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decrypt-data.c
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/* decrypt-data.c - Decrypt an encrypted data packet
* Copyright (C) 1998-2001, 2005-2006, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 1998-2001, 2005-2006, 2009, 2018 Werner Koch
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
*/
#include
<config.h>
#include
<stdio.h>
#include
<stdlib.h>
#include
<string.h>
#include
"gpg.h"
#include
"../common/util.h"
#include
"packet.h"
#include
"options.h"
#include
"../common/i18n.h"
#include
"../common/status.h"
#include
"../common/compliance.h"
static
int
aead_decode_filter
(
void
*
opaque
,
int
control
,
iobuf_t
a
,
byte
*
buf
,
size_t
*
ret_len
);
static
int
mdc_decode_filter
(
void
*
opaque
,
int
control
,
IOBUF
a
,
byte
*
buf
,
size_t
*
ret_len
);
static
int
decode_filter
(
void
*
opaque
,
int
control
,
IOBUF
a
,
byte
*
buf
,
size_t
*
ret_len
);
/* Our context object. */
struct
decode_filter_context_s
{
/* Redcounter (max value is 2). We need it because we do not know
* whether the iobuf or the outer control code frees this object
* first. */
int
refcount
;
/* The cipher handle. */
gcry_cipher_hd_t
cipher_hd
;
/* The hash handle for use in MDC mode. */
gcry_md_hd_t
mdc_hash
;
/* The start IV for AEAD encryption. */
byte
startiv
[
16
];
/* The holdback buffer and its used length. For AEAD we need 32+1
* bytes but we use 48 byte. For MDC we need 22 bytes; here
* holdbacklen will either 0 or 22. */
char
holdback
[
48
];
unsigned
int
holdbacklen
;
/* Working on a partial length packet. */
unsigned
int
partial
:
1
;
/* EOF indicator with these true values:
* 1 = normal EOF
* 2 = premature EOF (tag or hash incomplete)
* 3 = premature EOF (general) */
unsigned
int
eof_seen
:
2
;
/* The actually used cipher algo for AEAD. */
byte
cipher_algo
;
/* The AEAD algo. */
byte
aead_algo
;
/* The encoded chunk byte for AEAD. */
byte
chunkbyte
;
/* The decoded CHUNKBYTE. */
uint64_t
chunksize
;
/* The chunk index for AEAD. */
uint64_t
chunkindex
;
/* The number of bytes in the current chunk. */
uint64_t
chunklen
;
/* The total count of decrypted plaintext octets. */
uint64_t
total
;
/* Remaining bytes in the packet according to the packet header.
* Not used if PARTIAL is true. */
size_t
length
;
};
typedef
struct
decode_filter_context_s
*
decode_filter_ctx_t
;
/* Helper to release the decode context. */
static
void
release_dfx_context
(
decode_filter_ctx_t
dfx
)
{
if
(
!
dfx
)
return
;
log_assert
(
dfx
->
refcount
);
if
(
!--
dfx
->
refcount
)
{
gcry_cipher_close
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
);
dfx
->
cipher_hd
=
NULL
;
gcry_md_close
(
dfx
->
mdc_hash
);
dfx
->
mdc_hash
=
NULL
;
xfree
(
dfx
);
}
}
/* Set the nonce and the additional data for the current chunk. This
* also reset the decryption machinery so that the handle can be
* used for a new chunk. If FINAL is set the final AEAD chunk is
* processed. */
static
gpg_error_t
aead_set_nonce_and_ad
(
decode_filter_ctx_t
dfx
,
int
final
)
{
gpg_error_t
err
;
unsigned
char
ad
[
21
];
unsigned
char
nonce
[
16
];
int
i
;
switch
(
dfx
->
aead_algo
)
{
case
AEAD_ALGO_OCB
:
memcpy
(
nonce
,
dfx
->
startiv
,
15
);
i
=
7
;
break
;
case
AEAD_ALGO_EAX
:
memcpy
(
nonce
,
dfx
->
startiv
,
16
);
i
=
8
;
break
;
default
:
BUG
();
}
nonce
[
i
++
]
^=
dfx
->
chunkindex
>>
56
;
nonce
[
i
++
]
^=
dfx
->
chunkindex
>>
48
;
nonce
[
i
++
]
^=
dfx
->
chunkindex
>>
40
;
nonce
[
i
++
]
^=
dfx
->
chunkindex
>>
32
;
nonce
[
i
++
]
^=
dfx
->
chunkindex
>>
24
;
nonce
[
i
++
]
^=
dfx
->
chunkindex
>>
16
;
nonce
[
i
++
]
^=
dfx
->
chunkindex
>>
8
;
nonce
[
i
++
]
^=
dfx
->
chunkindex
;
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
log_printhex
(
nonce
,
i
,
"nonce:"
);
err
=
gcry_cipher_setiv
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
,
nonce
,
i
);
if
(
err
)
return
err
;
ad
[
0
]
=
(
0xc0
|
PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD
);
ad
[
1
]
=
1
;
ad
[
2
]
=
dfx
->
cipher_algo
;
ad
[
3
]
=
dfx
->
aead_algo
;
ad
[
4
]
=
dfx
->
chunkbyte
;
ad
[
5
]
=
dfx
->
chunkindex
>>
56
;
ad
[
6
]
=
dfx
->
chunkindex
>>
48
;
ad
[
7
]
=
dfx
->
chunkindex
>>
40
;
ad
[
8
]
=
dfx
->
chunkindex
>>
32
;
ad
[
9
]
=
dfx
->
chunkindex
>>
24
;
ad
[
10
]
=
dfx
->
chunkindex
>>
16
;
ad
[
11
]
=
dfx
->
chunkindex
>>
8
;
ad
[
12
]
=
dfx
->
chunkindex
;
if
(
final
)
{
ad
[
13
]
=
dfx
->
total
>>
56
;
ad
[
14
]
=
dfx
->
total
>>
48
;
ad
[
15
]
=
dfx
->
total
>>
40
;
ad
[
16
]
=
dfx
->
total
>>
32
;
ad
[
17
]
=
dfx
->
total
>>
24
;
ad
[
18
]
=
dfx
->
total
>>
16
;
ad
[
19
]
=
dfx
->
total
>>
8
;
ad
[
20
]
=
dfx
->
total
;
}
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
log_printhex
(
ad
,
final
?
21
:
13
,
"authdata:"
);
return
gcry_cipher_authenticate
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
,
ad
,
final
?
21
:
13
);
}
/* Helper to check the 16 byte tag in TAGBUF. The FINAL flag is only
* for debug messages. */
static
gpg_error_t
aead_checktag
(
decode_filter_ctx_t
dfx
,
int
final
,
const
void
*
tagbuf
)
{
gpg_error_t
err
;
if
(
DBG_FILTER
)
log_printhex
(
tagbuf
,
16
,
"tag:"
);
err
=
gcry_cipher_checktag
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
,
tagbuf
,
16
);
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
"gcry_cipher_checktag%s failed: %s
\n
"
,
final
?
" (final)"
:
""
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
return
err
;
}
if
(
DBG_FILTER
)
log_debug
(
"%stag is valid
\n
"
,
final
?
"final "
:
""
);
return
0
;
}
/****************
* Decrypt the data, specified by ED with the key DEK. On return
* COMPLIANCE_ERROR is set to true iff the decryption can claim that
* it was compliant in the current mode; otherwise this flag is set to
* false.
*/
int
decrypt_data
(
ctrl_t
ctrl
,
void
*
procctx
,
PKT_encrypted
*
ed
,
DEK
*
dek
,
int
*
compliance_error
)
{
decode_filter_ctx_t
dfx
;
enum
gcry_cipher_modes
ciphermode
;
unsigned
int
startivlen
;
byte
*
p
;
int
rc
=
0
,
c
,
i
;
byte
temp
[
32
];
unsigned
int
blocksize
;
unsigned
int
nprefix
;
*
compliance_error
=
0
;
dfx
=
xtrycalloc
(
1
,
sizeof
*
dfx
);
if
(
!
dfx
)
return
gpg_error_from_syserror
();
dfx
->
refcount
=
1
;
if
(
opt
.
verbose
&&
!
dek
->
algo_info_printed
)
{
if
(
!
openpgp_cipher_test_algo
(
dek
->
algo
))
log_info
(
_
(
"%s encrypted data
\n
"
),
openpgp_cipher_algo_mode_name
(
dek
->
algo
,
ed
->
aead_algo
));
else
log_info
(
_
(
"encrypted with unknown algorithm %d
\n
"
),
dek
->
algo
);
dek
->
algo_info_printed
=
1
;
}
if
(
ed
->
aead_algo
)
{
rc
=
openpgp_aead_algo_info
(
ed
->
aead_algo
,
&
ciphermode
,
&
startivlen
);
if
(
rc
)
goto
leave
;
log_assert
(
startivlen
<=
sizeof
dfx
->
startiv
);
}
else
ciphermode
=
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB
;
/* Check compliance. */
if
(
!
gnupg_cipher_is_allowed
(
opt
.
compliance
,
0
,
dek
->
algo
,
ciphermode
))
{
log_error
(
_
(
"cipher algorithm '%s' may not be used in %s mode
\n
"
),
openpgp_cipher_algo_mode_name
(
dek
->
algo
,
ed
->
aead_algo
),
gnupg_compliance_option_string
(
opt
.
compliance
));
*
compliance_error
=
1
;
if
(
opt
.
flags
.
require_compliance
)
{
/* We fail early in this case because it does not make sense
* to first decrypt everything. */
rc
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO
);
goto
leave
;
}
}
write_status_printf
(
STATUS_DECRYPTION_INFO
,
"%d %d %d"
,
ed
->
mdc_method
,
dek
->
algo
,
ed
->
aead_algo
);
if
(
opt
.
show_session_key
)
{
char
numbuf
[
30
];
char
*
hexbuf
;
if
(
ed
->
aead_algo
)
snprintf
(
numbuf
,
sizeof
numbuf
,
"%d.%u:"
,
dek
->
algo
,
ed
->
aead_algo
);
else
snprintf
(
numbuf
,
sizeof
numbuf
,
"%d:"
,
dek
->
algo
);
hexbuf
=
bin2hex
(
dek
->
key
,
dek
->
keylen
,
NULL
);
if
(
!
hexbuf
)
{
rc
=
gpg_error_from_syserror
();
goto
leave
;
}
log_info
(
"session key: '%s%s'
\n
"
,
numbuf
,
hexbuf
);
write_status_strings
(
STATUS_SESSION_KEY
,
numbuf
,
hexbuf
,
NULL
);
xfree
(
hexbuf
);
}
rc
=
openpgp_cipher_test_algo
(
dek
->
algo
);
if
(
rc
)
goto
leave
;
blocksize
=
openpgp_cipher_get_algo_blklen
(
dek
->
algo
);
if
(
!
blocksize
||
blocksize
>
16
)
log_fatal
(
"unsupported blocksize %u
\n
"
,
blocksize
);
if
(
ed
->
aead_algo
)
{
if
(
blocksize
!=
16
)
{
rc
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO
);
goto
leave
;
}
if
(
ed
->
chunkbyte
>
56
)
{
log_error
(
"invalid AEAD chunkbyte %u
\n
"
,
ed
->
chunkbyte
);
rc
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
);
goto
leave
;
}
/* Read the Start-IV. */
if
(
ed
->
len
)
{
for
(
i
=
0
;
i
<
startivlen
&&
ed
->
len
;
i
++
,
ed
->
len
--
)
{
if
((
c
=
iobuf_get
(
ed
->
buf
))
==
-1
)
break
;
dfx
->
startiv
[
i
]
=
c
;
}
}
else
{
for
(
i
=
0
;
i
<
startivlen
;
i
++
)
if
(
(
c
=
iobuf_get
(
ed
->
buf
))
==
-1
)
break
;
else
dfx
->
startiv
[
i
]
=
c
;
}
if
(
i
!=
startivlen
)
{
log_error
(
"Start-IV in AEAD packet too short (%d/%u)
\n
"
,
i
,
startivlen
);
rc
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT
);
goto
leave
;
}
dfx
->
cipher_algo
=
ed
->
cipher_algo
;
dfx
->
aead_algo
=
ed
->
aead_algo
;
dfx
->
chunkbyte
=
ed
->
chunkbyte
;
dfx
->
chunksize
=
(
uint64_t
)
1
<<
(
dfx
->
chunkbyte
+
6
);
if
(
dek
->
algo
!=
dfx
->
cipher_algo
)
log_info
(
"Note: different cipher algorithms used (%s/%s)
\n
"
,
openpgp_cipher_algo_name
(
dek
->
algo
),
openpgp_cipher_algo_name
(
dfx
->
cipher_algo
));
rc
=
openpgp_cipher_open
(
&
dfx
->
cipher_hd
,
dfx
->
cipher_algo
,
ciphermode
,
GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
);
if
(
rc
)
goto
leave
;
/* Should never happen. */
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
log_printhex
(
dek
->
key
,
dek
->
keylen
,
"thekey:"
);
rc
=
gcry_cipher_setkey
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
,
dek
->
key
,
dek
->
keylen
);
if
(
gpg_err_code
(
rc
)
==
GPG_ERR_WEAK_KEY
)
{
log_info
(
_
(
"WARNING: message was encrypted with"
" a weak key in the symmetric cipher.
\n
"
));
rc
=
0
;
}
else
if
(
rc
)
{
log_error
(
"key setup failed: %s
\n
"
,
gpg_strerror
(
rc
));
goto
leave
;
}
if
(
!
ed
->
buf
)
{
log_error
(
_
(
"problem handling encrypted packet
\n
"
));
goto
leave
;
}
}
else
/* CFB encryption. */
{
nprefix
=
blocksize
;
if
(
ed
->
len
&&
ed
->
len
<
(
nprefix
+
2
)
)
{
/* An invalid message. We can't check that during parsing
* because we may not know the used cipher then. */
rc
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
);
goto
leave
;
}
if
(
ed
->
mdc_method
)
{
if
(
gcry_md_open
(
&
dfx
->
mdc_hash
,
ed
->
mdc_method
,
0
))
BUG
();
if
(
DBG_HASHING
)
gcry_md_debug
(
dfx
->
mdc_hash
,
"checkmdc"
);
}
rc
=
openpgp_cipher_open
(
&
dfx
->
cipher_hd
,
dek
->
algo
,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB
,
(
GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
|
((
ed
->
mdc_method
||
dek
->
algo
>=
100
)
?
0
:
GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC
)));
if
(
rc
)
{
/* We should never get an error here cause we already checked
* that the algorithm is available. */
BUG
();
}
/* log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
rc
=
gcry_cipher_setkey
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
,
dek
->
key
,
dek
->
keylen
);
if
(
gpg_err_code
(
rc
)
==
GPG_ERR_WEAK_KEY
)
{
log_info
(
_
(
"WARNING: message was encrypted with"
" a weak key in the symmetric cipher.
\n
"
));
rc
=
0
;
}
else
if
(
rc
)
{
log_error
(
"key setup failed: %s
\n
"
,
gpg_strerror
(
rc
)
);
goto
leave
;
}
if
(
!
ed
->
buf
)
{
log_error
(
_
(
"problem handling encrypted packet
\n
"
));
rc
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
);
goto
leave
;
}
gcry_cipher_setiv
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
,
NULL
,
0
);
if
(
ed
->
len
)
{
for
(
i
=
0
;
i
<
(
nprefix
+
2
)
&&
ed
->
len
;
i
++
,
ed
->
len
--
)
{
if
(
(
c
=
iobuf_get
(
ed
->
buf
))
==
-1
)
break
;
else
temp
[
i
]
=
c
;
}
}
else
{
for
(
i
=
0
;
i
<
(
nprefix
+
2
);
i
++
)
if
(
(
c
=
iobuf_get
(
ed
->
buf
))
==
-1
)
break
;
else
temp
[
i
]
=
c
;
}
gcry_cipher_decrypt
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
,
temp
,
nprefix
+
2
,
NULL
,
0
);
gcry_cipher_sync
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
);
p
=
temp
;
/* log_hexdump( "prefix", temp, nprefix+2 ); */
if
(
dek
->
symmetric
&&
(
p
[
nprefix
-2
]
!=
p
[
nprefix
]
||
p
[
nprefix
-1
]
!=
p
[
nprefix
+
1
])
)
{
rc
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
);
goto
leave
;
}
if
(
dfx
->
mdc_hash
)
gcry_md_write
(
dfx
->
mdc_hash
,
temp
,
nprefix
+
2
);
}
dfx
->
refcount
++
;
dfx
->
partial
=
!!
ed
->
is_partial
;
dfx
->
length
=
ed
->
len
;
if
(
ed
->
aead_algo
)
iobuf_push_filter
(
ed
->
buf
,
aead_decode_filter
,
dfx
);
else
if
(
ed
->
mdc_method
)
iobuf_push_filter
(
ed
->
buf
,
mdc_decode_filter
,
dfx
);
else
iobuf_push_filter
(
ed
->
buf
,
decode_filter
,
dfx
);
if
(
opt
.
unwrap_encryption
)
{
char
*
filename
=
NULL
;
estream_t
fp
;
rc
=
get_output_file
(
""
,
0
,
ed
->
buf
,
&
filename
,
&
fp
);
if
(
!
rc
)
{
iobuf_t
output
=
iobuf_esopen
(
fp
,
"w"
,
0
,
0
);
armor_filter_context_t
*
afx
=
NULL
;
es_setbuf
(
fp
,
NULL
);
if
(
opt
.
armor
)
{
afx
=
new_armor_context
();
push_armor_filter
(
afx
,
output
);
}
iobuf_copy
(
output
,
ed
->
buf
);
if
((
rc
=
iobuf_error
(
ed
->
buf
)))
log_error
(
_
(
"error reading '%s': %s
\n
"
),
filename
,
gpg_strerror
(
rc
));
else
if
((
rc
=
iobuf_error
(
output
)))
log_error
(
_
(
"error writing '%s': %s
\n
"
),
filename
,
gpg_strerror
(
rc
));
iobuf_close
(
output
);
release_armor_context
(
afx
);
}
xfree
(
filename
);
}
else
proc_packets
(
ctrl
,
procctx
,
ed
->
buf
);
ed
->
buf
=
NULL
;
if
(
dfx
->
eof_seen
>
1
)
rc
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
);
else
if
(
ed
->
mdc_method
)
{
/* We used to let parse-packet.c handle the MDC packet but this
turned out to be a problem with compressed packets: With old
style packets there is no length information available and
the decompressor uses an implicit end. However we can't know
this implicit end beforehand (:-) and thus may feed the
decompressor with more bytes than actually needed. It would
be possible to unread the extra bytes but due to our weird
iobuf system any unread is non reliable due to filters
already popped off. The easy and sane solution is to care
about the MDC packet only here and never pass it to the
packet parser. Fortunatley the OpenPGP spec requires a
strict format for the MDC packet so that we know that 22
bytes are appended. */
int
datalen
=
gcry_md_get_algo_dlen
(
ed
->
mdc_method
);
log_assert
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
);
log_assert
(
dfx
->
mdc_hash
);
gcry_cipher_decrypt
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
,
dfx
->
holdback
,
22
,
NULL
,
0
);
gcry_md_write
(
dfx
->
mdc_hash
,
dfx
->
holdback
,
2
);
gcry_md_final
(
dfx
->
mdc_hash
);
if
(
dfx
->
holdback
[
0
]
!=
'\xd3'
||
dfx
->
holdback
[
1
]
!=
'\x14'
||
datalen
!=
20
||
memcmp
(
gcry_md_read
(
dfx
->
mdc_hash
,
0
),
dfx
->
holdback
+
2
,
datalen
))
rc
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
/* log_printhex("MDC message:", dfx->holdback, 22); */
/* log_printhex("MDC calc:", gcry_md_read (dfx->mdc_hash,0), datalen); */
}
leave
:
release_dfx_context
(
dfx
);
return
rc
;
}
/* Fill BUFFER with up to NBYTES-OFFSET from STREAM utilizing
* information from the context DFX. Returns the new offset which is
* the number of bytes read plus the original offset. On EOF the
* respective flag in DFX is set. */
static
size_t
fill_buffer
(
decode_filter_ctx_t
dfx
,
iobuf_t
stream
,
byte
*
buffer
,
size_t
nbytes
,
size_t
offset
)
{
size_t
nread
=
offset
;
size_t
curr
;
int
ret
;
if
(
dfx
->
partial
)
{
while
(
nread
<
nbytes
)
{
curr
=
nbytes
-
nread
;
ret
=
iobuf_read
(
stream
,
&
buffer
[
nread
],
curr
);
if
(
ret
==
-1
)
{
dfx
->
eof_seen
=
1
;
/* Normal EOF. */
break
;
}
nread
+=
ret
;
}
}
else
{
while
(
nread
<
nbytes
&&
dfx
->
length
)
{
curr
=
nbytes
-
nread
;
if
(
curr
>
dfx
->
length
)
curr
=
dfx
->
length
;
ret
=
iobuf_read
(
stream
,
&
buffer
[
nread
],
curr
);
if
(
ret
==
-1
)
{
dfx
->
eof_seen
=
3
;
/* Premature EOF. */
break
;
}
nread
+=
ret
;
dfx
->
length
-=
ret
;
}
if
(
!
dfx
->
length
)
dfx
->
eof_seen
=
1
;
/* Normal EOF. */
}
return
nread
;
}
/* The core of the AEAD decryption. This is the underflow function of
* the aead_decode_filter. */
static
gpg_error_t
aead_underflow
(
decode_filter_ctx_t
dfx
,
iobuf_t
a
,
byte
*
buf
,
size_t
*
ret_len
)
{
const
size_t
size
=
*
ret_len
;
/* The allocated size of BUF. */
gpg_error_t
err
;
size_t
totallen
=
0
;
/* The number of bytes to return on success or EOF. */
size_t
off
=
0
;
/* The offset into the buffer. */
size_t
len
;
/* The current number of bytes in BUF+OFF. */
log_assert
(
size
>
48
);
/* Our code requires at least this size. */
/* Copy the rest from the last call of this function into BUF. */
len
=
dfx
->
holdbacklen
;
dfx
->
holdbacklen
=
0
;
memcpy
(
buf
,
dfx
->
holdback
,
len
);
if
(
DBG_FILTER
)
log_debug
(
"aead_underflow: size=%zu len=%zu%s%s
\n
"
,
size
,
len
,
dfx
->
partial
?
" partial"
:
""
,
dfx
->
eof_seen
?
" eof"
:
""
);
/* Read and fill up BUF. We need to watch out for an EOF so that we
* can detect the last chunk which is commonly shorter than the
* chunksize. After the last data byte from the last chunk 32 more
* bytes are expected for the last chunk's tag and the following
* final chunk's tag. To detect the EOF we need to try reading at least
* one further byte; however we try to read 16 extra bytes to avoid
* single byte reads in some lower layers. The outcome is that we
* have up to 48 extra extra octets which we will later put into the
* holdback buffer for the next invocation (which handles the EOF
* case). */
len
=
fill_buffer
(
dfx
,
a
,
buf
,
size
,
len
);
if
(
len
<
32
)
{
/* Not enough data for the last two tags. */
err
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_TRUNCATED
);
goto
leave
;
}
if
(
dfx
->
eof_seen
)
{
/* If have seen an EOF we copy only the last two auth tags into
* the holdback buffer. */
dfx
->
holdbacklen
=
32
;
memcpy
(
dfx
->
holdback
,
buf
+
len
-32
,
32
);
len
-=
32
;
}
else
{
/* If have not seen an EOF we copy the entire extra 48 bytes
* into the holdback buffer for processing at the next call of
* this function. */
dfx
->
holdbacklen
=
len
>
48
?
48
:
len
;
memcpy
(
dfx
->
holdback
,
buf
+
len
-
dfx
->
holdbacklen
,
dfx
->
holdbacklen
);
len
-=
dfx
->
holdbacklen
;
}
/* log_printhex (dfx->holdback, dfx->holdbacklen, "holdback:"); */
/* Decrypt the buffer. This first requires a loop to handle the
* case when a chunk ends within the buffer. */
if
(
DBG_FILTER
)
log_debug
(
"decrypt: chunklen=%llu total=%llu size=%zu len=%zu%s
\n
"
,
(
unsigned
long
long
)
dfx
->
chunklen
,
(
unsigned
long
long
)
dfx
->
total
,
size
,
len
,
dfx
->
eof_seen
?
" eof"
:
""
);
while
(
len
&&
dfx
->
chunklen
+
len
>=
dfx
->
chunksize
)
{
size_t
n
=
dfx
->
chunksize
-
dfx
->
chunklen
;
byte
tagbuf
[
16
];
if
(
DBG_FILTER
)
log_debug
(
"chunksize will be reached: n=%zu
\n
"
,
n
);
if
(
!
dfx
->
chunklen
)
{
/* First data for this chunk - prepare. */
err
=
aead_set_nonce_and_ad
(
dfx
,
0
);
if
(
err
)
goto
leave
;
}
/* log_printhex (buf, n, "ciph:"); */
gcry_cipher_final
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
);
err
=
gcry_cipher_decrypt
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
,
buf
+
off
,
n
,
NULL
,
0
);
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
"gcry_cipher_decrypt failed (1): %s
\n
"
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
goto
leave
;
}
/* log_printhex (buf, n, "plai:"); */
totallen
+=
n
;
dfx
->
chunklen
+=
n
;
dfx
->
total
+=
n
;
off
+=
n
;
len
-=
n
;
if
(
DBG_FILTER
)
log_debug
(
"ndecrypted: %zu (nchunk=%llu) bytes left: %zu at off=%zu
\n
"
,
totallen
,
(
unsigned
long
long
)
dfx
->
chunklen
,
len
,
off
);
/* Check the tag. */
if
(
len
<
16
)
{
/* The tag is not entirely in the buffer. Read the rest of
* the tag from the holdback buffer. Then shift the holdback
* buffer and fill it up again. */
memcpy
(
tagbuf
,
buf
+
off
,
len
);
memcpy
(
tagbuf
+
len
,
dfx
->
holdback
,
16
-
len
);
dfx
->
holdbacklen
-=
16
-
len
;
memmove
(
dfx
->
holdback
,
dfx
->
holdback
+
(
16
-
len
),
dfx
->
holdbacklen
);
if
(
dfx
->
eof_seen
)
{
/* We should have the last chunk's tag in TAGBUF and the
* final tag in HOLDBACKBUF. */
if
(
len
||
dfx
->
holdbacklen
!=
16
)
{
/* Not enough data for the last two tags. */
err
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_TRUNCATED
);
goto
leave
;
}
}
else
{
len
=
0
;
dfx
->
holdbacklen
=
fill_buffer
(
dfx
,
a
,
dfx
->
holdback
,
48
,
dfx
->
holdbacklen
);
if
(
dfx
->
holdbacklen
<
32
)
{
/* Not enough data for the last two tags. */
err
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_TRUNCATED
);
goto
leave
;
}
}
}
else
/* We already have the full tag. */
{
memcpy
(
tagbuf
,
buf
+
off
,
16
);
/* Remove that tag from the output. */
memmove
(
buf
+
off
,
buf
+
off
+
16
,
len
-
16
);
len
-=
16
;
}
err
=
aead_checktag
(
dfx
,
0
,
tagbuf
);
if
(
err
)
goto
leave
;
dfx
->
chunklen
=
0
;
dfx
->
chunkindex
++
;
continue
;
}
/* The bulk decryption of our buffer. */
if
(
len
)
{
if
(
!
dfx
->
chunklen
)
{
/* First data for this chunk - prepare. */
err
=
aead_set_nonce_and_ad
(
dfx
,
0
);
if
(
err
)
goto
leave
;
}
if
(
dfx
->
eof_seen
)
{
/* This is the last block of the last chunk. Its length may
* not be a multiple of the block length. */
gcry_cipher_final
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
);
}
err
=
gcry_cipher_decrypt
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
,
buf
+
off
,
len
,
NULL
,
0
);
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
"gcry_cipher_decrypt failed (2): %s
\n
"
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
goto
leave
;
}
totallen
+=
len
;
dfx
->
chunklen
+=
len
;
dfx
->
total
+=
len
;
if
(
DBG_FILTER
)
log_debug
(
"ndecrypted: %zu (nchunk=%llu)
\n
"
,
totallen
,
(
unsigned
long
long
)
dfx
->
chunklen
);
}
if
(
dfx
->
eof_seen
)
{
if
(
dfx
->
chunklen
)
{
if
(
DBG_FILTER
)
log_debug
(
"eof seen: holdback has the last and final tag
\n
"
);
log_assert
(
dfx
->
holdbacklen
>=
32
);
err
=
aead_checktag
(
dfx
,
0
,
dfx
->
holdback
);
if
(
err
)
goto
leave
;
dfx
->
chunklen
=
0
;
dfx
->
chunkindex
++
;
off
=
16
;
}
else
{
if
(
DBG_FILTER
)
log_debug
(
"eof seen: holdback has the final tag
\n
"
);
log_assert
(
dfx
->
holdbacklen
>=
16
);
off
=
0
;
}
/* Check the final chunk. */
err
=
aead_set_nonce_and_ad
(
dfx
,
1
);
if
(
err
)
goto
leave
;
gcry_cipher_final
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
);
/* Decrypt an empty string (using HOLDBACK as a dummy). */
err
=
gcry_cipher_decrypt
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
,
dfx
->
holdback
,
0
,
NULL
,
0
);
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
"gcry_cipher_decrypt failed (final): %s
\n
"
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
goto
leave
;
}
err
=
aead_checktag
(
dfx
,
1
,
dfx
->
holdback
+
off
);
if
(
err
)
goto
leave
;
err
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_EOF
);
}
leave
:
if
(
DBG_FILTER
)
log_debug
(
"aead_underflow: returning %zu (%s)
\n
"
,
totallen
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
/* In case of an auth error we map the error code to the same as
* used by the MDC decryption. */
if
(
gpg_err_code
(
err
)
==
GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM
)
err
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
/* In case of an error we better wipe out the buffer than to convey
* partly decrypted data. */
if
(
err
&&
gpg_err_code
(
err
)
!=
GPG_ERR_EOF
)
memset
(
buf
,
0
,
size
);
*
ret_len
=
totallen
;
return
err
;
}
/* The IOBUF filter used to decrypt AEAD encrypted data. */
static
int
aead_decode_filter
(
void
*
opaque
,
int
control
,
IOBUF
a
,
byte
*
buf
,
size_t
*
ret_len
)
{
decode_filter_ctx_t
dfx
=
opaque
;
int
rc
=
0
;
if
(
control
==
IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW
&&
dfx
->
eof_seen
)
{
*
ret_len
=
0
;
rc
=
-1
;
}
else
if
(
control
==
IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW
)
{
log_assert
(
a
);
rc
=
aead_underflow
(
dfx
,
a
,
buf
,
ret_len
);
if
(
gpg_err_code
(
rc
)
==
GPG_ERR_EOF
)
rc
=
-1
;
/* We need to use the old convention in the filter. */
}
else
if
(
control
==
IOBUFCTRL_FREE
)
{
release_dfx_context
(
dfx
);
}
else
if
(
control
==
IOBUFCTRL_DESC
)
{
mem2str
(
buf
,
"aead_decode_filter"
,
*
ret_len
);
}
return
rc
;
}
static
int
mdc_decode_filter
(
void
*
opaque
,
int
control
,
IOBUF
a
,
byte
*
buf
,
size_t
*
ret_len
)
{
decode_filter_ctx_t
dfx
=
opaque
;
size_t
n
,
size
=
*
ret_len
;
int
rc
=
0
;
/* Note: We need to distinguish between a partial and a fixed length
packet. The first is the usual case as created by GPG. However
for short messages the format degrades to a fixed length packet
and other implementations might use fixed length as well. Only
looking for the EOF on fixed data works only if the encrypted
packet is not followed by other data. This used to be a long
standing bug which was fixed on 2009-10-02. */
if
(
control
==
IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW
&&
dfx
->
eof_seen
)
{
*
ret_len
=
0
;
rc
=
-1
;
}
else
if
(
control
==
IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW
)
{
log_assert
(
a
);
log_assert
(
size
>
44
);
/* Our code requires at least this size. */
/* Get at least 22 bytes and put it ahead in the buffer. */
n
=
fill_buffer
(
dfx
,
a
,
buf
,
44
,
22
);
if
(
n
==
44
)
{
/* We have enough stuff - flush the holdback buffer. */
if
(
!
dfx
->
holdbacklen
)
/* First time. */
{
memcpy
(
buf
,
buf
+
22
,
22
);
n
=
22
;
}
else
{
memcpy
(
buf
,
dfx
->
holdback
,
22
);
}
/* Fill up the buffer. */
n
=
fill_buffer
(
dfx
,
a
,
buf
,
size
,
n
);
/* Move the trailing 22 bytes back to the holdback buffer. We
have at least 44 bytes thus a memmove is not needed. */
n
-=
22
;
memcpy
(
dfx
->
holdback
,
buf
+
n
,
22
);
dfx
->
holdbacklen
=
22
;
}
else
if
(
!
dfx
->
holdbacklen
)
/* EOF seen but empty holdback. */
{
/* This is bad because it means an incomplete hash. */
n
-=
22
;
memcpy
(
buf
,
buf
+
22
,
n
);
dfx
->
eof_seen
=
2
;
/* EOF with incomplete hash. */
}
else
/* EOF seen (i.e. read less than 22 bytes). */
{
memcpy
(
buf
,
dfx
->
holdback
,
22
);
n
-=
22
;
memcpy
(
dfx
->
holdback
,
buf
+
n
,
22
);
dfx
->
eof_seen
=
1
;
/* Normal EOF. */
}
if
(
n
)
{
if
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
)
gcry_cipher_decrypt
(
dfx
->
cipher_hd
,
buf
,
n
,
NULL
,
0
);
if
(
dfx
->
mdc_hash
)
gcry_md_write
(
dfx
->
mdc_hash
,
buf
,
n
);
}
else
{
log_assert
(
dfx
->
eof_seen
);
rc
=
-1
;
/* Return EOF. */
}
*
ret_len
=
n
;
}
else
if
(
control
==
IOBUFCTRL_FREE
)
{
release_dfx_context
(
dfx
);
}
else
if
(
control
==
IOBUFCTRL_DESC
)
{
mem2str
(
buf
,
"mdc_decode_filter"
,
*
ret_len
);
}
return
rc
;
}
static
int
decode_filter
(
void
*
opaque
,
int
control
,
IOBUF
a
,
byte
*
buf
,
size_t
*
ret_len
)
{
decode_filter_ctx_t
fc
=
opaque
;
size_t
size
=
*
ret_len
;
size_t
n
;
int
rc
=
0
;
if
(
control
==
IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW
&&
fc
->
eof_seen
)
{
*
ret_len
=
0
;
rc
=
-1
;
}
else
if
(
control
==
IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW
)
{
log_assert
(
a
);
n
=
fill_buffer
(
fc
,
a
,
buf
,
size
,
0
);
if
(
n
)
{
if
(
fc
->
cipher_hd
)
gcry_cipher_decrypt
(
fc
->
cipher_hd
,
buf
,
n
,
NULL
,
0
);
}
else
{
if
(
!
fc
->
eof_seen
)
fc
->
eof_seen
=
1
;
rc
=
-1
;
/* Return EOF. */
}
*
ret_len
=
n
;
}
else
if
(
control
==
IOBUFCTRL_FREE
)
{
release_dfx_context
(
fc
);
}
else
if
(
control
==
IOBUFCTRL_DESC
)
{
mem2str
(
buf
,
"decode_filter"
,
*
ret_len
);
}
return
rc
;
}
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