{publickeys.backup}, so it won’t be recognized by any GnuPG version,
	run import, and finally restore the ownertrust values:

	@example
	$ cd ~/.gnupg
	$ gpg --export-ownertrust >otrust.lst
	$ mv pubring.gpg publickeys.backup
	$ gpg --import-options restore --import publickeys.backup
	$ gpg --import-ownertrust otrust.lst
	@end example

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx.lock
	The lock file for @file{pubring.kbx}.

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg
	@efindex secring.gpg
	The legacy secret keyring as used by GnuPG versions before 2.1. It is not
	used by GnuPG 2.1 and later. You may want to keep it in case you
	have to use GnuPG 1.4 to decrypt archived data.

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the legacy secret keyring.

	@item ~/.gnupg/.gpg-v21-migrated
	@efindex .gpg-v21-migrated
	File indicating that a migration to GnuPG 2.1 has been done.

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg
	@efindex trustdb.gpg
	The trust database. There is no need to backup this file; it is better
	to backup the ownertrust values (@pxref{option --export-ownertrust}).

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the trust database.

	@item ~/.gnupg/random_seed
	@efindex random_seed
	A file used to preserve the state of the internal random pool.

	@item ~/.gnupg/openpgp-revocs.d/
	@efindex openpgp-revocs.d
	This is the directory where gpg stores pre-generated revocation
	certificates. The file name corresponds to the OpenPGP fingerprint of
	the respective key. It is suggested to backup those certificates and
	if the primary private key is not stored on the disk to move them to
	an external storage device. Anyone who can access these files is
	able to revoke the corresponding key. You may want to print them out.
	You should backup all files in this directory and take care to keep
	this backup closed away.

	@end table

	Operation is further controlled by a few environment variables:

	@table @asis

	@item HOME
	@efindex HOME
	Used to locate the default home directory.

	@item GNUPGHOME
	@efindex GNUPGHOME
	If set directory used instead of "~/.gnupg".

	@item GPG_AGENT_INFO
	This variable is obsolete; it was used by GnuPG versions before 2.1.

	@item PINENTRY_USER_DATA
	@efindex PINENTRY_USER_DATA
	This value is passed via gpg-agent to pinentry. It is useful to convey
	extra information to a custom pinentry.

	@item COLUMNS
	@itemx LINES
	@efindex COLUMNS
	@efindex LINES
	Used to size some displays to the full size of the screen.

	@item LANGUAGE
	@efindex LANGUAGE
	Apart from its use by GNU, it is used in the W32 version to override the
	language selection done through the Registry. If used and set to a
	valid and available language name (@var{langid}), the file with the
	translation is loaded from
	@code{@var{gpgdir}/gnupg.nls/@var{langid}.mo}. Here @var{gpgdir} is the
	directory out of which the gpg binary has been loaded. If it can't be
	loaded the Registry is tried and as last resort the native Windows
	locale system is used.

	@item GNUPG_BUILD_ROOT
	@efindex GNUPG_BUILD_ROOT
	This variable is only used by the regression test suite as a helper
	under operating systems without proper support to figure out the
	name of a process' text file.

	@item GNUPG_EXEC_DEBUG_FLAGS
	@efindex GNUPG_EXEC_DEBUG_FLAGS
	This variable allows to enable diagnostics for process management.
	A numeric decimal value is expected. Bit 0 enables general
	diagnostics, bit 1 enables certain warnings on Windows.

	@end table

	When calling the gpg-agent component @command{@gpgname} sends a set of
	environment variables to gpg-agent. The names of these variables can
	be listed using the command:

	@example
	gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo std_env_names' /bye \| awk '$1=="D" @{print $2@}'
	@end example



	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* EXAMPLES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect examples
	@node GPG Examples
	@section Examples

	@table @asis

	@item gpg -se -r @code{Bob} @code{file}
	sign and encrypt for user Bob

	@item gpg --clear-sign @code{file}
	make a cleartext signature

	@item gpg -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature

	@item gpg -u 0x12345678 -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature with the key 0x12345678

	@item gpg --list-keys @code{user_ID}
	show keys

	@item gpg --fingerprint @code{user_ID}
	show fingerprint

	@item gpg --verify @code{pgpfile}
	@itemx gpg --verify @code{sigfile} [@code{datafile}]
	Verify the signature of the file but do not output the data unless
	requested. The second form is used for detached signatures, where
	@code{sigfile} is the detached signature (either ASCII armored or
	binary) and @code{datafile} are the signed data; if this is not given, the name of the
	file holding the signed data is constructed by cutting off the
	extension (".asc" or ".sig") of @code{sigfile} or by asking the user
	for the filename. If the option @option{--output} is also used the
	signed data is written to the file specified by that option; use
	@code{-} to write the signed data to stdout.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* USER ID **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect how to specify a user id
	@ifset isman
	@include specify-user-id.texi
	@end ifset

	@mansect filter expressions
	@chapheading FILTER EXPRESSIONS

	The options @option{--import-filter} and @option{--export-filter} use
	expressions with this syntax (square brackets indicate an optional
	part and curly braces a repetition, white space between the elements
	are allowed):

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	[lc] @{[@{flag@}] PROPNAME op VALUE [lc]@}
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	The name of a property (@var{PROPNAME}) may only consist of letters,
	digits and underscores. The description for the filter type
	describes which properties are defined. If an undefined property is
	used it evaluates to the empty string. Unless otherwise noted, the
	@var{VALUE} must always be given and may not be the empty string. No
	quoting is defined for the value, thus the value may not contain the
	strings @code{&&} or @code{\|\|}, which are used as logical connection
	operators. The flag @code{--} can be used to remove this restriction.

	Numerical values are computed as long int; standard C notation
	applies. @var{lc} is the logical connection operator; either
	@code{&&} for a conjunction or @code{\|\|} for a disjunction. A
	conjunction is assumed at the begin of an expression. Conjunctions
	have higher precedence than disjunctions. If @var{VALUE} starts with
	one of the characters used in any @var{op} a space after the
	@var{op} is required.

	@noindent
	The supported operators (@var{op}) are:

	@table @asis

	@item =~
	Substring must match.

	@item !~
	Substring must not match.

	@item =
	The full string must match.

	@item <>
	The full string must not match.

	@item ==
	The numerical value must match.

	@item !=
	The numerical value must not match.

	@item <=
	The numerical value of the field must be LE than the value.

	@item <
	The numerical value of the field must be LT than the value.

	@item >
	The numerical value of the field must be GT than the value.

	@item >=
	The numerical value of the field must be GE than the value.

	@item -le
	The string value of the field must be less or equal than the value.

	@item -lt
	The string value of the field must be less than the value.

	@item -gt
	The string value of the field must be greater than the value.

	@item -ge
	The string value of the field must be greater or equal than the value.

	@item -n
	True if value is not empty (no value allowed).

	@item -z
	True if value is empty (no value allowed).

	@item -t
	Alias for "PROPNAME != 0" (no value allowed).

	@item -f
	Alias for "PROPNAME == 0" (no value allowed).

	@end table

	@noindent
	Values for @var{flag} must be space separated. The supported flags
	are:

	@table @asis
	@item --
	@var{VALUE} spans to the end of the expression.
	@item -c
	The string match in this part is done case-sensitive.
	@item -t
	Leading and trailing spaces are not removed from @var{VALUE}.
	The optional single space after @var{op} is here required.
	@end table

	The filter options concatenate several specifications for a filter of
	the same type. For example the four options in this example:

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	--import-filter keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa"
	--import-filter keep-uid="&& uid !~ Test"
	--import-filter keep-uid="\|\| uid =~ Alpha"
	--import-filter keep-uid="uid !~ Test"
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	@noindent
	which is equivalent to

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	--import-filter \
	keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa" && uid !~ Test" \|\| uid =~ Alpha" && "uid !~ Test"
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	imports only the user ids of a key containing the strings "Alfa"
	or "Alpha" but not the string "test".

	@mansect trust values
	@ifset isman
	@include trust-values.texi
	@end ifset

	@mansect return value
	@chapheading RETURN VALUE

	The program returns 0 if there are no severe errors, 1 if at least a
	signature was bad, and other error codes for fatal errors.

	Note that signature verification requires exact knowledge of what has
	been signed and by whom it has been signed. Using only the return code
	is thus not an appropriate way to verify a signature by a script.
	Either make proper use or the status codes or use the @command{gpgv}
	tool which has been designed to make signature verification easy for
	scripts.

	@mansect warnings
	@chapheading WARNINGS

	Use a good password for your user account and make sure that all
	security issues are always fixed on your machine. Also employ
	diligent physical protection to your machine. Consider to use a good
	passphrase as a last resort protection to your secret key in the case
	your machine gets stolen. It is important that your secret key is
	never leaked. Using an easy to carry around token or smartcard with
	the secret key is often a advisable.

	If you are going to verify detached signatures, make sure that the
	program knows about it; either give both filenames on the command line
	or use @samp{-} to specify STDIN.

	For scripted or other unattended use of @command{gpg} make sure to use
	the machine-parseable interface and not the default interface which is
	intended for direct use by humans. The machine-parseable interface
	provides a stable and well documented API independent of the locale or
	future changes of @command{gpg}. To enable this interface use the
	options @option{--with-colons} and @option{--status-fd}. For certain
	operations the option @option{--command-fd} may come handy too. See
	this man page and the file @file{DETAILS} for the specification of the
	interface. Note that the GnuPG ``info'' pages as well as the PDF
	version of the GnuPG manual features a chapter on unattended use of
	GnuPG. As an alternative the library @command{GPGME} can be used as a
	high-level abstraction on top of that interface.

	@mansect interoperability
	@chapheading INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS

	GnuPG tries to be a very flexible implementation of the OpenPGP
	standard. In particular, GnuPG implements many of the optional parts
	of the standard, such as the SHA-512 hash, and the ZLIB and BZIP2
	compression algorithms. It is important to be aware that not all
	OpenPGP programs implement these optional algorithms and that by
	forcing their use via the @option{--cipher-algo},
	@option{--digest-algo}, @option{--cert-digest-algo}, or
	@option{--compress-algo} options in GnuPG, it is possible to create a
	perfectly valid OpenPGP message, but one that cannot be read by the
	intended recipient.

	There are dozens of variations of OpenPGP programs available, and each
	supports a slightly different subset of these optional algorithms.
	For example, until recently, no (unhacked) version of PGP supported
	the BLOWFISH cipher algorithm. A message using BLOWFISH simply could
	not be read by a PGP user. By default, GnuPG uses the standard
	OpenPGP preferences system that will always do the right thing and
	create messages that are usable by all recipients, regardless of which
	OpenPGP program they use. Only override this safe default if you
	really know what you are doing.

	If you absolutely must override the safe default, or if the preferences
	on a given key are invalid for some reason, you are far better off using
	the @option{--pgp6}, @option{--pgp7}, or @option{--pgp8} options. These
	options are safe as they do not force any particular algorithms in
	violation of OpenPGP, but rather reduce the available algorithms to a
	"PGP-safe" list.

	@mansect bugs
	@chapheading BUGS

	On older systems this program should be installed as setuid(root). This
	is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents the
	operating system from writing memory pages (which may contain
	passphrases or other sensitive material) to disk. If you get no
	warning message about insecure memory your operating system supports
	locking without being root. The program drops root privileges as soon
	as locked memory is allocated.

	Note also that some systems (especially laptops) have the ability to
	``suspend to disk'' (also known as ``safe sleep'' or ``hibernate'').
	This writes all memory to disk before going into a low power or even
	powered off mode. Unless measures are taken in the operating system
	to protect the saved memory, passphrases or other sensitive material
	may be recoverable from it later.

	Before you report a bug you should first search the mailing list
	archives for similar problems and second check whether such a bug has
	already been reported to our bug tracker at @url{https://bugs.gnupg.org}.

	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* ************
	@c ************* UNATTENDED ************
	@c ************* ************
	@c *******************************************
	@manpause
	@node Unattended Usage of GPG
	@section Unattended Usage

	@command{@gpgname} is often used as a backend engine by other software. To help
	with this a machine interface has been defined to have an unambiguous
	way to do this. The options @option{--status-fd} and @option{--batch}
	are almost always required for this.

	@menu
	* Programmatic use of GnuPG:: Programmatic use of GnuPG
	* Ephemeral home directories:: Ephemeral home directories
	* The quick key manipulation interface:: The quick key manipulation interface
	* Unattended GPG key generation:: Unattended key generation
	@end menu


	@node Programmatic use of GnuPG
	@subsection Programmatic use of GnuPG

	Please consider using GPGME instead of calling @command{@gpgname}
	directly. GPGME offers a stable, backend-independent interface for
	many cryptographic operations. It supports OpenPGP and S/MIME, and
	also allows interaction with various GnuPG components.

	GPGME provides a C-API, and comes with bindings for C++, Qt, and
	Python. Bindings for other languages are available.

	@node Ephemeral home directories
	@subsection Ephemeral home directories

	Sometimes you want to contain effects of some operation, for example
	you want to import a key to inspect it, but you do not want this key
	to be added to your keyring. In earlier versions of GnuPG, it was
	possible to specify alternate keyring files for both public and secret
	keys. In modern GnuPG versions, however, we changed how secret keys
	are stored in order to better protect secret key material, and it was
	not possible to preserve this interface.

	The preferred way to do this is to use ephemeral home directories.
	This technique works across all versions of GnuPG.

	Create a temporary directory, create (or copy) a configuration that
	meets your needs, make @command{@gpgname} use this directory either
	using the environment variable @var{GNUPGHOME}, or the option
	@option{--homedir}. GPGME supports this too on a per-context basis,
	by modifying the engine info of contexts. Now execute whatever
	operation you like, import and export key material as necessary. Once
	finished, you can delete the directory. All GnuPG backend services
	that were started will detect this and shut down.

	@node The quick key manipulation interface
	@subsection The quick key manipulation interface

	Recent versions of GnuPG have an interface to manipulate keys without
	using the interactive command @option{--edit-key}. This interface was
	added mainly for the benefit of GPGME (please consider using GPGME,
	see the manual subsection ``Programmatic use of GnuPG''). This
	interface is described in the subsection ``How to manage your keys''.

	@node Unattended GPG key generation
	@subsection Unattended key generation

	The command @option{--generate-key} may be used along with the option
	@option{--batch} for unattended key generation. This is the most
	flexible way of generating keys, but it is also the most complex one.
	Consider using the quick key manipulation interface described in the
	previous subsection ``The quick key manipulation interface''.

	The parameters for the key are either read from stdin or given as a
	file on the command line. The format of the parameter file is as
	follows:

	@itemize @bullet
	@item Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 characters.
	@item UTF-8 encoding must be used to specify non-ASCII characters.
	@item Empty lines are ignored.
	@item Leading and trailing white space is ignored.
	@item A hash sign as the first non white space character indicates
	a comment line.
	@item Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign, the
	arguments are separated by white space from the keyword.
	@item Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon. Arguments
	are separated by white space.
	@item
	The first parameter must be @samp{Key-Type}; control statements may be
	placed anywhere.
	@item
	The order of the parameters does not matter except for @samp{Key-Type}
	which must be the first parameter. The parameters are only used for
	the generated keyblock (primary and subkeys); parameters from previous
	sets are not used. Some syntactically checks may be performed.
	@item
	Key generation takes place when either the end of the parameter file
	is reached, the next @samp{Key-Type} parameter is encountered or at the
	control statement @samp{%commit} is encountered.
	@end itemize

	@noindent
	Control statements:

	@table @asis

	@item %echo @var{text}
	Print @var{text} as diagnostic.

	@item %dry-run
	Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking).

	@item %commit
	Perform the key generation. Note that an implicit commit is done at
	the next @asis{Key-Type} parameter.

	@item %pubring @var{filename}
	Do not write the key to the default or commandline given keyring but
	to @var{filename}. This must be given before the first commit to take
	place, duplicate specification of the same filename is ignored, the
	last filename before a commit is used. The filename is used until a
	new filename is used (at commit points) and all keys are written to
	that file. If a new filename is given, this file is created (and
	overwrites an existing one).

	See the previous subsection ``Ephemeral home directories'' for a more
	robust way to contain side-effects.

	@item %secring @var{filename}
	This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	See the previous subsection ``Ephemeral home directories''.

	@item %ask-passphrase
	@itemx %no-ask-passphrase
	This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	@item %no-protection
	Using this option allows the creation of keys without any passphrase
	protection. This option is mainly intended for regression tests.

	@item %transient-key
	If given the keys are created using a faster and a somewhat less
	secure random number generator. This option may be used for keys
	which are only used for a short time and do not require full
	cryptographic strength. It takes only effect if used together with
	the control statement @samp{%no-protection}.

	@end table

	@noindent
	General Parameters:

	@table @asis

	@item Key-Type: @var{algo}
	Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the primary
	key. The algorithm must be capable of signing. This is a required
	parameter. @var{algo} may either be an OpenPGP algorithm number or a
	string with the algorithm name. The special value @samp{default} may
	be used for @var{algo} to create the default key type; in this case a
	@samp{Key-Usage} shall not be given and @samp{default} also be used
	for @samp{Subkey-Type}.

	@item Key-Length: @var{nbits}
	The requested length of the generated key in bits. The default is
	returned by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}.
	For ECC keys this parameter is ignored.

	@item Key-Curve: @var{curve}
	The requested elliptic curve of the generated key. This is a required
	parameter for ECC keys. It is ignored for non-ECC keys.

	@item Key-Grip: @var{hexstring}
	This is optional and used to generate a CSR or certificate for an
	already existing key. Key-Length will be ignored when given.

	@item Key-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Space or comma delimited list of key usages. Allowed values are
	@samp{encrypt}, @samp{sign}, and @samp{auth}. This is used to
	generate the key flags. Please make sure that the algorithm is
	capable of this usage. Note that OpenPGP requires that all primary
	keys are capable of certification, so no matter what usage is given
	here, the @samp{cert} flag will be on. If no @samp{Key-Usage} is
	specified and the @samp{Key-Type} is not @samp{default}, all allowed
	usages for that particular algorithm are used; if it is not given but
	@samp{default} is used the usage will be @samp{sign}.

	@item Subkey-Type: @var{algo}
	This generates a secondary key (subkey). Currently only one subkey
	can be handled. See also @samp{Key-Type} above.

	@item Subkey-Length: @var{nbits}
	Length of the secondary key (subkey) in bits. The default is returned
	by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}.

	@item Subkey-Curve: @var{curve}
	Key curve for a subkey; similar to @samp{Key-Curve}.

	@item Subkey-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Key usage lists for a subkey; similar to @samp{Key-Usage}.

	@item Passphrase: @var{string}
	If you want to specify a passphrase for the secret key, enter it here.
	Default is to use the Pinentry dialog to ask for a passphrase.

	@item Name-Real: @var{name}
	@itemx Name-Comment: @var{comment}
	@itemx Name-Email: @var{email}
	The three parts of a user name. Remember to use UTF-8 encoding here.
	If you don't give any of them, no user ID is created.

	@item Expire-Date: @var{iso-date}\|(@var{number}[d\|w\|m\|y])
	Set the expiration date for the key (and the subkey). It may either
	be entered in ISO date format (e.g. "20000815T145012") or as number of
	days, weeks, month or years after the creation date. The special
	notation "seconds=N" is also allowed to specify a number of seconds
	since creation. Without a letter days are assumed. Note that there
	is no check done on the overflow of the type used by OpenPGP for
	timestamps. Thus you better make sure that the given value make
	sense. Although OpenPGP works with time intervals, GnuPG uses an
	absolute value internally and thus the last year we can represent is
	2105.

	@item Creation-Date: @var{iso-date}
	Set the creation date of the key as stored in the key information and
	which is also part of the fingerprint calculation. Either a date like
	"1986-04-26" or a full timestamp like "19860426T042640" may be used.
	The time is considered to be UTC. The special notation "seconds=N"
	may be used to directly specify a the number of seconds since Epoch
	(Unix time). If it is not given the current time is used.

	@item Preferences: @var{string}
	Set the cipher, hash, and compression preference values for this key.
	This expects the same type of string as the sub-command @samp{setpref}
	in the @option{--edit-key} menu.

	@item Revoker: @var{algo}:@var{fpr} [sensitive]
	Add a designated revoker to the generated key. Algo is the public key
	algorithm of the designated revoker (i.e. RSA=1, DSA=17, etc.)
	@var{fpr} is the fingerprint of the designated revoker. The optional
	@samp{sensitive} flag marks the designated revoker as sensitive
	information. Only v4 keys may be designated revokers.

	@item Keyserver: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter that specifies the preferred keyserver
	URL for the key.

	@item Handle: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter only used with the status lines
	KEY_CREATED and KEY_NOT_CREATED. @var{string} may be up to 100
	characters and should not contain spaces. It is useful for batch key
	generation to associate a key parameter block with a status line.

	@end table

	@noindent
	Here is an example on how to create a key in an ephemeral home directory:
	@smallexample
	$ export GNUPGHOME="$(mktemp -d)"
	$ cat >foo <<EOF
	%echo Generating a basic OpenPGP key
	Key-Type: DSA
	Key-Length: 1024
	Subkey-Type: ELG-E
	Subkey-Length: 1024
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	EOF
	$ @gpgname --batch --generate-key foo
	[...]
	$ @gpgname --list-secret-keys
	/tmp/tmp.0NQxB74PEf/pubring.kbx
	-------------------------------
	sec dsa1024 2016-12-16 [SCA]
	768E895903FC1C44045C8CB95EEBDB71E9E849D0
	uid [ultimate] Joe Tester (with stupid passphrase) <joe@@foo.bar>
	ssb elg1024 2016-12-16 [E]
	@end smallexample

	@noindent
	If you want to create a key with the default algorithms you would use
	these parameters:
	@smallexample
	%echo Generating a default key
	Key-Type: default
	Subkey-Type: default
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	@end smallexample




	@mansect see also
	@ifset isman
	@command{gpgv}(1),
	@command{gpgsm}(1),
	@command{gpg-agent}(1)
	@end ifset
	@include see-also-note.texi
	diff --git a/sm/call-dirmngr.c b/sm/call-dirmngr.c
	index 5dd8a3938..a15ff240d 100644
	--- a/sm/call-dirmngr.c
	+++ b/sm/call-dirmngr.c
	@@ -1,1096 +1,1095 @@
	/* call-dirmngr.c - Communication with the dirmngr
	* Copyright (C) 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008,
	* 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <errno.h>
	#include <unistd.h>
	#include <time.h>
	#include <ctype.h>

	#include "gpgsm.h"
	#include <gcrypt.h>
	#include <assuan.h>

	#include "../common/i18n.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "../common/asshelp.h"


	struct membuf {
	size_t len;
	size_t size;
	char *buf;
	int out_of_core;
	};



	/* fixme: We need a context for each thread or serialize the access to
	the dirmngr. */
	static assuan_context_t dirmngr_ctx = NULL;
	static assuan_context_t dirmngr2_ctx = NULL;

	static int dirmngr_ctx_locked;
	static int dirmngr2_ctx_locked;

	struct inq_certificate_parm_s {
	ctrl_t ctrl;
	assuan_context_t ctx;
	ksba_cert_t cert;
	ksba_cert_t issuer_cert;
	};

	struct isvalid_status_parm_s {
	ctrl_t ctrl;
	int seen;
	unsigned char fpr[20];
	};


	struct lookup_parm_s {
	ctrl_t ctrl;
	assuan_context_t ctx;
	void (cb)(void , ksba_cert_t);
	void *cb_value;
	struct membuf data;
	int error;
	};

	struct run_command_parm_s {
	ctrl_t ctrl;
	assuan_context_t ctx;
	};



	static gpg_error_t get_cached_cert (assuan_context_t ctx,
	const unsigned char *fpr,
	ksba_cert_t *r_cert);



	/* A simple implementation of a dynamic buffer. Use init_membuf() to
	create a buffer, put_membuf to append bytes and get_membuf to
	release and return the buffer. Allocation errors are detected but
	only returned at the final get_membuf(), this helps not to clutter
	the code with out of core checks. */

	static void
	init_membuf (struct membuf *mb, int initiallen)
	{
	mb->len = 0;
	mb->size = initiallen;
	mb->out_of_core = 0;
	mb->buf = xtrymalloc (initiallen);
	if (!mb->buf)
	mb->out_of_core = 1;
	}

	static void
	put_membuf (struct membuf mb, const void buf, size_t len)
	{
	if (mb->out_of_core)
	return;

	if (mb->len + len >= mb->size)
	{
	char *p;

	mb->size += len + 1024;
	p = xtryrealloc (mb->buf, mb->size);
	if (!p)
	{
	mb->out_of_core = 1;
	return;
	}
	mb->buf = p;
	}
	memcpy (mb->buf + mb->len, buf, len);
	mb->len += len;
	}

	static void *
	get_membuf (struct membuf mb, size_t len)
	{
	char *p;

	if (mb->out_of_core)
	{
	xfree (mb->buf);
	mb->buf = NULL;
	return NULL;
	}

	p = mb->buf;
	*len = mb->len;
	mb->buf = NULL;
	mb->out_of_core = 1; /* don't allow a reuse */
	return p;
	}


	/* Print a warning if the server's version number is less than our
	version number. Returns an error code on a connection problem. */
	static gpg_error_t
	warn_version_mismatch (ctrl_t ctrl, assuan_context_t ctx,
	const char *servername, int mode)
	{
	return warn_server_version_mismatch (ctx, servername, mode,
	gpgsm_status2, ctrl,
	!opt.quiet);
	}


	/* This function prepares the dirmngr for a new session. The
	audit-events option is used so that other dirmngr clients won't get
	disturbed by such events. */
	static void
	prepare_dirmngr (ctrl_t ctrl, assuan_context_t ctx, gpg_error_t err)
	{
	strlist_t server;

	if (!err)
	err = warn_version_mismatch (ctrl, ctx, DIRMNGR_NAME, 0);

	if (!err)
	{
	err = assuan_transact (ctx, "OPTION audit-events=1",
	NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_OPTION)
	err = 0; /* Allow the use of old dirmngr versions. */
	}
	audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_DIRMNGR_READY, err);

	if (!ctx \|\| err)
	return;

	server = opt.keyserver;
	while (server)
	{
	char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];

	/* If the host is "ldap" we prefix the entire line with "ldap:"
	* to avoid an ambiguity on the server due to the introduction
	* of this optional prefix. */
	snprintf (line, DIM (line), "LDAPSERVER %s%s",
	!strncmp (server->d, "ldap:", 5)? "ldap:":"",
	server->d);

	assuan_transact (ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
	/* The code below is not required because we don't return an error. */
	/* err = [above call] */
	/* if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_CMD) */
	/* err = 0; /\* Allow the use of old dirmngr versions. \/ /

	server = server->next;
	}
	}



	/* Return a new assuan context for a Dirmngr connection. */
	static gpg_error_t
	start_dirmngr_ext (ctrl_t ctrl, assuan_context_t *ctx_r)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	assuan_context_t ctx;

	if (opt.disable_dirmngr \|\| ctrl->offline)
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DIRMNGR);

	if (*ctx_r)
	return 0;

	/* Note: if you change this to multiple connections, you also need
	to take care of the implicit option sending caching. */

	err = start_new_dirmngr (&ctx, GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT,
	opt.dirmngr_program,
	opt.autostart, opt.verbose, DBG_IPC,
	gpgsm_status2, ctrl);
	if (!opt.autostart && gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DIRMNGR)
	{
	static int shown;

	if (!shown)
	{
	shown = 1;
	log_info (_("no dirmngr running in this session\n"));
	}
	}
	prepare_dirmngr (ctrl, ctx, err);
	if (err)
	return err;

	*ctx_r = ctx;
	return 0;
	}


	static int
	start_dirmngr (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;

	log_assert (! dirmngr_ctx_locked);
	dirmngr_ctx_locked = 1;

	err = start_dirmngr_ext (ctrl, &dirmngr_ctx);
	/* We do not check ERR but the existence of a context because the
	error might come from a failed command send to the dirmngr.
	Fixme: Why don't we close the drimngr context if we encountered
	an error in prepare_dirmngr? */
	if (!dirmngr_ctx)
	dirmngr_ctx_locked = 0;
	return err;
	}


	static void
	release_dirmngr (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	(void)ctrl;

	if (!dirmngr_ctx_locked)
	log_error ("WARNING: trying to release a non-locked dirmngr ctx\n");
	dirmngr_ctx_locked = 0;
	}


	static int
	start_dirmngr2 (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;

	log_assert (! dirmngr2_ctx_locked);
	dirmngr2_ctx_locked = 1;

	err = start_dirmngr_ext (ctrl, &dirmngr2_ctx);
	if (!dirmngr2_ctx)
	dirmngr2_ctx_locked = 0;
	return err;
	}


	static void
	release_dirmngr2 (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	(void)ctrl;

	if (!dirmngr2_ctx_locked)
	log_error ("WARNING: trying to release a non-locked dirmngr2 ctx\n");
	dirmngr2_ctx_locked = 0;
	}



	/* Handle a SENDCERT inquiry. */
	static gpg_error_t
	inq_certificate (void opaque, const char line)
	{
	struct inq_certificate_parm_s *parm = opaque;
	const char *s;
	int rc;
	size_t n;
	const unsigned char *der;
	size_t derlen;
	int issuer_mode = 0;
	ksba_sexp_t ski = NULL;

	if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "SENDCERT")))
	{
	line = s;
	}
	else if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "SENDCERT_SKI")))
	{
	/* Send a certificate where a sourceKeyIdentifier is included. */
	line = s;
	ski = make_simple_sexp_from_hexstr (line, &n);
	line += n;
	while (*line == ' ')
	line++;
	}
	else if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "SENDISSUERCERT")))
	{
	line = s;
	issuer_mode = 1;
	}
	else if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "ISTRUSTED")))
	{
	/* The server is asking us whether the certificate is a trusted
	root certificate. */
	char fpr[41];
	struct rootca_flags_s rootca_flags;

	line = s;

	for (s=line,n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
	;
	if (*s \|\| n != 40)
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER);
	for (s=line, n=0; n < 40; s++, n++)
	fpr[n] = (s >= 'a')? (s & 0xdf): *s;
	fpr[n] = 0;

	if (!gpgsm_agent_istrusted (parm->ctrl, NULL, fpr, &rootca_flags))
	rc = assuan_send_data (parm->ctx, "1", 1);
	else
	rc = 0;
	return rc;
	}
	else
	{
	log_error ("unsupported inquiry '%s'\n", line);
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_INQUIRE);
	}

	if (!*line)
	{ /* Send the current certificate. */
	der = ksba_cert_get_image (issuer_mode? parm->issuer_cert : parm->cert,
	&derlen);
	if (!der)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CERT_OBJ);
	else
	rc = assuan_send_data (parm->ctx, der, derlen);
	}
	else if (issuer_mode)
	{
	log_error ("sending specific issuer certificate back "
	"is not yet implemented\n");
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_INQUIRE);
	}
	else
	{ /* Send the given certificate. */
	int err;
	ksba_cert_t cert;


	err = gpgsm_find_cert (parm->ctrl, line, ski, &cert, 1);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("certificate not found: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
	}
	else
	{
	der = ksba_cert_get_image (cert, &derlen);
	if (!der)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CERT_OBJ);
	else
	rc = assuan_send_data (parm->ctx, der, derlen);
	ksba_cert_release (cert);
	}
	}

	xfree (ski);
	return rc;
	}


	/* Take a 20 byte hexencoded string and put it into the provided
	20 byte buffer FPR in binary format. */
	static int
	unhexify_fpr (const char hexstr, unsigned char fpr)
	{
	const char *s;
	int n;

	for (s=hexstr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
	;
	if (*s \|\| (n != 40))
	return 0; /* no fingerprint (invalid or wrong length). */
	for (s=hexstr, n=0; *s; s += 2, n++)
	fpr[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
	return 1; /* okay */
	}


	/* This is a helper to print diagnostics from dirmngr indicated by
	* WARNING or NOTE status lines. Returns true if the status LINE was
	* processed. */
	static int
	warning_and_note_printer (const char *line)
	{
	const char s, s2;
	const char *warn = NULL;
	int is_note = 0;

	if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "WARNING")))
	;
	else if ((is_note = !!(s = has_leading_keyword (line, "NOTE"))))
	;
	else
	return 0; /* Nothing to process. */

	if ((s2 = has_leading_keyword (s, "no_crl_due_to_tor"))
	\|\| (s2 = has_leading_keyword (s, "no_ldap_due_to_tor"))
	\|\| (s2 = has_leading_keyword (s, "no_ocsp_due_to_tor")))
	warn = _("Tor might be in use - network access is limited");
	else
	warn = NULL;

	if (warn)
	{
	if (is_note)
	log_info (_("Note: %s\n"), warn);
	else
	log_info (_("WARNING: %s\n"), warn);
	if (s2)
	{
	while (*s2 && !spacep (s2))
	s2++;
	while (*s2 && spacep (s2))
	s2++;
	if (*s2)
	gpgsm_print_further_info ("%s", s2);
	}
	}

	return 1; /* Status line processed. */
	}


	static gpg_error_t
	isvalid_status_cb (void opaque, const char line)
	{
	struct isvalid_status_parm_s *parm = opaque;
	const char *s;

	if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "PROGRESS")))
	{
	if (parm->ctrl)
	{
	line = s;
	if (gpgsm_status (parm->ctrl, STATUS_PROGRESS, line))
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_CANCELED);
	}
	}
	else if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "ONLY_VALID_IF_CERT_VALID")))
	{
	parm->seen++;
	if (!*s \|\| !unhexify_fpr (s, parm->fpr))
	parm->seen++; /* Bump it to indicate an error. */
	}
	else if (warning_and_note_printer (line))
	{
	}

	return 0;
	}




	/* Call the directory manager to check whether the certificate is valid
	Returns 0 for valid or usually one of the errors:

	GPG_ERR_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
	GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN
	GPG_ERR_CRL_TOO_OLD

	Values for USE_OCSP:
	0 = Do CRL check.
	- 1 = Do an OCSP check but fallback to CRL unless CRLS are disabled.
	- 2 = Do only an OCSP check using only the default responder.
	+ 1 = Do an OCSP check but fallback to CRL unless CRLs are disabled.
	+ 2 = Do only an OCSP check (used for the chain model).
	*/
	-int
	+gpg_error_t
	gpgsm_dirmngr_isvalid (ctrl_t ctrl,
	ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_cert_t issuer_cert, int use_ocsp)
	{
	static int did_options;
	int rc;
	char certid, certfpr;
	char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
	struct inq_certificate_parm_s parm;
	struct isvalid_status_parm_s stparm;

	rc = start_dirmngr (ctrl);
	if (rc)
	return rc;

	certfpr = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
	certid = gpgsm_get_certid (cert);
	if (!certid)
	{
	log_error ("error getting the certificate ID\n");
	release_dirmngr (ctrl);
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	}

	if (opt.verbose > 1)
	{
	char *fpr = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
	log_info ("asking dirmngr about %s%s\n", fpr,
	use_ocsp? " (using OCSP)":"");
	xfree (fpr);
	}

	parm.ctx = dirmngr_ctx;
	parm.ctrl = ctrl;
	parm.cert = cert;
	parm.issuer_cert = issuer_cert;

	stparm.ctrl = ctrl;
	stparm.seen = 0;
	memset (stparm.fpr, 0, 20);

	/* It is sufficient to send the options only once because we have
	* one connection per process only. */
	if (!did_options)
	{
	if (opt.force_crl_refresh)
	assuan_transact (dirmngr_ctx, "OPTION force-crl-refresh=1",
	NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
	did_options = 1;
	}
	- snprintf (line, DIM(line), "ISVALID%s%s %s%s%s",
	- use_ocsp == 2 \|\| opt.no_crl_check ? " --only-ocsp":"",
	- use_ocsp == 2? " --force-default-responder":"",
	+ snprintf (line, DIM(line), "ISVALID%s %s%s%s",
	+ (use_ocsp == 2 \|\| opt.no_crl_check) ? " --only-ocsp":"",
	certid,
	use_ocsp? " ":"",
	use_ocsp? certfpr:"");
	xfree (certid);
	xfree (certfpr);

	rc = assuan_transact (dirmngr_ctx, line, NULL, NULL,
	inq_certificate, &parm,
	isvalid_status_cb, &stparm);
	if (opt.verbose > 1)
	log_info ("response of dirmngr: %s\n", rc? gpg_strerror (rc): "okay");

	if (!rc && stparm.seen)
	{
	/* Need to also check the certificate validity. */
	if (stparm.seen != 1)
	{
	log_error ("communication problem with dirmngr detected\n");
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CRL);
	}
	else
	{
	ksba_cert_t rspcert = NULL;

	if (get_cached_cert (dirmngr_ctx, stparm.fpr, &rspcert))
	{
	/* Ooops: Something went wrong getting the certificate
	from the dirmngr. Try our own cert store now. */
	KEYDB_HANDLE kh;

	kh = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (!kh)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
	if (!rc)
	rc = keydb_search_fpr (ctrl, kh, stparm.fpr);
	if (!rc)
	rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &rspcert);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("unable to find the certificate used "
	"by the dirmngr: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CRL);
	}
	keydb_release (kh);
	}

	if (!rc)
	{
	rc = gpgsm_cert_use_ocsp_p (rspcert);
	if (rc)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CRL);
	else
	{
	/* Note the no_dirmngr flag: This avoids checking
	this certificate over and over again. */
	rc = gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl, rspcert, GNUPG_ISOTIME_NONE,
	NULL, 0, NULL,
	VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR, NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("invalid certificate used for CRL/OCSP: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CRL);
	}
	}
	}
	ksba_cert_release (rspcert);
	}
	}
	release_dirmngr (ctrl);
	return rc;
	}



	/* Lookup helpers*/
	static gpg_error_t
	lookup_cb (void opaque, const void buffer, size_t length)
	{
	struct lookup_parm_s *parm = opaque;
	size_t len;
	char *buf;
	ksba_cert_t cert;
	int rc;

	if (parm->error)
	return 0;

	if (buffer)
	{
	put_membuf (&parm->data, buffer, length);
	return 0;
	}
	/* END encountered - process what we have */
	buf = get_membuf (&parm->data, &len);
	if (!buf)
	{
	parm->error = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
	return 0;
	}

	rc = ksba_cert_new (&cert);
	if (rc)
	{
	parm->error = rc;
	return 0;
	}
	rc = ksba_cert_init_from_mem (cert, buf, len);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("failed to parse a certificate: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	else
	{
	parm->cb (parm->cb_value, cert);
	}

	ksba_cert_release (cert);
	init_membuf (&parm->data, 4096);
	return 0;
	}

	/* Return a properly escaped pattern from NAMES. The only error
	return is NULL to indicate a malloc failure. */
	static char *
	pattern_from_strlist (strlist_t names)
	{
	strlist_t sl;
	int n;
	const char *s;
	char pattern, p;

	for (n=0, sl=names; sl; sl = sl->next)
	{
	for (s=sl->d; *s; s++, n++)
	{
	if (s == '%' \|\| s == ' ' \|\| *s == '+')
	n += 2;
	}
	n++;
	}

	p = pattern = xtrymalloc (n+1);
	if (!pattern)
	return NULL;

	for (sl=names; sl; sl = sl->next)
	{
	for (s=sl->d; *s; s++)
	{
	switch (*s)
	{
	case '%':
	*p++ = '%';
	*p++ = '2';
	*p++ = '5';
	break;
	case ' ':
	*p++ = '%';
	*p++ = '2';
	*p++ = '0';
	break;
	case '+':
	*p++ = '%';
	*p++ = '2';
	*p++ = 'B';
	break;
	default:
	p++ = s;
	break;
	}
	}
	*p++ = ' ';
	}
	if (p == pattern)
	pattern = 0; / is empty */
	else
	p[-1] = '\0'; /* remove trailing blank */

	return pattern;
	}

	static gpg_error_t
	lookup_status_cb (void opaque, const char line)
	{
	struct lookup_parm_s *parm = opaque;
	const char *s;

	if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "PROGRESS")))
	{
	if (parm->ctrl)
	{
	line = s;
	if (gpgsm_status (parm->ctrl, STATUS_PROGRESS, line))
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_CANCELED);
	}
	}
	else if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "TRUNCATED")))
	{
	if (parm->ctrl)
	{
	line = s;
	gpgsm_status (parm->ctrl, STATUS_TRUNCATED, line);
	}
	}
	else if (warning_and_note_printer (line))
	{
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/* Run the Directory Manager's lookup command using the pattern
	compiled from the strings given in NAMES or from URI. The caller
	must provide the callback CB which will be passed cert by cert.
	Note that CTRL is optional. With CACHE_ONLY the dirmngr will
	search only its own key cache. */
	int
	gpgsm_dirmngr_lookup (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names, const char *uri,
	int cache_only,
	void (cb)(void, ksba_cert_t), void *cb_value)
	{
	int rc;
	char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
	struct lookup_parm_s parm;
	size_t len;
	assuan_context_t ctx;
	const char *s;

	if ((names && uri) \|\| (!names && !uri))
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG);

	/* The lookup function can be invoked from the callback of a lookup
	function, for example to walk the chain. */
	if (!dirmngr_ctx_locked)
	{
	rc = start_dirmngr (ctrl);
	if (rc)
	return rc;
	ctx = dirmngr_ctx;
	}
	else if (!dirmngr2_ctx_locked)
	{
	rc = start_dirmngr2 (ctrl);
	if (rc)
	return rc;
	ctx = dirmngr2_ctx;
	}
	else
	{
	log_fatal ("both dirmngr contexts are in use\n");
	}

	if (names)
	{
	char *pattern = pattern_from_strlist (names);
	if (!pattern)
	{
	if (ctx == dirmngr_ctx)
	release_dirmngr (ctrl);
	else
	release_dirmngr2 (ctrl);

	return out_of_core ();
	}
	snprintf (line, DIM(line), "LOOKUP%s %s",
	cache_only? " --cache-only":"", pattern);
	xfree (pattern);
	}
	else
	{
	for (s=uri; *s; s++)
	if (*s <= ' ')
	{
	if (ctx == dirmngr_ctx)
	release_dirmngr (ctrl);
	else
	release_dirmngr2 (ctrl);
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_URI);
	}
	snprintf (line, DIM(line), "LOOKUP --url %s", uri);
	}

	parm.ctrl = ctrl;
	parm.ctx = ctx;
	parm.cb = cb;
	parm.cb_value = cb_value;
	parm.error = 0;
	init_membuf (&parm.data, 4096);

	rc = assuan_transact (ctx, line, lookup_cb, &parm,
	NULL, NULL, lookup_status_cb, &parm);
	xfree (get_membuf (&parm.data, &len));

	if (ctx == dirmngr_ctx)
	release_dirmngr (ctrl);
	else
	release_dirmngr2 (ctrl);

	if (rc)
	return rc;
	return parm.error;
	}



	static gpg_error_t
	get_cached_cert_data_cb (void opaque, const void buffer, size_t length)
	{
	struct membuf *mb = opaque;

	if (buffer)
	put_membuf (mb, buffer, length);
	return 0;
	}

	/* Return a certificate from the Directory Manager's cache. This
	function only returns one certificate which must be specified using
	the fingerprint FPR and will be stored at R_CERT. On error NULL is
	stored at R_CERT and an error code returned. Note that the caller
	must provide the locked dirmngr context CTX. */
	static gpg_error_t
	get_cached_cert (assuan_context_t ctx,
	const unsigned char fpr, ksba_cert_t r_cert)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
	char hexfpr[2*20+1];
	struct membuf mb;
	char *buf;
	size_t buflen = 0;
	ksba_cert_t cert;

	*r_cert = NULL;

	bin2hex (fpr, 20, hexfpr);
	snprintf (line, DIM(line), "LOOKUP --single --cache-only 0x%s", hexfpr);

	init_membuf (&mb, 4096);
	err = assuan_transact (ctx, line, get_cached_cert_data_cb, &mb,
	NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
	buf = get_membuf (&mb, &buflen);
	if (err)
	{
	xfree (buf);
	return err;
	}
	if (!buf)
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);

	err = ksba_cert_new (&cert);
	if (err)
	{
	xfree (buf);
	return err;
	}
	err = ksba_cert_init_from_mem (cert, buf, buflen);
	xfree (buf);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("failed to parse a certificate: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	ksba_cert_release (cert);
	return err;
	}

	*r_cert = cert;
	return 0;
	}



	/* Run Command helpers*/

	/* Fairly simple callback to write all output of dirmngr to stdout. */
	static gpg_error_t
	run_command_cb (void opaque, const void buffer, size_t length)
	{
	(void)opaque;

	if (buffer)
	{
	if ( fwrite (buffer, length, 1, stdout) != 1 )
	log_error ("error writing to stdout: %s\n", strerror (errno));
	}
	return 0;
	}

	/* Handle inquiries from the dirmngr COMMAND. */
	static gpg_error_t
	run_command_inq_cb (void opaque, const char line)
	{
	struct run_command_parm_s *parm = opaque;
	const char *s;
	int rc = 0;

	if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "SENDCERT")))
	{ /* send the given certificate */
	int err;
	ksba_cert_t cert;
	const unsigned char *der;
	size_t derlen;

	line = s;
	if (!*line)
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER);

	err = gpgsm_find_cert (parm->ctrl, line, NULL, &cert, 1);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("certificate not found: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
	}
	else
	{
	der = ksba_cert_get_image (cert, &derlen);
	if (!der)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CERT_OBJ);
	else
	rc = assuan_send_data (parm->ctx, der, derlen);
	ksba_cert_release (cert);
	}
	}
	else if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "PRINTINFO")))
	{ /* Simply show the message given in the argument. */
	line = s;
	log_info ("dirmngr: %s\n", line);
	}
	else
	{
	log_error ("unsupported inquiry '%s'\n", line);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_INQUIRE);
	}

	return rc;
	}

	static gpg_error_t
	run_command_status_cb (void opaque, const char line)
	{
	ctrl_t ctrl = opaque;
	const char *s;

	if (opt.verbose)
	{
	log_info ("dirmngr status: %s\n", line);
	}
	if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "PROGRESS")))
	{
	if (ctrl)
	{
	line = s;
	if (gpgsm_status (ctrl, STATUS_PROGRESS, line))
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_CANCELED);
	}
	}
	else if (warning_and_note_printer (line))
	{
	}

	return 0;
	}



	/* Pass COMMAND to dirmngr and print all output generated by Dirmngr
	to stdout. A couple of inquiries are defined (see above). ARGC
	arguments in ARGV are given to the Dirmngr. Spaces, plus and
	percent characters within the argument strings are percent escaped
	so that blanks can act as delimiters. */
	int
	gpgsm_dirmngr_run_command (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *command,
	int argc, char **argv)
	{
	int rc;
	int i;
	const char *s;
	char line, p;
	size_t len;
	struct run_command_parm_s parm;

	rc = start_dirmngr (ctrl);
	if (rc)
	return rc;

	parm.ctrl = ctrl;
	parm.ctx = dirmngr_ctx;

	len = strlen (command) + 1;
	for (i=0; i < argc; i++)
	len += 1 + 3strlen (argv[i]); / enough space for percent escaping */
	line = xtrymalloc (len);
	if (!line)
	{
	release_dirmngr (ctrl);
	return out_of_core ();
	}

	p = stpcpy (line, command);
	for (i=0; i < argc; i++)
	{
	*p++ = ' ';
	for (s=argv[i]; *s; s++)
	{
	if (!isascii (*s))
	p++ = s;
	else if (*s == ' ')
	*p++ = '+';
	else if (!isprint (s) \|\| s == '+')
	{
	sprintf (p, "%%%02X", (const unsigned char )s);
	p += 3;
	}
	else
	p++ = s;
	}
	}
	*p = 0;

	rc = assuan_transact (dirmngr_ctx, line,
	run_command_cb, NULL,
	run_command_inq_cb, &parm,
	run_command_status_cb, ctrl);
	xfree (line);
	log_info ("response of dirmngr: %s\n", rc? gpg_strerror (rc): "okay");
	release_dirmngr (ctrl);
	return rc;
	}
	diff --git a/sm/certchain.c b/sm/certchain.c
	index 4050680e8..ca03a766f 100644
	--- a/sm/certchain.c
	+++ b/sm/certchain.c
	@@ -1,2399 +1,2401 @@
	/* certchain.c - certificate chain validation
	* Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
	* 2006, 2007, 2008, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <errno.h>
	#include <unistd.h>
	#include <time.h>
	#include <stdarg.h>

	#include "gpgsm.h"
	#include <gcrypt.h>
	#include <ksba.h>

	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "../kbx/keybox.h" /* for KEYBOX_FLAG_* */
	#include "../common/i18n.h"
	#include "../common/tlv.h"


	/* The OID for the authorityInfoAccess's caIssuers. */
	static const char oidstr_caIssuers[] = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2";


	/* Object to keep track of certain root certificates. */
	struct marktrusted_info_s
	{
	struct marktrusted_info_s *next;
	unsigned char fpr[20];
	};
	static struct marktrusted_info_s *marktrusted_info;


	/* While running the validation function we want to keep track of the
	certificates in the chain. This type is used for that. */
	struct chain_item_s
	{
	struct chain_item_s *next;
	ksba_cert_t cert; /* The certificate. */
	int is_root; /* The certificate is the root certificate. */
	};
	typedef struct chain_item_s *chain_item_t;


	static int is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert,
	const char issuerdn, const char subjectdn);
	static int get_regtp_ca_info (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int *chainlen);


	/* This function returns true if we already asked during this session
	whether the root certificate CERT shall be marked as trusted. */
	static int
	already_asked_marktrusted (ksba_cert_t cert)
	{
	unsigned char fpr[20];
	struct marktrusted_info_s *r;

	gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fpr, NULL);
	/* No context switches in the loop! */
	for (r=marktrusted_info; r; r= r->next)
	if (!memcmp (r->fpr, fpr, 20))
	return 1;
	return 0;
	}

	/* Flag certificate CERT as already asked whether it shall be marked
	as trusted. */
	static void
	set_already_asked_marktrusted (ksba_cert_t cert)
	{
	unsigned char fpr[20];
	struct marktrusted_info_s *r;

	gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fpr, NULL);
	for (r=marktrusted_info; r; r= r->next)
	if (!memcmp (r->fpr, fpr, 20))
	return; /* Already marked. */
	r = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *r);
	if (!r)
	return;
	memcpy (r->fpr, fpr, 20);
	r->next = marktrusted_info;
	marktrusted_info = r;
	}

	/* If LISTMODE is true, print FORMAT using LISTMODE to FP. If
	LISTMODE is false, use the string to print an log_info or, if
	IS_ERROR is true, and log_error. */
	static void
	do_list (int is_error, int listmode, estream_t fp, const char *format, ...)
	{
	va_list arg_ptr;

	va_start (arg_ptr, format) ;
	if (listmode)
	{
	if (fp)
	{
	es_fputs (" [", fp);
	es_vfprintf (fp, format, arg_ptr);
	es_fputs ("]\n", fp);
	}
	}
	else
	{
	log_logv (is_error? GPGRT_LOGLVL_ERROR: GPGRT_LOGLVL_INFO,
	format, arg_ptr);
	log_printf ("\n");
	}
	va_end (arg_ptr);
	}

	/* Return 0 if A and B are equal. */
	static int
	compare_certs (ksba_cert_t a, ksba_cert_t b)
	{
	const unsigned char img_a, img_b;
	size_t len_a, len_b;

	img_a = ksba_cert_get_image (a, &len_a);
	if (!img_a)
	return 1;
	img_b = ksba_cert_get_image (b, &len_b);
	if (!img_b)
	return 1;
	return !(len_a == len_b && !memcmp (img_a, img_b, len_a));
	}


	/* Return true if CERT has the validityModel extensions and defines
	the use of the chain model. */
	static int
	has_validation_model_chain (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t listfp)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	int idx, yes;
	const char *oid;
	size_t off, derlen, objlen, hdrlen;
	const unsigned char *der;
	int class, tag, constructed, ndef;
	char *oidbuf;

	for (idx=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_extension (cert, idx,
	&oid, NULL, &off, &derlen));idx++)
	if (!strcmp (oid, "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5") )
	break;
	if (err)
	return 0; /* Not found. */
	der = ksba_cert_get_image (cert, NULL);
	if (!der)
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); /* Oops */
	goto leave;
	}
	der += off;

	err = parse_ber_header (&der, &derlen, &class, &tag, &constructed,
	&ndef, &objlen, &hdrlen);
	if (!err && (objlen > derlen \|\| tag != TAG_SEQUENCE))
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
	if (err)
	goto leave;
	derlen = objlen;
	err = parse_ber_header (&der, &derlen, &class, &tag, &constructed,
	&ndef, &objlen, &hdrlen);
	if (!err && (objlen > derlen \|\| tag != TAG_OBJECT_ID))
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
	if (err)
	goto leave;
	oidbuf = ksba_oid_to_str (der, objlen);
	if (!oidbuf)
	{
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	goto leave;
	}

	if (opt.verbose)
	do_list (0, listmode, listfp,
	_("validation model requested by certificate: %s"),
	!strcmp (oidbuf, "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5.1")? _("chain") :
	!strcmp (oidbuf, "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5.2")? _("shell") :
	/* */ oidbuf);
	yes = !strcmp (oidbuf, "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5.1");
	ksba_free (oidbuf);
	return yes;


	leave:
	log_error ("error parsing validityModel: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	return 0;
	}



	static int
	unknown_criticals (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t fp)
	{
	static const char *known[] = {
	"2.5.29.15", /* keyUsage */
	"2.5.29.17", /* subjectAltName
	Japanese DoCoMo certs mark them as critical. PKIX
	only requires them as critical if subjectName is
	empty. I don't know whether our code gracefully
	handles such empry subjectNames but that is
	another story. */
	"2.5.29.19", /* basic Constraints */
	"2.5.29.32", /* certificatePolicies */
	"2.5.29.37", /* extendedKeyUsage - handled by certlist.c */
	"1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5", /* validityModel - handled here. */
	NULL
	};
	int rc = 0, i, idx, crit;
	const char *oid;
	gpg_error_t err;
	int unsupported;
	strlist_t sl;

	for (idx=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_extension (cert, idx,
	&oid, &crit, NULL, NULL));idx++)
	{
	if (!crit)
	continue;
	for (i=0; known[i] && strcmp (known[i],oid); i++)
	;
	unsupported = !known[i];

	/* If this critical extension is not supported. Check the list
	of to be ignored extensions to see whether we claim that it
	is supported. */
	if (unsupported && opt.ignored_cert_extensions)
	{
	for (sl=opt.ignored_cert_extensions;
	sl && strcmp (sl->d, oid); sl = sl->next)
	;
	if (sl)
	unsupported = 0;
	}
	if (unsupported)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, fp,
	_("critical certificate extension %s is not supported"),
	oid);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT);
	}
	}
	/* We ignore the error codes EOF as well as no-value. The later will
	occur for certificates with no extensions at all. */
	if (err
	&& gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF
	&& gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_VALUE)
	rc = err;

	return rc;
	}


	/* Check whether CERT is an allowed certificate. This requires that
	CERT matches all requirements for such a CA, i.e. the
	BasicConstraints extension. The function returns 0 on success and
	the allowed length of the chain at CHAINLEN. */
	static int
	allowed_ca (ctrl_t ctrl,
	ksba_cert_t cert, int *chainlen, int listmode, estream_t fp)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	int flag;

	err = ksba_cert_is_ca (cert, &flag, chainlen);
	if (err)
	return err;
	if (!flag)
	{
	if (get_regtp_ca_info (ctrl, cert, chainlen))
	{
	/* Note that dirmngr takes a different way to cope with such
	certs. */
	return 0; /* RegTP issued certificate. */
	}

	do_list (1, listmode, fp,_("issuer certificate is not marked as a CA"));
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CA_CERT);
	}
	return 0;
	}


	static int
	check_cert_policy (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t fplist)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	char *policies;
	estream_t fp;
	int any_critical;

	err = ksba_cert_get_cert_policies (cert, &policies);
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
	return 0; /* No policy given. */
	if (err)
	return err;

	/* STRING is a line delimited list of certificate policies as stored
	in the certificate. The line itself is colon delimited where the
	first field is the OID of the policy and the second field either
	N or C for normal or critical extension */

	if (opt.verbose > 1 && !listmode)
	log_info ("certificate's policy list: %s\n", policies);

	/* The check is very minimal but won't give false positives */
	any_critical = !!strstr (policies, ":C");

	if (!opt.policy_file)
	{
	xfree (policies);
	if (any_critical)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, fplist,
	_("critical marked policy without configured policies"));
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH);
	}
	return 0;
	}

	fp = es_fopen (opt.policy_file, "r");
	if (!fp)
	{
	if (opt.verbose \|\| errno != ENOENT)
	log_info (_("failed to open '%s': %s\n"),
	opt.policy_file, strerror (errno));
	xfree (policies);
	/* With no critical policies this is only a warning */
	if (!any_critical)
	{
	if (!opt.quiet)
	do_list (0, listmode, fplist,
	_("Note: non-critical certificate policy not allowed"));
	return 0;
	}
	do_list (1, listmode, fplist,
	_("certificate policy not allowed"));
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH);
	}

	for (;;)
	{
	int c;
	char *p, line[256];
	char haystack, allowed;

	/* read line */
	do
	{
	if (!es_fgets (line, DIM(line)-1, fp) )
	{
	gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error_from_syserror ();

	xfree (policies);
	if (es_feof (fp))
	{
	es_fclose (fp);
	/* With no critical policies this is only a warning */
	if (!any_critical)
	{
	do_list (0, listmode, fplist,
	_("Note: non-critical certificate policy not allowed"));
	return 0;
	}
	do_list (1, listmode, fplist,
	_("certificate policy not allowed"));
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH);
	}
	es_fclose (fp);
	return tmperr;
	}

	if (!*line \|\| line[strlen(line)-1] != '\n')
	{
	/* eat until end of line */
	while ((c = es_getc (fp)) != EOF && c != '\n')
	;
	es_fclose (fp);
	xfree (policies);
	return gpg_error (*line? GPG_ERR_LINE_TOO_LONG
	: GPG_ERR_INCOMPLETE_LINE);
	}

	/* Allow for empty lines and spaces */
	for (p=line; spacep (p); p++)
	;
	}
	while (!p \|\| p == '\n' \|\| *p == '#');

	/* Parse line. Note that the line has always a LF and spacep
	does not consider a LF a space. Thus strpbrk will always
	succeed. */
	for (allowed=line; spacep (allowed); allowed++)
	;
	p = strpbrk (allowed, " :\n");
	if (!*p \|\| p == allowed)
	{
	es_fclose (fp);
	xfree (policies);
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CONFIGURATION);
	}
	p = 0; / strip the rest of the line */
	/* See whether we find ALLOWED (which is an OID) in POLICIES */
	for (haystack=policies; (p=strstr (haystack, allowed)); haystack = p+1)
	{
	if ( !(p == policies \|\| p[-1] == '\n') )
	continue; /* Does not match the begin of a line. */
	if (p[strlen (allowed)] != ':')
	continue; /* The length does not match. */
	/* Yep - it does match so return okay. */
	es_fclose (fp);
	xfree (policies);
	return 0;
	}
	}
	}


	/* Helper function for find_up. This resets the key handle and search
	for an issuer ISSUER with a subjectKeyIdentifier of KEYID. Returns
	0 on success or GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND when not found. */
	static int
	find_up_search_by_keyid (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
	const char *issuer, ksba_sexp_t keyid)
	{
	int rc;
	ksba_cert_t cert = NULL;
	ksba_sexp_t subj = NULL;
	ksba_isotime_t not_before, not_after, last_not_before, ne_last_not_before;
	ksba_cert_t found_cert = NULL;
	ksba_cert_t ne_found_cert = NULL;

	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	while (!(rc = keydb_search_subject (ctrl, kh, issuer)))
	{
	ksba_cert_release (cert); cert = NULL;
	rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &cert);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_cert failed in %s: %s <%s>\n",
	__func__, gpg_strerror (rc), gpg_strsource (rc));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
	goto leave;
	}
	xfree (subj);
	if (!ksba_cert_get_subj_key_id (cert, NULL, &subj))
	{
	if (!cmp_simple_canon_sexp (keyid, subj))
	{
	/* Found matching cert. */
	rc = ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 0, not_before);
	if (!rc)
	rc = ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 1, not_after);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_validity() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
	goto leave;
	}

	if (!found_cert
	\|\| strcmp (last_not_before, not_before) < 0)
	{
	/* This certificate is the first one found or newer
	* than the previous one. This copes with
	* re-issuing CA certificates while keeping the same
	* key information. */
	gnupg_copy_time (last_not_before, not_before);
	ksba_cert_release (found_cert);
	ksba_cert_ref ((found_cert = cert));
	keydb_push_found_state (kh);
	}

	if (*not_after && strcmp (ctrl->current_time, not_after) > 0 )
	; /* CERT has expired - don't consider it. */
	else if (!ne_found_cert
	\|\| strcmp (ne_last_not_before, not_before) < 0)
	{
	/* This certificate is the first non-expired one
	* found or newer than the previous non-expired one. */
	gnupg_copy_time (ne_last_not_before, not_before);
	ksba_cert_release (ne_found_cert);
	ksba_cert_ref ((ne_found_cert = cert));
	}
	}
	}
	}

	if (!found_cert)
	goto leave;

	/* Take the last saved one. Note that push/pop_found_state are
	* misnomers because there is no stack of states. Renaming them to
	* save/restore_found_state would be better. */
	keydb_pop_found_state (kh);
	rc = 0; /* Ignore EOF or other error after the first cert. */

	/* We need to consider some corner cases. It is possible that we
	* have a long term certificate (e.g. valid from 2008 to 2033) as
	* well as a re-issued (i.e. using the same key material) short term
	* certificate (say from 2016 to 2019). Using the short term
	* certificate is the proper solution. But we need to take care if
	* there is no re-issued new short term certificate (e.g. from 2020
	* to 2023) available. In that case it is better to use the long
	* term certificate which is still valid. The code may run into
	* minor problems in the case of the chain validation mode. Given
	* that this corner case is due to non-diligent PKI management we
	* ignore this problem. */

	/* The most common case is that the found certificate is not expired
	* and thus identical to the one found from the list of non-expired
	* certs. We can stop here. */
	if (found_cert == ne_found_cert)
	goto leave;
	/* If we do not have a non expired certificate the actual cert is
	* expired and we can also stop here. */
	if (!ne_found_cert)
	goto leave;
	/* Now we need to see whether the found certificate is expired and
	* only in this case we return the certificate found in the list of
	* non-expired certs. */
	rc = ksba_cert_get_validity (found_cert, 1, not_after);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_validity() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
	goto leave;
	}
	if (*not_after && strcmp (ctrl->current_time, not_after) > 0 )
	{ /* CERT has expired. Use the NE_FOUND_CERT. Because we have no
	* found state for this we need to search for it again. */
	unsigned char fpr[20];

	gpgsm_get_fingerprint (ne_found_cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fpr, NULL);
	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	rc = keydb_search_fpr (ctrl, kh, fpr);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_search_fpr() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
	goto leave;
	}
	/* Ready. The NE_FOUND_CERT is available via keydb_get_cert. */
	}

	leave:
	ksba_cert_release (found_cert);
	ksba_cert_release (ne_found_cert);
	ksba_cert_release (cert);
	xfree (subj);
	return rc? gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND) : 0;
	}


	struct find_up_store_certs_s
	{
	ctrl_t ctrl;
	int count;
	unsigned int want_fpr:1;
	unsigned int got_fpr:1;
	unsigned char fpr[20];
	};

	static void
	find_up_store_certs_cb (void *cb_value, ksba_cert_t cert)
	{
	struct find_up_store_certs_s *parm = cb_value;

	if (keydb_store_cert (parm->ctrl, cert, 1, NULL))
	log_error ("error storing issuer certificate as ephemeral\n");
	else if (parm->want_fpr && !parm->got_fpr)
	{
	if (!gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, 0, parm->fpr, NULL))
	log_error (_("failed to get the fingerprint\n"));
	else
	parm->got_fpr = 1;
	}
	parm->count++;
	}


	/* Helper for find_up(). Locate the certificate for ISSUER using an
	external lookup. KH is the keydb context we are currently using.
	On success 0 is returned and the certificate may be retrieved from
	the keydb using keydb_get_cert(). KEYID is the keyIdentifier from
	the AKI or NULL. */
	static int
	find_up_external (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
	const char *issuer, ksba_sexp_t keyid)
	{
	int rc;
	strlist_t names = NULL;
	struct find_up_store_certs_s find_up_store_certs_parm;
	char *pattern;
	const char *s;

	find_up_store_certs_parm.ctrl = ctrl;
	find_up_store_certs_parm.want_fpr = 0;
	find_up_store_certs_parm.got_fpr = 0;
	find_up_store_certs_parm.count = 0;

	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("looking up issuer at external location\n"));
	/* The Dirmngr process is confused about unknown attributes. As a
	quick and ugly hack we locate the CN and use the issuer string
	starting at this attribite. Fixme: we should have far better
	parsing for external lookups in the Dirmngr. */
	s = strstr (issuer, "CN=");
	if (!s \|\| s == issuer \|\| s[-1] != ',')
	s = issuer;
	pattern = xtrymalloc (strlen (s)+2);
	if (!pattern)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	strcpy (stpcpy (pattern, "/"), s);
	add_to_strlist (&names, pattern);
	xfree (pattern);

	rc = gpgsm_dirmngr_lookup (ctrl, names, NULL, 0, find_up_store_certs_cb,
	&find_up_store_certs_parm);
	free_strlist (names);

	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("number of issuers matching: %d\n"),
	find_up_store_certs_parm.count);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("external key lookup failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
	}
	else if (!find_up_store_certs_parm.count)
	rc = gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND;
	else
	{
	int old;
	/* The issuers are currently stored in the ephemeral key DB, so
	we temporary switch to ephemeral mode. */
	old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
	if (keyid)
	rc = find_up_search_by_keyid (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
	else
	{
	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	rc = keydb_search_subject (ctrl, kh, issuer);
	}
	keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
	}
	return rc;
	}


	/* Helper for find_up(). Locate the certificate for CERT using the
	* caIssuer from the authorityInfoAccess. KH is the keydb context we
	* are currently using. On success 0 is returned and the certificate
	* may be retrieved from the keydb using keydb_get_cert(). If no
	* suitable authorityInfoAccess is encoded in the certificate
	* GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND is returned. */
	static gpg_error_t
	find_up_via_auth_info_access (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh, ksba_cert_t cert)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	struct find_up_store_certs_s find_up_store_certs_parm;
	char url, ldapurl;
	int idx, i;
	char *oid;
	ksba_name_t name;

	find_up_store_certs_parm.ctrl = ctrl;
	find_up_store_certs_parm.want_fpr = 1;
	find_up_store_certs_parm.got_fpr = 0;
	find_up_store_certs_parm.count = 0;

	/* Find suitable URLs; if there is a http scheme we prefer that. */
	url = ldapurl = NULL;
	for (idx=0;
	!url && !(err = ksba_cert_get_authority_info_access (cert, idx,
	&oid, &name));
	idx++)
	{
	if (!strcmp (oid, oidstr_caIssuers))
	{
	for (i=0; !url && ksba_name_enum (name, i); i++)
	{
	char *p = ksba_name_get_uri (name, i);
	if (p)
	{
	if (!strncmp (p, "http:", 5) \|\| !strncmp (p, "https:", 6))
	url = p;
	else if (ldapurl)
	xfree (p); /* We already got one. */
	else if (!strncmp (p, "ldap:",5) \|\| !strncmp (p, "ldaps:",6))
	ldapurl = p;
	}
	else
	xfree (p);
	}
	}
	ksba_name_release (name);
	ksba_free (oid);
	}
	if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF)
	{
	log_error (_("can't get authorityInfoAccess: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	return err;
	}
	if (!url && ldapurl)
	{
	/* No HTTP scheme; fallback to LDAP if available. */
	url = ldapurl;
	ldapurl = NULL;
	}
	xfree (ldapurl);
	if (!url)
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);

	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info ("looking up issuer via authorityInfoAccess.caIssuers\n");

	err = gpgsm_dirmngr_lookup (ctrl, NULL, url, 0, find_up_store_certs_cb,
	&find_up_store_certs_parm);

	/* Although we might receive several certificates we use only the
	* first one. Or more exacty the first one for which we retrieved
	* the fingerprint. */
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info ("number of caIssuers found: %d\n",
	find_up_store_certs_parm.count);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("external URL lookup failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
	}
	else if (!find_up_store_certs_parm.got_fpr)
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
	else
	{
	int old;
	/* The retrieved certificates are currently stored in the
	* ephemeral key DB, so we temporary switch to ephemeral
	* mode. */
	old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	err = keydb_search_fpr (ctrl, kh, find_up_store_certs_parm.fpr);
	keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
	}

	return err;
	}


	/* Helper for find_up(). Ask the dirmngr for the certificate for
	ISSUER with optional SERIALNO. KH is the keydb context we are
	currently using. With SUBJECT_MODE set, ISSUER is searched as the
	subject. On success 0 is returned and the certificate is available
	in the ephemeral DB. */
	static int
	find_up_dirmngr (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
	ksba_sexp_t serialno, const char *issuer, int subject_mode)
	{
	int rc;
	strlist_t names = NULL;
	struct find_up_store_certs_s find_up_store_certs_parm;
	char *pattern;

	(void)kh;

	find_up_store_certs_parm.ctrl = ctrl;
	find_up_store_certs_parm.count = 0;

	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("looking up issuer from the Dirmngr cache\n"));
	if (subject_mode)
	{
	pattern = xtrymalloc (strlen (issuer)+2);
	if (pattern)
	strcpy (stpcpy (pattern, "/"), issuer);
	}
	else if (serialno)
	pattern = gpgsm_format_sn_issuer (serialno, issuer);
	else
	{
	pattern = xtrymalloc (strlen (issuer)+3);
	if (pattern)
	strcpy (stpcpy (pattern, "#/"), issuer);
	}
	if (!pattern)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	add_to_strlist (&names, pattern);
	xfree (pattern);

	rc = gpgsm_dirmngr_lookup (ctrl, names, NULL, 1, find_up_store_certs_cb,
	&find_up_store_certs_parm);
	free_strlist (names);

	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("number of matching certificates: %d\n"),
	find_up_store_certs_parm.count);
	if (rc && opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("dirmngr cache-only key lookup failed: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	return ((!rc && find_up_store_certs_parm.count)
	? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND));
	}



	/* Locate issuing certificate for CERT. ISSUER is the name of the
	issuer used as a fallback if the other methods don't work. If
	FIND_NEXT is true, the function shall return the next possible
	issuer. The certificate itself is not directly returned but a
	keydb_get_cert on the keydb context KH will return it. Returns 0
	on success, GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND if not found or another error code. */
	static gpg_error_t
	find_up (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
	ksba_cert_t cert, const char *issuer, int find_next)
	{
	ksba_name_t authid;
	ksba_sexp_t authidno;
	ksba_sexp_t keyid;
	gpg_error_t err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);

	if (DBG_X509)
	log_debug ("looking for parent certificate\n");
	if (!ksba_cert_get_auth_key_id (cert, &keyid, &authid, &authidno))
	{
	const char *s = ksba_name_enum (authid, 0);
	if (s && *authidno)
	{
	err = keydb_search_issuer_sn (ctrl, kh, s, authidno);
	if (err)
	keydb_search_reset (kh);

	if (!err && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via authid and sn+issuer\n");

	/* In case of an error, try to get the certificate from the
	dirmngr. That is done by trying to put that certificate
	into the ephemeral DB and let the code below do the
	actual retrieve. Thus there is no error checking.
	Skipped in find_next mode as usual. */
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && !find_next)
	find_up_dirmngr (ctrl, kh, authidno, s, 0);

	/* In case of an error try the ephemeral DB. We can't do
	that in find_next mode because we can't keep the search
	state then. */
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && !find_next)
	{
	int old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
	if (!old)
	{
	err = keydb_search_issuer_sn (ctrl, kh, s, authidno);
	if (err)
	keydb_search_reset (kh);

	if (!err && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via authid and sn+issuer (ephem)\n");
	}
	keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
	}
	if (err) /* Need to make sure to have this error code. */
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
	}

	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && keyid && !find_next)
	{
	/* Not found by AKI.issuer_sn. Lets try the AKI.ki
	instead. Loop over all certificates with that issuer as
	subject and stop for the one with a matching
	subjectKeyIdentifier. */
	/* Fixme: Should we also search in the dirmngr? */
	err = find_up_search_by_keyid (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
	if (!err && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via authid and keyid\n");
	if (err)
	{
	int old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
	if (!old)
	err = find_up_search_by_keyid (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
	if (!err && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via authid and keyid (ephem)\n");
	keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
	}
	if (err) /* Need to make sure to have this error code. */
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
	}

	/* If we still didn't found it, try to find it via the subject
	from the dirmngr-cache. */
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && !find_next)
	{
	if (!find_up_dirmngr (ctrl, kh, NULL, issuer, 1))
	{
	int old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
	if (keyid)
	err = find_up_search_by_keyid (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
	else
	{
	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	err = keydb_search_subject (ctrl, kh, issuer);
	}
	keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
	}
	if (err) /* Need to make sure to have this error code. */
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);

	if (!err && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via authid and issuer from dirmngr cache\n");
	}

	/* If we still didn't found it, try an external lookup. */
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND
	&& !find_next && !ctrl->offline)
	{
	/* We allow AIA also if CRLs are enabled; both can be used
	* as a web bug so it does not make sense to not use AIA if
	* CRL checks are enabled. */
	if ((opt.auto_issuer_key_retrieve \|\| !opt.no_crl_check)
	&& !find_up_via_auth_info_access (ctrl, kh, cert))
	{
	if (DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via authorityInfoAccess.caIssuers\n");
	err = 0;
	}
	else if (opt.auto_issuer_key_retrieve)
	{
	err = find_up_external (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
	if (!err && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via authid and external lookup\n");
	}
	}


	/* Print a note so that the user does not feel too helpless when
	an issuer certificate was found and gpgsm prints BAD
	signature because it is not the correct one. */
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && opt.quiet)
	;
	else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	if (!opt.quiet)
	{
	log_info ("%sissuer certificate ", find_next?"next ":"");
	if (keyid)
	{
	log_printf ("{");
	gpgsm_dump_serial (keyid);
	log_printf ("} ");
	}
	if (authidno)
	{
	log_printf ("(#");
	gpgsm_dump_serial (authidno);
	log_printf ("/");
	gpgsm_dump_string (s);
	log_printf (") ");
	}
	log_printf ("not found using authorityKeyIdentifier\n");
	}
	}
	else if (err)
	log_error ("failed to find authorityKeyIdentifier: err=%d\n", err);
	xfree (keyid);
	ksba_name_release (authid);
	xfree (authidno);
	}

	if (err) /* Not found via authorithyKeyIdentifier, try regular issuer name. */
	err = keydb_search_subject (ctrl, kh, issuer);
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && !find_next)
	{
	int old;

	/* Also try to get it from the Dirmngr cache. The function
	merely puts it into the ephemeral database. */
	find_up_dirmngr (ctrl, kh, NULL, issuer, 0);

	/* Not found, let us see whether we have one in the ephemeral key DB. */
	old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
	if (!old)
	{
	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	err = keydb_search_subject (ctrl, kh, issuer);
	}
	keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);

	if (!err && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via issuer\n");
	}

	/* Still not found. If enabled, try an external lookup. */
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && !find_next && !ctrl->offline)
	{
	if ((opt.auto_issuer_key_retrieve \|\| !opt.no_crl_check)
	&& !find_up_via_auth_info_access (ctrl, kh, cert))
	{
	if (DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via authorityInfoAccess.caIssuers\n");
	err = 0;
	}
	else if (opt.auto_issuer_key_retrieve)
	{
	err = find_up_external (ctrl, kh, issuer, NULL);
	if (!err && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via issuer and external lookup\n");
	}
	}

	return err;
	}


	/* Return the next certificate up in the chain starting at START.
	Returns GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND when there are no more certificates. */
	gpg_error_t
	gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t start, ksba_cert_t *r_next)
	{
	gpg_error_t err = 0;
	char *issuer = NULL;
	char *subject = NULL;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kh = keydb_new (ctrl);

	*r_next = NULL;
	if (!kh)
	{
	log_error (_("failed to allocate keyDB handle\n"));
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	goto leave;
	}

	issuer = ksba_cert_get_issuer (start, 0);
	subject = ksba_cert_get_subject (start, 0);
	if (!issuer)
	{
	log_error ("no issuer found in certificate\n");
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}
	if (!subject)
	{
	log_error ("no subject found in certificate\n");
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}

	if (is_root_cert (start, issuer, subject))
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); /* we are at the root */
	goto leave;
	}

	err = find_up (ctrl, kh, start, issuer, 0);
	if (err)
	{
	/* It is quite common not to have a certificate, so better don't
	print an error here. */
	if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && opt.verbose > 1)
	log_error ("failed to find issuer's certificate: %s <%s>\n",
	gpg_strerror (err), gpg_strsource (err));
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_ISSUER_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}

	err = keydb_get_cert (kh, r_next);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_cert failed in %s: %s <%s>\n",
	__func__, gpg_strerror (err), gpg_strsource (err));
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	}

	leave:
	xfree (issuer);
	xfree (subject);
	keydb_release (kh);
	return err;
	}


	/* Helper for gpgsm_is_root_cert. This one is used if the subject and
	issuer DNs are already known. */
	static int
	is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert, const char issuerdn, const char subjectdn)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	int result = 0;
	ksba_sexp_t serialno;
	ksba_sexp_t ak_keyid;
	ksba_name_t ak_name;
	ksba_sexp_t ak_sn;
	const char *ak_name_str;
	ksba_sexp_t subj_keyid = NULL;

	if (!issuerdn \|\| !subjectdn)
	return 0; /* No. */

	if (strcmp (issuerdn, subjectdn))
	return 0; /* No. */

	err = ksba_cert_get_auth_key_id (cert, &ak_keyid, &ak_name, &ak_sn);
	if (err)
	{
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
	return 1; /* Yes. Without a authorityKeyIdentifier this needs
	to be the Root certificate (our trust anchor). */
	log_error ("error getting authorityKeyIdentifier: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	return 0; /* Well, it is broken anyway. Return No. */
	}

	serialno = ksba_cert_get_serial (cert);
	if (!serialno)
	{
	log_error ("error getting serialno: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Check whether the auth name's matches the issuer name+sn. If
	that is the case this is a root certificate. */
	ak_name_str = ksba_name_enum (ak_name, 0);
	if (ak_name_str
	&& !strcmp (ak_name_str, issuerdn)
	&& !cmp_simple_canon_sexp (ak_sn, serialno))
	{
	result = 1; /* Right, CERT is self-signed. */
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Similar for the ak_keyid. */
	if (ak_keyid && !ksba_cert_get_subj_key_id (cert, NULL, &subj_keyid)
	&& !cmp_simple_canon_sexp (ak_keyid, subj_keyid))
	{
	result = 1; /* Right, CERT is self-signed. */
	goto leave;
	}


	leave:
	ksba_free (subj_keyid);
	ksba_free (ak_keyid);
	ksba_name_release (ak_name);
	ksba_free (ak_sn);
	ksba_free (serialno);
	return result;
	}



	/* Check whether the CERT is a root certificate. Returns True if this
	is the case. */
	int
	gpgsm_is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert)
	{
	char *issuer;
	char *subject;
	int yes;

	issuer = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert, 0);
	subject = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, 0);
	yes = is_root_cert (cert, issuer, subject);
	xfree (issuer);
	xfree (subject);
	return yes;
	}


	/* This is a helper for gpgsm_validate_chain. */
	static gpg_error_t
	-is_cert_still_valid (ctrl_t ctrl, int force_ocsp, int lm, estream_t fp,
	+is_cert_still_valid (ctrl_t ctrl, int chain_model, int lm, estream_t fp,
	ksba_cert_t subject_cert, ksba_cert_t issuer_cert,
	int any_revoked, int any_no_crl, int *any_crl_too_old)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;

	if (ctrl->offline \|\| (opt.no_crl_check && !ctrl->use_ocsp))
	{
	audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CRL_CHECK,
	gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_ENABLED));
	return 0;
	}


	- if (!(force_ocsp \|\| ctrl->use_ocsp)
	+ if (!(chain_model \|\| ctrl->use_ocsp)
	&& !opt.enable_issuer_based_crl_check)
	{
	err = ksba_cert_get_crl_dist_point (subject_cert, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EOF)
	{
	/* No DP specified in the certificate. Thus the CA does not
	* consider a CRL useful and the user of the certificate
	* also does not consider this to be a critical thing. In
	* this case we can conclude that the certificate shall not
	* be revocable. Note that we reach this point here only if
	* no OCSP responder shall be used. */
	audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CRL_CHECK, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TRUE));
	return 0;
	}
	}

	err = gpgsm_dirmngr_isvalid (ctrl,
	subject_cert, issuer_cert,
	- force_ocsp? 2 : !!ctrl->use_ocsp);
	+ chain_model? 2 : !!ctrl->use_ocsp);
	audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CRL_CHECK, err);

	if (err)
	{
	if (!lm)
	gpgsm_cert_log_name (NULL, subject_cert);
	switch (gpg_err_code (err))
	{
	case GPG_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
	do_list (1, lm, fp, _("certificate has been revoked"));
	*any_revoked = 1;
	/* Store that in the keybox so that key listings are able to
	return the revoked flag. We don't care about error,
	though. */
	keydb_set_cert_flags (ctrl, subject_cert, 1, KEYBOX_FLAG_VALIDITY, 0,
	~0, VALIDITY_REVOKED);
	break;

	case GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN:
	do_list (1, lm, fp, _("no CRL found for certificate"));
	*any_no_crl = 1;
	break;

	case GPG_ERR_NO_DATA:
	do_list (1, lm, fp, _("the status of the certificate is unknown"));
	*any_no_crl = 1;
	break;

	case GPG_ERR_CRL_TOO_OLD:
	do_list (1, lm, fp, _("the available CRL is too old"));
	if (!lm)
	log_info (_("please make sure that the "
	"\"dirmngr\" is properly installed\n"));
	*any_crl_too_old = 1;
	break;

	default:
	do_list (1, lm, fp, _("checking the CRL failed: %s"),
	gpg_strerror (err));
	return err;
	}
	}
	return 0;
	}


	/* Helper for gpgsm_validate_chain to check the validity period of
	SUBJECT_CERT. The caller needs to pass EXPTIME which will be
	updated to the nearest expiration time seen. A DEPTH of 0 indicates
	the target certificate, -1 the final root certificate and other
	values intermediate certificates. */
	static gpg_error_t
	check_validity_period (ksba_isotime_t current_time,
	ksba_cert_t subject_cert,
	ksba_isotime_t exptime,
	int listmode, estream_t listfp, int depth)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	ksba_isotime_t not_before, not_after;

	err = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 0, not_before);
	if (!err)
	err = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 1, not_after);
	if (err)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	_("certificate with invalid validity: %s"), gpg_strerror (err));
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	}

	if (*not_after)
	{
	if (!*exptime)
	gnupg_copy_time (exptime, not_after);
	else if (strcmp (not_after, exptime) < 0 )
	gnupg_copy_time (exptime, not_after);
	}

	if (*not_before && strcmp (current_time, not_before) < 0 )
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	depth == 0 ? _("certificate not yet valid") :
	depth == -1 ? _("root certificate not yet valid") :
	/* other */ _("intermediate certificate not yet valid"));
	if (!listmode)
	{
	log_info (" (valid from ");
	dump_isotime (not_before);
	log_printf (")\n");
	}
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_TOO_YOUNG);
	}

	if (*not_after && strcmp (current_time, not_after) > 0 )
	{
	do_list (opt.ignore_expiration?0:1, listmode, listfp,
	depth == 0 ? _("certificate has expired") :
	depth == -1 ? _("root certificate has expired") :
	/* other */ _("intermediate certificate has expired"));
	if (!listmode)
	{
	log_info (" (expired at ");
	dump_isotime (not_after);
	log_printf (")\n");
	}
	if (opt.ignore_expiration)
	log_info ("WARNING: ignoring expiration\n");
	else
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED);
	}

	return 0;
	}

	/* This is a variant of check_validity_period used with the chain
	model. The extra constraint here is that notBefore and notAfter
	must exists and if the additional argument CHECK_TIME is given this
	time is used to check the validity period of SUBJECT_CERT. */
	static gpg_error_t
	check_validity_period_cm (ksba_isotime_t current_time,
	ksba_isotime_t check_time,
	ksba_cert_t subject_cert,
	ksba_isotime_t exptime,
	int listmode, estream_t listfp, int depth)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	ksba_isotime_t not_before, not_after;

	err = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 0, not_before);
	if (!err)
	err = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 1, not_after);
	if (err)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	_("certificate with invalid validity: %s"), gpg_strerror (err));
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	}
	if (!not_before \|\| !not_after)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	_("required certificate attributes missing: %s%s%s"),
	!*not_before? "notBefore":"",
	(!not_before && !not_after)? ", ":"",
	!*not_before? "notAfter":"");
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	}
	if (strcmp (not_before, not_after) > 0 )
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	_("certificate with invalid validity"));
	log_info (" (valid from ");
	dump_isotime (not_before);
	log_printf (" expired at ");
	dump_isotime (not_after);
	log_printf (")\n");
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	}

	if (!*exptime)
	gnupg_copy_time (exptime, not_after);
	else if (strcmp (not_after, exptime) < 0 )
	gnupg_copy_time (exptime, not_after);

	if (strcmp (current_time, not_before) < 0 )
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	depth == 0 ? _("certificate not yet valid") :
	depth == -1 ? _("root certificate not yet valid") :
	/* other */ _("intermediate certificate not yet valid"));
	if (!listmode)
	{
	log_info (" (valid from ");
	dump_isotime (not_before);
	log_printf (")\n");
	}
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_TOO_YOUNG);
	}

	if (*check_time
	&& (strcmp (check_time, not_before) < 0
	\|\| strcmp (check_time, not_after) > 0))
	{
	/* Note that we don't need a case for the root certificate
	because its own consistency has already been checked. */
	do_list(opt.ignore_expiration?0:1, listmode, listfp,
	depth == 0 ?
	_("signature not created during lifetime of certificate") :
	depth == 1 ?
	_("certificate not created during lifetime of issuer") :
	_("intermediate certificate not created during lifetime "
	"of issuer"));
	if (!listmode)
	{
	log_info (depth== 0? _(" ( signature created at ") :
	/* */ _(" (certificate created at ") );
	dump_isotime (check_time);
	log_printf (")\n");
	log_info (depth==0? _(" (certificate valid from ") :
	/* */ _(" ( issuer valid from ") );
	dump_isotime (not_before);
	log_info (" to ");
	dump_isotime (not_after);
	log_printf (")\n");
	}
	if (opt.ignore_expiration)
	log_info ("WARNING: ignoring expiration\n");
	else
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED);
	}

	return 0;
	}



	/* Ask the user whether he wants to mark the certificate CERT trusted.
	Returns true if the CERT is the trusted. We also check whether the
	agent is at all enabled to allow marktrusted and don't call it in
	this session again if it is not. */
	static int
	ask_marktrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode)
	{
	static int no_more_questions;
	int rc;
	char *fpr;
	int success = 0;

	fpr = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
	log_info (_("fingerprint=%s\n"), fpr? fpr : "?");
	xfree (fpr);

	if (no_more_questions)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
	else
	rc = gpgsm_agent_marktrusted (ctrl, cert);
	if (!rc)
	{
	log_info (_("root certificate has now been marked as trusted\n"));
	success = 1;
	}
	else if (!listmode)
	{
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("issuer", cert);
	log_info ("after checking the fingerprint, you may want "
	"to add it manually to the list of trusted certificates.\n");
	}

	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED)
	{
	if (!no_more_questions)
	log_info (_("interactive marking as trusted "
	"not enabled in gpg-agent\n"));
	no_more_questions = 1;
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED)
	{
	log_info (_("interactive marking as trusted "
	"disabled for this session\n"));
	no_more_questions = 1;
	}
	else
	set_already_asked_marktrusted (cert);

	return success;
	}




	/* Validate a chain and optionally return the nearest expiration time
	in R_EXPTIME. With LISTMODE set to 1 a special listmode is
	activated where only information about the certificate is printed
	to LISTFP and no output is send to the usual log stream. If
	CHECKTIME_ARG is set, it is used only in the chain model instead of the
	current time.

	Defined flag bits

	VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR - Do not do any dirmngr isvalid checks.
	VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL - Check according to chain model.
	VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED - Check according to the STEED model.
	*/
	static int
	do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
	ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
	int listmode, estream_t listfp, unsigned int flags,
	struct rootca_flags_s *rootca_flags)
	{
	int rc = 0, depth, maxdepth;
	char *issuer = NULL;
	char *subject = NULL;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kh = NULL;
	ksba_cert_t subject_cert = NULL, issuer_cert = NULL;
	ksba_isotime_t current_time;
	ksba_isotime_t check_time;
	ksba_isotime_t exptime;
	int any_expired = 0;
	int any_revoked = 0;
	int any_no_crl = 0;
	int any_crl_too_old = 0;
	int any_no_policy_match = 0;
	int is_qualified = -1; /* Indicates whether the certificate stems
	from a qualified root certificate.
	-1 = unknown, 0 = no, 1 = yes. */
	chain_item_t chain = NULL; /* A list of all certificates in the chain. */


	gnupg_get_isotime (current_time);
	gnupg_copy_time (ctrl->current_time, current_time);

	if ( (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL) )
	{
	if (!strcmp (checktime_arg, "19700101T000000"))
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	_("WARNING: creation time of signature not known - "
	"assuming current time"));
	gnupg_copy_time (check_time, current_time);
	}
	else
	gnupg_copy_time (check_time, checktime_arg);
	}
	else
	*check_time = 0;

	if (r_exptime)
	*r_exptime = 0;
	*exptime = 0;

	if (opt.no_chain_validation && !listmode)
	{
	log_info ("WARNING: bypassing certificate chain validation\n");
	return 0;
	}

	kh = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (!kh)
	{
	log_error (_("failed to allocate keyDB handle\n"));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	goto leave;
	}

	if (DBG_X509 && !listmode)
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("target", cert);

	subject_cert = cert;
	ksba_cert_ref (subject_cert);
	maxdepth = 50;
	depth = 0;

	for (;;)
	{
	int is_root;
	gpg_error_t istrusted_rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED);

	/* Put the certificate on our list. */
	{
	chain_item_t ci;

	ci = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ci);
	if (!ci)
	{
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	goto leave;
	}
	ksba_cert_ref (subject_cert);
	ci->cert = subject_cert;
	ci->next = chain;
	chain = ci;
	}

	xfree (issuer);
	xfree (subject);
	issuer = ksba_cert_get_issuer (subject_cert, 0);
	subject = ksba_cert_get_subject (subject_cert, 0);

	if (!issuer)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp, _("no issuer found in certificate"));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}


	/* Is this a self-issued certificate (i.e. the root certificate)? */
	is_root = is_root_cert (subject_cert, issuer, subject);
	if (is_root)
	{
	chain->is_root = 1;
	/* Check early whether the certificate is listed as trusted.
	We used to do this only later but changed it to call the
	check right here so that we can access special flags
	associated with that specific root certificate. */
	if (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (subject_cert))
	{
	memset (rootca_flags, 0, sizeof *rootca_flags);
	istrusted_rc = ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)
	? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED));
	}
	else
	istrusted_rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted (ctrl, subject_cert, NULL,
	rootca_flags);
	audit_log_cert (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_ROOT_TRUSTED,
	subject_cert, istrusted_rc);
	/* If the chain model extended attribute is used, make sure
	that our chain model flag is set. */
	if (!(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)
	&& has_validation_model_chain (subject_cert, listmode, listfp))
	rootca_flags->chain_model = 1;
	}


	/* Check the validity period. */
	if ( (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL) )
	rc = check_validity_period_cm (current_time, check_time, subject_cert,
	exptime, listmode, listfp,
	(depth && is_root)? -1: depth);
	else
	rc = check_validity_period (current_time, subject_cert,
	exptime, listmode, listfp,
	(depth && is_root)? -1: depth);
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED)
	any_expired = 1;
	else if (rc)
	goto leave;


	/* Assert that we understand all critical extensions. */
	rc = unknown_criticals (subject_cert, listmode, listfp);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	/* Do a policy check. */
	if (!opt.no_policy_check)
	{
	rc = check_cert_policy (subject_cert, listmode, listfp);
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH)
	{
	any_no_policy_match = 1;
	rc = 1; /* Be on the safe side and set RC. */
	}
	else if (rc)
	goto leave;
	}


	/* If this is the root certificate we are at the end of the chain. */
	if (is_root)
	{
	if (!istrusted_rc)
	; /* No need to check the certificate for a trusted one. */
	else if (gpgsm_check_cert_sig (subject_cert, subject_cert) )
	{
	/* We only check the signature if the certificate is not
	trusted for better diagnostics. */
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	_("self-signed certificate has a BAD signature"));
	if (DBG_X509)
	{
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("self-signing cert", subject_cert);
	}
	rc = gpg_error (depth? GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN
	: GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}
	if (!rootca_flags->relax)
	{
	rc = allowed_ca (ctrl, subject_cert, NULL, listmode, listfp);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;
	}


	/* Set the flag for qualified signatures. This flag is
	deduced from a list of root certificates allowed for
	qualified signatures. */
	if (is_qualified == -1 && !(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	size_t buflen;
	char buf[1];

	if (!ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "is_qualified",
	&buf, sizeof (buf),
	&buflen) && buflen)
	{
	/* We already checked this for this certificate,
	thus we simply take it from the user data. */
	is_qualified = !!*buf;
	}
	else
	{
	/* Need to consult the list of root certificates for
	qualified signatures. But first we check the
	modern way by looking at the root ca flag. */
	if (rootca_flags->qualified)
	err = 0;
	else
	err = gpgsm_is_in_qualified_list (ctrl, subject_cert, NULL);
	if (!err)
	is_qualified = 1;
	else if ( gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	is_qualified = 0;
	else
	log_error ("checking the list of qualified "
	"root certificates failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	if ( is_qualified != -1 )
	{
	/* Cache the result but don't care too much
	about an error. */
	buf[0] = !!is_qualified;
	err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (subject_cert,
	"is_qualified", buf, 1);
	if (err)
	log_error ("set_user_data(is_qualified) failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	}
	}
	}


	/* Act on the check for a trusted root certificates. */
	rc = istrusted_rc;
	if (!rc)
	;
	else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED)
	{
	do_list (0, listmode, listfp,
	_("root certificate is not marked trusted"));
	/* If we already figured out that the certificate is
	expired it does not make much sense to ask the user
	whether they want to trust the root certificate. We
	should do this only if the certificate under question
	will then be usable. If the certificate has a well
	known private key asking the user does not make any
	sense. */
	if ( !any_expired
	&& !gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (subject_cert)
	&& (!listmode \|\| !already_asked_marktrusted (subject_cert))
	&& ask_marktrusted (ctrl, subject_cert, listmode) )
	rc = 0;
	}
	else
	{
	log_error (_("checking the trust list failed: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	}

	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	/* Check for revocations etc. */
	if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR))
	;
	else if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
	; /* Fixme: check revocations via DNS. */
	else if (opt.no_trusted_cert_crl_check \|\| rootca_flags->relax)
	;
	else
	rc = is_cert_still_valid (ctrl,
	(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL),
	listmode, listfp,
	subject_cert, subject_cert,
	&any_revoked, &any_no_crl,
	&any_crl_too_old);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	break; /* Okay: a self-signed certificate is an end-point. */
	} /* End is_root. */


	/* Take care that the chain does not get too long. */
	if ((depth+1) > maxdepth)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp, _("certificate chain too long\n"));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN);
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Find the next cert up the tree. */
	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	rc = find_up (ctrl, kh, subject_cert, issuer, 0);
	if (rc)
	{
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("issuer certificate not found"));
	if (!listmode && !opt.quiet)
	{
	log_info ("issuer certificate: #/");
	gpgsm_dump_string (issuer);
	log_printf ("\n");
	}
	}
	else
	log_error ("failed to find issuer's certificate: %s <%s>\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc), gpg_strsource (rc));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_ISSUER_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}

	ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert); issuer_cert = NULL;
	rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &issuer_cert);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_cert failed in %s: %s <%s>\n",
	__func__, gpg_strerror (rc), gpg_strsource (rc));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	goto leave;
	}

	try_another_cert:
	if (DBG_X509)
	{
	log_debug ("got issuer's certificate:\n");
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("issuer", issuer_cert);
	}

	rc = gpgsm_check_cert_sig (issuer_cert, subject_cert);
	if (rc)
	{
	do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("certificate has a BAD signature"));
	if (DBG_X509)
	{
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("signing issuer", issuer_cert);
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("signed subject", subject_cert);
	}
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
	{
	/* We now try to find other issuer certificates which
	might have been used. This is required because some
	CAs are reusing the issuer and subject DN for new
	root certificates. */
	/* FIXME: Do this only if we don't have an
	AKI.keyIdentifier */
	rc = find_up (ctrl, kh, subject_cert, issuer, 1);
	if (!rc)
	{
	ksba_cert_t tmp_cert;

	rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &tmp_cert);
	if (rc \|\| !compare_certs (issuer_cert, tmp_cert))
	{
	/* The find next did not work or returned an
	identical certificate. We better stop here
	to avoid infinite checks. */
	/* No need to set RC because it is not used:
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE); */
	ksba_cert_release (tmp_cert);
	}
	else
	{
	do_list (0, listmode, listfp,
	_("found another possible matching "
	"CA certificate - trying again"));
	ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
	issuer_cert = tmp_cert;
	goto try_another_cert;
	}
	}
	}

	/* We give a more descriptive error code than the one
	returned from the signature checking. */
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN);
	goto leave;
	}

	is_root = gpgsm_is_root_cert (issuer_cert);
	istrusted_rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED);


	/* Check that a CA is allowed to issue certificates. */
	{
	int chainlen;

	rc = allowed_ca (ctrl, issuer_cert, &chainlen, listmode, listfp);
	if (rc)
	{
	/* Not allowed. Check whether this is a trusted root
	certificate and whether we allow special exceptions.
	We could carry the result of the test over to the
	regular root check at the top of the loop but for
	clarity we won't do that. Given that the majority of
	certificates carry proper BasicContraints our way of
	overriding an error in the way is justified for
	performance reasons. */
	if (is_root)
	{
	if (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (issuer_cert))
	{
	memset (rootca_flags, 0, sizeof *rootca_flags);
	istrusted_rc = ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)
	? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED));
	}
	else
	istrusted_rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted
	(ctrl, issuer_cert, NULL, rootca_flags);

	if (!istrusted_rc && rootca_flags->relax)
	{
	/* Ignore the error due to the relax flag. */
	rc = 0;
	chainlen = -1;
	}
	}
	}
	if (rc)
	goto leave;
	if (chainlen >= 0 && depth > chainlen)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	_("certificate chain longer than allowed by CA (%d)"),
	chainlen);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN);
	goto leave;
	}
	}

	/* Is the certificate allowed to sign other certificates. */
	if (!listmode)
	{
	rc = gpgsm_cert_use_cert_p (issuer_cert);
	if (rc)
	{
	char numbuf[50];
	sprintf (numbuf, "%d", rc);
	gpgsm_status2 (ctrl, STATUS_ERROR, "certcert.issuer.keyusage",
	numbuf, NULL);
	goto leave;
	}
	}

	/* Check for revocations etc. Note that for a root certificate
	this test is done a second time later. This should eventually
	be fixed. */
	if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR))
	rc = 0;
	else if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
	rc = 0; /* Fixme: XXX */
	else if (is_root && (opt.no_trusted_cert_crl_check
	\|\| (!istrusted_rc && rootca_flags->relax)))
	rc = 0;
	else
	rc = is_cert_still_valid (ctrl,
	(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL),
	listmode, listfp,
	subject_cert, issuer_cert,
	&any_revoked, &any_no_crl, &any_crl_too_old);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;


	if (opt.verbose && !listmode)
	log_info (depth == 0 ? _("certificate is good\n") :
	!is_root ? _("intermediate certificate is good\n") :
	/* other */ _("root certificate is good\n"));

	/* Under the chain model the next check time is the creation
	time of the subject certificate. */
	if ( (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL) )
	{
	rc = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 0, check_time);
	if (rc)
	{
	/* That will never happen as we have already checked
	this above. */
	BUG ();
	}
	}

	/* For the next round the current issuer becomes the new subject. */
	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	ksba_cert_release (subject_cert);
	subject_cert = issuer_cert;
	issuer_cert = NULL;
	depth++;
	} /* End chain traversal. */

	if (!listmode && !opt.quiet)
	{
	if (opt.no_policy_check)
	log_info ("policies not checked due to %s option\n",
	"--disable-policy-checks");
	if (ctrl->offline \|\| (opt.no_crl_check && !ctrl->use_ocsp))
	log_info ("CRLs not checked due to %s option\n",
	ctrl->offline ? "offline" : "--disable-crl-checks");
	}

	if (!rc)
	{ /* If we encountered an error somewhere during the checks, set
	the error code to the most critical one */
	if (any_revoked)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
	else if (any_expired)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED);
	else if (any_no_crl)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN);
	else if (any_crl_too_old)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CRL_TOO_OLD);
	else if (any_no_policy_match)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH);
	}

	leave:
	/* If we have traversed a complete chain up to the root we will
	reset the ephemeral flag for all these certificates. This is done
	regardless of any error because those errors may only be
	transient. */
	if (chain && chain->is_root)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	chain_item_t ci;

	for (ci = chain; ci; ci = ci->next)
	{
	/* Note that it is possible for the last certificate in the
	chain (i.e. our target certificate) that it has not yet
	been stored in the keybox and thus the flag can't be set.
	We ignore this error because it will later be stored
	anyway. */
	err = keydb_set_cert_flags (ctrl, ci->cert, 1, KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB, 0,
	KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_EPHEMERAL, 0);
	if (!ci->next && gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	;
	else if (err)
	log_error ("clearing ephemeral flag failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	}
	}

	/* If we have figured something about the qualified signature
	capability of the certificate under question, store the result as
	user data in all certificates of the chain. We do this even if the
	validation itself failed. */
	if (is_qualified != -1 && !(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	chain_item_t ci;
	char buf[1];

	buf[0] = !!is_qualified;

	for (ci = chain; ci; ci = ci->next)
	{
	err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (ci->cert, "is_qualified", buf, 1);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("set_user_data(is_qualified) failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	if (!rc)
	rc = err;
	}
	}
	}

	/* If auditing has been enabled, record what is in the chain. */
	if (ctrl->audit)
	{
	chain_item_t ci;

	audit_log (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CHAIN_BEGIN);
	for (ci = chain; ci; ci = ci->next)
	{
	audit_log_cert (ctrl->audit,
	ci->is_root? AUDIT_CHAIN_ROOTCERT : AUDIT_CHAIN_CERT,
	ci->cert, 0);
	}
	audit_log (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CHAIN_END);
	}

	if (r_exptime)
	gnupg_copy_time (r_exptime, exptime);
	xfree (issuer);
	xfree (subject);
	keydb_release (kh);
	while (chain)
	{
	chain_item_t ci_next = chain->next;
	ksba_cert_release (chain->cert);
	xfree (chain);
	chain = ci_next;
	}
	ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
	ksba_cert_release (subject_cert);
	return rc;
	}


	/* Validate a certificate chain. For a description see
	do_validate_chain. This function is a wrapper to handle a root
	certificate with the chain_model flag set. If RETFLAGS is not
	NULL, flags indicating now the verification was done are stored
	there. The only defined bits for RETFLAGS are
	VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL and VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED.

	If you are verifying a signature you should set CHECKTIME to the
	creation time of the signature. If your are verifying a
	certificate, set it nil (i.e. the empty string). If the creation
	date of the signature is not known use the special date
	"19700101T000000" which is treated in a special way here. */
	int
	gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime,
	ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
	int listmode, estream_t listfp, unsigned int flags,
	unsigned int *retflags)
	{
	int rc;
	struct rootca_flags_s rootca_flags;
	unsigned int dummy_retflags;

	if (!retflags)
	retflags = &dummy_retflags;

	/* If the session requested a certain validation mode make sure the
	corresponding flags are set. */
	if (ctrl->validation_model == 1)
	flags \|= VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL;
	else if (ctrl->validation_model == 2)
	flags \|= VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED;

	/* If the chain model was forced, set this immediately into
	RETFLAGS. */
	*retflags = (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL);

	memset (&rootca_flags, 0, sizeof rootca_flags);

	rc = do_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, checktime,
	r_exptime, listmode, listfp, flags,
	&rootca_flags);
	if (!rc && (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
	{
	*retflags \|= VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED;
	}
	- else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED
	- && !(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL)
	- && (rootca_flags.valid && rootca_flags.chain_model))
	+ else if (!(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL)
	+ && (rootca_flags.valid && rootca_flags.chain_model))
	{
	+ /* The root CA indicated that the chain model is to be used but
	+ * we have not yet used it. Thus do the validation again using
	+ * the chain model. */
	do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("switching to chain model"));
	rc = do_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, checktime,
	r_exptime, listmode, listfp,
	(flags \|= VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL),
	&rootca_flags);
	*retflags \|= VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL;
	}

	if (opt.verbose)
	do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("validation model used: %s"),
	(*retflags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)?
	"steed" :
	(*retflags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL)?
	_("chain"):_("shell"));

	return rc;
	}


	/* Check that the given certificate is valid but DO NOT check any
	constraints. We assume that the issuers certificate is already in
	the DB and that this one is valid; which it should be because it
	has been checked using this function. */
	int
	gpgsm_basic_cert_check (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	char *issuer = NULL;
	char *subject = NULL;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kh;
	ksba_cert_t issuer_cert = NULL;

	if (opt.no_chain_validation)
	{
	log_info ("WARNING: bypassing basic certificate checks\n");
	return 0;
	}

	kh = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (!kh)
	{
	log_error (_("failed to allocate keyDB handle\n"));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	goto leave;
	}

	issuer = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert, 0);
	subject = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, 0);
	if (!issuer)
	{
	log_error ("no issuer found in certificate\n");
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}

	if (is_root_cert (cert, issuer, subject))
	{
	rc = gpgsm_check_cert_sig (cert, cert);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("self-signed certificate has a BAD signature: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	if (DBG_X509)
	{
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("self-signing cert", cert);
	}
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	/* Find the next cert up the tree. */
	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	rc = find_up (ctrl, kh, cert, issuer, 0);
	if (rc)
	{
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	if (!opt.quiet)
	{
	log_info ("issuer certificate (#/");
	gpgsm_dump_string (issuer);
	log_printf (") not found\n");
	}
	}
	else
	log_error ("failed to find issuer's certificate: %s <%s>\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc), gpg_strsource (rc));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_ISSUER_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}

	ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert); issuer_cert = NULL;
	rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &issuer_cert);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_cert failed in %s: %s <%s>\n",
	__func__, gpg_strerror (rc), gpg_strsource (rc));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	goto leave;
	}

	rc = gpgsm_check_cert_sig (issuer_cert, cert);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("certificate has a BAD signature: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	if (DBG_X509)
	{
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("signing issuer", issuer_cert);
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("signed subject", cert);
	}
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("certificate is good\n"));
	}

	leave:
	xfree (issuer);
	xfree (subject);
	keydb_release (kh);
	ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
	return rc;
	}



	/* Check whether the certificate CERT has been issued by the German
	authority for qualified signature. They do not set the
	basicConstraints and thus we need this workaround. It works by
	looking up the root certificate and checking whether that one is
	listed as a qualified certificate for Germany.

	We also try to cache this data but as long as don't keep a
	reference to the certificate this won't be used.

	Returns: True if CERT is a RegTP issued CA cert (i.e. the root
	certificate itself or one of the CAs). In that case CHAINLEN will
	receive the length of the chain which is either 0 or 1.
	*/
	static int
	get_regtp_ca_info (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int *chainlen)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	ksba_cert_t next;
	int rc = 0;
	int i, depth;
	char country[3];
	ksba_cert_t array[4];
	char buf[2];
	size_t buflen;
	int dummy_chainlen;

	if (!chainlen)
	chainlen = &dummy_chainlen;

	*chainlen = 0;
	err = ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "regtp_ca_chainlen",
	&buf, sizeof (buf), &buflen);
	if (!err)
	{
	/* Got info. */
	if (buflen < 2 \|\| !*buf)
	return 0; /* Nothing found. */
	*chainlen = buf[1];
	return 1; /* This is a regtp CA. */
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	log_error ("ksba_cert_get_user_data(%s) failed: %s\n",
	"regtp_ca_chainlen", gpg_strerror (err));
	return 0; /* Nothing found. */
	}

	/* Need to gather the info. This requires to walk up the chain
	until we have found the root. Because we are only interested in
	German Bundesnetzagentur (former RegTP) derived certificates 3
	levels are enough. (The German signature law demands a 3 tier
	hierarchy; thus there is only one CA between the EE and the Root
	CA.) */
	memset (&array, 0, sizeof array);

	depth = 0;
	ksba_cert_ref (cert);
	array[depth++] = cert;
	ksba_cert_ref (cert);
	while (depth < DIM(array) && !(rc=gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl, cert, &next)))
	{
	ksba_cert_release (cert);
	ksba_cert_ref (next);
	array[depth++] = next;
	cert = next;
	}
	ksba_cert_release (cert);
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND \|\| !depth \|\| depth == DIM(array) )
	{
	/* We did not reached the root. */
	goto leave;
	}

	/* If this is a German signature law issued certificate, we store
	additional information. */
	if (!gpgsm_is_in_qualified_list (NULL, array[depth-1], country)
	&& !strcmp (country, "de"))
	{
	/* Setting the pathlen for the root CA and the CA flag for the
	next one is all what we need to do. */
	err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (array[depth-1], "regtp_ca_chainlen",
	"\x01\x01", 2);
	if (!err && depth > 1)
	err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (array[depth-2], "regtp_ca_chainlen",
	"\x01\x00", 2);
	if (err)
	log_error ("ksba_set_user_data(%s) failed: %s\n",
	"regtp_ca_chainlen", gpg_strerror (err));
	for (i=0; i < depth; i++)
	ksba_cert_release (array[i]);
	*chainlen = (depth>1? 0:1);
	return 1;
	}

	leave:
	/* Nothing special with this certificate. Mark the target
	certificate anyway to avoid duplicate lookups. */
	err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (cert, "regtp_ca_chainlen", "", 1);
	if (err)
	log_error ("ksba_set_user_data(%s) failed: %s\n",
	"regtp_ca_chainlen", gpg_strerror (err));
	for (i=0; i < depth; i++)
	ksba_cert_release (array[i]);
	return 0;
	}
	diff --git a/sm/gpgsm.h b/sm/gpgsm.h
	index 9fbb53a29..b0ed8891c 100644
	--- a/sm/gpgsm.h
	+++ b/sm/gpgsm.h
	@@ -1,520 +1,520 @@
	/* gpgsm.h - Global definitions for GpgSM
	* Copyright (C) 2001, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2009,
	* 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#ifndef GPGSM_H
	#define GPGSM_H

	#ifdef GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT
	#error GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT already defined
	#endif
	#define GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT GPG_ERR_SOURCE_GPGSM
	#include <gpg-error.h>


	#include <ksba.h>
	#include "../common/util.h"
	#include "../common/status.h"
	#include "../common/audit.h"
	#include "../common/session-env.h"
	#include "../common/ksba-io-support.h"
	#include "../common/compliance.h"

	/* The maximum length of a binary fingerprints. This is used to
	* provide a static buffer and will be increased if we need to support
	* longer fingerprints. */
	#define MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN 32

	/* The maximum length of a binary digest. */
	#define MAX_DIGEST_LEN 64 /* Fits for SHA-512 */


	/* A large struct named "opt" to keep global flags. */
	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	struct
	{
	unsigned int debug; /* debug flags (DBG_foo_VALUE) */
	int verbose; /* verbosity level */
	int quiet; /* be as quiet as possible */
	int batch; /* run in batch mode, i.e w/o any user interaction */
	int answer_yes; /* assume yes on most questions */
	int answer_no; /* assume no on most questions */
	int dry_run; /* don't change any persistent data */
	int no_homedir_creation;
	int use_keyboxd; /* Use the external keyboxd as storage backend. */

	const char config_filename; / Name of the used config file. */
	const char *agent_program;

	const char *keyboxd_program;

	session_env_t session_env;
	char *lc_ctype;
	char *lc_messages;

	int autostart;
	const char *dirmngr_program;
	int disable_dirmngr; /* Do not do any dirmngr calls. */
	const char *protect_tool_program;
	char outfile; / name of output file */

	int with_key_data;/* include raw key in the column delimited output */

	int fingerprint; /* list fingerprints in all key listings */

	int with_md5_fingerprint; /* Also print an MD5 fingerprint for
	standard key listings. */

	int with_keygrip; /* Option --with-keygrip active. */

	int with_key_screening; /* Option --with-key-screening active. */

	int pinentry_mode;
	int request_origin;

	int armor; /* force base64 armoring (see also ctrl.with_base64) */
	int no_armor; /* don't try to figure out whether data is base64 armored*/

	const char p12_charset; / Use this charset for encoding the
	pkcs#12 passphrase. */


	const char def_cipher_algoid; / cipher algorithm to use if
	nothing else is specified */

	int def_compress_algo; /* Ditto for compress algorithm */

	int forced_digest_algo; /* User forced hash algorithm. */

	int force_ecdh_sha1kdf; /* Only for debugging and testing. */

	char def_recipient; / userID of the default recipient */
	int def_recipient_self; /* The default recipient is the default key */

	int no_encrypt_to; /* Ignore all as encrypt to marked recipients. */

	char local_user; / NULL or argument to -u */

	int extra_digest_algo; /* A digest algorithm also used for
	verification of signatures. */

	int always_trust; /* Trust the given keys even if there is no
	valid certification chain */
	int skip_verify; /* do not check signatures on data */

	int lock_once; /* Keep lock once they are set */

	int ignore_time_conflict; /* Ignore certain time conflicts */

	int no_crl_check; /* Don't do a CRL check */
	int no_trusted_cert_crl_check; /* Don't run a CRL check for trusted certs. */
	int force_crl_refresh; /* Force refreshing the CRL. */
	int enable_issuer_based_crl_check; /* Backward compatibility hack. */
	int enable_ocsp; /* Default to use OCSP checks. */

	char policy_file; / full pathname of policy file */
	int no_policy_check; /* ignore certificate policies */
	int no_chain_validation; /* Bypass all cert chain validity tests */
	int ignore_expiration; /* Ignore the notAfter validity checks. */

	int auto_issuer_key_retrieve; /* try to retrieve a missing issuer key. */

	int qualsig_approval; /* Set to true if this software has
	officially been approved to create an
	verify qualified signatures. This is a
	runtime option in case we want to check
	the integrity of the software at
	runtime. */

	unsigned int min_rsa_length; /* Used for compliance checks. */

	strlist_t keyserver;

	/* A list of certificate extension OIDs which are ignored so that
	one can claim that a critical extension has been handled. One
	OID per string. */
	strlist_t ignored_cert_extensions;

	/* A list of OIDs which will be used to ignore certificates with
	* sunch an OID during --learn-card. */
	strlist_t ignore_cert_with_oid;

	/* The current compliance mode. */
	enum gnupg_compliance_mode compliance;

	/* Fail if an operation can't be done in the requested compliance
	* mode. */
	int require_compliance;

	/* Enable creation of authenticode signatures. */
	int authenticode;

	/* A list of extra attributes put into a signed data object. For a
	* signed each attribute each string has the format:
	* <oid>:s:<hex_or_filename>
	* and for an unsigned attribute
	* <oid>:u:<hex_or_filename>
	* The OID is in the usual dotted decimal for. The HEX_OR_FILENAME
	* is either a list of hex digits or a filename with the DER encoded
	* value. A filename is detected by the presence of a slash in the
	* HEX_OR_FILENAME. The actual value needs to be encoded as a SET OF
	* attribute values. */
	strlist_t attributes;

	/* Compatibility flags (COMPAT_FLAG_xxxx). */
	unsigned int compat_flags;
	} opt;

	/* Debug values and macros. */
	#define DBG_X509_VALUE 1 /* debug x.509 data reading/writing */
	#define DBG_MPI_VALUE 2 /* debug mpi details */
	#define DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE 4 /* debug low level crypto */
	#define DBG_MEMORY_VALUE 32 /* debug memory allocation stuff */
	#define DBG_CACHE_VALUE 64 /* debug the caching */
	#define DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE 128 /* show memory statistics */
	#define DBG_HASHING_VALUE 512 /* debug hashing operations */
	#define DBG_IPC_VALUE 1024 /* debug assuan communication */
	#define DBG_CLOCK_VALUE 4096
	#define DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE 8192 /* debug the key lookup */

	#define DBG_X509 (opt.debug & DBG_X509_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CRYPTO (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE)
	#define DBG_MEMORY (opt.debug & DBG_MEMORY_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CACHE (opt.debug & DBG_CACHE_VALUE)
	#define DBG_HASHING (opt.debug & DBG_HASHING_VALUE)
	#define DBG_IPC (opt.debug & DBG_IPC_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CLOCK (opt.debug & DBG_CLOCK_VALUE)
	#define DBG_LOOKUP (opt.debug & DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE)


	/* Compatibility flags */
	/* Telesec RSA cards produced for NRW in 2022 came with only the
	* keyAgreement bit set. This flag allows there use for encryption
	* anyway. Example cert:
	* Issuer: /CN=DOI CA 10a/OU=DOI/O=PKI-1-Verwaltung/C=DE
	* key usage: digitalSignature nonRepudiation keyAgreement
	* policies: 1.3.6.1.4.1.7924.1.1:N:
	*/
	#define COMPAT_ALLOW_KA_TO_ENCR 1


	/* Forward declaration for an object defined in server.c */
	struct server_local_s;

	/* Object used to keep state locally in keydb.c */
	struct keydb_local_s;
	typedef struct keydb_local_s *keydb_local_t;


	/* Session control object. This object is passed down to most
	functions. Note that the default values for it are set by
	gpgsm_init_default_ctrl(). */
	struct server_control_s
	{
	int no_server; /* We are not running under server control */
	int status_fd; /* Only for non-server mode */
	struct server_local_s *server_local;

	keydb_local_t keydb_local; /* Local data for call-keyboxd.c */

	audit_ctx_t audit; /* NULL or a context for the audit subsystem. */
	int agent_seen; /* Flag indicating that the gpg-agent has been
	accessed. */

	int with_colons; /* Use column delimited output format */
	int with_secret; /* Mark secret keys in a public key listing. */
	int with_chain; /* Include the certifying certs in a listing */
	int with_validation;/* Validate each key while listing. */
	int with_ephemeral_keys; /* Include ephemeral flagged keys in the
	keylisting. */

	int autodetect_encoding; /* Try to detect the input encoding */
	int is_pem; /* Is in PEM format */
	int is_base64; /* is in plain base-64 format */

	int create_base64; /* Create base64 encoded output */
	int create_pem; /* create PEM output */
	const char pem_name; / PEM name to use */

	int include_certs; /* -1 to send all certificates in the chain
	along with a signature or the number of
	certificates up the chain (0 = none, 1 = only
	signer) */
	int use_ocsp; /* Set to true if OCSP should be used. */
	int validation_model; /* 0 := standard model (shell),
	1 := chain model,
	2 := STEED model. */
	int offline; /* If true gpgsm won't do any network access. */

	/* The current time. Used as a helper in certchain.c. */
	ksba_isotime_t current_time;
	};


	/* An object to keep a list of certificates. */
	struct certlist_s
	{
	struct certlist_s *next;
	ksba_cert_t cert;
	int is_encrypt_to; /* True if the certificate has been set through
	the --encrypto-to option. */
	int pk_algo; /* The PK_ALGO from CERT or 0 if not yet known. */
	int hash_algo; /* Used to track the hash algorithm to use. */
	const char hash_algo_oid; / And the corresponding OID. */
	};
	typedef struct certlist_s *certlist_t;


	/* A structure carrying information about trusted root certificates. */
	struct rootca_flags_s
	{
	unsigned int valid:1; /* The rest of the structure has valid
	information. */
	unsigned int relax:1; /* Relax checking of root certificates. */
	unsigned int chain_model:1; /* Root requires the use of the chain model. */
	unsigned int qualified:1; /* Root CA used for qualfied signatures. */
	};



	/-- gpgsm.c --/
	extern int gpgsm_errors_seen;

	void gpgsm_exit (int rc);
	void gpgsm_init_default_ctrl (struct server_control_s *ctrl);
	void gpgsm_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl);
	int gpgsm_parse_validation_model (const char *model);

	/-- server.c --/
	void gpgsm_server (certlist_t default_recplist);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_status (ctrl_t ctrl, int no, const char *text);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_status2 (ctrl_t ctrl, int no, ...) GPGRT_ATTR_SENTINEL(0);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_status_with_err_code (ctrl_t ctrl, int no, const char *text,
	gpg_err_code_t ec);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_status_with_error (ctrl_t ctrl, int no, const char *text,
	gpg_error_t err);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_proxy_pinentry_notify (ctrl_t ctrl,
	const unsigned char *line);

	/-- fingerprint --/
	unsigned char *gpgsm_get_fingerprint (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo,
	unsigned char array, int r_len);
	char *gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo);
	char *gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo);
	unsigned long gpgsm_get_short_fingerprint (ksba_cert_t cert,
	unsigned long *r_high);
	unsigned char gpgsm_get_keygrip (ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned char array);
	char *gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_get_key_algo_info (ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned int *nbits);
	int gpgsm_get_key_algo_info2 (ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned int *nbits,
	char **r_curve);
	int gpgsm_is_ecc_key (ksba_cert_t cert);
	char gpgsm_pubkey_algo_string (ksba_cert_t cert, int r_algoid);
	gcry_mpi_t gpgsm_get_rsa_modulus (ksba_cert_t cert);
	char *gpgsm_get_certid (ksba_cert_t cert);


	/-- certdump.c --/
	const void gpgsm_get_serial (ksba_const_sexp_t sn, size_t r_length);
	void gpgsm_print_serial (estream_t fp, ksba_const_sexp_t p);
	void gpgsm_print_serial_decimal (estream_t fp, ksba_const_sexp_t sn);
	void gpgsm_print_time (estream_t fp, ksba_isotime_t t);
	void gpgsm_print_name2 (FILE fp, const char string, int translate);
	void gpgsm_print_name (FILE fp, const char string);
	void gpgsm_es_print_name (estream_t fp, const char *string);
	void gpgsm_es_print_name2 (estream_t fp, const char *string, int translate);

	void gpgsm_cert_log_name (const char *text, ksba_cert_t cert);

	void gpgsm_dump_cert (const char *text, ksba_cert_t cert);
	void gpgsm_dump_serial (ksba_const_sexp_t p);
	void gpgsm_dump_time (ksba_isotime_t t);
	void gpgsm_dump_string (const char *string);

	char *gpgsm_format_serial (ksba_const_sexp_t p);
	char gpgsm_format_name2 (const char name, int translate);
	char gpgsm_format_name (const char name);
	char gpgsm_format_sn_issuer (ksba_sexp_t sn, const char issuer);

	char *gpgsm_fpr_and_name_for_status (ksba_cert_t cert);

	char *gpgsm_format_keydesc (ksba_cert_t cert);


	/-- certcheck.c --/
	int gpgsm_check_cert_sig (ksba_cert_t issuer_cert, ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_check_cms_signature (ksba_cert_t cert, gcry_sexp_t sigval,
	gcry_md_hd_t md,
	int hash_algo, unsigned int pkalgoflags,
	int *r_pkalgo);
	/* fixme: move create functions to another file */
	int gpgsm_create_cms_signature (ctrl_t ctrl,
	ksba_cert_t cert, gcry_md_hd_t md, int mdalgo,
	unsigned char **r_sigval);


	/-- certchain.c --/

	/* Flags used with gpgsm_validate_chain. */
	#define VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR 1
	#define VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL 2
	#define VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED 4

	gpg_error_t gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl,
	ksba_cert_t start, ksba_cert_t *r_next);
	int gpgsm_is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert,
	ksba_isotime_t checktime,
	ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
	int listmode, estream_t listfp,
	unsigned int flags, unsigned int *retflags);
	int gpgsm_basic_cert_check (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert);

	/-- certlist.c --/
	int gpgsm_cert_use_sign_p (ksba_cert_t cert, int silent);
	int gpgsm_cert_use_encrypt_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_cert_use_verify_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_cert_use_decrypt_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_cert_use_cert_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_cert_use_ocsp_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_certs_identical_p (ksba_cert_t cert_a, ksba_cert_t cert_b);
	int gpgsm_add_cert_to_certlist (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert,
	certlist_t *listaddr, int is_encrypt_to);
	int gpgsm_add_to_certlist (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, int secret,
	certlist_t *listaddr, int is_encrypt_to);
	void gpgsm_release_certlist (certlist_t list);
	int gpgsm_find_cert (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, ksba_sexp_t keyid,
	ksba_cert_t *r_cert, int allow_ambiguous);

	/-- keylist.c --/
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_list_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names,
	estream_t fp, unsigned int mode);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_show_certs (ctrl_t ctrl, int nfiles, char **files,
	estream_t fp);

	/-- import.c --/
	int gpgsm_import (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, int reimport_mode);
	int gpgsm_import_files (ctrl_t ctrl, int nfiles, char **files,
	int (of)(const char fname));

	/-- export.c --/
	void gpgsm_export (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names, estream_t stream);
	void gpgsm_p12_export (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, estream_t stream,
	int rawmode);

	/-- delete.c --/
	int gpgsm_delete (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names);

	/-- verify.c --/
	int gpgsm_verify (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, int data_fd, estream_t out_fp);

	/-- sign.c --/
	int gpgsm_get_default_cert (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t *r_cert);
	int gpgsm_sign (ctrl_t ctrl, certlist_t signerlist,
	int data_fd, int detached, estream_t out_fp);

	/-- encrypt.c --/
	int gpgsm_encrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, certlist_t recplist,
	int in_fd, estream_t out_fp);

	/-- decrypt.c --/
	gpg_error_t ecdh_derive_kek (unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen,
	int hash_algo, const char *wrap_algo_str,
	const void *secret, unsigned int secretlen,
	const void *ukm, unsigned int ukmlen);
	int gpgsm_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, estream_t out_fp);

	/-- certreqgen.c --/
	int gpgsm_genkey (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t in_stream, estream_t out_stream);

	/-- certreqgen-ui.c --/
	void gpgsm_gencertreq_tty (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t out_stream);


	/-- qualified.c --/
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_is_in_qualified_list (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert,
	char *country);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_qualified_consent (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_not_qualified_warning (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert);

	/-- call-agent.c --/
	int gpgsm_agent_pksign (ctrl_t ctrl, const char keygrip, const char desc,
	unsigned char *digest,
	size_t digestlen,
	int digestalgo,
	unsigned char *r_buf, size_t r_buflen);
	int gpgsm_scd_pksign (ctrl_t ctrl, const char keyid, const char desc,
	unsigned char *digest, size_t digestlen, int digestalgo,
	unsigned char *r_buf, size_t r_buflen);
	int gpgsm_agent_pkdecrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char keygrip, const char desc,
	ksba_const_sexp_t ciphertext,
	char *r_buf, size_t r_buflen);
	int gpgsm_agent_genkey (ctrl_t ctrl,
	ksba_const_sexp_t keyparms, ksba_sexp_t *r_pubkey);
	int gpgsm_agent_readkey (ctrl_t ctrl, int fromcard, const char *hexkeygrip,
	ksba_sexp_t *r_pubkey);
	int gpgsm_agent_scd_serialno (ctrl_t ctrl, char **r_serialno);
	int gpgsm_agent_scd_keypairinfo (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t *r_list);
	int gpgsm_agent_istrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, const char *hexfpr,
	struct rootca_flags_s *rootca_flags);
	int gpgsm_agent_havekey (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *hexkeygrip);
	int gpgsm_agent_marktrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_agent_learn (ctrl_t ctrl);
	int gpgsm_agent_passwd (ctrl_t ctrl, const char hexkeygrip, const char desc);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_get_confirmation (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_send_nop (ctrl_t ctrl);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_keyinfo (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *hexkeygrip,
	char **r_serialno);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_ask_passphrase (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_msg,
	int repeat, char **r_passphrase);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_keywrap_key (ctrl_t ctrl, int forexport,
	void *r_kek, size_t r_keklen);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_import_key (ctrl_t ctrl,
	const void *key, size_t keylen);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_export_key (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keygrip,
	const char *desc,
	unsigned char **r_result,
	size_t *r_resultlen);

	/-- call-dirmngr.c --/
	-int gpgsm_dirmngr_isvalid (ctrl_t ctrl,
	- ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_cert_t issuer_cert,
	- int use_ocsp);
	+gpg_error_t gpgsm_dirmngr_isvalid (ctrl_t ctrl,
	+ ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_cert_t issuer_cert,
	+ int use_ocsp);
	int gpgsm_dirmngr_lookup (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names, const char *uri,
	int cache_only,
	void (cb)(void, ksba_cert_t), void *cb_value);
	int gpgsm_dirmngr_run_command (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *command,
	int argc, char **argv);


	/-- misc.c --/
	void gpgsm_print_further_info (const char *format, ...) GPGRT_ATTR_PRINTF(1,2);
	void setup_pinentry_env (void);
	gpg_error_t transform_sigval (const unsigned char *sigval, size_t sigvallen,
	int mdalgo,
	unsigned char **r_newsigval,
	size_t *r_newsigvallen);
	gcry_sexp_t gpgsm_ksba_cms_get_sig_val (ksba_cms_t cms, int idx);
	int gpgsm_get_hash_algo_from_sigval (gcry_sexp_t sigval,
	unsigned int *r_pkalgo_flags);



	#endif /GPGSM_H/

File Metadata

Mime Type: text/x-diff
Expires: Sat, Feb 7, 7:19 AM (1 h, 31 m)
Storage Engine: local-disk
Storage Format: Raw Data
Storage Handle: 4e/9c/bf721fcafcca561fc712cc32de93

No OneTemporaryActions

View Options

File Metadata

Event Timeline

No OneTemporary
Actions