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	diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi
	index a54bc1fee..1bc2bd9e4 100644
	--- a/doc/gpg.texi
	+++ b/doc/gpg.texi
	@@ -1,4713 +1,4717 @@
	@c Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
	@c 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	@c This is part of the GnuPG manual.
	@c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi.

	@include defs.inc

	@node Invoking GPG
	@chapter Invoking GPG
	@cindex GPG command options
	@cindex command options
	@cindex options, GPG command


	@c Begin standard stuff
	@ifclear gpgtwohack
	@manpage gpg.1
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg
	\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
	@end ifset

	@mansect synopsis
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg
	.RB [ \-\-homedir
	.IR dir ]
	.RB [ \-\-options
	.IR file ]
	.RI [ options ]
	.I command
	.RI [ args ]
	@end ifset
	@end ifclear
	@c End standard stuff

	@c Begin gpg2 hack stuff
	@ifset gpgtwohack
	@manpage gpg2.1
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
	@end ifset

	@mansect synopsis
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	.RB [ \-\-homedir
	.IR dir ]
	.RB [ \-\-options
	.IR file ]
	.RI [ options ]
	.I command
	.RI [ args ]
	@end ifset
	@end ifset
	@c End gpg2 hack stuff


	@mansect description
	@command{@gpgname} is the OpenPGP part of the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG). It
	is a tool to provide digital encryption and signing services using the
	OpenPGP standard. @command{@gpgname} features complete key management and
	all the bells and whistles you would expect from a full OpenPGP
	implementation.

	There are two main versions of GnuPG: GnuPG 1.x and GnuPG 2.x. GnuPG
	2.x supports modern encryption algorithms and thus should be preferred
	over GnuPG 1.x. You only need to use GnuPG 1.x if your platform
	doesn't support GnuPG 2.x, or you need support for some features that
	GnuPG 2.x has deprecated, e.g., decrypting data created with PGP-2
	keys.

	@ifclear gpgtwohack
	If you are looking for version 1 of GnuPG, you may find that version
	installed under the name @command{gpg1}.
	@end ifclear
	@ifset gpgtwohack
	In contrast to the standalone command @command{gpg} from GnuPG 1.x,
	the 2.x version is commonly installed under the name
	@command{@gpgname}.
	@end ifset

	@manpause

	@xref{Option Index}, for an index to @command{@gpgname}'s commands and options.
	@mancont

	@menu
	* GPG Commands:: List of all commands.
	* GPG Options:: List of all options.
	* GPG Configuration:: Configuration files.
	* GPG Examples:: Some usage examples.

	Developer information:
	* Unattended Usage of GPG:: Using @command{gpg} from other programs.
	@end menu

	@c * GPG Protocol:: The protocol the server mode uses.


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* COMMANDS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect commands
	@node GPG Commands
	@section Commands

	Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that
	only one command is allowed. Generally speaking, irrelevant options
	are silently ignored, and may not be checked for correctness.

	@command{@gpgname} may be run with no commands. In this case it will
	print a warning perform a reasonable action depending on the type of
	file it is given as input (an encrypted message is decrypted, a
	signature is verified, a file containing keys is listed, etc.).

	If you run into any problems, please add the option @option{--verbose}
	to the invocation to see more diagnostics.


	@menu
	* General GPG Commands:: Commands not specific to the functionality.
	* Operational GPG Commands:: Commands to select the type of operation.
	* OpenPGP Key Management:: How to manage your keys.
	@end menu


	@c *******************************************
	@c ******** GENERAL COMMANDS ***********
	@c *******************************************
	@node General GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands not specific to the function

	@table @gnupgtabopt
	@item --version
	@opindex version
	Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you
	cannot abbreviate this command.

	@item --help
	@itemx -h
	@opindex help
	Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command-line options.
	Note that you cannot arbitrarily abbreviate this command
	(though you can use its short form @option{-h}).

	@item --warranty
	@opindex warranty
	Print warranty information.

	@item --dump-options
	@opindex dump-options
	Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot
	abbreviate this command.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPERATIONAL COMMANDS *********
	@c *******************************************
	@node Operational GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands to select the type of operation


	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --sign
	@itemx -s
	@opindex sign
	Sign a message. This command may be combined with @option{--encrypt}
	(to sign and encrypt a message), @option{--symmetric} (to sign and
	symmetrically encrypt a message), or both @option{--encrypt} and
	@option{--symmetric} (to sign and encrypt a message that can be
	decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase). The signing key is
	chosen by default or can be set explicitly using the
	@option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key} options.

	@item --clear-sign
	@opindex clear-sign
	@itemx --clearsign
	@opindex clearsign
	Make a cleartext signature. The content in a cleartext signature is
	readable without any special software. OpenPGP software is only needed
	to verify the signature. cleartext signatures may modify end-of-line
	whitespace for platform independence and are not intended to be
	reversible. The signing key is chosen by default or can be set
	explicitly using the @option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key}
	options.


	@item --detach-sign
	@itemx -b
	@opindex detach-sign
	Make a detached signature.

	@item --encrypt
	@itemx -e
	@opindex encrypt
	Encrypt data to one or more public keys. This command may be combined
	with @option{--sign} (to sign and encrypt a message),
	@option{--symmetric} (to encrypt a message that can be decrypted using a
	secret key or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and
	@option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that can be
	decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase). @option{--recipient}
	and related options specify which public keys to use for encryption.

	@item --symmetric
	@itemx -c
	@opindex symmetric
	Encrypt with a symmetric cipher using a passphrase. The default
	symmetric cipher used is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}, but may be chosen with the
	@option{--cipher-algo} option. This command may be combined with
	@option{--sign} (for a signed and symmetrically encrypted message),
	@option{--encrypt} (for a message that may be decrypted via a secret key
	or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and @option{--encrypt} together
	(for a signed message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a
	passphrase). @command{@gpgname} caches the passphrase used for
	symmetric encryption so that a decrypt operation may not require that
	the user needs to enter the passphrase. The option
	@option{--no-symkey-cache} can be used to disable this feature.

	@item --store
	@opindex store
	Store only (make a simple literal data packet).

	@item --decrypt
	@itemx -d
	@opindex decrypt
	Decrypt the file given on the command line (or STDIN if no file
	is specified) and write it to STDOUT (or the file specified with
	@option{--output}). If the decrypted file is signed, the signature is also
	verified. This command differs from the default operation, as it never
	writes to the filename which is included in the file and it rejects
	files that don't begin with an encrypted message.

	@item --verify
	@opindex verify
	Assume that the first argument is a signed file and verify it without
	generating any output. With no arguments, the signature packet is
	read from STDIN. If only one argument is given, the specified file is
	expected to include a complete signature.

	With more than one argument, the first argument should specify a file
	with a detached signature and the remaining files should contain the
	signed data. To read the signed data from STDIN, use @samp{-} as the
	second filename. For security reasons, a detached signature will not
	read the signed material from STDIN if not explicitly specified.

	Note: If the option @option{--batch} is not used, @command{@gpgname}
	may assume that a single argument is a file with a detached signature,
	and it will try to find a matching data file by stripping certain
	suffixes. Using this historical feature to verify a detached
	signature is strongly discouraged; you should always specify the data file
	explicitly.

	Note: When verifying a cleartext signature, @command{@gpgname} verifies
	only what makes up the cleartext signed data and not any extra data
	outside of the cleartext signature or the header lines directly following
	the dash marker line. The option @code{--output} may be used to write
	out the actual signed data, but there are other pitfalls with this
	format as well. It is suggested to avoid cleartext signatures in
	favor of detached signatures.

	Note: To check whether a file was signed by a certain key the option
	@option{--assert-signer} can be used. As an alternative the
	@command{gpgv} tool can be used. @command{gpgv} is designed to
	compare signed data against a list of trusted keys and returns with
	success only for a good signature. It has its own manual page.


	@item --multifile
	@opindex multifile
	This modifies certain other commands to accept multiple files for
	processing on the command line or read from STDIN with each filename on
	a separate line. This allows for many files to be processed at
	once. @option{--multifile} may currently be used along with
	@option{--verify}, @option{--encrypt}, and @option{--decrypt}. Note that
	@option{--multifile --verify} may not be used with detached signatures.

	@item --verify-files
	@opindex verify-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --verify}.

	@item --encrypt-files
	@opindex encrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --encrypt}.

	@item --decrypt-files
	@opindex decrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --decrypt}.

	@item --list-keys
	@itemx -k
	@itemx --list-public-keys
	@opindex list-keys
	List the specified keys. If no keys are specified, then all keys from
	the configured public keyrings are listed.

	Never use the output of this command in scripts or other programs.
	The output is intended only for humans and its format is likely to
	change. The @option{--with-colons} option emits the output in a
	stable, machine-parseable format, which is intended for use by scripts
	and other programs.

	@item --list-secret-keys
	@itemx -K
	@opindex list-secret-keys
	List the specified secret keys. If no keys are specified, then all
	known secret keys are listed. A @code{#} after the initial tags
	@code{sec} or @code{ssb} means that the secret key or subkey is
	currently not usable. We also say that this key has been taken
	offline (for example, a primary key can be taken offline by exporting
	the key using the command @option{--export-secret-subkeys}). A
	@code{>} after these tags indicate that the key is stored on a
	smartcard. See also @option{--list-keys}.

	@item --check-signatures
	@opindex check-signatures
	@itemx --check-sigs
	@opindex check-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the key signatures are verified and
	listed too. Note that for performance reasons the revocation status
	of a signing key is not shown. This command has the same effect as
	using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-check}.

	The status of the verification is indicated by a flag directly
	following the "sig" tag (and thus before the flags described below. A
	"!" indicates that the signature has been successfully verified, a "-"
	denotes a bad signature and a "%" is used if an error occurred while
	checking the signature (e.g. a non supported algorithm). Signatures
	where the public key is not available are not listed; to see their
	keyids the command @option{--list-sigs} can be used.

	For each signature listed, there are several flags in between the
	signature status flag and keyid. These flags give additional
	information about each key signature. From left to right, they are
	the numbers 1-3 for certificate check level (see
	@option{--ask-cert-level}), "L" for a local or non-exportable
	signature (see @option{--lsign-key}), "R" for a nonRevocable signature
	(see the @option{--edit-key} command "nrsign"), "P" for a signature
	that contains a policy URL (see @option{--cert-policy-url}), "N" for a
	signature that contains a notation (see @option{--cert-notation}), "X"
	for an eXpired signature (see @option{--ask-cert-expire}), and the
	numbers 1-9 or "T" for 10 and above to indicate trust signature levels
	(see the @option{--edit-key} command "tsign").


	@item --locate-keys
	@itemx --locate-external-keys
	@opindex locate-keys
	@opindex locate-external-keys
	Locate the keys given as arguments. This command basically uses the
	same algorithm as used when locating keys for encryption and may thus
	be used to see what keys @command{@gpgname} might use. In particular
	external methods as defined by @option{--auto-key-locate} are used to
	locate a key if the arguments comain valid mail addresses. Only
	public keys are listed.

	The variant @option{--locate-external-keys} does not consider a
	locally existing key and can thus be used to force the refresh of a
	key via the defined external methods. If a fingerprint is given and
	and the methods defined by --auto-key-locate define LDAP servers, the
	key is fetched from these resources; defined non-LDAP keyservers are
	skipped.


	@item --show-keys
	@opindex show-keys
	This commands takes OpenPGP keys as input and prints information about
	them in the same way the command @option{--list-keys} does for locally
	stored key. In addition the list options @code{show-unusable-uids},
	@code{show-unusable-subkeys}, @code{show-notations} and
	@code{show-policy-urls} are also enabled. As usual for automated
	processing, this command should be combined with the option
	@option{--with-colons}.

	@item --fingerprint
	@opindex fingerprint
	List all keys (or the specified ones) along with their
	fingerprints. This is the same output as @option{--list-keys} but with
	the additional output of a line with the fingerprint. May also be
	combined with @option{--check-signatures}. If this
	command is given twice, the fingerprints of all secondary keys are
	listed too. This command also forces pretty printing of fingerprints
	if the keyid format has been set to "none".

	@item --list-packets
	@opindex list-packets
	List only the sequence of packets. This command is only useful for
	debugging. When used with option @option{--verbose} the actual MPI
	values are dumped and not only their lengths. Note that the output of
	this command may change with new releases.


	@item --edit-card
	@opindex edit-card
	@itemx --card-edit
	@opindex card-edit
	Present a menu to work with a smartcard. The subcommand "help"
	provides an overview on available commands. For a detailed
	description, please see the Card HOWTO at
	https://gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html#GnuPG-cardHOWTO . Please
	note that the command "openpgp" can be used to switch to the OpenPGP
	application of cards which by default are presenting another
	application (e.g. PIV).

	@item --card-status
	@opindex card-status
	Show the content of the smart card.

	@item --change-pin
	@opindex change-pin
	Present a menu to allow changing the PIN of a smartcard. This
	functionality is also available as the subcommand "passwd" with the
	@option{--edit-card} command.

	@item --delete-keys @var{name}
	@opindex delete-keys
	Remove key from the public keyring. In batch mode either @option{--yes} is
	required or the key must be specified by fingerprint. This is a
	safeguard against accidental deletion of multiple keys. If the
	exclamation mark syntax is used with the fingerprint of a subkey only
	that subkey is deleted; if the exclamation mark is used with the
	fingerprint of the primary key the entire public key is deleted.

	@item --delete-secret-keys @var{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-keys
	Remove key from the secret keyring. In batch mode the key must be
	specified by fingerprint. The option @option{--yes} can be used to
	advise gpg-agent not to request a confirmation. This extra
	pre-caution is done because @command{@gpgname} can't be sure that the
	secret key (as controlled by gpg-agent) is only used for the given
	OpenPGP public key. If the exclamation mark syntax is used with the
	fingerprint of a subkey only the secret part of that subkey is
	deleted; if the exclamation mark is used with the fingerprint of the
	primary key only the secret part of the primary key is deleted.


	@item --delete-secret-and-public-key @var{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-and-public-key
	Same as @option{--delete-key}, but if a secret key exists, it will be
	removed first. In batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint.
	The option @option{--yes} can be used to advise gpg-agent not to
	request a confirmation.

	@item --export
	@opindex export
	Either export all keys from all keyrings (default keyring and those
	registered via option @option{--keyring}), or if at least one name is given,
	those of the given name. The exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the
	file given with option @option{--output}. Use together with
	@option{--armor} to mail those keys.

	@item --send-keys @var{keyIDs}
	@opindex send-keys
	Similar to @option{--export} but sends the keys to a keyserver.
	Fingerprints may be used instead of key IDs.
	Don't send your complete keyring to a keyserver --- select
	only those keys which are new or changed by you. If no @var{keyIDs}
	are given, @command{@gpgname} does nothing.

	Take care: Keyservers are by design write only systems and thus it is
	not possible to ever delete keys once they have been send to a
	keyserver.


	@item --export-secret-keys
	@itemx --export-secret-subkeys
	@opindex export-secret-keys
	@opindex export-secret-subkeys
	Same as @option{--export}, but exports the secret keys instead. The
	exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the file given with option
	@option{--output}. This command is often used along with the option
	@option{--armor} to allow for easy printing of the key for paper backup;
	however the external tool @command{paperkey} does a better job of
	creating backups on paper. Note that exporting a secret key can be a
	security risk if the exported keys are sent over an insecure channel.

	The second form of the command has the special property to render the
	secret part of the primary key useless; this is a GNU extension to
	OpenPGP and other implementations can not be expected to successfully
	import such a key. Its intended use is in generating a full key with
	an additional signing subkey on a dedicated machine. This command
	then exports the key without the primary key to the main machine.

	GnuPG may ask you to enter the passphrase for the key. This is
	required, because the internal protection method of the secret key is
	different from the one specified by the OpenPGP protocol.

	@item --export-ssh-key
	@opindex export-ssh-key
	This command is used to export a key in the OpenSSH public key format.
	It requires the specification of one key by the usual means and
	exports the latest valid subkey which has an authentication capability
	to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. That
	output can directly be added to ssh's @file{authorized_key} file.

	By specifying the key to export using a key ID or a fingerprint
	suffixed with an exclamation mark (!), a specific subkey or the
	primary key can be exported. This does not even require that the key
	has the authentication capability flag set.

	@item --import
	@itemx --fast-import
	@opindex import
	Import/merge keys. This adds the given keys to the
	keyring. The fast version is currently just a synonym.

	There are a few other options which control how this command works.
	Most notable here is the @option{--import-options merge-only} option
	which does not insert new keys but does only the merging of new
	signatures, user-IDs and subkeys.

	@item --receive-keys @var{keyIDs}
	@opindex receive-keys
	@itemx --recv-keys @var{keyIDs}
	@opindex recv-keys
	Import the keys with the given @var{keyIDs} from a keyserver.

	@item --refresh-keys
	@opindex refresh-keys
	Request updates from a keyserver for keys that already exist on the
	local keyring. This is useful for updating a key with the latest
	signatures, user IDs, etc. Calling this with no arguments will refresh
	the entire keyring.

	@item --search-keys @var{names}
	@opindex search-keys
	Search the keyserver for the given @var{names}. Multiple names given
	here will be joined together to create the search string for the
	keyserver. Note that keyservers search for @var{names} in a different
	and simpler way than gpg does. The best choice is to use a mail
	address. Due to data privacy reasons keyservers may even not even
	allow searching by user id or mail address and thus may only return
	results when being used with the @option{--recv-key} command to
	search by key fingerprint or keyid.

	@item --fetch-keys @var{URIs}
	@opindex fetch-keys
	Retrieve keys located at the specified @var{URIs}. Note that different
	installations of GnuPG may support different protocols (HTTP, FTP,
	LDAP, etc.). When using HTTPS the system provided root certificates
	are used by this command.

	@item --update-trustdb
	@opindex update-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance. This command iterates over all keys and
	builds the Web of Trust. This is an interactive command because it may
	have to ask for the "ownertrust" values for keys. The user has to give
	an estimation of how far she trusts the owner of the displayed key to
	correctly certify (sign) other keys. GnuPG only asks for the ownertrust
	value if it has not yet been assigned to a key. Using the
	@option{--edit-key} menu, the assigned value can be changed at any time.

	@item --check-trustdb
	@opindex check-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance without user interaction. From time to
	time the trust database must be updated so that expired keys or
	signatures and the resulting changes in the Web of Trust can be
	tracked. Normally, GnuPG will calculate when this is required and do it
	automatically unless @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} is set. This
	command can be used to force a trust database check at any time. The
	processing is identical to that of @option{--update-trustdb} but it
	skips keys with a not yet defined "ownertrust".

	For use with cron jobs, this command can be used together with
	@option{--batch} in which case the trust database check is done only if
	a check is needed. To force a run even in batch mode add the option
	@option{--yes}.

	@anchor{option --export-ownertrust}
	@item --export-ownertrust
	@opindex export-ownertrust
	Send the ownertrust values to STDOUT. This is useful for backup purposes
	as these values are the only ones which can't be re-created from a
	corrupted trustdb. Example:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	@gpgname{} --export-ownertrust > otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --import-ownertrust
	@opindex import-ownertrust
	Update the trustdb with the ownertrust values stored in @code{files} (or
	STDIN if not given); existing values will be overwritten. In case of a
	severely damaged trustdb and if you have a recent backup of the
	ownertrust values (e.g. in the file @file{otrust.txt}), you may re-create
	the trustdb using these commands:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	cd ~/.gnupg
	rm trustdb.gpg
	@gpgname{} --import-ownertrust < otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --rebuild-keydb-caches
	@opindex rebuild-keydb-caches
	When updating from version 1.0.6 to 1.0.7 this command should be used
	to create signature caches in the keyring. It might be handy in other
	situations too.

	@item --print-md @var{algo}
	@itemx --print-mds
	@opindex print-md
	Print message digest of algorithm @var{algo} for all given files or STDIN.
	With the second form (or a deprecated "*" for @var{algo}) digests for all
	available algorithms are printed.

	@item --gen-random @var{0\|1\|2\|16\|30} @var{count}
	@opindex gen-random
	Emit @var{count} random bytes of the given quality level 0, 1 or 2. If
	@var{count} is not given or zero, an endless sequence of random bytes
	will be emitted. If used with @option{--armor} the output will be
	base64 encoded. The special level 16 uses a quality level of 1 and
	outputs an endless stream of hex-encoded octets. The special level
	30 outputs random as 30 zBase-32 characters.

	@item --gen-prime @var{mode} @var{bits}
	@opindex gen-prime
	Use the source, Luke :-). The output format is subject to change
	with any release.


	@item --enarmor
	@itemx --dearmor
	@opindex enarmor
	@opindex dearmor
	Pack or unpack an arbitrary input into/from an OpenPGP ASCII armor.
	This is a GnuPG extension to OpenPGP and in general not very useful.
	The @option{--dearmor} command can also be used to dearmor PEM armors.

	@item --unwrap
	@opindex unwrap
	This option modifies the command @option{--decrypt} to output the
	original message with the encryption layer removed. Thus the output
	will be an OpenPGP data structure which often means a signed OpenPGP
	message. Note that this option may or may not remove a compression
	layer which is often found beneath the encryption layer.

	@item --tofu-policy @{auto\|good\|unknown\|bad\|ask@} @var{keys}
	@opindex tofu-policy
	Set the TOFU policy for all the bindings associated with the specified
	@var{keys}. For more information about the meaning of the policies,
	@pxref{trust-model-tofu}. The @var{keys} may be specified either by their
	fingerprint (preferred) or their keyid.

	@c @item --server
	@c @opindex server
	@c Run gpg in server mode. This feature is not yet ready for use and
	@c thus not documented.

	@end table


	@c ********************************************
	@c ***** KEY MANAGEMENT COMMANDS ********
	@c ********************************************
	@node OpenPGP Key Management
	@subsection How to manage your keys

	This section explains the main commands for key management.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --quick-generate-key @var{user-id} [@var{algo} [@var{usage} [@var{expire}]]]
	@itemx --quick-gen-key
	@opindex quick-generate-key
	@opindex quick-gen-key
	This is a simple command to generate a standard key with one user id.
	In contrast to @option{--generate-key} the key is generated directly
	without the need to answer a bunch of prompts. Unless the option
	@option{--yes} is given, the key creation will be canceled if the
	given user id already exists in the keyring.

	If invoked directly on the console without any special options an
	answer to a ``Continue?'' style confirmation prompt is required. In
	case the user id already exists in the keyring a second prompt to
	force the creation of the key will show up.

	If @var{algo} or @var{usage} are given, only the primary key is
	created and no prompts are shown. To specify an expiration date but
	still create a primary and subkey use ``default'' or
	``future-default'' for @var{algo} and ``default'' for @var{usage}.
	For a description of these optional arguments see the command
	@code{--quick-add-key}. The @var{usage} accepts also the value
	``cert'' which can be used to create a certification only primary key;
	the default is to a create certification and signing key.

	The @var{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date
	for the key. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO formats
	``YYYY-MM-DD'' or ``YYYYMMDDThhmmss'' are used. To make the key
	expire in N seconds, N days, N weeks, N months, or N years use
	``seconds=N'', ``Nd'', ``Nw'', ``Nm'', or ``Ny'' respectively. Not
	specifying a value, or using ``-'' results in a key expiring in a
	reasonable default interval. The values ``never'', ``none'' can be
	used for no expiration date.

	If this command is used with @option{--batch},
	@option{--pinentry-mode} has been set to @code{loopback}, and one of
	the passphrase options (@option{--passphrase},
	@option{--passphrase-fd}, or @option{--passphrase-file}) is used, the
	supplied passphrase is used for the new key and the agent does not ask
	for it. To create a key without any protection @code{--passphrase ''}
	may be used.

	To create an OpenPGP key from the keys available on the currently
	inserted smartcard, the special string ``card'' can be used for
	@var{algo}. If the card features an encryption and a signing key, gpg
	will figure them out and creates an OpenPGP key consisting of the
	usual primary key and one subkey. This works only with certain
	smartcards. Note that the interactive @option{--full-gen-key} command
	allows to do the same but with greater flexibility in the selection of
	the smartcard keys.

	Note that it is possible to create a primary key and a subkey using
	non-default algorithms by using ``default'' and changing the default
	parameters using the option @option{--default-new-key-algo}.

	@item --quick-set-expire @var{fpr} @var{expire} [*\|@var{subfprs}]
	@opindex quick-set-expire
	With two arguments given, directly set the expiration time of the
	primary key identified by @var{fpr} to @var{expire}. To remove the
	expiration time @code{0} can be used. With three arguments and the
	third given as an asterisk, the expiration time of all non-revoked and
	not yet expired subkeys are set to @var{expire}. With more than two
	arguments and a list of fingerprints given for @var{subfprs}, all
	non-revoked subkeys matching these fingerprints are set to
	@var{expire}.


	@item --quick-add-key @var{fpr} [@var{algo} [@var{usage} [@var{expire}]]]
	@opindex quick-add-key
	Directly add a subkey to the key identified by the fingerprint
	@var{fpr}. Without the optional arguments an encryption subkey is
	added. If any of the arguments are given a more specific subkey is
	added.

	@var{algo} may be any of the supported algorithms or curve names
	given in the format as used by key listings. To use the default
	algorithm the string ``default'' or ``-'' can be used. Supported
	algorithms are ``rsa'', ``dsa'', ``elg'', ``ed25519'', ``cv25519'',
	and other ECC curves. For example the string ``rsa'' adds an RSA key
	with the default key length; a string ``rsa4096'' requests that the
	key length is 4096 bits. The string ``future-default'' is an alias
	for the algorithm which will likely be used as default algorithm in
	future versions of gpg. To list the supported ECC curves the command
	@code{gpg --with-colons --list-config curve} can be used.

	Depending on the given @var{algo} the subkey may either be an
	encryption subkey or a signing subkey. If an algorithm is capable of
	signing and encryption and such a subkey is desired, a @var{usage}
	string must be given. This string is either ``default'' or ``-'' to
	keep the default or a comma delimited list (or space delimited list)
	of keywords: ``sign'' for a signing subkey, ``auth'' for an
	authentication subkey, and ``encr'' for an encryption subkey
	(``encrypt'' can be used as alias for ``encr''). The valid
	combinations depend on the algorithm.

	The @var{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date
	for the key. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO formats
	``YYYY-MM-DD'' or ``YYYYMMDDThhmmss'' are used. To make the key
	expire in N seconds, N days, N weeks, N months, or N years use
	``seconds=N'', ``Nd'', ``Nw'', ``Nm'', or ``Ny'' respectively. Not
	specifying a value, or using ``-'' results in a key expiring in a
	reasonable default interval. The values ``never'', ``none'' can be
	used for no expiration date.

	@item --quick-add-adsk @var{fpr} @var{adskfpr}
	@opindex quick-add-adsk
	Directly add an Additional Decryption Subkey to the key identified by
	the fingerprint @var{fpr}. @var{adskfpr} is the fingerprint of
	another key's encryption subkey. A subkey is commonly used here
	because by default a primary key has no encryption capability. Use
	the option @option{--with-subkey-fingerprint} with a list command to
	display the subkey fingerprints.

	@item --generate-key
	@opindex generate-key
	@itemx --gen-key
	@opindex gen-key
	Generate a new key pair using the current default parameters. This is
	the standard command to create a new key. In addition to the key a
	revocation certificate is created and stored in the
	@file{openpgp-revocs.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory.

	@item --full-generate-key
	@opindex full-generate-key
	@itemx --full-gen-key
	@opindex full-gen-key
	Generate a new key pair with dialogs for all options. This is an
	extended version of @option{--generate-key}.

	There is also a feature which allows you to create keys in batch
	mode. See the manual section ``Unattended key generation'' on how
	to use this.


	@item --generate-revocation @var{name}
	@opindex generate-revocation
	@itemx --gen-revoke @var{name}
	@opindex gen-revoke
	Generate a revocation certificate for the complete key. To only revoke
	a subkey or a key signature, use the @option{--edit} command.

	This command merely creates the revocation certificate so that it can
	be used to revoke the key if that is ever needed. To actually revoke
	a key the created revocation certificate needs to be merged with the
	key to revoke. This is done by importing the revocation certificate
	using the @option{--import} command. Then the revoked key needs to be
	published, which is best done by sending the key to a keyserver
	(command @option{--send-key}) and by exporting (@option{--export}) it
	to a file which is then send to frequent communication partners.


	@item --generate-designated-revocation @var{name}
	@opindex generate-designated-revocation
	@itemx --desig-revoke @var{name}
	@opindex desig-revoke
	Generate a designated revocation certificate for a key. This allows a
	user (with the permission of the keyholder) to revoke someone else's
	key.


	@item --edit-key
	@opindex edit-key
	Present a menu which enables you to do most of the key management
	related tasks. It expects the specification of a key on the command
	line.

	@c ****** Begin Edit-key Options ********
	@table @asis

	@item uid @var{n}
	@opindex keyedit:uid
	Toggle selection of user ID or photographic user ID with index @var{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item key @var{n}
	@opindex keyedit:key
	Toggle selection of subkey with index @var{n} or key ID @var{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item sign
	@opindex keyedit:sign
	Make a signature on key of user @code{name}. If the key is not yet
	signed by the default user (or the users given with @option{-u}), the program
	displays the information of the key again, together with its
	fingerprint and asks whether it should be signed. This question is
	repeated for all users specified with
	@option{-u}.

	@item lsign
	@opindex keyedit:lsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-exportable and will
	therefore never be used by others. This may be used to make keys
	valid only in the local environment.

	@item nrsign
	@opindex keyedit:nrsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-revocable and can
	therefore never be revoked.

	@item tsign
	@opindex keyedit:tsign
	Make a trust signature. This is a signature that combines the notions
	of certification (like a regular signature), and trust (like the
	"trust" command). It is generally useful in distinct communities
	or groups to implement the concept of a Trusted Introducer. For
	more information please read the sections ``Trust Signature'' and
	``Regular Expression'' in RFC-4880.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	Note that "l" (for local / non-exportable), "nr" (for non-revocable,
	and "t" (for trust) may be freely mixed and prefixed to "sign" to
	create a signature of any type desired.
	@c man:.RE

	If the option @option{--only-sign-text-ids} is specified, then any
	non-text based user ids (e.g., photo IDs) will not be selected for
	signing.

	@table @asis

	@item delsig
	@opindex keyedit:delsig
	Delete a signature. Note that it is not possible to retract a signature,
	once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case
	you better use @code{revsig}.

	@item revsig
	@opindex keyedit:revsig
	Revoke a signature. For every signature which has been generated by
	one of the secret keys, GnuPG asks whether a revocation certificate
	should be generated.

	@item check
	@opindex keyedit:check
	Check the signatures on all selected user IDs. With the extra
	option @code{selfsig} only self-signatures are shown.

	@item adduid
	@opindex keyedit:adduid
	Create an additional user ID.

	@item addphoto
	@opindex keyedit:addphoto
	Create a photographic user ID. This will prompt for a JPEG file that
	will be embedded into the user ID. Note that a very large JPEG will make
	for a very large key. Also note that some programs will display your
	JPEG unchanged (GnuPG), and some programs will scale it to fit in a
	dialog box (PGP).

	@item showphoto
	@opindex keyedit:showphoto
	Display the selected photographic user ID.

	@item deluid
	@opindex keyedit:deluid
	Delete a user ID or photographic user ID. Note that it is not
	possible to retract a user id, once it has been send to the public
	(i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revuid}.

	@item revuid
	@opindex keyedit:revuid
	Revoke a user ID or photographic user ID.

	@item primary
	@opindex keyedit:primary
	Flag the current user id as the primary one, removes the primary user
	id flag from all other user ids and sets the timestamp of all affected
	self-signatures one second ahead. Note that setting a photo user ID
	as primary makes it primary over other photo user IDs, and setting a
	regular user ID as primary makes it primary over other regular user
	IDs.

	@item keyserver
	@opindex keyedit:keyserver
	Set a preferred keyserver for the specified user ID(s). This allows
	other users to know where you prefer they get your key from. See
	@option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url} for more on how this
	works. Setting a value of "none" removes an existing preferred
	keyserver.

	@item notation
	@opindex keyedit:notation
	Set a name=value notation for the specified user ID(s). See
	@option{--cert-notation} for more on how this works. Setting a value of
	"none" removes all notations, setting a notation prefixed with a minus
	sign (-) removes that notation, and setting a notation name (without the
	=value) prefixed with a minus sign removes all notations with that name.

	@item pref
	@opindex keyedit:pref
	List preferences from the selected user ID. This shows the actual
	preferences, without including any implied preferences.

	@item showpref
	@opindex keyedit:showpref
	More verbose preferences listing for the selected user ID. This shows
	the preferences in effect by including the implied preferences of 3DES
	(cipher), SHA-1 (digest), and Uncompressed (compression) if they are
	not already included in the preference list. In addition, the
	preferred keyserver and signature notations (if any) are shown.

	@item setpref @var{string}
	@opindex keyedit:setpref
	Set the list of user ID preferences to @var{string} for all (or just
	the selected) user IDs. Calling setpref with no arguments sets the
	preference list to the default (either built-in or set via
	@option{--default-preference-list}), and calling setpref with "none"
	as the argument sets an empty preference list. Use @command{@gpgname
	--version} to get a list of available algorithms. Note that while you
	can change the preferences on an attribute user ID (aka "photo ID"),
	GnuPG does not select keys via attribute user IDs so these preferences
	will not be used by GnuPG. Note that an unattended version of this
	command is available as @option{--quick-update-pref}.

	When setting preferences, you should list the algorithms in the order
	which you'd like to see them used by someone else when encrypting a
	message to your key. If you don't include 3DES, it will be
	automatically added at the end. Note that there are many factors that
	go into choosing an algorithm (for example, your key may not be the
	only recipient), and so the remote OpenPGP application being used to
	send to you may or may not follow your exact chosen order for a given
	message. It will, however, only choose an algorithm that is present
	on the preference list of every recipient key. See also the
	INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below.

	@item addkey
	@opindex keyedit:addkey
	Add a subkey to this key.

	@item addcardkey
	@opindex keyedit:addcardkey
	Generate a subkey on a card and add it to this key.

	@item keytocard
	@opindex keyedit:keytocard
	Transfer the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey
	has been selected) to a smartcard. The secret key in the keyring will
	be replaced by a stub if the key could be stored successfully on the
	card and you use the save command later. Only certain key types may be
	transferred to the card. A sub menu allows you to select on what card
	to store the key. Note that it is not possible to get that key back
	from the card - if the card gets broken your secret key will be lost
	unless you have a backup somewhere.

	@item bkuptocard @var{file}
	@opindex keyedit:bkuptocard
	Restore the given @var{file} to a card. This command may be used to restore a
	backup key (as generated during card initialization) to a new card. In
	almost all cases this will be the encryption key. You should use this
	command only with the corresponding public key and make sure that the
	file given as argument is indeed the backup to restore. You should then
	select 2 to restore as encryption key. You will first be asked to enter
	the passphrase of the backup key and then for the Admin PIN of the card.

	@item keytotpm
	@opindex keyedit:keytotpm
	Transfer the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey
	has been selected) to TPM form. The secret key in the keyring will
	be replaced by the TPM representation of that key, which can only be
	read by the particular TPM that created it (so the keyfile now
	becomes locked to the laptop containing the TPM). Only certain key
	types may be transferred to the TPM (all TPM 2.0 systems are
	mandated to have the rsa2048 and nistp256 algorithms but newer TPMs
	may have more). Note that the key itself is not transferred into the
	TPM, merely encrypted by the TPM in-place, so if the keyfile is
	deleted, the key will be lost. Once transferred to TPM
	representation, the key file can never be converted back to non-TPM
	form and the key will die when the TPM does, so you should first
	have a backup on secure offline storage of the actual secret key
	file before conversion. It is essential to use the physical system
	TPM that you have rw permission on the TPM resource manager device
	(/dev/tpmrm0). Usually this means you must be a member of the tss
	group.

	@item delkey
	@opindex keyedit:delkey
	Remove a subkey (secondary key). Note that it is not possible to retract
	a subkey, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In
	that case you better use @code{revkey}. Also note that this only
	deletes the public part of a key.

	@item revkey
	@opindex keyedit:revkey
	Revoke a subkey.

	@item expire
	@opindex keyedit:expire
	Change the key or subkey expiration time. If a subkey is selected, the
	expiration time of this subkey will be changed. With no selection, the
	key expiration of the primary key is changed.

	@item trust
	@opindex keyedit:trust
	Change the owner trust value for the key. This updates the trust-db
	immediately and no save is required.

	@item disable
	@itemx enable
	@opindex keyedit:disable
	@opindex keyedit:enable
	Disable or enable an entire key. A disabled key can not normally be
	used for encryption.

	@item addrevoker
	@opindex keyedit:addrevoker
	Add a designated revoker to the key. This takes one optional argument:
	"sensitive". If a designated revoker is marked as sensitive, it will
	not be exported by default (see export-options).

	@item addadsk
	@opindex keyedit:addadsk
	Add an Additional Decryption Subkey. The user is asked to enter the
	fingerprint of another encryption subkey. Note that the exact
	fingerprint of another key's encryption subkey needs to be entered.
	This is because commonly the primary key has no encryption
	capability. Use the option @option{--with-subkey-fingerprint} with
	a list command to display the subkey fingerprints.

	@item passwd
	@opindex keyedit:passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key.

	@item toggle
	@opindex keyedit:toggle
	This is dummy command which exists only for backward compatibility.

	@item clean
	@opindex keyedit:clean
	Compact (by removing all signatures except the selfsig) any user ID
	that is no longer usable (e.g. revoked, or expired). Then, remove any
	signatures that are not usable by the trust calculations.
	Specifically, this removes any signature that does not validate, any
	signature that is superseded by a later signature, revoked signatures,
	and signatures issued by keys that are not present on the keyring.

	@item minimize
	@opindex keyedit:minimize
	Make the key as small as possible. This removes all signatures from
	each user ID except for the most recent self-signature.

	@item change-usage
	@opindex keyedit:change-usage
	Change the usage flags (capabilities) of the primary key or of
	subkeys. These usage flags (e.g. Certify, Sign, Authenticate,
	Encrypt) are set during key creation. Sometimes it is useful to
	have the opportunity to change them (for example to add
	Authenticate) after they have been created. Please take care when
	doing this; the allowed usage flags depend on the key algorithm.

	@item cross-certify
	@opindex keyedit:cross-certify
	Add cross-certification signatures to signing subkeys that may not
	currently have them. Cross-certification signatures protect against a
	subtle attack against signing subkeys. See
	@option{--require-cross-certification}. All new keys generated have
	this signature by default, so this command is only useful to bring
	older keys up to date.

	@item save
	@opindex keyedit:save
	Save all changes to the keyring and quit.

	@item quit
	@opindex keyedit:quit
	Quit the program without updating the
	keyring.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	The listing shows you the key with its secondary keys and all user
	IDs. The primary user ID is indicated by a dot, and selected keys or
	user IDs are indicated by an asterisk. The trust
	value is displayed with the primary key: "trust" is the assigned owner
	trust and "validity" is the calculated validity of the key. Validity
	values are also displayed for all user IDs.
	For possible values of trust, @pxref{trust-values}.
	@c man:.RE
	@c ****** End Edit-key Options ********

	@item --sign-key @var{name}
	@opindex sign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key. This is a shortcut version of
	the subcommand "sign" from @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --lsign-key @var{name}
	@opindex lsign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key but marks it as
	non-exportable. This is a shortcut version of the subcommand "lsign"
	from @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --quick-sign-key @var{fpr} [@var{names}]
	@itemx --quick-lsign-key @var{fpr} [@var{names}]
	@opindex quick-sign-key
	@opindex quick-lsign-key
	Directly sign a key from the passphrase without any further user
	interaction. The @var{fpr} must be the verified primary fingerprint
	of a key in the local keyring. If no @var{names} are given, all
	useful user ids are signed; with given [@var{names}] only useful user
	ids matching one of these names are signed. By default, or if a name
	is prefixed with a '*', a case insensitive substring match is used.
	If a name is prefixed with a '=' a case sensitive exact match is done.

	The command @option{--quick-lsign-key} marks the signatures as
	non-exportable. If such a non-exportable signature already exists the
	@option{--quick-sign-key} turns it into a exportable signature. If
	you need to update an existing signature, for example to add or change
	notation data, you need to use the option @option{--force-sign-key}.

	This command uses reasonable defaults and thus does not provide the
	full flexibility of the "sign" subcommand from @option{--edit-key}.
	Its intended use is to help unattended key signing by utilizing a list
	of verified fingerprints.

	@item --quick-add-uid @var{user-id} @var{new-user-id}
	@opindex quick-add-uid
	This command adds a new user id to an existing key. In contrast to
	the interactive sub-command @code{adduid} of @option{--edit-key} the
	@var{new-user-id} is added verbatim with only leading and trailing
	white space removed, it is expected to be UTF-8 encoded, and no checks
	on its form are applied.

	@item --quick-revoke-uid @var{user-id} @var{user-id-to-revoke}
	@opindex quick-revoke-uid
	This command revokes a user ID on an existing key. It cannot be used
	to revoke the last user ID on key (some non-revoked user ID must
	remain), with revocation reason ``User ID is no longer valid''. If
	you want to specify a different revocation reason, or to supply
	supplementary revocation text, you should use the interactive
	sub-command @code{revuid} of @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --quick-revoke-sig @var{fpr} @var{signing-fpr} [@var{names}]
	@opindex quick-revoke-sig
	This command revokes the key signatures made by @var{signing-fpr} from
	the key specified by the fingerprint @var{fpr}. With @var{names}
	given only the signatures on user ids of the key matching any of the
	given names are affected (see @option{--quick-sign-key}). If a
	revocation already exists a notice is printed instead of creating a
	new revocation; no error is returned in this case. Note that key
	signature revocations may be superseded by a newer key signature and
	in turn again revoked.

	@item --quick-set-primary-uid @var{user-id} @var{primary-user-id}
	@opindex quick-set-primary-uid
	This command sets or updates the primary user ID flag on an existing
	key. @var{user-id} specifies the key and @var{primary-user-id} the
	user ID which shall be flagged as the primary user ID. The primary
	user ID flag is removed from all other user ids and the timestamp of
	all affected self-signatures is set one second ahead.

	@item --quick-update-pref @var{user-id}
	@opindex quick-update-pref
	This command updates the preference list of the key to the current
	default value (either built-in or set via
	@option{--default-preference-list}). This is the unattended version
	of of using "setpref" in the @option{--key-edit} menu without giving a
	list. Note that you can show the preferences in a key listing by
	using @option{--list-options show-pref} or @option{--list-options
	show-pref-verbose}. You should also re-distribute updated keys to
	your peers.

	@item --change-passphrase @var{user-id}
	@opindex change-passphrase
	@itemx --passwd @var{user-id}
	@opindex passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key belonging to the certificate
	specified as @var{user-id}. This is a shortcut for the sub-command
	@code{passwd} of the @option{--edit-key} menu. When using together with the
	option @option{--dry-run} this will not actually change the passphrase
	but check that the current passphrase is correct.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* OPTIONS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect options
	@node GPG Options
	@section Option Summary

	@command{@gpgname} features a bunch of options to control the exact
	behaviour and to change the default configuration.

	@menu
	* GPG Configuration Options:: How to change the configuration.
	* GPG Key related Options:: Key related options.
	* GPG Input and Output:: Input and Output.
	* OpenPGP Options:: OpenPGP protocol specific options.
	* Compliance Options:: Compliance options.
	* GPG Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually doesn't want to do.
	* Deprecated Options:: Deprecated options.
	@end menu

	Long options can be put in an options file (default
	"~/.gnupg/gpg.conf"). Short option names will not work - for example,
	"armor" is a valid option for the options file, while "a" is not. Do not
	write the 2 dashes, but simply the name of the option and any required
	arguments. Lines with a hash ('#') as the first non-white-space
	character are ignored. Commands may be put in this file too, but that is
	not generally useful as the command will execute automatically with
	every execution of gpg.

	Please remember that option parsing stops as soon as a non-option is
	encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by using the special option
	@option{--}.

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** CONFIGURATION OPTIONS ********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Configuration Options
	@subsection How to change the configuration

	These options are used to change the configuration and most of them
	are usually found in the option file.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --default-key @var{name}
	@opindex default-key
	Use @var{name} as the default key to sign with. If this option is not
	used, the default key is the first key found in the secret keyring.
	Note that @option{-u} or @option{--local-user} overrides this option.
	This option may be given multiple times. In this case, the last key
	for which a secret key is available is used. If there is no secret
	key available for any of the specified values, GnuPG will not emit an
	error message but continue as if this option wasn't given.

	@item --default-recipient @var{name}
	@opindex default-recipient
	Use @var{name} as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is
	not used and don't ask if this is a valid one. @var{name} must be
	non-empty.

	@item --default-recipient-self
	@opindex default-recipient-self
	Use the default key as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is not
	used and don't ask if this is a valid one. The default key is the first
	one from the secret keyring or the one set with @option{--default-key}.

	@item --no-default-recipient
	@opindex no-default-recipient
	Reset @option{--default-recipient} and @option{--default-recipient-self}.
	Should not be used in an option file.

	@item -v, --verbose
	@opindex verbose
	Give more information during processing. If used
	twice, the input data is listed in detail.

	@item --no-verbose
	@opindex no-verbose
	Reset verbose level to 0. Should not be used in an option file.

	@item -q, --quiet
	@opindex quiet
	Try to be as quiet as possible. Should not be used in an option file.

	@item --batch
	@itemx --no-batch
	@opindex batch
	@opindex no-batch
	Use batch mode. Never ask, do not allow interactive commands.
	@option{--no-batch} disables this option. Note that even with a
	filename given on the command line, gpg might still need to read from
	STDIN (in particular if gpg figures that the input is a
	detached signature and no data file has been specified). Thus if you
	do not want to feed data via STDIN, you should connect STDIN to
	@file{/dev/null}.

	It is highly recommended to use this option along with the options
	@option{--status-fd} and @option{--with-colons} for any unattended use of
	@command{gpg}. Should not be used in an option file.

	@item --no-tty
	@opindex no-tty
	Make sure that the TTY (terminal) is never used for any output.
	This option is needed in some cases because GnuPG sometimes prints
	warnings to the TTY even if @option{--batch} is used.

	@item --yes
	@opindex yes
	Assume "yes" on most questions. Should not be used in an option file.

	@item --no
	@opindex no
	Assume "no" on most questions. Should not be used in an option file.


	@item --list-filter @{select=@var{expr}@}
	@opindex list-filter
	A list filter can be used to output only certain keys during key
	listing commands. For the available property names, see the description
	of @option{--import-filter}.


	@item --list-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex list-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	listing keys and signatures (that is, @option{--list-keys},
	@option{--check-signatures}, @option{--list-public-keys},
	@option{--list-secret-keys}, and the @option{--edit-key} functions).
	Options can be prepended with a @option{no-} (after the two dashes) to
	give the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex list-options:show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--check-signatures},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, and @option{--list-secret-keys} to
	display any photo IDs attached to the key. Defaults to no. See also
	@option{--photo-viewer}. Does not work with @option{--with-colons}:
	see @option{--attribute-fd} for the appropriate way to get photo data
	for scripts and other frontends.

	@item show-usage
	@opindex list-options:show-usage
	Show usage information for keys and subkeys in the standard key
	listing. This is a list of letters indicating the allowed usage for a
	key (@code{E}=encryption, @code{S}=signing, @code{C}=certification,
	@code{A}=authentication). Defaults to yes.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--check-signatures}
	listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	@option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the
	@option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex list-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of user IDs during key listings.
	Defaults to yes.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-unusable-subkeys
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-subkeys
	Show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-unusable-sigs
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-sigs
	Show key signature made using weak or unsupported algorithms.

	@item show-keyring
	@opindex list-options:show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-expire
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-expire
	Show signature expiration dates (if any) during
	@option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-subpackets
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-subpackets
	Include signature subpackets in the key listing. This option can take an
	optional argument list of the subpackets to list. If no argument is
	passed, list all subpackets. Defaults to no. This option is only
	meaningful when using @option{--with-colons} along with
	@option{--check-signatures}.

	@item show-only-fpr-mbox
	@opindex list-options:show-only-fpr-mbox
	For each user-id which has a valid mail address print
	only the fingerprint followed by the mail address.

	@item sort-sigs
	@opindex list-options:sort-sigs
	With --list-sigs and --check-sigs sort the signatures by keyID and
	creation time to make it easier to view the history of these
	signatures. The self-signature is also listed before other
	signatures. Defaults to yes.

	@end table

	@item --verify-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex verify-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	verifying signatures. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give
	the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex verify-options:show-photos
	Display any photo IDs present on the key that issued the signature.
	Defaults to no. See also @option{--photo-viewer}.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the signature being verified. Defaults to yes.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	signature being verified. Defaults to IETF standard.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the signature being verified.
	Defaults to yes.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex verify-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of the user IDs on the key that issued
	the signature. Defaults to yes.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex verify-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs during signature verification.
	Defaults to no.

	@item show-primary-uid-only
	@opindex verify-options:show-primary-uid-only
	Show only the primary user ID during signature verification. That is
	all the AKA lines as well as photo Ids are not shown with the signature
	verification status.

	@end table

	@item --enable-large-rsa
	@itemx --disable-large-rsa
	@opindex enable-large-rsa
	@opindex disable-large-rsa
	With --generate-key and --batch, enable the creation of RSA secret keys as
	large as 8192 bit. Note: 8192 bit is more than is generally
	recommended. These large keys don't significantly improve security,
	but they are more expensive to use, and their signatures and
	certifications are larger. This option is only available if the
	binary was build with large-secmem support.

	@item --enable-dsa2
	@itemx --disable-dsa2
	@opindex enable-dsa2
	@opindex disable-dsa2
	Enable hash truncation for all DSA keys even for old DSA Keys up to
	1024 bit. This is also the default with @option{--openpgp}. Note
	that older versions of GnuPG also required this flag to allow the
	generation of DSA larger than 1024 bit.

	@item --photo-viewer @var{string}
	@opindex photo-viewer
	This is the command line that should be run to view a photo ID. "%i"
	will be expanded to a filename containing the photo. "%I" does the
	same, except the file will not be deleted once the viewer exits.
	Other flags are "%k" for the key ID, "%K" for the long key ID, "%f"
	for the key fingerprint, "%t" for the extension of the image type
	(e.g. "jpg"), "%T" for the MIME type of the image (e.g. "image/jpeg"),
	"%v" for the single-character calculated validity of the image being
	viewed (e.g. "f"), "%V" for the calculated validity as a string (e.g.
	"full"), "%U" for a base32 encoded hash of the user ID,
	and "%%" for an actual percent sign. If neither %i or %I are present,
	then the photo will be supplied to the viewer on standard input.

	On Unix the default viewer is
	@code{xloadimage -fork -quiet -title 'KeyID 0x%k' STDIN}
	with a fallback to
	@code{display -title 'KeyID 0x%k' %i}
	and finally to
	@code{xdg-open %i}.
	On Windows
	@code{!ShellExecute 400 %i} is used; here the command is a meta
	command to use that API call followed by a wait time in milliseconds
	which is used to give the viewer time to read the temporary image file
	before gpg deletes it again. Note that if your image viewer program
	is not secure, then executing it from gpg does not make it secure.

	@item --exec-path @var{string}
	@opindex exec-path
	@efindex PATH
	Sets a list of directories to search for photo viewers If not provided
	photo viewers use the @code{PATH} environment variable.

	@item --keyring @var{file}
	@opindex keyring
	Add @var{file} to the current list of keyrings. If @var{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory ("~/.gnupg" unless @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is
	used).

	Note that this adds a keyring to the current list. If the intent is to
	use the specified keyring alone, use @option{--keyring} along with
	@option{--no-default-keyring}.

	If the option @option{--no-keyring} has been used no keyrings will
	be used at all.

	Note that if the option @option{use-keyboxd} is enabled in
	@file{common.conf}, no keyrings are used at all and keys are all
	maintained by the keyboxd process in its own database.

	@item --primary-keyring @var{file}
	@opindex primary-keyring
	This is a varian of @option{--keyring} and designates @var{file} as
	the primary public keyring. This means that newly imported keys (via
	@option{--import} or keyserver @option{--recv-from}) will go to this
	keyring.


	@item --secret-keyring @var{file}
	@opindex secret-keyring
	This is an obsolete option and ignored. All secret keys are stored in
	the @file{private-keys-v1.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory.

	@item --trustdb-name @var{file}
	@opindex trustdb-name
	Use @var{file} instead of the default trustdb. If @var{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory (@file{~/.gnupg} if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is
	not used).

	@include opt-homedir.texi


	@item --display-charset @var{name}
	@opindex display-charset
	Set the name of the native character set. This is used to convert some
	informational strings like user IDs to the proper UTF-8 encoding.
	Note that this has nothing to do with the character set of data to be
	encrypted or signed; GnuPG does not recode user-supplied data. If this
	option is not used, the default character set is determined from the
	current locale. A verbosity level of 3 shows the chosen set. This
	option should not be used on Windows. Valid values for @var{name}
	are:

	@table @asis

	@item iso-8859-1
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-1
	This is the Latin 1 set.

	@item iso-8859-2
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-2
	The Latin 2 set.

	@item iso-8859-15
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-15
	This is currently an alias for
	the Latin 1 set.

	@item koi8-r
	@opindex display-charset:koi8-r
	The usual Russian set (RFC-1489).

	@item utf-8
	@opindex display-charset:utf-8
	Bypass all translations and assume
	that the OS uses native UTF-8 encoding.
	@end table

	@item --utf8-strings
	@itemx --no-utf8-strings
	@opindex utf8-strings
	Assume that command line arguments are given as UTF-8 strings. The
	default (@option{--no-utf8-strings}) is to assume that arguments are
	encoded in the character set as specified by
	@option{--display-charset}. These options affect all following
	arguments. Both options may be used multiple times.
	This option should not be used in an option file.

	This option has no effect on Windows. There the internal used UTF-8
	encoding is translated for console input and output. The command line
	arguments are expected as Unicode and translated to UTF-8. Thus when
	calling this program from another, make sure to use the Unicode
	version of CreateProcess.

	@anchor{gpg-option --options}
	@item --options @var{file}
	@opindex options
	Read options from @var{file} and do not try to read them from the
	default options file in the homedir (see @option{--homedir}). This
	option is ignored if used in an options file.

	@item --no-options
	@opindex no-options
	Shortcut for @option{--options /dev/null}. This option is detected
	before an attempt to open an option file. Using this option will also
	prevent the creation of a @file{~/.gnupg} homedir.

	@item -z @var{n}
	@itemx --compress-level @var{n}
	@itemx --bzip2-compress-level @var{n}
	@itemx --no-compress
	@opindex compress-level
	@opindex bzip2-compress-level
	@opindex no-compress
	Set compression level to @var{n} for the ZIP and ZLIB compression
	algorithms. The default is to use the default compression level of zlib
	(normally 6). @option{--bzip2-compress-level} sets the compression level
	for the BZIP2 compression algorithm (defaulting to 6 as well). This is a
	different option from @option{--compress-level} since BZIP2 uses a
	significant amount of memory for each additional compression level.

	Option @option{-z} sets both. A value of 0 for @var{n} disables
	compression. A value of -1 forces compression using the default
	level. Option @option{--no-compress} is identical to @option{-z0}.

	Except for the @option{--store} command compression is always used
	unless @command{gpg} detects that the input is already compressed. To
	inhibit the use of compression use @option{-z0} or
	@option{--no-compress}; to force compression use @option{-z-1} or
	option @option{z} with another compression level than the default as
	indicated by -1. Note that this overriding of the default deection
	works only with @option{z} and not with the long variant of this
	option.


	@item --bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	@opindex bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	Use a different decompression method for BZIP2 compressed files. This
	alternate method uses a bit more than half the memory, but also runs
	at half the speed. This is useful under extreme low memory
	circumstances when the file was originally compressed at a high
	@option{--bzip2-compress-level}.


	@item --mangle-dos-filenames
	@itemx --no-mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex no-mangle-dos-filenames
	Older version of Windows cannot handle filenames with more than one
	dot. @option{--mangle-dos-filenames} causes GnuPG to replace (rather
	than add to) the extension of an output filename to avoid this
	problem. This option is off by default and has no effect on non-Windows
	platforms.

	@item --ask-cert-level
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-level
	@opindex ask-cert-level
	When making a key signature, prompt for a certification level. If this
	option is not specified, the certification level used is set via
	@option{--default-cert-level}. See @option{--default-cert-level} for
	information on the specific levels and how they are
	used. @option{--no-ask-cert-level} disables this option. This option
	defaults to no.

	@item --default-cert-level @var{n}
	@opindex default-cert-level
	The default to use for the check level when signing a key.

	0 means you make no particular claim as to how carefully you verified
	the key.

	1 means you believe the key is owned by the person who claims to own
	it but you could not, or did not verify the key at all. This is
	useful for a "persona" verification, where you sign the key of a
	pseudonymous user.

	2 means you did casual verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint and checked the
	user ID on the key against a photo ID.

	3 means you did extensive verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint with the owner of the
	key in person, and that you checked, by means of a hard to forge
	document with a photo ID (such as a passport) that the name of the key
	owner matches the name in the user ID on the key, and finally that you
	verified (by exchange of email) that the email address on the key
	belongs to the key owner.

	Note that the examples given above for levels 2 and 3 are just that:
	examples. In the end, it is up to you to decide just what "casual"
	and "extensive" mean to you.

	This option defaults to 0 (no particular claim).

	@item --min-cert-level
	@opindex min-cert-level
	When building the trust database, treat any signatures with a
	certification level below this as invalid. Defaults to 2, which
	disregards level 1 signatures. Note that level 0 "no particular
	claim" signatures are always accepted.

	@item --trusted-key @var{long key ID or fingerprint}
	@opindex trusted-key
	Assume that the specified key (which should be given as fingerprint)
	is as trustworthy as one of your own secret keys. This option is
	useful if you don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them)
	online but still want to be able to check the validity of a given
	recipient's or signator's key. If the given key is not locally
	available but an LDAP keyserver is configured the missing key is
	imported from that server.

	@item --add-desig-revoker [sensitive:]@var{fingerprint}
	@opindex add-desig-revoker
	Add the key specified by @var{fingerprint} as a designated revoker to
	newly created keys. If the fingerprint is prefixed with the keyword
	``sensitive:'' that info is normally not exported wit the key. This
	option may be given several time to add more than one designated
	revoker. If the keyword ``clear'' is used instead of a fingerprint,
	all designated options previously encountered are discarded.
	Designated revokers are marked on the key as non-revocable. Note that
	a designated revoker specified using a parameter file will also be
	added to the key.


	@item --trust-model @{pgp\|classic\|tofu\|tofu+pgp\|direct\|always\|auto@}
	@opindex trust-model
	Set what trust model GnuPG should follow. The models are:

	@table @asis

	@item pgp
	@opindex trust-model:pgp
	This is the Web of Trust combined with trust signatures as used in PGP
	5.x and later. This is the default trust model when creating a new
	trust database.

	@item classic
	@opindex trust-model:classic
	This is the standard Web of Trust as introduced by PGP 2.

	@item tofu
	@opindex trust-model:tofu
	@anchor{trust-model-tofu}
	TOFU stands for Trust On First Use. In this experimental trust
	model, the first
	time a key is seen, it is memorized. If later another key with a
	user id with the same email address is seen, both keys are marked as
	suspect. In that case, the next time either is used, a warning is
	displayed describing the conflict, why it might have occurred
	(either the user generated a new key and failed to cross sign the
	old and new keys, the key is forgery, or a man-in-the-middle attack
	is being attempted), and the user is prompted to manually confirm
	the validity of the key in question.

	Because a potential attacker is able to control the email address
	and thereby circumvent the conflict detection algorithm by using an
	email address that is similar in appearance to a trusted email
	address, whenever a message is verified, statistics about the number
	of messages signed with the key are shown. In this way, a user can
	easily identify attacks using fake keys for regular correspondents.

	When compared with the Web of Trust, TOFU offers significantly
	weaker security guarantees. In particular, TOFU only helps ensure
	consistency (that is, that the binding between a key and email
	address doesn't change). A major advantage of TOFU is that it
	requires little maintenance to use correctly. To use the web of
	trust properly, you need to actively sign keys and mark users as
	trusted introducers. This is a time-consuming process and anecdotal
	evidence suggests that even security-conscious users rarely take the
	time to do this thoroughly and instead rely on an ad-hoc TOFU
	process.

	In the TOFU model, policies are associated with bindings between
	keys and email addresses (which are extracted from user ids and
	normalized). There are five policies, which can be set manually
	using the @option{--tofu-policy} option. The default policy can be
	set using the @option{--tofu-default-policy} option.

	The TOFU policies are: @code{auto}, @code{good}, @code{unknown},
	@code{bad} and @code{ask}. The @code{auto} policy is used by
	default (unless overridden by @option{--tofu-default-policy}) and
	marks a binding as marginally trusted. The @code{good},
	@code{unknown} and @code{bad} policies mark a binding as fully
	trusted, as having unknown trust or as having trust never,
	respectively. The @code{unknown} policy is useful for just using
	TOFU to detect conflicts, but to never assign positive trust to a
	binding. The final policy, @code{ask} prompts the user to indicate
	the binding's trust. If batch mode is enabled (or input is
	inappropriate in the context), then the user is not prompted and the
	@code{undefined} trust level is returned.

	@item tofu+pgp
	@opindex trust-model:tofu+pgp
	This experimental trust model combines TOFU with the Web of Trust.
	This is done
	by computing the trust level for each model and then taking the
	maximum trust level where the trust levels are ordered as follows:
	@code{unknown < undefined < marginal < fully < ultimate < expired <
	never}.

	By setting @option{--tofu-default-policy=unknown}, this model can be
	used to implement the web of trust with TOFU's conflict detection
	algorithm, but without its assignment of positive trust values,
	which some security-conscious users don't like.

	@item direct
	@opindex trust-model:direct
	Key validity is set directly by the user and not calculated via the
	Web of Trust. This model is solely based on the key and does
	not distinguish user IDs. Note that when changing to another trust
	model the trust values assigned to a key are transformed into
	ownertrust values, which also indicate how you trust the owner of
	the key to sign other keys.

	@item always
	@opindex trust-model:always
	Skip key validation and assume that used keys are always fully
	valid. You generally won't use this unless you are using some
	external validation scheme. This option also suppresses the
	"[uncertain]" tag printed with signature checks when there is no
	evidence that the user ID is bound to the key. Note that this
	trust model still does not allow the use of expired, revoked, or
	disabled keys.

	@item auto
	@opindex trust-model:auto
	Select the trust model depending on whatever the internal trust
	database says. This is the default model if such a database already
	exists. Note that a tofu trust model is not considered here and
	must be enabled explicitly.
	@end table

	@item --always-trust
	@opindex always-trust
	Identical to @option{--trust-model always}.

	@item --assert-signer @var{fpr_or_file}
	@opindex assert-signer
	This option checks whether at least one valid signature on a file has
	been made with the specified key. The key is either specified as a
	fingerprint or a file listing fingerprints. The fingerprint must be
	given or listed in compact format (no colons or spaces in between).
	This option can be given multiple times and each fingerprint is
	checked against the signing key as well as the corresponding primary
	key. If @var{fpr_or_file} specifies a file, empty lines are ignored
	as well as all lines starting with a hash sign. With this option gpg
	is guaranteed to return with an exit code of 0 if and only if a
	signature has been encountered, is valid, and the key matches one of
	the fingerprints given by this option.


	@item --auto-key-locate @var{mechanisms}
	@itemx --no-auto-key-locate
	@opindex auto-key-locate
	GnuPG can automatically locate and retrieve keys as needed using this
	option. This happens when encrypting to an email address (in the
	"user@@example.com" form), and there are no "user@@example.com" keys
	on the local keyring. This option takes any number of the mechanisms
	listed below, in the order they are to be tried. Instead of listing
	the mechanisms as comma delimited arguments, the option may also be
	given several times to add more mechanism. The option
	@option{--no-auto-key-locate} or the mechanism "clear" resets the
	list. The default is "local,wkd".

	@table @asis

	@item cert
	Locate a key using DNS CERT, as specified in RFC-4398.

	@item dane
	Locate a key using DANE, as specified
	in draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-05.txt.

	@item wkd
	Locate a key using the Web Key Directory protocol.

	@item ldap
	Using DNS Service Discovery, check the domain in question for any LDAP
	keyservers to use. If this fails, attempt to locate the key using the
	PGP Universal method of checking @samp{ldap://keys.(thedomain)}.

	@item ntds
	Locate the key using the Active Directory (Windows only). This
	method also allows to search by fingerprint using the command
	@option{--locate-external-key}. Note that this mechanism is
	actually a shortcut for the mechanism @samp{keyserver} but using
	"ldap:///" as the keyserver.

	@item keyserver
	Locate a key using a keyserver. This method also allows to search
	by fingerprint using the command @option{--locate-external-key} if
	any of the configured keyservers is an LDAP server.

	@item keyserver-URL
	In addition, a keyserver URL as used in the @command{dirmngr}
	configuration may be used here to query that particular keyserver.
	This method also allows to search by fingerprint using the command
	@option{--locate-external-key} if the URL specifies an LDAP server.

	@item local
	Locate the key using the local keyrings. This mechanism allows the user to
	select the order a local key lookup is done. Thus using
	@samp{--auto-key-locate local} is identical to
	@option{--no-auto-key-locate}.

	@item nodefault
	This flag disables the standard local key lookup, done before any of the
	mechanisms defined by the @option{--auto-key-locate} are tried. The
	position of this mechanism in the list does not matter. It is not
	required if @code{local} is also used.

	@item clear
	Clear all defined mechanisms. This is useful to override
	mechanisms given in a config file. Note that a @code{nodefault} in
	@var{mechanisms} will also be cleared unless it is given after the
	@code{clear}.

	@end table


	@item --auto-key-import
	@itemx --no-auto-key-import
	@opindex auto-key-import
	@opindex no-auto-key-import
	This is an offline mechanism to get a missing key for signature
	verification and for later encryption to this key. If this option is
	enabled and a signature includes an embedded key, that key is
	used to verify the signature and on verification success the key is
	imported. The default is @option{--no-auto-key-import}.

	On the sender (signing) site the option @option{--include-key-block}
	needs to be used to put the public part of the signing key as “Key
	Block subpacket” into the signature.

	@item --auto-key-retrieve
	@itemx --no-auto-key-retrieve
	@opindex auto-key-retrieve
	@opindex no-auto-key-retrieve
	These options enable or disable the automatic retrieving of keys from
	a keyserver when verifying signatures made by keys that are not on the
	local keyring. The default is @option{--no-auto-key-retrieve}.

	The order of methods tried to lookup the key is:

	1. If the option @option{--auto-key-import} is set and the signatures
	includes an embedded key, that key is used to verify the signature and
	on verification success that key is imported.

	2. If a preferred keyserver is specified in the signature and the
	option @option{honor-keyserver-url} is active (which is not the
	default), that keyserver is tried. Note that the creator of the
	signature uses the option @option{--sig-keyserver-url} to specify the
	preferred keyserver for data signatures.

	3. If the signature has the Signer's UID set (e.g. using
	@option{--sender} while creating the signature) a Web Key Directory
	(WKD) lookup is done. This is the default configuration but can be
	disabled by removing WKD from the auto-key-locate list or by using the
	option @option{--disable-signer-uid}.

	4. If any keyserver is configured and the Issuer Fingerprint is part
	of the signature (since GnuPG 2.1.16), the configured keyservers are
	tried.

	Note that this option makes a "web bug" like behavior possible.
	Keyserver or Web Key Directory operators can see which keys you
	request, so by sending you a message signed by a brand new key (which
	you naturally will not have on your local keyring), the operator can
	tell both your IP address and the time when you verified the
	signature.

	@item --keyid-format @{none\|short\|0xshort\|long\|0xlong@}
	@opindex keyid-format
	Select how to display key IDs. "none" does not show the key ID at all
	but shows the fingerprint in a separate line. "short" is the
	traditional 8-character key ID. "long" is the more accurate (but less
	convenient) 16-character key ID. Add an "0x" to either to include an
	"0x" at the beginning of the key ID, as in 0x99242560. Note that this
	option is ignored if the option @option{--with-colons} is used.

	@item --keyserver @var{name}
	@opindex keyserver
	This option is deprecated - please use the @option{--keyserver} in
	@file{dirmngr.conf} instead.

	Use @var{name} as your keyserver. This is the server that
	@option{--receive-keys}, @option{--send-keys}, and @option{--search-keys}
	will communicate with to receive keys from, send keys to, and search for
	keys on. The format of the @var{name} is a URI:
	`scheme:[//]keyservername[:port]' The scheme is the type of keyserver:
	"hkp"/"hkps" for the HTTP (or compatible) keyservers or "ldap"/"ldaps"
	for the LDAP keyservers. Note that your particular installation of
	GnuPG may have other keyserver types available as well. Keyserver
	schemes are case-insensitive.

	Most keyservers synchronize with each other, so there is generally no
	need to send keys to more than one server. The keyserver
	@code{hkp://keys.gnupg.net} uses round robin DNS to give a different
	keyserver each time you use it.

	@item --keyserver-options @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@opindex keyserver-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for the
	keyserver. Options can be prefixed with a `no-' to give the opposite
	meaning. Valid import-options or export-options may be used here as
	well to apply to importing (@option{--recv-key}) or exporting
	(@option{--send-key}) a key from a keyserver. While not all options
	are available for all keyserver types, some common options are:

	@table @asis

	@item include-revoked
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as revoked. Note that not all keyservers
	differentiate between revoked and unrevoked keys, and for such
	keyservers this option is meaningless. Note also that most keyservers do
	not have cryptographic verification of key revocations, and so turning
	this option off may result in skipping keys that are incorrectly marked
	as revoked.

	@item include-disabled
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as disabled. Note that this option is not
	used with HKP keyservers.

	@item auto-key-retrieve
	This is an obsolete alias for the option @option{auto-key-retrieve}.
	Please do not use it; it will be removed in future versions..

	@item honor-keyserver-url
	When using @option{--refresh-keys}, if the key in question has a preferred
	keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to refresh the key
	from. In addition, if auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature
	being verified has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred
	keyserver to fetch the key from. Note that this option introduces a
	"web bug": The creator of the key can see when the keys is
	refreshed. Thus this option is not enabled by default.

	@item include-subkeys
	When receiving a key, include subkeys as potential targets. Note that
	this option is not used with HKP keyservers, as they do not support
	retrieving keys by subkey id.

	@item timeout
	@itemx http-proxy=@var{value}
	@itemx verbose
	@itemx debug
	@itemx check-cert
	@item ca-cert-file
	These options have no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@end table

	The default list of options is: "self-sigs-only, import-clean,
	repair-keys, repair-pks-subkey-bug, export-attributes". However, if
	the actual used source is an LDAP server "no-self-sigs-only" is
	assumed unless "self-sigs-only" has been explicitly configured.


	@item --completes-needed @var{n}
	@opindex compliant-needed
	Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 1).

	@item --marginals-needed @var{n}
	@opindex marginals-needed
	Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 3)

	@item --tofu-default-policy @{auto\|good\|unknown\|bad\|ask@}
	@opindex tofu-default-policy
	The default TOFU policy (defaults to @code{auto}). For more
	information about the meaning of this option, @pxref{trust-model-tofu}.

	@item --max-cert-depth @var{n}
	@opindex max-cert-depth
	Maximum depth of a certification chain (default is 5).

	@item --no-sig-cache
	@opindex no-sig-cache
	Do not cache the verification status of key signatures.
	Caching gives a much better performance in key listings. However, if
	you suspect that your public keyring is not safe against write
	modifications, you can use this option to disable the caching. It
	probably does not make sense to disable it because all kind of damage
	can be done if someone else has write access to your public keyring.

	@item --auto-check-trustdb
	@itemx --no-auto-check-trustdb
	@opindex auto-check-trustdb
	If GnuPG feels that its information about the Web of Trust has to be
	updated, it automatically runs the @option{--check-trustdb} command
	internally. This may be a time consuming
	process. @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} disables this option.

	@item --use-agent
	@itemx --no-use-agent
	@opindex use-agent
	This is dummy option. @command{@gpgname} always requires the agent.

	@item --gpg-agent-info
	@opindex gpg-agent-info
	This is dummy option. It has no effect when used with @command{@gpgname}.


	@item --agent-program @var{file}
	@opindex agent-program
	Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The
	default value is determined by running @command{gpgconf} with the
	option @option{--list-dirs}. Note that the pipe symbol (@code{\|}) is
	used for a regression test suite hack and may thus not be used in the
	file name.

	@item --dirmngr-program @var{file}
	@opindex dirmngr-program
	Specify a dirmngr program to be used for keyserver access. The
	default value is @file{@value{BINDIR}/dirmngr}.

	@item --disable-dirmngr
	Entirely disable the use of the Dirmngr.

	@item --no-autostart
	@opindex no-autostart
	Do not start the gpg-agent or the dirmngr if it has not yet been
	started and its service is required. This option is mostly useful on
	machines where the connection to gpg-agent has been redirected to
	another machines. If dirmngr is required on the remote machine, it
	may be started manually using @command{gpgconf --launch dirmngr}.

	@item --lock-once
	@opindex lock-once
	Lock the databases the first time a lock is requested
	and do not release the lock until the process
	terminates.

	@item --lock-multiple
	@opindex lock-multiple
	Release the locks every time a lock is no longer
	needed. Use this to override a previous @option{--lock-once}
	from a config file.

	@item --lock-never
	@opindex lock-never
	Disable locking entirely. This option should be used only in very
	special environments, where it can be assured that only one process
	is accessing those files. A bootable floppy with a stand-alone
	encryption system will probably use this. Improper usage of this
	option may lead to data and key corruption.

	@item --exit-on-status-write-error
	@opindex exit-on-status-write-error
	This option will cause write errors on the status FD to immediately
	terminate the process. That should in fact be the default but it never
	worked this way and thus we need an option to enable this, so that the
	change won't break applications which close their end of a status fd
	connected pipe too early. Using this option along with
	@option{--enable-progress-filter} may be used to cleanly cancel long
	running gpg operations.

	@item --limit-card-insert-tries @var{n}
	@opindex limit-card-insert-tries
	With @var{n} greater than 0 the number of prompts asking to insert a
	smartcard gets limited to N-1. Thus with a value of 1 gpg won't at
	all ask to insert a card if none has been inserted at startup. This
	option is useful in the configuration file in case an application does
	not know about the smartcard support and waits ad infinitum for an
	inserted card.

	@item --no-random-seed-file
	@opindex no-random-seed-file
	GnuPG uses a file to store its internal random pool over invocations.
	This makes random generation faster; however sometimes write operations
	are not desired. This option can be used to achieve that with the cost of
	slower random generation.

	@item --no-greeting
	@opindex no-greeting
	Suppress the initial copyright message.

	@item --no-secmem-warning
	@opindex no-secmem-warning
	Suppress the warning about "using insecure memory".

	@item --no-permission-warning
	@opindex permission-warning
	Suppress the warning about unsafe file and home directory (@option{--homedir})
	permissions. Note that the permission checks that GnuPG performs are
	not intended to be authoritative, but rather they simply warn about
	certain common permission problems. Do not assume that the lack of a
	warning means that your system is secure.

	Note that the warning for unsafe @option{--homedir} permissions cannot be
	suppressed in the gpg.conf file, as this would allow an attacker to
	place an unsafe gpg.conf file in place, and use this file to suppress
	warnings about itself. The @option{--homedir} permissions warning may only be
	suppressed on the command line.

	@item --require-secmem
	@itemx --no-require-secmem
	@opindex require-secmem
	Refuse to run if GnuPG cannot get secure memory. Defaults to no
	(i.e. run, but give a warning).


	@item --require-cross-certification
	@itemx --no-require-cross-certification
	@opindex require-cross-certification
	When verifying a signature made from a subkey, ensure that the cross
	certification "back signature" on the subkey is present and valid. This
	protects against a subtle attack against subkeys that can sign.
	Defaults to @option{--require-cross-certification} for
	@command{@gpgname}.

	@item --expert
	@itemx --no-expert
	@opindex expert
	Allow the user to do certain nonsensical or "silly" things like
	signing an expired or revoked key, or certain potentially incompatible
	things like generating unusual key types. This also disables certain
	warning messages about potentially incompatible actions. As the name
	implies, this option is for experts only. If you don't fully
	understand the implications of what it allows you to do, leave this
	off. @option{--no-expert} disables this option.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** KEY RELATED OPTIONS **********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Key related Options
	@subsection Key related options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -r
	@opindex recipient
	Encrypt for user id @var{name}. If this option or
	@option{--hidden-recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user-id
	unless @option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --hidden-recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -R
	@opindex hidden-recipient
	Encrypt for user ID @var{name}, but hide the key ID of this user's
	key. This option helps to hide the receiver of the message and is a
	limited countermeasure against traffic analysis. If this option or
	@option{--recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user ID unless
	@option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --recipient-file @var{file}
	@itemx -f
	@opindex recipient-file
	This option is similar to @option{--recipient} except that it
	encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the
	name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{@gpgname} assumes that
	the key in this file is fully valid.

	@item --hidden-recipient-file @var{file}
	@itemx -F
	@opindex hidden-recipient-file
	This option is similar to @option{--hidden-recipient} except that it
	encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the
	name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{@gpgname} assumes that
	the key in this file is fully valid.

	@item --encrypt-to @var{name}
	@opindex encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as an
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked
	user id. No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even
	disabled keys can be used.

	@item --hidden-encrypt-to @var{name}
	@opindex hidden-encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--hidden-recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as a hidden
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked user id.
	No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even disabled
	keys can be used.

	@item --no-encrypt-to
	@opindex no-encrypt-to
	Disable the use of all @option{--encrypt-to} and
	@option{--hidden-encrypt-to} keys.

	@item --group @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@opindex group
	Sets up a named group, which is similar to aliases in email programs.
	Any time the group name is a recipient (@option{-r} or
	@option{--recipient}), it will be expanded to the values
	specified. Multiple groups with the same name are automatically merged
	into a single group.

	The values are @code{key IDs} or fingerprints, but any key description
	is accepted. Note that a value with spaces in it will be treated as
	two different values. Note also there is only one level of expansion
	--- you cannot make an group that points to another group. When used
	from the command line, it may be necessary to quote the argument to
	this option to prevent the shell from treating it as multiple
	arguments.

	@item --ungroup @var{name}
	@opindex ungroup
	Remove a given entry from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --no-groups
	@opindex no-groups
	Remove all entries from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --local-user @var{name}
	@itemx -u
	@opindex local-user
	Use @var{name} as the key to sign with. Note that this option overrides
	@option{--default-key}.

	@item --sender @var{mbox}
	@opindex sender
	This option has two purposes. @var{mbox} must either be a complete
	user ID containing a proper mail address or just a plain mail address.
	The option can be given multiple times.

	When creating a signature this option tells gpg the signing key's user
	id used to make the signature and embeds that user ID into the created
	signature (using OpenPGP's ``Signer's User ID'' subpacket). If the
	option is given multiple times a suitable user ID is picked. However,
	if the signing key was specified directly by using a mail address
	(i.e. not by using a fingerprint or key ID) this option is used and
	the mail address is embedded in the created signature.

	When verifying a signature @var{mbox} is used to restrict the
	information printed by the TOFU code to matching user IDs. If the
	option is used and the signature contains a ``Signer's User ID''
	subpacket that information is is also used to restrict the printed
	information. Note that GnuPG considers only the mail address part of
	a User ID.

	If this option or the said subpacket is available the TRUST lines as
	printed by option @option{status-fd} correspond to the corresponding
	User ID; if no User ID is known the TRUST lines are computed directly
	on the key and do not give any information about the User ID. In the
	latter case it his highly recommended to scripts and other frontends
	to evaluate the VALIDSIG line, retrieve the key and print all User IDs
	along with their validity (trust) information.


	@item --try-secret-key @var{name}
	@opindex try-secret-key
	For hidden recipients GPG needs to know the keys to use for trial
	decryption. The key set with @option{--default-key} is always tried
	first, but this is often not sufficient. This option allows setting more
	keys to be used for trial decryption. Although any valid user-id
	specification may be used for @var{name} it makes sense to use at least
	the long keyid to avoid ambiguities. Note that gpg-agent might pop up a
	pinentry for a lot keys to do the trial decryption. If you want to stop
	all further trial decryption you may use close-window button instead of
	the cancel button.

	@item --try-all-secrets
	@opindex try-all-secrets
	Don't look at the key ID as stored in the message but try all secret
	keys in turn to find the right decryption key. This option forces the
	behaviour as used by anonymous recipients (created by using
	@option{--throw-keyids} or @option{--hidden-recipient}) and might come
	handy in case where an encrypted message contains a bogus key ID.

	@item --skip-hidden-recipients
	@itemx --no-skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex no-skip-hidden-recipients
	During decryption skip all anonymous recipients. This option helps in
	the case that people use the hidden recipients feature to hide their
	own encrypt-to key from others. If one has many secret keys this
	may lead to a major annoyance because all keys are tried in turn to
	decrypt something which was not really intended for it. The drawback
	of this option is that it is currently not possible to decrypt a
	message which includes real anonymous recipients.


	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** INPUT AND OUTPUT *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Input and Output
	@subsection Input and Output

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --armor
	@itemx -a
	@opindex armor
	Create ASCII armored output. The default is to create the binary
	OpenPGP format.

	@item --no-armor
	@opindex no-armor
	Assume the input data is not in ASCII armored format.

	@item --output @var{file}
	@itemx -o @var{file}
	@opindex output
	Write output to @var{file}. To write to stdout use @code{-} as the
	filename.

	@item --max-output @var{n}
	@opindex max-output
	This option sets a limit on the number of bytes that will be generated
	when processing a file. Since OpenPGP supports various levels of
	compression, it is possible that the plaintext of a given message may be
	significantly larger than the original OpenPGP message. While GnuPG
	works properly with such messages, there is often a desire to set a
	maximum file size that will be generated before processing is forced to
	stop by the OS limits. Defaults to 0, which means "no limit".

	@item --chunk-size @var{n}
	@opindex chunk-size
	The AEAD encryption mode encrypts the data in chunks so that a
	receiving side can check for transmission errors or tampering at the
	end of each chunk and does not need to delay this until all data has
	been received. The used chunk size is 2^@var{n} byte. The lowest
	allowed value for @var{n} is 6 (64 byte) and the largest is the
	default of 22 which creates chunks not larger than 4 MiB.

	@item --input-size-hint @var{n}
	@opindex input-size-hint
	This option can be used to tell GPG the size of the input data in
	bytes. @var{n} must be a positive base-10 number. This option is
	only useful if the input is not taken from a file. GPG may use this
	hint to optimize its buffer allocation strategy. It is also used by
	the @option{--status-fd} line ``PROGRESS'' to provide a value for
	``total'' if that is not available by other means.

	@item --key-origin @var{string}[,@var{url}]
	@opindex key-origin
	gpg can track the origin of a key. Certain origins are implicitly
	known (e.g. keyserver, web key directory) and set. For a standard
	import the origin of the keys imported can be set with this option.
	To list the possible values use "help" for @var{string}. Some origins
	can store an optional @var{url} argument. That URL can appended to
	@var{string} after a comma.

	@item --import-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex import-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	importing keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item import-local-sigs
	Allow importing key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	@item keep-ownertrust
	Normally possible still existing ownertrust values of a key are
	cleared if a key is imported. This is in general desirable so that
	a formerly deleted key does not automatically gain an ownertrust
	values merely due to import. On the other hand it is sometimes
	necessary to re-import a trusted set of keys again but keeping
	already assigned ownertrust values. This can be achieved by using
	this option.

	@item repair-pks-subkey-bug
	During import, attempt to repair the damage caused by the PKS keyserver
	bug (pre version 0.9.6) that mangles keys with multiple subkeys. Note
	that this cannot completely repair the damaged key as some crucial data
	is removed by the keyserver, but it does at least give you back one
	subkey. Defaults to no for regular @option{--import} and to yes for
	keyserver @option{--receive-keys}.

	@item import-show
	@itemx show-only
	Show a listing of the key as imported right before it is stored.
	This can be combined with the option @option{--dry-run} to only look
	at keys; the option @option{show-only} is a shortcut for this
	combination. The command @option{--show-keys} is another shortcut
	for this. Note that suffixes like '#' for "sec" and "sbb" lines
	may or may not be printed.

	@item import-export
	Run the entire import code but instead of storing the key to the
	local keyring write it to the output. The export option
	@option{export-dane} affect the output. This option can for example
	be used to remove all invalid parts from a key without the
	need to store it.

	@item merge-only
	During import, allow key updates to existing keys, but do not allow
	any new keys to be imported. Defaults to no.

	@item import-clean
	After import, compact (remove all signatures except the
	self-signature) any user IDs from the new key that are not usable.
	Then, remove any signatures from the new key that are not usable.
	This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are not present
	on the keyring. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key}
	command "clean" after import. Defaults to no.

	@item self-sigs-only
	Accept only self-signatures while importing a key. All other key
	signatures are skipped at an early import stage. This option can be
	used with @code{keyserver-options} to mitigate attempts to flood a
	key with bogus signatures from a keyserver. The drawback is that
	all other valid key signatures, as required by the Web of Trust are
	also not imported. Note that when using this option along with
	import-clean it suppresses the final clean step after merging the
	imported key into the existing key.

	+ @item ignore-attributes
	+ Ignore all attribute user IDs (photo IDs) and their signatures while
	+ importing a key.
	+
	@item repair-keys
	After import, fix various problems with the
	keys. For example, this reorders signatures, and strips duplicate
	signatures. Defaults to yes.

	@item bulk-import
	When used the keyboxd (option @option{use-keyboxd} in @file{common.conf})
	does the import within a single
	transaction.

	@item import-minimal
	Import the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except
	the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the
	same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" after import.
	Defaults to no.

	@item restore
	@itemx import-restore
	Import in key restore mode. This imports all data which is usually
	skipped during import; including all GnuPG specific data. All other
	contradicting options are overridden.
	@end table

	@item --import-filter @{@var{name}=@var{expr}@}
	@itemx --export-filter @{@var{name}=@var{expr}@}
	@opindex import-filter
	@opindex export-filter
	These options define an import/export filter which are applied to the
	imported/exported keyblock right before it will be stored/written.
	@var{name} defines the type of filter to use, @var{expr} the
	expression to evaluate. The option can be used several times which
	then appends more expression to the same @var{name}.

	@noindent
	The available filter types are:

	@table @asis

	@item keep-uid
	This filter will keep a user id packet and its dependent packets in
	the keyblock if the expression evaluates to true.

	@item drop-subkey
	This filter drops the selected subkeys.
	Currently only implemented for --export-filter.

	@item drop-sig
	This filter drops the selected key signatures on user ids.
	Self-signatures are not considered.
	Currently only implemented for --import-filter.

	@item select
	This filter is only implemented by @option{--list-filter}. All
	property names may be used.

	@end table

	For the syntax of the expression see the chapter "FILTER EXPRESSIONS".
	The property names for the expressions depend on the actual filter
	type and are indicated in the following table. Note that all property
	names may also be used by @option{--list-filter}.

	Property names may be prefix with a scope delimited by a slash. Valid
	scopes are "pub" for public and secret primary keys, "sub" for public
	and secret subkeys, "uid" for for user-ID packets, and "sig" for
	signature packets. Invalid scopes are currently ignored.

	The available properties are:

	@table @asis

	@item uid
	A string with the user id. (keep-uid)

	@item mbox
	The addr-spec part of a user id with mailbox or the empty string.
	(keep-uid)

	@item algostr
	A string with the key algorithm description. For example "rsa3072"
	or "ed25519".

	@item key_algo
	A number with the public key algorithm of a key or subkey packet.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item key_size
	A number with the effective key size of a key or subkey packet.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item key_created
	@itemx key_created_d
	The first is the timestamp a public key or subkey packet was
	created. The second is the same but given as an ISO string,
	e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-subkey)

	@item key_expires
	@itemx key_expires_d
	The expiration time of a public key or subkey or 0 if it does not
	expire. The second is the same but given as an ISO date string or
	an empty string e.g. "2038-01-19".

	@item fpr
	The hexified fingerprint of the current subkey or primary key.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item primary
	Boolean indicating whether the user id is the primary one. (keep-uid)

	@item expired
	Boolean indicating whether a user id (keep-uid), a key (drop-subkey), or a
	signature (drop-sig) expired.

	@item revoked
	Boolean indicating whether a user id (keep-uid) or a key (drop-subkey) has
	been revoked.

	@item disabled
	Boolean indicating whether a primary key is disabled.

	@item secret
	Boolean indicating whether a key or subkey is a secret one.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item usage
	A string indicating the usage flags for the subkey, from the
	sequence ``ecsa?''. For example, a subkey capable of just signing
	and authentication would be an exact match for ``sa''. (drop-subkey)

	@item sig_created
	@itemx sig_created_d
	The first is the timestamp a signature packet was created. The
	second is the same but given as an ISO date string,
	e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-sig)

	@item sig_expires
	@itemx sig_expires_d
	The expiration time of a signature packet or 0 if it does not
	expire. The second is the same but given as an ISO date string or
	an empty string e.g. "2038-01-19".

	@item sig_algo
	A number with the public key algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig)

	@item sig_digest_algo
	A number with the digest algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig)

	@item origin
	A string with the key origin or a question mark. For example the
	string ``wkd'' is used if a key originated from a Web Key Directory
	lookup.

	@item lastupd
	The timestamp the key was last updated from a keyserver or the Web
	Key Directory.

	@item url
	A string with the the URL associated wit the last key lookup.

	@end table

	@item --export-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex export-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	exporting keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item export-local-sigs
	Allow exporting key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	@item export-attributes
	Include attribute user IDs (photo IDs) while exporting. Not
	including attribute user IDs is useful to export keys that are going
	to be used by an OpenPGP program that does not accept attribute user
	IDs. Defaults to yes.

	@item export-sensitive-revkeys
	Include designated revoker information that was marked as
	"sensitive". Defaults to no.

	@c Since GnuPG 2.1 gpg-agent manages the secret key and thus the
	@c export-reset-subkey-passwd hack is not anymore justified. Such use
	@c cases may be implemented using a specialized secret key export
	@c tool.
	@c @item export-reset-subkey-passwd
	@c When using the @option{--export-secret-subkeys} command, this option resets
	@c the passphrases for all exported subkeys to empty. This is useful
	@c when the exported subkey is to be used on an unattended machine where
	@c a passphrase doesn't necessarily make sense. Defaults to no.

	@item backup
	@itemx export-backup
	Export for use as a backup. The exported data includes all data
	which is needed to restore the key or keys later with GnuPG. The
	format is basically the OpenPGP format but enhanced with GnuPG
	specific data. All other contradicting options are overridden.

	@item export-clean
	Compact (remove all signatures from) user IDs on the key being
	exported if the user IDs are not usable. Also, do not export any
	signatures that are not usable. This includes signatures that were
	issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. This option is
	the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "clean" before export
	except that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to
	no.

	@item export-minimal
	Export the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except the
	most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the same as
	running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" before export except
	that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to no.

	@item export-revocs
	Export only standalone revocation certificates of the key. This
	option does not export revocations of 3rd party certificate
	revocations.

	@item export-dane
	Instead of outputting the key material output OpenPGP DANE records
	suitable to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before
	each record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone
	file.

	@item mode1003
	Enable the use of a new secret key export format. This format
	avoids the re-encryption as required with the current OpenPGP format
	and also improves the security of the secret key if it has been
	protected with a passphrase. Note that an unprotected key is
	exported as-is and thus not secure; the general rule to convey
	secret keys in an OpenPGP encrypted file still applies with this
	mode. Versions of GnuPG before 2.4.0 are not able to import such a
	secret file.

	@end table

	@item --with-colons
	@opindex with-colons
	Print key listings delimited by colons. Note that the output will be
	encoded in UTF-8 regardless of any @option{--display-charset} setting. This
	format is useful when GnuPG is called from scripts and other programs
	as it is easily machine parsed. The details of this format are
	documented in the file @file{doc/DETAILS}, which is included in the GnuPG
	source distribution.

	@item --fixed-list-mode
	@opindex fixed-list-mode
	Do not merge primary user ID and primary key in @option{--with-colon}
	listing mode and print all timestamps as seconds since 1970-01-01.
	Since GnuPG 2.0.10, this mode is always used and thus this option is
	obsolete; it does not harm to use it though.

	@item --legacy-list-mode
	@opindex legacy-list-mode
	Revert to the pre-2.1 public key list mode. This only affects the
	human readable output and not the machine interface
	(i.e. @code{--with-colons}). Note that the legacy format does not
	convey suitable information for elliptic curves.

	@item --with-fingerprint
	@opindex with-fingerprint
	Same as the command @option{--fingerprint} but changes only the format
	of the output and may be used together with another command.

	@item --with-subkey-fingerprint
	@opindex with-subkey-fingerprint
	If a fingerprint is printed for the primary key, this option forces
	printing of the fingerprint for all subkeys. This could also be
	achieved by using the @option{--with-fingerprint} twice but by using
	this option along with keyid-format "none" a compact fingerprint is
	printed.

	@item --with-v5-fingerprint
	@opindex with-v5-fingerprint
	In a colon mode listing emit "fp2" lines for version 4 OpenPGP keys
	having a v5 style fingerprint of the key.

	@item --with-icao-spelling
	@opindex with-icao-spelling
	Print the ICAO spelling of the fingerprint in addition to the hex digits.

	@item --with-keygrip
	@opindex with-keygrip
	Include the keygrip in the key listings. In @code{--with-colons} mode
	this is implicitly enable for secret keys.

	@item --with-key-origin
	@opindex with-key-origin
	Include the locally held information on the origin and last update of
	a key in a key listing. In @code{--with-colons} mode this is always
	printed. This data is currently experimental and shall not be
	considered part of the stable API.

	@item --with-wkd-hash
	@opindex with-wkd-hash
	Print a Web Key Directory identifier along with each user ID in key
	listings. This is an experimental feature and semantics may change.

	@item --with-secret
	@opindex with-secret
	Include info about the presence of a secret key in public key listings
	done with @code{--with-colons}.

	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPENPGP OPTIONS **************
	@c *******************************************
	@node OpenPGP Options
	@subsection OpenPGP protocol specific options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -t, --textmode
	@itemx --no-textmode
	@opindex textmode
	Treat input files as text and store them in the OpenPGP canonical text
	form with standard "CRLF" line endings. This also sets the necessary
	flags to inform the recipient that the encrypted or signed data is text
	and may need its line endings converted back to whatever the local
	system uses. This option is useful when communicating between two
	platforms that have different line ending conventions (UNIX-like to Mac,
	Mac to Windows, etc). @option{--no-textmode} disables this option, and
	is the default.

	@item --force-v3-sigs
	@itemx --no-force-v3-sigs
	@item --force-v4-certs
	@itemx --no-force-v4-certs
	These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.1.

	@item --force-ocb
	@itemx --force-aead
	@opindex force-ocb
	@opindex force-aead
	Force the use of AEAD encryption over MDC encryption. AEAD is a
	modern and faster way to do authenticated encryption than the old MDC
	method. @option{--force-aead} is an alias and deprecated. See also
	option @option{--chunk-size}.

	@item --force-mdc
	@itemx --disable-mdc
	@opindex force-mdc
	@opindex disable-mdc
	These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.2.8. The
	MDC is always used unless the keys indicate that an AEAD algorithm can
	be used in which case AEAD is used. But note: If the creation of a
	legacy non-MDC message is exceptionally required, the option
	@option{--rfc2440} allows for this.

	@item --disable-signer-uid
	@opindex disable-signer-uid
	By default the user ID of the signing key is embedded in the data signature.
	As of now this is only done if the signing key has been specified with
	@option{local-user} using a mail address, or with @option{sender}. This
	information can be helpful for verifier to locate the key; see option
	@option{--auto-key-retrieve}.

	@item --include-key-block
	@itemx --no-include-key-block
	@opindex include-key-block
	@opindex no-include-key-block
	This option is used to embed the actual signing key into a data
	signature. The embedded key is stripped down to a single user id and
	includes only the signing subkey used to create the signature as well
	as as valid encryption subkeys. All other info is removed from the
	key to keep it and thus the signature small. This option is the
	OpenPGP counterpart to the @command{gpgsm} option
	@option{--include-certs} and allows the recipient of a signed message
	to reply encrypted to the sender without using any online directories
	to lookup the key. The default is @option{--no-include-key-block}.
	See also the option @option{--auto-key-import}.

	@item --personal-cipher-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-cipher-preferences
	Set the list of personal cipher preferences to @var{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also
	used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command.

	@item --personal-digest-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-digest-preferences
	Set the list of personal digest preferences to @var{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked digest algorithm in this list
	is also used when signing without encryption
	(e.g. @option{--clear-sign} or @option{--sign}).

	@item --personal-compress-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-compress-preferences
	Set the list of personal compression preferences to @var{string}.
	Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available
	algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This
	allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the
	recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that
	is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked compression
	algorithm in this list is also used when there are no recipient keys
	to consider (e.g. @option{--symmetric}).

	@item --s2k-cipher-algo @var{name}
	@opindex s2k-cipher-algo
	Use @var{name} as the cipher algorithm for symmetric encryption with
	a passphrase if @option{--personal-cipher-preferences} and
	@option{--cipher-algo} are not given. The default is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}.

	@item --s2k-digest-algo @var{name}
	@opindex s2k-digest-algo
	Use @var{name} as the digest algorithm used to mangle the passphrases
	for symmetric encryption. The default is SHA-1.

	@item --s2k-mode @var{n}
	@opindex s2k-mode
	Selects how passphrases for symmetric encryption are mangled. If
	@var{n} is 0 a plain passphrase (which is in general not recommended)
	will be used, a 1 adds a salt (which should not be used) to the
	passphrase and a 3 (the default) iterates the whole process a number
	of times (see @option{--s2k-count}).

	@item --s2k-count @var{n}
	@opindex s2k-count
	Specify how many times the passphrases mangling for symmetric
	encryption is repeated. This value may range between 1024 and
	65011712 inclusive. The default is inquired from gpg-agent. Note
	that not all values in the 1024-65011712 range are legal and if an
	illegal value is selected, GnuPG will round up to the nearest legal
	value. This option is only meaningful if @option{--s2k-mode} is set
	to the default of 3.


	@end table

	@c ***************************
	@c ***** Compliance ******
	@c ***************************
	@node Compliance Options
	@subsection Compliance options

	These options control what GnuPG is compliant to. Only one of these
	options may be active at a time. Note that the default setting of
	this is nearly always the correct one. See the INTEROPERABILITY WITH
	OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below before using one of these
	options.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --gnupg
	@opindex gnupg
	Use standard GnuPG behavior. This is essentially OpenPGP behavior (see
	@option{--openpgp}), but with extension from the proposed update to
	OpenPGP and with some additional workarounds for common compatibility
	problems in different versions of PGP. This is the default option, so
	it is not generally needed, but it may be useful to override a
	different compliance option in the gpg.conf file.

	@item --openpgp
	@opindex openpgp
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict OpenPGP
	behavior. This option implies @option{--allow-old-cipher-algos}. Use
	this option to reset all previous options like @option{--s2k-*},
	@option{--cipher-algo}, @option{--digest-algo} and
	@option{--compress-algo} to OpenPGP compliant values. All PGP
	workarounds are disabled.

	@item --rfc4880
	@opindex rfc4880
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-4880
	behavior. This option implies @option{--allow-old-cipher-algos}.
	Note that this is currently the same thing as @option{--openpgp}.

	@item --rfc4880bis
	@opindex rfc4880bis
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict according to the
	proposed updates of RFC-4880.

	@item --rfc2440
	@opindex rfc2440
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-2440
	behavior. Note that by using this option encryption packets are
	created in a legacy mode without MDC protection. This is dangerous
	and should thus only be used for experiments. This option implies
	@option{--allow-old-cipher-algos}. See also option
	@option{--ignore-mdc-error}.

	@item --pgp6
	@opindex pgp6
	This option is obsolete; it is handled as an alias for @option{--pgp7}

	@item --pgp7
	@opindex pgp7
	Set up all options to be as PGP 7 compliant as possible. This allowed
	the ciphers IDEA, 3DES, CAST5,AES128, AES192, AES256, and TWOFISH.,
	the hashes MD5, SHA1 and RIPEMD160, and the compression algorithms
	none and ZIP. This option implies @option{--escape-from-lines} and
	disables @option{--throw-keyids},

	@item --pgp8
	@opindex pgp8
	Set up all options to be as PGP 8 compliant as possible. PGP 8 is a lot
	closer to the OpenPGP standard than previous versions of PGP, so all
	this does is disable @option{--throw-keyids} and set
	@option{--escape-from-lines}. All algorithms are allowed except for the
	SHA224, SHA384, and SHA512 digests.

	@item --compliance @var{string}
	@opindex compliance
	This option can be used instead of one of the options above. Valid
	values for @var{string} are the above option names (without the double
	dash) and possibly others as shown when using "help" for @var{string}.

	@item --min-rsa-length @var{n}
	@opindex min-rsa-length
	This option adjusts the compliance mode "de-vs" for stricter key size
	requirements. For example, a value of 3000 turns rsa2048 and dsa2048
	keys into non-VS-NfD compliant keys.

	@item --require-compliance
	@opindex require-compliance
	To check that data has been encrypted according to the rules of the
	current compliance mode, a gpg user needs to evaluate the status
	lines. This is allows frontends to handle compliance check in a more
	flexible way. However, for scripted use the required evaluation of
	the status-line requires quite some effort; this option can be used
	instead to make sure that the gpg process exits with a failure if the
	compliance rules are not fulfilled. Note that this option has
	currently an effect only in "de-vs" mode.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** ESOTERIC OPTIONS *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Esoteric Options
	@subsection Doing things one usually doesn't want to do

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -n
	@itemx --dry-run
	@opindex dry-run
	Don't make any changes (this is not completely implemented).

	@item --list-only
	@opindex list-only
	Changes the behaviour of some commands. This is like @option{--dry-run} but
	different in some cases. The semantic of this option may be extended in
	the future. Currently it only skips the actual decryption pass and
	therefore enables a fast listing of the encryption keys.

	@item -i
	@itemx --interactive
	@opindex interactive
	Prompt before overwriting any files.

	@item --compatibility-flags @var{flags}
	@opindex compatibility-flags
	Set compatibility flags to work around problems due to non-compliant
	keys or data. The @var{flags} are given as a comma separated
	list of flag names and are OR-ed together. The special flag "none"
	clears the list and allows to start over with an empty list. To get a
	list of available flags the sole word "help" can be used.

	@item --debug-level @var{level}
	@opindex debug-level
	Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be
	a numeric value or by a keyword:

	@table @code
	@item none
	No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of
	the keyword.
	@item basic
	Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item advanced
	More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item expert
	Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item guru
	All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be
	used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is
	only enabled if the keyword is used.
	@end table

	How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not
	specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are
	however carefully selected to best aid in debugging.

	@item --debug @var{flags}
	@opindex debug
	Set debug flags. All flags are or-ed and @var{flags} may be given
	in C syntax (e.g. 0x0042) or as a comma separated list of flag names.
	To get a list of all supported flags the single word "help" can be
	used. This option is only useful for debugging and the behavior may
	change at any time without notice.

	@item --debug-all
	@opindex debug-all
	Set all useful debugging flags.

	@item --debug-iolbf
	@opindex debug-iolbf
	Set stdout into line buffered mode. This option is only honored when
	given on the command line.

	@item --debug-set-iobuf-size @var{n}
	@opindex debug-iolbf
	Change the buffer size of the IOBUFs to @var{n} kilobyte. Using 0
	prints the current size. Note well: This is a maintainer only option
	and may thus be changed or removed at any time without notice.

	@item --debug-allow-large-chunks
	@opindex debug-allow-large-chunks
	To facilitate software tests and experiments this option allows to
	specify a limit of up to 4 EiB (@code{--chunk-size 62}).

	@item --debug-ignore-expiration
	@opindex debug-ignore-expiration
	This option tries to override certain key expiration dates. It is
	only useful for certain regression tests.

	@item --faked-system-time @var{epoch}
	@opindex faked-system-time
	This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back
	or forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since
	the year 1970. Alternatively @var{epoch} may be given as a full ISO
	time string (e.g. "20070924T154812").

	If you suffix @var{epoch} with an exclamation mark (!), the system time
	will appear to be frozen at the specified time.

	@item --full-timestrings
	@opindex full-timestrings
	Change the format of printed creation and expiration times from just
	the date to the date and time. This is in general not useful and the
	same information is anyway available in @option{--with-colons} mode.
	These longer strings are also not well aligned with other printed
	data.

	@item --enable-progress-filter
	@opindex enable-progress-filter
	Enable certain PROGRESS status outputs. This option allows frontends
	to display a progress indicator while gpg is processing larger files.
	There is a slight performance overhead using it.

	@item --status-fd @var{n}
	@opindex status-fd
	Write special status strings to the file descriptor @var{n}.
	See the file DETAILS in the documentation for a listing of them.

	@item --status-file @var{file}
	@opindex status-file
	Same as @option{--status-fd}, except the status data is written to file
	@var{file}.

	@item --logger-fd @var{n}
	@opindex logger-fd
	Write log output to file descriptor @var{n} and not to STDERR.

	@item --log-file @var{file}
	@itemx --logger-file @var{file}
	@opindex log-file
	Same as @option{--logger-fd}, except the logger data is written to
	file @var{file}. Use @file{socket://} to log to s socket.

	@item --log-time
	@opindex log-time
	Prefix all log output with a timestamp even if no log file is used.

	@item --attribute-fd @var{n}
	@opindex attribute-fd
	Write attribute subpackets to the file descriptor @var{n}. This is most
	useful for use with @option{--status-fd}, since the status messages are
	needed to separate out the various subpackets from the stream delivered
	to the file descriptor.

	@item --attribute-file @var{file}
	@opindex attribute-file
	Same as @option{--attribute-fd}, except the attribute data is written to
	file @var{file}.

	@item --comment @var{string}
	@itemx --no-comments
	@opindex comment
	Use @var{string} as a comment string in cleartext signatures and ASCII
	armored messages or keys (see @option{--armor}). The default behavior is
	not to use a comment string. @option{--comment} may be repeated multiple
	times to get multiple comment strings. @option{--no-comments} removes
	all comments. It is a good idea to keep the length of a single comment
	below 60 characters to avoid problems with mail programs wrapping such
	lines. Note that comment lines, like all other header lines, are not
	protected by the signature.

	@item --emit-version
	@itemx --no-emit-version
	@opindex emit-version
	Force inclusion of the version string in ASCII armored output. If
	given once only the name of the program and the major number is
	emitted, given twice the minor is also emitted, given thrice
	the micro is added, and given four times an operating system identification
	is also emitted. @option{--no-emit-version} (default) disables the version
	line.

	@item --sig-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@itemx --cert-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@itemx -N, --set-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@opindex sig-notation
	@opindex cert-notation
	@opindex set-notation
	Put the name value pair into the signature as notation data.
	@var{name} must consist only of printable characters or spaces, and
	must contain a '@@' character in the form keyname@@domain.example.com
	(substituting the appropriate keyname and domain name, of course). This
	is to help prevent pollution of the IETF reserved notation
	namespace. The @option{--expert} flag overrides the '@@'
	check. @var{value} may be any printable string; it will be encoded in
	UTF-8, so you should check that your @option{--display-charset} is set
	correctly. If you prefix @var{name} with an exclamation mark (!), the
	notation data will be flagged as critical
	(rfc4880:5.2.3.16). @option{--sig-notation} sets a notation for data
	signatures. @option{--cert-notation} sets a notation for key signatures
	(certifications). @option{--set-notation} sets both.

	There are special codes that may be used in notation names. "%k" will
	be expanded into the key ID of the key being signed, "%K" into the
	long key ID of the key being signed, "%f" into the fingerprint of the
	key being signed, "%s" into the key ID of the key making the
	signature, "%S" into the long key ID of the key making the signature,
	"%g" into the fingerprint of the key making the signature (which might
	be a subkey), "%p" into the fingerprint of the primary key of the key
	making the signature, "%c" into the signature count from the OpenPGP
	smartcard, and "%%" results in a single "%". %k, %K, and %f are only
	meaningful when making a key signature (certification), and %c is only
	meaningful when using the OpenPGP smartcard.

	@item --known-notation @var{name}
	@opindex known-notation
	Adds @var{name} to a list of known critical signature notations. The
	effect of this is that gpg will not mark a signature with a critical
	signature notation of that name as bad. Note that gpg already knows
	by default about a few critical signatures notation names.

	@item --sig-policy-url @var{string}
	@itemx --cert-policy-url @var{string}
	@itemx --set-policy-url @var{string}
	@opindex sig-policy-url
	@opindex cert-policy-url
	@opindex set-policy-url
	Use @var{string} as a Policy URL for signatures (rfc4880:5.2.3.20). If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the policy URL packet will
	be flagged as critical. @option{--sig-policy-url} sets a policy url for
	data signatures. @option{--cert-policy-url} sets a policy url for key
	signatures (certifications). @option{--set-policy-url} sets both.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --sig-keyserver-url @var{string}
	@opindex sig-keyserver-url
	Use @var{string} as a preferred keyserver URL for data signatures. If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the keyserver URL packet
	will be flagged as critical.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --set-filename @var{string}
	@opindex set-filename
	Use @var{string} as the filename which is stored inside messages.
	This overrides the default, which is to use the actual filename of the
	file being encrypted. Using the empty string for @var{string}
	effectively removes the filename from the output.

	@item --for-your-eyes-only
	@itemx --no-for-your-eyes-only
	@opindex for-your-eyes-only
	Set the `for your eyes only' flag in the message. This causes GnuPG to
	refuse to save the file unless the @option{--output} option is given,
	and PGP to use a "secure viewer" with a claimed Tempest-resistant font
	to display the message. This option overrides @option{--set-filename}.
	@option{--no-for-your-eyes-only} disables this option.

	@item --use-embedded-filename
	@itemx --no-use-embedded-filename
	@opindex use-embedded-filename
	Try to create a file with a name as embedded in the data. This can be
	a dangerous option as it enables overwriting files. Defaults to no.
	Note that the option @option{--output} overrides this option.

	@item --cipher-algo @var{name}
	@opindex cipher-algo
	Use @var{name} as cipher algorithm. Running the program with the
	command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. If
	this is not used the cipher algorithm is selected from the preferences
	stored with the key. In general, you do not want to use this option as
	it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option
	@option{--personal-cipher-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the
	same thing.

	@item --digest-algo @var{name}
	@opindex digest-algo
	Use @var{name} as the message digest algorithm. Running the program
	with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported
	algorithms. In general, you do not want to use this option as it
	allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option
	@option{--personal-digest-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish
	the same thing.

	@item --compress-algo @var{name}
	@opindex compress-algo
	Use compression algorithm @var{name}. "zlib" is RFC-1950 ZLIB
	compression. "zip" is RFC-1951 ZIP compression which is used by PGP.
	"bzip2" is a more modern compression scheme that can compress some
	things better than zip or zlib, but at the cost of more memory used
	during compression and decompression. "uncompressed" or "none"
	disables compression. If this option is not used, the default
	behavior is to examine the recipient key preferences to see which
	algorithms the recipient supports. If all else fails, ZIP is used for
	maximum compatibility.

	ZLIB may give better compression results than ZIP, as the compression
	window size is not limited to 8k. BZIP2 may give even better
	compression results than that, but will use a significantly larger
	amount of memory while compressing and decompressing. This may be
	significant in low memory situations. Note, however, that PGP (all
	versions) only supports ZIP compression. Using any algorithm other
	than ZIP or "none" will make the message unreadable with PGP. In
	general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to
	violate the OpenPGP standard. The option
	@option{--personal-compress-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish
	the same thing.

	@item --cert-digest-algo @var{name}
	@opindex cert-digest-algo
	Use @var{name} as the message digest algorithm used when signing a
	key. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a
	list of supported algorithms. Be aware that if you choose an
	algorithm that GnuPG supports but other OpenPGP implementations do
	not, then some users will not be able to use the key signatures you
	make, or quite possibly your entire key. Note also that a public key
	algorithm must be compatible with the specified digest algorithm; thus
	selecting an arbitrary digest algorithm may result in error messages
	from lower crypto layers or lead to security flaws.


	@item --disable-cipher-algo @var{name}
	@opindex disable-cipher-algo
	Never allow the use of @var{name} as cipher algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --disable-pubkey-algo @var{name}
	@opindex disable-pubkey-algo
	Never allow the use of @var{name} as public key algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --throw-keyids
	@itemx --no-throw-keyids
	@opindex throw-keyids
	Do not put the recipient key IDs into encrypted messages. This helps to
	hide the receivers of the message and is a limited countermeasure
	against traffic analysis.@footnote{Using a little social engineering
	anyone who is able to decrypt the message can check whether one of the
	other recipients is the one he suspects.} On the receiving side, it may
	slow down the decryption process because all available secret keys must
	be tried. @option{--no-throw-keyids} disables this option. This option
	is essentially the same as using @option{--hidden-recipient} for all
	recipients.

	@item --not-dash-escaped
	@opindex not-dash-escaped
	This option changes the behavior of cleartext signatures
	so that they can be used for patch files. You should not
	send such an armored file via email because all spaces
	and line endings are hashed too. You can not use this
	option for data which has 5 dashes at the beginning of a
	line, patch files don't have this. A special armor header
	line tells GnuPG about this cleartext signature option.

	@item --escape-from-lines
	@itemx --no-escape-from-lines
	@opindex escape-from-lines
	Because some mailers change lines starting with "From " to ">From " it
	is good to handle such lines in a special way when creating cleartext
	signatures to prevent the mail system from breaking the signature. Note
	that all other PGP versions do it this way too. Enabled by
	default. @option{--no-escape-from-lines} disables this option.

	@item --passphrase-repeat @var{n}
	@opindex passphrase-repeat
	Specify how many times @command{@gpgname} will request a new
	passphrase be repeated. This is useful for helping memorize a
	passphrase. Defaults to 1 repetition; can be set to 0 to disable any
	passphrase repetition. Note that a @var{n} greater than 1 will pop up
	the pinentry window @var{n}+1 times even if a modern pinentry with
	two entry fields is used.

	@item --passphrase-fd @var{n}
	@opindex passphrase-fd
	Read the passphrase from file descriptor @var{n}. Only the first line
	will be read from file descriptor @var{n}. If you use 0 for @var{n},
	the passphrase will be read from STDIN. This can only be used if only
	one passphrase is supplied.

	Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the
	option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1
	the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}.

	@item --passphrase-file @var{file}
	@opindex passphrase-file
	Read the passphrase from file @var{file}. Only the first line will
	be read from file @var{file}. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, a passphrase stored in a file is
	of questionable security if other users can read this file. Don't use
	this option if you can avoid it.

	Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the
	option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1
	the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}.

	@item --passphrase @var{string}
	@opindex passphrase
	Use @var{string} as the passphrase. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, this is of very questionable
	security on a multi-user system. Don't use this option if you can
	avoid it.

	Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the
	option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1
	the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}.

	@item --pinentry-mode @var{mode}
	@opindex pinentry-mode
	Set the pinentry mode to @var{mode}. Allowed values for @var{mode}
	are:
	@table @asis
	@item default
	Use the default of the agent, which is @code{ask}.
	@item ask
	Force the use of the Pinentry.
	@item cancel
	Emulate use of Pinentry's cancel button.
	@item error
	Return a Pinentry error (``No Pinentry'').
	@item loopback
	Redirect Pinentry queries to the caller. Note that in contrast to
	Pinentry the user is not prompted again if he enters a bad password.
	@end table

	@item --no-symkey-cache
	@opindex no-symkey-cache
	Disable the passphrase cache used for symmetrical en- and decryption.
	This cache is based on the message specific salt value
	(cf. @option{--s2k-mode}).

	@item --request-origin @var{origin}
	@opindex request-origin
	Tell gpg to assume that the operation ultimately originated at
	@var{origin}. Depending on the origin certain restrictions are applied
	and the Pinentry may include an extra note on the origin. Supported
	values for @var{origin} are: @code{local} which is the default,
	@code{remote} to indicate a remote origin or @code{browser} for an
	operation requested by a web browser.

	@item --command-fd @var{n}
	@opindex command-fd
	This is a replacement for the deprecated shared-memory IPC mode.
	If this option is enabled, user input on questions is not expected
	from the TTY but from the given file descriptor. It should be used
	together with @option{--status-fd}. See the file doc/DETAILS in the source
	distribution for details on how to use it.

	@item --command-file @var{file}
	@opindex command-file
	Same as @option{--command-fd}, except the commands are read out of file
	@var{file}

	@item --allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@itemx --no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@opindex allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	Allow the import and use of keys with user IDs which are not
	self-signed. This is not recommended, as a non self-signed user ID is
	trivial to forge. @option{--no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid} disables.

	@item --allow-freeform-uid
	@opindex allow-freeform-uid
	Disable all checks on the form of the user ID while generating a new
	one. This option should only be used in very special environments as
	it does not ensure the de-facto standard format of user IDs.

	@item --ignore-time-conflict
	@opindex ignore-time-conflict
	GnuPG normally checks that the timestamps associated with keys and
	signatures have plausible values. However, sometimes a signature
	seems to be older than the key due to clock problems. This option
	makes these checks just a warning. See also @option{--ignore-valid-from} for
	timestamp issues on subkeys.

	@item --ignore-valid-from
	@opindex ignore-valid-from
	GnuPG normally does not select and use subkeys created in the future.
	This option allows the use of such keys and thus exhibits the
	pre-1.0.7 behaviour. You should not use this option unless there
	is some clock problem. See also @option{--ignore-time-conflict} for timestamp
	issues with signatures.

	@item --ignore-crc-error
	@opindex ignore-crc-error
	The ASCII armor used by OpenPGP is protected by a CRC checksum against
	transmission errors. Occasionally the CRC gets mangled somewhere on
	the transmission channel but the actual content (which is protected by
	the OpenPGP protocol anyway) is still okay. This option allows GnuPG
	to ignore CRC errors.

	@item --ignore-mdc-error
	@opindex ignore-mdc-error
	This option changes a MDC integrity protection failure into a warning.
	It is required to decrypt old messages which did not use an MDC. It
	may also be useful if a message is partially garbled, but it is
	necessary to get as much data as possible out of that garbled message.
	Be aware that a missing or failed MDC can be an indication of an
	attack. Use with great caution; see also option @option{--rfc2440}.

	@item --allow-old-cipher-algos
	@opindex allow-old-cipher-algos
	Old cipher algorithms like 3DES, IDEA, or CAST5 encrypt data using
	blocks of 64 bits; modern algorithms use blocks of 128 bit instead.
	To avoid certain attack on these old algorithms it is suggested not to
	encrypt more than 150 MiByte using the same key. For this reason gpg
	does not allow the use of 64 bit block size algorithms for encryption
	unless this option is specified.

	@item --allow-weak-digest-algos
	@opindex allow-weak-digest-algos
	Signatures made with known-weak digest algorithms are normally
	rejected with an ``invalid digest algorithm'' message. This option
	allows the verification of signatures made with such weak algorithms.
	MD5 is the only digest algorithm considered weak by default. See also
	@option{--weak-digest} to reject other digest algorithms.

	@item --weak-digest @var{name}
	@opindex weak-digest
	Treat the specified digest algorithm as weak. Signatures made over
	weak digests algorithms are normally rejected. This option can be
	supplied multiple times if multiple algorithms should be considered
	weak. See also @option{--allow-weak-digest-algos} to disable
	rejection of weak digests. MD5 is always considered weak, and does
	not need to be listed explicitly.

	@item --allow-weak-key-signatures
	@opindex allow-weak-key-signatures
	To avoid a minor risk of collision attacks on third-party key
	signatures made using SHA-1, those key signatures are considered
	invalid. This options allows to override this restriction.

	@item --override-compliance-check
	This was a temporary introduced option and has no more effect.

	@item --no-default-keyring
	@opindex no-default-keyring
	Do not add the default keyring to the list of keyrings. Note that
	GnuPG needs for almost all operations a keyring. Thus if you use this
	option and do not provide alternate keyrings via @option{--keyring},
	then GnuPG will still use the default keyring.

	Note that if the option @option{use-keyboxd} is enabled in
	@file{common.conf}, no keyrings are used at all and keys are all
	maintained by the keyboxd process in its own database.

	@item --no-keyring
	@opindex no-keyring
	Do not use any keyring at all. This overrides the default and all
	options which specify keyrings.

	@item --skip-verify
	@opindex skip-verify
	Skip the signature verification step. This may be
	used to make the decryption faster if the signature
	verification is not needed.

	@item --with-key-data
	@opindex with-key-data
	Print key listings delimited by colons (like @option{--with-colons}) and
	print the public key data.

	@item --list-signatures
	@opindex list-signatures
	@itemx --list-sigs
	@opindex list-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the signatures are listed too. This
	command has the same effect as using @option{--list-keys} with
	@option{--with-sig-list}. Note that in contrast to
	@option{--check-signatures} the key signatures are not verified. This
	command can be used to create a list of signing keys missing in the
	local keyring; for example:

	@example
	gpg --list-sigs --with-colons USERID \| \
	awk -F: '$1=="sig" && $2=="?" @{if($13)@{print $13@}else@{print $5@}@}'
	@end example

	@item --fast-list-mode
	@opindex fast-list-mode
	Changes the output of the list commands to work faster; this is achieved
	by leaving some parts empty. Some applications don't need the user ID
	and the trust information given in the listings. By using this options
	they can get a faster listing. The exact behaviour of this option may
	change in future versions. If you are missing some information, don't
	use this option.

	@item --no-literal
	@opindex no-literal
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --set-filesize
	@opindex set-filesize
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --show-session-key
	@opindex show-session-key
	Display the session key used for one message. See
	@option{--override-session-key} for the counterpart of this option.

	We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing; however the user should have
	the freedom to decide whether to go to prison or to reveal the content
	of one specific message without compromising all messages ever
	encrypted for one secret key.

	You can also use this option if you receive an encrypted message which
	is abusive or offensive, to prove to the administrators of the
	messaging system that the ciphertext transmitted corresponds to an
	inappropriate plaintext so they can take action against the offending
	user.

	@item --override-session-key @var{string}
	@itemx --override-session-key-fd @var{fd}
	@opindex override-session-key
	Don't use the public key but the session key @var{string} respective
	the session key taken from the first line read from file descriptor
	@var{fd}. The format of this string is the same as the one printed by
	@option{--show-session-key}. This option is normally not used but
	comes handy in case someone forces you to reveal the content of an
	encrypted message; using this option you can do this without handing
	out the secret key. Note that using @option{--override-session-key}
	may reveal the session key to all local users via the global process
	table. Often it is useful to combine this option with
	@option{--no-keyring}.

	@item --ask-sig-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-sig-expire
	@opindex ask-sig-expire
	When making a data signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-sig-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-sig-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-sig-expire
	@opindex default-sig-expire
	The default expiration time to use for signature expiration. Valid
	values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d
	(for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for
	example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an absolute
	date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --ask-cert-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-expire
	@opindex ask-cert-expire
	When making a key signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-cert-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-cert-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-cert-expire
	@opindex default-cert-expire
	The default expiration time to use for key signature expiration.
	Valid values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the
	letter d (for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years)
	(for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an
	absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --default-new-key-algo @var{string}
	@opindex default-new-key-algo @var{string}
	This option can be used to change the default algorithms for key
	generation. The @var{string} is similar to the arguments required for
	the command @option{--quick-add-key} but slightly different. For
	example the current default of @code{"rsa2048/cert,sign+rsa2048/encr"}
	(or @code{"rsa3072"}) can be changed to the value of what we currently
	call future default, which is @code{"ed25519/cert,sign+cv25519/encr"}.
	You need to consult the source code to learn the details. Note that
	the advanced key generation commands can always be used to specify a
	key algorithm directly.

	@item --no-auto-trust-new-key
	@opindex no-auto-trust-new-key
	When creating a new key the ownertrust of the new key is set to
	ultimate. This option disables this and the user needs to manually
	assign an ownertrust value.

	@item --force-sign-key
	@opindex force-sign-key
	This option modifies the behaviour of the commands
	@option{--quick-sign-key}, @option{--quick-lsign-key}, and the "sign"
	sub-commands of @option{--edit-key} by forcing the creation of a key
	signature, even if one already exists.

	@item --forbid-gen-key
	@opindex forbid-gen-key
	This option is intended for use in the global config file to disallow
	the use of generate key commands. Those commands will then fail with
	the error code for Not Enabled.

	@item --allow-secret-key-import
	@opindex allow-secret-key-import
	This is an obsolete option and is not used anywhere.

	@item --allow-multiple-messages
	@item --no-allow-multiple-messages
	These are obsolete options; they have no more effect since GnuPG 2.2.8.

	@item --enable-special-filenames
	@opindex enable-special-filenames
	This option enables a mode in which filenames of the form
	@file{-&n}, where n is a non-negative decimal number,
	refer to the file descriptor n and not to a file with that name.

	@item --no-expensive-trust-checks
	@opindex no-expensive-trust-checks
	Experimental use only.

	@item --preserve-permissions
	@opindex preserve-permissions
	Don't change the permissions of a secret keyring back to user
	read/write only. Use this option only if you really know what you are doing.

	@item --default-preference-list @var{string}
	@opindex default-preference-list
	Set the list of default preferences to @var{string}. This preference
	list is used for new keys and becomes the default for "setpref" in the
	@option{--edit-key} menu.

	@item --default-keyserver-url @var{name}
	@opindex default-keyserver-url
	Set the default keyserver URL to @var{name}. This keyserver will be
	used as the keyserver URL when writing a new self-signature on a key,
	which includes key generation and changing preferences.

	@item --list-config
	@opindex list-config
	Display various internal configuration parameters of GnuPG. This option
	is intended for external programs that call GnuPG to perform tasks, and
	is thus not generally useful. See the file @file{doc/DETAILS} in the
	source distribution for the details of which configuration items may be
	listed. @option{--list-config} is only usable with
	@option{--with-colons} set.

	@item --list-gcrypt-config
	@opindex list-gcrypt-config
	Display various internal configuration parameters of Libgcrypt.

	@item --gpgconf-list
	@opindex gpgconf-list
	This command is similar to @option{--list-config} but in general only
	internally used by the @command{gpgconf} tool.

	@item --gpgconf-test
	@opindex gpgconf-test
	This is more or less dummy action. However it parses the configuration
	file and returns with failure if the configuration file would prevent
	@command{@gpgname} from startup. Thus it may be used to run a syntax check
	on the configuration file.

	@c @item --use-only-openpgp-card
	@c @opindex use-only-openpgp-card
	@c Only access OpenPGP card's and no other cards. This is a hidden
	@c option which could be used in case an old use case required the
	@c OpenPGP card while several cards are available. This option might be
	@c removed if it turns out that nobody requires it.

	@item --chuid @var{uid}
	@opindex chuid
	Change the current user to @var{uid} which may either be a number or a
	name. This can be used from the root account to run gpg for
	another user. If @var{uid} is not the current UID a standard PATH is
	set and the envvar GNUPGHOME is unset. To override the latter the
	option @option{--homedir} can be used. This option has only an effect
	when used on the command line. This option has currently no effect at
	all on Windows.

	@end table

	@c *******************************
	@c ***** Deprecated **********
	@c *******************************
	@node Deprecated Options
	@subsection Deprecated options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --show-photos
	@itemx --no-show-photos
	@opindex show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-signatures},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, @option{--list-secret-keys}, and verifying
	a signature to also display the photo ID attached to the key, if
	any. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. These options are deprecated. Use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-photos} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-photos} instead.

	@item --show-keyring
	@opindex show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. This option is deprecated: use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-keyring} instead.

	@item --show-notation
	@itemx --no-show-notation
	@opindex show-notation
	Show signature notations in the @option{--list-signatures} or @option{--check-signatures} listings
	as well as when verifying a signature with a notation in it. These
	options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-notation}
	and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-notation} instead.

	@item --show-policy-url
	@itemx --no-show-policy-url
	@opindex show-policy-url
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-signatures} or @option{--check-signatures}
	listings as well as when verifying a signature with a policy URL in
	it. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} instead.

	@item --personal-aead-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-aead-preferences
	This option is deprecated and has no more effect since version 2.3.9.

	@item --aead-algo @var{name}
	This option is deprecated and has no more effect since version 2.3.9.


	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* FILES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect files
	@node GPG Configuration
	@section Configuration files

	There are a few configuration files to control certain aspects of
	@command{@gpgname}'s operation. Unless noted, they are expected in the
	current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}).

	@table @file

	@item gpg.conf
	@efindex gpg.conf
	This is the standard configuration file read by @command{@gpgname} on
	startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes
	may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated. This default
	name may be changed on the command line (@pxref{gpg-option --options}).
	You should backup this file.

	@item common.conf
	@efindex common.conf
	This is an optional configuration file read by @command{@gpgname} on
	startup. It may contain options pertaining to all components of
	GnuPG. Its current main use is for the "use-keyboxd" option. If
	the default home directory @file{~/.gnupg} does not exist, GnuPG creates
	this directory and a @file{common.conf} file with "use_keyboxd".

	@end table

	Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files
	into the directory @file{@value{SYSCONFSKELDIR}} so that
	newly created users start up with a working configuration.
	For existing users a small
	helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}).

	For internal purposes @command{@gpgname} creates and maintains a few other
	files; They all live in the current home directory (@pxref{option
	--homedir}). Only the @command{@gpgname} program may modify these files.


	@table @file
	@item ~/.gnupg
	@efindex ~/.gnupg
	This is the default home directory which is used if neither the
	environment variable @code{GNUPGHOME} nor the option
	@option{--homedir} is given.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg
	@efindex pubring.gpg
	The public keyring using a legacy format. You should backup this file.

	If this file is not available, @command{gpg} defaults to the new
	keybox format and creates a file @file{pubring.kbx} unless that file
	already exists in which case that file will also be used for OpenPGP
	keys.

	Note that in the case that both files, @file{pubring.gpg} and
	@file{pubring.kbx} exists but the latter has no OpenPGP keys, the
	legacy file @file{pubring.gpg} will be used. Take care: GnuPG
	versions before 2.1 will always use the file @file{pubring.gpg}
	because they do not know about the new keybox format. In the case
	that you have to use GnuPG 1.4 to decrypt archived data you should
	keep this file.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the public keyring.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
	@efindex pubring.kbx
	The public keyring using the new keybox format. This file is shared
	with @command{gpgsm}. You should backup this file. See above for
	the relation between this file and it predecessor.

	To convert an existing @file{pubring.gpg} file to the keybox format, you
	first backup the ownertrust values, then rename @file{pubring.gpg} to
	@file{publickeys.backup}, so it won’t be recognized by any GnuPG version,
	run import, and finally restore the ownertrust values:

	@example
	$ cd ~/.gnupg
	$ gpg --export-ownertrust >otrust.lst
	$ mv pubring.gpg publickeys.backup
	$ gpg --import-options restore --import publickeys.backup
	$ gpg --import-ownertrust otrust.lst
	@end example

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx.lock
	The lock file for @file{pubring.kbx}.

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg
	@efindex secring.gpg
	The legacy secret keyring as used by GnuPG versions before 2.1. It is not
	used by GnuPG 2.1 and later. You may want to keep it in case you
	have to use GnuPG 1.4 to decrypt archived data.

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the legacy secret keyring.

	@item ~/.gnupg/.gpg-v21-migrated
	@efindex .gpg-v21-migrated
	File indicating that a migration to GnuPG 2.1 has been done.

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg
	@efindex trustdb.gpg
	The trust database. There is no need to backup this file; it is better
	to backup the ownertrust values (@pxref{option --export-ownertrust}).

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the trust database.

	@item ~/.gnupg/random_seed
	@efindex random_seed
	A file used to preserve the state of the internal random pool.

	@item ~/.gnupg/openpgp-revocs.d/
	@efindex openpgp-revocs.d
	This is the directory where gpg stores pre-generated revocation
	certificates. The file name corresponds to the OpenPGP fingerprint of
	the respective key. It is suggested to backup those certificates and
	if the primary private key is not stored on the disk to move them to
	an external storage device. Anyone who can access these files is
	able to revoke the corresponding key. You may want to print them out.
	You should backup all files in this directory and take care to keep
	this backup closed away.

	@end table

	Operation is further controlled by a few environment variables:

	@table @asis

	@item HOME
	@efindex HOME
	Used to locate the default home directory.

	@item GNUPGHOME
	@efindex GNUPGHOME
	If set directory used instead of "~/.gnupg".

	@item GPG_AGENT_INFO
	This variable is obsolete; it was used by GnuPG versions before 2.1.

	@item PINENTRY_USER_DATA
	@efindex PINENTRY_USER_DATA
	This value is passed via gpg-agent to pinentry. It is useful to convey
	extra information to a custom pinentry.

	@item COLUMNS
	@itemx LINES
	@efindex COLUMNS
	@efindex LINES
	Used to size some displays to the full size of the screen.

	@item LANGUAGE
	@efindex LANGUAGE
	Apart from its use by GNU, it is used in the W32 version to override the
	language selection done through the Registry. If used and set to a
	valid and available language name (@var{langid}), the file with the
	translation is loaded from
	@code{@var{gpgdir}/gnupg.nls/@var{langid}.mo}. Here @var{gpgdir} is the
	directory out of which the gpg binary has been loaded. If it can't be
	loaded the Registry is tried and as last resort the native Windows
	locale system is used.

	@item GNUPG_BUILD_ROOT
	@efindex GNUPG_BUILD_ROOT
	This variable is only used by the regression test suite as a helper
	under operating systems without proper support to figure out the
	name of a process' text file.

	@item GNUPG_EXEC_DEBUG_FLAGS
	@efindex GNUPG_EXEC_DEBUG_FLAGS
	This variable allows to enable diagnostics for process management.
	A numeric decimal value is expected. Bit 0 enables general
	diagnostics, bit 1 enables certain warnings on Windows.

	@end table

	When calling the gpg-agent component @command{@gpgname} sends a set of
	environment variables to gpg-agent. The names of these variables can
	be listed using the command:

	@example
	gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo std_env_names' /bye \| awk '$1=="D" @{print $2@}'
	@end example



	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* EXAMPLES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect examples
	@node GPG Examples
	@section Examples

	@table @asis

	@item gpg -se -r @code{Bob} @code{file}
	sign and encrypt for user Bob

	@item gpg --clear-sign @code{file}
	make a cleartext signature

	@item gpg -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature

	@item gpg -u 0x12345678 -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature with the key 0x12345678

	@item gpg --list-keys @code{user_ID}
	show keys

	@item gpg --fingerprint @code{user_ID}
	show fingerprint

	@item gpg --verify @code{pgpfile}
	@itemx gpg --verify @code{sigfile} [@code{datafile}]
	Verify the signature of the file but do not output the data unless
	requested. The second form is used for detached signatures, where
	@code{sigfile} is the detached signature (either ASCII armored or
	binary) and @code{datafile} are the signed data; if this is not given, the name of the
	file holding the signed data is constructed by cutting off the
	extension (".asc" or ".sig") of @code{sigfile} or by asking the user
	for the filename. If the option @option{--output} is also used the
	signed data is written to the file specified by that option; use
	@code{-} to write the signed data to stdout.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* USER ID **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect how to specify a user id
	@ifset isman
	@include specify-user-id.texi
	@end ifset

	@mansect filter expressions
	@chapheading FILTER EXPRESSIONS

	The options @option{--import-filter} and @option{--export-filter} use
	expressions with this syntax (square brackets indicate an optional
	part and curly braces a repetition, white space between the elements
	are allowed):

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	[lc] @{[@{flag@}] PROPNAME op VALUE [lc]@}
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	The name of a property (@var{PROPNAME}) may only consist of letters,
	digits and underscores. The description for the filter type
	describes which properties are defined. If an undefined property is
	used it evaluates to the empty string. Unless otherwise noted, the
	@var{VALUE} must always be given and may not be the empty string. No
	quoting is defined for the value, thus the value may not contain the
	strings @code{&&} or @code{\|\|}, which are used as logical connection
	operators. The flag @code{--} can be used to remove this restriction.

	Numerical values are computed as long int; standard C notation
	applies. @var{lc} is the logical connection operator; either
	@code{&&} for a conjunction or @code{\|\|} for a disjunction. A
	conjunction is assumed at the begin of an expression. Conjunctions
	have higher precedence than disjunctions. If @var{VALUE} starts with
	one of the characters used in any @var{op} a space after the
	@var{op} is required.

	@noindent
	The supported operators (@var{op}) are:

	@table @asis

	@item =~
	Substring must match.

	@item !~
	Substring must not match.

	@item =
	The full string must match.

	@item <>
	The full string must not match.

	@item ==
	The numerical value must match.

	@item !=
	The numerical value must not match.

	@item <=
	The numerical value of the field must be LE than the value.

	@item <
	The numerical value of the field must be LT than the value.

	@item >
	The numerical value of the field must be GT than the value.

	@item >=
	The numerical value of the field must be GE than the value.

	@item -le
	The string value of the field must be less or equal than the value.

	@item -lt
	The string value of the field must be less than the value.

	@item -gt
	The string value of the field must be greater than the value.

	@item -ge
	The string value of the field must be greater or equal than the value.

	@item -n
	True if value is not empty (no value allowed).

	@item -z
	True if value is empty (no value allowed).

	@item -t
	Alias for "PROPNAME != 0" (no value allowed).

	@item -f
	Alias for "PROPNAME == 0" (no value allowed).

	@end table

	@noindent
	Values for @var{flag} must be space separated. The supported flags
	are:

	@table @asis
	@item --
	@var{VALUE} spans to the end of the expression.
	@item -c
	The string match in this part is done case-sensitive.
	@item -t
	Leading and trailing spaces are not removed from @var{VALUE}.
	The optional single space after @var{op} is here required.
	@end table

	The filter options concatenate several specifications for a filter of
	the same type. For example the four options in this example:

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	--import-filter keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa"
	--import-filter keep-uid="&& uid !~ Test"
	--import-filter keep-uid="\|\| uid =~ Alpha"
	--import-filter keep-uid="uid !~ Test"
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	@noindent
	which is equivalent to

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	--import-filter \
	keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa" && uid !~ Test" \|\| uid =~ Alpha" && "uid !~ Test"
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	imports only the user ids of a key containing the strings "Alfa"
	or "Alpha" but not the string "test".

	@mansect trust values
	@ifset isman
	@include trust-values.texi
	@end ifset

	@mansect return value
	@chapheading RETURN VALUE

	The program returns 0 if there are no severe errors, 1 if at least a
	signature was bad, and other error codes for fatal errors.

	Note that signature verification requires exact knowledge of what has
	been signed and by whom it has been signed. Using only the return code
	is thus not an appropriate way to verify a signature by a script.
	Either make proper use or the status codes or use the @command{gpgv}
	tool which has been designed to make signature verification easy for
	scripts.

	@mansect warnings
	@chapheading WARNINGS

	Use a good password for your user account and make sure that all
	security issues are always fixed on your machine. Also employ
	diligent physical protection to your machine. Consider to use a good
	passphrase as a last resort protection to your secret key in the case
	your machine gets stolen. It is important that your secret key is
	never leaked. Using an easy to carry around token or smartcard with
	the secret key is often a advisable.

	If you are going to verify detached signatures, make sure that the
	program knows about it; either give both filenames on the command line
	or use @samp{-} to specify STDIN.

	For scripted or other unattended use of @command{gpg} make sure to use
	the machine-parseable interface and not the default interface which is
	intended for direct use by humans. The machine-parseable interface
	provides a stable and well documented API independent of the locale or
	future changes of @command{gpg}. To enable this interface use the
	options @option{--with-colons} and @option{--status-fd}. For certain
	operations the option @option{--command-fd} may come handy too. See
	this man page and the file @file{DETAILS} for the specification of the
	interface. Note that the GnuPG ``info'' pages as well as the PDF
	version of the GnuPG manual features a chapter on unattended use of
	GnuPG. As an alternative the library @command{GPGME} can be used as a
	high-level abstraction on top of that interface.

	@mansect interoperability
	@chapheading INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS

	GnuPG tries to be a very flexible implementation of the OpenPGP
	standard. In particular, GnuPG implements many of the optional parts
	of the standard, such as the SHA-512 hash, and the ZLIB and BZIP2
	compression algorithms. It is important to be aware that not all
	OpenPGP programs implement these optional algorithms and that by
	forcing their use via the @option{--cipher-algo},
	@option{--digest-algo}, @option{--cert-digest-algo}, or
	@option{--compress-algo} options in GnuPG, it is possible to create a
	perfectly valid OpenPGP message, but one that cannot be read by the
	intended recipient.

	There are dozens of variations of OpenPGP programs available, and each
	supports a slightly different subset of these optional algorithms.
	For example, until recently, no (unhacked) version of PGP supported
	the BLOWFISH cipher algorithm. A message using BLOWFISH simply could
	not be read by a PGP user. By default, GnuPG uses the standard
	OpenPGP preferences system that will always do the right thing and
	create messages that are usable by all recipients, regardless of which
	OpenPGP program they use. Only override this safe default if you
	really know what you are doing.

	If you absolutely must override the safe default, or if the preferences
	on a given key are invalid for some reason, you are far better off using
	the @option{--pgp6}, @option{--pgp7}, or @option{--pgp8} options. These
	options are safe as they do not force any particular algorithms in
	violation of OpenPGP, but rather reduce the available algorithms to a
	"PGP-safe" list.

	@mansect bugs
	@chapheading BUGS

	On older systems this program should be installed as setuid(root). This
	is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents the
	operating system from writing memory pages (which may contain
	passphrases or other sensitive material) to disk. If you get no
	warning message about insecure memory your operating system supports
	locking without being root. The program drops root privileges as soon
	as locked memory is allocated.

	Note also that some systems (especially laptops) have the ability to
	``suspend to disk'' (also known as ``safe sleep'' or ``hibernate'').
	This writes all memory to disk before going into a low power or even
	powered off mode. Unless measures are taken in the operating system
	to protect the saved memory, passphrases or other sensitive material
	may be recoverable from it later.

	Before you report a bug you should first search the mailing list
	archives for similar problems and second check whether such a bug has
	already been reported to our bug tracker at @url{https://bugs.gnupg.org}.

	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* ************
	@c ************* UNATTENDED ************
	@c ************* ************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect notes
	@node Unattended Usage of GPG
	@section Unattended Usage

	@command{@gpgname} is often used as a backend engine by other software. To help
	with this a machine interface has been defined to have an unambiguous
	way to do this. The options @option{--status-fd} and @option{--batch}
	are almost always required for this.

	@menu
	* Programmatic use of GnuPG:: Programmatic use of GnuPG
	* Ephemeral home directories:: Ephemeral home directories
	* The quick key manipulation interface:: The quick key manipulation interface
	* Unattended GPG key generation:: Unattended key generation
	@end menu


	@node Programmatic use of GnuPG
	@subsection Programmatic use of GnuPG

	Please consider using GPGME instead of calling @command{@gpgname}
	directly. GPGME offers a stable, backend-independent interface for
	many cryptographic operations. It supports OpenPGP and S/MIME, and
	also allows interaction with various GnuPG components.

	GPGME provides a C-API, and comes with bindings for C++, Qt, and
	Python. Bindings for other languages are available.

	@node Ephemeral home directories
	@subsection Ephemeral home directories

	Sometimes you want to contain effects of some operation, for example
	you want to import a key to inspect it, but you do not want this key
	to be added to your keyring. In earlier versions of GnuPG, it was
	possible to specify alternate keyring files for both public and secret
	keys. In modern GnuPG versions, however, we changed how secret keys
	are stored in order to better protect secret key material, and it was
	not possible to preserve this interface.

	The preferred way to do this is to use ephemeral home directories.
	This technique works across all versions of GnuPG.

	Create a temporary directory, create (or copy) a configuration that
	meets your needs, make @command{@gpgname} use this directory either
	using the environment variable @var{GNUPGHOME}, or the option
	@option{--homedir}. GPGME supports this too on a per-context basis,
	by modifying the engine info of contexts. Now execute whatever
	operation you like, import and export key material as necessary. Once
	finished, you can delete the directory. All GnuPG backend services
	that were started will detect this and shut down.

	@node The quick key manipulation interface
	@subsection The quick key manipulation interface

	Recent versions of GnuPG have an interface to manipulate keys without
	using the interactive command @option{--edit-key}. This interface was
	added mainly for the benefit of GPGME (please consider using GPGME,
	see the manual subsection ``Programmatic use of GnuPG''). This
	interface is described in the subsection ``How to manage your keys''.

	@node Unattended GPG key generation
	@subsection Unattended key generation

	The command @option{--generate-key} may be used along with the option
	@option{--batch} for unattended key generation. This is the most
	flexible way of generating keys, but it is also the most complex one.
	Consider using the quick key manipulation interface described in the
	previous subsection ``The quick key manipulation interface''.

	The parameters for the key are either read from stdin or given as a
	file on the command line. The format of the parameter file is as
	follows: Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 characters.
	UTF-8 encoding must be used to specify non-ASCII characters. Empty
	lines are ignored. Leading and trailing white space is ignored. A
	hash sign as the first non white space character indicates a comment
	line. Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign,
	their arguments are separated by white space from the keyword.
	Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon; arguments
	are separated by white space. The first parameter must be
	@samp{Key-Type} but control statements may be placed anywhere. The
	order of the parameters does not matter except for @samp{Key-Type}.
	The parameters are only used for the generated keyblock (primary and
	subkeys); parameters from previous sets are not used. Some syntax
	checks may be performed. Key commences when either the end of the
	parameter file is reached, the next @samp{Key-Type} parameter is
	encountered, or the control statement @samp{%commit} is encountered.

	@noindent
	Control statements:

	@table @asis

	@item %echo @var{text}
	Print @var{text} as diagnostic.

	@item %dry-run
	Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking).

	@item %commit
	Perform the key generation. Note that an implicit commit is done at
	the next @asis{Key-Type} parameter.

	@item %pubring @var{filename}
	Do not write the key to the default or commandline given keyring but
	to @var{filename}. This must be given before the first commit to take
	place, duplicate specification of the same filename is ignored, the
	last filename before a commit is used. The filename is used until a
	new filename is used (at commit points) and all keys are written to
	that file. If a new filename is given, this file is created (and
	overwrites an existing one).

	See the previous subsection ``Ephemeral home directories'' for a more
	robust way to contain side-effects.

	@item %secring @var{filename}
	This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	See the previous subsection ``Ephemeral home directories''.

	@item %ask-passphrase
	@itemx %no-ask-passphrase
	This option is a no-op since GnuPG version 2.1.

	@item %no-protection
	Using this option allows the creation of keys without any passphrase
	protection. This option is mainly intended for regression tests.

	@item %transient-key
	If given the keys are created using a faster and a somewhat less
	secure random number generator. This option may be used for keys
	which are only used for a short time and do not require full
	cryptographic strength. It takes only effect if used together with
	the control statement @samp{%no-protection}.

	@end table

	@noindent
	General Parameters:

	@table @asis

	@item Key-Type: @var{algo}
	Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the primary
	key. The algorithm must be capable of signing. This is a required
	parameter. @var{algo} may either be an OpenPGP algorithm number or a
	string with the algorithm name. The special value @samp{default} may
	be used for @var{algo} to create the default key type; in this case a
	@samp{Key-Usage} shall not be given and @samp{default} also be used
	for @samp{Subkey-Type}.

	@item Key-Length: @var{nbits}
	The requested length of the generated key in bits. The default is
	returned by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}.
	For ECC keys this parameter is ignored.

	@item Key-Curve: @var{curve}
	The requested elliptic curve of the generated key. This is a required
	parameter for ECC keys. It is ignored for non-ECC keys.

	@item Key-Grip: @var{hexstring}
	This is optional and used to generate a CSR or certificate for an
	already existing key. Key-Length will be ignored when given.

	@item Key-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Space or comma delimited list of key usages. Allowed values are
	@samp{encrypt}, @samp{sign}, and @samp{auth}. This is used to
	generate the key flags. Please make sure that the algorithm is
	capable of this usage. Note that OpenPGP requires that all primary
	keys are capable of certification, so no matter what usage is given
	here, the @samp{cert} flag will be on. If no @samp{Key-Usage} is
	specified and the @samp{Key-Type} is not @samp{default}, all allowed
	usages for that particular algorithm are used; if it is not given but
	@samp{default} is used the usage will be @samp{sign}.

	@item Subkey-Type: @var{algo}
	This generates a secondary key (subkey). Currently only one subkey
	can be handled. See also @samp{Key-Type} above.

	@item Subkey-Length: @var{nbits}
	Length of the secondary key (subkey) in bits. The default is returned
	by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}.

	@item Subkey-Curve: @var{curve}
	Key curve for a subkey; similar to @samp{Key-Curve}.

	@item Subkey-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Key usage lists for a subkey; similar to @samp{Key-Usage}.

	@item Passphrase: @var{string}
	If you want to specify a passphrase for the secret key, enter it here.
	Default is to use the Pinentry dialog to ask for a passphrase.

	@item Name-Real: @var{name}
	@itemx Name-Comment: @var{comment}
	@itemx Name-Email: @var{email}
	The three parts of a user name. Remember to use UTF-8 encoding here.
	If you don't give any of them, no user ID is created.

	@item Expire-Date: @var{iso-date}\|(@var{number}[d\|w\|m\|y])
	Set the expiration date for the key (and the subkey). It may either
	be entered in ISO date format (e.g. "20000815T145012") or as number of
	days, weeks, month or years after the creation date. The special
	notation "seconds=N" is also allowed to specify a number of seconds
	since creation. Without a letter days are assumed. Note that there
	is no check done on the overflow of the type used by OpenPGP for
	timestamps. Thus you better make sure that the given value make
	sense. Although OpenPGP works with time intervals, GnuPG uses an
	absolute value internally and thus the last year we can represent is
	2105.

	@item Creation-Date: @var{iso-date}
	Set the creation date of the key as stored in the key information and
	which is also part of the fingerprint calculation. Either a date like
	"1986-04-26" or a full timestamp like "19860426T042640" may be used.
	The time is considered to be UTC. The special notation "seconds=N"
	may be used to directly specify a the number of seconds since Epoch
	(Unix time). If it is not given the current time is used.

	@item Preferences: @var{string}
	Set the cipher, hash, and compression preference values for this key.
	This expects the same type of string as the sub-command @samp{setpref}
	in the @option{--edit-key} menu.

	@item Revoker: @var{algo}:@var{fpr} [sensitive]
	Add a designated revoker to the generated key. Algo is the public key
	algorithm of the designated revoker (i.e. RSA=1, DSA=17, etc.)
	@var{fpr} is the fingerprint of the designated revoker. @var{fpr} may
	not contain spaces or colons. The optional @samp{sensitive} flag
	marks the designated revoker as sensitive information. Only v4 and v5
	keys may be designated revokers.

	@item Keyserver: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter that specifies the preferred keyserver
	URL for the key.

	@item Handle: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter only used with the status lines
	KEY_CREATED and KEY_NOT_CREATED. @var{string} may be up to 100
	characters and should not contain spaces. It is useful for batch key
	generation to associate a key parameter block with a status line.

	@end table

	@noindent
	Here is an example on how to create a key in an ephemeral home directory:
	@smallexample
	$ export GNUPGHOME="$(mktemp -d)"
	$ cat >foo <<EOF
	%echo Generating a basic OpenPGP key
	Key-Type: DSA
	Key-Length: 1024
	Subkey-Type: ELG-E
	Subkey-Length: 1024
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	EOF
	$ @gpgname --batch --generate-key foo
	[...]
	$ @gpgname --list-secret-keys
	/tmp/tmp.0NQxB74PEf/pubring.kbx
	-------------------------------
	sec dsa1024 2016-12-16 [SCA]
	768E895903FC1C44045C8CB95EEBDB71E9E849D0
	uid [ultimate] Joe Tester (with stupid passphrase) <joe@@foo.bar>
	ssb elg1024 2016-12-16 [E]
	@end smallexample

	@noindent
	If you want to create a key with the default algorithms you would use
	these parameters:
	@smallexample
	%echo Generating a default key
	Key-Type: default
	Subkey-Type: default
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	@end smallexample




	@mansect see also
	@ifset isman
	@command{gpgv}(1),
	@command{gpgsm}(1),
	@command{gpg-agent}(1)
	@end ifset
	@include see-also-note.texi
	diff --git a/g10/import.c b/g10/import.c
	index c1e76c3f0..8f874a7d1 100644
	--- a/g10/import.c
	+++ b/g10/import.c
	@@ -1,4834 +1,4846 @@
	/* import.c - import a key into our key storage.
	* Copyright (C) 1998-2007, 2010-2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 2014, 2016, 2017, 2019 Werner Koch
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <errno.h>

	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "../common/status.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "../common/util.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "../common/i18n.h"
	#include "../common/ttyio.h"
	#include "../common/recsel.h"
	#include "keyserver-internal.h"
	#include "call-agent.h"
	#include "../common/membuf.h"
	#include "../common/init.h"
	#include "../common/mbox-util.h"
	#include "key-check.h"
	#include "key-clean.h"


	struct import_stats_s
	{
	ulong count;
	ulong no_user_id;
	ulong imported;
	ulong n_uids;
	ulong n_sigs;
	ulong n_subk;
	ulong unchanged;
	ulong n_revoc;
	ulong secret_read;
	ulong secret_imported;
	ulong secret_dups;
	ulong skipped_new_keys;
	ulong not_imported;
	ulong n_sigs_cleaned;
	ulong n_uids_cleaned;
	ulong v3keys; /* Number of V3 keys seen. */
	};


	/* Node flag to indicate that a user ID or a subkey has a
	* valid self-signature. */
	#define NODE_GOOD_SELFSIG 1
	/* Node flag to indicate that a user ID or subkey has
	* an invalid self-signature. */
	#define NODE_BAD_SELFSIG 2
	/* Node flag to indicate that the node shall be deleted. */
	#define NODE_DELETION_MARK 4
	/* A node flag used to temporary mark a node. */
	#define NODE_FLAG_A 8
	/* A flag used by transfer_secret_keys. */
	#define NODE_TRANSFER_SECKEY 16


	/* An object and a global instance to store selectors created from
	* --import-filter keep-uid=EXPR.
	* --import-filter drop-sig=EXPR.
	*
	* FIXME: We should put this into the CTRL object but that requires a
	* lot more changes right now. For now we use save and restore
	* function to temporary change them.
	*/
	/* Definition of the import filters. */
	struct import_filter_s
	{
	recsel_expr_t keep_uid;
	recsel_expr_t drop_sig;
	};
	/* The current instance. */
	struct import_filter_s import_filter;


	static int import (ctrl_t ctrl,
	IOBUF inp, const char* fname, struct import_stats_s *stats,
	unsigned char *fpr, size_t fpr_len, unsigned int options,
	import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg,
	int origin, const char *url);
	static int read_block (IOBUF a, unsigned int options,
	PACKET *pending_pkt, kbnode_t ret_root, int *r_v3keys);
	static void revocation_present (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock);
	static gpg_error_t import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
	kbnode_t keyblock,
	struct import_stats_s *stats,
	unsigned char *fpr, size_t fpr_len,
	unsigned int options, int from_sk, int silent,
	import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg,
	int origin, const char url, int r_valid);
	static gpg_error_t import_matching_seckeys (
	ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t seckeys,
	const byte *mainfpr, size_t mainfprlen,
	struct import_stats_s *stats, int batch);
	static gpg_error_t import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
	struct import_stats_s *stats, int batch,
	unsigned int options, int for_migration,
	import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg,
	kbnode_t *r_secattic);
	static int import_revoke_cert (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t node, unsigned int options,
	struct import_stats_s *stats);
	static int chk_self_sigs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, u32 *keyid,
	int *non_self);
	static int delete_inv_parts (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
	u32 *keyid, unsigned int options,
	kbnode_t *r_otherrevsigs);
	static int any_uid_left (kbnode_t keyblock);
	static void remove_all_non_self_sigs (kbnode_t keyblock, u32 keyid);
	static int merge_blocks (ctrl_t ctrl, unsigned int options,
	kbnode_t keyblock_orig,
	kbnode_t keyblock, u32 *keyid,
	u32 curtime, int origin, const char *url,
	int n_uids, int n_sigs, int *n_subk );
	static gpg_error_t append_new_uid (unsigned int options,
	kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t node,
	u32 curtime, int origin, const char *url,
	int *n_sigs);
	static int append_key (kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t node, int *n_sigs);
	static int merge_sigs (kbnode_t dst, kbnode_t src, int *n_sigs);
	static int merge_keysigs (kbnode_t dst, kbnode_t src, int *n_sigs);



	static void
	release_import_filter (import_filter_t filt)
	{
	recsel_release (filt->keep_uid);
	filt->keep_uid = NULL;
	recsel_release (filt->drop_sig);
	filt->drop_sig = NULL;
	}

	static void
	cleanup_import_globals (void)
	{
	release_import_filter (&import_filter);
	}


	int
	parse_import_options(char str,unsigned int options,int noisy)
	{
	struct parse_options import_opts[]=
	{
	{"import-local-sigs",IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,
	N_("import signatures that are marked as local-only")},

	{"repair-pks-subkey-bug",IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG,NULL,
	N_("repair damage from the pks keyserver during import")},

	{"keep-ownertrust", IMPORT_KEEP_OWNERTTRUST, NULL,
	N_("do not clear the ownertrust values during import")},

	{"fast-import",IMPORT_FAST,NULL,
	N_("do not update the trustdb after import")},

	{"bulk-import",IMPORT_BULK, NULL,
	N_("enable bulk import mode")},

	{"import-show",IMPORT_SHOW,NULL,
	N_("show key during import")},

	{"show-only", (IMPORT_SHOW \| IMPORT_DRY_RUN), NULL,
	N_("show key but do not actually import") },

	{"merge-only",IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY,NULL,
	N_("only accept updates to existing keys")},

	{"import-clean",IMPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
	N_("remove unusable parts from key after import")},

	{"import-minimal",IMPORT_MINIMAL\|IMPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
	N_("remove as much as possible from key after import")},

	{"self-sigs-only", IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY, NULL,
	N_("ignore key-signatures which are not self-signatures")},

	{"import-export", IMPORT_EXPORT, NULL,
	N_("run import filters and export key immediately")},

	{"restore", IMPORT_RESTORE, NULL,
	N_("assume the GnuPG key backup format")},
	{"import-restore", IMPORT_RESTORE, NULL, NULL},

	{"repair-keys", IMPORT_REPAIR_KEYS, NULL,
	N_("repair keys on import")},

	+ /* New options. Right now, without description string. */
	+ {"ignore-attributes", IMPORT_IGNORE_ATTRIBUTES, NULL, NULL},
	+
	/* Hidden options which are enabled by default and are provided
	* in case of problems with the respective implementation. */
	{"collapse-uids", IMPORT_COLLAPSE_UIDS, NULL, NULL},
	{"collapse-subkeys", IMPORT_COLLAPSE_SUBKEYS, NULL, NULL},

	/* Aliases for backward compatibility */
	{"allow-local-sigs",IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,NULL},
	{"repair-hkp-subkey-bug",IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG,NULL,NULL},
	/* dummy */
	{"import-unusable-sigs",0,NULL,NULL},
	{"import-clean-sigs",0,NULL,NULL},
	{"import-clean-uids",0,NULL,NULL},
	{"convert-sk-to-pk",0, NULL,NULL}, /* Not anymore needed due to
	the new design. */
	{NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
	};
	int rc;
	int saved_self_sigs_only, saved_import_clean;

	/* We need to set flags indicating wether the user has set certain
	* options or if they came from the default. */
	saved_self_sigs_only = (*options & IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY);
	saved_self_sigs_only &= ~IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY;
	saved_import_clean = (*options & IMPORT_CLEAN);
	saved_import_clean &= ~IMPORT_CLEAN;

	rc = parse_options (str, options, import_opts, noisy);

	if (rc && (*options & IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY))
	opt.flags.expl_import_self_sigs_only = 1;
	else
	*options \|= saved_self_sigs_only;

	if (rc && (*options & IMPORT_CLEAN))
	opt.flags.expl_import_clean = 1;
	else
	*options \|= saved_import_clean;


	if (rc && (*options & IMPORT_RESTORE))
	{
	/* Alter other options we want or don't want for restore. */
	*options \|= (IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS \| IMPORT_KEEP_OWNERTTRUST);
	*options &= ~(IMPORT_MINIMAL \| IMPORT_CLEAN
	\| IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG
	\| IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY);
	}
	return rc;
	}


	/* Parse and set an import filter from string. STRING has the format
	* "NAME=EXPR" with NAME being the name of the filter. Spaces before
	* and after NAME are not allowed. If this function is all called
	* several times all expressions for the same NAME are concatenated.
	* Supported filter names are:
	*
	* - keep-uid :: If the expression evaluates to true for a certain
	* user ID packet, that packet and all it dependencies
	* will be imported. The expression may use these
	* variables:
	*
	* - uid :: The entire user ID.
	* - mbox :: The mail box part of the user ID.
	* - primary :: Evaluate to true for the primary user ID.
	*/
	gpg_error_t
	parse_and_set_import_filter (const char *string)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;

	/* Auto register the cleanup function. */
	register_mem_cleanup_func (cleanup_import_globals);

	if (!strncmp (string, "keep-uid=", 9))
	err = recsel_parse_expr (&import_filter.keep_uid, string+9);
	else if (!strncmp (string, "drop-sig=", 9))
	err = recsel_parse_expr (&import_filter.drop_sig, string+9);
	else
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME);

	return err;
	}


	/* Save the current import filters, return them, and clear the current
	* filters. Returns NULL on error and sets ERRNO. */
	import_filter_t
	save_and_clear_import_filter (void)
	{
	import_filter_t filt;

	filt = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *filt);
	if (!filt)
	return NULL;
	*filt = import_filter;
	memset (&import_filter, 0, sizeof import_filter);

	return filt;
	}


	/* Release the current import filters and restore them from NEWFILT.
	* Ownership of NEWFILT is moved to this function. */
	void
	restore_import_filter (import_filter_t filt)
	{
	if (filt)
	{
	release_import_filter (&import_filter);
	import_filter = *filt;
	xfree (filt);
	}
	}


	import_stats_t
	import_new_stats_handle (void)
	{
	return xmalloc_clear ( sizeof (struct import_stats_s) );
	}


	void
	import_release_stats_handle (import_stats_t p)
	{
	xfree (p);
	}


	/* Read a key from a file. Only the first key in the file is
	* considered and stored at R_KEYBLOCK. FNAME is the name of the
	* file.
	*/
	gpg_error_t
	read_key_from_file_or_buffer (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname,
	const void *buffer, size_t buflen,
	kbnode_t *r_keyblock)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	iobuf_t inp;
	PACKET *pending_pkt = NULL;
	kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int v3keys; /* Dummy */
	int non_self; /* Dummy */

	(void)ctrl;

	*r_keyblock = NULL;

	log_assert (!!fname ^ !!buffer);

	if (fname)
	{
	inp = iobuf_open (fname);
	if (!inp)
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	else if (is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
	{
	iobuf_close (inp);
	inp = NULL;
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EPERM);
	}
	else
	err = 0;
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"),
	iobuf_is_pipe_filename (fname)? "[stdin]": fname,
	gpg_strerror (err));
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_ENOENT)
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Push the armor filter. */
	{
	armor_filter_context_t *afx;
	afx = new_armor_context ();
	afx->only_keyblocks = 1;
	push_armor_filter (afx, inp);
	release_armor_context (afx);
	}

	}
	else /* Read from buffer (No armor expected). */
	{
	inp = iobuf_temp_with_content (buffer, buflen);
	}

	/* Read the first non-v3 keyblock. */
	while (!(err = read_block (inp, 0, &pending_pkt, &keyblock, &v3keys)))
	{
	if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	break;
	log_info (_("skipping block of type %d\n"), keyblock->pkt->pkttype);
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	keyblock = NULL;
	}
	if (err)
	{
	if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_INV_KEYRING)
	log_error (_("error reading '%s': %s\n"),
	fname? (iobuf_is_pipe_filename (fname)? "[stdin]": fname)
	/* */ : "[buffer]",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	keyid_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);

	if (!find_next_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_USER_ID))
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_USER_ID);
	goto leave;
	}

	/* We do the collapsing unconditionally although it is expected that
	* clean keys are provided here. */
	collapse_uids (&keyblock);
	collapse_subkeys (&keyblock);

	clear_kbnode_flags (keyblock);
	if (chk_self_sigs (ctrl, keyblock, keyid, &non_self))
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_KEYRING);
	goto leave;
	}

	if (!delete_inv_parts (ctrl, keyblock, keyid, 0, NULL) )
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_USER_ID);
	goto leave;
	}

	*r_keyblock = keyblock;
	keyblock = NULL;

	leave:
	if (inp)
	{
	iobuf_close (inp);
	/* Must invalidate that ugly cache to actually close the file. */
	if (fname)
	iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE, 0, (char*)fname);
	}
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	/* FIXME: Do we need to free PENDING_PKT ? */
	return err;
	}


	/* Import an already checked public key which was included in a
	* signature and the signature verified out using this key. */
	gpg_error_t
	import_included_key_block (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	struct import_stats_s *stats;
	import_filter_t save_filt;
	int save_armor = opt.armor;

	opt.armor = 0;
	stats = import_new_stats_handle ();
	save_filt = save_and_clear_import_filter ();
	if (!save_filt)
	{
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	goto leave;
	}

	/* FIXME: Should we introduce a dedicated KEYORG ? */
	err = import_one (ctrl, keyblock,
	stats, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0,
	NULL, NULL, KEYORG_UNKNOWN, NULL, NULL);

	leave:
	restore_import_filter (save_filt);
	import_release_stats_handle (stats);
	opt.armor = save_armor;
	return err;
	}



	/*
	* Import the public keys from the given filename. Input may be armored.
	* This function rejects all keys which are not validly self signed on at
	* least one userid. Only user ids which are self signed will be imported.
	* Other signatures are not checked.
	*
	* Actually this function does a merge. It works like this:
	*
	* - get the keyblock
	* - check self-signatures and remove all userids and their signatures
	* without/invalid self-signatures.
	* - reject the keyblock, if we have no valid userid.
	* - See whether we have this key already in one of our pubrings.
	* If not, simply add it to the default keyring.
	* - Compare the key and the self-signatures of the new and the one in
	* our keyring. If they are different something weird is going on;
	* ask what to do.
	* - See whether we have only non-self-signature on one user id; if not
	* ask the user what to do.
	* - compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
	* that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
	* (consider looking at the timestamp and use the newest?)
	* - Simply add the signature. Can't verify here because we may not have
	* the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it
	* into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey
	* is used.
	* - Proceed with next signature.
	*
	* Key revocation certificates have special handling.
	*/
	static gpg_error_t
	import_keys_internal (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t inp, char **fnames, int nnames,
	import_stats_t stats_handle,
	unsigned char *fpr, size_t fpr_len,
	unsigned int options,
	import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg,
	int origin, const char *url)
	{
	int i;
	gpg_error_t err = 0;
	struct import_stats_s *stats = stats_handle;

	if (!stats)
	stats = import_new_stats_handle ();

	if (inp)
	{
	err = import (ctrl, inp, "[stream]", stats, fpr, fpr_len, options,
	screener, screener_arg, origin, url);
	}
	else
	{
	if (!fnames && !nnames)
	nnames = 1; /* Ohh what a ugly hack to jump into the loop */

	for (i=0; i < nnames; i++)
	{
	const char *fname = fnames? fnames[i] : NULL;
	IOBUF inp2 = iobuf_open(fname);

	if (!fname)
	fname = "[stdin]";
	if (inp2 && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp2)))
	{
	iobuf_close (inp2);
	inp2 = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	if (!inp2)
	log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror (errno));
	else
	{
	err = import (ctrl, inp2, fname, stats, fpr, fpr_len, options,
	screener, screener_arg, origin, url);
	iobuf_close (inp2);
	/* Must invalidate that ugly cache to actually close it. */
	iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE, 0, (char*)fname);
	if (err)
	log_error ("import from '%s' failed: %s\n",
	fname, gpg_strerror (err) );
	}
	if (!fname)
	break;
	}
	}

	if (!stats_handle)
	{
	if ((options & (IMPORT_SHOW \| IMPORT_DRY_RUN))
	!= (IMPORT_SHOW \| IMPORT_DRY_RUN))
	import_print_stats (stats);
	import_release_stats_handle (stats);
	}

	/* If no fast import and the trustdb is dirty (i.e. we added a key
	or userID that had something other than a selfsig, a signature
	that was other than a selfsig, or any revocation), then
	update/check the trustdb if the user specified by setting
	interactive or by not setting no-auto-check-trustdb */

	if (!(options & IMPORT_FAST))
	check_or_update_trustdb (ctrl);

	return err;
	}


	void
	import_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, char **fnames, int nnames,
	import_stats_t stats_handle, unsigned int options,
	int origin, const char *url)
	{
	import_keys_internal (ctrl, NULL, fnames, nnames, stats_handle,
	NULL, NULL, options, NULL, NULL, origin, url);
	}


	gpg_error_t
	import_keys_es_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
	import_stats_t stats_handle,
	unsigned char *fpr, size_t fpr_len,
	unsigned int options,
	import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg,
	int origin, const char *url)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	iobuf_t inp;

	inp = iobuf_esopen (fp, "rb", 1, 0);
	if (!inp)
	{
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	log_error ("iobuf_esopen failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	return err;
	}

	err = import_keys_internal (ctrl, inp, NULL, 0, stats_handle,
	fpr, fpr_len, options,
	screener, screener_arg, origin, url);

	iobuf_close (inp);
	return err;
	}


	static int
	import (ctrl_t ctrl, IOBUF inp, const char* fname,struct import_stats_s *stats,
	unsigned char *fpr,size_t fpr_len, unsigned int options,
	import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg,
	int origin, const char *url)
	{
	PACKET *pending_pkt = NULL;
	kbnode_t keyblock = NULL; /* Need to initialize because gcc can't
	grasp the return semantics of
	read_block. */
	kbnode_t secattic = NULL; /* Kludge for PGP desktop percularity */
	int rc = 0;
	int v3keys;

	getkey_disable_caches ();

	if (!opt.no_armor) /* Armored reading is not disabled. */
	{
	armor_filter_context_t *afx;

	afx = new_armor_context ();
	afx->only_keyblocks = 1;
	push_armor_filter (afx, inp);
	release_armor_context (afx);
	}

	while (!(rc = read_block (inp, options, &pending_pkt, &keyblock, &v3keys)))
	{
	stats->v3keys += v3keys;
	if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	rc = import_one (ctrl, keyblock,
	stats, fpr, fpr_len, options, 0, 0,
	screener, screener_arg, origin, url, NULL);
	if (secattic)
	{
	byte tmpfpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	size_t tmpfprlen;

	if (!rc && !(opt.dry_run \|\| (options & IMPORT_DRY_RUN)))
	{
	/* Kudge for PGP desktop - see below. */
	fingerprint_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
	tmpfpr, &tmpfprlen);
	rc = import_matching_seckeys (ctrl, secattic,
	tmpfpr, tmpfprlen,
	stats, opt.batch);
	}
	release_kbnode (secattic);
	secattic = NULL;
	}
	}
	else if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	{
	release_kbnode (secattic);
	secattic = NULL;
	rc = import_secret_one (ctrl, keyblock, stats,
	opt.batch, options, 0,
	screener, screener_arg, &secattic);
	keyblock = NULL; /* Ownership was transferred. */
	if (secattic)
	{
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
	rc = 0; /* Try import after the next pubkey. */

	/* The attic is a workaround for the peculiar PGP
	* Desktop method of exporting a secret key: The
	* exported file is the concatenation of two armored
	* keyblocks; first the private one and then the public
	* one. The strange thing is that the secret one has no
	* binding signatures at all and thus we have not
	* imported it. The attic stores that secret keys and
	* we try to import it once after the very next public
	* keyblock. */
	}
	}
	else if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& IS_KEY_REV (keyblock->pkt->pkt.signature) )
	{
	release_kbnode (secattic);
	secattic = NULL;
	rc = import_revoke_cert (ctrl, keyblock, options, stats);
	}
	else
	{
	release_kbnode (secattic);
	secattic = NULL;
	log_info (_("skipping block of type %d\n"), keyblock->pkt->pkttype);
	}
	release_kbnode (keyblock);

	/* fixme: we should increment the not imported counter but
	this does only make sense if we keep on going despite of
	errors. For now we do this only if the imported key is too
	large. */
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE
	&& gpg_err_source (rc) == GPG_ERR_SOURCE_KEYBOX)
	{
	stats->not_imported++;
	}
	else if (rc)
	break;

	if (!(++stats->count % 100) && !opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("%lu keys processed so far\n"), stats->count );

	if (origin == KEYORG_WKD && stats->count >= 5)
	{
	/* We limit the number of keys _received_ from the WKD to 5.
	* In fact there should be only one key but some sites want
	* to store a few expired keys there also. gpg's key
	* selection will later figure out which key to use. Note
	* that for WKD we always return the fingerprint of the
	* first imported key. */
	log_info ("import from WKD stopped after %d keys\n", 5);
	break;
	}
	}
	stats->v3keys += v3keys;
	if (rc == -1)
	rc = 0;
	else if (rc && gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_INV_KEYRING)
	log_error (_("error reading '%s': %s\n"), fname, gpg_strerror (rc));

	release_kbnode (secattic);

	/* When read_block loop was stopped by error, we have PENDING_PKT left. */
	if (pending_pkt)
	{
	free_packet (pending_pkt, NULL);
	xfree (pending_pkt);
	}
	return rc;
	}


	/* Helper to migrate secring.gpg to GnuPG 2.1. */
	gpg_error_t
	import_old_secring (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	iobuf_t inp;
	PACKET *pending_pkt = NULL;
	kbnode_t keyblock = NULL; /* Need to initialize because gcc can't
	grasp the return semantics of
	read_block. */
	struct import_stats_s *stats;
	int v3keys;

	inp = iobuf_open (fname);
	if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
	{
	iobuf_close (inp);
	inp = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	if (!inp)
	{
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, gpg_strerror (err));
	return err;
	}

	getkey_disable_caches();
	stats = import_new_stats_handle ();
	while (!(err = read_block (inp, 0, &pending_pkt, &keyblock, &v3keys)))
	{
	if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	{
	err = import_secret_one (ctrl, keyblock, stats, 1, 0, 1,
	NULL, NULL, NULL);
	keyblock = NULL; /* Ownership was transferred. */
	}
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	if (err)
	break;
	}
	import_release_stats_handle (stats);
	if (err == -1)
	err = 0;
	else if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_INV_KEYRING)
	log_error (_("error reading '%s': %s\n"), fname, gpg_strerror (err));
	else if (err)
	log_error ("import from '%s' failed: %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (err));

	iobuf_close (inp);
	iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE, 0, (char*)fname);

	return err;
	}


	void
	import_print_stats (import_stats_t stats)
	{
	if (!opt.quiet)
	{
	log_info(_("Total number processed: %lu\n"),
	stats->count + stats->v3keys);
	if (stats->v3keys)
	log_info(_(" skipped PGP-2 keys: %lu\n"), stats->v3keys);
	if (stats->skipped_new_keys )
	log_info(_(" skipped new keys: %lu\n"),
	stats->skipped_new_keys );
	if (stats->no_user_id )
	log_info(_(" w/o user IDs: %lu\n"), stats->no_user_id );
	if (stats->imported)
	{
	log_info(_(" imported: %lu"), stats->imported );
	log_printf ("\n");
	}
	if (stats->unchanged )
	log_info(_(" unchanged: %lu\n"), stats->unchanged );
	if (stats->n_uids )
	log_info(_(" new user IDs: %lu\n"), stats->n_uids );
	if (stats->n_subk )
	log_info(_(" new subkeys: %lu\n"), stats->n_subk );
	if (stats->n_sigs )
	log_info(_(" new signatures: %lu\n"), stats->n_sigs );
	if (stats->n_revoc )
	log_info(_(" new key revocations: %lu\n"), stats->n_revoc );
	if (stats->secret_read )
	log_info(_(" secret keys read: %lu\n"), stats->secret_read );
	if (stats->secret_imported )
	log_info(_(" secret keys imported: %lu\n"), stats->secret_imported );
	if (stats->secret_dups )
	log_info(_(" secret keys unchanged: %lu\n"), stats->secret_dups );
	if (stats->not_imported )
	log_info(_(" not imported: %lu\n"), stats->not_imported );
	if (stats->n_sigs_cleaned)
	log_info(_(" signatures cleaned: %lu\n"),stats->n_sigs_cleaned);
	if (stats->n_uids_cleaned)
	log_info(_(" user IDs cleaned: %lu\n"),stats->n_uids_cleaned);
	}

	if (is_status_enabled ())
	{
	char buf[15*20];

	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf,
	"%lu %lu %lu 0 %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu",
	stats->count + stats->v3keys,
	stats->no_user_id,
	stats->imported,
	stats->unchanged,
	stats->n_uids,
	stats->n_subk,
	stats->n_sigs,
	stats->n_revoc,
	stats->secret_read,
	stats->secret_imported,
	stats->secret_dups,
	stats->skipped_new_keys,
	stats->not_imported,
	stats->v3keys );
	write_status_text (STATUS_IMPORT_RES, buf);
	}
	}


	/* Return true if PKTTYPE is valid in a keyblock. */
	static int
	valid_keyblock_packet (int pkttype)
	{
	switch (pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
	case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
	case PKT_SIGNATURE:
	case PKT_USER_ID:
	case PKT_ATTRIBUTE:
	case PKT_RING_TRUST:
	return 1;
	default:
	return 0;
	}
	}


	/* Read the next keyblock from stream A. Meta data (ring trust
	* packets) are only considered if OPTIONS has the IMPORT_RESTORE flag
	* set. PENDING_PKT should be initialized to NULL and not changed by
	* the caller.
	*
	* Returns 0 for okay, -1 no more blocks, or any other errorcode. The
	* integer at R_V3KEY counts the number of unsupported v3 keyblocks.
	*/
	static int
	read_block( IOBUF a, unsigned int options,
	PACKET *pending_pkt, kbnode_t ret_root, int *r_v3keys)
	{
	int rc;
	struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx;
	PACKET *pkt;
	kbnode_t root = NULL;
	kbnode_t lastnode = NULL;
	int in_cert, in_v3key, skip_sigs;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int got_keyid = 0;
	unsigned int dropped_nonselfsigs = 0;

	*r_v3keys = 0;

	if (*pending_pkt)
	{
	root = lastnode = new_kbnode( *pending_pkt );
	*pending_pkt = NULL;
	log_assert (root->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| root->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY);
	in_cert = 1;
	keyid_from_pk (root->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);
	got_keyid = 1;
	}
	else
	in_cert = 0;

	pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
	init_packet (pkt);
	init_parse_packet (&parsectx, a);
	if (!(options & IMPORT_RESTORE))
	parsectx.skip_meta = 1;
	in_v3key = 0;
	skip_sigs = 0;
	while ((rc=parse_packet (&parsectx, pkt)) != -1)
	{
	if (rc && (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_LEGACY_KEY
	&& (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)))
	{
	in_v3key = 1;
	++*r_v3keys;
	free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
	init_packet (pkt);
	continue;
	}
	else if (rc ) /* (ignore errors) */
	{
	skip_sigs = 0;
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_PACKET)
	; /* Do not show a diagnostic. */
	else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
	&& (pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	\|\| pkt->pkttype == PKT_ATTRIBUTE))
	{
	/* This indicates a too large user id or attribute
	* packet. We skip this packet and all following
	* signatures. Sure, this won't allow to repair a
	* garbled keyring in case one of the signatures belong
	* to another user id. However, this better mitigates
	* DoS using inserted user ids. */
	skip_sigs = 1;
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
	&& (pkt->pkttype == PKT_OLD_COMMENT
	\|\| pkt->pkttype == PKT_COMMENT))
	; /* Ignore too large comment packets. */
	else
	{
	log_error("read_block: read error: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
	rc = GPG_ERR_INV_KEYRING;
	goto ready;
	}
	free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
	init_packet(pkt);
	continue;
	}
	+ else if ((opt.import_options & IMPORT_IGNORE_ATTRIBUTES)
	+ && (pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID \|\| pkt->pkttype == PKT_ATTRIBUTE)
	+ && pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
	+ {
	+ skip_sigs = 1;
	+ free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
	+ init_packet (pkt);
	+ continue;
	+ }

	if (skip_sigs)
	{
	if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
	init_packet (pkt);
	continue;
	}
	skip_sigs = 0;
	}

	if (in_v3key && !(pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY))
	{
	free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
	init_packet(pkt);
	continue;
	}
	in_v3key = 0;

	if (!root && pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& IS_KEY_REV (pkt->pkt.signature) )
	{
	/* This is a revocation certificate which is handled in a
	* special way. */
	root = new_kbnode( pkt );
	pkt = NULL;
	goto ready;
	}

	/* Make a linked list of all packets. */
	switch (pkt->pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_COMPRESSED:
	if (check_compress_algo (pkt->pkt.compressed->algorithm))
	{
	rc = GPG_ERR_COMPR_ALGO;
	goto ready;
	}
	else
	{
	compress_filter_context_t cfx = xmalloc_clear( sizeof cfx );
	pkt->pkt.compressed->buf = NULL;
	if (push_compress_filter2 (a, cfx,
	pkt->pkt.compressed->algorithm, 1))
	xfree (cfx); /* e.g. in case of compression_algo NONE. */
	}
	free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
	init_packet(pkt);
	break;

	case PKT_RING_TRUST:
	/* Skip those packets unless we are in restore mode. */
	if ((opt.import_options & IMPORT_RESTORE))
	goto x_default;
	free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
	init_packet(pkt);
	break;

	case PKT_SIGNATURE:
	if (!in_cert)
	goto x_default;
	if (!(options & IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY))
	goto x_default;
	log_assert (got_keyid);
	if (pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0] == keyid[0]
	&& pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] == keyid[1])
	{ /* This is likely a self-signature. We import this one.
	* Eventually we should use the ISSUER_FPR to compare
	* self-signatures, but that will work only for v5 keys
	* which are currently not even deployed.
	* Note that we do not do any crypto verify here because
	* that would defeat this very mitigation of DoS by
	* importing a key with a huge amount of faked
	* key-signatures. A verification will be done later in
	* the processing anyway. Here we want a cheap an early
	* way to drop non-self-signatures. */
	goto x_default;
	}
	/* Skip this signature. */
	dropped_nonselfsigs++;
	free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
	init_packet(pkt);
	break;

	case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
	if (!got_keyid)
	{
	keyid_from_pk (pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);
	got_keyid = 1;
	}
	if (in_cert) /* Store this packet. */
	{
	*pending_pkt = pkt;
	pkt = NULL;
	goto ready;
	}
	in_cert = 1;
	goto x_default;

	default:
	x_default:
	if (in_cert && valid_keyblock_packet (pkt->pkttype))
	{
	if (!root )
	root = lastnode = new_kbnode (pkt);
	else
	{
	lastnode->next = new_kbnode (pkt);
	lastnode = lastnode->next;
	}
	pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
	}
	else
	free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
	init_packet(pkt);
	break;
	}
	}

	ready:
	if (rc == -1 && root )
	rc = 0;

	if (rc )
	release_kbnode( root );
	else
	*ret_root = root;
	free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
	deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx);
	xfree( pkt );
	if (!rc && dropped_nonselfsigs && opt.verbose)
	log_info ("key %s: number of dropped non-self-signatures: %u\n",
	keystr (keyid), dropped_nonselfsigs);

	return rc;
	}


	/* Walk through the subkeys on a pk to find if we have the PKS
	disease: multiple subkeys with their binding sigs stripped, and the
	sig for the first subkey placed after the last subkey. That is,
	instead of "pk uid sig sub1 bind1 sub2 bind2 sub3 bind3" we have
	"pk uid sig sub1 sub2 sub3 bind1". We can't do anything about sub2
	and sub3, as they are already lost, but we can try and rescue sub1
	by reordering the keyblock so that it reads "pk uid sig sub1 bind1
	sub2 sub3". Returns TRUE if the keyblock was modified. */
	static int
	fix_pks_corruption (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	int changed = 0;
	int keycount = 0;
	kbnode_t node;
	kbnode_t last = NULL;
	kbnode_t sknode=NULL;

	/* First determine if we have the problem at all. Look for 2 or
	more subkeys in a row, followed by a single binding sig. */
	for (node=keyblock; node; last=node, node=node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	keycount++;
	if(!sknode)
	sknode=node;
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& IS_SUBKEY_SIG (node->pkt->pkt.signature)
	&& keycount >= 2
	&& !node->next)
	{
	/* We might have the problem, as this key has two subkeys in
	a row without any intervening packets. */

	/* Sanity check */
	if (!last)
	break;

	/* Temporarily attach node to sknode. */
	node->next = sknode->next;
	sknode->next = node;
	last->next = NULL;

	/* Note we aren't checking whether this binding sig is a
	selfsig. This is not necessary here as the subkey and
	binding sig will be rejected later if that is the
	case. */
	if (check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock,node,NULL))
	{
	/* Not a match, so undo the changes. */
	sknode->next = node->next;
	last->next = node;
	node->next = NULL;
	break;
	}
	else
	{
	/* Mark it good so we don't need to check it again */
	sknode->flag \|= NODE_GOOD_SELFSIG;
	changed = 1;
	break;
	}
	}
	else
	keycount = 0;
	}

	return changed;
	}


	/* Versions of GnuPG before 1.4.11 and 2.0.16 allowed to import bogus
	direct key signatures. A side effect of this was that a later
	import of the same good direct key signatures was not possible
	because the cmp_signature check in merge_blocks considered them
	equal. Although direct key signatures are now checked during
	import, there might still be bogus signatures sitting in a keyring.
	We need to detect and delete them before doing a merge. This
	function returns the number of removed sigs. */
	static int
	fix_bad_direct_key_sigs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, u32 *keyid)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	kbnode_t node;
	int count = 0;

	for (node = keyblock->next; node; node=node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	break;
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& IS_KEY_SIG (node->pkt->pkt.signature))
	{
	err = check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, node, NULL);
	if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO )
	{
	/* If we don't know the error, we can't decide; this is
	not a problem because cmp_signature can't compare the
	signature either. */
	log_info ("key %s: invalid direct key signature removed\n",
	keystr (keyid));
	delete_kbnode (node);
	count++;
	}
	}
	}

	return count;
	}


	static void
	print_import_ok (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int reason)
	{
	byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *s;
	char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN2+30], p;
	size_t i, n;

	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%u ", reason);
	p = buf + strlen (buf);

	fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n);
	s = array;
	for (i=0; i < n ; i++, s++, p += 2)
	sprintf (p, "%02X", *s);

	write_status_text (STATUS_IMPORT_OK, buf);
	}


	static void
	print_import_check (PKT_public_key * pk, PKT_user_id * id)
	{
	byte hexfpr[2*MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
	u32 keyid[2];

	keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
	hexfingerprint (pk, hexfpr, sizeof hexfpr);
	write_status_printf (STATUS_IMPORT_CHECK, "%08X%08X %s %s",
	keyid[0], keyid[1], hexfpr, id->name);

	}


	static void
	check_prefs_warning(PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	log_info(_("WARNING: key %s contains preferences for unavailable\n"
	"algorithms on these user IDs:\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
	}


	static void
	check_prefs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	kbnode_t node;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	int problem=0;

	merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock);
	pk=keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	for(node=keyblock;node;node=node->next)
	{
	if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
	&& node->pkt->pkt.user_id->created
	&& node->pkt->pkt.user_id->prefs)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	prefitem_t *prefs = uid->prefs;
	char *user = utf8_to_native(uid->name,strlen(uid->name),0);

	for(;prefs->type;prefs++)
	{
	char num[10]; /* prefs->value is a byte, so we're over
	safe here */

	sprintf(num,"%u",prefs->value);

	if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_SYM)
	{
	if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (prefs->value))
	{
	const char *algo =
	(openpgp_cipher_test_algo (prefs->value)
	? num
	: openpgp_cipher_algo_name (prefs->value));
	if(!problem)
	check_prefs_warning(pk);
	log_info(_(" \"%s\": preference for cipher"
	" algorithm %s\n"), user, algo);
	problem=1;
	}
	}
	else if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_AEAD)
	{
	if (openpgp_aead_test_algo (prefs->value))
	{
	/* FIXME: The test below is wrong. We should
	* check if ...algo_name yields a "?" and
	* only in that case use NUM. */
	const char *algo =
	(openpgp_aead_test_algo (prefs->value)
	? num
	: openpgp_aead_algo_name (prefs->value));
	if(!problem)
	check_prefs_warning(pk);
	log_info(_(" \"%s\": preference for AEAD"
	" algorithm %s\n"), user, algo);
	problem=1;
	}
	}
	else if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_HASH)
	{
	if(openpgp_md_test_algo(prefs->value))
	{
	const char *algo =
	(gcry_md_test_algo (prefs->value)
	? num
	: gcry_md_algo_name (prefs->value));
	if(!problem)
	check_prefs_warning(pk);
	log_info(_(" \"%s\": preference for digest"
	" algorithm %s\n"), user, algo);
	problem=1;
	}
	}
	else if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_ZIP)
	{
	if(check_compress_algo (prefs->value))
	{
	const char *algo=compress_algo_to_string(prefs->value);
	if(!problem)
	check_prefs_warning(pk);
	log_info(_(" \"%s\": preference for compression"
	" algorithm %s\n"),user,algo?algo:num);
	problem=1;
	}
	}
	}

	xfree(user);
	}
	}

	if(problem)
	{
	log_info(_("it is strongly suggested that you update"
	" your preferences and\n"));
	log_info(_("re-distribute this key to avoid potential algorithm"
	" mismatch problems\n"));

	if(!opt.batch)
	{
	strlist_t sl = NULL;
	strlist_t locusr = NULL;
	size_t fprlen=0;
	byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
	char username[(MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2)+1];
	unsigned int i;

	p = fingerprint_from_pk (pk,fpr,&fprlen);
	for(i=0;i<fprlen;i++,p++)
	sprintf(username+2i,"%02X",p);
	add_to_strlist(&locusr,username);

	append_to_strlist(&sl,"updpref");
	append_to_strlist(&sl,"save");

	keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, sl, 1, 1 );
	free_strlist(sl);
	free_strlist(locusr);
	}
	else if(!opt.quiet)
	log_info(_("you can update your preferences with:"
	" gpg --edit-key %s updpref save\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
	}
	}


	/* Helper for apply_*_filter in import.c and export.c and also used by
	* keylist.c. */
	const char *
	impex_filter_getval (void cookie, const char propname)
	{
	/* FIXME: Malloc our static buffers and access them via PARM. */
	struct impex_filter_parm_s *parm = cookie;
	ctrl_t ctrl = parm->ctrl;
	kbnode_t node = parm->node;
	static char numbuf[20];
	const char *result;
	const char *s;
	enum { scpNone = 0, scpPub, scpSub, scpUid, scpSig} scope = 0;

	log_assert (ctrl && ctrl->magic == SERVER_CONTROL_MAGIC);

	/* We allow a prefix delimited by a slash to limit the scope of the
	* keyword. Note that "pub" also includes "sec" and "sub" includes
	* "ssb". */
	if ((s=strchr (propname, '/')) && s != propname)
	{
	size_t n = s - propname;
	if (!strncmp (propname, "pub", n))
	scope = scpPub;
	else if (!strncmp (propname, "sub", n))
	scope = scpSub;
	else if (!strncmp (propname, "uid", n))
	scope = scpUid;
	else if (!strncmp (propname, "sig", n))
	scope = scpSig;

	propname = s + 1;
	}

	if ((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ATTRIBUTE)
	&& (!scope \|\| scope == scpUid))
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	if (!strcmp (propname, "uid"))
	result = uid->name;
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "mbox"))
	{
	if (!uid->mbox)
	{
	uid->mbox = mailbox_from_userid (uid->name, 0);
	}
	result = uid->mbox;
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "primary"))
	{
	result = uid->flags.primary? "1":"0";
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "expired"))
	{
	result = uid->flags.expired? "1":"0";
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "revoked"))
	{
	result = uid->flags.revoked? "1":"0";
	}
	else
	result = NULL;
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& (!scope \|\| scope == scpSig))
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;

	if (!strcmp (propname, "sig_created"))
	{
	snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%lu", (ulong)sig->timestamp);
	result = numbuf;
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "sig_created_d"))
	{
	result = dateonlystr_from_sig (sig);
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "sig_expires"))
	{
	snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%lu", (ulong)sig->expiredate);
	result = numbuf;
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "sig_expires_d"))
	{
	static char exdatestr[MK_DATESTR_SIZE];

	if (sig->expiredate)
	result = mk_datestr (exdatestr, sizeof exdatestr, sig->expiredate);
	else
	result = "";
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "sig_algo"))
	{
	snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%d", sig->pubkey_algo);
	result = numbuf;
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "sig_digest_algo"))
	{
	snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%d", sig->digest_algo);
	result = numbuf;
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "expired"))
	{
	result = sig->flags.expired? "1":"0";
	}
	else
	result = NULL;
	}
	else if (((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	&& (!scope \|\| scope == scpPub))
	\|\| ((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	&& (!scope \|\| scope == scpSub)))
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	if (!strcmp (propname, "secret"))
	{
	result = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)? "1":"0";
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "key_algo"))
	{
	snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%d", pk->pubkey_algo);
	result = numbuf;
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "key_size"))
	{
	snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%u", nbits_from_pk (pk));
	result = numbuf;
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "algostr"))
	{
	pubkey_string (pk, parm->hexfpr, sizeof parm->hexfpr);
	result = parm->hexfpr;
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "key_created"))
	{
	snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%lu", (ulong)pk->timestamp);
	result = numbuf;
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "key_created_d"))
	{
	result = dateonlystr_from_pk (pk);
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "key_expires"))
	{
	snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%lu", (ulong)pk->expiredate);
	result = numbuf;
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "key_expires_d"))
	{
	static char exdatestr[MK_DATESTR_SIZE];

	if (pk->expiredate)
	result = mk_datestr (exdatestr, sizeof exdatestr, pk->expiredate);
	else
	result = "";
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "expired"))
	{
	result = pk->has_expired? "1":"0";
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "revoked"))
	{
	result = pk->flags.revoked? "1":"0";
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "disabled"))
	{
	result = pk_is_disabled (pk)? "1":"0";
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "usage"))
	{
	snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%s%s%s%s%s",
	(pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)?"e":"",
	(pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)?"s":"",
	(pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT)?"c":"",
	(pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)?"a":"",
	(pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN)?"?":"");
	result = numbuf;
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "fpr"))
	{
	hexfingerprint (pk, parm->hexfpr, sizeof parm->hexfpr);
	result = parm->hexfpr;
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "origin"))
	{
	result = key_origin_string (pk->keyorg);
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "lastupd"))
	{
	snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%lu", (ulong)pk->keyupdate);
	result = numbuf;
	}
	else if (!strcmp (propname, "url"))
	{
	if (pk->updateurl && *pk->updateurl)
	{
	/* Fixme: This might get truncated. */
	mem2str (parm->hexfpr, pk->updateurl, sizeof parm->hexfpr);
	result = parm->hexfpr;
	}
	else
	result = "";
	}
	else
	result = NULL;
	}
	else
	result = NULL;

	return result;
	}


	/*
	* Apply the keep-uid filter to the keyblock. The deleted nodes are
	* marked and thus the caller should call commit_kbnode afterwards.
	* KEYBLOCK must not have any blocks marked as deleted.
	*/
	static void
	apply_keep_uid_filter (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, recsel_expr_t selector)
	{
	kbnode_t node;
	struct impex_filter_parm_s parm;

	parm.ctrl = ctrl;

	for (node = keyblock->next; node; node = node->next )
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	parm.node = node;
	if (!recsel_select (selector, impex_filter_getval, &parm))
	{

	/* log_debug ("keep-uid: deleting '%s'\n", */
	/* node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name); */
	/* The UID packet and all following packets up to the
	* next UID or a subkey. */
	delete_kbnode (node);
	for (; node->next
	&& node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID
	&& node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ;
	node = node->next)
	delete_kbnode (node->next);
	}
	/* else */
	/* log_debug ("keep-uid: keeping '%s'\n", */
	/* node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name); */
	}
	}
	}


	/*
	* Apply the drop-sig filter to the keyblock. The deleted nodes are
	* marked and thus the caller should call commit_kbnode afterwards.
	* KEYBLOCK must not have any blocks marked as deleted.
	*/
	static void
	apply_drop_sig_filter (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, recsel_expr_t selector)
	{
	kbnode_t node;
	int active = 0;
	u32 main_keyid[2];
	PKT_signature *sig;
	struct impex_filter_parm_s parm;

	parm.ctrl = ctrl;

	keyid_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, main_keyid);

	/* Loop over all signatures for user id and attribute packets which
	* are not self signatures. */
	for (node = keyblock->next; node; node = node->next )
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	break; /* ready. */
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ATTRIBUTE)
	active = 1;
	if (!active)
	continue;
	if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
	continue;

	sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (main_keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] \|\| main_keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
	continue; /* Skip self-signatures. */

	if (IS_UID_SIG(sig) \|\| IS_UID_REV(sig))
	{
	parm.node = node;
	if (recsel_select (selector, impex_filter_getval, &parm))
	delete_kbnode (node);
	}
	}
	}


	/* Insert a key origin into a public key packet. */
	static gpg_error_t
	insert_key_origin_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, u32 curtime,
	int origin, const char *url)
	{
	if (origin == KEYORG_WKD \|\| origin == KEYORG_DANE)
	{
	/* For WKD and DANE we insert origin information also for the
	* key but we don't record the URL because we have have no use
	* for that: An update using a keyserver has higher precedence
	* and will thus update this origin info. For refresh using WKD
	* or DANE we need to go via the User ID anyway. Recall that we
	* are only inserting a new key. */
	pk->keyorg = origin;
	pk->keyupdate = curtime;
	}
	else if (origin == KEYORG_KS && url)
	{
	/* If the key was retrieved from a keyserver using a fingerprint
	* request we add the meta information. Note that the use of a
	* fingerprint needs to be enforced by the caller of the import
	* function. This is commonly triggered by verifying a modern
	* signature which has an Issuer Fingerprint signature
	* subpacket. */
	pk->keyorg = origin;
	pk->keyupdate = curtime;
	xfree (pk->updateurl);
	pk->updateurl = xtrystrdup (url);
	if (!pk->updateurl)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	}
	else if (origin == KEYORG_FILE)
	{
	pk->keyorg = origin;
	pk->keyupdate = curtime;
	}
	else if (origin == KEYORG_URL)
	{
	pk->keyorg = origin;
	pk->keyupdate = curtime;
	if (url)
	{
	xfree (pk->updateurl);
	pk->updateurl = xtrystrdup (url);
	if (!pk->updateurl)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	}
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/* Insert a key origin into a user id packet. */
	static gpg_error_t
	insert_key_origin_uid (PKT_user_id *uid, u32 curtime,
	int origin, const char *url)

	{
	if (origin == KEYORG_WKD \|\| origin == KEYORG_DANE)
	{
	/* We insert origin information on a UID only when we received
	* them via the Web Key Directory or a DANE record. The key we
	* receive here from the WKD has been filtered to contain only
	* the user ID as looked up in the WKD. For a DANE origin we
	* this should also be the case. Thus we will see here only one
	* user id. */
	uid->keyorg = origin;
	uid->keyupdate = curtime;
	if (url)
	{
	xfree (uid->updateurl);
	uid->updateurl = xtrystrdup (url);
	if (!uid->updateurl)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	}
	}
	else if (origin == KEYORG_KS && url)
	{
	/* If the key was retrieved from a keyserver using a fingerprint
	* request we mark that also in the user ID. However we do not
	* store the keyserver URL in the UID. A later update (merge)
	* from a more trusted source will replace this info. */
	uid->keyorg = origin;
	uid->keyupdate = curtime;
	}
	else if (origin == KEYORG_FILE)
	{
	uid->keyorg = origin;
	uid->keyupdate = curtime;
	}
	else if (origin == KEYORG_URL)
	{
	uid->keyorg = origin;
	uid->keyupdate = curtime;
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/* Apply meta data to KEYBLOCK. This sets the origin of the key to
	* ORIGIN and the updateurl to URL. Note that this function is only
	* used for a new key, that is not when we are merging keys. */
	static gpg_error_t
	insert_key_origin (kbnode_t keyblock, int origin, const char *url)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	kbnode_t node;
	u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (is_deleted_kbnode (node))
	;
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	err = insert_key_origin_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, curtime,
	origin, url);
	if (err)
	return err;
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	err = insert_key_origin_uid (node->pkt->pkt.user_id, curtime,
	origin, url);
	if (err)
	return err;
	}
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/* Update meta data on KEYBLOCK. This updates the key origin on the
	* public key according to ORIGIN and URL. The UIDs are already
	* updated when this function is called. */
	static gpg_error_t
	update_key_origin (kbnode_t keyblock, u32 curtime, int origin, const char *url)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk;

	log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	if (pk->keyupdate > curtime)
	; /* Don't do it for a time warp. */
	else if (origin == KEYORG_WKD \|\| origin == KEYORG_DANE)
	{
	/* We only update the origin info if they either have never been
	* set or are the origin was the same as the new one. If this
	* is WKD we also update the UID to show from which user id this
	* was updated. */
	if (!pk->keyorg \|\| pk->keyorg == KEYORG_WKD \|\| pk->keyorg == KEYORG_DANE)
	{
	pk->keyorg = origin;
	pk->keyupdate = curtime;
	xfree (pk->updateurl);
	pk->updateurl = NULL;
	if (origin == KEYORG_WKD && url)
	{
	pk->updateurl = xtrystrdup (url);
	if (!pk->updateurl)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	}
	}
	}
	else if (origin == KEYORG_KS)
	{
	/* All updates from a keyserver are considered to have the
	* freshed key. Thus we always set the new key origin. */
	pk->keyorg = origin;
	pk->keyupdate = curtime;
	xfree (pk->updateurl);
	pk->updateurl = NULL;
	if (url)
	{
	pk->updateurl = xtrystrdup (url);
	if (!pk->updateurl)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	}
	}
	else if (origin == KEYORG_FILE)
	{
	/* Updates from a file are considered to be fresh. */
	pk->keyorg = origin;
	pk->keyupdate = curtime;
	xfree (pk->updateurl);
	pk->updateurl = NULL;
	}
	else if (origin == KEYORG_URL)
	{
	/* Updates from a URL are considered to be fresh. */
	pk->keyorg = origin;
	pk->keyupdate = curtime;
	xfree (pk->updateurl);
	pk->updateurl = NULL;
	if (url)
	{
	pk->updateurl = xtrystrdup (url);
	if (!pk->updateurl)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	}
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/*
	* Try to import one keyblock. Return an error only in serious cases,
	* but never for an invalid keyblock. It uses log_error to increase
	* the internal errorcount, so that invalid input can be detected by
	* programs which called gpg. If SILENT is no messages are printed -
	* even most error messages are suppressed. ORIGIN is the origin of
	* the key (0 for unknown) and URL the corresponding URL. FROM_SK
	* indicates that the key has been made from a secret key. If R_SAVED
	* is not NULL a boolean will be stored indicating whether the
	* keyblock has valid parts. Unless OTHERREVSIGS is NULL it is
	* updated with encountered new revocation signatures.
	*/
	static gpg_error_t
	import_one_real (ctrl_t ctrl,
	kbnode_t keyblock, struct import_stats_s *stats,
	unsigned char *fpr, size_t fpr_len, unsigned int options,
	int from_sk, int silent,
	import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg,
	int origin, const char url, int r_valid,
	kbnode_t *otherrevsigs)
	{
	gpg_error_t err = 0;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	kbnode_t node, uidnode;
	kbnode_t keyblock_orig = NULL;
	byte fpr2[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	size_t fpr2len;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int new_key = 0;
	int mod_key = 0;
	int same_key = 0;
	int non_self = 0;
	size_t an;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
	int merge_keys_done = 0;
	int any_filter = 0;
	KEYDB_HANDLE hd = NULL;

	if (r_valid)
	*r_valid = 0;

	/* If show-only is active we don't won't any extra output. */
	if ((options & (IMPORT_SHOW \| IMPORT_DRY_RUN)))
	silent = 1;

	/* Get the key and print some info about it. */
	node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
	if (!node )
	BUG();

	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	fingerprint_from_pk (pk, fpr2, &fpr2len);
	for (an = fpr2len; an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN; an++)
	fpr2[an] = 0;
	keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
	uidnode = find_next_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_USER_ID );

	if (opt.verbose && !opt.interactive && !silent && !from_sk)
	{
	/* Note that we do not print this info in FROM_SK mode
	* because import_secret_one already printed that. */
	log_info ("pub %s/%s %s ",
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr_from_pk(pk), datestr_from_pk(pk) );
	if (uidnode)
	print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream (),
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
	log_printf ("\n");
	}


	if (!uidnode)
	{
	if (!silent)
	log_error( _("key %s: no user ID\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
	return 0;
	}

	if (screener && screener (keyblock, screener_arg))
	{
	log_error (_("key %s: %s\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk),
	_("rejected by import screener"));
	return 0;
	}

	if (opt.interactive && !silent)
	{
	if (is_status_enabled())
	print_import_check (pk, uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id);
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	show_basic_key_info (ctrl, keyblock, from_sk);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("import.okay",
	"Do you want to import this key? (y/N) "))
	return 0;
	}

	/* Remove all non-self-sigs if requested. Note that this is a NOP if
	* that option has been globally set but we may also be called
	* latter with the already parsed keyblock and a locally changed
	* option. This is why we need to remove them here as well. */
	if ((options & IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY))
	remove_all_non_self_sigs (&keyblock, keyid);

	/* Remove or collapse the user ids. */
	if ((options & IMPORT_COLLAPSE_UIDS))
	collapse_uids (&keyblock);

	if ((options & IMPORT_COLLAPSE_SUBKEYS))
	collapse_subkeys (&keyblock);

	/* Clean the key that we're about to import, to cut down on things
	that we have to clean later. This has no practical impact on the
	end result, but does result in less logging which might confuse
	the user. */
	if ((options & IMPORT_CLEAN))
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock);
	clean_all_uids (ctrl, keyblock,
	opt.verbose, (options&IMPORT_MINIMAL), NULL, NULL);
	clean_all_subkeys (ctrl, keyblock, opt.verbose, KEY_CLEAN_NONE,
	NULL, NULL);
	}

	clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );

	if ((options&IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG)
	&& fix_pks_corruption (ctrl, keyblock)
	&& opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("key %s: PKS subkey corruption repaired\n"),
	keystr_from_pk(pk));

	if ((options & IMPORT_REPAIR_KEYS))
	key_check_all_keysigs (ctrl, 1, keyblock, 0, 0);

	if (chk_self_sigs (ctrl, keyblock, keyid, &non_self))
	return 0; /* Invalid keyblock - error already printed. */

	/* If we allow such a thing, mark unsigned uids as valid */
	if (opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid)
	{
	for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next )
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& !(node->flag & NODE_GOOD_SELFSIG)
	&& !(node->flag & NODE_BAD_SELFSIG) )
	{
	char *user=utf8_to_native(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
	/* Fake a good signature status for the user id. */
	node->flag \|= NODE_GOOD_SELFSIG;
	log_info( _("key %s: accepted non self-signed user ID \"%s\"\n"),
	keystr_from_pk(pk),user);
	xfree(user);
	}
	}

	/* Delete invalid parts and bail out if there are no user ids left. */
	if (!delete_inv_parts (ctrl, keyblock, keyid, options, otherrevsigs))
	{
	if (!silent)
	{
	log_error ( _("key %s: no valid user IDs\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info(_("this may be caused by a missing self-signature\n"));
	}
	stats->no_user_id++;
	return 0;
	}

	/* Get rid of deleted nodes. */
	commit_kbnode (&keyblock);

	/* Apply import filter. */
	if (import_filter.keep_uid)
	{
	apply_keep_uid_filter (ctrl, keyblock, import_filter.keep_uid);
	commit_kbnode (&keyblock);
	any_filter = 1;
	}
	if (import_filter.drop_sig)
	{
	apply_drop_sig_filter (ctrl, keyblock, import_filter.drop_sig);
	commit_kbnode (&keyblock);
	any_filter = 1;
	}

	/* If we ran any filter we need to check that at least one user id
	* is left in the keyring. Note that we do not use log_error in
	* this case. */
	if (any_filter && !any_uid_left (keyblock))
	{
	if (!opt.quiet )
	log_info ( _("key %s: no valid user IDs\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk));
	stats->no_user_id++;
	return 0;
	}

	/* The keyblock is valid and ready for real import. */
	if (r_valid)
	*r_valid = 1;

	/* Show the key in the form it is merged or inserted. We skip this
	* if "import-export" is also active without --armor or the output
	* file has explicily been given. */
	if ((options & IMPORT_SHOW)
	&& !((options & IMPORT_EXPORT) && !opt.armor && !opt.outfile))
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock);
	merge_keys_done = 1;
	/* Note that we do not want to show the validity because the key
	* has not yet imported. */
	list_keyblock_direct (ctrl, keyblock, from_sk, 0,
	opt.fingerprint \|\| opt.with_fingerprint, 1);
	es_fflush (es_stdout);
	no_usable_encr_subkeys_warning (keyblock);
	}

	/* Write the keyblock to the output and do not actually import. */
	if ((options & IMPORT_EXPORT))
	{
	if (!merge_keys_done)
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock);
	merge_keys_done = 1;
	}
	err = write_keyblock_to_output (keyblock, opt.armor, opt.export_options);
	goto leave;
	}

	if (opt.dry_run \|\| (options & IMPORT_DRY_RUN))
	goto leave;

	/* Do we have this key already in one of our pubrings ? */
	err = get_keyblock_byfprint_fast (ctrl, &keyblock_orig, &hd,
	fpr2, fpr2len, 1/locked/);
	if ((err
	&& gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
	&& gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY)
	\|\| !hd)
	{
	/* The !hd above is to catch a misbehaving function which
	* returns NO_PUBKEY for failing to allocate a handle. */
	if (!silent)
	log_error (_("key %s: public key not found: %s\n"),
	keystr(keyid), gpg_strerror (err));
	}
	else if (err && (opt.import_options&IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY) )
	{
	if (opt.verbose && !silent )
	log_info( _("key %s: new key - skipped\n"), keystr(keyid));
	err = 0;
	stats->skipped_new_keys++;
	}
	else if (err) /* Insert this key. */
	{
	/* Note: ERR can only be NO_PUBKEY or UNUSABLE_PUBKEY. */
	int n_sigs_cleaned, n_uids_cleaned;

	err = keydb_locate_writable (hd);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("no writable keyring found: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	goto leave;
	}
	if (opt.verbose > 1 )
	log_info (_("writing to '%s'\n"), keydb_get_resource_name (hd) );

	if ((options & IMPORT_CLEAN))
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock);
	clean_all_uids (ctrl, keyblock, opt.verbose, (options&IMPORT_MINIMAL),
	&n_uids_cleaned,&n_sigs_cleaned);
	clean_all_subkeys (ctrl, keyblock, opt.verbose, KEY_CLEAN_NONE,
	NULL, NULL);
	}

	/* Unless we are in restore mode apply meta data to the
	* keyblock. Note that this will never change the first packet
	* and thus the address of KEYBLOCK won't change. */
	if ( !(options & IMPORT_RESTORE) )
	{
	err = insert_key_origin (keyblock, origin, url);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("insert_key_origin failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	goto leave;
	}
	}

	err = keydb_insert_keyblock (hd, keyblock );
	if (err)
	log_error (_("error writing keyring '%s': %s\n"),
	keydb_get_resource_name (hd), gpg_strerror (err));
	else if (!(opt.import_options & IMPORT_KEEP_OWNERTTRUST))
	{
	/* This should not be possible since we delete the
	ownertrust when a key is deleted, but it can happen if
	the keyring and trustdb are out of sync. It can also
	be made to happen with the trusted-key command and by
	importing and locally exported key. */

	clear_ownertrusts (ctrl, pk);
	if (non_self)
	revalidation_mark (ctrl);
	}

	/* Release the handle and thus unlock the keyring asap. */
	keydb_release (hd);
	hd = NULL;

	/* We are ready. */
	if (!err && !opt.quiet && !silent)
	{
	char *p = get_user_id_byfpr_native (ctrl, fpr2, fpr2len);
	log_info (_("key %s: public key \"%s\" imported\n"),
	keystr(keyid), p);
	xfree(p);
	}
	if (!err && is_status_enabled())
	{
	char *us = get_long_user_id_string (ctrl, keyid);
	write_status_text( STATUS_IMPORTED, us );
	xfree(us);
	print_import_ok (pk, 1);
	}
	if (!err)
	{
	stats->imported++;
	new_key = 1;
	}
	}
	else /* Key already exists - merge. */
	{
	int n_uids, n_sigs, n_subk, n_sigs_cleaned, n_uids_cleaned;
	u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();

	/* Compare the original against the new key; just to be sure nothing
	* weird is going on */
	if (cmp_public_keys (keyblock_orig->pkt->pkt.public_key, pk))
	{
	if (!silent)
	log_error( _("key %s: doesn't match our copy\n"),keystr(keyid));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Make sure the original direct key sigs are all sane. */
	n_sigs_cleaned = fix_bad_direct_key_sigs (ctrl, keyblock_orig, keyid);
	if (n_sigs_cleaned)
	commit_kbnode (&keyblock_orig);

	/* Try to merge KEYBLOCK into KEYBLOCK_ORIG. */
	clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock_orig );
	clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );
	n_uids = n_sigs = n_subk = n_uids_cleaned = 0;
	err = merge_blocks (ctrl, options, keyblock_orig, keyblock, keyid,
	curtime, origin, url,
	&n_uids, &n_sigs, &n_subk );
	if (err)
	goto leave;

	/* Clean the final keyblock again if requested. we can't do
	* this if only self-signatures are imported; see bug #4628. */
	if ((options & IMPORT_CLEAN)
	&& !(options & IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY))
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock_orig);
	clean_all_uids (ctrl, keyblock_orig, opt.verbose,
	(options&IMPORT_MINIMAL),
	&n_uids_cleaned,&n_sigs_cleaned);
	clean_all_subkeys (ctrl, keyblock_orig, opt.verbose, KEY_CLEAN_NONE,
	NULL, NULL);
	}

	if (n_uids \|\| n_sigs \|\| n_subk \|\| n_sigs_cleaned \|\| n_uids_cleaned)
	{
	/* Unless we are in restore mode apply meta data to the
	* keyblock. Note that this will never change the first packet
	* and thus the address of KEYBLOCK won't change. */
	if ( !(options & IMPORT_RESTORE) )
	{
	err = update_key_origin (keyblock_orig, curtime, origin, url);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("update_key_origin failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}
	}

	mod_key = 1;
	/* KEYBLOCK_ORIG has been updated; write */
	err = keydb_update_keyblock (ctrl, hd, keyblock_orig);
	if (err)
	log_error (_("error writing keyring '%s': %s\n"),
	keydb_get_resource_name (hd), gpg_strerror (err));
	else if (non_self)
	revalidation_mark (ctrl);

	/* Release the handle and thus unlock the keyring asap. */
	keydb_release (hd);
	hd = NULL;

	/* We are ready. Print and update stats if we got no error.
	* An error here comes from writing the keyblock and thus
	* very likely means that no update happened. */
	if (!err && !opt.quiet && !silent)
	{
	char *p = get_user_id_byfpr_native (ctrl, fpr2, fpr2len);
	if (n_uids == 1 )
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" 1 new user ID\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p);
	else if (n_uids )
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" %d new user IDs\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p,n_uids);
	if (n_sigs == 1 )
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" 1 new signature\n"),
	keystr(keyid), p);
	else if (n_sigs )
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" %d new signatures\n"),
	keystr(keyid), p, n_sigs );
	if (n_subk == 1 )
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" 1 new subkey\n"),
	keystr(keyid), p);
	else if (n_subk )
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" %d new subkeys\n"),
	keystr(keyid), p, n_subk );
	if (n_sigs_cleaned==1)
	log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d signature cleaned\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p,n_sigs_cleaned);
	else if (n_sigs_cleaned)
	log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d signatures cleaned\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p,n_sigs_cleaned);
	if (n_uids_cleaned==1)
	log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d user ID cleaned\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p,n_uids_cleaned);
	else if (n_uids_cleaned)
	log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d user IDs cleaned\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p,n_uids_cleaned);
	xfree(p);
	}

	if (!err)
	{
	stats->n_uids +=n_uids;
	stats->n_sigs +=n_sigs;
	stats->n_subk +=n_subk;
	stats->n_sigs_cleaned +=n_sigs_cleaned;
	stats->n_uids_cleaned +=n_uids_cleaned;

	if (is_status_enabled () && !silent)
	print_import_ok (pk, ((n_uids?2:0)\|(n_sigs?4:0)\|(n_subk?8:0)));
	}
	}
	else
	{
	/* Release the handle and thus unlock the keyring asap. */
	keydb_release (hd);
	hd = NULL;

	/* FIXME: We do not track the time we last checked a key for
	* updates. To do this we would need to rewrite even the
	* keys which have no changes. Adding this would be useful
	* for the automatic update of expired keys via the WKD in
	* case the WKD still carries the expired key. See
	* get_best_pubkey_byname. */
	same_key = 1;
	if (is_status_enabled ())
	print_import_ok (pk, 0);

	if (!opt.quiet && !silent)
	{
	char *p = get_user_id_byfpr_native (ctrl, fpr2, fpr2len);
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" not changed\n"),keystr(keyid),p);
	xfree(p);
	}

	stats->unchanged++;
	}
	}

	leave:
	keydb_release (hd);
	if (mod_key \|\| new_key \|\| same_key)
	{
	/* A little explanation for this: we fill in the fingerprint
	when importing keys as it can be useful to know the
	fingerprint in certain keyserver-related cases (a keyserver
	asked for a particular name, but the key doesn't have that
	name). However, in cases where we're importing more than
	one key at a time, we cannot know which key to fingerprint.
	In these cases, rather than guessing, we do not
	fingerprinting at all, and we must hope the user ID on the
	keys are useful. Note that we need to do this for new
	keys, merged keys and even for unchanged keys. This is
	required because for example the --auto-key-locate feature
	may import an already imported key and needs to know the
	fingerprint of the key in all cases. */
	if (fpr)
	{
	/* Note that we need to compare against 0 here because
	COUNT gets only incremented after returning from this
	function. */
	if (!stats->count)
	{
	xfree (*fpr);
	*fpr = fingerprint_from_pk (pk, NULL, fpr_len);
	}
	else if (origin != KEYORG_WKD)
	{
	xfree (*fpr);
	*fpr = NULL;
	}
	}
	}

	/* Now that the key is definitely incorporated into the keydb, we
	need to check if a designated revocation is present or if the
	prefs are not rational so we can warn the user. */

	if (mod_key)
	{
	revocation_present (ctrl, keyblock_orig);
	if (!from_sk && have_secret_key_with_kid (ctrl, keyid))
	check_prefs (ctrl, keyblock_orig);
	}
	else if (new_key)
	{
	revocation_present (ctrl, keyblock);
	if (!from_sk && have_secret_key_with_kid (ctrl, keyid))
	check_prefs (ctrl, keyblock);
	}

	release_kbnode( keyblock_orig );

	return err;
	}


	/* Wrapper around import_one_real to retry the import in some cases. */
	static gpg_error_t
	import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
	kbnode_t keyblock, struct import_stats_s *stats,
	unsigned char *fpr, size_t fpr_len, unsigned int options,
	int from_sk, int silent,
	import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg,
	int origin, const char url, int r_valid)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	kbnode_t otherrevsigs = NULL;
	kbnode_t node;

	err = import_one_real (ctrl, keyblock, stats, fpr, fpr_len, options,
	from_sk, silent, screener, screener_arg,
	origin, url, r_valid, &otherrevsigs);
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE
	&& gpg_err_source (err) == GPG_ERR_SOURCE_KEYBOX
	&& ((options & (IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY \| IMPORT_CLEAN))
	!= (IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY \| IMPORT_CLEAN)))
	{
	/* We hit the maximum image length. Ask the wrapper to do
	* everything again but this time with some extra options. */
	u32 keyid[2];

	keyid_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);
	log_info ("key %s: keyblock too large, retrying with self-sigs-only\n",
	keystr (keyid));
	options \|= IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY \| IMPORT_CLEAN;
	err = import_one_real (ctrl, keyblock, stats, fpr, fpr_len, options,
	from_sk, silent, screener, screener_arg,
	origin, url, r_valid, &otherrevsigs);
	}

	/* Finally try to import other revocation certificates. For example
	* those of a former key appended to the current key. */
	if (!err)
	{
	for (node = otherrevsigs; node; node = node->next)
	import_revoke_cert (ctrl, node, options, stats);
	}
	release_kbnode (otherrevsigs);
	return err;
	}


	/* Transfer all the secret keys in SEC_KEYBLOCK to the gpg-agent. The
	* function prints diagnostics and returns an error code. If BATCH is
	* true the secret keys are stored by gpg-agent in the transfer format
	* (i.e. no re-protection and aksing for passphrases). If ONLY_MARKED
	* is set, only those nodes with flag NODE_TRANSFER_SECKEY are
	* processed. */
	gpg_error_t
	transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct import_stats_s *stats,
	kbnode_t sec_keyblock, int batch, int force,
	int only_marked)
	{
	gpg_error_t err = 0;
	void *kek = NULL;
	size_t keklen;
	kbnode_t ctx = NULL;
	kbnode_t node;
	PKT_public_key main_pk, pk;
	struct seckey_info *ski;
	int nskey;
	membuf_t mbuf;
	int i, j;
	void format_args[2PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
	gcry_sexp_t skey, prot, tmpsexp;
	gcry_sexp_t curve = NULL;
	unsigned char *transferkey = NULL;
	size_t transferkeylen;
	gcry_cipher_hd_t cipherhd = NULL;
	unsigned char *wrappedkey = NULL;
	size_t wrappedkeylen;
	char *cache_nonce = NULL;
	int stub_key_skipped = 0;

	/* Get the current KEK. */
	err = agent_keywrap_key (ctrl, 0, &kek, &keklen);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("error getting the KEK: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Prepare a cipher context. */
	err = gcry_cipher_open (&cipherhd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128,
	GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP, 0);
	if (!err)
	err = gcry_cipher_setkey (cipherhd, kek, keklen);
	if (err)
	goto leave;
	xfree (kek);
	kek = NULL;

	/* Note: We need to use walk_kbnode so that we skip nodes which are
	* marked as deleted. */
	main_pk = NULL;
	while ((node = walk_kbnode (sec_keyblock, &ctx, 0)))
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY
	&& node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	continue;
	if (only_marked && !(node->flag & NODE_TRANSFER_SECKEY))
	continue;
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (!main_pk)
	main_pk = pk;

	/* Make sure the keyids are available. */
	keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL);
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	{
	pk->main_keyid[0] = pk->keyid[0];
	pk->main_keyid[1] = pk->keyid[1];
	}
	else
	{
	pk->main_keyid[0] = main_pk->keyid[0];
	pk->main_keyid[1] = main_pk->keyid[1];
	}


	ski = pk->seckey_info;
	if (!ski)
	BUG ();

	if (stats)
	{
	stats->count++;
	stats->secret_read++;
	}

	/* We ignore stub keys. The way we handle them in other parts
	of the code is by asking the agent whether any secret key is
	available for a given keyblock and then concluding that we
	have a secret key; all secret (sub)keys of the keyblock the
	agent does not know of are then stub keys. This works also
	for card stub keys. The learn command or the card-status
	command may be used to check with the agent whether a card
	has been inserted and a stub key is in turn generated by the
	agent. */
	if (ski->s2k.mode == 1001 \|\| ski->s2k.mode == 1002)
	{
	stub_key_skipped = 1;
	continue;
	}

	/* Convert our internal secret key object into an S-expression. */
	nskey = pubkey_get_nskey (pk->pubkey_algo);
	if (!nskey \|\| nskey > PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY)
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
	log_error ("internal error: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	init_membuf (&mbuf, 50);
	put_membuf_str (&mbuf, "(skey");
	if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
	\|\| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA
	\|\| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
	{
	/* The ECC case. */
	char *curvestr = openpgp_oid_to_str (pk->pkey[0]);
	if (!curvestr)
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	else
	{
	const char *curvename = openpgp_oid_to_curve (curvestr, 1);
	gcry_sexp_release (curve);
	err = gcry_sexp_build (&curve, NULL, "(curve %s)",
	curvename?curvename:curvestr);
	if (!err)
	{
	j = 0;
	/* Append the public key element Q. */
	put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
	format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + 1;

	/* Append the secret key element D. For ECDH we
	skip PKEY[2] because this holds the KEK which is
	not needed by gpg-agent. */
	i = pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH? 3 : 2;
	if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1))
	put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " e %m");
	else
	put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
	format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + i;

	/* Simple hack to print a warning for an invalid key
	* in case of cv25519. We have only opaque MPIs here. */
	if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
	&& !strcmp (curvestr, "1.3.6.1.4.1.3029.1.5.1")
	&& !gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1)
	&& gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
	{
	const unsigned char *pp;
	unsigned int nn;

	pp = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pk->pkey[i], &nn);
	nn = (nn+7)/8;
	if (pp && nn && (pp[nn-1] & 7))
	log_info ("warning: lower 3 bits of the secret key"
	" are not cleared\n");
	}
	}
	xfree (curvestr);
	}
	}
	else
	{
	/* Standard case for the old (non-ECC) algorithms. */
	for (i=j=0; i < nskey; i++)
	{
	if (!pk->pkey[i])
	continue; /* Protected keys only have NPKEY+1 elements. */

	if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1))
	put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " e %m");
	else
	put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
	format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + i;
	}
	}
	put_membuf_str (&mbuf, ")");
	put_membuf (&mbuf, "", 1);
	if (err)
	xfree (get_membuf (&mbuf, NULL));
	else
	{
	char *format = get_membuf (&mbuf, NULL);
	if (!format)
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	else
	err = gcry_sexp_build_array (&skey, NULL, format, format_args);
	xfree (format);
	}
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("error building skey array: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	if (ski->is_protected)
	{
	char countbuf[35];

	/* FIXME: Support AEAD */
	/* Note that the IVLEN may be zero if we are working on a
	dummy key. We can't express that in an S-expression and
	thus we send dummy data for the IV. */
	snprintf (countbuf, sizeof countbuf, "%lu",
	(unsigned long)ski->s2k.count);
	err = gcry_sexp_build
	(&prot, NULL,
	" (protection %s %s %b %d %s %b %s)\n",
	ski->sha1chk? "sha1":"sum",
	openpgp_cipher_algo_name (ski->algo),
	ski->ivlen? (int)ski->ivlen:1,
	ski->ivlen? ski->iv: (const unsigned char*)"X",
	ski->s2k.mode,
	openpgp_md_algo_name (ski->s2k.hash_algo),
	(int)sizeof (ski->s2k.salt), ski->s2k.salt,
	countbuf);
	}
	else
	err = gcry_sexp_build (&prot, NULL, " (protection none)\n");

	tmpsexp = NULL;
	xfree (transferkey);
	transferkey = NULL;
	if (!err)
	err = gcry_sexp_build (&tmpsexp, NULL,
	"(openpgp-private-key\n"
	" (version %d)\n"
	" (algo %s)\n"
	" %S%S\n"
	" (csum %d)\n"
	" %S)\n",
	pk->version,
	openpgp_pk_algo_name (pk->pubkey_algo),
	curve, skey,
	(int)(unsigned long)ski->csum, prot);
	gcry_sexp_release (skey);
	gcry_sexp_release (prot);
	if (!err)
	err = make_canon_sexp_pad (tmpsexp, 1, &transferkey, &transferkeylen);
	gcry_sexp_release (tmpsexp);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("error building transfer key: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Wrap the key. */
	wrappedkeylen = transferkeylen + 8;
	xfree (wrappedkey);
	wrappedkey = xtrymalloc (wrappedkeylen);
	if (!wrappedkey)
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	else
	err = gcry_cipher_encrypt (cipherhd, wrappedkey, wrappedkeylen,
	transferkey, transferkeylen);
	if (err)
	goto leave;
	xfree (transferkey);
	transferkey = NULL;

	/* Send the wrapped key to the agent. */
	{
	char *desc = gpg_format_keydesc (ctrl, pk, FORMAT_KEYDESC_IMPORT, 1);
	err = agent_import_key (ctrl, desc, &cache_nonce,
	wrappedkey, wrappedkeylen, batch, force,
	pk->keyid, pk->main_keyid, pk->pubkey_algo,
	pk->timestamp);
	xfree (desc);
	}
	if (!err)
	{
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("key %s: secret key imported\n"),
	keystr_from_pk_with_sub (main_pk, pk));
	if (stats)
	stats->secret_imported++;
	}
	else if ( gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EEXIST )
	{
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("key %s: secret key already exists\n"),
	keystr_from_pk_with_sub (main_pk, pk));
	err = 0;
	if (stats)
	stats->secret_dups++;
	}
	else
	{
	log_error (_("key %s: error sending to agent: %s\n"),
	keystr_from_pk_with_sub (main_pk, pk),
	gpg_strerror (err));
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED
	\|\| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
	break; /* Don't try the other subkeys. */
	}
	}

	if (!err && stub_key_skipped)
	/* We need to notify user how to migrate stub keys. */
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED);

	leave:
	gcry_sexp_release (curve);
	xfree (cache_nonce);
	xfree (wrappedkey);
	xfree (transferkey);
	gcry_cipher_close (cipherhd);
	xfree (kek);
	return err;
	}


	/* Walk a secret keyblock and produce a public keyblock out of it.
	* Returns a new node or NULL on error. Modifies the tag field of the
	* nodes. */
	static kbnode_t
	sec_to_pub_keyblock (kbnode_t sec_keyblock)
	{
	kbnode_t pub_keyblock = NULL;
	kbnode_t ctx = NULL;
	kbnode_t secnode, pubnode;
	kbnode_t lastnode = NULL;
	unsigned int tag = 0;

	/* Set a tag to all nodes. */
	for (secnode = sec_keyblock; secnode; secnode = secnode->next)
	secnode->tag = ++tag;

	/* Copy. */
	while ((secnode = walk_kbnode (sec_keyblock, &ctx, 0)))
	{
	if (secnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
	\|\| secnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	{
	/* Make a public key. */
	PACKET *pkt;
	PKT_public_key *pk;

	pkt = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pkt);
	pk = pkt? copy_public_key (NULL, secnode->pkt->pkt.public_key): NULL;
	if (!pk)
	{
	xfree (pkt);
	release_kbnode (pub_keyblock);
	return NULL;
	}
	if (secnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_PUBLIC_KEY;
	else
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
	pkt->pkt.public_key = pk;

	pubnode = new_kbnode (pkt);
	}
	else
	{
	pubnode = clone_kbnode (secnode);
	}
	pubnode->tag = secnode->tag;

	if (!pub_keyblock)
	pub_keyblock = lastnode = pubnode;
	else
	{
	lastnode->next = pubnode;
	lastnode = pubnode;
	}
	}

	return pub_keyblock;
	}


	/* Delete all notes in the keyblock at R_KEYBLOCK which are not in
	* PUB_KEYBLOCK. Modifies the tags of both keyblock's nodes. */
	static gpg_error_t
	resync_sec_with_pub_keyblock (kbnode_t *r_keyblock, kbnode_t pub_keyblock,
	kbnode_t *r_removedsecs)
	{
	kbnode_t sec_keyblock = *r_keyblock;
	kbnode_t node, prevnode;
	unsigned int *taglist;
	unsigned int ntaglist, n;
	kbnode_t attic = NULL;
	kbnode_t *attic_head = &attic;

	/* Collect all tags in an array for faster searching. */
	for (ntaglist = 0, node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	ntaglist++;
	taglist = xtrycalloc (ntaglist, sizeof *taglist);
	if (!taglist)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	for (ntaglist = 0, node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	taglist[ntaglist++] = node->tag;

	/* Walks over the secret keyblock and delete all nodes which are not
	* in the tag list. Those nodes have been deleted in the
	* pub_keyblock. Sequential search is a bit lazy and could be
	* optimized by sorting and bsearch; however secret keyrings are
	* short and there are easier ways to DoS the import. */
	again:
	for (prevnode=NULL, node=sec_keyblock; node; prevnode=node, node=node->next)
	{
	for (n=0; n < ntaglist; n++)
	if (taglist[n] == node->tag)
	break;
	if (n == ntaglist) /* Not in public keyblock. */
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	{
	if (!prevnode)
	sec_keyblock = node->next;
	else
	prevnode->next = node->next;
	node->next = NULL;
	*attic_head = node;
	attic_head = &node->next;
	goto again; /* That's lame; I know. */
	}
	else
	delete_kbnode (node);
	}
	}

	xfree (taglist);

	/* Commit the as deleted marked nodes and return the possibly
	* modified keyblock and a list of removed secret key nodes. */
	commit_kbnode (&sec_keyblock);
	*r_keyblock = sec_keyblock;
	*r_removedsecs = attic;
	return 0;
	}


	/* Helper for import_secret_one. */
	static gpg_error_t
	do_transfer (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, PKT_public_key *pk,
	struct import_stats_s *stats, int batch, int only_marked)

	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	struct import_stats_s subkey_stats = {0};
	int force = 0;
	int already_exist = agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, pk);

	if (already_exist == 2 \|\| already_exist == 4)
	{
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("key %s: card reference is overridden by key material\n"),
	keystr_from_pk (pk));
	force = 1;
	}

	err = transfer_secret_keys (ctrl, &subkey_stats, keyblock,
	batch, force, only_marked);
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED)
	{
	/* TRANSLATORS: For a smartcard, each private key on host has a
	* reference (stub) to a smartcard and actual private key data
	* is stored on the card. A single smartcard can have up to
	* three private key data. Importing private key stub is always
	* skipped in 2.1, and it returns GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED.
	* Instead, user should be suggested to run 'gpg --card-status',
	* then, references to a card will be automatically created
	* again. */
	log_info (_("To migrate '%s', with each smartcard, "
	"run: %s\n"), "secring.gpg", "gpg --card-status");
	err = 0;
	}

	if (!err)
	{
	int status = 16;

	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("key %s: secret key imported\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk));
	if (subkey_stats.secret_imported)
	{
	status \|= 1;
	stats->secret_imported += 1;
	}
	if (subkey_stats.secret_dups)
	stats->secret_dups += 1;

	if (is_status_enabled ())
	print_import_ok (pk, status);
	}

	return err;
	}


	/* If the secret keys (main or subkey) in SECKEYS have a corresponding
	* public key in the public key described by (FPR,FPRLEN) import these
	* parts.
	*/
	static gpg_error_t
	import_matching_seckeys (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t seckeys,
	const byte *mainfpr, size_t mainfprlen,
	struct import_stats_s *stats, int batch)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	kbnode_t pub_keyblock = NULL;
	kbnode_t node;
	struct { byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN]; size_t fprlen; } *fprlist = NULL;
	size_t n, nfprlist;
	byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	size_t fprlen;
	PKT_public_key *pk;

	/* Get the entire public key block from our keystore and put all its
	* fingerprints into an array. */
	err = get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, NULL, &pub_keyblock, mainfpr, mainfprlen);
	if (err)
	goto leave;
	log_assert (pub_keyblock && pub_keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	for (nfprlist = 0, node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	nfprlist++;
	log_assert (nfprlist);
	fprlist = xtrycalloc (nfprlist, sizeof *fprlist);
	if (!fprlist)
	{
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	goto leave;
	}
	for (n = 0, node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	fingerprint_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key,
	fprlist[n].fpr, &fprlist[n].fprlen);
	n++;
	}
	log_assert (n == nfprlist);

	/* for (n=0; n < nfprlist; n++) */
	/* log_printhex (fprlist[n].fpr, fprlist[n].fprlen, "pubkey %zu:", n); */

	/* Mark all secret keys which have a matching public key part in
	* PUB_KEYBLOCK. */
	for (node = seckeys; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY
	&& node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	continue; /* Should not happen. */
	fingerprint_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, fpr, &fprlen);
	node->flag &= ~NODE_TRANSFER_SECKEY;
	for (n=0; n < nfprlist; n++)
	if (fprlist[n].fprlen == fprlen && !memcmp (fprlist[n].fpr,fpr,fprlen))
	{
	node->flag \|= NODE_TRANSFER_SECKEY;
	/* log_debug ("found matching seckey\n"); */
	break;
	}
	}

	/* Transfer all marked keys. */
	err = do_transfer (ctrl, seckeys, pk, stats, batch, 1);

	leave:
	xfree (fprlist);
	release_kbnode (pub_keyblock);
	return err;
	}


	/* Import function for a single secret keyblock. Handling is simpler
	* than for public keys. We allow secret key importing only when
	* allow is true, this is so that a secret key can not be imported
	* accidentally and thereby tampering with the trust calculation.
	*
	* Ownership of KEYBLOCK is transferred to this function!
	*
	* If R_SECATTIC is not null the last special sec_keyblock is stored
	* there.
	*/
	static gpg_error_t
	import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
	struct import_stats_s *stats, int batch,
	unsigned int options, int for_migration,
	import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg,
	kbnode_t *r_secattic)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	struct seckey_info *ski;
	kbnode_t node, uidnode;
	u32 keyid[2];
	gpg_error_t err = 0;
	int nr_prev;
	kbnode_t pub_keyblock;
	kbnode_t attic = NULL;
	byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	size_t fprlen;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

	/* Get the key and print some info about it */
	node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY);
	if (!node)
	BUG ();

	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	fingerprint_from_pk (pk, fpr, &fprlen);
	keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
	uidnode = find_next_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_USER_ID);

	if (screener && screener (keyblock, screener_arg))
	{
	log_error (_("secret key %s: %s\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk),
	_("rejected by import screener"));
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	return 0;
	}

	if (opt.verbose && !for_migration)
	{
	log_info ("sec %s/%s %s ",
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr_from_pk (pk), datestr_from_pk (pk));
	if (uidnode)
	print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream (), uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len);
	log_printf ("\n");
	}
	stats->secret_read++;

	if ((options & IMPORT_NO_SECKEY))
	{
	if (!for_migration)
	log_error (_("importing secret keys not allowed\n"));
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	return 0;
	}

	if (!uidnode)
	{
	if (!for_migration)
	log_error( _("key %s: no user ID\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk));
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	return 0;
	}

	ski = pk->seckey_info;
	if (!ski)
	{
	/* Actually an internal error. */
	log_error ("key %s: secret key info missing\n", keystr_from_pk (pk));
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	return 0;
	}

	/* A quick check to not import keys with an invalid protection
	cipher algorithm (only checks the primary key, though). */
	if (ski->algo > 110)
	{
	if (!for_migration)
	log_error (_("key %s: secret key with invalid cipher %d"
	" - skipped\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk), ski->algo);
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	return 0;
	}

	#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
	if (1)
	{
	/* We don't allow importing secret keys because that may be used
	to put a secret key into the keyring and the user might later
	be tricked into signing stuff with that key. */
	log_error (_("importing secret keys not allowed\n"));
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	return 0;
	}
	#endif

	clear_kbnode_flags (keyblock);

	nr_prev = stats->skipped_new_keys;

	/* Make a public key out of the key. */
	pub_keyblock = sec_to_pub_keyblock (keyblock);
	if (!pub_keyblock)
	{
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	log_error ("key %s: failed to create public key from secret key\n",
	keystr_from_pk (pk));
	}
	else
	{
	int valid;

	/* Note that this outputs an IMPORT_OK status message for the
	public key block, and below we will output another one for
	the secret keys. FIXME? */
	import_one (ctrl, pub_keyblock, stats,
	NULL, NULL, options, 1, for_migration,
	screener, screener_arg, 0, NULL, &valid);

	/* The secret keyblock may not have nodes which are deleted in
	* the public keyblock. Otherwise we would import just the
	* secret key without having the public key. That would be
	* surprising and clutters our private-keys-v1.d. */
	err = resync_sec_with_pub_keyblock (&keyblock, pub_keyblock, &attic);
	if (err)
	goto leave;

	if (!valid)
	{
	/* If the block was not valid the primary key is left in the
	* original keyblock because we require that for the first
	* node. Move it to ATTIC. */
	if (keyblock && keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	{
	node = keyblock;
	keyblock = node->next;
	node->next = NULL;
	if (attic)
	{
	node->next = attic;
	attic = node;
	}
	else
	attic = node;
	}

	/* Try to import the secret key iff we have a public key. */
	if (attic && !(opt.dry_run \|\| (options & IMPORT_DRY_RUN)))
	err = import_matching_seckeys (ctrl, attic, fpr, fprlen,
	stats, batch);
	else
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
	goto leave;
	}

	/* log_debug ("attic is:\n"); */
	/* dump_kbnode (attic); */

	/* Proceed with the valid parts of PUBKEYBLOCK. */

	/* At least we cancel the secret key import when the public key
	import was skipped due to MERGE_ONLY option and a new
	key. */
	if (!(opt.dry_run \|\| (options & IMPORT_DRY_RUN))
	&& stats->skipped_new_keys <= nr_prev)
	{
	/* Read the keyblock again to get the effects of a merge for
	* the public key. */
	err = get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, NULL, &node, fpr, fprlen);
	if (err \|\| !node)
	log_error ("key %s: failed to re-lookup public key: %s\n",
	keystr_from_pk (pk), gpg_strerror (err));
	else
	{
	err = do_transfer (ctrl, keyblock, pk, stats, batch, 0);
	if (!err)
	check_prefs (ctrl, node);
	release_kbnode (node);

	if (!err && attic)
	{
	/* Try to import invalid subkeys. This can be the
	* case if the primary secret key was imported due
	* to --allow-non-selfsigned-uid. */
	err = import_matching_seckeys (ctrl, attic, fpr, fprlen,
	stats, batch);
	}

	}
	}
	}

	leave:
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	release_kbnode (pub_keyblock);
	if (r_secattic)
	*r_secattic = attic;
	else
	release_kbnode (attic);
	return err;
	}



	/* Return the recocation reason from signature SIG. If no revocation
	* reason is available 0 is returned, in other cases the reason
	* (0..255). If R_REASON is not NULL a malloced textual
	* representation of the code is stored there. If R_COMMENT is not
	* NULL the comment from the reason is stored there and its length at
	* R_COMMENTLEN. Note that the value at R_COMMENT is not filtered but
	* user supplied data in UTF8; thus it needs to be escaped for display
	* purposes. Both return values are either NULL or a malloced
	* string/buffer. */
	int
	get_revocation_reason (PKT_signature sig, char *r_reason,
	char *r_comment, size_t r_commentlen)
	{
	int reason_seq = 0;
	size_t reason_n;
	const byte *reason_p;
	char reason_code_buf[20];
	const char *reason_text = NULL;
	int reason_code = 0;

	if (r_reason)
	*r_reason = NULL;
	if (r_comment)
	*r_comment = NULL;

	/* Skip over empty reason packets. */
	while ((reason_p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON,
	&reason_n, &reason_seq, NULL))
	&& !reason_n)
	;
	if (reason_p)
	{
	reason_code = *reason_p;
	reason_n--; reason_p++;
	switch (reason_code)
	{
	case 0x00: reason_text = _("No reason specified"); break;
	case 0x01: reason_text = _("Key is superseded"); break;
	case 0x02: reason_text = _("Key has been compromised"); break;
	case 0x03: reason_text = _("Key is no longer used"); break;
	case 0x20: reason_text = _("User ID is no longer valid"); break;
	default:
	snprintf (reason_code_buf, sizeof reason_code_buf,
	"code=%02x", reason_code);
	reason_text = reason_code_buf;
	break;
	}

	if (r_reason)
	*r_reason = xstrdup (reason_text);

	if (r_comment && reason_n)
	{
	*r_comment = xmalloc (reason_n);
	memcpy (*r_comment, reason_p, reason_n);
	*r_commentlen = reason_n;
	}
	}

	return reason_code;
	}


	/* List the recocation signature as a "rvs" record. SIGRC shows the
	* character from the signature verification or 0 if no public key was
	* found. */
	static void
	list_standalone_revocation (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig, int sigrc)
	{
	char *siguid = NULL;
	size_t siguidlen = 0;
	char *issuer_fpr = NULL;
	int reason_code = 0;
	char *reason_text = NULL;
	char *reason_comment = NULL;
	size_t reason_commentlen;

	if (sigrc != '%' && sigrc != '?' && !opt.fast_list_mode)
	{
	int nouid;
	siguid = get_user_id (ctrl, sig->keyid, &siguidlen, &nouid);
	if (nouid)
	sigrc = '?';
	}

	reason_code = get_revocation_reason (sig, &reason_text,
	&reason_comment, &reason_commentlen);

	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	es_fputs ("rvs:", es_stdout);
	if (sigrc)
	es_putc (sigrc, es_stdout);
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::",
	sig->pubkey_algo,
	(ulong) sig->keyid[0], (ulong) sig->keyid[1],
	colon_datestr_from_sig (sig),
	colon_expirestr_from_sig (sig));

	if (siguid)
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, siguid, siguidlen, ":", NULL);

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":%02x%c", sig->sig_class,
	sig->flags.exportable ? 'x' : 'l');
	if (reason_text)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, ",%02x", reason_code);
	es_fputs ("::", es_stdout);

	if ((issuer_fpr = issuer_fpr_string (sig)))
	es_fputs (issuer_fpr, es_stdout);

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":::%d:", sig->digest_algo);

	if (reason_comment)
	{
	es_fputs ("::::", es_stdout);
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, reason_comment, reason_commentlen,
	":", NULL);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	}
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);

	if (opt.show_subpackets)
	print_subpackets_colon (sig);
	}
	else /* Human readable. */
	{
	es_fputs ("rvs", es_stdout);
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%c%c %c%c%c%c%c%c %s %s",
	sigrc, (sig->sig_class - 0x10 > 0 &&
	sig->sig_class - 0x10 <
	4) ? '0' + sig->sig_class - 0x10 : ' ',
	sig->flags.exportable ? ' ' : 'L',
	sig->flags.revocable ? ' ' : 'R',
	sig->flags.policy_url ? 'P' : ' ',
	sig->flags.notation ? 'N' : ' ',
	sig->flags.expired ? 'X' : ' ',
	(sig->trust_depth > 9) ? 'T' : (sig->trust_depth >
	0) ? '0' +
	sig->trust_depth : ' ', keystr (sig->keyid),
	datestr_from_sig (sig));
	if (siguid)
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " ");
	print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, siguid, siguidlen);
	}
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);

	if (sig->flags.policy_url
	&& (opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS))
	show_policy_url (sig, 3, 0);

	if (sig->flags.notation && (opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS))
	show_notation (sig, 3, 0,
	((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS) ? 1 : 0)
	+
	((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS) ? 2 : 0));

	if (sig->flags.pref_ks
	&& (opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS))
	show_keyserver_url (sig, 3, 0);

	if (reason_text)
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " %s%s\n",
	_("reason for revocation: "), reason_text);
	if (reason_comment)
	{
	const byte s, s_lf;
	size_t n, n_lf;

	s = reason_comment;
	n = reason_commentlen;
	s_lf = NULL;
	do
	{
	/* We don't want any empty lines, so we skip them. */
	for (;n && *s == '\n'; s++, n--)
	;
	if (n)
	{
	s_lf = memchr (s, '\n', n);
	n_lf = s_lf? s_lf - s : n;
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " %s",
	_("revocation comment: "));
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, s, n_lf, NULL, NULL);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	s += n_lf; n -= n_lf;
	}
	} while (s_lf);
	}
	}
	}

	es_fflush (es_stdout);

	xfree (reason_text);
	xfree (reason_comment);
	xfree (siguid);
	xfree (issuer_fpr);
	}


	/* Import a revocation certificate; only the first packet in the
	* NODE-list is considered. */
	static int
	import_revoke_cert (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t node, unsigned int options,
	struct import_stats_s *stats)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
	kbnode_t onode;
	kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
	KEYDB_HANDLE hd = NULL;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int rc = 0;
	int sigrc = 0;
	int silent;

	/* No error output for --show-keys. */
	silent = (options & (IMPORT_SHOW \| IMPORT_DRY_RUN));

	log_assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE );
	log_assert (IS_KEY_REV (node->pkt->pkt.signature));

	/* FIXME: We can do better here by using the issuer fingerprint if
	* available. We should also make use of get_keyblock_byfprint_fast. */

	keyid[0] = node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0];
	keyid[1] = node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1];

	pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
	rc = get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, keyid );
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY )
	{
	if (!silent)
	log_error (_("key %s: no public key -"
	" can't apply revocation certificate\n"), keystr(keyid));
	rc = 0;
	goto leave;
	}
	else if (rc )
	{
	log_error (_("key %s: public key not found: %s\n"),
	keystr(keyid), gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Read the original keyblock. */
	hd = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (!hd)
	{
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	goto leave;
	}

	{
	byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	size_t an;

	fingerprint_from_pk (pk, afp, &an);
	rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, afp, an);
	}
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("key %s: can't locate original keyblock: %s\n"),
	keystr(keyid), gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto leave;
	}
	rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock );
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("key %s: can't read original keyblock: %s\n"),
	keystr(keyid), gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* it is okay, that node is not in keyblock because
	* check_key_signature works fine for sig_class 0x20 (KEY_REV) in
	* this special case. SIGRC is only used for IMPORT_SHOW. */
	rc = check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, node, NULL);
	switch (gpg_err_code (rc))
	{
	case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
	case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: sigrc = '-'; break;
	case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
	case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
	default: sigrc = '%'; break;
	}
	if (rc )
	{
	if (!silent)
	log_error (_("key %s: invalid revocation certificate"
	": %s - rejected\n"), keystr(keyid), gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* check whether we already have this */
	for(onode=keyblock->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
	if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
	break;
	else if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& !cmp_signatures(node->pkt->pkt.signature,
	onode->pkt->pkt.signature))
	{
	rc = 0;
	goto leave; /* yes, we already know about it */
	}
	}

	/* insert it */
	insert_kbnode( keyblock, clone_kbnode(node), 0 );

	/* and write the keyblock back unless in dry run mode. */
	if (!(opt.dry_run \|\| (options & IMPORT_DRY_RUN)))
	{
	rc = keydb_update_keyblock (ctrl, hd, keyblock );
	if (rc)
	log_error (_("error writing keyring '%s': %s\n"),
	keydb_get_resource_name (hd), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	keydb_release (hd);
	hd = NULL;

	/* we are ready */
	if (!opt.quiet )
	{
	char *p=get_user_id_native (ctrl, keyid);
	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" revocation certificate imported\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p);
	xfree(p);
	}

	/* If the key we just revoked was ultimately trusted, remove its
	* ultimate trust. This doesn't stop the user from putting the
	* ultimate trust back, but is a reasonable solution for now. */
	if (get_ownertrust (ctrl, pk) == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
	clear_ownertrusts (ctrl, pk);

	revalidation_mark (ctrl);
	}
	stats->n_revoc++;

	leave:
	if ((options & IMPORT_SHOW))
	list_standalone_revocation (ctrl, node->pkt->pkt.signature, sigrc);

	keydb_release (hd);
	release_kbnode( keyblock );
	free_public_key( pk );
	return rc;
	}


	/* Loop over the KEYBLOCK and check all self signatures. KEYID is the
	* keyid of the primary key for reporting purposes. On return the
	* following bits in the node flags are set:
	*
	* - NODE_GOOD_SELFSIG :: User ID or subkey has a self-signature
	* - NODE_BAD_SELFSIG :: Used ID or subkey has an invalid self-signature
	* - NODE_DELETION_MARK :: This node shall be deleted
	*
	* NON_SELF is set to true if there are any sigs other than self-sigs
	* in this keyblock.
	*
	* Returns 0 on success or -1 (but not an error code) if the keyblock
	* is invalid.
	*/
	static int
	chk_self_sigs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, u32 keyid, int non_self)
	{
	kbnode_t knode = NULL; /* The node of the current subkey. */
	PKT_public_key subpk = NULL; / and its packet. */
	kbnode_t bsnode = NULL; /* Subkey binding signature node. */
	u32 bsdate = 0; /* Timestamp of that node. */
	kbnode_t rsnode = NULL; /* Subkey recocation signature node. */
	u32 rsdate = 0; /* Timestamp of that node. */
	PKT_signature *sig;
	int rc;
	kbnode_t n;

	for (n=keyblock; (n = find_next_kbnode (n, 0)); )
	{
	if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	knode = n;
	subpk = knode->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	bsdate = 0;
	rsdate = 0;
	bsnode = NULL;
	rsnode = NULL;
	continue;
	}

	if ( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
	continue;

	sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if ( keyid[0] != sig->keyid[0] \|\| keyid[1] != sig->keyid[1] )
	{
	*non_self = 1;
	continue;
	}

	/* This just caches the sigs for later use. That way we
	import a fully-cached key which speeds things up. */
	if (!opt.no_sig_cache)
	check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, n, NULL);

	if ( IS_UID_SIG(sig) \|\| IS_UID_REV(sig) )
	{
	kbnode_t unode = find_prev_kbnode( keyblock, n, PKT_USER_ID );
	if ( !unode )
	{
	log_error( _("key %s: no user ID for signature\n"),
	keystr(keyid));
	return -1; /* The complete keyblock is invalid. */
	}

	/* If it hasn't been marked valid yet, keep trying. */
	if (!(unode->flag & NODE_GOOD_SELFSIG))
	{
	rc = check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, n, NULL);
	if ( rc )
	{
	if ( opt.verbose )
	{
	char *p = utf8_to_native
	(unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	strlen (unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name),0);
	log_info (gpg_err_code(rc) == GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
	_("key %s: unsupported public key "
	"algorithm on user ID \"%s\"\n"):
	_("key %s: invalid self-signature "
	"on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
	keystr (keyid),p);
	xfree (p);
	}
	}
	else
	unode->flag \|= NODE_GOOD_SELFSIG;
	}
	}
	else if (IS_KEY_SIG (sig))
	{
	rc = check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, n, NULL);
	if ( rc )
	{
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
	_("key %s: unsupported public key algorithm\n"):
	_("key %s: invalid direct key signature\n"),
	keystr (keyid));
	n->flag \|= NODE_DELETION_MARK;
	}
	}
	else if ( IS_SUBKEY_SIG (sig) )
	{
	/* Note that this works based solely on the timestamps like
	the rest of gpg. If the standard gets revocation
	targets, this may need to be revised. */

	if ( !knode )
	{
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("key %s: no subkey for key binding\n"),
	keystr (keyid));
	n->flag \|= NODE_DELETION_MARK;
	}
	else
	{
	rc = check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, n, NULL);
	if ( rc )
	{
	if (opt.verbose)
	{
	keyid_from_pk (subpk, NULL);
	log_info (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
	_("key %s: unsupported public key"
	" algorithm\n"):
	_("key %s: invalid subkey binding\n"),
	keystr_with_sub (keyid, subpk->keyid));
	}
	n->flag \|= NODE_DELETION_MARK;
	}
	else
	{
	/* It's valid, so is it newer? */
	if (sig->timestamp >= bsdate)
	{
	knode->flag \|= NODE_GOOD_SELFSIG; /* Subkey is valid. */
	if (bsnode)
	{
	/* Delete the last binding sig since this
	one is newer */
	bsnode->flag \|= NODE_DELETION_MARK;
	if (opt.verbose)
	{
	keyid_from_pk (subpk, NULL);
	log_info (_("key %s: removed multiple subkey"
	" binding\n"),
	keystr_with_sub (keyid, subpk->keyid));
	}
	}

	bsnode = n;
	bsdate = sig->timestamp;
	}
	else
	n->flag \|= NODE_DELETION_MARK; /* older */
	}
	}
	}
	else if ( IS_SUBKEY_REV (sig) )
	{
	/* We don't actually mark the subkey as revoked right now,
	so just check that the revocation sig is the most recent
	valid one. Note that we don't care if the binding sig is
	newer than the revocation sig. See the comment in
	getkey.c:merge_selfsigs_subkey for more. */
	if ( !knode )
	{
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("key %s: no subkey for key revocation\n"),
	keystr(keyid));
	n->flag \|= NODE_DELETION_MARK;
	}
	else
	{
	rc = check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, n, NULL);
	if ( rc )
	{
	if(opt.verbose)
	log_info (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
	_("key %s: unsupported public"
	" key algorithm\n"):
	_("key %s: invalid subkey revocation\n"),
	keystr(keyid));
	n->flag \|= NODE_DELETION_MARK;
	}
	else
	{
	/* It's valid, so is it newer? */
	if (sig->timestamp >= rsdate)
	{
	if (rsnode)
	{
	/* Delete the last revocation sig since
	this one is newer. */
	rsnode->flag \|= NODE_DELETION_MARK;
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("key %s: removed multiple subkey"
	" revocation\n"),keystr(keyid));
	}

	rsnode = n;
	rsdate = sig->timestamp;
	}
	else
	n->flag \|= NODE_DELETION_MARK; /* older */
	}
	}
	}
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/* Delete all parts which are invalid and those signatures whose
	* public key algorithm is not available in this implementation; but
	* consider RSA as valid, because parse/build_packets knows about it.
	* If R_OTHERREVSIGS is not NULL, it is used to return a list of
	* revocation certificates which have been deleted from KEYBLOCK but
	* should be handled later.
	*
	* Returns: True if at least one valid user-id is left over.
	*/
	static int
	delete_inv_parts (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, u32 *keyid,
	unsigned int options, kbnode_t *r_otherrevsigs)
	{
	kbnode_t node;
	int nvalid=0, uid_seen=0, subkey_seen=0;
	PKT_public_key *pk;

	for (node=keyblock->next; node; node = node->next )
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	uid_seen = 1;
	if ((node->flag & NODE_BAD_SELFSIG)
	\|\| !(node->flag & NODE_GOOD_SELFSIG))
	{
	if (opt.verbose )
	{
	char *p=utf8_to_native(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
	log_info( _("key %s: skipped user ID \"%s\"\n"),
	keystr(keyid),p);
	xfree(p);
	}
	delete_kbnode( node ); /* the user-id */
	/* and all following packets up to the next user-id */
	while (node->next
	&& node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID
	&& node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ){
	delete_kbnode( node->next );
	node = node->next;
	}
	}
	else
	nvalid++;
	}
	else if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
	{
	if ((node->flag & NODE_BAD_SELFSIG)
	\|\| !(node->flag & NODE_GOOD_SELFSIG))
	{
	if (opt.verbose )
	{
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL);
	log_info (_("key %s: skipped subkey\n"),
	keystr_with_sub (keyid, pk->keyid));
	}

	delete_kbnode( node ); /* the subkey */
	/* and all following signature packets */
	while (node->next
	&& node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
	delete_kbnode( node->next );
	node = node->next;
	}
	}
	else
	subkey_seen = 1;
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& openpgp_pk_test_algo (node->pkt->pkt.signature->pubkey_algo)
	&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->pubkey_algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
	{
	delete_kbnode( node ); /* build_packet() can't handle this */
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& !node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable
	&& !(options&IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS)
	&& !have_secret_key_with_kid (ctrl,
	node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid))
	{
	/* here we violate the rfc a bit by still allowing
	* to import non-exportable signature when we have the
	* the secret key used to create this signature - it
	* seems that this makes sense */
	if(opt.verbose)
	log_info( _("key %s: non exportable signature"
	" (class 0x%02X) - skipped\n"),
	keystr(keyid), node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class );
	delete_kbnode( node );
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& IS_KEY_REV (node->pkt->pkt.signature))
	{
	if (uid_seen )
	{
	if(opt.verbose)
	log_info( _("key %s: revocation certificate"
	" at wrong place - skipped\n"),keystr(keyid));
	if (r_otherrevsigs)
	{
	PACKET *pkt;

	pkt = xcalloc (1, sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = copy_signature
	(NULL, node->pkt->pkt.signature);
	r_otherrevsigs = new_kbnode2 (r_otherrevsigs, pkt);
	}
	delete_kbnode( node );
	}
	else
	{
	/* If the revocation cert is from a different key than
	the one we're working on don't check it - it's
	probably from a revocation key and won't be
	verifiable with this key anyway. */

	if(node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]==keyid[0]
	&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]==keyid[1])
	{
	int rc = check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, node, NULL);
	if (rc )
	{
	if(opt.verbose)
	log_info( _("key %s: invalid revocation"
	" certificate: %s - skipped\n"),
	keystr(keyid), gpg_strerror (rc));
	delete_kbnode( node );
	}
	}
	else if (r_otherrevsigs)
	{
	PACKET *pkt;

	pkt = xcalloc (1, sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = copy_signature
	(NULL, node->pkt->pkt.signature);
	r_otherrevsigs = new_kbnode2 (r_otherrevsigs, pkt);
	}
	}
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& (IS_SUBKEY_SIG (node->pkt->pkt.signature)
	\|\| IS_SUBKEY_REV (node->pkt->pkt.signature))
	&& !subkey_seen )
	{
	if(opt.verbose)
	log_info( _("key %s: subkey signature"
	" in wrong place - skipped\n"), keystr(keyid));
	delete_kbnode( node );
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& !IS_CERT(node->pkt->pkt.signature))
	{
	if(opt.verbose)
	log_info(_("key %s: unexpected signature class (0x%02X) -"
	" skipped\n"),keystr(keyid),
	node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class);
	delete_kbnode(node);
	}
	else if ((node->flag & NODE_DELETION_MARK))
	delete_kbnode( node );
	}

	/* note: because keyblock is the public key, it is never marked
	* for deletion and so keyblock cannot change */
	commit_kbnode( &keyblock );
	return nvalid;
	}

	/* This function returns true if any UID is left in the keyring. */
	static int
	any_uid_left (kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	kbnode_t node;

	for (node=keyblock->next; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	return 1;
	return 0;
	}


	/* Delete all non-self-sigs from KEYBLOCK.
	* Returns: True if the keyblock has changed. */
	static void
	remove_all_non_self_sigs (kbnode_t keyblock, u32 keyid)
	{
	kbnode_t node;
	unsigned int dropped = 0;

	for (node = *keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (is_deleted_kbnode (node))
	continue;

	if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
	continue;

	if (node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0] == keyid[0]
	&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] == keyid[1])
	continue;
	delete_kbnode (node);
	dropped++;
	}

	if (dropped)
	commit_kbnode (keyblock);

	if (dropped && opt.verbose)
	log_info ("key %s: number of dropped non-self-signatures: %u\n",
	keystr (keyid), dropped);
	}


	/*
	* It may happen that the imported keyblock has duplicated user IDs.
	* We check this here and collapse those user IDs together with their
	* sigs into one.
	* Returns: True if the keyblock has changed.
	*/
	int
	collapse_uids (kbnode_t *keyblock)
	{
	kbnode_t uid1;
	int any=0;

	for(uid1=*keyblock;uid1;uid1=uid1->next)
	{
	kbnode_t uid2;

	if(is_deleted_kbnode(uid1))
	continue;

	if(uid1->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_USER_ID)
	continue;

	for(uid2=uid1->next;uid2;uid2=uid2->next)
	{
	if(is_deleted_kbnode(uid2))
	continue;

	if(uid2->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_USER_ID)
	continue;

	if(cmp_user_ids(uid1->pkt->pkt.user_id,
	uid2->pkt->pkt.user_id)==0)
	{
	/* We have a duplicated uid */
	kbnode_t sig1,last;

	any=1;

	/* Now take uid2's signatures, and attach them to
	uid1 */
	for(last=uid2;last->next;last=last->next)
	{
	if(is_deleted_kbnode(last))
	continue;

	if(last->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
	\|\| last->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| last->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	break;
	}

	/* Snip out uid2 */
	(find_prev_kbnode(*keyblock,uid2,0))->next=last->next;

	/* Now put uid2 in place as part of uid1 */
	last->next=uid1->next;
	uid1->next=uid2;
	delete_kbnode(uid2);

	/* Now dedupe uid1 */
	for(sig1=uid1->next;sig1;sig1=sig1->next)
	{
	kbnode_t sig2;

	if(is_deleted_kbnode(sig1))
	continue;

	if(sig1->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
	\|\| sig1->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| sig1->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	break;

	if(sig1->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_SIGNATURE)
	continue;

	for(sig2=sig1->next,last=sig1;sig2;last=sig2,sig2=sig2->next)
	{
	if(is_deleted_kbnode(sig2))
	continue;

	if(sig2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
	\|\| sig2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| sig2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	break;

	if(sig2->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_SIGNATURE)
	continue;

	if(cmp_signatures(sig1->pkt->pkt.signature,
	sig2->pkt->pkt.signature)==0)
	{
	/* We have a match, so delete the second
	signature */
	delete_kbnode(sig2);
	sig2=last;
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}

	commit_kbnode(keyblock);

	if(any && !opt.quiet)
	{
	const char *key="???";

	if ((uid1 = find_kbnode (*keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)) )
	key = keystr_from_pk (uid1->pkt->pkt.public_key);
	else if ((uid1 = find_kbnode( *keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY)) )
	key = keystr_from_pk (uid1->pkt->pkt.public_key);

	log_info (_("key %s: duplicated user ID detected - merged\n"), key);
	}

	return any;
	}


	/*
	* It may happen that the imported keyblock has duplicated subkeys.
	* We check this here and collapse those subkeys along with their
	* binding self-signatures.
	* Returns: True if the keyblock has changed.
	*/
	int
	collapse_subkeys (kbnode_t *keyblock)
	{
	kbnode_t kb1, kb2, sig1, sig2, last;
	int any = 0;

	for (kb1 = *keyblock; kb1; kb1 = kb1->next)
	{
	if (is_deleted_kbnode (kb1))
	continue;

	if (kb1->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& kb1->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	continue;

	/* We assume just a few duplicates and use a straightforward
	* algorithm. */
	for (kb2 = kb1->next; kb2; kb2 = kb2->next)
	{
	if (is_deleted_kbnode (kb2))
	continue;

	if (kb2->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& kb2->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	continue;

	if (cmp_public_keys (kb1->pkt->pkt.public_key,
	kb2->pkt->pkt.public_key))
	continue;

	/* We have a duplicated subkey. */
	any = 1;

	/* Take subkey-2's signatures, and attach them to subkey-1. */
	for (last = kb2; last->next; last = last->next)
	{
	if (is_deleted_kbnode (last))
	continue;

	if (last->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
	break;
	}

	/* Snip out subkye-2 */
	find_prev_kbnode (*keyblock, kb2, 0)->next = last->next;

	/* Put subkey-2 in place as part of subkey-1 */
	last->next = kb1->next;
	kb1->next = kb2;
	delete_kbnode (kb2);

	/* Now dedupe kb1 */
	for (sig1 = kb1->next; sig1; sig1 = sig1->next)
	{
	if (is_deleted_kbnode (sig1))
	continue;

	if (sig1->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
	break;

	for (sig2 = sig1->next, last = sig1;
	sig2;
	last = sig2, sig2 = sig2->next)
	{
	if (is_deleted_kbnode (sig2))
	continue;

	if (sig2->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
	break;

	if (!cmp_signatures (sig1->pkt->pkt.signature,
	sig2->pkt->pkt.signature))
	{
	/* We have a match, so delete the second
	signature */
	delete_kbnode (sig2);
	sig2 = last;
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}

	commit_kbnode (keyblock);

	if (any && !opt.quiet)
	{
	const char *key="???";

	if ((kb1 = find_kbnode (*keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)) )
	key = keystr_from_pk (kb1->pkt->pkt.public_key);
	else if ((kb1 = find_kbnode (*keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY)) )
	key = keystr_from_pk (kb1->pkt->pkt.public_key);

	log_info (_("key %s: duplicated subkeys detected - merged\n"), key);
	}

	return any;
	}


	/* Check for a 0x20 revocation from a revocation key that is not
	present. This may be called without the benefit of merge_xxxx so
	you can't rely on pk->revkey and friends. */
	static void
	revocation_present (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	kbnode_t onode, inode;
	PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	for(onode=keyblock->next;onode;onode=onode->next)
	{
	/* If we reach user IDs, we're done. */
	if(onode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
	break;

	if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& IS_KEY_SIG (onode->pkt->pkt.signature)
	&& onode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey)
	{
	int idx;
	PKT_signature *sig=onode->pkt->pkt.signature;

	for(idx=0;idx<sig->numrevkeys;idx++)
	{
	u32 keyid[2];

	keyid_from_fingerprint (ctrl, sig->revkey[idx].fpr,
	sig->revkey[idx].fprlen, keyid);

	for(inode=keyblock->next;inode;inode=inode->next)
	{
	/* If we reach user IDs, we're done. */
	if(inode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
	break;

	if (inode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& IS_KEY_REV (inode->pkt->pkt.signature)
	&& inode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]==keyid[0]
	&& inode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]==keyid[1])
	{
	/* Okay, we have a revocation key, and a
	* revocation issued by it. Do we have the key
	* itself? */
	gpg_error_t err;

	err = get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (ctrl, NULL,
	sig->revkey[idx].fpr,
	sig->revkey[idx].fprlen);
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
	\|\| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY)
	{
	char *tempkeystr = xstrdup (keystr_from_pk (pk));

	/* No, so try and get it */
	if ((opt.keyserver_options.options
	& KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
	&& keyserver_any_configured (ctrl))
	{
	log_info(_("WARNING: key %s may be revoked:"
	" fetching revocation key %s\n"),
	tempkeystr,keystr(keyid));
	keyserver_import_fprint (ctrl,
	sig->revkey[idx].fpr,
	sig->revkey[idx].fprlen,
	opt.keyserver, 0);

	/* Do we have it now? */
	err = get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (ctrl, NULL,
	sig->revkey[idx].fpr,
	sig->revkey[idx].fprlen);
	}

	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
	\|\| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY)
	log_info(_("WARNING: key %s may be revoked:"
	" revocation key %s not present.\n"),
	tempkeystr,keystr(keyid));

	xfree(tempkeystr);
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}


	/*
	* compare and merge the blocks
	*
	* o compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
	* that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
	* o Simply add the signature. Can't verify here because we may not have
	* the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it
	* into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey
	* is used.
	* Note: We indicate newly inserted packets with NODE_FLAG_A.
	*/
	static int
	merge_blocks (ctrl_t ctrl, unsigned int options,
	kbnode_t keyblock_orig, kbnode_t keyblock,
	u32 keyid, u32 curtime, int origin, const char url,
	int n_uids, int n_sigs, int *n_subk )
	{
	kbnode_t onode, node;
	int rc, found;

	/* 1st: handle revocation certificates */
	for (node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next )
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
	break;
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& IS_KEY_REV (node->pkt->pkt.signature))
	{
	/* check whether we already have this */
	found = 0;
	for (onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next)
	{
	if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
	break;
	else if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& IS_KEY_REV (onode->pkt->pkt.signature)
	&& !cmp_signatures(onode->pkt->pkt.signature,
	node->pkt->pkt.signature))
	{
	found = 1;
	break;
	}
	}
	if (!found)
	{
	kbnode_t n2 = clone_kbnode(node);
	insert_kbnode( keyblock_orig, n2, 0 );
	n2->flag \|= NODE_FLAG_A;
	++*n_sigs;
	if(!opt.quiet)
	{
	char *p = get_user_id_native (ctrl, keyid);
	log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" revocation"
	" certificate added\n"), keystr(keyid),p);
	xfree(p);
	}
	}
	}
	}

	/* 2nd: merge in any direct key (0x1F) sigs */
	for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
	break;
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& IS_KEY_SIG (node->pkt->pkt.signature))
	{
	/* check whether we already have this */
	found = 0;
	for (onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next)
	{
	if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	break;
	else if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& IS_KEY_SIG (onode->pkt->pkt.signature)
	&& !cmp_signatures(onode->pkt->pkt.signature,
	node->pkt->pkt.signature))
	{
	found = 1;
	break;
	}
	}
	if (!found )
	{
	kbnode_t n2 = clone_kbnode(node);
	insert_kbnode( keyblock_orig, n2, 0 );
	n2->flag \|= NODE_FLAG_A;
	++*n_sigs;
	if(!opt.quiet)
	log_info( _("key %s: direct key signature added\n"),
	keystr(keyid));
	}
	}
	}

	/* 3rd: try to merge new certificates in */
	for (onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next)
	{
	if (!(onode->flag & NODE_FLAG_A) && onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	/* find the user id in the imported keyblock */
	for (node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& !cmp_user_ids( onode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id ) )
	break;
	if (node ) /* found: merge */
	{
	rc = merge_sigs (onode, node, n_sigs);
	if (rc )
	return rc;
	}
	}
	}

	/* 4th: add new user-ids */
	for (node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	/* do we have this in the original keyblock */
	for (onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
	if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& !cmp_user_ids( onode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id ) )
	break;
	if (!onode ) /* this is a new user id: append */
	{
	rc = append_new_uid (options, keyblock_orig, node,
	curtime, origin, url, n_sigs);
	if (rc )
	return rc;
	++*n_uids;
	}
	}
	}

	/* 5th: add new subkeys */
	for (node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next)
	{
	onode = NULL;
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	/* do we have this in the original keyblock? */
	for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next)
	if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& !cmp_public_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
	node->pkt->pkt.public_key))
	break;
	if (!onode ) /* This is a new subkey: append. */
	{
	rc = append_key (keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs);
	if (rc)
	return rc;
	++*n_subk;
	}
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	{
	/* do we have this in the original keyblock? */
	for (onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
	if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
	&& !cmp_public_keys (onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
	node->pkt->pkt.public_key) )
	break;
	if (!onode ) /* This is a new subkey: append. */
	{
	rc = append_key (keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs);
	if (rc )
	return rc;
	++*n_subk;
	}
	}
	}

	/* 6th: merge subkey certificates */
	for (onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next)
	{
	if (!(onode->flag & NODE_FLAG_A)
	&& (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY))
	{
	/* find the subkey in the imported keyblock */
	for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next)
	{
	if ((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	&& !cmp_public_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
	node->pkt->pkt.public_key ) )
	break;
	}
	if (node) /* Found: merge. */
	{
	rc = merge_keysigs( onode, node, n_sigs);
	if (rc )
	return rc;
	}
	}
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/* Helper function for merge_blocks.
	*
	* Append the new userid starting with NODE and all signatures to
	* KEYBLOCK. ORIGIN and URL conveys the usual key origin info. The
	* integer at N_SIGS is updated with the number of new signatures.
	*/
	static gpg_error_t
	append_new_uid (unsigned int options,
	kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t node, u32 curtime,
	int origin, const char url, int n_sigs)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	kbnode_t n;
	kbnode_t n_where = NULL;

	log_assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID);

	/* Find the right position for the new user id and its signatures. */
	for (n = keyblock; n; n_where = n, n = n->next)
	{
	if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
	break;
	}
	if (!n)
	n_where = NULL;

	/* and append/insert */
	while (node)
	{
	/* we add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
	* one is released first. */
	n = clone_kbnode(node);
	if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& !(options & IMPORT_RESTORE) )
	{
	err = insert_key_origin_uid (n->pkt->pkt.user_id,
	curtime, origin, url);
	if (err)
	{
	release_kbnode (n);
	return err;
	}
	}

	if (n_where)
	{
	insert_kbnode( n_where, n, 0 );
	n_where = n;
	}
	else
	add_kbnode( keyblock, n );
	n->flag \|= NODE_FLAG_A;
	node->flag \|= NODE_FLAG_A;
	if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
	++*n_sigs;

	node = node->next;
	if (node && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
	break;
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/* Helper function for merge_blocks
	* Merge the sigs from SRC onto DST. SRC and DST are both a PKT_USER_ID.
	* (how should we handle comment packets here?)
	*/
	static int
	merge_sigs (kbnode_t dst, kbnode_t src, int *n_sigs)
	{
	kbnode_t n, n2;
	int found = 0;

	log_assert (dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID);
	log_assert (src->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID);

	for (n=src->next; n && n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; n = n->next)
	{
	if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
	continue;
	if (IS_SUBKEY_SIG (n->pkt->pkt.signature)
	\|\| IS_SUBKEY_REV (n->pkt->pkt.signature) )
	continue; /* skip signatures which are only valid on subkeys */

	found = 0;
	for (n2=dst->next; n2 && n2->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; n2 = n2->next)
	if (!cmp_signatures(n->pkt->pkt.signature,n2->pkt->pkt.signature))
	{
	found++;
	break;
	}
	if (!found )
	{
	/* This signature is new or newer, append N to DST.
	* We add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
	* one is released first */
	n2 = clone_kbnode(n);
	insert_kbnode( dst, n2, PKT_SIGNATURE );
	n2->flag \|= NODE_FLAG_A;
	n->flag \|= NODE_FLAG_A;
	++*n_sigs;
	}
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/* Helper function for merge_blocks
	* Merge the sigs from SRC onto DST. SRC and DST are both a PKT_xxx_SUBKEY.
	*/
	static int
	merge_keysigs (kbnode_t dst, kbnode_t src, int *n_sigs)
	{
	kbnode_t n, n2;
	int found = 0;

	log_assert (dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY);

	for (n=src->next; n ; n = n->next)
	{
	if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
	break;
	if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
	continue;

	found = 0;
	for (n2=dst->next; n2; n2 = n2->next)
	{
	if (n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
	break;
	if (n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& (n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
	== n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0])
	&& (n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
	== n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1])
	&& (n->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
	<= n2->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp)
	&& (n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class
	== n2->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class))
	{
	found++;
	break;
	}
	}
	if (!found )
	{
	/* This signature is new or newer, append N to DST.
	* We add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
	* one is released first */
	n2 = clone_kbnode(n);
	insert_kbnode( dst, n2, PKT_SIGNATURE );
	n2->flag \|= NODE_FLAG_A;
	n->flag \|= NODE_FLAG_A;
	++*n_sigs;
	}
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/* Helper function for merge_blocks.
	* Append the subkey starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK.
	* Mark all new and copied packets by setting flag bit 0.
	*/
	static int
	append_key (kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t node, int *n_sigs)
	{
	kbnode_t n;

	log_assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY);

	while (node)
	{
	/* we add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
	* one is released first */
	n = clone_kbnode(node);
	add_kbnode( keyblock, n );
	n->flag \|= NODE_FLAG_A;
	node->flag \|= NODE_FLAG_A;
	if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
	++*n_sigs;

	node = node->next;
	if (node && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
	break;
	}

	return 0;
	}
	diff --git a/g10/options.h b/g10/options.h
	index e0ee99533..146b78361 100644
	--- a/g10/options.h
	+++ b/g10/options.h
	@@ -1,457 +1,458 @@
	/* options.h
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
	* 2007, 2010, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 2015 g10 Code GmbH
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/
	#ifndef G10_OPTIONS_H
	#define G10_OPTIONS_H

	#include <sys/types.h>
	#include "../common/types.h"
	#include <stdint.h>
	#include "main.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "tofu.h"
	#include "../common/session-env.h"
	#include "../common/compliance.h"


	/* Object to hold information pertaining to a keyserver; it also
	allows building a list of keyservers. For historic reasons this is
	not a strlist_t. */
	struct keyserver_spec
	{
	struct keyserver_spec *next;
	char *uri;
	};
	typedef struct keyserver_spec *keyserver_spec_t;


	/* Global options for GPG. */
	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	struct
	{
	int verbose;
	int quiet;
	unsigned debug;
	int armor;
	char *outfile;
	estream_t outfp; /* Hack, sometimes used in place of outfile. */
	off_t max_output;

	/* If > 0 a hint with the expected number of input data bytes. This
	* is not necessary an exact number but intended to be used for
	* progress info and to decide on how to allocate buffers. */
	uint64_t input_size_hint;

	/* The AEAD chunk size expressed as a power of 2. */
	int chunk_size;

	int dry_run;
	int autostart;
	int list_only;
	int mimemode;
	int textmode;
	int expert;
	const char *def_sig_expire;
	int ask_sig_expire;
	const char *def_cert_expire;
	int ask_cert_expire;
	int batch; /* run in batch mode */
	int answer_yes; /* answer yes on most questions */
	int answer_no; /* answer no on most questions */
	int check_sigs; /* check key signatures */
	int with_colons;
	int with_key_data;
	int with_icao_spelling; /* Print ICAO spelling with fingerprints. */
	int with_v5_fingerprint; /* Option --with-v5-fingerprint active. */
	int with_fingerprint; /* Option --with-fingerprint active. */
	int with_subkey_fingerprint; /* Option --with-subkey-fingerprint active. */
	int with_keygrip; /* Option --with-keygrip active. */
	int with_key_screening;/* Option --with-key-screening active. */
	int with_tofu_info; /* Option --with-tofu_info active. */
	int with_secret; /* Option --with-secret active. */
	int with_wkd_hash; /* Option --with-wkd-hash. */
	int with_key_origin; /* Option --with-key-origin. */
	int fingerprint; /* list fingerprints */
	int list_sigs; /* list signatures */
	int no_armor;
	int list_packets; /* Option --list-packets active. */
	int def_cipher_algo;
	int force_mdc;
	int disable_mdc;
	int force_aead;
	int def_digest_algo;
	int cert_digest_algo;
	int compress_algo;
	int explicit_compress_option; /* A compress option was explicitly given. */
	int compress_level;
	int bz2_compress_level;
	int bz2_decompress_lowmem;
	strlist_t def_secret_key;
	char *def_recipient;
	int def_recipient_self;
	strlist_t secret_keys_to_try;

	/* A list of mail addresses (addr-spec) provided by the user with
	* the option --sender. */
	strlist_t sender_list;

	/* A list of fingerprints added as designated revokers to new keys. */
	strlist_t desig_revokers;

	int def_cert_level;
	int min_cert_level;
	int ask_cert_level;
	int emit_version; /* 0 = none,
	1 = major only,
	2 = major and minor,
	3 = full version,
	4 = full version plus OS string. */
	int marginals_needed;
	int completes_needed;
	int max_cert_depth;
	const char *agent_program;
	const char *keyboxd_program;
	const char *dirmngr_program;
	int disable_dirmngr;

	const char *def_new_key_algo;

	/* Options to be passed to the gpg-agent */
	session_env_t session_env;
	char *lc_ctype;
	char *lc_messages;

	int skip_verify;
	int skip_hidden_recipients;

	/* TM_CLASSIC must be zero to accommodate trustdbsg generated before
	we started storing the trust model inside the trustdb. */
	enum
	{
	TM_CLASSIC=0, TM_PGP=1, TM_EXTERNAL=2,
	TM_ALWAYS, TM_DIRECT, TM_AUTO, TM_TOFU, TM_TOFU_PGP
	} trust_model;
	enum tofu_policy tofu_default_policy;
	int force_ownertrust;
	enum gnupg_compliance_mode compliance;
	enum
	{
	KF_DEFAULT, KF_NONE, KF_SHORT, KF_LONG, KF_0xSHORT, KF_0xLONG
	} keyid_format;
	const char *set_filename;
	strlist_t comments;
	int throw_keyids;
	const char *photo_viewer;
	int s2k_mode;
	int s2k_digest_algo;
	int s2k_cipher_algo;
	unsigned char s2k_count; /* This is the encoded form, not the raw
	count */
	int not_dash_escaped;
	int escape_from;
	int lock_once;
	keyserver_spec_t keyserver; /* The list of configured keyservers. */
	struct
	{
	unsigned int options;
	unsigned int import_options;
	unsigned int export_options;
	char *http_proxy;
	} keyserver_options;
	int exec_disable;
	int exec_path_set;
	unsigned int import_options;
	unsigned int export_options;
	unsigned int list_options;
	unsigned int verify_options;
	const char *def_preference_list;
	const char *def_keyserver_url;
	prefitem_t *personal_cipher_prefs;
	prefitem_t *personal_digest_prefs;
	prefitem_t *personal_compress_prefs;
	struct weakhash *weak_digests;
	int no_perm_warn;
	char *temp_dir;
	int no_encrypt_to;
	int encrypt_to_default_key;
	int interactive;
	struct notation *sig_notations;
	struct notation *cert_notations;
	strlist_t sig_policy_url;
	strlist_t cert_policy_url;
	strlist_t sig_keyserver_url;
	strlist_t cert_subpackets;
	strlist_t sig_subpackets;
	int allow_non_selfsigned_uid;
	int allow_freeform_uid;
	int no_literal;
	ulong set_filesize;
	int fast_list_mode;
	int legacy_list_mode;
	int ignore_time_conflict;
	int ignore_valid_from;
	int ignore_crc_error;
	int ignore_mdc_error;
	int ignore_expiration;
	int command_fd;
	const char *override_session_key;
	int show_session_key;

	const char *gpg_agent_info;
	int try_all_secrets;
	int no_expensive_trust_checks;
	int no_sig_cache;
	int no_auto_check_trustdb;
	int preserve_permissions;
	int no_homedir_creation;
	struct groupitem *grouplist;
	int mangle_dos_filenames;
	int enable_progress_filter;
	unsigned int screen_columns;
	unsigned int screen_lines;
	byte *show_subpackets;
	int rfc2440_text;
	unsigned int min_rsa_length; /* Used for compliance checks. */

	/* If true, let write failures on the status-fd exit the process. */
	int exit_on_status_write_error;

	/* If > 0, limit the number of card insertion prompts to this
	value. */
	int limit_card_insert_tries;

	/* The list of --assert-signer option values. Note: The values are
	* modify to be uppercase if they represent a fingerrint */
	strlist_t assert_signer_list;

	struct
	{
	/* If set, require an 0x19 backsig to be present on signatures
	made by signing subkeys. If not set, a missing backsig is not
	an error (but an invalid backsig still is). */
	unsigned int require_cross_cert:1;

	unsigned int use_embedded_filename:1;
	unsigned int utf8_filename:1;
	unsigned int dsa2:1;
	unsigned int allow_old_cipher_algos:1;
	unsigned int allow_weak_digest_algos:1;
	unsigned int allow_weak_key_signatures:1;
	unsigned int large_rsa:1;
	unsigned int disable_signer_uid:1;
	unsigned int include_key_block:1;
	unsigned int auto_key_import:1;
	/* Flag to enable experimental features from RFC4880bis. */
	unsigned int rfc4880bis:1;
	/* Hack: --output is not given but OUTFILE was temporary set to "-". */
	unsigned int dummy_outfile:1;
	/* Force the use of the OpenPGP card and do not allow the use of
	* another card. */
	unsigned int use_only_openpgp_card:1;
	unsigned int full_timestrings:1;
	/* Force signing keys even if a key signature already exists. */
	unsigned int force_sign_key:1;
	/* On key generation do not set the ownertrust. */
	unsigned int no_auto_trust_new_key:1;
	/* The next flag is set internally iff IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY has
	* been set by the user and is not the default value. */
	unsigned int expl_import_self_sigs_only:1;
	/* The next flag is set internally iff IMPORT_CLEAN has
	* been set by the user and is not the default value. */
	unsigned int expl_import_clean:1;
	/* Fail if an operation can't be done in the requested compliance
	* mode. */
	unsigned int require_compliance:1;
	} flags;

	/* Linked list of ways to find a key if the key isn't on the local
	keyring. */
	struct akl
	{
	enum {
	AKL_NODEFAULT,
	AKL_LOCAL,
	AKL_CERT,
	AKL_PKA,
	AKL_DANE,
	AKL_WKD,
	AKL_LDAP,
	AKL_NTDS,
	AKL_KEYSERVER,
	AKL_SPEC
	} type;
	keyserver_spec_t spec;
	struct akl *next;
	} *auto_key_locate;

	/* The value of --key-origin. See parse_key_origin(). */
	int key_origin;
	char *key_origin_url;

	int passphrase_repeat;
	int pinentry_mode;
	int request_origin;

	int unwrap_encryption;
	int only_sign_text_ids;

	int no_symkey_cache; /* Disable the cache used for --symmetric. */

	int use_keyboxd; /* Use the external keyboxd as storage backend. */

	/* Compatibility flags (COMPAT_FLAG_xxxx). */
	unsigned int compat_flags;
	} opt;

	/* CTRL is used to keep some global variables we currently can't
	avoid. Future concurrent versions of gpg will put it into a per
	request structure CTRL. */
	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	struct {
	int in_auto_key_retrieve; /* True if we are doing an
	auto_key_retrieve. */
	/* Hack to store the last error. We currently need it because the
	proc_packet machinery is not able to reliabale return error
	codes. Thus for the --server purposes we store some of the error
	codes here. FIXME! */
	gpg_error_t lasterr;

	/* Kludge to silence some warnings using --secret-key-list. */
	int silence_parse_warnings;
	} glo_ctrl;

	#define DBG_PACKET_VALUE 1 /* debug packet reading/writing */
	#define DBG_MPI_VALUE 2 /* debug mpi details */
	#define DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE 4 /* debug crypto handling */
	/* (may reveal sensitive data) */
	#define DBG_FILTER_VALUE 8 /* debug internal filter handling */
	#define DBG_IOBUF_VALUE 16 /* debug iobuf stuff */
	#define DBG_MEMORY_VALUE 32 /* debug memory allocation stuff */
	#define DBG_CACHE_VALUE 64 /* debug the caching */
	#define DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE 128 /* show memory statistics */
	#define DBG_TRUST_VALUE 256 /* debug the trustdb */
	#define DBG_HASHING_VALUE 512 /* debug hashing operations */
	#define DBG_IPC_VALUE 1024 /* debug assuan communication */
	#define DBG_CLOCK_VALUE 4096
	#define DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE 8192 /* debug the key lookup */
	#define DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE 16384 /* debug external program calls */

	/* Tests for the debugging flags. */
	#define DBG_PACKET (opt.debug & DBG_PACKET_VALUE)
	#define DBG_MPI (opt.debug & DBG_MPI_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CRYPTO (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE)
	#define DBG_FILTER (opt.debug & DBG_FILTER_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CACHE (opt.debug & DBG_CACHE_VALUE)
	#define DBG_TRUST (opt.debug & DBG_TRUST_VALUE)
	#define DBG_HASHING (opt.debug & DBG_HASHING_VALUE)
	#define DBG_IPC (opt.debug & DBG_IPC_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CLOCK (opt.debug & DBG_CLOCK_VALUE)
	#define DBG_LOOKUP (opt.debug & DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE)
	#define DBG_EXTPROG (opt.debug & DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE)

	/* FIXME: We need to check why we did not put this into opt. */
	#define DBG_MEMORY memory_debug_mode
	#define DBG_MEMSTAT memory_stat_debug_mode

	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE int memory_debug_mode;
	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE int memory_stat_debug_mode;

	/* Compatibility flags */
	/* #define COMPAT_FOO 1 */


	/* Compliance test macors. */
	#define GNUPG (opt.compliance==CO_GNUPG \|\| opt.compliance==CO_DE_VS)
	#define RFC2440 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC2440)
	#define RFC4880 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC4880)
	#define PGP7 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP7)
	#define PGP8 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP8)
	#define PGPX (PGP7 \|\| PGP8)

	/* Various option flags. Note that there should be no common string
	names between the IMPORT_ and EXPORT_ flags as they can be mixed in
	the keyserver-options option. */

	#define IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS (1<<0)
	#define IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG (1<<1)
	#define IMPORT_FAST (1<<2)
	#define IMPORT_SHOW (1<<3)
	#define IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY (1<<4)
	#define IMPORT_MINIMAL (1<<5)
	#define IMPORT_CLEAN (1<<6)
	#define IMPORT_NO_SECKEY (1<<7)
	#define IMPORT_KEEP_OWNERTTRUST (1<<8)
	#define IMPORT_EXPORT (1<<9)
	#define IMPORT_RESTORE (1<<10)
	#define IMPORT_REPAIR_KEYS (1<<11)
	#define IMPORT_DRY_RUN (1<<12)
	#define IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY (1<<14)
	#define IMPORT_COLLAPSE_UIDS (1<<15)
	#define IMPORT_COLLAPSE_SUBKEYS (1<<16)
	#define IMPORT_BULK (1<<17)
	+#define IMPORT_IGNORE_ATTRIBUTES (1<<18)

	#define EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS (1<<0)
	#define EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES (1<<1)
	#define EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS (1<<2)
	#define EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD (1<<3)
	#define EXPORT_MINIMAL (1<<4)
	#define EXPORT_CLEAN (1<<5)
	#define EXPORT_DANE_FORMAT (1<<7)
	#define EXPORT_BACKUP (1<<10)
	#define EXPORT_REVOCS (1<<11)
	#define EXPORT_MODE1003 (1<<12)

	#define LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS (1<<0)
	#define LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS (1<<1)
	#define LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS (1<<2)
	#define LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS (1<<3)
	#define LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS (LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS\|LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)
	#define LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS (1<<4)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY (1<<5)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS (1<<6)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS (1<<7)
	#define LIST_SHOW_KEYRING (1<<8)
	#define LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE (1<<9)
	#define LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS (1<<10)
	#define LIST_SHOW_USAGE (1<<11)
	#define LIST_SHOW_ONLY_FPR_MBOX (1<<12)
	#define LIST_SORT_SIGS (1<<13)
	#define LIST_SHOW_PREF (1<<14)
	#define LIST_SHOW_PREF_VERBOSE (1<<15)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SIGS (1<<16)

	#define VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS (1<<0)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS (1<<1)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS (1<<2)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS (1<<3)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS (VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS\|VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS (1<<4)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY (1<<5)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS (1<<6)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY (1<<9)

	#define KEYSERVER_HTTP_PROXY (1<<0)
	#define KEYSERVER_TIMEOUT (1<<1)
	#define KEYSERVER_ADD_FAKE_V3 (1<<2)
	#define KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE (1<<3)
	#define KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL (1<<4)


	#endif /G10_OPTIONS_H/

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