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	diff --git a/common/openpgpdefs.h b/common/openpgpdefs.h
	index 2962fe2d4..5ab45debd 100644
	--- a/common/openpgpdefs.h
	+++ b/common/openpgpdefs.h
	@@ -1,222 +1,223 @@
	/* openpgpdefs.h - Constants from the OpenPGP standard (rfc2440)
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
	* 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 2014 Werner Koch
	*
	* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of either
	*
	* - the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by the Free
	* Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at
	* your option) any later version.
	*
	* or
	*
	* - the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
	* Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at
	* your option) any later version.
	*
	* or both in parallel, as here.
	*
	* This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#ifndef GNUPG_COMMON_OPENPGPDEFS_H
	#define GNUPG_COMMON_OPENPGPDEFS_H

	typedef enum
	{
	PKT_NONE = 0,
	PKT_PUBKEY_ENC = 1, /* Public key encrypted packet. */
	PKT_SIGNATURE = 2, /* Secret key encrypted packet. */
	PKT_SYMKEY_ENC = 3, /* Session key packet. */
	PKT_ONEPASS_SIG = 4, /* One pass sig packet. */
	PKT_SECRET_KEY = 5, /* Secret key. */
	PKT_PUBLIC_KEY = 6, /* Public key. */
	PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY = 7, /* Secret subkey. */
	PKT_COMPRESSED = 8, /* Compressed data packet. */
	PKT_ENCRYPTED = 9, /* Conventional encrypted data. */
	PKT_MARKER = 10, /* Marker packet. */
	PKT_PLAINTEXT = 11, /* Literal data packet. */
	PKT_RING_TRUST = 12, /* Keyring trust packet. */
	PKT_USER_ID = 13, /* User id packet. */
	PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY = 14, /* Public subkey. */
	PKT_OLD_COMMENT = 16, /* Comment packet from an OpenPGP draft. */
	PKT_ATTRIBUTE = 17, /* PGP's attribute packet. */
	PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC = 18, /* Integrity protected encrypted data. */
	PKT_MDC = 19, /* Manipulation detection code packet. */
	PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD= 20, /* AEAD encrypted data packet. */
	PKT_COMMENT = 61, /* new comment packet (GnuPG specific). */
	PKT_GPG_CONTROL = 63 /* internal control packet (GnuPG specific). */
	}
	pkttype_t;

	static inline const char *
	pkttype_str (pkttype_t type)
	{
	switch (type)
	{
	case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: return "PUBKEY_ENC";
	case PKT_SIGNATURE: return "SIGNATURE";
	case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: return "SYMKEY_ENC";
	case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: return "ONEPASS_SIG";
	case PKT_SECRET_KEY: return "SECRET_KEY";
	case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: return "PUBLIC_KEY";
	case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY: return "SECRET_SUBKEY";
	case PKT_COMPRESSED: return "COMPRESSED";
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED: return "ENCRYPTED";
	case PKT_MARKER: return "MARKER";
	case PKT_PLAINTEXT: return "PLAINTEXT";
	case PKT_RING_TRUST: return "RING_TRUST";
	case PKT_USER_ID: return "USER_ID";
	case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY: return "PUBLIC_SUBKEY";
	case PKT_OLD_COMMENT: return "OLD_COMMENT";
	case PKT_ATTRIBUTE: return "ATTRIBUTE";
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: return "ENCRYPTED_MDC";
	case PKT_MDC: return "MDC";
	case PKT_COMMENT: return "COMMENT";
	case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: return "GPG_CONTROL";
	default: return "unknown packet type";
	}
	}

	typedef enum
	{
	SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL = -3,
	SIGSUBPKT_LIST_UNHASHED = -2,
	SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED = -1,
	SIGSUBPKT_NONE = 0,
	SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED = 2, /* Signature creation time. */
	SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE = 3, /* Signature expiration time. */
	SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE = 4, /* Exportable. */
	SIGSUBPKT_TRUST = 5, /* Trust signature. */
	SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP = 6, /* Regular expression. */
	SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE = 7, /* Revocable. */
	SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE = 9, /* Key expiration time. */
	SIGSUBPKT_ARR = 10, /* Additional recipient request. */
	SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM = 11, /* Preferred symmetric algorithms. */
	SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY = 12, /* Revocation key. */
	SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER = 16, /* Issuer key ID. */
	SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION = 20, /* Notation data. */
	SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH = 21, /* Preferred hash algorithms. */
	SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR = 22, /* Preferred compression algorithms. */
	SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS = 23, /* Key server preferences. */
	SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS = 24, /* Preferred keyserver. */
	SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID = 25, /* Primary user id. */
	SIGSUBPKT_POLICY = 26, /* Policy URL. */
	SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS = 27, /* Key flags. */
	SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID = 28, /* Signer's user id. */
	SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON = 29, /* Reason for revocation. */
	SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES = 30, /* Feature flags. */

	SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE = 32, /* Embedded signature. */
	SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR = 33, /* Issuer fingerprint. */
	SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD = 34, /* Preferred AEAD algorithms. */

	SIGSUBPKT_ATTST_SIGS = 37, /* Attested Certifications. */
	+ SIGSUBPKT_KEY_BLOCK = 38, /* Entire key used. */

	SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL = 128
	}
	sigsubpkttype_t;


	typedef enum
	{
	CIPHER_ALGO_NONE = 0,
	CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA = 1,
	CIPHER_ALGO_3DES = 2,
	CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5 = 3,
	CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH = 4, /* 128 bit */
	/* 5 & 6 are reserved */
	CIPHER_ALGO_AES = 7,
	CIPHER_ALGO_AES192 = 8,
	CIPHER_ALGO_AES256 = 9,
	CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH = 10, /* 256 bit */
	CIPHER_ALGO_CAMELLIA128 = 11,
	CIPHER_ALGO_CAMELLIA192 = 12,
	CIPHER_ALGO_CAMELLIA256 = 13,
	CIPHER_ALGO_PRIVATE10 = 110
	}
	cipher_algo_t;


	/* Note that we encode the AEAD algo in a 3 bit field at some places. */
	typedef enum
	{
	AEAD_ALGO_NONE = 0,
	AEAD_ALGO_EAX = 1,
	AEAD_ALGO_OCB = 2
	}
	aead_algo_t;


	typedef enum
	{
	PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA = 1,
	PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E = 2, /* RSA encrypt only (legacy). */
	PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S = 3, /* RSA sign only (legacy). */
	PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E = 16, /* Elgamal encrypt only. */
	PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA = 17,
	PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH = 18, /* RFC-6637 */
	PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA = 19, /* RFC-6637 */
	PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL = 20, /* Elgamal encrypt+sign (legacy). */
	/* 21 reserved by OpenPGP. */
	PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA = 22, /* EdDSA (not yet assigned). */
	PUBKEY_ALGO_PRIVATE10 = 110
	}
	pubkey_algo_t;


	typedef enum
	{
	DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 = 1,
	DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 = 2,
	DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 = 3,
	/* 4, 5, 6, and 7 are reserved. */
	DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256 = 8,
	DIGEST_ALGO_SHA384 = 9,
	DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512 = 10,
	DIGEST_ALGO_SHA224 = 11,
	DIGEST_ALGO_PRIVATE10 = 110
	}
	digest_algo_t;


	typedef enum
	{
	COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE = 0,
	COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP = 1,
	COMPRESS_ALGO_ZLIB = 2,
	COMPRESS_ALGO_BZIP2 = 3,
	COMPRESS_ALGO_PRIVATE10 = 110
	}
	compress_algo_t;

	/* Limits to be used for static arrays. */
	#define OPENPGP_MAX_NPKEY 5 /* Maximum number of public key parameters. */
	#define OPENPGP_MAX_NSKEY 7 /* Maximum number of secret key parameters. */
	#define OPENPGP_MAX_NSIG 2 /* Maximum number of signature parameters. */
	#define OPENPGP_MAX_NENC 2 /* Maximum number of encryption parameters. */


	/* Decode an rfc4880 encoded S2K count. */
	#define S2K_DECODE_COUNT(_val) ((16ul + ((_val) & 15)) << (((_val) >> 4) + 6))


	/-- openpgp-s2k.c --/
	unsigned char encode_s2k_iterations (int iterations);


	/-- openpgp-oid.c --/
	pubkey_algo_t map_gcry_pk_to_openpgp (enum gcry_pk_algos algo);
	enum gcry_pk_algos map_openpgp_pk_to_gcry (pubkey_algo_t algo);



	#endif /GNUPG_COMMON_OPENPGPDEFS_H/
	diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi
	index 2cb20f4c7..105aaf9df 100644
	--- a/doc/gpg.texi
	+++ b/doc/gpg.texi
	@@ -1,4345 +1,4355 @@
	@c Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
	@c 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	@c This is part of the GnuPG manual.
	@c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi.

	@include defs.inc

	@node Invoking GPG
	@chapter Invoking GPG
	@cindex GPG command options
	@cindex command options
	@cindex options, GPG command


	@c Begin standard stuff
	@ifclear gpgtwohack
	@manpage gpg.1
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg
	\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
	@end ifset

	@mansect synopsis
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg
	.RB [ \-\-homedir
	.IR dir ]
	.RB [ \-\-options
	.IR file ]
	.RI [ options ]
	.I command
	.RI [ args ]
	@end ifset
	@end ifclear
	@c End standard stuff

	@c Begin gpg2 hack stuff
	@ifset gpgtwohack
	@manpage gpg2.1
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
	@end ifset

	@mansect synopsis
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	.RB [ \-\-homedir
	.IR dir ]
	.RB [ \-\-options
	.IR file ]
	.RI [ options ]
	.I command
	.RI [ args ]
	@end ifset
	@end ifset
	@c End gpg2 hack stuff


	@mansect description
	@command{@gpgname} is the OpenPGP part of the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG). It
	is a tool to provide digital encryption and signing services using the
	OpenPGP standard. @command{@gpgname} features complete key management and
	all the bells and whistles you would expect from a full OpenPGP
	implementation.

	There are two main versions of GnuPG: GnuPG 1.x and GnuPG 2.x. GnuPG
	2.x supports modern encryption algorithms and thus should be preferred
	over GnuPG 1.x. You only need to use GnuPG 1.x if your platform
	doesn't support GnuPG 2.x, or you need support for some features that
	GnuPG 2.x has deprecated, e.g., decrypting data created with PGP-2
	keys.

	@ifclear gpgtwohack
	If you are looking for version 1 of GnuPG, you may find that version
	installed under the name @command{gpg1}.
	@end ifclear
	@ifset gpgtwohack
	In contrast to the standalone command @command{gpg} from GnuPG 1.x,
	the 2.x version is commonly installed under the name
	@command{@gpgname}.
	@end ifset

	@manpause

	@xref{Option Index}, for an index to @command{@gpgname}'s commands and options.
	@mancont

	@menu
	* GPG Commands:: List of all commands.
	* GPG Options:: List of all options.
	* GPG Configuration:: Configuration files.
	* GPG Examples:: Some usage examples.

	Developer information:
	* Unattended Usage of GPG:: Using @command{gpg} from other programs.
	@end menu

	@c * GPG Protocol:: The protocol the server mode uses.


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* COMMANDS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect commands
	@node GPG Commands
	@section Commands

	Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that
	only one command is allowed. Generally speaking, irrelevant options
	are silently ignored, and may not be checked for correctness.

	@command{@gpgname} may be run with no commands. In this case it will
	print a warning perform a reasonable action depending on the type of
	file it is given as input (an encrypted message is decrypted, a
	signature is verified, a file containing keys is listed, etc.).

	If you run into any problems, please add the option @option{--verbose}
	to the invocation to see more diagnostics.


	@menu
	* General GPG Commands:: Commands not specific to the functionality.
	* Operational GPG Commands:: Commands to select the type of operation.
	* OpenPGP Key Management:: How to manage your keys.
	@end menu


	@c *******************************************
	@c ******** GENERAL COMMANDS ***********
	@c *******************************************
	@node General GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands not specific to the function

	@table @gnupgtabopt
	@item --version
	@opindex version
	Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you
	cannot abbreviate this command.

	@item --help
	@itemx -h
	@opindex help
	Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command-line options.
	Note that you cannot arbitrarily abbreviate this command
	(though you can use its short form @option{-h}).

	@item --warranty
	@opindex warranty
	Print warranty information.

	@item --dump-options
	@opindex dump-options
	Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot
	abbreviate this command.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPERATIONAL COMMANDS *********
	@c *******************************************
	@node Operational GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands to select the type of operation


	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --sign
	@itemx -s
	@opindex sign
	Sign a message. This command may be combined with @option{--encrypt}
	(to sign and encrypt a message), @option{--symmetric} (to sign and
	symmetrically encrypt a message), or both @option{--encrypt} and
	@option{--symmetric} (to sign and encrypt a message that can be
	decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase). The signing key is
	chosen by default or can be set explicitly using the
	@option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key} options.

	@item --clear-sign
	@opindex clear-sign
	@itemx --clearsign
	@opindex clearsign
	Make a cleartext signature. The content in a cleartext signature is
	readable without any special software. OpenPGP software is only needed
	to verify the signature. cleartext signatures may modify end-of-line
	whitespace for platform independence and are not intended to be
	reversible. The signing key is chosen by default or can be set
	explicitly using the @option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key}
	options.


	@item --detach-sign
	@itemx -b
	@opindex detach-sign
	Make a detached signature.

	@item --encrypt
	@itemx -e
	@opindex encrypt
	Encrypt data to one or more public keys. This command may be combined
	with @option{--sign} (to sign and encrypt a message),
	@option{--symmetric} (to encrypt a message that can be decrypted using a
	secret key or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and
	@option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that can be
	decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase). @option{--recipient}
	and related options specify which public keys to use for encryption.

	@item --symmetric
	@itemx -c
	@opindex symmetric
	Encrypt with a symmetric cipher using a passphrase. The default
	symmetric cipher used is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}, but may be chosen with the
	@option{--cipher-algo} option. This command may be combined with
	@option{--sign} (for a signed and symmetrically encrypted message),
	@option{--encrypt} (for a message that may be decrypted via a secret key
	or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and @option{--encrypt} together
	(for a signed message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a
	passphrase). @command{@gpgname} caches the passphrase used for
	symmetric encryption so that a decrypt operation may not require that
	the user needs to enter the passphrase. The option
	@option{--no-symkey-cache} can be used to disable this feature.

	@item --store
	@opindex store
	Store only (make a simple literal data packet).

	@item --decrypt
	@itemx -d
	@opindex decrypt
	Decrypt the file given on the command line (or STDIN if no file
	is specified) and write it to STDOUT (or the file specified with
	@option{--output}). If the decrypted file is signed, the signature is also
	verified. This command differs from the default operation, as it never
	writes to the filename which is included in the file and it rejects
	files that don't begin with an encrypted message.

	@item --verify
	@opindex verify
	Assume that the first argument is a signed file and verify it without
	generating any output. With no arguments, the signature packet is
	read from STDIN. If only one argument is given, the specified file is
	expected to include a complete signature.

	With more than one argument, the first argument should specify a file
	with a detached signature and the remaining files should contain the
	signed data. To read the signed data from STDIN, use @samp{-} as the
	second filename. For security reasons, a detached signature will not
	read the signed material from STDIN if not explicitly specified.

	Note: If the option @option{--batch} is not used, @command{@gpgname}
	may assume that a single argument is a file with a detached signature,
	and it will try to find a matching data file by stripping certain
	suffixes. Using this historical feature to verify a detached
	signature is strongly discouraged; you should always specify the data file
	explicitly.

	Note: When verifying a cleartext signature, @command{@gpgname} verifies
	only what makes up the cleartext signed data and not any extra data
	outside of the cleartext signature or the header lines directly following
	the dash marker line. The option @code{--output} may be used to write
	out the actual signed data, but there are other pitfalls with this
	format as well. It is suggested to avoid cleartext signatures in
	favor of detached signatures.

	Note: Sometimes the use of the @command{gpgv} tool is easier than
	using the full-fledged @command{gpg} with this option. @command{gpgv}
	is designed to compare signed data against a list of trusted keys and
	returns with success only for a good signature. It has its own manual
	page.


	@item --multifile
	@opindex multifile
	This modifies certain other commands to accept multiple files for
	processing on the command line or read from STDIN with each filename on
	a separate line. This allows for many files to be processed at
	once. @option{--multifile} may currently be used along with
	@option{--verify}, @option{--encrypt}, and @option{--decrypt}. Note that
	@option{--multifile --verify} may not be used with detached signatures.

	@item --verify-files
	@opindex verify-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --verify}.

	@item --encrypt-files
	@opindex encrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --encrypt}.

	@item --decrypt-files
	@opindex decrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --decrypt}.

	@item --list-keys
	@itemx -k
	@itemx --list-public-keys
	@opindex list-keys
	List the specified keys. If no keys are specified, then all keys from
	the configured public keyrings are listed.

	Never use the output of this command in scripts or other programs.
	The output is intended only for humans and its format is likely to
	change. The @option{--with-colons} option emits the output in a
	stable, machine-parseable format, which is intended for use by scripts
	and other programs.

	@item --list-secret-keys
	@itemx -K
	@opindex list-secret-keys
	List the specified secret keys. If no keys are specified, then all
	known secret keys are listed. A @code{#} after the initial tags
	@code{sec} or @code{ssb} means that the secret key or subkey is
	currently not usable. We also say that this key has been taken
	offline (for example, a primary key can be taken offline by exporting
	the key using the command @option{--export-secret-subkeys}). A
	@code{>} after these tags indicate that the key is stored on a
	smartcard. See also @option{--list-keys}.

	@item --check-signatures
	@opindex check-signatures
	@itemx --check-sigs
	@opindex check-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the key signatures are verified and
	listed too. Note that for performance reasons the revocation status
	of a signing key is not shown. This command has the same effect as
	using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-check}.

	The status of the verification is indicated by a flag directly
	following the "sig" tag (and thus before the flags described below. A
	"!" indicates that the signature has been successfully verified, a "-"
	denotes a bad signature and a "%" is used if an error occurred while
	checking the signature (e.g. a non supported algorithm). Signatures
	where the public key is not available are not listed; to see their
	keyids the command @option{--list-sigs} can be used.

	For each signature listed, there are several flags in between the
	signature status flag and keyid. These flags give additional
	information about each key signature. From left to right, they are
	the numbers 1-3 for certificate check level (see
	@option{--ask-cert-level}), "L" for a local or non-exportable
	signature (see @option{--lsign-key}), "R" for a nonRevocable signature
	(see the @option{--edit-key} command "nrsign"), "P" for a signature
	that contains a policy URL (see @option{--cert-policy-url}), "N" for a
	signature that contains a notation (see @option{--cert-notation}), "X"
	for an eXpired signature (see @option{--ask-cert-expire}), and the
	numbers 1-9 or "T" for 10 and above to indicate trust signature levels
	(see the @option{--edit-key} command "tsign").


	@item --locate-keys
	@itemx --locate-external-keys
	@opindex locate-keys
	@opindex locate-external-keys
	Locate the keys given as arguments. This command basically uses the
	same algorithm as used when locating keys for encryption and may thus
	be used to see what keys @command{@gpgname} might use. In particular
	external methods as defined by @option{--auto-key-locate} may be used
	to locate a key. Only public keys are listed. The variant
	@option{--locate-external-keys} does not consider a locally existing
	key and can thus be used to force the refresh of a key via the defined
	external methods.

	@item --show-keys
	@opindex show-keys
	This commands takes OpenPGP keys as input and prints information about
	them in the same way the command @option{--list-keys} does for locally
	stored key. In addition the list options @code{show-unusable-uids},
	@code{show-unusable-subkeys}, @code{show-notations} and
	@code{show-policy-urls} are also enabled. As usual for automated
	processing, this command should be combined with the option
	@option{--with-colons}.

	@item --fingerprint
	@opindex fingerprint
	List all keys (or the specified ones) along with their
	fingerprints. This is the same output as @option{--list-keys} but with
	the additional output of a line with the fingerprint. May also be
	combined with @option{--check-signatures}. If this
	command is given twice, the fingerprints of all secondary keys are
	listed too. This command also forces pretty printing of fingerprints
	if the keyid format has been set to "none".

	@item --list-packets
	@opindex list-packets
	List only the sequence of packets. This command is only useful for
	debugging. When used with option @option{--verbose} the actual MPI
	values are dumped and not only their lengths. Note that the output of
	this command may change with new releases.


	@item --edit-card
	@opindex edit-card
	@itemx --card-edit
	@opindex card-edit
	Present a menu to work with a smartcard. The subcommand "help" provides
	an overview on available commands. For a detailed description, please
	see the Card HOWTO at
	https://gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html#GnuPG-cardHOWTO .

	@item --card-status
	@opindex card-status
	Show the content of the smart card.

	@item --change-pin
	@opindex change-pin
	Present a menu to allow changing the PIN of a smartcard. This
	functionality is also available as the subcommand "passwd" with the
	@option{--edit-card} command.

	@item --delete-keys @var{name}
	@opindex delete-keys
	Remove key from the public keyring. In batch mode either @option{--yes} is
	required or the key must be specified by fingerprint. This is a
	safeguard against accidental deletion of multiple keys. If the
	exclamation mark syntax is used with the fingerprint of a subkey only
	that subkey is deleted; if the exclamation mark is used with the
	fingerprint of the primary key the entire public key is deleted.

	@item --delete-secret-keys @var{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-keys
	Remove key from the secret keyring. In batch mode the key must be
	specified by fingerprint. The option @option{--yes} can be used to
	advice gpg-agent not to request a confirmation. This extra
	pre-caution is done because @command{@gpgname} can't be sure that the
	secret key (as controlled by gpg-agent) is only used for the given
	OpenPGP public key. If the exclamation mark syntax is used with the
	fingerprint of a subkey only the secret part of that subkey is
	deleted; if the exclamation mark is used with the fingerprint of the
	primary key only the secret part of the primary key is deleted.


	@item --delete-secret-and-public-key @var{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-and-public-key
	Same as @option{--delete-key}, but if a secret key exists, it will be
	removed first. In batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint.
	The option @option{--yes} can be used to advice gpg-agent not to
	request a confirmation.

	@item --export
	@opindex export
	Either export all keys from all keyrings (default keyrings and those
	registered via option @option{--keyring}), or if at least one name is given,
	those of the given name. The exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the
	file given with option @option{--output}. Use together with
	@option{--armor} to mail those keys.

	@item --send-keys @var{keyIDs}
	@opindex send-keys
	Similar to @option{--export} but sends the keys to a keyserver.
	Fingerprints may be used instead of key IDs.
	Don't send your complete keyring to a keyserver --- select
	only those keys which are new or changed by you. If no @var{keyIDs}
	are given, @command{@gpgname} does nothing.

	@item --export-secret-keys
	@itemx --export-secret-subkeys
	@opindex export-secret-keys
	@opindex export-secret-subkeys
	Same as @option{--export}, but exports the secret keys instead. The
	exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the file given with option
	@option{--output}. This command is often used along with the option
	@option{--armor} to allow for easy printing of the key for paper backup;
	however the external tool @command{paperkey} does a better job of
	creating backups on paper. Note that exporting a secret key can be a
	security risk if the exported keys are sent over an insecure channel.

	The second form of the command has the special property to render the
	secret part of the primary key useless; this is a GNU extension to
	OpenPGP and other implementations can not be expected to successfully
	import such a key. Its intended use is in generating a full key with
	an additional signing subkey on a dedicated machine. This command
	then exports the key without the primary key to the main machine.

	GnuPG may ask you to enter the passphrase for the key. This is
	required, because the internal protection method of the secret key is
	different from the one specified by the OpenPGP protocol.

	@item --export-ssh-key
	@opindex export-ssh-key
	This command is used to export a key in the OpenSSH public key format.
	It requires the specification of one key by the usual means and
	exports the latest valid subkey which has an authentication capability
	to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. That
	output can directly be added to ssh's @file{authorized_key} file.

	By specifying the key to export using a key ID or a fingerprint
	suffixed with an exclamation mark (!), a specific subkey or the
	primary key can be exported. This does not even require that the key
	has the authentication capability flag set.

	@item --import
	@itemx --fast-import
	@opindex import
	Import/merge keys. This adds the given keys to the
	keyring. The fast version is currently just a synonym.

	There are a few other options which control how this command works.
	Most notable here is the @option{--import-options merge-only} option
	which does not insert new keys but does only the merging of new
	signatures, user-IDs and subkeys.

	@item --receive-keys @var{keyIDs}
	@opindex receive-keys
	@itemx --recv-keys @var{keyIDs}
	@opindex recv-keys
	Import the keys with the given @var{keyIDs} from a keyserver.

	@item --refresh-keys
	@opindex refresh-keys
	Request updates from a keyserver for keys that already exist on the
	local keyring. This is useful for updating a key with the latest
	signatures, user IDs, etc. Calling this with no arguments will refresh
	the entire keyring.

	@item --search-keys @var{names}
	@opindex search-keys
	Search the keyserver for the given @var{names}. Multiple names given
	here will be joined together to create the search string for the
	keyserver. Note that keyservers search for @var{names} in a different
	and simpler way than gpg does. The best choice is to use a mail
	address. Due to data privacy reasons keyservers may even not even
	allow searching by user id or mail address and thus may only return
	results when being used with the @option{--recv-key} command to
	search by key fingerprint or keyid.

	@item --fetch-keys @var{URIs}
	@opindex fetch-keys
	Retrieve keys located at the specified @var{URIs}. Note that different
	installations of GnuPG may support different protocols (HTTP, FTP,
	LDAP, etc.). When using HTTPS the system provided root certificates
	are used by this command.

	@item --update-trustdb
	@opindex update-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance. This command iterates over all keys and
	builds the Web of Trust. This is an interactive command because it may
	have to ask for the "ownertrust" values for keys. The user has to give
	an estimation of how far she trusts the owner of the displayed key to
	correctly certify (sign) other keys. GnuPG only asks for the ownertrust
	value if it has not yet been assigned to a key. Using the
	@option{--edit-key} menu, the assigned value can be changed at any time.

	@item --check-trustdb
	@opindex check-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance without user interaction. From time to
	time the trust database must be updated so that expired keys or
	signatures and the resulting changes in the Web of Trust can be
	tracked. Normally, GnuPG will calculate when this is required and do it
	automatically unless @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} is set. This
	command can be used to force a trust database check at any time. The
	processing is identical to that of @option{--update-trustdb} but it
	skips keys with a not yet defined "ownertrust".

	For use with cron jobs, this command can be used together with
	@option{--batch} in which case the trust database check is done only if
	a check is needed. To force a run even in batch mode add the option
	@option{--yes}.

	@anchor{option --export-ownertrust}
	@item --export-ownertrust
	@opindex export-ownertrust
	Send the ownertrust values to STDOUT. This is useful for backup purposes
	as these values are the only ones which can't be re-created from a
	corrupted trustdb. Example:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	@gpgname{} --export-ownertrust > otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --import-ownertrust
	@opindex import-ownertrust
	Update the trustdb with the ownertrust values stored in @code{files} (or
	STDIN if not given); existing values will be overwritten. In case of a
	severely damaged trustdb and if you have a recent backup of the
	ownertrust values (e.g. in the file @file{otrust.txt}), you may re-create
	the trustdb using these commands:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	cd ~/.gnupg
	rm trustdb.gpg
	@gpgname{} --import-ownertrust < otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --rebuild-keydb-caches
	@opindex rebuild-keydb-caches
	When updating from version 1.0.6 to 1.0.7 this command should be used
	to create signature caches in the keyring. It might be handy in other
	situations too.

	@item --print-md @var{algo}
	@itemx --print-mds
	@opindex print-md
	Print message digest of algorithm @var{algo} for all given files or STDIN.
	With the second form (or a deprecated "*" for @var{algo}) digests for all
	available algorithms are printed.

	@item --gen-random @var{0\|1\|2} @var{count}
	@opindex gen-random
	Emit @var{count} random bytes of the given quality level 0, 1 or 2. If
	@var{count} is not given or zero, an endless sequence of random bytes
	will be emitted. If used with @option{--armor} the output will be
	base64 encoded. PLEASE, don't use this command unless you know what
	you are doing; it may remove precious entropy from the system!

	@item --gen-prime @var{mode} @var{bits}
	@opindex gen-prime
	Use the source, Luke :-). The output format is subject to change
	with ant release.


	@item --enarmor
	@itemx --dearmor
	@opindex enarmor
	@opindex dearmor
	Pack or unpack an arbitrary input into/from an OpenPGP ASCII armor.
	This is a GnuPG extension to OpenPGP and in general not very useful.

	@item --unwrap
	@opindex unwrap
	This command is similar to @option{--decrypt} with the change that the
	output is not the usual plaintext but the original message with the
	decryption layer removed. Thus the output will be an OpenPGP data
	structure which often means a signed OpenPGP message. Note that this
	command may or may not remove a compression layer which is often found
	beneath the encryption layer.

	@item --tofu-policy @{auto\|good\|unknown\|bad\|ask@} @var{keys}
	@opindex tofu-policy
	Set the TOFU policy for all the bindings associated with the specified
	@var{keys}. For more information about the meaning of the policies,
	@pxref{trust-model-tofu}. The @var{keys} may be specified either by their
	fingerprint (preferred) or their keyid.

	@c @item --server
	@c @opindex server
	@c Run gpg in server mode. This feature is not yet ready for use and
	@c thus not documented.

	@end table


	@c ********************************************
	@c ***** KEY MANAGEMENT COMMANDS ********
	@c ********************************************
	@node OpenPGP Key Management
	@subsection How to manage your keys

	This section explains the main commands for key management.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --quick-generate-key @var{user-id} [@var{algo} [@var{usage} [@var{expire}]]]
	@itemx --quick-gen-key
	@opindex quick-generate-key
	@opindex quick-gen-key
	This is a simple command to generate a standard key with one user id.
	In contrast to @option{--generate-key} the key is generated directly
	without the need to answer a bunch of prompts. Unless the option
	@option{--yes} is given, the key creation will be canceled if the
	given user id already exists in the keyring.

	If invoked directly on the console without any special options an
	answer to a ``Continue?'' style confirmation prompt is required. In
	case the user id already exists in the keyring a second prompt to
	force the creation of the key will show up.

	If @var{algo} or @var{usage} are given, only the primary key is
	created and no prompts are shown. To specify an expiration date but
	still create a primary and subkey use ``default'' or
	``future-default'' for @var{algo} and ``default'' for @var{usage}.
	For a description of these optional arguments see the command
	@code{--quick-add-key}. The @var{usage} accepts also the value
	``cert'' which can be used to create a certification only primary key;
	the default is to a create certification and signing key.

	The @var{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date
	for the key. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO formats
	``YYYY-MM-DD'' or ``YYYYMMDDThhmmss'' are used. To make the key
	expire in N seconds, N days, N weeks, N months, or N years use
	``seconds=N'', ``Nd'', ``Nw'', ``Nm'', or ``Ny'' respectively. Not
	specifying a value, or using ``-'' results in a key expiring in a
	reasonable default interval. The values ``never'', ``none'' can be
	used for no expiration date.

	If this command is used with @option{--batch},
	@option{--pinentry-mode} has been set to @code{loopback}, and one of
	the passphrase options (@option{--passphrase},
	@option{--passphrase-fd}, or @option{passphrase-file}) is used, the
	supplied passphrase is used for the new key and the agent does not ask
	for it. To create a key without any protection @code{--passphrase ''}
	may be used.

	To create an OpenPGP key from the keys available on the currently
	inserted smartcard, the special string ``card'' can be used for
	@var{algo}. If the card features an encryption and a signing key, gpg
	will figure them out and creates an OpenPGP key consisting of the
	usual primary key and one subkey. This works only with certain
	smartcards. Note that the interactive @option{--full-gen-key} command
	allows to do the same but with greater flexibility in the selection of
	the smartcard keys.

	Note that it is possible to create a primary key and a subkey using
	non-default algorithms by using ``default'' and changing the default
	parameters using the option @option{--default-new-key-algo}.

	@item --quick-set-expire @var{fpr} @var{expire} [*\|@var{subfprs}]
	@opindex quick-set-expire
	With two arguments given, directly set the expiration time of the
	primary key identified by @var{fpr} to @var{expire}. To remove the
	expiration time @code{0} can be used. With three arguments and the
	third given as an asterisk, the expiration time of all non-revoked and
	not yet expired subkeys are set to @var{expire}. With more than two
	arguments and a list of fingerprints given for @var{subfprs}, all
	non-revoked subkeys matching these fingerprints are set to
	@var{expire}.


	@item --quick-add-key @var{fpr} [@var{algo} [@var{usage} [@var{expire}]]]
	@opindex quick-add-key
	Directly add a subkey to the key identified by the fingerprint
	@var{fpr}. Without the optional arguments an encryption subkey is
	added. If any of the arguments are given a more specific subkey is
	added.

	@var{algo} may be any of the supported algorithms or curve names
	given in the format as used by key listings. To use the default
	algorithm the string ``default'' or ``-'' can be used. Supported
	algorithms are ``rsa'', ``dsa'', ``elg'', ``ed25519'', ``cv25519'',
	and other ECC curves. For example the string ``rsa'' adds an RSA key
	with the default key length; a string ``rsa4096'' requests that the
	key length is 4096 bits. The string ``future-default'' is an alias
	for the algorithm which will likely be used as default algorithm in
	future versions of gpg. To list the supported ECC curves the command
	@code{gpg --with-colons --list-config curve} can be used.

	Depending on the given @var{algo} the subkey may either be an
	encryption subkey or a signing subkey. If an algorithm is capable of
	signing and encryption and such a subkey is desired, a @var{usage}
	string must be given. This string is either ``default'' or ``-'' to
	keep the default or a comma delimited list (or space delimited list)
	of keywords: ``sign'' for a signing subkey, ``auth'' for an
	authentication subkey, and ``encr'' for an encryption subkey
	(``encrypt'' can be used as alias for ``encr''). The valid
	combinations depend on the algorithm.

	The @var{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date
	for the key. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO formats
	``YYYY-MM-DD'' or ``YYYYMMDDThhmmss'' are used. To make the key
	expire in N seconds, N days, N weeks, N months, or N years use
	``seconds=N'', ``Nd'', ``Nw'', ``Nm'', or ``Ny'' respectively. Not
	specifying a value, or using ``-'' results in a key expiring in a
	reasonable default interval. The values ``never'', ``none'' can be
	used for no expiration date.

	@item --generate-key
	@opindex generate-key
	@itemx --gen-key
	@opindex gen-key
	Generate a new key pair using the current default parameters. This is
	the standard command to create a new key. In addition to the key a
	revocation certificate is created and stored in the
	@file{openpgp-revocs.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory.

	@item --full-generate-key
	@opindex full-generate-key
	@itemx --full-gen-key
	@opindex full-gen-key
	Generate a new key pair with dialogs for all options. This is an
	extended version of @option{--generate-key}.

	There is also a feature which allows you to create keys in batch
	mode. See the manual section ``Unattended key generation'' on how
	to use this.


	@item --generate-revocation @var{name}
	@opindex generate-revocation
	@itemx --gen-revoke @var{name}
	@opindex gen-revoke
	Generate a revocation certificate for the complete key. To only revoke
	a subkey or a key signature, use the @option{--edit} command.

	This command merely creates the revocation certificate so that it can
	be used to revoke the key if that is ever needed. To actually revoke
	a key the created revocation certificate needs to be merged with the
	key to revoke. This is done by importing the revocation certificate
	using the @option{--import} command. Then the revoked key needs to be
	published, which is best done by sending the key to a keyserver
	(command @option{--send-key}) and by exporting (@option{--export}) it
	to a file which is then send to frequent communication partners.


	@item --generate-designated-revocation @var{name}
	@opindex generate-designated-revocation
	@itemx --desig-revoke @var{name}
	@opindex desig-revoke
	Generate a designated revocation certificate for a key. This allows a
	user (with the permission of the keyholder) to revoke someone else's
	key.


	@item --edit-key
	@opindex edit-key
	Present a menu which enables you to do most of the key management
	related tasks. It expects the specification of a key on the command
	line.

	@c ****** Begin Edit-key Options ********
	@table @asis

	@item uid @var{n}
	@opindex keyedit:uid
	Toggle selection of user ID or photographic user ID with index @var{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item key @var{n}
	@opindex keyedit:key
	Toggle selection of subkey with index @var{n} or key ID @var{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item sign
	@opindex keyedit:sign
	Make a signature on key of user @code{name}. If the key is not yet
	signed by the default user (or the users given with @option{-u}), the program
	displays the information of the key again, together with its
	fingerprint and asks whether it should be signed. This question is
	repeated for all users specified with
	@option{-u}.

	@item lsign
	@opindex keyedit:lsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-exportable and will
	therefore never be used by others. This may be used to make keys
	valid only in the local environment.

	@item nrsign
	@opindex keyedit:nrsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-revocable and can
	therefore never be revoked.

	@item tsign
	@opindex keyedit:tsign
	Make a trust signature. This is a signature that combines the notions
	of certification (like a regular signature), and trust (like the
	"trust" command). It is generally only useful in distinct communities
	or groups. For more information please read the sections
	``Trust Signature'' and ``Regular Expression'' in RFC-4880.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	Note that "l" (for local / non-exportable), "nr" (for non-revocable,
	and "t" (for trust) may be freely mixed and prefixed to "sign" to
	create a signature of any type desired.
	@c man:.RE

	If the option @option{--only-sign-text-ids} is specified, then any
	non-text based user ids (e.g., photo IDs) will not be selected for
	signing.

	@table @asis

	@item delsig
	@opindex keyedit:delsig
	Delete a signature. Note that it is not possible to retract a signature,
	once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case
	you better use @code{revsig}.

	@item revsig
	@opindex keyedit:revsig
	Revoke a signature. For every signature which has been generated by
	one of the secret keys, GnuPG asks whether a revocation certificate
	should be generated.

	@item check
	@opindex keyedit:check
	Check the signatures on all selected user IDs. With the extra
	option @code{selfsig} only self-signatures are shown.

	@item adduid
	@opindex keyedit:adduid
	Create an additional user ID.

	@item addphoto
	@opindex keyedit:addphoto
	Create a photographic user ID. This will prompt for a JPEG file that
	will be embedded into the user ID. Note that a very large JPEG will make
	for a very large key. Also note that some programs will display your
	JPEG unchanged (GnuPG), and some programs will scale it to fit in a
	dialog box (PGP).

	@item showphoto
	@opindex keyedit:showphoto
	Display the selected photographic user ID.

	@item deluid
	@opindex keyedit:deluid
	Delete a user ID or photographic user ID. Note that it is not
	possible to retract a user id, once it has been send to the public
	(i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revuid}.

	@item revuid
	@opindex keyedit:revuid
	Revoke a user ID or photographic user ID.

	@item primary
	@opindex keyedit:primary
	Flag the current user id as the primary one, removes the primary user
	id flag from all other user ids and sets the timestamp of all affected
	self-signatures one second ahead. Note that setting a photo user ID
	as primary makes it primary over other photo user IDs, and setting a
	regular user ID as primary makes it primary over other regular user
	IDs.

	@item keyserver
	@opindex keyedit:keyserver
	Set a preferred keyserver for the specified user ID(s). This allows
	other users to know where you prefer they get your key from. See
	@option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url} for more on how this
	works. Setting a value of "none" removes an existing preferred
	keyserver.

	@item notation
	@opindex keyedit:notation
	Set a name=value notation for the specified user ID(s). See
	@option{--cert-notation} for more on how this works. Setting a value of
	"none" removes all notations, setting a notation prefixed with a minus
	sign (-) removes that notation, and setting a notation name (without the
	=value) prefixed with a minus sign removes all notations with that name.

	@item pref
	@opindex keyedit:pref
	List preferences from the selected user ID. This shows the actual
	preferences, without including any implied preferences.

	@item showpref
	@opindex keyedit:showpref
	More verbose preferences listing for the selected user ID. This shows
	the preferences in effect by including the implied preferences of 3DES
	(cipher), SHA-1 (digest), and Uncompressed (compression) if they are
	not already included in the preference list. In addition, the
	preferred keyserver and signature notations (if any) are shown.

	@item setpref @var{string}
	@opindex keyedit:setpref
	Set the list of user ID preferences to @var{string} for all (or just
	the selected) user IDs. Calling setpref with no arguments sets the
	preference list to the default (either built-in or set via
	@option{--default-preference-list}), and calling setpref with "none"
	as the argument sets an empty preference list. Use @command{@gpgname
	--version} to get a list of available algorithms. Note that while you
	can change the preferences on an attribute user ID (aka "photo ID"),
	GnuPG does not select keys via attribute user IDs so these preferences
	will not be used by GnuPG.

	When setting preferences, you should list the algorithms in the order
	which you'd like to see them used by someone else when encrypting a
	message to your key. If you don't include 3DES, it will be
	automatically added at the end. Note that there are many factors that
	go into choosing an algorithm (for example, your key may not be the
	only recipient), and so the remote OpenPGP application being used to
	send to you may or may not follow your exact chosen order for a given
	message. It will, however, only choose an algorithm that is present
	on the preference list of every recipient key. See also the
	INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below.

	@item addkey
	@opindex keyedit:addkey
	Add a subkey to this key.

	@item addcardkey
	@opindex keyedit:addcardkey
	Generate a subkey on a card and add it to this key.

	@item keytocard
	@opindex keyedit:keytocard
	Transfer the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey
	has been selected) to a smartcard. The secret key in the keyring will
	be replaced by a stub if the key could be stored successfully on the
	card and you use the save command later. Only certain key types may be
	transferred to the card. A sub menu allows you to select on what card
	to store the key. Note that it is not possible to get that key back
	from the card - if the card gets broken your secret key will be lost
	unless you have a backup somewhere.

	@item bkuptocard @var{file}
	@opindex keyedit:bkuptocard
	Restore the given @var{file} to a card. This command may be used to restore a
	backup key (as generated during card initialization) to a new card. In
	almost all cases this will be the encryption key. You should use this
	command only with the corresponding public key and make sure that the
	file given as argument is indeed the backup to restore. You should then
	select 2 to restore as encryption key. You will first be asked to enter
	the passphrase of the backup key and then for the Admin PIN of the card.

	@item delkey
	@opindex keyedit:delkey
	Remove a subkey (secondary key). Note that it is not possible to retract
	a subkey, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In
	that case you better use @code{revkey}. Also note that this only
	deletes the public part of a key.

	@item revkey
	@opindex keyedit:revkey
	Revoke a subkey.

	@item expire
	@opindex keyedit:expire
	Change the key or subkey expiration time. If a subkey is selected, the
	expiration time of this subkey will be changed. With no selection, the
	key expiration of the primary key is changed.

	@item trust
	@opindex keyedit:trust
	Change the owner trust value for the key. This updates the trust-db
	immediately and no save is required.

	@item disable
	@itemx enable
	@opindex keyedit:disable
	@opindex keyedit:enable
	Disable or enable an entire key. A disabled key can not normally be
	used for encryption.

	@item addrevoker
	@opindex keyedit:addrevoker
	Add a designated revoker to the key. This takes one optional argument:
	"sensitive". If a designated revoker is marked as sensitive, it will
	not be exported by default (see export-options).

	@item passwd
	@opindex keyedit:passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key.

	@item toggle
	@opindex keyedit:toggle
	This is dummy command which exists only for backward compatibility.

	@item clean
	@opindex keyedit:clean
	Compact (by removing all signatures except the selfsig) any user ID
	that is no longer usable (e.g. revoked, or expired). Then, remove any
	signatures that are not usable by the trust calculations.
	Specifically, this removes any signature that does not validate, any
	signature that is superseded by a later signature, revoked signatures,
	and signatures issued by keys that are not present on the keyring.

	@item minimize
	@opindex keyedit:minimize
	Make the key as small as possible. This removes all signatures from
	each user ID except for the most recent self-signature.

	@item change-usage
	@opindex keyedit:change-usage
	Change the usage flags (capabilities) of the primary key or of
	subkeys. These usage flags (e.g. Certify, Sign, Authenticate,
	Encrypt) are set during key creation. Sometimes it is useful to
	have the opportunity to change them (for example to add
	Authenticate) after they have been created. Please take care when
	doing this; the allowed usage flags depend on the key algorithm.

	@item cross-certify
	@opindex keyedit:cross-certify
	Add cross-certification signatures to signing subkeys that may not
	currently have them. Cross-certification signatures protect against a
	subtle attack against signing subkeys. See
	@option{--require-cross-certification}. All new keys generated have
	this signature by default, so this command is only useful to bring
	older keys up to date.

	@item save
	@opindex keyedit:save
	Save all changes to the keyrings and quit.

	@item quit
	@opindex keyedit:quit
	Quit the program without updating the
	keyrings.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	The listing shows you the key with its secondary keys and all user
	IDs. The primary user ID is indicated by a dot, and selected keys or
	user IDs are indicated by an asterisk. The trust
	value is displayed with the primary key: "trust" is the assigned owner
	trust and "validity" is the calculated validity of the key. Validity
	values are also displayed for all user IDs.
	For possible values of trust, @pxref{trust-values}.
	@c man:.RE
	@c ****** End Edit-key Options ********

	@item --sign-key @var{name}
	@opindex sign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key. This is a shortcut version of
	the subcommand "sign" from @option{--edit}.

	@item --lsign-key @var{name}
	@opindex lsign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key but marks it as
	non-exportable. This is a shortcut version of the subcommand "lsign"
	from @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --quick-sign-key @var{fpr} [@var{names}]
	@itemx --quick-lsign-key @var{fpr} [@var{names}]
	@opindex quick-sign-key
	@opindex quick-lsign-key
	Directly sign a key from the passphrase without any further user
	interaction. The @var{fpr} must be the verified primary fingerprint
	of a key in the local keyring. If no @var{names} are given, all
	useful user ids are signed; with given [@var{names}] only useful user
	ids matching one of these names are signed. By default, or if a name
	is prefixed with a '*', a case insensitive substring match is used.
	If a name is prefixed with a '=' a case sensitive exact match is done.

	The command @option{--quick-lsign-key} marks the signatures as
	non-exportable. If such a non-exportable signature already exists the
	@option{--quick-sign-key} turns it into a exportable signature.

	This command uses reasonable defaults and thus does not provide the
	full flexibility of the "sign" subcommand from @option{--edit-key}.
	Its intended use is to help unattended key signing by utilizing a list
	of verified fingerprints.

	@item --quick-add-uid @var{user-id} @var{new-user-id}
	@opindex quick-add-uid
	This command adds a new user id to an existing key. In contrast to
	the interactive sub-command @code{adduid} of @option{--edit-key} the
	@var{new-user-id} is added verbatim with only leading and trailing
	white space removed, it is expected to be UTF-8 encoded, and no checks
	on its form are applied.

	@item --quick-revoke-uid @var{user-id} @var{user-id-to-revoke}
	@opindex quick-revoke-uid
	This command revokes a user ID on an existing key. It cannot be used
	to revoke the last user ID on key (some non-revoked user ID must
	remain), with revocation reason ``User ID is no longer valid''. If
	you want to specify a different revocation reason, or to supply
	supplementary revocation text, you should use the interactive
	sub-command @code{revuid} of @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --quick-set-primary-uid @var{user-id} @var{primary-user-id}
	@opindex quick-set-primary-uid
	This command sets or updates the primary user ID flag on an existing
	key. @var{user-id} specifies the key and @var{primary-user-id} the
	user ID which shall be flagged as the primary user ID. The primary
	user ID flag is removed from all other user ids and the timestamp of
	all affected self-signatures is set one second ahead.


	@item --change-passphrase @var{user-id}
	@opindex change-passphrase
	@itemx --passwd @var{user-id}
	@opindex passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key belonging to the certificate
	specified as @var{user-id}. This is a shortcut for the sub-command
	@code{passwd} of the edit key menu. When using together with the
	option @option{--dry-run} this will not actually change the passphrase
	but check that the current passphrase is correct.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* OPTIONS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect options
	@node GPG Options
	@section Option Summary

	@command{@gpgname} features a bunch of options to control the exact
	behaviour and to change the default configuration.

	@menu
	* GPG Configuration Options:: How to change the configuration.
	* GPG Key related Options:: Key related options.
	* GPG Input and Output:: Input and Output.
	* OpenPGP Options:: OpenPGP protocol specific options.
	* Compliance Options:: Compliance options.
	* GPG Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually doesn't want to do.
	* Deprecated Options:: Deprecated options.
	@end menu

	Long options can be put in an options file (default
	"~/.gnupg/gpg.conf"). Short option names will not work - for example,
	"armor" is a valid option for the options file, while "a" is not. Do not
	write the 2 dashes, but simply the name of the option and any required
	arguments. Lines with a hash ('#') as the first non-white-space
	character are ignored. Commands may be put in this file too, but that is
	not generally useful as the command will execute automatically with
	every execution of gpg.

	Please remember that option parsing stops as soon as a non-option is
	encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by using the special option
	@option{--}.

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** CONFIGURATION OPTIONS ********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Configuration Options
	@subsection How to change the configuration

	These options are used to change the configuration and are usually found
	in the option file.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --default-key @var{name}
	@opindex default-key
	Use @var{name} as the default key to sign with. If this option is not
	used, the default key is the first key found in the secret keyring.
	Note that @option{-u} or @option{--local-user} overrides this option.
	This option may be given multiple times. In this case, the last key
	for which a secret key is available is used. If there is no secret
	key available for any of the specified values, GnuPG will not emit an
	error message but continue as if this option wasn't given.

	@item --default-recipient @var{name}
	@opindex default-recipient
	Use @var{name} as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is
	not used and don't ask if this is a valid one. @var{name} must be
	non-empty.

	@item --default-recipient-self
	@opindex default-recipient-self
	Use the default key as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is not
	used and don't ask if this is a valid one. The default key is the first
	one from the secret keyring or the one set with @option{--default-key}.

	@item --no-default-recipient
	@opindex no-default-recipient
	Reset @option{--default-recipient} and @option{--default-recipient-self}.

	@item -v, --verbose
	@opindex verbose
	Give more information during processing. If used
	twice, the input data is listed in detail.

	@item --no-verbose
	@opindex no-verbose
	Reset verbose level to 0.

	@item -q, --quiet
	@opindex quiet
	Try to be as quiet as possible.

	@item --batch
	@itemx --no-batch
	@opindex batch
	@opindex no-batch
	Use batch mode. Never ask, do not allow interactive commands.
	@option{--no-batch} disables this option. Note that even with a
	filename given on the command line, gpg might still need to read from
	STDIN (in particular if gpg figures that the input is a
	detached signature and no data file has been specified). Thus if you
	do not want to feed data via STDIN, you should connect STDIN to
	g@file{/dev/null}.

	It is highly recommended to use this option along with the options
	@option{--status-fd} and @option{--with-colons} for any unattended use of
	@command{gpg}.

	@item --no-tty
	@opindex no-tty
	Make sure that the TTY (terminal) is never used for any output.
	This option is needed in some cases because GnuPG sometimes prints
	warnings to the TTY even if @option{--batch} is used.

	@item --yes
	@opindex yes
	Assume "yes" on most questions.

	@item --no
	@opindex no
	Assume "no" on most questions.


	@item --list-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex list-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	listing keys and signatures (that is, @option{--list-keys},
	@option{--check-signatures}, @option{--list-public-keys},
	@option{--list-secret-keys}, and the @option{--edit-key} functions).
	Options can be prepended with a @option{no-} (after the two dashes) to
	give the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex list-options:show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--check-signatures},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, and @option{--list-secret-keys} to
	display any photo IDs attached to the key. Defaults to no. See also
	@option{--photo-viewer}. Does not work with @option{--with-colons}:
	see @option{--attribute-fd} for the appropriate way to get photo data
	for scripts and other frontends.

	@item show-usage
	@opindex list-options:show-usage
	Show usage information for keys and subkeys in the standard key
	listing. This is a list of letters indicating the allowed usage for a
	key (@code{E}=encryption, @code{S}=signing, @code{C}=certification,
	@code{A}=authentication). Defaults to yes.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--check-signatures}
	listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	@option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the
	@option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex list-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of user IDs during key listings.
	Defaults to yes.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-unusable-subkeys
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-subkeys
	Show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-keyring
	@opindex list-options:show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-expire
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-expire
	Show signature expiration dates (if any) during
	@option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-subpackets
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-subpackets
	Include signature subpackets in the key listing. This option can take an
	optional argument list of the subpackets to list. If no argument is
	passed, list all subpackets. Defaults to no. This option is only
	meaningful when using @option{--with-colons} along with
	@option{--check-signatures}.

	@item show-only-fpr-mbox
	@opindex list-options:show-only-fpr-mbox
	For each user-id which has a valid mail address print
	only the fingerprint followed by the mail address.
	@end table

	@item --verify-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex verify-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	verifying signatures. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give
	the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex verify-options:show-photos
	Display any photo IDs present on the key that issued the signature.
	Defaults to no. See also @option{--photo-viewer}.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the signature being verified. Defaults to yes.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	signature being verified. Defaults to IETF standard.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the signature being verified.
	Defaults to yes.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex verify-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of the user IDs on the key that issued
	the signature. Defaults to yes.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex verify-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs during signature verification.
	Defaults to no.

	@item show-primary-uid-only
	@opindex verify-options:show-primary-uid-only
	Show only the primary user ID during signature verification. That is
	all the AKA lines as well as photo Ids are not shown with the signature
	verification status.

	@item pka-lookups
	@opindex verify-options:pka-lookups
	Enable PKA lookups to verify sender addresses. Note that PKA is based
	on DNS, and so enabling this option may disclose information on when
	and what signatures are verified or to whom data is encrypted. This
	is similar to the "web bug" described for the @option{--auto-key-retrieve}
	option.

	@item pka-trust-increase
	@opindex verify-options:pka-trust-increase
	Raise the trust in a signature to full if the signature passes PKA
	validation. This option is only meaningful if pka-lookups is set.
	@end table

	@item --enable-large-rsa
	@itemx --disable-large-rsa
	@opindex enable-large-rsa
	@opindex disable-large-rsa
	With --generate-key and --batch, enable the creation of RSA secret keys as
	large as 8192 bit. Note: 8192 bit is more than is generally
	recommended. These large keys don't significantly improve security,
	but they are more expensive to use, and their signatures and
	certifications are larger. This option is only available if the
	binary was build with large-secmem support.

	@item --enable-dsa2
	@itemx --disable-dsa2
	@opindex enable-dsa2
	@opindex disable-dsa2
	Enable hash truncation for all DSA keys even for old DSA Keys up to
	1024 bit. This is also the default with @option{--openpgp}. Note
	that older versions of GnuPG also required this flag to allow the
	generation of DSA larger than 1024 bit.

	@item --photo-viewer @var{string}
	@opindex photo-viewer
	This is the command line that should be run to view a photo ID. "%i"
	will be expanded to a filename containing the photo. "%I" does the
	same, except the file will not be deleted once the viewer exits.
	Other flags are "%k" for the key ID, "%K" for the long key ID, "%f"
	for the key fingerprint, "%t" for the extension of the image type
	(e.g. "jpg"), "%T" for the MIME type of the image (e.g. "image/jpeg"),
	"%v" for the single-character calculated validity of the image being
	viewed (e.g. "f"), "%V" for the calculated validity as a string (e.g.
	"full"), "%U" for a base32 encoded hash of the user ID,
	and "%%" for an actual percent sign. If neither %i or %I are present,
	then the photo will be supplied to the viewer on standard input.

	On Unix the default viewer is
	@code{xloadimage -fork -quiet -title 'KeyID 0x%k' STDIN}
	with a fallback to
	@code{display -title 'KeyID 0x%k' %i}
	and finally to
	@code{xdg-open %i}.
	On Windows
	@code{!ShellExecute 400 %i} is used; here the command is a meta
	command to use that API call followed by a wait time in milliseconds
	which is used to give the viewer time to read the temporary image file
	before gpg deletes it again. Note that if your image viewer program
	is not secure, then executing it from gpg does not make it secure.

	@item --exec-path @var{string}
	@opindex exec-path
	@efindex PATH
	Sets a list of directories to search for photo viewers If not provided
	photo viewers use the @code{PATH} environment variable.

	@item --keyring @var{file}
	@opindex keyring
	Add @var{file} to the current list of keyrings. If @var{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory ("~/.gnupg" if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is not
	used).

	Note that this adds a keyring to the current list. If the intent is to
	use the specified keyring alone, use @option{--keyring} along with
	@option{--no-default-keyring}.

	If the option @option{--no-keyring} has been used no keyrings will
	be used at all.


	@item --secret-keyring @var{file}
	@opindex secret-keyring
	This is an obsolete option and ignored. All secret keys are stored in
	the @file{private-keys-v1.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory.

	@item --primary-keyring @var{file}
	@opindex primary-keyring
	Designate @var{file} as the primary public keyring. This means that
	newly imported keys (via @option{--import} or keyserver
	@option{--recv-from}) will go to this keyring.

	@item --trustdb-name @var{file}
	@opindex trustdb-name
	Use @var{file} instead of the default trustdb. If @var{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory (@file{~/.gnupg} if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is
	not used).

	@include opt-homedir.texi


	@item --display-charset @var{name}
	@opindex display-charset
	Set the name of the native character set. This is used to convert
	some informational strings like user IDs to the proper UTF-8 encoding.
	Note that this has nothing to do with the character set of data to be
	encrypted or signed; GnuPG does not recode user-supplied data. If
	this option is not used, the default character set is determined from
	the current locale. A verbosity level of 3 shows the chosen set.
	Valid values for @var{name} are:

	@table @asis

	@item iso-8859-1
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-1
	This is the Latin 1 set.

	@item iso-8859-2
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-2
	The Latin 2 set.

	@item iso-8859-15
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-15
	This is currently an alias for
	the Latin 1 set.

	@item koi8-r
	@opindex display-charset:koi8-r
	The usual Russian set (RFC-1489).

	@item utf-8
	@opindex display-charset:utf-8
	Bypass all translations and assume
	that the OS uses native UTF-8 encoding.
	@end table

	@item --utf8-strings
	@itemx --no-utf8-strings
	@opindex utf8-strings
	Assume that command line arguments are given as UTF-8 strings. The
	default (@option{--no-utf8-strings}) is to assume that arguments are
	encoded in the character set as specified by
	@option{--display-charset}. These options affect all following
	arguments. Both options may be used multiple times.

	@anchor{gpg-option --options}
	@item --options @var{file}
	@opindex options
	Read options from @var{file} and do not try to read them from the
	default options file in the homedir (see @option{--homedir}). This
	option is ignored if used in an options file.

	@item --no-options
	@opindex no-options
	Shortcut for @option{--options /dev/null}. This option is detected
	before an attempt to open an option file. Using this option will also
	prevent the creation of a @file{~/.gnupg} homedir.

	@item -z @var{n}
	@itemx --compress-level @var{n}
	@itemx --bzip2-compress-level @var{n}
	@opindex compress-level
	@opindex bzip2-compress-level
	Set compression level to @var{n} for the ZIP and ZLIB compression
	algorithms. The default is to use the default compression level of zlib
	(normally 6). @option{--bzip2-compress-level} sets the compression level
	for the BZIP2 compression algorithm (defaulting to 6 as well). This is a
	different option from @option{--compress-level} since BZIP2 uses a
	significant amount of memory for each additional compression level.
	@option{-z} sets both. A value of 0 for @var{n} disables compression.

	@item --bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	@opindex bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	Use a different decompression method for BZIP2 compressed files. This
	alternate method uses a bit more than half the memory, but also runs
	at half the speed. This is useful under extreme low memory
	circumstances when the file was originally compressed at a high
	@option{--bzip2-compress-level}.


	@item --mangle-dos-filenames
	@itemx --no-mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex no-mangle-dos-filenames
	Older version of Windows cannot handle filenames with more than one
	dot. @option{--mangle-dos-filenames} causes GnuPG to replace (rather
	than add to) the extension of an output filename to avoid this
	problem. This option is off by default and has no effect on non-Windows
	platforms.

	@item --ask-cert-level
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-level
	@opindex ask-cert-level
	When making a key signature, prompt for a certification level. If this
	option is not specified, the certification level used is set via
	@option{--default-cert-level}. See @option{--default-cert-level} for
	information on the specific levels and how they are
	used. @option{--no-ask-cert-level} disables this option. This option
	defaults to no.

	@item --default-cert-level @var{n}
	@opindex default-cert-level
	The default to use for the check level when signing a key.

	0 means you make no particular claim as to how carefully you verified
	the key.

	1 means you believe the key is owned by the person who claims to own
	it but you could not, or did not verify the key at all. This is
	useful for a "persona" verification, where you sign the key of a
	pseudonymous user.

	2 means you did casual verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint and checked the
	user ID on the key against a photo ID.

	3 means you did extensive verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint with the owner of the
	key in person, and that you checked, by means of a hard to forge
	document with a photo ID (such as a passport) that the name of the key
	owner matches the name in the user ID on the key, and finally that you
	verified (by exchange of email) that the email address on the key
	belongs to the key owner.

	Note that the examples given above for levels 2 and 3 are just that:
	examples. In the end, it is up to you to decide just what "casual"
	and "extensive" mean to you.

	This option defaults to 0 (no particular claim).

	@item --min-cert-level
	@opindex min-cert-level
	When building the trust database, treat any signatures with a
	certification level below this as invalid. Defaults to 2, which
	disregards level 1 signatures. Note that level 0 "no particular
	claim" signatures are always accepted.

	@item --trusted-key @var{long key ID}
	@opindex trusted-key
	Assume that the specified key (which must be given
	as a full 8 byte key ID) is as trustworthy as one of
	your own secret keys. This option is useful if you
	don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them)
	online but still want to be able to check the validity of a given
	recipient's or signator's key.

	@item --trust-model @{pgp\|classic\|tofu\|tofu+pgp\|direct\|always\|auto@}
	@opindex trust-model
	Set what trust model GnuPG should follow. The models are:

	@table @asis

	@item pgp
	@opindex trust-model:pgp
	This is the Web of Trust combined with trust signatures as used in PGP
	5.x and later. This is the default trust model when creating a new
	trust database.

	@item classic
	@opindex trust-model:classic
	This is the standard Web of Trust as introduced by PGP 2.

	@item tofu
	@opindex trust-model:tofu
	@anchor{trust-model-tofu}
	TOFU stands for Trust On First Use. In this trust model, the first
	time a key is seen, it is memorized. If later another key with a
	user id with the same email address is seen, both keys are marked as
	suspect. In that case, the next time either is used, a warning is
	displayed describing the conflict, why it might have occurred
	(either the user generated a new key and failed to cross sign the
	old and new keys, the key is forgery, or a man-in-the-middle attack
	is being attempted), and the user is prompted to manually confirm
	the validity of the key in question.

	Because a potential attacker is able to control the email address
	and thereby circumvent the conflict detection algorithm by using an
	email address that is similar in appearance to a trusted email
	address, whenever a message is verified, statistics about the number
	of messages signed with the key are shown. In this way, a user can
	easily identify attacks using fake keys for regular correspondents.

	When compared with the Web of Trust, TOFU offers significantly
	weaker security guarantees. In particular, TOFU only helps ensure
	consistency (that is, that the binding between a key and email
	address doesn't change). A major advantage of TOFU is that it
	requires little maintenance to use correctly. To use the web of
	trust properly, you need to actively sign keys and mark users as
	trusted introducers. This is a time-consuming process and anecdotal
	evidence suggests that even security-conscious users rarely take the
	time to do this thoroughly and instead rely on an ad-hoc TOFU
	process.

	In the TOFU model, policies are associated with bindings between
	keys and email addresses (which are extracted from user ids and
	normalized). There are five policies, which can be set manually
	using the @option{--tofu-policy} option. The default policy can be
	set using the @option{--tofu-default-policy} option.

	The TOFU policies are: @code{auto}, @code{good}, @code{unknown},
	@code{bad} and @code{ask}. The @code{auto} policy is used by
	default (unless overridden by @option{--tofu-default-policy}) and
	marks a binding as marginally trusted. The @code{good},
	@code{unknown} and @code{bad} policies mark a binding as fully
	trusted, as having unknown trust or as having trust never,
	respectively. The @code{unknown} policy is useful for just using
	TOFU to detect conflicts, but to never assign positive trust to a
	binding. The final policy, @code{ask} prompts the user to indicate
	the binding's trust. If batch mode is enabled (or input is
	inappropriate in the context), then the user is not prompted and the
	@code{undefined} trust level is returned.

	@item tofu+pgp
	@opindex trust-model:tofu+pgp
	This trust model combines TOFU with the Web of Trust. This is done
	by computing the trust level for each model and then taking the
	maximum trust level where the trust levels are ordered as follows:
	@code{unknown < undefined < marginal < fully < ultimate < expired <
	never}.

	By setting @option{--tofu-default-policy=unknown}, this model can be
	used to implement the web of trust with TOFU's conflict detection
	algorithm, but without its assignment of positive trust values,
	which some security-conscious users don't like.

	@item direct
	@opindex trust-model:direct
	Key validity is set directly by the user and not calculated via the
	Web of Trust. This model is solely based on the key and does
	not distinguish user IDs. Note that when changing to another trust
	model the trust values assigned to a key are transformed into
	ownertrust values, which also indicate how you trust the owner of
	the key to sign other keys.

	@item always
	@opindex trust-model:always
	Skip key validation and assume that used keys are always fully
	valid. You generally won't use this unless you are using some
	external validation scheme. This option also suppresses the
	"[uncertain]" tag printed with signature checks when there is no
	evidence that the user ID is bound to the key. Note that this
	trust model still does not allow the use of expired, revoked, or
	disabled keys.

	@item auto
	@opindex trust-model:auto
	Select the trust model depending on whatever the internal trust
	database says. This is the default model if such a database already
	exists. Note that a tofu trust model is not considered here and
	must be enabled explicitly.
	@end table

	@item --auto-key-locate @var{mechanisms}
	@itemx --no-auto-key-locate
	@opindex auto-key-locate
	GnuPG can automatically locate and retrieve keys as needed using this
	option. This happens when encrypting to an email address (in the
	"user@@example.com" form), and there are no "user@@example.com" keys
	on the local keyring. This option takes any number of the mechanisms
	listed below, in the order they are to be tried. Instead of listing
	the mechanisms as comma delimited arguments, the option may also be
	given several times to add more mechanism. The option
	@option{--no-auto-key-locate} or the mechanism "clear" resets the
	list. The default is "local,wkd".

	@table @asis

	@item cert
	Locate a key using DNS CERT, as specified in RFC-4398.

	@item pka
	Locate a key using DNS PKA.

	@item dane
	Locate a key using DANE, as specified
	in draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-05.txt.

	@item wkd
	Locate a key using the Web Key Directory protocol.

	@item ldap
	Using DNS Service Discovery, check the domain in question for any LDAP
	keyservers to use. If this fails, attempt to locate the key using the
	PGP Universal method of checking @samp{ldap://keys.(thedomain)}.

	@item keyserver
	Locate a key using a keyserver.

	@item keyserver-URL
	In addition, a keyserver URL as used in the @command{dirmngr}
	configuration may be used here to query that particular keyserver.

	@item local
	Locate the key using the local keyrings. This mechanism allows the user to
	select the order a local key lookup is done. Thus using
	@samp{--auto-key-locate local} is identical to
	@option{--no-auto-key-locate}.

	@item nodefault
	This flag disables the standard local key lookup, done before any of the
	mechanisms defined by the @option{--auto-key-locate} are tried. The
	position of this mechanism in the list does not matter. It is not
	required if @code{local} is also used.

	@item clear
	Clear all defined mechanisms. This is useful to override
	mechanisms given in a config file. Note that a @code{nodefault} in
	@var{mechanisms} will also be cleared unless it is given after the
	@code{clear}.

	@end table


	@item --auto-key-retrieve
	@itemx --no-auto-key-retrieve
	@opindex auto-key-retrieve
	@opindex no-auto-key-retrieve
	These options enable or disable the automatic retrieving of keys from
	a keyserver when verifying signatures made by keys that are not on the
	local keyring. The default is @option{--no-auto-key-retrieve}.

	The order of methods tried to lookup the key is:

	1. If a preferred keyserver is specified in the signature and the
	option @option{honor-keyserver-url} is active (which is not the
	default), that keyserver is tried. Note that the creator of the
	signature uses the option @option{--sig-keyserver-url} to specify the
	preferred keyserver for data signatures.

	2. If the signature has the Signer's UID set (e.g. using
	@option{--sender} while creating the signature) a Web Key Directory
	(WKD) lookup is done. This is the default configuration but can be
	disabled by removing WKD from the auto-key-locate list or by using the
	option @option{--disable-signer-uid}.

	3. If the option @option{honor-pka-record} is active, the legacy PKA
	method is used.

	4. If any keyserver is configured and the Issuer Fingerprint is part
	of the signature (since GnuPG 2.1.16), the configured keyservers are
	tried.

	Note that this option makes a "web bug" like behavior possible.
	Keyserver or Web Key Directory operators can see which keys you
	request, so by sending you a message signed by a brand new key (which
	you naturally will not have on your local keyring), the operator can
	tell both your IP address and the time when you verified the
	signature.

	@item --keyid-format @{none\|short\|0xshort\|long\|0xlong@}
	@opindex keyid-format
	Select how to display key IDs. "none" does not show the key ID at all
	but shows the fingerprint in a separate line. "short" is the
	traditional 8-character key ID. "long" is the more accurate (but less
	convenient) 16-character key ID. Add an "0x" to either to include an
	"0x" at the beginning of the key ID, as in 0x99242560. Note that this
	option is ignored if the option @option{--with-colons} is used.

	@item --keyserver @var{name}
	@opindex keyserver
	This option is deprecated - please use the @option{--keyserver} in
	@file{dirmngr.conf} instead.

	Use @var{name} as your keyserver. This is the server that
	@option{--receive-keys}, @option{--send-keys}, and @option{--search-keys}
	will communicate with to receive keys from, send keys to, and search for
	keys on. The format of the @var{name} is a URI:
	`scheme:[//]keyservername[:port]' The scheme is the type of keyserver:
	"hkp" for the HTTP (or compatible) keyservers, "ldap" for the LDAP
	keyservers, or "mailto" for the Graff email keyserver. Note that your
	particular installation of GnuPG may have other keyserver types
	available as well. Keyserver schemes are case-insensitive. After the
	keyserver name, optional keyserver configuration options may be
	provided. These are the same as the global @option{--keyserver-options}
	from below, but apply only to this particular keyserver.

	Most keyservers synchronize with each other, so there is generally no
	need to send keys to more than one server. The keyserver
	@code{hkp://keys.gnupg.net} uses round robin DNS to give a different
	keyserver each time you use it.

	@item --keyserver-options @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@opindex keyserver-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for the
	keyserver. Options can be prefixed with a `no-' to give the opposite
	meaning. Valid import-options or export-options may be used here as
	well to apply to importing (@option{--recv-key}) or exporting
	(@option{--send-key}) a key from a keyserver. While not all options
	are available for all keyserver types, some common options are:

	@table @asis

	@item include-revoked
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as revoked. Note that not all keyservers
	differentiate between revoked and unrevoked keys, and for such
	keyservers this option is meaningless. Note also that most keyservers do
	not have cryptographic verification of key revocations, and so turning
	this option off may result in skipping keys that are incorrectly marked
	as revoked.

	@item include-disabled
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as disabled. Note that this option is not
	used with HKP keyservers.

	@item auto-key-retrieve
	This is an obsolete alias for the option @option{auto-key-retrieve}.
	Please do not use it; it will be removed in future versions..

	@item honor-keyserver-url
	When using @option{--refresh-keys}, if the key in question has a preferred
	keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to refresh the key
	from. In addition, if auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature
	being verified has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred
	keyserver to fetch the key from. Note that this option introduces a
	"web bug": The creator of the key can see when the keys is
	refreshed. Thus this option is not enabled by default.

	@item honor-pka-record
	If @option{--auto-key-retrieve} is used, and the signature being
	verified has a PKA record, then use the PKA information to fetch
	the key. Defaults to "yes".

	@item include-subkeys
	When receiving a key, include subkeys as potential targets. Note that
	this option is not used with HKP keyservers, as they do not support
	retrieving keys by subkey id.

	@item timeout
	@itemx http-proxy=@var{value}
	@itemx verbose
	@itemx debug
	@itemx check-cert
	@item ca-cert-file
	These options have no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@end table

	The default list of options is: "self-sigs-only, import-clean,
	repair-keys, repair-pks-subkey-bug, export-attributes,
	honor-pka-record".


	@item --completes-needed @var{n}
	@opindex compliant-needed
	Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 1).

	@item --marginals-needed @var{n}
	@opindex marginals-needed
	Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 3)

	@item --tofu-default-policy @{auto\|good\|unknown\|bad\|ask@}
	@opindex tofu-default-policy
	The default TOFU policy (defaults to @code{auto}). For more
	information about the meaning of this option, @pxref{trust-model-tofu}.

	@item --max-cert-depth @var{n}
	@opindex max-cert-depth
	Maximum depth of a certification chain (default is 5).

	@item --no-sig-cache
	@opindex no-sig-cache
	Do not cache the verification status of key signatures.
	Caching gives a much better performance in key listings. However, if
	you suspect that your public keyring is not safe against write
	modifications, you can use this option to disable the caching. It
	probably does not make sense to disable it because all kind of damage
	can be done if someone else has write access to your public keyring.

	@item --auto-check-trustdb
	@itemx --no-auto-check-trustdb
	@opindex auto-check-trustdb
	If GnuPG feels that its information about the Web of Trust has to be
	updated, it automatically runs the @option{--check-trustdb} command
	internally. This may be a time consuming
	process. @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} disables this option.

	@item --use-agent
	@itemx --no-use-agent
	@opindex use-agent
	This is dummy option. @command{@gpgname} always requires the agent.

	@item --gpg-agent-info
	@opindex gpg-agent-info
	This is dummy option. It has no effect when used with @command{@gpgname}.


	@item --agent-program @var{file}
	@opindex agent-program
	Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The
	default value is determined by running @command{gpgconf} with the
	option @option{--list-dirs}. Note that the pipe symbol (@code{\|}) is
	used for a regression test suite hack and may thus not be used in the
	file name.

	@item --dirmngr-program @var{file}
	@opindex dirmngr-program
	Specify a dirmngr program to be used for keyserver access. The
	default value is @file{@value{BINDIR}/dirmngr}.

	@item --disable-dirmngr
	Entirely disable the use of the Dirmngr.

	@item --no-autostart
	@opindex no-autostart
	Do not start the gpg-agent or the dirmngr if it has not yet been
	started and its service is required. This option is mostly useful on
	machines where the connection to gpg-agent has been redirected to
	another machines. If dirmngr is required on the remote machine, it
	may be started manually using @command{gpgconf --launch dirmngr}.

	@item --lock-once
	@opindex lock-once
	Lock the databases the first time a lock is requested
	and do not release the lock until the process
	terminates.

	@item --lock-multiple
	@opindex lock-multiple
	Release the locks every time a lock is no longer
	needed. Use this to override a previous @option{--lock-once}
	from a config file.

	@item --lock-never
	@opindex lock-never
	Disable locking entirely. This option should be used only in very
	special environments, where it can be assured that only one process
	is accessing those files. A bootable floppy with a stand-alone
	encryption system will probably use this. Improper usage of this
	option may lead to data and key corruption.

	@item --exit-on-status-write-error
	@opindex exit-on-status-write-error
	This option will cause write errors on the status FD to immediately
	terminate the process. That should in fact be the default but it never
	worked this way and thus we need an option to enable this, so that the
	change won't break applications which close their end of a status fd
	connected pipe too early. Using this option along with
	@option{--enable-progress-filter} may be used to cleanly cancel long
	running gpg operations.

	@item --limit-card-insert-tries @var{n}
	@opindex limit-card-insert-tries
	With @var{n} greater than 0 the number of prompts asking to insert a
	smartcard gets limited to N-1. Thus with a value of 1 gpg won't at
	all ask to insert a card if none has been inserted at startup. This
	option is useful in the configuration file in case an application does
	not know about the smartcard support and waits ad infinitum for an
	inserted card.

	@item --no-random-seed-file
	@opindex no-random-seed-file
	GnuPG uses a file to store its internal random pool over invocations.
	This makes random generation faster; however sometimes write operations
	are not desired. This option can be used to achieve that with the cost of
	slower random generation.

	@item --no-greeting
	@opindex no-greeting
	Suppress the initial copyright message.

	@item --no-secmem-warning
	@opindex no-secmem-warning
	Suppress the warning about "using insecure memory".

	@item --no-permission-warning
	@opindex permission-warning
	Suppress the warning about unsafe file and home directory (@option{--homedir})
	permissions. Note that the permission checks that GnuPG performs are
	not intended to be authoritative, but rather they simply warn about
	certain common permission problems. Do not assume that the lack of a
	warning means that your system is secure.

	Note that the warning for unsafe @option{--homedir} permissions cannot be
	suppressed in the gpg.conf file, as this would allow an attacker to
	place an unsafe gpg.conf file in place, and use this file to suppress
	warnings about itself. The @option{--homedir} permissions warning may only be
	suppressed on the command line.

	@item --require-secmem
	@itemx --no-require-secmem
	@opindex require-secmem
	Refuse to run if GnuPG cannot get secure memory. Defaults to no
	(i.e. run, but give a warning).


	@item --require-cross-certification
	@itemx --no-require-cross-certification
	@opindex require-cross-certification
	When verifying a signature made from a subkey, ensure that the cross
	certification "back signature" on the subkey is present and valid. This
	protects against a subtle attack against subkeys that can sign.
	Defaults to @option{--require-cross-certification} for
	@command{@gpgname}.

	@item --expert
	@itemx --no-expert
	@opindex expert
	Allow the user to do certain nonsensical or "silly" things like
	signing an expired or revoked key, or certain potentially incompatible
	things like generating unusual key types. This also disables certain
	warning messages about potentially incompatible actions. As the name
	implies, this option is for experts only. If you don't fully
	understand the implications of what it allows you to do, leave this
	off. @option{--no-expert} disables this option.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** KEY RELATED OPTIONS **********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Key related Options
	@subsection Key related options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -r
	@opindex recipient
	Encrypt for user id @var{name}. If this option or
	@option{--hidden-recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user-id
	unless @option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --hidden-recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -R
	@opindex hidden-recipient
	Encrypt for user ID @var{name}, but hide the key ID of this user's
	key. This option helps to hide the receiver of the message and is a
	limited countermeasure against traffic analysis. If this option or
	@option{--recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user ID unless
	@option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --recipient-file @var{file}
	@itemx -f
	@opindex recipient-file
	This option is similar to @option{--recipient} except that it
	encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the
	name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{@gpgname} assumes that
	the key in this file is fully valid.

	@item --hidden-recipient-file @var{file}
	@itemx -F
	@opindex hidden-recipient-file
	This option is similar to @option{--hidden-recipient} except that it
	encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the
	name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{@gpgname} assumes that
	the key in this file is fully valid.

	@item --encrypt-to @var{name}
	@opindex encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as an
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked
	user id. No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even
	disabled keys can be used.

	@item --hidden-encrypt-to @var{name}
	@opindex hidden-encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--hidden-recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as a hidden
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked user id.
	No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even disabled
	keys can be used.

	@item --no-encrypt-to
	@opindex no-encrypt-to
	Disable the use of all @option{--encrypt-to} and
	@option{--hidden-encrypt-to} keys.

	@item --group @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@opindex group
	Sets up a named group, which is similar to aliases in email programs.
	Any time the group name is a recipient (@option{-r} or
	@option{--recipient}), it will be expanded to the values
	specified. Multiple groups with the same name are automatically merged
	into a single group.

	The values are @code{key IDs} or fingerprints, but any key description
	is accepted. Note that a value with spaces in it will be treated as
	two different values. Note also there is only one level of expansion
	--- you cannot make an group that points to another group. When used
	from the command line, it may be necessary to quote the argument to
	this option to prevent the shell from treating it as multiple
	arguments.

	@item --ungroup @var{name}
	@opindex ungroup
	Remove a given entry from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --no-groups
	@opindex no-groups
	Remove all entries from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --local-user @var{name}
	@itemx -u
	@opindex local-user
	Use @var{name} as the key to sign with. Note that this option overrides
	@option{--default-key}.

	@item --sender @var{mbox}
	@opindex sender
	This option has two purposes. @var{mbox} must either be a complete
	user id with a proper mail address or just a mail address. When
	creating a signature this option tells gpg the user id of a key used
	to make a signature if the key was not directly specified by a user
	id. When verifying a signature the @var{mbox} is used to restrict the
	information printed by the TOFU code to matching user ids.

	@item --try-secret-key @var{name}
	@opindex try-secret-key
	For hidden recipients GPG needs to know the keys to use for trial
	decryption. The key set with @option{--default-key} is always tried
	first, but this is often not sufficient. This option allows setting more
	keys to be used for trial decryption. Although any valid user-id
	specification may be used for @var{name} it makes sense to use at least
	the long keyid to avoid ambiguities. Note that gpg-agent might pop up a
	pinentry for a lot keys to do the trial decryption. If you want to stop
	all further trial decryption you may use close-window button instead of
	the cancel button.

	@item --try-all-secrets
	@opindex try-all-secrets
	Don't look at the key ID as stored in the message but try all secret
	keys in turn to find the right decryption key. This option forces the
	behaviour as used by anonymous recipients (created by using
	@option{--throw-keyids} or @option{--hidden-recipient}) and might come
	handy in case where an encrypted message contains a bogus key ID.

	@item --skip-hidden-recipients
	@itemx --no-skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex no-skip-hidden-recipients
	During decryption skip all anonymous recipients. This option helps in
	the case that people use the hidden recipients feature to hide their
	own encrypt-to key from others. If one has many secret keys this
	may lead to a major annoyance because all keys are tried in turn to
	decrypt something which was not really intended for it. The drawback
	of this option is that it is currently not possible to decrypt a
	message which includes real anonymous recipients.


	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** INPUT AND OUTPUT *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Input and Output
	@subsection Input and Output

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --armor
	@itemx -a
	@opindex armor
	Create ASCII armored output. The default is to create the binary
	OpenPGP format.

	@item --no-armor
	@opindex no-armor
	Assume the input data is not in ASCII armored format.

	@item --output @var{file}
	@itemx -o @var{file}
	@opindex output
	Write output to @var{file}. To write to stdout use @code{-} as the
	filename.

	@item --max-output @var{n}
	@opindex max-output
	This option sets a limit on the number of bytes that will be generated
	when processing a file. Since OpenPGP supports various levels of
	compression, it is possible that the plaintext of a given message may be
	significantly larger than the original OpenPGP message. While GnuPG
	works properly with such messages, there is often a desire to set a
	maximum file size that will be generated before processing is forced to
	stop by the OS limits. Defaults to 0, which means "no limit".

	@item --chunk-size @var{n}
	@opindex chunk-size
	The AEAD encryption mode encrypts the data in chunks so that a
	receiving side can check for transmission errors or tampering at the
	end of each chunk and does not need to delay this until all data has
	been received. The used chunk size is 2^@var{n} byte. The lowest
	allowed value for @var{n} is 6 (64 byte) and the largest is the
	default of 27 which creates chunks not larger than 128 MiB.

	@item --input-size-hint @var{n}
	@opindex input-size-hint
	This option can be used to tell GPG the size of the input data in
	bytes. @var{n} must be a positive base-10 number. This option is
	only useful if the input is not taken from a file. GPG may use this
	hint to optimize its buffer allocation strategy. It is also used by
	the @option{--status-fd} line ``PROGRESS'' to provide a value for
	``total'' if that is not available by other means.

	@item --key-origin @var{string}[,@var{url}]
	@opindex key-origin
	gpg can track the origin of a key. Certain origins are implicitly
	known (e.g. keyserver, web key directory) and set. For a standard
	import the origin of the keys imported can be set with this option.
	To list the possible values use "help" for @var{string}. Some origins
	can store an optional @var{url} argument. That URL can appended to
	@var{string} after a comma.

	@item --import-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex import-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	importing keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item import-local-sigs
	Allow importing key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	@item keep-ownertrust
	Normally possible still existing ownertrust values of a key are
	cleared if a key is imported. This is in general desirable so that
	a formerly deleted key does not automatically gain an ownertrust
	values merely due to import. On the other hand it is sometimes
	necessary to re-import a trusted set of keys again but keeping
	already assigned ownertrust values. This can be achieved by using
	this option.

	@item repair-pks-subkey-bug
	During import, attempt to repair the damage caused by the PKS keyserver
	bug (pre version 0.9.6) that mangles keys with multiple subkeys. Note
	that this cannot completely repair the damaged key as some crucial data
	is removed by the keyserver, but it does at least give you back one
	subkey. Defaults to no for regular @option{--import} and to yes for
	keyserver @option{--receive-keys}.

	@item import-show
	@itemx show-only
	Show a listing of the key as imported right before it is stored.
	This can be combined with the option @option{--dry-run} to only look
	at keys; the option @option{show-only} is a shortcut for this
	combination. The command @option{--show-keys} is another shortcut
	for this. Note that suffixes like '#' for "sec" and "sbb" lines
	may or may not be printed.

	@item import-export
	Run the entire import code but instead of storing the key to the
	local keyring write it to the output. The export options
	@option{export-pka} and @option{export-dane} affect the output. This
	option can be used to remove all invalid parts from a key without the
	need to store it.

	@item merge-only
	During import, allow key updates to existing keys, but do not allow
	any new keys to be imported. Defaults to no.

	@item import-clean
	After import, compact (remove all signatures except the
	self-signature) any user IDs from the new key that are not usable.
	Then, remove any signatures from the new key that are not usable.
	This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are not present
	on the keyring. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key}
	command "clean" after import. Defaults to no.

	@item import-drop-uids
	Do not import any user ids or their binding signatures. This option
	can be used to update only the subkeys or other non-user id related
	information.

	@item self-sigs-only
	Accept only self-signatures while importing a key. All other key
	signatures are skipped at an early import stage. This option can be
	used with @code{keyserver-options} to mitigate attempts to flood a
	key with bogus signatures from a keyserver. The drawback is that
	all other valid key signatures, as required by the Web of Trust are
	also not imported. Note that when using this option along with
	import-clean it suppresses the final clean step after merging the
	imported key into the existing key.

	@item repair-keys
	After import, fix various problems with the
	keys. For example, this reorders signatures, and strips duplicate
	signatures. Defaults to yes.

	@item import-minimal
	Import the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except
	the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the
	same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" after import.
	Defaults to no.

	@item restore
	@itemx import-restore
	Import in key restore mode. This imports all data which is usually
	skipped during import; including all GnuPG specific data. All other
	contradicting options are overridden.
	@end table

	@item --import-filter @{@var{name}=@var{expr}@}
	@itemx --export-filter @{@var{name}=@var{expr}@}
	@opindex import-filter
	@opindex export-filter
	These options define an import/export filter which are applied to the
	imported/exported keyblock right before it will be stored/written.
	@var{name} defines the type of filter to use, @var{expr} the
	expression to evaluate. The option can be used several times which
	then appends more expression to the same @var{name}.

	@noindent
	The available filter types are:

	@table @asis

	@item keep-uid
	This filter will keep a user id packet and its dependent packets in
	the keyblock if the expression evaluates to true.

	@item drop-subkey
	This filter drops the selected subkeys.
	Currently only implemented for --export-filter.

	@item drop-sig
	This filter drops the selected key signatures on user ids.
	Self-signatures are not considered.
	Currently only implemented for --import-filter.

	@end table

	For the syntax of the expression see the chapter "FILTER EXPRESSIONS".
	The property names for the expressions depend on the actual filter
	type and are indicated in the following table.

	The available properties are:

	@table @asis

	@item uid
	A string with the user id. (keep-uid)

	@item mbox
	The addr-spec part of a user id with mailbox or the empty string.
	(keep-uid)

	@item key_algo
	A number with the public key algorithm of a key or subkey packet.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item key_created
	@itemx key_created_d
	The first is the timestamp a public key or subkey packet was
	created. The second is the same but given as an ISO string,
	e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-subkey)

	@item fpr
	The hexified fingerprint of the current subkey or primary key.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item primary
	Boolean indicating whether the user id is the primary one. (keep-uid)

	@item expired
	Boolean indicating whether a user id (keep-uid), a key (drop-subkey), or a
	signature (drop-sig) expired.

	@item revoked
	Boolean indicating whether a user id (keep-uid) or a key (drop-subkey) has
	been revoked.

	@item disabled
	Boolean indicating whether a primary key is disabled. (not used)

	@item secret
	Boolean indicating whether a key or subkey is a secret one.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item usage
	A string indicating the usage flags for the subkey, from the
	sequence ``ecsa?''. For example, a subkey capable of just signing
	and authentication would be an exact match for ``sa''. (drop-subkey)

	@item sig_created
	@itemx sig_created_d
	The first is the timestamp a signature packet was created. The
	second is the same but given as an ISO date string,
	e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-sig)

	@item sig_algo
	A number with the public key algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig)

	@item sig_digest_algo
	A number with the digest algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig)

	@end table

	@item --export-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex export-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	exporting keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item export-local-sigs
	Allow exporting key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	@item export-attributes
	Include attribute user IDs (photo IDs) while exporting. Not
	including attribute user IDs is useful to export keys that are going
	to be used by an OpenPGP program that does not accept attribute user
	IDs. Defaults to yes.

	@item export-sensitive-revkeys
	Include designated revoker information that was marked as
	"sensitive". Defaults to no.

	@c Since GnuPG 2.1 gpg-agent manages the secret key and thus the
	@c export-reset-subkey-passwd hack is not anymore justified. Such use
	@c cases may be implemented using a specialized secret key export
	@c tool.
	@c @item export-reset-subkey-passwd
	@c When using the @option{--export-secret-subkeys} command, this option resets
	@c the passphrases for all exported subkeys to empty. This is useful
	@c when the exported subkey is to be used on an unattended machine where
	@c a passphrase doesn't necessarily make sense. Defaults to no.

	@item backup
	@itemx export-backup
	Export for use as a backup. The exported data includes all data
	which is needed to restore the key or keys later with GnuPG. The
	format is basically the OpenPGP format but enhanced with GnuPG
	specific data. All other contradicting options are overridden.

	@item export-clean
	Compact (remove all signatures from) user IDs on the key being
	exported if the user IDs are not usable. Also, do not export any
	signatures that are not usable. This includes signatures that were
	issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. This option is
	the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "clean" before export
	except that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to
	no.

	@item export-minimal
	Export the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except the
	most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the same as
	running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" before export except
	that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to no.

	@item export-drop-uids
	Do no export any user id or attribute packets or their associates
	signatures. Note that due to missing user ids the resulting output is
	not strictly RFC-4880 compliant.

	@item export-pka
	Instead of outputting the key material output PKA records suitable
	to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before each
	record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone file.

	@item export-dane
	Instead of outputting the key material output OpenPGP DANE records
	suitable to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before
	each record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone
	file.

	@end table

	@item --with-colons
	@opindex with-colons
	Print key listings delimited by colons. Note that the output will be
	encoded in UTF-8 regardless of any @option{--display-charset} setting. This
	format is useful when GnuPG is called from scripts and other programs
	as it is easily machine parsed. The details of this format are
	documented in the file @file{doc/DETAILS}, which is included in the GnuPG
	source distribution.

	@item --fixed-list-mode
	@opindex fixed-list-mode
	Do not merge primary user ID and primary key in @option{--with-colon}
	listing mode and print all timestamps as seconds since 1970-01-01.
	Since GnuPG 2.0.10, this mode is always used and thus this option is
	obsolete; it does not harm to use it though.

	@item --legacy-list-mode
	@opindex legacy-list-mode
	Revert to the pre-2.1 public key list mode. This only affects the
	human readable output and not the machine interface
	(i.e. @code{--with-colons}). Note that the legacy format does not
	convey suitable information for elliptic curves.

	@item --with-fingerprint
	@opindex with-fingerprint
	Same as the command @option{--fingerprint} but changes only the format
	of the output and may be used together with another command.

	@item --with-subkey-fingerprint
	@opindex with-subkey-fingerprint
	If a fingerprint is printed for the primary key, this option forces
	printing of the fingerprint for all subkeys. This could also be
	achieved by using the @option{--with-fingerprint} twice but by using
	this option along with keyid-format "none" a compact fingerprint is
	printed.

	@item --with-icao-spelling
	@opindex with-icao-spelling
	Print the ICAO spelling of the fingerprint in addition to the hex digits.

	@item --with-keygrip
	@opindex with-keygrip
	Include the keygrip in the key listings. In @code{--with-colons} mode
	this is implicitly enable for secret keys.

	@item --with-key-origin
	@opindex with-key-origin
	Include the locally held information on the origin and last update of
	a key in a key listing. In @code{--with-colons} mode this is always
	printed. This data is currently experimental and shall not be
	considered part of the stable API.

	@item --with-wkd-hash
	@opindex with-wkd-hash
	Print a Web Key Directory identifier along with each user ID in key
	listings. This is an experimental feature and semantics may change.

	@item --with-secret
	@opindex with-secret
	Include info about the presence of a secret key in public key listings
	done with @code{--with-colons}.

	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPENPGP OPTIONS **************
	@c *******************************************
	@node OpenPGP Options
	@subsection OpenPGP protocol specific options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -t, --textmode
	@itemx --no-textmode
	@opindex textmode
	Treat input files as text and store them in the OpenPGP canonical text
	form with standard "CRLF" line endings. This also sets the necessary
	flags to inform the recipient that the encrypted or signed data is text
	and may need its line endings converted back to whatever the local
	system uses. This option is useful when communicating between two
	platforms that have different line ending conventions (UNIX-like to Mac,
	Mac to Windows, etc). @option{--no-textmode} disables this option, and
	is the default.

	@item --force-v3-sigs
	@itemx --no-force-v3-sigs
	@item --force-v4-certs
	@itemx --no-force-v4-certs
	These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.1.

	@item --force-aead
	@opindex force-aead
	Force the use of AEAD encryption over MDC encryption. AEAD is a
	modern and faster way to do authenticated encryption than the old MDC
	method. See also options @option{--aead-algo} and
	@option{--chunk-size}.

	@item --force-mdc
	@itemx --disable-mdc
	@opindex force-mdc
	@opindex disable-mdc
	These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.2.8. The
	MDC is always used unless the keys indicate that an AEAD algorithm can
	be used in which case AEAD is used. But note: If the creation of a
	legacy non-MDC message is exceptionally required, the option
	@option{--rfc2440} allows for this.

	@item --disable-signer-uid
	@opindex disable-signer-uid
	By default the user ID of the signing key is embedded in the data signature.
	As of now this is only done if the signing key has been specified with
	@option{local-user} using a mail address, or with @option{sender}. This
	information can be helpful for verifier to locate the key; see option
	@option{--auto-key-retrieve}.

	+@item --include-key-block
	+@opindex include-key-block
	+This option is used to embed the actual signing key into a data
	+signature. The embedded key is stripped down to a single user id and
	+includes only the signing subkey used to create the signature as well
	+as as valid encryption subkeys. All other info is removed from the
	+key to keep it and thus the signature small. This option is the
	+OpenPGP counterpart to the @command{gpgsm} option
	+@option{--include-certs}.
	+
	@item --personal-cipher-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-cipher-preferences
	Set the list of personal cipher preferences to @var{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also
	used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command.

	@item --personal-aead-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-aead-preferences
	Set the list of personal AEAD preferences to @var{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also
	used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command.

	@item --personal-digest-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-digest-preferences
	Set the list of personal digest preferences to @var{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked digest algorithm in this list
	is also used when signing without encryption
	(e.g. @option{--clear-sign} or @option{--sign}).

	@item --personal-compress-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-compress-preferences
	Set the list of personal compression preferences to @var{string}.
	Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available
	algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This
	allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the
	recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that
	is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked compression
	algorithm in this list is also used when there are no recipient keys
	to consider (e.g. @option{--symmetric}).

	@item --s2k-cipher-algo @var{name}
	@opindex s2k-cipher-algo
	Use @var{name} as the cipher algorithm for symmetric encryption with
	a passphrase if @option{--personal-cipher-preferences} and
	@option{--cipher-algo} are not given. The default is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}.

	@item --s2k-digest-algo @var{name}
	@opindex s2k-digest-algo
	Use @var{name} as the digest algorithm used to mangle the passphrases
	for symmetric encryption. The default is SHA-1.

	@item --s2k-mode @var{n}
	@opindex s2k-mode
	Selects how passphrases for symmetric encryption are mangled. If
	@var{n} is 0 a plain passphrase (which is in general not recommended)
	will be used, a 1 adds a salt (which should not be used) to the
	passphrase and a 3 (the default) iterates the whole process a number
	of times (see @option{--s2k-count}).

	@item --s2k-count @var{n}
	@opindex s2k-count
	Specify how many times the passphrases mangling for symmetric
	encryption is repeated. This value may range between 1024 and
	65011712 inclusive. The default is inquired from gpg-agent. Note
	that not all values in the 1024-65011712 range are legal and if an
	illegal value is selected, GnuPG will round up to the nearest legal
	value. This option is only meaningful if @option{--s2k-mode} is set
	to the default of 3.


	@end table

	@c ***************************
	@c ***** Compliance ******
	@c ***************************
	@node Compliance Options
	@subsection Compliance options

	These options control what GnuPG is compliant to. Only one of these
	options may be active at a time. Note that the default setting of
	this is nearly always the correct one. See the INTEROPERABILITY WITH
	OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below before using one of these
	options.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --gnupg
	@opindex gnupg
	Use standard GnuPG behavior. This is essentially OpenPGP behavior (see
	@option{--openpgp}), but with extension from the proposed update to
	OpenPGP and with some additional workarounds for common compatibility
	problems in different versions of PGP. This is the default option, so
	it is not generally needed, but it may be useful to override a
	different compliance option in the gpg.conf file.

	@item --openpgp
	@opindex openpgp
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict OpenPGP
	behavior. Use this option to reset all previous options like
	@option{--s2k-*}, @option{--cipher-algo}, @option{--digest-algo} and
	@option{--compress-algo} to OpenPGP compliant values. All PGP
	workarounds are disabled.

	@item --rfc4880
	@opindex rfc4880
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-4880
	behavior. Note that this is currently the same thing as
	@option{--openpgp}.

	@item --rfc4880bis
	@opindex rfc4880bis
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict according to the
	proposed updates of RFC-4880.

	@item --rfc2440
	@opindex rfc2440
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-2440
	behavior. Note that by using this option encryption packets are
	created in a legacy mode without MDC protection. This is dangerous
	and should thus only be used for experiments. See also option
	@option{--ignore-mdc-error}.

	@item --pgp6
	@opindex pgp6
	This option is obsolete; it is handled as an alias for @option{--pgp7}

	@item --pgp7
	@opindex pgp7
	Set up all options to be as PGP 7 compliant as possible. This allowed
	the ciphers IDEA, 3DES, CAST5,AES128, AES192, AES256, and TWOFISH.,
	the hashes MD5, SHA1 and RIPEMD160, and the compression algorithms
	none and ZIP. This option implies @option{--escape-from-lines} and
	disables @option{--throw-keyids},

	@item --pgp8
	@opindex pgp8
	Set up all options to be as PGP 8 compliant as possible. PGP 8 is a lot
	closer to the OpenPGP standard than previous versions of PGP, so all
	this does is disable @option{--throw-keyids} and set
	@option{--escape-from-lines}. All algorithms are allowed except for the
	SHA224, SHA384, and SHA512 digests.

	@item --compliance @var{string}
	@opindex compliance
	This option can be used instead of one of the options above. Valid
	values for @var{string} are the above option names (without the double
	dash) and possibly others as shown when using "help" for @var{value}.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** ESOTERIC OPTIONS *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Esoteric Options
	@subsection Doing things one usually doesn't want to do

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -n
	@itemx --dry-run
	@opindex dry-run
	Don't make any changes (this is not completely implemented).

	@item --list-only
	@opindex list-only
	Changes the behaviour of some commands. This is like @option{--dry-run} but
	different in some cases. The semantic of this option may be extended in
	the future. Currently it only skips the actual decryption pass and
	therefore enables a fast listing of the encryption keys.

	@item -i
	@itemx --interactive
	@opindex interactive
	Prompt before overwriting any files.

	@item --debug-level @var{level}
	@opindex debug-level
	Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be
	a numeric value or by a keyword:

	@table @code
	@item none
	No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of
	the keyword.
	@item basic
	Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item advanced
	More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item expert
	Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item guru
	All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be
	used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is
	only enabled if the keyword is used.
	@end table

	How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not
	specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are
	however carefully selected to best aid in debugging.

	@item --debug @var{flags}
	@opindex debug
	Set debug flags. All flags are or-ed and @var{flags} may be given
	in C syntax (e.g. 0x0042) or as a comma separated list of flag names.
	To get a list of all supported flags the single word "help" can be
	used. This option is only useful for debugging and the behavior may
	change at any time without notice.

	@item --debug-all
	@opindex debug-all
	Set all useful debugging flags.

	@item --debug-iolbf
	@opindex debug-iolbf
	Set stdout into line buffered mode. This option is only honored when
	given on the command line.

	@item --debug-set-iobuf-size @var{n}
	@opindex debug-iolbf
	Change the buffer size of the IOBUFs to @var{n} kilobyte. Using 0
	prints the current size. Note well: This is a maintainer only option
	and may thus be changed or removed at any time without notice.

	@item --debug-allow-large-chunks
	@opindex debug-allow-large-chunks
	To facilitate in-memory decryption on the receiving site, the largest
	recommended chunk size is 128 MiB (@code{--chunk-size 27}). This
	option allows to specify a limit of up to 4 EiB (@code{--chunk-size
	62}) for experiments.

	@item --faked-system-time @var{epoch}
	@opindex faked-system-time
	This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back or
	forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since the year
	1970. Alternatively @var{epoch} may be given as a full ISO time string
	(e.g. "20070924T154812").

	If you suffix @var{epoch} with an exclamation mark (!), the system time
	will appear to be frozen at the specified time.

	@item --full-timestrings
	@opindex full-timestrings
	Change the format of printed creation and expiration times from just
	the date to the date and time. This is in general not useful and the
	same information is anyway available in @option{--with-colons} mode.
	These longer strings are also not well aligned with other printed
	data.

	@item --enable-progress-filter
	@opindex enable-progress-filter
	Enable certain PROGRESS status outputs. This option allows frontends
	to display a progress indicator while gpg is processing larger files.
	There is a slight performance overhead using it.

	@item --status-fd @var{n}
	@opindex status-fd
	Write special status strings to the file descriptor @var{n}.
	See the file DETAILS in the documentation for a listing of them.

	@item --status-file @var{file}
	@opindex status-file
	Same as @option{--status-fd}, except the status data is written to file
	@var{file}.

	@item --logger-fd @var{n}
	@opindex logger-fd
	Write log output to file descriptor @var{n} and not to STDERR.

	@item --log-file @var{file}
	@itemx --logger-file @var{file}
	@opindex log-file
	Same as @option{--logger-fd}, except the logger data is written to
	file @var{file}. Use @file{socket://} to log to s socket.

	@item --attribute-fd @var{n}
	@opindex attribute-fd
	Write attribute subpackets to the file descriptor @var{n}. This is most
	useful for use with @option{--status-fd}, since the status messages are
	needed to separate out the various subpackets from the stream delivered
	to the file descriptor.

	@item --attribute-file @var{file}
	@opindex attribute-file
	Same as @option{--attribute-fd}, except the attribute data is written to
	file @var{file}.

	@item --comment @var{string}
	@itemx --no-comments
	@opindex comment
	Use @var{string} as a comment string in cleartext signatures and ASCII
	armored messages or keys (see @option{--armor}). The default behavior is
	not to use a comment string. @option{--comment} may be repeated multiple
	times to get multiple comment strings. @option{--no-comments} removes
	all comments. It is a good idea to keep the length of a single comment
	below 60 characters to avoid problems with mail programs wrapping such
	lines. Note that comment lines, like all other header lines, are not
	protected by the signature.

	@item --emit-version
	@itemx --no-emit-version
	@opindex emit-version
	Force inclusion of the version string in ASCII armored output. If
	given once only the name of the program and the major number is
	emitted, given twice the minor is also emitted, given thrice
	the micro is added, and given four times an operating system identification
	is also emitted. @option{--no-emit-version} (default) disables the version
	line.

	@item --sig-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@itemx --cert-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@itemx -N, --set-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@opindex sig-notation
	@opindex cert-notation
	@opindex set-notation
	Put the name value pair into the signature as notation data.
	@var{name} must consist only of printable characters or spaces, and
	must contain a '@@' character in the form keyname@@domain.example.com
	(substituting the appropriate keyname and domain name, of course). This
	is to help prevent pollution of the IETF reserved notation
	namespace. The @option{--expert} flag overrides the '@@'
	check. @var{value} may be any printable string; it will be encoded in
	UTF-8, so you should check that your @option{--display-charset} is set
	correctly. If you prefix @var{name} with an exclamation mark (!), the
	notation data will be flagged as critical
	(rfc4880:5.2.3.16). @option{--sig-notation} sets a notation for data
	signatures. @option{--cert-notation} sets a notation for key signatures
	(certifications). @option{--set-notation} sets both.

	There are special codes that may be used in notation names. "%k" will
	be expanded into the key ID of the key being signed, "%K" into the
	long key ID of the key being signed, "%f" into the fingerprint of the
	key being signed, "%s" into the key ID of the key making the
	signature, "%S" into the long key ID of the key making the signature,
	"%g" into the fingerprint of the key making the signature (which might
	be a subkey), "%p" into the fingerprint of the primary key of the key
	making the signature, "%c" into the signature count from the OpenPGP
	smartcard, and "%%" results in a single "%". %k, %K, and %f are only
	meaningful when making a key signature (certification), and %c is only
	meaningful when using the OpenPGP smartcard.

	@item --known-notation @var{name}
	@opindex known-notation
	Adds @var{name} to a list of known critical signature notations. The
	effect of this is that gpg will not mark a signature with a critical
	signature notation of that name as bad. Note that gpg already knows
	by default about a few critical signatures notation names.

	@item --sig-policy-url @var{string}
	@itemx --cert-policy-url @var{string}
	@itemx --set-policy-url @var{string}
	@opindex sig-policy-url
	@opindex cert-policy-url
	@opindex set-policy-url
	Use @var{string} as a Policy URL for signatures (rfc4880:5.2.3.20). If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the policy URL packet will
	be flagged as critical. @option{--sig-policy-url} sets a policy url for
	data signatures. @option{--cert-policy-url} sets a policy url for key
	signatures (certifications). @option{--set-policy-url} sets both.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --sig-keyserver-url @var{string}
	@opindex sig-keyserver-url
	Use @var{string} as a preferred keyserver URL for data signatures. If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the keyserver URL packet
	will be flagged as critical.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --set-filename @var{string}
	@opindex set-filename
	Use @var{string} as the filename which is stored inside messages.
	This overrides the default, which is to use the actual filename of the
	file being encrypted. Using the empty string for @var{string}
	effectively removes the filename from the output.

	@item --for-your-eyes-only
	@itemx --no-for-your-eyes-only
	@opindex for-your-eyes-only
	Set the `for your eyes only' flag in the message. This causes GnuPG to
	refuse to save the file unless the @option{--output} option is given,
	and PGP to use a "secure viewer" with a claimed Tempest-resistant font
	to display the message. This option overrides @option{--set-filename}.
	@option{--no-for-your-eyes-only} disables this option.

	@item --use-embedded-filename
	@itemx --no-use-embedded-filename
	@opindex use-embedded-filename
	Try to create a file with a name as embedded in the data. This can be
	a dangerous option as it enables overwriting files. Defaults to no.
	Note that the option @option{--output} overrides this option.

	@item --cipher-algo @var{name}
	@opindex cipher-algo
	Use @var{name} as cipher algorithm. Running the program with the
	command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. If
	this is not used the cipher algorithm is selected from the preferences
	stored with the key. In general, you do not want to use this option as
	it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option
	@option{--personal-cipher-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the
	same thing.

	@item --aead-algo @var{name}
	@opindex aead-algo
	Specify that the AEAD algorithm @var{name} is to be used. This is
	useful for symmetric encryption where no key preference are available
	to select the AEAD algorithm. Running @command{@gpgname} with option
	@option{--version} shows the available AEAD algorithms. In general,
	you do not want to use this option as it allows you to violate the
	OpenPGP standard. The option @option{--personal-aead-preferences} is
	the safe way to accomplish the same thing.

	@item --digest-algo @var{name}
	@opindex digest-algo
	Use @var{name} as the message digest algorithm. Running the program
	with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported
	algorithms. In general, you do not want to use this option as it
	allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option
	@option{--personal-digest-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish
	the same thing.

	@item --compress-algo @var{name}
	@opindex compress-algo
	Use compression algorithm @var{name}. "zlib" is RFC-1950 ZLIB
	compression. "zip" is RFC-1951 ZIP compression which is used by PGP.
	"bzip2" is a more modern compression scheme that can compress some
	things better than zip or zlib, but at the cost of more memory used
	during compression and decompression. "uncompressed" or "none"
	disables compression. If this option is not used, the default
	behavior is to examine the recipient key preferences to see which
	algorithms the recipient supports. If all else fails, ZIP is used for
	maximum compatibility.

	ZLIB may give better compression results than ZIP, as the compression
	window size is not limited to 8k. BZIP2 may give even better
	compression results than that, but will use a significantly larger
	amount of memory while compressing and decompressing. This may be
	significant in low memory situations. Note, however, that PGP (all
	versions) only supports ZIP compression. Using any algorithm other
	than ZIP or "none" will make the message unreadable with PGP. In
	general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to
	violate the OpenPGP standard. The option
	@option{--personal-compress-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish
	the same thing.

	@item --cert-digest-algo @var{name}
	@opindex cert-digest-algo
	Use @var{name} as the message digest algorithm used when signing a
	key. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a
	list of supported algorithms. Be aware that if you choose an
	algorithm that GnuPG supports but other OpenPGP implementations do
	not, then some users will not be able to use the key signatures you
	make, or quite possibly your entire key. Note also that a public key
	algorithm must be compatible with the specified digest algorithm; thus
	selecting an arbitrary digest algorithm may result in error messages
	from lower crypto layers or lead to security flaws.


	@item --disable-cipher-algo @var{name}
	@opindex disable-cipher-algo
	Never allow the use of @var{name} as cipher algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --disable-pubkey-algo @var{name}
	@opindex disable-pubkey-algo
	Never allow the use of @var{name} as public key algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --throw-keyids
	@itemx --no-throw-keyids
	@opindex throw-keyids
	Do not put the recipient key IDs into encrypted messages. This helps to
	hide the receivers of the message and is a limited countermeasure
	against traffic analysis.@footnote{Using a little social engineering
	anyone who is able to decrypt the message can check whether one of the
	other recipients is the one he suspects.} On the receiving side, it may
	slow down the decryption process because all available secret keys must
	be tried. @option{--no-throw-keyids} disables this option. This option
	is essentially the same as using @option{--hidden-recipient} for all
	recipients.

	@item --not-dash-escaped
	@opindex not-dash-escaped
	This option changes the behavior of cleartext signatures
	so that they can be used for patch files. You should not
	send such an armored file via email because all spaces
	and line endings are hashed too. You can not use this
	option for data which has 5 dashes at the beginning of a
	line, patch files don't have this. A special armor header
	line tells GnuPG about this cleartext signature option.

	@item --escape-from-lines
	@itemx --no-escape-from-lines
	@opindex escape-from-lines
	Because some mailers change lines starting with "From " to ">From " it
	is good to handle such lines in a special way when creating cleartext
	signatures to prevent the mail system from breaking the signature. Note
	that all other PGP versions do it this way too. Enabled by
	default. @option{--no-escape-from-lines} disables this option.

	@item --passphrase-repeat @var{n}
	@opindex passphrase-repeat
	Specify how many times @command{@gpgname} will request a new
	passphrase be repeated. This is useful for helping memorize a
	passphrase. Defaults to 1 repetition.

	@item --passphrase-fd @var{n}
	@opindex passphrase-fd
	Read the passphrase from file descriptor @var{n}. Only the first line
	will be read from file descriptor @var{n}. If you use 0 for @var{n},
	the passphrase will be read from STDIN. This can only be used if only
	one passphrase is supplied.

	Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the
	option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1
	the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}.

	@item --passphrase-file @var{file}
	@opindex passphrase-file
	Read the passphrase from file @var{file}. Only the first line will
	be read from file @var{file}. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, a passphrase stored in a file is
	of questionable security if other users can read this file. Don't use
	this option if you can avoid it.

	Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the
	option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1
	the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}.

	@item --passphrase @var{string}
	@opindex passphrase
	Use @var{string} as the passphrase. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, this is of very questionable
	security on a multi-user system. Don't use this option if you can
	avoid it.

	Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the
	option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1
	the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}.

	@item --pinentry-mode @var{mode}
	@opindex pinentry-mode
	Set the pinentry mode to @var{mode}. Allowed values for @var{mode}
	are:
	@table @asis
	@item default
	Use the default of the agent, which is @code{ask}.
	@item ask
	Force the use of the Pinentry.
	@item cancel
	Emulate use of Pinentry's cancel button.
	@item error
	Return a Pinentry error (``No Pinentry'').
	@item loopback
	Redirect Pinentry queries to the caller. Note that in contrast to
	Pinentry the user is not prompted again if he enters a bad password.
	@end table

	@item --no-symkey-cache
	@opindex no-symkey-cache
	Disable the passphrase cache used for symmetrical en- and decryption.
	This cache is based on the message specific salt value
	(cf. @option{--s2k-mode}).

	@item --request-origin @var{origin}
	@opindex request-origin
	Tell gpg to assume that the operation ultimately originated at
	@var{origin}. Depending on the origin certain restrictions are applied
	and the Pinentry may include an extra note on the origin. Supported
	values for @var{origin} are: @code{local} which is the default,
	@code{remote} to indicate a remote origin or @code{browser} for an
	operation requested by a web browser.

	@item --command-fd @var{n}
	@opindex command-fd
	This is a replacement for the deprecated shared-memory IPC mode.
	If this option is enabled, user input on questions is not expected
	from the TTY but from the given file descriptor. It should be used
	together with @option{--status-fd}. See the file doc/DETAILS in the source
	distribution for details on how to use it.

	@item --command-file @var{file}
	@opindex command-file
	Same as @option{--command-fd}, except the commands are read out of file
	@var{file}

	@item --allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@itemx --no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@opindex allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	Allow the import and use of keys with user IDs which are not
	self-signed. This is not recommended, as a non self-signed user ID is
	trivial to forge. @option{--no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid} disables.

	@item --allow-freeform-uid
	@opindex allow-freeform-uid
	Disable all checks on the form of the user ID while generating a new
	one. This option should only be used in very special environments as
	it does not ensure the de-facto standard format of user IDs.

	@item --ignore-time-conflict
	@opindex ignore-time-conflict
	GnuPG normally checks that the timestamps associated with keys and
	signatures have plausible values. However, sometimes a signature
	seems to be older than the key due to clock problems. This option
	makes these checks just a warning. See also @option{--ignore-valid-from} for
	timestamp issues on subkeys.

	@item --ignore-valid-from
	@opindex ignore-valid-from
	GnuPG normally does not select and use subkeys created in the future.
	This option allows the use of such keys and thus exhibits the
	pre-1.0.7 behaviour. You should not use this option unless there
	is some clock problem. See also @option{--ignore-time-conflict} for timestamp
	issues with signatures.

	@item --ignore-crc-error
	@opindex ignore-crc-error
	The ASCII armor used by OpenPGP is protected by a CRC checksum against
	transmission errors. Occasionally the CRC gets mangled somewhere on
	the transmission channel but the actual content (which is protected by
	the OpenPGP protocol anyway) is still okay. This option allows GnuPG
	to ignore CRC errors.

	@item --ignore-mdc-error
	@opindex ignore-mdc-error
	This option changes a MDC integrity protection failure into a warning.
	It is required to decrypt old messages which did not use an MDC. It
	may also be useful if a message is partially garbled, but it is
	necessary to get as much data as possible out of that garbled message.
	Be aware that a missing or failed MDC can be an indication of an
	attack. Use with great caution; see also option @option{--rfc2440}.

	@item --allow-weak-digest-algos
	@opindex allow-weak-digest-algos
	Signatures made with known-weak digest algorithms are normally
	rejected with an ``invalid digest algorithm'' message. This option
	allows the verification of signatures made with such weak algorithms.
	MD5 is the only digest algorithm considered weak by default. See also
	@option{--weak-digest} to reject other digest algorithms.

	@item --weak-digest @var{name}
	@opindex weak-digest
	Treat the specified digest algorithm as weak. Signatures made over
	weak digests algorithms are normally rejected. This option can be
	supplied multiple times if multiple algorithms should be considered
	weak. See also @option{--allow-weak-digest-algos} to disable
	rejection of weak digests. MD5 is always considered weak, and does
	not need to be listed explicitly.

	@item --allow-weak-key-signatures
	@opindex allow-weak-key-signatures
	To avoid a minor risk of collision attacks on third-party key
	signatures made using SHA-1, those key signatures are considered
	invalid. This options allows to override this restriction.

	@item --no-default-keyring
	@opindex no-default-keyring
	Do not add the default keyrings to the list of keyrings. Note that
	GnuPG will not operate without any keyrings, so if you use this option
	and do not provide alternate keyrings via @option{--keyring} or
	@option{--secret-keyring}, then GnuPG will still use the default public or
	secret keyrings.

	@item --no-keyring
	@opindex no-keyring
	Do not use any keyring at all. This overrides the default and all
	options which specify keyrings.

	@item --skip-verify
	@opindex skip-verify
	Skip the signature verification step. This may be
	used to make the decryption faster if the signature
	verification is not needed.

	@item --with-key-data
	@opindex with-key-data
	Print key listings delimited by colons (like @option{--with-colons}) and
	print the public key data.

	@item --list-signatures
	@opindex list-signatures
	@itemx --list-sigs
	@opindex list-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the signatures are listed too. This
	command has the same effect as using @option{--list-keys} with
	@option{--with-sig-list}. Note that in contrast to
	@option{--check-signatures} the key signatures are not verified. This
	command can be used to create a list of signing keys missing in the
	local keyring; for example:

	@example
	gpg --list-sigs --with-colons USERID \| \
	awk -F: '$1=="sig" && $2=="?" @{if($13)@{print $13@}else@{print $5@}@}'
	@end example

	@item --fast-list-mode
	@opindex fast-list-mode
	Changes the output of the list commands to work faster; this is achieved
	by leaving some parts empty. Some applications don't need the user ID
	and the trust information given in the listings. By using this options
	they can get a faster listing. The exact behaviour of this option may
	change in future versions. If you are missing some information, don't
	use this option.

	@item --no-literal
	@opindex no-literal
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --set-filesize
	@opindex set-filesize
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --show-session-key
	@opindex show-session-key
	Display the session key used for one message. See
	@option{--override-session-key} for the counterpart of this option.

	We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing; however the user should have
	the freedom to decide whether to go to prison or to reveal the content
	of one specific message without compromising all messages ever
	encrypted for one secret key.

	You can also use this option if you receive an encrypted message which
	is abusive or offensive, to prove to the administrators of the
	messaging system that the ciphertext transmitted corresponds to an
	inappropriate plaintext so they can take action against the offending
	user.

	@item --override-session-key @var{string}
	@itemx --override-session-key-fd @var{fd}
	@opindex override-session-key
	Don't use the public key but the session key @var{string} respective
	the session key taken from the first line read from file descriptor
	@var{fd}. The format of this string is the same as the one printed by
	@option{--show-session-key}. This option is normally not used but
	comes handy in case someone forces you to reveal the content of an
	encrypted message; using this option you can do this without handing
	out the secret key. Note that using @option{--override-session-key}
	may reveal the session key to all local users via the global process
	table. Often it is useful to combine this option with
	@option{--no-keyring}.

	@item --ask-sig-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-sig-expire
	@opindex ask-sig-expire
	When making a data signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-sig-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-sig-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-sig-expire
	@opindex default-sig-expire
	The default expiration time to use for signature expiration. Valid
	values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d
	(for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for
	example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an absolute
	date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --ask-cert-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-expire
	@opindex ask-cert-expire
	When making a key signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-cert-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-cert-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-cert-expire
	@opindex default-cert-expire
	The default expiration time to use for key signature expiration.
	Valid values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the
	letter d (for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years)
	(for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an
	absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --default-new-key-algo @var{string}
	@opindex default-new-key-algo @var{string}
	This option can be used to change the default algorithms for key
	generation. The @var{string} is similar to the arguments required for
	the command @option{--quick-add-key} but slightly different. For
	example the current default of @code{"rsa2048/cert,sign+rsa2048/encr"}
	(or @code{"rsa3072"}) can be changed to the value of what we currently
	call future default, which is @code{"ed25519/cert,sign+cv25519/encr"}.
	You need to consult the source code to learn the details. Note that
	the advanced key generation commands can always be used to specify a
	key algorithm directly.

	@item --allow-secret-key-import
	@opindex allow-secret-key-import
	This is an obsolete option and is not used anywhere.

	@item --allow-multiple-messages
	@item --no-allow-multiple-messages
	These are obsolete options; they have no more effect since GnuPG 2.2.8.

	@item --enable-special-filenames
	@opindex enable-special-filenames
	This option enables a mode in which filenames of the form
	@file{-&n}, where n is a non-negative decimal number,
	refer to the file descriptor n and not to a file with that name.

	@item --no-expensive-trust-checks
	@opindex no-expensive-trust-checks
	Experimental use only.

	@item --preserve-permissions
	@opindex preserve-permissions
	Don't change the permissions of a secret keyring back to user
	read/write only. Use this option only if you really know what you are doing.

	@item --default-preference-list @var{string}
	@opindex default-preference-list
	Set the list of default preferences to @var{string}. This preference
	list is used for new keys and becomes the default for "setpref" in the
	edit menu.

	@item --default-keyserver-url @var{name}
	@opindex default-keyserver-url
	Set the default keyserver URL to @var{name}. This keyserver will be
	used as the keyserver URL when writing a new self-signature on a key,
	which includes key generation and changing preferences.

	@item --list-config
	@opindex list-config
	Display various internal configuration parameters of GnuPG. This option
	is intended for external programs that call GnuPG to perform tasks, and
	is thus not generally useful. See the file @file{doc/DETAILS} in the
	source distribution for the details of which configuration items may be
	listed. @option{--list-config} is only usable with
	@option{--with-colons} set.

	@item --list-gcrypt-config
	@opindex list-gcrypt-config
	Display various internal configuration parameters of Libgcrypt.

	@item --gpgconf-list
	@opindex gpgconf-list
	This command is similar to @option{--list-config} but in general only
	internally used by the @command{gpgconf} tool.

	@item --gpgconf-test
	@opindex gpgconf-test
	This is more or less dummy action. However it parses the configuration
	file and returns with failure if the configuration file would prevent
	@command{@gpgname} from startup. Thus it may be used to run a syntax check
	on the configuration file.

	@c @item --use-only-openpgp-card
	@c @opindex use-only-openpgp-card
	@c Only access OpenPGP card's and no other cards. This is a hidden
	@c option which could be used in case an old use case required the
	@c OpenPGP card while several cards are available. This option might be
	@c removed if it turns out that nobody requires it.

	@end table

	@c *******************************
	@c ***** Deprecated **********
	@c *******************************
	@node Deprecated Options
	@subsection Deprecated options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --show-photos
	@itemx --no-show-photos
	@opindex show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-signatures},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, @option{--list-secret-keys}, and verifying
	a signature to also display the photo ID attached to the key, if
	any. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. These options are deprecated. Use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-photos} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-photos} instead.

	@item --show-keyring
	@opindex show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. This option is deprecated: use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-keyring} instead.

	@item --always-trust
	@opindex always-trust
	Identical to @option{--trust-model always}. This option is deprecated.

	@item --show-notation
	@itemx --no-show-notation
	@opindex show-notation
	Show signature notations in the @option{--list-signatures} or @option{--check-signatures} listings
	as well as when verifying a signature with a notation in it. These
	options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-notation}
	and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-notation} instead.

	@item --show-policy-url
	@itemx --no-show-policy-url
	@opindex show-policy-url
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-signatures} or @option{--check-signatures}
	listings as well as when verifying a signature with a policy URL in
	it. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} instead.


	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* FILES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect files
	@node GPG Configuration
	@section Configuration files

	There are a few configuration files to control certain aspects of
	@command{@gpgname}'s operation. Unless noted, they are expected in the
	current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}).

	@table @file

	@item gpg.conf
	@efindex gpg.conf
	This is the standard configuration file read by @command{@gpgname} on
	startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes
	may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated. This default
	name may be changed on the command line (@pxref{gpg-option --options}).
	You should backup this file.

	@end table

	Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files
	into the directory @file{@value{SYSCONFSKELDIR}} so that
	newly created users start up with a working configuration.
	For existing users a small
	helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}).

	For internal purposes @command{@gpgname} creates and maintains a few other
	files; They all live in the current home directory (@pxref{option
	--homedir}). Only the @command{@gpgname} program may modify these files.


	@table @file
	@item ~/.gnupg
	@efindex ~/.gnupg
	This is the default home directory which is used if neither the
	environment variable @code{GNUPGHOME} nor the option
	@option{--homedir} is given.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg
	@efindex pubring.gpg
	The public keyring. You should backup this file.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the public keyring.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
	@efindex pubring.kbx
	The public keyring using a different format. This file is shared
	with @command{gpgsm}. You should backup this file.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx.lock
	The lock file for @file{pubring.kbx}.

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg
	@efindex secring.gpg
	A secret keyring as used by GnuPG versions before 2.1. It is not
	used by GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the secret keyring.

	@item ~/.gnupg/.gpg-v21-migrated
	@efindex .gpg-v21-migrated
	File indicating that a migration to GnuPG 2.1 has been done.

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg
	@efindex trustdb.gpg
	The trust database. There is no need to backup this file; it is better
	to backup the ownertrust values (@pxref{option --export-ownertrust}).

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the trust database.

	@item ~/.gnupg/random_seed
	@efindex random_seed
	A file used to preserve the state of the internal random pool.

	@item ~/.gnupg/openpgp-revocs.d/
	@efindex openpgp-revocs.d
	This is the directory where gpg stores pre-generated revocation
	certificates. The file name corresponds to the OpenPGP fingerprint of
	the respective key. It is suggested to backup those certificates and
	if the primary private key is not stored on the disk to move them to
	an external storage device. Anyone who can access these files is
	able to revoke the corresponding key. You may want to print them out.
	You should backup all files in this directory and take care to keep
	this backup closed away.

	@end table

	Operation is further controlled by a few environment variables:

	@table @asis

	@item HOME
	@efindex HOME
	Used to locate the default home directory.

	@item GNUPGHOME
	@efindex GNUPGHOME
	If set directory used instead of "~/.gnupg".

	@item GPG_AGENT_INFO
	This variable is obsolete; it was used by GnuPG versions before 2.1.

	@item PINENTRY_USER_DATA
	@efindex PINENTRY_USER_DATA
	This value is passed via gpg-agent to pinentry. It is useful to convey
	extra information to a custom pinentry.

	@item COLUMNS
	@itemx LINES
	@efindex COLUMNS
	@efindex LINES
	Used to size some displays to the full size of the screen.

	@item LANGUAGE
	@efindex LANGUAGE
	Apart from its use by GNU, it is used in the W32 version to override the
	language selection done through the Registry. If used and set to a
	valid and available language name (@var{langid}), the file with the
	translation is loaded from
	@code{@var{gpgdir}/gnupg.nls/@var{langid}.mo}. Here @var{gpgdir} is the
	directory out of which the gpg binary has been loaded. If it can't be
	loaded the Registry is tried and as last resort the native Windows
	locale system is used.

	@end table

	When calling the gpg-agent component @command{@gpgname} sends a set of
	environment variables to gpg-agent. The names of these variables can
	be listed using the command:

	@example
	gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo std_env_names' /bye \| awk '$1=="D" @{print $2@}'
	@end example



	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* EXAMPLES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect examples
	@node GPG Examples
	@section Examples

	@table @asis

	@item gpg -se -r @code{Bob} @code{file}
	sign and encrypt for user Bob

	@item gpg --clear-sign @code{file}
	make a cleartext signature

	@item gpg -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature

	@item gpg -u 0x12345678 -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature with the key 0x12345678

	@item gpg --list-keys @code{user_ID}
	show keys

	@item gpg --fingerprint @code{user_ID}
	show fingerprint

	@item gpg --verify @code{pgpfile}
	@itemx gpg --verify @code{sigfile} [@code{datafile}]
	Verify the signature of the file but do not output the data unless
	requested. The second form is used for detached signatures, where
	@code{sigfile} is the detached signature (either ASCII armored or
	binary) and @code{datafile} are the signed data; if this is not given, the name of the
	file holding the signed data is constructed by cutting off the
	extension (".asc" or ".sig") of @code{sigfile} or by asking the user
	for the filename. If the option @option{--output} is also used the
	signed data is written to the file specified by that option; use
	@code{-} to write the signed data to stdout.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* USER ID **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect how to specify a user id
	@ifset isman
	@include specify-user-id.texi
	@end ifset

	@mansect filter expressions
	@chapheading FILTER EXPRESSIONS

	The options @option{--import-filter} and @option{--export-filter} use
	expressions with this syntax (square brackets indicate an optional
	part and curly braces a repetition, white space between the elements
	are allowed):

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	[lc] @{[@{flag@}] PROPNAME op VALUE [lc]@}
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	The name of a property (@var{PROPNAME}) may only consist of letters,
	digits and underscores. The description for the filter type
	describes which properties are defined. If an undefined property is
	used it evaluates to the empty string. Unless otherwise noted, the
	@var{VALUE} must always be given and may not be the empty string. No
	quoting is defined for the value, thus the value may not contain the
	strings @code{&&} or @code{\|\|}, which are used as logical connection
	operators. The flag @code{--} can be used to remove this restriction.

	Numerical values are computed as long int; standard C notation
	applies. @var{lc} is the logical connection operator; either
	@code{&&} for a conjunction or @code{\|\|} for a disjunction. A
	conjunction is assumed at the begin of an expression. Conjunctions
	have higher precedence than disjunctions. If @var{VALUE} starts with
	one of the characters used in any @var{op} a space after the
	@var{op} is required.

	@noindent
	The supported operators (@var{op}) are:

	@table @asis

	@item =~
	Substring must match.

	@item !~
	Substring must not match.

	@item =
	The full string must match.

	@item <>
	The full string must not match.

	@item ==
	The numerical value must match.

	@item !=
	The numerical value must not match.

	@item <=
	The numerical value of the field must be LE than the value.

	@item <
	The numerical value of the field must be LT than the value.

	@item >
	The numerical value of the field must be GT than the value.

	@item >=
	The numerical value of the field must be GE than the value.

	@item -le
	The string value of the field must be less or equal than the value.

	@item -lt
	The string value of the field must be less than the value.

	@item -gt
	The string value of the field must be greater than the value.

	@item -ge
	The string value of the field must be greater or equal than the value.

	@item -n
	True if value is not empty (no value allowed).

	@item -z
	True if value is empty (no value allowed).

	@item -t
	Alias for "PROPNAME != 0" (no value allowed).

	@item -f
	Alias for "PROPNAME == 0" (no value allowed).

	@end table

	@noindent
	Values for @var{flag} must be space separated. The supported flags
	are:

	@table @asis
	@item --
	@var{VALUE} spans to the end of the expression.
	@item -c
	The string match in this part is done case-sensitive.
	@end table

	The filter options concatenate several specifications for a filter of
	the same type. For example the four options in this example:

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	--import-filter keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa"
	--import-filter keep-uid="&& uid !~ Test"
	--import-filter keep-uid="\|\| uid =~ Alpha"
	--import-filter keep-uid="uid !~ Test"
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	@noindent
	which is equivalent to

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	--import-filter \
	keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa" && uid !~ Test" \|\| uid =~ Alpha" && "uid !~ Test"
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	imports only the user ids of a key containing the strings "Alfa"
	or "Alpha" but not the string "test".

	@mansect trust values
	@ifset isman
	@include trust-values.texi
	@end ifset

	@mansect return value
	@chapheading RETURN VALUE

	The program returns 0 if there are no severe errors, 1 if at least a
	signature was bad, and other error codes for fatal errors.

	Note that signature verification requires exact knowledge of what has
	been signed and by whom it has been signed. Using only the return code
	is thus not an appropriate way to verify a signature by a script.
	Either make proper use or the status codes or use the @command{gpgv}
	tool which has been designed to make signature verification easy for
	scripts.

	@mansect warnings
	@chapheading WARNINGS

	Use a good password for your user account and make sure that all
	security issues are always fixed on your machine. Also employ
	diligent physical protection to your machine. Consider to use a good
	passphrase as a last resort protection to your secret key in the case
	your machine gets stolen. It is important that your secret key is
	never leaked. Using an easy to carry around token or smartcard with
	the secret key is often a advisable.

	If you are going to verify detached signatures, make sure that the
	program knows about it; either give both filenames on the command line
	or use @samp{-} to specify STDIN.

	For scripted or other unattended use of @command{gpg} make sure to use
	the machine-parseable interface and not the default interface which is
	intended for direct use by humans. The machine-parseable interface
	provides a stable and well documented API independent of the locale or
	future changes of @command{gpg}. To enable this interface use the
	options @option{--with-colons} and @option{--status-fd}. For certain
	operations the option @option{--command-fd} may come handy too. See
	this man page and the file @file{DETAILS} for the specification of the
	interface. Note that the GnuPG ``info'' pages as well as the PDF
	version of the GnuPG manual features a chapter on unattended use of
	GnuPG. As an alternative the library @command{GPGME} can be used as a
	high-level abstraction on top of that interface.

	@mansect interoperability
	@chapheading INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS

	GnuPG tries to be a very flexible implementation of the OpenPGP
	standard. In particular, GnuPG implements many of the optional parts
	of the standard, such as the SHA-512 hash, and the ZLIB and BZIP2
	compression algorithms. It is important to be aware that not all
	OpenPGP programs implement these optional algorithms and that by
	forcing their use via the @option{--cipher-algo},
	@option{--digest-algo}, @option{--cert-digest-algo}, or
	@option{--compress-algo} options in GnuPG, it is possible to create a
	perfectly valid OpenPGP message, but one that cannot be read by the
	intended recipient.

	There are dozens of variations of OpenPGP programs available, and each
	supports a slightly different subset of these optional algorithms.
	For example, until recently, no (unhacked) version of PGP supported
	the BLOWFISH cipher algorithm. A message using BLOWFISH simply could
	not be read by a PGP user. By default, GnuPG uses the standard
	OpenPGP preferences system that will always do the right thing and
	create messages that are usable by all recipients, regardless of which
	OpenPGP program they use. Only override this safe default if you
	really know what you are doing.

	If you absolutely must override the safe default, or if the preferences
	on a given key are invalid for some reason, you are far better off using
	the @option{--pgp6}, @option{--pgp7}, or @option{--pgp8} options. These
	options are safe as they do not force any particular algorithms in
	violation of OpenPGP, but rather reduce the available algorithms to a
	"PGP-safe" list.

	@mansect bugs
	@chapheading BUGS

	On older systems this program should be installed as setuid(root). This
	is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents the
	operating system from writing memory pages (which may contain
	passphrases or other sensitive material) to disk. If you get no
	warning message about insecure memory your operating system supports
	locking without being root. The program drops root privileges as soon
	as locked memory is allocated.

	Note also that some systems (especially laptops) have the ability to
	``suspend to disk'' (also known as ``safe sleep'' or ``hibernate'').
	This writes all memory to disk before going into a low power or even
	powered off mode. Unless measures are taken in the operating system
	to protect the saved memory, passphrases or other sensitive material
	may be recoverable from it later.

	Before you report a bug you should first search the mailing list
	archives for similar problems and second check whether such a bug has
	already been reported to our bug tracker at @url{https://bugs.gnupg.org}.

	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* ************
	@c ************* UNATTENDED ************
	@c ************* ************
	@c *******************************************
	@manpause
	@node Unattended Usage of GPG
	@section Unattended Usage

	@command{@gpgname} is often used as a backend engine by other software. To help
	with this a machine interface has been defined to have an unambiguous
	way to do this. The options @option{--status-fd} and @option{--batch}
	are almost always required for this.

	@menu
	* Programmatic use of GnuPG:: Programmatic use of GnuPG
	* Ephemeral home directories:: Ephemeral home directories
	* The quick key manipulation interface:: The quick key manipulation interface
	* Unattended GPG key generation:: Unattended key generation
	@end menu


	@node Programmatic use of GnuPG
	@subsection Programmatic use of GnuPG

	Please consider using GPGME instead of calling @command{@gpgname}
	directly. GPGME offers a stable, backend-independent interface for
	many cryptographic operations. It supports OpenPGP and S/MIME, and
	also allows interaction with various GnuPG components.

	GPGME provides a C-API, and comes with bindings for C++, Qt, and
	Python. Bindings for other languages are available.

	@node Ephemeral home directories
	@subsection Ephemeral home directories

	Sometimes you want to contain effects of some operation, for example
	you want to import a key to inspect it, but you do not want this key
	to be added to your keyring. In earlier versions of GnuPG, it was
	possible to specify alternate keyring files for both public and secret
	keys. In modern GnuPG versions, however, we changed how secret keys
	are stored in order to better protect secret key material, and it was
	not possible to preserve this interface.

	The preferred way to do this is to use ephemeral home directories.
	This technique works across all versions of GnuPG.

	Create a temporary directory, create (or copy) a configuration that
	meets your needs, make @command{@gpgname} use this directory either
	using the environment variable @var{GNUPGHOME}, or the option
	@option{--homedir}. GPGME supports this too on a per-context basis,
	by modifying the engine info of contexts. Now execute whatever
	operation you like, import and export key material as necessary. Once
	finished, you can delete the directory. All GnuPG backend services
	that were started will detect this and shut down.

	@node The quick key manipulation interface
	@subsection The quick key manipulation interface

	Recent versions of GnuPG have an interface to manipulate keys without
	using the interactive command @option{--edit-key}. This interface was
	added mainly for the benefit of GPGME (please consider using GPGME,
	see the manual subsection ``Programmatic use of GnuPG''). This
	interface is described in the subsection ``How to manage your keys''.

	@node Unattended GPG key generation
	@subsection Unattended key generation

	The command @option{--generate-key} may be used along with the option
	@option{--batch} for unattended key generation. This is the most
	flexible way of generating keys, but it is also the most complex one.
	Consider using the quick key manipulation interface described in the
	previous subsection ``The quick key manipulation interface''.

	The parameters for the key are either read from stdin or given as a
	file on the command line. The format of the parameter file is as
	follows:

	@itemize @bullet
	@item Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 characters.
	@item UTF-8 encoding must be used to specify non-ASCII characters.
	@item Empty lines are ignored.
	@item Leading and trailing white space is ignored.
	@item A hash sign as the first non white space character indicates
	a comment line.
	@item Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign, the
	arguments are separated by white space from the keyword.
	@item Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon. Arguments
	are separated by white space.
	@item
	The first parameter must be @samp{Key-Type}; control statements may be
	placed anywhere.
	@item
	The order of the parameters does not matter except for @samp{Key-Type}
	which must be the first parameter. The parameters are only used for
	the generated keyblock (primary and subkeys); parameters from previous
	sets are not used. Some syntactically checks may be performed.
	@item
	Key generation takes place when either the end of the parameter file
	is reached, the next @samp{Key-Type} parameter is encountered or at the
	control statement @samp{%commit} is encountered.
	@end itemize

	@noindent
	Control statements:

	@table @asis

	@item %echo @var{text}
	Print @var{text} as diagnostic.

	@item %dry-run
	Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking).

	@item %commit
	Perform the key generation. Note that an implicit commit is done at
	the next @asis{Key-Type} parameter.

	@item %pubring @var{filename}
	Do not write the key to the default or commandline given keyring but
	to @var{filename}. This must be given before the first commit to take
	place, duplicate specification of the same filename is ignored, the
	last filename before a commit is used. The filename is used until a
	new filename is used (at commit points) and all keys are written to
	that file. If a new filename is given, this file is created (and
	overwrites an existing one).

	See the previous subsection ``Ephemeral home directories'' for a more
	robust way to contain side-effects.

	@item %secring @var{filename}
	This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	See the previous subsection ``Ephemeral home directories''.

	@item %ask-passphrase
	@itemx %no-ask-passphrase
	This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	@item %no-protection
	Using this option allows the creation of keys without any passphrase
	protection. This option is mainly intended for regression tests.

	@item %transient-key
	If given the keys are created using a faster and a somewhat less
	secure random number generator. This option may be used for keys
	which are only used for a short time and do not require full
	cryptographic strength. It takes only effect if used together with
	the control statement @samp{%no-protection}.

	@end table

	@noindent
	General Parameters:

	@table @asis

	@item Key-Type: @var{algo}
	Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the primary
	key. The algorithm must be capable of signing. This is a required
	parameter. @var{algo} may either be an OpenPGP algorithm number or a
	string with the algorithm name. The special value @samp{default} may
	be used for @var{algo} to create the default key type; in this case a
	@samp{Key-Usage} shall not be given and @samp{default} also be used
	for @samp{Subkey-Type}.

	@item Key-Length: @var{nbits}
	The requested length of the generated key in bits. The default is
	returned by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}.

	@item Key-Grip: @var{hexstring}
	This is optional and used to generate a CSR or certificate for an
	already existing key. Key-Length will be ignored when given.

	@item Key-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Space or comma delimited list of key usages. Allowed values are
	@samp{encrypt}, @samp{sign}, and @samp{auth}. This is used to
	generate the key flags. Please make sure that the algorithm is
	capable of this usage. Note that OpenPGP requires that all primary
	keys are capable of certification, so no matter what usage is given
	here, the @samp{cert} flag will be on. If no @samp{Key-Usage} is
	specified and the @samp{Key-Type} is not @samp{default}, all allowed
	usages for that particular algorithm are used; if it is not given but
	@samp{default} is used the usage will be @samp{sign}.

	@item Subkey-Type: @var{algo}
	This generates a secondary key (subkey). Currently only one subkey
	can be handled. See also @samp{Key-Type} above.

	@item Subkey-Length: @var{nbits}
	Length of the secondary key (subkey) in bits. The default is returned
	by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}.

	@item Subkey-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Key usage lists for a subkey; similar to @samp{Key-Usage}.

	@item Passphrase: @var{string}
	If you want to specify a passphrase for the secret key, enter it here.
	Default is to use the Pinentry dialog to ask for a passphrase.

	@item Name-Real: @var{name}
	@itemx Name-Comment: @var{comment}
	@itemx Name-Email: @var{email}
	The three parts of a user name. Remember to use UTF-8 encoding here.
	If you don't give any of them, no user ID is created.

	@item Expire-Date: @var{iso-date}\|(@var{number}[d\|w\|m\|y])
	Set the expiration date for the key (and the subkey). It may either
	be entered in ISO date format (e.g. "20000815T145012") or as number of
	days, weeks, month or years after the creation date. The special
	notation "seconds=N" is also allowed to specify a number of seconds
	since creation. Without a letter days are assumed. Note that there
	is no check done on the overflow of the type used by OpenPGP for
	timestamps. Thus you better make sure that the given value make
	sense. Although OpenPGP works with time intervals, GnuPG uses an
	absolute value internally and thus the last year we can represent is
	2105.

	@item Creation-Date: @var{iso-date}
	Set the creation date of the key as stored in the key information and
	which is also part of the fingerprint calculation. Either a date like
	"1986-04-26" or a full timestamp like "19860426T042640" may be used.
	The time is considered to be UTC. The special notation "seconds=N"
	may be used to directly specify a the number of seconds since Epoch
	(Unix time). If it is not given the current time is used.

	@item Preferences: @var{string}
	Set the cipher, hash, and compression preference values for this key.
	This expects the same type of string as the sub-command @samp{setpref}
	in the @option{--edit-key} menu.

	@item Revoker: @var{algo}:@var{fpr} [sensitive]
	Add a designated revoker to the generated key. Algo is the public key
	algorithm of the designated revoker (i.e. RSA=1, DSA=17, etc.)
	@var{fpr} is the fingerprint of the designated revoker. The optional
	@samp{sensitive} flag marks the designated revoker as sensitive
	information. Only v4 keys may be designated revokers.

	@item Keyserver: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter that specifies the preferred keyserver
	URL for the key.

	@item Handle: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter only used with the status lines
	KEY_CREATED and KEY_NOT_CREATED. @var{string} may be up to 100
	characters and should not contain spaces. It is useful for batch key
	generation to associate a key parameter block with a status line.

	@end table

	@noindent
	Here is an example on how to create a key in an ephemeral home directory:
	@smallexample
	$ export GNUPGHOME="$(mktemp -d)"
	$ cat >foo <<EOF
	%echo Generating a basic OpenPGP key
	Key-Type: DSA
	Key-Length: 1024
	Subkey-Type: ELG-E
	Subkey-Length: 1024
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	EOF
	$ @gpgname --batch --generate-key foo
	[...]
	$ @gpgname --list-secret-keys
	/tmp/tmp.0NQxB74PEf/pubring.kbx
	-------------------------------
	sec dsa1024 2016-12-16 [SCA]
	768E895903FC1C44045C8CB95EEBDB71E9E849D0
	uid [ultimate] Joe Tester (with stupid passphrase) <joe@@foo.bar>
	ssb elg1024 2016-12-16 [E]
	@end smallexample

	@noindent
	If you want to create a key with the default algorithms you would use
	these parameters:
	@smallexample
	%echo Generating a default key
	Key-Type: default
	Subkey-Type: default
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	@end smallexample




	@mansect see also
	@ifset isman
	@command{gpgv}(1),
	@command{gpgsm}(1),
	@command{gpg-agent}(1)
	@end ifset
	@include see-also-note.texi
	diff --git a/g10/gpg.c b/g10/gpg.c
	index bf7421577..05289880a 100644
	--- a/g10/gpg.c
	+++ b/g10/gpg.c
	@@ -1,5595 +1,5598 @@
	/* gpg.c - The GnuPG OpenPGP tool
	* Copyright (C) 1998-2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 1997-2019 Werner Koch
	* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 g10 Code GmbH
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <errno.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <ctype.h>
	#include <unistd.h>
	#ifdef HAVE_STAT
	#include <sys/stat.h> /* for stat() */
	#endif
	#include <fcntl.h>
	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	# ifdef HAVE_WINSOCK2_H
	# include <winsock2.h>
	# endif
	# include <windows.h>
	#endif
	#include <npth.h>

	#define INCLUDED_BY_MAIN_MODULE 1
	#include "gpg.h"
	#include <assuan.h>
	#include "../common/iobuf.h"
	#include "../common/util.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "../common/membuf.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "filter.h"
	#include "../common/ttyio.h"
	#include "../common/i18n.h"
	#include "../common/sysutils.h"
	#include "../common/status.h"
	#include "keyserver-internal.h"
	#include "exec.h"
	#include "../common/gc-opt-flags.h"
	#include "../common/asshelp.h"
	#include "call-dirmngr.h"
	#include "tofu.h"
	#include "objcache.h"
	#include "../common/init.h"
	#include "../common/mbox-util.h"
	#include "../common/shareddefs.h"
	#include "../common/compliance.h"

	#if defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM) \|\| defined(__CYGWIN__)
	#define MY_O_BINARY O_BINARY
	#ifndef S_IRGRP
	# define S_IRGRP 0
	# define S_IWGRP 0
	#endif
	#else
	#define MY_O_BINARY 0
	#endif

	#ifdef __MINGW32__
	int _dowildcard = -1;
	#endif

	enum cmd_and_opt_values
	{
	aNull = 0,
	oArmor = 'a',
	aDetachedSign = 'b',
	aSym = 'c',
	aDecrypt = 'd',
	aEncr = 'e',
	oRecipientFile = 'f',
	oHiddenRecipientFile = 'F',
	oInteractive = 'i',
	aListKeys = 'k',
	oDryRun = 'n',
	oOutput = 'o',
	oQuiet = 'q',
	oRecipient = 'r',
	oHiddenRecipient = 'R',
	aSign = 's',
	oTextmodeShort= 't',
	oLocalUser = 'u',
	oVerbose = 'v',
	oCompress = 'z',
	oSetNotation = 'N',
	aListSecretKeys = 'K',
	oBatch = 500,
	oMaxOutput,
	oInputSizeHint,
	oChunkSize,
	oSigNotation,
	oCertNotation,
	oShowNotation,
	oNoShowNotation,
	oKnownNotation,
	aEncrFiles,
	aEncrSym,
	aDecryptFiles,
	aClearsign,
	aStore,
	aQuickKeygen,
	aFullKeygen,
	aKeygen,
	aSignEncr,
	aSignEncrSym,
	aSignSym,
	aSignKey,
	aLSignKey,
	aQuickSignKey,
	aQuickLSignKey,
	aQuickAddUid,
	aQuickAddKey,
	aQuickRevUid,
	aQuickSetExpire,
	aQuickSetPrimaryUid,
	aListConfig,
	aListGcryptConfig,
	aGPGConfList,
	aGPGConfTest,
	aListPackets,
	aEditKey,
	aDeleteKeys,
	aDeleteSecretKeys,
	aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys,
	aImport,
	aFastImport,
	aVerify,
	aVerifyFiles,
	aListSigs,
	aSendKeys,
	aRecvKeys,
	aLocateKeys,
	aLocateExtKeys,
	aSearchKeys,
	aRefreshKeys,
	aFetchKeys,
	aShowKeys,
	aExport,
	aExportSecret,
	aExportSecretSub,
	aExportSshKey,
	aCheckKeys,
	aGenRevoke,
	aDesigRevoke,
	aPrimegen,
	aPrintMD,
	aPrintMDs,
	aCheckTrustDB,
	aUpdateTrustDB,
	aFixTrustDB,
	aListTrustDB,
	aListTrustPath,
	aExportOwnerTrust,
	aImportOwnerTrust,
	aDeArmor,
	aEnArmor,
	aGenRandom,
	aRebuildKeydbCaches,
	aCardStatus,
	aCardEdit,
	aChangePIN,
	aPasswd,
	aServer,
	aTOFUPolicy,

	oMimemode,
	oTextmode,
	oNoTextmode,
	oExpert,
	oNoExpert,
	oDefSigExpire,
	oAskSigExpire,
	oNoAskSigExpire,
	oDefCertExpire,
	oAskCertExpire,
	oNoAskCertExpire,
	oDefCertLevel,
	oMinCertLevel,
	oAskCertLevel,
	oNoAskCertLevel,
	oFingerprint,
	oWithFingerprint,
	oWithSubkeyFingerprint,
	oWithICAOSpelling,
	oWithKeygrip,
	oWithKeyScreening,
	oWithSecret,
	oWithWKDHash,
	oWithColons,
	oWithKeyData,
	oWithKeyOrigin,
	oWithTofuInfo,
	oWithSigList,
	oWithSigCheck,
	oAnswerYes,
	oAnswerNo,
	oKeyring,
	oPrimaryKeyring,
	oSecretKeyring,
	oShowKeyring,
	oDefaultKey,
	oDefRecipient,
	oDefRecipientSelf,
	oNoDefRecipient,
	oTrySecretKey,
	oOptions,
	oDebug,
	oDebugLevel,
	oDebugAll,
	oDebugIOLBF,
	oDebugSetIobufSize,
	oDebugAllowLargeChunks,
	oStatusFD,
	oStatusFile,
	oAttributeFD,
	oAttributeFile,
	oEmitVersion,
	oNoEmitVersion,
	oCompletesNeeded,
	oMarginalsNeeded,
	oMaxCertDepth,
	oLoadExtension,
	oCompliance,
	oGnuPG,
	oRFC2440,
	oRFC4880,
	oRFC4880bis,
	oOpenPGP,
	oPGP7,
	oPGP8,
	oDE_VS,
	oRFC2440Text,
	oNoRFC2440Text,
	oCipherAlgo,
	oAEADAlgo,
	oDigestAlgo,
	oCertDigestAlgo,
	oCompressAlgo,
	oCompressLevel,
	oBZ2CompressLevel,
	oBZ2DecompressLowmem,
	oPassphrase,
	oPassphraseFD,
	oPassphraseFile,
	oPassphraseRepeat,
	oPinentryMode,
	oCommandFD,
	oCommandFile,
	oQuickRandom,
	oNoVerbose,
	oTrustDBName,
	oNoSecmemWarn,
	oRequireSecmem,
	oNoRequireSecmem,
	oNoPermissionWarn,
	oNoArmor,
	oNoDefKeyring,
	oNoKeyring,
	oNoGreeting,
	oNoTTY,
	oNoOptions,
	oNoBatch,
	oHomedir,
	oSkipVerify,
	oSkipHiddenRecipients,
	oNoSkipHiddenRecipients,
	oAlwaysTrust,
	oTrustModel,
	oForceOwnertrust,
	oSetFilename,
	oForYourEyesOnly,
	oNoForYourEyesOnly,
	oSetPolicyURL,
	oSigPolicyURL,
	oCertPolicyURL,
	oShowPolicyURL,
	oNoShowPolicyURL,
	oSigKeyserverURL,
	oUseEmbeddedFilename,
	oNoUseEmbeddedFilename,
	oComment,
	oDefaultComment,
	oNoComments,
	oThrowKeyids,
	oNoThrowKeyids,
	oShowPhotos,
	oNoShowPhotos,
	oPhotoViewer,
	oForceAEAD,
	oS2KMode,
	oS2KDigest,
	oS2KCipher,
	oS2KCount,
	oDisplayCharset,
	oNotDashEscaped,
	oEscapeFrom,
	oNoEscapeFrom,
	oLockOnce,
	oLockMultiple,
	oLockNever,
	oKeyServer,
	oKeyServerOptions,
	oImportOptions,
	oImportFilter,
	oExportOptions,
	oExportFilter,
	oListOptions,
	oVerifyOptions,
	oTempDir,
	oExecPath,
	oEncryptTo,
	oHiddenEncryptTo,
	oNoEncryptTo,
	oEncryptToDefaultKey,
	oLoggerFD,
	oLoggerFile,
	oUtf8Strings,
	oNoUtf8Strings,
	oDisableCipherAlgo,
	oDisablePubkeyAlgo,
	oAllowNonSelfsignedUID,
	oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID,
	oAllowFreeformUID,
	oNoAllowFreeformUID,
	oAllowSecretKeyImport,
	oEnableSpecialFilenames,
	oNoLiteral,
	oSetFilesize,
	oHonorHttpProxy,
	oFastListMode,
	oListOnly,
	oIgnoreTimeConflict,
	oIgnoreValidFrom,
	oIgnoreCrcError,
	oIgnoreMDCError,
	oShowSessionKey,
	oOverrideSessionKey,
	oOverrideSessionKeyFD,
	oNoRandomSeedFile,
	oAutoKeyRetrieve,
	oNoAutoKeyRetrieve,
	oUseAgent,
	oNoUseAgent,
	oGpgAgentInfo,
	oUseKeyboxd,
	oMergeOnly,
	oTryAllSecrets,
	oTrustedKey,
	oNoExpensiveTrustChecks,
	oFixedListMode,
	oLegacyListMode,
	oNoSigCache,
	oAutoCheckTrustDB,
	oNoAutoCheckTrustDB,
	oPreservePermissions,
	oDefaultPreferenceList,
	oDefaultKeyserverURL,
	oPersonalCipherPreferences,
	oPersonalAEADPreferences,
	oPersonalDigestPreferences,
	oPersonalCompressPreferences,
	oAgentProgram,
	oKeyboxdProgram,
	oDirmngrProgram,
	oDisableDirmngr,
	oDisplay,
	oTTYname,
	oTTYtype,
	oLCctype,
	oLCmessages,
	oXauthority,
	oGroup,
	oUnGroup,
	oNoGroups,
	oStrict,
	oNoStrict,
	oMangleDosFilenames,
	oNoMangleDosFilenames,
	oEnableProgressFilter,
	oMultifile,
	oKeyidFormat,
	oExitOnStatusWriteError,
	oLimitCardInsertTries,
	oReaderPort,
	octapiDriver,
	opcscDriver,
	oDisableCCID,
	oRequireCrossCert,
	oNoRequireCrossCert,
	oAutoKeyLocate,
	oNoAutoKeyLocate,
	oEnableLargeRSA,
	oDisableLargeRSA,
	oEnableDSA2,
	oDisableDSA2,
	oAllowWeakDigestAlgos,
	oAllowWeakKeySignatures,
	oFakedSystemTime,
	oNoAutostart,
	oPrintPKARecords,
	oPrintDANERecords,
	oTOFUDefaultPolicy,
	oTOFUDBFormat,
	oDefaultNewKeyAlgo,
	oWeakDigest,
	oUnwrap,
	oOnlySignTextIDs,
	oDisableSignerUID,
	oSender,
	oKeyOrigin,
	oRequestOrigin,
	oNoSymkeyCache,
	oUseOnlyOpenPGPCard,
	oFullTimestrings,
	+ oIncludeKeyBlock,

	oNoop
	};


	static gpgrt_opt_t opts[] = {

	ARGPARSE_group (300, N_("@Commands:\n ")),

	ARGPARSE_c (aSign, "sign", N_("make a signature")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aClearsign, "clear-sign", N_("make a clear text signature")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aClearsign, "clearsign", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDetachedSign, "detach-sign", N_("make a detached signature")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEncr, "encrypt", N_("encrypt data")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEncrFiles, "encrypt-files", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aSym, "symmetric", N_("encryption only with symmetric cipher")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aStore, "store", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDecrypt, "decrypt", N_("decrypt data (default)")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDecryptFiles, "decrypt-files", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aVerify, "verify" , N_("verify a signature")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aVerifyFiles, "verify-files" , "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListKeys, "list-keys", N_("list keys")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListKeys, "list-public-keys", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListSigs, "list-signatures", N_("list keys and signatures")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListSigs, "list-sigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aCheckKeys, "check-signatures",
	N_("list and check key signatures")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aCheckKeys, "check-sigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (oFingerprint, "fingerprint", N_("list keys and fingerprints")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListSecretKeys, "list-secret-keys", N_("list secret keys")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aKeygen, "generate-key",
	N_("generate a new key pair")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aKeygen, "gen-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickKeygen, "quick-generate-key" ,
	N_("quickly generate a new key pair")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickKeygen, "quick-gen-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickAddUid, "quick-add-uid",
	N_("quickly add a new user-id")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickAddUid, "quick-adduid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickAddKey, "quick-add-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickAddKey, "quick-addkey", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickRevUid, "quick-revoke-uid",
	N_("quickly revoke a user-id")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickRevUid, "quick-revuid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickSetExpire, "quick-set-expire",
	N_("quickly set a new expiration date")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickSetPrimaryUid, "quick-set-primary-uid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aFullKeygen, "full-generate-key" ,
	N_("full featured key pair generation")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aFullKeygen, "full-gen-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aGenRevoke, "generate-revocation",
	N_("generate a revocation certificate")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aGenRevoke, "gen-revoke", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteKeys,"delete-keys",
	N_("remove keys from the public keyring")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteSecretKeys, "delete-secret-keys",
	N_("remove keys from the secret keyring")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickSignKey, "quick-sign-key" ,
	N_("quickly sign a key")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickLSignKey, "quick-lsign-key",
	N_("quickly sign a key locally")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aSignKey, "sign-key" ,N_("sign a key")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aLSignKey, "lsign-key" ,N_("sign a key locally")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEditKey, "edit-key" ,N_("sign or edit a key")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEditKey, "key-edit" ,"@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aPasswd, "change-passphrase", N_("change a passphrase")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aPasswd, "passwd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDesigRevoke, "generate-designated-revocation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDesigRevoke, "desig-revoke","@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aExport, "export" , N_("export keys") ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aSendKeys, "send-keys" , N_("export keys to a keyserver") ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aRecvKeys, "receive-keys" , N_("import keys from a keyserver") ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aRecvKeys, "recv-keys" , "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aSearchKeys, "search-keys" ,
	N_("search for keys on a keyserver") ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aRefreshKeys, "refresh-keys",
	N_("update all keys from a keyserver")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aLocateKeys, "locate-keys", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aLocateExtKeys, "locate-external-keys", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aFetchKeys, "fetch-keys" , "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aShowKeys, "show-keys" , "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aExportSecret, "export-secret-keys" , "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aExportSecretSub, "export-secret-subkeys" , "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aExportSshKey, "export-ssh-key", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aImport, "import", N_("import/merge keys")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aFastImport, "fast-import", "@"),
	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	ARGPARSE_c (aCardStatus, "card-status", N_("print the card status")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aCardEdit, "edit-card", N_("change data on a card")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aCardEdit, "card-edit", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aChangePIN, "change-pin", N_("change a card's PIN")),
	#endif
	ARGPARSE_c (aListConfig, "list-config", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListGcryptConfig, "list-gcrypt-config", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aGPGConfList, "gpgconf-list", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aGPGConfTest, "gpgconf-test", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListPackets, "list-packets","@"),

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	ARGPARSE_c (aExportOwnerTrust, "export-ownertrust", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aImportOwnerTrust, "import-ownertrust", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aUpdateTrustDB,"update-trustdb",
	N_("update the trust database")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aCheckTrustDB, "check-trustdb", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aFixTrustDB, "fix-trustdb", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListTrustDB, "list-trustdb", "@"),
	#endif

	ARGPARSE_c (aDeArmor, "dearmor", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDeArmor, "dearmour", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEnArmor, "enarmor", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEnArmor, "enarmour", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aPrintMD, "print-md", N_("print message digests")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aPrintMDs, "print-mds", "@"), /* old */
	ARGPARSE_c (aPrimegen, "gen-prime", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aGenRandom,"gen-random", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aServer, "server", N_("run in server mode")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aTOFUPolicy, "tofu-policy",
	N_("\|VALUE\|set the TOFU policy for a key")),
	/* Not yet used:
	ARGPARSE_c (aListTrustPath, "list-trust-path", "@"), */
	ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys,
	"delete-secret-and-public-keys", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aRebuildKeydbCaches, "rebuild-keydb-caches", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListKeys, "list-key", "@"), /* alias */
	ARGPARSE_c (aListSigs, "list-sig", "@"), /* alias */
	ARGPARSE_c (aCheckKeys, "check-sig", "@"), /* alias */
	ARGPARSE_c (aShowKeys, "show-key", "@"), /* alias */



	ARGPARSE_header ("Monitor", N_("Options controlling the diagnostic output")),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oVerbose, "verbose", N_("verbose")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoVerbose, "no-verbose", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oQuiet, "quiet", N_("be somewhat more quiet")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoTTY, "no-tty", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoGreeting, "no-greeting", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDebug, "debug", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDebugLevel, "debug-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugAll, "debug-all", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugIOLBF, "debug-iolbf", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_u (oDebugSetIobufSize, "debug-set-iobuf-size", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_u (oDebugAllowLargeChunks, "debug-allow-large-chunks", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplayCharset, "display-charset", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplayCharset, "charset", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_conffile (oOptions, "options", N_("\|FILE\|read options from FILE")),
	ARGPARSE_noconffile (oNoOptions, "no-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oLoggerFD, "logger-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLoggerFile, "log-file",
	N_("\|FILE\|write server mode logs to FILE")),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLoggerFile, "logger-file", "@"), /* 1.4 compatibility. */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oQuickRandom, "debug-quick-random", "@"),


	ARGPARSE_header ("Configuration",
	N_("Options controlling the configuration")),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oHomedir, "homedir", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oFakedSystemTime, "faked-system-time", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultKey, "default-key",
	N_("\|NAME\|use NAME as default secret key")),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oEncryptTo, "encrypt-to",
	N_("\|NAME\|encrypt to user ID NAME as well")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEncryptTo, "no-encrypt-to", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oHiddenEncryptTo, "hidden-encrypt-to", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEncryptToDefaultKey, "encrypt-to-default-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefRecipient, "default-recipient", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDefRecipientSelf, "default-recipient-self", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDefRecipient, "no-default-recipient", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oGroup, "group",
	N_("\|SPEC\|set up email aliases")),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oUnGroup, "ungroup", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoGroups, "no-groups", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCompliance, "compliance", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "gnupg", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp2", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp6", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp7", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp8", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC2440, "rfc2440", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC4880, "rfc4880", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC4880bis, "rfc4880bis", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oOpenPGP, "openpgp", N_("use strict OpenPGP behavior")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP7, "pgp6", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP7, "pgp7", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP8, "pgp8", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultNewKeyAlgo, "default-new-key-algo", "@"),
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAlwaysTrust, "always-trust", "@"),
	#endif
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrustModel, "trust-model", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPhotoViewer, "photo-viewer", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKnownNotation, "known-notation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oAgentProgram, "agent-program", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyboxdProgram, "keyboxd-program", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDirmngrProgram, "dirmngr-program", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oExitOnStatusWriteError, "exit-on-status-write-error", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oLimitCardInsertTries, "limit-card-insert-tries", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableProgressFilter, "enable-progress-filter", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTempDir, "temp-directory", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oExecPath, "exec-path", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oExpert, "expert", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoExpert, "no-expert", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSecmemWarn, "no-secmem-warning", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequireSecmem, "require-secmem", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRequireSecmem, "no-require-secmem", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoPermissionWarn, "no-permission-warning", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDryRun, "dry-run", N_("do not make any changes")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oInteractive, "interactive", N_("prompt before overwriting")),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefSigExpire, "default-sig-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAskSigExpire, "ask-sig-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAskSigExpire, "no-ask-sig-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefCertExpire, "default-cert-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAskCertExpire, "ask-cert-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAskCertExpire, "no-ask-cert-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oDefCertLevel, "default-cert-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oMinCertLevel, "min-cert-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAskCertLevel, "ask-cert-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAskCertLevel, "no-ask-cert-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oOnlySignTextIDs, "only-sign-text-ids", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableLargeRSA, "enable-large-rsa", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableLargeRSA, "disable-large-rsa", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableDSA2, "enable-dsa2", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableDSA2, "disable-dsa2", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCipherPreferences, "personal-cipher-preferences","@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalAEADPreferences, "personal-aead-preferences","@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalDigestPreferences, "personal-digest-preferences","@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCompressPreferences,
	"personal-compress-preferences", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultPreferenceList, "default-preference-list", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultKeyserverURL, "default-keyserver-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoExpensiveTrustChecks, "no-expensive-trust-checks", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowNonSelfsignedUID, "allow-non-selfsigned-uid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID, "no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowFreeformUID, "allow-freeform-uid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowFreeformUID, "no-allow-freeform-uid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPreservePermissions, "preserve-permissions", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oDefCertLevel, "default-cert-check-level", "@"), /* old */
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTOFUDefaultPolicy, "tofu-default-policy", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oLockOnce, "lock-once", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oLockMultiple, "lock-multiple", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oLockNever, "lock-never", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCompressAlgo,"compress-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCompressAlgo, "compression-algo", "@"), /* Alias */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oBZ2DecompressLowmem, "bzip2-decompress-lowmem", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oCompletesNeeded, "completes-needed", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oMarginalsNeeded, "marginals-needed", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oMaxCertDepth, "max-cert-depth", "@" ),
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrustDBName, "trustdb-name", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAutoCheckTrustDB, "auto-check-trustdb", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutoCheckTrustDB, "no-auto-check-trustdb", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oForceOwnertrust, "force-ownertrust", "@"),
	#endif


	ARGPARSE_header ("Input", N_("Options controlling the input")),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oMultifile, "multifile", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oInputSizeHint, "input-size-hint", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oUtf8Strings, "utf8-strings", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUtf8Strings, "no-utf8-strings", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_p_u (oSetFilesize, "set-filesize", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoLiteral, "no-literal", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSetNotation, "set-notation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSigNotation, "sig-notation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertNotation, "cert-notation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSetPolicyURL, "set-policy-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSigPolicyURL, "sig-policy-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertPolicyURL, "cert-policy-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSigKeyserverURL, "sig-keyserver-url", "@"),



	ARGPARSE_header ("Output", N_("Options controlling the output")),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oArmor, "armor", N_("create ascii armored output")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oArmor, "armour", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoArmor, "no-armor", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoArmor, "no-armour", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oOutput, "output", N_("\|FILE\|write output to FILE")),
	ARGPARSE_p_u (oMaxOutput, "max-output", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oComment, "comment", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDefaultComment, "default-comment", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoComments, "no-comments", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEmitVersion, "emit-version", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEmitVersion, "no-emit-version", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEmitVersion, "no-version", "@"), /* alias */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNotDashEscaped, "not-dash-escaped", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEscapeFrom, "escape-from-lines", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEscapeFrom, "no-escape-from-lines", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oMimemode, "mimemode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oTextmodeShort, NULL, "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oTextmode, "textmode", N_("use canonical text mode")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoTextmode, "no-textmode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSetFilename, "set-filename", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oForYourEyesOnly, "for-your-eyes-only", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoForYourEyesOnly, "no-for-your-eyes-only", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowNotation, "show-notation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoShowNotation, "no-show-notation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowSessionKey, "show-session-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oUseEmbeddedFilename, "use-embedded-filename", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUseEmbeddedFilename, "no-use-embedded-filename", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oUnwrap, "unwrap", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oMangleDosFilenames, "mangle-dos-filenames", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoMangleDosFilenames, "no-mangle-dos-filenames", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oChunkSize, "chunk-size", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSymkeyCache, "no-symkey-cache", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oSkipVerify, "skip-verify", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oListOnly, "list-only", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oCompress, NULL,
	N_("\|N\|set compress level to N (0 disables)")),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oCompressLevel, "compress-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oBZ2CompressLevel, "bzip2-compress-level", "@"),
	-
	+ ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableSignerUID, "disable-signer-uid", "@"),
	+ ARGPARSE_s_n (oIncludeKeyBlock, "include-key-block",
	+ N_("include the public key in the signature")),

	ARGPARSE_header ("ImportExport",
	N_("Options controlling key import and export")),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oAutoKeyLocate, "auto-key-locate",
	N_("\|MECHANISMS\|use MECHANISMS to locate keys by mail address")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutoKeyLocate, "no-auto-key-locate", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAutoKeyRetrieve, "auto-key-retrieve", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutoKeyRetrieve, "no-auto-key-retrieve", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableDirmngr, "disable-dirmngr",
	N_("disable all access to the dirmngr")),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyServer, "keyserver", "@"), /* Deprecated. */
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyServerOptions, "keyserver-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyOrigin, "key-origin", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oImportOptions, "import-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oImportFilter, "import-filter", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oExportOptions, "export-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oExportFilter, "export-filter", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oMergeOnly, "merge-only", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowSecretKeyImport, "allow-secret-key-import", "@"),


	ARGPARSE_header ("Keylist", N_("Options controlling key listings")),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oListOptions, "list-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oFullTimestrings, "full-timestrings", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowPhotos, "show-photos", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoShowPhotos, "no-show-photos", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowPolicyURL, "show-policy-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoShowPolicyURL, "no-show-policy-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithColons, "with-colons", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithTofuInfo,"with-tofu-info", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeyData,"with-key-data", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSigList,"with-sig-list", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSigCheck,"with-sig-check", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithFingerprint, "with-fingerprint", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSubkeyFingerprint, "with-subkey-fingerprint", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSubkeyFingerprint, "with-subkey-fingerprints", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithICAOSpelling, "with-icao-spelling", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeygrip, "with-keygrip", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeyScreening,"with-key-screening", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSecret, "with-secret", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithWKDHash, "with-wkd-hash", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeyOrigin, "with-key-origin", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oFastListMode, "fast-list-mode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oFixedListMode, "fixed-list-mode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oLegacyListMode, "legacy-list-mode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPrintPKARecords, "print-pka-records", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPrintDANERecords, "print-dane-records", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyidFormat, "keyid-format", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowKeyring, "show-keyring", "@"),


	ARGPARSE_header (NULL, N_("Options to specify keys")),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "recipient", N_("\|USER-ID\|encrypt for USER-ID")),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oHiddenRecipient, "hidden-recipient", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipientFile, "recipient-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oHiddenRecipientFile, "hidden-recipient-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "remote-user", "@"), /* (old option name) */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oThrowKeyids, "throw-keyids", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoThrowKeyids, "no-throw-keyids", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLocalUser, "local-user",
	N_("\|USER-ID\|use USER-ID to sign or decrypt")),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrustedKey, "trusted-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSender, "sender", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrySecretKey, "try-secret-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oTryAllSecrets, "try-all-secrets", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDefKeyring, "no-default-keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoKeyring, "no-keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyring, "keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPrimaryKeyring, "primary-keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSecretKeyring, "secret-keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oSkipHiddenRecipients, "skip-hidden-recipients", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSkipHiddenRecipients, "no-skip-hidden-recipients", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oOverrideSessionKey, "override-session-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oOverrideSessionKeyFD, "override-session-key-fd", "@"),
	- ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableSignerUID, "disable-signer-uid", "@"),


	ARGPARSE_header ("Security", N_("Options controlling the security")),

	ARGPARSE_s_i (oS2KMode, "s2k-mode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oS2KDigest, "s2k-digest-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oS2KCipher, "s2k-cipher-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oS2KCount, "s2k-count", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oForceAEAD, "force-aead", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequireCrossCert, "require-backsigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequireCrossCert, "require-cross-certification", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRequireCrossCert, "no-require-backsigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRequireCrossCert, "no-require-cross-certification", "@"),
	/* Options to override new security defaults. */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowWeakKeySignatures, "allow-weak-key-signatures", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowWeakDigestAlgos, "allow-weak-digest-algos", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oWeakDigest, "weak-digest","@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oVerifyOptions, "verify-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableSpecialFilenames, "enable-special-filenames", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRandomSeedFile, "no-random-seed-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSigCache, "no-sig-cache", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreTimeConflict, "ignore-time-conflict", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreValidFrom, "ignore-valid-from", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreCrcError, "ignore-crc-error", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreMDCError, "ignore-mdc-error", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisableCipherAlgo, "disable-cipher-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisablePubkeyAlgo, "disable-pubkey-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCipherAlgo, "cipher-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oAEADAlgo, "aead-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDigestAlgo, "digest-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertDigestAlgo, "cert-digest-algo", "@"),


	ARGPARSE_header (NULL, N_("Options for unattended use")),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oBatch, "batch", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoBatch, "no-batch", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAnswerYes, "yes", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAnswerNo, "no", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oStatusFD, "status-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oStatusFile, "status-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oAttributeFD, "attribute-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oAttributeFile, "attribute-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oCommandFD, "command-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCommandFile, "command-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_o_s (oPassphrase, "passphrase", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oPassphraseFD, "passphrase-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPassphraseFile, "passphrase-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oPassphraseRepeat,"passphrase-repeat", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPinentryMode, "pinentry-mode", "@"),


	ARGPARSE_header (NULL, N_("Other options")),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oRequestOrigin, "request-origin", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplay, "display", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTTYname, "ttyname", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTTYtype, "ttytype", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLCctype, "lc-ctype", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLCmessages, "lc-messages","@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oXauthority, "xauthority", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutostart, "no-autostart", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oUseKeyboxd, "use-keyboxd", "@"),
	/* Options which can be used in special circumstances. They are not
	* published and we hope they are never required. */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oUseOnlyOpenPGPCard, "use-only-openpgp-card", "@"),
	/* Esoteric compatibility options. */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC2440Text, "rfc2440-text", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRFC2440Text, "no-rfc2440-text", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_header (NULL, ""), /* Stop the header group. */

	/* Aliases. I constantly mistype these, and assume other people do
	as well. */
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCipherPreferences, "personal-cipher-prefs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalAEADPreferences, "personal-aead-prefs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalDigestPreferences, "personal-digest-prefs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCompressPreferences, "personal-compress-prefs", "@"),

	/* These two are aliases to help users of the PGP command line
	product use gpg with minimal pain. Many commands are common
	already as they seem to have borrowed commands from us. Now I'm
	returning the favor. */
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLocalUser, "sign-with", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "user", "@"),


	/* Dummy options with warnings. */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oUseAgent, "use-agent", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUseAgent, "no-use-agent", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oGpgAgentInfo, "gpg-agent-info", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oReaderPort, "reader-port", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (octapiDriver, "ctapi-driver", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (opcscDriver, "pcsc-driver", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableCCID, "disable-ccid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oHonorHttpProxy, "honor-http-proxy", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTOFUDBFormat, "tofu-db-format", "@"),

	/* Dummy options. */
	ARGPARSE_ignore (oStrict, "strict"),
	ARGPARSE_ignore (oNoStrict, "no-strict"),
	ARGPARSE_ignore (oLoadExtension, "load-extension"), /* from 1.4. */

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "sk-comments", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-sk-comments", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "compress-keys", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "compress-sigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "force-v3-sigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-force-v3-sigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "force-v4-certs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-force-v4-certs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-mdc-warning", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "force-mdc", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-force-mdc", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "disable-mdc", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-disable-mdc", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "allow-multisig-verification", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "allow-multiple-messages", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-allow-multiple-messages", "@"),


	ARGPARSE_group (302, N_(
	"@\n(See the man page for a complete listing of all commands and options)\n"
	)),

	ARGPARSE_group (303, N_("@\nExamples:\n\n"
	" -se -r Bob [file] sign and encrypt for user Bob\n"
	" --clear-sign [file] make a clear text signature\n"
	" --detach-sign [file] make a detached signature\n"
	" --list-keys [names] show keys\n"
	" --fingerprint [names] show fingerprints\n")),


	ARGPARSE_end ()
	};


	/* The list of supported debug flags. */
	static struct debug_flags_s debug_flags [] =
	{
	{ DBG_PACKET_VALUE , "packet" },
	{ DBG_MPI_VALUE , "mpi" },
	{ DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE , "crypto" },
	{ DBG_FILTER_VALUE , "filter" },
	{ DBG_IOBUF_VALUE , "iobuf" },
	{ DBG_MEMORY_VALUE , "memory" },
	{ DBG_CACHE_VALUE , "cache" },
	{ DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE, "memstat" },
	{ DBG_TRUST_VALUE , "trust" },
	{ DBG_HASHING_VALUE, "hashing" },
	{ DBG_IPC_VALUE , "ipc" },
	{ DBG_CLOCK_VALUE , "clock" },
	{ DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE , "lookup" },
	{ DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE, "extprog" },
	{ 0, NULL }
	};


	#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
	#define ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS 1
	#else
	#define ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS 0
	#endif

	/* The list of the default AKL methods. */
	#define DEFAULT_AKL_LIST "local,wkd"


	int g10_errors_seen = 0;

	static int utf8_strings = 0;
	static int maybe_setuid = 1;
	static unsigned int opt_set_iobuf_size;
	static unsigned int opt_set_iobuf_size_used;

	static char build_list( const char text, char letter,
	const char (mapf)(int), int (*chkf)(int) );
	static void set_cmd( enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd,
	enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd );
	static void print_mds( const char *fname, int algo );
	static void add_notation_data( const char *string, int which );
	static void add_policy_url( const char *string, int which );
	static void add_keyserver_url( const char *string, int which );
	static void emergency_cleanup (void);
	static void read_sessionkey_from_fd (int fd);

	/* NPth wrapper function definitions. */
	ASSUAN_SYSTEM_NPTH_IMPL;


	static char *
	make_libversion (const char libname, const char (getfnc)(const char))
	{
	const char *s;
	char *result;

	if (maybe_setuid)
	{
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 0, 0); /* Drop setuid. */
	maybe_setuid = 0;
	}
	s = getfnc (NULL);
	result = xmalloc (strlen (libname) + 1 + strlen (s) + 1);
	strcpy (stpcpy (stpcpy (result, libname), " "), s);
	return result;
	}


	static int
	build_list_pk_test_algo (int algo)
	{
	/* Show only one "RSA" string. If RSA_E or RSA_S is available RSA
	is also available. */
	if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E
	\|\| algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S)
	return GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;

	return openpgp_pk_test_algo (algo);
	}

	static const char *
	build_list_pk_algo_name (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_pk_algo_name (algo);
	}

	static int
	build_list_cipher_test_algo (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo);
	}

	static const char *
	build_list_cipher_algo_name (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
	}

	static int
	build_list_aead_test_algo (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_aead_test_algo (algo);
	}

	static const char *
	build_list_aead_algo_name (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_aead_algo_name (algo);
	}

	static int
	build_list_md_test_algo (int algo)
	{
	/* By default we do not accept MD5 based signatures. To avoid
	confusion we do not announce support for it either. */
	if (algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5)
	return GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;

	return openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
	}

	static const char *
	build_list_md_algo_name (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_md_algo_name (algo);
	}


	static const char *
	my_strusage( int level )
	{
	static char digests, pubkeys, ciphers, zips, aeads, ver_gcry;
	const char *p;

	switch( level ) {
	case 9: p = "GPL-3.0-or-later"; break;
	case 11: p = "@GPG@ (@GNUPG@)";
	break;
	case 13: p = VERSION; break;
	case 14: p = GNUPG_DEF_COPYRIGHT_LINE; break;

	case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break;
	case 19: p = _("Please report bugs to <@EMAIL@>.\n"); break;

	case 20:
	if (!ver_gcry)
	ver_gcry = make_libversion ("libgcrypt", gcry_check_version);
	p = ver_gcry;
	break;

	#ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION
	case 25:
	p="NOTE: THIS IS A DEVELOPMENT VERSION!";
	break;
	case 26:
	p="It is only intended for test purposes and should NOT be";
	break;
	case 27:
	p="used in a production environment or with production keys!";
	break;
	#endif

	case 1:
	case 40: p =
	_("Usage: @GPG@ [options] [files] (-h for help)");
	break;
	case 41: p =
	_("Syntax: @GPG@ [options] [files]\n"
	"Sign, check, encrypt or decrypt\n"
	"Default operation depends on the input data\n");
	break;

	case 31: p = "\nHome: "; break;
	#ifndef __riscos__
	case 32: p = gnupg_homedir (); break;
	#else /* __riscos__ */
	case 32: p = make_filename(gnupg_homedir (), NULL); break;
	#endif /* __riscos__ */
	case 33: p = _("\nSupported algorithms:\n"); break;
	case 34:
	if (!pubkeys)
	pubkeys = build_list (_("Pubkey: "), 1,
	build_list_pk_algo_name,
	build_list_pk_test_algo );
	p = pubkeys;
	break;
	case 35:
	if( !ciphers )
	ciphers = build_list(_("Cipher: "), 'S',
	build_list_cipher_algo_name,
	build_list_cipher_test_algo );
	p = ciphers;
	break;
	case 36:
	if (!aeads)
	aeads = build_list ("AEAD: ", 'A',
	build_list_aead_algo_name,
	build_list_aead_test_algo);
	p = aeads;
	break;
	case 37:
	if( !digests )
	digests = build_list(_("Hash: "), 'H',
	build_list_md_algo_name,
	build_list_md_test_algo );
	p = digests;
	break;
	case 38:
	if( !zips )
	zips = build_list(_("Compression: "),'Z',
	compress_algo_to_string,
	check_compress_algo);
	p = zips;
	break;

	default: p = NULL;
	}
	return p;
	}


	static char *
	build_list (const char *text, char letter,
	const char * (mapf)(int), int (chkf)(int))
	{
	membuf_t mb;
	int indent;
	int i, j, len;
	int limit;
	const char *s;
	char *string;

	if (maybe_setuid)
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 0, 0); /* Drop setuid. */

	indent = utf8_charcount (text, -1);
	len = 0;
	init_membuf (&mb, 512);

	limit = (letter == 'A')? 4 : 110;
	for (i=0; i <= limit; i++ )
	{
	if (!chkf (i) && (s = mapf (i)))
	{
	if (mb.len - len > 60)
	{
	put_membuf_str (&mb, ",\n");
	len = mb.len;
	for (j=0; j < indent; j++)
	put_membuf_str (&mb, " ");
	}
	else if (mb.len)
	put_membuf_str (&mb, ", ");
	else
	put_membuf_str (&mb, text);

	put_membuf_str (&mb, s);
	if (opt.verbose && letter)
	{
	char num[20];
	if (letter == 1)
	snprintf (num, sizeof num, " (%d)", i);
	else
	snprintf (num, sizeof num, " (%c%d)", letter, i);
	put_membuf_str (&mb, num);
	}
	}
	}
	if (mb.len)
	put_membuf_str (&mb, "\n");
	put_membuf (&mb, "", 1);

	string = get_membuf (&mb, NULL);
	return xrealloc (string, strlen (string)+1);
	}


	static void
	wrong_args( const char *text)
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stderr, _("usage: %s [options] %s\n"), GPG_NAME, text);
	log_inc_errorcount ();
	g10_exit(2);
	}


	static char *
	make_username( const char *string )
	{
	char *p;
	if( utf8_strings )
	p = xstrdup(string);
	else
	p = native_to_utf8( string );
	return p;
	}


	static void
	set_opt_session_env (const char name, const char value)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;

	err = session_env_setenv (opt.session_env, name, value);
	if (err)
	log_fatal ("error setting session environment: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	}


	/* Setup the debugging. With a LEVEL of NULL only the active debug
	flags are propagated to the subsystems. With LEVEL set, a specific
	set of debug flags is set; thus overriding all flags already
	set. */
	static void
	set_debug (const char *level)
	{
	int numok = (level && digitp (level));
	int numlvl = numok? atoi (level) : 0;

	if (!level)
	;
	else if (!strcmp (level, "none") \|\| (numok && numlvl < 1))
	opt.debug = 0;
	else if (!strcmp (level, "basic") \|\| (numok && numlvl <= 2))
	opt.debug = DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE;
	else if (!strcmp (level, "advanced") \|\| (numok && numlvl <= 5))
	opt.debug = DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE\|DBG_TRUST_VALUE\|DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE;
	else if (!strcmp (level, "expert") \|\| (numok && numlvl <= 8))
	opt.debug = (DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE\|DBG_TRUST_VALUE\|DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE
	\|DBG_CACHE_VALUE\|DBG_LOOKUP\|DBG_FILTER_VALUE\|DBG_PACKET_VALUE);
	else if (!strcmp (level, "guru") \|\| numok)
	{
	opt.debug = ~0;
	/* Unless the "guru" string has been used we don't want to allow
	hashing debugging. The rationale is that people tend to
	select the highest debug value and would then clutter their
	disk with debug files which may reveal confidential data. */
	if (numok)
	opt.debug &= ~(DBG_HASHING_VALUE);
	}
	else
	{
	log_error (_("invalid debug-level '%s' given\n"), level);
	g10_exit (2);
	}

	if ((opt.debug & DBG_MEMORY_VALUE))
	memory_debug_mode = 1;
	if ((opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE))
	memory_stat_debug_mode = 1;
	if (DBG_MPI)
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 2);
	if (DBG_CRYPTO)
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 1);
	if ((opt.debug & DBG_IOBUF_VALUE))
	iobuf_debug_mode = 1;
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);

	if (opt.debug)
	parse_debug_flag (NULL, &opt.debug, debug_flags);

	if (opt_set_iobuf_size \|\| opt_set_iobuf_size_used)
	log_debug ("iobuf buffer size is %uk\n",
	iobuf_set_buffer_size (opt_set_iobuf_size));
	}


	/* We set the screen dimensions for UI purposes. Do not allow screens
	smaller than 80x24 for the sake of simplicity. */
	static void
	set_screen_dimensions(void)
	{
	#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	char *str;

	str=getenv("COLUMNS");
	if(str)
	opt.screen_columns=atoi(str);

	str=getenv("LINES");
	if(str)
	opt.screen_lines=atoi(str);
	#endif

	if(opt.screen_columns<80 \|\| opt.screen_columns>255)
	opt.screen_columns=80;

	if(opt.screen_lines<24 \|\| opt.screen_lines>255)
	opt.screen_lines=24;
	}


	/* Helper to open a file FNAME either for reading or writing to be
	used with --status-file etc functions. Not generally useful but it
	avoids the riscos specific functions and well some Windows people
	might like it too. Prints an error message and returns -1 on
	error. On success the file descriptor is returned. */
	static int
	open_info_file (const char *fname, int for_write, int binary)
	{
	#ifdef __riscos__
	return riscos_fdopenfile (fname, for_write);
	#elif defined (ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS)
	/* We can't allow these even when testing for a secured filename
	because files to be secured might not yet been secured. This is
	similar to the option file but in that case it is unlikely that
	sensitive information may be retrieved by means of error
	messages. */
	(void)fname;
	(void)for_write;
	(void)binary;
	return -1;
	#else
	int fd;

	if (binary)
	binary = MY_O_BINARY;

	/* if (is_secured_filename (fname)) */
	/* { */
	/* fd = -1; */
	/* gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); */
	/* } */
	/* else */
	/* { */
	do
	{
	if (for_write)
	fd = open (fname, O_CREAT \| O_TRUNC \| O_WRONLY \| binary,
	S_IRUSR \| S_IWUSR \| S_IRGRP \| S_IWGRP);
	else
	fd = open (fname, O_RDONLY \| binary);
	}
	while (fd == -1 && errno == EINTR);
	/* } */
	if ( fd == -1)
	log_error ( for_write? _("can't create '%s': %s\n")
	: _("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno));

	return fd;
	#endif
	}

	static void
	set_cmd( enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd, enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd )
	{
	enum cmd_and_opt_values cmd = *ret_cmd;

	if( !cmd \|\| cmd == new_cmd )
	cmd = new_cmd;
	else if( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aEncr )
	cmd = aSignEncr;
	else if( cmd == aEncr && new_cmd == aSign )
	cmd = aSignEncr;
	else if( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aSym )
	cmd = aSignSym;
	else if( cmd == aSym && new_cmd == aSign )
	cmd = aSignSym;
	else if( cmd == aSym && new_cmd == aEncr )
	cmd = aEncrSym;
	else if( cmd == aEncr && new_cmd == aSym )
	cmd = aEncrSym;
	else if (cmd == aSignEncr && new_cmd == aSym)
	cmd = aSignEncrSym;
	else if (cmd == aSignSym && new_cmd == aEncr)
	cmd = aSignEncrSym;
	else if (cmd == aEncrSym && new_cmd == aSign)
	cmd = aSignEncrSym;
	else if( ( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aClearsign )
	\|\| ( cmd == aClearsign && new_cmd == aSign ) )
	cmd = aClearsign;
	else {
	log_error(_("conflicting commands\n"));
	g10_exit(2);
	}

	*ret_cmd = cmd;
	}


	static void
	add_group(char *string)
	{
	char name,value;
	struct groupitem *item;

	/* Break off the group name */
	name=strsep(&string,"=");
	if(string==NULL)
	{
	log_error(_("no = sign found in group definition '%s'\n"),name);
	return;
	}

	trim_trailing_ws(name,strlen(name));

	/* Does this group already exist? */
	for(item=opt.grouplist;item;item=item->next)
	if(strcasecmp(item->name,name)==0)
	break;

	if(!item)
	{
	item=xmalloc(sizeof(struct groupitem));
	item->name=name;
	item->next=opt.grouplist;
	item->values=NULL;
	opt.grouplist=item;
	}

	/* Break apart the values */
	while ((value= strsep(&string," \t")))
	{
	if (*value)
	add_to_strlist2(&item->values,value,utf8_strings);
	}
	}


	static void
	rm_group(char *name)
	{
	struct groupitem item,last=NULL;

	trim_trailing_ws(name,strlen(name));

	for(item=opt.grouplist;item;last=item,item=item->next)
	{
	if(strcasecmp(item->name,name)==0)
	{
	if(last)
	last->next=item->next;
	else
	opt.grouplist=item->next;

	free_strlist(item->values);
	xfree(item);
	break;
	}
	}
	}


	/* We need to check three things.

	0) The homedir. It must be x00, a directory, and owned by the
	user.

	1) The options/gpg.conf file. Okay unless it or its containing
	directory is group or other writable or not owned by us. Disable
	exec in this case.

	2) Extensions. Same as #1.

	Returns true if the item is unsafe. */
	static int
	check_permissions (const char *path, int item)
	{
	#if defined(HAVE_STAT) && !defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)
	static int homedir_cache=-1;
	char tmppath,dir;
	struct stat statbuf,dirbuf;
	int homedir=0,ret=0,checkonly=0;
	int perm=0,own=0,enc_dir_perm=0,enc_dir_own=0;

	if(opt.no_perm_warn)
	return 0;

	log_assert(item==0 \|\| item==1 \|\| item==2);

	/* extensions may attach a path */
	if(item==2 && path[0]!=DIRSEP_C)
	{
	if(strchr(path,DIRSEP_C))
	tmppath=make_filename(path,NULL);
	else
	tmppath=make_filename(gnupg_libdir (),path,NULL);
	}
	else
	tmppath=xstrdup(path);

	/* If the item is located in the homedir, but isn't the homedir,
	don't continue if we already checked the homedir itself. This is
	to avoid user confusion with an extra options file warning which
	could be rectified if the homedir itself had proper
	permissions. */
	if(item!=0 && homedir_cache>-1
	&& !ascii_strncasecmp (gnupg_homedir (), tmppath,
	strlen (gnupg_homedir ())))
	{
	ret=homedir_cache;
	goto end;
	}

	/* It's okay if the file or directory doesn't exist */
	if(stat(tmppath,&statbuf)!=0)
	{
	ret=0;
	goto end;
	}

	/* Now check the enclosing directory. Theoretically, we could walk
	this test up to the root directory /, but for the sake of sanity,
	I'm stopping at one level down. */
	dir=make_dirname(tmppath);

	if(stat(dir,&dirbuf)!=0 \|\| !S_ISDIR(dirbuf.st_mode))
	{
	/* Weird error */
	ret=1;
	goto end;
	}

	xfree(dir);

	/* Assume failure */
	ret=1;

	if(item==0)
	{
	/* The homedir must be x00, a directory, and owned by the user. */

	if(S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode))
	{
	if(statbuf.st_uid==getuid())
	{
	if((statbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG\|S_IRWXO))==0)
	ret=0;
	else
	perm=1;
	}
	else
	own=1;

	homedir_cache=ret;
	}
	}
	else if(item==1 \|\| item==2)
	{
	/* The options or extension file. Okay unless it or its
	containing directory is group or other writable or not owned
	by us or root. */

	if(S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
	{
	if(statbuf.st_uid==getuid() \|\| statbuf.st_uid==0)
	{
	if((statbuf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP\|S_IWOTH))==0)
	{
	/* it's not writable, so make sure the enclosing
	directory is also not writable */
	if(dirbuf.st_uid==getuid() \|\| dirbuf.st_uid==0)
	{
	if((dirbuf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP\|S_IWOTH))==0)
	ret=0;
	else
	enc_dir_perm=1;
	}
	else
	enc_dir_own=1;
	}
	else
	{
	/* it's writable, so the enclosing directory had
	better not let people get to it. */
	if(dirbuf.st_uid==getuid() \|\| dirbuf.st_uid==0)
	{
	if((dirbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG\|S_IRWXO))==0)
	ret=0;
	else
	perm=enc_dir_perm=1; /* unclear which one to fix! */
	}
	else
	enc_dir_own=1;
	}
	}
	else
	own=1;
	}
	}
	else
	BUG();

	if(!checkonly)
	{
	if(own)
	{
	if(item==0)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on"
	" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else if(item==1)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on"
	" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on"
	" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	}
	if(perm)
	{
	if(item==0)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on"
	" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else if(item==1)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on"
	" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on"
	" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	}
	if(enc_dir_own)
	{
	if(item==0)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on"
	" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else if(item==1)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on"
	" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on"
	" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	}
	if(enc_dir_perm)
	{
	if(item==0)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on"
	" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else if(item==1)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on"
	" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on"
	" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	}
	}

	end:
	xfree(tmppath);

	if(homedir)
	homedir_cache=ret;

	return ret;

	#else /!(HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)/
	(void)path;
	(void)item;
	return 0;
	#endif /!(HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)/
	}


	/* Print the OpenPGP defined algo numbers. */
	static void
	print_algo_numbers(int (*checker)(int))
	{
	int i,first=1;

	for(i=0;i<=110;i++)
	{
	if(!checker(i))
	{
	if(first)
	first=0;
	else
	es_printf (";");
	es_printf ("%d",i);
	}
	}
	}


	static void
	print_algo_names(int (checker)(int),const char (*mapper)(int))
	{
	int i,first=1;

	for(i=0;i<=110;i++)
	{
	if(!checker(i))
	{
	if(first)
	first=0;
	else
	es_printf (";");
	es_printf ("%s",mapper(i));
	}
	}
	}

	/* In the future, we can do all sorts of interesting configuration
	output here. For now, just give "group" as the Enigmail folks need
	it, and pubkey, cipher, hash, and compress as they may be useful
	for frontends. */
	static void
	list_config(char *items)
	{
	int show_all = !items;
	char *name = NULL;
	const char *s;
	struct groupitem *giter;
	int first, iter;

	if(!opt.with_colons)
	return;

	while(show_all \|\| (name=strsep(&items," ")))
	{
	int any=0;

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"group")==0)
	{
	for (giter = opt.grouplist; giter; giter = giter->next)
	{
	strlist_t sl;

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "cfg:group:");
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, giter->name, strlen(giter->name),
	":", NULL);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);

	for(sl=giter->values; sl; sl=sl->next)
	{
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sl->d, strlen (sl->d),
	":;", NULL);
	if(sl->next)
	es_printf(";");
	}

	es_printf("\n");
	}

	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"version")==0)
	{
	es_printf("cfg:version:");
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, VERSION, strlen(VERSION), ":", NULL);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"pubkey")==0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:pubkey:");
	print_algo_numbers (build_list_pk_test_algo);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"pubkeyname")==0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:pubkeyname:");
	print_algo_names (build_list_pk_test_algo,
	build_list_pk_algo_name);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"cipher")==0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:cipher:");
	print_algo_numbers (build_list_cipher_test_algo);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if (show_all \|\| !ascii_strcasecmp (name,"ciphername"))
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:ciphername:");
	print_algo_names (build_list_cipher_test_algo,
	build_list_cipher_algo_name);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any = 1;
	}

	if(show_all
	\|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"digest")==0
	\|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"hash")==0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:digest:");
	print_algo_numbers (build_list_md_test_algo);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if (show_all
	\|\| !ascii_strcasecmp(name,"digestname")
	\|\| !ascii_strcasecmp(name,"hashname"))
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:digestname:");
	print_algo_names (build_list_md_test_algo,
	build_list_md_algo_name);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"compress")==0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:compress:");
	print_algo_numbers(check_compress_algo);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp (name, "compressname") == 0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:compressname:");
	print_algo_names (check_compress_algo,
	compress_algo_to_string);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if (show_all \|\| !ascii_strcasecmp(name,"ccid-reader-id"))
	{
	/* We ignore this for GnuPG 1.4 backward compatibility. */
	any=1;
	}

	if (show_all \|\| !ascii_strcasecmp (name,"curve"))
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:curve:");
	for (iter=0, first=1; (s = openpgp_enum_curves (&iter)); first=0)
	es_printf ("%s%s", first?"":";", s);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	/* Curve OIDs are rarely useful and thus only printed if requested. */
	if (name && !ascii_strcasecmp (name,"curveoid"))
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:curveoid:");
	for (iter=0, first=1; (s = openpgp_enum_curves (&iter)); first = 0)
	{
	s = openpgp_curve_to_oid (s, NULL, NULL);
	es_printf ("%s%s", first?"":";", s? s:"[?]");
	}
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all)
	break;

	if(!any)
	log_error(_("unknown configuration item '%s'\n"),name);
	}
	}


	/* List options and default values in the GPG Conf format. This is a
	new tool distributed with gnupg 1.9.x but we also want some limited
	support in older gpg versions. The output is the name of the
	configuration file and a list of options available for editing by
	gpgconf. */
	static void
	gpgconf_list (const char *configfile)
	{
	char *configfile_esc = percent_escape (configfile, NULL);

	es_printf ("%s-%s.conf:%lu:\"%s\n",
	GPGCONF_NAME, GPG_NAME,
	GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT,
	configfile_esc ? configfile_esc : "/dev/null");
	es_printf ("verbose:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("quiet:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("keyserver:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("reader-port:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("default-key:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("encrypt-to:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("try-secret-key:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("auto-key-locate:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("auto-key-retrieve:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("log-file:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("debug-level:%lu:\"none:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT);
	es_printf ("group:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("compliance:%lu:\"%s:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT, "gnupg");
	es_printf ("default-new-key-algo:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("trust-model:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("disable-dirmngr:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("max-cert-depth:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("completes-needed:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("marginals-needed:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);

	/* The next one is an info only item and should match the macros at
	the top of keygen.c */
	es_printf ("default_pubkey_algo:%lu:\"%s:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT,
	get_default_pubkey_algo ());

	xfree (configfile_esc);
	}


	static int
	parse_subpacket_list(char *list)
	{
	char *tok;
	byte subpackets[128],i;
	int count=0;

	if(!list)
	{
	/* No arguments means all subpackets */
	memset(subpackets+1,1,sizeof(subpackets)-1);
	count=127;
	}
	else
	{
	memset(subpackets,0,sizeof(subpackets));

	/* Merge with earlier copy */
	if(opt.show_subpackets)
	{
	byte *in;

	for(in=opt.show_subpackets;*in;in++)
	{
	if(in>127 \|\| in<1)
	BUG();

	if(!subpackets[*in])
	count++;
	subpackets[*in]=1;
	}
	}

	while((tok=strsep(&list," ,")))
	{
	if(!*tok)
	continue;

	i=atoi(tok);
	if(i>127 \|\| i<1)
	return 0;

	if(!subpackets[i])
	count++;
	subpackets[i]=1;
	}
	}

	xfree(opt.show_subpackets);
	opt.show_subpackets=xmalloc(count+1);
	opt.show_subpackets[count--]=0;

	for(i=1;i<128 && count>=0;i++)
	if(subpackets[i])
	opt.show_subpackets[count--]=i;

	return 1;
	}


	static int
	parse_list_options(char *str)
	{
	char subpackets=""; / something that isn't NULL */
	struct parse_options lopts[]=
	{
	{"show-photos",LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS,NULL,
	N_("display photo IDs during key listings")},
	{"show-usage",LIST_SHOW_USAGE,NULL,
	N_("show key usage information during key listings")},
	{"show-policy-urls",LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS,NULL,
	N_("show policy URLs during signature listings")},
	{"show-notations",LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show all notations during signature listings")},
	{"show-std-notations",LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show IETF standard notations during signature listings")},
	{"show-standard-notations",LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	NULL},
	{"show-user-notations",LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show user-supplied notations during signature listings")},
	{"show-keyserver-urls",LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS,NULL,
	N_("show preferred keyserver URLs during signature listings")},
	{"show-uid-validity",LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY,NULL,
	N_("show user ID validity during key listings")},
	{"show-unusable-uids",LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS,NULL,
	N_("show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings")},
	{"show-unusable-subkeys",LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS,NULL,
	N_("show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings")},
	{"show-keyring",LIST_SHOW_KEYRING,NULL,
	N_("show the keyring name in key listings")},
	{"show-sig-expire",LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE,NULL,
	N_("show expiration dates during signature listings")},
	{"show-sig-subpackets",LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS,NULL,
	NULL},
	{"show-only-fpr-mbox",LIST_SHOW_ONLY_FPR_MBOX, NULL,
	NULL},
	{NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
	};

	/* C99 allows for non-constant initializers, but we'd like to
	compile everywhere, so fill in the show-sig-subpackets argument
	here. Note that if the parse_options array changes, we'll have
	to change the subscript here. */
	lopts[13].value=&subpackets;

	if(parse_options(str,&opt.list_options,lopts,1))
	{
	if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS)
	{
	/* Unset so users can pass multiple lists in. */
	opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS;
	if(!parse_subpacket_list(subpackets))
	return 0;
	}
	else if(subpackets==NULL && opt.show_subpackets)
	{
	/* User did 'no-show-subpackets' */
	xfree(opt.show_subpackets);
	opt.show_subpackets=NULL;
	}

	return 1;
	}
	else
	return 0;
	}


	/* Collapses argc/argv into a single string that must be freed */
	static char *
	collapse_args(int argc,char *argv[])
	{
	char *str=NULL;
	int i,first=1,len=0;

	for(i=0;i<argc;i++)
	{
	len+=strlen(argv[i])+2;
	str=xrealloc(str,len);
	if(first)
	{
	str[0]='\0';
	first=0;
	}
	else
	strcat(str," ");

	strcat(str,argv[i]);
	}

	return str;
	}


	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	static void
	parse_trust_model(const char *model)
	{
	if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"pgp")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_PGP;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"classic")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_CLASSIC;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"always")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_ALWAYS;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"direct")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_DIRECT;
	#ifdef USE_TOFU
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"tofu")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_TOFU;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"tofu+pgp")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_TOFU_PGP;
	#endif /USE_TOFU/
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"auto")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_AUTO;
	else
	log_error("unknown trust model '%s'\n",model);
	}
	#endif /NO_TRUST_MODELS/


	static int
	parse_tofu_policy (const char *policystr)
	{
	#ifdef USE_TOFU
	struct { const char *keyword; int policy; } list[] = {
	{ "auto", TOFU_POLICY_AUTO },
	{ "good", TOFU_POLICY_GOOD },
	{ "unknown", TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN },
	{ "bad", TOFU_POLICY_BAD },
	{ "ask", TOFU_POLICY_ASK }
	};
	int i;

	if (!ascii_strcasecmp (policystr, "help"))
	{
	log_info (_("valid values for option '%s':\n"), "--tofu-policy");
	for (i=0; i < DIM (list); i++)
	log_info (" %s\n", list[i].keyword);
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	for (i=0; i < DIM (list); i++)
	if (!ascii_strcasecmp (policystr, list[i].keyword))
	return list[i].policy;
	#endif /USE_TOFU/

	log_error (_("unknown TOFU policy '%s'\n"), policystr);
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("(use \"help\" to list choices)\n"));
	g10_exit (1);
	}


	static struct gnupg_compliance_option compliance_options[] =
	{
	{ "gnupg", oGnuPG },
	{ "openpgp", oOpenPGP },
	{ "rfc4880bis", oRFC4880bis },
	{ "rfc4880", oRFC4880 },
	{ "rfc2440", oRFC2440 },
	{ "pgp6", oPGP7 },
	{ "pgp7", oPGP7 },
	{ "pgp8", oPGP8 },
	{ "de-vs", oDE_VS }
	};


	/* Helper to set compliance related options. This is a separate
	* function so that it can also be used by the --compliance option
	* parser. */
	static void
	set_compliance_option (enum cmd_and_opt_values option)
	{
	opt.flags.rfc4880bis = 0; /* Clear because it is initially set. */

	switch (option)
	{
	case oRFC4880bis:
	opt.flags.rfc4880bis = 1;
	/* fall through. */
	case oOpenPGP:
	case oRFC4880:
	/* This is effectively the same as RFC2440, but with
	"--enable-dsa2 --no-rfc2440-text --escape-from-lines
	--require-cross-certification". */
	opt.compliance = CO_RFC4880;
	opt.flags.dsa2 = 1;
	opt.flags.require_cross_cert = 1;
	opt.rfc2440_text = 0;
	opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1;
	opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1;
	opt.escape_from = 1;
	opt.not_dash_escaped = 0;
	opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
	opt.def_aead_algo = 0;
	opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.cert_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.compress_algo = -1;
	opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
	opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
	opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;
	break;
	case oRFC2440:
	opt.compliance = CO_RFC2440;
	opt.flags.dsa2 = 0;
	opt.rfc2440_text = 1;
	opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1;
	opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1;
	opt.escape_from = 0;
	opt.not_dash_escaped = 0;
	opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
	opt.def_aead_algo = 0;
	opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.cert_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.compress_algo = -1;
	opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
	opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
	opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;
	break;
	case oPGP7: opt.compliance = CO_PGP7; break;
	case oPGP8: opt.compliance = CO_PGP8; break;
	case oGnuPG:
	opt.compliance = CO_GNUPG;
	opt.flags.rfc4880bis = 1;
	break;

	case oDE_VS:
	set_compliance_option (oOpenPGP);
	opt.compliance = CO_DE_VS;
	opt.def_aead_algo = 0;
	/* Fixme: Change other options. */
	break;

	default:
	BUG ();
	}
	}






	/* This function called to initialized a new control object. It is
	assumed that this object has been zeroed out before calling this
	function. */
	static void
	gpg_init_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	ctrl->magic = SERVER_CONTROL_MAGIC;
	}


	/* This function is called to deinitialize a control object. It is
	not deallocated. */
	static void
	gpg_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	#ifdef USE_TOFU
	tofu_closedbs (ctrl);
	#endif
	gpg_dirmngr_deinit_session_data (ctrl);

	keydb_release (ctrl->cached_getkey_kdb);
	gpg_keyboxd_deinit_session_data (ctrl);
	}


	int
	main (int argc, char **argv)
	{
	gpgrt_argparse_t pargs;
	IOBUF a;
	int rc=0;
	int orig_argc;
	char **orig_argv;
	const char *fname;
	char *username;
	int may_coredump;
	strlist_t sl;
	strlist_t remusr = NULL;
	strlist_t locusr = NULL;
	strlist_t nrings = NULL;
	armor_filter_context_t *afx = NULL;
	int detached_sig = 0;
	char *last_configname = NULL;
	const char configname = NULL; / NULL or points to last_configname.
	* NULL also indicates that we are
	* processing options from the cmdline. */
	int debug_argparser = 0;
	int default_keyring = 1;
	int greeting = 0;
	int nogreeting = 0;
	char *logfile = NULL;
	int use_random_seed = 1;
	enum cmd_and_opt_values cmd = 0;
	const char *debug_level = NULL;
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	const char *trustdb_name = NULL;
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	char *def_cipher_string = NULL;
	char *def_aead_string = NULL;
	char *def_digest_string = NULL;
	char *compress_algo_string = NULL;
	char *cert_digest_string = NULL;
	char *s2k_cipher_string = NULL;
	char *s2k_digest_string = NULL;
	char *pers_cipher_list = NULL;
	char *pers_aead_list = NULL;
	char *pers_digest_list = NULL;
	char *pers_compress_list = NULL;
	int eyes_only=0;
	int multifile=0;
	int pwfd = -1;
	int ovrseskeyfd = -1;
	int fpr_maybe_cmd = 0; /* --fingerprint maybe a command. */
	int any_explicit_recipient = 0;
	int default_akl = 1;
	int require_secmem = 0;
	int got_secmem = 0;
	struct assuan_malloc_hooks malloc_hooks;
	ctrl_t ctrl;

	static int print_dane_records;
	static int print_pka_records;
	static int allow_large_chunks;


	#ifdef __riscos__
	opt.lock_once = 1;
	#endif /* __riscos__ */

	/* Please note that we may running SUID(ROOT), so be very CAREFUL
	when adding any stuff between here and the call to
	secmem_init() somewhere after the option parsing. */
	early_system_init ();
	gnupg_reopen_std (GPG_NAME);
	trap_unaligned ();
	gnupg_rl_initialize ();
	gpgrt_set_strusage (my_strusage);
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SUSPEND_SECMEM_WARN);
	log_set_prefix (GPG_NAME, GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PREFIX);

	/* Make sure that our subsystems are ready. */
	i18n_init();
	init_common_subsystems (&argc, &argv);

	/* Use our own logging handler for Libcgrypt. */
	setup_libgcrypt_logging ();

	/* Put random number into secure memory */
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_USE_SECURE_RNDPOOL);

	may_coredump = disable_core_dumps();

	gnupg_init_signals (0, emergency_cleanup);

	dotlock_create (NULL, 0); /* Register lock file cleanup. */

	/* Tell the compliance module who we are. */
	gnupg_initialize_compliance (GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_GPG);

	opt.autostart = 1;
	opt.session_env = session_env_new ();
	if (!opt.session_env)
	log_fatal ("error allocating session environment block: %s\n",
	strerror (errno));

	opt.command_fd = -1; /* no command fd */
	opt.compress_level = -1; /* defaults to standard compress level */
	opt.bz2_compress_level = -1; /* defaults to standard compress level */
	/* note: if you change these lines, look at oOpenPGP */
	opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
	opt.def_aead_algo = 0;
	opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.cert_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.compress_algo = -1; /* defaults to DEFAULT_COMPRESS_ALGO */
	opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
	opt.s2k_count = 0; /* Auto-calibrate when needed. */
	opt.s2k_cipher_algo = DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO;
	opt.completes_needed = 1;
	opt.marginals_needed = 3;
	opt.max_cert_depth = 5;
	opt.escape_from = 1;
	opt.flags.require_cross_cert = 1;
	opt.import_options = IMPORT_REPAIR_KEYS;
	opt.export_options = EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES;
	opt.keyserver_options.import_options = (IMPORT_REPAIR_KEYS
	\| IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG
	\| IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY
	\| IMPORT_CLEAN);
	opt.keyserver_options.export_options = EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES;
	opt.keyserver_options.options = KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD;
	opt.verify_options = (LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY
	\| VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS
	\| VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS
	\| VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS);
	opt.list_options = (LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY
	\| LIST_SHOW_USAGE);
	#ifdef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	opt.trust_model = TM_ALWAYS;
	#else
	opt.trust_model = TM_AUTO;
	#endif
	opt.tofu_default_policy = TOFU_POLICY_AUTO;
	opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 0;
	opt.min_cert_level = 2;
	set_screen_dimensions ();
	opt.keyid_format = KF_NONE;
	opt.def_sig_expire = "0";
	opt.def_cert_expire = "0";
	gnupg_set_homedir (NULL);
	opt.passphrase_repeat = 1;
	opt.emit_version = 0;
	opt.weak_digests = NULL;
	opt.compliance = CO_GNUPG;
	opt.flags.rfc4880bis = 1;

	/* Check special options given on the command line. */
	orig_argc = argc;
	orig_argv = argv;
	pargs.argc = &argc;
	pargs.argv = &argv;
	pargs.flags= (ARGPARSE_FLAG_KEEP \| ARGPARSE_FLAG_NOVERSION);
	while (gpgrt_argparse (NULL, &pargs, opts))
	{
	switch (pargs.r_opt)
	{
	case oDebug:
	case oDebugAll:
	debug_argparser++;
	break;

	case oDebugIOLBF:
	es_setvbuf (es_stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
	break;

	case oNoOptions:
	/* Set here here because the homedir would otherwise be
	* created before main option parsing starts. */
	opt.no_homedir_creation = 1;
	break;

	case oHomedir:
	gnupg_set_homedir (pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oNoPermissionWarn:
	opt.no_perm_warn = 1;
	break;
	}
	}
	/* Reset the flags. */
	pargs.flags &= ~(ARGPARSE_FLAG_KEEP \| ARGPARSE_FLAG_NOVERSION);

	#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
	/* FIXME: Do we still need this? No: gnupg_homedir calls
	* make_filename which changes the slashed anyway. IsDBCSLeadByte still
	* needed? See bug #561. */
	if ( strchr (gnupg_homedir (), '\\') ) {
	char d, buf = xmalloc (strlen (gnupg_homedir ())+1);
	const char *s;
	for (d=buf, s = gnupg_homedir (); *s; s++)
	{
	d++ = s == '\\'? '/': *s;
	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	if (s[1] && IsDBCSLeadByte (*s))
	d++ = ++s;
	#endif
	}
	*d = 0;
	gnupg_set_homedir (buf);
	}
	#endif

	/* Initialize the secure memory. */
	if (!gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE, 0))
	got_secmem = 1;
	#if defined(HAVE_GETUID) && defined(HAVE_GETEUID)
	/* There should be no way to get to this spot while still carrying
	setuid privs. Just in case, bomb out if we are. */
	if ( getuid () != geteuid () )
	BUG ();
	#endif
	maybe_setuid = 0;

	/* Okay, we are now working under our real uid */

	/* malloc hooks go here ... */
	malloc_hooks.malloc = gcry_malloc;
	malloc_hooks.realloc = gcry_realloc;
	malloc_hooks.free = gcry_free;
	assuan_set_malloc_hooks (&malloc_hooks);
	assuan_set_gpg_err_source (GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT);
	setup_libassuan_logging (&opt.debug, NULL);

	/* Set default options which require that malloc stuff is ready. */
	additional_weak_digest ("MD5");
	parse_auto_key_locate (DEFAULT_AKL_LIST);

	argc = orig_argc;
	argv = orig_argv;
	pargs.argc = &argc;
	pargs.argv = &argv;
	/* We are re-using the struct, thus the reset flag. We OR the
	* flags so that the internal intialized flag won't be cleared. */
	pargs.flags \|= (ARGPARSE_FLAG_RESET
	\| ARGPARSE_FLAG_KEEP
	\| ARGPARSE_FLAG_SYS
	\| ARGPARSE_FLAG_USER
	\| ARGPARSE_FLAG_USERVERS);

	/* By this point we have a homedir, and cannot change it. */
	check_permissions (gnupg_homedir (), 0);

	/* The configuraton directories for use by gpgrt_argparser. */
	gpgrt_set_confdir (GPGRT_CONFDIR_SYS, gnupg_sysconfdir ());
	gpgrt_set_confdir (GPGRT_CONFDIR_USER, gnupg_homedir ());

	while (gpgrt_argparser (&pargs, opts, GPG_NAME EXTSEP_S "conf" ))
	{
	switch (pargs.r_opt)
	{
	case ARGPARSE_CONFFILE:
	if (debug_argparser)
	log_info (_("reading options from '%s'\n"),
	pargs.r_type? pargs.r.ret_str: "[cmdline]");
	if (pargs.r_type)
	{
	xfree (last_configname);
	last_configname = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str);
	configname = last_configname;
	if (is_secured_filename (configname))
	{
	pargs.r_opt = ARGPARSE_PERMISSION_ERROR;
	pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR;
	}
	else if (strncmp (configname, gnupg_sysconfdir (),
	strlen (gnupg_sysconfdir ())))
	{
	/* This is not the global config file and thus we
	* need to check the permissions: If the file is
	* unsafe, then disable any external programs for
	* keyserver calls or photo IDs. Since the
	* external program to call is set in the options
	* file, a unsafe options file can lead to an
	* arbitrary program being run. */
	if (check_permissions (configname, 1))
	opt.exec_disable=1;
	}
	}
	else
	configname = NULL;
	break;

	/* case oOptions: */
	/* case oNoOptions: */
	/* We will never see these options here because
	* gpgrt_argparse handles them for us. */
	/* break */

	case aListConfig:
	case aListGcryptConfig:
	case aGPGConfList:
	case aGPGConfTest:
	set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
	/* Do not register a keyring for these commands. */
	default_keyring = -1;
	break;

	case aCheckKeys:
	case aListPackets:
	case aImport:
	case aFastImport:
	case aSendKeys:
	case aRecvKeys:
	case aSearchKeys:
	case aRefreshKeys:
	case aFetchKeys:
	case aExport:
	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	case aCardStatus:
	case aCardEdit:
	case aChangePIN:
	#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
	case aListKeys:
	case aLocateKeys:
	case aLocateExtKeys:
	case aListSigs:
	case aExportSecret:
	case aExportSecretSub:
	case aExportSshKey:
	case aSym:
	case aClearsign:
	case aGenRevoke:
	case aDesigRevoke:
	case aPrimegen:
	case aGenRandom:
	case aPrintMD:
	case aPrintMDs:
	case aListTrustDB:
	case aCheckTrustDB:
	case aUpdateTrustDB:
	case aFixTrustDB:
	case aListTrustPath:
	case aDeArmor:
	case aEnArmor:
	case aSign:
	case aQuickSignKey:
	case aQuickLSignKey:
	case aSignKey:
	case aLSignKey:
	case aStore:
	case aQuickKeygen:
	case aQuickAddUid:
	case aQuickAddKey:
	case aQuickRevUid:
	case aQuickSetExpire:
	case aQuickSetPrimaryUid:
	case aExportOwnerTrust:
	case aImportOwnerTrust:
	case aRebuildKeydbCaches:
	set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
	break;

	case aKeygen:
	case aFullKeygen:
	case aEditKey:
	case aDeleteSecretKeys:
	case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys:
	case aDeleteKeys:
	case aPasswd:
	set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
	greeting=1;
	break;

	case aShowKeys:
	set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
	opt.import_options \|= IMPORT_SHOW;
	opt.import_options \|= IMPORT_DRY_RUN;
	opt.import_options &= ~IMPORT_REPAIR_KEYS;
	opt.list_options \|= LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS;
	opt.list_options \|= LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS;
	opt.list_options \|= LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
	opt.list_options \|= LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
	break;

	case aDetachedSign: detached_sig = 1; set_cmd( &cmd, aSign ); break;

	case aDecryptFiles: multifile=1; /* fall through */
	case aDecrypt: set_cmd( &cmd, aDecrypt); break;

	case aEncrFiles: multifile=1; /* fall through */
	case aEncr: set_cmd( &cmd, aEncr); break;

	case aVerifyFiles: multifile=1; /* fall through */
	case aVerify: set_cmd( &cmd, aVerify); break;

	case aServer:
	set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
	opt.batch = 1;
	break;

	case aTOFUPolicy:
	set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
	break;

	case oArmor: opt.armor = 1; opt.no_armor=0; break;
	case oOutput: opt.outfile = pargs.r.ret_str; break;

	case oMaxOutput: opt.max_output = pargs.r.ret_ulong; break;

	case oInputSizeHint:
	opt.input_size_hint = string_to_u64 (pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oChunkSize:
	opt.chunk_size = pargs.r.ret_int;
	break;

	case oQuiet: opt.quiet = 1; break;
	case oNoTTY: tty_no_terminal(1); break;
	case oDryRun: opt.dry_run = 1; break;
	case oInteractive: opt.interactive = 1; break;
	case oVerbose:
	opt.verbose++;
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS;
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS;
	break;

	case oBatch:
	opt.batch = 1;
	nogreeting = 1;
	break;

	case oUseAgent: /* Dummy. */
	break;

	case oNoUseAgent:
	obsolete_option (configname, pargs.lineno, "no-use-agent");
	break;
	case oGpgAgentInfo:
	obsolete_option (configname, pargs.lineno, "gpg-agent-info");
	break;

	case oUseKeyboxd:
	opt.use_keyboxd = 1;
	break;

	case oReaderPort:
	obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, pargs.lineno, "reader-port");
	break;
	case octapiDriver:
	obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, pargs.lineno, "ctapi-driver");
	break;
	case opcscDriver:
	obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, pargs.lineno, "pcsc-driver");
	break;
	case oDisableCCID:
	obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, pargs.lineno, "disable-ccid");
	break;
	case oHonorHttpProxy:
	obsolete_option (configname, pargs.lineno, "honor-http-proxy");
	break;

	case oAnswerYes: opt.answer_yes = 1; break;
	case oAnswerNo: opt.answer_no = 1; break;
	case oKeyring: append_to_strlist( &nrings, pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oPrimaryKeyring:
	sl = append_to_strlist (&nrings, pargs.r.ret_str);
	sl->flags = KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_PRIMARY;
	break;
	case oShowKeyring:
	deprecated_warning(configname,pargs.lineno,"--show-keyring",
	"--list-options ","show-keyring");
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_KEYRING;
	break;

	case oDebug:
	if (parse_debug_flag (pargs.r.ret_str, &opt.debug, debug_flags))
	{
	pargs.r_opt = ARGPARSE_INVALID_ARG;
	pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR;
	}
	break;

	case oDebugAll: opt.debug = ~0; break;
	case oDebugLevel: debug_level = pargs.r.ret_str; break;

	case oDebugIOLBF: break; /* Already set in pre-parse step. */

	case oDebugSetIobufSize:
	opt_set_iobuf_size = pargs.r.ret_ulong;
	opt_set_iobuf_size_used = 1;
	break;

	case oDebugAllowLargeChunks:
	allow_large_chunks = 1;
	break;

	case oStatusFD:
	set_status_fd ( translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1) );
	break;
	case oStatusFile:
	set_status_fd ( open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 1, 0) );
	break;
	case oAttributeFD:
	set_attrib_fd ( translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1) );
	break;
	case oAttributeFile:
	set_attrib_fd ( open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 1, 1) );
	break;
	case oLoggerFD:
	log_set_fd (translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1));
	break;
	case oLoggerFile:
	logfile = pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;

	case oWithFingerprint:
	opt.with_fingerprint = 1;
	opt.fingerprint++;
	break;
	case oWithSubkeyFingerprint:
	opt.with_subkey_fingerprint = 1;
	break;
	case oWithICAOSpelling:
	opt.with_icao_spelling = 1;
	break;
	case oFingerprint:
	opt.fingerprint++;
	fpr_maybe_cmd = 1;
	break;

	case oWithKeygrip:
	opt.with_keygrip = 1;
	break;

	case oWithKeyScreening:
	opt.with_key_screening = 1;
	break;

	case oWithSecret:
	opt.with_secret = 1;
	break;

	case oWithWKDHash:
	opt.with_wkd_hash = 1;
	break;

	case oWithKeyOrigin:
	opt.with_key_origin = 1;
	break;

	case oSecretKeyring:
	/* Ignore this old option. */
	break;

	case oNoArmor: opt.no_armor=1; opt.armor=0; break;

	case oNoDefKeyring:
	if (default_keyring > 0)
	default_keyring = 0;
	break;
	case oNoKeyring:
	default_keyring = -1;
	break;

	case oNoGreeting: nogreeting = 1; break;
	case oNoVerbose:
	opt.verbose = 0;
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);
	opt.list_sigs=0;
	break;
	case oQuickRandom:
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_ENABLE_QUICK_RANDOM, 0);
	break;
	case oEmitVersion: opt.emit_version++; break;
	case oNoEmitVersion: opt.emit_version=0; break;
	case oCompletesNeeded: opt.completes_needed = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oMarginalsNeeded: opt.marginals_needed = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oMaxCertDepth: opt.max_cert_depth = pargs.r.ret_int; break;

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	case oTrustDBName: trustdb_name = pargs.r.ret_str; break;

	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	case oDefaultKey:
	sl = add_to_strlist (&opt.def_secret_key, pargs.r.ret_str);
	sl->flags = (pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT);
	if (configname)
	sl->flags \|= PK_LIST_CONFIG;
	break;
	case oDefRecipient:
	if( *pargs.r.ret_str )
	{
	xfree (opt.def_recipient);
	opt.def_recipient = make_username(pargs.r.ret_str);
	}
	break;
	case oDefRecipientSelf:
	xfree(opt.def_recipient); opt.def_recipient = NULL;
	opt.def_recipient_self = 1;
	break;
	case oNoDefRecipient:
	xfree(opt.def_recipient); opt.def_recipient = NULL;
	opt.def_recipient_self = 0;
	break;
	case oHomedir: break;
	case oNoBatch: opt.batch = 0; break;

	case oWithTofuInfo: opt.with_tofu_info = 1; break;

	case oWithKeyData: opt.with_key_data=1; /FALLTHRU/
	case oWithColons: opt.with_colons=':'; break;

	case oWithSigCheck: opt.check_sigs = 1; /FALLTHRU/
	case oWithSigList: opt.list_sigs = 1; break;

	case oSkipVerify: opt.skip_verify=1; break;

	case oSkipHiddenRecipients: opt.skip_hidden_recipients = 1; break;
	case oNoSkipHiddenRecipients: opt.skip_hidden_recipients = 0; break;

	case aListSecretKeys: set_cmd( &cmd, aListSecretKeys); break;

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	/* There are many programs (like mutt) that call gpg with
	--always-trust so keep this option around for a long
	time. */
	case oAlwaysTrust: opt.trust_model=TM_ALWAYS; break;
	case oTrustModel:
	parse_trust_model(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	case oTOFUDefaultPolicy:
	opt.tofu_default_policy = parse_tofu_policy (pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oTOFUDBFormat:
	obsolete_option (configname, pargs.lineno, "tofu-db-format");
	break;

	case oForceOwnertrust:
	log_info(_("Note: %s is not for normal use!\n"),
	"--force-ownertrust");
	opt.force_ownertrust=string_to_trust_value(pargs.r.ret_str);
	if(opt.force_ownertrust==-1)
	{
	log_error("invalid ownertrust '%s'\n",pargs.r.ret_str);
	opt.force_ownertrust=0;
	}
	break;

	case oCompliance:
	{
	int compliance = gnupg_parse_compliance_option
	(pargs.r.ret_str,
	compliance_options, DIM (compliance_options),
	opt.quiet);
	if (compliance < 0)
	g10_exit (1);
	set_compliance_option (compliance);
	}
	break;
	case oOpenPGP:
	case oRFC2440:
	case oRFC4880:
	case oRFC4880bis:
	case oPGP7:
	case oPGP8:
	case oGnuPG:
	set_compliance_option (pargs.r_opt);
	break;

	case oRFC2440Text: opt.rfc2440_text=1; break;
	case oNoRFC2440Text: opt.rfc2440_text=0; break;

	case oSetFilename:
	if(utf8_strings)
	opt.set_filename = pargs.r.ret_str;
	else
	opt.set_filename = native_to_utf8(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oForYourEyesOnly: eyes_only = 1; break;
	case oNoForYourEyesOnly: eyes_only = 0; break;
	case oSetPolicyURL:
	add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0);
	add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,1);
	break;
	case oSigPolicyURL: add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0); break;
	case oCertPolicyURL: add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,1); break;
	case oShowPolicyURL:
	deprecated_warning(configname,pargs.lineno,"--show-policy-url",
	"--list-options ","show-policy-urls");
	deprecated_warning(configname,pargs.lineno,"--show-policy-url",
	"--verify-options ","show-policy-urls");
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
	opt.verify_options\|=VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
	break;
	case oNoShowPolicyURL:
	deprecated_warning(configname,pargs.lineno,"--no-show-policy-url",
	"--list-options ","no-show-policy-urls");
	deprecated_warning(configname,pargs.lineno,"--no-show-policy-url",
	"--verify-options ","no-show-policy-urls");
	opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
	opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
	break;
	case oSigKeyserverURL: add_keyserver_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0); break;
	case oUseEmbeddedFilename:
	opt.flags.use_embedded_filename=1;
	break;
	case oNoUseEmbeddedFilename:
	opt.flags.use_embedded_filename=0;
	break;
	case oComment:
	if(pargs.r.ret_str[0])
	append_to_strlist(&opt.comments,pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oDefaultComment:
	deprecated_warning(configname,pargs.lineno,
	"--default-comment","--no-comments","");
	/* fall through */
	case oNoComments:
	free_strlist(opt.comments);
	opt.comments=NULL;
	break;
	case oThrowKeyids: opt.throw_keyids = 1; break;
	case oNoThrowKeyids: opt.throw_keyids = 0; break;
	case oShowPhotos:
	deprecated_warning(configname,pargs.lineno,"--show-photos",
	"--list-options ","show-photos");
	deprecated_warning(configname,pargs.lineno,"--show-photos",
	"--verify-options ","show-photos");
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS;
	opt.verify_options\|=VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS;
	break;
	case oNoShowPhotos:
	deprecated_warning(configname,pargs.lineno,"--no-show-photos",
	"--list-options ","no-show-photos");
	deprecated_warning(configname,pargs.lineno,"--no-show-photos",
	"--verify-options ","no-show-photos");
	opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS;
	opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS;
	break;
	case oPhotoViewer: opt.photo_viewer = pargs.r.ret_str; break;

	case oForceAEAD: opt.force_aead = 1; break;

	case oDisableSignerUID: opt.flags.disable_signer_uid = 1; break;
	+ case oIncludeKeyBlock: opt.flags.include_key_block = 1; break;

	case oS2KMode: opt.s2k_mode = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oS2KDigest: s2k_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oS2KCipher: s2k_cipher_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oS2KCount:
	if (pargs.r.ret_int)
	opt.s2k_count = encode_s2k_iterations (pargs.r.ret_int);
	else
	opt.s2k_count = 0; /* Auto-calibrate when needed. */
	break;

	case oRecipient:
	case oHiddenRecipient:
	case oRecipientFile:
	case oHiddenRecipientFile:
	/* Store the recipient. Note that we also store the
	* option as private data in the flags. This is achieved
	* by shifting the option value to the left so to keep
	* enough space for the flags. */
	sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
	sl->flags = (pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT);
	if (configname)
	sl->flags \|= PK_LIST_CONFIG;
	if (pargs.r_opt == oHiddenRecipient
	\|\| pargs.r_opt == oHiddenRecipientFile)
	sl->flags \|= PK_LIST_HIDDEN;
	if (pargs.r_opt == oRecipientFile
	\|\| pargs.r_opt == oHiddenRecipientFile)
	sl->flags \|= PK_LIST_FROM_FILE;
	any_explicit_recipient = 1;
	break;

	case oEncryptTo:
	case oHiddenEncryptTo:
	/* Store an additional recipient. */
	sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
	sl->flags = ((pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT) \| PK_LIST_ENCRYPT_TO);
	if (configname)
	sl->flags \|= PK_LIST_CONFIG;
	if (pargs.r_opt == oHiddenEncryptTo)
	sl->flags \|= PK_LIST_HIDDEN;
	break;

	case oNoEncryptTo:
	opt.no_encrypt_to = 1;
	break;
	case oEncryptToDefaultKey:
	opt.encrypt_to_default_key = configname ? 2 : 1;
	break;

	case oTrySecretKey:
	add_to_strlist2 (&opt.secret_keys_to_try,
	pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings);
	break;

	case oMimemode: opt.mimemode = opt.textmode = 1; break;
	case oTextmodeShort: opt.textmode = 2; break;
	case oTextmode: opt.textmode=1; break;
	case oNoTextmode: opt.textmode=opt.mimemode=0; break;

	case oExpert: opt.expert = 1; break;
	case oNoExpert: opt.expert = 0; break;
	case oDefSigExpire:
	if(*pargs.r.ret_str!='\0')
	{
	if(parse_expire_string(pargs.r.ret_str)==(u32)-1)
	log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid signature expiration\n"),
	pargs.r.ret_str);
	else
	opt.def_sig_expire=pargs.r.ret_str;
	}
	break;
	case oAskSigExpire: opt.ask_sig_expire = 1; break;
	case oNoAskSigExpire: opt.ask_sig_expire = 0; break;
	case oDefCertExpire:
	if(*pargs.r.ret_str!='\0')
	{
	if(parse_expire_string(pargs.r.ret_str)==(u32)-1)
	log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid signature expiration\n"),
	pargs.r.ret_str);
	else
	opt.def_cert_expire=pargs.r.ret_str;
	}
	break;
	case oAskCertExpire: opt.ask_cert_expire = 1; break;
	case oNoAskCertExpire: opt.ask_cert_expire = 0; break;
	case oDefCertLevel: opt.def_cert_level=pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oMinCertLevel: opt.min_cert_level=pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oAskCertLevel: opt.ask_cert_level = 1; break;
	case oNoAskCertLevel: opt.ask_cert_level = 0; break;
	case oLocalUser: /* store the local users */
	sl = add_to_strlist2( &locusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
	sl->flags = (pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT);
	if (configname)
	sl->flags \|= PK_LIST_CONFIG;
	break;
	case oSender:
	{
	char *mbox = mailbox_from_userid (pargs.r.ret_str, 0);
	if (!mbox)
	log_error (_("\"%s\" is not a proper mail address\n"),
	pargs.r.ret_str);
	else
	{
	add_to_strlist (&opt.sender_list, mbox);
	xfree (mbox);
	}
	}
	break;
	case oCompress:
	/* this is the -z command line option */
	opt.compress_level = opt.bz2_compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int;
	break;
	case oCompressLevel: opt.compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oBZ2CompressLevel: opt.bz2_compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oBZ2DecompressLowmem: opt.bz2_decompress_lowmem=1; break;
	case oPassphrase:
	set_passphrase_from_string (pargs.r_type ? pargs.r.ret_str : "");
	break;
	case oPassphraseFD:
	pwfd = translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 0);
	break;
	case oPassphraseFile:
	pwfd = open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 0, 1);
	break;
	case oPassphraseRepeat:
	opt.passphrase_repeat = pargs.r.ret_int;
	break;

	case oPinentryMode:
	opt.pinentry_mode = parse_pinentry_mode (pargs.r.ret_str);
	if (opt.pinentry_mode == -1)
	log_error (_("invalid pinentry mode '%s'\n"), pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oRequestOrigin:
	opt.request_origin = parse_request_origin (pargs.r.ret_str);
	if (opt.request_origin == -1)
	log_error (_("invalid request origin '%s'\n"), pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oCommandFD:
	opt.command_fd = translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 0);
	if (! gnupg_fd_valid (opt.command_fd))
	log_error ("command-fd is invalid: %s\n", strerror (errno));
	break;
	case oCommandFile:
	opt.command_fd = open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 0, 1);
	break;
	case oCipherAlgo:
	def_cipher_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oAEADAlgo:
	def_aead_string = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oDigestAlgo:
	def_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oCompressAlgo:
	/* If it is all digits, stick a Z in front of it for
	later. This is for backwards compatibility with
	versions that took the compress algorithm number. */
	{
	char *pt=pargs.r.ret_str;
	while(*pt)
	{
	if (!isascii (pt) \|\| !isdigit (pt))
	break;

	pt++;
	}

	if(*pt=='\0')
	{
	compress_algo_string=xmalloc(strlen(pargs.r.ret_str)+2);
	strcpy(compress_algo_string,"Z");
	strcat(compress_algo_string,pargs.r.ret_str);
	}
	else
	compress_algo_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
	}
	break;
	case oCertDigestAlgo:
	cert_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oNoSecmemWarn:
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM_WARN);
	break;

	case oRequireSecmem: require_secmem=1; break;
	case oNoRequireSecmem: require_secmem=0; break;
	case oNoPermissionWarn: opt.no_perm_warn=1; break;
	case oDisplayCharset:
	if( set_native_charset( pargs.r.ret_str ) )
	log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid character set\n"),
	pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oNotDashEscaped: opt.not_dash_escaped = 1; break;
	case oEscapeFrom: opt.escape_from = 1; break;
	case oNoEscapeFrom: opt.escape_from = 0; break;
	case oLockOnce: opt.lock_once = 1; break;
	case oLockNever:
	dotlock_disable ();
	break;
	case oLockMultiple:
	#ifndef __riscos__
	opt.lock_once = 0;
	#else /* __riscos__ */
	riscos_not_implemented("lock-multiple");
	#endif /* __riscos__ */
	break;
	case oKeyServer:
	{
	keyserver_spec_t keyserver;
	keyserver = parse_keyserver_uri (pargs.r.ret_str, 0);
	if (!keyserver)
	log_error (_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
	else
	{
	/* We only support a single keyserver. Later ones
	override earlier ones. (Since we parse the
	config file first and then the command line
	arguments, the command line takes
	precedence.) */
	if (opt.keyserver)
	free_keyserver_spec (opt.keyserver);
	opt.keyserver = keyserver;
	}
	}
	break;
	case oKeyServerOptions:
	if(!parse_keyserver_options(pargs.r.ret_str))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid keyserver options\n"),
	configname,pargs.lineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid keyserver options\n"));
	}
	break;
	case oImportOptions:
	if(!parse_import_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.import_options,1))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid import options\n"),
	configname,pargs.lineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid import options\n"));
	}
	break;
	case oImportFilter:
	rc = parse_and_set_import_filter (pargs.r.ret_str);
	if (rc)
	log_error (_("invalid filter option: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	break;
	case oExportOptions:
	if(!parse_export_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.export_options,1))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid export options\n"),
	configname,pargs.lineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid export options\n"));
	}
	break;
	case oExportFilter:
	rc = parse_and_set_export_filter (pargs.r.ret_str);
	if (rc)
	log_error (_("invalid filter option: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	break;
	case oListOptions:
	if(!parse_list_options(pargs.r.ret_str))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid list options\n"),
	configname,pargs.lineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid list options\n"));
	}
	break;
	case oVerifyOptions:
	{
	struct parse_options vopts[]=
	{
	{"show-photos",VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS,NULL,
	N_("display photo IDs during signature verification")},
	{"show-policy-urls",VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS,NULL,
	N_("show policy URLs during signature verification")},
	{"show-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show all notations during signature verification")},
	{"show-std-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show IETF standard notations during signature verification")},
	{"show-standard-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	NULL},
	{"show-user-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show user-supplied notations during signature verification")},
	{"show-keyserver-urls",VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS,NULL,
	N_("show preferred keyserver URLs during signature verification")},
	{"show-uid-validity",VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY,NULL,
	N_("show user ID validity during signature verification")},
	{"show-unusable-uids",VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS,NULL,
	N_("show revoked and expired user IDs in signature verification")},
	{"show-primary-uid-only",VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY,NULL,
	N_("show only the primary user ID in signature verification")},
	{"pka-lookups",VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS,NULL,
	N_("validate signatures with PKA data")},
	{"pka-trust-increase",VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE,NULL,
	N_("elevate the trust of signatures with valid PKA data")},
	{NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
	};

	if(!parse_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.verify_options,vopts,1))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid verify options\n"),
	configname,pargs.lineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid verify options\n"));
	}
	}
	break;
	case oTempDir: opt.temp_dir=pargs.r.ret_str; break;
	case oExecPath:
	if(set_exec_path(pargs.r.ret_str))
	log_error(_("unable to set exec-path to %s\n"),pargs.r.ret_str);
	else
	opt.exec_path_set=1;
	break;
	case oSetNotation:
	add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 0 );
	add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 1 );
	break;
	case oSigNotation: add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 0 ); break;
	case oCertNotation: add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 1 ); break;
	case oKnownNotation: register_known_notation (pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oShowNotation:
	deprecated_warning(configname,pargs.lineno,"--show-notation",
	"--list-options ","show-notations");
	deprecated_warning(configname,pargs.lineno,"--show-notation",
	"--verify-options ","show-notations");
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
	opt.verify_options\|=VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
	break;
	case oNoShowNotation:
	deprecated_warning(configname,pargs.lineno,"--no-show-notation",
	"--list-options ","no-show-notations");
	deprecated_warning(configname,pargs.lineno,"--no-show-notation",
	"--verify-options ","no-show-notations");
	opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
	opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
	break;
	case oUtf8Strings: utf8_strings = 1; break;
	case oNoUtf8Strings: utf8_strings = 0; break;
	case oDisableCipherAlgo:
	{
	int algo = string_to_cipher_algo (pargs.r.ret_str);
	gcry_cipher_ctl (NULL, GCRYCTL_DISABLE_ALGO, &algo, sizeof algo);
	}
	break;
	case oDisablePubkeyAlgo:
	{
	int algo = gcry_pk_map_name (pargs.r.ret_str);
	gcry_pk_ctl (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_ALGO, &algo, sizeof algo);
	}
	break;
	case oNoSigCache: opt.no_sig_cache = 1; break;
	case oAllowNonSelfsignedUID: opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1; break;
	case oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID: opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid=0; break;
	case oAllowFreeformUID: opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1; break;
	case oNoAllowFreeformUID: opt.allow_freeform_uid = 0; break;
	case oNoLiteral: opt.no_literal = 1; break;
	case oSetFilesize: opt.set_filesize = pargs.r.ret_ulong; break;
	case oFastListMode: opt.fast_list_mode = 1; break;
	case oFixedListMode: /* Dummy */ break;
	case oLegacyListMode: opt.legacy_list_mode = 1; break;
	case oPrintPKARecords: print_pka_records = 1; break;
	case oPrintDANERecords: print_dane_records = 1; break;
	case oListOnly: opt.list_only=1; break;
	case oIgnoreTimeConflict: opt.ignore_time_conflict = 1; break;
	case oIgnoreValidFrom: opt.ignore_valid_from = 1; break;
	case oIgnoreCrcError: opt.ignore_crc_error = 1; break;
	case oIgnoreMDCError: opt.ignore_mdc_error = 1; break;
	case oNoRandomSeedFile: use_random_seed = 0; break;

	case oAutoKeyRetrieve:
	opt.keyserver_options.options \|= KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE;
	break;
	case oNoAutoKeyRetrieve:
	opt.keyserver_options.options &= ~KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE;
	break;

	case oShowSessionKey: opt.show_session_key = 1; break;
	case oOverrideSessionKey:
	opt.override_session_key = pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oOverrideSessionKeyFD:
	ovrseskeyfd = translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 0);
	break;
	case oMergeOnly:
	deprecated_warning(configname,pargs.lineno,"--merge-only",
	"--import-options ","merge-only");
	opt.import_options\|=IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY;
	break;
	case oAllowSecretKeyImport: /* obsolete */ break;
	case oTryAllSecrets: opt.try_all_secrets = 1; break;
	case oTrustedKey: register_trusted_key( pargs.r.ret_str ); break;

	case oEnableSpecialFilenames:
	enable_special_filenames ();
	break;

	case oNoExpensiveTrustChecks: opt.no_expensive_trust_checks=1; break;
	case oAutoCheckTrustDB: opt.no_auto_check_trustdb=0; break;
	case oNoAutoCheckTrustDB: opt.no_auto_check_trustdb=1; break;
	case oPreservePermissions: opt.preserve_permissions=1; break;
	case oDefaultPreferenceList:
	opt.def_preference_list = pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oDefaultKeyserverURL:
	{
	keyserver_spec_t keyserver;
	keyserver = parse_keyserver_uri (pargs.r.ret_str,1 );
	if (!keyserver)
	log_error (_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
	else
	free_keyserver_spec (keyserver);

	opt.def_keyserver_url = pargs.r.ret_str;
	}
	break;
	case oPersonalCipherPreferences:
	pers_cipher_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oPersonalAEADPreferences:
	pers_aead_list = pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oPersonalDigestPreferences:
	pers_digest_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oPersonalCompressPreferences:
	pers_compress_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oAgentProgram: opt.agent_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
	case oKeyboxdProgram: opt.keyboxd_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
	case oDirmngrProgram: opt.dirmngr_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
	case oDisableDirmngr: opt.disable_dirmngr = 1; break;
	case oWeakDigest:
	additional_weak_digest(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oUnwrap:
	opt.unwrap_encryption = 1;
	break;
	case oOnlySignTextIDs:
	opt.only_sign_text_ids = 1;
	break;

	case oDisplay:
	set_opt_session_env ("DISPLAY", pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oTTYname:
	set_opt_session_env ("GPG_TTY", pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oTTYtype:
	set_opt_session_env ("TERM", pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oXauthority:
	set_opt_session_env ("XAUTHORITY", pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oLCctype: opt.lc_ctype = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
	case oLCmessages: opt.lc_messages = pargs.r.ret_str; break;

	case oGroup: add_group(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oUnGroup: rm_group(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oNoGroups:
	while(opt.grouplist)
	{
	struct groupitem *iter=opt.grouplist;
	free_strlist(iter->values);
	opt.grouplist=opt.grouplist->next;
	xfree(iter);
	}
	break;

	case oMangleDosFilenames: opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 1; break;
	case oNoMangleDosFilenames: opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 0; break;
	case oEnableProgressFilter: opt.enable_progress_filter = 1; break;
	case oMultifile: multifile=1; break;
	case oKeyidFormat:
	if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"short")==0)
	opt.keyid_format=KF_SHORT;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"long")==0)
	opt.keyid_format=KF_LONG;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"0xshort")==0)
	opt.keyid_format=KF_0xSHORT;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"0xlong")==0)
	opt.keyid_format=KF_0xLONG;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"none")==0)
	opt.keyid_format = KF_NONE;
	else
	log_error("unknown keyid-format '%s'\n",pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oExitOnStatusWriteError:
	opt.exit_on_status_write_error = 1;
	break;

	case oLimitCardInsertTries:
	opt.limit_card_insert_tries = pargs.r.ret_int;
	break;

	case oRequireCrossCert: opt.flags.require_cross_cert=1; break;
	case oNoRequireCrossCert: opt.flags.require_cross_cert=0; break;

	case oAutoKeyLocate:
	if (default_akl)
	{
	/* This is the first time --auto-key-locate is seen.
	* We need to reset the default akl. */
	default_akl = 0;
	release_akl();
	}
	if(!parse_auto_key_locate(pargs.r.ret_str))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid auto-key-locate list\n"),
	configname,pargs.lineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid auto-key-locate list\n"));
	}
	break;
	case oNoAutoKeyLocate:
	release_akl();
	break;

	case oKeyOrigin:
	if(!parse_key_origin (pargs.r.ret_str))
	log_error (_("invalid argument for option \"%.50s\"\n"),
	"--key-origin");
	break;

	case oEnableLargeRSA:
	#if SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE >= 65536
	opt.flags.large_rsa=1;
	#else
	if (configname)
	log_info("%s:%d: WARNING: gpg not built with large secure "
	"memory buffer. Ignoring enable-large-rsa\n",
	configname,pargs.lineno);
	else
	log_info("WARNING: gpg not built with large secure "
	"memory buffer. Ignoring --enable-large-rsa\n");
	#endif /* SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE >= 65536 */
	break;
	case oDisableLargeRSA: opt.flags.large_rsa=0;
	break;

	case oEnableDSA2: opt.flags.dsa2=1; break;
	case oDisableDSA2: opt.flags.dsa2=0; break;

	case oAllowWeakDigestAlgos:
	opt.flags.allow_weak_digest_algos = 1;
	break;

	case oAllowWeakKeySignatures:
	opt.flags.allow_weak_key_signatures = 1;
	break;

	case oFakedSystemTime:
	{
	size_t len = strlen (pargs.r.ret_str);
	int freeze = 0;
	time_t faked_time;

	if (len > 0 && pargs.r.ret_str[len-1] == '!')
	{
	freeze = 1;
	pargs.r.ret_str[len-1] = '\0';
	}

	faked_time = isotime2epoch (pargs.r.ret_str);
	if (faked_time == (time_t)(-1))
	faked_time = (time_t)strtoul (pargs.r.ret_str, NULL, 10);
	gnupg_set_time (faked_time, freeze);
	}
	break;

	case oNoAutostart: opt.autostart = 0; break;
	case oNoSymkeyCache: opt.no_symkey_cache = 1; break;

	case oDefaultNewKeyAlgo:
	opt.def_new_key_algo = pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;

	case oUseOnlyOpenPGPCard:
	opt.flags.use_only_openpgp_card = 1;
	break;

	case oFullTimestrings:
	opt.flags.full_timestrings = 1;
	break;

	case oNoop: break;

	default:
	if (configname)
	pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_WARNING;
	else
	{
	pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR;
	/* The argparse function calls a plain exit and thus
	* we need to print a status here. */
	write_status_failure ("option-parser",
	gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	}
	break;
	}
	}

	gpgrt_argparse (NULL, &pargs, NULL); /* Release internal state. */

	if (log_get_errorcount (0))
	{
	write_status_failure ("option-parser", gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	g10_exit(2);
	}

	/* The command --gpgconf-list is pretty simple and may be called
	directly after the option parsing. */
	if (cmd == aGPGConfList)
	{
	gpgconf_list (last_configname ? last_configname : "UNKNOWN");
	g10_exit (0);
	}
	xfree (last_configname);

	if (print_dane_records)
	log_error ("invalid option \"%s\"; use \"%s\" instead\n",
	"--print-dane-records",
	"--export-options export-dane");
	if (print_pka_records)
	log_error ("invalid option \"%s\"; use \"%s\" instead\n",
	"--print-pks-records",
	"--export-options export-pka");
	if (log_get_errorcount (0))
	{
	write_status_failure ("option-checking", gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	g10_exit(2);
	}


	if( nogreeting )
	greeting = 0;

	if( greeting )
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stderr, "%s %s; %s\n",
	gpgrt_strusage(11), gpgrt_strusage(13), gpgrt_strusage(14));
	es_fprintf (es_stderr, "%s\n", gpgrt_strusage(15) );
	}
	#ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION
	if (!opt.batch)
	{
	const char *s;

	if((s=gpgrt_strusage(25)))
	log_info("%s\n",s);
	if((s=gpgrt_strusage(26)))
	log_info("%s\n",s);
	if((s=gpgrt_strusage(27)))
	log_info("%s\n",s);
	}
	#endif

	/* Init threading which is used by some helper functions. */
	npth_init ();
	assuan_set_system_hooks (ASSUAN_SYSTEM_NPTH);
	gpgrt_set_syscall_clamp (npth_unprotect, npth_protect);

	if (logfile)
	{
	log_set_file (logfile);
	log_set_prefix (NULL, (GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PREFIX
	\| GPGRT_LOG_WITH_TIME
	\| GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PID ));
	}

	if (opt.verbose > 2)
	log_info ("using character set '%s'\n", get_native_charset ());

	if( may_coredump && !opt.quiet )
	log_info(_("WARNING: program may create a core file!\n"));

	if (opt.flags.rfc4880bis)
	{
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info ("Note: RFC4880bis features are enabled.\n");
	}
	else
	{
	opt.mimemode = 0; /* This will use text mode instead. */
	}

	if (eyes_only) {
	if (opt.set_filename)
	log_info(_("WARNING: %s overrides %s\n"),
	"--for-your-eyes-only","--set-filename");

	opt.set_filename="_CONSOLE";
	}

	if (opt.no_literal) {
	log_info(_("Note: %s is not for normal use!\n"), "--no-literal");
	if (opt.textmode)
	log_error(_("%s not allowed with %s!\n"),
	"--textmode", "--no-literal" );
	if (opt.set_filename)
	log_error(_("%s makes no sense with %s!\n"),
	eyes_only?"--for-your-eyes-only":"--set-filename",
	"--no-literal" );
	}


	if (opt.set_filesize)
	log_info(_("Note: %s is not for normal use!\n"), "--set-filesize");
	if( opt.batch )
	tty_batchmode( 1 );

	if (gnupg_faked_time_p ())
	{
	gnupg_isotime_t tbuf;

	log_info (_("WARNING: running with faked system time: "));
	gnupg_get_isotime (tbuf);
	dump_isotime (tbuf);
	log_printf ("\n");
	}

	/* Print a warning if an argument looks like an option. */
	if (!opt.quiet && !(pargs.flags & ARGPARSE_FLAG_STOP_SEEN))
	{
	int i;

	for (i=0; i < argc; i++)
	if (argv[i][0] == '-' && argv[i][1] == '-')
	log_info (_("Note: '%s' is not considered an option\n"), argv[i]);
	}


	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_RESUME_SECMEM_WARN);

	if(require_secmem && !got_secmem)
	{
	log_info(_("will not run with insecure memory due to %s\n"),
	"--require-secmem");
	write_status_failure ("option-checking", gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	g10_exit(2);
	}

	set_debug (debug_level);
	if (DBG_CLOCK)
	log_clock ("start");

	/* Do these after the switch(), so they can override settings. */
	if (PGP7)
	{
	/* That does not anymore work because we have no more support
	for v3 signatures. */
	opt.escape_from=1;
	opt.ask_sig_expire=0;
	}
	else if(PGP8)
	{
	opt.escape_from=1;
	}


	if( def_cipher_string ) {
	opt.def_cipher_algo = string_to_cipher_algo (def_cipher_string);
	xfree(def_cipher_string); def_cipher_string = NULL;
	if ( openpgp_cipher_test_algo (opt.def_cipher_algo) )
	log_error(_("selected cipher algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if (def_aead_string)
	{
	opt.def_aead_algo = string_to_aead_algo (def_aead_string);
	xfree (def_aead_string); def_aead_string = NULL;
	if (openpgp_aead_test_algo (opt.def_aead_algo))
	log_error(_("selected AEAD algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( def_digest_string ) {
	opt.def_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo (def_digest_string);
	xfree(def_digest_string); def_digest_string = NULL;
	if ( openpgp_md_test_algo (opt.def_digest_algo) )
	log_error(_("selected digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( compress_algo_string ) {
	opt.compress_algo = string_to_compress_algo(compress_algo_string);
	xfree(compress_algo_string); compress_algo_string = NULL;
	if( check_compress_algo(opt.compress_algo) )
	log_error(_("selected compression algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( cert_digest_string ) {
	opt.cert_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo (cert_digest_string);
	xfree(cert_digest_string); cert_digest_string = NULL;
	if (openpgp_md_test_algo(opt.cert_digest_algo))
	log_error(_("selected certification digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( s2k_cipher_string ) {
	opt.s2k_cipher_algo = string_to_cipher_algo (s2k_cipher_string);
	xfree(s2k_cipher_string); s2k_cipher_string = NULL;
	if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (opt.s2k_cipher_algo))
	log_error(_("selected cipher algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( s2k_digest_string ) {
	opt.s2k_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo (s2k_digest_string);
	xfree(s2k_digest_string); s2k_digest_string = NULL;
	if (openpgp_md_test_algo(opt.s2k_digest_algo))
	log_error(_("selected digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( opt.completes_needed < 1 )
	log_error(_("completes-needed must be greater than 0\n"));
	if( opt.marginals_needed < 2 )
	log_error(_("marginals-needed must be greater than 1\n"));
	if( opt.max_cert_depth < 1 \|\| opt.max_cert_depth > 255 )
	log_error(_("max-cert-depth must be in the range from 1 to 255\n"));
	if(opt.def_cert_level<0 \|\| opt.def_cert_level>3)
	log_error(_("invalid default-cert-level; must be 0, 1, 2, or 3\n"));
	if( opt.min_cert_level < 1 \|\| opt.min_cert_level > 3 )
	log_error(_("invalid min-cert-level; must be 1, 2, or 3\n"));
	switch( opt.s2k_mode ) {
	case 0:
	log_info(_("Note: simple S2K mode (0) is strongly discouraged\n"));
	break;
	case 1: case 3: break;
	default:
	log_error(_("invalid S2K mode; must be 0, 1 or 3\n"));
	}

	/* This isn't actually needed, but does serve to error out if the
	string is invalid. */
	if(opt.def_preference_list &&
	keygen_set_std_prefs(opt.def_preference_list,0))
	log_error(_("invalid default preferences\n"));

	if(pers_cipher_list &&
	keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_cipher_list,PREFTYPE_SYM))
	log_error(_("invalid personal cipher preferences\n"));

	if (pers_aead_list && keygen_set_std_prefs (pers_aead_list, PREFTYPE_AEAD))
	log_error(_("invalid personal AEAD preferences\n"));

	if(pers_digest_list &&
	keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_digest_list,PREFTYPE_HASH))
	log_error(_("invalid personal digest preferences\n"));

	if(pers_compress_list &&
	keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_compress_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP))
	log_error(_("invalid personal compress preferences\n"));

	/* Check chunk size. Please fix also the man page if you change
	* the default. The limits are given by the specs. */
	if (!opt.chunk_size)
	opt.chunk_size = 27; /* Default to the suggested max of 128 MiB. */
	else if (opt.chunk_size < 6)
	{
	opt.chunk_size = 6;
	log_info (_("chunk size invalid - using %d\n"), opt.chunk_size);
	}
	else if (opt.chunk_size > (allow_large_chunks? 62 : 27))
	{
	opt.chunk_size = (allow_large_chunks? 62 : 27);
	log_info (_("chunk size invalid - using %d\n"), opt.chunk_size);
	}

	/* We don't support all possible commands with multifile yet */
	if(multifile)
	{
	char *cmdname;

	switch(cmd)
	{
	case aSign:
	cmdname="--sign";
	break;
	case aSignEncr:
	cmdname="--sign --encrypt";
	break;
	case aClearsign:
	cmdname="--clear-sign";
	break;
	case aDetachedSign:
	cmdname="--detach-sign";
	break;
	case aSym:
	cmdname="--symmetric";
	break;
	case aEncrSym:
	cmdname="--symmetric --encrypt";
	break;
	case aStore:
	cmdname="--store";
	break;
	default:
	cmdname=NULL;
	break;
	}

	if(cmdname)
	log_error(_("%s does not yet work with %s\n"),cmdname,"--multifile");
	}

	if( log_get_errorcount(0) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("option-postprocessing",
	gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	g10_exit (2);
	}

	if(opt.compress_level==0)
	opt.compress_algo=COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE;

	/* Check our chosen algorithms against the list of legal
	algorithms. */

	if(!GNUPG && !opt.flags.rfc4880bis)
	{
	const char *badalg=NULL;
	preftype_t badtype=PREFTYPE_NONE;

	if(opt.def_cipher_algo
	&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_SYM,opt.def_cipher_algo,NULL))
	{
	badalg = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (opt.def_cipher_algo);
	badtype = PREFTYPE_SYM;
	}
	else if(opt.def_aead_algo
	&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_AEAD, opt.def_aead_algo, NULL))
	{
	badalg = openpgp_aead_algo_name (opt.def_aead_algo);
	badtype = PREFTYPE_AEAD;
	}
	else if(opt.def_digest_algo
	&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_HASH,opt.def_digest_algo,NULL))
	{
	badalg = gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo);
	badtype = PREFTYPE_HASH;
	}
	else if(opt.cert_digest_algo
	&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_HASH,opt.cert_digest_algo,NULL))
	{
	badalg = gcry_md_algo_name (opt.cert_digest_algo);
	badtype = PREFTYPE_HASH;
	}
	else if(opt.compress_algo!=-1
	&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_ZIP,opt.compress_algo,NULL))
	{
	badalg = compress_algo_to_string(opt.compress_algo);
	badtype = PREFTYPE_ZIP;
	}

	if(badalg)
	{
	switch(badtype)
	{
	case PREFTYPE_SYM:
	log_info (_("cipher algorithm '%s'"
	" may not be used in %s mode\n"),
	badalg,
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	break;
	case PREFTYPE_AEAD:
	log_info (_("AEAD algorithm '%s'"
	" may not be used in %s mode\n"),
	badalg,
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	break;
	case PREFTYPE_HASH:
	log_info (_("digest algorithm '%s'"
	" may not be used in %s mode\n"),
	badalg,
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	break;
	case PREFTYPE_ZIP:
	log_info (_("compression algorithm '%s'"
	" may not be used in %s mode\n"),
	badalg,
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	break;
	default:
	BUG();
	}

	compliance_failure();
	}
	}

	/* Check our chosen algorithms against the list of allowed
	* algorithms in the current compliance mode, and fail hard if it
	* is not. This is us being nice to the user informing her early
	* that the chosen algorithms are not available. We also check
	* and enforce this right before the actual operation. */
	/* FIXME: We also need to check the AEAD algo. */
	if (opt.def_cipher_algo
	&& ! gnupg_cipher_is_allowed (opt.compliance,
	cmd == aEncr
	\|\| cmd == aSignEncr
	\|\| cmd == aEncrSym
	\|\| cmd == aSym
	\|\| cmd == aSignSym
	\|\| cmd == aSignEncrSym,
	opt.def_cipher_algo,
	GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_NONE))
	log_error (_("cipher algorithm '%s' may not be used in %s mode\n"),
	openpgp_cipher_algo_name (opt.def_cipher_algo),
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));

	if (opt.def_digest_algo
	&& ! gnupg_digest_is_allowed (opt.compliance,
	cmd == aSign
	\|\| cmd == aSignEncr
	\|\| cmd == aSignEncrSym
	\|\| cmd == aSignSym
	\|\| cmd == aClearsign,
	opt.def_digest_algo))
	log_error (_("digest algorithm '%s' may not be used in %s mode\n"),
	gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo),
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));

	/* Fail hard. */
	if (log_get_errorcount (0))
	{
	write_status_failure ("option-checking", gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	g10_exit (2);
	}

	/* Set the random seed file. */
	if( use_random_seed ) {
	char *p = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), "random_seed", NULL );
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_RANDOM_SEED_FILE, p);
	if (!access (p, F_OK))
	register_secured_file (p);
	xfree(p);
	}

	/* If there is no command but the --fingerprint is given, default
	to the --list-keys command. */
	if (!cmd && fpr_maybe_cmd)
	{
	set_cmd (&cmd, aListKeys);
	}


	if( opt.verbose > 1 )
	set_packet_list_mode(1);

	/* Add the keyrings, but not for some special commands. We always
	* need to add the keyrings if we are running under SELinux, this
	* is so that the rings are added to the list of secured files.
	* We do not add any keyring if --no-keyring or --use-keyboxd has
	* been used. */
	if (!opt.use_keyboxd
	&& default_keyring >= 0
	&& (ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS
	\|\| (cmd != aDeArmor && cmd != aEnArmor && cmd != aGPGConfTest)))
	{
	if (!nrings \|\| default_keyring > 0) /* Add default ring. */
	keydb_add_resource ("pubring" EXTSEP_S GPGEXT_GPG,
	KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_DEFAULT);
	for (sl = nrings; sl; sl = sl->next )
	keydb_add_resource (sl->d, sl->flags);
	}
	FREE_STRLIST(nrings);

	/* In loopback mode, never ask for the password multiple times. */
	if (opt.pinentry_mode == PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK)
	{
	opt.passphrase_repeat = 0;
	}

	/* If no pinentry is expected shunt
	* gnupg_allow_set_foregound_window to avoid useless error
	* messages on Windows. */
	if (opt.pinentry_mode != PINENTRY_MODE_ASK)
	{
	gnupg_inhibit_set_foregound_window (1);
	}


	if (cmd == aGPGConfTest)
	g10_exit(0);


	if (pwfd != -1) /* Read the passphrase now. */
	read_passphrase_from_fd (pwfd);

	if (ovrseskeyfd != -1 ) /* Read the sessionkey now. */
	read_sessionkey_from_fd (ovrseskeyfd);

	fname = argc? *argv : NULL;

	if(fname && utf8_strings)
	opt.flags.utf8_filename=1;

	ctrl = xcalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl);
	gpg_init_default_ctrl (ctrl);

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	switch (cmd)
	{
	case aPrimegen:
	case aPrintMD:
	case aPrintMDs:
	case aGenRandom:
	case aDeArmor:
	case aEnArmor:
	case aListConfig:
	case aListGcryptConfig:
	break;
	case aFixTrustDB:
	case aExportOwnerTrust:
	rc = setup_trustdb (0, trustdb_name);
	break;
	case aListTrustDB:
	rc = setup_trustdb (argc? 1:0, trustdb_name);
	break;
	case aKeygen:
	case aFullKeygen:
	case aQuickKeygen:
	rc = setup_trustdb (1, trustdb_name);
	break;
	default:
	/* If we are using TM_ALWAYS, we do not need to create the
	trustdb. */
	rc = setup_trustdb (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS, trustdb_name);
	break;
	}
	if (rc)
	log_error (_("failed to initialize the TrustDB: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/

	switch (cmd)
	{
	case aStore:
	case aSym:
	case aSign:
	case aSignSym:
	case aClearsign:
	if (!opt.quiet && any_explicit_recipient)
	log_info (_("WARNING: recipients (-r) given "
	"without using public key encryption\n"));
	break;
	default:
	break;
	}


	/* Check for certain command whether we need to migrate a
	secring.gpg to the gpg-agent. */
	switch (cmd)
	{
	case aListSecretKeys:
	case aSign:
	case aSignEncr:
	case aSignEncrSym:
	case aSignSym:
	case aClearsign:
	case aDecrypt:
	case aSignKey:
	case aLSignKey:
	case aEditKey:
	case aPasswd:
	case aDeleteSecretKeys:
	case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys:
	case aQuickKeygen:
	case aQuickAddUid:
	case aQuickAddKey:
	case aQuickRevUid:
	case aQuickSetPrimaryUid:
	case aFullKeygen:
	case aKeygen:
	case aImport:
	case aExportSecret:
	case aExportSecretSub:
	case aGenRevoke:
	case aDesigRevoke:
	case aCardEdit:
	case aChangePIN:
	migrate_secring (ctrl);
	break;
	case aListKeys:
	if (opt.with_secret)
	migrate_secring (ctrl);
	break;
	default:
	break;
	}

	/* The command dispatcher. */
	switch( cmd )
	{
	case aServer:
	gpg_server (ctrl);
	break;

	case aStore: /* only store the file */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--store [filename]");
	if( (rc = encrypt_store(fname)) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("store", rc);
	log_error ("storing '%s' failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname),gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	break;
	case aSym: /* encrypt the given file only with the symmetric cipher */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--symmetric [filename]");
	if( (rc = encrypt_symmetric(fname)) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("symencrypt", rc);
	log_error (_("symmetric encryption of '%s' failed: %s\n"),
	print_fname_stdin(fname),gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	break;

	case aEncr: /* encrypt the given file */
	if(multifile)
	encrypt_crypt_files (ctrl, argc, argv, remusr);
	else
	{
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--encrypt [filename]");
	if( (rc = encrypt_crypt (ctrl, -1, fname, remusr, 0, NULL, -1)) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("encrypt", rc);
	log_error("%s: encryption failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	}
	break;

	case aEncrSym:
	/* This works with PGP 8 in the sense that it acts just like a
	symmetric message. It doesn't work at all with 2 or 6. It
	might work with 7, but alas, I don't have a copy to test
	with right now. */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--symmetric --encrypt [filename]");
	else if(opt.s2k_mode==0)
	log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --encrypt"
	" with --s2k-mode 0\n"));
	else if (PGP7)
	log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --encrypt"
	" in %s mode\n"),
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	else
	{
	if( (rc = encrypt_crypt (ctrl, -1, fname, remusr, 1, NULL, -1)) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("encrypt", rc);
	log_error ("%s: encryption failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	}
	break;

	case aSign: /* sign the given file */
	sl = NULL;
	if( detached_sig ) { /* sign all files */
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	add_to_strlist( &sl, *argv );
	}
	else {
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--sign [filename]");
	if( argc ) {
	sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname));
	strcpy(sl->d, fname);
	}
	}
	if ((rc = sign_file (ctrl, sl, detached_sig, locusr, 0, NULL, NULL)))
	{
	write_status_failure ("sign", rc);
	log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aSignEncr: /* sign and encrypt the given file */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--sign --encrypt [filename]");
	if( argc ) {
	sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname));
	strcpy(sl->d, fname);
	}
	else
	sl = NULL;
	if ((rc = sign_file (ctrl, sl, detached_sig, locusr, 1, remusr, NULL)))
	{
	write_status_failure ("sign-encrypt", rc);
	log_error("%s: sign+encrypt failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aSignEncrSym: /* sign and encrypt the given file */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--symmetric --sign --encrypt [filename]");
	else if(opt.s2k_mode==0)
	log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --sign --encrypt"
	" with --s2k-mode 0\n"));
	else if (PGP7)
	log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --sign --encrypt"
	" in %s mode\n"),
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	else
	{
	if( argc )
	{
	sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname));
	strcpy(sl->d, fname);
	}
	else
	sl = NULL;
	if ((rc = sign_file (ctrl, sl, detached_sig, locusr,
	2, remusr, NULL)))
	{
	write_status_failure ("sign-encrypt", rc);
	log_error("%s: symmetric+sign+encrypt failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	}
	break;

	case aSignSym: /* sign and conventionally encrypt the given file */
	if (argc > 1)
	wrong_args("--sign --symmetric [filename]");
	rc = sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl, fname, locusr);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_failure ("sign-symencrypt", rc);
	log_error("%s: sign+symmetric failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	break;

	case aClearsign: /* make a clearsig */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--clear-sign [filename]");
	if( (rc = clearsign_file (ctrl, fname, locusr, NULL)) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("sign", rc);
	log_error("%s: clear-sign failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	break;

	case aVerify:
	if (multifile)
	{
	if ((rc = verify_files (ctrl, argc, argv)))
	log_error("verify files failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	else
	{
	if ((rc = verify_signatures (ctrl, argc, argv)))
	log_error("verify signatures failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	if (rc)
	write_status_failure ("verify", rc);
	break;

	case aDecrypt:
	if (multifile)
	decrypt_messages (ctrl, argc, argv);
	else
	{
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--decrypt [filename]");
	if( (rc = decrypt_message (ctrl, fname) ))
	{
	write_status_failure ("decrypt", rc);
	log_error("decrypt_message failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	}
	break;

	case aQuickSignKey:
	case aQuickLSignKey:
	{
	const char *fpr;

	if (argc < 1)
	wrong_args ("--quick-[l]sign-key fingerprint [userids]");
	fpr = *argv++; argc--;
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++)
	append_to_strlist2 (&sl, *argv, utf8_strings);
	keyedit_quick_sign (ctrl, fpr, sl, locusr, (cmd == aQuickLSignKey));
	free_strlist (sl);
	}
	break;

	case aSignKey:
	if( argc != 1 )
	wrong_args("--sign-key user-id");
	/* fall through */
	case aLSignKey:
	if( argc != 1 )
	wrong_args("--lsign-key user-id");
	/* fall through */

	sl=NULL;

	if(cmd==aSignKey)
	append_to_strlist(&sl,"sign");
	else if(cmd==aLSignKey)
	append_to_strlist(&sl,"lsign");
	else
	BUG();

	append_to_strlist( &sl, "save" );
	username = make_username( fname );
	keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, sl, 0, 0 );
	xfree(username);
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aEditKey: /* Edit a key signature */
	if( !argc )
	wrong_args("--edit-key user-id [commands]");
	username = make_username( fname );
	if( argc > 1 ) {
	sl = NULL;
	for( argc--, argv++ ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	append_to_strlist( &sl, *argv );
	keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, sl, 0, 1 );
	free_strlist(sl);
	}
	else
	keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, NULL, 0, 1 );
	xfree(username);
	break;

	case aPasswd:
	if (argc != 1)
	wrong_args("--change-passphrase <user-id>");
	else
	{
	username = make_username (fname);
	keyedit_passwd (ctrl, username);
	xfree (username);
	}
	break;

	case aDeleteKeys:
	case aDeleteSecretKeys:
	case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	/* I'm adding these in reverse order as add_to_strlist2
	reverses them again, and it's easier to understand in the
	proper order :) */
	for( ; argc; argc-- )
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, argv[argc-1], utf8_strings );
	delete_keys (ctrl, sl,
	cmd==aDeleteSecretKeys, cmd==aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys);
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aCheckKeys:
	opt.check_sigs = 1; /* fall through */
	case aListSigs:
	opt.list_sigs = 1; /* fall through */
	case aListKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	public_key_list (ctrl, sl, 0, 0);
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;
	case aListSecretKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	secret_key_list (ctrl, sl);
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;
	case aLocateKeys:
	case aLocateExtKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for (; argc; argc--, argv++)
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	if (cmd == aLocateExtKeys && akl_empty_or_only_local ())
	{
	/* This is a kludge to let --locate-external-keys even
	* work if the config file has --no-auto-key-locate. This
	* better matches the expectations of the user. */
	release_akl ();
	parse_auto_key_locate (DEFAULT_AKL_LIST);
	}
	public_key_list (ctrl, sl, 1, cmd == aLocateExtKeys);


	free_strlist (sl);
	break;

	case aQuickKeygen:
	{
	const char x_algo, x_usage, *x_expire;

	if (argc < 1 \|\| argc > 4)
	wrong_args("--quick-generate-key USER-ID [ALGO [USAGE [EXPIRE]]]");
	username = make_username (fname);
	argv++, argc--;
	x_algo = "";
	x_usage = "";
	x_expire = "";
	if (argc)
	{
	x_algo = *argv++; argc--;
	if (argc)
	{
	x_usage = *argv++; argc--;
	if (argc)
	{
	x_expire = *argv++; argc--;
	}
	}
	}
	quick_generate_keypair (ctrl, username, x_algo, x_usage, x_expire);
	xfree (username);
	}
	break;

	case aKeygen: /* generate a key */
	if( opt.batch ) {
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--generate-key [parameterfile]");
	generate_keypair (ctrl, 0, argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, 0);
	}
	else {
	if (opt.command_fd != -1 && argc)
	{
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--generate-key [parameterfile]");

	opt.batch = 1;
	generate_keypair (ctrl, 0, argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, 0);
	}
	else if (argc)
	wrong_args ("--generate-key");
	else
	generate_keypair (ctrl, 0, NULL, NULL, 0);
	}
	break;

	case aFullKeygen: /* Generate a key with all options. */
	if (opt.batch)
	{
	if (argc > 1)
	wrong_args ("--full-generate-key [parameterfile]");
	generate_keypair (ctrl, 1, argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, 0);
	}
	else
	{
	if (argc)
	wrong_args("--full-generate-key");
	generate_keypair (ctrl, 1, NULL, NULL, 0);
	}
	break;

	case aQuickAddUid:
	{
	const char uid, newuid;

	if (argc != 2)
	wrong_args ("--quick-add-uid USER-ID NEW-USER-ID");
	uid = *argv++; argc--;
	newuid = *argv++; argc--;
	keyedit_quick_adduid (ctrl, uid, newuid);
	}
	break;

	case aQuickAddKey:
	{
	const char x_fpr, x_algo, x_usage, x_expire;

	if (argc < 1 \|\| argc > 4)
	wrong_args ("--quick-add-key FINGERPRINT [ALGO [USAGE [EXPIRE]]]");
	x_fpr = *argv++; argc--;
	x_algo = "";
	x_usage = "";
	x_expire = "";
	if (argc)
	{
	x_algo = *argv++; argc--;
	if (argc)
	{
	x_usage = *argv++; argc--;
	if (argc)
	{
	x_expire = *argv++; argc--;
	}
	}
	}
	keyedit_quick_addkey (ctrl, x_fpr, x_algo, x_usage, x_expire);
	}
	break;

	case aQuickRevUid:
	{
	const char uid, uidtorev;

	if (argc != 2)
	wrong_args ("--quick-revoke-uid USER-ID USER-ID-TO-REVOKE");
	uid = *argv++; argc--;
	uidtorev = *argv++; argc--;
	keyedit_quick_revuid (ctrl, uid, uidtorev);
	}
	break;

	case aQuickSetExpire:
	{
	const char x_fpr, x_expire;

	if (argc < 2)
	wrong_args ("--quick-set-exipre FINGERPRINT EXPIRE [SUBKEY-FPRS]");
	x_fpr = *argv++; argc--;
	x_expire = *argv++; argc--;
	keyedit_quick_set_expire (ctrl, x_fpr, x_expire, argv);
	}
	break;

	case aQuickSetPrimaryUid:
	{
	const char uid, primaryuid;

	if (argc != 2)
	wrong_args ("--quick-set-primary-uid USER-ID PRIMARY-USER-ID");
	uid = *argv++; argc--;
	primaryuid = *argv++; argc--;
	keyedit_quick_set_primary (ctrl, uid, primaryuid);
	}
	break;

	case aFastImport:
	opt.import_options \|= IMPORT_FAST; /* fall through */
	case aImport:
	case aShowKeys:
	import_keys (ctrl, argc? argv:NULL, argc, NULL,
	opt.import_options, opt.key_origin, opt.key_origin_url);
	break;

	/* TODO: There are a number of command that use this same
	"make strlist, call function, report error, free strlist"
	pattern. Join them together here and avoid all that
	duplicated code. */

	case aExport:
	case aSendKeys:
	case aRecvKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	if( cmd == aSendKeys )
	rc = keyserver_export (ctrl, sl );
	else if( cmd == aRecvKeys )
	rc = keyserver_import (ctrl, sl );
	else
	{
	export_stats_t stats = export_new_stats ();
	rc = export_pubkeys (ctrl, sl, opt.export_options, stats);
	export_print_stats (stats);
	export_release_stats (stats);
	}
	if(rc)
	{
	if(cmd==aSendKeys)
	{
	write_status_failure ("send-keys", rc);
	log_error(_("keyserver send failed: %s\n"),gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	else if(cmd==aRecvKeys)
	{
	write_status_failure ("recv-keys", rc);
	log_error (_("keyserver receive failed: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	else
	{
	write_status_failure ("export", rc);
	log_error (_("key export failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aExportSshKey:
	if (argc != 1)
	wrong_args ("--export-ssh-key <user-id>");
	rc = export_ssh_key (ctrl, argv[0]);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_failure ("export-ssh-key", rc);
	log_error (_("export as ssh key failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	break;

	case aSearchKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for (; argc; argc--, argv++)
	append_to_strlist2 (&sl, *argv, utf8_strings);
	rc = keyserver_search (ctrl, sl);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_failure ("search-keys", rc);
	log_error (_("keyserver search failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	free_strlist (sl);
	break;

	case aRefreshKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	rc = keyserver_refresh (ctrl, sl);
	if(rc)
	{
	write_status_failure ("refresh-keys", rc);
	log_error (_("keyserver refresh failed: %s\n"),gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aFetchKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	rc = keyserver_fetch (ctrl, sl, opt.key_origin);
	if(rc)
	{
	write_status_failure ("fetch-keys", rc);
	log_error ("key fetch failed: %s\n",gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aExportSecret:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	{
	export_stats_t stats = export_new_stats ();
	export_seckeys (ctrl, sl, opt.export_options, stats);
	export_print_stats (stats);
	export_release_stats (stats);
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aExportSecretSub:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	{
	export_stats_t stats = export_new_stats ();
	export_secsubkeys (ctrl, sl, opt.export_options, stats);
	export_print_stats (stats);
	export_release_stats (stats);
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aGenRevoke:
	if( argc != 1 )
	wrong_args("--generate-revocation user-id");
	username = make_username(*argv);
	gen_revoke (ctrl, username );
	xfree( username );
	break;

	case aDesigRevoke:
	if (argc != 1)
	wrong_args ("--generate-designated-revocation user-id");
	username = make_username (*argv);
	gen_desig_revoke (ctrl, username, locusr);
	xfree (username);
	break;

	case aDeArmor:
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--dearmor [file]");
	rc = dearmor_file( argc? *argv: NULL );
	if( rc )
	{
	write_status_failure ("dearmor", rc);
	log_error (_("dearmoring failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	break;

	case aEnArmor:
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--enarmor [file]");
	rc = enarmor_file( argc? *argv: NULL );
	if( rc )
	{
	write_status_failure ("enarmor", rc);
	log_error (_("enarmoring failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	break;


	case aPrimegen:
	#if 0 /FIXME/
	{ int mode = argc < 2 ? 0 : atoi(*argv);

	if( mode == 1 && argc == 2 ) {
	mpi_print (es_stdout,
	generate_public_prime( atoi(argv[1]) ), 1);
	}
	else if( mode == 2 && argc == 3 ) {
	mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_elg_prime(
	0, atoi(argv[1]),
	atoi(argv[2]), NULL,NULL ), 1);
	}
	else if( mode == 3 && argc == 3 ) {
	MPI *factors;
	mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_elg_prime(
	1, atoi(argv[1]),
	atoi(argv[2]), NULL,&factors ), 1);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	mpi_print (es_stdout, factors[0], 1 ); /* print q */
	}
	else if( mode == 4 && argc == 3 ) {
	MPI g = mpi_alloc(1);
	mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_elg_prime(
	0, atoi(argv[1]),
	atoi(argv[2]), g, NULL ), 1);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	mpi_print (es_stdout, g, 1 );
	mpi_free (g);
	}
	else
	wrong_args("--gen-prime mode bits [qbits] ");
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	#endif
	wrong_args("--gen-prime not yet supported ");
	break;

	case aGenRandom:
	{
	int level = argc ? atoi(*argv):0;
	int count = argc > 1 ? atoi(argv[1]): 0;
	int endless = !count;

	if( argc < 1 \|\| argc > 2 \|\| level < 0 \|\| level > 2 \|\| count < 0 )
	wrong_args("--gen-random 0\|1\|2 [count]");

	while( endless \|\| count ) {
	byte *p;
	/* We need a multiple of 3, so that in case of
	armored output we get a correct string. No
	linefolding is done, as it is best to leave this to
	other tools */
	size_t n = !endless && count < 99? count : 99;

	p = gcry_random_bytes (n, level);
	#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
	setmode ( fileno(stdout), O_BINARY );
	#endif
	if (opt.armor) {
	char *tmp = make_radix64_string (p, n);
	es_fputs (tmp, es_stdout);
	xfree (tmp);
	if (n%3 == 1)
	es_putc ('=', es_stdout);
	if (n%3)
	es_putc ('=', es_stdout);
	} else {
	es_fwrite( p, n, 1, es_stdout );
	}
	xfree(p);
	if( !endless )
	count -= n;
	}
	if (opt.armor)
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	break;

	case aPrintMD:
	if( argc < 1)
	wrong_args("--print-md algo [files]");
	{
	int all_algos = (*argv=='' && !(*argv)[1]);
	int algo = all_algos? 0 : gcry_md_map_name (*argv);

	if( !algo && !all_algos )
	log_error(_("invalid hash algorithm '%s'\n"), *argv );
	else {
	argc--; argv++;
	if( !argc )
	print_mds(NULL, algo);
	else {
	for(; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	print_mds(*argv, algo);
	}
	}
	}
	break;

	case aPrintMDs: /* old option */
	if( !argc )
	print_mds(NULL,0);
	else {
	for(; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	print_mds(*argv,0);
	}
	break;

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	case aListTrustDB:
	if( !argc )
	list_trustdb (ctrl, es_stdout, NULL);
	else {
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	list_trustdb (ctrl, es_stdout, *argv );
	}
	break;

	case aUpdateTrustDB:
	if( argc )
	wrong_args("--update-trustdb");
	update_trustdb (ctrl);
	break;

	case aCheckTrustDB:
	/* Old versions allowed for arguments - ignore them */
	check_trustdb (ctrl);
	break;

	case aFixTrustDB:
	how_to_fix_the_trustdb ();
	break;

	case aListTrustPath:
	if( !argc )
	wrong_args("--list-trust-path <user-ids>");
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) {
	username = make_username( *argv );
	list_trust_path( username );
	xfree(username);
	}
	break;

	case aExportOwnerTrust:
	if( argc )
	wrong_args("--export-ownertrust");
	export_ownertrust (ctrl);
	break;

	case aImportOwnerTrust:
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--import-ownertrust [file]");
	import_ownertrust (ctrl, argc? *argv:NULL );
	break;
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/

	case aRebuildKeydbCaches:
	if (argc)
	wrong_args ("--rebuild-keydb-caches");
	keydb_rebuild_caches (ctrl, 1);
	break;

	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	case aCardStatus:
	if (argc == 0)
	card_status (ctrl, es_stdout, NULL);
	else if (argc == 1)
	card_status (ctrl, es_stdout, *argv);
	else
	wrong_args ("--card-status [serialno]");
	break;

	case aCardEdit:
	if (argc) {
	sl = NULL;
	for (argc--, argv++ ; argc; argc--, argv++)
	append_to_strlist (&sl, *argv);
	card_edit (ctrl, sl);
	free_strlist (sl);
	}
	else
	card_edit (ctrl, NULL);
	break;

	case aChangePIN:
	if (!argc)
	change_pin (0,1);
	else if (argc == 1)
	change_pin (atoi (*argv),1);
	else
	wrong_args ("--change-pin [no]");
	break;
	#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/

	case aListConfig:
	{
	char *str=collapse_args(argc,argv);
	list_config(str);
	xfree(str);
	}
	break;

	case aListGcryptConfig:
	/* Fixme: It would be nice to integrate that with
	--list-config but unfortunately there is no way yet to have
	libgcrypt print it to an estream for further parsing. */
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_PRINT_CONFIG, stdout);
	break;

	case aTOFUPolicy:
	#ifdef USE_TOFU
	{
	int policy;
	int i;
	KEYDB_HANDLE hd;

	if (argc < 2)
	wrong_args ("--tofu-policy POLICY KEYID [KEYID...]");

	policy = parse_tofu_policy (argv[0]);

	hd = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (! hd)
	{
	write_status_failure ("tofu-driver", gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	tofu_begin_batch_update (ctrl);

	for (i = 1; i < argc; i ++)
	{
	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
	kbnode_t kb;

	rc = classify_user_id (argv[i], &desc, 0);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("error parsing key specification '%s': %s\n"),
	argv[i], gpg_strerror (rc));
	write_status_failure ("tofu-driver", rc);
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	if (! (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID
	\|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID
	\|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
	\|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_KEYGRIP))
	{
	log_error (_("'%s' does not appear to be a valid"
	" key ID, fingerprint or keygrip\n"),
	argv[i]);
	write_status_failure ("tofu-driver",
	gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	rc = keydb_search_reset (hd);
	if (rc)
	{
	/* This should not happen, thus no need to tranalate
	the string. */
	log_error ("keydb_search_reset failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	write_status_failure ("tofu-driver", rc);
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), argv[i],
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	write_status_failure ("tofu-driver", rc);
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &kb);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	write_status_failure ("tofu-driver", rc);
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, kb);
	if (tofu_set_policy (ctrl, kb, policy))
	{
	write_status_failure ("tofu-driver", rc);
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	release_kbnode (kb);
	}

	tofu_end_batch_update (ctrl);

	keydb_release (hd);
	}
	#endif /USE_TOFU/
	break;

	default:
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("WARNING: no command supplied."
	" Trying to guess what you mean ...\n"));
	/FALLTHRU/
	case aListPackets:
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("[filename]");
	/* Issue some output for the unix newbie */
	if (!fname && !opt.outfile
	&& gnupg_isatty (fileno (stdin))
	&& gnupg_isatty (fileno (stdout))
	&& gnupg_isatty (fileno (stderr)))
	log_info(_("Go ahead and type your message ...\n"));

	a = iobuf_open(fname);
	if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a)))
	{
	iobuf_close (a);
	a = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	if( !a )
	log_error(_("can't open '%s'\n"), print_fname_stdin(fname));
	else {

	if( !opt.no_armor ) {
	if( use_armor_filter( a ) ) {
	afx = new_armor_context ();
	push_armor_filter (afx, a);
	}
	}
	if( cmd == aListPackets ) {
	opt.list_packets=1;
	set_packet_list_mode(1);
	}
	rc = proc_packets (ctrl, NULL, a );
	if( rc )
	{
	write_status_failure ("-", rc);
	log_error ("processing message failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	iobuf_close(a);
	}
	break;
	}

	/* cleanup */
	gpg_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl);
	xfree (ctrl);
	release_armor_context (afx);
	FREE_STRLIST(remusr);
	FREE_STRLIST(locusr);
	g10_exit(0);
	return 8; /NEVER REACHED/
	}


	/* Note: This function is used by signal handlers!. */
	static void
	emergency_cleanup (void)
	{
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM );
	}


	void
	g10_exit( int rc )
	{
	/* If we had an error but not printed an error message, do it now.
	* Note that write_status_failure will never print a second failure
	* status line. */
	if (rc)
	write_status_failure ("gpg-exit", gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL));

	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_UPDATE_RANDOM_SEED_FILE);
	if (DBG_CLOCK)
	log_clock ("stop");

	if ( (opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE) )
	{
	keydb_dump_stats ();
	sig_check_dump_stats ();
	objcache_dump_stats ();
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_MEMORY_STATS);
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_RANDOM_STATS);
	}
	if (opt.debug)
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_SECMEM_STATS );

	gnupg_block_all_signals ();
	emergency_cleanup ();

	rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 : g10_errors_seen? 1 : 0;
	exit (rc);
	}


	/* Pretty-print hex hashes. This assumes at least an 80-character
	display, but there are a few other similar assumptions in the
	display code. */
	static void
	print_hex (gcry_md_hd_t md, int algo, const char *fname)
	{
	int i,n,count,indent=0;
	const byte *p;

	if (fname)
	indent = es_printf("%s: ",fname);

	if (indent>40)
	{
	es_printf ("\n");
	indent=0;
	}

	if (algo==DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160)
	indent += es_printf("RMD160 = ");
	else if (algo>0)
	indent += es_printf("%6s = ", gcry_md_algo_name (algo));
	else
	algo = abs(algo);

	count = indent;

	p = gcry_md_read (md, algo);
	n = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);

	count += es_printf ("%02X",*p++);

	for(i=1;i<n;i++,p++)
	{
	if(n==16)
	{
	if(count+2>79)
	{
	es_printf ("\n%*s",indent," ");
	count = indent;
	}
	else
	count += es_printf(" ");

	if (!(i%8))
	count += es_printf(" ");
	}
	else if (n==20)
	{
	if(!(i%2))
	{
	if(count+4>79)
	{
	es_printf ("\n%*s",indent," ");
	count=indent;
	}
	else
	count += es_printf(" ");
	}

	if (!(i%10))
	count += es_printf(" ");
	}
	else
	{
	if(!(i%4))
	{
	if (count+8>79)
	{
	es_printf ("\n%*s",indent," ");
	count=indent;
	}
	else
	count += es_printf(" ");
	}
	}

	count += es_printf("%02X",*p);
	}

	es_printf ("\n");
	}

	static void
	print_hashline( gcry_md_hd_t md, int algo, const char *fname )
	{
	int i, n;
	const byte *p;

	if ( fname )
	{
	for (p = fname; *p; p++ )
	{
	if ( p <= 32 \|\| p > 127 \|\| p == ':' \|\| p == '%' )
	es_printf ("%%%02X", *p );
	else
	es_putc (*p, es_stdout);
	}
	}
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	es_printf ("%d:", algo);
	p = gcry_md_read (md, algo);
	n = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
	for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ )
	es_printf ("%02X", *p);
	es_fputs (":\n", es_stdout);
	}


	static void
	print_mds( const char *fname, int algo )
	{
	estream_t fp;
	char buf[1024];
	size_t n;
	gcry_md_hd_t md;

	if (!fname)
	{
	fp = es_stdin;
	es_set_binary (fp);
	}
	else
	{
	fp = es_fopen (fname, "rb" );
	if (fp && is_secured_file (es_fileno (fp)))
	{
	es_fclose (fp);
	fp = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	}
	if (!fp)
	{
	log_error("%s: %s\n", fname?fname:"[stdin]", strerror(errno) );
	return;
	}

	gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0);
	if (algo)
	gcry_md_enable (md, algo);
	else
	{
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_MD5))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_MD5);
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_RMD160))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_RMD160);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA224))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA224);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA256))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA256);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA384))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA384);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA512))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA512);
	}

	while ((n=es_fread (buf, 1, DIM(buf), fp)))
	gcry_md_write (md, buf, n);

	if (es_ferror(fp))
	log_error ("%s: %s\n", fname?fname:"[stdin]", strerror(errno));
	else
	{
	gcry_md_final (md);
	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	if ( algo )
	print_hashline (md, algo, fname);
	else
	{
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_MD5))
	print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_MD5, fname );
	print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_RMD160))
	print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_RMD160, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA224))
	print_hashline (md, GCRY_MD_SHA224, fname);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA256))
	print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_SHA256, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA384))
	print_hashline ( md, GCRY_MD_SHA384, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA512))
	print_hashline ( md, GCRY_MD_SHA512, fname );
	}
	}
	else
	{
	if (algo)
	print_hex (md, -algo, fname);
	else
	{
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_MD5))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_MD5, fname);
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_RMD160))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_RMD160, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA224))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA224, fname);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA256))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA256, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA384))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA384, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA512))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA512, fname );
	}
	}
	}
	gcry_md_close (md);

	if (fp != es_stdin)
	es_fclose (fp);
	}


	/****************
	* Check the supplied name,value string and add it to the notation
	* data to be used for signatures. which==0 for sig notations, and 1
	* for cert notations.
	*/
	static void
	add_notation_data( const char *string, int which )
	{
	struct notation *notation;

	notation=string_to_notation(string,utf8_strings);
	if(notation)
	{
	if(which)
	{
	notation->next=opt.cert_notations;
	opt.cert_notations=notation;
	}
	else
	{
	notation->next=opt.sig_notations;
	opt.sig_notations=notation;
	}
	}
	}

	static void
	add_policy_url( const char *string, int which )
	{
	unsigned int i,critical=0;
	strlist_t sl;

	if(*string=='!')
	{
	string++;
	critical=1;
	}

	for(i=0;i<strlen(string);i++)
	if( !isascii (string[i]) \|\| iscntrl(string[i]))
	break;

	if(i==0 \|\| i<strlen(string))
	{
	if(which)
	log_error(_("the given certification policy URL is invalid\n"));
	else
	log_error(_("the given signature policy URL is invalid\n"));
	}

	if(which)
	sl=add_to_strlist( &opt.cert_policy_url, string );
	else
	sl=add_to_strlist( &opt.sig_policy_url, string );

	if(critical)
	sl->flags \|= 1;
	}

	static void
	add_keyserver_url( const char *string, int which )
	{
	unsigned int i,critical=0;
	strlist_t sl;

	if(*string=='!')
	{
	string++;
	critical=1;
	}

	for(i=0;i<strlen(string);i++)
	if( !isascii (string[i]) \|\| iscntrl(string[i]))
	break;

	if(i==0 \|\| i<strlen(string))
	{
	if(which)
	BUG();
	else
	log_error(_("the given preferred keyserver URL is invalid\n"));
	}

	if(which)
	BUG();
	else
	sl=add_to_strlist( &opt.sig_keyserver_url, string );

	if(critical)
	sl->flags \|= 1;
	}


	static void
	read_sessionkey_from_fd (int fd)
	{
	int i, len;
	char *line;

	if (! gnupg_fd_valid (fd))
	log_fatal ("override-session-key-fd is invalid: %s\n", strerror (errno));

	for (line = NULL, i = len = 100; ; i++ )
	{
	if (i >= len-1 )
	{
	char *tmp = line;
	len += 100;
	line = xmalloc_secure (len);
	if (tmp)
	{
	memcpy (line, tmp, i);
	xfree (tmp);
	}
	else
	i=0;
	}
	if (read (fd, line + i, 1) != 1 \|\| line[i] == '\n')
	break;
	}
	line[i] = 0;
	log_debug ("seskey: %s\n", line);
	gpgrt_annotate_leaked_object (line);
	opt.override_session_key = line;
	}
	diff --git a/g10/options.h b/g10/options.h
	index 4f190a1bc..d05164eac 100644
	--- a/g10/options.h
	+++ b/g10/options.h
	@@ -1,417 +1,418 @@
	/* options.h
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
	* 2007, 2010, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 2015 g10 Code GmbH
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/
	#ifndef G10_OPTIONS_H
	#define G10_OPTIONS_H

	#include <sys/types.h>
	#include "../common/types.h"
	#include <stdint.h>
	#include "main.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "tofu.h"
	#include "../common/session-env.h"
	#include "../common/compliance.h"


	/* Declaration of a keyserver spec type. The definition is found in
	../common/keyserver.h. */
	struct keyserver_spec;
	typedef struct keyserver_spec *keyserver_spec_t;


	/* Global options for GPG. */
	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	struct
	{
	int verbose;
	int quiet;
	unsigned debug;
	int armor;
	char *outfile;
	estream_t outfp; /* Hack, sometimes used in place of outfile. */
	off_t max_output;

	/* If > 0 a hint with the expected number of input data bytes. This
	* is not necessary an exact number but intended to be used for
	* progress info and to decide on how to allocate buffers. */
	uint64_t input_size_hint;

	/* The AEAD chunk size expressed as a power of 2. */
	int chunk_size;

	int dry_run;
	int autostart;
	int list_only;
	int mimemode;
	int textmode;
	int expert;
	const char *def_sig_expire;
	int ask_sig_expire;
	const char *def_cert_expire;
	int ask_cert_expire;
	int batch; /* run in batch mode */
	int answer_yes; /* answer yes on most questions */
	int answer_no; /* answer no on most questions */
	int check_sigs; /* check key signatures */
	int with_colons;
	int with_key_data;
	int with_icao_spelling; /* Print ICAO spelling with fingerprints. */
	int with_fingerprint; /* Option --with-fingerprint active. */
	int with_subkey_fingerprint; /* Option --with-subkey-fingerprint active. */
	int with_keygrip; /* Option --with-keygrip active. */
	int with_key_screening;/* Option --with-key-screening active. */
	int with_tofu_info; /* Option --with-tofu_info active. */
	int with_secret; /* Option --with-secret active. */
	int with_wkd_hash; /* Option --with-wkd-hash. */
	int with_key_origin; /* Option --with-key-origin. */
	int fingerprint; /* list fingerprints */
	int list_sigs; /* list signatures */
	int no_armor;
	int list_packets; /* Option --list-packets active. */
	int def_cipher_algo;
	int def_aead_algo;
	int force_mdc;
	int disable_mdc;
	int force_aead;
	int def_digest_algo;
	int cert_digest_algo;
	int compress_algo;
	int compress_level;
	int bz2_compress_level;
	int bz2_decompress_lowmem;
	strlist_t def_secret_key;
	char *def_recipient;
	int def_recipient_self;
	strlist_t secret_keys_to_try;

	/* A list of mail addresses (addr-spec) provided by the user with
	* the option --sender. */
	strlist_t sender_list;

	int def_cert_level;
	int min_cert_level;
	int ask_cert_level;
	int emit_version; /* 0 = none,
	1 = major only,
	2 = major and minor,
	3 = full version,
	4 = full version plus OS string. */
	int marginals_needed;
	int completes_needed;
	int max_cert_depth;
	const char *agent_program;
	const char *keyboxd_program;
	const char *dirmngr_program;
	int disable_dirmngr;

	const char *def_new_key_algo;

	/* Options to be passed to the gpg-agent */
	session_env_t session_env;
	char *lc_ctype;
	char *lc_messages;

	int skip_verify;
	int skip_hidden_recipients;

	/* TM_CLASSIC must be zero to accommodate trustdbsg generated before
	we started storing the trust model inside the trustdb. */
	enum
	{
	TM_CLASSIC=0, TM_PGP=1, TM_EXTERNAL=2,
	TM_ALWAYS, TM_DIRECT, TM_AUTO, TM_TOFU, TM_TOFU_PGP
	} trust_model;
	enum tofu_policy tofu_default_policy;
	int force_ownertrust;
	enum gnupg_compliance_mode compliance;
	enum
	{
	KF_DEFAULT, KF_NONE, KF_SHORT, KF_LONG, KF_0xSHORT, KF_0xLONG
	} keyid_format;
	const char *set_filename;
	strlist_t comments;
	int throw_keyids;
	const char *photo_viewer;
	int s2k_mode;
	int s2k_digest_algo;
	int s2k_cipher_algo;
	unsigned char s2k_count; /* This is the encoded form, not the raw
	count */
	int not_dash_escaped;
	int escape_from;
	int lock_once;
	keyserver_spec_t keyserver; /* The list of configured keyservers. */
	struct
	{
	unsigned int options;
	unsigned int import_options;
	unsigned int export_options;
	char *http_proxy;
	} keyserver_options;
	int exec_disable;
	int exec_path_set;
	unsigned int import_options;
	unsigned int export_options;
	unsigned int list_options;
	unsigned int verify_options;
	const char *def_preference_list;
	const char *def_keyserver_url;
	prefitem_t *personal_cipher_prefs;
	prefitem_t *personal_aead_prefs;
	prefitem_t *personal_digest_prefs;
	prefitem_t *personal_compress_prefs;
	struct weakhash *weak_digests;
	int no_perm_warn;
	char *temp_dir;
	int no_encrypt_to;
	int encrypt_to_default_key;
	int interactive;
	struct notation *sig_notations;
	struct notation *cert_notations;
	strlist_t sig_policy_url;
	strlist_t cert_policy_url;
	strlist_t sig_keyserver_url;
	strlist_t cert_subpackets;
	strlist_t sig_subpackets;
	int allow_non_selfsigned_uid;
	int allow_freeform_uid;
	int no_literal;
	ulong set_filesize;
	int fast_list_mode;
	int legacy_list_mode;
	int ignore_time_conflict;
	int ignore_valid_from;
	int ignore_crc_error;
	int ignore_mdc_error;
	int command_fd;
	const char *override_session_key;
	int show_session_key;

	const char *gpg_agent_info;
	int try_all_secrets;
	int no_expensive_trust_checks;
	int no_sig_cache;
	int no_auto_check_trustdb;
	int preserve_permissions;
	int no_homedir_creation;
	struct groupitem *grouplist;
	int mangle_dos_filenames;
	int enable_progress_filter;
	unsigned int screen_columns;
	unsigned int screen_lines;
	byte *show_subpackets;
	int rfc2440_text;

	/* If true, let write failures on the status-fd exit the process. */
	int exit_on_status_write_error;

	/* If > 0, limit the number of card insertion prompts to this
	value. */
	int limit_card_insert_tries;

	struct
	{
	/* If set, require an 0x19 backsig to be present on signatures
	made by signing subkeys. If not set, a missing backsig is not
	an error (but an invalid backsig still is). */
	unsigned int require_cross_cert:1;

	unsigned int use_embedded_filename:1;
	unsigned int utf8_filename:1;
	unsigned int dsa2:1;
	unsigned int allow_weak_digest_algos:1;
	unsigned int allow_weak_key_signatures:1;
	unsigned int large_rsa:1;
	unsigned int disable_signer_uid:1;
	+ unsigned int include_key_block:1;
	/* Flag to enable experimental features from RFC4880bis. */
	unsigned int rfc4880bis:1;
	/* Hack: --output is not given but OUTFILE was temporary set to "-". */
	unsigned int dummy_outfile:1;
	/* Force the use of the OpenPGP card and do not allow the use of
	* another card. */
	unsigned int use_only_openpgp_card:1;
	unsigned int full_timestrings:1;
	} flags;

	/* Linked list of ways to find a key if the key isn't on the local
	keyring. */
	struct akl
	{
	enum {
	AKL_NODEFAULT,
	AKL_LOCAL,
	AKL_CERT,
	AKL_PKA,
	AKL_DANE,
	AKL_WKD,
	AKL_LDAP,
	AKL_KEYSERVER,
	AKL_SPEC
	} type;
	keyserver_spec_t spec;
	struct akl *next;
	} *auto_key_locate;

	/* The value of --key-origin. See parse_key_origin(). */
	int key_origin;
	char *key_origin_url;

	int passphrase_repeat;
	int pinentry_mode;
	int request_origin;

	int unwrap_encryption;
	int only_sign_text_ids;

	int no_symkey_cache; /* Disable the cache used for --symmetric. */

	int use_keyboxd; /* Use the external keyboxd as storage backend. */
	} opt;

	/* CTRL is used to keep some global variables we currently can't
	avoid. Future concurrent versions of gpg will put it into a per
	request structure CTRL. */
	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	struct {
	int in_auto_key_retrieve; /* True if we are doing an
	auto_key_retrieve. */
	/* Hack to store the last error. We currently need it because the
	proc_packet machinery is not able to reliabale return error
	codes. Thus for the --server purposes we store some of the error
	codes here. FIXME! */
	gpg_error_t lasterr;

	/* Kludge to silence some warnings using --secret-key-list. */
	int silence_parse_warnings;
	} glo_ctrl;

	#define DBG_PACKET_VALUE 1 /* debug packet reading/writing */
	#define DBG_MPI_VALUE 2 /* debug mpi details */
	#define DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE 4 /* debug crypto handling */
	/* (may reveal sensitive data) */
	#define DBG_FILTER_VALUE 8 /* debug internal filter handling */
	#define DBG_IOBUF_VALUE 16 /* debug iobuf stuff */
	#define DBG_MEMORY_VALUE 32 /* debug memory allocation stuff */
	#define DBG_CACHE_VALUE 64 /* debug the caching */
	#define DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE 128 /* show memory statistics */
	#define DBG_TRUST_VALUE 256 /* debug the trustdb */
	#define DBG_HASHING_VALUE 512 /* debug hashing operations */
	#define DBG_IPC_VALUE 1024 /* debug assuan communication */
	#define DBG_CLOCK_VALUE 4096
	#define DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE 8192 /* debug the key lookup */
	#define DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE 16384 /* debug external program calls */

	/* Tests for the debugging flags. */
	#define DBG_PACKET (opt.debug & DBG_PACKET_VALUE)
	#define DBG_MPI (opt.debug & DBG_MPI_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CRYPTO (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE)
	#define DBG_FILTER (opt.debug & DBG_FILTER_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CACHE (opt.debug & DBG_CACHE_VALUE)
	#define DBG_TRUST (opt.debug & DBG_TRUST_VALUE)
	#define DBG_HASHING (opt.debug & DBG_HASHING_VALUE)
	#define DBG_IPC (opt.debug & DBG_IPC_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CLOCK (opt.debug & DBG_CLOCK_VALUE)
	#define DBG_LOOKUP (opt.debug & DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE)
	#define DBG_EXTPROG (opt.debug & DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE)

	/* FIXME: We need to check why we did not put this into opt. */
	#define DBG_MEMORY memory_debug_mode
	#define DBG_MEMSTAT memory_stat_debug_mode

	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE int memory_debug_mode;
	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE int memory_stat_debug_mode;


	/* Compatibility flags. */
	#define GNUPG (opt.compliance==CO_GNUPG \|\| opt.compliance==CO_DE_VS)
	#define RFC2440 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC2440)
	#define RFC4880 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC4880)
	#define PGP7 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP7)
	#define PGP8 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP8)
	#define PGPX (PGP7 \|\| PGP8)

	/* Various option flags. Note that there should be no common string
	names between the IMPORT_ and EXPORT_ flags as they can be mixed in
	the keyserver-options option. */

	#define IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS (1<<0)
	#define IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG (1<<1)
	#define IMPORT_FAST (1<<2)
	#define IMPORT_SHOW (1<<3)
	#define IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY (1<<4)
	#define IMPORT_MINIMAL (1<<5)
	#define IMPORT_CLEAN (1<<6)
	#define IMPORT_NO_SECKEY (1<<7)
	#define IMPORT_KEEP_OWNERTTRUST (1<<8)
	#define IMPORT_EXPORT (1<<9)
	#define IMPORT_RESTORE (1<<10)
	#define IMPORT_REPAIR_KEYS (1<<11)
	#define IMPORT_DRY_RUN (1<<12)
	#define IMPORT_DROP_UIDS (1<<13)
	#define IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY (1<<14)

	#define EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS (1<<0)
	#define EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES (1<<1)
	#define EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS (1<<2)
	#define EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD (1<<3)
	#define EXPORT_MINIMAL (1<<4)
	#define EXPORT_CLEAN (1<<5)
	#define EXPORT_PKA_FORMAT (1<<6)
	#define EXPORT_DANE_FORMAT (1<<7)
	#define EXPORT_BACKUP (1<<10)
	#define EXPORT_DROP_UIDS (1<<13)

	#define LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS (1<<0)
	#define LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS (1<<1)
	#define LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS (1<<2)
	#define LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS (1<<3)
	#define LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS (LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS\|LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)
	#define LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS (1<<4)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY (1<<5)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS (1<<6)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS (1<<7)
	#define LIST_SHOW_KEYRING (1<<8)
	#define LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE (1<<9)
	#define LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS (1<<10)
	#define LIST_SHOW_USAGE (1<<11)
	#define LIST_SHOW_ONLY_FPR_MBOX (1<<12)

	#define VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS (1<<0)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS (1<<1)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS (1<<2)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS (1<<3)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS (VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS\|VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS (1<<4)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY (1<<5)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS (1<<6)
	#define VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS (1<<7)
	#define VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE (1<<8)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY (1<<9)

	#define KEYSERVER_HTTP_PROXY (1<<0)
	#define KEYSERVER_TIMEOUT (1<<1)
	#define KEYSERVER_ADD_FAKE_V3 (1<<2)
	#define KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE (1<<3)
	#define KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL (1<<4)
	#define KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD (1<<5)


	#endif /G10_OPTIONS_H/
	diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c
	index 7c330ee43..d554bf5fe 100644
	--- a/g10/parse-packet.c
	+++ b/g10/parse-packet.c
	@@ -1,3631 +1,3660 @@
	/* parse-packet.c - read packets
	* Copyright (C) 1998-2007, 2009-2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 2014, 2018 Werner Koch
	* Copyright (C) 2015 g10 Code GmbH
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0+
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>

	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "../common/util.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "../common/iobuf.h"
	#include "filter.h"
	#include "photoid.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "../common/i18n.h"
	#include "../common/host2net.h"
	#include "../common/mbox-util.h"


	static int mpi_print_mode;
	static int list_mode;
	static estream_t listfp;

	/* A linked list of known notation names. Note that the FLAG is used
	* to store the length of the name to speed up the check. */
	static strlist_t known_notations_list;


	static int parse (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt, int onlykeypkts,
	off_t * retpos, int *skip, IOBUF out, int do_skip
	#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
	, const char dbg_w, const char dbg_f, int dbg_l
	#endif
	);
	static int copy_packet (IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, int pkttype,
	unsigned long pktlen, int partial);
	static void skip_packet (IOBUF inp, int pkttype,
	unsigned long pktlen, int partial);
	static void *read_rest (IOBUF inp, size_t pktlen);
	static int parse_marker (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen);
	static int parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * packet);
	static int parse_pubkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * packet);
	static int parse_onepass_sig (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PKT_onepass_sig * ops);
	static int parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	byte * hdr, int hdrlen, PACKET * packet);
	static int parse_user_id (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * packet);
	static int parse_attribute (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * packet);
	static int parse_comment (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * packet);
	static gpg_error_t parse_ring_trust (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx,
	unsigned long pktlen);
	static int parse_plaintext (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * packet, int new_ctb, int partial);
	static int parse_compressed (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * packet, int new_ctb);
	static int parse_encrypted (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * packet, int new_ctb, int partial);
	static gpg_error_t parse_encrypted_aead (IOBUF inp, int pkttype,
	unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet,
	int partial);
	static int parse_mdc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * packet, int new_ctb);
	static int parse_gpg_control (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * packet, int partial);

	/* Read a 16-bit value in MSB order (big endian) from an iobuf. */
	static unsigned short
	read_16 (IOBUF inp)
	{
	unsigned short a;
	a = (unsigned short)iobuf_get_noeof (inp) << 8;
	a \|= iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	return a;
	}


	/* Read a 32-bit value in MSB order (big endian) from an iobuf. */
	static unsigned long
	read_32 (IOBUF inp)
	{
	unsigned long a;
	a = (unsigned long)iobuf_get_noeof (inp) << 24;
	a \|= iobuf_get_noeof (inp) << 16;
	a \|= iobuf_get_noeof (inp) << 8;
	a \|= iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	return a;
	}


	/* Read an external representation of an MPI and return the MPI. The
	external format is a 16-bit unsigned value stored in network byte
	order giving the number of bits for the following integer. The
	integer is stored MSB first and is left padded with zero bits to
	align on a byte boundary.

	The caller must set *RET_NREAD to the maximum number of bytes to
	read from the pipeline INP. This function sets *RET_NREAD to be
	the number of bytes actually read from the pipeline.

	If SECURE is true, the integer is stored in secure memory
	(allocated using gcry_xmalloc_secure). */
	static gcry_mpi_t
	mpi_read (iobuf_t inp, unsigned int *ret_nread, int secure)
	{
	int c, c1, c2, i;
	unsigned int nmax = *ret_nread;
	unsigned int nbits, nbytes;
	size_t nread = 0;
	gcry_mpi_t a = NULL;
	byte *buf = NULL;
	byte *p;

	if (!nmax)
	goto overflow;

	if ((c = c1 = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
	goto leave;
	if (++nread == nmax)
	goto overflow;
	nbits = c << 8;
	if ((c = c2 = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
	goto leave;
	++nread;
	nbits \|= c;
	if (nbits > MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS)
	{
	log_error ("mpi too large (%u bits)\n", nbits);
	goto leave;
	}

	nbytes = (nbits + 7) / 8;
	buf = secure ? gcry_xmalloc_secure (nbytes + 2) : gcry_xmalloc (nbytes + 2);
	p = buf;
	p[0] = c1;
	p[1] = c2;
	for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++)
	{
	if (nread == nmax)
	goto overflow;

	c = iobuf_get (inp);
	if (c == -1)
	goto leave;

	p[i + 2] = c;
	nread ++;
	}

	if (gcry_mpi_scan (&a, GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, buf, nread, &nread))
	a = NULL;

	*ret_nread = nread;
	gcry_free(buf);
	return a;

	overflow:
	log_error ("mpi larger than indicated length (%u bits)\n", 8*nmax);
	leave:
	*ret_nread = nread;
	gcry_free(buf);
	return a;
	}


	/* Register STRING as a known critical notation name. */
	void
	register_known_notation (const char *string)
	{
	strlist_t sl;

	if (!known_notations_list)
	{
	sl = add_to_strlist (&known_notations_list,
	"preferred-email-encoding@pgp.com");
	sl->flags = 32;
	sl = add_to_strlist (&known_notations_list, "pka-address@gnupg.org");
	sl->flags = 21;
	}
	if (!string)
	return; /* Only initialized the default known notations. */

	/* In --set-notation we use an exclamation mark to indicate a
	* critical notation. As a convenience skip this here. */
	if (*string == '!')
	string++;

	if (!*string \|\| strlist_find (known_notations_list, string))
	return; /* Empty string or already registered. */

	sl = add_to_strlist (&known_notations_list, string);
	sl->flags = strlen (string);
	}


	int
	set_packet_list_mode (int mode)
	{
	int old = list_mode;
	list_mode = mode;

	/* We use stdout only if invoked by the --list-packets command
	but switch to stderr in all other cases. This breaks the
	previous behaviour but that seems to be more of a bug than
	intentional. I don't believe that any application makes use of
	this long standing annoying way of printing to stdout except when
	doing a --list-packets. If this assumption fails, it will be easy
	to add an option for the listing stream. Note that we initialize
	it only once; mainly because there is code which switches
	opt.list_mode back to 1 and we want to have all output to the
	same stream. The MPI_PRINT_MODE will be enabled if the
	corresponding debug flag is set or if we are in --list-packets
	and --verbose is given.

	Using stderr is not actually very clean because it bypasses the
	logging code but it is a special thing anyway. I am not sure
	whether using log_stream() would be better. Perhaps we should
	enable the list mode only with a special option. */
	if (!listfp)
	{
	if (opt.list_packets)
	{
	listfp = es_stdout;
	if (opt.verbose)
	mpi_print_mode = 1;
	}
	else
	listfp = es_stderr;

	if (DBG_MPI)
	mpi_print_mode = 1;
	}
	return old;
	}


	/* If OPT.VERBOSE is set, print a warning that the algorithm ALGO is
	not suitable for signing and encryption. */
	static void
	unknown_pubkey_warning (int algo)
	{
	static byte unknown_pubkey_algos[256];

	/* First check whether the algorithm is usable but not suitable for
	encryption/signing. */
	if (pubkey_get_npkey (algo))
	{
	if (opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings)
	{
	if (!pubkey_get_nsig (algo))
	log_info ("public key algorithm %s not suitable for %s\n",
	openpgp_pk_algo_name (algo), "signing");
	if (!pubkey_get_nenc (algo))
	log_info ("public key algorithm %s not suitable for %s\n",
	openpgp_pk_algo_name (algo), "encryption");
	}
	}
	else
	{
	algo &= 0xff;
	if (!unknown_pubkey_algos[algo])
	{
	if (opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings)
	log_info (_("can't handle public key algorithm %d\n"), algo);
	unknown_pubkey_algos[algo] = 1;
	}
	}
	}


	#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
	int
	dbg_parse_packet (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt,
	const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l)
	{
	int skip, rc;

	do
	{
	rc = parse (ctx, pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 0, "parse", dbg_f, dbg_l);
	}
	while (skip && ! rc);
	return rc;
	}
	#else /!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET/
	int
	parse_packet (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	int skip, rc;

	do
	{
	rc = parse (ctx, pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 0);
	}
	while (skip && ! rc);
	return rc;
	}
	#endif /!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET/


	/*
	* Like parse packet, but only return secret or public (sub)key
	* packets.
	*/
	#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
	int
	dbg_search_packet (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt,
	off_t * retpos, int with_uid,
	const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l)
	{
	int skip, rc;

	do
	{
	rc = parse (ctx, pkt, with_uid ? 2 : 1, retpos, &skip, NULL, 0, "search",
	dbg_f, dbg_l);
	}
	while (skip && ! rc);
	return rc;
	}
	#else /!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET/
	int
	search_packet (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt,
	off_t * retpos, int with_uid)
	{
	int skip, rc;

	do
	{
	rc = parse (ctx, pkt, with_uid ? 2 : 1, retpos, &skip, NULL, 0);
	}
	while (skip && ! rc);
	return rc;
	}
	#endif /!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET/


	/*
	* Copy all packets from INP to OUT, thereby removing unused spaces.
	*/
	#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
	int
	dbg_copy_all_packets (iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l)
	{
	PACKET pkt;
	struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx;
	int skip, rc = 0;

	if (! out)
	log_bug ("copy_all_packets: OUT may not be NULL.\n");

	init_parse_packet (&parsectx, inp);

	do
	{
	init_packet (&pkt);
	}
	while (!
	(rc =
	parse (&parsectx, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0, "copy",
	dbg_f, dbg_l)));

	deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx);

	return rc;
	}
	#else /!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET/
	int
	copy_all_packets (iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out)
	{
	PACKET pkt;
	struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx;
	int skip, rc = 0;

	if (! out)
	log_bug ("copy_all_packets: OUT may not be NULL.\n");

	init_parse_packet (&parsectx, inp);

	do
	{
	init_packet (&pkt);
	}
	while (!(rc = parse (&parsectx, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0)));

	deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx);

	return rc;
	}
	#endif /!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET/


	/*
	* Copy some packets from INP to OUT, thereby removing unused spaces.
	* Stop at offset STOPoff (i.e. don't copy packets at this or later
	* offsets)
	*/
	#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
	int
	dbg_copy_some_packets (iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out, off_t stopoff,
	const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	PACKET pkt;
	int skip;
	struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx;

	init_parse_packet (&parsectx, inp);

	do
	{
	if (iobuf_tell (inp) >= stopoff)
	{
	deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx);
	return 0;
	}
	init_packet (&pkt);
	}
	while (!(rc = parse (&parsectx, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0,
	"some", dbg_f, dbg_l)));

	deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx);

	return rc;
	}
	#else /!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET/
	int
	copy_some_packets (iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out, off_t stopoff)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	PACKET pkt;
	struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx;
	int skip;

	init_parse_packet (&parsectx, inp);

	do
	{
	if (iobuf_tell (inp) >= stopoff)
	{
	deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx);
	return 0;
	}
	init_packet (&pkt);
	}
	while (!(rc = parse (&parsectx, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0)));

	deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx);

	return rc;
	}
	#endif /!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET/


	/*
	* Skip over N packets
	*/
	#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
	int
	dbg_skip_some_packets (iobuf_t inp, unsigned n, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	int skip;
	PACKET pkt;
	struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx;

	init_parse_packet (&parsectx, inp);

	for (; n && !rc; n--)
	{
	init_packet (&pkt);
	rc = parse (&parsectx, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 1, "skip",
	dbg_f, dbg_l);
	}

	deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx);

	return rc;
	}
	#else /!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET/
	int
	skip_some_packets (iobuf_t inp, unsigned int n)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	int skip;
	PACKET pkt;
	struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx;

	init_parse_packet (&parsectx, inp);

	for (; n && !rc; n--)
	{
	init_packet (&pkt);
	rc = parse (&parsectx, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 1);
	}

	deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx);

	return rc;
	}
	#endif /!DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET/


	/* Parse a packet and save it in *PKT.

	If OUT is not NULL and the packet is valid (its type is not 0),
	then the header, the initial length field and the packet's contents
	are written to OUT. In this case, the packet is not saved in *PKT.

	ONLYKEYPKTS is a simple packet filter. If ONLYKEYPKTS is set to 1,
	then only public subkey packets, public key packets, private subkey
	packets and private key packets are parsed. The rest are skipped
	(i.e., the header and the contents are read from the pipeline and
	discarded). If ONLYKEYPKTS is set to 2, then in addition to the
	above 4 types of packets, user id packets are also accepted.

	DO_SKIP is a more coarse grained filter. Unless ONLYKEYPKTS is set
	to 2 and the packet is a user id packet, all packets are skipped.

	Finally, if a packet is invalid (it's type is 0), it is skipped.

	If a packet is skipped and SKIP is not NULL, then *SKIP is set to
	1.

	Note: ONLYKEYPKTS and DO_SKIP are only respected if OUT is NULL,
	i.e., the packets are not simply being copied.

	If RETPOS is not NULL, then the position of CTX->INP (as returned by
	iobuf_tell) is saved there before any data is read from CTX->INP.
	*/
	static int
	parse (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET pkt, int onlykeypkts, off_t retpos,
	int *skip, IOBUF out, int do_skip
	#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
	, const char dbg_w, const char dbg_f, int dbg_l
	#endif
	)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	iobuf_t inp;
	int c, ctb, pkttype, lenbytes;
	unsigned long pktlen;
	byte hdr[8];
	int hdrlen;
	int new_ctb = 0, partial = 0;
	int with_uid = (onlykeypkts == 2);
	off_t pos;

	*skip = 0;
	inp = ctx->inp;

	again:
	log_assert (!pkt->pkt.generic);
	if (retpos \|\| list_mode)
	{
	pos = iobuf_tell (inp);
	if (retpos)
	*retpos = pos;
	}
	else
	pos = 0; /* (silence compiler warning) */

	/* The first byte of a packet is the so-called tag. The highest bit
	must be set. */
	if ((ctb = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
	{
	rc = -1;
	goto leave;
	}
	hdrlen = 0;
	hdr[hdrlen++] = ctb;

	if (!(ctb & 0x80))
	{
	log_error ("%s: invalid packet (ctb=%02x)\n", iobuf_where (inp), ctb);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Immediately following the header is the length. There are two
	formats: the old format and the new format. If bit 6 (where the
	least significant bit is bit 0) is set in the tag, then we are
	dealing with a new format packet. Otherwise, it is an old format
	packet. */
	pktlen = 0;
	new_ctb = !!(ctb & 0x40);
	if (new_ctb)
	{
	/* Get the packet's type. This is encoded in the 6 least
	significant bits of the tag. */
	pkttype = ctb & 0x3f;

	/* Extract the packet's length. New format packets have 4 ways
	to encode the packet length. The value of the first byte
	determines the encoding and partially determines the length.
	See section 4.2.2 of RFC 4880 for details. */
	if ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
	{
	log_error ("%s: 1st length byte missing\n", iobuf_where (inp));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}


	hdr[hdrlen++] = c;
	if (c < 192)
	pktlen = c;
	else if (c < 224)
	{
	pktlen = (c - 192) * 256;
	if ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
	{
	log_error ("%s: 2nd length byte missing\n",
	iobuf_where (inp));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	hdr[hdrlen++] = c;
	pktlen += c + 192;
	}
	else if (c == 255)
	{
	int i;
	char value[4];

	for (i = 0; i < 4; i ++)
	{
	if ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
	{
	log_error ("%s: 4 byte length invalid\n", iobuf_where (inp));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	value[i] = hdr[hdrlen++] = c;
	}

	pktlen = buf32_to_ulong (value);
	}
	else /* Partial body length. */
	{
	switch (pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_PLAINTEXT:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD:
	case PKT_COMPRESSED:
	iobuf_set_partial_body_length_mode (inp, c & 0xff);
	pktlen = 0; /* To indicate partial length. */
	partial = 1;
	break;

	default:
	log_error ("%s: partial length invalid for"
	" packet type %d\n", iobuf_where (inp), pkttype);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	}

	}
	else
	/* This is an old format packet. */
	{
	/* Extract the packet's type. This is encoded in bits 2-5. */
	pkttype = (ctb >> 2) & 0xf;

	/* The type of length encoding is encoded in bits 0-1 of the
	tag. */
	lenbytes = ((ctb & 3) == 3) ? 0 : (1 << (ctb & 3));
	if (!lenbytes)
	{
	pktlen = 0; /* Don't know the value. */
	/* This isn't really partial, but we can treat it the same
	in a "read until the end" sort of way. */
	partial = 1;
	if (pkttype != PKT_ENCRYPTED && pkttype != PKT_PLAINTEXT
	&& pkttype != PKT_COMPRESSED)
	{
	log_error ("%s: indeterminate length for invalid"
	" packet type %d\n", iobuf_where (inp), pkttype);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	for (; lenbytes; lenbytes--)
	{
	pktlen <<= 8;
	c = iobuf_get (inp);
	if (c == -1)
	{
	log_error ("%s: length invalid\n", iobuf_where (inp));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	pktlen \|= hdr[hdrlen++] = c;
	}
	}
	}

	/* Sometimes the decompressing layer enters an error state in which
	it simply outputs 0xff for every byte read. If we have a stream
	of 0xff bytes, then it will be detected as a new format packet
	with type 63 and a 4-byte encoded length that is 4G-1. Since
	packets with type 63 are private and we use them as a control
	packet, which won't be 4 GB, we reject such packets as
	invalid. */
	if (pkttype == 63 && pktlen == 0xFFFFFFFF)
	{
	/* With some probability this is caused by a problem in the
	* the uncompressing layer - in some error cases it just loops
	* and spits out 0xff bytes. */
	log_error ("%s: garbled packet detected\n", iobuf_where (inp));
	g10_exit (2);
	}

	if (out && pkttype)
	{
	/* This type of copying won't work if the packet uses a partial
	body length. (In other words, this only works if HDR is
	actually the length.) Currently, no callers require this
	functionality so we just log this as an error. */
	if (partial)
	{
	log_error ("parse: Can't copy partial packet. Aborting.\n");
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}

	rc = iobuf_write (out, hdr, hdrlen);
	if (!rc)
	rc = copy_packet (inp, out, pkttype, pktlen, partial);
	goto leave;
	}

	if (with_uid && pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	/* If ONLYKEYPKTS is set to 2, then we never skip user id packets,
	even if DO_SKIP is set. */
	;
	else if (do_skip
	/* type==0 is not allowed. This is an invalid packet. */
	\|\| !pkttype
	/* When ONLYKEYPKTS is set, we don't skip keys. */
	\|\| (onlykeypkts && pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	&& pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY && pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY))
	{
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, partial);
	*skip = 1;
	rc = 0;
	goto leave;
	}

	if (DBG_PACKET)
	{
	#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
	log_debug ("parse_packet(iob=%d): type=%d length=%lu%s (%s.%s.%d)\n",
	iobuf_id (inp), pkttype, pktlen, new_ctb ? " (new_ctb)" : "",
	dbg_w, dbg_f, dbg_l);
	#else
	log_debug ("parse_packet(iob=%d): type=%d length=%lu%s\n",
	iobuf_id (inp), pkttype, pktlen,
	new_ctb ? " (new_ctb)" : "");
	#endif
	}

	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "# off=%lu ctb=%02x tag=%d hlen=%d plen=%lu%s%s\n",
	(unsigned long)pos, ctb, pkttype, hdrlen, pktlen,
	partial? (new_ctb ? " partial" : " indeterminate") :"",
	new_ctb? " new-ctb":"");

	/* Count it. */
	ctx->n_parsed_packets++;

	pkt->pkttype = pkttype;
	rc = GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_PACKET; /* default error */
	switch (pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
	case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
	pkt->pkt.public_key = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt->pkt.public_key);
	rc = parse_key (inp, pkttype, pktlen, hdr, hdrlen, pkt);
	break;
	case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
	rc = parse_symkeyenc (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
	break;
	case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
	rc = parse_pubkeyenc (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
	break;
	case PKT_SIGNATURE:
	pkt->pkt.signature = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt->pkt.signature);
	rc = parse_signature (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt->pkt.signature);
	break;
	case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG:
	pkt->pkt.onepass_sig = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt->pkt.onepass_sig);
	rc = parse_onepass_sig (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt->pkt.onepass_sig);
	break;
	case PKT_USER_ID:
	rc = parse_user_id (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
	break;
	case PKT_ATTRIBUTE:
	pkt->pkttype = pkttype = PKT_USER_ID; /* we store it in the userID */
	rc = parse_attribute (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
	break;
	case PKT_OLD_COMMENT:
	case PKT_COMMENT:
	rc = parse_comment (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
	break;
	case PKT_RING_TRUST:
	{
	rc = parse_ring_trust (ctx, pktlen);
	if (!rc)
	goto again; /* Directly read the next packet. */
	}
	break;
	case PKT_PLAINTEXT:
	rc = parse_plaintext (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb, partial);
	break;
	case PKT_COMPRESSED:
	rc = parse_compressed (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb);
	break;
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
	rc = parse_encrypted (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb, partial);
	break;
	case PKT_MDC:
	rc = parse_mdc (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb);
	break;
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD:
	rc = parse_encrypted_aead (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, partial);
	break;
	case PKT_GPG_CONTROL:
	rc = parse_gpg_control (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, partial);
	break;
	case PKT_MARKER:
	rc = parse_marker (inp, pkttype, pktlen);
	break;
	default:
	/* Unknown packet. Skip it. */
	skip_packet (inp, pkttype, pktlen, partial);
	break;
	}

	/* Store a shallow copy of certain packets in the context. */
	free_packet (NULL, ctx);
	if (!rc && (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
	\|\| pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	\|\| pkttype == PKT_ATTRIBUTE
	\|\| pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE))
	{
	ctx->last_pkt = *pkt;
	}

	leave:
	/* FIXME: We leak in case of an error (see the xmalloc's above). */
	if (!rc && iobuf_error (inp))
	rc = GPG_ERR_INV_KEYRING;

	/* FIXME: We use only the error code for now to avoid problems with
	callers which have not been checked to always use gpg_err_code()
	when comparing error codes. */
	return rc == -1? -1 : gpg_err_code (rc);
	}


	static void
	dump_hex_line (int c, int *i)
	{
	if (i && !(i % 8))
	{
	if (i && !(i % 24))
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\n%4d:", *i);
	else
	es_putc (' ', listfp);
	}
	if (c == -1)
	es_fprintf (listfp, " EOF");
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, " %02x", c);
	++*i;
	}


	/* Copy the contents of a packet from the pipeline IN to the pipeline
	OUT.

	The header and length have already been read from INP and the
	decoded values are given as PKGTYPE and PKTLEN.

	If the packet is a partial body length packet (RFC 4880, Section
	4.2.2.4), then iobuf_set_partial_block_modeiobuf_set_partial_block_mode
	should already have been called on INP and PARTIAL should be set.

	If PARTIAL is set or PKTLEN is 0 and PKTTYPE is PKT_COMPRESSED,
	copy until the first EOF is encountered on INP.

	Returns 0 on success and an error code if an error occurs. */
	static int
	copy_packet (IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, int pkttype,
	unsigned long pktlen, int partial)
	{
	int rc;
	int n;
	char buf[100];

	if (partial)
	{
	while ((n = iobuf_read (inp, buf, sizeof (buf))) != -1)
	if ((rc = iobuf_write (out, buf, n)))
	return rc; /* write error */
	}
	else if (!pktlen && pkttype == PKT_COMPRESSED)
	{
	log_debug ("copy_packet: compressed!\n");
	/* compressed packet, copy till EOF */
	while ((n = iobuf_read (inp, buf, sizeof (buf))) != -1)
	if ((rc = iobuf_write (out, buf, n)))
	return rc; /* write error */
	}
	else
	{
	for (; pktlen; pktlen -= n)
	{
	n = pktlen > sizeof (buf) ? sizeof (buf) : pktlen;
	n = iobuf_read (inp, buf, n);
	if (n == -1)
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
	if ((rc = iobuf_write (out, buf, n)))
	return rc; /* write error */
	}
	}
	return 0;
	}


	/* Skip an unknown packet. PKTTYPE is the packet's type, PKTLEN is
	the length of the packet's content and PARTIAL is whether partial
	body length encoding in used (in this case PKTLEN is ignored). */
	static void
	skip_packet (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, int partial)
	{
	if (list_mode)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":unknown packet: type %2d, length %lu\n",
	pkttype, pktlen);
	if (pkttype)
	{
	int c, i = 0;
	es_fputs ("dump:", listfp);
	if (partial)
	{
	while ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) != -1)
	dump_hex_line (c, &i);
	}
	else
	{
	for (; pktlen; pktlen--)
	{
	dump_hex_line ((c = iobuf_get (inp)), &i);
	if (c == -1)
	break;
	}
	}
	es_putc ('\n', listfp);
	return;
	}
	}
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, partial);
	}


	/* Read PKTLEN bytes from INP and return them in a newly allocated
	* buffer. In case of an error (including reading fewer than PKTLEN
	* bytes from INP before EOF is returned), NULL is returned and an
	* error message is logged. */
	static void *
	read_rest (IOBUF inp, size_t pktlen)
	{
	int c;
	byte buf, p;

	buf = xtrymalloc (pktlen);
	if (!buf)
	{
	gpg_error_t err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	log_error ("error reading rest of packet: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	return NULL;
	}
	for (p = buf; pktlen; pktlen--)
	{
	c = iobuf_get (inp);
	if (c == -1)
	{
	log_error ("premature eof while reading rest of packet\n");
	xfree (buf);
	return NULL;
	}
	*p++ = c;
	}

	return buf;
	}


	/* Read a special size+body from INP. On success store an opaque MPI
	with it at R_DATA. On error return an error code and store NULL at
	R_DATA. Even in the error case store the number of read bytes at
	R_NREAD. The caller shall pass the remaining size of the packet in
	PKTLEN. */
	static gpg_error_t
	read_size_body (iobuf_t inp, int pktlen, size_t *r_nread,
	gcry_mpi_t *r_data)
	{
	char buffer[256];
	char *tmpbuf;
	int i, c, nbytes;

	*r_nread = 0;
	*r_data = NULL;

	if (!pktlen)
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	c = iobuf_readbyte (inp);
	if (c < 0)
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	pktlen--;
	++*r_nread;
	nbytes = c;
	if (nbytes < 2 \|\| nbytes > 254)
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	if (nbytes > pktlen)
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);

	buffer[0] = nbytes;

	for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++)
	{
	c = iobuf_get (inp);
	if (c < 0)
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	++*r_nread;
	buffer[1+i] = c;
	}

	tmpbuf = xtrymalloc (1 + nbytes);
	if (!tmpbuf)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	memcpy (tmpbuf, buffer, 1 + nbytes);
	r_data = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, tmpbuf, 8 (1 + nbytes));
	if (!*r_data)
	{
	xfree (tmpbuf);
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	}
	return 0;
	}


	/* Parse a marker packet. */
	static int
	parse_marker (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen)
	{
	(void) pkttype;

	if (pktlen != 3)
	goto fail;

	if (iobuf_get (inp) != 'P')
	{
	pktlen--;
	goto fail;
	}

	if (iobuf_get (inp) != 'G')
	{
	pktlen--;
	goto fail;
	}

	if (iobuf_get (inp) != 'P')
	{
	pktlen--;
	goto fail;
	}

	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":marker packet: PGP\n", listfp);

	return 0;

	fail:
	log_error ("invalid marker packet\n");
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":marker packet: [invalid]\n", listfp);
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
	return GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
	}


	static int
	parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * packet)
	{
	PKT_symkey_enc *k;
	int rc = 0;
	int i, version, s2kmode, cipher_algo, aead_algo, hash_algo, seskeylen, minlen;

	if (pktlen < 4)
	goto too_short;
	version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	if (version == 4)
	;
	else if (version == 5)
	;
	else
	{
	log_error ("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: [unknown version]\n");
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	if (pktlen > 200)
	{ /* (we encode the seskeylen in a byte) */
	log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: [too large]\n");
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	cipher_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	if (version == 5)
	{
	aead_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	}
	else
	aead_algo = 0;
	if (pktlen < 2)
	goto too_short;
	s2kmode = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	hash_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	switch (s2kmode)
	{
	case 0: /* Simple S2K. */
	minlen = 0;
	break;
	case 1: /* Salted S2K. */
	minlen = 8;
	break;
	case 3: /* Iterated+salted S2K. */
	minlen = 9;
	break;
	default:
	log_error ("unknown S2K mode %d\n", s2kmode);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: [unknown S2K mode]\n");
	goto leave;
	}
	if (minlen > pktlen)
	{
	log_error ("packet with S2K %d too short\n", s2kmode);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: [too short]\n");
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	seskeylen = pktlen - minlen;
	k = packet->pkt.symkey_enc = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *packet->pkt.symkey_enc
	+ seskeylen - 1);
	k->version = version;
	k->cipher_algo = cipher_algo;
	k->aead_algo = aead_algo;
	k->s2k.mode = s2kmode;
	k->s2k.hash_algo = hash_algo;
	if (s2kmode == 1 \|\| s2kmode == 3)
	{
	for (i = 0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen--)
	k->s2k.salt[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	}
	if (s2kmode == 3)
	{
	k->s2k.count = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	}
	k->seskeylen = seskeylen;
	if (k->seskeylen)
	{
	for (i = 0; i < seskeylen && pktlen; i++, pktlen--)
	k->seskey[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);

	/* What we're watching out for here is a session key decryptor
	with no salt. The RFC says that using salt for this is a
	MUST. */
	if (s2kmode != 1 && s2kmode != 3)
	log_info (_("WARNING: potentially insecure symmetrically"
	" encrypted session key\n"));
	}
	log_assert (!pktlen);

	if (list_mode)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp,
	":symkey enc packet: version %d, cipher %d, aead %d,"
	" s2k %d, hash %d",
	version, cipher_algo, aead_algo, s2kmode, hash_algo);
	if (seskeylen)
	{
	/* To compute the size of the session key we need to know
	* the size of the AEAD nonce which we may not know. Thus
	* we show only the seize of the entire encrypted session
	* key. */
	if (aead_algo)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ", encrypted seskey %d bytes", seskeylen);
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, ", seskey %d bits", (seskeylen - 1) * 8);
	}
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\n");
	if (s2kmode == 1 \|\| s2kmode == 3)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tsalt ");
	es_write_hexstring (listfp, k->s2k.salt, 8, 0, NULL);
	if (s2kmode == 3)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ", count %lu (%lu)",
	S2K_DECODE_COUNT ((ulong) k->s2k.count),
	(ulong) k->s2k.count);
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\n");
	}
	}

	leave:
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
	return rc;

	too_short:
	log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: [too short]\n");
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}


	static int
	parse_pubkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * packet)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	int i, ndata;
	PKT_pubkey_enc *k;

	k = packet->pkt.pubkey_enc = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *packet->pkt.pubkey_enc);
	if (pktlen < 12)
	{
	log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":pubkey enc packet: [too short]\n", listfp);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	k->version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	if (k->version != 2 && k->version != 3)
	{
	log_error ("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, k->version);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":pubkey enc packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	k->keyid[0] = read_32 (inp);
	pktlen -= 4;
	k->keyid[1] = read_32 (inp);
	pktlen -= 4;
	k->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	k->throw_keyid = 0; /* Only used as flag for build_packet. */
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp,
	":pubkey enc packet: version %d, algo %d, keyid %08lX%08lX\n",
	k->version, k->pubkey_algo, (ulong) k->keyid[0],
	(ulong) k->keyid[1]);

	ndata = pubkey_get_nenc (k->pubkey_algo);
	if (!ndata)
	{
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tunsupported algorithm %d\n", k->pubkey_algo);
	unknown_pubkey_warning (k->pubkey_algo);
	k->data[0] = NULL; /* No need to store the encrypted data. */
	}
	else
	{
	for (i = 0; i < ndata; i++)
	{
	if (k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH && i == 1)
	{
	size_t n;
	rc = read_size_body (inp, pktlen, &n, k->data+i);
	pktlen -= n;
	}
	else
	{
	int n = pktlen;
	k->data[i] = mpi_read (inp, &n, 0);
	pktlen -= n;
	if (!k->data[i])
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	}
	if (rc)
	goto leave;
	if (list_mode)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tdata: ");
	mpi_print (listfp, k->data[i], mpi_print_mode);
	es_putc ('\n', listfp);
	}
	}
	}

	leave:
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
	return rc;
	}


	/* Dump a subpacket to LISTFP. BUFFER contains the subpacket in
	* question and points to the type field in the subpacket header (not
	* the start of the header). TYPE is the subpacket's type with the
	* critical bit cleared. CRITICAL is the value of the CRITICAL bit.
	* BUFLEN is the length of the buffer and LENGTH is the length of the
	* subpacket according to the subpacket's header. DIGEST_ALGO is the
	* digest algo of the signature. */
	static void
	dump_sig_subpkt (int hashed, int type, int critical,
	const byte * buffer, size_t buflen, size_t length,
	int digest_algo)
	{
	const char *p = NULL;
	int i;
	int nprinted;

	/* The CERT has warning out with explains how to use GNUPG to detect
	* the ARRs - we print our old message here when it is a faked ARR
	* and add an additional notice. */
	if (type == SIGSUBPKT_ARR && !hashed)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp,
	"\tsubpkt %d len %u (additional recipient request)\n"
	"WARNING: PGP versions > 5.0 and < 6.5.8 will automagically "
	"encrypt to this key and thereby reveal the plaintext to "
	"the owner of this ARR key. Detailed info follows:\n",
	type, (unsigned) length);
	}

	buffer++;
	length--;

	nprinted = es_fprintf (listfp, "\t%s%ssubpkt %d len %u (", /) /
	critical ? "critical " : "",
	hashed ? "hashed " : "", type, (unsigned) length);
	if (nprinted < 1)
	nprinted = 1; /(we use (nprinted-1) later.)/
	if (length > buflen)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, "too short: buffer is only %u)\n", (unsigned) buflen);
	return;
	}
	switch (type)
	{
	case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED:
	if (length >= 4)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "sig created %s",
	strtimestamp (buf32_to_u32 (buffer)));
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
	if (length >= 4)
	{
	if (buf32_to_u32 (buffer))
	es_fprintf (listfp, "sig expires after %s",
	strtimevalue (buf32_to_u32 (buffer)));
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, "sig does not expire");
	}
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
	if (length)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "%sexportable", *buffer ? "" : "not ");
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST:
	if (length != 2)
	p = "[invalid trust subpacket]";
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, "trust signature of depth %d, value %d", buffer[0],
	buffer[1]);
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP:
	if (!length)
	p = "[invalid regexp subpacket]";
	else
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, "regular expression: \"");
	es_write_sanitized (listfp, buffer, length, "\"", NULL);
	p = "\"";
	}
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE:
	if (length)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "%srevocable", *buffer ? "" : "not ");
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
	if (length >= 4)
	{
	if (buf32_to_u32 (buffer))
	es_fprintf (listfp, "key expires after %s",
	strtimevalue (buf32_to_u32 (buffer)));
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, "key does not expire");
	}
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
	es_fputs ("pref-sym-algos:", listfp);
	for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
	es_fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i]);
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD:
	es_fputs ("pref-aead-algos:", listfp);
	for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
	es_fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i]);
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
	es_fputs ("revocation key: ", listfp);
	if (length < 22)
	p = "[too short]";
	else
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, "c=%02x a=%d f=", buffer[0], buffer[1]);
	for (i = 2; i < length; i++)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "%02X", buffer[i]);
	}
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER:
	if (length >= 8)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "issuer key ID %08lX%08lX",
	(ulong) buf32_to_u32 (buffer),
	(ulong) buf32_to_u32 (buffer + 4));
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR:
	if (length >= 21)
	{
	char *tmp;
	es_fprintf (listfp, "issuer fpr v%d ", buffer[0]);
	tmp = bin2hex (buffer+1, length-1, NULL);
	if (tmp)
	{
	es_fputs (tmp, listfp);
	xfree (tmp);
	}
	}
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
	{
	es_fputs ("notation: ", listfp);
	if (length < 8)
	p = "[too short]";
	else
	{
	const byte *s = buffer;
	size_t n1, n2;

	n1 = (s[4] << 8) \| s[5];
	n2 = (s[6] << 8) \| s[7];
	s += 8;
	if (8 + n1 + n2 != length)
	p = "[error]";
	else
	{
	es_write_sanitized (listfp, s, n1, ")", NULL);
	es_putc ('=', listfp);

	if (*buffer & 0x80)
	es_write_sanitized (listfp, s + n1, n2, ")", NULL);
	else
	p = "[not human readable]";
	}
	}
	}
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH:
	es_fputs ("pref-hash-algos:", listfp);
	for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
	es_fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i]);
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR:
	es_fputs ("pref-zip-algos:", listfp);
	for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
	es_fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i]);
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS:
	es_fputs ("keyserver preferences:", listfp);
	for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
	es_fprintf (listfp, " %02X", buffer[i]);
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS:
	es_fputs ("preferred keyserver: ", listfp);
	es_write_sanitized (listfp, buffer, length, ")", NULL);
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID:
	p = "primary user ID";
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
	es_fputs ("policy: ", listfp);
	es_write_sanitized (listfp, buffer, length, ")", NULL);
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
	es_fputs ("key flags:", listfp);
	for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
	es_fprintf (listfp, " %02X", buffer[i]);
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID:
	p = "signer's user ID";
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON:
	if (length)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, "revocation reason 0x%02x (", *buffer);
	es_write_sanitized (listfp, buffer + 1, length - 1, ")", NULL);
	p = ")";
	}
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_ARR:
	es_fputs ("Big Brother's key (ignored): ", listfp);
	if (length < 22)
	p = "[too short]";
	else
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, "c=%02x a=%d f=", buffer[0], buffer[1]);
	if (length > 2)
	es_write_hexstring (listfp, buffer+2, length-2, 0, NULL);
	}
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES:
	es_fputs ("features:", listfp);
	for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
	es_fprintf (listfp, " %02x", buffer[i]);
	break;
	case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE:
	es_fputs ("signature: ", listfp);
	if (length < 17)
	p = "[too short]";
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, "v%d, class 0x%02X, algo %d, digest algo %d",
	buffer[0],
	buffer[0] == 3 ? buffer[2] : buffer[1],
	buffer[0] == 3 ? buffer[15] : buffer[2],
	buffer[0] == 3 ? buffer[16] : buffer[3]);
	break;

	case SIGSUBPKT_ATTST_SIGS:
	{
	unsigned int hlen;

	es_fputs ("attst-sigs: ", listfp);
	hlen = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (map_md_openpgp_to_gcry (digest_algo));
	if (!hlen)
	p = "[unknown digest algo]";
	else if ((length % hlen))
	p = "[invalid length]";
	else
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, "%u", (unsigned int)length/hlen);
	while (length)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\n\t%*s", nprinted-1, "");
	es_write_hexstring (listfp, buffer, hlen, 0, NULL);
	buffer += hlen;
	length -= hlen;
	}
	}
	}
	break;

	+ case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_BLOCK:
	+ es_fputs ("key-block: ", listfp);
	+ if (length && buffer[0])
	+ p = "[unknown reserved octet]";
	+ else if (length < 50) /* 50 is an arbitrary min. length. */
	+ p = "[invalid subpacket]";
	+ else
	+ {
	+ /* estream_t fp; */
	+ /* fp = es_fopen ("a.key-block", "wb"); */
	+ /* log_assert (fp); */
	+ /* es_fwrite ( buffer+1, length-1, 1, fp); */
	+ /* es_fclose (fp); */
	+ es_fprintf (listfp, "[%u octets]", (unsigned int)length-1);
	+ }
	+ break;
	+

	default:
	if (type >= 100 && type <= 110)
	p = "experimental / private subpacket";
	else
	p = "?";
	break;
	}

	es_fprintf (listfp, "%s)\n", p ? p : "");
	}


	/*
	* Returns: >= 0 use this offset into buffer
	* -1 explicitly reject returning this type
	* -2 subpacket too short
	*/
	int
	parse_one_sig_subpkt (const byte * buffer, size_t n, int type)
	{
	switch (type)
	{
	case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
	if (n < 22)
	break;
	return 0;
	case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED:
	case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
	case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
	if (n < 4)
	break;
	return 0;
	case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
	case SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS:
	case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
	case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD:
	case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH:
	case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR:
	case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
	case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS:
	case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES:
	case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP:
	case SIGSUBPKT_ATTST_SIGS:
	return 0;
	case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE:
	case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
	case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE:
	case SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON:
	if (!n)
	break;
	return 0;
	case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER: /* issuer key ID */
	if (n < 8)
	break;
	return 0;
	case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR: /* issuer key fingerprint */
	if (n < 21)
	break;
	return 0;
	case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
	/* minimum length needed, and the subpacket must be well-formed
	where the name length and value length all fit inside the
	packet. */
	if (n < 8
	\|\| 8 + ((buffer[4] << 8) \| buffer[5]) +
	((buffer[6] << 8) \| buffer[7]) != n)
	break;
	return 0;
	case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID:
	if (n != 1)
	break;
	return 0;
	case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST:
	if (n != 2)
	break;
	return 0;
	+ case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_BLOCK:
	+ if (n && buffer[0])
	+ return -1; /* Unknown version - ignore. */
	+ if (n < 50)
	+ break; /* Definitely too short to carry a key block. */
	+ return 0;
	default:
	return 0;
	}
	return -2;
	}


	/* Return true if we understand the critical notation. */
	static int
	can_handle_critical_notation (const byte *name, size_t len)
	{
	strlist_t sl;

	register_known_notation (NULL); /* Make sure it is initialized. */

	for (sl = known_notations_list; sl; sl = sl->next)
	if (sl->flags == len && !memcmp (sl->d, name, len))
	return 1; /* Known */

	if (opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings)
	{
	log_info(_("Unknown critical signature notation: ") );
	print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream(), name, len);
	log_printf ("\n");
	}

	return 0; /* Unknown. */
	}


	static int
	can_handle_critical (const byte * buffer, size_t n, int type)
	{
	switch (type)
	{
	case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
	if (n >= 8)
	{
	size_t notation_len = ((buffer[4] << 8) \| buffer[5]);
	if (n - 8 >= notation_len)
	return can_handle_critical_notation (buffer + 8, notation_len);
	}
	return 0;
	case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE:
	case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED:
	case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
	case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
	case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
	case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE:
	case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
	case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER: /* issuer key ID */
	case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR: /* issuer fingerprint */
	case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
	case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD:
	case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH:
	case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR:
	case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
	case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID:
	case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES:
	case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST:
	case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP:
	case SIGSUBPKT_ATTST_SIGS:
	/* Is it enough to show the policy or keyserver? */
	case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
	case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS:
	case SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON: /* At least we know about it. */
	return 1;

	+ case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_BLOCK:
	+ if (n && !buffer[0])
	+ return 1;
	+ else
	+ return 0;
	+
	default:
	return 0;
	}
	}


	const byte *
	enum_sig_subpkt (PKT_signature *sig, int want_hashed, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
	size_t ret_n, int start, int *critical)
	{
	const byte *buffer;
	int buflen;
	int type;
	int critical_dummy;
	int offset;
	size_t n;
	const subpktarea_t *pktbuf = want_hashed? sig->hashed : sig->unhashed;
	int seq = 0;
	int reqseq = start ? *start : 0;

	if (!critical)
	critical = &critical_dummy;

	if (!pktbuf \|\| reqseq == -1)
	{
	static char dummy[] = "x";
	/* Return a value different from NULL to indicate that
	* there is no critical bit we do not understand. */
	return reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL ? dummy : NULL;
	}
	buffer = pktbuf->data;
	buflen = pktbuf->len;
	while (buflen)
	{
	n = *buffer++;
	buflen--;
	if (n == 255) /* 4 byte length header. */
	{
	if (buflen < 4)
	goto too_short;
	n = buf32_to_size_t (buffer);
	buffer += 4;
	buflen -= 4;
	}
	else if (n >= 192) /* 4 byte special encoded length header. */
	{
	if (buflen < 2)
	goto too_short;
	n = ((n - 192) << 8) + *buffer + 192;
	buffer++;
	buflen--;
	}
	if (buflen < n)
	goto too_short;
	if (!buflen)
	goto no_type_byte;
	type = *buffer;
	if (type & 0x80)
	{
	type &= 0x7f;
	*critical = 1;
	}
	else
	*critical = 0;
	if (!(++seq > reqseq))
	;
	else if (reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL)
	{
	if (*critical)
	{
	if (n - 1 > buflen + 1)
	goto too_short;
	if (!can_handle_critical (buffer + 1, n - 1, type))
	{
	if (opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings)
	log_info (_("subpacket of type %d has "
	"critical bit set\n"), type);
	if (start)
	*start = seq;
	return NULL; /* This is an error. */
	}
	}
	}
	else if (reqtype < 0) /* List packets. */
	dump_sig_subpkt (reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED,
	type, *critical, buffer, buflen, n, sig->digest_algo);
	else if (type == reqtype) /* Found. */
	{
	buffer++;
	n--;
	if (n > buflen)
	goto too_short;
	if (ret_n)
	*ret_n = n;
	offset = parse_one_sig_subpkt (buffer, n, type);
	switch (offset)
	{
	case -2:
	log_error ("subpacket of type %d too short\n", type);
	return NULL;
	case -1:
	return NULL;
	default:
	break;
	}
	if (start)
	*start = seq;
	return buffer + offset;
	}
	buffer += n;
	buflen -= n;
	}
	if (reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL)
	/* Returning NULL means we found a subpacket with the critical bit
	set that we don't grok. We've iterated over all the subpackets
	and haven't found such a packet so we need to return a non-NULL
	value. */
	return buffer;

	/* Critical bit we don't understand. */
	if (start)
	*start = -1;
	return NULL; /* End of packets; not found. */

	too_short:
	if (opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings)
	log_printhex (pktbuf->data, pktbuf->len > 16? 16 : pktbuf->len,
	"buffer shorter than subpacket (%zu/%d/%zu); dump:",
	pktbuf->len, buflen, n);

	if (start)
	*start = -1;
	return NULL;

	no_type_byte:
	if (opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings)
	log_info ("type octet missing in subpacket\n");
	if (start)
	*start = -1;
	return NULL;
	}


	const byte *
	parse_sig_subpkt (PKT_signature *sig, int want_hashed, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
	size_t *ret_n)
	{
	return enum_sig_subpkt (sig, want_hashed, reqtype, ret_n, NULL, NULL);
	}


	const byte *
	parse_sig_subpkt2 (PKT_signature *sig, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype)
	{
	const byte *p;

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, reqtype, NULL);
	if (!p)
	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 0, reqtype, NULL);
	return p;
	}


	/* Find all revocation keys. Look in hashed area only. */
	void
	parse_revkeys (PKT_signature * sig)
	{
	const byte *revkey;
	int seq = 0;
	size_t len;

	if (sig->sig_class != 0x1F)
	return;

	while ((revkey = enum_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY,
	&len, &seq, NULL)))
	{
	/* Consider only valid packets. They must have a length of
	* either 2+20 or 2+32 octets and bit 7 of the class octet must
	* be set. */
	if ((len == 22 \|\| len == 34)
	&& (revkey[0] & 0x80))
	{
	sig->revkey = xrealloc (sig->revkey,
	sizeof (struct revocation_key) *
	(sig->numrevkeys + 1));

	sig->revkey[sig->numrevkeys].class = revkey[0];
	sig->revkey[sig->numrevkeys].algid = revkey[1];
	len -= 2;
	sig->revkey[sig->numrevkeys].fprlen = len;
	memcpy (sig->revkey[sig->numrevkeys].fpr, revkey+2, len);
	memset (sig->revkey[sig->numrevkeys].fpr+len, 0,
	sizeof (sig->revkey[sig->numrevkeys].fpr) - len);
	sig->numrevkeys++;
	}
	}
	}


	int
	parse_signature (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PKT_signature * sig)
	{
	int md5_len = 0;
	unsigned n;
	int is_v4or5 = 0;
	int rc = 0;
	int i, ndata;

	if (pktlen < 16)
	{
	log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":signature packet: [too short]\n", listfp);
	goto leave;
	}
	sig->version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	if (sig->version == 4 \|\| sig->version == 5)
	is_v4or5 = 1;
	else if (sig->version != 2 && sig->version != 3)
	{
	log_error ("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n",
	pkttype, sig->version);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":signature packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}

	if (!is_v4or5)
	{
	if (pktlen == 0)
	goto underflow;
	md5_len = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	}
	if (pktlen == 0)
	goto underflow;
	sig->sig_class = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	if (!is_v4or5)
	{
	if (pktlen < 12)
	goto underflow;
	sig->timestamp = read_32 (inp);
	pktlen -= 4;
	sig->keyid[0] = read_32 (inp);
	pktlen -= 4;
	sig->keyid[1] = read_32 (inp);
	pktlen -= 4;
	}
	if (pktlen < 2)
	goto underflow;
	sig->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	sig->digest_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	sig->flags.exportable = 1;
	sig->flags.revocable = 1;
	if (is_v4or5) /* Read subpackets. */
	{
	if (pktlen < 2)
	goto underflow;
	n = read_16 (inp);
	pktlen -= 2; /* Length of hashed data. */
	if (pktlen < n)
	goto underflow;
	if (n > 10000)
	{
	log_error ("signature packet: hashed data too long\n");
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":signature packet: [hashed data too long]\n", listfp);
	rc = GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
	goto leave;
	}
	if (n)
	{
	sig->hashed = xmalloc (sizeof (*sig->hashed) + n - 1);
	sig->hashed->size = n;
	sig->hashed->len = n;
	if (iobuf_read (inp, sig->hashed->data, n) != n)
	{
	log_error ("premature eof while reading "
	"hashed signature data\n");
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":signature packet: [premature eof]\n", listfp);
	rc = -1;
	goto leave;
	}
	pktlen -= n;
	}
	if (pktlen < 2)
	goto underflow;
	n = read_16 (inp);
	pktlen -= 2; /* Length of unhashed data. */
	if (pktlen < n)
	goto underflow;
	if (n > 10000)
	{
	log_error ("signature packet: unhashed data too long\n");
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":signature packet: [unhashed data too long]\n", listfp);
	rc = GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
	goto leave;
	}
	if (n)
	{
	sig->unhashed = xmalloc (sizeof (*sig->unhashed) + n - 1);
	sig->unhashed->size = n;
	sig->unhashed->len = n;
	if (iobuf_read (inp, sig->unhashed->data, n) != n)
	{
	log_error ("premature eof while reading "
	"unhashed signature data\n");
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":signature packet: [premature eof]\n", listfp);
	rc = -1;
	goto leave;
	}
	pktlen -= n;
	}
	}

	if (pktlen < 2)
	goto underflow;
	sig->digest_start[0] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	sig->digest_start[1] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;

	if (is_v4or5 && sig->pubkey_algo) /* Extract required information. */
	{
	const byte *p;
	size_t len;

	/* Set sig->flags.unknown_critical if there is a critical bit
	* set for packets which we do not understand. */
	if (!parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL, NULL)
	\|\| !parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 0, SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL, NULL))
	sig->flags.unknown_critical = 1;

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED, NULL);
	if (p)
	sig->timestamp = buf32_to_u32 (p);
	else if (!(sig->pubkey_algo >= 100 && sig->pubkey_algo <= 110)
	&& opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings)
	log_info ("signature packet without timestamp\n");

	/* Set the key id. We first try the issuer fingerprint and if
	* it is a v4 signature the fallback to the issuer. Note that
	* only the issuer packet is also searched in the unhashed area. */
	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR, &len);
	if (p && len == 21 && p[0] == 4)
	{
	sig->keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (p + 1 + 12);
	sig->keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (p + 1 + 16);
	}
	else if (p && len == 33 && p[0] == 5)
	{
	sig->keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (p + 1 );
	sig->keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (p + 1 + 4);
	}
	else if ((p = parse_sig_subpkt2 (sig, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER)))
	{
	sig->keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (p);
	sig->keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (p + 4);
	}
	else if (!(sig->pubkey_algo >= 100 && sig->pubkey_algo <= 110)
	&& opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings)
	log_info ("signature packet without keyid\n");

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE, NULL);
	if (p && buf32_to_u32 (p))
	sig->expiredate = sig->timestamp + buf32_to_u32 (p);
	if (sig->expiredate && sig->expiredate <= make_timestamp ())
	sig->flags.expired = 1;

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_POLICY, NULL);
	if (p)
	sig->flags.policy_url = 1;

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, NULL);
	if (p)
	sig->flags.pref_ks = 1;

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID, &len);
	if (p && len)
	{
	char *mbox;

	sig->signers_uid = try_make_printable_string (p, len, 0);
	if (!sig->signers_uid)
	{
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	goto leave;
	}
	mbox = mailbox_from_userid (sig->signers_uid, 0);
	if (mbox)
	{
	xfree (sig->signers_uid);
	sig->signers_uid = mbox;
	}
	}

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION, NULL);
	if (p)
	sig->flags.notation = 1;

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE, NULL);
	if (p && *p == 0)
	sig->flags.revocable = 0;

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_TRUST, &len);
	if (p && len == 2)
	{
	sig->trust_depth = p[0];
	sig->trust_value = p[1];

	/* Only look for a regexp if there is also a trust
	subpacket. */
	sig->trust_regexp =
	parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP, &len);

	/* If the regular expression is of 0 length, there is no
	regular expression. */
	if (len == 0)
	sig->trust_regexp = NULL;
	}

	/* We accept the exportable subpacket from either the hashed or
	unhashed areas as older versions of gpg put it in the
	unhashed area. In theory, anyway, we should never see this
	packet off of a local keyring. */

	p = parse_sig_subpkt2 (sig, SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE);
	if (p && *p == 0)
	sig->flags.exportable = 0;

	/* Find all revocation keys. */
	if (sig->sig_class == 0x1F)
	parse_revkeys (sig);
	}

	if (list_mode)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":signature packet: algo %d, keyid %08lX%08lX\n"
	"\tversion %d, created %lu, md5len %d, sigclass 0x%02x\n"
	"\tdigest algo %d, begin of digest %02x %02x\n",
	sig->pubkey_algo,
	(ulong) sig->keyid[0], (ulong) sig->keyid[1],
	sig->version, (ulong) sig->timestamp, md5_len, sig->sig_class,
	sig->digest_algo, sig->digest_start[0], sig->digest_start[1]);
	if (is_v4or5)
	{
	parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED, NULL);
	parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 0, SIGSUBPKT_LIST_UNHASHED, NULL);
	}
	}

	ndata = pubkey_get_nsig (sig->pubkey_algo);
	if (!ndata)
	{
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tunknown algorithm %d\n", sig->pubkey_algo);
	unknown_pubkey_warning (sig->pubkey_algo);

	/* We store the plain material in data[0], so that we are able
	* to write it back with build_packet(). */
	if (pktlen > (5 * MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS / 8))
	{
	/* We include a limit to avoid too trivial DoS attacks by
	having gpg allocate too much memory. */
	log_error ("signature packet: too much data\n");
	rc = GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
	}
	else
	{
	sig->data[0] =
	gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, read_rest (inp, pktlen), pktlen * 8);
	pktlen = 0;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	for (i = 0; i < ndata; i++)
	{
	n = pktlen;
	sig->data[i] = mpi_read (inp, &n, 0);
	pktlen -= n;
	if (list_mode)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tdata: ");
	mpi_print (listfp, sig->data[i], mpi_print_mode);
	es_putc ('\n', listfp);
	}
	if (!sig->data[i])
	rc = GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
	}
	}

	leave:
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
	return rc;

	underflow:
	log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":signature packet: [too short]\n", listfp);

	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);

	return GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
	}


	static int
	parse_onepass_sig (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PKT_onepass_sig * ops)
	{
	int version;
	int rc = 0;

	if (pktlen < 13)
	{
	log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":onepass_sig packet: [too short]\n", listfp);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	if (version != 3)
	{
	log_error ("onepass_sig with unknown version %d\n", version);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":onepass_sig packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	ops->sig_class = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	ops->digest_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	ops->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	ops->keyid[0] = read_32 (inp);
	pktlen -= 4;
	ops->keyid[1] = read_32 (inp);
	pktlen -= 4;
	ops->last = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp,
	":onepass_sig packet: keyid %08lX%08lX\n"
	"\tversion %d, sigclass 0x%02x, digest %d, pubkey %d, "
	"last=%d\n",
	(ulong) ops->keyid[0], (ulong) ops->keyid[1],
	version, ops->sig_class,
	ops->digest_algo, ops->pubkey_algo, ops->last);


	leave:
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
	return rc;
	}


	static int
	parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	byte * hdr, int hdrlen, PACKET * pkt)
	{
	gpg_error_t err = 0;
	int i, version, algorithm;
	unsigned long timestamp, expiredate, max_expiredate;
	int npkey, nskey;
	u32 keyid[2];
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	int is_v5;
	unsigned int pkbytes; /* For v5 keys: Number of bytes in the public
	* key material. For v4 keys: 0. */

	(void) hdr;

	pk = pkt->pkt.public_key; /* PK has been cleared. */

	version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	if (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY && version == '#')
	{
	/* Early versions of G10 used the old PGP comments packets;
	* luckily all those comments are started by a hash. */
	if (list_mode)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":rfc1991 comment packet: \"");
	for (; pktlen; pktlen--)
	{
	int c;
	c = iobuf_get (inp);
	if (c == -1)
	break; /* Ooops: shorter than indicated. */
	if (c >= ' ' && c <= 'z')
	es_putc (c, listfp);
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", c);
	}
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\"\n");
	}
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
	return 0;
	}
	else if (version == 4)
	is_v5 = 0;
	else if (version == 5)
	is_v5 = 1;
	else if (version == 2 \|\| version == 3)
	{
	/* Not anymore supported since 2.1. Use an older gpg version
	* (i.e. gpg 1.4) to parse v3 packets. */
	if (opt.verbose > 1 && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings)
	log_info ("packet(%d) with obsolete version %d\n", pkttype, version);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":key packet: [obsolete version %d]\n", version);
	pk->version = version;
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_LEGACY_KEY);
	goto leave;
	}
	else
	{
	log_error ("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":key packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp);
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}

	if (pktlen < (is_v5? 15:11))
	{
	log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":key packet: [too short]\n", listfp);
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	else if (pktlen > MAX_KEY_PACKET_LENGTH)
	{
	log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":key packet: [too large]\n", listfp);
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}

	timestamp = read_32 (inp);
	pktlen -= 4;
	expiredate = 0; /* have to get it from the selfsignature */
	max_expiredate = 0;
	algorithm = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	if (is_v5)
	{
	pkbytes = read_32 (inp);
	pktlen -= 4;
	}
	else
	pkbytes = 0;

	if (list_mode)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":%s key packet:\n"
	"\tversion %d, algo %d, created %lu, expires %lu",
	pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "public" :
	pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ? "secret" :
	pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ? "public sub" :
	pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ? "secret sub" : "??",
	version, algorithm, timestamp, expiredate);
	if (is_v5)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ", pkbytes %u\n", pkbytes);
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\n");
	}

	pk->timestamp = timestamp;
	pk->expiredate = expiredate;
	pk->max_expiredate = max_expiredate;
	pk->hdrbytes = hdrlen;
	pk->version = version;
	pk->flags.primary = (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY \|\| pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY);
	pk->pubkey_algo = algorithm;

	nskey = pubkey_get_nskey (algorithm);
	npkey = pubkey_get_npkey (algorithm);
	if (!npkey)
	{
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tunknown algorithm %d\n", algorithm);
	unknown_pubkey_warning (algorithm);
	}

	if (!npkey)
	{
	/* Unknown algorithm - put data into an opaque MPI. */
	pk->pkey[0] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL,
	read_rest (inp, pktlen), pktlen * 8);
	pktlen = 0;
	goto leave;
	}
	else
	{
	for (i = 0; i < npkey; i++)
	{
	if ( (algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA && (i == 0))
	\|\| (algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA && (i == 0))
	\|\| (algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH && (i == 0 \|\| i == 2)))
	{
	/* Read the OID (i==1) or the KDF params (i==2). */
	size_t n;
	err = read_size_body (inp, pktlen, &n, pk->pkey+i);
	pktlen -= n;
	}
	else
	{
	unsigned int n = pktlen;
	pk->pkey[i] = mpi_read (inp, &n, 0);
	pktlen -= n;
	if (!pk->pkey[i])
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	}
	if (err)
	goto leave;
	if (list_mode)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tpkey[%d]: ", i);
	mpi_print (listfp, pk->pkey[i], mpi_print_mode);
	if ((algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
	\|\| algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA
	\|\| algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) && i==0)
	{
	char *curve = openpgp_oid_to_str (pk->pkey[0]);
	const char *name = openpgp_oid_to_curve (curve, 0);
	es_fprintf (listfp, " %s (%s)", name?name:"", curve);
	xfree (curve);
	}
	es_putc ('\n', listfp);
	}
	}
	}
	if (list_mode)
	keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);

	if (pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY \|\| pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	{
	struct seckey_info *ski;
	byte temp[16];
	size_t snlen = 0;
	unsigned int skbytes;

	if (pktlen < 1)
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}

	pk->seckey_info = ski = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ski);
	if (!pk->seckey_info)
	{
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	goto leave;
	}

	ski->algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;

	if (is_v5)
	{
	unsigned int protcount = 0;

	/* Read the one octet count of the following key-protection
	* material. Only required in case of unknown values. */
	if (!pktlen)
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	protcount = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tprotbytes: %u\n", protcount);
	}

	if (ski->algo)
	{
	ski->is_protected = 1;
	ski->s2k.count = 0;
	if (ski->algo == 254 \|\| ski->algo == 255)
	{
	if (pktlen < 3)
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}

	ski->sha1chk = (ski->algo == 254);
	ski->algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	/* Note that a ski->algo > 110 is illegal, but I'm not
	* erroring out here as otherwise there would be no way
	* to delete such a key. */
	ski->s2k.mode = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	ski->s2k.hash_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	/* Check for the special GNU extension. */
	if (ski->s2k.mode == 101)
	{
	for (i = 0; i < 4 && pktlen; i++, pktlen--)
	temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	if (i < 4 \|\| memcmp (temp, "GNU", 3))
	{
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tunknown S2K %d\n",
	ski->s2k.mode);
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	/* Here we know that it is a GNU extension. What
	* follows is the GNU protection mode: All values
	* have special meanings and they are mapped to MODE
	* with a base of 1000. */
	ski->s2k.mode = 1000 + temp[3];
	}

	/* Read the salt. */
	if (ski->s2k.mode == 3 \|\| ski->s2k.mode == 1)
	{
	for (i = 0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen--)
	temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	if (i < 8)
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	memcpy (ski->s2k.salt, temp, 8);
	}

	/* Check the mode. */
	switch (ski->s2k.mode)
	{
	case 0:
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tsimple S2K");
	break;
	case 1:
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tsalted S2K");
	break;
	case 3:
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\titer+salt S2K");
	break;
	case 1001:
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tgnu-dummy S2K");
	break;
	case 1002:
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tgnu-divert-to-card S2K");
	break;
	default:
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tunknown %sS2K %d\n",
	ski->s2k.mode < 1000 ? "" : "GNU ",
	ski->s2k.mode);
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Print some info. */
	if (list_mode)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, ", algo: %d,%s hash: %d",
	ski->algo,
	ski->sha1chk ? " SHA1 protection,"
	: " simple checksum,", ski->s2k.hash_algo);
	if (ski->s2k.mode == 1 \|\| ski->s2k.mode == 3)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, ", salt: ");
	es_write_hexstring (listfp, ski->s2k.salt, 8, 0, NULL);
	}
	es_putc ('\n', listfp);
	}

	/* Read remaining protection parameters. */
	if (ski->s2k.mode == 3)
	{
	if (pktlen < 1)
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	ski->s2k.count = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tprotect count: %lu (%lu)\n",
	(ulong)S2K_DECODE_COUNT ((ulong)ski->s2k.count),
	(ulong) ski->s2k.count);
	}
	else if (ski->s2k.mode == 1002)
	{
	/* Read the serial number. */
	if (pktlen < 1)
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	snlen = iobuf_get (inp);
	pktlen--;
	if (pktlen < snlen \|\| snlen == (size_t)(-1))
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	}
	}
	else /* Old version; no S2K, so we set mode to 0, hash MD5. */
	{
	/* Note that a ski->algo > 110 is illegal, but I'm not
	erroring on it here as otherwise there would be no
	way to delete such a key. */
	ski->s2k.mode = 0;
	ski->s2k.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tprotect algo: %d (hash algo: %d)\n",
	ski->algo, ski->s2k.hash_algo);
	}

	/* It is really ugly that we don't know the size
	* of the IV here in cases we are not aware of the algorithm.
	* so a
	* ski->ivlen = cipher_get_blocksize (ski->algo);
	* won't work. The only solution I see is to hardwire it.
	* NOTE: if you change the ivlen above 16, don't forget to
	* enlarge temp.
	* FIXME: For v5 keys we can deduce this info!
	*/
	ski->ivlen = openpgp_cipher_blocklen (ski->algo);
	log_assert (ski->ivlen <= sizeof (temp));

	if (ski->s2k.mode == 1001)
	ski->ivlen = 0;
	else if (ski->s2k.mode == 1002)
	ski->ivlen = snlen < 16 ? snlen : 16;

	if (pktlen < ski->ivlen)
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	for (i = 0; i < ski->ivlen; i++, pktlen--)
	temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	if (list_mode)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp,
	ski->s2k.mode == 1002 ? "\tserial-number: "
	: "\tprotect IV: ");
	for (i = 0; i < ski->ivlen; i++)
	es_fprintf (listfp, " %02x", temp[i]);
	es_putc ('\n', listfp);
	}
	memcpy (ski->iv, temp, ski->ivlen);
	}

	/* Skip count of secret key material. */
	if (is_v5)
	{
	if (pktlen < 4)
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	skbytes = read_32 (inp);
	pktlen -= 4;
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tskbytes: %u\n", skbytes);
	}

	/* It does not make sense to read it into secure memory.
	* If the user is so careless, not to protect his secret key,
	* we can assume, that he operates an open system :=(.
	* So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect it. */
	if (ski->s2k.mode == 1001 \|\| ski->s2k.mode == 1002)
	{
	/* Better set some dummy stuff here. */
	pk->pkey[npkey] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL,
	xstrdup ("dummydata"),
	10 * 8);
	pktlen = 0;
	}
	else if (ski->is_protected)
	{
	if (pktlen < 2) /* At least two bytes for the length. */
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Ugly: The length is encrypted too, so we read all stuff
	* up to the end of the packet into the first SKEY
	* element.
	* FIXME: We can do better for v5 keys. */
	pk->pkey[npkey] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL,
	read_rest (inp, pktlen),
	pktlen * 8);
	/* Mark that MPI as protected - we need this information for
	* importing a key. The OPAQUE flag can't be used because
	* we also store public EdDSA values in opaque MPIs. */
	if (pk->pkey[npkey])
	gcry_mpi_set_flag (pk->pkey[npkey], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1);
	pktlen = 0;
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tskey[%d]: [v4 protected]\n", npkey);
	}
	else
	{
	/* Not encrypted. */
	for (i = npkey; i < nskey; i++)
	{
	unsigned int n;

	if (pktlen < 2) /* At least two bytes for the length. */
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	n = pktlen;
	pk->pkey[i] = mpi_read (inp, &n, 0);
	pktlen -= n;
	if (list_mode)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tskey[%d]: ", i);
	mpi_print (listfp, pk->pkey[i], mpi_print_mode);
	es_putc ('\n', listfp);
	}

	if (!pk->pkey[i])
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	}
	if (err)
	goto leave;

	if (pktlen < 2)
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	ski->csum = read_16 (inp);
	pktlen -= 2;
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tchecksum: %04hx\n", ski->csum);
	}
	}

	/* Note that KEYID below has been initialized above in list_mode. */
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tkeyid: %08lX%08lX\n",
	(ulong) keyid[0], (ulong) keyid[1]);

	leave:
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
	return err;
	}


	/* Attribute subpackets have the same format as v4 signature
	subpackets. This is not part of OpenPGP, but is done in several
	versions of PGP nevertheless. */
	int
	parse_attribute_subpkts (PKT_user_id * uid)
	{
	size_t n;
	int count = 0;
	struct user_attribute *attribs = NULL;
	const byte *buffer = uid->attrib_data;
	int buflen = uid->attrib_len;
	byte type;

	xfree (uid->attribs);

	while (buflen)
	{
	n = *buffer++;
	buflen--;
	if (n == 255) /* 4 byte length header. */
	{
	if (buflen < 4)
	goto too_short;
	n = buf32_to_size_t (buffer);
	buffer += 4;
	buflen -= 4;
	}
	else if (n >= 192) /* 2 byte special encoded length header. */
	{
	if (buflen < 2)
	goto too_short;
	n = ((n - 192) << 8) + *buffer + 192;
	buffer++;
	buflen--;
	}
	if (buflen < n)
	goto too_short;

	if (!n)
	{
	/* Too short to encode the subpacket type. */
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info ("attribute subpacket too short\n");
	break;
	}

	attribs = xrealloc (attribs,
	(count + 1) * sizeof (struct user_attribute));
	memset (&attribs[count], 0, sizeof (struct user_attribute));

	type = *buffer;
	buffer++;
	buflen--;
	n--;

	attribs[count].type = type;
	attribs[count].data = buffer;
	attribs[count].len = n;
	buffer += n;
	buflen -= n;
	count++;
	}

	uid->attribs = attribs;
	uid->numattribs = count;
	return count;

	too_short:
	if (opt.verbose && !glo_ctrl.silence_parse_warnings)
	log_info ("buffer shorter than attribute subpacket\n");
	uid->attribs = attribs;
	uid->numattribs = count;
	return count;
	}


	static int
	parse_user_id (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET * packet)
	{
	byte *p;

	/* Cap the size of a user ID at 2k: a value absurdly large enough
	that there is no sane user ID string (which is printable text
	as of RFC2440bis) that won't fit in it, but yet small enough to
	avoid allocation problems. A large pktlen may not be
	allocatable, and a very large pktlen could actually cause our
	allocation to wrap around in xmalloc to a small number. */

	if (pktlen > MAX_UID_PACKET_LENGTH)
	{
	log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":user ID packet: [too large]\n");
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
	return GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
	}

	packet->pkt.user_id = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *packet->pkt.user_id + pktlen);
	packet->pkt.user_id->len = pktlen;
	packet->pkt.user_id->ref = 1;

	p = packet->pkt.user_id->name;
	for (; pktlen; pktlen--, p++)
	*p = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	*p = 0;

	if (list_mode)
	{
	int n = packet->pkt.user_id->len;
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":user ID packet: \"");
	/* fixme: Hey why don't we replace this with es_write_sanitized?? */
	for (p = packet->pkt.user_id->name; n; p++, n--)
	{
	if (p >= ' ' && p <= 'z')
	es_putc (*p, listfp);
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", *p);
	}
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\"\n");
	}
	return 0;
	}


	void
	make_attribute_uidname (PKT_user_id * uid, size_t max_namelen)
	{
	log_assert (max_namelen > 70);
	if (uid->numattribs <= 0)
	sprintf (uid->name, "[bad attribute packet of size %lu]",
	uid->attrib_len);
	else if (uid->numattribs > 1)
	sprintf (uid->name, "[%d attributes of size %lu]",
	uid->numattribs, uid->attrib_len);
	else
	{
	/* Only one attribute, so list it as the "user id" */

	if (uid->attribs->type == ATTRIB_IMAGE)
	{
	u32 len;
	byte type;

	if (parse_image_header (uid->attribs, &type, &len))
	sprintf (uid->name, "[%.20s image of size %lu]",
	image_type_to_string (type, 1), (ulong) len);
	else
	sprintf (uid->name, "[invalid image]");
	}
	else
	sprintf (uid->name, "[unknown attribute of size %lu]",
	(ulong) uid->attribs->len);
	}

	uid->len = strlen (uid->name);
	}


	static int
	parse_attribute (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * packet)
	{
	byte *p;

	(void) pkttype;

	/* We better cap the size of an attribute packet to make DoS not too
	easy. 16MB should be more then enough for one attribute packet
	(ie. a photo). */
	if (pktlen > MAX_ATTR_PACKET_LENGTH)
	{
	log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":attribute packet: [too large]\n");
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
	return GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
	}

	#define EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE 71
	packet->pkt.user_id = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *packet->pkt.user_id
	+ EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE);
	packet->pkt.user_id->ref = 1;
	packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_data = xmalloc (pktlen? pktlen:1);
	packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_len = pktlen;

	p = packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_data;
	for (; pktlen; pktlen--, p++)
	*p = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);

	/* Now parse out the individual attribute subpackets. This is
	somewhat pointless since there is only one currently defined
	attribute type (jpeg), but it is correct by the spec. */
	parse_attribute_subpkts (packet->pkt.user_id);

	make_attribute_uidname (packet->pkt.user_id, EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE);

	if (list_mode)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":attribute packet: %s\n", packet->pkt.user_id->name);
	}
	return 0;
	}


	static int
	parse_comment (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET * packet)
	{
	byte *p;

	/* Cap comment packet at a reasonable value to avoid an integer
	overflow in the malloc below. Comment packets are actually not
	anymore define my OpenPGP and we even stopped to use our
	private comment packet. */
	if (pktlen > MAX_COMMENT_PACKET_LENGTH)
	{
	log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":%scomment packet: [too large]\n",
	pkttype == PKT_OLD_COMMENT ? "OpenPGP draft " : "");
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
	return GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
	}
	packet->pkt.comment = xmalloc (sizeof *packet->pkt.comment + pktlen - 1);
	packet->pkt.comment->len = pktlen;
	p = packet->pkt.comment->data;
	for (; pktlen; pktlen--, p++)
	*p = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);

	if (list_mode)
	{
	int n = packet->pkt.comment->len;
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":%scomment packet: \"", pkttype == PKT_OLD_COMMENT ?
	"OpenPGP draft " : "");
	for (p = packet->pkt.comment->data; n; p++, n--)
	{
	if (p >= ' ' && p <= 'z')
	es_putc (*p, listfp);
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", *p);
	}
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\"\n");
	}
	return 0;
	}


	/* Parse a ring trust packet RFC4880 (5.10).
	*
	* This parser is special in that the packet is not stored as a packet
	* but its content is merged into the previous packet. */
	static gpg_error_t
	parse_ring_trust (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, unsigned long pktlen)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	iobuf_t inp = ctx->inp;
	PKT_ring_trust rt = {0};
	int c;
	int not_gpg = 0;

	if (!pktlen)
	{
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: empty\n");
	err = 0;
	goto leave;
	}

	c = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	rt.trustval = c;
	if (pktlen)
	{
	if (!c)
	{
	c = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	/* We require that bit 7 of the sigcache is 0 (easier
	* eof handling). */
	if (!(c & 0x80))
	rt.sigcache = c;
	}
	else
	iobuf_get_noeof (inp); /* Dummy read. */
	pktlen--;
	}

	/* Next is the optional subtype. */
	if (pktlen > 3)
	{
	char tmp[4];
	tmp[0] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	tmp[1] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	tmp[2] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	tmp[3] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen -= 4;
	if (!memcmp (tmp, "gpg", 3))
	rt.subtype = tmp[3];
	else
	not_gpg = 1;
	}
	/* If it is a key or uid subtype read the remaining data. */
	if ((rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_KEY \|\| rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_UID)
	&& pktlen >= 6 )
	{
	int i;
	unsigned int namelen;

	rt.keyorg = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	rt.keyupdate = read_32 (inp);
	pktlen -= 4;
	namelen = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	if (namelen && pktlen)
	{
	rt.url = xtrymalloc (namelen + 1);
	if (!rt.url)
	{
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	goto leave;
	}
	for (i = 0; pktlen && i < namelen; pktlen--, i++)
	rt.url[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	rt.url[i] = 0;
	}
	}

	if (list_mode)
	{
	if (rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_SIG)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: sig flag=%02x sigcache=%02x\n",
	rt.trustval, rt.sigcache);
	else if (rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_UID \|\| rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_KEY)
	{
	unsigned char *p;

	es_fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: %s upd=%lu src=%d%s",
	(rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_UID? "uid" : "key"),
	(unsigned long)rt.keyupdate,
	rt.keyorg,
	(rt.url? " url=":""));
	if (rt.url)
	{
	for (p = rt.url; *p; p++)
	{
	if (p >= ' ' && p <= 'z')
	es_putc (*p, listfp);
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", *p);
	}
	}
	es_putc ('\n', listfp);
	}
	else if (not_gpg)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: not created by gpg\n");
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: subtype=%02x\n",
	rt.subtype);
	}

	/* Now transfer the data to the respective packet. Do not do this
	* if SKIP_META is set. */
	if (!ctx->last_pkt.pkt.generic \|\| ctx->skip_meta)
	;
	else if (rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_SIG
	&& ctx->last_pkt.pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = ctx->last_pkt.pkt.signature;

	if ((rt.sigcache & 1))
	{
	sig->flags.checked = 1;
	sig->flags.valid = !!(rt.sigcache & 2);
	}
	}
	else if (rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_UID
	&& (ctx->last_pkt.pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	\|\| ctx->last_pkt.pkttype == PKT_ATTRIBUTE))
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = ctx->last_pkt.pkt.user_id;

	uid->keyorg = rt.keyorg;
	uid->keyupdate = rt.keyupdate;
	uid->updateurl = rt.url;
	rt.url = NULL;
	}
	else if (rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_KEY
	&& (ctx->last_pkt.pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| ctx->last_pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY))
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = ctx->last_pkt.pkt.public_key;

	pk->keyorg = rt.keyorg;
	pk->keyupdate = rt.keyupdate;
	pk->updateurl = rt.url;
	rt.url = NULL;
	}

	err = 0;

	leave:
	xfree (rt.url);
	free_packet (NULL, ctx); /* This sets ctx->last_pkt to NULL. */
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
	return err;
	}


	static int
	parse_plaintext (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * pkt, int new_ctb, int partial)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	int mode, namelen;
	PKT_plaintext *pt;
	byte *p;
	int c, i;

	if (!partial && pktlen < 6)
	{
	log_error ("packet(%d) too short (%lu)\n", pkttype, (ulong) pktlen);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":literal data packet: [too short]\n", listfp);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	mode = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	if (pktlen)
	pktlen--;
	namelen = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	if (pktlen)
	pktlen--;
	/* Note that namelen will never exceed 255 bytes. */
	pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext =
	xmalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.plaintext + namelen - 1);
	pt->new_ctb = new_ctb;
	pt->mode = mode;
	pt->namelen = namelen;
	pt->is_partial = partial;
	if (pktlen)
	{
	for (i = 0; pktlen > 4 && i < namelen; pktlen--, i++)
	pt->name[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	}
	else
	{
	for (i = 0; i < namelen; i++)
	if ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
	break;
	else
	pt->name[i] = c;
	}
	/* Fill up NAME so that a check with valgrind won't complain about
	* reading from uninitialized memory. This case may be triggred by
	* corrupted packets. */
	for (; i < namelen; i++)
	pt->name[i] = 0;

	pt->timestamp = read_32 (inp);
	if (pktlen)
	pktlen -= 4;
	pt->len = pktlen;
	pt->buf = inp;

	if (list_mode)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":literal data packet:\n"
	"\tmode %c (%X), created %lu, name=\"",
	mode >= ' ' && mode < 'z' ? mode : '?', mode,
	(ulong) pt->timestamp);
	for (p = pt->name, i = 0; i < namelen; p++, i++)
	{
	if (p >= ' ' && p <= 'z')
	es_putc (*p, listfp);
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", *p);
	}
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\",\n\traw data: ");
	if (partial)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "unknown length\n");
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, "%lu bytes\n", (ulong) pt->len);
	}

	leave:
	return rc;
	}


	static int
	parse_compressed (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * pkt, int new_ctb)
	{
	PKT_compressed *zd;

	/* PKTLEN is here 0, but data follows (this should be the last
	object in a file or the compress algorithm should know the
	length). */
	(void) pkttype;
	(void) pktlen;

	zd = pkt->pkt.compressed = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.compressed);
	zd->algorithm = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	zd->len = 0; /* not used */
	zd->new_ctb = new_ctb;
	zd->buf = inp;
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":compressed packet: algo=%d\n", zd->algorithm);
	return 0;
	}


	static int
	parse_encrypted (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * pkt, int new_ctb, int partial)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	PKT_encrypted *ed;
	unsigned long orig_pktlen = pktlen;

	ed = pkt->pkt.encrypted = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.encrypted);
	/* ed->len is set below. */
	ed->extralen = 0; /* Unknown here; only used in build_packet. */
	ed->buf = NULL;
	ed->new_ctb = new_ctb;
	ed->is_partial = partial;
	ed->aead_algo = 0;
	ed->cipher_algo = 0; /* Only used with AEAD. */
	ed->chunkbyte = 0; /* Only used with AEAD. */
	if (pkttype == PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC)
	{
	/* Fixme: add some pktlen sanity checks. */
	int version;

	version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	if (orig_pktlen)
	pktlen--;
	if (version != 1)
	{
	log_error ("encrypted_mdc packet with unknown version %d\n",
	version);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":encrypted data packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp);
	/skip_rest(inp, pktlen); should we really do this? /
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	ed->mdc_method = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
	}
	else
	ed->mdc_method = 0;

	/* A basic sanity check. We need at least an 8 byte IV plus the 2
	detection bytes. Note that we don't known the algorithm and thus
	we may only check against the minimum blocksize. */
	if (orig_pktlen && pktlen < 10)
	{
	/* Actually this is blocksize+2. */
	log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":encrypted data packet: [too short]\n", listfp);
	rc = GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET;
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, partial);
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Store the remaining length of the encrypted data (i.e. without
	the MDC version number but with the IV etc.). This value is
	required during decryption. */
	ed->len = pktlen;

	if (list_mode)
	{
	if (orig_pktlen)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":encrypted data packet:\n\tlength: %lu\n",
	orig_pktlen);
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":encrypted data packet:\n\tlength: unknown\n");
	if (ed->mdc_method)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tmdc_method: %d\n", ed->mdc_method);
	}

	ed->buf = inp;

	leave:
	return rc;
	}


	/* Note, that this code is not anymore used in real life because the
	MDC checking is now done right after the decryption in
	decrypt_data. */
	static int
	parse_mdc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * pkt, int new_ctb)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	PKT_mdc *mdc;
	byte *p;

	(void) pkttype;

	mdc = pkt->pkt.mdc = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.mdc);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":mdc packet: length=%lu\n", pktlen);
	if (!new_ctb \|\| pktlen != 20)
	{
	log_error ("mdc_packet with invalid encoding\n");
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}
	p = mdc->hash;
	for (; pktlen; pktlen--, p++)
	*p = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);

	leave:
	return rc;
	}


	static gpg_error_t
	parse_encrypted_aead (iobuf_t inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET *pkt, int partial)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	PKT_encrypted *ed;
	unsigned long orig_pktlen = pktlen;
	int version;

	ed = pkt->pkt.encrypted = xtrymalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.encrypted);
	if (!ed)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	ed->len = 0;
	ed->extralen = 0; /* (only used in build_packet.) */
	ed->buf = NULL;
	ed->new_ctb = 1; /* (packet number requires a new CTB anyway.) */
	ed->is_partial = partial;
	ed->mdc_method = 0;
	/* A basic sanity check. We need one version byte, one algo byte,
	* one aead algo byte, one chunkbyte, at least 15 byte IV. */
	if (orig_pktlen && pktlen < 19)
	{
	log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":aead encrypted packet: [too short]\n", listfp);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, partial);
	goto leave;
	}

	version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	if (orig_pktlen)
	pktlen--;
	if (version != 1)
	{
	log_error ("aead encrypted packet with unknown version %d\n",
	version);
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs (":aead encrypted packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp);
	/skip_rest(inp, pktlen); should we really do this? /
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	goto leave;
	}

	ed->cipher_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	if (orig_pktlen)
	pktlen--;
	ed->aead_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	if (orig_pktlen)
	pktlen--;
	ed->chunkbyte = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	if (orig_pktlen)
	pktlen--;

	/* Store the remaining length of the encrypted data. We read the
	* rest during decryption. */
	ed->len = pktlen;

	if (list_mode)
	{
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":aead encrypted packet: cipher=%u aead=%u cb=%u\n",
	ed->cipher_algo, ed->aead_algo, ed->chunkbyte);
	if (orig_pktlen)
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tlength: %lu\n", orig_pktlen);
	else
	es_fprintf (listfp, "\tlength: unknown\n");
	}

	ed->buf = inp;

	leave:
	return rc;
	}


	/*
	* This packet is internally generated by us (in armor.c) to transfer
	* some information to the lower layer. To make sure that this packet
	* is really a GPG faked one and not one coming from outside, we
	* first check that there is a unique tag in it.
	*
	* The format of such a control packet is:
	* n byte session marker
	* 1 byte control type CTRLPKT_xxxxx
	* m byte control data
	*/
	static int
	parse_gpg_control (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PACKET * packet, int partial)
	{
	byte *p;
	const byte *sesmark;
	size_t sesmarklen;
	int i;

	(void) pkttype;

	if (list_mode)
	es_fprintf (listfp, ":packet 63: length %lu ", pktlen);

	sesmark = get_session_marker (&sesmarklen);
	if (pktlen < sesmarklen + 1) /* 1 is for the control bytes */
	goto skipit;
	for (i = 0; i < sesmarklen; i++, pktlen--)
	{
	if (sesmark[i] != iobuf_get_noeof (inp))
	goto skipit;
	}
	if (pktlen > 4096)
	goto skipit; /* Definitely too large. We skip it to avoid an
	overflow in the malloc. */
	if (list_mode)
	es_fputs ("- gpg control packet", listfp);

	packet->pkt.gpg_control = xmalloc (sizeof *packet->pkt.gpg_control
	+ pktlen - 1);
	packet->pkt.gpg_control->control = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
	pktlen--;
	packet->pkt.gpg_control->datalen = pktlen;
	p = packet->pkt.gpg_control->data;
	for (; pktlen; pktlen--, p++)
	*p = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);

	return 0;

	skipit:
	if (list_mode)
	{
	int c;

	i = 0;
	es_fprintf (listfp, "- private (rest length %lu)\n", pktlen);
	if (partial)
	{
	while ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) != -1)
	dump_hex_line (c, &i);
	}
	else
	{
	for (; pktlen; pktlen--)
	{
	dump_hex_line ((c = iobuf_get (inp)), &i);
	if (c == -1)
	break;
	}
	}
	es_putc ('\n', listfp);
	}
	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
	}


	/* Create a GPG control packet to be used internally as a placeholder. */
	PACKET *
	create_gpg_control (ctrlpkttype_t type, const byte * data, size_t datalen)
	{
	PACKET *packet;
	byte *p;

	if (!data)
	datalen = 0;

	packet = xmalloc (sizeof *packet);
	init_packet (packet);
	packet->pkttype = PKT_GPG_CONTROL;
	packet->pkt.gpg_control = xmalloc (sizeof *packet->pkt.gpg_control + datalen);
	packet->pkt.gpg_control->control = type;
	packet->pkt.gpg_control->datalen = datalen;
	p = packet->pkt.gpg_control->data;
	for (; datalen; datalen--, p++)
	p = data++;

	return packet;
	}
	diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c
	index f0d622b31..90466e9bc 100644
	--- a/g10/sign.c
	+++ b/g10/sign.c
	@@ -1,1842 +1,1932 @@
	/* sign.c - sign data
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
	* 2007, 2010, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <errno.h>

	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "../common/status.h"
	#include "../common/iobuf.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "../common/util.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "filter.h"
	#include "../common/ttyio.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "../common/status.h"
	#include "../common/i18n.h"
	#include "pkglue.h"
	#include "../common/sysutils.h"
	#include "call-agent.h"
	#include "../common/mbox-util.h"
	#include "../common/compliance.h"

	#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
	#define LF "\r\n"
	#else
	#define LF "\n"
	#endif


	/* Bitflags to convey hints on what kind of signayire is created. */
	#define SIGNHINT_KEYSIG 1
	#define SIGNHINT_SELFSIG 2


	/* Hack */
	static int recipient_digest_algo;


	/* A type for the extra data we hash into v5 signature packets. */
	struct pt_extra_hash_data_s
	{
	unsigned char mode;
	u32 timestamp;
	unsigned char namelen;
	char name[1];
	};
	typedef struct pt_extra_hash_data_s *pt_extra_hash_data_t;


	/*
	* Create notations and other stuff. It is assumed that the strings in
	* STRLIST are already checked to contain only printable data and have
	* a valid NAME=VALUE format.
	*/
	static void
	mk_notation_policy_etc (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig,
	PKT_public_key pk, PKT_public_key pksk)
	{
	const char *string;
	char *p = NULL;
	strlist_t pu = NULL;
	struct notation *nd = NULL;
	struct expando_args args;

	log_assert (sig->version >= 4);

	memset (&args, 0, sizeof(args));
	args.pk = pk;
	args.pksk = pksk;

	/* Notation data. */
	if (IS_ATTST_SIGS(sig))
	;
	else if (IS_SIG(sig) && opt.sig_notations)
	nd = opt.sig_notations;
	else if (IS_CERT(sig) && opt.cert_notations)
	nd = opt.cert_notations;

	if (nd)
	{
	struct notation *item;

	for (item = nd; item; item = item->next)
	{
	item->altvalue = pct_expando (ctrl, item->value,&args);
	if (!item->altvalue)
	log_error (_("WARNING: unable to %%-expand notation "
	"(too large). Using unexpanded.\n"));
	}

	keygen_add_notations (sig, nd);

	for (item = nd; item; item = item->next)
	{
	xfree (item->altvalue);
	item->altvalue = NULL;
	}
	}

	/* Set policy URL. */
	if (IS_ATTST_SIGS(sig))
	;
	else if (IS_SIG(sig) && opt.sig_policy_url)
	pu = opt.sig_policy_url;
	else if (IS_CERT(sig) && opt.cert_policy_url)
	pu = opt.cert_policy_url;

	for (; pu; pu = pu->next)
	{
	string = pu->d;

	p = pct_expando (ctrl, string, &args);
	if (!p)
	{
	log_error(_("WARNING: unable to %%-expand policy URL "
	"(too large). Using unexpanded.\n"));
	p = xstrdup(string);
	}

	build_sig_subpkt (sig, (SIGSUBPKT_POLICY
	\| ((pu->flags & 1)?SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL:0)),
	p, strlen (p));

	xfree (p);
	}

	/* Preferred keyserver URL. */
	if (IS_SIG(sig) && opt.sig_keyserver_url)
	pu = opt.sig_keyserver_url;

	for (; pu; pu = pu->next)
	{
	string = pu->d;

	p = pct_expando (ctrl, string, &args);
	if (!p)
	{
	log_error (_("WARNING: unable to %%-expand preferred keyserver URL"
	" (too large). Using unexpanded.\n"));
	p = xstrdup (string);
	}

	build_sig_subpkt (sig, (SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS
	\| ((pu->flags & 1)?SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL:0)),
	p, strlen (p));
	xfree (p);
	}

	/* Set signer's user id. */
	if (IS_SIG (sig) && !opt.flags.disable_signer_uid)
	{
	char *mbox;

	/* For now we use the uid which was used to locate the key. */
	if (pksk->user_id
	&& (mbox = mailbox_from_userid (pksk->user_id->name, 0)))
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("setting Signer's UID to '%s'\n", mbox);
	build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID, mbox, strlen (mbox));
	xfree (mbox);
	}
	else if (opt.sender_list)
	{
	/* If a list of --sender was given we scan that list and use
	* the first one matching a user id of the current key. */

	/* FIXME: We need to get the list of user ids for the PKSK
	* packet. That requires either a function to look it up
	* again or we need to extend the key packet struct to link
	* to the primary key which in turn could link to the user
	* ids. Too much of a change right now. Let's take just
	* one from the supplied list and hope that the caller
	* passed a matching one. */
	build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID,
	opt.sender_list->d, strlen (opt.sender_list->d));
	}
	}
	}


	+
	+/*
	+ * Put the Key Block subpakcet into SIG for key PKSK. Returns an
	+ * error code on failure.
	+ */
	+static gpg_error_t
	+mk_sig_subpkt_key_block (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature sig, PKT_public_key pksk)
	+{
	+ gpg_error_t err;
	+ char *mbox;
	+ char *filterexp = NULL;
	+ int save_opt_armor = opt.armor;
	+ int save_opt_verbose = opt.verbose;
	+ char hexfpr[2*MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN + 1];
	+ void *data = NULL;
	+ size_t datalen;
	+ kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
	+
	+ push_export_filters ();
	+ opt.armor = 0;
	+
	+ hexfingerprint (pksk, hexfpr, sizeof hexfpr);
	+
	+ /* Get the user id so that we know which one to insert into the
	+ * key. */
	+ if (pksk->user_id
	+ && (mbox = mailbox_from_userid (pksk->user_id->name, 0)))
	+ {
	+ if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	+ log_debug ("including key with UID '%s' (specified)\n", mbox);
	+ filterexp = xasprintf ("keep-uid= -- mbox = %s", mbox);
	+ xfree (mbox);
	+ }
	+ else if (opt.sender_list)
	+ {
	+ /* If --sender was given we use the first one from that list. */
	+ if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	+ log_debug ("including key with UID '%s' (--sender)\n",
	+ opt.sender_list->d);
	+ filterexp = xasprintf ("keep-uid= -- mbox = %s", opt.sender_list->d);
	+ }
	+ else /* Use the primary user id. */
	+ {
	+ if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	+ log_debug ("including key with primary UID\n");
	+ filterexp = xstrdup ("keep-uid= primary -t");
	+ }
	+
	+ if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	+ log_debug ("export filter expression: %s\n", filterexp);
	+ err = parse_and_set_export_filter (filterexp);
	+ if (err)
	+ goto leave;
	+ xfree (filterexp);
	+ filterexp = xasprintf ("drop-subkey= fpr <> %s && usage !~ e", hexfpr);
	+ if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	+ log_debug ("export filter expression: %s\n", filterexp);
	+ err = parse_and_set_export_filter (filterexp);
	+ if (err)
	+ goto leave;
	+
	+
	+ opt.verbose = 0;
	+ err = export_pubkey_buffer (ctrl, hexfpr, EXPORT_MINIMAL\|EXPORT_CLEAN,
	+ "", 1, /* Prefix with the reserved byte. */
	+ NULL, &keyblock, &data, &datalen);
	+ opt.verbose = save_opt_verbose;
	+ if (err)
	+ {
	+ log_error ("failed to get to be included key: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	+ goto leave;
	+ }
	+
	+ build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_BLOCK, data, datalen);
	+
	+ leave:
	+ xfree (data);
	+ release_kbnode (keyblock);
	+ xfree (filterexp);
	+ opt.armor = save_opt_armor;
	+ pop_export_filters ();
	+ return err;
	+}
	+
	+
	/*
	* Helper to hash a user ID packet.
	*/
	static void
	hash_uid (gcry_md_hd_t md, int sigversion, const PKT_user_id *uid)
	{
	byte buf[5];

	(void)sigversion;

	if (uid->attrib_data)
	{
	buf[0] = 0xd1; /* Indicates an attribute packet. */
	buf[1] = uid->attrib_len >> 24; /* Always use 4 length bytes. */
	buf[2] = uid->attrib_len >> 16;
	buf[3] = uid->attrib_len >> 8;
	buf[4] = uid->attrib_len;
	}
	else
	{
	buf[0] = 0xb4; /* Indicates a userid packet. */
	buf[1] = uid->len >> 24; /* Always use 4 length bytes. */
	buf[2] = uid->len >> 16;
	buf[3] = uid->len >> 8;
	buf[4] = uid->len;
	}
	gcry_md_write( md, buf, 5 );

	if (uid->attrib_data)
	gcry_md_write (md, uid->attrib_data, uid->attrib_len );
	else
	gcry_md_write (md, uid->name, uid->len );
	}


	/*
	* Helper to hash some parts from the signature. EXTRAHASH gives the
	* extra data to be hashed into v5 signatures; it may by NULL for
	* detached signatures.
	*/
	static void
	hash_sigversion_to_magic (gcry_md_hd_t md, const PKT_signature *sig,
	pt_extra_hash_data_t extrahash)
	{
	byte buf[10];
	int i;
	size_t n;

	gcry_md_putc (md, sig->version);
	gcry_md_putc (md, sig->sig_class);
	gcry_md_putc (md, sig->pubkey_algo);
	gcry_md_putc (md, sig->digest_algo);
	if (sig->hashed)
	{
	n = sig->hashed->len;
	gcry_md_putc (md, (n >> 8) );
	gcry_md_putc (md, n );
	gcry_md_write (md, sig->hashed->data, n );
	n += 6;
	}
	else
	{
	gcry_md_putc (md, 0); /* Always hash the length of the subpacket. */
	gcry_md_putc (md, 0);
	n = 6;
	}
	/* Hash data from the literal data packet. */
	if (sig->version >= 5 && (sig->sig_class == 0x00 \|\| sig->sig_class == 0x01))
	{
	/* - One octet content format
	* - File name (one octet length followed by the name)
	* - Four octet timestamp */
	if (extrahash)
	{
	buf[0] = extrahash->mode;
	buf[1] = extrahash->namelen;
	gcry_md_write (md, buf, 2);
	if (extrahash->namelen)
	gcry_md_write (md, extrahash->name, extrahash->namelen);
	buf[0] = extrahash->timestamp >> 24;
	buf[1] = extrahash->timestamp >> 16;
	buf[2] = extrahash->timestamp >> 8;
	buf[3] = extrahash->timestamp;
	gcry_md_write (md, buf, 4);
	}
	else /* Detached signatures */
	{
	memset (buf, 0, 6);
	gcry_md_write (md, buf, 6);
	}
	}
	/* Add some magic aka known as postscript. The idea was to make it
	* impossible to make up a document with a v3 signature and then
	* turn this into a v4 signature for another document. The last
	* hashed 5 bytes of a v4 signature should never look like a the
	* last 5 bytes of a v3 signature. The length can be used to parse
	* from the end. */
	i = 0;
	buf[i++] = sig->version; /* Hash convention version. */
	buf[i++] = 0xff; /* Not any sig type value. */
	if (sig->version >= 5)
	{
	/* Note: We don't hashed any data larger than 2^32 and thus we
	* can always use 0 here. See also note below. */
	buf[i++] = 0;
	buf[i++] = 0;
	buf[i++] = 0;
	buf[i++] = 0;
	}
	buf[i++] = n >> 24; /* (n is only 16 bit, so this is always 0) */
	buf[i++] = n >> 16;
	buf[i++] = n >> 8;
	buf[i++] = n;
	gcry_md_write (md, buf, i);
	}


	/* Perform the sign operation. If CACHE_NONCE is given the agent is
	* advised to use that cached passphrase for the key. SIGNHINTS has
	* hints so that we can do some additional checks. */
	static int
	do_sign (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key pksk, PKT_signature sig,
	gcry_md_hd_t md, int mdalgo,
	const char *cache_nonce, unsigned int signhints)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	byte *dp;
	char *hexgrip;

	if (pksk->timestamp > sig->timestamp )
	{
	ulong d = pksk->timestamp - sig->timestamp;
	log_info (ngettext("key %s was created %lu second"
	" in the future (time warp or clock problem)\n",
	"key %s was created %lu seconds"
	" in the future (time warp or clock problem)\n",
	d), keystr_from_pk (pksk), d);
	if (!opt.ignore_time_conflict)
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TIME_CONFLICT);
	}

	print_pubkey_algo_note (pksk->pubkey_algo);

	if (!mdalgo)
	mdalgo = gcry_md_get_algo (md);

	if ((signhints & SIGNHINT_KEYSIG) && !(signhints & SIGNHINT_SELFSIG)
	&& mdalgo == GCRY_MD_SHA1
	&& !opt.flags.allow_weak_key_signatures)
	{
	/* We do not allow the creation of third-party key signatures
	* using SHA-1 because we also reject them when verifying. Note
	* that this will render dsa1024 keys unsuitable for such
	* keysigs and in turn the WoT. */
	print_sha1_keysig_rejected_note ();
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO);
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Check compliance. */
	if (! gnupg_digest_is_allowed (opt.compliance, 1, mdalgo))
	{
	log_error (_("digest algorithm '%s' may not be used in %s mode\n"),
	gcry_md_algo_name (mdalgo),
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO);
	goto leave;
	}

	if (! gnupg_pk_is_allowed (opt.compliance, PK_USE_SIGNING, pksk->pubkey_algo,
	pksk->pkey, nbits_from_pk (pksk), NULL))
	{
	log_error (_("key %s may not be used for signing in %s mode\n"),
	keystr_from_pk (pksk),
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO);
	goto leave;
	}

	if (!gnupg_rng_is_compliant (opt.compliance))
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN);
	log_error (_("%s is not compliant with %s mode\n"),
	"RNG",
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	write_status_error ("random-compliance", err);
	goto leave;
	}

	print_digest_algo_note (mdalgo);
	dp = gcry_md_read (md, mdalgo);
	sig->digest_algo = mdalgo;
	sig->digest_start[0] = dp[0];
	sig->digest_start[1] = dp[1];
	mpi_release (sig->data[0]);
	sig->data[0] = NULL;
	mpi_release (sig->data[1]);
	sig->data[1] = NULL;


	err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pksk, &hexgrip);
	if (!err)
	{
	char *desc;
	gcry_sexp_t s_sigval;

	desc = gpg_format_keydesc (ctrl, pksk, FORMAT_KEYDESC_NORMAL, 1);
	err = agent_pksign (NULL/ctrl/, cache_nonce, hexgrip, desc,
	pksk->keyid, pksk->main_keyid, pksk->pubkey_algo,
	dp, gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (mdalgo), mdalgo,
	&s_sigval);
	xfree (desc);

	if (err)
	;
	else if (pksk->pubkey_algo == GCRY_PK_RSA
	\|\| pksk->pubkey_algo == GCRY_PK_RSA_S)
	sig->data[0] = get_mpi_from_sexp (s_sigval, "s", GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
	else if (openpgp_oid_is_ed25519 (pksk->pkey[0]))
	{
	sig->data[0] = get_mpi_from_sexp (s_sigval, "r", GCRYMPI_FMT_OPAQUE);
	sig->data[1] = get_mpi_from_sexp (s_sigval, "s", GCRYMPI_FMT_OPAQUE);
	}
	else
	{
	sig->data[0] = get_mpi_from_sexp (s_sigval, "r", GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
	sig->data[1] = get_mpi_from_sexp (s_sigval, "s", GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
	}

	gcry_sexp_release (s_sigval);
	}
	xfree (hexgrip);

	leave:
	if (err)
	log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	else
	{
	if (opt.verbose)
	{
	char *ustr = get_user_id_string_native (ctrl, sig->keyid);
	log_info (_("%s/%s signature from: \"%s\"\n"),
	openpgp_pk_algo_name (pksk->pubkey_algo),
	openpgp_md_algo_name (sig->digest_algo),
	ustr);
	xfree (ustr);
	}
	}
	return err;
	}


	static int
	complete_sig (ctrl_t ctrl,
	PKT_signature sig, PKT_public_key pksk, gcry_md_hd_t md,
	const char *cache_nonce, unsigned int signhints)
	{
	int rc;

	/* if (!(rc = check_secret_key (pksk, 0))) */
	rc = do_sign (ctrl, pksk, sig, md, 0, cache_nonce, signhints);
	return rc;
	}


	/* Return true if the key seems to be on a version 1 OpenPGP card.
	This works by asking the agent and may fail if the card has not yet
	been used with the agent. */
	static int
	openpgp_card_v1_p (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	int result;

	/* Shortcut if we are not using RSA: The v1 cards only support RSA
	thus there is no point in looking any further. */
	if (!is_RSA (pk->pubkey_algo))
	return 0;

	if (!pk->flags.serialno_valid)
	{
	char *hexgrip;

	err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	return 0; /* Ooops. */
	}

	xfree (pk->serialno);
	agent_get_keyinfo (NULL, hexgrip, &pk->serialno, NULL);
	xfree (hexgrip);
	pk->flags.serialno_valid = 1;
	}

	if (!pk->serialno)
	result = 0; /* Error from a past agent_get_keyinfo or no card. */
	else
	{
	/* The version number of the card is included in the serialno. */
	result = !strncmp (pk->serialno, "D2760001240101", 14);
	}
	return result;
	}



	static int
	match_dsa_hash (unsigned int qbytes)
	{
	if (qbytes <= 20)
	return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;

	if (qbytes <= 28)
	return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA224;

	if (qbytes <= 32)
	return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256;

	if (qbytes <= 48)
	return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA384;

	if (qbytes <= 66 ) /* 66 corresponds to 521 (64 to 512) */
	return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512;

	return DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO;
	/* DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO will certainly fail, but it's the best wrong
	answer we have if a digest larger than 512 bits is requested. */
	}


	/*
	First try --digest-algo. If that isn't set, see if the recipient
	has a preferred algorithm (which is also filtered through
	--personal-digest-prefs). If we're making a signature without a
	particular recipient (i.e. signing, rather than signing+encrypting)
	then take the first algorithm in --personal-digest-prefs that is
	usable for the pubkey algorithm. If --personal-digest-prefs isn't
	set, then take the OpenPGP default (i.e. SHA-1).

	Note that Ed25519+EdDSA takes an input of arbitrary length and thus
	we don't enforce any particular algorithm like we do for standard
	ECDSA. However, we use SHA256 as the default algorithm.

	Possible improvement: Use the highest-ranked usable algorithm from
	the signing key prefs either before or after using the personal
	list?
	*/
	static int
	hash_for (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	if (opt.def_digest_algo)
	{
	return opt.def_digest_algo;
	}
	else if (recipient_digest_algo)
	{
	return recipient_digest_algo;
	}
	else if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA
	&& openpgp_oid_is_ed25519 (pk->pkey[0]))
	{
	if (opt.personal_digest_prefs)
	return opt.personal_digest_prefs[0].value;
	else
	return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256;
	}
	else if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
	\|\| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA)
	{
	unsigned int qbytes = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (pk->pkey[1]);

	if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA)
	qbytes = ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (qbytes);
	qbytes = qbytes/8;

	/* It's a DSA key, so find a hash that is the same size as q or
	larger. If q is 160, assume it is an old DSA key and use a
	160-bit hash unless --enable-dsa2 is set, in which case act
	like a new DSA key that just happens to have a 160-bit q
	(i.e. allow truncation). If q is not 160, by definition it
	must be a new DSA key. */

	if (opt.personal_digest_prefs)
	{
	prefitem_t *prefs;

	if (qbytes != 20 \|\| opt.flags.dsa2)
	{
	for (prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs; prefs->type; prefs++)
	if (gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (prefs->value) >= qbytes)
	return prefs->value;
	}
	else
	{
	for (prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs; prefs->type; prefs++)
	if (gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (prefs->value) == qbytes)
	return prefs->value;
	}
	}

	return match_dsa_hash(qbytes);
	}
	else if (openpgp_card_v1_p (pk))
	{
	/* The sk lives on a smartcard, and old smartcards only handle
	SHA-1 and RIPEMD/160. Newer smartcards (v2.0) don't have
	this restriction anymore. Fortunately the serial number
	encodes the version of the card and thus we know that this
	key is on a v1 card. */
	if(opt.personal_digest_prefs)
	{
	prefitem_t *prefs;

	for (prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs;prefs->type;prefs++)
	if (prefs->value==DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
	\|\| prefs->value==DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160)
	return prefs->value;
	}

	return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
	}
	else if (opt.personal_digest_prefs)
	{
	/* It's not DSA, so we can use whatever the first hash algorithm
	is in the pref list */
	return opt.personal_digest_prefs[0].value;
	}
	else
	return DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO;
	}


	static void
	print_status_sig_created (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_signature sig, int what)
	{
	byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	char buf[100+MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2];
	size_t n;

	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf - 2*MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN, "%c %d %d %02x %lu ",
	what, sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo, sig->sig_class,
	(ulong)sig->timestamp );
	fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n);
	bin2hex (array, n, buf + strlen (buf));

	write_status_text( STATUS_SIG_CREATED, buf );
	}


	/*
	* Loop over the secret certificates in SK_LIST and build the one pass
	* signature packets. OpenPGP says that the data should be bracket by
	* the onepass-sig and signature-packet; so we build these onepass
	* packet here in reverse order.
	*/
	static int
	write_onepass_sig_packets (SK_LIST sk_list, IOBUF out, int sigclass )
	{
	int skcount;
	SK_LIST sk_rover;

	for (skcount=0, sk_rover=sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
	skcount++;

	for (; skcount; skcount--)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	PKT_onepass_sig *ops;
	PACKET pkt;
	int i, rc;

	for (i=0, sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
	if (++i == skcount)
	break;

	pk = sk_rover->pk;
	ops = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *ops);
	ops->sig_class = sigclass;
	ops->digest_algo = hash_for (pk);
	ops->pubkey_algo = pk->pubkey_algo;
	keyid_from_pk (pk, ops->keyid);
	ops->last = (skcount == 1);

	init_packet (&pkt);
	pkt.pkttype = PKT_ONEPASS_SIG;
	pkt.pkt.onepass_sig = ops;
	rc = build_packet (out, &pkt);
	free_packet (&pkt, NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("build onepass_sig packet failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	return rc;
	}
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/*
	* Helper to write the plaintext (literal data) packet. At
	* R_EXTRAHASH a malloced object with the with the extra data hashed
	* into v5 signatures is stored.
	*/
	static int
	write_plaintext_packet (iobuf_t out, iobuf_t inp,
	const char *fname, int ptmode,
	pt_extra_hash_data_t *r_extrahash)
	{
	PKT_plaintext *pt = NULL;
	u32 filesize;
	int rc = 0;

	if (!opt.no_literal)
	pt = setup_plaintext_name (fname, inp);

	/* Try to calculate the length of the data. */
	if ( !iobuf_is_pipe_filename (fname) && *fname)
	{
	off_t tmpsize;
	int overflow;

	if (!(tmpsize = iobuf_get_filelength (inp, &overflow))
	&& !overflow && opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("WARNING: '%s' is an empty file\n"), fname);

	/* We can't encode the length of very large files because
	* OpenPGP uses only 32 bit for file sizes. So if the size of a
	* file is larger than 2^32 minus some bytes for packet headers,
	* we switch to partial length encoding. */
	if (tmpsize < (IOBUF_FILELENGTH_LIMIT - 65536))
	filesize = tmpsize;
	else
	filesize = 0;

	/* Because the text_filter modifies the length of the
	* data, it is not possible to know the used length
	* without a double read of the file - to avoid that
	* we simple use partial length packets. */
	if (ptmode == 't' \|\| ptmode == 'u' \|\| ptmode == 'm')
	filesize = 0;
	}
	else
	filesize = opt.set_filesize? opt.set_filesize : 0; /* stdin */

	if (!opt.no_literal)
	{
	PACKET pkt;

	/* Note that PT has been initialized above in no_literal mode. */
	pt->timestamp = make_timestamp ();
	pt->mode = ptmode;
	pt->len = filesize;
	pt->new_ctb = !pt->len;
	pt->buf = inp;
	init_packet (&pkt);
	pkt.pkttype = PKT_PLAINTEXT;
	pkt.pkt.plaintext = pt;
	/cfx.datalen = filesize? calc_packet_length( &pkt ) : 0;/
	if ((rc = build_packet (out, &pkt)))
	log_error ("build_packet(PLAINTEXT) failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc) );

	r_extrahash = xtrymalloc (sizeof *r_extrahash + pt->namelen);
	if (!*r_extrahash)
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	else
	{
	(*r_extrahash)->mode = pt->mode;
	(*r_extrahash)->timestamp = pt->timestamp;
	(*r_extrahash)->namelen = pt->namelen;
	/* Note that the last byte of NAME won't be initialized
	* because we don't need it. */
	memcpy ((*r_extrahash)->name, pt->name, pt->namelen);
	}
	pt->buf = NULL;
	free_packet (&pkt, NULL);
	}
	else
	{
	byte copy_buffer[4096];
	int bytes_copied;

	r_extrahash = xtrymalloc (sizeof *r_extrahash);
	if (!*r_extrahash)
	{
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	goto leave;
	}
	/* FIXME: We need to parse INP to get the to be hashed data from
	* it. */
	(*r_extrahash)->mode = 0;
	(*r_extrahash)->timestamp = 0;
	(*r_extrahash)->namelen = 0;

	while ((bytes_copied = iobuf_read (inp, copy_buffer, 4096)) != -1)
	if ((rc = iobuf_write (out, copy_buffer, bytes_copied)))
	{
	log_error ("copying input to output failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	break;
	}
	wipememory (copy_buffer, 4096); /* burn buffer */
	}

	leave:
	return rc;
	}


	/*
	* Write the signatures from the SK_LIST to OUT. HASH must be a
	* non-finalized hash which will not be changes here. EXTRAHASH is
	* either NULL or the extra data tro be hashed into v5 signatures.
	*/
	static int
	write_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl,
	SK_LIST sk_list, IOBUF out, gcry_md_hd_t hash,
	pt_extra_hash_data_t extrahash,
	int sigclass, u32 timestamp, u32 duration,
	int status_letter, const char *cache_nonce)
	{
	SK_LIST sk_rover;

	/* Loop over the certificates with secret keys. */
	for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	PKT_signature *sig;
	gcry_md_hd_t md;
	- int rc;
	+ gpg_error_t err;

	pk = sk_rover->pk;

	/* Build the signature packet. */
	sig = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *sig);
	if (!sig)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();

	if (pk->version >= 5)
	sig->version = 5; /* Required for v5 keys. */
	else
	sig->version = 4; /* Required. */

	keyid_from_pk (pk, sig->keyid);
	sig->digest_algo = hash_for (pk);
	sig->pubkey_algo = pk->pubkey_algo;
	if (timestamp)
	sig->timestamp = timestamp;
	else
	sig->timestamp = make_timestamp();
	if (duration)
	sig->expiredate = sig->timestamp + duration;
	sig->sig_class = sigclass;

	if (gcry_md_copy (&md, hash))
	BUG ();

	build_sig_subpkt_from_sig (sig, pk);
	mk_notation_policy_etc (ctrl, sig, NULL, pk);
	+ if (opt.flags.include_key_block && IS_SIG (sig))
	+ err = mk_sig_subpkt_key_block (ctrl, sig, pk);
	+ else
	+ err = 0;
	hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig, extrahash);
	gcry_md_final (md);

	- rc = do_sign (ctrl, pk, sig, md, hash_for (pk), cache_nonce, 0);
	+ if (!err)
	+ err = do_sign (ctrl, pk, sig, md, hash_for (pk), cache_nonce, 0);
	gcry_md_close (md);
	- if (!rc)
	+ if (!err)
	{
	/* Write the packet. */
	PACKET pkt;

	init_packet (&pkt);
	pkt.pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt.pkt.signature = sig;
	- rc = build_packet (out, &pkt);
	- if (!rc && is_status_enabled())
	+ err = build_packet (out, &pkt);
	+ if (!err && is_status_enabled())
	print_status_sig_created (pk, sig, status_letter);
	free_packet (&pkt, NULL);
	- if (rc)
	+ if (err)
	log_error ("build signature packet failed: %s\n",
	- gpg_strerror (rc));
	+ gpg_strerror (err));
	}
	else
	free_seckey_enc (sig);

	- if (rc)
	- return rc;
	+ if (err)
	+ return err;
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/*
	* Sign the files whose names are in FILENAME.
	* If DETACHED has the value true,
	* make a detached signature. If FILENAMES->d is NULL read from stdin
	* and ignore the detached mode. Sign the file with all secret keys
	* which can be taken from LOCUSR, if this is NULL, use the default one
	* If ENCRYPTFLAG is true, use REMUSER (or ask if it is NULL) to encrypt the
	* signed data for these users.
	* If OUTFILE is not NULL; this file is used for output and the function
	* does not ask for overwrite permission; output is then always
	* uncompressed, non-armored and in binary mode.
	*/
	int
	sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
	int encryptflag, strlist_t remusr, const char *outfile )
	{
	const char *fname;
	armor_filter_context_t *afx;
	compress_filter_context_t zfx;
	md_filter_context_t mfx;
	text_filter_context_t tfx;
	progress_filter_context_t *pfx;
	encrypt_filter_context_t efx;
	iobuf_t inp = NULL;
	iobuf_t out = NULL;
	PACKET pkt;
	int rc = 0;
	PK_LIST pk_list = NULL;
	SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
	SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
	int multifile = 0;
	u32 duration=0;
	pt_extra_hash_data_t extrahash = NULL;

	pfx = new_progress_context ();
	afx = new_armor_context ();
	memset (&zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
	memset (&mfx, 0, sizeof mfx);
	memset (&efx, 0, sizeof efx);
	efx.ctrl = ctrl;
	init_packet (&pkt);

	if (filenames)
	{
	fname = filenames->d;
	multifile = !!filenames->next;
	}
	else
	fname = NULL;

	if (fname && filenames->next && (!detached \|\| encryptflag))
	log_bug ("multiple files can only be detached signed");

	if (encryptflag == 2
	&& (rc = setup_symkey (&efx.symkey_s2k, &efx.symkey_dek)))
	goto leave;

	if (opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch)
	duration = ask_expire_interval(1,opt.def_sig_expire);
	else
	duration = parse_expire_string(opt.def_sig_expire);

	/* Note: In the old non-agent version the following call used to
	* unprotect the secret key. This is now done on demand by the agent. */
	if ((rc = build_sk_list (ctrl, locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )))
	goto leave;

	if (encryptflag
	&& (rc = build_pk_list (ctrl, remusr, &pk_list)))
	goto leave;

	/* Prepare iobufs. */
	if (multifile) /* have list of filenames */
	inp = NULL; /* we do it later */
	else
	{
	inp = iobuf_open(fname);
	if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
	{
	iobuf_close (inp);
	inp = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	if (!inp)
	{
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname? fname: "[stdin]",
	strerror (errno));
	goto leave;
	}

	handle_progress (pfx, inp, fname);
	}

	if (outfile)
	{
	if (is_secured_filename (outfile))
	{
	out = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	else
	out = iobuf_create (outfile, 0);
	if (!out)
	{
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	log_error (_("can't create '%s': %s\n"), outfile, gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto leave;
	}
	else if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("writing to '%s'\n"), outfile);
	}
	else if ((rc = open_outfile (-1, fname,
	opt.armor? 1 : detached? 2 : 0, 0, &out)))
	{
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Prepare to calculate the MD over the input. */
	if (opt.textmode && !outfile && !multifile)
	{
	memset (&tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
	iobuf_push_filter (inp, text_filter, &tfx);
	}

	if (gcry_md_open (&mfx.md, 0, 0))
	BUG ();
	if (DBG_HASHING)
	gcry_md_debug (mfx.md, "sign");

	/* If we're encrypting and signing, it is reasonable to pick the
	* hash algorithm to use out of the recipient key prefs. This is
	* best effort only, as in a DSA2 and smartcard world there are
	* cases where we cannot please everyone with a single hash (DSA2
	* wants >160 and smartcards want =160). In the future this could
	* be more complex with different hashes for each sk, but the
	* current design requires a single hash for all SKs. */
	if (pk_list)
	{
	if (opt.def_digest_algo)
	{
	if (!opt.expert
	&& select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH,
	opt.def_digest_algo,
	NULL) != opt.def_digest_algo)
	{
	log_info (_("WARNING: forcing digest algorithm %s (%d)"
	" violates recipient preferences\n"),
	gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo),
	opt.def_digest_algo);
	}
	}
	else
	{
	int algo;
	int smartcard=0;
	union pref_hint hint;

	hint.digest_length = 0;

	/* Of course, if the recipient asks for something
	* unreasonable (like the wrong hash for a DSA key) then
	* don't do it. Check all sk's - if any are DSA or live
	* on a smartcard, then the hash has restrictions and we
	* may not be able to give the recipient what they want.
	* For DSA, pass a hint for the largest q we have. Note
	* that this means that a q>160 key will override a q=160
	* key and force the use of truncation for the q=160 key.
	* The alternative would be to ignore the recipient prefs
	* completely and get a different hash for each DSA key in
	* hash_for(). The override behavior here is more or less
	* reasonable as it is under the control of the user which
	* keys they sign with for a given message and the fact
	* that the message with multiple signatures won't be
	* usable on an implementation that doesn't understand
	* DSA2 anyway. */
	for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next )
	{
	if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
	\|\| sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA)
	{
	int temp_hashlen = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk_rover->pk->pkey[1]);

	if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA)
	temp_hashlen = ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (temp_hashlen);

	temp_hashlen = (temp_hashlen+7)/8;

	/* Pick a hash that is large enough for our largest Q */
	if (hint.digest_length < temp_hashlen)
	hint.digest_length = temp_hashlen;
	}
	/* FIXME: need to check gpg-agent for this. */
	/* else if (sk_rover->pk->is_protected */
	/* && sk_rover->pk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002) */
	/* smartcard = 1; */
	}

	/* Current smartcards only do 160-bit hashes. If we have
	* to have a >160-bit hash, then we can't use the
	* recipient prefs as we'd need both =160 and >160 at the
	* same time and recipient prefs currently require a
	* single hash for all signatures. All this may well have
	* to change as the cards add algorithms. */
	if ((!smartcard \|\| (smartcard && hint.digest_length==20))
	&& ((algo = select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list, PREFTYPE_HASH,
	-1, &hint)) > 0))
	{
	recipient_digest_algo = algo;
	}
	}
	}

	for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
	gcry_md_enable (mfx.md, hash_for (sk_rover->pk));

	if (!multifile)
	iobuf_push_filter (inp, md_filter, &mfx);

	if (detached && !encryptflag)
	afx->what = 2;

	if (opt.armor && !outfile)
	push_armor_filter (afx, out);

	if (encryptflag)
	{
	efx.pk_list = pk_list;
	/* fixme: set efx.cfx.datalen if known */
	iobuf_push_filter (out, encrypt_filter, &efx);
	}

	if (opt.compress_algo && !outfile && !detached)
	{
	int compr_algo = opt.compress_algo;

	/* If not forced by user */
	if (compr_algo==-1)
	{
	/* If we're not encrypting, then select_algo_from_prefs
	* will fail and we'll end up with the default. If we are
	* encrypting, select_algo_from_prefs cannot fail since
	* there is an assumed preference for uncompressed data.
	* Still, if it did fail, we'll also end up with the
	* default. */
	if ((compr_algo = select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list, PREFTYPE_ZIP,
	-1, NULL)) == -1)
	{
	compr_algo = default_compress_algo();
	}
	}
	else if (!opt.expert && pk_list
	&& select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list, PREFTYPE_ZIP,
	compr_algo, NULL) != compr_algo)
	{
	log_info (_("WARNING: forcing compression algorithm %s (%d)"
	" violates recipient preferences\n"),
	compress_algo_to_string (compr_algo), compr_algo);
	}

	/* Algo 0 means no compression. */
	if (compr_algo)
	push_compress_filter (out, &zfx, compr_algo);
	}

	/* Write the one-pass signature packets if needed */
	if (!detached)
	{
	rc = write_onepass_sig_packets (sk_list, out,
	opt.textmode && !outfile ? 0x01:0x00);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;
	}

	write_status_begin_signing (mfx.md);

	/* Setup the inner packet. */
	if (detached)
	{
	if (multifile)
	{
	strlist_t sl;

	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("signing:") );
	/* Must walk reverse trough this list. */
	for (sl = strlist_last(filenames);
	sl;
	sl = strlist_prev( filenames, sl))
	{
	inp = iobuf_open (sl->d);
	if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
	{
	iobuf_close (inp);
	inp = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	if (!inp)
	{
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"),
	sl->d, gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto leave;
	}
	handle_progress (pfx, inp, sl->d);
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_printf (" '%s'", sl->d );
	if (opt.textmode)
	{
	memset (&tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
	iobuf_push_filter (inp, text_filter, &tfx);
	}
	iobuf_push_filter (inp, md_filter, &mfx);
	while (iobuf_get (inp) != -1)
	;
	iobuf_close (inp);
	inp = NULL;
	}
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_printf ("\n");
	}
	else
	{
	/* Read, so that the filter can calculate the digest. */
	while (iobuf_get(inp) != -1)
	;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	rc = write_plaintext_packet (out, inp, fname,
	(opt.textmode && !outfile) ?
	(opt.mimemode? 'm' : 't') : 'b',
	&extrahash);
	}

	/* Catch errors from above. */
	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	/* Write the signatures. */
	rc = write_signature_packets (ctrl, sk_list, out, mfx.md, extrahash,
	opt.textmode && !outfile? 0x01 : 0x00,
	0, duration, detached ? 'D':'S', NULL);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;


	leave:
	if (rc)
	iobuf_cancel (out);
	else
	{
	iobuf_close (out);
	if (encryptflag)
	write_status (STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION);
	}
	iobuf_close (inp);
	gcry_md_close (mfx.md);
	release_sk_list (sk_list);
	release_pk_list (pk_list);
	recipient_digest_algo = 0;
	release_progress_context (pfx);
	release_armor_context (afx);
	xfree (extrahash);
	return rc;
	}


	/*
	* Make a clear signature. Note that opt.armor is not needed.
	*/
	int
	clearsign_file (ctrl_t ctrl,
	const char fname, strlist_t locusr, const char outfile)
	{
	armor_filter_context_t *afx;
	progress_filter_context_t *pfx;
	gcry_md_hd_t textmd = NULL;
	iobuf_t inp = NULL;
	iobuf_t out = NULL;
	PACKET pkt;
	int rc = 0;
	SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
	SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
	u32 duration = 0;

	pfx = new_progress_context ();
	afx = new_armor_context ();
	init_packet( &pkt );

	if (opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch)
	duration = ask_expire_interval (1, opt.def_sig_expire);
	else
	duration = parse_expire_string (opt.def_sig_expire);

	/* Note: In the old non-agent version the following call used to
	* unprotect the secret key. This is now done on demand by the agent. */
	if ((rc=build_sk_list (ctrl, locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)))
	goto leave;

	/* Prepare iobufs. */
	inp = iobuf_open (fname);
	if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
	{
	iobuf_close (inp);
	inp = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	if (!inp)
	{
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"),
	fname? fname: "[stdin]", gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto leave;
	}
	handle_progress (pfx, inp, fname);

	if (outfile)
	{
	if (is_secured_filename (outfile))
	{
	outfile = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	else
	out = iobuf_create (outfile, 0);

	if (!out)
	{
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	log_error (_("can't create '%s': %s\n"), outfile, gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto leave;
	}
	else if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("writing to '%s'\n"), outfile);

	}
	else if ((rc = open_outfile (-1, fname, 1, 0, &out)))
	{
	goto leave;
	}

	iobuf_writestr (out, "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" LF);

	{
	const char *s;
	int any = 0;
	byte hashs_seen[256];

	memset (hashs_seen, 0, sizeof hashs_seen);
	iobuf_writestr (out, "Hash: " );
	for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
	{
	int i = hash_for (sk_rover->pk);

	if (!hashs_seen[ i & 0xff ])
	{
	s = gcry_md_algo_name (i);
	if (s)
	{
	hashs_seen[ i & 0xff ] = 1;
	if (any)
	iobuf_put (out, ',');
	iobuf_writestr (out, s);
	any = 1;
	}
	}
	}
	log_assert (any);
	iobuf_writestr (out, LF);
	}

	if (opt.not_dash_escaped)
	iobuf_writestr (out,
	"NotDashEscaped: You need "GPG_NAME
	" to verify this message" LF);
	iobuf_writestr (out, LF );

	if (gcry_md_open (&textmd, 0, 0))
	BUG ();
	for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
	gcry_md_enable (textmd, hash_for(sk_rover->pk));

	if (DBG_HASHING)
	gcry_md_debug (textmd, "clearsign");

	copy_clearsig_text (out, inp, textmd, !opt.not_dash_escaped, opt.escape_from);
	/* fixme: check for read errors */

	/* Now write the armor. */
	afx->what = 2;
	push_armor_filter (afx, out);

	/* Write the signatures. */
	rc = write_signature_packets (ctrl, sk_list, out, textmd, NULL, 0x01, 0,
	duration, 'C', NULL);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	leave:
	if (rc)
	iobuf_cancel (out);
	else
	iobuf_close (out);
	iobuf_close (inp);
	gcry_md_close (textmd);
	release_sk_list (sk_list);
	release_progress_context (pfx);
	release_armor_context (afx);
	return rc;
	}


	/*
	* Sign and conventionally encrypt the given file.
	* FIXME: Far too much code is duplicated - revamp the whole file.
	*/
	int
	sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
	{
	armor_filter_context_t *afx;
	progress_filter_context_t *pfx;
	compress_filter_context_t zfx;
	md_filter_context_t mfx;
	text_filter_context_t tfx;
	cipher_filter_context_t cfx;
	iobuf_t inp = NULL;
	iobuf_t out = NULL;
	PACKET pkt;
	STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
	int rc = 0;
	SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
	SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
	int algo;
	u32 duration = 0;
	int canceled;
	pt_extra_hash_data_t extrahash = NULL;

	pfx = new_progress_context ();
	afx = new_armor_context ();
	memset (&zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
	memset (&mfx, 0, sizeof mfx);
	memset (&tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
	memset (&cfx, 0, sizeof cfx);
	init_packet (&pkt);

	if (opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch)
	duration = ask_expire_interval (1, opt.def_sig_expire);
	else
	duration = parse_expire_string (opt.def_sig_expire);

	/* Note: In the old non-agent version the following call used to
	* unprotect the secret key. This is now done on demand by the agent. */
	rc = build_sk_list (ctrl, locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	/* Prepare iobufs. */
	inp = iobuf_open (fname);
	if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
	{
	iobuf_close (inp);
	inp = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	if (!inp)
	{
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"),
	fname? fname: "[stdin]", gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto leave;
	}
	handle_progress (pfx, inp, fname);

	/* Prepare key. */
	s2k = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *s2k);
	s2k->mode = opt.s2k_mode;
	s2k->hash_algo = S2K_DIGEST_ALGO;

	algo = default_cipher_algo ();
	cfx.dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, s2k, 1, 1, NULL, &canceled);

	if (!cfx.dek \|\| !cfx.dek->keylen)
	{
	rc = gpg_error (canceled?GPG_ERR_CANCELED:GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
	log_error (_("error creating passphrase: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto leave;
	}

	cfx.dek->use_aead = use_aead (NULL, cfx.dek->algo);
	if (!cfx.dek->use_aead)
	cfx.dek->use_mdc = !!use_mdc (NULL, cfx.dek->algo);

	if (!opt.quiet \|\| !opt.batch)
	log_info (_("%s.%s encryption will be used\n"),
	openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo),
	cfx.dek->use_aead? openpgp_aead_algo_name (cfx.dek->use_aead)
	/**/ : "CFB");

	/* Now create the outfile. */
	rc = open_outfile (-1, fname, opt.armor? 1:0, 0, &out);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	/* Prepare to calculate the MD over the input. */
	if (opt.textmode)
	iobuf_push_filter (inp, text_filter, &tfx);
	if (gcry_md_open (&mfx.md, 0, 0))
	BUG ();
	if (DBG_HASHING)
	gcry_md_debug (mfx.md, "symc-sign");

	for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
	gcry_md_enable (mfx.md, hash_for (sk_rover->pk));

	iobuf_push_filter (inp, md_filter, &mfx);

	/* Push armor output filter */
	if (opt.armor)
	push_armor_filter (afx, out);

	/* Write the symmetric key packet */
	/* (current filters: armor)*/
	{
	PKT_symkey_enc enc = xmalloc_clear( sizeof enc );

	enc->version = 4;
	enc->cipher_algo = cfx.dek->algo;
	enc->s2k = *s2k;
	pkt.pkttype = PKT_SYMKEY_ENC;
	pkt.pkt.symkey_enc = enc;
	if ((rc = build_packet (out, &pkt)))
	log_error ("build symkey packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	xfree (enc);
	}

	/* Push the encryption filter */
	iobuf_push_filter (out,
	cfx.dek->use_aead? cipher_filter_aead
	/**/ : cipher_filter_cfb,
	&cfx);

	/* Push the compress filter */
	if (default_compress_algo())
	{
	if (cfx.dek && (cfx.dek->use_mdc \|\| cfx.dek->use_aead))
	zfx.new_ctb = 1;
	push_compress_filter (out, &zfx,default_compress_algo() );
	}

	/* Write the one-pass signature packets */
	/* (current filters: zip - encrypt - armor) */
	rc = write_onepass_sig_packets (sk_list, out, opt.textmode? 0x01:0x00);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	write_status_begin_signing (mfx.md);

	/* Pipe data through all filters; i.e. write the signed stuff. */
	/* (current filters: zip - encrypt - armor) */
	rc = write_plaintext_packet (out, inp, fname,
	opt.textmode ? (opt.mimemode?'m':'t'):'b',
	&extrahash);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	/* Write the signatures. */
	/* (current filters: zip - encrypt - armor) */
	rc = write_signature_packets (ctrl, sk_list, out, mfx.md, extrahash,
	opt.textmode? 0x01 : 0x00,
	0, duration, 'S', NULL);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;


	leave:
	if (rc)
	iobuf_cancel (out);
	else
	{
	iobuf_close (out);
	write_status (STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION);
	}
	iobuf_close (inp);
	release_sk_list (sk_list);
	gcry_md_close (mfx.md);
	xfree (cfx.dek);
	xfree (s2k);
	release_progress_context (pfx);
	release_armor_context (afx);
	xfree (extrahash);
	return rc;
	}


	/*
	* Create a v4 signature in *RET_SIG.
	*
	* PK is the primary key to sign (required for all sigs)
	* UID is the user id to sign (required for 0x10..0x13, 0x30)
	* SUBPK is subkey to sign (required for 0x18, 0x19, 0x28)
	*
	* PKSK is the signing key
	*
	* SIGCLASS is the type of signature to create.
	*
	* DIGEST_ALGO is the digest algorithm. If it is 0 the function
	* selects an appropriate one.
	*
	* TIMESTAMP is the timestamp to use for the signature. 0 means "now"
	*
	* DURATION is the amount of time (in seconds) until the signature
	* expires.
	*
	* This function creates the following subpackets: issuer, created,
	* and expire (if duration is not 0). Additional subpackets can be
	* added using MKSUBPKT, which is called after these subpackets are
	* added and before the signature is generated. OPAQUE is passed to
	* MKSUBPKT.
	*/
	int
	make_keysig_packet (ctrl_t ctrl,
	PKT_signature *ret_sig, PKT_public_key pk,
	PKT_user_id uid, PKT_public_key subpk,
	PKT_public_key *pksk,
	int sigclass,
	u32 timestamp, u32 duration,
	int (mksubpkt)(PKT_signature , void ), void opaque,
	const char *cache_nonce)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig;
	int rc = 0;
	int sigversion;
	int digest_algo;
	gcry_md_hd_t md;
	u32 pk_keyid[2], pksk_keyid[2];
	unsigned int signhints;

	log_assert ((sigclass >= 0x10 && sigclass <= 0x13) \|\| sigclass == 0x1F
	\|\| sigclass == 0x20 \|\| sigclass == 0x18 \|\| sigclass == 0x19
	\|\| sigclass == 0x30 \|\| sigclass == 0x28 );

	if (pksk->version >= 5)
	sigversion = 5;
	else
	sigversion = 4;

	/* Select the digest algo to use. */
	if (opt.cert_digest_algo) /* Forceful override by the user. */
	digest_algo = opt.cert_digest_algo;
	else if (pksk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA) /* Meet DSA requirements. */
	digest_algo = match_dsa_hash (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (pksk->pkey[1])/8);
	else if (pksk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA /* Meet ECDSA requirements. */
	\|\| pksk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA)
	{
	if (openpgp_oid_is_ed25519 (pksk->pkey[0]))
	digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256;
	else
	digest_algo = match_dsa_hash
	(ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (pksk->pkey[1]))/8);
	}
	else /* Use the default. */
	digest_algo = DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO;

	signhints = SIGNHINT_KEYSIG;
	keyid_from_pk (pk, pk_keyid);
	keyid_from_pk (pksk, pksk_keyid);
	if (pk_keyid[0] == pksk_keyid[0] && pk_keyid[1] == pksk_keyid[1])
	signhints \|= SIGNHINT_SELFSIG;

	if (gcry_md_open (&md, digest_algo, 0))
	BUG ();

	/* Hash the public key certificate. */
	hash_public_key (md, pk);

	if (sigclass == 0x18 \|\| sigclass == 0x19 \|\| sigclass == 0x28)
	{
	/* Hash the subkey binding/backsig/revocation. */
	hash_public_key (md, subpk);
	}
	else if (sigclass != 0x1F && sigclass != 0x20)
	{
	/* Hash the user id. */
	hash_uid (md, sigversion, uid);
	}
	/* Make the signature packet. */
	sig = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *sig);
	sig->version = sigversion;
	sig->flags.exportable = 1;
	sig->flags.revocable = 1;
	keyid_from_pk (pksk, sig->keyid);
	sig->pubkey_algo = pksk->pubkey_algo;
	sig->digest_algo = digest_algo;
	sig->timestamp = timestamp? timestamp : make_timestamp ();
	if (duration)
	sig->expiredate = sig->timestamp + duration;
	sig->sig_class = sigclass;

	build_sig_subpkt_from_sig (sig, pksk);
	mk_notation_policy_etc (ctrl, sig, pk, pksk);

	/* Crucial that the call to mksubpkt comes LAST before the calls
	* to finalize the sig as that makes it possible for the mksubpkt
	* function to get a reliable pointer to the subpacket area. */
	if (mksubpkt)
	rc = (*mksubpkt)(sig, opaque);

	if (!rc)
	{
	hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig, NULL);
	gcry_md_final (md);
	rc = complete_sig (ctrl, sig, pksk, md, cache_nonce, signhints);
	}

	gcry_md_close (md);
	if (rc)
	free_seckey_enc (sig);
	else
	*ret_sig = sig;
	return rc;
	}



	/*
	* Create a new signature packet based on an existing one.
	* Only user ID signatures are supported for now.
	* PK is the public key to work on.
	* PKSK is the key used to make the signature.
	*
	* TODO: Merge this with make_keysig_packet.
	*/
	gpg_error_t
	update_keysig_packet (ctrl_t ctrl,
	PKT_signature **ret_sig,
	PKT_signature *orig_sig,
	PKT_public_key *pk,
	PKT_user_id *uid,
	PKT_public_key *subpk,
	PKT_public_key *pksk,
	int (mksubpkt)(PKT_signature , void *),
	void *opaque)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig;
	gpg_error_t rc = 0;
	int digest_algo;
	gcry_md_hd_t md;
	u32 pk_keyid[2], pksk_keyid[2];
	unsigned int signhints = 0;

	if ((!orig_sig \|\| !pk \|\| !pksk)
	\|\| (orig_sig->sig_class >= 0x10 && orig_sig->sig_class <= 0x13 && !uid)
	\|\| (orig_sig->sig_class == 0x18 && !subpk))
	return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;

	/* Either use the override digest algo or in the normal case the
	* original digest algorithm. However, iff the original digest
	* algorithms is SHA-1 and we are in gnupg or de-vs compliance mode
	* we switch to SHA-256 (done by the macro). */
	if (opt.cert_digest_algo)
	digest_algo = opt.cert_digest_algo;
	else if (pksk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
	\|\| pksk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
	\|\| pksk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA)
	digest_algo = orig_sig->digest_algo;
	else if (orig_sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
	\|\| orig_sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160)
	digest_algo = DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO;
	else
	digest_algo = orig_sig->digest_algo;

	signhints = SIGNHINT_KEYSIG;
	keyid_from_pk (pk, pk_keyid);
	keyid_from_pk (pksk, pksk_keyid);
	if (pk_keyid[0] == pksk_keyid[0] && pk_keyid[1] == pksk_keyid[1])
	signhints \|= SIGNHINT_SELFSIG;

	if (gcry_md_open (&md, digest_algo, 0))
	BUG ();

	/* Hash the public key certificate and the user id. */
	hash_public_key (md, pk);

	if (orig_sig->sig_class == 0x18)
	hash_public_key (md, subpk);
	else
	hash_uid (md, orig_sig->version, uid);

	/* Create a new signature packet. */
	sig = copy_signature (NULL, orig_sig);

	sig->digest_algo = digest_algo;

	/* We need to create a new timestamp so that new sig expiration
	* calculations are done correctly... */
	sig->timestamp = make_timestamp();

	/* ... but we won't make a timestamp earlier than the existing
	* one. */
	{
	int tmout = 0;
	while (sig->timestamp <= orig_sig->timestamp)
	{
	if (++tmout > 5 && !opt.ignore_time_conflict)
	{
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TIME_CONFLICT);
	goto leave;
	}
	gnupg_sleep (1);
	sig->timestamp = make_timestamp();
	}
	}

	/* Note that already expired sigs will remain expired (with a
	* duration of 1) since build-packet.c:build_sig_subpkt_from_sig
	* detects this case. */

	/* Put the updated timestamp into the sig. Note that this will
	* automagically lower any sig expiration dates to correctly
	* correspond to the differences in the timestamps (i.e. the
	* duration will shrink). */
	build_sig_subpkt_from_sig (sig, pksk);

	if (mksubpkt)
	rc = (*mksubpkt)(sig, opaque);

	if (!rc)
	{
	hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig, NULL);
	gcry_md_final (md);
	rc = complete_sig (ctrl, sig, pksk, md, NULL, signhints);
	}

	leave:
	gcry_md_close (md);
	if (rc)
	free_seckey_enc (sig);
	else
	*ret_sig = sig;
	return rc;
	}

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