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# doc/DETAILS -*- org -*-
#+TITLE: GnuPG Details
# Globally disable superscripts and subscripts:
#+OPTIONS: ^:{}
#
# Note: This file uses org-mode; it should be easy to read as plain
# text but be aware of some markup peculiarities: Verbatim code is
# enclosed in #+begin-example, #+end-example blocks or marked by a
# colon as the first non-white-space character, words bracketed with
# equal signs indicate a monospace font, and the usual /italics/,
# *bold*, and _underline_ conventions are recognized.
This is the DETAILS file for GnuPG which specifies some internals and
parts of the external API for GPG and GPGSM.
* Format of the colon listings
The format is a based on colon separated record, each recods starts
with a tag string and extends to the end of the line. Here is an
example:
#+begin_example
$ gpg --with-colons --list-keys \
--with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint wk@gnupg.org
pub:f:1024:17:6C7EE1B8621CC013:899817715:1055898235::m:::scESC:
fpr:::::::::ECAF7590EB3443B5C7CF3ACB6C7EE1B8621CC013:
uid:f::::::::Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>:
uid:f::::::::Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>:
sub:f:1536:16:06AD222CADF6A6E1:919537416:1036177416:::::e:
fpr:::::::::CF8BCC4B18DE08FCD8A1615906AD222CADF6A6E1:
sub:r:1536:20:5CE086B5B5A18FF4:899817788:1025961788:::::esc:
fpr:::::::::AB059359A3B81F410FCFF97F5CE086B5B5A18FF4:
#+end_example
Note that new version of GnuPG or the use of certain options may add
new fields to the output. Parsers should not assume a limit on the
number of fields per line. Some fields are not yet used or only used
with certain record types; parsers should ignore fields they are not
aware of.
The double =--with-fingerprint= prints the fingerprint for the subkeys
too. Old versions of gpg used a slightly different format and required
the use of the option =--fixed-list-mode= to conform to the format
described here.
** Description of the fields
*** Field 1 - Type of record
- pub :: Public key
- crt :: X.509 certificate
- crs :: X.509 certificate and private key available
- sub :: Subkey (secondary key)
- sec :: Secret key
- ssb :: Secret subkey (secondary key)
- uid :: User id (only field 10 is used).
- uat :: User attribute (same as user id except for field 10).
- sig :: Signature
- rev :: Revocation signature
- fpr :: Fingerprint (fingerprint is in field 10)
- pkd :: Public key data [*]
- grp :: Keygrip
- rvk :: Revocation key
+ - tfs :: TOFU statistics [*]
- tru :: Trust database information [*]
- spk :: Signature subpacket [*]
- cfg :: Configuration data [*]
Records marked with an asterisk are described at [[*Special%20field%20formats][*Special fields]].
*** Field 2 - Validity
This is a letter describing the computed validity of a key.
Currently this is a single letter, but be prepared that additional
information may follow in some future versions. Note that GnuPG <
2.1 does not set this field for secret key listings.
- o :: Unknown (this key is new to the system)
- i :: The key is invalid (e.g. due to a missing self-signature)
- d :: The key has been disabled
(deprecated - use the 'D' in field 12 instead)
- r :: The key has been revoked
- e :: The key has expired
- - :: Unknown validity (i.e. no value assigned)
- q :: Undefined validity. '-' and 'q' may safely be treated as
the same value for most purposes
- n :: The key is not valid
- m :: The key is marginal valid.
- f :: The key is fully valid
- u :: The key is ultimately valid. This often means that the
secret key is available, but any key may be marked as
ultimately valid.
- w :: The key has a well known private part.
- s :: The key has special validity. This means that it might be
self-signed and expected to be used in the STEED sytem.
If the validity information is given for a UID or UAT record, it
describes the validity calculated based on this user ID. If given
for a key record it describes the validity taken from the best
rated user ID.
For X.509 certificates a 'u' is used for a trusted root
certificate (i.e. for the trust anchor) and an 'f' for all other
valid certificates.
*** Field 3 - Key length
The length of key in bits.
*** Field 4 - Public key algorithm
The values here are those from the OpenPGP specs or if they are
greather than 255 the algorithm ids as used by Libgcrypt.
*** Field 5 - KeyID
This is the 64 bit keyid as specified by OpenPGP and the last 64
bit of the SHA-1 fingerprint of an X.509 certifciate.
*** Field 6 - Creation date
The creation date of the key is given in UTC. For UID and UAT
records, this is used for the self-signature date. Note that the
date is usally printed in seconds since epoch, however, we are
migrating to an ISO 8601 format (e.g. "19660205T091500"). This is
currently only relevant for X.509. A simple way to detect the new
format is to scan for the 'T'. Note that old versions of gpg
without using the =--fixed-list-mode= option used a "yyyy-mm-tt"
format.
*** Field 7 - Expiration date
Key or UID/UAT expiration date or empty if it does not expire.
*** Field 8 - Certificate S/N, UID hash, trust signature info
Used for serial number in crt records. For UID and UAT records,
this is a hash of the user ID contents used to represent that
exact user ID. For trust signatures, this is the trust depth
seperated by the trust value by a space.
*** Field 9 - Ownertrust
This is only used on primary keys. This is a single letter, but
be prepared that additional information may follow in future
versions. For trust signatures with a regular expression, this is
the regular expression value, quoted as in field 10.
*** Field 10 - User-ID
The value is quoted like a C string to avoid control characters
(the colon is quoted =\x3a=). For a "pub" record this field is
not used on --fixed-list-mode. A UAT record puts the attribute
subpacket count here, a space, and then the total attribute
subpacket size. In gpgsm the issuer name comes here. A FPR
record stores the fingerprint here. The fingerprint of a
revocation key is stored here.
*** Field 11 - Signature class
Signature class as per RFC-4880. This is a 2 digit hexnumber
followed by either the letter 'x' for an exportable signature or
the letter 'l' for a local-only signature. The class byte of an
revocation key is also given here, 'x' and 'l' is used the same
way. This field if not used for X.509.
*** Field 12 - Key capabilities
The defined capabilities are:
- e :: Encrypt
- s :: Sign
- c :: Certify
- a :: Authentication
- ? :: Unknown capability
A key may have any combination of them in any order. In addition
to these letters, the primary key has uppercase versions of the
letters to denote the _usable_ capabilities of the entire key, and
a potential letter 'D' to indicate a disabled key.
*** Field 13 - Issuer certificate fingerprint or other info
Used in FPR records for S/MIME keys to store the fingerprint of
the issuer certificate. This is useful to build the certificate
path based on certificates stored in the local key database it is
only filled if the issuer certificate is available. The root has
been reached if this is the same string as the fingerprint. The
advantage of using this value is that it is guaranteed to have
been been build by the same lookup algorithm as gpgsm uses.
For "uid" records this field lists the preferences in the same way
gpg's --edit-key menu does.
For "sig" records, this is the fingerprint of the key that issued
the signature. Note that this is only filled in if the signature
verified correctly. Note also that for various technical reasons,
this fingerprint is only available if --no-sig-cache is used.
*** Field 14 - Flag field
Flag field used in the --edit menu output
*** Field 15 - S/N of a token
Used in sec/ssb to print the serial number of a token (internal
protect mode 1002) or a '#' if that key is a simple stub (internal
protect mode 1001). If the option --with-secret is used and a
secret key is available for the public key, a '+' indicates this.
*** Field 16 - Hash algorithm
For sig records, this is the used hash algorithm. For example:
2 = SHA-1, 8 = SHA-256.
*** Field 17 - Curve name
For pub, sub, sec, and ssb records this field is used for the ECC
curve name.
*** Field 18 - TOFU Policy
This is the TOFU policy. It is either good, bad, unknown, ask or
auto. This is only shows for uid records.
** Special fields
*** PKD - Public key data
If field 1 has the tag "pkd", a listing looks like this:
#+begin_example
pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB:
! ! !-- the value
! !------ for information number of bits in the value
!--------- index (eg. DSA goes from 0 to 3: p,q,g,y)
#+end_example
+*** TFS - TOFU statistics
+
+ This field may follows a UID record to convey information about
+ the TOFU database. The information is similar to a TOFU_STATS
+ status line.
+
+ - Field 2 :: tfs record version (must be 1)
+ - Field 3 :: validity - A number with validity code.
+ - Field 4 :: signcount - The number of signatures seen.
+ - Field 5 :: encrcount - The number of encryptions done.
+ - Field 6 :: policy - A string with the policy
+ - Field 7 :: first-seen - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
+ - Field 8 :: most-recent-seen - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
+
*** TRU - Trust database information
Example for a "tru" trust base record:
#+begin_example
tru:o:0:1166697654:1:3:1:5
#+end_example
- Field 2 :: Reason for staleness of trust. If this field is
empty, then the trustdb is not stale. This field may
have multiple flags in it:
- o :: Trustdb is old
- t :: Trustdb was built with a different trust model
than the one we are using now.
- Field 3 :: Trust model
- 0 :: Classic trust model, as used in PGP 2.x.
- 1 :: PGP trust model, as used in PGP 6 and later.
This is the same as the classic trust model,
except for the addition of trust signatures.
GnuPG before version 1.4 used the classic trust model
by default. GnuPG 1.4 and later uses the PGP trust
model by default.
- Field 4 :: Date trustdb was created in seconds since Epoch.
- Field 5 :: Date trustdb will expire in seconds since Epoch.
- Field 6 :: Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
key signer (gpg's option --marginals-needed).
- Field 7 :: Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
key signer. (gpg's option --completes-needed)
- Field 8 :: Maximum depth of a certification chain. (gpg's option
--max-cert-depth)
*** SPK - Signature subpacket records
- Field 2 :: Subpacket number as per RFC-4880 and later.
- Field 3 :: Flags in hex. Currently the only two bits assigned
are 1, to indicate that the subpacket came from the
hashed part of the signature, and 2, to indicate the
subpacket was marked critical.
- Field 4 :: Length of the subpacket. Note that this is the
length of the subpacket, and not the length of field
5 below. Due to the need for %-encoding, the length
of field 5 may be up to 3x this value.
- Field 5 :: The subpacket data. Printable ASCII is shown as
ASCII, but other values are rendered as %XX where XX
is the hex value for the byte.
*** CFG - Configuration data
--list-config outputs information about the GnuPG configuration
for the benefit of frontends or other programs that call GnuPG.
There are several list-config items, all colon delimited like the
rest of the --with-colons output. The first field is always "cfg"
to indicate configuration information. The second field is one of
(with examples):
- version :: The third field contains the version of GnuPG.
: cfg:version:1.3.5
- pubkey :: The third field contains the public key algorithms
this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
semicolons. The algorithm numbers are as specified in
RFC-4880. Note that in contrast to the --status-fd
interface these are _not_ the Libgcrypt identifiers.
Using =pubkeyname= prints names instead of numbers.
: cfg:pubkey:1;2;3;16;17
- cipher :: The third field contains the symmetric ciphers this
version of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons.
The cipher numbers are as specified in RFC-4880.
Using =ciphername= prints names instead of numbers.
: cfg:cipher:2;3;4;7;8;9;10
- digest :: The third field contains the digest (hash) algorithms
this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
semicolons. The digest numbers are as specified in
RFC-4880. Using =digestname= prints names instead of
numbers.
: cfg:digest:1;2;3;8;9;10
- compress :: The third field contains the compression algorithms
this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
semicolons. The algorithm numbers are as specified
in RFC-4880.
: cfg:compress:0;1;2;3
- group :: The third field contains the name of the group, and the
fourth field contains the values that the group expands
to, separated by semicolons.
For example, a group of:
: group mynames = paige 0x12345678 joe patti
would result in:
: cfg:group:mynames:patti;joe;0x12345678;paige
- curve :: The third field contains the curve names this version
of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons. Using
=curveoid= prints OIDs instead of numbers.
: cfg:curve:ed25519;nistp256;nistp384;nistp521
* Format of the --status-fd output
Every line is prefixed with "[GNUPG:] ", followed by a keyword with
the type of the status line and some arguments depending on the type
(maybe none); an application should always be prepared to see new
keyworkds or more arguments in future versions.
** General status codes
*** NEWSIG [<signers_uid>]
Is issued right before a signature verification starts. This is
useful to define a context for parsing ERROR status messages.
arguments are currently defined. If SIGNERS_UID is given and is
not "-" this is the percent escape value of the OpenPGP Signer's
User ID signature sub-packet.
*** GOODSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
The signature with the keyid is good. For each signature only one
of the codes GOODSIG, BADSIG, EXPSIG, EXPKEYSIG, REVKEYSIG or
ERRSIG will be emitted. In the past they were used as a marker
for a new signature; new code should use the NEWSIG status
instead. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if
it is available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually
also be available for OpenPGP.
*** EXPSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature is
expired. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if
it is available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually
also be available for OpenPGP.
*** EXPKEYSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made
by an expired key. The username is the primary one encoded in
UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the
long keyid if it is available. This is the case with CMS and
might eventually also be available for OpenPGP.
*** REVKEYSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made
by a revoked key. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8
and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long
keyid if it is available. This is the case with CMS and might
eventually also beñ available for OpenPGP.
*** BADSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
The signature with the keyid has not been verified okay. The
username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The
fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if it is
available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually also be
available for OpenPGP.
*** ERRSIG <keyid> <pkalgo> <hashalgo> <sig_class> <time> <rc>
It was not possible to check the signature. This may be caused by
a missing public key or an unsupported algorithm. A RC of 4
indicates unknown algorithm, a 9 indicates a missing public
key. The other fields give more information about this signature.
sig_class is a 2 byte hex-value. The fingerprint may be used
instead of the keyid if it is available. This is the case with
gpgsm and might eventually also be available for OpenPGP.
Note, that TIME may either be the number of seconds since Epoch or
an ISO 8601 string. The latter can be detected by the presence of
the letter 'T'.
*** VALIDSIG <args>
The args are:
- <fingerprint_in_hex>
- <sig_creation_date>
- <sig-timestamp>
- <expire-timestamp>
- <sig-version>
- <reserved>
- <pubkey-algo>
- <hash-algo>
- <sig-class>
- [ <primary-key-fpr> ]
This status indicates that the signature is cryptographically
valid. This is similar to GOODSIG, EXPSIG, EXPKEYSIG, or REVKEYSIG
(depending on the date and the state of the signature and signing
key) but has the fingerprint as the argument. Multiple status
lines (VALIDSIG and the other appropriate *SIG status) are emitted
for a valid signature. All arguments here are on one long line.
sig-timestamp is the signature creation time in seconds after the
epoch. expire-timestamp is the signature expiration time in
seconds after the epoch (zero means "does not
expire"). sig-version, pubkey-algo, hash-algo, and sig-class (a
2-byte hex value) are all straight from the signature packet.
PRIMARY-KEY-FPR is the fingerprint of the primary key or identical
to the first argument. This is useful to get back to the primary
key without running gpg again for this purpose.
The primary-key-fpr parameter is used for OpenPGP and not
available for CMS signatures. The sig-version as well as the sig
class is not defined for CMS and currently set to 0 and 00.
Note, that *-TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
of the letter 'T'.
*** SIG_ID <radix64_string> <sig_creation_date> <sig-timestamp>
This is emitted only for signatures of class 0 or 1 which have
been verified okay. The string is a signature id and may be used
in applications to detect replay attacks of signed messages. Note
that only DLP algorithms give unique ids - others may yield
duplicated ones when they have been created in the same second.
Note, that SIG-TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
of the letter 'T'.
*** ENC_TO <long_keyid> <keytype> <keylength>
The message is encrypted to this LONG_KEYID. KEYTYPE is the
numerical value of the public key algorithm or 0 if it is not
known, KEYLENGTH is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known
(which is currently always the case). Gpg prints this line
always; Gpgsm only if it knows the certificate.
*** BEGIN_DECRYPTION
Mark the start of the actual decryption process. This is also
emitted when in --list-only mode.
*** END_DECRYPTION
Mark the end of the actual decryption process. This are also
emitted when in --list-only mode.
*** DECRYPTION_INFO <mdc_method> <sym_algo>
Print information about the symmetric encryption algorithm and the
MDC method. This will be emitted even if the decryption fails.
*** DECRYPTION_FAILED
The symmetric decryption failed - one reason could be a wrong
passphrase for a symmetrical encrypted message.
*** DECRYPTION_OKAY
The decryption process succeeded. This means, that either the
correct secret key has been used or the correct passphrase for a
symmetric encrypted message was given. The program itself may
return an errorcode because it may not be possible to verify a
signature for some reasons.
*** SESSION_KEY <algo>:<hexdigits>
The session key used to decrypt the message. This message will
only be emitted if the option --show-session-key is used. The
format is suitable to be passed as value for the option
--override-session-key. It is not an indication that the
decryption will or has succeeded.
*** BEGIN_ENCRYPTION <mdc_method> <sym_algo>
Mark the start of the actual encryption process.
*** END_ENCRYPTION
Mark the end of the actual encryption process.
*** FILE_START <what> <filename>
Start processing a file <filename>. <what> indicates the performed
operation:
- 1 :: verify
- 2 :: encrypt
- 3 :: decrypt
*** FILE_DONE
Marks the end of a file processing which has been started
by FILE_START.
*** BEGIN_SIGNING
Mark the start of the actual signing process. This may be used as
an indication that all requested secret keys are ready for use.
*** ALREADY_SIGNED <long-keyid>
Warning: This is experimental and might be removed at any time.
*** SIG_CREATED <type> <pk_algo> <hash_algo> <class> <timestamp> <keyfpr>
A signature has been created using these parameters.
Values for type <type> are:
- D :: detached
- C :: cleartext
- S :: standard
(only the first character should be checked)
<class> are 2 hex digits with the OpenPGP signature class.
Note, that TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since Epoch
or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence of the
letter 'T'.
*** NOTATION_
There are actually three related status codes to convey notation
data:
- NOTATION_NAME <name>
- NOTATION_FLAGS <critical> <human_readable>
- NOTATION_DATA <string>
<name> and <string> are %XX escaped. The data may be split among
several NOTATION_DATA lines. NOTATION_FLAGS is emitted after
NOTATION_NAME and gives the critical and human readable flags;
the flag values are either 0 or 1.
*** POLICY_URL <string>
Note that URL in <string> is %XX escaped.
*** PLAINTEXT <format> <timestamp> <filename>
This indicates the format of the plaintext that is about to be
written. The format is a 1 byte hex code that shows the format of
the plaintext: 62 ('b') is binary data, 74 ('t') is text data with
no character set specified, and 75 ('u') is text data encoded in
the UTF-8 character set. The timestamp is in seconds since the
epoch. If a filename is available it gets printed as the third
argument, percent-escaped as usual.
*** PLAINTEXT_LENGTH <length>
This indicates the length of the plaintext that is about to be
written. Note that if the plaintext packet has partial length
encoding it is not possible to know the length ahead of time. In
that case, this status tag does not appear.
*** ATTRIBUTE <arguments>
The list or arguments are:
- <fpr>
- <octets>
- <type>
- <index>
- <count>
- <timestamp>
- <expiredate>
- <flags>
This is one long line issued for each attribute subpacket when an
attribute packet is seen during key listing. <fpr> is the
fingerprint of the key. <octets> is the length of the attribute
subpacket. <type> is the attribute type (e.g. 1 for an image).
<index> and <count> indicate that this is the N-th indexed
subpacket of count total subpackets in this attribute packet.
<timestamp> and <expiredate> are from the self-signature on the
attribute packet. If the attribute packet does not have a valid
self-signature, then the timestamp is 0. <flags> are a bitwise OR
of:
- 0x01 :: this attribute packet is a primary uid
- 0x02 :: this attribute packet is revoked
- 0x04 :: this attribute packet is expired
*** SIG_SUBPACKET <type> <flags> <len> <data>
This indicates that a signature subpacket was seen. The format is
the same as the "spk" record above.
** Key related
*** INV_RECP, INV_SGNR
The two similar status codes:
- INV_RECP <reason> <requested_recipient>
- INV_SGNR <reason> <requested_sender>
are issued for each unusable recipient/sender. The reasons codes
currently in use are:
- 0 :: No specific reason given
- 1 :: Not Found
- 2 :: Ambigious specification
- 3 :: Wrong key usage
- 4 :: Key revoked
- 5 :: Key expired
- 6 :: No CRL known
- 7 :: CRL too old
- 8 :: Policy mismatch
- 9 :: Not a secret key
- 10 :: Key not trusted
- 11 :: Missing certificate
- 12 :: Missing issuer certificate
- 13 :: Key disabled
- 14 :: Syntax error in specification
If no specific reason was given a previously emitted status code
KEY_CONSIDERED may be used to analyzed the problem.
Note that for historical reasons the INV_RECP status is also used
for gpgsm's SIGNER command where it relates to signer's of course.
Newer GnuPG versions are using INV_SGNR; applications should
ignore the INV_RECP during the sender's command processing once
they have seen an INV_SGNR. Different codes are used so that they
can be distinguish while doing an encrypt+sign operation.
*** NO_RECP <reserved>
Issued if no recipients are usable.
*** NO_SGNR <reserved>
Issued if no senders are usable.
*** KEY_CONSIDERED <fpr> <flags>
Issued to explian the lookup of a key. FPR is the hexified
fingerprint of the primary key. The bit values for FLAGS are:
- 1 :: The key has not been selected.
- 2 :: All subkeys of the key are expired or have been revoked.
*** KEYEXPIRED <expire-timestamp>
The key has expired. expire-timestamp is the expiration time in
seconds since Epoch. This status line is not very useful because
it will also be emitted for expired subkeys even if this subkey is
not used. To check whether a key used to sign a message has
expired, the EXPKEYSIG status line is to be used.
Note, that the TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
of the letter 'T'.
*** KEYREVOKED
The used key has been revoked by its owner. No arguments yet.
*** NO_PUBKEY <long keyid>
The public key is not available
*** NO_SECKEY <long keyid>
The secret key is not available
*** KEY_CREATED <type> <fingerprint> [<handle>]
A key has been created. Values for <type> are:
- B :: primary and subkey
- P :: primary
- S :: subkey
The fingerprint is one of the primary key for type B and P and the
one of the subkey for S. Handle is an arbitrary non-whitespace
string used to match key parameters from batch key creation run.
*** KEY_NOT_CREATED [<handle>]
The key from batch run has not been created due to errors.
*** TRUST_
These are several similar status codes:
- TRUST_UNDEFINED <error_token>
- TRUST_NEVER <error_token>
- TRUST_MARGINAL [0 [<validation_model>]]
- TRUST_FULLY [0 [<validation_model>]]
- TRUST_ULTIMATE [0 [<validation_model>]]
For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted to
indicate the validity of the key used to create the signature.
The error token values are currently only emitted by gpgsm.
VALIDATION_MODEL describes the algorithm used to check the
validity of the key. The defaults are the standard Web of Trust
model for gpg and the the standard X.509 model for gpgsm. The
defined values are
- pgp :: The standard PGP WoT.
- shell :: The standard X.509 model.
- chain :: The chain model.
- steed :: The STEED model.
- tofu :: The TOFU model
Note that the term =TRUST_= in the status names is used for
historic reasons; we now speak of validity.
*** TOFU_USER <fingerprint_in_hex> <mbox>
This status identifies the key and the userid for all following
Tofu information. The fingerprint is the fingerprint of the
primary key and the mbox is in general the addr-spec part of the
userid encoded in UTF-8 and percent escaped. The fingerprint is
indentical for all TOFU_USER lines up to a NEWSIG line.
*** TOFU_STATS <validity> <sign-count> 0 [<policy> [<tm1> <tm2>]]
Statistics for the current user id.
Values for VALIDITY are:
- 0 :: conflict
- 1 :: key without history
- 2 :: key with too little history
- 3 :: key with enough history for basic trust
- 4 :: key with a lot of history
Values for POLICY are:
- none :: No Policy set
- auto :: Policy is "auto"
- good :: Policy is "good"
- bad :: Policy is "bad"
- ask :: Policy is "ask"
- unknown :: Policy is not known.
- TM1 gives the number of seconds since the the first messages was
- verified. TM2 gives the number of seconds since the most recent
- message was verified.
+ TM1 ist the time the first messages was verified. TM2 is the time
+ the most recent message was verified. Both may either be seconds
+ since Epoch or an ISO time string (yyyymmddThhmmss).
*** TOFU_STATS_SHORT <long_string>
Information about the TOFU binding for the signature.
Example: "15 signatures verified. 10 messages encrypted"
*** TOFU_STATS_LONG <long_string>
Information about the TOFU binding for the signature in verbose
format. The LONG_STRING is percent escaped.
Example: 'Verified 9 messages signed by "Werner Koch
(dist sig)" in the past 3 minutes, 40 seconds. The most
recent message was verified 4 seconds ago.'
*** PKA_TRUST_
This is is one:
- PKA_TRUST_GOOD <addr-spec>
- PKA_TRUST_BAD <addr-spec>
Depending on the outcome of the PKA check one of the above status
codes is emitted in addition to a =TRUST_*= status.
** Remote control
*** GET_BOOL, GET_LINE, GET_HIDDEN, GOT_IT
These status line are used with --command-fd for interactive
control of the process.
*** USERID_HINT <long main keyid> <string>
Give a hint about the user ID for a certain keyID.
*** NEED_PASSPHRASE <long keyid> <long main keyid> <keytype> <keylength>
Issued whenever a passphrase is needed. KEYTYPE is the numerical
value of the public key algorithm or 0 if this is not applicable,
KEYLENGTH is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known (this
is currently always the case).
*** NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM <cipher_algo> <s2k_mode> <s2k_hash>
Issued whenever a passphrase for symmetric encryption is needed.
*** NEED_PASSPHRASE_PIN <card_type> <chvno> [<serialno>]
Issued whenever a PIN is requested to unlock a card.
*** MISSING_PASSPHRASE
No passphrase was supplied. An application which encounters this
message may want to stop parsing immediately because the next
message will probably be a BAD_PASSPHRASE. However, if the
application is a wrapper around the key edit menu functionality it
might not make sense to stop parsing but simply ignoring the
following BAD_PASSPHRASE.
*** BAD_PASSPHRASE <long keyid>
The supplied passphrase was wrong or not given. In the latter
case you may have seen a MISSING_PASSPHRASE.
*** GOOD_PASSPHRASE
The supplied passphrase was good and the secret key material
is therefore usable.
** Import/Export
*** IMPORT_CHECK <long keyid> <fingerprint> <user ID>
This status is emitted in interactive mode right before
the "import.okay" prompt.
*** IMPORTED <long keyid> <username>
The keyid and name of the signature just imported
*** IMPORT_OK <reason> [<fingerprint>]
The key with the primary key's FINGERPRINT has been imported.
REASON flags are:
- 0 :: Not actually changed
- 1 :: Entirely new key.
- 2 :: New user IDs
- 4 :: New signatures
- 8 :: New subkeys
- 16 :: Contains private key.
The flags may be ORed.
*** IMPORT_PROBLEM <reason> [<fingerprint>]
Issued for each import failure. Reason codes are:
- 0 :: No specific reason given.
- 1 :: Invalid Certificate.
- 2 :: Issuer Certificate missing.
- 3 :: Certificate Chain too long.
- 4 :: Error storing certificate.
*** IMPORT_RES <args>
Final statistics on import process (this is one long line). The
args are a list of unsigned numbers separated by white space:
- <count>
- <no_user_id>
- <imported>
- always 0 (formerly used for the number of RSA keys)
- <unchanged>
- <n_uids>
- <n_subk>
- <n_sigs>
- <n_revoc>
- <sec_read>
- <sec_imported>
- <sec_dups>
- <skipped_new_keys>
- <not_imported>
- <skipped_v3_keys>
*** EXPORTED <fingerprint>
The key with <fingerprint> has been exported. The fingerprint is
the fingerprint of the primary key even if the primary key has
been replaced by a stub key during secret key export.
*** EXPORT_RES <args>
Final statistics on export process (this is one long line). The
args are a list of unsigned numbers separated by white space:
- <count>
- <secret_count>
- <exported>
** Smartcard related
*** CARDCTRL <what> [<serialno>]
This is used to control smartcard operations. Defined values for
WHAT are:
- 1 :: Request insertion of a card. Serialnumber may be given
to request a specific card. Used by gpg 1.4 w/o
scdaemon
- 2 :: Request removal of a card. Used by gpg 1.4 w/o scdaemon.
- 3 :: Card with serialnumber detected
- 4 :: No card available
- 5 :: No card reader available
- 6 :: No card support available
- 7 :: Card is in termination state
*** SC_OP_FAILURE [<code>]
An operation on a smartcard definitely failed. Currently there is
no indication of the actual error code, but application should be
prepared to later accept more arguments. Defined values for
<code> are:
- 0 :: unspecified error (identically to a missing CODE)
- 1 :: canceled
- 2 :: bad PIN
*** SC_OP_SUCCESS
A smart card operaion succeeded. This status is only printed for
certain operation and is mostly useful to check whether a PIN
change really worked.
** Miscellaneous status codes
*** NODATA <what>
No data has been found. Codes for WHAT are:
- 1 :: No armored data.
- 2 :: Expected a packet but did not found one.
- 3 :: Invalid packet found, this may indicate a non OpenPGP
message.
- 4 :: Signature expected but not found
You may see more than one of these status lines.
*** UNEXPECTED <what>
Unexpected data has been encountered. Codes for WHAT are:
- 0 :: Not further specified
- 1 :: Corrupted message structure
*** TRUNCATED <maxno>
The output was truncated to MAXNO items. This status code is
issued for certain external requests.
*** ERROR <error location> <error code> [<more>]
This is a generic error status message, it might be followed by
error location specific data. <error code> and <error_location>
should not contain spaces. The error code is a either a string
commencing with a letter or such a string prefixed with a
numerical error code and an underscore; e.g.: "151011327_EOF".
*** WARNING <location> <error code> [<text>]
This is a generic warning status message, it might be followed by
error location specific data. <error code> and <location>
should not contain spaces. The error code is a either a string
commencing with a letter or such a string prefixed with a
numerical error code and an underscore; e.g.: "151011327_EOF".
*** SUCCESS [<location>]
Postive confirmation that an operation succeeded. It is used
similar to ISO-C's EXIT_SUCCESS. <location> is optional but if
given should not contain spaces. Used only with a few commands.
*** FAILURE <location> <error_code>
This is the counterpart to SUCCESS and used to indicate a program
failure. It is used similar to ISO-C's EXIT_FAILURE but allows
conveying more information, in particular a gpg-error error code.
That numerical error code may optionally have a suffix made of an
underscore and a string with an error symbol like "151011327_EOF".
A dash may be used instead of <location>.
*** BADARMOR
The ASCII armor is corrupted. No arguments yet.
*** DELETE_PROBLEM <reason_code>
Deleting a key failed. Reason codes are:
- 1 :: No such key
- 2 :: Must delete secret key first
- 3 :: Ambigious specification
- 4 :: Key is stored on a smartcard.
*** PROGRESS <what> <char> <cur> <total> [<units>]
Used by the primegen and Public key functions to indicate
progress. <char> is the character displayed with no --status-fd
enabled, with the linefeed replaced by an 'X'. <cur> is the
current amount done and <total> is amount to be done; a <total> of
0 indicates that the total amount is not known. The condition
: TOTAL && CUR == TOTAL
may be used to detect the end of an operation.
Well known values for WHAT are:
- pk_dsa :: DSA key generation
- pk_elg :: Elgamal key generation
- primegen :: Prime generation
- need_entropy :: Waiting for new entropy in the RNG
- tick :: Generic tick without any special meaning - useful
for letting clients know that the server is still
working.
- starting_agent :: A gpg-agent was started because it is not
running as a daemon.
- learncard :: Send by the agent and gpgsm while learing
the data of a smartcard.
- card_busy :: A smartcard is still working
<units> is sometines used to describe the units for <current> and
<total>. For example "B", "KiB", or "MiB".
*** BACKUP_KEY_CREATED <fingerprint> <fname>
A backup of a key identified by <fingerprint> has been writte to
the file <fname>; <fname> is percent-escaped.
*** MOUNTPOINT <name>
<name> is a percent-plus escaped filename describing the
mountpoint for the current operation (e.g. used by "g13 --mount").
This may either be the specified mountpoint or one randomly
choosen by g13.
*** PINENTRY_LAUNCHED <pid>
This status line is emitted by gpg to notify a client that a
Pinentry has been launched. <pid> is the PID of the Pinentry. It
may be used to display a hint to the user but can't be used to
synchronize with Pinentry. Note that there is also an Assuan
inquiry line with the same name used internally or, if enabled,
send to the client instead of this status line. Such an inquiry
may be used to sync with Pinentry
** Obsolete status codes
*** SIGEXPIRED
Removed on 2011-02-04. This is deprecated in favor of KEYEXPIRED.
*** RSA_OR_IDEA
Obsolete. This status message used to be emitted for requests to
use the IDEA or RSA algorithms. It has been dropped from GnuPG
2.1 after the respective patents expired.
*** SHM_INFO, SHM_GET, SHM_GET_BOOL, SHM_GET_HIDDEN
These were used for the ancient shared memory based co-processing.
*** BEGIN_STREAM, END_STREAM
Used to issued by the experimental pipemode.
* Format of the --attribute-fd output
When --attribute-fd is set, during key listings (--list-keys,
--list-secret-keys) GnuPG dumps each attribute packet to the file
descriptor specified. --attribute-fd is intended for use with
--status-fd as part of the required information is carried on the
ATTRIBUTE status tag (see above).
The contents of the attribute data is specified by RFC 4880. For
convenience, here is the Photo ID format, as it is currently the
only attribute defined:
- Byte 0-1 :: The length of the image header. Due to a historical
accident (i.e. oops!) back in the NAI PGP days, this
is a little-endian number. Currently 16 (0x10 0x00).
- Byte 2 :: The image header version. Currently 0x01.
- Byte 3 :: Encoding format. 0x01 == JPEG.
- Byte 4-15 :: Reserved, and currently unused.
All other data after this header is raw image (JPEG) data.
* Layout of the TrustDB
The TrustDB is built from fixed length records, where the first byte
describes the record type. All numeric values are stored in network
byte order. The length of each record is 40 bytes. The first
record of the DB is always of type 1 and this is the only record of
this type.
The record types: directory(2), key(3), uid(4), pref(5), sigrec(6),
and shadow directory(8) are not anymore used by version 2 of the
TrustDB.
** Record type 0
Unused record or deleted, can be reused for any purpose. Such
records should in general not exist because deleted records are of
type 254 and kept in a linked list.
** Version info (RECTYPE_VER, 1)
Version information for this TrustDB. This is always the first
record of the DB and the only one of this type.
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 1).
- 3 byte :: Magic value ("gpg")
- 1 u8 :: TrustDB version (value: 2).
- 1 u8 :: =marginals=. How many marginal trusted keys are required.
- 1 u8 :: =completes=. How many completely trusted keys are
required.
- 1 u8 :: =max_cert_depth=. How deep is the WoT evaluated. Along
with =marginals= and =completes=, this value is used to
check whether the cached validity value from a [FIXME
dir] record can be used.
- 1 u8 :: =trust_model=
- 1 u8 :: =min_cert_level=
- 2 byte :: Not used
- 1 u32 :: =created=. Timestamp of trustdb creation.
- 1 u32 :: =nextcheck=. Timestamp of last modification which may
affect the validity of keys in the trustdb. This value
is checked against the validity timestamp in the dir
records.
- 1 u32 :: =reserved=. Not used.
- 1 u32 :: =reserved2=. Not used.
- 1 u32 :: =firstfree=. Number of the record with the head record
of the RECTYPE_FREE linked list.
- 1 u32 :: =reserved3=. Not used.
- 1 u32 :: =trusthashtbl=. Record number of the trusthashtable.
** Hash table (RECTYPE_HTBL, 10)
Due to the fact that we use fingerprints to lookup keys, we can
implement quick access by some simple hash methods, and avoid the
overhead of gdbm. A property of fingerprints is that they can be
used directly as hash values. What we use is a dynamic multilevel
architecture, which combines hash tables, record lists, and linked
lists.
This record is a hash table of 256 entries with the property that
all these records are stored consecutively to make one big
table. The hash value is simple the 1st, 2nd, ... byte of the
fingerprint (depending on the indirection level).
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 10).
- 1 u8 :: Reserved
- n u32 :: =recnum=. A table with the hash table items fitting into
this record. =n= depends on the record length:
$n=(reclen-2)/4$ which yields 9 for oure current record
length of 40 bytes.
The total number of hash table records to form the table is:
$m=(256+n-1)/n$. This is 29 for our record length of 40.
To look up a key we use the first byte of the fingerprint to get
the recnum from this hash table and then look up the addressed
record:
- If that record is another hash table, we use 2nd byte to index
that hash table and so on;
- if that record is a hash list, we walk all entries until we find
a matching one; or
- if that record is a key record, we compare the fingerprint to
decide whether it is the requested key;
** Hash list (RECTYPE_HLST, 11)
See hash table above on how it is used. It may also be used for
other purposes.
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 11).
- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
- 1 u32 :: =next=. Record number of the next hash list record or 0
if none.
- n u32 :: =rnum=. Array with record numbers to values. With
$n=(reclen-5)/5$ and our record length of 40, n is 7.
** Trust record (RECTYPE_TRUST, 12)
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 12).
- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
- 20 byte :: =fingerprint=.
- 1 u8 :: =ownertrust=.
- 1 u8 :: =depth=.
- 1 u8 :: =min_ownertrust=.
- 1 byte :: Not used.
- 1 u32 :: =validlist=.
- 10 byte :: Not used.
** Validity record (RECTYPE_VALID, 13)
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 13).
- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
- 20 byte :: =namehash=.
- 1 u8 :: =validity=
- 1 u32 :: =next=.
- 1 u8 :: =full_count=.
- 1 u8 :: =marginal_count=.
- 11 byte :: Not used.
** Free record (RECTYPE_FREE, 254)
All these records form a linked list of unused records in the TrustDB.
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 254)
- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
- 1 u32 :: =next=. Record number of the next rcord of this type.
The record number to the head of this linked list is
stored in the version info record.
* Database scheme for the TOFU info
#+begin_src sql
--
-- The VERSION table holds the version of our TOFU data structures.
--
CREATE TABLE version (
version integer -- As of now this is always 1
);
--
-- The BINDINGS table associates mail addresses with keys.
--
CREATE TABLE bindings (
oid integer primary key autoincrement,
fingerprint text, -- The key's fingerprint in hex
email text, -- The normalized mail address destilled from user_id
user_id text, -- The unmodified user id
time integer, -- The time this binding was first observed.
policy boolean check
(policy in (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)), -- The trust policy with the values:
-- 1 := Auto
-- 2 := Good
-- 3 := Unknown
-- 4 := Bad
-- 5 := Ask
conflict string, -- NULL or a hex formatted fingerprint.
unique (fingerprint, email)
);
CREATE INDEX bindings_fingerprint_email on bindings (fingerprint, email);
CREATE INDEX bindings_email on bindings (email);
--
-- The SIGNATURES table records all data signatures we verified
--
CREATE TABLE signatures (
binding integer not null, -- Link to bindings table,
-- references bindings.oid.
sig_digest text, -- The digest of the signed message.
origin text, -- String describing who initially fed
-- the signature to gpg (e.g. "email:claws").
sig_time integer, -- Timestamp from the signature.
time integer, -- Time this record was created.
primary key (binding, sig_digest, origin)
);
#+end_src
* GNU extensions to the S2K algorithm
1 octet - S2K Usage: either 254 or 255.
1 octet - S2K Cipher Algo: 0
1 octet - S2K Specifier: 101
3 octets - "GNU"
1 octet - GNU S2K Extension Number.
If such a GNU extension is used neither an IV nor any kind of
checksum is used. The defined GNU S2K Extension Numbers are:
- 1 :: Do not store the secret part at all. No specific data
follows.
- 2 :: A stub to access smartcards. This data follows:
- One octet with the length of the following serial number.
- The serial number. Regardless of what the length octet
indicates no more than 16 octets are stored.
Note that gpg stores the GNU S2K Extension Number internally as an
S2K Specifier with an offset of 1000.
* Keyserver helper message format
*This information is obsolete*
(Keyserver helpers have been replaced by dirmngr)
The keyserver may be contacted by a Unix Domain socket or via TCP.
The format of a request is:
#+begin_example
command-tag
"Content-length:" digits
CRLF
#+end_example
Where command-tag is
#+begin_example
NOOP
GET <user-name>
PUT
DELETE <user-name>
#+end_example
The format of a response is:
#+begin_example
"GNUPG/1.0" status-code status-text
"Content-length:" digits
CRLF
#+end_example
followed by <digits> bytes of data
Status codes are:
- 1xx :: Informational - Request received, continuing process
- 2xx :: Success - The action was successfully received, understood,
and accepted
- 4xx :: Client Error - The request contains bad syntax or cannot be
fulfilled
- 5xx :: Server Error - The server failed to fulfill an apparently
valid request
* Object identifiers
OIDs below the GnuPG arc:
#+begin_example
1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2 GnuPG
1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1 notation
1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1.1 pkaAddress
1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2 X.509 extensions
1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.1 standaloneCertificate
1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.2 wellKnownPrivateKey
1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.12242973 invalid encoded OID
#+end_example
* Miscellaneous notes
** v3 fingerprints
For packet version 3 we calculate the keyids this way:
- RSA :: Low 64 bits of n
- ELGAMAL :: Build a v3 pubkey packet (with CTB 0x99) and
calculate a RMD160 hash value from it. This is used
as the fingerprint and the low 64 bits are the keyid.
** Simplified revocation certificates
Revocation certificates consist only of the signature packet;
"--import" knows how to handle this. The rationale behind it is to
keep them small.
** Documentation on HKP (the http keyserver protocol):
A minimalistic HTTP server on port 11371 recognizes a GET for
/pks/lookup. The standard http URL encoded query parameters are
this (always key=value):
- op=index (like pgp -kv), op=vindex (like pgp -kvv) and op=get (like
pgp -kxa)
- search=<stringlist>. This is a list of words that must occur in the key.
The words are delimited with space, points, @ and so on. The delimiters
are not searched for and the order of the words doesn't matter (but see
next option).
- exact=on. This switch tells the hkp server to only report exact matching
keys back. In this case the order and the "delimiters" are important.
- fingerprint=on. Also reports the fingerprints when used with 'index' or
'vindex'
The keyserver also recognizes http-POSTs to /pks/add. Use this to upload
keys.
A better way to do this would be a request like:
/pks/lookup/<gnupg_formatierte_user_id>?op=<operation>
This can be implemented using Hurd's translator mechanism.
However, I think the whole keyserver stuff has to be re-thought;
I have some ideas and probably create a white paper.
** Algorithm names for the "keygen.algo" prompt
When using a --command-fd controlled key generation or "addkey"
there is way to know the number to enter on the "keygen.algo"
prompt. The displayed numbers are for human reception and may
change with releases. To provide a stable way to enter a desired
algorithm choice the prompt also accepts predefined names for the
algorithms, which will not change.
| Name | No | Description |
|---------+----+---------------------------------|
| rsa+rsa | 1 | RSA and RSA (default) |
| dsa+elg | 2 | DSA and Elgamal |
| dsa | 3 | DSA (sign only) |
| rsa/s | 4 | RSA (sign only) |
| elg | 5 | Elgamal (encrypt only) |
| rsa/e | 6 | RSA (encrypt only) |
| dsa/* | 7 | DSA (set your own capabilities) |
| rsa/* | 8 | RSA (set your own capabilities) |
| ecc+ecc | 9 | ECC and ECC |
| ecc/s | 10 | ECC (sign only) |
| ecc/* | 11 | ECC (set your own capabilities) |
| ecc/e | 12 | ECC (encrypt only) |
| keygrip | 13 | Existing key |
If one of the "foo/*" names are used a "keygen.flags" prompt needs
to be answered as well. Instead of toggling the predefined flags,
it is also possible to set them direct: Use a "=" character
directly followed by a comination of "a" (for authentication), "s"
(for signing), or "c" (for certification).
diff --git a/g10/tofu.c b/g10/tofu.c
index ef14e85cd..29318c761 100644
--- a/g10/tofu.c
+++ b/g10/tofu.c
@@ -1,2527 +1,2554 @@
/* tofu.c - TOFU trust model.
* Copyright (C) 2015, 2016 g10 Code GmbH
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
/* TODO:
- Format the fingerprints nicely when printing (similar to gpg
--list-keys)
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <sqlite3.h>
#include "gpg.h"
#include "types.h"
#include "logging.h"
#include "stringhelp.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "mbox-util.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "ttyio.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "mkdir_p.h"
#include "gpgsql.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "tofu.h"
#define CONTROL_L ('L' - 'A' + 1)
/* Number of signed messages required to indicate that enough history
* is available for basic trust. */
#define BASIC_TRUST_THRESHOLD 10
/* Number of signed messages required to indicate that a lot of
* history is available. */
#define FULL_TRUST_THRESHOLD 100
/* An struct with data pertaining to the tofu DB.
To initialize this data structure, call opendbs(). Cleanup is done
when the CTRL object is released. To get a handle to a database,
use the getdb() function. This will either return an existing
handle or open a new DB connection, as appropriate. */
struct tofu_dbs_s
{
sqlite3 *db;
struct
{
sqlite3_stmt *savepoint_batch;
sqlite3_stmt *savepoint_batch_commit;
sqlite3_stmt *savepoint_inner;
sqlite3_stmt *savepoint_inner_commit;
sqlite3_stmt *record_binding_get_old_policy;
sqlite3_stmt *record_binding_update;
sqlite3_stmt *record_binding_update2;
sqlite3_stmt *get_policy_select_policy_and_conflict;
sqlite3_stmt *get_trust_bindings_with_this_email;
sqlite3_stmt *get_trust_gather_other_user_ids;
sqlite3_stmt *get_trust_gather_other_keys;
sqlite3_stmt *register_already_seen;
sqlite3_stmt *register_insert;
} s;
int batch_update;
};
#define STRINGIFY(s) STRINGIFY2(s)
#define STRINGIFY2(s) #s
/* The grouping parameters when collecting signature statistics. */
/* If a message is signed a couple of hours in the future, just assume
some clock skew. */
#define TIME_AGO_FUTURE_IGNORE (2 * 60 * 60)
#if 0
# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL 60
# define TIME_AGO_MEDIUM_THRESHOLD (60 * TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL)
# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM (60 * 60)
# define TIME_AGO_LARGE_THRESHOLD (24 * 60 * TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL)
# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE (24 * 60 * 60)
#else
# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL (24 * 60 * 60)
# define TIME_AGO_MEDIUM_THRESHOLD (4 * TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL)
# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM (7 * 24 * 60 * 60)
# define TIME_AGO_LARGE_THRESHOLD (28 * TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL)
# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE (30 * 24 * 60 * 60)
#endif
/* Local prototypes. */
static gpg_error_t end_transaction (ctrl_t ctrl, int only_batch);
const char *
tofu_policy_str (enum tofu_policy policy)
{
switch (policy)
{
case TOFU_POLICY_NONE: return "none";
case TOFU_POLICY_AUTO: return "auto";
case TOFU_POLICY_GOOD: return "good";
case TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN: return "unknown";
case TOFU_POLICY_BAD: return "bad";
case TOFU_POLICY_ASK: return "ask";
default: return "???";
}
}
/* Convert a binding policy (e.g., TOFU_POLICY_BAD) to a trust level
(e.g., TRUST_BAD) in light of the current configuration. */
int
tofu_policy_to_trust_level (enum tofu_policy policy)
{
if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO)
/* If POLICY is AUTO, fallback to OPT.TOFU_DEFAULT_POLICY. */
policy = opt.tofu_default_policy;
switch (policy)
{
case TOFU_POLICY_AUTO:
/* If POLICY and OPT.TOFU_DEFAULT_POLICY are both AUTO, default
to marginal trust. */
return TRUST_MARGINAL;
case TOFU_POLICY_GOOD:
return TRUST_FULLY;
case TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN:
return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
case TOFU_POLICY_BAD:
return TRUST_NEVER;
case TOFU_POLICY_ASK:
return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
default:
log_bug ("Bad value for trust policy: %d\n",
opt.tofu_default_policy);
return 0;
}
}
/* Start a transaction on DB. */
static gpg_error_t
begin_transaction (ctrl_t ctrl, int only_batch)
{
tofu_dbs_t dbs = ctrl->tofu.dbs;
int rc;
char *err = NULL;
log_assert (dbs);
if (ctrl->tofu.batch_update_ref
&& ctrl->tofu.batch_update_started != gnupg_get_time ())
{
/* We've been in batch update mode for a while (on average, more
* than 500 ms). To prevent starving other gpg processes, we
* drop and retake the batch lock.
*
* Note: if we wanted higher resolution, we could use
* npth_clock_gettime. */
if (dbs->batch_update)
end_transaction (ctrl, 1);
ctrl->tofu.batch_update_started = gnupg_get_time ();
/* Yield to allow another process a chance to run. */
gpgrt_yield ();
}
if (ctrl->tofu.batch_update_ref && !dbs->batch_update)
{
rc = gpgsql_stepx (dbs->db, &dbs->s.savepoint_batch,
NULL, NULL, &err,
"savepoint batch;", SQLITE_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error beginning transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
dbs->batch_update = 1;
}
if (only_batch)
return 0;
rc = gpgsql_stepx (dbs->db, &dbs->s.savepoint_inner,
NULL, NULL, &err,
"savepoint inner;", SQLITE_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error beginning transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
return 0;
}
/* Commit a transaction. If ONLY_BATCH is 1, then this only ends the
* batch transaction if we have left batch mode. If ONLY_BATCH is 2,
* this ends any open batch transaction even if we are still in batch
* mode. */
static gpg_error_t
end_transaction (ctrl_t ctrl, int only_batch)
{
tofu_dbs_t dbs = ctrl->tofu.dbs;
int rc;
char *err = NULL;
if (!dbs)
return 0; /* Shortcut to allow for easier cleanup code. */
if ((!ctrl->tofu.batch_update_ref || only_batch == 2) && dbs->batch_update)
{
/* The batch transaction is still in open, but we left batch
* mode. */
dbs->batch_update = 0;
rc = gpgsql_stepx (dbs->db, &dbs->s.savepoint_batch_commit,
NULL, NULL, &err,
"release batch;", SQLITE_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error committing transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
/* Releasing an outer transaction releases an open inner
transactions. We're done. */
return 0;
}
if (only_batch)
return 0;
rc = gpgsql_stepx (dbs->db, &dbs->s.savepoint_inner_commit,
NULL, NULL, &err,
"release inner;", SQLITE_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error committing transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
return 0;
}
static gpg_error_t
rollback_transaction (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
tofu_dbs_t dbs = ctrl->tofu.dbs;
int rc;
char *err = NULL;
if (!dbs)
return 0; /* Shortcut to allow for easier cleanup code. */
if (dbs->batch_update)
{
/* Just undo the most recent update; don't revert any progress
made by the batch transaction. */
rc = sqlite3_exec (dbs->db, "rollback to inner;", NULL, NULL, &err);
}
else
{
/* Rollback the whole she-bang. */
rc = sqlite3_exec (dbs->db, "rollback;", NULL, NULL, &err);
}
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error rolling back transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
return 0;
}
void
tofu_begin_batch_update (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
if (!ctrl->tofu.batch_update_ref)
ctrl->tofu.batch_update_started = gnupg_get_time ();
ctrl->tofu.batch_update_ref ++;
}
void
tofu_end_batch_update (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
log_assert (ctrl->tofu.batch_update_ref > 0);
ctrl->tofu.batch_update_ref --;
if (!ctrl->tofu.batch_update_ref)
end_transaction (ctrl, 1);
}
/* Wrapper around strtol which prints a warning in case of a
* conversion error. On success the converted value is stored at
* R_VALUE and 0 is returned; on error FALLBACK is stored at R_VALUE
* and an error code is returned. */
static gpg_error_t
string_to_long (long *r_value, const char *string, long fallback, int line)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *tail = NULL;
gpg_err_set_errno (0);
*r_value = strtol (string, &tail, 0);
if (errno || !(!strcmp (tail, ".0") || !*tail))
{
err = errno? gpg_error_from_errno (errno) : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
log_debug ("%s:%d: "
"strtol failed for DB returned string (tail=%.10s): %s\n",
__FILE__, line, tail, gpg_strerror (err));
*r_value = fallback;
}
else
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Wrapper around strtoul which prints a warning in case of a
* conversion error. On success the converted value is stored at
* R_VALUE and 0 is returned; on error FALLBACK is stored at R_VALUE
* and an error code is returned. */
static gpg_error_t
string_to_ulong (unsigned long *r_value, const char *string,
unsigned long fallback, int line)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *tail = NULL;
gpg_err_set_errno (0);
*r_value = strtoul (string, &tail, 0);
if (errno || !(!strcmp (tail, ".0") || !*tail))
{
err = errno? gpg_error_from_errno (errno) : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
log_debug ("%s:%d: "
"strtoul failed for DB returned string (tail=%.10s): %s\n",
__FILE__, line, tail, gpg_strerror (err));
*r_value = fallback;
}
else
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Collect results of a select count (*) ...; style query. Aborts if
the argument is not a valid integer (or real of the form X.0). */
static int
get_single_unsigned_long_cb (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv,
char **azColName)
{
unsigned long int *count = cookie;
(void) azColName;
log_assert (argc == 1);
if (string_to_ulong (count, argv[0], 0, __LINE__))
return 1; /* Abort. */
return 0;
}
static int
get_single_unsigned_long_cb2 (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv,
char **azColName, sqlite3_stmt *stmt)
{
(void) stmt;
return get_single_unsigned_long_cb (cookie, argc, argv, azColName);
}
/* We expect a single integer column whose name is "version". COOKIE
must point to an int. This function always aborts. On error or a
if the version is bad, sets *VERSION to -1. */
static int
version_check_cb (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv, char **azColName)
{
int *version = cookie;
if (argc != 1 || strcmp (azColName[0], "version") != 0)
{
*version = -1;
return 1;
}
if (strcmp (argv[0], "1") == 0)
*version = 1;
else
{
log_error (_("unsupported TOFU database version: %s\n"), argv[0]);
*version = -1;
}
/* Don't run again. */
return 1;
}
/* If the DB is new, initialize it. Otherwise, check the DB's
version.
Return 0 if the database is okay and 1 otherwise. */
static int
initdb (sqlite3 *db)
{
char *err = NULL;
int rc;
unsigned long int count;
int version = -1;
rc = sqlite3_exec (db, "begin transaction;", NULL, NULL, &err);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error beginning transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
return 1;
}
/* If the DB has no tables, then assume this is a new DB that needs
to be initialized. */
rc = sqlite3_exec (db,
"select count(*) from sqlite_master where type='table';",
get_single_unsigned_long_cb, &count, &err);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("query available tables");
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
else if (count != 0)
/* Assume that the DB is already initialized. Make sure the
version is okay. */
{
rc = sqlite3_exec (db, "select version from version;", version_check_cb,
&version, &err);
if (rc == SQLITE_ABORT && version == 1)
/* Happy, happy, joy, joy. */
{
sqlite3_free (err);
rc = 0;
goto out;
}
else if (rc == SQLITE_ABORT && version == -1)
/* Unsupported version. */
{
/* An error message was already displayed. */
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
else if (rc)
/* Some error. */
{
log_error (_("error determining TOFU database's version: %s\n"), err);
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
else
{
/* Unexpected success. This can only happen if there are no
rows. (select returned 0, but expected ABORT.) */
log_error (_("error determining TOFU database's version: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA));
rc = 1;
goto out;
}
}
/* Create the version table. */
rc = sqlite3_exec (db,
"create table version (version INTEGER);",
NULL, NULL, &err);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error initializing TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("create version");
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
/* Initialize the version table, which contains a single integer
value. */
rc = sqlite3_exec (db,
"insert into version values (1);",
NULL, NULL, &err);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error initializing TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("insert version");
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
/* The list of <fingerprint, email> bindings and auxiliary data.
*
* OID is a unique ID identifying this binding (and used by the
* signatures table, see below). Note: OIDs will never be
* reused.
*
* FINGERPRINT: The key's fingerprint.
*
* EMAIL: The normalized email address.
*
* USER_ID: The unmodified user id from which EMAIL was extracted.
*
* TIME: The time this binding was first observed.
*
* POLICY: The trust policy (TOFU_POLICY_BAD, etc. as an integer).
*
* CONFLICT is either NULL or a fingerprint. Assume that we have
* a binding <0xdeadbeef, foo@example.com> and then we observe
* <0xbaddecaf, foo@example.com>. There two bindings conflict
* (they have the same email address). When we observe the
* latter binding, we warn the user about the conflict and ask
* for a policy decision about the new binding. We also change
* the old binding's policy to ask if it was auto. So that we
* know why this occurred, we also set conflict to 0xbaddecaf.
*/
rc = gpgsql_exec_printf
(db, NULL, NULL, &err,
"create table bindings\n"
" (oid INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,\n"
" fingerprint TEXT, email TEXT, user_id TEXT, time INTEGER,\n"
" policy BOOLEAN CHECK (policy in (%d, %d, %d, %d, %d)),\n"
" conflict STRING,\n"
" unique (fingerprint, email));\n"
"create index bindings_fingerprint_email\n"
" on bindings (fingerprint, email);\n"
"create index bindings_email on bindings (email);\n",
TOFU_POLICY_AUTO, TOFU_POLICY_GOOD, TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN,
TOFU_POLICY_BAD, TOFU_POLICY_ASK);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error initializing TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("create bindings");
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
/* The signatures that we have observed.
*
* BINDING refers to a record in the bindings table, which
* describes the binding (i.e., this is a foreign key that
* references bindings.oid).
*
* SIG_DIGEST is the digest stored in the signature.
*
* SIG_TIME is the timestamp stored in the signature.
*
* ORIGIN is a free-form string that describes who fed this
* signature to GnuPG (e.g., email:claws).
*
* TIME is the time this signature was registered. */
rc = sqlite3_exec (db,
"create table signatures "
" (binding INTEGER NOT NULL, sig_digest TEXT,"
" origin TEXT, sig_time INTEGER, time INTEGER,"
" primary key (binding, sig_digest, origin));",
NULL, NULL, &err);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error initializing TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("create signatures");
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
out:
if (rc)
{
rc = sqlite3_exec (db, "rollback;", NULL, NULL, &err);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error rolling back transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
}
return 1;
}
else
{
rc = sqlite3_exec (db, "end transaction;", NULL, NULL, &err);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error committing transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
}
/* Create a new DB handle. Returns NULL on error. */
/* FIXME: Change to return an error code for better reporting by the
caller. */
static tofu_dbs_t
opendbs (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
char *filename;
sqlite3 *db;
int rc;
if (!ctrl->tofu.dbs)
{
filename = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), "tofu.db", NULL);
rc = sqlite3_open (filename, &db);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error opening TOFU database '%s': %s\n"),
filename, sqlite3_errmsg (db));
/* Even if an error occurs, DB is guaranteed to be valid. */
sqlite3_close (db);
db = NULL;
}
xfree (filename);
/* If a DB is locked wait up to 5 seconds for the lock to be cleared
before failing. */
if (db)
sqlite3_busy_timeout (db, 5 * 1000);
if (db && initdb (db))
{
sqlite3_close (db);
db = NULL;
}
if (db)
{
ctrl->tofu.dbs = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *ctrl->tofu.dbs);
ctrl->tofu.dbs->db = db;
}
}
else
log_assert (ctrl->tofu.dbs->db);
return ctrl->tofu.dbs;
}
/* Release all of the resources associated with the DB handle. */
void
tofu_closedbs (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
tofu_dbs_t dbs;
sqlite3_stmt **statements;
dbs = ctrl->tofu.dbs;
if (!dbs)
return; /* Not initialized. */
if (dbs->batch_update)
end_transaction (ctrl, 2);
/* Arghh, that is asurprising use of the struct. */
for (statements = (void *) &dbs->s;
(void *) statements < (void *) &(&dbs->s)[1];
statements ++)
sqlite3_finalize (*statements);
sqlite3_close (dbs->db);
xfree (dbs);
ctrl->tofu.dbs = NULL;
}
/* Collect results of a select min (foo) ...; style query. Aborts if
the argument is not a valid integer (or real of the form X.0). */
static int
get_single_long_cb (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv, char **azColName)
{
long *count = cookie;
(void) azColName;
log_assert (argc == 1);
if (string_to_long (count, argv[0], 0, __LINE__))
return 1; /* Abort. */
return 0;
}
static int
get_single_long_cb2 (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv, char **azColName,
sqlite3_stmt *stmt)
{
(void) stmt;
return get_single_long_cb (cookie, argc, argv, azColName);
}
/* Record (or update) a trust policy about a (possibly new)
binding.
If SHOW_OLD is set, the binding's old policy is displayed. */
static gpg_error_t
record_binding (tofu_dbs_t dbs, const char *fingerprint, const char *email,
const char *user_id, enum tofu_policy policy, int show_old)
{
char *fingerprint_pp = format_hexfingerprint (fingerprint, NULL, 0);
gpg_error_t rc;
char *err = NULL;
/* policy_old needs to be a long and not an enum tofu_policy,
because we pass it by reference to get_single_long_cb2, which
expects a long. */
long policy_old = TOFU_POLICY_NONE;
if (! (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_GOOD
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_BAD
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK))
log_bug ("%s: Bad value for policy (%d)!\n", __func__, policy);
if (show_old)
{
/* Get the old policy. Since this is just for informational
* purposes, there is no need to start a transaction or to die
* if there is a failure. */
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.record_binding_get_old_policy,
get_single_long_cb2, &policy_old, &err,
"select policy from bindings where fingerprint = ? and email = ?",
SQLITE_ARG_STRING, fingerprint, SQLITE_ARG_STRING, email,
SQLITE_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_debug ("TOFU: Error reading from binding database"
" (reading policy for <%s, %s>): %s\n",
fingerprint, email, err);
sqlite3_free (err);
}
}
if (DBG_TRUST)
{
if (policy_old != TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
log_debug ("Changing TOFU trust policy for binding <%s, %s>"
" from %s to %s.\n",
fingerprint, email,
tofu_policy_str (policy_old),
tofu_policy_str (policy));
else
log_debug ("Set TOFU trust policy for binding <%s, %s> to %s.\n",
fingerprint, email,
tofu_policy_str (policy));
}
if (policy_old == policy)
{
rc = 0;
goto leave; /* Nothing to do. */
}
if (opt.dry_run)
{
log_info ("TOFU database update skipped due to --dry-run\n");
rc = 0;
goto leave;
}
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.record_binding_update, NULL, NULL, &err,
"insert or replace into bindings\n"
" (oid, fingerprint, email, user_id, time, policy)\n"
" values (\n"
/* If we don't explicitly reuse the OID, then SQLite will
reallocate a new one. We just need to search for the OID
based on the fingerprint and email since they are unique. */
" (select oid from bindings where fingerprint = ? and email = ?),\n"
" ?, ?, ?, strftime('%s','now'), ?);",
SQLITE_ARG_STRING, fingerprint, SQLITE_ARG_STRING, email,
SQLITE_ARG_STRING, fingerprint, SQLITE_ARG_STRING, email,
SQLITE_ARG_STRING, user_id, SQLITE_ARG_INT, (int) policy,
SQLITE_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error updating TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info (" insert bindings <%s, %s> = %s",
fingerprint, email, tofu_policy_str (policy));
sqlite3_free (err);
goto leave;
}
leave:
xfree (fingerprint_pp);
return rc;
}
/* Collect the strings returned by a query in a simply string list.
Any NULL values are converted to the empty string.
If a result has 3 rows and each row contains two columns, then the
results are added to the list as follows (the value is parentheses
is the 1-based index in the final list):
row 1, col 2 (6)
row 1, col 1 (5)
row 2, col 2 (4)
row 2, col 1 (3)
row 3, col 2 (2)
row 3, col 1 (1)
This is because add_to_strlist pushes the results onto the front of
the list. The end result is that the rows are backwards, but the
columns are in the expected order. */
static int
strings_collect_cb (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv, char **azColName)
{
int i;
strlist_t *strlist = cookie;
(void) azColName;
for (i = argc - 1; i >= 0; i --)
add_to_strlist (strlist, argv[i] ? argv[i] : "");
return 0;
}
static int
strings_collect_cb2 (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv, char **azColName,
sqlite3_stmt *stmt)
{
(void) stmt;
return strings_collect_cb (cookie, argc, argv, azColName);
}
/* Auxiliary data structure to collect statistics about
signatures. */
struct signature_stats
{
struct signature_stats *next;
/* The user-assigned policy for this binding. */
enum tofu_policy policy;
/* How long ago the signature was created (rounded to a multiple of
TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL, etc.). */
long time_ago;
/* Number of signatures during this time. */
unsigned long count;
/* The key that generated this signature. */
char fingerprint[1];
};
static void
signature_stats_free (struct signature_stats *stats)
{
while (stats)
{
struct signature_stats *next = stats->next;
xfree (stats);
stats = next;
}
}
static void
signature_stats_prepend (struct signature_stats **statsp,
const char *fingerprint,
enum tofu_policy policy,
long time_ago,
unsigned long count)
{
struct signature_stats *stats =
xmalloc (sizeof (*stats) + strlen (fingerprint));
stats->next = *statsp;
*statsp = stats;
strcpy (stats->fingerprint, fingerprint);
stats->policy = policy;
stats->time_ago = time_ago;
stats->count = count;
}
/* Process rows that contain the four columns:
<fingerprint, policy, time ago, count>. */
static int
signature_stats_collect_cb (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv,
char **azColName, sqlite3_stmt *stmt)
{
struct signature_stats **statsp = cookie;
int i = 0;
enum tofu_policy policy;
long time_ago;
unsigned long count;
long along;
(void) azColName;
(void) stmt;
i ++;
if (string_to_long (&along, argv[i], 0, __LINE__))
return 1; /* Abort */
policy = along;
i ++;
if (! argv[i])
time_ago = 0;
else
{
if (string_to_long (&time_ago, argv[i], 0, __LINE__))
return 1; /* Abort. */
}
i ++;
/* If time_ago is NULL, then we had no messages, but we still have a
single row, which count(*) turns into 1. */
if (! argv[i - 1])
count = 0;
else
{
if (string_to_ulong (&count, argv[i], 0, __LINE__))
return 1; /* Abort */
}
i ++;
log_assert (argc == i);
signature_stats_prepend (statsp, argv[0], policy, time_ago, count);
return 0;
}
/* Convert from seconds to time units.
Note: T should already be a multiple of TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL or
TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM or TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE. */
signed long
time_ago_scale (signed long t)
{
if (t < TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM)
return t / TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL;
if (t < TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE)
return t / TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM;
return t / TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE;
}
/* Return the policy for the binding <FINGERPRINT, EMAIL> (email has
already been normalized) and any conflict information in *CONFLICT
if CONFLICT is not NULL. Returns _tofu_GET_POLICY_ERROR if an error
occurs. */
static enum tofu_policy
get_policy (tofu_dbs_t dbs, const char *fingerprint, const char *email,
char **conflict)
{
int rc;
char *err = NULL;
strlist_t strlist = NULL;
enum tofu_policy policy = _tofu_GET_POLICY_ERROR;
long along;
/* Check if the <FINGERPRINT, EMAIL> binding is known
(TOFU_POLICY_NONE cannot appear in the DB. Thus, if POLICY is
still TOFU_POLICY_NONE after executing the query, then the
result set was empty.) */
rc = gpgsql_stepx (dbs->db, &dbs->s.get_policy_select_policy_and_conflict,
strings_collect_cb2, &strlist, &err,
"select policy, conflict from bindings\n"
" where fingerprint = ? and email = ?",
SQLITE_ARG_STRING, fingerprint,
SQLITE_ARG_STRING, email,
SQLITE_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("checking for existing bad bindings");
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
if (strlist_length (strlist) == 0)
/* No results. */
{
policy = TOFU_POLICY_NONE;
goto out;
}
else if (strlist_length (strlist) != 2)
/* The result has the wrong form. */
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA));
print_further_info ("checking for existing bad bindings:"
" expected 2 results, got %d\n",
strlist_length (strlist));
goto out;
}
/* The result has the right form. */
if (string_to_long (&along, strlist->d, 0, __LINE__))
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA));
print_further_info ("bad value for policy: %s", strlist->d);
goto out;
}
policy = along;
if (! (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_GOOD
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_BAD
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK))
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_DB_CORRUPTED));
print_further_info ("invalid value for policy (%d)", policy);
policy = _tofu_GET_POLICY_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* If CONFLICT is set, then policy should be TOFU_POLICY_ASK. But,
just in case, we do the check again here and ignore the conflict
is POLICY is not TOFU_POLICY_ASK. */
if (conflict)
{
if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK && *strlist->next->d)
*conflict = xstrdup (strlist->next->d);
else
*conflict = NULL;
}
out:
log_assert (policy == _tofu_GET_POLICY_ERROR
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_GOOD
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_BAD
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK);
free_strlist (strlist);
return policy;
}
/* Format the first part of a conflict message and return that as a
* malloced string. */
static char *
format_conflict_msg_part1 (int policy, const char *conflict,
const char *fingerprint, const char *email)
{
estream_t fp;
char *binding;
int binding_shown = 0;
char *tmpstr, *text;
binding = xasprintf ("<%s, %s>", fingerprint, email);
fp = es_fopenmem (0, "rw,samethread");
if (!fp)
log_fatal ("error creating memory stream: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror()));
if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
{
es_fprintf (fp, _("The binding %s is NOT known."), binding);
es_fputs (" ", fp);
binding_shown = 1;
}
else if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK
/* If there the conflict is with itself, then don't
* display this message. */
&& conflict && strcmp (conflict, fingerprint))
{
es_fprintf (fp,
_("The key with fingerprint %s raised a conflict "
"with the binding %s."
" Since this binding's policy was 'auto', it was "
"changed to 'ask'."),
conflict, binding);
es_fputs (" ", fp);
binding_shown = 1;
}
/* TRANSLATORS: The %s%s is replaced by either a fingerprint and a
blank or by two empty strings. */
es_fprintf (fp,
_("Please indicate whether you believe the binding %s%s"
"is legitimate (the key belongs to the stated owner) "
"or a forgery (bad)."),
binding_shown ? "" : binding,
binding_shown ? "" : " ");
es_fputc ('\n', fp);
xfree (binding);
es_fputc (0, fp);
if (es_fclose_snatch (fp, (void **)&tmpstr, NULL))
log_fatal ("error snatching memory stream\n");
text = format_text (tmpstr, 0, 72, 80);
es_free (tmpstr);
return text;
}
/* Ask the user about the binding. There are three ways we could end
* up here:
*
* - This is a new binding and there is a conflict
* (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE && bindings_with_this_email_count > 0),
*
* - This is a new binding and opt.tofu_default_policy is set to
* ask. (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE && opt.tofu_default_policy ==
* TOFU_POLICY_ASK), or,
*
* - The policy is ask (the user deferred last time) (policy ==
* TOFU_POLICY_ASK).
*/
static void
ask_about_binding (tofu_dbs_t dbs,
enum tofu_policy *policy,
int *trust_level,
int bindings_with_this_email_count,
strlist_t bindings_with_this_email,
char *conflict,
const char *fingerprint,
const char *email,
const char *user_id)
{
char *sqerr = NULL;
int rc;
estream_t fp;
strlist_t other_user_ids = NULL;
struct signature_stats *stats = NULL;
struct signature_stats *stats_iter = NULL;
char *prompt;
char *choices;
fp = es_fopenmem (0, "rw,samethread");
if (!fp)
log_fatal ("error creating memory stream: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror()));
{
char *text = format_conflict_msg_part1 (*policy, conflict,
fingerprint, email);
es_fputs (text, fp);
es_fputc ('\n', fp);
xfree (text);
}
/* Find other user ids associated with this key and whether the
* bindings are marked as good or bad. */
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.get_trust_gather_other_user_ids,
strings_collect_cb2, &other_user_ids, &sqerr,
"select user_id, policy from bindings where fingerprint = ?;",
SQLITE_ARG_STRING, fingerprint, SQLITE_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error gathering other user IDs: %s\n"), sqerr);
sqlite3_free (sqerr);
sqerr = NULL;
}
if (other_user_ids)
{
strlist_t strlist_iter;
es_fprintf (fp, _("Known user IDs associated with this key:\n"));
for (strlist_iter = other_user_ids;
strlist_iter;
strlist_iter = strlist_iter->next)
{
char *other_user_id = strlist_iter->d;
char *other_thing;
enum tofu_policy other_policy;
log_assert (strlist_iter->next);
strlist_iter = strlist_iter->next;
other_thing = strlist_iter->d;
other_policy = atoi (other_thing);
es_fprintf (fp, " %s (", other_user_id);
es_fprintf (fp, _("policy: %s"), tofu_policy_str (other_policy));
es_fprintf (fp, ")\n");
}
es_fprintf (fp, "\n");
free_strlist (other_user_ids);
}
/* Find other keys associated with this email address. */
/* FIXME: When generating the statistics, do we want the time
embedded in the signature (column 'sig_time') or the time that
we first verified the signature (column 'time'). */
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.get_trust_gather_other_keys,
signature_stats_collect_cb, &stats, &sqerr,
"select fingerprint, policy, time_ago, count(*)\n"
" from (select bindings.*,\n"
" case\n"
/* From the future (but if its just a couple of hours in the
* future don't turn it into a warning)? Or should we use
* small, medium or large units? (Note: whatever we do, we
* keep the value in seconds. Then when we group, everything
* that rounds to the same number of seconds is grouped.) */
" when delta < -("STRINGIFY (TIME_AGO_FUTURE_IGNORE)") then -1\n"
" when delta < ("STRINGIFY (TIME_AGO_MEDIUM_THRESHOLD)")\n"
" then max(0,\n"
" round(delta / ("STRINGIFY (TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL)"))\n"
" * ("STRINGIFY (TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL)"))\n"
" when delta < ("STRINGIFY (TIME_AGO_LARGE_THRESHOLD)")\n"
" then round(delta / ("STRINGIFY (TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM)"))\n"
" * ("STRINGIFY (TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM)")\n"
" else round(delta / ("STRINGIFY (TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE)"))\n"
" * ("STRINGIFY (TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE)")\n"
" end time_ago,\n"
" delta time_ago_raw\n"
" from bindings\n"
" left join\n"
" (select *,\n"
" cast(strftime('%s','now') - sig_time as real) delta\n"
" from signatures) ss\n"
" on ss.binding = bindings.oid)\n"
" where email = ?\n"
" group by fingerprint, time_ago\n"
/* Make sure the current key is first. */
" order by fingerprint = ? asc, fingerprint desc, time_ago desc;\n",
SQLITE_ARG_STRING, email, SQLITE_ARG_STRING, fingerprint,
SQLITE_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
strlist_t strlist_iter;
log_error (_("error gathering signature stats: %s\n"), sqerr);
sqlite3_free (sqerr);
sqerr = NULL;
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("The email address \"%s\" is"
" associated with %d key:\n",
"The email address \"%s\" is"
" associated with %d keys:\n",
bindings_with_this_email_count),
email, bindings_with_this_email_count);
for (strlist_iter = bindings_with_this_email;
strlist_iter;
strlist_iter = strlist_iter->next)
es_fprintf (fp, " %s\n", strlist_iter->d);
}
else
{
char *key = NULL;
if (! stats || strcmp (stats->fingerprint, fingerprint))
{
/* If we have already added this key to the DB, then it will
* be first (see the above select). Since the first key on
* the list is not this key, we must not yet have verified any
* messages signed by this key. Add a dummy entry. */
signature_stats_prepend (&stats, fingerprint, TOFU_POLICY_AUTO, 0, 0);
}
es_fprintf (fp, _("Statistics for keys with the email address \"%s\":\n"),
email);
for (stats_iter = stats; stats_iter; stats_iter = stats_iter->next)
{
if (! key || strcmp (key, stats_iter->fingerprint))
{
int this_key;
char *key_pp;
key = stats_iter->fingerprint;
this_key = strcmp (key, fingerprint) == 0;
key_pp = format_hexfingerprint (key, NULL, 0);
es_fprintf (fp, " %s (", key_pp);
if (this_key)
es_fprintf (fp, _("this key"));
else
es_fprintf (fp, _("policy: %s"),
tofu_policy_str (stats_iter->policy));
es_fputs ("):\n", fp);
xfree (key_pp);
}
es_fputs (" ", fp);
if (stats_iter->time_ago == -1)
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("%ld message signed in the future.",
"%ld messages signed in the future.",
stats_iter->count), stats_iter->count);
else
{
long t_scaled = time_ago_scale (stats_iter->time_ago);
/* TANSLATORS: This string is concatenated with one of
* the day/week/month strings to form one sentence. */
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("%ld message signed",
"%ld messages signed",
stats_iter->count), stats_iter->count);
if (!stats_iter->count)
es_fputs (".", fp);
else if (stats_iter->time_ago < TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM)
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext(" over the past %ld day.",
" over the past %ld days.",
t_scaled), t_scaled);
else if (stats_iter->time_ago < TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE)
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext(" over the past %ld week.",
" over the past %ld weeks.",
t_scaled), t_scaled);
else
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext(" over the past %ld month.",
" over the past %ld months.",
t_scaled), t_scaled);
}
es_fputs ("\n", fp);
}
}
if ((*policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE && bindings_with_this_email_count > 0)
|| (*policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK && conflict))
{
/* This is a conflict. */
/* TRANSLATORS: Please translate the text found in the source
* file below. We don't directly internationalize that text so
* that we can tweak it without breaking translations. */
char *text = _("TOFU detected a binding conflict");
char *textbuf;
if (!strcmp (text, "TOFU detected a binding conflict"))
{
/* No translation. Use the English text. */
text =
"Normally, there is only a single key associated with an email "
"address. However, people sometimes generate a new key if "
"their key is too old or they think it might be compromised. "
"Alternatively, a new key may indicate a man-in-the-middle "
"attack! Before accepting this key, you should talk to or "
"call the person to make sure this new key is legitimate.";
}
textbuf = format_text (text, 0, 72, 80);
es_fprintf (fp, "\n%s\n", text);
xfree (textbuf);
}
es_fputc ('\n', fp);
/* Add a NUL terminator. */
es_fputc (0, fp);
if (es_fclose_snatch (fp, (void **) &prompt, NULL))
log_fatal ("error snatching memory stream\n");
/* I think showing the large message once is sufficient. If we
* would move it right before the cpr_get many lines will scroll
* away and the user might not realize that he merely entered a
* wrong choise (because he does not see that either). As a small
* benefit we allow C-L to redisplay everything. */
tty_printf ("%s", prompt);
while (1)
{
char *response;
/* TRANSLATORS: Two letters (normally the lower and upper case
* version of the hotkey) for each of the five choices. If
* there is only one choice in your language, repeat it. */
choices = _("gG" "aA" "uU" "rR" "bB");
if (strlen (choices) != 10)
log_bug ("Bad TOFU conflict translation! Please report.");
response = cpr_get
("tofu.conflict",
_("(G)ood, (A)ccept once, (U)nknown, (R)eject once, (B)ad? "));
trim_spaces (response);
cpr_kill_prompt ();
if (*response == CONTROL_L)
tty_printf ("%s", prompt);
else if (strlen (response) == 1)
{
char *choice = strchr (choices, *response);
if (choice)
{
int c = ((size_t) choice - (size_t) choices) / 2;
switch (c)
{
case 0: /* Good. */
*policy = TOFU_POLICY_GOOD;
*trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (*policy);
break;
case 1: /* Accept once. */
*policy = TOFU_POLICY_ASK;
*trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (TOFU_POLICY_GOOD);
break;
case 2: /* Unknown. */
*policy = TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN;
*trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (*policy);
break;
case 3: /* Reject once. */
*policy = TOFU_POLICY_ASK;
*trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (TOFU_POLICY_BAD);
break;
case 4: /* Bad. */
*policy = TOFU_POLICY_BAD;
*trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (*policy);
break;
default:
log_bug ("c should be between 0 and 4 but it is %d!", c);
}
if (record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id,
*policy, 0))
{
/* If there's an error registering the
* binding, don't save the signature. */
*trust_level = _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR;
}
break;
}
}
xfree (response);
}
xfree (prompt);
signature_stats_free (stats);
}
/* Return the trust level (TRUST_NEVER, etc.) for the binding
* <FINGERPRINT, EMAIL> (email is already normalized). If no policy
* is registered, returns TOFU_POLICY_NONE. If an error occurs,
* returns _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR.
*
* PK is the public key object for FINGERPRINT.
*
* USER_ID is the unadulterated user id.
*
* If MAY_ASK is set, then we may interact with the user. This is
* necessary if there is a conflict or the binding's policy is
* TOFU_POLICY_ASK. In the case of a conflict, we set the new
* conflicting binding's policy to TOFU_POLICY_ASK. In either case,
* we return TRUST_UNDEFINED. */
static enum tofu_policy
get_trust (tofu_dbs_t dbs, PKT_public_key *pk,
const char *fingerprint, const char *email,
const char *user_id, int may_ask)
{
enum tofu_policy policy;
char *conflict = NULL;
int rc;
char *sqerr = NULL;
strlist_t bindings_with_this_email = NULL;
int bindings_with_this_email_count;
int change_conflicting_to_ask = 0;
int trust_level = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
if (opt.batch)
may_ask = 0;
/* Make sure _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR isn't equal to any of the trust
levels. */
log_assert (_tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_UNKNOWN
&& _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_EXPIRED
&& _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_UNDEFINED
&& _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_NEVER
&& _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_MARGINAL
&& _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_FULLY
&& _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_ULTIMATE);
policy = get_policy (dbs, fingerprint, email, &conflict);
if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO || policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
{ /* See if the key is ultimately trusted. If so, we're done. */
u32 kid[2];
keyid_from_pk (pk, kid);
if (tdb_keyid_is_utk (kid))
{
if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
{
if (record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id,
TOFU_POLICY_AUTO, 0) != 0)
{
log_error (_("error setting TOFU binding's trust level"
" to %s\n"), "auto");
trust_level = _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR;
goto out;
}
}
trust_level = TRUST_ULTIMATE;
goto out;
}
}
if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO)
{
policy = opt.tofu_default_policy;
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("TOFU: binding <%s, %s>'s policy is auto (default: %s).\n",
fingerprint, email,
tofu_policy_str (opt.tofu_default_policy));
}
switch (policy)
{
case TOFU_POLICY_AUTO:
case TOFU_POLICY_GOOD:
case TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN:
case TOFU_POLICY_BAD:
/* The saved judgement is auto -> auto, good, unknown or bad.
* We don't need to ask the user anything. */
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("TOFU: Known binding <%s, %s>'s policy: %s\n",
fingerprint, email, tofu_policy_str (policy));
trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (policy);
goto out;
case TOFU_POLICY_ASK:
/* We need to ask the user what to do. Case #1 or #2 below. */
if (! may_ask)
{
trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
goto out;
}
break;
case TOFU_POLICY_NONE:
/* The binding is new, we need to check for conflicts. Case #3
* below. */
break;
case _tofu_GET_POLICY_ERROR:
trust_level = _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR;
goto out;
default:
log_bug ("%s: Impossible value for policy (%d)\n", __func__, policy);
}
/* We get here if:
*
* 1. The saved policy is auto and the default policy is ask
* (get_policy() == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO
* && opt.tofu_default_policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK)
*
* 2. The saved policy is ask (either last time the user selected
* accept once or reject once or there was a conflict and this
* binding's policy was changed from auto to ask)
* (policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK), or,
*
* 3. We don't have a saved policy (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
* (need to check for a conflict).
*/
/* Look for conflicts. This is needed in all 3 cases.
*
* Get the fingerprints of any bindings that share the email
* address. Note: if the binding in question is in the DB, it will
* also be returned. Thus, if the result set is empty, then this is
* a new binding. */
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.get_trust_bindings_with_this_email,
strings_collect_cb2, &bindings_with_this_email, &sqerr,
"select distinct fingerprint from bindings where email = ?;",
SQLITE_ARG_STRING, email, SQLITE_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"), sqerr);
print_further_info ("listing fingerprints");
sqlite3_free (sqerr);
goto out;
}
bindings_with_this_email_count = strlist_length (bindings_with_this_email);
if (bindings_with_this_email_count == 0
&& opt.tofu_default_policy != TOFU_POLICY_ASK)
{
/* New binding with no conflict and a concrete default policy.
*
* We've never observed a binding with this email address
* BINDINGS_WITH_THIS_EMAIL_COUNT is 0 and the above query would
* return the current binding if it were in the DB) and we have
* a default policy, which is not to ask the user.
*/
/* If we've seen this binding, then we've seen this email and
policy couldn't possibly be TOFU_POLICY_NONE. */
log_assert (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE);
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("TOFU: New binding <%s, %s>, no conflict.\n",
email, fingerprint);
if (record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id,
TOFU_POLICY_AUTO, 0) != 0)
{
log_error (_("error setting TOFU binding's trust level to %s\n"),
"auto");
trust_level = _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR;
goto out;
}
trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (TOFU_POLICY_AUTO);
goto out;
}
if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
{
/* This is a new binding and we have a conflict. Mark any
* conflicting bindings that have an automatic policy as now
* requiring confirmation. Note: we delay this until after we
* ask for confirmation so that when the current policy is
* printed, it is correct. */
change_conflicting_to_ask = 1;
}
if (! may_ask)
{
/* We can only get here in the third case (no saved policy) and
* if there is a conflict. (If the policy was ask (cases #1 and
* #2) and we weren't allowed to ask, we'd have already exited). */
log_assert (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE);
if (record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id,
TOFU_POLICY_ASK, 0) != 0)
log_error (_("error setting TOFU binding's trust level to %s\n"),
"ask");
trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
goto out;
}
/* If we get here, we need to ask the user about the binding. */
ask_about_binding (dbs,
&policy,
&trust_level,
bindings_with_this_email_count,
bindings_with_this_email,
conflict,
fingerprint,
email,
user_id);
out:
if (change_conflicting_to_ask)
{
if (! may_ask)
{
/* If we weren't allowed to ask, also update this key as
conflicting with itself. */
rc = gpgsql_exec_printf
(dbs->db, NULL, NULL, &sqerr,
"update bindings set policy = %d, conflict = %Q"
" where email = %Q"
" and (policy = %d or (policy = %d and fingerprint = %Q));",
TOFU_POLICY_ASK, fingerprint, email, TOFU_POLICY_AUTO,
TOFU_POLICY_ASK, fingerprint);
}
else
{
rc = gpgsql_exec_printf
(dbs->db, NULL, NULL, &sqerr,
"update bindings set policy = %d, conflict = %Q"
" where email = %Q and fingerprint != %Q and policy = %d;",
TOFU_POLICY_ASK, fingerprint, email, fingerprint,
TOFU_POLICY_AUTO);
}
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error changing TOFU policy: %s\n"), sqerr);
sqlite3_free (sqerr);
sqerr = NULL;
}
}
xfree (conflict);
free_strlist (bindings_with_this_email);
return trust_level;
}
/* Return a malloced string of the form
* "7 months, 1 day, 5 minutes, 0 seconds"
* The caller should replace all '~' in the returned string by a space
* and also free the returned string.
*
* This is actually a bad hack which may not work correctly with all
* languages.
*/
static char *
time_ago_str (long long int t)
{
estream_t fp;
int years = 0;
int months = 0;
int days = 0;
int hours = 0;
int minutes = 0;
int seconds = 0;
/* The number of units that we've printed so far. */
int count = 0;
/* The first unit that we printed (year = 0, month = 1,
etc.). */
int first = -1;
/* The current unit. */
int i = 0;
char *str;
/* It would be nice to use a macro to do this, but gettext
works on the unpreprocessed code. */
#define MIN_SECS (60)
#define HOUR_SECS (60 * MIN_SECS)
#define DAY_SECS (24 * HOUR_SECS)
#define MONTH_SECS (30 * DAY_SECS)
#define YEAR_SECS (365 * DAY_SECS)
if (t > YEAR_SECS)
{
years = t / YEAR_SECS;
t -= years * YEAR_SECS;
}
if (t > MONTH_SECS)
{
months = t / MONTH_SECS;
t -= months * MONTH_SECS;
}
if (t > DAY_SECS)
{
days = t / DAY_SECS;
t -= days * DAY_SECS;
}
if (t > HOUR_SECS)
{
hours = t / HOUR_SECS;
t -= hours * HOUR_SECS;
}
if (t > MIN_SECS)
{
minutes = t / MIN_SECS;
t -= minutes * MIN_SECS;
}
seconds = t;
#undef MIN_SECS
#undef HOUR_SECS
#undef DAY_SECS
#undef MONTH_SECS
#undef YEAR_SECS
fp = es_fopenmem (0, "rw,samethread");
if (! fp)
log_fatal ("error creating memory stream: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror()));
if (years)
{
/* TRANSLATORS: The tilde ('~') is used here to indicate a
* non-breakable space */
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("%d~year", "%d~years", years), years);
count ++;
first = i;
}
i ++;
if ((first == -1 || i - first <= 3) && months)
{
if (count)
es_fprintf (fp, ", ");
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("%d~month", "%d~months", months), months);
count ++;
first = i;
}
i ++;
if ((first == -1 || i - first <= 3) && count < 2 && days)
{
if (count)
es_fprintf (fp, ", ");
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("%d~day", "%d~days", days), days);
count ++;
first = i;
}
i ++;
if ((first == -1 || i - first <= 3) && count < 2 && hours)
{
if (count)
es_fprintf (fp, ", ");
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("%d~hour", "%d~hours", hours), hours);
count ++;
first = i;
}
i ++;
if ((first == -1 || i - first <= 3) && count < 2 && minutes)
{
if (count)
es_fprintf (fp, ", ");
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("%d~minute", "%d~minutes", minutes), minutes);
count ++;
first = i;
}
i ++;
if ((first == -1 || i - first <= 3) && count < 2)
{
if (count)
es_fprintf (fp, ", ");
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("%d~second", "%d~seconds", seconds), seconds);
}
es_fputc (0, fp);
if (es_fclose_snatch (fp, (void **) &str, NULL))
log_fatal ("error snatching memory stream\n");
return str;
}
-/* Write TOFU_STATS status line. */
+/* If FP is NULL, write TOFU_STATS status line. If FP is not NULL
+ * write a "tfs" record to that stream. */
static void
-write_stats_status (long messages, enum tofu_policy policy,
- long first_seen_ago, long most_recent_seen_ago)
+write_stats_status (estream_t fp, long messages, enum tofu_policy policy,
+ unsigned long first_seen,
+ unsigned long most_recent_seen)
{
- char numbuf1[35];
- char numbuf2[35];
- char numbuf3[35];
const char *validity;
if (messages < 1)
validity = "1"; /* Key without history. */
else if (messages < BASIC_TRUST_THRESHOLD)
validity = "2"; /* Key with too little history. */
else if (messages < FULL_TRUST_THRESHOLD)
validity = "3"; /* Key with enough history for basic trust. */
else
validity = "4"; /* Key with a lot of history. */
- snprintf (numbuf1, sizeof numbuf1, " %ld", messages);
- *numbuf2 = *numbuf3 = 0;
- if (first_seen_ago >= 0 && most_recent_seen_ago >= 0)
+ if (fp)
{
- snprintf (numbuf2, sizeof numbuf2, " %ld", first_seen_ago);
- snprintf (numbuf3, sizeof numbuf3, " %ld", most_recent_seen_ago);
+ es_fprintf (fp, "tfs:1:%s:%ld:0:%s:%lu:%lu:\n",
+ validity, messages,
+ tofu_policy_str (policy),
+ first_seen, most_recent_seen);
}
+ else
+ {
+ char numbuf1[35];
+ char numbuf2[35];
+ char numbuf3[35];
+
+ snprintf (numbuf1, sizeof numbuf1, " %ld", messages);
+ *numbuf2 = *numbuf3 = 0;
+ if (first_seen && most_recent_seen)
+ {
+ snprintf (numbuf2, sizeof numbuf2, " %lu", first_seen);
+ snprintf (numbuf3, sizeof numbuf3, " %lu", most_recent_seen);
+ }
- write_status_strings (STATUS_TOFU_STATS,
- validity, numbuf1, " 0",
- " ", tofu_policy_str (policy),
- numbuf2, numbuf3,
- NULL);
+ write_status_strings (STATUS_TOFU_STATS,
+ validity, numbuf1, " 0",
+ " ", tofu_policy_str (policy),
+ numbuf2, numbuf3,
+ NULL);
+ }
}
static void
show_statistics (tofu_dbs_t dbs, const char *fingerprint,
const char *email, const char *user_id,
const char *sig_exclude)
{
char *fingerprint_pp;
int rc;
strlist_t strlist = NULL;
char *err = NULL;
fingerprint_pp = format_hexfingerprint (fingerprint, NULL, 0);
rc = gpgsql_exec_printf
(dbs->db, strings_collect_cb, &strlist, &err,
- "select count (*), strftime('%%s','now') - min (signatures.time),\n"
- " strftime('%%s','now') - max (signatures.time)\n"
+ "select count (*), min (signatures.time), max (signatures.time)\n"
" from signatures\n"
" left join bindings on signatures.binding = bindings.oid\n"
" where fingerprint = %Q and email = %Q and sig_digest %s%s%s;",
fingerprint, email,
/* We want either: sig_digest != 'SIG_EXCLUDE' or sig_digest is
not NULL. */
sig_exclude ? "!= '" : "is not NULL",
sig_exclude ? sig_exclude : "",
sig_exclude ? "'" : "");
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("getting statistics");
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
+
write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_TOFU_USER, fingerprint,
email, strlen (email), 0);
if (! strlist)
{
log_info (_("Have never verified a message signed by key %s!\n"),
fingerprint_pp);
- write_stats_status (0, TOFU_POLICY_NONE, -1, -1);
+ write_stats_status (NULL, 0, TOFU_POLICY_NONE, 0, 0);
}
else
{
+ unsigned long now = gnupg_get_time ();
signed long messages;
- signed long first_seen_ago;
- signed long most_recent_seen_ago;
+ unsigned long first_seen;
+ unsigned long most_recent_seen;
log_assert (strlist_length (strlist) == 3);
string_to_long (&messages, strlist->d, -1, __LINE__);
if (messages == 0 && *strlist->next->d == '\0')
{ /* min(NULL) => NULL => "". */
- first_seen_ago = -1;
- most_recent_seen_ago = -1;
+ first_seen = 0;
+ most_recent_seen = 0;
}
else
{
- string_to_long (&first_seen_ago, strlist->next->d, -1, __LINE__);
- string_to_long (&most_recent_seen_ago, strlist->next->next->d, -1,
- __LINE__);
+ string_to_ulong (&first_seen, strlist->next->d, -1, __LINE__);
+ if (first_seen > now)
+ {
+ log_debug ("time-warp - tofu DB has a future value (%lu, %lu)\n",
+ first_seen, now);
+ first_seen = now;
+ }
+ string_to_ulong (&most_recent_seen, strlist->next->next->d, -1,
+ __LINE__);
+ if (most_recent_seen > now)
+ {
+ log_debug ("time-warp - tofu DB has a future value (%lu, %lu)\n",
+ most_recent_seen, now);
+ most_recent_seen = now;
+ }
+
}
- if (messages == -1 || first_seen_ago == -1)
+ if (messages == -1 || !first_seen)
{
- write_stats_status (0, TOFU_POLICY_NONE, -1, -1);
+ write_stats_status (NULL, 0, TOFU_POLICY_NONE, 0, 0);
log_info (_("Failed to collect signature statistics for \"%s\"\n"
"(key %s)\n"),
user_id, fingerprint_pp);
}
else
{
enum tofu_policy policy = get_policy (dbs, fingerprint, email, NULL);
estream_t fp;
char *msg;
- write_stats_status (messages, policy,
- first_seen_ago, most_recent_seen_ago);
+ write_stats_status (NULL, messages, policy,
+ first_seen, most_recent_seen);
fp = es_fopenmem (0, "rw,samethread");
if (! fp)
log_fatal ("error creating memory stream: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror()));
if (messages == 0)
{
es_fprintf (fp, _("Verified %ld messages signed by \"%s\"."),
0L, user_id);
es_fputc ('\n', fp);
}
else
{
- char *first_seen_ago_str = time_ago_str (first_seen_ago);
+ char *first_seen_ago_str = time_ago_str (now - first_seen);
/* TRANSLATORS: The final %s is replaced by a string like
"7 months, 1 day, 5 minutes, 0 seconds". */
es_fprintf (fp,
ngettext("Verified %ld message signed by \"%s\"\n"
"in the past %s.",
"Verified %ld messages signed by \"%s\"\n"
"in the past %s.",
messages),
messages, user_id, first_seen_ago_str);
if (messages > 1)
{
- char *tmpstr = time_ago_str (most_recent_seen_ago);
+ char *tmpstr = time_ago_str (now - most_recent_seen);
es_fputs (" ", fp);
es_fprintf (fp, _("The most recent message was"
" verified %s ago."), tmpstr);
xfree (tmpstr);
}
xfree (first_seen_ago_str);
if (opt.verbose)
{
es_fputs (" ", fp);
es_fputc ('(', fp);
es_fprintf (fp, _("policy: %s"), tofu_policy_str (policy));
es_fputs (")\n", fp);
}
else
es_fputs ("\n", fp);
}
{
char *tmpmsg, *p;
es_fputc (0, fp);
if (es_fclose_snatch (fp, (void **) &tmpmsg, NULL))
log_fatal ("error snatching memory stream\n");
msg = format_text (tmpmsg, 0, 72, 80);
es_free (tmpmsg);
/* Print a status line but suppress the trailing LF.
* Spaces are not percent escaped. */
if (*msg)
write_status_buffer (STATUS_TOFU_STATS_LONG,
msg, strlen (msg)-1, -1);
/* Remove the non-breaking space markers. */
for (p=msg; *p; p++)
if (*p == '~')
*p = ' ';
}
log_string (GPGRT_LOG_INFO, msg);
xfree (msg);
if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO && messages < BASIC_TRUST_THRESHOLD)
{
char *set_policy_command;
char *text;
char *tmpmsg;
if (messages == 0)
log_info (_("Warning: we've have yet to see"
" a message signed by this key!\n"));
else if (messages == 1)
log_info (_("Warning: we've only seen a"
" single message signed by this key!\n"));
set_policy_command =
xasprintf ("gpg --tofu-policy bad %s", fingerprint);
tmpmsg = xasprintf
(ngettext
("Warning: if you think you've seen more than %ld message "
"signed by this key, then this key might be a forgery! "
"Carefully examine the email address for small "
"variations. If the key is suspect, then use\n"
" %s\n"
"to mark it as being bad.\n",
"Warning: if you think you've seen more than %ld messages "
"signed by this key, then this key might be a forgery! "
"Carefully examine the email address for small "
"variations. If the key is suspect, then use\n"
" %s\n"
"to mark it as being bad.\n",
messages),
messages, set_policy_command);
text = format_text (tmpmsg, 0, 72, 80);
xfree (tmpmsg);
log_string (GPGRT_LOG_INFO, text);
xfree (text);
es_free (set_policy_command);
}
}
}
out:
free_strlist (strlist);
xfree (fingerprint_pp);
return;
}
/* Extract the email address from a user id and normalize it. If the
user id doesn't contain an email address, then we use the whole
user_id and normalize that. The returned string must be freed. */
static char *
email_from_user_id (const char *user_id)
{
char *email = mailbox_from_userid (user_id);
if (! email)
{
/* Hmm, no email address was provided or we are out of core. Just
take the lower-case version of the whole user id. It could be
a hostname, for instance. */
email = ascii_strlwr (xstrdup (user_id));
}
return email;
}
/* Register the signature with the binding <fingerprint, USER_ID>.
The fingerprint is taken from the primary key packet PK.
SIG_DIGEST_BIN is the binary representation of the message's
digest. SIG_DIGEST_BIN_LEN is its length.
SIG_TIME is the time that the signature was generated.
ORIGIN is a free-formed string describing the origin of the
signature. If this was from an email and the Claws MUA was used,
then this should be something like: "email:claws". If this is
NULL, the default is simply "unknown".
If MAY_ASK is 1, then this function may interact with the user.
This is necessary if there is a conflict or the binding's policy is
TOFU_POLICY_ASK.
This function returns the binding's trust level on return. If an
error occurs, this function returns TRUST_UNKNOWN. */
int
tofu_register (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, const char *user_id,
const byte *sig_digest_bin, int sig_digest_bin_len,
time_t sig_time, const char *origin, int may_ask)
{
tofu_dbs_t dbs;
char *fingerprint = NULL;
char *email = NULL;
char *err = NULL;
int rc;
int trust_level = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
char *sig_digest;
unsigned long c;
int already_verified = 0;
sig_digest = make_radix64_string (sig_digest_bin, sig_digest_bin_len);
dbs = opendbs (ctrl);
if (! dbs)
{
log_error (_("error opening TOFU database: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
goto die;
}
fingerprint = hexfingerprint (pk, NULL, 0);
if (! *user_id)
{
log_debug ("TOFU: user id is empty. Can't continue.\n");
goto die;
}
email = email_from_user_id (user_id);
if (! origin)
/* The default origin is simply "unknown". */
origin = "unknown";
/* It's necessary to get the trust so that we are certain that the
binding has been registered. */
trust_level = get_trust (dbs, pk, fingerprint, email, user_id, may_ask);
if (trust_level == _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR)
/* An error. */
{
trust_level = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
goto die;
}
/* We do a query and then an insert. Make sure they are atomic
by wrapping them in a transaction. */
rc = begin_transaction (ctrl, 0);
if (rc)
goto die;
/* If we've already seen this signature before, then don't add
it again. */
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.register_already_seen,
get_single_unsigned_long_cb2, &c, &err,
"select count (*)\n"
" from signatures left join bindings\n"
" on signatures.binding = bindings.oid\n"
" where fingerprint = ? and email = ? and sig_time = ?\n"
" and sig_digest = ?",
SQLITE_ARG_STRING, fingerprint, SQLITE_ARG_STRING, email,
SQLITE_ARG_LONG_LONG, (long long) sig_time,
SQLITE_ARG_STRING, sig_digest,
SQLITE_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("checking existence");
sqlite3_free (err);
}
else if (c > 1)
/* Duplicates! This should not happen. In particular,
because <fingerprint, email, sig_time, sig_digest> is the
primary key! */
log_debug ("SIGNATURES DB contains duplicate records"
" <%s, %s, 0x%lx, %s, %s>."
" Please report.\n",
fingerprint, email, (unsigned long) sig_time,
sig_digest, origin);
else if (c == 1)
{
already_verified = 1;
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("Already observed the signature"
" <%s, %s, 0x%lx, %s, %s>\n",
fingerprint, email, (unsigned long) sig_time,
sig_digest, origin);
}
else if (opt.dry_run)
{
log_info ("TOFU database update skipped due to --dry-run\n");
}
else
/* This is the first time that we've seen this signature.
Record it. */
{
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("TOFU: Saving signature <%s, %s, %s>\n",
fingerprint, email, sig_digest);
log_assert (c == 0);
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.register_insert, NULL, NULL, &err,
"insert into signatures\n"
" (binding, sig_digest, origin, sig_time, time)\n"
" values\n"
" ((select oid from bindings\n"
" where fingerprint = ? and email = ?),\n"
" ?, ?, ?, strftime('%s', 'now'));",
SQLITE_ARG_STRING, fingerprint, SQLITE_ARG_STRING, email,
SQLITE_ARG_STRING, sig_digest, SQLITE_ARG_STRING, origin,
SQLITE_ARG_LONG_LONG, (long long) sig_time,
SQLITE_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error updating TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("insert signatures");
sqlite3_free (err);
}
}
/* It only matters whether we abort or commit the transaction
(so long as we do something) if we execute the insert. */
if (rc)
rc = rollback_transaction (ctrl);
else
rc = end_transaction (ctrl, 0);
if (rc)
{
sqlite3_free (err);
goto die;
}
die:
if (may_ask && trust_level != TRUST_ULTIMATE)
/* It's only appropriate to show the statistics in an interactive
context. */
show_statistics (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id,
already_verified ? NULL : sig_digest);
xfree (email);
xfree (fingerprint);
xfree (sig_digest);
return trust_level;
}
/* Combine a trust level returned from the TOFU trust model with a
trust level returned by the PGP trust model. This is primarily of
interest when the trust model is tofu+pgp (TM_TOFU_PGP).
This function ors together the upper bits (the values not covered
by TRUST_MASK, i.e., TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED, etc.). */
int
tofu_wot_trust_combine (int tofu_base, int wot_base)
{
int tofu = tofu_base & TRUST_MASK;
int wot = wot_base & TRUST_MASK;
int upper = (tofu_base & ~TRUST_MASK) | (wot_base & ~TRUST_MASK);
log_assert (tofu == TRUST_UNKNOWN
|| tofu == TRUST_EXPIRED
|| tofu == TRUST_UNDEFINED
|| tofu == TRUST_NEVER
|| tofu == TRUST_MARGINAL
|| tofu == TRUST_FULLY
|| tofu == TRUST_ULTIMATE);
log_assert (wot == TRUST_UNKNOWN
|| wot == TRUST_EXPIRED
|| wot == TRUST_UNDEFINED
|| wot == TRUST_NEVER
|| wot == TRUST_MARGINAL
|| wot == TRUST_FULLY
|| wot == TRUST_ULTIMATE);
/* We first consider negative trust policys. These trump positive
trust policies. */
if (tofu == TRUST_NEVER || wot == TRUST_NEVER)
/* TRUST_NEVER trumps everything else. */
return upper | TRUST_NEVER;
if (tofu == TRUST_EXPIRED || wot == TRUST_EXPIRED)
/* TRUST_EXPIRED trumps everything but TRUST_NEVER. */
return upper | TRUST_EXPIRED;
/* Now we only have positive or neutral trust policies. We take
the max. */
if (tofu == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
return upper | TRUST_ULTIMATE | TRUST_FLAG_TOFU_BASED;
if (wot == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
return upper | TRUST_ULTIMATE;
if (tofu == TRUST_FULLY)
return upper | TRUST_FULLY | TRUST_FLAG_TOFU_BASED;
if (wot == TRUST_FULLY)
return upper | TRUST_FULLY;
if (tofu == TRUST_MARGINAL)
return upper | TRUST_MARGINAL | TRUST_FLAG_TOFU_BASED;
if (wot == TRUST_MARGINAL)
return upper | TRUST_MARGINAL;
if (tofu == TRUST_UNDEFINED)
return upper | TRUST_UNDEFINED | TRUST_FLAG_TOFU_BASED;
if (wot == TRUST_UNDEFINED)
return upper | TRUST_UNDEFINED;
return upper | TRUST_UNKNOWN;
}
/* Return the validity (TRUST_NEVER, etc.) of the binding
<FINGERPRINT, USER_ID>.
PK is the primary key packet.
If MAY_ASK is 1 and the policy is TOFU_POLICY_ASK, then the user
will be prompted to choose a different policy. If MAY_ASK is 0 and
the policy is TOFU_POLICY_ASK, then TRUST_UNKNOWN is returned.
Returns TRUST_UNDEFINED if an error occurs. */
int
tofu_get_validity (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, const char *user_id,
int may_ask)
{
tofu_dbs_t dbs;
char *fingerprint = NULL;
char *email = NULL;
int trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
dbs = opendbs (ctrl);
if (! dbs)
{
log_error (_("error opening TOFU database: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
goto die;
}
fingerprint = hexfingerprint (pk, NULL, 0);
if (! *user_id)
{
log_debug ("user id is empty."
" Can't get TOFU validity for this binding.\n");
goto die;
}
email = email_from_user_id (user_id);
trust_level = get_trust (dbs, pk, fingerprint, email, user_id, may_ask);
if (trust_level == _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR)
/* An error. */
trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
if (may_ask && trust_level != TRUST_ULTIMATE)
show_statistics (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id, NULL);
die:
xfree (email);
xfree (fingerprint);
return trust_level;
}
/* Set the policy for all non-revoked user ids in the keyblock KB to
POLICY.
If no key is available with the specified key id, then this
function returns GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY.
Returns 0 on success and an error code otherwise. */
gpg_error_t
tofu_set_policy (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t kb, enum tofu_policy policy)
{
tofu_dbs_t dbs;
PKT_public_key *pk;
char *fingerprint = NULL;
log_assert (kb->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
dbs = opendbs (ctrl);
if (! dbs)
{
log_error (_("error opening TOFU database: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("Setting TOFU policy for %s to %s\n",
keystr (pk->keyid), tofu_policy_str (policy));
if (! (pk->main_keyid[0] == pk->keyid[0]
&& pk->main_keyid[1] == pk->keyid[1]))
log_bug ("%s: Passed a subkey, but expecting a primary key.\n", __func__);
fingerprint = hexfingerprint (pk, NULL, 0);
for (; kb; kb = kb->next)
{
PKT_user_id *user_id;
char *email;
if (kb->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
continue;
user_id = kb->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if (user_id->is_revoked)
/* Skip revoked user ids. (Don't skip expired user ids, the
expiry can be changed.) */
continue;
email = email_from_user_id (user_id->name);
record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id->name, policy, 1);
xfree (email);
}
xfree (fingerprint);
return 0;
}
/* Set the TOFU policy for all non-revoked user ids in the KEY with
the key id KEYID to POLICY.
If no key is available with the specified key id, then this
function returns GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY.
Returns 0 on success and an error code otherwise. */
gpg_error_t
tofu_set_policy_by_keyid (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 *keyid, enum tofu_policy policy)
{
kbnode_t keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (keyid);
if (! keyblock)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
return tofu_set_policy (ctrl, keyblock, policy);
}
/* Return the TOFU policy for the specified binding in *POLICY. If no
policy has been set for the binding, sets *POLICY to
TOFU_POLICY_NONE.
PK is a primary public key and USER_ID is a user id.
Returns 0 on success and an error code otherwise. */
gpg_error_t
tofu_get_policy (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *user_id,
enum tofu_policy *policy)
{
tofu_dbs_t dbs;
char *fingerprint;
char *email;
/* Make sure PK is a primary key. */
log_assert (pk->main_keyid[0] == pk->keyid[0]
&& pk->main_keyid[1] == pk->keyid[1]);
dbs = opendbs (ctrl);
if (! dbs)
{
log_error (_("error opening TOFU database: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
fingerprint = hexfingerprint (pk, NULL, 0);
email = email_from_user_id (user_id->name);
*policy = get_policy (dbs, fingerprint, email, NULL);
xfree (email);
xfree (fingerprint);
if (*policy == _tofu_GET_POLICY_ERROR)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
return 0;
}

File Metadata

Mime Type
text/x-diff
Expires
Sun, Feb 23, 7:32 PM (1 d, 57 m)
Storage Engine
local-disk
Storage Format
Raw Data
Storage Handle
0b/70/d8c5ff6257ed3610cc6185dad02d

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