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ecdh.c
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/* ecdh.c - ECDH public key operations used in public key glue code
* Copyright (C) 2010, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include
<config.h>
#include
<stdio.h>
#include
<stdlib.h>
#include
<string.h>
#include
<errno.h>
#include
"gpg.h"
#include
"util.h"
#include
"pkglue.h"
#include
"main.h"
#include
"options.h"
/* A table with the default KEK parameters used by GnuPG. */
static
const
struct
{
unsigned
int
qbits
;
int
openpgp_hash_id
;
/* KEK digest algorithm. */
int
openpgp_cipher_id
;
/* KEK cipher algorithm. */
}
kek_params_table
[]
=
/* Note: Must be sorted by ascending values for QBITS. */
{
{
256
,
DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256
,
CIPHER_ALGO_AES
},
{
384
,
DIGEST_ALGO_SHA384
,
CIPHER_ALGO_AES256
},
/* Note: 528 is 521 rounded to the 8 bit boundary */
{
528
,
DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512
,
CIPHER_ALGO_AES256
}
};
/* Return KEK parameters as an opaque MPI The caller must free the
returned value. Returns NULL and sets ERRNO on error. */
gcry_mpi_t
pk_ecdh_default_params
(
unsigned
int
qbits
)
{
byte
*
kek_params
;
int
i
;
kek_params
=
xtrymalloc
(
4
);
if
(
!
kek_params
)
return
NULL
;
kek_params
[
0
]
=
3
;
/* Number of bytes to follow. */
kek_params
[
1
]
=
1
;
/* Version for KDF+AESWRAP. */
/* Search for matching KEK parameter. Defaults to the strongest
possible choices. Performance is not an issue here, only
interoperability. */
for
(
i
=
0
;
i
<
DIM
(
kek_params_table
);
i
++
)
{
if
(
kek_params_table
[
i
].
qbits
>=
qbits
||
i
+
1
==
DIM
(
kek_params_table
))
{
kek_params
[
2
]
=
kek_params_table
[
i
].
openpgp_hash_id
;
kek_params
[
3
]
=
kek_params_table
[
i
].
openpgp_cipher_id
;
break
;
}
}
log_assert
(
i
<
DIM
(
kek_params_table
));
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
log_printhex
(
"ECDH KEK params are"
,
kek_params
,
sizeof
(
kek_params
)
);
return
gcry_mpi_set_opaque
(
NULL
,
kek_params
,
4
*
8
);
}
/* Encrypts/decrypts DATA using a key derived from the ECC shared
point SHARED_MPI using the FIPS SP 800-56A compliant method
key_derivation+key_wrapping. If IS_ENCRYPT is true the function
encrypts; if false, it decrypts. PKEY is the public key and PK_FP
the fingerprint of this public key. On success the result is
stored at R_RESULT; on failure NULL is stored at R_RESULT and an
error code returned. */
gpg_error_t
pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point
(
int
is_encrypt
,
gcry_mpi_t
shared_mpi
,
const
byte
pk_fp
[
MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN
],
gcry_mpi_t
data
,
gcry_mpi_t
*
pkey
,
gcry_mpi_t
*
r_result
)
{
gpg_error_t
err
;
byte
*
secret_x
;
int
secret_x_size
;
unsigned
int
nbits
;
const
unsigned
char
*
kek_params
;
size_t
kek_params_size
;
int
kdf_hash_algo
;
int
kdf_encr_algo
;
unsigned
char
message
[
256
];
size_t
message_size
;
*
r_result
=
NULL
;
nbits
=
pubkey_nbits
(
PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
,
pkey
);
if
(
!
nbits
)
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT
);
{
size_t
nbytes
;
/* Extract x component of the shared point: this is the actual
shared secret. */
nbytes
=
(
mpi_get_nbits
(
pkey
[
1
]
/* public point */
)
+
7
)
/
8
;
secret_x
=
xtrymalloc_secure
(
nbytes
);
if
(
!
secret_x
)
return
gpg_error_from_syserror
();
err
=
gcry_mpi_print
(
GCRYMPI_FMT_USG
,
secret_x
,
nbytes
,
&
nbytes
,
shared_mpi
);
if
(
err
)
{
xfree
(
secret_x
);
log_error
(
"ECDH ephemeral export of shared point failed: %s
\n
"
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
return
err
;
}
/* Expected size of the x component */
secret_x_size
=
(
nbits
+
7
)
/
8
;
/* Extract X from the result. It must be in the format of:
04 || X || Y
40 || X
41 || X
Since it always comes with the prefix, it's larger than X. In
old experimental version of libgcrypt, there is a case where it
returns X with no prefix of 40, so, nbytes == secret_x_size
is allowed. */
if
(
nbytes
<
secret_x_size
)
{
xfree
(
secret_x
);
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA
);
}
/* Remove the prefix. */
if
((
nbytes
&
1
))
memmove
(
secret_x
,
secret_x
+
1
,
secret_x_size
);
/* Clear the rest of data. */
if
(
nbytes
-
secret_x_size
)
memset
(
secret_x
+
secret_x_size
,
0
,
nbytes
-
secret_x_size
);
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
log_printhex
(
"ECDH shared secret X is:"
,
secret_x
,
secret_x_size
);
}
/*** We have now the shared secret bytes in secret_x. ***/
/* At this point we are done with PK encryption and the rest of the
* function uses symmetric key encryption techniques to protect the
* input DATA. The following two sections will simply replace
* current secret_x with a value derived from it. This will become
* a KEK.
*/
if
(
!
gcry_mpi_get_flag
(
pkey
[
2
],
GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE
))
{
xfree
(
secret_x
);
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_BUG
);
}
kek_params
=
gcry_mpi_get_opaque
(
pkey
[
2
],
&
nbits
);
kek_params_size
=
(
nbits
+
7
)
/
8
;
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
log_printhex
(
"ecdh KDF params:"
,
kek_params
,
kek_params_size
);
/* Expect 4 bytes 03 01 hash_alg symm_alg. */
if
(
kek_params_size
!=
4
||
kek_params
[
0
]
!=
3
||
kek_params
[
1
]
!=
1
)
{
xfree
(
secret_x
);
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY
);
}
kdf_hash_algo
=
kek_params
[
2
];
kdf_encr_algo
=
kek_params
[
3
];
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
log_debug
(
"ecdh KDF algorithms %s+%s with aeswrap
\n
"
,
openpgp_md_algo_name
(
kdf_hash_algo
),
openpgp_cipher_algo_name
(
kdf_encr_algo
));
if
(
kdf_hash_algo
!=
GCRY_MD_SHA256
&&
kdf_hash_algo
!=
GCRY_MD_SHA384
&&
kdf_hash_algo
!=
GCRY_MD_SHA512
)
{
xfree
(
secret_x
);
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY
);
}
if
(
kdf_encr_algo
!=
CIPHER_ALGO_AES
&&
kdf_encr_algo
!=
CIPHER_ALGO_AES192
&&
kdf_encr_algo
!=
CIPHER_ALGO_AES256
)
{
xfree
(
secret_x
);
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY
);
}
/* Build kdf_params. */
{
IOBUF
obuf
;
obuf
=
iobuf_temp
();
/* variable-length field 1, curve name OID */
err
=
gpg_mpi_write_nohdr
(
obuf
,
pkey
[
0
]);
/* fixed-length field 2 */
iobuf_put
(
obuf
,
PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
);
/* variable-length field 3, KDF params */
err
=
(
err
?
err
:
gpg_mpi_write_nohdr
(
obuf
,
pkey
[
2
]));
/* fixed-length field 4 */
iobuf_write
(
obuf
,
"Anonymous Sender "
,
20
);
/* fixed-length field 5, recipient fp */
iobuf_write
(
obuf
,
pk_fp
,
20
);
message_size
=
iobuf_temp_to_buffer
(
obuf
,
message
,
sizeof
message
);
iobuf_close
(
obuf
);
if
(
err
)
{
xfree
(
secret_x
);
return
err
;
}
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
log_printhex
(
"ecdh KDF message params are:"
,
message
,
message_size
);
}
/* Derive a KEK (key wrapping key) using MESSAGE and SECRET_X. */
{
gcry_md_hd_t
h
;
int
old_size
;
err
=
gcry_md_open
(
&
h
,
kdf_hash_algo
,
0
);
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
"gcry_md_open failed for kdf_hash_algo %d: %s"
,
kdf_hash_algo
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
xfree
(
secret_x
);
return
err
;
}
gcry_md_write
(
h
,
"
\x00\x00\x00\x01
"
,
4
);
/* counter = 1 */
gcry_md_write
(
h
,
secret_x
,
secret_x_size
);
/* x of the point X */
gcry_md_write
(
h
,
message
,
message_size
);
/* KDF parameters */
gcry_md_final
(
h
);
log_assert
(
gcry_md_get_algo_dlen
(
kdf_hash_algo
)
>=
32
);
memcpy
(
secret_x
,
gcry_md_read
(
h
,
kdf_hash_algo
),
gcry_md_get_algo_dlen
(
kdf_hash_algo
));
gcry_md_close
(
h
);
old_size
=
secret_x_size
;
log_assert
(
old_size
>=
gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen
(
kdf_encr_algo
)
);
secret_x_size
=
gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen
(
kdf_encr_algo
);
log_assert
(
secret_x_size
<=
gcry_md_get_algo_dlen
(
kdf_hash_algo
)
);
/* We could have allocated more, so clean the tail before returning. */
memset
(
secret_x
+
secret_x_size
,
0
,
old_size
-
secret_x_size
);
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
log_printhex
(
"ecdh KEK is:"
,
secret_x
,
secret_x_size
);
}
/* And, finally, aeswrap with key secret_x. */
{
gcry_cipher_hd_t
hd
;
size_t
nbytes
;
byte
*
data_buf
;
int
data_buf_size
;
gcry_mpi_t
result
;
err
=
gcry_cipher_open
(
&
hd
,
kdf_encr_algo
,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP
,
0
);
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
"ecdh failed to initialize AESWRAP: %s
\n
"
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
xfree
(
secret_x
);
return
err
;
}
err
=
gcry_cipher_setkey
(
hd
,
secret_x
,
secret_x_size
);
xfree
(
secret_x
);
secret_x
=
NULL
;
if
(
err
)
{
gcry_cipher_close
(
hd
);
log_error
(
"ecdh failed in gcry_cipher_setkey: %s
\n
"
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
return
err
;
}
data_buf_size
=
(
gcry_mpi_get_nbits
(
data
)
+
7
)
/
8
;
if
((
data_buf_size
&
7
)
!=
(
is_encrypt
?
0
:
1
))
{
log_error
(
"can't use a shared secret of %d bytes for ecdh
\n
"
,
data_buf_size
);
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA
);
}
data_buf
=
xtrymalloc_secure
(
1
+
2
*
data_buf_size
+
8
);
if
(
!
data_buf
)
{
err
=
gpg_error_from_syserror
();
gcry_cipher_close
(
hd
);
return
err
;
}
if
(
is_encrypt
)
{
byte
*
in
=
data_buf
+
1
+
data_buf_size
+
8
;
/* Write data MPI into the end of data_buf. data_buf is size
aeswrap data. */
err
=
gcry_mpi_print
(
GCRYMPI_FMT_USG
,
in
,
data_buf_size
,
&
nbytes
,
data
/*in*/
);
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
"ecdh failed to export DEK: %s
\n
"
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
gcry_cipher_close
(
hd
);
xfree
(
data_buf
);
return
err
;
}
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
log_printhex
(
"ecdh encrypting :"
,
in
,
data_buf_size
);
err
=
gcry_cipher_encrypt
(
hd
,
data_buf
+
1
,
data_buf_size
+
8
,
in
,
data_buf_size
);
memset
(
in
,
0
,
data_buf_size
);
gcry_cipher_close
(
hd
);
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
"ecdh failed in gcry_cipher_encrypt: %s
\n
"
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
xfree
(
data_buf
);
return
err
;
}
data_buf
[
0
]
=
data_buf_size
+
8
;
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
log_printhex
(
"ecdh encrypted to:"
,
data_buf
+
1
,
data_buf
[
0
]
);
result
=
gcry_mpi_set_opaque
(
NULL
,
data_buf
,
8
*
(
1
+
data_buf
[
0
]));
if
(
!
result
)
{
err
=
gpg_error_from_syserror
();
xfree
(
data_buf
);
log_error
(
"ecdh failed to create an MPI: %s
\n
"
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
return
err
;
}
*
r_result
=
result
;
}
else
{
byte
*
in
;
const
void
*
p
;
p
=
gcry_mpi_get_opaque
(
data
,
&
nbits
);
nbytes
=
(
nbits
+
7
)
/
8
;
if
(
!
p
||
nbytes
>
data_buf_size
||
!
nbytes
)
{
xfree
(
data_buf
);
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI
);
}
memcpy
(
data_buf
,
p
,
nbytes
);
if
(
data_buf
[
0
]
!=
nbytes
-1
)
{
log_error
(
"ecdh inconsistent size
\n
"
);
xfree
(
data_buf
);
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI
);
}
in
=
data_buf
+
data_buf_size
;
data_buf_size
=
data_buf
[
0
];
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
log_printhex
(
"ecdh decrypting :"
,
data_buf
+
1
,
data_buf_size
);
err
=
gcry_cipher_decrypt
(
hd
,
in
,
data_buf_size
,
data_buf
+
1
,
data_buf_size
);
gcry_cipher_close
(
hd
);
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
"ecdh failed in gcry_cipher_decrypt: %s
\n
"
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
xfree
(
data_buf
);
return
err
;
}
data_buf_size
-=
8
;
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
log_printhex
(
"ecdh decrypted to :"
,
in
,
data_buf_size
);
/* Padding is removed later. */
/* if (in[data_buf_size-1] > 8 ) */
/* { */
/* log_error ("ecdh failed at decryption: invalid padding." */
/* " 0x%02x > 8\n", in[data_buf_size-1] ); */
/* return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY); */
/* } */
err
=
gcry_mpi_scan
(
&
result
,
GCRYMPI_FMT_USG
,
in
,
data_buf_size
,
NULL
);
xfree
(
data_buf
);
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
"ecdh failed to create a plain text MPI: %s
\n
"
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
return
err
;
}
*
r_result
=
result
;
}
}
return
err
;
}
static
gcry_mpi_t
gen_k
(
unsigned
nbits
)
{
gcry_mpi_t
k
;
k
=
gcry_mpi_snew
(
nbits
);
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
log_debug
(
"choosing a random k of %u bits
\n
"
,
nbits
);
gcry_mpi_randomize
(
k
,
nbits
-1
,
GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM
);
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
{
unsigned
char
*
buffer
;
if
(
gcry_mpi_aprint
(
GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX
,
&
buffer
,
NULL
,
k
))
BUG
();
log_debug
(
"ephemeral scalar MPI #0: %s
\n
"
,
buffer
);
gcry_free
(
buffer
);
}
return
k
;
}
/* Generate an ephemeral key for the public ECDH key in PKEY. On
success the generated key is stored at R_K; on failure NULL is
stored at R_K and an error code returned. */
gpg_error_t
pk_ecdh_generate_ephemeral_key
(
gcry_mpi_t
*
pkey
,
gcry_mpi_t
*
r_k
)
{
unsigned
int
nbits
;
gcry_mpi_t
k
;
*
r_k
=
NULL
;
nbits
=
pubkey_nbits
(
PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
,
pkey
);
if
(
!
nbits
)
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT
);
k
=
gen_k
(
nbits
);
if
(
!
k
)
BUG
();
*
r_k
=
k
;
return
0
;
}
/* Perform ECDH decryption. */
int
pk_ecdh_decrypt
(
gcry_mpi_t
*
result
,
const
byte
sk_fp
[
MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN
],
gcry_mpi_t
data
,
gcry_mpi_t
shared
,
gcry_mpi_t
*
skey
)
{
if
(
!
data
)
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI
);
return
pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point
(
0
/*=decryption*/
,
shared
,
sk_fp
,
data
/*encr data as an MPI*/
,
skey
,
result
);
}
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Expires
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