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	diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi
	index c69e512d5..e3756e91f 100644
	--- a/doc/gpg.texi
	+++ b/doc/gpg.texi
	@@ -1,3934 +1,3934 @@
	@c Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
	@c 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	@c This is part of the GnuPG manual.
	@c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi.

	@include defs.inc

	@node Invoking GPG
	@chapter Invoking GPG
	@cindex GPG command options
	@cindex command options
	@cindex options, GPG command


	@c Begin standard stuff
	@ifclear gpgtwohack
	@manpage gpg.1
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg
	\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
	@end ifset

	@mansect synopsis
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg
	.RB [ \-\-homedir
	.IR dir ]
	.RB [ \-\-options
	.IR file ]
	.RI [ options ]
	.I command
	.RI [ args ]
	@end ifset
	@end ifclear
	@c End standard stuff

	@c Begin gpg2 hack stuff
	@ifset gpgtwohack
	@manpage gpg2.1
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
	@end ifset

	@mansect synopsis
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	.RB [ \-\-homedir
	.IR dir ]
	.RB [ \-\-options
	.IR file ]
	.RI [ options ]
	.I command
	.RI [ args ]
	@end ifset
	@end ifset
	@c End gpg2 hack stuff


	@mansect description
	@command{@gpgname} is the OpenPGP part of the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG). It
	is a tool to provide digital encryption and signing services using the
	OpenPGP standard. @command{@gpgname} features complete key management and
	all bells and whistles you can expect from a decent OpenPGP
	implementation.

	@ifclear gpgtwohack
	Note that this version of GnuPG features all modern algorithms and
	should thus be preferred over older GnuPG versions. If you are
	looking for version 1 of GnuPG, you may find that version installed
	under the name @command{gpg1}.
	@end ifclear
	@ifset gpgtwohack
	In contrast to the standalone command gpg from GnuPG 1.x, which
	might be better suited for server and embedded platforms, the 2.x
	version is commonly installed under the name @command{@gpgname} and
	targeted to the desktop as it requires several other modules to be
	installed.
	@end ifset

	@manpause

	@xref{Option Index}, for an index to @command{@gpgname}'s commands and options.
	@mancont

	@menu
	* GPG Commands:: List of all commands.
	* GPG Options:: List of all options.
	* GPG Configuration:: Configuration files.
	* GPG Examples:: Some usage examples.

	Developer information:
	* Unattended Usage of GPG:: Using @command{gpg} from other programs.
	@end menu

	@c * GPG Protocol:: The protocol the server mode uses.


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* COMMANDS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect commands
	@node GPG Commands
	@section Commands

	Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that
	only one command is allowed.

	@command{@gpgname} may be run with no commands, in which case it will
	perform a reasonable action depending on the type of file it is given
	as input (an encrypted message is decrypted, a signature is verified,
	a file containing keys is listed).

	Please remember that option as well as command parsing stops as soon as
	a non-option is encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by
	using the special option @option{--}.


	@menu
	* General GPG Commands:: Commands not specific to the functionality.
	* Operational GPG Commands:: Commands to select the type of operation.
	* OpenPGP Key Management:: How to manage your keys.
	@end menu


	@c *******************************************
	@c ******** GENERAL COMMANDS ***********
	@c *******************************************
	@node General GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands not specific to the function

	@table @gnupgtabopt
	@item --version
	@opindex version
	Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you
	cannot abbreviate this command.

	@item --help
	@itemx -h
	@opindex help
	Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command line options.
	Note that you cannot abbreviate this command.

	@item --warranty
	@opindex warranty
	Print warranty information.

	@item --dump-options
	@opindex dump-options
	Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot
	abbreviate this command.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPERATIONAL COMMANDS *********
	@c *******************************************
	@node Operational GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands to select the type of operation


	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --sign
	@itemx -s
	@opindex sign
	Make a signature. This command may be combined with @option{--encrypt}
	(for a signed and encrypted message), @option{--symmetric} (for a
	signed and symmetrically encrypted message), or @option{--encrypt} and
	@option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that may be
	decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase). The key to be used for
	signing is chosen by default or can be set with the
	@option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key} options.

	@item --clearsign
	@opindex clearsign
	Make a clear text signature. The content in a clear text signature is
	readable without any special software. OpenPGP software is only needed
	to verify the signature. Clear text signatures may modify end-of-line
	whitespace for platform independence and are not intended to be
	reversible. The key to be used for signing is chosen by default or
	can be set with the @option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key}
	options.


	@item --detach-sign
	@itemx -b
	@opindex detach-sign
	Make a detached signature.

	@item --encrypt
	@itemx -e
	@opindex encrypt
	Encrypt data. This command may be combined with @option{--sign} (for a
	signed and encrypted message), @option{--symmetric} (for a message that
	may be decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase), or @option{--sign}
	and @option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that may be
	decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase).

	@item --symmetric
	@itemx -c
	@opindex symmetric
	Encrypt with a symmetric cipher using a passphrase. The default
	symmetric cipher used is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}, but may be chosen with the
	@option{--cipher-algo} option. This command may be combined with
	@option{--sign} (for a signed and symmetrically encrypted message),
	@option{--encrypt} (for a message that may be decrypted via a secret key
	or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and @option{--encrypt} together
	(for a signed message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a
	passphrase).

	@item --store
	@opindex store
	Store only (make a simple literal data packet).

	@item --decrypt
	@itemx -d
	@opindex decrypt
	Decrypt the file given on the command line (or STDIN if no file
	is specified) and write it to STDOUT (or the file specified with
	@option{--output}). If the decrypted file is signed, the signature is also
	verified. This command differs from the default operation, as it never
	writes to the filename which is included in the file and it rejects
	files which don't begin with an encrypted message.

	@item --verify
	@opindex verify
	Assume that the first argument is a signed file and verify it without
	generating any output. With no arguments, the signature packet is
	read from STDIN. If only a one argument is given, it is expected to
	be a complete signature.

	With more than 1 argument, the first should be a detached signature
	and the remaining files make up the the signed data. To read the signed
	data from STDIN, use @samp{-} as the second filename. For security
	reasons a detached signature cannot read the signed material from
	STDIN without denoting it in the above way.

	Note: If the option @option{--batch} is not used, @command{@gpgname}
	may assume that a single argument is a file with a detached signature
	and it will try to find a matching data file by stripping certain
	suffixes. Using this historical feature to verify a detached
	signature is strongly discouraged; always specify the data file too.

	Note: When verifying a cleartext signature, @command{gpg} verifies
	only what makes up the cleartext signed data and not any extra data
	outside of the cleartext signature or header lines following directly
	the dash marker line. The option @code{--output} may be used to write
	out the actual signed data; but there are other pitfalls with this
	format as well. It is suggested to avoid cleartext signatures in
	favor of detached signatures.

	@item --multifile
	@opindex multifile
	This modifies certain other commands to accept multiple files for
	processing on the command line or read from STDIN with each filename on
	a separate line. This allows for many files to be processed at
	once. @option{--multifile} may currently be used along with
	@option{--verify}, @option{--encrypt}, and @option{--decrypt}. Note that
	@option{--multifile --verify} may not be used with detached signatures.

	@item --verify-files
	@opindex verify-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --verify}.

	@item --encrypt-files
	@opindex encrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --encrypt}.

	@item --decrypt-files
	@opindex decrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --decrypt}.

	@item --list-keys
	@itemx -k
	@itemx --list-public-keys
	@opindex list-keys
	List all keys from the public keyrings, or just the keys given on the
	command line.

	Avoid using the output of this command in scripts or other programs as
	it is likely to change as GnuPG changes. See @option{--with-colons}
	for a machine-parseable key listing command that is appropriate for
	use in scripts and other programs. Never use the regular output for
	scripts --- it is only for human consumption.

	@item --list-secret-keys
	@itemx -K
	@opindex list-secret-keys
	List all keys from the secret keyrings, or just the ones given on the
	command line. A @code{#} after the letters @code{sec} means that the
	secret key is not usable (for example, if it was created via
	@option{--export-secret-subkeys}). See also @option{--list-keys}.

	@item --list-sigs
	@opindex list-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the signatures are listed too.
	This command has the same effect as
	using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-list}.

	For each signature listed, there are several flags in between the "sig"
	tag and keyid. These flags give additional information about each
	signature. From left to right, they are the numbers 1-3 for certificate
	check level (see @option{--ask-cert-level}), "L" for a local or
	non-exportable signature (see @option{--lsign-key}), "R" for a
	nonRevocable signature (see the @option{--edit-key} command "nrsign"),
	"P" for a signature that contains a policy URL (see
	@option{--cert-policy-url}), "N" for a signature that contains a
	notation (see @option{--cert-notation}), "X" for an eXpired signature
	(see @option{--ask-cert-expire}), and the numbers 1-9 or "T" for 10 and
	above to indicate trust signature levels (see the @option{--edit-key}
	command "tsign").

	@item --check-sigs
	@opindex check-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-sigs}, but the signatures are verified. Note
	that for performance reasons the revocation status of a signing key is
	not shown.
	This command has the same effect as
	using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-check}.

	The status of the verification is indicated by a flag directly following
	the "sig" tag (and thus before the flags described above for
	@option{--list-sigs}). A "!" indicates that the signature has been
	successfully verified, a "-" denotes a bad signature and a "%" is used
	if an error occurred while checking the signature (e.g. a non supported
	algorithm).

	@item --locate-keys
	@opindex locate-keys
	Locate the keys given as arguments. This command basically uses the
	same algorithm as used when locating keys for encryption or signing and
	may thus be used to see what keys @command{@gpgname} might use. In
	particular external methods as defined by @option{--auto-key-locate} may
	be used to locate a key. Only public keys are listed.

	@item --fingerprint
	@opindex fingerprint
	List all keys (or the specified ones) along with their
	fingerprints. This is the same output as @option{--list-keys} but with
	the additional output of a line with the fingerprint. May also be
	combined with @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}. If this
	command is given twice, the fingerprints of all secondary keys are
	listed too. This command also forces pretty printing of fingerprints
	if the keyid format has been set to "none".

	@item --list-packets
	@opindex list-packets
	List only the sequence of packets. This command is only useful for
	debugging. When used with option @option{--verbose} the actual MPI
	values are dumped and not only their lengths. Note that the output of
	this command may change with new releases.


	@item --card-edit
	@opindex card-edit
	Present a menu to work with a smartcard. The subcommand "help" provides
	an overview on available commands. For a detailed description, please
	see the Card HOWTO at
	https://gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html#GnuPG-cardHOWTO .

	@item --card-status
	@opindex card-status
	Show the content of the smart card.

	@item --change-pin
	@opindex change-pin
	Present a menu to allow changing the PIN of a smartcard. This
	functionality is also available as the subcommand "passwd" with the
	@option{--card-edit} command.

	@item --delete-keys @code{name}
	@itemx --delete-keys @code{name}
	Remove key from the public keyring. In batch mode either @option{--yes} is
	required or the key must be specified by fingerprint. This is a
	safeguard against accidental deletion of multiple keys.

	@item --delete-secret-keys @code{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-keys
	Remove key from the secret keyring. In batch mode the key must be
	specified by fingerprint. The option @option{--yes} can be used to
	advice gpg-agent not to request a confirmation. This extra
	pre-caution is done because @command{gpg} can't be sure that the
	secret key (as controlled by gpg-agent) is only used for the given
	OpenPGP public key.


	@item --delete-secret-and-public-key @code{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-and-public-key
	Same as @option{--delete-key}, but if a secret key exists, it will be
	removed first. In batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint.
	The option @option{--yes} can be used to advice gpg-agent not to
	request a confirmation.

	@item --export
	@opindex export
	Either export all keys from all keyrings (default keyrings and those
	registered via option @option{--keyring}), or if at least one name is given,
	those of the given name. The exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the
	file given with option @option{--output}. Use together with
	@option{--armor} to mail those keys.

	@item --send-keys @code{key IDs}
	@opindex send-keys
	Similar to @option{--export} but sends the keys to a keyserver.
	Fingerprints may be used instead of key IDs. Option @option{--keyserver}
	must be used to give the name of this keyserver. Don't send your
	complete keyring to a keyserver --- select only those keys which are new
	or changed by you. If no key IDs are given, @command{gpg} does nothing.

	@item --export-secret-keys
	@itemx --export-secret-subkeys
	@opindex export-secret-keys
	@opindex export-secret-subkeys
	Same as @option{--export}, but exports the secret keys instead. The
	exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the file given with option
	@option{--output}. This command is often used along with the option
	@option{--armor} to allow easy printing of the key for paper backup;
	however the external tool @command{paperkey} does a better job for
	creating backups on paper. Note that exporting a secret key can be a
	security risk if the exported keys are sent over an insecure channel.

	The second form of the command has the special property to render the
	secret part of the primary key useless; this is a GNU extension to
	OpenPGP and other implementations can not be expected to successfully
	import such a key. Its intended use is to generated a full key with
	an additional signing subkey on a dedicated machine and then using
	this command to export the key without the primary key to the main
	machine.

	GnuPG may ask you to enter the passphrase for the key. This is
	required because the internal protection method of the secret key is
	different from the one specified by the OpenPGP protocol.

	@item --export-ssh-key
	@opindex export-ssh-key
	This command is used to export a key in the OpenSSH public key format.
	It requires the specification of one key by the usual means and
	exports the latest valid subkey which has an authentication capability
	to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. That
	output can directly be added to ssh's @file{authorized_key} file.

	By specifying the key to export using a key ID or a fingerprint
	suffixed with an exclamation mark (!), a specific subkey or the
	primary key can be exported. This does not even require that the key
	has the authentication capability flag set.

	@item --import
	@itemx --fast-import
	@opindex import
	Import/merge keys. This adds the given keys to the
	keyring. The fast version is currently just a synonym.

	There are a few other options which control how this command works.
	Most notable here is the @option{--import-options merge-only} option
	which does not insert new keys but does only the merging of new
	signatures, user-IDs and subkeys.

	@item --recv-keys @code{key IDs}
	@opindex recv-keys
	Import the keys with the given key IDs from a keyserver. Option
	@option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this keyserver.

	@item --refresh-keys
	@opindex refresh-keys
	Request updates from a keyserver for keys that already exist on the
	local keyring. This is useful for updating a key with the latest
	signatures, user IDs, etc. Calling this with no arguments will refresh
	the entire keyring. Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the
	name of the keyserver for all keys that do not have preferred keyservers
	set (see @option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url}).

	@item --search-keys @code{names}
	@opindex search-keys
	Search the keyserver for the given names. Multiple names given here will
	be joined together to create the search string for the keyserver.
	Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this
	keyserver. Keyservers that support different search methods allow using
	the syntax specified in "How to specify a user ID" below. Note that
	different keyserver types support different search methods. Currently
	only LDAP supports them all.

	@item --fetch-keys @code{URIs}
	@opindex fetch-keys
	Retrieve keys located at the specified URIs. Note that different
	installations of GnuPG may support different protocols (HTTP, FTP,
	LDAP, etc.). When using HTTPS the system provided root certificates
	are used by this command.

	@item --update-trustdb
	@opindex update-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance. This command iterates over all keys and
	builds the Web of Trust. This is an interactive command because it may
	have to ask for the "ownertrust" values for keys. The user has to give
	an estimation of how far she trusts the owner of the displayed key to
	correctly certify (sign) other keys. GnuPG only asks for the ownertrust
	value if it has not yet been assigned to a key. Using the
	@option{--edit-key} menu, the assigned value can be changed at any time.

	@item --check-trustdb
	@opindex check-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance without user interaction. From time to
	time the trust database must be updated so that expired keys or
	signatures and the resulting changes in the Web of Trust can be
	tracked. Normally, GnuPG will calculate when this is required and do it
	automatically unless @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} is set. This
	command can be used to force a trust database check at any time. The
	processing is identical to that of @option{--update-trustdb} but it
	skips keys with a not yet defined "ownertrust".

	For use with cron jobs, this command can be used together with
	@option{--batch} in which case the trust database check is done only if
	a check is needed. To force a run even in batch mode add the option
	@option{--yes}.

	@anchor{option --export-ownertrust}
	@item --export-ownertrust
	@opindex export-ownertrust
	Send the ownertrust values to STDOUT. This is useful for backup purposes
	as these values are the only ones which can't be re-created from a
	corrupted trustdb. Example:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	@gpgname{} --export-ownertrust > otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --import-ownertrust
	@opindex import-ownertrust
	Update the trustdb with the ownertrust values stored in @code{files} (or
	STDIN if not given); existing values will be overwritten. In case of a
	severely damaged trustdb and if you have a recent backup of the
	ownertrust values (e.g. in the file @file{otrust.txt}), you may re-create
	the trustdb using these commands:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	cd ~/.gnupg
	rm trustdb.gpg
	@gpgname{} --import-ownertrust < otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --rebuild-keydb-caches
	@opindex rebuild-keydb-caches
	When updating from version 1.0.6 to 1.0.7 this command should be used
	to create signature caches in the keyring. It might be handy in other
	situations too.

	@item --print-md @code{algo}
	@itemx --print-mds
	@opindex print-md
	Print message digest of algorithm ALGO for all given files or STDIN.
	With the second form (or a deprecated "*" as algo) digests for all
	available algorithms are printed.

	@item --gen-random @code{0\|1\|2} @code{count}
	@opindex gen-random
	Emit @var{count} random bytes of the given quality level 0, 1 or 2. If
	@var{count} is not given or zero, an endless sequence of random bytes
	will be emitted. If used with @option{--armor} the output will be
	base64 encoded. PLEASE, don't use this command unless you know what
	you are doing; it may remove precious entropy from the system!

	@item --gen-prime @code{mode} @code{bits}
	@opindex gen-prime
	Use the source, Luke :-). The output format is still subject to change.


	@item --enarmor
	@itemx --dearmor
	@opindex enarmor
	@opindex dearmor
	Pack or unpack an arbitrary input into/from an OpenPGP ASCII armor.
	This is a GnuPG extension to OpenPGP and in general not very useful.

	@item --tofu-policy @code{auto\|good\|unknown\|bad\|ask} @code{key...}
	@opindex tofu-policy
	Set the TOFU policy for all the bindings associated with the specified
	keys. For more information about the meaning of the policies,
	@pxref{trust-model-tofu}. The keys may be specified either by their
	fingerprint (preferred) or their keyid.

	@c @item --server
	@c @opindex server
	@c Run gpg in server mode. This feature is not yet ready for use and
	@c thus not documented.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ***** KEY MANGEMENT COMMANDS ********
	@c *******************************************
	@node OpenPGP Key Management
	@subsection How to manage your keys

	This section explains the main commands for key management.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --quick-gen-key @code{user-id} [@code{algo} [@code{usage} [@code{expire}]]]
	@opindex quick-gen-key
	This is a simple command to generate a standard key with one user id.
	In contrast to @option{--gen-key} the key is generated directly
	without the need to answer a bunch of prompts. Unless the option
	@option{--yes} is given, the key creation will be canceled if the
	given user id already exists in the keyring.

	If invoked directly on the console without any special options an
	answer to a ``Continue?'' style confirmation prompt is required. In
	case the user id already exists in the keyring a second prompt to
	force the creation of the key will show up.

	If @code{algo} or @code{usage} are given, only the primary key is
	created and no prompts are shown. To specify an expiration date but
	still create a primary and subkey use ``default'' or
	``future-default'' for @code{algo} and ``default'' for @code{usage}.
	For a description of these optional arguments see the command
	@code{--quick-addkey}. The @code{usage} accepts also the value
	``cert'' which can be used to create a certification only primary key;
	the default is to a create certification and signing key.

	If this command is used with @option{--batch},
	@option{--pinentry-mode} has been set to @code{loopback}, and one of
	the passphrase options (@option{--passphrase},
	@option{--passphrase-fd}, or @option{passphrase-file}) is used, the
	supplied passphrase is used for the new key and the agent does not ask
	for it. To create a key without any protection @code{--passphrase ''}
	may be used.

	@item --quick-addkey @code{fpr} [@code{algo} [@code{usage} [@code{expire}]]]
	@opindex quick-addkey
	Directly add a subkey to the key identified by the fingerprint
	@code{fpr}. Without the optional arguments an encryption subkey is
	added. If any of the arguments are given a more specific subkey is
	added.

	@code{algo} may be any of the supported algorithms or curve names
	given in the format as used by key listings. To use the default
	algorithm the string ``default'' or ``-'' can be used. Supported
	algorithms are ``rsa'', ``dsa'', ``elg'', ``ed25519'', ``cv25519'',
	and other ECC curves. For example the string ``rsa'' adds an RSA key
	with the default key length; a string ``rsa4096'' requests that the
	key length is 4096 bits. The string ``future-default'' is an alias
	for the algorithm which will likely be used as default algorithm in
	future versions of gpg.

	Depending on the given @code{algo} the subkey may either be an
	encryption subkey or a signing subkey. If an algorithm is capable of
	signing and encryption and such a subkey is desired, a @code{usage}
	string must be given. This string is either ``default'' or ``-'' to
	keep the default or a comma delimited list of keywords: ``sign'' for a
	signing subkey, ``auth'' for an authentication subkey, and ``encr''
	for an encryption subkey (``encrypt'' can be used as alias for
	``encr''). The valid combinations depend on the algorithm.

	The @code{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date
	for the subkey. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO
	YYYY-MM-DD format is used. The values ``never'', ``none'', or ``-''
	can be used for no expiration date.

	@item --gen-key
	@opindex gen-key
	Generate a new key pair using the current default parameters. This is
	the standard command to create a new key. In addition to the key a
	revocation certificate is created and stored in the
	@file{openpgp-revocs.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory.

	@item --full-gen-key
	@opindex gen-key
	Generate a new key pair with dialogs for all options. This is an
	extended version of @option{--gen-key}.

	There is also a feature which allows you to create keys in batch
	mode. See the manual section ``Unattended key generation'' on how
	to use this.


	@item --gen-revoke @code{name}
	@opindex gen-revoke
	Generate a revocation certificate for the complete key. To only revoke
	a subkey or a key signature, use the @option{--edit} command.

	This command merely creates the revocation certificate so that it can
	be used to revoke the key if that is ever needed. To actually revoke
	a key the created revocation certificate needs to be merged with the
	key to revoke. This is done by importing the revocation certificate
	using the @option{--import} command. Then the revoked key needs to be
	published, which is best done by sending the key to a keyserver
	(command @option{--send-key}) and by exporting (@option{--export}) it
	to a file which is then send to frequent communication partners.


	@item --desig-revoke @code{name}
	@opindex desig-revoke
	Generate a designated revocation certificate for a key. This allows a
	user (with the permission of the keyholder) to revoke someone else's
	key.


	@item --edit-key
	@opindex edit-key
	Present a menu which enables you to do most of the key management
	related tasks. It expects the specification of a key on the command
	line.

	@c ****** Begin Edit-key Options ********
	@table @asis

	@item uid @code{n}
	@opindex keyedit:uid
	Toggle selection of user ID or photographic user ID with index @code{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item key @code{n}
	@opindex keyedit:key
	Toggle selection of subkey with index @code{n} or key ID @code{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item sign
	@opindex keyedit:sign
	Make a signature on key of user @code{name}. If the key is not yet
	signed by the default user (or the users given with @option{-u}), the program
	displays the information of the key again, together with its
	fingerprint and asks whether it should be signed. This question is
	repeated for all users specified with
	@option{-u}.

	@item lsign
	@opindex keyedit:lsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-exportable and will
	therefore never be used by others. This may be used to make keys
	valid only in the local environment.

	@item nrsign
	@opindex keyedit:nrsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-revocable and can
	therefore never be revoked.

	@item tsign
	@opindex keyedit:tsign
	Make a trust signature. This is a signature that combines the notions
	of certification (like a regular signature), and trust (like the
	"trust" command). It is generally only useful in distinct communities
	or groups. For more information please read the sections
	``Trust Signature'' and ``Regular Expression'' in RFC-4880.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	Note that "l" (for local / non-exportable), "nr" (for non-revocable,
	and "t" (for trust) may be freely mixed and prefixed to "sign" to
	create a signature of any type desired.
	@c man:.RE

	If the option @option{--only-sign-text-ids} is specified, then any
	non-text based user ids (e.g., photo IDs) will not be selected for
	signing.

	@table @asis

	@item delsig
	@opindex keyedit:delsig
	Delete a signature. Note that it is not possible to retract a signature,
	once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case
	you better use @code{revsig}.

	@item revsig
	@opindex keyedit:revsig
	Revoke a signature. For every signature which has been generated by
	one of the secret keys, GnuPG asks whether a revocation certificate
	should be generated.

	@item check
	@opindex keyedit:check
	Check the signatures on all selected user IDs. With the extra
	option @code{selfsig} only self-signatures are shown.

	@item adduid
	@opindex keyedit:adduid
	Create an additional user ID.

	@item addphoto
	@opindex keyedit:addphoto
	Create a photographic user ID. This will prompt for a JPEG file that
	will be embedded into the user ID. Note that a very large JPEG will make
	for a very large key. Also note that some programs will display your
	JPEG unchanged (GnuPG), and some programs will scale it to fit in a
	dialog box (PGP).

	@item showphoto
	@opindex keyedit:showphoto
	Display the selected photographic user ID.

	@item deluid
	@opindex keyedit:deluid
	Delete a user ID or photographic user ID. Note that it is not
	possible to retract a user id, once it has been send to the public
	(i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revuid}.

	@item revuid
	@opindex keyedit:revuid
	Revoke a user ID or photographic user ID.

	@item primary
	@opindex keyedit:primary
	Flag the current user id as the primary one, removes the primary user
	id flag from all other user ids and sets the timestamp of all affected
	self-signatures one second ahead. Note that setting a photo user ID
	as primary makes it primary over other photo user IDs, and setting a
	regular user ID as primary makes it primary over other regular user
	IDs.

	@item keyserver
	@opindex keyedit:keyserver
	Set a preferred keyserver for the specified user ID(s). This allows
	other users to know where you prefer they get your key from. See
	@option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url} for more on how this
	works. Setting a value of "none" removes an existing preferred
	keyserver.

	@item notation
	@opindex keyedit:notation
	Set a name=value notation for the specified user ID(s). See
	@option{--cert-notation} for more on how this works. Setting a value of
	"none" removes all notations, setting a notation prefixed with a minus
	sign (-) removes that notation, and setting a notation name (without the
	=value) prefixed with a minus sign removes all notations with that name.

	@item pref
	@opindex keyedit:pref
	List preferences from the selected user ID. This shows the actual
	preferences, without including any implied preferences.

	@item showpref
	@opindex keyedit:showpref
	More verbose preferences listing for the selected user ID. This shows
	the preferences in effect by including the implied preferences of 3DES
	(cipher), SHA-1 (digest), and Uncompressed (compression) if they are
	not already included in the preference list. In addition, the
	preferred keyserver and signature notations (if any) are shown.

	@item setpref @code{string}
	@opindex keyedit:setpref
	Set the list of user ID preferences to @code{string} for all (or just
	the selected) user IDs. Calling setpref with no arguments sets the
	preference list to the default (either built-in or set via
	@option{--default-preference-list}), and calling setpref with "none"
	as the argument sets an empty preference list. Use @command{@gpgname
	--version} to get a list of available algorithms. Note that while you
	can change the preferences on an attribute user ID (aka "photo ID"),
	GnuPG does not select keys via attribute user IDs so these preferences
	will not be used by GnuPG.

	When setting preferences, you should list the algorithms in the order
	which you'd like to see them used by someone else when encrypting a
	message to your key. If you don't include 3DES, it will be
	automatically added at the end. Note that there are many factors that
	go into choosing an algorithm (for example, your key may not be the
	only recipient), and so the remote OpenPGP application being used to
	send to you may or may not follow your exact chosen order for a given
	message. It will, however, only choose an algorithm that is present
	on the preference list of every recipient key. See also the
	INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below.

	@item addkey
	@opindex keyedit:addkey
	Add a subkey to this key.

	@item addcardkey
	@opindex keyedit:addcardkey
	Generate a subkey on a card and add it to this key.

	@item keytocard
	@opindex keyedit:keytocard
	Transfer the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey
	has been selected) to a smartcard. The secret key in the keyring will
	be replaced by a stub if the key could be stored successfully on the
	card and you use the save command later. Only certain key types may be
	transferred to the card. A sub menu allows you to select on what card
	to store the key. Note that it is not possible to get that key back
	from the card - if the card gets broken your secret key will be lost
	unless you have a backup somewhere.

	@item bkuptocard @code{file}
	@opindex keyedit:bkuptocard
	Restore the given file to a card. This command may be used to restore a
	backup key (as generated during card initialization) to a new card. In
	almost all cases this will be the encryption key. You should use this
	command only with the corresponding public key and make sure that the
	file given as argument is indeed the backup to restore. You should then
	select 2 to restore as encryption key. You will first be asked to enter
	the passphrase of the backup key and then for the Admin PIN of the card.

	@item delkey
	@opindex keyedit:delkey
	Remove a subkey (secondary key). Note that it is not possible to retract
	a subkey, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In
	that case you better use @code{revkey}.

	@item revkey
	@opindex keyedit:revkey
	Revoke a subkey.

	@item expire
	@opindex keyedit:expire
	Change the key or subkey expiration time. If a subkey is selected, the
	expiration time of this subkey will be changed. With no selection, the
	key expiration of the primary key is changed.

	@item trust
	@opindex keyedit:trust
	Change the owner trust value for the key. This updates the trust-db
	immediately and no save is required.

	@item disable
	@itemx enable
	@opindex keyedit:disable
	@opindex keyedit:enable
	Disable or enable an entire key. A disabled key can not normally be
	used for encryption.

	@item addrevoker
	@opindex keyedit:addrevoker
	Add a designated revoker to the key. This takes one optional argument:
	"sensitive". If a designated revoker is marked as sensitive, it will
	not be exported by default (see export-options).

	@item passwd
	@opindex keyedit:passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key.

	@item toggle
	@opindex keyedit:toggle
	This is dummy command which exists only for backward compatibility.

	@item clean
	@opindex keyedit:clean
	Compact (by removing all signatures except the selfsig) any user ID
	that is no longer usable (e.g. revoked, or expired). Then, remove any
	signatures that are not usable by the trust calculations.
	Specifically, this removes any signature that does not validate, any
	signature that is superseded by a later signature, revoked signatures,
	and signatures issued by keys that are not present on the keyring.

	@item minimize
	@opindex keyedit:minimize
	Make the key as small as possible. This removes all signatures from
	each user ID except for the most recent self-signature.

	@item cross-certify
	@opindex keyedit:cross-certify
	Add cross-certification signatures to signing subkeys that may not
	currently have them. Cross-certification signatures protect against a
	subtle attack against signing subkeys. See
	@option{--require-cross-certification}. All new keys generated have
	this signature by default, so this command is only useful to bring
	older keys up to date.

	@item save
	@opindex keyedit:save
	Save all changes to the keyrings and quit.

	@item quit
	@opindex keyedit:quit
	Quit the program without updating the
	keyrings.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	The listing shows you the key with its secondary keys and all user
	ids. The primary user id is indicated by a dot, and selected keys or
	user ids are indicated by an asterisk. The trust
	value is displayed with the primary key: the first is the assigned owner
	trust and the second is the calculated trust value. Letters are used for
	the values:
	@c man:.RE

	@table @asis

	@item -
	No ownertrust assigned / not yet calculated.

	@item e
	Trust
	calculation has failed; probably due to an expired key.

	@item q
	Not enough information for calculation.

	@item n
	Never trust this key.

	@item m
	Marginally trusted.

	@item f
	Fully trusted.

	@item u
	Ultimately trusted.

	@end table
	@c ****** End Edit-key Options ********

	@item --sign-key @code{name}
	@opindex sign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key. This is a shortcut version of
	the subcommand "sign" from @option{--edit}.

	@item --lsign-key @code{name}
	@opindex lsign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key but marks it as
	non-exportable. This is a shortcut version of the subcommand "lsign"
	from @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --quick-sign-key @code{fpr} [@code{names}]
	@itemx --quick-lsign-key @code{fpr} [@code{names}]
	@opindex quick-sign-key
	@opindex quick-lsign-key
	Directly sign a key from the passphrase without any further user
	interaction. The @code{fpr} must be the verified primary fingerprint
	of a key in the local keyring. If no @code{names} are given, all
	useful user ids are signed; with given [@code{names}] only useful user
	ids matching one of theses names are signed. By default, or if a name
	is prefixed with a '*', a case insensitive substring match is used.
	If a name is prefixed with a '=' a case sensitive exact match is done.

	The command @option{--quick-lsign-key} marks the signatures as
	non-exportable. If such a non-exportable signature already exists the
	@option{--quick-sign-key} turns it into a exportable signature.

	This command uses reasonable defaults and thus does not provide the
	full flexibility of the "sign" subcommand from @option{--edit-key}.
	Its intended use is to help unattended key signing by utilizing a list
	of verified fingerprints.

	@item --quick-adduid @var{user-id} @var{new-user-id}
	@opindex quick-adduid
	This command adds a new user id to an existing key. In contrast to
	the interactive sub-command @code{adduid} of @option{--edit-key} the
	@var{new-user-id} is added verbatim with only leading and trailing
	white space removed, it is expected to be UTF-8 encoded, and no checks
	on its form are applied.

	@item --quick-revuid @var{user-id} @var{user-id-to-revoke}
	@opindex quick-revuid
	This command revokes a User ID on an existing key. It cannot be used
	to revoke the last User ID on key (some non-revoked User ID must
	remain), with revocation reason ``User ID is no longer valid''. If
	you want to specify a different revocation reason, or to supply
	supplementary revocation text, you should use the interactive
	sub-command @code{revuid} of @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --passwd @var{user_id}
	@opindex passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key belonging to the certificate
	specified as @var{user_id}. This is a shortcut for the sub-command
	@code{passwd} of the edit key menu.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* OPTIONS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect options
	@node GPG Options
	@section Option Summary

	@command{@gpgname} features a bunch of options to control the exact
	behaviour and to change the default configuration.

	@menu
	* GPG Configuration Options:: How to change the configuration.
	* GPG Key related Options:: Key related options.
	* GPG Input and Output:: Input and Output.
	* OpenPGP Options:: OpenPGP protocol specific options.
	* Compliance Options:: Compliance options.
	* GPG Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually doesn't want to do.
	* Deprecated Options:: Deprecated options.
	@end menu

	Long options can be put in an options file (default
	"~/.gnupg/gpg.conf"). Short option names will not work - for example,
	"armor" is a valid option for the options file, while "a" is not. Do not
	write the 2 dashes, but simply the name of the option and any required
	arguments. Lines with a hash ('#') as the first non-white-space
	character are ignored. Commands may be put in this file too, but that is
	not generally useful as the command will execute automatically with
	every execution of gpg.

	Please remember that option parsing stops as soon as a non-option is
	encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by using the special option
	@option{--}.

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** CONFIGURATION OPTIONS ********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Configuration Options
	@subsection How to change the configuration

	These options are used to change the configuration and are usually found
	in the option file.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --default-key @var{name}
	@opindex default-key
	Use @var{name} as the default key to sign with. If this option is not
	used, the default key is the first key found in the secret keyring.
	Note that @option{-u} or @option{--local-user} overrides this option.
	This option may be given multiple times. In this case, the last key
	for which a secret key is available is used. If there is no secret
	key available for any of the specified values, GnuPG will not emit an
	error message but continue as if this option wasn't given.

	@item --default-recipient @var{name}
	@opindex default-recipient
	Use @var{name} as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is
	not used and don't ask if this is a valid one. @var{name} must be
	non-empty.

	@item --default-recipient-self
	@opindex default-recipient-self
	Use the default key as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is not
	used and don't ask if this is a valid one. The default key is the first
	one from the secret keyring or the one set with @option{--default-key}.

	@item --no-default-recipient
	@opindex no-default-recipient
	Reset @option{--default-recipient} and @option{--default-recipient-self}.

	@item -v, --verbose
	@opindex verbose
	Give more information during processing. If used
	twice, the input data is listed in detail.

	@item --no-verbose
	@opindex no-verbose
	Reset verbose level to 0.

	@item -q, --quiet
	@opindex quiet
	Try to be as quiet as possible.

	@item --batch
	@itemx --no-batch
	@opindex batch
	@opindex no-batch
	Use batch mode. Never ask, do not allow interactive commands.
	@option{--no-batch} disables this option. Note that even with a
	filename given on the command line, gpg might still need to read from
	STDIN (in particular if gpg figures that the input is a
	detached signature and no data file has been specified). Thus if you
	do not want to feed data via STDIN, you should connect STDIN to
	@file{/dev/null}.

	@item --no-tty
	@opindex no-tty
	Make sure that the TTY (terminal) is never used for any output.
	This option is needed in some cases because GnuPG sometimes prints
	warnings to the TTY even if @option{--batch} is used.

	@item --yes
	@opindex yes
	Assume "yes" on most questions.

	@item --no
	@opindex no
	Assume "no" on most questions.


	@item --list-options @code{parameters}
	@opindex list-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	listing keys and signatures (that is, @option{--list-keys},
	@option{--list-sigs}, @option{--list-public-keys},
	@option{--list-secret-keys}, and the @option{--edit-key} functions).
	Options can be prepended with a @option{no-} (after the two dashes) to
	give the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex list-options:show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-sigs},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, and @option{--list-secret-keys} to
	display any photo IDs attached to the key. Defaults to no. See also
	@option{--photo-viewer}. Does not work with @option{--with-colons}:
	see @option{--attribute-fd} for the appropriate way to get photo data
	for scripts and other frontends.

	@item show-usage
	@opindex list-options:show-usage
	Show usage information for keys and subkeys in the standard key
	listing. This is a list of letters indicating the allowed usage for a
	key (@code{E}=encryption, @code{S}=signing, @code{C}=certification,
	@code{A}=authentication). Defaults to yes.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}
	listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	@option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the @option{--list-sigs} or
	@option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex list-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of user IDs during key listings.
	Defaults to yes.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-unusable-subkeys
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-subkeys
	Show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-keyring
	@opindex list-options:show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-expire
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-expire
	Show signature expiration dates (if any) during @option{--list-sigs} or
	@option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-subpackets
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-subpackets
	Include signature subpackets in the key listing. This option can take an
	optional argument list of the subpackets to list. If no argument is
	passed, list all subpackets. Defaults to no. This option is only
	meaningful when using @option{--with-colons} along with
	@option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}.

	@end table

	@item --verify-options @code{parameters}
	@opindex verify-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	verifying signatures. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give
	the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex verify-options:show-photos
	Display any photo IDs present on the key that issued the signature.
	Defaults to no. See also @option{--photo-viewer}.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the signature being verified. Defaults to yes.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	signature being verified. Defaults to IETF standard.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the signature being verified.
	Defaults to yes.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex verify-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of the user IDs on the key that issued
	the signature. Defaults to yes.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex verify-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs during signature verification.
	Defaults to no.

	@item show-primary-uid-only
	@opindex verify-options:show-primary-uid-only
	Show only the primary user ID during signature verification. That is
	all the AKA lines as well as photo Ids are not shown with the signature
	verification status.

	@item pka-lookups
	@opindex verify-options:pka-lookups
	Enable PKA lookups to verify sender addresses. Note that PKA is based
	on DNS, and so enabling this option may disclose information on when
	and what signatures are verified or to whom data is encrypted. This
	is similar to the "web bug" described for the @option{--auto-key-retrieve}
	option.

	@item pka-trust-increase
	@opindex verify-options:pka-trust-increase
	Raise the trust in a signature to full if the signature passes PKA
	validation. This option is only meaningful if pka-lookups is set.
	@end table

	@item --enable-large-rsa
	@itemx --disable-large-rsa
	@opindex enable-large-rsa
	@opindex disable-large-rsa
	With --gen-key and --batch, enable the creation of RSA secret keys as
	large as 8192 bit. Note: 8192 bit is more than is generally
	recommended. These large keys don't significantly improve security,
	but they are more expensive to use, and their signatures and
	certifications are larger. This option is only available if the
	binary was build with large-secmem support.

	@item --enable-dsa2
	@itemx --disable-dsa2
	@opindex enable-dsa2
	@opindex disable-dsa2
	Enable hash truncation for all DSA keys even for old DSA Keys up to
	1024 bit. This is also the default with @option{--openpgp}. Note
	that older versions of GnuPG also required this flag to allow the
	generation of DSA larger than 1024 bit.

	@item --photo-viewer @code{string}
	@opindex photo-viewer
	This is the command line that should be run to view a photo ID. "%i"
	will be expanded to a filename containing the photo. "%I" does the
	same, except the file will not be deleted once the viewer exits.
	Other flags are "%k" for the key ID, "%K" for the long key ID, "%f"
	for the key fingerprint, "%t" for the extension of the image type
	(e.g. "jpg"), "%T" for the MIME type of the image (e.g. "image/jpeg"),
	"%v" for the single-character calculated validity of the image being
	viewed (e.g. "f"), "%V" for the calculated validity as a string (e.g.
	"full"), "%U" for a base32 encoded hash of the user ID,
	and "%%" for an actual percent sign. If neither %i or %I are present,
	then the photo will be supplied to the viewer on standard input.

	The default viewer is "xloadimage -fork -quiet -title 'KeyID 0x%k'
	STDIN". Note that if your image viewer program is not secure, then
	executing it from GnuPG does not make it secure.

	@item --exec-path @code{string}
	@opindex exec-path
	@efindex PATH
	Sets a list of directories to search for photo viewers and keyserver
	helpers. If not provided, keyserver helpers use the compiled-in
	default directory, and photo viewers use the @code{PATH} environment
	variable.
	Note, that on W32 system this value is ignored when searching for
	keyserver helpers.

	@item --keyring @code{file}
	@opindex keyring
	Add @code{file} to the current list of keyrings. If @code{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory ("~/.gnupg" if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is not
	used).

	Note that this adds a keyring to the current list. If the intent is to
	use the specified keyring alone, use @option{--keyring} along with
	@option{--no-default-keyring}.

	If the the option @option{--no-keyring} has been used no keyrings will
	be used at all.


	@item --secret-keyring @code{file}
	@opindex secret-keyring
	This is an obsolete option and ignored. All secret keys are stored in
	the @file{private-keys-v1.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory.

	@item --primary-keyring @code{file}
	@opindex primary-keyring
	Designate @code{file} as the primary public keyring. This means that
	newly imported keys (via @option{--import} or keyserver
	@option{--recv-from}) will go to this keyring.

	@item --trustdb-name @code{file}
	@opindex trustdb-name
	Use @code{file} instead of the default trustdb. If @code{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory (@file{~/.gnupg} if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is
	not used).

	@include opt-homedir.texi


	@item --display-charset @code{name}
	@opindex display-charset
	Set the name of the native character set. This is used to convert
	some informational strings like user IDs to the proper UTF-8 encoding.
	Note that this has nothing to do with the character set of data to be
	encrypted or signed; GnuPG does not recode user-supplied data. If
	this option is not used, the default character set is determined from
	the current locale. A verbosity level of 3 shows the chosen set.
	Valid values for @code{name} are:

	@table @asis

	@item iso-8859-1
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-1
	This is the Latin 1 set.

	@item iso-8859-2
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-2
	The Latin 2 set.

	@item iso-8859-15
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-15
	This is currently an alias for
	the Latin 1 set.

	@item koi8-r
	@opindex display-charset:koi8-r
	The usual Russian set (RFC-1489).

	@item utf-8
	@opindex display-charset:utf-8
	Bypass all translations and assume
	that the OS uses native UTF-8 encoding.
	@end table

	@item --utf8-strings
	@itemx --no-utf8-strings
	@opindex utf8-strings
	Assume that command line arguments are given as UTF-8 strings. The
	default (@option{--no-utf8-strings}) is to assume that arguments are
	encoded in the character set as specified by
	@option{--display-charset}. These options affect all following
	arguments. Both options may be used multiple times.

	@anchor{gpg-option --options}
	@item --options @code{file}
	@opindex options
	Read options from @code{file} and do not try to read them from the
	default options file in the homedir (see @option{--homedir}). This
	option is ignored if used in an options file.

	@item --no-options
	@opindex no-options
	Shortcut for @option{--options /dev/null}. This option is detected
	before an attempt to open an option file. Using this option will also
	prevent the creation of a @file{~/.gnupg} homedir.

	@item -z @code{n}
	@itemx --compress-level @code{n}
	@itemx --bzip2-compress-level @code{n}
	@opindex compress-level
	@opindex bzip2-compress-level
	Set compression level to @code{n} for the ZIP and ZLIB compression
	algorithms. The default is to use the default compression level of zlib
	(normally 6). @option{--bzip2-compress-level} sets the compression level
	for the BZIP2 compression algorithm (defaulting to 6 as well). This is a
	different option from @option{--compress-level} since BZIP2 uses a
	significant amount of memory for each additional compression level.
	@option{-z} sets both. A value of 0 for @code{n} disables compression.

	@item --bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	@opindex bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	Use a different decompression method for BZIP2 compressed files. This
	alternate method uses a bit more than half the memory, but also runs
	at half the speed. This is useful under extreme low memory
	circumstances when the file was originally compressed at a high
	@option{--bzip2-compress-level}.


	@item --mangle-dos-filenames
	@itemx --no-mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex no-mangle-dos-filenames
	Older version of Windows cannot handle filenames with more than one
	dot. @option{--mangle-dos-filenames} causes GnuPG to replace (rather
	than add to) the extension of an output filename to avoid this
	problem. This option is off by default and has no effect on non-Windows
	platforms.

	@item --ask-cert-level
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-level
	@opindex ask-cert-level
	When making a key signature, prompt for a certification level. If this
	option is not specified, the certification level used is set via
	@option{--default-cert-level}. See @option{--default-cert-level} for
	information on the specific levels and how they are
	used. @option{--no-ask-cert-level} disables this option. This option
	defaults to no.

	@item --default-cert-level @code{n}
	@opindex default-cert-level
	The default to use for the check level when signing a key.

	0 means you make no particular claim as to how carefully you verified
	the key.

	1 means you believe the key is owned by the person who claims to own
	it but you could not, or did not verify the key at all. This is
	useful for a "persona" verification, where you sign the key of a
	pseudonymous user.

	2 means you did casual verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint and checked the
	user ID on the key against a photo ID.

	3 means you did extensive verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint with the owner of the
	key in person, and that you checked, by means of a hard to forge
	document with a photo ID (such as a passport) that the name of the key
	owner matches the name in the user ID on the key, and finally that you
	verified (by exchange of email) that the email address on the key
	belongs to the key owner.

	Note that the examples given above for levels 2 and 3 are just that:
	examples. In the end, it is up to you to decide just what "casual"
	and "extensive" mean to you.

	This option defaults to 0 (no particular claim).

	@item --min-cert-level
	@opindex min-cert-level
	When building the trust database, treat any signatures with a
	certification level below this as invalid. Defaults to 2, which
	disregards level 1 signatures. Note that level 0 "no particular
	claim" signatures are always accepted.

	@item --trusted-key @code{long key ID}
	@opindex trusted-key
	Assume that the specified key (which must be given
	as a full 8 byte key ID) is as trustworthy as one of
	your own secret keys. This option is useful if you
	don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them)
	online but still want to be able to check the validity of a given
	recipient's or signator's key.

	@item --trust-model @code{pgp\|classic\|tofu\|tofu+pgp\|direct\|always\|auto}
	@opindex trust-model
	Set what trust model GnuPG should follow. The models are:

	@table @asis

	@item pgp
	@opindex trust-mode:pgp
	This is the Web of Trust combined with trust signatures as used in PGP
	5.x and later. This is the default trust model when creating a new
	trust database.

	@item classic
	@opindex trust-mode:classic
	This is the standard Web of Trust as introduced by PGP 2.

	@item tofu
	@opindex trust-mode:tofu
	@anchor{trust-model-tofu}
	TOFU stands for Trust On First Use. In this trust model, the first
	time a key is seen, it is memorized. If later another key is seen
	with a user id with the same email address, a warning is displayed
	indicating that there is a conflict and that the key might be a
	forgery and an attempt at a man-in-the-middle attack.

	Because a potential attacker is able to control the email address
	and thereby circumvent the conflict detection algorithm by using an
	email address that is similar in appearance to a trusted email
	address, whenever a message is verified, statistics about the number
	of messages signed with the key are shown. In this way, a user can
	easily identify attacks using fake keys for regular correspondents.

	When compared with the Web of Trust, TOFU offers significantly
	weaker security guarantees. In particular, TOFU only helps ensure
	consistency (that is, that the binding between a key and email
	address doesn't change). A major advantage of TOFU is that it
	requires little maintenance to use correctly. To use the web of
	trust properly, you need to actively sign keys and mark users as
	trusted introducers. This is a time-consuming process and anecdotal
	evidence suggests that even security-conscious users rarely take the
	time to do this thoroughly and instead rely on an ad-hoc TOFU
	process.

	In the TOFU model, policies are associated with bindings between
	keys and email addresses (which are extracted from user ids and
	normalized). There are five policies, which can be set manually
	using the @option{--tofu-policy} option. The default policy can be
	set using the @option{--tofu-default-policy} option.

	The TOFU policies are: @code{auto}, @code{good}, @code{unknown},
	@code{bad} and @code{ask}. The @code{auto} policy is used by
	default (unless overridden by @option{--tofu-default-policy}) and
	marks a binding as marginally trusted. The @code{good},
	@code{unknown} and @code{bad} policies mark a binding as fully
	trusted, as having unknown trust or as having trust never,
	respectively. The @code{unknown} policy is useful for just using
	TOFU to detect conflicts, but to never assign positive trust to a
	binding. The final policy, @code{ask} prompts the user to indicate
	the binding's trust. If batch mode is enabled (or input is
	inappropriate in the context), then the user is not prompted and the
	@code{undefined} trust level is returned.

	@item tofu+pgp
	@opindex trust-mode:tofu+pgp
	This trust model combines TOFU with the Web of Trust. This is done
	by computing the trust level for each model and then taking the
	maximum trust level where the trust levels are ordered as follows:
	@code{unknown < undefined < marginal < fully < ultimate < expired <
	never}.

	By setting @option{--tofu-default-policy=unknown}, this model can be
	used to implement the web of trust with TOFU's conflict detection
	algorithm, but without its assignment of positive trust values,
	which some security-conscious users don't like.

	@item direct
	@opindex trust-mode:direct
	Key validity is set directly by the user and not calculated via the
	Web of Trust.

	@item always
	@opindex trust-mode:always
	Skip key validation and assume that used keys are always fully
	valid. You generally won't use this unless you are using some
	external validation scheme. This option also suppresses the
	"[uncertain]" tag printed with signature checks when there is no
	evidence that the user ID is bound to the key. Note that this
	trust model still does not allow the use of expired, revoked, or
	disabled keys.

	@item auto
	@opindex trust-mode:auto
	Select the trust model depending on whatever the internal trust
	database says. This is the default model if such a database already
	exists.
	@end table

	@item --auto-key-locate @code{parameters}
	@itemx --no-auto-key-locate
	@opindex auto-key-locate
	GnuPG can automatically locate and retrieve keys as needed using this
	option. This happens when encrypting to an email address (in the
	"user@@example.com" form), and there are no user@@example.com keys on
	the local keyring. This option takes any number of the following
	mechanisms, in the order they are to be tried:

	@table @asis

	@item cert
	Locate a key using DNS CERT, as specified in RFC-4398.

	@item pka
	Locate a key using DNS PKA.

	@item dane
	Locate a key using DANE, as specified
	in draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-05.txt.

	@item wkd
	Locate a key using the Web Key Directory protocol.
	This is an experimental method and semantics may change.

	@item ldap
	Using DNS Service Discovery, check the domain in question for any LDAP
	keyservers to use. If this fails, attempt to locate the key using the
	PGP Universal method of checking @samp{ldap://keys.(thedomain)}.

	@item keyserver
	Locate a key using whatever keyserver is defined using the
	@option{--keyserver} option.

	@item keyserver-URL
	In addition, a keyserver URL as used in the @option{--keyserver} option
	may be used here to query that particular keyserver.

	@item local
	Locate the key using the local keyrings. This mechanism allows the user to
	select the order a local key lookup is done. Thus using
	@samp{--auto-key-locate local} is identical to
	@option{--no-auto-key-locate}.

	@item nodefault
	This flag disables the standard local key lookup, done before any of the
	mechanisms defined by the @option{--auto-key-locate} are tried. The
	position of this mechanism in the list does not matter. It is not
	required if @code{local} is also used.

	@item clear
	Clear all defined mechanisms. This is useful to override
	mechanisms given in a config file.

	@end table

	@item --auto-key-retrieve
	@itemx --no-auto-key-retrieve
	@opindex auto-key-retrieve
	@opindex no-auto-key-retrieve
	This option enables the automatic retrieving of keys from a keyserver
	when verifying signatures made by keys that are not on the local
	keyring.

	If the method "wkd" is included in the list of methods given to
	@option{auto-key-locate}, the Signer's User ID is part of the
	signature, and the option @option{--disable-signer-uid} is not used,
	the "wkd" method may also be used to retrieve a key.

	Note that this option makes a "web bug" like behavior possible.
	Keyserver or Web Key Directory operators can see which keys you
	request, so by sending you a message signed by a brand new key (which
	you naturally will not have on your local keyring), the operator can
	tell both your IP address and the time when you verified the
	signature.

	@item --keyid-format @code{none\|short\|0xshort\|long\|0xlong}
	@opindex keyid-format
	Select how to display key IDs. "none" does not show the key ID at all
	but shows the fingerprint in a separate line. "short" is the
	traditional 8-character key ID. "long" is the more accurate (but less
	convenient) 16-character key ID. Add an "0x" to either to include an
	"0x" at the beginning of the key ID, as in 0x99242560. Note that this
	option is ignored if the option @option{--with-colons} is used.

	@item --keyserver @code{name}
	@opindex keyserver
	This option is deprecated - please use the @option{--keyserver} in
	@file{dirmngr.conf} instead.

	Use @code{name} as your keyserver. This is the server that
	@option{--recv-keys}, @option{--send-keys}, and @option{--search-keys}
	will communicate with to receive keys from, send keys to, and search for
	keys on. The format of the @code{name} is a URI:
	`scheme:[//]keyservername[:port]' The scheme is the type of keyserver:
	"hkp" for the HTTP (or compatible) keyservers, "ldap" for the LDAP
	keyservers, or "mailto" for the Graff email keyserver. Note that your
	particular installation of GnuPG may have other keyserver types
	available as well. Keyserver schemes are case-insensitive. After the
	keyserver name, optional keyserver configuration options may be
	provided. These are the same as the global @option{--keyserver-options}
	from below, but apply only to this particular keyserver.

	Most keyservers synchronize with each other, so there is generally no
	need to send keys to more than one server. The keyserver
	@code{hkp://keys.gnupg.net} uses round robin DNS to give a different
	keyserver each time you use it.

	@item --keyserver-options @code{name=value}
	@opindex keyserver-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for the
	keyserver. Options can be prefixed with a `no-' to give the opposite
	meaning. Valid import-options or export-options may be used here as
	well to apply to importing (@option{--recv-key}) or exporting
	(@option{--send-key}) a key from a keyserver. While not all options
	are available for all keyserver types, some common options are:

	@table @asis

	@item include-revoked
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as revoked. Note that not all keyservers
	differentiate between revoked and unrevoked keys, and for such
	keyservers this option is meaningless. Note also that most keyservers do
	not have cryptographic verification of key revocations, and so turning
	this option off may result in skipping keys that are incorrectly marked
	as revoked.

	@item include-disabled
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as disabled. Note that this option is not
	used with HKP keyservers.

	@item auto-key-retrieve
	This is the same as the option @option{auto-key-retrieve}.

	@item honor-keyserver-url
	When using @option{--refresh-keys}, if the key in question has a preferred
	keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to refresh the key
	from. In addition, if auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature
	being verified has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred
	keyserver to fetch the key from. Note that this option introduces a
	"web bug": The creator of the key can see when the keys is
	refreshed. Thus this option is not enabled by default.

	@item honor-pka-record
	If @option{--auto-key-retrieve} is used, and the signature being
	verified has a PKA record, then use the PKA information to fetch
	the key. Defaults to "yes".

	@item include-subkeys
	When receiving a key, include subkeys as potential targets. Note that
	this option is not used with HKP keyservers, as they do not support
	retrieving keys by subkey id.

	@item timeout
	Tell the keyserver helper program how long (in seconds) to try and
	perform a keyserver action before giving up. Note that performing
	multiple actions at the same time uses this timeout value per action.
	For example, when retrieving multiple keys via @option{--recv-keys}, the
	timeout applies separately to each key retrieval, and not to the
	@option{--recv-keys} command as a whole. Defaults to 30 seconds.

	@item http-proxy=@code{value}
	This option is deprecated.
	Set the proxy to use for HTTP and HKP keyservers.
	This overrides any proxy defined in @file{dirmngr.conf}.

	@item verbose
	This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@item debug
	This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@item check-cert
	This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@item ca-cert-file
	This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@end table

	@item --completes-needed @code{n}
	@opindex compliant-needed
	Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 1).

	@item --marginals-needed @code{n}
	@opindex marginals-needed
	Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 3)

	@item --tofu-default-policy @code{auto\|good\|unknown\|bad\|ask}
	@opindex tofu-default-policy
	The default TOFU policy (defaults to @code{auto}). For more
	information about the meaning of this option, @pxref{trust-model-tofu}.

	@item --max-cert-depth @code{n}
	@opindex max-cert-depth
	Maximum depth of a certification chain (default is 5).

	@item --no-sig-cache
	@opindex no-sig-cache
	Do not cache the verification status of key signatures.
	Caching gives a much better performance in key listings. However, if
	-you suspect that your public keyring is not save against write
	+you suspect that your public keyring is not safe against write
	modifications, you can use this option to disable the caching. It
	probably does not make sense to disable it because all kind of damage
	can be done if someone else has write access to your public keyring.

	@item --auto-check-trustdb
	@itemx --no-auto-check-trustdb
	@opindex auto-check-trustdb
	If GnuPG feels that its information about the Web of Trust has to be
	updated, it automatically runs the @option{--check-trustdb} command
	internally. This may be a time consuming
	process. @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} disables this option.

	@item --use-agent
	@itemx --no-use-agent
	@opindex use-agent
	This is dummy option. @command{@gpgname} always requires the agent.

	@item --gpg-agent-info
	@opindex gpg-agent-info
	This is dummy option. It has no effect when used with @command{@gpgname}.


	@item --agent-program @var{file}
	@opindex agent-program
	Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The
	default value is determined by running @command{gpgconf} with the
	option @option{--list-dirs}. Note that the pipe symbol (@code{\|}) is
	used for a regression test suite hack and may thus not be used in the
	file name.

	@item --dirmngr-program @var{file}
	@opindex dirmngr-program
	Specify a dirmngr program to be used for keyserver access. The
	default value is @file{@value{BINDIR}/dirmngr}.

	@item --no-autostart
	@opindex no-autostart
	Do not start the gpg-agent or the dirmngr if it has not yet been
	started and its service is required. This option is mostly useful on
	machines where the connection to gpg-agent has been redirected to
	another machines. If dirmngr is required on the remote machine, it
	may be started manually using @command{gpgconf --launch dirmngr}.

	@item --lock-once
	@opindex lock-once
	Lock the databases the first time a lock is requested
	and do not release the lock until the process
	terminates.

	@item --lock-multiple
	@opindex lock-multiple
	Release the locks every time a lock is no longer
	needed. Use this to override a previous @option{--lock-once}
	from a config file.

	@item --lock-never
	@opindex lock-never
	Disable locking entirely. This option should be used only in very
	special environments, where it can be assured that only one process
	is accessing those files. A bootable floppy with a stand-alone
	encryption system will probably use this. Improper usage of this
	option may lead to data and key corruption.

	@item --exit-on-status-write-error
	@opindex exit-on-status-write-error
	This option will cause write errors on the status FD to immediately
	terminate the process. That should in fact be the default but it never
	worked this way and thus we need an option to enable this, so that the
	change won't break applications which close their end of a status fd
	connected pipe too early. Using this option along with
	@option{--enable-progress-filter} may be used to cleanly cancel long
	running gpg operations.

	@item --limit-card-insert-tries @code{n}
	@opindex limit-card-insert-tries
	With @code{n} greater than 0 the number of prompts asking to insert a
	smartcard gets limited to N-1. Thus with a value of 1 gpg won't at
	all ask to insert a card if none has been inserted at startup. This
	option is useful in the configuration file in case an application does
	not know about the smartcard support and waits ad infinitum for an
	inserted card.

	@item --no-random-seed-file
	@opindex no-random-seed-file
	GnuPG uses a file to store its internal random pool over invocations.
	This makes random generation faster; however sometimes write operations
	are not desired. This option can be used to achieve that with the cost of
	slower random generation.

	@item --no-greeting
	@opindex no-greeting
	Suppress the initial copyright message.

	@item --no-secmem-warning
	@opindex no-secmem-warning
	Suppress the warning about "using insecure memory".

	@item --no-permission-warning
	@opindex permission-warning
	Suppress the warning about unsafe file and home directory (@option{--homedir})
	permissions. Note that the permission checks that GnuPG performs are
	not intended to be authoritative, but rather they simply warn about
	certain common permission problems. Do not assume that the lack of a
	warning means that your system is secure.

	Note that the warning for unsafe @option{--homedir} permissions cannot be
	suppressed in the gpg.conf file, as this would allow an attacker to
	place an unsafe gpg.conf file in place, and use this file to suppress
	warnings about itself. The @option{--homedir} permissions warning may only be
	suppressed on the command line.

	@item --no-mdc-warning
	@opindex no-mdc-warning
	Suppress the warning about missing MDC integrity protection.

	@item --require-secmem
	@itemx --no-require-secmem
	@opindex require-secmem
	Refuse to run if GnuPG cannot get secure memory. Defaults to no
	(i.e. run, but give a warning).


	@item --require-cross-certification
	@itemx --no-require-cross-certification
	@opindex require-cross-certification
	When verifying a signature made from a subkey, ensure that the cross
	certification "back signature" on the subkey is present and valid. This
	protects against a subtle attack against subkeys that can sign.
	Defaults to @option{--require-cross-certification} for
	@command{@gpgname}.

	@item --expert
	@itemx --no-expert
	@opindex expert
	Allow the user to do certain nonsensical or "silly" things like
	signing an expired or revoked key, or certain potentially incompatible
	things like generating unusual key types. This also disables certain
	warning messages about potentially incompatible actions. As the name
	implies, this option is for experts only. If you don't fully
	understand the implications of what it allows you to do, leave this
	off. @option{--no-expert} disables this option.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** KEY RELATED OPTIONS **********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Key related Options
	@subsection Key related options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -r
	@opindex recipient
	Encrypt for user id @var{name}. If this option or
	@option{--hidden-recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user-id
	unless @option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --hidden-recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -R
	@opindex hidden-recipient
	Encrypt for user ID @var{name}, but hide the key ID of this user's
	key. This option helps to hide the receiver of the message and is a
	limited countermeasure against traffic analysis. If this option or
	@option{--recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user ID unless
	@option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --recipient-file @var{file}
	@itemx -f
	@opindex recipient-file
	This option is similar to @option{--recipient} except that it
	encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the
	name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{gpg} assumes that
	the key in this file is fully valid.

	@item --hidden-recipient-file @var{file}
	@itemx -F
	@opindex hidden-recipient-file
	This option is similar to @option{--hidden-recipient} except that it
	encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the
	name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{gpg} assumes that
	the key in this file is fully valid.

	@item --encrypt-to @code{name}
	@opindex encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as an
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked
	user id. No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even
	disabled keys can be used.

	@item --hidden-encrypt-to @code{name}
	@opindex hidden-encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--hidden-recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as a hidden
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked user id.
	No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even disabled
	keys can be used.

	@item --no-encrypt-to
	@opindex no-encrypt-to
	Disable the use of all @option{--encrypt-to} and
	@option{--hidden-encrypt-to} keys.

	@item --group @code{name=value}
	@opindex group
	Sets up a named group, which is similar to aliases in email programs.
	Any time the group name is a recipient (@option{-r} or
	@option{--recipient}), it will be expanded to the values
	specified. Multiple groups with the same name are automatically merged
	into a single group.

	The values are @code{key IDs} or fingerprints, but any key description
	is accepted. Note that a value with spaces in it will be treated as
	two different values. Note also there is only one level of expansion
	--- you cannot make an group that points to another group. When used
	from the command line, it may be necessary to quote the argument to
	this option to prevent the shell from treating it as multiple
	arguments.

	@item --ungroup @code{name}
	@opindex ungroup
	Remove a given entry from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --no-groups
	@opindex no-groups
	Remove all entries from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --local-user @var{name}
	@itemx -u
	@opindex local-user
	Use @var{name} as the key to sign with. Note that this option overrides
	@option{--default-key}.

	@item --sender @var{mbox}
	@opindex sender
	This option has two purposes. @var{mbox} must either be a complete
	user id with a proper mail address or just a mail address. When
	creating a signature this option tells gpg the user id of a key used
	to make a signature if the key was not directly specified by a user
	id. When verifying a signature the @var{mbox} is used to restrict the
	information printed by the TOFU code to matching user ids.

	@item --try-secret-key @var{name}
	@opindex try-secret-key
	For hidden recipients GPG needs to know the keys to use for trial
	decryption. The key set with @option{--default-key} is always tried
	first, but this is often not sufficient. This option allows setting more
	keys to be used for trial decryption. Although any valid user-id
	specification may be used for @var{name} it makes sense to use at least
	the long keyid to avoid ambiguities. Note that gpg-agent might pop up a
	pinentry for a lot keys to do the trial decryption. If you want to stop
	all further trial decryption you may use close-window button instead of
	the cancel button.

	@item --try-all-secrets
	@opindex try-all-secrets
	Don't look at the key ID as stored in the message but try all secret
	keys in turn to find the right decryption key. This option forces the
	behaviour as used by anonymous recipients (created by using
	@option{--throw-keyids} or @option{--hidden-recipient}) and might come
	handy in case where an encrypted message contains a bogus key ID.

	@item --skip-hidden-recipients
	@itemx --no-skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex no-skip-hidden-recipients
	During decryption skip all anonymous recipients. This option helps in
	the case that people use the hidden recipients feature to hide there
	own encrypt-to key from others. If oneself has many secret keys this
	may lead to a major annoyance because all keys are tried in turn to
	decrypt something which was not really intended for it. The drawback
	of this option is that it is currently not possible to decrypt a
	message which includes real anonymous recipients.


	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** INPUT AND OUTPUT *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Input and Output
	@subsection Input and Output

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --armor
	@itemx -a
	@opindex armor
	Create ASCII armored output. The default is to create the binary
	OpenPGP format.

	@item --no-armor
	@opindex no-armor
	Assume the input data is not in ASCII armored format.

	@item --output @var{file}
	@itemx -o @var{file}
	@opindex output
	Write output to @var{file}. To write to stdout use @code{-} as the
	filename.

	@item --max-output @code{n}
	@opindex max-output
	This option sets a limit on the number of bytes that will be generated
	when processing a file. Since OpenPGP supports various levels of
	compression, it is possible that the plaintext of a given message may be
	significantly larger than the original OpenPGP message. While GnuPG
	works properly with such messages, there is often a desire to set a
	maximum file size that will be generated before processing is forced to
	stop by the OS limits. Defaults to 0, which means "no limit".

	@item --input-size-hint @var{n}
	@opindex input-size-hint
	This option can be used to tell GPG the size of the input data in
	bytes. @var{n} must be a positive base-10 number. This option is
	only useful if the input is not taken from a file. GPG may use this
	hint to optimize its buffer allocation strategy. It is also used by
	the @option{--status-fd} line ``PROGRESS'' to provide a value for
	``total'' if that is not available by other means.

	@item --import-options @code{parameters}
	@opindex import-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	importing keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item import-local-sigs
	Allow importing key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	@item keep-ownertrust
	Normally possible still existing ownertrust values of a key are
	cleared if a key is imported. This is in general desirable so that
	a formerly deleted key does not automatically gain an ownertrust
	values merely due to import. On the other hand it is sometimes
	necessary to re-import a trusted set of keys again but keeping
	already assigned ownertrust values. This can be achieved by using
	this option.

	@item repair-pks-subkey-bug
	During import, attempt to repair the damage caused by the PKS keyserver
	bug (pre version 0.9.6) that mangles keys with multiple subkeys. Note
	that this cannot completely repair the damaged key as some crucial data
	is removed by the keyserver, but it does at least give you back one
	subkey. Defaults to no for regular @option{--import} and to yes for
	keyserver @option{--recv-keys}.

	@item import-show
	Show a listing of the key as imported right before it is stored.
	This can be combined with the option @option{--dry-run} to only look
	at keys.

	@item import-export
	Run the entire import code but instead of storing the key to the
	local keyring write it to the output. The export options
	@option{export-pka} and @option{export-dane} affect the output. This
	option can be used to remove all invalid parts from a key without the
	need to store it.

	@item merge-only
	During import, allow key updates to existing keys, but do not allow
	any new keys to be imported. Defaults to no.

	@item import-clean
	After import, compact (remove all signatures except the
	self-signature) any user IDs from the new key that are not usable.
	Then, remove any signatures from the new key that are not usable.
	This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are not present
	on the keyring. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key}
	command "clean" after import. Defaults to no.

	@item import-minimal
	Import the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except
	the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the
	same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" after import.
	Defaults to no.
	@end table

	@item --import-filter @code{@var{name}=@var{expr}}
	@itemx --export-filter @code{@var{name}=@var{expr}}
	@opindex import-filter
	@opindex export-filter
	These options define an import/export filter which are applied to the
	imported/exported keyblock right before it will be stored/written.
	@var{name} defines the type of filter to use, @var{expr} the
	expression to evaluate. The option can be used several times which
	then appends more expression to the same @var{name}.

	@noindent
	The available filter types are:

	@table @asis

	@item keep-uid
	This filter will keep a user id packet and its dependent packets in
	the keyblock if the expression evaluates to true.

	@item drop-subkey
	This filter drops the selected subkeys.
	Currently only implemented for --export-filter.

	@item drop-sig
	This filter drops the selected key signatures on user ids.
	Self-signatures are not considered.
	Currently only implemented for --import-filter.

	@end table

	For the syntax of the expression see the chapter "FILTER EXPRESSIONS".
	The property names for the expressions depend on the actual filter
	type and are indicated in the following table.

	The available properties are:

	@table @asis

	@item uid
	A string with the user id. (keep-uid)

	@item mbox
	The addr-spec part of a user id with mailbox or the empty string.
	(keep-uid)

	@item key_algo
	A number with the public key algorithm of a key or subkey packet.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item key_created
	@itemx key_created_d
	The first is the timestamp a public key or subkey packet was
	created. The second is the same but given as an ISO string,
	e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-subkey)

	@item primary
	Boolean indicating whether the user id is the primary one. (keep-uid)

	@item secret
	Boolean indicating whether a key or subkey is a secret one.
	drop-subkey)

	@item sig_created
	@itemx sig_created_d
	The first is the timestamp a signature packet was created. The
	second is the same but given as an ISO string,
	e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-sig)

	@item sig_algo
	A number with the public key algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig)

	@item sig_digest_algo
	A number with the digest algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig)

	@end table

	@item --export-options @code{parameters}
	@opindex export-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	exporting keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item export-local-sigs
	Allow exporting key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	@item export-attributes
	Include attribute user IDs (photo IDs) while exporting. This is
	useful to export keys if they are going to be used by an OpenPGP
	program that does not accept attribute user IDs. Defaults to yes.

	@item export-sensitive-revkeys
	Include designated revoker information that was marked as
	"sensitive". Defaults to no.

	@c Since GnuPG 2.1 gpg-agent manages the secret key and thus the
	@c export-reset-subkey-passwd hack is not anymore justified. Such use
	@c cases may be implemented using a specialized secret key export
	@c tool.
	@c @item export-reset-subkey-passwd
	@c When using the @option{--export-secret-subkeys} command, this option resets
	@c the passphrases for all exported subkeys to empty. This is useful
	@c when the exported subkey is to be used on an unattended machine where
	@c a passphrase doesn't necessarily make sense. Defaults to no.

	@item export-clean
	Compact (remove all signatures from) user IDs on the key being
	exported if the user IDs are not usable. Also, do not export any
	signatures that are not usable. This includes signatures that were
	issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. This option is
	the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "clean" before export
	except that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to
	no.

	@item export-minimal
	Export the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except the
	most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the same as
	running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" before export except
	that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to no.

	@item export-pka
	Instead of outputting the key material output PKA records suitable
	to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before each
	record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone file.

	@item export-dane
	Instead of outputting the key material output OpenPGP DANE records
	suitable to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before
	each record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone
	file.

	@end table

	@item --with-colons
	@opindex with-colons
	Print key listings delimited by colons. Note that the output will be
	encoded in UTF-8 regardless of any @option{--display-charset} setting. This
	format is useful when GnuPG is called from scripts and other programs
	as it is easily machine parsed. The details of this format are
	documented in the file @file{doc/DETAILS}, which is included in the GnuPG
	source distribution.

	@item --fixed-list-mode
	@opindex fixed-list-mode
	Do not merge primary user ID and primary key in @option{--with-colon}
	listing mode and print all timestamps as seconds since 1970-01-01.
	Since GnuPG 2.0.10, this mode is always used and thus this option is
	obsolete; it does not harm to use it though.

	@item --legacy-list-mode
	@opindex legacy-list-mode
	Revert to the pre-2.1 public key list mode. This only affects the
	human readable output and not the machine interface
	(i.e. @code{--with-colons}). Note that the legacy format does not
	convey suitable information for elliptic curves.

	@item --with-fingerprint
	@opindex with-fingerprint
	Same as the command @option{--fingerprint} but changes only the format
	of the output and may be used together with another command.

	@item --with-subkey-fingerprint
	@opindex with-subkey-fingerprint
	If a fingerprint is printed for the primary key, this option forces
	printing of the fingerprint for all subkeys. This could also be
	achieved by using the @option{--with-fingerprint} twice but by using
	this option along with keyid-format "none" a compact fingerprint is
	printed.

	@item --with-icao-spelling
	@opindex with-icao-spelling
	Print the ICAO spelling of the fingerprint in addition to the hex digits.

	@item --with-keygrip
	@opindex with-keygrip
	Include the keygrip in the key listings. In @code{--with-colons} mode
	this is implicitly enable for secret keys.

	@item --with-wkd-hash
	@opindex with-wkd-hash
	Print a Web Key Directory identifier along with each user ID in key
	listings. This is an experimental feature and semantics may change.

	@item --with-secret
	@opindex with-secret
	Include info about the presence of a secret key in public key listings
	done with @code{--with-colons}.

	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPENPGP OPTIONS **************
	@c *******************************************
	@node OpenPGP Options
	@subsection OpenPGP protocol specific options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -t, --textmode
	@itemx --no-textmode
	@opindex textmode
	Treat input files as text and store them in the OpenPGP canonical text
	form with standard "CRLF" line endings. This also sets the necessary
	flags to inform the recipient that the encrypted or signed data is text
	and may need its line endings converted back to whatever the local
	system uses. This option is useful when communicating between two
	platforms that have different line ending conventions (UNIX-like to Mac,
	Mac to Windows, etc). @option{--no-textmode} disables this option, and
	is the default.

	@item --force-v3-sigs
	@itemx --no-force-v3-sigs
	@item --force-v4-certs
	@itemx --no-force-v4-certs
	These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.1.

	@item --force-mdc
	@opindex force-mdc
	Force the use of encryption with a modification detection code. This
	is always used with the newer ciphers (those with a blocksize greater
	than 64 bits), or if all of the recipient keys indicate MDC support in
	their feature flags.

	@item --disable-mdc
	@opindex disable-mdc
	Disable the use of the modification detection code. Note that by
	using this option, the encrypted message becomes vulnerable to a
	message modification attack.

	@item --disable-signer-uid
	@opindex disable-signer-uid
	By default the user ID of the signing key is embedded in the data
	signature. As of now this is only done if the signing key has been
	specified with @option{local-user} using a mail address. This
	information can be helpful for verifier to locate the key; see
	option @option{--auto-key-retrieve}.

	@item --personal-cipher-preferences @code{string}
	@opindex personal-cipher-preferences
	Set the list of personal cipher preferences to @code{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also
	used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command.

	@item --personal-digest-preferences @code{string}
	@opindex personal-digest-preferences
	Set the list of personal digest preferences to @code{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked digest algorithm in this list
	is also used when signing without encryption
	(e.g. @option{--clearsign} or @option{--sign}).

	@item --personal-compress-preferences @code{string}
	@opindex personal-compress-preferences
	Set the list of personal compression preferences to @code{string}.
	Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available
	algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This
	allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the
	recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that
	is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked compression
	algorithm in this list is also used when there are no recipient keys
	to consider (e.g. @option{--symmetric}).

	@item --s2k-cipher-algo @code{name}
	@opindex s2k-cipher-algo
	Use @code{name} as the cipher algorithm for symmetric encryption with
	a passphrase if @option{--personal-cipher-preferences} and
	@option{--cipher-algo} are not given. The default is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}.

	@item --s2k-digest-algo @code{name}
	@opindex s2k-digest-algo
	Use @code{name} as the digest algorithm used to mangle the passphrases
	for symmetric encryption. The default is SHA-1.

	@item --s2k-mode @code{n}
	@opindex s2k-mode
	Selects how passphrases for symmetric encryption are mangled. If
	@code{n} is 0 a plain passphrase (which is in general not recommended)
	will be used, a 1 adds a salt (which should not be used) to the
	passphrase and a 3 (the default) iterates the whole process a number
	of times (see @option{--s2k-count}).

	@item --s2k-count @code{n}
	@opindex s2k-count
	Specify how many times the passphrases mangling for symmetric
	encryption is repeated. This value may range between 1024 and
	65011712 inclusive. The default is inquired from gpg-agent. Note
	that not all values in the 1024-65011712 range are legal and if an
	illegal value is selected, GnuPG will round up to the nearest legal
	value. This option is only meaningful if @option{--s2k-mode} is set
	to the default of 3.


	@end table

	@c ***************************
	@c ***** Compliance ******
	@c ***************************
	@node Compliance Options
	@subsection Compliance options

	These options control what GnuPG is compliant to. Only one of these
	options may be active at a time. Note that the default setting of
	this is nearly always the correct one. See the INTEROPERABILITY WITH
	OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below before using one of these
	options.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --gnupg
	@opindex gnupg
	Use standard GnuPG behavior. This is essentially OpenPGP behavior
	(see @option{--openpgp}), but with some additional workarounds for common
	compatibility problems in different versions of PGP. This is the
	default option, so it is not generally needed, but it may be useful to
	override a different compliance option in the gpg.conf file.

	@item --openpgp
	@opindex openpgp
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict OpenPGP
	behavior. Use this option to reset all previous options like
	@option{--s2k-*}, @option{--cipher-algo}, @option{--digest-algo} and
	@option{--compress-algo} to OpenPGP compliant values. All PGP
	workarounds are disabled.

	@item --rfc4880
	@opindex rfc4880
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-4880
	behavior. Note that this is currently the same thing as
	@option{--openpgp}.

	@item --rfc4880bis
	@opindex rfc4880bis
	Enable experimental features from proposed updates to RFC-4880. This
	option can be used in addition to the other compliance options.
	Warning: The behavior may change with any GnuPG release and created
	keys or data may not be usable with future GnuPG versions.

	@item --rfc2440
	@opindex rfc2440
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-2440
	behavior.

	@item --pgp6
	@opindex pgp6
	Set up all options to be as PGP 6 compliant as possible. This
	restricts you to the ciphers IDEA (if the IDEA plugin is installed),
	3DES, and CAST5, the hashes MD5, SHA1 and RIPEMD160, and the
	compression algorithms none and ZIP. This also disables
	@option{--throw-keyids}, and making signatures with signing subkeys as PGP 6
	does not understand signatures made by signing subkeys.

	This option implies @option{--disable-mdc --escape-from-lines}.

	@item --pgp7
	@opindex pgp7
	Set up all options to be as PGP 7 compliant as possible. This is
	identical to @option{--pgp6} except that MDCs are not disabled, and the
	list of allowable ciphers is expanded to add AES128, AES192, AES256, and
	TWOFISH.

	@item --pgp8
	@opindex pgp8
	Set up all options to be as PGP 8 compliant as possible. PGP 8 is a lot
	closer to the OpenPGP standard than previous versions of PGP, so all
	this does is disable @option{--throw-keyids} and set
	@option{--escape-from-lines}. All algorithms are allowed except for the
	SHA224, SHA384, and SHA512 digests.

	@item --compliance @var{string}
	@opindex compliance
	This option can be used instead of one of the options above. Valid
	values for @var{string} are the above option names (without the double
	dash) and possibly others as shown when using "help" for @var{value}.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** ESOTERIC OPTIONS *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Esoteric Options
	@subsection Doing things one usually doesn't want to do

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -n
	@itemx --dry-run
	@opindex dry-run
	Don't make any changes (this is not completely implemented).

	@item --list-only
	@opindex list-only
	Changes the behaviour of some commands. This is like @option{--dry-run} but
	different in some cases. The semantic of this option may be extended in
	the future. Currently it only skips the actual decryption pass and
	therefore enables a fast listing of the encryption keys.

	@item -i
	@itemx --interactive
	@opindex interactive
	Prompt before overwriting any files.

	@item --debug-level @var{level}
	@opindex debug-level
	Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be
	a numeric value or by a keyword:

	@table @code
	@item none
	No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of
	the keyword.
	@item basic
	Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item advanced
	More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item expert
	Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item guru
	All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be
	used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is
	only enabled if the keyword is used.
	@end table

	How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not
	specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are
	however carefully selected to best aid in debugging.

	@item --debug @var{flags}
	@opindex debug
	Set debugging flags. All flags are or-ed and @var{flags} may be given
	in C syntax (e.g. 0x0042) or as a comma separated list of flag names.
	To get a list of all supported flags the single word "help" can be
	used.

	@item --debug-all
	@opindex debug-all
	Set all useful debugging flags.

	@item --debug-iolbf
	@opindex debug-iolbf
	Set stdout into line buffered mode. This option is only honored when
	given on the command line.

	@item --faked-system-time @var{epoch}
	@opindex faked-system-time
	This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back or
	forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since the year
	1970. Alternatively @var{epoch} may be given as a full ISO time string
	(e.g. "20070924T154812").

	@item --enable-progress-filter
	@opindex enable-progress-filter
	Enable certain PROGRESS status outputs. This option allows frontends
	to display a progress indicator while gpg is processing larger files.
	There is a slight performance overhead using it.

	@item --status-fd @code{n}
	@opindex status-fd
	Write special status strings to the file descriptor @code{n}.
	See the file DETAILS in the documentation for a listing of them.

	@item --status-file @code{file}
	@opindex status-file
	Same as @option{--status-fd}, except the status data is written to file
	@code{file}.

	@item --logger-fd @code{n}
	@opindex logger-fd
	Write log output to file descriptor @code{n} and not to STDERR.

	@item --log-file @code{file}
	@itemx --logger-file @code{file}
	@opindex log-file
	Same as @option{--logger-fd}, except the logger data is written to
	file @code{file}. Use @file{socket://} to log to socket.

	@item --attribute-fd @code{n}
	@opindex attribute-fd
	Write attribute subpackets to the file descriptor @code{n}. This is most
	useful for use with @option{--status-fd}, since the status messages are
	needed to separate out the various subpackets from the stream delivered
	to the file descriptor.

	@item --attribute-file @code{file}
	@opindex attribute-file
	Same as @option{--attribute-fd}, except the attribute data is written to
	file @code{file}.

	@item --comment @code{string}
	@itemx --no-comments
	@opindex comment
	Use @code{string} as a comment string in clear text signatures and ASCII
	armored messages or keys (see @option{--armor}). The default behavior is
	not to use a comment string. @option{--comment} may be repeated multiple
	times to get multiple comment strings. @option{--no-comments} removes
	all comments. It is a good idea to keep the length of a single comment
	below 60 characters to avoid problems with mail programs wrapping such
	lines. Note that comment lines, like all other header lines, are not
	protected by the signature.

	@item --emit-version
	@itemx --no-emit-version
	@opindex emit-version
	Force inclusion of the version string in ASCII armored output. If
	given once only the name of the program and the major number is
	-emitted, given twice the minor is also emitted, given triple
	-the micro is added, and given quad an operating system identification
	+emitted, given twice the minor is also emitted, given thrice
	+the micro is added, and given four times an operating system identification
	is also emitted. @option{--no-emit-version} (default) disables the version
	line.

	@item --sig-notation @code{name=value}
	@itemx --cert-notation @code{name=value}
	@itemx -N, --set-notation @code{name=value}
	@opindex sig-notation
	@opindex cert-notation
	@opindex set-notation
	Put the name value pair into the signature as notation data.
	@code{name} must consist only of printable characters or spaces, and
	must contain a '@@' character in the form keyname@@domain.example.com
	(substituting the appropriate keyname and domain name, of course). This
	is to help prevent pollution of the IETF reserved notation
	namespace. The @option{--expert} flag overrides the '@@'
	check. @code{value} may be any printable string; it will be encoded in
	UTF-8, so you should check that your @option{--display-charset} is set
	correctly. If you prefix @code{name} with an exclamation mark (!), the
	notation data will be flagged as critical
	(rfc4880:5.2.3.16). @option{--sig-notation} sets a notation for data
	signatures. @option{--cert-notation} sets a notation for key signatures
	(certifications). @option{--set-notation} sets both.

	There are special codes that may be used in notation names. "%k" will
	be expanded into the key ID of the key being signed, "%K" into the
	long key ID of the key being signed, "%f" into the fingerprint of the
	key being signed, "%s" into the key ID of the key making the
	signature, "%S" into the long key ID of the key making the signature,
	"%g" into the fingerprint of the key making the signature (which might
	be a subkey), "%p" into the fingerprint of the primary key of the key
	making the signature, "%c" into the signature count from the OpenPGP
	smartcard, and "%%" results in a single "%". %k, %K, and %f are only
	meaningful when making a key signature (certification), and %c is only
	meaningful when using the OpenPGP smartcard.

	@item --sig-policy-url @code{string}
	@itemx --cert-policy-url @code{string}
	@itemx --set-policy-url @code{string}
	@opindex sig-policy-url
	@opindex cert-policy-url
	@opindex set-policy-url
	Use @code{string} as a Policy URL for signatures (rfc4880:5.2.3.20). If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the policy URL packet will
	be flagged as critical. @option{--sig-policy-url} sets a policy url for
	data signatures. @option{--cert-policy-url} sets a policy url for key
	signatures (certifications). @option{--set-policy-url} sets both.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --sig-keyserver-url @code{string}
	@opindex sig-keyserver-url
	Use @code{string} as a preferred keyserver URL for data signatures. If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the keyserver URL packet
	will be flagged as critical.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --set-filename @code{string}
	@opindex set-filename
	Use @code{string} as the filename which is stored inside messages.
	This overrides the default, which is to use the actual filename of the
	file being encrypted. Using the empty string for @code{string}
	effectively removes the filename from the output.

	@item --for-your-eyes-only
	@itemx --no-for-your-eyes-only
	@opindex for-your-eyes-only
	Set the `for your eyes only' flag in the message. This causes GnuPG to
	refuse to save the file unless the @option{--output} option is given,
	and PGP to use a "secure viewer" with a claimed Tempest-resistant font
	to display the message. This option overrides @option{--set-filename}.
	@option{--no-for-your-eyes-only} disables this option.

	@item --use-embedded-filename
	@itemx --no-use-embedded-filename
	@opindex use-embedded-filename
	Try to create a file with a name as embedded in the data. This can be
	a dangerous option as it enables overwriting files. Defaults to no.

	@item --cipher-algo @code{name}
	@opindex cipher-algo
	Use @code{name} as cipher algorithm. Running the program with the
	command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. If
	this is not used the cipher algorithm is selected from the preferences
	stored with the key. In general, you do not want to use this option as
	it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard.
	@option{--personal-cipher-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the
	same thing.

	@item --digest-algo @code{name}
	@opindex digest-algo
	Use @code{name} as the message digest algorithm. Running the program
	with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. In
	general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to
	violate the OpenPGP standard. @option{--personal-digest-preferences} is the
	safe way to accomplish the same thing.

	@item --compress-algo @code{name}
	@opindex compress-algo
	Use compression algorithm @code{name}. "zlib" is RFC-1950 ZLIB
	compression. "zip" is RFC-1951 ZIP compression which is used by PGP.
	"bzip2" is a more modern compression scheme that can compress some
	things better than zip or zlib, but at the cost of more memory used
	during compression and decompression. "uncompressed" or "none"
	disables compression. If this option is not used, the default
	behavior is to examine the recipient key preferences to see which
	algorithms the recipient supports. If all else fails, ZIP is used for
	maximum compatibility.

	ZLIB may give better compression results than ZIP, as the compression
	window size is not limited to 8k. BZIP2 may give even better
	compression results than that, but will use a significantly larger
	amount of memory while compressing and decompressing. This may be
	significant in low memory situations. Note, however, that PGP (all
	versions) only supports ZIP compression. Using any algorithm other
	than ZIP or "none" will make the message unreadable with PGP. In
	general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to
	violate the OpenPGP standard. @option{--personal-compress-preferences} is the
	safe way to accomplish the same thing.

	@item --cert-digest-algo @code{name}
	@opindex cert-digest-algo
	Use @code{name} as the message digest algorithm used when signing a
	key. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a
	list of supported algorithms. Be aware that if you choose an algorithm
	that GnuPG supports but other OpenPGP implementations do not, then some
	users will not be able to use the key signatures you make, or quite
	possibly your entire key.

	@item --disable-cipher-algo @code{name}
	@opindex disable-cipher-algo
	Never allow the use of @code{name} as cipher algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --disable-pubkey-algo @code{name}
	@opindex disable-pubkey-algo
	Never allow the use of @code{name} as public key algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --throw-keyids
	@itemx --no-throw-keyids
	@opindex throw-keyids
	Do not put the recipient key IDs into encrypted messages. This helps to
	hide the receivers of the message and is a limited countermeasure
	against traffic analysis.@footnote{Using a little social engineering
	anyone who is able to decrypt the message can check whether one of the
	other recipients is the one he suspects.} On the receiving side, it may
	slow down the decryption process because all available secret keys must
	be tried. @option{--no-throw-keyids} disables this option. This option
	is essentially the same as using @option{--hidden-recipient} for all
	recipients.

	@item --not-dash-escaped
	@opindex not-dash-escaped
	This option changes the behavior of cleartext signatures
	so that they can be used for patch files. You should not
	send such an armored file via email because all spaces
	and line endings are hashed too. You can not use this
	option for data which has 5 dashes at the beginning of a
	line, patch files don't have this. A special armor header
	line tells GnuPG about this cleartext signature option.

	@item --escape-from-lines
	@itemx --no-escape-from-lines
	@opindex escape-from-lines
	Because some mailers change lines starting with "From " to ">From " it
	is good to handle such lines in a special way when creating cleartext
	signatures to prevent the mail system from breaking the signature. Note
	that all other PGP versions do it this way too. Enabled by
	default. @option{--no-escape-from-lines} disables this option.

	@item --passphrase-repeat @code{n}
	@opindex passphrase-repeat
	Specify how many times @command{@gpgname} will request a new
	passphrase be repeated. This is useful for helping memorize a
	passphrase. Defaults to 1 repetition.

	@item --passphrase-fd @code{n}
	@opindex passphrase-fd
	Read the passphrase from file descriptor @code{n}. Only the first line
	will be read from file descriptor @code{n}. If you use 0 for @code{n},
	the passphrase will be read from STDIN. This can only be used if only
	one passphrase is supplied.

	Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch}
	has also been given. This is different from GnuPG version 1.x.

	@item --passphrase-file @code{file}
	@opindex passphrase-file
	Read the passphrase from file @code{file}. Only the first line will
	be read from file @code{file}. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, a passphrase stored in a file is
	of questionable security if other users can read this file. Don't use
	this option if you can avoid it.
	Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch}
	has also been given. This is different from GnuPG version 1.x.

	@item --passphrase @code{string}
	@opindex passphrase
	Use @code{string} as the passphrase. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, this is of very questionable
	security on a multi-user system. Don't use this option if you can
	avoid it.
	Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch}
	has also been given. This is different from GnuPG version 1.x.

	@item --pinentry-mode @code{mode}
	@opindex pinentry-mode
	Set the pinentry mode to @code{mode}. Allowed values for @code{mode}
	are:
	@table @asis
	@item default
	Use the default of the agent, which is @code{ask}.
	@item ask
	Force the use of the Pinentry.
	@item cancel
	Emulate use of Pinentry's cancel button.
	@item error
	Return a Pinentry error (``No Pinentry'').
	@item loopback
	Redirect Pinentry queries to the caller. Note that in contrast to
	Pinentry the user is not prompted again if he enters a bad password.
	@end table

	@item --command-fd @code{n}
	@opindex command-fd
	This is a replacement for the deprecated shared-memory IPC mode.
	If this option is enabled, user input on questions is not expected
	from the TTY but from the given file descriptor. It should be used
	together with @option{--status-fd}. See the file doc/DETAILS in the source
	distribution for details on how to use it.

	@item --command-file @code{file}
	@opindex command-file
	Same as @option{--command-fd}, except the commands are read out of file
	@code{file}

	@item --allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@itemx --no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@opindex allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	Allow the import and use of keys with user IDs which are not
	self-signed. This is not recommended, as a non self-signed user ID is
	trivial to forge. @option{--no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid} disables.

	@item --allow-freeform-uid
	@opindex allow-freeform-uid
	Disable all checks on the form of the user ID while generating a new
	one. This option should only be used in very special environments as
	it does not ensure the de-facto standard format of user IDs.

	@item --ignore-time-conflict
	@opindex ignore-time-conflict
	GnuPG normally checks that the timestamps associated with keys and
	signatures have plausible values. However, sometimes a signature
	seems to be older than the key due to clock problems. This option
	makes these checks just a warning. See also @option{--ignore-valid-from} for
	timestamp issues on subkeys.

	@item --ignore-valid-from
	@opindex ignore-valid-from
	GnuPG normally does not select and use subkeys created in the future.
	This option allows the use of such keys and thus exhibits the
	pre-1.0.7 behaviour. You should not use this option unless there
	is some clock problem. See also @option{--ignore-time-conflict} for timestamp
	issues with signatures.

	@item --ignore-crc-error
	@opindex ignore-crc-error
	The ASCII armor used by OpenPGP is protected by a CRC checksum against
	transmission errors. Occasionally the CRC gets mangled somewhere on
	the transmission channel but the actual content (which is protected by
	the OpenPGP protocol anyway) is still okay. This option allows GnuPG
	to ignore CRC errors.

	@item --ignore-mdc-error
	@opindex ignore-mdc-error
	This option changes a MDC integrity protection failure into a warning.
	This can be useful if a message is partially corrupt, but it is
	necessary to get as much data as possible out of the corrupt message.
	However, be aware that a MDC protection failure may also mean that the
	message was tampered with intentionally by an attacker.

	@item --allow-weak-digest-algos
	@opindex allow-weak-digest-algos
	Signatures made with known-weak digest algorithms are normally
	rejected with an ``invalid digest algorithm'' message. This option
	allows the verification of signatures made with such weak algorithms.
	MD5 is the only digest algorithm considered weak by default. See also
	@option{--weak-digest} to reject other digest algorithms.

	@item --weak-digest @code{name}
	@opindex weak-digest
	Treat the specified digest algorithm as weak. Signatures made over
	weak digests algorithms are normally rejected. This option can be
	supplied multiple times if multiple algorithms should be considered
	weak. See also @option{--allow-weak-digest-algos} to disable
	rejection of weak digests. MD5 is always considered weak, and does
	not need to be listed explicitly.

	@item --no-default-keyring
	@opindex no-default-keyring
	Do not add the default keyrings to the list of keyrings. Note that
	GnuPG will not operate without any keyrings, so if you use this option
	and do not provide alternate keyrings via @option{--keyring} or
	@option{--secret-keyring}, then GnuPG will still use the default public or
	secret keyrings.

	@item --no-keyring
	@opindex no-keyring
	Do not add use any keyrings even if specified as options.

	@item --skip-verify
	@opindex skip-verify
	Skip the signature verification step. This may be
	used to make the decryption faster if the signature
	verification is not needed.

	@item --with-key-data
	@opindex with-key-data
	Print key listings delimited by colons (like @option{--with-colons}) and
	print the public key data.

	@item --fast-list-mode
	@opindex fast-list-mode
	Changes the output of the list commands to work faster; this is achieved
	by leaving some parts empty. Some applications don't need the user ID
	and the trust information given in the listings. By using this options
	they can get a faster listing. The exact behaviour of this option may
	change in future versions. If you are missing some information, don't
	use this option.

	@item --no-literal
	@opindex no-literal
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --set-filesize
	@opindex set-filesize
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --show-session-key
	@opindex show-session-key
	Display the session key used for one message. See
	@option{--override-session-key} for the counterpart of this option.

	We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing; however the user should have
	the freedom to decide whether to go to prison or to reveal the content
	of one specific message without compromising all messages ever
	encrypted for one secret key.

	You can also use this option if you receive an encrypted message which
	is abusive or offensive, to prove to the administrators of the
	messaging system that the ciphertext transmitted corresponds to an
	inappropriate plaintext so they can take action against the offending
	user.

	@item --override-session-key @code{string}
	@itemx --override-session-key-fd @code{fd}
	@opindex override-session-key
	Don't use the public key but the session key @code{string} respective
	the session key taken from the first line read from file descriptor
	@code{fd}. The format of this string is the same as the one printed
	by @option{--show-session-key}. This option is normally not used but
	comes handy in case someone forces you to reveal the content of an
	encrypted message; using this option you can do this without handing
	out the secret key. Note that using @option{--override-session-key}
	may reveal the session key to all local users via the global process
	table.

	@item --ask-sig-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-sig-expire
	@opindex ask-sig-expire
	When making a data signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-sig-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-sig-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-sig-expire
	@opindex default-sig-expire
	The default expiration time to use for signature expiration. Valid
	values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d
	(for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for
	example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an absolute
	date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --ask-cert-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-expire
	@opindex ask-cert-expire
	When making a key signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-cert-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-cert-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-cert-expire
	@opindex default-cert-expire
	The default expiration time to use for key signature expiration.
	Valid values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the
	letter d (for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years)
	(for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an
	absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --allow-secret-key-import
	@opindex allow-secret-key-import
	This is an obsolete option and is not used anywhere.

	@item --allow-multiple-messages
	@item --no-allow-multiple-messages
	@opindex allow-multiple-messages
	Allow processing of multiple OpenPGP messages contained in a single file
	or stream. Some programs that call GPG are not prepared to deal with
	multiple messages being processed together, so this option defaults to
	no. Note that versions of GPG prior to 1.4.7 always allowed multiple
	messages.

	Warning: Do not use this option unless you need it as a temporary
	workaround!


	@item --enable-special-filenames
	@opindex enable-special-filenames
	This option enables a mode in which filenames of the form
	@file{-&n}, where n is a non-negative decimal number,
	refer to the file descriptor n and not to a file with that name.

	@item --no-expensive-trust-checks
	@opindex no-expensive-trust-checks
	Experimental use only.

	@item --preserve-permissions
	@opindex preserve-permissions
	Don't change the permissions of a secret keyring back to user
	read/write only. Use this option only if you really know what you are doing.

	@item --default-preference-list @code{string}
	@opindex default-preference-list
	Set the list of default preferences to @code{string}. This preference
	list is used for new keys and becomes the default for "setpref" in the
	edit menu.

	@item --default-keyserver-url @code{name}
	@opindex default-keyserver-url
	Set the default keyserver URL to @code{name}. This keyserver will be
	used as the keyserver URL when writing a new self-signature on a key,
	which includes key generation and changing preferences.

	@item --list-config
	@opindex list-config
	Display various internal configuration parameters of GnuPG. This option
	is intended for external programs that call GnuPG to perform tasks, and
	is thus not generally useful. See the file @file{doc/DETAILS} in the
	source distribution for the details of which configuration items may be
	listed. @option{--list-config} is only usable with
	@option{--with-colons} set.

	@item --list-gcrypt-config
	@opindex list-gcrypt-config
	Display various internal configuration parameters of Libgcrypt.

	@item --gpgconf-list
	@opindex gpgconf-list
	This command is similar to @option{--list-config} but in general only
	internally used by the @command{gpgconf} tool.

	@item --gpgconf-test
	@opindex gpgconf-test
	This is more or less dummy action. However it parses the configuration
	file and returns with failure if the configuration file would prevent
	@command{gpg} from startup. Thus it may be used to run a syntax check
	on the configuration file.

	@end table

	@c *******************************
	@c ***** Deprecated **********
	@c *******************************
	@node Deprecated Options
	@subsection Deprecated options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --show-photos
	@itemx --no-show-photos
	@opindex show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-sigs},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, @option{--list-secret-keys}, and verifying
	a signature to also display the photo ID attached to the key, if
	any. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. These options are deprecated. Use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-photos} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-photos} instead.

	@item --show-keyring
	@opindex show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. This option is deprecated: use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-keyring} instead.

	@item --always-trust
	@opindex always-trust
	Identical to @option{--trust-model always}. This option is deprecated.

	@item --show-notation
	@itemx --no-show-notation
	@opindex show-notation
	Show signature notations in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs} listings
	as well as when verifying a signature with a notation in it. These
	options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-notation}
	and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-notation} instead.

	@item --show-policy-url
	@itemx --no-show-policy-url
	@opindex show-policy-url
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}
	listings as well as when verifying a signature with a policy URL in
	it. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} instead.


	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* FILES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect files
	@node GPG Configuration
	@section Configuration files

	There are a few configuration files to control certain aspects of
	@command{@gpgname}'s operation. Unless noted, they are expected in the
	current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}).

	@table @file

	@item gpg.conf
	@efindex gpg.conf
	This is the standard configuration file read by @command{@gpgname} on
	startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes
	may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated. This default
	name may be changed on the command line (@pxref{gpg-option --options}).
	You should backup this file.

	@end table

	Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files
	into the directory @file{@value{SYSCONFSKELDIR}} so that
	newly created users start up with a working configuration.
	For existing users a small
	helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}).

	For internal purposes @command{@gpgname} creates and maintains a few other
	files; They all live in in the current home directory (@pxref{option
	--homedir}). Only the @command{@gpgname} program may modify these files.


	@table @file
	@item ~/.gnupg
	@efindex ~/.gnupg
	This is the default home directory which is used if neither the
	environment variable @code{GNUPGHOME} nor the option
	@option{--homedir} is given.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg
	@efindex pubring.gpg
	The public keyring. You should backup this file.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the public keyring.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
	@efindex pubring.kbx
	The public keyring using a different format. This file is shared
	with @command{gpgsm}. You should backup this file.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx.lock
	The lock file for @file{pubring.kbx}.

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg
	@efindex secring.gpg
	A secret keyring as used by GnuPG versions before 2.1. It is not
	used by GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the secret keyring.

	@item ~/.gnupg/.gpg-v21-migrated
	@efindex .gpg-v21-migrated
	File indicating that a migration to GnuPG 2.1 has been done.

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg
	@efindex trustdb.gpg
	The trust database. There is no need to backup this file; it is better
	to backup the ownertrust values (@pxref{option --export-ownertrust}).

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the trust database.

	@item ~/.gnupg/random_seed
	@efindex random_seed
	A file used to preserve the state of the internal random pool.

	@item ~/.gnupg/openpgp-revocs.d/
	@efindex openpgp-revocs.d
	This is the directory where gpg stores pre-generated revocation
	certificates. The file name corresponds to the OpenPGP fingerprint of
	the respective key. It is suggested to backup those certificates and
	if the primary private key is not stored on the disk to move them to
	an external storage device. Anyone who can access theses files is
	able to revoke the corresponding key. You may want to print them out.
	You should backup all files in this directory and take care to keep
	this backup closed away.

	@item @value{DATADIR}/options.skel
	@efindex options.skel
	The skeleton options file.

	@end table

	Operation is further controlled by a few environment variables:

	@table @asis

	@item HOME
	@efindex HOME
	Used to locate the default home directory.

	@item GNUPGHOME
	@efindex GNUPGHOME
	If set directory used instead of "~/.gnupg".

	@item GPG_AGENT_INFO
	This variable is obsolete; it was used by GnuPG versions before 2.1.

	@item PINENTRY_USER_DATA
	@efindex PINENTRY_USER_DATA
	This value is passed via gpg-agent to pinentry. It is useful to convey
	extra information to a custom pinentry.

	@item COLUMNS
	@itemx LINES
	@efindex COLUMNS
	@efindex LINES
	Used to size some displays to the full size of the screen.

	@item LANGUAGE
	@efindex LANGUAGE
	Apart from its use by GNU, it is used in the W32 version to override the
	language selection done through the Registry. If used and set to a
	valid and available language name (@var{langid}), the file with the
	translation is loaded from
	@code{@var{gpgdir}/gnupg.nls/@var{langid}.mo}. Here @var{gpgdir} is the
	directory out of which the gpg binary has been loaded. If it can't be
	loaded the Registry is tried and as last resort the native Windows
	locale system is used.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* EXAMPLES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect examples
	@node GPG Examples
	@section Examples

	@table @asis

	@item gpg -se -r @code{Bob} @code{file}
	sign and encrypt for user Bob

	@item gpg --clearsign @code{file}
	make a clear text signature

	@item gpg -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature

	@item gpg -u 0x12345678 -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature with the key 0x12345678

	@item gpg --list-keys @code{user_ID}
	show keys

	@item gpg --fingerprint @code{user_ID}
	show fingerprint

	@item gpg --verify @code{pgpfile}
	@itemx gpg --verify @code{sigfile} [@code{datafile}]
	Verify the signature of the file but do not output the data unless
	requested. The second form is used for detached signatures, where
	@code{sigfile} is the detached signature (either ASCII armored or
	binary) and @code{datafile} are the signed data; if this is not given, the name of the
	file holding the signed data is constructed by cutting off the
	extension (".asc" or ".sig") of @code{sigfile} or by asking the user
	for the filename. If the option @option{--output} is also used the
	signed data is written to the file specified by that option; use
	@code{-} to write the signed data to stdout.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* USER ID **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect how to specify a user id
	@ifset isman
	@include specify-user-id.texi
	@end ifset

	@mansect filter expressions
	@chapheading FILTER EXPRESSIONS

	The options @option{--import-filter} and @option{--export-filter} use
	expressions with this syntax (square brackets indicate an optional
	part and curly braces a repetition, white space between the elements
	are allowed):

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	[lc] @{[@{flag@}] PROPNAME op VALUE [lc]@}
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	The name of a property (@var{PROPNAME}) may only consist of letters,
	digits and underscores. The description for the filter type
	describes which properties are defined. If an undefined property is
	used it evaluates to the empty string. Unless otherwise noted, the
	@var{VALUE} must always be given and may not be the empty string. No
	quoting is defined for the value, thus the value may not contain the
	strings @code{&&} or @code{\|\|}, which are used as logical connection
	operators. The flag @code{--} can be used to remove this restriction.

	Numerical values are computed as long int; standard C notation
	applies. @var{lc} is the logical connection operator; either
	@code{&&} for a conjunction or @code{\|\|} for a disjunction. A
	conjunction is assumed at the begin of an expression. Conjunctions
	have higher precedence than disjunctions. If @var{VALUE} starts with
	one of the characters used in any @var{op} a space after the
	@var{op} is required.

	@noindent
	The supported operators (@var{op}) are:

	@table @asis

	@item =~
	Substring must match.

	@item !~
	Substring must not match.

	@item =
	The full string must match.

	@item <>
	The full string must not match.

	@item ==
	The numerical value must match.

	@item !=
	The numerical value must not match.

	@item <=
	The numerical value of the field must be LE than the value.

	@item <
	The numerical value of the field must be LT than the value.

	@item >
	The numerical value of the field must be GT than the value.

	@item >=
	The numerical value of the field must be GE than the value.

	@item -le
	The string value of the field must be less or equal than the value.

	@item -lt
	The string value of the field must be less than the value.

	@item -gt
	The string value of the field must be greater than the value.

	@item -ge
	The string value of the field must be greater or equal than the value.

	@item -n
	True if value is not empty (no value allowed).

	@item -z
	True if value is empty (no value allowed).

	@item -t
	Alias for "PROPNAME != 0" (no value allowed).

	@item -f
	Alias for "PROPNAME == 0" (no value allowed).

	@end table

	@noindent
	Values for @var{flag} must be space separated. The supported flags
	are:

	@table @asis
	@item --
	@var{VALUE} spans to the end of the expression.
	@item -c
	The string match in this part is done case-sensitive.
	@end table

	The filter options concatenate several specifications for a filter of
	the same type. For example the four options in this example:

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	--import-option keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa"
	--import-option keep-uid="&& uid !~ Test"
	--import-option keep-uid="\|\| uid =~ Alpha"
	--import-option keep-uid="uid !~ Test"
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	@noindent
	which is equivalent to

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	--import-option \
	keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa" && uid !~ Test" \|\| uid =~ Alpha" && "uid !~ Test"
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	imports only the user ids of a key containing the strings "Alfa"
	or "Alpha" but not the string "test".


	@mansect return value
	@chapheading RETURN VALUE

	The program returns 0 if everything was fine, 1 if at least
	a signature was bad, and other error codes for fatal errors.

	@mansect warnings
	@chapheading WARNINGS

	Use a good password for your user account and a good passphrase
	to protect your secret key. This passphrase is the weakest part of the
	whole system. Programs to do dictionary attacks on your secret keyring
	are very easy to write and so you should protect your "~/.gnupg/"
	directory very well.

	Keep in mind that, if this program is used over a network (telnet), it
	is very easy to spy out your passphrase!

	If you are going to verify detached signatures, make sure that the
	program knows about it; either give both filenames on the command line
	or use @samp{-} to specify STDIN.

	@mansect interoperability
	@chapheading INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS

	GnuPG tries to be a very flexible implementation of the OpenPGP
	standard. In particular, GnuPG implements many of the optional parts
	of the standard, such as the SHA-512 hash, and the ZLIB and BZIP2
	compression algorithms. It is important to be aware that not all
	OpenPGP programs implement these optional algorithms and that by
	forcing their use via the @option{--cipher-algo},
	@option{--digest-algo}, @option{--cert-digest-algo}, or
	@option{--compress-algo} options in GnuPG, it is possible to create a
	perfectly valid OpenPGP message, but one that cannot be read by the
	intended recipient.

	There are dozens of variations of OpenPGP programs available, and each
	supports a slightly different subset of these optional algorithms.
	For example, until recently, no (unhacked) version of PGP supported
	the BLOWFISH cipher algorithm. A message using BLOWFISH simply could
	not be read by a PGP user. By default, GnuPG uses the standard
	OpenPGP preferences system that will always do the right thing and
	create messages that are usable by all recipients, regardless of which
	OpenPGP program they use. Only override this safe default if you
	really know what you are doing.

	If you absolutely must override the safe default, or if the preferences
	on a given key are invalid for some reason, you are far better off using
	the @option{--pgp6}, @option{--pgp7}, or @option{--pgp8} options. These
	options are safe as they do not force any particular algorithms in
	violation of OpenPGP, but rather reduce the available algorithms to a
	"PGP-safe" list.

	@mansect bugs
	@chapheading BUGS

	On older systems this program should be installed as setuid(root). This
	is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents the
	operating system from writing memory pages (which may contain
	passphrases or other sensitive material) to disk. If you get no
	warning message about insecure memory your operating system supports
	locking without being root. The program drops root privileges as soon
	as locked memory is allocated.

	Note also that some systems (especially laptops) have the ability to
	``suspend to disk'' (also known as ``safe sleep'' or ``hibernate'').
	This writes all memory to disk before going into a low power or even
	powered off mode. Unless measures are taken in the operating system
	to protect the saved memory, passphrases or other sensitive material
	may be recoverable from it later.

	Before you report a bug you should first search the mailing list
	archives for similar problems and second check whether such a bug has
	already been reported to our bug tracker at http://bugs.gnupg.org .

	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* ************
	@c ************* UNATTENDED ************
	@c ************* ************
	@c *******************************************
	@manpause
	@node Unattended Usage of GPG
	@section Unattended Usage

	@command{gpg} is often used as a backend engine by other software. To help
	with this a machine interface has been defined to have an unambiguous
	way to do this. The options @option{--status-fd} and @option{--batch}
	are almost always required for this.

	@menu
	* Unattended GPG key generation:: Unattended key generation
	@end menu


	@node Unattended GPG key generation
	@subsection Unattended key generation

	The command @option{--gen-key} may be used along with the option
	@option{--batch} for unattended key generation. The parameters are
	either read from stdin or given as a file on the command line.
	The format of the parameter file is as follows:

	@itemize @bullet
	@item Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 characters.
	@item UTF-8 encoding must be used to specify non-ASCII characters.
	@item Empty lines are ignored.
	@item Leading and trailing while space is ignored.
	@item A hash sign as the first non white space character indicates
	a comment line.
	@item Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign, the
	arguments are separated by white space from the keyword.
	@item Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon. Arguments
	are separated by white space.
	@item
	The first parameter must be @samp{Key-Type}; control statements may be
	placed anywhere.
	@item
	The order of the parameters does not matter except for @samp{Key-Type}
	which must be the first parameter. The parameters are only used for
	the generated keyblock (primary and subkeys); parameters from previous
	sets are not used. Some syntactically checks may be performed.
	@item
	Key generation takes place when either the end of the parameter file
	is reached, the next @samp{Key-Type} parameter is encountered or at the
	control statement @samp{%commit} is encountered.
	@end itemize

	@noindent
	Control statements:

	@table @asis

	@item %echo @var{text}
	Print @var{text} as diagnostic.

	@item %dry-run
	Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking).

	@item %commit
	Perform the key generation. Note that an implicit commit is done at
	the next @asis{Key-Type} parameter.

	@item %pubring @var{filename}
	@itemx %secring @var{filename}
	Do not write the key to the default or commandline given keyring but
	to @var{filename}. This must be given before the first commit to take
	place, duplicate specification of the same filename is ignored, the
	last filename before a commit is used. The filename is used until a
	new filename is used (at commit points) and all keys are written to
	that file. If a new filename is given, this file is created (and
	overwrites an existing one). For GnuPG versions prior to 2.1, both
	control statements must be given. For GnuPG 2.1 and later
	@samp{%secring} is a no-op.

	@item %ask-passphrase
	@itemx %no-ask-passphrase
	This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	@item %no-protection
	Using this option allows the creation of keys without any passphrase
	protection. This option is mainly intended for regression tests.

	@item %transient-key
	If given the keys are created using a faster and a somewhat less
	secure random number generator. This option may be used for keys
	which are only used for a short time and do not require full
	cryptographic strength. It takes only effect if used together with
	the control statement @samp{%no-protection}.

	@end table

	@noindent
	General Parameters:

	@table @asis

	@item Key-Type: @var{algo}
	Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the primary
	key. The algorithm must be capable of signing. This is a required
	parameter. @var{algo} may either be an OpenPGP algorithm number or a
	string with the algorithm name. The special value @samp{default} may
	be used for @var{algo} to create the default key type; in this case a
	@samp{Key-Usage} shall not be given and @samp{default} also be used
	for @samp{Subkey-Type}.

	@item Key-Length: @var{nbits}
	The requested length of the generated key in bits. The default is
	returned by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}.

	@item Key-Grip: @var{hexstring}
	This is optional and used to generate a CSR or certificate for an
	already existing key. Key-Length will be ignored when given.

	@item Key-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Space or comma delimited list of key usages. Allowed values are
	@samp{encrypt}, @samp{sign}, and @samp{auth}. This is used to
	generate the key flags. Please make sure that the algorithm is
	capable of this usage. Note that OpenPGP requires that all primary
	keys are capable of certification, so no matter what usage is given
	here, the @samp{cert} flag will be on. If no @samp{Key-Usage} is
	specified and the @samp{Key-Type} is not @samp{default}, all allowed
	usages for that particular algorithm are used; if it is not given but
	@samp{default} is used the usage will be @samp{sign}.

	@item Subkey-Type: @var{algo}
	This generates a secondary key (subkey). Currently only one subkey
	can be handled. See also @samp{Key-Type} above.

	@item Subkey-Length: @var{nbits}
	Length of the secondary key (subkey) in bits. The default is returned
	by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}.

	@item Subkey-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Key usage lists for a subkey; similar to @samp{Key-Usage}.

	@item Passphrase: @var{string}
	If you want to specify a passphrase for the secret key, enter it here.
	Default is to use the Pinentry dialog to ask for a passphrase.

	@item Name-Real: @var{name}
	@itemx Name-Comment: @var{comment}
	@itemx Name-Email: @var{email}
	The three parts of a user name. Remember to use UTF-8 encoding here.
	If you don't give any of them, no user ID is created.

	@item Expire-Date: @var{iso-date}\|(@var{number}[d\|w\|m\|y])
	Set the expiration date for the key (and the subkey). It may either
	be entered in ISO date format (e.g. "20000815T145012") or as number of
	days, weeks, month or years after the creation date. The special
	notation "seconds=N" is also allowed to specify a number of seconds
	since creation. Without a letter days are assumed. Note that there
	is no check done on the overflow of the type used by OpenPGP for
	timestamps. Thus you better make sure that the given value make
	sense. Although OpenPGP works with time intervals, GnuPG uses an
	absolute value internally and thus the last year we can represent is
	2105.

	@item Creation-Date: @var{iso-date}
	Set the creation date of the key as stored in the key information and
	which is also part of the fingerprint calculation. Either a date like
	"1986-04-26" or a full timestamp like "19860426T042640" may be used.
	The time is considered to be UTC. The special notation "seconds=N"
	may be used to directly specify a the number of seconds since Epoch
	(Unix time). If it is not given the current time is used.

	@item Preferences: @var{string}
	Set the cipher, hash, and compression preference values for this key.
	This expects the same type of string as the sub-command @samp{setpref}
	in the @option{--edit-key} menu.

	@item Revoker: @var{algo}:@var{fpr} [sensitive]
	Add a designated revoker to the generated key. Algo is the public key
	algorithm of the designated revoker (i.e. RSA=1, DSA=17, etc.)
	@var{fpr} is the fingerprint of the designated revoker. The optional
	@samp{sensitive} flag marks the designated revoker as sensitive
	information. Only v4 keys may be designated revokers.

	@item Keyserver: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter that specifies the preferred keyserver
	URL for the key.

	@item Handle: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter only used with the status lines
	KEY_CREATED and KEY_NOT_CREATED. @var{string} may be up to 100
	characters and should not contain spaces. It is useful for batch key
	generation to associate a key parameter block with a status line.

	@end table

	@noindent
	Here is an example on how to create a key:
	@smallexample
	$ cat >foo <<EOF
	%echo Generating a basic OpenPGP key
	Key-Type: DSA
	Key-Length: 1024
	Subkey-Type: ELG-E
	Subkey-Length: 1024
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	%pubring foo.pub
	%secring foo.sec
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	EOF
	$ @gpgname --batch --gen-key foo
	[...]
	$ @gpgname --no-default-keyring --secret-keyring ./foo.sec \
	--keyring ./foo.pub --list-secret-keys
	/home/wk/work/gnupg-stable/scratch/foo.sec
	------------------------------------------
	sec 1024D/915A878D 2000-03-09 Joe Tester (with stupid passphrase) <joe@@foo.bar>
	ssb 1024g/8F70E2C0 2000-03-09
	@end smallexample


	@noindent
	If you want to create a key with the default algorithms you would use
	these parameters:
	@smallexample
	%echo Generating a default key
	Key-Type: default
	Subkey-Type: default
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	%pubring foo.pub
	%secring foo.sec
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	@end smallexample




	@mansect see also
	@ifset isman
	@command{gpgv}(1),
	@command{gpgsm}(1),
	@command{gpg-agent}(1)
	@end ifset
	@include see-also-note.texi
	diff --git a/g10/keyedit.c b/g10/keyedit.c
	index 171afb7d7..795be052d 100644
	--- a/g10/keyedit.c
	+++ b/g10/keyedit.c
	@@ -1,6555 +1,6555 @@
	/* keyedit.c - Edit properties of a key
	* Copyright (C) 1998-2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 1998-2016 Werner Koch
	* Copyright (C) 2015, 2016 g10 Code GmbH
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <errno.h>
	#include <ctype.h>
	#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
	# define GNUPG_LIBREADLINE_H_INCLUDED
	# include <readline/readline.h>
	#endif

	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "status.h"
	#include "iobuf.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "photoid.h"
	#include "util.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "filter.h"
	#include "ttyio.h"
	#include "status.h"
	#include "i18n.h"
	#include "keyserver-internal.h"
	#include "call-agent.h"
	#include "host2net.h"
	#include "tofu.h"

	static void show_prefs (PKT_user_id * uid, PKT_signature * selfsig,
	int verbose);
	static void show_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
	kbnode_t keyblock, PKT_public_key * pk,
	unsigned int flag, int with_prefs);
	static void show_key_with_all_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
	KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked,
	int with_revoker, int with_fpr,
	int with_subkeys, int with_prefs,
	int nowarn);
	static void show_key_and_fingerprint (kbnode_t keyblock, int with_subkeys);
	static void show_key_and_grip (kbnode_t keyblock);
	static void subkey_expire_warning (kbnode_t keyblock);
	static int menu_adduid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
	int photo, const char photo_name, const char uidstr);
	static void menu_deluid (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_delsig (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_clean (KBNODE keyblock, int self_only);
	static void menu_delkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_addrevoker (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int sensitive);
	static int menu_expire (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_changeusage (kbnode_t keyblock);
	static int menu_backsign (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_set_primary_uid (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_set_preferences (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_set_keyserver_url (const char *url, KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_set_notation (const char *string, KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_select_uid (KBNODE keyblock, int idx);
	static int menu_select_uid_namehash (KBNODE keyblock, const char *namehash);
	static int menu_select_key (KBNODE keyblock, int idx, char *p);
	static int count_uids (KBNODE keyblock);
	static int count_uids_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag);
	static int count_keys_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag);
	static int count_selected_uids (KBNODE keyblock);
	static int real_uids_left (KBNODE keyblock);
	static int count_selected_keys (KBNODE keyblock);
	static int menu_revsig (KBNODE keyblock);
	static int menu_revuid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock);
	static int core_revuid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, KBNODE node,
	const struct revocation_reason_info *reason,
	int *modified);
	static int menu_revkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_revsubkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	static int enable_disable_key (KBNODE keyblock, int disable);
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	static void menu_showphoto (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock);

	static int update_trust = 0;

	#define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)

	#define NODFLG_BADSIG (1<<0) /* Bad signature. */
	#define NODFLG_NOKEY (1<<1) /* No public key. */
	#define NODFLG_SIGERR (1<<2) /* Other sig error. */

	#define NODFLG_MARK_A (1<<4) /* Temporary mark. */
	#define NODFLG_DELSIG (1<<5) /* To be deleted. */

	#define NODFLG_SELUID (1<<8) /* Indicate the selected userid. */
	#define NODFLG_SELKEY (1<<9) /* Indicate the selected key. */
	#define NODFLG_SELSIG (1<<10) /* Indicate a selected signature. */

	struct sign_attrib
	{
	int non_exportable, non_revocable;
	struct revocation_reason_info *reason;
	byte trust_depth, trust_value;
	char *trust_regexp;
	};



	/* TODO: Fix duplicated code between here and the check-sigs/list-sigs
	code in keylist.c. */
	static int
	print_and_check_one_sig_colon (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node,
	int inv_sigs, int no_key, int *oth_err,
	int *is_selfsig, int print_without_key)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	int rc, sigrc;

	/* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has the pk that
	issued it. See also keylist.c:list_keyblock_print */

	rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, node, is_selfsig);
	switch (gpg_err_code (rc))
	{
	case 0:
	node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_BADSIG \| NODFLG_NOKEY \| NODFLG_SIGERR);
	sigrc = '!';
	break;
	case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
	node->flag = NODFLG_BADSIG;
	sigrc = '-';
	if (inv_sigs)
	++ * inv_sigs;
	break;
	case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
	case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY:
	node->flag = NODFLG_NOKEY;
	sigrc = '?';
	if (no_key)
	++ * no_key;
	break;
	default:
	node->flag = NODFLG_SIGERR;
	sigrc = '%';
	if (oth_err)
	++ * oth_err;
	break;
	}

	if (sigrc != '?' \|\| print_without_key)
	{
	es_printf ("sig:%c::%d:%08lX%08lX:%lu:%lu:",
	sigrc, sig->pubkey_algo, (ulong) sig->keyid[0],
	(ulong) sig->keyid[1], (ulong) sig->timestamp,
	(ulong) sig->expiredate);

	if (sig->trust_depth \|\| sig->trust_value)
	es_printf ("%d %d", sig->trust_depth, sig->trust_value);

	es_printf (":");

	if (sig->trust_regexp)
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout,
	sig->trust_regexp, strlen (sig->trust_regexp),
	":", NULL);

	es_printf ("::%02x%c\n", sig->sig_class,
	sig->flags.exportable ? 'x' : 'l');

	if (opt.show_subpackets)
	print_subpackets_colon (sig);
	}

	return (sigrc == '!');
	}


	/*
	* Print information about a signature (rc is its status), check it
	* and return true if the signature is okay. NODE must be a signature
	* packet. With EXTENDED set all possible signature list options will
	* always be printed.
	*/
	static int
	print_one_sig (int rc, KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node,
	int inv_sigs, int no_key, int *oth_err,
	int is_selfsig, int print_without_key, int extended)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	int sigrc;
	int is_rev = sig->sig_class == 0x30;

	/* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has the pk that
	issued it. See also keylist.c:list_keyblock_print */

	switch (gpg_err_code (rc))
	{
	case 0:
	node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_BADSIG \| NODFLG_NOKEY \| NODFLG_SIGERR);
	sigrc = '!';
	break;
	case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
	node->flag = NODFLG_BADSIG;
	sigrc = '-';
	if (inv_sigs)
	++ * inv_sigs;
	break;
	case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
	case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY:
	node->flag = NODFLG_NOKEY;
	sigrc = '?';
	if (no_key)
	++ * no_key;
	break;
	default:
	node->flag = NODFLG_SIGERR;
	sigrc = '%';
	if (oth_err)
	++ * oth_err;
	break;
	}
	if (sigrc != '?' \|\| print_without_key)
	{
	tty_printf ("%s%c%c %c%c%c%c%c%c %s %s",
	is_rev ? "rev" : "sig", sigrc,
	(sig->sig_class - 0x10 > 0 &&
	sig->sig_class - 0x10 <
	4) ? '0' + sig->sig_class - 0x10 : ' ',
	sig->flags.exportable ? ' ' : 'L',
	sig->flags.revocable ? ' ' : 'R',
	sig->flags.policy_url ? 'P' : ' ',
	sig->flags.notation ? 'N' : ' ',
	sig->flags.expired ? 'X' : ' ',
	(sig->trust_depth > 9) ? 'T' : (sig->trust_depth >
	0) ? '0' +
	sig->trust_depth : ' ',
	keystr (sig->keyid),
	datestr_from_sig (sig));
	if ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE) \|\| extended )
	tty_printf (" %s", expirestr_from_sig (sig));
	tty_printf (" ");
	if (sigrc == '%')
	tty_printf ("[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc));
	else if (sigrc == '?')
	;
	else if (is_selfsig)
	{
	tty_printf (is_rev ? _("[revocation]") : _("[self-signature]"));
	if (extended && sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	tty_printf ("*");
	}
	else
	{
	size_t n;
	char *p = get_user_id (sig->keyid, &n);
	tty_print_utf8_string2 (NULL, p, n,
	opt.screen_columns - keystrlen () - 26 -
	((opt.
	list_options & LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE) ? 11
	: 0));
	xfree (p);
	}
	tty_printf ("\n");

	if (sig->flags.policy_url
	&& ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS) \|\| extended))
	show_policy_url (sig, 3, 0);

	if (sig->flags.notation
	&& ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS) \|\| extended))
	show_notation (sig, 3, 0,
	((opt.
	list_options & LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS) ? 1 : 0) +
	((opt.
	list_options & LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS) ? 2 : 0));

	if (sig->flags.pref_ks
	&& ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS) \|\| extended))
	show_keyserver_url (sig, 3, 0);

	if (extended)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	const unsigned char *s;

	s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL);
	if (s && *s)
	tty_printf (" [primary]\n");

	s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
	if (s && buf32_to_u32 (s))
	tty_printf (" [expires: %s]\n",
	isotimestamp (pk->timestamp + buf32_to_u32 (s)));
	}
	}

	return (sigrc == '!');
	}


	static int
	print_and_check_one_sig (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node,
	int inv_sigs, int no_key, int *oth_err,
	int *is_selfsig, int print_without_key, int extended)
	{
	int rc;

	rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, node, is_selfsig);
	return print_one_sig (rc,
	keyblock, node, inv_sigs, no_key, oth_err,
	*is_selfsig, print_without_key, extended);
	}



	/* Order two signatures. The actual ordering isn't important. Our
	goal is to ensure that identical signatures occur together. */
	static int
	sig_comparison (const void av, const void bv)
	{
	const KBNODE an = (const KBNODE ) av;
	const KBNODE bn = (const KBNODE ) bv;
	const PKT_signature *a;
	const PKT_signature *b;
	int ndataa;
	int ndatab;
	int i;

	log_assert (an->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
	log_assert (bn->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);

	a = an->pkt->pkt.signature;
	b = bn->pkt->pkt.signature;

	if (a->digest_algo < b->digest_algo)
	return -1;
	if (a->digest_algo > b->digest_algo)
	return 1;

	ndataa = pubkey_get_nsig (a->pubkey_algo);
	ndatab = pubkey_get_nsig (b->pubkey_algo);
	if (ndataa != ndatab)
	return (ndataa < ndatab)? -1 : 1;

	for (i = 0; i < ndataa; i ++)
	{
	int c = gcry_mpi_cmp (a->data[i], b->data[i]);
	if (c != 0)
	return c;
	}

	/* Okay, they are equal. */
	return 0;
	}

	/* Perform a few sanity checks on a keyblock is okay and possibly
	repair some damage. Concretely:

	- Detect duplicate signatures and remove them.

	- Detect out of order signatures and relocate them (e.g., a sig
	over user id X located under subkey Y).

	Note: this function does not remove signatures that don't belong or
	components that are not signed! (Although it would be trivial to
	do so.)

	If ONLY_SELFSIGS is true, then this function only reorders self
	signatures (it still checks all signatures for duplicates,
	however).

	Returns 1 if the keyblock was modified, 0 otherwise. */
	static int
	check_all_keysigs (KBNODE kb, int only_selected, int only_selfsigs)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	KBNODE n, n_next, *n_prevp, n2;
	char *pending_desc = NULL;
	PKT_public_key *issuer;
	KBNODE last_printed_component;
	KBNODE current_component = NULL;
	int dups = 0;
	int missing_issuer = 0;
	int reordered = 0;
	int bad_signature = 0;
	int missing_selfsig = 0;
	int modified = 0;

	log_assert (kb->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	/* First we look for duplicates. */
	{
	int nsigs;
	kbnode_t *sigs;
	int i;
	int last_i;

	/* Count the sigs. */
	for (nsigs = 0, n = kb; n; n = n->next)
	{
	if (is_deleted_kbnode (n))
	continue;
	else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	nsigs ++;
	}

	if (!nsigs)
	return 0; /* No signatures at all. */

	/* Add them all to the SIGS array. */
	sigs = xtrycalloc (nsigs, sizeof *sigs);
	if (!sigs)
	{
	log_error (_("error allocating memory: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror ()));
	return 0;
	}

	i = 0;
	for (n = kb; n; n = n->next)
	{
	if (is_deleted_kbnode (n))
	continue;

	if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
	continue;

	sigs[i] = n;
	i ++;
	}
	log_assert (i == nsigs);

	qsort (sigs, nsigs, sizeof (sigs[0]), sig_comparison);

	last_i = 0;
	for (i = 1; i < nsigs; i ++)
	{
	log_assert (sigs[last_i]);
	log_assert (sigs[last_i]->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
	log_assert (sigs[i]);
	log_assert (sigs[i]->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);

	if (sig_comparison (&sigs[last_i], &sigs[i]) == 0)
	/* They are the same. Kill the latter. */
	{
	if (DBG_PACKET)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = sigs[i]->pkt->pkt.signature;

	log_debug ("Signature appears multiple times, "
	"deleting duplicate:\n");
	log_debug (" sig: class 0x%x, issuer: %s,"
	" timestamp: %s (%lld), digest: %02x %02x\n",
	sig->sig_class, keystr (sig->keyid),
	isotimestamp (sig->timestamp),
	(long long) sig->timestamp,
	sig->digest_start[0], sig->digest_start[1]);
	}

	/* Remove sigs[i] from the keyblock. */
	{
	KBNODE z, *prevp;
	int to_kill = last_i;
	last_i = i;

	for (prevp = &kb, z = kb; z; prevp = &z->next, z = z->next)
	if (z == sigs[to_kill])
	break;

	*prevp = sigs[to_kill]->next;

	sigs[to_kill]->next = NULL;
	release_kbnode (sigs[to_kill]);
	sigs[to_kill] = NULL;

	dups ++;
	modified = 1;
	}
	}
	else
	last_i = i;
	}

	xfree (sigs);
	}

	/* Make sure the sigs occur after the component (public key, subkey,
	user id) that they sign. */
	issuer = NULL;
	last_printed_component = NULL;
	for (n_prevp = &kb, n = kb;
	n;
	/* If we moved n, then n_prevp is need valid. */
	n_prevp = (n->next == n_next ? &n->next : n_prevp), n = n_next)
	{
	PACKET *p;
	int processed_current_component;
	PKT_signature *sig;
	int rc;
	int dump_sig_params = 0;

	n_next = n->next;

	if (is_deleted_kbnode (n))
	continue;

	p = n->pkt;

	if (issuer && issuer != pk)
	{
	free_public_key (issuer);
	issuer = NULL;
	}

	xfree (pending_desc);
	pending_desc = NULL;

	switch (p->pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
	log_assert (p->pkt.public_key == pk);
	if (only_selected && ! (n->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
	{
	current_component = NULL;
	break;
	}

	if (DBG_PACKET)
	log_debug ("public key %s: timestamp: %s (%lld)\n",
	pk_keyid_str (pk),
	isotimestamp (pk->timestamp),
	(long long) pk->timestamp);
	current_component = n;
	break;
	case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
	if (only_selected && ! (n->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
	{
	current_component = NULL;
	break;
	}

	if (DBG_PACKET)
	log_debug ("subkey %s: timestamp: %s (%lld)\n",
	pk_keyid_str (p->pkt.public_key),
	isotimestamp (p->pkt.public_key->timestamp),
	(long long) p->pkt.public_key->timestamp);
	current_component = n;
	break;
	case PKT_USER_ID:
	if (only_selected && ! (n->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
	{
	current_component = NULL;
	break;
	}

	if (DBG_PACKET)
	log_debug ("user id: %s\n",
	p->pkt.user_id->attrib_data
	? "[ photo id ]"
	: p->pkt.user_id->name);
	current_component = n;
	break;
	case PKT_SIGNATURE:
	if (! current_component)
	/* The current component is not selected, don't check the
	sigs under it. */
	break;

	sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;

	pending_desc = xasprintf (" sig: class: 0x%x, issuer: %s,"
	" timestamp: %s (%lld), digest: %02x %02x",
	sig->sig_class,
	keystr (sig->keyid),
	isotimestamp (sig->timestamp),
	(long long) sig->timestamp,
	sig->digest_start[0], sig->digest_start[1]);


	if (keyid_cmp (pk_keyid (pk), sig->keyid) == 0)
	issuer = pk;
	else
	/* Issuer is a different key. */
	{
	if (only_selfsigs)
	continue;

	issuer = xmalloc (sizeof (*issuer));
	err = get_pubkey (issuer, sig->keyid);
	if (err)
	{
	xfree (issuer);
	issuer = NULL;
	if (DBG_PACKET)
	{
	if (pending_desc)
	log_debug ("%s", pending_desc);
	log_debug (" Can't check signature allegedly"
	" issued by %s: %s\n",
	keystr (sig->keyid), gpg_strerror (err));
	}
	missing_issuer ++;
	break;
	}
	}

	if ((err = openpgp_pk_test_algo (sig->pubkey_algo)))
	{
	if (DBG_PACKET && pending_desc)
	log_debug ("%s", pending_desc);
	tty_printf (_("can't check signature with unsupported"
	" public-key algorithm (%d): %s.\n"),
	sig->pubkey_algo, gpg_strerror (err));
	break;
	}
	if ((err = openpgp_md_test_algo (sig->digest_algo)))
	{
	if (DBG_PACKET && pending_desc)
	log_debug ("%s", pending_desc);
	tty_printf (_("can't check signature with unsupported"
	" message-digest algorithm %d: %s.\n"),
	sig->digest_algo, gpg_strerror (err));
	break;
	}

	/* We iterate over the keyblock. Most likely, the matching
	component is the current component so always try that
	first. */
	processed_current_component = 0;
	for (n2 = current_component;
	n2;
	n2 = (processed_current_component ? n2->next : kb),
	processed_current_component = 1)
	if (is_deleted_kbnode (n2))
	continue;
	else if (processed_current_component && n2 == current_component)
	/* Don't process it twice. */
	continue;
	else
	{
	err = check_signature_over_key_or_uid (issuer, sig, kb, n2->pkt,
	NULL, NULL);
	if (! err)
	break;
	}

	/* n/sig is a signature and n2 is the component (public key,
	subkey or user id) that it signs, if any.
	current_component is that component that it appears to
	apply to (according to the ordering). */

	if (current_component == n2)
	{
	if (DBG_PACKET)
	{
	log_debug ("%s", pending_desc);
	log_debug (" Good signature over last key or uid!\n");
	}

	rc = 0;
	}
	else if (n2)
	{
	log_assert (n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	\|\| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY);

	if (DBG_PACKET)
	{
	log_debug ("%s", pending_desc);
	log_debug (" Good signature out of order!"
	" (Over %s (%d) '%s')\n",
	n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	? "user id"
	: n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	? "subkey"
	: "primary key",
	n2->pkt->pkttype,
	n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	? n2->pkt->pkt.user_id->name
	: pk_keyid_str (n2->pkt->pkt.public_key));
	}

	/* Reorder the packets: move the signature n to be just
	after n2. */

	/* Unlink the signature. */
	log_assert (n_prevp);
	*n_prevp = n->next;

	/* Insert the sig immediately after the component. */
	n->next = n2->next;
	n2->next = n;

	reordered ++;
	modified = 1;

	rc = 0;
	}
	else
	{
	if (DBG_PACKET)
	{
	log_debug ("%s", pending_desc);
	log_debug (" Bad signature.\n");
	}

	if (DBG_PACKET)
	dump_sig_params = 1;

	bad_signature ++;

	rc = GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
	}

	/* We don't cache the result here, because we haven't
	completely checked that the signature is legitimate. For
	instance, if we have a revocation certificate on Alice's
	key signed by Bob, the signature may be good, but we
	haven't checked that Bob is a designated revoker. */
	/* cache_sig_result (sig, rc); */

	{
	int has_selfsig = 0;
	if (! rc && issuer == pk)
	{
	if (n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	&& (/* Direct key signature. */
	sig->sig_class == 0x1f
	/* Key revocation signature. */
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x20))
	has_selfsig = 1;
	if (n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& (/* Subkey binding sig. */
	sig->sig_class == 0x18
	/* Subkey revocation sig. */
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x28))
	has_selfsig = 1;
	if (n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& (/* Certification sigs. */
	sig->sig_class == 0x10
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x11
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x12
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x13
	/* Certification revocation sig. */
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x30))
	has_selfsig = 1;
	}

	if ((n2 && n2 != last_printed_component)
	\|\| (! n2 && last_printed_component != current_component))
	{
	int is_reordered = n2 && n2 != current_component;
	if (n2)
	last_printed_component = n2;
	else
	last_printed_component = current_component;

	if (!modified)
	;
	else if (last_printed_component->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	tty_printf ("uid ");
	tty_print_utf8_string (last_printed_component
	->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	last_printed_component
	->pkt->pkt.user_id->len);
	}
	else if (last_printed_component->pkt->pkttype
	== PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	tty_printf ("pub %s",
	pk_keyid_str (last_printed_component
	->pkt->pkt.public_key));
	else
	tty_printf ("sub %s",
	pk_keyid_str (last_printed_component
	->pkt->pkt.public_key));

	if (modified)
	{
	if (is_reordered)
	tty_printf (_(" (reordered signatures follow)"));
	tty_printf ("\n");
	}
	}

	if (modified)
	print_one_sig (rc, kb, n, NULL, NULL, NULL, has_selfsig,
	0, only_selfsigs);
	}

	if (dump_sig_params)
	{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < pubkey_get_nsig (sig->pubkey_algo); i ++)
	{
	char buffer[1024];
	size_t len;
	char *printable;
	gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
	buffer, sizeof (buffer), &len,
	sig->data[i]);
	printable = bin2hex (buffer, len, NULL);
	log_info (" %d: %s\n", i, printable);
	xfree (printable);
	}
	}
	break;
	default:
	if (DBG_PACKET)
	log_debug ("unhandled packet: %d\n", p->pkttype);
	break;
	}
	}

	xfree (pending_desc);
	pending_desc = NULL;

	if (issuer != pk)
	free_public_key (issuer);
	issuer = NULL;

	/* Identify keys / uids that don't have a self-sig. */
	{
	int has_selfsig = 0;
	PACKET *p;
	PKT_signature *sig;

	current_component = NULL;
	for (n = kb; n; n = n->next)
	{
	if (is_deleted_kbnode (n))
	continue;

	p = n->pkt;

	switch (p->pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
	case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
	case PKT_USER_ID:
	if (current_component && ! has_selfsig)
	missing_selfsig ++;
	current_component = n;
	has_selfsig = 0;
	break;

	case PKT_SIGNATURE:
	if (! current_component \|\| has_selfsig)
	break;

	sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;

	if (! (sig->flags.checked && sig->flags.valid))
	break;

	if (keyid_cmp (pk_keyid (pk), sig->keyid) != 0)
	/* Different issuer, couldn't be a self-sig. */
	break;

	if (current_component->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	&& (/* Direct key signature. */
	sig->sig_class == 0x1f
	/* Key revocation signature. */
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x20))
	has_selfsig = 1;
	if (current_component->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& (/* Subkey binding sig. */
	sig->sig_class == 0x18
	/* Subkey revocation sig. */
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x28))
	has_selfsig = 1;
	if (current_component->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& (/* Certification sigs. */
	sig->sig_class == 0x10
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x11
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x12
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x13
	/* Certification revocation sig. */
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x30))
	has_selfsig = 1;

	break;

	default:
	if (current_component && ! has_selfsig)
	missing_selfsig ++;
	current_component = NULL;
	}
	}
	}

	if (dups \|\| missing_issuer \|\| bad_signature \|\| reordered)
	tty_printf (_("key %s:\n"), pk_keyid_str (pk));

	if (dups)
	tty_printf (ngettext ("%d duplicate signature removed\n",
	"%d duplicate signatures removed\n", dups), dups);
	if (missing_issuer)
	tty_printf (ngettext ("%d signature not checked due to a missing key\n",
	"%d signatures not checked due to missing keys\n",
	missing_issuer), missing_issuer);
	if (bad_signature)
	tty_printf (ngettext ("%d bad signature\n",
	"%d bad signatures\n",
	bad_signature), bad_signature);
	if (reordered)
	tty_printf (ngettext ("%d signature reordered\n",
	"%d signatures reordered\n",
	reordered), reordered);

	if (only_selfsigs && (bad_signature \|\| reordered))
	tty_printf (_("Warning: errors found and only checked self-signatures,"
	" run '%s' to check all signatures.\n"), "check");

	return modified;
	}


	static int
	sign_mk_attrib (PKT_signature * sig, void *opaque)
	{
	struct sign_attrib *attrib = opaque;
	byte buf[8];

	if (attrib->non_exportable)
	{
	buf[0] = 0; /* not exportable */
	build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE, buf, 1);
	}

	if (attrib->non_revocable)
	{
	buf[0] = 0; /* not revocable */
	build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE, buf, 1);
	}

	if (attrib->reason)
	revocation_reason_build_cb (sig, attrib->reason);

	if (attrib->trust_depth)
	{
	/* Not critical. If someone doesn't understand trust sigs,
	this can still be a valid regular signature. */
	buf[0] = attrib->trust_depth;
	buf[1] = attrib->trust_value;
	build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_TRUST, buf, 2);

	/* Critical. If someone doesn't understands regexps, this
	whole sig should be invalid. Note the +1 for the length -
	regexps are null terminated. */
	if (attrib->trust_regexp)
	build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL \| SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP,
	attrib->trust_regexp,
	strlen (attrib->trust_regexp) + 1);
	}

	return 0;
	}


	static void
	trustsig_prompt (byte * trust_value, byte * trust_depth, char **regexp)
	{
	char *p;

	*trust_value = 0;
	*trust_depth = 0;
	*regexp = NULL;

	/* Same string as pkclist.c:do_edit_ownertrust */
	tty_printf (_
	("Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify"
	" other users' keys\n(by looking at passports, checking"
	" fingerprints from different sources, etc.)\n"));
	tty_printf ("\n");
	tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust marginally\n"), 1);
	tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust fully\n"), 2);
	tty_printf ("\n");

	while (*trust_value == 0)
	{
	p = cpr_get ("trustsig_prompt.trust_value", _("Your selection? "));
	trim_spaces (p);
	cpr_kill_prompt ();
	/* 60 and 120 are as per RFC2440 */
	if (p[0] == '1' && !p[1])
	*trust_value = 60;
	else if (p[0] == '2' && !p[1])
	*trust_value = 120;
	xfree (p);
	}

	tty_printf ("\n");

	tty_printf (_("Please enter the depth of this trust signature.\n"
	"A depth greater than 1 allows the key you are"
	" signing to make\n"
	"trust signatures on your behalf.\n"));
	tty_printf ("\n");

	while (*trust_depth == 0)
	{
	p = cpr_get ("trustsig_prompt.trust_depth", _("Your selection? "));
	trim_spaces (p);
	cpr_kill_prompt ();
	*trust_depth = atoi (p);
	xfree (p);
	}

	tty_printf ("\n");

	tty_printf (_("Please enter a domain to restrict this signature, "
	"or enter for none.\n"));

	tty_printf ("\n");

	p = cpr_get ("trustsig_prompt.trust_regexp", _("Your selection? "));
	trim_spaces (p);
	cpr_kill_prompt ();

	if (strlen (p) > 0)
	{
	char *q = p;
	int regexplen = 100, ind;

	*regexp = xmalloc (regexplen);

	/* Now mangle the domain the user entered into a regexp. To do
	this, \-escape everything that isn't alphanumeric, and attach
	"<[^>]+[@.]" to the front, and ">$" to the end. */

	strcpy (*regexp, "<[^>]+[@.]");
	ind = strlen (*regexp);

	while (*q)
	{
	if (!((q >= 'A' && q <= 'Z')
	\|\| (q >= 'a' && q <= 'z') \|\| (q >= '0' && q <= '9')))
	(*regexp)[ind++] = '\\';

	(regexp)[ind++] = q;

	if ((regexplen - ind) < 3)
	{
	regexplen += 100;
	regexp = xrealloc (regexp, regexplen);
	}

	q++;
	}

	(*regexp)[ind] = '\0';
	strcat (*regexp, ">$");
	}

	xfree (p);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	}


	/*
	* Loop over all LOCUSR and and sign the uids after asking. If no
	* user id is marked, all user ids will be signed; if some user_ids
	* are marked only those will be signed. If QUICK is true the
	* function won't ask the user and use sensible defaults.
	*/
	static int
	sign_uids (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
	kbnode_t keyblock, strlist_t locusr, int *ret_modified,
	int local, int nonrevocable, int trust, int interactive,
	int quick)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
	SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
	KBNODE node, uidnode;
	PKT_public_key *primary_pk = NULL;
	int select_all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock) \|\| interactive;

	/* Build a list of all signators.
	*
	* We use the CERT flag to request the primary which must always
	* be one which is capable of signing keys. I can't see a reason
	* why to sign keys using a subkey. Implementation of USAGE_CERT
	* is just a hack in getkey.c and does not mean that a subkey
	* marked as certification capable will be used. */
	rc = build_sk_list (ctrl, locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	/* Loop over all signators. */
	for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
	{
	u32 sk_keyid[2], pk_keyid[2];
	char p, trust_regexp = NULL;
	int class = 0, selfsig = 0;
	u32 duration = 0, timestamp = 0;
	byte trust_depth = 0, trust_value = 0;

	pk = sk_rover->pk;
	keyid_from_pk (pk, sk_keyid);

	/* Set mark A for all selected user ids. */
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (select_all \|\| (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_MARK_A;
	else
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	}

	/* Reset mark for uids which are already signed. */
	uidnode = NULL;
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	primary_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (primary_pk, pk_keyid);

	/* Is this a self-sig? */
	if (pk_keyid[0] == sk_keyid[0] && pk_keyid[1] == sk_keyid[1])
	selfsig = 1;
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	uidnode = (node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) ? node : NULL;
	if (uidnode)
	{
	int yesreally = 0;
	char *user;

	user = utf8_to_native (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);

	if (opt.only_sign_text_ids
	&& uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("Skipping user ID \"%s\","
	" which is not a text ID.\n"),
	user);
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	uidnode = NULL;
	}
	else if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is revoked."), user);

	if (selfsig)
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	else if (opt.expert && !quick)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.revoke_okay",
	_("Are you sure you "
	"still want to sign "
	"it? (y/N) ")))
	{
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	uidnode = NULL;
	}
	else if (interactive)
	yesreally = 1;
	}
	else
	{
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	uidnode = NULL;
	tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
	}
	}
	else if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is expired."), user);

	if (selfsig)
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	else if (opt.expert && !quick)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.expire_okay",
	_("Are you sure you "
	"still want to sign "
	"it? (y/N) ")))
	{
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	uidnode = NULL;
	}
	else if (interactive)
	yesreally = 1;
	}
	else
	{
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	uidnode = NULL;
	tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
	}
	}
	else if (!uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->created && !selfsig)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is not self-signed."),
	user);

	if (opt.expert && !quick)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.nosig_okay",
	_("Are you sure you "
	"still want to sign "
	"it? (y/N) ")))
	{
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	uidnode = NULL;
	}
	else if (interactive)
	yesreally = 1;
	}
	else
	{
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	uidnode = NULL;
	tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
	}
	}

	if (uidnode && interactive && !yesreally && !quick)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("User ID \"%s\" is signable. "), user);
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.sign_okay",
	_("Sign it? (y/N) ")))
	{
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	uidnode = NULL;
	}
	}

	xfree (user);
	}
	}
	else if (uidnode && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	{
	if (sk_keyid[0] == node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
	&& sk_keyid[1] == node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1])
	{
	char buf[50];
	char *user;

	user = utf8_to_native (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);

	/* It's a v3 self-sig. Make it into a v4 self-sig? */
	if (node->pkt->pkt.signature->version < 4
	&& selfsig && !quick)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("The self-signature on \"%s\"\n"
	"is a PGP 2.x-style signature.\n"), user);

	/* Note that the regular PGP2 warning below
	still applies if there are no v4 sigs on
	this key at all. */

	if (opt.expert)
	if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.v4_promote_okay",
	_("Do you want to promote "
	"it to an OpenPGP self-"
	"signature? (y/N) ")))
	{
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_DELSIG;
	xfree (user);
	continue;
	}
	}

	/* Is the current signature expired? */
	if (node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.expired)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("Your current signature on \"%s\"\n"
	"has expired.\n"), user);

	if (quick \|\| cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("sign_uid.replace_expired_okay",
	_("Do you want to issue a "
	"new signature to replace "
	"the expired one? (y/N) ")))
	{
	/* Mark these for later deletion. We
	don't want to delete them here, just in
	case the replacement signature doesn't
	happen for some reason. We only delete
	these after the replacement is already
	in place. */

	node->flag \|= NODFLG_DELSIG;
	xfree (user);
	continue;
	}
	}

	if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable && !local)
	{
	/* It's a local sig, and we want to make a
	exportable sig. */
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("Your current signature on \"%s\"\n"
	"is a local signature.\n"), user);

	if (quick \|\| cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("sign_uid.local_promote_okay",
	_("Do you want to promote "
	"it to a full exportable " "signature? (y/N) ")))
	{
	/* Mark these for later deletion. We
	don't want to delete them here, just in
	case the replacement signature doesn't
	happen for some reason. We only delete
	these after the replacement is already
	in place. */

	node->flag \|= NODFLG_DELSIG;
	xfree (user);
	continue;
	}
	}

	/* Fixme: see whether there is a revocation in which
	* case we should allow signing it again. */
	if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable && local)
	tty_fprintf ( fp,
	_("\"%s\" was already locally signed by key %s\n"),
	user, keystr_from_pk (pk));
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("\"%s\" was already signed by key %s\n"),
	user, keystr_from_pk (pk));

	if (opt.expert && !quick
	&& cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.dupe_okay",
	_("Do you want to sign it "
	"again anyway? (y/N) ")))
	{
	/* Don't delete the old sig here since this is
	an --expert thing. */
	xfree (user);
	continue;
	}

	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
	(ulong) pk->keyid[0], (ulong) pk->keyid[1]);
	write_status_text (STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED, buf);
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; /* remove mark */

	xfree (user);
	}
	}
	}

	/* Check whether any uids are left for signing. */
	if (!count_uids_with_flag (keyblock, NODFLG_MARK_A))
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("Nothing to sign with key %s\n"),
	keystr_from_pk (pk));
	continue;
	}

	/* Ask whether we really should sign these user id(s). */
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, fp, keyblock, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0);
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");

	if (primary_pk->expiredate && !selfsig)
	{
	/* Static analyzer note: A claim that PRIMARY_PK might be
	NULL is not correct because it set from the public key
	packet which is always the first packet in a keyblock and
	parsed in the above loop over the keyblock. In case the
	keyblock has no packets at all and thus the loop was not
	entered the above count_uids_with_flag would have
	detected this case. */

	u32 now = make_timestamp ();

	if (primary_pk->expiredate <= now)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key has expired!"));

	if (opt.expert && !quick)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.expired_okay",
	_("Are you sure you still "
	"want to sign it? (y/N) ")))
	continue;
	}
	else
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
	continue;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key is due to expire on %s.\n"),
	expirestr_from_pk (primary_pk));

	if (opt.ask_cert_expire && !quick)
	{
	char *answer = cpr_get ("sign_uid.expire",
	_("Do you want your signature to "
	"expire at the same time? (Y/n) "));
	if (answer_is_yes_no_default (answer, 1))
	{
	/* This fixes the signature timestamp we're
	going to make as now. This is so the
	expiration date is exactly correct, and not
	a few seconds off (due to the time it takes
	to answer the questions, enter the
	passphrase, etc). */
	timestamp = now;
	duration = primary_pk->expiredate - now;
	}

	cpr_kill_prompt ();
	xfree (answer);
	}
	}
	}

	/* Only ask for duration if we haven't already set it to match
	the expiration of the pk */
	if (!duration && !selfsig)
	{
	if (opt.ask_cert_expire && !quick)
	duration = ask_expire_interval (1, opt.def_cert_expire);
	else
	duration = parse_expire_string (opt.def_cert_expire);
	}

	if (selfsig)
	;
	else
	{
	if (opt.batch \|\| !opt.ask_cert_level \|\| quick)
	class = 0x10 + opt.def_cert_level;
	else
	{
	char *answer;

	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("How carefully have you verified the key you are "
	"about to sign actually belongs\nto the person "
	"named above? If you don't know what to "
	"answer, enter \"0\".\n"));
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (0) I will not answer.%s\n"),
	opt.def_cert_level == 0 ? " (default)" : "");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (1) I have not checked at all.%s\n"),
	opt.def_cert_level == 1 ? " (default)" : "");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (2) I have done casual checking.%s\n"),
	opt.def_cert_level == 2 ? " (default)" : "");
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_(" (3) I have done very careful checking.%s\n"),
	opt.def_cert_level == 3 ? " (default)" : "");
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");

	while (class == 0)
	{
	answer = cpr_get ("sign_uid.class",
	_("Your selection? "
	"(enter '?' for more information): "));
	if (answer[0] == '\0')
	class = 0x10 + opt.def_cert_level; /* Default */
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "0") == 0)
	class = 0x10; /* Generic */
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "1") == 0)
	class = 0x11; /* Persona */
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "2") == 0)
	class = 0x12; /* Casual */
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "3") == 0)
	class = 0x13; /* Positive */
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("Invalid selection.\n"));

	xfree (answer);
	}
	}

	if (trust && !quick)
	trustsig_prompt (&trust_value, &trust_depth, &trust_regexp);
	}

	if (!quick)
	{
	p = get_user_id_native (sk_keyid);
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("Are you sure that you want to sign this key with your\n"
	"key \"%s\" (%s)\n"), p, keystr_from_pk (pk));
	xfree (p);
	}

	if (selfsig)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("This will be a self-signature.\n"));

	if (local)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("WARNING: the signature will not be marked "
	"as non-exportable.\n"));
	}

	if (nonrevocable)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("WARNING: the signature will not be marked "
	"as non-revocable.\n"));
	}
	}
	else
	{
	if (local)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("The signature will be marked as non-exportable.\n"));
	}

	if (nonrevocable)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("The signature will be marked as non-revocable.\n"));
	}

	switch (class)
	{
	case 0x11:
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("I have not checked this key at all.\n"));
	break;

	case 0x12:
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("I have checked this key casually.\n"));
	break;

	case 0x13:
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("I have checked this key very carefully.\n"));
	break;
	}
	}

	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");

	if (opt.batch && opt.answer_yes)
	;
	else if (quick)
	;
	else if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.okay",
	_("Really sign? (y/N) ")))
	continue;

	/* Now we can sign the user ids. */
	reloop: /* (Must use this, because we are modifing the list.) */
	primary_pk = NULL;
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	primary_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& (node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A))
	{
	PACKET *pkt;
	PKT_signature *sig;
	struct sign_attrib attrib;

	log_assert (primary_pk);
	memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
	attrib.non_exportable = local;
	attrib.non_revocable = nonrevocable;
	attrib.trust_depth = trust_depth;
	attrib.trust_value = trust_value;
	attrib.trust_regexp = trust_regexp;
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;

	/* We force creation of a v4 signature for local
	* signatures, otherwise we would not generate the
	* subpacket with v3 keys and the signature becomes
	* exportable. */

	if (selfsig)
	rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, primary_pk,
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
	NULL,
	pk,
	0x13, 0, 0, 0,
	keygen_add_std_prefs, primary_pk,
	NULL);
	else
	rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, primary_pk,
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
	NULL,
	pk,
	class, 0,
	timestamp, duration,
	sign_mk_attrib, &attrib,
	NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
	log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto leave;
	}

	ret_modified = 1; / We changed the keyblock. */
	update_trust = 1;

	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
	insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE);
	goto reloop;
	}
	}

	/* Delete any sigs that got promoted */
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->flag & NODFLG_DELSIG)
	delete_kbnode (node);
	} /* End loop over signators. */

	leave:
	release_sk_list (sk_list);
	return rc;
	}


	/*
	* Change the passphrase of the primary and all secondary keys. Note
	* that it is common to use only one passphrase for the primary and
	* all subkeys. However, this is now (since GnuPG 2.1) all up to the
	* gpg-agent. Returns 0 on success or an error code.
	*/
	static gpg_error_t
	change_passphrase (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	kbnode_t node;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	int any;
	u32 keyid[2], subid[2];
	char *hexgrip = NULL;
	char *cache_nonce = NULL;
	char *passwd_nonce = NULL;

	node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	if (!node)
	{
	log_error ("Oops; public key missing!\n");
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
	goto leave;
	}
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);

	/* Check whether it is likely that we will be able to change the
	passphrase for any subkey. */
	for (any = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	char *serialno;

	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (pk, subid);

	xfree (hexgrip);
	err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
	if (err)
	goto leave;
	err = agent_get_keyinfo (ctrl, hexgrip, &serialno, NULL);
	if (!err && serialno)
	; /* Key on card. */
	else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	; /* Maybe stub key. */
	else if (!err)
	any = 1; /* Key is known. */
	else
	log_error ("key %s: error getting keyinfo from agent: %s\n",
	keystr_with_sub (keyid, subid), gpg_strerror (err));
	xfree (serialno);
	}
	}
	err = 0;
	if (!any)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Key has only stub or on-card key items - "
	"no passphrase to change.\n"));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Change the passphrase for all keys. */
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	char *desc;

	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (pk, subid);

	xfree (hexgrip);
	err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
	if (err)
	goto leave;

	desc = gpg_format_keydesc (pk, FORMAT_KEYDESC_NORMAL, 1);
	err = agent_passwd (ctrl, hexgrip, desc, 0,
	&cache_nonce, &passwd_nonce);
	xfree (desc);

	if (err)
	log_log ((gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED
	\|\| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
	? GPGRT_LOG_INFO : GPGRT_LOG_ERROR,
	_("key %s: error changing passphrase: %s\n"),
	keystr_with_sub (keyid, subid),
	gpg_strerror (err));
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
	break;
	}
	}

	leave:
	xfree (hexgrip);
	xfree (cache_nonce);
	xfree (passwd_nonce);
	return err;
	}



	/* Fix various problems in the keyblock. Returns true if the keyblock
	was changed. Note that a pointer to the keyblock must be given and
	the function may change it (i.e. replacing the first node). */
	static int
	fix_keyblock (kbnode_t *keyblockp)
	{
	int changed = 0;

	if (collapse_uids (keyblockp))
	changed++;
	if (check_all_keysigs (*keyblockp, 0, 1))
	changed++;
	reorder_keyblock (*keyblockp);
	/* If we modified the keyblock, make sure the flags are right. */
	if (changed)
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (*keyblockp);

	return changed;
	}


	static int
	parse_sign_type (const char str, int localsig, int *nonrevokesig,
	int *trustsig)
	{
	const char *p = str;

	while (*p)
	{
	if (ascii_strncasecmp (p, "l", 1) == 0)
	{
	*localsig = 1;
	p++;
	}
	else if (ascii_strncasecmp (p, "nr", 2) == 0)
	{
	*nonrevokesig = 1;
	p += 2;
	}
	else if (ascii_strncasecmp (p, "t", 1) == 0)
	{
	*trustsig = 1;
	p++;
	}
	else
	return 0;
	}

	return 1;
	}



	/*
	* Menu driven key editor. If seckey_check is true, then a secret key
	* that matches username will be looked for. If it is false, not all
	* commands will be available.
	*
	* Note: to keep track of certain selections we use node->mark MARKBIT_xxxx.
	*/

	/* Need an SK for this command */
	#define KEYEDIT_NEED_SK 1
	/* Cannot be viewing the SK for this command */
	#define KEYEDIT_NOT_SK 2
	/* Must be viewing the SK for this command */
	#define KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK 4
	/* Match the tail of the string */
	#define KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH 8

	enum cmdids
	{
	cmdNONE = 0,
	cmdQUIT, cmdHELP, cmdFPR, cmdLIST, cmdSELUID, cmdCHECK, cmdSIGN,
	cmdREVSIG, cmdREVKEY, cmdREVUID, cmdDELSIG, cmdPRIMARY, cmdDEBUG,
	cmdSAVE, cmdADDUID, cmdADDPHOTO, cmdDELUID, cmdADDKEY, cmdDELKEY,
	cmdADDREVOKER, cmdTOGGLE, cmdSELKEY, cmdPASSWD, cmdTRUST, cmdPREF,
	cmdEXPIRE, cmdCHANGEUSAGE, cmdBACKSIGN,
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	cmdENABLEKEY, cmdDISABLEKEY,
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	cmdSHOWPREF,
	cmdSETPREF, cmdPREFKS, cmdNOTATION, cmdINVCMD, cmdSHOWPHOTO, cmdUPDTRUST,
	cmdCHKTRUST, cmdADDCARDKEY, cmdKEYTOCARD, cmdBKUPTOCARD,
	cmdCLEAN, cmdMINIMIZE, cmdGRIP, cmdNOP
	};

	static struct
	{
	const char *name;
	enum cmdids id;
	int flags;
	const char *desc;
	} cmds[] =
	{
	{ "quit", cmdQUIT, 0, N_("quit this menu")},
	{ "q", cmdQUIT, 0, NULL},
	{ "save", cmdSAVE, 0, N_("save and quit")},
	{ "help", cmdHELP, 0, N_("show this help")},
	{ "?", cmdHELP, 0, NULL},
	{ "fpr", cmdFPR, 0, N_("show key fingerprint")},
	{ "grip", cmdGRIP, 0, N_("show the keygrip")},
	{ "list", cmdLIST, 0, N_("list key and user IDs")},
	{ "l", cmdLIST, 0, NULL},
	{ "uid", cmdSELUID, 0, N_("select user ID N")},
	{ "key", cmdSELKEY, 0, N_("select subkey N")},
	{ "check", cmdCHECK, 0, N_("check signatures")},
	{ "c", cmdCHECK, 0, NULL},
	{ "change-usage", cmdCHANGEUSAGE, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
	{ "cross-certify", cmdBACKSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
	{ "backsign", cmdBACKSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
	{ "sign", cmdSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH,
	N_("sign selected user IDs [* see below for related commands]")},
	{ "s", cmdSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, NULL},
	/* "lsign" and friends will never match since "sign" comes first
	and it is a tail match. They are just here so they show up in
	the help menu. */
	{ "lsign", cmdNOP, 0, N_("sign selected user IDs locally")},
	{ "tsign", cmdNOP, 0, N_("sign selected user IDs with a trust signature")},
	{ "nrsign", cmdNOP, 0,
	N_("sign selected user IDs with a non-revocable signature")},
	{ "debug", cmdDEBUG, 0, NULL},
	{ "adduid", cmdADDUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("add a user ID")},
	{ "addphoto", cmdADDPHOTO, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("add a photo ID")},
	{ "deluid", cmdDELUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("delete selected user IDs")},
	/* delphoto is really deluid in disguise */
	{ "delphoto", cmdDELUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, NULL},
	{ "addkey", cmdADDKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("add a subkey")},
	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	{ "addcardkey", cmdADDCARDKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("add a key to a smartcard")},
	{ "keytocard", cmdKEYTOCARD, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK \| KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK,
	N_("move a key to a smartcard")},
	{ "bkuptocard", cmdBKUPTOCARD, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK \| KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK,
	N_("move a backup key to a smartcard")},
	#endif /ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT /
	{ "delkey", cmdDELKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("delete selected subkeys")},
	{ "addrevoker", cmdADDREVOKER, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("add a revocation key")},
	{ "delsig", cmdDELSIG, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
	N_("delete signatures from the selected user IDs")},
	{ "expire", cmdEXPIRE, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("change the expiration date for the key or selected subkeys")},
	{ "primary", cmdPRIMARY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("flag the selected user ID as primary")},
	{ "toggle", cmdTOGGLE, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL}, /* Dummy command. */
	{ "t", cmdTOGGLE, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
	{ "pref", cmdPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("list preferences (expert)")},
	{ "showpref", cmdSHOWPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("list preferences (verbose)")},
	{ "setpref", cmdSETPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("set preference list for the selected user IDs")},
	{ "updpref", cmdSETPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
	{ "keyserver", cmdPREFKS, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("set the preferred keyserver URL for the selected user IDs")},
	{ "notation", cmdNOTATION, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("set a notation for the selected user IDs")},
	{ "passwd", cmdPASSWD, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("change the passphrase")},
	{ "password", cmdPASSWD, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	{ "trust", cmdTRUST, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("change the ownertrust")},
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	{ "revsig", cmdREVSIG, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
	N_("revoke signatures on the selected user IDs")},
	{ "revuid", cmdREVUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("revoke selected user IDs")},
	{ "revphoto", cmdREVUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
	{ "revkey", cmdREVKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("revoke key or selected subkeys")},
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	{ "enable", cmdENABLEKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("enable key")},
	{ "disable", cmdDISABLEKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("disable key")},
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	{ "showphoto", cmdSHOWPHOTO, 0, N_("show selected photo IDs")},
	{ "clean", cmdCLEAN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
	N_("compact unusable user IDs and remove unusable signatures from key")},
	{ "minimize", cmdMINIMIZE, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
	N_("compact unusable user IDs and remove all signatures from key")},

	{ NULL, cmdNONE, 0, NULL}
	};



	#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE

	/*
	These two functions are used by readline for command completion.
	*/

	static char *
	command_generator (const char *text, int state)
	{
	static int list_index, len;
	const char *name;

	/* If this is a new word to complete, initialize now. This includes
	saving the length of TEXT for efficiency, and initializing the
	index variable to 0. */
	if (!state)
	{
	list_index = 0;
	len = strlen (text);
	}

	/* Return the next partial match */
	while ((name = cmds[list_index].name))
	{
	/* Only complete commands that have help text */
	if (cmds[list_index++].desc && strncmp (name, text, len) == 0)
	return strdup (name);
	}

	return NULL;
	}

	static char **
	keyedit_completion (const char *text, int start, int end)
	{
	/* If we are at the start of a line, we try and command-complete.
	If not, just do nothing for now. */

	(void) end;

	if (start == 0)
	return rl_completion_matches (text, command_generator);

	rl_attempted_completion_over = 1;

	return NULL;
	}
	#endif /* HAVE_LIBREADLINE */



	/* Main function of the menu driven key editor. */
	void
	keyedit_menu (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, strlist_t locusr,
	strlist_t commands, int quiet, int seckey_check)
	{
	enum cmdids cmd = 0;
	gpg_error_t err = 0;
	KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
	int have_seckey = 0;
	char *answer = NULL;
	int redisplay = 1;
	int modified = 0;
	int sec_shadowing = 0;
	int run_subkey_warnings = 0;
	int have_commands = !!commands;

	if (opt.command_fd != -1)
	;
	else if (opt.batch && !have_commands)
	{
	log_error (_("can't do this in batch mode\n"));
	goto leave;
	}

	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	/* Due to Windows peculiarities we need to make sure that the
	trustdb stale check is done before we open another file
	(i.e. by searching for a key). In theory we could make sure
	that the files are closed after use but the open/close caches
	inhibits that and flushing the cache right before the stale
	check is not easy to implement. Thus we take the easy way out
	and run the stale check as early as possible. Note, that for
	non- W32 platforms it is run indirectly trough a call to
	get_validity (). */
	check_trustdb_stale (ctrl);
	#endif

	/* Get the public key */
	err = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, NULL, username, &keyblock, &kdbhd, 1, 1);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), username, gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	if (fix_keyblock (&keyblock))
	modified++;

	/* See whether we have a matching secret key. */
	if (seckey_check)
	{
	have_seckey = !agent_probe_any_secret_key (ctrl, keyblock);
	if (have_seckey && !quiet)
	tty_printf (_("Secret key is available.\n"));
	}

	/* Main command loop. */
	for (;;)
	{
	int i, arg_number, photo;
	const char *arg_string = "";
	char *p;
	PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	tty_printf ("\n");

	if (redisplay && !quiet)
	{
	/* Show using flags: with_revoker, with_subkeys. */
	show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	redisplay = 0;
	}

	if (run_subkey_warnings)
	{
	run_subkey_warnings = 0;
	if (!count_selected_keys (keyblock))
	subkey_expire_warning (keyblock);
	}

	do
	{
	xfree (answer);
	if (have_commands)
	{
	if (commands)
	{
	answer = xstrdup (commands->d);
	commands = commands->next;
	}
	else if (opt.batch)
	{
	answer = xstrdup ("quit");
	}
	else
	have_commands = 0;
	}
	if (!have_commands)
	{
	#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
	tty_enable_completion (keyedit_completion);
	#endif
	answer = cpr_get_no_help ("keyedit.prompt", GPG_NAME "> ");
	cpr_kill_prompt ();
	tty_disable_completion ();
	}
	trim_spaces (answer);
	}
	while (*answer == '#');

	arg_number = 0; /* Here is the init which egcc complains about. */
	photo = 0; /* Same here. */
	if (!*answer)
	cmd = cmdLIST;
	else if (*answer == CONTROL_D)
	cmd = cmdQUIT;
	else if (digitp (answer))
	{
	cmd = cmdSELUID;
	arg_number = atoi (answer);
	}
	else
	{
	if ((p = strchr (answer, ' ')))
	{
	*p++ = 0;
	trim_spaces (answer);
	trim_spaces (p);
	arg_number = atoi (p);
	arg_string = p;
	}

	for (i = 0; cmds[i].name; i++)
	{
	if (cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH)
	{
	size_t l = strlen (cmds[i].name);
	size_t a = strlen (answer);
	if (a >= l)
	{
	if (!ascii_strcasecmp (&answer[a - l], cmds[i].name))
	{
	answer[a - l] = '\0';
	break;
	}
	}
	}
	else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (answer, cmds[i].name))
	break;
	}
	if ((cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_NEED_SK) && !have_seckey)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Need the secret key to do this.\n"));
	cmd = cmdNOP;
	}
	else
	cmd = cmds[i].id;
	}

	/* Dispatch the command. */
	switch (cmd)
	{
	case cmdHELP:
	for (i = 0; cmds[i].name; i++)
	{
	if ((cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_NEED_SK) && !have_seckey)
	; /* Skip those item if we do not have the secret key. */
	else if (cmds[i].desc)
	tty_printf ("%-11s %s\n", cmds[i].name, _(cmds[i].desc));
	}

	tty_printf ("\n");
	tty_printf
	(_("* The 'sign' command may be prefixed with an 'l' for local "
	"signatures (lsign),\n"
	" a 't' for trust signatures (tsign), an 'nr' for "
	"non-revocable signatures\n"
	" (nrsign), or any combination thereof (ltsign, "
	"tnrsign, etc.).\n"));
	break;

	case cmdLIST:
	redisplay = 1;
	break;

	case cmdFPR:
	show_key_and_fingerprint
	(keyblock, (arg_string == ''
	&& (!arg_string[1] \|\| spacep (arg_string + 1))));
	break;

	case cmdGRIP:
	show_key_and_grip (keyblock);
	break;

	case cmdSELUID:
	if (strlen (arg_string) == NAMEHASH_LEN * 2)
	redisplay = menu_select_uid_namehash (keyblock, arg_string);
	else
	{
	if (arg_string == ''
	&& (!arg_string[1] \|\| spacep (arg_string + 1)))
	arg_number = -1; /* Select all. */
	redisplay = menu_select_uid (keyblock, arg_number);
	}
	break;

	case cmdSELKEY:
	{
	if (arg_string == ''
	&& (!arg_string[1] \|\| spacep (arg_string + 1)))
	arg_number = -1; /* Select all. */
	if (menu_select_key (keyblock, arg_number, p))
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	break;

	case cmdCHECK:
	if (check_all_keysigs (keyblock, count_selected_uids (keyblock),
	!strcmp (arg_string, "selfsig")))
	modified = 1;
	break;

	case cmdSIGN:
	{
	int localsig = 0, nonrevokesig = 0, trustsig = 0, interactive = 0;

	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Key is revoked."));

	if (opt.expert)
	{
	tty_printf (" ");
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.sign_revoked.okay",
	_("Are you sure you still want to sign it? (y/N) ")))
	break;
	}
	else
	{
	tty_printf (_(" Unable to sign.\n"));
	break;
	}
	}

	if (count_uids (keyblock) > 1 && !count_selected_uids (keyblock))
	{
	int result;
	if (opt.only_sign_text_ids)
	result = cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.sign_all.okay",
	_("Really sign all user IDs? (y/N) "));
	else
	result = cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.sign_all.okay",
	_("Really sign all text user IDs? (y/N) "));

	if (! result)
	{
	if (opt.interactive)
	interactive = 1;
	else
	{
	tty_printf (_("Hint: Select the user IDs to sign\n"));
	have_commands = 0;
	break;
	}

	}
	}
	/* What sort of signing are we doing? */
	if (!parse_sign_type
	(answer, &localsig, &nonrevokesig, &trustsig))
	{
	tty_printf (_("Unknown signature type '%s'\n"), answer);
	break;
	}

	sign_uids (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, locusr, &modified,
	localsig, nonrevokesig, trustsig, interactive, 0);
	}
	break;

	case cmdDEBUG:
	dump_kbnode (keyblock);
	break;

	case cmdTOGGLE:
	/* The toggle command is a leftover from old gpg versions
	where we worked with a secret and a public keyring. It
	is not necessary anymore but we keep this command for the
	sake of scripts using it. */
	redisplay = 1;
	break;

	case cmdADDPHOTO:
	if (RFC2440)
	{
	tty_printf (_("This command is not allowed while in %s mode.\n"),
	compliance_option_string ());
	break;
	}
	photo = 1;
	/* fall through */
	case cmdADDUID:
	if (menu_adduid (ctrl, keyblock, photo, arg_string, NULL))
	{
	update_trust = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	}
	break;

	case cmdDELUID:
	{
	int n1;

	if (!(n1 = count_selected_uids (keyblock)))
	{
	tty_printf (_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
	if (!opt.expert)
	tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "uid");
	}
	else if (real_uids_left (keyblock) < 1)
	tty_printf (_("You can't delete the last user ID!\n"));
	else if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.remove.uid.okay",
	n1 > 1 ? _("Really remove all selected user IDs? (y/N) ")
	: _("Really remove this user ID? (y/N) ")))
	{
	menu_deluid (keyblock);
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	}
	}
	break;

	case cmdDELSIG:
	{
	int n1;

	if (!(n1 = count_selected_uids (keyblock)))
	{
	tty_printf (_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
	if (!opt.expert)
	tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "uid");
	}
	else if (menu_delsig (keyblock))
	{
	/* No redisplay here, because it may scroll away some
	* of the status output of this command. */
	modified = 1;
	}
	}
	break;

	case cmdADDKEY:
	if (!generate_subkeypair (ctrl, keyblock, NULL, NULL, NULL))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	}
	break;

	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	case cmdADDCARDKEY:
	if (!card_generate_subkey (keyblock))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	}
	break;

	case cmdKEYTOCARD:
	{
	KBNODE node = NULL;
	switch (count_selected_keys (keyblock))
	{
	case 0:
	if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.keytocard.use_primary",
	/* TRANSLATORS: Please take care: This is about
	moving the key and not about removing it. */
	_("Really move the primary key? (y/N) ")))
	node = keyblock;
	break;
	case 1:
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)
	break;
	}
	break;
	default:
	tty_printf (_("You must select exactly one key.\n"));
	break;
	}
	if (node)
	{
	PKT_public_key *xxpk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (card_store_subkey (node, xxpk ? xxpk->pubkey_usage : 0))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	sec_shadowing = 1;
	}
	}
	}
	break;

	case cmdBKUPTOCARD:
	{
	/* Ask for a filename, check whether this is really a
	backup key as generated by the card generation, parse
	that key and store it on card. */
	KBNODE node;
	char *fname;
	PACKET *pkt;
	IOBUF a;

	if (!*arg_string)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Command expects a filename argument\n"));
	break;
	}

	if (*arg_string == DIRSEP_C)
	fname = xstrdup (arg_string);
	else if (*arg_string == '~')
	fname = make_filename (arg_string, NULL);
	else
	fname = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), arg_string, NULL);

	/* Open that file. */
	a = iobuf_open (fname);
	if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a)))
	{
	iobuf_close (a);
	a = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	if (!a)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Can't open '%s': %s\n"),
	fname, strerror (errno));
	xfree (fname);
	break;
	}

	/* Parse and check that file. */
	pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
	init_packet (pkt);
	err = parse_packet (a, pkt);
	iobuf_close (a);
	iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE, 0, (char *) fname);
	if (!err && pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY
	&& pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	err = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
	if (err)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Error reading backup key from '%s': %s\n"),
	fname, gpg_strerror (err));
	xfree (fname);
	free_packet (pkt);
	xfree (pkt);
	break;
	}

	xfree (fname);
	node = new_kbnode (pkt);

	/* Transfer it to gpg-agent which handles secret keys. */
	err = transfer_secret_keys (ctrl, NULL, node, 1, 1);

	/* Treat the pkt as a public key. */
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_PUBLIC_KEY;

	/* Ask gpg-agent to store the secret key to card. */
	if (card_store_subkey (node, 0))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	sec_shadowing = 1;
	}
	release_kbnode (node);
	}
	break;

	#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */

	case cmdDELKEY:
	{
	int n1;

	if (!(n1 = count_selected_keys (keyblock)))
	{
	tty_printf (_("You must select at least one key.\n"));
	if (!opt.expert)
	tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "key");
	}
	else if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.remove.subkey.okay",
	n1 > 1 ? _("Do you really want to delete the "
	"selected keys? (y/N) ")
	: _("Do you really want to delete this key? (y/N) ")))
	;
	else
	{
	menu_delkey (keyblock);
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	}
	}
	break;

	case cmdADDREVOKER:
	{
	int sensitive = 0;

	if (ascii_strcasecmp (arg_string, "sensitive") == 0)
	sensitive = 1;
	if (menu_addrevoker (ctrl, keyblock, sensitive))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	}
	}
	break;

	case cmdREVUID:
	{
	int n1;

	if (!(n1 = count_selected_uids (keyblock)))
	{
	tty_printf (_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
	if (!opt.expert)
	tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "uid");
	}
	else if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.revoke.uid.okay",
	n1 > 1 ? _("Really revoke all selected user IDs? (y/N) ")
	: _("Really revoke this user ID? (y/N) ")))
	{
	if (menu_revuid (ctrl, keyblock))
	{
	modified = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	}
	}
	break;

	case cmdREVKEY:
	{
	int n1;

	if (!(n1 = count_selected_keys (keyblock)))
	{
	if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.revoke.subkey.okay",
	_("Do you really want to revoke"
	" the entire key? (y/N) ")))
	{
	if (menu_revkey (keyblock))
	modified = 1;

	redisplay = 1;
	}
	}
	else if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.revoke.subkey.okay",
	n1 > 1 ?
	_("Do you really want to revoke"
	" the selected subkeys? (y/N) ")
	: _("Do you really want to revoke"
	" this subkey? (y/N) ")))
	{
	if (menu_revsubkey (keyblock))
	modified = 1;

	redisplay = 1;
	}

	if (modified)
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	}
	break;

	case cmdEXPIRE:
	if (menu_expire (keyblock))
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	run_subkey_warnings = 1;
	modified = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	break;

	case cmdCHANGEUSAGE:
	if (menu_changeusage (keyblock))
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	modified = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	break;

	case cmdBACKSIGN:
	if (menu_backsign (keyblock))
	{
	modified = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	break;

	case cmdPRIMARY:
	if (menu_set_primary_uid (keyblock))
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	modified = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	break;

	case cmdPASSWD:
	change_passphrase (ctrl, keyblock);
	break;

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	case cmdTRUST:
	if (opt.trust_model == TM_EXTERNAL)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Owner trust may not be set while "
	"using a user provided trust database\n"));
	break;
	}

	show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	if (edit_ownertrust (ctrl, find_kbnode (keyblock,
	PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)->pkt->pkt.
	public_key, 1))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	/* No real need to set update_trust here as
	edit_ownertrust() calls revalidation_mark()
	anyway. */
	update_trust = 1;
	}
	break;
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/

	case cmdPREF:
	{
	int count = count_selected_uids (keyblock);
	log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	show_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
	count ? NODFLG_SELUID : 0, 1);
	}
	break;

	case cmdSHOWPREF:
	{
	int count = count_selected_uids (keyblock);
	log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	show_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
	count ? NODFLG_SELUID : 0, 2);
	}
	break;

	case cmdSETPREF:
	{
	PKT_user_id *tempuid;

	keygen_set_std_prefs (!*arg_string ? "default" : arg_string, 0);

	tempuid = keygen_get_std_prefs ();
	tty_printf (_("Set preference list to:\n"));
	show_prefs (tempuid, NULL, 1);
	free_user_id (tempuid);

	if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.setpref.okay",
	count_selected_uids (keyblock) ?
	_("Really update the preferences"
	" for the selected user IDs? (y/N) ")
	: _("Really update the preferences? (y/N) ")))
	{
	if (menu_set_preferences (keyblock))
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	modified = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	}
	}
	break;

	case cmdPREFKS:
	if (menu_set_keyserver_url (*arg_string ? arg_string : NULL,
	keyblock))
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	modified = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	break;

	case cmdNOTATION:
	if (menu_set_notation (*arg_string ? arg_string : NULL,
	keyblock))
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	modified = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	break;

	case cmdNOP:
	break;

	case cmdREVSIG:
	if (menu_revsig (keyblock))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	}
	break;

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	case cmdENABLEKEY:
	case cmdDISABLEKEY:
	if (enable_disable_key (keyblock, cmd == cmdDISABLEKEY))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	}
	break;
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/

	case cmdSHOWPHOTO:
	menu_showphoto (ctrl, keyblock);
	break;

	case cmdCLEAN:
	if (menu_clean (keyblock, 0))
	redisplay = modified = 1;
	break;

	case cmdMINIMIZE:
	if (menu_clean (keyblock, 1))
	redisplay = modified = 1;
	break;

	case cmdQUIT:
	if (have_commands)
	goto leave;
	if (!modified && !sec_shadowing)
	goto leave;
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.save.okay",
	_("Save changes? (y/N) ")))
	{
	if (cpr_enabled ()
	\|\| cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.cancel.okay",
	_("Quit without saving? (y/N) ")))
	goto leave;
	break;
	}
	/* fall through */
	case cmdSAVE:
	if (modified)
	{
	err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	break;
	}
	}

	if (sec_shadowing)
	{
	err = agent_scd_learn (NULL, 1);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	break;
	}
	}

	if (!modified && !sec_shadowing)
	tty_printf (_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n"));

	if (update_trust)
	{
	revalidation_mark ();
	update_trust = 0;
	}
	goto leave;

	case cmdINVCMD:
	default:
	tty_printf ("\n");
	tty_printf (_("Invalid command (try \"help\")\n"));
	break;
	}
	} /* End of the main command loop. */

	leave:
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	keydb_release (kdbhd);
	xfree (answer);
	}


	/* Change the passphrase of the secret key identified by USERNAME. */
	void
	keyedit_passwd (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;

	pk = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pk);
	if (!pk)
	{
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	goto leave;
	}
	err = getkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, pk, username, 1, &keyblock);
	if (err)
	goto leave;

	err = change_passphrase (ctrl, keyblock);

	leave:
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	free_public_key (pk);
	if (err)
	{
	log_info ("error changing the passphrase for '%s': %s\n",
	username, gpg_strerror (err));
	write_status_error ("keyedit.passwd", err);
	}
	else
	write_status_text (STATUS_SUCCESS, "keyedit.passwd");
	}


	/* Unattended adding of a new keyid. USERNAME specifies the
	key. NEWUID is the new user id to add to the key. */
	void
	keyedit_quick_adduid (ctrl_t ctrl, const char username, const char newuid)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
	kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
	kbnode_t node;
	char *uidstring = NULL;

	uidstring = xstrdup (newuid);
	trim_spaces (uidstring);
	if (!*uidstring)
	{
	log_error ("%s\n", gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_INV_USER_ID));
	goto leave;
	}

	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	/* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */
	check_trustdb_stale (ctrl);
	#endif

	/* Search the key; we don't want the whole getkey stuff here. */
	kdbhd = keydb_new ();
	if (!kdbhd)
	{
	/* Note that keydb_new has already used log_error. */
	goto leave;
	}

	err = classify_user_id (username, &desc, 1);
	if (!err)
	err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL);
	if (!err)
	{
	err = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}
	/* Now with the keyblock retrieved, search again to detect an
	ambiguous specification. We need to save the found state so
	that we can do an update later. */
	keydb_push_found_state (kdbhd);
	err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL);
	if (!err)
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_AMBIGUOUS_NAME);
	else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	err = 0;
	keydb_pop_found_state (kdbhd);

	if (!err)
	{
	/* We require the secret primary key to add a UID. */
	node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	if (!node)
	BUG ();
	err = agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, node->pkt->pkt.public_key);
	}
	}
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("secret key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),
	username, gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	fix_keyblock (&keyblock);

	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);

	if (menu_adduid (ctrl, keyblock, 0, NULL, uidstring))
	{
	err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	if (update_trust)
	revalidation_mark ();
	}

	leave:
	xfree (uidstring);
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	keydb_release (kdbhd);
	}

	-/* Unattended revokation of a keyid. USERNAME specifies the
	+/* Unattended revocation of a keyid. USERNAME specifies the
	key. UIDTOREV is the user id revoke from the key. */
	void
	keyedit_quick_revuid (ctrl_t ctrl, const char username, const char uidtorev)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
	kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
	kbnode_t node;
	int modified = 0;
	size_t revlen;

	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	/* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */
	check_trustdb_stale (ctrl);
	#endif

	/* Search the key; we don't want the whole getkey stuff here. */
	kdbhd = keydb_new ();
	if (!kdbhd)
	{
	/* Note that keydb_new has already used log_error. */
	goto leave;
	}

	err = classify_user_id (username, &desc, 1);
	if (!err)
	err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL);
	if (!err)
	{
	err = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}
	/* Now with the keyblock retrieved, search again to detect an
	ambiguous specification. We need to save the found state so
	that we can do an update later. */
	keydb_push_found_state (kdbhd);
	err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL);
	if (!err)
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_AMBIGUOUS_NAME);
	else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	err = 0;
	keydb_pop_found_state (kdbhd);

	if (!err)
	{
	/* We require the secret primary key to revoke a UID. */
	node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	if (!node)
	BUG ();
	err = agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, node->pkt->pkt.public_key);
	}
	}
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("secret key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),
	username, gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	fix_keyblock (&keyblock);
	setup_main_keyids (keyblock);

	revlen = strlen (uidtorev);
	/* find the right UID */
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& revlen == node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len
	&& !memcmp (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, uidtorev, revlen))
	{
	struct revocation_reason_info *reason;

	reason = get_default_uid_revocation_reason ();
	err = core_revuid (ctrl, keyblock, node, reason, &modified);
	release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("User ID revocation failed: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}
	err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	if (update_trust)
	revalidation_mark ();
	goto leave;
	}
	}

	leave:
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	keydb_release (kdbhd);
	}


	/* Find a keyblock by fingerprint because only this uniquely
	* identifies a key and may thus be used to select a key for
	* unattended subkey creation os key signing. */
	static gpg_error_t
	find_by_primary_fpr (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fpr,
	kbnode_t r_keyblock, KEYDB_HANDLE r_kdbhd)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
	byte fprbin[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	size_t fprlen;

	*r_keyblock = NULL;
	*r_kdbhd = NULL;

	if (classify_user_id (fpr, &desc, 1)
	\|\| !(desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
	\|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
	\|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20))
	{
	log_error (_("\"%s\" is not a fingerprint\n"), fpr);
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME);
	goto leave;
	}
	err = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, NULL, fpr, &keyblock, &kdbhd, 1, 1);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), fpr, gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Check that the primary fingerprint has been given. */
	fingerprint_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, fprbin, &fprlen);
	if (fprlen == 16 && desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
	&& !memcmp (fprbin, desc.u.fpr, 16))
	;
	else if (fprlen == 16 && desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
	&& !memcmp (fprbin, desc.u.fpr, 16)
	&& !desc.u.fpr[16]
	&& !desc.u.fpr[17]
	&& !desc.u.fpr[18]
	&& !desc.u.fpr[19])
	;
	else if (fprlen == 20 && (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20
	\|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR)
	&& !memcmp (fprbin, desc.u.fpr, 20))
	;
	else
	{
	log_error (_("\"%s\" is not the primary fingerprint\n"), fpr);
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME);
	goto leave;
	}

	*r_keyblock = keyblock;
	keyblock = NULL;
	*r_kdbhd = kdbhd;
	kdbhd = NULL;
	err = 0;

	leave:
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	keydb_release (kdbhd);
	return err;
	}


	/* Unattended key signing function. If the key specifified by FPR is
	available and FPR is the primary fingerprint all user ids of the
	key are signed using the default signing key. If UIDS is an empty
	list all usable UIDs are signed, if it is not empty, only those
	user ids matching one of the entries of the list are signed. With
	LOCAL being true the signatures are marked as non-exportable. */
	void
	keyedit_quick_sign (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fpr, strlist_t uids,
	strlist_t locusr, int local)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
	int modified = 0;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	kbnode_t node;
	strlist_t sl;
	int any;

	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	/* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */
	check_trustdb_stale (ctrl);
	#endif

	/* We require a fingerprint because only this uniquely identifies a
	key and may thus be used to select a key for unattended key
	signing. */
	if (find_by_primary_fpr (ctrl, fpr, &keyblock, &kdbhd))
	goto leave;

	if (fix_keyblock (&keyblock))
	modified++;

	/* Give some info in verbose. */
	if (opt.verbose)
	{
	show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0,
	1/with_revoker/, 1/with_fingerprint/,
	0, 0, 1);
	es_fflush (es_stdout);
	}

	pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	if (!opt.verbose)
	show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1);
	log_error ("%s%s", _("Key is revoked."), _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Set the flags according to the UIDS list. Fixme: We may want to
	use classify_user_id along with dedicated compare functions so
	that we match the same way as in the key lookup. */
	any = 0;
	menu_select_uid (keyblock, 0); /* Better clear the flags first. */
	for (sl=uids; sl; sl = sl->next)
	{
	const char *name = sl->d;
	int count = 0;

	sl->flags &= ~(1\|2); /* Clear flags used for error reporting. */

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	if (uid->attrib_data)
	;
	else if (*name == '='
	&& strlen (name+1) == uid->len
	&& !memcmp (uid->name, name + 1, uid->len))
	{ /* Exact match - we don't do a check for ambiguity
	* in this case. */
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELUID;
	if (any != -1)
	{
	sl->flags \|= 1; /* Report as found. */
	any = 1;
	}
	}
	else if (ascii_memistr (uid->name, uid->len,
	name == ''? name+1:name))
	{
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELUID;
	if (any != -1)
	{
	sl->flags \|= 1; /* Report as found. */
	any = 1;
	}
	count++;
	}
	}
	}

	if (count > 1)
	{
	any = -1; /* Force failure at end. */
	sl->flags \|= 2; /* Report as ambiguous. */
	}
	}

	/* Check whether all given user ids were found. */
	for (sl=uids; sl; sl = sl->next)
	if (!(sl->flags & 1))
	any = -1; /* That user id was not found. */

	/* Print an error if there was a problem with the user ids. */
	if (uids && any < 1)
	{
	if (!opt.verbose)
	show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1);
	es_fflush (es_stdout);
	for (sl=uids; sl; sl = sl->next)
	{
	if ((sl->flags & 2))
	log_info (_("Invalid user ID '%s': %s\n"),
	sl->d, gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_AMBIGUOUS_NAME));
	else if (!(sl->flags & 1))
	log_info (_("Invalid user ID '%s': %s\n"),
	sl->d, gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND));
	}
	log_error ("%s %s", _("No matching user IDs."), _("Nothing to sign.\n"));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Sign. */
	sign_uids (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, locusr, &modified, local, 0, 0, 0, 1);
	es_fflush (es_stdout);

	if (modified)
	{
	err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}
	}
	else
	log_info (_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n"));

	if (update_trust)
	revalidation_mark ();


	leave:
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	keydb_release (kdbhd);
	}


	/* Unattended subkey creation function.
	*
	*/
	void
	keyedit_quick_addkey (ctrl_t ctrl, const char fpr, const char algostr,
	const char usagestr, const char expirestr)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	kbnode_t keyblock;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd;
	int modified = 0;
	PKT_public_key *pk;

	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	/* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */
	check_trustdb_stale (ctrl);
	#endif

	/* We require a fingerprint because only this uniquely identifies a
	* key and may thus be used to select a key for unattended subkey
	* creation. */
	if (find_by_primary_fpr (ctrl, fpr, &keyblock, &kdbhd))
	goto leave;

	if (fix_keyblock (&keyblock))
	modified++;

	pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	if (!opt.verbose)
	show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1);
	log_error ("%s%s", _("Key is revoked."), "\n");
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Create the subkey. Note that the called function already prints
	* an error message. */
	if (!generate_subkeypair (ctrl, keyblock, algostr, usagestr, expirestr))
	modified = 1;
	es_fflush (es_stdout);

	/* Store. */
	if (modified)
	{
	err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}
	}
	else
	log_info (_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n"));

	leave:
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	keydb_release (kdbhd);
	}



	static void
	tty_print_notations (int indent, PKT_signature * sig)
	{
	int first = 1;
	struct notation notation, nd;

	if (indent < 0)
	{
	first = 0;
	indent = -indent;
	}

	notation = sig_to_notation (sig);

	for (nd = notation; nd; nd = nd->next)
	{
	if (!first)
	tty_printf ("%*s", indent, "");
	else
	first = 0;

	tty_print_utf8_string (nd->name, strlen (nd->name));
	tty_printf ("=");
	tty_print_utf8_string (nd->value, strlen (nd->value));
	tty_printf ("\n");
	}

	free_notation (notation);
	}


	/*
	* Show preferences of a public keyblock.
	*/
	static void
	show_prefs (PKT_user_id * uid, PKT_signature * selfsig, int verbose)
	{
	const prefitem_t fake = { 0, 0 };
	const prefitem_t *prefs;
	int i;

	if (!uid)
	return;

	if (uid->prefs)
	prefs = uid->prefs;
	else if (verbose)
	prefs = &fake;
	else
	return;

	if (verbose)
	{
	int any, des_seen = 0, sha1_seen = 0, uncomp_seen = 0;

	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_printf (_("Cipher: "));
	for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
	{
	if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM)
	{
	if (any)
	tty_printf (", ");
	any = 1;
	/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
	if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (prefs[i].value)
	&& prefs[i].value < 100)
	tty_printf ("%s", openpgp_cipher_algo_name (prefs[i].value));
	else
	tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
	if (prefs[i].value == CIPHER_ALGO_3DES)
	des_seen = 1;
	}
	}
	if (!des_seen)
	{
	if (any)
	tty_printf (", ");
	tty_printf ("%s", openpgp_cipher_algo_name (CIPHER_ALGO_3DES));
	}
	tty_printf ("\n ");
	tty_printf (_("Digest: "));
	for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
	{
	if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH)
	{
	if (any)
	tty_printf (", ");
	any = 1;
	/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (prefs[i].value) && prefs[i].value < 100)
	tty_printf ("%s", gcry_md_algo_name (prefs[i].value));
	else
	tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
	if (prefs[i].value == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1)
	sha1_seen = 1;
	}
	}
	if (!sha1_seen)
	{
	if (any)
	tty_printf (", ");
	tty_printf ("%s", gcry_md_algo_name (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1));
	}
	tty_printf ("\n ");
	tty_printf (_("Compression: "));
	for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
	{
	if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP)
	{
	const char *s = compress_algo_to_string (prefs[i].value);

	if (any)
	tty_printf (", ");
	any = 1;
	/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
	if (s && prefs[i].value < 100)
	tty_printf ("%s", s);
	else
	tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
	if (prefs[i].value == COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE)
	uncomp_seen = 1;
	}
	}
	if (!uncomp_seen)
	{
	if (any)
	tty_printf (", ");
	else
	{
	tty_printf ("%s", compress_algo_to_string (COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP));
	tty_printf (", ");
	}
	tty_printf ("%s", compress_algo_to_string (COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE));
	}
	if (uid->flags.mdc \|\| !uid->flags.ks_modify)
	{
	tty_printf ("\n ");
	tty_printf (_("Features: "));
	any = 0;
	if (uid->flags.mdc)
	{
	tty_printf ("MDC");
	any = 1;
	}
	if (!uid->flags.ks_modify)
	{
	if (any)
	tty_printf (", ");
	tty_printf (_("Keyserver no-modify"));
	}
	}
	tty_printf ("\n");

	if (selfsig)
	{
	const byte *pref_ks;
	size_t pref_ks_len;

	pref_ks = parse_sig_subpkt (selfsig->hashed,
	SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, &pref_ks_len);
	if (pref_ks && pref_ks_len)
	{
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_printf (_("Preferred keyserver: "));
	tty_print_utf8_string (pref_ks, pref_ks_len);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	}

	if (selfsig->flags.notation)
	{
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_printf (_("Notations: "));
	tty_print_notations (5 + strlen (_("Notations: ")), selfsig);
	}
	}
	}
	else
	{
	tty_printf (" ");
	for (i = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
	{
	tty_printf (" %c%d", prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ? 'S' :
	prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ? 'H' :
	prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z' : '?',
	prefs[i].value);
	}
	if (uid->flags.mdc)
	tty_printf (" [mdc]");
	if (!uid->flags.ks_modify)
	tty_printf (" [no-ks-modify]");
	tty_printf ("\n");
	}
	}


	/* This is the version of show_key_with_all_names used when
	opt.with_colons is used. It prints all available data in a easy to
	parse format and does not translate utf8 */
	static void
	show_key_with_all_names_colon (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp, kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i, j, ulti_hack = 0;
	byte pk_version = 0;
	PKT_public_key *primary = NULL;
	int have_seckey;

	if (!fp)
	fp = es_stdout;

	/* the keys */
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY))
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	u32 keyid[2];

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	pk_version = pk->version;
	primary = pk;
	}

	keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
	have_seckey = !agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, pk);

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	es_fputs (have_seckey? "sec:" : "pub:", fp);
	else
	es_fputs (have_seckey? "ssb:" : "sub:", fp);

	if (!pk->flags.valid)
	es_putc ('i', fp);
	else if (pk->flags.revoked)
	es_putc ('r', fp);
	else if (pk->has_expired)
	es_putc ('e', fp);
	else if (!(opt.fast_list_mode \|\| opt.no_expensive_trust_checks))
	{
	int trust = get_validity_info (ctrl, pk, NULL);
	if (trust == 'u')
	ulti_hack = 1;
	es_putc (trust, fp);
	}

	es_fprintf (fp, ":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%lu:%lu::",
	nbits_from_pk (pk),
	pk->pubkey_algo,
	(ulong) keyid[0], (ulong) keyid[1],
	(ulong) pk->timestamp, (ulong) pk->expiredate);
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	&& !(opt.fast_list_mode \|\| opt.no_expensive_trust_checks))
	es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (pk), fp);
	es_putc (':', fp);
	es_putc (':', fp);
	es_putc (':', fp);
	/* Print capabilities. */
	if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC))
	es_putc ('e', fp);
	if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG))
	es_putc ('s', fp);
	if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT))
	es_putc ('c', fp);
	if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH))
	es_putc ('a', fp);
	es_putc ('\n', fp);

	print_fingerprint (fp, pk, 0);
	print_revokers (fp, pk);
	}
	}

	/* the user ids */
	i = 0;
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	++i;

	if (uid->attrib_data)
	es_fputs ("uat:", fp);
	else
	es_fputs ("uid:", fp);

	if (uid->is_revoked)
	es_fputs ("r::::::::", fp);
	else if (uid->is_expired)
	es_fputs ("e::::::::", fp);
	else if (opt.fast_list_mode \|\| opt.no_expensive_trust_checks)
	es_fputs ("::::::::", fp);
	else
	{
	int uid_validity;

	if (primary && !ulti_hack)
	uid_validity = get_validity_info (ctrl, primary, uid);
	else
	uid_validity = 'u';
	es_fprintf (fp, "%c::::::::", uid_validity);
	}

	if (uid->attrib_data)
	es_fprintf (fp, "%u %lu", uid->numattribs, uid->attrib_len);
	else
	es_write_sanitized (fp, uid->name, uid->len, ":", NULL);

	es_putc (':', fp);
	/* signature class */
	es_putc (':', fp);
	/* capabilities */
	es_putc (':', fp);
	/* preferences */
	if (pk_version > 3 \|\| uid->selfsigversion > 3)
	{
	const prefitem_t *prefs = uid->prefs;

	for (j = 0; prefs && prefs[j].type; j++)
	{
	if (j)
	es_putc (' ', fp);
	es_fprintf (fp,
	"%c%d", prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ? 'S' :
	prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ? 'H' :
	prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z' : '?',
	prefs[j].value);
	}
	if (uid->flags.mdc)
	es_fputs (",mdc", fp);
	if (!uid->flags.ks_modify)
	es_fputs (",no-ks-modify", fp);
	}
	es_putc (':', fp);
	/* flags */
	es_fprintf (fp, "%d,", i);
	if (uid->is_primary)
	es_putc ('p', fp);
	if (uid->is_revoked)
	es_putc ('r', fp);
	if (uid->is_expired)
	es_putc ('e', fp);
	if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
	es_putc ('s', fp);
	if ((node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A))
	es_putc ('m', fp);
	es_putc (':', fp);
	if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
	{
	#ifdef USE_TOFU
	enum tofu_policy policy;
	if (! tofu_get_policy (ctrl, primary, uid, &policy)
	&& policy != TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
	es_fprintf (fp, "%s", tofu_policy_str (policy));
	#endif /USE_TOFU/
	}
	es_putc (':', fp);
	es_putc ('\n', fp);
	}
	}
	}


	static void
	show_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
	kbnode_t keyblock, PKT_public_key * pk, unsigned int flag,
	int with_prefs)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i = 0;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !is_deleted_kbnode (node))
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	++i;
	if (!flag \|\| (flag && (node->flag & flag)))
	{
	if (!(flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) && pk)
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%s ", uid_trust_string_fixed (ctrl, pk, uid));

	if (flag & NODFLG_MARK_A)
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	else if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)
	tty_fprintf (fp, "(%d)* ", i);
	else if (uid->is_primary)
	tty_fprintf (fp, "(%d). ", i);
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp, "(%d) ", i);
	tty_print_utf8_string2 (fp, uid->name, uid->len, 0);
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	if (with_prefs && pk)
	{
	if (pk->version > 3 \|\| uid->selfsigversion > 3)
	{
	PKT_signature *selfsig = NULL;
	KBNODE signode;

	for (signode = node->next;
	signode && signode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE;
	signode = signode->next)
	{
	if (signode->pkt->pkt.signature->
	flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	selfsig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
	break;
	}
	}

	show_prefs (uid, selfsig, with_prefs == 2);
	}
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("There are no preferences on a"
	" PGP 2.x-style user ID.\n"));
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}


	/*
	* Display the key a the user ids, if only_marked is true, do only so
	* for user ids with mark A flag set and do not display the index
	* number. If FP is not NULL print to the given stream and not to the
	* tty (ignored in with-colons mode).
	*/
	static void
	show_key_with_all_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
	KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked, int with_revoker,
	int with_fpr, int with_subkeys, int with_prefs,
	int nowarn)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	kbnode_t node;
	int i;
	int do_warn = 0;
	int have_seckey = 0;
	char *serialno = NULL;
	PKT_public_key *primary = NULL;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	show_key_with_all_names_colon (ctrl, fp, keyblock);
	return;
	}

	/* the keys */
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| (with_subkeys && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& !is_deleted_kbnode (node)))
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	const char *otrust = "err";
	const char *trust = "err";

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	/* do it here, so that debug messages don't clutter the
	* output */
	static int did_warn = 0;

	trust = get_validity_string (ctrl, pk, NULL);
	otrust = get_ownertrust_string (pk);

	/* Show a warning once */
	if (!did_warn
	&& (get_validity (ctrl, pk, NULL, NULL, 0)
	& TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK))
	{
	did_warn = 1;
	do_warn = 1;
	}

	primary = pk;
	}

	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	char *user = get_user_id_string_native (pk->revoked.keyid);
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("The following key was revoked on"
	" %s by %s key %s\n"),
	revokestr_from_pk (pk),
	gcry_pk_algo_name (pk->revoked.algo), user);
	xfree (user);
	}

	if (with_revoker)
	{
	if (!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys)
	BUG ();
	else
	for (i = 0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++)
	{
	u32 r_keyid[2];
	char *user;
	const char *algo;

	algo = gcry_pk_algo_name (pk->revkey[i].algid);
	keyid_from_fingerprint (pk->revkey[i].fpr,
	MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN, r_keyid);

	user = get_user_id_string_native (r_keyid);
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("This key may be revoked by %s key %s"),
	algo ? algo : "?", user);

	if (pk->revkey[i].class & 0x40)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("(sensitive)"));
	}

	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	xfree (user);
	}
	}

	keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL);

	xfree (serialno);
	serialno = NULL;
	{
	char *hexgrip;

	err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	have_seckey = 0;
	}
	else
	have_seckey = !agent_get_keyinfo (ctrl, hexgrip, &serialno, NULL);
	xfree (hexgrip);
	}

	tty_fprintf
	(fp, "%s%c %s/%s",
	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY && have_seckey? "sec" :
	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "pub" :
	have_seckey ? "ssb" :
	"sub",
	(node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY) ? '*' : ' ',
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr (pk->keyid));

	if (opt.legacy_list_mode)
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n ");

	tty_fprintf (fp, _("created: %s"), datestr_from_pk (pk));
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("revoked: %s"), revokestr_from_pk (pk));
	else if (pk->has_expired)
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("expired: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("usage: %s"), usagestr_from_pk (pk, 1));
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");

	if (serialno)
	{
	/* The agent told us that a secret key is available and
	that it has been stored on a card. */
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s%s", opt.legacy_list_mode? 21:5, "",
	_("card-no: "));
	if (strlen (serialno) == 32
	&& !strncmp (serialno, "D27600012401", 12))
	{
	/* This is an OpenPGP card. Print the relevant part. */
	/* Example: D2760001240101010001000003470000 */
	/* xxxxyyyyyyyy */
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%.s %.s\n",
	4, serialno+16, 8, serialno+20);
	}
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%s\n", serialno);

	}
	else if (pk->seckey_info
	&& pk->seckey_info->is_protected
	&& pk->seckey_info->s2k.mode == 1002)
	{
	/* FIXME: Check wether this code path is still used. */
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s%s", opt.legacy_list_mode? 21:5, "",
	_("card-no: "));
	if (pk->seckey_info->ivlen == 16
	&& !memcmp (pk->seckey_info->iv,
	"\xD2\x76\x00\x01\x24\x01", 6))
	{
	/* This is an OpenPGP card. */
	for (i = 8; i < 14; i++)
	{
	if (i == 10)
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%02X", pk->seckey_info->iv[i]);
	}
	}
	else
	{
	/* Unknown card: Print all. */
	for (i = 0; i < pk->seckey_info->ivlen; i++)
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%02X", pk->seckey_info->iv[i]);
	}
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	}

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	{
	if (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s",
	opt.legacy_list_mode?
	((int) keystrlen () + 13):5, "");
	/* Ownertrust is only meaningful for the PGP or
	classic trust models, or PGP combined with TOFU */
	if (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP
	\|\| opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC
	\|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
	{
	int width = 14 - strlen (otrust);
	if (width <= 0)
	width = 1;
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("trust: %s"), otrust);
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s", width, "");
	}

	tty_fprintf (fp, _("validity: %s"), trust);
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	}
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	&& (get_ownertrust (pk) & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "*** ");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key has been disabled"));
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	}
	}

	if ((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) && with_fpr)
	{
	print_fingerprint (fp, pk, 2);
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	}
	}
	}

	show_names (ctrl, fp,
	keyblock, primary, only_marked ? NODFLG_MARK_A : 0, with_prefs);

	if (do_warn && !nowarn)
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("Please note that the shown key validity"
	" is not necessarily correct\n"
	"unless you restart the program.\n"));

	xfree (serialno);
	}


	/* Display basic key information. This function is suitable to show
	information on the key without any dependencies on the trustdb or
	any other internal GnuPG stuff. KEYBLOCK may either be a public or
	a secret key. This function may be called with KEYBLOCK containing
	secret keys and thus the printing of "pub" vs. "sec" does only
	depend on the packet type and not by checking with gpg-agent. */
	void
	show_basic_key_info (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

	/* The primary key */
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	/* Note, we use the same format string as in other show
	functions to make the translation job easier. */
	tty_printf ("%s %s/%s ",
	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "pub" :
	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ? "sub" :
	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ? "sec" :"ssb",
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr_from_pk (pk));
	tty_printf (_("created: %s"), datestr_from_pk (pk));
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_printf (_("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
	tty_printf ("\n");
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 3);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	}
	}

	/* The user IDs. */
	for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	++i;

	tty_printf (" ");
	if (uid->is_revoked)
	tty_printf ("[%s] ", _("revoked"));
	else if (uid->is_expired)
	tty_printf ("[%s] ", _("expired"));
	tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	}
	}
	}


	static void
	show_key_and_fingerprint (kbnode_t keyblock, int with_subkeys)
	{
	kbnode_t node;
	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	tty_printf ("pub %s/%s %s ",
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr_from_pk(pk),
	datestr_from_pk (pk));
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
	break;
	}
	}
	tty_printf ("\n");
	if (pk)
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 2);
	if (with_subkeys)
	{
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	tty_printf ("sub %s/%s %s [%s]\n",
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr_from_pk(pk),
	datestr_from_pk (pk),
	usagestr_from_pk (pk, 0));

	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 4);
	}
	}
	}
	}


	/* Show a listing of the primary and its subkeys along with their
	keygrips. */
	static void
	show_key_and_grip (kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	kbnode_t node;
	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
	char *hexgrip;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	tty_printf ("%s %s/%s %s [%s]\n",
	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY? "pub":"sub",
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr_from_pk(pk),
	datestr_from_pk (pk),
	usagestr_from_pk (pk, 0));

	if (!hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip))
	{
	tty_printf (" Keygrip: %s\n", hexgrip);
	xfree (hexgrip);
	}
	}
	}
	}


	/* Show a warning if no uids on the key have the primary uid flag
	set. */
	static void
	no_primary_warning (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int have_primary = 0, uid_count = 0;

	/* TODO: if we ever start behaving differently with a primary or
	non-primary attribute ID, we will need to check for attributes
	here as well. */

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data == NULL)
	{
	uid_count++;

	if (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary == 2)
	{
	have_primary = 1;
	break;
	}
	}
	}

	if (uid_count > 1 && !have_primary)
	log_info (_
	("WARNING: no user ID has been marked as primary. This command"
	" may\n cause a different user ID to become"
	" the assumed primary.\n"));
	}


	/* Print a warning if the latest encryption subkey expires soon. This
	function is called after the expire data of the primary key has
	been changed. */
	static void
	subkey_expire_warning (kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
	kbnode_t node;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	/* u32 mainexpire = 0; */
	u32 subexpire = 0;
	u32 latest_date = 0;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	/* if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) */
	/* { */
	/* pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; */
	/* mainexpire = pk->expiredate; */
	/* } */

	if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	continue;
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	if (!pk->flags.valid)
	continue;
	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	continue;
	if (pk->timestamp > curtime)
	continue; /* Ignore future keys. */
	if (!(pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC))
	continue; /* Not an encryption key. */

	if (pk->timestamp > latest_date \|\| (!pk->timestamp && !latest_date))
	{
	latest_date = pk->timestamp;
	subexpire = pk->expiredate;
	}
	}

	if (!subexpire)
	return; /* No valid subkey with an expiration time. */

	if (curtime + (10*86400) > subexpire)
	{
	log_info (_("WARNING: Your encryption subkey expires soon.\n"));
	log_info (_("You may want to change its expiration date too.\n"));
	}
	}


	/*
	* Ask for a new user id, add the self-signature, and update the
	* keyblock. If UIDSTRING is not NULL the user ID is generated
	* unattended using that string. UIDSTRING is expected to be utf-8
	* encoded and white space trimmed. Returns true if there is a new
	* user id.
	*/
	static int
	menu_adduid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock,
	int photo, const char photo_name, const char uidstring)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid;
	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
	PKT_signature *sig = NULL;
	PACKET *pkt;
	KBNODE node;
	KBNODE pub_where = NULL;
	gpg_error_t err;

	if (photo && uidstring)
	return 0; /* Not allowed. */

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; pub_where = node, node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	break;
	}
	if (!node) /* No subkey. */
	pub_where = NULL;
	log_assert (pk);

	if (photo)
	{
	int hasattrib = 0;

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data != NULL)
	{
	hasattrib = 1;
	break;
	}

	/* It is legal but bad for compatibility to add a photo ID to a
	v3 key as it means that PGP2 will not be able to use that key
	anymore. Also, PGP may not expect a photo on a v3 key.
	Don't bother to ask this if the key already has a photo - any
	damage has already been done at that point. -dms */
	if (pk->version == 3 && !hasattrib)
	{
	if (opt.expert)
	{
	tty_printf (_("WARNING: This is a PGP2-style key. "
	"Adding a photo ID may cause some versions\n"
	" of PGP to reject this key.\n"));

	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.v3_photo.okay",
	_("Are you sure you still want "
	"to add it? (y/N) ")))
	return 0;
	}
	else
	{
	tty_printf (_("You may not add a photo ID to "
	"a PGP2-style key.\n"));
	return 0;
	}
	}

	uid = generate_photo_id (ctrl, pk, photo_name);
	}
	else
	uid = generate_user_id (pub_keyblock, uidstring);
	if (!uid)
	{
	if (uidstring)
	{
	write_status_error ("adduid", gpg_error (304));
	log_error ("%s", _("Such a user ID already exists on this key!\n"));
	}
	return 0;
	}

	err = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, uid, NULL, pk, 0x13, 0, 0, 0,
	keygen_add_std_prefs, pk, NULL);
	if (err)
	{
	write_status_error ("keysig", err);
	log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	free_user_id (uid);
	return 0;
	}

	/* Insert/append to public keyblock */
	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_USER_ID;
	pkt->pkt.user_id = uid;
	node = new_kbnode (pkt);
	if (pub_where)
	insert_kbnode (pub_where, node, 0);
	else
	add_kbnode (pub_keyblock, node);
	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
	if (pub_where)
	insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
	else
	add_kbnode (pub_keyblock, new_kbnode (pkt));
	return 1;
	}


	/*
	* Remove all selected userids from the keyring
	*/
	static void
	menu_deluid (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int selected = 0;

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID;
	if (selected)
	{
	/* Only cause a trust update if we delete a
	non-revoked user id */
	if (!node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
	update_trust = 1;
	delete_kbnode (node);
	}
	}
	else if (selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	delete_kbnode (node);
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	selected = 0;
	}
	commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
	}


	static int
	menu_delsig (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	PKT_user_id *uid = NULL;
	int changed = 0;

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	uid = (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) ? node->pkt->pkt.user_id : NULL;
	}
	else if (uid && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	int okay, valid, selfsig, inv_sig, no_key, other_err;

	tty_printf ("uid ");
	tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
	tty_printf ("\n");

	okay = inv_sig = no_key = other_err = 0;
	if (opt.with_colons)
	valid = print_and_check_one_sig_colon (pub_keyblock, node,
	&inv_sig, &no_key,
	&other_err, &selfsig, 1);
	else
	valid = print_and_check_one_sig (pub_keyblock, node,
	&inv_sig, &no_key, &other_err,
	&selfsig, 1, 0);

	if (valid)
	{
	okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit
	("keyedit.delsig.valid",
	_("Delete this good signature? (y/N/q)"));

	/* Only update trust if we delete a good signature.
	The other two cases do not affect trust. */
	if (okay)
	update_trust = 1;
	}
	else if (inv_sig \|\| other_err)
	okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit
	("keyedit.delsig.invalid",
	_("Delete this invalid signature? (y/N/q)"));
	else if (no_key)
	okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit
	("keyedit.delsig.unknown",
	_("Delete this unknown signature? (y/N/q)"));

	if (okay == -1)
	break;
	if (okay && selfsig
	&& !cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.delsig.selfsig",
	_("Really delete this self-signature? (y/N)")))
	okay = 0;
	if (okay)
	{
	delete_kbnode (node);
	changed++;
	}

	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	uid = NULL;
	}

	if (changed)
	{
	commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
	tty_printf (ngettext("Deleted %d signature.\n",
	"Deleted %d signatures.\n", changed), changed);
	}
	else
	tty_printf (_("Nothing deleted.\n"));

	return changed;
	}


	static int
	menu_clean (KBNODE keyblock, int self_only)
	{
	KBNODE uidnode;
	int modified = 0, select_all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock);

	for (uidnode = keyblock->next;
	uidnode && uidnode->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
	uidnode = uidnode->next)
	{
	if (uidnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& (uidnode->flag & NODFLG_SELUID \|\| select_all))
	{
	int uids = 0, sigs = 0;
	char *user = utf8_to_native (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,
	0);

	clean_one_uid (keyblock, uidnode, opt.verbose, self_only, &uids,
	&sigs);
	if (uids)
	{
	const char *reason;

	if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
	reason = _("revoked");
	else if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
	reason = _("expired");
	else
	reason = _("invalid");

	tty_printf (_("User ID \"%s\" compacted: %s\n"), user, reason);

	modified = 1;
	}
	else if (sigs)
	{
	tty_printf (ngettext("User ID \"%s\": %d signature removed\n",
	"User ID \"%s\": %d signatures removed\n",
	sigs), user, sigs);
	modified = 1;
	}
	else
	{
	tty_printf (self_only == 1 ?
	_("User ID \"%s\": already minimized\n") :
	_("User ID \"%s\": already clean\n"), user);
	}

	xfree (user);
	}
	}

	return modified;
	}


	/*
	* Remove some of the secondary keys
	*/
	static void
	menu_delkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int selected = 0;

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY;
	if (selected)
	delete_kbnode (node);
	}
	else if (selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	delete_kbnode (node);
	else
	selected = 0;
	}
	commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);

	/* No need to set update_trust here since signing keys are no
	longer used to certify other keys, so there is no change in
	trust when revoking/removing them. */
	}


	/*
	* Ask for a new revoker, create the self-signature and put it into
	* the keyblock. Returns true if there is a new revoker.
	*/
	static int
	menu_addrevoker (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int sensitive)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
	PKT_public_key *revoker_pk = NULL;
	PKT_signature *sig = NULL;
	PACKET *pkt;
	struct revocation_key revkey;
	size_t fprlen;
	int rc;

	log_assert (pub_keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);

	pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	if (pk->numrevkeys == 0 && pk->version == 3)
	{
	/* It is legal but bad for compatibility to add a revoker to a
	v3 key as it means that PGP2 will not be able to use that key
	anymore. Also, PGP may not expect a revoker on a v3 key.
	Don't bother to ask this if the key already has a revoker -
	any damage has already been done at that point. -dms */
	if (opt.expert)
	{
	tty_printf (_("WARNING: This is a PGP 2.x-style key. "
	"Adding a designated revoker may cause\n"
	" some versions of PGP to reject this key.\n"));

	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.v3_revoker.okay",
	_("Are you sure you still want "
	"to add it? (y/N) ")))
	return 0;
	}
	else
	{
	tty_printf (_("You may not add a designated revoker to "
	"a PGP 2.x-style key.\n"));
	return 0;
	}
	}

	for (;;)
	{
	char *answer;

	free_public_key (revoker_pk);
	revoker_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*revoker_pk));

	tty_printf ("\n");

	answer = cpr_get_utf8
	("keyedit.add_revoker",
	_("Enter the user ID of the designated revoker: "));
	if (answer[0] == '\0' \|\| answer[0] == CONTROL_D)
	{
	xfree (answer);
	goto fail;
	}

	/* Note that I'm requesting CERT here, which usually implies
	primary keys only, but some casual testing shows that PGP and
	GnuPG both can handle a designated revocation from a subkey. */
	revoker_pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT;
	rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, revoker_pk, answer, NULL, NULL, 1, 1);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), answer,
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	xfree (answer);
	continue;
	}

	xfree (answer);

	fingerprint_from_pk (revoker_pk, revkey.fpr, &fprlen);
	if (fprlen != 20)
	{
	log_error (_("cannot appoint a PGP 2.x style key as a "
	"designated revoker\n"));
	continue;
	}

	revkey.class = 0x80;
	if (sensitive)
	revkey.class \|= 0x40;
	revkey.algid = revoker_pk->pubkey_algo;

	if (cmp_public_keys (revoker_pk, pk) == 0)
	{
	/* This actually causes no harm (after all, a key that
	designates itself as a revoker is the same as a
	regular key), but it's easy enough to check. */
	log_error (_("you cannot appoint a key as its own "
	"designated revoker\n"));

	continue;
	}

	keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL);

	/* Does this revkey already exist? */
	if (!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys)
	BUG ();
	else
	{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++)
	{
	if (memcmp (&pk->revkey[i], &revkey,
	sizeof (struct revocation_key)) == 0)
	{
	char buf[50];

	log_error (_("this key has already been designated "
	"as a revoker\n"));

	format_keyid (pk_keyid (pk), KF_LONG, buf, sizeof (buf));
	write_status_text (STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED, buf);

	break;
	}
	}

	if (i < pk->numrevkeys)
	continue;
	}

	print_pubkey_info (NULL, revoker_pk);
	print_fingerprint (NULL, revoker_pk, 2);
	tty_printf ("\n");

	tty_printf (_("WARNING: appointing a key as a designated revoker "
	"cannot be undone!\n"));

	tty_printf ("\n");

	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.add_revoker.okay",
	_("Are you sure you want to appoint this "
	"key as a designated revoker? (y/N) ")))
	continue;

	free_public_key (revoker_pk);
	revoker_pk = NULL;
	break;
	}

	rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk, 0x1F, 0, 0, 0,
	keygen_add_revkey, &revkey, NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
	log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto fail;
	}

	/* Insert into public keyblock. */
	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
	insert_kbnode (pub_keyblock, new_kbnode (pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE);

	return 1;

	fail:
	if (sig)
	free_seckey_enc (sig);
	free_public_key (revoker_pk);

	return 0;
	}


	static int
	menu_expire (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	int n1, signumber, rc;
	u32 expiredate;
	int mainkey = 0;
	PKT_public_key main_pk, sub_pk;
	PKT_user_id *uid;
	KBNODE node;
	u32 keyid[2];

	n1 = count_selected_keys (pub_keyblock);
	if (n1 > 1)
	{
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.expire_multiple_subkeys.okay",
	_("Are you sure you want to change the"
	" expiration time for multiple subkeys? (y/N) ")))
	return 0;
	}
	else if (n1)
	tty_printf (_("Changing expiration time for a subkey.\n"));
	else
	{
	tty_printf (_("Changing expiration time for the primary key.\n"));
	mainkey = 1;
	no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);
	}

	expiredate = ask_expiredate ();

	/* Now we can actually change the self-signature(s) */
	main_pk = sub_pk = NULL;
	uid = NULL;
	signumber = 0;
	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
	main_pk->expiredate = expiredate;
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)
	{
	sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	sub_pk->expiredate = expiredate;
	}
	else
	sub_pk = NULL;
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	else if (main_pk && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& (mainkey \|\| sub_pk))
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
	&& ((mainkey && uid
	&& uid->created && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	\|\| (!mainkey && sig->sig_class == 0x18))
	&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	/* This is a self-signature which is to be replaced. */
	PKT_signature *newsig;
	PACKET *newpkt;

	signumber++;

	if ((mainkey && main_pk->version < 4)
	\|\| (!mainkey && sub_pk->version < 4))
	{
	log_info
	(_("You can't change the expiration date of a v3 key\n"));
	return 0;
	}

	if (mainkey)
	rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig, main_pk, uid, NULL,
	main_pk, keygen_add_key_expire,
	main_pk);
	else
	rc =
	update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig, main_pk, NULL, sub_pk,
	main_pk, keygen_add_key_expire, sub_pk);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	return 0;
	}

	/* Replace the packet. */
	newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
	newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
	free_packet (node->pkt);
	xfree (node->pkt);
	node->pkt = newpkt;
	sub_pk = NULL;
	}
	}
	}

	update_trust = 1;
	return 1;
	}


	/* Change the capability of a selected key. This command should only
	* be used to rectify badly created keys and as such is not suggested
	* for general use. */
	static int
	menu_changeusage (kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	int n1, rc;
	int mainkey = 0;
	PKT_public_key main_pk, sub_pk;
	PKT_user_id *uid;
	kbnode_t node;
	u32 keyid[2];

	n1 = count_selected_keys (keyblock);
	if (n1 > 1)
	{
	tty_printf (_("You must select exactly one key.\n"));
	return 0;
	}
	else if (n1)
	tty_printf ("Changing usage of a subkey.\n");
	else
	{
	tty_printf ("Changing usage of the primary key.\n");
	mainkey = 1;
	}

	/* Now we can actually change the self-signature(s) */
	main_pk = sub_pk = NULL;
	uid = NULL;
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)
	sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	else
	sub_pk = NULL;
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	else if (main_pk && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& (mainkey \|\| sub_pk))
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
	&& ((mainkey && uid
	&& uid->created && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	\|\| (!mainkey && sig->sig_class == 0x18))
	&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	/* This is the self-signature which is to be replaced. */
	PKT_signature *newsig;
	PACKET *newpkt;

	if ((mainkey && main_pk->version < 4)
	\|\| (!mainkey && sub_pk->version < 4))
	{
	log_info ("You can't change the capabilities of a v3 key\n");
	return 0;
	}

	if (mainkey)
	main_pk->pubkey_usage = ask_key_flags (main_pk->pubkey_algo, 0,
	main_pk->pubkey_usage);
	else
	sub_pk->pubkey_usage = ask_key_flags (sub_pk->pubkey_algo, 1,
	sub_pk->pubkey_usage);

	if (mainkey)
	rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig, main_pk, uid, NULL,
	main_pk, keygen_add_key_flags,
	main_pk);
	else
	rc =
	update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig, main_pk, NULL, sub_pk,
	main_pk, keygen_add_key_flags, sub_pk);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	return 0;
	}

	/* Replace the packet. */
	newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
	newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
	free_packet (node->pkt);
	xfree (node->pkt);
	node->pkt = newpkt;
	sub_pk = NULL;
	break;
	}
	}
	}

	return 1;
	}


	static int
	menu_backsign (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	int rc, modified = 0;
	PKT_public_key *main_pk;
	KBNODE node;
	u32 timestamp;

	log_assert (pub_keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);

	merge_keys_and_selfsig (pub_keyblock);
	main_pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (main_pk, NULL);

	/* We use the same timestamp for all backsigs so that we don't
	reveal information about the used machine. */
	timestamp = make_timestamp ();

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	PKT_public_key *sub_pk = NULL;
	KBNODE node2, sig_pk = NULL /,sig_sk = NULL/;
	/* char passphrase; /

	/* Find a signing subkey with no backsig */
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkt.public_key->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkt.public_key->flags.backsig)
	tty_printf (_
	("signing subkey %s is already cross-certified\n"),
	keystr_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key));
	else
	sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	}
	else
	tty_printf (_("subkey %s does not sign and so does"
	" not need to be cross-certified\n"),
	keystr_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key));
	}

	if (!sub_pk)
	continue;

	/* Find the selected selfsig on this subkey */
	for (node2 = node->next;
	node2 && node2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; node2 = node2->next)
	if (node2->pkt->pkt.signature->version >= 4
	&& node2->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	sig_pk = node2;
	break;
	}

	if (!sig_pk)
	continue;

	/* Find the secret subkey that matches the public subkey */
	log_debug ("FIXME: Check whether a secret subkey is available.\n");
	/* if (!sub_sk) */
	/* { */
	/* tty_printf (_("no secret subkey for public subkey %s - ignoring\n"), */
	/* keystr_from_pk (sub_pk)); */
	/* continue; */
	/* } */


	/* Now we can get to work. */

	rc = make_backsig (sig_pk->pkt->pkt.signature, main_pk, sub_pk, sub_pk,
	timestamp, NULL);
	if (!rc)
	{
	PKT_signature *newsig;
	PACKET *newpkt;

	rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig_pk->pkt->pkt.signature,
	main_pk, NULL, sub_pk, main_pk,
	NULL, NULL);
	if (!rc)
	{
	/* Put the new sig into place on the pubkey */
	newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*newpkt));
	newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
	free_packet (sig_pk->pkt);
	xfree (sig_pk->pkt);
	sig_pk->pkt = newpkt;

	modified = 1;
	}
	else
	{
	log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	break;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	log_error ("make_backsig failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	break;
	}
	}

	return modified;
	}


	static int
	change_primary_uid_cb (PKT_signature * sig, void *opaque)
	{
	byte buf[1];

	/* first clear all primary uid flags so that we are sure none are
	* lingering around */
	delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID);
	delete_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID);

	/* if opaque is set,we want to set the primary id */
	if (opaque)
	{
	buf[0] = 1;
	build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, buf, 1);
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/*
	* Set the primary uid flag for the selected UID. We will also reset
	* all other primary uid flags. For this to work with have to update
	* all the signature timestamps. If we would do this with the current
	* time, we lose quite a lot of information, so we use a a kludge to
	* do this: Just increment the timestamp by one second which is
	* sufficient to updated a signature during import.
	*/
	static int
	menu_set_primary_uid (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	PKT_public_key *main_pk;
	PKT_user_id *uid;
	KBNODE node;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int selected;
	int attribute = 0;
	int modified = 0;

	if (count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock) != 1)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Please select exactly one user ID.\n"));
	return 0;
	}

	main_pk = NULL;
	uid = NULL;
	selected = 0;

	/* Is our selected uid an attribute packet? */
	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)
	attribute = (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data != NULL);

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	break; /* No more user ids expected - ready. */

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID;
	}
	else if (main_pk && uid && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
	&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	&& attribute == (uid->attrib_data != NULL)
	&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	if (sig->version < 4)
	{
	char *user =
	utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);

	log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
	user);
	xfree (user);
	}
	else
	{
	/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced.
	We can just ignore v3 signatures because they are
	not able to carry the primary ID flag. We also
	ignore self-sigs on user IDs that are not of the
	same type that we are making primary. That is, if
	we are making a user ID primary, we alter user IDs.
	If we are making an attribute packet primary, we
	alter attribute packets. */

	/* FIXME: We must make sure that we only have one
	self-signature per user ID here (not counting
	revocations) */
	PKT_signature *newsig;
	PACKET *newpkt;
	const byte *p;
	int action;

	/* See whether this signature has the primary UID flag. */
	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,
	SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL);
	if (!p)
	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed,
	SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL);
	if (p && p) / yes */
	action = selected ? 0 : -1;
	else /* no */
	action = selected ? 1 : 0;

	if (action)
	{
	int rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
	main_pk, uid, NULL,
	main_pk,
	change_primary_uid_cb,
	action > 0 ? "x" : NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	return 0;
	}
	/* replace the packet */
	newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
	newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
	free_packet (node->pkt);
	xfree (node->pkt);
	node->pkt = newpkt;
	modified = 1;
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}

	return modified;
	}


	/*
	* Set preferences to new values for the selected user IDs
	*/
	static int
	menu_set_preferences (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	PKT_public_key *main_pk;
	PKT_user_id *uid;
	KBNODE node;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int selected, select_all;
	int modified = 0;

	no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);

	select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);

	/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
	main_pk = NULL;
	uid = NULL;
	selected = 0;
	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	break; /* No more user-ids expected - ready. */

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	selected = select_all \|\| (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
	}
	else if (main_pk && uid && selected
	&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
	&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	if (sig->version < 4)
	{
	char *user =
	utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);

	log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
	user);
	xfree (user);
	}
	else
	{
	/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced
	* We have to ignore v3 signatures because they are
	* not able to carry the preferences. */
	PKT_signature *newsig;
	PACKET *newpkt;
	int rc;

	rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
	main_pk, uid, NULL, main_pk,
	keygen_upd_std_prefs, NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	return 0;
	}
	/* replace the packet */
	newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
	newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
	free_packet (node->pkt);
	xfree (node->pkt);
	node->pkt = newpkt;
	modified = 1;
	}
	}
	}
	}

	return modified;
	}


	static int
	menu_set_keyserver_url (const char *url, KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	PKT_public_key *main_pk;
	PKT_user_id *uid;
	KBNODE node;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int selected, select_all;
	int modified = 0;
	char answer, uri;

	no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);

	if (url)
	answer = xstrdup (url);
	else
	{
	answer = cpr_get_utf8 ("keyedit.add_keyserver",
	_("Enter your preferred keyserver URL: "));
	if (answer[0] == '\0' \|\| answer[0] == CONTROL_D)
	{
	xfree (answer);
	return 0;
	}
	}

	if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "none") == 0)
	uri = NULL;
	else
	{
	struct keyserver_spec *keyserver = NULL;
	/* Sanity check the format */
	keyserver = parse_keyserver_uri (answer, 1);
	xfree (answer);
	if (!keyserver)
	{
	log_info (_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
	return 0;
	}
	uri = xstrdup (keyserver->uri);
	free_keyserver_spec (keyserver);
	}

	select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);

	/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
	main_pk = NULL;
	uid = NULL;
	selected = 0;
	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	break; /* ready */

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	selected = select_all \|\| (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
	}
	else if (main_pk && uid && selected
	&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
	&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);
	if (sig->version < 4)
	log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
	user);
	else
	{
	/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced
	* We have to ignore v3 signatures because they are
	* not able to carry the subpacket. */
	PKT_signature *newsig;
	PACKET *newpkt;
	int rc;
	const byte *p;
	size_t plen;

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, &plen);
	if (p && plen)
	{
	tty_printf ("Current preferred keyserver for user"
	" ID \"%s\": ", user);
	tty_print_utf8_string (p, plen);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.confirm_keyserver",
	uri
	? _("Are you sure you want to replace it? (y/N) ")
	: _("Are you sure you want to delete it? (y/N) ")))
	continue;
	}
	else if (uri == NULL)
	{
	/* There is no current keyserver URL, so there
	is no point in trying to un-set it. */
	continue;
	}

	rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
	main_pk, uid, NULL,
	main_pk,
	keygen_add_keyserver_url, uri);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	xfree (uri);
	return 0;
	}
	/* replace the packet */
	newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
	newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
	free_packet (node->pkt);
	xfree (node->pkt);
	node->pkt = newpkt;
	modified = 1;
	}

	xfree (user);
	}
	}
	}

	xfree (uri);
	return modified;
	}

	static int
	menu_set_notation (const char *string, KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	PKT_public_key *main_pk;
	PKT_user_id *uid;
	KBNODE node;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int selected, select_all;
	int modified = 0;
	char *answer;
	struct notation *notation;

	no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);

	if (string)
	answer = xstrdup (string);
	else
	{
	answer = cpr_get_utf8 ("keyedit.add_notation",
	_("Enter the notation: "));
	if (answer[0] == '\0' \|\| answer[0] == CONTROL_D)
	{
	xfree (answer);
	return 0;
	}
	}

	if (!ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "none")
	\|\| !ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "-"))
	notation = NULL; /* Delete them all. */
	else
	{
	notation = string_to_notation (answer, 0);
	if (!notation)
	{
	xfree (answer);
	return 0;
	}
	}

	xfree (answer);

	select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);

	/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
	main_pk = NULL;
	uid = NULL;
	selected = 0;
	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	break; /* ready */

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	selected = select_all \|\| (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
	}
	else if (main_pk && uid && selected
	&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
	&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);
	if (sig->version < 4)
	log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
	user);
	else
	{
	PKT_signature *newsig;
	PACKET *newpkt;
	int rc, skip = 0, addonly = 1;

	if (sig->flags.notation)
	{
	tty_printf ("Current notations for user ID \"%s\":\n",
	user);
	tty_print_notations (-9, sig);
	}
	else
	{
	tty_printf ("No notations on user ID \"%s\"\n", user);
	if (notation == NULL)
	{
	/* There are no current notations, so there
	is no point in trying to un-set them. */
	continue;
	}
	}

	if (notation)
	{
	struct notation *n;
	int deleting = 0;

	notation->next = sig_to_notation (sig);

	for (n = notation->next; n; n = n->next)
	if (strcmp (n->name, notation->name) == 0)
	{
	if (notation->value)
	{
	if (strcmp (n->value, notation->value) == 0)
	{
	if (notation->flags.ignore)
	{
	/* Value match with a delete
	flag. */
	n->flags.ignore = 1;
	deleting = 1;
	}
	else
	{
	/* Adding the same notation
	twice, so don't add it at
	all. */
	skip = 1;
	tty_printf ("Skipping notation:"
	" %s=%s\n",
	notation->name,
	notation->value);
	break;
	}
	}
	}
	else
	{
	/* No value, so it means delete. */
	n->flags.ignore = 1;
	deleting = 1;
	}

	if (n->flags.ignore)
	{
	tty_printf ("Removing notation: %s=%s\n",
	n->name, n->value);
	addonly = 0;
	}
	}

	if (!notation->flags.ignore && !skip)
	tty_printf ("Adding notation: %s=%s\n",
	notation->name, notation->value);

	/* We tried to delete, but had no matches. */
	if (notation->flags.ignore && !deleting)
	continue;
	}
	else
	{
	tty_printf ("Removing all notations\n");
	addonly = 0;
	}

	if (skip
	\|\| (!addonly
	&&
	!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.confirm_notation",
	_("Proceed? (y/N) "))))
	continue;

	rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
	main_pk, uid, NULL,
	main_pk,
	keygen_add_notations, notation);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	free_notation (notation);
	xfree (user);
	return 0;
	}

	/* replace the packet */
	newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
	newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
	free_packet (node->pkt);
	xfree (node->pkt);
	node->pkt = newpkt;
	modified = 1;

	if (notation)
	{
	/* Snip off the notation list from the sig */
	free_notation (notation->next);
	notation->next = NULL;
	}

	xfree (user);
	}
	}
	}
	}

	free_notation (notation);
	return modified;
	}


	/*
	* Select one user id or remove all selection if IDX is 0 or select
	* all if IDX is -1. Returns: True if the selection changed.
	*/
	static int
	menu_select_uid (KBNODE keyblock, int idx)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i;

	if (idx == -1) /* Select all. */
	{
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELUID;
	return 1;
	}
	else if (idx) /* Toggle. */
	{
	for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	if (++i == idx)
	break;
	}
	if (!node)
	{
	tty_printf (_("No user ID with index %d\n"), idx);
	return 0;
	}

	for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	if (++i == idx)
	{
	if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
	else
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELUID;
	}
	}
	}
	}
	else /* Unselect all */
	{
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
	}

	return 1;
	}


	/* Search in the keyblock for a uid that matches namehash */
	static int
	menu_select_uid_namehash (KBNODE keyblock, const char *namehash)
	{
	byte hash[NAMEHASH_LEN];
	KBNODE node;
	int i;

	log_assert (strlen (namehash) == NAMEHASH_LEN * 2);

	for (i = 0; i < NAMEHASH_LEN; i++)
	hash[i] = hextobyte (&namehash[i * 2]);

	for (node = keyblock->next; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	namehash_from_uid (node->pkt->pkt.user_id);
	if (memcmp (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->namehash, hash, NAMEHASH_LEN) ==
	0)
	{
	if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
	else
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELUID;

	break;
	}
	}
	}

	if (!node)
	{
	tty_printf (_("No user ID with hash %s\n"), namehash);
	return 0;
	}

	return 1;
	}


	/*
	* Select secondary keys
	* Returns: True if the selection changed.
	*/
	static int
	menu_select_key (KBNODE keyblock, int idx, char *p)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i, j;
	int is_hex_digits;

	is_hex_digits = p && strlen (p) >= 8;
	if (is_hex_digits)
	{
	/* Skip initial spaces. */
	while (spacep (p))
	p ++;
	/* If the id starts with 0x accept and ignore it. */
	if (p[0] == '0' && p[1] == 'x')
	p += 2;

	for (i = 0, j = 0; p[i]; i ++)
	if (hexdigitp (&p[i]))
	{
	p[j] = toupper (p[i]);
	j ++;
	}
	else if (spacep (&p[i]))
	/* Skip spaces. */
	{
	}
	else
	{
	is_hex_digits = 0;
	break;
	}
	if (is_hex_digits)
	/* In case we skipped some spaces, add a new NUL terminator. */
	{
	p[j] = 0;
	/* If we skipped some spaces, make sure that we still have
	at least 8 characters. */
	is_hex_digits = (/* Short keyid. */
	strlen (p) == 8
	/* Long keyid. */
	\|\| strlen (p) == 16
	/* Fingerprints are (currently) 32 or 40
	characters. */
	\|\| strlen (p) >= 32);
	}
	}

	if (is_hex_digits)
	{
	int found_one = 0;
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	{
	int match = 0;
	if (strlen (p) == 8 \|\| strlen (p) == 16)
	{
	u32 kid[2];
	char kid_str[17];
	keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
	format_keyid (kid, strlen (p) == 8 ? KF_SHORT : KF_LONG,
	kid_str, sizeof (kid_str));

	if (strcmp (p, kid_str) == 0)
	match = 1;
	}
	else
	{
	char fp[2*MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN + 1];
	hexfingerprint (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, fp, sizeof (fp));
	if (strcmp (fp, p) == 0)
	match = 1;
	}

	if (match)
	{
	if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
	else
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELKEY;

	found_one = 1;
	}
	}

	if (found_one)
	return 1;

	tty_printf (_("No subkey with key ID '%s'.\n"), p);
	return 0;
	}

	if (idx == -1) /* Select all. */
	{
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELKEY;
	}
	else if (idx) /* Toggle selection. */
	{
	for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	if (++i == idx)
	break;
	}
	if (!node)
	{
	tty_printf (_("No subkey with index %d\n"), idx);
	return 0;
	}

	for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	if (++i == idx)
	{
	if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
	else
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELKEY;
	}
	}
	}
	else /* Unselect all. */
	{
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
	}

	return 1;
	}


	static int
	count_uids_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i = 0;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & flag))
	i++;
	return i;
	}


	static int
	count_keys_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i = 0;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if ((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) && (node->flag & flag))
	i++;
	return i;
	}


	static int
	count_uids (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i = 0;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	i++;
	return i;
	}


	/*
	* Returns true if there is at least one selected user id
	*/
	static int
	count_selected_uids (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	return count_uids_with_flag (keyblock, NODFLG_SELUID);
	}


	static int
	count_selected_keys (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	return count_keys_with_flag (keyblock, NODFLG_SELKEY);
	}


	/* Returns how many real (i.e. not attribute) uids are unmarked. */
	static int
	real_uids_left (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int real = 0;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) &&
	!node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
	real++;

	return real;
	}


	/*
	* Ask whether the signature should be revoked. If the user commits this,
	* flag bit MARK_A is set on the signature and the user ID.
	*/
	static void
	ask_revoke_sig (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node)
	{
	int doit = 0;
	PKT_user_id *uid;
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	KBNODE unode = find_prev_kbnode (keyblock, node, PKT_USER_ID);

	if (!unode)
	{
	log_error ("Oops: no user ID for signature\n");
	return;
	}

	uid = unode->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	if (uid->attrib_data)
	printf ("uat:::::::::%u %lu", uid->numattribs, uid->attrib_len);
	else
	{
	es_printf ("uid:::::::::");
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, uid->name, uid->len, ":", NULL);
	}

	es_printf ("\n");

	print_and_check_one_sig_colon (keyblock, node, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
	1);
	}
	else
	{
	char *p = utf8_to_native (unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
	tty_printf (_("user ID: \"%s\"\n"), p);
	xfree (p);

	tty_printf (_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"),
	keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig),
	sig->flags.exportable ? "" : _(" (non-exportable)"), "");
	}
	if (sig->flags.expired)
	{
	tty_printf (_("This signature expired on %s.\n"),
	expirestr_from_sig (sig));
	/* Use a different question so we can have different help text */
	doit = cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("ask_revoke_sig.expired",
	_("Are you sure you still want to revoke it? (y/N) "));
	}
	else
	doit = cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("ask_revoke_sig.one",
	_("Create a revocation certificate for this signature? (y/N) "));

	if (doit)
	{
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_MARK_A;
	unode->flag \|= NODFLG_MARK_A;
	}
	}


	/*
	* Display all user ids of the current public key together with signatures
	* done by one of our keys. Then walk over all this sigs and ask the user
	* whether he wants to revoke this signature.
	* Return: True when the keyblock has changed.
	*/
	static int
	menu_revsig (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig;
	PKT_public_key *primary_pk;
	KBNODE node;
	int changed = 0;
	int rc, any, skip = 1, all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock);
	struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;

	log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);

	/* First check whether we have any signatures at all. */
	any = 0;
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_SELSIG \| NODFLG_MARK_A);
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID \|\| all)
	skip = 0;
	else
	skip = 1;
	}
	else if (!skip && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& ((sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature),
	have_secret_key_with_kid (sig->keyid)))
	{
	if ((sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	{
	any = 1;
	break;
	}
	}
	}

	if (!any)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Not signed by you.\n"));
	return 0;
	}


	/* FIXME: detect duplicates here */
	tty_printf (_("You have signed these user IDs on key %s:\n"),
	keystr_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key));
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_SELSIG \| NODFLG_MARK_A);
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID \|\| all)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	/* Hmmm: Should we show only UIDs with a signature? */
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	skip = 0;
	}
	else
	skip = 1;
	}
	else if (!skip && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& ((sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature),
	have_secret_key_with_kid (sig->keyid)))
	{
	if ((sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	{
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_printf (_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"),
	keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig),
	sig->flags.exportable ? "" : _(" (non-exportable)"),
	sig->flags.revocable ? "" : _(" (non-revocable)"));
	if (sig->flags.revocable)
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELSIG;
	}
	else if (sig->sig_class == 0x30)
	{
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_printf (_("revoked by your key %s on %s\n"),
	keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig));
	}
	}
	}

	tty_printf ("\n");

	/* ask */
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (!(node->flag & NODFLG_SELSIG))
	continue;
	ask_revoke_sig (keyblock, node);
	}

	/* present selected */
	any = 0;
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (!(node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A))
	continue;
	if (!any)
	{
	any = 1;
	tty_printf (_("You are about to revoke these signatures:\n"));
	}
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_printf (_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"),
	keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig), "",
	sig->flags.exportable ? "" : _(" (non-exportable)"));
	}
	}
	if (!any)
	return 0; /* none selected */

	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("ask_revoke_sig.okay",
	_("Really create the revocation certificates? (y/N) ")))
	return 0; /* forget it */

	reason = ask_revocation_reason (0, 1, 0);
	if (!reason)
	{ /* user decided to cancel */
	return 0;
	}

	/* now we can sign the user ids */
	reloop: /* (must use this, because we are modifing the list) */
	primary_pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	KBNODE unode;
	PACKET *pkt;
	struct sign_attrib attrib;
	PKT_public_key *signerkey;

	if (!(node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A)
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
	continue;
	unode = find_prev_kbnode (keyblock, node, PKT_USER_ID);
	log_assert (unode); /* we already checked this */

	memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
	attrib.reason = reason;
	attrib.non_exportable = !node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable;

	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	signerkey = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *signerkey);
	if (get_seckey (signerkey, node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid))
	{
	log_info (_("no secret key\n"));
	free_public_key (signerkey);
	continue;
	}
	rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, primary_pk,
	unode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
	NULL, signerkey, 0x30, 0, 0, 0,
	sign_mk_attrib, &attrib, NULL);
	free_public_key (signerkey);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
	log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
	return changed;
	}
	changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */
	update_trust = 1;
	/* Are we revoking our own uid? */
	if (primary_pk->keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] &&
	primary_pk->keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
	unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked = 1;
	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
	insert_kbnode (unode, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
	goto reloop;
	}

	release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
	return changed;
	}


	/* return 0 if revocation of NODE (which must be a User ID) was
	successful, non-zero if there was an error. *modified will be set
	to 1 if a change was made. */
	static int
	core_revuid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, KBNODE node,
	const struct revocation_reason_info reason, int modified)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	gpg_error_t rc;

	if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_USER_ID);
	write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
	log_error (_("tried to revoke a non-user ID: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	return 1;
	}
	else
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	if (uid->is_revoked)
	{
	char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, uid->len, 0);
	log_info (_("user ID \"%s\" is already revoked\n"), user);
	xfree (user);
	}
	else
	{
	PACKET *pkt;
	PKT_signature *sig;
	struct sign_attrib attrib;
	u32 timestamp = make_timestamp ();

	if (uid->created >= timestamp)
	{
	/* Okay, this is a problem. The user ID selfsig was
	created in the future, so we need to warn the user and
	set our revocation timestamp one second after that so
	everything comes out clean. */

	log_info (_("WARNING: a user ID signature is dated %d"
	" seconds in the future\n"),
	uid->created - timestamp);

	timestamp = uid->created + 1;
	}

	memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
	/* should not need to cast away const here; but
	revocation_reason_build_cb needs to take a non-const
	void* in order to meet the function signtuare for the
	mksubpkt argument to make_keysig_packet */
	attrib.reason = (struct revocation_reason_info *)reason;

	rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, uid, NULL, pk, 0x30, 0,
	timestamp, 0,
	sign_mk_attrib, &attrib, NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
	log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	return 1;
	}
	else
	{
	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
	insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	/* If the trustdb has an entry for this key+uid then the
	trustdb needs an update. */
	if (!update_trust
	&& ((get_validity (ctrl, pk, uid, NULL, 0) & TRUST_MASK)
	>= TRUST_UNDEFINED))
	update_trust = 1;
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/

	node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked = 1;
	if (modified)
	*modified = 1;
	}
	}
	return 0;
	}
	}

	/* Revoke a user ID (i.e. revoke a user ID selfsig). Return true if
	keyblock changed. */
	static int
	menu_revuid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	KBNODE node;
	int changed = 0;
	int rc;
	struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;

	/* Note that this is correct as per the RFCs, but nevertheless
	somewhat meaningless in the real world. 1991 did define the 0x30
	sig class, but PGP 2.x did not actually implement it, so it would
	probably be safe to use v4 revocations everywhere. -ds */

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (pk->version > 3 \|\| (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id->selfsigversion > 3))
	{
	if ((reason = ask_revocation_reason (0, 1, 4)))
	break;
	else
	goto leave;
	}

	reloop: /* (better this way because we are modifying the keyring) */
	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
	{
	int modified = 0;
	rc = core_revuid (ctrl, pub_keyblock, node, reason, &modified);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;
	if (modified)
	{
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
	changed = 1;
	goto reloop;
	}
	}

	if (changed)
	commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);

	leave:
	release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
	return changed;
	}


	/*
	* Revoke the whole key.
	*/
	static int
	menu_revkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	int rc, changed = 0;
	struct revocation_reason_info *reason;
	PACKET *pkt;
	PKT_signature *sig;

	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Key %s is already revoked.\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk));
	return 0;
	}

	reason = ask_revocation_reason (1, 0, 0);
	/* user decided to cancel */
	if (!reason)
	return 0;

	rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk,
	0x20, 0, 0, 0,
	revocation_reason_build_cb, reason, NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
	log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto scram;
	}

	changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */

	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
	insert_kbnode (pub_keyblock, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
	commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);

	update_trust = 1;

	scram:
	release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
	return changed;
	}


	static int
	menu_revsubkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	PKT_public_key *mainpk;
	KBNODE node;
	int changed = 0;
	int rc;
	struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;

	reason = ask_revocation_reason (1, 0, 0);
	if (!reason)
	return 0; /* User decided to cancel. */

	reloop: /* (better this way because we are modifing the keyring) */
	mainpk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
	{
	PACKET *pkt;
	PKT_signature *sig;
	PKT_public_key *subpk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	struct sign_attrib attrib;

	if (subpk->flags.revoked)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Subkey %s is already revoked.\n"),
	keystr_from_pk (subpk));
	continue;
	}

	memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
	attrib.reason = reason;

	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
	rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, mainpk, NULL, subpk, mainpk,
	0x28, 0, 0, 0, sign_mk_attrib, &attrib,
	NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
	log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
	return changed;
	}
	changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */

	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
	insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
	goto reloop;
	}
	}
	commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);

	/* No need to set update_trust here since signing keys no longer
	are used to certify other keys, so there is no change in trust
	when revoking/removing them */

	release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
	return changed;
	}


	/* Note that update_ownertrust is going to mark the trustdb dirty when
	enabling or disabling a key. This is arguably sub-optimal as
	disabled keys are still counted in the web of trust, but perhaps
	not worth adding extra complexity to change. -ds */
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	static int
	enable_disable_key (KBNODE keyblock, int disable)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk =
	find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	unsigned int trust, newtrust;

	trust = newtrust = get_ownertrust (pk);
	newtrust &= ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
	if (disable)
	newtrust \|= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
	if (trust == newtrust)
	return 0; /* already in that state */
	update_ownertrust (pk, newtrust);
	return 0;
	}
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/


	static void
	menu_showphoto (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int select_all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock);
	int count = 0;
	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;

	/* Look for the public key first. We have to be really, really,
	explicit as to which photo this is, and what key it is a UID on
	since people may want to sign it. */

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	count++;

	if ((select_all \|\| (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)) &&
	uid->attribs != NULL)
	{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < uid->numattribs; i++)
	{
	byte type;
	u32 size;

	if (uid->attribs[i].type == ATTRIB_IMAGE &&
	parse_image_header (&uid->attribs[i], &type, &size))
	{
	tty_printf (_("Displaying %s photo ID of size %ld for "
	"key %s (uid %d)\n"),
	image_type_to_string (type, 1),
	(ulong) size, keystr_from_pk (pk), count);
	show_photos (ctrl, &uid->attribs[i], 1, pk, uid);
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}

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