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Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.16 (unreleased)
-------------------------------------------------
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.15 (2016-08-18)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Remove the --tofu-db-format option and support for the split
TOFU database.
* gpg: Add option --sender to prepare for coming features.
* gpg: Add option --input-size-hint to help progress indicators.
* gpg: Extend the PROGRESS status line with the counted unit.
* gpg: Avoid publishing the GnuPG version by default with --armor.
* gpg: Properly ignore legacy keys in the keyring cache.
* gpg: Always print fingerprint records in --with-colons mode.
* gpg: Make sure that keygrips are printed for each subkey in
--with-colons mode.
* gpg: New import filter "drop-sig".
* gpgsm: Fix a bug in the machine-readable key listing.
* gpg,gpgsm: Block signals during keyring updates to limits the
effects of a Ctrl-C at the wrong time.
* g13: Add command --umount and other fixes for dm-crypt.
* agent: Fix regression in SIGTERM handling.
* agent: Cleanup of the ssh-agent code.
* agent: Allow import of overly long keys.
* scd: Fix problems with card removal.
* dirmngr: Remove all code for running as a system service.
* tools: Make gpg-wks-client conforming to the specs.
* tests: Improve the output of the new regression test tool.
* tests: Distribute the standalone test runner.
* tests: Run each test in a clean environment.
* Spelling and grammar fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.14 (2016-07-14)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Removed options --print-dane-records and --print-pka-records.
The new export options "export-pka" and "export-dane" can instead
be used with the export command.
* gpg: New options --import-filter and --export-filter.
* gpg: New import options "import-show" and "import-export".
* gpg: New option --no-keyring.
* gpg: New command --quick-revuid.
* gpg: New options -f/--recipient-file and -F/--hidden-recipient-file
to directly specify encryption keys.
* gpg: New option --mimemode to indicate that the content is a MIME
part. Does only enable --textmode right now.
* gpg: New option --rfc4880bis to allow experiments with proposed
changes to the current OpenPGP specs.
* gpg: Fix regression in the "fetch" sub-command of --card-edit.
* gpg: Fix regression since 2.1 in option --try-all-secrets.
* gpgv: Change default options for extra security.
* gpgsm: No more root certificates are installed by default.
* agent: "updatestartuptty" does now affect more environment
variables.
* scd: The option --homedir does now work with scdaemon.
* scd: Support some more GEMPlus card readers.
* gpgtar: Fix handling of '-' as file name.
* gpgtar: New commands --create and --extract.
* gpgconf: Tweak for --list-dirs to better support shell scripts.
* tools: Add programs gpg-wks-client and gpg-wks-server to implement
a Web Key Service. The configure option --enable-wks-tools is
required to build them; they should be considered Beta software.
* tests: Complete rework of the openpgp part of the test suite. The
test scripts have been changed from Bourne shell scripts to Scheme
programs. A customized scheme interpreter (gpgscm) is included.
This change was triggered by the need to run the test suite on
non-Unix platforms.
* The rendering of the man pages has been improved.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.13 (2016-06-16)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: New command --quick-addkey. Extend the --quick-gen-key
command.
* gpg: New --keyid-format "none" which is now also the default.
* gpg: New option --with-subkey-fingerprint.
* gpg: Include Signer's UID subpacket in signatures if the secret key
has been specified using a mail address and the new option
--disable-signer-uid is not used.
* gpg: Allow unattended deletion of a secret key.
* gpg: Allow export of non-passphrase protected secret keys.
* gpg: New status lines KEY_CONSIDERED and NOTATION_FLAGS.
* gpg: Change status line TOFU_STATS_LONG to use '~' as
a non-breaking-space character.
* gpg: Speedup key listings in Tofu mode.
* gpg: Make sure that the current and total values of a PROGRESS
status line are small enough.
* gpgsm: Allow the use of AES192 and SERPENT ciphers.
* dirmngr: Adjust WKD lookup to current specs.
* dirmngr: Fallback to LDAP v3 if v2 is is not supported.
* gpgconf: New commands --create-socketdir and --remove-socketdir,
new option --homedir.
* If a /run/user/$UID directory exists, that directory is now used
for IPC sockets instead of the GNUPGHOME directory. This fixes
problems with NFS and too long socket names and thus avoids the
need for redirection files.
* The Speedo build systems now uses the new versions.gnupg.org server
to retrieve the default package versions.
* Fix detection of libusb on FreeBSD.
* Speedup fd closing after a fork.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.12 (2016-05-04)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: New --edit-key sub-command "change-usage" for testing
purposes.
* gpg: Out of order key-signatures are now systematically detected
and fixed by --edit-key.
* gpg: Improved detection of non-armored messages.
* gpg: Removed the extra prompt needed to create Curve25519 keys.
* gpg: Improved user ID selection for --quick-sign-key.
* gpg: Use the root CAs provided by the system with --fetch-key.
* gpg: Add support for the experimental Web Key Directory key
location service.
* gpg: Improve formatting of Tofu messages and emit new Tofu specific
status lines.
* gpgsm: Add option --pinentry-mode to support a loopback pinentry.
* gpgsm: A new pubring.kbx is now created with the header blob so
that gpg can detect that the keybox format needs to be used.
* agent: Add read support for the new private key protection format
openpgp-s2k-ocb-aes.
* agent: Add read support for the new extended private key format.
* agent: Default to --allow-loopback-pinentry and add option
--no-allow-loopback-pinentry.
* scd: Changed to use the new libusb 1.0 API for the internal CCID
driver.
* dirmngr: The dirmngr-client does now auto-detect the PEM format.
* g13: Add experimental support for dm-crypt.
* w32: Tofu support is now available with the Speedo build method.
* w32: Removed the need for libiconv.dll.
* The man pages for gpg and gpgv are now installed under the correct
name (gpg2 or gpg - depending on a configure option).
* Lots of internal cleanups and bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.11 (2016-01-26)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: New command --export-ssh-key to replace the gpgkey2ssh tool.
* gpg: Allow to generate mail address only keys with --gen-key.
* gpg: "--list-options show-usage" is now the default.
* gpg: Make lookup of DNS CERT records holding an URL work.
* gpg: Emit PROGRESS status lines during key generation.
* gpg: Don't check for ambigious or non-matching key specification in
the config file or given to --encrypt-to. This feature will return
in 2.3.x.
* gpg: Lock keybox files while updating them.
* gpg: Solve rare error on Windows during keyring and Keybox updates.
* gpg: Fix possible keyring corruption. (bug#2193)
* gpg: Fix regression of "bkuptocard" sub-command in --edit-key and
remove "checkbkupkey" sub-command introduced with 2.1. (bug#2169)
* gpg: Fix internal error in gpgv when using default keyid-format.
* gpg: Fix --auto-key-retrieve to work with dirmngr.conf configured
keyservers. (bug#2147).
* agent: New option --pinentry-timeout.
* scd: Improve unplugging of USB readers under Windows.
* scd: Fix regression for generating RSA keys on card.
* dirmmgr: All configured keyservers are now searched.
* dirmngr: Install CA certificate for hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net.
Use this certiticate even if --hkp-cacert is not used.
* gpgtar: Add actual encryption code. gpgtar does now fully replace
gpg-zip.
* gpgtar: Fix filename encoding problem on Windows.
* Print a warning if a GnuPG component is using an older version of
gpg-agent, dirmngr, or scdaemon.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.10 (2015-12-04)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: New trust models "tofu" and "tofu+pgp".
* gpg: New command --tofu-policy. New options --tofu-default-policy
and --tofu-db-format.
* gpg: New option --weak-digest to specify hash algorithms which
should be considered weak.
* gpg: Allow the use of multiple --default-key options; take the last
available key.
* gpg: New option --encrypt-to-default-key.
* gpg: New option --unwrap to only strip the encryption layer.
* gpg: New option --only-sign-text-ids to exclude photo IDs from key
signing.
* gpg: Check for ambigious or non-matching key specification in the
config file or given to --encrypt-to.
* gpg: Show the used card reader with --card-status.
* gpg: Print export statistics and an EXPORTED status line.
* gpg: Allow selecting subkeys by keyid in --edit-key.
* gpg: Allow updating the expiration time of multiple subkeys at
once.
* dirmngr: New option --use-tor. For full support this requires
libassuan version 2.4.2 and a patched version of libadns
(e.g. adns-1.4-g10-7 as used by the standard Windows installer).
* dirmngr: New option --nameserver to specify the nameserver used in
Tor mode.
* dirmngr: Keyservers may again be specified by IP address.
* dirmngr: Fixed problems in resolving keyserver pools.
* dirmngr: Fixed handling of premature termination of TLS streams so
that large numbers of keys can be refreshed via hkps.
* gpg: Fixed a regression in --locate-key [since 2.1.9].
* gpg: Fixed another bug for keyrings with legacy keys.
* gpgsm: Allow combinations of usage flags in --gen-key.
* Make tilde expansion work with most options.
* Many other cleanups and bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.9 (2015-10-09)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Allow fetching keys via OpenPGP DANE (--auto-key-locate). New
option --print-dane-records. [Update: --print-dane-records replaced
in 2.1.4.]
* gpg: Fix for a problem with PGP-2 keys in a keyring.
* gpg: Fail with an error instead of a warning if a modern cipher
algorithm is used without a MDC.
* agent: New option --pinentry-invisible-char.
* agent: Always do a RSA signature verification after creation.
* agent: Fix a regression in ssh-add-ing Ed25519 keys.
* agent: Fix ssh fingerprint computation for nistp384 and EdDSA.
* agent: Fix crash during passprase entry on some platforms.
* scd: Change timeout to fix problems with some 2.1 cards.
* dirmngr: Displayed name is now Key Acquirer.
* dirmngr: Add option --keyserver. Deprecate that option for gpg.
Install a dirmngr.conf file from a skeleton for new installations.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.8 (2015-09-10)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Sending very large keys to the keyservers works again.
* gpg: Validity strings in key listings are now again translatable.
* gpg: Emit FAILURE status lines to help GPGME.
* gpg: Does not anymore link to Libksba to reduce dependencies.
* gpgsm: Export of secret keys via Assuan is now possible.
* agent: Raise the maximum passphrase length from 100 to 255 bytes.
* agent: Fix regression using EdDSA keys with ssh.
* Does not anymore use a build timestamp by default.
* The fallback encoding for broken locale settings changed
from Latin-1 to UTF-8.
* Many code cleanups and improved internal documentation.
* Various minor bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.7 (2015-08-11)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Support encryption with Curve25519 if Libgcrypt 1.7 is used.
* gpg: In the --edit-key menu: Removed the need for "toggle", changed
how secret keys are indicated, new commands "fpr *" and "grip".
* gpg: More fixes related to legacy keys in a keyring.
* gpgv: Does now also work with a "trustedkeys.kbx" file.
* scd: Support some feature from the OpenPGP card 3.0 specs.
* scd: Improved ECC support
* agent: New option --force for the DELETE_KEY command.
* w32: Look for the Pinentry at more places.
* Dropped deprecated gpgsm-gencert.sh
* Various other bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.6 (2015-07-01)
------------------------------------------------
* agent: New option --verify for the PASSWD command.
* gpgsm: Add command option "offline" as an alternative to
--disable-dirmngr.
* gpg: Do not prompt multiple times for a password in pinentry
loopback mode.
* Allow the use of debug category names with --debug.
* Using gpg-agent and gpg/gpgsm with different locales will now show
the correct translations in Pinentry.
* gpg: Improve speed of --list-sigs and --check-sigs.
* gpg: Make --list-options show-sig-subpackets work again.
* gpg: Fix an export problem for old keyrings with PGP-2 keys.
* scd: Support PIN-pads on more readers.
* dirmngr: Properly cleanup zombie LDAP helper processes and avoid
hangs on dirmngr shutdown.
* Various other bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.5 (2015-06-11)
------------------------------------------------
* Support for an external passphrase cache.
* Support for the forthcoming version 3 OpenPGP smartcard.
* Manuals now show the actual used file names.
* Prepared for improved integration with Emacs.
* Code cleanups and minor bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.4 (2015-05-12)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Add command --quick-adduid to non-interactively add a new user
id to an existing key.
* gpg: Do no enable honor-keyserver-url by default. Make it work if
enabled.
* gpg: Display the serial number in the --card-status output again.
* agent: Support for external password managers.
Add option --no-allow-external-cache.
* scdaemon: Improved handling of extended APDUs.
* Make HTTP proxies work again.
* All network access including DNS as been moved to Dirmngr.
* Allow building without LDAP support.
* Fixed lots of smaller bugs.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.3 (2015-04-11)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: LDAP keyservers are now supported by 2.1.
* gpg: New option --with-icao-spelling.
* gpg: New option --print-pka-records. Changed the PKA method to use
CERT records and hashed names. [Update: --print-pka-records
replaced in 2.1.4.]
* gpg: New command --list-gcrypt-config. New parameter "curve"
for --list-config.
* gpg: Print a NEWSIG status line like gpgsm always did.
* gpg: Print MPI values with --list-packets and --verbose.
* gpg: Write correct MPI lengths with ECC keys.
* gpg: Skip legacy PGP-2 keys while searching.
* gpg: Improved searching for mail addresses when using a keybox.
* gpgsm: Changed default algos to AES-128 and SHA-256.
* gpgtar: Fixed extracting files with sizes of a multiple of 512.
* dirmngr: Fixed SNI handling for hkps pools.
* dirmngr: extra-certs and trusted-certs are now always loaded from
the sysconfig dir instead of the homedir.
* Fixed possible problems due to compiler optimization, two minor
regressions, and other bugs.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.2 (2015-02-11)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: The parameter 'Passphrase' for batch key generation works
again.
* gpg: Using a passphrase option in batch mode now has the expected
effect on --quick-gen-key.
* gpg: Improved reporting of unsupported PGP-2 keys.
* gpg: Added support for algo names when generating keys using
--command-fd.
* gpg: Fixed DoS based on bogus and overlong key packets.
* agent: When setting --default-cache-ttl the value
for --max-cache-ttl is adjusted to be not lower than the former.
* agent: Fixed problems with the new --extra-socket.
* agent: Made --allow-loopback-pinentry changeable with gpgconf.
* agent: Fixed importing of unprotected openpgp keys.
* agent: Now tries to use a fallback pinentry if the standard
pinentry is not installed.
* scd: Added support for ECDH.
* Fixed several bugs related to bogus keyrings and improved some
other code.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.1 (2014-12-16)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Detect faulty use of --verify on detached signatures.
* gpg: New import option "keep-ownertrust".
* gpg: New sub-command "factory-reset" for --card-edit.
* gpg: A stub key for smartcards is now created by --card-status.
* gpg: Fixed regression in --refresh-keys.
* gpg: Fixed regresion in %g and %p codes for --sig-notation.
* gpg: Fixed best matching hash algo detection for ECDSA and EdDSA.
* gpg: Improved perceived speed of secret key listisngs.
* gpg: Print number of skipped PGP-2 keys on import.
* gpg: Removed the option aliases --throw-keyid and --notation-data;
use --throw-keyids and --set-notation instead.
* gpg: New import option "keep-ownertrust".
* gpg: Skip too large keys during import.
* gpg,gpgsm: New option --no-autostart to avoid starting gpg-agent or
dirmngr.
* gpg-agent: New option --extra-socket to provide a restricted
command set for use with remote clients.
* gpgconf --kill does not anymore start a service only to kill it.
* gpg-pconnect-agent: Add convenience option --uiserver.
* Fixed keyserver access for Windows.
* Fixed build problems on Mac OS X
* The Windows installer does now install development files
* More translations (but most of them are not complete).
* To support remotely mounted home directories, the IPC sockets may
now be redirected. This feature requires Libassuan 2.2.0.
* Improved portability and the usual bunch of bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0 (2014-11-06)
------------------------------------------------
This release introduces a lot of changes. Most of them are internal
and thus not user visible. However, some long standing behavior has
slightly changed and it is strongly suggested that an existing
"~/.gnupg" directory is backed up before this version is used.
A verbose description of the major new features and changes can be
found in the file doc/whats-new-in-2.1.txt.
* gpg: All support for v3 (PGP 2) keys has been dropped. All
signatures are now created as v4 signatures. v3 keys will be
removed from the keyring.
* gpg: With pinentry-0.9.0 the passphrase "enter again" prompt shows
up in the same window as the "new passphrase" prompt.
* gpg: Allow importing keys with duplicated long key ids.
* dirmngr: May now be build without support for LDAP.
* For a complete list of changes see the lists of changes for the
2.1.0 beta versions below. Note that all relevant fixes from
versions 2.0.14 to 2.0.26 are also applied to this version.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0-beta864 (2014-10-03)]
* gpg: Removed the GPG_AGENT_INFO related code. GnuPG does now
always use a fixed socket name in its home directory.
* gpg: Renamed --gen-key to --full-gen-key and re-added a --gen-key
command with less choices.
* gpg: Use SHA-256 for all signature types also on RSA keys.
* gpg: Default keyring is now created with a .kbx suffix.
* gpg: Add a shortcut to the key capabilies menu (e.g. "=e" sets the
encryption capabilities).
* gpg: Fixed obsolete options parsing.
* Further improvements for the alternative speedo build system.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0-beta834 (2014-09-18)]
* gpg: Improved passphrase caching.
* gpg: Switched to algorithm number 22 for EdDSA.
* gpg: Removed CAST5 from the default preferences.
* gpg: Order SHA-1 last in the hash preferences.
* gpg: Changed default cipher for --symmetric to AES-128.
* gpg: Fixed export of ECC keys and import of EdDSA keys.
* dirmngr: Fixed the KS_FETCH command.
* The speedo build system now downloads related packages and works
for non-Windows platforms.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0-beta783 (2014-08-14)]
* gpg: Add command --quick-gen-key.
* gpg: Make --quick-sign-key promote local key signatures.
* gpg: Added "show-usage" sub-option to --list-options.
* gpg: Screen keyserver responses to avoid importing unwanted keys
from rogue servers.
* gpg: Removed the option --pgp2 and --rfc1991 and the ability to
create PGP-2 compatible messages.
* gpg: Removed options --compress-keys and --compress-sigs.
* gpg: Cap attribute packets at 16MB.
* gpg: Improved output of --list-packets.
* gpg: Make with-colons output of --search-keys work again.
* gpgsm: Auto-create the ".gnupg" directory like gpg does.
* agent: Fold new passphrase warning prompts into one.
* scdaemon: Add support for the Smartcard-HSM card.
* scdaemon: Remove the use of the pcsc-wrapper.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0-beta751 (2014-07-03)]
* gpg: Create revocation certificates during key generation.
* gpg: Create exported secret keys and revocation certifciates with
mode 0700
* gpg: The validity of user ids is now shown by default. To revert
this add "list-options no-show-uid-validity" to gpg.conf.
* gpg: Make export of secret keys work again.
* gpg: The output of --list-packets does now print the offset of the
packet and information about the packet header.
* gpg: Avoid DoS due to garbled compressed data packets. [CVE-2014-4617]
* gpg: Print more specific reason codes with the INV_RECP status.
* gpg: Cap RSA and Elgamal keysize at 4096 bit also for unattended
key generation.
* scdaemon: Support reader Gemalto IDBridge CT30 and pinpad of SCT
cyberJack go.
* The speedo build system has been improved. It is now also possible
to build a partly working installer for Windows.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0-beta442 (2014-06-05)]
* gpg: Changed the format of key listings. To revert to the old
format the option --legacy-list-mode is available.
* gpg: Add experimental signature support using curve Ed25519 and
with a patched Libgcrypt also encryption support with Curve25519.
[Update: this encryption support has been removed from 2.1.0 until
we have agreed on a suitable format.]
* gpg: Allow use of Brainpool curves.
* gpg: Accepts a space separated fingerprint as user ID. This
allows to copy and paste the fingerprint from the key listing.
* gpg: The hash algorithm is now printed for signature records in key
listings.
* gpg: Reject signatures made using the MD5 hash algorithm unless the
new option --allow-weak-digest-algos or --pgp2 are given.
* gpg: Print a warning if the Gnome-Keyring-Daemon intercepts the
communication with the gpg-agent.
* gpg: New option --pinentry-mode.
* gpg: Fixed decryption using an OpenPGP card.
* gpg: Fixed bug with deeply nested compressed packets.
* gpg: Only the major version number is by default included in the
armored output.
* gpg: Do not create a trustdb file if --trust-model=always is used.
* gpg: Protect against rogue keyservers sending secret keys.
* gpg: The format of the fallback key listing ("gpg KEYFILE") is now
more aligned to the regular key listing ("gpg -k").
* gpg: The option--show-session-key prints its output now before the
decryption of the bulk message starts.
* gpg: New %U expando for the photo viewer.
* gpg,gpgsm: New option --with-secret.
* gpgsm: By default the users are now asked via the Pinentry whether
they trust an X.509 root key. To prohibit interactive marking of
such keys, the new option --no-allow-mark-trusted may be used.
* gpgsm: New commands to export a secret RSA key in PKCS#1 or PKCS#8
format.
* gpgsm: Improved handling of re-issued CA certificates.
* agent: The included ssh agent does now support ECDSA keys.
* agent: New option --enable-putty-support to allow gpg-agent on
Windows to act as a Pageant replacement with full smartcard support.
* scdaemon: New option --enable-pinpad-varlen.
* scdaemon: Various fixes for pinpad equipped card readers.
* scdaemon: Rename option --disable-pinpad (was --disable-keypad).
* scdaemon: Better support fo CCID readers. Now, internal CCID
driver supports readers with no auto configuration feature.
* dirmngr: Removed support for the original HKP keyserver which is
not anymore used by any site.
* dirmngr: Improved support for keyserver pools.
* tools: New option --dirmngr for gpg-connect-agent.
* The GNU Pth library has been replaced by the new nPth library.
* Support installation as portable application under Windows.
* All kind of other improvements - see the git log.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0beta3 (2011-12-20)]
* gpg: Fixed regression in the secret key export function.
* gpg: Allow generation of card keys up to 4096 bit.
* gpgsm: Preliminary support for the validation model "steed".
* gpgsm: Improved certificate creation.
* agent: Support the SSH confirm flag.
* agent: New option to select a passphrase mode. The loopback
mode may be used to bypass Pinentry.
* agent: The Assuan commands KILLAGENT and KILLSCD are working again.
* scdaemon: Does not anymore block after changing a card (regression
fix).
* tools: gpg-connect-agent does now proberly display the help output
for "SCD HELP" commands.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0beta2 (2011-03-08)]
* gpg: ECC support as described by draft-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-06.txt
[Update: now known as RFC-6637].
* gpg: Print "AES128" instead of "AES". This change introduces a
little incompatibility for tools using "gpg --list-config". We
hope that these tools are written robust enough to accept this new
algorithm name as well.
* gpgsm: New feature to create certificates from a parameter file.
Add prompt to the --gen-key UI to create self-signed certificates.
* agent: TMPDIR is now also honored when creating a socket using
the --no-standard-socket option and with symcryptrun's temp files.
* scdaemon: Fixed a bug where scdaemon sends a signal to gpg-agent
running in non-daemon mode.
* dirmngr: Fixed CRL loading under W32 (bug#1010).
* Dirmngr has taken over the function of the keyserver helpers. Thus
we now have a specified direct interface to keyservers via Dirmngr.
LDAP, DNS and mail backends are not yet implemented.
* Fixed TTY management for pinentries and session variable update
problem.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0beta1 (2010-10-26)]
* gpg: secring.gpg is not anymore used but all secret key operations
are delegated to gpg-agent. The import command moves secret keys
to the agent.
* gpg: The OpenPGP import command is now able to merge secret keys.
* gpg: Encrypted OpenPGP messages with trailing data (e.g. other
OpenPGP packets) are now correctly parsed.
* gpg: Given sufficient permissions Dirmngr is started automagically.
* gpg: Fixed output of "gpgconf --check-options".
* gpg: Removed options --export-options(export-secret-subkey-passwd)
and --simple-sk-checksum.
* gpg: New options --try-secret-key.
* gpg: Support DNS lookups for SRV, PKA and CERT on W32.
* gpgsm: The --audit-log feature is now more complete.
* gpgsm: The default for --include-cert is now to include all
certificates in the chain except for the root certificate.
* gpgsm: New option --ignore-cert-extension.
* g13: The G13 tool for disk encryption key management has been
added.
* agent: If the agent's --use-standard-socket option is active, all
tools try to start and daemonize the agent on the fly. In the past
this was only supported on W32; on non-W32 systems the new
configure option --disable-standard-socket may now be used to
disable this new default.
* agent: New and changed passphrases are now created with an
iteration count requiring about 100ms of CPU work.
* dirmngr: Dirmngr is now a part of this package. It is now also
expected to run as a system service and the configuration
directories are changed to the GnuPG name space. [Update: 2.1.0
starts dirmngr on demand as user daemon.]
* Support for Windows CE. [Update: This has not been tested for the
2.1.0 release]
* Numerical values may now be used as an alternative to the
debug-level keywords.
Version 2.0.28 (2015-06-02)
Version 2.0.27 (2015-02-18)
Version 2.0.26 (2014-08-12)
Version 2.0.25 (2014-06-30)
Version 2.0.24 (2014-06-24)
Version 2.0.23 (2014-06-03)
Version 2.0.22 (2013-10-04)
Version 2.0.21 (2013-08-19)
Version 2.0.20 (2013-05-10)
Version 2.0.19 (2012-03-27)
Version 2.0.18 (2011-08-04)
Version 2.0.17 (2011-01-13)
Version 2.0.16 (2010-07-19)
Version 2.0.15 (2010-03-09)
Version 2.0.14 (2009-12-21)
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.13 (2009-09-04)
-------------------------------------------------
* GPG now generates 2048 bit RSA keys by default. The default hash
algorithm preferences has changed to prefer SHA-256 over SHA-1.
2048 bit DSA keys are now generated to use a 256 bit hash algorithm
* The envvars XMODIFIERS, GTK_IM_MODULE and QT_IM_MODULE are now
passed to the Pinentry to make SCIM work.
* The GPGSM command --gen-key features a --batch mode and implements
all features of gpgsm-gencert.sh in standard mode.
* New option --re-import for GPGSM's IMPORT server command.
* Enhanced writing of existing keys to OpenPGP v2 cards.
* Add hack to the internal CCID driver to allow the use of some
Omnikey based card readers with 2048 bit keys.
* GPG now repeatly asks the user to insert the requested OpenPGP
card. This can be disabled with --limit-card-insert-tries=1.
* Minor bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.12 (2009-06-17)
-------------------------------------------------
* GPGSM now always lists ephemeral certificates if specified by
fingerprint or keygrip.
* New command "KEYINFO" for GPG_AGENT. GPGSM now also returns
information about smartcards.
* Made sure not to leak file descriptors if running gpg-agent with a
command. Restore the signal mask to solve a problem in Mono.
* Changed order of the confirmation questions for root certificates
and store negative answers in trustlist.txt.
* Better synchronization of concurrent smartcard sessions.
* Support 2048 bit OpenPGP cards.
* Support Telesec Netkey 3 cards.
* The gpg-protect-tool now uses gpg-agent via libassuan. Under
Windows the Pinentry will now be put into the foreground.
* Changed code to avoid a possible Mac OS X system freeze.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.11 (2009-03-03)
-------------------------------------------------
* Fixed a problem in SCDAEMON which caused unexpected card resets.
* SCDAEMON is now aware of the Geldkarte.
* The SCDAEMON option --allow-admin is now used by default.
* GPGCONF now restarts SCdaemon if necessary.
* The default cipher algorithm in GPGSM is now again 3DES. This is
due to interoperability problems with Outlook 2003 which still
can't cope with AES.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.10 (2009-01-12)
-------------------------------------------------
* [gpg] New keyserver helper gpg2keys_kdns as generic DNS CERT
lookup. Run with --help for a short description. Requires the
ADNS library.
* [gpg] New mechanisms "local" and "nodefault" for --auto-key-locate.
Fixed a few problems with this option.
* [gpg] New command --locate-keys.
* [gpg] New options --with-sig-list and --with-sig-check.
* [gpg] The option "-sat" is no longer an alias for --clearsign.
* [gpg] The option --fixed-list-mode is now implicitly used and obsolete.
* [gpg] New control statement %ask-passphrase for the unattended key
generation.
* [gpg] The algorithm to compute the SIG_ID status has been changed.
* [gpgsm] Now uses AES by default.
* [gpgsm] Made --output option work with --export-secret-key-p12.
* [gpg-agent] Terminate process if the own listening socket is not
anymore served by ourself.
* [scdaemon] Made it more robust on W32.
* [gpg-connect-agent] Accept commands given as command line arguments.
* [w32] Initialized the socket subsystem for all keyserver helpers.
* [w32] The sysconf directory has been moved from a subdirectory of
the installation directory to %CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA%/GNU/etc/gnupg.
* [w32] The gnupg2.nls directory is not anymore used. The standard
locale directory is now used.
* [w32] Fixed a race condition between gpg and gpgsm in the use of
temporary file names.
* The gpg-preset-passphrase mechanism works again. An arbitrary
string may now be used for a custom cache ID.
* Admin PINs are cached again (bug in 2.0.9).
* Support for version 2 OpenPGP cards.
* Libgcrypt 1.4 is now required.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.9 (2008-03-26)
------------------------------------------------
* Gpgsm always tries to locate missing certificates from a running
Dirmngr's cache.
* Tweaks for Windows.
* The Admin PIN for OpenPGP cards may now be entered with the pinpad.
* Improved certificate chain construction.
* Extended the PKITS framework.
* Fixed a bug in the ambigious name detection.
* Fixed possible memory corruption while importing OpenPGP keys (bug
introduced with 2.0.8). [CVE-2008-1530]
* Minor bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.8 (2007-12-20)
------------------------------------------------
* Enhanced gpg-connect-agent with a small scripting language.
* New option --list-config for gpgconf.
* Fixed a crash in gpgconf.
* Gpg-agent now supports the passphrase quality bar of the latest
Pinentry.
* The envvars XAUTHORITY and PINENTRY_USER_DATA are now passed to the
Pinentry.
* Fixed the auto creation of the key stub for smartcards.
* Fixed a rare bug in decryption using the OpenPGP card.
* Creating DSA2 keys is now possible.
* New option --extra-digest-algo for gpgsm to allow verification of
broken signatures.
* Allow encryption with legacy Elgamal sign+encrypt keys with option
--rfc2440.
* Windows is now a supported platform.
* Made sure that under Windows the file permissions of the socket are
taken into account. This required a change of our socket emulation
code and changed the IPC protocol under Windows.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.7 (2007-09-10)
------------------------------------------------
* Fixed encryption problem if duplicate certificates are in the
keybox.
* Made it work on Windows Vista. Note that the entire Windows port
is still considered Beta.
* Add new options min-passphrase-nonalpha, check-passphrase-pattern,
enforce-passphrase-constraints and max-passphrase-days to
gpg-agent.
* Add command --check-components to gpgconf. Gpgconf now uses the
installed versions of the programs and does not anymore search via
PATH for them.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.6 (2007-08-16)
------------------------------------------------
* GPGSM does now grok --default-key.
* GPGCONF is now aware of --default-key and --encrypt-to.
* GPGSM does again correctly print the serial number as well the the
various keyids. This was broken since 2.0.4.
* New option --validation-model and support for the chain-model.
* Improved Windows support.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.5 (2007-07-05)
------------------------------------------------
* Switched license to GPLv3.
* Basic support for Windows. Run "./autogen.sh --build-w32" to build
it. As usual the mingw cross compiling toolchain is required.
* Fixed bug when using the --p12-charset without --armor.
* The command --gen-key may now be used instead of the
gpgsm-gencert.sh script.
* Changed key generation to reveal less information about the
machine. Bug fixes for gpg2's card key generation.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.4 (2007-05-09)
------------------------------------------------
* The server mode key listing commands are now also working for
systems without the funopen/fopencookie API.
* PKCS#12 import now tries several encodings in case the passphrase
was not utf-8 encoded. New option --p12-charset for gpgsm.
* Improved the libgcrypt logging support in all modules.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.3 (2007-03-08)
------------------------------------------------
* By default, do not allow processing multiple plaintexts in a single
stream. Many programs that called GnuPG were assuming that GnuPG
did not permit this, and were thus not using the plaintext boundary
status tags that GnuPG provides. This change makes GnuPG reject
such messages by default which makes those programs safe again.
--allow-multiple-messages returns to the old behavior. [CVE-2007-1263].
* New --verify-option show-primary-uid-only.
* gpgconf may now reads a global configuration file to select which
options are changeable by a frontend. The new applygnupgdefaults
tool may be used by an admin to set default options for all users.
* The PIN pad of the Cherry XX44 keyboard is now supported. The
DINSIG and the NKS applications are now also aware of PIN pads.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.2 (2007-01-31)
------------------------------------------------
* Fixed a serious and exploitable bug in processing encrypted
packages. [CVE-2006-6235].
* Added --passphrase-repeat to set the number of times GPG will
prompt for a new passphrase to be repeated. This is useful to help
memorize a new passphrase. The default is 1 repetition.
* Using a PIN pad does now also work for the signing key.
* A warning is displayed by gpg-agent if a new passphrase is too
short. New option --min-passphrase-len defaults to 8.
* The status code BEGIN_SIGNING now shows the used hash algorithms.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.1 (2006-11-28)
------------------------------------------------
* Experimental support for the PIN pads of the SPR 532 and the Kaan
Advanced card readers. Add "disable-keypad" scdaemon.conf if you
don't want it. Does currently only work for the OpenPGP card and
its authentication and decrypt keys.
* Fixed build problems on some some platforms and crashes on amd64.
* Fixed a buffer overflow in gpg2. [bug#728,CVE-2006-6169]
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.0 (2006-11-11)
------------------------------------------------
* First stable version of a GnuPG integrating OpenPGP and S/MIME.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.95 (2006-11-06)
-------------------------------------------------
* Minor bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.94 (2006-10-24)
-------------------------------------------------
* Keys for gpgsm may now be specified using a keygrip. A keygrip is
indicated by a prefixing it with an ampersand.
* gpgconf now supports switching the CMS cipher algo (e.g. to AES).
* New command --gpgconf-test for all major tools. This may be used to
check whether the configuration file is sane.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.93 (2006-10-18)
-------------------------------------------------
* In --with-validation mode gpgsm will now also ask whether a root
certificate should be trusted.
* Link to Pth only if really necessary.
* Fixed a pubring corruption bug in gpg2 occurring when importing
signatures or keys with insane lengths.
* Fixed v3 keyID calculation bug in gpg2.
* More tweaks for certificates without extensions.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.92 (2006-10-11)
-------------------------------------------------
* Bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.91 (2006-10-04)
-------------------------------------------------
* New "relax" flag for trustlist.txt to allow root CA certificates
without BasicContraints.
* [gpg2] Removed the -k PGP 2 compatibility hack. -k is now an
alias for --list-keys.
* [gpg2] Print a warning if "-sat" is used instead of "--clearsign".
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.90 (2006-09-25)
-------------------------------------------------
* Made readline work for gpg.
* Cleanups und minor bug fixes.
* Included translations from gnupg 1.4.5.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.23 (2006-09-18)
-------------------------------------------------
* Regular man pages for most tools are now build directly from the
Texinfo source.
* The gpg code from 1.4.5 has been fully merged into this release.
The configure option --enable-gpg is still required to build this
gpg part. For production use of OpenPGP the gpg version 1.4.5 is
still recommended. Note, that gpg will be installed under the name
gpg2 to allow coexisting with an 1.4.x gpg.
* API change in gpg-agent's pkdecrypt command. Thus an older gpgsm
may not be used with the current gpg-agent.
* The scdaemon will now call a script on reader status changes.
* gpgsm now allows file descriptor passing for "INPUT", "OUTPUT" and
"MESSAGE".
* The gpgsm server may now output a key listing to the output file
handle. This needs to be enabled using "OPTION list-to-output=1".
* The --output option of gpgsm has now an effect on list-keys.
* New gpgsm commands --dump-chain and list-chain.
* gpg-connect-agent has new options to utilize descriptor passing.
* A global trustlist may now be used. See doc/examples/trustlist.txt.
* When creating a new pubring.kbx keybox common certificates are
imported.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.22 (2006-07-27)
-------------------------------------------------
* Enhanced pkcs#12 support to allow import from simple keyBags.
* Exporting to pkcs#12 now create bag attributes so that Mozilla is
able to import the files.
* Fixed uploading of certain keys to the smart card.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.21 (2006-06-20)
-------------------------------------------------
* New command APDU for scdaemon to allow using it for general card
access. Might be used through gpg-connect-agent by using the SCD
prefix command.
* Support for the CardMan 4040 PCMCIA reader (Linux 2.6.15 required).
* Scdaemon does not anymore reset cards at the end of a connection.
* Kludge to allow use of Bundesnetzagentur issued X.509 certificates.
* Added --hash=xxx option to scdaemon's PKSIGN command.
* Pkcs#12 files are now created with a MAC. This is for better
interoperability.
* Collected bug fixes and minor other changes.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.20 (2005-12-20)
-------------------------------------------------
* Importing pkcs#12 files created be recent versions of Mozilla works
again.
* Basic support for qualified signatures.
* New debug tool gpgparsemail.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.19 (2005-09-12)
-------------------------------------------------
* The Belgian eID card is now supported for signatures and ssh.
Other pkcs#15 cards should work as well.
* Fixed bug in --export-secret-key-p12 so that certificates are again
included.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.18 (2005-08-01)
-------------------------------------------------
* [gpgsm] Now allows for more than one email address as well as URIs
and dnsNames in certificate request generation. A keygrip may be
given to create a request from an existing key.
* A couple of minor bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.17 (2005-06-20)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg-connect-agent has now features to handle Assuan INQUIRE
commands.
* Internal changes for OpenPGP cards. New Assuan command WRITEKEY.
* GNU Pth is now a hard requirement.
* [scdaemon] Support for OpenSC has been removed. Instead a new and
straightforward pkcs#15 modules has been written. As of now it
does allows only signing using TCOS cards but we are going to
enhance it to match all the old capabilities.
* [gpg-agent] New option --write-env-file and Assuan command
UPDATESTARTUPTTY.
* [gpg-agent] New option --default-cache-ttl-ssh to set the TTL for
SSH passphrase caching independent from the other passphrases.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.16 (2005-04-21)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg-agent does now support the ssh-agent protocol and thus allows
to use the pinentry as well as the OpenPGP smartcard with ssh.
* New tool gpg-connect-agent as a general client for the gpg-agent.
* New tool symcryptrun as a wrapper for certain encryption tools.
* The gpg tool is not anymore build by default because those gpg
versions available in the gnupg 1.4 series are far more matured.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.15 (2005-01-13)
-------------------------------------------------
* Fixed passphrase caching bug.
* Better support for CCID readers; the reader from Cherry RS 6700 USB
does now work.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.14 (2004-12-22)
-------------------------------------------------
* [gpg-agent] New option --use-standard-socket to allow the use of a
fixed socket. gpgsm falls back to this socket if GPG_AGENT_INFO
has not been set.
* Ported to MS Windows with some functional limitations.
* New tool gpg-preset-passphrase.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.13 (2004-12-03)
-------------------------------------------------
* [gpgsm] New option --prefer-system-dirmngr.
* Minor cleanups and debugging aids.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.12 (2004-10-22)
-------------------------------------------------
* [scdaemon] Partly rewrote the PC/SC code.
* Removed the sc-investigate tool. It is now in a separate package
available at ftp://ftp.g10code.com/g10code/gscutils/ .
* [gpg-agent] Fixed logging problem.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.11 (2004-10-01)
-------------------------------------------------
* When using --import along with --with-validation, the imported
certificates are validated and only imported if they are fully
valid.
* [gpg-agent] New option --max-cache-ttl.
* [gpg-agent] When used without --daemon or --server, gpg-agent now
check whether a agent is already running and usable.
* Fixed some i18n problems.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.10 (2004-07-22)
-------------------------------------------------
* Fixed a serious bug in the checking of trusted root certificates.
* New configure option --enable-agent-pnly allows to build and
install just the agent.
* Fixed a problem with the log file handling.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.9 (2004-06-08)
------------------------------------------------
* [gpg-agent] The new option --allow-mark-trusted is now required to
allow gpg-agent to add a key to the trustlist.txt after user
confirmation.
* Creating PKCS#10 requests does now honor the key usage.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.8 (2004-04-29)
------------------------------------------------
* [scdaemon] Overhauled the internal CCID driver.
* [scdaemon] Status files named ~/.gnupg/reader_<n>.status are now
written when using the internal CCID driver.
* [gpgsm] New commands --dump-{,secret,external}-keys to show a very
detailed view of the certificates.
* The keybox gets now compressed after 3 hours and ephemeral
stored certificates are deleted after about a day.
* [gpg] Usability fixes for --card-edit. Note, that this has already
been ported back to gnupg-1.3
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.7 (2004-04-06)
------------------------------------------------
* Instrumented the modules for gpgconf.
* Added support for DINSIG card applications.
* Include the smimeCapabilities attribute with signed messages.
* Now uses the gettext domain "gnupg2" to avoid conflicts with gnupg
versions < 1.9.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.6 (2004-03-06)
------------------------------------------------
* Code cleanups and bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.5 (2004-02-21)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg-protect-tool gets now installed into libexec as it ought to be.
Cleaned up the build system to better comply with the coding
standards.
* [gpgsm] The --import command is now able to autodetect pkcs#12
files and import secret and private keys from this file format.
A new command --export-secret-key-p12 is provided to allow
exporting of secret keys in PKCS\#12 format.
* [gpgsm] The pinentry will now present a description of the key for
whom the passphrase is requested.
* [gpgsm] New option --with-validation to check the validity of key
while listing it.
* New option --debug-level={none,basic,advanced,expert,guru} to map
the debug flags to sensitive levels on a per program base.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.4 (2004-01-30)
------------------------------------------------
* Added support for the Telesec NKS 2.0 card application.
* Added simple tool addgnupghome to create .gnupg directories from
/etc/skel/.gnupg.
* Various minor bug fixes and cleanups; mainly gpgsm and gpg-agent
related.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.3 (2003-12-23)
------------------------------------------------
* New gpgsm options --{enable,disable}-ocsp to validate keys using
OCSP. This option requires a not yet released DirMngr version.
Default is disabled.
* The --log-file option may now be used to print logs to a socket.
Prefix the socket name with "socket://" to enable this. This does
not work on all systems and falls back to stderr if there is a
problem with the socket.
* The options --encrypt-to and --no-encrypt-to now work the same in
gpgsm as in gpg. Note, they are also used in server mode.
* Duplicated recipients are now silently removed in gpgsm.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.2 (2003-11-17)
------------------------------------------------
* On card key generation is no longer done using the --gen-key
command but from the menu provided by the new --card-edit command.
* PINs are now properly cached and there are only 2 PINs visible.
The 3rd PIN (CHV2) is internally syncronized with the regular PIN.
* All kind of other internal stuff.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.1 (2003-09-06)
------------------------------------------------
* Support for OpenSC is back. scdaemon supports a --disable-opensc to
disable OpenSC use at runtime, so that PC/SC or ct-API can still be
used directly.
* Rudimentary support for the SCR335 smartcard reader using an
internal driver. Requires current libusb from CVS.
* Bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.0 (2003-08-05)
------------------------------------------------
====== PLEASE SEE README-alpha =======
* gpg has been renamed to gpg2 and gpgv to gpgv2. This is a
temporary change to allow co-existing with stable gpg versions.
* ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf-1.9.0 is fist tried as config file before the
usual gpg.conf.
* Removed the -k, -kv and -kvv commands. -k is now an alias to
--list-keys. New command -K as alias for --list-secret-keys.
* Removed --run-as-shm-coprocess feature.
* gpg does now also use libgcrypt, libgpg-error is required.
* New gpgsm commands --call-dirmngr and --call-protect-tool.
* Changing a passphrase is now possible using "gpgsm --passwd"
* The content-type attribute is now recognized and created.
* The agent does now reread certain options on receiving a HUP.
* The pinentry is now forked for each request so that clients with
different environments are supported. When running in daemon mode
and --keep-display is not used the DISPLAY variable is ignored.
* Merged stuff from the newpg branch and started this new
development branch.
Version 1.4.19 (2015-02-27)
Version 1.4.18 (2014-06-30)
Version 1.4.17 (2014-06-23)
Version 1.4.16 (2013-12-18)
Version 1.4.15 (2013-10-04)
Version 1.4.14 (2013-07-25)
Version 1.4.13 (2012-12-20)
Version 1.4.12 (2012-01-30)
Version 1.4.11 (2010-10-18)
Version 1.4.10 (2009-09-02)
Version 1.4.9 (2008-03-26)
Version 1.4.8 (2007-12-20)
Version 1.4.7 (2007-03-05)
Version 1.4.6 (2006-12-06)
Version 1.4.5 (2006-08-01)
Version 1.4.4 (2006-06-25)
Version 1.4.3 (2006-04-03)
Version 1.4.2 (2005-07-26)
Version 1.4.1 (2005-03-15)
Version 1.4.0 (2004-12-16)
Noteworthy changes in version 1.3.2 (2003-05-27)
------------------------------------------------
* New "--gnupg" option (set by default) that disables --openpgp,
and the various --pgpX emulation options. This replaces
--no-openpgp, and --no-pgpX, and also means that GnuPG has
finally grown a --gnupg option to make GnuPG act like GnuPG.
* A bug in key validation has been fixed. This bug only affects
keys with more than one user ID (photo IDs do not count here),
and results in all user IDs on a given key being treated with
the validity of the most-valid user ID on that key.
* Notation names that do not contain a '@' are no longer allowed
unless --expert is set. This is to help prevent pollution of
the (as yet unused) IETF notation namespace.
* Multiple trust models are now supported via the --trust-model
option. The options are "pgp" (web-of-trust plus trust
signatures), "classic" (web-of-trust only), and "always"
(identical to the --always-trust option).
* The --personal-{cipher|digest|compression}-preferences are now
consulted to get default algorithms before resorting to the
last-ditch defaults of --s2k-cipher-algo, SHA1, and ZIP
respectively. This allows a user to set algorithms to use in a
safe manner so they are used when legal to do so, without
forcing them on for all messages.
* New --primary-keyring option to designate the keyring that the
user wants new keys imported into.
* --s2k-digest-algo is now used for all password mangling.
Earlier versions used both --s2k-digest-algo and --digest-algo
for passphrase mangling.
* Handling of --hidden-recipient or --throw-keyid messages is now
easier - the user only needs to give their passphrase once, and
GnuPG will try it against all of the available secret keys.
* Care is taken to prevent compiler optimization from removing
memory wiping code.
* New option --no-mangle-dos-filenames so that filenames are not
truncated in the W32 version.
* A "convert-from-106" script has been added. This is a simple
script that automates the conversion from a 1.0.6 or earlier
version of GnuPG to a 1.0.7 or later version.
* Disabled keys are now skipped when selecting keys for
encryption. If you are using the --with-colons key listings to
detect disabled keys, please see doc/DETAILS for a minor format
change in this release.
* Minor trustdb changes to make the trust calculations match
common usage.
* New command "revuid" in the --edit-key menu to revoke a user ID.
This is a simpler interface to the old method (which still
works) of revoking the user ID self-signature.
* Status VALIDSIG does now also print the primary key's
fingerprint, as well as the signature version, pubkey algorithm,
hash algorithm, and signature class.
* Add read-only support for the SHA-256 hash, and optional
read-only support for the SHA-384 and SHA-512 hashes.
* New option --enable-progress-filter for use with frontends.
* DNS SRV records are used in HKP keyserver lookups to allow
administrators to load balance and select keyserver ports
automatically. This is as specified in
draft-shaw-openpgp-hkp-00.txt.
* When using the "keyid!" syntax during a key export, only that
specified key is exported. If the key in question is a subkey,
the primary key plus only that subkey is exported.
* configure --disable-xxx options to disable individual algorithms
at build time. This can be used to build a smaller gpg binary
for embedded uses where space is tight. See the README file for
the algorithms that can be used with this option, or use
--enable-minimal to build the smallest gpg possible (disables
all optional algorithms, disables keyserver access, and disables
photo IDs).
* The keyserver no-modify flag on a key can now be displayed and
modified.
* Note that the TIGER/192 digest algorithm is in the process of
being dropped from the OpenPGP standard. While this release of
GnuPG still contains it, it is disabled by default. To ensure
you will still be able to use your messages with future versions
of GnuPG and other OpenPGP programs, please do not use this
algorithm.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.3.1 (2002-11-12)
------------------------------------------------
* Trust signature support. This is based on the Maurer trust
model where a user can specify the trust level along with the
signature with multiple levels so users can delegate
certification ability to other users, possibly restricted by a
regular expression on the user ID. Note that full trust
signature support requires a regular expression parsing library.
The regexp code from glibc 2.3.1 is included for those platforms
that don't have working regexp functions available. The
configure option --disable-regex may be used to disable any
regular expression code, which will make GnuPG ignore any trust
signature with a regular expression included.
* Two new commands --hidden-recipient (-R) and --hidden-encrypt-to
encrypt to a user, but hide the identity of that user. This is
the same functionality as --throw-keyid, but can be used on a
per-user basis.
* Full algorithm names (e.g. "3DES", "SHA1", "ZIP") can now be
used interchangeably with the short algorithm names (e.g. "S2",
"H2", "Z1") anywhere algorithm names are used in GnuPG.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.3.0 (2002-10-18)
------------------------------------------------
* The last piece of internal keyserver support has been removed,
and now all keyserver access is done via the keyserver plugins.
There is also a newer keyserver protocol used between GnuPG and
the plugins, so plugins from earlier versions of GnuPG may not
work properly.
* The HKP keyserver plugin supports the new machine-readable key
listing format for those keyservers that provide it.
* When using a HKP keyserver with multiple DNS records (such as
wwwkeys.pgp.net which has the addresses of multiple servers
around the world), try all records until one succeeds. Note
that it depends on the LDAP library used whether the LDAP
keyserver plugin does this as well.
* The library dependencies for OpenLDAP seem to change fairly
frequently, and GnuPG's configure script cannot guess all the
combinations. Use ./configure LDAPLIBS="-L libdir -l libs" to
override the script and use the libraries selected.
* Secret keys generated with --export-secret-subkeys are now
indicated in key listings with a '#' after the "sec", and in
--with-colons listings by showing no capabilities (no lowercase
characters).
* --trusted-key has been un-obsoleted, as it is useful for adding
ultimately trusted keys from the config file. It is identical
to using --edit and "trust" to change a key to ultimately
trusted.
* Translations other than de are no longer distributed with the
development branch. This is due to the frequent text changes
during development, which cause the translations to rapidly go
out of date.
Version 1.2.8 (2006-12-07)
Version 1.2.7 (2004-12-27)
Version 1.2.6 (2004-08-25)
Version 1.2.5 (2004-07-26)
Version 1.2.4 (2003-12-23)
Version 1.2.3 (2003-08-21)
Version 1.2.2 (2003-05-01)
Version 1.2.1 (2002-10-25)
Version 1.2.0 (2002-09-21)
Noteworthy changes in version 1.1.92 (2002-09-11)
-------------------------------------------------
* [IMPORTANT] The default configuration file is now
~/.gnupg/gpg.conf. If an old ~/.gnupg/options is found it will
still be used. This change is required to have a more
consistent naming scheme with forthcoming tools.
* The use of MDCs have increased. A MDC will be used if the
recipients directly request it, if the recipients have AES,
AES192, AES256, or TWOFISH in their cipher preferences, or if
the chosen cipher has a blocksize not equal to 64 bits
(currently this is also AES, AES192, AES256, and TWOFISH).
* GnuPG will no longer automatically disable compression when
processing an already-compressed file unless a MDC is being
used. This is to give the message a certain amount of
resistance to the chosen-ciphertext attack while communicating
with other programs (most commonly PGP earlier than version 7.x)
that do not support MDCs.
* The option --interactive now has the desired effect when
importing keys.
* The file permission and ownership checks on files have been
clarified. Specifically, the homedir (usually ~/.gnupg) is
checked to protect everything within it. If the user specifies
keyrings outside this homedir, they are presumed to be shared
keyrings and therefore *not* checked. Configuration files
specified with the --options option and the IDEA cipher
extension specified with --load-extension are checked, along
with their enclosing directories.
* The configure option --with-static-rnd=auto allows to build gpg
with all available entropy gathering modules included. At
runtime the best usable one will be selected from the list
linux, egd, unix. This is also the default for systems lacking
a /dev/random device.
* The default character set is now taken from the current locale;
it can still be overridden by the --charset option. Using the
option -vvv shows the used character set.
* [REMOVED] --emulate-checksum-bug and --emulate-3des-s2k-bug have
been removed.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.1.91 (2002-08-04)
-------------------------------------------------
* All modules are now linked statically; the --load-extension
option is in general not useful anymore. The only exception is
to specify the deprecated idea cipher.
* The IDEA plugin has changed. Previous versions of the IDEA
plugin will no longer work with GnuPG. However, the current
version of the plugin will work with earlier GnuPG versions.
* When using --batch with one of the --delete-key commands, the
key must be specified by fingerprint. See the man page for
details.
* There are now various ways to restrict the ability GnuPG has to
exec external programs (for the keyserver helpers or photo ID
viewers). Read the README file for the complete list.
* New export option to leave off attribute packets (photo IDs)
during export. This is useful when exporting to HKP keyservers
which do not understand attribute packets.
* New import option to repair during import the HKP keyserver
mangling multiple subkeys bug. Note that this cannot completely
repair the damaged key as some crucial data is removed by the
keyserver, but it does at least give you back one subkey. This
is on by default for keyserver --recv-keys, and off by default
for regular --import.
* The keyserver helper programs now live in
/usr/[local/]libexec/gnupg by default. If you are upgrading
from 1.0.7, you might want to delete your old copies in
/usr/[local/]bin. If you use an OS that does not use libexec
for whatever reason, use configure --libexecdir=/usr/local/lib
to place the keyserver helpers there.
* The LDAP keyserver handler now works properly with very old
(version 1) LDAP keyservers.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.1.90 (2002-07-01)
-------------------------------------------------
* New commands: --personal-cipher-preferences,
--personal-digest-preferences, and
--personal-compress-preferences allow the user to specify which
algorithms are to be preferred. Note that this does not permit
using an algorithm that is not present in the recipient's
preferences (which would violate the OpenPGP standard). This
just allows sorting the preferences differently.
* New "group" command to refer to several keys with one name.
* A warning is issued if the user forces the use of an algorithm
that is not listed in the recipient's preferences.
* Full revocation key (aka "designated revoker") support.
* The preferred hash algorithms on a key are consulted when
encrypting a signed message to that key. Note that this is
disabled by default by a SHA1 preference in
--personal-digest-preferences.
* --cert-digest-algo allows the user to specify the hash algorithm
to use when signing a key rather than the default SHA1 (or MD5
for PGP2 keys). Do not use this feature unless you fully
understand the implications of this.
* --pgp7 mode automatically sets all necessary options to ensure
that the resulting message will be usable by a user of PGP 7.x.
* New --attribute-fd command for frontends and scripts to get the
contents of attribute packets (i.e. photos)
* In expert mode, the user can now re-sign a v3 key with a v4
self-signature. This does not change the v3 key into a v4 key,
but it does allow the user to use preferences, primary ID flags,
etc.
* Significantly improved photo ID support on non-unixlike
platforms.
* The version number has jumped ahead to 1.1.90 to skip over the
old version 1.1 and to get ready for the upcoming 1.2.
* ElGamal sign and encrypt is not anymore allowed in the key
generation dialog unless in expert mode. RSA sign and encrypt
has been added with the same restrictions.
* [W32] Keyserver access does work with Windows NT.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.7 (2002-04-29)
------------------------------------------------
* Secret keys are now stored and exported in a new format which
uses SHA-1 for integrity checks. This format renders the
Rosa/Klima attack useless. Other OpenPGP implementations might
not yet support this, so the option --simple-sk-checksum creates
the old vulnerable format.
* The default cipher algorithm for encryption is now CAST5,
default hash algorithm is SHA-1. This will give us better
interoperability with other OpenPGP implementations.
* Symmetric encrypted messages now use a fixed file size if
possible. This is a tradeoff: it breaks PGP 5, but fixes PGP 2,
6, and 7. Note this was only an issue with RFC-1991 style
symmetric messages.
* Photographic user ID support. This uses an external program to
view the images.
* Enhanced keyserver support via keyserver "plugins". GnuPG comes
with plugins for the NAI LDAP keyserver as well as the HKP email
keyserver. It retains internal support for the HKP HTTP
keyserver.
* Nonrevocable signatures are now supported. If a user signs a
key nonrevocably, this signature cannot be taken back so be
careful!
* Multiple signature classes are usable when signing a key to
specify how carefully the key information (fingerprint, photo
ID, etc) was checked.
* --pgp2 mode automatically sets all necessary options to ensure
that the resulting message will be usable by a user of PGP 2.x.
* --pgp6 mode automatically sets all necessary options to ensure
that the resulting message will be usable by a user of PGP 6.x.
* Signatures may now be given an expiration date. When signing a
key with an expiration date, the user is prompted whether they
want their signature to expire at the same time.
* Revocation keys (designated revokers) are now supported if
present. There is currently no way to designate new keys as
designated revokers.
* Permissions on the .gnupg directory and its files are checked
for safety.
* --expert mode enables certain silly things such as signing a
revoked user id, expired key, or revoked key.
* Some fixes to build cleanly under Cygwin32.
* New tool gpgsplit to split OpenPGP data formats into packets.
* New option --preserve-permissions.
* Subkeys created in the future are not used for encryption or
signing unless the new option --ignore-valid-from is used.
* Revoked user-IDs are not listed unless signatures are listed too
or we are in verbose mode.
* There is no default comment string with ascii armors anymore
except for revocation certificates and --enarmor mode.
* The command "primary" in the edit menu can be used to change the
primary UID, "setpref" and "updpref" can be used to change the
preferences.
* Fixed the preference handling; since 1.0.5 they were erroneously
matched against against the latest user ID and not the given one.
* RSA key generation.
* Merged Stefan's patches for RISC OS in. See comments in
scripts/build-riscos.
* It is now possible to sign and conventional encrypt a message (-cs).
* The MDC feature flag is supported and can be set by using
the "updpref" edit command.
* The status messages GOODSIG and BADSIG are now returning the primary
UID, encoded using %XX escaping (but with spaces left as spaces,
so that it should not break too much)
* Support for GDBM based keyrings has been removed.
* The entire keyring management has been revamped.
* The way signature stati are store has changed so that v3
signatures can be supported. To increase the speed of many
operations for existing keyrings you can use the new
--rebuild-keydb-caches command.
* The entire key validation process (trustdb) has been revamped.
See the man page entries for --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb
and --no-auto-check-trustdb.
* --trusted-keys is again obsolete, --edit can be used to set the
ownertrust of any key to ultimately trusted.
* A subkey is never used to sign keys.
* Read only keyrings are now handled as expected.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.6 (2001-05-29)
------------------------------------------------
* Security fix for a format string bug in the tty code.
* Fixed format string bugs in all PO files.
* Removed Russian translation due to too many bugs. The FTP
server has an unofficial but better translation in the contrib
directory.
* Fixed expire time calculation and keyserver access.
* The usual set of minor bug fixes and enhancements.
* non-writable keyrings are now correctly handled.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.5 (2001-04-29)
------------------------------------------------
* WARNING: The semantics of --verify have changed to address a
problem with detached signature detection. --verify now ignores
signed material given on stdin unless this is requested by using
a "-" as the name for the file with the signed material. Please
check all your detached signature handling applications and make
sure that they don't pipe the signed material to stdin without
using a filename together with "-" on the the command line.
* WARNING: Corrected hash calculation for input data larger than
512M - it was just wrong, so you might notice bad signature in
some very big files. It may be wise to keep an old copy of
GnuPG around.
* Secret keys are no longer imported unless you use the new option
--allow-secret-key-import. This is a kludge and future versions will
handle it in another way.
* New command "showpref" in the --edit-key menu to show an easier
to understand preference listing.
* There is now the notation of a primary user ID. For example, it
is printed with a signature verification as the first user ID;
revoked user IDs are not printed there anymore. In general the
primary user ID is the one with the latest self-signature.
* New --charset=utf-8 to bypass all internal conversions.
* Large File Support (LFS) is now working.
* New options: --ignore-crc-error, --no-sig-create-check,
--no-sig-cache, --fixed-list-mode, --no-expensive-trust-checks,
--enable-special-filenames and --use-agent. See man page.
* New command --pipemode, which can be used to run gpg as a
co-process. Currently only the verification of detached
signatures are working. See doc/DETAILS.
* Keyserver support for the W32 version.
* Rewritten key selection code so that GnuPG can better cope with
multiple subkeys, expire dates and so. The drawback is that it
is slower.
* A whole lot of bug fixes.
* The verification status of self-signatures are now cached. To
increase the speed of key list operations for existing keys you
can do the following in your GnuPG homedir (~/.gnupg):
cp pubring.gpg pubring.gpg.save && gpg --export-all >x && \
rm pubring.gpg && gpg --import x
Only v4 keys (i.e not the old RSA keys) benefit from this caching.
* New translations: Estonian, Turkish.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.4 (2000-10-17)
------------------------------------------------
* Fixed a serious bug which could lead to false signature verification
results when more than one signature is fed to gpg. This is the
primary reason for releasing this version.
* New utility gpgv which is a stripped down version of gpg to
be used to verify signatures against a list of trusted keys.
* Rijndael (AES) is now supported and listed with top preference.
* --with-colons now works with --print-md[s].
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.3 (2000-09-18)
------------------------------------------------
* Fixed problems with piping to/from other MS-Windows software
* Expiration time of the primary key can be changed again.
* Revoked user IDs are now marked in the output of --list-key
* New options --show-session-key and --override-session-key
to help the British folks to somewhat minimize the danger
of this Orwellian RIP bill.
* New options --merge-only and --try-all-secrets.
* New configuration option --with-egd-socket.
* The --trusted-key option is back after it left us with 0.9.5
* RSA is supported. Key generation does not yet work but will come
soon.
* CAST5 and SHA-1 are now the default algorithms to protect the key
and for symmetric-only encryption. This should solve a couple
of compatibility problems because the old algorithms are optional
according to RFC2440
* Twofish and MDC enhanced encryption is now used. PGP 7 supports
this. Older versions of GnuPG don't support it, so they should be
upgraded to at least 1.0.2
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.2 (2000-07-12)
----------------------------------------------
* Fixed expiration handling of encryption keys.
* Add an experimental feature to do unattended key generation.
* The user is now asked for the reason of revocation as required
by the new OpenPGP draft.
* There is a ~/.gnupg/random_seed file now which saves the
state of the internal RNG and increases system performance
somewhat. This way the full entropy source is only used in
cases were it is really required.
Use the option --no-random-seed-file to disable this feature.
* New options --ignore-time-conflict and --lock-never.
* Some fixes for the W32 version.
* The entropy.dll is not anymore used by the W32 version but replaced
by code derived from Cryptlib.
* Encryption is now much faster: About 2 times for 1k bit keys
and 8 times for 4k keys.
* New encryption keys are generated in a way which allows a much
faster decryption.
* New command --export-secret-subkeys which outputs the
the _primary_ key with it's secret parts deleted. This is
useful for automated decryption/signature creation as it
allows to keep the real secret primary key offline and
thereby protecting the key certificates and allowing to
create revocations for the subkeys. See the FAQ for a
procedure to install such secret keys.
* Keygeneration now writes to the first writeable keyring or
as default to the one in the homedirectory. Prior versions
ignored all --keyring options.
* New option --command-fd to take user input from a file descriptor;
to be used with --status-fd by software which uses GnuPG as a backend.
* There is a new status PROGRESS which is used to show progress during
key generation.
* Support for the new MDC encryption packets. To create them either
--force-mdc must be use or cipher algorithm with a blocksize other
than 64 bits is to be used. --openpgp currently disables MDC packets
entirely. This option should not yet be used.
* New option --no-auto-key-retrieve to disable retrieving of
a missing public key from a keyserver, when a keyserver has been set.
* Danish translation
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.1 (1999-12-16)
-----------------------------------
* New command --verify-files. New option --fast-list-mode.
* $http_proxy is now used when --honor-http-proxy is set.
* Fixed some minor bugs and the problem with conventional encrypted
packets which did use the gpg v3 partial length headers.
* Add Indonesian and Portugese translations.
* Fixed a bug with symmetric-only encryption using the non-default 3DES.
The option --emulate-3des-s2k-bug may be used to decrypt documents
which have been encrypted this way; this should be done immediately
as this workaround will be remove in 1.1
* Can now handle (but not display) PGP's photo IDs. I don't know the
format of that packet but after stripping a few bytes from the start
it looks like a JPEG (at least my test data). Handling of this
package is required because otherwise it would mix up the
self signatures and you can't import those keys.
* Passing non-ascii user IDs on the commandline should now work in all
cases.
* New keys are now generated with an additional preference to Blowfish.
* Removed the GNU Privacy Handbook from the distribution as it will go
into a separate one.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.0 (1999-09-07)
-----------------------------------
* Add a very preliminary version of the GNU Privacy Handbook to
the distribution (lynx doc/gph/index.html).
* Changed the version number to GnuPG 2001 ;-)
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.11 (1999-09-03)
------------------------------------
* UTF-8 strings are now correctly printed (if --charset is set correctly).
Output of --with-colons remains C-style escaped UTF-8.
* Workaround for a problem with PGP 5 detached signature in textmode.
* Fixed a problem when importing new subkeys (duplicated signatures).
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.10 (1999-07-23)
------------------------------------
* Some strange new options to help pgpgpg
* Cleaned up the dox a bit.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.9
-----------------------------------
* New options --[no-]utf8-strings.
* New edit-menu commands "enable" and "disable" for entire keys.
* You will be asked for a filename if gpg cannot deduce one.
* Changes to support libtool which is needed for the development
of libgcrypt.
* New script tools/lspgpot to help transferring assigned
trustvalues from PGP to GnuPG.
* New commands --lsign-key and made --sign-key a shortcut for --edit
and sign.
* New options (#122--126 ;-) --[no-]default-recipient[-self],
--disable-{cipher,pubkey}-algo. See the man page.
* Enhanced info output in case of multiple recipients and fixed exit code.
* New option --allow-non-selfsigned-uid to work around a problem with
the German IN way of separating signing and encryption keys.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.8 (1999-06-26)
-----------------------------------
* New subcommand "delsig" in the edit menu.
* The name of the output file is not anymore the one which is
embedded in the processed message, but the used filename with
the extension stripped. To revert to the old behaviour you can
use the option --use-embedded-filename.
* Another hack to cope with pgp2 generated detached signatures.
* latin-2 character set works (--charset=iso-8859-2).
* New option --with-key-data to list the public key parameters.
New option -N to insert notations and a --set-policy-url.
A couple of other options to allow reseting of options.
* Better support for HPUX.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.7 (1999-05-23)
-----------------------------------
* Add some work arounds for a bugs in pgp 2 which led to bad signatures
when used with canonical texts in some cases.
* Enhanced some status outputs.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.6 (1999-05-06)
-----------------------------------
* Twofish is now statically linked by default. The experimental 128 bit
version is now disabled. Full support will be available as soon as
the OpenPGP WG has decided on an interpretation of rfc2440.
* Dropped support for the ancient Blowfish160 which is not OpenPGP.
* Merged gpgm and gpg into one binary.
* Add "revsig" and "revkey" commands to the edit menu. It is now
possible to revoke signature and subkeys.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.5 (1999-03-20)
-----------------------------------
* New command "lsign" in the keyedit menu to create non-exportable
signatures. Removed --trusted-keys option.
* A bunch of changes to the key validation code.
* --list-trust-path now has an optional --with-colons format.
* New command --recv-keys to import keys from an keyserver.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.4 (1999-03-08)
-----------------------------------
* New configure option --enable-static-rnd=[egd|linux|unix|none]
to select a random gathering module for static linking.
* The original text is now verbatim copied to a cleartext signed message.
* Bugfixes but there are still a couple of bugs.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.3 (1999-02-19)
-----------------------------------
* Changed the internal design of getkey which now allows a
efficient lookup of multiple keys and add a word match mode.
* New options --[no-]encrypt-to.
* Some changes to the configure stuff. Switched to automake 1.4.
Removed intl/ from CVS, autogen.sh now uses gettextize.
* Preferences now include Twofish. Removed preference to Blowfish with
a special hack to suppress the "not listed in preferences" warning;
this is to allow us to switch completely to Twofish in the near future.
* Changed the locking stuff.
* Print all user ids of a good signature.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.2 (1999-01-01)
-----------------------------------
* add some additional time warp checks.
* Option --keyserver and command --send-keys to utilize HKP servers.
* Upgraded to zlib 1.1.3 and fixed an inflate bug
* More cleanup on the cleartext signatures.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.1 (1999-01-01)
-----------------------------------
* Polish language support.
* When querying the passphrase, the key ID of the primary key is
displayed along with the one of the used secondary key.
* Fixed a bug occurring when decrypting pgp 5 encrypted messages,
fixed an infinite loop bug in the 3DES code and in the code
which looks for trusted signatures.
* Fixed a bug in the mpi library which caused signatures not to
compare okay.
* Rewrote the handling of cleartext signatures; the code is now
better maintainable (I hope so).
* New status output VALIDSIG only for valid signatures together
with the fingerprint of the signer's key.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.0 (1998-12-23)
-----------------------------------
* --export does now only exports rfc2440 compatible keys; the
old behaviour is available with --export-all.
Generation of v3 ElGamal (sign and encrypt) keys is not longer
supported.
* Fixed the uncompress bug.
* Rewrote the rndunix module. There are two environment variables
used for debugging now: GNUPG_RNDUNIX_DBG give the file to write
debugging information (use "-" for stdout) and if GNUPG_RNDUNIX_DBGALL
is set, all programs which are only tried are also printed.
* New option --escape-from-lines to "dash-escape" "From " lines to
prevent mailers to change them to ">From ". This is not enabled by
default because it is not in compliance with rfc2440 - however, you
should turn it on.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.5 (1998-12-08)
-----------------------------------
* The keyrings and the trustdb is now locked, so that
other GnuPG processes won't damage these files. You
may want to put the option --lock-once into your options file.
* The latest self-signatures are now used; this enables --import
to see updated preferences etc.
* Import of subkeys should now work.
* Random gathering modules may now be loaded as extensions. Add
such a module for most Unices but it is very experimental!
* Brazilian language support.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.4 (1998-11-20)
-----------------------------------
* Fixed the way the key expiration time is stored. If you have
an expiration time on your key you should fix it with --edit-key
and the command "expire". I apologize for this inconvenience.
* Add option --charset to support "koi8-r" encoding of user ids.
(Not yet tested).
* Preferences should now work again. You should run
"gpgm --check-trustdb \*" to rebuild all preferences.
* Checking of certificates should now work but this needs a lot
of testing. Key validation values are now cached in the
trustdb; they should be recalculated as needed, but you may
use --check-trustdb or --update-trustdb to do this.
* Spanish translation by Urko Lusa.
* Patch files are from now on signed. See the man page
for the new option --not-dash-escaped.
* New syntax: --edit-key <userID> [<commands>]
If you run it without --batch the commands are executed and then
you are put into normal mode unless you use "quit" or "save" as
one of the commands. When in batch mode, the program quits after
the last command, so you have to use "save" if you did some changes.
It does not yet work completely, but may be used to list so the
keys etc.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.3 (1998-11-08)
-----------------------------------
* Fixed the gettext configure bug.
* Kludge for RSA keys: keyid and length of a RSA key are
correctly reported, but you get an error if you try to use
this key (If you do not have the non-US version).
* Experimental support for keyrings stored in a GDBM database.
This is *much* faster than a standard keyring. You will notice
that the import gets slower with time; the reason is that all
new keys are used to verify signatures of previous inserted
keys. Use "--keyring gnupg-gdbm:<name-of-gdbm-file>". This is
not (yet) supported for secret keys.
* A Russian language file in the distribution (alternatives are in
the contrib directory of the FTP servers)
* commandline option processing now works as expected for GNU programs
with the exception that you can't mix options and normal arguments.
* Now --list-key lists all matching keys. This is needed in some
other places too.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.2 (1998-10-18)
-----------------------------------
* This is only a snapshot: There are still a few bugs.
* Fixed this huge memory leak.
* Redesigned the trust database: You should run "gpgm --check-trustdb".
New command --update-trustdb, which adds new key from the public
keyring into your trustdb
* Fixed a bug in the armor code, leading to invalid packet errors.
(a workaround for this was to use --no-armor). The shorten line
length (64 instead of 72) fixes a problem with pgp5 and keyservers.
* comment packets are not anymore generated. "--export" filters
them out. One Exception: The comment packets in a secret keyring
are still used because they carry the factorization of the public
prime product.
* --import now only looks for KEYBLOCK headers, so you can now simply
- remove the "- " in front of such a header if someone accidently signed
+ remove the "- " in front of such a header if someone accidentally signed
such a message or the keyblock is part of a cleartext signed message.
* --with-colons now lists the key expiration time and not anymore
the valid period.
* Some keyblocks created with old releases have a wrong sequence
of packets, so that the keyservers don't accept these keys.
Simply using "--edit-key" fixes the problem.
* New option --force-v3-sigs to generate signed messages which are
compatible to PGP 5.
* Add some code to support DLD (for non ELF systems) - but this is
not tested because my BSD box is currently broken.
* New command "expire" in the edit-key menu.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.1 (1998-10-07)
-----------------------------------
* A secondary key is used when the primary key is specified but cannot
be used for the operation (if it is a sign-only key).
* GNUPG can now handle concatenated armored messages: There is still a
bug if different kinds of messages are mixed.
* Iterated+Salted passphrases now work. If want to be sure that PGP5
is able to handle them you may want to use the options
"--s2k-mode 3 --s2k-cipher-algo cast5 --s2k-digest-algo sha1"
when changing a passphrase.
* doc/OpenPGP talks about OpenPGP compliance, doc/HACKING gives
a few hints about the internal structure.
* Checked gnupg against the August 1998 draft (07) and I believe
it is in compliance with this document (except for one point).
* Fixed some bugs in the import merging code and rewrote some
code for the trustdb.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.0 (1998-09-18)
-----------------------------------
* Triple DES is now supported. Michael Roth did this piece of
needed work. We have now all the coded needed to be OpenPGP
compliant.
* Added a simple rpm spec file (see INSTALL).
* detached and armored signatures are now using "PGP SIGNATURE",
except when --rfc1991 is used.
* All times which are not in the yyyy-mm-dd format are now printed
in local time.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.3.5 (1998-09-14)
-----------------------------------
* New option --throw-keyid to create anonymous enciphered messages.
If gpg detects such a message it tires all available secret keys
in turn so decode it. This is a gnupg extension and not in OpenPGP
but it has been discussed there and afaik some products use this
scheme too (Suggested by Nimrod Zimmerman).
* Fixed a bug with 5 byte length headers.
* --delete-[secret-]key is now also available in gpgm.
* cleartext signatures are not anymore converted to LF only.
* Fixed a trustdb problem. Run "gpgm --check-trustdb" to fix old
trust dbs.
* Building in another directory should now work.
* Weak key detection mechanism (Niklas Hernaeus).
Noteworthy changes in version 0.3.4 (1998-08-11)
-----------------------------------
* New options --comment and --set-filename; see g10/OPTIONS
* yes/no, y/n localized.
* Fixed some bugs.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.3.3 (1998-08-08)
-----------------------------------
* IMPORTANT: I found yet another bug in the way the secret keys
are encrypted - I did it the way pgp 2.x did it, but OpenPGP
and pgp 5.x specify another (in some aspects simpler) method.
To convert your secret keys you have to do this:
1. Build the new release but don't install it and keep
a copy of the old program.
2. Disable the network, make sure that you are the only
user, be sure that there are no Trojan horses etc ....
3. Use your old gpg (version 0.3.[12]) and set the
passphrases of ALL your secret keys to empty!
(gpg --change-passphrase your-user-id).
4. Save your ownertrusts (see the next point)
5. rm ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg
6. install the new version of gpg (0.3.3)
7. For every secret key call "gpg --edit-key your-user-id",
enter "passwd" at the prompt, follow the instructions and
change your password back, enter "save" to store it.
8. Restore the ownertrust (see next point).
* The format of the trust database has changed; you must delete
the old one, so gnupg can create a new one.
IMPORTANT: Use version 0.3.[12] to save your assigned ownertrusts
("gpgm --list-ownertrust >saved-trust"); then build this new version
and restore the ownertrust with this new version
("gpgm --import-ownertrust saved-trust"). Please note that
--list-ownertrust has been renamed to --export-ownertrust in this
release and it does now only export defined ownertrusts.
* The command --edit-key now provides a commandline driven menu
which can be used for various tasks. --sign-key is only an
an alias to --edit-key and maybe removed in future: use the
command "sign" of this new menu - you can select which user ids
you want to sign.
* Alternate user ids can now be created an signed.
* Owner trust values can now be changed with --edit-key (trust)
* GNUPG can now run as a coprocess; this enables sophisticated
frontends. tools/shmtest.c is a simple sample implementation.
This needs some more work: all tty_xxx() are to be replaced
by cpr_xxx() and some changes in the display logics is needed.
* Removed options --gen-prime and --gen-random.
* Removed option --add-key; use --edit-key instead.
* Removed option --change-passphrase; use --edit-key instead.
* Signatures are now checked even if the output file could not
be created. Command "--verify" tries to find the detached data.
* gpg now disables core dumps.
* compress and symmetric cipher preferences are now used.
Because there is no 3DES yet, this is replaced by Blowfish.
* We have added the Twofish as an experimental cipher algorithm.
Many thanks to Matthew Skala for doing this work.
Twofish is the AES submission from Schneier et al.; see
"www.counterpane.com/twofish.html" for more information.
* Started with a help system: If you enter a question mark at some
prompt; you should get a specific help for this prompt.
* There is no more backup copy of the secret keyring.
* A lot of new bugs. I think this release is not as stable as
the previous one.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.3.2 (1998-07-09)
-----------------------------------
* Fixed some bugs when using --textmode (-seat)
* Now displays the trust status of a positive verified message.
* Keyrings are now scanned in the sequence they are added with
--[secret-]keyring. Note that the default keyring is implicitly
added as the very first one unless --no-default-keyring is used.
* Fixed setuid and dlopen bug.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.3.1 (1998-07-06)
-----------------------------------
* Partial headers are now written in the OpenPGP format if
a key in a v4 packet is used.
* Removed some unused options, removed the gnupg.sig stuff.
* Key lookup by name now returns a key which can be used for
the desired action.
* New options --list-ownertrust (gpgm) to make a backup copy
of the ownertrust values you assigned.
* clear signature headers are now in compliance with OpenPGP.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.3.0 (1998-06-25)
-----------------------------------
* New option --emulate-checksum-bug. If your passphrase does not
work anymore, use this option and --change-passphrase to rewrite
your passphrase.
* More complete v4 key support: Preferences and expiration time
is set into the self signature.
* Key generation defaults to DSA/ElGamal keys, so that new keys are
interoperable with pgp5
* DSA key generation is faster and key generation does not anymore
remove entropy from the random generator (the primes are public
parameters, so there is really no need for a cryptographic secure
prime number generator which we had used).
* A complete new structure for representing the key parameters.
* Removed most public key knowledge into the cipher library.
* Support for dynamic loading of new algorithms.
* Moved tiger to an extension module.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.19 (1998-05-29)
------------------------------------
* Replaced /dev/urandom in checks with new tool mk-tdata.
* Some assembler file cleanups; some more functions for the Alpha.
* Tiger has now the OpenPGP assigned number 6. Because the OID has
changed, old signatures using this algorithm can't be verified.
* gnupg now encrypts the compressed packed and not any longer in the
reverse order; anyway it can decrypt both versions. Thanks to Tom
for telling me this (not security related) bug.
* --add-key works and you are now able to generate subkeys.
* It is now possible to generate ElGamal keys in v4 packets to create
valid OpenPGP keys.
* Some new features for better integration into MUAs.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.18 (1998-05-15)
------------------------------------
* Splitted cipher/random.c, add new option "--disable-dev-random"
to configure to support the development of a random source for
other systems. Prepared sourcefiles rand-unix.c, rand-w32.c
and rand-dummy.c (which is used to allow compilation on systems
without a random source).
* Fixed a small bug in the key generation (it was possible that 48 bits
of a key were not taken from the random pool)
* Add key generation for DSA and v4 signatures.
* Add a function trap_unaligned(), so that a SIGBUS is issued on
Alphas and not the slow emulation code is used. And success: rmd160
raised a SIGBUS.
* Enhanced the formatting facility of argparse and changed the use of
\r,\v to @ because gettext does not like it.
* New option "--compress-algo 1" to allow the creation of compressed
messages which are readable by PGP and "--print-md" (gpgm) to make
speed measurement easier.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.17 (1998-05-04)
------------------------------------
* Comment packets are now of private type 61.
* Passphrase code still used a 160 bit blowfish key, added a
silly workaround. Please change your passphrase again - sorry.
* Conventional encryption now uses a type 3 packet to describe the
used algorithms.
* The new algorithm number for Blowfish is 20, 16 is still used for
encryption only; for signing it is only used when it is in a v3 packet,
so that GNUPG keys are still valid.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.16 (1998-04-28)
------------------------------------
* Add experimental support for the TIGER/192 message digest algorithm.
(But there is only a dummy ASN OID).
* Standard cipher is now Blowfish with 128 bit key in OpenPGP's CFB
mode. I renamed the old cipher to Blowfish160. Because the OpenPGP
group refused to assign me a number for Blowfish160, I have to
drop support for this in the future. You should use
"--change-passphrase" to recode your current passphrase with 128
bit Blowfish.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.15 (1998-04-09)
------------------------------------
* Fixed a bug with the old checksum calculation for secret keys.
If you run the program without --batch, a warning does inform
you if your secret key needs to be converted; simply use
--change-passphrase to recalculate the checksum. Please do this
soon, as the compatible mode will be removed sometime in the future.
* CAST5 works (using the PGP's special CFB mode).
* Again somewhat more PGP 5 compatible.
* Some new test cases
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.14 (1998-04-02)
------------------------------------
* Changed the internal handling of keyrings.
* Add support to list PGP 5 keyrings with subkeys
* Timestamps of signatures are now verified.
* A expiration time can now be specified during key generation.
* Some speedups for Blowfish and SHA-1, rewrote SHA-1 transform.
Reduced the amount of random bytes needed for key generation in
some cases.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.13 (1998-03-10)
------------------------------------
* Verify of DSA signatures works.
* Re-implemented the slower random number generator.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.12 (1998-03-07)
------------------------------------
* --delete-key checks that there is no secret key. The new
option --delete-secret-key maybe used to delete a secret key.
* "-kv" now works as expected. Options "--list-{keys,sigs]"
and "--check-sigs" are now working.
* New options "--verify" and "--decrypt" to better support integration
into MUAs (partly done for Mutt).
* New option "--with-colons" to make parsing of key lists easier.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.11 (1998-03-02)
------------------------------------
* GPG now asks for a recipient's name if option "-r" is not used.
* If there is no good trust path, the program asks whether to use
the public keys anyway.
* "--delete-key" works for public keys. What semantics shall I use
when there is a secret key too? Delete the secret key or leave him
and auto-regenerate the public key, next time the secret key is used?
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.10 (1998-02-27)
------------------------------------
* Code for the alpha is much faster (about 20 times); the data
was misaligned and the kernel traps this, so nearly all time
was used by system to trap the misalignments and to write
syslog messages. Shame on me and thanks to Ralph for
pointing me at this while drinking some beer yesterday.
* Changed some configure options and add an option
--disable-m-guard to remove the memory checking code
and to compile everything with optimization on.
* New environment variable GNUPGHOME, which can be used to set
another homedir than ~/.gnupg. Changed default homedir for
Windoze version to c:/gnupg.
* Fixed detached signatures; detached PGP signatures caused a SEGV.
* The Windoze version works (as usual w/o a strong RNG).
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.9 (1998-02-26)
-----------------------------------
* Fixed FreeBSD bug.
* Added a simple man page.
* Switched to automake1.2f and a newer gettext.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.8 (1998-02-24)
-----------------------------------
* Changed the name to GNUPG, the binaries are called gpg and gpgm.
You must rename rename the directory "~/.g10" to ~/.gnupg/, rename
{pub,sec}ring.g10 to {pub,sec}ring.gpg, trustdb.g10 to trustdb.gpg
and g10.sig to gnupg.sig.
* New or changed passphrases are now salted.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.7 (1998-02-18)
-----------------------------------
* New command "gen-revoke" to create a key revocation certificate.
* New option "homedir" to set the homedir (which defaults to "~/.g10").
This directory is created if it does not exists (only the last
part of the name and not the complete hierarchy)
* Command "import" works. (Try: "finger gcrypt@ftp.guug.de|g10 --import")
* New commands "dearmor/enarmor" for g10maint. These are mainly
used for internal test purposes.
* Option --version now conforming to the GNU standards and lists
the available ciphers, message digests and public key algorithms.
* Assembler code for m68k (not tested).
* "make check" works.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.6 (1998-02-13)
-----------------------------------
* Option "--export" works.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.5 (1998-02-12)
-----------------------------------
* Added zlib for systems which don't have it.
Use "./configure --with-zlib" to link with the static version.
* Generalized some more functions and rewrote the encoding of
message digests into MPIs.
* Enhanced the checkit script
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.4 (1998-02-11)
-----------------------------------
* nearly doubled the speed of the ElGamal signature verification.
* backup copies of keyrings are created.
* assembler stuff for Pentium; gives about 15% better performance.
* fixed a lot of bugs.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.3 (1998-02-09)
-----------------------------------
* Found a bug in the calculation of ELG fingerprints. This is now
fixed, but all existing fingerprints and keyids for ELG keys
are not any more valid.
* armor should now work; including clear signed text.
* moved some options to the new program g10maint
* It's now 64 bit clean and runs fine on an alpha--linux.
* Key generation is much faster now. I fixed this by using not
so strong random number for the primes (this was a bug because the
ElGamal primes are public parameters and it does not make sense
to generate them from strong random). The real secret is the x value
which is still generated from strong (okay: /dev/random) random bits.
* added option "--status-fd": see g10/OPTIONS
* We have secure memory on systems which support mlock().
It is not complete yet, because we do not have signal handler
which does a cleanup in very case.
We should also check the ulimit for the user in the case
that the admin does not have set a limit on locked pages.
* started with internationalization support.
* The logic to handle the web of trust is now implemented. It is
has some bugs; but I'm going to change the algorithm anyway.
It works by calculating the trustlevel on the fly. It may ask
you to provide trust parameters if the calculated trust probability
is too low. I will write a paper which discusses this new approach.
* a couple of changes to the configure script.
* New option "--quick-random" which uses a much quicker random
number generator. Keys generated while this option is in effect
are flags with "INSECURE!" in the user-id. This is a development
only option.
* Read support for new version packets (OpenPGP).
* Comment packets are now of correct OpenPGP type 16. Old comment
packets written by G10 are detected because they always start with
a hash which is an invalid version byte.
* The string "(INSECURE!)" is appended to a new user-id if this
is generated on a system without a good random number generator.
Version 0.2.2 (1998-02-09)
Version 0.2.1 (1998-01-28)
Version 0.2.0 (1998-01-25)
Version 0.1.3 (1998-01-12)
Version 0.1.2 (1998-01-07)
Version 0.1.1 (1998-01-07)
Version 0.1.0 (1998-01-05)
Version 0.0.0 (1997-12-20)
Copyright (C) 1998-2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
Copyright (C) 1997-2016 Werner Koch
This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives
unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without
modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the
implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
diff --git a/acinclude.m4 b/acinclude.m4
index 724c08572..4b48ea202 100644
--- a/acinclude.m4
+++ b/acinclude.m4
@@ -1,351 +1,351 @@
dnl macros to configure gnupg
dnl Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
dnl
dnl This file is part of GnuPG.
dnl
dnl GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
dnl it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
dnl the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
dnl (at your option) any later version.
dnl
dnl GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
dnl but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
dnl MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
dnl GNU General Public License for more details.
dnl
dnl You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
dnl along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
dnl GNUPG_CHECK_TYPEDEF(TYPE, HAVE_NAME)
dnl Check whether a typedef exists and create a #define $2 if it exists
dnl
AC_DEFUN([GNUPG_CHECK_TYPEDEF],
[ AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1 typedef)
AC_CACHE_VAL(gnupg_cv_typedef_$1,
[AC_TRY_COMPILE([#define _GNU_SOURCE 1
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/types.h>], [
#undef $1
int a = sizeof($1);
], gnupg_cv_typedef_$1=yes, gnupg_cv_typedef_$1=no )])
AC_MSG_RESULT($gnupg_cv_typedef_$1)
if test "$gnupg_cv_typedef_$1" = yes; then
AC_DEFINE($2,1,[Defined if a `]$1[' is typedef'd])
fi
])
dnl GNUPG_CHECK_GNUMAKE
dnl
AC_DEFUN([GNUPG_CHECK_GNUMAKE],
[
if ${MAKE-make} --version 2>/dev/null | grep '^GNU ' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
:
else
AC_MSG_WARN([[
***
*** It seems that you are not using GNU make. Some make tools have serious
*** flaws and you may not be able to build this software at all. Before you
*** complain, please try GNU make: GNU make is easy to build and available
*** at all GNU archives. It is always available from ftp.gnu.org:/gnu/make.
***]])
fi
])
dnl GNUPG_CHECK_FAQPROG
dnl
AC_DEFUN([GNUPG_CHECK_FAQPROG],
[ AC_MSG_CHECKING(for faqprog.pl)
if faqprog.pl -V 2>/dev/null | grep '^faqprog.pl ' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
working_faqprog=yes
FAQPROG="faqprog.pl"
else
working_faqprog=no
FAQPROG=": "
fi
AC_MSG_RESULT($working_faqprog)
AC_SUBST(FAQPROG)
AM_CONDITIONAL(WORKING_FAQPROG, test "$working_faqprog" = "yes" )
dnl if test $working_faqprog = no; then
dnl AC_MSG_WARN([[
dnl ***
dnl *** It seems that the faqprog.pl program is not installed;
dnl *** however it is only needed if you want to change the FAQ.
dnl *** (faqprog.pl should be available at:
dnl *** ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/contrib/faqprog.pl )
dnl *** No need to worry about this warning.
dnl ***]])
dnl fi
])
dnl GNUPG_CHECK_DOCBOOK_TO_TEXI
dnl
AC_DEFUN([GNUPG_CHECK_DOCBOOK_TO_TEXI],
[
AC_CHECK_PROG(DOCBOOK_TO_TEXI, docbook2texi, yes, no)
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for sgml to texi tools)
working_sgmltotexi=no
if test "$ac_cv_prog_DOCBOOK_TO_TEXI" = yes; then
if sgml2xml -v /dev/null 2>&1 | grep 'SP version' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
working_sgmltotexi=yes
fi
fi
AC_MSG_RESULT($working_sgmltotexi)
AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_DOCBOOK_TO_TEXI, test "$working_sgmltotexi" = "yes" )
])
dnl GNUPG_CHECK_ENDIAN
dnl define either LITTLE_ENDIAN_HOST or BIG_ENDIAN_HOST
dnl
AC_DEFUN([GNUPG_CHECK_ENDIAN],
[
tmp_assumed_endian=big
tmp_assume_warn=""
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
case "$host_cpu" in
i@<:@345678@:>@* )
tmp_assumed_endian=little
;;
*)
;;
esac
fi
- AC_MSG_CHECKING(endianess)
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(endianness)
AC_CACHE_VAL(gnupg_cv_c_endian,
[ gnupg_cv_c_endian=unknown
# See if sys/param.h defines the BYTE_ORDER macro.
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>], [
#if !BYTE_ORDER || !BIG_ENDIAN || !LITTLE_ENDIAN
bogus endian macros
#endif], [# It does; now see whether it defined to BIG_ENDIAN or not.
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>], [
#if BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN
not big endian
#endif], gnupg_cv_c_endian=big, gnupg_cv_c_endian=little)])
if test "$gnupg_cv_c_endian" = unknown; then
AC_TRY_RUN([main () {
/* Are we little or big endian? From Harbison&Steele. */
union
{
long l;
char c[sizeof (long)];
} u;
u.l = 1;
exit (u.c[sizeof (long) - 1] == 1);
}],
gnupg_cv_c_endian=little,
gnupg_cv_c_endian=big,
gnupg_cv_c_endian=$tmp_assumed_endian
tmp_assumed_warn=" (assumed)"
)
fi
])
AC_MSG_RESULT([${gnupg_cv_c_endian}${tmp_assumed_warn}])
if test "$gnupg_cv_c_endian" = little; then
AC_DEFINE(LITTLE_ENDIAN_HOST,1,
[Defined if the host has little endian byte ordering])
else
AC_DEFINE(BIG_ENDIAN_HOST,1,
[Defined if the host has big endian byte ordering])
fi
])
# GNUPG_BUILD_PROGRAM(NAME,DEFAULT)
# Add a --enable-NAME option to configure an set the
# shell variable build_NAME either to "yes" or "no". DEFAULT must
# either be "yes" or "no" and decided on the default value for
# build_NAME and whether --enable-NAME or --disable-NAME is shown with
# ./configure --help
AC_DEFUN([GNUPG_BUILD_PROGRAM],
[m4_define([my_build], [m4_bpatsubst(build_$1, [[^a-zA-Z0-9_]], [_])])
my_build=$2
m4_if([$2],[yes],[
AC_ARG_ENABLE([$1], AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-$1],
[do not build the $1 program]),
my_build=$enableval, my_build=$2)
],[
AC_ARG_ENABLE([$1], AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-$1],
[build the $1 program]),
my_build=$enableval, my_build=$2)
])
case "$my_build" in
no|yes)
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([only yes or no allowed for feature --enable-$1])
;;
esac
m4_undefine([my_build])
])
# GNUPG_DISABLE_GPG_ALGO(NAME,DESCRIPTION)
#
# Add a --disable-gpg-NAME option and the corresponding ac_define
# GPG_USE_<NAME>.
AC_DEFUN([GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO],
[AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable the $2 for gpg])
AC_ARG_ENABLE([gpg-$1], AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-gpg-$1],
[disable the $2 algorithm in gpg]),
, enableval=yes)
AC_MSG_RESULT($enableval)
if test x"$enableval" = xyes ; then
AC_DEFINE(GPG_USE_[]m4_toupper($1), 1, [Define to support the $2])
fi
])
# Check whether mlock is broken (hpux 10.20 raises a SIGBUS if mlock
# is not called from uid 0 (not tested whether uid 0 works)
# For DECs Tru64 we have also to check whether mlock is in librt
# mlock is there a macro using memlk()
dnl GNUPG_CHECK_MLOCK
dnl
AC_DEFUN([GNUPG_CHECK_MLOCK],
[ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(mlock)
if test "$ac_cv_func_mlock" = "no"; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(sys/mman.h)
if test "$ac_cv_header_sys_mman_h" = "yes"; then
# Add librt to LIBS:
AC_CHECK_LIB(rt, memlk)
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether mlock is in sys/mman.h],
gnupg_cv_mlock_is_in_sys_mman,
[AC_TRY_LINK([
#include <assert.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
#include <sys/mman.h>
#endif
], [
int i;
/* glibc defines this for functions which it implements
* to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually
* named something starting with __ and the normal name
* is an alias. */
#if defined (__stub_mlock) || defined (__stub___mlock)
choke me
#else
mlock(&i, 4);
#endif
; return 0;
],
gnupg_cv_mlock_is_in_sys_mman=yes,
gnupg_cv_mlock_is_in_sys_mman=no)])
if test "$gnupg_cv_mlock_is_in_sys_mman" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_MLOCK,1,
[Defined if the system supports an mlock() call])
fi
fi
fi
if test "$ac_cv_func_mlock" = "yes"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING(whether mlock is broken)
AC_CACHE_VAL(gnupg_cv_have_broken_mlock,
AC_TRY_RUN([
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
int main()
{
char *pool;
int err;
long int pgsize = getpagesize();
pool = malloc( 4096 + pgsize );
if( !pool )
return 2;
pool += (pgsize - ((long int)pool % pgsize));
err = mlock( pool, 4096 );
if( !err || errno == EPERM )
return 0; /* okay */
return 1; /* hmmm */
}
],
gnupg_cv_have_broken_mlock="no",
gnupg_cv_have_broken_mlock="yes",
gnupg_cv_have_broken_mlock="assume-no"
)
)
if test "$gnupg_cv_have_broken_mlock" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BROKEN_MLOCK,1,
[Defined if the mlock() call does not work])
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(plock)
else
if test "$gnupg_cv_have_broken_mlock" = "no"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(assuming no)
fi
fi
fi
])
dnl Stolen from gcc
dnl Define MKDIR_TAKES_ONE_ARG if mkdir accepts only one argument instead
dnl of the usual 2.
AC_DEFUN([GNUPG_FUNC_MKDIR_TAKES_ONE_ARG],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(sys/stat.h unistd.h direct.h)
AC_CACHE_CHECK([if mkdir takes one argument], gnupg_cv_mkdir_takes_one_arg,
[AC_TRY_COMPILE([
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
# include <unistd.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_DIRECT_H
# include <direct.h>
#endif], [mkdir ("foo", 0);],
gnupg_cv_mkdir_takes_one_arg=no, gnupg_cv_mkdir_takes_one_arg=yes)])
if test $gnupg_cv_mkdir_takes_one_arg = yes ; then
AC_DEFINE(MKDIR_TAKES_ONE_ARG,1,
[Defined if mkdir() does not take permission flags])
fi
])
# GNUPG_TIME_T_UNSIGNED
# Check whether time_t is unsigned
#
AC_DEFUN([GNUPG_TIME_T_UNSIGNED],
[ AC_CACHE_CHECK(whether time_t is unsigned, gnupg_cv_time_t_unsigned,
[AC_REQUIRE([AC_HEADER_TIME])dnl
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_BOOL_COMPILE_TRY(
[AC_INCLUDES_DEFAULT([])
#if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
# include <sys/time.h>
# include <time.h>
#else
# if HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
# else
# include <time.h>
# endif
#endif
],
[((time_t)-1) < 0])],
gnupg_cv_time_t_unsigned=no, gnupg_cv_time_t_unsigned=yes)])
if test $gnupg_cv_time_t_unsigned = yes; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_UNSIGNED_TIME_T,1,[Defined if time_t is an unsigned type])
fi
])# GNUPG_TIME_T_UNSIGNED
diff --git a/agent/command-ssh.c b/agent/command-ssh.c
index 83a27ed50..083b8d890 100644
--- a/agent/command-ssh.c
+++ b/agent/command-ssh.c
@@ -1,3722 +1,3722 @@
/* command-ssh.c - gpg-agent's ssh-agent emulation layer
* Copyright (C) 2004-2006, 2009, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2004-2006, 2009, 2012-2014 Werner Koch
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
/* Only v2 of the ssh-agent protocol is implemented. Relevant RFCs
are:
RFC-4250 - Protocol Assigned Numbers
RFC-4251 - Protocol Architecture
RFC-4252 - Authentication Protocol
RFC-4253 - Transport Layer Protocol
RFC-5656 - ECC support
The protocol for the agent is defined in OpenSSH's PROTOCL.agent
file.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "agent.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "ssh-utils.h"
/* Request types. */
#define SSH_REQUEST_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11
#define SSH_REQUEST_SIGN_REQUEST 13
#define SSH_REQUEST_ADD_IDENTITY 17
#define SSH_REQUEST_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18
#define SSH_REQUEST_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19
#define SSH_REQUEST_LOCK 22
#define SSH_REQUEST_UNLOCK 23
#define SSH_REQUEST_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25
/* Options. */
#define SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1
#define SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2
/* Response types. */
#define SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS 6
#define SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE 5
#define SSH_RESPONSE_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12
#define SSH_RESPONSE_SIGN_RESPONSE 14
/* Other constants. */
#define SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING 20
#define SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_ELEMS 2
#define SPEC_FLAG_USE_PKCS1V2 (1 << 0)
#define SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA (1 << 1)
#define SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA (1 << 2) /*(lowercase 'd' on purpose.)*/
#define SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT (1 << 7)
/* The name of the control file. */
#define SSH_CONTROL_FILE_NAME "sshcontrol"
/* The blurb we put into the header of a newly created control file. */
static const char sshcontrolblurb[] =
"# List of allowed ssh keys. Only keys present in this file are used\n"
"# in the SSH protocol. The ssh-add tool may add new entries to this\n"
"# file to enable them; you may also add them manually. Comment\n"
"# lines, like this one, as well as empty lines are ignored. Lines do\n"
"# have a certain length limit but this is not serious limitation as\n"
"# the format of the entries is fixed and checked by gpg-agent. A\n"
"# non-comment line starts with optional white spaces, followed by the\n"
"# keygrip of the key given as 40 hex digits, optionally followed by a\n"
"# caching TTL in seconds, and another optional field for arbitrary\n"
"# flags. Prepend the keygrip with an '!' mark to disable it.\n"
"\n";
/* Macros. */
/* Return a new uint32 with b0 being the most significant byte and b3
being the least significant byte. */
#define uint32_construct(b0, b1, b2, b3) \
((b0 << 24) | (b1 << 16) | (b2 << 8) | b3)
/*
* Basic types.
*/
/* Type for a request handler. */
typedef gpg_error_t (*ssh_request_handler_t) (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
struct ssh_key_type_spec;
typedef struct ssh_key_type_spec ssh_key_type_spec_t;
/* Type, which is used for associating request handlers with the
appropriate request IDs. */
typedef struct ssh_request_spec
{
unsigned char type;
ssh_request_handler_t handler;
const char *identifier;
unsigned int secret_input;
} ssh_request_spec_t;
/* Type for "key modifier functions", which are necessary since
OpenSSH and GnuPG treat key material slightly different. A key
modifier is called right after a new key identity has been received
in order to "sanitize" the material. */
typedef gpg_error_t (*ssh_key_modifier_t) (const char *elems,
gcry_mpi_t *mpis);
/* The encoding of a generated signature is dependent on the
algorithm; therefore algorithm specific signature encoding
functions are necessary. */
typedef gpg_error_t (*ssh_signature_encoder_t) (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t signature_blob,
gcry_sexp_t sig);
/* Type, which is used for boundling all the algorithm specific
information together in a single object. */
struct ssh_key_type_spec
{
/* Algorithm identifier as used by OpenSSH. */
const char *ssh_identifier;
/* Human readable name of the algorithm. */
const char *name;
/* Algorithm identifier as used by GnuPG. */
int algo;
/* List of MPI names for secret keys; order matches the one of the
agent protocol. */
const char *elems_key_secret;
/* List of MPI names for public keys; order matches the one of the
agent protocol. */
const char *elems_key_public;
/* List of MPI names for signature data. */
const char *elems_signature;
/* List of MPI names for secret keys; order matches the one, which
is required by gpg-agent's key access layer. */
const char *elems_sexp_order;
/* Key modifier function. Key modifier functions are necessary in
order to fix any inconsistencies between the representation of
keys on the SSH and on the GnuPG side. */
ssh_key_modifier_t key_modifier;
/* Signature encoder function. Signature encoder functions are
necessary since the encoding of signatures depends on the used
algorithm. */
ssh_signature_encoder_t signature_encoder;
/* The name of the ECC curve or NULL. */
const char *curve_name;
/* The hash algorithm to be used with this key. 0 for using the
default. */
int hash_algo;
/* Misc flags. */
unsigned int flags;
};
/* Definition of an object to access the sshcontrol file. */
struct ssh_control_file_s
{
char *fname; /* Name of the file. */
FILE *fp; /* This is never NULL. */
int lnr; /* The current line number. */
struct {
int valid; /* True if the data of this structure is valid. */
int disabled; /* The item is disabled. */
int ttl; /* The TTL of the item. */
int confirm; /* The confirm flag is set. */
char hexgrip[40+1]; /* The hexgrip of the item (uppercase). */
} item;
};
/* Prototypes. */
static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_request_identities (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_sign_request (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_add_identity (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_remove_identity (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_remove_all_identities (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_lock (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_unlock (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
static gpg_error_t ssh_key_modifier_rsa (const char *elems, gcry_mpi_t *mpis);
static gpg_error_t ssh_signature_encoder_rsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t signature_blob,
gcry_sexp_t signature);
static gpg_error_t ssh_signature_encoder_dsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t signature_blob,
gcry_sexp_t signature);
static gpg_error_t ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t signature_blob,
gcry_sexp_t signature);
static gpg_error_t ssh_signature_encoder_eddsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t signature_blob,
gcry_sexp_t signature);
static gpg_error_t ssh_key_extract_comment (gcry_sexp_t key, char **comment);
/* Global variables. */
/* Associating request types with the corresponding request
handlers. */
static ssh_request_spec_t request_specs[] =
{
#define REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE(id, name, secret_input) \
{ SSH_REQUEST_##id, ssh_handler_##name, #name, secret_input }
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (REQUEST_IDENTITIES, request_identities, 1),
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (SIGN_REQUEST, sign_request, 0),
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (ADD_IDENTITY, add_identity, 1),
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED, add_identity, 1),
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (REMOVE_IDENTITY, remove_identity, 0),
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES, remove_all_identities, 0),
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (LOCK, lock, 0),
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (UNLOCK, unlock, 0)
#undef REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE
};
/* Table holding key type specifications. */
static ssh_key_type_spec_t ssh_key_types[] =
{
{
"ssh-ed25519", "Ed25519", GCRY_PK_EDDSA, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_eddsa,
"Ed25519", 0, SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA
},
{
"ssh-rsa", "RSA", GCRY_PK_RSA, "nedupq", "en", "s", "nedpqu",
ssh_key_modifier_rsa, ssh_signature_encoder_rsa,
NULL, 0, SPEC_FLAG_USE_PKCS1V2
},
{
"ssh-dss", "DSA", GCRY_PK_DSA, "pqgyx", "pqgy", "rs", "pqgyx",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_dsa,
NULL, 0, 0
},
{
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ECDSA", GCRY_PK_ECC, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa,
"nistp256", GCRY_MD_SHA256, SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA
},
{
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ECDSA", GCRY_PK_ECC, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa,
"nistp384", GCRY_MD_SHA384, SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA
},
{
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521", "ECDSA", GCRY_PK_ECC, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa,
"nistp521", GCRY_MD_SHA512, SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA
},
{
"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "Ed25519",
GCRY_PK_EDDSA, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_eddsa,
"Ed25519", 0, SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA | SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT
},
{
"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA",
GCRY_PK_RSA, "nedupq", "en", "s", "nedpqu",
ssh_key_modifier_rsa, ssh_signature_encoder_rsa,
NULL, 0, SPEC_FLAG_USE_PKCS1V2 | SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT
},
{
"ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "DSA",
GCRY_PK_DSA, "pqgyx", "pqgy", "rs", "pqgyx",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_dsa,
NULL, 0, SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT | SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT
},
{
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA",
GCRY_PK_ECC, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa,
"nistp256", GCRY_MD_SHA256, SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA | SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT
},
{
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA",
GCRY_PK_ECC, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa,
"nistp384", GCRY_MD_SHA384, SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA | SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT
},
{
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA",
GCRY_PK_ECC, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa,
"nistp521", GCRY_MD_SHA512, SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA | SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT
}
};
/*
General utility functions.
*/
/* A secure realloc, i.e. it makes sure to allocate secure memory if A
is NULL. This is required because the standard gcry_realloc does
not know whether to allocate secure or normal if NULL is passed as
existing buffer. */
static void *
realloc_secure (void *a, size_t n)
{
void *p;
if (a)
p = gcry_realloc (a, n);
else
p = gcry_malloc_secure (n);
return p;
}
/* Lookup the ssh-identifier for the ECC curve CURVE_NAME. Returns
NULL if not found. */
static const char *
ssh_identifier_from_curve_name (const char *curve_name)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < DIM (ssh_key_types); i++)
if (ssh_key_types[i].curve_name
&& !strcmp (ssh_key_types[i].curve_name, curve_name))
return ssh_key_types[i].ssh_identifier;
return NULL;
}
/*
Primitive I/O functions.
*/
/* Read a byte from STREAM, store it in B. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_byte (estream_t stream, unsigned char *b)
{
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
ret = es_fgetc (stream);
if (ret == EOF)
{
if (es_ferror (stream))
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
*b = 0;
}
else
{
*b = ret & 0xFF;
err = 0;
}
return err;
}
/* Write the byte contained in B to STREAM. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_write_byte (estream_t stream, unsigned char b)
{
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
ret = es_fputc (b, stream);
if (ret == EOF)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Read a uint32 from STREAM, store it in UINT32. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_uint32 (estream_t stream, u32 *uint32)
{
unsigned char buffer[4];
size_t bytes_read;
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
ret = es_read (stream, buffer, sizeof (buffer), &bytes_read);
if (ret)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
if (bytes_read != sizeof (buffer))
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
else
{
u32 n;
n = uint32_construct (buffer[0], buffer[1], buffer[2], buffer[3]);
*uint32 = n;
err = 0;
}
}
return err;
}
/* Write the uint32 contained in UINT32 to STREAM. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_write_uint32 (estream_t stream, u32 uint32)
{
unsigned char buffer[4];
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
buffer[0] = uint32 >> 24;
buffer[1] = uint32 >> 16;
buffer[2] = uint32 >> 8;
buffer[3] = uint32 >> 0;
ret = es_write (stream, buffer, sizeof (buffer), NULL);
if (ret)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Read SIZE bytes from STREAM into BUFFER. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_data (estream_t stream, unsigned char *buffer, size_t size)
{
gpg_error_t err;
size_t bytes_read;
int ret;
ret = es_read (stream, buffer, size, &bytes_read);
if (ret)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
if (bytes_read != size)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
else
err = 0;
}
return err;
}
/* Skip over SIZE bytes from STREAM. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_skip (estream_t stream, size_t size)
{
char buffer[128];
size_t bytes_to_read, bytes_read;
int ret;
do
{
bytes_to_read = size;
if (bytes_to_read > sizeof buffer)
bytes_to_read = sizeof buffer;
ret = es_read (stream, buffer, bytes_to_read, &bytes_read);
if (ret)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else if (bytes_read != bytes_to_read)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
else
size -= bytes_to_read;
}
while (size);
return 0;
}
/* Write SIZE bytes from BUFFER to STREAM. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_write_data (estream_t stream, const unsigned char *buffer, size_t size)
{
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
ret = es_write (stream, buffer, size, NULL);
if (ret)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Read a binary string from STREAM into STRING, store size of string
in STRING_SIZE. Append a hidden nul so that the result may
directly be used as a C string. Depending on SECURE use secure
memory for STRING. If STRING is NULL do only a dummy read. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_string (estream_t stream, unsigned int secure,
unsigned char **string, u32 *string_size)
{
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
u32 length = 0;
if (string_size)
*string_size = 0;
/* Read string length. */
err = stream_read_uint32 (stream, &length);
if (err)
goto out;
if (string)
{
/* Allocate space. */
if (secure)
buffer = xtrymalloc_secure (length + 1);
else
buffer = xtrymalloc (length + 1);
if (! buffer)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
/* Read data. */
err = stream_read_data (stream, buffer, length);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Finalize string object. */
buffer[length] = 0;
*string = buffer;
}
else /* Dummy read requested. */
{
err = stream_read_skip (stream, length);
if (err)
goto out;
}
if (string_size)
*string_size = length;
out:
if (err)
xfree (buffer);
return err;
}
/* Read a binary string from STREAM and store it as an opaque MPI at
R_MPI, adding 0x40 (this is the prefix for EdDSA key in OpenPGP).
Depending on SECURE use secure memory. If the string is too large
for key material return an error. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_blob (estream_t stream, unsigned int secure, gcry_mpi_t *r_mpi)
{
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
u32 length = 0;
*r_mpi = NULL;
/* Read string length. */
err = stream_read_uint32 (stream, &length);
if (err)
goto leave;
/* To avoid excessive use of secure memory we check that an MPI is
not too large. */
if (length > (4096/8) + 8)
{
log_error (_("ssh keys greater than %d bits are not supported\n"), 4096);
err = GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE;
goto leave;
}
/* Allocate space. */
if (secure)
buffer = xtrymalloc_secure (length+1);
else
buffer = xtrymalloc (length+1);
if (!buffer)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
/* Read data. */
err = stream_read_data (stream, buffer + 1, length);
if (err)
goto leave;
buffer[0] = 0x40;
*r_mpi = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, buffer, 8*(length+1));
buffer = NULL;
leave:
xfree (buffer);
return err;
}
/* Read a C-string from STREAM, store copy in STRING. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_cstring (estream_t stream, char **string)
{
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char *buffer;
err = stream_read_string (stream, 0, &buffer, NULL);
if (!err)
*string = (char *)buffer;
return err;
}
/* Write a binary string from STRING of size STRING_N to STREAM. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_write_string (estream_t stream,
const unsigned char *string, u32 string_n)
{
gpg_error_t err;
err = stream_write_uint32 (stream, string_n);
if (err)
goto out;
err = stream_write_data (stream, string, string_n);
out:
return err;
}
/* Write a C-string from STRING to STREAM. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_write_cstring (estream_t stream, const char *string)
{
gpg_error_t err;
err = stream_write_string (stream,
(const unsigned char *) string, strlen (string));
return err;
}
/* Read an MPI from STREAM, store it in MPINT. Depending on SECURE
use secure memory. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_mpi (estream_t stream, unsigned int secure, gcry_mpi_t *mpint)
{
unsigned char *mpi_data;
u32 mpi_data_size;
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_mpi_t mpi;
mpi_data = NULL;
err = stream_read_string (stream, secure, &mpi_data, &mpi_data_size);
if (err)
goto out;
/* To avoid excessive use of secure memory we check that an MPI is
not too large. */
if (mpi_data_size > 520)
{
log_error (_("ssh keys greater than %d bits are not supported\n"), 4096);
err = GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE;
goto out;
}
err = gcry_mpi_scan (&mpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, mpi_data, mpi_data_size, NULL);
if (err)
goto out;
*mpint = mpi;
out:
xfree (mpi_data);
return err;
}
/* Write the MPI contained in MPINT to STREAM. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_write_mpi (estream_t stream, gcry_mpi_t mpint)
{
unsigned char *mpi_buffer;
size_t mpi_buffer_n;
gpg_error_t err;
mpi_buffer = NULL;
err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, &mpi_buffer, &mpi_buffer_n, mpint);
if (err)
goto out;
err = stream_write_string (stream, mpi_buffer, mpi_buffer_n);
out:
xfree (mpi_buffer);
return err;
}
/* Copy data from SRC to DST until EOF is reached. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_copy (estream_t dst, estream_t src)
{
char buffer[BUFSIZ];
size_t bytes_read;
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
err = 0;
while (1)
{
ret = es_read (src, buffer, sizeof (buffer), &bytes_read);
if (ret || (! bytes_read))
{
if (ret)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
break;
}
ret = es_write (dst, buffer, bytes_read, NULL);
if (ret)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
break;
}
}
return err;
}
/* Open the ssh control file and create it if not available. With
APPEND passed as true the file will be opened in append mode,
otherwise in read only mode. On success 0 is returned and a new
control file object stored at R_CF. On error an error code is
returned and NULL is stored at R_CF. */
static gpg_error_t
open_control_file (ssh_control_file_t *r_cf, int append)
{
gpg_error_t err;
ssh_control_file_t cf;
cf = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *cf);
if (!cf)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
/* Note: As soon as we start to use non blocking functions here
(i.e. where Pth might switch threads) we need to employ a
mutex. */
cf->fname = make_filename_try (gnupg_homedir (), SSH_CONTROL_FILE_NAME, NULL);
if (!cf->fname)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
/* FIXME: With "a+" we are not able to check whether this will
be created and thus the blurb needs to be written first. */
cf->fp = fopen (cf->fname, append? "a+":"r");
if (!cf->fp && errno == ENOENT)
{
estream_t stream = es_fopen (cf->fname, "wx,mode=-rw-r");
if (!stream)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error (_("can't create '%s': %s\n"),
cf->fname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
es_fputs (sshcontrolblurb, stream);
es_fclose (stream);
cf->fp = fopen (cf->fname, append? "a+":"r");
}
if (!cf->fp)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"),
cf->fname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
err = 0;
leave:
if (err && cf)
{
if (cf->fp)
fclose (cf->fp);
xfree (cf->fname);
xfree (cf);
}
else
*r_cf = cf;
return err;
}
static void
rewind_control_file (ssh_control_file_t cf)
{
fseek (cf->fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
cf->lnr = 0;
clearerr (cf->fp);
}
static void
close_control_file (ssh_control_file_t cf)
{
if (!cf)
return;
fclose (cf->fp);
xfree (cf->fname);
xfree (cf);
}
/* Read the next line from the control file and store the data in CF.
Returns 0 on success, GPG_ERR_EOF on EOF, or other error codes. */
static gpg_error_t
read_control_file_item (ssh_control_file_t cf)
{
int c, i, n;
char *p, *pend, line[256];
long ttl = 0;
cf->item.valid = 0;
clearerr (cf->fp);
do
{
if (!fgets (line, DIM(line)-1, cf->fp) )
{
if (feof (cf->fp))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
}
cf->lnr++;
if (!*line || line[strlen(line)-1] != '\n')
{
/* Eat until end of line */
while ( (c=getc (cf->fp)) != EOF && c != '\n')
;
return gpg_error (*line? GPG_ERR_LINE_TOO_LONG
: GPG_ERR_INCOMPLETE_LINE);
}
/* Allow for empty lines and spaces */
for (p=line; spacep (p); p++)
;
}
while (!*p || *p == '\n' || *p == '#');
cf->item.disabled = 0;
if (*p == '!')
{
cf->item.disabled = 1;
for (p++; spacep (p); p++)
;
}
for (i=0; hexdigitp (p) && i < 40; p++, i++)
cf->item.hexgrip[i] = (*p >= 'a'? (*p & 0xdf): *p);
cf->item.hexgrip[i] = 0;
if (i != 40 || !(spacep (p) || *p == '\n'))
{
log_error ("%s:%d: invalid formatted line\n", cf->fname, cf->lnr);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
}
ttl = strtol (p, &pend, 10);
p = pend;
if (!(spacep (p) || *p == '\n') || (int)ttl < -1)
{
log_error ("%s:%d: invalid TTL value; assuming 0\n", cf->fname, cf->lnr);
cf->item.ttl = 0;
}
cf->item.ttl = ttl;
/* Now check for key-value pairs of the form NAME[=VALUE]. */
cf->item.confirm = 0;
while (*p)
{
for (; spacep (p) && *p != '\n'; p++)
;
if (!*p || *p == '\n')
break;
n = strcspn (p, "= \t\n");
if (p[n] == '=')
{
log_error ("%s:%d: assigning a value to a flag is not yet supported; "
"flag ignored\n", cf->fname, cf->lnr);
p++;
}
else if (n == 7 && !memcmp (p, "confirm", 7))
{
cf->item.confirm = 1;
}
else
log_error ("%s:%d: invalid flag '%.*s'; ignored\n",
cf->fname, cf->lnr, n, p);
p += n;
}
/* log_debug ("%s:%d: grip=%s ttl=%d%s%s\n", */
/* cf->fname, cf->lnr, */
/* cf->item.hexgrip, cf->item.ttl, */
/* cf->item.disabled? " disabled":"", */
/* cf->item.confirm? " confirm":""); */
cf->item.valid = 1;
return 0; /* Okay: valid entry found. */
}
/* Search the control file CF from the beginning until a matching
HEXGRIP is found; return success in this case and store true at
DISABLED if the found key has been disabled. If R_TTL is not NULL
a specified TTL for that key is stored there. If R_CONFIRM is not
NULL it is set to 1 if the key has the confirm flag set. */
static gpg_error_t
search_control_file (ssh_control_file_t cf, const char *hexgrip,
int *r_disabled, int *r_ttl, int *r_confirm)
{
gpg_error_t err;
assert (strlen (hexgrip) == 40 );
if (r_disabled)
*r_disabled = 0;
if (r_ttl)
*r_ttl = 0;
if (r_confirm)
*r_confirm = 0;
rewind_control_file (cf);
while (!(err=read_control_file_item (cf)))
{
if (!cf->item.valid)
continue; /* Should not happen. */
if (!strcmp (hexgrip, cf->item.hexgrip))
break;
}
if (!err)
{
if (r_disabled)
*r_disabled = cf->item.disabled;
if (r_ttl)
*r_ttl = cf->item.ttl;
if (r_confirm)
*r_confirm = cf->item.confirm;
}
return err;
}
/* Add an entry to the control file to mark the key with the keygrip
HEXGRIP as usable for SSH; i.e. it will be returned when ssh asks
for it. FMTFPR is the fingerprint string. This function is in
general used to add a key received through the ssh-add function.
We can assume that the user wants to allow ssh using this key. */
static gpg_error_t
add_control_entry (ctrl_t ctrl, ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
const char *hexgrip, const char *fmtfpr,
int ttl, int confirm)
{
gpg_error_t err;
ssh_control_file_t cf;
int disabled;
(void)ctrl;
err = open_control_file (&cf, 1);
if (err)
return err;
err = search_control_file (cf, hexgrip, &disabled, NULL, NULL);
if (err && gpg_err_code(err) == GPG_ERR_EOF)
{
struct tm *tp;
time_t atime = time (NULL);
/* Not yet in the file - add it. Because the file has been
opened in append mode, we simply need to write to it. */
tp = localtime (&atime);
fprintf (cf->fp,
("# %s key added on: %04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n"
"# MD5 Fingerprint: %s\n"
"%s %d%s\n"),
spec->name,
1900+tp->tm_year, tp->tm_mon+1, tp->tm_mday,
tp->tm_hour, tp->tm_min, tp->tm_sec,
fmtfpr, hexgrip, ttl, confirm? " confirm":"");
}
close_control_file (cf);
return 0;
}
/* Scan the sshcontrol file and return the TTL. */
static int
ttl_from_sshcontrol (const char *hexgrip)
{
ssh_control_file_t cf;
int disabled, ttl;
if (!hexgrip || strlen (hexgrip) != 40)
return 0; /* Wrong input: Use global default. */
if (open_control_file (&cf, 0))
return 0; /* Error: Use the global default TTL. */
if (search_control_file (cf, hexgrip, &disabled, &ttl, NULL)
|| disabled)
ttl = 0; /* Use the global default if not found or disabled. */
close_control_file (cf);
return ttl;
}
/* Scan the sshcontrol file and return the confirm flag. */
static int
confirm_flag_from_sshcontrol (const char *hexgrip)
{
ssh_control_file_t cf;
int disabled, confirm;
if (!hexgrip || strlen (hexgrip) != 40)
return 1; /* Wrong input: Better ask for confirmation. */
if (open_control_file (&cf, 0))
return 1; /* Error: Better ask for confirmation. */
if (search_control_file (cf, hexgrip, &disabled, NULL, &confirm)
|| disabled)
confirm = 0; /* If not found or disabled, there is no reason to
ask for confirmation. */
close_control_file (cf);
return confirm;
}
/* Open the ssh control file for reading. This is a public version of
open_control_file. The caller must use ssh_close_control_file to
release the retruned handle. */
ssh_control_file_t
ssh_open_control_file (void)
{
ssh_control_file_t cf;
/* Then look at all the registered and non-disabled keys. */
if (open_control_file (&cf, 0))
return NULL;
return cf;
}
/* Close an ssh control file handle. This is the public version of
close_control_file. CF may be NULL. */
void
ssh_close_control_file (ssh_control_file_t cf)
{
close_control_file (cf);
}
/* Read the next item from the ssh control file. The function returns
0 if a item was read, GPG_ERR_EOF on eof or another error value.
R_HEXGRIP shall either be null or a BUFFER of at least 41 byte.
R_DISABLED, R_TTLm and R_CONFIRM return flags from the control
file; they are only set on success. */
gpg_error_t
ssh_read_control_file (ssh_control_file_t cf,
char *r_hexgrip,
int *r_disabled, int *r_ttl, int *r_confirm)
{
gpg_error_t err;
do
err = read_control_file_item (cf);
while (!err && !cf->item.valid);
if (!err)
{
if (r_hexgrip)
strcpy (r_hexgrip, cf->item.hexgrip);
if (r_disabled)
*r_disabled = cf->item.disabled;
if (r_ttl)
*r_ttl = cf->item.ttl;
if (r_confirm)
*r_confirm = cf->item.confirm;
}
return err;
}
/* Search for a key with HEXGRIP in sshcontrol and return all
info. */
gpg_error_t
ssh_search_control_file (ssh_control_file_t cf,
const char *hexgrip,
int *r_disabled, int *r_ttl, int *r_confirm)
{
gpg_error_t err;
int i;
const char *s;
char uphexgrip[41];
/* We need to make sure that HEXGRIP is all uppercase. The easiest
way to do this and also check its length is by copying to a
second buffer. */
for (i=0, s=hexgrip; i < 40 && *s; s++, i++)
uphexgrip[i] = *s >= 'a'? (*s & 0xdf): *s;
uphexgrip[i] = 0;
if (i != 40)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH);
else
err = search_control_file (cf, uphexgrip, r_disabled, r_ttl, r_confirm);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EOF)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
return err;
}
/*
MPI lists.
*/
/* Free the list of MPIs MPI_LIST. */
static void
mpint_list_free (gcry_mpi_t *mpi_list)
{
if (mpi_list)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; mpi_list[i]; i++)
gcry_mpi_release (mpi_list[i]);
xfree (mpi_list);
}
}
/* Receive key material MPIs from STREAM according to KEY_SPEC;
depending on SECRET expect a public key or secret key. CERT is the
certificate blob used if KEY_SPEC indicates the certificate format;
it needs to be positioned to the end of the nonce. The newly
allocated list of MPIs is stored in MPI_LIST. Returns usual error
code. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_receive_mpint_list (estream_t stream, int secret,
ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec, estream_t cert,
gcry_mpi_t **mpi_list)
{
const char *elems_public;
unsigned int elems_n;
const char *elems;
int elem_is_secret;
gcry_mpi_t *mpis = NULL;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
unsigned int i;
if (secret)
elems = spec->elems_key_secret;
else
elems = spec->elems_key_public;
elems_n = strlen (elems);
elems_public = spec->elems_key_public;
- /* Check that either noth, CERT and the WITH_CERT flag, are given or
+ /* Check that either both, CERT and the WITH_CERT flag, are given or
none of them. */
if (!(!!(spec->flags & SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT) ^ !cert))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CERT_OBJ);
goto out;
}
mpis = xtrycalloc (elems_n + 1, sizeof *mpis );
if (!mpis)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
elem_is_secret = 0;
for (i = 0; i < elems_n; i++)
{
if (secret)
elem_is_secret = !strchr (elems_public, elems[i]);
if (cert && !elem_is_secret)
err = stream_read_mpi (cert, elem_is_secret, &mpis[i]);
else
err = stream_read_mpi (stream, elem_is_secret, &mpis[i]);
if (err)
goto out;
}
*mpi_list = mpis;
mpis = NULL;
out:
if (err)
mpint_list_free (mpis);
return err;
}
/* Key modifier function for RSA. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_key_modifier_rsa (const char *elems, gcry_mpi_t *mpis)
{
gcry_mpi_t p;
gcry_mpi_t q;
gcry_mpi_t u;
if (strcmp (elems, "nedupq"))
/* Modifying only necessary for secret keys. */
goto out;
u = mpis[3];
p = mpis[4];
q = mpis[5];
if (gcry_mpi_cmp (p, q) > 0)
{
/* P shall be smaller then Q! Swap primes. iqmp becomes u. */
gcry_mpi_t tmp;
tmp = mpis[4];
mpis[4] = mpis[5];
mpis[5] = tmp;
}
else
/* U needs to be recomputed. */
gcry_mpi_invm (u, p, q);
out:
return 0;
}
/* Signature encoder function for RSA. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_signature_encoder_rsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t signature_blob,
gcry_sexp_t s_signature)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
gcry_sexp_t valuelist = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t sublist = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t sig_value = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t *mpis = NULL;
const char *elems;
size_t elems_n;
int i;
unsigned char *data;
size_t data_n;
gcry_mpi_t s;
valuelist = gcry_sexp_nth (s_signature, 1);
if (!valuelist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
elems = spec->elems_signature;
elems_n = strlen (elems);
mpis = xtrycalloc (elems_n + 1, sizeof *mpis);
if (!mpis)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < elems_n; i++)
{
sublist = gcry_sexp_find_token (valuelist, spec->elems_signature + i, 1);
if (!sublist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
break;
}
sig_value = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (sublist, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
if (!sig_value)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); /* FIXME? */
break;
}
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
sublist = NULL;
mpis[i] = sig_value;
}
if (err)
goto out;
/* RSA specific */
s = mpis[0];
err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &data, &data_n, s);
if (err)
goto out;
err = stream_write_string (signature_blob, data, data_n);
xfree (data);
out:
gcry_sexp_release (valuelist);
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
mpint_list_free (mpis);
return err;
}
/* Signature encoder function for DSA. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_signature_encoder_dsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t signature_blob,
gcry_sexp_t s_signature)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
gcry_sexp_t valuelist = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t sublist = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t sig_value = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t *mpis = NULL;
const char *elems;
size_t elems_n;
int i;
unsigned char buffer[SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING * SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_ELEMS];
unsigned char *data = NULL;
size_t data_n;
valuelist = gcry_sexp_nth (s_signature, 1);
if (!valuelist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
elems = spec->elems_signature;
elems_n = strlen (elems);
mpis = xtrycalloc (elems_n + 1, sizeof *mpis);
if (!mpis)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < elems_n; i++)
{
sublist = gcry_sexp_find_token (valuelist, spec->elems_signature + i, 1);
if (!sublist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
break;
}
sig_value = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (sublist, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
if (!sig_value)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); /* FIXME? */
break;
}
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
sublist = NULL;
mpis[i] = sig_value;
}
if (err)
goto out;
/* DSA specific code. */
/* FIXME: Why this complicated code? Why collecting boths mpis in a
buffer instead of writing them out one after the other? */
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
{
err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &data, &data_n, mpis[i]);
if (err)
break;
if (data_n > SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); /* FIXME? */
break;
}
memset (buffer + (i * SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING), 0,
SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING - data_n);
memcpy (buffer + (i * SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING)
+ (SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING - data_n), data, data_n);
xfree (data);
data = NULL;
}
if (err)
goto out;
err = stream_write_string (signature_blob, buffer, sizeof (buffer));
out:
xfree (data);
gcry_sexp_release (valuelist);
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
mpint_list_free (mpis);
return err;
}
/* Signature encoder function for ECDSA. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t stream, gcry_sexp_t s_signature)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
gcry_sexp_t valuelist = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t sublist = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t sig_value = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t *mpis = NULL;
const char *elems;
size_t elems_n;
int i;
unsigned char *data[2] = {NULL, NULL};
size_t data_n[2];
size_t innerlen;
valuelist = gcry_sexp_nth (s_signature, 1);
if (!valuelist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
elems = spec->elems_signature;
elems_n = strlen (elems);
mpis = xtrycalloc (elems_n + 1, sizeof *mpis);
if (!mpis)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < elems_n; i++)
{
sublist = gcry_sexp_find_token (valuelist, spec->elems_signature + i, 1);
if (!sublist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
break;
}
sig_value = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (sublist, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
if (!sig_value)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); /* FIXME? */
break;
}
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
sublist = NULL;
mpis[i] = sig_value;
}
if (err)
goto out;
/* ECDSA specific */
innerlen = 0;
for (i = 0; i < DIM(data); i++)
{
err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, &data[i], &data_n[i], mpis[i]);
if (err)
goto out;
innerlen += 4 + data_n[i];
}
err = stream_write_uint32 (stream, innerlen);
if (err)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < DIM(data); i++)
{
err = stream_write_string (stream, data[i], data_n[i]);
if (err)
goto out;
}
out:
for (i = 0; i < DIM(data); i++)
xfree (data[i]);
gcry_sexp_release (valuelist);
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
mpint_list_free (mpis);
return err;
}
/* Signature encoder function for EdDSA. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_signature_encoder_eddsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t stream, gcry_sexp_t s_signature)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
gcry_sexp_t valuelist = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t sublist = NULL;
const char *elems;
size_t elems_n;
int i;
unsigned char *data[2] = {NULL, NULL};
size_t data_n[2];
size_t totallen = 0;
valuelist = gcry_sexp_nth (s_signature, 1);
if (!valuelist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
elems = spec->elems_signature;
elems_n = strlen (elems);
if (elems_n != DIM(data))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < DIM(data); i++)
{
sublist = gcry_sexp_find_token (valuelist, spec->elems_signature + i, 1);
if (!sublist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
break;
}
data[i] = gcry_sexp_nth_buffer (sublist, 1, &data_n[i]);
if (!data[i])
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); /* FIXME? */
break;
}
totallen += data_n[i];
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
sublist = NULL;
}
if (err)
goto out;
err = stream_write_uint32 (stream, totallen);
if (err)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < DIM(data); i++)
{
err = stream_write_data (stream, data[i], data_n[i]);
if (err)
goto out;
}
out:
for (i = 0; i < DIM(data); i++)
xfree (data[i]);
gcry_sexp_release (valuelist);
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
return err;
}
/*
S-Expressions.
*/
/* This function constructs a new S-Expression for the key identified
by the KEY_SPEC, SECRET, CURVE_NAME, MPIS, and COMMENT, which is to
be stored at R_SEXP. Returns an error code. */
static gpg_error_t
sexp_key_construct (gcry_sexp_t *r_sexp,
ssh_key_type_spec_t key_spec, int secret,
const char *curve_name, gcry_mpi_t *mpis,
const char *comment)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t sexp_new = NULL;
void *formatbuf = NULL;
void **arg_list = NULL;
estream_t format = NULL;
char *algo_name = NULL;
if ((key_spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA))
{
/* It is much easier and more readable to use a separate code
path for EdDSA. */
if (!curve_name)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CURVE);
else if (!mpis[0] || !gcry_mpi_get_flag (mpis[0], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY);
else if (secret
&& (!mpis[1]
|| !gcry_mpi_get_flag (mpis[1], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)))
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
else if (secret)
err = gcry_sexp_build (&sexp_new, NULL,
"(private-key(ecc(curve %s)"
"(flags eddsa)(q %m)(d %m))"
"(comment%s))",
curve_name,
mpis[0], mpis[1],
comment? comment:"");
else
err = gcry_sexp_build (&sexp_new, NULL,
"(public-key(ecc(curve %s)"
"(flags eddsa)(q %m))"
"(comment%s))",
curve_name,
mpis[0],
comment? comment:"");
}
else
{
const char *key_identifier[] = { "public-key", "private-key" };
int arg_idx;
const char *elems;
size_t elems_n;
unsigned int i, j;
if (secret)
elems = key_spec.elems_sexp_order;
else
elems = key_spec.elems_key_public;
elems_n = strlen (elems);
format = es_fopenmem (0, "a+b");
if (!format)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
/* Key identifier, algorithm identifier, mpis, comment, and a NULL
as a safeguard. */
arg_list = xtrymalloc (sizeof (*arg_list) * (2 + 1 + elems_n + 1 + 1));
if (!arg_list)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
arg_idx = 0;
es_fputs ("(%s(%s", format);
arg_list[arg_idx++] = &key_identifier[secret];
algo_name = xtrystrdup (gcry_pk_algo_name (key_spec.algo));
if (!algo_name)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
strlwr (algo_name);
arg_list[arg_idx++] = &algo_name;
if (curve_name)
{
es_fputs ("(curve%s)", format);
arg_list[arg_idx++] = &curve_name;
}
for (i = 0; i < elems_n; i++)
{
es_fprintf (format, "(%c%%m)", elems[i]);
if (secret)
{
for (j = 0; j < elems_n; j++)
if (key_spec.elems_key_secret[j] == elems[i])
break;
}
else
j = i;
arg_list[arg_idx++] = &mpis[j];
}
es_fputs (")(comment%s))", format);
arg_list[arg_idx++] = &comment;
arg_list[arg_idx] = NULL;
es_putc (0, format);
if (es_ferror (format))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
if (es_fclose_snatch (format, &formatbuf, NULL))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
format = NULL;
err = gcry_sexp_build_array (&sexp_new, NULL, formatbuf, arg_list);
}
if (!err)
*r_sexp = sexp_new;
out:
es_fclose (format);
xfree (arg_list);
xfree (formatbuf);
xfree (algo_name);
return err;
}
/* This function extracts the key from the s-expression SEXP according
to KEY_SPEC and stores it in ssh format at (R_BLOB, R_BLOBLEN). If
WITH_SECRET is true, the secret key parts are also extracted if
possible. Returns 0 on success or an error code. Note that data
stored at R_BLOB must be freed using es_free! */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_key_to_blob (gcry_sexp_t sexp, int with_secret,
ssh_key_type_spec_t key_spec,
void **r_blob, size_t *r_blob_size)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
gcry_sexp_t value_list = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t value_pair = NULL;
char *curve_name = NULL;
estream_t stream = NULL;
void *blob = NULL;
size_t blob_size;
const char *elems, *p_elems;
const char *data;
size_t datalen;
*r_blob = NULL;
*r_blob_size = 0;
stream = es_fopenmem (0, "r+b");
if (!stream)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
/* Get the type of the key extpression. */
data = gcry_sexp_nth_data (sexp, 0, &datalen);
if (!data)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
if ((datalen == 10 && !strncmp (data, "public-key", 10))
|| (datalen == 21 && !strncmp (data, "protected-private-key", 21))
|| (datalen == 20 && !strncmp (data, "shadowed-private-key", 20)))
elems = key_spec.elems_key_public;
else if (datalen == 11 && !strncmp (data, "private-key", 11))
elems = with_secret? key_spec.elems_key_secret : key_spec.elems_key_public;
else
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
/* Get key value list. */
value_list = gcry_sexp_cadr (sexp);
if (!value_list)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
/* Write the ssh algorithm identifier. */
if ((key_spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA))
{
/* Parse the "curve" parameter. We currently expect the curve
name for ECC and not the parameters of the curve. This can
easily be changed but then we need to find the curve name
from the parameters using gcry_pk_get_curve. */
const char *mapped;
const char *sshname;
gcry_sexp_release (value_pair);
value_pair = gcry_sexp_find_token (value_list, "curve", 5);
if (!value_pair)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CURVE);
goto out;
}
curve_name = gcry_sexp_nth_string (value_pair, 1);
if (!curve_name)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CURVE); /* (Or out of core.) */
goto out;
}
/* Fixme: The mapping should be done by using gcry_pk_get_curve
et al to iterate over all name aliases. */
if (!strcmp (curve_name, "NIST P-256"))
mapped = "nistp256";
else if (!strcmp (curve_name, "NIST P-384"))
mapped = "nistp384";
else if (!strcmp (curve_name, "NIST P-521"))
mapped = "nistp521";
else
mapped = NULL;
if (mapped)
{
xfree (curve_name);
curve_name = xtrystrdup (mapped);
if (!curve_name)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
}
sshname = ssh_identifier_from_curve_name (curve_name);
if (!sshname)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_CURVE);
goto out;
}
err = stream_write_cstring (stream, sshname);
if (err)
goto out;
err = stream_write_cstring (stream, curve_name);
if (err)
goto out;
}
else
{
/* Note: This is also used for EdDSA. */
err = stream_write_cstring (stream, key_spec.ssh_identifier);
if (err)
goto out;
}
/* Write the parameters. */
for (p_elems = elems; *p_elems; p_elems++)
{
gcry_sexp_release (value_pair);
value_pair = gcry_sexp_find_token (value_list, p_elems, 1);
if (!value_pair)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
if ((key_spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA))
{
data = gcry_sexp_nth_data (value_pair, 1, &datalen);
if (!data)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
if (*p_elems == 'q' && datalen)
{ /* Remove the prefix 0x40. */
data++;
datalen--;
}
err = stream_write_string (stream, data, datalen);
if (err)
goto out;
}
else
{
gcry_mpi_t mpi;
/* Note that we need to use STD format; i.e. prepend a 0x00
to indicate a positive number if the high bit is set. */
mpi = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (value_pair, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_STD);
if (!mpi)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
err = stream_write_mpi (stream, mpi);
gcry_mpi_release (mpi);
if (err)
goto out;
}
}
if (es_fclose_snatch (stream, &blob, &blob_size))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
stream = NULL;
*r_blob = blob;
blob = NULL;
*r_blob_size = blob_size;
out:
gcry_sexp_release (value_list);
gcry_sexp_release (value_pair);
xfree (curve_name);
es_fclose (stream);
es_free (blob);
return err;
}
/*
Key I/O.
*/
/* Search for a key specification entry. If SSH_NAME is not NULL,
search for an entry whose "ssh_name" is equal to SSH_NAME;
otherwise, search for an entry whose algorithm is equal to ALGO.
Store found entry in SPEC on success, return error otherwise. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_key_type_lookup (const char *ssh_name, int algo,
ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec)
{
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < DIM (ssh_key_types); i++)
if ((ssh_name && (! strcmp (ssh_name, ssh_key_types[i].ssh_identifier)))
|| algo == ssh_key_types[i].algo)
break;
if (i == DIM (ssh_key_types))
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
else
{
*spec = ssh_key_types[i];
err = 0;
}
return err;
}
/* Receive a key from STREAM, according to the key specification given
as KEY_SPEC. Depending on SECRET, receive a secret or a public
key. If READ_COMMENT is true, receive a comment string as well.
Constructs a new S-Expression from received data and stores it in
KEY_NEW. Returns zero on success or an error code. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_receive_key (estream_t stream, gcry_sexp_t *key_new, int secret,
int read_comment, ssh_key_type_spec_t *key_spec)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *key_type = NULL;
char *comment = NULL;
estream_t cert = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t key = NULL;
ssh_key_type_spec_t spec;
gcry_mpi_t *mpi_list = NULL;
const char *elems;
char *curve_name = NULL;
err = stream_read_cstring (stream, &key_type);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_key_type_lookup (key_type, 0, &spec);
if (err)
goto out;
if ((spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT))
{
/* This is an OpenSSH certificate+private key. The certificate
is an SSH string and which we store in an estream object. */
unsigned char *buffer;
u32 buflen;
char *cert_key_type;
err = stream_read_string (stream, 0, &buffer, &buflen);
if (err)
goto out;
cert = es_fopenmem_init (0, "rb", buffer, buflen);
xfree (buffer);
if (!cert)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
/* Check that the key type matches. */
err = stream_read_cstring (cert, &cert_key_type);
if (err)
goto out;
if (strcmp (cert_key_type, key_type) )
{
xfree (cert_key_type);
log_error ("key types in received ssh certificate do not match\n");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CERT_OBJ);
goto out;
}
xfree (cert_key_type);
/* Skip the nonce. */
err = stream_read_string (cert, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (err)
goto out;
}
if ((spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA))
{
/* The format of an EdDSA key is:
* string key_type ("ssh-ed25519")
* string public_key
* string private_key
*
* Note that the private key is the concatenation of the private
* key with the public key. Thus theres are 64 bytes; however
* we only want the real 32 byte private key - Libgcrypt expects
* this.
*/
mpi_list = xtrycalloc (3, sizeof *mpi_list);
if (!mpi_list)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
err = stream_read_blob (cert? cert : stream, 0, &mpi_list[0]);
if (err)
goto out;
if (secret)
{
u32 len = 0;
unsigned char *buffer;
/* Read string length. */
err = stream_read_uint32 (stream, &len);
if (err)
goto out;
if (len != 32 && len != 64)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
goto out;
}
buffer = xtrymalloc_secure (32);
if (!buffer)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
err = stream_read_data (stream, buffer, 32);
if (err)
{
xfree (buffer);
goto out;
}
mpi_list[1] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, buffer, 8*32);
buffer = NULL;
if (len == 64)
{
err = stream_read_skip (stream, 32);
if (err)
goto out;
}
}
}
else if ((spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA))
{
/* The format of an ECDSA key is:
* string key_type ("ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" |
* "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384" |
* "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521" )
* string ecdsa_curve_name
* string ecdsa_public_key
* mpint ecdsa_private
*
* Note that we use the mpint reader instead of the string
* reader for ecsa_public_key. For the certificate variante
* ecdsa_curve_name+ecdsa_public_key are replaced by the
* certificate.
*/
unsigned char *buffer;
const char *mapped;
err = stream_read_string (cert? cert : stream, 0, &buffer, NULL);
if (err)
goto out;
curve_name = buffer;
/* Fixme: Check that curve_name matches the keytype. */
/* Because Libgcrypt < 1.6 has no support for the "nistpNNN"
curve names, we need to translate them here to Libgcrypt's
native names. */
if (!strcmp (curve_name, "nistp256"))
mapped = "NIST P-256";
else if (!strcmp (curve_name, "nistp384"))
mapped = "NIST P-384";
else if (!strcmp (curve_name, "nistp521"))
mapped = "NIST P-521";
else
mapped = NULL;
if (mapped)
{
xfree (curve_name);
curve_name = xtrystrdup (mapped);
if (!curve_name)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
}
err = ssh_receive_mpint_list (stream, secret, &spec, cert, &mpi_list);
if (err)
goto out;
}
else
{
err = ssh_receive_mpint_list (stream, secret, &spec, cert, &mpi_list);
if (err)
goto out;
}
if (read_comment)
{
err = stream_read_cstring (stream, &comment);
if (err)
goto out;
}
if (secret)
elems = spec.elems_key_secret;
else
elems = spec.elems_key_public;
if (spec.key_modifier)
{
err = (*spec.key_modifier) (elems, mpi_list);
if (err)
goto out;
}
if ((spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA))
{
if (secret)
{
err = gcry_sexp_build (&key, NULL,
"(private-key(ecc(curve \"Ed25519\")"
"(flags eddsa)(q %m)(d %m))"
"(comment%s))",
mpi_list[0], mpi_list[1],
comment? comment:"");
}
else
{
err = gcry_sexp_build (&key, NULL,
"(public-key(ecc(curve \"Ed25519\")"
"(flags eddsa)(q %m))"
"(comment%s))",
mpi_list[0],
comment? comment:"");
}
}
else
{
err = sexp_key_construct (&key, spec, secret, curve_name, mpi_list,
comment? comment:"");
if (err)
goto out;
}
if (key_spec)
*key_spec = spec;
*key_new = key;
out:
es_fclose (cert);
mpint_list_free (mpi_list);
xfree (curve_name);
xfree (key_type);
xfree (comment);
return err;
}
/* Write the public key from KEY to STREAM in SSH key format. If
OVERRIDE_COMMENT is not NULL, it will be used instead of the
comment stored in the key. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_send_key_public (estream_t stream, gcry_sexp_t key,
const char *override_comment)
{
ssh_key_type_spec_t spec;
int algo;
char *comment = NULL;
void *blob = NULL;
size_t bloblen;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
algo = get_pk_algo_from_key (key);
if (algo == 0)
goto out;
err = ssh_key_type_lookup (NULL, algo, &spec);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_key_to_blob (key, 0, spec, &blob, &bloblen);
if (err)
goto out;
err = stream_write_string (stream, blob, bloblen);
if (err)
goto out;
if (override_comment)
err = stream_write_cstring (stream, override_comment);
else
{
err = ssh_key_extract_comment (key, &comment);
if (err)
err = stream_write_cstring (stream, "(none)");
else
err = stream_write_cstring (stream, comment);
}
if (err)
goto out;
out:
xfree (comment);
es_free (blob);
return err;
}
/* Read a public key out of BLOB/BLOB_SIZE according to the key
specification given as KEY_SPEC, storing the new key in KEY_PUBLIC.
Returns zero on success or an error code. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_read_key_public_from_blob (unsigned char *blob, size_t blob_size,
gcry_sexp_t *key_public,
ssh_key_type_spec_t *key_spec)
{
gpg_error_t err;
estream_t blob_stream;
blob_stream = es_fopenmem (0, "r+b");
if (!blob_stream)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
err = stream_write_data (blob_stream, blob, blob_size);
if (err)
goto out;
err = es_fseek (blob_stream, 0, SEEK_SET);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_receive_key (blob_stream, key_public, 0, 0, key_spec);
out:
es_fclose (blob_stream);
return err;
}
/* This function calculates the key grip for the key contained in the
S-Expression KEY and writes it to BUFFER, which must be large
enough to hold it. Returns usual error code. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_key_grip (gcry_sexp_t key, unsigned char *buffer)
{
if (!gcry_pk_get_keygrip (key, buffer))
{
gpg_error_t err = gcry_pk_testkey (key);
return err? err : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
}
return 0;
}
/* Check whether a smartcard is available and whether it has a usable
key. Store a copy of that key at R_PK and return 0. If no key is
available store NULL at R_PK and return an error code. If CARDSN
is not NULL, a string with the serial number of the card will be
a malloced and stored there. */
static gpg_error_t
card_key_available (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t *r_pk, char **cardsn)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *authkeyid;
char *serialno = NULL;
unsigned char *pkbuf;
size_t pkbuflen;
gcry_sexp_t s_pk;
unsigned char grip[20];
*r_pk = NULL;
if (cardsn)
*cardsn = NULL;
/* First see whether a card is available and whether the application
is supported. */
err = agent_card_getattr (ctrl, "$AUTHKEYID", &authkeyid);
if ( gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CARD_REMOVED )
{
/* Ask for the serial number to reset the card. */
err = agent_card_serialno (ctrl, &serialno);
if (err)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("error getting serial number of card: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
log_info (_("detected card with S/N: %s\n"), serialno);
err = agent_card_getattr (ctrl, "$AUTHKEYID", &authkeyid);
}
if (err)
{
log_error (_("no authentication key for ssh on card: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (serialno);
return err;
}
/* Get the S/N if we don't have it yet. Use the fast getattr method. */
if (!serialno && (err = agent_card_getattr (ctrl, "SERIALNO", &serialno)) )
{
log_error (_("error getting serial number of card: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (authkeyid);
return err;
}
/* Read the public key. */
err = agent_card_readkey (ctrl, authkeyid, &pkbuf);
if (err)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("no suitable card key found: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (serialno);
xfree (authkeyid);
return err;
}
pkbuflen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (pkbuf, 0, NULL, NULL);
err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_pk, NULL, (char*)pkbuf, pkbuflen);
if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to build S-Exp from received card key: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (pkbuf);
xfree (serialno);
xfree (authkeyid);
return err;
}
err = ssh_key_grip (s_pk, grip);
if (err)
{
log_debug ("error computing keygrip from received card key: %s\n",
gcry_strerror (err));
xfree (pkbuf);
gcry_sexp_release (s_pk);
xfree (serialno);
xfree (authkeyid);
return err;
}
if ( agent_key_available (grip) )
{
/* (Shadow)-key is not available in our key storage. */
unsigned char *shadow_info;
unsigned char *tmp;
shadow_info = make_shadow_info (serialno, authkeyid);
if (!shadow_info)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
xfree (pkbuf);
gcry_sexp_release (s_pk);
xfree (serialno);
xfree (authkeyid);
return err;
}
err = agent_shadow_key (pkbuf, shadow_info, &tmp);
xfree (shadow_info);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("shadowing the key failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (pkbuf);
gcry_sexp_release (s_pk);
xfree (serialno);
xfree (authkeyid);
return err;
}
xfree (pkbuf);
pkbuf = tmp;
pkbuflen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (pkbuf, 0, NULL, NULL);
assert (pkbuflen);
err = agent_write_private_key (grip, pkbuf, pkbuflen, 0);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error writing key: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (pkbuf);
gcry_sexp_release (s_pk);
xfree (serialno);
xfree (authkeyid);
return err;
}
}
if (cardsn)
{
char *dispsn;
/* If the card handler is able to return a short serialnumber,
use that one, else use the complete serialno. */
if (!agent_card_getattr (ctrl, "$DISPSERIALNO", &dispsn))
{
*cardsn = xtryasprintf ("cardno:%s", dispsn);
xfree (dispsn);
}
else
*cardsn = xtryasprintf ("cardno:%s", serialno);
if (!*cardsn)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
xfree (pkbuf);
gcry_sexp_release (s_pk);
xfree (serialno);
xfree (authkeyid);
return err;
}
}
xfree (pkbuf);
xfree (serialno);
xfree (authkeyid);
*r_pk = s_pk;
return 0;
}
/*
Request handler. Each handler is provided with a CTRL context, a
REQUEST object and a RESPONSE object. The actual request is to be
read from REQUEST, the response needs to be written to RESPONSE.
*/
/* Handler for the "request_identities" command. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_handler_request_identities (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request, estream_t response)
{
u32 key_counter;
estream_t key_blobs;
gcry_sexp_t key_public;
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
ssh_control_file_t cf = NULL;
char *cardsn;
gpg_error_t ret_err;
(void)request;
/* Prepare buffer stream. */
key_public = NULL;
key_counter = 0;
err = 0;
key_blobs = es_fopenmem (0, "r+b");
if (! key_blobs)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
/* First check whether a key is currently available in the card
reader - this should be allowed even without being listed in
sshcontrol. */
if (!opt.disable_scdaemon
&& !card_key_available (ctrl, &key_public, &cardsn))
{
err = ssh_send_key_public (key_blobs, key_public, cardsn);
gcry_sexp_release (key_public);
key_public = NULL;
xfree (cardsn);
if (err)
goto out;
key_counter++;
}
/* Then look at all the registered and non-disabled keys. */
err = open_control_file (&cf, 0);
if (err)
goto out;
while (!read_control_file_item (cf))
{
unsigned char grip[20];
if (!cf->item.valid)
continue; /* Should not happen. */
if (cf->item.disabled)
continue;
assert (strlen (cf->item.hexgrip) == 40);
hex2bin (cf->item.hexgrip, grip, sizeof (grip));
err = agent_public_key_from_file (ctrl, grip, &key_public);
if (err)
{
log_error ("%s:%d: key '%s' skipped: %s\n",
cf->fname, cf->lnr, cf->item.hexgrip,
gpg_strerror (err));
continue;
}
err = ssh_send_key_public (key_blobs, key_public, NULL);
if (err)
goto out;
gcry_sexp_release (key_public);
key_public = NULL;
key_counter++;
}
err = 0;
ret = es_fseek (key_blobs, 0, SEEK_SET);
if (ret)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
out:
/* Send response. */
gcry_sexp_release (key_public);
if (!err)
{
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_IDENTITIES_ANSWER);
if (!ret_err)
ret_err = stream_write_uint32 (response, key_counter);
if (!ret_err)
ret_err = stream_copy (response, key_blobs);
}
else
{
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
}
es_fclose (key_blobs);
close_control_file (cf);
return ret_err;
}
/* This function hashes the data contained in DATA of size DATA_N
according to the message digest algorithm specified by MD_ALGORITHM
and writes the message digest to HASH, which needs to large enough
for the digest. */
static gpg_error_t
data_hash (unsigned char *data, size_t data_n,
int md_algorithm, unsigned char *hash)
{
gcry_md_hash_buffer (md_algorithm, hash, data, data_n);
return 0;
}
/* This function signs the data described by CTRL. If HASH is is not
NULL, (HASH,HASHLEN) overrides the hash stored in CTRL. This is to
allow the use of signature algorithms that implement the hashing
internally (e.g. Ed25519). On success the created signature is
stored in ssh format at R_SIG and it's size at R_SIGLEN; the caller
must use es_free to releaase this memory. */
static gpg_error_t
data_sign (ctrl_t ctrl, ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
const void *hash, size_t hashlen,
unsigned char **r_sig, size_t *r_siglen)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t signature_sexp = NULL;
estream_t stream = NULL;
void *blob = NULL;
size_t bloblen;
char hexgrip[40+1];
*r_sig = NULL;
*r_siglen = 0;
/* Quick check to see whether we have a valid keygrip and convert it
to hex. */
if (!ctrl->have_keygrip)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
goto out;
}
bin2hex (ctrl->keygrip, 20, hexgrip);
/* Ask for confirmation if needed. */
if (confirm_flag_from_sshcontrol (hexgrip))
{
gcry_sexp_t key;
char *fpr, *prompt;
char *comment = NULL;
err = agent_raw_key_from_file (ctrl, ctrl->keygrip, &key);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_get_fingerprint_string (key, &fpr);
if (!err)
{
gcry_sexp_t tmpsxp = gcry_sexp_find_token (key, "comment", 0);
if (tmpsxp)
comment = gcry_sexp_nth_string (tmpsxp, 1);
gcry_sexp_release (tmpsxp);
}
gcry_sexp_release (key);
if (err)
goto out;
prompt = xtryasprintf (L_("An ssh process requested the use of key%%0A"
" %s%%0A"
" (%s)%%0A"
"Do you want to allow this?"),
fpr, comment? comment:"");
xfree (fpr);
gcry_free (comment);
err = agent_get_confirmation (ctrl, prompt, L_("Allow"), L_("Deny"), 0);
xfree (prompt);
if (err)
goto out;
}
/* Create signature. */
ctrl->use_auth_call = 1;
err = agent_pksign_do (ctrl, NULL,
L_("Please enter the passphrase "
"for the ssh key%%0A %F%%0A (%c)"),
&signature_sexp,
CACHE_MODE_SSH, ttl_from_sshcontrol,
hash, hashlen);
ctrl->use_auth_call = 0;
if (err)
goto out;
stream = es_fopenmem (0, "r+b");
if (!stream)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
err = stream_write_cstring (stream, spec->ssh_identifier);
if (err)
goto out;
err = spec->signature_encoder (spec, stream, signature_sexp);
if (err)
goto out;
err = es_fclose_snatch (stream, &blob, &bloblen);
if (err)
goto out;
stream = NULL;
*r_sig = blob; blob = NULL;
*r_siglen = bloblen;
out:
xfree (blob);
es_fclose (stream);
gcry_sexp_release (signature_sexp);
return err;
}
/* Handler for the "sign_request" command. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_handler_sign_request (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t request, estream_t response)
{
gcry_sexp_t key = NULL;
ssh_key_type_spec_t spec;
unsigned char hash[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
unsigned int hash_n;
unsigned char key_grip[20];
unsigned char *key_blob = NULL;
u32 key_blob_size;
unsigned char *data = NULL;
unsigned char *sig = NULL;
size_t sig_n;
u32 data_size;
u32 flags;
gpg_error_t err;
gpg_error_t ret_err;
int hash_algo;
/* Receive key. */
err = stream_read_string (request, 0, &key_blob, &key_blob_size);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_read_key_public_from_blob (key_blob, key_blob_size, &key, &spec);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Receive data to sign. */
err = stream_read_string (request, 0, &data, &data_size);
if (err)
goto out;
/* FIXME? */
err = stream_read_uint32 (request, &flags);
if (err)
goto out;
hash_algo = spec.hash_algo;
if (!hash_algo)
hash_algo = GCRY_MD_SHA1; /* Use the default. */
ctrl->digest.algo = hash_algo;
if ((spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_USE_PKCS1V2))
ctrl->digest.raw_value = 0;
else
ctrl->digest.raw_value = 1;
/* Calculate key grip. */
err = ssh_key_grip (key, key_grip);
if (err)
goto out;
ctrl->have_keygrip = 1;
memcpy (ctrl->keygrip, key_grip, 20);
/* Hash data unless we use EdDSA. */
if ((spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA))
{
ctrl->digest.valuelen = 0;
}
else
{
hash_n = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo);
if (!hash_n)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
goto out;
}
err = data_hash (data, data_size, hash_algo, hash);
if (err)
goto out;
memcpy (ctrl->digest.value, hash, hash_n);
ctrl->digest.valuelen = hash_n;
}
/* Sign data. */
if ((spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA))
err = data_sign (ctrl, &spec, data, data_size, &sig, &sig_n);
else
err = data_sign (ctrl, &spec, NULL, 0, &sig, &sig_n);
out:
/* Done. */
if (!err)
{
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SIGN_RESPONSE);
if (ret_err)
goto leave;
ret_err = stream_write_string (response, sig, sig_n);
if (ret_err)
goto leave;
}
else
{
log_error ("ssh sign request failed: %s <%s>\n",
gpg_strerror (err), gpg_strsource (err));
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
if (ret_err)
goto leave;
}
leave:
gcry_sexp_release (key);
xfree (key_blob);
xfree (data);
es_free (sig);
return ret_err;
}
/* This function extracts the comment contained in the key
s-expression KEY and stores a copy in COMMENT. Returns usual error
code. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_key_extract_comment (gcry_sexp_t key, char **r_comment)
{
gcry_sexp_t comment_list;
*r_comment = NULL;
comment_list = gcry_sexp_find_token (key, "comment", 0);
if (!comment_list)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
*r_comment = gcry_sexp_nth_string (comment_list, 1);
gcry_sexp_release (comment_list);
if (!*r_comment)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
return 0;
}
/* This function converts the key contained in the S-Expression KEY
into a buffer, which is protected by the passphrase PASSPHRASE.
Returns usual error code. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_key_to_protected_buffer (gcry_sexp_t key, const char *passphrase,
unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buffer_n)
{
unsigned char *buffer_new;
unsigned int buffer_new_n;
gpg_error_t err;
err = 0;
buffer_new_n = gcry_sexp_sprint (key, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0);
buffer_new = xtrymalloc_secure (buffer_new_n);
if (! buffer_new)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
gcry_sexp_sprint (key, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, buffer_new, buffer_new_n);
/* FIXME: guarantee? */
err = agent_protect (buffer_new, passphrase, buffer, buffer_n, 0, -1);
out:
xfree (buffer_new);
return err;
}
/* Callback function to compare the first entered PIN with the one
currently being entered. */
static gpg_error_t
reenter_compare_cb (struct pin_entry_info_s *pi)
{
const char *pin1 = pi->check_cb_arg;
if (!strcmp (pin1, pi->pin))
return 0; /* okay */
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
}
/* Store the ssh KEY into our local key storage and protect it after
asking for a passphrase. Cache that passphrase. TTL is the
maximum caching time for that key. If the key already exists in
our key storage, don't do anything. When entering a key also add
an entry to the sshcontrol file. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_identity_register (ctrl_t ctrl, ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
gcry_sexp_t key, int ttl, int confirm)
{
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char key_grip_raw[20];
char key_grip[41];
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
size_t buffer_n;
char *description = NULL;
const char *description2 = L_("Please re-enter this passphrase");
char *comment = NULL;
char *key_fpr = NULL;
const char *initial_errtext = NULL;
struct pin_entry_info_s *pi = NULL;
struct pin_entry_info_s *pi2 = NULL;
err = ssh_key_grip (key, key_grip_raw);
if (err)
goto out;
bin2hex (key_grip_raw, 20, key_grip);
err = ssh_get_fingerprint_string (key, &key_fpr);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Check whether the key is already in our key storage. Don't do
anything then besides (re-)adding it to sshcontrol. */
if ( !agent_key_available (key_grip_raw) )
goto key_exists; /* Yes, key is available. */
err = ssh_key_extract_comment (key, &comment);
if (err)
goto out;
if ( asprintf (&description,
L_("Please enter a passphrase to protect"
" the received secret key%%0A"
" %s%%0A"
" %s%%0A"
"within gpg-agent's key storage"),
key_fpr, comment ? comment : "") < 0)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
pi = gcry_calloc_secure (1, sizeof (*pi) + MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN + 1);
if (!pi)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
pi2 = gcry_calloc_secure (1, sizeof (*pi2) + MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN + 1);
if (!pi2)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
pi->max_length = MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN + 1;
pi->max_tries = 1;
pi->with_repeat = 1;
pi2->max_length = MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN + 1;
pi2->max_tries = 1;
pi2->check_cb = reenter_compare_cb;
pi2->check_cb_arg = pi->pin;
next_try:
err = agent_askpin (ctrl, description, NULL, initial_errtext, pi, NULL, 0);
initial_errtext = NULL;
if (err)
goto out;
/* Unless the passphrase is empty or the pinentry told us that
it already did the repetition check, ask to confirm it. */
if (*pi->pin && !pi->repeat_okay)
{
err = agent_askpin (ctrl, description2, NULL, NULL, pi2, NULL, 0);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE)
{ /* The re-entered one did not match and the user did not
hit cancel. */
initial_errtext = L_("does not match - try again");
goto next_try;
}
}
err = ssh_key_to_protected_buffer (key, pi->pin, &buffer, &buffer_n);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Store this key to our key storage. */
err = agent_write_private_key (key_grip_raw, buffer, buffer_n, 0);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Cache this passphrase. */
err = agent_put_cache (key_grip, CACHE_MODE_SSH, pi->pin, ttl);
if (err)
goto out;
key_exists:
/* And add an entry to the sshcontrol file. */
err = add_control_entry (ctrl, spec, key_grip, key_fpr, ttl, confirm);
out:
if (pi2 && pi2->max_length)
wipememory (pi2->pin, pi2->max_length);
xfree (pi2);
if (pi && pi->max_length)
wipememory (pi->pin, pi->max_length);
xfree (pi);
xfree (buffer);
xfree (comment);
xfree (key_fpr);
xfree (description);
return err;
}
/* This function removes the key contained in the S-Expression KEY
from the local key storage, in case it exists there. Returns usual
error code. FIXME: this function is a stub. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_identity_drop (gcry_sexp_t key)
{
unsigned char key_grip[21] = { 0 };
gpg_error_t err;
err = ssh_key_grip (key, key_grip);
if (err)
goto out;
key_grip[sizeof (key_grip) - 1] = 0;
/* FIXME: What to do here - forgetting the passphrase or deleting
the key from key cache? */
out:
return err;
}
/* Handler for the "add_identity" command. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_handler_add_identity (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t request, estream_t response)
{
gpg_error_t ret_err;
ssh_key_type_spec_t spec;
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t key;
unsigned char b;
int confirm;
int ttl;
confirm = 0;
key = NULL;
ttl = 0;
/* FIXME? */
err = ssh_receive_key (request, &key, 1, 1, &spec);
if (err)
goto out;
while (1)
{
err = stream_read_byte (request, &b);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EOF)
{
err = 0;
break;
}
switch (b)
{
case SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
{
u32 n = 0;
err = stream_read_uint32 (request, &n);
if (! err)
ttl = n;
break;
}
case SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
{
confirm = 1;
break;
}
default:
/* FIXME: log/bad? */
break;
}
}
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_identity_register (ctrl, &spec, key, ttl, confirm);
out:
gcry_sexp_release (key);
if (! err)
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
else
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
return ret_err;
}
/* Handler for the "remove_identity" command. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_handler_remove_identity (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request, estream_t response)
{
unsigned char *key_blob;
u32 key_blob_size;
gcry_sexp_t key;
gpg_error_t ret_err;
gpg_error_t err;
(void)ctrl;
/* Receive key. */
key_blob = NULL;
key = NULL;
err = stream_read_string (request, 0, &key_blob, &key_blob_size);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_read_key_public_from_blob (key_blob, key_blob_size, &key, NULL);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_identity_drop (key);
out:
xfree (key_blob);
gcry_sexp_release (key);
if (! err)
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
else
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
return ret_err;
}
/* FIXME: stub function. Actually useful? */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_identities_remove_all (void)
{
gpg_error_t err;
err = 0;
/* FIXME: shall we remove _all_ cache entries or only those
registered through the ssh emulation? */
return err;
}
/* Handler for the "remove_all_identities" command. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_handler_remove_all_identities (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request, estream_t response)
{
gpg_error_t ret_err;
gpg_error_t err;
(void)ctrl;
(void)request;
err = ssh_identities_remove_all ();
if (! err)
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
else
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
return ret_err;
}
/* Lock agent? FIXME: stub function. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_lock (void)
{
gpg_error_t err;
/* FIXME */
log_error ("ssh-agent's lock command is not implemented\n");
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Unock agent? FIXME: stub function. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_unlock (void)
{
gpg_error_t err;
log_error ("ssh-agent's unlock command is not implemented\n");
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Handler for the "lock" command. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_handler_lock (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t request, estream_t response)
{
gpg_error_t ret_err;
gpg_error_t err;
(void)ctrl;
(void)request;
err = ssh_lock ();
if (! err)
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
else
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
return ret_err;
}
/* Handler for the "unlock" command. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_handler_unlock (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t request, estream_t response)
{
gpg_error_t ret_err;
gpg_error_t err;
(void)ctrl;
(void)request;
err = ssh_unlock ();
if (! err)
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
else
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
return ret_err;
}
/* Return the request specification for the request identified by TYPE
or NULL in case the requested request specification could not be
found. */
static ssh_request_spec_t *
request_spec_lookup (int type)
{
ssh_request_spec_t *spec;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < DIM (request_specs); i++)
if (request_specs[i].type == type)
break;
if (i == DIM (request_specs))
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("ssh request %u is not supported\n", type);
spec = NULL;
}
else
spec = request_specs + i;
return spec;
}
/* Process a single request. The request is read from and the
response is written to STREAM_SOCK. Uses CTRL as context. Returns
zero in case of success, non zero in case of failure. */
static int
ssh_request_process (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t stream_sock)
{
ssh_request_spec_t *spec;
estream_t response = NULL;
estream_t request = NULL;
unsigned char request_type;
gpg_error_t err;
int send_err = 0;
int ret;
unsigned char *request_data = NULL;
u32 request_data_size;
u32 response_size;
/* Create memory streams for request/response data. The entire
request will be stored in secure memory, since it might contain
secret key material. The response does not have to be stored in
secure memory, since we never give out secret keys.
Note: we only have little secure memory, but there is NO
possibility of DoS here; only trusted clients are allowed to
connect to the agent. What could happen is that the agent
returns out-of-secure-memory errors on requests in case the
agent's owner floods his own agent with many large messages.
-moritz */
/* Retrieve request. */
err = stream_read_string (stream_sock, 1, &request_data, &request_data_size);
if (err)
goto out;
if (opt.verbose > 1)
log_info ("received ssh request of length %u\n",
(unsigned int)request_data_size);
if (! request_data_size)
{
send_err = 1;
goto out;
/* Broken request; FIXME. */
}
request_type = request_data[0];
spec = request_spec_lookup (request_type);
if (! spec)
{
send_err = 1;
goto out;
/* Unknown request; FIXME. */
}
if (spec->secret_input)
request = es_mopen (NULL, 0, 0, 1, realloc_secure, gcry_free, "r+b");
else
request = es_mopen (NULL, 0, 0, 1, gcry_realloc, gcry_free, "r+b");
if (! request)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
ret = es_setvbuf (request, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
if (ret)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
err = stream_write_data (request, request_data + 1, request_data_size - 1);
if (err)
goto out;
es_rewind (request);
response = es_fopenmem (0, "r+b");
if (! response)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("ssh request handler for %s (%u) started\n",
spec->identifier, spec->type);
err = (*spec->handler) (ctrl, request, response);
if (opt.verbose)
{
if (err)
log_info ("ssh request handler for %s (%u) failed: %s\n",
spec->identifier, spec->type, gpg_strerror (err));
else
log_info ("ssh request handler for %s (%u) ready\n",
spec->identifier, spec->type);
}
if (err)
{
send_err = 1;
goto out;
}
response_size = es_ftell (response);
if (opt.verbose > 1)
log_info ("sending ssh response of length %u\n",
(unsigned int)response_size);
err = es_fseek (response, 0, SEEK_SET);
if (err)
{
send_err = 1;
goto out;
}
err = stream_write_uint32 (stream_sock, response_size);
if (err)
{
send_err = 1;
goto out;
}
err = stream_copy (stream_sock, response);
if (err)
goto out;
err = es_fflush (stream_sock);
if (err)
goto out;
out:
if (err && es_feof (stream_sock))
log_error ("error occurred while processing request: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
if (send_err)
{
if (opt.verbose > 1)
log_info ("sending ssh error response\n");
err = stream_write_uint32 (stream_sock, 1);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = stream_write_byte (stream_sock, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
if (err)
goto leave;
}
leave:
es_fclose (request);
es_fclose (response);
xfree (request_data);
return !!err;
}
/* Start serving client on SOCK_CLIENT. */
void
start_command_handler_ssh (ctrl_t ctrl, gnupg_fd_t sock_client)
{
estream_t stream_sock = NULL;
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
err = agent_copy_startup_env (ctrl);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Create stream from socket. */
stream_sock = es_fdopen (FD2INT(sock_client), "r+");
if (!stream_sock)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error (_("failed to create stream from socket: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (err));
goto out;
}
/* We have to disable the estream buffering, because the estream
core doesn't know about secure memory. */
ret = es_setvbuf (stream_sock, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
if (ret)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("failed to disable buffering "
"on socket stream: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto out;
}
/* Main processing loop. */
while ( !ssh_request_process (ctrl, stream_sock) )
{
/* Check wether we have reached EOF before trying to read
another request. */
int c;
c = es_fgetc (stream_sock);
if (c == EOF)
break;
es_ungetc (c, stream_sock);
}
/* Reset the SCD in case it has been used. */
agent_reset_scd (ctrl);
out:
if (stream_sock)
es_fclose (stream_sock);
}
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
/* Serve one ssh-agent request. This is used for the Putty support.
REQUEST is the the mmapped memory which may be accessed up to a
length of MAXREQLEN. Returns 0 on success which also indicates
that a valid SSH response message is now in REQUEST. */
int
serve_mmapped_ssh_request (ctrl_t ctrl,
unsigned char *request, size_t maxreqlen)
{
gpg_error_t err;
int send_err = 0;
int valid_response = 0;
ssh_request_spec_t *spec;
u32 msglen;
estream_t request_stream, response_stream;
if (agent_copy_startup_env (ctrl))
goto leave; /* Error setting up the environment. */
if (maxreqlen < 5)
goto leave; /* Caller error. */
msglen = uint32_construct (request[0], request[1], request[2], request[3]);
if (msglen < 1 || msglen > maxreqlen - 4)
{
log_error ("ssh message len (%u) out of range", (unsigned int)msglen);
goto leave;
}
spec = request_spec_lookup (request[4]);
if (!spec)
{
send_err = 1; /* Unknown request type. */
goto leave;
}
/* Create a stream object with the data part of the request. */
if (spec->secret_input)
request_stream = es_mopen (NULL, 0, 0, 1, realloc_secure, gcry_free, "r+");
else
request_stream = es_mopen (NULL, 0, 0, 1, gcry_realloc, gcry_free, "r+");
if (!request_stream)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
/* We have to disable the estream buffering, because the estream
core doesn't know about secure memory. */
if (es_setvbuf (request_stream, NULL, _IONBF, 0))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
/* Copy the request to the stream but omit the request type. */
err = stream_write_data (request_stream, request + 5, msglen - 1);
if (err)
goto leave;
es_rewind (request_stream);
response_stream = es_fopenmem (0, "r+b");
if (!response_stream)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("ssh request handler for %s (%u) started\n",
spec->identifier, spec->type);
err = (*spec->handler) (ctrl, request_stream, response_stream);
if (opt.verbose)
{
if (err)
log_info ("ssh request handler for %s (%u) failed: %s\n",
spec->identifier, spec->type, gpg_strerror (err));
else
log_info ("ssh request handler for %s (%u) ready\n",
spec->identifier, spec->type);
}
es_fclose (request_stream);
request_stream = NULL;
if (err)
{
send_err = 1;
goto leave;
}
/* Put the response back into the mmapped buffer. */
{
void *response_data;
size_t response_size;
/* NB: In contrast to the request-stream, the response stream
includes the the message type byte. */
if (es_fclose_snatch (response_stream, &response_data, &response_size))
{
log_error ("snatching ssh response failed: %s",
gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror ()));
send_err = 1; /* Ooops. */
goto leave;
}
if (opt.verbose > 1)
log_info ("sending ssh response of length %u\n",
(unsigned int)response_size);
if (response_size > maxreqlen - 4)
{
log_error ("invalid length of the ssh response: %s",
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL));
es_free (response_data);
send_err = 1;
goto leave;
}
request[0] = response_size >> 24;
request[1] = response_size >> 16;
request[2] = response_size >> 8;
request[3] = response_size >> 0;
memcpy (request+4, response_data, response_size);
es_free (response_data);
valid_response = 1;
}
leave:
if (send_err)
{
request[0] = 0;
request[1] = 0;
request[2] = 0;
request[3] = 1;
request[4] = SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE;
valid_response = 1;
}
/* Reset the SCD in case it has been used. */
agent_reset_scd (ctrl);
return valid_response? 0 : -1;
}
#endif /*HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
diff --git a/agent/command.c b/agent/command.c
index 7e651bfdb..1ecdf20cd 100644
--- a/agent/command.c
+++ b/agent/command.c
@@ -1,3303 +1,3303 @@
/* command.c - gpg-agent command handler
* Copyright (C) 2001-2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2001-2013 Werner Koch
* Copyright (C) 2015 g10 Code GmbH.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
/* FIXME: we should not use the default assuan buffering but setup
some buffering in secure mempory to protect session keys etc. */
#include <config.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include "agent.h"
#include <assuan.h>
#include "i18n.h"
#include "cvt-openpgp.h"
#include "../common/ssh-utils.h"
#include "../common/asshelp.h"
#include "../common/server-help.h"
/* Maximum allowed size of the inquired ciphertext. */
#define MAXLEN_CIPHERTEXT 4096
/* Maximum allowed size of the key parameters. */
#define MAXLEN_KEYPARAM 1024
/* Maximum allowed size of key data as used in inquiries (bytes). */
#define MAXLEN_KEYDATA 8192
/* The size of the import/export KEK key (in bytes). */
#define KEYWRAP_KEYSIZE (128/8)
/* A shortcut to call assuan_set_error using an gpg_err_code_t and a
text string. */
#define set_error(e,t) assuan_set_error (ctx, gpg_error (e), (t))
/* Check that the maximum digest length we support has at least the
length of the keygrip. */
#if MAX_DIGEST_LEN < 20
#error MAX_DIGEST_LEN shorter than keygrip
#endif
/* Data used to associate an Assuan context with local server data.
This is this modules local part of the server_control_s struct. */
struct server_local_s
{
/* Our Assuan context. */
assuan_context_t assuan_ctx;
/* If this flag is true, the passphrase cache is used for signing
operations. It defaults to true but may be set on a per
connection base. The global option opt.ignore_cache_for_signing
takes precedence over this flag. */
unsigned int use_cache_for_signing : 1;
/* Flag to suppress I/O logging during a command. */
unsigned int pause_io_logging : 1;
/* Flag indicating that the connection is from ourselves. */
unsigned int connect_from_self : 1;
/* Helper flag for io_monitor to allow suppressing of our own
* greeting in some cases. See io_monitor for details. */
unsigned int greeting_seen : 1;
/* If this flag is set to true the agent will be terminated after
the end of the current session. */
unsigned int stopme : 1;
/* Flag indicating whether pinentry notifications shall be done. */
unsigned int allow_pinentry_notify : 1;
/* An allocated description for the next key operation. This is
used if a pinnetry needs to be popped up. */
char *keydesc;
/* Malloced KEK (Key-Encryption-Key) for the import_key command. */
void *import_key;
/* Malloced KEK for the export_key command. */
void *export_key;
/* Client is aware of the error code GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED. */
int allow_fully_canceled;
/* Last CACHE_NONCE sent as status (malloced). */
char *last_cache_nonce;
/* Last PASSWD_NONCE sent as status (malloced). */
char *last_passwd_nonce;
};
/* An entry for the getval/putval commands. */
struct putval_item_s
{
struct putval_item_s *next;
size_t off; /* Offset to the value into DATA. */
size_t len; /* Length of the value. */
char d[1]; /* Key | Nul | value. */
};
/* A list of key value pairs fpr the getval/putval commands. */
static struct putval_item_s *putval_list;
/* To help polling clients, we keep track of the number of certain
events. This structure keeps those counters. The counters are
integers and there should be no problem if they are overflowing as
callers need to check only whether a counter changed. The actual
values are not meaningful. */
struct
{
/* Incremented if any of the other counters below changed. */
unsigned int any;
/* Incremented if a key is added or removed from the internal privat
key database. */
unsigned int key;
/* Incremented if a change of the card readers stati has been
detected. */
unsigned int card;
} eventcounter;
/* Local prototypes. */
static int command_has_option (const char *cmd, const char *cmdopt);
/* Release the memory buffer MB but first wipe out the used memory. */
static void
clear_outbuf (membuf_t *mb)
{
void *p;
size_t n;
p = get_membuf (mb, &n);
if (p)
{
wipememory (p, n);
xfree (p);
}
}
/* Write the content of memory buffer MB as assuan data to CTX and
wipe the buffer out afterwards. */
static gpg_error_t
write_and_clear_outbuf (assuan_context_t ctx, membuf_t *mb)
{
gpg_error_t ae;
void *p;
size_t n;
p = get_membuf (mb, &n);
if (!p)
return out_of_core ();
ae = assuan_send_data (ctx, p, n);
memset (p, 0, n);
xfree (p);
return ae;
}
/* Clear the nonces used to enable the passphrase cache for certain
multi-command command sequences. */
static void
clear_nonce_cache (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
if (ctrl->server_local->last_cache_nonce)
{
agent_put_cache (ctrl->server_local->last_cache_nonce,
CACHE_MODE_NONCE, NULL, 0);
xfree (ctrl->server_local->last_cache_nonce);
ctrl->server_local->last_cache_nonce = NULL;
}
if (ctrl->server_local->last_passwd_nonce)
{
agent_put_cache (ctrl->server_local->last_passwd_nonce,
CACHE_MODE_NONCE, NULL, 0);
xfree (ctrl->server_local->last_passwd_nonce);
ctrl->server_local->last_passwd_nonce = NULL;
}
}
/* This function is called by Libassuan whenever the client sends a
reset. It has been registered similar to the other Assuan
commands. */
static gpg_error_t
reset_notify (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
(void) line;
memset (ctrl->keygrip, 0, 20);
ctrl->have_keygrip = 0;
ctrl->digest.valuelen = 0;
xfree (ctrl->server_local->keydesc);
ctrl->server_local->keydesc = NULL;
clear_nonce_cache (ctrl);
return 0;
}
/* Replace all '+' by a blank in the string S. */
static void
plus_to_blank (char *s)
{
for (; *s; s++)
{
if (*s == '+')
*s = ' ';
}
}
/* Parse a hex string. Return an Assuan error code or 0 on success and the
length of the parsed string in LEN. */
static int
parse_hexstring (assuan_context_t ctx, const char *string, size_t *len)
{
const char *p;
size_t n;
/* parse the hash value */
for (p=string, n=0; hexdigitp (p); p++, n++)
;
if (*p != ' ' && *p != '\t' && *p)
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid hexstring");
if ((n&1))
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "odd number of digits");
*len = n;
return 0;
}
/* Parse the keygrip in STRING into the provided buffer BUF. BUF must
provide space for 20 bytes. BUF is not changed if the function
returns an error. */
static int
parse_keygrip (assuan_context_t ctx, const char *string, unsigned char *buf)
{
int rc;
size_t n = 0;
rc = parse_hexstring (ctx, string, &n);
if (rc)
return rc;
n /= 2;
if (n != 20)
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid length of keygrip");
if (hex2bin (string, buf, 20) < 0)
return set_error (GPG_ERR_BUG, "hex2bin");
return 0;
}
/* Write an Assuan status line. KEYWORD is the first item on the
status line. The following arguments are all separated by a space
in the output. The last argument must be a NULL. Linefeeds and
carriage returns characters (which are not allowed in an Assuan
status line) are silently quoted in C-style. */
gpg_error_t
agent_write_status (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyword, ...)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
va_list arg_ptr;
const char *text;
assuan_context_t ctx = ctrl->server_local->assuan_ctx;
char buf[950], *p;
size_t n;
va_start (arg_ptr, keyword);
p = buf;
n = 0;
while ( (text = va_arg (arg_ptr, const char *)) )
{
if (n)
{
*p++ = ' ';
n++;
}
for ( ; *text && n < DIM (buf)-3; n++, text++)
{
if (*text == '\n')
{
*p++ = '\\';
*p++ = 'n';
}
else if (*text == '\r')
{
*p++ = '\\';
*p++ = 'r';
}
else
*p++ = *text;
}
}
*p = 0;
err = assuan_write_status (ctx, keyword, buf);
va_end (arg_ptr);
return err;
}
/* This function is similar to print_assuan_status but takes a CTRL
arg instead of an assuan context as first argument. */
gpg_error_t
agent_print_status (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyword, const char *format, ...)
{
gpg_error_t err;
va_list arg_ptr;
assuan_context_t ctx = ctrl->server_local->assuan_ctx;
va_start (arg_ptr, format);
err = vprint_assuan_status (ctx, keyword, format, arg_ptr);
va_end (arg_ptr);
return err;
}
/* Helper to notify the client about a launched Pinentry. Because
that might disturb some older clients, this is only done if enabled
via an option. Returns an gpg error code. */
gpg_error_t
agent_inq_pinentry_launched (ctrl_t ctrl, unsigned long pid)
{
char line[100];
if (!ctrl || !ctrl->server_local
|| !ctrl->server_local->allow_pinentry_notify)
return 0;
snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "PINENTRY_LAUNCHED %lu", pid);
return assuan_inquire (ctrl->server_local->assuan_ctx, line, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
/* An agent progress callback for Libgcrypt. This has been registered
* to be called via the progress dispatcher mechanism from
* gpg-agent.c */
static void
progress_cb (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *what, int printchar,
int current, int total)
{
if (!ctrl || !ctrl->server_local || !ctrl->server_local->assuan_ctx)
;
else if (printchar == '\n' && what && !strcmp (what, "primegen"))
agent_print_status (ctrl, "PROGRESS", "%.20s X 100 100", what);
else
agent_print_status (ctrl, "PROGRESS", "%.20s %c %d %d",
what, printchar=='\n'?'X':printchar, current, total);
}
/* Helper to print a message while leaving a command. */
static gpg_error_t
leave_cmd (assuan_context_t ctx, gpg_error_t err)
{
if (err)
{
const char *name = assuan_get_command_name (ctx);
if (!name)
name = "?";
/* Not all users of gpg-agent know about the fully canceled
error code; map it back if needed. */
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
if (!ctrl->server_local->allow_fully_canceled)
err = gpg_err_make (gpg_err_source (err), GPG_ERR_CANCELED);
}
/* Most code from common/ does not know the error source, thus
we fix this here. */
if (gpg_err_source (err) == GPG_ERR_SOURCE_UNKNOWN)
err = gpg_err_make (GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT, gpg_err_code (err));
if (gpg_err_source (err) == GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT)
log_error ("command '%s' failed: %s\n", name,
gpg_strerror (err));
else
log_error ("command '%s' failed: %s <%s>\n", name,
gpg_strerror (err), gpg_strsource (err));
}
return err;
}
static const char hlp_geteventcounter[] =
"GETEVENTCOUNTER\n"
"\n"
"Return a a status line named EVENTCOUNTER with the current values\n"
"of all event counters. The values are decimal numbers in the range\n"
"0 to UINT_MAX and wrapping around to 0. The actual values should\n"
"not be relied upon, they shall only be used to detect a change.\n"
"\n"
"The currently defined counters are:\n"
"\n"
"ANY - Incremented with any change of any of the other counters.\n"
"KEY - Incremented for added or removed private keys.\n"
"CARD - Incremented for changes of the card readers stati.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_geteventcounter (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
(void)line;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
return agent_print_status (ctrl, "EVENTCOUNTER", "%u %u %u",
eventcounter.any,
eventcounter.key,
eventcounter.card);
}
/* This function should be called once for all key removals or
additions. This function is assured not to do any context
switches. */
void
bump_key_eventcounter (void)
{
eventcounter.key++;
eventcounter.any++;
}
/* This function should be called for all card reader status
changes. This function is assured not to do any context
switches. */
void
bump_card_eventcounter (void)
{
eventcounter.card++;
eventcounter.any++;
}
static const char hlp_istrusted[] =
"ISTRUSTED <hexstring_with_fingerprint>\n"
"\n"
"Return OK when we have an entry with this fingerprint in our\n"
"trustlist";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_istrusted (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
int rc, n, i;
char *p;
char fpr[41];
/* Parse the fingerprint value. */
for (p=line,n=0; hexdigitp (p); p++, n++)
;
if (*p || !(n == 40 || n == 32))
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid fingerprint");
i = 0;
if (n==32)
{
strcpy (fpr, "00000000");
i += 8;
}
for (p=line; i < 40; p++, i++)
fpr[i] = *p >= 'a'? (*p & 0xdf): *p;
fpr[i] = 0;
rc = agent_istrusted (ctrl, fpr, NULL);
if (!rc || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED)
return rc;
else if (rc == -1 || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EOF )
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED);
else
return leave_cmd (ctx, rc);
}
static const char hlp_listtrusted[] =
"LISTTRUSTED\n"
"\n"
"List all entries from the trustlist.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_listtrusted (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
int rc;
(void)line;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
rc = agent_listtrusted (ctx);
return leave_cmd (ctx, rc);
}
static const char hlp_martrusted[] =
"MARKTRUSTED <hexstring_with_fingerprint> <flag> <display_name>\n"
"\n"
"Store a new key in into the trustlist.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_marktrusted (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
int rc, n, i;
char *p;
char fpr[41];
int flag;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
/* parse the fingerprint value */
for (p=line,n=0; hexdigitp (p); p++, n++)
;
if (!spacep (p) || !(n == 40 || n == 32))
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid fingerprint");
i = 0;
if (n==32)
{
strcpy (fpr, "00000000");
i += 8;
}
for (p=line; i < 40; p++, i++)
fpr[i] = *p >= 'a'? (*p & 0xdf): *p;
fpr[i] = 0;
while (spacep (p))
p++;
flag = *p++;
if ( (flag != 'S' && flag != 'P') || !spacep (p) )
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid flag - must be P or S");
while (spacep (p))
p++;
rc = agent_marktrusted (ctrl, p, fpr, flag);
return leave_cmd (ctx, rc);
}
static const char hlp_havekey[] =
"HAVEKEY <hexstrings_with_keygrips>\n"
"\n"
"Return success if at least one of the secret keys with the given\n"
"keygrips is available.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_havekey (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char buf[20];
do
{
err = parse_keygrip (ctx, line, buf);
if (err)
return err;
if (!agent_key_available (buf))
return 0; /* Found. */
while (*line && *line != ' ' && *line != '\t')
line++;
while (*line == ' ' || *line == '\t')
line++;
}
while (*line);
/* No leave_cmd() here because errors are expected and would clutter
the log. */
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
}
static const char hlp_sigkey[] =
"SIGKEY <hexstring_with_keygrip>\n"
"SETKEY <hexstring_with_keygrip>\n"
"\n"
"Set the key used for a sign or decrypt operation.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_sigkey (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
int rc;
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
rc = parse_keygrip (ctx, line, ctrl->keygrip);
if (rc)
return rc;
ctrl->have_keygrip = 1;
return 0;
}
static const char hlp_setkeydesc[] =
"SETKEYDESC plus_percent_escaped_string\n"
"\n"
"Set a description to be used for the next PKSIGN, PKDECRYPT, IMPORT_KEY\n"
"or EXPORT_KEY operation if this operation requires a passphrase. If\n"
"this command is not used a default text will be used. Note, that\n"
"this description implictly selects the label used for the entry\n"
"box; if the string contains the string PIN (which in general will\n"
"not be translated), \"PIN\" is used, otherwise the translation of\n"
"\"passphrase\" is used. The description string should not contain\n"
"blanks unless they are percent or '+' escaped.\n"
"\n"
"The description is only valid for the next PKSIGN, PKDECRYPT,\n"
"IMPORT_KEY, EXPORT_KEY, or DELETE_KEY operation.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_setkeydesc (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
char *desc, *p;
for (p=line; *p == ' '; p++)
;
desc = p;
p = strchr (desc, ' ');
if (p)
*p = 0; /* We ignore any garbage; we might late use it for other args. */
if (!*desc)
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "no description given");
/* Note, that we only need to replace the + characters and should
leave the other escaping in place because the escaped string is
send verbatim to the pinentry which does the unescaping (but not
the + replacing) */
plus_to_blank (desc);
xfree (ctrl->server_local->keydesc);
if (ctrl->restricted)
{
ctrl->server_local->keydesc = strconcat
((ctrl->restricted == 2
? _("Note: Request from the web browser.")
: _("Note: Request from a remote site.") ), "%0A%0A", desc, NULL);
}
else
ctrl->server_local->keydesc = xtrystrdup (desc);
if (!ctrl->server_local->keydesc)
return out_of_core ();
return 0;
}
static const char hlp_sethash[] =
"SETHASH (--hash=<name>)|(<algonumber>) <hexstring>\n"
"\n"
"The client can use this command to tell the server about the data\n"
"(which usually is a hash) to be signed.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_sethash (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
int rc;
size_t n;
char *p;
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
unsigned char *buf;
char *endp;
int algo;
/* Parse the alternative hash options which may be used instead of
the algo number. */
if (has_option_name (line, "--hash"))
{
if (has_option (line, "--hash=sha1"))
algo = GCRY_MD_SHA1;
else if (has_option (line, "--hash=sha224"))
algo = GCRY_MD_SHA224;
else if (has_option (line, "--hash=sha256"))
algo = GCRY_MD_SHA256;
else if (has_option (line, "--hash=sha384"))
algo = GCRY_MD_SHA384;
else if (has_option (line, "--hash=sha512"))
algo = GCRY_MD_SHA512;
else if (has_option (line, "--hash=rmd160"))
algo = GCRY_MD_RMD160;
else if (has_option (line, "--hash=md5"))
algo = GCRY_MD_MD5;
else if (has_option (line, "--hash=tls-md5sha1"))
algo = MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1;
else
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid hash algorithm");
}
else
algo = 0;
line = skip_options (line);
if (!algo)
{
/* No hash option has been given: require an algo number instead */
algo = (int)strtoul (line, &endp, 10);
for (line = endp; *line == ' ' || *line == '\t'; line++)
;
if (!algo || gcry_md_test_algo (algo))
return set_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, NULL);
}
ctrl->digest.algo = algo;
ctrl->digest.raw_value = 0;
/* Parse the hash value. */
n = 0;
rc = parse_hexstring (ctx, line, &n);
if (rc)
return rc;
n /= 2;
if (algo == MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1 && n == 36)
;
else if (n != 16 && n != 20 && n != 24
&& n != 28 && n != 32 && n != 48 && n != 64)
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "unsupported length of hash");
if (n > MAX_DIGEST_LEN)
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "hash value to long");
buf = ctrl->digest.value;
ctrl->digest.valuelen = n;
for (p=line, n=0; n < ctrl->digest.valuelen; p += 2, n++)
buf[n] = xtoi_2 (p);
for (; n < ctrl->digest.valuelen; n++)
buf[n] = 0;
return 0;
}
static const char hlp_pksign[] =
"PKSIGN [<options>] [<cache_nonce>]\n"
"\n"
"Perform the actual sign operation. Neither input nor output are\n"
"sensitive to eavesdropping.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_pksign (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
int rc;
cache_mode_t cache_mode = CACHE_MODE_NORMAL;
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
membuf_t outbuf;
char *cache_nonce = NULL;
char *p;
line = skip_options (line);
p = line;
for (p=line; *p && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t'; p++)
;
*p = '\0';
if (*line)
cache_nonce = xtrystrdup (line);
if (opt.ignore_cache_for_signing)
cache_mode = CACHE_MODE_IGNORE;
else if (!ctrl->server_local->use_cache_for_signing)
cache_mode = CACHE_MODE_IGNORE;
init_membuf (&outbuf, 512);
rc = agent_pksign (ctrl, cache_nonce, ctrl->server_local->keydesc,
&outbuf, cache_mode);
if (rc)
clear_outbuf (&outbuf);
else
rc = write_and_clear_outbuf (ctx, &outbuf);
xfree (cache_nonce);
xfree (ctrl->server_local->keydesc);
ctrl->server_local->keydesc = NULL;
return leave_cmd (ctx, rc);
}
static const char hlp_pkdecrypt[] =
"PKDECRYPT [<options>]\n"
"\n"
"Perform the actual decrypt operation. Input is not\n"
"sensitive to eavesdropping.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_pkdecrypt (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
int rc;
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
unsigned char *value;
size_t valuelen;
membuf_t outbuf;
int padding;
(void)line;
/* First inquire the data to decrypt */
rc = print_assuan_status (ctx, "INQUIRE_MAXLEN", "%u", MAXLEN_CIPHERTEXT);
if (!rc)
rc = assuan_inquire (ctx, "CIPHERTEXT",
&value, &valuelen, MAXLEN_CIPHERTEXT);
if (rc)
return rc;
init_membuf (&outbuf, 512);
rc = agent_pkdecrypt (ctrl, ctrl->server_local->keydesc,
value, valuelen, &outbuf, &padding);
xfree (value);
if (rc)
clear_outbuf (&outbuf);
else
{
if (padding != -1)
rc = print_assuan_status (ctx, "PADDING", "%d", padding);
else
rc = 0;
if (!rc)
rc = write_and_clear_outbuf (ctx, &outbuf);
}
xfree (ctrl->server_local->keydesc);
ctrl->server_local->keydesc = NULL;
return leave_cmd (ctx, rc);
}
static const char hlp_genkey[] =
"GENKEY [--no-protection] [--preset] [--inq-passwd]\n"
" [--passwd-nonce=<s>] [<cache_nonce>]\n"
"\n"
"Generate a new key, store the secret part and return the public\n"
"part. Here is an example transaction:\n"
"\n"
" C: GENKEY\n"
" S: INQUIRE KEYPARAM\n"
" C: D (genkey (rsa (nbits 2048)))\n"
" C: END\n"
" S: D (public-key\n"
" S: D (rsa (n 326487324683264) (e 10001)))\n"
" S: OK key created\n"
"\n"
"When the --preset option is used the passphrase for the generated\n"
"key will be added to the cache. When --inq-passwd is used an inquire\n"
"with the keyword NEWPASSWD is used to request the passphrase for the\n"
"new key. When a --passwd-nonce is used, the corresponding cached\n"
"passphrase is used to protect the new key.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_genkey (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
int rc;
int no_protection;
unsigned char *value;
size_t valuelen;
unsigned char *newpasswd = NULL;
membuf_t outbuf;
char *cache_nonce = NULL;
char *passwd_nonce = NULL;
int opt_preset;
int opt_inq_passwd;
size_t n;
char *p, *pend;
int c;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
no_protection = has_option (line, "--no-protection");
opt_preset = has_option (line, "--preset");
opt_inq_passwd = has_option (line, "--inq-passwd");
passwd_nonce = option_value (line, "--passwd-nonce");
if (passwd_nonce)
{
for (pend = passwd_nonce; *pend && !spacep (pend); pend++)
;
c = *pend;
*pend = '\0';
passwd_nonce = xtrystrdup (passwd_nonce);
*pend = c;
if (!passwd_nonce)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
}
line = skip_options (line);
p = line;
for (p=line; *p && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t'; p++)
;
*p = '\0';
if (*line)
cache_nonce = xtrystrdup (line);
/* First inquire the parameters */
rc = print_assuan_status (ctx, "INQUIRE_MAXLEN", "%u", MAXLEN_KEYPARAM);
if (!rc)
rc = assuan_inquire (ctx, "KEYPARAM", &value, &valuelen, MAXLEN_KEYPARAM);
if (rc)
return rc;
init_membuf (&outbuf, 512);
/* If requested, ask for the password to be used for the key. If
this is not used the regular Pinentry mechanism is used. */
if (opt_inq_passwd && !no_protection)
{
/* (N is used as a dummy) */
assuan_begin_confidential (ctx);
rc = assuan_inquire (ctx, "NEWPASSWD", &newpasswd, &n, 256);
assuan_end_confidential (ctx);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (!*newpasswd)
{
/* Empty password given - switch to no-protection mode. */
xfree (newpasswd);
newpasswd = NULL;
no_protection = 1;
}
}
else if (passwd_nonce)
newpasswd = agent_get_cache (passwd_nonce, CACHE_MODE_NONCE);
rc = agent_genkey (ctrl, cache_nonce, (char*)value, valuelen, no_protection,
newpasswd, opt_preset, &outbuf);
leave:
if (newpasswd)
{
/* Assuan_inquire does not allow us to read into secure memory
thus we need to wipe it ourself. */
wipememory (newpasswd, strlen (newpasswd));
xfree (newpasswd);
}
xfree (value);
if (rc)
clear_outbuf (&outbuf);
else
rc = write_and_clear_outbuf (ctx, &outbuf);
xfree (cache_nonce);
xfree (passwd_nonce);
return leave_cmd (ctx, rc);
}
static const char hlp_readkey[] =
"READKEY <hexstring_with_keygrip>\n"
"\n"
"Return the public key for the given keygrip.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_readkey (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
int rc;
unsigned char grip[20];
gcry_sexp_t s_pkey = NULL;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
rc = parse_keygrip (ctx, line, grip);
if (rc)
return rc; /* Return immediately as this is already an Assuan error code.*/
rc = agent_public_key_from_file (ctrl, grip, &s_pkey);
if (!rc)
{
size_t len;
unsigned char *buf;
len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_pkey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0);
assert (len);
buf = xtrymalloc (len);
if (!buf)
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_pkey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, buf, len);
assert (len);
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, buf, len);
xfree (buf);
}
gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey);
}
return leave_cmd (ctx, rc);
}
static const char hlp_keyinfo[] =
"KEYINFO [--[ssh-]list] [--data] [--ssh-fpr] [--with-ssh] <keygrip>\n"
"\n"
"Return information about the key specified by the KEYGRIP. If the\n"
"key is not available GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND is returned. If the option\n"
"--list is given the keygrip is ignored and information about all\n"
"available keys are returned. If --ssh-list is given information\n"
"about all keys listed in the sshcontrol are returned. With --with-ssh\n"
"information from sshcontrol is always added to the info. Unless --data\n"
"is given, the information is returned as a status line using the format:\n"
"\n"
" KEYINFO <keygrip> <type> <serialno> <idstr> <cached> <protection> <fpr>\n"
"\n"
"KEYGRIP is the keygrip.\n"
"\n"
"TYPE is describes the type of the key:\n"
" 'D' - Regular key stored on disk,\n"
" 'T' - Key is stored on a smartcard (token),\n"
" 'X' - Unknown type,\n"
" '-' - Key is missing.\n"
"\n"
"SERIALNO is an ASCII string with the serial number of the\n"
" smartcard. If the serial number is not known a single\n"
" dash '-' is used instead.\n"
"\n"
"IDSTR is the IDSTR used to distinguish keys on a smartcard. If it\n"
" is not known a dash is used instead.\n"
"\n"
"CACHED is 1 if the passphrase for the key was found in the key cache.\n"
" If not, a '-' is used instead.\n"
"\n"
"PROTECTION describes the key protection type:\n"
" 'P' - The key is protected with a passphrase,\n"
" 'C' - The key is not protected,\n"
" '-' - Unknown protection.\n"
"\n"
"FPR returns the formatted ssh-style fingerprint of the key. It is only\n"
" printed if the option --ssh-fpr has been used. It defaults to '-'.\n"
"\n"
"TTL is the TTL in seconds for that key or '-' if n/a.\n"
"\n"
"FLAGS is a word consisting of one-letter flags:\n"
" 'D' - The key has been disabled,\n"
" 'S' - The key is listed in sshcontrol (requires --with-ssh),\n"
" 'c' - Use of the key needs to be confirmed,\n"
" '-' - No flags given.\n"
"\n"
"More information may be added in the future.";
static gpg_error_t
do_one_keyinfo (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *grip, assuan_context_t ctx,
int data, int with_ssh_fpr, int in_ssh,
int ttl, int disabled, int confirm)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char hexgrip[40+1];
char *fpr = NULL;
int keytype;
unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL;
char *serialno = NULL;
char *idstr = NULL;
const char *keytypestr;
const char *cached;
const char *protectionstr;
char *pw;
int missing_key = 0;
char ttlbuf[20];
char flagsbuf[5];
err = agent_key_info_from_file (ctrl, grip, &keytype, &shadow_info);
if (err)
{
if (in_ssh && gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
missing_key = 1;
else
goto leave;
}
/* Reformat the grip so that we use uppercase as good style. */
bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip);
if (ttl > 0)
snprintf (ttlbuf, sizeof ttlbuf, "%d", ttl);
else
strcpy (ttlbuf, "-");
*flagsbuf = 0;
if (disabled)
strcat (flagsbuf, "D");
if (in_ssh)
strcat (flagsbuf, "S");
if (confirm)
strcat (flagsbuf, "c");
if (!*flagsbuf)
strcpy (flagsbuf, "-");
if (missing_key)
{
protectionstr = "-"; keytypestr = "-";
}
else
{
switch (keytype)
{
case PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR:
case PRIVATE_KEY_OPENPGP_NONE:
protectionstr = "C"; keytypestr = "D";
break;
case PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED: protectionstr = "P"; keytypestr = "D";
break;
case PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED: protectionstr = "-"; keytypestr = "T";
break;
default: protectionstr = "-"; keytypestr = "X";
break;
}
}
/* Compute the ssh fingerprint if requested. */
if (with_ssh_fpr)
{
gcry_sexp_t key;
if (!agent_raw_key_from_file (ctrl, grip, &key))
{
ssh_get_fingerprint_string (key, &fpr);
gcry_sexp_release (key);
}
}
/* Here we have a little race by doing the cache check separately
from the retrieval function. Given that the cache flag is only a
hint, it should not really matter. */
pw = agent_get_cache (hexgrip, CACHE_MODE_NORMAL);
cached = pw ? "1" : "-";
xfree (pw);
if (shadow_info)
{
err = parse_shadow_info (shadow_info, &serialno, &idstr, NULL);
if (err)
goto leave;
}
if (!data)
err = agent_write_status (ctrl, "KEYINFO",
hexgrip,
keytypestr,
serialno? serialno : "-",
idstr? idstr : "-",
cached,
protectionstr,
fpr? fpr : "-",
ttlbuf,
flagsbuf,
NULL);
else
{
char *string;
string = xtryasprintf ("%s %s %s %s %s %s %s %s %s\n",
hexgrip, keytypestr,
serialno? serialno : "-",
idstr? idstr : "-", cached, protectionstr,
fpr? fpr : "-",
ttlbuf,
flagsbuf);
if (!string)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = assuan_send_data (ctx, string, strlen(string));
xfree (string);
}
leave:
xfree (fpr);
xfree (shadow_info);
xfree (serialno);
xfree (idstr);
return err;
}
/* Entry int for the command KEYINFO. This function handles the
command option processing. For details see hlp_keyinfo above. */
static gpg_error_t
cmd_keyinfo (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
int err;
unsigned char grip[20];
DIR *dir = NULL;
int list_mode;
int opt_data, opt_ssh_fpr, opt_with_ssh;
ssh_control_file_t cf = NULL;
char hexgrip[41];
int disabled, ttl, confirm, is_ssh;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
if (has_option (line, "--ssh-list"))
list_mode = 2;
else
list_mode = has_option (line, "--list");
opt_data = has_option (line, "--data");
opt_ssh_fpr = has_option (line, "--ssh-fpr");
opt_with_ssh = has_option (line, "--with-ssh");
line = skip_options (line);
if (opt_with_ssh || list_mode == 2)
cf = ssh_open_control_file ();
if (list_mode == 2)
{
if (cf)
{
while (!ssh_read_control_file (cf, hexgrip,
&disabled, &ttl, &confirm))
{
if (hex2bin (hexgrip, grip, 20) < 0 )
continue; /* Bad hex string. */
err = do_one_keyinfo (ctrl, grip, ctx, opt_data, opt_ssh_fpr, 1,
ttl, disabled, confirm);
if (err)
goto leave;
}
}
err = 0;
}
else if (list_mode)
{
char *dirname;
struct dirent *dir_entry;
dirname = make_filename_try (gnupg_homedir (),
GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR, NULL);
if (!dirname)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
dir = opendir (dirname);
if (!dir)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
xfree (dirname);
goto leave;
}
xfree (dirname);
while ( (dir_entry = readdir (dir)) )
{
if (strlen (dir_entry->d_name) != 44
|| strcmp (dir_entry->d_name + 40, ".key"))
continue;
strncpy (hexgrip, dir_entry->d_name, 40);
hexgrip[40] = 0;
if ( hex2bin (hexgrip, grip, 20) < 0 )
continue; /* Bad hex string. */
disabled = ttl = confirm = is_ssh = 0;
if (opt_with_ssh)
{
err = ssh_search_control_file (cf, hexgrip,
&disabled, &ttl, &confirm);
if (!err)
is_ssh = 1;
else if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
goto leave;
}
err = do_one_keyinfo (ctrl, grip, ctx, opt_data, opt_ssh_fpr, is_ssh,
ttl, disabled, confirm);
if (err)
goto leave;
}
err = 0;
}
else
{
err = parse_keygrip (ctx, line, grip);
if (err)
goto leave;
disabled = ttl = confirm = is_ssh = 0;
if (opt_with_ssh)
{
err = ssh_search_control_file (cf, line,
&disabled, &ttl, &confirm);
if (!err)
is_ssh = 1;
else if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
goto leave;
}
err = do_one_keyinfo (ctrl, grip, ctx, opt_data, opt_ssh_fpr, is_ssh,
ttl, disabled, confirm);
}
leave:
ssh_close_control_file (cf);
if (dir)
closedir (dir);
if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
leave_cmd (ctx, err);
return err;
}
/* Helper for cmd_get_passphrase. */
static int
send_back_passphrase (assuan_context_t ctx, int via_data, const char *pw)
{
size_t n;
int rc;
assuan_begin_confidential (ctx);
n = strlen (pw);
if (via_data)
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, pw, n);
else
{
char *p = xtrymalloc_secure (n*2+1);
if (!p)
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
bin2hex (pw, n, p);
rc = assuan_set_okay_line (ctx, p);
xfree (p);
}
}
return rc;
}
static const char hlp_get_passphrase[] =
"GET_PASSPHRASE [--data] [--check] [--no-ask] [--repeat[=N]]\n"
" [--qualitybar] <cache_id>\n"
" [<error_message> <prompt> <description>]\n"
"\n"
"This function is usually used to ask for a passphrase to be used\n"
"for conventional encryption, but may also be used by programs which\n"
"need specal handling of passphrases. This command uses a syntax\n"
"which helps clients to use the agent with minimum effort. The\n"
"agent either returns with an error or with a OK followed by the hex\n"
"encoded passphrase. Note that the length of the strings is\n"
"implicitly limited by the maximum length of a command.\n"
"\n"
"If the option \"--data\" is used the passphrase is returned by usual\n"
"data lines and not on the okay line.\n"
"\n"
"If the option \"--check\" is used the passphrase constraints checks as\n"
"implemented by gpg-agent are applied. A check is not done if the\n"
"passphrase has been found in the cache.\n"
"\n"
"If the option \"--no-ask\" is used and the passphrase is not in the\n"
"cache the user will not be asked to enter a passphrase but the error\n"
"code GPG_ERR_NO_DATA is returned. \n"
"\n"
"If the option \"--qualitybar\" is used a visual indication of the\n"
"entered passphrase quality is shown. (Unless no minimum passphrase\n"
"length has been configured.)";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_get_passphrase (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
int rc;
char *pw;
char *response;
char *cacheid = NULL, *desc = NULL, *prompt = NULL, *errtext = NULL;
const char *desc2 = _("Please re-enter this passphrase");
char *p;
int opt_data, opt_check, opt_no_ask, opt_qualbar;
int opt_repeat = 0;
char *entry_errtext = NULL;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
opt_data = has_option (line, "--data");
opt_check = has_option (line, "--check");
opt_no_ask = has_option (line, "--no-ask");
if (has_option_name (line, "--repeat"))
{
p = option_value (line, "--repeat");
if (p)
opt_repeat = atoi (p);
else
opt_repeat = 1;
}
opt_qualbar = has_option (line, "--qualitybar");
line = skip_options (line);
cacheid = line;
p = strchr (cacheid, ' ');
if (p)
{
*p++ = 0;
while (*p == ' ')
p++;
errtext = p;
p = strchr (errtext, ' ');
if (p)
{
*p++ = 0;
while (*p == ' ')
p++;
prompt = p;
p = strchr (prompt, ' ');
if (p)
{
*p++ = 0;
while (*p == ' ')
p++;
desc = p;
p = strchr (desc, ' ');
if (p)
*p = 0; /* Ignore trailing garbage. */
}
}
}
if (!*cacheid || strlen (cacheid) > 50)
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid length of cacheID");
if (!desc)
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "no description given");
if (!strcmp (cacheid, "X"))
cacheid = NULL;
if (!strcmp (errtext, "X"))
errtext = NULL;
if (!strcmp (prompt, "X"))
prompt = NULL;
if (!strcmp (desc, "X"))
desc = NULL;
pw = cacheid ? agent_get_cache (cacheid, CACHE_MODE_USER) : NULL;
if (pw)
{
rc = send_back_passphrase (ctx, opt_data, pw);
xfree (pw);
}
else if (opt_no_ask)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
else
{
/* Note, that we only need to replace the + characters and
should leave the other escaping in place because the escaped
string is send verbatim to the pinentry which does the
unescaping (but not the + replacing) */
if (errtext)
plus_to_blank (errtext);
if (prompt)
plus_to_blank (prompt);
if (desc)
plus_to_blank (desc);
next_try:
rc = agent_get_passphrase (ctrl, &response, desc, prompt,
entry_errtext? entry_errtext:errtext,
opt_qualbar, cacheid, CACHE_MODE_USER);
xfree (entry_errtext);
entry_errtext = NULL;
if (!rc)
{
int i;
if (opt_check
&& check_passphrase_constraints (ctrl, response, &entry_errtext))
{
xfree (response);
goto next_try;
}
for (i = 0; i < opt_repeat; i++)
{
char *response2;
if (ctrl->pinentry_mode == PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK)
break;
rc = agent_get_passphrase (ctrl, &response2, desc2, prompt,
errtext, 0,
cacheid, CACHE_MODE_USER);
if (rc)
break;
if (strcmp (response2, response))
{
xfree (response2);
xfree (response);
entry_errtext = try_percent_escape
(_("does not match - try again"), NULL);
if (!entry_errtext)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
break;
}
goto next_try;
}
xfree (response2);
}
if (!rc)
{
if (cacheid)
agent_put_cache (cacheid, CACHE_MODE_USER, response, 0);
rc = send_back_passphrase (ctx, opt_data, response);
}
xfree (response);
}
}
return leave_cmd (ctx, rc);
}
static const char hlp_clear_passphrase[] =
"CLEAR_PASSPHRASE [--mode=normal] <cache_id>\n"
"\n"
"may be used to invalidate the cache entry for a passphrase. The\n"
"function returns with OK even when there is no cached passphrase.\n"
"The --mode=normal option is used to clear an entry for a cacheid\n"
"added by the agent.\n";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_clear_passphrase (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
char *cacheid = NULL;
char *p;
int opt_normal;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
opt_normal = has_option (line, "--mode=normal");
line = skip_options (line);
/* parse the stuff */
for (p=line; *p == ' '; p++)
;
cacheid = p;
p = strchr (cacheid, ' ');
if (p)
*p = 0; /* ignore garbage */
if (!*cacheid || strlen (cacheid) > 50)
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid length of cacheID");
agent_put_cache (cacheid, opt_normal ? CACHE_MODE_NORMAL : CACHE_MODE_USER,
NULL, 0);
agent_clear_passphrase (ctrl, cacheid,
opt_normal ? CACHE_MODE_NORMAL : CACHE_MODE_USER);
return 0;
}
static const char hlp_get_confirmation[] =
"GET_CONFIRMATION <description>\n"
"\n"
"This command may be used to ask for a simple confirmation.\n"
"DESCRIPTION is displayed along with a Okay and Cancel button. This\n"
"command uses a syntax which helps clients to use the agent with\n"
"minimum effort. The agent either returns with an error or with a\n"
"OK. Note, that the length of DESCRIPTION is implicitly limited by\n"
"the maximum length of a command. DESCRIPTION should not contain\n"
"any spaces, those must be encoded either percent escaped or simply\n"
"as '+'.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_get_confirmation (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
int rc;
char *desc = NULL;
char *p;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
/* parse the stuff */
for (p=line; *p == ' '; p++)
;
desc = p;
p = strchr (desc, ' ');
if (p)
*p = 0; /* We ignore any garbage -may be later used for other args. */
if (!*desc)
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "no description given");
if (!strcmp (desc, "X"))
desc = NULL;
/* Note, that we only need to replace the + characters and should
leave the other escaping in place because the escaped string is
send verbatim to the pinentry which does the unescaping (but not
the + replacing) */
if (desc)
plus_to_blank (desc);
rc = agent_get_confirmation (ctrl, desc, NULL, NULL, 0);
return leave_cmd (ctx, rc);
}
static const char hlp_learn[] =
"LEARN [--send] [--sendinfo] [--force]\n"
"\n"
"Learn something about the currently inserted smartcard. With\n"
"--sendinfo information about the card is returned; with --send\n"
"the available certificates are returned as D lines; with --force\n"
"private key storage will be updated by the result.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_learn (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err;
int send, sendinfo, force;
send = has_option (line, "--send");
sendinfo = send? 1 : has_option (line, "--sendinfo");
force = has_option (line, "--force");
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
err = agent_handle_learn (ctrl, send, sendinfo? ctx : NULL, force);
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
static const char hlp_passwd[] =
"PASSWD [--cache-nonce=<c>] [--passwd-nonce=<s>] [--preset]\n"
" [--verify] <hexkeygrip>\n"
"\n"
"Change the passphrase/PIN for the key identified by keygrip in LINE. If\n"
"--preset is used then the new passphrase will be added to the cache.\n"
"If --verify is used the command asks for the passphrase and verifies\n"
"that the passphrase valid.\n";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_passwd (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err;
int c;
char *cache_nonce = NULL;
char *passwd_nonce = NULL;
unsigned char grip[20];
gcry_sexp_t s_skey = NULL;
unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL;
char *passphrase = NULL;
char *pend;
int opt_preset, opt_verify;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
opt_preset = has_option (line, "--preset");
cache_nonce = option_value (line, "--cache-nonce");
opt_verify = has_option (line, "--verify");
if (cache_nonce)
{
for (pend = cache_nonce; *pend && !spacep (pend); pend++)
;
c = *pend;
*pend = '\0';
cache_nonce = xtrystrdup (cache_nonce);
*pend = c;
if (!cache_nonce)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
}
passwd_nonce = option_value (line, "--passwd-nonce");
if (passwd_nonce)
{
for (pend = passwd_nonce; *pend && !spacep (pend); pend++)
;
c = *pend;
*pend = '\0';
passwd_nonce = xtrystrdup (passwd_nonce);
*pend = c;
if (!passwd_nonce)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
}
line = skip_options (line);
err = parse_keygrip (ctx, line, grip);
if (err)
goto leave;
ctrl->in_passwd++;
err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl,
opt_verify? NULL : cache_nonce,
ctrl->server_local->keydesc,
grip, &shadow_info, CACHE_MODE_IGNORE, NULL,
&s_skey, &passphrase);
if (err)
;
else if (shadow_info)
{
log_error ("changing a smartcard PIN is not yet supported\n");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
}
else if (opt_verify)
{
/* All done. */
if (passphrase)
{
if (!passwd_nonce)
{
char buf[12];
gcry_create_nonce (buf, 12);
passwd_nonce = bin2hex (buf, 12, NULL);
}
if (passwd_nonce
&& !agent_put_cache (passwd_nonce, CACHE_MODE_NONCE,
passphrase, CACHE_TTL_NONCE))
{
assuan_write_status (ctx, "PASSWD_NONCE", passwd_nonce);
xfree (ctrl->server_local->last_passwd_nonce);
ctrl->server_local->last_passwd_nonce = passwd_nonce;
passwd_nonce = NULL;
}
}
}
else
{
char *newpass = NULL;
if (passwd_nonce)
newpass = agent_get_cache (passwd_nonce, CACHE_MODE_NONCE);
err = agent_protect_and_store (ctrl, s_skey, &newpass);
if (!err && passphrase)
{
/* A passphrase existed on the old key and the change was
successful. Return a nonce for that old passphrase to
let the caller try to unprotect the other subkeys with
the same key. */
if (!cache_nonce)
{
char buf[12];
gcry_create_nonce (buf, 12);
cache_nonce = bin2hex (buf, 12, NULL);
}
if (cache_nonce
&& !agent_put_cache (cache_nonce, CACHE_MODE_NONCE,
passphrase, CACHE_TTL_NONCE))
{
assuan_write_status (ctx, "CACHE_NONCE", cache_nonce);
xfree (ctrl->server_local->last_cache_nonce);
ctrl->server_local->last_cache_nonce = cache_nonce;
cache_nonce = NULL;
}
if (newpass)
{
/* If we have a new passphrase (which might be empty) we
store it under a passwd nonce so that the caller may
send that nonce again to use it for another key. */
if (!passwd_nonce)
{
char buf[12];
gcry_create_nonce (buf, 12);
passwd_nonce = bin2hex (buf, 12, NULL);
}
if (passwd_nonce
&& !agent_put_cache (passwd_nonce, CACHE_MODE_NONCE,
newpass, CACHE_TTL_NONCE))
{
assuan_write_status (ctx, "PASSWD_NONCE", passwd_nonce);
xfree (ctrl->server_local->last_passwd_nonce);
ctrl->server_local->last_passwd_nonce = passwd_nonce;
passwd_nonce = NULL;
}
}
}
if (!err && opt_preset)
{
char hexgrip[40+1];
bin2hex(grip, 20, hexgrip);
err = agent_put_cache (hexgrip, CACHE_MODE_ANY, newpass,
ctrl->cache_ttl_opt_preset);
}
xfree (newpass);
}
ctrl->in_passwd--;
xfree (ctrl->server_local->keydesc);
ctrl->server_local->keydesc = NULL;
leave:
xfree (passphrase);
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
xfree (shadow_info);
xfree (cache_nonce);
xfree (passwd_nonce);
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
static const char hlp_preset_passphrase[] =
"PRESET_PASSPHRASE [--inquire] <string_or_keygrip> <timeout> [<hexstring>]\n"
"\n"
"Set the cached passphrase/PIN for the key identified by the keygrip\n"
"to passwd for the given time, where -1 means infinite and 0 means\n"
"the default (currently only a timeout of -1 is allowed, which means\n"
"to never expire it). If passwd is not provided, ask for it via the\n"
"pinentry module unless --inquire is passed in which case the passphrase\n"
"is retrieved from the client via a server inquire.\n";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_preset_passphrase (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
int rc;
char *grip_clear = NULL;
unsigned char *passphrase = NULL;
int ttl;
size_t len;
int opt_inquire;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
if (!opt.allow_preset_passphrase)
return set_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED, "no --allow-preset-passphrase");
opt_inquire = has_option (line, "--inquire");
line = skip_options (line);
grip_clear = line;
while (*line && (*line != ' ' && *line != '\t'))
line++;
if (!*line)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE);
*line = '\0';
line++;
while (*line && (*line == ' ' || *line == '\t'))
line++;
/* Currently, only infinite timeouts are allowed. */
ttl = -1;
if (line[0] != '-' || line[1] != '1')
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
line++;
line++;
while (!(*line != ' ' && *line != '\t'))
line++;
/* Syntax check the hexstring. */
len = 0;
rc = parse_hexstring (ctx, line, &len);
if (rc)
return rc;
line[len] = '\0';
/* If there is a passphrase, use it. Currently, a passphrase is
required. */
if (*line)
{
if (opt_inquire)
{
rc = set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER,
"both --inquire and passphrase specified");
goto leave;
}
/* Do in-place conversion. */
passphrase = line;
if (!hex2str (passphrase, passphrase, strlen (passphrase)+1, NULL))
rc = set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid hexstring");
}
else if (opt_inquire)
{
/* Note that the passphrase will be truncated at any null byte and the
* limit is 480 characters. */
size_t maxlen = 480;
rc = print_assuan_status (ctx, "INQUIRE_MAXLEN", "%zu", maxlen);
if (!rc)
rc = assuan_inquire (ctx, "PASSPHRASE", &passphrase, &len, maxlen);
}
else
rc = set_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "passphrase is required");
if (!rc)
{
rc = agent_put_cache (grip_clear, CACHE_MODE_ANY, passphrase, ttl);
if (opt_inquire)
xfree (passphrase);
}
leave:
return leave_cmd (ctx, rc);
}
static const char hlp_scd[] =
"SCD <commands to pass to the scdaemon>\n"
" \n"
"This is a general quote command to redirect everything to the\n"
"SCdaemon.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_scd (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
int rc;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
rc = divert_generic_cmd (ctrl, line, ctx);
return rc;
}
static const char hlp_keywrap_key[] =
"KEYWRAP_KEY [--clear] <mode>\n"
"\n"
"Return a key to wrap another key. For now the key is returned\n"
"verbatim and and thus makes not much sense because an eavesdropper on\n"
"the gpg-agent connection will see the key as well as the wrapped key.\n"
"However, this function may either be equipped with a public key\n"
"mechanism or not used at all if the key is a pre-shared key. In any\n"
"case wrapping the import and export of keys is a requirement for\n"
"certain cryptographic validations and thus useful. The key persists\n"
"until a RESET command but may be cleared using the option --clear.\n"
"\n"
"Supported modes are:\n"
" --import - Return a key to import a key into gpg-agent\n"
" --export - Return a key to export a key from gpg-agent";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_keywrap_key (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err = 0;
int clearopt = has_option (line, "--clear");
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
assuan_begin_confidential (ctx);
if (has_option (line, "--import"))
{
xfree (ctrl->server_local->import_key);
if (clearopt)
ctrl->server_local->import_key = NULL;
else if (!(ctrl->server_local->import_key =
gcry_random_bytes (KEYWRAP_KEYSIZE, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM)))
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = assuan_send_data (ctx, ctrl->server_local->import_key,
KEYWRAP_KEYSIZE);
}
else if (has_option (line, "--export"))
{
xfree (ctrl->server_local->export_key);
if (clearopt)
ctrl->server_local->export_key = NULL;
else if (!(ctrl->server_local->export_key =
gcry_random_bytes (KEYWRAP_KEYSIZE, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM)))
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = assuan_send_data (ctx, ctrl->server_local->export_key,
KEYWRAP_KEYSIZE);
}
else
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "unknown value for MODE");
assuan_end_confidential (ctx);
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
static const char hlp_import_key[] =
"IMPORT_KEY [--unattended] [--force] [<cache_nonce>]\n"
"\n"
"Import a secret key into the key store. The key is expected to be\n"
"encrypted using the current session's key wrapping key (cf. command\n"
"KEYWRAP_KEY) using the AESWRAP-128 algorithm. This function takes\n"
"no arguments but uses the inquiry \"KEYDATA\" to ask for the actual\n"
"key data. The unwrapped key must be a canonical S-expression. The\n"
"option --unattended tries to import the key as-is without any\n"
"re-encryption. Existing key can be overwritten with --force.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_import_key (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err;
int opt_unattended;
int force;
unsigned char *wrappedkey = NULL;
size_t wrappedkeylen;
gcry_cipher_hd_t cipherhd = NULL;
unsigned char *key = NULL;
size_t keylen, realkeylen;
char *passphrase = NULL;
unsigned char *finalkey = NULL;
size_t finalkeylen;
unsigned char grip[20];
gcry_sexp_t openpgp_sexp = NULL;
char *cache_nonce = NULL;
char *p;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
if (!ctrl->server_local->import_key)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_KEY);
goto leave;
}
opt_unattended = has_option (line, "--unattended");
force = has_option (line, "--force");
line = skip_options (line);
p = line;
for (p=line; *p && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t'; p++)
;
*p = '\0';
if (*line)
cache_nonce = xtrystrdup (line);
assuan_begin_confidential (ctx);
err = assuan_inquire (ctx, "KEYDATA",
&wrappedkey, &wrappedkeylen, MAXLEN_KEYDATA);
assuan_end_confidential (ctx);
if (err)
goto leave;
if (wrappedkeylen < 24)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH);
goto leave;
}
keylen = wrappedkeylen - 8;
key = xtrymalloc_secure (keylen);
if (!key)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
err = gcry_cipher_open (&cipherhd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP, 0);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (cipherhd,
ctrl->server_local->import_key, KEYWRAP_KEYSIZE);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = gcry_cipher_decrypt (cipherhd, key, keylen, wrappedkey, wrappedkeylen);
if (err)
goto leave;
gcry_cipher_close (cipherhd);
cipherhd = NULL;
xfree (wrappedkey);
wrappedkey = NULL;
realkeylen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (key, keylen, NULL, &err);
if (!realkeylen)
goto leave; /* Invalid canonical encoded S-expression. */
err = keygrip_from_canon_sexp (key, realkeylen, grip);
if (err)
{
/* This might be due to an unsupported S-expression format.
Check whether this is openpgp-private-key and trigger that
import code. */
if (!gcry_sexp_sscan (&openpgp_sexp, NULL, key, realkeylen))
{
const char *tag;
size_t taglen;
tag = gcry_sexp_nth_data (openpgp_sexp, 0, &taglen);
if (tag && taglen == 19 && !memcmp (tag, "openpgp-private-key", 19))
;
else
{
gcry_sexp_release (openpgp_sexp);
openpgp_sexp = NULL;
}
}
if (!openpgp_sexp)
goto leave; /* Note that ERR is still set. */
}
if (openpgp_sexp)
{
/* In most cases the key is encrypted and thus the conversion
function from the OpenPGP format to our internal format will
ask for a passphrase. That passphrase will be returned and
used to protect the key using the same code as for regular
key import. */
xfree (key);
key = NULL;
err = convert_from_openpgp (ctrl, openpgp_sexp, force, grip,
ctrl->server_local->keydesc, cache_nonce,
&key, opt_unattended? NULL : &passphrase);
if (err)
goto leave;
realkeylen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (key, 0, NULL, &err);
if (!realkeylen)
goto leave; /* Invalid canonical encoded S-expression. */
if (passphrase)
{
assert (!opt_unattended);
if (!cache_nonce)
{
char buf[12];
gcry_create_nonce (buf, 12);
cache_nonce = bin2hex (buf, 12, NULL);
}
if (cache_nonce
&& !agent_put_cache (cache_nonce, CACHE_MODE_NONCE,
passphrase, CACHE_TTL_NONCE))
assuan_write_status (ctx, "CACHE_NONCE", cache_nonce);
}
}
else if (opt_unattended)
{
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER,
"\"--unattended\" may only be used with OpenPGP keys");
goto leave;
}
else
{
if (!force && !agent_key_available (grip))
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EEXIST);
else
{
char *prompt = xtryasprintf
(_("Please enter the passphrase to protect the "
"imported object within the %s system."), GNUPG_NAME);
if (!prompt)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = agent_ask_new_passphrase (ctrl, prompt, &passphrase);
xfree (prompt);
}
if (err)
goto leave;
}
if (passphrase)
{
err = agent_protect (key, passphrase, &finalkey, &finalkeylen,
ctrl->s2k_count, -1);
if (!err)
err = agent_write_private_key (grip, finalkey, finalkeylen, force);
}
else
err = agent_write_private_key (grip, key, realkeylen, force);
leave:
gcry_sexp_release (openpgp_sexp);
xfree (finalkey);
xfree (passphrase);
xfree (key);
gcry_cipher_close (cipherhd);
xfree (wrappedkey);
xfree (cache_nonce);
xfree (ctrl->server_local->keydesc);
ctrl->server_local->keydesc = NULL;
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
static const char hlp_export_key[] =
"EXPORT_KEY [--cache-nonce=<nonce>] [--openpgp] <hexstring_with_keygrip>\n"
"\n"
"Export a secret key from the key store. The key will be encrypted\n"
"using the current session's key wrapping key (cf. command KEYWRAP_KEY)\n"
"using the AESWRAP-128 algorithm. The caller needs to retrieve that key\n"
"prior to using this command. The function takes the keygrip as argument.\n"
"\n"
"If --openpgp is used, the secret key material will be exported in RFC 4880\n"
"compatible passphrase-protected form. Without --openpgp, the secret key\n"
"material will be exported in the clear (after prompting the user to unlock\n"
"it, if needed).\n";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_export_key (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char grip[20];
gcry_sexp_t s_skey = NULL;
unsigned char *key = NULL;
size_t keylen;
gcry_cipher_hd_t cipherhd = NULL;
unsigned char *wrappedkey = NULL;
size_t wrappedkeylen;
int openpgp;
char *cache_nonce;
char *passphrase = NULL;
unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL;
char *pend;
int c;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
openpgp = has_option (line, "--openpgp");
cache_nonce = option_value (line, "--cache-nonce");
if (cache_nonce)
{
for (pend = cache_nonce; *pend && !spacep (pend); pend++)
;
c = *pend;
*pend = '\0';
cache_nonce = xtrystrdup (cache_nonce);
*pend = c;
if (!cache_nonce)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
}
line = skip_options (line);
if (!ctrl->server_local->export_key)
{
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_KEY, "did you run KEYWRAP_KEY ?");
goto leave;
}
err = parse_keygrip (ctx, line, grip);
if (err)
goto leave;
if (agent_key_available (grip))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
goto leave;
}
/* Get the key from the file. With the openpgp flag we also ask for
the passphrase so that we can use it to re-encrypt it. */
err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, cache_nonce,
ctrl->server_local->keydesc, grip,
&shadow_info, CACHE_MODE_IGNORE, NULL, &s_skey,
openpgp ? &passphrase : NULL);
if (err)
goto leave;
if (shadow_info)
{
/* Key is on a smartcard. */
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_SECKEY);
goto leave;
}
if (openpgp)
{
/* The openpgp option changes the key format into the OpenPGP
key transfer format. The result is already a padded
canonical S-expression. */
if (!passphrase)
{
err = agent_ask_new_passphrase
(ctrl, _("This key (or subkey) is not protected with a passphrase."
" Please enter a new passphrase to export it."),
&passphrase);
if (err)
goto leave;
}
err = convert_to_openpgp (ctrl, s_skey, passphrase, &key, &keylen);
if (!err && passphrase)
{
if (!cache_nonce)
{
char buf[12];
gcry_create_nonce (buf, 12);
cache_nonce = bin2hex (buf, 12, NULL);
}
if (cache_nonce
&& !agent_put_cache (cache_nonce, CACHE_MODE_NONCE,
passphrase, CACHE_TTL_NONCE))
{
assuan_write_status (ctx, "CACHE_NONCE", cache_nonce);
xfree (ctrl->server_local->last_cache_nonce);
ctrl->server_local->last_cache_nonce = cache_nonce;
cache_nonce = NULL;
}
}
}
else
{
/* Convert into a canonical S-expression and wrap that. */
err = make_canon_sexp_pad (s_skey, 1, &key, &keylen);
}
if (err)
goto leave;
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
s_skey = NULL;
err = gcry_cipher_open (&cipherhd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP, 0);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (cipherhd,
ctrl->server_local->export_key, KEYWRAP_KEYSIZE);
if (err)
goto leave;
wrappedkeylen = keylen + 8;
wrappedkey = xtrymalloc (wrappedkeylen);
if (!wrappedkey)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
err = gcry_cipher_encrypt (cipherhd, wrappedkey, wrappedkeylen, key, keylen);
if (err)
goto leave;
xfree (key);
key = NULL;
gcry_cipher_close (cipherhd);
cipherhd = NULL;
assuan_begin_confidential (ctx);
err = assuan_send_data (ctx, wrappedkey, wrappedkeylen);
assuan_end_confidential (ctx);
leave:
xfree (cache_nonce);
xfree (passphrase);
xfree (wrappedkey);
gcry_cipher_close (cipherhd);
xfree (key);
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
xfree (ctrl->server_local->keydesc);
ctrl->server_local->keydesc = NULL;
xfree (shadow_info);
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
static const char hlp_delete_key[] =
"DELETE_KEY [--force] <hexstring_with_keygrip>\n"
"\n"
"Delete a secret key from the key store. If --force is used\n"
"and a loopback pinentry is allowed, the agent will not ask\n"
"the user for confirmation.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_delete_key (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err;
int force;
unsigned char grip[20];
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
force = has_option (line, "--force");
line = skip_options (line);
/* If the use of a loopback pinentry has been disabled, we assume
* that a silent deletion of keys shall also not be allowed. */
if (!opt.allow_loopback_pinentry)
force = 0;
err = parse_keygrip (ctx, line, grip);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = agent_delete_key (ctrl, ctrl->server_local->keydesc, grip, force );
if (err)
goto leave;
leave:
xfree (ctrl->server_local->keydesc);
ctrl->server_local->keydesc = NULL;
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
static const char hlp_keytocard[] =
"KEYTOCARD [--force] <hexstring_with_keygrip> <serialno> <id> <timestamp>\n"
"\n";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_keytocard (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
int force;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
unsigned char grip[20];
gcry_sexp_t s_skey = NULL;
unsigned char *keydata;
size_t keydatalen, timestamplen;
const char *serialno, *timestamp_str, *id;
unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL;
time_t timestamp;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
force = has_option (line, "--force");
line = skip_options (line);
err = parse_keygrip (ctx, line, grip);
if (err)
return err;
if (agent_key_available (grip))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
line += 40;
while (*line && (*line == ' ' || *line == '\t'))
line++;
serialno = line;
while (*line && (*line != ' ' && *line != '\t'))
line++;
if (!*line)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE);
*line = '\0';
line++;
while (*line && (*line == ' ' || *line == '\t'))
line++;
id = line;
while (*line && (*line != ' ' && *line != '\t'))
line++;
if (!*line)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE);
*line = '\0';
line++;
while (*line && (*line == ' ' || *line == '\t'))
line++;
timestamp_str = line;
while (*line && (*line != ' ' && *line != '\t'))
line++;
if (*line)
*line = '\0';
timestamplen = line - timestamp_str;
if (timestamplen != 15)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, ctrl->server_local->keydesc, grip,
&shadow_info, CACHE_MODE_IGNORE, NULL,
&s_skey, NULL);
if (err)
{
xfree (shadow_info);
return err;
}
if (shadow_info)
{
/* Key is on a smartcard already. */
xfree (shadow_info);
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_SECKEY);
}
keydatalen = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_skey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0);
keydata = xtrymalloc_secure (keydatalen + 30);
if (keydata == NULL)
{
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
}
gcry_sexp_sprint (s_skey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, keydata, keydatalen);
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
keydatalen--; /* Decrement for last '\0'. */
/* Add timestamp "created-at" in the private key */
timestamp = isotime2epoch (timestamp_str);
snprintf (keydata+keydatalen-1, 30, "(10:created-at10:%010lu))", timestamp);
keydatalen += 10 + 19 - 1;
err = divert_writekey (ctrl, force, serialno, id, keydata, keydatalen);
xfree (keydata);
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
static const char hlp_getval[] =
"GETVAL <key>\n"
"\n"
"Return the value for KEY from the special environment as created by\n"
"PUTVAL.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_getval (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
int rc = 0;
char *key = NULL;
char *p;
struct putval_item_s *vl;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
for (p=line; *p == ' '; p++)
;
key = p;
p = strchr (key, ' ');
if (p)
{
*p++ = 0;
for (; *p == ' '; p++)
;
if (*p)
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "too many arguments");
}
if (!*key)
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "no key given");
for (vl=putval_list; vl; vl = vl->next)
if ( !strcmp (vl->d, key) )
break;
if (vl) /* Got an entry. */
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, vl->d+vl->off, vl->len);
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
return leave_cmd (ctx, rc);
}
static const char hlp_putval[] =
"PUTVAL <key> [<percent_escaped_value>]\n"
"\n"
"The gpg-agent maintains a kind of environment which may be used to\n"
"store key/value pairs in it, so that they can be retrieved later.\n"
"This may be used by helper daemons to daemonize themself on\n"
"invocation and register them with gpg-agent. Callers of the\n"
"daemon's service may now first try connect to get the information\n"
"for that service from gpg-agent through the GETVAL command and then\n"
"try to connect to that daemon. Only if that fails they may start\n"
"an own instance of the service daemon. \n"
"\n"
"KEY is an an arbitrary symbol with the same syntax rules as keys\n"
"for shell environment variables. PERCENT_ESCAPED_VALUE is the\n"
"corresponding value; they should be similar to the values of\n"
"envronment variables but gpg-agent does not enforce any\n"
"restrictions. If that value is not given any value under that KEY\n"
"is removed from this special environment.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_putval (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
int rc = 0;
char *key = NULL;
char *value = NULL;
size_t valuelen = 0;
char *p;
struct putval_item_s *vl, *vlprev;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
for (p=line; *p == ' '; p++)
;
key = p;
p = strchr (key, ' ');
if (p)
{
*p++ = 0;
for (; *p == ' '; p++)
;
if (*p)
{
value = p;
p = strchr (value, ' ');
if (p)
*p = 0;
valuelen = percent_plus_unescape_inplace (value, 0);
}
}
if (!*key)
return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "no key given");
for (vl=putval_list,vlprev=NULL; vl; vlprev=vl, vl = vl->next)
if ( !strcmp (vl->d, key) )
break;
if (vl) /* Delete old entry. */
{
if (vlprev)
vlprev->next = vl->next;
else
putval_list = vl->next;
xfree (vl);
}
if (valuelen) /* Add entry. */
{
vl = xtrymalloc (sizeof *vl + strlen (key) + valuelen);
if (!vl)
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
vl->len = valuelen;
vl->off = strlen (key) + 1;
strcpy (vl->d, key);
memcpy (vl->d + vl->off, value, valuelen);
vl->next = putval_list;
putval_list = vl;
}
}
return leave_cmd (ctx, rc);
}
static const char hlp_updatestartuptty[] =
"UPDATESTARTUPTTY\n"
"\n"
"Set startup TTY and X11 DISPLAY variables to the values of this\n"
"session. This command is useful to pull future pinentries to\n"
"another screen. It is only required because there is no way in the\n"
"ssh-agent protocol to convey this information.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_updatestartuptty (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err = 0;
session_env_t se;
char *lc_ctype = NULL;
char *lc_messages = NULL;
int iterator;
const char *name;
(void)line;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
se = session_env_new ();
if (!se)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
iterator = 0;
while (!err && (name = session_env_list_stdenvnames (&iterator, NULL)))
{
const char *value = session_env_getenv (ctrl->session_env, name);
if (value)
err = session_env_setenv (se, name, value);
}
if (!err && ctrl->lc_ctype)
if (!(lc_ctype = xtrystrdup (ctrl->lc_ctype)))
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
if (!err && ctrl->lc_messages)
if (!(lc_messages = xtrystrdup (ctrl->lc_messages)))
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
if (err)
{
session_env_release (se);
xfree (lc_ctype);
xfree (lc_messages);
}
else
{
session_env_release (opt.startup_env);
opt.startup_env = se;
xfree (opt.startup_lc_ctype);
opt.startup_lc_ctype = lc_ctype;
xfree (opt.startup_lc_messages);
opt.startup_lc_messages = lc_messages;
}
return err;
}
static const char hlp_killagent[] =
"KILLAGENT\n"
"\n"
"Stop the agent.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_killagent (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
(void)line;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
ctrl->server_local->stopme = 1;
assuan_set_flag (ctx, ASSUAN_FORCE_CLOSE, 1);
return 0;
}
static const char hlp_reloadagent[] =
"RELOADAGENT\n"
"\n"
"This command is an alternative to SIGHUP\n"
"to reload the configuration.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_reloadagent (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
(void)line;
if (ctrl->restricted)
return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
agent_sighup_action ();
return 0;
}
static const char hlp_getinfo[] =
"GETINFO <what>\n"
"\n"
"Multipurpose function to return a variety of information.\n"
"Supported values for WHAT are:\n"
"\n"
" version - Return the version of the program.\n"
" pid - Return the process id of the server.\n"
" socket_name - Return the name of the socket.\n"
" ssh_socket_name - Return the name of the ssh socket.\n"
" scd_running - Return OK if the SCdaemon is already running.\n"
" s2k_count - Return the calibrated S2K count.\n"
" std_env_names - List the names of the standard environment.\n"
" std_session_env - List the standard session environment.\n"
" std_startup_env - List the standard startup environment.\n"
" cmd_has_option\n"
" - Returns OK if the command CMD implements the option OPT.\n"
" connections - Return number of active connections.\n"
" restricted - Returns OK if the connection is in restricted mode.\n";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_getinfo (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
int rc = 0;
if (!strcmp (line, "version"))
{
const char *s = VERSION;
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, s, strlen (s));
}
else if (!strncmp (line, "cmd_has_option", 14)
&& (line[14] == ' ' || line[14] == '\t' || !line[14]))
{
char *cmd, *cmdopt;
line += 14;
while (*line == ' ' || *line == '\t')
line++;
if (!*line)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE);
else
{
cmd = line;
while (*line && (*line != ' ' && *line != '\t'))
line++;
if (!*line)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE);
else
{
*line++ = 0;
while (*line == ' ' || *line == '\t')
line++;
if (!*line)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE);
else
{
cmdopt = line;
if (!command_has_option (cmd, cmdopt))
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
}
}
}
else if (!strcmp (line, "s2k_count"))
{
char numbuf[50];
snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%lu", get_standard_s2k_count ());
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, numbuf, strlen (numbuf));
}
else if (!strcmp (line, "restricted"))
{
rc = ctrl->restricted? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
else if (ctrl->restricted)
{
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN);
}
/* All sub-commands below are not allowed in restricted mode. */
else if (!strcmp (line, "pid"))
{
char numbuf[50];
snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%lu", (unsigned long)getpid ());
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, numbuf, strlen (numbuf));
}
else if (!strcmp (line, "socket_name"))
{
const char *s = get_agent_socket_name ();
if (s)
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, s, strlen (s));
else
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
}
else if (!strcmp (line, "ssh_socket_name"))
{
const char *s = get_agent_ssh_socket_name ();
if (s)
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, s, strlen (s));
else
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
}
else if (!strcmp (line, "scd_running"))
{
rc = agent_scd_check_running ()? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
else if (!strcmp (line, "std_env_names"))
{
int iterator;
const char *name;
iterator = 0;
while ((name = session_env_list_stdenvnames (&iterator, NULL)))
{
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, name, strlen (name)+1);
if (!rc)
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, NULL, 0);
if (rc)
break;
}
}
else if (!strcmp (line, "std_session_env")
|| !strcmp (line, "std_startup_env"))
{
int iterator;
const char *name, *value;
char *string;
iterator = 0;
while ((name = session_env_list_stdenvnames (&iterator, NULL)))
{
value = session_env_getenv_or_default
(line[5] == 't'? opt.startup_env:ctrl->session_env, name, NULL);
if (value)
{
string = xtryasprintf ("%s=%s", name, value);
if (!string)
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, string, strlen (string)+1);
if (!rc)
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, NULL, 0);
}
if (rc)
break;
}
}
}
else if (!strcmp (line, "connections"))
{
char numbuf[20];
snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%d",
get_agent_active_connection_count ());
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, numbuf, strlen (numbuf));
}
else
rc = set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "unknown value for WHAT");
return rc;
}
/* This function is called by Libassuan to parse the OPTION command.
It has been registered similar to the other Assuan commands. */
static gpg_error_t
option_handler (assuan_context_t ctx, const char *key, const char *value)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err = 0;
if (!strcmp (key, "agent-awareness"))
{
/* The value is a version string telling us of which agent
version the caller is aware of. */
ctrl->server_local->allow_fully_canceled =
gnupg_compare_version (value, "2.1.0");
}
else if (ctrl->restricted)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN);
}
/* All options below are not allowed in restricted mode. */
else if (!strcmp (key, "putenv"))
{
/* Change the session's environment to be used for the
Pinentry. Valid values are:
<NAME> Delete envvar NAME
<KEY>= Set envvar NAME to the empty string
<KEY>=<VALUE> Set envvar NAME to VALUE
*/
err = session_env_putenv (ctrl->session_env, value);
}
else if (!strcmp (key, "display"))
{
err = session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "DISPLAY", value);
}
else if (!strcmp (key, "ttyname"))
{
if (!opt.keep_tty)
err = session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "GPG_TTY", value);
}
else if (!strcmp (key, "ttytype"))
{
if (!opt.keep_tty)
err = session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "TERM", value);
}
else if (!strcmp (key, "lc-ctype"))
{
if (ctrl->lc_ctype)
xfree (ctrl->lc_ctype);
ctrl->lc_ctype = xtrystrdup (value);
if (!ctrl->lc_ctype)
return out_of_core ();
}
else if (!strcmp (key, "lc-messages"))
{
if (ctrl->lc_messages)
xfree (ctrl->lc_messages);
ctrl->lc_messages = xtrystrdup (value);
if (!ctrl->lc_messages)
return out_of_core ();
}
else if (!strcmp (key, "xauthority"))
{
err = session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "XAUTHORITY", value);
}
else if (!strcmp (key, "pinentry-user-data"))
{
err = session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "PINENTRY_USER_DATA", value);
}
else if (!strcmp (key, "use-cache-for-signing"))
ctrl->server_local->use_cache_for_signing = *value? !!atoi (value) : 0;
else if (!strcmp (key, "allow-pinentry-notify"))
ctrl->server_local->allow_pinentry_notify = 1;
else if (!strcmp (key, "pinentry-mode"))
{
int tmp = parse_pinentry_mode (value);
if (tmp == -1)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
else if (tmp == PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK && !opt.allow_loopback_pinentry)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
else
ctrl->pinentry_mode = tmp;
}
else if (!strcmp (key, "cache-ttl-opt-preset"))
{
ctrl->cache_ttl_opt_preset = *value? atoi (value) : 0;
}
else if (!strcmp (key, "s2k-count"))
{
ctrl->s2k_count = *value? strtoul(value, NULL, 10) : 0;
if (ctrl->s2k_count && ctrl->s2k_count < 65536)
{
ctrl->s2k_count = 0;
}
}
else
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_OPTION);
return err;
}
/* Called by libassuan after all commands. ERR is the error from the
last assuan operation and not the one returned from the command. */
static void
post_cmd_notify (assuan_context_t ctx, gpg_error_t err)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
(void)err;
/* Switch off any I/O monitor controlled logging pausing. */
ctrl->server_local->pause_io_logging = 0;
}
/* This function is called by libassuan for all I/O. We use it here
to disable logging for the GETEVENTCOUNTER commands. This is so
that the debug output won't get cluttered by this primitive
command. */
static unsigned int
io_monitor (assuan_context_t ctx, void *hook, int direction,
const char *line, size_t linelen)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
(void) hook;
/* We want to suppress all Assuan log messages for connections from
* self. However, assuan_get_pid works only after
* assuan_accept. Now, assuan_accept already logs a line ending with
* the process id. We use this hack here to get the peers pid so
* that we can compare it to our pid. We should add an assuan
* function to return the pid for a file descriptor and use that to
* detect connections to self. */
if (ctx && !ctrl->server_local->greeting_seen
&& direction == ASSUAN_IO_TO_PEER)
{
ctrl->server_local->greeting_seen = 1;
if (linelen > 32
&& !strncmp (line, "OK Pleased to meet you, process ", 32)
&& strtoul (line+32, NULL, 10) == getpid ())
return ASSUAN_IO_MONITOR_NOLOG;
}
/* Do not log self-connections. This makes the log cleaner because
* we won't see the check-our-own-socket calls. */
if (ctx && ctrl->server_local->connect_from_self)
return ASSUAN_IO_MONITOR_NOLOG;
/* Note that we only check for the uppercase name. This allows the user to
see the logging for debugging if using a non-upercase command
name. */
if (ctx && direction == ASSUAN_IO_FROM_PEER
&& linelen >= 15
&& !strncmp (line, "GETEVENTCOUNTER", 15)
&& (linelen == 15 || spacep (line+15)))
{
ctrl->server_local->pause_io_logging = 1;
}
return ctrl->server_local->pause_io_logging? ASSUAN_IO_MONITOR_NOLOG : 0;
}
/* Return true if the command CMD implements the option OPT. */
static int
command_has_option (const char *cmd, const char *cmdopt)
{
if (!strcmp (cmd, "GET_PASSPHRASE"))
{
if (!strcmp (cmdopt, "repeat"))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Tell Libassuan about our commands. Also register the other Assuan
handlers. */
static int
register_commands (assuan_context_t ctx)
{
static struct {
const char *name;
assuan_handler_t handler;
const char * const help;
} table[] = {
{ "GETEVENTCOUNTER",cmd_geteventcounter, hlp_geteventcounter },
{ "ISTRUSTED", cmd_istrusted, hlp_istrusted },
{ "HAVEKEY", cmd_havekey, hlp_havekey },
{ "KEYINFO", cmd_keyinfo, hlp_keyinfo },
{ "SIGKEY", cmd_sigkey, hlp_sigkey },
{ "SETKEY", cmd_sigkey, hlp_sigkey },
{ "SETKEYDESC", cmd_setkeydesc,hlp_setkeydesc },
{ "SETHASH", cmd_sethash, hlp_sethash },
{ "PKSIGN", cmd_pksign, hlp_pksign },
{ "PKDECRYPT", cmd_pkdecrypt, hlp_pkdecrypt },
{ "GENKEY", cmd_genkey, hlp_genkey },
{ "READKEY", cmd_readkey, hlp_readkey },
{ "GET_PASSPHRASE", cmd_get_passphrase, hlp_get_passphrase },
{ "PRESET_PASSPHRASE", cmd_preset_passphrase, hlp_preset_passphrase },
{ "CLEAR_PASSPHRASE", cmd_clear_passphrase, hlp_clear_passphrase },
{ "GET_CONFIRMATION", cmd_get_confirmation, hlp_get_confirmation },
{ "LISTTRUSTED", cmd_listtrusted, hlp_listtrusted },
{ "MARKTRUSTED", cmd_marktrusted, hlp_martrusted },
{ "LEARN", cmd_learn, hlp_learn },
{ "PASSWD", cmd_passwd, hlp_passwd },
{ "INPUT", NULL },
{ "OUTPUT", NULL },
{ "SCD", cmd_scd, hlp_scd },
{ "KEYWRAP_KEY", cmd_keywrap_key, hlp_keywrap_key },
{ "IMPORT_KEY", cmd_import_key, hlp_import_key },
{ "EXPORT_KEY", cmd_export_key, hlp_export_key },
{ "DELETE_KEY", cmd_delete_key, hlp_delete_key },
{ "GETVAL", cmd_getval, hlp_getval },
{ "PUTVAL", cmd_putval, hlp_putval },
{ "UPDATESTARTUPTTY", cmd_updatestartuptty, hlp_updatestartuptty },
{ "KILLAGENT", cmd_killagent, hlp_killagent },
{ "RELOADAGENT", cmd_reloadagent,hlp_reloadagent },
{ "GETINFO", cmd_getinfo, hlp_getinfo },
{ "KEYTOCARD", cmd_keytocard, hlp_keytocard },
{ NULL }
};
int i, rc;
for (i=0; table[i].name; i++)
{
rc = assuan_register_command (ctx, table[i].name, table[i].handler,
table[i].help);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
assuan_register_post_cmd_notify (ctx, post_cmd_notify);
assuan_register_reset_notify (ctx, reset_notify);
assuan_register_option_handler (ctx, option_handler);
return 0;
}
/* Startup the server. If LISTEN_FD and FD is given as -1, this is a
simple piper server, otherwise it is a regular server. CTRL is the
control structure for this connection; it has only the basic
- intialization. */
+ initialization. */
void
start_command_handler (ctrl_t ctrl, gnupg_fd_t listen_fd, gnupg_fd_t fd)
{
int rc;
assuan_context_t ctx = NULL;
if (ctrl->restricted)
{
if (agent_copy_startup_env (ctrl))
return;
}
rc = assuan_new (&ctx);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("failed to allocate assuan context: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
agent_exit (2);
}
if (listen_fd == GNUPG_INVALID_FD && fd == GNUPG_INVALID_FD)
{
assuan_fd_t filedes[2];
filedes[0] = assuan_fdopen (0);
filedes[1] = assuan_fdopen (1);
rc = assuan_init_pipe_server (ctx, filedes);
}
else if (listen_fd != GNUPG_INVALID_FD)
{
rc = assuan_init_socket_server (ctx, listen_fd, 0);
/* FIXME: Need to call assuan_sock_set_nonce for Windows. But
this branch is currently not used. */
}
else
{
rc = assuan_init_socket_server (ctx, fd, ASSUAN_SOCKET_SERVER_ACCEPTED);
}
if (rc)
{
log_error ("failed to initialize the server: %s\n",
gpg_strerror(rc));
agent_exit (2);
}
rc = register_commands (ctx);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("failed to register commands with Assuan: %s\n",
gpg_strerror(rc));
agent_exit (2);
}
assuan_set_pointer (ctx, ctrl);
ctrl->server_local = xcalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl->server_local);
ctrl->server_local->assuan_ctx = ctx;
ctrl->server_local->use_cache_for_signing = 1;
ctrl->digest.raw_value = 0;
assuan_set_io_monitor (ctx, io_monitor, NULL);
agent_set_progress_cb (progress_cb, ctrl);
for (;;)
{
rc = assuan_accept (ctx);
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EOF || rc == -1)
{
break;
}
else if (rc)
{
log_info ("Assuan accept problem: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
break;
}
ctrl->server_local->connect_from_self = (assuan_get_pid (ctx)==getpid ());
rc = assuan_process (ctx);
if (rc)
{
log_info ("Assuan processing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
continue;
}
}
/* Reset the nonce caches. */
clear_nonce_cache (ctrl);
/* Reset the SCD if needed. */
agent_reset_scd (ctrl);
/* Reset the pinentry (in case of popup messages). */
agent_reset_query (ctrl);
/* Cleanup. */
assuan_release (ctx);
xfree (ctrl->server_local->keydesc);
xfree (ctrl->server_local->import_key);
xfree (ctrl->server_local->export_key);
if (ctrl->server_local->stopme)
agent_exit (0);
xfree (ctrl->server_local);
ctrl->server_local = NULL;
}
/* Helper for the pinentry loopback mode. It merely passes the
parameters on to the client. */
gpg_error_t
pinentry_loopback(ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyword,
unsigned char **buffer, size_t *size,
size_t max_length)
{
gpg_error_t rc;
assuan_context_t ctx = ctrl->server_local->assuan_ctx;
rc = print_assuan_status (ctx, "INQUIRE_MAXLEN", "%zu", max_length);
if (rc)
return rc;
assuan_begin_confidential (ctx);
rc = assuan_inquire (ctx, keyword, buffer, size, max_length);
assuan_end_confidential (ctx);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/agent/gpg-agent.c b/agent/gpg-agent.c
index 75a9283f4..d3c3891f3 100644
--- a/agent/gpg-agent.c
+++ b/agent/gpg-agent.c
@@ -1,2851 +1,2851 @@
/* gpg-agent.c - The GnuPG Agent
* Copyright (C) 2000-2007, 2009-2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2000-2016 Werner Koch
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
# ifndef WINVER
# define WINVER 0x0500 /* Same as in common/sysutils.c */
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_WINSOCK2_H
# include <winsock2.h>
# endif
# include <aclapi.h>
# include <sddl.h>
#else /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
# include <sys/socket.h>
# include <sys/un.h>
#endif /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H
# include <signal.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_INOTIFY_INIT
# include <sys/inotify.h>
#endif /*HAVE_INOTIFY_INIT*/
#include <npth.h>
#define GNUPG_COMMON_NEED_AFLOCAL
#include "agent.h"
#include <assuan.h> /* Malloc hooks and socket wrappers. */
#include "i18n.h"
#include "sysutils.h"
#include "gc-opt-flags.h"
#include "exechelp.h"
#include "asshelp.h"
#include "../common/init.h"
enum cmd_and_opt_values
{ aNull = 0,
oCsh = 'c',
oQuiet = 'q',
oSh = 's',
oVerbose = 'v',
oNoVerbose = 500,
aGPGConfList,
aGPGConfTest,
aUseStandardSocketP,
oOptions,
oDebug,
oDebugAll,
oDebugLevel,
oDebugWait,
oDebugQuickRandom,
oDebugPinentry,
oNoGreeting,
oNoOptions,
oHomedir,
oNoDetach,
oNoGrab,
oLogFile,
oServer,
oDaemon,
oBatch,
oPinentryProgram,
oPinentryTouchFile,
oPinentryInvisibleChar,
oPinentryTimeout,
oDisplay,
oTTYname,
oTTYtype,
oLCctype,
oLCmessages,
oXauthority,
oScdaemonProgram,
oDefCacheTTL,
oDefCacheTTLSSH,
oMaxCacheTTL,
oMaxCacheTTLSSH,
oEnforcePassphraseConstraints,
oMinPassphraseLen,
oMinPassphraseNonalpha,
oCheckPassphrasePattern,
oMaxPassphraseDays,
oEnablePassphraseHistory,
oUseStandardSocket,
oNoUseStandardSocket,
oExtraSocket,
oBrowserSocket,
oFakedSystemTime,
oIgnoreCacheForSigning,
oAllowMarkTrusted,
oNoAllowMarkTrusted,
oAllowPresetPassphrase,
oAllowLoopbackPinentry,
oNoAllowLoopbackPinentry,
oNoAllowExternalCache,
oAllowEmacsPinentry,
oKeepTTY,
oKeepDISPLAY,
oSSHSupport,
oPuttySupport,
oDisableScdaemon,
oDisableCheckOwnSocket,
oWriteEnvFile
};
#ifndef ENAMETOOLONG
# define ENAMETOOLONG EINVAL
#endif
static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
ARGPARSE_c (aGPGConfList, "gpgconf-list", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aGPGConfTest, "gpgconf-test", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aUseStandardSocketP, "use-standard-socket-p", "@"),
ARGPARSE_group (301, N_("@Options:\n ")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDaemon, "daemon", N_("run in daemon mode (background)")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oServer, "server", N_("run in server mode (foreground)")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oVerbose, "verbose", N_("verbose")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oQuiet, "quiet", N_("be somewhat more quiet")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oSh, "sh", N_("sh-style command output")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oCsh, "csh", N_("csh-style command output")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oOptions, "options", N_("|FILE|read options from FILE")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDebug, "debug", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugAll, "debug-all", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDebugLevel, "debug-level", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oDebugWait," debug-wait", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugQuickRandom, "debug-quick-random", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugPinentry, "debug-pinentry", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDetach, "no-detach", N_("do not detach from the console")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoGrab, "no-grab", N_("do not grab keyboard and mouse")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oLogFile, "log-file", N_("use a log file for the server")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPinentryProgram, "pinentry-program",
/* */ N_("|PGM|use PGM as the PIN-Entry program")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPinentryTouchFile, "pinentry-touch-file", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPinentryInvisibleChar, "pinentry-invisible-char", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_u (oPinentryTimeout, "pinentry-timeout", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oScdaemonProgram, "scdaemon-program",
/* */ N_("|PGM|use PGM as the SCdaemon program") ),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableScdaemon, "disable-scdaemon",
/* */ N_("do not use the SCdaemon") ),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableCheckOwnSocket, "disable-check-own-socket", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oExtraSocket, "extra-socket",
/* */ N_("|NAME|accept some commands via NAME")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oBrowserSocket, "browser-socket", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oFakedSystemTime, "faked-system-time", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oBatch, "batch", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oHomedir, "homedir", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplay, "display", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oTTYname, "ttyname", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oTTYtype, "ttytype", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oLCctype, "lc-ctype", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oLCmessages, "lc-messages", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oXauthority, "xauthority", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oKeepTTY, "keep-tty",
/* */ N_("ignore requests to change the TTY")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oKeepDISPLAY, "keep-display",
/* */ N_("ignore requests to change the X display")),
ARGPARSE_s_u (oDefCacheTTL, "default-cache-ttl",
N_("|N|expire cached PINs after N seconds")),
ARGPARSE_s_u (oDefCacheTTLSSH, "default-cache-ttl-ssh", "@" ),
ARGPARSE_s_u (oMaxCacheTTL, "max-cache-ttl", "@" ),
ARGPARSE_s_u (oMaxCacheTTLSSH, "max-cache-ttl-ssh", "@" ),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnforcePassphraseConstraints, "enforce-passphrase-constraints",
/* */ "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_u (oMinPassphraseLen, "min-passphrase-len", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_u (oMinPassphraseNonalpha, "min-passphrase-nonalpha", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oCheckPassphrasePattern, "check-passphrase-pattern", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_u (oMaxPassphraseDays, "max-passphrase-days", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnablePassphraseHistory, "enable-passphrase-history", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreCacheForSigning, "ignore-cache-for-signing",
/* */ N_("do not use the PIN cache when signing")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowExternalCache, "no-allow-external-cache",
/* */ N_("disallow the use of an external password cache")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowMarkTrusted, "no-allow-mark-trusted",
/* */ N_("disallow clients to mark keys as \"trusted\"")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowMarkTrusted, "allow-mark-trusted", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowPresetPassphrase, "allow-preset-passphrase",
/* */ N_("allow presetting passphrase")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowLoopbackPinentry, "no-allow-loopback-pinentry",
N_("disallow caller to override the pinentry")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowLoopbackPinentry, "allow-loopback-pinentry", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowEmacsPinentry, "allow-emacs-pinentry",
/* */ N_("allow passphrase to be prompted through Emacs")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oSSHSupport, "enable-ssh-support", N_("enable ssh support")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oPuttySupport, "enable-putty-support",
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
/* */ N_("enable putty support")
#else
/* */ "@"
#endif
),
/* Dummy options for backward compatibility. */
ARGPARSE_o_s (oWriteEnvFile, "write-env-file", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oUseStandardSocket, "use-standard-socket", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUseStandardSocket, "no-use-standard-socket", "@"),
{0} /* End of list */
};
/* The list of supported debug flags. */
static struct debug_flags_s debug_flags [] =
{
{ DBG_COMMAND_VALUE, "command" },
{ DBG_MPI_VALUE , "mpi" },
{ DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE , "crypto" },
{ DBG_MEMORY_VALUE , "memory" },
{ DBG_CACHE_VALUE , "cache" },
{ DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE, "memstat" },
{ DBG_HASHING_VALUE, "hashing" },
{ DBG_IPC_VALUE , "ipc" },
{ 77, NULL } /* 77 := Do not exit on "help" or "?". */
};
#define DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL (10*60) /* 10 minutes */
#define DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SSH (30*60) /* 30 minutes */
#define MAX_CACHE_TTL (120*60) /* 2 hours */
#define MAX_CACHE_TTL_SSH (120*60) /* 2 hours */
#define MIN_PASSPHRASE_LEN (8)
#define MIN_PASSPHRASE_NONALPHA (1)
#define MAX_PASSPHRASE_DAYS (0)
/* The timer tick used for housekeeping stuff. For Windows we use a
longer period as the SetWaitableTimer seems to signal earlier than
the 2 seconds. CHECK_OWN_SOCKET_INTERVAL defines how often we
check our own socket in standard socket mode. If that value is 0
we don't check at all. All values are in seconds. */
#if defined(HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM)
# define TIMERTICK_INTERVAL (60)
# define CHECK_OWN_SOCKET_INTERVAL (0) /* Never */
#elif defined(HAVE_W32_SYSTEM)
# define TIMERTICK_INTERVAL (4)
# define CHECK_OWN_SOCKET_INTERVAL (60)
#else
# define TIMERTICK_INTERVAL (2)
# define CHECK_OWN_SOCKET_INTERVAL (60)
#endif
/* Flag indicating that the ssh-agent subsystem has been enabled. */
static int ssh_support;
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
/* Flag indicating that support for Putty has been enabled. */
static int putty_support;
/* A magic value used with WM_COPYDATA. */
#define PUTTY_IPC_MAGIC 0x804e50ba
/* To avoid surprises we limit the size of the mapped IPC file to this
value. Putty currently (0.62) uses 8k, thus 16k should be enough
for the foreseeable future. */
#define PUTTY_IPC_MAXLEN 16384
#endif /*HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
/* The list of open file descriptors at startup. Note that this list
has been allocated using the standard malloc. */
static int *startup_fd_list;
/* The signal mask at startup and a flag telling whether it is valid. */
#ifdef HAVE_SIGPROCMASK
static sigset_t startup_signal_mask;
static int startup_signal_mask_valid;
#endif
/* Flag to indicate that a shutdown was requested. */
static int shutdown_pending;
/* Counter for the currently running own socket checks. */
static int check_own_socket_running;
/* Flags to indicate that check_own_socket shall not be called. */
static int disable_check_own_socket;
/* It is possible that we are currently running under setuid permissions */
static int maybe_setuid = 1;
/* Name of the communication socket used for native gpg-agent
requests. The second variable is either NULL or a malloced string
with the real socket name in case it has been redirected. */
static char *socket_name;
static char *redir_socket_name;
/* Name of the optional extra socket used for native gpg-agent requests. */
static char *socket_name_extra;
static char *redir_socket_name_extra;
/* Name of the optional browser socket used for native gpg-agent requests. */
static char *socket_name_browser;
static char *redir_socket_name_browser;
/* Name of the communication socket used for ssh-agent-emulation. */
static char *socket_name_ssh;
static char *redir_socket_name_ssh;
/* We need to keep track of the server's nonces (these are dummies for
POSIX systems). */
static assuan_sock_nonce_t socket_nonce;
static assuan_sock_nonce_t socket_nonce_extra;
static assuan_sock_nonce_t socket_nonce_browser;
static assuan_sock_nonce_t socket_nonce_ssh;
/* Default values for options passed to the pinentry. */
static char *default_display;
static char *default_ttyname;
static char *default_ttytype;
static char *default_lc_ctype;
static char *default_lc_messages;
static char *default_xauthority;
/* Name of a config file, which will be reread on a HUP if it is not NULL. */
static char *config_filename;
/* Helper to implement --debug-level */
static const char *debug_level;
/* Keep track of the current log file so that we can avoid updating
the log file after a SIGHUP if it didn't changed. Malloced. */
static char *current_logfile;
/* The handle_tick() function may test whether a parent is still
running. We record the PID of the parent here or -1 if it should be
watched. */
static pid_t parent_pid = (pid_t)(-1);
/* Number of active connections. */
static int active_connections;
/* This object is used to dispatch progress messages from Libgcrypt to
* the right thread. Given that we won't have at max a few dozen
* connections at the same time using a linked list is the easiest way
* to handle this. */
struct progress_dispatch_s
{
struct progress_dispatch_s *next;
/* The control object of the connection. If this is NULL no
* connection is associated with this item and it is free for reuse
* by new connections. */
ctrl_t ctrl;
/* The thread id of (npth_self) of the connection. */
npth_t tid;
/* The callback set by the connection. This is similar to the
* Libgcrypt callback but with the control object passed as the
* first argument. */
void (*cb)(ctrl_t ctrl,
const char *what, int printchar,
int current, int total);
};
struct progress_dispatch_s *progress_dispatch_list;
/*
Local prototypes.
*/
static char *create_socket_name (char *standard_name, int with_homedir);
static gnupg_fd_t create_server_socket (char *name, int primary, int cygwin,
char **r_redir_name,
assuan_sock_nonce_t *nonce);
static void create_directories (void);
static void agent_libgcrypt_progress_cb (void *data, const char *what,
int printchar,
int current, int total);
static void agent_init_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl);
static void agent_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl);
static void handle_connections (gnupg_fd_t listen_fd,
gnupg_fd_t listen_fd_extra,
gnupg_fd_t listen_fd_browser,
gnupg_fd_t listen_fd_ssh);
static void check_own_socket (void);
static int check_for_running_agent (int silent);
/* Pth wrapper function definitions. */
ASSUAN_SYSTEM_NPTH_IMPL;
/*
Functions.
*/
/* Allocate a string describing a library version by calling a GETFNC.
This function is expected to be called only once. GETFNC is
expected to have a semantic like gcry_check_version (). */
static char *
make_libversion (const char *libname, const char *(*getfnc)(const char*))
{
const char *s;
char *result;
if (maybe_setuid)
{
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 0, 0); /* Drop setuid. */
maybe_setuid = 0;
}
s = getfnc (NULL);
result = xmalloc (strlen (libname) + 1 + strlen (s) + 1);
strcpy (stpcpy (stpcpy (result, libname), " "), s);
return result;
}
/* Return strings describing this program. The case values are
described in common/argparse.c:strusage. The values here override
the default values given by strusage. */
static const char *
my_strusage (int level)
{
static char *ver_gcry;
const char *p;
switch (level)
{
case 11: p = "@GPG_AGENT@ (@GNUPG@)";
break;
case 13: p = VERSION; break;
case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break;
/* TRANSLATORS: @EMAIL@ will get replaced by the actual bug
reporting address. This is so that we can change the
reporting address without breaking the translations. */
case 19: p = _("Please report bugs to <@EMAIL@>.\n"); break;
case 20:
if (!ver_gcry)
ver_gcry = make_libversion ("libgcrypt", gcry_check_version);
p = ver_gcry;
break;
case 1:
case 40: p = _("Usage: @GPG_AGENT@ [options] (-h for help)");
break;
case 41: p = _("Syntax: @GPG_AGENT@ [options] [command [args]]\n"
"Secret key management for @GNUPG@\n");
break;
default: p = NULL;
}
return p;
}
/* Setup the debugging. With the global variable DEBUG_LEVEL set to NULL
only the active debug flags are propagated to the subsystems. With
DEBUG_LEVEL set, a specific set of debug flags is set; thus overriding
all flags already set. Note that we don't fail here, because it is
important to keep gpg-agent running even after re-reading the
options due to a SIGHUP. */
static void
set_debug (void)
{
int numok = (debug_level && digitp (debug_level));
int numlvl = numok? atoi (debug_level) : 0;
if (!debug_level)
;
else if (!strcmp (debug_level, "none") || (numok && numlvl < 1))
opt.debug = 0;
else if (!strcmp (debug_level, "basic") || (numok && numlvl <= 2))
opt.debug = DBG_IPC_VALUE;
else if (!strcmp (debug_level, "advanced") || (numok && numlvl <= 5))
opt.debug = DBG_IPC_VALUE|DBG_COMMAND_VALUE;
else if (!strcmp (debug_level, "expert") || (numok && numlvl <= 8))
opt.debug = (DBG_IPC_VALUE|DBG_COMMAND_VALUE
|DBG_CACHE_VALUE);
else if (!strcmp (debug_level, "guru") || numok)
{
opt.debug = ~0;
/* Unless the "guru" string has been used we don't want to allow
hashing debugging. The rationale is that people tend to
select the highest debug value and would then clutter their
disk with debug files which may reveal confidential data. */
if (numok)
opt.debug &= ~(DBG_HASHING_VALUE);
}
else
{
log_error (_("invalid debug-level '%s' given\n"), debug_level);
opt.debug = 0; /* Reset debugging, so that prior debug
statements won't have an undesired effect. */
}
if (opt.debug && !opt.verbose)
opt.verbose = 1;
if (opt.debug && opt.quiet)
opt.quiet = 0;
if (opt.debug & DBG_MPI_VALUE)
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 2);
if (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE )
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 1);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);
if (opt.debug)
parse_debug_flag (NULL, &opt.debug, debug_flags);
}
/* Helper for cleanup to remove one socket with NAME. REDIR_NAME is
the corresponding real name if the socket has been redirected. */
static void
remove_socket (char *name, char *redir_name)
{
if (name && *name)
{
if (redir_name)
name = redir_name;
gnupg_remove (name);
*name = 0;
}
}
/* Cleanup code for this program. This is either called has an atexit
handler or directly. */
static void
cleanup (void)
{
static int done;
if (done)
return;
done = 1;
deinitialize_module_cache ();
remove_socket (socket_name, redir_socket_name);
if (opt.extra_socket > 1)
remove_socket (socket_name_extra, redir_socket_name_extra);
if (opt.browser_socket > 1)
remove_socket (socket_name_browser, redir_socket_name_browser);
remove_socket (socket_name_ssh, redir_socket_name_ssh);
}
/* Handle options which are allowed to be reset after program start.
Return true when the current option in PARGS could be handled and
false if not. As a special feature, passing a value of NULL for
PARGS, resets the options to the default. REREAD should be set
true if it is not the initial option parsing. */
static int
parse_rereadable_options (ARGPARSE_ARGS *pargs, int reread)
{
if (!pargs)
{ /* reset mode */
opt.quiet = 0;
opt.verbose = 0;
opt.debug = 0;
opt.no_grab = 0;
opt.debug_pinentry = 0;
opt.pinentry_program = NULL;
opt.pinentry_touch_file = NULL;
xfree (opt.pinentry_invisible_char);
opt.pinentry_invisible_char = NULL;
opt.pinentry_timeout = 0;
opt.scdaemon_program = NULL;
opt.def_cache_ttl = DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL;
opt.def_cache_ttl_ssh = DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SSH;
opt.max_cache_ttl = MAX_CACHE_TTL;
opt.max_cache_ttl_ssh = MAX_CACHE_TTL_SSH;
opt.enforce_passphrase_constraints = 0;
opt.min_passphrase_len = MIN_PASSPHRASE_LEN;
opt.min_passphrase_nonalpha = MIN_PASSPHRASE_NONALPHA;
opt.check_passphrase_pattern = NULL;
opt.max_passphrase_days = MAX_PASSPHRASE_DAYS;
opt.enable_passhrase_history = 0;
opt.ignore_cache_for_signing = 0;
opt.allow_mark_trusted = 1;
opt.allow_external_cache = 1;
opt.allow_loopback_pinentry = 1;
opt.allow_emacs_pinentry = 0;
opt.disable_scdaemon = 0;
disable_check_own_socket = 0;
return 1;
}
switch (pargs->r_opt)
{
case oQuiet: opt.quiet = 1; break;
case oVerbose: opt.verbose++; break;
case oDebug:
parse_debug_flag (pargs->r.ret_str, &opt.debug, debug_flags);
break;
case oDebugAll: opt.debug = ~0; break;
case oDebugLevel: debug_level = pargs->r.ret_str; break;
case oDebugPinentry: opt.debug_pinentry = 1; break;
case oLogFile:
if (!reread)
return 0; /* not handeld */
if (!current_logfile || !pargs->r.ret_str
|| strcmp (current_logfile, pargs->r.ret_str))
{
log_set_file (pargs->r.ret_str);
xfree (current_logfile);
current_logfile = xtrystrdup (pargs->r.ret_str);
}
break;
case oNoGrab: opt.no_grab = 1; break;
case oPinentryProgram: opt.pinentry_program = pargs->r.ret_str; break;
case oPinentryTouchFile: opt.pinentry_touch_file = pargs->r.ret_str; break;
case oPinentryInvisibleChar:
xfree (opt.pinentry_invisible_char);
opt.pinentry_invisible_char = xtrystrdup (pargs->r.ret_str); break;
break;
case oPinentryTimeout: opt.pinentry_timeout = pargs->r.ret_ulong; break;
case oScdaemonProgram: opt.scdaemon_program = pargs->r.ret_str; break;
case oDisableScdaemon: opt.disable_scdaemon = 1; break;
case oDisableCheckOwnSocket: disable_check_own_socket = 1; break;
case oDefCacheTTL: opt.def_cache_ttl = pargs->r.ret_ulong; break;
case oDefCacheTTLSSH: opt.def_cache_ttl_ssh = pargs->r.ret_ulong; break;
case oMaxCacheTTL: opt.max_cache_ttl = pargs->r.ret_ulong; break;
case oMaxCacheTTLSSH: opt.max_cache_ttl_ssh = pargs->r.ret_ulong; break;
case oEnforcePassphraseConstraints:
opt.enforce_passphrase_constraints=1;
break;
case oMinPassphraseLen: opt.min_passphrase_len = pargs->r.ret_ulong; break;
case oMinPassphraseNonalpha:
opt.min_passphrase_nonalpha = pargs->r.ret_ulong;
break;
case oCheckPassphrasePattern:
opt.check_passphrase_pattern = pargs->r.ret_str;
break;
case oMaxPassphraseDays:
opt.max_passphrase_days = pargs->r.ret_ulong;
break;
case oEnablePassphraseHistory:
opt.enable_passhrase_history = 1;
break;
case oIgnoreCacheForSigning: opt.ignore_cache_for_signing = 1; break;
case oAllowMarkTrusted: opt.allow_mark_trusted = 1; break;
case oNoAllowMarkTrusted: opt.allow_mark_trusted = 0; break;
case oAllowPresetPassphrase: opt.allow_preset_passphrase = 1; break;
case oAllowLoopbackPinentry: opt.allow_loopback_pinentry = 1; break;
case oNoAllowLoopbackPinentry: opt.allow_loopback_pinentry = 0; break;
case oNoAllowExternalCache: opt.allow_external_cache = 0;
break;
case oAllowEmacsPinentry: opt.allow_emacs_pinentry = 1;
break;
default:
return 0; /* not handled */
}
return 1; /* handled */
}
/* Fixup some options after all have been processed. */
static void
finalize_rereadable_options (void)
{
}
/* The main entry point. */
int
main (int argc, char **argv )
{
ARGPARSE_ARGS pargs;
int orig_argc;
char **orig_argv;
FILE *configfp = NULL;
char *configname = NULL;
const char *shell;
unsigned configlineno;
int parse_debug = 0;
int default_config =1;
int pipe_server = 0;
int is_daemon = 0;
int nodetach = 0;
int csh_style = 0;
char *logfile = NULL;
int debug_wait = 0;
int gpgconf_list = 0;
gpg_error_t err;
struct assuan_malloc_hooks malloc_hooks;
early_system_init ();
/* Before we do anything else we save the list of currently open
file descriptors and the signal mask. This info is required to
do the exec call properly. */
startup_fd_list = get_all_open_fds ();
#ifdef HAVE_SIGPROCMASK
if (!sigprocmask (SIG_UNBLOCK, NULL, &startup_signal_mask))
startup_signal_mask_valid = 1;
#endif /*HAVE_SIGPROCMASK*/
/* Set program name etc. */
set_strusage (my_strusage);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SUSPEND_SECMEM_WARN);
/* Please note that we may running SUID(ROOT), so be very CAREFUL
when adding any stuff between here and the call to INIT_SECMEM()
somewhere after the option parsing */
log_set_prefix (GPG_AGENT_NAME, GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PREFIX|GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PID);
/* Make sure that our subsystems are ready. */
i18n_init ();
init_common_subsystems (&argc, &argv);
npth_init ();
malloc_hooks.malloc = gcry_malloc;
malloc_hooks.realloc = gcry_realloc;
malloc_hooks.free = gcry_free;
assuan_set_malloc_hooks (&malloc_hooks);
assuan_set_gpg_err_source (GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT);
assuan_set_system_hooks (ASSUAN_SYSTEM_NPTH);
assuan_sock_init ();
setup_libassuan_logging (&opt.debug, NULL);
setup_libgcrypt_logging ();
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_USE_SECURE_RNDPOOL);
gcry_set_progress_handler (agent_libgcrypt_progress_cb, NULL);
disable_core_dumps ();
/* Set default options. */
parse_rereadable_options (NULL, 0); /* Reset them to default values. */
shell = getenv ("SHELL");
if (shell && strlen (shell) >= 3 && !strcmp (shell+strlen (shell)-3, "csh") )
csh_style = 1;
/* Record some of the original environment strings. */
{
const char *s;
int idx;
static const char *names[] =
{ "DISPLAY", "TERM", "XAUTHORITY", "PINENTRY_USER_DATA", NULL };
err = 0;
opt.startup_env = session_env_new ();
if (!opt.startup_env)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
for (idx=0; !err && names[idx]; idx++)
{
s = getenv (names[idx]);
if (s)
err = session_env_setenv (opt.startup_env, names[idx], s);
}
if (!err)
{
s = gnupg_ttyname (0);
if (s)
err = session_env_setenv (opt.startup_env, "GPG_TTY", s);
}
if (err)
log_fatal ("error recording startup environment: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
/* Fixme: Better use the locale function here. */
opt.startup_lc_ctype = getenv ("LC_CTYPE");
if (opt.startup_lc_ctype)
opt.startup_lc_ctype = xstrdup (opt.startup_lc_ctype);
opt.startup_lc_messages = getenv ("LC_MESSAGES");
if (opt.startup_lc_messages)
opt.startup_lc_messages = xstrdup (opt.startup_lc_messages);
}
/* Check whether we have a config file on the commandline */
orig_argc = argc;
orig_argv = argv;
pargs.argc = &argc;
pargs.argv = &argv;
pargs.flags= 1|(1<<6); /* do not remove the args, ignore version */
while (arg_parse( &pargs, opts))
{
if (pargs.r_opt == oDebug || pargs.r_opt == oDebugAll)
parse_debug++;
else if (pargs.r_opt == oOptions)
{ /* yes there is one, so we do not try the default one, but
read the option file when it is encountered at the
commandline */
default_config = 0;
}
else if (pargs.r_opt == oNoOptions)
default_config = 0; /* --no-options */
else if (pargs.r_opt == oHomedir)
gnupg_set_homedir (pargs.r.ret_str);
else if (pargs.r_opt == oDebugQuickRandom)
{
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_ENABLE_QUICK_RANDOM, 0);
}
}
/* Initialize the secure memory. */
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 32768, 0);
maybe_setuid = 0;
/*
Now we are now working under our real uid
*/
if (default_config)
configname = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (),
GPG_AGENT_NAME EXTSEP_S "conf", NULL);
argc = orig_argc;
argv = orig_argv;
pargs.argc = &argc;
pargs.argv = &argv;
pargs.flags= 1; /* do not remove the args */
next_pass:
if (configname)
{
configlineno = 0;
configfp = fopen (configname, "r");
if (!configfp)
{
if (default_config)
{
if( parse_debug )
log_info (_("Note: no default option file '%s'\n"),
configname );
/* Save the default conf file name so that
reread_configuration is able to test whether the
config file has been created in the meantime. */
xfree (config_filename);
config_filename = configname;
configname = NULL;
}
else
{
log_error (_("option file '%s': %s\n"),
configname, strerror(errno) );
exit(2);
}
xfree (configname);
configname = NULL;
}
if (parse_debug && configname )
log_info (_("reading options from '%s'\n"), configname );
default_config = 0;
}
while (optfile_parse( configfp, configname, &configlineno, &pargs, opts) )
{
if (parse_rereadable_options (&pargs, 0))
continue; /* Already handled */
switch (pargs.r_opt)
{
case aGPGConfList: gpgconf_list = 1; break;
case aGPGConfTest: gpgconf_list = 2; break;
case aUseStandardSocketP: gpgconf_list = 3; break;
case oBatch: opt.batch=1; break;
case oDebugWait: debug_wait = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
case oOptions:
/* config files may not be nested (silently ignore them) */
if (!configfp)
{
xfree(configname);
configname = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
goto next_pass;
}
break;
case oNoGreeting: /* Dummy option. */ break;
case oNoVerbose: opt.verbose = 0; break;
case oNoOptions: break; /* no-options */
case oHomedir: gnupg_set_homedir (pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oNoDetach: nodetach = 1; break;
case oLogFile: logfile = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oCsh: csh_style = 1; break;
case oSh: csh_style = 0; break;
case oServer: pipe_server = 1; break;
case oDaemon: is_daemon = 1; break;
case oDisplay: default_display = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oTTYname: default_ttyname = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oTTYtype: default_ttytype = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oLCctype: default_lc_ctype = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oLCmessages: default_lc_messages = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oXauthority: default_xauthority = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oUseStandardSocket:
case oNoUseStandardSocket:
obsolete_option (configname, configlineno, "use-standard-socket");
break;
case oFakedSystemTime:
{
time_t faked_time = isotime2epoch (pargs.r.ret_str);
if (faked_time == (time_t)(-1))
faked_time = (time_t)strtoul (pargs.r.ret_str, NULL, 10);
gnupg_set_time (faked_time, 0);
}
break;
case oKeepTTY: opt.keep_tty = 1; break;
case oKeepDISPLAY: opt.keep_display = 1; break;
case oSSHSupport:
ssh_support = 1;
break;
case oPuttySupport:
# ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
putty_support = 1;
# endif
break;
case oExtraSocket:
opt.extra_socket = 1; /* (1 = points into argv) */
socket_name_extra = pargs.r.ret_str;
break;
case oBrowserSocket:
opt.browser_socket = 1; /* (1 = points into argv) */
socket_name_browser = pargs.r.ret_str;
break;
case oDebugQuickRandom:
/* Only used by the first stage command line parser. */
break;
case oWriteEnvFile:
obsolete_option (configname, configlineno, "write-env-file");
break;
default : pargs.err = configfp? 1:2; break;
}
}
if (configfp)
{
fclose( configfp );
configfp = NULL;
/* Keep a copy of the name so that it can be read on SIGHUP. */
if (config_filename != configname)
{
xfree (config_filename);
config_filename = configname;
}
configname = NULL;
goto next_pass;
}
xfree (configname);
configname = NULL;
if (log_get_errorcount(0))
exit(2);
finalize_rereadable_options ();
/* Print a warning if an argument looks like an option. */
if (!opt.quiet && !(pargs.flags & ARGPARSE_FLAG_STOP_SEEN))
{
int i;
for (i=0; i < argc; i++)
if (argv[i][0] == '-' && argv[i][1] == '-')
log_info (_("Note: '%s' is not considered an option\n"), argv[i]);
}
#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
/* gpg-agent usually does not output any messages because it runs in
the background. For log files it is acceptable to have messages
always encoded in utf-8. We switch here to utf-8, so that
commands like --help still give native messages. It is far
easier to switch only once instead of for every message and it
actually helps when more then one thread is active (avoids an
extra copy step). */
bind_textdomain_codeset (PACKAGE_GT, "UTF-8");
#endif
if (!pipe_server && !is_daemon && !gpgconf_list)
{
/* We have been called without any options and thus we merely
check whether an agent is already running. We do this right
here so that we don't clobber a logfile with this check but
print the status directly to stderr. */
opt.debug = 0;
set_debug ();
check_for_running_agent (0);
agent_exit (0);
}
set_debug ();
if (atexit (cleanup))
{
log_error ("atexit failed\n");
cleanup ();
exit (1);
}
initialize_module_cache ();
initialize_module_call_pinentry ();
initialize_module_call_scd ();
initialize_module_trustlist ();
/* Try to create missing directories. */
create_directories ();
if (debug_wait && pipe_server)
{
log_debug ("waiting for debugger - my pid is %u .....\n",
(unsigned int)getpid());
gnupg_sleep (debug_wait);
log_debug ("... okay\n");
}
if (gpgconf_list == 3)
{
/* We now use the standard socket always - return true for
backward compatibility. */
agent_exit (0);
}
else if (gpgconf_list == 2)
agent_exit (0);
else if (gpgconf_list)
{
char *filename;
char *filename_esc;
/* List options and default values in the GPG Conf format. */
filename = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (),
GPG_AGENT_NAME EXTSEP_S "conf", NULL);
filename_esc = percent_escape (filename, NULL);
es_printf ("%s-%s.conf:%lu:\"%s\n",
GPGCONF_NAME, GPG_AGENT_NAME,
GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT, filename_esc);
xfree (filename);
xfree (filename_esc);
es_printf ("verbose:%lu:\n"
"quiet:%lu:\n"
"debug-level:%lu:\"none:\n"
"log-file:%lu:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME,
GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME,
GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME,
GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME );
es_printf ("default-cache-ttl:%lu:%d:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME, DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL );
es_printf ("default-cache-ttl-ssh:%lu:%d:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME, DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SSH );
es_printf ("max-cache-ttl:%lu:%d:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME, MAX_CACHE_TTL );
es_printf ("max-cache-ttl-ssh:%lu:%d:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME, MAX_CACHE_TTL_SSH );
es_printf ("enforce-passphrase-constraints:%lu:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME);
es_printf ("min-passphrase-len:%lu:%d:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME, MIN_PASSPHRASE_LEN );
es_printf ("min-passphrase-nonalpha:%lu:%d:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME,
MIN_PASSPHRASE_NONALPHA);
es_printf ("check-passphrase-pattern:%lu:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME);
es_printf ("max-passphrase-days:%lu:%d:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME,
MAX_PASSPHRASE_DAYS);
es_printf ("enable-passphrase-history:%lu:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME);
es_printf ("no-grab:%lu:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME);
es_printf ("ignore-cache-for-signing:%lu:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME);
es_printf ("no-allow-external-cache:%lu:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME);
es_printf ("no-allow-mark-trusted:%lu:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME);
es_printf ("disable-scdaemon:%lu:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME);
es_printf ("enable-ssh-support:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
es_printf ("enable-putty-support:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
#endif
es_printf ("no-allow-loopback-pinentry:%lu:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME);
es_printf ("allow-emacs-pinentry:%lu:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME);
es_printf ("pinentry-timeout:%lu:0:\n",
GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME);
agent_exit (0);
}
/* Now start with logging to a file if this is desired. */
if (logfile)
{
log_set_file (logfile);
log_set_prefix (NULL, (GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PREFIX
| GPGRT_LOG_WITH_TIME
| GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PID));
current_logfile = xstrdup (logfile);
}
/* Make sure that we have a default ttyname. */
if (!default_ttyname && gnupg_ttyname (1))
default_ttyname = xstrdup (gnupg_ttyname (1));
if (!default_ttytype && getenv ("TERM"))
default_ttytype = xstrdup (getenv ("TERM"));
if (pipe_server)
{
/* This is the simple pipe based server */
ctrl_t ctrl;
ctrl = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl);
if (!ctrl)
{
log_error ("error allocating connection control data: %s\n",
strerror (errno) );
agent_exit (1);
}
ctrl->session_env = session_env_new ();
if (!ctrl->session_env)
{
log_error ("error allocating session environment block: %s\n",
strerror (errno) );
xfree (ctrl);
agent_exit (1);
}
agent_init_default_ctrl (ctrl);
start_command_handler (ctrl, GNUPG_INVALID_FD, GNUPG_INVALID_FD);
agent_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl);
xfree (ctrl);
}
else if (!is_daemon)
; /* NOTREACHED */
else
{ /* Regular server mode */
gnupg_fd_t fd;
gnupg_fd_t fd_extra = GNUPG_INVALID_FD;
gnupg_fd_t fd_browser = GNUPG_INVALID_FD;
gnupg_fd_t fd_ssh = GNUPG_INVALID_FD;
#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
pid_t pid;
#endif
/* Remove the DISPLAY variable so that a pinentry does not
default to a specific display. There is still a default
display when gpg-agent was started using --display or a
client requested this using an OPTION command. Note, that we
don't do this when running in reverse daemon mode (i.e. when
exec the program given as arguments). */
#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
if (!opt.keep_display && !argc)
gnupg_unsetenv ("DISPLAY");
#endif
/* Remove the INSIDE_EMACS variable so that a pinentry does not
always try to interact with Emacs. The variable is set when
a client requested this using an OPTION command. */
gnupg_unsetenv ("INSIDE_EMACS");
/* Create the sockets. */
socket_name = create_socket_name (GPG_AGENT_SOCK_NAME, 1);
fd = create_server_socket (socket_name, 1, 0,
&redir_socket_name, &socket_nonce);
if (opt.extra_socket)
{
socket_name_extra = create_socket_name (socket_name_extra, 0);
opt.extra_socket = 2; /* Indicate that it has been malloced. */
fd_extra = create_server_socket (socket_name_extra, 0, 0,
&redir_socket_name_extra,
&socket_nonce_extra);
}
if (opt.browser_socket)
{
socket_name_browser = create_socket_name (socket_name_browser, 0);
opt.browser_socket = 2; /* Indicate that it has been malloced. */
fd_browser = create_server_socket (socket_name_browser, 0, 0,
&redir_socket_name_browser,
&socket_nonce_browser);
}
if (ssh_support)
{
socket_name_ssh = create_socket_name (GPG_AGENT_SSH_SOCK_NAME, 1);
fd_ssh = create_server_socket (socket_name_ssh, 0, 1,
&redir_socket_name_ssh,
&socket_nonce_ssh);
}
/* If we are going to exec a program in the parent, we record
the PID, so that the child may check whether the program is
still alive. */
if (argc)
parent_pid = getpid ();
fflush (NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
(void)csh_style;
(void)nodetach;
#else /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
pid = fork ();
if (pid == (pid_t)-1)
{
log_fatal ("fork failed: %s\n", strerror (errno) );
exit (1);
}
else if (pid)
{ /* We are the parent */
char *infostr_ssh_sock, *infostr_ssh_valid;
/* Close the socket FD. */
close (fd);
/* The signal mask might not be correct right now and thus
we restore it. That is not strictly necessary but some
programs falsely assume a cleared signal mask. */
#ifdef HAVE_SIGPROCMASK
if (startup_signal_mask_valid)
{
if (sigprocmask (SIG_SETMASK, &startup_signal_mask, NULL))
log_error ("error restoring signal mask: %s\n",
strerror (errno));
}
else
log_info ("no saved signal mask\n");
#endif /*HAVE_SIGPROCMASK*/
/* Create the SSH info string if enabled. */
if (ssh_support)
{
if (asprintf (&infostr_ssh_sock, "SSH_AUTH_SOCK=%s",
socket_name_ssh) < 0)
{
log_error ("out of core\n");
kill (pid, SIGTERM);
exit (1);
}
if (asprintf (&infostr_ssh_valid, "gnupg_SSH_AUTH_SOCK_by=%lu",
(unsigned long)getpid()) < 0)
{
log_error ("out of core\n");
kill (pid, SIGTERM);
exit (1);
}
}
*socket_name = 0; /* Don't let cleanup() remove the socket -
the child should do this from now on */
if (opt.extra_socket)
*socket_name_extra = 0;
if (opt.browser_socket)
*socket_name_browser = 0;
if (ssh_support)
*socket_name_ssh = 0;
if (argc)
{ /* Run the program given on the commandline. */
if (ssh_support && (putenv (infostr_ssh_sock)
|| putenv (infostr_ssh_valid)))
{
log_error ("failed to set environment: %s\n",
strerror (errno) );
kill (pid, SIGTERM );
exit (1);
}
/* Close all the file descriptors except the standard
ones and those open at startup. We explicitly don't
close 0,1,2 in case something went wrong collecting
them at startup. */
close_all_fds (3, startup_fd_list);
/* Run the command. */
execvp (argv[0], argv);
log_error ("failed to run the command: %s\n", strerror (errno));
kill (pid, SIGTERM);
exit (1);
}
else
{
/* Print the environment string, so that the caller can use
shell's eval to set it */
if (csh_style)
{
if (ssh_support)
{
*strchr (infostr_ssh_sock, '=') = ' ';
es_printf ("setenv %s;\n", infostr_ssh_sock);
}
}
else
{
if (ssh_support)
{
es_printf ("%s; export SSH_AUTH_SOCK;\n",
infostr_ssh_sock);
}
}
if (ssh_support)
{
xfree (infostr_ssh_sock);
xfree (infostr_ssh_valid);
}
exit (0);
}
/*NOTREACHED*/
} /* End parent */
/*
This is the child
*/
/* Detach from tty and put process into a new session */
if (!nodetach )
{
int i;
unsigned int oldflags;
/* Close stdin, stdout and stderr unless it is the log stream */
for (i=0; i <= 2; i++)
{
if (!log_test_fd (i) && i != fd )
{
if ( ! close (i)
&& open ("/dev/null", i? O_WRONLY : O_RDONLY) == -1)
{
log_error ("failed to open '%s': %s\n",
"/dev/null", strerror (errno));
cleanup ();
exit (1);
}
}
}
if (setsid() == -1)
{
log_error ("setsid() failed: %s\n", strerror(errno) );
cleanup ();
exit (1);
}
log_get_prefix (&oldflags);
log_set_prefix (NULL, oldflags | GPGRT_LOG_RUN_DETACHED);
opt.running_detached = 1;
}
if (chdir("/"))
{
log_error ("chdir to / failed: %s\n", strerror (errno));
exit (1);
}
{
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
sigemptyset (&sa.sa_mask);
sa.sa_flags = 0;
sigaction (SIGPIPE, &sa, NULL);
}
#endif /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
log_info ("%s %s started\n", strusage(11), strusage(13) );
handle_connections (fd, fd_extra, fd_browser, fd_ssh);
assuan_sock_close (fd);
}
return 0;
}
/* Exit entry point. This function should be called instead of a
plain exit. */
void
agent_exit (int rc)
{
/*FIXME: update_random_seed_file();*/
/* We run our cleanup handler because that may close cipher contexts
stored in secure memory and thus this needs to be done before we
explicitly terminate secure memory. */
cleanup ();
#if 1
/* at this time a bit annoying */
if (opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE)
{
gcry_control( GCRYCTL_DUMP_MEMORY_STATS );
gcry_control( GCRYCTL_DUMP_RANDOM_STATS );
}
if (opt.debug)
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_SECMEM_STATS );
#endif
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM );
rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 : 0;
exit (rc);
}
/* This is our callback function for gcrypt progress messages. It is
set once at startup and dispatches progress messages to the
corresponding threads of the agent. */
static void
agent_libgcrypt_progress_cb (void *data, const char *what, int printchar,
int current, int total)
{
struct progress_dispatch_s *dispatch;
npth_t mytid = npth_self ();
(void)data;
for (dispatch = progress_dispatch_list; dispatch; dispatch = dispatch->next)
if (dispatch->ctrl && dispatch->tid == mytid)
break;
if (dispatch && dispatch->cb)
dispatch->cb (dispatch->ctrl, what, printchar, current, total);
}
/* If a progress dispatcher callback has been associated with the
* current connection unregister it. */
static void
unregister_progress_cb (void)
{
struct progress_dispatch_s *dispatch;
npth_t mytid = npth_self ();
for (dispatch = progress_dispatch_list; dispatch; dispatch = dispatch->next)
if (dispatch->ctrl && dispatch->tid == mytid)
break;
if (dispatch)
{
dispatch->ctrl = NULL;
dispatch->cb = NULL;
}
}
/* Setup a progress callback CB for the current connection. Using a
* CB of NULL disables the callback. */
void
agent_set_progress_cb (void (*cb)(ctrl_t ctrl, const char *what,
int printchar, int current, int total),
ctrl_t ctrl)
{
struct progress_dispatch_s *dispatch, *firstfree;
npth_t mytid = npth_self ();
firstfree = NULL;
for (dispatch = progress_dispatch_list; dispatch; dispatch = dispatch->next)
{
if (dispatch->ctrl && dispatch->tid == mytid)
break;
if (!dispatch->ctrl && !firstfree)
firstfree = dispatch;
}
if (!dispatch) /* None allocated: Reuse or allocate a new one. */
{
if (firstfree)
{
dispatch = firstfree;
}
else if ((dispatch = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *dispatch)))
{
dispatch->next = progress_dispatch_list;
progress_dispatch_list = dispatch;
}
else
{
log_error ("error allocating new progress dispatcher slot: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror ()));
return;
}
dispatch->ctrl = ctrl;
dispatch->tid = mytid;
}
dispatch->cb = cb;
}
/* Each thread has its own local variables conveyed by a control
structure usually identified by an argument named CTRL. This
function is called immediately after allocating the control
structure. Its purpose is to setup the default values for that
structure. Note that some values may have already been set. */
static void
agent_init_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
assert (ctrl->session_env);
/* Note we ignore malloc errors because we can't do much about it
and the request will fail anyway shortly after this
initialization. */
session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "DISPLAY", default_display);
session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "GPG_TTY", default_ttyname);
session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "TERM", default_ttytype);
session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "XAUTHORITY", default_xauthority);
session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "PINENTRY_USER_DATA", NULL);
if (ctrl->lc_ctype)
xfree (ctrl->lc_ctype);
ctrl->lc_ctype = default_lc_ctype? xtrystrdup (default_lc_ctype) : NULL;
if (ctrl->lc_messages)
xfree (ctrl->lc_messages);
ctrl->lc_messages = default_lc_messages? xtrystrdup (default_lc_messages)
/**/ : NULL;
ctrl->cache_ttl_opt_preset = CACHE_TTL_OPT_PRESET;
}
/* Release all resources allocated by default in the control
structure. This is the counterpart to agent_init_default_ctrl. */
static void
agent_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
unregister_progress_cb ();
session_env_release (ctrl->session_env);
if (ctrl->lc_ctype)
xfree (ctrl->lc_ctype);
if (ctrl->lc_messages)
xfree (ctrl->lc_messages);
}
/* Because the ssh protocol does not send us information about the
current TTY setting, we use this function to use those from startup
or those explicitly set. This is also used for the restricted mode
where we ignore requests to change the environment. */
gpg_error_t
agent_copy_startup_env (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
static const char *names[] =
{"GPG_TTY", "DISPLAY", "TERM", "XAUTHORITY", "PINENTRY_USER_DATA", NULL};
gpg_error_t err = 0;
int idx;
const char *value;
for (idx=0; !err && names[idx]; idx++)
if ((value = session_env_getenv (opt.startup_env, names[idx])))
err = session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, names[idx], value);
if (!err && !ctrl->lc_ctype && opt.startup_lc_ctype)
if (!(ctrl->lc_ctype = xtrystrdup (opt.startup_lc_ctype)))
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
if (!err && !ctrl->lc_messages && opt.startup_lc_messages)
if (!(ctrl->lc_messages = xtrystrdup (opt.startup_lc_messages)))
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
if (err)
log_error ("error setting default session environment: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
/* Reread parts of the configuration. Note, that this function is
obviously not thread-safe and should only be called from the PTH
signal handler.
Fixme: Due to the way the argument parsing works, we create a
memory leak here for all string type arguments. There is currently
no clean way to tell whether the memory for the argument has been
allocated or points into the process' original arguments. Unless
we have a mechanism to tell this, we need to live on with this. */
static void
reread_configuration (void)
{
ARGPARSE_ARGS pargs;
FILE *fp;
unsigned int configlineno = 0;
int dummy;
if (!config_filename)
return; /* No config file. */
fp = fopen (config_filename, "r");
if (!fp)
{
log_info (_("option file '%s': %s\n"),
config_filename, strerror(errno) );
return;
}
parse_rereadable_options (NULL, 1); /* Start from the default values. */
memset (&pargs, 0, sizeof pargs);
dummy = 0;
pargs.argc = &dummy;
pargs.flags = 1; /* do not remove the args */
while (optfile_parse (fp, config_filename, &configlineno, &pargs, opts) )
{
if (pargs.r_opt < -1)
pargs.err = 1; /* Print a warning. */
else /* Try to parse this option - ignore unchangeable ones. */
parse_rereadable_options (&pargs, 1);
}
fclose (fp);
finalize_rereadable_options ();
set_debug ();
}
/* Return the file name of the socket we are using for native
requests. */
const char *
get_agent_socket_name (void)
{
const char *s = socket_name;
return (s && *s)? s : NULL;
}
/* Return the file name of the socket we are using for SSH
requests. */
const char *
get_agent_ssh_socket_name (void)
{
const char *s = socket_name_ssh;
return (s && *s)? s : NULL;
}
/* Return the number of active connections. */
int
get_agent_active_connection_count (void)
{
return active_connections;
}
/* Under W32, this function returns the handle of the scdaemon
notification event. Calling it the first time creates that
event. */
#if defined(HAVE_W32_SYSTEM) && !defined(HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM)
void *
get_agent_scd_notify_event (void)
{
static HANDLE the_event = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
if (the_event == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
{
HANDLE h, h2;
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES sa = { sizeof (SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES), NULL, TRUE};
/* We need to use a manual reset event object due to the way our
w32-pth wait function works: If we would use an automatic
reset event we are not able to figure out which handle has
been signaled because at the time we single out the signaled
handles using WFSO the event has already been reset due to
the WFMO. */
h = CreateEvent (&sa, TRUE, FALSE, NULL);
if (!h)
log_error ("can't create scd notify event: %s\n", w32_strerror (-1) );
else if (!DuplicateHandle (GetCurrentProcess(), h,
GetCurrentProcess(), &h2,
EVENT_MODIFY_STATE|SYNCHRONIZE, TRUE, 0))
{
log_error ("setting syncronize for scd notify event failed: %s\n",
w32_strerror (-1) );
CloseHandle (h);
}
else
{
CloseHandle (h);
the_event = h2;
}
}
return the_event;
}
#endif /*HAVE_W32_SYSTEM && !HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM*/
/* Create a name for the socket in the home directory as using
STANDARD_NAME. We also check for valid characters as well as
against a maximum allowed length for a unix domain socket is done.
The function terminates the process in case of an error. Returns:
Pointer to an allocated string with the absolute name of the socket
used. */
static char *
create_socket_name (char *standard_name, int with_homedir)
{
char *name;
if (with_homedir)
name = make_filename (gnupg_socketdir (), standard_name, NULL);
else
name = make_filename (standard_name, NULL);
if (strchr (name, PATHSEP_C))
{
log_error (("'%s' are not allowed in the socket name\n"), PATHSEP_S);
agent_exit (2);
}
return name;
}
/* Create a Unix domain socket with NAME. Returns the file descriptor
or terminates the process in case of an error. Note that this
function needs to be used for the regular socket first (indicated
by PRIMARY) and only then for the extra and the ssh sockets. If
the socket has been redirected the name of the real socket is
stored as a malloced string at R_REDIR_NAME. If CYGWIN is set a
Cygwin compatible socket is created (Windows only). */
static gnupg_fd_t
create_server_socket (char *name, int primary, int cygwin,
char **r_redir_name, assuan_sock_nonce_t *nonce)
{
struct sockaddr *addr;
struct sockaddr_un *unaddr;
socklen_t len;
gnupg_fd_t fd;
int rc;
xfree (*r_redir_name);
*r_redir_name = NULL;
fd = assuan_sock_new (AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (fd == ASSUAN_INVALID_FD)
{
log_error (_("can't create socket: %s\n"), strerror (errno));
*name = 0; /* Inhibit removal of the socket by cleanup(). */
agent_exit (2);
}
if (cygwin)
assuan_sock_set_flag (fd, "cygwin", 1);
unaddr = xmalloc (sizeof *unaddr);
addr = (struct sockaddr*)unaddr;
{
int redirected;
if (assuan_sock_set_sockaddr_un (name, addr, &redirected))
{
if (errno == ENAMETOOLONG)
log_error (_("socket name '%s' is too long\n"), name);
else
log_error ("error preparing socket '%s': %s\n",
name, gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror ()));
*name = 0; /* Inhibit removal of the socket by cleanup(). */
agent_exit (2);
}
if (redirected)
{
*r_redir_name = xstrdup (unaddr->sun_path);
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("redirecting socket '%s' to '%s'\n", name, *r_redir_name);
}
}
len = SUN_LEN (unaddr);
rc = assuan_sock_bind (fd, addr, len);
/* Our error code mapping on W32CE returns EEXIST thus we also test
for this. */
if (rc == -1
&& (errno == EADDRINUSE
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
|| errno == EEXIST
#endif
))
{
/* Check whether a gpg-agent is already running. We do this
test only if this is the primary socket. For secondary
sockets we assume that a test for gpg-agent has already been
done and reuse the requested socket. Testing the ssh-socket
is not possible because at this point, though we know the new
Assuan socket, the Assuan server and thus the ssh-agent
server is not yet operational; this would lead to a hang. */
if (primary && !check_for_running_agent (1))
{
log_set_prefix (NULL, GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PREFIX);
log_set_file (NULL);
log_error (_("a gpg-agent is already running - "
"not starting a new one\n"));
*name = 0; /* Inhibit removal of the socket by cleanup(). */
assuan_sock_close (fd);
agent_exit (2);
}
gnupg_remove (unaddr->sun_path);
rc = assuan_sock_bind (fd, addr, len);
}
if (rc != -1 && (rc=assuan_sock_get_nonce (addr, len, nonce)))
log_error (_("error getting nonce for the socket\n"));
if (rc == -1)
{
/* We use gpg_strerror here because it allows us to get strings
for some W32 socket error codes. */
log_error (_("error binding socket to '%s': %s\n"),
unaddr->sun_path,
gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror ()));
assuan_sock_close (fd);
*name = 0; /* Inhibit removal of the socket by cleanup(). */
agent_exit (2);
}
if (gnupg_chmod (unaddr->sun_path, "-rwx"))
log_error (_("can't set permissions of '%s': %s\n"),
unaddr->sun_path, strerror (errno));
if (listen (FD2INT(fd), 5 ) == -1)
{
log_error (_("listen() failed: %s\n"), strerror (errno));
*name = 0; /* Inhibit removal of the socket by cleanup(). */
assuan_sock_close (fd);
agent_exit (2);
}
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("listening on socket '%s'\n"), unaddr->sun_path);
return fd;
}
/* Check that the directory for storing the private keys exists and
create it if not. This function won't fail as it is only a
convenience function and not strictly necessary. */
static void
create_private_keys_directory (const char *home)
{
char *fname;
struct stat statbuf;
fname = make_filename (home, GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR, NULL);
if (stat (fname, &statbuf) && errno == ENOENT)
{
if (gnupg_mkdir (fname, "-rwx"))
log_error (_("can't create directory '%s': %s\n"),
fname, strerror (errno) );
else if (!opt.quiet)
log_info (_("directory '%s' created\n"), fname);
}
if (gnupg_chmod (fname, "-rwx"))
log_error (_("can't set permissions of '%s': %s\n"),
fname, strerror (errno));
xfree (fname);
}
/* Create the directory only if the supplied directory name is the
same as the default one. This way we avoid to create arbitrary
directories when a non-default home directory is used. To cope
with HOME, we compare only the suffix if we see that the default
homedir does start with a tilde. We don't stop here in case of
problems because other functions will throw an error anyway.*/
static void
create_directories (void)
{
struct stat statbuf;
const char *defhome = standard_homedir ();
char *home;
home = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), NULL);
if ( stat (home, &statbuf) )
{
if (errno == ENOENT)
{
if (
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
( !compare_filenames (home, defhome) )
#else
(*defhome == '~'
&& (strlen (home) >= strlen (defhome+1)
&& !strcmp (home + strlen(home)
- strlen (defhome+1), defhome+1)))
|| (*defhome != '~' && !strcmp (home, defhome) )
#endif
)
{
if (gnupg_mkdir (home, "-rwx"))
log_error (_("can't create directory '%s': %s\n"),
home, strerror (errno) );
else
{
if (!opt.quiet)
log_info (_("directory '%s' created\n"), home);
create_private_keys_directory (home);
}
}
}
else
log_error (_("stat() failed for '%s': %s\n"), home, strerror (errno));
}
else if ( !S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode))
{
log_error (_("can't use '%s' as home directory\n"), home);
}
else /* exists and is a directory. */
{
create_private_keys_directory (home);
}
xfree (home);
}
/* This is the worker for the ticker. It is called every few seconds
and may only do fast operations. */
static void
handle_tick (void)
{
static time_t last_minute;
if (!last_minute)
last_minute = time (NULL);
/* Check whether the scdaemon has died and cleanup in this case. */
agent_scd_check_aliveness ();
/* If we are running as a child of another process, check whether
the parent is still alive and shutdown if not. */
#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
if (parent_pid != (pid_t)(-1))
{
if (kill (parent_pid, 0))
{
shutdown_pending = 2;
log_info ("parent process died - shutting down\n");
log_info ("%s %s stopped\n", strusage(11), strusage(13) );
cleanup ();
agent_exit (0);
}
}
#endif /*HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
/* Code to be run from time to time. */
#if CHECK_OWN_SOCKET_INTERVAL > 0
if (last_minute + CHECK_OWN_SOCKET_INTERVAL <= time (NULL))
{
check_own_socket ();
last_minute = time (NULL);
}
#endif
}
/* A global function which allows us to call the reload stuff from
other places too. This is only used when build for W32. */
void
agent_sighup_action (void)
{
log_info ("SIGHUP received - "
"re-reading configuration and flushing cache\n");
agent_flush_cache ();
reread_configuration ();
agent_reload_trustlist ();
/* We flush the module name cache so that after installing a
"pinentry" binary that one can be used in case the
"pinentry-basic" fallback was in use. */
gnupg_module_name_flush_some ();
}
/* A helper function to handle SIGUSR2. */
static void
agent_sigusr2_action (void)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("SIGUSR2 received - updating card event counter\n");
/* Nothing to check right now. We only increment a counter. */
bump_card_eventcounter ();
}
#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
/* The signal handler for this program. It is expected to be run in
its own trhead and not in the context of a signal handler. */
static void
handle_signal (int signo)
{
switch (signo)
{
#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
case SIGHUP:
agent_sighup_action ();
break;
case SIGUSR1:
log_info ("SIGUSR1 received - printing internal information:\n");
/* Fixme: We need to see how to integrate pth dumping into our
logging system. */
/* pth_ctrl (PTH_CTRL_DUMPSTATE, log_get_stream ()); */
agent_query_dump_state ();
agent_scd_dump_state ();
break;
case SIGUSR2:
agent_sigusr2_action ();
break;
case SIGTERM:
if (!shutdown_pending)
log_info ("SIGTERM received - shutting down ...\n");
else
log_info ("SIGTERM received - still %i open connections\n",
active_connections);
shutdown_pending++;
if (shutdown_pending > 2)
{
log_info ("shutdown forced\n");
log_info ("%s %s stopped\n", strusage(11), strusage(13) );
cleanup ();
agent_exit (0);
}
break;
case SIGINT:
log_info ("SIGINT received - immediate shutdown\n");
log_info( "%s %s stopped\n", strusage(11), strusage(13));
cleanup ();
agent_exit (0);
break;
#endif
default:
log_info ("signal %d received - no action defined\n", signo);
}
}
#endif
/* Check the nonce on a new connection. This is a NOP unless we we
are using our Unix domain socket emulation under Windows. */
static int
check_nonce (ctrl_t ctrl, assuan_sock_nonce_t *nonce)
{
if (assuan_sock_check_nonce (ctrl->thread_startup.fd, nonce))
{
log_info (_("error reading nonce on fd %d: %s\n"),
FD2INT(ctrl->thread_startup.fd), strerror (errno));
assuan_sock_close (ctrl->thread_startup.fd);
xfree (ctrl);
return -1;
}
else
return 0;
}
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
/* The window message processing function for Putty. Warning: This
code runs as a native Windows thread. Use of our own functions
needs to be bracket with pth_leave/pth_enter. */
static LRESULT CALLBACK
putty_message_proc (HWND hwnd, UINT msg, WPARAM wparam, LPARAM lparam)
{
int ret = 0;
int w32rc;
COPYDATASTRUCT *cds;
const char *mapfile;
HANDLE maphd;
PSID mysid = NULL;
PSID mapsid = NULL;
void *data = NULL;
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR psd = NULL;
ctrl_t ctrl = NULL;
if (msg != WM_COPYDATA)
{
return DefWindowProc (hwnd, msg, wparam, lparam);
}
cds = (COPYDATASTRUCT*)lparam;
if (cds->dwData != PUTTY_IPC_MAGIC)
return 0; /* Ignore data with the wrong magic. */
mapfile = cds->lpData;
if (!cds->cbData || mapfile[cds->cbData - 1])
return 0; /* Ignore empty and non-properly terminated strings. */
if (DBG_IPC)
{
npth_protect ();
log_debug ("ssh map file '%s'", mapfile);
npth_unprotect ();
}
maphd = OpenFileMapping (FILE_MAP_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, mapfile);
if (DBG_IPC)
{
npth_protect ();
log_debug ("ssh map handle %p\n", maphd);
npth_unprotect ();
}
if (!maphd || maphd == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
return 0;
npth_protect ();
mysid = w32_get_user_sid ();
if (!mysid)
{
log_error ("error getting my sid\n");
goto leave;
}
w32rc = GetSecurityInfo (maphd, SE_KERNEL_OBJECT,
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
&mapsid, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&psd);
if (w32rc)
{
log_error ("error getting sid of ssh map file: rc=%d", w32rc);
goto leave;
}
if (DBG_IPC)
{
char *sidstr;
if (!ConvertSidToStringSid (mysid, &sidstr))
sidstr = NULL;
log_debug (" my sid: '%s'", sidstr? sidstr: "[error]");
LocalFree (sidstr);
if (!ConvertSidToStringSid (mapsid, &sidstr))
sidstr = NULL;
log_debug ("ssh map file sid: '%s'", sidstr? sidstr: "[error]");
LocalFree (sidstr);
}
if (!EqualSid (mysid, mapsid))
{
log_error ("ssh map file has a non-matching sid\n");
goto leave;
}
data = MapViewOfFile (maphd, FILE_MAP_ALL_ACCESS, 0, 0, 0);
if (DBG_IPC)
log_debug ("ssh IPC buffer at %p\n", data);
if (!data)
goto leave;
/* log_printhex ("request:", data, 20); */
ctrl = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl);
if (!ctrl)
{
log_error ("error allocating connection control data: %s\n",
strerror (errno) );
goto leave;
}
ctrl->session_env = session_env_new ();
if (!ctrl->session_env)
{
log_error ("error allocating session environment block: %s\n",
strerror (errno) );
goto leave;
}
agent_init_default_ctrl (ctrl);
if (!serve_mmapped_ssh_request (ctrl, data, PUTTY_IPC_MAXLEN))
ret = 1; /* Valid ssh message has been constructed. */
agent_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl);
/* log_printhex (" reply:", data, 20); */
leave:
xfree (ctrl);
if (data)
UnmapViewOfFile (data);
xfree (mapsid);
if (psd)
LocalFree (psd);
xfree (mysid);
CloseHandle (maphd);
npth_unprotect ();
return ret;
}
#endif /*HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
/* The thread handling Putty's IPC requests. */
static void *
putty_message_thread (void *arg)
{
WNDCLASS wndwclass = {0, putty_message_proc, 0, 0,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "Pageant"};
HWND hwnd;
MSG msg;
(void)arg;
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("putty message loop thread started\n");
/* The message loop runs as thread independent from our nPth system.
This also means that we need to make sure that we switch back to
our system before calling any no-windows function. */
npth_unprotect ();
/* First create a window to make sure that a message queue exists
for this thread. */
if (!RegisterClass (&wndwclass))
{
npth_protect ();
log_error ("error registering Pageant window class");
return NULL;
}
hwnd = CreateWindowEx (0, "Pageant", "Pageant", 0,
0, 0, 0, 0,
HWND_MESSAGE, /* hWndParent */
NULL, /* hWndMenu */
NULL, /* hInstance */
NULL); /* lpParm */
if (!hwnd)
{
npth_protect ();
log_error ("error creating Pageant window");
return NULL;
}
while (GetMessage(&msg, NULL, 0, 0))
{
TranslateMessage(&msg);
DispatchMessage(&msg);
}
/* Back to nPth. */
npth_protect ();
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("putty message loop thread stopped\n");
return NULL;
}
#endif /*HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
static void *
do_start_connection_thread (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
active_connections++;
agent_init_default_ctrl (ctrl);
if (opt.verbose && !DBG_IPC)
log_info (_("handler 0x%lx for fd %d started\n"),
(unsigned long) npth_self(), FD2INT(ctrl->thread_startup.fd));
start_command_handler (ctrl, GNUPG_INVALID_FD, ctrl->thread_startup.fd);
if (opt.verbose && !DBG_IPC)
log_info (_("handler 0x%lx for fd %d terminated\n"),
(unsigned long) npth_self(), FD2INT(ctrl->thread_startup.fd));
agent_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl);
xfree (ctrl);
active_connections--;
return NULL;
}
/* This is the standard connection thread's main function. */
static void *
start_connection_thread_std (void *arg)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = arg;
if (check_nonce (ctrl, &socket_nonce))
{
log_error ("handler 0x%lx nonce check FAILED\n",
(unsigned long) npth_self());
return NULL;
}
return do_start_connection_thread (ctrl);
}
/* This is the extra socket connection thread's main function. */
static void *
start_connection_thread_extra (void *arg)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = arg;
if (check_nonce (ctrl, &socket_nonce_extra))
{
log_error ("handler 0x%lx nonce check FAILED\n",
(unsigned long) npth_self());
return NULL;
}
ctrl->restricted = 1;
return do_start_connection_thread (ctrl);
}
/* This is the browser socket connection thread's main function. */
static void *
start_connection_thread_browser (void *arg)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = arg;
if (check_nonce (ctrl, &socket_nonce_browser))
{
log_error ("handler 0x%lx nonce check FAILED\n",
(unsigned long) npth_self());
return NULL;
}
ctrl->restricted = 2;
return do_start_connection_thread (ctrl);
}
/* This is the ssh connection thread's main function. */
static void *
start_connection_thread_ssh (void *arg)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = arg;
if (check_nonce (ctrl, &socket_nonce_ssh))
return NULL;
active_connections++;
agent_init_default_ctrl (ctrl);
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("ssh handler 0x%lx for fd %d started\n"),
(unsigned long) npth_self(), FD2INT(ctrl->thread_startup.fd));
start_command_handler_ssh (ctrl, ctrl->thread_startup.fd);
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("ssh handler 0x%lx for fd %d terminated\n"),
(unsigned long) npth_self(), FD2INT(ctrl->thread_startup.fd));
agent_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl);
xfree (ctrl);
active_connections--;
return NULL;
}
#ifdef HAVE_INOTIFY_INIT
/* Read an inotify event and return true if it matches NAME. */
static int
my_inotify_is_name (int fd, const char *name)
{
union {
struct inotify_event ev;
char _buf[sizeof (struct inotify_event) + 100 + 1];
} buf;
int n;
n = npth_read (fd, &buf, sizeof buf);
if (n < sizeof (struct inotify_event))
return 0;
if (buf.ev.len < strlen (name)+1)
return 0;
if (strcmp (buf.ev.name, name))
return 0; /* Not the desired file. */
return 1; /* Found. */
}
#endif /*HAVE_INOTIFY_INIT*/
/* Connection handler loop. Wait for connection requests and spawn a
thread after accepting a connection. */
static void
handle_connections (gnupg_fd_t listen_fd,
gnupg_fd_t listen_fd_extra,
gnupg_fd_t listen_fd_browser,
gnupg_fd_t listen_fd_ssh)
{
npth_attr_t tattr;
struct sockaddr_un paddr;
socklen_t plen;
fd_set fdset, read_fdset;
int ret;
gnupg_fd_t fd;
int nfd;
int saved_errno;
struct timespec abstime;
struct timespec curtime;
struct timespec timeout;
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
HANDLE events[2];
unsigned int events_set;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_INOTIFY_INIT
int my_inotify_fd;
#endif /*HAVE_INOTIFY_INIT*/
struct {
const char *name;
void *(*func) (void *arg);
gnupg_fd_t l_fd;
} listentbl[] = {
{ "std", start_connection_thread_std },
{ "extra", start_connection_thread_extra },
{ "browser", start_connection_thread_browser },
{ "ssh", start_connection_thread_ssh }
};
ret = npth_attr_init(&tattr);
if (ret)
log_fatal ("error allocating thread attributes: %s\n",
strerror (ret));
npth_attr_setdetachstate (&tattr, NPTH_CREATE_DETACHED);
#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
npth_sigev_init ();
npth_sigev_add (SIGHUP);
npth_sigev_add (SIGUSR1);
npth_sigev_add (SIGUSR2);
npth_sigev_add (SIGINT);
npth_sigev_add (SIGTERM);
npth_sigev_fini ();
#else
# ifdef HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM
/* Use a dummy event. */
sigs = 0;
ev = pth_event (PTH_EVENT_SIGS, &sigs, &signo);
# else
events[0] = get_agent_scd_notify_event ();
events[1] = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
# endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_INOTIFY_INIT
if (disable_check_own_socket)
my_inotify_fd = -1;
else if ((my_inotify_fd = inotify_init ()) == -1)
log_info ("error enabling fast daemon termination: %s\n",
strerror (errno));
else
{
- /* We need to watch the directory for the file becuase there
+ /* We need to watch the directory for the file because there
* won't be an IN_DELETE_SELF for a socket file. */
char *slash = strrchr (socket_name, '/');
log_assert (slash && slash[1]);
*slash = 0;
if (inotify_add_watch (my_inotify_fd, socket_name, IN_DELETE) == -1)
{
close (my_inotify_fd);
my_inotify_fd = -1;
}
*slash = '/';
}
#endif /*HAVE_INOTIFY_INIT*/
/* On Windows we need to fire up a separate thread to listen for
requests from Putty (an SSH client), so we can replace Putty's
Pageant (its ssh-agent implementation). */
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
if (putty_support)
{
npth_t thread;
ret = npth_create (&thread, &tattr, putty_message_thread, NULL);
if (ret)
{
log_error ("error spawning putty message loop: %s\n", strerror (ret));
}
}
#endif /*HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
/* Set a flag to tell call-scd.c that it may enable event
notifications. */
opt.sigusr2_enabled = 1;
FD_ZERO (&fdset);
FD_SET (FD2INT (listen_fd), &fdset);
nfd = FD2INT (listen_fd);
if (listen_fd_extra != GNUPG_INVALID_FD)
{
FD_SET ( FD2INT(listen_fd_extra), &fdset);
if (FD2INT (listen_fd_extra) > nfd)
nfd = FD2INT (listen_fd_extra);
}
if (listen_fd_browser != GNUPG_INVALID_FD)
{
FD_SET ( FD2INT(listen_fd_browser), &fdset);
if (FD2INT (listen_fd_browser) > nfd)
nfd = FD2INT (listen_fd_browser);
}
if (listen_fd_ssh != GNUPG_INVALID_FD)
{
FD_SET ( FD2INT(listen_fd_ssh), &fdset);
if (FD2INT (listen_fd_ssh) > nfd)
nfd = FD2INT (listen_fd_ssh);
}
#ifdef HAVE_INOTIFY_INIT
if (my_inotify_fd != -1)
{
FD_SET (my_inotify_fd, &fdset);
if (my_inotify_fd > nfd)
nfd = my_inotify_fd;
}
#endif /*HAVE_INOTIFY_INIT*/
listentbl[0].l_fd = listen_fd;
listentbl[1].l_fd = listen_fd_extra;
listentbl[2].l_fd = listen_fd_browser;
listentbl[3].l_fd = listen_fd_ssh;
npth_clock_gettime (&abstime);
abstime.tv_sec += TIMERTICK_INTERVAL;
for (;;)
{
/* Shutdown test. */
if (shutdown_pending)
{
if (active_connections == 0)
break; /* ready */
/* Do not accept new connections but keep on running the
loop to cope with the timer events. */
FD_ZERO (&fdset);
}
/* POSIX says that fd_set should be implemented as a structure,
thus a simple assignment is fine to copy the entire set. */
read_fdset = fdset;
npth_clock_gettime (&curtime);
if (!(npth_timercmp (&curtime, &abstime, <)))
{
/* Timeout. */
handle_tick ();
npth_clock_gettime (&abstime);
abstime.tv_sec += TIMERTICK_INTERVAL;
}
npth_timersub (&abstime, &curtime, &timeout);
#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
ret = npth_pselect (nfd+1, &read_fdset, NULL, NULL, &timeout,
npth_sigev_sigmask ());
saved_errno = errno;
{
int signo;
while (npth_sigev_get_pending (&signo))
handle_signal (signo);
}
#else
ret = npth_eselect (nfd+1, &read_fdset, NULL, NULL, &timeout,
events, &events_set);
saved_errno = errno;
/* This is valid even if npth_eselect returns an error. */
if (events_set & 1)
agent_sigusr2_action ();
#endif
if (ret == -1 && saved_errno != EINTR)
{
log_error (_("npth_pselect failed: %s - waiting 1s\n"),
strerror (saved_errno));
npth_sleep (1);
continue;
}
if (ret <= 0)
/* Interrupt or timeout. Will be handled when calculating the
next timeout. */
continue;
if (!shutdown_pending)
{
int idx;
ctrl_t ctrl;
npth_t thread;
#ifdef HAVE_INOTIFY_INIT
if (my_inotify_fd != -1 && FD_ISSET (my_inotify_fd, &read_fdset)
&& my_inotify_is_name (my_inotify_fd, GPG_AGENT_SOCK_NAME))
{
shutdown_pending = 1;
log_info ("socket file has been removed - shutting down\n");
}
#endif /*HAVE_INOTIFY_INIT*/
for (idx=0; idx < DIM(listentbl); idx++)
{
if (listentbl[idx].l_fd == GNUPG_INVALID_FD)
continue;
if (!FD_ISSET (FD2INT (listentbl[idx].l_fd), &read_fdset))
continue;
plen = sizeof paddr;
fd = INT2FD (npth_accept (FD2INT(listentbl[idx].l_fd),
(struct sockaddr *)&paddr, &plen));
if (fd == GNUPG_INVALID_FD)
{
log_error ("accept failed for %s: %s\n",
listentbl[idx].name, strerror (errno));
}
else if ( !(ctrl = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl)))
{
log_error ("error allocating connection data for %s: %s\n",
listentbl[idx].name, strerror (errno) );
assuan_sock_close (fd);
}
else if ( !(ctrl->session_env = session_env_new ()))
{
log_error ("error allocating session env block for %s: %s\n",
listentbl[idx].name, strerror (errno) );
xfree (ctrl);
assuan_sock_close (fd);
}
else
{
ctrl->thread_startup.fd = fd;
ret = npth_create (&thread, &tattr,
listentbl[idx].func, ctrl);
if (ret)
{
log_error ("error spawning connection handler for %s:"
" %s\n", listentbl[idx].name, strerror (ret));
assuan_sock_close (fd);
xfree (ctrl);
}
}
fd = GNUPG_INVALID_FD;
}
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_INOTIFY_INIT
if (my_inotify_fd != -1)
close (my_inotify_fd);
#endif /*HAVE_INOTIFY_INIT*/
cleanup ();
log_info (_("%s %s stopped\n"), strusage(11), strusage(13));
npth_attr_destroy (&tattr);
}
/* Helper for check_own_socket. */
static gpg_error_t
check_own_socket_pid_cb (void *opaque, const void *buffer, size_t length)
{
membuf_t *mb = opaque;
put_membuf (mb, buffer, length);
return 0;
}
/* The thread running the actual check. We need to run this in a
separate thread so that check_own_thread can be called from the
timer tick. */
static void *
check_own_socket_thread (void *arg)
{
int rc;
char *sockname = arg;
assuan_context_t ctx = NULL;
membuf_t mb;
char *buffer;
check_own_socket_running++;
rc = assuan_new (&ctx);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("can't allocate assuan context: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
assuan_set_flag (ctx, ASSUAN_NO_LOGGING, 1);
rc = assuan_socket_connect (ctx, sockname, (pid_t)(-1), 0);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("can't connect my own socket: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
init_membuf (&mb, 100);
rc = assuan_transact (ctx, "GETINFO pid", check_own_socket_pid_cb, &mb,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
put_membuf (&mb, "", 1);
buffer = get_membuf (&mb, NULL);
if (rc || !buffer)
{
log_error ("sending command \"%s\" to my own socket failed: %s\n",
"GETINFO pid", gpg_strerror (rc));
rc = 1;
}
else if ( (pid_t)strtoul (buffer, NULL, 10) != getpid ())
{
log_error ("socket is now serviced by another server\n");
rc = 1;
}
else if (opt.verbose > 1)
log_error ("socket is still served by this server\n");
xfree (buffer);
leave:
xfree (sockname);
if (ctx)
assuan_release (ctx);
if (rc)
{
/* We may not remove the socket as it is now in use by another
server. Setting the name to empty does this. */
if (socket_name)
*socket_name = 0;
if (socket_name_ssh)
*socket_name_ssh = 0;
shutdown_pending = 2;
log_info ("this process is useless - shutting down\n");
}
check_own_socket_running--;
return NULL;
}
/* Check whether we are still listening on our own socket. In case
another gpg-agent process started after us has taken ownership of
our socket, we would linger around without any real task. Thus we
better check once in a while whether we are really needed. */
static void
check_own_socket (void)
{
char *sockname;
npth_t thread;
npth_attr_t tattr;
int err;
if (disable_check_own_socket)
return;
if (check_own_socket_running || shutdown_pending)
return; /* Still running or already shutting down. */
sockname = make_filename_try (gnupg_socketdir (), GPG_AGENT_SOCK_NAME, NULL);
if (!sockname)
return; /* Out of memory. */
err = npth_attr_init (&tattr);
if (err)
return;
npth_attr_setdetachstate (&tattr, NPTH_CREATE_DETACHED);
err = npth_create (&thread, &tattr, check_own_socket_thread, sockname);
if (err)
log_error ("error spawning check_own_socket_thread: %s\n", strerror (err));
npth_attr_destroy (&tattr);
}
/* Figure out whether an agent is available and running. Prints an
error if not. If SILENT is true, no messages are printed.
Returns 0 if the agent is running. */
static int
check_for_running_agent (int silent)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *sockname;
assuan_context_t ctx = NULL;
sockname = make_filename_try (gnupg_socketdir (), GPG_AGENT_SOCK_NAME, NULL);
if (!sockname)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
err = assuan_new (&ctx);
if (!err)
err = assuan_socket_connect (ctx, sockname, (pid_t)(-1), 0);
xfree (sockname);
if (err)
{
if (!silent)
log_error (_("no gpg-agent running in this session\n"));
if (ctx)
assuan_release (ctx);
return -1;
}
if (!opt.quiet && !silent)
log_info ("gpg-agent running and available\n");
assuan_release (ctx);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/agent/keyformat.txt b/agent/keyformat.txt
index ddfb44b0b..e80496e1c 100644
--- a/agent/keyformat.txt
+++ b/agent/keyformat.txt
@@ -1,425 +1,425 @@
keyformat.txt emacs, please switch to -*- org -*- mode
-------------
Some notes on the format of the secret keys used with gpg-agent.
* Location of keys
The secret keys[1] are stored on a per file basis in a directory below
the ~/.gnupg home directory. This directory is named
private-keys-v1.d
and should have permissions 700.
The secret keys are stored in files with a name matching the
hexadecimal representation of the keygrip[2] and suffixed with ".key".
* Extended Private Key Format
GnuPG 2.3+ will use a new format to store private keys that is both
more flexible and easier to read and edit by human beings. The new
format stores name,value-pairs using the common mail and http header
convention. Example (here indented with two spaces):
Description: Key to sign all GnuPG released tarballs.
The key is actually stored on a smart card.
Use-for-ssh: yes
OpenSSH-cert: long base64 encoded string wrapped so that this
key file can be easily edited with a standard editor.
Key: (shadowed-private-key
(rsa
(n #00AA1AD2A55FD8C8FDE9E1941772D9CC903FA43B268CB1B5A1BAFDC900
2961D8AEA153424DC851EF13B83AC64FBE365C59DC1BD3E83017C90D4365B4
83E02859FC13DB5842A00E969480DB96CE6F7D1C03600392B8E08EF0C01FC7
19F9F9086B25AD39B4F1C2A2DF3E2BE317110CFFF21D4A11455508FE407997
601260816C8422297C0637BB291C3A079B9CB38A92CE9E551F80AA0EBF4F0E
72C3F250461E4D31F23A7087857FC8438324A013634563D34EFDDCBF2EA80D
F9662C9CCD4BEF2522D8BDFED24CEF78DC6B309317407EAC576D889F88ADA0
8C4FFB480981FB68C5C6CA27503381D41018E6CDC52AAAE46B166BDC10637A
E186A02BA2497FDC5D1221#)
(e #00010001#)
(shadowed t1-v1
(#D2760001240102000005000011730000# OPENPGP.1)
)))
GnuPG 2.2 is able to read and update keys using the new format, but
will not create new files using the new format. Furthermore, it only
makes use of the value stored under the name 'Key:'.
Keys in the extended format can be recognized by looking at the first
byte of the file. If it starts with a '(' it is a naked S-expression,
otherwise it is a key in extended format.
** Names
A name must start with a letter and end with a colon. Valid
characters are all ASCII letters, numbers and the hyphen. Comparison
of names is done case insensitively. Names may be used several times
to represent an array of values.
The name "Key:" is special in that it may occur only once and the
associated value holds the actual S-expression with the cryptographic
key. The S-expression is formatted using the 'Advanced Format'
(GCRYSEXP_FMT_ADVANCED) that avoids non-printable characters so that
the file can be easily inspected and edited. See section 'Private Key
Format' below for details.
** Values
Values are UTF-8 encoded strings. Values can be wrapped at any point,
and continued in the next line indicated by leading whitespace. A
continuation line with one leading space does not introduce a blank so
that the lines can be effectively concatenated. A blank line as part
of a continuation line encodes a newline.
** Comments
Lines containing only whitespace, and lines starting with whitespace
followed by '#' are considered to be comments and are ignored.
* Private Key Format
** Unprotected Private Key Format
The content of the file is an S-Expression like the ones used with
Libgcrypt. Here is an example of an unprotected file:
(private-key
(rsa
(n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#)
(e #010001#)
(d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#)
(p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#)
(q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#)
(u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#)
)
(created-at timestamp)
(uri http://foo.bar x-foo:whatever_you_want)
(comment whatever)
)
"comment", "created-at" and "uri" are optional. "comment" is
currently used to keep track of ssh key comments. "created-at" is used
to keep track of the creation time stamp used with OpenPGP keys; it is
optional but required for some operations to calculate the fingerprint
of the key. This timestamp should be a string with the number of
seconds since Epoch or an ISO time string (yyyymmddThhmmss).
** Protected Private Key Format
A protected key is like this:
(protected-private-key
(rsa
(n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#)
(e #010001#)
(protected mode (parms) encrypted_octet_string)
(protected-at <isotimestamp>)
)
(uri http://foo.bar x-foo:whatever_you_want)
(comment whatever)
)
In this scheme the encrypted_octet_string is encrypted according to
the algorithm described after the keyword protected; most protection
algorithms need some parameters, which are given in a list before the
encrypted_octet_string. The result of the decryption process is a
list of the secret key parameters. The protected-at expression is
optional; the isotimestamp is 15 bytes long (e.g. "19610711T172000").
The currently defined protection modes are:
*** openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc
This describes an algorithm using using AES in CBC mode for
encryption, SHA-1 for integrity protection and the String to Key
algorithm 3 from OpenPGP (rfc4880).
Example:
(protected openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc
((sha1 16byte_salt no_of_iterations) 16byte_iv)
encrypted_octet_string
)
The encrypted_octet string should yield this S-Exp (in canonical
representation) after decryption:
(
(
(d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#)
(p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#)
(q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#)
(u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#)
)
(hash sha1 #...[hashvalue]...#)
)
For padding reasons, random bytes are appended to this list - they can
easily be stripped by looking for the end of the list.
The hash is calculated on the concatenation of the public key and
secret key parameter lists: i.e. it is required to hash the
concatenation of these 6 canonical encoded lists for RSA, including
the parenthesis, the algorithm keyword and (if used) the protected-at
list.
(rsa
(n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#)
(e #010001#)
(d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#)
(p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#)
(q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#)
(u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#)
(protected-at "18950523T000000")
)
After decryption the hash must be recalculated and compared against
the stored one - If they don't match the integrity of the key is not
given.
*** openpgp-s2k3-ocb-aes
This describes an algorithm using using AES-128 in OCB mode, a nonce
of 96 bit, a taglen of 128 bit, and the String to Key algorithm 3
from OpenPGP (rfc4880).
Example:
(protected openpgp-s2k3-ocb-aes
((sha1 16byte_salt no_of_iterations) 12byte_nonce)
encrypted_octet_string
)
The encrypted_octet string should yield this S-Exp (in canonical
representation) after decryption:
(
(
(d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#)
(p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#)
(q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#)
(u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#)
)
)
For padding reasons, random bytes may be appended to this list -
they can easily be stripped by looking for the end of the list.
The associated data required for this protection mode is the list
formiing the public key parameters. For the above example this is
is this canonical encoded S-expression:
(rsa
(n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#)
(e #010001#)
(protected-at "18950523T000000")
)
*** openpgp-native
This is a wrapper around the OpenPGP Private Key Transport format
which resembles the standard OpenPGP format and allows the use of an
existing key without re-encrypting to the default protection format.
Example:
(protected openpgp-native
(openpgp-private-key
(version V)
(algo PUBKEYALGO)
(skey _ P1 _ P2 _ P3 ... e PN)
(csum n)
(protection PROTTYPE PROTALGO IV S2KMODE S2KHASH S2KSALT S2KCOUNT)))
Note that the public key paramaters in SKEY are duplicated and
should be identical to their copies in the standard parameter
elements. Here is an example of an entire protected private key
using this format:
(protected-private-key
(rsa
(n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#)
(e #010001#)
(protected openpgp-native
(openpgp-private-key
(version 4)
(algo rsa)
(skey _ #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#
_ #010001#
e #.........................#)
(protection sha1 aes #aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899#
3 sha1 #2596f93e85f41e53# 3:190))))
(uri http://foo.bar x-foo:whatever_you_want)
(comment whatever))
** Shadowed Private Key Format
To keep track of keys stored on IC cards we use a third format for
private kyes which are called shadow keys as they are only a reference
to keys stored on a token:
(shadowed-private-key
(rsa
(n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#)
(e #010001#)
(shadowed protocol (info))
)
(uri http://foo.bar x-foo:whatever_you_want)
(comment whatever)
)
The currently used protocol is "ti-v1" (token info version 1). The
second list with the information has this layout:
(card_serial_number id_string_of_key fixed_pin_length)
FIXED_PIN_LENGTH is optional. It can be used to store the length of
the PIN; a value of 0 indicates that this information is not
available. The rationale for this field is that some pinpad equipped
readers don't allow passing a variable length PIN.
More items may be added to the list.
** OpenPGP Private Key Transfer Format
This format is used to transfer keys between gpg and gpg-agent.
(openpgp-private-key
(version V)
(algo PUBKEYALGO)
(curve CURVENAME)
(skey _ P1 _ P2 _ P3 ... e PN)
(csum n)
(protection PROTTYPE PROTALGO IV S2KMODE S2KHASH S2KSALT S2KCOUNT))
* V is the packet version number (3 or 4).
* PUBKEYALGO is a Libgcrypt algo name
* CURVENAME is the name of the curve - only used with ECC.
* P1 .. PN are the parameters; the public parameters are never encrypted
the secrect key parameters are encrypted if the "protection" list is
given. To make this more explicit each parameter is preceded by a
flag "_" for cleartext or "e" for encrypted text.
* CSUM is the deprecated 16 bit checksum as defined by OpenPGP. This
is an optional element.
* If PROTTYPE is "sha1" the new style SHA1 checksum is used if it is "sum"
the old 16 bit checksum (above) is used and if it is "none" no
protection at all is used.
* PROTALGO is a Libgcrypt style cipher algorithm name
* IV is the initialization verctor.
* S2KMODE is the value from RFC-4880.
* S2KHASH is a a libgcrypt style hash algorithm identifier.
* S2KSALT is the 8 byte salt
* S2KCOUNT is the count value from RFC-4880.
** Persistent Passphrase Format
Note: That this has not yet been implemented.
To allow persistent storage of cached passphrases we use a scheme
similar to the private-key storage format. This is a master
passphrase format where each file may protect several secrets under
one master passphrase. It is possible to have several of those files
each protected by a dedicated master passphrase. Clear text keywords
allow listing the available protected passphrases.
The name of the files with these protected secrets have this form:
pw-<string>.dat. STRING may be an arbitrary string, as a default name
for the passphrase storage the name "pw-default.dat" is suggested.
(protected-shared-secret
((desc descriptive_text)
(key [key_1] (keyword_1 keyword_2 keyword_n))
(key [key_2] (keyword_21 keyword_22 keyword_2n))
(key [key_n] (keyword_n1 keyword_n2 keyword_nn))
(protected mode (parms) encrypted_octet_string)
(protected-at <isotimestamp>)
)
)
After decryption the encrypted_octet_string yields this S-expression:
(
(
(value key_1 value_1)
(value key_2 value_2)
(value key_n value_n)
)
(hash sha1 #...[hashvalue]...#)
)
The "descriptive_text" is displayed with the prompt to enter the
unprotection passphrase.
KEY_1 to KEY_N are unique identifiers for the shared secret, for
example an URI. In case this information should be kept confidential
as well, they may not appear in the unprotected part; however they are
mandatory in the encrypted_octet_string. The list of keywords is
optional. The oder of the "key" lists and the order of the "value"
lists mut match, that is the first "key"-list is associated with the
first "value" list in the encrypted_octet_string.
-The protection mode etc. is indentical to the protection mode as
-decribed for the private key format.
+The protection mode etc. is identical to the protection mode as
+described for the private key format.
list of the secret key parameters. The protected-at expression is
optional; the isotimestamp is 15 bytes long (e.g. "19610711T172000").
The "hash" in the encrypted_octet_string is calculated on the
concatenation of the key list and value lists: i.e it is required to
hash the concatenation of all these lists, including the
parenthesis and (if used) the protected-at list.
Example:
(protected-shared-secret
((desc "List of system passphrases")
(key "uid-1002" ("Knuth" "Donald Ervin Knuth"))
(key "uid-1001" ("Dijkstra" "Edsgar Wybe Dijkstra"))
(key)
(protected mode (parms) encrypted_octet_string)
(protected-at "20100915T111722")
)
)
with "encrypted_octet_string" decoding to:
(
(
(value 4:1002 "signal flags at the lock")
(value 4:1001 "taocp")
(value 1:0 "premature optimization is the root of all evil")
)
(hash sha1 #0102030405060708091011121314151617181920#)
)
To compute the hash this S-expression (in canoncical format) was
hashed:
((desc "List of system passphrases")
(key "uid-1002" ("Knuth" "Donald Ervin Knuth"))
(key "uid-1001" ("Dijkstra" "Edsgar Wybe Dijkstra"))
(key)
(value 4:1002 "signal flags at the lock")
(value 4:1001 "taocp")
(value 1:0 "premature optimization is the root of all evil")
(protected-at "20100915T111722")
)
* Notes
[1] I usually use the terms private and secret key exchangeable but prefer the
term secret key because it can be visually be better distinguished
from the term public key.
[2] The keygrip is a unique identifier for a key pair, it is
independent of any protocol, so that the same key can be used with
different protocols. PKCS-15 calls this a subjectKeyHash; it can be
calculated using Libgcrypt's gcry_pk_get_keygrip ().
[3] Even when canonical representation are required we will show the
S-expression here in a more readable representation.
diff --git a/agent/protect-tool.c b/agent/protect-tool.c
index dbf781144..fa97b694d 100644
--- a/agent/protect-tool.c
+++ b/agent/protect-tool.c
@@ -1,819 +1,819 @@
/* protect-tool.c - A tool to test the secret key protection
* Copyright (C) 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H
#include <locale.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LANGINFO_CODESET
#include <langinfo.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
#include <fcntl.h> /* for setmode() */
#endif
#include "agent.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "get-passphrase.h"
#include "sysutils.h"
#include "../common/init.h"
enum cmd_and_opt_values
{
aNull = 0,
oVerbose = 'v',
oArmor = 'a',
oPassphrase = 'P',
oProtect = 'p',
oUnprotect = 'u',
oNoVerbose = 500,
oShadow,
oShowShadowInfo,
oShowKeygrip,
oS2Kcalibration,
oCanonical,
oStore,
oForce,
oHaveCert,
oNoFailOnExist,
oHomedir,
oPrompt,
oStatusMsg,
oDebugUseOCB,
oAgentProgram
};
struct rsa_secret_key_s
{
gcry_mpi_t n; /* public modulus */
gcry_mpi_t e; /* public exponent */
gcry_mpi_t d; /* exponent */
gcry_mpi_t p; /* prime p. */
gcry_mpi_t q; /* prime q. */
gcry_mpi_t u; /* inverse of p mod q. */
};
static int opt_armor;
static int opt_canonical;
static int opt_store;
static int opt_force;
static int opt_no_fail_on_exist;
static int opt_have_cert;
static const char *opt_passphrase;
static char *opt_prompt;
static int opt_status_msg;
static const char *opt_agent_program;
static int opt_debug_use_ocb;
static char *get_passphrase (int promptno);
static void release_passphrase (char *pw);
static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
ARGPARSE_group (300, N_("@Commands:\n ")),
ARGPARSE_c (oProtect, "protect", "protect a private key"),
ARGPARSE_c (oUnprotect, "unprotect", "unprotect a private key"),
ARGPARSE_c (oShadow, "shadow", "create a shadow entry for a public key"),
ARGPARSE_c (oShowShadowInfo, "show-shadow-info", "return the shadow info"),
ARGPARSE_c (oShowKeygrip, "show-keygrip", "show the \"keygrip\""),
ARGPARSE_c (oS2Kcalibration, "s2k-calibration", "@"),
ARGPARSE_group (301, N_("@\nOptions:\n ")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oVerbose, "verbose", "verbose"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oArmor, "armor", "write output in advanced format"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oCanonical, "canonical", "write output in canonical format"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPassphrase, "passphrase", "|STRING|use passphrase STRING"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oHaveCert, "have-cert",
"certificate to export provided on STDIN"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oStore, "store",
"store the created key in the appropriate place"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oForce, "force",
"force overwriting"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoFailOnExist, "no-fail-on-exist", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oHomedir, "homedir", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPrompt, "prompt",
"|ESCSTRING|use ESCSTRING as prompt in pinentry"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oStatusMsg, "enable-status-msg", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oAgentProgram, "agent-program", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugUseOCB, "debug-use-ocb", "@"), /* For hacking only. */
ARGPARSE_end ()
};
static const char *
my_strusage (int level)
{
const char *p;
switch (level)
{
case 11: p = "gpg-protect-tool (" GNUPG_NAME ")";
break;
case 13: p = VERSION; break;
case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break;
case 19: p = _("Please report bugs to <@EMAIL@>.\n"); break;
case 1:
case 40: p = _("Usage: gpg-protect-tool [options] (-h for help)\n");
break;
case 41: p = _("Syntax: gpg-protect-tool [options] [args]\n"
"Secret key maintenance tool\n");
break;
default: p = NULL;
}
return p;
}
/* static void */
/* print_mpi (const char *text, gcry_mpi_t a) */
/* { */
/* char *buf; */
/* void *bufaddr = &buf; */
/* int rc; */
/* rc = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, bufaddr, NULL, a); */
/* if (rc) */
/* log_info ("%s: [error printing number: %s]\n", text, gpg_strerror (rc)); */
/* else */
/* { */
/* log_info ("%s: %s\n", text, buf); */
/* gcry_free (buf); */
/* } */
/* } */
static unsigned char *
make_canonical (const char *fname, const char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int rc;
size_t erroff, len;
gcry_sexp_t sexp;
unsigned char *result;
rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&sexp, &erroff, buf, buflen);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("invalid S-Expression in '%s' (off=%u): %s\n",
fname, (unsigned int)erroff, gpg_strerror (rc));
return NULL;
}
len = gcry_sexp_sprint (sexp, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0);
assert (len);
result = xmalloc (len);
len = gcry_sexp_sprint (sexp, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, result, len);
assert (len);
gcry_sexp_release (sexp);
return result;
}
static char *
make_advanced (const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int rc;
size_t erroff, len;
gcry_sexp_t sexp;
char *result;
rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&sexp, &erroff, (const char*)buf, buflen);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("invalid canonical S-Expression (off=%u): %s\n",
(unsigned int)erroff, gpg_strerror (rc));
return NULL;
}
len = gcry_sexp_sprint (sexp, GCRYSEXP_FMT_ADVANCED, NULL, 0);
assert (len);
result = xmalloc (len);
len = gcry_sexp_sprint (sexp, GCRYSEXP_FMT_ADVANCED, result, len);
assert (len);
gcry_sexp_release (sexp);
return result;
}
static char *
read_file (const char *fname, size_t *r_length)
{
FILE *fp;
char *buf;
size_t buflen;
if (!strcmp (fname, "-"))
{
size_t nread, bufsize = 0;
fp = stdin;
#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
setmode ( fileno(fp) , O_BINARY );
#endif
buf = NULL;
buflen = 0;
#define NCHUNK 8192
do
{
bufsize += NCHUNK;
if (!buf)
buf = xmalloc (bufsize);
else
buf = xrealloc (buf, bufsize);
nread = fread (buf+buflen, 1, NCHUNK, fp);
if (nread < NCHUNK && ferror (fp))
{
log_error ("error reading '[stdin]': %s\n", strerror (errno));
xfree (buf);
return NULL;
}
buflen += nread;
}
while (nread == NCHUNK);
#undef NCHUNK
}
else
{
struct stat st;
fp = fopen (fname, "rb");
if (!fp)
{
log_error ("can't open '%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno));
return NULL;
}
if (fstat (fileno(fp), &st))
{
log_error ("can't stat '%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno));
fclose (fp);
return NULL;
}
buflen = st.st_size;
buf = xmalloc (buflen+1);
if (fread (buf, buflen, 1, fp) != 1)
{
log_error ("error reading '%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno));
fclose (fp);
xfree (buf);
return NULL;
}
fclose (fp);
}
*r_length = buflen;
return buf;
}
static unsigned char *
read_key (const char *fname)
{
char *buf;
size_t buflen;
unsigned char *key;
buf = read_file (fname, &buflen);
if (!buf)
return NULL;
key = make_canonical (fname, buf, buflen);
xfree (buf);
return key;
}
static void
read_and_protect (const char *fname)
{
int rc;
unsigned char *key;
unsigned char *result;
size_t resultlen;
char *pw;
key = read_key (fname);
if (!key)
return;
pw = get_passphrase (1);
rc = agent_protect (key, pw, &result, &resultlen, 0,
opt_debug_use_ocb? 1 : -1);
release_passphrase (pw);
xfree (key);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("protecting the key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return;
}
if (opt_armor)
{
char *p = make_advanced (result, resultlen);
xfree (result);
if (!p)
return;
result = (unsigned char*)p;
resultlen = strlen (p);
}
fwrite (result, resultlen, 1, stdout);
xfree (result);
}
static void
read_and_unprotect (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname)
{
int rc;
unsigned char *key;
unsigned char *result;
size_t resultlen;
char *pw;
gnupg_isotime_t protected_at;
key = read_key (fname);
if (!key)
return;
rc = agent_unprotect (ctrl, key, (pw=get_passphrase (1)),
protected_at, &result, &resultlen);
release_passphrase (pw);
xfree (key);
if (rc)
{
if (opt_status_msg)
log_info ("[PROTECT-TOOL:] bad-passphrase\n");
log_error ("unprotecting the key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return;
}
if (opt.verbose)
{
if (*protected_at)
log_info ("key protection done at %.4s-%.2s-%.2s %.2s:%.2s:%s\n",
protected_at, protected_at+4, protected_at+6,
protected_at+9, protected_at+11, protected_at+13);
else
log_info ("key protection done at [unknown]\n");
}
if (opt_armor)
{
char *p = make_advanced (result, resultlen);
xfree (result);
if (!p)
return;
result = (unsigned char*)p;
resultlen = strlen (p);
}
fwrite (result, resultlen, 1, stdout);
xfree (result);
}
static void
read_and_shadow (const char *fname)
{
int rc;
unsigned char *key;
unsigned char *result;
size_t resultlen;
unsigned char dummy_info[] = "(8:313233342:43)";
key = read_key (fname);
if (!key)
return;
rc = agent_shadow_key (key, dummy_info, &result);
xfree (key);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("shadowing the key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return;
}
resultlen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (result, 0, NULL,NULL);
assert (resultlen);
if (opt_armor)
{
char *p = make_advanced (result, resultlen);
xfree (result);
if (!p)
return;
result = (unsigned char*)p;
resultlen = strlen (p);
}
fwrite (result, resultlen, 1, stdout);
xfree (result);
}
static void
show_shadow_info (const char *fname)
{
int rc;
unsigned char *key;
const unsigned char *info;
size_t infolen;
key = read_key (fname);
if (!key)
return;
rc = agent_get_shadow_info (key, &info);
xfree (key);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("get_shadow_info failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return;
}
infolen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (info, 0, NULL,NULL);
assert (infolen);
if (opt_armor)
{
char *p = make_advanced (info, infolen);
if (!p)
return;
fwrite (p, strlen (p), 1, stdout);
xfree (p);
}
else
fwrite (info, infolen, 1, stdout);
}
static void
show_file (const char *fname)
{
unsigned char *key;
size_t keylen;
char *p;
key = read_key (fname);
if (!key)
return;
keylen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (key, 0, NULL,NULL);
assert (keylen);
if (opt_canonical)
{
fwrite (key, keylen, 1, stdout);
}
else
{
p = make_advanced (key, keylen);
if (p)
{
fwrite (p, strlen (p), 1, stdout);
xfree (p);
}
}
xfree (key);
}
static void
show_keygrip (const char *fname)
{
unsigned char *key;
gcry_sexp_t private;
unsigned char grip[20];
int i;
key = read_key (fname);
if (!key)
return;
if (gcry_sexp_new (&private, key, 0, 0))
{
log_error ("gcry_sexp_new failed\n");
return;
}
xfree (key);
if (!gcry_pk_get_keygrip (private, grip))
{
log_error ("can't calculate keygrip\n");
return;
}
gcry_sexp_release (private);
for (i=0; i < 20; i++)
printf ("%02X", grip[i]);
putchar ('\n');
}
int
main (int argc, char **argv )
{
ARGPARSE_ARGS pargs;
int cmd = 0;
const char *fname;
ctrl_t ctrl;
early_system_init ();
set_strusage (my_strusage);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SUSPEND_SECMEM_WARN);
log_set_prefix ("gpg-protect-tool", GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PREFIX);
/* Make sure that our subsystems are ready. */
i18n_init ();
init_common_subsystems (&argc, &argv);
setup_libgcrypt_logging ();
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 16384, 0);
pargs.argc = &argc;
pargs.argv = &argv;
pargs.flags= 1; /* (do not remove the args) */
while (arg_parse (&pargs, opts) )
{
switch (pargs.r_opt)
{
case oVerbose: opt.verbose++; break;
case oArmor: opt_armor=1; break;
case oCanonical: opt_canonical=1; break;
case oHomedir: gnupg_set_homedir (pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oAgentProgram: opt_agent_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oProtect: cmd = oProtect; break;
case oUnprotect: cmd = oUnprotect; break;
case oShadow: cmd = oShadow; break;
case oShowShadowInfo: cmd = oShowShadowInfo; break;
case oShowKeygrip: cmd = oShowKeygrip; break;
case oS2Kcalibration: cmd = oS2Kcalibration; break;
case oPassphrase: opt_passphrase = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oStore: opt_store = 1; break;
case oForce: opt_force = 1; break;
case oNoFailOnExist: opt_no_fail_on_exist = 1; break;
case oHaveCert: opt_have_cert = 1; break;
case oPrompt: opt_prompt = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oStatusMsg: opt_status_msg = 1; break;
case oDebugUseOCB: opt_debug_use_ocb = 1; break;
default: pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR; break;
}
}
if (log_get_errorcount (0))
exit (2);
fname = "-";
if (argc == 1)
fname = *argv;
else if (argc > 1)
usage (1);
- /* Allocate an CTRL object. An empty object should sufficent. */
+ /* Allocate an CTRL object. An empty object should sufficient. */
ctrl = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl);
if (!ctrl)
{
log_error ("error allocating connection control data: %s\n",
strerror (errno));
agent_exit (1);
}
/* Set the information which can't be taken from envvars. */
gnupg_prepare_get_passphrase (GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT,
opt.verbose,
opt_agent_program,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (opt_prompt)
opt_prompt = percent_plus_unescape (opt_prompt, 0);
if (cmd == oProtect)
read_and_protect (fname);
else if (cmd == oUnprotect)
read_and_unprotect (ctrl, fname);
else if (cmd == oShadow)
read_and_shadow (fname);
else if (cmd == oShowShadowInfo)
show_shadow_info (fname);
else if (cmd == oShowKeygrip)
show_keygrip (fname);
else if (cmd == oS2Kcalibration)
{
if (!opt.verbose)
opt.verbose++; /* We need to see something. */
get_standard_s2k_count ();
}
else
show_file (fname);
xfree (ctrl);
agent_exit (0);
return 8; /*NOTREACHED*/
}
void
agent_exit (int rc)
{
rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 : 0;
exit (rc);
}
/* Return the passphrase string and ask the agent if it has not been
set from the command line PROMPTNO select the prompt to display:
0 = default
1 = taken from the option --prompt
2 = for unprotecting a pkcs#12 object
3 = for protecting a new pkcs#12 object
4 = for protecting an imported pkcs#12 in our system
*/
static char *
get_passphrase (int promptno)
{
char *pw;
int err;
const char *desc;
char *orig_codeset;
int repeat = 0;
if (opt_passphrase)
return xstrdup (opt_passphrase);
orig_codeset = i18n_switchto_utf8 ();
if (promptno == 1 && opt_prompt)
{
desc = opt_prompt;
}
else if (promptno == 2)
{
desc = _("Please enter the passphrase to unprotect the "
"PKCS#12 object.");
}
else if (promptno == 3)
{
desc = _("Please enter the passphrase to protect the "
"new PKCS#12 object.");
repeat = 1;
}
else if (promptno == 4)
{
desc = _("Please enter the passphrase to protect the "
"imported object within the GnuPG system.");
repeat = 1;
}
else
desc = _("Please enter the passphrase or the PIN\n"
"needed to complete this operation.");
i18n_switchback (orig_codeset);
err = gnupg_get_passphrase (NULL, NULL, _("Passphrase:"), desc,
repeat, repeat, 1, &pw);
if (err)
{
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED
|| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
log_info (_("cancelled\n"));
else
log_error (_("error while asking for the passphrase: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (err));
agent_exit (0);
}
assert (pw);
return pw;
}
static void
release_passphrase (char *pw)
{
if (pw)
{
wipememory (pw, strlen (pw));
xfree (pw);
}
}
/* Stub function. */
int
agent_key_available (const unsigned char *grip)
{
(void)grip;
return -1; /* Not available. */
}
char *
agent_get_cache (const char *key, cache_mode_t cache_mode)
{
(void)key;
(void)cache_mode;
return NULL;
}
gpg_error_t
agent_askpin (ctrl_t ctrl,
const char *desc_text, const char *prompt_text,
const char *initial_errtext,
struct pin_entry_info_s *pininfo,
const char *keyinfo, cache_mode_t cache_mode)
{
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char *passphrase;
size_t size;
(void)ctrl;
(void)desc_text;
(void)prompt_text;
(void)initial_errtext;
(void)keyinfo;
(void)cache_mode;
*pininfo->pin = 0; /* Reset the PIN. */
passphrase = get_passphrase (0);
size = strlen (passphrase);
if (size >= pininfo->max_length)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
memcpy (&pininfo->pin, passphrase, size);
xfree (passphrase);
pininfo->pin[size] = 0;
if (pininfo->check_cb)
{
/* More checks by utilizing the optional callback. */
pininfo->cb_errtext = NULL;
err = pininfo->check_cb (pininfo);
}
else
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Replacement for the function in findkey.c. Here we write the key
* to stdout. */
int
agent_write_private_key (const unsigned char *grip,
const void *buffer, size_t length, int force)
{
char hexgrip[40+4+1];
char *p;
(void)force;
bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip);
strcpy (hexgrip+40, ".key");
p = make_advanced (buffer, length);
if (p)
{
printf ("# Begin dump of %s\n%s%s# End dump of %s\n",
hexgrip, p, (*p && p[strlen(p)-1] == '\n')? "":"\n", hexgrip);
xfree (p);
}
return 0;
}
diff --git a/common/asshelp.c b/common/asshelp.c
index bb01a03c7..b4efcf326 100644
--- a/common/asshelp.c
+++ b/common/asshelp.c
@@ -1,722 +1,722 @@
/* asshelp.c - Helper functions for Assuan
* Copyright (C) 2002, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of either
*
* - the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by the Free
* Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at
* your option) any later version.
*
* or
*
* - the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
* Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at
* your option) any later version.
*
* or both in parallel, as here.
*
* This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H
#include <locale.h>
#endif
#include "i18n.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "exechelp.h"
#include "sysutils.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "membuf.h"
#include "asshelp.h"
/* The type we use for lock_agent_spawning. */
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
# define lock_spawn_t HANDLE
#else
# define lock_spawn_t dotlock_t
#endif
/* The time we wait until the agent or the dirmngr are ready for
operation after we started them before giving up. */
#ifdef HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM
# define SECS_TO_WAIT_FOR_AGENT 30
# define SECS_TO_WAIT_FOR_DIRMNGR 30
#else
# define SECS_TO_WAIT_FOR_AGENT 5
# define SECS_TO_WAIT_FOR_DIRMNGR 5
#endif
/* A bitfield that specifies the assuan categories to log. This is
identical to the default log handler of libassuan. We need to do
it ourselves because we use a custom log handler and want to use
the same assuan variables to select the categories to log. */
static int log_cats;
#define TEST_LOG_CAT(x) (!! (log_cats & (1 << (x - 1))))
/* The assuan log monitor used to temporary inhibit log messages from
* assuan. */
static int (*my_log_monitor) (assuan_context_t ctx,
unsigned int cat,
const char *msg);
static int
my_libassuan_log_handler (assuan_context_t ctx, void *hook,
unsigned int cat, const char *msg)
{
unsigned int dbgval;
if (! TEST_LOG_CAT (cat))
return 0;
dbgval = hook? *(unsigned int*)hook : 0;
if (!(dbgval & 1024))
return 0; /* Assuan debugging is not enabled. */
if (ctx && my_log_monitor && !my_log_monitor (ctx, cat, msg))
return 0; /* Temporary disabled. */
if (msg)
log_string (GPGRT_LOG_DEBUG, msg);
return 1;
}
/* Setup libassuan to use our own logging functions. Should be used
early at startup. */
void
setup_libassuan_logging (unsigned int *debug_var_address,
int (*log_monitor)(assuan_context_t ctx,
unsigned int cat,
const char *msg))
{
char *flagstr;
flagstr = getenv ("ASSUAN_DEBUG");
if (flagstr)
log_cats = atoi (flagstr);
else /* Default to log the control channel. */
log_cats = (1 << (ASSUAN_LOG_CONTROL - 1));
my_log_monitor = log_monitor;
assuan_set_log_cb (my_libassuan_log_handler, debug_var_address);
}
/* Change the Libassuan log categories to those given by NEWCATS.
NEWCATS is 0 the default category of ASSUAN_LOG_CONTROL is
selected. Note, that setup_libassuan_logging overrides the values
given here. */
void
set_libassuan_log_cats (unsigned int newcats)
{
if (newcats)
log_cats = newcats;
else /* Default to log the control channel. */
log_cats = (1 << (ASSUAN_LOG_CONTROL - 1));
}
static gpg_error_t
send_one_option (assuan_context_t ctx, gpg_err_source_t errsource,
const char *name, const char *value, int use_putenv)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *optstr;
(void)errsource;
if (!value || !*value)
err = 0; /* Avoid sending empty strings. */
else if (asprintf (&optstr, "OPTION %s%s=%s",
use_putenv? "putenv=":"", name, value) < 0)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
err = assuan_transact (ctx, optstr, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
xfree (optstr);
}
return err;
}
/* Send the assuan commands pertaining to the pinentry environment. The
OPT_* arguments are optional and may be used to override the
defaults taken from the current locale. */
gpg_error_t
send_pinentry_environment (assuan_context_t ctx,
gpg_err_source_t errsource,
const char *opt_lc_ctype,
const char *opt_lc_messages,
session_env_t session_env)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
#if defined(HAVE_SETLOCALE)
char *old_lc = NULL;
#endif
char *dft_lc = NULL;
const char *dft_ttyname;
int iterator;
const char *name, *assname, *value;
int is_default;
iterator = 0;
while ((name = session_env_list_stdenvnames (&iterator, &assname)))
{
value = session_env_getenv_or_default (session_env, name, NULL);
if (!value)
continue;
if (assname)
err = send_one_option (ctx, errsource, assname, value, 0);
else
{
err = send_one_option (ctx, errsource, name, value, 1);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_OPTION)
err = 0; /* Server too old; can't pass the new envvars. */
}
if (err)
return err;
}
dft_ttyname = session_env_getenv_or_default (session_env, "GPG_TTY",
&is_default);
if (dft_ttyname && !is_default)
dft_ttyname = NULL; /* We need the default value. */
/* Send the value for LC_CTYPE. */
#if defined(HAVE_SETLOCALE) && defined(LC_CTYPE)
old_lc = setlocale (LC_CTYPE, NULL);
if (old_lc)
{
old_lc = xtrystrdup (old_lc);
if (!old_lc)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
}
dft_lc = setlocale (LC_CTYPE, "");
#endif
if (opt_lc_ctype || (dft_ttyname && dft_lc))
{
err = send_one_option (ctx, errsource, "lc-ctype",
opt_lc_ctype ? opt_lc_ctype : dft_lc, 0);
}
#if defined(HAVE_SETLOCALE) && defined(LC_CTYPE)
if (old_lc)
{
setlocale (LC_CTYPE, old_lc);
xfree (old_lc);
}
#endif
if (err)
return err;
/* Send the value for LC_MESSAGES. */
#if defined(HAVE_SETLOCALE) && defined(LC_MESSAGES)
old_lc = setlocale (LC_MESSAGES, NULL);
if (old_lc)
{
old_lc = xtrystrdup (old_lc);
if (!old_lc)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
}
dft_lc = setlocale (LC_MESSAGES, "");
#endif
if (opt_lc_messages || (dft_ttyname && dft_lc))
{
err = send_one_option (ctx, errsource, "lc-messages",
opt_lc_messages ? opt_lc_messages : dft_lc, 0);
}
#if defined(HAVE_SETLOCALE) && defined(LC_MESSAGES)
if (old_lc)
{
setlocale (LC_MESSAGES, old_lc);
xfree (old_lc);
}
#endif
if (err)
return err;
return 0;
}
/* Lock a spawning process. The caller needs to provide the address
of a variable to store the lock information and the name or the
process. */
static gpg_error_t
lock_spawning (lock_spawn_t *lock, const char *homedir, const char *name,
int verbose)
{
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
int waitrc;
int timeout = (!strcmp (name, "agent")
? SECS_TO_WAIT_FOR_AGENT
: SECS_TO_WAIT_FOR_DIRMNGR);
(void)homedir; /* Not required. */
*lock = CreateMutexW
(NULL, FALSE,
!strcmp (name, "agent")? L"spawn_"GNUPG_NAME"_agent_sentinel":
!strcmp (name, "dirmngr")? L"spawn_"GNUPG_NAME"_dirmngr_sentinel":
/* */ L"spawn_"GNUPG_NAME"_unknown_sentinel");
if (!*lock)
{
log_error ("failed to create the spawn_%s mutex: %s\n",
name, w32_strerror (-1));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
retry:
waitrc = WaitForSingleObject (*lock, 1000);
if (waitrc == WAIT_OBJECT_0)
return 0;
if (waitrc == WAIT_TIMEOUT && timeout)
{
timeout--;
if (verbose)
log_info ("another process is trying to start the %s ... (%ds)\n",
name, timeout);
goto retry;
}
if (waitrc == WAIT_TIMEOUT)
log_info ("error waiting for the spawn_%s mutex: timeout\n", name);
else
log_info ("error waiting for the spawn_%s mutex: (code=%d) %s\n",
name, waitrc, w32_strerror (-1));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
#else /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
char *fname;
(void)verbose;
*lock = NULL;
fname = make_absfilename_try
(homedir,
!strcmp (name, "agent")? "gnupg_spawn_agent_sentinel":
!strcmp (name, "dirmngr")? "gnupg_spawn_dirmngr_sentinel":
/* */ "gnupg_spawn_unknown_sentinel",
NULL);
if (!fname)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
*lock = dotlock_create (fname, 0);
xfree (fname);
if (!*lock)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
/* FIXME: We should use a timeout of 5000 here - however
make_dotlock does not yet support values other than -1 and 0. */
if (dotlock_take (*lock, -1))
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
return 0;
#endif /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
}
/* Unlock the spawning process. */
static void
unlock_spawning (lock_spawn_t *lock, const char *name)
{
if (*lock)
{
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
if (!ReleaseMutex (*lock))
log_error ("failed to release the spawn_%s mutex: %s\n",
name, w32_strerror (-1));
CloseHandle (*lock);
#else /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
(void)name;
dotlock_destroy (*lock);
#endif /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
*lock = NULL;
}
}
/* Try to connect to the agent via socket or start it if it is not
running and AUTOSTART is set. Handle the server's initial
greeting. Returns a new assuan context at R_CTX or an error
code. */
gpg_error_t
start_new_gpg_agent (assuan_context_t *r_ctx,
gpg_err_source_t errsource,
const char *agent_program,
const char *opt_lc_ctype,
const char *opt_lc_messages,
session_env_t session_env,
int autostart, int verbose, int debug,
gpg_error_t (*status_cb)(ctrl_t, int, ...),
ctrl_t status_cb_arg)
{
gpg_error_t err;
assuan_context_t ctx;
int did_success_msg = 0;
char *sockname;
const char *argv[6];
*r_ctx = NULL;
err = assuan_new (&ctx);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error allocating assuan context: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
sockname = make_filename_try (gnupg_socketdir (), GPG_AGENT_SOCK_NAME, NULL);
if (!sockname)
{
err = gpg_err_make (errsource, gpg_err_code_from_syserror ());
assuan_release (ctx);
return err;
}
err = assuan_socket_connect (ctx, sockname, 0, 0);
if (err && autostart)
{
char *abs_homedir;
lock_spawn_t lock;
char *program = NULL;
const char *program_arg = NULL;
char *p;
const char *s;
int i;
/* With no success start a new server. */
if (!agent_program || !*agent_program)
agent_program = gnupg_module_name (GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_AGENT);
else if ((s=strchr (agent_program, '|')) && s[1] == '-' && s[2]=='-')
{
/* Hack to insert an additional option on the command line. */
program = xtrystrdup (agent_program);
if (!program)
{
gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_err_make (errsource,
gpg_err_code_from_syserror ());
xfree (sockname);
assuan_release (ctx);
return tmperr;
}
p = strchr (program, '|');
*p++ = 0;
program_arg = p;
}
if (verbose)
log_info (_("no running gpg-agent - starting '%s'\n"),
agent_program);
if (status_cb)
status_cb (status_cb_arg, STATUS_PROGRESS,
"starting_agent ? 0 0", NULL);
/* We better pass an absolute home directory to the agent just
in case gpg-agent does not convert the passed name to an
absolute one (which it should do). */
abs_homedir = make_absfilename_try (gnupg_homedir (), NULL);
if (!abs_homedir)
{
gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_err_make (errsource,
gpg_err_code_from_syserror ());
log_error ("error building filename: %s\n",gpg_strerror (tmperr));
xfree (sockname);
assuan_release (ctx);
xfree (program);
return tmperr;
}
if (fflush (NULL))
{
gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_err_make (errsource,
gpg_err_code_from_syserror ());
log_error ("error flushing pending output: %s\n",
strerror (errno));
xfree (sockname);
assuan_release (ctx);
xfree (abs_homedir);
xfree (program);
return tmperr;
}
/* If the agent has been configured for use with a standard
socket, an environment variable is not required and thus
we we can savely start the agent here. */
i = 0;
argv[i++] = "--homedir";
argv[i++] = abs_homedir;
argv[i++] = "--use-standard-socket";
if (program_arg)
argv[i++] = program_arg;
argv[i++] = "--daemon";
argv[i++] = NULL;
if (!(err = lock_spawning (&lock, gnupg_homedir (), "agent", verbose))
&& assuan_socket_connect (ctx, sockname, 0, 0))
{
err = gnupg_spawn_process_detached (program? program : agent_program,
argv, NULL);
if (err)
log_error ("failed to start agent '%s': %s\n",
agent_program, gpg_strerror (err));
else
{
for (i=0; i < SECS_TO_WAIT_FOR_AGENT; i++)
{
if (verbose)
log_info (_("waiting for the agent to come up ... (%ds)\n"),
SECS_TO_WAIT_FOR_AGENT - i);
gnupg_sleep (1);
err = assuan_socket_connect (ctx, sockname, 0, 0);
if (!err)
{
if (verbose)
{
log_info (_("connection to agent established\n"));
did_success_msg = 1;
}
break;
}
}
}
}
unlock_spawning (&lock, "agent");
xfree (abs_homedir);
xfree (program);
}
xfree (sockname);
if (err)
{
if (autostart || gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_ASS_CONNECT_FAILED)
log_error ("can't connect to the agent: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
assuan_release (ctx);
return gpg_err_make (errsource, GPG_ERR_NO_AGENT);
}
if (debug && !did_success_msg)
log_debug ("connection to agent established\n");
err = assuan_transact (ctx, "RESET",
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!err)
{
err = send_pinentry_environment (ctx, errsource,
opt_lc_ctype, opt_lc_messages,
session_env);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN
&& gpg_err_source (err) == GPG_ERR_SOURCE_GPGAGENT)
{
/* Check whether we are in restricted mode. */
if (!assuan_transact (ctx, "GETINFO restricted",
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL))
{
if (verbose)
log_info (_("connection to agent is in restricted mode\n"));
err = 0;
}
}
}
if (err)
{
assuan_release (ctx);
return err;
}
*r_ctx = ctx;
return 0;
}
/* Try to connect to the dirmngr via a socket. On platforms
supporting it, start it up if needed and if AUTOSTART is true.
Returns a new assuan context at R_CTX or an error code. */
gpg_error_t
start_new_dirmngr (assuan_context_t *r_ctx,
gpg_err_source_t errsource,
const char *dirmngr_program,
int autostart,
int verbose, int debug,
gpg_error_t (*status_cb)(ctrl_t, int, ...),
ctrl_t status_cb_arg)
{
gpg_error_t err;
assuan_context_t ctx;
const char *sockname;
int did_success_msg = 0;
*r_ctx = NULL;
err = assuan_new (&ctx);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error allocating assuan context: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
sockname = dirmngr_socket_name ();
err = assuan_socket_connect (ctx, sockname, 0, 0);
#ifdef USE_DIRMNGR_AUTO_START
if (err && autostart)
{
lock_spawn_t lock;
const char *argv[4];
char *abs_homedir;
/* No connection: Try start a new Dirmngr. */
if (!dirmngr_program || !*dirmngr_program)
dirmngr_program = gnupg_module_name (GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_DIRMNGR);
if (verbose)
log_info (_("no running Dirmngr - starting '%s'\n"),
dirmngr_program);
if (status_cb)
status_cb (status_cb_arg, STATUS_PROGRESS,
"starting_dirmngr ? 0 0", NULL);
abs_homedir = make_absfilename (gnupg_homedir (), NULL);
if (!abs_homedir)
{
gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_err_make (errsource,
gpg_err_code_from_syserror ());
log_error ("error building filename: %s\n",gpg_strerror (tmperr));
assuan_release (ctx);
return tmperr;
}
if (fflush (NULL))
{
gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_err_make (errsource,
gpg_err_code_from_syserror ());
log_error ("error flushing pending output: %s\n",
strerror (errno));
assuan_release (ctx);
return tmperr;
}
argv[0] = "--daemon";
/* Try starting the daemon. Versions of dirmngr < 2.1.15 do
* this only if the home directory is given on the command line. */
argv[1] = "--homedir";
argv[2] = abs_homedir;
argv[3] = NULL;
if (!(err = lock_spawning (&lock, gnupg_homedir (), "dirmngr", verbose))
&& assuan_socket_connect (ctx, sockname, 0, 0))
{
err = gnupg_spawn_process_detached (dirmngr_program, argv, NULL);
if (err)
log_error ("failed to start the dirmngr '%s': %s\n",
dirmngr_program, gpg_strerror (err));
else
{
int i;
for (i=0; i < SECS_TO_WAIT_FOR_DIRMNGR; i++)
{
if (verbose)
log_info (_("waiting for the dirmngr "
"to come up ... (%ds)\n"),
SECS_TO_WAIT_FOR_DIRMNGR - i);
gnupg_sleep (1);
err = assuan_socket_connect (ctx, sockname, 0, 0);
if (!err)
{
if (verbose)
{
log_info (_("connection to the dirmngr"
" established\n"));
did_success_msg = 1;
}
break;
}
}
}
}
unlock_spawning (&lock, "dirmngr");
xfree (abs_homedir);
}
#else
(void)dirmngr_program;
(void)verbose;
(void)status_cb;
(void)status_cb_arg;
#endif /*USE_DIRMNGR_AUTO_START*/
if (err)
{
if (autostart || gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_ASS_CONNECT_FAILED)
log_error ("connecting dirmngr at '%s' failed: %s\n",
sockname, gpg_strerror (err));
assuan_release (ctx);
return gpg_err_make (errsource, GPG_ERR_NO_DIRMNGR);
}
if (debug && !did_success_msg)
log_debug ("connection to the dirmngr established\n");
*r_ctx = ctx;
return 0;
}
/* Return the version of a server using "GETINFO version". On success
0 is returned and R_VERSION receives a malloced string with the
version which must be freed by the caller. On error NULL is stored
at R_VERSION and an error code returned. Mode is in general 0 but
- certian values may be used to modify the used version command:
+ certain values may be used to modify the used version command:
MODE == 0 = Use "GETINFO version"
MODE == 2 - Use "SCD GETINFO version"
*/
gpg_error_t
get_assuan_server_version (assuan_context_t ctx, int mode, char **r_version)
{
gpg_error_t err;
membuf_t data;
init_membuf (&data, 64);
err = assuan_transact (ctx,
mode == 2? "SCD GETINFO version"
/**/ : "GETINFO version",
put_membuf_cb, &data,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (err)
{
xfree (get_membuf (&data, NULL));
*r_version = NULL;
}
else
{
put_membuf (&data, "", 1);
*r_version = get_membuf (&data, NULL);
if (!*r_version)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
}
return err;
}
diff --git a/common/b64enc.c b/common/b64enc.c
index af861fcbc..4150f3e56 100644
--- a/common/b64enc.c
+++ b/common/b64enc.c
@@ -1,422 +1,422 @@
/* b64enc.c - Simple Base64 encoder.
* Copyright (C) 2001, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2010,
* 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2001, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2010,
* 2011 g10 Code GmbH
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
* the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "i18n.h"
#include "util.h"
#define B64ENC_DID_HEADER 1
#define B64ENC_DID_TRAILER 2
#define B64ENC_NO_LINEFEEDS 16
#define B64ENC_USE_PGPCRC 32
/* The base-64 character list */
static unsigned char bintoasc[64] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
"0123456789+/";
/* Stuff required to create the OpenPGP CRC. This crc_table has been
created using this code:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#define CRCPOLY 0x864CFB
int
main (void)
{
int i, j;
uint32_t t;
uint32_t crc_table[256];
crc_table[0] = 0;
for (i=j=0; j < 128; j++ )
{
t = crc_table[j];
if ( (t & 0x00800000) )
{
t <<= 1;
crc_table[i++] = t ^ CRCPOLY;
crc_table[i++] = t;
}
else
{
t <<= 1;
crc_table[i++] = t;
crc_table[i++] = t ^ CRCPOLY;
}
}
puts ("static const u32 crc_table[256] = {");
for (i=j=0; i < 256; i++)
{
printf ("%s 0x%08lx", j? "":" ", (unsigned long)crc_table[i]);
if (i != 255)
{
putchar (',');
if ( ++j > 5)
{
j = 0;
putchar ('\n');
}
}
}
puts ("\n};");
return 0;
}
*/
#define CRCINIT 0xB704CE
static const u32 crc_table[256] = {
0x00000000, 0x00864cfb, 0x018ad50d, 0x010c99f6, 0x0393e6e1, 0x0315aa1a,
0x021933ec, 0x029f7f17, 0x07a18139, 0x0727cdc2, 0x062b5434, 0x06ad18cf,
0x043267d8, 0x04b42b23, 0x05b8b2d5, 0x053efe2e, 0x0fc54e89, 0x0f430272,
0x0e4f9b84, 0x0ec9d77f, 0x0c56a868, 0x0cd0e493, 0x0ddc7d65, 0x0d5a319e,
0x0864cfb0, 0x08e2834b, 0x09ee1abd, 0x09685646, 0x0bf72951, 0x0b7165aa,
0x0a7dfc5c, 0x0afbb0a7, 0x1f0cd1e9, 0x1f8a9d12, 0x1e8604e4, 0x1e00481f,
0x1c9f3708, 0x1c197bf3, 0x1d15e205, 0x1d93aefe, 0x18ad50d0, 0x182b1c2b,
0x192785dd, 0x19a1c926, 0x1b3eb631, 0x1bb8faca, 0x1ab4633c, 0x1a322fc7,
0x10c99f60, 0x104fd39b, 0x11434a6d, 0x11c50696, 0x135a7981, 0x13dc357a,
0x12d0ac8c, 0x1256e077, 0x17681e59, 0x17ee52a2, 0x16e2cb54, 0x166487af,
0x14fbf8b8, 0x147db443, 0x15712db5, 0x15f7614e, 0x3e19a3d2, 0x3e9fef29,
0x3f9376df, 0x3f153a24, 0x3d8a4533, 0x3d0c09c8, 0x3c00903e, 0x3c86dcc5,
0x39b822eb, 0x393e6e10, 0x3832f7e6, 0x38b4bb1d, 0x3a2bc40a, 0x3aad88f1,
0x3ba11107, 0x3b275dfc, 0x31dced5b, 0x315aa1a0, 0x30563856, 0x30d074ad,
0x324f0bba, 0x32c94741, 0x33c5deb7, 0x3343924c, 0x367d6c62, 0x36fb2099,
0x37f7b96f, 0x3771f594, 0x35ee8a83, 0x3568c678, 0x34645f8e, 0x34e21375,
0x2115723b, 0x21933ec0, 0x209fa736, 0x2019ebcd, 0x228694da, 0x2200d821,
0x230c41d7, 0x238a0d2c, 0x26b4f302, 0x2632bff9, 0x273e260f, 0x27b86af4,
0x252715e3, 0x25a15918, 0x24adc0ee, 0x242b8c15, 0x2ed03cb2, 0x2e567049,
0x2f5ae9bf, 0x2fdca544, 0x2d43da53, 0x2dc596a8, 0x2cc90f5e, 0x2c4f43a5,
0x2971bd8b, 0x29f7f170, 0x28fb6886, 0x287d247d, 0x2ae25b6a, 0x2a641791,
0x2b688e67, 0x2beec29c, 0x7c3347a4, 0x7cb50b5f, 0x7db992a9, 0x7d3fde52,
0x7fa0a145, 0x7f26edbe, 0x7e2a7448, 0x7eac38b3, 0x7b92c69d, 0x7b148a66,
0x7a181390, 0x7a9e5f6b, 0x7801207c, 0x78876c87, 0x798bf571, 0x790db98a,
0x73f6092d, 0x737045d6, 0x727cdc20, 0x72fa90db, 0x7065efcc, 0x70e3a337,
0x71ef3ac1, 0x7169763a, 0x74578814, 0x74d1c4ef, 0x75dd5d19, 0x755b11e2,
0x77c46ef5, 0x7742220e, 0x764ebbf8, 0x76c8f703, 0x633f964d, 0x63b9dab6,
0x62b54340, 0x62330fbb, 0x60ac70ac, 0x602a3c57, 0x6126a5a1, 0x61a0e95a,
0x649e1774, 0x64185b8f, 0x6514c279, 0x65928e82, 0x670df195, 0x678bbd6e,
0x66872498, 0x66016863, 0x6cfad8c4, 0x6c7c943f, 0x6d700dc9, 0x6df64132,
0x6f693e25, 0x6fef72de, 0x6ee3eb28, 0x6e65a7d3, 0x6b5b59fd, 0x6bdd1506,
0x6ad18cf0, 0x6a57c00b, 0x68c8bf1c, 0x684ef3e7, 0x69426a11, 0x69c426ea,
0x422ae476, 0x42aca88d, 0x43a0317b, 0x43267d80, 0x41b90297, 0x413f4e6c,
0x4033d79a, 0x40b59b61, 0x458b654f, 0x450d29b4, 0x4401b042, 0x4487fcb9,
0x461883ae, 0x469ecf55, 0x479256a3, 0x47141a58, 0x4defaaff, 0x4d69e604,
0x4c657ff2, 0x4ce33309, 0x4e7c4c1e, 0x4efa00e5, 0x4ff69913, 0x4f70d5e8,
0x4a4e2bc6, 0x4ac8673d, 0x4bc4fecb, 0x4b42b230, 0x49ddcd27, 0x495b81dc,
0x4857182a, 0x48d154d1, 0x5d26359f, 0x5da07964, 0x5cace092, 0x5c2aac69,
0x5eb5d37e, 0x5e339f85, 0x5f3f0673, 0x5fb94a88, 0x5a87b4a6, 0x5a01f85d,
0x5b0d61ab, 0x5b8b2d50, 0x59145247, 0x59921ebc, 0x589e874a, 0x5818cbb1,
0x52e37b16, 0x526537ed, 0x5369ae1b, 0x53efe2e0, 0x51709df7, 0x51f6d10c,
0x50fa48fa, 0x507c0401, 0x5542fa2f, 0x55c4b6d4, 0x54c82f22, 0x544e63d9,
0x56d11cce, 0x56575035, 0x575bc9c3, 0x57dd8538
};
static gpg_error_t
enc_start (struct b64state *state, FILE *fp, estream_t stream,
const char *title)
{
memset (state, 0, sizeof *state);
state->fp = fp;
state->stream = stream;
state->lasterr = 0;
if (title && !*title)
state->flags |= B64ENC_NO_LINEFEEDS;
else if (title)
{
if (!strncmp (title, "PGP ", 4))
{
state->flags |= B64ENC_USE_PGPCRC;
state->crc = CRCINIT;
}
state->title = xtrystrdup (title);
if (!state->title)
state->lasterr = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
}
return state->lasterr;
}
/* Prepare for base-64 writing to the stream FP. If TITLE is not NULL
and not an empty string, this string will be used as the title for
the armor lines, with TITLE being an empty string, we don't write
the header lines and furthermore even don't write any linefeeds.
If TITLE starts with "PGP " the OpenPGP CRC checksum will be
- written as well. With TITLE beeing NULL, we merely don't write
+ written as well. With TITLE being NULL, we merely don't write
header but make sure that lines are not too long. Note, that we
don't write any output unless at least one byte get written using
b64enc_write. */
gpg_error_t
b64enc_start (struct b64state *state, FILE *fp, const char *title)
{
return enc_start (state, fp, NULL, title);
}
/* Same as b64enc_start but takes an estream. */
gpg_error_t
b64enc_start_es (struct b64state *state, estream_t fp, const char *title)
{
return enc_start (state, NULL, fp, title);
}
static int
my_fputs (const char *string, struct b64state *state)
{
if (state->stream)
return es_fputs (string, state->stream);
else
return fputs (string, state->fp);
}
/* Write NBYTES from BUFFER to the Base 64 stream identified by
STATE. With BUFFER and NBYTES being 0, merely do a fflush on the
stream. */
gpg_error_t
b64enc_write (struct b64state *state, const void *buffer, size_t nbytes)
{
unsigned char radbuf[4];
int idx, quad_count;
const unsigned char *p;
if (state->lasterr)
return state->lasterr;
if (!nbytes)
{
if (buffer)
if (state->stream? es_fflush (state->stream) : fflush (state->fp))
goto write_error;
return 0;
}
if (!(state->flags & B64ENC_DID_HEADER))
{
if (state->title)
{
if ( my_fputs ("-----BEGIN ", state) == EOF
|| my_fputs (state->title, state) == EOF
|| my_fputs ("-----\n", state) == EOF)
goto write_error;
if ( (state->flags & B64ENC_USE_PGPCRC)
&& my_fputs ("\n", state) == EOF)
goto write_error;
}
state->flags |= B64ENC_DID_HEADER;
}
idx = state->idx;
quad_count = state->quad_count;
assert (idx < 4);
memcpy (radbuf, state->radbuf, idx);
if ( (state->flags & B64ENC_USE_PGPCRC) )
{
size_t n;
u32 crc = state->crc;
for (p=buffer, n=nbytes; n; p++, n-- )
crc = ((u32)crc << 8) ^ crc_table[((crc >> 16)&0xff) ^ *p];
state->crc = (crc & 0x00ffffff);
}
for (p=buffer; nbytes; p++, nbytes--)
{
radbuf[idx++] = *p;
if (idx > 2)
{
char tmp[4];
tmp[0] = bintoasc[(*radbuf >> 2) & 077];
tmp[1] = bintoasc[(((*radbuf<<4)&060)|((radbuf[1] >> 4)&017))&077];
tmp[2] = bintoasc[(((radbuf[1]<<2)&074)|((radbuf[2]>>6)&03))&077];
tmp[3] = bintoasc[radbuf[2]&077];
if (state->stream)
{
for (idx=0; idx < 4; idx++)
es_putc (tmp[idx], state->stream);
idx = 0;
if (es_ferror (state->stream))
goto write_error;
}
else
{
for (idx=0; idx < 4; idx++)
putc (tmp[idx], state->fp);
idx = 0;
if (ferror (state->fp))
goto write_error;
}
if (++quad_count >= (64/4))
{
quad_count = 0;
if (!(state->flags & B64ENC_NO_LINEFEEDS)
&& my_fputs ("\n", state) == EOF)
goto write_error;
}
}
}
memcpy (state->radbuf, radbuf, idx);
state->idx = idx;
state->quad_count = quad_count;
return 0;
write_error:
state->lasterr = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
if (state->title)
{
xfree (state->title);
state->title = NULL;
}
return state->lasterr;
}
gpg_error_t
b64enc_finish (struct b64state *state)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
unsigned char radbuf[4];
int idx, quad_count;
char tmp[4];
if (state->lasterr)
return state->lasterr;
if (!(state->flags & B64ENC_DID_HEADER))
goto cleanup;
/* Flush the base64 encoding */
idx = state->idx;
quad_count = state->quad_count;
assert (idx < 4);
memcpy (radbuf, state->radbuf, idx);
if (idx)
{
tmp[0] = bintoasc[(*radbuf>>2)&077];
if (idx == 1)
{
tmp[1] = bintoasc[((*radbuf << 4) & 060) & 077];
tmp[2] = '=';
tmp[3] = '=';
}
else
{
tmp[1] = bintoasc[(((*radbuf<<4)&060)|((radbuf[1]>>4)&017))&077];
tmp[2] = bintoasc[((radbuf[1] << 2) & 074) & 077];
tmp[3] = '=';
}
if (state->stream)
{
for (idx=0; idx < 4; idx++)
es_putc (tmp[idx], state->stream);
if (es_ferror (state->stream))
goto write_error;
}
else
{
for (idx=0; idx < 4; idx++)
putc (tmp[idx], state->fp);
if (ferror (state->fp))
goto write_error;
}
if (++quad_count >= (64/4))
{
quad_count = 0;
if (!(state->flags & B64ENC_NO_LINEFEEDS)
&& my_fputs ("\n", state) == EOF)
goto write_error;
}
}
/* Finish the last line and write the trailer. */
if (quad_count
&& !(state->flags & B64ENC_NO_LINEFEEDS)
&& my_fputs ("\n", state) == EOF)
goto write_error;
if ( (state->flags & B64ENC_USE_PGPCRC) )
{
/* Write the CRC. */
my_fputs ("=", state);
radbuf[0] = state->crc >>16;
radbuf[1] = state->crc >> 8;
radbuf[2] = state->crc;
tmp[0] = bintoasc[(*radbuf>>2)&077];
tmp[1] = bintoasc[(((*radbuf<<4)&060)|((radbuf[1]>>4)&017))&077];
tmp[2] = bintoasc[(((radbuf[1]<<2)&074)|((radbuf[2]>>6)&03))&077];
tmp[3] = bintoasc[radbuf[2]&077];
if (state->stream)
{
for (idx=0; idx < 4; idx++)
es_putc (tmp[idx], state->stream);
if (es_ferror (state->stream))
goto write_error;
}
else
{
for (idx=0; idx < 4; idx++)
putc (tmp[idx], state->fp);
if (ferror (state->fp))
goto write_error;
}
if (!(state->flags & B64ENC_NO_LINEFEEDS)
&& my_fputs ("\n", state) == EOF)
goto write_error;
}
if (state->title)
{
if ( my_fputs ("-----END ", state) == EOF
|| my_fputs (state->title, state) == EOF
|| my_fputs ("-----\n", state) == EOF)
goto write_error;
}
goto cleanup;
write_error:
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
cleanup:
if (state->title)
{
xfree (state->title);
state->title = NULL;
}
state->fp = NULL;
state->stream = NULL;
state->lasterr = err;
return err;
}
diff --git a/common/recsel.c b/common/recsel.c
index 866861b87..ef71c4598 100644
--- a/common/recsel.c
+++ b/common/recsel.c
@@ -1,624 +1,624 @@
/* recsel.c - Record selection
* Copyright (C) 2014, 2016 Werner Koch
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of either
*
* - the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by the Free
* Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at
* your option) any later version.
*
* or
*
* - the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
* Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at
* your option) any later version.
*
* or both in parallel, as here.
*
* This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "util.h"
#include "recsel.h"
/* Select operators. */
typedef enum
{
SELECT_SAME,
SELECT_SUB,
SELECT_NONEMPTY,
SELECT_ISTRUE,
SELECT_EQ, /* Numerically equal. */
SELECT_LE,
SELECT_GE,
SELECT_LT,
SELECT_GT,
SELECT_STRLE, /* String is less or equal. */
SELECT_STRGE,
SELECT_STRLT,
SELECT_STRGT
} select_op_t;
/* Definition for a select expression. */
struct recsel_expr_s
{
recsel_expr_t next;
select_op_t op; /* Operation code. */
unsigned int not:1; /* Negate operators. */
unsigned int disjun:1;/* Start of a disjunction. */
unsigned int xcase:1; /* String match is case sensitive. */
const char *value; /* (Points into NAME.) */
long numvalue; /* strtol of VALUE. */
char name[1]; /* Name of the property. */
};
/* Helper */
static inline gpg_error_t
my_error_from_syserror (void)
{
return gpg_err_make (default_errsource, gpg_err_code_from_syserror ());
}
/* Helper */
static inline gpg_error_t
my_error (gpg_err_code_t ec)
{
return gpg_err_make (default_errsource, ec);
}
/* This is a case-sensitive version of our memistr. I wonder why no
* standard function memstr exists but I better do not use the name
* memstr to avoid future conflicts.
*
* FIXME: Move this to a stringhelp.c
*/
static const char *
my_memstr (const void *buffer, size_t buflen, const char *sub)
{
const unsigned char *buf = buffer;
const unsigned char *t = (const unsigned char *)buf;
const unsigned char *s = (const unsigned char *)sub;
size_t n = buflen;
for ( ; n ; t++, n-- )
{
if (*t == *s)
{
for (buf = t++, buflen = n--, s++; n && *t ==*s; t++, s++, n--)
;
if (!*s)
return (const char*)buf;
t = (const unsigned char *)buf;
s = (const unsigned char *)sub ;
n = buflen;
}
}
return NULL;
}
/* Return a pointer to the next logical connection operator or NULL if
* none. */
static char *
find_next_lc (char *string)
{
char *p1, *p2;
p1 = strchr (string, '&');
if (p1 && p1[1] != '&')
p1 = NULL;
p2 = strchr (string, '|');
if (p2 && p2[1] != '|')
p2 = NULL;
if (p1 && !p2)
return p1;
if (!p1)
return p2;
return p1 < p2 ? p1 : p2;
}
/* Parse an expression. The expression syntax is:
*
* [<lc>] {{<flag>} PROPNAME <op> VALUE [<lc>]}
*
* A [] indicates an optional part, a {} a repetition. PROPNAME and
* VALUE may not be the empty string. White space between the
* elements is ignored. Numerical values are computed as long int;
* standard C notation applies. <lc> is the logical connection
* operator; either "&&" for a conjunction or "||" for a disjunction.
* A conjunction is assumed at the begin of an expression and
* conjunctions have higher precedence than disjunctions. If VALUE
* starts with one of the characters used in any <op> a space after
* the <op> is required. A VALUE is terminated by an <lc> unless the
* "--" <flag> is used in which case the VALUE spans to the end of the
* expression. <op> may be any of
*
* =~ Substring must match
* !~ Substring must not match
* = The full string must match
* <> The full string must not match
* == The numerical value must match
* != The numerical value must not match
* <= The numerical value of the field must be LE than the value.
* < The numerical value of the field must be LT than the value.
* >= The numerical value of the field must be GT than the value.
* >= The numerical value of the field must be GE than the value.
* -n True if value is not empty (no VALUE parameter allowed).
* -z True if value is empty (no VALUE parameter allowed).
* -t Alias for "PROPNAME != 0" (no VALUE parameter allowed).
* -f Alias for "PROPNAME == 0" (no VALUE parameter allowed).
*
* Values for <flag> must be space separated and any of:
*
* -- VALUE spans to the end of the expression.
* -c The string match in this part is done case-sensitive.
*
* For example four calls to recsel_parse_expr() with these values for
* EXPR
*
* "uid =~ Alfa"
* "&& uid !~ Test"
* "|| uid =~ Alpha"
* "uid !~ Test"
*
* or the equivalent expression
*
* "uid =~ Alfa" && uid !~ Test" || uid =~ Alpha" && "uid !~ Test"
*
* are making a selector for records where the "uid" property contains
* the strings "Alfa" or "Alpha" but not the String "test".
*
* The caller must pass the address of a selector variable to this
* function and initialize the value of the function to NULL before
* the first call. recset_release needs to be called to free the
* selector.
*/
gpg_error_t
recsel_parse_expr (recsel_expr_t *selector, const char *expression)
{
recsel_expr_t se_head = NULL;
recsel_expr_t se, se2;
char *expr_buffer;
char *expr;
char *s0, *s;
int toend = 0;
int xcase = 0;
int disjun = 0;
char *next_lc = NULL;
while (*expression == ' ' || *expression == '\t')
expression++;
expr_buffer = xtrystrdup (expression);
if (!expr_buffer)
return my_error_from_syserror ();
expr = expr_buffer;
if (*expr == '|' && expr[1] == '|')
{
disjun = 1;
expr += 2;
}
else if (*expr == '&' && expr[1] == '&')
expr += 2;
next_term:
while (*expr == ' ' || *expr == '\t')
expr++;
while (*expr == '-')
{
switch (*++expr)
{
case '-': toend = 1; break;
case 'c': xcase = 1; break;
default:
log_error ("invalid flag '-%c' in expression\n", *expr);
recsel_release (se_head);
xfree (expr_buffer);
return my_error (GPG_ERR_INV_FLAG);
}
expr++;
while (*expr == ' ' || *expr == '\t')
expr++;
}
next_lc = toend? NULL : find_next_lc (expr);
if (next_lc)
*next_lc = 0; /* Terminate this term. */
se = xtrymalloc (sizeof *se + strlen (expr));
if (!se)
return my_error_from_syserror ();
strcpy (se->name, expr);
se->next = NULL;
se->not = 0;
se->disjun = disjun;
se->xcase = xcase;
if (!se_head)
se_head = se;
else
{
for (se2 = se_head; se2->next; se2 = se2->next)
;
se2->next = se;
}
s = strpbrk (expr, "=<>!~-");
if (!s || s == expr )
{
log_error ("no field name given in expression\n");
recsel_release (se_head);
xfree (expr_buffer);
return my_error (GPG_ERR_NO_NAME);
}
s0 = s;
if (!strncmp (s, "=~", 2))
{
se->op = SELECT_SUB;
s += 2;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, "!~", 2))
{
se->op = SELECT_SUB;
se->not = 1;
s += 2;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, "<>", 2))
{
se->op = SELECT_SAME;
se->not = 1;
s += 2;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, "==", 2))
{
se->op = SELECT_EQ;
s += 2;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, "!=", 2))
{
se->op = SELECT_EQ;
se->not = 1;
s += 2;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, "<=", 2))
{
se->op = SELECT_LE;
s += 2;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, ">=", 2))
{
se->op = SELECT_GE;
s += 2;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, "<", 1))
{
se->op = SELECT_LT;
s += 1;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, ">", 1))
{
se->op = SELECT_GT;
s += 1;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, "=", 1))
{
se->op = SELECT_SAME;
s += 1;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, "-z", 2))
{
se->op = SELECT_NONEMPTY;
se->not = 1;
s += 2;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, "-n", 2))
{
se->op = SELECT_NONEMPTY;
s += 2;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, "-f", 2))
{
se->op = SELECT_ISTRUE;
se->not = 1;
s += 2;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, "-t", 2))
{
se->op = SELECT_ISTRUE;
s += 2;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, "-le", 3))
{
se->op = SELECT_STRLE;
s += 3;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, "-ge", 3))
{
se->op = SELECT_STRGE;
s += 3;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, "-lt", 3))
{
se->op = SELECT_STRLT;
s += 3;
}
else if (!strncmp (s, "-gt", 3))
{
se->op = SELECT_STRGT;
s += 3;
}
else
{
log_error ("invalid operator in expression\n");
recsel_release (se_head);
xfree (expr_buffer);
return my_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OP);
}
/* We require that a space is used if the value starts with any of
the operator characters. */
if (se->op == SELECT_NONEMPTY || se->op == SELECT_ISTRUE)
;
else if (strchr ("=<>!~", *s))
{
log_error ("invalid operator in expression\n");
recsel_release (se_head);
xfree (expr_buffer);
return my_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OP);
}
while (*s == ' ' || *s == '\t')
s++;
if (se->op == SELECT_NONEMPTY || se->op == SELECT_ISTRUE)
{
if (*s)
{
log_error ("value given for -n or -z\n");
recsel_release (se_head);
xfree (expr_buffer);
return my_error (GPG_ERR_SYNTAX);
}
}
else
{
if (!*s)
{
log_error ("no value given in expression\n");
recsel_release (se_head);
xfree (expr_buffer);
return my_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE);
}
}
se->name[s0 - expr] = 0;
trim_spaces (se->name);
if (!se->name[0])
{
log_error ("no field name given in expression\n");
recsel_release (se_head);
xfree (expr_buffer);
return my_error (GPG_ERR_NO_NAME);
}
trim_spaces (se->name + (s - expr));
se->value = se->name + (s - expr);
if (!se->value[0] && !(se->op == SELECT_NONEMPTY || se->op == SELECT_ISTRUE))
{
log_error ("no value given in expression\n");
recsel_release (se_head);
xfree (expr_buffer);
return my_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE);
}
se->numvalue = strtol (se->value, NULL, 0);
if (next_lc)
{
disjun = next_lc[1] == '|';
expr = next_lc + 2;
goto next_term;
}
/* Read:y Append to passes last selector. */
if (!*selector)
*selector = se_head;
else
{
for (se2 = *selector; se2->next; se2 = se2->next)
;
se2->next = se_head;
}
xfree (expr_buffer);
return 0;
}
void
recsel_release (recsel_expr_t a)
{
while (a)
{
recsel_expr_t tmp = a->next;
xfree (a);
a = tmp;
}
}
void
recsel_dump (recsel_expr_t selector)
{
recsel_expr_t se;
log_debug ("--- Begin selectors ---\n");
for (se = selector; se; se = se->next)
{
log_debug ("%s %s %s %s '%s'\n",
se==selector? " ": (se->disjun? "||":"&&"),
se->xcase? "-c":" ",
se->name,
se->op == SELECT_SAME? (se->not? "<>":"= "):
se->op == SELECT_SUB? (se->not? "!~":"=~"):
se->op == SELECT_NONEMPTY?(se->not? "-z":"-n"):
se->op == SELECT_ISTRUE? (se->not? "-f":"-t"):
se->op == SELECT_EQ? (se->not? "!=":"=="):
se->op == SELECT_LT? "< ":
se->op == SELECT_LE? "<=":
se->op == SELECT_GT? "> ":
se->op == SELECT_GE? ">=":
se->op == SELECT_STRLT? "-lt":
se->op == SELECT_STRLE? "-le":
se->op == SELECT_STRGT? "-gt":
se->op == SELECT_STRGE? "-ge":
/**/ "[oops]",
se->value);
}
log_debug ("--- End selectors ---\n");
}
/* Return true if the record RECORD has been selected. The GETVAL
* function is called with COOKIE and the NAME of a property used in
* the expression. */
int
recsel_select (recsel_expr_t selector,
const char *(*getval)(void *cookie, const char *propname),
void *cookie)
{
recsel_expr_t se;
const char *value;
size_t selen, valuelen;
long numvalue;
int result = 1;
se = selector;
while (se)
{
value = getval? getval (cookie, se->name) : NULL;
if (!value)
value = "";
if (!*value)
{
/* Field is empty. */
result = 0;
}
else /* Field has a value. */
{
valuelen = strlen (value);
numvalue = strtol (value, NULL, 0);
selen = strlen (se->value);
switch (se->op)
{
case SELECT_SAME:
if (se->xcase)
result = (valuelen==selen && !memcmp (value,se->value,selen));
else
result = (valuelen==selen && !memicmp (value,se->value,selen));
break;
case SELECT_SUB:
if (se->xcase)
result = !!my_memstr (value, valuelen, se->value);
else
result = !!memistr (value, valuelen, se->value);
break;
case SELECT_NONEMPTY:
result = !!valuelen;
break;
case SELECT_ISTRUE:
result = !!numvalue;
break;
case SELECT_EQ:
result = (numvalue == se->numvalue);
break;
case SELECT_GT:
result = (numvalue > se->numvalue);
break;
case SELECT_GE:
result = (numvalue >= se->numvalue);
break;
case SELECT_LT:
result = (numvalue < se->numvalue);
break;
case SELECT_LE:
result = (numvalue <= se->numvalue);
break;
case SELECT_STRGT:
if (se->xcase)
result = strcmp (value, se->value) > 0;
else
result = strcasecmp (value, se->value) > 0;
break;
case SELECT_STRGE:
if (se->xcase)
result = strcmp (value, se->value) >= 0;
else
result = strcasecmp (value, se->value) >= 0;
break;
case SELECT_STRLT:
if (se->xcase)
result = strcmp (value, se->value) < 0;
else
result = strcasecmp (value, se->value) < 0;
break;
case SELECT_STRLE:
if (se->xcase)
result = strcmp (value, se->value) <= 0;
else
result = strcasecmp (value, se->value) <= 0;
break;
}
}
if (se->not)
result = !result;
if (result)
{
/* This expression evaluated to true. See wether there are
remaining expressions in this conjunction. */
if (!se->next || se->next->disjun)
break; /* All expressions are true. Return True. */
se = se->next; /* Test the next. */
}
else
{
/* This expression evaluated to false and thus the
- * conjuction evaluates to false. We skip over the
+ * conjunction evaluates to false. We skip over the
* remaining expressions of this conjunction and continue
* with the next disjunction if any. */
do
se = se->next;
while (se && !se->disjun);
}
}
return result;
}
diff --git a/doc/DETAILS b/doc/DETAILS
index b5431d004..1e9682dcd 100644
--- a/doc/DETAILS
+++ b/doc/DETAILS
@@ -1,1378 +1,1380 @@
# doc/DETAILS -*- org -*-
#+TITLE: GnuPG Details
# Globally disable superscripts and subscripts:
#+OPTIONS: ^:{}
#
# Note: This file uses org-mode; it should be easy to read as plain
# text but be aware of some markup peculiarities: Verbatim code is
# enclosed in #+begin-example, #+end-example blocks or marked by a
# colon as the first non-white-space character, words bracketed with
# equal signs indicate a monospace font, and the usual /italics/,
# *bold*, and _underline_ conventions are recognized.
This is the DETAILS file for GnuPG which specifies some internals and
parts of the external API for GPG and GPGSM.
* Format of the colon listings
+
+*
The format is a based on colon separated record, each recods starts
with a tag string and extends to the end of the line. Here is an
example:
#+begin_example
$ gpg --with-colons --list-keys \
--with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint wk@gnupg.org
pub:f:1024:17:6C7EE1B8621CC013:899817715:1055898235::m:::scESC:
fpr:::::::::ECAF7590EB3443B5C7CF3ACB6C7EE1B8621CC013:
uid:f::::::::Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>:
uid:f::::::::Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>:
sub:f:1536:16:06AD222CADF6A6E1:919537416:1036177416:::::e:
fpr:::::::::CF8BCC4B18DE08FCD8A1615906AD222CADF6A6E1:
sub:r:1536:20:5CE086B5B5A18FF4:899817788:1025961788:::::esc:
fpr:::::::::AB059359A3B81F410FCFF97F5CE086B5B5A18FF4:
#+end_example
Note that new version of GnuPG or the use of certain options may add
new fields to the output. Parsers should not assume a limit on the
number of fields per line. Some fields are not yet used or only used
with certain record types; parsers should ignore fields they are not
aware of.
The double =--with-fingerprint= prints the fingerprint for the subkeys
too. Old versions of gpg used a slightly different format and required
the use of the option =--fixed-list-mode= to conform to the format
described here.
** Description of the fields
*** Field 1 - Type of record
- pub :: Public key
- crt :: X.509 certificate
- crs :: X.509 certificate and private key available
- sub :: Subkey (secondary key)
- sec :: Secret key
- ssb :: Secret subkey (secondary key)
- uid :: User id
- uat :: User attribute (same as user id except for field 10).
- sig :: Signature
- rev :: Revocation signature
- fpr :: Fingerprint (fingerprint is in field 10)
- pkd :: Public key data [*]
- grp :: Keygrip
- rvk :: Revocation key
- tfs :: TOFU statistics [*]
- tru :: Trust database information [*]
- spk :: Signature subpacket [*]
- cfg :: Configuration data [*]
Records marked with an asterisk are described at [[*Special%20field%20formats][*Special fields]].
*** Field 2 - Validity
This is a letter describing the computed validity of a key.
Currently this is a single letter, but be prepared that additional
information may follow in some future versions. Note that GnuPG <
2.1 does not set this field for secret key listings.
- o :: Unknown (this key is new to the system)
- i :: The key is invalid (e.g. due to a missing self-signature)
- d :: The key has been disabled
(deprecated - use the 'D' in field 12 instead)
- r :: The key has been revoked
- e :: The key has expired
- - :: Unknown validity (i.e. no value assigned)
- q :: Undefined validity. '-' and 'q' may safely be treated as
the same value for most purposes
- n :: The key is not valid
- m :: The key is marginal valid.
- f :: The key is fully valid
- u :: The key is ultimately valid. This often means that the
secret key is available, but any key may be marked as
ultimately valid.
- w :: The key has a well known private part.
- s :: The key has special validity. This means that it might be
- self-signed and expected to be used in the STEED sytem.
+ self-signed and expected to be used in the STEED system.
If the validity information is given for a UID or UAT record, it
describes the validity calculated based on this user ID. If given
for a key record it describes the validity taken from the best
rated user ID.
For X.509 certificates a 'u' is used for a trusted root
certificate (i.e. for the trust anchor) and an 'f' for all other
valid certificates.
*** Field 3 - Key length
The length of key in bits.
*** Field 4 - Public key algorithm
The values here are those from the OpenPGP specs or if they are
greather than 255 the algorithm ids as used by Libgcrypt.
*** Field 5 - KeyID
This is the 64 bit keyid as specified by OpenPGP and the last 64
bit of the SHA-1 fingerprint of an X.509 certifciate.
*** Field 6 - Creation date
The creation date of the key is given in UTC. For UID and UAT
records, this is used for the self-signature date. Note that the
- date is usally printed in seconds since epoch, however, we are
+ date is usually printed in seconds since epoch, however, we are
migrating to an ISO 8601 format (e.g. "19660205T091500"). This is
currently only relevant for X.509. A simple way to detect the new
format is to scan for the 'T'. Note that old versions of gpg
without using the =--fixed-list-mode= option used a "yyyy-mm-tt"
format.
*** Field 7 - Expiration date
Key or UID/UAT expiration date or empty if it does not expire.
*** Field 8 - Certificate S/N, UID hash, trust signature info
Used for serial number in crt records. For UID and UAT records,
this is a hash of the user ID contents used to represent that
exact user ID. For trust signatures, this is the trust depth
- seperated by the trust value by a space.
+ separated by the trust value by a space.
*** Field 9 - Ownertrust
This is only used on primary keys. This is a single letter, but
be prepared that additional information may follow in future
versions. For trust signatures with a regular expression, this is
the regular expression value, quoted as in field 10.
*** Field 10 - User-ID
The value is quoted like a C string to avoid control characters
(the colon is quoted =\x3a=). For a "pub" record this field is
not used on --fixed-list-mode. A UAT record puts the attribute
subpacket count here, a space, and then the total attribute
subpacket size. In gpgsm the issuer name comes here. A FPR
record stores the fingerprint here. The fingerprint of a
revocation key is stored here.
*** Field 11 - Signature class
Signature class as per RFC-4880. This is a 2 digit hexnumber
followed by either the letter 'x' for an exportable signature or
the letter 'l' for a local-only signature. The class byte of an
revocation key is also given here, 'x' and 'l' is used the same
way. This field if not used for X.509.
*** Field 12 - Key capabilities
The defined capabilities are:
- e :: Encrypt
- s :: Sign
- c :: Certify
- a :: Authentication
- ? :: Unknown capability
A key may have any combination of them in any order. In addition
to these letters, the primary key has uppercase versions of the
letters to denote the _usable_ capabilities of the entire key, and
a potential letter 'D' to indicate a disabled key.
*** Field 13 - Issuer certificate fingerprint or other info
Used in FPR records for S/MIME keys to store the fingerprint of
the issuer certificate. This is useful to build the certificate
path based on certificates stored in the local key database it is
only filled if the issuer certificate is available. The root has
been reached if this is the same string as the fingerprint. The
advantage of using this value is that it is guaranteed to have
been been build by the same lookup algorithm as gpgsm uses.
For "uid" records this field lists the preferences in the same way
gpg's --edit-key menu does.
For "sig" records, this is the fingerprint of the key that issued
the signature. Note that this is only filled in if the signature
verified correctly. Note also that for various technical reasons,
this fingerprint is only available if --no-sig-cache is used.
*** Field 14 - Flag field
Flag field used in the --edit menu output
*** Field 15 - S/N of a token
Used in sec/ssb to print the serial number of a token (internal
protect mode 1002) or a '#' if that key is a simple stub (internal
protect mode 1001). If the option --with-secret is used and a
secret key is available for the public key, a '+' indicates this.
*** Field 16 - Hash algorithm
For sig records, this is the used hash algorithm. For example:
2 = SHA-1, 8 = SHA-256.
*** Field 17 - Curve name
For pub, sub, sec, and ssb records this field is used for the ECC
curve name.
** Special fields
*** PKD - Public key data
If field 1 has the tag "pkd", a listing looks like this:
#+begin_example
pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB:
! ! !-- the value
! !------ for information number of bits in the value
!--------- index (eg. DSA goes from 0 to 3: p,q,g,y)
#+end_example
*** TFS - TOFU statistics
This field may follows a UID record to convey information about
the TOFU database. The information is similar to a TOFU_STATS
status line.
- Field 2 :: tfs record version (must be 1)
- Field 3 :: validity - A number with validity code.
- Field 4 :: signcount - The number of signatures seen.
- Field 5 :: encrcount - The number of encryptions done.
- Field 6 :: policy - A string with the policy
- Field 7 :: signture-first-seen - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
- Field 8 :: signature-most-recent-seen - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
- Field 9 :: encryption-first-done - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
- Field 10 :: encryption-most-recent-done - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
*** TRU - Trust database information
Example for a "tru" trust base record:
#+begin_example
tru:o:0:1166697654:1:3:1:5
#+end_example
- Field 2 :: Reason for staleness of trust. If this field is
empty, then the trustdb is not stale. This field may
have multiple flags in it:
- o :: Trustdb is old
- t :: Trustdb was built with a different trust model
than the one we are using now.
- Field 3 :: Trust model
- 0 :: Classic trust model, as used in PGP 2.x.
- 1 :: PGP trust model, as used in PGP 6 and later.
This is the same as the classic trust model,
except for the addition of trust signatures.
GnuPG before version 1.4 used the classic trust model
by default. GnuPG 1.4 and later uses the PGP trust
model by default.
- Field 4 :: Date trustdb was created in seconds since Epoch.
- Field 5 :: Date trustdb will expire in seconds since Epoch.
- Field 6 :: Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
key signer (gpg's option --marginals-needed).
- Field 7 :: Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
key signer. (gpg's option --completes-needed)
- Field 8 :: Maximum depth of a certification chain. (gpg's option
--max-cert-depth)
*** SPK - Signature subpacket records
- Field 2 :: Subpacket number as per RFC-4880 and later.
- Field 3 :: Flags in hex. Currently the only two bits assigned
are 1, to indicate that the subpacket came from the
hashed part of the signature, and 2, to indicate the
subpacket was marked critical.
- Field 4 :: Length of the subpacket. Note that this is the
length of the subpacket, and not the length of field
5 below. Due to the need for %-encoding, the length
of field 5 may be up to 3x this value.
- Field 5 :: The subpacket data. Printable ASCII is shown as
ASCII, but other values are rendered as %XX where XX
is the hex value for the byte.
*** CFG - Configuration data
--list-config outputs information about the GnuPG configuration
for the benefit of frontends or other programs that call GnuPG.
There are several list-config items, all colon delimited like the
rest of the --with-colons output. The first field is always "cfg"
to indicate configuration information. The second field is one of
(with examples):
- version :: The third field contains the version of GnuPG.
: cfg:version:1.3.5
- pubkey :: The third field contains the public key algorithms
this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
semicolons. The algorithm numbers are as specified in
RFC-4880. Note that in contrast to the --status-fd
interface these are _not_ the Libgcrypt identifiers.
Using =pubkeyname= prints names instead of numbers.
: cfg:pubkey:1;2;3;16;17
- cipher :: The third field contains the symmetric ciphers this
version of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons.
The cipher numbers are as specified in RFC-4880.
Using =ciphername= prints names instead of numbers.
: cfg:cipher:2;3;4;7;8;9;10
- digest :: The third field contains the digest (hash) algorithms
this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
semicolons. The digest numbers are as specified in
RFC-4880. Using =digestname= prints names instead of
numbers.
: cfg:digest:1;2;3;8;9;10
- compress :: The third field contains the compression algorithms
this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
semicolons. The algorithm numbers are as specified
in RFC-4880.
: cfg:compress:0;1;2;3
- group :: The third field contains the name of the group, and the
fourth field contains the values that the group expands
to, separated by semicolons.
For example, a group of:
: group mynames = paige 0x12345678 joe patti
would result in:
: cfg:group:mynames:patti;joe;0x12345678;paige
- curve :: The third field contains the curve names this version
of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons. Using
=curveoid= prints OIDs instead of numbers.
: cfg:curve:ed25519;nistp256;nistp384;nistp521
* Format of the --status-fd output
Every line is prefixed with "[GNUPG:] ", followed by a keyword with
the type of the status line and some arguments depending on the type
(maybe none); an application should always be prepared to see new
keyworkds or more arguments in future versions.
** General status codes
*** NEWSIG [<signers_uid>]
Is issued right before a signature verification starts. This is
useful to define a context for parsing ERROR status messages.
arguments are currently defined. If SIGNERS_UID is given and is
not "-" this is the percent escape value of the OpenPGP Signer's
User ID signature sub-packet.
*** GOODSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
The signature with the keyid is good. For each signature only one
of the codes GOODSIG, BADSIG, EXPSIG, EXPKEYSIG, REVKEYSIG or
ERRSIG will be emitted. In the past they were used as a marker
for a new signature; new code should use the NEWSIG status
instead. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if
it is available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually
also be available for OpenPGP.
*** EXPSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature is
expired. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if
it is available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually
also be available for OpenPGP.
*** EXPKEYSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made
by an expired key. The username is the primary one encoded in
UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the
long keyid if it is available. This is the case with CMS and
might eventually also be available for OpenPGP.
*** REVKEYSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made
by a revoked key. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8
and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long
keyid if it is available. This is the case with CMS and might
eventually also beñ available for OpenPGP.
*** BADSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
The signature with the keyid has not been verified okay. The
username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The
fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if it is
available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually also be
available for OpenPGP.
*** ERRSIG <keyid> <pkalgo> <hashalgo> <sig_class> <time> <rc>
It was not possible to check the signature. This may be caused by
a missing public key or an unsupported algorithm. A RC of 4
indicates unknown algorithm, a 9 indicates a missing public
key. The other fields give more information about this signature.
sig_class is a 2 byte hex-value. The fingerprint may be used
instead of the keyid if it is available. This is the case with
gpgsm and might eventually also be available for OpenPGP.
Note, that TIME may either be the number of seconds since Epoch or
an ISO 8601 string. The latter can be detected by the presence of
the letter 'T'.
*** VALIDSIG <args>
The args are:
- <fingerprint_in_hex>
- <sig_creation_date>
- <sig-timestamp>
- <expire-timestamp>
- <sig-version>
- <reserved>
- <pubkey-algo>
- <hash-algo>
- <sig-class>
- [ <primary-key-fpr> ]
This status indicates that the signature is cryptographically
valid. This is similar to GOODSIG, EXPSIG, EXPKEYSIG, or REVKEYSIG
(depending on the date and the state of the signature and signing
key) but has the fingerprint as the argument. Multiple status
lines (VALIDSIG and the other appropriate *SIG status) are emitted
for a valid signature. All arguments here are on one long line.
sig-timestamp is the signature creation time in seconds after the
epoch. expire-timestamp is the signature expiration time in
seconds after the epoch (zero means "does not
expire"). sig-version, pubkey-algo, hash-algo, and sig-class (a
2-byte hex value) are all straight from the signature packet.
PRIMARY-KEY-FPR is the fingerprint of the primary key or identical
to the first argument. This is useful to get back to the primary
key without running gpg again for this purpose.
The primary-key-fpr parameter is used for OpenPGP and not
available for CMS signatures. The sig-version as well as the sig
class is not defined for CMS and currently set to 0 and 00.
Note, that *-TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
of the letter 'T'.
*** SIG_ID <radix64_string> <sig_creation_date> <sig-timestamp>
This is emitted only for signatures of class 0 or 1 which have
been verified okay. The string is a signature id and may be used
in applications to detect replay attacks of signed messages. Note
that only DLP algorithms give unique ids - others may yield
duplicated ones when they have been created in the same second.
Note, that SIG-TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
of the letter 'T'.
*** ENC_TO <long_keyid> <keytype> <keylength>
The message is encrypted to this LONG_KEYID. KEYTYPE is the
numerical value of the public key algorithm or 0 if it is not
known, KEYLENGTH is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known
(which is currently always the case). Gpg prints this line
always; Gpgsm only if it knows the certificate.
*** BEGIN_DECRYPTION
Mark the start of the actual decryption process. This is also
emitted when in --list-only mode.
*** END_DECRYPTION
Mark the end of the actual decryption process. This are also
emitted when in --list-only mode.
*** DECRYPTION_INFO <mdc_method> <sym_algo>
Print information about the symmetric encryption algorithm and the
MDC method. This will be emitted even if the decryption fails.
*** DECRYPTION_FAILED
The symmetric decryption failed - one reason could be a wrong
passphrase for a symmetrical encrypted message.
*** DECRYPTION_OKAY
The decryption process succeeded. This means, that either the
correct secret key has been used or the correct passphrase for a
symmetric encrypted message was given. The program itself may
return an errorcode because it may not be possible to verify a
signature for some reasons.
*** SESSION_KEY <algo>:<hexdigits>
The session key used to decrypt the message. This message will
only be emitted if the option --show-session-key is used. The
format is suitable to be passed as value for the option
--override-session-key. It is not an indication that the
decryption will or has succeeded.
*** BEGIN_ENCRYPTION <mdc_method> <sym_algo>
Mark the start of the actual encryption process.
*** END_ENCRYPTION
Mark the end of the actual encryption process.
*** FILE_START <what> <filename>
Start processing a file <filename>. <what> indicates the performed
operation:
- 1 :: verify
- 2 :: encrypt
- 3 :: decrypt
*** FILE_DONE
Marks the end of a file processing which has been started
by FILE_START.
*** BEGIN_SIGNING
Mark the start of the actual signing process. This may be used as
an indication that all requested secret keys are ready for use.
*** ALREADY_SIGNED <long-keyid>
Warning: This is experimental and might be removed at any time.
*** SIG_CREATED <type> <pk_algo> <hash_algo> <class> <timestamp> <keyfpr>
A signature has been created using these parameters.
Values for type <type> are:
- D :: detached
- C :: cleartext
- S :: standard
(only the first character should be checked)
<class> are 2 hex digits with the OpenPGP signature class.
Note, that TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since Epoch
or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence of the
letter 'T'.
*** NOTATION_
There are actually three related status codes to convey notation
data:
- NOTATION_NAME <name>
- NOTATION_FLAGS <critical> <human_readable>
- NOTATION_DATA <string>
<name> and <string> are %XX escaped. The data may be split among
several NOTATION_DATA lines. NOTATION_FLAGS is emitted after
NOTATION_NAME and gives the critical and human readable flags;
the flag values are either 0 or 1.
*** POLICY_URL <string>
Note that URL in <string> is %XX escaped.
*** PLAINTEXT <format> <timestamp> <filename>
This indicates the format of the plaintext that is about to be
written. The format is a 1 byte hex code that shows the format of
the plaintext: 62 ('b') is binary data, 74 ('t') is text data with
no character set specified, and 75 ('u') is text data encoded in
the UTF-8 character set. The timestamp is in seconds since the
epoch. If a filename is available it gets printed as the third
argument, percent-escaped as usual.
*** PLAINTEXT_LENGTH <length>
This indicates the length of the plaintext that is about to be
written. Note that if the plaintext packet has partial length
encoding it is not possible to know the length ahead of time. In
that case, this status tag does not appear.
*** ATTRIBUTE <arguments>
The list or arguments are:
- <fpr>
- <octets>
- <type>
- <index>
- <count>
- <timestamp>
- <expiredate>
- <flags>
This is one long line issued for each attribute subpacket when an
attribute packet is seen during key listing. <fpr> is the
fingerprint of the key. <octets> is the length of the attribute
subpacket. <type> is the attribute type (e.g. 1 for an image).
<index> and <count> indicate that this is the N-th indexed
subpacket of count total subpackets in this attribute packet.
<timestamp> and <expiredate> are from the self-signature on the
attribute packet. If the attribute packet does not have a valid
self-signature, then the timestamp is 0. <flags> are a bitwise OR
of:
- 0x01 :: this attribute packet is a primary uid
- 0x02 :: this attribute packet is revoked
- 0x04 :: this attribute packet is expired
*** SIG_SUBPACKET <type> <flags> <len> <data>
This indicates that a signature subpacket was seen. The format is
the same as the "spk" record above.
** Key related
*** INV_RECP, INV_SGNR
The two similar status codes:
- INV_RECP <reason> <requested_recipient>
- INV_SGNR <reason> <requested_sender>
are issued for each unusable recipient/sender. The reasons codes
currently in use are:
- 0 :: No specific reason given
- 1 :: Not Found
- 2 :: Ambigious specification
- 3 :: Wrong key usage
- 4 :: Key revoked
- 5 :: Key expired
- 6 :: No CRL known
- 7 :: CRL too old
- 8 :: Policy mismatch
- 9 :: Not a secret key
- 10 :: Key not trusted
- 11 :: Missing certificate
- 12 :: Missing issuer certificate
- 13 :: Key disabled
- 14 :: Syntax error in specification
If no specific reason was given a previously emitted status code
KEY_CONSIDERED may be used to analyzed the problem.
Note that for historical reasons the INV_RECP status is also used
for gpgsm's SIGNER command where it relates to signer's of course.
Newer GnuPG versions are using INV_SGNR; applications should
ignore the INV_RECP during the sender's command processing once
they have seen an INV_SGNR. Different codes are used so that they
can be distinguish while doing an encrypt+sign operation.
*** NO_RECP <reserved>
Issued if no recipients are usable.
*** NO_SGNR <reserved>
Issued if no senders are usable.
*** KEY_CONSIDERED <fpr> <flags>
Issued to explian the lookup of a key. FPR is the hexified
fingerprint of the primary key. The bit values for FLAGS are:
- 1 :: The key has not been selected.
- 2 :: All subkeys of the key are expired or have been revoked.
*** KEYEXPIRED <expire-timestamp>
The key has expired. expire-timestamp is the expiration time in
seconds since Epoch. This status line is not very useful because
it will also be emitted for expired subkeys even if this subkey is
not used. To check whether a key used to sign a message has
expired, the EXPKEYSIG status line is to be used.
Note, that the TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
of the letter 'T'.
*** KEYREVOKED
The used key has been revoked by its owner. No arguments yet.
*** NO_PUBKEY <long keyid>
The public key is not available
*** NO_SECKEY <long keyid>
The secret key is not available
*** KEY_CREATED <type> <fingerprint> [<handle>]
A key has been created. Values for <type> are:
- B :: primary and subkey
- P :: primary
- S :: subkey
The fingerprint is one of the primary key for type B and P and the
one of the subkey for S. Handle is an arbitrary non-whitespace
string used to match key parameters from batch key creation run.
*** KEY_NOT_CREATED [<handle>]
The key from batch run has not been created due to errors.
*** TRUST_
These are several similar status codes:
- TRUST_UNDEFINED <error_token>
- TRUST_NEVER <error_token>
- TRUST_MARGINAL [0 [<validation_model>]]
- TRUST_FULLY [0 [<validation_model>]]
- TRUST_ULTIMATE [0 [<validation_model>]]
For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted to
indicate the validity of the key used to create the signature.
The error token values are currently only emitted by gpgsm.
VALIDATION_MODEL describes the algorithm used to check the
validity of the key. The defaults are the standard Web of Trust
model for gpg and the the standard X.509 model for gpgsm. The
defined values are
- pgp :: The standard PGP WoT.
- shell :: The standard X.509 model.
- chain :: The chain model.
- steed :: The STEED model.
- tofu :: The TOFU model
Note that the term =TRUST_= in the status names is used for
historic reasons; we now speak of validity.
*** TOFU_USER <fingerprint_in_hex> <mbox>
This status identifies the key and the userid for all following
Tofu information. The fingerprint is the fingerprint of the
primary key and the mbox is in general the addr-spec part of the
userid encoded in UTF-8 and percent escaped. The fingerprint is
- indentical for all TOFU_USER lines up to a NEWSIG line.
+ identical for all TOFU_USER lines up to a NEWSIG line.
*** TOFU_STATS <validity> <sign-count> 0 [<policy> [<tm1> <tm2> <tm3> <tm4>]]
Statistics for the current user id.
Values for VALIDITY are:
- 0 :: conflict
- 1 :: key without history
- 2 :: key with too little history
- 3 :: key with enough history for basic trust
- 4 :: key with a lot of history
Values for POLICY are:
- none :: No Policy set
- auto :: Policy is "auto"
- good :: Policy is "good"
- bad :: Policy is "bad"
- ask :: Policy is "ask"
- unknown :: Policy is not known.
TM1 ist the time the first message was verified. TM2 is the time
the most recent message was verified. TM3 is the time the first
message was encrypted. TM4 is the most recent encryption. All may
either be seconds since Epoch or an ISO time string
(yyyymmddThhmmss).
*** TOFU_STATS_SHORT <long_string>
Information about the TOFU binding for the signature.
Example: "15 signatures verified. 10 messages encrypted"
*** TOFU_STATS_LONG <long_string>
Information about the TOFU binding for the signature in verbose
format. The LONG_STRING is percent escaped.
Example: 'Verified 9 messages signed by "Werner Koch
(dist sig)" in the past 3 minutes, 40 seconds. The most
recent message was verified 4 seconds ago.'
*** PKA_TRUST_
This is is one:
- PKA_TRUST_GOOD <addr-spec>
- PKA_TRUST_BAD <addr-spec>
Depending on the outcome of the PKA check one of the above status
codes is emitted in addition to a =TRUST_*= status.
** Remote control
*** GET_BOOL, GET_LINE, GET_HIDDEN, GOT_IT
These status line are used with --command-fd for interactive
control of the process.
*** USERID_HINT <long main keyid> <string>
Give a hint about the user ID for a certain keyID.
*** NEED_PASSPHRASE <long keyid> <long main keyid> <keytype> <keylength>
Issued whenever a passphrase is needed. KEYTYPE is the numerical
value of the public key algorithm or 0 if this is not applicable,
KEYLENGTH is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known (this
is currently always the case).
*** NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM <cipher_algo> <s2k_mode> <s2k_hash>
Issued whenever a passphrase for symmetric encryption is needed.
*** NEED_PASSPHRASE_PIN <card_type> <chvno> [<serialno>]
Issued whenever a PIN is requested to unlock a card.
*** MISSING_PASSPHRASE
No passphrase was supplied. An application which encounters this
message may want to stop parsing immediately because the next
message will probably be a BAD_PASSPHRASE. However, if the
application is a wrapper around the key edit menu functionality it
might not make sense to stop parsing but simply ignoring the
following BAD_PASSPHRASE.
*** BAD_PASSPHRASE <long keyid>
The supplied passphrase was wrong or not given. In the latter
case you may have seen a MISSING_PASSPHRASE.
*** GOOD_PASSPHRASE
The supplied passphrase was good and the secret key material
is therefore usable.
** Import/Export
*** IMPORT_CHECK <long keyid> <fingerprint> <user ID>
This status is emitted in interactive mode right before
the "import.okay" prompt.
*** IMPORTED <long keyid> <username>
The keyid and name of the signature just imported
*** IMPORT_OK <reason> [<fingerprint>]
The key with the primary key's FINGERPRINT has been imported.
REASON flags are:
- 0 :: Not actually changed
- 1 :: Entirely new key.
- 2 :: New user IDs
- 4 :: New signatures
- 8 :: New subkeys
- 16 :: Contains private key.
The flags may be ORed.
*** IMPORT_PROBLEM <reason> [<fingerprint>]
Issued for each import failure. Reason codes are:
- 0 :: No specific reason given.
- 1 :: Invalid Certificate.
- 2 :: Issuer Certificate missing.
- 3 :: Certificate Chain too long.
- 4 :: Error storing certificate.
*** IMPORT_RES <args>
Final statistics on import process (this is one long line). The
args are a list of unsigned numbers separated by white space:
- <count>
- <no_user_id>
- <imported>
- always 0 (formerly used for the number of RSA keys)
- <unchanged>
- <n_uids>
- <n_subk>
- <n_sigs>
- <n_revoc>
- <sec_read>
- <sec_imported>
- <sec_dups>
- <skipped_new_keys>
- <not_imported>
- <skipped_v3_keys>
*** EXPORTED <fingerprint>
The key with <fingerprint> has been exported. The fingerprint is
the fingerprint of the primary key even if the primary key has
been replaced by a stub key during secret key export.
*** EXPORT_RES <args>
Final statistics on export process (this is one long line). The
args are a list of unsigned numbers separated by white space:
- <count>
- <secret_count>
- <exported>
** Smartcard related
*** CARDCTRL <what> [<serialno>]
This is used to control smartcard operations. Defined values for
WHAT are:
- 1 :: Request insertion of a card. Serialnumber may be given
to request a specific card. Used by gpg 1.4 w/o
scdaemon
- 2 :: Request removal of a card. Used by gpg 1.4 w/o scdaemon.
- 3 :: Card with serialnumber detected
- 4 :: No card available
- 5 :: No card reader available
- 6 :: No card support available
- 7 :: Card is in termination state
*** SC_OP_FAILURE [<code>]
An operation on a smartcard definitely failed. Currently there is
no indication of the actual error code, but application should be
prepared to later accept more arguments. Defined values for
<code> are:
- 0 :: unspecified error (identically to a missing CODE)
- 1 :: canceled
- 2 :: bad PIN
*** SC_OP_SUCCESS
A smart card operaion succeeded. This status is only printed for
certain operation and is mostly useful to check whether a PIN
change really worked.
** Miscellaneous status codes
*** NODATA <what>
No data has been found. Codes for WHAT are:
- 1 :: No armored data.
- 2 :: Expected a packet but did not found one.
- 3 :: Invalid packet found, this may indicate a non OpenPGP
message.
- 4 :: Signature expected but not found
You may see more than one of these status lines.
*** UNEXPECTED <what>
Unexpected data has been encountered. Codes for WHAT are:
- 0 :: Not further specified
- 1 :: Corrupted message structure
*** TRUNCATED <maxno>
The output was truncated to MAXNO items. This status code is
issued for certain external requests.
*** ERROR <error location> <error code> [<more>]
This is a generic error status message, it might be followed by
error location specific data. <error code> and <error_location>
should not contain spaces. The error code is a either a string
commencing with a letter or such a string prefixed with a
numerical error code and an underscore; e.g.: "151011327_EOF".
*** WARNING <location> <error code> [<text>]
This is a generic warning status message, it might be followed by
error location specific data. <error code> and <location>
should not contain spaces. The error code is a either a string
commencing with a letter or such a string prefixed with a
numerical error code and an underscore; e.g.: "151011327_EOF".
*** SUCCESS [<location>]
- Postive confirmation that an operation succeeded. It is used
+ Positive confirmation that an operation succeeded. It is used
similar to ISO-C's EXIT_SUCCESS. <location> is optional but if
given should not contain spaces. Used only with a few commands.
*** FAILURE <location> <error_code>
This is the counterpart to SUCCESS and used to indicate a program
failure. It is used similar to ISO-C's EXIT_FAILURE but allows
conveying more information, in particular a gpg-error error code.
That numerical error code may optionally have a suffix made of an
underscore and a string with an error symbol like "151011327_EOF".
A dash may be used instead of <location>.
*** BADARMOR
The ASCII armor is corrupted. No arguments yet.
*** DELETE_PROBLEM <reason_code>
Deleting a key failed. Reason codes are:
- 1 :: No such key
- 2 :: Must delete secret key first
- 3 :: Ambigious specification
- 4 :: Key is stored on a smartcard.
*** PROGRESS <what> <char> <cur> <total> [<units>]
Used by the primegen and Public key functions to indicate
progress. <char> is the character displayed with no --status-fd
enabled, with the linefeed replaced by an 'X'. <cur> is the
current amount done and <total> is amount to be done; a <total> of
0 indicates that the total amount is not known. The condition
: TOTAL && CUR == TOTAL
may be used to detect the end of an operation.
Well known values for WHAT are:
- pk_dsa :: DSA key generation
- pk_elg :: Elgamal key generation
- primegen :: Prime generation
- need_entropy :: Waiting for new entropy in the RNG
- tick :: Generic tick without any special meaning - useful
for letting clients know that the server is still
working.
- starting_agent :: A gpg-agent was started because it is not
running as a daemon.
- learncard :: Send by the agent and gpgsm while learing
the data of a smartcard.
- card_busy :: A smartcard is still working
<units> is sometines used to describe the units for <current> and
<total>. For example "B", "KiB", or "MiB".
*** BACKUP_KEY_CREATED <fingerprint> <fname>
A backup of a key identified by <fingerprint> has been writte to
the file <fname>; <fname> is percent-escaped.
*** MOUNTPOINT <name>
<name> is a percent-plus escaped filename describing the
mountpoint for the current operation (e.g. used by "g13 --mount").
This may either be the specified mountpoint or one randomly
- choosen by g13.
+ chosen by g13.
*** PINENTRY_LAUNCHED <pid>
This status line is emitted by gpg to notify a client that a
Pinentry has been launched. <pid> is the PID of the Pinentry. It
may be used to display a hint to the user but can't be used to
synchronize with Pinentry. Note that there is also an Assuan
inquiry line with the same name used internally or, if enabled,
send to the client instead of this status line. Such an inquiry
may be used to sync with Pinentry
** Obsolete status codes
*** SIGEXPIRED
Removed on 2011-02-04. This is deprecated in favor of KEYEXPIRED.
*** RSA_OR_IDEA
Obsolete. This status message used to be emitted for requests to
use the IDEA or RSA algorithms. It has been dropped from GnuPG
2.1 after the respective patents expired.
*** SHM_INFO, SHM_GET, SHM_GET_BOOL, SHM_GET_HIDDEN
These were used for the ancient shared memory based co-processing.
*** BEGIN_STREAM, END_STREAM
Used to issued by the experimental pipemode.
* Format of the --attribute-fd output
When --attribute-fd is set, during key listings (--list-keys,
--list-secret-keys) GnuPG dumps each attribute packet to the file
descriptor specified. --attribute-fd is intended for use with
--status-fd as part of the required information is carried on the
ATTRIBUTE status tag (see above).
The contents of the attribute data is specified by RFC 4880. For
convenience, here is the Photo ID format, as it is currently the
only attribute defined:
- Byte 0-1 :: The length of the image header. Due to a historical
accident (i.e. oops!) back in the NAI PGP days, this
is a little-endian number. Currently 16 (0x10 0x00).
- Byte 2 :: The image header version. Currently 0x01.
- Byte 3 :: Encoding format. 0x01 == JPEG.
- Byte 4-15 :: Reserved, and currently unused.
All other data after this header is raw image (JPEG) data.
* Layout of the TrustDB
The TrustDB is built from fixed length records, where the first byte
describes the record type. All numeric values are stored in network
byte order. The length of each record is 40 bytes. The first
record of the DB is always of type 1 and this is the only record of
this type.
The record types: directory(2), key(3), uid(4), pref(5), sigrec(6),
and shadow directory(8) are not anymore used by version 2 of the
TrustDB.
** Record type 0
Unused record or deleted, can be reused for any purpose. Such
records should in general not exist because deleted records are of
type 254 and kept in a linked list.
** Version info (RECTYPE_VER, 1)
Version information for this TrustDB. This is always the first
record of the DB and the only one of this type.
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 1).
- 3 byte :: Magic value ("gpg")
- 1 u8 :: TrustDB version (value: 2).
- 1 u8 :: =marginals=. How many marginal trusted keys are required.
- 1 u8 :: =completes=. How many completely trusted keys are
required.
- 1 u8 :: =max_cert_depth=. How deep is the WoT evaluated. Along
with =marginals= and =completes=, this value is used to
check whether the cached validity value from a [FIXME
dir] record can be used.
- 1 u8 :: =trust_model=
- 1 u8 :: =min_cert_level=
- 2 byte :: Not used
- 1 u32 :: =created=. Timestamp of trustdb creation.
- 1 u32 :: =nextcheck=. Timestamp of last modification which may
affect the validity of keys in the trustdb. This value
is checked against the validity timestamp in the dir
records.
- 1 u32 :: =reserved=. Not used.
- 1 u32 :: =reserved2=. Not used.
- 1 u32 :: =firstfree=. Number of the record with the head record
of the RECTYPE_FREE linked list.
- 1 u32 :: =reserved3=. Not used.
- 1 u32 :: =trusthashtbl=. Record number of the trusthashtable.
** Hash table (RECTYPE_HTBL, 10)
Due to the fact that we use fingerprints to lookup keys, we can
implement quick access by some simple hash methods, and avoid the
overhead of gdbm. A property of fingerprints is that they can be
used directly as hash values. What we use is a dynamic multilevel
architecture, which combines hash tables, record lists, and linked
lists.
This record is a hash table of 256 entries with the property that
all these records are stored consecutively to make one big
table. The hash value is simple the 1st, 2nd, ... byte of the
fingerprint (depending on the indirection level).
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 10).
- 1 u8 :: Reserved
- n u32 :: =recnum=. A table with the hash table items fitting into
this record. =n= depends on the record length:
$n=(reclen-2)/4$ which yields 9 for oure current record
length of 40 bytes.
The total number of hash table records to form the table is:
$m=(256+n-1)/n$. This is 29 for our record length of 40.
To look up a key we use the first byte of the fingerprint to get
the recnum from this hash table and then look up the addressed
record:
- If that record is another hash table, we use 2nd byte to index
that hash table and so on;
- if that record is a hash list, we walk all entries until we find
a matching one; or
- if that record is a key record, we compare the fingerprint to
decide whether it is the requested key;
** Hash list (RECTYPE_HLST, 11)
See hash table above on how it is used. It may also be used for
other purposes.
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 11).
- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
- 1 u32 :: =next=. Record number of the next hash list record or 0
if none.
- n u32 :: =rnum=. Array with record numbers to values. With
$n=(reclen-5)/5$ and our record length of 40, n is 7.
** Trust record (RECTYPE_TRUST, 12)
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 12).
- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
- 20 byte :: =fingerprint=.
- 1 u8 :: =ownertrust=.
- 1 u8 :: =depth=.
- 1 u8 :: =min_ownertrust=.
- 1 byte :: Not used.
- 1 u32 :: =validlist=.
- 10 byte :: Not used.
** Validity record (RECTYPE_VALID, 13)
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 13).
- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
- 20 byte :: =namehash=.
- 1 u8 :: =validity=
- 1 u32 :: =next=.
- 1 u8 :: =full_count=.
- 1 u8 :: =marginal_count=.
- 11 byte :: Not used.
** Free record (RECTYPE_FREE, 254)
All these records form a linked list of unused records in the TrustDB.
- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 254)
- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
- 1 u32 :: =next=. Record number of the next rcord of this type.
The record number to the head of this linked list is
stored in the version info record.
* Database scheme for the TOFU info
#+begin_src sql
--
-- The VERSION table holds the version of our TOFU data structures.
--
CREATE TABLE version (
version integer -- As of now this is always 1
);
--
-- The BINDINGS table associates mail addresses with keys.
--
CREATE TABLE bindings (
oid integer primary key autoincrement,
fingerprint text, -- The key's fingerprint in hex
email text, -- The normalized mail address destilled from user_id
user_id text, -- The unmodified user id
time integer, -- The time this binding was first observed.
policy boolean check
(policy in (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)), -- The trust policy with the values:
-- 1 := Auto
-- 2 := Good
-- 3 := Unknown
-- 4 := Bad
-- 5 := Ask
conflict string, -- NULL or a hex formatted fingerprint.
unique (fingerprint, email)
);
CREATE INDEX bindings_fingerprint_email on bindings (fingerprint, email);
CREATE INDEX bindings_email on bindings (email);
--
-- The SIGNATURES table records all data signatures we verified
--
CREATE TABLE signatures (
binding integer not null, -- Link to bindings table,
-- references bindings.oid.
sig_digest text, -- The digest of the signed message.
origin text, -- String describing who initially fed
-- the signature to gpg (e.g. "email:claws").
sig_time integer, -- Timestamp from the signature.
time integer, -- Time this record was created.
primary key (binding, sig_digest, origin)
);
#+end_src
* GNU extensions to the S2K algorithm
1 octet - S2K Usage: either 254 or 255.
1 octet - S2K Cipher Algo: 0
1 octet - S2K Specifier: 101
3 octets - "GNU"
1 octet - GNU S2K Extension Number.
If such a GNU extension is used neither an IV nor any kind of
checksum is used. The defined GNU S2K Extension Numbers are:
- 1 :: Do not store the secret part at all. No specific data
follows.
- 2 :: A stub to access smartcards. This data follows:
- One octet with the length of the following serial number.
- The serial number. Regardless of what the length octet
indicates no more than 16 octets are stored.
Note that gpg stores the GNU S2K Extension Number internally as an
S2K Specifier with an offset of 1000.
* Keyserver helper message format
*This information is obsolete*
(Keyserver helpers have been replaced by dirmngr)
The keyserver may be contacted by a Unix Domain socket or via TCP.
The format of a request is:
#+begin_example
command-tag
"Content-length:" digits
CRLF
#+end_example
Where command-tag is
#+begin_example
NOOP
GET <user-name>
PUT
DELETE <user-name>
#+end_example
The format of a response is:
#+begin_example
"GNUPG/1.0" status-code status-text
"Content-length:" digits
CRLF
#+end_example
followed by <digits> bytes of data
Status codes are:
- 1xx :: Informational - Request received, continuing process
- 2xx :: Success - The action was successfully received, understood,
and accepted
- 4xx :: Client Error - The request contains bad syntax or cannot be
fulfilled
- 5xx :: Server Error - The server failed to fulfill an apparently
valid request
* Object identifiers
OIDs below the GnuPG arc:
#+begin_example
1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2 GnuPG
1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1 notation
1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1.1 pkaAddress
1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2 X.509 extensions
1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.1 standaloneCertificate
1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.2 wellKnownPrivateKey
1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.12242973 invalid encoded OID
#+end_example
* Miscellaneous notes
** v3 fingerprints
For packet version 3 we calculate the keyids this way:
- RSA :: Low 64 bits of n
- ELGAMAL :: Build a v3 pubkey packet (with CTB 0x99) and
calculate a RMD160 hash value from it. This is used
as the fingerprint and the low 64 bits are the keyid.
** Simplified revocation certificates
Revocation certificates consist only of the signature packet;
"--import" knows how to handle this. The rationale behind it is to
keep them small.
** Documentation on HKP (the http keyserver protocol):
A minimalistic HTTP server on port 11371 recognizes a GET for
/pks/lookup. The standard http URL encoded query parameters are
this (always key=value):
- op=index (like pgp -kv), op=vindex (like pgp -kvv) and op=get (like
pgp -kxa)
- search=<stringlist>. This is a list of words that must occur in the key.
The words are delimited with space, points, @ and so on. The delimiters
are not searched for and the order of the words doesn't matter (but see
next option).
- exact=on. This switch tells the hkp server to only report exact matching
keys back. In this case the order and the "delimiters" are important.
- fingerprint=on. Also reports the fingerprints when used with 'index' or
'vindex'
The keyserver also recognizes http-POSTs to /pks/add. Use this to upload
keys.
A better way to do this would be a request like:
/pks/lookup/<gnupg_formatierte_user_id>?op=<operation>
This can be implemented using Hurd's translator mechanism.
However, I think the whole keyserver stuff has to be re-thought;
I have some ideas and probably create a white paper.
** Algorithm names for the "keygen.algo" prompt
When using a --command-fd controlled key generation or "addkey"
there is way to know the number to enter on the "keygen.algo"
prompt. The displayed numbers are for human reception and may
change with releases. To provide a stable way to enter a desired
algorithm choice the prompt also accepts predefined names for the
algorithms, which will not change.
| Name | No | Description |
|---------+----+---------------------------------|
| rsa+rsa | 1 | RSA and RSA (default) |
| dsa+elg | 2 | DSA and Elgamal |
| dsa | 3 | DSA (sign only) |
| rsa/s | 4 | RSA (sign only) |
| elg | 5 | Elgamal (encrypt only) |
| rsa/e | 6 | RSA (encrypt only) |
| dsa/* | 7 | DSA (set your own capabilities) |
| rsa/* | 8 | RSA (set your own capabilities) |
| ecc+ecc | 9 | ECC and ECC |
| ecc/s | 10 | ECC (sign only) |
| ecc/* | 11 | ECC (set your own capabilities) |
| ecc/e | 12 | ECC (encrypt only) |
| keygrip | 13 | Existing key |
If one of the "foo/*" names are used a "keygen.flags" prompt needs
to be answered as well. Instead of toggling the predefined flags,
it is also possible to set them direct: Use a "=" character
directly followed by a comination of "a" (for authentication), "s"
(for signing), or "c" (for certification).
diff --git a/doc/HACKING b/doc/HACKING
index 94e65d83b..1888b29e6 100644
--- a/doc/HACKING
+++ b/doc/HACKING
@@ -1,405 +1,405 @@
# HACKING -*- org -*-
#+TITLE: A Hacker's Guide to GnuPG
#+TEXT: Some notes on GnuPG internals
#+STARTUP: showall
#+OPTIONS: ^:{}
* How to contribute
The following stuff explains some basic procedures you need to
follow if you want to contribute code or documentation.
** No more ChangeLog files
Do not modify any of the ChangeLog files in GnuPG. Starting on
December 1st, 2011 we put change information only in the GIT commit
log, and generate a top-level ChangeLog file from logs at "make dist"
time. As such, there are strict requirements on the form of the
commit log messages. The old ChangeLog files have all be renamed to
ChangeLog-2011
** Commit log requirements
Your commit log should always start with a one-line summary, the
second line should be blank, and the remaining lines are usually
ChangeLog-style entries for all affected files. However, it's fine
--- even recommended --- to write a few lines of prose describing the
change, when the summary and ChangeLog entries don't give enough of
the big picture. Omit the leading TABs that you are seeing in a
"real" ChangeLog file, but keep the maximum line length at 72 or
smaller, so that the generated ChangeLog lines, each with its leading
TAB, will not exceed 80 columns. If you want to add text which shall
not be copied to the ChangeLog, separate it by a line consisting of
two dashes at the begin of a line.
The one-line summary usually starts with a keyword to identify the
mainly affected subsystem. If more than one keyword is required the
are delimited by a comma (e.g. =scd,w32:=). Commonly found keywords
are
- agent :: The gpg-agent component
- ssh :: The ssh-agent part of the agent
- common :: Code in common
- iobuf :: The IOBUF system in common
- gpg :: The gpg or gpgv components
- gpgsm :: The gpgsm component
- scd :: The scdaemon component
- ccid :: The CCID driver in scdaemon
- dirmngr :: The dirmngr component
- wks :: The web key service tools
- tools :: Other code in tools
- w32 :: Windows related code
- po :: Translations
- build :: Changes to the build system
- speedo :: Speedo build system specific changes
- doc :: Documentation changes
- indent :: Indentation and similar changes
Typo fixes and documentation updates don't need a ChangeLog entry;
thus you would use a commit message like
#+begin_example
Fix typo in a comment
--
#+end_example
The marker line here is important; without it the first line would
appear in the ChangeLog.
If you exceptionally need to have longer lines in a commit log you may
do this after this scissor line:
#+begin_example
# ------------------------ >8 ------------------------
#+end_example
(hash, blank, 24 dashes, blank, scissor, blank, 24 dashes).
Note that such a comment will be removed if the git commit option
=--cleanup=scissor= is used.
** License policy
GnuPG is licensed under the GPLv3+ with some files under a mixed
LGPLv3+/GPLv2+ license. It is thus important, that all contributed
code allows for an update of the license; for example we can't
accept code under the GPLv2(only).
GnuPG used to have a strict policy of requiring copyright
assignments to the FSF. To avoid this major organizational overhead
and to allow inclusion of code, not copyrighted by the FSF, this
policy has been relaxed on 2013-03-29. It is now also possible to
contribute code by asserting that the contribution is in accordance
to the "Libgcrypt Developer's Certificate of Origin" as found in the
file "DCO". (Except for a slight wording change, this DCO is
identical to the one used by the Linux kernel.)
If you want to contribute code or documentation to GnuPG and you
didn't sign a copyright assignment with the FSF in the past, you
need to take these simple steps:
- Decide which mail address you want to use. Please have your real
name in the address and not a pseudonym. Anonymous contributions
can only be done if you find a proxy who certifies for you.
- If your employer or school might claim ownership of code written
by you; you need to talk to them to make sure that you have the
right to contribute under the DCO.
- Send an OpenPGP signed mail to the gnupg-devel@gnupg.org mailing
list from your mail address. Include a copy of the DCO as found
in the official master branch. Insert your name and email address
into the DCO in the same way you want to use it later. Example:
Signed-off-by: Joe R. Hacker <joe@example.org>
(If you really need it, you may perform simple transformations of
the mail address: Replacing "@" by " at " or "." by " dot ".)
- That's it. From now on you only need to add a "Signed-off-by:"
line with your name and mail address to the commit message. It is
recommended to send the patches using a PGP/MIME signed mail.
** Coding standards
Please follow the GNU coding standards. If you are in doubt consult
the existing code as an example. Do no re-indent code without a
need. If you really need to do it, use a separate commit for such a
change.
- Only certain C99 features may be used (see below); in general
stick to C90.
- Please do not use C++ =//= style comments.
- Try to fit lines into 80 columns.
- Ignore signed/unsigned pointer mismatches
- No arithmetic on void pointers; cast to char* first.
- We use our own printf style functions like =es_printf=, and
=gpgrt_asprintf= (or the =es_asprintf= macro) which implement most
C99 features with the exception of =wchar_t= (which should anyway
not be used). Please use them always and do not resort to those
provided by libc. The rationale for using them is that we know
that the format specifiers work on all platforms and that we do
not need to chase platform dependent bugs. Note also that in
gnupg asprintf is a macro already evaluating to gpgrt_asprintf.
- It is common to have a label named "leave" for a function's
cleanup and return code. This helps with freeing memory and is a
convenient location to set a breakpoint for debugging.
- Always use xfree() instead of free(). If it is not easy to see
that the freed variable is not anymore used, explicitly set the
variable to NULL.
- Init function local variables only if needed so that the compiler
can do a better job in detecting uninitialized variables which may
indicate a problem with the code.
- Never init static or file local variables to 0 to make sure they
end up in BSS.
- Use --enable-maintainer-mode with configure.
** Variable names
Follow the GNU standards. Here are some conventions you may want to
stick to (do not rename existing "wrong" uses without a goog
reason).
- err :: This conveys an error code of type =gpg_error_t= which is
compatible to an =int=. To compare such a variable to a
GPG_ERR_ constant, it is necessary to map the value like
this: =gpg_err_code(err)=.
- ec :: This is used for a gpg-error code which has no source part
(=gpg_err_code_t=) and will eventually be used as input to
=gpg_err_make=.
- rc :: Used for all kind of other errors; for example system
calls. The value is not compatible with gpg-error.
*** C99 language features
In GnuPG 2.x, but *not in 1.4* and not in most libraries, a limited
set of C99 features may be used:
- Variadic macros:
: #define foo(a,...) bar(a, __VA_ARGS__)
- The predefined macro =__func__=:
: log_debug ("%s: Problem with foo\n", __func__);
- Variable declaration inside a for():
: for (int i = 0; i < 5; ++)
: bar (i);
Although we usually make use of the =u16=, =u32=, and =u64= types,
it is also possible to include =<stdint.h>= and use =int16_t=,
=int32_t=, =int64_t=, =uint16_t=, =uint32_t=, and =uint64_t=. But do
not use =int8_t= or =uint8_t=.
** Commit log keywords
- GnuPG-bug-id :: Values are comma or space delimited bug numbers
from bug.gnupg.org pertaining to this commit.
- Debian-bug-id :: Same as above but from the Debian bug tracker.
- CVE-id :: CVE id number pertaining to this commit.
- Regression-due-to :: Commit id of the regression fixed by this commit.
- Fixes-commit :: Commit id this commit fixes.
- Reported-by :: Value is a name or mail address of a bug reporte.
- Suggested-by :: Value is a name or mail address of someone how
suggested this change.
- Co-authored-by :: Name or mail address of a co-author
- Some-comments-by :: Name or mail address of the author of
additional comments (commit log or code).
- Proofread-by :: Sometimes used by translation commits.
- Signed-off-by :: Name or mail address of the developer
* Windows
** How to build an installer for Windows
Your best bet is to use a decent Debian System for development.
You need to install a long list of tools for building. This list
still needs to be compiled. However, the build process will stop
if a tool is missing. GNU make is required (on non GNU systems
often installed as "gmake"). The installer requires a couple of
extra software to be available either as tarballs or as local git
repositories. In case this file here is part of a gnupg-w32-2.*.xz
complete tarball as distributed from the same place as a binary
installer, all such tarballs are already included.
Cd to the GnuPG source directory and use one of one of these
command:
- If sources are included (gnupg-w32-*.tar.xz)
make -f build-aux/speedo.mk WHAT=this installer
- To build from tarballs
make -f build-aux/speedo.mk WHAT=release TARBALLS=TARDIR installer
- To build from local GIT repos
make -f build-aux/speedo.mk WHAT=git TARBALLS=TARDIR installer
Note that also you need to supply tarballs with supporting
libraries even if you build from git. The makefile expects only
the core GnuPG software to be available as local GIT repositories.
speedo.mk has the versions of the tarballs and the branch names of
the git repositories. In case of problems, don't hesitate to ask
on the gnupg-devel mailing for help.
* Debug hints
See the manual for some hints.
* Standards
** RFCs
1423 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers.
1489 Registration of a Cyrillic Character Set.
1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security.
1991 PGP Message Exchange Formats (obsolete)
2144 The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm.
2279 UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646.
2440 OpenPGP (obsolete).
3156 MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP).
4880 Current OpenPGP specification.
6337 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in OpenPGP
* Various information
** Directory Layout
- ./ :: Readme, configure
- ./agent :: Gpg-agent and related tools
- ./doc :: Documentation
- ./g10 :: Gpg program here called gpg2
- ./sm :: Gpgsm program
- ./jnlib :: Not used (formerly used utility functions)
- ./common :: Utility functions
- ./kbx :: Keybox library
- ./scd :: Smartcard daemon
- ./scripts :: Scripts needed by configure and others
- ./dirmngr :: The directory manager
** Detailed Roadmap
This list of files is not up to date!
- g10/gpg.c :: Main module with option parsing and all the stuff you
have to do on startup. Also has the exit handler and
some helper functions.
- g10/parse-packet.c ::
- g10/build-packet.c ::
- g10/free-packet.c :: Parsing and creating of OpenPGP message packets.
- g10/getkey.c :: Key selection code
- g10/pkclist.c :: Build a list of public keys
- g10/skclist.c :: Build a list of secret keys
- g10/keyring.c :: Keyring access functions
- g10/keydb.h ::
- g10/keyid.c :: Helper functions to get the keyid, fingerprint etc.
- g10/trustdb.c :: Web-of-Trust computations
- g10/trustdb.h ::
- g10/tdbdump.c :: Export/import/list the trustdb.gpg
- g10/tdbio.c :: I/O handling for the trustdb.gpg
- g10/tdbio.h ::
- g10/compress.c :: Filter to handle compression
- g10/filter.h :: Declarations for all filter functions
- g10/delkey.c :: Delete a key
- g10/kbnode.c :: Helper for the kbnode_t linked list
- g10/main.h :: Prototypes and some constants
- g10/mainproc.c :: Message processing
- g10/armor.c :: Ascii armor filter
- g10/mdfilter.c :: Filter to calculate hashs
- g10/textfilter.c :: Filter to handle CR/LF and trailing white space
- g10/cipher.c :: En-/Decryption filter
- g10/misc.c :: Utlity functions
- g10/options.h :: Structure with all the command line options
and related constants
- g10/openfile.c :: Create/Open Files
- g10/keyserver.h :: Keyserver access dispatcher.
- - g10/packet.h :: Defintion of OpenPGP structures.
+ - g10/packet.h :: Definition of OpenPGP structures.
- g10/passphrase.c :: Passphrase handling code
- g10/pubkey-enc.c :: Process a public key encoded packet.
- g10/seckey-cert.c :: Not anymore used
- g10/seskey.c :: Make sesssion keys etc.
- g10/import.c :: Import keys into our key storage.
- g10/export.c :: Export keys to the OpenPGP format.
- g10/sign.c :: Create signature and optionally encrypt.
- g10/plaintext.c :: Process plaintext packets.
- g10/decrypt-data.c :: Decrypt an encrypted data packet
- g10/encrypt.c :: Main encryption driver
- g10/revoke.c :: Create recovation certificates.
- g10/keylist.c :: Print information about OpenPGP keys
- g10/sig-check.c :: Check a signature
- g10/helptext.c :: Show online help texts
- g10/verify.c :: Verify signed data.
- g10/decrypt.c :: Decrypt and verify data.
- g10/keyedit.c :: Edit properties of a key.
- g10/dearmor.c :: Armor utility.
- g10/keygen.c :: Generate a key pair
** Memory allocation
Use only the functions:
- xmalloc
- xmalloc_secure
- xtrymalloc
- xtrymalloc_secure
- xcalloc
- xcalloc_secure
- xtrycalloc
- xtrycalloc_secure
- xrealloc
- xtryrealloc
- xstrdup
- xtrystrdup
- xfree
The *secure versions allocate memory in the secure memory. That is,
swapping out of this memory is avoided and is gets overwritten on
free. Use this for passphrases, session keys and other sensitive
material. This memory set aside for secure memory is linited to a few
k. In general the function don't print a memeory message and
terminate the process if there is not enough memory available. The
"try" versions of the functions return NULL instead.
** Logging
TODO
** Option parsing
GnuPG does not use getopt or GNU getopt but functions of it's own.
See util/argparse.c for details. The advantage of these functions is
that it is more easy to display and maintain the help texts for the
options. The same option table is also used to parse resource files.
** What is an IOBUF
This is the data structure used for most I/O of gnupg. It is similar
to System V Streams but much simpler. Because OpenPGP messages are
nested in different ways; the use of such a system has big advantages.
Here is an example, how it works: If the parser sees a packet header
with a partial length, it pushes the block_filter onto the IOBUF to
handle these partial length packets: from now on you don't have to
worry about this. When it sees a compressed packet it pushes the
uncompress filter and the next read byte is one which has already been
uncompressed by this filter. Same goes for enciphered packet,
plaintext packets and so on. The file g10/encode.c might be a good
starting point to see how it is used - actually this is the other way:
constructing messages using pushed filters but it may be easier to
understand.
diff --git a/doc/Notes b/doc/Notes
index 3598bc7a7..19241b7b7 100644
--- a/doc/Notes
+++ b/doc/Notes
@@ -1,245 +1,245 @@
Add an infor page for watchgnupg.
> * How to mark a CA certificate as trusted.
There are two ways:
1. Let gpg-agent do this for you. Since version 1.9.9 you need to
add the option --allow-mark-trusted gpg-agent.conf or when
- invoking gpg-agent. Everytime gpgsm notices an untrusted root
+ invoking gpg-agent. Every time gpgsm notices an untrusted root
certificate gpg-agent will pop up a dialog to ask whether this
certificate should be trusted. This is similar to whatmost
browsers do.
The disadvantage of this method and the reason why
--allow-mark-trusted is required is that the list of trusted root
certificates will grow, because almost all user will just hit
"yes, I trust" and "yes, I verified the fingerprint" without
understanding that this is a very serious decision.
2. Use your editor. Edit the file ~/.gnupg/trustlist.txt and add
the fingerprints of the trusted root certificates. There are
comments on the top explaining the simple format. The current
CVS version allows for colons in the fingerprint, so you can
- easily cut and paste it from whereever you know that this is the
+ easily cut and paste it from wherever you know that this is the
correct fingerprint.
An example for an entry in the trustlist.txt is:
# CN=PCA-1-Verwaltung,O=PKI-1-Verwaltung,C=de
3EEE3D8BB7F0FE5C9F5804A3A7E51BCE98209DF9 S
This is in fact one that probably made its way into the file using the
first method. As usual a # indicates a comment. The trailing S means
that this is to be used for (X.509).
It is not possible to trust intermediate CA certificates; gpgsm always
checks the entire chain of certificates.
> * How to import a key and bind it to some certificate already
> imported. Alternatively, import key and certificate together, from
> a pkcs12 blob, or pkcs8 + certificate blobs, or whatever.
> Alternatively, don't import the key at all, but specify location of
> key using a parameter when signing.
You always need to import the key; there is something similar to a
keyring (here called a keybox: ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx).
Importing a key either from a binary or ascii armored (PEM) certificate
file or from a cert-only signature file is done using
gpg --import FILE
or
gpg --import < FILE
In general you should first import the root certificates and then down
to the end user certificate. You may put all into one file and gpgsm
will do the right thing in this case independend of the order.
While verifying a signature, all included certificates are
automagically imported.
To import from a pkcs#12 file you may use the same command; if a
private key is contained in that file, you will be asked for the
transport passphrases as well as for the new passphrase used to
protect it in gpg-agent's private key storage
(~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/). Note that the pkcs#12 support is very
basic but sufficient for certificates exported from Mozilla, OpenSSL
and MS Outlook.
Background info on private keys:
If you want to look at the private key you first need to know the name
of the keyfile. Run the command "gpgsm -K --with-key-data [KEYID]" and
you get an output like:
crs::1024:1:CF8[..]6D:20040105T184908:2006[...]:09::CN=ZS[....]::esES:
fpr:::::::::3B50BF2BDAF2[...]1AE6796D:::2812[...]508F21F065E65E44:
grp:::::::::C92DB9CFD588ADE846BE3AC4E7A2E1B11A4A2ADB:
uid:::::::::CN=Werner Koch,OU=test,O=g10 Code,C=de::
uid:::::::::<wk@g10code.de>::
This should be familar to advanced gpg-users; see doc/DETAILS in gpg
1.3 (CVS HEAD) for a description of the records. The value in the
"grp" tagged record is the so called keygrip and you should find a
file ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/C92DB9CFD588ADE846BE3AC4E7A2E1B11A4A2ADB.key
with the private and public key in an S-expression like format. The
gpg-protect-tool may be used to display it in a human readable format:
$ gpgsm --call-protect-tool ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/C9[...]B.key
(protected-private-key
(rsa
(n #00C16B6E807C47BB[...]10487#)
(e #010001#)
(protected openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc
(
(sha1 "Hvü9Qt^Ç" "96")
#2B17DC766AEA2568EE0C688E18F9757E#)
#65A4FF9F30750A1300[...]7#)
)
)
The current CVS version of gpgsm has a command --dump-keys which lists
more details of a key including the keygrip so you don't need to use
the colon format if you want to manually debug things.
$ gpgsm --dump-keys
Serial number: 01
Issuer: CN=Trust Anchor,O=Test Certificates,C=US
Subject: CN=Trust Anchor,O=Test Certificates,C=US
sha1_fpr: 66:8A:47:56:A2:DC:88:FF:DA:B8:95:E1:3C:63:37:55:5F:0A:F7:BF
md5_fpr: 03:01:3B:BB:EC:6C:5D:48:88:4C:95:63:99:84:ED:C0
keygrip: 6A082B3063F6DA6D68B2994AB11B4328FD6206D2
notBefore: 2001-04-19 14:57:20
notAfter: 2011-04-19 14:57:20
hashAlgo: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5 (sha1WithRSAEncryption)
keyType: 1024 bit RSA
authKeyId: [none]
keyUsage: certSign crlSign
extKeyUsage: [none]
policies: [none]
chainLength: unlimited
crlDP: [none]
authInfo: [none]
subjInfo: [none]
extn: 2.5.29.14 (subjectKeyIdentifier) [22 octets]
> * How to import a CRL
CRLs are managed by the dirmngr which is a separate package. The idea
is to eventaully turn it into a system daemon, so that on a multi-user
machine CRLs are handled more efficiently. As of now the dirmngr
needs service from gpgsm thus it is best to call it through gpgsm:
gpgsm --call-dirmngr LOAD /absolute/filename/to/a/CRL/file
See the dirmngr README and manual for further details.
If you don't want to check CRLs, use the option --diable-crl-checks
with gpgsm.
> I'm trying to replace the S/MIME support in OpenSSL with gpgsm for the
> MUA Gnus.
Great; I'd love it.
> Perhaps I shouldn't be using gpgsm directly? gpgme didn't seem to
> have a command line front end.
For Gnus it makes sense to use gpgsm directly. Enhancing pgg to
support gpgsm should not be that hard. Things you need to take care
off are: Warn if GPG_AGENT_INFO has not been set, because this will
call gpg-agent for each operation and obviously does not cache the
passphrase them. If GPG_AGENT_INFO has been set, also disable the
passphrase code for gpg and pass --use-agent to gpg - this way gpg
benefits from the passphrase caching and the pinentry.
You may want to look at gpgconf (tools/README.gpgconf) to provide a
customization interface for gpgsm, gpg-agent and dirmngr.
Module Overview
================
gpgsm
libgpg-error
libgcrypt
libksba
libassuan [statically linked]
[Standard system libraries]
gpg-agent
libgpg-error
libgcrypt
libassuan [statically linked]
libpth [system library]
[Standard system libraries]
scdaemon
libgpg-error
libgcrypt
libksba
libassuan [statically linked]
libusb [system library, optional]
libopensc [system library, optional]
[For reader access libpcsclite or a CT-API library may be
linked at runtime (controllable by scdaemon.conf)]
[Standard system libraries]
gpg-protect-tool
libgpg-error
libgcrypt
[Standard system libraries]
dirmngr
libgpg-error
libgcrypt
libksba
libassuan [statically linked]
- libldap [system libary]
- liblber [system libary]
- libsasl [system libary, required by libldap]
- libdb2 [system libary, required by libsasl]
- libcrypt [system libary, required by libsasl - OOPS]
- libpam [system libary, required by libsasl]
+ libldap [system library]
+ liblber [system library]
+ libsasl [system library, required by libldap]
+ libdb2 [system library, required by libsasl]
+ libcrypt [system library, required by libsasl - OOPS]
+ libpam [system library, required by libsasl]
[Standard system libraries]
pinentry-curses
libncurses
[Standard system libraries]
[Independent Assuan code is source included]
pinentry-gtk
libncurses
[GTK+ and X libraries]
[Standard system libraries]
[Independent Assuan code is source included]
pinentry-qt
libncurses
[QT and X libraries]
[Standard system libraries]
[Independent Assuan code is source included]
gpgme
[Standard system libraries]
[gpgsm is required at runtime]
[Independent Assuan code is source included]
libgpg-error
[none]
libgcrypt
libgpg-error
libksba
libgpg-error
libassuan
[none]
diff --git a/doc/TRANSLATE b/doc/TRANSLATE
index eb0de97cd..7c3e54468 100644
--- a/doc/TRANSLATE
+++ b/doc/TRANSLATE
@@ -1,61 +1,61 @@
$Id$
Note for translators
--------------------
Some strings in GnuPG are for matching user input against. These
strings can accept multiple values that mean essentially the same
thing.
For example, the string "yes" in English is "sí" in Spanish. However,
-some users will type "si" (without the accent). To accomodate both
+some users will type "si" (without the accent). To accommodate both
users, you can translate the string "yes" as "sí|si". You can have
-any number of alternate matches seperated by the | character like
+any number of alternate matches separated by the | character like
"sí|si|seguro".
The strings that can be handled in this way are of the form "yes|yes",
(or "no|no", etc.) There should also be a comment in the .po file
directing you to this file.
Help files
----------
GnuPG provides a little help feature (entering a ? on a prompt). This
help used to be translated the usual way with gettext but it turned
out that this is too inflexible and does for example not allow
correcting little mistakes in the English text. For some newer features
we require editable help files anyway and thus the existing help
strings have been moved to plain text files names "help.LL.txt". We
distribute these files and allow overriding them by files of that name
in /etc/gnupg. The syntax of these files is documented in
doc/help.txt. This is also the original we use to describe new
possible online help keys. The source files are located in doc/ and
need to be in encoded in UTF-8. Strings which require a translation
are disabled like this
.#gpgsm.some.help-item
This string is not translated.
After translation you should remove the the hash mark so that the
entry looks like.
.gpgsm.some.help-item
This string has been translated.
The percent sign is not a special character and if there is something
to watch out there will be a remark.
Sending new or updated translations
-----------------------------------
Please note that we do not use the TP Robot but require that
translations are to be send by mail to translations@gnupg.org. We
also strongly advise to get subscribed to i18n@gnupg.org and request
assistance if it is not clear on how to translate certain strings. A
wrongly translated string may lead to a security problem.
A copyright disclaimer to the FSF is not anymore required since
December 2012.
diff --git a/doc/dirmngr.texi b/doc/dirmngr.texi
index d442103a3..8f984e39a 100644
--- a/doc/dirmngr.texi
+++ b/doc/dirmngr.texi
@@ -1,1106 +1,1106 @@
@c Copyright (C) 2002 Klar"alvdalens Datakonsult AB
@c Copyright (C) 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 g10 Code GmbH
@c This is part of the GnuPG manual.
@c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi.
@include defs.inc
@node Invoking DIRMNGR
@chapter Invoking DIRMNGR
@cindex DIRMNGR command options
@cindex command options
@cindex options, DIRMNGR command
@manpage dirmngr.8
@ifset manverb
.B dirmngr
\- CRL and OCSP daemon
@end ifset
@mansect synopsis
@ifset manverb
.B dirmngr
.RI [ options ]
.I command
.RI [ args ]
@end ifset
@mansect description
Since version 2.1 of GnuPG, @command{dirmngr} takes care of accessing
the OpenPGP keyservers. As with previous versions it is also used as
a server for managing and downloading certificate revocation lists
(CRLs) for X.509 certificates, downloading X.509 certificates, and
providing access to OCSP providers. Dirmngr is invoked internally by
@command{gpg}, @command{gpgsm}, or via the @command{gpg-connect-agent}
tool.
@manpause
@noindent
@xref{Option Index},for an index to @command{DIRMNGR}'s commands and
options.
@mancont
@menu
* Dirmngr Commands:: List of all commands.
* Dirmngr Options:: List of all options.
* Dirmngr Configuration:: Configuration files.
* Dirmngr Signals:: Use of signals.
* Dirmngr Examples:: Some usage examples.
* Dirmngr Protocol:: The protocol dirmngr uses.
@end menu
@node Dirmngr Commands
@section Commands
@mansect commands
Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that
only one command is allowed.
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --version
@opindex version
Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you cannot
abbreviate this command.
@item --help, -h
@opindex help
Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command-line options.
Not that you cannot abbreviate this command.
@item --dump-options
@opindex dump-options
Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot
abbreviate this command.
@item --server
@opindex server
Run in server mode and wait for commands on the @code{stdin}. The
default mode is to create a socket and listen for commands there.
This is only used for testing.
@item --daemon
@opindex daemon
Run in background daemon mode and listen for commands on a socket.
Note that this also changes the default home directory and enables the
internal certificate validation code. This mode is deprecated.
@item --list-crls
@opindex list-crls
List the contents of the CRL cache on @code{stdout}. This is probably
only useful for debugging purposes.
@item --load-crl @var{file}
@opindex load-crl
This command requires a filename as additional argument, and it will
make Dirmngr try to import the CRL in @var{file} into it's cache.
Note, that this is only possible if Dirmngr is able to retrieve the
CA's certificate directly by its own means. In general it is better
to use @code{gpgsm}'s @code{--call-dirmngr loadcrl filename} command
so that @code{gpgsm} can help dirmngr.
@item --fetch-crl @var{url}
@opindex fetch-crl
This command requires an URL as additional argument, and it will make
dirmngr try to retrieve an import the CRL from that @var{url} into
it's cache. This is mainly useful for debugging purposes. The
@command{dirmngr-client} provides the same feature for a running dirmngr.
@item --shutdown
@opindex shutdown
This commands shuts down an running instance of Dirmngr. This command
has currently no effect.
@item --flush
@opindex flush
This command removes all CRLs from Dirmngr's cache. Client requests
will thus trigger reading of fresh CRLs.
@end table
@mansect options
@node Dirmngr Options
@section Option Summary
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --options @var{file}
@opindex options
Reads configuration from @var{file} instead of from the default
per-user configuration file. The default configuration file is named
@file{dirmngr.conf} and expected in the home directory.
@item --homedir @var{dir}
@opindex options
Set the name of the home directory to @var{dir}. This option is only
effective when used on the command line. The default depends on the
running mode:
@table @asis
@item With @code{--daemon} given on the commandline
the directory named @file{@value{SYSCONFDIR}} is used for configuration files
and @file{@value{LOCALCACHEDIR}} for cached CRLs.
@item Without @code{--daemon} given on the commandline
the directory named @file{.gnupg} directly below the home directory
of the user unless the environment variable @code{GNUPGHOME} has been set
in which case its value will be used. All kind of data is stored below
this directory.
@end table
@item -v
@item --verbose
@opindex v
@opindex verbose
Outputs additional information while running.
You can increase the verbosity by giving several
verbose commands to @sc{dirmngr}, such as @option{-vv}.
@item --log-file @var{file}
@opindex log-file
Append all logging output to @var{file}. This is very helpful in
seeing what the agent actually does. Use @file{socket://} to log to
socket.
@item --debug-level @var{level}
@opindex debug-level
Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be a
numeric value or by a keyword:
@table @code
@item none
No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of
the keyword.
@item basic
Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used
instead of the keyword.
@item advanced
More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used
instead of the keyword.
@item expert
Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used
instead of the keyword.
@item guru
All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be
used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is
only enabled if the keyword is used.
@end table
How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not
specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are
however carefully selected to best aid in debugging.
@item --debug @var{flags}
@opindex debug
This option is only useful for debugging and the behaviour may change at
any time without notice. FLAGS are bit encoded and may be given in
usual C-Syntax.
@item --debug-all
@opindex debug-all
Same as @code{--debug=0xffffffff}
@item --gnutls-debug @var{level}
@opindex gnutls-debug
Enable debugging of GNUTLS at @var{level}.
@item --debug-wait @var{n}
@opindex debug-wait
When running in server mode, wait @var{n} seconds before entering the
actual processing loop and print the pid. This gives time to attach a
debugger.
@item --disable-check-own-socket
@opindex disable-check-own-socket
On some platforms @command{dirmngr} is able to detect the removal of
its socket file and shutdown itself. This option disable this
self-test for debugging purposes.
@item -s
@itemx --sh
@itemx -c
@itemx --csh
@opindex s
@opindex sh
@opindex c
@opindex csh
Format the info output in daemon mode for use with the standard Bourne
shell respective the C-shell . The default ist to guess it based on the
environment variable @code{SHELL} which is in almost all cases
sufficient.
@item --force
@opindex force
Enabling this option forces loading of expired CRLs; this is only
useful for debugging.
@item --use-tor
@opindex use-tor
This option switches Dirmngr and thus GnuPG into ``Tor mode'' to route
all network access via Tor (an anonymity network). WARNING: As of now
this still leaks the DNS queries; e.g. to lookup the hosts in a
keyserver pool. Certain other features are disabled if this mode is
active.
@item --keyserver @var{name}
@opindex keyserver
Use @var{name} as your keyserver. This is the server that @command{gpg}
communicates with to receive keys, send keys, and search for
keys. The format of the @var{name} is a URI:
`scheme:[//]keyservername[:port]' The scheme is the type of keyserver:
"hkp" for the HTTP (or compatible) keyservers, "ldap" for the LDAP
keyservers, or "mailto" for the Graff email keyserver. Note that your
particular installation of GnuPG may have other keyserver types
available as well. Keyserver schemes are case-insensitive. After the
keyserver name, optional keyserver configuration options may be
provided. These are the same as the @option{--keyserver-options} of
@command{gpg}, but apply only to this particular keyserver.
Most keyservers synchronize with each other, so there is generally no
need to send keys to more than one server. The keyserver
@code{hkp://keys.gnupg.net} uses round robin DNS to give a different
keyserver each time you use it.
If exactly two keyservers are configured and only one is a Tor hidden
service (.onion), Dirmngr selects the keyserver to use depending on
whether Tor is locally running or not. The check for a running Tor is
done for each new connection.
@item --nameserver @var{ipaddr}
@opindex nameserver
In ``Tor mode'' Dirmngr uses a public resolver via Tor to resolve DNS
names. If the default public resolver, which is @code{8.8.8.8}, shall
not be used a different one can be given using this option. Note that
a numerical IP address must be given (IPv6 or IPv4) and that no error
checking is done for @var{ipaddr}. DNS queries in Tor mode do only
work if GnuPG as been build with ADNS support.
@item --disable-ldap
@opindex disable-ldap
Entirely disables the use of LDAP.
@item --disable-http
@opindex disable-http
Entirely disables the use of HTTP.
@item --ignore-http-dp
@opindex ignore-http-dp
When looking for the location of a CRL, the to be tested certificate
usually contains so called @dfn{CRL Distribution Point} (DP) entries
which are URLs describing the way to access the CRL. The first found DP
entry is used. With this option all entries using the @acronym{HTTP}
scheme are ignored when looking for a suitable DP.
@item --ignore-ldap-dp
@opindex ignore-ldap-dp
This is similar to @option{--ignore-http-dp} but ignores entries using
the @acronym{LDAP} scheme. Both options may be combined resulting in
ignoring DPs entirely.
@item --ignore-ocsp-service-url
@opindex ignore-ocsp-service-url
Ignore all OCSP URLs contained in the certificate. The effect is to
force the use of the default responder.
@item --honor-http-proxy
@opindex honor-http-proxy
If the environment variable @env{http_proxy} has been set, use its
value to access HTTP servers.
@item --http-proxy @var{host}[:@var{port}]
@opindex http-proxy
@efindex http_proxy
Use @var{host} and @var{port} to access HTTP servers. The use of this
option overrides the environment variable @env{http_proxy} regardless
whether @option{--honor-http-proxy} has been set.
@item --ldap-proxy @var{host}[:@var{port}]
@opindex ldap-proxy
Use @var{host} and @var{port} to connect to LDAP servers. If @var{port}
is omitted, port 389 (standard LDAP port) is used. This overrides any
specified host and port part in a LDAP URL and will also be used if host
and port have been omitted from the URL.
@item --only-ldap-proxy
@opindex only-ldap-proxy
Never use anything else but the LDAP "proxy" as configured with
@option{--ldap-proxy}. Usually @command{dirmngr} tries to use other
configured LDAP server if the connection using the "proxy" failed.
@item --ldapserverlist-file @var{file}
@opindex ldapserverlist-file
Read the list of LDAP servers to consult for CRLs and certificates from
file instead of the default per-user ldap server list file. The default
value for @var{file} is @file{dirmngr_ldapservers.conf} or
@file{ldapservers.conf} when running in @option{--daemon} mode.
This server list file contains one LDAP server per line in the format
@sc{hostname:port:username:password:base_dn}
Lines starting with a @samp{#} are comments.
Note that as usual all strings entered are expected to be UTF-8 encoded.
Obviously this will lead to problems if the password has originally been
encoded as Latin-1. There is no other solution here than to put such a
password in the binary encoding into the file (i.e. non-ascii characters
won't show up readable).@footnote{The @command{gpgconf} tool might be
helpful for frontends as it enables editing this configuration file using
percent-escaped strings.}
@item --ldaptimeout @var{secs}
@opindex ldaptimeout
Specify the number of seconds to wait for an LDAP query before timing
out. The default is currently 100 seconds. 0 will never timeout.
@item --add-servers
@opindex add-servers
This options makes dirmngr add any servers it discovers when validating
certificates against CRLs to the internal list of servers to consult for
certificates and CRLs.
This options is useful when trying to validate a certificate that has
a CRL distribution point that points to a server that is not already
listed in the ldapserverlist. Dirmngr will always go to this server and
try to download the CRL, but chances are high that the certificate used
to sign the CRL is located on the same server. So if dirmngr doesn't add
that new server to list, it will often not be able to verify the
signature of the CRL unless the @code{--add-servers} option is used.
Note: The current version of dirmngr has this option disabled by default.
@item --allow-ocsp
@opindex allow-ocsp
This option enables OCSP support if requested by the client.
OCSP requests are rejected by default because they may violate the
privacy of the user; for example it is possible to track the time when
a user is reading a mail.
@item --ocsp-responder @var{url}
@opindex ocsp-responder
Use @var{url} as the default OCSP Responder if the certificate does
not contain information about an assigned responder. Note, that
@code{--ocsp-signer} must also be set to a valid certificate.
@item --ocsp-signer @var{fpr}|@var{file}
@opindex ocsp-signer
Use the certificate with the fingerprint @var{fpr} to check the
responses of the default OCSP Responder. Alternativly a filename can be
given in which case the respinse is expected to be signed by one of the
certificates described in that file. Any argument which contains a
slash, dot or tilde is considered a filename. Usual filename expansion
takes place: A tilde at the start followed by a slash is replaced by the
content of @env{HOME}, no slash at start describes a relative filename
which will be searched at the home directory. To make sure that the
@var{file} is searched in the home directory, either prepend the name
with "./" or use a name which contains a dot.
If a response has been signed by a certificate described by these
fingerprints no further check upon the validity of this certificate is
done.
The format of the @var{FILE} is a list of SHA-1 fingerprint, one per
line with optional colons between the bytes. Empty lines and lines
prefix with a hash mark are ignored.
@item --ocsp-max-clock-skew @var{n}
@opindex ocsp-max-clock-skew
The number of seconds a skew between the OCSP responder and them local
clock is accepted. Default is 600 (20 minutes).
@item --ocsp-max-period @var{n}
@opindex ocsp-max-period
Seconds a response is at maximum considered valid after the time given
in the thisUpdate field. Default is 7776000 (90 days).
@item --ocsp-current-period @var{n}
@opindex ocsp-current-period
The number of seconds an OCSP response is considered valid after the
time given in the NEXT_UPDATE datum. Default is 10800 (3 hours).
@item --max-replies @var{n}
@opindex max-replies
Do not return more that @var{n} items in one query. The default is
10.
@item --ignore-cert-extension @var{oid}
@opindex ignore-cert-extension
Add @var{oid} to the list of ignored certificate extensions. The
@var{oid} is expected to be in dotted decimal form, like
@code{2.5.29.3}. This option may be used more than once. Critical
flagged certificate extensions matching one of the OIDs in the list
are treated as if they are actually handled and thus the certificate
won't be rejected due to an unknown critical extension. Use this
option with care because extensions are usually flagged as critical
for a reason.
@item --hkp-cacert @var{file}
Use the root certificates in @var{file} for verification of the TLS
certificates used with @code{hkps} (keyserver access over TLS). If
the file is in PEM format a suffix of @code{.pem} is expected for
@var{file}. This option may be given multiple times to add more
root certificates. Tilde expansion is supported.
@end table
@c
@c Dirmngr Configuration
@c
@mansect files
@node Dirmngr Configuration
@section Configuration
Dirmngr makes use of several directories when running in daemon mode:
@table @file
@item ~/.gnupg
This is the standard home directory for all configuration files.
@item /etc/gnupg/trusted-certs
This directory should be filled with certificates of Root CAs you
are trusting in checking the CRLs and signing OCSP Responses.
Usually these are the same certificates you use with the applications
making use of dirmngr. It is expected that each of these certificate
files contain exactly one @acronym{DER} encoded certificate in a file
with the suffix @file{.crt} or @file{.der}. @command{dirmngr} reads
those certificates on startup and when given a SIGHUP. Certificates
which are not readable or do not make up a proper X.509 certificate
are ignored; see the log file for details.
Applications using dirmngr (e.g. gpgsm) can request these
certificates to complete a trust chain in the same way as with the
extra-certs directory (see below).
Note that for OCSP responses the certificate specified using the option
@option{--ocsp-signer} is always considered valid to sign OCSP requests.
@item /etc/gnupg/extra-certs
This directory may contain extra certificates which are preloaded
into the interal cache on startup. Applications using dirmngr (e.g. gpgsm)
can request cached certificates to complete a trust chain.
This is convenient in cases you have a couple intermediate CA certificates
-or certificates ususally used to sign OCSP responses.
+or certificates usually used to sign OCSP responses.
These certificates are first tried before going
out to the net to look for them. These certificates must also be
@acronym{DER} encoded and suffixed with @file{.crt} or @file{.der}.
@item ~/.gnupg/crls.d
This directory is used to store cached CRLs. The @file{crls.d}
part will be created by dirmngr if it does not exists but you need to
make sure that the upper directory exists.
@end table
@manpause
To be able to see what's going on you should create the configure file
@file{~/gnupg/dirmngr.conf} with at least one line:
@example
log-file ~/dirmngr.log
@end example
To be able to perform OCSP requests you probably want to add the line:
@example
allow-ocsp
@end example
To make sure that new options are read and that after the installation
of a new GnuPG versions the installed dirmngr is running, you may want
to kill an existing dirmngr first:
@example
gpgconf --kill dirmngr
@end example
You may check the log file to see whether all desired root
certificates have been loaded correctly.
@c
@c Dirmngr Signals
@c
@mansect signals
@node Dirmngr Signals
@section Use of signals.
A running @command{dirmngr} may be controlled by signals, i.e. using
the @command{kill} command to send a signal to the process.
Here is a list of supported signals:
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item SIGHUP
@cpindex SIGHUP
This signals flushes all internally cached CRLs as well as any cached
certificates. Then the certificate cache is reinitialized as on
startup. Options are re-read from the configuration file. Instead of
sending this signal it is better to use
@example
gpgconf --reload dirmngr
@end example
@item SIGTERM
@cpindex SIGTERM
Shuts down the process but waits until all current requests are
fulfilled. If the process has received 3 of these signals and requests
are still pending, a shutdown is forced. You may also use
@example
gpgconf --kill dirmngr
@end example
instead of this signal
@item SIGINT
@cpindex SIGINT
Shuts down the process immediately.
@item SIGUSR1
@cpindex SIGUSR1
This prints some caching statistics to the log file.
@end table
@c
@c Examples
@c
@mansect examples
@node Dirmngr Examples
@section Examples
Here is an example on how to show dirmngr's internal table of OpenPGP
keyserver addresses. The output is intended for debugging purposes
and not part of a defined API.
@example
gpg-connect-agent --dirmngr 'keyserver --hosttable' /bye
@end example
To inhibit the use of a particular host you have noticed in one of the
keyserver pools, you may use
@example
gpg-connect-agent --dirmngr 'keyserver --dead pgpkeys.bnd.de' /bye
@end example
The description of the @code{keyserver} command can be printed using
@example
gpg-connect-agent --dirmngr 'help keyserver' /bye
@end example
@c
@c Assuan Protocol
@c
@manpause
@node Dirmngr Protocol
@section Dirmngr's Assuan Protocol
Assuan is the IPC protocol used to access dirmngr. This is a
description of the commands implemented by dirmngr.
@menu
* Dirmngr LOOKUP:: Look up a certificate via LDAP
* Dirmngr ISVALID:: Validate a certificate using a CRL or OCSP.
* Dirmngr CHECKCRL:: Validate a certificate using a CRL.
* Dirmngr CHECKOCSP:: Validate a certificate using OCSP.
* Dirmngr CACHECERT:: Put a certificate into the internal cache.
* Dirmngr VALIDATE:: Validate a certificate for debugging.
@end menu
@node Dirmngr LOOKUP
@subsection Return the certificate(s) found
Lookup certificate. To allow multiple patterns (which are ORed)
quoting is required: Spaces are to be translated into "+" or into
"%20"; obviously this requires that the usual escape quoting rules
are applied. The server responds with:
@example
S: D <DER encoded certificate>
S: END
S: D <second DER encoded certificate>
S: END
S: OK
@end example
In this example 2 certificates are returned. The server may return
any number of certificates; OK will also be returned when no
certificates were found. The dirmngr might return a status line
@example
S: S TRUNCATED <n>
@end example
To indicate that the output was truncated to N items due to a
limitation of the server or by an arbitrary set limit.
The option @option{--url} may be used if instead of a search pattern a
complete URL to the certificate is known:
@example
C: LOOKUP --url CN%3DWerner%20Koch,o%3DIntevation%20GmbH,c%3DDE?userCertificate
@end example
If the option @option{--cache-only} is given, no external lookup is done
so that only certificates from the cache are returned.
With the option @option{--single}, the first and only the first match
will be returned. Unless option @option{--cache-only} is also used, no
local lookup will be done in this case.
@node Dirmngr ISVALID
@subsection Validate a certificate using a CRL or OCSP
@example
ISVALID [--only-ocsp] [--force-default-responder] @var{certid}|@var{certfpr}
@end example
Check whether the certificate described by the @var{certid} has been
revoked. Due to caching, the Dirmngr is able to answer immediately in
most cases.
The @var{certid} is a hex encoded string consisting of two parts,
delimited by a single dot. The first part is the SHA-1 hash of the
issuer name and the second part the serial number.
Alternatively the certificate's SHA-1 fingerprint @var{certfpr} may be
given in which case an OCSP request is done before consulting the CRL.
If the option @option{--only-ocsp} is given, no fallback to a CRL check
will be used. If the option @option{--force-default-responder} is
given, only the default OCSP responder will be used and any other
methods of obtaining an OCSP responder URL won't be used.
@noindent
Common return values are:
@table @code
@item GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR (0)
This is the positive answer: The certificate is not revoked and we have
an up-to-date revocation list for that certificate. If OCSP was used
the responder confirmed that the certificate has not been revoked.
@item GPG_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
This is the negative answer: The certificate has been revoked. Either
it is in a CRL and that list is up to date or an OCSP responder informed
us that it has been revoked.
@item GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN
No CRL is known for this certificate or the CRL is not valid or out of
date.
@item GPG_ERR_NO_DATA
The OCSP responder returned an ``unknown'' status. This means that it
is not aware of the certificate's status.
@item GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED
This is commonly seen if OCSP support has not been enabled in the
configuration.
@end table
If DirMngr has not enough information about the given certificate (which
is the case for not yet cached certificates), it will will inquire the
missing data:
@example
S: INQUIRE SENDCERT <CertID>
C: D <DER encoded certificate>
C: END
@end example
A client should be aware that DirMngr may ask for more than one
certificate.
If Dirmngr has a certificate but the signature of the certificate
could not been validated because the root certificate is not known to
dirmngr as trusted, it may ask back to see whether the client trusts
this the root certificate:
@example
S: INQUIRE ISTRUSTED <CertHexfpr>
C: D 1
C: END
@end example
Only this answer will let Dirmngr consider the CRL as valid.
@node Dirmngr CHECKCRL
@subsection Validate a certificate using a CRL
Check whether the certificate with FINGERPRINT (SHA-1 hash of the
entire X.509 certificate blob) is valid or not by consulting the CRL
responsible for this certificate. If the fingerprint has not been
given or the certificate is not know, the function inquires the
certificate using:
@example
S: INQUIRE TARGETCERT
C: D <DER encoded certificate>
C: END
@end example
Thus the caller is expected to return the certificate for the request
(which should match FINGERPRINT) as a binary blob. Processing then
takes place without further interaction; in particular dirmngr tries
to locate other required certificate by its own mechanism which
includes a local certificate store as well as a list of trusted root
certificates.
@noindent
The return code is 0 for success; i.e. the certificate has not been
revoked or one of the usual error codes from libgpg-error.
@node Dirmngr CHECKOCSP
@subsection Validate a certificate using OCSP
@example
CHECKOCSP [--force-default-responder] [@var{fingerprint}]
@end example
Check whether the certificate with @var{fingerprint} (the SHA-1 hash of
-the entire X.509 certificate blob) is valid by consulting the appropiate
+the entire X.509 certificate blob) is valid by consulting the appropriate
OCSP responder. If the fingerprint has not been given or the
certificate is not known by Dirmngr, the function inquires the
certificate using:
@example
S: INQUIRE TARGETCERT
C: D <DER encoded certificate>
C: END
@end example
Thus the caller is expected to return the certificate for the request
(which should match @var{fingerprint}) as a binary blob. Processing
then takes place without further interaction; in particular dirmngr
tries to locate other required certificates by its own mechanism which
includes a local certificate store as well as a list of trusted root
certificates.
If the option @option{--force-default-responder} is given, only the
default OCSP responder is used. This option is the per-command variant
of the global option @option{--ignore-ocsp-service-url}.
@noindent
The return code is 0 for success; i.e. the certificate has not been
revoked or one of the usual error codes from libgpg-error.
@node Dirmngr CACHECERT
@subsection Put a certificate into the internal cache
Put a certificate into the internal cache. This command might be
useful if a client knows in advance certificates required for a test and
-wnats to make sure they get added to the internal cache. It is also
+wants to make sure they get added to the internal cache. It is also
helpful for debugging. To get the actual certificate, this command
immediately inquires it using
@example
S: INQUIRE TARGETCERT
C: D <DER encoded certificate>
C: END
@end example
Thus the caller is expected to return the certificate for the request
as a binary blob.
@noindent
The return code is 0 for success; i.e. the certificate has not been
-succesfully cached or one of the usual error codes from libgpg-error.
+successfully cached or one of the usual error codes from libgpg-error.
@node Dirmngr VALIDATE
@subsection Validate a certificate for debugging
Validate a certificate using the certificate validation function used
internally by dirmngr. This command is only useful for debugging. To
get the actual certificate, this command immediately inquires it using
@example
S: INQUIRE TARGETCERT
C: D <DER encoded certificate>
C: END
@end example
Thus the caller is expected to return the certificate for the request
as a binary blob.
@mansect see also
@ifset isman
@command{gpgsm}(1),
@command{dirmngr-client}(1)
@end ifset
@include see-also-note.texi
@c
@c !!! UNDER CONSTRUCTION !!!
@c
@c
@c @section Verifying a Certificate
@c
@c There are several ways to request services from Dirmngr. Almost all of
@c them are done using the Assuan protocol. What we describe here is the
@c Assuan command CHECKCRL as used for example by the dirmnr-client tool if
@c invoked as
@c
@c @example
@c dirmngr-client foo.crt
@c @end example
@c
@c This command will send an Assuan request to an already running Dirmngr
@c instance. foo.crt is expected to be a standard X.509 certificate and
@c dirmngr will receive the Assuan command
@c
@c @example
@c CHECKCRL @var [{fingerprint}]
@c @end example
@c
@c @var{fingerprint} is optional and expected to be the SHA-1 has of the
@c DER encoding of the certificate under question. It is to be HEX
@c encoded. The rationale for sending the fingerprint is that it allows
-@c dirmngr to reply immediatly if it has already cached such a request. If
+@c dirmngr to reply immediately if it has already cached such a request. If
@c this is not the case and no certificate has been found in dirmngr's
@c internal certificate storage, dirmngr will request the certificate using
@c the Assuan inquiry
@c
@c @example
@c INQUIRE TARGETCERT
@c @end example
@c
@c The caller (in our example dirmngr-client) is then expected to return
@c the certificate for the request (which should match @var{fingerprint})
@c as a binary blob.
@c
@c Dirmngr now passes control to @code{crl_cache_cert_isvalid}. This
@c function checks whether a CRL item exists for target certificate. These
@c CRL items are kept in a database of already loaded and verified CRLs.
@c This mechanism is called the CRL cache. Obviously timestamps are kept
@c there with each item to cope with the expiration date of the CRL. The
@c possible return values are: @code{0} to indicate that a valid CRL is
@c available for the certificate and the certificate itself is not listed
@c in this CRL, @code{GPG_ERR_CERT_REVOKED} to indicate that the certificate is
@c listed in the CRL or @code{GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN} in cases where no CRL or no
-@c information is available. The first two codes are immediatly returned to
+@c information is available. The first two codes are immediately returned to
@c the caller and the processing of this request has been done.
@c
@c Only the @code{GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN} needs more attention: Dirmngr now
@c calls @code{clr_cache_reload_crl} and if this succeeds calls
@c @code{crl_cache_cert_isvald) once more. All further errors are
@c immediately returned to the caller.
@c
@c @code{crl_cache_reload_crl} is the actual heart of the CRL management.
@c It locates the corresponding CRL for the target certificate, reads and
@c verifies this CRL and stores it in the CRL cache. It works like this:
@c
@c * Loop over all crlDPs in the target certificate.
@c * If the crlDP is invalid immediately terminate the loop.
@c * Loop over all names in the current crlDP.
@c * If the URL scheme is unknown or not enabled
@c (--ignore-http-dp, --ignore-ldap-dp) continues with
@c the next name.
@c * @code{crl_fetch} is called to actually retrieve the CRL.
@c In case of problems this name is ignore and we continue with
@c the next name. Note that @code{crl_fetch} does only return
@c a descriptor for the CRL for further reading so does the CRL
@c does not yet end up in memory.
@c * @code{crl_cache_insert} is called with that descriptor to
@c actually read the CRL into the cache. See below for a
@c description of this function. If there is any error (e.g. read
@c problem, CRL not correctly signed or verification of signature
@c not possible), this descriptor is rejected and we continue
@c with the next name. If the CRL has been successfully loaded,
@c the loop is terminated.
@c * If no crlDP has been found in the previous loop use a default CRL.
@c Note, that if any crlDP has been found but loading of the CRL failed,
@c this condition is not true.
@c * Try to load a CRL from all configured servers (ldapservers.conf)
@c in turn. The first server returning a CRL is used.
@c * @code(crl_cache_insert) is then used to actually insert the CRL
-@c into the cache. If this failed we give up immediatley without
+@c into the cache. If this failed we give up immediately without
@c checking the rest of the servers from the first step.
@c * Ready.
@c
@c
@c The @code{crl_cache_insert} function takes care of reading the bulk of
@c the CRL, parsing it and checking the signature. It works like this: A
@c new database file is created using a temporary file name. The CRL
@c parsing machinery is started and all items of the CRL are put into
@c this database file. At the end the issuer certificate of the CRL
@c needs to be retrieved. Three cases are to be distinguished:
@c
@c a) An authorityKeyIdentifier with an issuer and serialno exits: The
@c certificate is retrieved using @code{find_cert_bysn}. If
@c the certificate is in the certificate cache, it is directly
@c returned. Then the requester (i.e. the client who requested the
@c CRL check) is asked via the Assuan inquiry ``SENDCERT'' whether
@c he can provide this certificate. If this succeed the returned
@c certificate gets cached and returned. Note, that dirmngr does not
@c verify in any way whether the expected certificate is returned.
@c It is in the interest of the client to return a useful certificate
@c as otherwise the service request will fail due to a bad signature.
@c The last way to get the certificate is by looking it up at
@c external resources. This is done using the @code{ca_cert_fetch}
@c and @code{fetch_next_ksba_cert} and comparing the returned
@c certificate to match the requested issuer and seriano (This is
@c needed because the LDAP layer may return several certificates as
@c LDAP as no standard way to retrieve by serial number).
@c
@c b) An authorityKeyIdentifier with a key ID exists: The certificate is
@c retrieved using @code{find_cert_bysubject}. If the certificate is
@c in the certificate cache, it is directly returned. Then the
@c requester is asked via the Assuan inquiry ``SENDCERT_SKI'' whether
@c he can provide this certificate. If this succeed the returned
@c certificate gets cached and returned. Note, that dirmngr does not
@c verify in any way whether the expected certificate is returned.
@c It is in the interest of the client to return a useful certificate
@c as otherwise the service request will fail due to a bad signature.
@c The last way to get the certificate is by looking it up at
@c external resources. This is done using the @code{ca_cert_fetch}
@c and @code{fetch_next_ksba_cert} and comparing the returned
@c certificate to match the requested subject and key ID.
@c
@c c) No authorityKeyIdentifier exits: The certificate is retrieved
@c using @code{find_cert_bysubject} without the key ID argument. If
@c the certificate is in the certificate cache the first one with a
@c matching subject is is directly returned. Then the requester is
@c asked via the Assuan inquiry ``SENDCERT'' and an exact
@c specification of the subject whether he can
@c provide this certificate. If this succeed the returned
@c certificate gets cached and returned. Note, that dirmngr does not
@c verify in any way whether the expected certificate is returned.
@c It is in the interest of the client to return a useful certificate
@c as otherwise the service request will fail due to a bad signature.
@c The last way to get the certificate is by looking it up at
@c external resources. This is done using the @code{ca_cert_fetch}
@c and @code{fetch_next_ksba_cert} and comparing the returned
@c certificate to match the requested subject; the first certificate
@c with a matching subject is then returned.
@c
@c If no certificate was found, the function returns with the error
@c GPG_ERR_MISSING_CERT. Now the signature is verified. If this fails,
@c the erro is returned. On success the @code{validate_cert_chain} is
@c used to verify that the certificate is actually valid.
@c
@c Here we may encounter a recursive situation:
@c @code{validate_cert_chain} needs to look at other certificates and
@c also at CRLs to check whether these other certificates and well, the
@c CRL issuer certificate itself are not revoked. FIXME: We need to make
@c sure that @code{validate_cert_chain} does not try to lookup the CRL we
@c are currently processing. This would be a catch-22 and may indicate a
@c broken PKI. However, due to overlapping expiring times and imprecise
-@c clocks thsi may actually happen.
+@c clocks this may actually happen.
@c
@c For historical reasons the Assuan command ISVALID is a bit different
@c to CHECKCRL but this is mainly due to different calling conventions.
@c In the end the same fucntionality is used, albeit hidden by a couple
@c of indirection and argument and result code mangling. It furthere
@c ingetrages OCSP checking depending on options are the way it is
@c called. GPGSM still uses this command but might eventuall switch over
@c to CHECKCRL and CHECKOCSP so that ISVALID can be retired.
@c
@c
@c @section Validating a certificate
@c
@c We describe here how the internal function @code{validate_cert_chain}
@c works. Note that mainly testing purposes this functionality may be
@c called directly using @cmd{dirmngr-client --validate @file{foo.crt}}.
@c
@c The function takes the target certificate and a mode argument as
@c parameters and returns an error code and optionally the closes
@c expiration time of all certificates in the chain.
@c
@c We first check that the certificate may be used for the requested
@c purpose (i.e. OCSP or CRL signing). If this is not the case
@c GPG_ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE is returned.
@c
@c The next step is to find the trust anchor (root certificate) and to
@c assemble the chain in memory: Starting with the target certificate,
@c the expiration time is checked against the current date, unknown
@c critical extensions are detected and certificate policies are matched
@c (We only allow 2.289.9.9 but I have no clue about that OID and from
@c where I got it - it does not even seem to be assigned - debug cruft?).
@c
@c Now if this certificate is a self-signed one, we have reached the
@c trust anchor. In this case we check that the signature is good, the
@c certificate is allowed to act as a CA, that it is a trusted one (by
@c checking whether it is has been put into the trusted-certs
@c configuration directory) and finally prepend into to our list
@c representing the certificate chain. This steps ends then.
@c
@c If it is not a self-signed certificate, we check that the chain won't
@c get too long (current limit is 100), if this is the case we terminate
@c with the error GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN.
@c
@c Now the issuer's certificate is looked up: If an
@c authorityKeyIdentifier is available, this one is used to locate the
@c certificate either using issuer and serialnumber or subject DN
@c (i.e. the issuer's DN) and the keyID. The functions
@c @code{find_cert_bysn) and @code{find_cert_bysubject} are used
@c respectively. The have already been described above under the
@c description of @code{crl_cache_insert}. If no certificate was found
@c or with no authorityKeyIdentifier, only the cache is consulted using
@c @code{get_cert_bysubject}. The latter is is done under the assumption
@c that a matching certificate has explicitly been put into the
@c certificate cache. If the issuer's certificate could not be found,
@c the validation terminates with the error code @code{GPG_ERR_MISSING_CERT}.
@c
@c If the issuer's certificate has been found, the signature of the
@c actual certificate is checked and in case this fails the error
@c #code{GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN} is returned. If the signature checks out, the
-@c maximum cahin length of the issueing certificate is checked as well as
-@c the capiblity of the certificate (i.e. whether he may be used for
+@c maximum chain length of the issuing certificate is checked as well as
+@c the capability of the certificate (i.e. whether he may be used for
@c certificate signing). Then the certificate is prepended to our list
@c representing the certificate chain. Finally the loop is continued now
@c with the issuer's certificate as the current certificate.
@c
@c After the end of the loop and if no error as been encountered
@c (i.e. the certificate chain has been assempled correctly), a check is
@c done whether any certificate expired or a critical policy has not been
@c met. In any of these cases the validation terminates with an
@c appropriate error.
@c
@c Finally the function @code{check_revocations} is called to verify no
@c certificate in the assempled chain has been revoked: This is an
@c recursive process because a CRL has to be checked for each certificate
@c in the chain except for the root certificate, of which we already know
@c that it is trusted and we avoid checking a CRL here due to common
@c setup problems and the assumption that a revoked root certifcate has
@c been removed from the list of trusted certificates.
@c
@c
@c
@c
@c @section Looking up certificates through LDAP.
@c
@c This describes the LDAP layer to retrieve certificates.
@c the functions @code{ca_cert_fetch} and @code{fetch_next_ksba_cert} are
@c used for this. The first one starts a search and the second one is
@c used to retrieve certificate after certificate.
@c
diff --git a/doc/faq.org b/doc/faq.org
index e4e9187d6..27046ffdb 100644
--- a/doc/faq.org
+++ b/doc/faq.org
@@ -1,1558 +1,1558 @@
# faq.org -*- coding: utf-8; -*-
#+STARTUP: overview
#+OPTIONS: H:2 num:t toc:t \n:nil @:t ::t |:t ^:t *:t TeX:t
#+EMAIL: wk@gnupg.org
#+AUTHOR: GnuPG users
#+LANGUAGE: en
#+TITLE: GnuPG Frequently Asked Questions
#+OPTIONS: H:3 num:nil toc:t \n:nil @:t ::t |:t ^:{} -:t f:t *:t TeX:t LaTeX:t skip:nil d:(HIDE) tags:not-in-toc
#+LINK: gnupgweb http://www.gnupg.org/
#+LINK: roundup https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue
#+STYLE: <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="http://www.gnupg.org/share/site.css" />
# FIXME: This FAQ needs a heavy cleanup. For now I only switched to
# org-mode format for easier maintenance.
#+begin_html
<a href="/"><img src="http://gnupg.org/share/logo-gnupg-light-purple-bg.png" class="logo-link" /></a>
#+end_html
*WARNING: This FAQ is heavily outdated*. Mentioned versions of GnuPG
have reached end of life many years ago. Almost all bugs and problems
have been fixed in the now current versions of GnuPG. We will try to
update this FAQ in the next month. See the section "Changes" for recent updates.
* Welcome
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: welcome
:END:
Welcome to the GnuPG FAQ. The latest HTML version is available at\\
[[http://www.gnupg.org/faq/GnuPG-FAQ.html]]; \\
a plain text Gversion at \\
ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/GnuPG-FAQ.txt.
See the end of this file for the release date.
The index is generated automatically, so there may be errors. Not
all questions may be in the section they belong to. Suggestions
about how to improve the structure of this FAQ are welcome.
Please send additions and corrections to the gnupg-users mailing
list. It would be most convenient if you could provide the answer to
be included here as well. Your help is very much appreciated!
Please, don't send message like "This should be a FAQ - what's the
answer?". If it hasn't been asked before, it isn't a FAQ. In that
case you could search in the mailing list archive.
** What conventions are used in this FAQ?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: what-conventions-are-used-in-this-faq
:END:
Although GnuPG is being developed for several operating systems
(often in parallel), the conventions used in this FAQ reflect a
UNIX shell environment. For Win32 users, references to a shell
prompt (=$=) should be interpreted as a command prompt (=>=),
directory names separated by a forward slash (=/=) may need to be
converted to a back slash (=\=), and a tilde (=~=) represents a
user's "home" directory (reference question [[id:how-do-i-put-my-keyring-in-a-different-directory][How do I put my keyring in a different directory?]] for an example).
Some command-lines presented in this FAQ are too long to properly
display in some browsers for the web page version of this file, and
have been split into two or more lines. For these commands please
remember to enter the entire command-string on one line or the
command will error, or at minimum not give the desired results.
Please keep in mind that this FAQ contains information that may not
apply to your particular version, as new features and bug fixes are
added on a continuing basis (reference the NEWS file included with
the source or package for noteworthy changes between versions). One
item to note is that starting with GnuPG version 1.1.92 the file
containing user options and settings has been renamed from "options"
to "gpg.conf". Information in the FAQ that relates to the options
- file may be interchangable with the newer gpg.conf file in many
+ file may be interchangeable with the newer gpg.conf file in many
instances. See question
[[#gnupg-no-longer-installs-a-options-file-is-it-missing][GnuPG no longer installs a ~/.gnupg/options file. Is it missing?]]
for details.
* General Questions
** What is GnuPG?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: what-is-gnupg
:END:
[[gnupgweb][GnuPG]] stands for GNU Privacy Guard and is GNU's tool for secure
communication and data storage. It can be used to encrypt data and
to create digital signatures. It includes an advanced key
management facility and is compliant with the proposed OpenPGP
Internet standard as described in [[http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4880.txt][RFC-4880]]. As such, it is aimed
to be compatible with PGP from PGP Corp. and other OpenPGP tools
** Is GnuPG compatible with PGP?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: is-gnupg-compatible-with-pgp
:END:
In general, yes. GnuPG and newer PGP releases should be implementing
the OpenPGP standard. But there are some interoperability problems.
See question
[[#how-can-i-encrypt-a-message-so-that-pgp-is-able-to-decrypt-it][How can I encrypt a message with GnuPG so that PGP is able to decrypt it?]]
for details.
** Is GnuPG free to use for personal or commercial use?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: is-gnupg-free-to-use
:END:
Yes. GnuPG is part of the GNU family of tools and applications built
and provided in accordance with the Free Software Foundation (FSF)
General Public License (GPL). Therefore the software is free to copy,
use, modify and distribute in accordance with that license. Please
read the file titled COPYING that accompanies the application for
more information.
* Sources of Information
** Where can I find more information on GnuPG?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: more-information-on-gnupg
:END:
On-line resources:
- The documentation page is located at [[gnupgweb:documentation/]].
Also, have a look at the HOWTOs and the GNU Privacy Handbook
(GPH, available in English, Spanish and Russian). The latter
provides a detailed user's guide to GnuPG. You'll also find a
document about how to convert from PGP 2.x to GnuPG.
- At [[gnupgweb:documentation/mailing-lists.html]] you'll find an
online archive of the GnuPG mailing lists. Most interesting
should be gnupg-users for all user-related issues and gnupg-devel
if you want to get in touch with the developers.
In addition, searchable archives can be found on MARC, e.g.:\\
For gnupg-users : [[http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gnupg-users&r=1&w=2]]\\
For gnupg-devel : [[http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gnupg-devel&r=1&w=2]]
*Please:* Before posting to a list, read this FAQ and the
available documentation. In addition, search the list archive
--- maybe your question has already been discussed. This way you
help people focus on topics that have not yet been resolved.
- The GnuPG source distribution contains a subdirectory:
: ./doc
where some additional documentation is located (mainly
interesting for hackers, not the casual user).
** Where do I get GnuPG?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: where-do-i-get-gnupg
:END:
You can download the GNU Privacy Guard from its primary FTP server
[[ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/][ftp.gnupg.org]] or from one of its [[gnupgweb:download/mirrors.html][mirrors]].
The current stable version is FIXME. Please upgrade to this
version as it includes additional features, functions and security
fixes that may not have existed in prior versions.
* Installation
** Which OSes does GnuPG run on?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: which-oses-does-gnupg-run-on
:END:
It should run on most Unices as well as Windows versions
(including Windows NT/2000) and Macintosh OS/X. A list of OSes
reported to be OK is presented at:
[[gnupgweb:download/supported_systems.html]]
** Which random data gatherer should I use?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: which-random-data-gatherer-should-i-use
:END:
"Good" random numbers are crucial for the security of your encryption.
Different operating systems provide a variety of more or less quality
random data. Linux and *BSD provide kernel generated random data
through /dev/random - this should be the preferred choice on these
systems. Also Solaris users with the SUNWski package installed have
a /dev/random. In these cases, use the configure option:
: --enable-static-rnd=linux
In addition, there's also the kernel random device by Andi Maier
[[http://www.cosy.sbg.ac.at/~andi/SUNrand/]], but it's still beta. Use
at your own risk!
On other systems, the Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is a good choice.
It is a perl-daemon that monitors system activity and hashes it into
random data. See the download page [[gnupgweb:download/]]
to obtain EGD. Use:
: --enable-static-rnd=egd
here.
If the above options do not work, you can use the random number
generator "unix". This is *very slow* and should be avoided. The
random quality isn't very good so don't use it on sensitive data.
** How do I include support for RSA and IDEA?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-do-i-include-support-for-rsa-and-idea
:END:
RSA is included as of GnuPG version 1.0.3.
The official GnuPG distribution does not contain IDEA due to a patent
restriction. The patent does not expire before 2007 so don't expect
official support before then.
However, there is an unofficial module to include it even in earlier
versions of GnuPG. It's available from
[[ftp://ftp.gnupg.dk/pub/contrib-dk/]]. Look for:
: idea.c.gz (c module)
: idea.c.gz.sig (signature file)
: ideadll.zip (c module and win32 dll)
: ideadll.zip.sig (signature file)
Compilation directives are in the headers of these files. You will
then need to add the following line to your =~/.gnupg/gpg.conf= or
=~/.gnupg/options= file:
: load-extension idea
* Usage
** What is the recommended key size?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: what-is-the-recommended-key-size
:END:
1024 bit for DSA signatures; even for plain Elgamal signatures.
This is sufficient as the size of the hash is probably the weakest
link if the key size is larger than 1024 bits. Encryption keys may
have greater sizes, but you should then check the fingerprint of
this key:
: $ gpg --fingerprint <user ID>
As for the key algorithms, you should stick with the default (i.e.,
DSA signature and Elgamal encryption). An Elgamal signing key has
the following disadvantages: the signature is larger, it is hard
to create such a key useful for signatures which can withstand some
real world attacks, you don't get any extra security compared to
DSA, and there might be compatibility problems with certain PGP
versions. It has only been introduced because at the time it was
not clear whether there was a patent on DSA.
** Why does it sometimes take so long to create keys?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: why-does-it-sometimes-take-so-long-to-create-keys
:END:
The problem here is that we need a lot of random bytes and for that
we (on Linux the /dev/random device) must collect some random data.
It is really not easy to fill the Linux internal entropy buffer; I
talked to Ted Ts'o and he commented that the best way to fill the
buffer is to play with your keyboard. Good security has its price.
What I do is to hit several times on the shift, control, alternate,
and caps lock keys, because these keys do not produce output to the
screen. This way you get your keys really fast (it's the same thing
PGP2 does).
Another problem might be another program which eats up your random
bytes (a program (look at your daemons) that reads from /dev/random).
** And it really takes long when I work on a remote system. Why?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: it-really-takes-long-when-i-work-on-a-remote-system
:END:
Don't do this at all! You should never create keys or even use GnuPG
on a remote system because you normally have no physical control
over your secret key ring (which is in most cases vulnerable to
advanced dictionary attacks) - I strongly encourage everyone to only
create keys on a local computer (a disconnected laptop is probably
the best choice) and if you need it on your connected box (I know,
we all do this) be sure to have a strong password for both your
account and for your secret key, and that you can trust your system
administrator.
When I check GnuPG on a remote system via ssh (I have no Alpha here)
;-) I have the same problem. It takes a *very* long time to create
the keys, so I use a special option, --quick-random, to generate
insecure keys which are only good for some tests.
** What is the difference between options and commands?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: difference-between-options-and-commands
:END:
If you do a 'gpg --help', you will get two separate lists. The first
is a list of commands. The second is a list of options. Whenever you
run GPG, you *must* pick exactly one command (with one exception,
see below). You *may* pick one or more options. The command should,
just by convention, come at the end of the argument list, after all
the options. If the command takes a file (all the basic ones do),
the filename comes at the very end. So the basic way to run gpg is:
: $ gpg [--option something] [--option2] [--option3 something] --command file
Some options take arguments. For example, the --output option (which
can be abbreviated as -o) is an option that takes a filename. The
option's argument must follow immediately after the option itself,
otherwise gpg doesn't know which option the argument is supposed to
paired with. As an option, --output and its filename must come before
the command. The --recipient (-r) option takes a name or keyID to
encrypt the message to, which must come right after the -r option.
The --encrypt (or -e) command comes after all the options and is
followed by the file you wish to encrypt. Therefore in this example
the command-line issued would be:
: $ gpg -r alice -o secret.txt -e test.txt
If you write the options out in full, it is easier to read:
: $ gpg --recipient alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt
If you're encrypting to a file with the extension ".txt", then you'd
probably expect to see ASCII-armored text in the file (not binary),
so you need to add the --armor (-a) option, which doesn't take any
arguments:
: $ gpg --armor --recipient alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt
If you imagine square brackets around the optional parts, it becomes
a bit clearer:
: $ gpg [--armor] [--recipient alice] [--output secret.txt] --encrypt test.txt
The optional parts can be rearranged any way you want:
: $ gpg --output secret.txt --recipient alice --armor --encrypt test.txt
If your filename begins with a hyphen (e.g. "-a.txt"), GnuPG assumes
this is an option and may complain. To avoid this you have to either
use =./-a.txt=, or stop the option and command processing with two
hyphens: =-- -a.txt=.
*The exception to using only one command*: signing and encrypting
at the same time. For this you can combine both commands, such as in:
: $ gpg [--options] --sign --encrypt foo.txt
** I can't delete a user ID on my secret keyring because it has already been deleted on my public keyring. What can I do?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: delete-user-id-from-secring-if-already-deleted-from-pubring
:END:
Because you can only select from the public key ring, there is no
direct way to do this. However it is not very complicated to do
anyway. Create a new user ID with exactly the same name and you
will see that there are now two identical user IDs on the secret
ring. Now select this user ID and delete it. Both user IDs will be
removed from the secret ring.
** I can't delete my secret key because the public key disappeared. What can I do?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: delete-my-secret-key-because-the-public-key-disappeared
:END:
To select a key a search is always done on the public keyring,
therefore it is not possible to select a secret key without
having the public key. Normally it should never happen that the
public key got lost but the secret key is still available. The
reality is different, so GnuPG implements a special way to deal
with it: Simply use the long keyID to specify the key to delete,
which can be obtained by using the --with-colons options (it is
the fifth field in the lines beginning with "sec").
If you've lost your public key and need to recreate it instead
for continued use with your secret key, you may be able to use
gpgsplit as detailed in question
[[#i-still-have-my-secret-key-but-lost-my-public-key][I still have my secret key, but lost my public key. What can I do?]].
** What are trust, validity and ownertrust?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: what-are-trust-validity-and-ownertrust
:END:
With GnuPG, the term "ownertrust" is used instead of "trust" to
help clarify that this is the value you have assigned to a key
to express how much you trust the owner of this key to correctly
sign (and thereby introduce) other keys. The "validity", or
calculated trust, is a value which indicates how much GnuPG
considers a key as being valid (that it really belongs to the
one who claims to be the owner of the key). For more information
on trust values see the chapter "The Web of Trust" in The GNU
Privacy Handbook.
** How do I sign a patch file?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-do-i-sign-a-patch-file
:END:
Use "gpg --clearsign --not-dash-escaped ...". The problem with
--clearsign is that all lines starting with a dash are quoted with
"- "; obviously diff produces many lines starting with a dash and
these are then quoted and that is not good for a patch ;-). To use
a patch file without removing the cleartext signature, the special
option --not-dash-escaped may be used to suppress generation of
these escape sequences. You should not mail such a patch because
spaces and line endings are also subject to the signature and a
mailer may not preserve these. If you want to mail a file you can
simply sign it using your MUA (Mail User Agent).
** Where is the "encrypt-to-self" option?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: where-is-the-encrypt-to-self-option
:END:
Use "--encrypt-to your_keyID". You can use more than one of these
options. To temporarily override the use of this additional key,
you can use the option "--no-encrypt-to".
** How can I get rid of the Version and Comment headers in armored messages?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: get-rid-of-the-version-and-comment-headers-in-armored-messages
:END:
Use
: --no-version --comment ''
Note that the left over blank line
is required by the protocol.
** What does the "You are using the xxxx character set." mean?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: what-does-the-you-are-using-the-xxx-character-set-mean
:END:
This note is printed when UTF-8 mapping has to be done. Make sure
that the displayed character set is the one you have activated on
your system. Since "iso-8859-1" is the character set most used,
this is the default. You can change the charset with the option
=--charset=. It is important that your active character set matches
the one displayed --- if not, restrict yourself to plain 7 bit
ASCII and no mapping has to be done.
** How can I get list of key IDs used to encrypt a message?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-can-i-get-list-of-key-ids-used-to-encrypt-a-message
:END:
: $ gpg --batch --decrypt --list-only --status-fd 1 2>/dev/null | \
: awk '/^\[GNUPG:\] ENC_TO / { print $3 }'
** Why can't I decrypt files encrypted as symmetrical-only (-c) with a version of GnuPG prior to 1.0.1.
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: why-cant-i-decrypt-symmetrical-only-with-gnupg-prior-to-1.0.1
:END:
There was a bug in GnuPG versions prior to 1.0.1 which affected files
only if 3DES or Twofish was used for symmetric-only encryption (this has
never been the default). The bug has been fixed, but to enable decryption
of old files you should run gpg with the option =--emulate-3des-s2k-bug=,
decrypt the file and encrypt it again without this option.
NOTE: This option was removed in GnuPG development version 1.1.0 and later
updates, so you will need to use a version between 1.0.1 and 1.0.7 to
re-encrypt any affected files.
** How can I use GnuPG in an automated environment?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-can-i-use-gnupg-in-an-automated-environment
:END:
You should use the option =--batch= and don't use passphrases as
there is usually no way to store it more securely than on the
secret keyring itself. The suggested way to create keys for an
automated environment is:
On a secure machine:
1. If you want to do automatic signing, create a signing subkey for
- your key. Use the interactive key editing menu by issueing the
+ your key. Use the interactive key editing menu by issuing the
command
: gpg --edit-key keyID
enter "addkey" and select the DSA key type).
1. Make sure that you use a passphrase (needed by the current
implementation).
1.
: gpg --export-secret-subkeys --no-comment foo >secring.auto
1. Copy secring.auto and the public keyring to a test directory.
1. Change to this directory.
1. Run the command
: gpg --homedir . --edit foo
and use the sub-command =passwd= to remove the passphrase from the
subkeys. You may also want to remove all unused subkeys.
1. Copy secring.auto to a floppy and carry it to the target box.
On the target machine:
1. Install secring.auto as the secret keyring.
1. Now you can start your new service. It's also a good idea to
install an intrusion detection system so that you hopefully get
a notice of an successful intrusion, so that you in turn can
revoke all the subkeys installed on that machine and install new
subkeys.
** Which email-client can I use with GnuPG?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: which-email-client-can-i-use-with-gnupg
:END:
Using GnuPG to encrypt email is one of the most popular uses.
Several mail clients or mail user agents (MUAs) support GnuPG to
varying degrees. Simplifying a bit, there are two ways mail can be
encrypted with GnuPG: the "old style" ASCII armor (i.e. cleartext
encryption), and RFC 2015 style (previously PGP/MIME, now OpenPGP).
The latter has full MIME support. Some MUAs support only one of
them, so whichever you actually use depends on your needs as well
as the capabilities of your addressee. As well, support may be
native to the MUA, or provided via "plug-ins" or external tools.
The following list is not exhaustive:
| MUA | OpenPGP | ASCII | How? (N,P,T) |
|-----------------+---------+-------+----------------------|
| Calypso | N | Y | P (Unixmail) |
| Elm | N | Y | T (mailpgp,morepgp) |
| Elm ME+ | N | Y | N |
| Emacs/Gnus | Y | Y | T (Mailcrypt,gpg.el) |
| Emacs/Mew | Y | Y | N |
| Emacs/VM | N | Y | T (Mailcrypt) |
| Evolution | Y | Y | N |
| Exmh | Y | Y | N |
| GNUMail.app | Y | Y | P (PGPBundle) |
| GPGMail | Y | Y | N |
| KMail (<=1.4.x) | N | Y | N |
| KMail (1.5.x) | Y(P) | Y(N) | P/N |
| Mozilla | Y | Y | P (Enigmail) |
| Mulberry | Y | Y | P |
| Mutt | Y | Y | N |
| Sylpheed | Y | Y | N |
| Claws-mail | Y | Y | N |
| TkRat | Y | Y | N |
| XEmacs/Gnus | Y | Y | T (Mailcrypt) |
| XEmacs/Mew | Y | Y | N |
| XEmacs/VM | N | Y | T (Mailcrypt) |
| XFmail | Y | Y | N |
( N - Native, P - Plug-in, T - External Tool)
The following table lists proprietary MUAs. The GNU Project
suggests against the use of these programs, but they are listed
for interoperability reasons for your convenience.
| MUA | OpenPGP | ASCII | How? (N,P,T) |
|------------------+---------+-------+--------------------------|
| Apple Mail | Y | Y | P (GPGMail) |
| Becky2 | Y | Y | P (BkGnuPG) |
| Eudora | Y | Y | P (EuroraGPG) |
| Eudora Pro | Y | Y | P (EudoraGPG) |
| Lotus Notes | N | Y | P |
| Netscape 4.x | N | Y | P |
| Netscape 7.x | Y | Y | P (Enigmail) |
| Novell Groupwise | N | Y | P |
| Outlook | N | Y | P (G-Data) |
| Outlook Express | N | Y | P (GPGOE) |
| Pegasus | N | Y | P (QDPGP,PM-PGP) |
| Pine | N | Y | T (pgpenvelope,gpg4pine) |
| Postme | N | Y | P (GPGPPL) |
| The Bat! | N | Y | P (Ritlabs) |
Good overviews of OpenPGP-support can be found at:\\
[[http://www.openpgp.fr.st/courrier_en.html]] \\
http://www.bretschneidernet.de/tips/secmua.html
Users of Win32 MUAs that lack OpenPGP support may look into using
GPGrelay http://gpgrelay.sourceforge.net, a small email-relaying
server that uses GnuPG to enable many email clients to send and
receive emails that conform to PGP-MIME (RFC 2015).
** Can't we have a gpg library?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: cant-we-have-a-gpg-library
:END:
This has been frequently requested. However, the current viewpoint
of the GnuPG maintainers is that this would lead to several security
issues and will therefore not be implemented in the foreseeable
future. However, for some areas of application gpgme could do the
trick. You'll find it at [[gnupgweb:related_software/gpgme]].
** I have successfully generated a revocation certificate, but I don't understand how to send it to the key servers.
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-to-send-a-revocation-to-the-keyservers
:END:
Most keyservers don't accept a 'bare' revocation certificate. You
have to import the certificate into gpg first:
: $ gpg --import my-revocation.asc
then send the revoked key to the keyservers:
: $ gpg --keyserver certserver.pgp.com --send-keys mykeyid
(or use a keyserver web interface for this).
** How do I put my keyring in a different directory?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-do-i-put-my-keyring-in-a-different-directory
:END:
GnuPG keeps several files in a special homedir directory. These
include the options file, pubring.gpg, secring.gpg, trustdb.gpg,
and others. GnuPG will always create and use these files. On
unices, the homedir is usually ~/.gnupg; on Windows it is name
"gnupg" and found below the user's application directory. Run the
gpg and pass the option --version to see the name of that
directory.
If you want to put your keyrings somewhere else, use the option:
: --homedir /my/path/
to make GnuPG create all its files in that directory. Your keyring
will be "/my/path/pubring.gpg". This way you can store your secrets
on a floppy disk. Don't use "--keyring" as its purpose is to specify
additional keyring files.
** How do I verify signed packages?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-do-i-verify-signed-packages
:END:
- must first have the vendor, organisation, or issueing person's key
+ must first have the vendor, organisation, or issuing person's key
Before you can verify the signature that accompanies a package, you
imported into your public keyring. To prevent GnuPG warning
messages the key should also be validated (or locally signed).
You will also need to download the detached signature file along
with the package. These files will usually have the same name as
the package, with either a binary (.sig) or ASCII armor (.asc)
extension.
Once their key has been imported, and the package and accompanying
signature files have been downloaded, use:
: $ gpg --verify sigfile signed-file
If the signature file has the same base name as the package file,
the package can also be verified by specifying just the signature
file, as GnuPG will derive the package's file name from the name
given (less the .sig or .asc extension). For example, to verify a
package named foobar.tar.gz against its detached binary signature
file, use:
: $ gpg --verify foobar.tar.gz.sig
** How do I export a keyring with only selected signatures (keys)?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-do-i-export-a-keyring-with-only-selected-signatures
:END:
If you're wanting to create a keyring with only a subset of keys
selected from a master keyring (for a club, user group, or company
department for example), simply specify the keys you want to export:
: $ gpg --armor --export key1 key2 key3 key4 > keys1-4.asc
** I still have my secret key, but lost my public key. What can I do?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: i-still-have-my-secret-key-but-lost-my-public-key
:END:
All OpenPGP secret keys have a copy of the public key inside them,
and in a worst-case scenario, you can create yourself a new public
key using the secret key.
A tool to convert a secret key into a public one has been included
(it's actually a new option for gpgsplit) and is available with GnuPG
versions 1.2.1 or later (or can be found in CVS). It works like this:
: $ gpgsplit --no-split --secret-to-public secret.gpg >publickey.gpg
One should first try to export the secret key and convert just this
one. Using the entire secret keyring should work too. After this has
been done, the publickey.gpg file can be imported into GnuPG as usual.
** Clearsigned messages sent from my web-mail account have an invalid signature. Why?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: clearsig-sent-from-webmail-have-an-invalid-signature
:END:
Check to make sure the settings for your web-based email account
do not use HTML formatting for the pasted clearsigned message. This can
alter the message with embedded HTML markup tags or spaces, resulting
in an invalid signature. The recipient may be able to copy the signed
message block to a text file for verification, or the web email
service may allow you to attach the clearsigned message as a file
if plaintext messages are not an option.
* Compatibility Issues
** How can I encrypt a message with GnuPG so that PGP is able to decrypt it?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-can-i-encrypt-a-message-so-that-pgp-is-able-to-decrypt-it
:END:
It depends on the PGP version.
- PGP 2.x ::
You can't do that because PGP 2.x normally uses IDEA which is
not supported by GnuPG as it is patented (see [[#how-do-i-include-support-for-rsa-and-idea][How do I include
support for RSA and IDEA?]]), but if you have a modified version
of PGP you can try this:
: $ gpg --rfc1991 --cipher-algo 3des ...
Please don't pipe the data to encrypt to gpg but provide it
using a filename; otherwise, PGP 2 will not be able to handle
it.
As for conventional encryption, you can't do this for PGP 2.
- PGP 5.x and higher ::
You need to provide two additional options:
: --compress-algo 1 --cipher-algo cast5
You may also use "3des" instead of "cast5", and "blowfish" does
not work with all versions of PGP 5. You may also want to put:
: compress-algo 1
into your =~/.gnupg/options= file --- this does not affect
normal GnuPG operation.
This applies to conventional encryption as well.
** How do I migrate from PGP 2.x to GnuPG?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-do-i-migrate-from-pgp2-to-gnupg
:END:
PGP 2 uses the RSA and IDEA encryption algorithms. Whereas the RSA
patent has expired and RSA is included as of GnuPG 1.0.3, the IDEA
algorithm is still patented until 2007. Under certain conditions you
may use IDEA even today. In that case, you may refer to Question
[[*How%20do%20I%20include%20support%20for%20RSA%20and%20IDEA][How do I include support for RSA and IDEA?]] about how to add
IDEA support to GnuPG and read
[[gnupgweb:gph/en/pgp2x.html]] to perform the migration.
** Why is PGP 5.x not able to encrypt messages with some keys?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: why-is-pgp5-not-able-to-encrypt-messages-with-some-keys
:END:
PGP, Inc. refuses to accept Elgamal keys of type 20 even for
encryption. They only support type 16 (which is identical at least
for decryption). To be more inter-operable, GnuPG (starting with
version 0.3.3) now also uses type 16 for the Elgamal subkey which is
created if the default key algorithm is chosen. You may add a type
16 Elgamal key to your public key, which is easy as your key
signatures are still valid.
** Why is PGP 5.x not able to verify my messages?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: why-is-pgp5-not-able-to-verify-my-messages
:END:
PGP 5.x does not accept v4 signatures for data material but OpenPGP
requests generation of v4 signatures for all kind of data, that's why
GnuPG defaults to them. Use the option "--force-v3-sigs" to generate
v3 signatures for data.
** How do I transfer owner trust values from PGP to GnuPG?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-do-i-transfer-owner-trust-values-from-pgp-to-gnupg
:END:
There is a script in the tools directory to help you. After you have
imported the PGP keyring you can give this command:
: $ lspgpot pgpkeyring | gpg --import-ownertrust
where pgpkeyring is the original keyring and not the GnuPG keyring
you might have created in the first step.
** PGP does not like my secret key.
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: pgp-does-not-like-my-secret-key
:END:
Older PGPs probably bail out on some private comment packets used by
GnuPG. These packets are fully in compliance with OpenPGP; however
PGP is not really OpenPGP aware. A workaround is to export the
secret keys with this command:
: $ gpg --export-secret-keys --no-comment -a your-KeyID
Another possibility is this: by default, GnuPG encrypts your secret
key using the Blowfish symmetric algorithm. Older PGPs will only
understand 3DES, CAST5, or IDEA symmetric algorithms. Using the
following method you can re-encrypt your secret gpg key with a
different algo:
: $ gpg --s2k-cipher-algo=CAST5 --s2k-digest-algo=SHA1 \
: --compress-algo=1 --edit-key <username>
Then use passwd to change the password (just change it to the same
thing, but it will encrypt the key with CAST5 this time).
Now you can export it and PGP should be able to handle it.
For PGP 6.x the following options work to export a key:
: $ gpg --s2k-cipher-algo 3des --compress-algo 1 --rfc1991 \
: --export-secret-keys <KeyID>
** GnuPG no longer installs a ~/.gnupg/options file. Is it missing?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: gnupg-no-longer-installs-a-options-file-is-it-missing
:END:
No. The ~/.gnupg/options file has been renamed to
~/.gnupg/gpg.conf for new installs as of version 1.1.92. If an
existing ~/.gnupg/options file is found during an upgrade it will
still be used, but this change was required to have a more
consistent naming scheme with forthcoming tools. An existing
options file can be renamed to gpg.conf for users upgrading, or
receiving the message that the "old default options file" is
ignored (occurs if both a gpg.conf and an options file are found).
** How do you export GnuPG keys for use with PGP?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-do-you-export-gnupg-keys-for-use-with-pgp
:END:
This has come up fairly often, so here's the HOWTO:
PGP can (for most key types) use secret keys generated by GnuPG. The
problems that come up occasionally are generally because GnuPG
supports a few more features from the OpenPGP standard than PGP does.
If your secret key has any of those features in use, then PGP will
reject the key or you will have problems communicating later. Note
that PGP doesn't do Elgamal signing keys at all, so they are not
usable with any version.
These instructions should work for GnuPG 1.0.7 and later, and PGP
7.0.3 and later.
Start by editing the key. Most of this line is not really necessary
as the default values are correct, but it does not hurt to repeat the
values, as this will override them in case you have something else set
in your options file.
: $ gpg --s2k-cipher-algo cast5 --s2k-digest-algo sha1 --s2k-mode 3 \
: --simple-sk-checksum --edit KeyID
Turn off some features. Set the list of preferred ciphers, hashes,
and compression algorithms to things that PGP can handle. (Yes, I
know this is an odd list of ciphers, but this is what PGP itself uses,
minus IDEA).
: > setpref S9 S8 S7 S3 S2 S10 H2 H3 Z1 Z0
Now put the list of preferences onto the key.
: > updpref
Finally we must decrypt and re-encrypt the key, making sure that we
encrypt with a cipher that PGP likes. We set this up in the --edit
line above, so now we just need to change the passphrase to make it
take effect. You can use the same passphrase if you like, or take
this opportunity to actually change it.
: > passwd
Save our work.
: > save
Now we can do the usual export:
: $ gpg --export KeyID > mypublickey.pgp[H br]
: $ gpg --export-secret-key KeyID > mysecretkey.pgp
Thanks to David Shaw for this information!
** What are DH/DSS keys?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: what-are-dh-dss-keys
:END:
PGP uses a different name for the former default encryption
algorithm Elgamal: They name it DH, which usually stands for the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. It has been said that this
had historic patent and business reasons. It is however exactly
the same thing as the Elgamal algorithm.
They also use the acronym DSS (Digital Signature Standard) instead
of the DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm). The difference is that
DSS requires the use of certain hash algorithms; however OpenPGP
allows the use of more than those hash algorithms, thus GPG usually
uses the term DSA.
* Problems and Error Messages
** Why do I get "gpg: Warning: using insecure memory!"
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: why-do-i-get-gpg_warning_using_insecure_memory
:END:
You see this warning if GPG is not able to lock pages against being
swapped out to disk.
However, on most modern system you should not see this message
anymore because these systems allow any process to prevent a small
number of memory pages from being swapped out to disk (using the
mlock system call). Other (mostly older) systems don't allow this
unless you install GPG as setuid(root).
Locking pages against being swapped out is not necessary if your
system uses an encrypted swap partition. In fact that is the best
way to protect sensitive data from ending up on a disk. If your
system allows for encrypted swap partitions, please make use of
that feature. Note that GPG does not know about encrypted swap
partitions and might print the warning; thus you should disabled
the warning if your swap partition is encrypted. You may also want
to disable this warning if you can't or don't want to install GnuPG
setuid(root). To disable the warning you put a line
: no-secmem-warning
into your ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf file.
What follows is a short description on how to install GPG
setuid(root); for those who need this.
On some systems this program should be installed as setuid(root).
This is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages
prevents the operating system from writing them to disk and thereby
keeping your secret keys really secret. If you get no warning
message about insecure memory your operating system supports
locking without being root. The program drops root privileges as
soon as locked memory is allocated.
To setuid(root) permissions on the gpg binary you can either use:
: $ chmod u+s /path/to/gpg
or
: $ chmod 4755 /path/to/gpg
Some refrain from using setuid(root) unless absolutely required for
security reasons. Please check with your system administrator if
you are not able to make these determinations yourself.
On UnixWare 2.x and 7.x you should install GnuPG with the 'plock'
privilege to get the same effect:
: $ filepriv -f plock /path/to/gpg
On some systems (e.g., Windows) GnuPG does not lock memory pages
and older GnuPG versions (<=1.0.4) issue the warning:
: gpg: Please note that you don't have secure memory
This warning can't be switched off by the above option because it
was thought to be too serious an issue. However, it confused users
too much, so the warning was eventually removed.
** Large File Support doesn't work
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: large-file-support-does-not-work
:END:
LFS works correctly in post-1.0.4 versions. If configure doesn't
detect it, try a different (i.e., better) compiler. egcs 1.1.2
works fine, other gccs sometimes don't. BTW, several compilation
problems of GnuPG 1.0.3 and 1.0.4 on HP-UX and Solaris were due to
broken LFS support.
** In the edit menu the trust values are not displayed correctly after signing uids. Why?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: edit-menu-trust-not-show-correctly-after-signing-uids
:END:
This happens because some information is stored immediately in
the trustdb, but the actual trust calculation can be done after the
save command. This is a "not easy to fix" design bug which will be
addressed in some future release.
** What does "skipping pubkey 1: already loaded" mean?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: what-does-skipping_pubkey_1_already_loaded-mean
:END:
As of GnuPG 1.0.3, the RSA algorithm is included. If you still have
a "load-extension rsa" in your options file, the above message
occurs. Just remove the load command from the options file.
** GnuPG 1.0.4 doesn't create ~/.gnupg ...
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: gnupg-1.0.4-does-not-create-.gnupg
:END:
That's a known bug, already fixed in newer versions.
** An Elgamal signature does not verify anymore since version 1.0.2
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: an-elgamal-signature-does-not-verify-anymore-since-version-1.0.2
:END:
Use the option --emulate-md-encode-bug.
** Old versions of GnuPG can't verify Elgamal signatures
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: old-versions-of-gnupg-cant-verify-elgamal-signatures
:END:
Update to GnuPG 1.0.2 or newer.
** When I use --clearsign, the plain text has sometimes extra dashes in it - why?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: extra-dashes-in-clearsign-messages
:END:
This is called dash-escaped text and is required by OpenPGP.
It always happens when a line starts with a dash ("-") and is
needed to make the lines that structure signature and text
(i.e., "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----") to be the only lines
that start with two dashes.
If you use GnuPG to process those messages, the extra dashes
are removed. Good mail clients remove those extra dashes when
displaying such a message.
** What is the thing with "can't handle multiple signatures"?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: what-is-the-thing-with-cant_handle_multiple_signatures
:END:
Due to different message formats GnuPG is not always able to split
a file with multiple signatures unambiguously into its parts. This
error message informs you that there is something wrong with the input.
The only way to have multiple signatures in a file is by using the
OpenPGP format with one-pass-signature packets (which is GnuPG's
default) or the cleartext signed format.
** If I submit a key to a keyserver, nothing happens
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: if-i-submit-a-key-to-a-keyserver-nothing-happens
:END:
You are most likely using GnuPG 1.0.2 or older on Windows. That's
feature isn't yet implemented, but it's a bug not to say it. Newer
versions issue a warning. Upgrade to 1.4.5 or newer.
** I get "gpg: waiting for lock ..."
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: i-get-gpg_waiting_for_lock
:END:
A previous instance of gpg has most likely exited abnormally and left
a lock file. Go to ~/.gnupg and look for .*.lock files and remove them.
** Older gpg binaries (e.g., 1.0) have problems with keys from newer gpg binaries
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: gpg-1.0-has-problems-with-keys-from-newer-gpg-versions
:END:
As of 1.0.3, keys generated with gpg are created with preferences to
TWOFISH (and AES since 1.0.4) and that also means that they have the
capability to use the new MDC encryption method. This will go into
OpenPGP soon, and is also suppoted by PGP 7. This new method avoids
a (not so new) attack on all email encryption systems.
This in turn means that pre-1.0.3 gpg binaries have problems with
newer keys. Because of security and bug fixes, you should keep your
GnuPG installation in a recent state anyway. As a workaround, you can
force gpg to use a previous default cipher algo by putting:
: cipher-algo cast5
into your options file.
** With 1.0.4, I get "this cipher algorithm is deprecated ..."
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: with-1.0.4-i-get-this_cipher_algorithm_is_deprecated
:END:
If you just generated a new key and get this message while
encrypting, you've witnessed a bug in 1.0.4. It uses the new AES
cipher Rijndael that is incorrectly being referred as "deprecated".
Ignore this warning, more recent versions of gpg are corrected.
** Some dates are displayed as ????-??-??. Why?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: some-dates-are-displayed-as-question-marks
:END:
Due to constraints in most libc implementations, dates beyond
2038-01-19 can't be displayed correctly. 64-bit OSes are not
affected by this problem. To avoid printing wrong dates, GnuPG
instead prints some question marks. To see the correct value, you
can use the options --with-colons and --fixed-list-mode.
** I still have a problem. How do I report a bug?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: i-still-have-a-problem-how-do-i-report-a-bug
:END:
Are you sure that it's not been mentioned somewhere on the mailing
lists? Did you have a look at the bug list (you'll find a link to
the list of reported bugs on the documentation page). If you're
not sure about it being a bug, you can send mail to the
gnupg-devel list. Otherwise, use the bug tracking system
[[http://bugs.gnupg.org][bugs.gnupg.org]].
** Why doesn't GnuPG support X.509 certificates?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: why-doesnt-gnupg-support-x509-certificates
:END:
That is only the case for GnuPG version 1.x. GnuPG 2.x fully
supports X.509 and S/MIME using the gpgsm tool.
** Why do national characters in my user ID look funny?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: why-do-national-characters-in-my-user-id-look-funny
:END:
According to OpenPGP, GnuPG encodes user ID strings (and other
things) using UTF-8. In this encoding of Unicode, most national
characters get encoded as two- or three-byte sequences. For
example, &aring; (0xE5 in ISO-8859-1) becomes &Atilde;&yen; (0xC3,
0xA5). This might also be the reason why keyservers can't find
your key.
** I get 'sed' errors when running ./configure on Mac OS X ...
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: i-get-sed-errors-when-running-configure-on-mac-os-x
:END:
This problem has been fixed for all modern GnuPG versions.
(By using an autoconf 2.50 generated configure script).
** Why does GnuPG 1.0.6 bail out on keyrings used with 1.0.7?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: why-does-gnupg-1.0.6-bail-out-on-keyrings-used-with-1.0.7
:END:
There is a small bug in 1.0.6 which didn't parse trust packets
correctly. You may want to apply this patch if you can't upgrade:
[[http://www.gnupg.org/developer/gpg-woody-fix.txt]].
** I upgraded to GnuPG version 1.0.7 and now it takes longer to load my keyrings. What can I do?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: with-gpg-1.0.7-it-takes-longer-to-load-my-keyrings
:END:
The way signature states are stored has changed so that v3 signatures
can be supported. You can use the new --rebuild-keydb-caches migration
command, which was built into this release and increases the speed of
many operations for existing keyrings.
** Doesn't a fully trusted user ID on a key prevent warning messages when encrypting to other IDs on the key?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: key-validation-bug-in-gpg-1.2.1
:END:
No. That was actually a key validity bug in GnuPG 1.2.1 and earlier
versions. As part of the development of GnuPG 1.2.2, a bug was
discovered in the key validation code. This bug causes keys with
more than one user ID to give all user IDs on the key the amount of
validity given to the most-valid key. The bug has been fixed in GnuPG
release 1.2.2, and upgrading is the recommended fix for this problem.
More information and a patch for a some pre-1.2.2 versions of GnuPG
can be found at:
[[http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2003q2/000268.html]].
** I just compiled GnuPG from source on my GNU/Linux RPM-based system and it's not working. Why?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: compiled-on-gnu-linux-rpm-based-system-and-not-working
:END:
Many GNU/Linux distributions that are RPM-based will install a
version of GnuPG as part of its standard installation, placing the
binaries in the /usr/bin directory. Later, compiling and installing
GnuPG from source other than from a source RPM won't normally
overwrite these files, as the default location for placement of
GnuPG binaries is in /usr/local/bin unless the '--prefix' switch
is used during compile to specify an alternate location. Since the
/usr/bin directory more than likely appears in your path before
/usr/local/bin, the older RPM-version binaries will continue to
be used when called since they were not replaced.
To resolve this, uninstall the RPM-based version with 'rpm -e gnupg'
before installing the binaries compiled from source. If dependency
errors are displayed when attempting to uninstall the RPM (such as
when Red Hat's up2date is also installed, which uses GnuPG), uninstall
the RPM with 'rpm -e gnupg --nodeps' to force the uninstall. Any
dependent files should be automatically replaced during the install
of the compiled version. If the default /usr/local/bin directory is
used, some packages such as SuSE's Yast Online Update may need to be
configured to look for GnuPG binaries in the /usr/local/bin directory,
or symlinks can be created in /usr/bin that point to the binaries
located in /usr/local/bin.
* Advanced Topics
** How does this whole thing work?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-does-this-whole-thing-work
:END:
To generate a secret/public keypair, run:
: $ gpg --gen-key
and choose the default values.
Data that is encrypted with a public key can only be decrypted by
the matching secret key. The secret key is protected by a password,
the public key is not.
So to send your friend a message, you would encrypt your message
with his public key, and he would only be able to decrypt it by
having the secret key and putting in the password to use his secret
key.
GnuPG is also useful for signing things. Files that are encrypted
with the secret key can be decrypted with the public key. To sign
something, a hash is taken of the data, and then the hash is in some
form encoded with the secret key. If someone has your public key, they
can verify that it is from you and that it hasn't changed by checking
the encoded form of the hash with the public key.
A keyring is just a large file that stores keys. You have a public
keyring where you store yours and your friend's public keys. You have
a secret keyring that you keep your secret key on, and should be very
careful with. Never ever give anyone else access to it and use a *good*
passphrase to protect the data in it.
You can 'conventionally' encrypt something by using the option 'gpg -c'.
It is encrypted using a passphrase, and does not use public and secret
keys. If the person you send the data to knows that passphrase, they
can decrypt it. This is usually most useful for encrypting things to
yourself, although you can encrypt things to your own public key in the
same way. It should be used for communication with partners you know
and where it is easy to exchange the passphrases (e.g. with your boy
friend or your wife). The advantage is that you can change the
passphrase from time to time and decrease the risk, that many old
- messages may be decrypted by people who accidently got your passphrase.
+ messages may be decrypted by people who accidentally got your passphrase.
You can add and copy keys to and from your keyring with the 'gpg
--import' and 'gpg --export' command. 'gpg --export-secret-keys' will
export secret keys. This is normally not useful, but you can generate
the key on one machine then move it to another machine.
Keys can be signed under the 'gpg --edit-key' option. When you sign a
key, you are saying that you are certain that the key belongs to the
person it says it comes from. You should be very sure that is really
that person: You should verify the key fingerprint with:
: $ gpg --fingerprint KeyID
over the phone (if you really know the voice of the other person), at
a key signing party (which are often held at computer conferences),
or at a meeting of your local GNU/Linux User Group.
Hmm, what else. You may use the option '-o filename' to force output
to this filename (use '-' to force output to stdout). '-r' just lets
you specify the recipient (which public key you encrypt with) on the
command line instead of typing it interactively.
Oh yeah, this is important. By default all data is encrypted in some
weird binary format. If you want to have things appear in ASCII text
that is readable, just add the '-a' option. But the preferred method
is to use a MIME aware mail reader (Mutt, Pine and many more).
There is a small security glitch in the OpenPGP (and therefore GnuPG)
system; to avoid this you should always sign and encrypt a message
instead of only encrypting it.
** Why are some signatures with an ELG-E key valid?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: why-are-some-signatures-with-an-elg-e-key-valid
:END:
These are Elgamal keys generated by GnuPG in v3 (RFC 1991) packets.
The OpenPGP draft later changed the algorithm identifier for Elgamal
keys which are usable for signatures and encryption from 16 to 20.
GnuPG now uses 20 when it generates new Elgamal keys but still
accepts 16 (which is according to OpenPGP "encryption only") if this
key is in a v3 packet. GnuPG is the only program which had used
these v3 Elgamal keys - so this assumption is quite safe.
** How does the whole trust thing work?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-does-the-whole-trust-thing-work
:END:
It works more or less like PGP. The difference is that the trust is
computed at the time it is needed. This is one of the reasons for
the trustdb which holds a list of valid key signatures. If you are
not running in batch mode you will be asked to assign a trust
parameter (ownertrust) to a key.
You can see the validity (calculated trust value) using this
command.
: $ gpg --list-keys --with-colons
If the first field is "pub" or "uid", the second field shows you the
trust:
: o = Unknown (this key is new to the system)
: e = The key has expired
: q = Undefined (no value assigned)
: n = Don't trust this key at all
: m = There is marginal trust in this key
: f = The key is full trusted
: u = The key is ultimately trusted; this is only used
: for keys for which the secret key is also available.
: r = The key has been revoked
: d = The key has been disabled
The value in the "pub" record is the best one of all "uid" records.
You can get a list of the assigned trust values (how much you trust
the owner to correctly sign another person's key) with:
: $ gpg --export-ownertrust
The first field is the fingerprint of the primary key, the second
field is the assigned value:
: - = No ownertrust value yet assigned or calculated.
: n = Never trust this keyholder to correctly verify others signatures.
: m = Have marginal trust in the keyholders capability to sign other
: keys.
: f = Assume that the key holder really knows how to sign keys.
: u = No need to trust ourself because we have the secret key.
Keep these values confidential because they express your opinions
about others. PGP stores this information with the keyring thus it
is not a good idea to publish a PGP keyring instead of exporting
the keyring. GnuPG stores the trust in the trustdb.gpg file so it
is okay to give a gpg keyring away (but we have a --export command
too).
** What kind of output is this: "key C26EE891.298, uid 09FB: ...."?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: trustb-diagnostics-output-key-uid
:END:
This is the internal representation of a user ID in the trustdb.
"C26EE891" is the keyid, "298" is the local ID (a record number in
the trustdb) and "09FB" is the last two bytes of a ripe-md-160 hash
of the user ID for this key.
** How do I interpret some of the informational outputs?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-do-i-interpret-some-of-the-informational-outputs
:END:
While checking the validity of a key, GnuPG sometimes prints some
information which is prefixed with information about the checked
item.
: "key 12345678.3456"
This is about the key with key ID 12345678 and the internal number
3456, which is the record number of the so called directory record
in the trustdb.
: "uid 12345678.3456/ACDE"
This is about the user ID for the same key. To identify the user ID
the last two bytes of a ripe-md-160 over the user ID ring is printed.
: "sig 12345678.3456/ACDE/9A8B7C6D"
This is about the signature with key ID 9A8B7C6D for the above key
and user ID, if it is a signature which is direct on a key, the user
ID part is empty (..//..).
** Are the header lines of a cleartext signature part of the signed material?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: are-header-lines-of-cleartext-sigs-part-of-the-signed-material
:END:
No. For example you can add or remove "Comment:" lines. They have
a purpose like the mail header lines. However a "Hash:" line is
needed for OpenPGP signatures to tell the parser which hash
algorithm to use.
** What is the list of preferred algorithms?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: what-is-the-list-of-preferred-algorithms
:END:
The list of preferred algorithms is a list of cipher, hash and
compression algorithms stored in the self-signature of a key during
key generation. When you encrypt a document, GnuPG uses this list
(which is then part of a public key) to determine which algorithms
to use. Basically it tells other people what algorithms the
recipient is able to handle and provides an order of preference.
** How do I change the list of preferred algorithms?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-do-i-change-the-list-of-preferred-algorithms
:END:
In version 1.0.7 or later, you can use the edit menu and set the
new list of preference using the command "setpref"; the format of
this command resembles the output of the command "pref". The
preference is not changed immediately but the set preference will
be used when a new user ID is created. If you want to update the
preferences for existing user IDs, select those user IDs (or select
none to update all) and enter the command "updpref". Note that the
timestamp of the self-signature is increased by one second when
running this command.
** How can I import all the missing signer keys?
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: how-can-i-import-all-the-missing-signer-keys
:END:
If you imported a key and you want to also import all the signer's
keys, you can do this with this command:
: gpg --check-sigs --with-colon KEYID \
: | awk -F: '$1 == "sig" && $2 == "?" { print $5 }' \
: | sort | uniq | xargs echo gpg --recv-keys
Note that the invocation of sort is also required to wait for the
of the listing before before starting the import.
* Bug reporting and hacking
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: bugreports-et-al
:END:
** Copyright assignments
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: copyright-assignments
:END:
Like most core GNU projects, GnuPG requires the signing of a copyright
assignment to the FSF. Without such an assignment we may only accept
trivial patches. As a rule of thumb the sum of all changed lines by
one contributor may not exceed about 15 lines. Exceptions are typo
corrections and translations. See
http://www.gnu.org/prep/maintain/html_node/Copyright-Papers.html for
details.
** U.S. export restrictions
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: us-export-restrictions
:END:
GnuPG has originally been developed in Germany because we have been
able to do that without being affected by the US export restrictions.
We had to reject any contributions from US citizens or from people
living the the US. That changed by end of 2000 when the export
restrictions were basically dropped for all kind of freely available
software. However there are still some requirements in the US.
Quoting David Shaw: mail
#+begin_quote
For each release of GPG that I contributed to, I sent an email
containing a pointer to the new source code to the Commerce
Department. The rules changed slightly in 2004, so that you could
send a single email and then be done until the information in that
email changed, so I just sent "www.gnupg.org" and haven't bothered
with the email since.
#+end_quote
The rules: http://www.bis.doc.gov/encryption/pubavailencsourcecodenofify.html
The 2004 rule change: http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2004/04-26992.htm
* Acknowledgements
:PROPERTIES:
:CUSTOM_ID: acknowledgements
:END:
Many thanks to Nils Ellmenreich for maintaining this FAQ file for
such a long time, David D. Scribner for continuing maintenance,
Werner Koch for the original FAQ file, and to all posters to
gnupg-users and gnupg-devel. They all provided most of the answers.
Converted to org-mode and removed from the tarballs in October 2010.
Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2010 Free Software Foundation,
Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02111, USA
This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives
unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without
modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
* Changes
- 2010-11-14: Update "gpg: Warning: using insecure memory!"
* COMMENT HTML style specifications
#+begin_src emacs-lisp
(defun org-faq-make-target ()
"Make hard target for current headline."
(interactive)
(if (not (org-on-heading-p))
(error "Not on a headline"))
(let ((h (org-trim (org-get-heading 'no-tags))))
(if (string-match "[ \t]*\\?\\'" h)
(setq h (replace-match "" t t h)))
(while (string-match "[ \t]+" h)
(setq h (replace-match "-" t t h)))
(setq h (downcase h))
(org-entry-put nil "CUSTOM_ID" h)))
#+end_src
# Local Variables:
# org-export-html-style-include-default: nil
# org-export-html-style-include-scripts: nil
# End:
diff --git a/doc/gpg-agent.texi b/doc/gpg-agent.texi
index b890c214b..9eb38e051 100644
--- a/doc/gpg-agent.texi
+++ b/doc/gpg-agent.texi
@@ -1,1506 +1,1506 @@
@c Copyright (C) 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
@c This is part of the GnuPG manual.
@c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi.
@include defs.inc
@node Invoking GPG-AGENT
@chapter Invoking GPG-AGENT
@cindex GPG-AGENT command options
@cindex command options
@cindex options, GPG-AGENT command
@manpage gpg-agent.1
@ifset manverb
.B gpg-agent
\- Secret key management for GnuPG
@end ifset
@mansect synopsis
@ifset manverb
.B gpg-agent
.RB [ \-\-homedir
.IR dir ]
.RB [ \-\-options
.IR file ]
.RI [ options ]
.br
.B gpg-agent
.RB [ \-\-homedir
.IR dir ]
.RB [ \-\-options
.IR file ]
.RI [ options ]
.B \-\-server
.br
.B gpg-agent
.RB [ \-\-homedir
.IR dir ]
.RB [ \-\-options
.IR file ]
.RI [ options ]
.B \-\-daemon
.RI [ command_line ]
@end ifset
@mansect description
@command{gpg-agent} is a daemon to manage secret (private) keys
independently from any protocol. It is used as a backend for
@command{gpg} and @command{gpgsm} as well as for a couple of other
utilities.
The agent is automatically started on demand by @command{gpg},
@command{gpgsm}, @command{gpgconf}, or @command{gpg-connect-agent}.
Thus there is no reason to start it manually. In case you want to use
the included Secure Shell Agent you may start the agent using:
@c From dkg on gnupg-devel on 2016-04-21:
@c
@c Here's an attempt at writing a short description of the goals of an
@c isolated cryptographic agent:
@c
@c A cryptographic agent should control access to secret key material.
@c The agent permits use of the secret key material by a supplicant
@c without providing a copy of the secret key material to the supplicant.
@c
@c An isolated cryptographic agent separates the request for use of
@c secret key material from permission for use of secret key material.
@c That is, the system or process requesting use of the key (the
@c "supplicant") can be denied use of the key by the owner/operator of
@c the agent (the "owner"), which the supplicant has no control over.
@c
@c One way of enforcing this split is a per-key or per-session
@c passphrase, known only by the owner, which must be supplied to the
@c agent to permit the use of the secret key material. Another way is
@c with an out-of-band permission mechanism (e.g. a button or GUI
@c interface that the owner has access to, but the supplicant does not).
@c
@c The rationale for this separation is that it allows access to the
-@c secret key to be tightly controled and audited, and it doesn't permit
+@c secret key to be tightly controlled and audited, and it doesn't permit
@c the the supplicant to either copy the key or to override the owner's
@c intentions.
@example
gpg-connect-agent /bye
@end example
@noindent
@efindex GPG_TTY
You should always add the following lines to your @code{.bashrc} or
whatever initialization file is used for all shell invocations:
@smallexample
GPG_TTY=$(tty)
export GPG_TTY
@end smallexample
@noindent
It is important that this environment variable always reflects the
output of the @code{tty} command. For W32 systems this option is not
required.
Please make sure that a proper pinentry program has been installed
under the default filename (which is system dependent) or use the
option @option{pinentry-program} to specify the full name of that program.
It is often useful to install a symbolic link from the actual used
pinentry (e.g. @file{@value{BINDIR}/pinentry-gtk}) to the expected
one (e.g. @file{@value{BINDIR}/pinentry}).
@manpause
@noindent
@xref{Option Index},for an index to @command{GPG-AGENT}'s commands and options.
@mancont
@menu
* Agent Commands:: List of all commands.
* Agent Options:: List of all options.
* Agent Configuration:: Configuration files.
* Agent Signals:: Use of some signals.
* Agent Examples:: Some usage examples.
* Agent Protocol:: The protocol the agent uses.
@end menu
@mansect commands
@node Agent Commands
@section Commands
Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that
only one command is allowed.
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --version
@opindex version
Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you cannot
abbreviate this command.
@item --help
@itemx -h
@opindex help
Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command-line options.
Note that you cannot abbreviate this command.
@item --dump-options
@opindex dump-options
Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot
abbreviate this command.
@item --server
@opindex server
Run in server mode and wait for commands on the @code{stdin}. The
default mode is to create a socket and listen for commands there.
@item --daemon [@var{command line}]
@opindex daemon
Start the gpg-agent as a daemon; that is, detach it from the console
and run it in the background.
As an alternative you may create a new process as a child of
gpg-agent: @code{gpg-agent --daemon /bin/sh}. This way you get a new
shell with the environment setup properly; after you exit from this
shell, gpg-agent terminates within a few seconds.
@end table
@mansect options
@node Agent Options
@section Option Summary
@table @gnupgtabopt
@anchor{option --options}
@item --options @var{file}
@opindex options
Reads configuration from @var{file} instead of from the default
per-user configuration file. The default configuration file is named
@file{gpg-agent.conf} and expected in the @file{.gnupg} directory directly
below the home directory of the user.
@anchor{option --homedir}
@include opt-homedir.texi
@item -v
@item --verbose
@opindex verbose
Outputs additional information while running.
You can increase the verbosity by giving several
verbose commands to @command{gpgsm}, such as @samp{-vv}.
@item -q
@item --quiet
@opindex quiet
Try to be as quiet as possible.
@item --batch
@opindex batch
Don't invoke a pinentry or do any other thing requiring human interaction.
@item --faked-system-time @var{epoch}
@opindex faked-system-time
This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back or
forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since the year
1970.
@item --debug-level @var{level}
@opindex debug-level
Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be
a numeric value or a keyword:
@table @code
@item none
No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of
the keyword.
@item basic
Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used
instead of the keyword.
@item advanced
More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used
instead of the keyword.
@item expert
Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used
instead of the keyword.
@item guru
All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be
used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is
only enabled if the keyword is used.
@end table
How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not
specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are
however carefully selected to best aid in debugging.
@item --debug @var{flags}
@opindex debug
This option is only useful for debugging and the behaviour may change at
any time without notice. FLAGS are bit encoded and may be given in
usual C-Syntax. The currently defined bits are:
@table @code
@item 0 (1)
X.509 or OpenPGP protocol related data
@item 1 (2)
values of big number integers
@item 2 (4)
low level crypto operations
@item 5 (32)
memory allocation
@item 6 (64)
caching
@item 7 (128)
show memory statistics.
@item 9 (512)
write hashed data to files named @code{dbgmd-000*}
@item 10 (1024)
trace Assuan protocol
@item 12 (4096)
bypass all certificate validation
@end table
@item --debug-all
@opindex debug-all
Same as @code{--debug=0xffffffff}
@item --debug-wait @var{n}
@opindex debug-wait
When running in server mode, wait @var{n} seconds before entering the
actual processing loop and print the pid. This gives time to attach a
debugger.
@item --debug-quick-random
@opindex debug-quick-random
This option inhibits the use of the very secure random quality level
(Libgcrypt’s @code{GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM}) and degrades all request
down to standard random quality. It is only used for testing and
should not be used for any production quality keys. This option is
only effective when given on the command line.
On GNU/Linux, another way to quickly generate insecure keys is to use
@command{rngd} to fill the kernel's entropy pool with lower quality
random data. @command{rngd} is typically provided by the
@command{rng-tools} package. It can be run as follows: @samp{sudo
rngd -f -r /dev/urandom}.
@item --debug-pinentry
@opindex debug-pinentry
This option enables extra debug information pertaining to the
Pinentry. As of now it is only useful when used along with
@code{--debug 1024}.
@item --no-detach
@opindex no-detach
Don't detach the process from the console. This is mainly useful for
debugging.
@item -s
@itemx --sh
@itemx -c
@itemx --csh
@opindex sh
@opindex csh
@efindex SHELL
Format the info output in daemon mode for use with the standard Bourne
shell or the C-shell respectively. The default is to guess it based on
the environment variable @code{SHELL} which is correct in almost all
cases.
@item --no-grab
@opindex no-grab
Tell the pinentry not to grab the keyboard and mouse. This option
should in general not be used to avoid X-sniffing attacks.
@anchor{option --log-file}
@item --log-file @var{file}
@opindex log-file
@efindex HKCU\Software\GNU\GnuPG:DefaultLogFile
Append all logging output to @var{file}. This is very helpful in
seeing what the agent actually does. Use @file{socket://} to log to
socket. If neither a log file nor a log file descriptor has been set
on a Windows platform, the Registry entry
@code{HKCU\Software\GNU\GnuPG:DefaultLogFile}, if set, is used to
specify the logging output.
@anchor{option --no-allow-mark-trusted}
@item --no-allow-mark-trusted
@opindex no-allow-mark-trusted
Do not allow clients to mark keys as trusted, i.e. put them into the
@file{trustlist.txt} file. This makes it harder for users to inadvertently
accept Root-CA keys.
@anchor{option --allow-preset-passphrase}
@item --allow-preset-passphrase
@opindex allow-preset-passphrase
This option allows the use of @command{gpg-preset-passphrase} to seed the
internal cache of @command{gpg-agent} with passphrases.
@anchor{option --no-allow-loopback-pinentry}
@item --no-allow-loopback-pinentry
@item --allow-loopback-pinentry
@opindex no-allow-loopback-pinentry
@opindex allow-loopback-pinentry
Disallow or allow clients to use the loopback pinentry features; see
the option @option{pinentry-mode} for details. Allow is the default.
The @option{--force} option of the Assuan command @command{DELETE_KEY}
is also controlled by this option: The option is ignored if a loopback
pinentry is disallowed.
@item --no-allow-external-cache
@opindex no-allow-external-cache
Tell Pinentry not to enable features which use an external cache for
passphrases.
Some desktop environments prefer to unlock all
credentials with one master password and may have installed a Pinentry
which employs an additional external cache to implement such a policy.
By using this option the Pinentry is advised not to make use of such a
cache and instead always ask the user for the requested passphrase.
@item --allow-emacs-pinentry
@opindex allow-emacs-pinentry
Tell Pinentry to allow features to divert the passphrase entry to a
running Emacs instance. How this is exactly handled depends on the
version of the used Pinentry.
@item --ignore-cache-for-signing
@opindex ignore-cache-for-signing
This option will let @command{gpg-agent} bypass the passphrase cache for all
signing operation. Note that there is also a per-session option to
control this behaviour but this command line option takes precedence.
@item --default-cache-ttl @var{n}
@opindex default-cache-ttl
Set the time a cache entry is valid to @var{n} seconds. The default
is 600 seconds. Each time a cache entry is accessed, the entry's
timer is reset. To set an entry's maximum lifetime, use
@command{max-cache-ttl}.
@item --default-cache-ttl-ssh @var{n}
@opindex default-cache-ttl
Set the time a cache entry used for SSH keys is valid to @var{n}
seconds. The default is 1800 seconds. Each time a cache entry is
accessed, the entry's timer is reset. To set an entry's maximum
lifetime, use @command{max-cache-ttl-ssh}.
@item --max-cache-ttl @var{n}
@opindex max-cache-ttl
Set the maximum time a cache entry is valid to @var{n} seconds. After
this time a cache entry will be expired even if it has been accessed
recently or has been set using @command{gpg-preset-passphrase}. The
default is 2 hours (7200 seconds).
@item --max-cache-ttl-ssh @var{n}
@opindex max-cache-ttl-ssh
Set the maximum time a cache entry used for SSH keys is valid to
@var{n} seconds. After this time a cache entry will be expired even
if it has been accessed recently or has been set using
@command{gpg-preset-passphrase}. The default is 2 hours (7200
seconds).
@item --enforce-passphrase-constraints
@opindex enforce-passphrase-constraints
Enforce the passphrase constraints by not allowing the user to bypass
them using the ``Take it anyway'' button.
@item --min-passphrase-len @var{n}
@opindex min-passphrase-len
Set the minimal length of a passphrase. When entering a new passphrase
shorter than this value a warning will be displayed. Defaults to 8.
@item --min-passphrase-nonalpha @var{n}
@opindex min-passphrase-nonalpha
Set the minimal number of digits or special characters required in a
passphrase. When entering a new passphrase with less than this number
of digits or special characters a warning will be displayed. Defaults
to 1.
@item --check-passphrase-pattern @var{file}
@opindex check-passphrase-pattern
Check the passphrase against the pattern given in @var{file}. When
entering a new passphrase matching one of these pattern a warning will
be displayed. @var{file} should be an absolute filename. The default is
not to use any pattern file.
Security note: It is known that checking a passphrase against a list of
pattern or even against a complete dictionary is not very effective to
enforce good passphrases. Users will soon figure up ways to bypass such
a policy. A better policy is to educate users on good security
behavior and optionally to run a passphrase cracker regularly on all
users passphrases to catch the very simple ones.
@item --max-passphrase-days @var{n}
@opindex max-passphrase-days
Ask the user to change the passphrase if @var{n} days have passed since
the last change. With @option{--enforce-passphrase-constraints} set the
user may not bypass this check.
@item --enable-passphrase-history
@opindex enable-passphrase-history
This option does nothing yet.
@item --pinentry-invisible-char @var{char}
@opindex pinentry-invisible-char
This option asks the Pinentry to use @var{char} for displaying hidden
characters. @var{char} must be one character UTF-8 string. A
Pinentry may or may not honor this request.
@item --pinentry-timeout @var{n}
@opindex pinentry-timeout
This option asks the Pinentry to timeout after @var{n} seconds with no
user input. The default value of 0 does not ask the pinentry to
timeout, however a Pinentry may use its own default timeout value in
this case. A Pinentry may or may not honor this request.
@item --pinentry-program @var{filename}
@opindex pinentry-program
Use program @var{filename} as the PIN entry. The default is
installation dependent. With the default configuration the name of
the default pinentry is @file{pinentry}; if that file does not exist
but a @file{pinentry-basic} exist the latter is used.
On a Windows platform the default is to use the first existing program
from this list:
@file{bin\pinentry.exe},
@file{..\Gpg4win\bin\pinentry.exe},
@file{..\Gpg4win\pinentry.exe},
@file{..\GNU\GnuPG\pinentry.exe},
@file{..\GNU\bin\pinentry.exe},
@file{bin\pinentry-basic.exe}
where the file names are relative to the GnuPG installation directory.
@item --pinentry-touch-file @var{filename}
@opindex pinentry-touch-file
By default the filename of the socket gpg-agent is listening for
requests is passed to Pinentry, so that it can touch that file before
exiting (it does this only in curses mode). This option changes the
file passed to Pinentry to @var{filename}. The special name
@code{/dev/null} may be used to completely disable this feature. Note
that Pinentry will not create that file, it will only change the
modification and access time.
@item --scdaemon-program @var{filename}
@opindex scdaemon-program
Use program @var{filename} as the Smartcard daemon. The default is
installation dependent and can be shown with the @command{gpgconf}
command.
@item --disable-scdaemon
@opindex disable-scdaemon
Do not make use of the scdaemon tool. This option has the effect of
disabling the ability to do smartcard operations. Note, that enabling
this option at runtime does not kill an already forked scdaemon.
@item --disable-check-own-socket
@opindex disable-check-own-socket
@command{gpg-agent} employs a periodic self-test to detect a stolen
socket. This usually means a second instance of @command{gpg-agent}
has taken over the socket and @command{gpg-agent} will then terminate
itself. This option may be used to disable this self-test for
debugging purposes.
@item --use-standard-socket
@itemx --no-use-standard-socket
@itemx --use-standard-socket-p
@opindex use-standard-socket
@opindex no-use-standard-socket
@opindex use-standard-socket-p
Since GnuPG 2.1 the standard socket is always used. These options
have no more effect. The command @code{gpg-agent
--use-standard-socket-p} will thus always return success.
@item --display @var{string}
@itemx --ttyname @var{string}
@itemx --ttytype @var{string}
@itemx --lc-ctype @var{string}
@itemx --lc-messages @var{string}
@itemx --xauthority @var{string}
@opindex display
@opindex ttyname
@opindex ttytype
@opindex lc-ctype
@opindex lc-messages
@opindex xauthority
These options are used with the server mode to pass localization
information.
@item --keep-tty
@itemx --keep-display
@opindex keep-tty
@opindex keep-display
Ignore requests to change the current @code{tty} or X window system's
@code{DISPLAY} variable respectively. This is useful to lock the
pinentry to pop up at the @code{tty} or display you started the agent.
@anchor{option --extra-socket}
@item --extra-socket @var{name}
@opindex extra-socket
Also listen on native gpg-agent connections on the given socket. The
intended use for this extra socket is to setup a Unix domain socket
forwarding from a remote machine to this socket on the local machine.
A @command{gpg} running on the remote machine may then connect to the
local gpg-agent and use its private keys. This enables decrypting or
signing data on a remote machine without exposing the private keys to the
remote machine.
@anchor{option --enable-ssh-support}
@item --enable-ssh-support
@itemx --enable-putty-support
@opindex enable-ssh-support
@opindex enable-putty-support
Enable the OpenSSH Agent protocol.
In this mode of operation, the agent does not only implement the
gpg-agent protocol, but also the agent protocol used by OpenSSH
(through a separate socket). Consequently, it should be possible to use
the gpg-agent as a drop-in replacement for the well known ssh-agent.
SSH Keys, which are to be used through the agent, need to be added to
the gpg-agent initially through the ssh-add utility. When a key is
added, ssh-add will ask for the password of the provided key file and
send the unprotected key material to the agent; this causes the
gpg-agent to ask for a passphrase, which is to be used for encrypting
the newly received key and storing it in a gpg-agent specific
directory.
Once a key has been added to the gpg-agent this way, the gpg-agent
will be ready to use the key.
Note: in case the gpg-agent receives a signature request, the user might
need to be prompted for a passphrase, which is necessary for decrypting
the stored key. Since the ssh-agent protocol does not contain a
mechanism for telling the agent on which display/terminal it is running,
gpg-agent's ssh-support will use the TTY or X display where gpg-agent
has been started. To switch this display to the current one, the
following command may be used:
@smallexample
gpg-connect-agent updatestartuptty /bye
@end smallexample
Although all GnuPG components try to start the gpg-agent as needed, this
is not possible for the ssh support because ssh does not know about it.
Thus if no GnuPG tool which accesses the agent has been run, there is no
guarantee that ssh is able to use gpg-agent for authentication. To fix
this you may start gpg-agent if needed using this simple command:
@smallexample
gpg-connect-agent /bye
@end smallexample
Adding the @option{--verbose} shows the progress of starting the agent.
The @option{--enable-putty-support} is only available under Windows
and allows the use of gpg-agent with the ssh implementation
@command{putty}. This is similar to the regular ssh-agent support but
makes use of Windows message queue as required by @command{putty}.
@end table
All the long options may also be given in the configuration file after
stripping off the two leading dashes.
@mansect files
@node Agent Configuration
@section Configuration
There are a few configuration files needed for the operation of the
agent. By default they may all be found in the current home directory
(@pxref{option --homedir}).
@table @file
@item gpg-agent.conf
@efindex gpg-agent.conf
This is the standard configuration file read by @command{gpg-agent} on
startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading
two dashes may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated.
This file is also read after a @code{SIGHUP} however only a few
options will actually have an effect. This default name may be
changed on the command line (@pxref{option --options}).
You should backup this file.
@item trustlist.txt
@efindex trustlist.txt
This is the list of trusted keys. You should backup this file.
Comment lines, indicated by a leading hash mark, as well as empty
lines are ignored. To mark a key as trusted you need to enter its
fingerprint followed by a space and a capital letter @code{S}. Colons
may optionally be used to separate the bytes of a fingerprint; this
enables cutting and pasting the fingerprint from a key listing output. If
the line is prefixed with a @code{!} the key is explicitly marked as
not trusted.
Here is an example where two keys are marked as ultimately trusted
and one as not trusted:
@cartouche
@smallexample
# CN=Wurzel ZS 3,O=Intevation GmbH,C=DE
A6935DD34EF3087973C706FC311AA2CCF733765B S
# CN=PCA-1-Verwaltung-02/O=PKI-1-Verwaltung/C=DE
DC:BD:69:25:48:BD:BB:7E:31:6E:BB:80:D3:00:80:35:D4:F8:A6:CD S
# CN=Root-CA/O=Schlapphuete/L=Pullach/C=DE
!14:56:98:D3:FE:9C:CA:5A:31:6E:BC:81:D3:11:4E:00:90:A3:44:C2 S
@end smallexample
@end cartouche
Before entering a key into this file, you need to ensure its
authenticity. How to do this depends on your organisation; your
administrator might have already entered those keys which are deemed
trustworthy enough into this file. Places where to look for the
fingerprint of a root certificate are letters received from the CA or
the website of the CA (after making 100% sure that this is indeed the
website of that CA). You may want to consider disallowing interactive
updates of this file by using the @xref{option --no-allow-mark-trusted}.
It might even be advisable to change the permissions to read-only so
that this file can't be changed inadvertently.
As a special feature a line @code{include-default} will include a global
list of trusted certificates (e.g. @file{@value{SYSCONFDIR}/trustlist.txt}).
This global list is also used if the local list is not available.
It is possible to add further flags after the @code{S} for use by the
caller:
@table @code
@item relax
@cindex relax
Relax checking of some root certificate requirements. As of now this
flag allows the use of root certificates with a missing basicConstraints
attribute (despite that it is a MUST for CA certificates) and disables
CRL checking for the root certificate.
@item cm
If validation of a certificate finally issued by a CA with this flag set
fails, try again using the chain validation model.
@end table
@item sshcontrol
@efindex sshcontrol
This file is used when support for the secure shell agent protocol has
been enabled (@pxref{option --enable-ssh-support}). Only keys present in
this file are used in the SSH protocol. You should backup this file.
The @command{ssh-add} tool may be used to add new entries to this file;
you may also add them manually. Comment lines, indicated by a leading
hash mark, as well as empty lines are ignored. An entry starts with
optional whitespace, followed by the keygrip of the key given as 40 hex
digits, optionally followed by the caching TTL in seconds and another
optional field for arbitrary flags. A non-zero TTL overrides the global
default as set by @option{--default-cache-ttl-ssh}.
The only flag support is @code{confirm}. If this flag is found for a
key, each use of the key will pop up a pinentry to confirm the use of
that key. The flag is automatically set if a new key was loaded into
@code{gpg-agent} using the option @option{-c} of the @code{ssh-add}
command.
The keygrip may be prefixed with a @code{!} to disable an entry entry.
The following example lists exactly one key. Note that keys available
through a OpenPGP smartcard in the active smartcard reader are
implicitly added to this list; i.e. there is no need to list them.
@cartouche
@smallexample
# Key added on: 2011-07-20 20:38:46
# Fingerprint: 5e:8d:c4:ad:e7:af:6e:27:8a:d6:13:e4:79:ad:0b:81
34B62F25E277CF13D3C6BCEBFD3F85D08F0A864B 0 confirm
@end smallexample
@end cartouche
@item private-keys-v1.d/
@efindex private-keys-v1.d
This is the directory where gpg-agent stores the private keys. Each
key is stored in a file with the name made up of the keygrip and the
suffix @file{key}. You should backup all files in this directory
and take great care to keep this backup closed away.
@end table
Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined
files into the directory @file{@value{SYSCONFSKELDIR}} so that newly created
users start up with a working configuration. For existing users the
a small helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}).
@c
@c Agent Signals
@c
@mansect signals
@node Agent Signals
@section Use of some signals.
A running @command{gpg-agent} may be controlled by signals, i.e. using
the @command{kill} command to send a signal to the process.
Here is a list of supported signals:
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item SIGHUP
@cpindex SIGHUP
This signal flushes all cached passphrases and if the program has been
started with a configuration file, the configuration file is read
again. Only certain options are honored: @code{quiet},
@code{verbose}, @code{debug}, @code{debug-all}, @code{debug-level},
@code{debug-pinentry},
@code{no-grab},
@code{pinentry-program},
@code{pinentry-invisible-char},
@code{default-cache-ttl},
@code{max-cache-ttl}, @code{ignore-cache-for-signing},
@code{no-allow-external-cache}, @code{allow-emacs-pinentry},
@code{no-allow-mark-trusted}, @code{disable-scdaemon}, and
@code{disable-check-own-socket}. @code{scdaemon-program} is also
supported but due to the current implementation, which calls the
scdaemon only once, it is not of much use unless you manually kill the
scdaemon.
@item SIGTERM
@cpindex SIGTERM
Shuts down the process but waits until all current requests are
fulfilled. If the process has received 3 of these signals and requests
are still pending, a shutdown is forced.
@item SIGINT
@cpindex SIGINT
Shuts down the process immediately.
@item SIGUSR1
@cpindex SIGUSR1
Dump internal information to the log file.
@item SIGUSR2
@cpindex SIGUSR2
This signal is used for internal purposes.
@end table
@c
@c Examples
@c
@mansect examples
@node Agent Examples
@section Examples
It is important to set the environment variable @code{GPG_TTY} in
your login shell, for example in the @file{~/.bashrc} init script:
@cartouche
@example
export GPG_TTY=$(tty)
@end example
@end cartouche
If you enabled the Ssh Agent Support, you also need to tell ssh about
it by adding this to your init script:
@cartouche
@example
unset SSH_AGENT_PID
if [ "$@{gnupg_SSH_AUTH_SOCK_by:-0@}" -ne $$ ]; then
export SSH_AUTH_SOCK="$(gpgconf --list-dirs agent-ssh-socket)"
fi
@end example
@end cartouche
@c
@c Assuan Protocol
@c
@manpause
@node Agent Protocol
@section Agent's Assuan Protocol
Note: this section does only document the protocol, which is used by
GnuPG components; it does not deal with the ssh-agent protocol. To
see the full specification of each command, use
@example
gpg-connect-agent 'help COMMAND' /bye
@end example
@noindent
or just 'help' to list all available commands.
@noindent
The @command{gpg-agent} daemon is started on demand by the GnuPG
components.
To identify a key we use a thing called keygrip which is the SHA-1 hash
of an canonical encoded S-Expression of the public key as used in
Libgcrypt. For the purpose of this interface the keygrip is given as a
hex string. The advantage of using this and not the hash of a
certificate is that it will be possible to use the same keypair for
different protocols, thereby saving space on the token used to keep the
secret keys.
The @command{gpg-agent} may send status messages during a command or when
returning from a command to inform a client about the progress or result of an
operation. For example, the @var{INQUIRE_MAXLEN} status message may be sent
during a server inquire to inform the client of the maximum usable length of
the inquired data (which should not be exceeded).
@menu
* Agent PKDECRYPT:: Decrypting a session key
* Agent PKSIGN:: Signing a Hash
* Agent GENKEY:: Generating a Key
* Agent IMPORT:: Importing a Secret Key
* Agent EXPORT:: Exporting a Secret Key
* Agent ISTRUSTED:: Importing a Root Certificate
* Agent GET_PASSPHRASE:: Ask for a passphrase
* Agent CLEAR_PASSPHRASE:: Expire a cached passphrase
* Agent PRESET_PASSPHRASE:: Set a passphrase for a keygrip
* Agent GET_CONFIRMATION:: Ask for confirmation
* Agent HAVEKEY:: Check whether a key is available
* Agent LEARN:: Register a smartcard
* Agent PASSWD:: Change a Passphrase
* Agent UPDATESTARTUPTTY:: Change the Standard Display
* Agent GETEVENTCOUNTER:: Get the Event Counters
* Agent GETINFO:: Return information about the process
* Agent OPTION:: Set options for the session
@end menu
@node Agent PKDECRYPT
@subsection Decrypting a session key
The client asks the server to decrypt a session key. The encrypted
session key should have all information needed to select the
appropriate secret key or to delegate it to a smartcard.
@example
SETKEY <keyGrip>
@end example
Tell the server about the key to be used for decryption. If this is
not used, @command{gpg-agent} may try to figure out the key by trying to
decrypt the message with each key available.
@example
PKDECRYPT
@end example
The agent checks whether this command is allowed and then does an
INQUIRY to get the ciphertext the client should then send the cipher
text.
@example
S: INQUIRE CIPHERTEXT
C: D (xxxxxx
C: D xxxx)
C: END
@end example
Please note that the server may send status info lines while reading the
data lines from the client. The data send is a SPKI like S-Exp with
this structure:
@example
(enc-val
(<algo>
(<param_name1> <mpi>)
...
(<param_namen> <mpi>)))
@end example
Where algo is a string with the name of the algorithm; see the libgcrypt
documentation for a list of valid algorithms. The number and names of
the parameters depend on the algorithm. The agent does return an error
if there is an inconsistency.
If the decryption was successful the decrypted data is returned by
means of "D" lines.
Here is an example session:
@cartouche
@smallexample
C: PKDECRYPT
S: INQUIRE CIPHERTEXT
C: D (enc-val elg (a 349324324)
C: D (b 3F444677CA)))
C: END
S: # session key follows
S: S PADDING 0
S: D (value 1234567890ABCDEF0)
S: OK descryption successful
@end smallexample
@end cartouche
The “PADDING” status line is only send if gpg-agent can tell what kind
of padding is used. As of now only the value 0 is used to indicate
that the padding has been removed.
@node Agent PKSIGN
@subsection Signing a Hash
The client ask the agent to sign a given hash value. A default key
will be chosen if no key has been set. To set a key a client first
uses:
@example
SIGKEY <keyGrip>
@end example
This can be used multiple times to create multiple signature, the list
of keys is reset with the next PKSIGN command or a RESET. The server
test whether the key is a valid key to sign something and responds with
okay.
@example
SETHASH --hash=<name>|<algo> <hexstring>
@end example
The client can use this command to tell the server about the data <hexstring>
(which usually is a hash) to be signed. <algo> is the decimal encoded hash
algorithm number as used by Libgcrypt. Either <algo> or --hash=<name>
must be given. Valid names for <name> are:
@table @code
@item sha1
The SHA-1 hash algorithm
@item sha256
The SHA-256 hash algorithm
@item rmd160
The RIPE-MD160 hash algorithm
@item md5
The old and broken MD5 hash algorithm
@item tls-md5sha1
A combined hash algorithm as used by the TLS protocol.
@end table
@noindent
The actual signing is done using
@example
PKSIGN <options>
@end example
Options are not yet defined, but my later be used to choose among
different algorithms. The agent does then some checks, asks for the
passphrase and as a result the server returns the signature as an SPKI
like S-expression in "D" lines:
@example
(sig-val
(<algo>
(<param_name1> <mpi>)
...
(<param_namen> <mpi>)))
@end example
The operation is affected by the option
@example
OPTION use-cache-for-signing=0|1
@end example
The default of @code{1} uses the cache. Setting this option to @code{0}
will lead @command{gpg-agent} to ignore the passphrase cache. Note, that there is
also a global command line option for @command{gpg-agent} to globally disable the
caching.
Here is an example session:
@cartouche
@smallexample
C: SIGKEY <keyGrip>
S: OK key available
C: SIGKEY <keyGrip>
S: OK key available
C: PKSIGN
S: # I did ask the user whether he really wants to sign
S: # I did ask the user for the passphrase
S: INQUIRE HASHVAL
C: D ABCDEF012345678901234
C: END
S: # signature follows
S: D (sig-val rsa (s 45435453654612121212))
S: OK
@end smallexample
@end cartouche
@node Agent GENKEY
@subsection Generating a Key
This is used to create a new keypair and store the secret key inside the
active PSE --- which is in most cases a Soft-PSE. A not-yet-defined
option allows choosing the storage location. To get the secret key out
of the PSE, a special export tool has to be used.
@example
GENKEY [--no-protection] [--preset] [<cache_nonce>]
@end example
Invokes the key generation process and the server will then inquire
on the generation parameters, like:
@example
S: INQUIRE KEYPARM
C: D (genkey (rsa (nbits 1024)))
C: END
@end example
The format of the key parameters which depends on the algorithm is of
the form:
@example
(genkey
(algo
(parameter_name_1 ....)
....
(parameter_name_n ....)))
@end example
If everything succeeds, the server returns the *public key* in a SPKI
like S-Expression like this:
@example
(public-key
(rsa
(n <mpi>)
(e <mpi>)))
@end example
Here is an example session:
@cartouche
@smallexample
C: GENKEY
S: INQUIRE KEYPARM
C: D (genkey (rsa (nbits 1024)))
C: END
S: D (public-key
S: D (rsa (n 326487324683264) (e 10001)))
S OK key created
@end smallexample
@end cartouche
The @option{--no-protection} option may be used to prevent prompting for a
passphrase to protect the secret key while leaving the secret key unprotected.
The @option{--preset} option may be used to add the passphrase to the cache
using the default cache parameters.
The @option{--inq-passwd} option may be used to create the key with a
supplied passphrase. When used the agent does an inquiry with the
keyword @code{NEWPASSWD} to retrieve that passphrase. This option
takes precedence over @option{--no-protection}; however if the client
sends a empty (zero-length) passphrase, this is identical to
@option{--no-protection}.
@node Agent IMPORT
@subsection Importing a Secret Key
This operation is not yet supported by GpgAgent. Specialized tools
are to be used for this.
There is no actual need because we can expect that secret keys
created by a 3rd party are stored on a smartcard. If we have
generated the key ourself, we do not need to import it.
@node Agent EXPORT
@subsection Export a Secret Key
Not implemented.
Should be done by an extra tool.
@node Agent ISTRUSTED
@subsection Importing a Root Certificate
Actually we do not import a Root Cert but provide a way to validate
any piece of data by storing its Hash along with a description and
an identifier in the PSE. Here is the interface description:
@example
ISTRUSTED <fingerprint>
@end example
Check whether the OpenPGP primary key or the X.509 certificate with the
given fingerprint is an ultimately trusted key or a trusted Root CA
certificate. The fingerprint should be given as a hexstring (without
any blanks or colons or whatever in between) and may be left padded with
00 in case of an MD5 fingerprint. GPGAgent will answer with:
@example
OK
@end example
The key is in the table of trusted keys.
@example
ERR 304 (Not Trusted)
@end example
The key is not in this table.
Gpg needs the entire list of trusted keys to maintain the web of
trust; the following command is therefore quite helpful:
@example
LISTTRUSTED
@end example
GpgAgent returns a list of trusted keys line by line:
@example
S: D 000000001234454556565656677878AF2F1ECCFF P
S: D 340387563485634856435645634856438576457A P
S: D FEDC6532453745367FD83474357495743757435D S
S: OK
@end example
The first item on a line is the hexified fingerprint where MD5
fingerprints are @code{00} padded to the left and the second item is a
flag to indicate the type of key (so that gpg is able to only take care
of PGP keys). P = OpenPGP, S = S/MIME. A client should ignore the rest
of the line, so that we can extend the format in the future.
Finally a client should be able to mark a key as trusted:
@example
MARKTRUSTED @var{fingerprint} "P"|"S"
@end example
The server will then pop up a window to ask the user whether she
really trusts this key. For this it will probably ask for a text to
be displayed like this:
@example
S: INQUIRE TRUSTDESC
C: D Do you trust the key with the fingerprint @@FPR@@
C: D bla fasel blurb.
C: END
S: OK
@end example
Known sequences with the pattern @@foo@@ are replaced according to this
table:
@table @code
@item @@FPR16@@
Format the fingerprint according to gpg rules for a v3 keys.
@item @@FPR20@@
Format the fingerprint according to gpg rules for a v4 keys.
@item @@FPR@@
Choose an appropriate format to format the fingerprint.
@item @@@@
Replaced by a single @code{@@}
@end table
@node Agent GET_PASSPHRASE
@subsection Ask for a passphrase
This function is usually used to ask for a passphrase to be used for
symmetric encryption, but may also be used by programs which need
special handling of passphrases. This command uses a syntax which helps
clients to use the agent with minimum effort.
@example
GET_PASSPHRASE [--data] [--check] [--no-ask] [--repeat[=N]] \
[--qualitybar] @var{cache_id} \
[@var{error_message} @var{prompt} @var{description}]
@end example
@var{cache_id} is expected to be a string used to identify a cached
passphrase. Use a @code{X} to bypass the cache. With no other
arguments the agent returns a cached passphrase or an error. By
convention either the hexified fingerprint of the key shall be used for
@var{cache_id} or an arbitrary string prefixed with the name of the
calling application and a colon: Like @code{gpg:somestring}.
@var{error_message} is either a single @code{X} for no error message or
a string to be shown as an error message like (e.g. "invalid
passphrase"). Blanks must be percent escaped or replaced by @code{+}'.
@var{prompt} is either a single @code{X} for a default prompt or the
text to be shown as the prompt. Blanks must be percent escaped or
replaced by @code{+}.
@var{description} is a text shown above the entry field. Blanks must be
percent escaped or replaced by @code{+}.
The agent either returns with an error or with a OK followed by the hex
encoded passphrase. Note that the length of the strings is implicitly
limited by the maximum length of a command. If the option
@option{--data} is used, the passphrase is not returned on the OK line
but by regular data lines; this is the preferred method.
If the option @option{--check} is used, the standard passphrase
constraints checks are applied. A check is not done if the passphrase
has been found in the cache.
If the option @option{--no-ask} is used and the passphrase is not in the
cache the user will not be asked to enter a passphrase but the error
code @code{GPG_ERR_NO_DATA} is returned.
If the option @option{--qualitybar} is used and a minimum passphrase
length has been configured, a visual indication of the entered
passphrase quality is shown.
@example
CLEAR_PASSPHRASE @var{cache_id}
@end example
may be used to invalidate the cache entry for a passphrase. The
function returns with OK even when there is no cached passphrase.
@node Agent CLEAR_PASSPHRASE
@subsection Remove a cached passphrase
Use this command to remove a cached passphrase.
@example
CLEAR_PASSPHRASE [--mode=normal] <cache_id>
@end example
The @option{--mode=normal} option can be used to clear a @var{cache_id} that
was set by gpg-agent.
@node Agent PRESET_PASSPHRASE
@subsection Set a passphrase for a keygrip
This command adds a passphrase to the cache for the specified @var{keygrip}.
@example
PRESET_PASSPHRASE [--inquire] <string_or_keygrip> <timeout> [<hexstring>]
@end example
The passphrase is a hexidecimal string when specified. When not specified, the
passphrase will be retrieved from the pinentry module unless the
@option{--inquire} option was specified in which case the passphrase will be
retrieved from the client.
The @var{timeout} parameter keeps the passphrase cached for the specified
number of seconds. A value of @code{-1} means infinate while @code{0} means
the default (currently only a timeout of -1 is allowed, which means to never
expire it).
@node Agent GET_CONFIRMATION
@subsection Ask for confirmation
This command may be used to ask for a simple confirmation by
presenting a text and 2 buttons: Okay and Cancel.
@example
GET_CONFIRMATION @var{description}
@end example
@var{description}is displayed along with a Okay and Cancel
button. Blanks must be percent escaped or replaced by @code{+}. A
@code{X} may be used to display confirmation dialog with a default
text.
The agent either returns with an error or with a OK. Note, that the
length of @var{description} is implicitly limited by the maximum
length of a command.
@node Agent HAVEKEY
@subsection Check whether a key is available
This can be used to see whether a secret key is available. It does
not return any information on whether the key is somehow protected.
@example
HAVEKEY @var{keygrips}
@end example
The agent answers either with OK or @code{No_Secret_Key} (208). The
caller may want to check for other error codes as well. More than one
keygrip may be given. In this case the command returns success if at
least one of the keygrips corresponds to an available secret key.
@node Agent LEARN
@subsection Register a smartcard
@example
LEARN [--send]
@end example
This command is used to register a smartcard. With the --send
option given the certificates are send back.
@node Agent PASSWD
@subsection Change a Passphrase
@example
PASSWD [--cache-nonce=<c>] [--passwd-nonce=<s>] [--preset] @var{keygrip}
@end example
This command is used to interactively change the passphrase of the key
identified by the hex string @var{keygrip}. The @option{--preset}
option may be used to add the new passphrase to the cache using the
default cache parameters.
@node Agent UPDATESTARTUPTTY
@subsection Change the standard display
@example
UPDATESTARTUPTTY
@end example
Set the startup TTY and X-DISPLAY variables to the values of this
session. This command is useful to direct future pinentry invocations
to another screen. It is only required because there is no way in the
ssh-agent protocol to convey this information.
@node Agent GETEVENTCOUNTER
@subsection Get the Event Counters
@example
GETEVENTCOUNTER
@end example
This function return one status line with the current values of the
event counters. The event counters are useful to avoid polling by
delaying a poll until something has changed. The values are decimal
numbers in the range @code{0} to @code{UINT_MAX} and wrapping around to
0. The actual values should not be relied upon; they shall only be used
to detect a change.
The currently defined counters are are:
@table @code
@item ANY
Incremented with any change of any of the other counters.
@item KEY
Incremented for added or removed private keys.
@item CARD
Incremented for changes of the card readers stati.
@end table
@node Agent GETINFO
@subsection Return information about the process
This is a multipurpose function to return a variety of information.
@example
GETINFO @var{what}
@end example
The value of @var{what} specifies the kind of information returned:
@table @code
@item version
Return the version of the program.
@item pid
Return the process id of the process.
@item socket_name
Return the name of the socket used to connect the agent.
@item ssh_socket_name
Return the name of the socket used for SSH connections. If SSH support
has not been enabled the error @code{GPG_ERR_NO_DATA} will be returned.
@end table
@node Agent OPTION
@subsection Set options for the session
Here is a list of session options which are not yet described with
other commands. The general syntax for an Assuan option is:
@smallexample
OPTION @var{key}=@var{value}
@end smallexample
@noindent
Supported @var{key}s are:
@table @code
@item agent-awareness
This may be used to tell gpg-agent of which gpg-agent version the
client is aware of. gpg-agent uses this information to enable
features which might break older clients.
@item putenv
Change the session's environment to be used for the
Pinentry. Valid values are:
@table @code
@item @var{name}
Delete envvar @var{name}
@item @var{name}=
Set envvar @var{name} to the empty string
@item @var{name}=@var{value}
Set envvar @var{name} to the string @var{value}.
@end table
@item use-cache-for-signing
See Assuan command @code{PKSIGN}.
@item allow-pinentry-notify
This does not need any value. It is used to enable the
PINENTRY_LAUNCHED inquiry.
@item pinentry-mode
This option is used to change the operation mode of the pinentry. The
following values are defined:
@table @code
@item ask
This is the default mode which pops up a pinentry as needed.
@item cancel
Instead of popping up a pinentry, return the error code
@code{GPG_ERR_CANCELED}.
@item error
Instead of popping up a pinentry, return the error code
@code{GPG_ERR_NO_PIN_ENTRY}.
@item loopback
Use a loopback pinentry. This fakes a pinentry by using inquiries
back to the caller to ask for a passphrase. This option may only be
set if the agent has been configured for that.
To disable this feature use @xref{option --no-allow-loopback-pinentry}.
@end table
@item cache-ttl-opt-preset
This option sets the cache TTL for new entries created by GENKEY and
PASSWD commands when using the @option{--preset} option. It it is not
used a default value is used.
@item s2k-count
Instead of using the standard S2K count (which is computed on the
fly), the given S2K count is used for new keys or when changing the
passphrase of a key. Values below 65536 are considered to be 0. This
option is valid for the entire session or until reset to 0. This
option is useful if the key is later used on boxes which are either
much slower or faster than the actual box.
@end table
@mansect see also
@ifset isman
@command{gpg2}(1),
@command{gpgsm}(1),
@command{gpg-connect-agent}(1),
@command{scdaemon}(1)
@end ifset
@include see-also-note.texi
diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi
index 118066a2b..64fa60bfc 100644
--- a/doc/gpg.texi
+++ b/doc/gpg.texi
@@ -1,3925 +1,3925 @@
@c Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
@c 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
@c This is part of the GnuPG manual.
@c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi.
@include defs.inc
@node Invoking GPG
@chapter Invoking GPG
@cindex GPG command options
@cindex command options
@cindex options, GPG command
@c Begin standard stuff
@ifclear gpgtwohack
@manpage gpg.1
@ifset manverb
.B gpg
\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
@end ifset
@mansect synopsis
@ifset manverb
.B gpg
.RB [ \-\-homedir
.IR dir ]
.RB [ \-\-options
.IR file ]
.RI [ options ]
.I command
.RI [ args ]
@end ifset
@end ifclear
@c End standard stuff
@c Begin gpg2 hack stuff
@ifset gpgtwohack
@manpage gpg2.1
@ifset manverb
.B gpg2
\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
@end ifset
@mansect synopsis
@ifset manverb
.B gpg2
.RB [ \-\-homedir
.IR dir ]
.RB [ \-\-options
.IR file ]
.RI [ options ]
.I command
.RI [ args ]
@end ifset
@end ifset
@c End gpg2 hack stuff
@mansect description
@command{@gpgname} is the OpenPGP part of the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG). It
is a tool to provide digital encryption and signing services using the
OpenPGP standard. @command{@gpgname} features complete key management and
all bells and whistles you can expect from a decent OpenPGP
implementation.
@ifclear gpgtwohack
Note that this version of GnuPG features all modern algorithms and
should thus be preferred over older GnuPG versions. If you are
looking for version 1 of GnuPG, you may find that version installed
under the name @command{gpg1}.
@end ifclear
@ifset gpgtwohack
In contrast to the standalone command gpg from GnuPG 1.x, which
might be better suited for server and embedded platforms, the 2.x
version is commonly installed under the name @command{@gpgname} and
targeted to the desktop as it requires several other modules to be
installed.
@end ifset
@manpause
@xref{Option Index}, for an index to @command{@gpgname}'s commands and options.
@mancont
@menu
* GPG Commands:: List of all commands.
* GPG Options:: List of all options.
* GPG Configuration:: Configuration files.
* GPG Examples:: Some usage examples.
Developer information:
* Unattended Usage of GPG:: Using @command{gpg} from other programs.
@end menu
@c * GPG Protocol:: The protocol the server mode uses.
@c *******************************************
@c *************** ****************
@c *************** COMMANDS ****************
@c *************** ****************
@c *******************************************
@mansect commands
@node GPG Commands
@section Commands
Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that
only one command is allowed.
@command{@gpgname} may be run with no commands, in which case it will
perform a reasonable action depending on the type of file it is given
as input (an encrypted message is decrypted, a signature is verified,
a file containing keys is listed).
Please remember that option as well as command parsing stops as soon as
a non-option is encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by
using the special option @option{--}.
@menu
* General GPG Commands:: Commands not specific to the functionality.
* Operational GPG Commands:: Commands to select the type of operation.
* OpenPGP Key Management:: How to manage your keys.
@end menu
@c *******************************************
@c ********** GENERAL COMMANDS *************
@c *******************************************
@node General GPG Commands
@subsection Commands not specific to the function
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --version
@opindex version
Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you
cannot abbreviate this command.
@item --help
@itemx -h
@opindex help
Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command line options.
Note that you cannot abbreviate this command.
@item --warranty
@opindex warranty
Print warranty information.
@item --dump-options
@opindex dump-options
Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot
abbreviate this command.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c ******** OPERATIONAL COMMANDS ***********
@c *******************************************
@node Operational GPG Commands
@subsection Commands to select the type of operation
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --sign
@itemx -s
@opindex sign
Make a signature. This command may be combined with @option{--encrypt}
(for a signed and encrypted message), @option{--symmetric} (for a
signed and symmetrically encrypted message), or @option{--encrypt} and
@option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that may be
decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase). The key to be used for
signing is chosen by default or can be set with the
@option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key} options.
@item --clearsign
@opindex clearsign
Make a clear text signature. The content in a clear text signature is
readable without any special software. OpenPGP software is only needed
to verify the signature. Clear text signatures may modify end-of-line
whitespace for platform independence and are not intended to be
reversible. The key to be used for signing is chosen by default or
can be set with the @option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key}
options.
@item --detach-sign
@itemx -b
@opindex detach-sign
Make a detached signature.
@item --encrypt
@itemx -e
@opindex encrypt
Encrypt data. This option may be combined with @option{--sign} (for a
signed and encrypted message), @option{--symmetric} (for a message that
may be decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase), or @option{--sign}
and @option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that may be
decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase).
@item --symmetric
@itemx -c
@opindex symmetric
Encrypt with a symmetric cipher using a passphrase. The default
symmetric cipher used is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}, but may be chosen with the
@option{--cipher-algo} option. This option may be combined with
@option{--sign} (for a signed and symmetrically encrypted message),
@option{--encrypt} (for a message that may be decrypted via a secret key
or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and @option{--encrypt} together
(for a signed message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a
passphrase).
@item --store
@opindex store
Store only (make a simple literal data packet).
@item --decrypt
@itemx -d
@opindex decrypt
Decrypt the file given on the command line (or STDIN if no file
is specified) and write it to STDOUT (or the file specified with
@option{--output}). If the decrypted file is signed, the signature is also
verified. This command differs from the default operation, as it never
writes to the filename which is included in the file and it rejects
files which don't begin with an encrypted message.
@item --verify
@opindex verify
Assume that the first argument is a signed file and verify it without
generating any output. With no arguments, the signature packet is
read from STDIN. If only a one argument is given, it is expected to
be a complete signature.
With more than 1 argument, the first should be a detached signature
and the remaining files make up the the signed data. To read the signed
data from STDIN, use @samp{-} as the second filename. For security
reasons a detached signature cannot read the signed material from
STDIN without denoting it in the above way.
Note: If the option @option{--batch} is not used, @command{@gpgname}
may assume that a single argument is a file with a detached signature
and it will try to find a matching data file by stripping certain
suffixes. Using this historical feature to verify a detached
signature is strongly discouraged; always specify the data file too.
Note: When verifying a cleartext signature, @command{gpg} verifies
only what makes up the cleartext signed data and not any extra data
outside of the cleartext signature or header lines following directly
the dash marker line. The option @code{--output} may be used to write
out the actual signed data; but there are other pitfalls with this
format as well. It is suggested to avoid cleartext signatures in
favor of detached signatures.
@item --multifile
@opindex multifile
This modifies certain other commands to accept multiple files for
processing on the command line or read from STDIN with each filename on
a separate line. This allows for many files to be processed at
once. @option{--multifile} may currently be used along with
@option{--verify}, @option{--encrypt}, and @option{--decrypt}. Note that
@option{--multifile --verify} may not be used with detached signatures.
@item --verify-files
@opindex verify-files
Identical to @option{--multifile --verify}.
@item --encrypt-files
@opindex encrypt-files
Identical to @option{--multifile --encrypt}.
@item --decrypt-files
@opindex decrypt-files
Identical to @option{--multifile --decrypt}.
@item --list-keys
@itemx -k
@itemx --list-public-keys
@opindex list-keys
List all keys from the public keyrings, or just the keys given on the
command line.
Avoid using the output of this command in scripts or other programs as
it is likely to change as GnuPG changes. See @option{--with-colons}
for a machine-parseable key listing command that is appropriate for
use in scripts and other programs. Never use the regular output for
scripts - it is only for human consumption.
@item --list-secret-keys
@itemx -K
@opindex list-secret-keys
List all keys from the secret keyrings, or just the ones given on the
command line. A @code{#} after the letters @code{sec} means that the
secret key is not usable (for example, if it was created via
@option{--export-secret-subkeys}). See also @option{--list-keys}.
@item --list-sigs
@opindex list-sigs
Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the signatures are listed too.
This command has the same effect as
using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-list}.
For each signature listed, there are several flags in between the "sig"
tag and keyid. These flags give additional information about each
signature. From left to right, they are the numbers 1-3 for certificate
check level (see @option{--ask-cert-level}), "L" for a local or
non-exportable signature (see @option{--lsign-key}), "R" for a
nonRevocable signature (see the @option{--edit-key} command "nrsign"),
"P" for a signature that contains a policy URL (see
@option{--cert-policy-url}), "N" for a signature that contains a
notation (see @option{--cert-notation}), "X" for an eXpired signature
(see @option{--ask-cert-expire}), and the numbers 1-9 or "T" for 10 and
above to indicate trust signature levels (see the @option{--edit-key}
command "tsign").
@item --check-sigs
@opindex check-sigs
Same as @option{--list-sigs}, but the signatures are verified. Note
that for performance reasons the revocation status of a signing key is
not shown.
This command has the same effect as
using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-check}.
The status of the verification is indicated by a flag directly following
the "sig" tag (and thus before the flags described above for
@option{--list-sigs}). A "!" indicates that the signature has been
successfully verified, a "-" denotes a bad signature and a "%" is used
if an error occurred while checking the signature (e.g. a non supported
algorithm).
@item --locate-keys
@opindex locate-keys
Locate the keys given as arguments. This command basically uses the
same algorithm as used when locating keys for encryption or signing and
may thus be used to see what keys @command{@gpgname} might use. In
particular external methods as defined by @option{--auto-key-locate} may
be used to locate a key. Only public keys are listed.
@item --fingerprint
@opindex fingerprint
List all keys (or the specified ones) along with their
fingerprints. This is the same output as @option{--list-keys} but with
the additional output of a line with the fingerprint. May also be
combined with @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}. If this
command is given twice, the fingerprints of all secondary keys are
listed too. This command also forces pretty printing of fingerprints
if the keyid format has been set to "none".
@item --list-packets
@opindex list-packets
List only the sequence of packets. This command is only useful for
debugging. When used with option @option{--verbose} the actual MPI
values are dumped and not only their lengths. Note that the output of
this command may change with new releases.
@item --card-edit
@opindex card-edit
Present a menu to work with a smartcard. The subcommand "help" provides
an overview on available commands. For a detailed description, please
see the Card HOWTO at
https://gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html#GnuPG-cardHOWTO .
@item --card-status
@opindex card-status
Show the content of the smart card.
@item --change-pin
@opindex change-pin
Present a menu to allow changing the PIN of a smartcard. This
functionality is also available as the subcommand "passwd" with the
@option{--card-edit} command.
@item --delete-keys @code{name}
@itemx --delete-keys @code{name}
Remove key from the public keyring. In batch mode either @option{--yes} is
required or the key must be specified by fingerprint. This is a
safeguard against accidental deletion of multiple keys.
@item --delete-secret-keys @code{name}
@opindex delete-secret-keys
gRemove key from the secret keyring. In batch mode the key must be
specified by fingerprint. The option @option{--yes} can be used to
advice gpg-agent not to request a confirmation. This extra
pre-caution is done because @command{gpg} can't be sure that the
secret key (as controlled by gpg-agent) is only used for the given
OpenPGP public key.
@item --delete-secret-and-public-key @code{name}
@opindex delete-secret-and-public-key
Same as @option{--delete-key}, but if a secret key exists, it will be
removed first. In batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint.
The option @option{--yes} can be used to advice gpg-agent not to
request a confirmation.
@item --export
@opindex export
Either export all keys from all keyrings (default keyrings and those
registered via option @option{--keyring}), or if at least one name is given,
those of the given name. The exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the
file given with option @option{--output}. Use together with
@option{--armor} to mail those keys.
@item --send-keys @code{key IDs}
@opindex send-keys
Similar to @option{--export} but sends the keys to a keyserver.
Fingerprints may be used instead of key IDs. Option @option{--keyserver}
must be used to give the name of this keyserver. Don't send your
complete keyring to a keyserver --- select only those keys which are new
or changed by you. If no key IDs are given, @command{gpg} does nothing.
@item --export-secret-keys
@itemx --export-secret-subkeys
@opindex export-secret-keys
@opindex export-secret-subkeys
Same as @option{--export}, but exports the secret keys instead. The
exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the file given with option
@option{--output}. This command is often used along with the option
@option{--armor} to allow easy printing of the key for paper backup;
however the external tool @command{paperkey} does a better job for
creating backups on paper. Note that exporting a secret key can be a
security risk if the exported keys are send over an insecure channel.
The second form of the command has the special property to render the
secret part of the primary key useless; this is a GNU extension to
OpenPGP and other implementations can not be expected to successfully
import such a key. Its intended use is to generated a full key with
an additional signing subkey on a dedicated machine and then using
this command to export the key without the primary key to the main
machine.
GnuPG may ask you to enter the passphrase for the key. This is
required because the internal protection method of the secret key is
different from the one specified by the OpenPGP protocol.
@item --export-ssh-key
@opindex export-ssh-key
This command is used to export a key in the OpenSSH public key format.
It requires the specification of one key by the usual means and
exports the latest valid subkey which has an authentication capability
to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. That
output can directly be added to ssh's @file{authorized_key} file.
By specifying the key to export using a key ID or a fingerprint
suffixed with an exclamation mark (!), a specific subkey or the
primary key can be exported. This does not even require that the key
has the authentication capability flag set.
@item --import
@itemx --fast-import
@opindex import
Import/merge keys. This adds the given keys to the
keyring. The fast version is currently just a synonym.
There are a few other options which control how this command works.
Most notable here is the @option{--import-options merge-only} option
which does not insert new keys but does only the merging of new
signatures, user-IDs and subkeys.
@item --recv-keys @code{key IDs}
@opindex recv-keys
Import the keys with the given key IDs from a keyserver. Option
@option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this keyserver.
@item --refresh-keys
@opindex refresh-keys
Request updates from a keyserver for keys that already exist on the
local keyring. This is useful for updating a key with the latest
signatures, user IDs, etc. Calling this with no arguments will refresh
the entire keyring. Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the
name of the keyserver for all keys that do not have preferred keyservers
set (see @option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url}).
@item --search-keys @code{names}
@opindex search-keys
Search the keyserver for the given names. Multiple names given here will
be joined together to create the search string for the keyserver.
Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this
keyserver. Keyservers that support different search methods allow using
the syntax specified in "How to specify a user ID" below. Note that
different keyserver types support different search methods. Currently
only LDAP supports them all.
@item --fetch-keys @code{URIs}
@opindex fetch-keys
Retrieve keys located at the specified URIs. Note that different
installations of GnuPG may support different protocols (HTTP, FTP,
LDAP, etc.). When using HTTPS the system provided root certificates
are used by this command.
@item --update-trustdb
@opindex update-trustdb
Do trust database maintenance. This command iterates over all keys and
builds the Web of Trust. This is an interactive command because it may
have to ask for the "ownertrust" values for keys. The user has to give
an estimation of how far she trusts the owner of the displayed key to
correctly certify (sign) other keys. GnuPG only asks for the ownertrust
value if it has not yet been assigned to a key. Using the
@option{--edit-key} menu, the assigned value can be changed at any time.
@item --check-trustdb
@opindex check-trustdb
Do trust database maintenance without user interaction. From time to
time the trust database must be updated so that expired keys or
signatures and the resulting changes in the Web of Trust can be
tracked. Normally, GnuPG will calculate when this is required and do it
automatically unless @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} is set. This
command can be used to force a trust database check at any time. The
processing is identical to that of @option{--update-trustdb} but it
skips keys with a not yet defined "ownertrust".
For use with cron jobs, this command can be used together with
@option{--batch} in which case the trust database check is done only if
a check is needed. To force a run even in batch mode add the option
@option{--yes}.
@anchor{option --export-ownertrust}
@item --export-ownertrust
@opindex export-ownertrust
Send the ownertrust values to STDOUT. This is useful for backup purposes
as these values are the only ones which can't be re-created from a
corrupted trustdb. Example:
@c man:.RS
@example
@gpgname{} --export-ownertrust > otrust.txt
@end example
@c man:.RE
@item --import-ownertrust
@opindex import-ownertrust
Update the trustdb with the ownertrust values stored in @code{files} (or
STDIN if not given); existing values will be overwritten. In case of a
severely damaged trustdb and if you have a recent backup of the
ownertrust values (e.g. in the file @file{otrust.txt}, you may re-create
the trustdb using these commands:
@c man:.RS
@example
cd ~/.gnupg
rm trustdb.gpg
@gpgname{} --import-ownertrust < otrust.txt
@end example
@c man:.RE
@item --rebuild-keydb-caches
@opindex rebuild-keydb-caches
When updating from version 1.0.6 to 1.0.7 this command should be used
to create signature caches in the keyring. It might be handy in other
situations too.
@item --print-md @code{algo}
@itemx --print-mds
@opindex print-md
Print message digest of algorithm ALGO for all given files or STDIN.
With the second form (or a deprecated "*" as algo) digests for all
available algorithms are printed.
@item --gen-random @code{0|1|2} @code{count}
@opindex gen-random
Emit @var{count} random bytes of the given quality level 0, 1 or 2. If
@var{count} is not given or zero, an endless sequence of random bytes
will be emitted. If used with @option{--armor} the output will be
base64 encoded. PLEASE, don't use this command unless you know what
you are doing; it may remove precious entropy from the system!
@item --gen-prime @code{mode} @code{bits}
@opindex gen-prime
Use the source, Luke :-). The output format is still subject to change.
@item --enarmor
@itemx --dearmor
@opindex enarmor
@opindex dearmor
Pack or unpack an arbitrary input into/from an OpenPGP ASCII armor.
This is a GnuPG extension to OpenPGP and in general not very useful.
@item --tofu-policy @code{auto|good|unknown|bad|ask} @code{key...}
@opindex tofu-policy
Set the TOFU policy for all the bindings associated with the specified
keys. For more information about the meaning of the policies,
@pxref{trust-model-tofu}. The keys may be specified either by their
fingerprint (preferred) or their keyid.
@c @item --server
@c @opindex server
@c Run gpg in server mode. This feature is not yet ready for use and
@c thus not documented.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c ******* KEY MANGEMENT COMMANDS **********
@c *******************************************
@node OpenPGP Key Management
@subsection How to manage your keys
This section explains the main commands for key management
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --quick-gen-key @code{user-id} [@code{algo} [@code{usage} [@code{expire}]]]
@opindex quick-gen-key
This is a simple command to generate a standard key with one user id.
In contrast to @option{--gen-key} the key is generated directly
without the need to answer a bunch of prompts. Unless the option
@option{--yes} is given, the key creation will be canceled if the
given user id already exists in the key ring.
If invoked directly on the console without any special options an
answer to a ``Continue?'' style confirmation prompt is required. In
case the user id already exists in the key ring a second prompt to
force the creation of the key will show up.
If @code{algo} or @code{usage} are given, only the primary key is
created and no prompts are shown. To specify an expiration date but
still create a primary and subkey use ``default'' or
``future-default'' for @code{algo} and ``default'' for @code{usage}.
For a description of these optional arguments see the command
@code{--quick-addkey}. The @code{usage} accepts also the value
``cert'' which can be used to create a certification only primary key;
the default is to a create certification and signing key.
If this command is used with @option{--batch},
@option{--pinentry-mode} has been set to @code{loopback}, and one of
the passphrase options (@option{--passphrase},
@option{--passphrase-fd}, or @option{passphrase-file}) is used, the
supplied passphrase is used for the new key and the agent does not ask
for it. To create a key without any protection @code{--passphrase ''}
may be used.
@item --quick-addkey @code{fpr} [@code{algo} [@code{usage} [@code{expire}]]]
@opindex quick-addkey
Directly add a subkey to the key identified by the fingerprint
@code{fpr}. Without the optional arguments an encryption subkey is
added. If any of the arguments are given a more specific subkey is
added.
@code{algo} may be any of the supported algorithms or curve names
given in the format as used by key listings. To use the default
algorithm the string ``default'' or ``-'' can be used. Supported
algorithms are ``rsa'', ``dsa'', ``elg'', ``ed25519'', ``cv25519'',
and other ECC curves. For example the string ``rsa'' adds an RSA key
with the default key length; a string ``rsa4096'' requests that the
key length is 4096 bits. The string ``future-default'' is an alias
for the algorithm which will likely be used as default algorithm in
future versions of gpg.
Depending on the given @code{algo} the subkey may either be an
encryption subkey or a signing subkey. If an algorithm is capable of
signing and encryption and such a subkey is desired, a @code{usage}
string must be given. This string is either ``default'' or ``-'' to
keep the default or a comma delimited list of keywords: ``sign'' for a
signing subkey, ``auth'' for an authentication subkey, and ``encr''
for an encryption subkey (``encrypt'' can be used as alias for
``encr''). The valid combinations depend on the algorithm.
The @code{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date
for the subkey. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO
YYYY-MM-DD format is used. The values ``never'', ``none'', or ``-''
can be used for no expiration date.
@item --gen-key
@opindex gen-key
Generate a new key pair using the current default parameters. This is
the standard command to create a new key. In addition to the key a
revocation certificate is created and stored in the
@file{openpgp-revocs.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory.
@item --full-gen-key
@opindex gen-key
Generate a new key pair with dialogs for all options. This is an
extended version of @option{--gen-key}.
There is also a feature which allows you to create keys in batch
mode. See the manual section ``Unattended key generation'' on how
to use this.
@item --gen-revoke @code{name}
@opindex gen-revoke
Generate a revocation certificate for the complete key. To only revoke
a subkey or a key signature, use the @option{--edit} command.
This command merely creates the revocation certificate so that it can
be used to revoke the key if that is ever needed. To actually revoke
a key the created revocation certificate needs to be merged with the
key to revoke. This is done by importing the revocation certificate
using the @option{--import} command. Then the revoked key needs to be
published, which is best done by sending the key to a keyserver
(command @option{--send-key}) and by exporting (@option{--export}) it
to a file which is then send to frequent communication partners.
@item --desig-revoke @code{name}
@opindex desig-revoke
Generate a designated revocation certificate for a key. This allows a
user (with the permission of the keyholder) to revoke someone else's
key.
@item --edit-key
@opindex edit-key
Present a menu which enables you to do most of the key management
related tasks. It expects the specification of a key on the command
line.
@c ******** Begin Edit-key Options **********
@table @asis
@item uid @code{n}
@opindex keyedit:uid
Toggle selection of user ID or photographic user ID with index @code{n}.
Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.
@item key @code{n}
@opindex keyedit:key
Toggle selection of subkey with index @code{n} or key ID @code{n}.
Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.
@item sign
@opindex keyedit:sign
Make a signature on key of user @code{name} If the key is not yet
signed by the default user (or the users given with -u), the program
displays the information of the key again, together with its
fingerprint and asks whether it should be signed. This question is
repeated for all users specified with
-u.
@item lsign
@opindex keyedit:lsign
Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-exportable and will
therefore never be used by others. This may be used to make keys
valid only in the local environment.
@item nrsign
@opindex keyedit:nrsign
Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-revocable and can
therefore never be revoked.
@item tsign
@opindex keyedit:tsign
Make a trust signature. This is a signature that combines the notions
of certification (like a regular signature), and trust (like the
"trust" command). It is generally only useful in distinct communities
or groups. For more information please read the sections
``Trust Signature'' and ``Regular Expression'' in RFC-4880.
@end table
@c man:.RS
Note that "l" (for local / non-exportable), "nr" (for non-revocable,
and "t" (for trust) may be freely mixed and prefixed to "sign" to
create a signature of any type desired.
@c man:.RE
If the option @option{--only-sign-text-ids} is specified, then any
non-text based user ids (e.g., photo IDs) will not be selected for
signing.
@table @asis
@item delsig
@opindex keyedit:delsig
Delete a signature. Note that it is not possible to retract a signature,
once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case
you better use @code{revsig}.
@item revsig
@opindex keyedit:revsig
Revoke a signature. For every signature which has been generated by
one of the secret keys, GnuPG asks whether a revocation certificate
should be generated.
@item check
@opindex keyedit:check
Check the signatures on all selected user IDs. With the extra
option @code{selfsig} only self-signatures are shown.
@item adduid
@opindex keyedit:adduid
Create an additional user ID.
@item addphoto
@opindex keyedit:addphoto
Create a photographic user ID. This will prompt for a JPEG file that
will be embedded into the user ID. Note that a very large JPEG will make
for a very large key. Also note that some programs will display your
JPEG unchanged (GnuPG), and some programs will scale it to fit in a
dialog box (PGP).
@item showphoto
@opindex keyedit:showphoto
Display the selected photographic user ID.
@item deluid
@opindex keyedit:deluid
Delete a user ID or photographic user ID. Note that it is not
possible to retract a user id, once it has been send to the public
(i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revuid}.
@item revuid
@opindex keyedit:revuid
Revoke a user ID or photographic user ID.
@item primary
@opindex keyedit:primary
Flag the current user id as the primary one, removes the primary user
id flag from all other user ids and sets the timestamp of all affected
self-signatures one second ahead. Note that setting a photo user ID
as primary makes it primary over other photo user IDs, and setting a
regular user ID as primary makes it primary over other regular user
IDs.
@item keyserver
@opindex keyedit:keyserver
Set a preferred keyserver for the specified user ID(s). This allows
other users to know where you prefer they get your key from. See
@option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url} for more on how this
works. Setting a value of "none" removes an existing preferred
keyserver.
@item notation
@opindex keyedit:notation
Set a name=value notation for the specified user ID(s). See
@option{--cert-notation} for more on how this works. Setting a value of
"none" removes all notations, setting a notation prefixed with a minus
sign (-) removes that notation, and setting a notation name (without the
=value) prefixed with a minus sign removes all notations with that name.
@item pref
@opindex keyedit:pref
List preferences from the selected user ID. This shows the actual
preferences, without including any implied preferences.
@item showpref
@opindex keyedit:showpref
More verbose preferences listing for the selected user ID. This shows
the preferences in effect by including the implied preferences of 3DES
(cipher), SHA-1 (digest), and Uncompressed (compression) if they are
not already included in the preference list. In addition, the
preferred keyserver and signature notations (if any) are shown.
@item setpref @code{string}
@opindex keyedit:setpref
Set the list of user ID preferences to @code{string} for all (or just
the selected) user IDs. Calling setpref with no arguments sets the
preference list to the default (either built-in or set via
@option{--default-preference-list}), and calling setpref with "none"
as the argument sets an empty preference list. Use @command{@gpgname
--version} to get a list of available algorithms. Note that while you
can change the preferences on an attribute user ID (aka "photo ID"),
GnuPG does not select keys via attribute user IDs so these preferences
will not be used by GnuPG.
When setting preferences, you should list the algorithms in the order
which you'd like to see them used by someone else when encrypting a
message to your key. If you don't include 3DES, it will be
automatically added at the end. Note that there are many factors that
go into choosing an algorithm (for example, your key may not be the
only recipient), and so the remote OpenPGP application being used to
send to you may or may not follow your exact chosen order for a given
message. It will, however, only choose an algorithm that is present
on the preference list of every recipient key. See also the
INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below.
@item addkey
@opindex keyedit:addkey
Add a subkey to this key.
@item addcardkey
@opindex keyedit:addcardkey
Generate a subkey on a card and add it to this key.
@item keytocard
@opindex keyedit:keytocard
Transfer the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey
has been selected) to a smartcard. The secret key in the keyring will
be replaced by a stub if the key could be stored successfully on the
card and you use the save command later. Only certain key types may be
transferred to the card. A sub menu allows you to select on what card
to store the key. Note that it is not possible to get that key back
from the card - if the card gets broken your secret key will be lost
unless you have a backup somewhere.
@item bkuptocard @code{file}
@opindex keyedit:bkuptocard
Restore the given file to a card. This command may be used to restore a
backup key (as generated during card initialization) to a new card. In
almost all cases this will be the encryption key. You should use this
command only with the corresponding public key and make sure that the
file given as argument is indeed the backup to restore. You should then
select 2 to restore as encryption key. You will first be asked to enter
the passphrase of the backup key and then for the Admin PIN of the card.
@item delkey
@opindex keyedit:delkey
Remove a subkey (secondary key). Note that it is not possible to retract
a subkey, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In
that case you better use @code{revkey}.
@item revkey
@opindex keyedit:revkey
Revoke a subkey.
@item expire
@opindex keyedit:expire
Change the key or subkey expiration time. If a subkey is selected, the
expiration time of this subkey will be changed. With no selection, the
key expiration of the primary key is changed.
@item trust
@opindex keyedit:trust
Change the owner trust value for the key. This updates the trust-db
immediately and no save is required.
@item disable
@itemx enable
@opindex keyedit:disable
@opindex keyedit:enable
Disable or enable an entire key. A disabled key can not normally be
used for encryption.
@item addrevoker
@opindex keyedit:addrevoker
Add a designated revoker to the key. This takes one optional argument:
"sensitive". If a designated revoker is marked as sensitive, it will
not be exported by default (see export-options).
@item passwd
@opindex keyedit:passwd
Change the passphrase of the secret key.
@item toggle
@opindex keyedit:toggle
This is dummy command which exists only for backward compatibility.
@item clean
@opindex keyedit:clean
Compact (by removing all signatures except the selfsig) any user ID
that is no longer usable (e.g. revoked, or expired). Then, remove any
signatures that are not usable by the trust calculations.
Specifically, this removes any signature that does not validate, any
signature that is superseded by a later signature, revoked signatures,
and signatures issued by keys that are not present on the keyring.
@item minimize
@opindex keyedit:minimize
Make the key as small as possible. This removes all signatures from
each user ID except for the most recent self-signature.
@item cross-certify
@opindex keyedit:cross-certify
Add cross-certification signatures to signing subkeys that may not
currently have them. Cross-certification signatures protect against a
subtle attack against signing subkeys. See
@option{--require-cross-certification}. All new keys generated have
this signature by default, so this option is only useful to bring
older keys up to date.
@item save
@opindex keyedit:save
Save all changes to the key rings and quit.
@item quit
@opindex keyedit:quit
Quit the program without updating the
key rings.
@end table
@c man:.RS
The listing shows you the key with its secondary keys and all user
ids. The primary user id is indicated by a dot, and selected keys or
user ids are indicated by an asterisk. The trust
value is displayed with the primary key: the first is the assigned owner
trust and the second is the calculated trust value. Letters are used for
the values:
@c man:.RE
@table @asis
@item -
No ownertrust assigned / not yet calculated.
@item e
Trust
calculation has failed; probably due to an expired key.
@item q
Not enough information for calculation.
@item n
Never trust this key.
@item m
Marginally trusted.
@item f
Fully trusted.
@item u
Ultimately trusted.
@end table
@c ******** End Edit-key Options **********
@item --sign-key @code{name}
@opindex sign-key
Signs a public key with your secret key. This is a shortcut version of
the subcommand "sign" from @option{--edit}.
@item --lsign-key @code{name}
@opindex lsign-key
Signs a public key with your secret key but marks it as
non-exportable. This is a shortcut version of the subcommand "lsign"
from @option{--edit-key}.
@item --quick-sign-key @code{fpr} [@code{names}]
@itemx --quick-lsign-key @code{fpr} [@code{names}]
@opindex quick-sign-key
@opindex quick-lsign-key
Directly sign a key from the passphrase without any further user
interaction. The @code{fpr} must be the verified primary fingerprint
of a key in the local keyring. If no @code{names} are given, all
useful user ids are signed; with given [@code{names}] only useful user
ids matching one of theses names are signed. By default, or if a name
is prefixed with a '*', a case insensitive substring match is used.
If a name is prefixed with a '=' a case sensitive exact match is done.
The command @option{--quick-lsign-key} marks the signatures as
non-exportable. If such a non-exportable signature already exists the
@option{--quick-sign-key} turns it into a exportable signature.
This command uses reasonable defaults and thus does not provide the
full flexibility of the "sign" subcommand from @option{--edit-key}.
Its intended use is to help unattended key signing by utilizing a list
of verified fingerprints.
@item --quick-adduid @var{user-id} @var{new-user-id}
@opindex quick-adduid
This command adds a new user id to an existing key. In contrast to
the interactive sub-command @code{adduid} of @option{--edit-key} the
@var{new-user-id} is added verbatim with only leading and trailing
white space removed, it is expected to be UTF-8 encoded, and no checks
on its form are applied.
@item --quick-revuid @var{user-id} @var{user-id-to-revoke}
@opindex quick-revuid
This command revokes a User ID on an existing key. It cannot be used
to revoke the last User ID on key (some non-revoked User ID must
remain), with revocation reason ``User ID is no longer valid''. If
you want to specify a different revocation reason, or to supply
supplementary revocation text, you should use the interactive
sub-command @code{revuid} of @option{--edit-key}.
@item --passwd @var{user_id}
@opindex passwd
Change the passphrase of the secret key belonging to the certificate
specified as @var{user_id}. This is a shortcut for the sub-command
@code{passwd} of the edit key menu.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c *************** ****************
@c *************** OPTIONS ****************
@c *************** ****************
@c *******************************************
@mansect options
@node GPG Options
@section Option Summary
@command{@gpgname} features a bunch of options to control the exact
behaviour and to change the default configuration.
@menu
* GPG Configuration Options:: How to change the configuration.
* GPG Key related Options:: Key related options.
* GPG Input and Output:: Input and Output.
* OpenPGP Options:: OpenPGP protocol specific options.
* Compliance Options:: Compliance options.
* GPG Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually don't want to do.
* Deprecated Options:: Deprecated options.
@end menu
Long options can be put in an options file (default
"~/.gnupg/gpg.conf"). Short option names will not work - for example,
"armor" is a valid option for the options file, while "a" is not. Do not
write the 2 dashes, but simply the name of the option and any required
arguments. Lines with a hash ('#') as the first non-white-space
character are ignored. Commands may be put in this file too, but that is
not generally useful as the command will execute automatically with
every execution of gpg.
Please remember that option parsing stops as soon as a non-option is
encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by using the special option
@option{--}.
@c *******************************************
@c ******** CONFIGURATION OPTIONS **********
@c *******************************************
@node GPG Configuration Options
@subsection How to change the configuration
These options are used to change the configuration and are usually found
in the option file.
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --default-key @var{name}
@opindex default-key
Use @var{name} as the default key to sign with. If this option is not
used, the default key is the first key found in the secret keyring.
Note that @option{-u} or @option{--local-user} overrides this option.
This option may be given multiple times. In this case, the last key
for which a secret key is available is used. If there is no secret
key available for any of the specified values, GnuPG will not emit an
error message but continue as if this option wasn't given.
@item --default-recipient @var{name}
@opindex default-recipient
Use @var{name} as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is
not used and don't ask if this is a valid one. @var{name} must be
non-empty.
@item --default-recipient-self
@opindex default-recipient-self
Use the default key as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is not
used and don't ask if this is a valid one. The default key is the first
one from the secret keyring or the one set with @option{--default-key}.
@item --no-default-recipient
@opindex no-default-recipient
Reset @option{--default-recipient} and @option{--default-recipient-self}.
@item -v, --verbose
@opindex verbose
Give more information during processing. If used
twice, the input data is listed in detail.
@item --no-verbose
@opindex no-verbose
Reset verbose level to 0.
@item -q, --quiet
@opindex quiet
Try to be as quiet as possible.
@item --batch
@itemx --no-batch
@opindex batch
@opindex no-batch
Use batch mode. Never ask, do not allow interactive commands.
@option{--no-batch} disables this option. Note that even with a
filename given on the command line, gpg might still need to read from
STDIN (in particular if gpg figures that the input is a
detached signature and no data file has been specified). Thus if you
do not want to feed data via STDIN, you should connect STDIN to
@file{/dev/null}.
@item --no-tty
@opindex no-tty
Make sure that the TTY (terminal) is never used for any output.
This option is needed in some cases because GnuPG sometimes prints
warnings to the TTY even if @option{--batch} is used.
@item --yes
@opindex yes
Assume "yes" on most questions.
@item --no
@opindex no
Assume "no" on most questions.
@item --list-options @code{parameters}
@opindex list-options
This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
listing keys and signatures (that is, @option{--list-keys},
@option{--list-sigs}, @option{--list-public-keys},
@option{--list-secret-keys}, and the @option{--edit-key} functions).
Options can be prepended with a @option{no-} (after the two dashes) to
give the opposite meaning. The options are:
@table @asis
@item show-photos
@opindex list-options:show-photos
Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-sigs},
@option{--list-public-keys}, and @option{--list-secret-keys} to
display any photo IDs attached to the key. Defaults to no. See also
@option{--photo-viewer}. Does not work with @option{--with-colons}:
see @option{--attribute-fd} for the appropriate way to get photo data
for scripts and other frontends.
@item show-usage
@opindex list-options:show-usage
Show usage information for keys and subkeys in the standard key
listing. This is a list of letters indicating the allowed usage for a
key (@code{E}=encryption, @code{S}=signing, @code{C}=certification,
@code{A}=authentication). Defaults to yes.
@item show-policy-urls
@opindex list-options:show-policy-urls
Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}
listings. Defaults to no.
@item show-notations
@itemx show-std-notations
@itemx show-user-notations
@opindex list-options:show-notations
@opindex list-options:show-std-notations
@opindex list-options:show-user-notations
Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
@option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no.
@item show-keyserver-urls
@opindex list-options:show-keyserver-urls
Show any preferred keyserver URL in the @option{--list-sigs} or
@option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no.
@item show-uid-validity
@opindex list-options:show-uid-validity
Display the calculated validity of user IDs during key listings.
Defaults to yes.
@item show-unusable-uids
@opindex list-options:show-unusable-uids
Show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings. Defaults to no.
@item show-unusable-subkeys
@opindex list-options:show-unusable-subkeys
Show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings. Defaults to no.
@item show-keyring
@opindex list-options:show-keyring
Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
keyring a given key resides on. Defaults to no.
@item show-sig-expire
@opindex list-options:show-sig-expire
Show signature expiration dates (if any) during @option{--list-sigs} or
@option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no.
@item show-sig-subpackets
@opindex list-options:show-sig-subpackets
Include signature subpackets in the key listing. This option can take an
optional argument list of the subpackets to list. If no argument is
passed, list all subpackets. Defaults to no. This option is only
meaningful when using @option{--with-colons} along with
@option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}.
@end table
@item --verify-options @code{parameters}
@opindex verify-options
This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
verifying signatures. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give
the opposite meaning. The options are:
@table @asis
@item show-photos
@opindex verify-options:show-photos
Display any photo IDs present on the key that issued the signature.
Defaults to no. See also @option{--photo-viewer}.
@item show-policy-urls
@opindex verify-options:show-policy-urls
Show policy URLs in the signature being verified. Defaults to yes.
@item show-notations
@itemx show-std-notations
@itemx show-user-notations
@opindex verify-options:show-notations
@opindex verify-options:show-std-notations
@opindex verify-options:show-user-notations
Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
signature being verified. Defaults to IETF standard.
@item show-keyserver-urls
@opindex verify-options:show-keyserver-urls
Show any preferred keyserver URL in the signature being verified.
Defaults to yes.
@item show-uid-validity
@opindex verify-options:show-uid-validity
Display the calculated validity of the user IDs on the key that issued
the signature. Defaults to yes.
@item show-unusable-uids
@opindex verify-options:show-unusable-uids
Show revoked and expired user IDs during signature verification.
Defaults to no.
@item show-primary-uid-only
@opindex verify-options:show-primary-uid-only
Show only the primary user ID during signature verification. That is
all the AKA lines as well as photo Ids are not shown with the signature
verification status.
@item pka-lookups
@opindex verify-options:pka-lookups
Enable PKA lookups to verify sender addresses. Note that PKA is based
on DNS, and so enabling this option may disclose information on when
and what signatures are verified or to whom data is encrypted. This
is similar to the "web bug" described for the @option{--auto-key-retrieve}
option.
@item pka-trust-increase
@opindex verify-options:pka-trust-increase
Raise the trust in a signature to full if the signature passes PKA
validation. This option is only meaningful if pka-lookups is set.
@end table
@item --enable-large-rsa
@itemx --disable-large-rsa
@opindex enable-large-rsa
@opindex disable-large-rsa
With --gen-key and --batch, enable the creation of RSA secret keys as
large as 8192 bit. Note: 8192 bit is more than is generally
recommended. These large keys don't significantly improve security,
but they are more expensive to use, and their signatures and
certifications are larger. This option is only available if the
binary was build with large-secmem support.
@item --enable-dsa2
@itemx --disable-dsa2
@opindex enable-dsa2
@opindex disable-dsa2
Enable hash truncation for all DSA keys even for old DSA Keys up to
1024 bit. This is also the default with @option{--openpgp}. Note
that older versions of GnuPG also required this flag to allow the
generation of DSA larger than 1024 bit.
@item --photo-viewer @code{string}
@opindex photo-viewer
This is the command line that should be run to view a photo ID. "%i"
will be expanded to a filename containing the photo. "%I" does the
same, except the file will not be deleted once the viewer exits.
Other flags are "%k" for the key ID, "%K" for the long key ID, "%f"
for the key fingerprint, "%t" for the extension of the image type
(e.g. "jpg"), "%T" for the MIME type of the image (e.g. "image/jpeg"),
"%v" for the single-character calculated validity of the image being
viewed (e.g. "f"), "%V" for the calculated validity as a string (e.g.
"full"), "%U" for a base32 encoded hash of the user ID,
and "%%" for an actual percent sign. If neither %i or %I are present,
then the photo will be supplied to the viewer on standard input.
The default viewer is "xloadimage -fork -quiet -title 'KeyID 0x%k'
STDIN". Note that if your image viewer program is not secure, then
executing it from GnuPG does not make it secure.
@item --exec-path @code{string}
@opindex exec-path
@efindex PATH
Sets a list of directories to search for photo viewers and keyserver
helpers. If not provided, keyserver helpers use the compiled-in
default directory, and photo viewers use the @code{PATH} environment
variable.
Note, that on W32 system this value is ignored when searching for
keyserver helpers.
@item --keyring @code{file}
@opindex keyring
Add @code{file} to the current list of keyrings. If @code{file} begins
with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
home directory ("~/.gnupg" if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is not
used).
Note that this adds a keyring to the current list. If the intent is to
use the specified keyring alone, use @option{--keyring} along with
@option{--no-default-keyring}.
If the the option @option{--no-keyring} has been used no keyrings will
be used at all.
@item --secret-keyring @code{file}
@opindex secret-keyring
This is an obsolete option and ignored. All secret keys are stored in
the @file{private-keys-v1.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory.
@item --primary-keyring @code{file}
@opindex primary-keyring
Designate @code{file} as the primary public keyring. This means that
newly imported keys (via @option{--import} or keyserver
@option{--recv-from}) will go to this keyring.
@item --trustdb-name @code{file}
@opindex trustdb-name
Use @code{file} instead of the default trustdb. If @code{file} begins
with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
home directory (@file{~/.gnupg} if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is
not used).
@include opt-homedir.texi
@item --display-charset @code{name}
@opindex display-charset
Set the name of the native character set. This is used to convert
some informational strings like user IDs to the proper UTF-8 encoding.
Note that this has nothing to do with the character set of data to be
encrypted or signed; GnuPG does not recode user-supplied data. If
this option is not used, the default character set is determined from
the current locale. A verbosity level of 3 shows the chosen set.
Valid values for @code{name} are:
@table @asis
@item iso-8859-1
@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-1
This is the Latin 1 set.
@item iso-8859-2
@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-2
The Latin 2 set.
@item iso-8859-15
@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-15
This is currently an alias for
the Latin 1 set.
@item koi8-r
@opindex display-charset:koi8-r
The usual Russian set (rfc1489).
@item utf-8
@opindex display-charset:utf-8
Bypass all translations and assume
that the OS uses native UTF-8 encoding.
@end table
@item --utf8-strings
@itemx --no-utf8-strings
@opindex utf8-strings
Assume that command line arguments are given as UTF8 strings. The
default (@option{--no-utf8-strings}) is to assume that arguments are
encoded in the character set as specified by
@option{--display-charset}. These options affect all following
arguments. Both options may be used multiple times.
@anchor{gpg-option --options}
@item --options @code{file}
@opindex options
Read options from @code{file} and do not try to read them from the
default options file in the homedir (see @option{--homedir}). This
option is ignored if used in an options file.
@item --no-options
@opindex no-options
Shortcut for @option{--options /dev/null}. This option is detected
before an attempt to open an option file. Using this option will also
prevent the creation of a @file{~/.gnupg} homedir.
@item -z @code{n}
@itemx --compress-level @code{n}
@itemx --bzip2-compress-level @code{n}
@opindex compress-level
@opindex bzip2-compress-level
Set compression level to @code{n} for the ZIP and ZLIB compression
algorithms. The default is to use the default compression level of zlib
(normally 6). @option{--bzip2-compress-level} sets the compression level
for the BZIP2 compression algorithm (defaulting to 6 as well). This is a
different option from @option{--compress-level} since BZIP2 uses a
significant amount of memory for each additional compression level.
@option{-z} sets both. A value of 0 for @code{n} disables compression.
@item --bzip2-decompress-lowmem
@opindex bzip2-decompress-lowmem
Use a different decompression method for BZIP2 compressed files. This
alternate method uses a bit more than half the memory, but also runs
at half the speed. This is useful under extreme low memory
circumstances when the file was originally compressed at a high
@option{--bzip2-compress-level}.
@item --mangle-dos-filenames
@itemx --no-mangle-dos-filenames
@opindex mangle-dos-filenames
@opindex no-mangle-dos-filenames
Older version of Windows cannot handle filenames with more than one
dot. @option{--mangle-dos-filenames} causes GnuPG to replace (rather
than add to) the extension of an output filename to avoid this
problem. This option is off by default and has no effect on non-Windows
platforms.
@item --ask-cert-level
@itemx --no-ask-cert-level
@opindex ask-cert-level
When making a key signature, prompt for a certification level. If this
option is not specified, the certification level used is set via
@option{--default-cert-level}. See @option{--default-cert-level} for
information on the specific levels and how they are
used. @option{--no-ask-cert-level} disables this option. This option
defaults to no.
@item --default-cert-level @code{n}
@opindex default-cert-level
The default to use for the check level when signing a key.
0 means you make no particular claim as to how carefully you verified
the key.
1 means you believe the key is owned by the person who claims to own
it but you could not, or did not verify the key at all. This is
useful for a "persona" verification, where you sign the key of a
pseudonymous user.
2 means you did casual verification of the key. For example, this
could mean that you verified the key fingerprint and checked the
user ID on the key against a photo ID.
3 means you did extensive verification of the key. For example, this
could mean that you verified the key fingerprint with the owner of the
key in person, and that you checked, by means of a hard to forge
document with a photo ID (such as a passport) that the name of the key
owner matches the name in the user ID on the key, and finally that you
verified (by exchange of email) that the email address on the key
belongs to the key owner.
Note that the examples given above for levels 2 and 3 are just that:
examples. In the end, it is up to you to decide just what "casual"
and "extensive" mean to you.
This option defaults to 0 (no particular claim).
@item --min-cert-level
@opindex min-cert-level
When building the trust database, treat any signatures with a
certification level below this as invalid. Defaults to 2, which
disregards level 1 signatures. Note that level 0 "no particular
claim" signatures are always accepted.
@item --trusted-key @code{long key ID}
@opindex trusted-key
Assume that the specified key (which must be given
as a full 8 byte key ID) is as trustworthy as one of
your own secret keys. This option is useful if you
don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them)
online but still want to be able to check the validity of a given
recipient's or signator's key.
@item --trust-model @code{pgp|classic|tofu|tofu+pgp|direct|always|auto}
@opindex trust-model
Set what trust model GnuPG should follow. The models are:
@table @asis
@item pgp
@opindex trust-mode:pgp
This is the Web of Trust combined with trust signatures as used in PGP
5.x and later. This is the default trust model when creating a new
trust database.
@item classic
@opindex trust-mode:classic
This is the standard Web of Trust as introduced by PGP 2.
@item tofu
@opindex trust-mode:tofu
@anchor{trust-model-tofu}
TOFU stands for Trust On First Use. In this trust model, the first
time a key is seen, it is memorized. If later another key is seen
with a user id with the same email address, a warning is displayed
indicating that there is a conflict and that the key might be a
forgery and an attempt at a man-in-the-middle attack.
Because a potential attacker is able to control the email address
and thereby circumvent the conflict detection algorithm by using an
email address that is similar in appearance to a trusted email
address, whenever a message is verified, statistics about the number
of messages signed with the key are shown. In this way, a user can
easily identify attacks using fake keys for regular correspondents.
When compared with the Web of Trust, TOFU offers significantly
weaker security guarantees. In particular, TOFU only helps ensure
consistency (that is, that the binding between a key and email
address doesn't change). A major advantage of TOFU is that it
requires little maintenance to use correctly. To use the web of
trust properly, you need to actively sign keys and mark users as
trusted introducers. This is a time-consuming process and anecdotal
evidence suggests that even security-conscious users rarely take the
time to do this thoroughly and instead rely on an ad-hoc TOFU
process.
In the TOFU model, policies are associated with bindings between
keys and email addresses (which are extracted from user ids and
normalized). There are five policies, which can be set manually
using the @option{--tofu-policy} option. The default policy can be
set using the @option{--tofu-default-policy} policy.
The TOFU policies are: @code{auto}, @code{good}, @code{unknown},
@code{bad} and @code{ask}. The @code{auto} policy is used by
default (unless overridden by @option{--tofu-default-policy}) and
marks a binding as marginally trusted. The @code{good},
@code{unknown} and @code{bad} policies mark a binding as fully
trusted, as having unknown trust or as having trust never,
respectively. The @code{unknown} policy is useful for just using
TOFU to detect conflicts, but to never assign positive trust to a
binding. The final policy, @code{ask} prompts the user to indicate
the binding's trust. If batch mode is enabled (or input is
inappropriate in the context), then the user is not prompted and the
@code{undefined} trust level is returned.
@item tofu+pgp
@opindex trust-mode:tofu+pgp
This trust model combines TOFU with the Web of Trust. This is done
by computing the trust level for each model and then taking the
maximum trust level where the trust levels are ordered as follows:
@code{unknown < undefined < marginal < fully < ultimate < expired <
never}.
By setting @option{--tofu-default-policy=unknown}, this model can be
used to implement the web of trust with TOFU's conflict detection
algorithm, but without its assignment of positive trust values,
which some security-conscious users don't like.
@item direct
@opindex trust-mode:direct
Key validity is set directly by the user and not calculated via the
Web of Trust.
@item always
@opindex trust-mode:always
Skip key validation and assume that used keys are always fully
valid. You generally won't use this unless you are using some
external validation scheme. This option also suppresses the
"[uncertain]" tag printed with signature checks when there is no
evidence that the user ID is bound to the key. Note that this
trust model still does not allow the use of expired, revoked, or
disabled keys.
@item auto
@opindex trust-mode:auto
Select the trust model depending on whatever the internal trust
database says. This is the default model if such a database already
exists.
@end table
@item --auto-key-locate @code{parameters}
@itemx --no-auto-key-locate
@opindex auto-key-locate
GnuPG can automatically locate and retrieve keys as needed using this
option. This happens when encrypting to an email address (in the
"user@@example.com" form), and there are no user@@example.com keys on
the local keyring. This option takes any number of the following
mechanisms, in the order they are to be tried:
@table @asis
@item cert
Locate a key using DNS CERT, as specified in rfc4398.
@item pka
Locate a key using DNS PKA.
@item dane
Locate a key using DANE, as specified
in draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-05.txt.
@item wkd
Locate a key using the Web Key Directory protocol.
This is an experimental method and semantics may change.
@item ldap
Using DNS Service Discovery, check the domain in question for any LDAP
keyservers to use. If this fails, attempt to locate the key using the
PGP Universal method of checking @samp{ldap://keys.(thedomain)}.
@item keyserver
Locate a key using whatever keyserver is defined using the
@option{--keyserver} option.
@item keyserver-URL
In addition, a keyserver URL as used in the @option{--keyserver} option
may be used here to query that particular keyserver.
@item local
Locate the key using the local keyrings. This mechanism allows the user to
select the order a local key lookup is done. Thus using
@samp{--auto-key-locate local} is identical to
@option{--no-auto-key-locate}.
@item nodefault
This flag disables the standard local key lookup, done before any of the
mechanisms defined by the @option{--auto-key-locate} are tried. The
position of this mechanism in the list does not matter. It is not
required if @code{local} is also used.
@item clear
Clear all defined mechanisms. This is useful to override
mechanisms given in a config file.
@end table
@item --auto-key-retrieve
@itemx --no-auto-key-retrieve
@opindex auto-key-retrieve
@opindex no-auto-key-retrieve
This option enables the automatic retrieving of keys from a keyserver
when verifying signatures made by keys that are not on the local
keyring.
If the method "wkd" is included in the list of methods given to
@option{auto-key-locate}, the Signer's User ID is part of the
signature, and the option @option{--disable-signer-uid} is not used,
the "wkd" method may also be used to retrieve a key.
Note that this option makes a "web bug" like behavior possible.
Keyserver or Web Key Directory operators can see which keys you
request, so by sending you a message signed by a brand new key (which
you naturally will not have on your local keyring), the operator can
tell both your IP address and the time when you verified the
signature.
@item --keyid-format @code{none|short|0xshort|long|0xlong}
@opindex keyid-format
Select how to display key IDs. "none" does not show the key ID at all
but shows the fingerprint in a separate line. "short" is the
traditional 8-character key ID. "long" is the more accurate (but less
convenient) 16-character key ID. Add an "0x" to either to include an
"0x" at the beginning of the key ID, as in 0x99242560. Note that this
option is ignored if the option @option{--with-colons} is used.
@item --keyserver @code{name}
@opindex keyserver
This option is deprecated - please use the @option{--keyserver} in
@file{dirmngr.conf} instead.
Use @code{name} as your keyserver. This is the server that
@option{--recv-keys}, @option{--send-keys}, and @option{--search-keys}
will communicate with to receive keys from, send keys to, and search for
keys on. The format of the @code{name} is a URI:
`scheme:[//]keyservername[:port]' The scheme is the type of keyserver:
"hkp" for the HTTP (or compatible) keyservers, "ldap" for the LDAP
keyservers, or "mailto" for the Graff email keyserver. Note that your
particular installation of GnuPG may have other keyserver types
available as well. Keyserver schemes are case-insensitive. After the
keyserver name, optional keyserver configuration options may be
provided. These are the same as the global @option{--keyserver-options}
from below, but apply only to this particular keyserver.
Most keyservers synchronize with each other, so there is generally no
need to send keys to more than one server. The keyserver
@code{hkp://keys.gnupg.net} uses round robin DNS to give a different
keyserver each time you use it.
@item --keyserver-options @code{name=value}
@opindex keyserver-options
This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for the
keyserver. Options can be prefixed with a `no-' to give the opposite
meaning. Valid import-options or export-options may be used here as
well to apply to importing (@option{--recv-key}) or exporting
(@option{--send-key}) a key from a keyserver. While not all options
are available for all keyserver types, some common options are:
@table @asis
@item include-revoked
When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
are marked on the keyserver as revoked. Note that not all keyservers
differentiate between revoked and unrevoked keys, and for such
keyservers this option is meaningless. Note also that most keyservers do
not have cryptographic verification of key revocations, and so turning
this option off may result in skipping keys that are incorrectly marked
as revoked.
@item include-disabled
When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
are marked on the keyserver as disabled. Note that this option is not
used with HKP keyservers.
@item auto-key-retrieve
This is the same as the option @option{auto-key-retrieve}.
@item honor-keyserver-url
When using @option{--refresh-keys}, if the key in question has a preferred
keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to refresh the key
from. In addition, if auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature
being verified has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred
keyserver to fetch the key from. Note that this option introduces a
"web bug": The creator of the key can see when the keys is
refreshed. Thus this option is not enabled by default.
@item honor-pka-record
If @option{--auto-key-retrieve} is used, and the signature being
verified has a PKA record, then use the PKA information to fetch
the key. Defaults to "yes".
@item include-subkeys
When receiving a key, include subkeys as potential targets. Note that
this option is not used with HKP keyservers, as they do not support
retrieving keys by subkey id.
@item timeout
Tell the keyserver helper program how long (in seconds) to try and
perform a keyserver action before giving up. Note that performing
multiple actions at the same time uses this timeout value per action.
For example, when retrieving multiple keys via @option{--recv-keys}, the
timeout applies separately to each key retrieval, and not to the
@option{--recv-keys} command as a whole. Defaults to 30 seconds.
@item http-proxy=@code{value}
This options is deprecated.
Set the proxy to use for HTTP and HKP keyservers.
This overrides any proxy defined in @file{dirmngr.conf}.
@item verbose
This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.
@item debug
This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.
@item check-cert
This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.
@item ca-cert-file
This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.
@end table
@item --completes-needed @code{n}
@opindex compliant-needed
Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
key signer (defaults to 1).
@item --marginals-needed @code{n}
@opindex marginals-needed
Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
key signer (defaults to 3)
@item --tofu-default-policy @code{auto|good|unknown|bad|ask}
@opindex tofu-default-policy
The default TOFU policy (defaults to @code{auto}). For more
information about the meaning of this option, @xref{trust-model-tofu}.
@item --max-cert-depth @code{n}
@opindex max-cert-depth
Maximum depth of a certification chain (default is 5).
@item --no-sig-cache
@opindex no-sig-cache
Do not cache the verification status of key signatures.
Caching gives a much better performance in key listings. However, if
you suspect that your public keyring is not save against write
modifications, you can use this option to disable the caching. It
probably does not make sense to disable it because all kind of damage
can be done if someone else has write access to your public keyring.
@item --auto-check-trustdb
@itemx --no-auto-check-trustdb
@opindex auto-check-trustdb
If GnuPG feels that its information about the Web of Trust has to be
updated, it automatically runs the @option{--check-trustdb} command
internally. This may be a time consuming
process. @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} disables this option.
@item --use-agent
@itemx --no-use-agent
@opindex use-agent
This is dummy option. @command{@gpgname} always requires the agent.
@item --gpg-agent-info
@opindex gpg-agent-info
This is dummy option. It has no effect when used with @command{@gpgname}.
@item --agent-program @var{file}
@opindex agent-program
Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The
default value is determined by running @command{gpgconf} with the
option @option{--list-dirs}. Note that the pipe symbol (@code{|}) is
used for a regression test suite hack and may thus not be used in the
file name.
@item --dirmngr-program @var{file}
@opindex dirmngr-program
Specify a dirmngr program to be used for keyserver access. The
default value is @file{@value{BINDIR}/dirmngr}.
@item --no-autostart
@opindex no-autostart
Do not start the gpg-agent or the dirmngr if it has not yet been
started and its service is required. This option is mostly useful on
machines where the connection to gpg-agent has been redirected to
another machines. If dirmngr is required on the remote machine, it
may be started manually using @command{gpgconf --launch dirmngr}.
@item --lock-once
@opindex lock-once
Lock the databases the first time a lock is requested
and do not release the lock until the process
terminates.
@item --lock-multiple
@opindex lock-multiple
Release the locks every time a lock is no longer
needed. Use this to override a previous @option{--lock-once}
from a config file.
@item --lock-never
@opindex lock-never
Disable locking entirely. This option should be used only in very
special environments, where it can be assured that only one process
is accessing those files. A bootable floppy with a stand-alone
encryption system will probably use this. Improper usage of this
option may lead to data and key corruption.
@item --exit-on-status-write-error
@opindex exit-on-status-write-error
This option will cause write errors on the status FD to immediately
terminate the process. That should in fact be the default but it never
worked this way and thus we need an option to enable this, so that the
change won't break applications which close their end of a status fd
connected pipe too early. Using this option along with
@option{--enable-progress-filter} may be used to cleanly cancel long
running gpg operations.
@item --limit-card-insert-tries @code{n}
@opindex limit-card-insert-tries
With @code{n} greater than 0 the number of prompts asking to insert a
smartcard gets limited to N-1. Thus with a value of 1 gpg won't at
all ask to insert a card if none has been inserted at startup. This
option is useful in the configuration file in case an application does
not know about the smartcard support and waits ad infinitum for an
inserted card.
@item --no-random-seed-file
@opindex no-random-seed-file
GnuPG uses a file to store its internal random pool over invocations.
This makes random generation faster; however sometimes write operations
are not desired. This option can be used to achieve that with the cost of
slower random generation.
@item --no-greeting
@opindex no-greeting
Suppress the initial copyright message.
@item --no-secmem-warning
@opindex no-secmem-warning
Suppress the warning about "using insecure memory".
@item --no-permission-warning
@opindex permission-warning
Suppress the warning about unsafe file and home directory (@option{--homedir})
permissions. Note that the permission checks that GnuPG performs are
not intended to be authoritative, but rather they simply warn about
certain common permission problems. Do not assume that the lack of a
warning means that your system is secure.
Note that the warning for unsafe @option{--homedir} permissions cannot be
suppressed in the gpg.conf file, as this would allow an attacker to
place an unsafe gpg.conf file in place, and use this file to suppress
warnings about itself. The @option{--homedir} permissions warning may only be
suppressed on the command line.
@item --no-mdc-warning
@opindex no-mdc-warning
Suppress the warning about missing MDC integrity protection.
@item --require-secmem
@itemx --no-require-secmem
@opindex require-secmem
Refuse to run if GnuPG cannot get secure memory. Defaults to no
(i.e. run, but give a warning).
@item --require-cross-certification
@itemx --no-require-cross-certification
@opindex require-cross-certification
When verifying a signature made from a subkey, ensure that the cross
certification "back signature" on the subkey is present and valid. This
protects against a subtle attack against subkeys that can sign.
Defaults to @option{--require-cross-certification} for
@command{@gpgname}.
@item --expert
@itemx --no-expert
@opindex expert
Allow the user to do certain nonsensical or "silly" things like
signing an expired or revoked key, or certain potentially incompatible
things like generating unusual key types. This also disables certain
warning messages about potentially incompatible actions. As the name
implies, this option is for experts only. If you don't fully
understand the implications of what it allows you to do, leave this
off. @option{--no-expert} disables this option.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c ******** KEY RELATED OPTIONS ************
@c *******************************************
@node GPG Key related Options
@subsection Key related options
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --recipient @var{name}
@itemx -r
@opindex recipient
Encrypt for user id @var{name}. If this option or
@option{--hidden-recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user-id
unless @option{--default-recipient} is given.
@item --hidden-recipient @var{name}
@itemx -R
@opindex hidden-recipient
Encrypt for user ID @var{name}, but hide the key ID of this user's
key. This option helps to hide the receiver of the message and is a
limited countermeasure against traffic analysis. If this option or
@option{--recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user ID unless
@option{--default-recipient} is given.
@item --recipient-file @var{file}
@itemx -f
@opindex recipient-file
This option is similar to @option{--recipient} except that it
encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the
name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{gpg} assumes that
the key in this file is fully valid.
@item --hidden-recipient-file @var{file}
@itemx -F
@opindex hidden-recipient-file
This option is similar to @option{--hidden-recipient} except that it
encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the
name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{gpg} assumes that
the key in this file is fully valid.
@item --encrypt-to @code{name}
@opindex encrypt-to
Same as @option{--recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
options file and may be used with your own user-id as an
"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked
user id. No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even
disabled keys can be used.
@item --hidden-encrypt-to @code{name}
@opindex hidden-encrypt-to
Same as @option{--hidden-recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
options file and may be used with your own user-id as a hidden
"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked user id.
No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even disabled
keys can be used.
@item --no-encrypt-to
@opindex no-encrypt-to
Disable the use of all @option{--encrypt-to} and
@option{--hidden-encrypt-to} keys.
@item --group @code{name=value1 }
@opindex group
Sets up a named group, which is similar to aliases in email programs.
Any time the group name is a recipient (@option{-r} or
@option{--recipient}), it will be expanded to the values
specified. Multiple groups with the same name are automatically merged
into a single group.
The values are @code{key IDs} or fingerprints, but any key description
is accepted. Note that a value with spaces in it will be treated as
two different values. Note also there is only one level of expansion
--- you cannot make an group that points to another group. When used
from the command line, it may be necessary to quote the argument to
this option to prevent the shell from treating it as multiple
arguments.
@item --ungroup @code{name}
@opindex ungroup
Remove a given entry from the @option{--group} list.
@item --no-groups
@opindex no-groups
Remove all entries from the @option{--group} list.
@item --local-user @var{name}
@itemx -u
@opindex local-user
Use @var{name} as the key to sign with. Note that this option overrides
@option{--default-key}.
@item --sender @var{mbox}
@opindex sender
This option has two purposes. @var{mbox} must either be a complete
user id with a proper mail address or just a mail address. When
creating a signature this option tells gpg the user id of a key used
to make a signature if the key was not directly specified by a user
id. When verifying a signature the @var{mbox} is used to restrict the
information printed by the TOFU code to matching user ids.
@item --try-secret-key @var{name}
@opindex try-secret-key
For hidden recipients GPG needs to know the keys to use for trial
decryption. The key set with @option{--default-key} is always tried
first, but this is often not sufficient. This option allows setting more
keys to be used for trial decryption. Although any valid user-id
specification may be used for @var{name} it makes sense to use at least
the long keyid to avoid ambiguities. Note that gpg-agent might pop up a
pinentry for a lot keys to do the trial decryption. If you want to stop
all further trial decryption you may use close-window button instead of
the cancel button.
@item --try-all-secrets
@opindex try-all-secrets
Don't look at the key ID as stored in the message but try all secret
keys in turn to find the right decryption key. This option forces the
behaviour as used by anonymous recipients (created by using
@option{--throw-keyids} or @option{--hidden-recipient}) and might come
handy in case where an encrypted message contains a bogus key ID.
@item --skip-hidden-recipients
@itemx --no-skip-hidden-recipients
@opindex skip-hidden-recipients
@opindex no-skip-hidden-recipients
During decryption skip all anonymous recipients. This option helps in
the case that people use the hidden recipients feature to hide there
own encrypt-to key from others. If oneself has many secret keys this
may lead to a major annoyance because all keys are tried in turn to
decrypt something which was not really intended for it. The drawback
of this option is that it is currently not possible to decrypt a
message which includes real anonymous recipients.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c ******** INPUT AND OUTPUT ***************
@c *******************************************
@node GPG Input and Output
@subsection Input and Output
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --armor
@itemx -a
@opindex armor
Create ASCII armored output. The default is to create the binary
OpenPGP format.
@item --no-armor
@opindex no-armor
Assume the input data is not in ASCII armored format.
@item --output @var{file}
@itemx -o @var{file}
@opindex output
Write output to @var{file}. To write to stdout use @code{-} as the
filename.
@item --max-output @code{n}
@opindex max-output
This option sets a limit on the number of bytes that will be generated
when processing a file. Since OpenPGP supports various levels of
compression, it is possible that the plaintext of a given message may be
significantly larger than the original OpenPGP message. While GnuPG
works properly with such messages, there is often a desire to set a
maximum file size that will be generated before processing is forced to
stop by the OS limits. Defaults to 0, which means "no limit".
@item --input-size-hint @var{n}
@opindex input-size-hint
This option can be used to tell GPG the size of the input data in
bytes. @var{n} must be a positive base-10 number. This option is
only useful if the input is not taken from a file. GPG may use thos
hint to optimize its buffer allocation strategy. It is also used by
the @option{--status-fd} line ``PROGRESS'' to provide a value for
``total'' if that is not available by other means.
@item --import-options @code{parameters}
@opindex import-options
This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
importing keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
opposite meaning. The options are:
@table @asis
@item import-local-sigs
Allow importing key signatures marked as "local". This is not
generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
Defaults to no.
@item keep-ownertrust
Normally possible still existing ownertrust values of a key are
cleared if a key is imported. This is in general desirable so that
a formerly deleted key does not automatically gain an ownertrust
values merely due to import. On the other hand it is sometimes
necessary to re-import a trusted set of keys again but keeping
already assigned ownertrust values. This can be achieved by using
this option.
@item repair-pks-subkey-bug
During import, attempt to repair the damage caused by the PKS keyserver
bug (pre version 0.9.6) that mangles keys with multiple subkeys. Note
that this cannot completely repair the damaged key as some crucial data
is removed by the keyserver, but it does at least give you back one
subkey. Defaults to no for regular @option{--import} and to yes for
keyserver @option{--recv-keys}.
@item import-show
Show a listing of the key as imported right before it is stored.
This can be combined with the option @option{--dry-run} to only look
at keys.
@item import-export
Run the entire import code but instead of storing the key to the
local keyring write it to the output. The export options
@option{export-pka} and @option{export-dane} affect the output. This
option can be used to remove all invalid parts from a key without the
need to store it.
@item merge-only
During import, allow key updates to existing keys, but do not allow
any new keys to be imported. Defaults to no.
@item import-clean
After import, compact (remove all signatures except the
self-signature) any user IDs from the new key that are not usable.
Then, remove any signatures from the new key that are not usable.
This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are not present
on the keyring. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key}
command "clean" after import. Defaults to no.
@item import-minimal
Import the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except
the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the
same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" after import.
Defaults to no.
@end table
@item --import-filter @code{@var{name}=@var{expr}}
@itemx --export-filter @code{@var{name}=@var{expr}}
@opindex import-filter
@opindex export-filter
These options define an import/export filter which are applied to the
imported/exported keyblock right before it will be stored/written.
@var{name} defines the type of filter to use, @var{expr} the
expression to evaluate. The option can be used several times which
then appends more expression to the same @var{name}.
@noindent
The available filter types are:
@table @asis
@item keep-uid
This filter will keep a user id packet and its dependent packets in
the keyblock if the expression evaluates to true.
@item drop-subkey
This filter drops the selected subkeys.
Currently only implemented for --export-filter.
@item drop-sig
This filter drops the selected key signatures on user ids.
- Self-signatures are not consideres.
+ Self-signatures are not considered.
Currently only implemented for --import-filter.
@end table
For the syntax of the expression see the chapter "FILTER EXPRESSIONS".
The property names for the expressions depend on the actual filter
type and are indicated in the following table.
The available properties are:
@table @asis
@item uid
A string with the user id. (keep-uid)
@item mbox
The addr-spec part of a user id with mailbox or the empty string.
(keep-uid)
@item key_algo
A number with the public key algorithm of a key or subkey packet.
(drop-subkey)
@item key_created
@itemx key_created_d
The first is the timestamp a public key or subkey packet was
created. The second is the same but given as an ISO string,
e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-subkey)
@item primary
Boolean indicating whether the user id is the primary one. (keep-uid)
@item secret
Boolean indicating whether a key or subkey is a secret one.
drop-subkey)
@item sig_created
@itemx sig_created_d
The first is the timestamp a signature packet was created. The
second is the same but given as an ISO string,
e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-sig)
@item sig_algo
A number with the public key algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig)
@item sig_digest_algo
A number with the digest algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig)
@end table
@item --export-options @code{parameters}
@opindex export-options
This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
exporting keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
opposite meaning. The options are:
@table @asis
@item export-local-sigs
Allow exporting key signatures marked as "local". This is not
generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
Defaults to no.
@item export-attributes
Include attribute user IDs (photo IDs) while exporting. This is
useful to export keys if they are going to be used by an OpenPGP
program that does not accept attribute user IDs. Defaults to yes.
@item export-sensitive-revkeys
Include designated revoker information that was marked as
"sensitive". Defaults to no.
@c Since GnuPG 2.1 gpg-agent manages the secret key and thus the
@c export-reset-subkey-passwd hack is not anymore justified. Such use
@c cases may be implemented using a specialized secret key export
@c tool.
@c @item export-reset-subkey-passwd
@c When using the @option{--export-secret-subkeys} command, this option resets
@c the passphrases for all exported subkeys to empty. This is useful
@c when the exported subkey is to be used on an unattended machine where
@c a passphrase doesn't necessarily make sense. Defaults to no.
@item export-clean
Compact (remove all signatures from) user IDs on the key being
exported if the user IDs are not usable. Also, do not export any
signatures that are not usable. This includes signatures that were
issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. This option is
the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "clean" before export
except that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to
no.
@item export-minimal
Export the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except the
most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the same as
running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" before export except
that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to no.
@item export-pka
Instead of outputting the key material output PKA records suitable
to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before each
record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone file.
@item export-dane
Instead of outputting the key material output OpenPGP DANE records
suitable to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before
each record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone
file.
@end table
@item --with-colons
@opindex with-colons
Print key listings delimited by colons. Note that the output will be
encoded in UTF-8 regardless of any @option{--display-charset} setting. This
format is useful when GnuPG is called from scripts and other programs
as it is easily machine parsed. The details of this format are
documented in the file @file{doc/DETAILS}, which is included in the GnuPG
source distribution.
@item --fixed-list-mode
@opindex fixed-list-mode
Do not merge primary user ID and primary key in @option{--with-colon}
listing mode and print all timestamps as seconds since 1970-01-01.
Since GnuPG 2.0.10, this mode is always used and thus this option is
obsolete; it does not harm to use it though.
@item --legacy-list-mode
@opindex legacy-list-mode
Revert to the pre-2.1 public key list mode. This only affects the
human readable output and not the machine interface
(i.e. @code{--with-colons}). Note that the legacy format does not
convey suitable information for elliptic curves.
@item --with-fingerprint
@opindex with-fingerprint
Same as the command @option{--fingerprint} but changes only the format
of the output and may be used together with another command.
@item --with-subkey-fingerprint
@opindex with-subkey-fingerprint
If a fingerprint is printed for the primary key, this option forces
printing of the fingerprint for all subkeys. This could also be
achieved by using the @option{--with-fingerprint} twice but by using
this option along with keyid-format "none" a compact fingerprint is
printed.
@item --with-icao-spelling
@opindex with-icao-spelling
Print the ICAO spelling of the fingerprint in addition to the hex digits.
@item --with-keygrip
@opindex with-keygrip
Include the keygrip in the key listings. In @code{--with-colons} mode
this is implicitly enable for secret keys.
@item --with-wkd-hash
@opindex with-wkd-hash
-Print a Web Key Directory indentifier along with each user ID in key
+Print a Web Key Directory identifier along with each user ID in key
listings. This is an experimental feature and semantics may change.
@item --with-secret
@opindex with-secret
Include info about the presence of a secret key in public key listings
done with @code{--with-colons}.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c ******** OPENPGP OPTIONS ****************
@c *******************************************
@node OpenPGP Options
@subsection OpenPGP protocol specific options.
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item -t, --textmode
@itemx --no-textmode
@opindex textmode
Treat input files as text and store them in the OpenPGP canonical text
form with standard "CRLF" line endings. This also sets the necessary
flags to inform the recipient that the encrypted or signed data is text
and may need its line endings converted back to whatever the local
system uses. This option is useful when communicating between two
platforms that have different line ending conventions (UNIX-like to Mac,
Mac to Windows, etc). @option{--no-textmode} disables this option, and
is the default.
@item --force-v3-sigs
@itemx --no-force-v3-sigs
@item --force-v4-certs
@itemx --no-force-v4-certs
These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.1.
@item --force-mdc
@opindex force-mdc
Force the use of encryption with a modification detection code. This
is always used with the newer ciphers (those with a blocksize greater
than 64 bits), or if all of the recipient keys indicate MDC support in
their feature flags.
@item --disable-mdc
@opindex disable-mdc
Disable the use of the modification detection code. Note that by
using this option, the encrypted message becomes vulnerable to a
message modification attack.
@item --disable-signer-uid
@opindex disable-signer-uid
By default the user ID of the signing key is embedded in the data
signature. As of now this is only done if the signing key has been
specified with @option{local-user} using a mail address. This
information can be helpful for verifier to locate the key; see
option @option{--auto-key-retrieve}.
@item --personal-cipher-preferences @code{string}
@opindex personal-cipher-preferences
Set the list of personal cipher preferences to @code{string}. Use
@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also
used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command.
@item --personal-digest-preferences @code{string}
@opindex personal-digest-preferences
Set the list of personal digest preferences to @code{string}. Use
@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
all recipients. The most highly ranked digest algorithm in this list
is also used when signing without encryption
(e.g. @option{--clearsign} or @option{--sign}).
@item --personal-compress-preferences @code{string}
@opindex personal-compress-preferences
Set the list of personal compression preferences to @code{string}.
Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available
algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This
allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the
recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that
is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked compression
algorithm in this list is also used when there are no recipient keys
to consider (e.g. @option{--symmetric}).
@item --s2k-cipher-algo @code{name}
@opindex s2k-cipher-algo
Use @code{name} as the cipher algorithm for symmetric encryption with
a passphrase if @option{--personal-cipher-preferences} and
@option{--cipher-algo} are not given. The default is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}.
@item --s2k-digest-algo @code{name}
@opindex s2k-digest-algo
Use @code{name} as the digest algorithm used to mangle the passphrases
for symmetric encryption. The default is SHA-1.
@item --s2k-mode @code{n}
@opindex s2k-mode
Selects how passphrases for symmetric encryption are mangled. If
@code{n} is 0 a plain passphrase (which is in general not recommended)
will be used, a 1 adds a salt (which should not be used) to the
passphrase and a 3 (the default) iterates the whole process a number
of times (see @option{--s2k-count}).
@item --s2k-count @code{n}
@opindex s2k-count
Specify how many times the passphrases mangling for symmetric
encryption is repeated. This value may range between 1024 and
65011712 inclusive. The default is inquired from gpg-agent. Note
that not all values in the 1024-65011712 range are legal and if an
illegal value is selected, GnuPG will round up to the nearest legal
value. This option is only meaningful if @option{--s2k-mode} is set
to the default of 3.
@end table
@c ***************************
@c ******* Compliance ********
@c ***************************
@node Compliance Options
@subsection Compliance options
These options control what GnuPG is compliant to. Only one of these
options may be active at a time. Note that the default setting of
this is nearly always the correct one. See the INTEROPERABILITY WITH
OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below before using one of these
options.
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --gnupg
@opindex gnupg
Use standard GnuPG behavior. This is essentially OpenPGP behavior
(see @option{--openpgp}), but with some additional workarounds for common
compatibility problems in different versions of PGP. This is the
default option, so it is not generally needed, but it may be useful to
override a different compliance option in the gpg.conf file.
@item --openpgp
@opindex openpgp
Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict OpenPGP
behavior. Use this option to reset all previous options like
@option{--s2k-*}, @option{--cipher-algo}, @option{--digest-algo} and
@option{--compress-algo} to OpenPGP compliant values. All PGP
workarounds are disabled.
@item --rfc4880
@opindex rfc4880
Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-4880
behavior. Note that this is currently the same thing as
@option{--openpgp}.
@item --rfc4880bis
@opindex rfc4880bis
Enable experimental features from proposed updates to RFC-4880. This
option can be used in addition to the other compliance options.
Warning: The behavior may change with any GnuPG release and created
keys or data may not be usable with future GnuPG versions.
@item --rfc2440
@opindex rfc2440
Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-2440
behavior.
@item --pgp6
@opindex pgp6
Set up all options to be as PGP 6 compliant as possible. This
restricts you to the ciphers IDEA (if the IDEA plugin is installed),
3DES, and CAST5, the hashes MD5, SHA1 and RIPEMD160, and the
compression algorithms none and ZIP. This also disables
--throw-keyids, and making signatures with signing subkeys as PGP 6
does not understand signatures made by signing subkeys.
This option implies @option{--disable-mdc --escape-from-lines}.
@item --pgp7
@opindex pgp7
Set up all options to be as PGP 7 compliant as possible. This is
identical to @option{--pgp6} except that MDCs are not disabled, and the
list of allowable ciphers is expanded to add AES128, AES192, AES256, and
TWOFISH.
@item --pgp8
@opindex pgp8
Set up all options to be as PGP 8 compliant as possible. PGP 8 is a lot
closer to the OpenPGP standard than previous versions of PGP, so all
this does is disable @option{--throw-keyids} and set
@option{--escape-from-lines}. All algorithms are allowed except for the
SHA224, SHA384, and SHA512 digests.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c ******** ESOTERIC OPTIONS ***************
@c *******************************************
@node GPG Esoteric Options
@subsection Doing things one usually doesn't want to do.
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item -n
@itemx --dry-run
@opindex dry-run
Don't make any changes (this is not completely implemented).
@item --list-only
@opindex list-only
Changes the behaviour of some commands. This is like @option{--dry-run} but
different in some cases. The semantic of this command may be extended in
the future. Currently it only skips the actual decryption pass and
therefore enables a fast listing of the encryption keys.
@item -i
@itemx --interactive
@opindex interactive
Prompt before overwriting any files.
@item --debug-level @var{level}
@opindex debug-level
Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be
a numeric value or by a keyword:
@table @code
@item none
No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of
the keyword.
@item basic
Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used
instead of the keyword.
@item advanced
More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used
instead of the keyword.
@item expert
Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used
instead of the keyword.
@item guru
All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be
used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is
only enabled if the keyword is used.
@end table
How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not
specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are
however carefully selected to best aid in debugging.
@item --debug @var{flags}
@opindex debug
Set debugging flags. All flags are or-ed and @var{flags} may be given
in C syntax (e.g. 0x0042) or as a comma separated list of flag names.
To get a list of all supported flags the single word "help" can be
used.
@item --debug-all
@opindex debug-all
Set all useful debugging flags.
@item --debug-iolbf
@opindex debug-iolbf
Set stdout into line buffered mode. This option is only honored when
given on the command line.
@item --faked-system-time @var{epoch}
@opindex faked-system-time
This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back or
forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since the year
1970. Alternatively @var{epoch} may be given as a full ISO time string
(e.g. "20070924T154812").
@item --enable-progress-filter
@opindex enable-progress-filter
Enable certain PROGRESS status outputs. This option allows frontends
to display a progress indicator while gpg is processing larger files.
There is a slight performance overhead using it.
@item --status-fd @code{n}
@opindex status-fd
Write special status strings to the file descriptor @code{n}.
See the file DETAILS in the documentation for a listing of them.
@item --status-file @code{file}
@opindex status-file
Same as @option{--status-fd}, except the status data is written to file
@code{file}.
@item --logger-fd @code{n}
@opindex logger-fd
Write log output to file descriptor @code{n} and not to STDERR.
@item --log-file @code{file}
@itemx --logger-file @code{file}
@opindex log-file
Same as @option{--logger-fd}, except the logger data is written to
file @code{file}. Use @file{socket://} to log to socket.
@item --attribute-fd @code{n}
@opindex attribute-fd
Write attribute subpackets to the file descriptor @code{n}. This is most
useful for use with @option{--status-fd}, since the status messages are
needed to separate out the various subpackets from the stream delivered
to the file descriptor.
@item --attribute-file @code{file}
@opindex attribute-file
Same as @option{--attribute-fd}, except the attribute data is written to
file @code{file}.
@item --comment @code{string}
@itemx --no-comments
@opindex comment
Use @code{string} as a comment string in clear text signatures and ASCII
armored messages or keys (see @option{--armor}). The default behavior is
not to use a comment string. @option{--comment} may be repeated multiple
times to get multiple comment strings. @option{--no-comments} removes
all comments. It is a good idea to keep the length of a single comment
below 60 characters to avoid problems with mail programs wrapping such
lines. Note that comment lines, like all other header lines, are not
protected by the signature.
@item --emit-version
@itemx --no-emit-version
@opindex emit-version
Force inclusion of the version string in ASCII armored output. If
given once only the name of the program and the major number is
emitted, given twice the minor is also emitted, given triple
the micro is added, and given quad an operating system identification
is also emitted. @option{--no-emit-version} (default) disables the version
line.
@item --sig-notation @code{name=value}
@itemx --cert-notation @code{name=value}
@itemx -N, --set-notation @code{name=value}
@opindex sig-notation
@opindex cert-notation
@opindex set-notation
Put the name value pair into the signature as notation data.
@code{name} must consist only of printable characters or spaces, and
must contain a '@@' character in the form keyname@@domain.example.com
(substituting the appropriate keyname and domain name, of course). This
is to help prevent pollution of the IETF reserved notation
namespace. The @option{--expert} flag overrides the '@@'
check. @code{value} may be any printable string; it will be encoded in
UTF8, so you should check that your @option{--display-charset} is set
correctly. If you prefix @code{name} with an exclamation mark (!), the
notation data will be flagged as critical
(rfc4880:5.2.3.16). @option{--sig-notation} sets a notation for data
signatures. @option{--cert-notation} sets a notation for key signatures
(certifications). @option{--set-notation} sets both.
There are special codes that may be used in notation names. "%k" will
be expanded into the key ID of the key being signed, "%K" into the
long key ID of the key being signed, "%f" into the fingerprint of the
key being signed, "%s" into the key ID of the key making the
signature, "%S" into the long key ID of the key making the signature,
"%g" into the fingerprint of the key making the signature (which might
be a subkey), "%p" into the fingerprint of the primary key of the key
making the signature, "%c" into the signature count from the OpenPGP
smartcard, and "%%" results in a single "%". %k, %K, and %f are only
meaningful when making a key signature (certification), and %c is only
meaningful when using the OpenPGP smartcard.
@item --sig-policy-url @code{string}
@itemx --cert-policy-url @code{string}
@itemx --set-policy-url @code{string}
@opindex sig-policy-url
@opindex cert-policy-url
@opindex set-policy-url
Use @code{string} as a Policy URL for signatures (rfc4880:5.2.3.20). If
you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the policy URL packet will
be flagged as critical. @option{--sig-policy-url} sets a policy url for
data signatures. @option{--cert-policy-url} sets a policy url for key
signatures (certifications). @option{--set-policy-url} sets both.
The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.
@item --sig-keyserver-url @code{string}
@opindex sig-keyserver-url
Use @code{string} as a preferred keyserver URL for data signatures. If
you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the keyserver URL packet
will be flagged as critical.
The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.
@item --set-filename @code{string}
@opindex set-filename
Use @code{string} as the filename which is stored inside messages.
This overrides the default, which is to use the actual filename of the
file being encrypted. Using the empty string for @var{string}
effectively removes the filename from the output.
@item --for-your-eyes-only
@itemx --no-for-your-eyes-only
@opindex for-your-eyes-only
Set the `for your eyes only' flag in the message. This causes GnuPG to
refuse to save the file unless the @option{--output} option is given,
and PGP to use a "secure viewer" with a claimed Tempest-resistant font
to display the message. This option overrides @option{--set-filename}.
@option{--no-for-your-eyes-only} disables this option.
@item --use-embedded-filename
@itemx --no-use-embedded-filename
@opindex use-embedded-filename
Try to create a file with a name as embedded in the data. This can be
a dangerous option as it enables overwriting files. Defaults to no.
@item --cipher-algo @code{name}
@opindex cipher-algo
Use @code{name} as cipher algorithm. Running the program with the
command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. If
this is not used the cipher algorithm is selected from the preferences
stored with the key. In general, you do not want to use this option as
it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard.
@option{--personal-cipher-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the
same thing.
@item --digest-algo @code{name}
@opindex digest-algo
Use @code{name} as the message digest algorithm. Running the program
with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. In
general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to
violate the OpenPGP standard. @option{--personal-digest-preferences} is the
safe way to accomplish the same thing.
@item --compress-algo @code{name}
@opindex compress-algo
Use compression algorithm @code{name}. "zlib" is RFC-1950 ZLIB
compression. "zip" is RFC-1951 ZIP compression which is used by PGP.
"bzip2" is a more modern compression scheme that can compress some
things better than zip or zlib, but at the cost of more memory used
during compression and decompression. "uncompressed" or "none"
disables compression. If this option is not used, the default
behavior is to examine the recipient key preferences to see which
algorithms the recipient supports. If all else fails, ZIP is used for
maximum compatibility.
ZLIB may give better compression results than ZIP, as the compression
window size is not limited to 8k. BZIP2 may give even better
compression results than that, but will use a significantly larger
amount of memory while compressing and decompressing. This may be
significant in low memory situations. Note, however, that PGP (all
versions) only supports ZIP compression. Using any algorithm other
than ZIP or "none" will make the message unreadable with PGP. In
general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to
violate the OpenPGP standard. @option{--personal-compress-preferences} is the
safe way to accomplish the same thing.
@item --cert-digest-algo @code{name}
@opindex cert-digest-algo
Use @code{name} as the message digest algorithm used when signing a
key. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a
list of supported algorithms. Be aware that if you choose an algorithm
that GnuPG supports but other OpenPGP implementations do not, then some
users will not be able to use the key signatures you make, or quite
possibly your entire key.
@item --disable-cipher-algo @code{name}
@opindex disable-cipher-algo
Never allow the use of @code{name} as cipher algorithm.
The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
will still get disabled.
@item --disable-pubkey-algo @code{name}
@opindex disable-pubkey-algo
Never allow the use of @code{name} as public key algorithm.
The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
will still get disabled.
@item --throw-keyids
@itemx --no-throw-keyids
@opindex throw-keyids
Do not put the recipient key IDs into encrypted messages. This helps to
hide the receivers of the message and is a limited countermeasure
against traffic analysis.@footnote{Using a little social engineering
anyone who is able to decrypt the message can check whether one of the
other recipients is the one he suspects.} On the receiving side, it may
slow down the decryption process because all available secret keys must
be tried. @option{--no-throw-keyids} disables this option. This option
is essentially the same as using @option{--hidden-recipient} for all
recipients.
@item --not-dash-escaped
@opindex not-dash-escaped
This option changes the behavior of cleartext signatures
so that they can be used for patch files. You should not
send such an armored file via email because all spaces
and line endings are hashed too. You can not use this
option for data which has 5 dashes at the beginning of a
line, patch files don't have this. A special armor header
line tells GnuPG about this cleartext signature option.
@item --escape-from-lines
@itemx --no-escape-from-lines
@opindex escape-from-lines
Because some mailers change lines starting with "From " to ">From " it
is good to handle such lines in a special way when creating cleartext
signatures to prevent the mail system from breaking the signature. Note
that all other PGP versions do it this way too. Enabled by
default. @option{--no-escape-from-lines} disables this option.
@item --passphrase-repeat @code{n}
@opindex passphrase-repeat
Specify how many times @command{@gpgname} will request a new
passphrase be repeated. This is useful for helping memorize a
passphrase. Defaults to 1 repetition.
@item --passphrase-fd @code{n}
@opindex passphrase-fd
Read the passphrase from file descriptor @code{n}. Only the first line
will be read from file descriptor @code{n}. If you use 0 for @code{n},
the passphrase will be read from STDIN. This can only be used if only
one passphrase is supplied.
Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch}
has also been given. This is different from GnuPG version 1.x.
@item --passphrase-file @code{file}
@opindex passphrase-file
Read the passphrase from file @code{file}. Only the first line will
be read from file @code{file}. This can only be used if only one
passphrase is supplied. Obviously, a passphrase stored in a file is
of questionable security if other users can read this file. Don't use
this option if you can avoid it.
Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch}
has also been given. This is different from GnuPG version 1.x.
@item --passphrase @code{string}
@opindex passphrase
Use @code{string} as the passphrase. This can only be used if only one
passphrase is supplied. Obviously, this is of very questionable
security on a multi-user system. Don't use this option if you can
avoid it.
Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch}
has also been given. This is different from GnuPG version 1.x.
@item --pinentry-mode @code{mode}
@opindex pinentry-mode
Set the pinentry mode to @code{mode}. Allowed values for @code{mode}
are:
@table @asis
@item default
Use the default of the agent, which is @code{ask}.
@item ask
Force the use of the Pinentry.
@item cancel
Emulate use of Pinentry's cancel button.
@item error
Return a Pinentry error (``No Pinentry'').
@item loopback
Redirect Pinentry queries to the caller. Note that in contrast to
Pinentry the user is not prompted again if he enters a bad password.
@end table
@item --command-fd @code{n}
@opindex command-fd
This is a replacement for the deprecated shared-memory IPC mode.
If this option is enabled, user input on questions is not expected
from the TTY but from the given file descriptor. It should be used
together with @option{--status-fd}. See the file doc/DETAILS in the source
distribution for details on how to use it.
@item --command-file @code{file}
@opindex command-file
Same as @option{--command-fd}, except the commands are read out of file
@code{file}
@item --allow-non-selfsigned-uid
@itemx --no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid
@opindex allow-non-selfsigned-uid
Allow the import and use of keys with user IDs which are not
self-signed. This is not recommended, as a non self-signed user ID is
trivial to forge. @option{--no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid} disables.
@item --allow-freeform-uid
@opindex allow-freeform-uid
Disable all checks on the form of the user ID while generating a new
one. This option should only be used in very special environments as
it does not ensure the de-facto standard format of user IDs.
@item --ignore-time-conflict
@opindex ignore-time-conflict
GnuPG normally checks that the timestamps associated with keys and
signatures have plausible values. However, sometimes a signature
seems to be older than the key due to clock problems. This option
makes these checks just a warning. See also @option{--ignore-valid-from} for
timestamp issues on subkeys.
@item --ignore-valid-from
@opindex ignore-valid-from
GnuPG normally does not select and use subkeys created in the future.
This option allows the use of such keys and thus exhibits the
pre-1.0.7 behaviour. You should not use this option unless there
is some clock problem. See also @option{--ignore-time-conflict} for timestamp
issues with signatures.
@item --ignore-crc-error
@opindex ignore-crc-error
The ASCII armor used by OpenPGP is protected by a CRC checksum against
transmission errors. Occasionally the CRC gets mangled somewhere on
the transmission channel but the actual content (which is protected by
the OpenPGP protocol anyway) is still okay. This option allows GnuPG
to ignore CRC errors.
@item --ignore-mdc-error
@opindex ignore-mdc-error
This option changes a MDC integrity protection failure into a warning.
This can be useful if a message is partially corrupt, but it is
necessary to get as much data as possible out of the corrupt message.
However, be aware that a MDC protection failure may also mean that the
message was tampered with intentionally by an attacker.
@item --allow-weak-digest-algos
@opindex allow-weak-digest-algos
Signatures made with known-weak digest algorithms are normally
rejected with an ``invalid digest algorithm'' message. This option
allows the verification of signatures made with such weak algorithms.
MD5 is the only digest algorithm considered weak by default. See also
@option{--weak-digest} to reject other digest algorithms.
@item --weak-digest @code{name}
@opindex weak-digest
Treat the specified digest algorithm as weak. Signatures made over
weak digests algorithms are normally rejected. This option can be
supplied multiple times if multiple algorithms should be considered
weak. See also @option{--allow-weak-digest-algos} to disable
rejection of weak digests. MD5 is always considered weak, and does
not need to be listed explicitly.
@item --no-default-keyring
@opindex no-default-keyring
Do not add the default keyrings to the list of keyrings. Note that
GnuPG will not operate without any keyrings, so if you use this option
and do not provide alternate keyrings via @option{--keyring} or
@option{--secret-keyring}, then GnuPG will still use the default public or
secret keyrings.
@item --no-keyring
@opindex no-keyring
Do not add use any keyrings even if specified as options.
@item --skip-verify
@opindex skip-verify
Skip the signature verification step. This may be
used to make the decryption faster if the signature
verification is not needed.
@item --with-key-data
@opindex with-key-data
Print key listings delimited by colons (like @option{--with-colons}) and
print the public key data.
@item --fast-list-mode
@opindex fast-list-mode
Changes the output of the list commands to work faster; this is achieved
by leaving some parts empty. Some applications don't need the user ID
and the trust information given in the listings. By using this options
they can get a faster listing. The exact behaviour of this option may
change in future versions. If you are missing some information, don't
use this option.
@item --no-literal
@opindex no-literal
This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.
@item --set-filesize
@opindex set-filesize
This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.
@item --show-session-key
@opindex show-session-key
Display the session key used for one message. See
@option{--override-session-key} for the counterpart of this option.
We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing; however the user should have
the freedom to decide whether to go to prison or to reveal the content
of one specific message without compromising all messages ever
encrypted for one secret key.
You can also use this option if you receive an encrypted message which
is abusive or offensive, to prove to the administrators of the
messaging system that the ciphertext transmitted corresponds to an
inappropriate plaintext so they can take action against the offending
user.
@item --override-session-key @code{string}
@opindex override-session-key
Don't use the public key but the session key @code{string}. The format
of this string is the same as the one printed by
@option{--show-session-key}. This option is normally not used but comes
handy in case someone forces you to reveal the content of an encrypted
message; using this option you can do this without handing out the
secret key.
@item --ask-sig-expire
@itemx --no-ask-sig-expire
@opindex ask-sig-expire
When making a data signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
option is not specified, the expiration time set via
@option{--default-sig-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-sig-expire}
disables this option.
@item --default-sig-expire
@opindex default-sig-expire
The default expiration time to use for signature expiration. Valid
values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d
(for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for
example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an absolute
date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".
@item --ask-cert-expire
@itemx --no-ask-cert-expire
@opindex ask-cert-expire
When making a key signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
option is not specified, the expiration time set via
@option{--default-cert-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-cert-expire}
disables this option.
@item --default-cert-expire
@opindex default-cert-expire
The default expiration time to use for key signature expiration.
Valid values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the
letter d (for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years)
(for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an
absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".
@item --allow-secret-key-import
@opindex allow-secret-key-import
This is an obsolete option and is not used anywhere.
@item --allow-multiple-messages
@item --no-allow-multiple-messages
@opindex allow-multiple-messages
Allow processing of multiple OpenPGP messages contained in a single file
or stream. Some programs that call GPG are not prepared to deal with
multiple messages being processed together, so this option defaults to
no. Note that versions of GPG prior to 1.4.7 always allowed multiple
messages.
Warning: Do not use this option unless you need it as a temporary
workaround!
@item --enable-special-filenames
@opindex enable-special-filenames
This options enables a mode in which filenames of the form
@file{-&n}, where n is a non-negative decimal number,
refer to the file descriptor n and not to a file with that name.
@item --no-expensive-trust-checks
@opindex no-expensive-trust-checks
Experimental use only.
@item --preserve-permissions
@opindex preserve-permissions
Don't change the permissions of a secret keyring back to user
read/write only. Use this option only if you really know what you are doing.
@item --default-preference-list @code{string}
@opindex default-preference-list
Set the list of default preferences to @code{string}. This preference
list is used for new keys and becomes the default for "setpref" in the
edit menu.
@item --default-keyserver-url @code{name}
@opindex default-keyserver-url
Set the default keyserver URL to @code{name}. This keyserver will be
used as the keyserver URL when writing a new self-signature on a key,
which includes key generation and changing preferences.
@item --list-config
@opindex list-config
Display various internal configuration parameters of GnuPG. This option
is intended for external programs that call GnuPG to perform tasks, and
is thus not generally useful. See the file @file{doc/DETAILS} in the
source distribution for the details of which configuration items may be
listed. @option{--list-config} is only usable with
@option{--with-colons} set.
@item --list-gcrypt-config
@opindex list-gcrypt-config
Display various internal configuration parameters of Libgcrypt.
@item --gpgconf-list
@opindex gpgconf-list
This command is similar to @option{--list-config} but in general only
internally used by the @command{gpgconf} tool.
@item --gpgconf-test
@opindex gpgconf-test
This is more or less dummy action. However it parses the configuration
file and returns with failure if the configuration file would prevent
@command{gpg} from startup. Thus it may be used to run a syntax check
on the configuration file.
@end table
@c *******************************
@c ******* Deprecated ************
@c *******************************
@node Deprecated Options
@subsection Deprecated options
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --show-photos
@itemx --no-show-photos
@opindex show-photos
Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-sigs},
@option{--list-public-keys}, @option{--list-secret-keys}, and verifying
a signature to also display the photo ID attached to the key, if
any. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. These options are deprecated. Use
@option{--list-options [no-]show-photos} and/or @option{--verify-options
[no-]show-photos} instead.
@item --show-keyring
@opindex show-keyring
Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
keyring a given key resides on. This option is deprecated: use
@option{--list-options [no-]show-keyring} instead.
@item --always-trust
@opindex always-trust
Identical to @option{--trust-model always}. This option is deprecated.
@item --show-notation
@itemx --no-show-notation
@opindex show-notation
Show signature notations in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs} listings
as well as when verifying a signature with a notation in it. These
options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-notation}
and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-notation} instead.
@item --show-policy-url
@itemx --no-show-policy-url
@opindex show-policy-url
Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}
listings as well as when verifying a signature with a policy URL in
it. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options
[no-]show-policy-url} and/or @option{--verify-options
[no-]show-policy-url} instead.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c *************** ****************
@c *************** FILES ****************
@c *************** ****************
@c *******************************************
@mansect files
@node GPG Configuration
@section Configuration files
There are a few configuration files to control certain aspects of
@command{@gpgname}'s operation. Unless noted, they are expected in the
current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}).
@table @file
@item gpg.conf
@efindex gpg.conf
This is the standard configuration file read by @command{@gpgname} on
startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes
may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated. This default
name may be changed on the command line (@pxref{gpg-option --options}).
You should backup this file.
@end table
Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files
into the directory @file{@value{SYSCONFSKELDIR}} so that
newly created users start up with a working configuration.
For existing users a small
helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}).
For internal purposes @command{@gpgname} creates and maintains a few other
files; They all live in in the current home directory (@pxref{option
--homedir}). Only the @command{@gpgname} program may modify these files.
@table @file
@item ~/.gnupg
@efindex ~/.gnupg
This is the default home directory which is used if neither the
environment variable @code{GNUPGHOME} nor the option
@option{--homedir} is given.
@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg
@efindex pubring.gpg
The public keyring. You should backup this file.
@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg.lock
The lock file for the public keyring.
@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
@efindex pubring.kbx
The public keyring using a different format. This file is sharred
with @command{gpgsm}. You should backup this file.
@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx.lock
The lock file for @file{pubring.kbx}.
@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg
@efindex secring.gpg
A secret keyring as used by GnuPG versions before 2.1. It is not
used by GnuPG 2.1 and later.
@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg.lock
The lock file for the secret keyring.
@item ~/.gnupg/.gpg-v21-migrated
@efindex .gpg-v21-migrated
File indicating that a migration to GnuPG 2.1 has been done.
@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg
@efindex trustdb.gpg
The trust database. There is no need to backup this file; it is better
to backup the ownertrust values (@pxref{option --export-ownertrust}).
@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg.lock
The lock file for the trust database.
@item ~/.gnupg/random_seed
@efindex random_seed
A file used to preserve the state of the internal random pool.
@item ~/.gnupg/openpgp-revocs.d/
@efindex openpgp-revocs.d
This is the directory where gpg stores pre-generated revocation
certificates. The file name corresponds to the OpenPGP fingerprint of
the respective key. It is suggested to backup those certificates and
if the primary private key is not stored on the disk to move them to
an external storage device. Anyone who can access theses files is
able to revoke the corresponding key. You may want to print them out.
You should backup all files in this directory and take care to keep
this backup closed away.
@item @value{DATADIR}/options.skel
@efindex options.skel
The skeleton options file.
@end table
Operation is further controlled by a few environment variables:
@table @asis
@item HOME
@efindex HOME
Used to locate the default home directory.
@item GNUPGHOME
@efindex GNUPGHOME
If set directory used instead of "~/.gnupg".
@item GPG_AGENT_INFO
This variable is obsolete; it was used by GnuPG versions before 2.1.
@item PINENTRY_USER_DATA
@efindex PINENTRY_USER_DATA
This value is passed via gpg-agent to pinentry. It is useful to convey
extra information to a custom pinentry.
@item COLUMNS
@itemx LINES
@efindex COLUMNS
@efindex LINES
Used to size some displays to the full size of the screen.
@item LANGUAGE
@efindex LANGUAGE
Apart from its use by GNU, it is used in the W32 version to override the
language selection done through the Registry. If used and set to a
valid and available language name (@var{langid}), the file with the
translation is loaded from
@code{@var{gpgdir}/gnupg.nls/@var{langid}.mo}. Here @var{gpgdir} is the
directory out of which the gpg binary has been loaded. If it can't be
loaded the Registry is tried and as last resort the native Windows
locale system is used.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c *************** ****************
@c *************** EXAMPLES ****************
@c *************** ****************
@c *******************************************
@mansect examples
@node GPG Examples
@section Examples
@table @asis
@item gpg -se -r @code{Bob} @code{file}
sign and encrypt for user Bob
@item gpg --clearsign @code{file}
make a clear text signature
@item gpg -sb @code{file}
make a detached signature
@item gpg -u 0x12345678 -sb @code{file}
make a detached signature with the key 0x12345678
@item gpg --list-keys @code{user_ID}
show keys
@item gpg --fingerprint @code{user_ID}
show fingerprint
@item gpg --verify @code{pgpfile}
@itemx gpg --verify @code{sigfile}
Verify the signature of the file but do not output the data unless
requested. The second form is used for detached signatures, where
@code{sigfile} is the detached signature (either ASCII armored or
binary) and are the signed data; if this is not given, the name of the
file holding the signed data is constructed by cutting off the
extension (".asc" or ".sig") of @code{sigfile} or by asking the user
for the filename. If the option @option{--output} is also used the
signed data is written to the file specified by that option; use
@code{-} to write the signed data to stdout.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c *************** ****************
@c *************** USER ID ****************
@c *************** ****************
@c *******************************************
@mansect how to specify a user id
@ifset isman
@include specify-user-id.texi
@end ifset
@mansect filter expressions
@chapheading FILTER EXPRESSIONS
The options @option{--import-filter} and @option{--export-filter} use
expressions with this syntax (square brackets indicate an optional
part and curly braces a repetition, white space between the elements
are allowed):
@c man:.RS
@example
[lc] @{[@{flag@}] PROPNAME op VALUE [lc]@}
@end example
@c man:.RE
The name of a property (@var{PROPNAME}) may only consist of letters,
digits and underscores. The description for the filter type
describes which properties are defined. If an undefined property is
used it evaluates to the empty string. Unless otherwise noted, the
@var{VALUE} must always be given and may not be the empty string. No
quoting is defined for the value, thus the value may not contain the
strings @code{&&} or @code{||}, which are used as logical connection
operators. The flag @code{--} can be used to remove this restriction.
Numerical values are computed as long int; standard C notation
applies. @var{lc} is the logical connection operator; either
@code{&&} for a conjunction or @code{||} for a disjunction. A
conjunction is assumed at the begin of an expression. Conjunctions
have higher precedence than disjunctions. If @var{VALUE} starts with
one of the characters used in any @var{op} a space after the
@var{op} is required.
@noindent
The supported operators (@var{op}) are:
@table @asis
@item =~
Substring must match.
@item !~
Substring must not match.
@item =
The full string must match.
@item <>
The full string must not match.
@item ==
The numerical value must match.
@item !=
The numerical value must not match.
@item <=
The numerical value of the field must be LE than the value.
@item <
The numerical value of the field must be LT than the value.
@item >
The numerical value of the field must be GT than the value.
@item >=
The numerical value of the field must be GE than the value.
@item -le
The string value of the field must be less or equal than the value.
@item -lt
The string value of the field must be less than the value.
@item -gt
The string value of the field must be greater than the value.
@item -ge
The string value of the field must be greater or equal than the value.
@item -n
True if value is not empty (no value allowed).
@item -z
True if value is empty (no value allowed).
@item -t
Alias for "PROPNAME != 0" (no value allowed).
@item -f
Alias for "PROPNAME == 0" (no value allowed).
@end table
@noindent
Values for @var{flag} must be space separated. The supported flags
are:
@table @asis
@item --
@var{VALUE} spans to the end of the expression.
@item -c
The string match in this part is done case-sensitive.
@end table
The filter options concatenate several specifications for a filter of
the same type. For example the four options in this example:
@c man:.RS
@example
--import-option keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa"
--import-option keep-uid="&& uid !~ Test"
--import-option keep-uid="|| uid =~ Alpha"
--import-option keep-uid="uid !~ Test"
@end example
@c man:.RE
@noindent
which is equivalent to
@c man:.RS
@example
--import-option \
keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa" && uid !~ Test" || uid =~ Alpha" && "uid !~ Test"
@end example
@c man:.RE
imports only the user ids of a key containing the strings "Alfa"
or "Alpha" but not the string "test".
@mansect return value
@chapheading RETURN VALUE
The program returns 0 if everything was fine, 1 if at least
a signature was bad, and other error codes for fatal errors.
@mansect warnings
@chapheading WARNINGS
Use a *good* password for your user account and a *good* passphrase
to protect your secret key. This passphrase is the weakest part of the
whole system. Programs to do dictionary attacks on your secret keyring
are very easy to write and so you should protect your "~/.gnupg/"
directory very well.
Keep in mind that, if this program is used over a network (telnet), it
is *very* easy to spy out your passphrase!
If you are going to verify detached signatures, make sure that the
program knows about it; either give both filenames on the command line
or use @samp{-} to specify STDIN.
@mansect interoperability
@chapheading INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS
GnuPG tries to be a very flexible implementation of the OpenPGP
standard. In particular, GnuPG implements many of the optional parts
of the standard, such as the SHA-512 hash, and the ZLIB and BZIP2
compression algorithms. It is important to be aware that not all
OpenPGP programs implement these optional algorithms and that by
forcing their use via the @option{--cipher-algo},
@option{--digest-algo}, @option{--cert-digest-algo}, or
@option{--compress-algo} options in GnuPG, it is possible to create a
perfectly valid OpenPGP message, but one that cannot be read by the
intended recipient.
There are dozens of variations of OpenPGP programs available, and each
supports a slightly different subset of these optional algorithms.
For example, until recently, no (unhacked) version of PGP supported
the BLOWFISH cipher algorithm. A message using BLOWFISH simply could
not be read by a PGP user. By default, GnuPG uses the standard
OpenPGP preferences system that will always do the right thing and
create messages that are usable by all recipients, regardless of which
OpenPGP program they use. Only override this safe default if you
really know what you are doing.
If you absolutely must override the safe default, or if the preferences
on a given key are invalid for some reason, you are far better off using
the @option{--pgp6}, @option{--pgp7}, or @option{--pgp8} options. These
options are safe as they do not force any particular algorithms in
violation of OpenPGP, but rather reduce the available algorithms to a
"PGP-safe" list.
@mansect bugs
@chapheading BUGS
On older systems this program should be installed as setuid(root). This
is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents the
operating system from writing memory pages (which may contain
passphrases or other sensitive material) to disk. If you get no
warning message about insecure memory your operating system supports
locking without being root. The program drops root privileges as soon
as locked memory is allocated.
Note also that some systems (especially laptops) have the ability to
``suspend to disk'' (also known as ``safe sleep'' or ``hibernate'').
This writes all memory to disk before going into a low power or even
powered off mode. Unless measures are taken in the operating system
to protect the saved memory, passphrases or other sensitive material
may be recoverable from it later.
Before you report a bug you should first search the mailing list
archives for similar problems and second check whether such a bug has
already been reported to our bug tracker at http://bugs.gnupg.org .
@c *******************************************
@c *************** **************
@c *************** UNATTENDED **************
@c *************** **************
@c *******************************************
@manpause
@node Unattended Usage of GPG
@section Unattended Usage
@command{gpg} is often used as a backend engine by other software. To help
with this a machine interface has been defined to have an unambiguous
way to do this. The options @option{--status-fd} and @option{--batch}
are almost always required for this.
@menu
* Unattended GPG key generation:: Unattended key generation
@end menu
@node Unattended GPG key generation
@subsection Unattended key generation
The command @option{--gen-key} may be used along with the option
@option{--batch} for unattended key generation. The parameters are
either read from stdin or given as a file on the command line.
The format of the parameter file is as follows:
@itemize @bullet
@item Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 characters.
@item UTF-8 encoding must be used to specify non-ASCII characters.
@item Empty lines are ignored.
@item Leading and trailing while space is ignored.
@item A hash sign as the first non white space character indicates
a comment line.
@item Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign, the
arguments are separated by white space from the keyword.
@item Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon. Arguments
are separated by white space.
@item
The first parameter must be @samp{Key-Type}; control statements may be
placed anywhere.
@item
The order of the parameters does not matter except for @samp{Key-Type}
which must be the first parameter. The parameters are only used for
the generated keyblock (primary and subkeys); parameters from previous
sets are not used. Some syntactically checks may be performed.
@item
Key generation takes place when either the end of the parameter file
is reached, the next @samp{Key-Type} parameter is encountered or at the
control statement @samp{%commit} is encountered.
@end itemize
@noindent
Control statements:
@table @asis
@item %echo @var{text}
Print @var{text} as diagnostic.
@item %dry-run
Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking).
@item %commit
Perform the key generation. Note that an implicit commit is done at
the next @asis{Key-Type} parameter.
@item %pubring @var{filename}
@itemx %secring @var{filename}
Do not write the key to the default or commandline given keyring but
to @var{filename}. This must be given before the first commit to take
place, duplicate specification of the same filename is ignored, the
last filename before a commit is used. The filename is used until a
new filename is used (at commit points) and all keys are written to
that file. If a new filename is given, this file is created (and
overwrites an existing one). For GnuPG versions prior to 2.1, both
control statements must be given. For GnuPG 2.1 and later
@samp{%secring} is a no-op.
@item %ask-passphrase
@itemx %no-ask-passphrase
This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later.
@item %no-protection
Using this option allows the creation of keys without any passphrase
protection. This option is mainly intended for regression tests.
@item %transient-key
If given the keys are created using a faster and a somewhat less
secure random number generator. This option may be used for keys
which are only used for a short time and do not require full
cryptographic strength. It takes only effect if used together with
the control statement @samp{%no-protection}.
@end table
@noindent
General Parameters:
@table @asis
@item Key-Type: @var{algo}
Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the primary
key. The algorithm must be capable of signing. This is a required
parameter. @var{algo} may either be an OpenPGP algorithm number or a
string with the algorithm name. The special value @samp{default} may
be used for @var{algo} to create the default key type; in this case a
@samp{Key-Usage} shall not be given and @samp{default} also be used
for @samp{Subkey-Type}.
@item Key-Length: @var{nbits}
The requested length of the generated key in bits. The default is
returned by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}.
@item Key-Grip: @var{hexstring}
This is optional and used to generate a CSR or certificate for an
already existing key. Key-Length will be ignored when given.
@item Key-Usage: @var{usage-list}
Space or comma delimited list of key usages. Allowed values are
@samp{encrypt}, @samp{sign}, and @samp{auth}. This is used to
generate the key flags. Please make sure that the algorithm is
capable of this usage. Note that OpenPGP requires that all primary
keys are capable of certification, so no matter what usage is given
here, the @samp{cert} flag will be on. If no @samp{Key-Usage} is
specified and the @samp{Key-Type} is not @samp{default}, all allowed
usages for that particular algorithm are used; if it is not given but
@samp{default} is used the usage will be @samp{sign}.
@item Subkey-Type: @var{algo}
This generates a secondary key (subkey). Currently only one subkey
can be handled. See also @samp{Key-Type} above.
@item Subkey-Length: @var{nbits}
Length of the secondary key (subkey) in bits. The default is returned
by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}".
@item Subkey-Usage: @var{usage-list}
Key usage lists for a subkey; similar to @samp{Key-Usage}.
@item Passphrase: @var{string}
If you want to specify a passphrase for the secret key, enter it here.
Default is to use the Pinentry dialog to ask for a passphrase.
@item Name-Real: @var{name}
@itemx Name-Comment: @var{comment}
@itemx Name-Email: @var{email}
The three parts of a user name. Remember to use UTF-8 encoding here.
If you don't give any of them, no user ID is created.
@item Expire-Date: @var{iso-date}|(@var{number}[d|w|m|y])
Set the expiration date for the key (and the subkey). It may either
be entered in ISO date format (e.g. "20000815T145012") or as number of
days, weeks, month or years after the creation date. The special
notation "seconds=N" is also allowed to specify a number of seconds
since creation. Without a letter days are assumed. Note that there
is no check done on the overflow of the type used by OpenPGP for
timestamps. Thus you better make sure that the given value make
sense. Although OpenPGP works with time intervals, GnuPG uses an
absolute value internally and thus the last year we can represent is
2105.
@item Creation-Date: @var{iso-date}
Set the creation date of the key as stored in the key information and
which is also part of the fingerprint calculation. Either a date like
"1986-04-26" or a full timestamp like "19860426T042640" may be used.
The time is considered to be UTC. The special notation "seconds=N"
may be used to directly specify a the number of seconds since Epoch
(Unix time). If it is not given the current time is used.
@item Preferences: @var{string}
Set the cipher, hash, and compression preference values for this key.
This expects the same type of string as the sub-command @samp{setpref}
in the @option{--edit-key} menu.
@item Revoker: @var{algo}:@var{fpr} [sensitive]
Add a designated revoker to the generated key. Algo is the public key
algorithm of the designated revoker (i.e. RSA=1, DSA=17, etc.)
@var{fpr} is the fingerprint of the designated revoker. The optional
@samp{sensitive} flag marks the designated revoker as sensitive
information. Only v4 keys may be designated revokers.
@item Keyserver: @var{string}
This is an optional parameter that specifies the preferred keyserver
URL for the key.
@item Handle: @var{string}
This is an optional parameter only used with the status lines
KEY_CREATED and KEY_NOT_CREATED. @var{string} may be up to 100
characters and should not contain spaces. It is useful for batch key
generation to associate a key parameter block with a status line.
@end table
@noindent
Here is an example on how to create a key:
@smallexample
$ cat >foo <<EOF
%echo Generating a basic OpenPGP key
Key-Type: DSA
Key-Length: 1024
Subkey-Type: ELG-E
Subkey-Length: 1024
Name-Real: Joe Tester
Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
Expire-Date: 0
Passphrase: abc
%pubring foo.pub
%secring foo.sec
# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
%commit
%echo done
EOF
$ @gpgname --batch --gen-key foo
[...]
$ @gpgname --no-default-keyring --secret-keyring ./foo.sec \
--keyring ./foo.pub --list-secret-keys
/home/wk/work/gnupg-stable/scratch/foo.sec
------------------------------------------
sec 1024D/915A878D 2000-03-09 Joe Tester (with stupid passphrase) <joe@@foo.bar>
ssb 1024g/8F70E2C0 2000-03-09
@end smallexample
@noindent
If you want to create a key with the default algorithms you would use
these parameters:
@smallexample
%echo Generating a default key
Key-Type: default
Subkey-Type: default
Name-Real: Joe Tester
Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
Expire-Date: 0
Passphrase: abc
%pubring foo.pub
%secring foo.sec
# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
%commit
%echo done
@end smallexample
@mansect see also
@ifset isman
@command{gpgv}(1),
@command{gpgsm}(1),
@command{gpg-agent}(1)
@end ifset
@include see-also-note.texi
diff --git a/doc/gpgsm.texi b/doc/gpgsm.texi
index 7cee0f35f..c632ce739 100644
--- a/doc/gpgsm.texi
+++ b/doc/gpgsm.texi
@@ -1,1625 +1,1625 @@
@c Copyright (C) 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
@c This is part of the GnuPG manual.
@c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi.
@include defs.inc
@node Invoking GPGSM
@chapter Invoking GPGSM
@cindex GPGSM command options
@cindex command options
@cindex options, GPGSM command
@manpage gpgsm.1
@ifset manverb
.B gpgsm
\- CMS encryption and signing tool
@end ifset
@mansect synopsis
@ifset manverb
.B gpgsm
.RB [ \-\-homedir
.IR dir ]
.RB [ \-\-options
.IR file ]
.RI [ options ]
.I command
.RI [ args ]
@end ifset
@mansect description
@command{gpgsm} is a tool similar to @command{gpg} to provide digital
encryption and signing services on X.509 certificates and the CMS
protocol. It is mainly used as a backend for S/MIME mail processing.
@command{gpgsm} includes a full featured certificate management and
complies with all rules defined for the German Sphinx project.
@manpause
@xref{Option Index}, for an index to @command{GPGSM}'s commands and options.
@mancont
@menu
* GPGSM Commands:: List of all commands.
* GPGSM Options:: List of all options.
* GPGSM Configuration:: Configuration files.
* GPGSM Examples:: Some usage examples.
Developer information:
* Unattended Usage:: Using @command{gpgsm} from other programs.
* GPGSM Protocol:: The protocol the server mode uses.
@end menu
@c *******************************************
@c *************** ****************
@c *************** COMMANDS ****************
@c *************** ****************
@c *******************************************
@mansect commands
@node GPGSM Commands
@section Commands
Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that
only one command is allowed.
@menu
* General GPGSM Commands:: Commands not specific to the functionality.
* Operational GPGSM Commands:: Commands to select the type of operation.
* Certificate Management:: How to manage certificates.
@end menu
@c *******************************************
@c ********** GENERAL COMMANDS *************
@c *******************************************
@node General GPGSM Commands
@subsection Commands not specific to the function
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --version
@opindex version
Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you
cannot abbreviate this command.
@item --help, -h
@opindex help
Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command-line options.
Note that you cannot abbreviate this command.
@item --warranty
@opindex warranty
Print warranty information. Note that you cannot abbreviate this
command.
@item --dump-options
@opindex dump-options
Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot
abbreviate this command.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c ******** OPERATIONAL COMMANDS ***********
@c *******************************************
@node Operational GPGSM Commands
@subsection Commands to select the type of operation
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --encrypt
@opindex encrypt
Perform an encryption. The keys the data is encrypted too must be set
using the option @option{--recipient}.
@item --decrypt
@opindex decrypt
Perform a decryption; the type of input is automatically determined. It
may either be in binary form or PEM encoded; automatic determination of
base-64 encoding is not done.
@item --sign
@opindex sign
Create a digital signature. The key used is either the fist one found
in the keybox or those set with the @option{--local-user} option.
@item --verify
@opindex verify
Check a signature file for validity. Depending on the arguments a
detached signature may also be checked.
@item --server
@opindex server
Run in server mode and wait for commands on the @code{stdin}.
@item --call-dirmngr @var{command} [@var{args}]
@opindex call-dirmngr
Behave as a Dirmngr client issuing the request @var{command} with the
optional list of @var{args}. The output of the Dirmngr is printed
stdout. Please note that file names given as arguments should have an
absolute file name (i.e. commencing with @code{/} because they are
passed verbatim to the Dirmngr and the working directory of the
Dirmngr might not be the same as the one of this client. Currently it
is not possible to pass data via stdin to the Dirmngr. @var{command}
should not contain spaces.
This is command is required for certain maintaining tasks of the dirmngr
where a dirmngr must be able to call back to @command{gpgsm}. See the Dirmngr
manual for details.
@item --call-protect-tool @var{arguments}
@opindex call-protect-tool
Certain maintenance operations are done by an external program call
@command{gpg-protect-tool}; this is usually not installed in a directory
listed in the PATH variable. This command provides a simple wrapper to
access this tool. @var{arguments} are passed verbatim to this command;
use @samp{--help} to get a list of supported operations.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c ******* CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT **********
@c *******************************************
@node Certificate Management
@subsection How to manage the certificates and keys
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --gen-key
@opindex gen-key
This command allows the creation of a certificate signing request or a
self-signed certificate. It is commonly used along with the
@option{--output} option to save the created CSR or certificate into a
file. If used with the @option{--batch} a parameter file is used to
create the CSR or certificate and it is further possible to create
non-self-signed certificates.
@item --list-keys
@itemx -k
@opindex list-keys
List all available certificates stored in the local key database.
Note that the displayed data might be reformatted for better human
readability and illegal characters are replaced by safe substitutes.
@item --list-secret-keys
@itemx -K
@opindex list-secret-keys
List all available certificates for which a corresponding a secret key
is available.
@item --list-external-keys @var{pattern}
@opindex list-keys
List certificates matching @var{pattern} using an external server. This
utilizes the @code{dirmngr} service.
@item --list-chain
@opindex list-chain
Same as @option{--list-keys} but also prints all keys making up the chain.
@item --dump-cert
@itemx --dump-keys
@opindex dump-cert
@opindex dump-keys
List all available certificates stored in the local key database using a
format useful mainly for debugging.
@item --dump-chain
@opindex dump-chain
Same as @option{--dump-keys} but also prints all keys making up the chain.
@item --dump-secret-keys
@opindex dump-secret-keys
List all available certificates for which a corresponding a secret key
is available using a format useful mainly for debugging.
@item --dump-external-keys @var{pattern}
@opindex dump-external-keys
List certificates matching @var{pattern} using an external server.
This utilizes the @code{dirmngr} service. It uses a format useful
mainly for debugging.
@item --keydb-clear-some-cert-flags
@opindex keydb-clear-some-cert-flags
This is a debugging aid to reset certain flags in the key database
which are used to cache certain certificate stati. It is especially
useful if a bad CRL or a weird running OCSP responder did accidentally
revoke certificate. There is no security issue with this command
because @command{gpgsm} always make sure that the validity of a certificate is
checked right before it is used.
@item --delete-keys @var{pattern}
@opindex delete-keys
Delete the keys matching @var{pattern}. Note that there is no command
to delete the secret part of the key directly. In case you need to do
this, you should run the command @code{gpgsm --dump-secret-keys KEYID}
before you delete the key, copy the string of hex-digits in the
``keygrip'' line and delete the file consisting of these hex-digits
and the suffix @code{.key} from the @file{private-keys-v1.d} directory
below our GnuPG home directory (usually @file{~/.gnupg}).
@item --export [@var{pattern}]
@opindex export
Export all certificates stored in the Keybox or those specified by the
optional @var{pattern}. Those pattern consist of a list of user ids
(@pxref{how-to-specify-a-user-id}). When used along with the
@option{--armor} option a few informational lines are prepended before
each block. There is one limitation: As there is no commonly agreed
upon way to pack more than one certificate into an ASN.1 structure,
the binary export (i.e. without using @option{armor}) works only for
the export of one certificate. Thus it is required to specify a
@var{pattern} which yields exactly one certificate. Ephemeral
certificate are only exported if all @var{pattern} are given as
fingerprints or keygrips.
@item --export-secret-key-p12 @var{key-id}
@opindex export-secret-key-p12
Export the private key and the certificate identified by @var{key-id} in
a PKCS#12 format. When used with the @code{--armor} option a few
informational lines are prepended to the output. Note, that the PKCS#12
format is not very secure and this command is only provided if there is
no other way to exchange the private key. (@pxref{option --p12-charset})
@item --export-secret-key-p8 @var{key-id}
@itemx --export-secret-key-raw @var{key-id}
@opindex export-secret-key-p8
@opindex export-secret-key-raw
Export the private key of the certificate identified by @var{key-id}
with any encryption stripped. The @code{...-raw} command exports in
PKCS#1 format; the @code{...-p8} command exports in PKCS#8 format.
When used with the @code{--armor} option a few informational lines are
prepended to the output. These commands are useful to prepare a key
for use on a TLS server.
@item --import [@var{files}]
@opindex import
Import the certificates from the PEM or binary encoded files as well as
from signed-only messages. This command may also be used to import a
secret key from a PKCS#12 file.
@item --learn-card
@opindex learn-card
Read information about the private keys from the smartcard and import
the certificates from there. This command utilizes the @command{gpg-agent}
and in turn the @command{scdaemon}.
@item --passwd @var{user_id}
@opindex passwd
Change the passphrase of the private key belonging to the certificate
specified as @var{user_id}. Note, that changing the passphrase/PIN of a
smartcard is not yet supported.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c *************** ****************
@c *************** OPTIONS ****************
@c *************** ****************
@c *******************************************
@mansect options
@node GPGSM Options
@section Option Summary
@command{GPGSM} features a bunch of options to control the exact behaviour
and to change the default configuration.
@menu
* Configuration Options:: How to change the configuration.
* Certificate Options:: Certificate related options.
* Input and Output:: Input and Output.
* CMS Options:: How to change how the CMS is created.
* Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually do not want to do.
@end menu
@c *******************************************
@c ******** CONFIGURATION OPTIONS **********
@c *******************************************
@node Configuration Options
@subsection How to change the configuration
These options are used to change the configuration and are usually found
in the option file.
@table @gnupgtabopt
@anchor{gpgsm-option --options}
@item --options @var{file}
@opindex options
Reads configuration from @var{file} instead of from the default
per-user configuration file. The default configuration file is named
@file{gpgsm.conf} and expected in the @file{.gnupg} directory directly
below the home directory of the user.
@include opt-homedir.texi
@item -v
@item --verbose
@opindex v
@opindex verbose
Outputs additional information while running.
You can increase the verbosity by giving several
verbose commands to @command{gpgsm}, such as @samp{-vv}.
@item --policy-file @var{filename}
@opindex policy-file
Change the default name of the policy file to @var{filename}.
@item --agent-program @var{file}
@opindex agent-program
Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The
default value is determined by running the command @command{gpgconf}.
Note that the pipe symbol (@code{|}) is used for a regression test
suite hack and may thus not be used in the file name.
@item --dirmngr-program @var{file}
@opindex dirmngr-program
Specify a dirmngr program to be used for @acronym{CRL} checks. The
default value is @file{@value{BINDIR}/dirmngr}.
@item --prefer-system-dirmngr
@opindex prefer-system-dirmngr
If a system wide @command{dirmngr} is running in daemon mode, first try
to connect to this one. Fallback to a pipe based server if this does
not work. Under Windows this option is ignored because the system dirmngr is
always used.
@item --disable-dirmngr
Entirely disable the use of the Dirmngr.
@item --no-autostart
@opindex no-autostart
Do not start the gpg-agent or the dirmngr if it has not yet been
started and its service is required. This option is mostly useful on
machines where the connection to gpg-agent has been redirected to
another machines. If dirmngr is required on the remote machine, it
may be started manually using @command{gpgconf --launch dirmngr}.
@item --no-secmem-warning
@opindex no-secmem-warning
Do not print a warning when the so called "secure memory" cannot be used.
@item --log-file @var{file}
@opindex log-file
When running in server mode, append all logging output to @var{file}.
Use @file{socket://} to log to socket.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c ******** CERTIFICATE OPTIONS ************
@c *******************************************
@node Certificate Options
@subsection Certificate related options
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --enable-policy-checks
@itemx --disable-policy-checks
@opindex enable-policy-checks
@opindex disable-policy-checks
By default policy checks are enabled. These options may be used to
change it.
@item --enable-crl-checks
@itemx --disable-crl-checks
@opindex enable-crl-checks
@opindex disable-crl-checks
By default the @acronym{CRL} checks are enabled and the DirMngr is used
to check for revoked certificates. The disable option is most useful
with an off-line network connection to suppress this check.
@item --enable-trusted-cert-crl-check
@itemx --disable-trusted-cert-crl-check
@opindex enable-trusted-cert-crl-check
@opindex disable-trusted-cert-crl-check
By default the @acronym{CRL} for trusted root certificates are checked
like for any other certificates. This allows a CA to revoke its own
certificates voluntary without the need of putting all ever issued
certificates into a CRL. The disable option may be used to switch this
extra check off. Due to the caching done by the Dirmngr, there will not be
any noticeable performance gain. Note, that this also disables possible
OCSP checks for trusted root certificates. A more specific way of
disabling this check is by adding the ``relax'' keyword to the root CA
line of the @file{trustlist.txt}
@item --force-crl-refresh
@opindex force-crl-refresh
Tell the dirmngr to reload the CRL for each request. For better
performance, the dirmngr will actually optimize this by suppressing
the loading for short time intervals (e.g. 30 minutes). This option
is useful to make sure that a fresh CRL is available for certificates
hold in the keybox. The suggested way of doing this is by using it
along with the option @option{--with-validation} for a key listing
command. This option should not be used in a configuration file.
@item --enable-ocsp
@itemx --disable-ocsp
@opindex enable-ocsp
@opindex disable-ocsp
By default @acronym{OCSP} checks are disabled. The enable option may
be used to enable OCSP checks via Dirmngr. If @acronym{CRL} checks
are also enabled, CRLs will be used as a fallback if for some reason an
OCSP request will not succeed. Note, that you have to allow OCSP
requests in Dirmngr's configuration too (option
@option{--allow-ocsp}) and configure Dirmngr properly. If you do not do
so you will get the error code @samp{Not supported}.
@item --auto-issuer-key-retrieve
@opindex auto-issuer-key-retrieve
If a required certificate is missing while validating the chain of
certificates, try to load that certificate from an external location.
This usually means that Dirmngr is employed to search for the
certificate. Note that this option makes a "web bug" like behavior
possible. LDAP server operators can see which keys you request, so by
sending you a message signed by a brand new key (which you naturally
will not have on your local keybox), the operator can tell both your IP
address and the time when you verified the signature.
@anchor{gpgsm-option --validation-model}
@item --validation-model @var{name}
@opindex validation-model
This option changes the default validation model. The only possible
values are "shell" (which is the default), "chain" which forces the
use of the chain model and "steed" for a new simplified model. The
chain model is also used if an option in the @file{trustlist.txt} or
an attribute of the certificate requests it. However the standard
model (shell) is in that case always tried first.
@item --ignore-cert-extension @var{oid}
@opindex ignore-cert-extension
Add @var{oid} to the list of ignored certificate extensions. The
@var{oid} is expected to be in dotted decimal form, like
@code{2.5.29.3}. This option may be used more than once. Critical
flagged certificate extensions matching one of the OIDs in the list
are treated as if they are actually handled and thus the certificate
will not be rejected due to an unknown critical extension. Use this
option with care because extensions are usually flagged as critical
for a reason.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c *********** INPUT AND OUTPUT ************
@c *******************************************
@node Input and Output
@subsection Input and Output
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --armor
@itemx -a
@opindex armor
Create PEM encoded output. Default is binary output.
@item --base64
@opindex base64
Create Base-64 encoded output; i.e. PEM without the header lines.
@item --assume-armor
@opindex assume-armor
Assume the input data is PEM encoded. Default is to autodetect the
encoding but this is may fail.
@item --assume-base64
@opindex assume-base64
Assume the input data is plain base-64 encoded.
@item --assume-binary
@opindex assume-binary
Assume the input data is binary encoded.
@anchor{option --p12-charset}
@item --p12-charset @var{name}
@opindex p12-charset
@command{gpgsm} uses the UTF-8 encoding when encoding passphrases for
PKCS#12 files. This option may be used to force the passphrase to be
encoded in the specified encoding @var{name}. This is useful if the
application used to import the key uses a different encoding and thus
will not be able to import a file generated by @command{gpgsm}. Commonly
used values for @var{name} are @code{Latin1} and @code{CP850}. Note
that @command{gpgsm} itself automagically imports any file with a
passphrase encoded to the most commonly used encodings.
@item --default-key @var{user_id}
@opindex default-key
Use @var{user_id} as the standard key for signing. This key is used if
no other key has been defined as a signing key. Note, that the first
@option{--local-users} option also sets this key if it has not yet been
set; however @option{--default-key} always overrides this.
@item --local-user @var{user_id}
@item -u @var{user_id}
@opindex local-user
Set the user(s) to be used for signing. The default is the first
secret key found in the database.
@item --recipient @var{name}
@itemx -r
@opindex recipient
Encrypt to the user id @var{name}. There are several ways a user id
may be given (@pxref{how-to-specify-a-user-id}).
@item --output @var{file}
@itemx -o @var{file}
@opindex output
Write output to @var{file}. The default is to write it to stdout.
@anchor{gpgsm-option --with-key-data}
@item --with-key-data
@opindex with-key-data
Displays extra information with the @code{--list-keys} commands. Especially
a line tagged @code{grp} is printed which tells you the keygrip of a
key. This string is for example used as the file name of the
secret key.
@anchor{gpgsm-option --with-validation}
@item --with-validation
@opindex with-validation
When doing a key listing, do a full validation check for each key and
print the result. This is usually a slow operation because it
requires a CRL lookup and other operations.
When used along with --import, a validation of the certificate to
import is done and only imported if it succeeds the test. Note that
this does not affect an already available certificate in the DB.
This option is therefore useful to simply verify a certificate.
@item --with-md5-fingerprint
For standard key listings, also print the MD5 fingerprint of the
certificate.
@item --with-keygrip
Include the keygrip in standard key listings. Note that the keygrip is
always listed in --with-colons mode.
@item --with-secret
@opindex with-secret
Include info about the presence of a secret key in public key listings
done with @code{--with-colons}.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c ************* CMS OPTIONS ***************
@c *******************************************
@node CMS Options
@subsection How to change how the CMS is created.
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --include-certs @var{n}
@opindex include-certs
Using @var{n} of -2 includes all certificate except for the root cert,
-1 includes all certs, 0 does not include any certs, 1 includes only the
signers cert and all other positive values include up to @var{n}
certificates starting with the signer cert. The default is -2.
@item --cipher-algo @var{oid}
@opindex cipher-algo
Use the cipher algorithm with the ASN.1 object identifier @var{oid} for
encryption. For convenience the strings @code{3DES}, @code{AES} and
@code{AES256} may be used instead of their OIDs. The default is
@code{AES} (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2).
@item --digest-algo @code{name}
Use @code{name} as the message digest algorithm. Usually this
algorithm is deduced from the respective signing certificate. This
option forces the use of the given algorithm and may lead to severe
interoperability problems.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c ******** ESOTERIC OPTIONS ***************
@c *******************************************
@node Esoteric Options
@subsection Doing things one usually do not want to do.
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --extra-digest-algo @var{name}
@opindex extra-digest-algo
Sometimes signatures are broken in that they announce a different digest
algorithm than actually used. @command{gpgsm} uses a one-pass data
processing model and thus needs to rely on the announced digest
algorithms to properly hash the data. As a workaround this option may
be used to tell gpg to also hash the data using the algorithm
@var{name}; this slows processing down a little bit but allows verification of
such broken signatures. If @command{gpgsm} prints an error like
``digest algo 8 has not been enabled'' you may want to try this option,
with @samp{SHA256} for @var{name}.
@item --faked-system-time @var{epoch}
@opindex faked-system-time
This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back or
forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since the year
1970. Alternatively @var{epoch} may be given as a full ISO time string
(e.g. "20070924T154812").
@item --with-ephemeral-keys
@opindex with-ephemeral-keys
Include ephemeral flagged keys in the output of key listings. Note
that they are included anyway if the key specification for a listing
is given as fingerprint or keygrip.
@item --debug-level @var{level}
@opindex debug-level
Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be
a numeric value or by a keyword:
@table @code
@item none
No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of
the keyword.
@item basic
Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used
instead of the keyword.
@item advanced
More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used
instead of the keyword.
@item expert
Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used
instead of the keyword.
@item guru
All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be
used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is
only enabled if the keyword is used.
@end table
How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not
specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are
however carefully selected to best aid in debugging.
@item --debug @var{flags}
@opindex debug
This option is only useful for debugging and the behaviour may change
at any time without notice; using @code{--debug-levels} is the
preferred method to select the debug verbosity. FLAGS are bit encoded
and may be given in usual C-Syntax. The currently defined bits are:
@table @code
@item 0 (1)
X.509 or OpenPGP protocol related data
@item 1 (2)
values of big number integers
@item 2 (4)
low level crypto operations
@item 5 (32)
memory allocation
@item 6 (64)
caching
@item 7 (128)
show memory statistics.
@item 9 (512)
write hashed data to files named @code{dbgmd-000*}
@item 10 (1024)
trace Assuan protocol
@end table
Note, that all flags set using this option may get overridden by
@code{--debug-level}.
@item --debug-all
@opindex debug-all
Same as @code{--debug=0xffffffff}
@item --debug-allow-core-dump
@opindex debug-allow-core-dump
Usually @command{gpgsm} tries to avoid dumping core by well written code and by
disabling core dumps for security reasons. However, bugs are pretty
durable beasts and to squash them it is sometimes useful to have a core
dump. This option enables core dumps unless the Bad Thing happened
before the option parsing.
@item --debug-no-chain-validation
@opindex debug-no-chain-validation
This is actually not a debugging option but only useful as such. It
lets @command{gpgsm} bypass all certificate chain validation checks.
@item --debug-ignore-expiration
@opindex debug-ignore-expiration
This is actually not a debugging option but only useful as such. It
lets @command{gpgsm} ignore all notAfter dates, this is used by the regression
tests.
@item --passphrase-fd @code{n}
@opindex passphrase-fd
Read the passphrase from file descriptor @code{n}. Only the first line
will be read from file descriptor @code{n}. If you use 0 for @code{n},
the passphrase will be read from STDIN. This can only be used if only
one passphrase is supplied.
Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch}
has also been given.
@item --pinentry-mode @code{mode}
@opindex pinentry-mode
Set the pinentry mode to @code{mode}. Allowed values for @code{mode}
are:
@table @asis
@item default
Use the default of the agent, which is @code{ask}.
@item ask
Force the use of the Pinentry.
@item cancel
Emulate use of Pinentry's cancel button.
@item error
Return a Pinentry error (``No Pinentry'').
@item loopback
Redirect Pinentry queries to the caller. Note that in contrast to
Pinentry the user is not prompted again if he enters a bad password.
@end table
@item --no-common-certs-import
@opindex no-common-certs-import
Suppress the import of common certificates on keybox creation.
@end table
All the long options may also be given in the configuration file after
stripping off the two leading dashes.
@c *******************************************
@c *************** ****************
@c *************** USER ID ****************
@c *************** ****************
@c *******************************************
@mansect how to specify a user id
@ifset isman
@include specify-user-id.texi
@end ifset
@c *******************************************
@c *************** ****************
@c *************** FILES ****************
@c *************** ****************
@c *******************************************
@mansect files
@node GPGSM Configuration
@section Configuration files
There are a few configuration files to control certain aspects of
@command{gpgsm}'s operation. Unless noted, they are expected in the
current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}).
@table @file
@item gpgsm.conf
@efindex gpgsm.conf
This is the standard configuration file read by @command{gpgsm} on
startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes
may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated. This default
name may be changed on the command line (@pxref{gpgsm-option --options}).
You should backup this file.
@item policies.txt
@efindex policies.txt
This is a list of allowed CA policies. This file should list the
object identifiers of the policies line by line. Empty lines and
lines starting with a hash mark are ignored. Policies missing in this
file and not marked as critical in the certificate will print only a
warning; certificates with policies marked as critical and not listed
in this file will fail the signature verification. You should backup
this file.
For example, to allow only the policy 2.289.9.9, the file should look
like this:
@c man:.RS
@example
# Allowed policies
2.289.9.9
@end example
@c man:.RE
@item qualified.txt
@efindex qualified.txt
This is the list of root certificates used for qualified certificates.
They are defined as certificates capable of creating legally binding
signatures in the same way as handwritten signatures are. Comments
start with a hash mark and empty lines are ignored. Lines do have a
length limit but this is not a serious limitation as the format of the
entries is fixed and checked by gpgsm: A non-comment line starts with
optional whitespace, followed by exactly 40 hex character, white space
and a lowercased 2 letter country code. Additional data delimited with
by a white space is current ignored but might late be used for other
purposes.
Note that even if a certificate is listed in this file, this does not
mean that the certificate is trusted; in general the certificates listed
in this file need to be listed also in @file{trustlist.txt}.
This is a global file an installed in the data directory
(e.g. @file{@value{DATADIR}/qualified.txt}). GnuPG installs a suitable
file with root certificates as used in Germany. As new Root-CA
certificates may be issued over time, these entries may need to be
updated; new distributions of this software should come with an updated
list but it is still the responsibility of the Administrator to check
that this list is correct.
-Everytime @command{gpgsm} uses a certificate for signing or verification
+Every time @command{gpgsm} uses a certificate for signing or verification
this file will be consulted to check whether the certificate under
question has ultimately been issued by one of these CAs. If this is the
case the user will be informed that the verified signature represents a
legally binding (``qualified'') signature. When creating a signature
using such a certificate an extra prompt will be issued to let the user
confirm that such a legally binding signature shall really be created.
Because this software has not yet been approved for use with such
certificates, appropriate notices will be shown to indicate this fact.
@item help.txt
@efindex help.txt
This is plain text file with a few help entries used with
@command{pinentry} as well as a large list of help items for
@command{gpg} and @command{gpgsm}. The standard file has English help
texts; to install localized versions use filenames like @file{help.LL.txt}
with LL denoting the locale. GnuPG comes with a set of predefined help
files in the data directory (e.g. @file{@value{DATADIR}/gnupg/help.de.txt})
and allows overriding of any help item by help files stored in the
system configuration directory (e.g. @file{@value{SYSCONFDIR}/help.de.txt}).
For a reference of the help file's syntax, please see the installed
@file{help.txt} file.
@item com-certs.pem
@efindex com-certs.pem
This file is a collection of common certificates used to populated a
newly created @file{pubring.kbx}. An administrator may replace this
file with a custom one. The format is a concatenation of PEM encoded
X.509 certificates. This global file is installed in the data directory
(e.g. @file{@value{DATADIR}/com-certs.pem}).
@end table
@c man:.RE
Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files
into the directory @file{/etc/skel/.gnupg/} so that newly created users
start up with a working configuration. For existing users a small
helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}).
For internal purposes gpgsm creates and maintains a few other files;
they all live in in the current home directory (@pxref{option
--homedir}). Only @command{gpgsm} may modify these files.
@table @file
@item pubring.kbx
@efindex pubring.kbx
This a database file storing the certificates as well as meta
information. For debugging purposes the tool @command{kbxutil} may be
used to show the internal structure of this file. You should backup
this file.
@item random_seed
@efindex random_seed
This content of this file is used to maintain the internal state of the
random number generator across invocations. The same file is used by
other programs of this software too.
@item S.gpg-agent
@efindex S.gpg-agent
If this file exists
@command{gpgsm} will first try to connect to this socket for
accessing @command{gpg-agent} before starting a new @command{gpg-agent}
instance. Under Windows this socket (which in reality be a plain file
describing a regular TCP listening port) is the standard way of
connecting the @command{gpg-agent}.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c *************** ****************
@c *************** EXAMPLES ****************
@c *************** ****************
@c *******************************************
@mansect examples
@node GPGSM Examples
@section Examples
@example
$ gpgsm -er goo@@bar.net <plaintext >ciphertext
@end example
@c *******************************************
@c *************** **************
@c *************** UNATTENDED **************
@c *************** **************
@c *******************************************
@manpause
@node Unattended Usage
@section Unattended Usage
@command{gpgsm} is often used as a backend engine by other software. To help
with this a machine interface has been defined to have an unambiguous
way to do this. This is most likely used with the @code{--server} command
but may also be used in the standard operation mode by using the
@code{--status-fd} option.
@menu
* Automated signature checking:: Automated signature checking.
* CSR and certificate creation:: CSR and certificate creation.
@end menu
@node Automated signature checking
@subsection Automated signature checking
It is very important to understand the semantics used with signature
verification. Checking a signature is not as simple as it may sound and
so the operation is a bit complicated. In most cases it is required
to look at several status lines. Here is a table of all cases a signed
message may have:
@table @asis
@item The signature is valid
This does mean that the signature has been successfully verified, the
certificates are all sane. However there are two subcases with
important information: One of the certificates may have expired or a
signature of a message itself as expired. It is a sound practise to
consider such a signature still as valid but additional information
should be displayed. Depending on the subcase @command{gpgsm} will issue
these status codes:
@table @asis
@item signature valid and nothing did expire
@code{GOODSIG}, @code{VALIDSIG}, @code{TRUST_FULLY}
@item signature valid but at least one certificate has expired
@code{EXPKEYSIG}, @code{VALIDSIG}, @code{TRUST_FULLY}
@item signature valid but expired
@code{EXPSIG}, @code{VALIDSIG}, @code{TRUST_FULLY}
Note, that this case is currently not implemented.
@end table
@item The signature is invalid
This means that the signature verification failed (this is an indication
of af a transfer error, a program error or tampering with the message).
@command{gpgsm} issues one of these status codes sequences:
@table @code
@item @code{BADSIG}
@item @code{GOODSIG}, @code{VALIDSIG} @code{TRUST_NEVER}
@end table
@item Error verifying a signature
For some reason the signature could not be verified, i.e. it cannot be
decided whether the signature is valid or invalid. A common reason for
this is a missing certificate.
@end table
@node CSR and certificate creation
@subsection CSR and certificate creation
The command @option{--gen-key} may be used along with the option
@option{--batch} to either create a certificate signing request (CSR)
or an X.509 certificate. This is controlled by a parameter file; the
format of this file is as follows:
@itemize @bullet
@item Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 characters.
@item UTF-8 encoding must be used to specify non-ASCII characters.
@item Empty lines are ignored.
@item Leading and trailing while space is ignored.
@item A hash sign as the first non white space character indicates
a comment line.
@item Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign, the
arguments are separated by white space from the keyword.
@item Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon. Arguments
are separated by white space.
@item The first parameter must be @samp{Key-Type}, control statements
may be placed anywhere.
@item
The order of the parameters does not matter except for @samp{Key-Type}
which must be the first parameter. The parameters are only used for
the generated CSR/certificate; parameters from previous sets are not
used. Some syntactically checks may be performed.
@item
Key generation takes place when either the end of the parameter file
is reached, the next @samp{Key-Type} parameter is encountered or at the
control statement @samp{%commit} is encountered.
@end itemize
@noindent
Control statements:
@table @asis
@item %echo @var{text}
Print @var{text} as diagnostic.
@item %dry-run
Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking).
@item %commit
Perform the key generation. Note that an implicit commit is done at
the next @asis{Key-Type} parameter.
@c %certfile <filename>
@c [Not yet implemented!]
@c Do not write the certificate to the keyDB but to <filename>.
@c This must be given before the first
@c commit to take place, duplicate specification of the same filename
@c is ignored, the last filename before a commit is used.
@c The filename is used until a new filename is used (at commit points)
@c and all keys are written to that file. If a new filename is given,
@c this file is created (and overwrites an existing one).
@c Both control statements must be given.
@end table
@noindent
General Parameters:
@table @asis
@item Key-Type: @var{algo}
Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the primary
key. The algorithm must be capable of signing. This is a required
parameter. The only supported value for @var{algo} is @samp{rsa}.
@item Key-Length: @var{nbits}
The requested length of a generated key in bits. Defaults to 2048.
@item Key-Grip: @var{hexstring}
This is optional and used to generate a CSR or certificatet for an
already existing key. Key-Length will be ignored when given.
@item Key-Usage: @var{usage-list}
Space or comma delimited list of key usage, allowed values are
@samp{encrypt}, @samp{sign} and @samp{cert}. This is used to generate
the keyUsage extension. Please make sure that the algorithm is
capable of this usage. Default is to allow encrypt and sign.
@item Name-DN: @var{subject-name}
This is the Distinguished Name (DN) of the subject in RFC-2253 format.
@item Name-Email: @var{string}
This is an email address for the altSubjectName. This parameter is
optional but may occur several times to add several email addresses to
a certificate.
@item Name-DNS: @var{string}
The is an DNS name for the altSubjectName. This parameter is optional
but may occur several times to add several DNS names to a certificate.
@item Name-URI: @var{string}
This is an URI for the altSubjectName. This parameter is optional but
may occur several times to add several URIs to a certificate.
@end table
@noindent
Additional parameters used to create a certificate (in contrast to a
certificate signing request):
@table @asis
@item Serial: @var{sn}
If this parameter is given an X.509 certificate will be generated.
@var{sn} is expected to be a hex string representing an unsigned
-integer of arbitary length. The special value @samp{random} can be
+integer of arbitrary length. The special value @samp{random} can be
used to create a 64 bit random serial number.
@item Issuer-DN: @var{issuer-name}
This is the DN name of the issuer in rfc2253 format. If it is not set
it will default to the subject DN and a special GnuPG extension will
be included in the certificate to mark it as a standalone certificate.
@item Creation-Date: @var{iso-date}
@itemx Not-Before: @var{iso-date}
Set the notBefore date of the certificate. Either a date like
@samp{1986-04-26} or @samp{1986-04-26 12:00} or a standard ISO
timestamp like @samp{19860426T042640} may be used. The time is
considered to be UTC. If it is not given the current date is used.
@item Expire-Date: @var{iso-date}
@itemx Not-After: @var{iso-date}
Set the notAfter date of the certificate. Either a date like
@samp{2063-04-05} or @samp{2063-04-05 17:00} or a standard ISO
timestamp like @samp{20630405T170000} may be used. The time is
considered to be UTC. If it is not given a default value in the not
too far future is used.
@item Signing-Key: @var{keygrip}
This gives the keygrip of the key used to sign the certificate. If it
is not given a self-signed certificate will be created. For
compatibility with future versions, it is suggested to prefix the
keygrip with a @samp{&}.
@item Hash-Algo: @var{hash-algo}
Use @var{hash-algo} for this CSR or certificate. The supported hash
algorithms are: @samp{sha1}, @samp{sha256}, @samp{sha384} and
@samp{sha512}; they may also be specified with uppercase letters. The
default is @samp{sha256}.
@end table
@c *******************************************
@c *************** *****************
@c *************** ASSSUAN *****************
@c *************** *****************
@c *******************************************
@node GPGSM Protocol
@section The Protocol the Server Mode Uses.
Description of the protocol used to access @command{GPGSM}.
@command{GPGSM} does implement the Assuan protocol and in addition
provides a regular command line interface which exhibits a full client
to this protocol (but uses internal linking). To start
@command{gpgsm} as a server the command line the option
@code{--server} must be used. Additional options are provided to
select the communication method (i.e. the name of the socket).
We assume that the connection has already been established; see the
Assuan manual for details.
@menu
* GPGSM ENCRYPT:: Encrypting a message.
* GPGSM DECRYPT:: Decrypting a message.
* GPGSM SIGN:: Signing a message.
* GPGSM VERIFY:: Verifying a message.
* GPGSM GENKEY:: Generating a key.
* GPGSM LISTKEYS:: List available keys.
* GPGSM EXPORT:: Export certificates.
* GPGSM IMPORT:: Import certificates.
* GPGSM DELETE:: Delete certificates.
* GPGSM GETAUDITLOG:: Retrieve an audit log.
* GPGSM GETINFO:: Information about the process
* GPGSM OPTION:: Session options.
@end menu
@node GPGSM ENCRYPT
@subsection Encrypting a Message
Before encryption can be done the recipient must be set using the
command:
@example
RECIPIENT @var{userID}
@end example
Set the recipient for the encryption. @var{userID} should be the
internal representation of the key; the server may accept any other way
of specification. If this is a valid and trusted recipient the server
does respond with OK, otherwise the return is an ERR with the reason why
the recipient cannot be used, the encryption will then not be done for
this recipient. If the policy is not to encrypt at all if not all
recipients are valid, the client has to take care of this. All
@code{RECIPIENT} commands are cumulative until a @code{RESET} or an
successful @code{ENCRYPT} command.
@example
INPUT FD[=@var{n}] [--armor|--base64|--binary]
@end example
Set the file descriptor for the message to be encrypted to @var{n}.
Obviously the pipe must be open at that point, the server establishes
its own end. If the server returns an error the client should consider
this session failed. If @var{n} is not given, this commands uses the
last file descriptor passed to the application.
@xref{fun-assuan_sendfd, ,the assuan_sendfd function,assuan,the Libassuan
manual}, on how to do descriptor passing.
The @code{--armor} option may be used to advice the server that the
input data is in @acronym{PEM} format, @code{--base64} advices that a
raw base-64 encoding is used, @code{--binary} advices of raw binary
input (@acronym{BER}). If none of these options is used, the server
tries to figure out the used encoding, but this may not always be
correct.
@example
OUTPUT FD[=@var{n}] [--armor|--base64]
@end example
Set the file descriptor to be used for the output (i.e. the encrypted
message). Obviously the pipe must be open at that point, the server
establishes its own end. If the server returns an error he client
should consider this session failed.
The option armor encodes the output in @acronym{PEM} format, the
@code{--base64} option applies just a base 64 encoding. No option
creates binary output (@acronym{BER}).
The actual encryption is done using the command
@example
ENCRYPT
@end example
It takes the plaintext from the @code{INPUT} command, writes to the
ciphertext to the file descriptor set with the @code{OUTPUT} command,
take the recipients from all the recipients set so far. If this command
fails the clients should try to delete all output currently done or
otherwise mark it as invalid. @command{GPGSM} does ensure that there
will not be any
security problem with leftover data on the output in this case.
This command should in general not fail, as all necessary checks have
been done while setting the recipients. The input and output pipes are
closed.
@node GPGSM DECRYPT
@subsection Decrypting a message
Input and output FDs are set the same way as in encryption, but
@code{INPUT} refers to the ciphertext and output to the plaintext. There
is no need to set recipients. @command{GPGSM} automatically strips any
@acronym{S/MIME} headers from the input, so it is valid to pass an
entire MIME part to the INPUT pipe.
The encryption is done by using the command
@example
DECRYPT
@end example
It performs the decrypt operation after doing some check on the internal
state. (e.g. that all needed data has been set). Because it utilizes
the GPG-Agent for the session key decryption, there is no need to ask
the client for a protecting passphrase - GpgAgent takes care of this by
requesting this from the user.
@node GPGSM SIGN
@subsection Signing a Message
Signing is usually done with these commands:
@example
INPUT FD[=@var{n}] [--armor|--base64|--binary]
@end example
This tells @command{GPGSM} to read the data to sign from file descriptor @var{n}.
@example
OUTPUT FD[=@var{m}] [--armor|--base64]
@end example
Write the output to file descriptor @var{m}. If a detached signature is
requested, only the signature is written.
@example
SIGN [--detached]
@end example
Sign the data set with the INPUT command and write it to the sink set by
OUTPUT. With @code{--detached}, a detached signature is created
(surprise).
The key used for signing is the default one or the one specified in
the configuration file. To get finer control over the keys, it is
possible to use the command
@example
SIGNER @var{userID}
@end example
to the signer's key. @var{userID} should be the
internal representation of the key; the server may accept any other way
of specification. If this is a valid and trusted recipient the server
does respond with OK, otherwise the return is an ERR with the reason why
the key cannot be used, the signature will then not be created using
this key. If the policy is not to sign at all if not all
keys are valid, the client has to take care of this. All
@code{SIGNER} commands are cumulative until a @code{RESET} is done.
Note that a @code{SIGN} does not reset this list of signers which is in
contrats to the @code{RECIPIENT} command.
@node GPGSM VERIFY
@subsection Verifying a Message
To verify a mesage the command:
@example
VERIFY
@end example
is used. It does a verify operation on the message send to the input FD.
The result is written out using status lines. If an output FD was
given, the signed text will be written to that. If the signature is a
detached one, the server will inquire about the signed material and the
client must provide it.
@node GPGSM GENKEY
@subsection Generating a Key
This is used to generate a new keypair, store the secret part in the
@acronym{PSE} and the public key in the key database. We will probably
add optional commands to allow the client to select whether a hardware
token is used to store the key. Configuration options to
@command{GPGSM} can be used to restrict the use of this command.
@example
GENKEY
@end example
@command{GPGSM} checks whether this command is allowed and then does an
INQUIRY to get the key parameters, the client should then send the
key parameters in the native format:
@example
S: INQUIRE KEY_PARAM native
C: D foo:fgfgfg
C: D bar
C: END
@end example
Please note that the server may send Status info lines while reading the
data lines from the client. After this the key generation takes place
and the server eventually does send an ERR or OK response. Status lines
may be issued as a progress indicator.
@node GPGSM LISTKEYS
@subsection List available keys
@anchor{gpgsm-cmd listkeys}
To list the keys in the internal database or using an external key
provider, the command:
@example
LISTKEYS @var{pattern}
@end example
is used. To allow multiple patterns (which are ORed during the search)
quoting is required: Spaces are to be translated into "+" or into "%20";
in turn this requires that the usual escape quoting rules are done.
@example
LISTSECRETKEYS @var{pattern}
@end example
Lists only the keys where a secret key is available.
The list commands commands are affected by the option
@example
OPTION list-mode=@var{mode}
@end example
where mode may be:
@table @code
@item 0
Use default (which is usually the same as 1).
@item 1
List only the internal keys.
@item 2
List only the external keys.
@item 3
List internal and external keys.
@end table
Note that options are valid for the entire session.
@node GPGSM EXPORT
@subsection Export certificates
To export certificate from the internal key database the command:
@example
EXPORT [--data [--armor] [--base64]] [--] @var{pattern}
@end example
is used. To allow multiple patterns (which are ORed) quoting is
required: Spaces are to be translated into "+" or into "%20"; in turn
this requires that the usual escape quoting rules are done.
If the @option{--data} option has not been given, the format of the
output depends on what was set with the OUTPUT command. When using
@acronym{PEM} encoding a few informational lines are prepended.
If the @option{--data} has been given, a target set via OUTPUT is
ignored and the data is returned inline using standard
@code{D}-lines. This avoids the need for an extra file descriptor. In
this case the options @option{--armor} and @option{--base64} may be used
in the same way as with the OUTPUT command.
@node GPGSM IMPORT
@subsection Import certificates
To import certificates into the internal key database, the command
@example
IMPORT [--re-import]
@end example
is used. The data is expected on the file descriptor set with the
@code{INPUT} command. Certain checks are performed on the
certificate. Note that the code will also handle PKCS#12 files and
import private keys; a helper program is used for that.
With the option @option{--re-import} the input data is expected to a be
a linefeed separated list of fingerprints. The command will re-import
the corresponding certificates; that is they are made permanent by
removing their ephemeral flag.
@node GPGSM DELETE
@subsection Delete certificates
To delete a certificate the command
@example
DELKEYS @var{pattern}
@end example
is used. To allow multiple patterns (which are ORed) quoting is
required: Spaces are to be translated into "+" or into "%20"; in turn
this requires that the usual escape quoting rules are done.
The certificates must be specified unambiguously otherwise an error is
returned.
@node GPGSM GETAUDITLOG
@subsection Retrieve an audit log.
@anchor{gpgsm-cmd getauditlog}
This command is used to retrieve an audit log.
@example
GETAUDITLOG [--data] [--html]
@end example
If @option{--data} is used, the audit log is send using D-lines
instead of being sent to the file descriptor given by an OUTPUT
command. If @option{--html} is used, the output is formatted as an
XHTML block. This is designed to be incorporated into a HTML
document.
@node GPGSM GETINFO
@subsection Return information about the process
This is a multipurpose function to return a variety of information.
@example
GETINFO @var{what}
@end example
The value of @var{what} specifies the kind of information returned:
@table @code
@item version
Return the version of the program.
@item pid
Return the process id of the process.
@item agent-check
Return OK if the agent is running.
@item cmd_has_option @var{cmd} @var{opt}
Return OK if the command @var{cmd} implements the option @var{opt}.
The leading two dashes usually used with @var{opt} shall not be given.
@item offline
Return OK if the connection is in offline mode. This may be either
due to a @code{OPTION offline=1} or due to @command{gpgsm} being
started with option @option{--disable-dirmngr}.
@end table
@node GPGSM OPTION
@subsection Session options.
The standard Assuan option handler supports these options.
@example
OPTION @var{name}[=@var{value}]
@end example
These @var{name}s are recognized:
@table @code
@item putenv
Change the session's environment to be passed via gpg-agent to
Pinentry. @var{value} is a string of the form
@code{<KEY>[=[<STRING>]]}. If only @code{<KEY>} is given the
environment variable @code{<KEY>} is removed from the session
environment, if @code{<KEY>=} is given that environment variable is
set to the empty string, and if @code{<STRING>} is given it is set to
that string.
@item display
@efindex DISPLAY
Set the session environment variable @code{DISPLAY} is set to @var{value}.
@item ttyname
@efindex GPG_TTY
Set the session environment variable @code{GPG_TTY} is set to @var{value}.
@item ttytype
@efindex TERM
Set the session environment variable @code{TERM} is set to @var{value}.
@item lc-ctype
@efindex LC_CTYPE
Set the session environment variable @code{LC_CTYPE} is set to @var{value}.
@item lc-messages
@efindex LC_MESSAGES
Set the session environment variable @code{LC_MESSAGES} is set to @var{value}.
@item xauthority
@efindex XAUTHORITY
Set the session environment variable @code{XAUTHORITY} is set to @var{value}.
@item pinentry-user-data
@efindex PINENTRY_USER_DATA
Set the session environment variable @code{PINENTRY_USER_DATA} is set
to @var{value}.
@item include-certs
This option overrides the command line option
@option{--include-certs}. A @var{value} of -2 includes all
certificates except for the root certificate, -1 includes all
certicates, 0 does not include any certicates, 1 includes only the
signers certicate and all other positive values include up to
@var{value} certificates starting with the signer cert.
@item list-mode
@xref{gpgsm-cmd listkeys}.
@item list-to-output
If @var{value} is true the output of the list commands
(@pxref{gpgsm-cmd listkeys}) is written to the file descriptor set
with the last OUTPUT command. If @var{value} is false the output is
written via data lines; this is the default.
@item with-validation
If @var{value} is true for each listed certificate the validation
status is printed. This may result in the download of a CRL or the
user being asked about the trustworthiness of a root certificate. The
default is given by a command line option (@pxref{gpgsm-option
--with-validation}).
@item with-secret
If @var{value} is true certificates with a corresponding private key
are marked by the list commands.
@item validation-model
This option overrides the command line option
@option{validation-model} for the session.
(@pxref{gpgsm-option --validation-model}.)
@item with-key-data
This option globally enables the command line option
@option{--with-key-data}. (@pxref{gpgsm-option --with-key-data}.)
@item enable-audit-log
If @var{value} is true data to write an audit log is gathered.
(@pxref{gpgsm-cmd getauditlog}.)
@item allow-pinentry-notify
If this option is used notifications about the launch of a Pinentry
are passed back to the client.
@item with-ephemeral-keys
If @var{value} is true ephemeral certificates are included in the
output of the list commands.
@item no-encrypt-to
If this option is used all keys set by the command line option
@option{--encrypt-to} are ignored.
@item offline
If @var{value} is true or @var{value} is not given all network access
is disabled for this session. This is the same as the command line
option @option{--disable-dirmngr}.
@end table
@mansect see also
@ifset isman
@command{gpg2}(1),
@command{gpg-agent}(1)
@end ifset
@include see-also-note.texi
diff --git a/doc/instguide.texi b/doc/instguide.texi
index 76d8de159..99b8696e7 100644
--- a/doc/instguide.texi
+++ b/doc/instguide.texi
@@ -1,77 +1,77 @@
@c instguide.texi - Installation guide for GnuPG
@c Copyright (C) 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
@c This is part of the GnuPG manual.
@c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi.
@node Installation
@chapter A short installation guide.
Unfortunately the installation guide has not been finished in time.
Instead of delaying the release of GnuPG 2.0 even further, I decided to
release without that guide. The chapter on gpg-agent and gpgsm do
include brief information on how to set up the whole thing. Please
watch the GnuPG website for updates of the documentation. In the
meantime you may search the GnuPG mailing list archives or ask on the
gnupg-users mailing listsfor advise on how to solve problems or how to
get that whole thing up and running.
** Building the software
-Building the software is decribed in the file @file{INSTALL}. Given
+Building the software is described in the file @file{INSTALL}. Given
that you are already reading this documentation we can only give some
extra hints
To comply with the rules on GNU systems you should have build time
configured @command{gnupg} using:
@example
./configure --sysconfdir=/etc --localstatedir=/var
@end example
This is to make sure that system wide configuration files are searched
in the directory @file{/etc} and variable data below @file{/var};
the default would be to also install them below @file{/usr/local} where
the binaries get installed. If you selected to use the
@option{--prefix=/} you obviously don't need those option as they are
the default then.
** Notes on setting a root CA key to trusted
X.509 is based on a hierarchical key infrastructure. At the root of the
tree a trusted anchor (root certificate) is required. There are usually
no other means of verifying whether this root certificate is trustworthy
than looking it up in a list. GnuPG uses a file (@file{trustlist.txt})
to keep track of all root certificates it knows about. There are 3 ways
to get certificates into this list:
@itemize
@item
Use the list which comes with GnuPG. However this list only
contains a few root certificates. Most installations will need more.
@item
Let @command{gpgsm} ask you whether you want to insert a new root
certificate. This feature is enabled by default; you may disable it
using the option @option{no-allow-mark-trusted} into
@file{gpg-agent.conf}.
@item
Manually maintain the list of trusted root certificates. For a multi
user installation this can be done once for all users on a machine.
Specific changes on a per-user base are also possible.
@end itemize
-@c decribe how to maintain trustlist.txt and /etc/gnupg/trustlist.txt.
+@c describe how to maintain trustlist.txt and /etc/gnupg/trustlist.txt.
@c ** How to get the ssh support running
@c
@c XXX How to use the ssh support.
@c @section Installation Overview
@c
@c XXXX
diff --git a/g10/armor.c b/g10/armor.c
index 9e58520a3..55c84258b 100644
--- a/g10/armor.c
+++ b/g10/armor.c
@@ -1,1568 +1,1568 @@
/* armor.c - Armor flter
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
* 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include "gpg.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "iobuf.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "filter.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#define MAX_LINELEN 20000
#define CRCINIT 0xB704CE
#define CRCPOLY 0X864CFB
#define CRCUPDATE(a,c) do { \
a = ((a) << 8) ^ crc_table[((a)&0xff >> 16) ^ (c)]; \
a &= 0x00ffffff; \
} while(0)
static u32 crc_table[256];
static byte bintoasc[] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
"0123456789+/";
static byte asctobin[256]; /* runtime initialized */
static int is_initialized;
typedef enum {
fhdrHASArmor = 0,
fhdrNOArmor,
fhdrINIT,
fhdrINITCont,
fhdrINITSkip,
fhdrCHECKBegin,
fhdrWAITHeader,
fhdrWAITClearsig,
fhdrSKIPHeader,
fhdrCLEARSIG,
fhdrREADClearsig,
fhdrNullClearsig,
fhdrEMPTYClearsig,
fhdrCHECKClearsig,
fhdrCHECKClearsig2,
fhdrCHECKDashEscaped,
fhdrCHECKDashEscaped2,
fhdrCHECKDashEscaped3,
fhdrREADClearsigNext,
fhdrENDClearsig,
fhdrENDClearsigHelp,
fhdrTESTSpaces,
fhdrCLEARSIGSimple,
fhdrCLEARSIGSimpleNext,
fhdrTEXT,
fhdrTEXTSimple,
fhdrERROR,
fhdrERRORShow,
fhdrEOF
} fhdr_state_t;
/* if we encounter this armor string with this index, go
* into a mode which fakes packets and wait for the next armor */
#define BEGIN_SIGNATURE 2
#define BEGIN_SIGNED_MSG_IDX 3
static char *head_strings[] = {
"BEGIN PGP MESSAGE",
"BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK",
"BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE",
"BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE",
"BEGIN PGP ARMORED FILE", /* gnupg extension */
"BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK",
"BEGIN PGP SECRET KEY BLOCK", /* only used by pgp2 */
NULL
};
static char *tail_strings[] = {
"END PGP MESSAGE",
"END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK",
"END PGP SIGNATURE",
"END dummy",
"END PGP ARMORED FILE",
"END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK",
"END PGP SECRET KEY BLOCK",
NULL
};
static int armor_filter ( void *opaque, int control,
iobuf_t chain, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len);
/* Create a new context for armor filters. */
armor_filter_context_t *
new_armor_context (void)
{
armor_filter_context_t *afx;
afx = xcalloc (1, sizeof *afx);
afx->refcount = 1;
return afx;
}
/* Release an armor filter context. Passing NULL is explicitly
allowed and a no-op. */
void
release_armor_context (armor_filter_context_t *afx)
{
if (!afx)
return;
log_assert (afx->refcount);
if ( --afx->refcount )
return;
xfree (afx);
}
/* Push the armor filter onto the iobuf stream IOBUF. */
int
push_armor_filter (armor_filter_context_t *afx, iobuf_t iobuf)
{
int rc;
afx->refcount++;
rc = iobuf_push_filter (iobuf, armor_filter, afx);
if (rc)
afx->refcount--;
return rc;
}
static void
initialize(void)
{
int i, j;
u32 t;
byte *s;
/* init the crc lookup table */
crc_table[0] = 0;
for(i=j=0; j < 128; j++ ) {
t = crc_table[j];
if( t & 0x00800000 ) {
t <<= 1;
crc_table[i++] = t ^ CRCPOLY;
crc_table[i++] = t;
}
else {
t <<= 1;
crc_table[i++] = t;
crc_table[i++] = t ^ CRCPOLY;
}
}
/* build the helptable for radix64 to bin conversion */
for(i=0; i < 256; i++ )
asctobin[i] = 255; /* used to detect invalid characters */
for(s=bintoasc,i=0; *s; s++,i++ )
asctobin[*s] = i;
is_initialized=1;
}
/*
* Check whether this is an armored file. See also
* parse-packet.c for details on this code.
*
* Note that the buffer BUF needs to be at least 2 bytes long. If in
* doubt that the second byte to 0.
*
* Returns: True if it seems to be armored
*/
static int
is_armored (const byte *buf)
{
int ctb, pkttype;
int indeterminate_length_allowed;
ctb = *buf;
if( !(ctb & 0x80) )
/* The most significant bit of the CTB must be set. Since it is
cleared, this is not a binary OpenPGP message. Assume it is
armored. */
return 1;
pkttype = ctb & 0x40 ? (ctb & 0x3f) : ((ctb>>2)&0xf);
switch( pkttype ) {
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
case PKT_SIGNATURE:
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG:
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
case PKT_MARKER:
case PKT_RING_TRUST:
case PKT_USER_ID:
case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
case PKT_ATTRIBUTE:
case PKT_MDC:
indeterminate_length_allowed = 0;
break;
case PKT_COMPRESSED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
case PKT_PLAINTEXT:
case PKT_OLD_COMMENT:
case PKT_COMMENT:
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL:
indeterminate_length_allowed = 1;
break;
default:
/* Invalid packet type. */
return 1;
}
if (! indeterminate_length_allowed)
/* It is only legal to use an indeterminate length with a few
packet types. If a packet uses an indeterminate length, but
that is not allowed, then the data is not valid binary
OpenPGP data. */
{
int new_format;
int indeterminate_length;
new_format = !! (ctb & (1 << 6));
if (new_format)
indeterminate_length = (buf[1] >= 224 && buf[1] < 255);
else
indeterminate_length = (ctb & 3) == 3;
if (indeterminate_length)
return 1;
}
/* The first CTB seems legit. It is probably not armored
data. */
return 0;
}
/****************
* Try to check whether the iobuf is armored
* Returns true if this may be the case; the caller should use the
* filter to do further processing.
*/
int
use_armor_filter( IOBUF a )
{
byte buf[2];
int n;
/* fixme: there might be a problem with iobuf_peek */
n = iobuf_peek (a, buf, 2);
if( n == -1 )
return 0; /* EOF, doesn't matter whether armored or not */
if( !n )
return 1; /* can't check it: try armored */
if (n != 2)
return 0; /* short buffer */
return is_armored(buf);
}
static void
invalid_armor(void)
{
write_status(STATUS_BADARMOR);
g10_exit(1); /* stop here */
}
/****************
* check whether the armor header is valid on a signed message.
* this is for security reasons: the header lines are not included in the
* hash and by using some creative formatting rules, Mallory could fake
* any text at the beginning of a document; assuming it is read with
* a simple viewer. We only allow the Hash Header.
*/
static int
parse_hash_header( const char *line )
{
const char *s, *s2;
unsigned found = 0;
if( strlen(line) < 6 || strlen(line) > 60 )
return 0; /* too short or too long */
if( memcmp( line, "Hash:", 5 ) )
return 0; /* invalid header */
for(s=line+5;;s=s2) {
for(; *s && (*s==' ' || *s == '\t'); s++ )
;
if( !*s )
break;
for(s2=s+1; *s2 && *s2!=' ' && *s2 != '\t' && *s2 != ','; s2++ )
;
if( !strncmp( s, "RIPEMD160", s2-s ) )
found |= 1;
else if( !strncmp( s, "SHA1", s2-s ) )
found |= 2;
else if( !strncmp( s, "SHA224", s2-s ) )
found |= 8;
else if( !strncmp( s, "SHA256", s2-s ) )
found |= 16;
else if( !strncmp( s, "SHA384", s2-s ) )
found |= 32;
else if( !strncmp( s, "SHA512", s2-s ) )
found |= 64;
else
return 0;
for(; *s2 && (*s2==' ' || *s2 == '\t'); s2++ )
;
if( *s2 && *s2 != ',' )
return 0;
if( *s2 )
s2++;
}
return found;
}
/* Returns true if this is a valid armor tag as per RFC-2440bis-21. */
static int
is_armor_tag(const char *line)
{
if(strncmp(line,"Version",7)==0
|| strncmp(line,"Comment",7)==0
|| strncmp(line,"MessageID",9)==0
|| strncmp(line,"Hash",4)==0
|| strncmp(line,"Charset",7)==0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/****************
* Check whether this is a armor line.
* returns: -1 if it is not a armor header or the index number of the
* armor header.
*/
static int
is_armor_header( byte *line, unsigned len )
{
const char *s;
byte *save_p, *p;
int save_c;
int i;
if( len < 15 )
return -1; /* too short */
if( memcmp( line, "-----", 5 ) )
return -1; /* no */
p = strstr( line+5, "-----");
if( !p )
return -1;
save_p = p;
p += 5;
/* Some Windows environments seem to add whitespace to the end of
the line, so we strip it here. This becomes strict if
--rfc2440 is set since 2440 reads "The header lines, therefore,
MUST start at the beginning of a line, and MUST NOT have text
following them on the same line." It is unclear whether "text"
refers to all text or just non-whitespace text. 4880 clarified
this was only non-whitespace text. */
if(RFC2440)
{
if( *p == '\r' )
p++;
if( *p == '\n' )
p++;
}
else
while(*p==' ' || *p=='\r' || *p=='\n' || *p=='\t')
p++;
if( *p )
return -1; /* garbage after dashes */
save_c = *save_p; *save_p = 0;
p = line+5;
for(i=0; (s=head_strings[i]); i++ )
if( !strcmp(s, p) )
break;
*save_p = save_c;
if( !s )
return -1; /* unknown armor line */
if( opt.verbose > 1 )
log_info(_("armor: %s\n"), head_strings[i]);
return i;
}
/****************
* Parse a header lines
* Return 0: Empty line (end of header lines)
* -1: invalid header line
* >0: Good header line
*/
static int
parse_header_line( armor_filter_context_t *afx, byte *line, unsigned int len )
{
byte *p;
int hashes=0;
unsigned int len2;
len2 = length_sans_trailing_ws ( line, len );
if( !len2 ) {
afx->buffer_pos = len2; /* (it is not the fine way to do it here) */
return 0; /* WS only: same as empty line */
}
/*
This is fussy. The spec says that a header line is delimited
with a colon-space pair. This means that a line such as
"Comment: " (with nothing else) is actually legal as an empty
string comment. However, email and cut-and-paste being what it
is, that trailing space may go away. Therefore, we accept empty
headers delimited with only a colon. --rfc2440, as always,
makes this strict and enforces the colon-space pair. -dms
*/
p = strchr( line, ':');
if( !p || (RFC2440 && p[1]!=' ')
|| (!RFC2440 && p[1]!=' ' && p[1]!='\n' && p[1]!='\r'))
{
log_error (_("invalid armor header: "));
es_write_sanitized (log_get_stream (), line, len, NULL, NULL);
log_printf ("\n");
return -1;
}
/* Chop off the whitespace we detected before */
len=len2;
line[len2]='\0';
if( opt.verbose ) {
log_info(_("armor header: "));
es_write_sanitized (log_get_stream (), line, len, NULL, NULL);
log_printf ("\n");
}
if( afx->in_cleartext )
{
if( (hashes=parse_hash_header( line )) )
afx->hashes |= hashes;
else if( strlen(line) > 15 && !memcmp( line, "NotDashEscaped:", 15 ) )
afx->not_dash_escaped = 1;
else
{
log_error(_("invalid clearsig header\n"));
return -1;
}
}
else if(!is_armor_tag(line))
{
/* Section 6.2: "Unknown keys should be reported to the user,
but OpenPGP should continue to process the message." Note
that in a clearsigned message this applies to the signature
part (i.e. "BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE") and not the signed data
("BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE"). The only key allowed in the
signed data section is "Hash". */
log_info(_("unknown armor header: "));
es_write_sanitized (log_get_stream (), line, len, NULL, NULL);
log_printf ("\n");
}
return 1;
}
/* figure out whether the data is armored or not */
static int
check_input( armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF a )
{
int rc = 0;
int i;
byte *line;
unsigned len;
unsigned maxlen;
int hdr_line = -1;
/* read the first line to see whether this is armored data */
maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
len = afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
&afx->buffer_size, &maxlen );
line = afx->buffer;
if( !maxlen ) {
/* line has been truncated: assume not armored */
afx->inp_checked = 1;
afx->inp_bypass = 1;
return 0;
}
if( !len ) {
return -1; /* eof */
}
/* (the line is always a C string but maybe longer) */
if( *line == '\n' || ( len && (*line == '\r' && line[1]=='\n') ) )
;
else if (len >= 2 && !is_armored (line)) {
afx->inp_checked = 1;
afx->inp_bypass = 1;
return 0;
}
/* find the armor header */
while(len) {
i = is_armor_header( line, len );
if( i >= 0 && !(afx->only_keyblocks && i != 1 && i != 5 && i != 6 )) {
hdr_line = i;
if( hdr_line == BEGIN_SIGNED_MSG_IDX ) {
if( afx->in_cleartext ) {
log_error(_("nested clear text signatures\n"));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARMOR);
}
afx->in_cleartext = 1;
}
break;
}
/* read the next line (skip all truncated lines) */
do {
maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
&afx->buffer_size, &maxlen );
line = afx->buffer;
len = afx->buffer_len;
} while( !maxlen );
}
/* Parse the header lines. */
while(len) {
/* Read the next line (skip all truncated lines). */
do {
maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
&afx->buffer_size, &maxlen );
line = afx->buffer;
len = afx->buffer_len;
} while( !maxlen );
i = parse_header_line( afx, line, len );
if( i <= 0 ) {
if (i && RFC2440)
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_ARMOR;
break;
}
}
if( rc )
invalid_armor();
else if( afx->in_cleartext )
afx->faked = 1;
else {
afx->inp_checked = 1;
afx->crc = CRCINIT;
afx->idx = 0;
afx->radbuf[0] = 0;
}
return rc;
}
#define PARTIAL_CHUNK 512
#define PARTIAL_POW 9
/****************
* Fake a literal data packet and wait for the next armor line
* fixme: empty line handling and null length clear text signature are
* not implemented/checked.
*/
static int
fake_packet( armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF a,
size_t *retn, byte *buf, size_t size )
{
int rc = 0;
size_t len = 0;
int lastline = 0;
unsigned maxlen, n;
byte *p;
byte tempbuf[PARTIAL_CHUNK];
size_t tempbuf_len=0;
while( !rc && size-len>=(PARTIAL_CHUNK+1)) {
/* copy what we have in the line buffer */
if( afx->faked == 1 )
afx->faked++; /* skip the first (empty) line */
else
{
/* It's full, so write this partial chunk */
if(tempbuf_len==PARTIAL_CHUNK)
{
buf[len++]=0xE0+PARTIAL_POW;
memcpy(&buf[len],tempbuf,PARTIAL_CHUNK);
len+=PARTIAL_CHUNK;
tempbuf_len=0;
continue;
}
while( tempbuf_len < PARTIAL_CHUNK
&& afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len )
tempbuf[tempbuf_len++] = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
if( tempbuf_len==PARTIAL_CHUNK )
continue;
}
/* read the next line */
maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
afx->buffer_pos = 0;
afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
&afx->buffer_size, &maxlen );
if( !afx->buffer_len ) {
rc = -1; /* eof (should not happen) */
continue;
}
if( !maxlen )
afx->truncated++;
p = afx->buffer;
n = afx->buffer_len;
/* Armor header or dash-escaped line? */
if(p[0]=='-')
{
/* 2440bis-10: When reversing dash-escaping, an
implementation MUST strip the string "- " if it occurs
at the beginning of a line, and SHOULD warn on "-" and
any character other than a space at the beginning of a
line. */
if(p[1]==' ' && !afx->not_dash_escaped)
{
/* It's a dash-escaped line, so skip over the
escape. */
afx->buffer_pos = 2;
}
else if(p[1]=='-' && p[2]=='-' && p[3]=='-' && p[4]=='-')
{
/* Five dashes in a row mean it's probably armor
header. */
int type = is_armor_header( p, n );
if( afx->not_dash_escaped && type != BEGIN_SIGNATURE )
; /* this is okay */
else
{
if( type != BEGIN_SIGNATURE )
{
log_info(_("unexpected armor: "));
es_write_sanitized (log_get_stream (), p, n,
NULL, NULL);
log_printf ("\n");
}
lastline = 1;
rc = -1;
}
}
else if(!afx->not_dash_escaped)
{
/* Bad dash-escaping. */
log_info (_("invalid dash escaped line: "));
es_write_sanitized (log_get_stream (), p, n, NULL, NULL);
log_printf ("\n");
}
}
/* Now handle the end-of-line canonicalization */
if( !afx->not_dash_escaped )
{
int crlf = n > 1 && p[n-2] == '\r' && p[n-1]=='\n';
afx->buffer_len=
trim_trailing_chars( &p[afx->buffer_pos], n-afx->buffer_pos,
" \t\r\n");
afx->buffer_len+=afx->buffer_pos;
/* the buffer is always allocated with enough space to append
* the removed [CR], LF and a Nul
* The reason for this complicated procedure is to keep at least
* the original type of lineending - handling of the removed
* trailing spaces seems to be impossible in our method
* of faking a packet; either we have to use a temporary file
* or calculate the hash here in this module and somehow find
* a way to send the hash down the processing line (well, a special
* faked packet could do the job).
*/
if( crlf )
afx->buffer[afx->buffer_len++] = '\r';
afx->buffer[afx->buffer_len++] = '\n';
afx->buffer[afx->buffer_len] = '\0';
}
}
if( lastline ) { /* write last (ending) length header */
if(tempbuf_len<192)
buf[len++]=tempbuf_len;
else
{
buf[len++]=((tempbuf_len-192)/256) + 192;
buf[len++]=(tempbuf_len-192) % 256;
}
memcpy(&buf[len],tempbuf,tempbuf_len);
len+=tempbuf_len;
rc = 0;
afx->faked = 0;
afx->in_cleartext = 0;
/* and now read the header lines */
afx->buffer_pos = 0;
for(;;) {
int i;
/* read the next line (skip all truncated lines) */
do {
maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
&afx->buffer_size, &maxlen );
} while( !maxlen );
p = afx->buffer;
n = afx->buffer_len;
if( !n ) {
rc = -1;
break; /* eof */
}
i = parse_header_line( afx, p , n );
if( i <= 0 ) {
if( i )
invalid_armor();
break;
}
}
afx->inp_checked = 1;
afx->crc = CRCINIT;
afx->idx = 0;
afx->radbuf[0] = 0;
}
*retn = len;
return rc;
}
static int
invalid_crc(void)
{
if ( opt.ignore_crc_error )
return 0;
log_inc_errorcount();
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARMOR);
}
static int
radix64_read( armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF a, size_t *retn,
byte *buf, size_t size )
{
byte val;
int c=0, c2; /*init c because gcc is not clever enough for the continue*/
int checkcrc=0;
int rc = 0;
size_t n = 0;
int idx, i, onlypad=0;
u32 crc;
crc = afx->crc;
idx = afx->idx;
val = afx->radbuf[0];
for( n=0; n < size; ) {
if( afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len )
c = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
else { /* read the next line */
unsigned maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
afx->buffer_pos = 0;
afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
&afx->buffer_size, &maxlen );
if( !maxlen )
afx->truncated++;
if( !afx->buffer_len )
break; /* eof */
continue;
}
again:
if( c == '\n' || c == ' ' || c == '\r' || c == '\t' )
continue;
else if( c == '=' ) { /* pad character: stop */
/* some mailers leave quoted-printable encoded characters
* so we try to workaround this */
if( afx->buffer_pos+2 < afx->buffer_len ) {
int cc1, cc2, cc3;
cc1 = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos];
cc2 = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos+1];
cc3 = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos+2];
if( isxdigit(cc1) && isxdigit(cc2)
&& strchr( "=\n\r\t ", cc3 )) {
/* well it seems to be the case - adjust */
c = isdigit(cc1)? (cc1 - '0'): (ascii_toupper(cc1)-'A'+10);
c <<= 4;
c |= isdigit(cc2)? (cc2 - '0'): (ascii_toupper(cc2)-'A'+10);
afx->buffer_pos += 2;
afx->qp_detected = 1;
goto again;
}
}
/* Occasionally a bug MTA will leave the = escaped as
=3D. If the 4 characters following that are valid
Radix64 characters and they are following by a new
line, assume that this is the case and skip the
3D. */
if (afx->buffer_pos + 6 < afx->buffer_len
&& afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos + 0] == '3'
&& afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos + 1] == 'D'
&& asctobin[afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos + 2]] != 255
&& asctobin[afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos + 3]] != 255
&& asctobin[afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos + 4]] != 255
&& asctobin[afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos + 5]] != 255
&& afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos + 6] == '\n')
{
afx->buffer_pos += 2;
afx->qp_detected = 1;
}
if (!n)
onlypad = 1;
if( idx == 1 )
buf[n++] = val;
checkcrc++;
break;
}
else if( (c = asctobin[(c2=c)]) == 255 ) {
log_error(_("invalid radix64 character %02X skipped\n"), c2);
continue;
}
switch(idx) {
case 0: val = c << 2; break;
case 1: val |= (c>>4)&3; buf[n++]=val;val=(c<<4)&0xf0;break;
case 2: val |= (c>>2)&15; buf[n++]=val;val=(c<<6)&0xc0;break;
case 3: val |= c&0x3f; buf[n++] = val; break;
}
idx = (idx+1) % 4;
}
for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
crc = (crc << 8) ^ crc_table[((crc >> 16)&0xff) ^ buf[i]];
crc &= 0x00ffffff;
afx->crc = crc;
afx->idx = idx;
afx->radbuf[0] = val;
if( checkcrc ) {
afx->any_data = 1;
afx->inp_checked=0;
afx->faked = 0;
for(;;) { /* skip lf and pad characters */
if( afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len )
c = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
else { /* read the next line */
unsigned maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
afx->buffer_pos = 0;
afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
&afx->buffer_size, &maxlen );
if( !maxlen )
afx->truncated++;
if( !afx->buffer_len )
break; /* eof */
continue;
}
if( c == '\n' || c == ' ' || c == '\r'
|| c == '\t' || c == '=' )
continue;
break;
}
if( c == -1 )
log_error(_("premature eof (no CRC)\n"));
else {
u32 mycrc = 0;
idx = 0;
do {
if( (c = asctobin[c]) == 255 )
break;
switch(idx) {
case 0: val = c << 2; break;
case 1: val |= (c>>4)&3; mycrc |= val << 16;val=(c<<4)&0xf0;break;
case 2: val |= (c>>2)&15; mycrc |= val << 8;val=(c<<6)&0xc0;break;
case 3: val |= c&0x3f; mycrc |= val; break;
}
for(;;) {
if( afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len )
c = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
else { /* read the next line */
unsigned maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
afx->buffer_pos = 0;
afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
&afx->buffer_size,
&maxlen );
if( !maxlen )
afx->truncated++;
if( !afx->buffer_len )
break; /* eof */
continue;
}
break;
}
if( !afx->buffer_len )
break; /* eof */
} while( ++idx < 4 );
if( c == -1 ) {
log_info(_("premature eof (in CRC)\n"));
rc = invalid_crc();
}
else if( idx == 0 ) {
/* No CRC at all is legal ("MAY") */
rc=0;
}
else if( idx != 4 ) {
log_info(_("malformed CRC\n"));
rc = invalid_crc();
}
else if( mycrc != afx->crc ) {
log_info (_("CRC error; %06lX - %06lX\n"),
(ulong)afx->crc, (ulong)mycrc);
rc = invalid_crc();
}
else {
rc = 0;
/* FIXME: Here we should emit another control packet,
* so that we know in mainproc that we are processing
* a clearsign message */
#if 0
for(rc=0;!rc;) {
rc = 0 /*check_trailer( &fhdr, c )*/;
if( !rc ) {
if( (c=iobuf_get(a)) == -1 )
rc = 2;
}
}
if( rc == -1 )
rc = 0;
else if( rc == 2 ) {
log_error(_("premature eof (in trailer)\n"));
rc = GPG_ERR_INVALID_ARMOR;
}
else {
log_error(_("error in trailer line\n"));
rc = GPG_ERR_INVALID_ARMOR;
}
#endif
}
}
}
if( !n && !onlypad )
rc = -1;
*retn = n;
return rc;
}
/****************
* This filter is used to handle the armor stuff
*/
static int
armor_filter( void *opaque, int control,
IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
{
size_t size = *ret_len;
armor_filter_context_t *afx = opaque;
int rc=0, i, c;
byte radbuf[3];
int idx, idx2;
size_t n=0;
u32 crc;
#if 0
static FILE *fp ;
if( !fp ) {
fp = fopen("armor.out", "w");
assert(fp);
}
#endif
if( DBG_FILTER )
log_debug("armor-filter: control: %d\n", control );
if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW && afx->inp_bypass ) {
n = 0;
if( afx->buffer_len ) {
for(; n < size && afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len; n++ )
buf[n++] = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
if( afx->buffer_pos >= afx->buffer_len )
afx->buffer_len = 0;
}
for(; n < size; n++ ) {
if( (c=iobuf_get(a)) == -1 )
break;
buf[n] = c & 0xff;
}
if( !n )
rc = -1;
*ret_len = n;
}
else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) {
/* We need some space for the faked packet. The minmum
* required size is the PARTIAL_CHUNK size plus a byte for the
* length itself */
if( size < PARTIAL_CHUNK+1 )
BUG(); /* supplied buffer too short */
if( afx->faked )
rc = fake_packet( afx, a, &n, buf, size );
else if( !afx->inp_checked ) {
rc = check_input( afx, a );
if( afx->inp_bypass ) {
for(n=0; n < size && afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len; )
buf[n++] = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
if( afx->buffer_pos >= afx->buffer_len )
afx->buffer_len = 0;
if( !n )
rc = -1;
}
else if( afx->faked ) {
unsigned int hashes = afx->hashes;
const byte *sesmark;
size_t sesmarklen;
sesmark = get_session_marker( &sesmarklen );
if ( sesmarklen > 20 )
BUG();
/* the buffer is at least 15+n*15 bytes long, so it
* is easy to construct the packets */
hashes &= 1|2|8|16|32|64;
if( !hashes ) {
hashes |= 2; /* Default to SHA-1. */
}
n=0;
/* First a gpg control packet... */
buf[n++] = 0xff; /* new format, type 63, 1 length byte */
n++; /* see below */
memcpy(buf+n, sesmark, sesmarklen ); n+= sesmarklen;
buf[n++] = CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START;
buf[n++] = afx->not_dash_escaped? 0:1; /* sigclass */
if( hashes & 1 )
buf[n++] = DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160;
if( hashes & 2 )
buf[n++] = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
if( hashes & 8 )
buf[n++] = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA224;
if( hashes & 16 )
buf[n++] = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256;
if( hashes & 32 )
buf[n++] = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA384;
if( hashes & 64 )
buf[n++] = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512;
buf[1] = n - 2;
/* ...followed by an invented plaintext packet.
Amusingly enough, this packet is not compliant with
2440 as the initial partial length is less than 512
bytes. Of course, we'll accept it anyway ;) */
buf[n++] = 0xCB; /* new packet format, type 11 */
buf[n++] = 0xE1; /* 2^1 == 2 bytes */
buf[n++] = 't'; /* canonical text mode */
buf[n++] = 0; /* namelength */
buf[n++] = 0xE2; /* 2^2 == 4 more bytes */
memset(buf+n, 0, 4); /* timestamp */
n += 4;
}
else if( !rc )
rc = radix64_read( afx, a, &n, buf, size );
}
else
rc = radix64_read( afx, a, &n, buf, size );
#if 0
if( n )
if( fwrite(buf, n, 1, fp ) != 1 )
BUG();
#endif
*ret_len = n;
}
else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FLUSH && !afx->cancel ) {
if( !afx->status ) { /* write the header line */
const char *s;
strlist_t comment=opt.comments;
if( afx->what >= DIM(head_strings) )
log_bug("afx->what=%d", afx->what);
iobuf_writestr(a, "-----");
iobuf_writestr(a, head_strings[afx->what] );
iobuf_writestr(a, "-----" );
iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
if (opt.emit_version)
{
iobuf_writestr (a, "Version: "GNUPG_NAME" v");
for (s=VERSION; *s && *s != '.'; s++)
iobuf_writebyte (a, *s);
if (opt.emit_version > 1 && *s)
{
iobuf_writebyte (a, *s++);
for (; *s && *s != '.'; s++)
iobuf_writebyte (a, *s);
if (opt.emit_version > 2)
{
for (; *s && *s != '-' && !spacep (s); s++)
iobuf_writebyte (a, *s);
if (opt.emit_version > 3)
iobuf_writestr (a, " (" PRINTABLE_OS_NAME ")");
}
}
iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
}
/* write the comment strings */
for(s=comment->d;comment;comment=comment->next,s=comment->d)
{
iobuf_writestr(a, "Comment: " );
for( ; *s; s++ )
{
if( *s == '\n' )
iobuf_writestr(a, "\\n" );
else if( *s == '\r' )
iobuf_writestr(a, "\\r" );
else if( *s == '\v' )
iobuf_writestr(a, "\\v" );
else
iobuf_put(a, *s );
}
iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
}
if ( afx->hdrlines ) {
for ( s = afx->hdrlines; *s; s++ ) {
#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
if ( *s == '\n' )
iobuf_put( a, '\r');
#endif
iobuf_put(a, *s );
}
}
iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
afx->status++;
afx->idx = 0;
afx->idx2 = 0;
afx->crc = CRCINIT;
}
crc = afx->crc;
idx = afx->idx;
idx2 = afx->idx2;
for(i=0; i < idx; i++ )
radbuf[i] = afx->radbuf[i];
for(i=0; i < size; i++ )
crc = (crc << 8) ^ crc_table[((crc >> 16)&0xff) ^ buf[i]];
crc &= 0x00ffffff;
for( ; size; buf++, size-- ) {
radbuf[idx++] = *buf;
if( idx > 2 ) {
idx = 0;
c = bintoasc[(*radbuf >> 2) & 077];
iobuf_put(a, c);
c = bintoasc[(((*radbuf<<4)&060)|((radbuf[1] >> 4)&017))&077];
iobuf_put(a, c);
c = bintoasc[(((radbuf[1]<<2)&074)|((radbuf[2]>>6)&03))&077];
iobuf_put(a, c);
c = bintoasc[radbuf[2]&077];
iobuf_put(a, c);
if( ++idx2 >= (64/4) )
{ /* pgp doesn't like 72 here */
iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
idx2=0;
}
}
}
for(i=0; i < idx; i++ )
afx->radbuf[i] = radbuf[i];
afx->idx = idx;
afx->idx2 = idx2;
afx->crc = crc;
}
else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_INIT )
{
if( !is_initialized )
initialize();
/* Figure out what we're using for line endings if the caller
didn't specify. */
if(afx->eol[0]==0)
{
#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
afx->eol[0]='\r';
afx->eol[1]='\n';
#else
afx->eol[0]='\n';
#endif
}
}
else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_CANCEL ) {
afx->cancel = 1;
}
else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE ) {
if( afx->cancel )
;
else if( afx->status ) { /* pad, write cecksum, and bottom line */
crc = afx->crc;
idx = afx->idx;
idx2 = afx->idx2;
if( idx ) {
c = bintoasc[(afx->radbuf[0]>>2)&077];
iobuf_put(a, c);
if( idx == 1 ) {
c = bintoasc[((afx->radbuf[0] << 4) & 060) & 077];
iobuf_put(a, c);
iobuf_put(a, '=');
iobuf_put(a, '=');
}
else { /* 2 */
c = bintoasc[(((afx->radbuf[0]<<4)&060)
|((afx->radbuf[1]>>4)&017))&077];
iobuf_put(a, c);
c = bintoasc[((afx->radbuf[1] << 2) & 074) & 077];
iobuf_put(a, c);
iobuf_put(a, '=');
}
if( ++idx2 >= (64/4) )
{ /* pgp doesn't like 72 here */
iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
idx2=0;
}
}
/* may need a linefeed */
if( idx2 )
iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
/* write the CRC */
iobuf_put(a, '=');
radbuf[0] = crc >>16;
radbuf[1] = crc >> 8;
radbuf[2] = crc;
c = bintoasc[(*radbuf >> 2) & 077];
iobuf_put(a, c);
c = bintoasc[(((*radbuf<<4)&060)|((radbuf[1] >> 4)&017))&077];
iobuf_put(a, c);
c = bintoasc[(((radbuf[1]<<2)&074)|((radbuf[2]>>6)&03))&077];
iobuf_put(a, c);
c = bintoasc[radbuf[2]&077];
iobuf_put(a, c);
iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
/* and the the trailer */
if( afx->what >= DIM(tail_strings) )
log_bug("afx->what=%d", afx->what);
iobuf_writestr(a, "-----");
iobuf_writestr(a, tail_strings[afx->what] );
iobuf_writestr(a, "-----" );
iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
}
else if( !afx->any_data && !afx->inp_bypass ) {
log_error(_("no valid OpenPGP data found.\n"));
afx->no_openpgp_data = 1;
write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "1" );
}
if( afx->truncated )
log_info(_("invalid armor: line longer than %d characters\n"),
MAX_LINELEN );
/* issue an error to enforce dissemination of correct software */
if( afx->qp_detected )
log_error(_("quoted printable character in armor - "
"probably a buggy MTA has been used\n") );
xfree( afx->buffer );
afx->buffer = NULL;
release_armor_context (afx);
}
else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC )
mem2str (buf, "armor_filter", *ret_len);
return rc;
}
/****************
* create a radix64 encoded string.
*/
char *
make_radix64_string( const byte *data, size_t len )
{
char *buffer, *p;
buffer = p = xmalloc( (len+2)/3*4 + 1 );
for( ; len >= 3 ; len -= 3, data += 3 ) {
*p++ = bintoasc[(data[0] >> 2) & 077];
*p++ = bintoasc[(((data[0] <<4)&060)|((data[1] >> 4)&017))&077];
*p++ = bintoasc[(((data[1]<<2)&074)|((data[2]>>6)&03))&077];
*p++ = bintoasc[data[2]&077];
}
if( len == 2 ) {
*p++ = bintoasc[(data[0] >> 2) & 077];
*p++ = bintoasc[(((data[0] <<4)&060)|((data[1] >> 4)&017))&077];
*p++ = bintoasc[((data[1]<<2)&074)];
}
else if( len == 1 ) {
*p++ = bintoasc[(data[0] >> 2) & 077];
*p++ = bintoasc[(data[0] <<4)&060];
}
*p = 0;
return buffer;
}
/***********************************************
* For the pipemode command we can't use the armor filter for various
* reasons, so we use this new unarmor_pump stuff to remove the armor
*/
enum unarmor_state_e {
STA_init = 0,
STA_bypass,
STA_wait_newline,
STA_wait_dash,
STA_first_dash,
STA_compare_header,
STA_found_header_wait_newline,
STA_skip_header_lines,
STA_skip_header_lines_non_ws,
STA_read_data,
STA_wait_crc,
STA_read_crc,
STA_ready
};
struct unarmor_pump_s {
enum unarmor_state_e state;
byte val;
int checkcrc;
int pos; /* counts from 0..3 */
u32 crc;
u32 mycrc; /* the one store in the data */
};
UnarmorPump
unarmor_pump_new (void)
{
UnarmorPump x;
if( !is_initialized )
initialize();
x = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *x);
return x;
}
void
unarmor_pump_release (UnarmorPump x)
{
xfree (x);
}
/*
* Get the next character from the ascii armor taken from the IOBUF
* created earlier by unarmor_pump_new().
* Return: c = Character
* 256 = ignore this value
* -1 = End of current armor
* -2 = Premature EOF (not used)
* -3 = Invalid armor
*/
int
unarmor_pump (UnarmorPump x, int c)
{
int rval = 256; /* default is to ignore the return value */
switch (x->state) {
case STA_init:
{
byte tmp[2];
tmp[0] = c;
tmp[1] = 0;
if ( is_armored (tmp) )
x->state = c == '-'? STA_first_dash : STA_wait_newline;
else {
x->state = STA_bypass;
return c;
}
}
break;
case STA_bypass:
return c; /* return here to avoid crc calculation */
case STA_wait_newline:
if (c == '\n')
x->state = STA_wait_dash;
break;
case STA_wait_dash:
x->state = c == '-'? STA_first_dash : STA_wait_newline;
break;
- case STA_first_dash: /* just need for initalization */
+ case STA_first_dash: /* just need for initialization */
x->pos = 0;
x->state = STA_compare_header;
case STA_compare_header:
if ( "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----"[++x->pos] == c ) {
if ( x->pos == 28 )
x->state = STA_found_header_wait_newline;
}
else
x->state = c == '\n'? STA_wait_dash : STA_wait_newline;
break;
case STA_found_header_wait_newline:
/* to make CR,LF issues easier we simply allow for white space
behind the 5 dashes */
if ( c == '\n' )
x->state = STA_skip_header_lines;
else if ( c != '\r' && c != ' ' && c != '\t' )
x->state = STA_wait_dash; /* garbage after the header line */
break;
case STA_skip_header_lines:
/* i.e. wait for one empty line */
if ( c == '\n' ) {
x->state = STA_read_data;
x->crc = CRCINIT;
x->val = 0;
x->pos = 0;
}
else if ( c != '\r' && c != ' ' && c != '\t' )
x->state = STA_skip_header_lines_non_ws;
break;
case STA_skip_header_lines_non_ws:
/* like above but we already encountered non white space */
if ( c == '\n' )
x->state = STA_skip_header_lines;
break;
case STA_read_data:
/* fixme: we don't check for the trailing dash lines but rely
* on the armor stop characters */
if( c == '\n' || c == ' ' || c == '\r' || c == '\t' )
break; /* skip all kind of white space */
if( c == '=' ) { /* pad character: stop */
if( x->pos == 1 ) /* in this case val has some value */
rval = x->val;
x->state = STA_wait_crc;
break;
}
{
int c2;
if( (c = asctobin[(c2=c)]) == 255 ) {
log_error(_("invalid radix64 character %02X skipped\n"), c2);
break;
}
}
switch(x->pos) {
case 0:
x->val = c << 2;
break;
case 1:
x->val |= (c>>4)&3;
rval = x->val;
x->val = (c<<4)&0xf0;
break;
case 2:
x->val |= (c>>2)&15;
rval = x->val;
x->val = (c<<6)&0xc0;
break;
case 3:
x->val |= c&0x3f;
rval = x->val;
break;
}
x->pos = (x->pos+1) % 4;
break;
case STA_wait_crc:
if( c == '\n' || c == ' ' || c == '\r' || c == '\t' || c == '=' )
break; /* skip ws and pad characters */
/* assume that we are at the next line */
x->state = STA_read_crc;
x->pos = 0;
x->mycrc = 0;
case STA_read_crc:
if( (c = asctobin[c]) == 255 ) {
rval = -1; /* ready */
if( x->crc != x->mycrc ) {
log_info (_("CRC error; %06lX - %06lX\n"),
(ulong)x->crc, (ulong)x->mycrc);
if ( invalid_crc() )
rval = -3;
}
x->state = STA_ready; /* not sure whether this is correct */
break;
}
switch(x->pos) {
case 0:
x->val = c << 2;
break;
case 1:
x->val |= (c>>4)&3;
x->mycrc |= x->val << 16;
x->val = (c<<4)&0xf0;
break;
case 2:
x->val |= (c>>2)&15;
x->mycrc |= x->val << 8;
x->val = (c<<6)&0xc0;
break;
case 3:
x->val |= c&0x3f;
x->mycrc |= x->val;
break;
}
x->pos = (x->pos+1) % 4;
break;
case STA_ready:
rval = -1;
break;
}
if ( !(rval & ~255) ) { /* compute the CRC */
x->crc = (x->crc << 8) ^ crc_table[((x->crc >> 16)&0xff) ^ rval];
x->crc &= 0x00ffffff;
}
return rval;
}
diff --git a/g10/gpg.c b/g10/gpg.c
index 9f7da050b..2d5b4ffb0 100644
--- a/g10/gpg.c
+++ b/g10/gpg.c
@@ -1,5132 +1,5132 @@
/* gpg.c - The GnuPG utility (main for gpg)
* Copyright (C) 1998-2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 1997-2016 Werner Koch
* Copyright (C) 2015-2016 g10 Code GmbH
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STAT
#include <sys/stat.h> /* for stat() */
#endif
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
# ifdef HAVE_WINSOCK2_H
# include <winsock2.h>
# endif
# include <windows.h>
#endif
#define INCLUDED_BY_MAIN_MODULE 1
#include "gpg.h"
#include <assuan.h>
#include "../common/iobuf.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "membuf.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "filter.h"
#include "ttyio.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "sysutils.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "keyserver-internal.h"
#include "exec.h"
#include "gc-opt-flags.h"
#include "asshelp.h"
#include "call-dirmngr.h"
#include "tofu.h"
#include "../common/init.h"
#include "../common/mbox-util.h"
#include "../common/shareddefs.h"
#if defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
#define MY_O_BINARY O_BINARY
#ifndef S_IRGRP
# define S_IRGRP 0
# define S_IWGRP 0
#endif
#else
#define MY_O_BINARY 0
#endif
enum cmd_and_opt_values
{
aNull = 0,
oArmor = 'a',
aDetachedSign = 'b',
aSym = 'c',
aDecrypt = 'd',
aEncr = 'e',
oRecipientFile = 'f',
oHiddenRecipientFile = 'F',
oInteractive = 'i',
aListKeys = 'k',
oDryRun = 'n',
oOutput = 'o',
oQuiet = 'q',
oRecipient = 'r',
oHiddenRecipient = 'R',
aSign = 's',
oTextmodeShort= 't',
oLocalUser = 'u',
oVerbose = 'v',
oCompress = 'z',
oSetNotation = 'N',
aListSecretKeys = 'K',
oBatch = 500,
oMaxOutput,
oInputSizeHint,
oSigNotation,
oCertNotation,
oShowNotation,
oNoShowNotation,
aEncrFiles,
aEncrSym,
aDecryptFiles,
aClearsign,
aStore,
aQuickKeygen,
aFullKeygen,
aKeygen,
aSignEncr,
aSignEncrSym,
aSignSym,
aSignKey,
aLSignKey,
aQuickSignKey,
aQuickLSignKey,
aQuickAddUid,
aQuickAddKey,
aQuickRevUid,
aListConfig,
aListGcryptConfig,
aGPGConfList,
aGPGConfTest,
aListPackets,
aEditKey,
aDeleteKeys,
aDeleteSecretKeys,
aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys,
aImport,
aFastImport,
aVerify,
aVerifyFiles,
aListSigs,
aSendKeys,
aRecvKeys,
aLocateKeys,
aSearchKeys,
aRefreshKeys,
aFetchKeys,
aExport,
aExportSecret,
aExportSecretSub,
aExportSshKey,
aCheckKeys,
aGenRevoke,
aDesigRevoke,
aPrimegen,
aPrintMD,
aPrintMDs,
aCheckTrustDB,
aUpdateTrustDB,
aFixTrustDB,
aListTrustDB,
aListTrustPath,
aExportOwnerTrust,
aImportOwnerTrust,
aDeArmor,
aEnArmor,
aGenRandom,
aRebuildKeydbCaches,
aCardStatus,
aCardEdit,
aChangePIN,
aPasswd,
aServer,
aTOFUPolicy,
oMimemode,
oTextmode,
oNoTextmode,
oExpert,
oNoExpert,
oDefSigExpire,
oAskSigExpire,
oNoAskSigExpire,
oDefCertExpire,
oAskCertExpire,
oNoAskCertExpire,
oDefCertLevel,
oMinCertLevel,
oAskCertLevel,
oNoAskCertLevel,
oFingerprint,
oWithFingerprint,
oWithSubkeyFingerprint,
oWithICAOSpelling,
oWithKeygrip,
oWithSecret,
oWithWKDHash,
oWithColons,
oWithKeyData,
oWithTofuInfo,
oWithSigList,
oWithSigCheck,
oAnswerYes,
oAnswerNo,
oKeyring,
oPrimaryKeyring,
oSecretKeyring,
oShowKeyring,
oDefaultKey,
oDefRecipient,
oDefRecipientSelf,
oNoDefRecipient,
oTrySecretKey,
oOptions,
oDebug,
oDebugLevel,
oDebugAll,
oDebugIOLBF,
oStatusFD,
oStatusFile,
oAttributeFD,
oAttributeFile,
oEmitVersion,
oNoEmitVersion,
oCompletesNeeded,
oMarginalsNeeded,
oMaxCertDepth,
oLoadExtension,
oGnuPG,
oRFC2440,
oRFC4880,
oRFC4880bis,
oOpenPGP,
oPGP6,
oPGP7,
oPGP8,
oRFC2440Text,
oNoRFC2440Text,
oCipherAlgo,
oDigestAlgo,
oCertDigestAlgo,
oCompressAlgo,
oCompressLevel,
oBZ2CompressLevel,
oBZ2DecompressLowmem,
oPassphrase,
oPassphraseFD,
oPassphraseFile,
oPassphraseRepeat,
oPinentryMode,
oCommandFD,
oCommandFile,
oQuickRandom,
oNoVerbose,
oTrustDBName,
oNoSecmemWarn,
oRequireSecmem,
oNoRequireSecmem,
oNoPermissionWarn,
oNoMDCWarn,
oNoArmor,
oNoDefKeyring,
oNoKeyring,
oNoGreeting,
oNoTTY,
oNoOptions,
oNoBatch,
oHomedir,
oSkipVerify,
oSkipHiddenRecipients,
oNoSkipHiddenRecipients,
oAlwaysTrust,
oTrustModel,
oForceOwnertrust,
oSetFilename,
oForYourEyesOnly,
oNoForYourEyesOnly,
oSetPolicyURL,
oSigPolicyURL,
oCertPolicyURL,
oShowPolicyURL,
oNoShowPolicyURL,
oSigKeyserverURL,
oUseEmbeddedFilename,
oNoUseEmbeddedFilename,
oComment,
oDefaultComment,
oNoComments,
oThrowKeyids,
oNoThrowKeyids,
oShowPhotos,
oNoShowPhotos,
oPhotoViewer,
oForceMDC,
oNoForceMDC,
oDisableMDC,
oNoDisableMDC,
oS2KMode,
oS2KDigest,
oS2KCipher,
oS2KCount,
oDisplayCharset,
oNotDashEscaped,
oEscapeFrom,
oNoEscapeFrom,
oLockOnce,
oLockMultiple,
oLockNever,
oKeyServer,
oKeyServerOptions,
oImportOptions,
oImportFilter,
oExportOptions,
oExportFilter,
oListOptions,
oVerifyOptions,
oTempDir,
oExecPath,
oEncryptTo,
oHiddenEncryptTo,
oNoEncryptTo,
oEncryptToDefaultKey,
oLoggerFD,
oLoggerFile,
oUtf8Strings,
oNoUtf8Strings,
oDisableCipherAlgo,
oDisablePubkeyAlgo,
oAllowNonSelfsignedUID,
oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID,
oAllowFreeformUID,
oNoAllowFreeformUID,
oAllowSecretKeyImport,
oEnableSpecialFilenames,
oNoLiteral,
oSetFilesize,
oHonorHttpProxy,
oFastListMode,
oListOnly,
oIgnoreTimeConflict,
oIgnoreValidFrom,
oIgnoreCrcError,
oIgnoreMDCError,
oShowSessionKey,
oOverrideSessionKey,
oNoRandomSeedFile,
oAutoKeyRetrieve,
oNoAutoKeyRetrieve,
oUseAgent,
oNoUseAgent,
oGpgAgentInfo,
oMergeOnly,
oTryAllSecrets,
oTrustedKey,
oNoExpensiveTrustChecks,
oFixedListMode,
oLegacyListMode,
oNoSigCache,
oAutoCheckTrustDB,
oNoAutoCheckTrustDB,
oPreservePermissions,
oDefaultPreferenceList,
oDefaultKeyserverURL,
oPersonalCipherPreferences,
oPersonalDigestPreferences,
oPersonalCompressPreferences,
oAgentProgram,
oDirmngrProgram,
oDisplay,
oTTYname,
oTTYtype,
oLCctype,
oLCmessages,
oXauthority,
oGroup,
oUnGroup,
oNoGroups,
oStrict,
oNoStrict,
oMangleDosFilenames,
oNoMangleDosFilenames,
oEnableProgressFilter,
oMultifile,
oKeyidFormat,
oExitOnStatusWriteError,
oLimitCardInsertTries,
oReaderPort,
octapiDriver,
opcscDriver,
oDisableCCID,
oRequireCrossCert,
oNoRequireCrossCert,
oAutoKeyLocate,
oNoAutoKeyLocate,
oAllowMultisigVerification,
oEnableLargeRSA,
oDisableLargeRSA,
oEnableDSA2,
oDisableDSA2,
oAllowMultipleMessages,
oNoAllowMultipleMessages,
oAllowWeakDigestAlgos,
oFakedSystemTime,
oNoAutostart,
oPrintPKARecords,
oPrintDANERecords,
oTOFUDefaultPolicy,
oTOFUDBFormat,
oWeakDigest,
oUnwrap,
oOnlySignTextIDs,
oDisableSignerUID,
oSender,
oNoop
};
static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
ARGPARSE_group (300, N_("@Commands:\n ")),
ARGPARSE_c (aSign, "sign", N_("make a signature")),
ARGPARSE_c (aClearsign, "clearsign", N_("make a clear text signature")),
ARGPARSE_c (aDetachedSign, "detach-sign", N_("make a detached signature")),
ARGPARSE_c (aEncr, "encrypt", N_("encrypt data")),
ARGPARSE_c (aEncrFiles, "encrypt-files", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aSym, "symmetric", N_("encryption only with symmetric cipher")),
ARGPARSE_c (aStore, "store", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aDecrypt, "decrypt", N_("decrypt data (default)")),
ARGPARSE_c (aDecryptFiles, "decrypt-files", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aVerify, "verify" , N_("verify a signature")),
ARGPARSE_c (aVerifyFiles, "verify-files" , "@" ),
ARGPARSE_c (aListKeys, "list-keys", N_("list keys")),
ARGPARSE_c (aListKeys, "list-public-keys", "@" ),
ARGPARSE_c (aListSigs, "list-sigs", N_("list keys and signatures")),
ARGPARSE_c (aCheckKeys, "check-sigs",N_("list and check key signatures")),
ARGPARSE_c (oFingerprint, "fingerprint", N_("list keys and fingerprints")),
ARGPARSE_c (aListSecretKeys, "list-secret-keys", N_("list secret keys")),
ARGPARSE_c (aKeygen, "gen-key",
N_("generate a new key pair")),
ARGPARSE_c (aQuickKeygen, "quick-gen-key" ,
N_("quickly generate a new key pair")),
ARGPARSE_c (aQuickAddUid, "quick-adduid",
N_("quickly add a new user-id")),
ARGPARSE_c (aQuickAddKey, "quick-addkey", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aQuickRevUid, "quick-revuid",
N_("quickly revoke a user-id")),
ARGPARSE_c (aFullKeygen, "full-gen-key" ,
N_("full featured key pair generation")),
ARGPARSE_c (aGenRevoke, "gen-revoke",N_("generate a revocation certificate")),
ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteKeys,"delete-keys",
N_("remove keys from the public keyring")),
ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteSecretKeys, "delete-secret-keys",
N_("remove keys from the secret keyring")),
ARGPARSE_c (aQuickSignKey, "quick-sign-key" ,
N_("quickly sign a key")),
ARGPARSE_c (aQuickLSignKey, "quick-lsign-key",
N_("quickly sign a key locally")),
ARGPARSE_c (aSignKey, "sign-key" ,N_("sign a key")),
ARGPARSE_c (aLSignKey, "lsign-key" ,N_("sign a key locally")),
ARGPARSE_c (aEditKey, "edit-key" ,N_("sign or edit a key")),
ARGPARSE_c (aEditKey, "key-edit" ,"@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aPasswd, "passwd", N_("change a passphrase")),
ARGPARSE_c (aDesigRevoke, "desig-revoke","@" ),
ARGPARSE_c (aExport, "export" , N_("export keys") ),
ARGPARSE_c (aSendKeys, "send-keys" , N_("export keys to a keyserver") ),
ARGPARSE_c (aRecvKeys, "recv-keys" , N_("import keys from a keyserver") ),
ARGPARSE_c (aSearchKeys, "search-keys" ,
N_("search for keys on a keyserver") ),
ARGPARSE_c (aRefreshKeys, "refresh-keys",
N_("update all keys from a keyserver")),
ARGPARSE_c (aLocateKeys, "locate-keys", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aFetchKeys, "fetch-keys" , "@" ),
ARGPARSE_c (aExportSecret, "export-secret-keys" , "@" ),
ARGPARSE_c (aExportSecretSub, "export-secret-subkeys" , "@" ),
ARGPARSE_c (aExportSshKey, "export-ssh-key", "@" ),
ARGPARSE_c (aImport, "import", N_("import/merge keys")),
ARGPARSE_c (aFastImport, "fast-import", "@"),
#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
ARGPARSE_c (aCardStatus, "card-status", N_("print the card status")),
ARGPARSE_c (aCardEdit, "card-edit", N_("change data on a card")),
ARGPARSE_c (aChangePIN, "change-pin", N_("change a card's PIN")),
#endif
ARGPARSE_c (aListConfig, "list-config", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aListGcryptConfig, "list-gcrypt-config", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aGPGConfList, "gpgconf-list", "@" ),
ARGPARSE_c (aGPGConfTest, "gpgconf-test", "@" ),
ARGPARSE_c (aListPackets, "list-packets","@"),
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
ARGPARSE_c (aExportOwnerTrust, "export-ownertrust", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aImportOwnerTrust, "import-ownertrust", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aUpdateTrustDB,"update-trustdb",
N_("update the trust database")),
ARGPARSE_c (aCheckTrustDB, "check-trustdb", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aFixTrustDB, "fix-trustdb", "@"),
#endif
ARGPARSE_c (aDeArmor, "dearmor", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aDeArmor, "dearmour", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aEnArmor, "enarmor", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aEnArmor, "enarmour", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aPrintMD, "print-md", N_("print message digests")),
ARGPARSE_c (aPrimegen, "gen-prime", "@" ),
ARGPARSE_c (aGenRandom,"gen-random", "@" ),
ARGPARSE_c (aServer, "server", N_("run in server mode")),
ARGPARSE_c (aTOFUPolicy, "tofu-policy",
N_("|VALUE|set the TOFU policy for a key")),
ARGPARSE_group (301, N_("@\nOptions:\n ")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oArmor, "armor", N_("create ascii armored output")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oArmor, "armour", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "recipient", N_("|USER-ID|encrypt for USER-ID")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oHiddenRecipient, "hidden-recipient", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipientFile, "recipient-file", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oHiddenRecipientFile, "hidden-recipient-file", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "remote-user", "@"), /* (old option name) */
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefRecipient, "default-recipient", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDefRecipientSelf, "default-recipient-self", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDefRecipient, "no-default-recipient", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oTempDir, "temp-directory", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oExecPath, "exec-path", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oEncryptTo, "encrypt-to", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEncryptTo, "no-encrypt-to", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oHiddenEncryptTo, "hidden-encrypt-to", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oEncryptToDefaultKey, "encrypt-to-default-key", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oLocalUser, "local-user",
N_("|USER-ID|use USER-ID to sign or decrypt")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oSender, "sender", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrySecretKey, "try-secret-key", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oCompress, NULL,
N_("|N|set compress level to N (0 disables)")),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oCompressLevel, "compress-level", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oBZ2CompressLevel, "bzip2-compress-level", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oBZ2DecompressLowmem, "bzip2-decompress-lowmem", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oMimemode, "mimemode", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oTextmodeShort, NULL, "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oTextmode, "textmode", N_("use canonical text mode")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoTextmode, "no-textmode", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oExpert, "expert", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoExpert, "no-expert", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefSigExpire, "default-sig-expire", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAskSigExpire, "ask-sig-expire", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAskSigExpire, "no-ask-sig-expire", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefCertExpire, "default-cert-expire", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAskCertExpire, "ask-cert-expire", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAskCertExpire, "no-ask-cert-expire", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oDefCertLevel, "default-cert-level", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oMinCertLevel, "min-cert-level", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAskCertLevel, "ask-cert-level", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAskCertLevel, "no-ask-cert-level", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oOutput, "output", N_("|FILE|write output to FILE")),
ARGPARSE_p_u (oMaxOutput, "max-output", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oInputSizeHint, "input-size-hint", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oVerbose, "verbose", N_("verbose")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oQuiet, "quiet", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoTTY, "no-tty", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oForceMDC, "force-mdc", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoForceMDC, "no-force-mdc", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableMDC, "disable-mdc", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDisableMDC, "no-disable-mdc", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableSignerUID, "disable-signer-uid", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDryRun, "dry-run", N_("do not make any changes")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oInteractive, "interactive", N_("prompt before overwriting")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oBatch, "batch", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAnswerYes, "yes", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAnswerNo, "no", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyring, "keyring", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPrimaryKeyring, "primary-keyring", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oSecretKeyring, "secret-keyring", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowKeyring, "show-keyring", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultKey, "default-key", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyServer, "keyserver", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyServerOptions, "keyserver-options", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oImportOptions, "import-options", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oImportFilter, "import-filter", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oExportOptions, "export-options", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oExportFilter, "export-filter", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oListOptions, "list-options", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oVerifyOptions, "verify-options", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplayCharset, "display-charset", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplayCharset, "charset", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oOptions, "options", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDebug, "debug", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDebugLevel, "debug-level", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugAll, "debug-all", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugIOLBF, "debug-iolbf", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oStatusFD, "status-fd", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oStatusFile, "status-file", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oAttributeFD, "attribute-fd", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oAttributeFile, "attribute-file", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oCompletesNeeded, "completes-needed", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oMarginalsNeeded, "marginals-needed", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oMaxCertDepth, "max-cert-depth", "@" ),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrustedKey, "trusted-key", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oLoadExtension, "load-extension", "@"), /* Dummy. */
ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "gnupg", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp2", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp6", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp7", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp8", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC2440, "rfc2440", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC4880, "rfc4880", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC4880bis, "rfc4880bis", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oOpenPGP, "openpgp", N_("use strict OpenPGP behavior")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP6, "pgp6", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP7, "pgp7", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP8, "pgp8", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC2440Text, "rfc2440-text", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRFC2440Text, "no-rfc2440-text", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oS2KMode, "s2k-mode", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oS2KDigest, "s2k-digest-algo", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oS2KCipher, "s2k-cipher-algo", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oS2KCount, "s2k-count", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oCipherAlgo, "cipher-algo", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDigestAlgo, "digest-algo", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertDigestAlgo, "cert-digest-algo", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oCompressAlgo,"compress-algo", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oCompressAlgo, "compression-algo", "@"), /* Alias */
ARGPARSE_s_n (oThrowKeyids, "throw-keyids", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoThrowKeyids, "no-throw-keyids", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowPhotos, "show-photos", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoShowPhotos, "no-show-photos", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPhotoViewer, "photo-viewer", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oSetNotation, "set-notation", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oSigNotation, "sig-notation", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertNotation, "cert-notation", "@"),
ARGPARSE_group (302, N_(
"@\n(See the man page for a complete listing of all commands and options)\n"
)),
ARGPARSE_group (303, N_("@\nExamples:\n\n"
" -se -r Bob [file] sign and encrypt for user Bob\n"
" --clearsign [file] make a clear text signature\n"
" --detach-sign [file] make a detached signature\n"
" --list-keys [names] show keys\n"
" --fingerprint [names] show fingerprints\n")),
/* More hidden commands and options. */
ARGPARSE_c (aPrintMDs, "print-mds", "@"), /* old */
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
ARGPARSE_c (aListTrustDB, "list-trustdb", "@"),
#endif
/* Not yet used:
ARGPARSE_c (aListTrustPath, "list-trust-path", "@"), */
ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys,
"delete-secret-and-public-keys", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aRebuildKeydbCaches, "rebuild-keydb-caches", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPassphrase, "passphrase", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oPassphraseFD, "passphrase-fd", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPassphraseFile, "passphrase-file", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oPassphraseRepeat,"passphrase-repeat", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPinentryMode, "pinentry-mode", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oCommandFD, "command-fd", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oCommandFile, "command-file", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oQuickRandom, "debug-quick-random", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoVerbose, "no-verbose", "@"),
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrustDBName, "trustdb-name", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAutoCheckTrustDB, "auto-check-trustdb", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutoCheckTrustDB, "no-auto-check-trustdb", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oForceOwnertrust, "force-ownertrust", "@"),
#endif
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSecmemWarn, "no-secmem-warning", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequireSecmem, "require-secmem", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRequireSecmem, "no-require-secmem", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoPermissionWarn, "no-permission-warning", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoMDCWarn, "no-mdc-warning", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoArmor, "no-armor", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoArmor, "no-armour", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDefKeyring, "no-default-keyring", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoKeyring, "no-keyring", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoGreeting, "no-greeting", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoOptions, "no-options", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oHomedir, "homedir", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoBatch, "no-batch", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithColons, "with-colons", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithTofuInfo,"with-tofu-info", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeyData,"with-key-data", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSigList,"with-sig-list", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSigCheck,"with-sig-check", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (aListKeys, "list-key", "@"), /* alias */
ARGPARSE_s_n (aListSigs, "list-sig", "@"), /* alias */
ARGPARSE_s_n (aCheckKeys, "check-sig", "@"), /* alias */
ARGPARSE_s_n (oSkipVerify, "skip-verify", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oSkipHiddenRecipients, "skip-hidden-recipients", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSkipHiddenRecipients, "no-skip-hidden-recipients", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oDefCertLevel, "default-cert-check-level", "@"), /* old */
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAlwaysTrust, "always-trust", "@"),
#endif
ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrustModel, "trust-model", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oTOFUDefaultPolicy, "tofu-default-policy", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oSetFilename, "set-filename", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oForYourEyesOnly, "for-your-eyes-only", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoForYourEyesOnly, "no-for-your-eyes-only", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oSetPolicyURL, "set-policy-url", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oSigPolicyURL, "sig-policy-url", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertPolicyURL, "cert-policy-url", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowPolicyURL, "show-policy-url", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoShowPolicyURL, "no-show-policy-url", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oSigKeyserverURL, "sig-keyserver-url", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowNotation, "show-notation", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoShowNotation, "no-show-notation", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oComment, "comment", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDefaultComment, "default-comment", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoComments, "no-comments", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oEmitVersion, "emit-version", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEmitVersion, "no-emit-version", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEmitVersion, "no-version", "@"), /* alias */
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNotDashEscaped, "not-dash-escaped", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oEscapeFrom, "escape-from-lines", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEscapeFrom, "no-escape-from-lines", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oLockOnce, "lock-once", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oLockMultiple, "lock-multiple", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oLockNever, "lock-never", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oLoggerFD, "logger-fd", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oLoggerFile, "log-file", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oLoggerFile, "logger-file", "@"), /* 1.4 compatibility. */
ARGPARSE_s_n (oUseEmbeddedFilename, "use-embedded-filename", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUseEmbeddedFilename, "no-use-embedded-filename", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oUtf8Strings, "utf8-strings", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUtf8Strings, "no-utf8-strings", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithFingerprint, "with-fingerprint", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSubkeyFingerprint, "with-subkey-fingerprint", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSubkeyFingerprint, "with-subkey-fingerprints", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithICAOSpelling, "with-icao-spelling", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeygrip, "with-keygrip", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSecret, "with-secret", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithWKDHash, "with-wkd-hash", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisableCipherAlgo, "disable-cipher-algo", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisablePubkeyAlgo, "disable-pubkey-algo", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowNonSelfsignedUID, "allow-non-selfsigned-uid", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID, "no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowFreeformUID, "allow-freeform-uid", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowFreeformUID, "no-allow-freeform-uid", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoLiteral, "no-literal", "@"),
ARGPARSE_p_u (oSetFilesize, "set-filesize", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oFastListMode, "fast-list-mode", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oFixedListMode, "fixed-list-mode", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oLegacyListMode, "legacy-list-mode", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oListOnly, "list-only", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oPrintPKARecords, "print-pka-records", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oPrintDANERecords, "print-dane-records", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreTimeConflict, "ignore-time-conflict", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreValidFrom, "ignore-valid-from", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreCrcError, "ignore-crc-error", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreMDCError, "ignore-mdc-error", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowSessionKey, "show-session-key", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oOverrideSessionKey, "override-session-key", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRandomSeedFile, "no-random-seed-file", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAutoKeyRetrieve, "auto-key-retrieve", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutoKeyRetrieve, "no-auto-key-retrieve", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSigCache, "no-sig-cache", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oMergeOnly, "merge-only", "@" ),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowSecretKeyImport, "allow-secret-key-import", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oTryAllSecrets, "try-all-secrets", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableSpecialFilenames, "enable-special-filenames", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoExpensiveTrustChecks, "no-expensive-trust-checks", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oPreservePermissions, "preserve-permissions", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultPreferenceList, "default-preference-list", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultKeyserverURL, "default-keyserver-url", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCipherPreferences, "personal-cipher-preferences","@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalDigestPreferences, "personal-digest-preferences","@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCompressPreferences,
"personal-compress-preferences", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oFakedSystemTime, "faked-system-time", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oWeakDigest, "weak-digest","@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oUnwrap, "unwrap", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oOnlySignTextIDs, "only-sign-text-ids", "@"),
/* Aliases. I constantly mistype these, and assume other people do
as well. */
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCipherPreferences, "personal-cipher-prefs", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalDigestPreferences, "personal-digest-prefs", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCompressPreferences, "personal-compress-prefs", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oAgentProgram, "agent-program", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDirmngrProgram, "dirmngr-program", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplay, "display", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oTTYname, "ttyname", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oTTYtype, "ttytype", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oLCctype, "lc-ctype", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oLCmessages, "lc-messages","@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oXauthority, "xauthority", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oGroup, "group", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oUnGroup, "ungroup", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoGroups, "no-groups", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oStrict, "strict", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoStrict, "no-strict", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oMangleDosFilenames, "mangle-dos-filenames", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoMangleDosFilenames, "no-mangle-dos-filenames", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableProgressFilter, "enable-progress-filter", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oMultifile, "multifile", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyidFormat, "keyid-format", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oExitOnStatusWriteError, "exit-on-status-write-error", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oLimitCardInsertTries, "limit-card-insert-tries", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowMultisigVerification,
"allow-multisig-verification", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableLargeRSA, "enable-large-rsa", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableLargeRSA, "disable-large-rsa", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableDSA2, "enable-dsa2", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableDSA2, "disable-dsa2", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowMultipleMessages, "allow-multiple-messages", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowMultipleMessages, "no-allow-multiple-messages", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowWeakDigestAlgos, "allow-weak-digest-algos", "@"),
/* These two are aliases to help users of the PGP command line
product use gpg with minimal pain. Many commands are common
already as they seem to have borrowed commands from us. Now I'm
returning the favor. */
ARGPARSE_s_s (oLocalUser, "sign-with", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "user", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequireCrossCert, "require-backsigs", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequireCrossCert, "require-cross-certification", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRequireCrossCert, "no-require-backsigs", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRequireCrossCert, "no-require-cross-certification", "@"),
/* New options. Fixme: Should go more to the top. */
ARGPARSE_s_s (oAutoKeyLocate, "auto-key-locate", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutoKeyLocate, "no-auto-key-locate", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutostart, "no-autostart", "@"),
/* Dummy options with warnings. */
ARGPARSE_s_n (oUseAgent, "use-agent", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUseAgent, "no-use-agent", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oGpgAgentInfo, "gpg-agent-info", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oReaderPort, "reader-port", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (octapiDriver, "ctapi-driver", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (opcscDriver, "pcsc-driver", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableCCID, "disable-ccid", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oHonorHttpProxy, "honor-http-proxy", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oTOFUDBFormat, "tofu-db-format", "@"),
/* Dummy options. */
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "sk-comments", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-sk-comments", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "compress-keys", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "compress-sigs", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "force-v3-sigs", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-force-v3-sigs", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "force-v4-certs", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-force-v4-certs", "@"),
ARGPARSE_end ()
};
/* The list of supported debug flags. */
static struct debug_flags_s debug_flags [] =
{
{ DBG_PACKET_VALUE , "packet" },
{ DBG_MPI_VALUE , "mpi" },
{ DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE , "crypto" },
{ DBG_FILTER_VALUE , "filter" },
{ DBG_IOBUF_VALUE , "iobuf" },
{ DBG_MEMORY_VALUE , "memory" },
{ DBG_CACHE_VALUE , "cache" },
{ DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE, "memstat" },
{ DBG_TRUST_VALUE , "trust" },
{ DBG_HASHING_VALUE, "hashing" },
{ DBG_CARD_IO_VALUE, "cardio" },
{ DBG_IPC_VALUE , "ipc" },
{ DBG_CLOCK_VALUE , "clock" },
{ DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE , "lookup" },
{ DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE, "extprog" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
#define ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS 1
#else
#define ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS 0
#endif
int g10_errors_seen = 0;
static int utf8_strings = 0;
static int maybe_setuid = 1;
static char *build_list( const char *text, char letter,
const char *(*mapf)(int), int (*chkf)(int) );
static void set_cmd( enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd,
enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd );
static void print_mds( const char *fname, int algo );
static void add_notation_data( const char *string, int which );
static void add_policy_url( const char *string, int which );
static void add_keyserver_url( const char *string, int which );
static void emergency_cleanup (void);
static char *
make_libversion (const char *libname, const char *(*getfnc)(const char*))
{
const char *s;
char *result;
if (maybe_setuid)
{
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 0, 0); /* Drop setuid. */
maybe_setuid = 0;
}
s = getfnc (NULL);
result = xmalloc (strlen (libname) + 1 + strlen (s) + 1);
strcpy (stpcpy (stpcpy (result, libname), " "), s);
return result;
}
static int
build_list_pk_test_algo (int algo)
{
/* Show only one "RSA" string. If RSA_E or RSA_S is available RSA
is also available. */
if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E
|| algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S)
return GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
return openpgp_pk_test_algo (algo);
}
static const char *
build_list_pk_algo_name (int algo)
{
return openpgp_pk_algo_name (algo);
}
static int
build_list_cipher_test_algo (int algo)
{
return openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo);
}
static const char *
build_list_cipher_algo_name (int algo)
{
return openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
}
static int
build_list_md_test_algo (int algo)
{
/* By default we do not accept MD5 based signatures. To avoid
confusion we do not announce support for it either. */
if (algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5)
return GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
return openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
}
static const char *
build_list_md_algo_name (int algo)
{
return openpgp_md_algo_name (algo);
}
static const char *
my_strusage( int level )
{
static char *digests, *pubkeys, *ciphers, *zips, *ver_gcry;
const char *p;
switch( level ) {
case 11: p = "@GPG@ (@GNUPG@)";
break;
case 13: p = VERSION; break;
case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break;
case 19: p = _("Please report bugs to <@EMAIL@>.\n"); break;
case 20:
if (!ver_gcry)
ver_gcry = make_libversion ("libgcrypt", gcry_check_version);
p = ver_gcry;
break;
#ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION
case 25:
p="NOTE: THIS IS A DEVELOPMENT VERSION!";
break;
case 26:
p="It is only intended for test purposes and should NOT be";
break;
case 27:
p="used in a production environment or with production keys!";
break;
#endif
case 1:
case 40: p =
_("Usage: @GPG@ [options] [files] (-h for help)");
break;
case 41: p =
_("Syntax: @GPG@ [options] [files]\n"
"Sign, check, encrypt or decrypt\n"
"Default operation depends on the input data\n");
break;
case 31: p = "\nHome: "; break;
#ifndef __riscos__
case 32: p = gnupg_homedir (); break;
#else /* __riscos__ */
case 32: p = make_filename(gnupg_homedir (), NULL); break;
#endif /* __riscos__ */
case 33: p = _("\nSupported algorithms:\n"); break;
case 34:
if (!pubkeys)
pubkeys = build_list (_("Pubkey: "), 1,
build_list_pk_algo_name,
build_list_pk_test_algo );
p = pubkeys;
break;
case 35:
if( !ciphers )
ciphers = build_list(_("Cipher: "), 'S',
build_list_cipher_algo_name,
build_list_cipher_test_algo );
p = ciphers;
break;
case 36:
if( !digests )
digests = build_list(_("Hash: "), 'H',
build_list_md_algo_name,
build_list_md_test_algo );
p = digests;
break;
case 37:
if( !zips )
zips = build_list(_("Compression: "),'Z',
compress_algo_to_string,
check_compress_algo);
p = zips;
break;
default: p = NULL;
}
return p;
}
static char *
build_list (const char *text, char letter,
const char * (*mapf)(int), int (*chkf)(int))
{
membuf_t mb;
int indent;
int i, j, len;
const char *s;
char *string;
if (maybe_setuid)
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 0, 0); /* Drop setuid. */
indent = utf8_charcount (text, -1);
len = 0;
init_membuf (&mb, 512);
for (i=0; i <= 110; i++ )
{
if (!chkf (i) && (s = mapf (i)))
{
if (mb.len - len > 60)
{
put_membuf_str (&mb, ",\n");
len = mb.len;
for (j=0; j < indent; j++)
put_membuf_str (&mb, " ");
}
else if (mb.len)
put_membuf_str (&mb, ", ");
else
put_membuf_str (&mb, text);
put_membuf_str (&mb, s);
if (opt.verbose && letter)
{
char num[20];
if (letter == 1)
snprintf (num, sizeof num, " (%d)", i);
else
snprintf (num, sizeof num, " (%c%d)", letter, i);
put_membuf_str (&mb, num);
}
}
}
if (mb.len)
put_membuf_str (&mb, "\n");
put_membuf (&mb, "", 1);
string = get_membuf (&mb, NULL);
return xrealloc (string, strlen (string)+1);
}
static void
wrong_args( const char *text)
{
es_fprintf (es_stderr, _("usage: %s [options] %s\n"), GPG_NAME, text);
g10_exit(2);
}
static char *
make_username( const char *string )
{
char *p;
if( utf8_strings )
p = xstrdup(string);
else
p = native_to_utf8( string );
return p;
}
static void
set_opt_session_env (const char *name, const char *value)
{
gpg_error_t err;
err = session_env_setenv (opt.session_env, name, value);
if (err)
log_fatal ("error setting session environment: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
}
/* Setup the debugging. With a LEVEL of NULL only the active debug
flags are propagated to the subsystems. With LEVEL set, a specific
set of debug flags is set; thus overriding all flags already
set. */
static void
set_debug (const char *level)
{
int numok = (level && digitp (level));
int numlvl = numok? atoi (level) : 0;
if (!level)
;
else if (!strcmp (level, "none") || (numok && numlvl < 1))
opt.debug = 0;
else if (!strcmp (level, "basic") || (numok && numlvl <= 2))
opt.debug = DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE;
else if (!strcmp (level, "advanced") || (numok && numlvl <= 5))
opt.debug = DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE|DBG_TRUST_VALUE|DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE;
else if (!strcmp (level, "expert") || (numok && numlvl <= 8))
opt.debug = (DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE|DBG_TRUST_VALUE|DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE
|DBG_CACHE_VALUE|DBG_LOOKUP|DBG_FILTER_VALUE|DBG_PACKET_VALUE);
else if (!strcmp (level, "guru") || numok)
{
opt.debug = ~0;
/* Unless the "guru" string has been used we don't want to allow
hashing debugging. The rationale is that people tend to
select the highest debug value and would then clutter their
disk with debug files which may reveal confidential data. */
if (numok)
opt.debug &= ~(DBG_HASHING_VALUE);
}
else
{
log_error (_("invalid debug-level '%s' given\n"), level);
g10_exit (2);
}
if (opt.debug & DBG_MEMORY_VALUE )
memory_debug_mode = 1;
if (opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE )
memory_stat_debug_mode = 1;
if (opt.debug & DBG_MPI_VALUE)
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 2);
if (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE )
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 1);
if (opt.debug & DBG_IOBUF_VALUE )
iobuf_debug_mode = 1;
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);
if (opt.debug)
parse_debug_flag (NULL, &opt.debug, debug_flags);
}
/* We set the screen dimensions for UI purposes. Do not allow screens
smaller than 80x24 for the sake of simplicity. */
static void
set_screen_dimensions(void)
{
#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
char *str;
str=getenv("COLUMNS");
if(str)
opt.screen_columns=atoi(str);
str=getenv("LINES");
if(str)
opt.screen_lines=atoi(str);
#endif
if(opt.screen_columns<80 || opt.screen_columns>255)
opt.screen_columns=80;
if(opt.screen_lines<24 || opt.screen_lines>255)
opt.screen_lines=24;
}
/* Helper to open a file FNAME either for reading or writing to be
used with --status-file etc functions. Not generally useful but it
avoids the riscos specific functions and well some Windows people
might like it too. Prints an error message and returns -1 on
error. On success the file descriptor is returned. */
static int
open_info_file (const char *fname, int for_write, int binary)
{
#ifdef __riscos__
return riscos_fdopenfile (fname, for_write);
#elif defined (ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS)
/* We can't allow these even when testing for a secured filename
because files to be secured might not yet been secured. This is
similar to the option file but in that case it is unlikely that
sensitive information may be retrieved by means of error
messages. */
(void)fname;
(void)for_write;
(void)binary;
return -1;
#else
int fd;
if (binary)
binary = MY_O_BINARY;
/* if (is_secured_filename (fname)) */
/* { */
/* fd = -1; */
/* gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); */
/* } */
/* else */
/* { */
do
{
if (for_write)
fd = open (fname, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY | binary,
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP);
else
fd = open (fname, O_RDONLY | binary);
}
while (fd == -1 && errno == EINTR);
/* } */
if ( fd == -1)
log_error ( for_write? _("can't create '%s': %s\n")
: _("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno));
return fd;
#endif
}
static void
set_cmd( enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd, enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd )
{
enum cmd_and_opt_values cmd = *ret_cmd;
if( !cmd || cmd == new_cmd )
cmd = new_cmd;
else if( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aEncr )
cmd = aSignEncr;
else if( cmd == aEncr && new_cmd == aSign )
cmd = aSignEncr;
else if( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aSym )
cmd = aSignSym;
else if( cmd == aSym && new_cmd == aSign )
cmd = aSignSym;
else if( cmd == aSym && new_cmd == aEncr )
cmd = aEncrSym;
else if( cmd == aEncr && new_cmd == aSym )
cmd = aEncrSym;
else if (cmd == aSignEncr && new_cmd == aSym)
cmd = aSignEncrSym;
else if (cmd == aSignSym && new_cmd == aEncr)
cmd = aSignEncrSym;
else if (cmd == aEncrSym && new_cmd == aSign)
cmd = aSignEncrSym;
else if( ( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aClearsign )
|| ( cmd == aClearsign && new_cmd == aSign ) )
cmd = aClearsign;
else {
log_error(_("conflicting commands\n"));
g10_exit(2);
}
*ret_cmd = cmd;
}
static void
add_group(char *string)
{
char *name,*value;
struct groupitem *item;
/* Break off the group name */
name=strsep(&string,"=");
if(string==NULL)
{
log_error(_("no = sign found in group definition '%s'\n"),name);
return;
}
trim_trailing_ws(name,strlen(name));
/* Does this group already exist? */
for(item=opt.grouplist;item;item=item->next)
if(strcasecmp(item->name,name)==0)
break;
if(!item)
{
item=xmalloc(sizeof(struct groupitem));
item->name=name;
item->next=opt.grouplist;
item->values=NULL;
opt.grouplist=item;
}
/* Break apart the values */
while ((value= strsep(&string," \t")))
{
if (*value)
add_to_strlist2(&item->values,value,utf8_strings);
}
}
static void
rm_group(char *name)
{
struct groupitem *item,*last=NULL;
trim_trailing_ws(name,strlen(name));
for(item=opt.grouplist;item;last=item,item=item->next)
{
if(strcasecmp(item->name,name)==0)
{
if(last)
last->next=item->next;
else
opt.grouplist=item->next;
free_strlist(item->values);
xfree(item);
break;
}
}
}
/* We need to check three things.
0) The homedir. It must be x00, a directory, and owned by the
user.
1) The options/gpg.conf file. Okay unless it or its containing
directory is group or other writable or not owned by us. Disable
exec in this case.
2) Extensions. Same as #1.
Returns true if the item is unsafe. */
static int
check_permissions (const char *path, int item)
{
#if defined(HAVE_STAT) && !defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)
static int homedir_cache=-1;
char *tmppath,*dir;
struct stat statbuf,dirbuf;
int homedir=0,ret=0,checkonly=0;
int perm=0,own=0,enc_dir_perm=0,enc_dir_own=0;
if(opt.no_perm_warn)
return 0;
log_assert(item==0 || item==1 || item==2);
/* extensions may attach a path */
if(item==2 && path[0]!=DIRSEP_C)
{
if(strchr(path,DIRSEP_C))
tmppath=make_filename(path,NULL);
else
tmppath=make_filename(gnupg_libdir (),path,NULL);
}
else
tmppath=xstrdup(path);
/* If the item is located in the homedir, but isn't the homedir,
don't continue if we already checked the homedir itself. This is
to avoid user confusion with an extra options file warning which
could be rectified if the homedir itself had proper
permissions. */
if(item!=0 && homedir_cache>-1
&& !ascii_strncasecmp (gnupg_homedir (), tmppath,
strlen (gnupg_homedir ())))
{
ret=homedir_cache;
goto end;
}
/* It's okay if the file or directory doesn't exist */
if(stat(tmppath,&statbuf)!=0)
{
ret=0;
goto end;
}
/* Now check the enclosing directory. Theoretically, we could walk
this test up to the root directory /, but for the sake of sanity,
I'm stopping at one level down. */
dir=make_dirname(tmppath);
if(stat(dir,&dirbuf)!=0 || !S_ISDIR(dirbuf.st_mode))
{
/* Weird error */
ret=1;
goto end;
}
xfree(dir);
/* Assume failure */
ret=1;
if(item==0)
{
/* The homedir must be x00, a directory, and owned by the user. */
if(S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode))
{
if(statbuf.st_uid==getuid())
{
if((statbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO))==0)
ret=0;
else
perm=1;
}
else
own=1;
homedir_cache=ret;
}
}
else if(item==1 || item==2)
{
/* The options or extension file. Okay unless it or its
containing directory is group or other writable or not owned
by us or root. */
if(S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
{
if(statbuf.st_uid==getuid() || statbuf.st_uid==0)
{
if((statbuf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH))==0)
{
/* it's not writable, so make sure the enclosing
directory is also not writable */
if(dirbuf.st_uid==getuid() || dirbuf.st_uid==0)
{
if((dirbuf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH))==0)
ret=0;
else
enc_dir_perm=1;
}
else
enc_dir_own=1;
}
else
{
/* it's writable, so the enclosing directory had
better not let people get to it. */
if(dirbuf.st_uid==getuid() || dirbuf.st_uid==0)
{
if((dirbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO))==0)
ret=0;
else
perm=enc_dir_perm=1; /* unclear which one to fix! */
}
else
enc_dir_own=1;
}
}
else
own=1;
}
}
else
BUG();
if(!checkonly)
{
if(own)
{
if(item==0)
log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on"
" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
else if(item==1)
log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on"
" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
else
log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on"
" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
}
if(perm)
{
if(item==0)
log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on"
" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
else if(item==1)
log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on"
" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
else
log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on"
" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
}
if(enc_dir_own)
{
if(item==0)
log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on"
" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
else if(item==1)
log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on"
" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
else
log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on"
" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
}
if(enc_dir_perm)
{
if(item==0)
log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on"
" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
else if(item==1)
log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on"
" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
else
log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on"
" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
}
}
end:
xfree(tmppath);
if(homedir)
homedir_cache=ret;
return ret;
#else /*!(HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)*/
(void)path;
(void)item;
return 0;
#endif /*!(HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)*/
}
/* Print the OpenPGP defined algo numbers. */
static void
print_algo_numbers(int (*checker)(int))
{
int i,first=1;
for(i=0;i<=110;i++)
{
if(!checker(i))
{
if(first)
first=0;
else
es_printf (";");
es_printf ("%d",i);
}
}
}
static void
print_algo_names(int (*checker)(int),const char *(*mapper)(int))
{
int i,first=1;
for(i=0;i<=110;i++)
{
if(!checker(i))
{
if(first)
first=0;
else
es_printf (";");
es_printf ("%s",mapper(i));
}
}
}
/* In the future, we can do all sorts of interesting configuration
output here. For now, just give "group" as the Enigmail folks need
it, and pubkey, cipher, hash, and compress as they may be useful
for frontends. */
static void
list_config(char *items)
{
int show_all = !items;
char *name = NULL;
const char *s;
struct groupitem *giter;
int first, iter;
if(!opt.with_colons)
return;
while(show_all || (name=strsep(&items," ")))
{
int any=0;
if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"group")==0)
{
for (giter = opt.grouplist; giter; giter = giter->next)
{
strlist_t sl;
es_fprintf (es_stdout, "cfg:group:");
es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, giter->name, strlen(giter->name),
":", NULL);
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
for(sl=giter->values; sl; sl=sl->next)
{
es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sl->d, strlen (sl->d),
":;", NULL);
if(sl->next)
es_printf(";");
}
es_printf("\n");
}
any=1;
}
if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"version")==0)
{
es_printf("cfg:version:");
es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, VERSION, strlen(VERSION), ":", NULL);
es_printf ("\n");
any=1;
}
if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"pubkey")==0)
{
es_printf ("cfg:pubkey:");
print_algo_numbers (build_list_pk_test_algo);
es_printf ("\n");
any=1;
}
if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"pubkeyname")==0)
{
es_printf ("cfg:pubkeyname:");
print_algo_names (build_list_pk_test_algo,
build_list_pk_algo_name);
es_printf ("\n");
any=1;
}
if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"cipher")==0)
{
es_printf ("cfg:cipher:");
print_algo_numbers (build_list_cipher_test_algo);
es_printf ("\n");
any=1;
}
if (show_all || !ascii_strcasecmp (name,"ciphername"))
{
es_printf ("cfg:ciphername:");
print_algo_names (build_list_cipher_test_algo,
build_list_cipher_algo_name);
es_printf ("\n");
any = 1;
}
if(show_all
|| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"digest")==0
|| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"hash")==0)
{
es_printf ("cfg:digest:");
print_algo_numbers (build_list_md_test_algo);
es_printf ("\n");
any=1;
}
if (show_all
|| !ascii_strcasecmp(name,"digestname")
|| !ascii_strcasecmp(name,"hashname"))
{
es_printf ("cfg:digestname:");
print_algo_names (build_list_md_test_algo,
build_list_md_algo_name);
es_printf ("\n");
any=1;
}
if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"compress")==0)
{
es_printf ("cfg:compress:");
print_algo_numbers(check_compress_algo);
es_printf ("\n");
any=1;
}
if (show_all || !ascii_strcasecmp(name,"ccid-reader-id"))
{
/* We ignore this for GnuPG 1.4 backward compatibility. */
any=1;
}
if (show_all || !ascii_strcasecmp (name,"curve"))
{
es_printf ("cfg:curve:");
for (iter=0, first=1; (s = openpgp_enum_curves (&iter)); first=0)
es_printf ("%s%s", first?"":";", s);
es_printf ("\n");
any=1;
}
/* Curve OIDs are rarely useful and thus only printed if requested. */
if (name && !ascii_strcasecmp (name,"curveoid"))
{
es_printf ("cfg:curveoid:");
for (iter=0, first=1; (s = openpgp_enum_curves (&iter)); first = 0)
{
s = openpgp_curve_to_oid (s, NULL);
es_printf ("%s%s", first?"":";", s? s:"[?]");
}
es_printf ("\n");
any=1;
}
if(show_all)
break;
if(!any)
log_error(_("unknown configuration item '%s'\n"),name);
}
}
/* List options and default values in the GPG Conf format. This is a
new tool distributed with gnupg 1.9.x but we also want some limited
support in older gpg versions. The output is the name of the
configuration file and a list of options available for editing by
gpgconf. */
static void
gpgconf_list (const char *configfile)
{
char *configfile_esc = percent_escape (configfile, NULL);
es_printf ("%s-%s.conf:%lu:\"%s\n",
GPGCONF_NAME, GPG_NAME,
GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT,
configfile_esc ? configfile_esc : "/dev/null");
es_printf ("verbose:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("quiet:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("keyserver:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("reader-port:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("default-key:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("encrypt-to:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("try-secret-key:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("auto-key-locate:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("log-file:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("debug-level:%lu:\"none:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT);
es_printf ("group:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
/* The next one is an info only item and should match the macros at
the top of keygen.c */
es_printf ("default_pubkey_algo:%lu:\"%s:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT,
"RSA-2048");
xfree (configfile_esc);
}
static int
parse_subpacket_list(char *list)
{
char *tok;
byte subpackets[128],i;
int count=0;
if(!list)
{
/* No arguments means all subpackets */
memset(subpackets+1,1,sizeof(subpackets)-1);
count=127;
}
else
{
memset(subpackets,0,sizeof(subpackets));
/* Merge with earlier copy */
if(opt.show_subpackets)
{
byte *in;
for(in=opt.show_subpackets;*in;in++)
{
if(*in>127 || *in<1)
BUG();
if(!subpackets[*in])
count++;
subpackets[*in]=1;
}
}
while((tok=strsep(&list," ,")))
{
if(!*tok)
continue;
i=atoi(tok);
if(i>127 || i<1)
return 0;
if(!subpackets[i])
count++;
subpackets[i]=1;
}
}
xfree(opt.show_subpackets);
opt.show_subpackets=xmalloc(count+1);
opt.show_subpackets[count--]=0;
for(i=1;i<128 && count>=0;i++)
if(subpackets[i])
opt.show_subpackets[count--]=i;
return 1;
}
static int
parse_list_options(char *str)
{
char *subpackets=""; /* something that isn't NULL */
struct parse_options lopts[]=
{
{"show-photos",LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS,NULL,
N_("display photo IDs during key listings")},
{"show-usage",LIST_SHOW_USAGE,NULL,
N_("show key usage information during key listings")},
{"show-policy-urls",LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS,NULL,
N_("show policy URLs during signature listings")},
{"show-notations",LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS,NULL,
N_("show all notations during signature listings")},
{"show-std-notations",LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
N_("show IETF standard notations during signature listings")},
{"show-standard-notations",LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
NULL},
{"show-user-notations",LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS,NULL,
N_("show user-supplied notations during signature listings")},
{"show-keyserver-urls",LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS,NULL,
N_("show preferred keyserver URLs during signature listings")},
{"show-uid-validity",LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY,NULL,
N_("show user ID validity during key listings")},
{"show-unusable-uids",LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS,NULL,
N_("show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings")},
{"show-unusable-subkeys",LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS,NULL,
N_("show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings")},
{"show-keyring",LIST_SHOW_KEYRING,NULL,
N_("show the keyring name in key listings")},
{"show-sig-expire",LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE,NULL,
N_("show expiration dates during signature listings")},
{"show-sig-subpackets",LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS,NULL,
NULL},
{NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
};
/* C99 allows for non-constant initializers, but we'd like to
compile everywhere, so fill in the show-sig-subpackets argument
here. Note that if the parse_options array changes, we'll have
to change the subscript here. */
lopts[13].value=&subpackets;
if(parse_options(str,&opt.list_options,lopts,1))
{
if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS)
{
/* Unset so users can pass multiple lists in. */
opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS;
if(!parse_subpacket_list(subpackets))
return 0;
}
else if(subpackets==NULL && opt.show_subpackets)
{
/* User did 'no-show-subpackets' */
xfree(opt.show_subpackets);
opt.show_subpackets=NULL;
}
return 1;
}
else
return 0;
}
/* Collapses argc/argv into a single string that must be freed */
static char *
collapse_args(int argc,char *argv[])
{
char *str=NULL;
int i,first=1,len=0;
for(i=0;i<argc;i++)
{
len+=strlen(argv[i])+2;
str=xrealloc(str,len);
if(first)
{
str[0]='\0';
first=0;
}
else
strcat(str," ");
strcat(str,argv[i]);
}
return str;
}
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
static void
parse_trust_model(const char *model)
{
if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"pgp")==0)
opt.trust_model=TM_PGP;
else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"classic")==0)
opt.trust_model=TM_CLASSIC;
else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"always")==0)
opt.trust_model=TM_ALWAYS;
else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"direct")==0)
opt.trust_model=TM_DIRECT;
#ifdef USE_TOFU
else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"tofu")==0)
opt.trust_model=TM_TOFU;
else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"tofu+pgp")==0)
opt.trust_model=TM_TOFU_PGP;
#endif /*USE_TOFU*/
else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"auto")==0)
opt.trust_model=TM_AUTO;
else
log_error("unknown trust model '%s'\n",model);
}
#endif /*NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
static int
parse_tofu_policy (const char *policystr)
{
#ifdef USE_TOFU
struct { const char *keyword; int policy; } list[] = {
{ "auto", TOFU_POLICY_AUTO },
{ "good", TOFU_POLICY_GOOD },
{ "unknown", TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN },
{ "bad", TOFU_POLICY_BAD },
{ "ask", TOFU_POLICY_ASK }
};
int i;
if (!ascii_strcasecmp (policystr, "help"))
{
log_info (_("available TOFU policies:\n"));
for (i=0; i < DIM (list); i++)
log_info (" %s\n", list[i].keyword);
g10_exit (1);
}
for (i=0; i < DIM (list); i++)
if (!ascii_strcasecmp (policystr, list[i].keyword))
return list[i].policy;
#endif /*USE_TOFU*/
log_error (_("unknown TOFU policy '%s'\n"), policystr);
if (!opt.quiet)
log_info (_("(use \"help\" to list choices)\n"));
g10_exit (1);
}
/* This function called to initialized a new control object. It is
assumed that this object has been zeroed out before calling this
function. */
static void
gpg_init_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
(void)ctrl;
}
/* This function is called to deinitialize a control object. It is
not deallocated. */
static void
gpg_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
#ifdef USE_TOFU
tofu_closedbs (ctrl);
#endif
gpg_dirmngr_deinit_session_data (ctrl);
}
char *
get_default_configname (void)
{
char *configname = NULL;
char *name = xstrdup (GPG_NAME EXTSEP_S "conf-" SAFE_VERSION);
char *ver = &name[strlen (GPG_NAME EXTSEP_S "conf-")];
do
{
if (configname)
{
char *tok;
xfree (configname);
configname = NULL;
if ((tok = strrchr (ver, SAFE_VERSION_DASH)))
*tok='\0';
else if ((tok = strrchr (ver, SAFE_VERSION_DOT)))
*tok='\0';
else
break;
}
configname = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), name, NULL);
}
while (access (configname, R_OK));
xfree(name);
if (! configname)
configname = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (),
GPG_NAME EXTSEP_S "conf", NULL);
if (! access (configname, R_OK))
{
/* Print a warning when both config files are present. */
char *p = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), "options", NULL);
if (! access (p, R_OK))
log_info (_("Note: old default options file '%s' ignored\n"), p);
xfree (p);
}
else
{
/* Use the old default only if it exists. */
char *p = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), "options", NULL);
if (!access (p, R_OK))
{
xfree (configname);
configname = p;
}
else
xfree (p);
}
return configname;
}
int
main (int argc, char **argv)
{
ARGPARSE_ARGS pargs;
IOBUF a;
int rc=0;
int orig_argc;
char **orig_argv;
const char *fname;
char *username;
int may_coredump;
strlist_t sl;
strlist_t remusr = NULL;
strlist_t locusr = NULL;
strlist_t nrings = NULL;
armor_filter_context_t *afx = NULL;
int detached_sig = 0;
FILE *configfp = NULL;
char *configname = NULL;
char *save_configname = NULL;
char *default_configname = NULL;
unsigned configlineno;
int parse_debug = 0;
int default_config = 1;
int default_keyring = 1;
int greeting = 0;
int nogreeting = 0;
char *logfile = NULL;
int use_random_seed = 1;
enum cmd_and_opt_values cmd = 0;
const char *debug_level = NULL;
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
const char *trustdb_name = NULL;
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
char *def_cipher_string = NULL;
char *def_digest_string = NULL;
char *compress_algo_string = NULL;
char *cert_digest_string = NULL;
char *s2k_cipher_string = NULL;
char *s2k_digest_string = NULL;
char *pers_cipher_list = NULL;
char *pers_digest_list = NULL;
char *pers_compress_list = NULL;
int eyes_only=0;
int multifile=0;
int pwfd = -1;
int fpr_maybe_cmd = 0; /* --fingerprint maybe a command. */
int any_explicit_recipient = 0;
int require_secmem = 0;
int got_secmem = 0;
struct assuan_malloc_hooks malloc_hooks;
ctrl_t ctrl;
static int print_dane_records;
static int print_pka_records;
#ifdef __riscos__
opt.lock_once = 1;
#endif /* __riscos__ */
/* Please note that we may running SUID(ROOT), so be very CAREFUL
when adding any stuff between here and the call to
secmem_init() somewhere after the option parsing. */
early_system_init ();
gnupg_reopen_std (GPG_NAME);
trap_unaligned ();
gnupg_rl_initialize ();
set_strusage (my_strusage);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SUSPEND_SECMEM_WARN);
log_set_prefix (GPG_NAME, GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PREFIX);
/* Make sure that our subsystems are ready. */
i18n_init();
init_common_subsystems (&argc, &argv);
/* Use our own logging handler for Libcgrypt. */
setup_libgcrypt_logging ();
/* Put random number into secure memory */
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_USE_SECURE_RNDPOOL);
may_coredump = disable_core_dumps();
gnupg_init_signals (0, emergency_cleanup);
dotlock_create (NULL, 0); /* Register lock file cleanup. */
opt.autostart = 1;
opt.session_env = session_env_new ();
if (!opt.session_env)
log_fatal ("error allocating session environment block: %s\n",
strerror (errno));
opt.command_fd = -1; /* no command fd */
opt.compress_level = -1; /* defaults to standard compress level */
opt.bz2_compress_level = -1; /* defaults to standard compress level */
/* note: if you change these lines, look at oOpenPGP */
opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
opt.cert_digest_algo = 0;
opt.compress_algo = -1; /* defaults to DEFAULT_COMPRESS_ALGO */
opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
opt.s2k_count = 0; /* Auto-calibrate when needed. */
opt.s2k_cipher_algo = DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO;
opt.completes_needed = 1;
opt.marginals_needed = 3;
opt.max_cert_depth = 5;
opt.escape_from = 1;
opt.flags.require_cross_cert = 1;
opt.import_options = 0;
opt.export_options = EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES;
opt.keyserver_options.import_options = IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG;
opt.keyserver_options.export_options = EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES;
opt.keyserver_options.options = KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD;
opt.verify_options = (LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY
| VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS
| VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS
| VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS);
opt.list_options = (LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY
| LIST_SHOW_USAGE);
#ifdef NO_TRUST_MODELS
opt.trust_model = TM_ALWAYS;
#else
opt.trust_model = TM_AUTO;
#endif
opt.tofu_default_policy = TOFU_POLICY_AUTO;
opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 0;
opt.min_cert_level = 2;
set_screen_dimensions ();
opt.keyid_format = KF_NONE;
opt.def_sig_expire = "0";
opt.def_cert_expire = "0";
gnupg_set_homedir (NULL);
opt.passphrase_repeat = 1;
opt.emit_version = 0;
opt.weak_digests = NULL;
additional_weak_digest("MD5");
/* Check whether we have a config file on the command line. */
orig_argc = argc;
orig_argv = argv;
pargs.argc = &argc;
pargs.argv = &argv;
pargs.flags= (ARGPARSE_FLAG_KEEP | ARGPARSE_FLAG_NOVERSION);
while( arg_parse( &pargs, opts) ) {
if( pargs.r_opt == oDebug || pargs.r_opt == oDebugAll )
parse_debug++;
else if (pargs.r_opt == oDebugIOLBF)
es_setvbuf (es_stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
else if( pargs.r_opt == oOptions ) {
/* yes there is one, so we do not try the default one, but
* read the option file when it is encountered at the commandline
*/
default_config = 0;
}
else if( pargs.r_opt == oNoOptions )
{
default_config = 0; /* --no-options */
opt.no_homedir_creation = 1;
}
else if( pargs.r_opt == oHomedir )
gnupg_set_homedir (pargs.r.ret_str);
else if( pargs.r_opt == oNoPermissionWarn )
opt.no_perm_warn=1;
else if (pargs.r_opt == oStrict )
{
/* Not used */
}
else if (pargs.r_opt == oNoStrict )
{
/* Not used */
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
if ( strchr (gnupg_homedir (), '\\') ) {
char *d, *buf = xmalloc (strlen (gnupg_homedir ())+1);
const char *s;
for (d=buf, s = gnupg_homedir (); *s; s++)
{
*d++ = *s == '\\'? '/': *s;
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
if (s[1] && IsDBCSLeadByte (*s))
*d++ = *++s;
#endif
}
*d = 0;
gnupg_set_homedir (buf);
}
#endif
/* Initialize the secure memory. */
if (!gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE, 0))
got_secmem = 1;
#if defined(HAVE_GETUID) && defined(HAVE_GETEUID)
/* There should be no way to get to this spot while still carrying
setuid privs. Just in case, bomb out if we are. */
if ( getuid () != geteuid () )
BUG ();
#endif
maybe_setuid = 0;
/* Okay, we are now working under our real uid */
/* malloc hooks go here ... */
malloc_hooks.malloc = gcry_malloc;
malloc_hooks.realloc = gcry_realloc;
malloc_hooks.free = gcry_free;
assuan_set_malloc_hooks (&malloc_hooks);
assuan_set_gpg_err_source (GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT);
setup_libassuan_logging (&opt.debug, NULL);
/* Try for a version specific config file first */
default_configname = get_default_configname ();
if (default_config)
configname = xstrdup (default_configname);
argc = orig_argc;
argv = orig_argv;
pargs.argc = &argc;
pargs.argv = &argv;
pargs.flags= ARGPARSE_FLAG_KEEP;
/* By this point we have a homedir, and cannot change it. */
check_permissions (gnupg_homedir (), 0);
next_pass:
if( configname ) {
if(check_permissions(configname,1))
{
/* If any options file is unsafe, then disable any external
programs for keyserver calls or photo IDs. Since the
external program to call is set in the options file, a
unsafe options file can lead to an arbitrary program
being run. */
opt.exec_disable=1;
}
configlineno = 0;
configfp = fopen( configname, "r" );
if (configfp && is_secured_file (fileno (configfp)))
{
fclose (configfp);
configfp = NULL;
gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
}
if( !configfp ) {
if( default_config ) {
if( parse_debug )
log_info(_("Note: no default option file '%s'\n"),
configname );
}
else {
log_error(_("option file '%s': %s\n"),
configname, strerror(errno) );
g10_exit(2);
}
xfree(configname); configname = NULL;
}
if( parse_debug && configname )
log_info(_("reading options from '%s'\n"), configname );
default_config = 0;
}
while( optfile_parse( configfp, configname, &configlineno,
&pargs, opts) )
{
switch( pargs.r_opt )
{
case aListConfig:
case aListGcryptConfig:
case aGPGConfList:
case aGPGConfTest:
set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
/* Do not register a keyring for these commands. */
default_keyring = -1;
break;
case aCheckKeys:
case aListPackets:
case aImport:
case aFastImport:
case aSendKeys:
case aRecvKeys:
case aSearchKeys:
case aRefreshKeys:
case aFetchKeys:
case aExport:
#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
case aCardStatus:
case aCardEdit:
case aChangePIN:
#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
case aListKeys:
case aLocateKeys:
case aListSigs:
case aExportSecret:
case aExportSecretSub:
case aExportSshKey:
case aSym:
case aClearsign:
case aGenRevoke:
case aDesigRevoke:
case aPrimegen:
case aGenRandom:
case aPrintMD:
case aPrintMDs:
case aListTrustDB:
case aCheckTrustDB:
case aUpdateTrustDB:
case aFixTrustDB:
case aListTrustPath:
case aDeArmor:
case aEnArmor:
case aSign:
case aQuickSignKey:
case aQuickLSignKey:
case aSignKey:
case aLSignKey:
case aStore:
case aQuickKeygen:
case aQuickAddUid:
case aQuickAddKey:
case aQuickRevUid:
case aExportOwnerTrust:
case aImportOwnerTrust:
case aRebuildKeydbCaches:
set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
break;
case aKeygen:
case aFullKeygen:
case aEditKey:
case aDeleteSecretKeys:
case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys:
case aDeleteKeys:
case aPasswd:
set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
greeting=1;
break;
case aDetachedSign: detached_sig = 1; set_cmd( &cmd, aSign ); break;
case aDecryptFiles: multifile=1; /* fall through */
case aDecrypt: set_cmd( &cmd, aDecrypt); break;
case aEncrFiles: multifile=1; /* fall through */
case aEncr: set_cmd( &cmd, aEncr); break;
case aVerifyFiles: multifile=1; /* fall through */
case aVerify: set_cmd( &cmd, aVerify); break;
case aServer:
set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
opt.batch = 1;
break;
case aTOFUPolicy:
set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
break;
case oArmor: opt.armor = 1; opt.no_armor=0; break;
case oOutput: opt.outfile = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oMaxOutput: opt.max_output = pargs.r.ret_ulong; break;
case oInputSizeHint:
opt.input_size_hint = string_to_u64 (pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oQuiet: opt.quiet = 1; break;
case oNoTTY: tty_no_terminal(1); break;
case oDryRun: opt.dry_run = 1; break;
case oInteractive: opt.interactive = 1; break;
case oVerbose:
opt.verbose++;
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);
opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS;
opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS;
break;
case oBatch:
opt.batch = 1;
nogreeting = 1;
break;
case oUseAgent: /* Dummy. */
break;
case oNoUseAgent:
obsolete_option (configname, configlineno, "no-use-agent");
break;
case oGpgAgentInfo:
obsolete_option (configname, configlineno, "gpg-agent-info");
break;
case oReaderPort:
obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, configlineno, "reader-port");
break;
case octapiDriver:
obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, configlineno, "ctapi-driver");
break;
case opcscDriver:
obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, configlineno, "pcsc-driver");
break;
case oDisableCCID:
obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, configlineno, "disable-ccid");
break;
case oHonorHttpProxy:
obsolete_option (configname, configlineno, "honor-http-proxy");
break;
case oAnswerYes: opt.answer_yes = 1; break;
case oAnswerNo: opt.answer_no = 1; break;
case oKeyring: append_to_strlist( &nrings, pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oPrimaryKeyring:
sl = append_to_strlist (&nrings, pargs.r.ret_str);
sl->flags = KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_PRIMARY;
break;
case oShowKeyring:
deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-keyring",
"--list-options ","show-keyring");
opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_KEYRING;
break;
case oDebug:
if (parse_debug_flag (pargs.r.ret_str, &opt.debug, debug_flags))
{
pargs.r_opt = ARGPARSE_INVALID_ARG;
pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR;
}
break;
case oDebugAll: opt.debug = ~0; break;
case oDebugLevel: debug_level = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oDebugIOLBF: break; /* Already set in pre-parse step. */
case oStatusFD:
set_status_fd ( translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1) );
break;
case oStatusFile:
set_status_fd ( open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 1, 0) );
break;
case oAttributeFD:
set_attrib_fd ( translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1) );
break;
case oAttributeFile:
set_attrib_fd ( open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 1, 1) );
break;
case oLoggerFD:
log_set_fd (translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1));
break;
case oLoggerFile:
logfile = pargs.r.ret_str;
break;
case oWithFingerprint:
opt.with_fingerprint = 1;
opt.fingerprint++;
break;
case oWithSubkeyFingerprint:
opt.with_subkey_fingerprint = 1;
break;
case oWithICAOSpelling:
opt.with_icao_spelling = 1;
break;
case oFingerprint:
opt.fingerprint++;
fpr_maybe_cmd = 1;
break;
case oWithKeygrip:
opt.with_keygrip = 1;
break;
case oWithSecret:
opt.with_secret = 1;
break;
case oWithWKDHash:
opt.with_wkd_hash = 1;
break;
case oSecretKeyring:
/* Ignore this old option. */
break;
case oOptions:
/* config files may not be nested (silently ignore them) */
if( !configfp ) {
xfree(configname);
configname = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
goto next_pass;
}
break;
case oNoArmor: opt.no_armor=1; opt.armor=0; break;
case oNoDefKeyring:
if (default_keyring > 0)
default_keyring = 0;
break;
case oNoKeyring:
default_keyring = -1;
break;
case oNoGreeting: nogreeting = 1; break;
case oNoVerbose:
opt.verbose = 0;
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);
opt.list_sigs=0;
break;
case oQuickRandom:
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_ENABLE_QUICK_RANDOM, 0);
break;
case oEmitVersion: opt.emit_version++; break;
case oNoEmitVersion: opt.emit_version=0; break;
case oCompletesNeeded: opt.completes_needed = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
case oMarginalsNeeded: opt.marginals_needed = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
case oMaxCertDepth: opt.max_cert_depth = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
case oTrustDBName: trustdb_name = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
case oDefaultKey:
sl = add_to_strlist (&opt.def_secret_key, pargs.r.ret_str);
sl->flags = (pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT);
if (configfp)
sl->flags |= PK_LIST_CONFIG;
break;
case oDefRecipient:
if( *pargs.r.ret_str )
{
xfree (opt.def_recipient);
opt.def_recipient = make_username(pargs.r.ret_str);
}
break;
case oDefRecipientSelf:
xfree(opt.def_recipient); opt.def_recipient = NULL;
opt.def_recipient_self = 1;
break;
case oNoDefRecipient:
xfree(opt.def_recipient); opt.def_recipient = NULL;
opt.def_recipient_self = 0;
break;
case oNoOptions: opt.no_homedir_creation = 1; break; /* no-options */
case oHomedir: break;
case oNoBatch: opt.batch = 0; break;
case oWithTofuInfo: opt.with_tofu_info = 1; break;
case oWithKeyData: opt.with_key_data=1; /*FALLTHRU*/
case oWithColons: opt.with_colons=':'; break;
case oWithSigCheck: opt.check_sigs = 1; /*FALLTHRU*/
case oWithSigList: opt.list_sigs = 1; break;
case oSkipVerify: opt.skip_verify=1; break;
case oSkipHiddenRecipients: opt.skip_hidden_recipients = 1; break;
case oNoSkipHiddenRecipients: opt.skip_hidden_recipients = 0; break;
case aListSecretKeys: set_cmd( &cmd, aListSecretKeys); break;
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
/* There are many programs (like mutt) that call gpg with
--always-trust so keep this option around for a long
time. */
case oAlwaysTrust: opt.trust_model=TM_ALWAYS; break;
case oTrustModel:
parse_trust_model(pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
case oTOFUDefaultPolicy:
opt.tofu_default_policy = parse_tofu_policy (pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oTOFUDBFormat:
obsolete_option (configname, configlineno, "tofu-db-format");
break;
case oForceOwnertrust:
log_info(_("Note: %s is not for normal use!\n"),
"--force-ownertrust");
opt.force_ownertrust=string_to_trust_value(pargs.r.ret_str);
if(opt.force_ownertrust==-1)
{
log_error("invalid ownertrust '%s'\n",pargs.r.ret_str);
opt.force_ownertrust=0;
}
break;
case oLoadExtension:
/* Dummy so that gpg 1.4 conf files can work. Should
eventually be removed. */
break;
case oRFC4880bis:
opt.flags.rfc4880bis = 1;
- /* fall thru. */
+ /* fall through. */
case oOpenPGP:
case oRFC4880:
/* This is effectively the same as RFC2440, but with
"--enable-dsa2 --no-rfc2440-text --escape-from-lines
--require-cross-certification". */
opt.compliance = CO_RFC4880;
opt.flags.dsa2 = 1;
opt.flags.require_cross_cert = 1;
opt.rfc2440_text = 0;
opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1;
opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1;
opt.escape_from = 1;
opt.not_dash_escaped = 0;
opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
opt.cert_digest_algo = 0;
opt.compress_algo = -1;
opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;
break;
case oRFC2440:
opt.compliance = CO_RFC2440;
opt.flags.dsa2 = 0;
opt.rfc2440_text = 1;
opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1;
opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1;
opt.escape_from = 0;
opt.not_dash_escaped = 0;
opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
opt.cert_digest_algo = 0;
opt.compress_algo = -1;
opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;
break;
case oPGP6: opt.compliance = CO_PGP6; break;
case oPGP7: opt.compliance = CO_PGP7; break;
case oPGP8: opt.compliance = CO_PGP8; break;
case oGnuPG: opt.compliance = CO_GNUPG; break;
case oRFC2440Text: opt.rfc2440_text=1; break;
case oNoRFC2440Text: opt.rfc2440_text=0; break;
case oSetFilename:
if(utf8_strings)
opt.set_filename = pargs.r.ret_str;
else
opt.set_filename = native_to_utf8(pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oForYourEyesOnly: eyes_only = 1; break;
case oNoForYourEyesOnly: eyes_only = 0; break;
case oSetPolicyURL:
add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0);
add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,1);
break;
case oSigPolicyURL: add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0); break;
case oCertPolicyURL: add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,1); break;
case oShowPolicyURL:
deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-policy-url",
"--list-options ","show-policy-urls");
deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-policy-url",
"--verify-options ","show-policy-urls");
opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
opt.verify_options|=VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
break;
case oNoShowPolicyURL:
deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-policy-url",
"--list-options ","no-show-policy-urls");
deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-policy-url",
"--verify-options ","no-show-policy-urls");
opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
break;
case oSigKeyserverURL: add_keyserver_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0); break;
case oUseEmbeddedFilename:
opt.flags.use_embedded_filename=1;
break;
case oNoUseEmbeddedFilename:
opt.flags.use_embedded_filename=0;
break;
case oComment:
if(pargs.r.ret_str[0])
append_to_strlist(&opt.comments,pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oDefaultComment:
deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,
"--default-comment","--no-comments","");
/* fall through */
case oNoComments:
free_strlist(opt.comments);
opt.comments=NULL;
break;
case oThrowKeyids: opt.throw_keyids = 1; break;
case oNoThrowKeyids: opt.throw_keyids = 0; break;
case oShowPhotos:
deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-photos",
"--list-options ","show-photos");
deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-photos",
"--verify-options ","show-photos");
opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS;
opt.verify_options|=VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS;
break;
case oNoShowPhotos:
deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-photos",
"--list-options ","no-show-photos");
deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-photos",
"--verify-options ","no-show-photos");
opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS;
opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS;
break;
case oPhotoViewer: opt.photo_viewer = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oForceMDC: opt.force_mdc = 1; break;
case oNoForceMDC: opt.force_mdc = 0; break;
case oDisableMDC: opt.disable_mdc = 1; break;
case oNoDisableMDC: opt.disable_mdc = 0; break;
case oDisableSignerUID: opt.flags.disable_signer_uid = 1; break;
case oS2KMode: opt.s2k_mode = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
case oS2KDigest: s2k_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oS2KCipher: s2k_cipher_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oS2KCount:
if (pargs.r.ret_int)
opt.s2k_count = encode_s2k_iterations (pargs.r.ret_int);
else
opt.s2k_count = 0; /* Auto-calibrate when needed. */
break;
case oRecipient:
case oHiddenRecipient:
case oRecipientFile:
case oHiddenRecipientFile:
/* Store the recipient. Note that we also store the
* option as private data in the flags. This is achieved
* by shifting the option value to the left so to keep
* enough space for the flags. */
sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
sl->flags = (pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT);
if (configfp)
sl->flags |= PK_LIST_CONFIG;
if (pargs.r_opt == oHiddenRecipient
|| pargs.r_opt == oHiddenRecipientFile)
sl->flags |= PK_LIST_HIDDEN;
if (pargs.r_opt == oRecipientFile
|| pargs.r_opt == oHiddenRecipientFile)
sl->flags |= PK_LIST_FROM_FILE;
any_explicit_recipient = 1;
break;
case oEncryptTo:
case oHiddenEncryptTo:
/* Store an additional recipient. */
sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
sl->flags = ((pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT) | PK_LIST_ENCRYPT_TO);
if (configfp)
sl->flags |= PK_LIST_CONFIG;
if (pargs.r_opt == oHiddenEncryptTo)
sl->flags |= PK_LIST_HIDDEN;
break;
case oNoEncryptTo:
opt.no_encrypt_to = 1;
break;
case oEncryptToDefaultKey:
opt.encrypt_to_default_key = configfp ? 2 : 1;
break;
case oTrySecretKey:
add_to_strlist2 (&opt.secret_keys_to_try,
pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings);
break;
case oMimemode: opt.mimemode = opt.textmode = 1; break;
case oTextmodeShort: opt.textmode = 2; break;
case oTextmode: opt.textmode=1; break;
case oNoTextmode: opt.textmode=opt.mimemode=0; break;
case oExpert: opt.expert = 1; break;
case oNoExpert: opt.expert = 0; break;
case oDefSigExpire:
if(*pargs.r.ret_str!='\0')
{
if(parse_expire_string(pargs.r.ret_str)==(u32)-1)
log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid signature expiration\n"),
pargs.r.ret_str);
else
opt.def_sig_expire=pargs.r.ret_str;
}
break;
case oAskSigExpire: opt.ask_sig_expire = 1; break;
case oNoAskSigExpire: opt.ask_sig_expire = 0; break;
case oDefCertExpire:
if(*pargs.r.ret_str!='\0')
{
if(parse_expire_string(pargs.r.ret_str)==(u32)-1)
log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid signature expiration\n"),
pargs.r.ret_str);
else
opt.def_cert_expire=pargs.r.ret_str;
}
break;
case oAskCertExpire: opt.ask_cert_expire = 1; break;
case oNoAskCertExpire: opt.ask_cert_expire = 0; break;
case oDefCertLevel: opt.def_cert_level=pargs.r.ret_int; break;
case oMinCertLevel: opt.min_cert_level=pargs.r.ret_int; break;
case oAskCertLevel: opt.ask_cert_level = 1; break;
case oNoAskCertLevel: opt.ask_cert_level = 0; break;
case oLocalUser: /* store the local users */
sl = add_to_strlist2( &locusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
sl->flags = (pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT);
if (configfp)
sl->flags |= PK_LIST_CONFIG;
break;
case oSender:
{
char *mbox = mailbox_from_userid (pargs.r.ret_str);
if (!mbox)
log_error (_("\"%s\" is not a proper mail address\n"),
pargs.r.ret_str);
else
{
add_to_strlist (&opt.sender_list, mbox);
xfree (mbox);
}
}
break;
case oCompress:
/* this is the -z command line option */
opt.compress_level = opt.bz2_compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int;
break;
case oCompressLevel: opt.compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
case oBZ2CompressLevel: opt.bz2_compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
case oBZ2DecompressLowmem: opt.bz2_decompress_lowmem=1; break;
case oPassphrase:
set_passphrase_from_string(pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oPassphraseFD:
pwfd = translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 0);
break;
case oPassphraseFile:
pwfd = open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 0, 1);
break;
case oPassphraseRepeat:
opt.passphrase_repeat = pargs.r.ret_int;
break;
case oPinentryMode:
opt.pinentry_mode = parse_pinentry_mode (pargs.r.ret_str);
if (opt.pinentry_mode == -1)
log_error (_("invalid pinentry mode '%s'\n"), pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oCommandFD:
opt.command_fd = translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 0);
break;
case oCommandFile:
opt.command_fd = open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 0, 1);
break;
case oCipherAlgo:
def_cipher_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oDigestAlgo:
def_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oCompressAlgo:
/* If it is all digits, stick a Z in front of it for
later. This is for backwards compatibility with
versions that took the compress algorithm number. */
{
char *pt=pargs.r.ret_str;
while(*pt)
{
if (!isascii (*pt) || !isdigit (*pt))
break;
pt++;
}
if(*pt=='\0')
{
compress_algo_string=xmalloc(strlen(pargs.r.ret_str)+2);
strcpy(compress_algo_string,"Z");
strcat(compress_algo_string,pargs.r.ret_str);
}
else
compress_algo_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
}
break;
case oCertDigestAlgo:
cert_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oNoSecmemWarn:
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM_WARN);
break;
case oRequireSecmem: require_secmem=1; break;
case oNoRequireSecmem: require_secmem=0; break;
case oNoPermissionWarn: opt.no_perm_warn=1; break;
case oNoMDCWarn: opt.no_mdc_warn=1; break;
case oDisplayCharset:
if( set_native_charset( pargs.r.ret_str ) )
log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid character set\n"),
pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oNotDashEscaped: opt.not_dash_escaped = 1; break;
case oEscapeFrom: opt.escape_from = 1; break;
case oNoEscapeFrom: opt.escape_from = 0; break;
case oLockOnce: opt.lock_once = 1; break;
case oLockNever:
dotlock_disable ();
break;
case oLockMultiple:
#ifndef __riscos__
opt.lock_once = 0;
#else /* __riscos__ */
riscos_not_implemented("lock-multiple");
#endif /* __riscos__ */
break;
case oKeyServer:
{
keyserver_spec_t keyserver;
keyserver = parse_keyserver_uri (pargs.r.ret_str, 0);
if (!keyserver)
log_error (_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
else
{
/* We only support a single keyserver. Later ones
override earlier ones. (Since we parse the
config file first and then the command line
arguments, the command line takes
precedence.) */
if (opt.keyserver)
free_keyserver_spec (opt.keyserver);
opt.keyserver = keyserver;
}
}
break;
case oKeyServerOptions:
if(!parse_keyserver_options(pargs.r.ret_str))
{
if(configname)
log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid keyserver options\n"),
configname,configlineno);
else
log_error(_("invalid keyserver options\n"));
}
break;
case oImportOptions:
if(!parse_import_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.import_options,1))
{
if(configname)
log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid import options\n"),
configname,configlineno);
else
log_error(_("invalid import options\n"));
}
break;
case oImportFilter:
rc = parse_and_set_import_filter (pargs.r.ret_str);
if (rc)
log_error (_("invalid filter option: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
break;
case oExportOptions:
if(!parse_export_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.export_options,1))
{
if(configname)
log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid export options\n"),
configname,configlineno);
else
log_error(_("invalid export options\n"));
}
break;
case oExportFilter:
rc = parse_and_set_export_filter (pargs.r.ret_str);
if (rc)
log_error (_("invalid filter option: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
break;
case oListOptions:
if(!parse_list_options(pargs.r.ret_str))
{
if(configname)
log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid list options\n"),
configname,configlineno);
else
log_error(_("invalid list options\n"));
}
break;
case oVerifyOptions:
{
struct parse_options vopts[]=
{
{"show-photos",VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS,NULL,
N_("display photo IDs during signature verification")},
{"show-policy-urls",VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS,NULL,
N_("show policy URLs during signature verification")},
{"show-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS,NULL,
N_("show all notations during signature verification")},
{"show-std-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
N_("show IETF standard notations during signature verification")},
{"show-standard-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
NULL},
{"show-user-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS,NULL,
N_("show user-supplied notations during signature verification")},
{"show-keyserver-urls",VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS,NULL,
N_("show preferred keyserver URLs during signature verification")},
{"show-uid-validity",VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY,NULL,
N_("show user ID validity during signature verification")},
{"show-unusable-uids",VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS,NULL,
N_("show revoked and expired user IDs in signature verification")},
{"show-primary-uid-only",VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY,NULL,
N_("show only the primary user ID in signature verification")},
{"pka-lookups",VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS,NULL,
N_("validate signatures with PKA data")},
{"pka-trust-increase",VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE,NULL,
N_("elevate the trust of signatures with valid PKA data")},
{NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
};
if(!parse_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.verify_options,vopts,1))
{
if(configname)
log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid verify options\n"),
configname,configlineno);
else
log_error(_("invalid verify options\n"));
}
}
break;
case oTempDir: opt.temp_dir=pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oExecPath:
if(set_exec_path(pargs.r.ret_str))
log_error(_("unable to set exec-path to %s\n"),pargs.r.ret_str);
else
opt.exec_path_set=1;
break;
case oSetNotation:
add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 0 );
add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 1 );
break;
case oSigNotation: add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 0 ); break;
case oCertNotation: add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 1 ); break;
case oShowNotation:
deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-notation",
"--list-options ","show-notations");
deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-notation",
"--verify-options ","show-notations");
opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
opt.verify_options|=VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
break;
case oNoShowNotation:
deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-notation",
"--list-options ","no-show-notations");
deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-notation",
"--verify-options ","no-show-notations");
opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
break;
case oUtf8Strings: utf8_strings = 1; break;
case oNoUtf8Strings: utf8_strings = 0; break;
case oDisableCipherAlgo:
{
int algo = string_to_cipher_algo (pargs.r.ret_str);
gcry_cipher_ctl (NULL, GCRYCTL_DISABLE_ALGO, &algo, sizeof algo);
}
break;
case oDisablePubkeyAlgo:
{
int algo = gcry_pk_map_name (pargs.r.ret_str);
gcry_pk_ctl (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_ALGO, &algo, sizeof algo);
}
break;
case oNoSigCache: opt.no_sig_cache = 1; break;
case oAllowNonSelfsignedUID: opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1; break;
case oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID: opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid=0; break;
case oAllowFreeformUID: opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1; break;
case oNoAllowFreeformUID: opt.allow_freeform_uid = 0; break;
case oNoLiteral: opt.no_literal = 1; break;
case oSetFilesize: opt.set_filesize = pargs.r.ret_ulong; break;
case oFastListMode: opt.fast_list_mode = 1; break;
case oFixedListMode: /* Dummy */ break;
case oLegacyListMode: opt.legacy_list_mode = 1; break;
case oPrintPKARecords: print_pka_records = 1; break;
case oPrintDANERecords: print_dane_records = 1; break;
case oListOnly: opt.list_only=1; break;
case oIgnoreTimeConflict: opt.ignore_time_conflict = 1; break;
case oIgnoreValidFrom: opt.ignore_valid_from = 1; break;
case oIgnoreCrcError: opt.ignore_crc_error = 1; break;
case oIgnoreMDCError: opt.ignore_mdc_error = 1; break;
case oNoRandomSeedFile: use_random_seed = 0; break;
case oAutoKeyRetrieve:
case oNoAutoKeyRetrieve:
if(pargs.r_opt==oAutoKeyRetrieve)
opt.keyserver_options.options|=KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE;
else
opt.keyserver_options.options&=~KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE;
break;
case oShowSessionKey: opt.show_session_key = 1; break;
case oOverrideSessionKey:
opt.override_session_key = pargs.r.ret_str;
break;
case oMergeOnly:
deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--merge-only",
"--import-options ","merge-only");
opt.import_options|=IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY;
break;
case oAllowSecretKeyImport: /* obsolete */ break;
case oTryAllSecrets: opt.try_all_secrets = 1; break;
case oTrustedKey: register_trusted_key( pargs.r.ret_str ); break;
case oEnableSpecialFilenames:
iobuf_enable_special_filenames (1);
break;
case oNoExpensiveTrustChecks: opt.no_expensive_trust_checks=1; break;
case oAutoCheckTrustDB: opt.no_auto_check_trustdb=0; break;
case oNoAutoCheckTrustDB: opt.no_auto_check_trustdb=1; break;
case oPreservePermissions: opt.preserve_permissions=1; break;
case oDefaultPreferenceList:
opt.def_preference_list = pargs.r.ret_str;
break;
case oDefaultKeyserverURL:
{
keyserver_spec_t keyserver;
keyserver = parse_keyserver_uri (pargs.r.ret_str,1 );
if (!keyserver)
log_error (_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
else
free_keyserver_spec (keyserver);
opt.def_keyserver_url = pargs.r.ret_str;
}
break;
case oPersonalCipherPreferences:
pers_cipher_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
break;
case oPersonalDigestPreferences:
pers_digest_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
break;
case oPersonalCompressPreferences:
pers_compress_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
break;
case oAgentProgram: opt.agent_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oDirmngrProgram: opt.dirmngr_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oWeakDigest:
additional_weak_digest(pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oUnwrap:
opt.unwrap_encryption = 1;
break;
case oOnlySignTextIDs:
opt.only_sign_text_ids = 1;
break;
case oDisplay:
set_opt_session_env ("DISPLAY", pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oTTYname:
set_opt_session_env ("GPG_TTY", pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oTTYtype:
set_opt_session_env ("TERM", pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oXauthority:
set_opt_session_env ("XAUTHORITY", pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oLCctype: opt.lc_ctype = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oLCmessages: opt.lc_messages = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oGroup: add_group(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oUnGroup: rm_group(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oNoGroups:
while(opt.grouplist)
{
struct groupitem *iter=opt.grouplist;
free_strlist(iter->values);
opt.grouplist=opt.grouplist->next;
xfree(iter);
}
break;
case oStrict:
case oNoStrict:
/* Not used */
break;
case oMangleDosFilenames: opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 1; break;
case oNoMangleDosFilenames: opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 0; break;
case oEnableProgressFilter: opt.enable_progress_filter = 1; break;
case oMultifile: multifile=1; break;
case oKeyidFormat:
if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"short")==0)
opt.keyid_format=KF_SHORT;
else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"long")==0)
opt.keyid_format=KF_LONG;
else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"0xshort")==0)
opt.keyid_format=KF_0xSHORT;
else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"0xlong")==0)
opt.keyid_format=KF_0xLONG;
else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"none")==0)
opt.keyid_format = KF_NONE;
else
log_error("unknown keyid-format '%s'\n",pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oExitOnStatusWriteError:
opt.exit_on_status_write_error = 1;
break;
case oLimitCardInsertTries:
opt.limit_card_insert_tries = pargs.r.ret_int;
break;
case oRequireCrossCert: opt.flags.require_cross_cert=1; break;
case oNoRequireCrossCert: opt.flags.require_cross_cert=0; break;
case oAutoKeyLocate:
if(!parse_auto_key_locate(pargs.r.ret_str))
{
if(configname)
log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid auto-key-locate list\n"),
configname,configlineno);
else
log_error(_("invalid auto-key-locate list\n"));
}
break;
case oNoAutoKeyLocate:
release_akl();
break;
case oEnableLargeRSA:
#if SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE >= 65536
opt.flags.large_rsa=1;
#else
if (configname)
log_info("%s:%d: WARNING: gpg not built with large secure "
"memory buffer. Ignoring enable-large-rsa\n",
configname,configlineno);
else
log_info("WARNING: gpg not built with large secure "
"memory buffer. Ignoring --enable-large-rsa\n");
#endif /* SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE >= 65536 */
break;
case oDisableLargeRSA: opt.flags.large_rsa=0;
break;
case oEnableDSA2: opt.flags.dsa2=1; break;
case oDisableDSA2: opt.flags.dsa2=0; break;
case oAllowMultisigVerification:
case oAllowMultipleMessages:
opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages=1;
break;
case oNoAllowMultipleMessages:
opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages=0;
break;
case oAllowWeakDigestAlgos:
opt.flags.allow_weak_digest_algos = 1;
break;
case oFakedSystemTime:
{
time_t faked_time = isotime2epoch (pargs.r.ret_str);
if (faked_time == (time_t)(-1))
faked_time = (time_t)strtoul (pargs.r.ret_str, NULL, 10);
gnupg_set_time (faked_time, 0);
}
break;
case oNoAutostart: opt.autostart = 0; break;
case oNoop: break;
default:
pargs.err = configfp? ARGPARSE_PRINT_WARNING:ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR;
break;
}
}
if (configfp)
{
fclose( configfp );
configfp = NULL;
/* Remember the first config file name. */
if (!save_configname)
save_configname = configname;
else
xfree(configname);
configname = NULL;
goto next_pass;
}
xfree(configname); configname = NULL;
if (log_get_errorcount (0))
g10_exit(2);
/* The command --gpgconf-list is pretty simple and may be called
directly after the option parsing. */
if (cmd == aGPGConfList)
{
gpgconf_list (save_configname ? save_configname : default_configname);
g10_exit (0);
}
xfree (save_configname);
xfree (default_configname);
if (print_dane_records)
log_error ("invalid option \"%s\"; use \"%s\" instead\n",
"--print-dane-records",
"--export-options export-dane");
if (print_pka_records)
log_error ("invalid option \"%s\"; use \"%s\" instead\n",
"--print-pks-records",
"--export-options export-pka");
if (log_get_errorcount (0))
g10_exit(2);
if( nogreeting )
greeting = 0;
if( greeting )
{
es_fprintf (es_stderr, "%s %s; %s\n",
strusage(11), strusage(13), strusage(14) );
es_fprintf (es_stderr, "%s\n", strusage(15) );
}
#ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION
if (!opt.batch)
{
const char *s;
if((s=strusage(25)))
log_info("%s\n",s);
if((s=strusage(26)))
log_info("%s\n",s);
if((s=strusage(27)))
log_info("%s\n",s);
}
#endif
/* FIXME: We should use logging to a file only in server mode;
however we have not yet implemetyed that. Thus we try to get
away with --batch as indication for logging to file
required. */
if (logfile && opt.batch)
{
log_set_file (logfile);
log_set_prefix (NULL, GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PREFIX | GPGRT_LOG_WITH_TIME | GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PID);
}
if (opt.verbose > 2)
log_info ("using character set '%s'\n", get_native_charset ());
if( may_coredump && !opt.quiet )
log_info(_("WARNING: program may create a core file!\n"));
if (opt.flags.rfc4880bis)
log_info ("WARNING: using experimental features from RFC4880bis!\n");
else
{
opt.mimemode = 0; /* This will use text mode instead. */
}
if (eyes_only) {
if (opt.set_filename)
log_info(_("WARNING: %s overrides %s\n"),
"--for-your-eyes-only","--set-filename");
opt.set_filename="_CONSOLE";
}
if (opt.no_literal) {
log_info(_("Note: %s is not for normal use!\n"), "--no-literal");
if (opt.textmode)
log_error(_("%s not allowed with %s!\n"),
"--textmode", "--no-literal" );
if (opt.set_filename)
log_error(_("%s makes no sense with %s!\n"),
eyes_only?"--for-your-eyes-only":"--set-filename",
"--no-literal" );
}
if (opt.set_filesize)
log_info(_("Note: %s is not for normal use!\n"), "--set-filesize");
if( opt.batch )
tty_batchmode( 1 );
if (gnupg_faked_time_p ())
{
gnupg_isotime_t tbuf;
log_info (_("WARNING: running with faked system time: "));
gnupg_get_isotime (tbuf);
dump_isotime (tbuf);
log_printf ("\n");
}
/* Print a warning if an argument looks like an option. */
if (!opt.quiet && !(pargs.flags & ARGPARSE_FLAG_STOP_SEEN))
{
int i;
for (i=0; i < argc; i++)
if (argv[i][0] == '-' && argv[i][1] == '-')
log_info (_("Note: '%s' is not considered an option\n"), argv[i]);
}
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_RESUME_SECMEM_WARN);
if(require_secmem && !got_secmem)
{
log_info(_("will not run with insecure memory due to %s\n"),
"--require-secmem");
g10_exit(2);
}
set_debug (debug_level);
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("start");
/* Do these after the switch(), so they can override settings. */
if(PGP6)
{
/* That does not anymore work because we have no more support
for v3 signatures. */
opt.disable_mdc=1;
opt.escape_from=1;
opt.ask_sig_expire=0;
}
else if(PGP7)
{
/* That does not anymore work because we have no more support
for v3 signatures. */
opt.escape_from=1;
opt.ask_sig_expire=0;
}
else if(PGP8)
{
opt.escape_from=1;
}
if( def_cipher_string ) {
opt.def_cipher_algo = string_to_cipher_algo (def_cipher_string);
xfree(def_cipher_string); def_cipher_string = NULL;
if ( openpgp_cipher_test_algo (opt.def_cipher_algo) )
log_error(_("selected cipher algorithm is invalid\n"));
}
if( def_digest_string ) {
opt.def_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo (def_digest_string);
xfree(def_digest_string); def_digest_string = NULL;
if ( openpgp_md_test_algo (opt.def_digest_algo) )
log_error(_("selected digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
}
if( compress_algo_string ) {
opt.compress_algo = string_to_compress_algo(compress_algo_string);
xfree(compress_algo_string); compress_algo_string = NULL;
if( check_compress_algo(opt.compress_algo) )
log_error(_("selected compression algorithm is invalid\n"));
}
if( cert_digest_string ) {
opt.cert_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo (cert_digest_string);
xfree(cert_digest_string); cert_digest_string = NULL;
if (openpgp_md_test_algo(opt.cert_digest_algo))
log_error(_("selected certification digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
}
if( s2k_cipher_string ) {
opt.s2k_cipher_algo = string_to_cipher_algo (s2k_cipher_string);
xfree(s2k_cipher_string); s2k_cipher_string = NULL;
if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (opt.s2k_cipher_algo))
log_error(_("selected cipher algorithm is invalid\n"));
}
if( s2k_digest_string ) {
opt.s2k_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo (s2k_digest_string);
xfree(s2k_digest_string); s2k_digest_string = NULL;
if (openpgp_md_test_algo(opt.s2k_digest_algo))
log_error(_("selected digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
}
if( opt.completes_needed < 1 )
log_error(_("completes-needed must be greater than 0\n"));
if( opt.marginals_needed < 2 )
log_error(_("marginals-needed must be greater than 1\n"));
if( opt.max_cert_depth < 1 || opt.max_cert_depth > 255 )
log_error(_("max-cert-depth must be in the range from 1 to 255\n"));
if(opt.def_cert_level<0 || opt.def_cert_level>3)
log_error(_("invalid default-cert-level; must be 0, 1, 2, or 3\n"));
if( opt.min_cert_level < 1 || opt.min_cert_level > 3 )
log_error(_("invalid min-cert-level; must be 1, 2, or 3\n"));
switch( opt.s2k_mode ) {
case 0:
log_info(_("Note: simple S2K mode (0) is strongly discouraged\n"));
break;
case 1: case 3: break;
default:
log_error(_("invalid S2K mode; must be 0, 1 or 3\n"));
}
/* This isn't actually needed, but does serve to error out if the
string is invalid. */
if(opt.def_preference_list &&
keygen_set_std_prefs(opt.def_preference_list,0))
log_error(_("invalid default preferences\n"));
if(pers_cipher_list &&
keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_cipher_list,PREFTYPE_SYM))
log_error(_("invalid personal cipher preferences\n"));
if(pers_digest_list &&
keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_digest_list,PREFTYPE_HASH))
log_error(_("invalid personal digest preferences\n"));
if(pers_compress_list &&
keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_compress_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP))
log_error(_("invalid personal compress preferences\n"));
/* We don't support all possible commands with multifile yet */
if(multifile)
{
char *cmdname;
switch(cmd)
{
case aSign:
cmdname="--sign";
break;
case aSignEncr:
cmdname="--sign --encrypt";
break;
case aClearsign:
cmdname="--clearsign";
break;
case aDetachedSign:
cmdname="--detach-sign";
break;
case aSym:
cmdname="--symmetric";
break;
case aEncrSym:
cmdname="--symmetric --encrypt";
break;
case aStore:
cmdname="--store";
break;
default:
cmdname=NULL;
break;
}
if(cmdname)
log_error(_("%s does not yet work with %s\n"),cmdname,"--multifile");
}
if( log_get_errorcount(0) )
g10_exit(2);
if(opt.compress_level==0)
opt.compress_algo=COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE;
/* Check our chosen algorithms against the list of legal
algorithms. */
if(!GNUPG)
{
const char *badalg=NULL;
preftype_t badtype=PREFTYPE_NONE;
if(opt.def_cipher_algo
&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_SYM,opt.def_cipher_algo,NULL))
{
badalg = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (opt.def_cipher_algo);
badtype = PREFTYPE_SYM;
}
else if(opt.def_digest_algo
&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_HASH,opt.def_digest_algo,NULL))
{
badalg = gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo);
badtype = PREFTYPE_HASH;
}
else if(opt.cert_digest_algo
&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_HASH,opt.cert_digest_algo,NULL))
{
badalg = gcry_md_algo_name (opt.cert_digest_algo);
badtype = PREFTYPE_HASH;
}
else if(opt.compress_algo!=-1
&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_ZIP,opt.compress_algo,NULL))
{
badalg = compress_algo_to_string(opt.compress_algo);
badtype = PREFTYPE_ZIP;
}
if(badalg)
{
switch(badtype)
{
case PREFTYPE_SYM:
log_info(_("you may not use cipher algorithm '%s'"
" while in %s mode\n"),
badalg,compliance_option_string());
break;
case PREFTYPE_HASH:
log_info(_("you may not use digest algorithm '%s'"
" while in %s mode\n"),
badalg,compliance_option_string());
break;
case PREFTYPE_ZIP:
log_info(_("you may not use compression algorithm '%s'"
" while in %s mode\n"),
badalg,compliance_option_string());
break;
default:
BUG();
}
compliance_failure();
}
}
/* Set the random seed file. */
if( use_random_seed ) {
char *p = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), "random_seed", NULL );
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_RANDOM_SEED_FILE, p);
if (!access (p, F_OK))
register_secured_file (p);
xfree(p);
}
/* If there is no command but the --fingerprint is given, default
to the --list-keys command. */
if (!cmd && fpr_maybe_cmd)
{
set_cmd (&cmd, aListKeys);
}
if( opt.verbose > 1 )
set_packet_list_mode(1);
/* Add the keyrings, but not for some special commands. We always
* need to add the keyrings if we are running under SELinux, this
* is so that the rings are added to the list of secured files.
* We do not add any keyring if --no-keyring has been used. */
if (default_keyring >= 0
&& (ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS
|| (cmd != aDeArmor && cmd != aEnArmor && cmd != aGPGConfTest)))
{
if (!nrings || default_keyring > 0) /* Add default ring. */
keydb_add_resource ("pubring" EXTSEP_S GPGEXT_GPG,
KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_DEFAULT);
for (sl = nrings; sl; sl = sl->next )
keydb_add_resource (sl->d, sl->flags);
}
FREE_STRLIST(nrings);
if (opt.pinentry_mode == PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK)
/* In loopback mode, never ask for the password multiple
times. */
{
opt.passphrase_repeat = 0;
}
if (cmd == aGPGConfTest)
g10_exit(0);
if( pwfd != -1 ) /* Read the passphrase now. */
read_passphrase_from_fd( pwfd );
fname = argc? *argv : NULL;
if(fname && utf8_strings)
opt.flags.utf8_filename=1;
ctrl = xcalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl);
gpg_init_default_ctrl (ctrl);
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
switch (cmd)
{
case aPrimegen:
case aPrintMD:
case aPrintMDs:
case aGenRandom:
case aDeArmor:
case aEnArmor:
case aListConfig:
case aListGcryptConfig:
break;
case aFixTrustDB:
case aExportOwnerTrust:
rc = setup_trustdb (0, trustdb_name);
break;
case aListTrustDB:
rc = setup_trustdb (argc? 1:0, trustdb_name);
break;
default:
/* If we are using TM_ALWAYS, we do not need to create the
trustdb. */
rc = setup_trustdb (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS, trustdb_name);
break;
}
if (rc)
log_error (_("failed to initialize the TrustDB: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (rc));
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
switch (cmd)
{
case aStore:
case aSym:
case aSign:
case aSignSym:
case aClearsign:
if (!opt.quiet && any_explicit_recipient)
log_info (_("WARNING: recipients (-r) given "
"without using public key encryption\n"));
break;
default:
break;
}
/* Check for certain command whether we need to migrate a
secring.gpg to the gpg-agent. */
switch (cmd)
{
case aListSecretKeys:
case aSign:
case aSignEncr:
case aSignEncrSym:
case aSignSym:
case aClearsign:
case aDecrypt:
case aSignKey:
case aLSignKey:
case aEditKey:
case aPasswd:
case aDeleteSecretKeys:
case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys:
case aQuickKeygen:
case aQuickAddUid:
case aQuickAddKey:
case aQuickRevUid:
case aFullKeygen:
case aKeygen:
case aImport:
case aExportSecret:
case aExportSecretSub:
case aGenRevoke:
case aDesigRevoke:
case aCardEdit:
case aChangePIN:
migrate_secring (ctrl);
break;
case aListKeys:
if (opt.with_secret)
migrate_secring (ctrl);
break;
default:
break;
}
/* The command dispatcher. */
switch( cmd )
{
case aServer:
gpg_server (ctrl);
break;
case aStore: /* only store the file */
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args(_("--store [filename]"));
if( (rc = encrypt_store(fname)) )
{
write_status_failure ("store", rc);
log_error ("storing '%s' failed: %s\n",
print_fname_stdin(fname),gpg_strerror (rc) );
}
break;
case aSym: /* encrypt the given file only with the symmetric cipher */
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args(_("--symmetric [filename]"));
if( (rc = encrypt_symmetric(fname)) )
{
write_status_failure ("symencrypt", rc);
log_error (_("symmetric encryption of '%s' failed: %s\n"),
print_fname_stdin(fname),gpg_strerror (rc) );
}
break;
case aEncr: /* encrypt the given file */
if(multifile)
encrypt_crypt_files (ctrl, argc, argv, remusr);
else
{
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args(_("--encrypt [filename]"));
if( (rc = encrypt_crypt (ctrl, -1, fname, remusr, 0, NULL, -1)) )
{
write_status_failure ("encrypt", rc);
log_error("%s: encryption failed: %s\n",
print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
}
}
break;
case aEncrSym:
/* This works with PGP 8 in the sense that it acts just like a
symmetric message. It doesn't work at all with 2 or 6. It
might work with 7, but alas, I don't have a copy to test
with right now. */
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args(_("--symmetric --encrypt [filename]"));
else if(opt.s2k_mode==0)
log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --encrypt"
" with --s2k-mode 0\n"));
else if(PGP6 || PGP7)
log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --encrypt"
" while in %s mode\n"),compliance_option_string());
else
{
if( (rc = encrypt_crypt (ctrl, -1, fname, remusr, 1, NULL, -1)) )
{
write_status_failure ("encrypt", rc);
log_error ("%s: encryption failed: %s\n",
print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
}
}
break;
case aSign: /* sign the given file */
sl = NULL;
if( detached_sig ) { /* sign all files */
for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
add_to_strlist( &sl, *argv );
}
else {
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args(_("--sign [filename]"));
if( argc ) {
sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname));
strcpy(sl->d, fname);
}
}
if ((rc = sign_file (ctrl, sl, detached_sig, locusr, 0, NULL, NULL)))
{
write_status_failure ("sign", rc);
log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
}
free_strlist(sl);
break;
case aSignEncr: /* sign and encrypt the given file */
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args(_("--sign --encrypt [filename]"));
if( argc ) {
sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname));
strcpy(sl->d, fname);
}
else
sl = NULL;
if ((rc = sign_file (ctrl, sl, detached_sig, locusr, 1, remusr, NULL)))
{
write_status_failure ("sign-encrypt", rc);
log_error("%s: sign+encrypt failed: %s\n",
print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
}
free_strlist(sl);
break;
case aSignEncrSym: /* sign and encrypt the given file */
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args(_("--symmetric --sign --encrypt [filename]"));
else if(opt.s2k_mode==0)
log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --sign --encrypt"
" with --s2k-mode 0\n"));
else if(PGP6 || PGP7)
log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --sign --encrypt"
" while in %s mode\n"),compliance_option_string());
else
{
if( argc )
{
sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname));
strcpy(sl->d, fname);
}
else
sl = NULL;
if ((rc = sign_file (ctrl, sl, detached_sig, locusr,
2, remusr, NULL)))
{
write_status_failure ("sign-encrypt", rc);
log_error("%s: symmetric+sign+encrypt failed: %s\n",
print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
}
free_strlist(sl);
}
break;
case aSignSym: /* sign and conventionally encrypt the given file */
if (argc > 1)
wrong_args(_("--sign --symmetric [filename]"));
rc = sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl, fname, locusr);
if (rc)
{
write_status_failure ("sign-symencrypt", rc);
log_error("%s: sign+symmetric failed: %s\n",
print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
}
break;
case aClearsign: /* make a clearsig */
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args(_("--clearsign [filename]"));
if( (rc = clearsign_file (ctrl, fname, locusr, NULL)) )
{
write_status_failure ("sign", rc);
log_error("%s: clearsign failed: %s\n",
print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
}
break;
case aVerify:
if (multifile)
{
if ((rc = verify_files (ctrl, argc, argv)))
log_error("verify files failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
}
else
{
if ((rc = verify_signatures (ctrl, argc, argv)))
log_error("verify signatures failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
}
if (rc)
write_status_failure ("verify", rc);
break;
case aDecrypt:
if (multifile)
decrypt_messages (ctrl, argc, argv);
else
{
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args(_("--decrypt [filename]"));
if( (rc = decrypt_message (ctrl, fname) ))
{
write_status_failure ("decrypt", rc);
log_error("decrypt_message failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
}
}
break;
case aQuickSignKey:
case aQuickLSignKey:
{
const char *fpr;
if (argc < 1)
wrong_args ("--quick-[l]sign-key fingerprint [userids]");
fpr = *argv++; argc--;
sl = NULL;
for( ; argc; argc--, argv++)
append_to_strlist2 (&sl, *argv, utf8_strings);
keyedit_quick_sign (ctrl, fpr, sl, locusr, (cmd == aQuickLSignKey));
free_strlist (sl);
}
break;
case aSignKey:
if( argc != 1 )
wrong_args(_("--sign-key user-id"));
/* fall through */
case aLSignKey:
if( argc != 1 )
wrong_args(_("--lsign-key user-id"));
/* fall through */
sl=NULL;
if(cmd==aSignKey)
append_to_strlist(&sl,"sign");
else if(cmd==aLSignKey)
append_to_strlist(&sl,"lsign");
else
BUG();
append_to_strlist( &sl, "save" );
username = make_username( fname );
keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, sl, 0, 0 );
xfree(username);
free_strlist(sl);
break;
case aEditKey: /* Edit a key signature */
if( !argc )
wrong_args(_("--edit-key user-id [commands]"));
username = make_username( fname );
if( argc > 1 ) {
sl = NULL;
for( argc--, argv++ ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
append_to_strlist( &sl, *argv );
keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, sl, 0, 1 );
free_strlist(sl);
}
else
keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, NULL, 0, 1 );
xfree(username);
break;
case aPasswd:
if (argc != 1)
wrong_args (_("--passwd <user-id>"));
else
{
username = make_username (fname);
keyedit_passwd (ctrl, username);
xfree (username);
}
break;
case aDeleteKeys:
case aDeleteSecretKeys:
case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys:
sl = NULL;
/* I'm adding these in reverse order as add_to_strlist2
reverses them again, and it's easier to understand in the
proper order :) */
for( ; argc; argc-- )
add_to_strlist2( &sl, argv[argc-1], utf8_strings );
delete_keys(sl,cmd==aDeleteSecretKeys,cmd==aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys);
free_strlist(sl);
break;
case aCheckKeys:
opt.check_sigs = 1;
case aListSigs:
opt.list_sigs = 1;
case aListKeys:
sl = NULL;
for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
public_key_list (ctrl, sl, 0);
free_strlist(sl);
break;
case aListSecretKeys:
sl = NULL;
for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
secret_key_list (ctrl, sl);
free_strlist(sl);
break;
case aLocateKeys:
sl = NULL;
for (; argc; argc--, argv++)
add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
public_key_list (ctrl, sl, 1);
free_strlist (sl);
break;
case aQuickKeygen:
{
const char *x_algo, *x_usage, *x_expire;
if (argc < 1 || argc > 4)
wrong_args("--quick-gen-key USER-ID [ALGO [USAGE [EXPIRE]]]");
username = make_username (fname);
argv++, argc--;
x_algo = "";
x_usage = "";
x_expire = "";
if (argc)
{
x_algo = *argv++; argc--;
if (argc)
{
x_usage = *argv++; argc--;
if (argc)
{
x_expire = *argv++; argc--;
}
}
}
quick_generate_keypair (ctrl, username, x_algo, x_usage, x_expire);
xfree (username);
}
break;
case aKeygen: /* generate a key */
if( opt.batch ) {
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args("--gen-key [parameterfile]");
generate_keypair (ctrl, 0, argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, 0);
}
else {
if (opt.command_fd != -1 && argc)
{
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args("--gen-key [parameterfile]");
opt.batch = 1;
generate_keypair (ctrl, 0, argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, 0);
}
else if (argc)
wrong_args ("--gen-key");
else
generate_keypair (ctrl, 0, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
break;
case aFullKeygen: /* Generate a key with all options. */
if (opt.batch)
{
if (argc > 1)
wrong_args ("--full-gen-key [parameterfile]");
generate_keypair (ctrl, 1, argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, 0);
}
else
{
if (argc)
wrong_args("--full-gen-key");
generate_keypair (ctrl, 1, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
break;
case aQuickAddUid:
{
const char *uid, *newuid;
if (argc != 2)
wrong_args ("--quick-adduid USER-ID NEW-USER-ID");
uid = *argv++; argc--;
newuid = *argv++; argc--;
keyedit_quick_adduid (ctrl, uid, newuid);
}
break;
case aQuickAddKey:
{
const char *x_fpr, *x_algo, *x_usage, *x_expire;
if (argc < 1 || argc > 4)
wrong_args ("--quick-addkey FINGERPRINT [ALGO [USAGE [EXPIRE]]]");
x_fpr = *argv++; argc--;
x_algo = "";
x_usage = "";
x_expire = "";
if (argc)
{
x_algo = *argv++; argc--;
if (argc)
{
x_usage = *argv++; argc--;
if (argc)
{
x_expire = *argv++; argc--;
}
}
}
keyedit_quick_addkey (ctrl, x_fpr, x_algo, x_usage, x_expire);
}
break;
case aQuickRevUid:
{
const char *uid, *uidtorev;
if (argc != 2)
wrong_args ("--quick-revuid USER-ID USER-ID-TO-REVOKE");
uid = *argv++; argc--;
uidtorev = *argv++; argc--;
keyedit_quick_revuid (ctrl, uid, uidtorev);
}
break;
case aFastImport:
opt.import_options |= IMPORT_FAST;
case aImport:
import_keys (ctrl, argc? argv:NULL, argc, NULL, opt.import_options);
break;
/* TODO: There are a number of command that use this same
"make strlist, call function, report error, free strlist"
pattern. Join them together here and avoid all that
duplicated code. */
case aExport:
case aSendKeys:
case aRecvKeys:
sl = NULL;
for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
if( cmd == aSendKeys )
rc = keyserver_export (ctrl, sl );
else if( cmd == aRecvKeys )
rc = keyserver_import (ctrl, sl );
else
{
export_stats_t stats = export_new_stats ();
rc = export_pubkeys (ctrl, sl, opt.export_options, stats);
export_print_stats (stats);
export_release_stats (stats);
}
if(rc)
{
if(cmd==aSendKeys)
{
write_status_failure ("send-keys", rc);
log_error(_("keyserver send failed: %s\n"),gpg_strerror (rc));
}
else if(cmd==aRecvKeys)
{
write_status_failure ("recv-keys", rc);
log_error (_("keyserver receive failed: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (rc));
}
else
{
write_status_failure ("export", rc);
log_error (_("key export failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
}
}
free_strlist(sl);
break;
case aExportSshKey:
if (argc != 1)
wrong_args ("--export-ssh-key <user-id>");
rc = export_ssh_key (ctrl, argv[0]);
if (rc)
{
write_status_failure ("export-ssh-key", rc);
log_error (_("export as ssh key failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
}
break;
case aSearchKeys:
sl = NULL;
for (; argc; argc--, argv++)
append_to_strlist2 (&sl, *argv, utf8_strings);
rc = keyserver_search (ctrl, sl);
if (rc)
{
write_status_failure ("search-keys", rc);
log_error (_("keyserver search failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
}
free_strlist (sl);
break;
case aRefreshKeys:
sl = NULL;
for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
rc = keyserver_refresh (ctrl, sl);
if(rc)
{
write_status_failure ("refresh-keys", rc);
log_error (_("keyserver refresh failed: %s\n"),gpg_strerror (rc));
}
free_strlist(sl);
break;
case aFetchKeys:
sl = NULL;
for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
rc = keyserver_fetch (ctrl, sl);
if(rc)
{
write_status_failure ("fetch-keys", rc);
log_error ("key fetch failed: %s\n",gpg_strerror (rc));
}
free_strlist(sl);
break;
case aExportSecret:
sl = NULL;
for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
{
export_stats_t stats = export_new_stats ();
export_seckeys (ctrl, sl, stats);
export_print_stats (stats);
export_release_stats (stats);
}
free_strlist(sl);
break;
case aExportSecretSub:
sl = NULL;
for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
{
export_stats_t stats = export_new_stats ();
export_secsubkeys (ctrl, sl, stats);
export_print_stats (stats);
export_release_stats (stats);
}
free_strlist(sl);
break;
case aGenRevoke:
if( argc != 1 )
wrong_args("--gen-revoke user-id");
username = make_username(*argv);
gen_revoke( username );
xfree( username );
break;
case aDesigRevoke:
if (argc != 1)
wrong_args ("--desig-revoke user-id");
username = make_username (*argv);
gen_desig_revoke (ctrl, username, locusr);
xfree (username);
break;
case aDeArmor:
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args("--dearmor [file]");
rc = dearmor_file( argc? *argv: NULL );
if( rc )
{
write_status_failure ("dearmor", rc);
log_error (_("dearmoring failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
}
break;
case aEnArmor:
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args("--enarmor [file]");
rc = enarmor_file( argc? *argv: NULL );
if( rc )
{
write_status_failure ("enarmor", rc);
log_error (_("enarmoring failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
}
break;
case aPrimegen:
#if 0 /*FIXME*/
{ int mode = argc < 2 ? 0 : atoi(*argv);
if( mode == 1 && argc == 2 ) {
mpi_print (es_stdout,
generate_public_prime( atoi(argv[1]) ), 1);
}
else if( mode == 2 && argc == 3 ) {
mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_elg_prime(
0, atoi(argv[1]),
atoi(argv[2]), NULL,NULL ), 1);
}
else if( mode == 3 && argc == 3 ) {
MPI *factors;
mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_elg_prime(
1, atoi(argv[1]),
atoi(argv[2]), NULL,&factors ), 1);
es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
mpi_print (es_stdout, factors[0], 1 ); /* print q */
}
else if( mode == 4 && argc == 3 ) {
MPI g = mpi_alloc(1);
mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_elg_prime(
0, atoi(argv[1]),
atoi(argv[2]), g, NULL ), 1);
es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
mpi_print (es_stdout, g, 1 );
mpi_free (g);
}
else
wrong_args("--gen-prime mode bits [qbits] ");
es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
}
#endif
wrong_args("--gen-prime not yet supported ");
break;
case aGenRandom:
{
int level = argc ? atoi(*argv):0;
int count = argc > 1 ? atoi(argv[1]): 0;
int endless = !count;
if( argc < 1 || argc > 2 || level < 0 || level > 2 || count < 0 )
wrong_args("--gen-random 0|1|2 [count]");
while( endless || count ) {
byte *p;
/* Wee need a multiple of 3, so that in case of
armored output we get a correct string. No
linefolding is done, as it is best to levae this to
other tools */
size_t n = !endless && count < 99? count : 99;
p = gcry_random_bytes (n, level);
#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
setmode ( fileno(stdout), O_BINARY );
#endif
if (opt.armor) {
char *tmp = make_radix64_string (p, n);
es_fputs (tmp, es_stdout);
xfree (tmp);
if (n%3 == 1)
es_putc ('=', es_stdout);
if (n%3)
es_putc ('=', es_stdout);
} else {
es_fwrite( p, n, 1, es_stdout );
}
xfree(p);
if( !endless )
count -= n;
}
if (opt.armor)
es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
}
break;
case aPrintMD:
if( argc < 1)
wrong_args("--print-md algo [files]");
{
int all_algos = (**argv=='*' && !(*argv)[1]);
int algo = all_algos? 0 : gcry_md_map_name (*argv);
if( !algo && !all_algos )
log_error(_("invalid hash algorithm '%s'\n"), *argv );
else {
argc--; argv++;
if( !argc )
print_mds(NULL, algo);
else {
for(; argc; argc--, argv++ )
print_mds(*argv, algo);
}
}
}
break;
case aPrintMDs: /* old option */
if( !argc )
print_mds(NULL,0);
else {
for(; argc; argc--, argv++ )
print_mds(*argv,0);
}
break;
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
case aListTrustDB:
if( !argc )
list_trustdb (es_stdout, NULL);
else {
for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
list_trustdb (es_stdout, *argv );
}
break;
case aUpdateTrustDB:
if( argc )
wrong_args("--update-trustdb");
update_trustdb (ctrl);
break;
case aCheckTrustDB:
/* Old versions allowed for arguments - ignore them */
check_trustdb (ctrl);
break;
case aFixTrustDB:
how_to_fix_the_trustdb ();
break;
case aListTrustPath:
if( !argc )
wrong_args("--list-trust-path <user-ids>");
for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) {
username = make_username( *argv );
list_trust_path( username );
xfree(username);
}
break;
case aExportOwnerTrust:
if( argc )
wrong_args("--export-ownertrust");
export_ownertrust();
break;
case aImportOwnerTrust:
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args("--import-ownertrust [file]");
import_ownertrust( argc? *argv:NULL );
break;
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
case aRebuildKeydbCaches:
if (argc)
wrong_args ("--rebuild-keydb-caches");
keydb_rebuild_caches (1);
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
case aCardStatus:
if (argc)
wrong_args ("--card-status");
card_status (es_stdout, NULL, 0);
break;
case aCardEdit:
if (argc) {
sl = NULL;
for (argc--, argv++ ; argc; argc--, argv++)
append_to_strlist (&sl, *argv);
card_edit (ctrl, sl);
free_strlist (sl);
}
else
card_edit (ctrl, NULL);
break;
case aChangePIN:
if (!argc)
change_pin (0,1);
else if (argc == 1)
change_pin (atoi (*argv),1);
else
wrong_args ("--change-pin [no]");
break;
#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
case aListConfig:
{
char *str=collapse_args(argc,argv);
list_config(str);
xfree(str);
}
break;
case aListGcryptConfig:
/* Fixme: It would be nice to integrate that with
--list-config but unfortunately there is no way yet to have
libgcrypt print it to an estream for further parsing. */
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_PRINT_CONFIG, stdout);
break;
case aTOFUPolicy:
#ifdef USE_TOFU
{
int policy;
int i;
KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
if (argc < 2)
wrong_args ("--tofu-policy POLICY KEYID [KEYID...]");
policy = parse_tofu_policy (argv[0]);
hd = keydb_new ();
if (! hd)
g10_exit (1);
tofu_begin_batch_update (ctrl);
for (i = 1; i < argc; i ++)
{
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
kbnode_t kb;
rc = classify_user_id (argv[i], &desc, 0);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error parsing key specification '%s': %s\n"),
argv[i], gpg_strerror (rc));
g10_exit (1);
}
if (! (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID
|| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID
|| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
|| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20
|| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
|| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_KEYGRIP))
{
log_error (_("'%s' does not appear to be a valid"
" key ID, fingerprint or keygrip\n"),
argv[i]);
g10_exit (1);
}
rc = keydb_search_reset (hd);
if (rc)
{
/* This should not happen, thus no need to tranalate
the string. */
log_error ("keydb_search_reset failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
g10_exit (1);
}
rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), argv[i],
gpg_strerror (rc));
g10_exit (1);
}
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &kb);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (rc));
g10_exit (1);
}
merge_keys_and_selfsig (kb);
if (tofu_set_policy (ctrl, kb, policy))
g10_exit (1);
}
tofu_end_batch_update (ctrl);
keydb_release (hd);
}
#endif /*USE_TOFU*/
break;
case aListPackets:
default:
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args(_("[filename]"));
/* Issue some output for the unix newbie */
if (!fname && !opt.outfile
&& gnupg_isatty (fileno (stdin))
&& gnupg_isatty (fileno (stdout))
&& gnupg_isatty (fileno (stderr)))
log_info(_("Go ahead and type your message ...\n"));
a = iobuf_open(fname);
if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a)))
{
iobuf_close (a);
a = NULL;
gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
}
if( !a )
log_error(_("can't open '%s'\n"), print_fname_stdin(fname));
else {
if( !opt.no_armor ) {
if( use_armor_filter( a ) ) {
afx = new_armor_context ();
push_armor_filter (afx, a);
}
}
if( cmd == aListPackets ) {
opt.list_packets=1;
set_packet_list_mode(1);
}
rc = proc_packets (ctrl, NULL, a );
if( rc )
{
write_status_failure ("-", rc);
log_error ("processing message failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
}
iobuf_close(a);
}
break;
}
/* cleanup */
gpg_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl);
xfree (ctrl);
release_armor_context (afx);
FREE_STRLIST(remusr);
FREE_STRLIST(locusr);
g10_exit(0);
return 8; /*NEVER REACHED*/
}
/* Note: This function is used by signal handlers!. */
static void
emergency_cleanup (void)
{
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM );
}
void
g10_exit( int rc )
{
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_UPDATE_RANDOM_SEED_FILE);
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("stop");
if ( (opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE) )
{
keydb_dump_stats ();
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_MEMORY_STATS);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_RANDOM_STATS);
}
if (opt.debug)
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_SECMEM_STATS );
emergency_cleanup ();
rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 : g10_errors_seen? 1 : 0;
exit (rc);
}
/* Pretty-print hex hashes. This assumes at least an 80-character
display, but there are a few other similar assumptions in the
display code. */
static void
print_hex (gcry_md_hd_t md, int algo, const char *fname)
{
int i,n,count,indent=0;
const byte *p;
if (fname)
indent = es_printf("%s: ",fname);
if (indent>40)
{
es_printf ("\n");
indent=0;
}
if (algo==DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160)
indent += es_printf("RMD160 = ");
else if (algo>0)
indent += es_printf("%6s = ", gcry_md_algo_name (algo));
else
algo = abs(algo);
count = indent;
p = gcry_md_read (md, algo);
n = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
count += es_printf ("%02X",*p++);
for(i=1;i<n;i++,p++)
{
if(n==16)
{
if(count+2>79)
{
es_printf ("\n%*s",indent," ");
count = indent;
}
else
count += es_printf(" ");
if (!(i%8))
count += es_printf(" ");
}
else if (n==20)
{
if(!(i%2))
{
if(count+4>79)
{
es_printf ("\n%*s",indent," ");
count=indent;
}
else
count += es_printf(" ");
}
if (!(i%10))
count += es_printf(" ");
}
else
{
if(!(i%4))
{
if (count+8>79)
{
es_printf ("\n%*s",indent," ");
count=indent;
}
else
count += es_printf(" ");
}
}
count += es_printf("%02X",*p);
}
es_printf ("\n");
}
static void
print_hashline( gcry_md_hd_t md, int algo, const char *fname )
{
int i, n;
const byte *p;
if ( fname )
{
for (p = fname; *p; p++ )
{
if ( *p <= 32 || *p > 127 || *p == ':' || *p == '%' )
es_printf ("%%%02X", *p );
else
es_putc (*p, es_stdout);
}
}
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
es_printf ("%d:", algo);
p = gcry_md_read (md, algo);
n = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ )
es_printf ("%02X", *p);
es_fputs (":\n", es_stdout);
}
static void
print_mds( const char *fname, int algo )
{
estream_t fp;
char buf[1024];
size_t n;
gcry_md_hd_t md;
if (!fname)
{
fp = es_stdin;
es_set_binary (fp);
}
else
{
fp = es_fopen (fname, "rb" );
if (fp && is_secured_file (es_fileno (fp)))
{
es_fclose (fp);
fp = NULL;
gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
}
}
if (!fp)
{
log_error("%s: %s\n", fname?fname:"[stdin]", strerror(errno) );
return;
}
gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0);
if (algo)
gcry_md_enable (md, algo);
else
{
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_MD5))
gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_MD5);
gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_RMD160))
gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_RMD160);
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA224))
gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA224);
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA256))
gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA256);
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA384))
gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA384);
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA512))
gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA512);
}
while ((n=es_fread (buf, 1, DIM(buf), fp)))
gcry_md_write (md, buf, n);
if (es_ferror(fp))
log_error ("%s: %s\n", fname?fname:"[stdin]", strerror(errno));
else
{
gcry_md_final (md);
if (opt.with_colons)
{
if ( algo )
print_hashline (md, algo, fname);
else
{
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_MD5))
print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_MD5, fname );
print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fname );
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_RMD160))
print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_RMD160, fname );
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA224))
print_hashline (md, GCRY_MD_SHA224, fname);
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA256))
print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_SHA256, fname );
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA384))
print_hashline ( md, GCRY_MD_SHA384, fname );
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA512))
print_hashline ( md, GCRY_MD_SHA512, fname );
}
}
else
{
if (algo)
print_hex (md, -algo, fname);
else
{
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_MD5))
print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_MD5, fname);
print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fname );
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_RMD160))
print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_RMD160, fname );
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA224))
print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA224, fname);
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA256))
print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA256, fname );
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA384))
print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA384, fname );
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA512))
print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA512, fname );
}
}
}
gcry_md_close (md);
if (fp != es_stdin)
es_fclose (fp);
}
/****************
* Check the supplied name,value string and add it to the notation
* data to be used for signatures. which==0 for sig notations, and 1
* for cert notations.
*/
static void
add_notation_data( const char *string, int which )
{
struct notation *notation;
notation=string_to_notation(string,utf8_strings);
if(notation)
{
if(which)
{
notation->next=opt.cert_notations;
opt.cert_notations=notation;
}
else
{
notation->next=opt.sig_notations;
opt.sig_notations=notation;
}
}
}
static void
add_policy_url( const char *string, int which )
{
unsigned int i,critical=0;
strlist_t sl;
if(*string=='!')
{
string++;
critical=1;
}
for(i=0;i<strlen(string);i++)
if( !isascii (string[i]) || iscntrl(string[i]))
break;
if(i==0 || i<strlen(string))
{
if(which)
log_error(_("the given certification policy URL is invalid\n"));
else
log_error(_("the given signature policy URL is invalid\n"));
}
if(which)
sl=add_to_strlist( &opt.cert_policy_url, string );
else
sl=add_to_strlist( &opt.sig_policy_url, string );
if(critical)
sl->flags |= 1;
}
static void
add_keyserver_url( const char *string, int which )
{
unsigned int i,critical=0;
strlist_t sl;
if(*string=='!')
{
string++;
critical=1;
}
for(i=0;i<strlen(string);i++)
if( !isascii (string[i]) || iscntrl(string[i]))
break;
if(i==0 || i<strlen(string))
{
if(which)
BUG();
else
log_error(_("the given preferred keyserver URL is invalid\n"));
}
if(which)
BUG();
else
sl=add_to_strlist( &opt.sig_keyserver_url, string );
if(critical)
sl->flags |= 1;
}
diff --git a/g10/keyedit.c b/g10/keyedit.c
index 25f61ec6a..87e69b0bd 100644
--- a/g10/keyedit.c
+++ b/g10/keyedit.c
@@ -1,6542 +1,6542 @@
/* keyedit.c - Edit properties of a key
* Copyright (C) 1998-2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 1998-2016 Werner Koch
* Copyright (C) 2015, 2016 g10 Code GmbH
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
# define GNUPG_LIBREADLINE_H_INCLUDED
# include <readline/readline.h>
#endif
#include "gpg.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "iobuf.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "photoid.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "filter.h"
#include "ttyio.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "keyserver-internal.h"
#include "call-agent.h"
#include "host2net.h"
#include "tofu.h"
static void show_prefs (PKT_user_id * uid, PKT_signature * selfsig,
int verbose);
static void show_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
kbnode_t keyblock, PKT_public_key * pk,
unsigned int flag, int with_prefs);
static void show_key_with_all_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked,
int with_revoker, int with_fpr,
int with_subkeys, int with_prefs,
int nowarn);
static void show_key_and_fingerprint (kbnode_t keyblock, int with_subkeys);
static void show_key_and_grip (kbnode_t keyblock);
static void subkey_expire_warning (kbnode_t keyblock);
static int menu_adduid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
int photo, const char *photo_name, const char *uidstr);
static void menu_deluid (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_delsig (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_clean (KBNODE keyblock, int self_only);
static void menu_delkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_addrevoker (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int sensitive);
static int menu_expire (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_changeusage (kbnode_t keyblock);
static int menu_backsign (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_set_primary_uid (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_set_preferences (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_set_keyserver_url (const char *url, KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_set_notation (const char *string, KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_select_uid (KBNODE keyblock, int idx);
static int menu_select_uid_namehash (KBNODE keyblock, const char *namehash);
static int menu_select_key (KBNODE keyblock, int idx, char *p);
static int count_uids (KBNODE keyblock);
static int count_uids_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag);
static int count_keys_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag);
static int count_selected_uids (KBNODE keyblock);
static int real_uids_left (KBNODE keyblock);
static int count_selected_keys (KBNODE keyblock);
static int menu_revsig (KBNODE keyblock);
static int menu_revuid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock);
static int core_revuid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, KBNODE node,
const struct revocation_reason_info *reason,
int *modified);
static int menu_revkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
static int menu_revsubkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
static int enable_disable_key (KBNODE keyblock, int disable);
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
static void menu_showphoto (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock);
static int update_trust = 0;
#define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)
#define NODFLG_BADSIG (1<<0) /* Bad signature. */
#define NODFLG_NOKEY (1<<1) /* No public key. */
#define NODFLG_SIGERR (1<<2) /* Other sig error. */
#define NODFLG_MARK_A (1<<4) /* Temporary mark. */
#define NODFLG_DELSIG (1<<5) /* To be deleted. */
#define NODFLG_SELUID (1<<8) /* Indicate the selected userid. */
#define NODFLG_SELKEY (1<<9) /* Indicate the selected key. */
#define NODFLG_SELSIG (1<<10) /* Indicate a selected signature. */
struct sign_attrib
{
int non_exportable, non_revocable;
struct revocation_reason_info *reason;
byte trust_depth, trust_value;
char *trust_regexp;
};
/* TODO: Fix duplicated code between here and the check-sigs/list-sigs
code in keylist.c. */
static int
print_and_check_one_sig_colon (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node,
int *inv_sigs, int *no_key, int *oth_err,
int *is_selfsig, int print_without_key)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int rc, sigrc;
/* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has the pk that
issued it. See also keylist.c:list_keyblock_print */
rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, node, is_selfsig);
switch (gpg_err_code (rc))
{
case 0:
node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_BADSIG | NODFLG_NOKEY | NODFLG_SIGERR);
sigrc = '!';
break;
case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
node->flag = NODFLG_BADSIG;
sigrc = '-';
if (inv_sigs)
++ * inv_sigs;
break;
case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY:
node->flag = NODFLG_NOKEY;
sigrc = '?';
if (no_key)
++ * no_key;
break;
default:
node->flag = NODFLG_SIGERR;
sigrc = '%';
if (oth_err)
++ * oth_err;
break;
}
if (sigrc != '?' || print_without_key)
{
es_printf ("sig:%c::%d:%08lX%08lX:%lu:%lu:",
sigrc, sig->pubkey_algo, (ulong) sig->keyid[0],
(ulong) sig->keyid[1], (ulong) sig->timestamp,
(ulong) sig->expiredate);
if (sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
es_printf ("%d %d", sig->trust_depth, sig->trust_value);
es_printf (":");
if (sig->trust_regexp)
es_write_sanitized (es_stdout,
sig->trust_regexp, strlen (sig->trust_regexp),
":", NULL);
es_printf ("::%02x%c\n", sig->sig_class,
sig->flags.exportable ? 'x' : 'l');
if (opt.show_subpackets)
print_subpackets_colon (sig);
}
return (sigrc == '!');
}
/*
* Print information about a signature (rc is its status), check it
* and return true if the signature is okay. NODE must be a signature
* packet. With EXTENDED set all possible signature list options will
* always be printed.
*/
static int
print_one_sig (int rc, KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node,
int *inv_sigs, int *no_key, int *oth_err,
int is_selfsig, int print_without_key, int extended)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int sigrc;
int is_rev = sig->sig_class == 0x30;
/* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has the pk that
issued it. See also keylist.c:list_keyblock_print */
switch (gpg_err_code (rc))
{
case 0:
node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_BADSIG | NODFLG_NOKEY | NODFLG_SIGERR);
sigrc = '!';
break;
case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
node->flag = NODFLG_BADSIG;
sigrc = '-';
if (inv_sigs)
++ * inv_sigs;
break;
case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY:
node->flag = NODFLG_NOKEY;
sigrc = '?';
if (no_key)
++ * no_key;
break;
default:
node->flag = NODFLG_SIGERR;
sigrc = '%';
if (oth_err)
++ * oth_err;
break;
}
if (sigrc != '?' || print_without_key)
{
tty_printf ("%s%c%c %c%c%c%c%c%c %s %s",
is_rev ? "rev" : "sig", sigrc,
(sig->sig_class - 0x10 > 0 &&
sig->sig_class - 0x10 <
4) ? '0' + sig->sig_class - 0x10 : ' ',
sig->flags.exportable ? ' ' : 'L',
sig->flags.revocable ? ' ' : 'R',
sig->flags.policy_url ? 'P' : ' ',
sig->flags.notation ? 'N' : ' ',
sig->flags.expired ? 'X' : ' ',
(sig->trust_depth > 9) ? 'T' : (sig->trust_depth >
0) ? '0' +
sig->trust_depth : ' ',
keystr (sig->keyid),
datestr_from_sig (sig));
if ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE) || extended )
tty_printf (" %s", expirestr_from_sig (sig));
tty_printf (" ");
if (sigrc == '%')
tty_printf ("[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc));
else if (sigrc == '?')
;
else if (is_selfsig)
{
tty_printf (is_rev ? _("[revocation]") : _("[self-signature]"));
if (extended && sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
tty_printf ("*");
}
else
{
size_t n;
char *p = get_user_id (sig->keyid, &n);
tty_print_utf8_string2 (NULL, p, n,
opt.screen_columns - keystrlen () - 26 -
((opt.
list_options & LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE) ? 11
: 0));
xfree (p);
}
tty_printf ("\n");
if (sig->flags.policy_url
&& ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS) || extended))
show_policy_url (sig, 3, 0);
if (sig->flags.notation
&& ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS) || extended))
show_notation (sig, 3, 0,
((opt.
list_options & LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS) ? 1 : 0) +
((opt.
list_options & LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS) ? 2 : 0));
if (sig->flags.pref_ks
&& ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS) || extended))
show_keyserver_url (sig, 3, 0);
if (extended)
{
PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
const unsigned char *s;
s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL);
if (s && *s)
tty_printf (" [primary]\n");
s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
if (s && buf32_to_u32 (s))
tty_printf (" [expires: %s]\n",
isotimestamp (pk->timestamp + buf32_to_u32 (s)));
}
}
return (sigrc == '!');
}
static int
print_and_check_one_sig (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node,
int *inv_sigs, int *no_key, int *oth_err,
int *is_selfsig, int print_without_key, int extended)
{
int rc;
rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, node, is_selfsig);
return print_one_sig (rc,
keyblock, node, inv_sigs, no_key, oth_err,
*is_selfsig, print_without_key, extended);
}
/* Order two signatures. The actual ordering isn't important. Our
goal is to ensure that identical signatures occur together. */
static int
sig_comparison (const void *av, const void *bv)
{
const KBNODE an = *(const KBNODE *) av;
const KBNODE bn = *(const KBNODE *) bv;
const PKT_signature *a;
const PKT_signature *b;
int ndataa;
int ndatab;
int i;
log_assert (an->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
log_assert (bn->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
a = an->pkt->pkt.signature;
b = bn->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (a->digest_algo < b->digest_algo)
return -1;
if (a->digest_algo > b->digest_algo)
return 1;
ndataa = pubkey_get_nsig (a->pubkey_algo);
ndatab = pubkey_get_nsig (b->pubkey_algo);
if (ndataa != ndatab)
return (ndataa < ndatab)? -1 : 1;
for (i = 0; i < ndataa; i ++)
{
int c = gcry_mpi_cmp (a->data[i], b->data[i]);
if (c != 0)
return c;
}
/* Okay, they are equal. */
return 0;
}
/* Perform a few sanity checks on a keyblock is okay and possibly
repair some damage. Concretely:
- Detect duplicate signatures and remove them.
- Detect out of order signatures and relocate them (e.g., a sig
over user id X located under subkey Y).
Note: this function does not remove signatures that don't belong or
components that are not signed! (Although it would be trivial to
do so.)
If ONLY_SELFSIGS is true, then this function only reorders self
signatures (it still checks all signatures for duplicates,
however).
Returns 1 if the keyblock was modified, 0 otherwise. */
static int
check_all_keysigs (KBNODE kb, int only_selected, int only_selfsigs)
{
gpg_error_t err;
PKT_public_key *pk;
KBNODE n, n_next, *n_prevp, n2;
char *pending_desc = NULL;
PKT_public_key *issuer;
KBNODE last_printed_component;
KBNODE current_component = NULL;
int dups = 0;
int missing_issuer = 0;
int reordered = 0;
int bad_signature = 0;
int missing_selfsig = 0;
int modified = 0;
log_assert (kb->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
/* First we look for duplicates. */
{
int nsigs = 0;
KBNODE *sigs;
int i;
int last_i;
/* Count the sigs. */
for (n = kb; n; n = n->next)
if (is_deleted_kbnode (n))
continue;
else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
nsigs ++;
/* Add them all to the SIGS array. */
sigs = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*sigs) * nsigs);
i = 0;
for (n = kb; n; n = n->next)
{
if (is_deleted_kbnode (n))
continue;
if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
continue;
sigs[i] = n;
i ++;
}
log_assert (i == nsigs);
qsort (sigs, nsigs, sizeof (sigs[0]), sig_comparison);
last_i = 0;
for (i = 1; i < nsigs; i ++)
{
log_assert (sigs[last_i]);
log_assert (sigs[last_i]->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
log_assert (sigs[i]);
log_assert (sigs[i]->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
if (sig_comparison (&sigs[last_i], &sigs[i]) == 0)
/* They are the same. Kill the latter. */
{
if (DBG_PACKET)
{
PKT_signature *sig = sigs[i]->pkt->pkt.signature;
log_debug ("Signature appears multiple times, "
"deleting duplicate:\n");
log_debug (" sig: class 0x%x, issuer: %s,"
" timestamp: %s (%lld), digest: %02x %02x\n",
sig->sig_class, keystr (sig->keyid),
isotimestamp (sig->timestamp),
(long long) sig->timestamp,
sig->digest_start[0], sig->digest_start[1]);
}
/* Remove sigs[i] from the keyblock. */
{
KBNODE z, *prevp;
int to_kill = last_i;
last_i = i;
for (prevp = &kb, z = kb; z; prevp = &z->next, z = z->next)
if (z == sigs[to_kill])
break;
*prevp = sigs[to_kill]->next;
sigs[to_kill]->next = NULL;
release_kbnode (sigs[to_kill]);
sigs[to_kill] = NULL;
dups ++;
modified = 1;
}
}
else
last_i = i;
}
xfree (sigs);
}
/* Make sure the sigs occur after the component (public key, subkey,
user id) that they sign. */
issuer = NULL;
last_printed_component = NULL;
for (n_prevp = &kb, n = kb;
n;
/* If we moved n, then n_prevp is need valid. */
n_prevp = (n->next == n_next ? &n->next : n_prevp), n = n_next)
{
PACKET *p;
int processed_current_component;
PKT_signature *sig;
int rc;
int dump_sig_params = 0;
n_next = n->next;
if (is_deleted_kbnode (n))
continue;
p = n->pkt;
if (issuer && issuer != pk)
{
free_public_key (issuer);
issuer = NULL;
}
xfree (pending_desc);
pending_desc = NULL;
switch (p->pkttype)
{
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
log_assert (p->pkt.public_key == pk);
if (only_selected && ! (n->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
{
current_component = NULL;
break;
}
if (DBG_PACKET)
log_debug ("public key %s: timestamp: %s (%lld)\n",
pk_keyid_str (pk),
isotimestamp (pk->timestamp),
(long long) pk->timestamp);
current_component = n;
break;
case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
if (only_selected && ! (n->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
{
current_component = NULL;
break;
}
if (DBG_PACKET)
log_debug ("subkey %s: timestamp: %s (%lld)\n",
pk_keyid_str (p->pkt.public_key),
isotimestamp (p->pkt.public_key->timestamp),
(long long) p->pkt.public_key->timestamp);
current_component = n;
break;
case PKT_USER_ID:
if (only_selected && ! (n->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
{
current_component = NULL;
break;
}
if (DBG_PACKET)
log_debug ("user id: %s\n",
p->pkt.user_id->attrib_data
? "[ photo id ]"
: p->pkt.user_id->name);
current_component = n;
break;
case PKT_SIGNATURE:
if (! current_component)
/* The current component is not selected, don't check the
sigs under it. */
break;
sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
pending_desc = xasprintf (" sig: class: 0x%x, issuer: %s,"
" timestamp: %s (%lld), digest: %02x %02x",
sig->sig_class,
keystr (sig->keyid),
isotimestamp (sig->timestamp),
(long long) sig->timestamp,
sig->digest_start[0], sig->digest_start[1]);
if (keyid_cmp (pk_keyid (pk), sig->keyid) == 0)
issuer = pk;
else
/* Issuer is a different key. */
{
if (only_selfsigs)
continue;
issuer = xmalloc (sizeof (*issuer));
err = get_pubkey (issuer, sig->keyid);
if (err)
{
xfree (issuer);
issuer = NULL;
if (DBG_PACKET)
{
if (pending_desc)
log_debug ("%s", pending_desc);
log_debug (" Can't check signature allegedly"
" issued by %s: %s\n",
keystr (sig->keyid), gpg_strerror (err));
}
missing_issuer ++;
break;
}
}
if ((err = openpgp_pk_test_algo (sig->pubkey_algo)))
{
if (DBG_PACKET && pending_desc)
log_debug ("%s", pending_desc);
tty_printf (_("can't check signature with unsupported"
" public-key algorithm (%d): %s.\n"),
sig->pubkey_algo, gpg_strerror (err));
break;
}
if ((err = openpgp_md_test_algo (sig->digest_algo)))
{
if (DBG_PACKET && pending_desc)
log_debug ("%s", pending_desc);
tty_printf (_("can't check signature with unsupported"
" message-digest algorithm %d: %s.\n"),
sig->digest_algo, gpg_strerror (err));
break;
}
/* We iterate over the keyblock. Most likely, the matching
component is the current component so always try that
first. */
processed_current_component = 0;
for (n2 = current_component;
n2;
n2 = (processed_current_component ? n2->next : kb),
processed_current_component = 1)
if (is_deleted_kbnode (n2))
continue;
else if (processed_current_component && n2 == current_component)
/* Don't process it twice. */
continue;
else
{
err = check_signature_over_key_or_uid (issuer, sig, kb, n2->pkt,
NULL, NULL);
if (! err)
break;
}
/* n/sig is a signature and n2 is the component (public key,
subkey or user id) that it signs, if any.
current_component is that component that it appears to
apply to (according to the ordering). */
if (current_component == n2)
{
if (DBG_PACKET)
{
log_debug ("%s", pending_desc);
log_debug (" Good signature over last key or uid!\n");
}
rc = 0;
}
else if (n2)
{
log_assert (n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY);
if (DBG_PACKET)
{
log_debug ("%s", pending_desc);
log_debug (" Good signature out of order!"
" (Over %s (%d) '%s')\n",
n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
? "user id"
: n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
? "subkey"
: "primary key",
n2->pkt->pkttype,
n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
? n2->pkt->pkt.user_id->name
: pk_keyid_str (n2->pkt->pkt.public_key));
}
/* Reorder the packets: move the signature n to be just
after n2. */
/* Unlink the signature. */
log_assert (n_prevp);
*n_prevp = n->next;
/* Insert the sig immediately after the component. */
n->next = n2->next;
n2->next = n;
reordered ++;
modified = 1;
rc = 0;
}
else
{
if (DBG_PACKET)
{
log_debug ("%s", pending_desc);
log_debug (" Bad signature.\n");
}
if (DBG_PACKET)
dump_sig_params = 1;
bad_signature ++;
rc = GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
}
/* We don't cache the result here, because we haven't
completely checked that the signature is legitimate. For
instance, if we have a revocation certificate on Alice's
key signed by Bob, the signature may be good, but we
haven't checked that Bob is a designated revoker. */
/* cache_sig_result (sig, rc); */
{
int has_selfsig = 0;
if (! rc && issuer == pk)
{
if (n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
&& (/* Direct key signature. */
sig->sig_class == 0x1f
/* Key revocation signature. */
|| sig->sig_class == 0x20))
has_selfsig = 1;
if (n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& (/* Subkey binding sig. */
sig->sig_class == 0x18
/* Subkey revocation sig. */
|| sig->sig_class == 0x28))
has_selfsig = 1;
if (n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& (/* Certification sigs. */
sig->sig_class == 0x10
|| sig->sig_class == 0x11
|| sig->sig_class == 0x12
|| sig->sig_class == 0x13
/* Certification revocation sig. */
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30))
has_selfsig = 1;
}
if ((n2 && n2 != last_printed_component)
|| (! n2 && last_printed_component != current_component))
{
int is_reordered = n2 && n2 != current_component;
if (n2)
last_printed_component = n2;
else
last_printed_component = current_component;
if (!modified)
;
else if (last_printed_component->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
tty_printf ("uid ");
tty_print_utf8_string (last_printed_component
->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
last_printed_component
->pkt->pkt.user_id->len);
}
else if (last_printed_component->pkt->pkttype
== PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
tty_printf ("pub %s",
pk_keyid_str (last_printed_component
->pkt->pkt.public_key));
else
tty_printf ("sub %s",
pk_keyid_str (last_printed_component
->pkt->pkt.public_key));
if (modified)
{
if (is_reordered)
tty_printf (_(" (reordered signatures follow)"));
tty_printf ("\n");
}
}
if (modified)
print_one_sig (rc, kb, n, NULL, NULL, NULL, has_selfsig,
0, only_selfsigs);
}
if (dump_sig_params)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pubkey_get_nsig (sig->pubkey_algo); i ++)
{
char buffer[1024];
size_t len;
char *printable;
gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
buffer, sizeof (buffer), &len,
sig->data[i]);
printable = bin2hex (buffer, len, NULL);
log_info (" %d: %s\n", i, printable);
xfree (printable);
}
}
break;
default:
if (DBG_PACKET)
log_debug ("unhandled packet: %d\n", p->pkttype);
break;
}
}
xfree (pending_desc);
pending_desc = NULL;
if (issuer != pk)
free_public_key (issuer);
issuer = NULL;
/* Identify keys / uids that don't have a self-sig. */
{
int has_selfsig = 0;
PACKET *p;
PKT_signature *sig;
current_component = NULL;
for (n = kb; n; n = n->next)
{
if (is_deleted_kbnode (n))
continue;
p = n->pkt;
switch (p->pkttype)
{
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
case PKT_USER_ID:
if (current_component && ! has_selfsig)
missing_selfsig ++;
current_component = n;
has_selfsig = 0;
break;
case PKT_SIGNATURE:
if (! current_component || has_selfsig)
break;
sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (! (sig->flags.checked && sig->flags.valid))
break;
if (keyid_cmp (pk_keyid (pk), sig->keyid) != 0)
/* Different issuer, couldn't be a self-sig. */
break;
if (current_component->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
&& (/* Direct key signature. */
sig->sig_class == 0x1f
/* Key revocation signature. */
|| sig->sig_class == 0x20))
has_selfsig = 1;
if (current_component->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& (/* Subkey binding sig. */
sig->sig_class == 0x18
/* Subkey revocation sig. */
|| sig->sig_class == 0x28))
has_selfsig = 1;
if (current_component->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& (/* Certification sigs. */
sig->sig_class == 0x10
|| sig->sig_class == 0x11
|| sig->sig_class == 0x12
|| sig->sig_class == 0x13
/* Certification revocation sig. */
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30))
has_selfsig = 1;
break;
default:
if (current_component && ! has_selfsig)
missing_selfsig ++;
current_component = NULL;
}
}
}
if (dups || missing_issuer || bad_signature || reordered)
tty_printf (_("key %s:\n"), pk_keyid_str (pk));
if (dups)
tty_printf (ngettext ("%d duplicate signature removed\n",
"%d duplicate signatures removed\n", dups), dups);
if (missing_issuer)
tty_printf (ngettext ("%d signature not checked due to a missing key\n",
"%d signatures not checked due to missing keys\n",
missing_issuer), missing_issuer);
if (bad_signature)
tty_printf (ngettext ("%d bad signature\n",
"%d bad signatures\n",
bad_signature), bad_signature);
if (reordered)
tty_printf (ngettext ("%d signature reordered\n",
"%d signatures reordered\n",
reordered), reordered);
if (only_selfsigs && (bad_signature || reordered))
tty_printf (_("Warning: errors found and only checked self-signatures,"
" run '%s' to check all signatures.\n"), "check");
return modified;
}
static int
sign_mk_attrib (PKT_signature * sig, void *opaque)
{
struct sign_attrib *attrib = opaque;
byte buf[8];
if (attrib->non_exportable)
{
buf[0] = 0; /* not exportable */
build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE, buf, 1);
}
if (attrib->non_revocable)
{
buf[0] = 0; /* not revocable */
build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE, buf, 1);
}
if (attrib->reason)
revocation_reason_build_cb (sig, attrib->reason);
if (attrib->trust_depth)
{
/* Not critical. If someone doesn't understand trust sigs,
this can still be a valid regular signature. */
buf[0] = attrib->trust_depth;
buf[1] = attrib->trust_value;
build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_TRUST, buf, 2);
/* Critical. If someone doesn't understands regexps, this
whole sig should be invalid. Note the +1 for the length -
regexps are null terminated. */
if (attrib->trust_regexp)
build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL | SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP,
attrib->trust_regexp,
strlen (attrib->trust_regexp) + 1);
}
return 0;
}
static void
trustsig_prompt (byte * trust_value, byte * trust_depth, char **regexp)
{
char *p;
*trust_value = 0;
*trust_depth = 0;
*regexp = NULL;
/* Same string as pkclist.c:do_edit_ownertrust */
tty_printf (_
("Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify"
" other users' keys\n(by looking at passports, checking"
" fingerprints from different sources, etc.)\n"));
tty_printf ("\n");
tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust marginally\n"), 1);
tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust fully\n"), 2);
tty_printf ("\n");
while (*trust_value == 0)
{
p = cpr_get ("trustsig_prompt.trust_value", _("Your selection? "));
trim_spaces (p);
cpr_kill_prompt ();
/* 60 and 120 are as per RFC2440 */
if (p[0] == '1' && !p[1])
*trust_value = 60;
else if (p[0] == '2' && !p[1])
*trust_value = 120;
xfree (p);
}
tty_printf ("\n");
tty_printf (_("Please enter the depth of this trust signature.\n"
"A depth greater than 1 allows the key you are"
" signing to make\n"
"trust signatures on your behalf.\n"));
tty_printf ("\n");
while (*trust_depth == 0)
{
p = cpr_get ("trustsig_prompt.trust_depth", _("Your selection? "));
trim_spaces (p);
cpr_kill_prompt ();
*trust_depth = atoi (p);
xfree (p);
}
tty_printf ("\n");
tty_printf (_("Please enter a domain to restrict this signature, "
"or enter for none.\n"));
tty_printf ("\n");
p = cpr_get ("trustsig_prompt.trust_regexp", _("Your selection? "));
trim_spaces (p);
cpr_kill_prompt ();
if (strlen (p) > 0)
{
char *q = p;
int regexplen = 100, ind;
*regexp = xmalloc (regexplen);
/* Now mangle the domain the user entered into a regexp. To do
this, \-escape everything that isn't alphanumeric, and attach
"<[^>]+[@.]" to the front, and ">$" to the end. */
strcpy (*regexp, "<[^>]+[@.]");
ind = strlen (*regexp);
while (*q)
{
if (!((*q >= 'A' && *q <= 'Z')
|| (*q >= 'a' && *q <= 'z') || (*q >= '0' && *q <= '9')))
(*regexp)[ind++] = '\\';
(*regexp)[ind++] = *q;
if ((regexplen - ind) < 3)
{
regexplen += 100;
*regexp = xrealloc (*regexp, regexplen);
}
q++;
}
(*regexp)[ind] = '\0';
strcat (*regexp, ">$");
}
xfree (p);
tty_printf ("\n");
}
/*
* Loop over all LOCUSR and and sign the uids after asking. If no
* user id is marked, all user ids will be signed; if some user_ids
* are marked only those will be signed. If QUICK is true the
* function won't ask the user and use sensible defaults.
*/
static int
sign_uids (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
kbnode_t keyblock, strlist_t locusr, int *ret_modified,
int local, int nonrevocable, int trust, int interactive,
int quick)
{
int rc = 0;
SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
KBNODE node, uidnode;
PKT_public_key *primary_pk = NULL;
int select_all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock) || interactive;
/* Build a list of all signators.
*
* We use the CERT flag to request the primary which must always
* be one which is capable of signing keys. I can't see a reason
* why to sign keys using a subkey. Implementation of USAGE_CERT
* is just a hack in getkey.c and does not mean that a subkey
* marked as certification capable will be used. */
rc = build_sk_list (ctrl, locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT);
if (rc)
goto leave;
/* Loop over all signators. */
for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
{
u32 sk_keyid[2], pk_keyid[2];
char *p, *trust_regexp = NULL;
int class = 0, selfsig = 0;
u32 duration = 0, timestamp = 0;
byte trust_depth = 0, trust_value = 0;
pk = sk_rover->pk;
keyid_from_pk (pk, sk_keyid);
/* Set mark A for all selected user ids. */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
node->flag |= NODFLG_MARK_A;
else
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
}
/* Reset mark for uids which are already signed. */
uidnode = NULL;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
primary_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (primary_pk, pk_keyid);
/* Is this a self-sig? */
if (pk_keyid[0] == sk_keyid[0] && pk_keyid[1] == sk_keyid[1])
selfsig = 1;
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
uidnode = (node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) ? node : NULL;
if (uidnode)
{
int yesreally = 0;
char *user;
user = utf8_to_native (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
if (opt.only_sign_text_ids
&& uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _("Skipping user ID \"%s\","
" which is not a text ID.\n"),
user);
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode = NULL;
}
else if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is revoked."), user);
if (selfsig)
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
else if (opt.expert && !quick)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.revoke_okay",
_("Are you sure you "
"still want to sign "
"it? (y/N) ")))
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode = NULL;
}
else if (interactive)
yesreally = 1;
}
else
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode = NULL;
tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
}
}
else if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is expired."), user);
if (selfsig)
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
else if (opt.expert && !quick)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.expire_okay",
_("Are you sure you "
"still want to sign "
"it? (y/N) ")))
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode = NULL;
}
else if (interactive)
yesreally = 1;
}
else
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode = NULL;
tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
}
}
else if (!uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->created && !selfsig)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is not self-signed."),
user);
if (opt.expert && !quick)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.nosig_okay",
_("Are you sure you "
"still want to sign "
"it? (y/N) ")))
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode = NULL;
}
else if (interactive)
yesreally = 1;
}
else
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode = NULL;
tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
}
}
if (uidnode && interactive && !yesreally && !quick)
{
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("User ID \"%s\" is signable. "), user);
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.sign_okay",
_("Sign it? (y/N) ")))
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode = NULL;
}
}
xfree (user);
}
}
else if (uidnode && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
{
if (sk_keyid[0] == node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
&& sk_keyid[1] == node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1])
{
char buf[50];
char *user;
user = utf8_to_native (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
/* It's a v3 self-sig. Make it into a v4 self-sig? */
if (node->pkt->pkt.signature->version < 4
&& selfsig && !quick)
{
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("The self-signature on \"%s\"\n"
"is a PGP 2.x-style signature.\n"), user);
/* Note that the regular PGP2 warning below
still applies if there are no v4 sigs on
this key at all. */
if (opt.expert)
if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.v4_promote_okay",
_("Do you want to promote "
"it to an OpenPGP self-"
"signature? (y/N) ")))
{
node->flag |= NODFLG_DELSIG;
xfree (user);
continue;
}
}
/* Is the current signature expired? */
if (node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.expired)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _("Your current signature on \"%s\"\n"
"has expired.\n"), user);
if (quick || cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("sign_uid.replace_expired_okay",
_("Do you want to issue a "
"new signature to replace "
"the expired one? (y/N) ")))
{
/* Mark these for later deletion. We
don't want to delete them here, just in
case the replacement signature doesn't
happen for some reason. We only delete
these after the replacement is already
in place. */
node->flag |= NODFLG_DELSIG;
xfree (user);
continue;
}
}
if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable && !local)
{
/* It's a local sig, and we want to make a
exportable sig. */
tty_fprintf (fp, _("Your current signature on \"%s\"\n"
"is a local signature.\n"), user);
if (quick || cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("sign_uid.local_promote_okay",
_("Do you want to promote "
"it to a full exportable " "signature? (y/N) ")))
{
/* Mark these for later deletion. We
don't want to delete them here, just in
case the replacement signature doesn't
happen for some reason. We only delete
these after the replacement is already
in place. */
node->flag |= NODFLG_DELSIG;
xfree (user);
continue;
}
}
/* Fixme: see whether there is a revocation in which
* case we should allow signing it again. */
if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable && local)
tty_fprintf ( fp,
_("\"%s\" was already locally signed by key %s\n"),
user, keystr_from_pk (pk));
else
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("\"%s\" was already signed by key %s\n"),
user, keystr_from_pk (pk));
if (opt.expert && !quick
&& cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.dupe_okay",
_("Do you want to sign it "
"again anyway? (y/N) ")))
{
/* Don't delete the old sig here since this is
an --expert thing. */
xfree (user);
continue;
}
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
(ulong) pk->keyid[0], (ulong) pk->keyid[1]);
write_status_text (STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED, buf);
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; /* remove mark */
xfree (user);
}
}
}
/* Check whether any uids are left for signing. */
if (!count_uids_with_flag (keyblock, NODFLG_MARK_A))
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _("Nothing to sign with key %s\n"),
keystr_from_pk (pk));
continue;
}
/* Ask whether we really should sign these user id(s). */
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, fp, keyblock, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0);
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
if (primary_pk->expiredate && !selfsig)
{
/* Static analyzer note: A claim that PRIMARY_PK might be
NULL is not correct because it set from the public key
packet which is always the first packet in a keyblock and
parsed in the above loop over the keyblock. In case the
keyblock has no packets at all and thus the loop was not
entered the above count_uids_with_flag would have
detected this case. */
u32 now = make_timestamp ();
if (primary_pk->expiredate <= now)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key has expired!"));
if (opt.expert && !quick)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.expired_okay",
_("Are you sure you still "
"want to sign it? (y/N) ")))
continue;
}
else
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
continue;
}
}
else
{
tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key is due to expire on %s.\n"),
expirestr_from_pk (primary_pk));
if (opt.ask_cert_expire && !quick)
{
char *answer = cpr_get ("sign_uid.expire",
_("Do you want your signature to "
"expire at the same time? (Y/n) "));
if (answer_is_yes_no_default (answer, 1))
{
/* This fixes the signature timestamp we're
going to make as now. This is so the
expiration date is exactly correct, and not
a few seconds off (due to the time it takes
to answer the questions, enter the
passphrase, etc). */
timestamp = now;
duration = primary_pk->expiredate - now;
}
cpr_kill_prompt ();
xfree (answer);
}
}
}
/* Only ask for duration if we haven't already set it to match
the expiration of the pk */
if (!duration && !selfsig)
{
if (opt.ask_cert_expire && !quick)
duration = ask_expire_interval (1, opt.def_cert_expire);
else
duration = parse_expire_string (opt.def_cert_expire);
}
if (selfsig)
;
else
{
if (opt.batch || !opt.ask_cert_level || quick)
class = 0x10 + opt.def_cert_level;
else
{
char *answer;
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("How carefully have you verified the key you are "
"about to sign actually belongs\nto the person "
"named above? If you don't know what to "
"answer, enter \"0\".\n"));
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (0) I will not answer.%s\n"),
opt.def_cert_level == 0 ? " (default)" : "");
tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (1) I have not checked at all.%s\n"),
opt.def_cert_level == 1 ? " (default)" : "");
tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (2) I have done casual checking.%s\n"),
opt.def_cert_level == 2 ? " (default)" : "");
tty_fprintf (fp,
_(" (3) I have done very careful checking.%s\n"),
opt.def_cert_level == 3 ? " (default)" : "");
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
while (class == 0)
{
answer = cpr_get ("sign_uid.class",
_("Your selection? "
"(enter '?' for more information): "));
if (answer[0] == '\0')
class = 0x10 + opt.def_cert_level; /* Default */
else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "0") == 0)
class = 0x10; /* Generic */
else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "1") == 0)
class = 0x11; /* Persona */
else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "2") == 0)
class = 0x12; /* Casual */
else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "3") == 0)
class = 0x13; /* Positive */
else
tty_fprintf (fp, _("Invalid selection.\n"));
xfree (answer);
}
}
if (trust && !quick)
trustsig_prompt (&trust_value, &trust_depth, &trust_regexp);
}
if (!quick)
{
p = get_user_id_native (sk_keyid);
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("Are you sure that you want to sign this key with your\n"
"key \"%s\" (%s)\n"), p, keystr_from_pk (pk));
xfree (p);
}
if (selfsig)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("This will be a self-signature.\n"));
if (local)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("WARNING: the signature will not be marked "
"as non-exportable.\n"));
}
if (nonrevocable)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("WARNING: the signature will not be marked "
"as non-revocable.\n"));
}
}
else
{
if (local)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("The signature will be marked as non-exportable.\n"));
}
if (nonrevocable)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("The signature will be marked as non-revocable.\n"));
}
switch (class)
{
case 0x11:
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("I have not checked this key at all.\n"));
break;
case 0x12:
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("I have checked this key casually.\n"));
break;
case 0x13:
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("I have checked this key very carefully.\n"));
break;
}
}
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
if (opt.batch && opt.answer_yes)
;
else if (quick)
;
else if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.okay",
_("Really sign? (y/N) ")))
continue;
/* Now we can sign the user ids. */
reloop: /* (Must use this, because we are modifing the list.) */
primary_pk = NULL;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
primary_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& (node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A))
{
PACKET *pkt;
PKT_signature *sig;
struct sign_attrib attrib;
log_assert (primary_pk);
memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
attrib.non_exportable = local;
attrib.non_revocable = nonrevocable;
attrib.trust_depth = trust_depth;
attrib.trust_value = trust_value;
attrib.trust_regexp = trust_regexp;
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
/* We force creation of a v4 signature for local
* signatures, otherwise we would not generate the
* subpacket with v3 keys and the signature becomes
* exportable. */
if (selfsig)
rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, primary_pk,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
NULL,
pk,
0x13, 0, 0, 0,
keygen_add_std_prefs, primary_pk,
NULL);
else
rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, primary_pk,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
NULL,
pk,
class, 0,
timestamp, duration,
sign_mk_attrib, &attrib,
NULL);
if (rc)
{
write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
*ret_modified = 1; /* We changed the keyblock. */
update_trust = 1;
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE);
goto reloop;
}
}
/* Delete any sigs that got promoted */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->flag & NODFLG_DELSIG)
delete_kbnode (node);
} /* End loop over signators. */
leave:
release_sk_list (sk_list);
return rc;
}
/*
* Change the passphrase of the primary and all secondary keys. Note
* that it is common to use only one passphrase for the primary and
* all subkeys. However, this is now (since GnuPG 2.1) all up to the
* gpg-agent. Returns 0 on success or an error code.
*/
static gpg_error_t
change_passphrase (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
{
gpg_error_t err;
kbnode_t node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
int any;
u32 keyid[2], subid[2];
char *hexgrip = NULL;
char *cache_nonce = NULL;
char *passwd_nonce = NULL;
node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
if (!node)
{
log_error ("Oops; public key missing!\n");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
goto leave;
}
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
/* Check whether it is likely that we will be able to change the
passphrase for any subkey. */
for (any = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
char *serialno;
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (pk, subid);
xfree (hexgrip);
err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = agent_get_keyinfo (ctrl, hexgrip, &serialno, NULL);
if (!err && serialno)
; /* Key on card. */
else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
; /* Maybe stub key. */
else if (!err)
any = 1; /* Key is known. */
else
log_error ("key %s: error getting keyinfo from agent: %s\n",
keystr_with_sub (keyid, subid), gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (serialno);
}
}
err = 0;
if (!any)
{
tty_printf (_("Key has only stub or on-card key items - "
"no passphrase to change.\n"));
goto leave;
}
/* Change the passphrase for all keys. */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
char *desc;
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (pk, subid);
xfree (hexgrip);
err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
if (err)
goto leave;
desc = gpg_format_keydesc (pk, FORMAT_KEYDESC_NORMAL, 1);
err = agent_passwd (ctrl, hexgrip, desc, 0,
&cache_nonce, &passwd_nonce);
xfree (desc);
if (err)
log_log ((gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED
|| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
? GPGRT_LOG_INFO : GPGRT_LOG_ERROR,
_("key %s: error changing passphrase: %s\n"),
keystr_with_sub (keyid, subid),
gpg_strerror (err));
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
break;
}
}
leave:
xfree (hexgrip);
xfree (cache_nonce);
xfree (passwd_nonce);
return err;
}
/* Fix various problems in the keyblock. Returns true if the keyblock
was changed. Note that a pointer to the keyblock must be given and
the function may change it (i.e. replacing the first node). */
static int
fix_keyblock (kbnode_t *keyblockp)
{
int changed = 0;
if (collapse_uids (keyblockp))
changed++;
if (check_all_keysigs (*keyblockp, 0, 1))
changed++;
reorder_keyblock (*keyblockp);
/* If we modified the keyblock, make sure the flags are right. */
if (changed)
merge_keys_and_selfsig (*keyblockp);
return changed;
}
static int
parse_sign_type (const char *str, int *localsig, int *nonrevokesig,
int *trustsig)
{
const char *p = str;
while (*p)
{
if (ascii_strncasecmp (p, "l", 1) == 0)
{
*localsig = 1;
p++;
}
else if (ascii_strncasecmp (p, "nr", 2) == 0)
{
*nonrevokesig = 1;
p += 2;
}
else if (ascii_strncasecmp (p, "t", 1) == 0)
{
*trustsig = 1;
p++;
}
else
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Menu driven key editor. If seckey_check is true, then a secret key
* that matches username will be looked for. If it is false, not all
* commands will be available.
*
* Note: to keep track of certain selections we use node->mark MARKBIT_xxxx.
*/
/* Need an SK for this command */
#define KEYEDIT_NEED_SK 1
/* Cannot be viewing the SK for this command */
#define KEYEDIT_NOT_SK 2
/* Must be viewing the SK for this command */
#define KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK 4
/* Match the tail of the string */
#define KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH 8
enum cmdids
{
cmdNONE = 0,
cmdQUIT, cmdHELP, cmdFPR, cmdLIST, cmdSELUID, cmdCHECK, cmdSIGN,
cmdREVSIG, cmdREVKEY, cmdREVUID, cmdDELSIG, cmdPRIMARY, cmdDEBUG,
cmdSAVE, cmdADDUID, cmdADDPHOTO, cmdDELUID, cmdADDKEY, cmdDELKEY,
cmdADDREVOKER, cmdTOGGLE, cmdSELKEY, cmdPASSWD, cmdTRUST, cmdPREF,
cmdEXPIRE, cmdCHANGEUSAGE, cmdBACKSIGN,
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
cmdENABLEKEY, cmdDISABLEKEY,
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
cmdSHOWPREF,
cmdSETPREF, cmdPREFKS, cmdNOTATION, cmdINVCMD, cmdSHOWPHOTO, cmdUPDTRUST,
cmdCHKTRUST, cmdADDCARDKEY, cmdKEYTOCARD, cmdBKUPTOCARD,
cmdCLEAN, cmdMINIMIZE, cmdGRIP, cmdNOP
};
static struct
{
const char *name;
enum cmdids id;
int flags;
const char *desc;
} cmds[] =
{
{ "quit", cmdQUIT, 0, N_("quit this menu")},
{ "q", cmdQUIT, 0, NULL},
{ "save", cmdSAVE, 0, N_("save and quit")},
{ "help", cmdHELP, 0, N_("show this help")},
{ "?", cmdHELP, 0, NULL},
{ "fpr", cmdFPR, 0, N_("show key fingerprint")},
{ "grip", cmdGRIP, 0, N_("show the keygrip")},
{ "list", cmdLIST, 0, N_("list key and user IDs")},
{ "l", cmdLIST, 0, NULL},
{ "uid", cmdSELUID, 0, N_("select user ID N")},
{ "key", cmdSELKEY, 0, N_("select subkey N")},
{ "check", cmdCHECK, 0, N_("check signatures")},
{ "c", cmdCHECK, 0, NULL},
{ "change-usage", cmdCHANGEUSAGE, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
{ "cross-certify", cmdBACKSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
{ "backsign", cmdBACKSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
{ "sign", cmdSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH,
N_("sign selected user IDs [* see below for related commands]")},
{ "s", cmdSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, NULL},
/* "lsign" and friends will never match since "sign" comes first
and it is a tail match. They are just here so they show up in
the help menu. */
{ "lsign", cmdNOP, 0, N_("sign selected user IDs locally")},
{ "tsign", cmdNOP, 0, N_("sign selected user IDs with a trust signature")},
{ "nrsign", cmdNOP, 0,
N_("sign selected user IDs with a non-revocable signature")},
{ "debug", cmdDEBUG, 0, NULL},
{ "adduid", cmdADDUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("add a user ID")},
{ "addphoto", cmdADDPHOTO, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("add a photo ID")},
{ "deluid", cmdDELUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("delete selected user IDs")},
/* delphoto is really deluid in disguise */
{ "delphoto", cmdDELUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, NULL},
{ "addkey", cmdADDKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("add a subkey")},
#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
{ "addcardkey", cmdADDCARDKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("add a key to a smartcard")},
{ "keytocard", cmdKEYTOCARD, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK | KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK,
N_("move a key to a smartcard")},
{ "bkuptocard", cmdBKUPTOCARD, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK | KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK,
N_("move a backup key to a smartcard")},
#endif /*ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */
{ "delkey", cmdDELKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("delete selected subkeys")},
{ "addrevoker", cmdADDREVOKER, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("add a revocation key")},
{ "delsig", cmdDELSIG, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
N_("delete signatures from the selected user IDs")},
{ "expire", cmdEXPIRE, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("change the expiration date for the key or selected subkeys")},
{ "primary", cmdPRIMARY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("flag the selected user ID as primary")},
{ "toggle", cmdTOGGLE, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL}, /* Dummy command. */
{ "t", cmdTOGGLE, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
{ "pref", cmdPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("list preferences (expert)")},
{ "showpref", cmdSHOWPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("list preferences (verbose)")},
{ "setpref", cmdSETPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("set preference list for the selected user IDs")},
{ "updpref", cmdSETPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
{ "keyserver", cmdPREFKS, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("set the preferred keyserver URL for the selected user IDs")},
{ "notation", cmdNOTATION, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("set a notation for the selected user IDs")},
{ "passwd", cmdPASSWD, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("change the passphrase")},
{ "password", cmdPASSWD, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
{ "trust", cmdTRUST, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("change the ownertrust")},
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
{ "revsig", cmdREVSIG, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
N_("revoke signatures on the selected user IDs")},
{ "revuid", cmdREVUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("revoke selected user IDs")},
{ "revphoto", cmdREVUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
{ "revkey", cmdREVKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
N_("revoke key or selected subkeys")},
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
{ "enable", cmdENABLEKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("enable key")},
{ "disable", cmdDISABLEKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("disable key")},
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
{ "showphoto", cmdSHOWPHOTO, 0, N_("show selected photo IDs")},
{ "clean", cmdCLEAN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
N_("compact unusable user IDs and remove unusable signatures from key")},
{ "minimize", cmdMINIMIZE, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
N_("compact unusable user IDs and remove all signatures from key")},
{ NULL, cmdNONE, 0, NULL}
};
#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
/*
These two functions are used by readline for command completion.
*/
static char *
command_generator (const char *text, int state)
{
static int list_index, len;
const char *name;
/* If this is a new word to complete, initialize now. This includes
saving the length of TEXT for efficiency, and initializing the
index variable to 0. */
if (!state)
{
list_index = 0;
len = strlen (text);
}
/* Return the next partial match */
while ((name = cmds[list_index].name))
{
/* Only complete commands that have help text */
if (cmds[list_index++].desc && strncmp (name, text, len) == 0)
return strdup (name);
}
return NULL;
}
static char **
keyedit_completion (const char *text, int start, int end)
{
/* If we are at the start of a line, we try and command-complete.
If not, just do nothing for now. */
(void) end;
if (start == 0)
return rl_completion_matches (text, command_generator);
rl_attempted_completion_over = 1;
return NULL;
}
#endif /* HAVE_LIBREADLINE */
/* Main function of the menu driven key editor. */
void
keyedit_menu (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, strlist_t locusr,
strlist_t commands, int quiet, int seckey_check)
{
enum cmdids cmd = 0;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
int have_seckey = 0;
char *answer = NULL;
int redisplay = 1;
int modified = 0;
int sec_shadowing = 0;
int run_subkey_warnings = 0;
int have_commands = !!commands;
if (opt.command_fd != -1)
;
else if (opt.batch && !have_commands)
{
log_error (_("can't do this in batch mode\n"));
goto leave;
}
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
/* Due to Windows peculiarities we need to make sure that the
trustdb stale check is done before we open another file
(i.e. by searching for a key). In theory we could make sure
that the files are closed after use but the open/close caches
inhibits that and flushing the cache right before the stale
check is not easy to implement. Thus we take the easy way out
and run the stale check as early as possible. Note, that for
non- W32 platforms it is run indirectly trough a call to
get_validity (). */
check_trustdb_stale (ctrl);
#endif
/* Get the public key */
err = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, NULL, username, &keyblock, &kdbhd, 1, 1);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), username, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (fix_keyblock (&keyblock))
modified++;
/* See whether we have a matching secret key. */
if (seckey_check)
{
have_seckey = !agent_probe_any_secret_key (ctrl, keyblock);
if (have_seckey && !quiet)
tty_printf (_("Secret key is available.\n"));
}
/* Main command loop. */
for (;;)
{
int i, arg_number, photo;
const char *arg_string = "";
char *p;
PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
tty_printf ("\n");
if (redisplay && !quiet)
{
/* Show using flags: with_revoker, with_subkeys. */
show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0);
tty_printf ("\n");
redisplay = 0;
}
if (run_subkey_warnings)
{
run_subkey_warnings = 0;
if (!count_selected_keys (keyblock))
subkey_expire_warning (keyblock);
}
do
{
xfree (answer);
if (have_commands)
{
if (commands)
{
answer = xstrdup (commands->d);
commands = commands->next;
}
else if (opt.batch)
{
answer = xstrdup ("quit");
}
else
have_commands = 0;
}
if (!have_commands)
{
#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
tty_enable_completion (keyedit_completion);
#endif
answer = cpr_get_no_help ("keyedit.prompt", GPG_NAME "> ");
cpr_kill_prompt ();
tty_disable_completion ();
}
trim_spaces (answer);
}
while (*answer == '#');
arg_number = 0; /* Here is the init which egcc complains about. */
photo = 0; /* Same here. */
if (!*answer)
cmd = cmdLIST;
else if (*answer == CONTROL_D)
cmd = cmdQUIT;
else if (digitp (answer))
{
cmd = cmdSELUID;
arg_number = atoi (answer);
}
else
{
if ((p = strchr (answer, ' ')))
{
*p++ = 0;
trim_spaces (answer);
trim_spaces (p);
arg_number = atoi (p);
arg_string = p;
}
for (i = 0; cmds[i].name; i++)
{
if (cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH)
{
size_t l = strlen (cmds[i].name);
size_t a = strlen (answer);
if (a >= l)
{
if (!ascii_strcasecmp (&answer[a - l], cmds[i].name))
{
answer[a - l] = '\0';
break;
}
}
}
else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (answer, cmds[i].name))
break;
}
if ((cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_NEED_SK) && !have_seckey)
{
tty_printf (_("Need the secret key to do this.\n"));
cmd = cmdNOP;
}
else
cmd = cmds[i].id;
}
/* Dispatch the command. */
switch (cmd)
{
case cmdHELP:
for (i = 0; cmds[i].name; i++)
{
if ((cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_NEED_SK) && !have_seckey)
; /* Skip those item if we do not have the secret key. */
else if (cmds[i].desc)
tty_printf ("%-11s %s\n", cmds[i].name, _(cmds[i].desc));
}
tty_printf ("\n");
tty_printf
(_("* The 'sign' command may be prefixed with an 'l' for local "
"signatures (lsign),\n"
" a 't' for trust signatures (tsign), an 'nr' for "
"non-revocable signatures\n"
" (nrsign), or any combination thereof (ltsign, "
"tnrsign, etc.).\n"));
break;
case cmdLIST:
redisplay = 1;
break;
case cmdFPR:
show_key_and_fingerprint
(keyblock, (*arg_string == '*'
&& (!arg_string[1] || spacep (arg_string + 1))));
break;
case cmdGRIP:
show_key_and_grip (keyblock);
break;
case cmdSELUID:
if (strlen (arg_string) == NAMEHASH_LEN * 2)
redisplay = menu_select_uid_namehash (keyblock, arg_string);
else
{
if (*arg_string == '*'
&& (!arg_string[1] || spacep (arg_string + 1)))
arg_number = -1; /* Select all. */
redisplay = menu_select_uid (keyblock, arg_number);
}
break;
case cmdSELKEY:
{
if (*arg_string == '*'
&& (!arg_string[1] || spacep (arg_string + 1)))
arg_number = -1; /* Select all. */
if (menu_select_key (keyblock, arg_number, p))
redisplay = 1;
}
break;
case cmdCHECK:
if (check_all_keysigs (keyblock, count_selected_uids (keyblock),
!strcmp (arg_string, "selfsig")))
modified = 1;
break;
case cmdSIGN:
{
int localsig = 0, nonrevokesig = 0, trustsig = 0, interactive = 0;
if (pk->flags.revoked)
{
tty_printf (_("Key is revoked."));
if (opt.expert)
{
tty_printf (" ");
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.sign_revoked.okay",
_("Are you sure you still want to sign it? (y/N) ")))
break;
}
else
{
tty_printf (_(" Unable to sign.\n"));
break;
}
}
if (count_uids (keyblock) > 1 && !count_selected_uids (keyblock))
{
int result;
if (opt.only_sign_text_ids)
result = cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.sign_all.okay",
_("Really sign all user IDs? (y/N) "));
else
result = cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.sign_all.okay",
_("Really sign all text user IDs? (y/N) "));
if (! result)
{
if (opt.interactive)
interactive = 1;
else
{
tty_printf (_("Hint: Select the user IDs to sign\n"));
have_commands = 0;
break;
}
}
}
/* What sort of signing are we doing? */
if (!parse_sign_type
(answer, &localsig, &nonrevokesig, &trustsig))
{
tty_printf (_("Unknown signature type '%s'\n"), answer);
break;
}
sign_uids (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, locusr, &modified,
localsig, nonrevokesig, trustsig, interactive, 0);
}
break;
case cmdDEBUG:
dump_kbnode (keyblock);
break;
case cmdTOGGLE:
/* The toggle command is a leftover from old gpg versions
where we worked with a secret and a public keyring. It
is not necessary anymore but we keep this command for the
sake of scripts using it. */
redisplay = 1;
break;
case cmdADDPHOTO:
if (RFC2440)
{
tty_printf (_("This command is not allowed while in %s mode.\n"),
compliance_option_string ());
break;
}
photo = 1;
/* fall through */
case cmdADDUID:
if (menu_adduid (ctrl, keyblock, photo, arg_string, NULL))
{
update_trust = 1;
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
}
break;
case cmdDELUID:
{
int n1;
if (!(n1 = count_selected_uids (keyblock)))
{
tty_printf (_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
if (!opt.expert)
tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "uid");
}
else if (real_uids_left (keyblock) < 1)
tty_printf (_("You can't delete the last user ID!\n"));
else if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.remove.uid.okay",
n1 > 1 ? _("Really remove all selected user IDs? (y/N) ")
: _("Really remove this user ID? (y/N) ")))
{
menu_deluid (keyblock);
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
}
}
break;
case cmdDELSIG:
{
int n1;
if (!(n1 = count_selected_uids (keyblock)))
{
tty_printf (_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
if (!opt.expert)
tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "uid");
}
else if (menu_delsig (keyblock))
{
/* No redisplay here, because it may scroll away some
* of the status output of this command. */
modified = 1;
}
}
break;
case cmdADDKEY:
if (!generate_subkeypair (ctrl, keyblock, NULL, NULL, NULL))
{
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
}
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
case cmdADDCARDKEY:
if (!card_generate_subkey (keyblock))
{
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
}
break;
case cmdKEYTOCARD:
{
KBNODE node = NULL;
switch (count_selected_keys (keyblock))
{
case 0:
if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.keytocard.use_primary",
/* TRANSLATORS: Please take care: This is about
moving the key and not about removing it. */
_("Really move the primary key? (y/N) ")))
node = keyblock;
break;
case 1:
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)
break;
}
break;
default:
tty_printf (_("You must select exactly one key.\n"));
break;
}
if (node)
{
PKT_public_key *xxpk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (card_store_subkey (node, xxpk ? xxpk->pubkey_usage : 0))
{
redisplay = 1;
sec_shadowing = 1;
}
}
}
break;
case cmdBKUPTOCARD:
{
/* Ask for a filename, check whether this is really a
backup key as generated by the card generation, parse
that key and store it on card. */
KBNODE node;
char *fname;
PACKET *pkt;
IOBUF a;
if (!*arg_string)
{
tty_printf (_("Command expects a filename argument\n"));
break;
}
if (*arg_string == DIRSEP_C)
fname = xstrdup (arg_string);
else if (*arg_string == '~')
fname = make_filename (arg_string, NULL);
else
fname = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), arg_string, NULL);
/* Open that file. */
a = iobuf_open (fname);
if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a)))
{
iobuf_close (a);
a = NULL;
gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
}
if (!a)
{
tty_printf (_("Can't open '%s': %s\n"),
fname, strerror (errno));
xfree (fname);
break;
}
/* Parse and check that file. */
pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
init_packet (pkt);
err = parse_packet (a, pkt);
iobuf_close (a);
iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE, 0, (char *) fname);
if (!err && pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY
&& pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
err = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
if (err)
{
tty_printf (_("Error reading backup key from '%s': %s\n"),
fname, gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (fname);
free_packet (pkt);
xfree (pkt);
break;
}
xfree (fname);
node = new_kbnode (pkt);
/* Transfer it to gpg-agent which handles secret keys. */
err = transfer_secret_keys (ctrl, NULL, node, 1, 1);
/* Treat the pkt as a public key. */
pkt->pkttype = PKT_PUBLIC_KEY;
/* Ask gpg-agent to store the secret key to card. */
if (card_store_subkey (node, 0))
{
redisplay = 1;
sec_shadowing = 1;
}
release_kbnode (node);
}
break;
#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */
case cmdDELKEY:
{
int n1;
if (!(n1 = count_selected_keys (keyblock)))
{
tty_printf (_("You must select at least one key.\n"));
if (!opt.expert)
tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "key");
}
else if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.remove.subkey.okay",
n1 > 1 ? _("Do you really want to delete the "
"selected keys? (y/N) ")
: _("Do you really want to delete this key? (y/N) ")))
;
else
{
menu_delkey (keyblock);
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
}
}
break;
case cmdADDREVOKER:
{
int sensitive = 0;
if (ascii_strcasecmp (arg_string, "sensitive") == 0)
sensitive = 1;
if (menu_addrevoker (ctrl, keyblock, sensitive))
{
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
}
}
break;
case cmdREVUID:
{
int n1;
if (!(n1 = count_selected_uids (keyblock)))
{
tty_printf (_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
if (!opt.expert)
tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "uid");
}
else if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.revoke.uid.okay",
n1 > 1 ? _("Really revoke all selected user IDs? (y/N) ")
: _("Really revoke this user ID? (y/N) ")))
{
if (menu_revuid (ctrl, keyblock))
{
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
}
}
break;
case cmdREVKEY:
{
int n1;
if (!(n1 = count_selected_keys (keyblock)))
{
if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.revoke.subkey.okay",
_("Do you really want to revoke"
" the entire key? (y/N) ")))
{
if (menu_revkey (keyblock))
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
}
else if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.revoke.subkey.okay",
n1 > 1 ?
_("Do you really want to revoke"
" the selected subkeys? (y/N) ")
: _("Do you really want to revoke"
" this subkey? (y/N) ")))
{
if (menu_revsubkey (keyblock))
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
if (modified)
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
}
break;
case cmdEXPIRE:
if (menu_expire (keyblock))
{
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
run_subkey_warnings = 1;
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
break;
case cmdCHANGEUSAGE:
if (menu_changeusage (keyblock))
{
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
break;
case cmdBACKSIGN:
if (menu_backsign (keyblock))
{
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
break;
case cmdPRIMARY:
if (menu_set_primary_uid (keyblock))
{
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
break;
case cmdPASSWD:
change_passphrase (ctrl, keyblock);
break;
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
case cmdTRUST:
if (opt.trust_model == TM_EXTERNAL)
{
tty_printf (_("Owner trust may not be set while "
"using a user provided trust database\n"));
break;
}
show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0);
tty_printf ("\n");
if (edit_ownertrust (ctrl, find_kbnode (keyblock,
PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)->pkt->pkt.
public_key, 1))
{
redisplay = 1;
/* No real need to set update_trust here as
edit_ownertrust() calls revalidation_mark()
anyway. */
update_trust = 1;
}
break;
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
case cmdPREF:
{
int count = count_selected_uids (keyblock);
log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
show_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
count ? NODFLG_SELUID : 0, 1);
}
break;
case cmdSHOWPREF:
{
int count = count_selected_uids (keyblock);
log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
show_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
count ? NODFLG_SELUID : 0, 2);
}
break;
case cmdSETPREF:
{
PKT_user_id *tempuid;
keygen_set_std_prefs (!*arg_string ? "default" : arg_string, 0);
tempuid = keygen_get_std_prefs ();
tty_printf (_("Set preference list to:\n"));
show_prefs (tempuid, NULL, 1);
free_user_id (tempuid);
if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.setpref.okay",
count_selected_uids (keyblock) ?
_("Really update the preferences"
" for the selected user IDs? (y/N) ")
: _("Really update the preferences? (y/N) ")))
{
if (menu_set_preferences (keyblock))
{
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
}
}
break;
case cmdPREFKS:
if (menu_set_keyserver_url (*arg_string ? arg_string : NULL,
keyblock))
{
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
break;
case cmdNOTATION:
if (menu_set_notation (*arg_string ? arg_string : NULL,
keyblock))
{
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
break;
case cmdNOP:
break;
case cmdREVSIG:
if (menu_revsig (keyblock))
{
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
}
break;
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
case cmdENABLEKEY:
case cmdDISABLEKEY:
if (enable_disable_key (keyblock, cmd == cmdDISABLEKEY))
{
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
}
break;
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
case cmdSHOWPHOTO:
menu_showphoto (ctrl, keyblock);
break;
case cmdCLEAN:
if (menu_clean (keyblock, 0))
redisplay = modified = 1;
break;
case cmdMINIMIZE:
if (menu_clean (keyblock, 1))
redisplay = modified = 1;
break;
case cmdQUIT:
if (have_commands)
goto leave;
if (!modified && !sec_shadowing)
goto leave;
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.save.okay",
_("Save changes? (y/N) ")))
{
if (cpr_enabled ()
|| cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.cancel.okay",
_("Quit without saving? (y/N) ")))
goto leave;
break;
}
- /* fall thru */
+ /* fall through */
case cmdSAVE:
if (modified)
{
err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
break;
}
}
if (sec_shadowing)
{
err = agent_scd_learn (NULL, 1);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
break;
}
}
if (!modified && !sec_shadowing)
tty_printf (_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n"));
if (update_trust)
{
revalidation_mark ();
update_trust = 0;
}
goto leave;
case cmdINVCMD:
default:
tty_printf ("\n");
tty_printf (_("Invalid command (try \"help\")\n"));
break;
}
} /* End of the main command loop. */
leave:
release_kbnode (keyblock);
keydb_release (kdbhd);
xfree (answer);
}
/* Change the passphrase of the secret key identified by USERNAME. */
void
keyedit_passwd (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username)
{
gpg_error_t err;
PKT_public_key *pk;
kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
pk = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pk);
if (!pk)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
err = getkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, pk, username, 1, &keyblock);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = change_passphrase (ctrl, keyblock);
leave:
release_kbnode (keyblock);
free_public_key (pk);
if (err)
{
log_info ("error changing the passphrase for '%s': %s\n",
username, gpg_strerror (err));
write_status_error ("keyedit.passwd", err);
}
else
write_status_text (STATUS_SUCCESS, "keyedit.passwd");
}
/* Unattended adding of a new keyid. USERNAME specifies the
key. NEWUID is the new user id to add to the key. */
void
keyedit_quick_adduid (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, const char *newuid)
{
gpg_error_t err;
KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
kbnode_t node;
char *uidstring = NULL;
uidstring = xstrdup (newuid);
trim_spaces (uidstring);
if (!*uidstring)
{
log_error ("%s\n", gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_INV_USER_ID));
goto leave;
}
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
/* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */
check_trustdb_stale (ctrl);
#endif
/* Search the key; we don't want the whole getkey stuff here. */
kdbhd = keydb_new ();
if (!kdbhd)
{
/* Note that keydb_new has already used log_error. */
goto leave;
}
err = classify_user_id (username, &desc, 1);
if (!err)
err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL);
if (!err)
{
err = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Now with the keyblock retrieved, search again to detect an
ambiguous specification. We need to save the found state so
that we can do an update later. */
keydb_push_found_state (kdbhd);
err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL);
if (!err)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_AMBIGUOUS_NAME);
else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
err = 0;
keydb_pop_found_state (kdbhd);
if (!err)
{
/* We require the secret primary key to add a UID. */
node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
if (!node)
BUG ();
err = agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, node->pkt->pkt.public_key);
}
}
if (err)
{
log_error (_("secret key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),
username, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
fix_keyblock (&keyblock);
if (menu_adduid (ctrl, keyblock, 0, NULL, uidstring))
{
err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (update_trust)
revalidation_mark ();
}
leave:
xfree (uidstring);
release_kbnode (keyblock);
keydb_release (kdbhd);
}
/* Unattended revokation of a keyid. USERNAME specifies the
key. UIDTOREV is the user id revoke from the key. */
void
keyedit_quick_revuid (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, const char *uidtorev)
{
gpg_error_t err;
KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
kbnode_t node;
int modified = 0;
size_t revlen;
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
/* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */
check_trustdb_stale (ctrl);
#endif
/* Search the key; we don't want the whole getkey stuff here. */
kdbhd = keydb_new ();
if (!kdbhd)
{
/* Note that keydb_new has already used log_error. */
goto leave;
}
err = classify_user_id (username, &desc, 1);
if (!err)
err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL);
if (!err)
{
err = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Now with the keyblock retrieved, search again to detect an
ambiguous specification. We need to save the found state so
that we can do an update later. */
keydb_push_found_state (kdbhd);
err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL);
if (!err)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_AMBIGUOUS_NAME);
else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
err = 0;
keydb_pop_found_state (kdbhd);
if (!err)
{
/* We require the secret primary key to revoke a UID. */
node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
if (!node)
BUG ();
err = agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, node->pkt->pkt.public_key);
}
}
if (err)
{
log_error (_("secret key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),
username, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
fix_keyblock (&keyblock);
setup_main_keyids (keyblock);
revlen = strlen (uidtorev);
/* find the right UID */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& revlen == node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len
&& !memcmp (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, uidtorev, revlen))
{
struct revocation_reason_info *reason;
reason = get_default_uid_revocation_reason ();
err = core_revuid (ctrl, keyblock, node, reason, &modified);
release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("User ID revocation failed: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (update_trust)
revalidation_mark ();
goto leave;
}
}
leave:
release_kbnode (keyblock);
keydb_release (kdbhd);
}
/* Find a keyblock by fingerprint because only this uniquely
* identifies a key and may thus be used to select a key for
* unattended subkey creation os key signing. */
static gpg_error_t
find_by_primary_fpr (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fpr,
kbnode_t *r_keyblock, KEYDB_HANDLE *r_kdbhd)
{
gpg_error_t err;
kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
byte fprbin[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t fprlen;
*r_keyblock = NULL;
*r_kdbhd = NULL;
if (classify_user_id (fpr, &desc, 1)
|| !(desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
|| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
|| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20))
{
log_error (_("\"%s\" is not a fingerprint\n"), fpr);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME);
goto leave;
}
err = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, NULL, fpr, &keyblock, &kdbhd, 1, 1);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), fpr, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Check that the primary fingerprint has been given. */
fingerprint_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, fprbin, &fprlen);
if (fprlen == 16 && desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
&& !memcmp (fprbin, desc.u.fpr, 16))
;
else if (fprlen == 16 && desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
&& !memcmp (fprbin, desc.u.fpr, 16)
&& !desc.u.fpr[16]
&& !desc.u.fpr[17]
&& !desc.u.fpr[18]
&& !desc.u.fpr[19])
;
else if (fprlen == 20 && (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20
|| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR)
&& !memcmp (fprbin, desc.u.fpr, 20))
;
else
{
log_error (_("\"%s\" is not the primary fingerprint\n"), fpr);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME);
goto leave;
}
*r_keyblock = keyblock;
keyblock = NULL;
*r_kdbhd = kdbhd;
kdbhd = NULL;
err = 0;
leave:
release_kbnode (keyblock);
keydb_release (kdbhd);
return err;
}
/* Unattended key signing function. If the key specifified by FPR is
available and FPR is the primary fingerprint all user ids of the
key are signed using the default signing key. If UIDS is an empty
list all usable UIDs are signed, if it is not empty, only those
user ids matching one of the entries of the list are signed. With
LOCAL being true the signatures are marked as non-exportable. */
void
keyedit_quick_sign (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fpr, strlist_t uids,
strlist_t locusr, int local)
{
gpg_error_t err;
kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
int modified = 0;
PKT_public_key *pk;
kbnode_t node;
strlist_t sl;
int any;
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
/* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */
check_trustdb_stale (ctrl);
#endif
/* We require a fingerprint because only this uniquely identifies a
key and may thus be used to select a key for unattended key
signing. */
if (find_by_primary_fpr (ctrl, fpr, &keyblock, &kdbhd))
goto leave;
if (fix_keyblock (&keyblock))
modified++;
/* Give some info in verbose. */
if (opt.verbose)
{
show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0,
1/*with_revoker*/, 1/*with_fingerprint*/,
0, 0, 1);
es_fflush (es_stdout);
}
pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (pk->flags.revoked)
{
if (!opt.verbose)
show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1);
log_error ("%s%s", _("Key is revoked."), _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
goto leave;
}
/* Set the flags according to the UIDS list. Fixme: We may want to
use classify_user_id along with dedicated compare functions so
that we match the same way as in the key lookup. */
any = 0;
menu_select_uid (keyblock, 0); /* Better clear the flags first. */
for (sl=uids; sl; sl = sl->next)
{
const char *name = sl->d;
int count = 0;
sl->flags &= ~(1|2); /* Clear flags used for error reporting. */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if (uid->attrib_data)
;
else if (*name == '='
&& strlen (name+1) == uid->len
&& !memcmp (uid->name, name + 1, uid->len))
{ /* Exact match - we don't do a check for ambiguity
* in this case. */
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID;
if (any != -1)
{
sl->flags |= 1; /* Report as found. */
any = 1;
}
}
else if (ascii_memistr (uid->name, uid->len,
*name == '*'? name+1:name))
{
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID;
if (any != -1)
{
sl->flags |= 1; /* Report as found. */
any = 1;
}
count++;
}
}
}
if (count > 1)
{
any = -1; /* Force failure at end. */
sl->flags |= 2; /* Report as ambiguous. */
}
}
/* Check whether all given user ids were found. */
for (sl=uids; sl; sl = sl->next)
if (!(sl->flags & 1))
any = -1; /* That user id was not found. */
/* Print an error if there was a problem with the user ids. */
if (uids && any < 1)
{
if (!opt.verbose)
show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1);
es_fflush (es_stdout);
for (sl=uids; sl; sl = sl->next)
{
if ((sl->flags & 2))
log_info (_("Invalid user ID '%s': %s\n"),
sl->d, gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_AMBIGUOUS_NAME));
else if (!(sl->flags & 1))
log_info (_("Invalid user ID '%s': %s\n"),
sl->d, gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND));
}
log_error ("%s %s", _("No matching user IDs."), _("Nothing to sign.\n"));
goto leave;
}
/* Sign. */
sign_uids (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, locusr, &modified, local, 0, 0, 0, 1);
es_fflush (es_stdout);
if (modified)
{
err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
}
else
log_info (_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n"));
if (update_trust)
revalidation_mark ();
leave:
release_kbnode (keyblock);
keydb_release (kdbhd);
}
/* Unattended subkey creation function.
*
*/
void
keyedit_quick_addkey (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fpr, const char *algostr,
const char *usagestr, const char *expirestr)
{
gpg_error_t err;
kbnode_t keyblock;
KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd;
int modified = 0;
PKT_public_key *pk;
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
/* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */
check_trustdb_stale (ctrl);
#endif
/* We require a fingerprint because only this uniquely identifies a
* key and may thus be used to select a key for unattended subkey
* creation. */
if (find_by_primary_fpr (ctrl, fpr, &keyblock, &kdbhd))
goto leave;
if (fix_keyblock (&keyblock))
modified++;
pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (pk->flags.revoked)
{
if (!opt.verbose)
show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1);
log_error ("%s%s", _("Key is revoked."), "\n");
goto leave;
}
/* Create the subkey. Note that the called function already prints
* an error message. */
if (!generate_subkeypair (ctrl, keyblock, algostr, usagestr, expirestr))
modified = 1;
es_fflush (es_stdout);
/* Store. */
if (modified)
{
err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
}
else
log_info (_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n"));
leave:
release_kbnode (keyblock);
keydb_release (kdbhd);
}
static void
tty_print_notations (int indent, PKT_signature * sig)
{
int first = 1;
struct notation *notation, *nd;
if (indent < 0)
{
first = 0;
indent = -indent;
}
notation = sig_to_notation (sig);
for (nd = notation; nd; nd = nd->next)
{
if (!first)
tty_printf ("%*s", indent, "");
else
first = 0;
tty_print_utf8_string (nd->name, strlen (nd->name));
tty_printf ("=");
tty_print_utf8_string (nd->value, strlen (nd->value));
tty_printf ("\n");
}
free_notation (notation);
}
/*
* Show preferences of a public keyblock.
*/
static void
show_prefs (PKT_user_id * uid, PKT_signature * selfsig, int verbose)
{
const prefitem_t fake = { 0, 0 };
const prefitem_t *prefs;
int i;
if (!uid)
return;
if (uid->prefs)
prefs = uid->prefs;
else if (verbose)
prefs = &fake;
else
return;
if (verbose)
{
int any, des_seen = 0, sha1_seen = 0, uncomp_seen = 0;
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (_("Cipher: "));
for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
{
if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM)
{
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
any = 1;
/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (prefs[i].value)
&& prefs[i].value < 100)
tty_printf ("%s", openpgp_cipher_algo_name (prefs[i].value));
else
tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
if (prefs[i].value == CIPHER_ALGO_3DES)
des_seen = 1;
}
}
if (!des_seen)
{
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
tty_printf ("%s", openpgp_cipher_algo_name (CIPHER_ALGO_3DES));
}
tty_printf ("\n ");
tty_printf (_("Digest: "));
for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
{
if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH)
{
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
any = 1;
/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
if (!gcry_md_test_algo (prefs[i].value) && prefs[i].value < 100)
tty_printf ("%s", gcry_md_algo_name (prefs[i].value));
else
tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
if (prefs[i].value == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1)
sha1_seen = 1;
}
}
if (!sha1_seen)
{
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
tty_printf ("%s", gcry_md_algo_name (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1));
}
tty_printf ("\n ");
tty_printf (_("Compression: "));
for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
{
if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP)
{
const char *s = compress_algo_to_string (prefs[i].value);
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
any = 1;
/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
if (s && prefs[i].value < 100)
tty_printf ("%s", s);
else
tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
if (prefs[i].value == COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE)
uncomp_seen = 1;
}
}
if (!uncomp_seen)
{
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
else
{
tty_printf ("%s", compress_algo_to_string (COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP));
tty_printf (", ");
}
tty_printf ("%s", compress_algo_to_string (COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE));
}
if (uid->flags.mdc || !uid->flags.ks_modify)
{
tty_printf ("\n ");
tty_printf (_("Features: "));
any = 0;
if (uid->flags.mdc)
{
tty_printf ("MDC");
any = 1;
}
if (!uid->flags.ks_modify)
{
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
tty_printf (_("Keyserver no-modify"));
}
}
tty_printf ("\n");
if (selfsig)
{
const byte *pref_ks;
size_t pref_ks_len;
pref_ks = parse_sig_subpkt (selfsig->hashed,
SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, &pref_ks_len);
if (pref_ks && pref_ks_len)
{
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (_("Preferred keyserver: "));
tty_print_utf8_string (pref_ks, pref_ks_len);
tty_printf ("\n");
}
if (selfsig->flags.notation)
{
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (_("Notations: "));
tty_print_notations (5 + strlen (_("Notations: ")), selfsig);
}
}
}
else
{
tty_printf (" ");
for (i = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
{
tty_printf (" %c%d", prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ? 'S' :
prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ? 'H' :
prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z' : '?',
prefs[i].value);
}
if (uid->flags.mdc)
tty_printf (" [mdc]");
if (!uid->flags.ks_modify)
tty_printf (" [no-ks-modify]");
tty_printf ("\n");
}
}
/* This is the version of show_key_with_all_names used when
opt.with_colons is used. It prints all available data in a easy to
parse format and does not translate utf8 */
static void
show_key_with_all_names_colon (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp, kbnode_t keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
int i, j, ulti_hack = 0;
byte pk_version = 0;
PKT_public_key *primary = NULL;
int have_seckey;
if (!fp)
fp = es_stdout;
/* the keys */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY))
{
PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
u32 keyid[2];
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
pk_version = pk->version;
primary = pk;
}
keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
have_seckey = !agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, pk);
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
es_fputs (have_seckey? "sec:" : "pub:", fp);
else
es_fputs (have_seckey? "ssb:" : "sub:", fp);
if (!pk->flags.valid)
es_putc ('i', fp);
else if (pk->flags.revoked)
es_putc ('r', fp);
else if (pk->has_expired)
es_putc ('e', fp);
else if (!(opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks))
{
int trust = get_validity_info (ctrl, pk, NULL);
if (trust == 'u')
ulti_hack = 1;
es_putc (trust, fp);
}
es_fprintf (fp, ":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%lu:%lu::",
nbits_from_pk (pk),
pk->pubkey_algo,
(ulong) keyid[0], (ulong) keyid[1],
(ulong) pk->timestamp, (ulong) pk->expiredate);
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
&& !(opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks))
es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (pk), fp);
es_putc (':', fp);
es_putc (':', fp);
es_putc (':', fp);
/* Print capabilities. */
if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC))
es_putc ('e', fp);
if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG))
es_putc ('s', fp);
if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT))
es_putc ('c', fp);
if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH))
es_putc ('a', fp);
es_putc ('\n', fp);
print_fingerprint (fp, pk, 0);
print_revokers (fp, pk);
}
}
/* the user ids */
i = 0;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
++i;
if (uid->attrib_data)
es_fputs ("uat:", fp);
else
es_fputs ("uid:", fp);
if (uid->is_revoked)
es_fputs ("r::::::::", fp);
else if (uid->is_expired)
es_fputs ("e::::::::", fp);
else if (opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks)
es_fputs ("::::::::", fp);
else
{
int uid_validity;
if (primary && !ulti_hack)
uid_validity = get_validity_info (ctrl, primary, uid);
else
uid_validity = 'u';
es_fprintf (fp, "%c::::::::", uid_validity);
}
if (uid->attrib_data)
es_fprintf (fp, "%u %lu", uid->numattribs, uid->attrib_len);
else
es_write_sanitized (fp, uid->name, uid->len, ":", NULL);
es_putc (':', fp);
/* signature class */
es_putc (':', fp);
/* capabilities */
es_putc (':', fp);
/* preferences */
if (pk_version > 3 || uid->selfsigversion > 3)
{
const prefitem_t *prefs = uid->prefs;
for (j = 0; prefs && prefs[j].type; j++)
{
if (j)
es_putc (' ', fp);
es_fprintf (fp,
"%c%d", prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ? 'S' :
prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ? 'H' :
prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z' : '?',
prefs[j].value);
}
if (uid->flags.mdc)
es_fputs (",mdc", fp);
if (!uid->flags.ks_modify)
es_fputs (",no-ks-modify", fp);
}
es_putc (':', fp);
/* flags */
es_fprintf (fp, "%d,", i);
if (uid->is_primary)
es_putc ('p', fp);
if (uid->is_revoked)
es_putc ('r', fp);
if (uid->is_expired)
es_putc ('e', fp);
if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
es_putc ('s', fp);
if ((node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A))
es_putc ('m', fp);
es_putc (':', fp);
if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
{
#ifdef USE_TOFU
enum tofu_policy policy;
if (! tofu_get_policy (ctrl, primary, uid, &policy)
&& policy != TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
es_fprintf (fp, "%s", tofu_policy_str (policy));
#endif /*USE_TOFU*/
}
es_putc (':', fp);
es_putc ('\n', fp);
}
}
}
static void
show_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
kbnode_t keyblock, PKT_public_key * pk, unsigned int flag,
int with_prefs)
{
KBNODE node;
int i = 0;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !is_deleted_kbnode (node))
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
++i;
if (!flag || (flag && (node->flag & flag)))
{
if (!(flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) && pk)
tty_fprintf (fp, "%s ", uid_trust_string_fixed (ctrl, pk, uid));
if (flag & NODFLG_MARK_A)
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
else if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)
tty_fprintf (fp, "(%d)* ", i);
else if (uid->is_primary)
tty_fprintf (fp, "(%d). ", i);
else
tty_fprintf (fp, "(%d) ", i);
tty_print_utf8_string2 (fp, uid->name, uid->len, 0);
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
if (with_prefs && pk)
{
if (pk->version > 3 || uid->selfsigversion > 3)
{
PKT_signature *selfsig = NULL;
KBNODE signode;
for (signode = node->next;
signode && signode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE;
signode = signode->next)
{
if (signode->pkt->pkt.signature->
flags.chosen_selfsig)
{
selfsig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
break;
}
}
show_prefs (uid, selfsig, with_prefs == 2);
}
else
tty_fprintf (fp, _("There are no preferences on a"
" PGP 2.x-style user ID.\n"));
}
}
}
}
}
/*
* Display the key a the user ids, if only_marked is true, do only so
* for user ids with mark A flag set and do not display the index
* number. If FP is not NULL print to the given stream and not to the
* tty (ignored in with-colons mode).
*/
static void
show_key_with_all_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked, int with_revoker,
int with_fpr, int with_subkeys, int with_prefs,
int nowarn)
{
gpg_error_t err;
kbnode_t node;
int i;
int do_warn = 0;
int have_seckey = 0;
char *serialno = NULL;
PKT_public_key *primary = NULL;
char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
if (opt.with_colons)
{
show_key_with_all_names_colon (ctrl, fp, keyblock);
return;
}
/* the keys */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| (with_subkeys && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& !is_deleted_kbnode (node)))
{
PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
const char *otrust = "err";
const char *trust = "err";
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
/* do it here, so that debug messages don't clutter the
* output */
static int did_warn = 0;
trust = get_validity_string (ctrl, pk, NULL);
otrust = get_ownertrust_string (pk);
/* Show a warning once */
if (!did_warn
&& (get_validity (ctrl, pk, NULL, NULL, 0)
& TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK))
{
did_warn = 1;
do_warn = 1;
}
primary = pk;
}
if (pk->flags.revoked)
{
char *user = get_user_id_string_native (pk->revoked.keyid);
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("The following key was revoked on"
" %s by %s key %s\n"),
revokestr_from_pk (pk),
gcry_pk_algo_name (pk->revoked.algo), user);
xfree (user);
}
if (with_revoker)
{
if (!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys)
BUG ();
else
for (i = 0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++)
{
u32 r_keyid[2];
char *user;
const char *algo;
algo = gcry_pk_algo_name (pk->revkey[i].algid);
keyid_from_fingerprint (pk->revkey[i].fpr,
MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN, r_keyid);
user = get_user_id_string_native (r_keyid);
tty_fprintf (fp,
_("This key may be revoked by %s key %s"),
algo ? algo : "?", user);
if (pk->revkey[i].class & 0x40)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("(sensitive)"));
}
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
xfree (user);
}
}
keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL);
xfree (serialno);
serialno = NULL;
{
char *hexgrip;
err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
have_seckey = 0;
}
else
have_seckey = !agent_get_keyinfo (ctrl, hexgrip, &serialno, NULL);
xfree (hexgrip);
}
tty_fprintf
(fp, "%s%c %s/%s",
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY && have_seckey? "sec" :
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "pub" :
have_seckey ? "ssb" :
"sub",
(node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY) ? '*' : ' ',
pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
keystr (pk->keyid));
if (opt.legacy_list_mode)
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
else
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n ");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("created: %s"), datestr_from_pk (pk));
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
if (pk->flags.revoked)
tty_fprintf (fp, _("revoked: %s"), revokestr_from_pk (pk));
else if (pk->has_expired)
tty_fprintf (fp, _("expired: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
else
tty_fprintf (fp, _("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("usage: %s"), usagestr_from_pk (pk, 1));
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
if (serialno)
{
/* The agent told us that a secret key is available and
that it has been stored on a card. */
tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s%s", opt.legacy_list_mode? 21:5, "",
_("card-no: "));
if (strlen (serialno) == 32
&& !strncmp (serialno, "D27600012401", 12))
{
/* This is an OpenPGP card. Print the relevant part. */
/* Example: D2760001240101010001000003470000 */
/* xxxxyyyyyyyy */
tty_fprintf (fp, "%.*s %.*s\n",
4, serialno+16, 8, serialno+20);
}
else
tty_fprintf (fp, "%s\n", serialno);
}
else if (pk->seckey_info
&& pk->seckey_info->is_protected
&& pk->seckey_info->s2k.mode == 1002)
{
/* FIXME: Check wether this code path is still used. */
tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s%s", opt.legacy_list_mode? 21:5, "",
_("card-no: "));
if (pk->seckey_info->ivlen == 16
&& !memcmp (pk->seckey_info->iv,
"\xD2\x76\x00\x01\x24\x01", 6))
{
/* This is an OpenPGP card. */
for (i = 8; i < 14; i++)
{
if (i == 10)
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
tty_fprintf (fp, "%02X", pk->seckey_info->iv[i]);
}
}
else
{
/* Unknown card: Print all. */
for (i = 0; i < pk->seckey_info->ivlen; i++)
tty_fprintf (fp, "%02X", pk->seckey_info->iv[i]);
}
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
}
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
{
if (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s",
opt.legacy_list_mode?
((int) keystrlen () + 13):5, "");
/* Ownertrust is only meaningful for the PGP or
classic trust models, or PGP combined with TOFU */
if (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP
|| opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC
|| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
{
int width = 14 - strlen (otrust);
if (width <= 0)
width = 1;
tty_fprintf (fp, _("trust: %s"), otrust);
tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s", width, "");
}
tty_fprintf (fp, _("validity: %s"), trust);
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
}
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
&& (get_ownertrust (pk) & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "*** ");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key has been disabled"));
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
}
}
if ((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) && with_fpr)
{
print_fingerprint (fp, pk, 2);
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
}
}
}
show_names (ctrl, fp,
keyblock, primary, only_marked ? NODFLG_MARK_A : 0, with_prefs);
if (do_warn && !nowarn)
tty_fprintf (fp, _("Please note that the shown key validity"
" is not necessarily correct\n"
"unless you restart the program.\n"));
xfree (serialno);
}
/* Display basic key information. This function is suitable to show
information on the key without any dependencies on the trustdb or
any other internal GnuPG stuff. KEYBLOCK may either be a public or
a secret key. This function may be called with KEYBLOCK containing
secret keys and thus the printing of "pub" vs. "sec" does only
depend on the packet type and not by checking with gpg-agent. */
void
show_basic_key_info (KBNODE keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
int i;
char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
/* The primary key */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
{
PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
/* Note, we use the same format string as in other show
functions to make the translation job easier. */
tty_printf ("%s %s/%s ",
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "pub" :
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ? "sub" :
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ? "sec" :"ssb",
pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
keystr_from_pk (pk));
tty_printf (_("created: %s"), datestr_from_pk (pk));
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (_("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
tty_printf ("\n");
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 3);
tty_printf ("\n");
}
}
/* The user IDs. */
for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
++i;
tty_printf (" ");
if (uid->is_revoked)
tty_printf ("[%s] ", _("revoked"));
else if (uid->is_expired)
tty_printf ("[%s] ", _("expired"));
tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
tty_printf ("\n");
}
}
}
static void
show_key_and_fingerprint (kbnode_t keyblock, int with_subkeys)
{
kbnode_t node;
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
tty_printf ("pub %s/%s %s ",
pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
keystr_from_pk(pk),
datestr_from_pk (pk));
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
break;
}
}
tty_printf ("\n");
if (pk)
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 2);
if (with_subkeys)
{
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
tty_printf ("sub %s/%s %s [%s]\n",
pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
keystr_from_pk(pk),
datestr_from_pk (pk),
usagestr_from_pk (pk, 0));
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 4);
}
}
}
}
/* Show a listing of the primary and its subkeys along with their
keygrips. */
static void
show_key_and_grip (kbnode_t keyblock)
{
kbnode_t node;
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
char *hexgrip;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
tty_printf ("%s %s/%s %s [%s]\n",
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY? "pub":"sub",
pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
keystr_from_pk(pk),
datestr_from_pk (pk),
usagestr_from_pk (pk, 0));
if (!hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip))
{
tty_printf (" Keygrip: %s\n", hexgrip);
xfree (hexgrip);
}
}
}
}
/* Show a warning if no uids on the key have the primary uid flag
set. */
static void
no_primary_warning (KBNODE keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
int have_primary = 0, uid_count = 0;
/* TODO: if we ever start behaving differently with a primary or
non-primary attribute ID, we will need to check for attributes
here as well. */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data == NULL)
{
uid_count++;
if (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary == 2)
{
have_primary = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (uid_count > 1 && !have_primary)
log_info (_
("WARNING: no user ID has been marked as primary. This command"
" may\n cause a different user ID to become"
" the assumed primary.\n"));
}
/* Print a warning if the latest encryption subkey expires soon. This
function is called after the expire data of the primary key has
been changed. */
static void
subkey_expire_warning (kbnode_t keyblock)
{
u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
kbnode_t node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
/* u32 mainexpire = 0; */
u32 subexpire = 0;
u32 latest_date = 0;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
/* if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) */
/* { */
/* pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; */
/* mainexpire = pk->expiredate; */
/* } */
if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
continue;
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (!pk->flags.valid)
continue;
if (pk->flags.revoked)
continue;
if (pk->timestamp > curtime)
continue; /* Ignore future keys. */
if (!(pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC))
continue; /* Not an encryption key. */
if (pk->timestamp > latest_date || (!pk->timestamp && !latest_date))
{
latest_date = pk->timestamp;
subexpire = pk->expiredate;
}
}
if (!subexpire)
return; /* No valid subkey with an expiration time. */
if (curtime + (10*86400) > subexpire)
{
log_info (_("WARNING: Your encryption subkey expires soon.\n"));
log_info (_("You may want to change its expiration date too.\n"));
}
}
/*
* Ask for a new user id, add the self-signature, and update the
* keyblock. If UIDSTRING is not NULL the user ID is generated
* unattended using that string. UIDSTRING is expected to be utf-8
* encoded and white space trimmed. Returns true if there is a new
* user id.
*/
static int
menu_adduid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock,
int photo, const char *photo_name, const char *uidstring)
{
PKT_user_id *uid;
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
PKT_signature *sig = NULL;
PACKET *pkt;
KBNODE node;
KBNODE pub_where = NULL;
gpg_error_t err;
if (photo && uidstring)
return 0; /* Not allowed. */
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; pub_where = node, node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
break;
}
if (!node) /* No subkey. */
pub_where = NULL;
log_assert (pk);
if (photo)
{
int hasattrib = 0;
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data != NULL)
{
hasattrib = 1;
break;
}
/* It is legal but bad for compatibility to add a photo ID to a
v3 key as it means that PGP2 will not be able to use that key
anymore. Also, PGP may not expect a photo on a v3 key.
Don't bother to ask this if the key already has a photo - any
damage has already been done at that point. -dms */
if (pk->version == 3 && !hasattrib)
{
if (opt.expert)
{
tty_printf (_("WARNING: This is a PGP2-style key. "
"Adding a photo ID may cause some versions\n"
" of PGP to reject this key.\n"));
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.v3_photo.okay",
_("Are you sure you still want "
"to add it? (y/N) ")))
return 0;
}
else
{
tty_printf (_("You may not add a photo ID to "
"a PGP2-style key.\n"));
return 0;
}
}
uid = generate_photo_id (ctrl, pk, photo_name);
}
else
uid = generate_user_id (pub_keyblock, uidstring);
if (!uid)
{
if (uidstring)
{
write_status_error ("adduid", gpg_error (304));
log_error ("%s", _("Such a user ID already exists on this key!\n"));
}
return 0;
}
err = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, uid, NULL, pk, 0x13, 0, 0, 0,
keygen_add_std_prefs, pk, NULL);
if (err)
{
write_status_error ("keysig", err);
log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
free_user_id (uid);
return 0;
}
/* Insert/append to public keyblock */
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_USER_ID;
pkt->pkt.user_id = uid;
node = new_kbnode (pkt);
if (pub_where)
insert_kbnode (pub_where, node, 0);
else
add_kbnode (pub_keyblock, node);
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = copy_signature (NULL, sig);
if (pub_where)
insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
else
add_kbnode (pub_keyblock, new_kbnode (pkt));
return 1;
}
/*
* Remove all selected userids from the keyring
*/
static void
menu_deluid (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
int selected = 0;
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID;
if (selected)
{
/* Only cause a trust update if we delete a
non-revoked user id */
if (!node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
update_trust = 1;
delete_kbnode (node);
}
}
else if (selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
delete_kbnode (node);
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
selected = 0;
}
commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
}
static int
menu_delsig (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
PKT_user_id *uid = NULL;
int changed = 0;
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
uid = (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) ? node->pkt->pkt.user_id : NULL;
}
else if (uid && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
int okay, valid, selfsig, inv_sig, no_key, other_err;
tty_printf ("uid ");
tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
tty_printf ("\n");
okay = inv_sig = no_key = other_err = 0;
if (opt.with_colons)
valid = print_and_check_one_sig_colon (pub_keyblock, node,
&inv_sig, &no_key,
&other_err, &selfsig, 1);
else
valid = print_and_check_one_sig (pub_keyblock, node,
&inv_sig, &no_key, &other_err,
&selfsig, 1, 0);
if (valid)
{
okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit
("keyedit.delsig.valid",
_("Delete this good signature? (y/N/q)"));
/* Only update trust if we delete a good signature.
The other two cases do not affect trust. */
if (okay)
update_trust = 1;
}
else if (inv_sig || other_err)
okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit
("keyedit.delsig.invalid",
_("Delete this invalid signature? (y/N/q)"));
else if (no_key)
okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit
("keyedit.delsig.unknown",
_("Delete this unknown signature? (y/N/q)"));
if (okay == -1)
break;
if (okay && selfsig
&& !cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.delsig.selfsig",
_("Really delete this self-signature? (y/N)")))
okay = 0;
if (okay)
{
delete_kbnode (node);
changed++;
}
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
uid = NULL;
}
if (changed)
{
commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
tty_printf (ngettext("Deleted %d signature.\n",
"Deleted %d signatures.\n", changed), changed);
}
else
tty_printf (_("Nothing deleted.\n"));
return changed;
}
static int
menu_clean (KBNODE keyblock, int self_only)
{
KBNODE uidnode;
int modified = 0, select_all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock);
for (uidnode = keyblock->next;
uidnode && uidnode->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
uidnode = uidnode->next)
{
if (uidnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& (uidnode->flag & NODFLG_SELUID || select_all))
{
int uids = 0, sigs = 0;
char *user = utf8_to_native (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,
0);
clean_one_uid (keyblock, uidnode, opt.verbose, self_only, &uids,
&sigs);
if (uids)
{
const char *reason;
if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
reason = _("revoked");
else if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
reason = _("expired");
else
reason = _("invalid");
tty_printf (_("User ID \"%s\" compacted: %s\n"), user, reason);
modified = 1;
}
else if (sigs)
{
tty_printf (ngettext("User ID \"%s\": %d signature removed\n",
"User ID \"%s\": %d signatures removed\n",
sigs), user, sigs);
modified = 1;
}
else
{
tty_printf (self_only == 1 ?
_("User ID \"%s\": already minimized\n") :
_("User ID \"%s\": already clean\n"), user);
}
xfree (user);
}
}
return modified;
}
/*
* Remove some of the secondary keys
*/
static void
menu_delkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
int selected = 0;
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY;
if (selected)
delete_kbnode (node);
}
else if (selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
delete_kbnode (node);
else
selected = 0;
}
commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
/* No need to set update_trust here since signing keys are no
longer used to certify other keys, so there is no change in
trust when revoking/removing them. */
}
/*
* Ask for a new revoker, create the self-signature and put it into
* the keyblock. Returns true if there is a new revoker.
*/
static int
menu_addrevoker (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int sensitive)
{
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
PKT_public_key *revoker_pk = NULL;
PKT_signature *sig = NULL;
PACKET *pkt;
struct revocation_key revkey;
size_t fprlen;
int rc;
log_assert (pub_keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (pk->numrevkeys == 0 && pk->version == 3)
{
/* It is legal but bad for compatibility to add a revoker to a
v3 key as it means that PGP2 will not be able to use that key
anymore. Also, PGP may not expect a revoker on a v3 key.
Don't bother to ask this if the key already has a revoker -
any damage has already been done at that point. -dms */
if (opt.expert)
{
tty_printf (_("WARNING: This is a PGP 2.x-style key. "
"Adding a designated revoker may cause\n"
" some versions of PGP to reject this key.\n"));
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.v3_revoker.okay",
_("Are you sure you still want "
"to add it? (y/N) ")))
return 0;
}
else
{
tty_printf (_("You may not add a designated revoker to "
"a PGP 2.x-style key.\n"));
return 0;
}
}
for (;;)
{
char *answer;
free_public_key (revoker_pk);
revoker_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*revoker_pk));
tty_printf ("\n");
answer = cpr_get_utf8
("keyedit.add_revoker",
_("Enter the user ID of the designated revoker: "));
if (answer[0] == '\0' || answer[0] == CONTROL_D)
{
xfree (answer);
goto fail;
}
/* Note that I'm requesting CERT here, which usually implies
primary keys only, but some casual testing shows that PGP and
GnuPG both can handle a designated revocation from a subkey. */
revoker_pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT;
rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, revoker_pk, answer, NULL, NULL, 1, 1);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), answer,
gpg_strerror (rc));
xfree (answer);
continue;
}
xfree (answer);
fingerprint_from_pk (revoker_pk, revkey.fpr, &fprlen);
if (fprlen != 20)
{
log_error (_("cannot appoint a PGP 2.x style key as a "
"designated revoker\n"));
continue;
}
revkey.class = 0x80;
if (sensitive)
revkey.class |= 0x40;
revkey.algid = revoker_pk->pubkey_algo;
if (cmp_public_keys (revoker_pk, pk) == 0)
{
/* This actually causes no harm (after all, a key that
designates itself as a revoker is the same as a
regular key), but it's easy enough to check. */
log_error (_("you cannot appoint a key as its own "
"designated revoker\n"));
continue;
}
keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL);
/* Does this revkey already exist? */
if (!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys)
BUG ();
else
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++)
{
if (memcmp (&pk->revkey[i], &revkey,
sizeof (struct revocation_key)) == 0)
{
char buf[50];
log_error (_("this key has already been designated "
"as a revoker\n"));
format_keyid (pk_keyid (pk), KF_LONG, buf, sizeof (buf));
write_status_text (STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED, buf);
break;
}
}
if (i < pk->numrevkeys)
continue;
}
print_pubkey_info (NULL, revoker_pk);
print_fingerprint (NULL, revoker_pk, 2);
tty_printf ("\n");
tty_printf (_("WARNING: appointing a key as a designated revoker "
"cannot be undone!\n"));
tty_printf ("\n");
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.add_revoker.okay",
_("Are you sure you want to appoint this "
"key as a designated revoker? (y/N) ")))
continue;
free_public_key (revoker_pk);
revoker_pk = NULL;
break;
}
rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk, 0x1F, 0, 0, 0,
keygen_add_revkey, &revkey, NULL);
if (rc)
{
write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
goto fail;
}
/* Insert into public keyblock. */
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
insert_kbnode (pub_keyblock, new_kbnode (pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE);
return 1;
fail:
if (sig)
free_seckey_enc (sig);
free_public_key (revoker_pk);
return 0;
}
static int
menu_expire (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
int n1, signumber, rc;
u32 expiredate;
int mainkey = 0;
PKT_public_key *main_pk, *sub_pk;
PKT_user_id *uid;
KBNODE node;
u32 keyid[2];
n1 = count_selected_keys (pub_keyblock);
if (n1 > 1)
{
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.expire_multiple_subkeys.okay",
_("Are you sure you want to change the"
" expiration time for multiple subkeys? (y/N) ")))
return 0;
}
else if (n1)
tty_printf (_("Changing expiration time for a subkey.\n"));
else
{
tty_printf (_("Changing expiration time for the primary key.\n"));
mainkey = 1;
no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);
}
expiredate = ask_expiredate ();
/* Now we can actually change the self-signature(s) */
main_pk = sub_pk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
signumber = 0;
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
main_pk->expiredate = expiredate;
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)
{
sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
sub_pk->expiredate = expiredate;
}
else
sub_pk = NULL;
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
else if (main_pk && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& (mainkey || sub_pk))
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& ((mainkey && uid
&& uid->created && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
|| (!mainkey && sig->sig_class == 0x18))
&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
{
/* This is a self-signature which is to be replaced. */
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
signumber++;
if ((mainkey && main_pk->version < 4)
|| (!mainkey && sub_pk->version < 4))
{
log_info
(_("You can't change the expiration date of a v3 key\n"));
return 0;
}
if (mainkey)
rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig, main_pk, uid, NULL,
main_pk, keygen_add_key_expire,
main_pk);
else
rc =
update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig, main_pk, NULL, sub_pk,
main_pk, keygen_add_key_expire, sub_pk);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
return 0;
}
/* Replace the packet. */
newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
free_packet (node->pkt);
xfree (node->pkt);
node->pkt = newpkt;
sub_pk = NULL;
}
}
}
update_trust = 1;
return 1;
}
/* Change the capability of a selected key. This command should only
* be used to rectify badly created keys and as such is not suggested
* for general use. */
static int
menu_changeusage (kbnode_t keyblock)
{
int n1, rc;
int mainkey = 0;
PKT_public_key *main_pk, *sub_pk;
PKT_user_id *uid;
kbnode_t node;
u32 keyid[2];
n1 = count_selected_keys (keyblock);
if (n1 > 1)
{
tty_printf (_("You must select exactly one key.\n"));
return 0;
}
else if (n1)
tty_printf ("Changing usage of a subkey.\n");
else
{
tty_printf ("Changing usage of the primary key.\n");
mainkey = 1;
}
/* Now we can actually change the self-signature(s) */
main_pk = sub_pk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)
sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
else
sub_pk = NULL;
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
else if (main_pk && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& (mainkey || sub_pk))
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& ((mainkey && uid
&& uid->created && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
|| (!mainkey && sig->sig_class == 0x18))
&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
{
/* This is the self-signature which is to be replaced. */
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
if ((mainkey && main_pk->version < 4)
|| (!mainkey && sub_pk->version < 4))
{
log_info ("You can't change the capabilities of a v3 key\n");
return 0;
}
if (mainkey)
main_pk->pubkey_usage = ask_key_flags (main_pk->pubkey_algo, 0,
main_pk->pubkey_usage);
else
sub_pk->pubkey_usage = ask_key_flags (sub_pk->pubkey_algo, 1,
sub_pk->pubkey_usage);
if (mainkey)
rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig, main_pk, uid, NULL,
main_pk, keygen_add_key_flags,
main_pk);
else
rc =
update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig, main_pk, NULL, sub_pk,
main_pk, keygen_add_key_flags, sub_pk);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
return 0;
}
/* Replace the packet. */
newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
free_packet (node->pkt);
xfree (node->pkt);
node->pkt = newpkt;
sub_pk = NULL;
break;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
static int
menu_backsign (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
int rc, modified = 0;
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
KBNODE node;
u32 timestamp;
log_assert (pub_keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
merge_keys_and_selfsig (pub_keyblock);
main_pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (main_pk, NULL);
/* We use the same timestamp for all backsigs so that we don't
reveal information about the used machine. */
timestamp = make_timestamp ();
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
PKT_public_key *sub_pk = NULL;
KBNODE node2, sig_pk = NULL /*,sig_sk = NULL*/;
/* char *passphrase; */
/* Find a signing subkey with no backsig */
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
if (node->pkt->pkt.public_key->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)
{
if (node->pkt->pkt.public_key->flags.backsig)
tty_printf (_
("signing subkey %s is already cross-certified\n"),
keystr_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key));
else
sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
}
else
tty_printf (_("subkey %s does not sign and so does"
" not need to be cross-certified\n"),
keystr_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key));
}
if (!sub_pk)
continue;
/* Find the selected selfsig on this subkey */
for (node2 = node->next;
node2 && node2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; node2 = node2->next)
if (node2->pkt->pkt.signature->version >= 4
&& node2->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig)
{
sig_pk = node2;
break;
}
if (!sig_pk)
continue;
/* Find the secret subkey that matches the public subkey */
log_debug ("FIXME: Check whether a secret subkey is available.\n");
/* if (!sub_sk) */
/* { */
/* tty_printf (_("no secret subkey for public subkey %s - ignoring\n"), */
/* keystr_from_pk (sub_pk)); */
/* continue; */
/* } */
/* Now we can get to work. */
rc = make_backsig (sig_pk->pkt->pkt.signature, main_pk, sub_pk, sub_pk,
timestamp, NULL);
if (!rc)
{
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig_pk->pkt->pkt.signature,
main_pk, NULL, sub_pk, main_pk,
NULL, NULL);
if (!rc)
{
/* Put the new sig into place on the pubkey */
newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*newpkt));
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
free_packet (sig_pk->pkt);
xfree (sig_pk->pkt);
sig_pk->pkt = newpkt;
modified = 1;
}
else
{
log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
break;
}
}
else
{
log_error ("make_backsig failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
break;
}
}
return modified;
}
static int
change_primary_uid_cb (PKT_signature * sig, void *opaque)
{
byte buf[1];
/* first clear all primary uid flags so that we are sure none are
* lingering around */
delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID);
delete_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID);
/* if opaque is set,we want to set the primary id */
if (opaque)
{
buf[0] = 1;
build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, buf, 1);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Set the primary uid flag for the selected UID. We will also reset
* all other primary uid flags. For this to work with have to update
* all the signature timestamps. If we would do this with the current
* time, we lose quite a lot of information, so we use a a kludge to
* do this: Just increment the timestamp by one second which is
* sufficient to updated a signature during import.
*/
static int
menu_set_primary_uid (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
PKT_user_id *uid;
KBNODE node;
u32 keyid[2];
int selected;
int attribute = 0;
int modified = 0;
if (count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock) != 1)
{
tty_printf (_("Please select exactly one user ID.\n"));
return 0;
}
main_pk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
selected = 0;
/* Is our selected uid an attribute packet? */
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)
attribute = (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data != NULL);
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
break; /* No more user ids expected - ready. */
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID;
}
else if (main_pk && uid && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
&& attribute == (uid->attrib_data != NULL)
&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
{
if (sig->version < 4)
{
char *user =
utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);
log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
user);
xfree (user);
}
else
{
/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced.
We can just ignore v3 signatures because they are
not able to carry the primary ID flag. We also
ignore self-sigs on user IDs that are not of the
same type that we are making primary. That is, if
we are making a user ID primary, we alter user IDs.
If we are making an attribute packet primary, we
alter attribute packets. */
/* FIXME: We must make sure that we only have one
self-signature per user ID here (not counting
revocations) */
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
const byte *p;
int action;
/* See whether this signature has the primary UID flag. */
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,
SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL);
if (!p)
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed,
SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL);
if (p && *p) /* yes */
action = selected ? 0 : -1;
else /* no */
action = selected ? 1 : 0;
if (action)
{
int rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
main_pk, uid, NULL,
main_pk,
change_primary_uid_cb,
action > 0 ? "x" : NULL);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
return 0;
}
/* replace the packet */
newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
free_packet (node->pkt);
xfree (node->pkt);
node->pkt = newpkt;
modified = 1;
}
}
}
}
}
return modified;
}
/*
* Set preferences to new values for the selected user IDs
*/
static int
menu_set_preferences (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
PKT_user_id *uid;
KBNODE node;
u32 keyid[2];
int selected, select_all;
int modified = 0;
no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);
select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);
/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
main_pk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
selected = 0;
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
break; /* No more user-ids expected - ready. */
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
selected = select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
}
else if (main_pk && uid && selected
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
{
if (sig->version < 4)
{
char *user =
utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);
log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
user);
xfree (user);
}
else
{
/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced
* We have to ignore v3 signatures because they are
* not able to carry the preferences. */
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
int rc;
rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
main_pk, uid, NULL, main_pk,
keygen_upd_std_prefs, NULL);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
return 0;
}
/* replace the packet */
newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
free_packet (node->pkt);
xfree (node->pkt);
node->pkt = newpkt;
modified = 1;
}
}
}
}
return modified;
}
static int
menu_set_keyserver_url (const char *url, KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
PKT_user_id *uid;
KBNODE node;
u32 keyid[2];
int selected, select_all;
int modified = 0;
char *answer, *uri;
no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);
if (url)
answer = xstrdup (url);
else
{
answer = cpr_get_utf8 ("keyedit.add_keyserver",
_("Enter your preferred keyserver URL: "));
if (answer[0] == '\0' || answer[0] == CONTROL_D)
{
xfree (answer);
return 0;
}
}
if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "none") == 0)
uri = NULL;
else
{
struct keyserver_spec *keyserver = NULL;
/* Sanity check the format */
keyserver = parse_keyserver_uri (answer, 1);
xfree (answer);
if (!keyserver)
{
log_info (_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
return 0;
}
uri = xstrdup (keyserver->uri);
free_keyserver_spec (keyserver);
}
select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);
/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
main_pk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
selected = 0;
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
break; /* ready */
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
selected = select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
}
else if (main_pk && uid && selected
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
{
char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);
if (sig->version < 4)
log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
user);
else
{
/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced
* We have to ignore v3 signatures because they are
* not able to carry the subpacket. */
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
int rc;
const byte *p;
size_t plen;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, &plen);
if (p && plen)
{
tty_printf ("Current preferred keyserver for user"
" ID \"%s\": ", user);
tty_print_utf8_string (p, plen);
tty_printf ("\n");
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("keyedit.confirm_keyserver",
uri
? _("Are you sure you want to replace it? (y/N) ")
: _("Are you sure you want to delete it? (y/N) ")))
continue;
}
else if (uri == NULL)
{
/* There is no current keyserver URL, so there
is no point in trying to un-set it. */
continue;
}
rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
main_pk, uid, NULL,
main_pk,
keygen_add_keyserver_url, uri);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
xfree (uri);
return 0;
}
/* replace the packet */
newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
free_packet (node->pkt);
xfree (node->pkt);
node->pkt = newpkt;
modified = 1;
}
xfree (user);
}
}
}
xfree (uri);
return modified;
}
static int
menu_set_notation (const char *string, KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
PKT_user_id *uid;
KBNODE node;
u32 keyid[2];
int selected, select_all;
int modified = 0;
char *answer;
struct notation *notation;
no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);
if (string)
answer = xstrdup (string);
else
{
answer = cpr_get_utf8 ("keyedit.add_notation",
_("Enter the notation: "));
if (answer[0] == '\0' || answer[0] == CONTROL_D)
{
xfree (answer);
return 0;
}
}
if (!ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "none")
|| !ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "-"))
notation = NULL; /* Delete them all. */
else
{
notation = string_to_notation (answer, 0);
if (!notation)
{
xfree (answer);
return 0;
}
}
xfree (answer);
select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);
/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
main_pk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
selected = 0;
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
break; /* ready */
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
selected = select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
}
else if (main_pk && uid && selected
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
{
char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);
if (sig->version < 4)
log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
user);
else
{
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
int rc, skip = 0, addonly = 1;
if (sig->flags.notation)
{
tty_printf ("Current notations for user ID \"%s\":\n",
user);
tty_print_notations (-9, sig);
}
else
{
tty_printf ("No notations on user ID \"%s\"\n", user);
if (notation == NULL)
{
/* There are no current notations, so there
is no point in trying to un-set them. */
continue;
}
}
if (notation)
{
struct notation *n;
int deleting = 0;
notation->next = sig_to_notation (sig);
for (n = notation->next; n; n = n->next)
if (strcmp (n->name, notation->name) == 0)
{
if (notation->value)
{
if (strcmp (n->value, notation->value) == 0)
{
if (notation->flags.ignore)
{
/* Value match with a delete
flag. */
n->flags.ignore = 1;
deleting = 1;
}
else
{
/* Adding the same notation
twice, so don't add it at
all. */
skip = 1;
tty_printf ("Skipping notation:"
" %s=%s\n",
notation->name,
notation->value);
break;
}
}
}
else
{
/* No value, so it means delete. */
n->flags.ignore = 1;
deleting = 1;
}
if (n->flags.ignore)
{
tty_printf ("Removing notation: %s=%s\n",
n->name, n->value);
addonly = 0;
}
}
if (!notation->flags.ignore && !skip)
tty_printf ("Adding notation: %s=%s\n",
notation->name, notation->value);
/* We tried to delete, but had no matches. */
if (notation->flags.ignore && !deleting)
continue;
}
else
{
tty_printf ("Removing all notations\n");
addonly = 0;
}
if (skip
|| (!addonly
&&
!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.confirm_notation",
_("Proceed? (y/N) "))))
continue;
rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
main_pk, uid, NULL,
main_pk,
keygen_add_notations, notation);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
free_notation (notation);
xfree (user);
return 0;
}
/* replace the packet */
newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
free_packet (node->pkt);
xfree (node->pkt);
node->pkt = newpkt;
modified = 1;
if (notation)
{
/* Snip off the notation list from the sig */
free_notation (notation->next);
notation->next = NULL;
}
xfree (user);
}
}
}
}
free_notation (notation);
return modified;
}
/*
* Select one user id or remove all selection if IDX is 0 or select
* all if IDX is -1. Returns: True if the selection changed.
*/
static int
menu_select_uid (KBNODE keyblock, int idx)
{
KBNODE node;
int i;
if (idx == -1) /* Select all. */
{
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID;
return 1;
}
else if (idx) /* Toggle. */
{
for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
if (++i == idx)
break;
}
if (!node)
{
tty_printf (_("No user ID with index %d\n"), idx);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
if (++i == idx)
{
if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
else
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID;
}
}
}
}
else /* Unselect all */
{
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
}
return 1;
}
/* Search in the keyblock for a uid that matches namehash */
static int
menu_select_uid_namehash (KBNODE keyblock, const char *namehash)
{
byte hash[NAMEHASH_LEN];
KBNODE node;
int i;
log_assert (strlen (namehash) == NAMEHASH_LEN * 2);
for (i = 0; i < NAMEHASH_LEN; i++)
hash[i] = hextobyte (&namehash[i * 2]);
for (node = keyblock->next; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
namehash_from_uid (node->pkt->pkt.user_id);
if (memcmp (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->namehash, hash, NAMEHASH_LEN) ==
0)
{
if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
else
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID;
break;
}
}
}
if (!node)
{
tty_printf (_("No user ID with hash %s\n"), namehash);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Select secondary keys
* Returns: True if the selection changed.
*/
static int
menu_select_key (KBNODE keyblock, int idx, char *p)
{
KBNODE node;
int i, j;
int is_hex_digits;
is_hex_digits = p && strlen (p) >= 8;
if (is_hex_digits)
{
/* Skip initial spaces. */
while (spacep (p))
p ++;
/* If the id starts with 0x accept and ignore it. */
if (p[0] == '0' && p[1] == 'x')
p += 2;
for (i = 0, j = 0; p[i]; i ++)
if (hexdigitp (&p[i]))
{
p[j] = toupper (p[i]);
j ++;
}
else if (spacep (&p[i]))
/* Skip spaces. */
{
}
else
{
is_hex_digits = 0;
break;
}
if (is_hex_digits)
/* In case we skipped some spaces, add a new NUL terminator. */
{
p[j] = 0;
/* If we skipped some spaces, make sure that we still have
at least 8 characters. */
is_hex_digits = (/* Short keyid. */
strlen (p) == 8
/* Long keyid. */
|| strlen (p) == 16
/* Fingerprints are (currently) 32 or 40
characters. */
|| strlen (p) >= 32);
}
}
if (is_hex_digits)
{
int found_one = 0;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
{
int match = 0;
if (strlen (p) == 8 || strlen (p) == 16)
{
u32 kid[2];
char kid_str[17];
keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
format_keyid (kid, strlen (p) == 8 ? KF_SHORT : KF_LONG,
kid_str, sizeof (kid_str));
if (strcmp (p, kid_str) == 0)
match = 1;
}
else
{
char fp[2*MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN + 1];
hexfingerprint (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, fp, sizeof (fp));
if (strcmp (fp, p) == 0)
match = 1;
}
if (match)
{
if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
else
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELKEY;
found_one = 1;
}
}
if (found_one)
return 1;
tty_printf (_("No subkey with key ID '%s'.\n"), p);
return 0;
}
if (idx == -1) /* Select all. */
{
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELKEY;
}
else if (idx) /* Toggle selection. */
{
for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
if (++i == idx)
break;
}
if (!node)
{
tty_printf (_("No subkey with index %d\n"), idx);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
if (++i == idx)
{
if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
else
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELKEY;
}
}
}
else /* Unselect all. */
{
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
}
return 1;
}
static int
count_uids_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag)
{
KBNODE node;
int i = 0;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & flag))
i++;
return i;
}
static int
count_keys_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag)
{
KBNODE node;
int i = 0;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if ((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) && (node->flag & flag))
i++;
return i;
}
static int
count_uids (KBNODE keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
int i = 0;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
i++;
return i;
}
/*
* Returns true if there is at least one selected user id
*/
static int
count_selected_uids (KBNODE keyblock)
{
return count_uids_with_flag (keyblock, NODFLG_SELUID);
}
static int
count_selected_keys (KBNODE keyblock)
{
return count_keys_with_flag (keyblock, NODFLG_SELKEY);
}
/* Returns how many real (i.e. not attribute) uids are unmarked. */
static int
real_uids_left (KBNODE keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
int real = 0;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) &&
!node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
real++;
return real;
}
/*
* Ask whether the signature should be revoked. If the user commits this,
* flag bit MARK_A is set on the signature and the user ID.
*/
static void
ask_revoke_sig (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node)
{
int doit = 0;
PKT_user_id *uid;
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
KBNODE unode = find_prev_kbnode (keyblock, node, PKT_USER_ID);
if (!unode)
{
log_error ("Oops: no user ID for signature\n");
return;
}
uid = unode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if (opt.with_colons)
{
if (uid->attrib_data)
printf ("uat:::::::::%u %lu", uid->numattribs, uid->attrib_len);
else
{
es_printf ("uid:::::::::");
es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, uid->name, uid->len, ":", NULL);
}
es_printf ("\n");
print_and_check_one_sig_colon (keyblock, node, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
1);
}
else
{
char *p = utf8_to_native (unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
tty_printf (_("user ID: \"%s\"\n"), p);
xfree (p);
tty_printf (_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"),
keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig),
sig->flags.exportable ? "" : _(" (non-exportable)"), "");
}
if (sig->flags.expired)
{
tty_printf (_("This signature expired on %s.\n"),
expirestr_from_sig (sig));
/* Use a different question so we can have different help text */
doit = cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("ask_revoke_sig.expired",
_("Are you sure you still want to revoke it? (y/N) "));
}
else
doit = cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("ask_revoke_sig.one",
_("Create a revocation certificate for this signature? (y/N) "));
if (doit)
{
node->flag |= NODFLG_MARK_A;
unode->flag |= NODFLG_MARK_A;
}
}
/*
* Display all user ids of the current public key together with signatures
* done by one of our keys. Then walk over all this sigs and ask the user
* whether he wants to revoke this signature.
* Return: True when the keyblock has changed.
*/
static int
menu_revsig (KBNODE keyblock)
{
PKT_signature *sig;
PKT_public_key *primary_pk;
KBNODE node;
int changed = 0;
int rc, any, skip = 1, all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock);
struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
/* First check whether we have any signatures at all. */
any = 0;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_SELSIG | NODFLG_MARK_A);
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID || all)
skip = 0;
else
skip = 1;
}
else if (!skip && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& ((sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature),
have_secret_key_with_kid (sig->keyid)))
{
if ((sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
{
any = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!any)
{
tty_printf (_("Not signed by you.\n"));
return 0;
}
/* FIXME: detect duplicates here */
tty_printf (_("You have signed these user IDs on key %s:\n"),
keystr_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key));
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_SELSIG | NODFLG_MARK_A);
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID || all)
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
/* Hmmm: Should we show only UIDs with a signature? */
tty_printf (" ");
tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
tty_printf ("\n");
skip = 0;
}
else
skip = 1;
}
else if (!skip && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& ((sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature),
have_secret_key_with_kid (sig->keyid)))
{
if ((sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
{
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"),
keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig),
sig->flags.exportable ? "" : _(" (non-exportable)"),
sig->flags.revocable ? "" : _(" (non-revocable)"));
if (sig->flags.revocable)
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELSIG;
}
else if (sig->sig_class == 0x30)
{
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (_("revoked by your key %s on %s\n"),
keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig));
}
}
}
tty_printf ("\n");
/* ask */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (!(node->flag & NODFLG_SELSIG))
continue;
ask_revoke_sig (keyblock, node);
}
/* present selected */
any = 0;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (!(node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A))
continue;
if (!any)
{
any = 1;
tty_printf (_("You are about to revoke these signatures:\n"));
}
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
tty_printf (" ");
tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
tty_printf ("\n");
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"),
keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig), "",
sig->flags.exportable ? "" : _(" (non-exportable)"));
}
}
if (!any)
return 0; /* none selected */
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
("ask_revoke_sig.okay",
_("Really create the revocation certificates? (y/N) ")))
return 0; /* forget it */
reason = ask_revocation_reason (0, 1, 0);
if (!reason)
{ /* user decided to cancel */
return 0;
}
/* now we can sign the user ids */
reloop: /* (must use this, because we are modifing the list) */
primary_pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
KBNODE unode;
PACKET *pkt;
struct sign_attrib attrib;
PKT_public_key *signerkey;
if (!(node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A)
|| node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
continue;
unode = find_prev_kbnode (keyblock, node, PKT_USER_ID);
log_assert (unode); /* we already checked this */
memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
attrib.reason = reason;
attrib.non_exportable = !node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable;
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
signerkey = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *signerkey);
if (get_seckey (signerkey, node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid))
{
log_info (_("no secret key\n"));
free_public_key (signerkey);
continue;
}
rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, primary_pk,
unode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
NULL, signerkey, 0x30, 0, 0, 0,
sign_mk_attrib, &attrib, NULL);
free_public_key (signerkey);
if (rc)
{
write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
return changed;
}
changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */
update_trust = 1;
/* Are we revoking our own uid? */
if (primary_pk->keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] &&
primary_pk->keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked = 1;
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
insert_kbnode (unode, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
goto reloop;
}
release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
return changed;
}
/* return 0 if revocation of NODE (which must be a User ID) was
successful, non-zero if there was an error. *modified will be set
to 1 if a change was made. */
static int
core_revuid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, KBNODE node,
const struct revocation_reason_info *reason, int *modified)
{
PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
gpg_error_t rc;
if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
{
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_USER_ID);
write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
log_error (_("tried to revoke a non-user ID: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
return 1;
}
else
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if (uid->is_revoked)
{
char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, uid->len, 0);
log_info (_("user ID \"%s\" is already revoked\n"), user);
xfree (user);
}
else
{
PACKET *pkt;
PKT_signature *sig;
struct sign_attrib attrib;
u32 timestamp = make_timestamp ();
if (uid->created >= timestamp)
{
/* Okay, this is a problem. The user ID selfsig was
created in the future, so we need to warn the user and
set our revocation timestamp one second after that so
everything comes out clean. */
log_info (_("WARNING: a user ID signature is dated %d"
" seconds in the future\n"),
uid->created - timestamp);
timestamp = uid->created + 1;
}
memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
/* should not need to cast away const here; but
revocation_reason_build_cb needs to take a non-const
void* in order to meet the function signtuare for the
mksubpkt argument to make_keysig_packet */
attrib.reason = (struct revocation_reason_info *)reason;
rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, uid, NULL, pk, 0x30, 0,
timestamp, 0,
sign_mk_attrib, &attrib, NULL);
if (rc)
{
write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
return 1;
}
else
{
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
/* If the trustdb has an entry for this key+uid then the
trustdb needs an update. */
if (!update_trust
&& ((get_validity (ctrl, pk, uid, NULL, 0) & TRUST_MASK)
>= TRUST_UNDEFINED))
update_trust = 1;
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked = 1;
if (modified)
*modified = 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
}
/* Revoke a user ID (i.e. revoke a user ID selfsig). Return true if
keyblock changed. */
static int
menu_revuid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock)
{
PKT_public_key *pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
KBNODE node;
int changed = 0;
int rc;
struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
/* Note that this is correct as per the RFCs, but nevertheless
somewhat meaningless in the real world. 1991 did define the 0x30
sig class, but PGP 2.x did not actually implement it, so it would
probably be safe to use v4 revocations everywhere. -ds */
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (pk->version > 3 || (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->selfsigversion > 3))
{
if ((reason = ask_revocation_reason (0, 1, 4)))
break;
else
goto leave;
}
reloop: /* (better this way because we are modifying the keyring) */
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
{
int modified = 0;
rc = core_revuid (ctrl, pub_keyblock, node, reason, &modified);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (modified)
{
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
changed = 1;
goto reloop;
}
}
if (changed)
commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
leave:
release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
return changed;
}
/*
* Revoke the whole key.
*/
static int
menu_revkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
PKT_public_key *pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
int rc, changed = 0;
struct revocation_reason_info *reason;
PACKET *pkt;
PKT_signature *sig;
if (pk->flags.revoked)
{
tty_printf (_("Key %s is already revoked.\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk));
return 0;
}
reason = ask_revocation_reason (1, 0, 0);
/* user decided to cancel */
if (!reason)
return 0;
rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk,
0x20, 0, 0, 0,
revocation_reason_build_cb, reason, NULL);
if (rc)
{
write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
goto scram;
}
changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
insert_kbnode (pub_keyblock, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
update_trust = 1;
scram:
release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
return changed;
}
static int
menu_revsubkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
{
PKT_public_key *mainpk;
KBNODE node;
int changed = 0;
int rc;
struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
reason = ask_revocation_reason (1, 0, 0);
if (!reason)
return 0; /* User decided to cancel. */
reloop: /* (better this way because we are modifing the keyring) */
mainpk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
{
PACKET *pkt;
PKT_signature *sig;
PKT_public_key *subpk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
struct sign_attrib attrib;
if (subpk->flags.revoked)
{
tty_printf (_("Subkey %s is already revoked.\n"),
keystr_from_pk (subpk));
continue;
}
memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
attrib.reason = reason;
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, mainpk, NULL, subpk, mainpk,
0x28, 0, 0, 0, sign_mk_attrib, &attrib,
NULL);
if (rc)
{
write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
return changed;
}
changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */
pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
goto reloop;
}
}
commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
/* No need to set update_trust here since signing keys no longer
are used to certify other keys, so there is no change in trust
when revoking/removing them */
release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
return changed;
}
/* Note that update_ownertrust is going to mark the trustdb dirty when
enabling or disabling a key. This is arguably sub-optimal as
disabled keys are still counted in the web of trust, but perhaps
not worth adding extra complexity to change. -ds */
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
static int
enable_disable_key (KBNODE keyblock, int disable)
{
PKT_public_key *pk =
find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)->pkt->pkt.public_key;
unsigned int trust, newtrust;
trust = newtrust = get_ownertrust (pk);
newtrust &= ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
if (disable)
newtrust |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
if (trust == newtrust)
return 0; /* already in that state */
update_ownertrust (pk, newtrust);
return 0;
}
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
static void
menu_showphoto (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
int select_all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock);
int count = 0;
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
/* Look for the public key first. We have to be really, really,
explicit as to which photo this is, and what key it is a UID on
since people may want to sign it. */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
count++;
if ((select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)) &&
uid->attribs != NULL)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < uid->numattribs; i++)
{
byte type;
u32 size;
if (uid->attribs[i].type == ATTRIB_IMAGE &&
parse_image_header (&uid->attribs[i], &type, &size))
{
tty_printf (_("Displaying %s photo ID of size %ld for "
"key %s (uid %d)\n"),
image_type_to_string (type, 1),
(ulong) size, keystr_from_pk (pk), count);
show_photos (ctrl, &uid->attribs[i], 1, pk, uid);
}
}
}
}
}
}
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
index e663af889..f0527bc6e 100644
--- a/g10/mainproc.c
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -1,2468 +1,2468 @@
/* mainproc.c - handle packets
* Copyright (C) 1998-2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2013-2014 Werner Koch
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "gpg.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "iobuf.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "filter.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "keyserver-internal.h"
#include "photoid.h"
#include "mbox-util.h"
#include "call-dirmngr.h"
/* Put an upper limit on nested packets. The 32 is an arbitrary
value, a much lower should actually be sufficient. */
#define MAX_NESTING_DEPTH 32
/* An object to build a list of keyid related info. */
struct kidlist_item
{
struct kidlist_item *next;
u32 kid[2];
int pubkey_algo;
int reason;
};
/*
* Object to hold the processing context.
*/
typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX;
struct mainproc_context
{
ctrl_t ctrl;
struct mainproc_context *anchor; /* May be useful in the future. */
PKT_public_key *last_pubkey;
PKT_user_id *last_user_id;
md_filter_context_t mfx;
int sigs_only; /* Process only signatures and reject all other stuff. */
int encrypt_only; /* Process only encryption messages. */
/* Name of the file with the complete signature or the file with the
detached signature. This is currently only used to deduce the
file name of the data file if that has not been given. */
const char *sigfilename;
/* A structure to describe the signed data in case of a detached
signature. */
struct
{
/* A file descriptor of the the signed data. Only used if not -1. */
int data_fd;
/* A list of filenames with the data files or NULL. This is only
used if DATA_FD is -1. */
strlist_t data_names;
/* Flag to indicated that either one of the next previous fields
is used. This is only needed for better readability. */
int used;
} signed_data;
DEK *dek;
int last_was_session_key;
kbnode_t list; /* The current list of packets. */
iobuf_t iobuf; /* Used to get the filename etc. */
int trustletter; /* Temporary usage in list_node. */
ulong symkeys;
struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */
struct {
unsigned int sig_seen:1; /* Set to true if a signature packet
has been seen. */
unsigned int data:1; /* Any data packet seen */
unsigned int uncompress_failed:1;
} any;
};
/*** Local prototypes. ***/
static int do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a);
static void list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
static void proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
static int literals_seen;
/*** Functions. ***/
void
reset_literals_seen(void)
{
literals_seen = 0;
}
static void
release_list( CTX c )
{
proc_tree (c, c->list);
release_kbnode (c->list);
while (c->pkenc_list)
{
struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
xfree (c->pkenc_list);
c->pkenc_list = tmp;
}
c->pkenc_list = NULL;
c->list = NULL;
c->any.data = 0;
c->any.uncompress_failed = 0;
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
xfree (c->dek);
c->dek = NULL;
}
static int
add_onepass_sig (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
kbnode_t node;
if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
else /* Insert the first one. */
c->list = node = new_kbnode (pkt);
return 1;
}
static int
add_gpg_control (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
{
/* New clear text signature.
* Process the last one and reset everything */
release_list(c);
}
if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
else /* Insert the first one. */
c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
return 1;
}
static int
add_user_id (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
if (!c->list)
{
log_error ("orphaned user ID\n");
return 0;
}
add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
return 1;
}
static int
add_subkey (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
if (!c->list)
{
log_error ("subkey w/o mainkey\n");
return 0;
}
add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
return 1;
}
static int
add_ring_trust (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
if (!c->list)
{
log_error ("ring trust w/o key\n");
return 0;
}
add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
return 1;
}
static int
add_signature (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
kbnode_t node;
c->any.sig_seen = 1;
if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list)
{
/* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
* GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses
* onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method
* of prepending the signature to the data is
* that it is not possible to make a signature from data read
* from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */
node = new_kbnode (pkt);
c->list = node;
return 1;
}
else if (!c->list)
return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/
else if (!c->list->pkt)
BUG(); /* so nicht */
/* Add a new signature node item at the end. */
node = new_kbnode (pkt);
add_kbnode (c->list, node);
return 1;
}
static int
symkey_decrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen)
{
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
if(slen < 17 || slen > 33)
{
log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"),
(int)slen);
return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
}
if (openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1))
BUG ();
if (gcry_cipher_setkey ( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ))
BUG ();
gcry_cipher_setiv ( hd, NULL, 0 );
gcry_cipher_decrypt ( hd, seskey, slen, NULL, 0 );
gcry_cipher_close ( hd );
/* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
dek->keylen=slen-1;
dek->algo=seskey[0];
if(dek->keylen > DIM(dek->key))
BUG ();
memcpy(dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
/*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
return 0;
}
static void
proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
if (!enc)
log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n");
else if(!c->dek)
{
int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
const char *s = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo))
{
if (!opt.quiet)
{
if (enc->seskeylen)
log_info (_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s );
else
log_info (_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
}
}
else
log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo);
if (openpgp_md_test_algo (enc->s2k.hash_algo))
{
log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest"
" algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo);
s = NULL;
}
c->last_was_session_key = 2;
if (!s || opt.list_only)
goto leave;
if (opt.override_session_key)
{
c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
if (get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key))
{
xfree (c->dek);
c->dek = NULL;
}
}
else
{
c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, &enc->s2k, 0, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (c->dek)
{
c->dek->symmetric = 1;
/* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric key
comes before a public key in the message - if the
user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is a
chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen to
be a valid one, which will make the returned dek
appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that
come later. */
if (enc->seskeylen)
{
if (symkey_decrypt_seskey (c->dek,
enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen))
{
xfree (c->dek);
c->dek = NULL;
}
}
else
c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
}
}
}
leave:
c->symkeys++;
free_packet (pkt);
}
static void
proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
PKT_pubkey_enc *enc;
int result = 0;
/* Check whether the secret key is available and store in this case. */
c->last_was_session_key = 1;
enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
/*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/
/* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
* function to check it. */
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("public key is %s\n"), keystr (enc->keyid));
if (is_status_enabled())
{
char buf[50];
/* FIXME: For ECC support we need to map the OpenPGP algo number
to the Libgcrypt defined one. This is due a chicken-egg
problem: We need to have code in Libgcrypt for a new
algorithm so to implement a proposed new algorithm before the
IANA will finally assign an OpenPGP identifier. */
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
(ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo);
write_status_text (STATUS_ENC_TO, buf);
}
if (!opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key)
{
/* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
* secure memory because it has already been passed on the
* command line and the GCHQ knows about it. */
c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
if (result)
{
xfree (c->dek);
c->dek = NULL;
}
}
else if (enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E
|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E
|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL)
{
/* Note that we also allow type 20 Elgamal keys for decryption.
There are still a couple of those keys in active use as a
subkey. */
/* FIXME: Store this all in a list and process it later so that
we can prioritize what key to use. This gives a better user
experience if wildcard keyids are used. */
if (!c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
|| opt.try_all_secrets
|| have_secret_key_with_kid (enc->keyid)))
{
if(opt.list_only)
result = -1;
else
{
c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
if ((result = get_session_key (ctrl, enc, c->dek)))
{
/* Error: Delete the DEK. */
xfree (c->dek);
c->dek = NULL;
}
}
}
else
result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
}
else
result = GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
if (result == -1)
;
else
{
/* Store it for later display. */
struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc (sizeof *x);
x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
x->reason = result;
x->next = c->pkenc_list;
c->pkenc_list = x;
if (!result && opt.verbose > 1)
log_info (_("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n"));
}
free_packet(pkt);
}
/*
* Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could
* not decrypt.
*/
static void
print_pkenc_list (struct kidlist_item *list, int failed)
{
for (; list; list = list->next)
{
PKT_public_key *pk;
const char *algstr;
if (failed && !list->reason)
continue;
if (!failed && list->reason)
continue;
algstr = openpgp_pk_algo_name (list->pubkey_algo);
pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
if (!algstr)
algstr = "[?]";
pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
if (!get_pubkey (pk, list->kid))
{
char *p;
log_info (_("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
nbits_from_pk (pk), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
strtimestamp (pk->timestamp));
p = get_user_id_native (list->kid);
log_printf (_(" \"%s\"\n"), p);
xfree (p);
}
else
log_info (_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"),
algstr, keystr(list->kid));
free_public_key (pk);
if (gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
{
if (is_status_enabled())
{
char buf[20];
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
(ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1]);
write_status_text (STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf);
}
}
else if (list->reason)
{
log_info (_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (list->reason));
write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", list->reason);
}
}
}
static void
proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
int result = 0;
if (!opt.quiet)
{
if (c->symkeys>1)
log_info (_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"), c->symkeys);
else if (c->symkeys == 1)
log_info (_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n"));
print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 );
print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 );
}
/* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */
write_status (STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION);
/*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/
if (opt.list_only)
result = -1;
else if (!c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key)
{
int algo;
STRING2KEY s2kbuf;
STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
int canceled;
if (opt.override_session_key)
{
c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
if (result)
{
xfree (c->dek);
c->dek = NULL;
}
}
else
{
/* Assume this is old style conventional encrypted data. */
algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
if (algo)
log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
else if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA))
{
algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
if (!algo)
algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
"optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
}
else
{
algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo)
{
/* If no digest is given we assume SHA-1. */
s2kbuf.mode = 0;
s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
s2k = &s2kbuf;
}
log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
}
c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, s2k, 0, 0, NULL, &canceled);
if (c->dek)
c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
else if (canceled)
result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CANCELED);
else
result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PASSPHRASE);
}
}
else if (!c->dek)
result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
if (!result)
result = decrypt_data (c->ctrl, c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
if (result == -1)
;
else if (!result
&& !opt.ignore_mdc_error
&& !pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method
&& openpgp_cipher_get_algo_blklen (c->dek->algo) != 8
&& c->dek->algo != CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH)
{
/* The message has been decrypted but has no MDC despite that a
modern cipher (blocklength != 64 bit, except for Twofish) is
used and the option to ignore MDC errors is not used: To
avoid attacks changing an MDC message to a non-MDC message,
we fail here. */
log_error (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
if (opt.verbose > 1)
log_info ("decryption forced to fail\n");
write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
}
else if (!result || (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
&& opt.ignore_mdc_error))
{
write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY);
if (opt.verbose > 1)
log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result)
write_status (STATUS_GOODMDC);
else if (!opt.no_mdc_warn)
log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
}
else if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
{
glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
log_error (_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
write_status (STATUS_BADMDC);
write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
}
else
{
if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
&& *c->dek->s2k_cacheid != '\0')
{
if (opt.debug)
log_debug ("cleared passphrase cached with ID: %s\n",
c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
passphrase_clear_cache (c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
}
glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
log_error (_("decryption failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (result));
/* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
* ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK). */
}
xfree (c->dek);
c->dek = NULL;
free_packet (pkt);
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
write_status (STATUS_END_DECRYPTION);
}
static void
proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext;
int any, clearsig, rc;
kbnode_t n;
literals_seen++;
if (pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8))
log_info (_("Note: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
else if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name);
free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0))
BUG ();
/* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1
* and no armoring - Not yet tested
* Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1
* Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1??
* See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09
*/
any = clearsig = 0;
for (n=c->list; n; n = n->next )
{
if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
{
/* The onepass signature case. */
if (n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo)
{
gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo);
any = 1;
}
}
else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
{
/* The clearsigned message case. */
size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
/* Check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash. */
if (datalen < 2)
log_fatal ("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
/* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
* documents. */
clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
for (data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++)
gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, *data);
any = 1;
break; /* Stop here as one-pass signature packets are not
expected. */
}
else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
/* The SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use. */
gcry_md_enable ( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo );
any = 1;
}
}
if (!any && !opt.skip_verify)
{
/* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case. It's not legal
according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that often.
There is no good way to specify what algorithms to use in
that case, so these there are the historical answer. */
gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160);
gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1);
}
if (DBG_HASHING)
{
gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
if (c->mfx.md2)
gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
}
rc=0;
if (literals_seen > 1)
{
log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n"));
if (!opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages)
{
write_status_text (STATUS_ERROR, "proc_pkt.plaintext 89_BAD_DATA");
log_inc_errorcount ();
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
}
}
if (!rc)
{
/* It we are in --verify mode, we do not want to output the
* signed text. However, if --output is also used we do what
* has been requested and write out the signed data. */
rc = handle_plaintext (pt, &c->mfx,
(opt.outfp || opt.outfile)? 0 : c->sigs_only,
clearsig);
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EACCES && !c->sigs_only)
{
/* Can't write output but we hash it anyway to check the
signature. */
rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
}
}
if (rc)
log_error ("handle plaintext failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
free_packet(pkt);
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
/* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
* This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences. */
n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
if (c->list)
add_kbnode (c->list, n);
else
c->list = n;
}
static int
proc_compressed_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info)
{
if ( ((CTX)info)->signed_data.used
&& ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
return proc_signature_packets_by_fd (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd);
else
return proc_signature_packets (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_names,
((CTX)info)->sigfilename );
}
static int
proc_encrypt_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info )
{
CTX c = info;
return proc_encryption_packets (c->ctrl, info, a );
}
static int
proc_compressed (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
{
PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed;
int rc;
/*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/
if (c->sigs_only)
rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c);
else if( c->encrypt_only )
rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c);
else
rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, NULL, NULL);
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA)
{
if (!c->any.uncompress_failed)
{
CTX cc;
for (cc=c; cc; cc = cc->anchor)
cc->any.uncompress_failed = 1;
log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
}
}
else if (rc)
log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
free_packet(pkt);
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
return rc;
}
/*
* Check the signature. If R_PK is not NULL a copy of the public key
* used to verify the signature will be stored tehre, or NULL if not
* found. Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code
*/
static int
do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, int *is_selfsig,
int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey, PKT_public_key **r_pk)
{
PKT_signature *sig;
gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL;
gcry_md_hd_t md2 = NULL;
gcry_md_hd_t md_good = NULL;
int algo, rc;
if (r_pk)
*r_pk = NULL;
log_assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
if (is_selfsig)
*is_selfsig = 0;
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
algo = sig->digest_algo;
rc = openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (sig->sig_class == 0x00)
{
if (c->mfx.md)
{
if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
BUG ();
}
else /* detached signature */
{
/* check_signature() will enable the md. */
if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
BUG ();
}
}
else if (sig->sig_class == 0x01)
{
/* How do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text
in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */
if (c->mfx.md)
{
if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
BUG ();
if (c->mfx.md2 && gcry_md_copy (&md2, c->mfx.md2))
BUG ();
}
else /* detached signature */
{
log_debug ("Do we really need this here?");
/* check_signature() will enable the md*/
if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
BUG ();
if (gcry_md_open (&md2, 0, 0 ))
BUG ();
}
}
else if ((sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
|| sig->sig_class == 0x18
|| sig->sig_class == 0x1f
|| sig->sig_class == 0x20
|| sig->sig_class == 0x28
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30)
{
if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig );
}
else if (sig->sig_class == 0x20)
{
log_error (_("standalone revocation - "
"use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n"));
return GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
}
else
{
log_error ("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n", sig->sig_class);
return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
}
}
else
return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
/* We only get here if we are checking the signature of a binary
(0x00) or text document (0x01). */
rc = check_signature2 (sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, r_pk);
if (! rc)
md_good = md;
else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2)
{
PKT_public_key *pk2;
rc = check_signature2 (sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey,
r_pk? &pk2 : NULL);
if (!rc)
{
md_good = md2;
if (r_pk)
{
free_public_key (*r_pk);
*r_pk = pk2;
}
}
}
if (md_good)
{
unsigned char *buffer = gcry_md_read (md_good, sig->digest_algo);
sig->digest_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (map_md_openpgp_to_gcry (algo));
memcpy (sig->digest, buffer, sig->digest_len);
}
gcry_md_close (md);
gcry_md_close (md2);
return rc;
}
static void
print_userid (PACKET *pkt)
{
if (!pkt)
BUG();
if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
{
es_printf ("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype );
return;
}
if (opt.with_colons)
{
if (pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
es_printf("%u %lu",
pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
else
es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ":", NULL);
}
else
print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
}
/*
* List the keyblock in a user friendly way
*/
static void
list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
{
if (!node)
;
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (opt.with_colons)
{
u32 keyid[2];
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
if (pk->flags.primary)
c->trustletter = (opt.fast_list_mode?
0 : get_validity_info (c->ctrl, pk, NULL));
es_printf ("%s:", pk->flags.primary? "pub":"sub" );
if (c->trustletter)
es_putc (c->trustletter, es_stdout);
es_printf (":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pk->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
if (pk->flags.primary && !opt.fast_list_mode)
es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (pk), es_stdout);
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
}
else
{
print_key_line (es_stdout, pk, 0);
}
if (opt.keyid_format == KF_NONE && !opt.with_colons)
; /* Already printed. */
else if ((pk->flags.primary && opt.fingerprint) || opt.fingerprint > 1)
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 0);
if (opt.with_colons)
{
if (node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST)
es_printf ("rtv:1:%u:\n",
node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval);
}
if (pk->flags.primary)
{
int kl = opt.keyid_format == KF_NONE? 0 : keystrlen ();
/* Now list all userids with their signatures. */
for (node = node->next; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
list_node (c, node );
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
if (opt.with_colons)
es_printf ("%s:::::::::",
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
else
es_printf ("uid%*s",
kl + (opt.legacy_list_mode? 9:11),
"" );
print_userid (node->pkt);
if (opt.with_colons)
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
if (opt.with_colons
&& node->next
&& node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST)
{
es_printf ("rtv:2:%u:\n",
node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust?
node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval : 0);
}
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
list_node(c, node );
}
}
}
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
{
log_debug ("FIXME: No way to print secret key packets here\n");
/* fixme: We may use a function to turn a secret key packet into
a public key one and use that here. */
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int is_selfsig = 0;
int rc2 = 0;
size_t n;
char *p;
int sigrc = ' ';
if (!opt.verbose)
return;
if (sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30)
es_fputs ("rev", es_stdout);
else
es_fputs ("sig", es_stdout);
if (opt.check_sigs)
{
fflush (stdout);
rc2 = do_check_sig (c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL, NULL);
switch (gpg_err_code (rc2))
{
case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: sigrc = '-'; break;
case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
default: sigrc = '%'; break;
}
}
else /* Check whether this is a self signature. */
{
u32 keyid[2];
if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
{
keyid_from_pk (c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);
if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
is_selfsig = 1;
}
}
if (opt.with_colons)
{
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
if (sigrc != ' ')
es_putc (sigrc, es_stdout);
es_printf ("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_sig (sig),
colon_expirestr_from_sig (sig));
if (sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
es_printf ("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
if (sig->trust_regexp)
es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sig->trust_regexp,
strlen (sig->trust_regexp), ":", NULL);
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
}
else
es_printf ("%c %s %s ",
sigrc, keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig));
if (sigrc == '%')
es_printf ("[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc2) );
else if (sigrc == '?')
;
else if (is_selfsig)
{
if (opt.with_colons)
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
es_fputs (sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", es_stdout);
if (opt.with_colons)
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
}
else if (!opt.fast_list_mode)
{
p = get_user_id (sig->keyid, &n);
es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, p, n,
opt.with_colons?":":NULL, NULL );
xfree (p);
}
if (opt.with_colons)
es_printf (":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
}
else
log_error ("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype);
}
int
proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
{
int rc;
CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
c->ctrl = ctrl;
c->anchor = anchor;
rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
xfree (c);
return rc;
}
int
proc_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a,
strlist_t signedfiles, const char *sigfilename )
{
CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
int rc;
c->ctrl = ctrl;
c->anchor = anchor;
c->sigs_only = 1;
c->signed_data.data_fd = -1;
c->signed_data.data_names = signedfiles;
c->signed_data.used = !!signedfiles;
c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
/* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
with an error. */
if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
{
write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
rc = GPG_ERR_NO_DATA;
}
/* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
xfree (c);
return rc;
}
int
proc_signature_packets_by_fd (ctrl_t ctrl,
void *anchor, iobuf_t a, int signed_data_fd )
{
int rc;
CTX c;
c = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *c);
if (!c)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
c->ctrl = ctrl;
c->anchor = anchor;
c->sigs_only = 1;
c->signed_data.data_fd = signed_data_fd;
c->signed_data.data_names = NULL;
c->signed_data.used = (signed_data_fd != -1);
rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
/* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
with an error. */
if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
{
write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
}
/* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
xfree ( c );
return rc;
}
int
proc_encryption_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
{
CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
int rc;
c->ctrl = ctrl;
c->anchor = anchor;
c->encrypt_only = 1;
rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
xfree (c);
return rc;
}
static int
check_nesting (CTX c)
{
int level;
for (level=0; c; c = c->anchor)
level++;
if (level > MAX_NESTING_DEPTH)
{
log_error ("input data with too deeply nested packets\n");
write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "1");
return GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA;
}
return 0;
}
static int
do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a)
{
PACKET *pkt;
int rc = 0;
int any_data = 0;
int newpkt;
rc = check_nesting (c);
if (rc)
return rc;
pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
c->iobuf = a;
init_packet(pkt);
while ((rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1)
{
any_data = 1;
if (rc)
{
free_packet (pkt);
/* Stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered
* but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets. */
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
&& opt.list_packets == 0)
break;
continue;
}
newpkt = -1;
if (opt.list_packets)
{
switch (pkt->pkttype)
{
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
else if (c->sigs_only)
{
switch (pkt->pkttype)
{
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
case PKT_USER_ID:
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
goto leave;
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
else if (c->encrypt_only)
{
switch (pkt->pkttype)
{
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
case PKT_USER_ID:
write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0");
rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
goto leave;
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
else
{
switch (pkt->pkttype)
{
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
release_list (c);
c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
newpkt = 1;
break;
case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
newpkt = add_subkey (c, pkt);
break;
case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust (c, pkt); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
if (rc)
goto leave;
/* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
* I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
* The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
* packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right
* when there is a compression packet between which adds just
* an extra layer.
* Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
*/
if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC)
c->any.data = (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT);
if (newpkt == -1)
;
else if (newpkt)
{
pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
init_packet (pkt);
}
else
free_packet(pkt);
}
if (rc == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET)
write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "3");
if (any_data)
rc = 0;
else if (rc == -1)
write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "2");
leave:
release_list (c);
xfree(c->dek);
free_packet (pkt);
xfree (pkt);
free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
return rc;
}
/* Helper for pka_uri_from_sig to parse the to-be-verified address out
of the notation data. */
static pka_info_t *
get_pka_address (PKT_signature *sig)
{
pka_info_t *pka = NULL;
struct notation *nd,*notation;
notation=sig_to_notation(sig);
for(nd=notation;nd;nd=nd->next)
{
if(strcmp(nd->name,"pka-address@gnupg.org")!=0)
continue; /* Not the notation we want. */
/* For now we only use the first valid PKA notation. In future
we might want to keep additional PKA notations in a linked
list. */
if (is_valid_mailbox (nd->value))
{
pka = xmalloc (sizeof *pka + strlen(nd->value));
pka->valid = 0;
pka->checked = 0;
pka->uri = NULL;
strcpy (pka->email, nd->value);
break;
}
}
free_notation(notation);
return pka;
}
/* Return the URI from a DNS PKA record. If this record has already
be retrieved for the signature we merely return it; if not we go
out and try to get that DNS record. */
static const char *
pka_uri_from_sig (CTX c, PKT_signature *sig)
{
if (!sig->flags.pka_tried)
{
log_assert (!sig->pka_info);
sig->flags.pka_tried = 1;
sig->pka_info = get_pka_address (sig);
if (sig->pka_info)
{
char *url;
unsigned char *fpr;
size_t fprlen;
if (!gpg_dirmngr_get_pka (c->ctrl, sig->pka_info->email,
&fpr, &fprlen, &url))
{
if (fpr && fprlen == sizeof sig->pka_info->fpr)
{
memcpy (sig->pka_info->fpr, fpr, fprlen);
if (url)
{
sig->pka_info->valid = 1;
if (!*url)
xfree (url);
else
sig->pka_info->uri = url;
url = NULL;
}
}
xfree (fpr);
xfree (url);
}
}
}
return sig->pka_info? sig->pka_info->uri : NULL;
}
/* Return true if the AKL has the WKD method specified. */
static int
akl_has_wkd_method (void)
{
struct akl *akl;
for (akl = opt.auto_key_locate; akl; akl = akl->next)
if (akl->type == AKL_WKD)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Return the ISSUER fingerprint string in human readbale format if
* available. Caller must release the string. */
static char *
issuer_fpr_string (PKT_signature *sig)
{
const byte *p;
size_t n;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR, &n);
if (p && n == 21 && p[0] == 4)
return bin2hex (p+1, n-1, NULL);
return NULL;
}
static void
print_good_bad_signature (int statno, const char *keyid_str, kbnode_t un,
PKT_signature *sig, int rc)
{
char *p;
write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3,
-1);
if (un)
p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
else
p = xstrdup ("[?]");
if (rc)
log_info (_("BAD signature from \"%s\""), p);
else if (sig->flags.expired)
log_info (_("Expired signature from \"%s\""), p);
else
log_info (_("Good signature from \"%s\""), p);
xfree (p);
}
static int
check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
const char *astr;
int rc;
int is_expkey = 0;
int is_revkey = 0;
char *issuer_fpr;
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL; /* The public key for the signature or NULL. */
if (opt.skip_verify)
{
log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n"));
return 0;
}
/* Check that the message composition is valid.
*
* Per RFC-2440bis (-15) allowed:
*
* S{1,n} -- detached signature.
* S{1,n} P -- old style PGP2 signature
* O{1,n} P S{1,n} -- standard OpenPGP signature.
* C P S{1,n} -- cleartext signature.
*
*
* O = One-Pass Signature packet.
* S = Signature packet.
* P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted | Compressed | Literal)
* (Note that the current rfc2440bis draft also allows
* for a signed message but that does not work as it
* introduces ambiguities.)
* We keep track of these packages using the marker packet
* CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK.
* C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures.
*
* We reject all other messages.
*
* Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of
* each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently
* introduce a bug here.
*/
{
kbnode_t n;
int n_onepass, n_sig;
/* log_debug ("checking signature packet composition\n"); */
/* dump_kbnode (c->list); */
n = c->list;
log_assert (n);
if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
{
/* This is either "S{1,n}" case (detached signature) or
"S{1,n} P" (old style PGP2 signature). */
for (n = n->next; n; n = n->next)
if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
break;
if (!n)
; /* Okay, this is a detached signature. */
else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK) )
{
if (n->next)
goto ambiguous; /* We only allow one P packet. */
}
else
goto ambiguous;
}
else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
{
/* This is the "O{1,n} P S{1,n}" case (standard signature). */
for (n_onepass=1, n = n->next;
n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG; n = n->next)
n_onepass++;
if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
goto ambiguous;
for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
n_sig++;
if (!n_sig)
goto ambiguous;
/* If we wanted to disallow multiple sig verification, we'd do
something like this:
if (n && !opt.allow_multisig_verification)
goto ambiguous;
However, now that we have --allow-multiple-messages, this
can stay allowable as we can't get here unless multiple
messages (i.e. multiple literals) are allowed. */
if (n_onepass != n_sig)
{
log_info ("number of one-pass packets does not match "
"number of signature packets\n");
goto ambiguous;
}
}
else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
{
/* This is the "C P S{1,n}" case (clear text signature). */
n = n->next;
if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
goto ambiguous;
for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
n_sig++;
if (n || !n_sig)
goto ambiguous;
}
else
{
ambiguous:
log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n"));
return 0;
}
}
if (sig->signers_uid)
write_status_buffer (STATUS_NEWSIG,
sig->signers_uid, strlen (sig->signers_uid), 0);
else
write_status_text (STATUS_NEWSIG, NULL);
astr = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( sig->pubkey_algo );
if (opt.flags.rfc4880bis && (issuer_fpr = issuer_fpr_string (sig)))
{
log_info (_("Signature made %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
log_info (_(" using %s key %s\n"),
astr? astr: "?", issuer_fpr);
xfree (issuer_fpr);
}
else if (!keystrlen () || keystrlen () > 8)
{
log_info (_("Signature made %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
log_info (_(" using %s key %s\n"),
astr? astr: "?", keystr(sig->keyid));
}
else /* Legacy format. */
log_info (_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"),
asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?",
keystr(sig->keyid));
/* In verbose mode print the signers UID. */
if (sig->signers_uid)
log_info (_(" issuer \"%s\"\n"), sig->signers_uid);
rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
/* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver. */
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks)
{
const byte *p;
int seq = 0;
size_t n;
while ((p=enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
{
/* According to my favorite copy editor, in English grammar,
you say "at" if the key is located on a web page, but
"from" if it is located on a keyserver. I'm not going to
even try to make two strings here :) */
log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream(), p, n);
log_printf ("\n");
if (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
&& opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL)
{
struct keyserver_spec *spec;
spec = parse_preferred_keyserver (sig);
if (spec)
{
int res;
free_public_key (pk);
pk = NULL;
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid,spec);
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
if (!res)
rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL,
&is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
free_keyserver_spec (spec);
if (!rc)
break;
}
}
}
}
/* If the avove methods didn't work, our next try is to use the URI
* from a DNS PKA record. */
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
&& (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
&& (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD))
{
const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig);
if (uri)
{
/* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the
fingerprint instead of the keyid. */
int res;
struct keyserver_spec *spec;
spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1);
if (spec)
{
free_public_key (pk);
pk = NULL;
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, spec);
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
free_keyserver_spec (spec);
if (!res)
rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
}
}
}
/* If the above methods didn't work, our next try is to use locate
* the key via its fingerprint from a keyserver. This requires
* that the signers fingerprint is encoded in the signature. We
* favor this over the WKD method (to be tried next), because an
* arbitrary keyserver is less subject to web bug like
* monitoring. */
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
&& opt.flags.rfc4880bis
&& (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
&& keyserver_any_configured (c->ctrl))
{
int res;
const byte *p;
size_t n;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR, &n);
if (p && n == 21 && p[0] == 4)
{
/* v4 packet with a SHA-1 fingerprint. */
free_public_key (pk);
pk = NULL;
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
res = keyserver_import_fprint (c->ctrl, p+1, n-1, opt.keyserver);
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
if (!res)
rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
}
}
/* If the above methods didn't work, our next try is to retrieve the
* key from the WKD. */
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
&& (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
&& !opt.flags.disable_signer_uid
&& akl_has_wkd_method ()
&& sig->signers_uid)
{
int res;
free_public_key (pk);
pk = NULL;
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
res = keyserver_import_wkd (c->ctrl, sig->signers_uid, NULL, NULL);
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
/* Fixme: If the fingerprint is embedded in the signature,
* compare it to the fingerprint of the returned key. */
if (!res)
rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
}
/* If the above methods did't work, our next try is to use a
* keyserver. */
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
&& (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
&& keyserver_any_configured (c->ctrl))
{
int res;
free_public_key (pk);
pk = NULL;
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, opt.keyserver );
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
if (!res)
rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
}
if (!rc || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
{
kbnode_t un, keyblock;
int count = 0;
int statno;
char keyid_str[50];
PKT_public_key *mainpk = NULL;
if (rc)
statno = STATUS_BADSIG;
else if (sig->flags.expired)
statno = STATUS_EXPSIG;
else if (is_expkey)
statno = STATUS_EXPKEYSIG;
else if(is_revkey)
statno = STATUS_REVKEYSIG;
else
statno = STATUS_GOODSIG;
/* FIXME: We should have the public key in PK and thus the
* keyboock has already been fetched. Thus we could use the
* fingerprint or PK itself to lookup the entire keyblock. That
* would best be done with a cache. */
keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (sig->keyid);
snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
/* Find and print the primary user ID along with the
"Good|Expired|Bad signature" line. */
for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
{
int valid;
if (un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
mainpk = un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
continue;
}
if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
continue;
if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created)
continue;
if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
continue;
if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
continue;
if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary)
continue;
/* We want the textual primary user ID here */
if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
continue;
log_assert (mainpk);
/* Since this is just informational, don't actually ask the
user to update any trust information. (Note: we register
the signature later.) Because print_good_bad_signature
does not print a LF we need to compute the validity
before calling that function. */
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
valid = get_validity (c->ctrl, mainpk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id,
NULL, 0);
else
valid = 0; /* Not used. */
keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
log_printf (" [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
else
log_printf ("\n");
count++;
}
log_assert (mainpk);
/* In case we did not found a valid valid textual userid above
we print the first user id packet or a "[?]" instead along
with the "Good|Expired|Bad signature" line. */
if (!count)
{
/* Try for an invalid textual userid */
for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
{
if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
break;
}
/* Try for any userid at all */
if (!un)
{
for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
{
if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
break;
}
}
if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un)
keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);
if (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS && un)
log_printf (" %s",_("[uncertain]") );
log_printf ("\n");
}
/* If we have a good signature and already printed
* the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
if (count
&& !rc
&& !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY))
{
char *p;
for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
{
if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
continue;
if ((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
|| un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
&& !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
continue;
/* Skip textual primary user ids which we printed above. */
if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary
&& !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
continue;
/* If this user id has attribute data, print that. */
if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
{
dump_attribs (un->pkt->pkt.user_id, mainpk);
if (opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
show_photos (c->ctrl,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
mainpk ,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
}
p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
log_info (_(" aka \"%s\""), p);
xfree (p);
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
{
const char *valid;
if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
valid = _("revoked");
else if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
valid = _("expired");
else
/* Since this is just informational, don't
actually ask the user to update any trust
information. */
valid = (trust_value_to_string
(get_validity (c->ctrl, mainpk,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, 0)));
log_printf (" [%s]\n",valid);
}
else
log_printf ("\n");
}
}
/* For good signatures print notation data. */
if (!rc)
{
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS))
show_policy_url (sig, 0, 1);
else
show_policy_url (sig, 0, 2);
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS))
show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 1);
else
show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 2);
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS))
show_notation
(sig, 0, 1,
(((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)
+ ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0)));
else
show_notation (sig, 0, 2, 0);
}
/* For good signatures print the VALIDSIG status line. */
if (!rc && is_status_enabled () && pk)
{
char pkhex[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];
char mainpkhex[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];
hexfingerprint (pk, pkhex, sizeof pkhex);
hexfingerprint (mainpk, mainpkhex, sizeof mainpkhex);
/* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below with
bits for status flags (policy url, notation, etc.). */
write_status_printf (STATUS_VALIDSIG,
"%s %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X %s",
pkhex,
strtimestamp (sig->timestamp),
(ulong)sig->timestamp,
(ulong)sig->expiredate,
sig->version, sig->pubkey_algo,
sig->digest_algo,
sig->sig_class,
mainpkhex);
}
/* For good signatures compute and print the trust information.
Note that in the Tofu trust model this may ask the user on
how to resolve a conflict. */
if (!rc)
{
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS))
pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */
rc = check_signatures_trust (c->ctrl, sig);
}
/* Print extra information about the signature. */
if (sig->flags.expired)
{
log_info (_("Signature expired %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Need a better error here? */
}
else if (sig->expiredate)
log_info (_("Signature expires %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
if (opt.verbose)
{
char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
if (pk)
pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf);
else
*pkstrbuf = 0;
log_info (_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s%s%s\n"),
sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"):
sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"),
gcry_md_algo_name (sig->digest_algo),
*pkstrbuf?_(", key algorithm "):"", pkstrbuf);
}
/* Print final warnings. */
if (!rc && !c->signed_data.used)
{
/* Signature is basically good but we test whether the
deprecated command
gpg --verify FILE.sig
was used instead of
gpg --verify FILE.sig FILE
to verify a detached signature. If we figure out that a
data file with a matching name exists, we print a warning.
The problem is that the first form would also verify a
standard signature. This behavior could be used to
create a made up .sig file for a tarball by creating a
standard signature from a valid detached signature packet
(for example from a signed git tag). Then replace the
sig file on the FTP server along with a changed tarball.
Using the first form the verify command would correctly
verify the signature but don't even consider the tarball. */
kbnode_t n;
char *dfile;
dfile = get_matching_datafile (c->sigfilename);
if (dfile)
{
for (n = c->list; n; n = n->next)
if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
break;
if (n)
{
/* Not only signature packets in the tree thus this
is not a detached signature. */
log_info (_("WARNING: not a detached signature; "
"file '%s' was NOT verified!\n"), dfile);
}
xfree (dfile);
}
}
release_kbnode( keyblock );
if (rc)
g10_errors_seen = 1;
if (opt.batch && rc)
g10_exit (1);
}
else
{
char buf[50];
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d",
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo,
sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp, rc);
write_status_text (STATUS_ERRSIG, buf);
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
{
buf[16] = 0;
write_status_text (STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, buf);
}
if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED)
log_error (_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
}
return rc;
}
/*
* Process the tree which starts at node
*/
static void
proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
{
kbnode_t n1;
int rc;
if (opt.list_packets || opt.list_only)
return;
/* We must skip our special plaintext marker packets here because
they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in
- addional checks and skipping them here doesn't matter. */
+ addtional checks and skipping them here doesn't matter. */
while (node
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)
{
node = node->next;
}
if (!node)
return;
c->trustletter = ' ';
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
merge_keys_and_selfsig (node);
list_node (c, node);
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
{
merge_keys_and_selfsig (node);
list_node (c, node);
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
{
/* Check all signatures. */
if (!c->any.data)
{
int use_textmode = 0;
free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
/* Prepare to create all requested message digests. */
rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0);
if (rc)
goto hash_err;
/* Fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not the
one-pass packet? */
for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
if (n1 && n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01)
use_textmode = 1;
/* Ask for file and hash it. */
if (c->sigs_only)
{
if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, NULL,
c->signed_data.data_fd,
use_textmode);
else
rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, NULL,
c->signed_data.data_names,
c->sigfilename,
use_textmode);
}
else
{
rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
iobuf_get_real_fname (c->iobuf),
use_textmode);
}
hash_err:
if (rc)
{
log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return;
}
}
else if (c->signed_data.used)
{
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
return;
}
for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
{
/* Clear text signed message. */
if (!c->any.data)
{
log_error ("cleartext signature without data\n");
return;
}
else if (c->signed_data.used)
{
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
return;
}
for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int multiple_ok = 1;
n1 = find_next_kbnode (node, PKT_SIGNATURE);
if (n1)
{
byte class = sig->sig_class;
byte hash = sig->digest_algo;
for (; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
{
/* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have
to run a different hash context for each), but if
they are all the same, make an exception. */
if (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class != class
|| n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo != hash)
{
multiple_ok = 0;
log_info (_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. "
"Only the first will be checked.\n"));
break;
}
}
}
if (sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01)
{
log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"), sig->sig_class);
}
else if (!c->any.data)
{
/* Detached signature */
free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, sig->digest_algo, 0);
if (rc)
goto detached_hash_err;
if (RFC2440 || RFC4880)
; /* Strict RFC mode. */
else if (sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
&& sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
&& sig->sig_class == 0x01)
{
/* Enable a workaround for a pgp5 bug when the detached
* signature has been created in textmode. */
rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md2, sig->digest_algo, 0);
if (rc)
goto detached_hash_err;
}
/* Here we used to have another hack to work around a pgp
* 2 bug: It worked by not using the textmode for detached
* signatures; this would let the first signature check
* (on md) fail but the second one (on md2), which adds an
* extra CR would then have produced the "correct" hash.
* This is very, very ugly hack but it may haved help in
* some cases (and break others).
* c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01)
*/
if (DBG_HASHING)
{
gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
if (c->mfx.md2)
gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
}
if (c->sigs_only)
{
if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
c->signed_data.data_fd,
(sig->sig_class == 0x01));
else
rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
c->signed_data.data_names,
c->sigfilename,
(sig->sig_class == 0x01));
}
else
{
rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
(sig->sig_class == 0x01));
}
detached_hash_err:
if (rc)
{
log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return;
}
}
else if (c->signed_data.used)
{
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
return;
}
else if (!opt.quiet)
log_info (_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"));
if (multiple_ok)
{
for (n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
}
else
check_sig_and_print (c, node);
}
else
{
dump_kbnode (c->list);
log_error ("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n");
dump_kbnode (node);
}
}
diff --git a/g10/pkclist.c b/g10/pkclist.c
index 62f5b7f9b..823d67062 100644
--- a/g10/pkclist.c
+++ b/g10/pkclist.c
@@ -1,1693 +1,1693 @@
/* pkclist.c - create a list of public keys
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
* 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "gpg.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "ttyio.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "photoid.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "tofu.h"
#define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)
static void
send_status_inv_recp (int reason, const char *name)
{
char buf[40];
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%d ", reason);
write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, buf,
name, strlen (name),
-1);
}
/****************
* Show the revocation reason as it is stored with the given signature
*/
static void
do_show_revocation_reason( PKT_signature *sig )
{
size_t n, nn;
const byte *p, *pp;
int seq = 0;
const char *text;
while( (p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON,
&n, &seq, NULL )) ) {
if( !n )
continue; /* invalid - just skip it */
if( *p == 0 )
text = _("No reason specified");
else if( *p == 0x01 )
text = _("Key is superseded");
else if( *p == 0x02 )
text = _("Key has been compromised");
else if( *p == 0x03 )
text = _("Key is no longer used");
else if( *p == 0x20 )
text = _("User ID is no longer valid");
else
text = NULL;
log_info ( _("reason for revocation: "));
if (text)
log_printf ("%s\n", text);
else
log_printf ("code=%02x\n", *p );
n--; p++;
pp = NULL;
do {
/* We don't want any empty lines, so skip them */
while( n && *p == '\n' ) {
p++;
n--;
}
if( n ) {
pp = memchr( p, '\n', n );
nn = pp? pp - p : n;
log_info ( _("revocation comment: ") );
es_write_sanitized (log_get_stream(), p, nn, NULL, NULL);
log_printf ("\n");
p += nn; n -= nn;
}
} while( pp );
}
}
/* Mode 0: try and find the revocation based on the pk (i.e. check
subkeys, etc.) Mode 1: use only the revocation on the main pk */
void
show_revocation_reason( PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
{
/* Hmmm, this is not so easy because we have to duplicate the code
* used in the trustbd to calculate the keyflags. We need to find
* a clean way to check revocation certificates on keys and
* signatures. And there should be no duplicate code. Because we
* enter this function only when the trustdb told us that we have
* a revoked key, we could simply look for a revocation cert and
* display this one, when there is only one. Let's try to do this
* until we have a better solution. */
KBNODE node, keyblock = NULL;
byte fingerprint[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t fingerlen;
int rc;
/* get the keyblock */
fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fingerprint, &fingerlen );
rc = get_pubkey_byfprint(NULL, &keyblock, fingerprint, fingerlen);
if( rc ) { /* that should never happen */
log_debug( "failed to get the keyblock\n");
return;
}
for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( (mode && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) ||
( ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
&& !cmp_public_keys( node->pkt->pkt.public_key, pk ) ) )
break;
}
if( !node ) {
log_debug("Oops, PK not in keyblock\n");
release_kbnode( keyblock );
return;
}
/* now find the revocation certificate */
for( node = node->next; node ; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
break;
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20
|| node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28 ) ) {
/* FIXME: we should check the signature here */
do_show_revocation_reason ( node->pkt->pkt.signature );
break;
}
}
/* We didn't find it, so check if the whole key is revoked */
if(!node && !mode)
show_revocation_reason(pk,1);
release_kbnode( keyblock );
}
/****************
* mode: 0 = standard
* 1 = Without key info and additional menu option 'm'
* this does also add an option to set the key to ultimately trusted.
* Returns:
* -2 = nothing changed - caller should show some additional info
* -1 = quit operation
* 0 = nothing changed
* 1 = new ownertrust now in new_trust
*/
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
static int
do_edit_ownertrust (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, int mode,
unsigned *new_trust, int defer_help )
{
char *p;
u32 keyid[2];
int changed=0;
int quit=0;
int show=0;
int min_num;
int did_help=defer_help;
unsigned int minimum = tdb_get_min_ownertrust (pk);
switch(minimum)
{
default:
case TRUST_UNDEFINED: min_num=1; break;
case TRUST_NEVER: min_num=2; break;
case TRUST_MARGINAL: min_num=3; break;
case TRUST_FULLY: min_num=4; break;
}
keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
for(;;) {
/* A string with valid answers.
TRANSLATORS: These are the allowed answers in lower and
uppercase. Below you will find the matching strings which
should be translated accordingly and the letter changed to
match the one in the answer string.
i = please show me more information
m = back to the main menu
s = skip this key
q = quit
*/
const char *ans = _("iImMqQsS");
if( !did_help )
{
if( !mode )
{
KBNODE keyblock, un;
tty_printf (_("No trust value assigned to:\n"));
print_key_line (NULL, pk, 0);
p = get_user_id_native(keyid);
tty_printf (_(" \"%s\"\n"),p);
xfree (p);
keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (keyid);
if (!keyblock)
BUG ();
for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
{
if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
continue;
if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
continue;
if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired )
continue;
/* Only skip textual primaries */
if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary
&& !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
continue;
if((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
&& un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
show_photos (ctrl,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs, pk,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
tty_printf(_(" aka \"%s\"\n"),p);
}
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 2);
tty_printf("\n");
release_kbnode (keyblock);
}
if(opt.trust_model==TM_DIRECT)
{
tty_printf(_("How much do you trust that this key actually "
"belongs to the named user?\n"));
tty_printf("\n");
}
else
{
/* This string also used in keyedit.c:trustsig_prompt */
tty_printf(_("Please decide how far you trust this user to"
" correctly verify other users' keys\n"
"(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from"
" different sources, etc.)\n"));
tty_printf("\n");
}
if(min_num<=1)
tty_printf (_(" %d = I don't know or won't say\n"), 1);
if(min_num<=2)
tty_printf (_(" %d = I do NOT trust\n"), 2);
if(min_num<=3)
tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust marginally\n"), 3);
if(min_num<=4)
tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust fully\n"), 4);
if (mode)
tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust ultimately\n"), 5);
#if 0
/* not yet implemented */
tty_printf (" i = please show me more information\n");
#endif
if( mode )
tty_printf(_(" m = back to the main menu\n"));
else
{
tty_printf(_(" s = skip this key\n"));
tty_printf(_(" q = quit\n"));
}
tty_printf("\n");
if(minimum)
tty_printf(_("The minimum trust level for this key is: %s\n\n"),
trust_value_to_string(minimum));
did_help = 1;
}
if( strlen(ans) != 8 )
BUG();
p = cpr_get("edit_ownertrust.value",_("Your decision? "));
trim_spaces(p);
cpr_kill_prompt();
if( !*p )
did_help = 0;
else if( *p && p[1] )
;
else if( !p[1] && ((*p >= '0'+min_num) && *p <= (mode?'5':'4')) )
{
unsigned int trust;
switch( *p )
{
case '1': trust = TRUST_UNDEFINED; break;
case '2': trust = TRUST_NEVER ; break;
case '3': trust = TRUST_MARGINAL ; break;
case '4': trust = TRUST_FULLY ; break;
case '5': trust = TRUST_ULTIMATE ; break;
default: BUG();
}
if (trust == TRUST_ULTIMATE
&& !cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("edit_ownertrust.set_ultimate.okay",
_("Do you really want to set this key"
" to ultimate trust? (y/N) ")))
; /* no */
else
{
*new_trust = trust;
changed = 1;
break;
}
}
#if 0
/* not yet implemented */
else if( *p == ans[0] || *p == ans[1] )
{
tty_printf(_("Certificates leading to an ultimately trusted key:\n"));
show = 1;
break;
}
#endif
else if( mode && (*p == ans[2] || *p == ans[3] || *p == CONTROL_D ) )
{
break ; /* back to the menu */
}
else if( !mode && (*p == ans[6] || *p == ans[7] ) )
{
break; /* skip */
}
else if( !mode && (*p == ans[4] || *p == ans[5] ) )
{
quit = 1;
break ; /* back to the menu */
}
xfree(p); p = NULL;
}
xfree(p);
return show? -2: quit? -1 : changed;
}
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
/*
* Display a menu to change the ownertrust of the key PK (which should
* be a primary key).
* For mode values see do_edit_ownertrust ()
*/
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
int
edit_ownertrust (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
{
unsigned int trust = 0;
int no_help = 0;
for(;;)
{
switch ( do_edit_ownertrust (ctrl, pk, mode, &trust, no_help ) )
{
case -1: /* quit */
return -1;
case -2: /* show info */
no_help = 1;
break;
case 1: /* trust value set */
trust &= ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
trust |= get_ownertrust (pk) & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
update_ownertrust (pk, trust );
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
}
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/
/****************
* Check whether we can trust this pk which has a trustlevel of TRUSTLEVEL
* Returns: true if we trust.
*/
static int
do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
{
/* We should not be able to get here with a revoked or expired
key */
if(trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED
|| trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED
|| (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_EXPIRED)
BUG();
if( opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS )
{
if( opt.verbose )
log_info("No trust check due to '--trust-model always' option\n");
return 1;
}
switch(trustlevel & TRUST_MASK)
{
default:
log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
trustlevel);
- /* fall thru */
+ /* fall through */
case TRUST_UNKNOWN:
case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
log_info(_("%s: There is no assurance this key belongs"
" to the named user\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
return 0; /* no */
case TRUST_MARGINAL:
log_info(_("%s: There is limited assurance this key belongs"
" to the named user\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
return 1; /* yes */
case TRUST_FULLY:
if( opt.verbose )
log_info(_("This key probably belongs to the named user\n"));
return 1; /* yes */
case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
if( opt.verbose )
log_info(_("This key belongs to us\n"));
return 1; /* yes */
case TRUST_NEVER:
/* This is retruned can be returned by TOFU, which can return
negative assertions. */
log_info(_("%s: This key is bad! It has been marked as untrusted!\n"),
keystr_from_pk(pk));
return 0; /* no */
}
return 1; /*NOTREACHED*/
}
/****************
* wrapper around do_we_trust, so we can ask whether to use the
* key anyway.
*/
static int
do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
{
int rc;
rc = do_we_trust( pk, trustlevel );
if( !opt.batch && !rc )
{
print_pubkey_info(NULL,pk);
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 2);
tty_printf("\n");
if ((trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_NEVER)
tty_printf(
_("This key has is bad! It has been marked as untrusted! If you\n"
"*really* know what you are doing, you may answer the next\n"
"question with yes.\n"));
else
tty_printf(
_("It is NOT certain that the key belongs to the person named\n"
"in the user ID. If you *really* know what you are doing,\n"
"you may answer the next question with yes.\n"));
tty_printf("\n");
if (is_status_enabled ())
{
u32 kid[2];
char *hint_str;
keyid_from_pk (pk, kid);
hint_str = get_long_user_id_string ( kid );
write_status_text ( STATUS_USERID_HINT, hint_str );
xfree (hint_str);
}
if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes("untrusted_key.override",
_("Use this key anyway? (y/N) ")) )
rc = 1;
/* Hmmm: Should we set a flag to tell the user about
* his decision the next time he encrypts for this recipient?
*/
}
return rc;
}
/* Write a TRUST_foo status line inclduing the validation model. */
static void
write_trust_status (int statuscode, int trustlevel)
{
#ifdef NO_TRUST_MODELS
write_status (statuscode);
#else /* NO_TRUST_MODELS */
int tm;
/* For the combined tofu+pgp method, we return the trust model which
* was responsible for the trustlevel. */
if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
tm = (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_TOFU_BASED)? TM_TOFU : TM_PGP;
else
tm = opt.trust_model;
write_status_strings (statuscode, "0 ", trust_model_string (tm), NULL);
#endif /* NO_TRUST_MODELS */
}
/****************
* Check whether we can trust this signature.
* Returns an error code if we should not trust this signature.
*/
int
check_signatures_trust (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig)
{
PKT_public_key *pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
unsigned int trustlevel = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
int rc=0;
rc = get_pubkey( pk, sig->keyid );
if (rc)
{ /* this should not happen */
log_error("Ooops; the key vanished - can't check the trust\n");
rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
goto leave;
}
if ( opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS )
{
if( !opt.quiet )
log_info(_("WARNING: Using untrusted key!\n"));
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 1);
goto leave;
}
if(pk->flags.maybe_revoked && !pk->flags.revoked)
log_info(_("WARNING: this key might be revoked (revocation key"
" not present)\n"));
trustlevel = get_validity (ctrl, pk, NULL, sig, 1);
if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) )
{
write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
if(pk->flags.revoked == 2)
log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its"
" designated revoker!\n"));
else
log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
log_info(_(" This could mean that the signature is forged.\n"));
show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
}
else if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) )
{
write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
log_info(_("WARNING: This subkey has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
}
if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
log_info (_("Note: This key has been disabled.\n"));
/* If we have PKA information adjust the trustlevel. */
if (sig->pka_info && sig->pka_info->valid)
{
unsigned char fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
PKT_public_key *primary_pk;
size_t fprlen;
int okay;
primary_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *primary_pk);
get_pubkey (primary_pk, pk->main_keyid);
fingerprint_from_pk (primary_pk, fpr, &fprlen);
free_public_key (primary_pk);
if ( fprlen == 20 && !memcmp (sig->pka_info->fpr, fpr, 20) )
{
okay = 1;
write_status_text (STATUS_PKA_TRUST_GOOD, sig->pka_info->email);
log_info (_("Note: Verified signer's address is '%s'\n"),
sig->pka_info->email);
}
else
{
okay = 0;
write_status_text (STATUS_PKA_TRUST_BAD, sig->pka_info->email);
log_info (_("Note: Signer's address '%s' "
"does not match DNS entry\n"), sig->pka_info->email);
}
switch ( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) )
{
case TRUST_UNKNOWN:
case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
case TRUST_MARGINAL:
if (okay && opt.verify_options&VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE)
{
trustlevel = ((trustlevel & ~TRUST_MASK) | TRUST_FULLY);
log_info (_("trustlevel adjusted to FULL"
" due to valid PKA info\n"));
}
/* (fall through) */
case TRUST_FULLY:
if (!okay)
{
trustlevel = ((trustlevel & ~TRUST_MASK) | TRUST_NEVER);
log_info (_("trustlevel adjusted to NEVER"
" due to bad PKA info\n"));
}
break;
}
}
/* Now let the user know what up with the trustlevel. */
switch ( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) )
{
case TRUST_EXPIRED:
log_info(_("Note: This key has expired!\n"));
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 1);
break;
default:
log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
trustlevel);
- /* fall thru */
+ /* fall through */
case TRUST_UNKNOWN:
case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
write_trust_status (STATUS_TRUST_UNDEFINED, trustlevel);
log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
" a trusted signature!\n"));
log_info(_(" There is no indication that the "
"signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 1);
break;
case TRUST_NEVER:
/* This level can be returned by TOFU, which supports negative
* assertions. */
write_trust_status (STATUS_TRUST_NEVER, trustlevel);
log_info(_("WARNING: We do NOT trust this key!\n"));
log_info(_(" The signature is probably a FORGERY.\n"));
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 1);
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
break;
case TRUST_MARGINAL:
write_trust_status (STATUS_TRUST_MARGINAL, trustlevel);
log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
" sufficiently trusted signatures!\n"));
log_info(_(" It is not certain that the"
" signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 1);
break;
case TRUST_FULLY:
write_trust_status (STATUS_TRUST_FULLY, trustlevel);
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 1);
break;
case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
write_trust_status (STATUS_TRUST_ULTIMATE, trustlevel);
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 1);
break;
}
leave:
free_public_key( pk );
return rc;
}
void
release_pk_list (pk_list_t pk_list)
{
PK_LIST pk_rover;
for ( ; pk_list; pk_list = pk_rover)
{
pk_rover = pk_list->next;
free_public_key ( pk_list->pk );
xfree ( pk_list );
}
}
static int
key_present_in_pk_list(PK_LIST pk_list, PKT_public_key *pk)
{
for( ; pk_list; pk_list = pk_list->next)
if (cmp_public_keys(pk_list->pk, pk) == 0)
return 0;
return -1;
}
/****************
* Return a malloced string with a default recipient if there is any
*/
static char *
default_recipient(ctrl_t ctrl)
{
PKT_public_key *pk;
byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
size_t n;
char *p;
int i;
if( opt.def_recipient )
return xstrdup( opt.def_recipient );
if( !opt.def_recipient_self )
return NULL;
pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
i = get_seckey_default (ctrl, pk);
if( i ) {
free_public_key( pk );
return NULL;
}
n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN;
fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fpr, &n );
free_public_key( pk );
p = xmalloc( 2*n+3 );
*p++ = '0';
*p++ = 'x';
for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
sprintf( p+2*i, "%02X", fpr[i] );
p -= 2;
return p;
}
static int
expand_id(const char *id,strlist_t *into,unsigned int flags)
{
struct groupitem *groups;
int count=0;
for(groups=opt.grouplist;groups;groups=groups->next)
{
/* need strcasecmp() here, as this should be localized */
if(strcasecmp(groups->name,id)==0)
{
strlist_t each,sl;
/* this maintains the current utf8-ness */
for(each=groups->values;each;each=each->next)
{
sl=add_to_strlist(into,each->d);
sl->flags=flags;
count++;
}
break;
}
}
return count;
}
/* For simplicity, and to avoid potential loops, we only expand once -
* you can't make an alias that points to an alias. */
static strlist_t
expand_group (strlist_t input)
{
strlist_t output = NULL;
strlist_t sl, rover;
for (rover = input; rover; rover = rover->next)
if (!(rover->flags & PK_LIST_FROM_FILE)
&& !expand_id(rover->d,&output,rover->flags))
{
/* Didn't find any groups, so use the existing string */
sl=add_to_strlist(&output,rover->d);
sl->flags=rover->flags;
}
return output;
}
/* Helper for build_pk_list to find and check one key. This helper is
* also used directly in server mode by the RECIPIENTS command. On
* success the new key is added to PK_LIST_ADDR. NAME is the user id
* of the key. USE the requested usage and a set MARK_HIDDEN will
* mark the key in the updated list as a hidden recipient. If
* FROM_FILE is true, NAME is is not a user ID but the name of a file
* holding a key. */
gpg_error_t
find_and_check_key (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, unsigned int use,
int mark_hidden, int from_file, pk_list_t *pk_list_addr)
{
int rc;
PKT_public_key *pk;
if (!name || !*name)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_USER_ID);
pk = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pk);
if (!pk)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
pk->req_usage = use;
if (from_file)
rc = get_pubkey_fromfile (ctrl, pk, name);
else
rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, pk, name, NULL, NULL, 0, 0);
if (rc)
{
int code;
/* Key not found or other error. */
log_error (_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), name, gpg_strerror (rc) );
switch (gpg_err_code (rc))
{
case GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY:
case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY: code = 1; break;
case GPG_ERR_INV_USER_ID: code = 14; break;
default: code = 0; break;
}
send_status_inv_recp (code, name);
free_public_key (pk);
return rc;
}
rc = openpgp_pk_test_algo2 (pk->pubkey_algo, use);
if (rc)
{
/* Key found but not usable for us (e.g. sign-only key). */
send_status_inv_recp (3, name); /* Wrong key usage */
log_error (_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), name, gpg_strerror (rc) );
free_public_key (pk);
return rc;
}
/* Key found and usable. Check validity. */
if (!from_file)
{
int trustlevel;
trustlevel = get_validity (ctrl, pk, pk->user_id, NULL, 1);
if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
{
/* Key has been disabled. */
send_status_inv_recp (13, name);
log_info (_("%s: skipped: public key is disabled\n"), name);
free_public_key (pk);
return GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY;
}
if ( !do_we_trust_pre (pk, trustlevel) )
{
/* We don't trust this key. */
send_status_inv_recp (10, name);
free_public_key (pk);
return GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY;
}
}
/* Skip the actual key if the key is already present in the
list. */
if (!key_present_in_pk_list (*pk_list_addr, pk))
{
if (!opt.quiet)
log_info (_("%s: skipped: public key already present\n"), name);
free_public_key (pk);
}
else
{
pk_list_t r;
r = xtrymalloc (sizeof *r);
if (!r)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
free_public_key (pk);
return rc;
}
r->pk = pk;
r->next = *pk_list_addr;
r->flags = mark_hidden? 1:0;
*pk_list_addr = r;
}
return 0;
}
/* This is the central function to collect the keys for recipients.
* It is thus used to prepare a public key encryption. encrypt-to
* keys, default keys and the keys for the actual recipients are all
* collected here. When not in batch mode and no recipient has been
* passed on the commandline, the function will also ask for
* recipients.
*
* RCPTS is a string list with the recipients; NULL is an allowed
* value but not very useful. Group expansion is done on these names;
* they may be in any of the user Id formats we can handle. The flags
* bits for each string in the string list are used for:
*
* - PK_LIST_ENCRYPT_TO :: This is an encrypt-to recipient.
* - PK_LIST_HIDDEN :: This is a hidden recipient.
* - PK_LIST_FROM_FILE :: The argument is a file with a key.
*
* On success a list of keys is stored at the address RET_PK_LIST; the
* caller must free this list. On error the value at this address is
* not changed.
*/
int
build_pk_list (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list)
{
PK_LIST pk_list = NULL;
PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
int rc=0;
int any_recipients=0;
strlist_t rov,remusr;
char *def_rec = NULL;
char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
/* Try to expand groups if any have been defined. */
if (opt.grouplist)
remusr = expand_group (rcpts);
else
remusr = rcpts;
/* XXX: Change this function to use get_pubkeys instead of
get_pubkey_byname to detect ambiguous key specifications and warn
about duplicate keyblocks. For ambiguous key specifications on
the command line or provided interactively, prompt the user to
select the best key. If a key specification is ambiguous and we
are in batch mode, die. */
if (opt.encrypt_to_default_key)
{
static int warned;
const char *default_key = parse_def_secret_key (ctrl);
if (default_key)
{
PK_LIST r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r);
r->pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r->pk);
r->pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, r->pk, default_key,
NULL, NULL, 0, 1);
if (rc)
{
xfree (r->pk);
xfree (r);
log_error (_("can't encrypt to '%s'\n"), default_key);
if (!opt.quiet)
log_info (_("(check argument of option '%s')\n"),
"--default-key");
}
else
{
r->next = pk_list;
r->flags = 0;
pk_list = r;
}
}
else if (opt.def_secret_key)
{
if (! warned)
log_info (_("option '%s' given, but no valid default keys given\n"),
"--encrypt-to-default-key");
warned = 1;
}
else
{
if (! warned)
log_info (_("option '%s' given, but option '%s' not given\n"),
"--encrypt-to-default-key", "--default-key");
warned = 1;
}
}
/* Check whether there are any recipients in the list and build the
* list of the encrypt-to ones (we always trust them). */
for ( rov = remusr; rov; rov = rov->next )
{
if ( !(rov->flags & PK_LIST_ENCRYPT_TO) )
{
/* This is a regular recipient; i.e. not an encrypt-to
one. */
any_recipients = 1;
/* Hidden recipients are not allowed while in PGP mode,
issue a warning and switch into GnuPG mode. */
if ((rov->flags & PK_LIST_HIDDEN) && (PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8))
{
log_info(_("you may not use %s while in %s mode\n"),
"--hidden-recipient",
compliance_option_string());
compliance_failure();
}
}
else if (!opt.no_encrypt_to)
{
/* --encrypt-to has not been disabled. Check this
encrypt-to key. */
pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
/* We explicitly allow encrypt-to to an disabled key; thus
we pass 1 for the second last argument and 1 as the last
argument to disable AKL. */
if ( (rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl,
NULL, pk, rov->d, NULL, NULL, 1, 1)) )
{
free_public_key ( pk ); pk = NULL;
log_error (_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), rov->d, gpg_strerror (rc) );
send_status_inv_recp (0, rov->d);
goto fail;
}
else if ( !(rc=openpgp_pk_test_algo2 (pk->pubkey_algo,
PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)) )
{
/* Skip the actual key if the key is already present
* in the list. Add it to our list if not. */
if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0)
{
free_public_key (pk); pk = NULL;
if (!opt.quiet)
log_info (_("%s: skipped: public key already present\n"),
rov->d);
}
else
{
PK_LIST r;
r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
r->next = pk_list;
r->flags = (rov->flags&PK_LIST_HIDDEN)?1:0;
pk_list = r;
/* Hidden encrypt-to recipients are not allowed while
in PGP mode, issue a warning and switch into
GnuPG mode. */
if ((r->flags&PK_LIST_ENCRYPT_TO) && (PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8))
{
log_info(_("you may not use %s while in %s mode\n"),
"--hidden-encrypt-to",
compliance_option_string());
compliance_failure();
}
}
}
else
{
/* The public key is not usable for encryption. */
free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), rov->d, gpg_strerror (rc) );
send_status_inv_recp (3, rov->d); /* Wrong key usage */
goto fail;
}
}
}
/* If we don't have any recipients yet and we are not in batch mode
drop into interactive selection mode. */
if ( !any_recipients && !opt.batch )
{
int have_def_rec;
char *answer = NULL;
strlist_t backlog = NULL;
if (pk_list)
any_recipients = 1;
def_rec = default_recipient(ctrl);
have_def_rec = !!def_rec;
if ( !have_def_rec )
tty_printf(_("You did not specify a user ID. (you may use \"-r\")\n"));
for (;;)
{
rc = 0;
xfree(answer);
if ( have_def_rec )
{
/* A default recipient is taken as the first entry. */
answer = def_rec;
def_rec = NULL;
}
else if (backlog)
{
/* This is part of our trick to expand and display groups. */
answer = strlist_pop (&backlog);
}
else
{
/* Show the list of already collected recipients and ask
for more. */
PK_LIST iter;
tty_printf("\n");
tty_printf(_("Current recipients:\n"));
for (iter=pk_list;iter;iter=iter->next)
{
u32 keyid[2];
keyid_from_pk(iter->pk,keyid);
tty_printf ("%s/%s %s \"",
pubkey_string (iter->pk,
pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
keystr(keyid),
datestr_from_pk (iter->pk));
if (iter->pk->user_id)
tty_print_utf8_string(iter->pk->user_id->name,
iter->pk->user_id->len);
else
{
size_t n;
char *p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
xfree(p);
}
tty_printf("\"\n");
}
answer = cpr_get_utf8("pklist.user_id.enter",
_("\nEnter the user ID. "
"End with an empty line: "));
trim_spaces(answer);
cpr_kill_prompt();
}
if ( !answer || !*answer )
{
xfree(answer);
break; /* No more recipients entered - get out of loop. */
}
/* Do group expand here too. The trick here is to continue
the loop if any expansion occurred. The code above will
then list all expanded keys. */
if (expand_id(answer,&backlog,0))
continue;
/* Get and check key for the current name. */
free_public_key (pk);
pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, pk, answer, NULL, NULL, 0, 0 );
if (rc)
tty_printf(_("No such user ID.\n"));
else if ( !(rc=openpgp_pk_test_algo2 (pk->pubkey_algo,
PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)) )
{
if ( have_def_rec )
{
/* No validation for a default recipient. */
if (!key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk))
{
free_public_key (pk);
pk = NULL;
log_info (_("skipped: public key "
"already set as default recipient\n") );
}
else
{
PK_LIST r = xmalloc (sizeof *r);
r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
r->next = pk_list;
r->flags = 0; /* No throwing default ids. */
pk_list = r;
}
any_recipients = 1;
continue;
}
else
{ /* Check validity of this key. */
int trustlevel;
trustlevel = get_validity (ctrl, pk, pk->user_id, NULL, 1);
if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
{
tty_printf (_("Public key is disabled.\n") );
}
else if ( do_we_trust_pre (pk, trustlevel) )
{
/* Skip the actual key if the key is already
* present in the list */
if (!key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk))
{
free_public_key (pk);
pk = NULL;
log_info(_("skipped: public key already set\n") );
}
else
{
PK_LIST r;
r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
r->next = pk_list;
r->flags = 0; /* No throwing interactive ids. */
pk_list = r;
}
any_recipients = 1;
continue;
}
}
}
xfree(def_rec); def_rec = NULL;
have_def_rec = 0;
}
if ( pk )
{
free_public_key( pk );
pk = NULL;
}
}
else if ( !any_recipients && (def_rec = default_recipient(ctrl)) )
{
/* We are in batch mode and have only a default recipient. */
pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
/* The default recipient is allowed to be disabled; thus pass 1
as second last argument. We also don't want an AKL. */
rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, pk, def_rec, NULL, NULL, 1, 1);
if (rc)
log_error(_("unknown default recipient \"%s\"\n"), def_rec );
else if ( !(rc=openpgp_pk_test_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo,
PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)) )
{
/* Mark any_recipients here since the default recipient
would have been used if it wasn't already there. It
doesn't really matter if we got this key from the default
recipient or an encrypt-to. */
any_recipients = 1;
if (!key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk))
log_info (_("skipped: public key already set "
"as default recipient\n"));
else
{
PK_LIST r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
r->next = pk_list;
r->flags = 0; /* No throwing default ids. */
pk_list = r;
}
}
if ( pk )
{
free_public_key( pk );
pk = NULL;
}
xfree(def_rec); def_rec = NULL;
}
else
{
/* General case: Check all keys. */
any_recipients = 0;
for (; remusr; remusr = remusr->next )
{
if ( (remusr->flags & PK_LIST_ENCRYPT_TO) )
continue; /* encrypt-to keys are already handled. */
rc = find_and_check_key (ctrl, remusr->d, PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC,
!!(remusr->flags&PK_LIST_HIDDEN),
!!(remusr->flags&PK_LIST_FROM_FILE),
&pk_list);
if (rc)
goto fail;
any_recipients = 1;
}
}
if ( !rc && !any_recipients )
{
log_error(_("no valid addressees\n"));
write_status_text (STATUS_NO_RECP, "0");
rc = GPG_ERR_NO_USER_ID;
}
#ifdef USE_TOFU
if (! rc && (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU))
{
PK_LIST iter;
for (iter = pk_list; iter; iter = iter->next)
{
int rc2;
/* Note: we already resolved any conflict when looking up
the key. Don't annoy the user again if she selected
accept once. */
rc2 = tofu_register_encryption (ctrl, iter->pk, NULL, 0);
if (rc2)
log_info ("WARNING: Failed to register encryption to %s"
" with TOFU engine\n",
keystr (pk_main_keyid (iter->pk)));
else if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("Registered encryption to %s with TOFU DB.\n",
keystr (pk_main_keyid (iter->pk)));
}
}
#endif /*USE_TOFU*/
fail:
if ( rc )
release_pk_list( pk_list );
else
*ret_pk_list = pk_list;
if (opt.grouplist)
free_strlist(remusr);
return rc;
}
/* In pgp6 mode, disallow all ciphers except IDEA (1), 3DES (2), and
CAST5 (3), all hashes except MD5 (1), SHA1 (2), and RIPEMD160 (3),
and all compressions except none (0) and ZIP (1). pgp7 and pgp8
mode expands the cipher list to include AES128 (7), AES192 (8),
AES256 (9), and TWOFISH (10). pgp8 adds the SHA-256 hash (8). For
a true PGP key all of this is unneeded as they are the only items
present in the preferences subpacket, but checking here covers the
weird case of encrypting to a key that had preferences from a
different implementation which was then used with PGP. I am not
completely comfortable with this as the right thing to do, as it
slightly alters the list of what the user is supposedly requesting.
It is not against the RFC however, as the preference chosen will
never be one that the user didn't specify somewhere ("The
implementation may use any mechanism to pick an algorithm in the
intersection"), and PGP has no mechanism to fix such a broken
preference list, so I'm including it. -dms */
int
algo_available( preftype_t preftype, int algo, const union pref_hint *hint)
{
if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM )
{
if(PGP6 && (algo != CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_3DES
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5))
return 0;
if(PGP7 && (algo != CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_3DES
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES192
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES256
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH))
return 0;
/* PGP8 supports all the ciphers we do.. */
return algo && !openpgp_cipher_test_algo ( algo );
}
else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_HASH )
{
if (hint && hint->digest_length)
{
if (hint->digest_length!=20 || opt.flags.dsa2)
{
/* If --enable-dsa2 is set or the hash isn't 160 bits
(which implies DSA2), then we'll accept a hash that
is larger than we need. Otherwise we won't accept
any hash that isn't exactly the right size. */
if (hint->digest_length > gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo))
return 0;
}
else if (hint->digest_length != gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo))
return 0;
}
if((PGP6 || PGP7) && (algo != DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
&& algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
&& algo != DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160))
return 0;
if(PGP8 && (algo != DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
&& algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
&& algo != DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160
&& algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256))
return 0;
return algo && !openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
}
else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP )
{
if((PGP6 || PGP7) && (algo != COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE
&& algo != COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP))
return 0;
/* PGP8 supports all the compression algos we do */
return !check_compress_algo( algo );
}
else
return 0;
}
/****************
* Return -1 if we could not find an algorithm.
*/
int
select_algo_from_prefs(PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype,
int request, const union pref_hint *hint)
{
PK_LIST pkr;
u32 bits[8];
const prefitem_t *prefs;
int result=-1,i;
u16 scores[256];
if( !pk_list )
return -1;
memset(bits,0xFF,sizeof(bits));
memset(scores,0,sizeof(scores));
for( pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next )
{
u32 mask[8];
int rank=1,implicit=-1;
memset(mask,0,sizeof(mask));
switch(preftype)
{
case PREFTYPE_SYM:
/* IDEA is implicitly there for v3 keys with v3 selfsigs if
--pgp2 mode is on. This was a 2440 thing that was
dropped from 4880 but is still relevant to GPG's 1991
support. All this doesn't mean IDEA is actually
available, of course. */
implicit=CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;
break;
case PREFTYPE_HASH:
/* While I am including this code for completeness, note
that currently --pgp2 mode locks the hash at MD5, so this
code will never even be called. Even if the hash wasn't
locked at MD5, we don't support sign+encrypt in --pgp2
mode, and that's the only time PREFTYPE_HASH is used
anyway. -dms */
implicit=DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
break;
case PREFTYPE_ZIP:
/* Uncompressed is always an option. */
implicit=COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE;
}
if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
prefs = pkr->pk->user_id->prefs;
else
prefs = pkr->pk->prefs;
if( prefs )
{
for (i=0; prefs[i].type; i++ )
{
if( prefs[i].type == preftype )
{
/* Make sure all scores don't add up past 0xFFFF
(and roll around) */
if(rank+scores[prefs[i].value]<=0xFFFF)
scores[prefs[i].value]+=rank;
else
scores[prefs[i].value]=0xFFFF;
mask[prefs[i].value/32] |= 1<<(prefs[i].value%32);
rank++;
/* We saw the implicit algorithm, so we don't need
tack it on the end ourselves. */
if(implicit==prefs[i].value)
implicit=-1;
}
}
}
if(rank==1 && preftype==PREFTYPE_ZIP)
{
/* If the compression preferences are not present, they are
assumed to be ZIP, Uncompressed (RFC4880:13.3.1) */
scores[1]=1; /* ZIP is first choice */
scores[0]=2; /* Uncompressed is second choice */
mask[0]|=3;
}
/* If the key didn't have the implicit algorithm listed
explicitly, add it here at the tail of the list. */
if(implicit>-1)
{
scores[implicit]+=rank;
mask[implicit/32] |= 1<<(implicit%32);
}
for(i=0;i<8;i++)
bits[i]&=mask[i];
}
/* We've now scored all of the algorithms, and the usable ones have
bits set. Let's pick the winner. */
/* The caller passed us a request. Can we use it? */
if(request>-1 && (bits[request/32] & (1<<(request%32))) &&
algo_available(preftype,request,hint))
result=request;
if(result==-1)
{
/* If we have personal prefs set, use them. */
prefs=NULL;
if(preftype==PREFTYPE_SYM && opt.personal_cipher_prefs)
prefs=opt.personal_cipher_prefs;
else if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH && opt.personal_digest_prefs)
prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs;
else if(preftype==PREFTYPE_ZIP && opt.personal_compress_prefs)
prefs=opt.personal_compress_prefs;
if( prefs )
for(i=0; prefs[i].type; i++ )
{
if(bits[prefs[i].value/32] & (1<<(prefs[i].value%32))
&& algo_available( preftype, prefs[i].value, hint))
{
result = prefs[i].value;
break;
}
}
}
if(result==-1)
{
unsigned int best=-1;
/* At this point, we have not selected an algorithm due to a
special request or via personal prefs. Pick the highest
ranked algorithm (i.e. the one with the lowest score). */
if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH && scores[DIGEST_ALGO_MD5])
{
/* "If you are building an authentication system, the recipient
may specify a preferred signing algorithm. However, the
signer would be foolish to use a weak algorithm simply
because the recipient requests it." (RFC4880:14). If any
other hash algorithm is available, pretend that MD5 isn't.
Note that if the user intentionally chose MD5 by putting it
in their personal prefs, then we do what the user said (as we
never reach this code). */
for(i=DIGEST_ALGO_MD5+1;i<256;i++)
if(scores[i])
{
scores[DIGEST_ALGO_MD5]=0;
break;
}
}
for(i=0;i<256;i++)
{
/* Note the '<' here. This means in case of a tie, we will
favor the lower algorithm number. We have a choice
between the lower number (probably an older algorithm
with more time in use), or the higher number (probably a
newer algorithm with less time in use). Older is
probably safer here, even though the newer algorithms
tend to be "stronger". */
if(scores[i] && scores[i]<best
&& (bits[i/32] & (1<<(i%32)))
&& algo_available(preftype,i,hint))
{
best=scores[i];
result=i;
}
}
}
return result;
}
/*
* Select the MDC flag from the pk_list. We can only use MDC if all
* recipients support this feature.
*/
int
select_mdc_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list)
{
PK_LIST pkr;
if ( !pk_list )
return 0;
for (pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next)
{
int mdc;
if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
mdc = pkr->pk->user_id->flags.mdc;
else
mdc = pkr->pk->flags.mdc;
if (!mdc)
return 0; /* At least one recipient does not support it. */
}
return 1; /* Can be used. */
}
/* Print a warning for all keys in PK_LIST missing the MDC feature. */
void
warn_missing_mdc_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list)
{
PK_LIST pkr;
for (pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next)
{
int mdc;
if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
mdc = pkr->pk->user_id->flags.mdc;
else
mdc = pkr->pk->flags.mdc;
if (!mdc)
log_info (_("Note: key %s has no %s feature\n"),
keystr_from_pk (pkr->pk), "MDC");
}
}
void
warn_missing_aes_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list)
{
PK_LIST pkr;
for (pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next)
{
const prefitem_t *prefs;
int i;
int gotit = 0;
prefs = pkr->pk->user_id? pkr->pk->user_id->prefs : pkr->pk->prefs;
if (prefs)
{
for (i=0; !gotit && prefs[i].type; i++ )
if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM
&& prefs[i].value == CIPHER_ALGO_AES)
gotit++;
}
if (!gotit)
log_info (_("Note: key %s has no preference for %s\n"),
keystr_from_pk (pkr->pk), "AES");
}
}
diff --git a/g10/tofu.c b/g10/tofu.c
index e6a3429e3..b78279e25 100644
--- a/g10/tofu.c
+++ b/g10/tofu.c
@@ -1,3456 +1,3456 @@
/* tofu.c - TOFU trust model.
* Copyright (C) 2015, 2016 g10 Code GmbH
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
/* TODO:
- Format the fingerprints nicely when printing (similar to gpg
--list-keys)
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <sqlite3.h>
#include "gpg.h"
#include "types.h"
#include "logging.h"
#include "stringhelp.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "mbox-util.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "ttyio.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "mkdir_p.h"
#include "gpgsql.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "sqrtu32.h"
#include "tofu.h"
#define CONTROL_L ('L' - 'A' + 1)
/* Number of signed messages required to indicate that enough history
* is available for basic trust. */
#define BASIC_TRUST_THRESHOLD 10
/* Number of signed messages required to indicate that a lot of
* history is available. */
#define FULL_TRUST_THRESHOLD 100
/* An struct with data pertaining to the tofu DB.
To initialize this data structure, call opendbs(). Cleanup is done
when the CTRL object is released. To get a handle to a database,
use the getdb() function. This will either return an existing
handle or open a new DB connection, as appropriate. */
struct tofu_dbs_s
{
sqlite3 *db;
struct
{
sqlite3_stmt *savepoint_batch;
sqlite3_stmt *savepoint_batch_commit;
sqlite3_stmt *record_binding_get_old_policy;
sqlite3_stmt *record_binding_update;
sqlite3_stmt *record_binding_update2;
sqlite3_stmt *get_policy_select_policy_and_conflict;
sqlite3_stmt *get_trust_bindings_with_this_email;
sqlite3_stmt *get_trust_gather_other_user_ids;
sqlite3_stmt *get_trust_gather_signature_stats;
sqlite3_stmt *get_trust_gather_encryption_stats;
sqlite3_stmt *register_already_seen;
sqlite3_stmt *register_insert;
} s;
int in_batch_transaction;
int in_transaction;
time_t batch_update_started;
};
#define STRINGIFY(s) STRINGIFY2(s)
#define STRINGIFY2(s) #s
/* The grouping parameters when collecting signature statistics. */
/* If a message is signed a couple of hours in the future, just assume
some clock skew. */
#define TIME_AGO_FUTURE_IGNORE (2 * 60 * 60)
/* Days. */
#define TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL (24 * 60 * 60)
#define TIME_AGO_SMALL_THRESHOLD (7 * TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL)
/* Months. */
#define TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM (30 * 24 * 60 * 60)
#define TIME_AGO_MEDIUM_THRESHOLD (2 * TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM)
/* Years. */
#define TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE (365 * 24 * 60 * 60)
#define TIME_AGO_LARGE_THRESHOLD (2 * TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE)
/* Local prototypes. */
static gpg_error_t end_transaction (ctrl_t ctrl, int only_batch);
static char *email_from_user_id (const char *user_id);
const char *
tofu_policy_str (enum tofu_policy policy)
{
switch (policy)
{
case TOFU_POLICY_NONE: return "none";
case TOFU_POLICY_AUTO: return "auto";
case TOFU_POLICY_GOOD: return "good";
case TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN: return "unknown";
case TOFU_POLICY_BAD: return "bad";
case TOFU_POLICY_ASK: return "ask";
default: return "???";
}
}
/* Convert a binding policy (e.g., TOFU_POLICY_BAD) to a trust level
(e.g., TRUST_BAD) in light of the current configuration. */
int
tofu_policy_to_trust_level (enum tofu_policy policy)
{
if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO)
/* If POLICY is AUTO, fallback to OPT.TOFU_DEFAULT_POLICY. */
policy = opt.tofu_default_policy;
switch (policy)
{
case TOFU_POLICY_AUTO:
/* If POLICY and OPT.TOFU_DEFAULT_POLICY are both AUTO, default
to marginal trust. */
return TRUST_MARGINAL;
case TOFU_POLICY_GOOD:
return TRUST_FULLY;
case TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN:
return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
case TOFU_POLICY_BAD:
return TRUST_NEVER;
case TOFU_POLICY_ASK:
return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
default:
log_bug ("Bad value for trust policy: %d\n",
opt.tofu_default_policy);
return 0;
}
}
/* Start a transaction on DB. If ONLY_BATCH is set, then this will
start a batch transaction if we haven't started a batch transaction
and one has been requested. */
static gpg_error_t
begin_transaction (ctrl_t ctrl, int only_batch)
{
tofu_dbs_t dbs = ctrl->tofu.dbs;
int rc;
char *err = NULL;
log_assert (dbs);
/* If we've been in batch update mode for a while (on average, more
* than 500 ms), to prevent starving other gpg processes, we drop
* and retake the batch lock.
*
* Note: if we wanted higher resolution, we could use
* npth_clock_gettime. */
if (/* No real transactions. */
dbs->in_transaction == 0
/* There is an open batch transaction. */
&& dbs->in_batch_transaction
/* And some time has gone by since it was started. */
&& dbs->batch_update_started != gnupg_get_time ())
{
/* If we are in a batch update, then batch updates better have
been enabled. */
log_assert (ctrl->tofu.batch_updated_wanted);
end_transaction (ctrl, 2);
/* Yield to allow another process a chance to run. */
gpgrt_yield ();
}
if (/* Batch mode is enabled. */
ctrl->tofu.batch_updated_wanted
/* But we don't have an open batch transaction. */
&& !dbs->in_batch_transaction)
{
/* We are in batch mode, but we don't have an open batch
* transaction. Since the batch save point must be the outer
* save point, it must be taken before the inner save point. */
log_assert (dbs->in_transaction == 0);
rc = gpgsql_stepx (dbs->db, &dbs->s.savepoint_batch,
NULL, NULL, &err,
"savepoint batch;", GPGSQL_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error beginning transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
dbs->in_batch_transaction = 1;
dbs->batch_update_started = gnupg_get_time ();
}
if (only_batch)
return 0;
log_assert(dbs->in_transaction >= 0);
dbs->in_transaction ++;
rc = gpgsql_exec_printf (dbs->db, NULL, NULL, &err,
"savepoint inner%d;",
dbs->in_transaction);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error beginning transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
return 0;
}
/* Commit a transaction. If ONLY_BATCH is 1, then this only ends the
* batch transaction if we have left batch mode. If ONLY_BATCH is 2,
* this ends any open batch transaction even if we are still in batch
* mode. */
static gpg_error_t
end_transaction (ctrl_t ctrl, int only_batch)
{
tofu_dbs_t dbs = ctrl->tofu.dbs;
int rc;
char *err = NULL;
if (only_batch)
{
if (!dbs)
return 0; /* Shortcut to allow for easier cleanup code. */
/* If we are releasing the batch transaction, then we better not
be in a normal transaction. */
log_assert (dbs->in_transaction == 0);
if (/* Batch mode disabled? */
(!ctrl->tofu.batch_updated_wanted || only_batch == 2)
/* But, we still have an open batch transaction? */
&& dbs->in_batch_transaction)
{
/* The batch transaction is still in open, but we've left
* batch mode. */
dbs->in_batch_transaction = 0;
rc = gpgsql_stepx (dbs->db, &dbs->s.savepoint_batch_commit,
NULL, NULL, &err,
"release batch;", GPGSQL_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error committing transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
log_assert (dbs);
log_assert (dbs->in_transaction > 0);
rc = gpgsql_exec_printf (dbs->db, NULL, NULL, &err,
"release inner%d;", dbs->in_transaction);
dbs->in_transaction --;
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error committing transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
return 0;
}
static gpg_error_t
rollback_transaction (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
tofu_dbs_t dbs = ctrl->tofu.dbs;
int rc;
char *err = NULL;
log_assert (dbs);
log_assert (dbs->in_transaction > 0);
/* Be careful to not any progress made by closed transactions in
batch mode. */
rc = gpgsql_exec_printf (dbs->db, NULL, NULL, &err,
"rollback to inner%d;",
dbs->in_transaction);
dbs->in_transaction --;
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error rolling back transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
return 0;
}
void
tofu_begin_batch_update (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
ctrl->tofu.batch_updated_wanted ++;
}
void
tofu_end_batch_update (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
log_assert (ctrl->tofu.batch_updated_wanted > 0);
ctrl->tofu.batch_updated_wanted --;
end_transaction (ctrl, 1);
}
/* Suspend any extant batch transaction (it is safe to call this even
no batch transaction has been started). Note: you cannot suspend a
batch transaction if you are in a normal transaction. The batch
transaction can be resumed explicitly by calling
tofu_resume_batch_transaction or implicitly by starting a normal
transaction. */
static void
tofu_suspend_batch_transaction (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
end_transaction (ctrl, 2);
}
/* Resume a batch transaction if there is no extant batch transaction
and one has been requested using tofu_begin_batch_transaction. */
static void
tofu_resume_batch_transaction (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
begin_transaction (ctrl, 1);
}
/* Wrapper around strtol which prints a warning in case of a
* conversion error. On success the converted value is stored at
* R_VALUE and 0 is returned; on error FALLBACK is stored at R_VALUE
* and an error code is returned. */
static gpg_error_t
string_to_long (long *r_value, const char *string, long fallback, int line)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *tail = NULL;
gpg_err_set_errno (0);
*r_value = strtol (string, &tail, 0);
if (errno || !(!strcmp (tail, ".0") || !*tail))
{
err = errno? gpg_error_from_errno (errno) : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
log_debug ("%s:%d: "
"strtol failed for DB returned string (tail=%.10s): %s\n",
__FILE__, line, tail, gpg_strerror (err));
*r_value = fallback;
}
else
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Wrapper around strtoul which prints a warning in case of a
* conversion error. On success the converted value is stored at
* R_VALUE and 0 is returned; on error FALLBACK is stored at R_VALUE
* and an error code is returned. */
static gpg_error_t
string_to_ulong (unsigned long *r_value, const char *string,
unsigned long fallback, int line)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *tail = NULL;
gpg_err_set_errno (0);
*r_value = strtoul (string, &tail, 0);
if (errno || !(!strcmp (tail, ".0") || !*tail))
{
err = errno? gpg_error_from_errno (errno) : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
log_debug ("%s:%d: "
"strtoul failed for DB returned string (tail=%.10s): %s\n",
__FILE__, line, tail, gpg_strerror (err));
*r_value = fallback;
}
else
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Collect results of a select count (*) ...; style query. Aborts if
the argument is not a valid integer (or real of the form X.0). */
static int
get_single_unsigned_long_cb (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv,
char **azColName)
{
unsigned long int *count = cookie;
(void) azColName;
log_assert (argc == 1);
if (string_to_ulong (count, argv[0], 0, __LINE__))
return 1; /* Abort. */
return 0;
}
static int
get_single_unsigned_long_cb2 (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv,
char **azColName, sqlite3_stmt *stmt)
{
(void) stmt;
return get_single_unsigned_long_cb (cookie, argc, argv, azColName);
}
/* We expect a single integer column whose name is "version". COOKIE
must point to an int. This function always aborts. On error or a
if the version is bad, sets *VERSION to -1. */
static int
version_check_cb (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv, char **azColName)
{
int *version = cookie;
if (argc != 1 || strcmp (azColName[0], "version") != 0)
{
*version = -1;
return 1;
}
if (strcmp (argv[0], "1") == 0)
*version = 1;
else
{
log_error (_("unsupported TOFU database version: %s\n"), argv[0]);
*version = -1;
}
/* Don't run again. */
return 1;
}
/* If the DB is new, initialize it. Otherwise, check the DB's
version.
Return 0 if the database is okay and 1 otherwise. */
static int
initdb (sqlite3 *db)
{
char *err = NULL;
int rc;
unsigned long int count;
int version = -1;
rc = sqlite3_exec (db, "begin transaction;", NULL, NULL, &err);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error beginning transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
return 1;
}
/* If the DB has no tables, then assume this is a new DB that needs
to be initialized. */
rc = sqlite3_exec (db,
"select count(*) from sqlite_master where type='table';",
get_single_unsigned_long_cb, &count, &err);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("query available tables");
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
else if (count != 0)
/* Assume that the DB is already initialized. Make sure the
version is okay. */
{
rc = sqlite3_exec (db, "select version from version;", version_check_cb,
&version, &err);
if (rc == SQLITE_ABORT && version == 1)
/* Happy, happy, joy, joy. */
{
sqlite3_free (err);
rc = 0;
goto out;
}
else if (rc == SQLITE_ABORT && version == -1)
/* Unsupported version. */
{
/* An error message was already displayed. */
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
else if (rc)
/* Some error. */
{
log_error (_("error determining TOFU database's version: %s\n"), err);
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
else
{
/* Unexpected success. This can only happen if there are no
rows. (select returned 0, but expected ABORT.) */
log_error (_("error determining TOFU database's version: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA));
rc = 1;
goto out;
}
}
/* Create the version table. */
rc = sqlite3_exec (db,
"create table version (version INTEGER);",
NULL, NULL, &err);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error initializing TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("create version");
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
/* Initialize the version table, which contains a single integer
value. */
rc = sqlite3_exec (db,
"insert into version values (1);",
NULL, NULL, &err);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error initializing TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("insert version");
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
/* The list of <fingerprint, email> bindings and auxiliary data.
*
* OID is a unique ID identifying this binding (and used by the
* signatures table, see below). Note: OIDs will never be
* reused.
*
* FINGERPRINT: The key's fingerprint.
*
* EMAIL: The normalized email address.
*
* USER_ID: The unmodified user id from which EMAIL was extracted.
*
* TIME: The time this binding was first observed.
*
* POLICY: The trust policy (TOFU_POLICY_BAD, etc. as an integer).
*
* CONFLICT is either NULL or a fingerprint. Assume that we have
* a binding <0xdeadbeef, foo@example.com> and then we observe
* <0xbaddecaf, foo@example.com>. There two bindings conflict
* (they have the same email address). When we observe the
* latter binding, we warn the user about the conflict and ask
* for a policy decision about the new binding. We also change
* the old binding's policy to ask if it was auto. So that we
* know why this occurred, we also set conflict to 0xbaddecaf.
*/
rc = gpgsql_exec_printf
(db, NULL, NULL, &err,
"create table bindings\n"
" (oid INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,\n"
" fingerprint TEXT, email TEXT, user_id TEXT, time INTEGER,\n"
" policy BOOLEAN CHECK (policy in (%d, %d, %d, %d, %d)),\n"
" conflict STRING,\n"
" unique (fingerprint, email));\n"
"create index bindings_fingerprint_email\n"
" on bindings (fingerprint, email);\n"
"create index bindings_email on bindings (email);\n",
TOFU_POLICY_AUTO, TOFU_POLICY_GOOD, TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN,
TOFU_POLICY_BAD, TOFU_POLICY_ASK);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error initializing TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("create bindings");
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
/* The signatures that we have observed.
*
* BINDING refers to a record in the bindings table, which
* describes the binding (i.e., this is a foreign key that
* references bindings.oid).
*
* SIG_DIGEST is the digest stored in the signature.
*
* SIG_TIME is the timestamp stored in the signature.
*
* ORIGIN is a free-form string that describes who fed this
* signature to GnuPG (e.g., email:claws).
*
* TIME is the time this signature was registered. */
rc = sqlite3_exec (db,
"create table signatures "
" (binding INTEGER NOT NULL, sig_digest TEXT,"
" origin TEXT, sig_time INTEGER, time INTEGER,"
" primary key (binding, sig_digest, origin));",
NULL, NULL, &err);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error initializing TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("create signatures");
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
out:
if (! rc)
{
/* Early version of the v1 format did not include the encryption
table. Add it. */
sqlite3_exec (db,
"create table if not exists encryptions"
" (binding INTEGER NOT NULL,"
" time INTEGER);"
"create index if not exists encryptions_binding"
" on encryptions (binding);\n",
NULL, NULL, &err);
}
if (rc)
{
rc = sqlite3_exec (db, "rollback;", NULL, NULL, &err);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error rolling back transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
}
return 1;
}
else
{
rc = sqlite3_exec (db, "end transaction;", NULL, NULL, &err);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error committing transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
err);
sqlite3_free (err);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
}
/* Create a new DB handle. Returns NULL on error. */
/* FIXME: Change to return an error code for better reporting by the
caller. */
static tofu_dbs_t
opendbs (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
char *filename;
sqlite3 *db;
int rc;
if (!ctrl->tofu.dbs)
{
filename = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), "tofu.db", NULL);
rc = sqlite3_open (filename, &db);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error opening TOFU database '%s': %s\n"),
filename, sqlite3_errmsg (db));
/* Even if an error occurs, DB is guaranteed to be valid. */
sqlite3_close (db);
db = NULL;
}
xfree (filename);
/* If a DB is locked wait up to 5 seconds for the lock to be cleared
before failing. */
if (db)
sqlite3_busy_timeout (db, 5 * 1000);
if (db && initdb (db))
{
sqlite3_close (db);
db = NULL;
}
if (db)
{
ctrl->tofu.dbs = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *ctrl->tofu.dbs);
ctrl->tofu.dbs->db = db;
}
}
else
log_assert (ctrl->tofu.dbs->db);
return ctrl->tofu.dbs;
}
/* Release all of the resources associated with the DB handle. */
void
tofu_closedbs (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
tofu_dbs_t dbs;
sqlite3_stmt **statements;
dbs = ctrl->tofu.dbs;
if (!dbs)
return; /* Not initialized. */
log_assert (dbs->in_transaction == 0);
end_transaction (ctrl, 2);
/* Arghh, that is a surprising use of the struct. */
for (statements = (void *) &dbs->s;
(void *) statements < (void *) &(&dbs->s)[1];
statements ++)
sqlite3_finalize (*statements);
sqlite3_close (dbs->db);
xfree (dbs);
ctrl->tofu.dbs = NULL;
}
/* Collect results of a select min (foo) ...; style query. Aborts if
the argument is not a valid integer (or real of the form X.0). */
static int
get_single_long_cb (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv, char **azColName)
{
long *count = cookie;
(void) azColName;
log_assert (argc == 1);
if (string_to_long (count, argv[0], 0, __LINE__))
return 1; /* Abort. */
return 0;
}
static int
get_single_long_cb2 (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv, char **azColName,
sqlite3_stmt *stmt)
{
(void) stmt;
return get_single_long_cb (cookie, argc, argv, azColName);
}
/* Record (or update) a trust policy about a (possibly new)
binding.
If SHOW_OLD is set, the binding's old policy is displayed. */
static gpg_error_t
record_binding (tofu_dbs_t dbs, const char *fingerprint, const char *email,
const char *user_id, enum tofu_policy policy, int show_old,
time_t now)
{
char *fingerprint_pp = format_hexfingerprint (fingerprint, NULL, 0);
gpg_error_t rc;
char *err = NULL;
if (! (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_GOOD
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_BAD
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK))
log_bug ("%s: Bad value for policy (%d)!\n", __func__, policy);
if (DBG_TRUST || show_old)
{
/* Get the old policy. Since this is just for informational
* purposes, there is no need to start a transaction or to die
* if there is a failure. */
/* policy_old needs to be a long and not an enum tofu_policy,
because we pass it by reference to get_single_long_cb2, which
expects a long. */
long policy_old = TOFU_POLICY_NONE;
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.record_binding_get_old_policy,
get_single_long_cb2, &policy_old, &err,
"select policy from bindings where fingerprint = ? and email = ?",
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, fingerprint, GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, email,
GPGSQL_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_debug ("TOFU: Error reading from binding database"
" (reading policy for <key: %s, user id: %s>): %s\n",
fingerprint, email, err);
sqlite3_free (err);
}
if (policy_old != TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
(show_old ? log_info : log_debug)
("Changing TOFU trust policy for binding"
" <key: %s, user id: %s> from %s to %s.\n",
fingerprint, show_old ? user_id : email,
tofu_policy_str (policy_old),
tofu_policy_str (policy));
else
(show_old ? log_info : log_debug)
("Setting TOFU trust policy for new binding"
" <key: %s, user id: %s> to %s.\n",
fingerprint, show_old ? user_id : email,
tofu_policy_str (policy));
if (policy_old == policy)
{
rc = 0;
goto leave; /* Nothing to do. */
}
}
if (opt.dry_run)
{
log_info ("TOFU database update skipped due to --dry-run\n");
rc = 0;
goto leave;
}
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.record_binding_update, NULL, NULL, &err,
"insert or replace into bindings\n"
" (oid, fingerprint, email, user_id, time, policy)\n"
" values (\n"
/* If we don't explicitly reuse the OID, then SQLite will
reallocate a new one. We just need to search for the OID
based on the fingerprint and email since they are unique. */
" (select oid from bindings where fingerprint = ? and email = ?),\n"
" ?, ?, ?, ?, ?);",
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, fingerprint, GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, email,
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, fingerprint, GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, email,
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, user_id,
GPGSQL_ARG_LONG_LONG, (long long) now,
GPGSQL_ARG_INT, (int) policy,
GPGSQL_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error updating TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info (" insert bindings <key: %s, user id: %s> = %s",
fingerprint, email, tofu_policy_str (policy));
sqlite3_free (err);
goto leave;
}
leave:
xfree (fingerprint_pp);
return rc;
}
/* Collect the strings returned by a query in a simply string list.
Any NULL values are converted to the empty string.
If a result has 3 rows and each row contains two columns, then the
results are added to the list as follows (the value is parentheses
is the 1-based index in the final list):
row 1, col 2 (6)
row 1, col 1 (5)
row 2, col 2 (4)
row 2, col 1 (3)
row 3, col 2 (2)
row 3, col 1 (1)
This is because add_to_strlist pushes the results onto the front of
the list. The end result is that the rows are backwards, but the
columns are in the expected order. */
static int
strings_collect_cb (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv, char **azColName)
{
int i;
strlist_t *strlist = cookie;
(void) azColName;
for (i = argc - 1; i >= 0; i --)
add_to_strlist (strlist, argv[i] ? argv[i] : "");
return 0;
}
static int
strings_collect_cb2 (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv, char **azColName,
sqlite3_stmt *stmt)
{
(void) stmt;
return strings_collect_cb (cookie, argc, argv, azColName);
}
/* Auxiliary data structure to collect statistics about
signatures. */
struct signature_stats
{
struct signature_stats *next;
/* The user-assigned policy for this binding. */
enum tofu_policy policy;
/* How long ago the signature was created (rounded to a multiple of
TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL, etc.). */
long time_ago;
/* Number of signatures during this time. */
unsigned long count;
/* If the corresponding key/user id has been expired / revoked. */
int is_expired;
int is_revoked;
/* The key that generated this signature. */
char fingerprint[1];
};
static void
signature_stats_free (struct signature_stats *stats)
{
while (stats)
{
struct signature_stats *next = stats->next;
xfree (stats);
stats = next;
}
}
static void
signature_stats_prepend (struct signature_stats **statsp,
const char *fingerprint,
enum tofu_policy policy,
long time_ago,
unsigned long count)
{
struct signature_stats *stats =
xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*stats) + strlen (fingerprint));
stats->next = *statsp;
*statsp = stats;
strcpy (stats->fingerprint, fingerprint);
stats->policy = policy;
stats->time_ago = time_ago;
stats->count = count;
}
/* Process rows that contain the four columns:
<fingerprint, policy, time ago, count>. */
static int
signature_stats_collect_cb (void *cookie, int argc, char **argv,
char **azColName, sqlite3_stmt *stmt)
{
struct signature_stats **statsp = cookie;
int i = 0;
enum tofu_policy policy;
long time_ago;
unsigned long count;
long along;
(void) azColName;
(void) stmt;
i ++;
if (string_to_long (&along, argv[i], 0, __LINE__))
return 1; /* Abort */
policy = along;
i ++;
if (! argv[i])
time_ago = 0;
else
{
if (string_to_long (&time_ago, argv[i], 0, __LINE__))
return 1; /* Abort. */
}
i ++;
/* If time_ago is NULL, then we had no messages, but we still have a
single row, which count(*) turns into 1. */
if (! argv[i - 1])
count = 0;
else
{
if (string_to_ulong (&count, argv[i], 0, __LINE__))
return 1; /* Abort */
}
i ++;
log_assert (argc == i);
signature_stats_prepend (statsp, argv[0], policy, time_ago, count);
return 0;
}
/* Convert from seconds to time units.
Note: T should already be a multiple of TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL or
TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM or TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE. */
signed long
time_ago_scale (signed long t)
{
if (t < TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM)
return t / TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL;
if (t < TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE)
return t / TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM;
return t / TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE;
}
/* Return the policy for the binding <FINGERPRINT, EMAIL> (email has
already been normalized) and any conflict information in *CONFLICT
if CONFLICT is not NULL. Returns _tofu_GET_POLICY_ERROR if an error
occurs. */
static enum tofu_policy
get_policy (tofu_dbs_t dbs, const char *fingerprint, const char *email,
char **conflict)
{
int rc;
char *err = NULL;
strlist_t strlist = NULL;
enum tofu_policy policy = _tofu_GET_POLICY_ERROR;
long along;
/* Check if the <FINGERPRINT, EMAIL> binding is known
(TOFU_POLICY_NONE cannot appear in the DB. Thus, if POLICY is
still TOFU_POLICY_NONE after executing the query, then the
result set was empty.) */
rc = gpgsql_stepx (dbs->db, &dbs->s.get_policy_select_policy_and_conflict,
strings_collect_cb2, &strlist, &err,
"select policy, conflict from bindings\n"
" where fingerprint = ? and email = ?",
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, fingerprint,
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, email,
GPGSQL_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("checking for existing bad bindings");
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
if (strlist_length (strlist) == 0)
/* No results. */
{
policy = TOFU_POLICY_NONE;
goto out;
}
else if (strlist_length (strlist) != 2)
/* The result has the wrong form. */
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA));
print_further_info ("checking for existing bad bindings:"
" expected 2 results, got %d\n",
strlist_length (strlist));
goto out;
}
/* The result has the right form. */
if (string_to_long (&along, strlist->d, 0, __LINE__))
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA));
print_further_info ("bad value for policy: %s", strlist->d);
goto out;
}
policy = along;
if (! (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_GOOD
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_BAD
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK))
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_DB_CORRUPTED));
print_further_info ("invalid value for policy (%d)", policy);
policy = _tofu_GET_POLICY_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* If CONFLICT is set, then policy should be TOFU_POLICY_ASK. But,
just in case, we do the check again here and ignore the conflict
if POLICY is not TOFU_POLICY_ASK. */
if (conflict)
{
if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK && *strlist->next->d)
*conflict = xstrdup (strlist->next->d);
else
*conflict = NULL;
}
out:
log_assert (policy == _tofu_GET_POLICY_ERROR
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_GOOD
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_BAD
|| policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK);
free_strlist (strlist);
return policy;
}
/* Format the first part of a conflict message and return that as a
* malloced string. */
static char *
format_conflict_msg_part1 (int policy, strlist_t conflict_set,
const char *email)
{
estream_t fp;
char *fingerprint;
char *tmpstr, *text;
log_assert (conflict_set);
fingerprint = conflict_set->d;
fp = es_fopenmem (0, "rw,samethread");
if (!fp)
log_fatal ("error creating memory stream: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror()));
if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
{
es_fprintf (fp,
_("This is the first time the email address \"%s\" is "
"being used with key %s."),
email, fingerprint);
es_fputs (" ", fp);
}
else if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK && conflict_set->next)
{
int conflicts = strlist_length (conflict_set);
es_fprintf (fp, _("The email address \"%s\" is associated with %d keys!"),
email, conflicts);
if (opt.verbose)
es_fprintf (fp,
_(" Since this binding's policy was 'auto', it has been "
"changed to 'ask'."));
es_fputs (" ", fp);
}
es_fprintf (fp,
_("Please indicate whether this email address should"
" be associated with key %s or whether you think someone"
" is impersonating \"%s\"."),
fingerprint, email);
es_fputc ('\n', fp);
es_fputc (0, fp);
if (es_fclose_snatch (fp, (void **)&tmpstr, NULL))
log_fatal ("error snatching memory stream\n");
text = format_text (tmpstr, 0, 72, 80);
es_free (tmpstr);
return text;
}
/* Return 1 if A signed B and B signed A. */
static int
cross_sigs (kbnode_t a, kbnode_t b)
{
int i;
PKT_public_key *a_pk = a->pkt->pkt.public_key;
PKT_public_key *b_pk = b->pkt->pkt.public_key;
char a_keyid[33];
char b_keyid[33];
if (DBG_TRUST)
{
format_keyid (pk_main_keyid (a_pk),
KF_LONG, a_keyid, sizeof (a_keyid));
format_keyid (pk_main_keyid (b_pk),
KF_LONG, b_keyid, sizeof (b_keyid));
}
for (i = 0; i < 2; i ++)
{
/* See if SIGNER signed SIGNEE. */
kbnode_t signer = i == 0 ? a : b;
kbnode_t signee = i == 0 ? b : a;
PKT_public_key *signer_pk = signer->pkt->pkt.public_key;
u32 *signer_kid = pk_main_keyid (signer_pk);
kbnode_t n;
/* Iterate over SIGNEE's keyblock and see if there is a valid
signature from SIGNER. */
for (n = signee; n; n = n->next)
{
PKT_signature *sig;
if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
continue;
sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (! (sig->sig_class == 0x10
|| sig->sig_class == 0x11
|| sig->sig_class == 0x12
|| sig->sig_class == 0x13))
/* Not a signature over a user id. */
continue;
/* SIG is on SIGNEE's keyblock. If SIG was generated by the
signer, then it's a match. */
if (keyid_cmp (sig->keyid, signer_kid) == 0)
/* Match! */
break;
}
if (! n)
/* We didn't find a signature from signer over signee. */
{
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("No cross sig between %s and %s\n",
a_keyid, b_keyid);
return 0;
}
}
/* A signed B and B signed A. */
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("Cross sig between %s and %s\n",
a_keyid, b_keyid);
return 1;
}
/* Return whether the key was signed by an ultimately trusted key. */
static int
signed_by_utk (kbnode_t a)
{
kbnode_t n;
for (n = a; n; n = n->next)
{
PKT_signature *sig;
if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
continue;
sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (! (sig->sig_class == 0x10
|| sig->sig_class == 0x11
|| sig->sig_class == 0x12
|| sig->sig_class == 0x13))
/* Not a signature over a user id. */
continue;
/* SIG is on SIGNEE's keyblock. If SIG was generated by the
signer, then it's a match. */
if (tdb_keyid_is_utk (sig->keyid))
{
/* Match! */
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("TOFU: %s is signed by an ultimately trusted key.\n",
pk_keyid_str (a->pkt->pkt.public_key));
return 1;
}
}
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("TOFU: %s is NOT signed by an ultimately trusted key.\n",
pk_keyid_str (a->pkt->pkt.public_key));
return 0;
}
enum
{
BINDING_NEW = 1 << 0,
BINDING_CONFLICT = 1 << 1,
BINDING_EXPIRED = 1 << 2,
BINDING_REVOKED = 1 << 3
};
/* Ask the user about the binding. There are three ways we could end
* up here:
*
* - This is a new binding and there is a conflict
* (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE && conflict_set_count > 1),
*
* - This is a new binding and opt.tofu_default_policy is set to
* ask. (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE && opt.tofu_default_policy ==
* TOFU_POLICY_ASK), or,
*
* - The policy is ask (the user deferred last time) (policy ==
* TOFU_POLICY_ASK).
*
* Note: this function must not be called while in a transaction!
*
* CONFLICT_SET includes all of the conflicting bindings
* with FINGERPRINT first. FLAGS is a bit-wise or of
* BINDING_NEW, etc.
*/
static void
ask_about_binding (ctrl_t ctrl,
enum tofu_policy *policy,
int *trust_level,
strlist_t conflict_set,
const char *fingerprint,
const char *email,
const char *user_id,
time_t now)
{
tofu_dbs_t dbs;
strlist_t iter;
int conflict_set_count = strlist_length (conflict_set);
char *sqerr = NULL;
int rc;
estream_t fp;
strlist_t other_user_ids = NULL;
struct signature_stats *stats = NULL;
struct signature_stats *stats_iter = NULL;
char *prompt = NULL;
char *choices;
dbs = ctrl->tofu.dbs;
log_assert (dbs);
log_assert (dbs->in_transaction == 0);
fp = es_fopenmem (0, "rw,samethread");
if (!fp)
log_fatal ("error creating memory stream: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror()));
{
char *text = format_conflict_msg_part1 (*policy, conflict_set, email);
es_fputs (text, fp);
es_fputc ('\n', fp);
xfree (text);
}
begin_transaction (ctrl, 0);
/* Find other user ids associated with this key and whether the
* bindings are marked as good or bad. */
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.get_trust_gather_other_user_ids,
strings_collect_cb2, &other_user_ids, &sqerr,
"select user_id, policy from bindings where fingerprint = ?;",
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, fingerprint, GPGSQL_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error gathering other user IDs: %s\n"), sqerr);
sqlite3_free (sqerr);
sqerr = NULL;
}
if (other_user_ids)
{
strlist_t strlist_iter;
es_fprintf (fp, _("This key's user IDs:\n"));
for (strlist_iter = other_user_ids;
strlist_iter;
strlist_iter = strlist_iter->next)
{
char *other_user_id = strlist_iter->d;
char *other_thing;
enum tofu_policy other_policy;
log_assert (strlist_iter->next);
strlist_iter = strlist_iter->next;
other_thing = strlist_iter->d;
other_policy = atoi (other_thing);
es_fprintf (fp, " %s (", other_user_id);
es_fprintf (fp, _("policy: %s"), tofu_policy_str (other_policy));
es_fprintf (fp, ")\n");
}
es_fprintf (fp, "\n");
free_strlist (other_user_ids);
}
/* Get the stats for all the keys in CONFLICT_SET. */
strlist_rev (&conflict_set);
for (iter = conflict_set; iter && ! rc; iter = iter->next)
{
#define STATS_SQL(table, time, sign) \
"select fingerprint, policy, time_ago, count(*)\n" \
" from\n" \
" (select bindings.*,\n" \
" "sign" case\n" \
" when delta ISNULL then 1\n" \
/* From the future (but if its just a couple of hours in the \
* future don't turn it into a warning)? Or should we use \
* small, medium or large units? (Note: whatever we do, we \
* keep the value in seconds. Then when we group, everything \
* that rounds to the same number of seconds is grouped.) */ \
" when delta < -("STRINGIFY (TIME_AGO_FUTURE_IGNORE)") then 2\n" \
" when delta < ("STRINGIFY (TIME_AGO_SMALL_THRESHOLD)")\n" \
" then 3\n" \
" when delta < ("STRINGIFY (TIME_AGO_MEDIUM_THRESHOLD)")\n" \
" then 4\n" \
" when delta < ("STRINGIFY (TIME_AGO_LARGE_THRESHOLD)")\n" \
" then 5\n" \
" else 6\n" \
" end time_ago,\n" \
" delta time_ago_raw\n" \
" from bindings\n" \
" left join\n" \
" (select *,\n" \
" cast(? - " time " as real) delta\n" \
" from " table ") ss\n" \
" on ss.binding = bindings.oid)\n" \
" where email = ? and fingerprint = ?\n" \
" group by time_ago\n" \
/* Make sure the current key is first. */ \
" order by time_ago desc;\n"
/* Use the time when we saw the signature, not when the
signature was created as that can be forged. */
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.get_trust_gather_signature_stats,
signature_stats_collect_cb, &stats, &sqerr,
STATS_SQL ("signatures", "time", ""),
GPGSQL_ARG_LONG_LONG, (long long) now,
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, email,
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, iter->d,
GPGSQL_ARG_END);
if (rc)
break;
if (!stats || strcmp (iter->d, stats->fingerprint) != 0)
/* No stats for this binding. Add a dummy entry. */
signature_stats_prepend (&stats, iter->d, TOFU_POLICY_AUTO, 1, 1);
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.get_trust_gather_encryption_stats,
signature_stats_collect_cb, &stats, &sqerr,
STATS_SQL ("encryptions", "time", "-"),
GPGSQL_ARG_LONG_LONG, (long long) now,
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, email,
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, iter->d,
GPGSQL_ARG_END);
if (rc)
break;
#undef STATS_SQL
if (!stats || strcmp (iter->d, stats->fingerprint) != 0
|| stats->time_ago > 0)
/* No stats for this binding. Add a dummy entry. */
signature_stats_prepend (&stats, iter->d, TOFU_POLICY_AUTO, -1, 1);
}
end_transaction (ctrl, 0);
strlist_rev (&conflict_set);
if (rc)
{
strlist_t strlist_iter;
log_error (_("error gathering signature stats: %s\n"), sqerr);
sqlite3_free (sqerr);
sqerr = NULL;
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("The email address \"%s\" is"
" associated with %d key:\n",
"The email address \"%s\" is"
" associated with %d keys:\n",
conflict_set_count),
email, conflict_set_count);
for (strlist_iter = conflict_set;
strlist_iter;
strlist_iter = strlist_iter->next)
es_fprintf (fp, " %s\n", strlist_iter->d);
}
else
{
char *key = NULL;
strlist_t binding;
int seen_in_past = 0;
es_fprintf (fp, _("Statistics for keys"
" with the email address \"%s\":\n"),
email);
for (stats_iter = stats; stats_iter; stats_iter = stats_iter->next)
{
#if 0
log_debug ("%s: time_ago: %ld; count: %ld\n",
stats_iter->fingerprint,
stats_iter->time_ago,
stats_iter->count);
#endif
if (! key || strcmp (key, stats_iter->fingerprint))
{
int this_key;
char *key_pp;
key = stats_iter->fingerprint;
this_key = strcmp (key, fingerprint) == 0;
key_pp = format_hexfingerprint (key, NULL, 0);
es_fprintf (fp, " %s (", key_pp);
/* Find the associated binding. */
for (binding = conflict_set;
binding;
binding = binding->next)
if (strcmp (key, binding->d) == 0)
break;
log_assert (binding);
if ((binding->flags & BINDING_REVOKED))
{
es_fprintf (fp, _("revoked"));
es_fprintf (fp, _(", "));
}
else if ((binding->flags & BINDING_EXPIRED))
{
es_fprintf (fp, _("expired"));
es_fprintf (fp, _(", "));
}
if (this_key)
es_fprintf (fp, _("this key"));
else
es_fprintf (fp, _("policy: %s"),
tofu_policy_str (stats_iter->policy));
es_fputs ("):\n", fp);
xfree (key_pp);
seen_in_past = 0;
}
if (abs(stats_iter->time_ago) == 1)
{
/* The 1 in this case is the NULL entry. */
log_assert (stats_iter->count == 1);
stats_iter->count = 0;
}
seen_in_past += stats_iter->count;
es_fputs (" ", fp);
/* TANSLATORS: This string is concatenated with one of
* the day/week/month strings to form one sentence. */
if (stats_iter->time_ago > 0)
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("Verified %d message",
"Verified %d messages",
seen_in_past), seen_in_past);
else
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("Encrypted %d message",
"Encrypted %d messages",
seen_in_past), seen_in_past);
if (!stats_iter->count)
es_fputs (".", fp);
else if (abs(stats_iter->time_ago) == 2)
{
es_fprintf (fp, "in the future.");
/* Reset it. */
seen_in_past = 0;
}
else
{
if (abs(stats_iter->time_ago) == 3)
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext(" over the past days.",
" over the past %d days.",
seen_in_past),
TIME_AGO_SMALL_THRESHOLD
/ TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL);
else if (abs(stats_iter->time_ago) == 4)
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext(" over the past month.",
" over the past %d months.",
seen_in_past),
TIME_AGO_MEDIUM_THRESHOLD
/ TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM);
else if (abs(stats_iter->time_ago) == 5)
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext(" over the past year.",
" over the past %d years.",
seen_in_past),
TIME_AGO_LARGE_THRESHOLD
/ TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE);
else if (abs(stats_iter->time_ago) == 6)
es_fprintf (fp, _(" in the past."));
else
log_assert (! "Broken SQL.\n");
}
es_fputs ("\n", fp);
}
}
if (conflict_set_count > 1 || (conflict_set->flags & BINDING_CONFLICT))
{
/* This is a conflict. */
/* TRANSLATORS: Please translate the text found in the source
* file below. We don't directly internationalize that text so
* that we can tweak it without breaking translations. */
char *text = _("TOFU detected a binding conflict");
char *textbuf;
if (!strcmp (text, "TOFU detected a binding conflict"))
{
/* No translation. Use the English text. */
text =
"Normally, an email address is associated with a single key. "
"However, people sometimes generate a new key if "
"their key is too old or they think it might be compromised. "
"Alternatively, a new key may indicate a man-in-the-middle "
"attack! Before accepting this association, you should talk to or "
"call the person to make sure this new key is legitimate.";
}
textbuf = format_text (text, 0, 72, 80);
es_fprintf (fp, "\n%s\n", textbuf);
xfree (textbuf);
}
es_fputc ('\n', fp);
/* Add a NUL terminator. */
es_fputc (0, fp);
if (es_fclose_snatch (fp, (void **) &prompt, NULL))
log_fatal ("error snatching memory stream\n");
/* I think showing the large message once is sufficient. If we
* would move it right before the cpr_get many lines will scroll
* away and the user might not realize that he merely entered a
* wrong choise (because he does not see that either). As a small
* benefit we allow C-L to redisplay everything. */
tty_printf ("%s", prompt);
/* Suspend any transaction: it could take a while until the user
responds. */
tofu_suspend_batch_transaction (ctrl);
while (1)
{
char *response;
/* TRANSLATORS: Two letters (normally the lower and upper case
* version of the hotkey) for each of the five choices. If
* there is only one choice in your language, repeat it. */
choices = _("gG" "aA" "uU" "rR" "bB");
if (strlen (choices) != 10)
log_bug ("Bad TOFU conflict translation! Please report.");
response = cpr_get
("tofu.conflict",
_("(G)ood, (A)ccept once, (U)nknown, (R)eject once, (B)ad? "));
trim_spaces (response);
cpr_kill_prompt ();
if (*response == CONTROL_L)
tty_printf ("%s", prompt);
else if (!response[0])
/* Default to unknown. Don't save it. */
{
tty_printf (_("Defaulting to unknown."));
*policy = TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN;
break;
}
else if (!response[1])
{
char *choice = strchr (choices, *response);
if (choice)
{
int c = ((size_t) choice - (size_t) choices) / 2;
switch (c)
{
case 0: /* Good. */
*policy = TOFU_POLICY_GOOD;
*trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (*policy);
break;
case 1: /* Accept once. */
*policy = TOFU_POLICY_ASK;
*trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (TOFU_POLICY_GOOD);
break;
case 2: /* Unknown. */
*policy = TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN;
*trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (*policy);
break;
case 3: /* Reject once. */
*policy = TOFU_POLICY_ASK;
*trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (TOFU_POLICY_BAD);
break;
case 4: /* Bad. */
*policy = TOFU_POLICY_BAD;
*trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (*policy);
break;
default:
log_bug ("c should be between 0 and 4 but it is %d!", c);
}
if (record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id,
*policy, 0, now))
{
/* If there's an error registering the
* binding, don't save the signature. */
*trust_level = _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR;
}
break;
}
}
xfree (response);
}
tofu_resume_batch_transaction (ctrl);
xfree (prompt);
signature_stats_free (stats);
}
/* Return the set of keys that conflict with the binding <fingerprint,
email> (including the binding itself, which will be first in the
list). For each returned key also sets BINDING_NEW, etc. */
static strlist_t
build_conflict_set (tofu_dbs_t dbs, const char *fingerprint, const char *email)
{
gpg_error_t rc;
char *sqerr;
strlist_t conflict_set = NULL;
int conflict_set_count;
strlist_t iter;
kbnode_t *kb_all;
KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
int i;
/* Get the fingerprints of any bindings that share the email address
* and whether the bindings have a known conflict.
*
* Note: if the binding in question is in the DB, it will also be
* returned. Thus, if the result set is empty, then <email,
* fingerprint> is a new binding. */
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.get_trust_bindings_with_this_email,
strings_collect_cb2, &conflict_set, &sqerr,
"select"
/* A binding should only appear once, but try not to break in the
* case of corruption. */
" fingerprint || case sum(conflict ISNULL) when 0 then '' else '!' end"
" from bindings where email = ?"
" group by fingerprint"
/* Make sure the current key comes first in the result list (if
it is present). */
" order by fingerprint = ? asc, fingerprint desc;",
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, email,
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, fingerprint,
GPGSQL_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"), sqerr);
print_further_info ("listing fingerprints");
sqlite3_free (sqerr);
return NULL;
}
/* Set BINDING_CONFLICT if the binding has a known conflict. This
* allows us to distinguish between bindings where the user
* explicitly set the policy to ask and bindings where we set the
* policy to ask due to a conflict. */
for (iter = conflict_set; iter; iter = iter->next)
{
int l = strlen (iter->d);
if (!(l == 2 * MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN
|| l == 2 * MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN + 1))
{
log_error (_("TOFU db corruption detected.\n"));
print_further_info ("fingerprint '%s' is not %d characters long",
iter->d, 2 * MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
}
if (l >= 1 && iter->d[l - 1] == '!')
{
iter->flags |= BINDING_CONFLICT;
/* Remove the !. */
iter->d[l - 1] = 0;
}
}
/* If the current binding has not yet been recorded, add it to the
* list. (The order by above ensures that if it is present, it will
* be first.) */
if (! (conflict_set && strcmp (conflict_set->d, fingerprint) == 0))
{
add_to_strlist (&conflict_set, fingerprint);
conflict_set->flags |= BINDING_NEW;
}
conflict_set_count = strlist_length (conflict_set);
/* Eliminate false conflicts. */
/* If two keys have cross signatures, then they are controlled by
* the same person and thus are not in conflict. */
kb_all = xcalloc (sizeof (kb_all[0]), conflict_set_count);
hd = keydb_new ();
for (i = 0, iter = conflict_set;
i < conflict_set_count;
i ++, iter = iter->next)
{
char *fp = iter->d;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
kbnode_t kb;
PKT_public_key *binding_pk;
kbnode_t n;
int found_user_id;
rc = keydb_search_reset (hd);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("resetting keydb: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (rc));
continue;
}
rc = classify_user_id (fp, &desc, 0);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error parsing key specification '%s': %s\n"),
fp, gpg_strerror (rc));
continue;
}
rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL);
if (rc)
{
/* Note: it is entirely possible that we don't have the key
corresponding to an entry in the TOFU DB. This can
happen if we merge two TOFU DBs, but not the key
rings. */
log_info (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),
fp, gpg_strerror (rc));
continue;
}
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &kb);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (rc));
print_further_info ("fingerprint: %s", fp);
continue;
}
merge_keys_and_selfsig (kb);
log_assert (kb->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
kb_all[i] = kb;
/* Since we have the key block, use this opportunity to figure
* out if the binding is expired or revoked. */
binding_pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
/* The binding is always expired/revoked if the key is
* expired/revoked. */
if (binding_pk->has_expired)
iter->flags &= BINDING_EXPIRED;
if (binding_pk->flags.revoked)
iter->flags &= BINDING_REVOKED;
/* The binding is also expired/revoked if the user id is
* expired/revoked. */
n = kb;
found_user_id = 0;
while ((n = find_next_kbnode (n, PKT_USER_ID)) && ! found_user_id)
{
PKT_user_id *user_id2 = n->pkt->pkt.user_id;
char *email2;
if (user_id2->attrib_data)
continue;
email2 = email_from_user_id (user_id2->name);
if (strcmp (email, email2) == 0)
{
found_user_id = 1;
if (user_id2->is_revoked)
iter->flags &= BINDING_REVOKED;
if (user_id2->is_expired)
iter->flags &= BINDING_EXPIRED;
}
xfree (email2);
}
if (! found_user_id)
{
log_info (_("TOFU db corruption detected.\n"));
print_further_info ("user id '%s' not on key block '%s'",
email, fingerprint);
}
}
keydb_release (hd);
/* Now that we have the key blocks, check for cross sigs. */
{
int j;
strlist_t *prevp;
strlist_t iter_next;
int die[conflict_set_count];
memset (die, 0, sizeof (die));
for (i = 0; i < conflict_set_count; i ++)
{
/* Look for cross sigs between this key (i == 0) or a key
* that has cross sigs with i == 0 (i.e., transitively) */
if (! (i == 0 || die[i]))
continue;
for (j = i + 1; j < conflict_set_count; j ++)
/* Be careful: we might not have a key block for a key. */
if (kb_all[i] && kb_all[j] && cross_sigs (kb_all[i], kb_all[j]))
die[j] = 1;
}
/* Free unconflicting bindings (and all of the key blocks). */
for (iter = conflict_set, prevp = &conflict_set, i = 0;
iter;
iter = iter_next, i ++)
{
iter_next = iter->next;
release_kbnode (kb_all[i]);
if (die[i])
{
*prevp = iter_next;
iter->next = NULL;
free_strlist (iter);
conflict_set_count --;
}
else
{
prevp = &iter->next;
}
}
/* We shouldn't have removed the head. */
log_assert (conflict_set);
log_assert (conflict_set_count >= 1);
}
if (DBG_TRUST)
{
log_debug ("binding <key: %s, email: %s> conflicts:\n",
fingerprint, email);
for (iter = conflict_set; iter; iter = iter->next)
{
log_debug (" %s:%s%s%s%s\n",
iter->d,
(iter->flags & BINDING_NEW) ? " new" : "",
(iter->flags & BINDING_CONFLICT) ? " known_conflict" : "",
(iter->flags & BINDING_EXPIRED) ? " expired" : "",
(iter->flags & BINDING_REVOKED) ? " revoked" : "");
}
}
return conflict_set;
}
/* Return the trust level (TRUST_NEVER, etc.) for the binding
* <FINGERPRINT, EMAIL> (email is already normalized). If no policy
* is registered, returns TOFU_POLICY_NONE. If an error occurs,
* returns _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR.
*
* PK is the public key object for FINGERPRINT.
*
* USER_ID is the unadulterated user id.
*
* If MAY_ASK is set, then we may interact with the user. This is
* necessary if there is a conflict or the binding's policy is
* TOFU_POLICY_ASK. In the case of a conflict, we set the new
* conflicting binding's policy to TOFU_POLICY_ASK. In either case,
* we return TRUST_UNDEFINED. Note: if MAY_ASK is set, then this
* function must not be called while in a transaction! */
static enum tofu_policy
get_trust (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk,
const char *fingerprint, const char *email,
const char *user_id, int may_ask, time_t now)
{
tofu_dbs_t dbs = ctrl->tofu.dbs;
int in_transaction = 0;
enum tofu_policy policy;
int rc;
char *sqerr = NULL;
int change_conflicting_to_ask = 0;
strlist_t conflict_set = NULL;
int conflict_set_count;
int trust_level = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
strlist_t iter;
log_assert (dbs);
if (may_ask)
log_assert (dbs->in_transaction == 0);
if (opt.batch)
may_ask = 0;
log_assert (keyid_cmp (pk_keyid (pk), pk_main_keyid (pk)) == 0);
/* Make sure _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR isn't equal to any of the trust
levels. */
log_assert (_tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_UNKNOWN
&& _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_EXPIRED
&& _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_UNDEFINED
&& _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_NEVER
&& _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_MARGINAL
&& _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_FULLY
&& _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_ULTIMATE);
begin_transaction (ctrl, 0);
in_transaction = 1;
policy = get_policy (dbs, fingerprint, email, NULL);
{
/* See if the key is ultimately trusted. If so, we're done. */
u32 kid[2];
keyid_from_pk (pk, kid);
if (tdb_keyid_is_utk (kid))
{
if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
/* New binding. */
{
if (record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id,
TOFU_POLICY_GOOD, 0, now) != 0)
{
log_error (_("error setting TOFU binding's trust level"
" to %s\n"), "good");
trust_level = _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR;
goto out;
}
}
trust_level = TRUST_ULTIMATE;
goto out;
}
}
if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO)
{
policy = opt.tofu_default_policy;
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("TOFU: binding <key: %s, user id: %s>'s policy is"
" auto (default: %s).\n",
fingerprint, email,
tofu_policy_str (opt.tofu_default_policy));
}
switch (policy)
{
case TOFU_POLICY_AUTO:
case TOFU_POLICY_GOOD:
case TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN:
case TOFU_POLICY_BAD:
/* The saved judgement is auto -> auto, good, unknown or bad.
* We don't need to ask the user anything. */
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("TOFU: Known binding <key: %s, user id: %s>'s policy: %s\n",
fingerprint, email, tofu_policy_str (policy));
trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (policy);
goto out;
case TOFU_POLICY_ASK:
/* We need to ask the user what to do. Case #1 or #2 below. */
if (! may_ask)
{
trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
goto out;
}
break;
case TOFU_POLICY_NONE:
/* The binding is new, we need to check for conflicts. Case #3
* below. */
break;
case _tofu_GET_POLICY_ERROR:
trust_level = _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR;
goto out;
default:
log_bug ("%s: Impossible value for policy (%d)\n", __func__, policy);
}
/* We get here if:
*
* 1. The saved policy is auto and the default policy is ask
* (get_policy() == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO
* && opt.tofu_default_policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK)
*
* 2. The saved policy is ask (either last time the user selected
* accept once or reject once or there was a conflict and this
* binding's policy was changed from auto to ask)
* (policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK), or,
*
* 3. We don't have a saved policy (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
* (need to check for a conflict).
*
* In summary: POLICY is ask or none.
*/
/* Before continuing, see if the key is signed by an ultimately
* trusted key. */
{
int fingerprint_raw_len = strlen (fingerprint) / 2;
char fingerprint_raw[fingerprint_raw_len];
int len = 0;
int is_signed_by_utk = 0;
if (fingerprint_raw_len != 20
|| ((len = hex2bin (fingerprint,
fingerprint_raw, fingerprint_raw_len))
!= strlen (fingerprint)))
{
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("TOFU: Bad fingerprint: %s (len: %zd, parsed: %d)\n",
fingerprint, strlen (fingerprint), len);
}
else
{
int lookup_err;
kbnode_t kb;
lookup_err = get_pubkey_byfprint (NULL, &kb,
fingerprint_raw,
fingerprint_raw_len);
if (lookup_err)
{
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("TOFU: Looking up %s: %s\n",
fingerprint, gpg_strerror (lookup_err));
}
else
{
is_signed_by_utk = signed_by_utk (kb);
release_kbnode (kb);
}
}
if (is_signed_by_utk)
{
if (record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id,
TOFU_POLICY_GOOD, 0, now) != 0)
{
log_error (_("error setting TOFU binding's trust level"
" to %s\n"), "good");
trust_level = _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR;
}
else
trust_level = TRUST_FULLY;
goto out;
}
}
/* Look for conflicts. This is needed in all 3 cases. */
conflict_set = build_conflict_set (dbs, fingerprint, email);
conflict_set_count = strlist_length (conflict_set);
if (conflict_set_count == 0)
{
/* We should always at least have the current binding. */
trust_level = _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (conflict_set_count == 1
&& (conflict_set->flags & BINDING_NEW)
&& opt.tofu_default_policy != TOFU_POLICY_ASK)
{
/* We've never observed a binding with this email address and we
* have a default policy, which is not to ask the user. */
/* If we've seen this binding, then we've seen this email and
* policy couldn't possibly be TOFU_POLICY_NONE. */
log_assert (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE);
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("TOFU: New binding <key: %s, user id: %s>, no conflict.\n",
fingerprint, email);
if (record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id,
TOFU_POLICY_AUTO, 0, now) != 0)
{
log_error (_("error setting TOFU binding's trust level to %s\n"),
"auto");
trust_level = _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR;
goto out;
}
trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (TOFU_POLICY_AUTO);
goto out;
}
if (conflict_set_count == 1
&& (conflict_set->flags & BINDING_CONFLICT))
{
/* No known conflicts now, but there was a conflict. This means
* at somepoint, there was a conflict and we changed this
* binding's policy to ask and set the conflicting key. The
* conflict can go away if there is not a cross sig between the
* two keys. In this case, just silently clear the conflict and
* reset the policy to auto. */
log_assert (policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK);
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("TOFU: binding <key: %s, user id: %s> had a conflict, but it's been resolved (probably via cross sig).\n",
fingerprint, email);
if (record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id,
TOFU_POLICY_AUTO, 0, now) != 0)
log_error (_("error setting TOFU binding's trust level to %s\n"),
"auto");
trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (TOFU_POLICY_AUTO);
goto out;
}
/* We have a conflict. Mark any conflicting bindings that have an
* automatic policy as now requiring confirmation. Note: we delay
* this until after we ask for confirmation so that when the current
* policy is printed, it is correct. */
change_conflicting_to_ask = 1;
if (! may_ask)
{
/* We can only get here in the third case (no saved policy) and
* if there is a conflict. (If the policy was ask (cases #1 and
* #2) and we weren't allowed to ask, we'd have already exited). */
log_assert (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE);
if (record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id,
TOFU_POLICY_ASK, 0, now) != 0)
log_error (_("error setting TOFU binding's trust level to %s\n"),
"ask");
trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
goto out;
}
/* We can't be in a normal transaction in ask_about_binding. */
end_transaction (ctrl, 0);
in_transaction = 0;
/* If we get here, we need to ask the user about the binding. */
ask_about_binding (ctrl,
&policy,
&trust_level,
conflict_set,
fingerprint,
email,
user_id,
now);
out:
if (change_conflicting_to_ask)
{
/* Mark any conflicting bindings that have an automatic policy as
* now requiring confirmation. */
if (! in_transaction)
{
begin_transaction (ctrl, 0);
in_transaction = 1;
}
/* If we weren't allowed to ask, also update this key as
* conflicting with itself. */
for (iter = may_ask ? conflict_set->next : conflict_set;
iter; iter = iter->next)
{
rc = gpgsql_exec_printf
(dbs->db, NULL, NULL, &sqerr,
"update bindings set policy = %d, conflict = %Q"
" where email = %Q and fingerprint = %Q and policy = %d;",
TOFU_POLICY_ASK, fingerprint,
email, iter->d, TOFU_POLICY_AUTO);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error changing TOFU policy: %s\n"), sqerr);
print_further_info ("binding: <key: %s, user id: %s>",
fingerprint, user_id);
sqlite3_free (sqerr);
sqerr = NULL;
}
else if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("Set %s to conflict with %s\n",
iter->d, fingerprint);
}
}
if (in_transaction)
end_transaction (ctrl, 0);
free_strlist (conflict_set);
return trust_level;
}
/* Return a malloced string of the form
* "7 months, 1 day, 5 minutes, 0 seconds"
* The caller should replace all '~' in the returned string by a space
* and also free the returned string.
*
* This is actually a bad hack which may not work correctly with all
* languages.
*/
static char *
time_ago_str (long long int t)
{
estream_t fp;
int years = 0;
int months = 0;
int days = 0;
int hours = 0;
int minutes = 0;
int seconds = 0;
/* The number of units that we've printed so far. */
int count = 0;
/* The first unit that we printed (year = 0, month = 1,
etc.). */
int first = -1;
/* The current unit. */
int i = 0;
char *str;
/* It would be nice to use a macro to do this, but gettext
works on the unpreprocessed code. */
#define MIN_SECS (60)
#define HOUR_SECS (60 * MIN_SECS)
#define DAY_SECS (24 * HOUR_SECS)
#define MONTH_SECS (30 * DAY_SECS)
#define YEAR_SECS (365 * DAY_SECS)
if (t > YEAR_SECS)
{
years = t / YEAR_SECS;
t -= years * YEAR_SECS;
}
if (t > MONTH_SECS)
{
months = t / MONTH_SECS;
t -= months * MONTH_SECS;
}
if (t > DAY_SECS)
{
days = t / DAY_SECS;
t -= days * DAY_SECS;
}
if (t > HOUR_SECS)
{
hours = t / HOUR_SECS;
t -= hours * HOUR_SECS;
}
if (t > MIN_SECS)
{
minutes = t / MIN_SECS;
t -= minutes * MIN_SECS;
}
seconds = t;
#undef MIN_SECS
#undef HOUR_SECS
#undef DAY_SECS
#undef MONTH_SECS
#undef YEAR_SECS
fp = es_fopenmem (0, "rw,samethread");
if (! fp)
log_fatal ("error creating memory stream: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror()));
if (years)
{
/* TRANSLATORS: The tilde ('~') is used here to indicate a
* non-breakable space */
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("%d~year", "%d~years", years), years);
count ++;
first = i;
}
i ++;
if ((first == -1 || i - first <= 3) && count <= 0 && months)
{
if (count)
es_fprintf (fp, ", ");
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("%d~month", "%d~months", months), months);
count ++;
first = i;
}
i ++;
if ((first == -1 || i - first <= 3) && count <= 0 && days)
{
if (count)
es_fprintf (fp, ", ");
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("%d~day", "%d~days", days), days);
count ++;
first = i;
}
i ++;
if ((first == -1 || i - first <= 3) && count <= 0 && hours)
{
if (count)
es_fprintf (fp, ", ");
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("%d~hour", "%d~hours", hours), hours);
count ++;
first = i;
}
i ++;
if ((first == -1 || i - first <= 3) && count <= 0 && minutes)
{
if (count)
es_fprintf (fp, ", ");
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("%d~minute", "%d~minutes", minutes), minutes);
count ++;
first = i;
}
i ++;
if ((first == -1 || i - first <= 3) && count <= 0)
{
if (count)
es_fprintf (fp, ", ");
es_fprintf (fp, ngettext("%d~second", "%d~seconds", seconds), seconds);
}
es_fputc (0, fp);
if (es_fclose_snatch (fp, (void **) &str, NULL))
log_fatal ("error snatching memory stream\n");
return str;
}
/* If FP is NULL, write TOFU_STATS status line. If FP is not NULL
* write a "tfs" record to that stream. */
static void
write_stats_status (estream_t fp,
enum tofu_policy policy,
unsigned long signature_count,
unsigned long signature_first_seen,
unsigned long signature_most_recent,
unsigned long encryption_count,
unsigned long encryption_first_done,
unsigned long encryption_most_recent)
{
const char *validity;
unsigned long messages;
/* Use the euclidean distance (m = sqrt(a^2 + b^2)) rather then the
sum of the magnitudes (m = a + b) to ensure a balance between
verified signatures and encrypted messages. */
messages = sqrtu32 (signature_count * signature_count
+ encryption_count * encryption_count);
if (messages < 1)
validity = "1"; /* Key without history. */
else if (messages < 2 * BASIC_TRUST_THRESHOLD)
validity = "2"; /* Key with too little history. */
else if (messages < 2 * FULL_TRUST_THRESHOLD)
validity = "3"; /* Key with enough history for basic trust. */
else
validity = "4"; /* Key with a lot of history. */
if (fp)
{
es_fprintf (fp, "tfs:1:%s:%lu:%lu:%s:%lu:%lu:%lu:%lu:\n",
validity, signature_count, encryption_count,
tofu_policy_str (policy),
signature_first_seen, signature_most_recent,
encryption_first_done, encryption_most_recent);
}
else
{
write_status_printf (STATUS_TOFU_STATS,
"%s %lu %lu %s %lu %lu %lu %lu",
validity,
signature_count,
encryption_count,
tofu_policy_str (policy),
signature_first_seen,
signature_most_recent,
encryption_first_done,
encryption_most_recent);
}
}
/* Note: If OUTFP is not NULL, this function merely prints a "tfs" record
* to OUTFP. In this case USER_ID is not required.
*
* Returns whether the caller should call show_warning after iterating
* over all user ids.
*/
static int
show_statistics (tofu_dbs_t dbs, const char *fingerprint,
const char *email, const char *user_id,
estream_t outfp, time_t now)
{
enum tofu_policy policy = get_policy (dbs, fingerprint, email, NULL);
char *fingerprint_pp;
int rc;
strlist_t strlist = NULL;
char *err = NULL;
unsigned long signature_first_seen = 0;
unsigned long signature_most_recent = 0;
unsigned long signature_count = 0;
unsigned long encryption_first_done = 0;
unsigned long encryption_most_recent = 0;
unsigned long encryption_count = 0;
int show_warning = 0;
(void) user_id;
fingerprint_pp = format_hexfingerprint (fingerprint, NULL, 0);
/* Get the signature stats. */
rc = gpgsql_exec_printf
(dbs->db, strings_collect_cb, &strlist, &err,
"select count (*), min (signatures.time), max (signatures.time)\n"
" from signatures\n"
" left join bindings on signatures.binding = bindings.oid\n"
" where fingerprint = %Q and email = %Q;",
fingerprint, email);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("getting signature statistics");
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
if (strlist)
{
/* We expect exactly 3 elements. */
log_assert (strlist->next);
log_assert (strlist->next->next);
log_assert (! strlist->next->next->next);
string_to_ulong (&signature_count, strlist->d, -1, __LINE__);
string_to_ulong (&signature_first_seen, strlist->next->d, -1, __LINE__);
string_to_ulong (&signature_most_recent,
strlist->next->next->d, -1, __LINE__);
free_strlist (strlist);
strlist = NULL;
}
/* Get the encryption stats. */
rc = gpgsql_exec_printf
(dbs->db, strings_collect_cb, &strlist, &err,
"select count (*), min (encryptions.time), max (encryptions.time)\n"
" from encryptions\n"
" left join bindings on encryptions.binding = bindings.oid\n"
" where fingerprint = %Q and email = %Q;",
fingerprint, email);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("getting encryption statistics");
sqlite3_free (err);
goto out;
}
if (strlist)
{
/* We expect exactly 3 elements. */
log_assert (strlist->next);
log_assert (strlist->next->next);
log_assert (! strlist->next->next->next);
string_to_ulong (&encryption_count, strlist->d, -1, __LINE__);
string_to_ulong (&encryption_first_done, strlist->next->d, -1, __LINE__);
string_to_ulong (&encryption_most_recent,
strlist->next->next->d, -1, __LINE__);
free_strlist (strlist);
strlist = NULL;
}
if (!outfp)
write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_TOFU_USER, fingerprint,
email, strlen (email), 0);
write_stats_status (outfp, policy,
signature_count,
signature_first_seen,
signature_most_recent,
encryption_count,
encryption_first_done,
encryption_most_recent);
if (!outfp)
{
estream_t fp;
char *msg;
fp = es_fopenmem (0, "rw,samethread");
if (! fp)
log_fatal ("error creating memory stream: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror()));
es_fprintf (fp, _("%s: "), email);
if (signature_count == 0)
{
es_fprintf (fp, _("Verified %ld signatures"), 0L);
es_fputc ('\n', fp);
}
else
{
char *first_seen_ago_str = time_ago_str (now - signature_first_seen);
/* TRANSLATORS: The final %s is replaced by a string like
"7 months, 1 day, 5 minutes, 0 seconds". */
es_fprintf (fp,
ngettext("Verified %ld signature in the past %s",
"Verified %ld signatures in the past %s",
signature_count),
signature_count, first_seen_ago_str);
xfree (first_seen_ago_str);
}
if (encryption_count == 0)
{
es_fprintf (fp, _(", and encrypted %ld messages"), 0L);
}
else
{
char *first_done_ago_str = time_ago_str (now - encryption_first_done);
/* TRANSLATORS: The final %s is replaced by a string like
"7 months, 1 day, 5 minutes, 0 seconds". */
es_fprintf (fp,
ngettext(", and encrypted %ld message in the past %s",
", and encrypted %ld messages in the past %s",
encryption_count),
encryption_count, first_done_ago_str);
xfree (first_done_ago_str);
}
if (opt.verbose)
{
es_fputs (" ", fp);
es_fputc ('(', fp);
es_fprintf (fp, _("policy: %s"), tofu_policy_str (policy));
es_fputs (").\n", fp);
}
else
es_fputs (".\n", fp);
{
char *tmpmsg, *p;
es_fputc (0, fp);
if (es_fclose_snatch (fp, (void **) &tmpmsg, NULL))
log_fatal ("error snatching memory stream\n");
msg = format_text (tmpmsg, 0, 72, 80);
es_free (tmpmsg);
/* Print a status line but suppress the trailing LF.
* Spaces are not percent escaped. */
if (*msg)
write_status_buffer (STATUS_TOFU_STATS_LONG,
msg, strlen (msg)-1, -1);
/* Remove the non-breaking space markers. */
for (p=msg; *p; p++)
if (*p == '~')
*p = ' ';
}
log_string (GPGRT_LOG_INFO, msg);
xfree (msg);
if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO)
{
if (signature_count == 0)
log_info (_("Warning: we have yet to see"
" a message signed using this key and user id!\n"));
else if (signature_count == 1)
log_info (_("Warning: we've only seen one message"
" signed using this key and user id!\n"));
if (encryption_count == 0)
log_info (_("Warning: you have yet to encrypt"
" a message to this key!\n"));
else if (encryption_count == 1)
log_info (_("Warning: you have only encrypted"
" one message to this key!\n"));
/* Cf. write_stats_status */
if (sqrtu32 (encryption_count * encryption_count
+ signature_count * signature_count)
< 2 * BASIC_TRUST_THRESHOLD)
show_warning = 1;
}
}
out:
xfree (fingerprint_pp);
return show_warning;
}
static void
show_warning (const char *fingerprint, strlist_t user_id_list)
{
char *set_policy_command;
char *text;
char *tmpmsg;
set_policy_command =
xasprintf ("gpg --tofu-policy bad %s", fingerprint);
tmpmsg = xasprintf
(ngettext
("Warning: if you think you've seen more signatures "
"by this key and user id, then this key might be a "
"forgery! Carefully examine the email address for small "
"variations. If the key is suspect, then use\n"
" %s\n"
"to mark it as being bad.\n",
"Warning: if you think you've seen more signatures "
"by this key and these user ids, then this key might be a "
"forgery! Carefully examine the email addresses for small "
"variations. If the key is suspect, then use\n"
" %s\n"
"to mark it as being bad.\n",
strlist_length (user_id_list)),
set_policy_command);
text = format_text (tmpmsg, 0, 72, 80);
xfree (tmpmsg);
log_string (GPGRT_LOG_INFO, text);
xfree (text);
es_free (set_policy_command);
}
/* Extract the email address from a user id and normalize it. If the
user id doesn't contain an email address, then we use the whole
user_id and normalize that. The returned string must be freed. */
static char *
email_from_user_id (const char *user_id)
{
char *email = mailbox_from_userid (user_id);
if (! email)
{
/* Hmm, no email address was provided or we are out of core. Just
take the lower-case version of the whole user id. It could be
a hostname, for instance. */
email = ascii_strlwr (xstrdup (user_id));
}
return email;
}
/* Register the signature with the bindings <fingerprint, USER_ID>,
for each USER_ID in USER_ID_LIST. The fingerprint is taken from
the primary key packet PK.
SIG_DIGEST_BIN is the binary representation of the message's
digest. SIG_DIGEST_BIN_LEN is its length.
SIG_TIME is the time that the signature was generated.
ORIGIN is a free-formed string describing the origin of the
signature. If this was from an email and the Claws MUA was used,
then this should be something like: "email:claws". If this is
NULL, the default is simply "unknown".
If MAY_ASK is 1, then this function may interact with the user.
This is necessary if there is a conflict or the binding's policy is
TOFU_POLICY_ASK.
This function returns 0 on success and an error code if an error
- occured. */
+ occurred. */
gpg_error_t
tofu_register_signature (ctrl_t ctrl,
PKT_public_key *pk, strlist_t user_id_list,
const byte *sig_digest_bin, int sig_digest_bin_len,
time_t sig_time, const char *origin)
{
time_t now = gnupg_get_time ();
gpg_error_t rc;
tofu_dbs_t dbs;
char *fingerprint = NULL;
strlist_t user_id;
char *email = NULL;
char *err = NULL;
char *sig_digest;
unsigned long c;
dbs = opendbs (ctrl);
if (! dbs)
{
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
log_error (_("error opening TOFU database: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (rc));
return rc;
}
/* We do a query and then an insert. Make sure they are atomic
by wrapping them in a transaction. */
rc = begin_transaction (ctrl, 0);
if (rc)
return rc;
log_assert (keyid_cmp (pk_keyid (pk), pk_main_keyid (pk)) == 0);
sig_digest = make_radix64_string (sig_digest_bin, sig_digest_bin_len);
fingerprint = hexfingerprint (pk, NULL, 0);
if (! origin)
/* The default origin is simply "unknown". */
origin = "unknown";
for (user_id = user_id_list; user_id; user_id = user_id->next)
{
email = email_from_user_id (user_id->d);
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("TOFU: Registering signature %s with binding"
" <key: %s, user id: %s>\n",
sig_digest, fingerprint, email);
/* Make sure the binding exists and record any TOFU
conflicts. */
if (get_trust (ctrl, pk, fingerprint, email, user_id->d, 0, now)
== _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR)
{
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
xfree (email);
break;
}
/* If we've already seen this signature before, then don't add
it again. */
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.register_already_seen,
get_single_unsigned_long_cb2, &c, &err,
"select count (*)\n"
" from signatures left join bindings\n"
" on signatures.binding = bindings.oid\n"
" where fingerprint = ? and email = ? and sig_time = ?\n"
" and sig_digest = ?",
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, fingerprint, GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, email,
GPGSQL_ARG_LONG_LONG, (long long) sig_time,
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, sig_digest,
GPGSQL_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error reading TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("checking existence");
sqlite3_free (err);
}
else if (c > 1)
/* Duplicates! This should not happen. In particular,
because <fingerprint, email, sig_time, sig_digest> is the
primary key! */
log_debug ("SIGNATURES DB contains duplicate records"
" <key: %s, email: %s, time: 0x%lx, sig: %s,"
" origin: %s>."
" Please report.\n",
fingerprint, email, (unsigned long) sig_time,
sig_digest, origin);
else if (c == 1)
{
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("Already observed the signature and binding"
" <key: %s, email: %s, time: 0x%lx, sig: %s,"
" origin: %s>\n",
fingerprint, email, (unsigned long) sig_time,
sig_digest, origin);
}
else if (opt.dry_run)
{
log_info ("TOFU database update skipped due to --dry-run\n");
}
else
/* This is the first time that we've seen this signature and
binding. Record it. */
{
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("TOFU: Saving signature"
" <key: %s, user id: %s, sig: %s>\n",
fingerprint, email, sig_digest);
log_assert (c == 0);
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.register_insert, NULL, NULL, &err,
"insert into signatures\n"
" (binding, sig_digest, origin, sig_time, time)\n"
" values\n"
" ((select oid from bindings\n"
" where fingerprint = ? and email = ?),\n"
" ?, ?, ?, ?);",
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, fingerprint, GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, email,
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, sig_digest, GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, origin,
GPGSQL_ARG_LONG_LONG, (long long) sig_time,
GPGSQL_ARG_LONG_LONG, (long long) now,
GPGSQL_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error updating TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("insert signatures");
sqlite3_free (err);
}
}
xfree (email);
if (rc)
break;
}
if (rc)
rollback_transaction (ctrl);
else
rc = end_transaction (ctrl, 0);
xfree (fingerprint);
xfree (sig_digest);
return rc;
}
gpg_error_t
tofu_register_encryption (ctrl_t ctrl,
PKT_public_key *pk, strlist_t user_id_list,
int may_ask)
{
time_t now = gnupg_get_time ();
gpg_error_t rc = 0;
tofu_dbs_t dbs;
kbnode_t kb = NULL;
int free_user_id_list = 0;
char *fingerprint = NULL;
strlist_t user_id;
char *err = NULL;
dbs = opendbs (ctrl);
if (! dbs)
{
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
log_error (_("error opening TOFU database: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (rc));
return rc;
}
if (/* We need the key block to find the primary key. */
keyid_cmp (pk_keyid (pk), pk_main_keyid (pk)) != 0
/* We need the key block to find all user ids. */
|| ! user_id_list)
kb = get_pubkeyblock (pk->keyid);
/* Make sure PK is a primary key. */
if (keyid_cmp (pk_keyid (pk), pk_main_keyid (pk)) != 0)
pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (! user_id_list)
{
/* Use all non-revoked user ids. Do use expired user ids. */
kbnode_t n = kb;
while ((n = find_next_kbnode (n, PKT_USER_ID)))
{
PKT_user_id *uid = n->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if (uid->is_revoked)
continue;
add_to_strlist (&user_id_list, uid->name);
}
free_user_id_list = 1;
if (! user_id_list)
log_info (_("WARNING: Encrypting to %s, which has no"
"non-revoked user ids.\n"),
keystr (pk->keyid));
}
fingerprint = hexfingerprint (pk, NULL, 0);
tofu_begin_batch_update (ctrl);
tofu_resume_batch_transaction (ctrl);
for (user_id = user_id_list; user_id; user_id = user_id->next)
{
char *email = email_from_user_id (user_id->d);
/* Make sure the binding exists and that we recognize any
conflicts. */
int tl = get_trust (ctrl, pk, fingerprint, email, user_id->d,
may_ask, now);
if (tl == _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR)
{
/* An error. */
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
xfree (email);
goto die;
}
rc = gpgsql_stepx
(dbs->db, &dbs->s.register_insert, NULL, NULL, &err,
"insert into encryptions\n"
" (binding, time)\n"
" values\n"
" ((select oid from bindings\n"
" where fingerprint = ? and email = ?),\n"
" ?);",
GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, fingerprint, GPGSQL_ARG_STRING, email,
GPGSQL_ARG_LONG_LONG, (long long) now,
GPGSQL_ARG_END);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error updating TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
print_further_info ("insert encryption");
sqlite3_free (err);
}
xfree (email);
}
die:
tofu_end_batch_update (ctrl);
if (kb)
release_kbnode (kb);
if (free_user_id_list)
free_strlist (user_id_list);
xfree (fingerprint);
return rc;
}
/* Combine a trust level returned from the TOFU trust model with a
trust level returned by the PGP trust model. This is primarily of
interest when the trust model is tofu+pgp (TM_TOFU_PGP).
This function ors together the upper bits (the values not covered
by TRUST_MASK, i.e., TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED, etc.). */
int
tofu_wot_trust_combine (int tofu_base, int wot_base)
{
int tofu = tofu_base & TRUST_MASK;
int wot = wot_base & TRUST_MASK;
int upper = (tofu_base & ~TRUST_MASK) | (wot_base & ~TRUST_MASK);
log_assert (tofu == TRUST_UNKNOWN
|| tofu == TRUST_EXPIRED
|| tofu == TRUST_UNDEFINED
|| tofu == TRUST_NEVER
|| tofu == TRUST_MARGINAL
|| tofu == TRUST_FULLY
|| tofu == TRUST_ULTIMATE);
log_assert (wot == TRUST_UNKNOWN
|| wot == TRUST_EXPIRED
|| wot == TRUST_UNDEFINED
|| wot == TRUST_NEVER
|| wot == TRUST_MARGINAL
|| wot == TRUST_FULLY
|| wot == TRUST_ULTIMATE);
/* We first consider negative trust policys. These trump positive
trust policies. */
if (tofu == TRUST_NEVER || wot == TRUST_NEVER)
/* TRUST_NEVER trumps everything else. */
return upper | TRUST_NEVER;
if (tofu == TRUST_EXPIRED || wot == TRUST_EXPIRED)
/* TRUST_EXPIRED trumps everything but TRUST_NEVER. */
return upper | TRUST_EXPIRED;
/* Now we only have positive or neutral trust policies. We take
the max. */
if (tofu == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
return upper | TRUST_ULTIMATE | TRUST_FLAG_TOFU_BASED;
if (wot == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
return upper | TRUST_ULTIMATE;
if (tofu == TRUST_FULLY)
return upper | TRUST_FULLY | TRUST_FLAG_TOFU_BASED;
if (wot == TRUST_FULLY)
return upper | TRUST_FULLY;
if (tofu == TRUST_MARGINAL)
return upper | TRUST_MARGINAL | TRUST_FLAG_TOFU_BASED;
if (wot == TRUST_MARGINAL)
return upper | TRUST_MARGINAL;
if (tofu == TRUST_UNDEFINED)
return upper | TRUST_UNDEFINED | TRUST_FLAG_TOFU_BASED;
if (wot == TRUST_UNDEFINED)
return upper | TRUST_UNDEFINED;
return upper | TRUST_UNKNOWN;
}
/* Write a "tfs" record for a --with-colons listing. */
gpg_error_t
tofu_write_tfs_record (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
PKT_public_key *pk, const char *user_id)
{
time_t now = gnupg_get_time ();
gpg_error_t err;
tofu_dbs_t dbs;
char *fingerprint;
char *email;
if (!*user_id)
return 0; /* No TOFU stats possible for an empty ID. */
dbs = opendbs (ctrl);
if (!dbs)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
log_error (_("error opening TOFU database: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
fingerprint = hexfingerprint (pk, NULL, 0);
email = email_from_user_id (user_id);
show_statistics (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id, fp, now);
xfree (email);
xfree (fingerprint);
return 0;
}
/* Return the validity (TRUST_NEVER, etc.) of the bindings
<FINGERPRINT, USER_ID>, for each USER_ID in USER_ID_LIST. If
USER_ID_LIST->FLAG is set, then the id is considered to be expired.
PK is the primary key packet.
If MAY_ASK is 1 and the policy is TOFU_POLICY_ASK, then the user
will be prompted to choose a policy. If MAY_ASK is 0 and the
policy is TOFU_POLICY_ASK, then TRUST_UNKNOWN is returned.
Returns TRUST_UNDEFINED if an error occurs. */
int
tofu_get_validity (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, strlist_t user_id_list,
int may_ask)
{
time_t now = gnupg_get_time ();
tofu_dbs_t dbs;
char *fingerprint = NULL;
strlist_t user_id;
int trust_level = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
int bindings = 0;
int bindings_valid = 0;
int need_warning = 0;
dbs = opendbs (ctrl);
if (! dbs)
{
log_error (_("error opening TOFU database: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
return TRUST_UNDEFINED;
}
fingerprint = hexfingerprint (pk, NULL, 0);
tofu_begin_batch_update (ctrl);
/* Start the batch transaction now. */
tofu_resume_batch_transaction (ctrl);
for (user_id = user_id_list; user_id; user_id = user_id->next, bindings ++)
{
char *email = email_from_user_id (user_id->d);
/* Always call get_trust to make sure the binding is
registered. */
int tl = get_trust (ctrl, pk, fingerprint, email, user_id->d,
may_ask, now);
if (tl == _tofu_GET_TRUST_ERROR)
{
/* An error. */
trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
xfree (email);
goto die;
}
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("TOFU: validity for <key: %s, user id: %s>: %s%s.\n",
fingerprint, email,
trust_value_to_string (tl),
user_id->flags ? " (but expired)" : "");
if (user_id->flags)
tl = TRUST_EXPIRED;
if (tl != TRUST_EXPIRED)
bindings_valid ++;
if (may_ask && tl != TRUST_ULTIMATE && tl != TRUST_EXPIRED)
need_warning |=
show_statistics (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id->d, NULL, now);
if (tl == TRUST_NEVER)
trust_level = TRUST_NEVER;
else if (tl == TRUST_EXPIRED)
/* Ignore expired bindings in the trust calculation. */
;
else if (tl > trust_level)
{
/* The expected values: */
log_assert (tl == TRUST_UNKNOWN || tl == TRUST_UNDEFINED
|| tl == TRUST_MARGINAL || tl == TRUST_FULLY
|| tl == TRUST_ULTIMATE);
/* We assume the following ordering: */
log_assert (TRUST_UNKNOWN < TRUST_UNDEFINED);
log_assert (TRUST_UNDEFINED < TRUST_MARGINAL);
log_assert (TRUST_MARGINAL < TRUST_FULLY);
log_assert (TRUST_FULLY < TRUST_ULTIMATE);
trust_level = tl;
}
xfree (email);
}
if (need_warning)
show_warning (fingerprint, user_id_list);
die:
tofu_end_batch_update (ctrl);
xfree (fingerprint);
if (bindings_valid == 0)
{
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("no (of %d) valid bindings."
" Can't get TOFU validity for this set of user ids.\n",
bindings);
return TRUST_NEVER;
}
return trust_level;
}
/* Set the policy for all non-revoked user ids in the keyblock KB to
POLICY.
If no key is available with the specified key id, then this
function returns GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY.
Returns 0 on success and an error code otherwise. */
gpg_error_t
tofu_set_policy (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t kb, enum tofu_policy policy)
{
gpg_error_t err;
time_t now = gnupg_get_time ();
tofu_dbs_t dbs;
PKT_public_key *pk;
char *fingerprint = NULL;
log_assert (kb->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
dbs = opendbs (ctrl);
if (! dbs)
{
log_error (_("error opening TOFU database: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("Setting TOFU policy for %s to %s\n",
keystr (pk->keyid), tofu_policy_str (policy));
if (keyid_cmp (pk_main_keyid (pk), pk_keyid (pk)) != 0)
log_bug ("%s: Passed a subkey, but expecting a primary key.\n", __func__);
fingerprint = hexfingerprint (pk, NULL, 0);
begin_transaction (ctrl, 0);
for (; kb; kb = kb->next)
{
PKT_user_id *user_id;
char *email;
if (kb->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
continue;
user_id = kb->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if (user_id->is_revoked)
/* Skip revoked user ids. (Don't skip expired user ids, the
expiry can be changed.) */
continue;
email = email_from_user_id (user_id->name);
err = record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id->name,
policy, 1, now);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error setting policy for key %s, user id \"%s\": %s"),
fingerprint, email, gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (email);
break;
}
xfree (email);
}
if (err)
rollback_transaction (ctrl);
else
end_transaction (ctrl, 0);
xfree (fingerprint);
return err;
}
/* Set the TOFU policy for all non-revoked user ids in the KEY with
the key id KEYID to POLICY.
If no key is available with the specified key id, then this
function returns GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY.
Returns 0 on success and an error code otherwise. */
gpg_error_t
tofu_set_policy_by_keyid (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 *keyid, enum tofu_policy policy)
{
kbnode_t keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (keyid);
if (! keyblock)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
return tofu_set_policy (ctrl, keyblock, policy);
}
/* Return the TOFU policy for the specified binding in *POLICY. If no
policy has been set for the binding, sets *POLICY to
TOFU_POLICY_NONE.
PK is a primary public key and USER_ID is a user id.
Returns 0 on success and an error code otherwise. */
gpg_error_t
tofu_get_policy (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *user_id,
enum tofu_policy *policy)
{
tofu_dbs_t dbs;
char *fingerprint;
char *email;
/* Make sure PK is a primary key. */
log_assert (pk->main_keyid[0] == pk->keyid[0]
&& pk->main_keyid[1] == pk->keyid[1]);
dbs = opendbs (ctrl);
if (! dbs)
{
log_error (_("error opening TOFU database: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
fingerprint = hexfingerprint (pk, NULL, 0);
email = email_from_user_id (user_id->name);
*policy = get_policy (dbs, fingerprint, email, NULL);
xfree (email);
xfree (fingerprint);
if (*policy == _tofu_GET_POLICY_ERROR)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/g13/sh-cmd.c b/g13/sh-cmd.c
index 821491982..6a4a7d85d 100644
--- a/g13/sh-cmd.c
+++ b/g13/sh-cmd.c
@@ -1,937 +1,937 @@
/* sh-cmd.c - The Assuan server for g13-syshelp
* Copyright (C) 2015 Werner Koch
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "g13-syshelp.h"
#include <assuan.h>
#include "i18n.h"
#include "keyblob.h"
/* Local data for this server module. A pointer to this is stored in
the CTRL object of each connection. */
struct server_local_s
{
/* The Assuan contect we are working on. */
assuan_context_t assuan_ctx;
/* The malloced name of the device. */
char *devicename;
/* A stream open for read of the device set by the DEVICE command or
NULL if no DEVICE command has been used. */
estream_t devicefp;
};
/* Local prototypes. */
/*
Helper functions.
*/
/* Set an error and a description. */
#define set_error(e,t) assuan_set_error (ctx, gpg_error (e), (t))
#define set_error_fail_cmd() set_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_INITIALIZED, \
"not called via userv or unknown user")
/* Skip over options. Blanks after the options are also removed. */
static char *
skip_options (const char *line)
{
while (spacep (line))
line++;
while ( *line == '-' && line[1] == '-' )
{
while (*line && !spacep (line))
line++;
while (spacep (line))
line++;
}
return (char*)line;
}
/* Check whether the option NAME appears in LINE. */
/* static int */
/* has_option (const char *line, const char *name) */
/* { */
/* const char *s; */
/* int n = strlen (name); */
/* s = strstr (line, name); */
/* if (s && s >= skip_options (line)) */
/* return 0; */
/* return (s && (s == line || spacep (s-1)) && (!s[n] || spacep (s+n))); */
/* } */
/* Helper to print a message while leaving a command. */
static gpg_error_t
leave_cmd (assuan_context_t ctx, gpg_error_t err)
{
if (err)
{
const char *name = assuan_get_command_name (ctx);
if (!name)
name = "?";
if (gpg_err_source (err) == GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT)
log_error ("command '%s' failed: %s\n", name,
gpg_strerror (err));
else
log_error ("command '%s' failed: %s <%s>\n", name,
gpg_strerror (err), gpg_strsource (err));
}
return err;
}
/* The handler for Assuan OPTION commands. */
static gpg_error_t
option_handler (assuan_context_t ctx, const char *key, const char *value)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err = 0;
(void)ctrl;
(void)key;
(void)value;
if (ctrl->fail_all_cmds)
err = set_error_fail_cmd ();
else
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_OPTION);
return err;
}
/* The handler for an Assuan RESET command. */
static gpg_error_t
reset_notify (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
(void)line;
xfree (ctrl->server_local->devicename);
ctrl->server_local->devicename = NULL;
es_fclose (ctrl->server_local->devicefp);
ctrl->server_local->devicefp = NULL;
ctrl->devti = NULL;
assuan_close_input_fd (ctx);
assuan_close_output_fd (ctx);
return 0;
}
static const char hlp_finddevice[] =
"FINDDEVICE <name>\n"
"\n"
"Find the device matching NAME. NAME be any identifier from\n"
- "g13tab permissable for the user. The corresponding block\n"
+ "g13tab permissible for the user. The corresponding block\n"
"device is retruned using a status line.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_finddevice (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err = 0;
tab_item_t ti;
const char *s;
const char *name;
name = skip_options (line);
/* Are we allowed to use the given device? We check several names:
* 1. The full block device
* 2. The label
* 3. The final part of the block device if NAME does not have a slash.
* 4. The mountpoint
*/
for (ti=ctrl->client.tab; ti; ti = ti->next)
if (!strcmp (name, ti->blockdev))
break;
if (!ti)
{
for (ti=ctrl->client.tab; ti; ti = ti->next)
if (ti->label && !strcmp (name, ti->label))
break;
}
if (!ti && !strchr (name, '/'))
{
for (ti=ctrl->client.tab; ti; ti = ti->next)
{
s = strrchr (ti->blockdev, '/');
if (s && s[1] && !strcmp (name, s+1))
break;
}
}
if (!ti)
{
for (ti=ctrl->client.tab; ti; ti = ti->next)
if (ti->mountpoint && !strcmp (name, ti->mountpoint))
break;
}
if (!ti)
{
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND, "device not configured for user");
goto leave;
}
/* Check whether we have permissions to open the device. */
{
estream_t fp = es_fopen (ti->blockdev, "rb");
if (!fp)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("error opening '%s': %s\n",
ti->blockdev, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
es_fclose (fp);
}
err = g13_status (ctrl, STATUS_BLOCKDEV, ti->blockdev, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
leave:
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
static const char hlp_device[] =
"DEVICE <name>\n"
"\n"
"Set the device used by further commands.\n"
"A device name or a PARTUUID string may be used.\n"
"Access to that device (by the g13 system) is locked\n"
"until a new DEVICE command or end of this process\n";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_device (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err = 0;
tab_item_t ti;
estream_t fp = NULL;
line = skip_options (line);
/* # warning hardwired to /dev/sdb1 ! */
/* if (strcmp (line, "/dev/sdb1")) */
/* { */
/* err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOENT); */
/* goto leave; */
/* } */
/* Always close an open device stream of this session. */
xfree (ctrl->server_local->devicename);
ctrl->server_local->devicename = NULL;
es_fclose (ctrl->server_local->devicefp);
ctrl->server_local->devicefp = NULL;
/* Are we allowed to use the given device? */
for (ti=ctrl->client.tab; ti; ti = ti->next)
if (!strcmp (line, ti->blockdev))
break;
if (!ti)
{
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_EACCES, "device not configured for user");
goto leave;
}
ctrl->server_local->devicename = xtrystrdup (line);
if (!ctrl->server_local->devicename)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
/* Check whether we have permissions to open the device and keep an
FD open. */
fp = es_fopen (ctrl->server_local->devicename, "rb");
if (!fp)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("error opening '%s': %s\n",
ctrl->server_local->devicename, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
es_fclose (ctrl->server_local->devicefp);
ctrl->server_local->devicefp = fp;
fp = NULL;
ctrl->devti = ti;
/* Fixme: Take some kind of lock. */
leave:
es_fclose (fp);
if (err)
{
xfree (ctrl->server_local->devicename);
ctrl->server_local->devicename = NULL;
ctrl->devti = NULL;
}
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
static const char hlp_create[] =
"CREATE <type>\n"
"\n"
"Create a new encrypted partition on the current device.\n"
"<type> must be \"dm-crypt\" for now.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_create (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err = 0;
estream_t fp = NULL;
line = skip_options (line);
if (strcmp (line, "dm-crypt"))
{
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG, "Type must be \"dm-crypt\"");
goto leave;
}
if (!ctrl->server_local->devicename
|| !ctrl->server_local->devicefp
|| !ctrl->devti)
{
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_ENOENT, "No device has been set");
goto leave;
}
err = sh_is_empty_partition (ctrl->server_local->devicename);
if (err)
{
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FALSE)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CONFLICT);
err = assuan_set_error (ctx, err, "Partition is not empty");
goto leave;
}
/* We need a writeable stream to create the container. */
fp = es_fopen (ctrl->server_local->devicename, "r+b");
if (!fp)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("error opening '%s': %s\n",
ctrl->server_local->devicename, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (es_setvbuf (fp, NULL, _IONBF, 0))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("error setting '%s' to _IONBF: %s\n",
ctrl->server_local->devicename, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
err = sh_dmcrypt_create_container (ctrl,
ctrl->server_local->devicename,
fp);
if (es_fclose (fp))
{
gpg_error_t err2 = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("error closing '%s': %s\n",
ctrl->server_local->devicename, gpg_strerror (err2));
if (!err)
err = err2;
}
fp = NULL;
leave:
es_fclose (fp);
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
static const char hlp_getkeyblob[] =
"GETKEYBLOB\n"
"\n"
"Return the encrypted keyblob of the current device.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_getkeyblob (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err;
void *enckeyblob = NULL;
size_t enckeybloblen;
line = skip_options (line);
if (!ctrl->server_local->devicename
|| !ctrl->server_local->devicefp
|| !ctrl->devti)
{
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_ENOENT, "No device has been set");
goto leave;
}
err = sh_is_empty_partition (ctrl->server_local->devicename);
if (!err)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENODEV);
assuan_set_error (ctx, err, "Partition is empty");
goto leave;
}
err = 0;
err = g13_keyblob_read (ctrl->server_local->devicename,
&enckeyblob, &enckeybloblen);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = assuan_send_data (ctx, enckeyblob, enckeybloblen);
if (!err)
err = assuan_send_data (ctx, NULL, 0); /* Flush */
leave:
xfree (enckeyblob);
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
static const char hlp_mount[] =
"MOUNT <type>\n"
"\n"
"Mount an encrypted partition on the current device.\n"
"<type> must be \"dm-crypt\" for now.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_mount (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err = 0;
unsigned char *keyblob = NULL;
size_t keybloblen;
tupledesc_t tuples = NULL;
line = skip_options (line);
if (strcmp (line, "dm-crypt"))
{
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG, "Type must be \"dm-crypt\"");
goto leave;
}
if (!ctrl->server_local->devicename
|| !ctrl->server_local->devicefp
|| !ctrl->devti)
{
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_ENOENT, "No device has been set");
goto leave;
}
err = sh_is_empty_partition (ctrl->server_local->devicename);
if (!err)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENODEV);
assuan_set_error (ctx, err, "Partition is empty");
goto leave;
}
err = 0;
/* We expect that the client already decrypted the keyblob.
* Eventually we should move reading of the keyblob to here and ask
* the client to decrypt it. */
assuan_begin_confidential (ctx);
err = assuan_inquire (ctx, "KEYBLOB",
&keyblob, &keybloblen, 4 * 1024);
assuan_end_confidential (ctx);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("assuan_inquire failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
err = create_tupledesc (&tuples, keyblob, keybloblen);
if (!err)
keyblob = NULL;
else
{
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED)
log_error ("unknown keyblob version received\n");
goto leave;
}
err = sh_dmcrypt_mount_container (ctrl,
ctrl->server_local->devicename,
tuples);
leave:
destroy_tupledesc (tuples);
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
static const char hlp_umount[] =
"UMOUNT <type>\n"
"\n"
"Unmount an encrypted partition and wipe the key.\n"
"<type> must be \"dm-crypt\" for now.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_umount (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err = 0;
line = skip_options (line);
if (strcmp (line, "dm-crypt"))
{
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG, "Type must be \"dm-crypt\"");
goto leave;
}
if (!ctrl->server_local->devicename
|| !ctrl->server_local->devicefp
|| !ctrl->devti)
{
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_ENOENT, "No device has been set");
goto leave;
}
err = sh_dmcrypt_umount_container (ctrl, ctrl->server_local->devicename);
leave:
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
static const char hlp_suspend[] =
"SUSPEND <type>\n"
"\n"
"Suspend an encrypted partition and wipe the key.\n"
"<type> must be \"dm-crypt\" for now.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_suspend (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err = 0;
line = skip_options (line);
if (strcmp (line, "dm-crypt"))
{
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG, "Type must be \"dm-crypt\"");
goto leave;
}
if (!ctrl->server_local->devicename
|| !ctrl->server_local->devicefp
|| !ctrl->devti)
{
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_ENOENT, "No device has been set");
goto leave;
}
err = sh_is_empty_partition (ctrl->server_local->devicename);
if (!err)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENODEV);
assuan_set_error (ctx, err, "Partition is empty");
goto leave;
}
err = 0;
err = sh_dmcrypt_suspend_container (ctrl, ctrl->server_local->devicename);
leave:
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
static const char hlp_resume[] =
"RESUME <type>\n"
"\n"
"Resume an encrypted partition and set the key.\n"
"<type> must be \"dm-crypt\" for now.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_resume (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err = 0;
unsigned char *keyblob = NULL;
size_t keybloblen;
tupledesc_t tuples = NULL;
line = skip_options (line);
if (strcmp (line, "dm-crypt"))
{
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG, "Type must be \"dm-crypt\"");
goto leave;
}
if (!ctrl->server_local->devicename
|| !ctrl->server_local->devicefp
|| !ctrl->devti)
{
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_ENOENT, "No device has been set");
goto leave;
}
err = sh_is_empty_partition (ctrl->server_local->devicename);
if (!err)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENODEV);
assuan_set_error (ctx, err, "Partition is empty");
goto leave;
}
err = 0;
/* We expect that the client already decrypted the keyblob.
* Eventually we should move reading of the keyblob to here and ask
* the client to decrypt it. */
assuan_begin_confidential (ctx);
err = assuan_inquire (ctx, "KEYBLOB",
&keyblob, &keybloblen, 4 * 1024);
assuan_end_confidential (ctx);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("assuan_inquire failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
err = create_tupledesc (&tuples, keyblob, keybloblen);
if (!err)
keyblob = NULL;
else
{
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED)
log_error ("unknown keyblob version received\n");
goto leave;
}
err = sh_dmcrypt_resume_container (ctrl,
ctrl->server_local->devicename,
tuples);
leave:
destroy_tupledesc (tuples);
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
static const char hlp_getinfo[] =
"GETINFO <what>\n"
"\n"
"Multipurpose function to return a variety of information.\n"
"Supported values for WHAT are:\n"
"\n"
" version - Return the version of the program.\n"
" pid - Return the process id of the server.\n"
" showtab - Show the table for the user.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_getinfo (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx);
gpg_error_t err = 0;
char *buf;
if (!strcmp (line, "version"))
{
const char *s = PACKAGE_VERSION;
err = assuan_send_data (ctx, s, strlen (s));
}
else if (!strcmp (line, "pid"))
{
char numbuf[50];
snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%lu", (unsigned long)getpid ());
err = assuan_send_data (ctx, numbuf, strlen (numbuf));
}
else if (!strncmp (line, "getsz", 5))
{
unsigned long long nblocks;
err = sh_blockdev_getsz (line+6, &nblocks);
if (!err)
log_debug ("getsz=%llu\n", nblocks);
}
else if (!strcmp (line, "showtab"))
{
tab_item_t ti;
for (ti=ctrl->client.tab; !err && ti; ti = ti->next)
{
buf = es_bsprintf ("%s %s%s %s %s%s\n",
ctrl->client.uname,
*ti->blockdev=='/'? "":"partuuid=",
ti->blockdev,
ti->label? ti->label : "-",
ti->mountpoint? " ":"",
ti->mountpoint? ti->mountpoint:"");
if (!buf)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
err = assuan_send_data (ctx, buf, strlen (buf));
if (!err)
err = assuan_send_data (ctx, NULL, 0); /* Flush */
}
xfree (buf);
}
}
else
err = set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "unknown value for WHAT");
return leave_cmd (ctx, err);
}
/* This command handler is used for all commands if this process has
not been started as expected. */
static gpg_error_t
fail_command (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
gpg_error_t err;
const char *name = assuan_get_command_name (ctx);
(void)line;
if (!name)
name = "?";
err = set_error_fail_cmd ();
log_error ("command '%s' failed: %s\n", name, gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
/* Tell the Assuan library about our commands. */
static int
register_commands (assuan_context_t ctx, int fail_all)
{
static struct {
const char *name;
assuan_handler_t handler;
const char * const help;
} table[] = {
{ "FINDDEVICE", cmd_finddevice, hlp_finddevice },
{ "DEVICE", cmd_device, hlp_device },
{ "CREATE", cmd_create, hlp_create },
{ "GETKEYBLOB", cmd_getkeyblob, hlp_getkeyblob },
{ "MOUNT", cmd_mount, hlp_mount },
{ "UMOUNT", cmd_umount, hlp_umount },
{ "SUSPEND", cmd_suspend,hlp_suspend},
{ "RESUME", cmd_resume, hlp_resume },
{ "INPUT", NULL },
{ "OUTPUT", NULL },
{ "GETINFO", cmd_getinfo, hlp_getinfo },
{ NULL }
};
gpg_error_t err;
int i;
for (i=0; table[i].name; i++)
{
err = assuan_register_command (ctx, table[i].name,
fail_all ? fail_command : table[i].handler,
table[i].help);
if (err)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
/* Startup the server. */
gpg_error_t
syshelp_server (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
gpg_error_t err;
assuan_fd_t filedes[2];
assuan_context_t ctx = NULL;
/* We use a pipe based server so that we can work from scripts.
assuan_init_pipe_server will automagically detect when we are
called with a socketpair and ignore FILEDES in this case. */
filedes[0] = assuan_fdopen (0);
filedes[1] = assuan_fdopen (1);
err = assuan_new (&ctx);
if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to allocate an Assuan context: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
err = assuan_init_pipe_server (ctx, filedes);
if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to initialize the server: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
err = register_commands (ctx, 0 /*FIXME:ctrl->fail_all_cmds*/);
if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to the register commands with Assuan: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
assuan_set_pointer (ctx, ctrl);
{
char *tmp = xtryasprintf ("G13-syshelp %s ready to serve requests "
"from %lu(%s)",
PACKAGE_VERSION,
(unsigned long)ctrl->client.uid,
ctrl->client.uname);
if (tmp)
{
assuan_set_hello_line (ctx, tmp);
xfree (tmp);
}
}
assuan_register_reset_notify (ctx, reset_notify);
assuan_register_option_handler (ctx, option_handler);
ctrl->server_local = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl->server_local);
if (!ctrl->server_local)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
ctrl->server_local->assuan_ctx = ctx;
while ( !(err = assuan_accept (ctx)) )
{
err = assuan_process (ctx);
if (err)
log_info ("Assuan processing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
}
if (err == -1)
err = 0;
else
log_info ("Assuan accept problem: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
leave:
reset_notify (ctx, NULL); /* Release all items hold by SERVER_LOCAL. */
if (ctrl->server_local)
{
xfree (ctrl->server_local);
ctrl->server_local = NULL;
}
assuan_release (ctx);
return err;
}
gpg_error_t
sh_encrypt_keyblob (ctrl_t ctrl, const void *keyblob, size_t keybloblen,
char **r_enckeyblob, size_t *r_enckeybloblen)
{
assuan_context_t ctx = ctrl->server_local->assuan_ctx;
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char *enckeyblob;
size_t enckeybloblen;
*r_enckeyblob = NULL;
/* Send the plaintext. */
err = g13_status (ctrl, STATUS_PLAINTEXT_FOLLOWS, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
assuan_begin_confidential (ctx);
err = assuan_send_data (ctx, keyblob, keybloblen);
if (!err)
err = assuan_send_data (ctx, NULL, 0);
assuan_end_confidential (ctx);
if (!err)
err = assuan_write_line (ctx, "END");
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error sending data: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
/* Inquire the ciphertext. */
err = assuan_inquire (ctx, "ENCKEYBLOB",
&enckeyblob, &enckeybloblen, 16 * 1024);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("assuan_inquire failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
*r_enckeyblob = enckeyblob;
*r_enckeybloblen = enckeybloblen;
return 0;
}
/* Send a status line with status ID NO. The arguments are a list of
strings terminated by a NULL argument. */
gpg_error_t
g13_status (ctrl_t ctrl, int no, ...)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
va_list arg_ptr;
const char *text;
va_start (arg_ptr, no);
if (1)
{
assuan_context_t ctx = ctrl->server_local->assuan_ctx;
char buf[950], *p;
size_t n;
p = buf;
n = 0;
while ( (text = va_arg (arg_ptr, const char *)) )
{
if (n)
{
*p++ = ' ';
n++;
}
for ( ; *text && n < DIM (buf)-2; n++)
*p++ = *text++;
}
*p = 0;
err = assuan_write_status (ctx, get_status_string (no), buf);
}
va_end (arg_ptr);
return err;
}
diff --git a/g13/sh-dmcrypt.c b/g13/sh-dmcrypt.c
index 201f8569e..994fbbbac 100644
--- a/g13/sh-dmcrypt.c
+++ b/g13/sh-dmcrypt.c
@@ -1,1036 +1,1036 @@
/* sh-dmcrypt.c - The DM-Crypt part for g13-syshelp
* Copyright (C) 2015, 2016 Werner Koch
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STAT
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#include <unistd.h>
#include "g13-syshelp.h"
#include <assuan.h>
#include "i18n.h"
#include "g13tuple.h"
#include "exectool.h"
#include "keyblob.h"
/* The standard disk block size (logical). */
#define SECTOR_SIZE 512
/* The physical block size used by modern devices. */
#define PHY_SECTOR_SIZE (SECTOR_SIZE*8) /* 4 KiB */
/* The length of the crypto setup area in sectors. 16 KiB is a nice
multiple of a modern block size and should be sufficient for all
kind of extra public key encryption packets. */
#define SETUP_AREA_SECTORS 32 /* 16 KiB */
/* The number of header block copies stored at the begin and end of
the device. */
#define HEADER_SETUP_AREA_COPIES 2
#define FOOTER_SETUP_AREA_COPIES 2
/* The length in blocks of the space we put at the start and at the
end of the device. This space is used to store N copies of the
- setup area for the actual encrypted container inbetween. */
+ setup area for the actual encrypted container in between. */
#define HEADER_SECTORS (SETUP_AREA_SECTORS * HEADER_SETUP_AREA_COPIES)
#define FOOTER_SECTORS (SETUP_AREA_SECTORS * FOOTER_SETUP_AREA_COPIES)
/* Minimim size of the encrypted space in blocks. This is more or
less an arbitrary value. */
#define MIN_ENCRYPTED_SPACE 32
/* Some consistency checks for the above constants. */
#if (PHY_SECTOR_SIZE % SECTOR_SIZE)
# error the physical secotor size should be a multiple of 512
#endif
#if ((SETUP_AREA_SECTORS*SECTOR_SIZE) % PHY_SECTOR_SIZE)
# error The setup area size should be a multiple of the phy. sector size.
#endif
/*
* Check whether the block device DEVNAME is used by device mapper.
* If EXPECT_BUSY is set no error message is printed if the device is
* busy. Returns: 0 if the device is good and not yet used by DM.
*/
static gpg_error_t
check_blockdev (const char *devname, int expect_busy)
{
gpg_error_t err;
struct stat sb;
unsigned int devmajor, devminor;
char *result = NULL;
char **lines = NULL;
char **fields = NULL;
int lno, count;
if (stat (devname, &sb))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("error stating '%s': %s\n", devname, gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
if (!S_ISBLK (sb.st_mode))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOTBLK);
log_error ("can't use '%s': %s\n", devname, gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
devmajor = major (sb.st_rdev);
devminor = minor (sb.st_rdev);
{
const char *argv[2];
argv[0] = "deps";
argv[1] = NULL;
err = gnupg_exec_tool ("/sbin/dmsetup", argv, NULL, &result, NULL);
}
if (err)
{
log_error ("error running '%s' to search for '%s': %s\n",
"dmsetup deps", devname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
lines = strsplit (result, '\n', 0, NULL);
if (!lines)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
if (lines[0] && !strcmp (lines[0], "No devices found"))
;
else
{
for (lno=0; lines[lno]; lno++)
{
unsigned int xmajor, xminor;
if (!*lines[lno])
continue;
xfree (fields);
fields = strsplit (lines[lno], ':', 0, &count);
if (!fields)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
if (count < 3
|| sscanf (fields[2], " (%u,%u)", &xmajor, &xminor) != 2)
{
log_error ("error running '%s' to search for '%s': %s\n",
"dmsetup deps", devname, "unexpected output");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
goto leave;
}
if (xmajor == devmajor && xminor == devminor)
{
if (!expect_busy)
log_error ("device '%s' (%u:%u)"
" already in use by device mapper\n",
devname, devmajor, devminor);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EBUSY);
goto leave;
}
}
}
leave:
xfree (fields);
xfree (lines);
xfree (result);
return err;
}
/* Return a malloced buffer with the prefix of the setup area. This
is the data written right before the encrypted keyblob. Return NULL
on error and sets ERRNO. */
static void *
mk_setup_area_prefix (size_t *r_length)
{
unsigned char *packet;
size_t setuparealen;
packet = xtrymalloc (32);
if (!packet)
return NULL;
*r_length = 32;
setuparealen = SETUP_AREA_SECTORS * SECTOR_SIZE;
packet[0] = (0xc0|61); /* CTB for the private packet type 0x61. */
packet[1] = 0xff; /* 5 byte length packet, value 20. */
packet[2] = 0;
packet[3] = 0;
packet[4] = 0;
packet[5] = 26;
memcpy (packet+6, "GnuPG/G13", 10); /* Packet subtype. */
packet[16] = 1; /* G13 packet format version. */
packet[17] = 0; /* Reserved. */
packet[18] = 0; /* Reserved. */
packet[19] = 1; /* OS Flag = Linux */
packet[20] = (setuparealen >> 24); /* Total length of header. */
packet[21] = (setuparealen >> 16);
packet[22] = (setuparealen >> 8);
packet[23] = (setuparealen);
packet[24] = HEADER_SETUP_AREA_COPIES;
packet[25] = FOOTER_SETUP_AREA_COPIES;
packet[26] = 0; /* Reserved. */
packet[27] = 0; /* Reserved. */
packet[28] = 0; /* Reserved. */
packet[29] = 0; /* Reserved. */
packet[30] = 0; /* Reserved. */
packet[31] = 0; /* Reserved. */
return packet;
}
/* Create a new g13 styloe DM-Crypt container on devoce DEVNAME. */
gpg_error_t
sh_dmcrypt_create_container (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *devname, estream_t devfp)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *header_space;
size_t header_space_size, header_space_used;
size_t paddinglen;
char *targetname = NULL;
size_t nread;
char *p;
char hexkey[16*2+1];
char *table = NULL;
unsigned long long nblocks;
char *result = NULL;
unsigned char twobyte[2];
membuf_t keyblob;
void *keyblob_buf = NULL;
size_t keyblob_len;
size_t n;
const char *s;
unsigned char *packet;
int copy;
if (!ctrl->devti)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG);
g13_syshelp_i_know_what_i_am_doing ();
header_space_size = SETUP_AREA_SECTORS * SECTOR_SIZE;
header_space = xtrymalloc (header_space_size);
if (!header_space)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
/* Start building the keyblob. */
init_membuf (&keyblob, 512);
append_tuple (&keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_BLOBVERSION, "\x01", 1);
n = CONTTYPE_DM_CRYPT;
twobyte[0] = (n >> 8);
twobyte[1] = n;
append_tuple (&keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_CONTTYPE, twobyte, 2);
{
gnupg_isotime_t tbuf;
gnupg_get_isotime (tbuf);
append_tuple (&keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_CREATED, tbuf, strlen (tbuf));
}
/* Rewind device stream. */
if (es_fseeko (devfp, 0, SEEK_SET))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("error seeking to begin of '%s': %s\n",
devname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
es_clearerr (devfp);
/* Extra check that the device is empty. */
if (es_read (devfp, header_space, header_space_size, &nread))
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else if (nread != header_space_size)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT);
else
err = 0;
if (err)
{
log_error ("error reading header space of '%s': %s\n",
devname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
for (p=header_space; nread && !*p; nread--, p++)
;
if (nread)
{
log_error ("header space of '%s' already used - use %s to override\n",
devname, "--force");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
goto leave;
}
/* Check that the device is not used by device mapper. */
err = check_blockdev (devname, 0);
if (err)
goto leave;
/* Compute the number of blocks. */
err = sh_blockdev_getsz (devname, &nblocks);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error getting size of '%s': %s\n",
devname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (nblocks <= HEADER_SECTORS + MIN_ENCRYPTED_SPACE + FOOTER_SECTORS)
{
log_error ("device '%s' is too small (min=%d blocks)\n",
devname,
HEADER_SECTORS + MIN_ENCRYPTED_SPACE + FOOTER_SECTORS);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT);
goto leave;
}
append_tuple_uint (&keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_CONT_NSEC, nblocks);
nblocks -= HEADER_SECTORS + FOOTER_SECTORS;
append_tuple_uint (&keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_ENC_NSEC, nblocks);
append_tuple_uint (&keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_ENC_OFF, HEADER_SECTORS);
/* Device mapper needs a name for the device: Take it from the label
or use "0". */
targetname = strconcat ("g13-", ctrl->client.uname, "-",
ctrl->devti->label? ctrl->devti->label : "0",
NULL);
if (!targetname)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
/* Create the key. */
{
char key[16];
gcry_randomize (key, sizeof key, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
append_tuple (&keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_ENCKEY, key, sizeof key);
bin2hex (key, 16, hexkey);
wipememory (key, 16);
/* Add a 2*(4+16) byte filler to conceal the fact that we use
AES-128. If we ever want to switch to 256 bit we can resize
that filler to keep the keyblob at the same size. */
append_tuple (&keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_FILLER, key, sizeof key);
append_tuple (&keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_FILLER, key, sizeof key);
}
/* Build dmcrypt table. */
s = "aes-cbc-essiv:sha256";
append_tuple (&keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_ALGOSTR, s, strlen (s));
table = es_bsprintf ("0 %llu crypt %s %s 0 %s %d",
nblocks, s, hexkey, devname, HEADER_SECTORS);
if (!table)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
wipememory (hexkey, sizeof hexkey);
/* Add a copy of the setup area prefix to the keyblob. */
p = mk_setup_area_prefix (&n);
if (!p)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
append_tuple (&keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_HDRCOPY, p, n);
assert (n < header_space_size);
memcpy (header_space, p, n);
header_space_used = n;
/* Turn the keyblob into a buffer and callback to encrypt it. */
keyblob_buf = get_membuf (&keyblob, &keyblob_len);
if (!keyblob_buf)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
err = sh_encrypt_keyblob (ctrl, keyblob_buf, keyblob_len, &p, &n);
if (err)
{
log_error ("encrypting the keyblob failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
log_debug ("plain setuparea=%p %zu bytes\n", keyblob_buf, keyblob_len);
wipememory (keyblob_buf, keyblob_len);
xfree (keyblob_buf);
keyblob_buf = NULL;
log_debug ("encry setuparea=%p %zu bytes\n", p, n);
if (n >= header_space_size || (header_space_used + n) >= header_space_size)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
log_error ("setup area would overflow: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
memcpy (header_space + header_space_used, p, n);
header_space_used += n;
/* Write the padding. */
packet = header_space + header_space_used;
paddinglen = header_space_size - header_space_used;
if (paddinglen < 16)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
log_error ("setup area too short for padding: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
packet[0] = (0xc0|61); /* CTB for Private packet type 0x61. */
packet[1] = 0xff; /* 5 byte length packet, value 20. */
packet[2] = (paddinglen-6) >> 24;
packet[3] = (paddinglen-6) >> 16;
packet[4] = (paddinglen-6) >> 8;
packet[5] = (paddinglen-6);
packet += 6;
paddinglen -= 6;
header_space_used += 6;
for ( ;paddinglen >= 10;
paddinglen -= 10, packet += 10, header_space_used += 10)
memcpy (packet, "GnuPG/PAD", 10);
for ( ;paddinglen; paddinglen--, packet++, header_space_used++)
*packet = 0;
if (header_space_used != header_space_size)
BUG ();
/* Create the container. */
{
const char *argv[3];
argv[0] = "create";
argv[1] = targetname;
argv[2] = NULL;
log_debug ("now running \"dmsetup create %s\"\n", targetname);
log_debug (" with table='%s'\"\n", table);
err = gnupg_exec_tool ("/sbin/dmsetup", argv, table, &result, NULL);
}
if (err)
{
log_error ("error running dmsetup for '%s': %s\n",
devname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (result && *result)
log_debug ("dmsetup result: %s\n", result);
/* Write the setup area. */
if (es_fseeko (devfp, 0, SEEK_SET))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("error seeking to begin of '%s': %s\n",
devname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
es_clearerr (devfp);
for (copy = 0; copy < HEADER_SETUP_AREA_COPIES; copy++)
{
size_t nwritten;
if (es_write (devfp, header_space, header_space_size, &nwritten))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
break;
}
else if (nwritten != header_space_size)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT);
break;
}
}
if (err)
{
log_error ("error writing header space copy %d of '%s': %s\n",
copy, devname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (es_fseeko (devfp,
(- header_space_size * FOOTER_SETUP_AREA_COPIES), SEEK_END))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("error seeking to end of '%s': %s\n",
devname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
es_clearerr (devfp);
for (copy = 0; copy < FOOTER_SETUP_AREA_COPIES; copy++)
{
size_t nwritten;
if (es_write (devfp, header_space, header_space_size, &nwritten))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
break;
}
else if (nwritten != header_space_size)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT);
break;
}
}
if (!err && es_fflush (devfp))
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
if (err)
{
log_error ("error writing footer space copy %d of '%s': %s\n",
copy, devname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
leave:
wipememory (hexkey, sizeof hexkey);
if (table)
{
wipememory (table, strlen (table));
xfree (table);
}
if (keyblob_buf)
{
wipememory (keyblob_buf, keyblob_len);
xfree (keyblob_buf);
}
xfree (get_membuf (&keyblob, NULL));
xfree (targetname);
xfree (result);
xfree (header_space);
return err;
}
/* Mount a DM-Crypt container on device DEVNAME taking keys and other
* meta data from KEYBLOB. */
gpg_error_t
sh_dmcrypt_mount_container (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *devname,
tupledesc_t keyblob)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *targetname_abs = NULL;
const char *targetname;
char hexkey[16*2+1];
char *table = NULL;
unsigned long long nblocks, nblocks2;
char *result = NULL;
size_t n;
const char *s;
const char *algostr;
size_t algostrlen;
if (!ctrl->devti)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG);
g13_syshelp_i_know_what_i_am_doing ();
/* Check that the device is not yet used by device mapper. */
err = check_blockdev (devname, 0);
if (err)
goto leave;
/* Compute the number of blocks and compare them to the value
provided as meta data. */
err = sh_blockdev_getsz (devname, &nblocks);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error getting size of '%s': %s\n",
devname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
err = find_tuple_uint (keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_CONT_NSEC, &nblocks2);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error getting size from keyblob: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (nblocks != nblocks2)
{
log_error ("inconsistent size of container: expected==%llu got=%llu\n",
nblocks2, nblocks);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
goto leave;
}
if (nblocks <= HEADER_SECTORS + MIN_ENCRYPTED_SPACE + FOOTER_SECTORS)
{
log_error ("device '%s' is too small (min=%d blocks)\n",
devname,
HEADER_SECTORS + MIN_ENCRYPTED_SPACE + FOOTER_SECTORS);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT);
goto leave;
}
nblocks -= HEADER_SECTORS + FOOTER_SECTORS;
err = find_tuple_uint (keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_ENC_NSEC, &nblocks2);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error getting enc size from keyblob: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (nblocks != nblocks2)
{
log_error ("inconsistent size of enc data: expected==%llu got=%llu\n",
nblocks2, nblocks);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
goto leave;
}
/* Check that the offset is consistent. */
err = find_tuple_uint (keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_ENC_OFF, &nblocks2);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error getting enc offset from keyblob: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (nblocks2 != HEADER_SECTORS)
{
log_error ("inconsistent offset of enc data: expected==%llu got=%d\n",
nblocks2, HEADER_SECTORS);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
goto leave;
}
/* Device mapper needs a name for the device: Take it from the label
or use "0". */
targetname_abs = strconcat ("/dev/mapper/",
"g13-", ctrl->client.uname, "-",
ctrl->devti->label? ctrl->devti->label : "0",
NULL);
if (!targetname_abs)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
targetname = strrchr (targetname_abs, '/');
if (!targetname)
BUG ();
targetname++;
/* Get the algorithm string. */
algostr = find_tuple (keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_ALGOSTR, &algostrlen);
if (!algostr || algostrlen > 100)
{
log_error ("algo string not found in keyblob or too long\n");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
goto leave;
}
/* Get the key. */
s = find_tuple (keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_ENCKEY, &n);
if (!s || n != 16)
{
if (!s)
log_error ("no key found in keyblob\n");
else
log_error ("unexpected size of key (%zu)\n", n);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_KEYLEN);
goto leave;
}
bin2hex (s, 16, hexkey);
/* Build dmcrypt table. */
table = es_bsprintf ("0 %llu crypt %.*s %s 0 %s %d",
nblocks, (int)algostrlen, algostr,
hexkey, devname, HEADER_SECTORS);
wipememory (hexkey, sizeof hexkey);
if (!table)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
/* Load the table. */
{
const char *argv[3];
argv[0] = "create";
argv[1] = targetname;
argv[2] = NULL;
log_debug ("now running \"dmsetup create %s\"\n", targetname);
err = gnupg_exec_tool ("/sbin/dmsetup", argv, table, &result, NULL);
}
if (err)
{
log_error ("error running dmsetup for '%s': %s\n",
devname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (result && *result)
log_debug ("dmsetup result: %s\n", result);
xfree (result);
result = NULL;
/* Mount if a mountpoint has been given. */
if (ctrl->devti->mountpoint)
{
const char *argv[3];
argv[0] = targetname_abs;
argv[1] = ctrl->devti->mountpoint;
argv[2] = NULL;
log_debug ("now running \"mount %s %s\"\n",
targetname_abs, ctrl->devti->mountpoint);
err = gnupg_exec_tool ("/bin/mount", argv, NULL, &result, NULL);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error running mount: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (result && *result) /* (We should not see output to stdout). */
log_info ("WARNING: mount returned data on stdout! (%s)\n", result);
}
leave:
wipememory (hexkey, sizeof hexkey);
if (table)
{
wipememory (table, strlen (table));
xfree (table);
}
xfree (targetname_abs);
xfree (result);
return err;
}
/* Unmount a DM-Crypt container on device DEVNAME and wipe the keys. */
gpg_error_t
sh_dmcrypt_umount_container (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *devname)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *targetname_abs = NULL;
char *result = NULL;
if (!ctrl->devti)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG);
g13_syshelp_i_know_what_i_am_doing ();
/* Check that the device is used by device mapper. */
err = check_blockdev (devname, 1);
if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EBUSY)
{
log_error ("device '%s' is not used by the device mapper: %s\n",
devname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Fixme: Check that this is really a g13 partition. */
/* Device mapper needs a name for the device: Take it from the label
or use "0". */
targetname_abs = strconcat ("/dev/mapper/",
"g13-", ctrl->client.uname, "-",
ctrl->devti->label? ctrl->devti->label : "0",
NULL);
if (!targetname_abs)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
/* Run the regular umount command. */
{
const char *argv[2];
argv[0] = targetname_abs;
argv[1] = NULL;
log_debug ("now running \"umount %s\"\n", targetname_abs);
err = gnupg_exec_tool ("/bin/umount", argv, NULL, &result, NULL);
}
if (err)
{
log_error ("error running umount: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
if (1)
{
/* Try to show some info about processes using the partition. */
const char *argv[3];
argv[0] = "-mv";
argv[1] = targetname_abs;
argv[2] = NULL;
gnupg_exec_tool ("/bin/fuser", argv, NULL, &result, NULL);
}
goto leave;
}
if (result && *result) /* (We should not see output to stdout). */
log_info ("WARNING: umount returned data on stdout! (%s)\n", result);
xfree (result);
result = NULL;
/* Run the dmsetup remove command. */
{
const char *argv[3];
argv[0] = "remove";
argv[1] = targetname_abs;
argv[2] = NULL;
log_debug ("now running \"dmsetup remove %s\"\n", targetname_abs);
err = gnupg_exec_tool ("/sbin/dmsetup", argv, NULL, &result, NULL);
}
if (err)
{
log_error ("error running \"dmsetup remove %s\": %s\n",
targetname_abs, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (result && *result)
log_debug ("dmsetup result: %s\n", result);
xfree (result);
result = NULL;
leave:
xfree (targetname_abs);
xfree (result);
return err;
}
/* Suspend a DM-Crypt container on device DEVNAME and wipe the keys. */
gpg_error_t
sh_dmcrypt_suspend_container (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *devname)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *targetname_abs = NULL;
const char *targetname;
char *result = NULL;
if (!ctrl->devti)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG);
g13_syshelp_i_know_what_i_am_doing ();
/* Check that the device is used by device mapper. */
err = check_blockdev (devname, 1);
if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EBUSY)
{
log_error ("device '%s' is not used by the device mapper: %s\n",
devname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Fixme: Check that this is really a g13 partition. */
/* Device mapper needs a name for the device: Take it from the label
or use "0". */
targetname_abs = strconcat ("/dev/mapper/",
"g13-", ctrl->client.uname, "-",
ctrl->devti->label? ctrl->devti->label : "0",
NULL);
if (!targetname_abs)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
targetname = strrchr (targetname_abs, '/');
if (!targetname)
BUG ();
targetname++;
/* Send the suspend command. */
{
const char *argv[3];
argv[0] = "suspend";
argv[1] = targetname;
argv[2] = NULL;
log_debug ("now running \"dmsetup suspend %s\"\n", targetname);
err = gnupg_exec_tool ("/sbin/dmsetup", argv, NULL, &result, NULL);
}
if (err)
{
log_error ("error running \"dmsetup suspend %s\": %s\n",
targetname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (result && *result)
log_debug ("dmsetup result: %s\n", result);
xfree (result);
result = NULL;
/* Send the wipe key command. */
{
const char *argv[5];
argv[0] = "message";
argv[1] = targetname;
argv[2] = "0";
argv[3] = "key wipe";
argv[4] = NULL;
log_debug ("now running \"dmsetup message %s 0 key wipe\"\n", targetname);
err = gnupg_exec_tool ("/sbin/dmsetup", argv, NULL, &result, NULL);
}
if (err)
{
log_error ("error running \"dmsetup message %s 0 key wipe\": %s\n",
targetname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (result && *result)
log_debug ("dmsetup result: %s\n", result);
xfree (result);
result = NULL;
leave:
xfree (targetname_abs);
xfree (result);
return err;
}
/* Resume a DM-Crypt container on device DEVNAME taking keys and other
* meta data from KEYBLOB. */
gpg_error_t
sh_dmcrypt_resume_container (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *devname,
tupledesc_t keyblob)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *targetname_abs = NULL;
const char *targetname;
char hexkey[8+16*2+1]; /* 8 is used to prepend "key set ". */
char *table = NULL;
char *result = NULL;
size_t n;
const char *s;
const char *algostr;
size_t algostrlen;
if (!ctrl->devti)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG);
g13_syshelp_i_know_what_i_am_doing ();
/* Check that the device is used by device mapper. */
err = check_blockdev (devname, 1);
if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EBUSY)
{
log_error ("device '%s' is not used by the device mapper: %s\n",
devname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Device mapper needs a name for the device: Take it from the label
or use "0". */
targetname_abs = strconcat ("/dev/mapper/",
"g13-", ctrl->client.uname, "-",
ctrl->devti->label? ctrl->devti->label : "0",
NULL);
if (!targetname_abs)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
targetname = strrchr (targetname_abs, '/');
if (!targetname)
BUG ();
targetname++;
/* Get the algorithm string. */
algostr = find_tuple (keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_ALGOSTR, &algostrlen);
if (!algostr || algostrlen > 100)
{
log_error ("algo string not found in keyblob or too long\n");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
goto leave;
}
/* Get the key. */
s = find_tuple (keyblob, KEYBLOB_TAG_ENCKEY, &n);
if (!s || n != 16)
{
if (!s)
log_error ("no key found in keyblob\n");
else
log_error ("unexpected size of key (%zu)\n", n);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_KEYLEN);
goto leave;
}
strcpy (hexkey, "key set ");
bin2hex (s, 16, hexkey+8);
/* Send the key */
{
const char *argv[4];
argv[0] = "message";
argv[1] = targetname;
argv[2] = "0";
argv[3] = NULL;
log_debug ("now running \"dmsetup message %s 0 [key set]\"\n", targetname);
err = gnupg_exec_tool ("/sbin/dmsetup", argv, hexkey, &result, NULL);
}
wipememory (hexkey, sizeof hexkey);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error running \"dmsetup message %s 0 [key set]\": %s\n",
devname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (result && *result)
log_debug ("dmsetup result: %s\n", result);
xfree (result);
result = NULL;
/* Send the resume command. */
{
const char *argv[3];
argv[0] = "resume";
argv[1] = targetname;
argv[2] = NULL;
log_debug ("now running \"dmsetup resume %s\"\n", targetname);
err = gnupg_exec_tool ("/sbin/dmsetup", argv, NULL, &result, NULL);
}
if (err)
{
log_error ("error running \"dmsetup resume %s\": %s\n",
targetname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (result && *result)
log_debug ("dmsetup result: %s\n", result);
xfree (result);
result = NULL;
leave:
wipememory (hexkey, sizeof hexkey);
if (table)
{
wipememory (table, strlen (table));
xfree (table);
}
xfree (targetname_abs);
xfree (result);
return err;
}
diff --git a/kbx/keybox-init.c b/kbx/keybox-init.c
index 3b53cd5ec..35da804a4 100644
--- a/kbx/keybox-init.c
+++ b/kbx/keybox-init.c
@@ -1,329 +1,329 @@
-/* keybox-init.c - Initalization of the library
+/* keybox-init.c - Initialization of the library
* Copyright (C) 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "keybox-defs.h"
#include "../common/mischelp.h"
static KB_NAME kb_names;
/* Register a filename for plain keybox files. Returns 0 on success,
* GPG_ERR_EEXIST if it has already been registered, or another error
* code. On success or with error code GPG_ERR_EEXIST a token usable
* to access the keybox handle is stored at R_TOKEN, NULL is stored
* for all other errors. */
gpg_error_t
keybox_register_file (const char *fname, int secret, void **r_token)
{
KB_NAME kr;
*r_token = NULL;
for (kr=kb_names; kr; kr = kr->next)
{
if (same_file_p (kr->fname, fname) )
{
*r_token = kr;
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EEXIST); /* Already registered. */
}
}
kr = xtrymalloc (sizeof *kr + strlen (fname));
if (!kr)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
strcpy (kr->fname, fname);
kr->secret = !!secret;
kr->handle_table = NULL;
kr->handle_table_size = 0;
kr->lockhd = NULL;
kr->is_locked = 0;
kr->did_full_scan = 0;
/* keep a list of all issued pointers */
kr->next = kb_names;
kb_names = kr;
/* create the offset table the first time a function here is used */
/* if (!kb_offtbl) */
/* kb_offtbl = new_offset_hash_table (); */
*r_token = kr;
return 0;
}
int
keybox_is_writable (void *token)
{
KB_NAME r = token;
return r? !access (r->fname, W_OK) : 0;
}
static KEYBOX_HANDLE
do_keybox_new (KB_NAME resource, int secret, int for_openpgp)
{
KEYBOX_HANDLE hd;
int idx;
assert (resource && !resource->secret == !secret);
hd = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *hd);
if (hd)
{
hd->kb = resource;
hd->secret = !!secret;
hd->for_openpgp = for_openpgp;
if (!resource->handle_table)
{
resource->handle_table_size = 3;
resource->handle_table = xtrycalloc (resource->handle_table_size,
sizeof *resource->handle_table);
if (!resource->handle_table)
{
resource->handle_table_size = 0;
xfree (hd);
return NULL;
}
}
for (idx=0; idx < resource->handle_table_size; idx++)
if (!resource->handle_table[idx])
{
resource->handle_table[idx] = hd;
break;
}
if (!(idx < resource->handle_table_size))
{
KEYBOX_HANDLE *tmptbl;
size_t newsize;
newsize = resource->handle_table_size + 5;
tmptbl = xtryrealloc (resource->handle_table,
newsize * sizeof (*tmptbl));
if (!tmptbl)
{
xfree (hd);
return NULL;
}
resource->handle_table = tmptbl;
resource->handle_table_size = newsize;
resource->handle_table[idx] = hd;
for (idx++; idx < resource->handle_table_size; idx++)
resource->handle_table[idx] = NULL;
}
}
return hd;
}
/* Create a new handle for the resource associated with TOKEN. SECRET
is just a cross-check. This is the OpenPGP version. The returned
handle must be released using keybox_release. */
KEYBOX_HANDLE
keybox_new_openpgp (void *token, int secret)
{
KB_NAME resource = token;
return do_keybox_new (resource, secret, 1);
}
/* Create a new handle for the resource associated with TOKEN. SECRET
is just a cross-check. This is the X.509 version. The returned
handle must be released using keybox_release. */
KEYBOX_HANDLE
keybox_new_x509 (void *token, int secret)
{
KB_NAME resource = token;
return do_keybox_new (resource, secret, 0);
}
void
keybox_release (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd)
{
if (!hd)
return;
if (hd->kb->handle_table)
{
int idx;
for (idx=0; idx < hd->kb->handle_table_size; idx++)
if (hd->kb->handle_table[idx] == hd)
hd->kb->handle_table[idx] = NULL;
}
_keybox_release_blob (hd->found.blob);
_keybox_release_blob (hd->saved_found.blob);
if (hd->fp)
{
fclose (hd->fp);
hd->fp = NULL;
}
xfree (hd->word_match.name);
xfree (hd->word_match.pattern);
xfree (hd);
}
/* Save the current found state in HD for later retrieval by
keybox_restore_found_state. Only one state may be saved. */
void
keybox_push_found_state (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd)
{
if (hd->saved_found.blob)
{
_keybox_release_blob (hd->saved_found.blob);
hd->saved_found.blob = NULL;
}
hd->saved_found = hd->found;
hd->found.blob = NULL;
}
/* Restore the saved found state in HD. */
void
keybox_pop_found_state (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd)
{
if (hd->found.blob)
{
_keybox_release_blob (hd->found.blob);
hd->found.blob = NULL;
}
hd->found = hd->saved_found;
hd->saved_found.blob = NULL;
}
const char *
keybox_get_resource_name (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd)
{
if (!hd || !hd->kb)
return NULL;
return hd->kb->fname;
}
int
keybox_set_ephemeral (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd, int yes)
{
if (!hd)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_HANDLE);
hd->ephemeral = yes;
return 0;
}
/* Close the file of the resource identified by HD. For consistent
results this function closes the files of all handles pointing to
the resource identified by HD. */
void
_keybox_close_file (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd)
{
int idx;
KEYBOX_HANDLE roverhd;
if (!hd || !hd->kb || !hd->kb->handle_table)
return;
for (idx=0; idx < hd->kb->handle_table_size; idx++)
if ((roverhd = hd->kb->handle_table[idx]))
{
if (roverhd->fp)
{
fclose (roverhd->fp);
roverhd->fp = NULL;
}
}
assert (!hd->fp);
}
/*
* Lock the keybox at handle HD, or unlock if YES is false.
*/
gpg_error_t
keybox_lock (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd, int yes)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
KB_NAME kb = hd->kb;
if (!keybox_is_writable (kb))
return 0;
/* Make sure the lock handle has been created. */
if (!kb->lockhd)
{
kb->lockhd = dotlock_create (kb->fname, 0);
if (!kb->lockhd)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_info ("can't allocate lock for '%s'\n", kb->fname );
return err;
}
}
if (yes) /* Take the lock. */
{
if (!kb->is_locked)
{
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
/* Under Windows we need to close the file before we try
* to lock it. This is because another process might have
* taken the lock and is using keybox_file_rename to
* rename the base file. How if our dotlock_take below is
* waiting for the lock but we have the base file still
* open, keybox_file_rename will never succeed as we are
* in a deadlock. */
if (hd->fp)
{
fclose (hd->fp);
hd->fp = NULL;
}
#endif /*HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
if (dotlock_take (kb->lockhd, -1))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_info ("can't lock '%s'\n", kb->fname );
}
else
kb->is_locked = 1;
}
}
else /* Release the lock. */
{
if (kb->is_locked)
{
if (dotlock_release (kb->lockhd))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_info ("can't unlock '%s'\n", kb->fname );
}
else
kb->is_locked = 0;
}
}
return err;
}
diff --git a/m4/pkg.m4 b/m4/pkg.m4
index 78953b711..8b115ee81 100644
--- a/m4/pkg.m4
+++ b/m4/pkg.m4
@@ -1,214 +1,214 @@
# pkg.m4 - Macros to locate and utilise pkg-config. -*- Autoconf -*-
# serial 1 (pkg-config-0.24)
#
# Copyright © 2004 Scott James Remnant <scott@netsplit.com>.
#
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
#
# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you
# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a
# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under
# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program.
# PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG([MIN-VERSION])
# ----------------------------------
AC_DEFUN([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG],
[m4_pattern_forbid([^_?PKG_[A-Z_]+$])
m4_pattern_allow([^PKG_CONFIG(_(PATH|LIBDIR|SYSROOT_DIR|ALLOW_SYSTEM_(CFLAGS|LIBS)))?$])
m4_pattern_allow([^PKG_CONFIG_(DISABLE_UNINSTALLED|TOP_BUILD_DIR|DEBUG_SPEW)$])
AC_ARG_VAR([PKG_CONFIG], [path to pkg-config utility])
AC_ARG_VAR([PKG_CONFIG_PATH], [directories to add to pkg-config's search path])
AC_ARG_VAR([PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR], [path overriding pkg-config's built-in search path])
if test "x$ac_cv_env_PKG_CONFIG_set" != "xset"; then
AC_PATH_TOOL([PKG_CONFIG], [pkg-config])
fi
if test -n "$PKG_CONFIG"; then
_pkg_min_version=m4_default([$1], [0.9.0])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([pkg-config is at least version $_pkg_min_version])
if $PKG_CONFIG --atleast-pkgconfig-version $_pkg_min_version; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
PKG_CONFIG=""
fi
fi[]dnl
])# PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
# PKG_CHECK_EXISTS(MODULES, [ACTION-IF-FOUND], [ACTION-IF-NOT-FOUND])
#
# Check to see whether a particular set of modules exists. Similar
# to PKG_CHECK_MODULES(), but does not set variables or print errors.
#
# Please remember that m4 expands AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG])
-# only at the first occurence in configure.ac, so if the first place
+# only at the first occurrence in configure.ac, so if the first place
# it's called might be skipped (such as if it is within an "if", you
# have to call PKG_CHECK_EXISTS manually
# --------------------------------------------------------------
AC_DEFUN([PKG_CHECK_EXISTS],
[AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG])dnl
if test -n "$PKG_CONFIG" && \
AC_RUN_LOG([$PKG_CONFIG --exists --print-errors "$1"]); then
m4_default([$2], [:])
m4_ifvaln([$3], [else
$3])dnl
fi])
# _PKG_CONFIG([VARIABLE], [COMMAND], [MODULES])
# ---------------------------------------------
m4_define([_PKG_CONFIG],
[if test -n "$$1"; then
pkg_cv_[]$1="$$1"
elif test -n "$PKG_CONFIG"; then
PKG_CHECK_EXISTS([$3],
[pkg_cv_[]$1=`$PKG_CONFIG --[]$2 "$3" 2>/dev/null`
test "x$?" != "x0" && pkg_failed=yes ],
[pkg_failed=yes])
else
pkg_failed=untried
fi[]dnl
])# _PKG_CONFIG
# _PKG_SHORT_ERRORS_SUPPORTED
# -----------------------------
AC_DEFUN([_PKG_SHORT_ERRORS_SUPPORTED],
[AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG])
if $PKG_CONFIG --atleast-pkgconfig-version 0.20; then
_pkg_short_errors_supported=yes
else
_pkg_short_errors_supported=no
fi[]dnl
])# _PKG_SHORT_ERRORS_SUPPORTED
# PKG_CHECK_MODULES(VARIABLE-PREFIX, MODULES, [ACTION-IF-FOUND],
# [ACTION-IF-NOT-FOUND])
#
#
# Note that if there is a possibility the first call to
# PKG_CHECK_MODULES might not happen, you should be sure to include an
# explicit call to PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG in your configure.ac
#
#
# --------------------------------------------------------------
AC_DEFUN([PKG_CHECK_MODULES],
[AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG])dnl
AC_ARG_VAR([$1][_CFLAGS], [C compiler flags for $1, overriding pkg-config])dnl
AC_ARG_VAR([$1][_LIBS], [linker flags for $1, overriding pkg-config])dnl
pkg_failed=no
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for $1])
_PKG_CONFIG([$1][_CFLAGS], [cflags], [$2])
_PKG_CONFIG([$1][_LIBS], [libs], [$2])
m4_define([_PKG_TEXT], [Alternatively, you may set the environment variables $1[]_CFLAGS
and $1[]_LIBS to avoid the need to call pkg-config.
See the pkg-config man page for more details.])
if test $pkg_failed = yes; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
_PKG_SHORT_ERRORS_SUPPORTED
if test $_pkg_short_errors_supported = yes; then
$1[]_PKG_ERRORS=`$PKG_CONFIG --short-errors --print-errors --cflags --libs "$2" 2>&1`
else
$1[]_PKG_ERRORS=`$PKG_CONFIG --print-errors --cflags --libs "$2" 2>&1`
fi
# Put the nasty error message in config.log where it belongs
echo "$$1[]_PKG_ERRORS" >&AS_MESSAGE_LOG_FD
m4_default([$4], [AC_MSG_ERROR(
[Package requirements ($2) were not met:
$$1_PKG_ERRORS
Consider adjusting the PKG_CONFIG_PATH environment variable if you
installed software in a non-standard prefix.
_PKG_TEXT])[]dnl
])
elif test $pkg_failed = untried; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
m4_default([$4], [AC_MSG_FAILURE(
[The pkg-config script could not be found or is too old. Make sure it
is in your PATH or set the PKG_CONFIG environment variable to the full
path to pkg-config.
_PKG_TEXT
To get pkg-config, see <http://pkg-config.freedesktop.org/>.])[]dnl
])
else
$1[]_CFLAGS=$pkg_cv_[]$1[]_CFLAGS
$1[]_LIBS=$pkg_cv_[]$1[]_LIBS
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
$3
fi[]dnl
])# PKG_CHECK_MODULES
# PKG_INSTALLDIR(DIRECTORY)
# -------------------------
# Substitutes the variable pkgconfigdir as the location where a module
# should install pkg-config .pc files. By default the directory is
# $libdir/pkgconfig, but the default can be changed by passing
# DIRECTORY. The user can override through the --with-pkgconfigdir
# parameter.
AC_DEFUN([PKG_INSTALLDIR],
[m4_pushdef([pkg_default], [m4_default([$1], ['${libdir}/pkgconfig'])])
m4_pushdef([pkg_description],
[pkg-config installation directory @<:@]pkg_default[@:>@])
AC_ARG_WITH([pkgconfigdir],
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-pkgconfigdir], pkg_description)],,
[with_pkgconfigdir=]pkg_default)
AC_SUBST([pkgconfigdir], [$with_pkgconfigdir])
m4_popdef([pkg_default])
m4_popdef([pkg_description])
]) dnl PKG_INSTALLDIR
# PKG_NOARCH_INSTALLDIR(DIRECTORY)
# -------------------------
# Substitutes the variable noarch_pkgconfigdir as the location where a
# module should install arch-independent pkg-config .pc files. By
# default the directory is $datadir/pkgconfig, but the default can be
# changed by passing DIRECTORY. The user can override through the
# --with-noarch-pkgconfigdir parameter.
AC_DEFUN([PKG_NOARCH_INSTALLDIR],
[m4_pushdef([pkg_default], [m4_default([$1], ['${datadir}/pkgconfig'])])
m4_pushdef([pkg_description],
[pkg-config arch-independent installation directory @<:@]pkg_default[@:>@])
AC_ARG_WITH([noarch-pkgconfigdir],
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-noarch-pkgconfigdir], pkg_description)],,
[with_noarch_pkgconfigdir=]pkg_default)
AC_SUBST([noarch_pkgconfigdir], [$with_noarch_pkgconfigdir])
m4_popdef([pkg_default])
m4_popdef([pkg_description])
]) dnl PKG_NOARCH_INSTALLDIR
# PKG_CHECK_VAR(VARIABLE, MODULE, CONFIG-VARIABLE,
# [ACTION-IF-FOUND], [ACTION-IF-NOT-FOUND])
# -------------------------------------------
# Retrieves the value of the pkg-config variable for the given module.
AC_DEFUN([PKG_CHECK_VAR],
[AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG])dnl
AC_ARG_VAR([$1], [value of $3 for $2, overriding pkg-config])dnl
_PKG_CONFIG([$1], [variable="][$3]["], [$2])
AS_VAR_COPY([$1], [pkg_cv_][$1])
AS_VAR_IF([$1], [""], [$5], [$4])dnl
])# PKG_CHECK_VAR
diff --git a/sm/call-dirmngr.c b/sm/call-dirmngr.c
index 7e26c3ada..91f0c2f3c 100644
--- a/sm/call-dirmngr.c
+++ b/sm/call-dirmngr.c
@@ -1,1050 +1,1050 @@
/* call-dirmngr.c - Communication with the dirmngr
* Copyright (C) 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008,
* 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include "gpgsm.h"
#include <gcrypt.h>
#include <assuan.h>
#include "i18n.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "asshelp.h"
struct membuf {
size_t len;
size_t size;
char *buf;
int out_of_core;
};
/* fixme: We need a context for each thread or serialize the access to
the dirmngr. */
static assuan_context_t dirmngr_ctx = NULL;
static assuan_context_t dirmngr2_ctx = NULL;
static int dirmngr_ctx_locked;
static int dirmngr2_ctx_locked;
struct inq_certificate_parm_s {
ctrl_t ctrl;
assuan_context_t ctx;
ksba_cert_t cert;
ksba_cert_t issuer_cert;
};
struct isvalid_status_parm_s {
ctrl_t ctrl;
int seen;
unsigned char fpr[20];
};
struct lookup_parm_s {
ctrl_t ctrl;
assuan_context_t ctx;
void (*cb)(void *, ksba_cert_t);
void *cb_value;
struct membuf data;
int error;
};
struct run_command_parm_s {
assuan_context_t ctx;
};
static gpg_error_t get_cached_cert (assuan_context_t ctx,
const unsigned char *fpr,
ksba_cert_t *r_cert);
/* A simple implementation of a dynamic buffer. Use init_membuf() to
create a buffer, put_membuf to append bytes and get_membuf to
release and return the buffer. Allocation errors are detected but
only returned at the final get_membuf(), this helps not to clutter
the code with out of core checks. */
static void
init_membuf (struct membuf *mb, int initiallen)
{
mb->len = 0;
mb->size = initiallen;
mb->out_of_core = 0;
mb->buf = xtrymalloc (initiallen);
if (!mb->buf)
mb->out_of_core = 1;
}
static void
put_membuf (struct membuf *mb, const void *buf, size_t len)
{
if (mb->out_of_core)
return;
if (mb->len + len >= mb->size)
{
char *p;
mb->size += len + 1024;
p = xtryrealloc (mb->buf, mb->size);
if (!p)
{
mb->out_of_core = 1;
return;
}
mb->buf = p;
}
memcpy (mb->buf + mb->len, buf, len);
mb->len += len;
}
static void *
get_membuf (struct membuf *mb, size_t *len)
{
char *p;
if (mb->out_of_core)
{
xfree (mb->buf);
mb->buf = NULL;
return NULL;
}
p = mb->buf;
*len = mb->len;
mb->buf = NULL;
mb->out_of_core = 1; /* don't allow a reuse */
return p;
}
/* Print a warning if the server's version number is less than our
version number. Returns an error code on a connection problem. */
static gpg_error_t
warn_version_mismatch (ctrl_t ctrl, assuan_context_t ctx,
const char *servername, int mode)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *serverversion;
const char *myversion = strusage (13);
err = get_assuan_server_version (ctx, mode, &serverversion);
if (err)
log_error (_("error getting version from '%s': %s\n"),
servername, gpg_strerror (err));
else if (!compare_version_strings (serverversion, myversion))
{
char *warn;
warn = xtryasprintf (_("server '%s' is older than us (%s < %s)"),
servername, serverversion, myversion);
if (!warn)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
log_info (_("WARNING: %s\n"), warn);
gpgsm_status2 (ctrl, STATUS_WARNING, "server_version_mismatch 0",
warn, NULL);
xfree (warn);
}
}
xfree (serverversion);
return err;
}
/* This function prepares the dirmngr for a new session. The
audit-events option is used so that other dirmngr clients won't get
disturbed by such events. */
static void
prepare_dirmngr (ctrl_t ctrl, assuan_context_t ctx, gpg_error_t err)
{
struct keyserver_spec *server;
if (!err)
err = warn_version_mismatch (ctrl, ctx, DIRMNGR_NAME, 0);
if (!err)
{
err = assuan_transact (ctx, "OPTION audit-events=1",
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_OPTION)
err = 0; /* Allow the use of old dirmngr versions. */
}
audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_DIRMNGR_READY, err);
if (!ctx || err)
return;
server = opt.keyserver;
while (server)
{
char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
char *user = server->user ? server->user : "";
char *pass = server->pass ? server->pass : "";
char *base = server->base ? server->base : "";
snprintf (line, DIM (line) - 1, "LDAPSERVER %s:%i:%s:%s:%s",
server->host, server->port, user, pass, base);
line[DIM (line) - 1] = 0;
assuan_transact (ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- /* The code below is not required becuase we don't return an error. */
+ /* The code below is not required because we don't return an error. */
/* err = [above call] */
/* if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_CMD) */
/* err = 0; /\* Allow the use of old dirmngr versions. *\/ */
server = server->next;
}
}
/* Return a new assuan context for a Dirmngr connection. */
static gpg_error_t
start_dirmngr_ext (ctrl_t ctrl, assuan_context_t *ctx_r)
{
gpg_error_t err;
assuan_context_t ctx;
if (opt.disable_dirmngr || ctrl->offline)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DIRMNGR);
if (*ctx_r)
return 0;
/* Note: if you change this to multiple connections, you also need
to take care of the implicit option sending caching. */
err = start_new_dirmngr (&ctx, GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT,
opt.dirmngr_program,
opt.autostart, opt.verbose, DBG_IPC,
gpgsm_status2, ctrl);
if (!opt.autostart && gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DIRMNGR)
{
static int shown;
if (!shown)
{
shown = 1;
log_info (_("no dirmngr running in this session\n"));
}
}
prepare_dirmngr (ctrl, ctx, err);
if (err)
return err;
*ctx_r = ctx;
return 0;
}
static int
start_dirmngr (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
gpg_error_t err;
assert (! dirmngr_ctx_locked);
dirmngr_ctx_locked = 1;
err = start_dirmngr_ext (ctrl, &dirmngr_ctx);
/* We do not check ERR but the existence of a context because the
error might come from a failed command send to the dirmngr.
Fixme: Why don't we close the drimngr context if we encountered
an error in prepare_dirmngr? */
if (!dirmngr_ctx)
dirmngr_ctx_locked = 0;
return err;
}
static void
release_dirmngr (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
(void)ctrl;
if (!dirmngr_ctx_locked)
log_error ("WARNING: trying to release a non-locked dirmngr ctx\n");
dirmngr_ctx_locked = 0;
}
static int
start_dirmngr2 (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
gpg_error_t err;
assert (! dirmngr2_ctx_locked);
dirmngr2_ctx_locked = 1;
err = start_dirmngr_ext (ctrl, &dirmngr2_ctx);
if (!dirmngr2_ctx)
dirmngr2_ctx_locked = 0;
return err;
}
static void
release_dirmngr2 (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
(void)ctrl;
if (!dirmngr2_ctx_locked)
log_error ("WARNING: trying to release a non-locked dirmngr2 ctx\n");
dirmngr2_ctx_locked = 0;
}
/* Handle a SENDCERT inquiry. */
static gpg_error_t
inq_certificate (void *opaque, const char *line)
{
struct inq_certificate_parm_s *parm = opaque;
const char *s;
int rc;
size_t n;
const unsigned char *der;
size_t derlen;
int issuer_mode = 0;
ksba_sexp_t ski = NULL;
if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "SENDCERT")))
{
line = s;
}
else if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "SENDCERT_SKI")))
{
/* Send a certificate where a sourceKeyIdentifier is included. */
line = s;
ski = make_simple_sexp_from_hexstr (line, &n);
line += n;
while (*line == ' ')
line++;
}
else if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "SENDISSUERCERT")))
{
line = s;
issuer_mode = 1;
}
else if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "ISTRUSTED")))
{
/* The server is asking us whether the certificate is a trusted
root certificate. */
char fpr[41];
struct rootca_flags_s rootca_flags;
line = s;
for (s=line,n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
;
if (*s || n != 40)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER);
for (s=line, n=0; n < 40; s++, n++)
fpr[n] = (*s >= 'a')? (*s & 0xdf): *s;
fpr[n] = 0;
if (!gpgsm_agent_istrusted (parm->ctrl, NULL, fpr, &rootca_flags))
rc = assuan_send_data (parm->ctx, "1", 1);
else
rc = 0;
return rc;
}
else
{
log_error ("unsupported inquiry '%s'\n", line);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_INQUIRE);
}
if (!*line)
{ /* Send the current certificate. */
der = ksba_cert_get_image (issuer_mode? parm->issuer_cert : parm->cert,
&derlen);
if (!der)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CERT_OBJ);
else
rc = assuan_send_data (parm->ctx, der, derlen);
}
else if (issuer_mode)
{
log_error ("sending specific issuer certificate back "
"is not yet implemented\n");
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_INQUIRE);
}
else
{ /* Send the given certificate. */
int err;
ksba_cert_t cert;
err = gpgsm_find_cert (line, ski, &cert);
if (err)
{
log_error ("certificate not found: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
}
else
{
der = ksba_cert_get_image (cert, &derlen);
if (!der)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CERT_OBJ);
else
rc = assuan_send_data (parm->ctx, der, derlen);
ksba_cert_release (cert);
}
}
xfree (ski);
return rc;
}
/* Take a 20 byte hexencoded string and put it into the the provided
20 byte buffer FPR in binary format. */
static int
unhexify_fpr (const char *hexstr, unsigned char *fpr)
{
const char *s;
int n;
for (s=hexstr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
;
if (*s || (n != 40))
return 0; /* no fingerprint (invalid or wrong length). */
for (s=hexstr, n=0; *s; s += 2, n++)
fpr[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
return 1; /* okay */
}
static gpg_error_t
isvalid_status_cb (void *opaque, const char *line)
{
struct isvalid_status_parm_s *parm = opaque;
const char *s;
if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "PROGRESS")))
{
if (parm->ctrl)
{
line = s;
if (gpgsm_status (parm->ctrl, STATUS_PROGRESS, line))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_CANCELED);
}
}
else if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "ONLY_VALID_IF_CERT_VALID")))
{
parm->seen++;
if (!*s || !unhexify_fpr (s, parm->fpr))
parm->seen++; /* Bumb it to indicate an error. */
}
return 0;
}
/* Call the directory manager to check whether the certificate is valid
Returns 0 for valid or usually one of the errors:
GPG_ERR_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN
GPG_ERR_CRL_TOO_OLD
Values for USE_OCSP:
0 = Do CRL check.
1 = Do an OCSP check.
2 = Do an OCSP check using only the default responder.
*/
int
gpgsm_dirmngr_isvalid (ctrl_t ctrl,
ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_cert_t issuer_cert, int use_ocsp)
{
static int did_options;
int rc;
char *certid;
char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
struct inq_certificate_parm_s parm;
struct isvalid_status_parm_s stparm;
rc = start_dirmngr (ctrl);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (use_ocsp)
{
certid = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
}
else
{
certid = gpgsm_get_certid (cert);
if (!certid)
{
log_error ("error getting the certificate ID\n");
release_dirmngr (ctrl);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
}
if (opt.verbose > 1)
{
char *fpr = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
log_info ("asking dirmngr about %s%s\n", fpr,
use_ocsp? " (using OCSP)":"");
xfree (fpr);
}
parm.ctx = dirmngr_ctx;
parm.ctrl = ctrl;
parm.cert = cert;
parm.issuer_cert = issuer_cert;
stparm.ctrl = ctrl;
stparm.seen = 0;
memset (stparm.fpr, 0, 20);
/* FIXME: If --disable-crl-checks has been set, we should pass an
option to dirmngr, so that no fallback CRL check is done after an
ocsp check. It is not a problem right now as dirmngr does not
fallback to CRL checking. */
/* It is sufficient to send the options only once because we have
one connection per process only. */
if (!did_options)
{
if (opt.force_crl_refresh)
assuan_transact (dirmngr_ctx, "OPTION force-crl-refresh=1",
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
did_options = 1;
}
snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "ISVALID%s %s",
use_ocsp == 2? " --only-ocsp --force-default-responder":"",
certid);
line[DIM(line)-1] = 0;
xfree (certid);
rc = assuan_transact (dirmngr_ctx, line, NULL, NULL,
inq_certificate, &parm,
isvalid_status_cb, &stparm);
if (opt.verbose > 1)
log_info ("response of dirmngr: %s\n", rc? gpg_strerror (rc): "okay");
rc = rc;
if (!rc && stparm.seen)
{
/* Need to also check the certificate validity. */
if (stparm.seen != 1)
{
log_error ("communication problem with dirmngr detected\n");
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CRL);
}
else
{
ksba_cert_t rspcert = NULL;
if (get_cached_cert (dirmngr_ctx, stparm.fpr, &rspcert))
{
/* Ooops: Something went wrong getting the certificate
from the dirmngr. Try our own cert store now. */
KEYDB_HANDLE kh;
kh = keydb_new (0);
if (!kh)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
if (!rc)
rc = keydb_search_fpr (kh, stparm.fpr);
if (!rc)
rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &rspcert);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("unable to find the certificate used "
"by the dirmngr: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CRL);
}
keydb_release (kh);
}
if (!rc)
{
rc = gpgsm_cert_use_ocsp_p (rspcert);
if (rc)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CRL);
else
{
/* Note the no_dirmngr flag: This avoids checking
this certificate over and over again. */
rc = gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl, rspcert, "", NULL, 0, NULL,
VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR, NULL);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("invalid certificate used for CRL/OCSP: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CRL);
}
}
}
ksba_cert_release (rspcert);
}
}
release_dirmngr (ctrl);
return rc;
}
/* Lookup helpers*/
static gpg_error_t
lookup_cb (void *opaque, const void *buffer, size_t length)
{
struct lookup_parm_s *parm = opaque;
size_t len;
char *buf;
ksba_cert_t cert;
int rc;
if (parm->error)
return 0;
if (buffer)
{
put_membuf (&parm->data, buffer, length);
return 0;
}
/* END encountered - process what we have */
buf = get_membuf (&parm->data, &len);
if (!buf)
{
parm->error = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
return 0;
}
rc = ksba_cert_new (&cert);
if (rc)
{
parm->error = rc;
return 0;
}
rc = ksba_cert_init_from_mem (cert, buf, len);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("failed to parse a certificate: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
}
else
{
parm->cb (parm->cb_value, cert);
}
ksba_cert_release (cert);
init_membuf (&parm->data, 4096);
return 0;
}
/* Return a properly escaped pattern from NAMES. The only error
return is NULL to indicate a malloc failure. */
static char *
pattern_from_strlist (strlist_t names)
{
strlist_t sl;
int n;
const char *s;
char *pattern, *p;
for (n=0, sl=names; sl; sl = sl->next)
{
for (s=sl->d; *s; s++, n++)
{
if (*s == '%' || *s == ' ' || *s == '+')
n += 2;
}
n++;
}
p = pattern = xtrymalloc (n+1);
if (!pattern)
return NULL;
for (sl=names; sl; sl = sl->next)
{
for (s=sl->d; *s; s++)
{
switch (*s)
{
case '%':
*p++ = '%';
*p++ = '2';
*p++ = '5';
break;
case ' ':
*p++ = '%';
*p++ = '2';
*p++ = '0';
break;
case '+':
*p++ = '%';
*p++ = '2';
*p++ = 'B';
break;
default:
*p++ = *s;
break;
}
}
*p++ = ' ';
}
if (p == pattern)
*pattern = 0; /* is empty */
else
p[-1] = '\0'; /* remove trailing blank */
return pattern;
}
static gpg_error_t
lookup_status_cb (void *opaque, const char *line)
{
struct lookup_parm_s *parm = opaque;
const char *s;
if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "PROGRESS")))
{
if (parm->ctrl)
{
line = s;
if (gpgsm_status (parm->ctrl, STATUS_PROGRESS, line))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_CANCELED);
}
}
else if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "TRUNCATED")))
{
if (parm->ctrl)
{
line = s;
gpgsm_status (parm->ctrl, STATUS_TRUNCATED, line);
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Run the Directory Manager's lookup command using the pattern
compiled from the strings given in NAMES. The caller must provide
the callback CB which will be passed cert by cert. Note that CTRL
is optional. With CACHE_ONLY the dirmngr will search only its own
key cache. */
int
gpgsm_dirmngr_lookup (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names, int cache_only,
void (*cb)(void*, ksba_cert_t), void *cb_value)
{
int rc;
char *pattern;
char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
struct lookup_parm_s parm;
size_t len;
assuan_context_t ctx;
/* The lookup function can be invoked from the callback of a lookup
function, for example to walk the chain. */
if (!dirmngr_ctx_locked)
{
rc = start_dirmngr (ctrl);
if (rc)
return rc;
ctx = dirmngr_ctx;
}
else if (!dirmngr2_ctx_locked)
{
rc = start_dirmngr2 (ctrl);
if (rc)
return rc;
ctx = dirmngr2_ctx;
}
else
{
log_fatal ("both dirmngr contexts are in use\n");
}
pattern = pattern_from_strlist (names);
if (!pattern)
{
if (ctx == dirmngr_ctx)
release_dirmngr (ctrl);
else
release_dirmngr2 (ctrl);
return out_of_core ();
}
snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "LOOKUP%s %s",
cache_only? " --cache-only":"", pattern);
line[DIM(line)-1] = 0;
xfree (pattern);
parm.ctrl = ctrl;
parm.ctx = ctx;
parm.cb = cb;
parm.cb_value = cb_value;
parm.error = 0;
init_membuf (&parm.data, 4096);
rc = assuan_transact (ctx, line, lookup_cb, &parm,
NULL, NULL, lookup_status_cb, &parm);
xfree (get_membuf (&parm.data, &len));
if (ctx == dirmngr_ctx)
release_dirmngr (ctrl);
else
release_dirmngr2 (ctrl);
if (rc)
return rc;
return parm.error;
}
static gpg_error_t
get_cached_cert_data_cb (void *opaque, const void *buffer, size_t length)
{
struct membuf *mb = opaque;
if (buffer)
put_membuf (mb, buffer, length);
return 0;
}
/* Return a certificate from the Directory Manager's cache. This
function only returns one certificate which must be specified using
the fingerprint FPR and will be stored at R_CERT. On error NULL is
stored at R_CERT and an error code returned. Note that the caller
must provide the locked dirmngr context CTX. */
static gpg_error_t
get_cached_cert (assuan_context_t ctx,
const unsigned char *fpr, ksba_cert_t *r_cert)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
char hexfpr[2*20+1];
struct membuf mb;
char *buf;
size_t buflen = 0;
ksba_cert_t cert;
*r_cert = NULL;
bin2hex (fpr, 20, hexfpr);
snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "LOOKUP --single --cache-only 0x%s", hexfpr);
init_membuf (&mb, 4096);
err = assuan_transact (ctx, line, get_cached_cert_data_cb, &mb,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
buf = get_membuf (&mb, &buflen);
if (err)
{
xfree (buf);
return err;
}
if (!buf)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
err = ksba_cert_new (&cert);
if (err)
{
xfree (buf);
return err;
}
err = ksba_cert_init_from_mem (cert, buf, buflen);
xfree (buf);
if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to parse a certificate: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
ksba_cert_release (cert);
return err;
}
*r_cert = cert;
return 0;
}
/* Run Command helpers*/
/* Fairly simple callback to write all output of dirmngr to stdout. */
static gpg_error_t
run_command_cb (void *opaque, const void *buffer, size_t length)
{
(void)opaque;
if (buffer)
{
if ( fwrite (buffer, length, 1, stdout) != 1 )
log_error ("error writing to stdout: %s\n", strerror (errno));
}
return 0;
}
/* Handle inquiries from the dirmngr COMMAND. */
static gpg_error_t
run_command_inq_cb (void *opaque, const char *line)
{
struct run_command_parm_s *parm = opaque;
const char *s;
int rc = 0;
if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "SENDCERT")))
{ /* send the given certificate */
int err;
ksba_cert_t cert;
const unsigned char *der;
size_t derlen;
line = s;
if (!*line)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER);
err = gpgsm_find_cert (line, NULL, &cert);
if (err)
{
log_error ("certificate not found: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
}
else
{
der = ksba_cert_get_image (cert, &derlen);
if (!der)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CERT_OBJ);
else
rc = assuan_send_data (parm->ctx, der, derlen);
ksba_cert_release (cert);
}
}
else if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "PRINTINFO")))
{ /* Simply show the message given in the argument. */
line = s;
log_info ("dirmngr: %s\n", line);
}
else
{
log_error ("unsupported inquiry '%s'\n", line);
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_INQUIRE);
}
return rc;
}
static gpg_error_t
run_command_status_cb (void *opaque, const char *line)
{
ctrl_t ctrl = opaque;
const char *s;
if (opt.verbose)
{
log_info ("dirmngr status: %s\n", line);
}
if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "PROGRESS")))
{
if (ctrl)
{
line = s;
if (gpgsm_status (ctrl, STATUS_PROGRESS, line))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_CANCELED);
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Pass COMMAND to dirmngr and print all output generated by Dirmngr
to stdout. A couple of inquiries are defined (see above). ARGC
arguments in ARGV are given to the Dirmngr. Spaces, plus and
percent characters within the argument strings are percent escaped
so that blanks can act as delimiters. */
int
gpgsm_dirmngr_run_command (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *command,
int argc, char **argv)
{
int rc;
int i;
const char *s;
char *line, *p;
size_t len;
struct run_command_parm_s parm;
rc = start_dirmngr (ctrl);
if (rc)
return rc;
parm.ctx = dirmngr_ctx;
len = strlen (command) + 1;
for (i=0; i < argc; i++)
len += 1 + 3*strlen (argv[i]); /* enough space for percent escaping */
line = xtrymalloc (len);
if (!line)
{
release_dirmngr (ctrl);
return out_of_core ();
}
p = stpcpy (line, command);
for (i=0; i < argc; i++)
{
*p++ = ' ';
for (s=argv[i]; *s; s++)
{
if (!isascii (*s))
*p++ = *s;
else if (*s == ' ')
*p++ = '+';
else if (!isprint (*s) || *s == '+')
{
sprintf (p, "%%%02X", *(const unsigned char *)s);
p += 3;
}
else
*p++ = *s;
}
}
*p = 0;
rc = assuan_transact (dirmngr_ctx, line,
run_command_cb, NULL,
run_command_inq_cb, &parm,
run_command_status_cb, ctrl);
xfree (line);
log_info ("response of dirmngr: %s\n", rc? gpg_strerror (rc): "okay");
release_dirmngr (ctrl);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/sm/gpgsm.c b/sm/gpgsm.c
index 9bb3053c2..6e12b7da9 100644
--- a/sm/gpgsm.c
+++ b/sm/gpgsm.c
@@ -1,2244 +1,2244 @@
/* gpgsm.c - GnuPG for S/MIME
* Copyright (C) 2001-2008, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2001-2008, 2010 Werner Koch
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
/*#include <mcheck.h>*/
#include "gpgsm.h"
#include <gcrypt.h>
#include <assuan.h> /* malloc hooks */
#include "passphrase.h"
#include "../common/shareddefs.h"
#include "../kbx/keybox.h" /* malloc hooks */
#include "i18n.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "sysutils.h"
#include "gc-opt-flags.h"
#include "asshelp.h"
#include "../common/init.h"
#ifndef O_BINARY
#define O_BINARY 0
#endif
enum cmd_and_opt_values {
aNull = 0,
oArmor = 'a',
aDetachedSign = 'b',
aSym = 'c',
aDecrypt = 'd',
aEncr = 'e',
aListKeys = 'k',
aListSecretKeys = 'K',
oDryRun = 'n',
oOutput = 'o',
oQuiet = 'q',
oRecipient = 'r',
aSign = 's',
oUser = 'u',
oVerbose = 'v',
oBatch = 500,
aClearsign,
aKeygen,
aSignEncr,
aDeleteKey,
aImport,
aVerify,
aListExternalKeys,
aListChain,
aSendKeys,
aRecvKeys,
aExport,
aExportSecretKeyP12,
aExportSecretKeyP8,
aExportSecretKeyRaw,
aServer,
aLearnCard,
aCallDirmngr,
aCallProtectTool,
aPasswd,
aGPGConfList,
aGPGConfTest,
aDumpKeys,
aDumpChain,
aDumpSecretKeys,
aDumpExternalKeys,
aKeydbClearSomeCertFlags,
aFingerprint,
oOptions,
oDebug,
oDebugLevel,
oDebugAll,
oDebugNone,
oDebugWait,
oDebugAllowCoreDump,
oDebugNoChainValidation,
oDebugIgnoreExpiration,
oLogFile,
oNoLogFile,
oAuditLog,
oHtmlAuditLog,
oEnableSpecialFilenames,
oAgentProgram,
oDisplay,
oTTYname,
oTTYtype,
oLCctype,
oLCmessages,
oXauthority,
oPreferSystemDirmngr,
oDirmngrProgram,
oDisableDirmngr,
oProtectToolProgram,
oFakedSystemTime,
oPassphraseFD,
oPinentryMode,
oAssumeArmor,
oAssumeBase64,
oAssumeBinary,
oBase64,
oNoArmor,
oP12Charset,
oDisableCRLChecks,
oEnableCRLChecks,
oDisableTrustedCertCRLCheck,
oEnableTrustedCertCRLCheck,
oForceCRLRefresh,
oDisableOCSP,
oEnableOCSP,
oIncludeCerts,
oPolicyFile,
oDisablePolicyChecks,
oEnablePolicyChecks,
oAutoIssuerKeyRetrieve,
oWithFingerprint,
oWithMD5Fingerprint,
oWithKeygrip,
oWithSecret,
oAnswerYes,
oAnswerNo,
oKeyring,
oDefaultKey,
oDefRecipient,
oDefRecipientSelf,
oNoDefRecipient,
oStatusFD,
oCipherAlgo,
oDigestAlgo,
oExtraDigestAlgo,
oNoVerbose,
oNoSecmemWarn,
oNoDefKeyring,
oNoGreeting,
oNoTTY,
oNoOptions,
oNoBatch,
oHomedir,
oWithColons,
oWithKeyData,
oWithValidation,
oWithEphemeralKeys,
oSkipVerify,
oValidationModel,
oKeyServer,
oEncryptTo,
oNoEncryptTo,
oLoggerFD,
oDisableCipherAlgo,
oDisablePubkeyAlgo,
oIgnoreTimeConflict,
oNoRandomSeedFile,
oNoCommonCertsImport,
oIgnoreCertExtension,
oNoAutostart
};
static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
ARGPARSE_group (300, N_("@Commands:\n ")),
ARGPARSE_c (aSign, "sign", N_("make a signature")),
/*ARGPARSE_c (aClearsign, "clearsign", N_("make a clear text signature") ),*/
ARGPARSE_c (aDetachedSign, "detach-sign", N_("make a detached signature")),
ARGPARSE_c (aEncr, "encrypt", N_("encrypt data")),
/*ARGPARSE_c (aSym, "symmetric", N_("encryption only with symmetric cipher")),*/
ARGPARSE_c (aDecrypt, "decrypt", N_("decrypt data (default)")),
ARGPARSE_c (aVerify, "verify", N_("verify a signature")),
ARGPARSE_c (aListKeys, "list-keys", N_("list keys")),
ARGPARSE_c (aListExternalKeys, "list-external-keys",
N_("list external keys")),
ARGPARSE_c (aListSecretKeys, "list-secret-keys", N_("list secret keys")),
ARGPARSE_c (aListChain, "list-chain", N_("list certificate chain")),
ARGPARSE_c (aFingerprint, "fingerprint", N_("list keys and fingerprints")),
ARGPARSE_c (aKeygen, "gen-key", N_("generate a new key pair")),
ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteKey, "delete-keys",
N_("remove keys from the public keyring")),
/*ARGPARSE_c (aSendKeys, "send-keys", N_("export keys to a keyserver")),*/
/*ARGPARSE_c (aRecvKeys, "recv-keys", N_("import keys from a keyserver")),*/
ARGPARSE_c (aImport, "import", N_("import certificates")),
ARGPARSE_c (aExport, "export", N_("export certificates")),
/* We use -raw and not -p1 for pkcs#1 secret key export so that it
won't accidentally be used in case -p12 was intended. */
ARGPARSE_c (aExportSecretKeyP12, "export-secret-key-p12", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aExportSecretKeyP8, "export-secret-key-p8", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aExportSecretKeyRaw, "export-secret-key-raw", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aLearnCard, "learn-card", N_("register a smartcard")),
ARGPARSE_c (aServer, "server", N_("run in server mode")),
ARGPARSE_c (aCallDirmngr, "call-dirmngr",
N_("pass a command to the dirmngr")),
ARGPARSE_c (aCallProtectTool, "call-protect-tool",
N_("invoke gpg-protect-tool")),
ARGPARSE_c (aPasswd, "passwd", N_("change a passphrase")),
ARGPARSE_c (aGPGConfList, "gpgconf-list", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aGPGConfTest, "gpgconf-test", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aDumpKeys, "dump-cert", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aDumpKeys, "dump-keys", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aDumpChain, "dump-chain", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aDumpExternalKeys, "dump-external-keys", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aDumpSecretKeys, "dump-secret-keys", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aKeydbClearSomeCertFlags, "keydb-clear-some-cert-flags", "@"),
ARGPARSE_group (301, N_("@\nOptions:\n ")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oArmor, "armor", N_("create ascii armored output")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oArmor, "armour", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oBase64, "base64", N_("create base-64 encoded output")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oP12Charset, "p12-charset", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oPassphraseFD, "passphrase-fd", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPinentryMode, "pinentry-mode", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAssumeArmor, "assume-armor",
N_("assume input is in PEM format")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAssumeBase64, "assume-base64",
N_("assume input is in base-64 format")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAssumeBinary, "assume-binary",
N_("assume input is in binary format")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "recipient", N_("|USER-ID|encrypt for USER-ID")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oPreferSystemDirmngr,"prefer-system-dirmngr", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableCRLChecks, "disable-crl-checks",
N_("never consult a CRL")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableCRLChecks, "enable-crl-checks", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableTrustedCertCRLCheck,
"disable-trusted-cert-crl-check", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableTrustedCertCRLCheck,
"enable-trusted-cert-crl-check", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oForceCRLRefresh, "force-crl-refresh", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableOCSP, "disable-ocsp", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableOCSP, "enable-ocsp", N_("check validity using OCSP")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oValidationModel, "validation-model", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oIncludeCerts, "include-certs",
N_("|N|number of certificates to include") ),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPolicyFile, "policy-file",
N_("|FILE|take policy information from FILE")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisablePolicyChecks, "disable-policy-checks",
N_("do not check certificate policies")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnablePolicyChecks, "enable-policy-checks", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAutoIssuerKeyRetrieve, "auto-issuer-key-retrieve",
N_("fetch missing issuer certificates")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oEncryptTo, "encrypt-to", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEncryptTo, "no-encrypt-to", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oUser, "local-user",
N_("|USER-ID|use USER-ID to sign or decrypt")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oOutput, "output", N_("|FILE|write output to FILE")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oVerbose, "verbose", N_("verbose")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oQuiet, "quiet", N_("be somewhat more quiet")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoTTY, "no-tty", N_("don't use the terminal at all")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oLogFile, "log-file",
N_("|FILE|write a server mode log to FILE")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoLogFile, "no-log-file", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oLoggerFD, "logger-fd", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oAuditLog, "audit-log",
N_("|FILE|write an audit log to FILE")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oHtmlAuditLog, "html-audit-log", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDryRun, "dry-run", N_("do not make any changes")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oBatch, "batch", N_("batch mode: never ask")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAnswerYes, "yes", N_("assume yes on most questions")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oAnswerNo, "no", N_("assume no on most questions")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyring, "keyring",
N_("|FILE|add keyring to the list of keyrings")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultKey, "default-key",
N_("|USER-ID|use USER-ID as default secret key")),
/* Not yet used: */
/* ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefRecipient, "default-recipient", */
/* N_("|NAME|use NAME as default recipient")), */
/* ARGPARSE_s_n (oDefRecipientSelf, "default-recipient-self", */
/* N_("use the default key as default recipient")), */
/* ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDefRecipient, "no-default-recipient", "@"), */
ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyServer, "keyserver",
N_("|SPEC|use this keyserver to lookup keys")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oOptions, "options", N_("|FILE|read options from FILE")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDebug, "debug", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDebugLevel, "debug-level",
N_("|LEVEL|set the debugging level to LEVEL")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugAll, "debug-all", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugNone, "debug-none", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oDebugWait, "debug-wait", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugAllowCoreDump, "debug-allow-core-dump", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugNoChainValidation, "debug-no-chain-validation", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugIgnoreExpiration, "debug-ignore-expiration", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_i (oStatusFD, "status-fd",
N_("|FD|write status info to this FD")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oCipherAlgo, "cipher-algo",
N_("|NAME|use cipher algorithm NAME")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDigestAlgo, "digest-algo",
N_("|NAME|use message digest algorithm NAME")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oExtraDigestAlgo, "extra-digest-algo", "@"),
ARGPARSE_group (302, N_(
"@\n(See the man page for a complete listing of all commands and options)\n"
)),
ARGPARSE_group (303, N_("@\nExamples:\n\n"
" -se -r Bob [file] sign and encrypt for user Bob\n"
" --clearsign [file] make a clear text signature\n"
" --detach-sign [file] make a detached signature\n"
" --list-keys [names] show keys\n"
" --fingerprint [names] show fingerprints\n" )),
/* Hidden options. */
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoVerbose, "no-verbose", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableSpecialFilenames, "enable-special-filenames", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSecmemWarn, "no-secmem-warning", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoArmor, "no-armor", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoArmor, "no-armour", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDefKeyring, "no-default-keyring", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoGreeting, "no-greeting", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoOptions, "no-options", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oHomedir, "homedir", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oAgentProgram, "agent-program", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplay, "display", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oTTYname, "ttyname", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oTTYtype, "ttytype", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oLCctype, "lc-ctype", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oLCmessages, "lc-messages", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oXauthority, "xauthority", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDirmngrProgram, "dirmngr-program", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableDirmngr, "disable-dirmngr", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oProtectToolProgram, "protect-tool-program", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oFakedSystemTime, "faked-system-time", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoBatch, "no-batch", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithColons, "with-colons", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeyData,"with-key-data", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithValidation, "with-validation", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithMD5Fingerprint, "with-md5-fingerprint", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithEphemeralKeys, "with-ephemeral-keys", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oSkipVerify, "skip-verify", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithFingerprint, "with-fingerprint", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeygrip, "with-keygrip", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSecret, "with-secret", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisableCipherAlgo, "disable-cipher-algo", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisablePubkeyAlgo, "disable-pubkey-algo", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreTimeConflict, "ignore-time-conflict", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRandomSeedFile, "no-random-seed-file", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoCommonCertsImport, "no-common-certs-import", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oIgnoreCertExtension, "ignore-cert-extension", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutostart, "no-autostart", "@"),
/* Command aliases. */
ARGPARSE_c (aListKeys, "list-key", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aListChain, "list-sig", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aListChain, "list-sigs", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aListChain, "check-sig", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aListChain, "check-sigs", "@"),
ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteKey, "delete-key", "@"),
ARGPARSE_end ()
};
/* The list of supported debug flags. */
static struct debug_flags_s debug_flags [] =
{
{ DBG_X509_VALUE , "x509" },
{ DBG_MPI_VALUE , "mpi" },
{ DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE , "crypto" },
{ DBG_MEMORY_VALUE , "memory" },
{ DBG_CACHE_VALUE , "cache" },
{ DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE, "memstat" },
{ DBG_HASHING_VALUE, "hashing" },
{ DBG_IPC_VALUE , "ipc" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
/* Global variable to keep an error count. */
int gpgsm_errors_seen = 0;
/* It is possible that we are currentlu running under setuid permissions */
static int maybe_setuid = 1;
/* Helper to implement --debug-level and --debug*/
static const char *debug_level;
static unsigned int debug_value;
/* Option --enable-special-filenames */
static int allow_special_filenames;
/* Default value for include-certs. We need an extra macro for
gpgconf-list because the variable will be changed by the command
line option.
It is often cumbersome to locate intermediate certificates, thus by
default we include all certificates in the chain. However we leave
out the root certificate because that would make it too easy for
the recipient to import that root certificate. A root certificate
should be installed only after due checks and thus it won't help to
send it along with each message. */
#define DEFAULT_INCLUDE_CERTS -2 /* Include all certs but root. */
static int default_include_certs = DEFAULT_INCLUDE_CERTS;
/* Whether the chain mode shall be used for validation. */
static int default_validation_model;
/* The default cipher algo. */
#define DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO "AES"
static char *build_list (const char *text,
const char *(*mapf)(int), int (*chkf)(int));
static void set_cmd (enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd,
enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd );
static void emergency_cleanup (void);
static int check_special_filename (const char *fname, int for_write);
static int open_read (const char *filename);
static estream_t open_es_fread (const char *filename, const char *mode);
static estream_t open_es_fwrite (const char *filename);
static void run_protect_tool (int argc, char **argv);
static int
our_pk_test_algo (int algo)
{
switch (algo)
{
case GCRY_PK_RSA:
case GCRY_PK_ECDSA:
return gcry_pk_test_algo (algo);
default:
return 1;
}
}
static int
our_cipher_test_algo (int algo)
{
switch (algo)
{
case GCRY_CIPHER_3DES:
case GCRY_CIPHER_AES128:
case GCRY_CIPHER_AES192:
case GCRY_CIPHER_AES256:
case GCRY_CIPHER_SERPENT128:
case GCRY_CIPHER_SERPENT192:
case GCRY_CIPHER_SERPENT256:
case GCRY_CIPHER_SEED:
case GCRY_CIPHER_CAMELLIA128:
case GCRY_CIPHER_CAMELLIA192:
case GCRY_CIPHER_CAMELLIA256:
return gcry_cipher_test_algo (algo);
default:
return 1;
}
}
static int
our_md_test_algo (int algo)
{
switch (algo)
{
case GCRY_MD_MD5:
case GCRY_MD_SHA1:
case GCRY_MD_RMD160:
case GCRY_MD_SHA224:
case GCRY_MD_SHA256:
case GCRY_MD_SHA384:
case GCRY_MD_SHA512:
case GCRY_MD_WHIRLPOOL:
return gcry_md_test_algo (algo);
default:
return 1;
}
}
static char *
make_libversion (const char *libname, const char *(*getfnc)(const char*))
{
const char *s;
char *result;
if (maybe_setuid)
{
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 0, 0); /* Drop setuid. */
maybe_setuid = 0;
}
s = getfnc (NULL);
result = xmalloc (strlen (libname) + 1 + strlen (s) + 1);
strcpy (stpcpy (stpcpy (result, libname), " "), s);
return result;
}
static const char *
my_strusage( int level )
{
static char *digests, *pubkeys, *ciphers;
static char *ver_gcry, *ver_ksba;
const char *p;
switch (level)
{
case 11: p = "@GPGSM@ (@GNUPG@)";
break;
case 13: p = VERSION; break;
case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break;
case 19: p = _("Please report bugs to <@EMAIL@>.\n"); break;
case 1:
case 40: p = _("Usage: @GPGSM@ [options] [files] (-h for help)");
break;
case 41:
p = _("Syntax: @GPGSM@ [options] [files]\n"
"Sign, check, encrypt or decrypt using the S/MIME protocol\n"
"Default operation depends on the input data\n");
break;
case 20:
if (!ver_gcry)
ver_gcry = make_libversion ("libgcrypt", gcry_check_version);
p = ver_gcry;
break;
case 21:
if (!ver_ksba)
ver_ksba = make_libversion ("libksba", ksba_check_version);
p = ver_ksba;
break;
case 31: p = "\nHome: "; break;
case 32: p = gnupg_homedir (); break;
case 33: p = _("\nSupported algorithms:\n"); break;
case 34:
if (!ciphers)
ciphers = build_list ("Cipher: ", gnupg_cipher_algo_name,
our_cipher_test_algo );
p = ciphers;
break;
case 35:
if (!pubkeys)
pubkeys = build_list ("Pubkey: ", gcry_pk_algo_name,
our_pk_test_algo );
p = pubkeys;
break;
case 36:
if (!digests)
digests = build_list("Hash: ", gcry_md_algo_name, our_md_test_algo );
p = digests;
break;
default: p = NULL; break;
}
return p;
}
static char *
build_list (const char *text, const char * (*mapf)(int), int (*chkf)(int))
{
int i;
size_t n=strlen(text)+2;
char *list, *p;
if (maybe_setuid) {
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DROP_PRIVS); /* drop setuid */
}
for (i=1; i < 400; i++ )
if (!chkf(i))
n += strlen(mapf(i)) + 2;
list = xmalloc (21 + n);
*list = 0;
for (p=NULL, i=1; i < 400; i++)
{
if (!chkf(i))
{
if( !p )
p = stpcpy (list, text );
else
p = stpcpy (p, ", ");
p = stpcpy (p, mapf(i) );
}
}
if (p)
strcpy (p, "\n" );
return list;
}
/* Set the file pointer into binary mode if required. */
static void
set_binary (FILE *fp)
{
#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
setmode (fileno (fp), O_BINARY);
#else
(void)fp;
#endif
}
static void
wrong_args (const char *text)
{
fprintf (stderr, _("usage: %s [options] %s\n"), GPGSM_NAME, text);
gpgsm_exit (2);
}
static void
set_opt_session_env (const char *name, const char *value)
{
gpg_error_t err;
err = session_env_setenv (opt.session_env, name, value);
if (err)
log_fatal ("error setting session environment: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
}
/* Setup the debugging. With a DEBUG_LEVEL of NULL only the active
debug flags are propagated to the subsystems. With DEBUG_LEVEL
set, a specific set of debug flags is set; and individual debugging
flags will be added on top. */
static void
set_debug (void)
{
int numok = (debug_level && digitp (debug_level));
int numlvl = numok? atoi (debug_level) : 0;
if (!debug_level)
;
else if (!strcmp (debug_level, "none") || (numok && numlvl < 1))
opt.debug = 0;
else if (!strcmp (debug_level, "basic") || (numok && numlvl <= 2))
opt.debug = DBG_IPC_VALUE;
else if (!strcmp (debug_level, "advanced") || (numok && numlvl <= 5))
opt.debug = DBG_IPC_VALUE|DBG_X509_VALUE;
else if (!strcmp (debug_level, "expert") || (numok && numlvl <= 8))
opt.debug = (DBG_IPC_VALUE|DBG_X509_VALUE
|DBG_CACHE_VALUE|DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE);
else if (!strcmp (debug_level, "guru") || numok)
{
opt.debug = ~0;
/* Unless the "guru" string has been used we don't want to allow
hashing debugging. The rationale is that people tend to
select the highest debug value and would then clutter their
disk with debug files which may reveal confidential data. */
if (numok)
opt.debug &= ~(DBG_HASHING_VALUE);
}
else
{
log_error (_("invalid debug-level '%s' given\n"), debug_level);
gpgsm_exit (2);
}
opt.debug |= debug_value;
if (opt.debug && !opt.verbose)
opt.verbose = 1;
if (opt.debug)
opt.quiet = 0;
if (opt.debug & DBG_MPI_VALUE)
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 2);
if (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE )
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 1);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);
if (opt.debug)
parse_debug_flag (NULL, &opt.debug, debug_flags);
}
static void
set_cmd (enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd, enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd)
{
enum cmd_and_opt_values cmd = *ret_cmd;
if (!cmd || cmd == new_cmd)
cmd = new_cmd;
else if ( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aEncr )
cmd = aSignEncr;
else if ( cmd == aEncr && new_cmd == aSign )
cmd = aSignEncr;
else if ( (cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aClearsign)
|| (cmd == aClearsign && new_cmd == aSign) )
cmd = aClearsign;
else
{
log_error(_("conflicting commands\n"));
gpgsm_exit(2);
}
*ret_cmd = cmd;
}
/* Helper to add recipients to a list. */
static void
do_add_recipient (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name,
certlist_t *recplist, int is_encrypt_to, int recp_required)
{
int rc = gpgsm_add_to_certlist (ctrl, name, 0, recplist, is_encrypt_to);
if (rc)
{
if (recp_required)
{
log_error ("can't encrypt to '%s': %s\n", name, gpg_strerror (rc));
gpgsm_status2 (ctrl, STATUS_INV_RECP,
get_inv_recpsgnr_code (rc), name, NULL);
}
else
log_info (_("Note: won't be able to encrypt to '%s': %s\n"),
name, gpg_strerror (rc));
}
}
static void
parse_validation_model (const char *model)
{
int i = gpgsm_parse_validation_model (model);
if (i == -1)
log_error (_("unknown validation model '%s'\n"), model);
else
default_validation_model = i;
}
/* Release the list of SERVERS. As usual it is okay to call this
function with SERVERS passed as NULL. */
void
keyserver_list_free (struct keyserver_spec *servers)
{
while (servers)
{
struct keyserver_spec *tmp = servers->next;
xfree (servers->host);
xfree (servers->user);
if (servers->pass)
memset (servers->pass, 0, strlen (servers->pass));
xfree (servers->pass);
xfree (servers->base);
xfree (servers);
servers = tmp;
}
}
/* See also dirmngr ldapserver_parse_one(). */
struct keyserver_spec *
parse_keyserver_line (char *line,
const char *filename, unsigned int lineno)
{
char *p;
char *endp;
struct keyserver_spec *server;
int fieldno;
int fail = 0;
/* Parse the colon separated fields. */
server = xcalloc (1, sizeof *server);
for (fieldno = 1, p = line; p; p = endp, fieldno++ )
{
endp = strchr (p, ':');
if (endp)
*endp++ = '\0';
trim_spaces (p);
switch (fieldno)
{
case 1:
if (*p)
server->host = xstrdup (p);
else
{
log_error (_("%s:%u: no hostname given\n"),
filename, lineno);
fail = 1;
}
break;
case 2:
if (*p)
server->port = atoi (p);
break;
case 3:
if (*p)
server->user = xstrdup (p);
break;
case 4:
if (*p && !server->user)
{
log_error (_("%s:%u: password given without user\n"),
filename, lineno);
fail = 1;
}
else if (*p)
server->pass = xstrdup (p);
break;
case 5:
if (*p)
server->base = xstrdup (p);
break;
default:
/* (We silently ignore extra fields.) */
break;
}
}
if (fail)
{
log_info (_("%s:%u: skipping this line\n"), filename, lineno);
keyserver_list_free (server);
server = NULL;
}
return server;
}
int
main ( int argc, char **argv)
{
ARGPARSE_ARGS pargs;
int orig_argc;
char **orig_argv;
/* char *username;*/
int may_coredump;
strlist_t sl, remusr= NULL, locusr=NULL;
strlist_t nrings=NULL;
int detached_sig = 0;
FILE *configfp = NULL;
char *configname = NULL;
unsigned configlineno;
int parse_debug = 0;
int no_more_options = 0;
int default_config =1;
int default_keyring = 1;
char *logfile = NULL;
char *auditlog = NULL;
char *htmlauditlog = NULL;
int greeting = 0;
int nogreeting = 0;
int debug_wait = 0;
int use_random_seed = 1;
int no_common_certs_import = 0;
int with_fpr = 0;
const char *forced_digest_algo = NULL;
const char *extra_digest_algo = NULL;
enum cmd_and_opt_values cmd = 0;
struct server_control_s ctrl;
certlist_t recplist = NULL;
certlist_t signerlist = NULL;
int do_not_setup_keys = 0;
int recp_required = 0;
estream_t auditfp = NULL;
estream_t htmlauditfp = NULL;
struct assuan_malloc_hooks malloc_hooks;
int pwfd = -1;
/*mtrace();*/
early_system_init ();
gnupg_reopen_std (GPGSM_NAME);
/* trap_unaligned ();*/
gnupg_rl_initialize ();
set_strusage (my_strusage);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SUSPEND_SECMEM_WARN);
/* Please note that we may running SUID(ROOT), so be very CAREFUL
when adding any stuff between here and the call to secmem_init()
somewhere after the option parsing */
log_set_prefix (GPGSM_NAME, GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PREFIX);
/* Make sure that our subsystems are ready. */
i18n_init ();
init_common_subsystems (&argc, &argv);
/* Check that the libraries are suitable. Do it here because the
option parse may need services of the library */
if (!ksba_check_version (NEED_KSBA_VERSION) )
log_fatal (_("%s is too old (need %s, have %s)\n"), "libksba",
NEED_KSBA_VERSION, ksba_check_version (NULL) );
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_USE_SECURE_RNDPOOL);
may_coredump = disable_core_dumps ();
gnupg_init_signals (0, emergency_cleanup);
dotlock_create (NULL, 0); /* Register lockfile cleanup. */
opt.autostart = 1;
opt.session_env = session_env_new ();
if (!opt.session_env)
log_fatal ("error allocating session environment block: %s\n",
strerror (errno));
/* Note: If you change this default cipher algorithm , please
remember to update the Gpgconflist entry as well. */
opt.def_cipher_algoid = DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO;
/* First check whether we have a config file on the commandline */
orig_argc = argc;
orig_argv = argv;
pargs.argc = &argc;
pargs.argv = &argv;
pargs.flags= 1|(1<<6); /* do not remove the args, ignore version */
while (arg_parse( &pargs, opts))
{
if (pargs.r_opt == oDebug || pargs.r_opt == oDebugAll)
parse_debug++;
else if (pargs.r_opt == oOptions)
{ /* yes there is one, so we do not try the default one but
read the config file when it is encountered at the
commandline */
default_config = 0;
}
else if (pargs.r_opt == oNoOptions)
{
default_config = 0; /* --no-options */
opt.no_homedir_creation = 1;
}
else if (pargs.r_opt == oHomedir)
gnupg_set_homedir (pargs.r.ret_str);
else if (pargs.r_opt == aCallProtectTool)
break; /* This break makes sure that --version and --help are
passed to the protect-tool. */
}
/* Initialize the secure memory. */
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 16384, 0);
maybe_setuid = 0;
/*
Now we are now working under our real uid
*/
ksba_set_malloc_hooks (gcry_malloc, gcry_realloc, gcry_free );
malloc_hooks.malloc = gcry_malloc;
malloc_hooks.realloc = gcry_realloc;
malloc_hooks.free = gcry_free;
assuan_set_malloc_hooks (&malloc_hooks);
assuan_set_gpg_err_source (GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT);
setup_libassuan_logging (&opt.debug, NULL);
keybox_set_malloc_hooks (gcry_malloc, gcry_realloc, gcry_free);
/* Setup a default control structure for command line mode */
memset (&ctrl, 0, sizeof ctrl);
gpgsm_init_default_ctrl (&ctrl);
ctrl.no_server = 1;
ctrl.status_fd = -1; /* No status output. */
ctrl.autodetect_encoding = 1;
/* Set the default option file */
if (default_config )
configname = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (),
GPGSM_NAME EXTSEP_S "conf", NULL);
/* Set the default policy file */
opt.policy_file = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), "policies.txt", NULL);
argc = orig_argc;
argv = orig_argv;
pargs.argc = &argc;
pargs.argv = &argv;
pargs.flags = 1; /* do not remove the args */
next_pass:
if (configname) {
configlineno = 0;
configfp = fopen (configname, "r");
if (!configfp)
{
if (default_config)
{
if (parse_debug)
log_info (_("Note: no default option file '%s'\n"), configname);
}
else
{
log_error (_("option file '%s': %s\n"), configname, strerror(errno));
gpgsm_exit(2);
}
xfree(configname);
configname = NULL;
}
if (parse_debug && configname)
log_info (_("reading options from '%s'\n"), configname);
default_config = 0;
}
while (!no_more_options
&& optfile_parse (configfp, configname, &configlineno, &pargs, opts))
{
switch (pargs.r_opt)
{
case aGPGConfList:
case aGPGConfTest:
set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
do_not_setup_keys = 1;
nogreeting = 1;
break;
case aServer:
opt.batch = 1;
set_cmd (&cmd, aServer);
break;
case aCallDirmngr:
opt.batch = 1;
set_cmd (&cmd, aCallDirmngr);
do_not_setup_keys = 1;
break;
case aCallProtectTool:
opt.batch = 1;
set_cmd (&cmd, aCallProtectTool);
no_more_options = 1; /* Stop parsing. */
do_not_setup_keys = 1;
break;
case aDeleteKey:
set_cmd (&cmd, aDeleteKey);
/*greeting=1;*/
do_not_setup_keys = 1;
break;
case aDetachedSign:
detached_sig = 1;
set_cmd (&cmd, aSign );
break;
case aKeygen:
set_cmd (&cmd, aKeygen);
greeting=1;
do_not_setup_keys = 1;
break;
case aImport:
case aSendKeys:
case aRecvKeys:
case aExport:
case aExportSecretKeyP12:
case aExportSecretKeyP8:
case aExportSecretKeyRaw:
case aDumpKeys:
case aDumpChain:
case aDumpExternalKeys:
case aDumpSecretKeys:
case aListKeys:
case aListExternalKeys:
case aListSecretKeys:
case aListChain:
case aLearnCard:
case aPasswd:
case aKeydbClearSomeCertFlags:
do_not_setup_keys = 1;
set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
break;
case aEncr:
recp_required = 1;
set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
break;
case aSym:
case aDecrypt:
case aSign:
case aClearsign:
case aVerify:
set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
break;
/* Output encoding selection. */
case oArmor:
ctrl.create_pem = 1;
break;
case oBase64:
ctrl.create_pem = 0;
ctrl.create_base64 = 1;
break;
case oNoArmor:
ctrl.create_pem = 0;
ctrl.create_base64 = 0;
break;
case oP12Charset:
opt.p12_charset = pargs.r.ret_str;
break;
case oPassphraseFD:
pwfd = translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 0);
break;
case oPinentryMode:
opt.pinentry_mode = parse_pinentry_mode (pargs.r.ret_str);
if (opt.pinentry_mode == -1)
log_error (_("invalid pinentry mode '%s'\n"), pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
/* Input encoding selection. */
case oAssumeArmor:
ctrl.autodetect_encoding = 0;
ctrl.is_pem = 1;
ctrl.is_base64 = 0;
break;
case oAssumeBase64:
ctrl.autodetect_encoding = 0;
ctrl.is_pem = 0;
ctrl.is_base64 = 1;
break;
case oAssumeBinary:
ctrl.autodetect_encoding = 0;
ctrl.is_pem = 0;
ctrl.is_base64 = 0;
break;
case oDisableCRLChecks:
opt.no_crl_check = 1;
break;
case oEnableCRLChecks:
opt.no_crl_check = 0;
break;
case oDisableTrustedCertCRLCheck:
opt.no_trusted_cert_crl_check = 1;
break;
case oEnableTrustedCertCRLCheck:
opt.no_trusted_cert_crl_check = 0;
break;
case oForceCRLRefresh:
opt.force_crl_refresh = 1;
break;
case oDisableOCSP:
ctrl.use_ocsp = opt.enable_ocsp = 0;
break;
case oEnableOCSP:
ctrl.use_ocsp = opt.enable_ocsp = 1;
break;
case oIncludeCerts:
ctrl.include_certs = default_include_certs = pargs.r.ret_int;
break;
case oPolicyFile:
xfree (opt.policy_file);
if (*pargs.r.ret_str)
opt.policy_file = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str);
else
opt.policy_file = NULL;
break;
case oDisablePolicyChecks:
opt.no_policy_check = 1;
break;
case oEnablePolicyChecks:
opt.no_policy_check = 0;
break;
case oAutoIssuerKeyRetrieve:
opt.auto_issuer_key_retrieve = 1;
break;
case oOutput: opt.outfile = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oQuiet: opt.quiet = 1; break;
case oNoTTY: /* fixme:tty_no_terminal(1);*/ break;
case oDryRun: opt.dry_run = 1; break;
case oVerbose:
opt.verbose++;
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);
break;
case oNoVerbose:
opt.verbose = 0;
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);
break;
case oLogFile: logfile = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oNoLogFile: logfile = NULL; break;
case oAuditLog: auditlog = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oHtmlAuditLog: htmlauditlog = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oBatch:
opt.batch = 1;
greeting = 0;
break;
case oNoBatch: opt.batch = 0; break;
case oAnswerYes: opt.answer_yes = 1; break;
case oAnswerNo: opt.answer_no = 1; break;
case oKeyring: append_to_strlist (&nrings, pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oDebug:
if (parse_debug_flag (pargs.r.ret_str, &debug_value, debug_flags))
{
pargs.r_opt = ARGPARSE_INVALID_ARG;
pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR;
}
break;
case oDebugAll: debug_value = ~0; break;
case oDebugNone: debug_value = 0; break;
case oDebugLevel: debug_level = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oDebugWait: debug_wait = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
case oDebugAllowCoreDump:
may_coredump = enable_core_dumps ();
break;
case oDebugNoChainValidation: opt.no_chain_validation = 1; break;
case oDebugIgnoreExpiration: opt.ignore_expiration = 1; break;
case oStatusFD: ctrl.status_fd = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
case oLoggerFD: log_set_fd (pargs.r.ret_int ); break;
case oWithMD5Fingerprint:
- opt.with_md5_fingerprint=1; /*fall thru*/
+ opt.with_md5_fingerprint=1; /*fall through*/
case oWithFingerprint:
- with_fpr=1; /*fall thru*/
+ with_fpr=1; /*fall through*/
case aFingerprint:
opt.fingerprint++;
break;
case oWithKeygrip:
opt.with_keygrip = 1;
break;
case oOptions:
/* config files may not be nested (silently ignore them) */
if (!configfp)
{
xfree(configname);
configname = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str);
goto next_pass;
}
break;
case oNoOptions: opt.no_homedir_creation = 1; break; /* no-options */
case oHomedir: gnupg_set_homedir (pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oAgentProgram: opt.agent_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oDisplay:
set_opt_session_env ("DISPLAY", pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oTTYname:
set_opt_session_env ("GPG_TTY", pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oTTYtype:
set_opt_session_env ("TERM", pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oXauthority:
set_opt_session_env ("XAUTHORITY", pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oLCctype: opt.lc_ctype = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oLCmessages: opt.lc_messages = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oDirmngrProgram: opt.dirmngr_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oDisableDirmngr: opt.disable_dirmngr = 1; break;
case oPreferSystemDirmngr: /* Obsolete */; break;
case oProtectToolProgram:
opt.protect_tool_program = pargs.r.ret_str;
break;
case oFakedSystemTime:
{
time_t faked_time = isotime2epoch (pargs.r.ret_str);
if (faked_time == (time_t)(-1))
faked_time = (time_t)strtoul (pargs.r.ret_str, NULL, 10);
gnupg_set_time (faked_time, 0);
}
break;
case oNoDefKeyring: default_keyring = 0; break;
case oNoGreeting: nogreeting = 1; break;
case oDefaultKey:
if (*pargs.r.ret_str)
{
xfree (opt.local_user);
opt.local_user = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str);
}
break;
case oDefRecipient:
if (*pargs.r.ret_str)
opt.def_recipient = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oDefRecipientSelf:
xfree (opt.def_recipient);
opt.def_recipient = NULL;
opt.def_recipient_self = 1;
break;
case oNoDefRecipient:
xfree (opt.def_recipient);
opt.def_recipient = NULL;
opt.def_recipient_self = 0;
break;
- case oWithKeyData: opt.with_key_data=1; /* fall thru */
+ case oWithKeyData: opt.with_key_data=1; /* fall through */
case oWithColons: ctrl.with_colons = 1; break;
case oWithSecret: ctrl.with_secret = 1; break;
case oWithValidation: ctrl.with_validation=1; break;
case oWithEphemeralKeys: ctrl.with_ephemeral_keys=1; break;
case oSkipVerify: opt.skip_verify=1; break;
case oNoEncryptTo: opt.no_encrypt_to = 1; break;
case oEncryptTo: /* Store the recipient in the second list */
sl = add_to_strlist (&remusr, pargs.r.ret_str);
sl->flags = 1;
break;
case oRecipient: /* store the recipient */
add_to_strlist ( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oUser: /* Store the local users, the first one is the default */
if (!opt.local_user)
opt.local_user = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str);
add_to_strlist (&locusr, pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oNoSecmemWarn:
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM_WARN);
break;
case oCipherAlgo:
opt.def_cipher_algoid = pargs.r.ret_str;
break;
case oDisableCipherAlgo:
{
int algo = gcry_cipher_map_name (pargs.r.ret_str);
gcry_cipher_ctl (NULL, GCRYCTL_DISABLE_ALGO, &algo, sizeof algo);
}
break;
case oDisablePubkeyAlgo:
{
int algo = gcry_pk_map_name (pargs.r.ret_str);
gcry_pk_ctl (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_ALGO,&algo, sizeof algo );
}
break;
case oDigestAlgo:
forced_digest_algo = pargs.r.ret_str;
break;
case oExtraDigestAlgo:
extra_digest_algo = pargs.r.ret_str;
break;
case oIgnoreTimeConflict: opt.ignore_time_conflict = 1; break;
case oNoRandomSeedFile: use_random_seed = 0; break;
case oNoCommonCertsImport: no_common_certs_import = 1; break;
case oEnableSpecialFilenames: allow_special_filenames =1; break;
case oValidationModel: parse_validation_model (pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oKeyServer:
{
struct keyserver_spec *keyserver;
keyserver = parse_keyserver_line (pargs.r.ret_str,
configname, configlineno);
if (! keyserver)
log_error (_("could not parse keyserver\n"));
else
{
/* FIXME: Keep last next pointer. */
struct keyserver_spec **next_p = &opt.keyserver;
while (*next_p)
next_p = &(*next_p)->next;
*next_p = keyserver;
}
}
break;
case oIgnoreCertExtension:
add_to_strlist (&opt.ignored_cert_extensions, pargs.r.ret_str);
break;
case oNoAutostart: opt.autostart = 0; break;
default:
pargs.err = configfp? ARGPARSE_PRINT_WARNING:ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR;
break;
}
}
if (configfp)
{
fclose (configfp);
configfp = NULL;
/* Keep a copy of the config filename. */
opt.config_filename = configname;
configname = NULL;
goto next_pass;
}
xfree (configname);
configname = NULL;
if (!opt.config_filename)
opt.config_filename = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (),
GPGSM_NAME EXTSEP_S "conf",
NULL);
if (log_get_errorcount(0))
gpgsm_exit(2);
if (pwfd != -1) /* Read the passphrase now. */
read_passphrase_from_fd (pwfd);
/* Now that we have the options parsed we need to update the default
control structure. */
gpgsm_init_default_ctrl (&ctrl);
if (nogreeting)
greeting = 0;
if (greeting)
{
es_fprintf (es_stderr, "%s %s; %s\n",
strusage(11), strusage(13), strusage(14) );
es_fprintf (es_stderr, "%s\n", strusage(15) );
}
# ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION
if (!opt.batch)
{
log_info ("NOTE: THIS IS A DEVELOPMENT VERSION!\n");
log_info ("It is only intended for test purposes and should NOT be\n");
log_info ("used in a production environment or with production keys!\n");
}
# endif
if (may_coredump && !opt.quiet)
log_info (_("WARNING: program may create a core file!\n"));
/* if (opt.qualsig_approval && !opt.quiet) */
/* log_info (_("This software has officially been approved to " */
/* "create and verify\n" */
/* "qualified signatures according to German law.\n")); */
if (logfile && cmd == aServer)
{
log_set_file (logfile);
log_set_prefix (NULL, GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PREFIX | GPGRT_LOG_WITH_TIME | GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PID);
}
if (gnupg_faked_time_p ())
{
gnupg_isotime_t tbuf;
log_info (_("WARNING: running with faked system time: "));
gnupg_get_isotime (tbuf);
dump_isotime (tbuf);
log_printf ("\n");
}
/* Print a warning if an argument looks like an option. */
if (!opt.quiet && !(pargs.flags & ARGPARSE_FLAG_STOP_SEEN))
{
int i;
for (i=0; i < argc; i++)
if (argv[i][0] == '-' && argv[i][1] == '-')
log_info (_("Note: '%s' is not considered an option\n"), argv[i]);
}
/*FIXME if (opt.batch) */
/* tty_batchmode (1); */
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_RESUME_SECMEM_WARN);
set_debug ();
/* Although we always use gpgsm_exit, we better install a regualr
exit handler so that at least the secure memory gets wiped
out. */
if (atexit (emergency_cleanup))
{
log_error ("atexit failed\n");
gpgsm_exit (2);
}
/* Must do this after dropping setuid, because the mapping functions
may try to load an module and we may have disabled an algorithm.
We remap the commonly used algorithms to the OIDs for
convenience. We need to work with the OIDs because they are used
to check whether the encryption mode is actually available. */
if (!strcmp (opt.def_cipher_algoid, "3DES") )
opt.def_cipher_algoid = "1.2.840.113549.3.7";
else if (!strcmp (opt.def_cipher_algoid, "AES")
|| !strcmp (opt.def_cipher_algoid, "AES128"))
opt.def_cipher_algoid = "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2";
else if (!strcmp (opt.def_cipher_algoid, "AES192") )
opt.def_cipher_algoid = "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.22";
else if (!strcmp (opt.def_cipher_algoid, "AES256") )
opt.def_cipher_algoid = "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42";
else if (!strcmp (opt.def_cipher_algoid, "SERPENT")
|| !strcmp (opt.def_cipher_algoid, "SERPENT128") )
opt.def_cipher_algoid = "1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.13.2.2";
else if (!strcmp (opt.def_cipher_algoid, "SERPENT192") )
opt.def_cipher_algoid = "1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.13.2.22";
else if (!strcmp (opt.def_cipher_algoid, "SERPENT256") )
opt.def_cipher_algoid = "1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.13.2.42";
else if (!strcmp (opt.def_cipher_algoid, "SEED") )
opt.def_cipher_algoid = "1.2.410.200004.1.4";
else if (!strcmp (opt.def_cipher_algoid, "CAMELLIA")
|| !strcmp (opt.def_cipher_algoid, "CAMELLIA128") )
opt.def_cipher_algoid = "1.2.392.200011.61.1.1.1.2";
else if (!strcmp (opt.def_cipher_algoid, "CAMELLIA192") )
opt.def_cipher_algoid = "1.2.392.200011.61.1.1.1.3";
else if (!strcmp (opt.def_cipher_algoid, "CAMELLIA256") )
opt.def_cipher_algoid = "1.2.392.200011.61.1.1.1.4";
if (cmd != aGPGConfList)
{
if ( !gcry_cipher_map_name (opt.def_cipher_algoid)
|| !gcry_cipher_mode_from_oid (opt.def_cipher_algoid))
log_error (_("selected cipher algorithm is invalid\n"));
if (forced_digest_algo)
{
opt.forced_digest_algo = gcry_md_map_name (forced_digest_algo);
if (our_md_test_algo(opt.forced_digest_algo) )
log_error (_("selected digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
}
if (extra_digest_algo)
{
opt.extra_digest_algo = gcry_md_map_name (extra_digest_algo);
if (our_md_test_algo (opt.extra_digest_algo) )
log_error (_("selected digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
}
}
if (log_get_errorcount(0))
gpgsm_exit(2);
/* Set the random seed file. */
if (use_random_seed)
{
char *p = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), "random_seed", NULL);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_RANDOM_SEED_FILE, p);
xfree(p);
}
if (!cmd && opt.fingerprint && !with_fpr)
set_cmd (&cmd, aListKeys);
/* Add default keybox. */
if (!nrings && default_keyring)
{
int created;
keydb_add_resource ("pubring.kbx", 0, 0, &created);
if (created && !no_common_certs_import)
{
/* Import the standard certificates for a new default keybox. */
char *filelist[2];
filelist[0] = make_filename (gnupg_datadir (),"com-certs.pem", NULL);
filelist[1] = NULL;
if (!access (filelist[0], F_OK))
{
log_info (_("importing common certificates '%s'\n"),
filelist[0]);
gpgsm_import_files (&ctrl, 1, filelist, open_read);
}
xfree (filelist[0]);
}
}
for (sl = nrings; sl; sl = sl->next)
keydb_add_resource (sl->d, 0, 0, NULL);
FREE_STRLIST(nrings);
/* Prepare the audit log feature for certain commands. */
if (auditlog || htmlauditlog)
{
switch (cmd)
{
case aEncr:
case aSign:
case aDecrypt:
case aVerify:
audit_release (ctrl.audit);
ctrl.audit = audit_new ();
if (auditlog)
auditfp = open_es_fwrite (auditlog);
if (htmlauditlog)
htmlauditfp = open_es_fwrite (htmlauditlog);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (!do_not_setup_keys)
{
for (sl = locusr; sl ; sl = sl->next)
{
int rc = gpgsm_add_to_certlist (&ctrl, sl->d, 1, &signerlist, 0);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("can't sign using '%s': %s\n"),
sl->d, gpg_strerror (rc));
gpgsm_status2 (&ctrl, STATUS_INV_SGNR,
get_inv_recpsgnr_code (rc), sl->d, NULL);
gpgsm_status2 (&ctrl, STATUS_INV_RECP,
get_inv_recpsgnr_code (rc), sl->d, NULL);
}
}
/* Build the recipient list. We first add the regular ones and then
the encrypt-to ones because the underlying function will silently
ignore duplicates and we can't allow keeping a duplicate which is
flagged as encrypt-to as the actually encrypt function would then
complain about no (regular) recipients. */
for (sl = remusr; sl; sl = sl->next)
if (!(sl->flags & 1))
do_add_recipient (&ctrl, sl->d, &recplist, 0, recp_required);
if (!opt.no_encrypt_to)
{
for (sl = remusr; sl; sl = sl->next)
if ((sl->flags & 1))
do_add_recipient (&ctrl, sl->d, &recplist, 1, recp_required);
}
}
if (log_get_errorcount(0))
gpgsm_exit(1); /* Must stop for invalid recipients. */
/* Dispatch command. */
switch (cmd)
{
case aGPGConfList:
{ /* List options and default values in the GPG Conf format. */
char *config_filename_esc = percent_escape (opt.config_filename, NULL);
es_printf ("%s-%s.conf:%lu:\"%s\n",
GPGCONF_NAME, GPGSM_NAME,
GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT, config_filename_esc);
xfree (config_filename_esc);
es_printf ("verbose:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("quiet:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("debug-level:%lu:\"none:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT);
es_printf ("log-file:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("disable-crl-checks:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("disable-trusted-cert-crl-check:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("enable-ocsp:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("include-certs:%lu:%d:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT,
DEFAULT_INCLUDE_CERTS);
es_printf ("disable-policy-checks:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("auto-issuer-key-retrieve:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("disable-dirmngr:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
es_printf ("cipher-algo:%lu:\"%s:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT,
DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO);
es_printf ("p12-charset:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT);
es_printf ("default-key:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT);
es_printf ("encrypt-to:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT);
es_printf ("keyserver:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
/* The next one is an info only item and should match what
proc_parameters actually implements. */
es_printf ("default_pubkey_algo:%lu:\"%s:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT,
"RSA-2048");
}
break;
case aGPGConfTest:
/* This is merely a dummy command to test whether the
configuration file is valid. */
break;
case aServer:
if (debug_wait)
{
log_debug ("waiting for debugger - my pid is %u .....\n",
(unsigned int)getpid());
gnupg_sleep (debug_wait);
log_debug ("... okay\n");
}
gpgsm_server (recplist);
break;
case aCallDirmngr:
if (!argc)
wrong_args ("--call-dirmngr <command> {args}");
else
if (gpgsm_dirmngr_run_command (&ctrl, *argv, argc-1, argv+1))
gpgsm_exit (1);
break;
case aCallProtectTool:
run_protect_tool (argc, argv);
break;
case aEncr: /* Encrypt the given file. */
{
estream_t fp = open_es_fwrite (opt.outfile?opt.outfile:"-");
set_binary (stdin);
if (!argc) /* Source is stdin. */
gpgsm_encrypt (&ctrl, recplist, 0, fp);
else if (argc == 1) /* Source is the given file. */
gpgsm_encrypt (&ctrl, recplist, open_read (*argv), fp);
else
wrong_args ("--encrypt [datafile]");
es_fclose (fp);
}
break;
case aSign: /* Sign the given file. */
{
estream_t fp = open_es_fwrite (opt.outfile?opt.outfile:"-");
/* Fixme: We should also allow concatenation of multiple files for
signing because that is what gpg does.*/
set_binary (stdin);
if (!argc) /* Create from stdin. */
gpgsm_sign (&ctrl, signerlist, 0, detached_sig, fp);
else if (argc == 1) /* From file. */
gpgsm_sign (&ctrl, signerlist,
open_read (*argv), detached_sig, fp);
else
wrong_args ("--sign [datafile]");
es_fclose (fp);
}
break;
case aSignEncr: /* sign and encrypt the given file */
log_error ("this command has not yet been implemented\n");
break;
case aClearsign: /* make a clearsig */
log_error ("this command has not yet been implemented\n");
break;
case aVerify:
{
estream_t fp = NULL;
set_binary (stdin);
if (argc == 2 && opt.outfile)
log_info ("option --output ignored for a detached signature\n");
else if (opt.outfile)
fp = open_es_fwrite (opt.outfile);
if (!argc)
gpgsm_verify (&ctrl, 0, -1, fp); /* normal signature from stdin */
else if (argc == 1)
gpgsm_verify (&ctrl, open_read (*argv), -1, fp); /* std signature */
else if (argc == 2) /* detached signature (sig, detached) */
gpgsm_verify (&ctrl, open_read (*argv), open_read (argv[1]), NULL);
else
wrong_args ("--verify [signature [detached_data]]");
es_fclose (fp);
}
break;
case aDecrypt:
{
estream_t fp = open_es_fwrite (opt.outfile?opt.outfile:"-");
set_binary (stdin);
if (!argc)
gpgsm_decrypt (&ctrl, 0, fp); /* from stdin */
else if (argc == 1)
gpgsm_decrypt (&ctrl, open_read (*argv), fp); /* from file */
else
wrong_args ("--decrypt [filename]");
es_fclose (fp);
}
break;
case aDeleteKey:
for (sl=NULL; argc; argc--, argv++)
add_to_strlist (&sl, *argv);
gpgsm_delete (&ctrl, sl);
free_strlist(sl);
break;
case aListChain:
case aDumpChain:
ctrl.with_chain = 1;
case aListKeys:
case aDumpKeys:
case aListExternalKeys:
case aDumpExternalKeys:
case aListSecretKeys:
case aDumpSecretKeys:
{
unsigned int mode;
estream_t fp;
switch (cmd)
{
case aListChain:
case aListKeys: mode = (0 | 0 | (1<<6)); break;
case aDumpChain:
case aDumpKeys: mode = (256 | 0 | (1<<6)); break;
case aListExternalKeys: mode = (0 | 0 | (1<<7)); break;
case aDumpExternalKeys: mode = (256 | 0 | (1<<7)); break;
case aListSecretKeys: mode = (0 | 2 | (1<<6)); break;
case aDumpSecretKeys: mode = (256 | 2 | (1<<6)); break;
default: BUG();
}
fp = open_es_fwrite (opt.outfile?opt.outfile:"-");
for (sl=NULL; argc; argc--, argv++)
add_to_strlist (&sl, *argv);
gpgsm_list_keys (&ctrl, sl, fp, mode);
free_strlist(sl);
es_fclose (fp);
}
break;
case aKeygen: /* Generate a key; well kind of. */
{
estream_t fpin = NULL;
estream_t fpout;
if (opt.batch)
{
if (!argc) /* Create from stdin. */
fpin = open_es_fread ("-", "r");
else if (argc == 1) /* From file. */
fpin = open_es_fread (*argv, "r");
else
wrong_args ("--gen-key --batch [parmfile]");
}
fpout = open_es_fwrite (opt.outfile?opt.outfile:"-");
if (fpin)
gpgsm_genkey (&ctrl, fpin, fpout);
else
gpgsm_gencertreq_tty (&ctrl, fpout);
es_fclose (fpout);
}
break;
case aImport:
gpgsm_import_files (&ctrl, argc, argv, open_read);
break;
case aExport:
{
estream_t fp;
fp = open_es_fwrite (opt.outfile?opt.outfile:"-");
for (sl=NULL; argc; argc--, argv++)
add_to_strlist (&sl, *argv);
gpgsm_export (&ctrl, sl, fp);
free_strlist(sl);
es_fclose (fp);
}
break;
case aExportSecretKeyP12:
{
estream_t fp = open_es_fwrite (opt.outfile?opt.outfile:"-");
if (argc == 1)
gpgsm_p12_export (&ctrl, *argv, fp, 0);
else
wrong_args ("--export-secret-key-p12 KEY-ID");
if (fp != es_stdout)
es_fclose (fp);
}
break;
case aExportSecretKeyP8:
{
estream_t fp = open_es_fwrite (opt.outfile?opt.outfile:"-");
if (argc == 1)
gpgsm_p12_export (&ctrl, *argv, fp, 1);
else
wrong_args ("--export-secret-key-p8 KEY-ID");
if (fp != es_stdout)
es_fclose (fp);
}
break;
case aExportSecretKeyRaw:
{
estream_t fp = open_es_fwrite (opt.outfile?opt.outfile:"-");
if (argc == 1)
gpgsm_p12_export (&ctrl, *argv, fp, 2);
else
wrong_args ("--export-secret-key-raw KEY-ID");
if (fp != es_stdout)
es_fclose (fp);
}
break;
case aSendKeys:
case aRecvKeys:
log_error ("this command has not yet been implemented\n");
break;
case aLearnCard:
if (argc)
wrong_args ("--learn-card");
else
{
int rc = gpgsm_agent_learn (&ctrl);
if (rc)
log_error ("error learning card: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
}
break;
case aPasswd:
if (argc != 1)
wrong_args ("--passwd <key-Id>");
else
{
int rc;
ksba_cert_t cert = NULL;
char *grip = NULL;
rc = gpgsm_find_cert (*argv, NULL, &cert);
if (rc)
;
else if (!(grip = gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (cert)))
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);
else
{
char *desc = gpgsm_format_keydesc (cert);
rc = gpgsm_agent_passwd (&ctrl, grip, desc);
xfree (desc);
}
if (rc)
log_error ("error changing passphrase: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
xfree (grip);
ksba_cert_release (cert);
}
break;
case aKeydbClearSomeCertFlags:
for (sl=NULL; argc; argc--, argv++)
add_to_strlist (&sl, *argv);
keydb_clear_some_cert_flags (&ctrl, sl);
free_strlist(sl);
break;
default:
log_error (_("invalid command (there is no implicit command)\n"));
break;
}
/* Print the audit result if needed. */
if ((auditlog && auditfp) || (htmlauditlog && htmlauditfp))
{
if (auditlog && auditfp)
audit_print_result (ctrl.audit, auditfp, 0);
if (htmlauditlog && htmlauditfp)
audit_print_result (ctrl.audit, htmlauditfp, 1);
audit_release (ctrl.audit);
ctrl.audit = NULL;
es_fclose (auditfp);
es_fclose (htmlauditfp);
}
/* cleanup */
keyserver_list_free (opt.keyserver);
opt.keyserver = NULL;
gpgsm_release_certlist (recplist);
gpgsm_release_certlist (signerlist);
FREE_STRLIST (remusr);
FREE_STRLIST (locusr);
gpgsm_exit(0);
return 8; /*NOTREACHED*/
}
/* Note: This function is used by signal handlers!. */
static void
emergency_cleanup (void)
{
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM );
}
void
gpgsm_exit (int rc)
{
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_UPDATE_RANDOM_SEED_FILE);
if (opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE)
{
gcry_control( GCRYCTL_DUMP_MEMORY_STATS );
gcry_control( GCRYCTL_DUMP_RANDOM_STATS );
}
if (opt.debug)
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_SECMEM_STATS );
emergency_cleanup ();
rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 : gpgsm_errors_seen? 1 : 0;
exit (rc);
}
void
gpgsm_init_default_ctrl (struct server_control_s *ctrl)
{
ctrl->include_certs = default_include_certs;
ctrl->use_ocsp = opt.enable_ocsp;
ctrl->validation_model = default_validation_model;
ctrl->offline = opt.disable_dirmngr;
}
int
gpgsm_parse_validation_model (const char *model)
{
if (!ascii_strcasecmp (model, "shell") )
return 0;
else if ( !ascii_strcasecmp (model, "chain") )
return 1;
else if ( !ascii_strcasecmp (model, "steed") )
return 2;
else
return -1;
}
/* Check whether the filename has the form "-&nnnn", where n is a
non-zero number. Returns this number or -1 if it is not the case. */
static int
check_special_filename (const char *fname, int for_write)
{
if (allow_special_filenames
&& fname && *fname == '-' && fname[1] == '&' ) {
int i;
fname += 2;
for (i=0; isdigit (fname[i]); i++ )
;
if ( !fname[i] )
return translate_sys2libc_fd_int (atoi (fname), for_write);
}
return -1;
}
/* Open the FILENAME for read and return the file descriptor. Stop
with an error message in case of problems. "-" denotes stdin and
if special filenames are allowed the given fd is opened instead. */
static int
open_read (const char *filename)
{
int fd;
if (filename[0] == '-' && !filename[1])
{
set_binary (stdin);
return 0; /* stdin */
}
fd = check_special_filename (filename, 0);
if (fd != -1)
return fd;
fd = open (filename, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY);
if (fd == -1)
{
log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), filename, strerror (errno));
gpgsm_exit (2);
}
return fd;
}
/* Same as open_read but return an estream_t. */
static estream_t
open_es_fread (const char *filename, const char *mode)
{
int fd;
estream_t fp;
if (filename[0] == '-' && !filename[1])
fd = fileno (stdin);
else
fd = check_special_filename (filename, 0);
if (fd != -1)
{
fp = es_fdopen_nc (fd, mode);
if (!fp)
{
log_error ("es_fdopen(%d) failed: %s\n", fd, strerror (errno));
gpgsm_exit (2);
}
return fp;
}
fp = es_fopen (filename, mode);
if (!fp)
{
log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), filename, strerror (errno));
gpgsm_exit (2);
}
return fp;
}
/* Open FILENAME for fwrite and return an extended stream. Stop with
an error message in case of problems. "-" denotes stdout and if
special filenames are allowed the given fd is opened instead.
Caller must close the returned stream. */
static estream_t
open_es_fwrite (const char *filename)
{
int fd;
estream_t fp;
if (filename[0] == '-' && !filename[1])
{
fflush (stdout);
fp = es_fdopen_nc (fileno(stdout), "wb");
return fp;
}
fd = check_special_filename (filename, 1);
if (fd != -1)
{
fp = es_fdopen_nc (fd, "wb");
if (!fp)
{
log_error ("es_fdopen(%d) failed: %s\n", fd, strerror (errno));
gpgsm_exit (2);
}
return fp;
}
fp = es_fopen (filename, "wb");
if (!fp)
{
log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), filename, strerror (errno));
gpgsm_exit (2);
}
return fp;
}
static void
run_protect_tool (int argc, char **argv)
{
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
(void)argc;
(void)argv;
#else
const char *pgm;
char **av;
int i;
if (!opt.protect_tool_program || !*opt.protect_tool_program)
pgm = gnupg_module_name (GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_PROTECT_TOOL);
else
pgm = opt.protect_tool_program;
av = xcalloc (argc+2, sizeof *av);
av[0] = strrchr (pgm, '/');
if (!av[0])
av[0] = xstrdup (pgm);
for (i=1; argc; i++, argc--, argv++)
av[i] = *argv;
av[i] = NULL;
execv (pgm, av);
log_error ("error executing '%s': %s\n", pgm, strerror (errno));
#endif /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
gpgsm_exit (2);
}
diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
index f349763a6..1b25b784b 100644
--- a/tests/Makefile.am
+++ b/tests/Makefile.am
@@ -1,76 +1,76 @@
# Makefile.am -tests makefile for libxtime
# Copyright (C) 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
#
# This file is part of GnuPG.
#
# GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
## Process this file with automake to produce Makefile.in
if RUN_GPG_TESTS
openpgp = openpgp
else
openpgp =
endif
SUBDIRS = gpgscm ${openpgp} . migrations pkits
GPGSM = ../sm/gpgsm
# Note that we need to use /bin/pwd so that we don't get into trouble
# if the shell used for inittests would uses an internal version of
# pwd which handles symlinks differently.
TESTS_ENVIRONMENT = GNUPGHOME=`/bin/pwd` GPG_AGENT_INFO= LC_ALL=C \
GPGSM=$(GPGSM) $(srcdir)/runtest
testscripts = sm-sign+verify sm-verify
EXTRA_DIST = runtest inittests $(testscripts) ChangeLog-2011 \
text-1.txt text-2.txt text-3.txt \
text-1.osig.pem text-1.dsig.pem text-1.osig-bad.pem \
text-2.osig.pem text-2.osig-bad.pem \
samplekeys/steed-self-signing-nonthority.pem \
samplekeys/68A638998DFABAC510EA645CE34F9686B2EDF7EA.key \
samplekeys/32100C27173EF6E9C4E9A25D3D69F86D37A4F939.key \
samplekeys/cert_g10code_pete1.pem \
samplekeys/cert_g10code_test1.pem \
samplekeys/cert_g10code_theo1.pem
# We used to run $(testscripts) here but these asschk scripts are not
-# completely reliable in all enviroments and thus we better disable
+# completely reliable in all environments and thus we better disable
# them. The tests are anyway way too minimal. We will eventually
# write new tests based on gpg-connect-agent which has a full fledged
# script language and thus makes it far easier to write tests than to
# use that low-level asschk stuff.
TESTS =
CLEANFILES = inittests.stamp x y y z out err \
*.lock .\#lk*
DISTCLEANFILES = pubring.kbx~ random_seed
noinst_PROGRAMS = asschk
asschk_SOURCES = asschk.c
all-local: inittests.stamp
clean-local:
srcdir=$(srcdir) $(TESTS_ENVIRONMENT) $(srcdir)/inittests --clean
inittests.stamp: inittests
srcdir=$(srcdir) $(TESTS_ENVIRONMENT) $(srcdir)/inittests
echo timestamp >./inittests.stamp
diff --git a/tests/gpgscm/Manual.txt b/tests/gpgscm/Manual.txt
index 9fd294fc0..b1469269a 100644
--- a/tests/gpgscm/Manual.txt
+++ b/tests/gpgscm/Manual.txt
@@ -1,444 +1,444 @@
TinySCHEME Version 1.41
"Safe if used as prescribed"
-- Philip K. Dick, "Ubik"
This software is open source, covered by a BSD-style license.
Please read accompanying file COPYING.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This Scheme interpreter is based on MiniSCHEME version 0.85k4
(see miniscm.tar.gz in the Scheme Repository)
Original credits in file MiniSCHEMETribute.txt.
D. Souflis (dsouflis@acm.org)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
What is TinyScheme?
-------------------
TinyScheme is a lightweight Scheme interpreter that implements as large
a subset of R5RS as was possible without getting very large and
complicated. It is meant to be used as an embedded scripting interpreter
for other programs. As such, it does not offer IDEs or extensive toolkits
although it does sport a small top-level loop, included conditionally.
A lot of functionality in TinyScheme is included conditionally, to allow
developers freedom in balancing features and footprint.
As an embedded interpreter, it allows multiple interpreter states to
coexist in the same program, without any interference between them.
Programmatically, foreign functions in C can be added and values
can be defined in the Scheme environment. Being a quite small program,
it is easy to comprehend, get to grips with, and use.
Known bugs
----------
TinyScheme is known to misbehave when memory is exhausted.
Things that keep missing, or that need fixing
---------------------------------------------
There are no hygienic macros. No rational or
complex numbers. No unwind-protect and call-with-values.
Maybe (a subset of) SLIB will work with TinySCHEME...
Decent debugging facilities are missing. Only tracing is supported
natively.
Scheme Reference
----------------
If something seems to be missing, please refer to the code and
"init.scm", since some are library functions. Refer to the MiniSCHEME
readme as a last resort.
Environments
(interaction-environment)
See R5RS. In TinySCHEME, immutable list of association lists.
(current-environment)
The environment in effect at the time of the call. An example of its
use and its utility can be found in the sample code that implements
packages in "init.scm":
(macro (package form)
`(apply (lambda ()
,@(cdr form)
(current-environment))))
The environment containing the (local) definitions inside the closure
is returned as an immutable value.
(defined? <symbol>) (defined? <symbol> <environment>)
Checks whether the given symbol is defined in the current (or given)
environment.
Symbols
(gensym)
Returns a new interned symbol each time. Will probably move to the
library when string->symbol is implemented.
Directives
(gc)
- Performs garbage collection immediatelly.
+ Performs garbage collection immediately.
(gc-verbose) (gc-verbose <bool>)
The argument (defaulting to #t) controls whether GC produces
visible outcome.
(quit) (quit <num>)
Stops the interpreter and sets the 'retcode' internal field (defaults
to 0). When standalone, 'retcode' is returned as exit code to the OS.
(tracing <num>)
1, turns on tracing. 0 turns it off. (Only when USE_TRACING is 1).
Mathematical functions
Since rationals and complexes are absent, the respective functions
are also missing.
Supported: exp, log, sin, cos, tan, asin, acos, atan, floor, ceiling,
trunc, round and also sqrt and expt when USE_MATH=1.
Number-theoretical quotient, remainder and modulo, gcd, lcm.
Library: exact?, inexact?, odd?, even?, zero?, positive?, negative?,
exact->inexact. inexact->exact is a core function.
Type predicates
boolean?,eof-object?,symbol?,number?,string?,integer?,real?,list?,null?,
char?,port?,input-port?,output-port?,procedure?,pair?,environment?',
vector?. Also closure?, macro?.
Types
Types supported:
Numbers (integers and reals)
Symbols
Pairs
Strings
Characters
Ports
Eof object
Environments
Vectors
Literals
String literals can contain escaped quotes \" as usual, but also
\n, \r, \t, \xDD (hex representations) and \DDD (octal representations).
Note also that it is possible to include literal newlines in string
literals, e.g.
(define s "String with newline here
and here
that can function like a HERE-string")
Character literals contain #\space and #\newline and are supplemented
with #\return and #\tab, with obvious meanings. Hex character
representations are allowed (e.g. #\x20 is #\space).
When USE_ASCII_NAMES is defined, various control characters can be
referred to by their ASCII name.
0 #\nul 17 #\dc1
1 #\soh 18 #\dc2
2 #\stx 19 #\dc3
3 #\etx 20 #\dc4
4 #\eot 21 #\nak
5 #\enq 22 #\syn
6 #\ack 23 #\etv
7 #\bel 24 #\can
8 #\bs 25 #\em
9 #\ht 26 #\sub
10 #\lf 27 #\esc
11 #\vt 28 #\fs
12 #\ff 29 #\gs
13 #\cr 30 #\rs
14 #\so 31 #\us
15 #\si
16 #\dle 127 #\del
Numeric literals support #x #o #b and #d. Flonums are currently read only
in decimal notation. Full grammar will be supported soon.
Quote, quasiquote etc.
As usual.
Immutable values
Immutable pairs cannot be modified by set-car! and set-cdr!.
Immutable strings cannot be modified via string-set!
I/O
As per R5RS, plus String Ports (see below).
current-input-port, current-output-port,
close-input-port, close-output-port, input-port?, output-port?,
open-input-file, open-output-file.
read, write, display, newline, write-char, read-char, peek-char.
char-ready? returns #t only for string ports, because there is no
portable way in stdio to determine if a character is available.
Also open-input-output-file, set-input-port, set-output-port (not R5RS)
Library: call-with-input-file, call-with-output-file,
with-input-from-file, with-output-from-file and
with-input-output-from-to-files, close-port and input-output-port?
(not R5RS).
String Ports: open-input-string, open-output-string, get-output-string,
open-input-output-string. Strings can be used with I/O routines.
Vectors
make-vector, vector, vector-length, vector-ref, vector-set!, list->vector,
vector-fill!, vector->list, vector-equal? (auxiliary function, not R5RS)
Strings
string, make-string, list->string, string-length, string-ref, string-set!,
substring, string->list, string-fill!, string-append, string-copy.
string=?, string<?, string>?, string>?, string<=?, string>=?.
(No string-ci*? yet). string->number, number->string. Also atom->string,
string->atom (not R5RS).
Symbols
symbol->string, string->symbol
Characters
integer->char, char->integer.
char=?, char<?, char>?, char<=?, char>=?.
(No char-ci*?)
Pairs & Lists
cons, car, cdr, list, length, map, for-each, foldr, list-tail,
list-ref, last-pair, reverse, append.
Also member, memq, memv, based on generic-member, assoc, assq, assv
based on generic-assoc.
Streams
head, tail, cons-stream
Control features
Apart from procedure?, also macro? and closure?
map, for-each, force, delay, call-with-current-continuation (or call/cc),
eval, apply. 'Forcing' a value that is not a promise produces the value.
There is no call-with-values, values, nor dynamic-wind. Dynamic-wind in
the presence of continuations would require support from the abstract
machine itself.
Property lists
TinyScheme inherited from MiniScheme property lists for symbols.
put, get.
Dynamically-loaded extensions
(load-extension <filename without extension>)
Loads a DLL declaring foreign procedures. On Unix/Linux, one can make use
of the ld.so.conf file or the LD_RUN_PATH system variable in order to place
the library in a directory other than the current one. Please refer to the
appropriate 'man' page.
Esoteric procedures
(oblist)
Returns the oblist, an immutable list of all the symbols.
(macro-expand <form>)
Returns the expanded form of the macro call denoted by the argument
(define-with-return (<procname> <args>...) <body>)
Like plain 'define', but makes the continuation available as 'return'
inside the procedure. Handy for imperative programs.
(new-segment <num>)
Allocates more memory segments.
defined?
See "Environments"
(get-closure-code <closure>)
Gets the code as scheme data.
(make-closure <code> <environment>)
Makes a new closure in the given environment.
Obsolete procedures
(print-width <object>)
Programmer's Reference
----------------------
The interpreter state is initialized with "scheme_init".
Custom memory allocation routines can be installed with an alternate
initialization function: "scheme_init_custom_alloc".
Files can be loaded with "scheme_load_file". Strings containing Scheme
code can be loaded with "scheme_load_string". It is a good idea to
"scheme_load" init.scm before anything else.
External data for keeping external state (of use to foreign functions)
can be installed with "scheme_set_external_data".
Foreign functions are installed with "assign_foreign". Additional
definitions can be added to the interpreter state, with "scheme_define"
(this is the way HTTP header data and HTML form data are passed to the
Scheme script in the Altera SQL Server). If you wish to define the
foreign function in a specific environment (to enhance modularity),
use "assign_foreign_env".
The procedure "scheme_apply0" has been added with persistent scripts in
mind. Persistent scripts are loaded once, and every time they are needed
to produce HTTP output, appropriate data are passed through global
definitions and function "main" is called to do the job. One could
add easily "scheme_apply1" etc.
The interpreter state should be deinitialized with "scheme_deinit".
DLLs containing foreign functions should define a function named
init_<base-name>. E.g. foo.dll should define init_foo, and bar.so
should define init_bar. This function should assign_foreign any foreign
function contained in the DLL.
The first dynamically loaded extension available for TinyScheme is
a regular expression library. Although it's by no means an
established standard, this library is supposed to be installed in
a directory mirroring its name under the TinyScheme location.
Foreign Functions
-----------------
The user can add foreign functions in C. For example, a function
that squares its argument:
pointer square(scheme *sc, pointer args) {
if(args!=sc->NIL) {
if(sc->isnumber(sc->pair_car(args))) {
double v=sc->rvalue(sc->pair_car(args));
return sc->mk_real(sc,v*v);
}
}
return sc->NIL;
}
Foreign functions are now defined as closures:
sc->interface->scheme_define(
sc,
sc->global_env,
sc->interface->mk_symbol(sc,"square"),
sc->interface->mk_foreign_func(sc, square));
Foreign functions can use the external data in the "scheme" struct
to implement any kind of external state.
External data are set with the following function:
void scheme_set_external_data(scheme *sc, void *p);
As of v.1.17, the canonical way for a foreign function in a DLL to
manipulate Scheme data is using the function pointers in sc->interface.
Standalone
----------
Usage: tinyscheme -?
or: tinyscheme [<file1> <file2> ...]
followed by
-1 <file> [<arg1> <arg2> ...]
-c <Scheme commands> [<arg1> <arg2> ...]
assuming that the executable is named tinyscheme.
Use - in the place of a filename to denote stdin.
The -1 flag is meant for #! usage in shell scripts. If you specify
#! /somewhere/tinyscheme -1
then tinyscheme will be called to process the file. For example, the
following script echoes the Scheme list of its arguments.
#! /somewhere/tinyscheme -1
(display *args*)
The -c flag permits execution of arbitrary Scheme code.
Error Handling
--------------
Errors are recovered from without damage. The user can install his
own handler for system errors, by defining *error-hook*. Defining
to '() gives the default behavior, which is equivalent to "error".
USE_ERROR_HOOK must be defined.
A simple exception handling mechanism can be found in "init.scm".
A new syntactic form is introduced:
(catch <expr returned exceptionally>
<expr1> <expr2> ... <exprN>)
"Catch" establishes a scope spanning multiple call-frames
until another "catch" is encountered.
Exceptions are thrown with:
(throw "message")
If used outside a (catch ...), reverts to (error "message").
Example of use:
(define (foo x) (write x) (newline) (/ x 0))
(catch (begin (display "Error!\n") 0)
(write "Before foo ... ")
(foo 5)
(write "After foo"))
The exception mechanism can be used even by system errors, by
(define *error-hook* throw)
which makes use of the error hook described above.
If necessary, the user can devise his own exception mechanism with
tagged exceptions etc.
Reader extensions
-----------------
When encountering an unknown character after '#', the user-specified
procedure *sharp-hook* (if any), is called to read the expression.
This can be used to extend the reader to handle user-defined constants
or whatever. It should be a procedure without arguments, reading from
the current input port (which will be the load-port).
Colon Qualifiers - Packages
---------------------------
When USE_COLON_HOOK=1:
The lexer now recognizes the construction <qualifier>::<symbol> and
transforms it in the following manner (T is the transformation function):
T(<qualifier>::<symbol>) = (*colon-hook* 'T(<symbol>) <qualifier>)
where <qualifier> is a symbol not containing any double-colons.
As the definition is recursive, qualifiers can be nested.
The user can define his own *colon-hook*, to handle qualified names.
By default, "init.scm" defines *colon-hook* as EVAL. Consequently,
the qualifier must denote a Scheme environment, such as one returned
by (interaction-environment). "Init.scm" defines a new syntantic form,
PACKAGE, as a simple example. It is used like this:
(define toto
(package
(define foo 1)
(define bar +)))
foo ==> Error, "foo" undefined
(eval 'foo) ==> Error, "foo" undefined
(eval 'foo toto) ==> 1
toto::foo ==> 1
((eval 'bar toto) 2 (eval 'foo toto)) ==> 3
(toto::bar 2 toto::foo) ==> 3
(eval (bar 2 foo) toto) ==> 3
If the user installs another package infrastructure, he must define
a new 'package' procedure or macro to retain compatibility with supplied
code.
Note: Older versions used ':' as a qualifier. Unfortunately, the use
of ':' as a pseudo-qualifier in existing code (i.e. SLIB) essentially
precludes its use as a real qualifier.
diff --git a/tests/gpgscm/scheme.c b/tests/gpgscm/scheme.c
index 883395071..5a85063ee 100644
--- a/tests/gpgscm/scheme.c
+++ b/tests/gpgscm/scheme.c
@@ -1,5170 +1,5170 @@
/* T I N Y S C H E M E 1 . 4 1
* Dimitrios Souflis (dsouflis@acm.org)
* Based on MiniScheme (original credits follow)
* (MINISCM) coded by Atsushi Moriwaki (11/5/1989)
* (MINISCM) E-MAIL : moriwaki@kurims.kurims.kyoto-u.ac.jp
* (MINISCM) This version has been modified by R.C. Secrist.
* (MINISCM)
* (MINISCM) Mini-Scheme is now maintained by Akira KIDA.
* (MINISCM)
* (MINISCM) This is a revised and modified version by Akira KIDA.
* (MINISCM) current version is 0.85k4 (15 May 1994)
*
*/
#define _SCHEME_SOURCE
#include "scheme-private.h"
#ifndef WIN32
# include <unistd.h>
#endif
#ifdef WIN32
#define snprintf _snprintf
#endif
#if USE_DL
# include "dynload.h"
#endif
#if USE_MATH
# include <math.h>
#endif
#include <assert.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <float.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#if USE_STRCASECMP
#include <strings.h>
# ifndef __APPLE__
# define stricmp strcasecmp
# endif
#endif
/* Used for documentation purposes, to signal functions in 'interface' */
#define INTERFACE
#define TOK_EOF (-1)
#define TOK_LPAREN 0
#define TOK_RPAREN 1
#define TOK_DOT 2
#define TOK_ATOM 3
#define TOK_QUOTE 4
#define TOK_COMMENT 5
#define TOK_DQUOTE 6
#define TOK_BQUOTE 7
#define TOK_COMMA 8
#define TOK_ATMARK 9
#define TOK_SHARP 10
#define TOK_SHARP_CONST 11
#define TOK_VEC 12
#define BACKQUOTE '`'
#define DELIMITERS "()\";\f\t\v\n\r "
/*
* Basic memory allocation units
*/
#define banner "TinyScheme 1.41"
#include <string.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#ifdef __APPLE__
static int stricmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
{
unsigned char c1, c2;
do {
c1 = tolower(*s1);
c2 = tolower(*s2);
if (c1 < c2)
return -1;
else if (c1 > c2)
return 1;
s1++, s2++;
} while (c1 != 0);
return 0;
}
#endif /* __APPLE__ */
#if USE_STRLWR
static const char *strlwr(char *s) {
const char *p=s;
while(*s) {
*s=tolower(*s);
s++;
}
return p;
}
#endif
#ifndef prompt
# define prompt "ts> "
#endif
#ifndef InitFile
# define InitFile "init.scm"
#endif
#ifndef FIRST_CELLSEGS
# define FIRST_CELLSEGS 3
#endif
enum scheme_types {
T_STRING=1,
T_NUMBER=2,
T_SYMBOL=3,
T_PROC=4,
T_PAIR=5,
T_CLOSURE=6,
T_CONTINUATION=7,
T_FOREIGN=8,
T_CHARACTER=9,
T_PORT=10,
T_VECTOR=11,
T_MACRO=12,
T_PROMISE=13,
T_ENVIRONMENT=14,
T_FOREIGN_OBJECT=15,
T_BOOLEAN=16,
T_NIL=17,
T_EOF_OBJ=18,
T_SINK=19,
T_LAST_SYSTEM_TYPE=19
};
static const char *
type_to_string (enum scheme_types typ)
{
switch (typ)
{
case T_STRING: return "string";
case T_NUMBER: return "number";
case T_SYMBOL: return "symbol";
case T_PROC: return "proc";
case T_PAIR: return "pair";
case T_CLOSURE: return "closure";
case T_CONTINUATION: return "configuration";
case T_FOREIGN: return "foreign";
case T_CHARACTER: return "character";
case T_PORT: return "port";
case T_VECTOR: return "vector";
case T_MACRO: return "macro";
case T_PROMISE: return "promise";
case T_ENVIRONMENT: return "environment";
case T_FOREIGN_OBJECT: return "foreign object";
case T_BOOLEAN: return "boolean";
case T_NIL: return "nil";
case T_EOF_OBJ: return "eof object";
case T_SINK: return "sink";
}
assert (! "not reached");
}
/* ADJ is enough slack to align cells in a TYPE_BITS-bit boundary */
#define ADJ 32
#define TYPE_BITS 5
#define T_MASKTYPE 31 /* 0000000000011111 */
#define T_SYNTAX 4096 /* 0001000000000000 */
#define T_IMMUTABLE 8192 /* 0010000000000000 */
#define T_ATOM 16384 /* 0100000000000000 */ /* only for gc */
#define CLRATOM 49151 /* 1011111111111111 */ /* only for gc */
#define MARK 32768 /* 1000000000000000 */
#define UNMARK 32767 /* 0111111111111111 */
static num num_add(num a, num b);
static num num_mul(num a, num b);
static num num_div(num a, num b);
static num num_intdiv(num a, num b);
static num num_sub(num a, num b);
static num num_rem(num a, num b);
static num num_mod(num a, num b);
static int num_eq(num a, num b);
static int num_gt(num a, num b);
static int num_ge(num a, num b);
static int num_lt(num a, num b);
static int num_le(num a, num b);
#if USE_MATH
static double round_per_R5RS(double x);
#endif
static int is_zero_double(double x);
static INLINE int num_is_integer(pointer p) {
return ((p)->_object._number.is_fixnum);
}
static num num_zero;
static num num_one;
/* macros for cell operations */
#define typeflag(p) ((p)->_flag)
#define type(p) (typeflag(p)&T_MASKTYPE)
INTERFACE INLINE int is_string(pointer p) { return (type(p)==T_STRING); }
#define strvalue(p) ((p)->_object._string._svalue)
#define strlength(p) ((p)->_object._string._length)
INTERFACE static int is_list(scheme *sc, pointer p);
INTERFACE INLINE int is_vector(pointer p) { return (type(p)==T_VECTOR); }
INTERFACE static void fill_vector(pointer vec, pointer obj);
INTERFACE static pointer vector_elem(pointer vec, int ielem);
INTERFACE static pointer set_vector_elem(pointer vec, int ielem, pointer a);
INTERFACE INLINE int is_number(pointer p) { return (type(p)==T_NUMBER); }
INTERFACE INLINE int is_integer(pointer p) {
if (!is_number(p))
return 0;
if (num_is_integer(p) || (double)ivalue(p) == rvalue(p))
return 1;
return 0;
}
INTERFACE INLINE int is_real(pointer p) {
return is_number(p) && (!(p)->_object._number.is_fixnum);
}
INTERFACE INLINE int is_character(pointer p) { return (type(p)==T_CHARACTER); }
INTERFACE INLINE char *string_value(pointer p) { return strvalue(p); }
INLINE num nvalue(pointer p) { return ((p)->_object._number); }
INTERFACE long ivalue(pointer p) { return (num_is_integer(p)?(p)->_object._number.value.ivalue:(long)(p)->_object._number.value.rvalue); }
INTERFACE double rvalue(pointer p) { return (!num_is_integer(p)?(p)->_object._number.value.rvalue:(double)(p)->_object._number.value.ivalue); }
#define ivalue_unchecked(p) ((p)->_object._number.value.ivalue)
#define rvalue_unchecked(p) ((p)->_object._number.value.rvalue)
#define set_num_integer(p) (p)->_object._number.is_fixnum=1;
#define set_num_real(p) (p)->_object._number.is_fixnum=0;
INTERFACE long charvalue(pointer p) { return ivalue_unchecked(p); }
INTERFACE INLINE int is_port(pointer p) { return (type(p)==T_PORT); }
INTERFACE INLINE int is_inport(pointer p) { return is_port(p) && p->_object._port->kind & port_input; }
INTERFACE INLINE int is_outport(pointer p) { return is_port(p) && p->_object._port->kind & port_output; }
INTERFACE INLINE int is_pair(pointer p) { return (type(p)==T_PAIR); }
#define car(p) ((p)->_object._cons._car)
#define cdr(p) ((p)->_object._cons._cdr)
INTERFACE pointer pair_car(pointer p) { return car(p); }
INTERFACE pointer pair_cdr(pointer p) { return cdr(p); }
INTERFACE pointer set_car(pointer p, pointer q) { return car(p)=q; }
INTERFACE pointer set_cdr(pointer p, pointer q) { return cdr(p)=q; }
INTERFACE INLINE int is_symbol(pointer p) { return (type(p)==T_SYMBOL); }
INTERFACE INLINE char *symname(pointer p) { return strvalue(car(p)); }
#if USE_PLIST
SCHEME_EXPORT INLINE int hasprop(pointer p) { return (typeflag(p)&T_SYMBOL); }
#define symprop(p) cdr(p)
#endif
INTERFACE INLINE int is_syntax(pointer p) { return (typeflag(p)&T_SYNTAX); }
INTERFACE INLINE int is_proc(pointer p) { return (type(p)==T_PROC); }
INTERFACE INLINE int is_foreign(pointer p) { return (type(p)==T_FOREIGN); }
INTERFACE INLINE char *syntaxname(pointer p) { return strvalue(car(p)); }
#define procnum(p) ivalue(p)
static const char *procname(pointer x);
INTERFACE INLINE int is_closure(pointer p) { return (type(p)==T_CLOSURE); }
INTERFACE INLINE int is_macro(pointer p) { return (type(p)==T_MACRO); }
INTERFACE INLINE pointer closure_code(pointer p) { return car(p); }
INTERFACE INLINE pointer closure_env(pointer p) { return cdr(p); }
INTERFACE INLINE int is_continuation(pointer p) { return (type(p)==T_CONTINUATION); }
#define cont_dump(p) cdr(p)
INTERFACE INLINE int is_foreign_object(pointer p) { return (type(p)==T_FOREIGN_OBJECT); }
INTERFACE const foreign_object_vtable *get_foreign_object_vtable(pointer p) {
return p->_object._foreign_object._vtable;
}
INTERFACE void *get_foreign_object_data(pointer p) {
return p->_object._foreign_object._data;
}
/* To do: promise should be forced ONCE only */
INTERFACE INLINE int is_promise(pointer p) { return (type(p)==T_PROMISE); }
INTERFACE INLINE int is_environment(pointer p) { return (type(p)==T_ENVIRONMENT); }
#define setenvironment(p) typeflag(p) = T_ENVIRONMENT
#define is_atom(p) (typeflag(p)&T_ATOM)
#define setatom(p) typeflag(p) |= T_ATOM
#define clratom(p) typeflag(p) &= CLRATOM
#define is_mark(p) (typeflag(p)&MARK)
#define setmark(p) typeflag(p) |= MARK
#define clrmark(p) typeflag(p) &= UNMARK
INTERFACE INLINE int is_immutable(pointer p) { return (typeflag(p)&T_IMMUTABLE); }
/*#define setimmutable(p) typeflag(p) |= T_IMMUTABLE*/
INTERFACE INLINE void setimmutable(pointer p) { typeflag(p) |= T_IMMUTABLE; }
#define caar(p) car(car(p))
#define cadr(p) car(cdr(p))
#define cdar(p) cdr(car(p))
#define cddr(p) cdr(cdr(p))
#define cadar(p) car(cdr(car(p)))
#define caddr(p) car(cdr(cdr(p)))
#define cdaar(p) cdr(car(car(p)))
#define cadaar(p) car(cdr(car(car(p))))
#define cadddr(p) car(cdr(cdr(cdr(p))))
#define cddddr(p) cdr(cdr(cdr(cdr(p))))
#if USE_CHAR_CLASSIFIERS
static INLINE int Cisalpha(int c) { return isascii(c) && isalpha(c); }
static INLINE int Cisdigit(int c) { return isascii(c) && isdigit(c); }
static INLINE int Cisspace(int c) { return isascii(c) && isspace(c); }
static INLINE int Cisupper(int c) { return isascii(c) && isupper(c); }
static INLINE int Cislower(int c) { return isascii(c) && islower(c); }
#endif
#if USE_ASCII_NAMES
static const char *charnames[32]={
"nul",
"soh",
"stx",
"etx",
"eot",
"enq",
"ack",
"bel",
"bs",
"ht",
"lf",
"vt",
"ff",
"cr",
"so",
"si",
"dle",
"dc1",
"dc2",
"dc3",
"dc4",
"nak",
"syn",
"etb",
"can",
"em",
"sub",
"esc",
"fs",
"gs",
"rs",
"us"
};
static int is_ascii_name(const char *name, int *pc) {
int i;
for(i=0; i<32; i++) {
if(stricmp(name,charnames[i])==0) {
*pc=i;
return 1;
}
}
if(stricmp(name,"del")==0) {
*pc=127;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
#endif
static int file_push(scheme *sc, const char *fname);
static void file_pop(scheme *sc);
static int file_interactive(scheme *sc);
static INLINE int is_one_of(char *s, int c);
static int alloc_cellseg(scheme *sc, int n);
static long binary_decode(const char *s);
static INLINE pointer get_cell(scheme *sc, pointer a, pointer b);
static pointer _get_cell(scheme *sc, pointer a, pointer b);
static pointer reserve_cells(scheme *sc, int n);
static pointer get_consecutive_cells(scheme *sc, int n);
static pointer find_consecutive_cells(scheme *sc, int n);
static void finalize_cell(scheme *sc, pointer a);
static int count_consecutive_cells(pointer x, int needed);
static pointer find_slot_in_env(scheme *sc, pointer env, pointer sym, int all);
static pointer mk_number(scheme *sc, num n);
static char *store_string(scheme *sc, int len, const char *str, char fill);
static pointer mk_vector(scheme *sc, int len);
static pointer mk_atom(scheme *sc, char *q);
static pointer mk_sharp_const(scheme *sc, char *name);
static pointer mk_port(scheme *sc, port *p);
static pointer port_from_filename(scheme *sc, const char *fn, int prop);
static pointer port_from_file(scheme *sc, FILE *, int prop);
static pointer port_from_string(scheme *sc, char *start, char *past_the_end, int prop);
static port *port_rep_from_filename(scheme *sc, const char *fn, int prop);
static port *port_rep_from_file(scheme *sc, FILE *, int prop);
static port *port_rep_from_string(scheme *sc, char *start, char *past_the_end, int prop);
static void port_close(scheme *sc, pointer p, int flag);
static void mark(pointer a);
static void gc(scheme *sc, pointer a, pointer b);
static int basic_inchar(port *pt);
static int inchar(scheme *sc);
static void backchar(scheme *sc, int c);
static char *readstr_upto(scheme *sc, char *delim);
static pointer readstrexp(scheme *sc);
static INLINE int skipspace(scheme *sc);
static int token(scheme *sc);
static void printslashstring(scheme *sc, char *s, int len);
static void atom2str(scheme *sc, pointer l, int f, char **pp, int *plen);
static void printatom(scheme *sc, pointer l, int f);
static pointer mk_proc(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op);
static pointer mk_closure(scheme *sc, pointer c, pointer e);
static pointer mk_continuation(scheme *sc, pointer d);
static pointer reverse(scheme *sc, pointer a);
static pointer reverse_in_place(scheme *sc, pointer term, pointer list);
static pointer revappend(scheme *sc, pointer a, pointer b);
static void dump_stack_mark(scheme *);
static pointer opexe_0(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op);
static pointer opexe_1(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op);
static pointer opexe_2(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op);
static pointer opexe_3(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op);
static pointer opexe_4(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op);
static pointer opexe_5(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op);
static pointer opexe_6(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op);
static void Eval_Cycle(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op);
static void assign_syntax(scheme *sc, char *name);
static int syntaxnum(pointer p);
static void assign_proc(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes, char *name);
#define num_ivalue(n) (n.is_fixnum?(n).value.ivalue:(long)(n).value.rvalue)
#define num_rvalue(n) (!n.is_fixnum?(n).value.rvalue:(double)(n).value.ivalue)
static num num_add(num a, num b) {
num ret;
ret.is_fixnum=a.is_fixnum && b.is_fixnum;
if(ret.is_fixnum) {
ret.value.ivalue= a.value.ivalue+b.value.ivalue;
} else {
ret.value.rvalue=num_rvalue(a)+num_rvalue(b);
}
return ret;
}
static num num_mul(num a, num b) {
num ret;
ret.is_fixnum=a.is_fixnum && b.is_fixnum;
if(ret.is_fixnum) {
ret.value.ivalue= a.value.ivalue*b.value.ivalue;
} else {
ret.value.rvalue=num_rvalue(a)*num_rvalue(b);
}
return ret;
}
static num num_div(num a, num b) {
num ret;
ret.is_fixnum=a.is_fixnum && b.is_fixnum && a.value.ivalue%b.value.ivalue==0;
if(ret.is_fixnum) {
ret.value.ivalue= a.value.ivalue/b.value.ivalue;
} else {
ret.value.rvalue=num_rvalue(a)/num_rvalue(b);
}
return ret;
}
static num num_intdiv(num a, num b) {
num ret;
ret.is_fixnum=a.is_fixnum && b.is_fixnum;
if(ret.is_fixnum) {
ret.value.ivalue= a.value.ivalue/b.value.ivalue;
} else {
ret.value.rvalue=num_rvalue(a)/num_rvalue(b);
}
return ret;
}
static num num_sub(num a, num b) {
num ret;
ret.is_fixnum=a.is_fixnum && b.is_fixnum;
if(ret.is_fixnum) {
ret.value.ivalue= a.value.ivalue-b.value.ivalue;
} else {
ret.value.rvalue=num_rvalue(a)-num_rvalue(b);
}
return ret;
}
static num num_rem(num a, num b) {
num ret;
long e1, e2, res;
ret.is_fixnum=a.is_fixnum && b.is_fixnum;
e1=num_ivalue(a);
e2=num_ivalue(b);
res=e1%e2;
/* remainder should have same sign as second operand */
if (res > 0) {
if (e1 < 0) {
res -= labs(e2);
}
} else if (res < 0) {
if (e1 > 0) {
res += labs(e2);
}
}
ret.value.ivalue=res;
return ret;
}
static num num_mod(num a, num b) {
num ret;
long e1, e2, res;
ret.is_fixnum=a.is_fixnum && b.is_fixnum;
e1=num_ivalue(a);
e2=num_ivalue(b);
res=e1%e2;
/* modulo should have same sign as second operand */
if (res * e2 < 0) {
res += e2;
}
ret.value.ivalue=res;
return ret;
}
static int num_eq(num a, num b) {
int ret;
int is_fixnum=a.is_fixnum && b.is_fixnum;
if(is_fixnum) {
ret= a.value.ivalue==b.value.ivalue;
} else {
ret=num_rvalue(a)==num_rvalue(b);
}
return ret;
}
static int num_gt(num a, num b) {
int ret;
int is_fixnum=a.is_fixnum && b.is_fixnum;
if(is_fixnum) {
ret= a.value.ivalue>b.value.ivalue;
} else {
ret=num_rvalue(a)>num_rvalue(b);
}
return ret;
}
static int num_ge(num a, num b) {
return !num_lt(a,b);
}
static int num_lt(num a, num b) {
int ret;
int is_fixnum=a.is_fixnum && b.is_fixnum;
if(is_fixnum) {
ret= a.value.ivalue<b.value.ivalue;
} else {
ret=num_rvalue(a)<num_rvalue(b);
}
return ret;
}
static int num_le(num a, num b) {
return !num_gt(a,b);
}
#if USE_MATH
/* Round to nearest. Round to even if midway */
static double round_per_R5RS(double x) {
double fl=floor(x);
double ce=ceil(x);
double dfl=x-fl;
double dce=ce-x;
if(dfl>dce) {
return ce;
} else if(dfl<dce) {
return fl;
} else {
if(fmod(fl,2.0)==0.0) { /* I imagine this holds */
return fl;
} else {
return ce;
}
}
}
#endif
static int is_zero_double(double x) {
return x<DBL_MIN && x>-DBL_MIN;
}
static long binary_decode(const char *s) {
long x=0;
while(*s!=0 && (*s=='1' || *s=='0')) {
x<<=1;
x+=*s-'0';
s++;
}
return x;
}
/* allocate new cell segment */
static int alloc_cellseg(scheme *sc, int n) {
pointer newp;
pointer last;
pointer p;
void *cp;
long i;
int k;
int adj=ADJ;
if(adj<sizeof(struct cell)) {
adj=sizeof(struct cell);
}
for (k = 0; k < n; k++) {
if (sc->last_cell_seg >= CELL_NSEGMENT - 1)
return k;
cp = sc->malloc(CELL_SEGSIZE * sizeof(struct cell)+adj);
if (cp == 0)
return k;
i = ++sc->last_cell_seg ;
sc->alloc_seg[i] = cp;
/* adjust in TYPE_BITS-bit boundary */
if(((unsigned long)cp)%adj!=0) {
cp=(void *)(adj*((unsigned long)cp/adj+1));
}
/* insert new segment in address order */
newp=(pointer)cp;
sc->cell_seg[i] = newp;
while (i > 0 && sc->cell_seg[i - 1] > sc->cell_seg[i]) {
p = sc->cell_seg[i];
sc->cell_seg[i] = sc->cell_seg[i - 1];
sc->cell_seg[--i] = p;
}
sc->fcells += CELL_SEGSIZE;
last = newp + CELL_SEGSIZE - 1;
for (p = newp; p <= last; p++) {
typeflag(p) = 0;
cdr(p) = p + 1;
car(p) = sc->NIL;
}
/* insert new cells in address order on free list */
if (sc->free_cell == sc->NIL || p < sc->free_cell) {
cdr(last) = sc->free_cell;
sc->free_cell = newp;
} else {
p = sc->free_cell;
while (cdr(p) != sc->NIL && newp > cdr(p))
p = cdr(p);
cdr(last) = cdr(p);
cdr(p) = newp;
}
}
return n;
}
static INLINE pointer get_cell_x(scheme *sc, pointer a, pointer b) {
if (sc->free_cell != sc->NIL) {
pointer x = sc->free_cell;
sc->free_cell = cdr(x);
--sc->fcells;
return (x);
}
return _get_cell (sc, a, b);
}
/* get new cell. parameter a, b is marked by gc. */
static pointer _get_cell(scheme *sc, pointer a, pointer b) {
pointer x;
if(sc->no_memory) {
return sc->sink;
}
if (sc->free_cell == sc->NIL) {
const int min_to_be_recovered = sc->last_cell_seg*8;
gc(sc,a, b);
if (sc->fcells < min_to_be_recovered
|| sc->free_cell == sc->NIL) {
/* if only a few recovered, get more to avoid fruitless gc's */
if (!alloc_cellseg(sc,1) && sc->free_cell == sc->NIL) {
sc->no_memory=1;
return sc->sink;
}
}
}
x = sc->free_cell;
sc->free_cell = cdr(x);
--sc->fcells;
return (x);
}
/* make sure that there is a given number of cells free */
static pointer reserve_cells(scheme *sc, int n) {
if(sc->no_memory) {
return sc->NIL;
}
/* Are there enough cells available? */
if (sc->fcells < n) {
/* If not, try gc'ing some */
gc(sc, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
if (sc->fcells < n) {
/* If there still aren't, try getting more heap */
if (!alloc_cellseg(sc,1)) {
sc->no_memory=1;
return sc->NIL;
}
}
if (sc->fcells < n) {
/* If all fail, report failure */
sc->no_memory=1;
return sc->NIL;
}
}
return (sc->T);
}
static pointer get_consecutive_cells(scheme *sc, int n) {
pointer x;
if(sc->no_memory) { return sc->sink; }
/* Are there any cells available? */
x=find_consecutive_cells(sc,n);
if (x != sc->NIL) { return x; }
/* If not, try gc'ing some */
gc(sc, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
x=find_consecutive_cells(sc,n);
if (x != sc->NIL) { return x; }
/* If there still aren't, try getting more heap */
if (!alloc_cellseg(sc,1))
{
sc->no_memory=1;
return sc->sink;
}
x=find_consecutive_cells(sc,n);
if (x != sc->NIL) { return x; }
/* If all fail, report failure */
sc->no_memory=1;
return sc->sink;
}
static int count_consecutive_cells(pointer x, int needed) {
int n=1;
while(cdr(x)==x+1) {
x=cdr(x);
n++;
if(n>needed) return n;
}
return n;
}
static pointer find_consecutive_cells(scheme *sc, int n) {
pointer *pp;
int cnt;
pp=&sc->free_cell;
while(*pp!=sc->NIL) {
cnt=count_consecutive_cells(*pp,n);
if(cnt>=n) {
pointer x=*pp;
*pp=cdr(*pp+n-1);
sc->fcells -= n;
return x;
}
pp=&cdr(*pp+cnt-1);
}
return sc->NIL;
}
/* To retain recent allocs before interpreter knows about them -
Tehom */
static void push_recent_alloc(scheme *sc, pointer recent, pointer extra)
{
pointer holder = get_cell_x(sc, recent, extra);
typeflag(holder) = T_PAIR | T_IMMUTABLE;
car(holder) = recent;
cdr(holder) = car(sc->sink);
car(sc->sink) = holder;
}
static pointer get_cell(scheme *sc, pointer a, pointer b)
{
pointer cell = get_cell_x(sc, a, b);
/* For right now, include "a" and "b" in "cell" so that gc doesn't
think they are garbage. */
/* Tentatively record it as a pair so gc understands it. */
typeflag(cell) = T_PAIR;
car(cell) = a;
cdr(cell) = b;
push_recent_alloc(sc, cell, sc->NIL);
return cell;
}
static pointer get_vector_object(scheme *sc, int len, pointer init)
{
pointer cells = get_consecutive_cells(sc,len/2+len%2+1);
if(sc->no_memory) { return sc->sink; }
/* Record it as a vector so that gc understands it. */
typeflag(cells) = (T_VECTOR | T_ATOM);
ivalue_unchecked(cells)=len;
set_num_integer(cells);
fill_vector(cells,init);
push_recent_alloc(sc, cells, sc->NIL);
return cells;
}
static INLINE void ok_to_freely_gc(scheme *sc)
{
car(sc->sink) = sc->NIL;
}
#if defined TSGRIND
static void check_cell_alloced(pointer p, int expect_alloced)
{
/* Can't use putstr(sc,str) because callers have no access to
sc. */
if(typeflag(p) & !expect_alloced)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Cell is already allocated!\n");
}
if(!(typeflag(p)) & expect_alloced)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Cell is not allocated!\n");
}
}
static void check_range_alloced(pointer p, int n, int expect_alloced)
{
int i;
for(i = 0;i<n;i++)
{ (void)check_cell_alloced(p+i,expect_alloced); }
}
#endif
/* Medium level cell allocation */
/* get new cons cell */
pointer _cons(scheme *sc, pointer a, pointer b, int immutable) {
pointer x = get_cell(sc,a, b);
typeflag(x) = T_PAIR;
if(immutable) {
setimmutable(x);
}
car(x) = a;
cdr(x) = b;
return (x);
}
/* ========== oblist implementation ========== */
#ifndef USE_OBJECT_LIST
static int hash_fn(const char *key, int table_size);
static pointer oblist_initial_value(scheme *sc)
{
return mk_vector(sc, 461); /* probably should be bigger */
}
/* returns the new symbol */
static pointer oblist_add_by_name(scheme *sc, const char *name)
{
pointer x;
int location;
x = immutable_cons(sc, mk_string(sc, name), sc->NIL);
typeflag(x) = T_SYMBOL;
setimmutable(car(x));
location = hash_fn(name, ivalue_unchecked(sc->oblist));
set_vector_elem(sc->oblist, location,
immutable_cons(sc, x, vector_elem(sc->oblist, location)));
return x;
}
static INLINE pointer oblist_find_by_name(scheme *sc, const char *name)
{
int location;
pointer x;
char *s;
location = hash_fn(name, ivalue_unchecked(sc->oblist));
for (x = vector_elem(sc->oblist, location); x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
s = symname(car(x));
/* case-insensitive, per R5RS section 2. */
if(stricmp(name, s) == 0) {
return car(x);
}
}
return sc->NIL;
}
static pointer oblist_all_symbols(scheme *sc)
{
int i;
pointer x;
pointer ob_list = sc->NIL;
for (i = 0; i < ivalue_unchecked(sc->oblist); i++) {
for (x = vector_elem(sc->oblist, i); x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
ob_list = cons(sc, x, ob_list);
}
}
return ob_list;
}
#else
static pointer oblist_initial_value(scheme *sc)
{
return sc->NIL;
}
static INLINE pointer oblist_find_by_name(scheme *sc, const char *name)
{
pointer x;
char *s;
for (x = sc->oblist; x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
s = symname(car(x));
/* case-insensitive, per R5RS section 2. */
if(stricmp(name, s) == 0) {
return car(x);
}
}
return sc->NIL;
}
/* returns the new symbol */
static pointer oblist_add_by_name(scheme *sc, const char *name)
{
pointer x;
x = immutable_cons(sc, mk_string(sc, name), sc->NIL);
typeflag(x) = T_SYMBOL;
setimmutable(car(x));
sc->oblist = immutable_cons(sc, x, sc->oblist);
return x;
}
static pointer oblist_all_symbols(scheme *sc)
{
return sc->oblist;
}
#endif
static pointer mk_port(scheme *sc, port *p) {
pointer x = get_cell(sc, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
typeflag(x) = T_PORT|T_ATOM;
x->_object._port=p;
return (x);
}
pointer mk_foreign_func(scheme *sc, foreign_func f) {
pointer x = get_cell(sc, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
typeflag(x) = (T_FOREIGN | T_ATOM);
x->_object._ff=f;
return (x);
}
pointer mk_foreign_object(scheme *sc, const foreign_object_vtable *vtable, void *data) {
pointer x = get_cell(sc, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
typeflag(x) = (T_FOREIGN_OBJECT | T_ATOM);
x->_object._foreign_object._vtable=vtable;
x->_object._foreign_object._data = data;
return (x);
}
INTERFACE pointer mk_character(scheme *sc, int c) {
pointer x = get_cell(sc,sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
typeflag(x) = (T_CHARACTER | T_ATOM);
ivalue_unchecked(x)= c;
set_num_integer(x);
return (x);
}
/* get number atom (integer) */
INTERFACE pointer mk_integer(scheme *sc, long n) {
pointer x = get_cell(sc,sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
typeflag(x) = (T_NUMBER | T_ATOM);
ivalue_unchecked(x)= n;
set_num_integer(x);
return (x);
}
INTERFACE pointer mk_real(scheme *sc, double n) {
pointer x = get_cell(sc,sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
typeflag(x) = (T_NUMBER | T_ATOM);
rvalue_unchecked(x)= n;
set_num_real(x);
return (x);
}
static pointer mk_number(scheme *sc, num n) {
if(n.is_fixnum) {
return mk_integer(sc,n.value.ivalue);
} else {
return mk_real(sc,n.value.rvalue);
}
}
/* allocate name to string area */
static char *store_string(scheme *sc, int len_str, const char *str, char fill) {
char *q;
q=(char*)sc->malloc(len_str+1);
if(q==0) {
sc->no_memory=1;
return sc->strbuff;
}
if(str!=0) {
memcpy (q, str, len_str);
q[len_str]=0;
} else {
memset(q, fill, len_str);
q[len_str]=0;
}
return (q);
}
/* get new string */
INTERFACE pointer mk_string(scheme *sc, const char *str) {
return mk_counted_string(sc,str,strlen(str));
}
INTERFACE pointer mk_counted_string(scheme *sc, const char *str, int len) {
pointer x = get_cell(sc, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
typeflag(x) = (T_STRING | T_ATOM);
strvalue(x) = store_string(sc,len,str,0);
strlength(x) = len;
return (x);
}
INTERFACE pointer mk_empty_string(scheme *sc, int len, char fill) {
pointer x = get_cell(sc, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
typeflag(x) = (T_STRING | T_ATOM);
strvalue(x) = store_string(sc,len,0,fill);
strlength(x) = len;
return (x);
}
INTERFACE static pointer mk_vector(scheme *sc, int len)
{ return get_vector_object(sc,len,sc->NIL); }
INTERFACE static void fill_vector(pointer vec, pointer obj) {
int i;
int n = ivalue(vec)/2+ivalue(vec)%2;
for(i=0; i < n; i++) {
typeflag(vec+1+i) = T_PAIR;
setimmutable(vec+1+i);
car(vec+1+i)=obj;
cdr(vec+1+i)=obj;
}
}
INTERFACE static pointer vector_elem(pointer vec, int ielem) {
int n=ielem/2;
if(ielem%2==0) {
return car(vec+1+n);
} else {
return cdr(vec+1+n);
}
}
INTERFACE static pointer set_vector_elem(pointer vec, int ielem, pointer a) {
int n=ielem/2;
if(ielem%2==0) {
return car(vec+1+n)=a;
} else {
return cdr(vec+1+n)=a;
}
}
/* get new symbol */
INTERFACE pointer mk_symbol(scheme *sc, const char *name) {
pointer x;
/* first check oblist */
x = oblist_find_by_name(sc, name);
if (x != sc->NIL) {
return (x);
} else {
x = oblist_add_by_name(sc, name);
return (x);
}
}
INTERFACE pointer gensym(scheme *sc) {
pointer x;
char name[40];
for(; sc->gensym_cnt<LONG_MAX; sc->gensym_cnt++) {
snprintf(name,40,"gensym-%ld",sc->gensym_cnt);
/* first check oblist */
x = oblist_find_by_name(sc, name);
if (x != sc->NIL) {
continue;
} else {
x = oblist_add_by_name(sc, name);
return (x);
}
}
return sc->NIL;
}
/* double the size of the string buffer */
static int expand_strbuff(scheme *sc) {
size_t new_size = sc->strbuff_size * 2;
char *new_buffer = sc->malloc(new_size);
if (new_buffer == 0) {
sc->no_memory = 1;
return 1;
}
memcpy(new_buffer, sc->strbuff, sc->strbuff_size);
sc->free(sc->strbuff);
sc->strbuff = new_buffer;
sc->strbuff_size = new_size;
return 0;
}
/* make symbol or number atom from string */
static pointer mk_atom(scheme *sc, char *q) {
char c, *p;
int has_dec_point=0;
int has_fp_exp = 0;
#if USE_COLON_HOOK
if((p=strstr(q,"::"))!=0) {
*p=0;
return cons(sc, sc->COLON_HOOK,
cons(sc,
cons(sc,
sc->QUOTE,
cons(sc, mk_atom(sc,p+2), sc->NIL)),
cons(sc, mk_symbol(sc,strlwr(q)), sc->NIL)));
}
#endif
p = q;
c = *p++;
if ((c == '+') || (c == '-')) {
c = *p++;
if (c == '.') {
has_dec_point=1;
c = *p++;
}
if (!isdigit(c)) {
return (mk_symbol(sc, strlwr(q)));
}
} else if (c == '.') {
has_dec_point=1;
c = *p++;
if (!isdigit(c)) {
return (mk_symbol(sc, strlwr(q)));
}
} else if (!isdigit(c)) {
return (mk_symbol(sc, strlwr(q)));
}
for ( ; (c = *p) != 0; ++p) {
if (!isdigit(c)) {
if(c=='.') {
if(!has_dec_point) {
has_dec_point=1;
continue;
}
}
else if ((c == 'e') || (c == 'E')) {
if(!has_fp_exp) {
has_dec_point = 1; /* decimal point illegal
from now on */
p++;
if ((*p == '-') || (*p == '+') || isdigit(*p)) {
continue;
}
}
}
return (mk_symbol(sc, strlwr(q)));
}
}
if(has_dec_point) {
return mk_real(sc,atof(q));
}
return (mk_integer(sc, atol(q)));
}
/* make constant */
static pointer mk_sharp_const(scheme *sc, char *name) {
long x;
char tmp[STRBUFFSIZE];
if (!strcmp(name, "t"))
return (sc->T);
else if (!strcmp(name, "f"))
return (sc->F);
else if (*name == 'o') {/* #o (octal) */
snprintf(tmp, STRBUFFSIZE, "0%s", name+1);
sscanf(tmp, "%lo", (long unsigned *)&x);
return (mk_integer(sc, x));
} else if (*name == 'd') { /* #d (decimal) */
sscanf(name+1, "%ld", (long int *)&x);
return (mk_integer(sc, x));
} else if (*name == 'x') { /* #x (hex) */
snprintf(tmp, STRBUFFSIZE, "0x%s", name+1);
sscanf(tmp, "%lx", (long unsigned *)&x);
return (mk_integer(sc, x));
} else if (*name == 'b') { /* #b (binary) */
x = binary_decode(name+1);
return (mk_integer(sc, x));
} else if (*name == '\\') { /* #\w (character) */
int c=0;
if(stricmp(name+1,"space")==0) {
c=' ';
} else if(stricmp(name+1,"newline")==0) {
c='\n';
} else if(stricmp(name+1,"return")==0) {
c='\r';
} else if(stricmp(name+1,"tab")==0) {
c='\t';
} else if(name[1]=='x' && name[2]!=0) {
int c1=0;
if(sscanf(name+2,"%x",(unsigned int *)&c1)==1 && c1 < UCHAR_MAX) {
c=c1;
} else {
return sc->NIL;
}
#if USE_ASCII_NAMES
} else if(is_ascii_name(name+1,&c)) {
/* nothing */
#endif
} else if(name[2]==0) {
c=name[1];
} else {
return sc->NIL;
}
return mk_character(sc,c);
} else
return (sc->NIL);
}
/* ========== garbage collector ========== */
/*--
* We use algorithm E (Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming Vol.1,
* sec. 2.3.5), the Schorr-Deutsch-Waite link-inversion algorithm,
* for marking.
*/
static void mark(pointer a) {
pointer t, q, p;
t = (pointer) 0;
p = a;
E2: setmark(p);
if(is_vector(p)) {
int i;
int n = ivalue_unchecked(p)/2+ivalue_unchecked(p)%2;
for(i=0; i < n; i++) {
/* Vector cells will be treated like ordinary cells */
mark(p+1+i);
}
}
if (is_atom(p))
goto E6;
/* E4: down car */
q = car(p);
if (q && !is_mark(q)) {
setatom(p); /* a note that we have moved car */
car(p) = t;
t = p;
p = q;
goto E2;
}
E5: q = cdr(p); /* down cdr */
if (q && !is_mark(q)) {
cdr(p) = t;
t = p;
p = q;
goto E2;
}
E6: /* up. Undo the link switching from steps E4 and E5. */
if (!t)
return;
q = t;
if (is_atom(q)) {
clratom(q);
t = car(q);
car(q) = p;
p = q;
goto E5;
} else {
t = cdr(q);
cdr(q) = p;
p = q;
goto E6;
}
}
/* garbage collection. parameter a, b is marked. */
static void gc(scheme *sc, pointer a, pointer b) {
pointer p;
int i;
if(sc->gc_verbose) {
putstr(sc, "gc...");
}
/* mark system globals */
mark(sc->oblist);
mark(sc->global_env);
/* mark current registers */
mark(sc->args);
mark(sc->envir);
mark(sc->code);
dump_stack_mark(sc);
mark(sc->value);
mark(sc->inport);
mark(sc->save_inport);
mark(sc->outport);
mark(sc->loadport);
/* Mark recent objects the interpreter doesn't know about yet. */
mark(car(sc->sink));
/* Mark any older stuff above nested C calls */
mark(sc->c_nest);
/* mark variables a, b */
mark(a);
mark(b);
/* garbage collect */
clrmark(sc->NIL);
sc->fcells = 0;
sc->free_cell = sc->NIL;
/* free-list is kept sorted by address so as to maintain consecutive
ranges, if possible, for use with vectors. Here we scan the cells
(which are also kept sorted by address) downwards to build the
free-list in sorted order.
*/
for (i = sc->last_cell_seg; i >= 0; i--) {
p = sc->cell_seg[i] + CELL_SEGSIZE;
while (--p >= sc->cell_seg[i]) {
if (is_mark(p)) {
clrmark(p);
} else {
/* reclaim cell */
if (typeflag(p) != 0) {
finalize_cell(sc, p);
typeflag(p) = 0;
car(p) = sc->NIL;
}
++sc->fcells;
cdr(p) = sc->free_cell;
sc->free_cell = p;
}
}
}
if (sc->gc_verbose) {
char msg[80];
snprintf(msg,80,"done: %ld cells were recovered.\n", sc->fcells);
putstr(sc,msg);
}
}
static void finalize_cell(scheme *sc, pointer a) {
if(is_string(a)) {
sc->free(strvalue(a));
} else if(is_port(a)) {
if(a->_object._port->kind&port_file
&& a->_object._port->rep.stdio.closeit) {
port_close(sc,a,port_input|port_output);
} else if (a->_object._port->kind & port_srfi6) {
sc->free(a->_object._port->rep.string.start);
}
sc->free(a->_object._port);
} else if(is_foreign_object(a)) {
a->_object._foreign_object._vtable->finalize(sc, a->_object._foreign_object._data);
}
}
/* ========== Routines for Reading ========== */
static int file_push(scheme *sc, const char *fname) {
FILE *fin = NULL;
if (sc->file_i == MAXFIL-1)
return 0;
fin=fopen(fname,"r");
if(fin!=0) {
sc->file_i++;
sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].kind=port_file|port_input;
sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].rep.stdio.file=fin;
sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].rep.stdio.closeit=1;
sc->nesting_stack[sc->file_i]=0;
sc->loadport->_object._port=sc->load_stack+sc->file_i;
#if SHOW_ERROR_LINE
sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].rep.stdio.curr_line = 0;
if(fname)
sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].rep.stdio.filename = store_string(sc, strlen(fname), fname, 0);
#endif
}
return fin!=0;
}
static void file_pop(scheme *sc) {
if(sc->file_i != 0) {
sc->nesting=sc->nesting_stack[sc->file_i];
port_close(sc,sc->loadport,port_input);
sc->file_i--;
sc->loadport->_object._port=sc->load_stack+sc->file_i;
}
}
static int file_interactive(scheme *sc) {
return sc->file_i==0 && sc->load_stack[0].rep.stdio.file==stdin
&& sc->inport->_object._port->kind&port_file;
}
static port *port_rep_from_filename(scheme *sc, const char *fn, int prop) {
FILE *f;
char *rw;
port *pt;
if(prop==(port_input|port_output)) {
rw="a+";
} else if(prop==port_output) {
rw="w";
} else {
rw="r";
}
f=fopen(fn,rw);
if(f==0) {
return 0;
}
pt=port_rep_from_file(sc,f,prop);
pt->rep.stdio.closeit=1;
#if SHOW_ERROR_LINE
if(fn)
pt->rep.stdio.filename = store_string(sc, strlen(fn), fn, 0);
pt->rep.stdio.curr_line = 0;
#endif
return pt;
}
static pointer port_from_filename(scheme *sc, const char *fn, int prop) {
port *pt;
pt=port_rep_from_filename(sc,fn,prop);
if(pt==0) {
return sc->NIL;
}
return mk_port(sc,pt);
}
static port *port_rep_from_file(scheme *sc, FILE *f, int prop)
{
port *pt;
pt = (port *)sc->malloc(sizeof *pt);
if (pt == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
pt->kind = port_file | prop;
pt->rep.stdio.file = f;
pt->rep.stdio.closeit = 0;
return pt;
}
static pointer port_from_file(scheme *sc, FILE *f, int prop) {
port *pt;
pt=port_rep_from_file(sc,f,prop);
if(pt==0) {
return sc->NIL;
}
return mk_port(sc,pt);
}
static port *port_rep_from_string(scheme *sc, char *start, char *past_the_end, int prop) {
port *pt;
pt=(port*)sc->malloc(sizeof(port));
if(pt==0) {
return 0;
}
pt->kind=port_string|prop;
pt->rep.string.start=start;
pt->rep.string.curr=start;
pt->rep.string.past_the_end=past_the_end;
return pt;
}
static pointer port_from_string(scheme *sc, char *start, char *past_the_end, int prop) {
port *pt;
pt=port_rep_from_string(sc,start,past_the_end,prop);
if(pt==0) {
return sc->NIL;
}
return mk_port(sc,pt);
}
#define BLOCK_SIZE 256
static port *port_rep_from_scratch(scheme *sc) {
port *pt;
char *start;
pt=(port*)sc->malloc(sizeof(port));
if(pt==0) {
return 0;
}
start=sc->malloc(BLOCK_SIZE);
if(start==0) {
return 0;
}
memset(start,' ',BLOCK_SIZE-1);
start[BLOCK_SIZE-1]='\0';
pt->kind=port_string|port_output|port_srfi6;
pt->rep.string.start=start;
pt->rep.string.curr=start;
pt->rep.string.past_the_end=start+BLOCK_SIZE-1;
return pt;
}
static pointer port_from_scratch(scheme *sc) {
port *pt;
pt=port_rep_from_scratch(sc);
if(pt==0) {
return sc->NIL;
}
return mk_port(sc,pt);
}
static void port_close(scheme *sc, pointer p, int flag) {
port *pt=p->_object._port;
pt->kind&=~flag;
if((pt->kind & (port_input|port_output))==0) {
if(pt->kind&port_file) {
#if SHOW_ERROR_LINE
/* Cleanup is here so (close-*-port) functions could work too */
pt->rep.stdio.curr_line = 0;
if(pt->rep.stdio.filename)
sc->free(pt->rep.stdio.filename);
#endif
fclose(pt->rep.stdio.file);
}
pt->kind=port_free;
}
}
/* get new character from input file */
static int inchar(scheme *sc) {
int c;
port *pt;
pt = sc->inport->_object._port;
if(pt->kind & port_saw_EOF)
{ return EOF; }
c = basic_inchar(pt);
if(c == EOF && sc->inport == sc->loadport) {
/* Instead, set port_saw_EOF */
pt->kind |= port_saw_EOF;
/* file_pop(sc); */
return EOF;
/* NOTREACHED */
}
return c;
}
static int basic_inchar(port *pt) {
if(pt->kind & port_file) {
return fgetc(pt->rep.stdio.file);
} else {
if(*pt->rep.string.curr == 0 ||
pt->rep.string.curr == pt->rep.string.past_the_end) {
return EOF;
} else {
return *pt->rep.string.curr++;
}
}
}
/* back character to input buffer */
static void backchar(scheme *sc, int c) {
port *pt;
if(c==EOF) return;
pt=sc->inport->_object._port;
if(pt->kind&port_file) {
ungetc(c,pt->rep.stdio.file);
} else {
if(pt->rep.string.curr!=pt->rep.string.start) {
--pt->rep.string.curr;
}
}
}
static int realloc_port_string(scheme *sc, port *p)
{
char *start=p->rep.string.start;
size_t old_size = p->rep.string.past_the_end - start;
size_t new_size=p->rep.string.past_the_end-start+1+BLOCK_SIZE;
char *str=sc->malloc(new_size);
if(str) {
memset(str,' ',new_size-1);
str[new_size-1]='\0';
memcpy(str, start, old_size);
p->rep.string.start=str;
p->rep.string.past_the_end=str+new_size-1;
p->rep.string.curr-=start-str;
sc->free(start);
return 1;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
INTERFACE void putstr(scheme *sc, const char *s) {
port *pt=sc->outport->_object._port;
if(pt->kind&port_file) {
fputs(s,pt->rep.stdio.file);
} else {
for(;*s;s++) {
if(pt->rep.string.curr!=pt->rep.string.past_the_end) {
*pt->rep.string.curr++=*s;
} else if(pt->kind&port_srfi6&&realloc_port_string(sc,pt)) {
*pt->rep.string.curr++=*s;
}
}
}
}
static void putchars(scheme *sc, const char *s, int len) {
port *pt=sc->outport->_object._port;
if(pt->kind&port_file) {
fwrite(s,1,len,pt->rep.stdio.file);
} else {
for(;len;len--) {
if(pt->rep.string.curr!=pt->rep.string.past_the_end) {
*pt->rep.string.curr++=*s++;
} else if(pt->kind&port_srfi6&&realloc_port_string(sc,pt)) {
*pt->rep.string.curr++=*s++;
}
}
}
}
INTERFACE void putcharacter(scheme *sc, int c) {
port *pt=sc->outport->_object._port;
if(pt->kind&port_file) {
fputc(c,pt->rep.stdio.file);
} else {
if(pt->rep.string.curr!=pt->rep.string.past_the_end) {
*pt->rep.string.curr++=c;
} else if(pt->kind&port_srfi6&&realloc_port_string(sc,pt)) {
*pt->rep.string.curr++=c;
}
}
}
/* read characters up to delimiter, but cater to character constants */
static char *readstr_upto(scheme *sc, char *delim) {
char *p = sc->strbuff;
while ((p - sc->strbuff < sc->strbuff_size) &&
!is_one_of(delim, (*p++ = inchar(sc))));
if(p == sc->strbuff+2 && p[-2] == '\\') {
*p=0;
} else {
backchar(sc,p[-1]);
*--p = '\0';
}
return sc->strbuff;
}
/* read string expression "xxx...xxx" */
static pointer readstrexp(scheme *sc) {
char *p = sc->strbuff;
int c;
int c1=0;
enum { st_ok, st_bsl, st_x1, st_x2, st_oct1, st_oct2 } state=st_ok;
for (;;) {
c=inchar(sc);
if(c == EOF) {
return sc->F;
}
if(p-sc->strbuff > (sc->strbuff_size)-1) {
ptrdiff_t offset = p - sc->strbuff;
if (expand_strbuff(sc) != 0) {
return sc->F;
}
p = sc->strbuff + offset;
}
switch(state) {
case st_ok:
switch(c) {
case '\\':
state=st_bsl;
break;
case '"':
*p=0;
return mk_counted_string(sc,sc->strbuff,p-sc->strbuff);
default:
*p++=c;
break;
}
break;
case st_bsl:
switch(c) {
case '0':
case '1':
case '2':
case '3':
case '4':
case '5':
case '6':
case '7':
state=st_oct1;
c1=c-'0';
break;
case 'x':
case 'X':
state=st_x1;
c1=0;
break;
case 'n':
*p++='\n';
state=st_ok;
break;
case 't':
*p++='\t';
state=st_ok;
break;
case 'r':
*p++='\r';
state=st_ok;
break;
case '"':
*p++='"';
state=st_ok;
break;
default:
*p++=c;
state=st_ok;
break;
}
break;
case st_x1:
case st_x2:
c=toupper(c);
if(c>='0' && c<='F') {
if(c<='9') {
c1=(c1<<4)+c-'0';
} else {
c1=(c1<<4)+c-'A'+10;
}
if(state==st_x1) {
state=st_x2;
} else {
*p++=c1;
state=st_ok;
}
} else {
return sc->F;
}
break;
case st_oct1:
case st_oct2:
if (c < '0' || c > '7')
{
*p++=c1;
backchar(sc, c);
state=st_ok;
}
else
{
if (state==st_oct2 && c1 >= 32)
return sc->F;
c1=(c1<<3)+(c-'0');
if (state == st_oct1)
state=st_oct2;
else
{
*p++=c1;
state=st_ok;
}
}
break;
}
}
}
/* check c is in chars */
static INLINE int is_one_of(char *s, int c) {
if(c==EOF) return 1;
while (*s)
if (*s++ == c)
return (1);
return (0);
}
/* skip white characters */
static INLINE int skipspace(scheme *sc) {
int c = 0, curr_line = 0;
do {
c=inchar(sc);
#if SHOW_ERROR_LINE
if(c=='\n')
curr_line++;
#endif
} while (isspace(c));
/* record it */
#if SHOW_ERROR_LINE
if (sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].kind & port_file)
sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].rep.stdio.curr_line += curr_line;
#endif
if(c!=EOF) {
backchar(sc,c);
return 1;
}
else
{ return EOF; }
}
/* get token */
static int token(scheme *sc) {
int c;
c = skipspace(sc);
if(c == EOF) { return (TOK_EOF); }
switch (c=inchar(sc)) {
case EOF:
return (TOK_EOF);
case '(':
return (TOK_LPAREN);
case ')':
return (TOK_RPAREN);
case '.':
c=inchar(sc);
if(is_one_of(" \n\t",c)) {
return (TOK_DOT);
} else {
backchar(sc,c);
backchar(sc,'.');
return TOK_ATOM;
}
case '\'':
return (TOK_QUOTE);
case ';':
while ((c=inchar(sc)) != '\n' && c!=EOF)
;
#if SHOW_ERROR_LINE
if(c == '\n' && sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].kind & port_file)
sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].rep.stdio.curr_line++;
#endif
if(c == EOF)
{ return (TOK_EOF); }
else
{ return (token(sc));}
case '"':
return (TOK_DQUOTE);
case BACKQUOTE:
return (TOK_BQUOTE);
case ',':
if ((c=inchar(sc)) == '@') {
return (TOK_ATMARK);
} else {
backchar(sc,c);
return (TOK_COMMA);
}
case '#':
c=inchar(sc);
if (c == '(') {
return (TOK_VEC);
} else if(c == '!') {
while ((c=inchar(sc)) != '\n' && c!=EOF)
;
#if SHOW_ERROR_LINE
if(c == '\n' && sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].kind & port_file)
sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].rep.stdio.curr_line++;
#endif
if(c == EOF)
{ return (TOK_EOF); }
else
{ return (token(sc));}
} else {
backchar(sc,c);
if(is_one_of(" tfodxb\\",c)) {
return TOK_SHARP_CONST;
} else {
return (TOK_SHARP);
}
}
default:
backchar(sc,c);
return (TOK_ATOM);
}
}
/* ========== Routines for Printing ========== */
#define ok_abbrev(x) (is_pair(x) && cdr(x) == sc->NIL)
static void printslashstring(scheme *sc, char *p, int len) {
int i;
unsigned char *s=(unsigned char*)p;
putcharacter(sc,'"');
for ( i=0; i<len; i++) {
if(*s==0xff || *s=='"' || *s<' ' || *s=='\\') {
putcharacter(sc,'\\');
switch(*s) {
case '"':
putcharacter(sc,'"');
break;
case '\n':
putcharacter(sc,'n');
break;
case '\t':
putcharacter(sc,'t');
break;
case '\r':
putcharacter(sc,'r');
break;
case '\\':
putcharacter(sc,'\\');
break;
default: {
int d=*s/16;
putcharacter(sc,'x');
if(d<10) {
putcharacter(sc,d+'0');
} else {
putcharacter(sc,d-10+'A');
}
d=*s%16;
if(d<10) {
putcharacter(sc,d+'0');
} else {
putcharacter(sc,d-10+'A');
}
}
}
} else {
putcharacter(sc,*s);
}
s++;
}
putcharacter(sc,'"');
}
/* print atoms */
static void printatom(scheme *sc, pointer l, int f) {
char *p;
int len;
atom2str(sc,l,f,&p,&len);
putchars(sc,p,len);
}
/* Uses internal buffer unless string pointer is already available */
static void atom2str(scheme *sc, pointer l, int f, char **pp, int *plen) {
char *p;
if (l == sc->NIL) {
p = "()";
} else if (l == sc->T) {
p = "#t";
} else if (l == sc->F) {
p = "#f";
} else if (l == sc->EOF_OBJ) {
p = "#<EOF>";
} else if (is_port(l)) {
p = "#<PORT>";
} else if (is_number(l)) {
p = sc->strbuff;
if (f <= 1 || f == 10) /* f is the base for numbers if > 1 */ {
if(num_is_integer(l)) {
snprintf(p, STRBUFFSIZE, "%ld", ivalue_unchecked(l));
} else {
snprintf(p, STRBUFFSIZE, "%.10g", rvalue_unchecked(l));
/* r5rs says there must be a '.' (unless 'e'?) */
f = strcspn(p, ".e");
if (p[f] == 0) {
p[f] = '.'; /* not found, so add '.0' at the end */
p[f+1] = '0';
p[f+2] = 0;
}
}
} else {
long v = ivalue(l);
if (f == 16) {
if (v >= 0)
snprintf(p, STRBUFFSIZE, "%lx", v);
else
snprintf(p, STRBUFFSIZE, "-%lx", -v);
} else if (f == 8) {
if (v >= 0)
snprintf(p, STRBUFFSIZE, "%lo", v);
else
snprintf(p, STRBUFFSIZE, "-%lo", -v);
} else if (f == 2) {
unsigned long b = (v < 0) ? -v : v;
p = &p[STRBUFFSIZE-1];
*p = 0;
do { *--p = (b&1) ? '1' : '0'; b >>= 1; } while (b != 0);
if (v < 0) *--p = '-';
}
}
} else if (is_string(l)) {
if (!f) {
p = strvalue(l);
} else { /* Hack, uses the fact that printing is needed */
*pp=sc->strbuff;
*plen=0;
printslashstring(sc, strvalue(l), strlength(l));
return;
}
} else if (is_character(l)) {
int c=charvalue(l);
p = sc->strbuff;
if (!f) {
p[0]=c;
p[1]=0;
} else {
switch(c) {
case ' ':
p = "#\\space";
break;
case '\n':
p = "#\\newline";
break;
case '\r':
p = "#\\return";
break;
case '\t':
p = "#\\tab";
break;
default:
#if USE_ASCII_NAMES
if(c==127) {
p = "#\\del";
break;
} else if(c<32) {
snprintf(p,STRBUFFSIZE, "#\\%s",charnames[c]);
break;
}
#else
if(c<32) {
snprintf(p,STRBUFFSIZE,"#\\x%x",c);
break;
}
#endif
snprintf(p,STRBUFFSIZE,"#\\%c",c);
break;
}
}
} else if (is_symbol(l)) {
p = symname(l);
} else if (is_proc(l)) {
p = sc->strbuff;
snprintf(p,STRBUFFSIZE,"#<%s PROCEDURE %ld>", procname(l),procnum(l));
} else if (is_macro(l)) {
p = "#<MACRO>";
} else if (is_closure(l)) {
p = "#<CLOSURE>";
} else if (is_promise(l)) {
p = "#<PROMISE>";
} else if (is_foreign(l)) {
p = sc->strbuff;
snprintf(p,STRBUFFSIZE,"#<FOREIGN PROCEDURE %ld>", procnum(l));
} else if (is_continuation(l)) {
p = "#<CONTINUATION>";
} else if (is_foreign_object(l)) {
p = sc->strbuff;
l->_object._foreign_object._vtable->to_string(sc, p, STRBUFFSIZE, l->_object._foreign_object._data);
} else {
p = "#<ERROR>";
}
*pp=p;
*plen=strlen(p);
}
/* ========== Routines for Evaluation Cycle ========== */
/* make closure. c is code. e is environment */
static pointer mk_closure(scheme *sc, pointer c, pointer e) {
pointer x = get_cell(sc, c, e);
typeflag(x) = T_CLOSURE;
car(x) = c;
cdr(x) = e;
return (x);
}
/* make continuation. */
static pointer mk_continuation(scheme *sc, pointer d) {
pointer x = get_cell(sc, sc->NIL, d);
typeflag(x) = T_CONTINUATION;
cont_dump(x) = d;
return (x);
}
static pointer list_star(scheme *sc, pointer d) {
pointer p, q;
if(cdr(d)==sc->NIL) {
return car(d);
}
p=cons(sc,car(d),cdr(d));
q=p;
while(cdr(cdr(p))!=sc->NIL) {
d=cons(sc,car(p),cdr(p));
if(cdr(cdr(p))!=sc->NIL) {
p=cdr(d);
}
}
cdr(p)=car(cdr(p));
return q;
}
/* reverse list -- produce new list */
static pointer reverse(scheme *sc, pointer a) {
/* a must be checked by gc */
pointer p = sc->NIL;
for ( ; is_pair(a); a = cdr(a)) {
p = cons(sc, car(a), p);
}
return (p);
}
/* reverse list --- in-place */
static pointer reverse_in_place(scheme *sc, pointer term, pointer list) {
pointer p = list, result = term, q;
while (p != sc->NIL) {
q = cdr(p);
cdr(p) = result;
result = p;
p = q;
}
return (result);
}
/* append list -- produce new list (in reverse order) */
static pointer revappend(scheme *sc, pointer a, pointer b) {
pointer result = a;
pointer p = b;
while (is_pair(p)) {
result = cons(sc, car(p), result);
p = cdr(p);
}
if (p == sc->NIL) {
return result;
}
return sc->F; /* signal an error */
}
/* equivalence of atoms */
int eqv(pointer a, pointer b) {
if (is_string(a)) {
if (is_string(b))
return (strvalue(a) == strvalue(b));
else
return (0);
} else if (is_number(a)) {
if (is_number(b)) {
if (num_is_integer(a) == num_is_integer(b))
return num_eq(nvalue(a),nvalue(b));
}
return (0);
} else if (is_character(a)) {
if (is_character(b))
return charvalue(a)==charvalue(b);
else
return (0);
} else if (is_port(a)) {
if (is_port(b))
return a==b;
else
return (0);
} else if (is_proc(a)) {
if (is_proc(b))
return procnum(a)==procnum(b);
else
return (0);
} else {
return (a == b);
}
}
/* true or false value macro */
/* () is #t in R5RS */
#define is_true(p) ((p) != sc->F)
#define is_false(p) ((p) == sc->F)
/* ========== Environment implementation ========== */
#if !defined(USE_ALIST_ENV) || !defined(USE_OBJECT_LIST)
static int hash_fn(const char *key, int table_size)
{
unsigned int hashed = 0;
const char *c;
int bits_per_int = sizeof(unsigned int)*8;
for (c = key; *c; c++) {
/* letters have about 5 bits in them */
hashed = (hashed<<5) | (hashed>>(bits_per_int-5));
hashed ^= *c;
}
return hashed % table_size;
}
#endif
#ifndef USE_ALIST_ENV
/*
* In this implementation, each frame of the environment may be
* a hash table: a vector of alists hashed by variable name.
* In practice, we use a vector only for the initial frame;
* subsequent frames are too small and transient for the lookup
* speed to out-weigh the cost of making a new vector.
*/
static void new_frame_in_env(scheme *sc, pointer old_env)
{
pointer new_frame;
/* The interaction-environment has about 300 variables in it. */
if (old_env == sc->NIL) {
new_frame = mk_vector(sc, 461);
} else {
new_frame = sc->NIL;
}
sc->envir = immutable_cons(sc, new_frame, old_env);
setenvironment(sc->envir);
}
static INLINE void new_slot_spec_in_env(scheme *sc, pointer env,
pointer variable, pointer value)
{
pointer slot = immutable_cons(sc, variable, value);
if (is_vector(car(env))) {
int location = hash_fn(symname(variable), ivalue_unchecked(car(env)));
set_vector_elem(car(env), location,
immutable_cons(sc, slot, vector_elem(car(env), location)));
} else {
car(env) = immutable_cons(sc, slot, car(env));
}
}
static pointer find_slot_in_env(scheme *sc, pointer env, pointer hdl, int all)
{
pointer x,y;
int location;
for (x = env; x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
if (is_vector(car(x))) {
location = hash_fn(symname(hdl), ivalue_unchecked(car(x)));
y = vector_elem(car(x), location);
} else {
y = car(x);
}
for ( ; y != sc->NIL; y = cdr(y)) {
if (caar(y) == hdl) {
break;
}
}
if (y != sc->NIL) {
break;
}
if(!all) {
return sc->NIL;
}
}
if (x != sc->NIL) {
return car(y);
}
return sc->NIL;
}
#else /* USE_ALIST_ENV */
static INLINE void new_frame_in_env(scheme *sc, pointer old_env)
{
sc->envir = immutable_cons(sc, sc->NIL, old_env);
setenvironment(sc->envir);
}
static INLINE void new_slot_spec_in_env(scheme *sc, pointer env,
pointer variable, pointer value)
{
car(env) = immutable_cons(sc, immutable_cons(sc, variable, value), car(env));
}
static pointer find_slot_in_env(scheme *sc, pointer env, pointer hdl, int all)
{
pointer x,y;
for (x = env; x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
for (y = car(x); y != sc->NIL; y = cdr(y)) {
if (caar(y) == hdl) {
break;
}
}
if (y != sc->NIL) {
break;
}
if(!all) {
return sc->NIL;
}
}
if (x != sc->NIL) {
return car(y);
}
return sc->NIL;
}
#endif /* USE_ALIST_ENV else */
static INLINE void new_slot_in_env(scheme *sc, pointer variable, pointer value)
{
new_slot_spec_in_env(sc, sc->envir, variable, value);
}
static INLINE void set_slot_in_env(scheme *sc, pointer slot, pointer value)
{
(void)sc;
cdr(slot) = value;
}
static INLINE pointer slot_value_in_env(pointer slot)
{
return cdr(slot);
}
/* ========== Evaluation Cycle ========== */
static pointer _Error_1(scheme *sc, const char *s, pointer a) {
const char *str = s;
#if USE_ERROR_HOOK
pointer x;
pointer hdl=sc->ERROR_HOOK;
#endif
#if SHOW_ERROR_LINE
char sbuf[STRBUFFSIZE];
/* make sure error is not in REPL */
if (sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].kind & port_file &&
sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].rep.stdio.file != stdin) {
int ln = sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].rep.stdio.curr_line;
const char *fname = sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].rep.stdio.filename;
/* should never happen */
if(!fname) fname = "<unknown>";
/* we started from 0 */
ln++;
snprintf(sbuf, STRBUFFSIZE, "(%s : %i) %s", fname, ln, s);
str = (const char*)sbuf;
}
#endif
#if USE_ERROR_HOOK
x=find_slot_in_env(sc,sc->envir,hdl,1);
if (x != sc->NIL) {
if(a!=0) {
sc->code = cons(sc, cons(sc, sc->QUOTE, cons(sc,(a), sc->NIL)), sc->NIL);
} else {
sc->code = sc->NIL;
}
sc->code = cons(sc, mk_string(sc, str), sc->code);
setimmutable(car(sc->code));
sc->code = cons(sc, slot_value_in_env(x), sc->code);
sc->op = (int)OP_EVAL;
return sc->T;
}
#endif
if(a!=0) {
sc->args = cons(sc, (a), sc->NIL);
} else {
sc->args = sc->NIL;
}
sc->args = cons(sc, mk_string(sc, str), sc->args);
setimmutable(car(sc->args));
sc->op = (int)OP_ERR0;
return sc->T;
}
#define Error_1(sc,s, a) return _Error_1(sc,s,a)
#define Error_0(sc,s) return _Error_1(sc,s,0)
/* Too small to turn into function */
# define BEGIN do {
# define END } while (0)
#define s_goto(sc,a) BEGIN \
sc->op = (int)(a); \
return sc->T; END
#define s_return(sc,a) return _s_return(sc,a)
#ifndef USE_SCHEME_STACK
/* this structure holds all the interpreter's registers */
struct dump_stack_frame {
enum scheme_opcodes op;
pointer args;
pointer envir;
pointer code;
};
#define STACK_GROWTH 3
static void s_save(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op, pointer args, pointer code)
{
int nframes = (int)sc->dump;
struct dump_stack_frame *next_frame;
/* enough room for the next frame? */
if (nframes >= sc->dump_size) {
sc->dump_size += STACK_GROWTH;
/* alas there is no sc->realloc */
sc->dump_base = realloc(sc->dump_base,
sizeof(struct dump_stack_frame) * sc->dump_size);
}
next_frame = (struct dump_stack_frame *)sc->dump_base + nframes;
next_frame->op = op;
next_frame->args = args;
next_frame->envir = sc->envir;
next_frame->code = code;
sc->dump = (pointer)(nframes+1);
}
static pointer _s_return(scheme *sc, pointer a)
{
int nframes = (int)sc->dump;
struct dump_stack_frame *frame;
sc->value = (a);
if (nframes <= 0) {
return sc->NIL;
}
nframes--;
frame = (struct dump_stack_frame *)sc->dump_base + nframes;
sc->op = frame->op;
sc->args = frame->args;
sc->envir = frame->envir;
sc->code = frame->code;
sc->dump = (pointer)nframes;
return sc->T;
}
static INLINE void dump_stack_reset(scheme *sc)
{
/* in this implementation, sc->dump is the number of frames on the stack */
sc->dump = (pointer)0;
}
static INLINE void dump_stack_initialize(scheme *sc)
{
sc->dump_size = 0;
sc->dump_base = NULL;
dump_stack_reset(sc);
}
static void dump_stack_free(scheme *sc)
{
free(sc->dump_base);
sc->dump_base = NULL;
sc->dump = (pointer)0;
sc->dump_size = 0;
}
static INLINE void dump_stack_mark(scheme *sc)
{
int nframes = (int)sc->dump;
int i;
for(i=0; i<nframes; i++) {
struct dump_stack_frame *frame;
frame = (struct dump_stack_frame *)sc->dump_base + i;
mark(frame->args);
mark(frame->envir);
mark(frame->code);
}
}
#else
static INLINE void dump_stack_reset(scheme *sc)
{
sc->dump = sc->NIL;
}
static INLINE void dump_stack_initialize(scheme *sc)
{
dump_stack_reset(sc);
}
static void dump_stack_free(scheme *sc)
{
sc->dump = sc->NIL;
}
static pointer _s_return(scheme *sc, pointer a) {
sc->value = (a);
if(sc->dump==sc->NIL) return sc->NIL;
sc->op = ivalue(car(sc->dump));
sc->args = cadr(sc->dump);
sc->envir = caddr(sc->dump);
sc->code = cadddr(sc->dump);
sc->dump = cddddr(sc->dump);
return sc->T;
}
static void s_save(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op, pointer args, pointer code) {
sc->dump = cons(sc, sc->envir, cons(sc, (code), sc->dump));
sc->dump = cons(sc, (args), sc->dump);
sc->dump = cons(sc, mk_integer(sc, (long)(op)), sc->dump);
}
static INLINE void dump_stack_mark(scheme *sc)
{
mark(sc->dump);
}
#endif
#define s_retbool(tf) s_return(sc,(tf) ? sc->T : sc->F)
static pointer opexe_0(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op) {
pointer x, y;
switch (op) {
case OP_LOAD: /* load */
if(file_interactive(sc)) {
fprintf(sc->outport->_object._port->rep.stdio.file,
"Loading %s\n", strvalue(car(sc->args)));
}
if (!file_push(sc,strvalue(car(sc->args)))) {
Error_1(sc,"unable to open", car(sc->args));
}
else
{
sc->args = mk_integer(sc,sc->file_i);
s_goto(sc,OP_T0LVL);
}
case OP_T0LVL: /* top level */
/* If we reached the end of file, this loop is done. */
if(sc->loadport->_object._port->kind & port_saw_EOF)
{
if(sc->file_i == 0)
{
sc->args=sc->NIL;
sc->nesting = sc->nesting_stack[0];
s_goto(sc,OP_QUIT);
}
else
{
file_pop(sc);
s_return(sc,sc->value);
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
/* If interactive, be nice to user. */
if(file_interactive(sc))
{
sc->envir = sc->global_env;
dump_stack_reset(sc);
putstr(sc,"\n");
putstr(sc,prompt);
}
/* Set up another iteration of REPL */
sc->nesting=0;
sc->save_inport=sc->inport;
sc->inport = sc->loadport;
s_save(sc,OP_T0LVL, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
s_save(sc,OP_VALUEPRINT, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
s_save(sc,OP_T1LVL, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
s_goto(sc,OP_READ_INTERNAL);
case OP_T1LVL: /* top level */
sc->code = sc->value;
sc->inport=sc->save_inport;
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
case OP_READ_INTERNAL: /* internal read */
sc->tok = token(sc);
if(sc->tok==TOK_EOF)
{ s_return(sc,sc->EOF_OBJ); }
s_goto(sc,OP_RDSEXPR);
case OP_GENSYM:
s_return(sc, gensym(sc));
case OP_VALUEPRINT: /* print evaluation result */
/* OP_VALUEPRINT is always pushed, because when changing from
non-interactive to interactive mode, it needs to be
already on the stack */
if(sc->tracing) {
putstr(sc,"\nGives: ");
}
if(file_interactive(sc)) {
sc->print_flag = 1;
sc->args = sc->value;
s_goto(sc,OP_P0LIST);
} else {
s_return(sc,sc->value);
}
case OP_EVAL: /* main part of evaluation */
#if USE_TRACING
if(sc->tracing) {
/*s_save(sc,OP_VALUEPRINT,sc->NIL,sc->NIL);*/
s_save(sc,OP_REAL_EVAL,sc->args,sc->code);
sc->args=sc->code;
putstr(sc,"\nEval: ");
s_goto(sc,OP_P0LIST);
}
/* fall through */
case OP_REAL_EVAL:
#endif
if (is_symbol(sc->code)) { /* symbol */
x=find_slot_in_env(sc,sc->envir,sc->code,1);
if (x != sc->NIL) {
s_return(sc,slot_value_in_env(x));
} else {
Error_1(sc,"eval: unbound variable:", sc->code);
}
} else if (is_pair(sc->code)) {
if (is_syntax(x = car(sc->code))) { /* SYNTAX */
sc->code = cdr(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,syntaxnum(x));
} else {/* first, eval top element and eval arguments */
s_save(sc,OP_E0ARGS, sc->NIL, sc->code);
/* If no macros => s_save(sc,OP_E1ARGS, sc->NIL, cdr(sc->code));*/
sc->code = car(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
}
} else {
s_return(sc,sc->code);
}
case OP_E0ARGS: /* eval arguments */
if (is_macro(sc->value)) { /* macro expansion */
s_save(sc,OP_DOMACRO, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
sc->args = cons(sc,sc->code, sc->NIL);
sc->code = sc->value;
s_goto(sc,OP_APPLY);
} else {
sc->code = cdr(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_E1ARGS);
}
case OP_E1ARGS: /* eval arguments */
sc->args = cons(sc, sc->value, sc->args);
if (is_pair(sc->code)) { /* continue */
s_save(sc,OP_E1ARGS, sc->args, cdr(sc->code));
sc->code = car(sc->code);
sc->args = sc->NIL;
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
} else { /* end */
sc->args = reverse_in_place(sc, sc->NIL, sc->args);
sc->code = car(sc->args);
sc->args = cdr(sc->args);
s_goto(sc,OP_APPLY);
}
#if USE_TRACING
case OP_TRACING: {
int tr=sc->tracing;
sc->tracing=ivalue(car(sc->args));
s_return(sc,mk_integer(sc,tr));
}
#endif
case OP_APPLY: /* apply 'code' to 'args' */
#if USE_TRACING
if(sc->tracing) {
s_save(sc,OP_REAL_APPLY,sc->args,sc->code);
sc->print_flag = 1;
/* sc->args=cons(sc,sc->code,sc->args);*/
putstr(sc,"\nApply to: ");
s_goto(sc,OP_P0LIST);
}
/* fall through */
case OP_REAL_APPLY:
#endif
if (is_proc(sc->code)) {
s_goto(sc,procnum(sc->code)); /* PROCEDURE */
} else if (is_foreign(sc->code))
{
/* Keep nested calls from GC'ing the arglist */
push_recent_alloc(sc,sc->args,sc->NIL);
x=sc->code->_object._ff(sc,sc->args);
s_return(sc,x);
} else if (is_closure(sc->code) || is_macro(sc->code)
|| is_promise(sc->code)) { /* CLOSURE */
/* Should not accept promise */
/* make environment */
new_frame_in_env(sc, closure_env(sc->code));
for (x = car(closure_code(sc->code)), y = sc->args;
is_pair(x); x = cdr(x), y = cdr(y)) {
if (y == sc->NIL) {
Error_1(sc, "not enough arguments, missing:", x);
} else {
new_slot_in_env(sc, car(x), car(y));
}
}
if (x == sc->NIL) {
/*--
* if (y != sc->NIL) {
* Error_0(sc,"too many arguments");
* }
*/
} else if (is_symbol(x))
new_slot_in_env(sc, x, y);
else {
Error_1(sc,"syntax error in closure: not a symbol:", x);
}
sc->code = cdr(closure_code(sc->code));
sc->args = sc->NIL;
s_goto(sc,OP_BEGIN);
} else if (is_continuation(sc->code)) { /* CONTINUATION */
sc->dump = cont_dump(sc->code);
s_return(sc,sc->args != sc->NIL ? car(sc->args) : sc->NIL);
} else {
Error_1(sc,"illegal function",sc->code);
}
case OP_DOMACRO: /* do macro */
sc->code = sc->value;
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
#if 1
case OP_LAMBDA: /* lambda */
/* If the hook is defined, apply it to sc->code, otherwise
- set sc->value fall thru */
+ set sc->value fall through */
{
pointer f=find_slot_in_env(sc,sc->envir,sc->COMPILE_HOOK,1);
if(f==sc->NIL) {
sc->value = sc->code;
/* Fallthru */
} else {
s_save(sc,OP_LAMBDA1,sc->args,sc->code);
sc->args=cons(sc,sc->code,sc->NIL);
sc->code=slot_value_in_env(f);
s_goto(sc,OP_APPLY);
}
}
case OP_LAMBDA1:
s_return(sc,mk_closure(sc, sc->value, sc->envir));
#else
case OP_LAMBDA: /* lambda */
s_return(sc,mk_closure(sc, sc->code, sc->envir));
#endif
case OP_MKCLOSURE: /* make-closure */
x=car(sc->args);
if(car(x)==sc->LAMBDA) {
x=cdr(x);
}
if(cdr(sc->args)==sc->NIL) {
y=sc->envir;
} else {
y=cadr(sc->args);
}
s_return(sc,mk_closure(sc, x, y));
case OP_QUOTE: /* quote */
s_return(sc,car(sc->code));
case OP_DEF0: /* define */
if(is_immutable(car(sc->code)))
Error_1(sc,"define: unable to alter immutable", car(sc->code));
if (is_pair(car(sc->code))) {
x = caar(sc->code);
sc->code = cons(sc, sc->LAMBDA, cons(sc, cdar(sc->code), cdr(sc->code)));
} else {
x = car(sc->code);
sc->code = cadr(sc->code);
}
if (!is_symbol(x)) {
Error_0(sc,"variable is not a symbol");
}
s_save(sc,OP_DEF1, sc->NIL, x);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
case OP_DEF1: /* define */
x=find_slot_in_env(sc,sc->envir,sc->code,0);
if (x != sc->NIL) {
set_slot_in_env(sc, x, sc->value);
} else {
new_slot_in_env(sc, sc->code, sc->value);
}
s_return(sc,sc->code);
case OP_DEFP: /* defined? */
x=sc->envir;
if(cdr(sc->args)!=sc->NIL) {
x=cadr(sc->args);
}
s_retbool(find_slot_in_env(sc,x,car(sc->args),1)!=sc->NIL);
case OP_SET0: /* set! */
if(is_immutable(car(sc->code)))
Error_1(sc,"set!: unable to alter immutable variable",car(sc->code));
s_save(sc,OP_SET1, sc->NIL, car(sc->code));
sc->code = cadr(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
case OP_SET1: /* set! */
y=find_slot_in_env(sc,sc->envir,sc->code,1);
if (y != sc->NIL) {
set_slot_in_env(sc, y, sc->value);
s_return(sc,sc->value);
} else {
Error_1(sc,"set!: unbound variable:", sc->code);
}
case OP_BEGIN: /* begin */
if (!is_pair(sc->code)) {
s_return(sc,sc->code);
}
if (cdr(sc->code) != sc->NIL) {
s_save(sc,OP_BEGIN, sc->NIL, cdr(sc->code));
}
sc->code = car(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
case OP_IF0: /* if */
s_save(sc,OP_IF1, sc->NIL, cdr(sc->code));
sc->code = car(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
case OP_IF1: /* if */
if (is_true(sc->value))
sc->code = car(sc->code);
else
sc->code = cadr(sc->code); /* (if #f 1) ==> () because
* car(sc->NIL) = sc->NIL */
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
case OP_LET0: /* let */
sc->args = sc->NIL;
sc->value = sc->code;
sc->code = is_symbol(car(sc->code)) ? cadr(sc->code) : car(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_LET1);
case OP_LET1: /* let (calculate parameters) */
sc->args = cons(sc, sc->value, sc->args);
if (is_pair(sc->code)) { /* continue */
if (!is_pair(car(sc->code)) || !is_pair(cdar(sc->code))) {
Error_1(sc, "Bad syntax of binding spec in let :",
car(sc->code));
}
s_save(sc,OP_LET1, sc->args, cdr(sc->code));
sc->code = cadar(sc->code);
sc->args = sc->NIL;
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
} else { /* end */
sc->args = reverse_in_place(sc, sc->NIL, sc->args);
sc->code = car(sc->args);
sc->args = cdr(sc->args);
s_goto(sc,OP_LET2);
}
case OP_LET2: /* let */
new_frame_in_env(sc, sc->envir);
for (x = is_symbol(car(sc->code)) ? cadr(sc->code) : car(sc->code), y = sc->args;
y != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x), y = cdr(y)) {
new_slot_in_env(sc, caar(x), car(y));
}
if (is_symbol(car(sc->code))) { /* named let */
for (x = cadr(sc->code), sc->args = sc->NIL; x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
if (!is_pair(x))
Error_1(sc, "Bad syntax of binding in let :", x);
if (!is_list(sc, car(x)))
Error_1(sc, "Bad syntax of binding in let :", car(x));
sc->args = cons(sc, caar(x), sc->args);
}
x = mk_closure(sc, cons(sc, reverse_in_place(sc, sc->NIL, sc->args), cddr(sc->code)), sc->envir);
new_slot_in_env(sc, car(sc->code), x);
sc->code = cddr(sc->code);
sc->args = sc->NIL;
} else {
sc->code = cdr(sc->code);
sc->args = sc->NIL;
}
s_goto(sc,OP_BEGIN);
case OP_LET0AST: /* let* */
if (car(sc->code) == sc->NIL) {
new_frame_in_env(sc, sc->envir);
sc->code = cdr(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_BEGIN);
}
if(!is_pair(car(sc->code)) || !is_pair(caar(sc->code)) || !is_pair(cdaar(sc->code))) {
Error_1(sc,"Bad syntax of binding spec in let* :",car(sc->code));
}
s_save(sc,OP_LET1AST, cdr(sc->code), car(sc->code));
sc->code = cadaar(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
case OP_LET1AST: /* let* (make new frame) */
new_frame_in_env(sc, sc->envir);
s_goto(sc,OP_LET2AST);
case OP_LET2AST: /* let* (calculate parameters) */
new_slot_in_env(sc, caar(sc->code), sc->value);
sc->code = cdr(sc->code);
if (is_pair(sc->code)) { /* continue */
s_save(sc,OP_LET2AST, sc->args, sc->code);
sc->code = cadar(sc->code);
sc->args = sc->NIL;
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
} else { /* end */
sc->code = sc->args;
sc->args = sc->NIL;
s_goto(sc,OP_BEGIN);
}
default:
snprintf(sc->strbuff,STRBUFFSIZE,"%d: illegal operator", sc->op);
Error_0(sc,sc->strbuff);
}
return sc->T;
}
static pointer opexe_1(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op) {
pointer x, y;
switch (op) {
case OP_LET0REC: /* letrec */
new_frame_in_env(sc, sc->envir);
sc->args = sc->NIL;
sc->value = sc->code;
sc->code = car(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_LET1REC);
case OP_LET1REC: /* letrec (calculate parameters) */
sc->args = cons(sc, sc->value, sc->args);
if (is_pair(sc->code)) { /* continue */
if (!is_pair(car(sc->code)) || !is_pair(cdar(sc->code))) {
Error_1(sc, "Bad syntax of binding spec in letrec :",
car(sc->code));
}
s_save(sc,OP_LET1REC, sc->args, cdr(sc->code));
sc->code = cadar(sc->code);
sc->args = sc->NIL;
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
} else { /* end */
sc->args = reverse_in_place(sc, sc->NIL, sc->args);
sc->code = car(sc->args);
sc->args = cdr(sc->args);
s_goto(sc,OP_LET2REC);
}
case OP_LET2REC: /* letrec */
for (x = car(sc->code), y = sc->args; y != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x), y = cdr(y)) {
new_slot_in_env(sc, caar(x), car(y));
}
sc->code = cdr(sc->code);
sc->args = sc->NIL;
s_goto(sc,OP_BEGIN);
case OP_COND0: /* cond */
if (!is_pair(sc->code)) {
Error_0(sc,"syntax error in cond");
}
s_save(sc,OP_COND1, sc->NIL, sc->code);
sc->code = caar(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
case OP_COND1: /* cond */
if (is_true(sc->value)) {
if ((sc->code = cdar(sc->code)) == sc->NIL) {
s_return(sc,sc->value);
}
if(!sc->code || car(sc->code)==sc->FEED_TO) {
if(!is_pair(cdr(sc->code))) {
Error_0(sc,"syntax error in cond");
}
x=cons(sc, sc->QUOTE, cons(sc, sc->value, sc->NIL));
sc->code=cons(sc,cadr(sc->code),cons(sc,x,sc->NIL));
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
}
s_goto(sc,OP_BEGIN);
} else {
if ((sc->code = cdr(sc->code)) == sc->NIL) {
s_return(sc,sc->NIL);
} else {
s_save(sc,OP_COND1, sc->NIL, sc->code);
sc->code = caar(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
}
}
case OP_DELAY: /* delay */
x = mk_closure(sc, cons(sc, sc->NIL, sc->code), sc->envir);
typeflag(x)=T_PROMISE;
s_return(sc,x);
case OP_AND0: /* and */
if (sc->code == sc->NIL) {
s_return(sc,sc->T);
}
s_save(sc,OP_AND1, sc->NIL, cdr(sc->code));
sc->code = car(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
case OP_AND1: /* and */
if (is_false(sc->value)) {
s_return(sc,sc->value);
} else if (sc->code == sc->NIL) {
s_return(sc,sc->value);
} else {
s_save(sc,OP_AND1, sc->NIL, cdr(sc->code));
sc->code = car(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
}
case OP_OR0: /* or */
if (sc->code == sc->NIL) {
s_return(sc,sc->F);
}
s_save(sc,OP_OR1, sc->NIL, cdr(sc->code));
sc->code = car(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
case OP_OR1: /* or */
if (is_true(sc->value)) {
s_return(sc,sc->value);
} else if (sc->code == sc->NIL) {
s_return(sc,sc->value);
} else {
s_save(sc,OP_OR1, sc->NIL, cdr(sc->code));
sc->code = car(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
}
case OP_C0STREAM: /* cons-stream */
s_save(sc,OP_C1STREAM, sc->NIL, cdr(sc->code));
sc->code = car(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
case OP_C1STREAM: /* cons-stream */
sc->args = sc->value; /* save sc->value to register sc->args for gc */
x = mk_closure(sc, cons(sc, sc->NIL, sc->code), sc->envir);
typeflag(x)=T_PROMISE;
s_return(sc,cons(sc, sc->args, x));
case OP_MACRO0: /* macro */
if (is_pair(car(sc->code))) {
x = caar(sc->code);
sc->code = cons(sc, sc->LAMBDA, cons(sc, cdar(sc->code), cdr(sc->code)));
} else {
x = car(sc->code);
sc->code = cadr(sc->code);
}
if (!is_symbol(x)) {
Error_0(sc,"variable is not a symbol");
}
s_save(sc,OP_MACRO1, sc->NIL, x);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
case OP_MACRO1: /* macro */
typeflag(sc->value) = T_MACRO;
x = find_slot_in_env(sc, sc->envir, sc->code, 0);
if (x != sc->NIL) {
set_slot_in_env(sc, x, sc->value);
} else {
new_slot_in_env(sc, sc->code, sc->value);
}
s_return(sc,sc->code);
case OP_CASE0: /* case */
s_save(sc,OP_CASE1, sc->NIL, cdr(sc->code));
sc->code = car(sc->code);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
case OP_CASE1: /* case */
for (x = sc->code; x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
if (!is_pair(y = caar(x))) {
break;
}
for ( ; y != sc->NIL; y = cdr(y)) {
if (eqv(car(y), sc->value)) {
break;
}
}
if (y != sc->NIL) {
break;
}
}
if (x != sc->NIL) {
if (is_pair(caar(x))) {
sc->code = cdar(x);
s_goto(sc,OP_BEGIN);
} else {/* else */
s_save(sc,OP_CASE2, sc->NIL, cdar(x));
sc->code = caar(x);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
}
} else {
s_return(sc,sc->NIL);
}
case OP_CASE2: /* case */
if (is_true(sc->value)) {
s_goto(sc,OP_BEGIN);
} else {
s_return(sc,sc->NIL);
}
case OP_PAPPLY: /* apply */
sc->code = car(sc->args);
sc->args = list_star(sc,cdr(sc->args));
/*sc->args = cadr(sc->args);*/
s_goto(sc,OP_APPLY);
case OP_PEVAL: /* eval */
if(cdr(sc->args)!=sc->NIL) {
sc->envir=cadr(sc->args);
}
sc->code = car(sc->args);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
case OP_CONTINUATION: /* call-with-current-continuation */
sc->code = car(sc->args);
sc->args = cons(sc, mk_continuation(sc, sc->dump), sc->NIL);
s_goto(sc,OP_APPLY);
default:
snprintf(sc->strbuff,STRBUFFSIZE,"%d: illegal operator", sc->op);
Error_0(sc,sc->strbuff);
}
return sc->T;
}
static pointer opexe_2(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op) {
pointer x;
num v;
#if USE_MATH
double dd;
#endif
switch (op) {
#if USE_MATH
case OP_INEX2EX: /* inexact->exact */
x=car(sc->args);
if(num_is_integer(x)) {
s_return(sc,x);
} else if(modf(rvalue_unchecked(x),&dd)==0.0) {
s_return(sc,mk_integer(sc,ivalue(x)));
} else {
Error_1(sc,"inexact->exact: not integral:",x);
}
case OP_EXP:
x=car(sc->args);
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, exp(rvalue(x))));
case OP_LOG:
x=car(sc->args);
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, log(rvalue(x))));
case OP_SIN:
x=car(sc->args);
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, sin(rvalue(x))));
case OP_COS:
x=car(sc->args);
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, cos(rvalue(x))));
case OP_TAN:
x=car(sc->args);
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, tan(rvalue(x))));
case OP_ASIN:
x=car(sc->args);
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, asin(rvalue(x))));
case OP_ACOS:
x=car(sc->args);
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, acos(rvalue(x))));
case OP_ATAN:
x=car(sc->args);
if(cdr(sc->args)==sc->NIL) {
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, atan(rvalue(x))));
} else {
pointer y=cadr(sc->args);
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, atan2(rvalue(x),rvalue(y))));
}
case OP_SQRT:
x=car(sc->args);
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, sqrt(rvalue(x))));
case OP_EXPT: {
double result;
int real_result=1;
pointer y=cadr(sc->args);
x=car(sc->args);
if (num_is_integer(x) && num_is_integer(y))
real_result=0;
/* This 'if' is an R5RS compatibility fix. */
/* NOTE: Remove this 'if' fix for R6RS. */
if (rvalue(x) == 0 && rvalue(y) < 0) {
result = 0.0;
} else {
result = pow(rvalue(x),rvalue(y));
}
/* Before returning integer result make sure we can. */
/* If the test fails, result is too big for integer. */
if (!real_result)
{
long result_as_long = (long)result;
if (result != (double)result_as_long)
real_result = 1;
}
if (real_result) {
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, result));
} else {
s_return(sc, mk_integer(sc, result));
}
}
case OP_FLOOR:
x=car(sc->args);
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, floor(rvalue(x))));
case OP_CEILING:
x=car(sc->args);
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, ceil(rvalue(x))));
case OP_TRUNCATE : {
double rvalue_of_x ;
x=car(sc->args);
rvalue_of_x = rvalue(x) ;
if (rvalue_of_x > 0) {
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, floor(rvalue_of_x)));
} else {
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, ceil(rvalue_of_x)));
}
}
case OP_ROUND:
x=car(sc->args);
if (num_is_integer(x))
s_return(sc, x);
s_return(sc, mk_real(sc, round_per_R5RS(rvalue(x))));
#endif
case OP_ADD: /* + */
v=num_zero;
for (x = sc->args; x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
v=num_add(v,nvalue(car(x)));
}
s_return(sc,mk_number(sc, v));
case OP_MUL: /* * */
v=num_one;
for (x = sc->args; x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
v=num_mul(v,nvalue(car(x)));
}
s_return(sc,mk_number(sc, v));
case OP_SUB: /* - */
if(cdr(sc->args)==sc->NIL) {
x=sc->args;
v=num_zero;
} else {
x = cdr(sc->args);
v = nvalue(car(sc->args));
}
for (; x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
v=num_sub(v,nvalue(car(x)));
}
s_return(sc,mk_number(sc, v));
case OP_DIV: /* / */
if(cdr(sc->args)==sc->NIL) {
x=sc->args;
v=num_one;
} else {
x = cdr(sc->args);
v = nvalue(car(sc->args));
}
for (; x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
if (!is_zero_double(rvalue(car(x))))
v=num_div(v,nvalue(car(x)));
else {
Error_0(sc,"/: division by zero");
}
}
s_return(sc,mk_number(sc, v));
case OP_INTDIV: /* quotient */
if(cdr(sc->args)==sc->NIL) {
x=sc->args;
v=num_one;
} else {
x = cdr(sc->args);
v = nvalue(car(sc->args));
}
for (; x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
if (ivalue(car(x)) != 0)
v=num_intdiv(v,nvalue(car(x)));
else {
Error_0(sc,"quotient: division by zero");
}
}
s_return(sc,mk_number(sc, v));
case OP_REM: /* remainder */
v = nvalue(car(sc->args));
if (ivalue(cadr(sc->args)) != 0)
v=num_rem(v,nvalue(cadr(sc->args)));
else {
Error_0(sc,"remainder: division by zero");
}
s_return(sc,mk_number(sc, v));
case OP_MOD: /* modulo */
v = nvalue(car(sc->args));
if (ivalue(cadr(sc->args)) != 0)
v=num_mod(v,nvalue(cadr(sc->args)));
else {
Error_0(sc,"modulo: division by zero");
}
s_return(sc,mk_number(sc, v));
case OP_CAR: /* car */
s_return(sc,caar(sc->args));
case OP_CDR: /* cdr */
s_return(sc,cdar(sc->args));
case OP_CONS: /* cons */
cdr(sc->args) = cadr(sc->args);
s_return(sc,sc->args);
case OP_SETCAR: /* set-car! */
if(!is_immutable(car(sc->args))) {
caar(sc->args) = cadr(sc->args);
s_return(sc,car(sc->args));
} else {
Error_0(sc,"set-car!: unable to alter immutable pair");
}
case OP_SETCDR: /* set-cdr! */
if(!is_immutable(car(sc->args))) {
cdar(sc->args) = cadr(sc->args);
s_return(sc,car(sc->args));
} else {
Error_0(sc,"set-cdr!: unable to alter immutable pair");
}
case OP_CHAR2INT: { /* char->integer */
char c;
c=(char)ivalue(car(sc->args));
s_return(sc,mk_integer(sc,(unsigned char)c));
}
case OP_INT2CHAR: { /* integer->char */
unsigned char c;
c=(unsigned char)ivalue(car(sc->args));
s_return(sc,mk_character(sc,(char)c));
}
case OP_CHARUPCASE: {
unsigned char c;
c=(unsigned char)ivalue(car(sc->args));
c=toupper(c);
s_return(sc,mk_character(sc,(char)c));
}
case OP_CHARDNCASE: {
unsigned char c;
c=(unsigned char)ivalue(car(sc->args));
c=tolower(c);
s_return(sc,mk_character(sc,(char)c));
}
case OP_STR2SYM: /* string->symbol */
s_return(sc,mk_symbol(sc,strvalue(car(sc->args))));
case OP_STR2ATOM: /* string->atom */ {
char *s=strvalue(car(sc->args));
long pf = 0;
if(cdr(sc->args)!=sc->NIL) {
/* we know cadr(sc->args) is a natural number */
/* see if it is 2, 8, 10, or 16, or error */
pf = ivalue_unchecked(cadr(sc->args));
if(pf == 16 || pf == 10 || pf == 8 || pf == 2) {
/* base is OK */
}
else {
pf = -1;
}
}
if (pf < 0) {
Error_1(sc, "string->atom: bad base:", cadr(sc->args));
} else if(*s=='#') /* no use of base! */ {
s_return(sc, mk_sharp_const(sc, s+1));
} else {
if (pf == 0 || pf == 10) {
s_return(sc, mk_atom(sc, s));
}
else {
char *ep;
long iv = strtol(s,&ep,(int )pf);
if (*ep == 0) {
s_return(sc, mk_integer(sc, iv));
}
else {
s_return(sc, sc->F);
}
}
}
}
case OP_SYM2STR: /* symbol->string */
x=mk_string(sc,symname(car(sc->args)));
setimmutable(x);
s_return(sc,x);
case OP_ATOM2STR: /* atom->string */ {
long pf = 0;
x=car(sc->args);
if(cdr(sc->args)!=sc->NIL) {
/* we know cadr(sc->args) is a natural number */
/* see if it is 2, 8, 10, or 16, or error */
pf = ivalue_unchecked(cadr(sc->args));
if(is_number(x) && (pf == 16 || pf == 10 || pf == 8 || pf == 2)) {
/* base is OK */
}
else {
pf = -1;
}
}
if (pf < 0) {
Error_1(sc, "atom->string: bad base:", cadr(sc->args));
} else if(is_number(x) || is_character(x) || is_string(x) || is_symbol(x)) {
char *p;
int len;
atom2str(sc,x,(int )pf,&p,&len);
s_return(sc,mk_counted_string(sc,p,len));
} else {
Error_1(sc, "atom->string: not an atom:", x);
}
}
case OP_MKSTRING: { /* make-string */
int fill=' ';
int len;
len=ivalue(car(sc->args));
if(cdr(sc->args)!=sc->NIL) {
fill=charvalue(cadr(sc->args));
}
s_return(sc,mk_empty_string(sc,len,(char)fill));
}
case OP_STRLEN: /* string-length */
s_return(sc,mk_integer(sc,strlength(car(sc->args))));
case OP_STRREF: { /* string-ref */
char *str;
int index;
str=strvalue(car(sc->args));
index=ivalue(cadr(sc->args));
if(index>=strlength(car(sc->args))) {
Error_1(sc,"string-ref: out of bounds:",cadr(sc->args));
}
s_return(sc,mk_character(sc,((unsigned char*)str)[index]));
}
case OP_STRSET: { /* string-set! */
char *str;
int index;
int c;
if(is_immutable(car(sc->args))) {
Error_1(sc,"string-set!: unable to alter immutable string:",car(sc->args));
}
str=strvalue(car(sc->args));
index=ivalue(cadr(sc->args));
if(index>=strlength(car(sc->args))) {
Error_1(sc,"string-set!: out of bounds:",cadr(sc->args));
}
c=charvalue(caddr(sc->args));
str[index]=(char)c;
s_return(sc,car(sc->args));
}
case OP_STRAPPEND: { /* string-append */
/* in 1.29 string-append was in Scheme in init.scm but was too slow */
int len = 0;
pointer newstr;
char *pos;
/* compute needed length for new string */
for (x = sc->args; x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
len += strlength(car(x));
}
newstr = mk_empty_string(sc, len, ' ');
/* store the contents of the argument strings into the new string */
for (pos = strvalue(newstr), x = sc->args; x != sc->NIL;
pos += strlength(car(x)), x = cdr(x)) {
memcpy(pos, strvalue(car(x)), strlength(car(x)));
}
s_return(sc, newstr);
}
case OP_SUBSTR: { /* substring */
char *str;
int index0;
int index1;
int len;
str=strvalue(car(sc->args));
index0=ivalue(cadr(sc->args));
if(index0>strlength(car(sc->args))) {
Error_1(sc,"substring: start out of bounds:",cadr(sc->args));
}
if(cddr(sc->args)!=sc->NIL) {
index1=ivalue(caddr(sc->args));
if(index1>strlength(car(sc->args)) || index1<index0) {
Error_1(sc,"substring: end out of bounds:",caddr(sc->args));
}
} else {
index1=strlength(car(sc->args));
}
len=index1-index0;
x=mk_empty_string(sc,len,' ');
memcpy(strvalue(x),str+index0,len);
strvalue(x)[len]=0;
s_return(sc,x);
}
case OP_VECTOR: { /* vector */
int i;
pointer vec;
int len=list_length(sc,sc->args);
if(len<0) {
Error_1(sc,"vector: not a proper list:",sc->args);
}
vec=mk_vector(sc,len);
if(sc->no_memory) { s_return(sc, sc->sink); }
for (x = sc->args, i = 0; is_pair(x); x = cdr(x), i++) {
set_vector_elem(vec,i,car(x));
}
s_return(sc,vec);
}
case OP_MKVECTOR: { /* make-vector */
pointer fill=sc->NIL;
int len;
pointer vec;
len=ivalue(car(sc->args));
if(cdr(sc->args)!=sc->NIL) {
fill=cadr(sc->args);
}
vec=mk_vector(sc,len);
if(sc->no_memory) { s_return(sc, sc->sink); }
if(fill!=sc->NIL) {
fill_vector(vec,fill);
}
s_return(sc,vec);
}
case OP_VECLEN: /* vector-length */
s_return(sc,mk_integer(sc,ivalue(car(sc->args))));
case OP_VECREF: { /* vector-ref */
int index;
index=ivalue(cadr(sc->args));
if(index>=ivalue(car(sc->args))) {
Error_1(sc,"vector-ref: out of bounds:",cadr(sc->args));
}
s_return(sc,vector_elem(car(sc->args),index));
}
case OP_VECSET: { /* vector-set! */
int index;
if(is_immutable(car(sc->args))) {
Error_1(sc,"vector-set!: unable to alter immutable vector:",car(sc->args));
}
index=ivalue(cadr(sc->args));
if(index>=ivalue(car(sc->args))) {
Error_1(sc,"vector-set!: out of bounds:",cadr(sc->args));
}
set_vector_elem(car(sc->args),index,caddr(sc->args));
s_return(sc,car(sc->args));
}
default:
snprintf(sc->strbuff,STRBUFFSIZE,"%d: illegal operator", sc->op);
Error_0(sc,sc->strbuff);
}
return sc->T;
}
static int is_list(scheme *sc, pointer a)
{ return list_length(sc,a) >= 0; }
/* Result is:
proper list: length
circular list: -1
not even a pair: -2
dotted list: -2 minus length before dot
*/
int list_length(scheme *sc, pointer a) {
int i=0;
pointer slow, fast;
slow = fast = a;
while (1)
{
if (fast == sc->NIL)
return i;
if (!is_pair(fast))
return -2 - i;
fast = cdr(fast);
++i;
if (fast == sc->NIL)
return i;
if (!is_pair(fast))
return -2 - i;
++i;
fast = cdr(fast);
/* Safe because we would have already returned if `fast'
encountered a non-pair. */
slow = cdr(slow);
if (fast == slow)
{
/* the fast pointer has looped back around and caught up
with the slow pointer, hence the structure is circular,
not of finite length, and therefore not a list */
return -1;
}
}
}
static pointer opexe_3(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op) {
pointer x;
num v;
int (*comp_func)(num,num)=0;
switch (op) {
case OP_NOT: /* not */
s_retbool(is_false(car(sc->args)));
case OP_BOOLP: /* boolean? */
s_retbool(car(sc->args) == sc->F || car(sc->args) == sc->T);
case OP_EOFOBJP: /* boolean? */
s_retbool(car(sc->args) == sc->EOF_OBJ);
case OP_NULLP: /* null? */
s_retbool(car(sc->args) == sc->NIL);
case OP_NUMEQ: /* = */
case OP_LESS: /* < */
case OP_GRE: /* > */
case OP_LEQ: /* <= */
case OP_GEQ: /* >= */
switch(op) {
case OP_NUMEQ: comp_func=num_eq; break;
case OP_LESS: comp_func=num_lt; break;
case OP_GRE: comp_func=num_gt; break;
case OP_LEQ: comp_func=num_le; break;
case OP_GEQ: comp_func=num_ge; break;
default: assert (! "reached");
}
x=sc->args;
v=nvalue(car(x));
x=cdr(x);
for (; x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
if(!comp_func(v,nvalue(car(x)))) {
s_retbool(0);
}
v=nvalue(car(x));
}
s_retbool(1);
case OP_SYMBOLP: /* symbol? */
s_retbool(is_symbol(car(sc->args)));
case OP_NUMBERP: /* number? */
s_retbool(is_number(car(sc->args)));
case OP_STRINGP: /* string? */
s_retbool(is_string(car(sc->args)));
case OP_INTEGERP: /* integer? */
s_retbool(is_integer(car(sc->args)));
case OP_REALP: /* real? */
s_retbool(is_number(car(sc->args))); /* All numbers are real */
case OP_CHARP: /* char? */
s_retbool(is_character(car(sc->args)));
#if USE_CHAR_CLASSIFIERS
case OP_CHARAP: /* char-alphabetic? */
s_retbool(Cisalpha(ivalue(car(sc->args))));
case OP_CHARNP: /* char-numeric? */
s_retbool(Cisdigit(ivalue(car(sc->args))));
case OP_CHARWP: /* char-whitespace? */
s_retbool(Cisspace(ivalue(car(sc->args))));
case OP_CHARUP: /* char-upper-case? */
s_retbool(Cisupper(ivalue(car(sc->args))));
case OP_CHARLP: /* char-lower-case? */
s_retbool(Cislower(ivalue(car(sc->args))));
#endif
case OP_PORTP: /* port? */
s_retbool(is_port(car(sc->args)));
case OP_INPORTP: /* input-port? */
s_retbool(is_inport(car(sc->args)));
case OP_OUTPORTP: /* output-port? */
s_retbool(is_outport(car(sc->args)));
case OP_PROCP: /* procedure? */
/*--
* continuation should be procedure by the example
* (call-with-current-continuation procedure?) ==> #t
* in R^3 report sec. 6.9
*/
s_retbool(is_proc(car(sc->args)) || is_closure(car(sc->args))
|| is_continuation(car(sc->args)) || is_foreign(car(sc->args)));
case OP_PAIRP: /* pair? */
s_retbool(is_pair(car(sc->args)));
case OP_LISTP: /* list? */
s_retbool(list_length(sc,car(sc->args)) >= 0);
case OP_ENVP: /* environment? */
s_retbool(is_environment(car(sc->args)));
case OP_VECTORP: /* vector? */
s_retbool(is_vector(car(sc->args)));
case OP_EQ: /* eq? */
s_retbool(car(sc->args) == cadr(sc->args));
case OP_EQV: /* eqv? */
s_retbool(eqv(car(sc->args), cadr(sc->args)));
default:
snprintf(sc->strbuff,STRBUFFSIZE,"%d: illegal operator", sc->op);
Error_0(sc,sc->strbuff);
}
return sc->T;
}
static pointer opexe_4(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op) {
pointer x, y;
switch (op) {
case OP_FORCE: /* force */
sc->code = car(sc->args);
if (is_promise(sc->code)) {
/* Should change type to closure here */
s_save(sc, OP_SAVE_FORCED, sc->NIL, sc->code);
sc->args = sc->NIL;
s_goto(sc,OP_APPLY);
} else {
s_return(sc,sc->code);
}
case OP_SAVE_FORCED: /* Save forced value replacing promise */
memcpy(sc->code,sc->value,sizeof(struct cell));
s_return(sc,sc->value);
case OP_WRITE: /* write */
case OP_DISPLAY: /* display */
case OP_WRITE_CHAR: /* write-char */
if(is_pair(cdr(sc->args))) {
if(cadr(sc->args)!=sc->outport) {
x=cons(sc,sc->outport,sc->NIL);
s_save(sc,OP_SET_OUTPORT, x, sc->NIL);
sc->outport=cadr(sc->args);
}
}
sc->args = car(sc->args);
if(op==OP_WRITE) {
sc->print_flag = 1;
} else {
sc->print_flag = 0;
}
s_goto(sc,OP_P0LIST);
case OP_NEWLINE: /* newline */
if(is_pair(sc->args)) {
if(car(sc->args)!=sc->outport) {
x=cons(sc,sc->outport,sc->NIL);
s_save(sc,OP_SET_OUTPORT, x, sc->NIL);
sc->outport=car(sc->args);
}
}
putstr(sc, "\n");
s_return(sc,sc->T);
case OP_ERR0: /* error */
sc->retcode=-1;
if (!is_string(car(sc->args))) {
sc->args=cons(sc,mk_string(sc," -- "),sc->args);
setimmutable(car(sc->args));
}
putstr(sc, "Error: ");
putstr(sc, strvalue(car(sc->args)));
sc->args = cdr(sc->args);
s_goto(sc,OP_ERR1);
case OP_ERR1: /* error */
putstr(sc, " ");
if (sc->args != sc->NIL) {
s_save(sc,OP_ERR1, cdr(sc->args), sc->NIL);
sc->args = car(sc->args);
sc->print_flag = 1;
s_goto(sc,OP_P0LIST);
} else {
putstr(sc, "\n");
if(sc->interactive_repl) {
s_goto(sc,OP_T0LVL);
} else {
return sc->NIL;
}
}
case OP_REVERSE: /* reverse */
s_return(sc,reverse(sc, car(sc->args)));
case OP_LIST_STAR: /* list* */
s_return(sc,list_star(sc,sc->args));
case OP_APPEND: /* append */
x = sc->NIL;
y = sc->args;
if (y == x) {
s_return(sc, x);
}
/* cdr() in the while condition is not a typo. If car() */
/* is used (append '() 'a) will return the wrong result.*/
while (cdr(y) != sc->NIL) {
x = revappend(sc, x, car(y));
y = cdr(y);
if (x == sc->F) {
Error_0(sc, "non-list argument to append");
}
}
s_return(sc, reverse_in_place(sc, car(y), x));
#if USE_PLIST
case OP_PUT: /* put */
if (!hasprop(car(sc->args)) || !hasprop(cadr(sc->args))) {
Error_0(sc,"illegal use of put");
}
for (x = symprop(car(sc->args)), y = cadr(sc->args); x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
if (caar(x) == y) {
break;
}
}
if (x != sc->NIL)
cdar(x) = caddr(sc->args);
else
symprop(car(sc->args)) = cons(sc, cons(sc, y, caddr(sc->args)),
symprop(car(sc->args)));
s_return(sc,sc->T);
case OP_GET: /* get */
if (!hasprop(car(sc->args)) || !hasprop(cadr(sc->args))) {
Error_0(sc,"illegal use of get");
}
for (x = symprop(car(sc->args)), y = cadr(sc->args); x != sc->NIL; x = cdr(x)) {
if (caar(x) == y) {
break;
}
}
if (x != sc->NIL) {
s_return(sc,cdar(x));
} else {
s_return(sc,sc->NIL);
}
#endif /* USE_PLIST */
case OP_QUIT: /* quit */
if(is_pair(sc->args)) {
sc->retcode=ivalue(car(sc->args));
}
return (sc->NIL);
case OP_GC: /* gc */
gc(sc, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
s_return(sc,sc->T);
case OP_GCVERB: /* gc-verbose */
{ int was = sc->gc_verbose;
sc->gc_verbose = (car(sc->args) != sc->F);
s_retbool(was);
}
case OP_NEWSEGMENT: /* new-segment */
if (!is_pair(sc->args) || !is_number(car(sc->args))) {
Error_0(sc,"new-segment: argument must be a number");
}
alloc_cellseg(sc, (int) ivalue(car(sc->args)));
s_return(sc,sc->T);
case OP_OBLIST: /* oblist */
s_return(sc, oblist_all_symbols(sc));
case OP_CURR_INPORT: /* current-input-port */
s_return(sc,sc->inport);
case OP_CURR_OUTPORT: /* current-output-port */
s_return(sc,sc->outport);
case OP_OPEN_INFILE: /* open-input-file */
case OP_OPEN_OUTFILE: /* open-output-file */
case OP_OPEN_INOUTFILE: /* open-input-output-file */ {
int prop=0;
pointer p;
switch(op) {
case OP_OPEN_INFILE: prop=port_input; break;
case OP_OPEN_OUTFILE: prop=port_output; break;
case OP_OPEN_INOUTFILE: prop=port_input|port_output; break;
default: assert (! "reached");
}
p=port_from_filename(sc,strvalue(car(sc->args)),prop);
if(p==sc->NIL) {
s_return(sc,sc->F);
}
s_return(sc,p);
break;
default: assert (! "reached");
}
#if USE_STRING_PORTS
case OP_OPEN_INSTRING: /* open-input-string */
case OP_OPEN_INOUTSTRING: /* open-input-output-string */ {
int prop=0;
pointer p;
switch(op) {
case OP_OPEN_INSTRING: prop=port_input; break;
case OP_OPEN_INOUTSTRING: prop=port_input|port_output; break;
default: assert (! "reached");
}
p=port_from_string(sc, strvalue(car(sc->args)),
strvalue(car(sc->args))+strlength(car(sc->args)), prop);
if(p==sc->NIL) {
s_return(sc,sc->F);
}
s_return(sc,p);
}
case OP_OPEN_OUTSTRING: /* open-output-string */ {
pointer p;
if(car(sc->args)==sc->NIL) {
p=port_from_scratch(sc);
if(p==sc->NIL) {
s_return(sc,sc->F);
}
} else {
p=port_from_string(sc, strvalue(car(sc->args)),
strvalue(car(sc->args))+strlength(car(sc->args)),
port_output);
if(p==sc->NIL) {
s_return(sc,sc->F);
}
}
s_return(sc,p);
}
case OP_GET_OUTSTRING: /* get-output-string */ {
port *p;
if ((p=car(sc->args)->_object._port)->kind&port_string) {
off_t size;
char *str;
size=p->rep.string.curr-p->rep.string.start+1;
str=sc->malloc(size);
if(str != NULL) {
pointer s;
memcpy(str,p->rep.string.start,size-1);
str[size-1]='\0';
s=mk_string(sc,str);
sc->free(str);
s_return(sc,s);
}
}
s_return(sc,sc->F);
}
#endif
case OP_CLOSE_INPORT: /* close-input-port */
port_close(sc,car(sc->args),port_input);
s_return(sc,sc->T);
case OP_CLOSE_OUTPORT: /* close-output-port */
port_close(sc,car(sc->args),port_output);
s_return(sc,sc->T);
case OP_INT_ENV: /* interaction-environment */
s_return(sc,sc->global_env);
case OP_CURR_ENV: /* current-environment */
s_return(sc,sc->envir);
}
return sc->T;
}
static pointer opexe_5(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op) {
pointer x;
if(sc->nesting!=0) {
int n=sc->nesting;
sc->nesting=0;
sc->retcode=-1;
Error_1(sc,"unmatched parentheses:",mk_integer(sc,n));
}
switch (op) {
/* ========== reading part ========== */
case OP_READ:
if(!is_pair(sc->args)) {
s_goto(sc,OP_READ_INTERNAL);
}
if(!is_inport(car(sc->args))) {
Error_1(sc,"read: not an input port:",car(sc->args));
}
if(car(sc->args)==sc->inport) {
s_goto(sc,OP_READ_INTERNAL);
}
x=sc->inport;
sc->inport=car(sc->args);
x=cons(sc,x,sc->NIL);
s_save(sc,OP_SET_INPORT, x, sc->NIL);
s_goto(sc,OP_READ_INTERNAL);
case OP_READ_CHAR: /* read-char */
case OP_PEEK_CHAR: /* peek-char */ {
int c;
if(is_pair(sc->args)) {
if(car(sc->args)!=sc->inport) {
x=sc->inport;
x=cons(sc,x,sc->NIL);
s_save(sc,OP_SET_INPORT, x, sc->NIL);
sc->inport=car(sc->args);
}
}
c=inchar(sc);
if(c==EOF) {
s_return(sc,sc->EOF_OBJ);
}
if(sc->op==OP_PEEK_CHAR) {
backchar(sc,c);
}
s_return(sc,mk_character(sc,c));
}
case OP_CHAR_READY: /* char-ready? */ {
pointer p=sc->inport;
int res;
if(is_pair(sc->args)) {
p=car(sc->args);
}
res=p->_object._port->kind&port_string;
s_retbool(res);
}
case OP_SET_INPORT: /* set-input-port */
sc->inport=car(sc->args);
s_return(sc,sc->value);
case OP_SET_OUTPORT: /* set-output-port */
sc->outport=car(sc->args);
s_return(sc,sc->value);
case OP_RDSEXPR:
switch (sc->tok) {
case TOK_EOF:
s_return(sc,sc->EOF_OBJ);
/* NOTREACHED */
/*
* Commented out because we now skip comments in the scanner
*
case TOK_COMMENT: {
int c;
while ((c=inchar(sc)) != '\n' && c!=EOF)
;
sc->tok = token(sc);
s_goto(sc,OP_RDSEXPR);
}
*/
case TOK_VEC:
s_save(sc,OP_RDVEC,sc->NIL,sc->NIL);
/* fall through */
case TOK_LPAREN:
sc->tok = token(sc);
if (sc->tok == TOK_RPAREN) {
s_return(sc,sc->NIL);
} else if (sc->tok == TOK_DOT) {
Error_0(sc,"syntax error: illegal dot expression");
} else {
sc->nesting_stack[sc->file_i]++;
s_save(sc,OP_RDLIST, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
s_goto(sc,OP_RDSEXPR);
}
case TOK_QUOTE:
s_save(sc,OP_RDQUOTE, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
sc->tok = token(sc);
s_goto(sc,OP_RDSEXPR);
case TOK_BQUOTE:
sc->tok = token(sc);
if(sc->tok==TOK_VEC) {
s_save(sc,OP_RDQQUOTEVEC, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
sc->tok=TOK_LPAREN;
s_goto(sc,OP_RDSEXPR);
} else {
s_save(sc,OP_RDQQUOTE, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
}
s_goto(sc,OP_RDSEXPR);
case TOK_COMMA:
s_save(sc,OP_RDUNQUOTE, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
sc->tok = token(sc);
s_goto(sc,OP_RDSEXPR);
case TOK_ATMARK:
s_save(sc,OP_RDUQTSP, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
sc->tok = token(sc);
s_goto(sc,OP_RDSEXPR);
case TOK_ATOM:
s_return(sc,mk_atom(sc, readstr_upto(sc, DELIMITERS)));
case TOK_DQUOTE:
x=readstrexp(sc);
if(x==sc->F) {
Error_0(sc,"Error reading string");
}
setimmutable(x);
s_return(sc,x);
case TOK_SHARP: {
pointer f=find_slot_in_env(sc,sc->envir,sc->SHARP_HOOK,1);
if(f==sc->NIL) {
Error_0(sc,"undefined sharp expression");
} else {
sc->code=cons(sc,slot_value_in_env(f),sc->NIL);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL);
}
}
case TOK_SHARP_CONST:
if ((x = mk_sharp_const(sc, readstr_upto(sc, DELIMITERS))) == sc->NIL) {
Error_0(sc,"undefined sharp expression");
} else {
s_return(sc,x);
}
default:
Error_0(sc,"syntax error: illegal token");
}
break;
case OP_RDLIST: {
sc->args = cons(sc, sc->value, sc->args);
sc->tok = token(sc);
/* We now skip comments in the scanner
while (sc->tok == TOK_COMMENT) {
int c;
while ((c=inchar(sc)) != '\n' && c!=EOF)
;
sc->tok = token(sc);
}
*/
if (sc->tok == TOK_EOF)
{ s_return(sc,sc->EOF_OBJ); }
else if (sc->tok == TOK_RPAREN) {
int c = inchar(sc);
if (c != '\n')
backchar(sc,c);
#if SHOW_ERROR_LINE
else if (sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].kind & port_file)
sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].rep.stdio.curr_line++;
#endif
sc->nesting_stack[sc->file_i]--;
s_return(sc,reverse_in_place(sc, sc->NIL, sc->args));
} else if (sc->tok == TOK_DOT) {
s_save(sc,OP_RDDOT, sc->args, sc->NIL);
sc->tok = token(sc);
s_goto(sc,OP_RDSEXPR);
} else {
s_save(sc,OP_RDLIST, sc->args, sc->NIL);;
s_goto(sc,OP_RDSEXPR);
}
}
case OP_RDDOT:
if (token(sc) != TOK_RPAREN) {
Error_0(sc,"syntax error: illegal dot expression");
} else {
sc->nesting_stack[sc->file_i]--;
s_return(sc,reverse_in_place(sc, sc->value, sc->args));
}
case OP_RDQUOTE:
s_return(sc,cons(sc, sc->QUOTE, cons(sc, sc->value, sc->NIL)));
case OP_RDQQUOTE:
s_return(sc,cons(sc, sc->QQUOTE, cons(sc, sc->value, sc->NIL)));
case OP_RDQQUOTEVEC:
s_return(sc,cons(sc, mk_symbol(sc,"apply"),
cons(sc, mk_symbol(sc,"vector"),
cons(sc,cons(sc, sc->QQUOTE,
cons(sc,sc->value,sc->NIL)),
sc->NIL))));
case OP_RDUNQUOTE:
s_return(sc,cons(sc, sc->UNQUOTE, cons(sc, sc->value, sc->NIL)));
case OP_RDUQTSP:
s_return(sc,cons(sc, sc->UNQUOTESP, cons(sc, sc->value, sc->NIL)));
case OP_RDVEC:
/*sc->code=cons(sc,mk_proc(sc,OP_VECTOR),sc->value);
s_goto(sc,OP_EVAL); Cannot be quoted*/
/*x=cons(sc,mk_proc(sc,OP_VECTOR),sc->value);
s_return(sc,x); Cannot be part of pairs*/
/*sc->code=mk_proc(sc,OP_VECTOR);
sc->args=sc->value;
s_goto(sc,OP_APPLY);*/
sc->args=sc->value;
s_goto(sc,OP_VECTOR);
/* ========== printing part ========== */
case OP_P0LIST:
if(is_vector(sc->args)) {
putstr(sc,"#(");
sc->args=cons(sc,sc->args,mk_integer(sc,0));
s_goto(sc,OP_PVECFROM);
} else if(is_environment(sc->args)) {
putstr(sc,"#<ENVIRONMENT>");
s_return(sc,sc->T);
} else if (!is_pair(sc->args)) {
printatom(sc, sc->args, sc->print_flag);
s_return(sc,sc->T);
} else if (car(sc->args) == sc->QUOTE && ok_abbrev(cdr(sc->args))) {
putstr(sc, "'");
sc->args = cadr(sc->args);
s_goto(sc,OP_P0LIST);
} else if (car(sc->args) == sc->QQUOTE && ok_abbrev(cdr(sc->args))) {
putstr(sc, "`");
sc->args = cadr(sc->args);
s_goto(sc,OP_P0LIST);
} else if (car(sc->args) == sc->UNQUOTE && ok_abbrev(cdr(sc->args))) {
putstr(sc, ",");
sc->args = cadr(sc->args);
s_goto(sc,OP_P0LIST);
} else if (car(sc->args) == sc->UNQUOTESP && ok_abbrev(cdr(sc->args))) {
putstr(sc, ",@");
sc->args = cadr(sc->args);
s_goto(sc,OP_P0LIST);
} else {
putstr(sc, "(");
s_save(sc,OP_P1LIST, cdr(sc->args), sc->NIL);
sc->args = car(sc->args);
s_goto(sc,OP_P0LIST);
}
case OP_P1LIST:
if (is_pair(sc->args)) {
s_save(sc,OP_P1LIST, cdr(sc->args), sc->NIL);
putstr(sc, " ");
sc->args = car(sc->args);
s_goto(sc,OP_P0LIST);
} else if(is_vector(sc->args)) {
s_save(sc,OP_P1LIST,sc->NIL,sc->NIL);
putstr(sc, " . ");
s_goto(sc,OP_P0LIST);
} else {
if (sc->args != sc->NIL) {
putstr(sc, " . ");
printatom(sc, sc->args, sc->print_flag);
}
putstr(sc, ")");
s_return(sc,sc->T);
}
case OP_PVECFROM: {
int i=ivalue_unchecked(cdr(sc->args));
pointer vec=car(sc->args);
int len=ivalue_unchecked(vec);
if(i==len) {
putstr(sc,")");
s_return(sc,sc->T);
} else {
pointer elem=vector_elem(vec,i);
ivalue_unchecked(cdr(sc->args))=i+1;
s_save(sc,OP_PVECFROM, sc->args, sc->NIL);
sc->args=elem;
if (i > 0)
putstr(sc," ");
s_goto(sc,OP_P0LIST);
}
}
default:
snprintf(sc->strbuff,STRBUFFSIZE,"%d: illegal operator", sc->op);
Error_0(sc,sc->strbuff);
}
return sc->T;
}
static pointer opexe_6(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op) {
pointer x, y;
long v;
switch (op) {
case OP_LIST_LENGTH: /* length */ /* a.k */
v=list_length(sc,car(sc->args));
if(v<0) {
Error_1(sc,"length: not a list:",car(sc->args));
}
s_return(sc,mk_integer(sc, v));
case OP_ASSQ: /* assq */ /* a.k */
x = car(sc->args);
for (y = cadr(sc->args); is_pair(y); y = cdr(y)) {
if (!is_pair(car(y))) {
Error_0(sc,"unable to handle non pair element");
}
if (x == caar(y))
break;
}
if (is_pair(y)) {
s_return(sc,car(y));
} else {
s_return(sc,sc->F);
}
case OP_GET_CLOSURE: /* get-closure-code */ /* a.k */
sc->args = car(sc->args);
if (sc->args == sc->NIL) {
s_return(sc,sc->F);
} else if (is_closure(sc->args)) {
s_return(sc,cons(sc, sc->LAMBDA, closure_code(sc->value)));
} else if (is_macro(sc->args)) {
s_return(sc,cons(sc, sc->LAMBDA, closure_code(sc->value)));
} else {
s_return(sc,sc->F);
}
case OP_CLOSUREP: /* closure? */
/*
* Note, macro object is also a closure.
* Therefore, (closure? <#MACRO>) ==> #t
*/
s_retbool(is_closure(car(sc->args)));
case OP_MACROP: /* macro? */
s_retbool(is_macro(car(sc->args)));
default:
snprintf(sc->strbuff,STRBUFFSIZE,"%d: illegal operator", sc->op);
Error_0(sc,sc->strbuff);
}
return sc->T; /* NOTREACHED */
}
typedef pointer (*dispatch_func)(scheme *, enum scheme_opcodes);
typedef int (*test_predicate)(pointer);
static int is_any(pointer p) {
(void)p;
return 1;
}
static int is_nonneg(pointer p) {
return ivalue(p)>=0 && is_integer(p);
}
/* Correspond carefully with following defines! */
static struct {
test_predicate fct;
const char *kind;
} tests[]={
{0,0}, /* unused */
{is_any, 0},
{is_string, "string"},
{is_symbol, "symbol"},
{is_port, "port"},
{is_inport,"input port"},
{is_outport,"output port"},
{is_environment, "environment"},
{is_pair, "pair"},
{0, "pair or '()"},
{is_character, "character"},
{is_vector, "vector"},
{is_number, "number"},
{is_integer, "integer"},
{is_nonneg, "non-negative integer"}
};
#define TST_NONE 0
#define TST_ANY "\001"
#define TST_STRING "\002"
#define TST_SYMBOL "\003"
#define TST_PORT "\004"
#define TST_INPORT "\005"
#define TST_OUTPORT "\006"
#define TST_ENVIRONMENT "\007"
#define TST_PAIR "\010"
#define TST_LIST "\011"
#define TST_CHAR "\012"
#define TST_VECTOR "\013"
#define TST_NUMBER "\014"
#define TST_INTEGER "\015"
#define TST_NATURAL "\016"
typedef struct {
dispatch_func func;
char *name;
int min_arity;
int max_arity;
char *arg_tests_encoding;
} op_code_info;
#define INF_ARG 0xffff
static op_code_info dispatch_table[]= {
#define _OP_DEF(A,B,C,D,E,OP) {A,B,C,D,E},
#include "opdefines.h"
{ 0 }
};
static const char *procname(pointer x) {
int n=procnum(x);
const char *name=dispatch_table[n].name;
if(name==0) {
name="ILLEGAL!";
}
return name;
}
/* kernel of this interpreter */
static void Eval_Cycle(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op) {
sc->op = op;
for (;;) {
op_code_info *pcd=dispatch_table+sc->op;
if (pcd->name!=0) { /* if built-in function, check arguments */
char msg[STRBUFFSIZE];
int ok=1;
int n=list_length(sc,sc->args);
/* Check number of arguments */
if(n<pcd->min_arity) {
ok=0;
snprintf(msg, STRBUFFSIZE, "%s: needs%s %d argument(s)",
pcd->name,
pcd->min_arity==pcd->max_arity?"":" at least",
pcd->min_arity);
}
if(ok && n>pcd->max_arity) {
ok=0;
snprintf(msg, STRBUFFSIZE, "%s: needs%s %d argument(s)",
pcd->name,
pcd->min_arity==pcd->max_arity?"":" at most",
pcd->max_arity);
}
if(ok) {
if(pcd->arg_tests_encoding!=0) {
int i=0;
int j;
const char *t=pcd->arg_tests_encoding;
pointer arglist=sc->args;
do {
pointer arg=car(arglist);
j=(int)t[0];
if(j==TST_LIST[0]) {
if(arg!=sc->NIL && !is_pair(arg)) break;
} else {
if(!tests[j].fct(arg)) break;
}
if(t[1]!=0) {/* last test is replicated as necessary */
t++;
}
arglist=cdr(arglist);
i++;
} while(i<n);
if(i<n) {
ok=0;
snprintf(msg, STRBUFFSIZE, "%s: argument %d must be: %s, got: %s",
pcd->name,
i+1,
tests[j].kind,
type_to_string(type(car(arglist))));
}
}
}
if(!ok) {
if(_Error_1(sc,msg,0)==sc->NIL) {
return;
}
pcd=dispatch_table+sc->op;
}
}
ok_to_freely_gc(sc);
if (pcd->func(sc, (enum scheme_opcodes)sc->op) == sc->NIL) {
return;
}
if(sc->no_memory) {
fprintf(stderr,"No memory!\n");
exit(1);
}
}
}
/* ========== Initialization of internal keywords ========== */
static void assign_syntax(scheme *sc, char *name) {
pointer x;
x = oblist_add_by_name(sc, name);
typeflag(x) |= T_SYNTAX;
}
static void assign_proc(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op, char *name) {
pointer x, y;
x = mk_symbol(sc, name);
y = mk_proc(sc,op);
new_slot_in_env(sc, x, y);
}
static pointer mk_proc(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op) {
pointer y;
y = get_cell(sc, sc->NIL, sc->NIL);
typeflag(y) = (T_PROC | T_ATOM);
ivalue_unchecked(y) = (long) op;
set_num_integer(y);
return y;
}
/* Hard-coded for the given keywords. Remember to rewrite if more are added! */
static int syntaxnum(pointer p) {
const char *s=strvalue(car(p));
switch(strlength(car(p))) {
case 2:
if(s[0]=='i') return OP_IF0; /* if */
else return OP_OR0; /* or */
case 3:
if(s[0]=='a') return OP_AND0; /* and */
else return OP_LET0; /* let */
case 4:
switch(s[3]) {
case 'e': return OP_CASE0; /* case */
case 'd': return OP_COND0; /* cond */
case '*': return OP_LET0AST; /* let* */
default: return OP_SET0; /* set! */
}
case 5:
switch(s[2]) {
case 'g': return OP_BEGIN; /* begin */
case 'l': return OP_DELAY; /* delay */
case 'c': return OP_MACRO0; /* macro */
default: return OP_QUOTE; /* quote */
}
case 6:
switch(s[2]) {
case 'm': return OP_LAMBDA; /* lambda */
case 'f': return OP_DEF0; /* define */
default: return OP_LET0REC; /* letrec */
}
default:
return OP_C0STREAM; /* cons-stream */
}
}
/* initialization of TinyScheme */
#if USE_INTERFACE
INTERFACE static pointer s_cons(scheme *sc, pointer a, pointer b) {
return cons(sc,a,b);
}
INTERFACE static pointer s_immutable_cons(scheme *sc, pointer a, pointer b) {
return immutable_cons(sc,a,b);
}
static struct scheme_interface vtbl ={
scheme_define,
s_cons,
s_immutable_cons,
reserve_cells,
mk_integer,
mk_real,
mk_symbol,
gensym,
mk_string,
mk_counted_string,
mk_character,
mk_vector,
mk_foreign_func,
mk_foreign_object,
get_foreign_object_vtable,
get_foreign_object_data,
putstr,
putcharacter,
is_string,
string_value,
is_number,
nvalue,
ivalue,
rvalue,
is_integer,
is_real,
is_character,
charvalue,
is_list,
is_vector,
list_length,
ivalue,
fill_vector,
vector_elem,
set_vector_elem,
is_port,
is_pair,
pair_car,
pair_cdr,
set_car,
set_cdr,
is_symbol,
symname,
is_syntax,
is_proc,
is_foreign,
syntaxname,
is_closure,
is_macro,
closure_code,
closure_env,
is_continuation,
is_promise,
is_environment,
is_immutable,
setimmutable,
scheme_load_file,
scheme_load_string,
port_from_file
};
#endif
scheme *scheme_init_new() {
scheme *sc=(scheme*)malloc(sizeof(scheme));
if(!scheme_init(sc)) {
free(sc);
return 0;
} else {
return sc;
}
}
scheme *scheme_init_new_custom_alloc(func_alloc malloc, func_dealloc free) {
scheme *sc=(scheme*)malloc(sizeof(scheme));
if(!scheme_init_custom_alloc(sc,malloc,free)) {
free(sc);
return 0;
} else {
return sc;
}
}
int scheme_init(scheme *sc) {
return scheme_init_custom_alloc(sc,malloc,free);
}
int scheme_init_custom_alloc(scheme *sc, func_alloc malloc, func_dealloc free) {
int i, n=sizeof(dispatch_table)/sizeof(dispatch_table[0]);
pointer x;
num_zero.is_fixnum=1;
num_zero.value.ivalue=0;
num_one.is_fixnum=1;
num_one.value.ivalue=1;
#if USE_INTERFACE
sc->vptr=&vtbl;
#endif
sc->gensym_cnt=0;
sc->malloc=malloc;
sc->free=free;
sc->last_cell_seg = -1;
sc->sink = &sc->_sink;
sc->NIL = &sc->_NIL;
sc->T = &sc->_HASHT;
sc->F = &sc->_HASHF;
sc->EOF_OBJ=&sc->_EOF_OBJ;
sc->free_cell = &sc->_NIL;
sc->fcells = 0;
sc->no_memory=0;
sc->inport=sc->NIL;
sc->outport=sc->NIL;
sc->save_inport=sc->NIL;
sc->loadport=sc->NIL;
sc->nesting=0;
sc->interactive_repl=0;
sc->strbuff = sc->malloc(STRBUFFSIZE);
if (sc->strbuff == 0) {
sc->no_memory=1;
return 0;
}
sc->strbuff_size = STRBUFFSIZE;
if (alloc_cellseg(sc,FIRST_CELLSEGS) != FIRST_CELLSEGS) {
sc->no_memory=1;
return 0;
}
sc->gc_verbose = 0;
dump_stack_initialize(sc);
sc->code = sc->NIL;
sc->tracing=0;
/* init sc->NIL */
typeflag(sc->NIL) = (T_NIL | T_ATOM | MARK);
car(sc->NIL) = cdr(sc->NIL) = sc->NIL;
/* init T */
typeflag(sc->T) = (T_BOOLEAN | T_ATOM | MARK);
car(sc->T) = cdr(sc->T) = sc->T;
/* init F */
typeflag(sc->F) = (T_BOOLEAN | T_ATOM | MARK);
car(sc->F) = cdr(sc->F) = sc->F;
/* init EOF_OBJ */
typeflag(sc->EOF_OBJ) = (T_EOF_OBJ | T_ATOM | MARK);
car(sc->EOF_OBJ) = cdr(sc->EOF_OBJ) = sc->EOF_OBJ;
/* init sink */
typeflag(sc->sink) = (T_SINK | T_PAIR | MARK);
car(sc->sink) = sc->NIL;
/* init c_nest */
sc->c_nest = sc->NIL;
sc->oblist = oblist_initial_value(sc);
/* init global_env */
new_frame_in_env(sc, sc->NIL);
sc->global_env = sc->envir;
/* init else */
x = mk_symbol(sc,"else");
new_slot_in_env(sc, x, sc->T);
assign_syntax(sc, "lambda");
assign_syntax(sc, "quote");
assign_syntax(sc, "define");
assign_syntax(sc, "if");
assign_syntax(sc, "begin");
assign_syntax(sc, "set!");
assign_syntax(sc, "let");
assign_syntax(sc, "let*");
assign_syntax(sc, "letrec");
assign_syntax(sc, "cond");
assign_syntax(sc, "delay");
assign_syntax(sc, "and");
assign_syntax(sc, "or");
assign_syntax(sc, "cons-stream");
assign_syntax(sc, "macro");
assign_syntax(sc, "case");
for(i=0; i<n; i++) {
if(dispatch_table[i].name!=0) {
assign_proc(sc, (enum scheme_opcodes)i, dispatch_table[i].name);
}
}
/* initialization of global pointers to special symbols */
sc->LAMBDA = mk_symbol(sc, "lambda");
sc->QUOTE = mk_symbol(sc, "quote");
sc->QQUOTE = mk_symbol(sc, "quasiquote");
sc->UNQUOTE = mk_symbol(sc, "unquote");
sc->UNQUOTESP = mk_symbol(sc, "unquote-splicing");
sc->FEED_TO = mk_symbol(sc, "=>");
sc->COLON_HOOK = mk_symbol(sc,"*colon-hook*");
sc->ERROR_HOOK = mk_symbol(sc, "*error-hook*");
sc->SHARP_HOOK = mk_symbol(sc, "*sharp-hook*");
sc->COMPILE_HOOK = mk_symbol(sc, "*compile-hook*");
return !sc->no_memory;
}
void scheme_set_input_port_file(scheme *sc, FILE *fin) {
sc->inport=port_from_file(sc,fin,port_input);
}
void scheme_set_input_port_string(scheme *sc, char *start, char *past_the_end) {
sc->inport=port_from_string(sc,start,past_the_end,port_input);
}
void scheme_set_output_port_file(scheme *sc, FILE *fout) {
sc->outport=port_from_file(sc,fout,port_output);
}
void scheme_set_output_port_string(scheme *sc, char *start, char *past_the_end) {
sc->outport=port_from_string(sc,start,past_the_end,port_output);
}
void scheme_set_external_data(scheme *sc, void *p) {
sc->ext_data=p;
}
void scheme_deinit(scheme *sc) {
int i;
#if SHOW_ERROR_LINE
char *fname;
#endif
sc->oblist=sc->NIL;
sc->global_env=sc->NIL;
dump_stack_free(sc);
sc->envir=sc->NIL;
sc->code=sc->NIL;
sc->args=sc->NIL;
sc->value=sc->NIL;
if(is_port(sc->inport)) {
typeflag(sc->inport) = T_ATOM;
}
sc->inport=sc->NIL;
sc->outport=sc->NIL;
if(is_port(sc->save_inport)) {
typeflag(sc->save_inport) = T_ATOM;
}
sc->save_inport=sc->NIL;
if(is_port(sc->loadport)) {
typeflag(sc->loadport) = T_ATOM;
}
sc->loadport=sc->NIL;
sc->gc_verbose=0;
gc(sc,sc->NIL,sc->NIL);
for(i=0; i<=sc->last_cell_seg; i++) {
sc->free(sc->alloc_seg[i]);
}
sc->free(sc->strbuff);
#if SHOW_ERROR_LINE
for(i=0; i<=sc->file_i; i++) {
if (sc->load_stack[i].kind & port_file) {
fname = sc->load_stack[i].rep.stdio.filename;
if(fname)
sc->free(fname);
}
}
#endif
}
void scheme_load_file(scheme *sc, FILE *fin)
{ scheme_load_named_file(sc,fin,0); }
void scheme_load_named_file(scheme *sc, FILE *fin, const char *filename) {
dump_stack_reset(sc);
sc->envir = sc->global_env;
sc->file_i=0;
sc->load_stack[0].kind=port_input|port_file;
sc->load_stack[0].rep.stdio.file=fin;
sc->loadport=mk_port(sc,sc->load_stack);
sc->retcode=0;
if(fin==stdin) {
sc->interactive_repl=1;
}
#if SHOW_ERROR_LINE
sc->load_stack[0].rep.stdio.curr_line = 0;
if(fin!=stdin && filename)
sc->load_stack[0].rep.stdio.filename = store_string(sc, strlen(filename), filename, 0);
else
sc->load_stack[0].rep.stdio.filename = NULL;
#endif
sc->inport=sc->loadport;
sc->args = mk_integer(sc,sc->file_i);
Eval_Cycle(sc, OP_T0LVL);
typeflag(sc->loadport)=T_ATOM;
if(sc->retcode==0) {
sc->retcode=sc->nesting!=0;
}
#if SHOW_ERROR_LINE
sc->free(sc->load_stack[0].rep.stdio.filename);
sc->load_stack[0].rep.stdio.filename = NULL;
#endif
}
void scheme_load_string(scheme *sc, const char *cmd) {
dump_stack_reset(sc);
sc->envir = sc->global_env;
sc->file_i=0;
sc->load_stack[0].kind=port_input|port_string;
sc->load_stack[0].rep.string.start=(char*)cmd; /* This func respects const */
sc->load_stack[0].rep.string.past_the_end=(char*)cmd+strlen(cmd);
sc->load_stack[0].rep.string.curr=(char*)cmd;
sc->loadport=mk_port(sc,sc->load_stack);
sc->retcode=0;
sc->interactive_repl=0;
sc->inport=sc->loadport;
sc->args = mk_integer(sc,sc->file_i);
Eval_Cycle(sc, OP_T0LVL);
typeflag(sc->loadport)=T_ATOM;
if(sc->retcode==0) {
sc->retcode=sc->nesting!=0;
}
}
void scheme_define(scheme *sc, pointer envir, pointer symbol, pointer value) {
pointer x;
x=find_slot_in_env(sc,envir,symbol,0);
if (x != sc->NIL) {
set_slot_in_env(sc, x, value);
} else {
new_slot_spec_in_env(sc, envir, symbol, value);
}
}
#if !STANDALONE
void scheme_register_foreign_func(scheme * sc, scheme_registerable * sr)
{
scheme_define(sc,
sc->global_env,
mk_symbol(sc,sr->name),
mk_foreign_func(sc, sr->f));
}
void scheme_register_foreign_func_list(scheme * sc,
scheme_registerable * list,
int count)
{
int i;
for(i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
scheme_register_foreign_func(sc, list + i);
}
}
pointer scheme_apply0(scheme *sc, const char *procname)
{ return scheme_eval(sc, cons(sc,mk_symbol(sc,procname),sc->NIL)); }
void save_from_C_call(scheme *sc)
{
pointer saved_data =
cons(sc,
car(sc->sink),
cons(sc,
sc->envir,
sc->dump));
/* Push */
sc->c_nest = cons(sc, saved_data, sc->c_nest);
/* Truncate the dump stack so TS will return here when done, not
directly resume pre-C-call operations. */
dump_stack_reset(sc);
}
void restore_from_C_call(scheme *sc)
{
car(sc->sink) = caar(sc->c_nest);
sc->envir = cadar(sc->c_nest);
sc->dump = cdr(cdar(sc->c_nest));
/* Pop */
sc->c_nest = cdr(sc->c_nest);
}
/* "func" and "args" are assumed to be already eval'ed. */
pointer scheme_call(scheme *sc, pointer func, pointer args)
{
int old_repl = sc->interactive_repl;
sc->interactive_repl = 0;
save_from_C_call(sc);
sc->envir = sc->global_env;
sc->args = args;
sc->code = func;
sc->retcode = 0;
Eval_Cycle(sc, OP_APPLY);
sc->interactive_repl = old_repl;
restore_from_C_call(sc);
return sc->value;
}
pointer scheme_eval(scheme *sc, pointer obj)
{
int old_repl = sc->interactive_repl;
sc->interactive_repl = 0;
save_from_C_call(sc);
sc->args = sc->NIL;
sc->code = obj;
sc->retcode = 0;
Eval_Cycle(sc, OP_EVAL);
sc->interactive_repl = old_repl;
restore_from_C_call(sc);
return sc->value;
}
#endif
/* ========== Main ========== */
#if STANDALONE
#if defined(__APPLE__) && !defined (OSX)
int main()
{
extern MacTS_main(int argc, char **argv);
char** argv;
int argc = ccommand(&argv);
MacTS_main(argc,argv);
return 0;
}
int MacTS_main(int argc, char **argv) {
#else
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
#endif
scheme sc;
FILE *fin;
char *file_name=InitFile;
int retcode;
int isfile=1;
if(argc==1) {
printf(banner);
}
if(argc==2 && strcmp(argv[1],"-?")==0) {
printf("Usage: tinyscheme -?\n");
printf("or: tinyscheme [<file1> <file2> ...]\n");
printf("followed by\n");
printf(" -1 <file> [<arg1> <arg2> ...]\n");
printf(" -c <Scheme commands> [<arg1> <arg2> ...]\n");
printf("assuming that the executable is named tinyscheme.\n");
printf("Use - as filename for stdin.\n");
return 1;
}
if(!scheme_init(&sc)) {
fprintf(stderr,"Could not initialize!\n");
return 2;
}
scheme_set_input_port_file(&sc, stdin);
scheme_set_output_port_file(&sc, stdout);
#if USE_DL
scheme_define(&sc,sc.global_env,mk_symbol(&sc,"load-extension"),mk_foreign_func(&sc, scm_load_ext));
#endif
argv++;
if(access(file_name,0)!=0) {
char *p=getenv("TINYSCHEMEINIT");
if(p!=0) {
file_name=p;
}
}
do {
if(strcmp(file_name,"-")==0) {
fin=stdin;
} else if(strcmp(file_name,"-1")==0 || strcmp(file_name,"-c")==0) {
pointer args=sc.NIL;
isfile=file_name[1]=='1';
file_name=*argv++;
if(strcmp(file_name,"-")==0) {
fin=stdin;
} else if(isfile) {
fin=fopen(file_name,"r");
}
for(;*argv;argv++) {
pointer value=mk_string(&sc,*argv);
args=cons(&sc,value,args);
}
args=reverse_in_place(&sc,sc.NIL,args);
scheme_define(&sc,sc.global_env,mk_symbol(&sc,"*args*"),args);
} else {
fin=fopen(file_name,"r");
}
if(isfile && fin==0) {
fprintf(stderr,"Could not open file %s\n",file_name);
} else {
if(isfile) {
scheme_load_named_file(&sc,fin,file_name);
} else {
scheme_load_string(&sc,file_name);
}
if(!isfile || fin!=stdin) {
if(sc.retcode!=0) {
fprintf(stderr,"Errors encountered reading %s\n",file_name);
}
if(isfile) {
fclose(fin);
}
}
}
file_name=*argv++;
} while(file_name!=0);
if(argc==1) {
scheme_load_named_file(&sc,stdin,0);
}
retcode=sc.retcode;
scheme_deinit(&sc);
return retcode;
}
#endif
/*
Local variables:
c-file-style: "k&r"
End:
*/
diff --git a/tests/openpgp/gpgv-forged-keyring.scm b/tests/openpgp/gpgv-forged-keyring.scm
index 7094c96bb..ebe4e404e 100755
--- a/tests/openpgp/gpgv-forged-keyring.scm
+++ b/tests/openpgp/gpgv-forged-keyring.scm
@@ -1,67 +1,67 @@
#!/usr/bin/env gpgscm
;; Copyright (C) 2016 g10 Code GmbH
;;
;; This file is part of GnuPG.
;;
;; GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
;; it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
;; the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
;; (at your option) any later version.
;;
;; GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
;; but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
;; MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
;; GNU General Public License for more details.
;;
;; You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
;; along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
(load (with-path "defs.scm"))
(define msg_signed_asc "
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
This is an example text file to demonstrate a problem.
Using forged-keyring.gpg with signature cache, it looks like it is
signed by the following key:
Echo Test (demo key) <echo@example.net>
But actually not.
It is signed by a key (steve.biko@example.net) distributed as:
gnupg/tests/openpgp/samplekeys/rsa-rsa-sample-1.asc
in GnuPG.
The forged-keyring.gpg file is created by a key in
gnupg/tests/openpgp/pubdemo.asc
Replacing the raw key material packet by one of rsa-rsa-sample-1.asc.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2
iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJXp+5MAAoJEKpD8dzH/tG3bGMH/1idFLJAaMxkrq+JguvAboiN
tAA44IdAgJvAxtR5w5fgfed7PfsH70+tj54/ZTObt7rZDIlj/YBQ7XeCwd7/O5vx
W0QtjjAxMuAPH80rVv4JIoflxV/deD8YaV9EhPE+6W5G0Z8SYL9B2RzdBVMwJY9+
OZGJeKnUZ92Zg9jFr+H5gQNSeYdDHVDWYxr/xJUf0jYsZvAIBfB1mcSK1niiiVBv
GAcUC/I8g18a7pCS9Qf9iZflqxX4AXfocAGQqQAiG4744OCNhVa5q6TScqhaGUah
N1Glbw1OJfP1q+QFPMPKoCsTYmZpuugq2b5gV/eH0Abvk2pG4Fo/YTDPHhec7Jk=
=NnY/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
")
(for-each-p
"Checking that a signature by bad key should not be verified"
(lambda (armored-file)
(catch '()
(pipe:do
(pipe:echo (eval armored-file (current-environment)))
(pipe:spawn `(,@GPGV --keyring ,(in-srcdir "forged-keyring.gpg"))))
- (error "verification succeded but should not")))
+ (error "verification succeeded but should not")))
'(msg_signed_asc))
diff --git a/tests/openpgp/multisig.test b/tests/openpgp/multisig.test
index 9ad8676fd..9989be5cf 100755
--- a/tests/openpgp/multisig.test
+++ b/tests/openpgp/multisig.test
@@ -1,154 +1,154 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Copyright 2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,
# 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
# This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives
# unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without
# modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. This file is
# distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY
# WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the implied
# warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
# Check that gpg verifies only signatures where there is no ambiguity
# in the order of packets. Needs the Demo Keys Lima and Mike.
-# Note: We do son't support multiple signaturess anymore thus thsi test is
-# not really needed becuase verify could do the same. We keep it anyway.
+# Note: We do son't support multiple signaturess anymore thus this test is
+# not really needed because verify could do the same. We keep it anyway.
. $srcdir/defs.inc || exit 3
suspend_error
sig_1ls1ls_valid='
-----BEGIN PGP ARMORED FILE-----
kA0DAAIRN8q1H7eRA/gBrCdiBXRleHQxOogq9EkgYW0gc29ycnksIEkgY2FuJ3Qg
ZG8gdGhhdAqIPwMFADqIKvQ3yrUft5ED+BEC2joAoJaSaXOZEtSZqQ780HIXG77e
8PB7AJ4wCprmaFTO0fBaTcXDuEOBdAWnOZANAwACETfKtR+3kQP4AawnYgV0ZXh0
MTqIKvRJIGFtIHNvcnJ5LCBJIGNhbid0IGRvIHRoYXQKiD8DBQA6iCr0N8q1H7eR
A/gRAto6AKCWkmlzmRLUmakO/NByFxu+3vDwewCeMAqa5mhUztHwWk3Fw7hDgXQF
pzk=
=8jSC
-----END PGP ARMORED FILE-----
'
sig_ls_valid='
-----BEGIN PGP ARMORED FILE-----
rCdiBXRleHQxOogrS0kgYW0gc29ycnksIEkgY2FuJ3QgZG8gdGhhdAqIPwMFADqI
K0s3yrUft5ED+BECLQMAn2jZUNOpB4OuurSQkc2TRfg6ek02AJ9+oJS0frQ+yUsT
QDUFTH2PvZRxjw==
=J+lb
-----END PGP ARMORED FILE-----
'
sig_sl_valid='
-----BEGIN PGP ARMORED FILE-----
iD8DBQA6iCtLN8q1H7eRA/gRAi0DAJ9o2VDTqQeDrrq0kJHNk0X4OnpNNgCffqCU
tH60PslLE0A1BUx9j72UcY+sJ2IFdGV4dDE6iCtLSSBhbSBzb3JyeSwgSSBjYW4n
dCBkbyB0aGF0Cg==
=N9MP
-----END PGP ARMORED FILE-----
'
sig_11lss_valid_but_is_not='
-----BEGIN PGP ARMORED FILE-----
kA0DAAIRN8q1H7eRA/gAkA0DAAIRN8q1H7eRA/gBrCdiBXRleHQxOogyXUkgYW0g
c29ycnksIEkgY2FuJ3QgZG8gdGhhdAqIPwMFADqIMl03yrUft5ED+BECwQAAnRXT
mXjVd385oD38W80XuheWKTGcAJ9pZ6/flaKDfw+SLido7xaUHuhp5Yg/AwUAOogy
XTfKtR+3kQP4EQLBAACgnN0IP+NztE0aAc/DZ17yHWR9diwAniN0P01WmbgZJoZB
Q341WRXKS/at
=Ekrs
-----END PGP ARMORED FILE-----
'
sig_11lss11lss_valid_but_is_not='
-----BEGIN PGP ARMORED FILE-----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=P1Mu
-----END PGP ARMORED FILE-----
'
sig_ssl_valid_but_is_not='
-----BEGIN PGP ARMORED FILE-----
iD8DBQA6iCtLN8q1H7eRA/gRAi0DAJ9o2VDTqQeDrrq0kJHNk0X4OnpNNgCffqCU
tH60PslLE0A1BUx9j72UcY+IPwMFADqIK0s3yrUft5ED+BECLQMAn2jZUNOpB4Ou
urSQkc2TRfg6ek02AJ9+oJS0frQ+yUsTQDUFTH2PvZRxj6wnYgV0ZXh0MTqIK0tJ
IGFtIHNvcnJ5LCBJIGNhbid0IGRvIHRoYXQK
=Zven
-----END PGP ARMORED FILE-----
'
sig_1lsls_invalid='
-----BEGIN PGP ARMORED FILE-----
kA0DAAIRN8q1H7eRA/gBrCdiBXRleHQxOogq9EkgYW0gc29ycnksIEkgY2FuJ3Qg
ZG8gdGhhdAqIPwMFADqIKvQ3yrUft5ED+BEC2joAoJaSaXOZEtSZqQ780HIXG77e
8PB7AJ4wCprmaFTO0fBaTcXDuEOBdAWnOawnYgV0ZXh0MTqIK0tJIGFtIHNvcnJ5
LCBJIGNhbid0IGRvIHRoYXQKiD8DBQA6iCtLN8q1H7eRA/gRAi0DAJ9o2VDTqQeD
rrq0kJHNk0X4OnpNNgCffqCUtH60PslLE0A1BUx9j72UcY8=
=nkeu
-----END PGP ARMORED FILE-----
'
sig_lsls_invalid='
-----BEGIN PGP ARMORED FILE-----
rCdiBXRleHQxOogrS0kgYW0gc29ycnksIEkgY2FuJ3QgZG8gdGhhdAqIPwMFADqI
K0s3yrUft5ED+BECLQMAn2jZUNOpB4OuurSQkc2TRfg6ek02AJ9+oJS0frQ+yUsT
QDUFTH2PvZRxj6wnYgV0ZXh0MTqIK0tJIGFtIHNvcnJ5LCBJIGNhbid0IGRvIHRo
YXQKiD8DBQA6iCtLN8q1H7eRA/gRAi0DAJ9o2VDTqQeDrrq0kJHNk0X4OnpNNgCf
fqCUtH60PslLE0A1BUx9j72UcY8=
=BlZH
-----END PGP ARMORED FILE-----
'
sig_lss_invalid='
-----BEGIN PGP ARMORED FILE-----
rCdiBXRleHQxOogrS0kgYW0gc29ycnksIEkgY2FuJ3QgZG8gdGhhdAqIPwMFADqI
K0s3yrUft5ED+BECLQMAn2jZUNOpB4OuurSQkc2TRfg6ek02AJ9+oJS0frQ+yUsT
QDUFTH2PvZRxj4g/AwUAOogrSzfKtR+3kQP4EQItAwCfaNlQ06kHg666tJCRzZNF
+Dp6TTYAn36glLR+tD7JSxNANQVMfY+9lHGP
=jmt6
-----END PGP ARMORED FILE-----
'
sig_slsl_invalid='
-----BEGIN PGP ARMORED FILE-----
iD8DBQA6iCtLN8q1H7eRA/gRAi0DAJ9o2VDTqQeDrrq0kJHNk0X4OnpNNgCffqCU
tH60PslLE0A1BUx9j72UcY+sJ2IFdGV4dDE6iCtLSSBhbSBzb3JyeSwgSSBjYW4n
dCBkbyB0aGF0Cog/AwUAOogrSzfKtR+3kQP4EQItAwCfaNlQ06kHg666tJCRzZNF
+Dp6TTYAn36glLR+tD7JSxNANQVMfY+9lHGPrCdiBXRleHQxOogrS0kgYW0gc29y
cnksIEkgY2FuJ3QgZG8gdGhhdAo=
=phBF
-----END PGP ARMORED FILE-----
'
for i in sig_sl_valid ; do
eval "(IFS=; echo \"\$$i\")" | $GPG --dearmor >x
$GPG --verify x 2>/dev/null || error "valid is invalid ($i)"
linefeed
done
#for i in "$sig_11lss_valid_but_is_not" "$sig_11lss11lss_valid_but_is_not" \
# "$sig_ssl_valid_but_is_not"; do
# echo "$i" | $GPG --dearmor >x
# $GPG --verify <x 2>/dev/null || error "valid is invalid"
#done
for i in sig_1ls1ls_valid sig_ls_valid \
sig_1lsls_invalid sig_lsls_invalid \
sig_lss_invalid sig_slsl_invalid ; do
eval "(IFS=; echo \"\$$i\")" | $GPG --dearmor >x
$GPG --verify <x 2>/dev/null && error "invalid is valid ($i)"
linefeed
done
resume_error
diff --git a/tests/openpgp/verify.scm b/tests/openpgp/verify.scm
index 2f03027e7..e8aa7df35 100755
--- a/tests/openpgp/verify.scm
+++ b/tests/openpgp/verify.scm
@@ -1,347 +1,347 @@
#!/usr/bin/env gpgscm
;; Copyright (C) 2016 g10 Code GmbH
;;
;; This file is part of GnuPG.
;;
;; GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
;; it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
;; the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
;; (at your option) any later version.
;;
;; GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
;; but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
;; MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
;; GNU General Public License for more details.
;;
;; You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
;; along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
(load (with-path "defs.scm"))
;;
;; Two simple tests to check that verify fails for bad input data
;;
(for-each-p
"Checking bogus signature"
(lambda (char)
(lettmp (x)
(pipe:do
(pipe:spawn `(,(tool 'mktdata) --char ,char "64"))
(pipe:write-to x (logior O_WRONLY O_CREAT O_BINARY) #o600))
(if (= 0 (call `(,@GPG --verify ,x data-500)))
(error "no error code from verify"))))
'("0x2d" "0xca"))
;; A plain signed message created using
;; echo abc | gpg --homedir . --passphrase-fd 0 -u Alpha -z0 -sa msg
(define msg_ols_asc "
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
kA0DAAIRLXJ8x2hpdzQBrQEHYgNtc2dEDFJaSSB0aGluayB0aGF0IGFsbCByaWdo
dC10aGlua2luZyBwZW9wbGUgaW4gdGhpcyBjb3VudHJ5IGFyZSBzaWNrIGFuZAp0
aXJlZCBvZiBiZWluZyB0b2xkIHRoYXQgb3JkaW5hcnkgZGVjZW50IHBlb3BsZSBh
cmUgZmVkIHVwIGluIHRoaXMKY291bnRyeSB3aXRoIGJlaW5nIHNpY2sgYW5kIHRp
cmVkLiAgSSdtIGNlcnRhaW5seSBub3QuICBCdXQgSSdtCnNpY2sgYW5kIHRpcmVk
IG9mIGJlaW5nIHRvbGQgdGhhdCBJIGFtLgotIE1vbnR5IFB5dGhvbgqIPwMFAEQM
UlotcnzHaGl3NBECR4IAoJlEGTY+bHjD2HYuCixLQCmk01pbAKCIjkzLOAmkZNm0
D8luT78c/1x45Q==
=a29i
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
")
;; A plain signed message created using
;; echo abc | gpg --homedir . --passphrase-fd 0 -u Alpha -sa msg
(define msg_cols_asc "
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
owGbwMvMwCSoW1RzPCOz3IRxLSN7EnNucboLT6Cgp0JJRmZeNpBMLFFIzMlRKMpM
zyjRBQtm5qUrFKTmF+SkKmTmgdQVKyTnl+aVFFUqJBalKhRnJmcrJOalcJVkFqWm
KOSnKSSlgrSU5OekQMzLL0rJzEsEKk9JTU7NK4EZBtKcBtRRWgAzlwtmbnlmSQbU
GJjxCmDj9RQUPNVzFZJTi0oSM/NyKhXy8kuAYk6lJSBxLlTF2NziqZCYq8elq+Cb
n1dSqRBQWZKRn8fVYc/MygAKBljYCDIFiTDMT+9seu836Q+bevyHTJ0dzPNuvCjn
ZpgrwX38z58rJsfYDhwOSS4SkN/d6vUAAA==
=s6sY
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
")
;; A PGP 2 style message.
(define msg_sl_asc "
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
iD8DBQBEDFJaLXJ8x2hpdzQRAkeCAKCZRBk2Pmx4w9h2LgosS0AppNNaWwCgiI5M
yzgJpGTZtA/Jbk+/HP9ceOWtAQdiA21zZ0QMUlpJIHRoaW5rIHRoYXQgYWxsIHJp
Z2h0LXRoaW5raW5nIHBlb3BsZSBpbiB0aGlzIGNvdW50cnkgYXJlIHNpY2sgYW5k
CnRpcmVkIG9mIGJlaW5nIHRvbGQgdGhhdCBvcmRpbmFyeSBkZWNlbnQgcGVvcGxl
IGFyZSBmZWQgdXAgaW4gdGhpcwpjb3VudHJ5IHdpdGggYmVpbmcgc2ljayBhbmQg
dGlyZWQuICBJJ20gY2VydGFpbmx5IG5vdC4gIEJ1dCBJJ20Kc2ljayBhbmQgdGly
ZWQgb2YgYmVpbmcgdG9sZCB0aGF0IEkgYW0uCi0gTW9udHkgUHl0aG9uCg==
=0ukK
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
")
;; An OpenPGP message lacking the onepass packet. We used to accept
;; such messages but now consider them invalid.
(define bad_ls_asc "
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
rQEHYgNtc2dEDFJaSSB0aGluayB0aGF0IGFsbCByaWdodC10aGlua2luZyBwZW9w
bGUgaW4gdGhpcyBjb3VudHJ5IGFyZSBzaWNrIGFuZAp0aXJlZCBvZiBiZWluZyB0
b2xkIHRoYXQgb3JkaW5hcnkgZGVjZW50IHBlb3BsZSBhcmUgZmVkIHVwIGluIHRo
aXMKY291bnRyeSB3aXRoIGJlaW5nIHNpY2sgYW5kIHRpcmVkLiAgSSdtIGNlcnRh
aW5seSBub3QuICBCdXQgSSdtCnNpY2sgYW5kIHRpcmVkIG9mIGJlaW5nIHRvbGQg
dGhhdCBJIGFtLgotIE1vbnR5IFB5dGhvbgqIPwMFAEQMUlotcnzHaGl3NBECR4IA
oJlEGTY+bHjD2HYuCixLQCmk01pbAKCIjkzLOAmkZNm0D8luT78c/1x45Q==
=Mpiu
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
")
;; A signed message prefixed with an unsigned literal packet.
;; (fols = faked-literal-data, one-pass, literal-data, signature)
;; This should throw an error because running gpg to extract the
;; signed data will return both literal data packets
(define bad_fols_asc "
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----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=UNM4
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
")
;; A signed message suffixed with an unsigned literal packet.
;; (fols = faked-literal-data, one-pass, literal-data, signature)
;; This should throw an error because running gpg to extract the
;; signed data will return both literal data packets
(define bad_olsf_asc "
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----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=3gnG
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
")
;; Two standard signed messages in a row
(define msg_olsols_asc_multiple "
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----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=8nLN
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
")
;; A standard message with two signatures (actually the same signature
;; duplicated).
(define msg_oolss_asc "
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----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=KVw5
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
")
;; A standard message with two one-pass packet but only one signature
;; packet
(define bad_ools_asc "
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
kA0DAAIRLXJ8x2hpdzQBkA0DAAIRLXJ8x2hpdzQBrQEHYgNtc2dEDFJaSSB0aGlu
ayB0aGF0IGFsbCByaWdodC10aGlua2luZyBwZW9wbGUgaW4gdGhpcyBjb3VudHJ5
IGFyZSBzaWNrIGFuZAp0aXJlZCBvZiBiZWluZyB0b2xkIHRoYXQgb3JkaW5hcnkg
ZGVjZW50IHBlb3BsZSBhcmUgZmVkIHVwIGluIHRoaXMKY291bnRyeSB3aXRoIGJl
aW5nIHNpY2sgYW5kIHRpcmVkLiAgSSdtIGNlcnRhaW5seSBub3QuICBCdXQgSSdt
CnNpY2sgYW5kIHRpcmVkIG9mIGJlaW5nIHRvbGQgdGhhdCBJIGFtLgotIE1vbnR5
IFB5dGhvbgqIPwMFAEQMUlotcnzHaGl3NBECR4IAoJlEGTY+bHjD2HYuCixLQCmk
01pbAKCIjkzLOAmkZNm0D8luT78c/1x45Q==
=1/ix
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
")
;; Standard cleartext signature
(define msg_cls_asc "
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
I think that all right-thinking people in this country are sick and
tired of being told that ordinary decent people are fed up in this
country with being sick and tired. I'm certainly not. But I'm
sick and tired of being told that I am.
- - Monty Python
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iD8DBQFEDVp1LXJ8x2hpdzQRAplUAKCMfpG3GPw/TLN52tosgXP5lNECkwCfQhAa
emmev7IuQjWYrGF9Lxj+zj8=
=qJsY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
")
;; Cleartext signature with two signatures
(define msg_clss_asc "
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
What is the difference between a Turing machine and the modern computer?
It's the same as that between Hillary's ascent of Everest and the
establishment of a Hilton on its peak.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iD8DBQFEDVz6LXJ8x2hpdzQRAtkGAKCeMhNbHnh339fpjNj9owsYcC4zBwCfYO5l
2u+KEfXX0FKyk8SMzLjZ536IPwMFAUQNXPr+GAsdqeOwshEC2QYAoPOWAiQm0EF/
FWIAQUplk7JWbyRKAJ92ZJyJpWfzb0yc1s7MY65r2qEHrg==
=1Xvv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
")
;; Two clear text signatures in a row
(define msg_clsclss_asc_multiple (string-append msg_cls_asc msg_clss_asc))
;; An Ed25519 cleartext message with an R parameter of only 247 bits
;; so that the code to re-insert the stripped zero byte kicks in. The
;; S parameter has 253 bits but that does not strip a full byte.
(define msg_ed25519_rshort "
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
Dear Emily:
I'm still confused as to what groups articles should be posted
to. How about an example?
-- Still Confused
Dear Still:
Ok. Let's say you want to report that Gretzky has been traded from
the Oilers to the Kings. Now right away you might think rec.sport.hockey
would be enough. WRONG. Many more people might be interested. This is a
big trade! Since it's a NEWS article, it belongs in the news.* hierarchy
as well. If you are a news admin, or there is one on your machine, try
news.admin. If not, use news.misc.
The Oilers are probably interested in geology, so try sci.physics.
He is a big star, so post to sci.astro, and sci.space because they are also
interested in stars. Next, his name is Polish sounding. So post to
soc.culture.polish. But that group doesn't exist, so cross-post to
news.groups suggesting it should be created. With this many groups of
interest, your article will be quite bizarre, so post to talk.bizarre as
well. (And post to comp.std.mumps, since they hardly get any articles
there, and a \"comp\" group will propagate your article further.)
You may also find it is more fun to post the article once in each
group. If you list all the newsgroups in the same article, some newsreaders
will only show the the article to the reader once! Don't tolerate this.
-- Emily Postnews Answers Your Questions on Netiquette
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iJEEARYIADoWIQSyHeq0+HX7PaQvHR0TlWNoKgINCgUCV772DhwccGF0cmljZS5s
dW11bWJhQGV4YW1wbGUubmV0AAoJEBOVY2gqAg0KMAIA90EtUwAja0iJGpO91wyz
GLh9pS5v495V0r94yU6uUyUA/RT/StyPWe1wbnEZuacZnLbUV6Yy/aTXCVAlxf0r
TusO
=vQ3f
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
")
;; An Ed25519 cleartext message with an S parameter of only 248 bits
;; so that the code to re-insert the stripped zero byte kicks in.
(define msg_ed25519_sshort "
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
All articles that coruscate with resplendence are not truly auriferous.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iJEEARYIADoWIQSyHeq0+HX7PaQvHR0TlWNoKgINCgUCV771QhwccGF0cmljZS5s
dW11bWJhQGV4YW1wbGUubmV0AAoJEBOVY2gqAg0KHVEBAI66OPDYXKWO3r6SaFT+
uxmh8x4ZerW41vMA9gkJ4AEKAPjoe/Z7fDqo1lCptIFutFAGbfNxcm/53prfx2fT
GisM
=L7sk
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
")
;; Fixme: We need more tests with manipulated cleartext signatures.
;;
;; Now run the tests.
;;
(for-each-p
"Checking that a valid signature is verified as such"
(lambda (armored-file)
(pipe:do
(pipe:echo (eval armored-file (current-environment)))
(pipe:spawn `(,@GPG --verify))))
'(msg_ols_asc msg_cols_asc msg_sl_asc msg_oolss_asc msg_cls_asc msg_clss_asc))
(for-each-p
"Checking that a valid signature over multiple messages is verified as such"
(lambda (armored-file)
(pipe:do
(pipe:echo (eval armored-file (current-environment)))
(pipe:spawn `(,@GPG --verify --allow-multiple-messages)))
(catch '()
(pipe:do
(pipe:defer (lambda (sink)
(display armored-file (fdopen sink "w"))))
(pipe:spawn `(,@GPG --verify)))
- (error "verification succeded but should not")))
+ (error "verification succeeded but should not")))
'(msg_olsols_asc_multiple msg_clsclss_asc_multiple))
(for-each-p
"Checking that an invalid signature is verified as such"
(lambda (armored-file)
(catch '()
(pipe:do
(pipe:echo (eval armored-file (current-environment)))
(pipe:spawn `(,@GPG --verify)))
- (error "verification succeded but should not")))
+ (error "verification succeeded but should not")))
'(bad_ls_asc bad_fols_asc bad_olsf_asc bad_ools_asc))
;;; Need to import the ed25519 sample key used for
;;; the next two tests.
(call-check `(,@GPG --quiet --yes --import ,(in-srcdir key-file2)))
(for-each-p
"Checking that a valid Ed25519 signature is verified as such"
(lambda (armored-file)
(pipe:do
(pipe:echo (eval armored-file (current-environment)))
(pipe:spawn `(,@GPG --verify))))
'(msg_ed25519_rshort msg_ed25519_sshort))
diff --git a/tests/pkits/README b/tests/pkits/README
index 3fe238c6c..17f03eae4 100644
--- a/tests/pkits/README
+++ b/tests/pkits/README
@@ -1,37 +1,37 @@
tests/pkits/README
These are tests based on NIST's Public Key Interoperability Test Suite
(PKITS) as downloaded on 2006-05-02 from
http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/testing/x509paths.html .
README - this file.
-PKITS_data.tar.bz2 - the orginal ZIP file, repackaged as a tarball.
+PKITS_data.tar.bz2 - the original ZIP file, repackaged as a tarball.
Makefile.am - Part of our build system.
import-all-certs - Run a simple import test on all certifcates
validate-all-certs - Run an import and validate test on all certificates
signature-verification - PKITS test 4.1
validity-periods - PKITS test 4.2
verifying-name-chaining - PKITS test 4.3
basic-certificate-revocation - PKITS test 4.4
verifying-paths-self-issued - PKITS test 4.5
verifying-basic-constraints - PKITS test 4.6
key-usage - PKITS test 4.7
certificate-policies - PKITS test 4.8
require-explicit-policy - PKITS test 4.9
policy-mappings - PKITS test 4.10
inhibit-policy-mapping - PKITS test 4.11
inhibit-any-policy - PKITS test 4.12
name-constraints - PKITS test 4.13
distribution-points - PKITS test 4.14
delta-crls - PKITS test 4.15
private-certificate-extensions - PKITS test 4.16
The password for the p12 files is "password".
You may run the tests as usual with "make check" or after a plain make
in this directory you may run the tests individually. When run in
this way they will print easy to parse output to stdout. To run all
tests in this mode, use "make run-all-tests". All test scripts create
a log file with the suffix ".log" appended to the test script's name.
diff --git a/tools/applygnupgdefaults b/tools/applygnupgdefaults
index 2f298541b..54365ce34 100755
--- a/tools/applygnupgdefaults
+++ b/tools/applygnupgdefaults
@@ -1,81 +1,81 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Apply defaults from /etc/gnupg/gpg.conf to all users -*- sh -*-
#
# Copyright 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
#
# This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives
# unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without
# modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
#
# This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the
# implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
PGM=applygnupgdefaults
errorfile=
error () {
echo "$PGM: $*" >&2
[ -n "$errorfile" ] && echo "$PGM: $*" >>$errorfile
}
info () {
echo "$PGM: $*" >&2
}
if [ -n "$1" ]; then
echo "usage: $PGM" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Cleanup on exit
cleanup ()
{
[ -n "$errorfile" -a -f "$errorfile" ] && rm "$errorfile"
}
trap cleanup EXIT SIGINT SIGHUP SIGPIPE
errorfile=$(mktemp "/tmp/$PGM.log.XXXXXX")
[ -n "$errorfile" -a -f "$errorfile" ] || exit 2
# Check whether we can use getent
if getent --help </dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
cat_passwd='getent passwd'
else
cat_passwd='cat /etc/passwd'
info "please note that only users from /etc/passwd are processed"
fi
if [ ! -f /etc/gnupg/gpgconf.conf ]; then
error "global configuration file \`/etc/gnupg/gpgconf.conf' does not exist"
exit 1
fi
if [ ! -f /etc/shells ]; then
error "missing file \`/etc/shells'"
exit 1
fi
if [ $(id -u) -ne 0 ]; then
error "needs to be run as root"
exit 1
fi
${cat_passwd} \
| while IFS=: read -r user dmy_a uid dmy_c dmy_d home shell dmy_rest; do
# Process only entries with a valid login shell
grep </etc/shells "^$shell" 2>/dev/null >/dev/null || continue
- # and with an existant gnupg home directory
+ # and with an pre-existing gnupg home directory
[ -d "$home/.gnupg" ] || continue
# but not root
[ "${uid:-0}" -eq 0 ] && continue
info "running \"gpgconf --apply-defaults\" for $user"
if su -l -s /bin/sh \
-c 'gpgconf --apply-defaults && echo SUCCESS' $user \
| tail -1 | grep ^SUCCESS >/dev/null ; then
:
else
error "failed to update gnupg defaults for $user"
fi
done
[ "$(wc -c <$errorfile)" -gt 0 ] && exit 1
exit 0
diff --git a/tools/gpg-connect-agent.c b/tools/gpg-connect-agent.c
index 106a8eb61..d90365baf 100644
--- a/tools/gpg-connect-agent.c
+++ b/tools/gpg-connect-agent.c
@@ -1,2258 +1,2258 @@
/* gpg-connect-agent.c - Tool to connect to the agent.
* Copyright (C) 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2014 Werner Koch
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <assuan.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "i18n.h"
#include "../common/util.h"
#include "../common/asshelp.h"
#include "../common/sysutils.h"
#include "../common/membuf.h"
#include "../common/ttyio.h"
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
# include "../common/exechelp.h"
#endif
#include "../common/init.h"
#define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)
#define octdigitp(p) (*(p) >= '0' && *(p) <= '7')
/* Constants to identify the commands and options. */
enum cmd_and_opt_values
{
aNull = 0,
oQuiet = 'q',
oVerbose = 'v',
oRawSocket = 'S',
oTcpSocket = 'T',
oExec = 'E',
oRun = 'r',
oSubst = 's',
oNoVerbose = 500,
oHomedir,
oAgentProgram,
oDirmngrProgram,
oHex,
oDecode,
oNoExtConnect,
oDirmngr,
oUIServer,
oNoAutostart,
};
/* The list of commands and options. */
static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
ARGPARSE_group (301, N_("@\nOptions:\n ")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oVerbose, "verbose", N_("verbose")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oQuiet, "quiet", N_("quiet")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oHex, "hex", N_("print data out hex encoded")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDecode,"decode", N_("decode received data lines")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDirmngr,"dirmngr", N_("connect to the dirmngr")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oUIServer, "uiserver", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oRawSocket, "raw-socket",
N_("|NAME|connect to Assuan socket NAME")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oTcpSocket, "tcp-socket",
N_("|ADDR|connect to Assuan server at ADDR")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oExec, "exec",
N_("run the Assuan server given on the command line")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoExtConnect, "no-ext-connect",
N_("do not use extended connect mode")),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oRun, "run",
N_("|FILE|run commands from FILE on startup")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oSubst, "subst", N_("run /subst on startup")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutostart, "no-autostart", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoVerbose, "no-verbose", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oHomedir, "homedir", "@" ),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oAgentProgram, "agent-program", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oDirmngrProgram, "dirmngr-program", "@"),
ARGPARSE_end ()
};
/* We keep all global options in the structure OPT. */
struct
{
int verbose; /* Verbosity level. */
int quiet; /* Be extra quiet. */
int autostart; /* Start the server if not running. */
const char *homedir; /* Configuration directory name */
const char *agent_program; /* Value of --agent-program. */
const char *dirmngr_program; /* Value of --dirmngr-program. */
int hex; /* Print data lines in hex format. */
int decode; /* Decode received data lines. */
int use_dirmngr; /* Use the dirmngr and not gpg-agent. */
int use_uiserver; /* Use the standard UI server. */
const char *raw_socket; /* Name of socket to connect in raw mode. */
const char *tcp_socket; /* Name of server to connect in tcp mode. */
int exec; /* Run the pgm given on the command line. */
unsigned int connect_flags; /* Flags used for connecting. */
int enable_varsubst; /* Set if variable substitution is enabled. */
int trim_leading_spaces;
} opt;
/* Definitions for /definq commands and a global linked list with all
the definitions. */
struct definq_s
{
struct definq_s *next;
char *name; /* Name of inquiry or NULL for any name. */
int is_var; /* True if FILE is a variable name. */
int is_prog; /* True if FILE is a program to run. */
char file[1]; /* Name of file or program. */
};
typedef struct definq_s *definq_t;
static definq_t definq_list;
static definq_t *definq_list_tail = &definq_list;
/* Variable definitions and glovbal table. */
struct variable_s
{
struct variable_s *next;
char *value; /* Malloced value - always a string. */
char name[1]; /* Name of the variable. */
};
typedef struct variable_s *variable_t;
static variable_t variable_table;
/* To implement loops we store entire lines in a linked list. */
struct loopline_s
{
struct loopline_s *next;
char line[1];
};
typedef struct loopline_s *loopline_t;
/* This is used to store the pid of the server. */
static pid_t server_pid = (pid_t)(-1);
/* The current datasink file or NULL. */
static FILE *current_datasink;
/* A list of open file descriptors. */
static struct
{
int inuse;
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
HANDLE handle;
#endif
} open_fd_table[256];
/*-- local prototypes --*/
static char *substitute_line_copy (const char *buffer);
static int read_and_print_response (assuan_context_t ctx, int withhash,
int *r_goterr);
static assuan_context_t start_agent (void);
/* Print usage information and and provide strings for help. */
static const char *
my_strusage( int level )
{
const char *p;
switch (level)
{
case 11: p = "@GPG@-connect-agent (@GNUPG@)";
break;
case 13: p = VERSION; break;
case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break;
case 19: p = _("Please report bugs to <@EMAIL@>.\n"); break;
case 1:
case 40: p = _("Usage: @GPG@-connect-agent [options] (-h for help)");
break;
case 41:
p = _("Syntax: @GPG@-connect-agent [options]\n"
"Connect to a running agent and send commands\n");
break;
case 31: p = "\nHome: "; break;
case 32: p = gnupg_homedir (); break;
case 33: p = "\n"; break;
default: p = NULL; break;
}
return p;
}
/* Unescape STRING and returned the malloced result. The surrounding
quotes must already be removed from STRING. */
static char *
unescape_string (const char *string)
{
const unsigned char *s;
int esc;
size_t n;
char *buffer;
unsigned char *d;
n = 0;
for (s = (const unsigned char*)string, esc=0; *s; s++)
{
if (esc)
{
switch (*s)
{
case 'b':
case 't':
case 'v':
case 'n':
case 'f':
case 'r':
case '"':
case '\'':
case '\\': n++; break;
case 'x':
if (s[1] && s[2] && hexdigitp (s+1) && hexdigitp (s+2))
n++;
break;
default:
if (s[1] && s[2]
&& octdigitp (s) && octdigitp (s+1) && octdigitp (s+2))
n++;
break;
}
esc = 0;
}
else if (*s == '\\')
esc = 1;
else
n++;
}
buffer = xmalloc (n+1);
d = (unsigned char*)buffer;
for (s = (const unsigned char*)string, esc=0; *s; s++)
{
if (esc)
{
switch (*s)
{
case 'b': *d++ = '\b'; break;
case 't': *d++ = '\t'; break;
case 'v': *d++ = '\v'; break;
case 'n': *d++ = '\n'; break;
case 'f': *d++ = '\f'; break;
case 'r': *d++ = '\r'; break;
case '"': *d++ = '\"'; break;
case '\'': *d++ = '\''; break;
case '\\': *d++ = '\\'; break;
case 'x':
if (s[1] && s[2] && hexdigitp (s+1) && hexdigitp (s+2))
{
s++;
*d++ = xtoi_2 (s);
s++;
}
break;
default:
if (s[1] && s[2]
&& octdigitp (s) && octdigitp (s+1) && octdigitp (s+2))
{
*d++ = (atoi_1 (s)*64) + (atoi_1 (s+1)*8) + atoi_1 (s+2);
s += 2;
}
break;
}
esc = 0;
}
else if (*s == '\\')
esc = 1;
else
*d++ = *s;
}
*d = 0;
return buffer;
}
/* Do the percent unescaping and return a newly malloced string.
If WITH_PLUS is set '+' characters will be changed to space. */
static char *
unpercent_string (const char *string, int with_plus)
{
const unsigned char *s;
unsigned char *buffer, *p;
size_t n;
n = 0;
for (s=(const unsigned char *)string; *s; s++)
{
if (*s == '%' && s[1] && s[2])
{
s++;
n++;
s++;
}
else if (with_plus && *s == '+')
n++;
else
n++;
}
buffer = xmalloc (n+1);
p = buffer;
for (s=(const unsigned char *)string; *s; s++)
{
if (*s == '%' && s[1] && s[2])
{
s++;
*p++ = xtoi_2 (s);
s++;
}
else if (with_plus && *s == '+')
*p++ = ' ';
else
*p++ = *s;
}
*p = 0;
return (char*)buffer;
}
static const char *
set_var (const char *name, const char *value)
{
variable_t var;
for (var = variable_table; var; var = var->next)
if (!strcmp (var->name, name))
break;
if (!var)
{
var = xmalloc (sizeof *var + strlen (name));
var->value = NULL;
strcpy (var->name, name);
var->next = variable_table;
variable_table = var;
}
xfree (var->value);
var->value = value? xstrdup (value) : NULL;
return var->value;
}
static void
set_int_var (const char *name, int value)
{
char numbuf[35];
snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%d", value);
set_var (name, numbuf);
}
/* Return the value of a variable. That value is valid until a
variable of the name is changed. Return NULL if not found. Note
that envvars are copied to our variable list at the first access
and not at oprogram start. */
static const char *
get_var (const char *name)
{
variable_t var;
const char *s;
if (!*name)
return "";
for (var = variable_table; var; var = var->next)
if (!strcmp (var->name, name))
break;
if (!var && (s = getenv (name)))
return set_var (name, s);
if (!var || !var->value)
return NULL;
return var->value;
}
-/* Perform some simple arithmentic operations. Caller must release
+/* Perform some simple arithmetic operations. Caller must release
the return value. On error the return value is NULL. */
static char *
arithmetic_op (int operator, const char *operands)
{
long result, value;
char numbuf[35];
while ( spacep (operands) )
operands++;
if (!*operands)
return NULL;
result = strtol (operands, NULL, 0);
while (*operands && !spacep (operands) )
operands++;
if (operator == '!')
result = !result;
while (*operands)
{
while ( spacep (operands) )
operands++;
if (!*operands)
break;
value = strtol (operands, NULL, 0);
while (*operands && !spacep (operands) )
operands++;
switch (operator)
{
case '+': result += value; break;
case '-': result -= value; break;
case '*': result *= value; break;
case '/':
if (!value)
return NULL;
result /= value;
break;
case '%':
if (!value)
return NULL;
result %= value;
break;
case '!': result = !value; break;
case '|': result = result || value; break;
case '&': result = result && value; break;
default:
log_error ("unknown arithmetic operator '%c'\n", operator);
return NULL;
}
}
snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%ld", result);
return xstrdup (numbuf);
}
/* Extended version of get_var. This returns a malloced string and
understand the function syntax: "func args".
Defined functions are
get - Return a value described by the next argument:
cwd - The current working directory.
homedir - The gnupg homedir.
sysconfdir - GnuPG's system configuration directory.
bindir - GnuPG's binary directory.
libdir - GnuPG's library directory.
libexecdir - GnuPG's library directory for executable files.
datadir - GnuPG's data directory.
serverpid - The PID of the current server.
unescape ARGS
Remove C-style escapes from string. Note that "\0" and
"\x00" terminate the string implictly. Use "\x7d" to
represent the closing brace. The args start right after
the first space after the function name.
unpercent ARGS
unpercent+ ARGS
Remove percent style ecaping from string. Note that "%00
terminates the string implicitly. Use "%7d" to represetn
the closing brace. The args start right after the first
space after the function name. "unpercent+" also maps '+'
to space.
percent ARGS
percent+ ARGS
Escape the args using the percent style. Tabs, formfeeds,
linefeeds, carriage return, and the plus sign are also
escaped. "percent+" also maps spaces to plus characters.
errcode ARG
Assuming ARG is an integer, return the gpg-error code.
errsource ARG
Assuming ARG is an integer, return the gpg-error source.
errstring ARG
Assuming ARG is an integer return a formatted fpf error string.
Example: get_var_ext ("get sysconfdir") -> "/etc/gnupg"
*/
static char *
get_var_ext (const char *name)
{
static int recursion_count;
const char *s;
char *result;
char *p;
char *free_me = NULL;
int intvalue;
if (recursion_count > 50)
{
log_error ("variables nested too deeply\n");
return NULL;
}
recursion_count++;
free_me = opt.enable_varsubst? substitute_line_copy (name) : NULL;
if (free_me)
name = free_me;
for (s=name; *s && !spacep (s); s++)
;
if (!*s)
{
s = get_var (name);
result = s? xstrdup (s): NULL;
}
else if ( (s - name) == 3 && !strncmp (name, "get", 3))
{
while ( spacep (s) )
s++;
if (!strcmp (s, "cwd"))
{
result = gnupg_getcwd ();
if (!result)
log_error ("getcwd failed: %s\n", strerror (errno));
}
else if (!strcmp (s, "homedir"))
result = xstrdup (gnupg_homedir ());
else if (!strcmp (s, "sysconfdir"))
result = xstrdup (gnupg_sysconfdir ());
else if (!strcmp (s, "bindir"))
result = xstrdup (gnupg_bindir ());
else if (!strcmp (s, "libdir"))
result = xstrdup (gnupg_libdir ());
else if (!strcmp (s, "libexecdir"))
result = xstrdup (gnupg_libexecdir ());
else if (!strcmp (s, "datadir"))
result = xstrdup (gnupg_datadir ());
else if (!strcmp (s, "serverpid"))
result = xasprintf ("%d", (int)server_pid);
else
{
log_error ("invalid argument '%s' for variable function 'get'\n", s);
log_info ("valid are: cwd, "
"{home,bin,lib,libexec,data}dir, serverpid\n");
result = NULL;
}
}
else if ( (s - name) == 8 && !strncmp (name, "unescape", 8))
{
s++;
result = unescape_string (s);
}
else if ( (s - name) == 9 && !strncmp (name, "unpercent", 9))
{
s++;
result = unpercent_string (s, 0);
}
else if ( (s - name) == 10 && !strncmp (name, "unpercent+", 10))
{
s++;
result = unpercent_string (s, 1);
}
else if ( (s - name) == 7 && !strncmp (name, "percent", 7))
{
s++;
result = percent_escape (s, "+\t\r\n\f\v");
}
else if ( (s - name) == 8 && !strncmp (name, "percent+", 8))
{
s++;
result = percent_escape (s, "+\t\r\n\f\v");
for (p=result; *p; p++)
if (*p == ' ')
*p = '+';
}
else if ( (s - name) == 7 && !strncmp (name, "errcode", 7))
{
s++;
intvalue = (int)strtol (s, NULL, 0);
result = xasprintf ("%d", gpg_err_code (intvalue));
}
else if ( (s - name) == 9 && !strncmp (name, "errsource", 9))
{
s++;
intvalue = (int)strtol (s, NULL, 0);
result = xasprintf ("%d", gpg_err_source (intvalue));
}
else if ( (s - name) == 9 && !strncmp (name, "errstring", 9))
{
s++;
intvalue = (int)strtol (s, NULL, 0);
result = xasprintf ("%s <%s>",
gpg_strerror (intvalue), gpg_strsource (intvalue));
}
else if ( (s - name) == 1 && strchr ("+-*/%!|&", *name))
{
result = arithmetic_op (*name, s+1);
}
else
{
log_error ("unknown variable function '%.*s'\n", (int)(s-name), name);
result = NULL;
}
xfree (free_me);
recursion_count--;
return result;
}
/* Substitute variables in LINE and return a new allocated buffer if
required. The function might modify LINE if the expanded version
fits into it. */
static char *
substitute_line (char *buffer)
{
char *line = buffer;
char *p, *pend;
const char *value;
size_t valuelen, n;
char *result = NULL;
char *freeme = NULL;
while (*line)
{
p = strchr (line, '$');
if (!p)
return result; /* No more variables. */
if (p[1] == '$') /* Escaped dollar sign. */
{
memmove (p, p+1, strlen (p+1)+1);
line = p + 1;
continue;
}
if (p[1] == '{')
{
int count = 0;
for (pend=p+2; *pend; pend++)
{
if (*pend == '{')
count++;
else if (*pend == '}')
{
if (--count < 0)
break;
}
}
if (!*pend)
return result; /* Unclosed - don't substitute. */
}
else
{
for (pend=p+1; *pend && !spacep (pend) && *pend != '$' ; pend++)
;
}
if (p[1] == '{' && *pend == '}')
{
int save = *pend;
*pend = 0;
freeme = get_var_ext (p+2);
value = freeme;
*pend++ = save;
}
else if (*pend)
{
int save = *pend;
*pend = 0;
value = get_var (p+1);
*pend = save;
}
else
value = get_var (p+1);
if (!value)
value = "";
valuelen = strlen (value);
if (valuelen <= pend - p)
{
memcpy (p, value, valuelen);
p += valuelen;
n = pend - p;
if (n)
memmove (p, p+n, strlen (p+n)+1);
line = p;
}
else
{
char *src = result? result : buffer;
char *dst;
dst = xmalloc (strlen (src) + valuelen + 1);
n = p - src;
memcpy (dst, src, n);
memcpy (dst + n, value, valuelen);
n += valuelen;
strcpy (dst + n, pend);
line = dst + n;
xfree (result);
result = dst;
}
xfree (freeme);
freeme = NULL;
}
return result;
}
/* Same as substitute_line but do not modify BUFFER. */
static char *
substitute_line_copy (const char *buffer)
{
char *result, *p;
p = xstrdup (buffer?buffer:"");
result = substitute_line (p);
if (!result)
result = p;
else
xfree (p);
return result;
}
static void
assign_variable (char *line, int syslet)
{
char *name, *p, *tmp, *free_me, *buffer;
/* Get the name. */
name = line;
for (p=name; *p && !spacep (p); p++)
;
if (*p)
*p++ = 0;
while (spacep (p))
p++;
if (!*p)
set_var (name, NULL); /* Remove variable. */
else if (syslet)
{
free_me = opt.enable_varsubst? substitute_line_copy (p) : NULL;
if (free_me)
p = free_me;
buffer = xmalloc (4 + strlen (p) + 1);
strcpy (stpcpy (buffer, "get "), p);
tmp = get_var_ext (buffer);
xfree (buffer);
set_var (name, tmp);
xfree (tmp);
xfree (free_me);
}
else
{
tmp = opt.enable_varsubst? substitute_line_copy (p) : NULL;
if (tmp)
{
set_var (name, tmp);
xfree (tmp);
}
else
set_var (name, p);
}
}
static void
show_variables (void)
{
variable_t var;
for (var = variable_table; var; var = var->next)
if (var->value)
printf ("%-20s %s\n", var->name, var->value);
}
/* Store an inquire response pattern. Note, that this function may
change the content of LINE. We assume that leading white spaces
are already removed. */
static void
add_definq (char *line, int is_var, int is_prog)
{
definq_t d;
char *name, *p;
/* Get name. */
name = line;
for (p=name; *p && !spacep (p); p++)
;
if (*p)
*p++ = 0;
while (spacep (p))
p++;
d = xmalloc (sizeof *d + strlen (p) );
strcpy (d->file, p);
d->is_var = is_var;
d->is_prog = is_prog;
if ( !strcmp (name, "*"))
d->name = NULL;
else
d->name = xstrdup (name);
d->next = NULL;
*definq_list_tail = d;
definq_list_tail = &d->next;
}
/* Show all inquiry defintions. */
static void
show_definq (void)
{
definq_t d;
for (d=definq_list; d; d = d->next)
if (d->name)
printf ("%-20s %c %s\n",
d->name, d->is_var? 'v' : d->is_prog? 'p':'f', d->file);
for (d=definq_list; d; d = d->next)
if (!d->name)
printf ("%-20s %c %s\n", "*",
d->is_var? 'v': d->is_prog? 'p':'f', d->file);
}
/* Clear all inquiry definitions. */
static void
clear_definq (void)
{
while (definq_list)
{
definq_t tmp = definq_list->next;
xfree (definq_list->name);
xfree (definq_list);
definq_list = tmp;
}
definq_list_tail = &definq_list;
}
static void
do_sendfd (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
FILE *fp;
char *name, *mode, *p;
int rc, fd;
/* Get file name. */
name = line;
for (p=name; *p && !spacep (p); p++)
;
if (*p)
*p++ = 0;
while (spacep (p))
p++;
/* Get mode. */
mode = p;
if (!*mode)
mode = "r";
else
{
for (p=mode; *p && !spacep (p); p++)
;
if (*p)
*p++ = 0;
}
/* Open and send. */
fp = fopen (name, mode);
if (!fp)
{
log_error ("can't open '%s' in \"%s\" mode: %s\n",
name, mode, strerror (errno));
return;
}
fd = fileno (fp);
if (opt.verbose)
log_error ("file '%s' opened in \"%s\" mode, fd=%d\n",
name, mode, fd);
rc = assuan_sendfd (ctx, INT2FD (fd) );
if (rc)
log_error ("sending descriptor %d failed: %s\n", fd, gpg_strerror (rc));
fclose (fp);
}
static void
do_recvfd (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
(void)ctx;
(void)line;
log_info ("This command has not yet been implemented\n");
}
static void
do_open (char *line)
{
FILE *fp;
char *varname, *name, *mode, *p;
int fd;
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
if (server_pid == (pid_t)(-1))
{
log_error ("the pid of the server is unknown\n");
log_info ("use command \"/serverpid\" first\n");
return;
}
#endif
/* Get variable name. */
varname = line;
for (p=varname; *p && !spacep (p); p++)
;
if (*p)
*p++ = 0;
while (spacep (p))
p++;
/* Get file name. */
name = p;
for (p=name; *p && !spacep (p); p++)
;
if (*p)
*p++ = 0;
while (spacep (p))
p++;
/* Get mode. */
mode = p;
if (!*mode)
mode = "r";
else
{
for (p=mode; *p && !spacep (p); p++)
;
if (*p)
*p++ = 0;
}
/* Open and send. */
fp = fopen (name, mode);
if (!fp)
{
log_error ("can't open '%s' in \"%s\" mode: %s\n",
name, mode, strerror (errno));
return;
}
fd = fileno (fp);
if (fd >= 0 && fd < DIM (open_fd_table))
{
open_fd_table[fd].inuse = 1;
#ifdef HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM
# warning fixme: implement our pipe emulation.
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_W32_SYSTEM) && !defined(HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM)
{
HANDLE prochandle, handle, newhandle;
handle = (void*)_get_osfhandle (fd);
prochandle = OpenProcess (PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE, server_pid);
if (!prochandle)
{
log_error ("failed to open the server process\n");
close (fd);
return;
}
if (!DuplicateHandle (GetCurrentProcess(), handle,
prochandle, &newhandle, 0,
TRUE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS ))
{
log_error ("failed to duplicate the handle\n");
close (fd);
CloseHandle (prochandle);
return;
}
CloseHandle (prochandle);
open_fd_table[fd].handle = newhandle;
}
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("file '%s' opened in \"%s\" mode, fd=%d (libc=%d)\n",
name, mode, (int)open_fd_table[fd].handle, fd);
set_int_var (varname, (int)open_fd_table[fd].handle);
#else
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("file '%s' opened in \"%s\" mode, fd=%d\n",
name, mode, fd);
set_int_var (varname, fd);
#endif
}
else
{
log_error ("can't put fd %d into table\n", fd);
close (fd);
}
}
static void
do_close (char *line)
{
int fd = atoi (line);
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
int i;
for (i=0; i < DIM (open_fd_table); i++)
if ( open_fd_table[i].inuse && open_fd_table[i].handle == (void*)fd)
break;
if (i < DIM (open_fd_table))
fd = i;
else
{
log_error ("given fd (system handle) has not been opened\n");
return;
}
#endif
if (fd < 0 || fd >= DIM (open_fd_table))
{
log_error ("invalid fd\n");
return;
}
if (!open_fd_table[fd].inuse)
{
log_error ("given fd has not been opened\n");
return;
}
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
CloseHandle (open_fd_table[fd].handle); /* Close duped handle. */
#endif
close (fd);
open_fd_table[fd].inuse = 0;
}
static void
do_showopen (void)
{
int i;
for (i=0; i < DIM (open_fd_table); i++)
if (open_fd_table[i].inuse)
{
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
printf ("%-15d (libc=%d)\n", (int)open_fd_table[i].handle, i);
#else
printf ("%-15d\n", i);
#endif
}
}
static gpg_error_t
getinfo_pid_cb (void *opaque, const void *buffer, size_t length)
{
membuf_t *mb = opaque;
put_membuf (mb, buffer, length);
return 0;
}
/* Get the pid of the server and store it locally. */
static void
do_serverpid (assuan_context_t ctx)
{
int rc;
membuf_t mb;
char *buffer;
init_membuf (&mb, 100);
rc = assuan_transact (ctx, "GETINFO pid", getinfo_pid_cb, &mb,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
put_membuf (&mb, "", 1);
buffer = get_membuf (&mb, NULL);
if (rc || !buffer)
log_error ("command \"%s\" failed: %s\n",
"GETINFO pid", gpg_strerror (rc));
else
{
server_pid = (pid_t)strtoul (buffer, NULL, 10);
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("server's PID is %lu\n", (unsigned long)server_pid);
}
xfree (buffer);
}
/* Return true if the command is either "HELP" or "SCD HELP". */
static int
help_cmd_p (const char *line)
{
if (!ascii_strncasecmp (line, "SCD", 3)
&& (spacep (line+3) || !line[3]))
{
for (line += 3; spacep (line); line++)
;
}
return (!ascii_strncasecmp (line, "HELP", 4)
&& (spacep (line+4) || !line[4]));
}
/* gpg-connect-agent's entry point. */
int
main (int argc, char **argv)
{
ARGPARSE_ARGS pargs;
int no_more_options = 0;
assuan_context_t ctx;
char *line, *p;
char *tmpline;
size_t linesize;
int rc;
int cmderr;
const char *opt_run = NULL;
FILE *script_fp = NULL;
int use_tty, keep_line;
struct {
int collecting;
loopline_t head;
loopline_t *tail;
loopline_t current;
unsigned int nestlevel;
int oneshot;
char *condition;
} loopstack[20];
int loopidx;
char **cmdline_commands = NULL;
early_system_init ();
gnupg_rl_initialize ();
set_strusage (my_strusage);
log_set_prefix ("gpg-connect-agent", GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PREFIX);
/* Make sure that our subsystems are ready. */
i18n_init();
init_common_subsystems (&argc, &argv);
assuan_set_gpg_err_source (0);
opt.autostart = 1;
opt.connect_flags = 1;
/* Parse the command line. */
pargs.argc = &argc;
pargs.argv = &argv;
pargs.flags = 1; /* Do not remove the args. */
while (!no_more_options && optfile_parse (NULL, NULL, NULL, &pargs, opts))
{
switch (pargs.r_opt)
{
case oQuiet: opt.quiet = 1; break;
case oVerbose: opt.verbose++; break;
case oNoVerbose: opt.verbose = 0; break;
case oHomedir: gnupg_set_homedir (pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oAgentProgram: opt.agent_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oDirmngrProgram: opt.dirmngr_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oNoAutostart: opt.autostart = 0; break;
case oHex: opt.hex = 1; break;
case oDecode: opt.decode = 1; break;
case oDirmngr: opt.use_dirmngr = 1; break;
case oUIServer: opt.use_uiserver = 1; break;
case oRawSocket: opt.raw_socket = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oTcpSocket: opt.tcp_socket = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oExec: opt.exec = 1; break;
case oNoExtConnect: opt.connect_flags &= ~(1); break;
case oRun: opt_run = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oSubst:
opt.enable_varsubst = 1;
opt.trim_leading_spaces = 1;
break;
default: pargs.err = 2; break;
}
}
if (log_get_errorcount (0))
exit (2);
/* --uiserver is a shortcut for a specific raw socket. This comes
in particular handy on Windows. */
if (opt.use_uiserver)
{
opt.raw_socket = make_absfilename (gnupg_homedir (), "S.uiserver", NULL);
}
/* Print a warning if an argument looks like an option. */
if (!opt.quiet && !(pargs.flags & ARGPARSE_FLAG_STOP_SEEN))
{
int i;
for (i=0; i < argc; i++)
if (argv[i][0] == '-' && argv[i][1] == '-')
log_info (_("Note: '%s' is not considered an option\n"), argv[i]);
}
use_tty = (gnupg_isatty (fileno (stdin)) && gnupg_isatty (fileno (stdout)));
if (opt.exec)
{
if (!argc)
{
log_error (_("option \"%s\" requires a program "
"and optional arguments\n"), "--exec" );
exit (1);
}
}
else if (argc)
cmdline_commands = argv;
if (opt.exec && opt.raw_socket)
{
opt.raw_socket = NULL;
log_info (_("option \"%s\" ignored due to \"%s\"\n"),
"--raw-socket", "--exec");
}
if (opt.exec && opt.tcp_socket)
{
opt.tcp_socket = NULL;
log_info (_("option \"%s\" ignored due to \"%s\"\n"),
"--tcp-socket", "--exec");
}
if (opt.tcp_socket && opt.raw_socket)
{
opt.tcp_socket = NULL;
log_info (_("option \"%s\" ignored due to \"%s\"\n"),
"--tcp-socket", "--raw-socket");
}
if (opt_run && !(script_fp = fopen (opt_run, "r")))
{
log_error ("cannot open run file '%s': %s\n",
opt_run, strerror (errno));
exit (1);
}
if (opt.exec)
{
assuan_fd_t no_close[3];
no_close[0] = assuan_fd_from_posix_fd (es_fileno (es_stderr));
no_close[1] = assuan_fd_from_posix_fd (log_get_fd ());
no_close[2] = ASSUAN_INVALID_FD;
rc = assuan_new (&ctx);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("assuan_new failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
exit (1);
}
rc = assuan_pipe_connect
(ctx, *argv, (const char **)argv, no_close, NULL, NULL,
(opt.connect_flags & 1) ? ASSUAN_PIPE_CONNECT_FDPASSING : 0);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("assuan_pipe_connect_ext failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
exit (1);
}
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("server '%s' started\n", *argv);
}
else if (opt.raw_socket)
{
rc = assuan_new (&ctx);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("assuan_new failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
exit (1);
}
rc = assuan_socket_connect
(ctx, opt.raw_socket, 0,
(opt.connect_flags & 1) ? ASSUAN_SOCKET_CONNECT_FDPASSING : 0);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("can't connect to socket '%s': %s\n",
opt.raw_socket, gpg_strerror (rc));
exit (1);
}
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("connection to socket '%s' established\n", opt.raw_socket);
}
else if (opt.tcp_socket)
{
char *url;
url = xstrconcat ("assuan://", opt.tcp_socket, NULL);
rc = assuan_new (&ctx);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("assuan_new failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
exit (1);
}
rc = assuan_socket_connect (ctx, opt.tcp_socket, 0, 0);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("can't connect to server '%s': %s\n",
opt.tcp_socket, gpg_strerror (rc));
exit (1);
}
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("connection to socket '%s' established\n", url);
xfree (url);
}
else
ctx = start_agent ();
/* See whether there is a line pending from the server (in case
assuan did not run the initial handshaking). */
if (assuan_pending_line (ctx))
{
rc = read_and_print_response (ctx, 0, &cmderr);
if (rc)
log_info (_("receiving line failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc) );
}
for (loopidx=0; loopidx < DIM (loopstack); loopidx++)
loopstack[loopidx].collecting = 0;
loopidx = -1;
line = NULL;
linesize = 0;
keep_line = 1;
for (;;)
{
int n;
size_t maxlength = 2048;
assert (loopidx < (int)DIM (loopstack));
if (loopidx >= 0 && loopstack[loopidx].current)
{
keep_line = 0;
xfree (line);
line = xstrdup (loopstack[loopidx].current->line);
n = strlen (line);
/* Never go beyond of the final /end. */
if (loopstack[loopidx].current->next)
loopstack[loopidx].current = loopstack[loopidx].current->next;
else if (!strncmp (line, "/end", 4) && (!line[4]||spacep(line+4)))
;
else
log_fatal ("/end command vanished\n");
}
else if (cmdline_commands && *cmdline_commands && !script_fp)
{
keep_line = 0;
xfree (line);
line = xstrdup (*cmdline_commands);
cmdline_commands++;
n = strlen (line);
if (n >= maxlength)
maxlength = 0;
}
else if (use_tty && !script_fp)
{
keep_line = 0;
xfree (line);
line = tty_get ("> ");
n = strlen (line);
if (n==1 && *line == CONTROL_D)
n = 0;
if (n >= maxlength)
maxlength = 0;
}
else
{
if (!keep_line)
{
xfree (line);
line = NULL;
linesize = 0;
keep_line = 1;
}
n = read_line (script_fp? script_fp:stdin,
&line, &linesize, &maxlength);
}
if (n < 0)
{
log_error (_("error reading input: %s\n"), strerror (errno));
if (script_fp)
{
fclose (script_fp);
script_fp = NULL;
log_error ("stopping script execution\n");
continue;
}
exit (1);
}
if (!n)
{
/* EOF */
if (script_fp)
{
fclose (script_fp);
script_fp = NULL;
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("end of script\n");
continue;
}
break;
}
if (!maxlength)
{
log_error (_("line too long - skipped\n"));
continue;
}
if (memchr (line, 0, n))
log_info (_("line shortened due to embedded Nul character\n"));
if (line[n-1] == '\n')
line[n-1] = 0;
if (opt.trim_leading_spaces)
{
const char *s = line;
while (spacep (s))
s++;
if (s != line)
{
for (p=line; *s;)
*p++ = *s++;
*p = 0;
n = p - line;
}
}
if (loopidx+1 >= 0 && loopstack[loopidx+1].collecting)
{
loopline_t ll;
ll = xmalloc (sizeof *ll + strlen (line));
ll->next = NULL;
strcpy (ll->line, line);
*loopstack[loopidx+1].tail = ll;
loopstack[loopidx+1].tail = &ll->next;
if (!strncmp (line, "/end", 4) && (!line[4]||spacep(line+4)))
loopstack[loopidx+1].nestlevel--;
else if (!strncmp (line, "/while", 6) && (!line[6]||spacep(line+6)))
loopstack[loopidx+1].nestlevel++;
if (loopstack[loopidx+1].nestlevel)
continue;
/* We reached the corresponding /end. */
loopstack[loopidx+1].collecting = 0;
loopidx++;
}
if (*line == '/')
{
/* Handle control commands. */
char *cmd = line+1;
for (p=cmd; *p && !spacep (p); p++)
;
if (*p)
*p++ = 0;
while (spacep (p))
p++;
if (!strcmp (cmd, "let"))
{
assign_variable (p, 0);
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "slet"))
{
/* Deprecated - never used in a released version. */
assign_variable (p, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "showvar"))
{
show_variables ();
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "definq"))
{
tmpline = opt.enable_varsubst? substitute_line (p) : NULL;
if (tmpline)
{
add_definq (tmpline, 1, 0);
xfree (tmpline);
}
else
add_definq (p, 1, 0);
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "definqfile"))
{
tmpline = opt.enable_varsubst? substitute_line (p) : NULL;
if (tmpline)
{
add_definq (tmpline, 0, 0);
xfree (tmpline);
}
else
add_definq (p, 0, 0);
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "definqprog"))
{
tmpline = opt.enable_varsubst? substitute_line (p) : NULL;
if (tmpline)
{
add_definq (tmpline, 0, 1);
xfree (tmpline);
}
else
add_definq (p, 0, 1);
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "datafile"))
{
const char *fname;
if (current_datasink)
{
if (current_datasink != stdout)
fclose (current_datasink);
current_datasink = NULL;
}
tmpline = opt.enable_varsubst? substitute_line (p) : NULL;
fname = tmpline? tmpline : p;
if (fname && !strcmp (fname, "-"))
current_datasink = stdout;
else if (fname && *fname)
{
current_datasink = fopen (fname, "wb");
if (!current_datasink)
log_error ("can't open '%s': %s\n",
fname, strerror (errno));
}
xfree (tmpline);
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "showdef"))
{
show_definq ();
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "cleardef"))
{
clear_definq ();
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "echo"))
{
tmpline = opt.enable_varsubst? substitute_line (p) : NULL;
if (tmpline)
{
puts (tmpline);
xfree (tmpline);
}
else
puts (p);
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "sendfd"))
{
tmpline = opt.enable_varsubst? substitute_line (p) : NULL;
if (tmpline)
{
do_sendfd (ctx, tmpline);
xfree (tmpline);
}
else
do_sendfd (ctx, p);
continue;
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "recvfd"))
{
tmpline = opt.enable_varsubst? substitute_line (p) : NULL;
if (tmpline)
{
do_recvfd (ctx, tmpline);
xfree (tmpline);
}
else
do_recvfd (ctx, p);
continue;
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "open"))
{
tmpline = opt.enable_varsubst? substitute_line (p) : NULL;
if (tmpline)
{
do_open (tmpline);
xfree (tmpline);
}
else
do_open (p);
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "close"))
{
tmpline = opt.enable_varsubst? substitute_line (p) : NULL;
if (tmpline)
{
do_close (tmpline);
xfree (tmpline);
}
else
do_close (p);
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "showopen"))
{
do_showopen ();
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "serverpid"))
{
do_serverpid (ctx);
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "hex"))
opt.hex = 1;
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "nohex"))
opt.hex = 0;
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "decode"))
opt.decode = 1;
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "nodecode"))
opt.decode = 0;
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "subst"))
{
opt.enable_varsubst = 1;
opt.trim_leading_spaces = 1;
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "nosubst"))
opt.enable_varsubst = 0;
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "run"))
{
char *p2;
for (p2=p; *p2 && !spacep (p2); p2++)
;
if (*p2)
*p2++ = 0;
while (spacep (p2))
p++;
if (*p2)
{
log_error ("syntax error in run command\n");
if (script_fp)
{
fclose (script_fp);
script_fp = NULL;
}
}
else if (script_fp)
{
log_error ("cannot nest run commands - stop\n");
fclose (script_fp);
script_fp = NULL;
}
else if (!(script_fp = fopen (p, "r")))
{
log_error ("cannot open run file '%s': %s\n",
p, strerror (errno));
}
else if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("running commands from '%s'\n", p);
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "while"))
{
if (loopidx+2 >= (int)DIM(loopstack))
{
log_error ("blocks are nested too deep\n");
/* We should better die or break all loop in this
case as recovering from this error won't be
easy. */
}
else
{
loopstack[loopidx+1].head = NULL;
loopstack[loopidx+1].tail = &loopstack[loopidx+1].head;
loopstack[loopidx+1].current = NULL;
loopstack[loopidx+1].nestlevel = 1;
loopstack[loopidx+1].oneshot = 0;
loopstack[loopidx+1].condition = xstrdup (p);
loopstack[loopidx+1].collecting = 1;
}
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "if"))
{
if (loopidx+2 >= (int)DIM(loopstack))
{
log_error ("blocks are nested too deep\n");
}
else
{
/* Note that we need to evaluate the condition right
away and not just at the end of the block as we
do with a WHILE. */
loopstack[loopidx+1].head = NULL;
loopstack[loopidx+1].tail = &loopstack[loopidx+1].head;
loopstack[loopidx+1].current = NULL;
loopstack[loopidx+1].nestlevel = 1;
loopstack[loopidx+1].oneshot = 1;
loopstack[loopidx+1].condition = substitute_line_copy (p);
loopstack[loopidx+1].collecting = 1;
}
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "end"))
{
if (loopidx < 0)
log_error ("stray /end command encountered - ignored\n");
else
{
char *tmpcond;
const char *value;
long condition;
/* Evaluate the condition. */
tmpcond = xstrdup (loopstack[loopidx].condition);
if (loopstack[loopidx].oneshot)
{
xfree (loopstack[loopidx].condition);
loopstack[loopidx].condition = xstrdup ("0");
}
tmpline = substitute_line (tmpcond);
value = tmpline? tmpline : tmpcond;
/* "true" or "yes" are commonly used to mean TRUE;
all other strings will evaluate to FALSE due to
the strtoul. */
if (!ascii_strcasecmp (value, "true")
|| !ascii_strcasecmp (value, "yes"))
condition = 1;
else
condition = strtol (value, NULL, 0);
xfree (tmpline);
xfree (tmpcond);
if (condition)
{
/* Run loop. */
loopstack[loopidx].current = loopstack[loopidx].head;
}
else
{
/* Cleanup. */
while (loopstack[loopidx].head)
{
loopline_t tmp = loopstack[loopidx].head->next;
xfree (loopstack[loopidx].head);
loopstack[loopidx].head = tmp;
}
loopstack[loopidx].tail = NULL;
loopstack[loopidx].current = NULL;
loopstack[loopidx].nestlevel = 0;
loopstack[loopidx].collecting = 0;
loopstack[loopidx].oneshot = 0;
xfree (loopstack[loopidx].condition);
loopstack[loopidx].condition = NULL;
loopidx--;
}
}
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "bye"))
{
break;
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "sleep"))
{
gnupg_sleep (1);
}
else if (!strcmp (cmd, "help"))
{
puts (
"Available commands:\n"
"/echo ARGS Echo ARGS.\n"
"/let NAME VALUE Set variable NAME to VALUE.\n"
"/showvar Show all variables.\n"
"/definq NAME VAR Use content of VAR for inquiries with NAME.\n"
"/definqfile NAME FILE Use content of FILE for inquiries with NAME.\n"
"/definqprog NAME PGM Run PGM for inquiries with NAME.\n"
"/datafile [NAME] Write all D line content to file NAME.\n"
"/showdef Print all definitions.\n"
"/cleardef Delete all definitions.\n"
"/sendfd FILE MODE Open FILE and pass descriptor to server.\n"
"/recvfd Receive FD from server and print.\n"
"/open VAR FILE MODE Open FILE and assign the file descriptor to VAR.\n"
"/close FD Close file with descriptor FD.\n"
"/showopen Show descriptors of all open files.\n"
"/serverpid Retrieve the pid of the server.\n"
"/[no]hex Enable hex dumping of received data lines.\n"
"/[no]decode Enable decoding of received data lines.\n"
"/[no]subst Enable variable substitution.\n"
"/run FILE Run commands from FILE.\n"
"/if VAR Begin conditional block controlled by VAR.\n"
"/while VAR Begin loop controlled by VAR.\n"
"/end End loop or condition\n"
"/bye Terminate gpg-connect-agent.\n"
"/help Print this help.");
}
else
log_error (_("unknown command '%s'\n"), cmd );
continue;
}
if (opt.verbose && script_fp)
puts (line);
tmpline = opt.enable_varsubst? substitute_line (line) : NULL;
if (tmpline)
{
rc = assuan_write_line (ctx, tmpline);
xfree (tmpline);
}
else
rc = assuan_write_line (ctx, line);
if (rc)
{
log_info (_("sending line failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc) );
break;
}
if (*line == '#' || !*line)
continue; /* Don't expect a response for a comment line. */
rc = read_and_print_response (ctx, help_cmd_p (line), &cmderr);
if (rc)
log_info (_("receiving line failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc) );
if ((rc || cmderr) && script_fp)
{
log_error ("stopping script execution\n");
fclose (script_fp);
script_fp = NULL;
}
/* FIXME: If the last command was BYE or the server died for
some other reason, we won't notice until we get the next
input command. Probing the connection with a non-blocking
read could help to notice termination or other problems
early. */
}
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("closing connection to agent\n");
/* XXX: We would like to release the context here, but libassuan
nicely says good bye to the server, which results in a SIGPIPE if
the server died. Unfortunately, libassuan does not ignore
SIGPIPE when used with UNIX sockets, hence we simply leak the
context here. */
if (0)
assuan_release (ctx);
else
gpgrt_annotate_leaked_object (ctx);
xfree (line);
return 0;
}
/* Handle an Inquire from the server. Return False if it could not be
handled; in this case the caller shll complete the operation. LINE
is the complete line as received from the server. This function
may change the content of LINE. */
static int
handle_inquire (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
{
const char *name;
definq_t d;
FILE *fp = NULL;
char buffer[1024];
int rc, n;
/* Skip the command and trailing spaces. */
for (; *line && !spacep (line); line++)
;
while (spacep (line))
line++;
/* Get the name. */
name = line;
for (; *line && !spacep (line); line++)
;
if (*line)
*line++ = 0;
/* Now match it against our list. The second loop is there to
detect the match-all entry. */
for (d=definq_list; d; d = d->next)
if (d->name && !strcmp (d->name, name))
break;
if (!d)
for (d=definq_list; d; d = d->next)
if (!d->name)
break;
if (!d)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("no handler for inquiry '%s' found\n", name);
return 0;
}
if (d->is_var)
{
char *tmpvalue = get_var_ext (d->file);
if (tmpvalue)
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, tmpvalue, strlen (tmpvalue));
else
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, "", 0);
xfree (tmpvalue);
if (rc)
log_error ("sending data back failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
}
else
{
if (d->is_prog)
{
#ifdef HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM
fp = NULL;
#else
fp = popen (d->file, "r");
#endif
if (!fp)
log_error ("error executing '%s': %s\n",
d->file, strerror (errno));
else if (opt.verbose)
log_error ("handling inquiry '%s' by running '%s'\n",
name, d->file);
}
else
{
fp = fopen (d->file, "rb");
if (!fp)
log_error ("error opening '%s': %s\n", d->file, strerror (errno));
else if (opt.verbose)
log_error ("handling inquiry '%s' by returning content of '%s'\n",
name, d->file);
}
if (!fp)
return 0;
while ( (n = fread (buffer, 1, sizeof buffer, fp)) )
{
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, buffer, n);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("sending data back failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
break;
}
}
if (ferror (fp))
log_error ("error reading from '%s': %s\n", d->file, strerror (errno));
}
rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, NULL, 0);
if (rc)
log_error ("sending data back failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
if (d->is_var)
;
else if (d->is_prog)
{
#ifndef HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM
if (pclose (fp))
log_error ("error running '%s': %s\n", d->file, strerror (errno));
#endif
}
else
fclose (fp);
return 1;
}
/* Read all response lines from server and print them. Returns 0 on
success or an assuan error code. If WITHHASH istrue, comment lines
are printed. Sets R_GOTERR to true if the command did not returned
OK. */
static int
read_and_print_response (assuan_context_t ctx, int withhash, int *r_goterr)
{
char *line;
size_t linelen;
gpg_error_t rc;
int i, j;
int need_lf = 0;
*r_goterr = 0;
for (;;)
{
do
{
rc = assuan_read_line (ctx, &line, &linelen);
if (rc)
return rc;
if ((withhash || opt.verbose > 1) && *line == '#')
{
fwrite (line, linelen, 1, stdout);
putchar ('\n');
}
}
while (*line == '#' || !linelen);
if (linelen >= 1
&& line[0] == 'D' && line[1] == ' ')
{
if (current_datasink)
{
const unsigned char *s;
int c = 0;
for (j=2, s=(unsigned char*)line+2; j < linelen; j++, s++ )
{
if (*s == '%' && j+2 < linelen)
{
s++; j++;
c = xtoi_2 ( s );
s++; j++;
}
else
c = *s;
putc (c, current_datasink);
}
}
else if (opt.hex)
{
for (i=2; i < linelen; )
{
int save_i = i;
printf ("D[%04X] ", i-2);
for (j=0; j < 16 ; j++, i++)
{
if (j == 8)
putchar (' ');
if (i < linelen)
printf (" %02X", ((unsigned char*)line)[i]);
else
fputs (" ", stdout);
}
fputs (" ", stdout);
i= save_i;
for (j=0; j < 16; j++, i++)
{
unsigned int c = ((unsigned char*)line)[i];
if ( i >= linelen )
putchar (' ');
else if (isascii (c) && isprint (c) && !iscntrl (c))
putchar (c);
else
putchar ('.');
}
putchar ('\n');
}
}
else if (opt.decode)
{
const unsigned char *s;
int need_d = 1;
int c = 0;
for (j=2, s=(unsigned char*)line+2; j < linelen; j++, s++ )
{
if (need_d)
{
fputs ("D ", stdout);
need_d = 0;
}
if (*s == '%' && j+2 < linelen)
{
s++; j++;
c = xtoi_2 ( s );
s++; j++;
}
else
c = *s;
if (c == '\n')
need_d = 1;
putchar (c);
}
need_lf = (c != '\n');
}
else
{
fwrite (line, linelen, 1, stdout);
putchar ('\n');
}
}
else
{
if (need_lf)
{
if (!current_datasink || current_datasink != stdout)
putchar ('\n');
need_lf = 0;
}
if (linelen >= 1
&& line[0] == 'S'
&& (line[1] == '\0' || line[1] == ' '))
{
if (!current_datasink || current_datasink != stdout)
{
fwrite (line, linelen, 1, stdout);
putchar ('\n');
}
}
else if (linelen >= 2
&& line[0] == 'O' && line[1] == 'K'
&& (line[2] == '\0' || line[2] == ' '))
{
if (!current_datasink || current_datasink != stdout)
{
fwrite (line, linelen, 1, stdout);
putchar ('\n');
}
set_int_var ("?", 0);
return 0;
}
else if (linelen >= 3
&& line[0] == 'E' && line[1] == 'R' && line[2] == 'R'
&& (line[3] == '\0' || line[3] == ' '))
{
int errval;
errval = strtol (line+3, NULL, 10);
if (!errval)
errval = -1;
set_int_var ("?", errval);
if (!current_datasink || current_datasink != stdout)
{
fwrite (line, linelen, 1, stdout);
putchar ('\n');
}
*r_goterr = 1;
return 0;
}
else if (linelen >= 7
&& line[0] == 'I' && line[1] == 'N' && line[2] == 'Q'
&& line[3] == 'U' && line[4] == 'I' && line[5] == 'R'
&& line[6] == 'E'
&& (line[7] == '\0' || line[7] == ' '))
{
if (!current_datasink || current_datasink != stdout)
{
fwrite (line, linelen, 1, stdout);
putchar ('\n');
}
if (!handle_inquire (ctx, line))
assuan_write_line (ctx, "CANCEL");
}
else if (linelen >= 3
&& line[0] == 'E' && line[1] == 'N' && line[2] == 'D'
&& (line[3] == '\0' || line[3] == ' '))
{
if (!current_datasink || current_datasink != stdout)
{
fwrite (line, linelen, 1, stdout);
putchar ('\n');
}
/* Received from server, thus more responses are expected. */
}
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_INV_RESPONSE);
}
}
}
/* Connect to the agent and send the standard options. */
static assuan_context_t
start_agent (void)
{
gpg_error_t err;
assuan_context_t ctx;
session_env_t session_env;
session_env = session_env_new ();
if (!session_env)
log_fatal ("error allocating session environment block: %s\n",
strerror (errno));
if (opt.use_dirmngr)
err = start_new_dirmngr (&ctx,
GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT,
opt.dirmngr_program,
opt.autostart,
!opt.quiet, 0,
NULL, NULL);
else
err = start_new_gpg_agent (&ctx,
GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT,
opt.agent_program,
NULL, NULL,
session_env,
opt.autostart,
!opt.quiet, 0,
NULL, NULL);
session_env_release (session_env);
if (err)
{
if (!opt.autostart
&& (gpg_err_code (err)
== opt.use_dirmngr? GPG_ERR_NO_DIRMNGR : GPG_ERR_NO_AGENT))
{
/* In the no-autostart case we don't make gpg-connect-agent
fail on a missing server. */
log_info (opt.use_dirmngr?
_("no dirmngr running in this session\n"):
_("no gpg-agent running in this session\n"));
exit (0);
}
else
{
log_error (_("error sending standard options: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (err));
exit (1);
}
}
return ctx;
}
diff --git a/tools/mime-maker.c b/tools/mime-maker.c
index fa4204328..231889167 100644
--- a/tools/mime-maker.c
+++ b/tools/mime-maker.c
@@ -1,667 +1,667 @@
/* mime-maker.c - Create MIME structures
* Copyright (C) 2016 g10 Code GmbH
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "util.h"
#include "zb32.h"
#include "mime-maker.h"
-/* All valid charachters in a header name. */
+/* All valid characters in a header name. */
#define HEADER_NAME_CHARS ("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" \
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" \
"-01234567890")
/* An object to store an header. Also used for a list of headers. */
struct header_s
{
struct header_s *next;
char *value; /* Malloced value. */
char name[1]; /* Name. */
};
typedef struct header_s *header_t;
/* An object to store a MIME part. A part is the header plus the
* content (body). */
struct part_s
{
struct part_s *next; /* Next part in the current container. */
struct part_s *child; /* Child container. */
char *mediatype; /* Mediatype of the container (malloced). */
char *boundary; /* Malloced boundary string. */
header_t headers; /* List of headers. */
header_t *headers_tail;/* Address of last header in chain. */
size_t bodylen; /* Length of BODY. */
char *body; /* Malloced buffer with the body. This is the
* non-encoded value. */
};
typedef struct part_s *part_t;
/* Definition of the mime parser object. */
struct mime_maker_context_s
{
void *cookie; /* Cookie passed to all callbacks. */
unsigned int verbose:1; /* Enable verbose mode. */
unsigned int debug:1; /* Enable debug mode. */
part_t mail; /* The MIME tree. */
part_t current_part;
int boundary_counter; /* Used to create easy to read boundaries. */
char *boundary_suffix; /* Random string used in the boundaries. */
struct b64state *b64state; /* NULL or malloced Base64 decoder state. */
/* Helper to convey the output stream to recursive functions. */
estream_t outfp;
};
/* Create a new mime make object. COOKIE is a values woich will be
* used as first argument for all callbacks registered with this
* object. */
gpg_error_t
mime_maker_new (mime_maker_t *r_maker, void *cookie)
{
mime_maker_t ctx;
*r_maker = NULL;
ctx = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ctx);
if (!ctx)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
ctx->cookie = cookie;
*r_maker = ctx;
return 0;
}
static void
release_parts (part_t part)
{
while (part)
{
part_t partnext = part->next;
while (part->headers)
{
header_t hdrnext = part->headers->next;
xfree (part->headers);
part->headers = hdrnext;
}
release_parts (part->child);
xfree (part->mediatype);
xfree (part->boundary);
xfree (part->body);
xfree (part);
part = partnext;
}
}
/* Release a mime maker object. */
void
mime_maker_release (mime_maker_t ctx)
{
if (!ctx)
return;
release_parts (ctx->mail);
xfree (ctx->boundary_suffix);
xfree (ctx);
}
/* Set verbose and debug mode. */
void
mime_maker_set_verbose (mime_maker_t ctx, int level)
{
if (!level)
{
ctx->verbose = 0;
ctx->debug = 0;
}
else
{
ctx->verbose = 1;
if (level > 10)
ctx->debug = 1;
}
}
static void
dump_parts (part_t part, int level)
{
header_t hdr;
for (; part; part = part->next)
{
log_debug ("%*s[part]\n", level*2, "");
for (hdr = part->headers; hdr; hdr = hdr->next)
{
log_debug ("%*s%s: %s\n", level*2, "", hdr->name, hdr->value);
}
log_debug ("%*s[body %zu bytes]\n", level*2, "", part->bodylen);
if (part->child)
{
log_debug ("%*s[container]\n", level*2, "");
dump_parts (part->child, level+1);
}
}
}
/* Dump the mime tree for debugging. */
void
mime_maker_dump_tree (mime_maker_t ctx)
{
dump_parts (ctx->mail, 0);
}
/* Find the parent node for NEEDLE starting at ROOT. */
static part_t
find_parent (part_t root, part_t needle)
{
part_t node, n;
for (node = root->child; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node == needle)
return root;
if ((n = find_parent (node, needle)))
return n;
}
return NULL;
}
/* Create a boundary string. Outr codes is aware of the general
* structure of that string (gebins with "=-=") so that
- * it can protect against accidently used boundaries within the
+ * it can protect against accidentally-used boundaries within the
* content. */
static char *
generate_boundary (mime_maker_t ctx)
{
if (!ctx->boundary_suffix)
{
char buffer[12];
gcry_create_nonce (buffer, sizeof buffer);
ctx->boundary_suffix = zb32_encode (buffer, 8 * sizeof buffer);
if (!ctx->boundary_suffix)
return NULL;
}
ctx->boundary_counter++;
return es_bsprintf ("=-=%02d-%s=-=",
ctx->boundary_counter, ctx->boundary_suffix);
}
/* Ensure that the context has a MAIL and CURRENT_PART object and
* return the parent object if available */
static gpg_error_t
ensure_part (mime_maker_t ctx, part_t *r_parent)
{
if (!ctx->mail)
{
ctx->mail = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ctx->mail);
if (!ctx->mail)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_assert (!ctx->current_part);
ctx->current_part = ctx->mail;
ctx->current_part->headers_tail = &ctx->current_part->headers;
}
log_assert (ctx->current_part);
if (r_parent)
*r_parent = find_parent (ctx->mail, ctx->current_part);
return 0;
}
/* Transform a header name into a standard capitalized format.
* "Content-Type". Conversion stops at the colon. */
static void
capitalize_header_name (char *name)
{
unsigned char *p = name;
int first = 1;
/* Special cases first. */
if (!ascii_strcasecmp (name, "MIME-Version"))
{
strcpy (name, "MIME-Version");
return;
}
/* Regular cases. */
for (; *p && *p != ':'; p++)
{
if (*p == '-')
first = 1;
else if (first)
{
if (*p >= 'a' && *p <= 'z')
*p = *p - 'a' + 'A';
first = 0;
}
else if (*p >= 'A' && *p <= 'Z')
*p = *p - 'A' + 'a';
}
}
/* Check whether a header with NAME has already been set into PART.
* NAME must be in canonical capitalized format. Return true or
* false. */
static int
have_header (part_t part, const char *name)
{
header_t hdr;
for (hdr = part->headers; hdr; hdr = hdr->next)
if (!strcmp (hdr->name, name))
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Helper to add a header to a part. */
static gpg_error_t
add_header (part_t part, const char *name, const char *value)
{
gpg_error_t err;
header_t hdr;
size_t namelen;
const char *s;
if (!value)
{
s = strchr (name, '=');
if (!s)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG);
namelen = s - name;
value = s+1;
}
else
namelen = strlen (name);
hdr = xtrymalloc (sizeof *hdr + namelen);
if (!hdr)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
hdr->next = NULL;
memcpy (hdr->name, name, namelen);
hdr->name[namelen] = 0;
/* Check that the header name is valid. We allow all lower and
* uppercase letters and, except for the first character, digits and
* the dash. */
if (strspn (hdr->name, HEADER_NAME_CHARS) != namelen
|| strchr ("-0123456789", *hdr->name))
{
xfree (hdr);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME);
}
capitalize_header_name (hdr->name);
hdr->value = xtrystrdup (value);
if (!hdr->value)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
xfree (hdr);
return err;
}
if (part)
{
*part->headers_tail = hdr;
part->headers_tail = &hdr->next;
}
else
xfree (hdr);
return 0;
}
/* Add a header with NAME and VALUE to the current mail. A LF in the
* VALUE will be handled automagically. If NULL is used for VALUE it
* is expected that the NAME has the format "NAME=VALUE" and VALUE is
* taken from there.
*
* If no container has been added, the header will be used for the
* regular mail headers and not for a MIME part. If the current part
* is in a container and a body has been added, we append a new part
* to the current container. Thus for a non-MIME mail the caller
* needs to call this function followed by a call to add a body. When
* adding a Content-Type the boundary parameter must not be included.
*/
gpg_error_t
mime_maker_add_header (mime_maker_t ctx, const char *name, const char *value)
{
gpg_error_t err;
part_t part, parent;
- /* Hack to use this fucntion for a synacx check of NAME and VALUE. */
+ /* Hack to use this function for a syntax check of NAME and VALUE. */
if (!ctx)
return add_header (NULL, name, value);
err = ensure_part (ctx, &parent);
if (err)
return err;
part = ctx->current_part;
if (part->body && !parent)
{
/* We already have a body but no parent. Adding another part is
* thus not possible. */
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CONFLICT);
}
if (part->body)
{
/* We already have a body and there is a parent. We now append
* a new part to the current container. */
part = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *part);
if (!part)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
part->headers_tail = &part->headers;
log_assert (!ctx->current_part->next);
ctx->current_part->next = part;
ctx->current_part = part;
}
/* If no NAME and no VALUE has been given we do not add a header.
* This can be used to create a new part without any header. */
if (!name && !value)
return 0;
/* If we add Content-Type, make sure that we have a MIME-version
* header first; this simply looks better. */
if (!ascii_strcasecmp (name, "Content-Type")
&& !have_header (ctx->mail, "MIME-Version"))
{
err = add_header (ctx->mail, "MIME-Version", "1.0");
if (err)
return err;
}
return add_header (part, name, value);
}
/* Helper for mime_maker_add_{body,stream}. */
static gpg_error_t
add_body (mime_maker_t ctx, const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
gpg_error_t err;
part_t part, parent;
err = ensure_part (ctx, &parent);
if (err)
return err;
part = ctx->current_part;
if (part->body)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CONFLICT);
part->body = xtrymalloc (datalen? datalen : 1);
if (!part->body)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
part->bodylen = datalen;
if (data)
memcpy (part->body, data, datalen);
return 0;
}
/* Add STRING as body to the mail or the current MIME container. A
* second call to this function is not allowed.
*
* FIXME: We may want to have an append_body to add more data to a body.
*/
gpg_error_t
mime_maker_add_body (mime_maker_t ctx, const char *string)
{
return add_body (ctx, string, strlen (string));
}
/* This is the same as mime_maker_add_body but takes a stream as
* argument. As of now the stream is copied to the MIME object but
* eventually we may delay that and read the stream only at the time
* it is needed. Note that the address of the stream object must be
* passed and that the ownership of the stream is transferred to this
* MIME object. To indicate the latter the function will store NULL
* at the ADDR_STREAM so that a caller can't use that object anymore
* except for es_fclose which accepts a NULL pointer. */
gpg_error_t
mime_maker_add_stream (mime_maker_t ctx, estream_t *stream_addr)
{
void *data;
size_t datalen;
es_rewind (*stream_addr);
if (es_fclose_snatch (*stream_addr, &data, &datalen))
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
*stream_addr = NULL;
return add_body (ctx, data, datalen);
}
/* Add a new MIME container. The caller needs to provide the media
* and media-subtype in MEDIATYPE. If MEDIATYPE is NULL
* "multipart/mixed" is assumed. This function will then add a
* Content-Type header with that media type and an approriate boundary
* string to the parent part. */
gpg_error_t
mime_maker_add_container (mime_maker_t ctx, const char *mediatype)
{
gpg_error_t err;
part_t part;
if (!mediatype)
mediatype = "multipart/mixed";
err = ensure_part (ctx, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
part = ctx->current_part;
if (part->body)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CONFLICT); /* There is already a body. */
if (part->child || part->mediatype || part->boundary)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CONFLICT); /* There is already a container. */
/* If a content type has not yet been set, do it now. The boundary
* will be added while writing the headers. */
if (!have_header (ctx->mail, "Content-Type"))
{
err = add_header (ctx->mail, "Content-Type", mediatype);
if (err)
return err;
}
/* Create a child node. */
part->child = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *part->child);
if (!part->child)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
part->child->headers_tail = &part->child->headers;
part->mediatype = xtrystrdup (mediatype);
if (!part->mediatype)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
xfree (part->child);
part->child = NULL;
return err;
}
part->boundary = generate_boundary (ctx);
if (!part->boundary)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
xfree (part->child);
part->child = NULL;
xfree (part->mediatype);
part->mediatype = NULL;
return err;
}
part = part->child;
ctx->current_part = part;
return 0;
}
/* Write the Content-Type header with the boundary value. */
static gpg_error_t
write_ct_with_boundary (mime_maker_t ctx,
const char *value, const char *boundary)
{
const char *s;
if (!*value)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); /* Empty string. */
for (s=value + strlen (value) - 1;
(s >= value
&& (*s == ' ' || *s == '\t' || *s == '\n'));
s--)
;
if (!(s >= value))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); /* Only spaces. */
/* Fixme: We should use a dedicated header write functions which
* properly wraps the header. */
es_fprintf (ctx->outfp, "Content-Type: %s%s\n\tboundary=\"%s\"\n",
value,
(*s == ';')? "":";",
boundary);
return 0;
}
/* Recursive worker for mime_maker_make. */
static gpg_error_t
write_tree (mime_maker_t ctx, part_t parent, part_t part)
{
gpg_error_t err;
header_t hdr;
for (; part; part = part->next)
{
for (hdr = part->headers; hdr; hdr = hdr->next)
{
if (part->child && !strcmp (hdr->name, "Content-Type"))
write_ct_with_boundary (ctx, hdr->value, part->boundary);
else
es_fprintf (ctx->outfp, "%s: %s\n", hdr->name, hdr->value);
}
es_fputc ('\n', ctx->outfp);
if (part->body)
{
if (es_write (ctx->outfp, part->body, part->bodylen, NULL))
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
}
if (part->child)
{
log_assert (part->boundary);
if (es_fprintf (ctx->outfp, "\n--%s\n", part->boundary) < 0)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
err = write_tree (ctx, part, part->child);
if (err)
return err;
if (es_fprintf (ctx->outfp, "\n--%s--\n", part->boundary) < 0)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
}
if (part->next)
{
log_assert (parent && parent->boundary);
if (es_fprintf (ctx->outfp, "\n--%s\n", parent->boundary) < 0)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Add headers we always require. */
static gpg_error_t
add_missing_headers (mime_maker_t ctx)
{
gpg_error_t err;
if (!ctx->mail)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
if (!have_header (ctx->mail, "MIME-Version"))
{
/* Even if a Content-Type has never been set, we want to
* announce that we do MIME. */
err = add_header (ctx->mail, "MIME-Version", "1.0");
if (err)
goto leave;
}
if (!have_header (ctx->mail, "Date"))
{
char *p = rfctimestamp (make_timestamp ());
if (!p)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = add_header (ctx->mail, "Date", p);
xfree (p);
if (err)
goto leave;
}
leave:
return err;
}
/* Create message from the tree MIME and write it to FP. Noet that
* the output uses only a LF and a later called sendmail(1) is
* expected to convert them to network line endings. */
gpg_error_t
mime_maker_make (mime_maker_t ctx, estream_t fp)
{
gpg_error_t err;
err = add_missing_headers (ctx);
if (err)
return err;
ctx->outfp = fp;
err = write_tree (ctx, NULL, ctx->mail);
ctx->outfp = NULL;
return err;
}
diff --git a/tools/mime-parser.c b/tools/mime-parser.c
index 5f3659ee5..7ac3c69cb 100644
--- a/tools/mime-parser.c
+++ b/tools/mime-parser.c
@@ -1,772 +1,772 @@
/* mime-parser.c - Parse MIME structures (high level rfc822 parser).
* Copyright (C) 2016 g10 Code GmbH
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "util.h"
#include "rfc822parse.h"
#include "mime-parser.h"
enum pgpmime_states
{
PGPMIME_NONE = 0,
PGPMIME_WAIT_ENCVERSION,
PGPMIME_IN_ENCVERSION,
PGPMIME_WAIT_ENCDATA,
PGPMIME_IN_ENCDATA,
PGPMIME_GOT_ENCDATA,
PGPMIME_WAIT_SIGNEDDATA,
PGPMIME_IN_SIGNEDDATA,
PGPMIME_WAIT_SIGNATURE,
PGPMIME_IN_SIGNATURE,
PGPMIME_GOT_SIGNATURE,
PGPMIME_INVALID
};
/* Definition of the mime parser object. */
struct mime_parser_context_s
{
void *cookie; /* Cookie passed to all callbacks. */
/* The callback to announce a new part. */
gpg_error_t (*new_part) (void *cookie,
const char *mediatype,
const char *mediasubtype);
/* The callback to return data of a part. */
gpg_error_t (*part_data) (void *cookie,
const void *data,
size_t datalen);
/* The callback to collect encrypted data. */
gpg_error_t (*collect_encrypted) (void *cookie, const char *data);
/* The callback to collect signed data. */
gpg_error_t (*collect_signeddata) (void *cookie, const char *data);
/* The callback to collect a signature. */
gpg_error_t (*collect_signature) (void *cookie, const char *data);
/* Helper to convey error codes from user callbacks. */
gpg_error_t err;
int nesting_level; /* The current nesting level. */
int hashing_at_level; /* The nesting level at which we are hashing. */
enum pgpmime_states pgpmime; /* Current PGP/MIME state. */
unsigned int delay_hashing:1;/* Helper for PGPMIME_IN_SIGNEDDATA. */
unsigned int want_part:1; /* Return the current part. */
unsigned int decode_part:2; /* Decode the part. 1 = QP, 2 = Base64. */
unsigned int verbose:1; /* Enable verbose mode. */
unsigned int debug:1; /* Enable debug mode. */
/* Flags to help with debug output. */
struct {
unsigned int n_skip; /* Skip showing these number of lines. */
unsigned int header:1; /* Show the header lines. */
unsigned int data:1; /* Show the data lines. */
unsigned int as_note:1; /* Show the next data line as a note. */
unsigned int boundary : 1;
} show;
struct b64state *b64state; /* NULL or malloced Base64 decoder state. */
/* A buffer for reading a mail line, */
char line[5000];
};
/* Print the event received by the parser for debugging. */
static void
show_message_parser_event (rfc822parse_event_t event)
{
const char *s;
switch (event)
{
case RFC822PARSE_OPEN: s= "Open"; break;
case RFC822PARSE_CLOSE: s= "Close"; break;
case RFC822PARSE_CANCEL: s= "Cancel"; break;
case RFC822PARSE_T2BODY: s= "T2Body"; break;
case RFC822PARSE_FINISH: s= "Finish"; break;
case RFC822PARSE_RCVD_SEEN: s= "Rcvd_Seen"; break;
case RFC822PARSE_LEVEL_DOWN: s= "Level_Down"; break;
case RFC822PARSE_LEVEL_UP: s= "Level_Up"; break;
case RFC822PARSE_BOUNDARY: s= "Boundary"; break;
case RFC822PARSE_LAST_BOUNDARY: s= "Last_Boundary"; break;
case RFC822PARSE_BEGIN_HEADER: s= "Begin_Header"; break;
case RFC822PARSE_PREAMBLE: s= "Preamble"; break;
case RFC822PARSE_EPILOGUE: s= "Epilogue"; break;
default: s= "[unknown event]"; break;
}
log_debug ("*** RFC822 event %s\n", s);
}
/* Do in-place decoding of quoted-printable data of LENGTH in BUFFER.
Returns the new length of the buffer and stores true at R_SLBRK if
the line ended with a soft line break; false is stored if not.
- This fucntion asssumes that a complete line is passed in
+ This function asssumes that a complete line is passed in
buffer. */
static size_t
qp_decode (char *buffer, size_t length, int *r_slbrk)
{
char *d, *s;
if (r_slbrk)
*r_slbrk = 0;
/* Fixme: We should remove trailing white space first. */
for (s=d=buffer; length; length--)
{
if (*s == '=')
{
if (length > 2 && hexdigitp (s+1) && hexdigitp (s+2))
{
s++;
*(unsigned char*)d++ = xtoi_2 (s);
s += 2;
length -= 2;
}
else if (length > 2 && s[1] == '\r' && s[2] == '\n')
{
/* Soft line break. */
s += 3;
length -= 2;
if (r_slbrk && length == 1)
*r_slbrk = 1;
}
else if (length > 1 && s[1] == '\n')
{
/* Soft line break with only a Unix line terminator. */
s += 2;
length -= 1;
if (r_slbrk && length == 1)
*r_slbrk = 1;
}
else if (length == 1)
{
/* Soft line break at the end of the line. */
s += 1;
if (r_slbrk)
*r_slbrk = 1;
}
else
*d++ = *s++;
}
else
*d++ = *s++;
}
return d - buffer;
}
/* This function is called by parse_mail to communicate events. This
* callback communicates with the caller using a structure passed in
* OPAQUE. Should return 0 on success or set ERRNO and return -1. */
static int
parse_message_cb (void *opaque, rfc822parse_event_t event, rfc822parse_t msg)
{
mime_parser_t ctx = opaque;
const char *s;
int rc = 0;
if (ctx->debug)
show_message_parser_event (event);
if (event == RFC822PARSE_BEGIN_HEADER || event == RFC822PARSE_T2BODY)
{
/* We need to check here whether to start collecting signed data
* because attachments might come without header lines and thus
* we won't see the BEGIN_HEADER event. */
if (ctx->pgpmime == PGPMIME_WAIT_SIGNEDDATA)
{
if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("begin_hash\n");
ctx->hashing_at_level = ctx->nesting_level;
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_IN_SIGNEDDATA;
ctx->delay_hashing = 0;
}
}
if (event == RFC822PARSE_OPEN)
{
/* Initialize for a new message. */
ctx->show.header = 1;
}
else if (event == RFC822PARSE_T2BODY)
{
rfc822parse_field_t field;
ctx->want_part = 0;
ctx->decode_part = 0;
field = rfc822parse_parse_field (msg, "Content-Type", -1);
if (field)
{
const char *s1, *s2;
s1 = rfc822parse_query_media_type (field, &s2);
if (s1)
{
if (ctx->verbose)
log_debug ("h media: %*s%s %s\n",
ctx->nesting_level*2, "", s1, s2);
if (ctx->pgpmime == PGPMIME_WAIT_ENCVERSION)
{
if (!strcmp (s1, "application")
&& !strcmp (s2, "pgp-encrypted"))
{
if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("c begin_encversion\n");
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_IN_ENCVERSION;
}
else
{
log_error ("invalid PGP/MIME structure;"
" expected '%s', got '%s/%s'\n",
"application/pgp-encrypted", s1, s2);
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_INVALID;
}
}
else if (ctx->pgpmime == PGPMIME_WAIT_ENCDATA)
{
if (!strcmp (s1, "application")
&& !strcmp (s2, "octet-stream"))
{
if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("c begin_encdata\n");
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_IN_ENCDATA;
}
else
{
log_error ("invalid PGP/MIME structure;"
" expected '%s', got '%s/%s'\n",
"application/octet-stream", s1, s2);
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_INVALID;
}
}
else if (ctx->pgpmime == PGPMIME_WAIT_SIGNATURE)
{
if (!strcmp (s1, "application")
&& !strcmp (s2, "pgp-signature"))
{
if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("c begin_signature\n");
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_IN_SIGNATURE;
}
else
{
log_error ("invalid PGP/MIME structure;"
" expected '%s', got '%s/%s'\n",
"application/pgp-signature", s1, s2);
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_INVALID;
}
}
else if (!strcmp (s1, "multipart")
&& !strcmp (s2, "encrypted"))
{
s = rfc822parse_query_parameter (field, "protocol", 0);
if (s)
{
if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("h encrypted.protocol: %s\n", s);
if (!strcmp (s, "application/pgp-encrypted"))
{
if (ctx->pgpmime)
log_error ("note: "
"ignoring nested PGP/MIME signature\n");
else
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_WAIT_ENCVERSION;
}
else if (ctx->verbose)
log_debug ("# this protocol is not supported\n");
}
}
else if (!strcmp (s1, "multipart")
&& !strcmp (s2, "signed"))
{
s = rfc822parse_query_parameter (field, "protocol", 1);
if (s)
{
if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("h signed.protocol: %s\n", s);
if (!strcmp (s, "application/pgp-signature"))
{
if (ctx->pgpmime)
log_error ("note: "
"ignoring nested PGP/MIME signature\n");
else
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_WAIT_SIGNEDDATA;
}
else if (ctx->verbose)
log_debug ("# this protocol is not supported\n");
}
}
else if (ctx->new_part)
{
ctx->err = ctx->new_part (ctx->cookie, s1, s2);
if (!ctx->err)
ctx->want_part = 1;
else if (gpg_err_code (ctx->err) == GPG_ERR_FALSE)
ctx->err = 0;
else if (gpg_err_code (ctx->err) == GPG_ERR_TRUE)
{
ctx->want_part = ctx->decode_part = 1;
ctx->err = 0;
}
}
}
else
{
if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("h media: %*s none\n", ctx->nesting_level*2, "");
if (ctx->new_part)
{
ctx->err = ctx->new_part (ctx->cookie, "", "");
if (!ctx->err)
ctx->want_part = 1;
else if (gpg_err_code (ctx->err) == GPG_ERR_FALSE)
ctx->err = 0;
else if (gpg_err_code (ctx->err) == GPG_ERR_TRUE)
{
ctx->want_part = ctx->decode_part = 1;
ctx->err = 0;
}
}
}
rfc822parse_release_field (field);
}
else
{
if (ctx->verbose)
log_debug ("h media: %*stext plain [assumed]\n",
ctx->nesting_level*2, "");
if (ctx->new_part)
{
ctx->err = ctx->new_part (ctx->cookie, "text", "plain");
if (!ctx->err)
ctx->want_part = 1;
else if (gpg_err_code (ctx->err) == GPG_ERR_FALSE)
ctx->err = 0;
else if (gpg_err_code (ctx->err) == GPG_ERR_TRUE)
{
ctx->want_part = ctx->decode_part = 1;
ctx->err = 0;
}
}
}
/* Figure out the encoding if needed. */
if (ctx->decode_part)
{
char *value;
size_t valueoff;
ctx->decode_part = 0; /* Fallback for unknown encoding. */
value = rfc822parse_get_field (msg, "Content-Transfer-Encoding", -1,
&valueoff);
if (value)
{
if (!stricmp (value+valueoff, "quoted-printable"))
ctx->decode_part = 1;
else if (!stricmp (value+valueoff, "base64"))
{
ctx->decode_part = 2;
if (ctx->b64state)
b64dec_finish (ctx->b64state); /* Reuse state. */
else
{
ctx->b64state = xtrymalloc (sizeof *ctx->b64state);
if (!ctx->b64state)
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
}
if (!rc)
rc = b64dec_start (ctx->b64state, NULL);
}
free (value); /* Right, we need a plain free. */
}
}
ctx->show.header = 0;
ctx->show.data = 1;
ctx->show.n_skip = 1;
}
else if (event == RFC822PARSE_PREAMBLE)
ctx->show.as_note = 1;
else if (event == RFC822PARSE_LEVEL_DOWN)
{
if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("b down\n");
ctx->nesting_level++;
}
else if (event == RFC822PARSE_LEVEL_UP)
{
if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("b up\n");
if (ctx->nesting_level)
ctx->nesting_level--;
else
log_error ("invalid structure (bad nesting level)\n");
}
else if (event == RFC822PARSE_BOUNDARY || event == RFC822PARSE_LAST_BOUNDARY)
{
ctx->show.data = 0;
ctx->show.boundary = 1;
if (event == RFC822PARSE_BOUNDARY)
{
ctx->show.header = 1;
ctx->show.n_skip = 1;
if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("b part\n");
}
else if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("b last\n");
if (ctx->pgpmime == PGPMIME_IN_ENCDATA)
{
if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("c end_encdata\n");
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_GOT_ENCDATA;
/* FIXME: We should assert (event == LAST_BOUNDARY). */
}
else if (ctx->pgpmime == PGPMIME_IN_SIGNEDDATA
&& ctx->nesting_level == ctx->hashing_at_level)
{
if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("c end_hash\n");
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_WAIT_SIGNATURE;
if (ctx->collect_signeddata)
ctx->err = ctx->collect_signeddata (ctx->cookie, NULL);
}
else if (ctx->pgpmime == PGPMIME_IN_SIGNATURE)
{
if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("c end_signature\n");
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_GOT_SIGNATURE;
/* FIXME: We should assert (event == LAST_BOUNDARY). */
}
else if (ctx->want_part)
{
if (ctx->part_data)
{
/* FIXME: We may need to flush things. */
ctx->err = ctx->part_data (ctx->cookie, NULL, 0);
}
ctx->want_part = 0;
}
}
return rc;
}
/* Create a new mime parser object. COOKIE is a values which will be
* used as first argument for all callbacks registered with this
* parser object. */
gpg_error_t
mime_parser_new (mime_parser_t *r_parser, void *cookie)
{
mime_parser_t ctx;
*r_parser = NULL;
ctx = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ctx);
if (!ctx)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
ctx->cookie = cookie;
*r_parser = ctx;
return 0;
}
/* Release a mime parser object. */
void
mime_parser_release (mime_parser_t ctx)
{
if (!ctx)
return;
if (ctx->b64state)
{
b64dec_finish (ctx->b64state);
xfree (ctx->b64state);
}
xfree (ctx);
}
/* Set verbose and debug mode. */
void
mime_parser_set_verbose (mime_parser_t ctx, int level)
{
if (!level)
{
ctx->verbose = 0;
ctx->debug = 0;
}
else
{
ctx->verbose = 1;
if (level > 10)
ctx->debug = 1;
}
}
/* Set the callback used to announce a new part. It will be called
* with the media type and media subtype of the part. If no
* Content-type header was given both values are the empty string.
* The callback should return 0 on success or an error code. The
* error code GPG_ERR_FALSE indicates that the caller is not
* interested in the part and data shall not be returned via a
* registered part_data callback. The error code GPG_ERR_TRUE
* indicates that the parts shall be redurned in decoded format
* (i.e. base64 or QP encoding is removed). */
void
mime_parser_set_new_part (mime_parser_t ctx,
gpg_error_t (*fnc) (void *cookie,
const char *mediatype,
const char *mediasubtype))
{
ctx->new_part = fnc;
}
/* Set the callback used to return the data of a part to the caller.
* The end of the part is indicated by passing NUL for DATA. */
void
mime_parser_set_part_data (mime_parser_t ctx,
gpg_error_t (*fnc) (void *cookie,
const void *data,
size_t datalen))
{
ctx->part_data = fnc;
}
/* Set the callback to collect encrypted data. A NULL passed to the
* callback indicates the end of the encrypted data; the callback may
* then decrypt the collected data. */
void
mime_parser_set_collect_encrypted (mime_parser_t ctx,
gpg_error_t (*fnc) (void *cookie,
const char *data))
{
ctx->collect_encrypted = fnc;
}
/* Set the callback to collect signed data. A NULL passed to the
* callback indicates the end of the signed data. */
void
mime_parser_set_collect_signeddata (mime_parser_t ctx,
gpg_error_t (*fnc) (void *cookie,
const char *data))
{
ctx->collect_signeddata = fnc;
}
/* Set the callback to collect the signature. A NULL passed to the
* callback indicates the end of the signature; the callback may the
* verify the signature. */
void
mime_parser_set_collect_signature (mime_parser_t ctx,
gpg_error_t (*fnc) (void *cookie,
const char *data))
{
ctx->collect_signature = fnc;
}
/* Read and parse a message from FP and call the appropriate
* callbacks. */
gpg_error_t
mime_parser_parse (mime_parser_t ctx, estream_t fp)
{
gpg_error_t err;
rfc822parse_t msg = NULL;
unsigned int lineno = 0;
size_t length, nbytes;
char *line;
line = ctx->line;
msg = rfc822parse_open (parse_message_cb, ctx);
if (!msg)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("can't open mail parser: %s", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Fixme: We should not use fgets because it can't cope with
embedded nul characters. */
while (es_fgets (ctx->line, sizeof (ctx->line), fp))
{
lineno++;
if (lineno == 1 && !strncmp (line, "From ", 5))
continue; /* We better ignore a leading From line. */
length = strlen (line);
if (length && line[length - 1] == '\n')
line[--length] = 0;
else
log_error ("mail parser detected too long or"
" non terminated last line (lnr=%u)\n", lineno);
if (length && line[length - 1] == '\r')
line[--length] = 0;
ctx->err = 0;
if (rfc822parse_insert (msg, line, length))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("mail parser failed: %s", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (ctx->err)
{
/* Error from a callback detected. */
err = ctx->err;
goto leave;
}
/* Debug output. Note that the boundary is shown before n_skip
* is evaluated. */
if (ctx->show.boundary)
{
if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("# Boundary: %s\n", line);
ctx->show.boundary = 0;
}
if (ctx->show.n_skip)
ctx->show.n_skip--;
else if (ctx->show.data)
{
if (ctx->show.as_note)
{
if (ctx->verbose)
log_debug ("# Note: %s\n", line);
ctx->show.as_note = 0;
}
else if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("# Data: %s\n", line);
}
else if (ctx->show.header && ctx->verbose)
log_debug ("# Header: %s\n", line);
if (ctx->pgpmime == PGPMIME_IN_ENCVERSION)
{
trim_trailing_spaces (line);
if (!*line)
; /* Skip empty lines. */
else if (!strcmp (line, "Version: 1"))
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_WAIT_ENCDATA;
else
{
log_error ("invalid PGP/MIME structure;"
" garbage in pgp-encrypted part ('%s')\n", line);
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_INVALID;
}
}
else if (ctx->pgpmime == PGPMIME_IN_ENCDATA)
{
if (ctx->collect_encrypted)
{
err = ctx->collect_encrypted (ctx->cookie, line);
if (!err)
err = ctx->collect_encrypted (ctx->cookie, "\r\n");
if (err)
goto leave;
}
}
else if (ctx->pgpmime == PGPMIME_GOT_ENCDATA)
{
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_NONE;
if (ctx->collect_encrypted)
ctx->collect_encrypted (ctx->cookie, NULL);
}
else if (ctx->pgpmime == PGPMIME_IN_SIGNEDDATA)
{
/* If we are processing signed data, store the signed data.
* We need to delay the hashing of the CR/LF because the
* last line ending belongs to the next boundary. This is
* the reason why we can't use the PGPMIME state as a
* condition. */
if (ctx->debug)
log_debug ("# hashing %s'%s'\n",
ctx->delay_hashing? "CR,LF+":"", line);
if (ctx->collect_signeddata)
{
if (ctx->delay_hashing)
ctx->collect_signeddata (ctx->cookie, "\r\n");
ctx->collect_signeddata (ctx->cookie, line);
}
ctx->delay_hashing = 1;
}
else if (ctx->pgpmime == PGPMIME_IN_SIGNATURE)
{
if (ctx->collect_signeddata)
{
ctx->collect_signature (ctx->cookie, line);
ctx->collect_signature (ctx->cookie, "\r\n");
}
}
else if (ctx->pgpmime == PGPMIME_GOT_SIGNATURE)
{
ctx->pgpmime = PGPMIME_NONE;
if (ctx->collect_signeddata)
ctx->collect_signature (ctx->cookie, NULL);
}
else if (ctx->want_part)
{
if (ctx->part_data)
{
if (ctx->decode_part == 1)
{
length = qp_decode (line, length, NULL);
}
else if (ctx->decode_part == 2)
{
log_assert (ctx->b64state);
err = b64dec_proc (ctx->b64state, line, length, &nbytes);
if (err)
goto leave;
length = nbytes;
}
err = ctx->part_data (ctx->cookie, line, length);
if (err)
goto leave;
}
}
}
rfc822parse_close (msg);
msg = NULL;
err = 0;
leave:
rfc822parse_cancel (msg);
return err;
}

File Metadata

Mime Type
text/x-diff
Expires
Tue, Jun 3, 5:35 AM (10 h, 43 m)
Storage Engine
local-disk
Storage Format
Raw Data
Storage Handle
bb/d7/70fdd2a7de486d462d1f630fb6d2

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