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	diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi
	index b2c956ec9..0689cb57d 100644
	--- a/doc/gpg.texi
	+++ b/doc/gpg.texi
	@@ -1,3560 +1,3569 @@
	@c Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
	@c 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	@c This is part of the GnuPG manual.
	@c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi.

	@c Note that we use this texinfo file for all versions of GnuPG: 1.4.x,
	@c 2.0 and 2.1. The macro "gpgone" controls parts which are only valid
	@c for GnuPG 1.4, the macro "gpgtwoone" controls parts which are only
	@c valid for GnupG 2.1 and later.

	@node Invoking GPG
	@chapter Invoking GPG
	@cindex GPG command options
	@cindex command options
	@cindex options, GPG command

	@c Begin GnuPG 1.x specific stuff
	@ifset gpgone
	@macro gpgname
	gpg
	@end macro
	@manpage gpg.1
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg
	\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
	@end ifset

	@mansect synopsis
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg
	.RB [ \-\-homedir
	.IR dir ]
	.RB [ \-\-options
	.IR file ]
	.RI [ options ]
	.I command
	.RI [ args ]
	@end ifset
	@end ifset
	@c End GnuPG 1.x specific stuff

	@c Begin GnuPG 2 specific stuff
	@ifclear gpgone
	@macro gpgname
	gpg2
	@end macro
	@manpage gpg2.1
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
	@end ifset

	@mansect synopsis
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	.RB [ \-\-homedir
	.IR dir ]
	.RB [ \-\-options
	.IR file ]
	.RI [ options ]
	.I command
	.RI [ args ]
	@end ifset
	@end ifclear
	@c Begin GnuPG 2 specific stuff

	@mansect description
	@command{@gpgname} is the OpenPGP part of the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG). It
	is a tool to provide digital encryption and signing services using the
	OpenPGP standard. @command{@gpgname} features complete key management and
	all bells and whistles you can expect from a decent OpenPGP
	implementation.

	@ifset gpgone
	This is the standalone version of @command{gpg}. For desktop use you
	should consider using @command{gpg2} @footnote{On some platforms gpg2 is
	installed under the name @command{gpg}}.
	@end ifset

	@ifclear gpgone
	In contrast to the standalone version @command{gpg}, which is more
	suited for server and embedded platforms, this version is commonly
	installed under the name @command{gpg2} and more targeted to the desktop
	as it requires several other modules to be installed. The standalone
	version will be kept maintained and it is possible to install both
	versions on the same system. If you need to use different configuration
	files, you should make use of something like @file{gpg.conf-2} instead
	of just @file{gpg.conf}.
	@end ifclear

	@manpause
	@ifclear gpgone
	Documentation for the old standard @command{gpg} is available as a man
	page and at @inforef{Top,GnuPG 1,gpg}.
	@end ifclear

	@xref{Option Index}, for an index to @command{@gpgname}'s commands and options.
	@mancont

	@menu
	* GPG Commands:: List of all commands.
	* GPG Options:: List of all options.
	* GPG Configuration:: Configuration files.
	* GPG Examples:: Some usage examples.

	Developer information:
	* Unattended Usage of GPG:: Using @command{gpg} from other programs.
	@end menu

	@c * GPG Protocol:: The protocol the server mode uses.


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* COMMANDS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect commands
	@node GPG Commands
	@section Commands

	Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that
	only one command is allowed.

	@command{@gpgname} may be run with no commands, in which case it will
	perform a reasonable action depending on the type of file it is given
	as input (an encrypted message is decrypted, a signature is verified,
	a file containing keys is listed).

	Please remember that option as well as command parsing stops as soon as
	a non-option is encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by
	using the special option @option{--}.


	@menu
	* General GPG Commands:: Commands not specific to the functionality.
	* Operational GPG Commands:: Commands to select the type of operation.
	* OpenPGP Key Management:: How to manage your keys.
	@end menu


	@c *******************************************
	@c ******** GENERAL COMMANDS ***********
	@c *******************************************
	@node General GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands not specific to the function

	@table @gnupgtabopt
	@item --version
	@opindex version
	Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you
	cannot abbreviate this command.

	@item --help
	@itemx -h
	@opindex help
	Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command line options.
	Note that you cannot abbreviate this command.

	@item --warranty
	@opindex warranty
	Print warranty information.

	@item --dump-options
	@opindex dump-options
	Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot
	abbreviate this command.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPERATIONAL COMMANDS *********
	@c *******************************************
	@node Operational GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands to select the type of operation


	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --sign
	@itemx -s
	@opindex sign
	Make a signature. This command may be combined with @option{--encrypt}
	(for a signed and encrypted message), @option{--symmetric} (for a
	signed and symmetrically encrypted message), or @option{--encrypt} and
	@option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that may be
	decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase). The key to be used for
	signing is chosen by default or can be set with the
	@option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key} options.

	@item --clearsign
	@opindex clearsign
	Make a clear text signature. The content in a clear text signature is
	readable without any special software. OpenPGP software is only needed
	to verify the signature. Clear text signatures may modify end-of-line
	whitespace for platform independence and are not intended to be
	reversible. The key to be used for signing is chosen by default or
	can be set with the @option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key}
	options.


	@item --detach-sign
	@itemx -b
	@opindex detach-sign
	Make a detached signature.

	@item --encrypt
	@itemx -e
	@opindex encrypt
	Encrypt data. This option may be combined with @option{--sign} (for a
	signed and encrypted message), @option{--symmetric} (for a message that
	may be decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase), or @option{--sign}
	and @option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that may be
	decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase).

	@item --symmetric
	@itemx -c
	@opindex symmetric
	Encrypt with a symmetric cipher using a passphrase. The default
	symmetric cipher used is CAST5, but may be chosen with the
	@option{--cipher-algo} option. This option may be combined with
	@option{--sign} (for a signed and symmetrically encrypted message),
	@option{--encrypt} (for a message that may be decrypted via a secret key
	or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and @option{--encrypt} together
	(for a signed message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a
	passphrase).

	@item --store
	@opindex store
	Store only (make a simple RFC1991 literal data packet).

	@item --decrypt
	@itemx -d
	@opindex decrypt
	Decrypt the file given on the command line (or STDIN if no file
	is specified) and write it to STDOUT (or the file specified with
	@option{--output}). If the decrypted file is signed, the signature is also
	verified. This command differs from the default operation, as it never
	writes to the filename which is included in the file and it rejects
	files which don't begin with an encrypted message.

	@item --verify
	@opindex verify
	Assume that the first argument is a signed file or a detached signature
	and verify it without generating any output. With no arguments, the
	signature packet is read from STDIN. If only a sigfile is given, it may
	be a complete signature or a detached signature, in which case the
	signed stuff is expected in a file without the ".sig" or ".asc"
	extension. With more than 1 argument, the first should be a detached
	signature and the remaining files are the signed stuff. To read the
	signed stuff from STDIN, use @samp{-} as the second filename. For
	security reasons a detached signature cannot read the signed material
	from STDIN without denoting it in the above way.

	Note: When verifying a cleartext signature, @command{gpg} verifies
	only what makes up the cleartext signed data and not any extra data
	outside of the cleartext signature or header lines following directly
	the dash marker line. The option @code{--output} may be used to write
	out the actual signed data; but there are other pitfalls with this
	format as well. It is suggested to avoid cleartext signatures in
	favor of detached signatures.

	@item --multifile
	@opindex multifile
	This modifies certain other commands to accept multiple files for
	processing on the command line or read from STDIN with each filename on
	a separate line. This allows for many files to be processed at
	once. @option{--multifile} may currently be used along with
	@option{--verify}, @option{--encrypt}, and @option{--decrypt}. Note that
	@option{--multifile --verify} may not be used with detached signatures.

	@item --verify-files
	@opindex verify-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --verify}.

	@item --encrypt-files
	@opindex encrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --encrypt}.

	@item --decrypt-files
	@opindex decrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --decrypt}.

	@item --list-keys
	@itemx -k
	@itemx --list-public-keys
	@opindex list-keys
	List all keys from the public keyrings, or just the keys given on the
	command line.
	@ifset gpgone
	@option{-k} is slightly different from @option{--list-keys} in that it
	allows only for one argument and takes the second argument as the
	keyring to search. This is for command line compatibility with PGP 2
	and has been removed in @command{gpg2}.
	@end ifset

	Avoid using the output of this command in scripts or other programs as
	it is likely to change as GnuPG changes. See @option{--with-colons} for a
	machine-parseable key listing command that is appropriate for use in
	scripts and other programs.

	@item --list-secret-keys
	@itemx -K
	@opindex list-secret-keys
	List all keys from the secret keyrings, or just the ones given on the
	command line. A @code{#} after the letters @code{sec} means that the
	secret key is not usable (for example, if it was created via
	@option{--export-secret-subkeys}).

	@item --list-sigs
	@opindex list-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the signatures are listed too.
	@ifclear gpgone
	This command has the same effect as
	using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-list}.
	@end ifclear

	For each signature listed, there are several flags in between the "sig"
	tag and keyid. These flags give additional information about each
	signature. From left to right, they are the numbers 1-3 for certificate
	check level (see @option{--ask-cert-level}), "L" for a local or
	non-exportable signature (see @option{--lsign-key}), "R" for a
	nonRevocable signature (see the @option{--edit-key} command "nrsign"),
	"P" for a signature that contains a policy URL (see
	@option{--cert-policy-url}), "N" for a signature that contains a
	notation (see @option{--cert-notation}), "X" for an eXpired signature
	(see @option{--ask-cert-expire}), and the numbers 1-9 or "T" for 10 and
	above to indicate trust signature levels (see the @option{--edit-key}
	command "tsign").

	@item --check-sigs
	@opindex check-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-sigs}, but the signatures are verified. Note
	that for performance reasons the revocation status of a signing key is
	not shown.
	@ifclear gpgone
	This command has the same effect as
	using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-check}.
	@end ifclear

	The status of the verification is indicated by a flag directly following
	the "sig" tag (and thus before the flags described above for
	@option{--list-sigs}). A "!" indicates that the signature has been
	successfully verified, a "-" denotes a bad signature and a "%" is used
	if an error occurred while checking the signature (e.g. a non supported
	algorithm).

	@ifclear gpgone
	@item --locate-keys
	@opindex locate-keys
	Locate the keys given as arguments. This command basically uses the
	same algorithm as used when locating keys for encryption or signing and
	may thus be used to see what keys @command{@gpgname} might use. In
	particular external methods as defined by @option{--auto-key-locate} may
	be used to locate a key. Only public keys are listed.
	@end ifclear


	@item --fingerprint
	@opindex fingerprint
	List all keys (or the specified ones) along with their
	fingerprints. This is the same output as @option{--list-keys} but with
	the additional output of a line with the fingerprint. May also be
	combined with @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}. If this
	command is given twice, the fingerprints of all secondary keys are
	listed too.

	@item --list-packets
	@opindex list-packets
	List only the sequence of packets. This is mainly
	useful for debugging.


	@item --card-edit
	@opindex card-edit
	Present a menu to work with a smartcard. The subcommand "help" provides
	an overview on available commands. For a detailed description, please
	see the Card HOWTO at
	http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html#GnuPG-cardHOWTO .

	@item --card-status
	@opindex card-status
	Show the content of the smart card.

	@item --change-pin
	@opindex change-pin
	Present a menu to allow changing the PIN of a smartcard. This
	functionality is also available as the subcommand "passwd" with the
	@option{--card-edit} command.

	@item --delete-key @code{name}
	@opindex delete-key
	Remove key from the public keyring. In batch mode either @option{--yes} is
	required or the key must be specified by fingerprint. This is a
	safeguard against accidental deletion of multiple keys.

	@item --delete-secret-key @code{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-key
	Remove key from the secret keyring. In batch mode the key
	must be specified by fingerprint.

	@item --delete-secret-and-public-key @code{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-and-public-key
	Same as @option{--delete-key}, but if a secret key exists, it will be
	removed first. In batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint.

	@item --export
	@opindex export
	Either export all keys from all keyrings (default keyrings and those
	registered via option @option{--keyring}), or if at least one name is given,
	those of the given name. The exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the
	file given with option @option{--output}. Use together with
	@option{--armor} to mail those keys.

	@item --send-keys @code{key IDs}
	@opindex send-keys
	Similar to @option{--export} but sends the keys to a keyserver.
	Fingerprints may be used instead of key IDs. Option @option{--keyserver}
	must be used to give the name of this keyserver. Don't send your
	complete keyring to a keyserver --- select only those keys which are new
	or changed by you. If no key IDs are given, @command{gpg} does nothing.

	@item --export-secret-keys
	@itemx --export-secret-subkeys
	@opindex export-secret-keys
	@opindex export-secret-subkeys
	Same as @option{--export}, but exports the secret keys instead. The
	exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the file given with option
	@option{--output}. This command is often used along with the option
	@option{--armor} to allow easy printing of the key for paper backup;
	however the external tool @command{paperkey} does a better job for
	creating backups on paper. Note that exporting a secret key can be a
	security risk if the exported keys are send over an insecure channel.

	The second form of the command has the special property to render the
	secret part of the primary key useless; this is a GNU extension to
	OpenPGP and other implementations can not be expected to successfully
	import such a key. Its intended use is to generated a full key with
	an additional signing subkey on a dedicated machine and then using
	this command to export the key without the primary key to the main
	machine.

	@ifset gpgtwoone
	GnuPG may ask you to enter the passphrase for the key. This is
	required because the internal protection method of the secret key is
	different from the one specified by the OpenPGP protocol.
	@end ifset
	@ifclear gpgtwoone
	See the option @option{--simple-sk-checksum} if you want to import an
	exported secret key into ancient OpenPGP implementations.
	@end ifclear

	@item --import
	@itemx --fast-import
	@opindex import
	Import/merge keys. This adds the given keys to the
	keyring. The fast version is currently just a synonym.

	There are a few other options which control how this command works.
	Most notable here is the @option{--import-options merge-only} option
	which does not insert new keys but does only the merging of new
	signatures, user-IDs and subkeys.

	@item --recv-keys @code{key IDs}
	@opindex recv-keys
	Import the keys with the given key IDs from a keyserver. Option
	@option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this keyserver.

	@item --refresh-keys
	@opindex refresh-keys
	Request updates from a keyserver for keys that already exist on the
	local keyring. This is useful for updating a key with the latest
	signatures, user IDs, etc. Calling this with no arguments will refresh
	the entire keyring. Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the
	name of the keyserver for all keys that do not have preferred keyservers
	set (see @option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url}).

	@item --search-keys @code{names}
	@opindex search-keys
	Search the keyserver for the given names. Multiple names given here will
	be joined together to create the search string for the keyserver.
	Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this
	keyserver. Keyservers that support different search methods allow using
	the syntax specified in "How to specify a user ID" below. Note that
	different keyserver types support different search methods. Currently
	only LDAP supports them all.

	@item --fetch-keys @code{URIs}
	@opindex fetch-keys
	Retrieve keys located at the specified URIs. Note that different
	installations of GnuPG may support different protocols (HTTP, FTP,
	LDAP, etc.)

	@item --update-trustdb
	@opindex update-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance. This command iterates over all keys and
	builds the Web of Trust. This is an interactive command because it may
	have to ask for the "ownertrust" values for keys. The user has to give
	an estimation of how far she trusts the owner of the displayed key to
	correctly certify (sign) other keys. GnuPG only asks for the ownertrust
	value if it has not yet been assigned to a key. Using the
	@option{--edit-key} menu, the assigned value can be changed at any time.

	@item --check-trustdb
	@opindex check-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance without user interaction. From time to
	time the trust database must be updated so that expired keys or
	signatures and the resulting changes in the Web of Trust can be
	tracked. Normally, GnuPG will calculate when this is required and do it
	automatically unless @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} is set. This
	command can be used to force a trust database check at any time. The
	processing is identical to that of @option{--update-trustdb} but it
	skips keys with a not yet defined "ownertrust".

	For use with cron jobs, this command can be used together with
	@option{--batch} in which case the trust database check is done only if
	a check is needed. To force a run even in batch mode add the option
	@option{--yes}.

	@anchor{option --export-ownertrust}
	@item --export-ownertrust
	@opindex export-ownertrust
	Send the ownertrust values to STDOUT. This is useful for backup purposes
	as these values are the only ones which can't be re-created from a
	corrupted trustdb. Example:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	@gpgname{} --export-ownertrust > otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --import-ownertrust
	@opindex import-ownertrust
	Update the trustdb with the ownertrust values stored in @code{files} (or
	STDIN if not given); existing values will be overwritten. In case of a
	severely damaged trustdb and if you have a recent backup of the
	ownertrust values (e.g. in the file @file{otrust.txt}, you may re-create
	the trustdb using these commands:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	cd ~/.gnupg
	rm trustdb.gpg
	@gpgname{} --import-ownertrust < otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --rebuild-keydb-caches
	@opindex rebuild-keydb-caches
	When updating from version 1.0.6 to 1.0.7 this command should be used
	to create signature caches in the keyring. It might be handy in other
	situations too.

	@item --print-md @code{algo}
	@itemx --print-mds
	@opindex print-md
	Print message digest of algorithm ALGO for all given files or STDIN.
	With the second form (or a deprecated "*" as algo) digests for all
	available algorithms are printed.

	@item --gen-random @code{0\|1\|2} @code{count}
	@opindex gen-random
	Emit @var{count} random bytes of the given quality level 0, 1 or 2. If
	@var{count} is not given or zero, an endless sequence of random bytes
	will be emitted. If used with @option{--armor} the output will be
	base64 encoded. PLEASE, don't use this command unless you know what
	you are doing; it may remove precious entropy from the system!

	@item --gen-prime @code{mode} @code{bits}
	@opindex gen-prime
	Use the source, Luke :-). The output format is still subject to change.


	@item --enarmor
	@item --dearmor
	@opindex enarmor
	@opindex dearmor
	Pack or unpack an arbitrary input into/from an OpenPGP ASCII armor.
	This is a GnuPG extension to OpenPGP and in general not very useful.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ***** KEY MANGEMENT COMMANDS ********
	@c *******************************************
	@node OpenPGP Key Management
	@subsection How to manage your keys

	This section explains the main commands for key management

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --gen-key
	@opindex gen-key
	Generate a new key pair. This command is normally only used
	interactively.

	There is an experimental feature which allows you to create keys in
	batch mode. See the file @file{doc/DETAILS} in the source distribution
	on how to use this.

	@item --gen-revoke @code{name}
	@opindex gen-revoke
	Generate a revocation certificate for the complete key. To revoke
	a subkey or a signature, use the @option{--edit} command.

	@item --desig-revoke @code{name}
	@opindex desig-revoke
	Generate a designated revocation certificate for a key. This allows a
	user (with the permission of the keyholder) to revoke someone else's
	key.


	@item --edit-key
	@opindex edit-key
	Present a menu which enables you to do most of the key management
	related tasks. It expects the specification of a key on the command
	line.

	@c ****** Begin Edit-key Options ********
	@table @asis

	@item uid @code{n}
	@opindex keyedit:uid
	Toggle selection of user ID or photographic user ID with index @code{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item key @code{n}
	@opindex keyedit:key
	Toggle selection of subkey with index @code{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item sign
	@opindex keyedit:sign
	Make a signature on key of user @code{name} If the key is not yet
	signed by the default user (or the users given with -u), the program
	displays the information of the key again, together with its
	fingerprint and asks whether it should be signed. This question is
	repeated for all users specified with
	-u.

	@item lsign
	@opindex keyedit:lsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-exportable and will
	therefore never be used by others. This may be used to make keys
	valid only in the local environment.

	@item nrsign
	@opindex keyedit:nrsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-revocable and can
	therefore never be revoked.

	@item tsign
	@opindex keyedit:tsign
	Make a trust signature. This is a signature that combines the notions
	of certification (like a regular signature), and trust (like the
	"trust" command). It is generally only useful in distinct communities
	or groups.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	Note that "l" (for local / non-exportable), "nr" (for non-revocable,
	and "t" (for trust) may be freely mixed and prefixed to "sign" to
	create a signature of any type desired.
	@c man:.RE

	@table @asis

	@item delsig
	@opindex keyedit:delsig
	Delete a signature. Note that it is not possible to retract a signature,
	once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case
	you better use @code{revsig}.

	@item revsig
	@opindex keyedit:revsig
	Revoke a signature. For every signature which has been generated by
	one of the secret keys, GnuPG asks whether a revocation certificate
	should be generated.

	@item check
	@opindex keyedit:check
	Check the signatures on all selected user IDs.

	@item adduid
	@opindex keyedit:adduid
	Create an additional user ID.

	@item addphoto
	@opindex keyedit:addphoto
	Create a photographic user ID. This will prompt for a JPEG file that
	will be embedded into the user ID. Note that a very large JPEG will make
	for a very large key. Also note that some programs will display your
	JPEG unchanged (GnuPG), and some programs will scale it to fit in a
	dialog box (PGP).

	@item showphoto
	@opindex keyedit:showphoto
	Display the selected photographic user ID.

	@item deluid
	@opindex keyedit:deluid
	Delete a user ID or photographic user ID. Note that it is not
	possible to retract a user id, once it has been send to the public
	(i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revuid}.

	@item revuid
	@opindex keyedit:revuid
	Revoke a user ID or photographic user ID.

	@item primary
	@opindex keyedit:primary
	Flag the current user id as the primary one, removes the primary user
	id flag from all other user ids and sets the timestamp of all affected
	self-signatures one second ahead. Note that setting a photo user ID
	as primary makes it primary over other photo user IDs, and setting a
	regular user ID as primary makes it primary over other regular user
	IDs.

	@item keyserver
	@opindex keyedit:keyserver
	Set a preferred keyserver for the specified user ID(s). This allows
	other users to know where you prefer they get your key from. See
	@option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url} for more on how this
	works. Setting a value of "none" removes an existing preferred
	keyserver.

	@item notation
	@opindex keyedit:notation
	Set a name=value notation for the specified user ID(s). See
	@option{--cert-notation} for more on how this works. Setting a value of
	"none" removes all notations, setting a notation prefixed with a minus
	sign (-) removes that notation, and setting a notation name (without the
	=value) prefixed with a minus sign removes all notations with that name.

	@item pref
	@opindex keyedit:pref
	List preferences from the selected user ID. This shows the actual
	preferences, without including any implied preferences.

	@item showpref
	@opindex keyedit:showpref
	More verbose preferences listing for the selected user ID. This shows
	the preferences in effect by including the implied preferences of 3DES
	(cipher), SHA-1 (digest), and Uncompressed (compression) if they are
	not already included in the preference list. In addition, the
	preferred keyserver and signature notations (if any) are shown.

	@item setpref @code{string}
	@opindex keyedit:setpref
	Set the list of user ID preferences to @code{string} for all (or just
	the selected) user IDs. Calling setpref with no arguments sets the
	preference list to the default (either built-in or set via
	@option{--default-preference-list}), and calling setpref with "none"
	as the argument sets an empty preference list. Use @command{@gpgname
	--version} to get a list of available algorithms. Note that while you
	can change the preferences on an attribute user ID (aka "photo ID"),
	GnuPG does not select keys via attribute user IDs so these preferences
	will not be used by GnuPG.

	When setting preferences, you should list the algorithms in the order
	which you'd like to see them used by someone else when encrypting a
	message to your key. If you don't include 3DES, it will be
	automatically added at the end. Note that there are many factors that
	go into choosing an algorithm (for example, your key may not be the
	only recipient), and so the remote OpenPGP application being used to
	send to you may or may not follow your exact chosen order for a given
	message. It will, however, only choose an algorithm that is present
	on the preference list of every recipient key. See also the
	INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below.

	@item addkey
	@opindex keyedit:addkey
	Add a subkey to this key.

	@item addcardkey
	@opindex keyedit:addcardkey
	Generate a subkey on a card and add it to this key.

	@item keytocard
	@opindex keyedit:keytocard
	Transfer the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey
	has been selected) to a smartcard. The secret key in the keyring will
	be replaced by a stub if the key could be stored successfully on the
	card and you use the save command later. Only certain key types may be
	transferred to the card. A sub menu allows you to select on what card
	to store the key. Note that it is not possible to get that key back
	from the card - if the card gets broken your secret key will be lost
	unless you have a backup somewhere.

	@item bkuptocard @code{file}
	@opindex keyedit:bkuptocard
	Restore the given file to a card. This command may be used to restore a
	backup key (as generated during card initialization) to a new card. In
	almost all cases this will be the encryption key. You should use this
	command only with the corresponding public key and make sure that the
	file given as argument is indeed the backup to restore. You should then
	select 2 to restore as encryption key. You will first be asked to enter
	the passphrase of the backup key and then for the Admin PIN of the card.

	@item delkey
	@opindex keyedit:delkey
	Remove a subkey (secondart key). Note that it is not possible to retract
	a subkey, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In
	that case you better use @code{revkey}.

	@item revkey
	@opindex keyedit:revkey
	Revoke a subkey.

	@item expire
	@opindex keyedit:expire
	Change the key or subkey expiration time. If a subkey is selected, the
	expiration time of this subkey will be changed. With no selection, the
	key expiration of the primary key is changed.

	@item trust
	@opindex keyedit:trust
	Change the owner trust value for the key. This updates the trust-db
	immediately and no save is required.

	@item disable
	@itemx enable
	@opindex keyedit:disable
	@opindex keyedit:enable
	Disable or enable an entire key. A disabled key can not normally be
	used for encryption.

	@item addrevoker
	@opindex keyedit:addrevoker
	Add a designated revoker to the key. This takes one optional argument:
	"sensitive". If a designated revoker is marked as sensitive, it will
	not be exported by default (see export-options).

	@item passwd
	@opindex keyedit:passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key.

	@item toggle
	@opindex keyedit:toggle
	Toggle between public and secret key listing.

	@item clean
	@opindex keyedit:clean
	Compact (by removing all signatures except the selfsig) any user ID
	that is no longer usable (e.g. revoked, or expired). Then, remove any
	signatures that are not usable by the trust calculations.
	Specifically, this removes any signature that does not validate, any
	signature that is superseded by a later signature, revoked signatures,
	and signatures issued by keys that are not present on the keyring.

	@item minimize
	@opindex keyedit:minimize
	Make the key as small as possible. This removes all signatures from
	each user ID except for the most recent self-signature.

	@item cross-certify
	@opindex keyedit:cross-certify
	Add cross-certification signatures to signing subkeys that may not
	currently have them. Cross-certification signatures protect against a
	subtle attack against signing subkeys. See
	@option{--require-cross-certification}. All new keys generated have
	this signature by default, so this option is only useful to bring
	older keys up to date.

	@item save
	@opindex keyedit:save
	Save all changes to the key rings and quit.

	@item quit
	@opindex keyedit:quit
	Quit the program without updating the
	key rings.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	The listing shows you the key with its secondary keys and all user
	ids. The primary user id is indicated by a dot, and selected keys or
	user ids are indicated by an asterisk. The trust
	value is displayed with the primary key: the first is the assigned owner
	trust and the second is the calculated trust value. Letters are used for
	the values:
	@c man:.RE

	@table @asis

	@item -
	No ownertrust assigned / not yet calculated.

	@item e
	Trust
	calculation has failed; probably due to an expired key.

	@item q
	Not enough information for calculation.

	@item n
	Never trust this key.

	@item m
	Marginally trusted.

	@item f
	Fully trusted.

	@item u
	Ultimately trusted.

	@end table
	@c ****** End Edit-key Options ********

	@item --sign-key @code{name}
	@opindex sign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key. This is a shortcut version of
	the subcommand "sign" from @option{--edit}.

	@item --lsign-key @code{name}
	@opindex lsign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key but marks it as
	non-exportable. This is a shortcut version of the subcommand "lsign"
	from @option{--edit-key}.

	@ifset gpgtwoone
	@item --quick-sign-key @code{fpr} [@code{names}]
	@itemx --quick-lsign-key @code{name}
	@opindex quick-sign-key
	@opindex quick-lsign-key
	Directly sign a key from the passphrase without any further user
	interaction. The @code{fpr} must be the verified primary fingerprint
	of a key in the local keyring. If no @code{names} are given, all
	useful user ids are signed; with given [@code{names}] only useful user
	ids matching one of theses names are signed. The command
	@option{--quick-lsign-key} marks the signatures as non-exportable.

	This command uses reasonable defaults and thus does not provide the
	full flexibility of the "sign" subcommand from @option{--edit-key}.
	Its intended use to help unattended signing using a list of verified
	fingerprints.
	@end ifset

	@ifclear gpgone
	@item --passwd @var{user_id}
	@opindex passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key belonging to the certificate
	specified as @var{user_id}. This is a shortcut for the sub-command
	@code{passwd} of the edit key menu.
	@end ifclear

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* OPTIONS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect options
	@node GPG Options
	@section Option Summary

	@command{@gpgname} features a bunch of options to control the exact
	behaviour and to change the default configuration.

	@menu
	* GPG Configuration Options:: How to change the configuration.
	* GPG Key related Options:: Key related options.
	* GPG Input and Output:: Input and Output.
	* OpenPGP Options:: OpenPGP protocol specific options.
	* Compliance Options:: Compliance options.
	* GPG Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually don't want to do.
	* Deprecated Options:: Deprecated options.
	@end menu

	Long options can be put in an options file (default
	"~/.gnupg/gpg.conf"). Short option names will not work - for example,
	"armor" is a valid option for the options file, while "a" is not. Do not
	write the 2 dashes, but simply the name of the option and any required
	arguments. Lines with a hash ('#') as the first non-white-space
	character are ignored. Commands may be put in this file too, but that is
	not generally useful as the command will execute automatically with
	every execution of gpg.

	Please remember that option parsing stops as soon as a non-option is
	encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by using the special option
	@option{--}.

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** CONFIGURATION OPTIONS ********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Configuration Options
	@subsection How to change the configuration

	These options are used to change the configuration and are usually found
	in the option file.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --default-key @var{name}
	@opindex default-key
	Use @var{name} as the default key to sign with. If this option is not
	used, the default key is the first key found in the secret keyring.
	Note that @option{-u} or @option{--local-user} overrides this option.

	@item --default-recipient @var{name}
	@opindex default-recipient
	Use @var{name} as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is
	not used and don't ask if this is a valid one. @var{name} must be
	non-empty.

	@item --default-recipient-self
	@opindex default-recipient-self
	Use the default key as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is not
	used and don't ask if this is a valid one. The default key is the first
	one from the secret keyring or the one set with @option{--default-key}.

	@item --no-default-recipient
	@opindex no-default-recipient
	Reset @option{--default-recipient} and @option{--default-recipient-self}.

	@item -v, --verbose
	@opindex verbose
	Give more information during processing. If used
	twice, the input data is listed in detail.

	@item --no-verbose
	@opindex no-verbose
	Reset verbose level to 0.

	@item -q, --quiet
	@opindex quiet
	Try to be as quiet as possible.

	@item --batch
	@itemx --no-batch
	@opindex batch
	@opindex no-batch
	Use batch mode. Never ask, do not allow interactive commands.
	@option{--no-batch} disables this option. Note that even with a
	filename given on the command line, gpg might still need to read from
	STDIN (in particular if gpg figures that the input is a
	detached signature and no data file has been specified). Thus if you
	do not want to feed data via STDIN, you should connect STDIN to
	@file{/dev/null}.

	@item --no-tty
	@opindex no-tty
	Make sure that the TTY (terminal) is never used for any output.
	This option is needed in some cases because GnuPG sometimes prints
	warnings to the TTY even if @option{--batch} is used.

	@item --yes
	@opindex yes
	Assume "yes" on most questions.

	@item --no
	@opindex no
	Assume "no" on most questions.


	@item --list-options @code{parameters}
	@opindex list-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	listing keys and signatures (that is, @option{--list-keys},
	@option{--list-sigs}, @option{--list-public-keys},
	@option{--list-secret-keys}, and the @option{--edit-key} functions).
	Options can be prepended with a @option{no-} (after the two dashes) to
	give the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex list-options:show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-sigs},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, and @option{--list-secret-keys} to
	display any photo IDs attached to the key. Defaults to no. See also
	@option{--photo-viewer}. Does not work with @option{--with-colons}:
	see @option{--attribute-fd} for the appropriate way to get photo data
	for scripts and other frontends.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}
	listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	@option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the @option{--list-sigs} or
	@option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex list-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of user IDs during key listings.
	Defaults to no.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-unusable-subkeys
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-subkeys
	Show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-keyring
	@opindex list-options:show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-expire
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-expire
	Show signature expiration dates (if any) during @option{--list-sigs} or
	@option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-subpackets
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-subpackets
	Include signature subpackets in the key listing. This option can take an
	optional argument list of the subpackets to list. If no argument is
	passed, list all subpackets. Defaults to no. This option is only
	meaningful when using @option{--with-colons} along with
	@option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}.

	@end table

	@item --verify-options @code{parameters}
	@opindex verify-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	verifying signatures. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give
	the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex verify-options:show-photos
	Display any photo IDs present on the key that issued the signature.
	Defaults to no. See also @option{--photo-viewer}.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the signature being verified. Defaults to no.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	signature being verified. Defaults to IETF standard.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the signature being verified.
	Defaults to no.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex verify-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of the user IDs on the key that issued
	the signature. Defaults to no.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex verify-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs during signature verification.
	Defaults to no.

	@item show-primary-uid-only
	@opindex verify-options:show-primary-uid-only
	Show only the primary user ID during signature verification. That is
	all the AKA lines as well as photo Ids are not shown with the signature
	verification status.

	@item pka-lookups
	@opindex verify-options:pka-lookups
	Enable PKA lookups to verify sender addresses. Note that PKA is based
	on DNS, and so enabling this option may disclose information on when
	and what signatures are verified or to whom data is encrypted. This
	is similar to the "web bug" described for the auto-key-retrieve
	feature.

	@item pka-trust-increase
	@opindex verify-options:pka-trust-increase
	Raise the trust in a signature to full if the signature passes PKA
	validation. This option is only meaningful if pka-lookups is set.
	@end table

	@item --enable-large-rsa
	@itemx --disable-large-rsa
	@opindex enable-large-rsa
	@opindex disable-large-rsa
	With --gen-key and --batch, enable the creation of larger RSA secret
	keys than is generally recommended (up to 8192 bits). These large
	keys are more expensive to use, and their signatures and
	certifications are also larger.

	@item --enable-dsa2
	@itemx --disable-dsa2
	@opindex enable-dsa2
	@opindex disable-dsa2
	Enable hash truncation for all DSA keys even for old DSA Keys up to
	1024 bit. This is also the default with @option{--openpgp}. Note
	that older versions of GnuPG also required this flag to allow the
	generation of DSA larger than 1024 bit.

	@item --photo-viewer @code{string}
	@opindex photo-viewer
	This is the command line that should be run to view a photo ID. "%i"
	will be expanded to a filename containing the photo. "%I" does the
	same, except the file will not be deleted once the viewer exits.
	Other flags are "%k" for the key ID, "%K" for the long key ID, "%f"
	for the key fingerprint, "%t" for the extension of the image type
	(e.g. "jpg"), "%T" for the MIME type of the image (e.g. "image/jpeg"),
	"%v" for the single-character calculated validity of the image being
	viewed (e.g. "f"), "%V" for the calculated validity as a string (e.g.
	"full"), "%U" for a base32 encoded hash of the user ID,
	and "%%" for an actual percent sign. If neither %i or %I are present,
	then the photo will be supplied to the viewer on standard input.

	The default viewer is "xloadimage -fork -quiet -title 'KeyID 0x%k'
	STDIN". Note that if your image viewer program is not secure, then
	executing it from GnuPG does not make it secure.

	@item --exec-path @code{string}
	@opindex exec-path
	Sets a list of directories to search for photo viewers and keyserver
	helpers. If not provided, keyserver helpers use the compiled-in
	default directory, and photo viewers use the $PATH environment
	variable.
	Note, that on W32 system this value is ignored when searching for
	keyserver helpers.

	@item --keyring @code{file}
	@opindex keyring
	Add @code{file} to the current list of keyrings. If @code{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory ("~/.gnupg" if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is not
	used).

	Note that this adds a keyring to the current list. If the intent is to
	use the specified keyring alone, use @option{--keyring} along with
	@option{--no-default-keyring}.

	@item --secret-keyring @code{file}
	@opindex secret-keyring
	Same as @option{--keyring} but for the secret keyrings.

	@item --primary-keyring @code{file}
	@opindex primary-keyring
	Designate @code{file} as the primary public keyring. This means that
	newly imported keys (via @option{--import} or keyserver
	@option{--recv-from}) will go to this keyring.

	@item --trustdb-name @code{file}
	@opindex trustdb-name
	Use @code{file} instead of the default trustdb. If @code{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory (@file{~/.gnupg} if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is
	not used).

	@ifset gpgone
	@anchor{option --homedir}
	@end ifset
	@include opt-homedir.texi


	@ifset gpgone
	@item --pcsc-driver @code{file}
	@opindex pcsc-driver
	Use @code{file} to access the smartcard reader. The current default is
	`libpcsclite.so.1' for GLIBC based systems,
	`/System/Library/Frameworks/PCSC.framework/PCSC' for MAC OS X,
	`winscard.dll' for Windows and `libpcsclite.so' for other systems.
	@end ifset

	@ifset gpgone
	@item --disable-ccid
	@opindex disable-ccid
	Disable the integrated support for CCID compliant readers. This
	allows to fall back to one of the other drivers even if the internal
	CCID driver can handle the reader. Note, that CCID support is only
	available if libusb was available at build time.
	@end ifset

	@ifset gpgone
	@item --reader-port @code{number_or_string}
	@opindex reader-port
	This option may be used to specify the port of the card terminal. A
	value of 0 refers to the first serial device; add 32768 to access USB
	devices. The default is 32768 (first USB device). PC/SC or CCID
	readers might need a string here; run the program in verbose mode to get
	a list of available readers. The default is then the first reader
	found.
	@end ifset

	@item --display-charset @code{name}
	@opindex display-charset
	Set the name of the native character set. This is used to convert
	some informational strings like user IDs to the proper UTF-8 encoding.
	Note that this has nothing to do with the character set of data to be
	encrypted or signed; GnuPG does not recode user-supplied data. If
	this option is not used, the default character set is determined from
	the current locale. A verbosity level of 3 shows the chosen set.
	Valid values for @code{name} are:

	@table @asis

	@item iso-8859-1
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-1
	This is the Latin 1 set.

	@item iso-8859-2
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-2
	The Latin 2 set.

	@item iso-8859-15
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-15
	This is currently an alias for
	the Latin 1 set.

	@item koi8-r
	@opindex display-charset:koi8-r
	The usual Russian set (rfc1489).

	@item utf-8
	@opindex display-charset:utf-8
	Bypass all translations and assume
	that the OS uses native UTF-8 encoding.
	@end table

	@item --utf8-strings
	@itemx --no-utf8-strings
	@opindex utf8-strings
	Assume that command line arguments are given as UTF8 strings. The
	default (@option{--no-utf8-strings}) is to assume that arguments are
	encoded in the character set as specified by
	@option{--display-charset}. These options affect all following
	arguments. Both options may be used multiple times.

	@anchor{gpg-option --options}
	@item --options @code{file}
	@opindex options
	Read options from @code{file} and do not try to read them from the
	default options file in the homedir (see @option{--homedir}). This
	option is ignored if used in an options file.

	@item --no-options
	@opindex no-options
	Shortcut for @option{--options /dev/null}. This option is detected
	before an attempt to open an option file. Using this option will also
	prevent the creation of a @file{~/.gnupg} homedir.

	@item -z @code{n}
	@itemx --compress-level @code{n}
	@itemx --bzip2-compress-level @code{n}
	@opindex compress-level
	@opindex bzip2-compress-level
	Set compression level to @code{n} for the ZIP and ZLIB compression
	algorithms. The default is to use the default compression level of zlib
	(normally 6). @option{--bzip2-compress-level} sets the compression level
	for the BZIP2 compression algorithm (defaulting to 6 as well). This is a
	different option from @option{--compress-level} since BZIP2 uses a
	significant amount of memory for each additional compression level.
	@option{-z} sets both. A value of 0 for @code{n} disables compression.

	@item --bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	@opindex bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	Use a different decompression method for BZIP2 compressed files. This
	alternate method uses a bit more than half the memory, but also runs
	at half the speed. This is useful under extreme low memory
	circumstances when the file was originally compressed at a high
	@option{--bzip2-compress-level}.


	@item --mangle-dos-filenames
	@itemx --no-mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex no-mangle-dos-filenames
	Older version of Windows cannot handle filenames with more than one
	dot. @option{--mangle-dos-filenames} causes GnuPG to replace (rather
	than add to) the extension of an output filename to avoid this
	problem. This option is off by default and has no effect on non-Windows
	platforms.

	@item --ask-cert-level
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-level
	@opindex ask-cert-level
	When making a key signature, prompt for a certification level. If this
	option is not specified, the certification level used is set via
	@option{--default-cert-level}. See @option{--default-cert-level} for
	information on the specific levels and how they are
	used. @option{--no-ask-cert-level} disables this option. This option
	defaults to no.

	@item --default-cert-level @code{n}
	@opindex default-cert-level
	The default to use for the check level when signing a key.

	0 means you make no particular claim as to how carefully you verified
	the key.

	1 means you believe the key is owned by the person who claims to own
	it but you could not, or did not verify the key at all. This is
	useful for a "persona" verification, where you sign the key of a
	pseudonymous user.

	2 means you did casual verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint and checked the
	user ID on the key against a photo ID.

	3 means you did extensive verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint with the owner of the
	key in person, and that you checked, by means of a hard to forge
	document with a photo ID (such as a passport) that the name of the key
	owner matches the name in the user ID on the key, and finally that you
	verified (by exchange of email) that the email address on the key
	belongs to the key owner.

	Note that the examples given above for levels 2 and 3 are just that:
	examples. In the end, it is up to you to decide just what "casual"
	and "extensive" mean to you.

	This option defaults to 0 (no particular claim).

	@item --min-cert-level
	@opindex min-cert-level
	When building the trust database, treat any signatures with a
	certification level below this as invalid. Defaults to 2, which
	disregards level 1 signatures. Note that level 0 "no particular
	claim" signatures are always accepted.

	@item --trusted-key @code{long key ID}
	@opindex trusted-key
	Assume that the specified key (which must be given
	as a full 8 byte key ID) is as trustworthy as one of
	your own secret keys. This option is useful if you
	don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them)
	online but still want to be able to check the validity of a given
	recipient's or signator's key.

	@item --trust-model @code{pgp\|classic\|direct\|always\|auto}
	@opindex trust-model
	Set what trust model GnuPG should follow. The models are:

	@table @asis

	@item pgp
	@opindex trust-mode:pgp
	This is the Web of Trust combined with trust signatures as used in PGP
	5.x and later. This is the default trust model when creating a new
	trust database.

	@item classic
	@opindex trust-mode:classic
	This is the standard Web of Trust as used in PGP 2.x and earlier.

	@item direct
	@opindex trust-mode:direct
	Key validity is set directly by the user and not calculated via the
	Web of Trust.

	@item always
	@opindex trust-mode:always
	Skip key validation and assume that used keys are always fully
	trusted. You generally won't use this unless you are using some
	external validation scheme. This option also suppresses the
	"[uncertain]" tag printed with signature checks when there is no
	evidence that the user ID is bound to the key. Note that this
	trust model still does not allow the use of expired, revoked, or
	disabled keys.

	@item auto
	@opindex trust-mode:auto
	Select the trust model depending on whatever the internal trust
	database says. This is the default model if such a database already
	exists.
	@end table

	@item --auto-key-locate @code{parameters}
	@itemx --no-auto-key-locate
	@opindex auto-key-locate
	GnuPG can automatically locate and retrieve keys as needed using this
	option. This happens when encrypting to an email address (in the
	"user@@example.com" form), and there are no user@@example.com keys on
	the local keyring. This option takes any number of the following
	mechanisms, in the order they are to be tried:

	@table @asis

	@item cert
	Locate a key using DNS CERT, as specified in rfc4398.

	@item pka
	Locate a key using DNS PKA.

	@item ldap
	Using DNS Service Discovery, check the domain in question for any LDAP
	keyservers to use. If this fails, attempt to locate the key using the
	PGP Universal method of checking @samp{ldap://keys.(thedomain)}.

	@item keyserver
	Locate a key using whatever keyserver is defined using the
	@option{--keyserver} option.

	@item keyserver-URL
	In addition, a keyserver URL as used in the @option{--keyserver} option
	may be used here to query that particular keyserver.

	@item local
	Locate the key using the local keyrings. This mechanism allows to
	select the order a local key lookup is done. Thus using
	@samp{--auto-key-locate local} is identical to
	@option{--no-auto-key-locate}.

	@item nodefault
	This flag disables the standard local key lookup, done before any of the
	mechanisms defined by the @option{--auto-key-locate} are tried. The
	position of this mechanism in the list does not matter. It is not
	required if @code{local} is also used.

	@item clear
	Clear all defined mechanisms. This is useful to override
	mechanisms given in a config file.

	@end table

	@item --keyid-format @code{short\|0xshort\|long\|0xlong}
	@opindex keyid-format
	Select how to display key IDs. "short" is the traditional 8-character
	key ID. "long" is the more accurate (but less convenient)
	16-character key ID. Add an "0x" to either to include an "0x" at the
	beginning of the key ID, as in 0x99242560. Note that this option is
	ignored if the option --with-colons is used.

	@item --keyserver @code{name}
	@opindex keyserver
	Use @code{name} as your keyserver. This is the server that
	@option{--recv-keys}, @option{--send-keys}, and @option{--search-keys}
	will communicate with to receive keys from, send keys to, and search for
	keys on. The format of the @code{name} is a URI:
	`scheme:[//]keyservername[:port]' The scheme is the type of keyserver:
	"hkp" for the HTTP (or compatible) keyservers, "ldap" for the LDAP
	keyservers, or "mailto" for the Graff email keyserver. Note that your
	particular installation of GnuPG may have other keyserver types
	available as well. Keyserver schemes are case-insensitive. After the
	keyserver name, optional keyserver configuration options may be
	provided. These are the same as the global @option{--keyserver-options}
	from below, but apply only to this particular keyserver.

	Most keyservers synchronize with each other, so there is generally no
	need to send keys to more than one server. The keyserver
	@code{hkp://keys.gnupg.net} uses round robin DNS to give a different
	keyserver each time you use it.

	@item --keyserver-options @code{name=value1 }
	@opindex keyserver-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for the
	keyserver. Options can be prefixed with a `no-' to give the opposite
	meaning. Valid import-options or export-options may be used here as
	well to apply to importing (@option{--recv-key}) or exporting
	(@option{--send-key}) a key from a keyserver. While not all options
	are available for all keyserver types, some common options are:

	@table @asis

	@item include-revoked
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as revoked. Note that not all keyservers
	differentiate between revoked and unrevoked keys, and for such
	keyservers this option is meaningless. Note also that most keyservers do
	not have cryptographic verification of key revocations, and so turning
	this option off may result in skipping keys that are incorrectly marked
	as revoked.

	@item include-disabled
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as disabled. Note that this option is not
	used with HKP keyservers.

	@item auto-key-retrieve
	This option enables the automatic retrieving of keys from a keyserver
	when verifying signatures made by keys that are not on the local
	keyring.

	Note that this option makes a "web bug" like behavior possible.
	Keyserver operators can see which keys you request, so by sending you
	a message signed by a brand new key (which you naturally will not have
	on your local keyring), the operator can tell both your IP address and
	the time when you verified the signature.

	@item honor-keyserver-url
	When using @option{--refresh-keys}, if the key in question has a preferred
	keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to refresh the key
	from. In addition, if auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature
	being verified has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred
	keyserver to fetch the key from. Defaults to yes.

	@item honor-pka-record
	If auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature being verified has a
	PKA record, then use the PKA information to fetch the key. Defaults
	to yes.

	@item include-subkeys
	When receiving a key, include subkeys as potential targets. Note that
	this option is not used with HKP keyservers, as they do not support
	retrieving keys by subkey id.

	@item use-temp-files
	On most Unix-like platforms, GnuPG communicates with the keyserver
	helper program via pipes, which is the most efficient method. This
	option forces GnuPG to use temporary files to communicate. On some
	platforms (such as Win32 and RISC OS), this option is always enabled.

	@item keep-temp-files
	If using `use-temp-files', do not delete the temp files after using
	them. This option is useful to learn the keyserver communication
	protocol by reading the temporary files.

	@item verbose
	Tell the keyserver helper program to be more verbose. This option can
	be repeated multiple times to increase the verbosity level.

	@item timeout
	Tell the keyserver helper program how long (in seconds) to try and
	perform a keyserver action before giving up. Note that performing
	multiple actions at the same time uses this timeout value per action.
	For example, when retrieving multiple keys via @option{--recv-keys}, the
	timeout applies separately to each key retrieval, and not to the
	@option{--recv-keys} command as a whole. Defaults to 30 seconds.

	@item http-proxy=@code{value}
	Set the proxy to use for HTTP and HKP keyservers. This overrides the
	"http_proxy" environment variable, if any.


	@ifclear gpgtwoone
	@item max-cert-size
	When retrieving a key via DNS CERT, only accept keys up to this size.
	Defaults to 16384 bytes.
	@end ifclear

	@item debug
	Turn on debug output in the keyserver helper program. Note that the
	details of debug output depends on which keyserver helper program is
	being used, and in turn, on any libraries that the keyserver helper
	program uses internally (libcurl, openldap, etc).

	@item check-cert
	@ifset gpgtwoone
	This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.
	@end ifset
	@ifclear gpgtwoone
	Enable certificate checking if the keyserver presents one (for hkps or
	ldaps). Defaults to on.
	@end ifclear

	@item ca-cert-file
	@ifset gpgtwoone
	This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.
	@end ifset
	@ifclear gpgtwoone
	Provide a certificate store to override the system default. Only
	necessary if check-cert is enabled, and the keyserver is using a
	certificate that is not present in a system default certificate list.

	Note that depending on the SSL library that the keyserver helper is
	built with, this may actually be a directory or a file.
	@end ifclear

	@end table

	@item --completes-needed @code{n}
	@opindex compliant-needed
	Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 1).

	@item --marginals-needed @code{n}
	@opindex marginals-needed
	Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 3)

	@item --max-cert-depth @code{n}
	@opindex max-cert-depth
	Maximum depth of a certification chain (default is 5).

	@ifclear gpgtwoone
	@item --simple-sk-checksum
	@opindex simple-sk-checksum
	Secret keys are integrity protected by using a SHA-1 checksum. This
	method is part of the upcoming enhanced OpenPGP specification but
	GnuPG already uses it as a countermeasure against certain attacks.
	Old applications don't understand this new format, so this option may
	be used to switch back to the old behaviour. Using this option bears
	a security risk. Note that using this option only takes effect when
	the secret key is encrypted - the simplest way to make this happen is
	to change the passphrase on the key (even changing it to the same
	value is acceptable).
	@end ifclear

	@item --no-sig-cache
	@opindex no-sig-cache
	Do not cache the verification status of key signatures.
	Caching gives a much better performance in key listings. However, if
	you suspect that your public keyring is not save against write
	modifications, you can use this option to disable the caching. It
	probably does not make sense to disable it because all kind of damage
	can be done if someone else has write access to your public keyring.

	@item --no-sig-create-check
	@opindex no-sig-create-check
	GnuPG normally verifies each signature right after creation to protect
	against bugs and hardware malfunctions which could leak out bits from
	the secret key. This extra verification needs some time (about 115%
	for DSA keys), and so this option can be used to disable it.
	However, due to the fact that the signature creation needs manual
	interaction, this performance penalty does not matter in most settings.

	@item --auto-check-trustdb
	@itemx --no-auto-check-trustdb
	@opindex auto-check-trustdb
	If GnuPG feels that its information about the Web of Trust has to be
	updated, it automatically runs the @option{--check-trustdb} command
	internally. This may be a time consuming
	process. @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} disables this option.

	@item --use-agent
	@itemx --no-use-agent
	@opindex use-agent
	@ifclear gpgone
	This is dummy option. @command{@gpgname} always requires the agent.
	@end ifclear
	@ifset gpgone
	Try to use the GnuPG-Agent. With this option, GnuPG first tries to
	connect to the agent before it asks for a
	passphrase. @option{--no-use-agent} disables this option.
	@end ifset

	@item --gpg-agent-info
	@opindex gpg-agent-info
	@ifclear gpgone
	This is dummy option. It has no effect when used with @command{gpg2}.
	@end ifclear
	@ifset gpgone
	Override the value of the environment variable
	@samp{GPG_AGENT_INFO}. This is only used when @option{--use-agent} has
	been given. Given that this option is not anymore used by
	@command{gpg2}, it should be avoided if possible.
	@end ifset


	@ifclear gpgone
	@item --agent-program @var{file}
	@opindex agent-program
	Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The
	default value is the @file{/usr/bin/gpg-agent}. This is only used
	as a fallback when the environment variable @code{GPG_AGENT_INFO} is not
	set or a running agent cannot be connected.
	@end ifclear

	@ifset gpgtwoone
	@item --dirmngr-program @var{file}
	@opindex dirmngr-program
	Specify a dirmngr program to be used for keyserver access. The
	default value is @file{/usr/sbin/dirmngr}. This is only used as a
	fallback when the environment variable @code{DIRMNGR_INFO} is not set or
	a running dirmngr cannot be connected.
	@end ifset

	@item --lock-once
	@opindex lock-once
	Lock the databases the first time a lock is requested
	and do not release the lock until the process
	terminates.

	@item --lock-multiple
	@opindex lock-multiple
	Release the locks every time a lock is no longer
	needed. Use this to override a previous @option{--lock-once}
	from a config file.

	@item --lock-never
	@opindex lock-never
	Disable locking entirely. This option should be used only in very
	special environments, where it can be assured that only one process
	is accessing those files. A bootable floppy with a stand-alone
	encryption system will probably use this. Improper usage of this
	option may lead to data and key corruption.

	@item --exit-on-status-write-error
	@opindex exit-on-status-write-error
	This option will cause write errors on the status FD to immediately
	terminate the process. That should in fact be the default but it never
	worked this way and thus we need an option to enable this, so that the
	change won't break applications which close their end of a status fd
	connected pipe too early. Using this option along with
	@option{--enable-progress-filter} may be used to cleanly cancel long
	running gpg operations.

	@item --limit-card-insert-tries @code{n}
	@opindex limit-card-insert-tries
	With @code{n} greater than 0 the number of prompts asking to insert a
	smartcard gets limited to N-1. Thus with a value of 1 gpg won't at
	all ask to insert a card if none has been inserted at startup. This
	option is useful in the configuration file in case an application does
	not know about the smartcard support and waits ad infinitum for an
	inserted card.

	@item --no-random-seed-file
	@opindex no-random-seed-file
	GnuPG uses a file to store its internal random pool over invocations.
	This makes random generation faster; however sometimes write operations
	are not desired. This option can be used to achieve that with the cost of
	slower random generation.

	@item --no-greeting
	@opindex no-greeting
	Suppress the initial copyright message.

	@item --no-secmem-warning
	@opindex no-secmem-warning
	Suppress the warning about "using insecure memory".

	@item --no-permission-warning
	@opindex permission-warning
	Suppress the warning about unsafe file and home directory (@option{--homedir})
	permissions. Note that the permission checks that GnuPG performs are
	not intended to be authoritative, but rather they simply warn about
	certain common permission problems. Do not assume that the lack of a
	warning means that your system is secure.

	Note that the warning for unsafe @option{--homedir} permissions cannot be
	suppressed in the gpg.conf file, as this would allow an attacker to
	place an unsafe gpg.conf file in place, and use this file to suppress
	warnings about itself. The @option{--homedir} permissions warning may only be
	suppressed on the command line.

	@item --no-mdc-warning
	@opindex no-mdc-warning
	Suppress the warning about missing MDC integrity protection.

	@item --require-secmem
	@itemx --no-require-secmem
	@opindex require-secmem
	Refuse to run if GnuPG cannot get secure memory. Defaults to no
	(i.e. run, but give a warning).


	@item --require-cross-certification
	@itemx --no-require-cross-certification
	@opindex require-cross-certification
	When verifying a signature made from a subkey, ensure that the cross
	certification "back signature" on the subkey is present and valid. This
	protects against a subtle attack against subkeys that can sign.
	Defaults to @option{--require-cross-certification} for
	@command{@gpgname}.

	@item --expert
	@itemx --no-expert
	@opindex expert
	Allow the user to do certain nonsensical or "silly" things like
	signing an expired or revoked key, or certain potentially incompatible
	things like generating unusual key types. This also disables certain
	warning messages about potentially incompatible actions. As the name
	implies, this option is for experts only. If you don't fully
	understand the implications of what it allows you to do, leave this
	off. @option{--no-expert} disables this option.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** KEY RELATED OPTIONS **********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Key related Options
	@subsection Key related options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -r
	@opindex recipient
	Encrypt for user id @var{name}. If this option or
	@option{--hidden-recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user-id
	unless @option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --hidden-recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -R
	@opindex hidden-recipient
	Encrypt for user ID @var{name}, but hide the key ID of this user's
	key. This option helps to hide the receiver of the message and is a
	limited countermeasure against traffic analysis. If this option or
	@option{--recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user ID unless
	@option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --encrypt-to @code{name}
	@opindex encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as an
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked
	user id. No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even
	disabled keys can be used.

	@item --hidden-encrypt-to @code{name}
	@opindex hidden-encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--hidden-recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as a hidden
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked user id.
	No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even disabled
	keys can be used.

	@item --no-encrypt-to
	@opindex no-encrypt-to
	Disable the use of all @option{--encrypt-to} and
	@option{--hidden-encrypt-to} keys.

	@item --group @code{name=value1 }
	@opindex group
	Sets up a named group, which is similar to aliases in email programs.
	Any time the group name is a recipient (@option{-r} or
	@option{--recipient}), it will be expanded to the values
	specified. Multiple groups with the same name are automatically merged
	into a single group.

	The values are @code{key IDs} or fingerprints, but any key description
	is accepted. Note that a value with spaces in it will be treated as
	two different values. Note also there is only one level of expansion
	--- you cannot make an group that points to another group. When used
	from the command line, it may be necessary to quote the argument to
	this option to prevent the shell from treating it as multiple
	arguments.

	@item --ungroup @code{name}
	@opindex ungroup
	Remove a given entry from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --no-groups
	@opindex no-groups
	Remove all entries from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --local-user @var{name}
	@itemx -u
	@opindex local-user
	Use @var{name} as the key to sign with. Note that this option overrides
	@option{--default-key}.

	@ifset gpgtwoone
	@item --try-secret-key @var{name}
	@opindex try-secret-key
	For hidden recipients GPG needs to know the keys to use for trial
	decryption. The key set with @option{--default-key} is always tried
	first, but this is often not sufficient. This option allows to set more
	keys to be used for trial decryption. Although any valid user-id
	specification may be used for @var{name} it makes sense to use at least
	the long keyid to avoid ambiguities. Note that gpg-agent might pop up a
	pinentry for a lot keys to do the trial decryption. If you want to stop
	all further trial decryption you may use close-window button instead of
	the cancel button.
	@end ifset

	@item --try-all-secrets
	@opindex try-all-secrets
	Don't look at the key ID as stored in the message but try all secret
	keys in turn to find the right decryption key. This option forces the
	behaviour as used by anonymous recipients (created by using
	@option{--throw-keyids} or @option{--hidden-recipient}) and might come
	handy in case where an encrypted message contains a bogus key ID.

	@item --skip-hidden-recipients
	@itemx --no-skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex no-skip-hidden-recipients
	During decryption skip all anonymous recipients. This option helps in
	the case that people use the hidden recipients feature to hide there
	own encrypt-to key from others. If oneself has many secret keys this
	may lead to a major annoyance because all keys are tried in turn to
	decrypt soemthing which was not really intended for it. The drawback
	of this option is that it is currently not possible to decrypt a
	message which includes real anonymous recipients.


	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** INPUT AND OUTPUT *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Input and Output
	@subsection Input and Output

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --armor
	@itemx -a
	@opindex armor
	Create ASCII armored output. The default is to create the binary
	OpenPGP format.

	@item --no-armor
	@opindex no-armor
	Assume the input data is not in ASCII armored format.

	@item --output @var{file}
	@itemx -o @var{file}
	@opindex output
	Write output to @var{file}.

	@item --max-output @code{n}
	@opindex max-output
	This option sets a limit on the number of bytes that will be generated
	when processing a file. Since OpenPGP supports various levels of
	compression, it is possible that the plaintext of a given message may be
	significantly larger than the original OpenPGP message. While GnuPG
	works properly with such messages, there is often a desire to set a
	maximum file size that will be generated before processing is forced to
	stop by the OS limits. Defaults to 0, which means "no limit".

	@item --import-options @code{parameters}
	@opindex import-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	importing keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item import-local-sigs
	Allow importing key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	+ @item import-keep-ownertrust
	+ Normally possible still existing ownertrust values of a key are
	+ cleared if a key is imported. This is in general desirable so that
	+ a formerly deleted key does not automatically gain an ownertrust
	+ values merely due to import. On the other hand it is sometimes
	+ necessary to re-import a trusted set of keys again but keeping
	+ already assigned ownertrust values. This can be achived by using
	+ this option.
	+
	@item repair-pks-subkey-bug
	During import, attempt to repair the damage caused by the PKS keyserver
	bug (pre version 0.9.6) that mangles keys with multiple subkeys. Note
	that this cannot completely repair the damaged key as some crucial data
	is removed by the keyserver, but it does at least give you back one
	subkey. Defaults to no for regular @option{--import} and to yes for
	keyserver @option{--recv-keys}.

	@item merge-only
	During import, allow key updates to existing keys, but do not allow
	any new keys to be imported. Defaults to no.

	@item import-clean
	After import, compact (remove all signatures except the
	self-signature) any user IDs from the new key that are not usable.
	Then, remove any signatures from the new key that are not usable.
	This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are not present
	on the keyring. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key}
	command "clean" after import. Defaults to no.

	@item import-minimal
	Import the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except
	the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the
	same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" after import.
	Defaults to no.
	@end table

	@item --export-options @code{parameters}
	@opindex export-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	exporting keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item export-local-sigs
	Allow exporting key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	@item export-attributes
	Include attribute user IDs (photo IDs) while exporting. This is
	useful to export keys if they are going to be used by an OpenPGP
	program that does not accept attribute user IDs. Defaults to yes.

	@item export-sensitive-revkeys
	Include designated revoker information that was marked as
	"sensitive". Defaults to no.

	@c Since GnuPG 2.1 gpg-agent manages the secret key and thus the
	@c export-reset-subkey-passwd hack is not anymore justified. Such use
	@c cases need to be implemented using a specialized secret key export
	@c tool.
	@ifclear gpgtwoone
	@item export-reset-subkey-passwd
	When using the @option{--export-secret-subkeys} command, this option resets
	the passphrases for all exported subkeys to empty. This is useful
	when the exported subkey is to be used on an unattended machine where
	a passphrase doesn't necessarily make sense. Defaults to no.
	@end ifclear

	@item export-clean
	Compact (remove all signatures from) user IDs on the key being
	exported if the user IDs are not usable. Also, do not export any
	signatures that are not usable. This includes signatures that were
	issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. This option is
	the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "clean" before export
	except that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to
	no.

	@item export-minimal
	Export the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except the
	most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the same as
	running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" before export except
	that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to no.
	@end table

	@item --with-colons
	@opindex with-colons
	Print key listings delimited by colons. Note that the output will be
	encoded in UTF-8 regardless of any @option{--display-charset} setting. This
	format is useful when GnuPG is called from scripts and other programs
	as it is easily machine parsed. The details of this format are
	documented in the file @file{doc/DETAILS}, which is included in the GnuPG
	source distribution.

	@item --fixed-list-mode
	@opindex fixed-list-mode
	Do not merge primary user ID and primary key in @option{--with-colon}
	listing mode and print all timestamps as seconds since 1970-01-01.
	@ifclear gpgone
	Since GnuPG 2.0.10, this mode is always used and thus this option is
	obsolete; it does not harm to use it though.
	@end ifclear

	@ifset gpgtwoone
	@item --legacy-list-mode
	@opindex legacy-list-mode
	Revert to the pre-2.1 public key list mode. This only affects the
	human readable output and not the machine interface
	(i.e. @code{--with-colons}). Note that the legacy format does not
	allow to convey suitable information for elliptic curves.
	@end ifset

	@item --with-fingerprint
	@opindex with-fingerprint
	Same as the command @option{--fingerprint} but changes only the format
	of the output and may be used together with another command.

	@ifset gpgtwoone
	@item --with-keygrip
	@opindex with-keygrip
	Include the keygrip in the key listings.

	@item --with-secret
	@opindex with-secret
	Include info about the presence of a secret key in public key listings
	done with @code{--with-colons}.

	@end ifset

	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPENPGP OPTIONS **************
	@c *******************************************
	@node OpenPGP Options
	@subsection OpenPGP protocol specific options.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -t, --textmode
	@itemx --no-textmode
	@opindex textmode
	Treat input files as text and store them in the OpenPGP canonical text
	form with standard "CRLF" line endings. This also sets the necessary
	flags to inform the recipient that the encrypted or signed data is text
	and may need its line endings converted back to whatever the local
	system uses. This option is useful when communicating between two
	platforms that have different line ending conventions (UNIX-like to Mac,
	Mac to Windows, etc). @option{--no-textmode} disables this option, and
	is the default.

	@ifset gpgone
	If @option{-t} (but not @option{--textmode}) is used together with
	armoring and signing, this enables clearsigned messages. This kludge is
	needed for command-line compatibility with command-line versions of PGP;
	normally you would use @option{--sign} or @option{--clearsign} to select
	the type of the signature.
	@end ifset

	@item --force-v3-sigs
	@itemx --no-force-v3-sigs
	@opindex force-v3-sigs
	OpenPGP states that an implementation should generate v4 signatures
	but PGP versions 5 through 7 only recognize v4 signatures on key
	material. This option forces v3 signatures for signatures on data.
	Note that this option implies @option{--no-ask-sig-expire}, and unsets
	@option{--sig-policy-url}, @option{--sig-notation}, and
	@option{--sig-keyserver-url}, as these features cannot be used with v3
	signatures. @option{--no-force-v3-sigs} disables this option.
	Defaults to no.

	@item --force-v4-certs
	@itemx --no-force-v4-certs
	@opindex force-v4-certs
	Always use v4 key signatures even on v3 keys. This option also
	changes the default hash algorithm for v3 RSA keys from MD5 to SHA-1.
	@option{--no-force-v4-certs} disables this option.

	@item --force-mdc
	@opindex force-mdc
	Force the use of encryption with a modification detection code. This
	is always used with the newer ciphers (those with a blocksize greater
	than 64 bits), or if all of the recipient keys indicate MDC support in
	their feature flags.

	@item --disable-mdc
	@opindex disable-mdc
	Disable the use of the modification detection code. Note that by
	using this option, the encrypted message becomes vulnerable to a
	message modification attack.

	@item --personal-cipher-preferences @code{string}
	@opindex personal-cipher-preferences
	Set the list of personal cipher preferences to @code{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also
	used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command.

	@item --personal-digest-preferences @code{string}
	@opindex personal-digest-preferences
	Set the list of personal digest preferences to @code{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked digest algorithm in this list
	is also used when signing without encryption
	(e.g. @option{--clearsign} or @option{--sign}).

	@item --personal-compress-preferences @code{string}
	@opindex personal-compress-preferences
	Set the list of personal compression preferences to @code{string}.
	Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available
	algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This
	allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the
	recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that
	is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked compression
	algorithm in this list is also used when there are no recipient keys
	to consider (e.g. @option{--symmetric}).

	@item --s2k-cipher-algo @code{name}
	@opindex s2k-cipher-algo
	Use @code{name} as the cipher algorithm used to protect secret keys.
	The default cipher is CAST5. This cipher is also used for
	conventional encryption if @option{--personal-cipher-preferences} and
	@option{--cipher-algo} is not given.

	@item --s2k-digest-algo @code{name}
	@opindex s2k-digest-algo
	Use @code{name} as the digest algorithm used to mangle the passphrases.
	The default algorithm is SHA-1.

	@item --s2k-mode @code{n}
	@opindex s2k-mode
	Selects how passphrases are mangled. If @code{n} is 0 a plain
	passphrase (which is not recommended) will be used, a 1 adds a salt to
	the passphrase and a 3 (the default) iterates the whole process a
	number of times (see --s2k-count). Unless @option{--rfc1991} is used,
	this mode is also used for conventional encryption.

	@item --s2k-count @code{n}
	@opindex s2k-count
	Specify how many times the passphrase mangling is repeated. This
	value may range between 1024 and 65011712 inclusive. The default is
	inquired from gpg-agent. Note that not all values in the
	1024-65011712 range are legal and if an illegal value is selected,
	GnuPG will round up to the nearest legal value. This option is only
	meaningful if @option{--s2k-mode} is 3.


	@end table

	@c ***************************
	@c ***** Compliance ******
	@c ***************************
	@node Compliance Options
	@subsection Compliance options

	These options control what GnuPG is compliant to. Only one of these
	options may be active at a time. Note that the default setting of
	this is nearly always the correct one. See the INTEROPERABILITY WITH
	OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below before using one of these
	options.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --gnupg
	@opindex gnupg
	Use standard GnuPG behavior. This is essentially OpenPGP behavior
	(see @option{--openpgp}), but with some additional workarounds for common
	compatibility problems in different versions of PGP. This is the
	default option, so it is not generally needed, but it may be useful to
	override a different compliance option in the gpg.conf file.

	@item --openpgp
	@opindex openpgp
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict OpenPGP
	behavior. Use this option to reset all previous options like
	@option{--s2k-*}, @option{--cipher-algo}, @option{--digest-algo} and
	@option{--compress-algo} to OpenPGP compliant values. All PGP
	workarounds are disabled.

	@item --rfc4880
	@opindex rfc4880
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-4880
	behavior. Note that this is currently the same thing as
	@option{--openpgp}.

	@item --rfc2440
	@opindex rfc2440
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-2440
	behavior.

	@item --rfc1991
	@opindex rfc1991
	Try to be more RFC-1991 (PGP 2.x) compliant.

	@item --pgp2
	@opindex pgp2
	Set up all options to be as PGP 2.x compliant as possible, and warn if
	an action is taken (e.g. encrypting to a non-RSA key) that will create
	a message that PGP 2.x will not be able to handle. Note that `PGP
	2.x' here means `MIT PGP 2.6.2'. There are other versions of PGP 2.x
	available, but the MIT release is a good common baseline.

	This option implies
	@ifset gpgone
	@option{--rfc1991 --disable-mdc --no-force-v4-certs
	--escape-from-lines --force-v3-sigs
	--cipher-algo IDEA --digest-algo MD5 --compress-algo ZIP}.
	@end ifset
	@ifclear gpgone
	@option{--rfc1991 --disable-mdc --no-force-v4-certs
	--escape-from-lines --force-v3-sigs --allow-weak-digest-algos
	--cipher-algo IDEA --digest-algo MD5 --compress-algo ZIP}.
	@end ifclear
	It also disables @option{--textmode} when encrypting.

	@item --pgp6
	@opindex pgp6
	Set up all options to be as PGP 6 compliant as possible. This
	restricts you to the ciphers IDEA (if the IDEA plugin is installed),
	3DES, and CAST5, the hashes MD5, SHA1 and RIPEMD160, and the
	compression algorithms none and ZIP. This also disables
	--throw-keyids, and making signatures with signing subkeys as PGP 6
	does not understand signatures made by signing subkeys.

	This option implies @option{--disable-mdc --escape-from-lines
	--force-v3-sigs}.

	@item --pgp7
	@opindex pgp7
	Set up all options to be as PGP 7 compliant as possible. This is
	identical to @option{--pgp6} except that MDCs are not disabled, and the
	list of allowable ciphers is expanded to add AES128, AES192, AES256, and
	TWOFISH.

	@item --pgp8
	@opindex pgp8
	Set up all options to be as PGP 8 compliant as possible. PGP 8 is a lot
	closer to the OpenPGP standard than previous versions of PGP, so all
	this does is disable @option{--throw-keyids} and set
	@option{--escape-from-lines}. All algorithms are allowed except for the
	SHA224, SHA384, and SHA512 digests.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** ESOTERIC OPTIONS *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Esoteric Options
	@subsection Doing things one usually doesn't want to do.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -n
	@itemx --dry-run
	@opindex dry-run
	Don't make any changes (this is not completely implemented).

	@item --list-only
	@opindex list-only
	Changes the behaviour of some commands. This is like @option{--dry-run} but
	different in some cases. The semantic of this command may be extended in
	the future. Currently it only skips the actual decryption pass and
	therefore enables a fast listing of the encryption keys.

	@item -i
	@itemx --interactive
	@opindex interactive
	Prompt before overwriting any files.

	@item --debug-level @var{level}
	@opindex debug-level
	Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be
	a numeric value or by a keyword:

	@table @code
	@item none
	No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of
	the keyword.
	@item basic
	Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item advanced
	More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item expert
	Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item guru
	All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be
	used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is
	only enabled if the keyword is used.
	@end table

	How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not
	specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are
	however carefully selected to best aid in debugging.

	@item --debug @var{flags}
	@opindex debug
	Set debugging flags. All flags are or-ed and @var{flags} may
	be given in C syntax (e.g. 0x0042).

	@item --debug-all
	@opindex debug-all
	Set all useful debugging flags.

	@ifset gpgone
	@item --debug-ccid-driver
	@opindex debug-ccid-driver
	Enable debug output from the included CCID driver for smartcards.
	Note that this option is only available on some system.
	@end ifset

	@item --faked-system-time @var{epoch}
	@opindex faked-system-time
	This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back or
	forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since the year
	1970. Alternatively @var{epoch} may be given as a full ISO time string
	(e.g. "20070924T154812").

	@item --enable-progress-filter
	@opindex enable-progress-filter
	Enable certain PROGRESS status outputs. This option allows frontends
	to display a progress indicator while gpg is processing larger files.
	There is a slight performance overhead using it.

	@item --status-fd @code{n}
	@opindex status-fd
	Write special status strings to the file descriptor @code{n}.
	See the file DETAILS in the documentation for a listing of them.

	@item --status-file @code{file}
	@opindex status-file
	Same as @option{--status-fd}, except the status data is written to file
	@code{file}.

	@item --logger-fd @code{n}
	@opindex logger-fd
	Write log output to file descriptor @code{n} and not to STDERR.

	@item --log-file @code{file}
	@itemx --logger-file @code{file}
	@opindex log-file
	Same as @option{--logger-fd}, except the logger data is written to file
	@code{file}. Note that @option{--log-file} is only implemented for
	GnuPG-2.

	@item --attribute-fd @code{n}
	@opindex attribute-fd
	Write attribute subpackets to the file descriptor @code{n}. This is most
	useful for use with @option{--status-fd}, since the status messages are
	needed to separate out the various subpackets from the stream delivered
	to the file descriptor.

	@item --attribute-file @code{file}
	@opindex attribute-file
	Same as @option{--attribute-fd}, except the attribute data is written to
	file @code{file}.

	@item --comment @code{string}
	@itemx --no-comments
	@opindex comment
	Use @code{string} as a comment string in clear text signatures and ASCII
	armored messages or keys (see @option{--armor}). The default behavior is
	not to use a comment string. @option{--comment} may be repeated multiple
	times to get multiple comment strings. @option{--no-comments} removes
	all comments. It is a good idea to keep the length of a single comment
	below 60 characters to avoid problems with mail programs wrapping such
	lines. Note that comment lines, like all other header lines, are not
	protected by the signature.

	@item --emit-version
	@itemx --no-emit-version
	@opindex emit-version
	Force inclusion of the version string in ASCII armored output. If
	given once only the name of the program and the major number is
	emitted (default), given twice the minor is also emitted, given triple
	the micro is added, and given quad an operating system identification
	is also emitted. @option{--no-emit-version} disables the version
	line.

	@item --sig-notation @code{name=value}
	@itemx --cert-notation @code{name=value}
	@itemx -N, --set-notation @code{name=value}
	@opindex sig-notation
	@opindex cert-notation
	@opindex set-notation
	Put the name value pair into the signature as notation data.
	@code{name} must consist only of printable characters or spaces, and
	must contain a '@@' character in the form keyname@@domain.example.com
	(substituting the appropriate keyname and domain name, of course). This
	is to help prevent pollution of the IETF reserved notation
	namespace. The @option{--expert} flag overrides the '@@'
	check. @code{value} may be any printable string; it will be encoded in
	UTF8, so you should check that your @option{--display-charset} is set
	correctly. If you prefix @code{name} with an exclamation mark (!), the
	notation data will be flagged as critical
	(rfc4880:5.2.3.16). @option{--sig-notation} sets a notation for data
	signatures. @option{--cert-notation} sets a notation for key signatures
	(certifications). @option{--set-notation} sets both.

	There are special codes that may be used in notation names. "%k" will
	be expanded into the key ID of the key being signed, "%K" into the
	long key ID of the key being signed, "%f" into the fingerprint of the
	key being signed, "%s" into the key ID of the key making the
	signature, "%S" into the long key ID of the key making the signature,
	"%g" into the fingerprint of the key making the signature (which might
	be a subkey), "%p" into the fingerprint of the primary key of the key
	making the signature, "%c" into the signature count from the OpenPGP
	smartcard, and "%%" results in a single "%". %k, %K, and %f are only
	meaningful when making a key signature (certification), and %c is only
	meaningful when using the OpenPGP smartcard.

	@item --sig-policy-url @code{string}
	@itemx --cert-policy-url @code{string}
	@itemx --set-policy-url @code{string}
	@opindex sig-policy-url
	@opindex cert-policy-url
	@opindex set-policy-url
	Use @code{string} as a Policy URL for signatures (rfc4880:5.2.3.20). If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the policy URL packet will
	be flagged as critical. @option{--sig-policy-url} sets a policy url for
	data signatures. @option{--cert-policy-url} sets a policy url for key
	signatures (certifications). @option{--set-policy-url} sets both.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --sig-keyserver-url @code{string}
	@opindex sig-keyserver-url
	Use @code{string} as a preferred keyserver URL for data signatures. If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the keyserver URL packet
	will be flagged as critical.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --set-filename @code{string}
	@opindex set-filename
	Use @code{string} as the filename which is stored inside messages.
	This overrides the default, which is to use the actual filename of the
	file being encrypted.

	@item --for-your-eyes-only
	@itemx --no-for-your-eyes-only
	@opindex for-your-eyes-only
	Set the `for your eyes only' flag in the message. This causes GnuPG to
	refuse to save the file unless the @option{--output} option is given,
	and PGP to use a "secure viewer" with a claimed Tempest-resistant font
	to display the message. This option overrides @option{--set-filename}.
	@option{--no-for-your-eyes-only} disables this option.

	@item --use-embedded-filename
	@itemx --no-use-embedded-filename
	@opindex use-embedded-filename
	Try to create a file with a name as embedded in the data. This can be
	a dangerous option as it allows to overwrite files. Defaults to no.

	@item --cipher-algo @code{name}
	@opindex cipher-algo
	Use @code{name} as cipher algorithm. Running the program with the
	command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. If
	this is not used the cipher algorithm is selected from the preferences
	stored with the key. In general, you do not want to use this option as
	it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard.
	@option{--personal-cipher-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the
	same thing.

	@item --digest-algo @code{name}
	@opindex digest-algo
	Use @code{name} as the message digest algorithm. Running the program
	with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. In
	general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to
	violate the OpenPGP standard. @option{--personal-digest-preferences} is the
	safe way to accomplish the same thing.

	@item --compress-algo @code{name}
	@opindex compress-algo
	Use compression algorithm @code{name}. "zlib" is RFC-1950 ZLIB
	compression. "zip" is RFC-1951 ZIP compression which is used by PGP.
	"bzip2" is a more modern compression scheme that can compress some
	things better than zip or zlib, but at the cost of more memory used
	during compression and decompression. "uncompressed" or "none"
	disables compression. If this option is not used, the default
	behavior is to examine the recipient key preferences to see which
	algorithms the recipient supports. If all else fails, ZIP is used for
	maximum compatibility.

	ZLIB may give better compression results than ZIP, as the compression
	window size is not limited to 8k. BZIP2 may give even better
	compression results than that, but will use a significantly larger
	amount of memory while compressing and decompressing. This may be
	significant in low memory situations. Note, however, that PGP (all
	versions) only supports ZIP compression. Using any algorithm other
	than ZIP or "none" will make the message unreadable with PGP. In
	general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to
	violate the OpenPGP standard. @option{--personal-compress-preferences} is the
	safe way to accomplish the same thing.

	@item --cert-digest-algo @code{name}
	@opindex cert-digest-algo
	Use @code{name} as the message digest algorithm used when signing a
	key. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a
	list of supported algorithms. Be aware that if you choose an algorithm
	that GnuPG supports but other OpenPGP implementations do not, then some
	users will not be able to use the key signatures you make, or quite
	possibly your entire key.

	@item --disable-cipher-algo @code{name}
	@opindex disable-cipher-algo
	Never allow the use of @code{name} as cipher algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --disable-pubkey-algo @code{name}
	@opindex disable-pubkey-algo
	Never allow the use of @code{name} as public key algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --throw-keyids
	@itemx --no-throw-keyids
	@opindex throw-keyids
	Do not put the recipient key IDs into encrypted messages. This helps to
	hide the receivers of the message and is a limited countermeasure
	against traffic analysis.@footnote{Using a little social engineering
	anyone who is able to decrypt the message can check whether one of the
	other recipients is the one he suspects.} On the receiving side, it may
	slow down the decryption process because all available secret keys must
	be tried. @option{--no-throw-keyids} disables this option. This option
	is essentially the same as using @option{--hidden-recipient} for all
	recipients.

	@item --not-dash-escaped
	@opindex not-dash-escaped
	This option changes the behavior of cleartext signatures
	so that they can be used for patch files. You should not
	send such an armored file via email because all spaces
	and line endings are hashed too. You can not use this
	option for data which has 5 dashes at the beginning of a
	line, patch files don't have this. A special armor header
	line tells GnuPG about this cleartext signature option.

	@item --escape-from-lines
	@itemx --no-escape-from-lines
	@opindex escape-from-lines
	Because some mailers change lines starting with "From " to ">From " it
	is good to handle such lines in a special way when creating cleartext
	signatures to prevent the mail system from breaking the signature. Note
	that all other PGP versions do it this way too. Enabled by
	default. @option{--no-escape-from-lines} disables this option.

	@item --passphrase-repeat @code{n}
	@opindex passphrase-repeat
	Specify how many times @command{@gpgname} will request a new
	passphrase be repeated. This is useful for helping memorize a
	passphrase. Defaults to 1 repetition.

	@item --passphrase-fd @code{n}
	@opindex passphrase-fd
	Read the passphrase from file descriptor @code{n}. Only the first line
	will be read from file descriptor @code{n}. If you use 0 for @code{n},
	the passphrase will be read from STDIN. This can only be used if only
	one passphrase is supplied.
	@ifclear gpgone
	Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch}
	has also been given. This is different from @command{gpg}.
	@end ifclear

	@item --passphrase-file @code{file}
	@opindex passphrase-file
	Read the passphrase from file @code{file}. Only the first line will
	be read from file @code{file}. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, a passphrase stored in a file is
	of questionable security if other users can read this file. Don't use
	this option if you can avoid it.
	@ifclear gpgone
	Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch}
	has also been given. This is different from @command{gpg}.
	@end ifclear

	@item --passphrase @code{string}
	@opindex passphrase
	Use @code{string} as the passphrase. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, this is of very questionable
	security on a multi-user system. Don't use this option if you can
	avoid it.
	@ifclear gpgone
	Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch}
	has also been given. This is different from @command{gpg}.
	@end ifclear

	@ifset gpgtwoone
	@item --pinentry-mode @code{mode}
	@opindex pinentry-mode
	Set the pinentry mode to @code{mode}. Allowed values for @code{mode}
	are:
	@table @asis
	@item default
	Use the default of the agent, which is @code{ask}.
	@item ask
	Force the use of the Pinentry.
	@item cancel
	Emulate use of Pinentry's cancel button.
	@item error
	Return a Pinentry error (``No Pinentry'').
	@item loopback
	Redirect Pinentry queries to the caller. Note that in contrast to
	Pinentry the user is not prompted again if he enters a bad password.
	@end table
	@end ifset

	@item --command-fd @code{n}
	@opindex command-fd
	This is a replacement for the deprecated shared-memory IPC mode.
	If this option is enabled, user input on questions is not expected
	from the TTY but from the given file descriptor. It should be used
	together with @option{--status-fd}. See the file doc/DETAILS in the source
	distribution for details on how to use it.

	@item --command-file @code{file}
	@opindex command-file
	Same as @option{--command-fd}, except the commands are read out of file
	@code{file}

	@item --allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@itemx --no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@opindex allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	Allow the import and use of keys with user IDs which are not
	self-signed. This is not recommended, as a non self-signed user ID is
	trivial to forge. @option{--no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid} disables.

	@item --allow-freeform-uid
	@opindex allow-freeform-uid
	Disable all checks on the form of the user ID while generating a new
	one. This option should only be used in very special environments as
	it does not ensure the de-facto standard format of user IDs.

	@item --ignore-time-conflict
	@opindex ignore-time-conflict
	GnuPG normally checks that the timestamps associated with keys and
	signatures have plausible values. However, sometimes a signature
	seems to be older than the key due to clock problems. This option
	makes these checks just a warning. See also @option{--ignore-valid-from} for
	timestamp issues on subkeys.

	@item --ignore-valid-from
	@opindex ignore-valid-from
	GnuPG normally does not select and use subkeys created in the future.
	This option allows the use of such keys and thus exhibits the
	pre-1.0.7 behaviour. You should not use this option unless there
	is some clock problem. See also @option{--ignore-time-conflict} for timestamp
	issues with signatures.

	@item --ignore-crc-error
	@opindex ignore-crc-error
	The ASCII armor used by OpenPGP is protected by a CRC checksum against
	transmission errors. Occasionally the CRC gets mangled somewhere on
	the transmission channel but the actual content (which is protected by
	the OpenPGP protocol anyway) is still okay. This option allows GnuPG
	to ignore CRC errors.

	@item --ignore-mdc-error
	@opindex ignore-mdc-error
	This option changes a MDC integrity protection failure into a warning.
	This can be useful if a message is partially corrupt, but it is
	necessary to get as much data as possible out of the corrupt message.
	However, be aware that a MDC protection failure may also mean that the
	message was tampered with intentionally by an attacker.

	@ifclear gpgone
	@item --allow-weak-digest-algos
	@opindex allow-weak-digest-algos
	Signatures made with the broken MD5 algorithm are normally rejected
	with an ``invalid digest algorithm'' message. This option allows the
	verification of signatures made with such weak algorithms.
	@end ifclear

	@item --no-default-keyring
	@opindex no-default-keyring
	Do not add the default keyrings to the list of keyrings. Note that
	GnuPG will not operate without any keyrings, so if you use this option
	and do not provide alternate keyrings via @option{--keyring} or
	@option{--secret-keyring}, then GnuPG will still use the default public or
	secret keyrings.

	@item --skip-verify
	@opindex skip-verify
	Skip the signature verification step. This may be
	used to make the decryption faster if the signature
	verification is not needed.

	@item --with-key-data
	@opindex with-key-data
	Print key listings delimited by colons (like @option{--with-colons}) and
	print the public key data.

	@item --fast-list-mode
	@opindex fast-list-mode
	Changes the output of the list commands to work faster; this is achieved
	by leaving some parts empty. Some applications don't need the user ID
	and the trust information given in the listings. By using this options
	they can get a faster listing. The exact behaviour of this option may
	change in future versions. If you are missing some information, don't
	use this option.

	@item --no-literal
	@opindex no-literal
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --set-filesize
	@opindex set-filesize
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --show-session-key
	@opindex show-session-key
	Display the session key used for one message. See
	@option{--override-session-key} for the counterpart of this option.

	We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing; however the user should have
	the freedom to decide whether to go to prison or to reveal the content
	of one specific message without compromising all messages ever
	encrypted for one secret key. DON'T USE IT UNLESS YOU ARE REALLY
	FORCED TO DO SO.

	@item --override-session-key @code{string}
	@opindex override-session-key
	Don't use the public key but the session key @code{string}. The format
	of this string is the same as the one printed by
	@option{--show-session-key}. This option is normally not used but comes
	handy in case someone forces you to reveal the content of an encrypted
	message; using this option you can do this without handing out the
	secret key.

	@item --ask-sig-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-sig-expire
	@opindex ask-sig-expire
	When making a data signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-sig-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-sig-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-sig-expire
	@opindex default-sig-expire
	The default expiration time to use for signature expiration. Valid
	values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d
	(for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for
	example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an absolute
	date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --ask-cert-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-expire
	@opindex ask-cert-expire
	When making a key signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-cert-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-cert-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-cert-expire
	@opindex default-cert-expire
	The default expiration time to use for key signature expiration.
	Valid values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the
	letter d (for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years)
	(for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an
	absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --allow-secret-key-import
	@opindex allow-secret-key-import
	This is an obsolete option and is not used anywhere.

	@item --allow-multiple-messages
	@item --no-allow-multiple-messages
	@opindex allow-multiple-messages
	Allow processing of multiple OpenPGP messages contained in a single file
	or stream. Some programs that call GPG are not prepared to deal with
	multiple messages being processed together, so this option defaults to
	no. Note that versions of GPG prior to 1.4.7 always allowed multiple
	messages.

	Warning: Do not use this option unless you need it as a temporary
	workaround!


	@item --enable-special-filenames
	@opindex enable-special-filenames
	This options enables a mode in which filenames of the form
	@file{-&n}, where n is a non-negative decimal number,
	refer to the file descriptor n and not to a file with that name.

	@item --no-expensive-trust-checks
	@opindex no-expensive-trust-checks
	Experimental use only.

	@item --preserve-permissions
	@opindex preserve-permissions
	Don't change the permissions of a secret keyring back to user
	read/write only. Use this option only if you really know what you are doing.

	@item --default-preference-list @code{string}
	@opindex default-preference-list
	Set the list of default preferences to @code{string}. This preference
	list is used for new keys and becomes the default for "setpref" in the
	edit menu.

	@item --default-keyserver-url @code{name}
	@opindex default-keyserver-url
	Set the default keyserver URL to @code{name}. This keyserver will be
	used as the keyserver URL when writing a new self-signature on a key,
	which includes key generation and changing preferences.

	@item --list-config
	@opindex list-config
	Display various internal configuration parameters of GnuPG. This option
	is intended for external programs that call GnuPG to perform tasks, and
	is thus not generally useful. See the file @file{doc/DETAILS} in the
	source distribution for the details of which configuration items may be
	listed. @option{--list-config} is only usable with
	@option{--with-colons} set.

	@item --gpgconf-list
	@opindex gpgconf-list
	This command is similar to @option{--list-config} but in general only
	internally used by the @command{gpgconf} tool.

	@item --gpgconf-test
	@opindex gpgconf-test
	This is more or less dummy action. However it parses the configuration
	file and returns with failure if the configuration file would prevent
	@command{gpg} from startup. Thus it may be used to run a syntax check
	on the configuration file.

	@end table

	@c *******************************
	@c ***** Deprecated **********
	@c *******************************
	@node Deprecated Options
	@subsection Deprecated options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@ifset gpgone
	@item --load-extension @code{name}
	@opindex load-extension
	Load an extension module. If @code{name} does not contain a slash it is
	searched for in the directory configured when GnuPG was built
	(generally "/usr/local/lib/gnupg"). Extensions are not generally
	useful anymore, and the use of this option is deprecated.
	@end ifset

	@item --show-photos
	@itemx --no-show-photos
	@opindex show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-sigs},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, @option{--list-secret-keys}, and verifying
	a signature to also display the photo ID attached to the key, if
	any. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. These options are deprecated. Use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-photos} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-photos} instead.

	@item --show-keyring
	@opindex show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. This option is deprecated: use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-keyring} instead.

	@ifset gpgone
	@item --ctapi-driver @code{file}
	@opindex ctapi-driver
	Use @code{file} to access the smartcard reader. The current default
	is `libtowitoko.so'. Note that the use of this interface is
	deprecated; it may be removed in future releases.
	@end ifset

	@item --always-trust
	@opindex always-trust
	Identical to @option{--trust-model always}. This option is deprecated.

	@item --show-notation
	@itemx --no-show-notation
	@opindex show-notation
	Show signature notations in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs} listings
	as well as when verifying a signature with a notation in it. These
	options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-notation}
	and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-notation} instead.

	@item --show-policy-url
	@itemx --no-show-policy-url
	@opindex show-policy-url
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}
	listings as well as when verifying a signature with a policy URL in
	it. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} instead.


	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* FILES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect files
	@node GPG Configuration
	@section Configuration files

	There are a few configuration files to control certain aspects of
	@command{@gpgname}'s operation. Unless noted, they are expected in the
	current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}).

	@table @file

	@item gpg.conf
	@cindex gpg.conf
	This is the standard configuration file read by @command{@gpgname} on
	startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes
	may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated. This default
	name may be changed on the command line (@pxref{gpg-option --options}).
	You should backup this file.

	@end table

	@c man:.RE
	Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files
	into the directory @file{/etc/skel/.gnupg/} so that newly created users
	start up with a working configuration.
	@ifclear gpgone
	For existing users the a small
	helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}).
	@end ifclear

	For internal purposes @command{@gpgname} creates and maintains a few other
	files; They all live in in the current home directory (@pxref{option
	--homedir}). Only the @command{@gpgname} may modify these files.


	@table @file
	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg
	The public keyring. You should backup this file.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the public keyring.

	@ifset gpgtwoone
	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
	The public keyring using a different format. This file is sharred
	with @command{gpgsm}. You should backup this file.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx.lock
	The lock file for @file{pubring.kbx}.
	@end ifset

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg
	@ifclear gpgtwoone
	The secret keyring. You should backup this file.
	@end ifclear
	@ifset gpgtwoone
	A secret keyring as used by GnuPG versions before 2.1. It is not
	used by GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	@item ~/.gnupg/.gpg-v21-migrated
	File indicating that a migration to GnuPG 2.1 has taken place.
	@end ifset

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg
	The trust database. There is no need to backup this file; it is better
	to backup the ownertrust values (@pxref{option --export-ownertrust}).

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the trust database.

	@item ~/.gnupg/random_seed
	A file used to preserve the state of the internal random pool.

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the secret keyring.

	@item /usr[/local]/share/gnupg/options.skel
	The skeleton options file.

	@item /usr[/local]/lib/gnupg/
	Default location for extensions.

	@end table

	@c man:.RE
	Operation is further controlled by a few environment variables:

	@table @asis

	@item HOME
	Used to locate the default home directory.

	@item GNUPGHOME
	If set directory used instead of "~/.gnupg".

	@item GPG_AGENT_INFO
	Used to locate the gpg-agent.
	@ifset gpgone
	This is only honored when @option{--use-agent} is set.
	@end ifset
	The value consists of 3 colon delimited fields: The first is the path
	to the Unix Domain Socket, the second the PID of the gpg-agent and the
	protocol version which should be set to 1. When starting the gpg-agent
	as described in its documentation, this variable is set to the correct
	value. The option @option{--gpg-agent-info} can be used to override it.

	@item PINENTRY_USER_DATA
	This value is passed via gpg-agent to pinentry. It is useful to convey
	extra information to a custom pinentry.

	@item COLUMNS
	@itemx LINES
	Used to size some displays to the full size of the screen.


	@item LANGUAGE
	Apart from its use by GNU, it is used in the W32 version to override the
	language selection done through the Registry. If used and set to a
	valid and available language name (@var{langid}), the file with the
	translation is loaded from

	@code{@var{gpgdir}/gnupg.nls/@var{langid}.mo}. Here @var{gpgdir} is the
	directory out of which the gpg binary has been loaded. If it can't be
	loaded the Registry is tried and as last resort the native Windows
	locale system is used.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* EXAMPLES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect examples
	@node GPG Examples
	@section Examples

	@table @asis

	@item gpg -se -r @code{Bob} @code{file}
	sign and encrypt for user Bob

	@item gpg --clearsign @code{file}
	make a clear text signature

	@item gpg -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature

	@item gpg -u 0x12345678 -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature with the key 0x12345678

	@item gpg --list-keys @code{user_ID}
	show keys

	@item gpg --fingerprint @code{user_ID}
	show fingerprint

	@item gpg --verify @code{pgpfile}
	@itemx gpg --verify @code{sigfile}
	Verify the signature of the file but do not output the data. The
	second form is used for detached signatures, where @code{sigfile}
	is the detached signature (either ASCII armored or binary) and
	are the signed data; if this is not given, the name of
	the file holding the signed data is constructed by cutting off the
	extension (".asc" or ".sig") of @code{sigfile} or by asking the
	user for the filename.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* USER ID **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect how to specify a user id
	@ifset isman
	@include specify-user-id.texi
	@end ifset

	@mansect return value
	@chapheading RETURN VALUE

	The program returns 0 if everything was fine, 1 if at least
	a signature was bad, and other error codes for fatal errors.

	@mansect warnings
	@chapheading WARNINGS

	Use a good password for your user account and a good passphrase
	to protect your secret key. This passphrase is the weakest part of the
	whole system. Programs to do dictionary attacks on your secret keyring
	are very easy to write and so you should protect your "~/.gnupg/"
	directory very well.

	Keep in mind that, if this program is used over a network (telnet), it
	is very easy to spy out your passphrase!

	If you are going to verify detached signatures, make sure that the
	program knows about it; either give both filenames on the command line
	or use @samp{-} to specify STDIN.

	@mansect interoperability
	@chapheading INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS

	GnuPG tries to be a very flexible implementation of the OpenPGP
	standard. In particular, GnuPG implements many of the optional parts
	of the standard, such as the SHA-512 hash, and the ZLIB and BZIP2
	compression algorithms. It is important to be aware that not all
	OpenPGP programs implement these optional algorithms and that by
	forcing their use via the @option{--cipher-algo},
	@option{--digest-algo}, @option{--cert-digest-algo}, or
	@option{--compress-algo} options in GnuPG, it is possible to create a
	perfectly valid OpenPGP message, but one that cannot be read by the
	intended recipient.

	There are dozens of variations of OpenPGP programs available, and each
	supports a slightly different subset of these optional algorithms.
	For example, until recently, no (unhacked) version of PGP supported
	the BLOWFISH cipher algorithm. A message using BLOWFISH simply could
	not be read by a PGP user. By default, GnuPG uses the standard
	OpenPGP preferences system that will always do the right thing and
	create messages that are usable by all recipients, regardless of which
	OpenPGP program they use. Only override this safe default if you
	really know what you are doing.

	If you absolutely must override the safe default, or if the preferences
	on a given key are invalid for some reason, you are far better off using
	the @option{--pgp6}, @option{--pgp7}, or @option{--pgp8} options. These
	options are safe as they do not force any particular algorithms in
	violation of OpenPGP, but rather reduce the available algorithms to a
	"PGP-safe" list.

	@mansect bugs
	@chapheading BUGS

	On older systems this program should be installed as setuid(root). This
	is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents the
	operating system from writing memory pages (which may contain
	passphrases or other sensitive material) to disk. If you get no
	warning message about insecure memory your operating system supports
	locking without being root. The program drops root privileges as soon
	as locked memory is allocated.

	Note also that some systems (especially laptops) have the ability to
	``suspend to disk'' (also known as ``safe sleep'' or ``hibernate'').
	This writes all memory to disk before going into a low power or even
	powered off mode. Unless measures are taken in the operating system
	to protect the saved memory, passphrases or other sensitive material
	may be recoverable from it later.

	Before you report a bug you should first search the mailing list
	archives for similar problems and second check whether such a bug has
	already been reported to our bug tracker at http://bugs.gnupg.org .

	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* ************
	@c ************* UNATTENDED ************
	@c ************* ************
	@c *******************************************
	@manpause
	@node Unattended Usage of GPG
	@section Unattended Usage

	@command{gpg} is often used as a backend engine by other software. To help
	with this a machine interface has been defined to have an unambiguous
	way to do this. The options @option{--status-fd} and @option{--batch}
	are almost always required for this.

	@menu
	* Unattended GPG key generation:: Unattended key generation
	@end menu


	@node Unattended GPG key generation
	@subsection Unattended key generation

	The command @option{--gen-key} may be used along with the option
	@option{--batch} for unattended key generation. The parameters are
	either read from stdin or given as a file on the command line.
	The format of the parameter file is as follows:

	@itemize @bullet
	@item Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 characters.
	@item UTF-8 encoding must be used to specify non-ASCII characters.
	@item Empty lines are ignored.
	@item Leading and trailing while space is ignored.
	@item A hash sign as the first non white space character indicates
	a comment line.
	@item Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign, the
	arguments are separated by white space from the keyword.
	@item Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon. Arguments
	are separated by white space.
	@item
	The first parameter must be @samp{Key-Type}; control statements may be
	placed anywhere.
	@item
	The order of the parameters does not matter except for @samp{Key-Type}
	which must be the first parameter. The parameters are only used for
	the generated keyblock (primary and subkeys); parameters from previous
	sets are not used. Some syntactically checks may be performed.
	@item
	Key generation takes place when either the end of the parameter file
	is reached, the next @samp{Key-Type} parameter is encountered or at the
	control statement @samp{%commit} is encountered.
	@end itemize

	@noindent
	Control statements:

	@table @asis

	@item %echo @var{text}
	Print @var{text} as diagnostic.

	@item %dry-run
	Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking).

	@item %commit
	Perform the key generation. Note that an implicit commit is done at
	the next @asis{Key-Type} parameter.

	@item %pubring @var{filename}
	@itemx %secring @var{filename}
	Do not write the key to the default or commandline given keyring but
	to @var{filename}. This must be given before the first commit to take
	place, duplicate specification of the same filename is ignored, the
	last filename before a commit is used. The filename is used until a
	new filename is used (at commit points) and all keys are written to
	that file. If a new filename is given, this file is created (and
	overwrites an existing one). For GnuPG versions prior to 2.1, both
	control statements must be given. For GnuPG 2.1 and later
	@samp{%secring} is a no-op.

	@item %ask-passphrase
	@itemx %no-ask-passphrase
	Enable (or disable) a mode where the command @option{passphrase} is
	ignored and instead the usual passphrase dialog is used. This does
	not make sense for batch key generation; however the unattended key
	generation feature is also used by GUIs and this feature relinquishes
	the GUI from implementing its own passphrase entry code. These are
	global control statements and affect all future key genrations.

	@item %no-protection
	Since GnuPG version 2.1 it is not anymore possible to specify a
	passphrase for unattended key generation. The passphrase command is
	simply ignored and @samp{%ask-passpharse} is thus implicitly enabled.
	Using this option allows the creation of keys without any passphrase
	protection. This option is mainly intended for regression tests.

	@item %transient-key
	If given the keys are created using a faster and a somewhat less
	secure random number generator. This option may be used for keys
	which are only used for a short time and do not require full
	cryptographic strength. It takes only effect if used together with
	the control statement @samp{%no-protection}.

	@end table

	@noindent
	General Parameters:

	@table @asis

	@item Key-Type: @var{algo}
	Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the primary
	key. The algorithm must be capable of signing. This is a required
	parameter. @var{algo} may either be an OpenPGP algorithm number or a
	string with the algorithm name. The special value @samp{default} may
	be used for @var{algo} to create the default key type; in this case a
	@samp{Key-Usage} shall not be given and @samp{default} also be used
	for @samp{Subkey-Type}.

	@item Key-Length: @var{nbits}
	The requested length of the generated key in bits. The default is
	returned by running the command @samp{gpg2 --gpgconf-list}.

	@item Key-Grip: @var{hexstring}
	This is optional and used to generate a CSR or certificate for an
	already existing key. Key-Length will be ignored when given.

	@item Key-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Space or comma delimited list of key usages. Allowed values are
	@samp{encrypt}, @samp{sign}, and @samp{auth}. This is used to
	generate the key flags. Please make sure that the algorithm is
	capable of this usage. Note that OpenPGP requires that all primary
	keys are capable of certification, so no matter what usage is given
	here, the @samp{cert} flag will be on. If no @samp{Key-Usage} is
	specified and the @samp{Key-Type} is not @samp{default}, all allowed
	usages for that particular algorithm are used; if it is not given but
	@samp{default} is used the usage will be @samp{sign}.

	@item Subkey-Type: @var{algo}
	This generates a secondary key (subkey). Currently only one subkey
	can be handled. See also @samp{Key-Type} above.

	@item Subkey-Length: @var{nbits}
	Length of the secondary key (subkey) in bits. The default is returned
	by running the command @samp{gpg2 --gpgconf-list}".

	@item Subkey-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Key usage lists for a subkey; similar to @samp{Key-Usage}.

	@item Passphrase: @var{string}
	If you want to specify a passphrase for the secret key,
	enter it here. Default is not to use any passphrase.

	@item Name-Real: @var{name}
	@itemx Name-Comment: @var{comment}
	@itemx Name-Email: @var{email}
	The three parts of a user name. Remember to use UTF-8 encoding here.
	If you don't give any of them, no user ID is created.

	@item Expire-Date: @var{iso-date}\|(@var{number}[d\|w\|m\|y])
	Set the expiration date for the key (and the subkey). It may either
	be entered in ISO date format (e.g. "20000815T145012") or as number of
	days, weeks, month or years after the creation date. The special
	notation "seconds=N" is also allowed to specify a number of seconds
	since creation. Without a letter days are assumed. Note that there
	is no check done on the overflow of the type used by OpenPGP for
	timestamps. Thus you better make sure that the given value make
	sense. Although OpenPGP works with time intervals, GnuPG uses an
	absolute value internally and thus the last year we can represent is
	2105.

	@item Ceation-Date: @var{iso-date}
	Set the creation date of the key as stored in the key information and
	which is also part of the fingerprint calculation. Either a date like
	"1986-04-26" or a full timestamp like "19860426T042640" may be used.
	The time is considered to be UTC. The special notation "seconds=N"
	may be used to directly specify a the number of seconds since Epoch
	(Unix time). If it is not given the current time is used.

	@item Preferences: @var{string}
	Set the cipher, hash, and compression preference values for this key.
	This expects the same type of string as the sub-command @samp{setpref}
	in the @option{--edit-key} menu.

	@item Revoker: @var{algo}:@var{fpr} [sensitive]
	Add a designated revoker to the generated key. Algo is the public key
	algorithm of the designated revoker (i.e. RSA=1, DSA=17, etc.)
	@var{fpr} is the fingerprint of the designated revoker. The optional
	@samp{sensitive} flag marks the designated revoker as sensitive
	information. Only v4 keys may be designated revokers.

	@item Keyserver: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter that specifies the preferred keyserver
	URL for the key.

	@item Handle: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter only used with the status lines
	KEY_CREATED and KEY_NOT_CREATED. @var{string} may be up to 100
	characters and should not contain spaces. It is useful for batch key
	generation to associate a key parameter block with a status line.

	@end table

	@noindent
	Here is an example on how to create a key:
	@smallexample
	$ cat >foo <<EOF
	%echo Generating a basic OpenPGP key
	Key-Type: DSA
	Key-Length: 1024
	Subkey-Type: ELG-E
	Subkey-Length: 1024
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	%pubring foo.pub
	%secring foo.sec
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	EOF
	$ gpg2 --batch --gen-key foo
	[...]
	$ gpg2 --no-default-keyring --secret-keyring ./foo.sec \
	--keyring ./foo.pub --list-secret-keys
	/home/wk/work/gnupg-stable/scratch/foo.sec
	------------------------------------------
	sec 1024D/915A878D 2000-03-09 Joe Tester (with stupid passphrase) <joe@@foo.bar>
	ssb 1024g/8F70E2C0 2000-03-09
	@end smallexample


	@noindent
	If you want to create a key with the default algorithms you would use
	these parameters:
	@smallexample
	%echo Generating a default key
	Key-Type: default
	Subkey-Type: default
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	%pubring foo.pub
	%secring foo.sec
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	@end smallexample




	@mansect see also
	@ifset isman
	@command{gpgv}(1),
	@ifclear gpgone
	@command{gpgsm}(1),
	@command{gpg-agent}(1)
	@end ifclear
	@end ifset
	@include see-also-note.texi
	diff --git a/g10/import.c b/g10/import.c
	index 1bf409044..8e509ddf8 100644
	--- a/g10/import.c
	+++ b/g10/import.c
	@@ -1,2578 +1,2589 @@
	/* import.c - import a key into our key storage.
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
	* 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <errno.h>
	#include <assert.h>

	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "status.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "util.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "i18n.h"
	#include "ttyio.h"
	#include "status.h"
	#include "keyserver-internal.h"

	struct stats_s {
	ulong count;
	ulong no_user_id;
	ulong imported;
	ulong imported_rsa;
	ulong n_uids;
	ulong n_sigs;
	ulong n_subk;
	ulong unchanged;
	ulong n_revoc;
	ulong secret_read;
	ulong secret_imported;
	ulong secret_dups;
	ulong skipped_new_keys;
	ulong not_imported;
	ulong n_sigs_cleaned;
	ulong n_uids_cleaned;
	};


	static int import( IOBUF inp, const char* fname,struct stats_s *stats,
	unsigned char *fpr,size_t fpr_len,unsigned int options,
	import_filter_t filter, void *filter_arg );
	static int read_block( IOBUF a, PACKET *pending_pkt, KBNODE ret_root );
	static void revocation_present(KBNODE keyblock);
	static int import_one(const char fname, KBNODE keyblock,struct stats_s stats,
	unsigned char *fpr,size_t fpr_len,
	unsigned int options,int from_sk,
	import_filter_t filter, void *filter_arg);
	static int import_secret_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
	struct stats_s *stats, unsigned int options,
	import_filter_t filter, void *filter_arg);
	static int import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node,
	struct stats_s *stats);
	static int chk_self_sigs( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
	PKT_public_key pk, u32 keyid, int *non_self );
	static int delete_inv_parts( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
	u32 *keyid, unsigned int options );
	static int merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig,
	KBNODE keyblock, u32 *keyid,
	int n_uids, int n_sigs, int *n_subk );
	static int append_uid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
	const char fname, u32 keyid );
	static int append_key( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
	const char fname, u32 keyid );
	static int merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
	const char fname, u32 keyid );
	static int merge_keysigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
	const char fname, u32 keyid );

	int
	parse_import_options(char str,unsigned int options,int noisy)
	{
	struct parse_options import_opts[]=
	{
	{"import-local-sigs",IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,
	N_("import signatures that are marked as local-only")},
	+
	{"repair-pks-subkey-bug",IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG,NULL,
	N_("repair damage from the pks keyserver during import")},
	+
	+ {"keep-ownertrust", IMPORT_KEEP_OWNERTTRUST, NULL,
	+ N_("do not clear the ownertrust values during import")},
	+
	{"fast-import",IMPORT_FAST,NULL,
	N_("do not update the trustdb after import")},
	+
	{"convert-sk-to-pk",IMPORT_SK2PK,NULL,
	N_("create a public key when importing a secret key")},
	+
	{"merge-only",IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY,NULL,
	N_("only accept updates to existing keys")},
	+
	{"import-clean",IMPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
	N_("remove unusable parts from key after import")},
	+
	{"import-minimal",IMPORT_MINIMAL\|IMPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
	N_("remove as much as possible from key after import")},
	+
	/* Aliases for backward compatibility */
	{"allow-local-sigs",IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,NULL},
	{"repair-hkp-subkey-bug",IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG,NULL,NULL},
	/* dummy */
	{"import-unusable-sigs",0,NULL,NULL},
	{"import-clean-sigs",0,NULL,NULL},
	{"import-clean-uids",0,NULL,NULL},
	{NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
	};

	return parse_options(str,options,import_opts,noisy);
	}

	void *
	import_new_stats_handle (void)
	{
	return xmalloc_clear ( sizeof (struct stats_s) );
	}

	void
	import_release_stats_handle (void *p)
	{
	xfree (p);
	}

	/****************
	* Import the public keys from the given filename. Input may be armored.
	* This function rejects all keys which are not validly self signed on at
	* least one userid. Only user ids which are self signed will be imported.
	* Other signatures are not checked.
	*
	* Actually this function does a merge. It works like this:
	*
	* - get the keyblock
	* - check self-signatures and remove all userids and their signatures
	* without/invalid self-signatures.
	* - reject the keyblock, if we have no valid userid.
	* - See whether we have this key already in one of our pubrings.
	* If not, simply add it to the default keyring.
	* - Compare the key and the self-signatures of the new and the one in
	* our keyring. If they are different something weird is going on;
	* ask what to do.
	* - See whether we have only non-self-signature on one user id; if not
	* ask the user what to do.
	* - compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
	* that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
	* (consider looking at the timestamp and use the newest?)
	* - Simply add the signature. Can't verify here because we may not have
	* the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it
	* into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey
	* is used.
	* - Proceed with next signature.
	*
	* Key revocation certificates have special handling.
	*
	*/
	static int
	import_keys_internal( IOBUF inp, char **fnames, int nnames,
	void stats_handle, unsigned char fpr, size_t fpr_len,
	unsigned int options,
	import_filter_t filter, void *filter_arg)
	{
	int i, rc = 0;
	struct stats_s *stats = stats_handle;

	if (!stats)
	stats = import_new_stats_handle ();

	if (inp) {
	rc = import (inp, "[stream]", stats, fpr, fpr_len, options,
	filter, filter_arg);
	}
	else {
	int once = (!fnames && !nnames);

	for(i=0; once \|\| i < nnames; once=0, i++ ) {
	const char *fname = fnames? fnames[i] : NULL;
	IOBUF inp2 = iobuf_open(fname);
	if( !fname )
	fname = "[stdin]";
	if (inp2 && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp2)))
	{
	iobuf_close (inp2);
	inp2 = NULL;
	errno = EPERM;
	}
	if( !inp2 )
	log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
	else
	{
	rc = import (inp2, fname, stats, fpr, fpr_len, options,
	NULL, NULL);
	iobuf_close(inp2);
	/* Must invalidate that ugly cache to actually close it. */
	iobuf_ioctl (NULL, 2, 0, (char*)fname);
	if( rc )
	log_error("import from `%s' failed: %s\n", fname,
	g10_errstr(rc) );
	}
	}
	}
	if (!stats_handle) {
	import_print_stats (stats);
	import_release_stats_handle (stats);
	}

	/* If no fast import and the trustdb is dirty (i.e. we added a key
	or userID that had something other than a selfsig, a signature
	that was other than a selfsig, or any revocation), then
	update/check the trustdb if the user specified by setting
	interactive or by not setting no-auto-check-trustdb */

	if(!(options&IMPORT_FAST))
	trustdb_check_or_update();

	return rc;
	}

	void
	import_keys( char **fnames, int nnames,
	void *stats_handle, unsigned int options )
	{
	import_keys_internal (NULL, fnames, nnames, stats_handle, NULL, NULL,
	options, NULL, NULL);
	}

	int
	import_keys_stream( IOBUF inp, void *stats_handle,
	unsigned char *fpr, size_t fpr_len,unsigned int options,
	import_filter_t filter, void *filter_arg)
	{
	return import_keys_internal (inp, NULL, 0, stats_handle, fpr, fpr_len,
	options, filter, filter_arg);
	}


	static int
	import (IOBUF inp, const char* fname,struct stats_s *stats,
	unsigned char *fpr, size_t fpr_len, unsigned int options,
	import_filter_t filter, void *filter_arg)
	{
	PACKET *pending_pkt = NULL;
	KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
	int rc = 0;

	getkey_disable_caches();

	if( !opt.no_armor ) { /* armored reading is not disabled */
	armor_filter_context_t *afx;

	afx = new_armor_context ();
	afx->only_keyblocks = 1;
	push_armor_filter (afx, inp);
	release_armor_context (afx);
	}

	while( !(rc = read_block( inp, &pending_pkt, &keyblock) )) {
	if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
	rc = import_one (fname, keyblock, stats, fpr, fpr_len, options, 0,
	filter, filter_arg);
	else if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
	rc = import_secret_one (fname, keyblock, stats, options,
	filter, filter_arg);
	else if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& keyblock->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
	rc = import_revoke_cert( fname, keyblock, stats );
	else {
	log_info( _("skipping block of type %d\n"),
	keyblock->pkt->pkttype );
	}
	release_kbnode(keyblock);
	/* fixme: we should increment the not imported counter but this
	does only make sense if we keep on going despite of errors. */
	if( rc )
	break;
	if( !(++stats->count % 100) && !opt.quiet )
	log_info(_("%lu keys processed so far\n"), stats->count );
	}
	if( rc == -1 )
	rc = 0;
	else if( rc && rc != G10ERR_INV_KEYRING )
	log_error( _("error reading `%s': %s\n"), fname, g10_errstr(rc));

	return rc;
	}


	void
	import_print_stats (void *hd)
	{
	struct stats_s *stats = hd;

	if( !opt.quiet ) {
	log_info(_("Total number processed: %lu\n"), stats->count );
	if( stats->skipped_new_keys )
	log_info(_(" skipped new keys: %lu\n"),
	stats->skipped_new_keys );
	if( stats->no_user_id )
	log_info(_(" w/o user IDs: %lu\n"), stats->no_user_id );
	if( stats->imported \|\| stats->imported_rsa ) {
	log_info(_(" imported: %lu"), stats->imported );
	if (stats->imported_rsa)
	log_printf (" (RSA: %lu)", stats->imported_rsa );
	log_printf ("\n");
	}
	if( stats->unchanged )
	log_info(_(" unchanged: %lu\n"), stats->unchanged );
	if( stats->n_uids )
	log_info(_(" new user IDs: %lu\n"), stats->n_uids );
	if( stats->n_subk )
	log_info(_(" new subkeys: %lu\n"), stats->n_subk );
	if( stats->n_sigs )
	log_info(_(" new signatures: %lu\n"), stats->n_sigs );
	if( stats->n_revoc )
	log_info(_(" new key revocations: %lu\n"), stats->n_revoc );
	if( stats->secret_read )
	log_info(_(" secret keys read: %lu\n"), stats->secret_read );
	if( stats->secret_imported )
	log_info(_(" secret keys imported: %lu\n"), stats->secret_imported );
	if( stats->secret_dups )
	log_info(_(" secret keys unchanged: %lu\n"), stats->secret_dups );
	if( stats->not_imported )
	log_info(_(" not imported: %lu\n"), stats->not_imported );
	if( stats->n_sigs_cleaned)
	log_info(_(" signatures cleaned: %lu\n"),stats->n_sigs_cleaned);
	if( stats->n_uids_cleaned)
	log_info(_(" user IDs cleaned: %lu\n"),stats->n_uids_cleaned);
	}

	if( is_status_enabled() ) {
	char buf[14*20];
	sprintf(buf, "%lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu",
	stats->count,
	stats->no_user_id,
	stats->imported,
	stats->imported_rsa,
	stats->unchanged,
	stats->n_uids,
	stats->n_subk,
	stats->n_sigs,
	stats->n_revoc,
	stats->secret_read,
	stats->secret_imported,
	stats->secret_dups,
	stats->skipped_new_keys,
	stats->not_imported );
	write_status_text( STATUS_IMPORT_RES, buf );
	}
	}


	/* Return true if PKTTYPE is valid in a keyblock. */
	static int
	valid_keyblock_packet (int pkttype)
	{
	switch (pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
	case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
	case PKT_SIGNATURE:
	case PKT_USER_ID:
	case PKT_ATTRIBUTE:
	case PKT_RING_TRUST:
	return 1;
	default:
	return 0;
	}
	}


	/****************
	* Read the next keyblock from stream A.
	* PENDING_PKT should be initialzed to NULL
	* and not chnaged form the caller.
	* Retunr: 0 = okay, -1 no more blocks or another errorcode.
	*/
	static int
	read_block( IOBUF a, PACKET *pending_pkt, KBNODE ret_root )
	{
	int rc;
	PACKET *pkt;
	KBNODE root = NULL;
	int in_cert;

	if( *pending_pkt ) {
	root = new_kbnode( *pending_pkt );
	*pending_pkt = NULL;
	in_cert = 1;
	}
	else
	in_cert = 0;
	pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
	init_packet(pkt);
	while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) {
	if( rc ) { /* ignore errors */
	if( rc != G10ERR_UNKNOWN_PACKET ) {
	log_error("read_block: read error: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
	rc = G10ERR_INV_KEYRING;
	goto ready;
	}
	free_packet( pkt );
	init_packet(pkt);
	continue;
	}

	if( !root && pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
	/* this is a revocation certificate which is handled
	* in a special way */
	root = new_kbnode( pkt );
	pkt = NULL;
	goto ready;
	}

	/* make a linked list of all packets */
	switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
	case PKT_COMPRESSED:
	if(check_compress_algo(pkt->pkt.compressed->algorithm))
	{
	rc = G10ERR_COMPR_ALGO;
	goto ready;
	}
	else
	{
	compress_filter_context_t cfx = xmalloc_clear( sizeof cfx );
	pkt->pkt.compressed->buf = NULL;
	push_compress_filter2(a,cfx,pkt->pkt.compressed->algorithm,1);
	}
	free_packet( pkt );
	init_packet(pkt);
	break;

	case PKT_RING_TRUST:
	/* skip those packets */
	free_packet( pkt );
	init_packet(pkt);
	break;

	case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
	if( in_cert ) { /* store this packet */
	*pending_pkt = pkt;
	pkt = NULL;
	goto ready;
	}
	in_cert = 1;
	default:
	if (in_cert && valid_keyblock_packet (pkt->pkttype)) {
	if( !root )
	root = new_kbnode( pkt );
	else
	add_kbnode( root, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
	pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
	}
	init_packet(pkt);
	break;
	}
	}
	ready:
	if( rc == -1 && root )
	rc = 0;

	if( rc )
	release_kbnode( root );
	else
	*ret_root = root;
	free_packet( pkt );
	xfree( pkt );
	return rc;
	}

	/* Walk through the subkeys on a pk to find if we have the PKS
	disease: multiple subkeys with their binding sigs stripped, and the
	sig for the first subkey placed after the last subkey. That is,
	instead of "pk uid sig sub1 bind1 sub2 bind2 sub3 bind3" we have
	"pk uid sig sub1 sub2 sub3 bind1". We can't do anything about sub2
	and sub3, as they are already lost, but we can try and rescue sub1
	by reordering the keyblock so that it reads "pk uid sig sub1 bind1
	sub2 sub3". Returns TRUE if the keyblock was modified. */

	static int
	fix_pks_corruption(KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	int changed=0,keycount=0;
	KBNODE node,last=NULL,sknode=NULL;

	/* First determine if we have the problem at all. Look for 2 or
	more subkeys in a row, followed by a single binding sig. */
	for(node=keyblock;node;last=node,node=node->next)
	{
	if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	keycount++;
	if(!sknode)
	sknode=node;
	}
	else if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
	node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class==0x18 &&
	keycount>=2 && node->next==NULL)
	{
	/* We might have the problem, as this key has two subkeys in
	a row without any intervening packets. */

	/* Sanity check */
	if(last==NULL)
	break;

	/* Temporarily attach node to sknode. */
	node->next=sknode->next;
	sknode->next=node;
	last->next=NULL;

	/* Note we aren't checking whether this binding sig is a
	selfsig. This is not necessary here as the subkey and
	binding sig will be rejected later if that is the
	case. */
	if(check_key_signature(keyblock,node,NULL))
	{
	/* Not a match, so undo the changes. */
	sknode->next=node->next;
	last->next=node;
	node->next=NULL;
	break;
	}
	else
	{
	sknode->flag \|= 1; /* Mark it good so we don't need to
	check it again */
	changed=1;
	break;
	}
	}
	else
	keycount=0;
	}

	return changed;
	}


	/* Versions of GnuPG before 1.4.11 and 2.0.16 allowed to import bogus
	direct key signatures. A side effect of this was that a later
	import of the same good direct key signatures was not possible
	because the cmp_signature check in merge_blocks considered them
	equal. Although direct key signatures are now checked during
	import, there might still be bogus signatures sitting in a keyring.
	We need to detect and delete them before doing a merge. This
	fucntion returns the number of removed sigs. */
	static int
	fix_bad_direct_key_sigs (KBNODE keyblock, u32 *keyid)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	KBNODE node;
	int count = 0;

	for (node = keyblock->next; node; node=node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	break;
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& IS_KEY_SIG (node->pkt->pkt.signature))
	{
	err = check_key_signature (keyblock, node, NULL);
	if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO )
	{
	/* If we don't know the error, we can't decide; this is
	not a problem because cmp_signature can't compare the
	signature either. */
	log_info ("key %s: invalid direct key signature removed\n",
	keystr (keyid));
	delete_kbnode (node);
	count++;
	}
	}
	}

	return count;
	}


	static void
	print_import_ok (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_secret_key sk, unsigned int reason)
	{
	byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *s;
	char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN2+30], p;
	size_t i, n;

	sprintf (buf, "%u ", reason);
	p = buf + strlen (buf);

	if (pk)
	fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n);
	else
	fingerprint_from_sk (sk, array, &n);
	s = array;
	for (i=0; i < n ; i++, s++, p += 2)
	sprintf (p, "%02X", *s);

	write_status_text (STATUS_IMPORT_OK, buf);
	}

	static void
	print_import_check (PKT_public_key * pk, PKT_user_id * id)
	{
	char * buf;
	byte fpr[24];
	u32 keyid[2];
	size_t i, pos = 0, n;

	buf = xmalloc (17+41+id->len+32);
	keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
	sprintf (buf, "%08X%08X ", keyid[0], keyid[1]);
	pos = 17;
	fingerprint_from_pk (pk, fpr, &n);
	for (i = 0; i < n; i++, pos += 2)
	sprintf (buf+pos, "%02X", fpr[i]);
	strcat (buf, " ");
	pos += 1;
	strcat (buf, id->name);
	write_status_text (STATUS_IMPORT_CHECK, buf);
	xfree (buf);
	}

	static void
	check_prefs_warning(PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	log_info(_("WARNING: key %s contains preferences for unavailable\n"
	"algorithms on these user IDs:\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
	}

	static void
	check_prefs(KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	int problem=0;

	merge_keys_and_selfsig(keyblock);
	pk=keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	for(node=keyblock;node;node=node->next)
	{
	if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
	&& node->pkt->pkt.user_id->created
	&& node->pkt->pkt.user_id->prefs)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	prefitem_t *prefs=uid->prefs;
	char *user=utf8_to_native(uid->name,strlen(uid->name),0);

	for(;prefs->type;prefs++)
	{
	char num[10]; /* prefs->value is a byte, so we're over
	safe here */

	sprintf(num,"%u",prefs->value);

	if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_SYM)
	{
	if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (prefs->value))
	{
	const char *algo =
	(openpgp_cipher_test_algo (prefs->value)
	? num
	: openpgp_cipher_algo_name (prefs->value));
	if(!problem)
	check_prefs_warning(pk);
	log_info(_(" \"%s\": preference for cipher"
	" algorithm %s\n"), user, algo);
	problem=1;
	}
	}
	else if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_HASH)
	{
	if(openpgp_md_test_algo(prefs->value))
	{
	const char *algo =
	(gcry_md_test_algo (prefs->value)
	? num
	: gcry_md_algo_name (prefs->value));
	if(!problem)
	check_prefs_warning(pk);
	log_info(_(" \"%s\": preference for digest"
	" algorithm %s\n"), user, algo);
	problem=1;
	}
	}
	else if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_ZIP)
	{
	if(check_compress_algo (prefs->value))
	{
	const char *algo=compress_algo_to_string(prefs->value);
	if(!problem)
	check_prefs_warning(pk);
	log_info(_(" \"%s\": preference for compression"
	" algorithm %s\n"),user,algo?algo:num);
	problem=1;
	}
	}
	}

	xfree(user);
	}
	}

	if(problem)
	{
	log_info(_("it is strongly suggested that you update"
	" your preferences and\n"));
	log_info(_("re-distribute this key to avoid potential algorithm"
	" mismatch problems\n"));

	if(!opt.batch)
	{
	strlist_t sl=NULL,locusr=NULL;
	size_t fprlen=0;
	byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN],*p;
	char username[(MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2)+1];
	unsigned int i;

	p=fingerprint_from_pk(pk,fpr,&fprlen);
	for(i=0;i<fprlen;i++,p++)
	sprintf(username+2i,"%02X",p);
	add_to_strlist(&locusr,username);

	append_to_strlist(&sl,"updpref");
	append_to_strlist(&sl,"save");

	keyedit_menu( username, locusr, sl, 1, 1 );
	free_strlist(sl);
	free_strlist(locusr);
	}
	else if(!opt.quiet)
	log_info(_("you can update your preferences with:"
	" gpg --edit-key %s updpref save\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
	}
	}

	/****************
	* Try to import one keyblock. Return an error only in serious cases, but
	* never for an invalid keyblock. It uses log_error to increase the
	* internal errorcount, so that invalid input can be detected by programs
	* which called gpg.
	*/
	static int
	import_one( const char fname, KBNODE keyblock, struct stats_s stats,
	unsigned char *fpr,size_t fpr_len,unsigned int options,
	int from_sk, import_filter_t filter, void *filter_arg)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	PKT_public_key *pk_orig;
	KBNODE node, uidnode;
	KBNODE keyblock_orig = NULL;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int rc = 0;
	int new_key = 0;
	int mod_key = 0;
	int same_key = 0;
	int non_self = 0;

	/* get the key and print some info about it */
	node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
	if( !node )
	BUG();

	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
	uidnode = find_next_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_USER_ID );

	if( opt.verbose && !opt.interactive )
	{
	log_info( "pub %4u%c/%s %s ",
	nbits_from_pk( pk ),
	pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
	keystr_from_pk(pk), datestr_from_pk(pk) );
	if (uidnode)
	print_utf8_string (log_get_stream (),
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
	log_printf ("\n");
	}


	if( !uidnode )
	{
	log_error( _("key %s: no user ID\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
	return 0;
	}

	if (filter && filter (keyblock, filter_arg))
	{
	log_error (_("key %s: %s\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk),
	_("rejected by import filter"));
	return 0;
	}

	if (opt.interactive) {
	if(is_status_enabled())
	print_import_check (pk, uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id);
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	show_basic_key_info (keyblock);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("import.okay",
	"Do you want to import this key? (y/N) "))
	return 0;
	}

	collapse_uids(&keyblock);

	/* Clean the key that we're about to import, to cut down on things
	that we have to clean later. This has no practical impact on
	the end result, but does result in less logging which might
	confuse the user. */
	if(options&IMPORT_CLEAN)
	clean_key(keyblock,opt.verbose,options&IMPORT_MINIMAL,NULL,NULL);

	clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );

	if((options&IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG) && fix_pks_corruption(keyblock)
	&& opt.verbose)
	log_info(_("key %s: PKS subkey corruption repaired\n"),
	keystr_from_pk(pk));

	rc = chk_self_sigs( fname, keyblock , pk, keyid, &non_self );
	if( rc )
	return rc== -1? 0:rc;

	/* If we allow such a thing, mark unsigned uids as valid */
	if( opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid )
	for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next )
	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & 1) )
	{
	char *user=utf8_to_native(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
	node->flag \|= 1;
	log_info( _("key %s: accepted non self-signed user ID \"%s\"\n"),
	keystr_from_pk(pk),user);
	xfree(user);
	}

	if( !delete_inv_parts( fname, keyblock, keyid, options ) ) {
	log_error( _("key %s: no valid user IDs\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
	if( !opt.quiet )
	log_info(_("this may be caused by a missing self-signature\n"));
	stats->no_user_id++;
	return 0;
	}

	/* do we have this key already in one of our pubrings ? */
	pk_orig = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk_orig );
	rc = get_pubkey_fast ( pk_orig, keyid );
	if( rc && rc != G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && rc != G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY )
	{
	log_error( _("key %s: public key not found: %s\n"),
	keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
	}
	else if ( rc && (opt.import_options&IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY) )
	{
	if( opt.verbose )
	log_info( _("key %s: new key - skipped\n"), keystr(keyid));
	rc = 0;
	stats->skipped_new_keys++;
	}
	else if( rc ) { /* insert this key */
	KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new (0);

	rc = keydb_locate_writable (hd, NULL);
	if (rc) {
	log_error (_("no writable keyring found: %s\n"), g10_errstr (rc));
	keydb_release (hd);
	return G10ERR_GENERAL;
	}
	if( opt.verbose > 1 )
	log_info (_("writing to `%s'\n"), keydb_get_resource_name (hd) );

	rc = keydb_insert_keyblock (hd, keyblock );
	if (rc)
	log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
	keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc));
	- else
	+ else if (!(opt.import_options & IMPORT_KEEP_OWNERTTRUST))
	{
	/* This should not be possible since we delete the
	ownertrust when a key is deleted, but it can happen if
	the keyring and trustdb are out of sync. It can also
	- be made to happen with the trusted-key command. */
	+ be made to happen with the trusted-key command and by
	+ importing and locally exported key. */

	clear_ownertrusts (pk);
	if(non_self)
	revalidation_mark ();
	}
	keydb_release (hd);

	/* we are ready */
	if( !opt.quiet )
	{
	char *p=get_user_id_native (keyid);
	log_info( _("key %s: public key \"%s\" imported\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p);
	xfree(p);
	}
	if( is_status_enabled() )
	{
	char *us = get_long_user_id_string( keyid );
	write_status_text( STATUS_IMPORTED, us );
	xfree(us);
	print_import_ok (pk,NULL, 1);
	}
	stats->imported++;
	if( is_RSA( pk->pubkey_algo ) )
	stats->imported_rsa++;
	new_key = 1;
	}
	else { /* merge */
	KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
	int n_uids, n_sigs, n_subk, n_sigs_cleaned, n_uids_cleaned;

	/* Compare the original against the new key; just to be sure nothing
	* weird is going on */
	if( cmp_public_keys( pk_orig, pk ) )
	{
	log_error( _("key %s: doesn't match our copy\n"),keystr(keyid));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* now read the original keyblock */
	hd = keydb_new (0);
	{
	byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	size_t an;

	fingerprint_from_pk (pk_orig, afp, &an);
	while (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)
	afp[an++] = 0;
	rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, afp);
	}
	if( rc )
	{
	log_error (_("key %s: can't locate original keyblock: %s\n"),
	keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
	keydb_release (hd);
	goto leave;
	}
	rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock_orig );
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("key %s: can't read original keyblock: %s\n"),
	keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
	keydb_release (hd);
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Make sure the original direct key sigs are all sane. */
	n_sigs_cleaned = fix_bad_direct_key_sigs (keyblock_orig, keyid);
	if (n_sigs_cleaned)
	commit_kbnode (&keyblock_orig);

	/* and try to merge the block */
	clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock_orig );
	clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );
	n_uids = n_sigs = n_subk = n_uids_cleaned = 0;
	rc = merge_blocks( fname, keyblock_orig, keyblock,
	keyid, &n_uids, &n_sigs, &n_subk );
	if( rc )
	{
	keydb_release (hd);
	goto leave;
	}

	if(options&IMPORT_CLEAN)
	clean_key(keyblock_orig,opt.verbose,options&IMPORT_MINIMAL,
	&n_uids_cleaned,&n_sigs_cleaned);

	if( n_uids \|\| n_sigs \|\| n_subk \|\| n_sigs_cleaned \|\| n_uids_cleaned) {
	mod_key = 1;
	/* keyblock_orig has been updated; write */
	rc = keydb_update_keyblock (hd, keyblock_orig);
	if (rc)
	log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
	keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc) );
	else if(non_self)
	revalidation_mark ();

	/* we are ready */
	if( !opt.quiet )
	{
	char *p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
	if( n_uids == 1 )
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" 1 new user ID\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p);
	else if( n_uids )
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" %d new user IDs\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p,n_uids);
	if( n_sigs == 1 )
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" 1 new signature\n"),
	keystr(keyid), p);
	else if( n_sigs )
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" %d new signatures\n"),
	keystr(keyid), p, n_sigs );
	if( n_subk == 1 )
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" 1 new subkey\n"),
	keystr(keyid), p);
	else if( n_subk )
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" %d new subkeys\n"),
	keystr(keyid), p, n_subk );
	if(n_sigs_cleaned==1)
	log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d signature cleaned\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p,n_sigs_cleaned);
	else if(n_sigs_cleaned)
	log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d signatures cleaned\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p,n_sigs_cleaned);
	if(n_uids_cleaned==1)
	log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d user ID cleaned\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p,n_uids_cleaned);
	else if(n_uids_cleaned)
	log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d user IDs cleaned\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p,n_uids_cleaned);
	xfree(p);
	}

	stats->n_uids +=n_uids;
	stats->n_sigs +=n_sigs;
	stats->n_subk +=n_subk;
	stats->n_sigs_cleaned +=n_sigs_cleaned;
	stats->n_uids_cleaned +=n_uids_cleaned;

	if (is_status_enabled ())
	print_import_ok (pk, NULL,
	((n_uids?2:0)\|(n_sigs?4:0)\|(n_subk?8:0)));
	}
	else
	{
	same_key = 1;
	if (is_status_enabled ())
	print_import_ok (pk, NULL, 0);

	if( !opt.quiet )
	{
	char *p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" not changed\n"),keystr(keyid),p);
	xfree(p);
	}

	stats->unchanged++;
	}

	keydb_release (hd); hd = NULL;
	}

	leave:
	if (mod_key \|\| new_key \|\| same_key)
	{
	/* A little explanation for this: we fill in the fingerprint
	when importing keys as it can be useful to know the
	fingerprint in certain keyserver-related cases (a keyserver
	asked for a particular name, but the key doesn't have that
	name). However, in cases where we're importing more than
	one key at a time, we cannot know which key to fingerprint.
	In these cases, rather than guessing, we do not
	fingerprinting at all, and we must hope the user ID on the
	keys are useful. Note that we need to do this for new
	keys, merged keys and even for unchanged keys. This is
	required because for example the --auto-key-locate feature
	may import an already imported key and needs to know the
	fingerprint of the key in all cases. */
	if (fpr)
	{
	xfree (*fpr);
	/* Note that we need to compare against 0 here because
	COUNT gets only incremented after returning form this
	function. */
	if (stats->count == 0)
	*fpr = fingerprint_from_pk (pk, NULL, fpr_len);
	else
	*fpr = NULL;
	}
	}

	/* Now that the key is definitely incorporated into the keydb, we
	need to check if a designated revocation is present or if the
	prefs are not rational so we can warn the user. */

	if(mod_key)
	{
	revocation_present(keyblock_orig);
	if(!from_sk && seckey_available(keyid)==0)
	check_prefs(keyblock_orig);
	}
	else if(new_key)
	{
	revocation_present(keyblock);
	if(!from_sk && seckey_available(keyid)==0)
	check_prefs(keyblock);
	}

	release_kbnode( keyblock_orig );
	free_public_key( pk_orig );

	return rc;
	}

	/* Walk a secret keyblock and produce a public keyblock out of it. */
	static KBNODE
	sec_to_pub_keyblock(KBNODE sec_keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE secnode,pub_keyblock=NULL,ctx=NULL;

	while((secnode=walk_kbnode(sec_keyblock,&ctx,0)))
	{
	KBNODE pubnode;

	if(secnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_KEY \|\|
	secnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	{
	/* Make a public key. We only need to convert enough to
	write the keyblock out. */

	PKT_secret_key *sk=secnode->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
	PACKET *pkt=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(PACKET));
	PKT_public_key *pk=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(PKT_public_key));
	int n;

	if(secnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	pkt->pkttype=PKT_PUBLIC_KEY;
	else
	pkt->pkttype=PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;

	pkt->pkt.public_key=pk;

	pk->version=sk->version;
	pk->timestamp=sk->timestamp;
	pk->expiredate=sk->expiredate;
	pk->pubkey_algo=sk->pubkey_algo;

	n=pubkey_get_npkey(pk->pubkey_algo);
	if(n==0)
	{
	/* we can't properly extract the pubkey without knowing
	the number of MPIs */
	release_kbnode(pub_keyblock);
	return NULL;
	}
	else
	{
	int i;

	for(i=0;i<n;i++)
	pk->pkey[i]=mpi_copy(sk->skey[i]);
	}

	pubnode=new_kbnode(pkt);
	}
	else
	{
	pubnode=clone_kbnode(secnode);
	}

	if(pub_keyblock==NULL)
	pub_keyblock=pubnode;
	else
	add_kbnode(pub_keyblock,pubnode);
	}

	return pub_keyblock;
	}

	/****************
	* Ditto for secret keys. Handling is simpler than for public keys.
	* We allow secret key importing only when allow is true, this is so
	* that a secret key can not be imported accidently and thereby tampering
	* with the trust calculation.
	*/
	static int
	import_secret_one (const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
	struct stats_s *stats, unsigned int options,
	import_filter_t filter, void *filter_arg)
	{
	PKT_secret_key *sk;
	KBNODE node, uidnode;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int rc = 0;

	/* Get the key and print some info about it. */
	node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
	if( !node )
	BUG();

	sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
	keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
	uidnode = find_next_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_USER_ID );

	if (filter && filter (keyblock, filter_arg)) {
	log_error (_("secret key %s: %s\n"), keystr_from_sk(sk),
	_("rejected by import filter"));
	return 0;
	}

	if( opt.verbose )
	{
	log_info( "sec %4u%c/%s %s ",
	nbits_from_sk( sk ),
	pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
	keystr_from_sk(sk), datestr_from_sk(sk) );
	if( uidnode )
	print_utf8_string( stderr, uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
	log_printf ("\n");
	}
	stats->secret_read++;

	if ((options & IMPORT_NO_SECKEY))
	{
	log_error (_("importing secret keys not allowed\n"));
	return 0;
	}

	if( !uidnode )
	{
	log_error( _("key %s: no user ID\n"), keystr_from_sk(sk));
	return 0;
	}

	if(sk->protect.algo>110)
	{
	log_error(_("key %s: secret key with invalid cipher %d"
	" - skipped\n"),keystr_from_sk(sk),sk->protect.algo);
	return 0;
	}

	#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
	if (1)
	{
	/* We don't allow to import secret keys because that may be used
	to put a secret key into the keyring and the user might later
	be tricked into signing stuff with that key. */
	log_error (_("importing secret keys not allowed\n"));
	return 0;
	}
	#endif

	clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );

	/* do we have this key already in one of our secrings ? */
	rc = seckey_available( keyid );
	if( rc == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY && !(opt.import_options&IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY) )
	{
	/* simply insert this key */
	KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new (1);

	/* get default resource */
	rc = keydb_locate_writable (hd, NULL);
	if (rc) {
	log_error (_("no default secret keyring: %s\n"), g10_errstr (rc));
	keydb_release (hd);
	return G10ERR_GENERAL;
	}
	rc = keydb_insert_keyblock (hd, keyblock );
	if (rc)
	log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
	keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc) );
	keydb_release (hd);
	/* we are ready */
	if( !opt.quiet )
	log_info( _("key %s: secret key imported\n"), keystr_from_sk(sk));
	stats->secret_imported++;
	if (is_status_enabled ())
	print_import_ok (NULL, sk, 1\|16);

	if(options&IMPORT_SK2PK)
	{
	/* Try and make a public key out of this. */

	KBNODE pub_keyblock=sec_to_pub_keyblock(keyblock);
	if(pub_keyblock)
	{
	import_one (fname, pub_keyblock, stats,
	NULL, NULL, opt.import_options, 1,
	NULL, NULL);
	release_kbnode(pub_keyblock);
	}
	}

	/* Now that the key is definitely incorporated into the keydb,
	if we have the public part of this key, we need to check if
	the prefs are rational. */
	node=get_pubkeyblock(keyid);
	if(node)
	{
	check_prefs(node);
	release_kbnode(node);
	}
	}
	else if( !rc )
	{ /* we can't merge secret keys */
	log_error( _("key %s: already in secret keyring\n"),
	keystr_from_sk(sk));
	stats->secret_dups++;
	if (is_status_enabled ())
	print_import_ok (NULL, sk, 16);

	/* TODO: if we ever do merge secret keys, make sure to handle
	the sec_to_pub_keyblock feature as well. */
	}
	else
	log_error( _("key %s: secret key not found: %s\n"),
	keystr_from_sk(sk), g10_errstr(rc));

	return rc;
	}


	/****************
	* Import a revocation certificate; this is a single signature packet.
	*/
	static int
	import_revoke_cert( const char fname, KBNODE node, struct stats_s stats )
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
	KBNODE onode, keyblock = NULL;
	KEYDB_HANDLE hd = NULL;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int rc = 0;

	(void)fname;

	assert( !node->next );
	assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE );
	assert( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 );

	keyid[0] = node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0];
	keyid[1] = node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1];

	pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
	rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
	if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY )
	{
	log_error(_("key %s: no public key -"
	" can't apply revocation certificate\n"), keystr(keyid));
	rc = 0;
	goto leave;
	}
	else if( rc )
	{
	log_error(_("key %s: public key not found: %s\n"),
	keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* read the original keyblock */
	hd = keydb_new (0);
	{
	byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	size_t an;

	fingerprint_from_pk (pk, afp, &an);
	while (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)
	afp[an++] = 0;
	rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, afp);
	}
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("key %s: can't locate original keyblock: %s\n"),
	keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
	goto leave;
	}
	rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock );
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("key %s: can't read original keyblock: %s\n"),
	keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* it is okay, that node is not in keyblock because
	* check_key_signature works fine for sig_class 0x20 in this
	* special case. */
	rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL);
	if( rc )
	{
	log_error( _("key %s: invalid revocation certificate"
	": %s - rejected\n"), keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* check whether we already have this */
	for(onode=keyblock->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
	if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
	break;
	else if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& !cmp_signatures(node->pkt->pkt.signature,
	onode->pkt->pkt.signature))
	{
	rc = 0;
	goto leave; /* yes, we already know about it */
	}
	}


	/* insert it */
	insert_kbnode( keyblock, clone_kbnode(node), 0 );

	/* and write the keyblock back */
	rc = keydb_update_keyblock (hd, keyblock );
	if (rc)
	log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
	keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc) );
	keydb_release (hd); hd = NULL;
	/* we are ready */
	if( !opt.quiet )
	{
	char *p=get_user_id_native (keyid);
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" revocation certificate imported\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p);
	xfree(p);
	}
	stats->n_revoc++;

	/* If the key we just revoked was ultimately trusted, remove its
	ultimate trust. This doesn't stop the user from putting the
	ultimate trust back, but is a reasonable solution for now. */
	if(get_ownertrust(pk)==TRUST_ULTIMATE)
	clear_ownertrusts(pk);

	revalidation_mark ();

	leave:
	keydb_release (hd);
	release_kbnode( keyblock );
	free_public_key( pk );
	return rc;
	}


	/*
	* Loop over the keyblock and check all self signatures.
	* Mark all user-ids with a self-signature by setting flag bit 0.
	* Mark all user-ids with an invalid self-signature by setting bit 1.
	* This works also for subkeys, here the subkey is marked. Invalid or
	* extra subkey sigs (binding or revocation) are marked for deletion.
	* non_self is set to true if there are any sigs other than self-sigs
	* in this keyblock.
	*/
	static int
	chk_self_sigs( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
	PKT_public_key pk, u32 keyid, int *non_self )
	{
	KBNODE n, knode = NULL;
	PKT_signature *sig;
	int rc;
	u32 bsdate=0,rsdate=0;
	KBNODE bsnode = NULL, rsnode = NULL;

	(void)fname;
	(void)pk;

	for (n=keyblock; (n = find_next_kbnode (n, 0)); )
	{
	if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	knode = n;
	bsdate = 0;
	rsdate = 0;
	bsnode = NULL;
	rsnode = NULL;
	continue;
	}

	if ( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
	continue;

	sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if ( keyid[0] != sig->keyid[0] \|\| keyid[1] != sig->keyid[1] )
	{
	*non_self = 1;
	continue;
	}

	/* This just caches the sigs for later use. That way we
	import a fully-cached key which speeds things up. */
	if (!opt.no_sig_cache)
	check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);

	if ( IS_UID_SIG(sig) \|\| IS_UID_REV(sig) )
	{
	KBNODE unode = find_prev_kbnode( keyblock, n, PKT_USER_ID );
	if ( !unode )
	{
	log_error( _("key %s: no user ID for signature\n"),
	keystr(keyid));
	return -1; /* The complete keyblock is invalid. */
	}

	/* If it hasn't been marked valid yet, keep trying. */
	if (!(unode->flag&1))
	{
	rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
	if ( rc )
	{
	if ( opt.verbose )
	{
	char *p = utf8_to_native
	(unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	strlen (unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name),0);
	log_info (gpg_err_code(rc) == G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
	_("key %s: unsupported public key "
	"algorithm on user ID \"%s\"\n"):
	_("key %s: invalid self-signature "
	"on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
	keystr (keyid),p);
	xfree (p);
	}
	}
	else
	unode->flag \|= 1; /* Mark that signature checked. */
	}
	}
	else if (IS_KEY_SIG (sig))
	{
	rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
	if ( rc )
	{
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (gpg_err_code (rc) == G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
	_("key %s: unsupported public key algorithm\n"):
	_("key %s: invalid direct key signature\n"),
	keystr (keyid));
	n->flag \|= 4;
	}
	}
	else if ( IS_SUBKEY_SIG (sig) )
	{
	/* Note that this works based solely on the timestamps like
	the rest of gpg. If the standard gets revocation
	targets, this may need to be revised. */

	if ( !knode )
	{
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("key %s: no subkey for key binding\n"),
	keystr (keyid));
	n->flag \|= 4; /* delete this */
	}
	else
	{
	rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
	if ( rc )
	{
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (gpg_err_code (rc) == G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
	_("key %s: unsupported public key"
	" algorithm\n"):
	_("key %s: invalid subkey binding\n"),
	keystr (keyid));
	n->flag \|= 4;
	}
	else
	{
	/* It's valid, so is it newer? */
	if (sig->timestamp >= bsdate)
	{
	knode->flag \|= 1; /* The subkey is valid. */
	if (bsnode)
	{
	/* Delete the last binding sig since this
	one is newer */
	bsnode->flag \|= 4;
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("key %s: removed multiple subkey"
	" binding\n"),keystr(keyid));
	}

	bsnode = n;
	bsdate = sig->timestamp;
	}
	else
	n->flag \|= 4; /* older */
	}
	}
	}
	else if ( IS_SUBKEY_REV (sig) )
	{
	/* We don't actually mark the subkey as revoked right now,
	so just check that the revocation sig is the most recent
	valid one. Note that we don't care if the binding sig is
	newer than the revocation sig. See the comment in
	getkey.c:merge_selfsigs_subkey for more. */
	if ( !knode )
	{
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("key %s: no subkey for key revocation\n"),
	keystr(keyid));
	n->flag \|= 4; /* delete this */
	}
	else
	{
	rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
	if ( rc )
	{
	if(opt.verbose)
	log_info (gpg_err_code (rc) == G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
	_("key %s: unsupported public"
	" key algorithm\n"):
	_("key %s: invalid subkey revocation\n"),
	keystr(keyid));
	n->flag \|= 4;
	}
	else
	{
	/* It's valid, so is it newer? */
	if (sig->timestamp >= rsdate)
	{
	if (rsnode)
	{
	/* Delete the last revocation sig since
	this one is newer. */
	rsnode->flag \|= 4;
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("key %s: removed multiple subkey"
	" revocation\n"),keystr(keyid));
	}

	rsnode = n;
	rsdate = sig->timestamp;
	}
	else
	n->flag \|= 4; /* older */
	}
	}
	}
	}

	return 0;
	}

	/****************
	* delete all parts which are invalid and those signatures whose
	* public key algorithm is not available in this implemenation;
	* but consider RSA as valid, because parse/build_packets knows
	* about it.
	* returns: true if at least one valid user-id is left over.
	*/
	static int
	delete_inv_parts( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
	u32 *keyid, unsigned int options)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int nvalid=0, uid_seen=0, subkey_seen=0;

	(void)fname;

	for(node=keyblock->next; node; node = node->next ) {
	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
	uid_seen = 1;
	if( (node->flag & 2) \|\| !(node->flag & 1) ) {
	if( opt.verbose )
	{
	char *p=utf8_to_native(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
	log_info( _("key %s: skipped user ID \"%s\"\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p);
	xfree(p);
	}
	delete_kbnode( node ); /* the user-id */
	/* and all following packets up to the next user-id */
	while( node->next
	&& node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID
	&& node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ){
	delete_kbnode( node->next );
	node = node->next;
	}
	}
	else
	nvalid++;
	}
	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
	if( (node->flag & 2) \|\| !(node->flag & 1) ) {
	if( opt.verbose )
	log_info( _("key %s: skipped subkey\n"),keystr(keyid));

	delete_kbnode( node ); /* the subkey */
	/* and all following signature packets */
	while( node->next
	&& node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
	delete_kbnode( node->next );
	node = node->next;
	}
	}
	else
	subkey_seen = 1;
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& openpgp_pk_test_algo (node->pkt->pkt.signature->pubkey_algo)
	&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->pubkey_algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
	delete_kbnode( node ); /* build_packet() can't handle this */
	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE &&
	!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable &&
	!(options&IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS) &&
	seckey_available( node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid ) )
	{
	/* here we violate the rfc a bit by still allowing
	* to import non-exportable signature when we have the
	* the secret key used to create this signature - it
	* seems that this makes sense */
	if(opt.verbose)
	log_info( _("key %s: non exportable signature"
	" (class 0x%02X) - skipped\n"),
	keystr(keyid), node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class );
	delete_kbnode( node );
	}
	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
	if( uid_seen )
	{
	if(opt.verbose)
	log_info( _("key %s: revocation certificate"
	" at wrong place - skipped\n"),keystr(keyid));
	delete_kbnode( node );
	}
	else {
	/* If the revocation cert is from a different key than
	the one we're working on don't check it - it's
	probably from a revocation key and won't be
	verifiable with this key anyway. */

	if(node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]==keyid[0] &&
	node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]==keyid[1])
	{
	int rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL);
	if( rc )
	{
	if(opt.verbose)
	log_info( _("key %s: invalid revocation"
	" certificate: %s - skipped\n"),
	keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
	delete_kbnode( node );
	}
	}
	}
	}
	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE &&
	(node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x18 \|\|
	node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28) &&
	!subkey_seen )
	{
	if(opt.verbose)
	log_info( _("key %s: subkey signature"
	" in wrong place - skipped\n"), keystr(keyid));
	delete_kbnode( node );
	}
	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& !IS_CERT(node->pkt->pkt.signature))
	{
	if(opt.verbose)
	log_info(_("key %s: unexpected signature class (0x%02X) -"
	" skipped\n"),keystr(keyid),
	node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class);
	delete_kbnode(node);
	}
	else if( (node->flag & 4) ) /* marked for deletion */
	delete_kbnode( node );
	}

	/* note: because keyblock is the public key, it is never marked
	* for deletion and so keyblock cannot change */
	commit_kbnode( &keyblock );
	return nvalid;
	}


	/****************
	* It may happen that the imported keyblock has duplicated user IDs.
	* We check this here and collapse those user IDs together with their
	* sigs into one.
	* Returns: True if the keyblock has changed.
	*/
	int
	collapse_uids( KBNODE *keyblock )
	{
	KBNODE uid1;
	int any=0;

	for(uid1=*keyblock;uid1;uid1=uid1->next)
	{
	KBNODE uid2;

	if(is_deleted_kbnode(uid1))
	continue;

	if(uid1->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_USER_ID)
	continue;

	for(uid2=uid1->next;uid2;uid2=uid2->next)
	{
	if(is_deleted_kbnode(uid2))
	continue;

	if(uid2->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_USER_ID)
	continue;

	if(cmp_user_ids(uid1->pkt->pkt.user_id,
	uid2->pkt->pkt.user_id)==0)
	{
	/* We have a duplicated uid */
	KBNODE sig1,last;

	any=1;

	/* Now take uid2's signatures, and attach them to
	uid1 */
	for(last=uid2;last->next;last=last->next)
	{
	if(is_deleted_kbnode(last))
	continue;

	if(last->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
	\|\| last->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| last->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	break;
	}

	/* Snip out uid2 */
	(find_prev_kbnode(*keyblock,uid2,0))->next=last->next;

	/* Now put uid2 in place as part of uid1 */
	last->next=uid1->next;
	uid1->next=uid2;
	delete_kbnode(uid2);

	/* Now dedupe uid1 */
	for(sig1=uid1->next;sig1;sig1=sig1->next)
	{
	KBNODE sig2;

	if(is_deleted_kbnode(sig1))
	continue;

	if(sig1->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
	\|\| sig1->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| sig1->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	break;

	if(sig1->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_SIGNATURE)
	continue;

	for(sig2=sig1->next,last=sig1;sig2;last=sig2,sig2=sig2->next)
	{
	if(is_deleted_kbnode(sig2))
	continue;

	if(sig2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
	\|\| sig2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| sig2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	break;

	if(sig2->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_SIGNATURE)
	continue;

	if(cmp_signatures(sig1->pkt->pkt.signature,
	sig2->pkt->pkt.signature)==0)
	{
	/* We have a match, so delete the second
	signature */
	delete_kbnode(sig2);
	sig2=last;
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}

	commit_kbnode(keyblock);

	if(any && !opt.quiet)
	{
	const char *key="???";

	if( (uid1=find_kbnode( *keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )) )
	key=keystr_from_pk(uid1->pkt->pkt.public_key);
	else if( (uid1 = find_kbnode( *keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY )) )
	key=keystr_from_sk(uid1->pkt->pkt.secret_key);

	log_info(_("key %s: duplicated user ID detected - merged\n"),key);
	}

	return any;
	}

	/* Check for a 0x20 revocation from a revocation key that is not
	present. This may be called without the benefit of merge_xxxx so
	you can't rely on pk->revkey and friends. */
	static void
	revocation_present(KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE onode,inode;
	PKT_public_key *pk=keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	for(onode=keyblock->next;onode;onode=onode->next)
	{
	/* If we reach user IDs, we're done. */
	if(onode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
	break;

	if(onode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
	onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class==0x1F &&
	onode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey)
	{
	int idx;
	PKT_signature *sig=onode->pkt->pkt.signature;

	for(idx=0;idx<sig->numrevkeys;idx++)
	{
	u32 keyid[2];

	keyid_from_fingerprint(sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
	MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN,keyid);

	for(inode=keyblock->next;inode;inode=inode->next)
	{
	/* If we reach user IDs, we're done. */
	if(inode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
	break;

	if(inode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
	inode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class==0x20 &&
	inode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]==keyid[0] &&
	inode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]==keyid[1])
	{
	/* Okay, we have a revocation key, and a
	revocation issued by it. Do we have the key
	itself? */
	int rc;

	rc=get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (NULL,sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
	MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
	if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY \|\| rc==G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY)
	{
	char *tempkeystr=xstrdup(keystr_from_pk(pk));

	/* No, so try and get it */
	if(opt.keyserver
	&& (opt.keyserver_options.options
	& KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE))
	{
	log_info(_("WARNING: key %s may be revoked:"
	" fetching revocation key %s\n"),
	tempkeystr,keystr(keyid));
	keyserver_import_fprint(sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
	MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN,
	opt.keyserver);

	/* Do we have it now? */
	rc=get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (NULL,
	sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
	MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
	}

	if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY \|\| rc==G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY)
	log_info(_("WARNING: key %s may be revoked:"
	" revocation key %s not present.\n"),
	tempkeystr,keystr(keyid));

	xfree(tempkeystr);
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}

	/****************
	* compare and merge the blocks
	*
	* o compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
	* that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
	* o Simply add the signature. Can't verify here because we may not have
	* the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it
	* into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey
	* is used.
	* Note: We indicate newly inserted packets with flag bit 0
	*/
	static int
	merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig, KBNODE keyblock,
	u32 keyid, int n_uids, int n_sigs, int n_subk )
	{
	KBNODE onode, node;
	int rc, found;

	/* 1st: handle revocation certificates */
	for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
	break;
	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
	/* check whether we already have this */
	found = 0;
	for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
	if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
	break;
	else if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20
	&& !cmp_signatures(onode->pkt->pkt.signature,
	node->pkt->pkt.signature))
	{
	found = 1;
	break;
	}
	}
	if( !found ) {
	KBNODE n2 = clone_kbnode(node);
	insert_kbnode( keyblock_orig, n2, 0 );
	n2->flag \|= 1;
	++*n_sigs;
	if(!opt.quiet)
	{
	char *p=get_user_id_native (keyid);
	log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" revocation"
	" certificate added\n"), keystr(keyid),p);
	xfree(p);
	}
	}
	}
	}

	/* 2nd: merge in any direct key (0x1F) sigs */
	for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
	break;
	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x1F ) {
	/* check whether we already have this */
	found = 0;
	for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
	if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
	break;
	else if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x1F
	&& !cmp_signatures(onode->pkt->pkt.signature,
	node->pkt->pkt.signature)) {
	found = 1;
	break;
	}
	}
	if( !found )
	{
	KBNODE n2 = clone_kbnode(node);
	insert_kbnode( keyblock_orig, n2, 0 );
	n2->flag \|= 1;
	++*n_sigs;
	if(!opt.quiet)
	log_info( _("key %s: direct key signature added\n"),
	keystr(keyid));
	}
	}
	}

	/* 3rd: try to merge new certificates in */
	for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
	if( !(onode->flag & 1) && onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) {
	/* find the user id in the imported keyblock */
	for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next )
	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& !cmp_user_ids( onode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id ) )
	break;
	if( node ) { /* found: merge */
	rc = merge_sigs( onode, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid );
	if( rc )
	return rc;
	}
	}
	}

	/* 4th: add new user-ids */
	for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) {
	/* do we have this in the original keyblock */
	for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
	if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& !cmp_user_ids( onode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id ) )
	break;
	if( !onode ) { /* this is a new user id: append */
	rc = append_uid( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
	if( rc )
	return rc;
	++*n_uids;
	}
	}
	}

	/* 5th: add new subkeys */
	for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
	onode = NULL;
	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
	/* do we have this in the original keyblock? */
	for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
	if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& !cmp_public_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
	node->pkt->pkt.public_key ) )
	break;
	if( !onode ) { /* this is a new subkey: append */
	rc = append_key( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
	if( rc )
	return rc;
	++*n_subk;
	}
	}
	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
	/* do we have this in the original keyblock? */
	for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
	if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
	&& !cmp_secret_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.secret_key,
	node->pkt->pkt.secret_key ) )
	break;
	if( !onode ) { /* this is a new subkey: append */
	rc = append_key( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
	if( rc )
	return rc;
	++*n_subk;
	}
	}
	}

	/* 6th: merge subkey certificates */
	for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
	if( !(onode->flag & 1)
	&& ( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) ) {
	/* find the subkey in the imported keyblock */
	for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& !cmp_public_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
	node->pkt->pkt.public_key ) )
	break;
	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
	&& !cmp_secret_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.secret_key,
	node->pkt->pkt.secret_key ) )
	break;
	}
	if( node ) { /* found: merge */
	rc = merge_keysigs( onode, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid );
	if( rc )
	return rc;
	}
	}
	}


	return 0;
	}


	/****************
	* append the userid starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK.
	*/
	static int
	append_uid (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
	const char fname, u32 keyid )
	{
	KBNODE n, n_where=NULL;

	(void)fname;
	(void)keyid;

	assert(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );

	/* find the position */
	for( n = keyblock; n; n_where = n, n = n->next ) {
	if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
	break;
	}
	if( !n )
	n_where = NULL;

	/* and append/insert */
	while( node ) {
	/* we add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
	* one is released first */
	n = clone_kbnode(node);
	if( n_where ) {
	insert_kbnode( n_where, n, 0 );
	n_where = n;
	}
	else
	add_kbnode( keyblock, n );
	n->flag \|= 1;
	node->flag \|= 1;
	if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
	++*n_sigs;

	node = node->next;
	if( node && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
	break;
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/****************
	* Merge the sigs from SRC onto DST. SRC and DST are both a PKT_USER_ID.
	* (how should we handle comment packets here?)
	*/
	static int
	merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
	const char fname, u32 keyid )
	{
	KBNODE n, n2;
	int found=0;

	(void)fname;
	(void)keyid;

	assert(dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
	assert(src->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );

	for(n=src->next; n && n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; n = n->next ) {
	if( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
	continue;
	if( n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x18
	\|\| n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28 )
	continue; /* skip signatures which are only valid on subkeys */
	found = 0;
	for(n2=dst->next; n2 && n2->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; n2 = n2->next)
	if(!cmp_signatures(n->pkt->pkt.signature,n2->pkt->pkt.signature))
	{
	found++;
	break;
	}
	if( !found ) {
	/* This signature is new or newer, append N to DST.
	* We add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
	* one is released first */
	n2 = clone_kbnode(n);
	insert_kbnode( dst, n2, PKT_SIGNATURE );
	n2->flag \|= 1;
	n->flag \|= 1;
	++*n_sigs;
	}
	}

	return 0;
	}

	/****************
	* Merge the sigs from SRC onto DST. SRC and DST are both a PKT_xxx_SUBKEY.
	*/
	static int
	merge_keysigs (KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
	const char fname, u32 keyid)
	{
	KBNODE n, n2;
	int found=0;

	(void)fname;
	(void)keyid;

	assert( dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY );

	for(n=src->next; n ; n = n->next ) {
	if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
	break;
	if( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
	continue;
	found = 0;
	for(n2=dst->next; n2; n2 = n2->next){
	if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
	break;
	if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
	== n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
	&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
	== n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
	&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
	<= n2->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
	&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class
	== n2->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class ) {
	found++;
	break;
	}
	}
	if( !found ) {
	/* This signature is new or newer, append N to DST.
	* We add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
	* one is released first */
	n2 = clone_kbnode(n);
	insert_kbnode( dst, n2, PKT_SIGNATURE );
	n2->flag \|= 1;
	n->flag \|= 1;
	++*n_sigs;
	}
	}

	return 0;
	}

	/****************
	* append the subkey starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK.
	* Mark all new and copied packets by setting flag bit 0.
	*/
	static int
	append_key (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
	const char fname, u32 keyid)
	{
	KBNODE n;

	(void)fname;
	(void)keyid;

	assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY );

	while( node ) {
	/* we add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
	* one is released first */
	n = clone_kbnode(node);
	add_kbnode( keyblock, n );
	n->flag \|= 1;
	node->flag \|= 1;
	if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
	++*n_sigs;

	node = node->next;
	if( node && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
	break;
	}

	return 0;
	}



	/* Walk a public keyblock and produce a secret keyblock out of it.
	Instead of inserting the secret key parameters (which we don't
	have), we insert a stub. */
	static KBNODE
	pub_to_sec_keyblock (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE pubnode, secnode;
	KBNODE sec_keyblock = NULL;
	KBNODE walkctx = NULL;

	while((pubnode = walk_kbnode (pub_keyblock,&walkctx,0)))
	{
	if (pubnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| pubnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	/* Make a secret key. We only need to convert enough to
	write the keyblock out. */
	PKT_public_key *pk = pubnode->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	PACKET pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof pkt);
	PKT_secret_key sk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof sk);
	int i, n;

	if (pubnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_KEY;
	else
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY;

	pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk;

	copy_public_parts_to_secret_key ( pk, sk );
	sk->version = pk->version;
	sk->timestamp = pk->timestamp;

	n = pubkey_get_npkey (pk->pubkey_algo);
	if (!n)
	n = 1; /* Unknown number of parameters, however the data
	is stored in the first mpi. */
	for (i=0; i < n; i++ )
	sk->skey[i] = mpi_copy (pk->pkey[i]);

	sk->is_protected = 1;
	sk->protect.s2k.mode = 1001;

	secnode = new_kbnode (pkt);
	}
	else
	{
	secnode = clone_kbnode (pubnode);
	}

	if(!sec_keyblock)
	sec_keyblock = secnode;
	else
	add_kbnode (sec_keyblock, secnode);
	}

	return sec_keyblock;
	}


	/* Walk over the secret keyring SEC_KEYBLOCK and update any simple
	stub keys with the serial number SNNUM of the card if one of the
	fingerprints FPR1, FPR2 or FPR3 match. Print a note if the key is
	a duplicate (may happen in case of backed uped keys).

	Returns: True if anything changed.
	*/
	static int
	update_sec_keyblock_with_cardinfo (KBNODE sec_keyblock,
	const unsigned char *fpr1,
	const unsigned char *fpr2,
	const unsigned char *fpr3,
	const char *serialnostr)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	KBNODE walkctx = NULL;
	PKT_secret_key *sk;
	byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	size_t n;
	int result = 0;
	const char *s;

	while((node = walk_kbnode (sec_keyblock, &walkctx, 0)))
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY
	&& node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	continue;
	sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;

	fingerprint_from_sk (sk, array, &n);
	if (n != 20)
	continue; /* Can't be a card key. */
	if ( !((fpr1 && !memcmp (array, fpr1, 20))
	\|\| (fpr2 && !memcmp (array, fpr2, 20))
	\|\| (fpr3 && !memcmp (array, fpr3, 20))) )
	continue; /* No match. */

	if (sk->is_protected == 1 && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001)
	{
	/* Standard case: migrate that stub to a key stub. */
	sk->protect.s2k.mode = 1002;
	s = serialnostr;
	for (sk->protect.ivlen=0; sk->protect.ivlen < 16 && *s && s[1];
	sk->protect.ivlen++, s += 2)
	sk->protect.iv[sk->protect.ivlen] = xtoi_2 (s);
	result = 1;
	}
	else if (sk->is_protected == 1 && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002)
	{
	s = serialnostr;
	for (sk->protect.ivlen=0; sk->protect.ivlen < 16 && *s && s[1];
	sk->protect.ivlen++, s += 2)
	if (sk->protect.iv[sk->protect.ivlen] != xtoi_2 (s))
	{
	log_info (_("NOTE: a key's S/N does not "
	"match the card's one\n"));
	break;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	log_info (_("NOTE: primary key is online and stored on card\n"));
	else
	log_info (_("NOTE: secondary key is online and stored on card\n"));
	}
	}

	return result;
	}



	/* Check whether a secret key stub exists for the public key PK. If
	not create such a stub key and store it into the secring. If it
	exists, add appropriate subkey stubs and update the secring.
	Return 0 if the key could be created. */
	int
	auto_create_card_key_stub ( const char *serialnostr,
	const unsigned char *fpr1,
	const unsigned char *fpr2,
	const unsigned char *fpr3)
	{
	KBNODE pub_keyblock;
	KBNODE sec_keyblock;
	KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
	int rc;

	/* We only want to do this for an OpenPGP card. */
	if (!serialnostr \|\| strncmp (serialnostr, "D27600012401", 12)
	\|\| strlen (serialnostr) != 32 )
	return G10ERR_GENERAL;

	/* First get the public keyring from any of the provided fingerprints. */
	if ( (fpr1 && !get_keyblock_byfprint (&pub_keyblock, fpr1, 20))
	\|\| (fpr2 && !get_keyblock_byfprint (&pub_keyblock, fpr2, 20))
	\|\| (fpr3 && !get_keyblock_byfprint (&pub_keyblock, fpr3, 20)))
	;
	else
	return G10ERR_GENERAL;

	hd = keydb_new (1);

	/* Now check whether there is a secret keyring. */
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	size_t an;

	fingerprint_from_pk (pk, afp, &an);
	if (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)
	memset (afp+an, 0, MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN-an);
	rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, afp);
	}

	if (!rc)
	{
	rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &sec_keyblock);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
	rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
	}
	else
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (sec_keyblock);

	/* FIXME: We need to add new subkeys first. */
	if (update_sec_keyblock_with_cardinfo (sec_keyblock,
	fpr1, fpr2, fpr3,
	serialnostr))
	{
	rc = keydb_update_keyblock (hd, sec_keyblock );
	if (rc)
	log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
	keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc) );
	}
	}
	}
	else /* A secret key does not exists - create it. */
	{
	sec_keyblock = pub_to_sec_keyblock (pub_keyblock);
	update_sec_keyblock_with_cardinfo (sec_keyblock,
	fpr1, fpr2, fpr3,
	serialnostr);

	rc = keydb_locate_writable (hd, NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("no default secret keyring: %s\n"), g10_errstr (rc));
	rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
	}
	else
	{
	rc = keydb_insert_keyblock (hd, sec_keyblock );
	if (rc)
	log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
	keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc) );
	}
	}

	release_kbnode (sec_keyblock);
	release_kbnode (pub_keyblock);
	keydb_release (hd);
	return rc;
	}
	diff --git a/g10/options.h b/g10/options.h
	index e9c540df7..9b12b7769 100644
	--- a/g10/options.h
	+++ b/g10/options.h
	@@ -1,368 +1,369 @@
	/* options.h
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
	* 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/
	#ifndef G10_OPTIONS_H
	#define G10_OPTIONS_H

	#include <sys/types.h>
	#include <types.h>
	#include "main.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "../common/session-env.h"

	#ifndef EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	/* Norcraft can't cope with common symbols */
	#if defined (__riscos__) && !defined (INCLUDED_BY_MAIN_MODULE)
	#define EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE extern
	#else
	#define EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	#endif
	#endif

	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	struct
	{
	int verbose;
	int quiet;
	unsigned debug;
	int armor;
	char *outfile;
	off_t max_output;
	int dry_run;
	int list_only;
	int textmode;
	int expert;
	const char *def_sig_expire;
	int ask_sig_expire;
	const char *def_cert_expire;
	int ask_cert_expire;
	int batch; /* run in batch mode */
	int answer_yes; /* answer yes on most questions */
	int answer_no; /* answer no on most questions */
	int check_sigs; /* check key signatures */
	int with_colons;
	int with_key_data;
	int with_fingerprint; /* opt --with-fingerprint active */
	int fingerprint; /* list fingerprints */
	int list_sigs; /* list signatures */
	int no_armor;
	int list_packets; /* list-packets mode: 1=normal, 2=invoked by command*/
	int def_cipher_algo;
	int force_v3_sigs;
	int force_v4_certs;
	int force_mdc;
	int disable_mdc;
	int def_digest_algo;
	int cert_digest_algo;
	int compress_algo;
	int compress_level;
	int bz2_compress_level;
	int bz2_decompress_lowmem;
	const char *def_secret_key;
	char *def_recipient;
	int def_recipient_self;
	int def_cert_level;
	int min_cert_level;
	int ask_cert_level;
	int emit_version; /* 0 = none,
	1 = major only,
	2 = major and minor,
	3 = full version,
	4 = full version plus OS string. */
	int marginals_needed;
	int completes_needed;
	int max_cert_depth;
	const char *homedir;
	const char *agent_program;

	/* Options to be passed to the gpg-agent */
	session_env_t session_env;
	char *lc_ctype;
	char *lc_messages;

	int skip_verify;
	int compress_keys;
	int compress_sigs;
	/* TM_CLASSIC must be zero to accomodate trustdbs generated before
	we started storing the trust model inside the trustdb. */
	enum
	{
	TM_CLASSIC=0, TM_PGP=1, TM_EXTERNAL=2, TM_ALWAYS, TM_DIRECT, TM_AUTO
	} trust_model;
	int force_ownertrust;
	enum
	{
	CO_GNUPG, CO_RFC4880, CO_RFC2440, CO_RFC1991, CO_PGP2,
	CO_PGP6, CO_PGP7, CO_PGP8
	} compliance;
	enum
	{
	KF_SHORT, KF_LONG, KF_0xSHORT, KF_0xLONG
	} keyid_format;
	int pgp2_workarounds;
	int shm_coprocess;
	const char *set_filename;
	strlist_t comments;
	int throw_keyid;
	const char *photo_viewer;
	int s2k_mode;
	int s2k_digest_algo;
	int s2k_cipher_algo;
	unsigned char s2k_count; /* This is the encoded form, not the raw
	count */
	int simple_sk_checksum; /* create the deprecated rfc2440 secret key
	protection */
	int not_dash_escaped;
	int escape_from;
	int lock_once;
	struct keyserver_spec
	{
	char *uri;
	char *scheme;
	char *auth;
	char *host;
	char *port;
	char *path;
	char *opaque;
	strlist_t options;
	struct
	{
	unsigned int direct_uri:1;
	} flags;
	struct keyserver_spec *next;
	} *keyserver;
	struct
	{
	unsigned int options;
	unsigned int import_options;
	unsigned int export_options;
	strlist_t other;
	} keyserver_options;
	int exec_disable;
	int exec_path_set;
	unsigned int import_options;
	unsigned int export_options;
	unsigned int list_options;
	unsigned int verify_options;
	const char *def_preference_list;
	const char *def_keyserver_url;
	prefitem_t *personal_cipher_prefs;
	prefitem_t *personal_digest_prefs;
	prefitem_t *personal_compress_prefs;
	int no_perm_warn;
	int no_mdc_warn;
	char *temp_dir;
	int no_encrypt_to;
	int interactive;
	struct notation *sig_notations;
	struct notation *cert_notations;
	strlist_t sig_policy_url;
	strlist_t cert_policy_url;
	strlist_t sig_keyserver_url;
	strlist_t cert_subpackets;
	strlist_t sig_subpackets;
	int allow_non_selfsigned_uid;
	int allow_freeform_uid;
	int no_literal;
	ulong set_filesize;
	int fast_list_mode;
	int ignore_time_conflict;
	int ignore_valid_from;
	int ignore_crc_error;
	int ignore_mdc_error;
	int command_fd;
	const char *override_session_key;
	int show_session_key;

	const char *gpg_agent_info;
	int try_all_secrets;
	int no_expensive_trust_checks;
	int no_sig_cache;
	int no_sig_create_check;
	int no_auto_check_trustdb;
	int preserve_permissions;
	int no_homedir_creation;
	struct groupitem *grouplist;
	int mangle_dos_filenames;
	int enable_progress_filter;
	unsigned int screen_columns;
	unsigned int screen_lines;
	byte *show_subpackets;
	int rfc2440_text;

	/* If true, let write failures on the status-fd exit the process. */
	int exit_on_status_write_error;

	/* If > 0, limit the number of card insertion prompts to this
	value. */
	int limit_card_insert_tries;

	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	/* FIXME: We don't needs this here as it is done in scdaemon. */
	const char ctapi_driver; / Library to access the ctAPI. */
	const char pcsc_driver; / Library to access the PC/SC system. */
	int disable_ccid; /* Disable the use of the internal CCID driver. */
	#endif /ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT/

	struct
	{
	/* If set, require an 0x19 backsig to be present on signatures
	made by signing subkeys. If not set, a missing backsig is not
	an error (but an invalid backsig still is). */
	unsigned int require_cross_cert:1;

	unsigned int use_embedded_filename:1;
	unsigned int utf8_filename:1;
	unsigned int dsa2:1;
	unsigned int allow_multiple_messages:1;
	unsigned int allow_weak_digest_algos:1;
	unsigned int large_rsa:1;
	} flags;

	/* Linked list of ways to find a key if the key isn't on the local
	keyring. */
	struct akl
	{
	enum {
	AKL_NODEFAULT,
	AKL_LOCAL,
	AKL_CERT,
	AKL_PKA,
	AKL_LDAP,
	AKL_KEYSERVER,
	AKL_SPEC
	} type;
	struct keyserver_spec *spec;
	struct akl *next;
	} *auto_key_locate;

	int passphrase_repeat;
	} opt;

	/* CTRL is used to keep some global variables we currently can't
	avoid. Future concurrent versions of gpg will put it into a per
	request structure CTRL. */
	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	struct {
	int in_auto_key_retrieve; /* True if we are doing an
	auto_key_retrieve. */
	} glo_ctrl;

	#define DBG_PACKET_VALUE 1 /* debug packet reading/writing */
	#define DBG_MPI_VALUE 2 /* debug mpi details */
	#define DBG_CIPHER_VALUE 4 /* debug cipher handling */
	/* (may reveal sensitive data) */
	#define DBG_FILTER_VALUE 8 /* debug internal filter handling */
	#define DBG_IOBUF_VALUE 16 /* debug iobuf stuff */
	#define DBG_MEMORY_VALUE 32 /* debug memory allocation stuff */
	#define DBG_CACHE_VALUE 64 /* debug the cacheing */
	#define DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE 128 /* show memory statistics */
	#define DBG_TRUST_VALUE 256 /* debug the trustdb */
	#define DBG_HASHING_VALUE 512 /* debug hashing operations */
	#define DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE 1024 /* debug external program calls */
	#define DBG_CARD_IO_VALUE 2048 /* debug smart card I/O. */

	/* Fixme: For now alias this value. */
	#define DBG_ASSUAN_VALUE DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE


	/* Tests for the debugging flags. */
	#define DBG_PACKET (opt.debug & DBG_PACKET_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CIPHER (opt.debug & DBG_CIPHER_VALUE)
	#define DBG_FILTER (opt.debug & DBG_FILTER_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CACHE (opt.debug & DBG_CACHE_VALUE)
	#define DBG_TRUST (opt.debug & DBG_TRUST_VALUE)
	#define DBG_HASHING (opt.debug & DBG_HASHING_VALUE)
	#define DBG_EXTPROG (opt.debug & DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CARD_IO (opt.debug & DBG_CARD_IO_VALUE)
	#define DBG_ASSUAN (opt.debug & DBG_ASSUAN_VALUE)

	/* FIXME: We need to check whey we did not put this into opt. */
	#define DBG_MEMORY memory_debug_mode
	#define DBG_MEMSTAT memory_stat_debug_mode

	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE int memory_debug_mode;
	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE int memory_stat_debug_mode;



	#define GNUPG (opt.compliance==CO_GNUPG)
	#define RFC1991 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC1991 \|\| opt.compliance==CO_PGP2)
	#define RFC2440 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC2440)
	#define RFC4880 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC4880)
	#define PGP2 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP2)
	#define PGP6 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP6)
	#define PGP7 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP7)
	#define PGP8 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP8)
	#define PGPX (PGP2 \|\| PGP6 \|\| PGP7 \|\| PGP8)

	/* Various option flags. Note that there should be no common string
	names between the IMPORT_ and EXPORT_ flags as they can be mixed in
	the keyserver-options option. */

	#define IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS (1<<0)
	#define IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG (1<<1)
	#define IMPORT_FAST (1<<2)
	#define IMPORT_SK2PK (1<<3)
	#define IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY (1<<4)
	#define IMPORT_MINIMAL (1<<5)
	#define IMPORT_CLEAN (1<<6)
	#define IMPORT_NO_SECKEY (1<<7)
	+#define IMPORT_KEEP_OWNERTTRUST (1<<8)

	#define EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS (1<<0)
	#define EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES (1<<1)
	#define EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS (1<<2)
	#define EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD (1<<3)
	#define EXPORT_MINIMAL (1<<4)
	#define EXPORT_CLEAN (1<<5)
	#define EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT (1<<6)

	#define LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS (1<<0)
	#define LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS (1<<1)
	#define LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS (1<<2)
	#define LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS (1<<3)
	#define LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS (LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS\|LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)
	#define LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS (1<<4)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY (1<<5)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS (1<<6)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS (1<<7)
	#define LIST_SHOW_KEYRING (1<<8)
	#define LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE (1<<9)
	#define LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS (1<<10)

	#define VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS (1<<0)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS (1<<1)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS (1<<2)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS (1<<3)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS (VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS\|VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS (1<<4)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY (1<<5)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS (1<<6)
	#define VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS (1<<7)
	#define VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE (1<<8)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY (1<<9)

	#define KEYSERVER_USE_TEMP_FILES (1<<0)
	#define KEYSERVER_KEEP_TEMP_FILES (1<<1)
	#define KEYSERVER_ADD_FAKE_V3 (1<<2)
	#define KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE (1<<3)
	#define KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL (1<<4)
	#define KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD (1<<5)

	#endif /G10_OPTIONS_H/

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