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	diff --git a/misc/id/openpgp-webkey-service/draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-21.txt b/misc/id/openpgp-webkey-service/draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-21.txt
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	+
	+
	+
	+
	+Network Working Group W. Koch
	+Internet-Draft g10 Code GmbH
	+Intended status: Informational 24 November 2025
	+Expires: 28 May 2026
	+
	+
	+ OpenPGP Web Key Directory
	+ draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-21
	+
	+Abstract
	+
	+ This specification describes a service to locate OpenPGP and LibrePGP
	+ keys by mail address using a Web service and the HTTPS protocol. It
	+ also provides a method for secure communication between the key owner
	+ and the mail provider to publish and revoke the public key.
	+
	+Status of This Memo
	+
	+ This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	+ provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	+
	+ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	+ Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	+ working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	+ Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	+
	+ Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	+ and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	+ time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	+ material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	+
	+ This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 May 2026.
	+
	+Copyright Notice
	+
	+ Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	+ document authors. All rights reserved.
	+
	+ This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	+ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
	+ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
	+ Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
	+ and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
	+ extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
	+ described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
	+ provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+Koch Expires 28 May 2026 [Page 1]
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	+
	+
	+Table of Contents
	+
	+ 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	+ 2. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	+ 3. Web Key Directory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	+ 3.1. Key Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	+ 4. Web Key Directory Update Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	+ 4.1. The Submission Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	+ 4.2. The Submission Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	+ 4.3. The Confirmation Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	+ 4.4. The Confirmation Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	+ 4.5. Policy Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	+ 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	+ 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	+ 6.1. Well-Known URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	+ 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	+ 8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	+ Appendix A. Sample Protocol Run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	+ A.1. Sample Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	+ A.2. Sample Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	+ Appendix B. Changes Since -14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	+ Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	+
	+1. Introduction
	+
	+ This memo describes a method to associate OpenPGP keys with a mail
	+ address and how to look them up using a web service with a well-known
	+ URI. In addition a mail based protocol is given to allow a client to
	+ setup such an association and to maintain it.
	+
	+2. Notational Conventions
	+
	+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	+ "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	+ document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
	+
	+3. Web Key Directory
	+
	+ A major use case for OpenPGP is the encryption of mail. A common
	+ difficulty of sending encrypted mails to a new communication partner
	+ is to find the appropriate public key of the recipient. Unless an
	+ off-channel key exchange has been done, there are no easy ways to
	+ discover the required key. The common practice is to search the
	+ network of public key servers for a key matching the recipient's mail
	+ address. This practise bears the problem that the keyservers are not
	+ able to give a positive confirmation that a key actually belongs to
	+ the mail addresses given in the key. Further, there are often
	+ several keys matching a mail address and thus one needs to pick a key
	+
	+
	+
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	+
	+
	+ on good luck. This is clearly not a secure way to setup an end-to-
	+ end encryption. Even if the need for a trusted key for an initial
	+ mail message is relinquished, a non-authenticated key may be a wrong
	+ one and the actual recipient would receive a mail which she can't
	+ decrypt, due to the use of a wrong key.
	+
	+ Methods to overcome this problem are
	+
	+ * sending an initial unencrypted message with the public key
	+ attached,
	+
	+ * using the OpenPGP DANE protocol to lookup the recipients key via
	+ the DNS.
	+
	+ The first method has the obvious problems of not even trying to
	+ encrypt the initial mail, an extra mail round-trip, and problems with
	+ unattended key discovery.
	+
	+ The latter method works fine but requires that mail providers need to
	+ set up a separate DNS resolver to provide the key. The
	+ administration of a DNS zone is often not in the hands of small mail
	+ installations. Thus an update of the DNS resource records needs to
	+ be delegated to the ISP running the DNS service. Further, DNS
	+ lookups are not encrypted and missing all confidentially. Even if
	+ the participating MUAs are using STARTTLS to encrypt the mail
	+ exchange, a DNS lookup for the key unnecessarily identifies the
	+ local-part of the recipients mail address to any passive
	+ eavesdroppers.
	+
	+ This memo specified a new method for key discovery using an encrypted
	+ https connection.
	+
	+3.1. Key Discovery
	+
	+ Although URIs are able to encode all kind of characters,
	+ straightforward implementations of a key directory may want to store
	+ the local-part of a mail address directly in the file system. This
	+ forbids the use of certain characters in the local-part. To allow
	+ for such an implementation method the URI uses an encoded form of the
	+ local-part which can be directly mapped to a file name.
	+
	+ OpenPGP defines its User IDs, and thus the mail address, as UTF-8
	+ strings. To help with the common pattern of using capitalized names
	+ (e.g. "Joe.Doe@example.org") for mail addresses, and under the
	+ premise that almost all MTAs treat the local-part case-insensitive
	+ and that the domain-part is required to be compared case-insensitive
	+ anyway, all upper-case ASCII characters in a User ID are mapped to
	+ lowercase. Non-ASCII characters are not changed.
	+
	+
	+
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	+
	+
	+ The so mapped local-part is hashed using the SHA-1 algorithm. The
	+ resulting 160 bit digest is encoded using the Z-Base-32 method as
	+ described in [RFC6189], section 5.1.6. The resulting string has a
	+ fixed length of 32 octets.
	+
	+ There are two variants on how to form the request URI: The advanced
	+ and the direct method. Implementations MUST first try the advanced
	+ method. Only if an address for the required sub-domain does not
	+ exist, they SHOULD fall back to the direct method. A non-responding
	+ server does not mean that the fall back should be carried out.
	+
	+ The advanced method requires that a sub-domain with the fixed name
	+ openpgpkey is created and queried. The URI is constructed by
	+ concatenating these items:
	+
	+ * The scheme https://,
	+
	+ * the string openpgpkey,
	+
	+ * the domain-part,
	+
	+ * the string /.well-known/openpgpkey/,
	+
	+ * the domain-part in lowercase,
	+
	+ * the string /hu/,
	+
	+ * the above constructed 32 octet string,
	+
	+ * the unchanged local-part as a parameter with name l using proper
	+ percent escaping.
	+
	+ An example for such an advanced method URI to lookup the key for
	+ Joe.Doe@Example.ORG is:
	+
	+ https://openpgpkey.example.org/.well-known/openpgpkey/
	+ example.org/hu/iy9q119eutrkn8s1mk4r39qejnbu3n5q?l=Joe.Doe
	+
	+ (line has been wrapped for rendering purposes)
	+
	+ The direct method requires no additional DNS entries and constructs
	+ the URI by concatenating these items:
	+
	+ * The scheme https://,
	+
	+ * the domain-part,
	+
	+ * the string /.well-known/openpgpkey/hu/,
	+
	+
	+
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	+
	+ * the above constructed 32 octet string,
	+
	+ * the unchanged local-part as a parameter with name l using proper
	+ percent escaping.
	+
	+ Example for a direct method URI:
	+
	+ https://example.org/.well-known/openpgpkey/
	+ hu/iy9q119eutrkn8s1mk4r39qejnbu3n5q?l=Joe.Doe
	+
	+ (line has been wrapped for rendering purposes)
	+
	+ Sites which do not use the advanced method but employ wildcard DNS
	+ for their sub-domains MUST make sure that the openpgpkey sub-domain
	+ is not subject to the wildcarding. This can be done by inserting an
	+ empty TXT RR for this sub-domain.
	+
	+ The HTTP GET method MUST return the binary representation of the
	+ OpenPGP key for the given mail address. The key needs to carry a
	+ User ID packet ([RFC4880]) with that mail address. Note that the key
	+ may be revoked or expired - it is up to the client to handle such
	+ conditions. To ease distribution of revoked keys, a server may
	+ return revoked keys in addition to a new key. The keys are returned
	+ by a single request as concatenated key blocks.
	+
	+ The server MUST accept the HTTP HEAD method to allow a client to
	+ check for the existence of a key.
	+
	+ The server SHOULD use "application/octet-stream" as the Content-Type
	+ for the data but clients SHOULD also accept any other Content-Type.
	+ The server SHOULD NOT return an ASCII armored version of the key.
	+
	+ The server MUST serve a Policy Flags file as specified below. That
	+ file is even required if the Web Key Directory Update Protocol is not
	+ supported.
	+
	+ The benefit of the advanced method is its greater flexibility in
	+ setting up the Web Key Directory in environments where more than one
	+ mail domain is hosted. DNS SRV resource records, as used in earlier
	+ specifications of this protocol, posed a problem for implementations
	+ which have only limited access to DNS resolvers. Note that the
	+ direct method allows to provide a Web Key Directory without any DNS
	+ changes.
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
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	+
	+
	+4. Web Key Directory Update Protocol
	+
	+ To put keys into the key directory a protocol to automate the task is
	+ desirable. The protocol defined here is entirely based on mail and
	+ the assumption that a mail provider can securely deliver mail to the
	+ INBOX of a user (e.g. an IMAP folder). Note that the same protocol
	+ may also be used for submitting keys for use with OpenPGP DANE.
	+
	+ In the following sections the term "target key" denotes the to be
	+ published key, the term "submission key" the key associated with the
	+ submission-address of the mail provider. The string "WELLKNOWN"
	+ denotes the first part of an URI specific for a domain. In the
	+ examples the domain "example.org" is assumed, thus:
	+
	+ WELLKNOWN := https://openpgpkey.example.org/.well-known/
	+ openpgpkey/example.org
	+
	+ (line has been wrapped for rendering purposes)
	+
	+ or if the sub-domain openpgpkey does not exist (direct method):
	+
	+ WELLKNOWN := https://example.org/.well-known/openpgpkey
	+
	+ We assume that the user already created a key for her mail account
	+ alice@example.org. To install the key at her provider's Web Key
	+ Directory, she performs the following steps:
	+
	+ 1. She retrieves a file which contains one line with the mail
	+ address used to submit the key to the mail provider. See below
	+ for the syntax of that file. For a mail address at the domain
	+ "example.org" the URI of the file is
	+
	+ WELLKNOWN/submission-address
	+
	+ 2. She sends her key using SMTP (or any other transport mechanism)
	+ to the provider using the submission address and key format as
	+ specified by PGP/MIME.
	+
	+ 3. The provider checks that the received key has a User ID which
	+ matches an account name of the provider.
	+
	+ 4. The provider sends an encrypted message containing a nonce and
	+ the fingerprint of the key to the mail account of the user. Note
	+ that a similar scheme is used by the well known caff(1) tool to
	+ help with key signing parties.
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
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	+
	+ 5. A legitimate user will be able to decrypt the message because she
	+ created the key and is in charge of the private key. This step
	+ verifies that the submitted key has actually been created by the
	+ owner of the account.
	+
	+ 6. The user sends the decrypted nonce back to the submission address
	+ as a confirmation that the private key is owned by her and that
	+ the provider may now publish the key. The confirmation mail to
	+ the provider MUST be encrypted using the provider's public key as
	+ retrieved using the key lookup protocol described above.
	+
	+ 7. The provider receives the nonce, matches it with its database of
	+ pending confirmations and then publishes the key. Finally the
	+ provider sends a mail back to the user to notify her of the
	+ publication of her key.
	+
	+ The message data structures used for the above protocol are specified
	+ in detail below.
	+
	+4.1. The Submission Address
	+
	+ The address of the submission file is
	+
	+ WELLKNOWN/submission-address
	+
	+ The file consists of exactly one line, terminated by a LF, or the
	+ sequence of CR and LF, with the full mail address to be used for
	+ submission of a key to the mail provider. For example the content of
	+ the file may be
	+
	+ key-submission-example.org@directory.example.org
	+
	+4.2. The Submission Mail
	+
	+ The mail used to submit a key to the mail provider MUST comply to the
	+ PGP/MIME specification ([RFC3156], section 7), which states that the
	+ Content-Type must be "application/pgp-keys", there are no required or
	+ optional parameters, and the body part contains the ASCII-armored
	+ transferable Public Key Packets as defined in [RFC4880], section
	+ 11.1.
	+
	+ The mail provider MUST publish a key capable of signing and
	+ encryption for the submission-address in the Web Key Directory or via
	+ DANE. The key to be published MUST be submitted using a PGP/MIME
	+ encrypted message ([RFC3156], section 4). The message MUST NOT be
	+ signed (because the authenticity of the signing key has not yet been
	+ confirmed). After decryption of the message at the mail provider a
	+ single "application/pgp-keys" part, as specified above, is expected.
	+
	+
	+
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	+
	+4.3. The Confirmation Request
	+
	+ The mail provider sends a confirmation mail in response to a received
	+ key publication request. The message MUST be sent from the
	+ submission-address of the mail provider to the mail address extracted
	+ from the target key. The message needs to be a PGP/MIME signed
	+ message using the submission key of the provider for the signature.
	+ The signed message MUST have two parts:
	+
	+ The first part MUST have "text" as its Content-Type and can be used
	+ to explain the purpose of the mail. For example it may point to this
	+ specification and explain on how to manually perform the protocol.
	+ By evaluating the Content-Language header of the request the provider
	+ may send back a localized version.
	+
	+ The second part MUST have a Content-Type of "application/
	+ vnd.gnupg.wkd" and carry an OpenPGP encrypted message in ASCII Armor
	+ format. If the protocol version is unknown or less than 5 the
	+ Content-Type "application/vnd.gnupg.wks" MUST be used for backward
	+ compatibility. The message MUST be encrypted to the target key and
	+ MUST NOT be signed. After decryption a text file in the Web Key data
	+ format must be yielded.
	+
	+ That data format consists of name-value pairs with one name-value
	+ pair per LF or CR+LF terminated line. Empty lines are allowed and
	+ will be ignored by the receiver. A colon is used to terminate a
	+ name.
	+
	+ In a confirmation request the following names MUST be send in the
	+ specified order:
	+
	+ * "type": The value must be "confirmation-request".
	+
	+ * "sender": This is the mailbox the user is expected to sent the
	+ confirmation response to. The value must match the mailbox part
	+ of the "From:" address of this request. Exactly one address MUST
	+ be given.
	+
	+ * "address": The value is the addr-spec part of the target key's
	+ mail address. The value SHOULD match the addr-spec part of the
	+ recipient's address. The value MUST be UTF-8 encoded as required
	+ for an OpenPGP User ID.
	+
	+ * "fingerprint": The value is the fingerprint of the target key.
	+ The fingerprint is given in uppercase hex encoding without any
	+ interleaving spaces.
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
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	+
	+ * "nonce": The value is a string with a minimum length of 16 octets
	+ and a maximum length of 64 octets. The string must entirely be
	+ made up of random ASCII letters or digits. This nonce will be
	+ sent back to the mail provider as proof that the recipient is the
	+ legitimate owner of the target-key.
	+
	+ The receiver of that message is expected to verify the outer
	+ signature and disregard the entire message if it can't be verified or
	+ has not been signed by the key associated with the submission
	+ address.
	+
	+ After the message has been verified the receiver decrypts the second
	+ part of the signed message, checks that the "fingerprint" matches the
	+ target key, checks that the "address" matches a User ID of the target
	+ key, and checks the other constrains of the request format. If any
	+ constraint is not asserted, or the fingerprint or User ID do not
	+ match the target key, or there is no pending publication requests
	+ (i.e. a mail recently sent to the submission address), the user MAY
	+ be notified about this fake confirmation attempt.
	+
	+ In other cases the confirmation request is legitimate and the MUA
	+ shall silently send a response as described in the next section.
	+
	+ The rationale for the outer signature used with this request is to
	+ allow early detection of spam mails. This can be done prior to the
	+ decryption step and avoids asking the user to enter a passphrase to
	+ perform the decryption for a non-legitimate message. The use of a
	+ simple encrypted attachment, instead of using PGP/MIME encryption, is
	+ to convey the Content-Type of that attachment in the clear and also
	+ to prevent automatic decryption of that attachment by PGP/MIME aware
	+ clients. The MUA may in fact detect this confirmation request and
	+ present a customized dialog for confirming that request.
	+
	+4.4. The Confirmation Response
	+
	+ A response to a confirmation request MUST only be send in the
	+ positive case; there is no negative confirmation response. A mail
	+ service provider is expected to cancel a pending key submission after
	+ a suitable time without a confirmation. The mail service provider
	+ SHOULD NOT retry the sending of a confirmation request after the
	+ first request has been send successfully.
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
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	+
	+ The user MUST send the confirmation response from her target mail
	+ address to the "from" address of the confirmation request. The
	+ message MUST be signed and encrypted using the PGP/MIME Combined
	+ format ([RFC3156], section 6.2). The signing key is the target key
	+ and the encryption key is the key associated with the provider's
	+ submission address. The server MAY verify the signature and silently
	+ discard the message if it is not found to be valid;
	+
	+ The Content-Type used for the plaintext message MUST match the
	+ Content-Type of the request. The format is the same as described
	+ above for the Confirmation Request. The body must contain four name-
	+ value pairs in this order:
	+
	+ * "type": The value must be "confirmation-response".
	+
	+ * "sender": The value is the value of the "sender" parameter from
	+ the confirmation request.
	+
	+ * "address": The value is the value of the "address" parameter from
	+ the confirmation request.
	+
	+ * "nonce": The value is the value of the "nonce" parameter from the
	+ confirmation request.
	+
	+ The server MUST check the "nonce" against the one sent in the request
	+ and publish the key only if the nonce matches and has not been re-
	+ used.
	+
	+4.5. Policy Flags
	+
	+ For key generation and submission it is useful to tell the client
	+ about certain properties of the mail provider in advance. This can
	+ be done with a file at the URL
	+
	+ WELLKNOWN/policy
	+
	+ A site supporting the Web Key Directory MUST serve this file; it is
	+ sufficient if that file has a zero length. Clients may use this file
	+ to check for Web Key Directory support.
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
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	+
	+ The file contains keywords and optionally values, one per line with
	+ each line terminated by a LF or the sequence of CR and LF. Empty
	+ lines and lines starting with a '#' character are considered comment
	+ lines. A keyword is made up of lowercase letters, digits, hyphens,
	+ or dots. An underscore is allowed as a name space delimiters; see
	+ below. The first character must be a letter. Keywords which are
	+ defined to require a value are directly followed by a colon and then
	+ after optional white space the value. Clients MUST use case-
	+ insensitive matching for the keyword.
	+
	+ Currently defined keywords are:
	+
	+ * "mailbox-only": The mail server provider does only accept keys
	+ with only a mailbox in the User ID. In particular User IDs with a
	+ real name in addition to the mailbox will be rejected as invalid.
	+
	+ * "dane-only": The mail server provider does not run a Web Key
	+ Directory but only an OpenPGP DANE service. The Web Key Directory
	+ Update protocol is used to update the keys for the DANE service.
	+ The use of this keyword is deprecated.
	+
	+ * "auth-submit": The submission of the mail to the server is done
	+ using an authenticated connection. Thus the submitted key will be
	+ published immediately without any confirmation request.
	+
	+ * "protocol-version": This keyword can be used to explicitly claim
	+ the support of a specific version of the Web Key Directory update
	+ protocol. This is in general not needed but implementations may
	+ have workarounds for providers which only support an old protocol
	+ version. If these providers update to a newer version they should
	+ add this keyword so that the implementation can disable the
	+ workaround. The value is an integer corresponding to the
	+ respective draft revision number.
	+
	+ * "submission-address": An alternative way to specify the submission
	+ address. The value is the addr-spec part of the address to send
	+ requests to this server. If this keyword is used in addition to
	+ the submission-address file, both MUST have the same value.
	+
	+ More keywords will be defined in updates to this I-D. There is no
	+ registry except for this document. For experimental use of new
	+ features or for provider specific settings, keywords MUST be prefixed
	+ with a domain name and an underscore.
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
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	+
	+5. Security Considerations
	+
	+ The use of SHA-1 for the mapping of the local-part to a fixed string
	+ is not a security feature but merely used to map the local-part to a
	+ fixed-sized string made from a well defined set of characters. It is
	+ not intended to conceal information about a mail address.
	+
	+ The domain name part of the mail address is not part of the hash to
	+ avoid problems with internationalized domain names. Instead a
	+ separate URL is required for each domain name.
	+
	+ To make it a bit harder to test for published keys, the server
	+ responsible to serve the WELLKNOWN directory SHOULD NOT create an
	+ index file for that directory or any sub-directory.
	+
	+ The mail provider MUST make sure to publish a key in a way that only
	+ the mail address belonging to the requested user is part of the User
	+ ID packets included in the returned key. Other User ID packets and
	+ their associated binding signatures MUST be removed before
	+ publication. Confirmation requests MUST only be send for such to be
	+ published User ID. It is further recommended that a client filters a
	+ received key or a key send for a publication requests so that only
	+ the specific User ID with the mail address of the provider is
	+ imported or send.
	+
	+ A client MUST NOT accept a HTTP authentication challenge (HTTP code
	+ 401) because the information in the Web Key Directory is public and
	+ needs no authentication. Allowing an authentication challenge has
	+ the problem to easily confuse a user with a password prompt and
	+ tricking him into falsely entering the passphrase used to protect his
	+ private key or to login to his mail provider.
	+
	+ The use of DNS SRV records as specified in former revisions of this
	+ document reduces the certainty that a mail address belongs to a
	+ domain. For example an attacker may change the target to a host in a
	+ sub-domain under their control and thus gain full control over all
	+ keys.
	+
	+6. IANA Considerations
	+
	+6.1. Well-Known URI
	+
	+ IANA is requested to assign a well-known URI in the "Well-Known URIs"
	+ registry as defined by [RFC8615]:
	+
	+ URI suffix: openpgpkey
	+
	+ Change controller: IETF
	+
	+
	+
	+Koch Expires 28 May 2026 [Page 12]
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	+
	+
	+ Specification document: This
	+
	+7. Acknowledgments
	+
	+ The author would like to acknowledge the help of the individuals who
	+ kindly voiced their opinions on the GnuPG mailing lists, in
	+ particular, the help of Bernhard Reiter and Guilhem Moulin.
	+
	+8. Normative References
	+
	+ [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	+ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	+ DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
	+
	+ [RFC3156] Elkins, M., Del Torto, D., Levien, R., and T. Roessler,
	+ "MIME Security with OpenPGP", RFC 3156,
	+ DOI 10.17487/RFC3156, August 2001,
	+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3156>.
	+
	+ [RFC4880] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.
	+ Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880,
	+ DOI 10.17487/RFC4880, November 2007,
	+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4880>.
	+
	+ [RFC6189] Zimmermann, P., Johnston, A., Ed., and J. Callas, "ZRTP:
	+ Media Path Key Agreement for Unicast Secure RTP",
	+ RFC 6189, DOI 10.17487/RFC6189, April 2011,
	+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6189>.
	+
	+ [RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
	+ (URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
	+ <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8615>.
	+
	+Appendix A. Sample Protocol Run
	+
	+ The following non-normative example can be used by implementors as
	+ guidance.
	+
	+ Note that GnuPG version 2.1.12 supports the key discovery described
	+ in version -00 of this document (auto-key-locate method "wkd").
	+ Version 2.1.16 can run the protocol described in this document but is
	+ also able to run the protocol version specified by -01. For backward
	+ compatibility this example uses the Content-Type as required for
	+ versions of this protocol prior to -04; if the client knows that the
	+ server support -04 "vnd.gnupg.wkd" should be used.
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+Koch Expires 28 May 2026 [Page 13]
	+
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	+
	+
	+A.1. Sample Keys
	+
	+ This is the provider's submission key:
	+
	+ -----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
	+
	+ lFgEV/TAohYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAB/k9YQfSTI8qQqqK1KimH/BsvzsowWItSQPT
	+ FP+fOC4AAP46uJ3Snno3Vy+kORye3rf0VvWvuz82voEQLxG6WpfHhREEtBprZXkt
	+ c3VibWlzc2lvbkBleGFtcGxlLm5ldIh5BBMWCAAhBQJX9MCiAhsDBQsJCAcCBhUI
	+ CQoLAgQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEKhtNooW0cqEWMUA/0e9XaeptszWC9ZvPg8INL6a
	+ BvRqPBYGU7PGmuXsxBovAQDyckOykG0UAfHVyN1w4gSK/biMcnqVr857i8/HuvjW
	+ C5xdBFf0wKISCisGAQQBl1UBBQEBB0Apvaoe4MtSEJ1fpds/4DFl2kXXBpnVji/s
	+ Wg9btdthNQMBCAcAAP9FJX99T1LEJzBnvBBnc6bimnT6/1OKM9RdO4R0/uVP6BFL
	+ iGEEGBYIAAkFAlf0wKICGwwACgkQqG02ihbRyoTlGwD9FBr92osjL7HkhhZZ7Z2D
	+ My3b9zpoZeMjvPg5YPqpdKMA/jhZoHuZCRMBYf7YRFb8aXtuyetDFZYrkjnum+OG
	+ HFAD
	+ =Hnwd
	+ -----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
	+
	+ This is the target key to be published:
	+
	+ -----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
	+
	+ lFgEV2o9XRYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAZ8zkuQDL9x7rcvvoo6s3iEF1j88Dknd9nZhL
	+ nTEoBRkAAP94nCZMM4WY2IORXfM6phLGSz3RsHvs/vA1Opaus4+R3BKJtBtwYXRy
	+ aWNlLmx1bXVtYmFAZXhhbXBsZS5uZXSIeQQTFggAIQUCV2o9XQIbAwULCQgHAgYV
	+ CAkKCwIEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAAKCRATlWNoKgINCpkNAQDFDcwJUzsxu7aJUiPdpYXj
	+ 4uVarrXakxEE8mGFotWhLAD9GH4rqLDYIE3NKEU0s+Okt4tEIwJaV8H1NNPPPMiK
	+ 3g2cXQRXaj2NEgorBgEEAZdVAQUBAQdAFnnmZc99TuKk5iCq9wmYZUVF2RcXN2Cs
	+ qAl8iGQQUWsDAQgHAAD/VN/VGmlcwGBPcLTya2hfU4t37nMcFCKdNSXjJ5DFA0AP
	+ PohhBBgWCAAJBQJXaj2NAhsMAAoJEBOVY2gqAg0Ky4UA/0GmVaXzXemLvv1Xw4yx
	+ Eaz/KfKKGc4RJ+38fyqUzw8NAQCohQ+ki3I5f84EXLZEiUiLsnVtOn1HNxvND/gW
	+ TiFZBA==
	+ =GHi7
	+ -----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
	+
	+A.2. Sample Messages
	+
	+ The first message triggers the publication requests.
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+Koch Expires 28 May 2026 [Page 14]
	+
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	+
	+
	+ From: patrice.lumumba@example.net
	+ To: key-submission@example.net
	+ Subject: Key publishing request
	+ MIME-Version: 1.0
	+ Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;
	+ protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";
	+ boundary="=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-="
	+ Date: Wed, 05 Oct 2016 10:15:51 +0000
	+
	+
	+ --=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-=
	+ Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted
	+
	+ Version: 1
	+
	+ --=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-=
	+ Content-Type: application/octet-stream
	+
	+ -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
	+
	+ hF4DUgLY5tvmW2sSAQdAR1AcqvFpQe/fHRZbf0xcnl9Tb+AtwaX2yZnZXGELGHsw
	+ 1/e3E0JptwM5tpRAVe71ooF8Zq4jl76ZgQKfj/SyjpLJxyoEDy2N5wTQaqW4JtML
	+ 0ukB1vh7dIRDxBJX/LQIJC0wz8o1Q3vjcLJKFFvDb7YrerABpPIzwOAupcgIbQHj
	+ 5m1+2WU5CL8ffyJy2h1jV2X4OnvWF1Sn6J6SVD6DfZpOPRt9TxSemJrN1LJ3lG0N
	+ ts8AuYmCOeC1H2r5TYyxqkC98JF8+Nvyxd/fwne8IOjK9uixkNMC5H9/ZOH0YWCb
	+ wBnNB4iXuym4OIPxiLkDymsVF0ww/XrODE9Y259EGmO45VFNrJAX3HFs9/PcMCVk
	+ n2qMyEkr8LHiXeEPun6Z54RHUPYv2cUkEZ0hhSJ+rtBxkc/5D/cAScCEXRKFSKEF
	+ jLJAvLK/u/ga5DAzVai+vh6b6Bq+YVPaD9GWMhWj4CgR90p9LULi6S/Hzwhv9Wzf
	+ 8fJoJOaDjyvRDgr09jYLWamxkS9NWxqwy6MXJvxwbNdd5XtqiW4Y4o0Ll1hDJhxR
	+ ljn/XvotXKwhKN+4QGhIXDVt4Dl4XxS5ptWfVTau8W8DYqDsU2obEcfsirZv53M1
	+ Q9FCD8CD9+dkBt8VAJekCWVhEltcRHxlrznbk2jxm93xSD2o6gZ5X0VSaSUXyEhm
	+ J+8F3gyTHGgbq/TgyjFoockWh5EtGgAFuWvmPJCF5PO/UaNeoKwgwSJBu6oTXkHx
	+ R4nvvMRcj5UgTsKpZ79NiDQukbjG5ScNT5TCUiiZsBXBqBx3fD61EH6cAuh4P3Kr
	+ iM7PY4fwAHo890Dx+Qlt
	+ =WIhx
	+ -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
	+
	+ --=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-=--
	+
	+ The server decrypts this message to
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+Koch Expires 28 May 2026 [Page 15]
	+
	+Internet-Draft OpenPGP Web Key Directory November 2025
	+
	+
	+ Content-Type: application/pgp-keys
	+
	+ -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
	+
	+ mDMEV2o9XRYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAZ8zkuQDL9x7rcvvoo6s3iEF1j88Dknd9nZhL
	+ nTEoBRm0G3BhdHJpY2UubHVtdW1iYUBleGFtcGxlLm5ldIh5BBMWCAAhBQJXaj1d
	+ AhsDBQsJCAcCBhUICQoLAgQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEBOVY2gqAg0KmQ0BAMUNzAlT
	+ OzG7tolSI92lhePi5VqutdqTEQTyYYWi1aEsAP0YfiuosNggTc0oRTSz46S3i0Qj
	+ AlpXwfU00888yIreDbg4BFdqPY0SCisGAQQBl1UBBQEBB0AWeeZlz31O4qTmIKr3
	+ CZhlRUXZFxc3YKyoCXyIZBBRawMBCAeIYQQYFggACQUCV2o9jQIbDAAKCRATlWNo
	+ KgINCsuFAP9BplWl813pi779V8OMsRGs/ynyihnOESft/H8qlM8PDQEAqIUPpIty
	+ OX/OBFy2RIlIi7J1bTp9RzcbzQ/4Fk4hWQQ=
	+ =qRfF
	+ -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
	+
	+ and returns this confirmation request
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+Koch Expires 28 May 2026 [Page 16]
	+
	+Internet-Draft OpenPGP Web Key Directory November 2025
	+
	+
	+ From: key-submission@example.net
	+ To: patrice.lumumba@example.net
	+ Subject: Confirm your key publication
	+ MIME-Version: 1.0
	+ Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;
	+ protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";
	+ boundary="=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-="
	+ Date: Wed, 05 Oct 2016 10:16:57 +0000
	+
	+
	+ --=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-=
	+ Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted
	+
	+ Version: 1
	+
	+ --=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-=
	+ Content-Type: application/octet-stream
	+
	+ -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
	+
	+ hF4DkYWHjk/NdMASAQdAluQeqhECpU2T0zEyBAEbFzhLkpubN160wjkFCrtUc0Mw
	+ FwYgM2fp9cvTMdJ/xjkvmAcIEOT4AY/hn1yFQ4z0KG0gCkSac+8mkDylnPdxlXYw
	+ 0sBSAXlbqpVA7eUpFuU2Zs10zbIXxlwe6osR5wUIJut/RCOsYQmfvxC55x8mUX5/
	+ zgTnNzlMzye5ws4pTgAeQm2x0Yv018L8IZgY5KxwJLBzlss0wLZ45ZcS80hR11Fx
	+ NCow1fKF8lMnOJxagTEOih807nctz8vT5bR1gx0d7N3LM+th8nAg9/6Ghf1XTpLo
	+ MzwGW0FtOG7Dg1Uxbw2bjaOuRBeh6IIpmNAw1pmIfnNu7PpoRydU5w1K/R8MT06z
	+ MKdJ7IW5mVGes9EGnG3e4mjuILvNaZhfYy+a73IhDSaPm3oqdl1Qx7tbNg6lGjn6
	+ KStCYAcPGPp3m7aWkfsPGThOVRhEXqaFFywfwSVEj1pdIRjDFA==
	+ =Cdjh
	+ -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
	+
	+ --=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-=--
	+
	+ The client decrypts this PGP/MIME message as
	+
	+ Content-Type: application/vnd.gnupg.wks
	+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
	+
	+ type: confirmation-request
	+ sender: key-submission@example.net
	+ address: patrice.lumumba@example.net
	+ fingerprint: B21DEAB4F875FB3DA42F1D1D139563682A020D0A
	+ nonce: f5pscz57zj6fk11wekk8gx4cmrb659a7
	+
	+ creates this response
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+Koch Expires 28 May 2026 [Page 17]
	+
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	+
	+
	+ Content-Type: application/vnd.gnupg.wks
	+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
	+
	+ type: confirmation-response
	+ sender: key-submission@example.net
	+ address: patrice.lumumba@example.net
	+ nonce: f5pscz57zj6fk11wekk8gx4cmrb659a7
	+
	+ and sends it PGP/MIME Combined signed and encrypted to the server
	+
	+ From: patrice.lumumba@example.net
	+ To: key-submission@example.net
	+ Subject: Key publication confirmation
	+ MIME-Version: 1.0
	+ Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;
	+ protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";
	+ boundary="=-=01-iacqg4og4pqz11a5cg1o=-="
	+ Date: Wed, 05 Oct 2016 10:18:52 +0000
	+
	+
	+ --=-=01-iacqg4og4pqz11a5cg1o=-=
	+ Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted
	+
	+ Version: 1
	+
	+ --=-=01-iacqg4og4pqz11a5cg1o=-=
	+ Content-Type: application/octet-stream
	+
	+ -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
	+
	+ hF4DUgLY5tvmW2sSAQdAlq98ugycHadQGRe0+055eGUzdQtORR+u5LuJU+oYXHkw
	+ 4V1z0S1QPO9BWixHA62PtjAOShT2xN+1v8T2gq3mdgCEMCHX/Nj6INuu+HXF8o0D
	+ 0sC5AfEwq24oKF/6Q8vb1L/KUzFeitnWBnxS1i9XONlG9FTpSGfBir9szqz3QtMu
	+ 8Sma+X4g/i/rbO5ZtY9v0r+NCh0fY+fMj8Iaqw8IJUcUWcL2oz+GaHU+CIaJWUyk
	+ suqjw5Zw9WVPQ2nXHZTVOKPk4b8Y8f34GvoqP9ZyVFhZ+/9xcvE3fHOoZKeIK9Yi
	+ 4Bxza2HvWRkkKc48Orf5AjK45Wm/G72m72d/KiYfzBm0W4T5QkVqRnX+vpoQc+bo
	+ thEE715ma9SnZMcY3fRcPnhjlDxDneB5DD7WNdiz+wZL0OiHW/kT8Eo4/OZnb72M
	+ t44hd8xB8wbfhz5/zmgmlG4IGGA4MomZyg7G/fo24xaIqkjgnJ1GryWaztNQM6Xx
	+ 34kDLTF1fkjqmMZOtTEFKwC5dzrp1qb7B4ZWsFXC+bSLC5teaRajmOr4T5tXCFV7
	+ TL0gNBsg/bRBU6wmFDaOaJjleoTsh/7YNJaMsoiMx7NrHe+uVqaEbE4HsWU=
	+ =tlCO
	+ -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
	+
	+ --=-=01-iacqg4og4pqz11a5cg1o=-=--
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+Koch Expires 28 May 2026 [Page 18]
	+
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	+
	+
	+Appendix B. Changes Since -14
	+
	+ * Deprectated dane-only keyword.
	+
	+Author's Address
	+
	+ Werner Koch
	+ g10 Code GmbH
	+ Germany
	+ Email: wk@gnupg.org
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
	+
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	+Koch Expires 28 May 2026 [Page 19]
	diff --git a/misc/id/openpgp-webkey-service/draft.md b/misc/id/openpgp-webkey-service/draft.md
	index 04ea009..b94bce3 100644
	--- a/misc/id/openpgp-webkey-service/draft.md
	+++ b/misc/id/openpgp-webkey-service/draft.md
	@@ -1,748 +1,748 @@
	---
	title: OpenPGP Web Key Directory
	-docname: draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-19
	-date: 2024-12-05
	+docname: draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-21
	+date: 2025-11-24
	submissiontype: IETF
	category: info

	ipr: trust200902
	consensus: yes
	area: sec
	workgroup: Network Working Group
	keyword: Internet-Draft

	stand_alone: yes
	pi: [toc, sortrefs, symrefs]

	author:
	-
	ins: W.Koch
	name: Werner Koch
	org: g10 Code GmbH
	country: Germany
	email: wk@gnupg.org

	normative:
	RFC2119:
	RFC3156:
	RFC4880:
	RFC8615:
	RFC6189:


	--- abstract

	-This specification describes a service to locate OpenPGP keys by mail
	-address using a Web service and the HTTPS protocol. It also provides a
	-method for secure communication between the key owner and the mail
	-provider to publish and revoke the public key.
	+This specification describes a service to locate OpenPGP and LibrePGP
	+keys by mail address using a Web service and the HTTPS protocol. It
	+also provides a method for secure communication between the key owner
	+and the mail provider to publish and revoke the public key.


	--- middle


	# Introduction

	This memo describes a method to associate OpenPGP keys with a mail
	address and how to look them up using a web service with a well-known
	URI. In addition a mail based protocol is given to allow a client to
	setup such an association and to maintain it.


	# Notational Conventions

	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [](#RFC2119).


	# Web Key Directory

	A major use case for OpenPGP is the encryption of mail. A common
	difficulty of sending encrypted mails to a new communication partner is
	to find the appropriate public key of the recipient. Unless an
	off-channel key exchange has been done, there are no easy ways to
	discover the required key. The common practice is to search the network
	of public key servers for a key matching the recipient's mail address.
	This practise bears the problem that the keyservers are not able to give
	a positive confirmation that a key actually belongs to the mail
	addresses given in the key. Further, there are often several keys
	matching a mail address and thus one needs to pick a key on good luck.
	This is clearly not a secure way to setup an end-to-end encryption. Even
	if the need for a trusted key for an initial mail message is
	relinquished, a non-authenticated key may be a wrong one and the actual
	recipient would receive a mail which she can't decrypt, due to the use
	of a wrong key.

	Methods to overcome this problem are

	- sending an initial unencrypted message with the public key attached,
	- using the OpenPGP DANE protocol to lookup the recipients key via the
	DNS.

	The first method has the obvious problems of not even trying to encrypt
	the initial mail, an extra mail round-trip, and problems with unattended
	key discovery.

	The latter method works fine but requires that mail providers need to
	set up a separate DNS resolver to provide the key. The administration of
	a DNS zone is often not in the hands of small mail installations. Thus
	an update of the DNS resource records needs to be delegated to the ISP
	running the DNS service. Further, DNS lookups are not encrypted and
	missing all confidentially. Even if the participating MUAs are using
	STARTTLS to encrypt the mail exchange, a DNS lookup for the key
	unnecessarily identifies the local-part of the recipients mail address
	to any passive eavesdroppers.

	This memo specified a new method for key discovery using an encrypted
	https connection.


	## Key Discovery

	Although URIs are able to encode all kind of characters, straightforward
	implementations of a key directory may want to store the local-part of
	a mail address directly in the file system. This forbids the use of
	certain characters in the local-part. To allow for such an
	implementation method the URI uses an encoded form of the local-part
	which can be directly mapped to a file name.

	OpenPGP defines its User IDs, and thus the mail address, as UTF-8
	strings. To help with the common pattern of using capitalized names
	(e.g. "Joe.Doe@example.org") for mail addresses, and under the premise
	that almost all MTAs treat the local-part case-insensitive and that
	the domain-part is required to be compared case-insensitive anyway,
	all upper-case ASCII characters in a User ID are mapped to lowercase.
	Non-ASCII characters are not changed.

	The so mapped local-part is hashed using the SHA-1 algorithm. The
	resulting 160 bit digest is encoded using the Z-Base-32 method as
	described in [](#RFC6189), section 5.1.6. The resulting string has
	a fixed length of 32 octets.

	There are two variants on how to form the request URI: The advanced
	and the direct method. Implementations MUST first try the advanced
	method. Only if an address for the required sub-domain does not
	exist, they SHOULD fall back to the direct method. A non-responding
	server does not mean that the fall back should be carried out.

	The advanced method requires that a sub-domain with the fixed name
	`openpgpkey` is created and queried. The URI is constructed by
	concatenating these items:

	- The scheme `https://`,
	- the string `openpgpkey`,
	- the domain-part,
	- the string `/.well-known/openpgpkey/`,
	- the domain-part in lowercase,
	- the string `/hu/`,
	- the above constructed 32 octet string,
	- the unchanged local-part as a parameter with name `l` using proper
	percent escaping.

	An example for such an advanced method URI to lookup the key for
	Joe.Doe@Example.ORG is:

	https://openpgpkey.example.org/.well-known/openpgpkey/
	example.org/hu/iy9q119eutrkn8s1mk4r39qejnbu3n5q?l=Joe.Doe

	(line has been wrapped for rendering purposes)

	The direct method requires no additional DNS entries and constructs
	the URI by concatenating these items:

	- The scheme `https://`,
	- the domain-part,
	- the string `/.well-known/openpgpkey/hu/`,
	- the above constructed 32 octet string,
	- the unchanged local-part as a parameter with name `l` using proper
	percent escaping.

	Example for a direct method URI:

	https://example.org/.well-known/openpgpkey/
	hu/iy9q119eutrkn8s1mk4r39qejnbu3n5q?l=Joe.Doe

	(line has been wrapped for rendering purposes)

	Sites which do not use the advanced method but employ wildcard DNS for
	their sub-domains MUST make sure that the `openpgpkey` sub-domain is
	not subject to the wildcarding. This can be done by inserting an
	empty TXT RR for this sub-domain.

	The HTTP GET method MUST return the binary representation of the
	OpenPGP key for the given mail address. The key needs to carry a User
	ID packet ([](#RFC4880)) with that mail address. Note that the key
	may be revoked or expired - it is up to the client to handle such
	conditions. To ease distribution of revoked keys, a server may return
	revoked keys in addition to a new key. The keys are returned by a
	single request as concatenated key blocks.

	The server MUST accept the HTTP HEAD method to allow a client to
	check for the existence of a key.

	The server SHOULD use "application/octet-stream" as the
	Content-Type for the data but clients SHOULD also accept any other
	Content-Type. The server SHOULD NOT return an ASCII armored version of
	the key.

	The server MUST serve a Policy Flags file as specified below. That
	file is even required if the Web Key Directory Update Protocol is not
	supported.

	The benefit of the advanced method is its greater flexibility in
	setting up the Web Key Directory in environments where more than one
	mail domain is hosted. DNS SRV resource records, as used in earlier
	specifications of this protocol, posed a problem for implementations
	which have only limited access to DNS resolvers. Note that the direct
	method allows to provide a Web Key Directory without any DNS changes.


	# Web Key Directory Update Protocol

	To put keys into the key directory a protocol to automate the task is
	desirable. The protocol defined here is entirely based on mail and
	the assumption that a mail provider can securely deliver mail to the
	INBOX of a user (e.g. an IMAP folder). Note that the same protocol
	may also be used for submitting keys for use with OpenPGP DANE.

	In the following sections the term "target key" denotes the to be
	published key, the term "submission key" the key associated with the
	submission-address of the mail provider. The string "WELLKNOWN"
	denotes the first part of an URI specific for a domain. In the
	examples the domain "example.org" is assumed, thus:

	WELLKNOWN := https://openpgpkey.example.org/.well-known/
	openpgpkey/example.org

	(line has been wrapped for rendering purposes)

	or if the sub-domain `openpgpkey` does not exist (direct method):

	WELLKNOWN := https://example.org/.well-known/openpgpkey

	We assume that the user already created a key for her mail account
	alice@example.org. To install the key at her provider's Web Key
	Directory, she performs the following steps:

	1. She retrieves a file which contains one line with the mail address
	used to submit the key to the mail provider. See below
	for the syntax of that file. For a mail address at the domain
	"example.org" the URI of the file is

	WELLKNOWN/submission-address

	1. She sends her key using SMTP (or any other transport mechanism) to
	the provider using the submission address and key format as specified
	by PGP/MIME.

	2. The provider checks that the received key has a User ID which matches
	an account name of the provider.

	3. The provider sends an encrypted message containing a nonce and the
	fingerprint of the key to the mail account of the user. Note that a
	similar scheme is used by the well known caff(1) tool to help with
	key signing parties.

	4. A legitimate user will be able to decrypt the message because she
	created the key and is in charge of the private key. This step
	verifies that the submitted key has actually been created by the
	owner of the account.

	5. The user sends the decrypted nonce back to the submission address
	as a confirmation that the private key is owned by her and that the
	provider may now publish the key. The confirmation mail to the
	provider MUST be encrypted using the provider's public key as
	retrieved using the key lookup protocol described above.

	6. The provider receives the nonce, matches it with its database of
	pending confirmations and then publishes the key. Finally the
	provider sends a mail back to the user to notify her of the
	publication of her key.

	The message data structures used for the above protocol are specified in
	detail below.


	## The Submission Address

	The address of the submission file is

	WELLKNOWN/submission-address

	The file consists of exactly one line, terminated by a LF, or the
	sequence of CR and LF, with the full mail address to be used for
	submission of a key to the mail provider. For example the content of the
	file may be

	key-submission-example.org@directory.example.org


	## The Submission Mail

	The mail used to submit a key to the mail provider MUST comply to the
	PGP/MIME specification ([](#RFC3156), section 7), which states that
	the Content-Type must be "application/pgp-keys", there are no required
	or optional parameters, and the body part contains the ASCII-armored
	transferable Public Key Packets as defined in [](#RFC4880), section
	11.1.

	The mail provider MUST publish a key capable of signing and encryption
	for the submission-address in the Web Key Directory or via DANE. The
	key to be published MUST be submitted using a PGP/MIME encrypted
	message ([](#RFC3156), section 4). The message MUST NOT be signed
	(because the authenticity of the signing key has not yet been
	confirmed). After decryption of the message at the mail provider a
	single "application/pgp-keys" part, as specified above, is expected.


	## The Confirmation Request

	The mail provider sends a confirmation mail in response to a received
	key publication request. The message MUST be sent from the
	submission-address of the mail provider to the mail address extracted
	from the target key. The message needs to be a PGP/MIME signed
	message using the submission key of the provider for the
	signature. The signed message MUST have two parts:

	The first part MUST have "text" as its Content-Type and can be used to
	explain the purpose of the mail. For example it may point to this
	specification and explain on how to manually perform the protocol. By
	evaluating the Content-Language header of the request the provider may
	send back a localized version.

	The second part MUST have a Content-Type of
	"application/vnd.gnupg.wkd" and carry an OpenPGP encrypted message in
	ASCII Armor format. If the protocol version is unknown or less than 5
	the Content-Type "application/vnd.gnupg.wks" MUST be used for backward
	compatibility. The message MUST be encrypted to the target key and
	MUST NOT be signed. After decryption a text file in the Web Key data
	format must be yielded.

	That data format consists of name-value pairs with one name-value pair
	per LF or CR+LF terminated line. Empty lines are allowed and will be
	ignored by the receiver. A colon is used to terminate a name.

	In a confirmation request the following names MUST be send in the
	specified order:

	- "type": The value must be "confirmation-request".

	- "sender": This is the mailbox the user is expected to sent the
	confirmation response to. The value must match the
	mailbox part of the "From:" address of this
	request. Exactly one address MUST be given.

	- "address": The value is the addr-spec part of the target key's
	mail address. The value SHOULD match the addr-spec part
	of the recipient's address. The value MUST be UTF-8
	encoded as required for an OpenPGP User ID.

	- "fingerprint": The value is the fingerprint of the target key. The
	fingerprint is given in uppercase hex encoding
	without any interleaving spaces.

	- "nonce": The value is a string with a minimum length of 16 octets
	and a maximum length of 64 octets. The string must
	entirely be made up of random ASCII letters or
	digits. This nonce will be sent back to the mail provider
	as proof that the recipient is the legitimate owner of
	the target-key.

	The receiver of that message is expected to verify the outer signature
	and disregard the entire message if it can't be verified or has not
	been signed by the key associated with the submission address.

	After the message has been verified the receiver decrypts the second
	part of the signed message, checks that the "fingerprint" matches the
	target key, checks that the "address" matches a User ID of the target
	key, and checks the other constrains of the request format. If any
	constraint is not asserted, or the fingerprint or User ID do not match
	the target key, or there is no pending publication requests (i.e. a
	mail recently sent to the submission address), the user MAY be
	notified about this fake confirmation attempt.

	In other cases the confirmation request is legitimate and the MUA
	shall silently send a response as described in the next section.

	The rationale for the outer signature used with this request is to
	allow early detection of spam mails. This can be done prior to the
	decryption step and avoids asking the user to enter a passphrase to
	perform the decryption for a non-legitimate message. The use of a
	simple encrypted attachment, instead of using PGP/MIME encryption, is
	to convey the Content-Type of that attachment in the clear and also to
	prevent automatic decryption of that attachment by PGP/MIME aware
	clients. The MUA may in fact detect this confirmation request and
	present a customized dialog for confirming that request.


	## The Confirmation Response

	A response to a confirmation request MUST only be send in the positive
	case; there is no negative confirmation response. A mail service
	provider is expected to cancel a pending key submission after a suitable
	time without a confirmation. The mail service provider SHOULD NOT retry
	the sending of a confirmation request after the first request has been
	send successfully.

	The user MUST send the confirmation response from her target mail
	address to the "from" address of the confirmation request. The
	message MUST be signed and encrypted using the PGP/MIME Combined
	format ([](#RFC3156), section 6.2). The signing key is the target
	key and the encryption key is the key associated with the provider's
	submission address. The server MAY verify the signature and silently
	discard the message if it is not found to be valid;

	The Content-Type used for the plaintext message MUST match the
	Content-Type of the request. The format is the same as described
	above for the Confirmation Request. The body must contain four
	name-value pairs in this order:

	- "type": The value must be "confirmation-response".

	- "sender": The value is the value of the "sender" parameter from the
	confirmation request.

	- "address": The value is the value of the "address" parameter from
	the confirmation request.

	- "nonce": The value is the value of the "nonce" parameter from the
	confirmation request.

	The server MUST check the "nonce" against the one sent in the request
	and publish the key only if the nonce matches and has not been
	re-used.


	## Policy Flags

	For key generation and submission it is useful to tell the
	client about certain properties of the mail provider in advance. This
	can be done with a file at the URL

	WELLKNOWN/policy

	A site supporting the Web Key Directory MUST serve this file; it is
	sufficient if that file has a zero length. Clients may use this file
	to check for Web Key Directory support.

	The file contains keywords and optionally values, one per line with
	each line terminated by a LF or the sequence of CR and LF. Empty lines
	and lines starting with a '#' character are considered comment
	lines. A keyword is made up of lowercase letters, digits, hyphens, or
	dots. An underscore is allowed as a name space delimiters; see
	below. The first character must be a letter. Keywords which are
	defined to require a value are directly followed by a colon and then
	after optional white space the value. Clients MUST use
	case-insensitive matching for the keyword.

	Currently defined keywords are:

	- "mailbox-only": The mail server provider does only accept keys
	with only a mailbox in the User ID. In particular
	User IDs with a real name in addition to the
	mailbox will be rejected as invalid.

	- "dane-only": The mail server provider does not run a Web Key
	Directory but only an OpenPGP DANE service. The Web
	Key Directory Update protocol is used to update the
	keys for the DANE service. The use of this keyword
	is deprecated.

	- "auth-submit": The submission of the mail to the server is done
	using an authenticated connection. Thus the
	submitted key will be published immediately without
	any confirmation request.

	- "protocol-version": This keyword can be used to explicitly claim the
	support of a specific version of the Web Key Directory update protocol.
	This is in general not needed but implementations may have
	workarounds for providers which only support an old protocol
	version. If these providers update to a newer version they
	should add this keyword so that the implementation can disable
	the workaround. The value is an integer corresponding to the
	respective draft revision number.

	- "submission-address": An alternative way to specify the submission
	address. The value is the addr-spec part of the address to send
	requests to this server. If this keyword is used in addition to
	the `submission-address` file, both MUST have the same value.

	More keywords will be defined in updates to this I-D. There is no
	registry except for this document. For experimental use of new
	features or for provider specific settings, keywords MUST be prefixed
	with a domain name and an underscore.


	# Security Considerations

	The use of SHA-1 for the mapping of the local-part to a fixed string
	is not a security feature but merely used to map the local-part to a
	fixed-sized string made from a well defined set of characters. It is not
	intended to conceal information about a mail address.

	The domain name part of the mail address is not part of the hash to
	avoid problems with internationalized domain names. Instead a
	separate URL is required for each domain name.

	To make it a bit harder to test for published keys, the server
	responsible to serve the WELLKNOWN directory SHOULD NOT create an
	index file for that directory or any sub-directory.

	The mail provider MUST make sure to publish a key in a way that only
	the mail address belonging to the requested user is part of the User
	ID packets included in the returned key. Other User ID packets and
	their associated binding signatures MUST be removed before
	publication. Confirmation requests MUST only be send for such to be
	published User ID. It is further recommended that a client filters a
	received key or a key send for a publication requests so that only the
	specific User ID with the mail address of the provider is imported or
	send.

	A client MUST NOT accept a HTTP authentication challenge (HTTP
	code 401) because the information in the Web Key Directory is public
	and needs no authentication. Allowing an authentication challenge has
	the problem to easily confuse a user with a password prompt and
	tricking him into falsely entering the passphrase used to protect his
	private key or to login to his mail provider.

	The use of DNS SRV records as specified in former revisions of this
	document reduces the certainty that a mail address belongs to a
	domain. For example an attacker may change the target to a host in a
	sub-domain under their control and thus gain full control over all
	keys.


	# IANA Considerations


	## Well-Known URI

	IANA is requested to assign a well-known URI in the "Well-Known URIs"
	registry as defined by [](#RFC8615):

	URI suffix: openpgpkey

	Change controller: IETF

	Specification document: This


	# Acknowledgments

	The author would like to acknowledge the help of the individuals who
	kindly voiced their opinions on the GnuPG mailing lists, in particular,
	the help of Bernhard Reiter and Guilhem Moulin.


	--- back


	# Sample Protocol Run

	The following non-normative example can be used by implementors as
	guidance.

	Note that GnuPG version 2.1.12 supports the key discovery described in
	version -00 of this document (auto-key-locate method "wkd"). Version
	2.1.16 can run the protocol described in this document but is also able
	to run the protocol version specified by -01. For backward
	compatibility this example uses the Content-Type as required for
	versions of this protocol prior to -04; if the client knows that the
	server support -04 "vnd.gnupg.wkd" should be used.


	## Sample Keys

	This is the provider's submission key:

	-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----

	lFgEV/TAohYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAB/k9YQfSTI8qQqqK1KimH/BsvzsowWItSQPT
	FP+fOC4AAP46uJ3Snno3Vy+kORye3rf0VvWvuz82voEQLxG6WpfHhREEtBprZXkt
	c3VibWlzc2lvbkBleGFtcGxlLm5ldIh5BBMWCAAhBQJX9MCiAhsDBQsJCAcCBhUI
	CQoLAgQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEKhtNooW0cqEWMUA/0e9XaeptszWC9ZvPg8INL6a
	BvRqPBYGU7PGmuXsxBovAQDyckOykG0UAfHVyN1w4gSK/biMcnqVr857i8/HuvjW
	C5xdBFf0wKISCisGAQQBl1UBBQEBB0Apvaoe4MtSEJ1fpds/4DFl2kXXBpnVji/s
	Wg9btdthNQMBCAcAAP9FJX99T1LEJzBnvBBnc6bimnT6/1OKM9RdO4R0/uVP6BFL
	iGEEGBYIAAkFAlf0wKICGwwACgkQqG02ihbRyoTlGwD9FBr92osjL7HkhhZZ7Z2D
	My3b9zpoZeMjvPg5YPqpdKMA/jhZoHuZCRMBYf7YRFb8aXtuyetDFZYrkjnum+OG
	HFAD
	=Hnwd
	-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----

	This is the target key to be published:

	-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----

	lFgEV2o9XRYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAZ8zkuQDL9x7rcvvoo6s3iEF1j88Dknd9nZhL
	nTEoBRkAAP94nCZMM4WY2IORXfM6phLGSz3RsHvs/vA1Opaus4+R3BKJtBtwYXRy
	aWNlLmx1bXVtYmFAZXhhbXBsZS5uZXSIeQQTFggAIQUCV2o9XQIbAwULCQgHAgYV
	CAkKCwIEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAAKCRATlWNoKgINCpkNAQDFDcwJUzsxu7aJUiPdpYXj
	4uVarrXakxEE8mGFotWhLAD9GH4rqLDYIE3NKEU0s+Okt4tEIwJaV8H1NNPPPMiK
	3g2cXQRXaj2NEgorBgEEAZdVAQUBAQdAFnnmZc99TuKk5iCq9wmYZUVF2RcXN2Cs
	qAl8iGQQUWsDAQgHAAD/VN/VGmlcwGBPcLTya2hfU4t37nMcFCKdNSXjJ5DFA0AP
	PohhBBgWCAAJBQJXaj2NAhsMAAoJEBOVY2gqAg0Ky4UA/0GmVaXzXemLvv1Xw4yx
	Eaz/KfKKGc4RJ+38fyqUzw8NAQCohQ+ki3I5f84EXLZEiUiLsnVtOn1HNxvND/gW
	TiFZBA==
	=GHi7
	-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----


	## Sample Messages

	The first message triggers the publication requests.

	From: patrice.lumumba@example.net
	To: key-submission@example.net
	Subject: Key publishing request
	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;
	protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";
	boundary="=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-="
	Date: Wed, 05 Oct 2016 10:15:51 +0000


	--=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-=
	Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted

	Version: 1

	--=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-=
	Content-Type: application/octet-stream

	-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

	hF4DUgLY5tvmW2sSAQdAR1AcqvFpQe/fHRZbf0xcnl9Tb+AtwaX2yZnZXGELGHsw
	1/e3E0JptwM5tpRAVe71ooF8Zq4jl76ZgQKfj/SyjpLJxyoEDy2N5wTQaqW4JtML
	0ukB1vh7dIRDxBJX/LQIJC0wz8o1Q3vjcLJKFFvDb7YrerABpPIzwOAupcgIbQHj
	5m1+2WU5CL8ffyJy2h1jV2X4OnvWF1Sn6J6SVD6DfZpOPRt9TxSemJrN1LJ3lG0N
	ts8AuYmCOeC1H2r5TYyxqkC98JF8+Nvyxd/fwne8IOjK9uixkNMC5H9/ZOH0YWCb
	wBnNB4iXuym4OIPxiLkDymsVF0ww/XrODE9Y259EGmO45VFNrJAX3HFs9/PcMCVk
	n2qMyEkr8LHiXeEPun6Z54RHUPYv2cUkEZ0hhSJ+rtBxkc/5D/cAScCEXRKFSKEF
	jLJAvLK/u/ga5DAzVai+vh6b6Bq+YVPaD9GWMhWj4CgR90p9LULi6S/Hzwhv9Wzf
	8fJoJOaDjyvRDgr09jYLWamxkS9NWxqwy6MXJvxwbNdd5XtqiW4Y4o0Ll1hDJhxR
	ljn/XvotXKwhKN+4QGhIXDVt4Dl4XxS5ptWfVTau8W8DYqDsU2obEcfsirZv53M1
	Q9FCD8CD9+dkBt8VAJekCWVhEltcRHxlrznbk2jxm93xSD2o6gZ5X0VSaSUXyEhm
	J+8F3gyTHGgbq/TgyjFoockWh5EtGgAFuWvmPJCF5PO/UaNeoKwgwSJBu6oTXkHx
	R4nvvMRcj5UgTsKpZ79NiDQukbjG5ScNT5TCUiiZsBXBqBx3fD61EH6cAuh4P3Kr
	iM7PY4fwAHo890Dx+Qlt
	=WIhx
	-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

	--=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-=--

	The server decrypts this message to

	Content-Type: application/pgp-keys

	-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

	mDMEV2o9XRYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAZ8zkuQDL9x7rcvvoo6s3iEF1j88Dknd9nZhL
	nTEoBRm0G3BhdHJpY2UubHVtdW1iYUBleGFtcGxlLm5ldIh5BBMWCAAhBQJXaj1d
	AhsDBQsJCAcCBhUICQoLAgQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEBOVY2gqAg0KmQ0BAMUNzAlT
	OzG7tolSI92lhePi5VqutdqTEQTyYYWi1aEsAP0YfiuosNggTc0oRTSz46S3i0Qj
	AlpXwfU00888yIreDbg4BFdqPY0SCisGAQQBl1UBBQEBB0AWeeZlz31O4qTmIKr3
	CZhlRUXZFxc3YKyoCXyIZBBRawMBCAeIYQQYFggACQUCV2o9jQIbDAAKCRATlWNo
	KgINCsuFAP9BplWl813pi779V8OMsRGs/ynyihnOESft/H8qlM8PDQEAqIUPpIty
	OX/OBFy2RIlIi7J1bTp9RzcbzQ/4Fk4hWQQ=
	=qRfF
	-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

	and returns this confirmation request

	From: key-submission@example.net
	To: patrice.lumumba@example.net
	Subject: Confirm your key publication
	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;
	protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";
	boundary="=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-="
	Date: Wed, 05 Oct 2016 10:16:57 +0000


	--=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-=
	Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted

	Version: 1

	--=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-=
	Content-Type: application/octet-stream

	-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

	hF4DkYWHjk/NdMASAQdAluQeqhECpU2T0zEyBAEbFzhLkpubN160wjkFCrtUc0Mw
	FwYgM2fp9cvTMdJ/xjkvmAcIEOT4AY/hn1yFQ4z0KG0gCkSac+8mkDylnPdxlXYw
	0sBSAXlbqpVA7eUpFuU2Zs10zbIXxlwe6osR5wUIJut/RCOsYQmfvxC55x8mUX5/
	zgTnNzlMzye5ws4pTgAeQm2x0Yv018L8IZgY5KxwJLBzlss0wLZ45ZcS80hR11Fx
	NCow1fKF8lMnOJxagTEOih807nctz8vT5bR1gx0d7N3LM+th8nAg9/6Ghf1XTpLo
	MzwGW0FtOG7Dg1Uxbw2bjaOuRBeh6IIpmNAw1pmIfnNu7PpoRydU5w1K/R8MT06z
	MKdJ7IW5mVGes9EGnG3e4mjuILvNaZhfYy+a73IhDSaPm3oqdl1Qx7tbNg6lGjn6
	KStCYAcPGPp3m7aWkfsPGThOVRhEXqaFFywfwSVEj1pdIRjDFA==
	=Cdjh
	-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

	--=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-=--

	The client decrypts this PGP/MIME message as

	Content-Type: application/vnd.gnupg.wks
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

	type: confirmation-request
	sender: key-submission@example.net
	address: patrice.lumumba@example.net
	fingerprint: B21DEAB4F875FB3DA42F1D1D139563682A020D0A
	nonce: f5pscz57zj6fk11wekk8gx4cmrb659a7

	creates this response

	Content-Type: application/vnd.gnupg.wks
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

	type: confirmation-response
	sender: key-submission@example.net
	address: patrice.lumumba@example.net
	nonce: f5pscz57zj6fk11wekk8gx4cmrb659a7

	and sends it PGP/MIME Combined signed and encrypted to the server

	From: patrice.lumumba@example.net
	To: key-submission@example.net
	Subject: Key publication confirmation
	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;
	protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";
	boundary="=-=01-iacqg4og4pqz11a5cg1o=-="
	Date: Wed, 05 Oct 2016 10:18:52 +0000


	--=-=01-iacqg4og4pqz11a5cg1o=-=
	Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted

	Version: 1

	--=-=01-iacqg4og4pqz11a5cg1o=-=
	Content-Type: application/octet-stream

	-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

	hF4DUgLY5tvmW2sSAQdAlq98ugycHadQGRe0+055eGUzdQtORR+u5LuJU+oYXHkw
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	# Changes Since -14

	- Deprectated dane-only keyword.

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