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	diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
	index 289df2a7e..ddbc0657d 100644
	--- a/configure.ac
	+++ b/configure.ac
	@@ -1,1813 +1,1819 @@
	# configure.ac - for GnuPG 2.1
	# Copyright (C) 1998-2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	# Copyright (C) 1998-2015 Werner Koch
	#
	# This file is part of GnuPG.
	#
	# GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	# (at your option) any later version.
	#
	# GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	# GNU General Public License for more details.
	#
	# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	# along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.

	# Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
	AC_PREREQ(2.61)
	min_automake_version="1.14"

	# To build a release you need to create a tag with the version number
	# (git tag -s gnupg-2.n.m) and run "./autogen.sh --force". Please
	# bump the version number immediately after the release and do
	# another commit and push so that the git magic is able to work.
	m4_define([mym4_package],[gnupg])
	m4_define([mym4_major], [2])
	m4_define([mym4_minor], [1])
	m4_define([mym4_micro], [10])

	# To start a new development series, i.e a new major or minor number
	# you need to mark an arbitrary commit before the first beta release
	# with an annotated tag. For example the 2.1 branch starts off with
	# the tag "gnupg-2.1-base". This is used as the base for counting
	# beta numbers before the first release of a series.

	# Below is m4 magic to extract and compute the git revision number,
	# the decimalized short revision number, a beta version string and a
	# flag indicating a development version (mym4_isbeta). Note that the
	# m4 processing is done by autoconf and not during the configure run.
	m4_define([mym4_verslist], m4_split(m4_esyscmd([./autogen.sh --find-version] \
	mym4_package mym4_major mym4_minor mym4_micro),[:]))
	m4_define([mym4_isbeta], m4_argn(2, mym4_verslist))
	m4_define([mym4_version], m4_argn(4, mym4_verslist))
	m4_define([mym4_revision], m4_argn(7, mym4_verslist))
	m4_define([mym4_revision_dec], m4_argn(8, mym4_verslist))
	m4_esyscmd([echo ]mym4_version[>VERSION])
	AC_INIT([mym4_package],[mym4_version], [http://bugs.gnupg.org])

	NEED_GPG_ERROR_VERSION=1.16

	NEED_LIBGCRYPT_API=1
	NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION=1.6.0

	NEED_LIBASSUAN_API=2
	NEED_LIBASSUAN_VERSION=2.1.0

	NEED_KSBA_API=1
	NEED_KSBA_VERSION=1.2.0

	NEED_NTBTLS_API=1
	NEED_NTBTLS_VERSION=0.1.0

	NEED_NPTH_API=1
	NEED_NPTH_VERSION=0.91


	NEED_GNUTLS_VERSION=3.0


	development_version=mym4_isbeta
	PACKAGE=$PACKAGE_NAME
	PACKAGE_GT=${PACKAGE_NAME}2
	VERSION=$PACKAGE_VERSION

	AC_CONFIG_AUX_DIR([build-aux])
	AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([sm/gpgsm.c])
	AC_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h])
	AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([serial-tests dist-bzip2 no-dist-gzip])
	AC_CANONICAL_HOST
	AB_INIT

	AC_GNU_SOURCE

	# Some status variables.
	have_gpg_error=no
	have_libgcrypt=no
	have_libassuan=no
	have_ksba=no
	have_ntbtls=no
	have_gnutls=no
	have_npth=no
	have_libusb=no
	have_adns=no
	gnupg_have_ldap="n/a"

	use_zip=yes
	use_bzip2=yes
	use_exec=yes
	use_trust_models=yes
	card_support=yes
	use_ccid_driver=yes
	dirmngr_auto_start=yes
	use_tls_library=no
	large_secmem=no

	GNUPG_BUILD_PROGRAM(gpg, yes)
	GNUPG_BUILD_PROGRAM(gpgsm, yes)
	# The agent is a required part and can't be disabled anymore.
	build_agent=yes
	GNUPG_BUILD_PROGRAM(scdaemon, yes)
	GNUPG_BUILD_PROGRAM(g13, yes)
	GNUPG_BUILD_PROGRAM(dirmngr, yes)
	GNUPG_BUILD_PROGRAM(tools, yes)
	GNUPG_BUILD_PROGRAM(doc, yes)
	GNUPG_BUILD_PROGRAM(symcryptrun, no)
	GNUPG_BUILD_PROGRAM(gpgtar, yes)

	AC_SUBST(PACKAGE)
	AC_SUBST(PACKAGE_GT)
	AC_SUBST(VERSION)
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PACKAGE, "$PACKAGE", [Name of this package])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PACKAGE_GT, "$PACKAGE_GT",
	[Name of this package for gettext])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(VERSION, "$VERSION", [Version of this package])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PACKAGE_BUGREPORT, "$PACKAGE_BUGREPORT",
	[Bug report address])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION, "$NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION",
	[Required version of Libgcrypt])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(NEED_KSBA_VERSION, "$NEED_KSBA_VERSION",
	[Required version of Libksba])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(NEED_NTBTLS_VERSION, "$NEED_NTBTLS_VERSION",
	[Required version of NTBTLS])



	# The default is to use the modules from this package and the few
	# other packages in a standard place; i.e where this package gets
	# installed. With these options it is possible to override these
	# ${prefix} depended values with fixed paths, which can't be replaced
	# at make time. See also am/cmacros.am and the defaults in AH_BOTTOM.
	AC_ARG_WITH(agent-pgm,
	[ --with-agent-pgm=PATH Use PATH as the default for the agent)],
	GNUPG_AGENT_PGM="$withval", GNUPG_AGENT_PGM="" )
	AC_SUBST(GNUPG_AGENT_PGM)
	AM_CONDITIONAL(GNUPG_AGENT_PGM, test -n "$GNUPG_AGENT_PGM")
	show_gnupg_agent_pgm="(default)"
	test -n "$GNUPG_AGENT_PGM" && show_gnupg_agent_pgm="$GNUPG_AGENT_PGM"

	AC_ARG_WITH(pinentry-pgm,
	[ --with-pinentry-pgm=PATH Use PATH as the default for the pinentry)],
	GNUPG_PINENTRY_PGM="$withval", GNUPG_PINENTRY_PGM="" )
	AC_SUBST(GNUPG_PINENTRY_PGM)
	AM_CONDITIONAL(GNUPG_PINENTRY_PGM, test -n "$GNUPG_PINENTRY_PGM")
	show_gnupg_pinentry_pgm="(default)"
	test -n "$GNUPG_PINENTRY_PGM" && show_gnupg_pinentry_pgm="$GNUPG_PINENTRY_PGM"


	AC_ARG_WITH(scdaemon-pgm,
	[ --with-scdaemon-pgm=PATH Use PATH as the default for the scdaemon)],
	GNUPG_SCDAEMON_PGM="$withval", GNUPG_SCDAEMON_PGM="" )
	AC_SUBST(GNUPG_SCDAEMON_PGM)
	AM_CONDITIONAL(GNUPG_SCDAEMON_PGM, test -n "$GNUPG_SCDAEMON_PGM")
	show_gnupg_scdaemon_pgm="(default)"
	test -n "$GNUPG_SCDAEMON_PGM" && show_gnupg_scdaemon_pgm="$GNUPG_SCDAEMON_PGM"


	AC_ARG_WITH(dirmngr-pgm,
	[ --with-dirmngr-pgm=PATH Use PATH as the default for the dirmngr)],
	GNUPG_DIRMNGR_PGM="$withval", GNUPG_DIRMNGR_PGM="" )
	AC_SUBST(GNUPG_DIRMNGR_PGM)
	AM_CONDITIONAL(GNUPG_DIRMNGR_PGM, test -n "$GNUPG_DIRMNGR_PGM")
	show_gnupg_dirmngr_pgm="(default)"
	test -n "$GNUPG_DIRMNGR_PGM" && show_gnupg_dirmngr_pgm="$GNUPG_DIRMNGR_PGM"

	AC_ARG_WITH(protect-tool-pgm,
	[ --with-protect-tool-pgm=PATH Use PATH as the default for the protect-tool)],
	GNUPG_PROTECT_TOOL_PGM="$withval", GNUPG_PROTECT_TOOL_PGM="" )
	AC_SUBST(GNUPG_PROTECT_TOOL_PGM)
	AM_CONDITIONAL(GNUPG_PROTECT_TOOL_PGM, test -n "$GNUPG_PROTECT_TOOL_PGM")
	show_gnupg_protect_tool_pgm="(default)"
	test -n "$GNUPG_PROTECT_TOOL_PGM" \
	&& show_gnupg_protect_tool_pgm="$GNUPG_PROTECT_TOOL_PGM"

	AC_ARG_WITH(dirmngr-ldap-pgm,
	[ --with-dirmngr-ldap-pgm=PATH Use PATH as the default for the dirmnge ldap wrapper)],
	GNUPG_DIRMNGR_LDAP_PGM="$withval", GNUPG_DIRMNGR_LDAP_PGM="" )
	AC_SUBST(GNUPG_DIRMNGR_LDAP_PGM)
	AM_CONDITIONAL(GNUPG_DIRMNGR_LDAP_PGM, test -n "$GNUPG_DIRMNGR_LDAP_PGM")
	show_gnupg_dirmngr_ldap_pgm="(default)"
	test -n "$GNUPG_DIRMNGR_LDAP_PGM" \
	&& show_gnupg_dirmngr_ldap_pgm="$GNUPG_DIRMNGR_LDAP_PGM"

	#
	# On some platforms gpg2 is usually installed as gpg without using a
	# symlink. For correct operation of gpgconf it needs to know the
	# installed name of gpg. This option sets "gpg2"'s installed name to
	# just "gpg". Note that it might be required to rename gpg2 to gpg
	# manually after the build process.
	#
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(gpg2-is-gpg,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-gpg2-is-gpg],[Set installed name of gpg2 to gpg]),
	gpg2_is_gpg=$enableval)
	if test "$gpg2_is_gpg" = "yes"; then
	name_of_installed_gpg=gpg
	else
	name_of_installed_gpg=gpg2
	fi
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(NAME_OF_INSTALLED_GPG, "$name_of_installed_gpg",
	[The name of the installed GPG tool])


	# SELinux support includes tracking of sensitive files to avoid
	# leaking their contents through processing these files by gpg itself
	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether SELinux support is requested])
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(selinux-support,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-selinux-support],
	[enable SELinux support]),
	selinux_support=$enableval, selinux_support=no)
	AC_MSG_RESULT($selinux_support)


	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to allocate extra secure memory])
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(large-secmem,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-large-secmem],
	[allocate extra secure memory]),
	large_secmem=$enableval, large_secmem=no)
	AC_MSG_RESULT($large_secmem)
	if test "$large_secmem" = yes ; then
	SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE=65536
	else
	SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE=32768
	fi
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE,$SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE,
	[Size of secure memory buffer])

	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable trust models])
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(trust-models,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-trust-models],
	[disable all trust models except "always"]),
	use_trust_models=$enableval)
	AC_MSG_RESULT($use_trust_models)
	if test "$use_trust_models" = no ; then
	AC_DEFINE(NO_TRUST_MODELS, 1,
	[Define to include only trust-model always])
	fi


	#
	# Options to disable algorithm
	#

	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([rsa],[RSA public key])
	# Elgamal is a MUST algorithm
	# DSA is a MUST algorithm
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([ecdh],[ECDH public key])
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([ecdsa],[ECDSA public key])
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([eddsa],[EdDSA public key])

	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([idea],[IDEA cipher])
	# 3DES is a MUST algorithm
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([cast5],[CAST5 cipher])
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([blowfish],[BLOWFISH cipher])
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([aes128],[AES128 cipher])
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([aes192],[AES192 cipher])
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([aes256],[AES256 cipher])
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([twofish],[TWOFISH cipher])
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([camellia128],[CAMELLIA128 cipher])
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([camellia192],[CAMELLIA192 cipher])
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([camellia256],[CAMELLIA256 cipher])

	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([md5],[MD5 hash])
	# SHA1 is a MUST algorithm
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([rmd160],[RIPE-MD160 hash])
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([sha224],[SHA-224 hash])
	# SHA256 is a MUST algorithm for GnuPG.
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([sha384],[SHA-384 hash])
	GNUPG_GPG_DISABLE_ALGO([sha512],[SHA-512 hash])


	# Allow disabling of zip support.
	# This is in general not a good idea because according to rfc4880 OpenPGP
	# implementations SHOULD support ZLIB.
	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable the ZIP and ZLIB compression algorithm])
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(zip,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-zip],
	[disable the ZIP and ZLIB compression algorithm]),
	use_zip=$enableval)
	AC_MSG_RESULT($use_zip)

	# Allow disabling of bzib2 support.
	# It is defined only after we confirm the library is available later
	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable the BZIP2 compression algorithm])
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(bzip2,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-bzip2],[disable the BZIP2 compression algorithm]),
	use_bzip2=$enableval)
	AC_MSG_RESULT($use_bzip2)

	# Configure option to allow or disallow execution of external
	# programs, like a photo viewer.
	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable external program execution])
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(exec,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-exec],[disable all external program execution]),
	use_exec=$enableval)
	AC_MSG_RESULT($use_exec)
	if test "$use_exec" = no ; then
	AC_DEFINE(NO_EXEC,1,[Define to disable all external program execution])
	fi

	if test "$use_exec" = yes ; then
	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable photo ID viewing])
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(photo-viewers,
	[ --disable-photo-viewers disable photo ID viewers],
	[if test "$enableval" = no ; then
	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_PHOTO_VIEWER,1,[define to disable photo viewing])
	fi],enableval=yes)
	gnupg_cv_enable_photo_viewers=$enableval
	AC_MSG_RESULT($enableval)

	if test "$gnupg_cv_enable_photo_viewers" = yes ; then
	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to use a fixed photo ID viewer])
	AC_ARG_WITH(photo-viewer,
	[ --with-photo-viewer=FIXED_VIEWER set a fixed photo ID viewer],
	[if test "$withval" = yes ; then
	withval=no
	elif test "$withval" != no ; then
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(FIXED_PHOTO_VIEWER,"$withval",
	[if set, restrict photo-viewer to this])
	fi],withval=no)
	AC_MSG_RESULT($withval)
	fi
	fi


	#
	# Check for the key/uid cache size. This can't be zero, but can be
	# pretty small on embedded systems. This is used for the gpg part.
	#
	AC_MSG_CHECKING([for the size of the key and uid cache])
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(key-cache,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-key-cache=SIZE],
	[Set key cache to SIZE (default 4096)]),,enableval=4096)
	if test "$enableval" = "no"; then
	enableval=5
	elif test "$enableval" = "yes" \|\| test "$enableval" = ""; then
	enableval=4096
	fi
	changequote(,)dnl
	key_cache_size=`echo "$enableval" \| sed 's/[A-Za-z]//g'`
	changequote([,])dnl
	if test "$enableval" != "$key_cache_size" \|\| test "$key_cache_size" -lt 5; then
	AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid key-cache size])
	fi
	AC_MSG_RESULT($key_cache_size)
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PK_UID_CACHE_SIZE,$key_cache_size,
	[Size of the key and UID caches])



	#
	# Check whether we want to use Linux capabilities
	#
	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether use of capabilities is requested])
	AC_ARG_WITH(capabilities,
	[ --with-capabilities use linux capabilities [default=no]],
	[use_capabilities="$withval"],[use_capabilities=no])
	AC_MSG_RESULT($use_capabilities)

	#
	# Check whether to disable the card support
	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether smartcard support is requested])
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(card-support,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-card-support],
	[disable smartcard support]),
	card_support=$enableval)
	AC_MSG_RESULT($card_support)
	if test "$card_support" = yes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT,1,[Define to include smartcard support])
	else
	build_scdaemon=no
	fi

	#
	# Allow disabling of internal CCID support.
	# It is defined only after we confirm the library is available later
	#
	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable the internal CCID driver])
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(ccid-driver,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-ccid-driver],
	[disable the internal CCID driver]),
	use_ccid_driver=$enableval)
	AC_MSG_RESULT($use_ccid_driver)

	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to auto start dirmngr])
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(dirmngr-auto-start,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-dirmngr-auto-start],
	[disable auto starting of the dirmngr]),
	dirmngr_auto_start=$enableval)
	AC_MSG_RESULT($dirmngr_auto_start)
	if test "$dirmngr_auto_start" = yes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(USE_DIRMNGR_AUTO_START,1,
	[Define to enable auto starting of the dirmngr])
	fi


	#
	# To avoid double inclusion of config.h which might happen at some
	# places, we add the usual double inclusion protection at the top of
	# config.h.
	#
	AH_TOP([
	#ifndef GNUPG_CONFIG_H_INCLUDED
	#define GNUPG_CONFIG_H_INCLUDED
	])

	#
	# Stuff which goes at the bottom of config.h.
	#
	AH_BOTTOM([
	/* This is the major version number of GnuPG so that
	source included files can test for this. Note, that
	we use 2 here even for GnuPG 1.9.x. */
	#define GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION 2

	/* Now to separate file name parts.
	Please note that the string version must not contain more
	than one character because the code assumes strlen()==1 */
	#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
	#define DIRSEP_C '\\'
	#define DIRSEP_S "\\"
	#define EXTSEP_C '.'
	#define EXTSEP_S "."
	#define PATHSEP_C ';'
	#define PATHSEP_S ";"
	#define EXEEXT_S ".exe"
	#else
	#define DIRSEP_C '/'
	#define DIRSEP_S "/"
	#define EXTSEP_C '.'
	#define EXTSEP_S "."
	#define PATHSEP_C ':'
	#define PATHSEP_S ":"
	#define EXEEXT_S ""
	#endif

	/* This is the same as VERSION, but should be overridden if the
	platform cannot handle things like dots '.' in filenames. Set
	SAFE_VERSION_DOT and SAFE_VERSION_DASH to whatever SAFE_VERSION
	uses for dots and dashes. */
	#define SAFE_VERSION VERSION
	#define SAFE_VERSION_DOT '.'
	#define SAFE_VERSION_DASH '-'

	/* Some global constants. */
	#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
	# ifdef HAVE_DRIVE_LETTERS
	# define GNUPG_DEFAULT_HOMEDIR "c:/gnupg"
	# else
	# define GNUPG_DEFAULT_HOMEDIR "/gnupg"
	# endif
	#elif defined(__VMS)
	#define GNUPG_DEFAULT_HOMEDIR "/SYS$LOGIN/gnupg"
	#else
	#define GNUPG_DEFAULT_HOMEDIR "~/.gnupg"
	#endif
	#define GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR "private-keys-v1.d"
	#define GNUPG_OPENPGP_REVOC_DIR "openpgp-revocs.d"

	/* For some systems (DOS currently), we hardcode the path here. For
	POSIX systems the values are constructed by the Makefiles, so that
	the values may be overridden by the make invocations; this is to
	comply with the GNU coding standards. Note that these values are
	only defaults. */
	#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
	# ifdef HAVE_DRIVE_LETTERS
	# define GNUPG_BINDIR "c:\\gnupg"
	# define GNUPG_LIBEXECDIR "c:\\gnupg"
	# define GNUPG_LIBDIR "c:\\gnupg"
	# define GNUPG_DATADIR "c:\\gnupg"
	# define GNUPG_SYSCONFDIR "c:\\gnupg"
	# else
	# define GNUPG_BINDIR "\\gnupg"
	# define GNUPG_LIBEXECDIR "\\gnupg"
	# define GNUPG_LIBDIR "\\gnupg"
	# define GNUPG_DATADIR "\\gnupg"
	# define GNUPG_SYSCONFDIR "\\gnupg"
	# endif
	#endif

	/* Derive some other constants. */
	#if !(defined(HAVE_FORK) && defined(HAVE_PIPE) && defined(HAVE_WAITPID))
	#define EXEC_TEMPFILE_ONLY
	#endif


	/* We didn't define endianness above, so get it from OS macros. This
	is intended for making fat binary builds on OS X. */
	#if !defined(BIG_ENDIAN_HOST) && !defined(LITTLE_ENDIAN_HOST)
	#if defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__)
	#define BIG_ENDIAN_HOST 1
	#elif defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
	#define LITTLE_ENDIAN_HOST 1
	#else
	#error "No endianness found"
	#endif
	#endif


	/* Hack used for W32: ldap.m4 also tests for the ASCII version of
	ldap_start_tls_s because that is the actual symbol used in the
	library. winldap.h redefines it to our commonly used value,
	thus we define our usual macro here. */
	#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_SA
	# ifndef HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_S
	# define HAVE_LDAP_START_TLS_S 1
	# endif
	#endif

	/* Provide the es_ macro for estream. */
	#define GPGRT_ENABLE_ES_MACROS 1

	/* Tell libgcrypt not to use its own libgpg-error implementation. */
	#define USE_LIBGPG_ERROR 1

	/* Tell Libgcrypt not to include deprecated definitions. */
	#define GCRYPT_NO_DEPRECATED 1

	/* Our HTTP code is used in estream mode. */
	#define HTTP_USE_ESTREAM 1

	/* Under W32 we do an explicit socket initialization, thus we need to
	avoid the on-demand initialization which would also install an atexit
	handler. */
	#define HTTP_NO_WSASTARTUP

	/* Under Windows we use the gettext code from libgpg-error. */
	#define GPG_ERR_ENABLE_GETTEXT_MACROS

	/* Under WindowsCE we use the strerror replacement from libgpg-error. */
	#define GPG_ERR_ENABLE_ERRNO_MACROS

	#endif /GNUPG_CONFIG_H_INCLUDED/
	])


	AM_MAINTAINER_MODE
	AC_ARG_VAR(SYSROOT,[locate config scripts also below that directory])

	# Checks for programs.
	AC_MSG_NOTICE([checking for programs])
	AC_PROG_MAKE_SET
	AM_SANITY_CHECK
	missing_dir=`cd $ac_aux_dir && pwd`
	AM_MISSING_PROG(ACLOCAL, aclocal, $missing_dir)
	AM_MISSING_PROG(AUTOCONF, autoconf, $missing_dir)
	AM_MISSING_PROG(AUTOMAKE, automake, $missing_dir)
	AM_MISSING_PROG(AUTOHEADER, autoheader, $missing_dir)
	AM_MISSING_PROG(MAKEINFO, makeinfo, $missing_dir)
	AM_SILENT_RULES
	AC_PROG_AWK
	AC_PROG_CC
	AC_PROG_CPP
	AM_PROG_CC_C_O
	if test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" = "xno" ; then
	AC_MSG_ERROR([[No C-89 compiler found]])
	fi
	AC_PROG_INSTALL
	AC_PROG_LN_S
	AC_PROG_RANLIB
	AC_CHECK_TOOL(AR, ar, :)
	AC_PATH_PROG(PERL,"perl")
	AC_CHECK_TOOL(WINDRES, windres, :)
	AC_ISC_POSIX
	AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
	GNUPG_CHECK_USTAR

	# We need to compile and run a program on the build machine. A
	# comment in libgpg-error says that the AC_PROG_CC_FOR_BUILD macro in
	# the AC archive is broken for autoconf 2.57. Given that there is no
	# newer version of that macro, we assume that it is also broken for
	# autoconf 2.61 and thus we use a simple but usually sufficient
	# approach.
	AC_MSG_CHECKING(for cc for build)
	if test "$cross_compiling" = "yes"; then
	CC_FOR_BUILD="${CC_FOR_BUILD-cc}"
	else
	CC_FOR_BUILD="${CC_FOR_BUILD-$CC}"
	fi
	AC_MSG_RESULT($CC_FOR_BUILD)
	AC_ARG_VAR(CC_FOR_BUILD,[build system C compiler])



	try_gettext=yes
	require_iconv=yes
	have_dosish_system=no
	have_w32_system=no
	have_w32ce_system=no
	have_android_system=no
	run_tests=yes
	use_simple_gettext=no
	use_ldapwrapper=yes
	mmap_needed=yes
	case "${host}" in
	-mingw32)
	# special stuff for Windoze NT
	ac_cv_have_dev_random=no
	AC_DEFINE(USE_ONLY_8DOT3,1,
	[Set this to limit filenames to the 8.3 format])
	AC_DEFINE(USE_SIMPLE_GETTEXT,1,
	[Because the Unix gettext has too much overhead on
	MingW32 systems and these systems lack Posix functions,
	we use a simplified version of gettext])
	have_dosish_system=yes
	have_w32_system=yes
	run_tests=no
	use_ldapwrapper=no # Fixme: Do this only for CE.
	case "${host}" in
	-mingw32ce)
	have_w32ce_system=yes
	;;
	*)
	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DRIVE_LETTERS,1,
	[Defined if the OS supports drive letters.])
	;;
	esac
	try_gettext="no"
	use_simple_gettext=yes
	mmap_needed=no
	;;
	i?86-emx-os2 \| i?86--os2emx )
	# OS/2 with the EMX environment
	ac_cv_have_dev_random=no
	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DRIVE_LETTERS)
	have_dosish_system=yes
	try_gettext="no"
	;;

	i?86--msdosdjgpp)
	# DOS with the DJGPP environment
	ac_cv_have_dev_random=no
	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DRIVE_LETTERS)
	have_dosish_system=yes
	try_gettext="no"
	;;

	--hpux*)
	if test -z "$GCC" ; then
	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae -D_HPUX_SOURCE"
	fi
	;;
	-dec-osf4)
	if test -z "$GCC" ; then
	# Suppress all warnings
	# to get rid of the unsigned/signed char mismatch warnings.
	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -w"
	fi
	;;
	-dec-osf5)
	if test -z "$GCC" ; then
	# Use the newer compiler `-msg_disable ptrmismatch1' to
	# get rid of the unsigned/signed char mismatch warnings.
	# Using this may hide other pointer mismatch warnings, but
	# it at least lets other warning classes through
	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -msg_disable ptrmismatch1"
	fi
	;;
	m68k-atari-mint)
	;;
	*-linux-androideabi)
	have_android_system=yes
	# Android is fully utf-8 and we do not want to use iconv to
	# keeps things simple
	require_iconv=no
	run_tests=no
	;;
	*)
	;;
	esac

	if test "$have_dosish_system" = yes; then
	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM,1,
	[Defined if we run on some of the PCDOS like systems
	(DOS, Windoze. OS/2) with special properties like
	no file modes, case insensitive file names and preferred
	use of backslashes as directory name separators.])
	fi
	AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM, test "$have_dosish_system" = yes)

	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_SIMPLE_GETTEXT, test x"$use_simple_gettext" = xyes)

	if test "$have_w32_system" = yes; then
	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_W32_SYSTEM,1, [Defined if we run on a W32 API based system])
	if test "$have_w32ce_system" = yes; then
	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM,1,[Defined if we run on WindowsCE])
	fi
	fi
	AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_W32_SYSTEM, test "$have_w32_system" = yes)
	AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM, test "$have_w32ce_system" = yes)

	if test "$have_android_system" = yes; then
	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_ANDROID_SYSTEM,1, [Defined if we build for an Android system])
	fi
	AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_ANDROID_SYSTEM, test "$have_android_system" = yes)

	if test "$run_tests" = yes; then
	AC_DEFINE(RUN_TESTS,1, [Defined if we should run the tests])
	fi
	AM_CONDITIONAL(RUN_TESTS, test "$run_tests" = yes)


	# (These need to go after AC_PROG_CC so that $EXEEXT is defined)
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(EXEEXT,"$EXEEXT",[The executable file extension, if any])


	#
	# Checks for libraries.
	#
	AC_MSG_NOTICE([checking for libraries])


	#
	# libgpg-error is a library with error codes shared between GnuPG
	# related projects.
	#
	AM_PATH_GPG_ERROR("$NEED_GPG_ERROR_VERSION",
	have_gpg_error=yes,have_gpg_error=no)


	#
	# Libgcrypt is our generic crypto library
	#
	AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT("$NEED_LIBGCRYPT_API:$NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION",
	have_libgcrypt=yes,have_libgcrypt=no)


	#
	# libassuan is used for IPC
	#
	AM_PATH_LIBASSUAN("$NEED_LIBASSUAN_API:$NEED_LIBASSUAN_VERSION",
	have_libassuan=yes,have_libassuan=no)
	if test "$have_libassuan" = "yes"; then
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GNUPG_LIBASSUAN_VERSION, "$libassuan_version",
	[version of the libassuan library])
	fi



	#
	# libksba is our X.509 support library
	#
	AM_PATH_KSBA("$NEED_KSBA_API:$NEED_KSBA_VERSION",have_ksba=yes,have_ksba=no)


	#
	# libusb allows us to use the integrated CCID smartcard reader driver.
	#
	# FiXME: Use GNUPG_CHECK_LIBUSB and modify to use separate AC_SUBSTs.
	if test "$use_ccid_driver" = yes ; then
	AC_CHECK_LIB(usb, usb_bulk_write,
	[ LIBUSB_LIBS="$LIBUSB_LIBS -lusb"
	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBUSB,1,
	[defined if libusb is available])
	have_libusb=yes
	])
	AC_CHECK_FUNCS(usb_create_match)
	fi
	AC_SUBST(LIBUSB_LIBS)

	#
	# Check wether it is necessary to link against libdl.
	# (For example to load libpcsclite)
	#
	gnupg_dlopen_save_libs="$LIBS"
	LIBS=""
	AC_SEARCH_LIBS(dlopen, c dl,,,)
	DL_LIBS=$LIBS
	AC_SUBST(DL_LIBS)
	LIBS="$gnupg_dlopen_save_libs"

	+# Checks for g10
	+
	+PKG_CHECK_MODULES(SQLITE3, sqlite3)
	+AC_SUBST(SQLITE3_CFLAGS)
	+AC_SUBST(SQLITE3_LIBS)
	+
	# Checks for g13

	AC_PATH_PROG(ENCFS, encfs, /usr/bin/encfs)
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(ENCFS,
	"${ENCFS}", [defines the filename of the encfs program])

	AC_PATH_PROG(FUSERMOUNT, fusermount, /usr/bin/fusermount)
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(FUSERMOUNT,
	"${FUSERMOUNT}", [defines the filename of the fusermount program])


	# Checks for dirmngr


	#
	# Checks for symcryptrun:
	#

	# libutil has openpty() and login_tty().
	AC_CHECK_LIB(util, openpty,
	[ LIBUTIL_LIBS="$LIBUTIL_LIBS -lutil"
	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBUTIL,1,
	[defined if libutil is available])
	])
	AC_SUBST(LIBUTIL_LIBS)

	# shred is used to clean temporary plain text files.
	AC_PATH_PROG(SHRED, shred, /usr/bin/shred)
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHRED,
	"${SHRED}", [defines the filename of the shred program])


	#
	# Check whether the nPth library is available
	#
	AM_PATH_NPTH("$NEED_NPTH_API:$NEED_NPTH_VERSION",have_npth=yes,have_npth=no)
	if test "$have_npth" = "yes"; then
	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NPTH, 1,
	[Defined if the New Portable Thread Library is available])
	AC_DEFINE(USE_NPTH, 1,
	[Defined if support for nPth is requested and nPth is available])
	else
	AC_MSG_WARN([[
	***
	*** To support concurrent access for example in gpg-agent and the SCdaemon
	*** we need the support of the New Portable Threads Library.
	***]])
	fi


	#
	# NTBTLS is our TLS library. If it is not available fallback to
	# GNUTLS.
	#
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(ntbtls,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-ntbtls],
	[disable the use of NTBTLS as TLS library]),
	try_ntbtls=$enableval, try_ntbtls=yes)
	if test x"$try_ntbtls" = xyes ; then
	AM_PATH_NTBTLS("$NEED_NTBTLS_API:$NEED_NTBTLS_VERSION",
	[have_ntbtls=yes],[have_ntbtls=no])
	fi
	if test "$have_ntbtls" = yes ; then
	use_tls_library=ntbtls
	AC_DEFINE(HTTP_USE_NTBTLS, 1, [Enable NTBTLS support in http.c])
	else
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(gnutls,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-gnutls],
	[disable GNUTLS as fallback TLS library]),
	try_gnutls=$enableval, try_gnutls=yes)
	if test x"$try_gnutls" = xyes ; then
	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([LIBGNUTLS], [gnutls >= $NEED_GNUTLS_VERSION],
	[have_gnutls=yes],
	[have_gnutls=no])
	fi
	if test "$have_gnutls" = "yes"; then
	AC_SUBST([LIBGNUTLS_CFLAGS])
	AC_SUBST([LIBGNUTLS_LIBS])
	use_tls_library=gnutls
	AC_DEFINE(HTTP_USE_GNUTLS, 1, [Enable GNUTLS support in http.c])
	else
	tmp=$(echo "$LIBGNUTLS_PKG_ERRORS" \| tr '\n' '\v' \| sed 's/\v/\n*** /g')
	AC_MSG_WARN([[
	***
	*** Building without NTBTLS and GNUTLS - no TLS access to keyservers.
	***
	*** $tmp]])
	fi
	fi


	AC_MSG_NOTICE([checking for networking options])

	#
	# Must check for network library requirements before doing link tests
	# for ldap, for example. If ldap libs are static (or dynamic and without
	# ELF runtime link paths), then link will fail and LDAP support won't
	# be detected.
	#
	AC_CHECK_FUNC(gethostbyname, , AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, gethostbyname,
	[NETLIBS="-lnsl $NETLIBS"]))
	AC_CHECK_FUNC(setsockopt, , AC_CHECK_LIB(socket, setsockopt,
	[NETLIBS="-lsocket $NETLIBS"]))


	#
	# Check for ADNS.
	#
	_cppflags="${CPPFLAGS}"
	_ldflags="${LDFLAGS}"
	AC_ARG_WITH(adns,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--with-adns=DIR],
	[look for the adns library in DIR]),
	[if test -d "$withval"; then
	CPPFLAGS="${CPPFLAGS} -I$withval/include"
	LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} -L$withval/lib"
	fi])
	if test "$with_adns" != "no"; then
	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(adns.h,
	AC_CHECK_LIB(adns, adns_free,
	[have_adns=yes],
	[CPPFLAGS=${_cppflags} LDFLAGS=${_ldflags}]),
	[CPPFLAGS=${_cppflags} LDFLAGS=${_ldflags}])
	fi
	if test "$have_adns" = "yes"; then
	ADNSLIBS="-ladns"
	fi


	#
	# Now try for the resolver functions so we can use DNS for SRV, PA and CERT.
	#
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(dns-srv,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-dns-srv],
	[disable the use of DNS SRV in HKP and HTTP]),
	use_dns_srv=$enableval,use_dns_srv=yes)

	AC_ARG_ENABLE(dns-cert,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-dns-cert],
	[disable the use of CERT records in DNS]),
	use_dns_cert=$enableval,use_dns_cert=yes)

	if test x"$use_dns_srv" = xyes \|\| test x"$use_dns_cert" = xyes; then
	_dns_save_libs=$LIBS
	LIBS=""
	# the double underscore thing is a glibc-ism?
	AC_SEARCH_LIBS(res_query,resolv bind,,
	AC_SEARCH_LIBS(__res_query,resolv bind,,have_resolver=no))
	AC_SEARCH_LIBS(dn_expand,resolv bind,,
	AC_SEARCH_LIBS(__dn_expand,resolv bind,,have_resolver=no))
	AC_SEARCH_LIBS(dn_skipname,resolv bind,,
	AC_SEARCH_LIBS(__dn_skipname,resolv bind,,have_resolver=no))

	if test x"$have_resolver" != xno ; then

	# Make sure that the BIND 4 resolver interface is workable before
	# enabling any code that calls it. At some point I'll rewrite the
	# code to use the BIND 8 resolver API.
	# We might also want to use adns instead. Problem with ADNS is that
	# it does not support v6.

	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether the resolver is usable])
	AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include <sys/types.h>
	#include <netinet/in.h>
	#include <arpa/nameser.h>
	#include <resolv.h>]],
	[[unsigned char answer[PACKETSZ];
	res_query("foo.bar",C_IN,T_A,answer,PACKETSZ);
	dn_skipname(0,0);
	dn_expand(0,0,0,0,0);
	]])],have_resolver=yes,have_resolver=no)
	AC_MSG_RESULT($have_resolver)

	# This is Apple-specific and somewhat bizarre as they changed the
	# define in bind 8 for some reason.

	if test x"$have_resolver" != xyes ; then
	AC_MSG_CHECKING(
	[whether I can make the resolver usable with BIND_8_COMPAT])
	AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#define BIND_8_COMPAT
	#include <sys/types.h>
	#include <netinet/in.h>
	#include <arpa/nameser.h>
	#include <resolv.h>]],
	[[unsigned char answer[PACKETSZ];
	res_query("foo.bar",C_IN,T_A,answer,PACKETSZ);
	dn_skipname(0,0); dn_expand(0,0,0,0,0);
	]])],[have_resolver=yes ; need_compat=yes])
	AC_MSG_RESULT($have_resolver)
	fi
	fi

	if test x"$have_resolver" = xyes ; then
	DNSLIBS=$LIBS

	if test x"$use_dns_srv" = xyes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(USE_DNS_SRV,1,[define to use DNS SRV])
	fi

	if test x"$use_dns_cert" = xyes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(USE_DNS_CERT,1,[define to use DNS CERT])
	fi

	if test x"$need_compat" = xyes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(BIND_8_COMPAT,1,[an Apple OSXism])
	fi
	else
	# If we have no resolver library but ADNS (e.g. under W32) enable the
	# code parts which can be used with ADNS.
	if test x"$have_adns" = xyes ; then
	DNSLIBS="$ADNSLIBS"
	AC_DEFINE(USE_ADNS,1,[Use ADNS as resolver library.])

	if test x"$use_dns_srv" = xyes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(USE_DNS_SRV,1)
	fi

	if test x"$use_dns_cert" = xyes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(USE_DNS_CERT,1,[define to use DNS CERT])
	fi
	else
	use_dns_srv=no
	use_dns_cert=no
	fi
	fi

	LIBS=$_dns_save_libs
	fi

	AC_SUBST(DNSLIBS)

	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_DNS_SRV, test x"$use_dns_srv" = xyes)


	#
	# Check for LDAP
	#
	# Note that running the check changes the variable
	# gnupg_have_ldap from "n/a" to "no" or "yes".

	AC_ARG_ENABLE(ldap,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-ldap],[disable LDAP support]),
	[if test "$enableval" = "no"; then gnupg_have_ldap=no; fi])

	if test "$gnupg_have_ldap" != "no" ; then
	if test "$build_dirmngr" = "yes" ; then
	GNUPG_CHECK_LDAP($NETLIBS)
	AC_CHECK_LIB(lber, ber_free,
	[ LBER_LIBS="$LBER_LIBS -llber"
	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LBER,1,
	[defined if liblber is available])
	have_lber=yes
	])
	fi
	fi
	AC_SUBST(LBER_LIBS)
	if test "$gnupg_have_ldap" = "no"; then
	AC_MSG_WARN([[
	***
	*** Building without LDAP support.
	*** No CRL access or X.509 certificate search available.
	***]])
	fi

	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_LDAP, [test "$gnupg_have_ldap" = yes])
	if test "$gnupg_have_ldap" = yes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(USE_LDAP,1,[Defined if LDAP is support])
	else
	use_ldapwrapper=no
	fi

	if test "$use_ldapwrapper" = yes; then
	AC_DEFINE(USE_LDAPWRAPPER,1, [Build dirmngr with LDAP wrapper process])
	fi
	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_LDAPWRAPPER, test "$use_ldapwrapper" = yes)




	#
	# Check for sendmail
	#
	# This isn't necessarily sendmail itself, but anything that gives a
	# sendmail-ish interface to the outside world. That includes Exim,
	# Postfix, etc. Basically, anything that can handle "sendmail -t".
	AC_ARG_WITH(mailprog,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--with-mailprog=NAME],
	[use "NAME -t" for mail transport]),
	,with_mailprog=yes)
	if test x"$with_mailprog" = xyes ; then
	AC_PATH_PROG(SENDMAIL,sendmail,,$PATH:/usr/sbin:/usr/libexec:/usr/lib)
	elif test x"$with_mailprog" != xno ; then
	AC_MSG_CHECKING([for a mail transport program])
	AC_SUBST(SENDMAIL,$with_mailprog)
	AC_MSG_RESULT($with_mailprog)
	fi


	#
	# Construct a printable name of the OS
	#
	case "${host}" in
	-mingw32ce)
	PRINTABLE_OS_NAME="W32CE"
	;;
	-mingw32)
	PRINTABLE_OS_NAME="MingW32"
	;;
	--cygwin*)
	PRINTABLE_OS_NAME="Cygwin"
	;;
	i?86-emx-os2 \| i?86--os2emx )
	PRINTABLE_OS_NAME="OS/2"
	;;
	i?86--msdosdjgpp)
	PRINTABLE_OS_NAME="MSDOS/DJGPP"
	try_dynload=no
	;;
	-linux)
	PRINTABLE_OS_NAME="GNU/Linux"
	;;
	*)
	PRINTABLE_OS_NAME=`uname -s \|\| echo "Unknown"`
	;;
	esac
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PRINTABLE_OS_NAME, "$PRINTABLE_OS_NAME",
	[A human readable text with the name of the OS])


	#
	# Checking for iconv
	#
	if test "$require_iconv" = yes; then
	AM_ICONV
	else
	LIBICONV=
	LTLIBICONV=
	AC_SUBST(LIBICONV)
	AC_SUBST(LTLIBICONV)
	fi


	#
	# Check for gettext
	#
	# This is "GNU gnupg" - The project-id script from gettext
	# needs this string
	#
	AC_MSG_NOTICE([checking for gettext])
	AM_PO_SUBDIRS
	AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION([0.17])
	if test "$try_gettext" = yes; then
	AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external],[need-ngettext])

	# gettext requires some extra checks. These really should be part of
	# the basic AM_GNU_GETTEXT macro. TODO: move other gettext-specific
	# function checks to here.

	AC_CHECK_FUNCS(strchr)
	else
	USE_NLS=no
	USE_INCLUDED_LIBINTL=no
	BUILD_INCLUDED_LIBINTL=no
	POSUB=po
	AC_SUBST(USE_NLS)
	AC_SUBST(USE_INCLUDED_LIBINTL)
	AC_SUBST(BUILD_INCLUDED_LIBINTL)
	AC_SUBST(POSUB)
	fi

	# We use HAVE_LANGINFO_CODESET in a couple of places.
	AM_LANGINFO_CODESET

	# Checks required for our use of locales
	gt_LC_MESSAGES


	#
	# SELinux support
	#
	if test "$selinux_support" = yes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS,1,[Define to enable SELinux support])
	fi


	#
	# Checks for header files.
	#
	AC_MSG_NOTICE([checking for header files])
	AC_HEADER_STDC
	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([string.h unistd.h langinfo.h termio.h locale.h getopt.h \
	pty.h utmp.h pwd.h inttypes.h signal.h sys/select.h \
	signal.h])
	AC_HEADER_TIME


	#
	# Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics.
	#
	AC_MSG_NOTICE([checking for system characteristics])
	AC_C_CONST
	AC_C_INLINE
	AC_C_VOLATILE
	AC_TYPE_SIZE_T
	AC_TYPE_MODE_T
	AC_TYPE_SIGNAL
	AC_DECL_SYS_SIGLIST

	gl_HEADER_SYS_SOCKET
	gl_TYPE_SOCKLEN_T

	AC_SEARCH_LIBS([inet_addr], [nsl])

	AC_ARG_ENABLE(endian-check,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-endian-check],
	[disable the endian check and trust the OS provided macros]),
	endiancheck=$enableval,endiancheck=yes)

	if test x"$endiancheck" = xyes ; then
	GNUPG_CHECK_ENDIAN
	fi

	# fixme: we should get rid of the byte type
	GNUPG_CHECK_TYPEDEF(byte, HAVE_BYTE_TYPEDEF)
	GNUPG_CHECK_TYPEDEF(ushort, HAVE_USHORT_TYPEDEF)
	GNUPG_CHECK_TYPEDEF(ulong, HAVE_ULONG_TYPEDEF)
	GNUPG_CHECK_TYPEDEF(u16, HAVE_U16_TYPEDEF)
	GNUPG_CHECK_TYPEDEF(u32, HAVE_U32_TYPEDEF)

	AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(unsigned short)
	AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(unsigned int)
	AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(unsigned long)
	AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(unsigned long long)
	AC_HEADER_TIME
	AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(time_t,,[[
	#include <stdio.h>
	#if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
	# include <sys/time.h>
	# include <time.h>
	#else
	# if HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
	# include <sys/time.h>
	# else
	# include <time.h>
	# endif
	#endif
	]])
	GNUPG_TIME_T_UNSIGNED


	if test "$ac_cv_sizeof_unsigned_short" = "0" \
	\|\| test "$ac_cv_sizeof_unsigned_int" = "0" \
	\|\| test "$ac_cv_sizeof_unsigned_long" = "0"; then
	AC_MSG_WARN([Hmmm, something is wrong with the sizes - using defaults]);
	fi


	#
	# Checks for library functions.
	#
	AC_MSG_NOTICE([checking for library functions])
	AC_CHECK_DECLS(getpagesize)
	AC_FUNC_FSEEKO
	AC_FUNC_VPRINTF
	AC_FUNC_FORK
	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strerror strlwr tcgetattr mmap canonicalize_file_name])
	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strcasecmp strncasecmp ctermid times gmtime_r strtoull])
	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setenv unsetenv fcntl ftruncate inet_ntop])
	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([canonicalize_file_name])
	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gettimeofday getrusage getrlimit setrlimit clock_gettime])
	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([atexit raise getpagesize strftime nl_langinfo setlocale])
	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([waitpid wait4 sigaction sigprocmask pipe getaddrinfo])
	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ttyname rand ftello fsync stat lstat])
	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([memicmp stpcpy strsep strlwr strtoul memmove stricmp strtol \
	memrchr isascii timegm getrusage setrlimit stat setlocale \
	flockfile funlockfile fopencookie funopen getpwnam getpwuid \
	getenv inet_pton strpbrk])

	if test "$have_android_system" = yes; then
	# On Android ttyname is a stub but prints an error message.
	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BROKEN_TTYNAME,1,
	[Defined if ttyname does not work properly])
	fi

	AC_CHECK_TYPES([struct sigaction, sigset_t],,,[#include <signal.h>])

	# Dirmngr requires mmap on Unix systems.
	if test $ac_cv_func_mmap != yes -a $mmap_needed = yes; then
	AC_MSG_ERROR([[Sorry, the current implemenation requires mmap.]])
	fi

	#
	# W32 specific test
	#
	GNUPG_FUNC_MKDIR_TAKES_ONE_ARG

	#
	# Sanity check regex. Tests adapted from mutt.
	#
	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether regular expression support is requested])
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(regex,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-regex],
	[do not handle regular expressions in trust signatures]),
	use_regex=$enableval, use_regex=yes)
	AC_MSG_RESULT($use_regex)

	if test "$use_regex" = yes ; then
	_cppflags="${CPPFLAGS}"
	_ldflags="${LDFLAGS}"
	AC_ARG_WITH(regex,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--with-regex=DIR],[look for regex in DIR]),
	[
	if test -d "$withval" ; then
	CPPFLAGS="${CPPFLAGS} -I$withval/include"
	LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} -L$withval/lib"
	fi
	],withval="")

	# Does the system have regex functions at all?
	AC_SEARCH_LIBS([regcomp], [regex])
	AC_CHECK_FUNC(regcomp, gnupg_cv_have_regex=yes, gnupg_cv_have_regex=no)

	if test $gnupg_cv_have_regex = no; then
	use_regex=no
	else
	if test x"$cross_compiling" = xyes; then
	AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling; assuming regexp libray is not broken])
	else
	AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether your system's regexp library is broken],
	[gnupg_cv_regex_broken],
	AC_TRY_RUN([
	#include <unistd.h>
	#include <regex.h>
	main() { regex_t blah ; regmatch_t p; p.rm_eo = p.rm_eo; return regcomp(&blah, "foo.*bar", REG_NOSUB) \|\| regexec (&blah, "foobar", 0, NULL, 0); }],
	gnupg_cv_regex_broken=no, gnupg_cv_regex_broken=yes, gnupg_cv_regex_broken=yes))

	if test $gnupg_cv_regex_broken = yes; then
	AC_MSG_WARN([your regex is broken - disabling regex use])
	use_regex=no
	fi
	fi
	fi
	CPPFLAGS="${_cppflags}"
	LDFLAGS="${_ldflags}"
	fi

	if test "$use_regex" != yes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_REGEX,1, [Define to disable regular expression support])
	fi
	AM_CONDITIONAL(DISABLE_REGEX, test x"$use_regex" != xyes)



	#
	# Do we have zlib? Must do it here because Solaris failed
	# when compiling a conftest (due to the "-lz" from LIBS).
	# Note that we combine zlib and bzlib2 in ZLIBS.
	#
	if test "$use_zip" = yes ; then
	_cppflags="${CPPFLAGS}"
	_ldflags="${LDFLAGS}"
	AC_ARG_WITH(zlib,
	[ --with-zlib=DIR use libz in DIR],[
	if test -d "$withval"; then
	CPPFLAGS="${CPPFLAGS} -I$withval/include"
	LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} -L$withval/lib"
	fi
	])

	AC_CHECK_HEADER(zlib.h,
	AC_CHECK_LIB(z, deflateInit2_,
	[
	ZLIBS="-lz"
	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_ZIP,1, [Defined if ZIP and ZLIB are supported])
	],
	CPPFLAGS=${_cppflags} LDFLAGS=${_ldflags}),
	CPPFLAGS=${_cppflags} LDFLAGS=${_ldflags})
	fi


	#
	# Check whether we can support bzip2
	#
	if test "$use_bzip2" = yes ; then
	_cppflags="${CPPFLAGS}"
	_ldflags="${LDFLAGS}"
	AC_ARG_WITH(bzip2,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--with-bzip2=DIR],[look for bzip2 in DIR]),
	[
	if test -d "$withval" ; then
	CPPFLAGS="${CPPFLAGS} -I$withval/include"
	LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} -L$withval/lib"
	fi
	],withval="")

	# Checking alongside stdio.h as an early version of bzip2 (1.0)
	# required stdio.h to be included before bzlib.h, and Solaris 9 is
	# woefully out of date.
	if test "$withval" != no ; then
	AC_CHECK_HEADER(bzlib.h,
	AC_CHECK_LIB(bz2,BZ2_bzCompressInit,
	[
	have_bz2=yes
	ZLIBS="$ZLIBS -lbz2"
	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BZIP2,1,
	[Defined if the bz2 compression library is available])
	],
	CPPFLAGS=${_cppflags} LDFLAGS=${_ldflags}),
	CPPFLAGS=${_cppflags} LDFLAGS=${_ldflags},[#include <stdio.h>])
	fi
	fi
	AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_BZIP2_SUPPORT,test x"$have_bz2" = "xyes")
	AC_SUBST(ZLIBS)


	# Check for readline support
	GNUPG_CHECK_READLINE


	if test "$development_version" = yes; then
	AC_DEFINE(IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION,1,
	[Defined if this is not a regular release])
	fi

	AM_CONDITIONAL(CROSS_COMPILING, test x$cross_compiling = xyes)

	GNUPG_CHECK_GNUMAKE

	# Add some extra libs here so that previous tests don't fail for
	# mysterious reasons - the final link step should bail out.
	# W32SOCKLIBS is also defined so that if can be used for tools not
	# requiring any network stuff but linking to code in libcommon which
	# tracks in winsock stuff (e.g. init_common_subsystems).
	if test "$have_w32_system" = yes; then
	if test "$have_w32ce_system" = yes; then
	W32SOCKLIBS="-lws2"
	else
	W32SOCKLIBS="-lws2_32"
	fi
	NETLIBS="${NETLIBS} ${W32SOCKLIBS}"
	fi

	AC_SUBST(NETLIBS)
	AC_SUBST(W32SOCKLIBS)

	#
	# Setup gcc specific options
	#
	AC_MSG_NOTICE([checking for cc features])
	if test "$GCC" = yes; then
	# Check whether gcc does not emit a diagnositc for unknow -Wno-*
	# options. This is the case for gcc >= 4.6
	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if gcc ignores unknown -Wno-* options])
	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
	#if __GNUC__ < 4 \|\| (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ < 6 )
	#kickerror
	#endif]],[])],[_gcc_silent_wno=yes],[_gcc_silent_wno=no])
	AC_MSG_RESULT($_gcc_silent_wno)

	# Note that it is okay to use CFLAGS here because these are just
	# warning options and the user should have a chance of overriding
	# them.
	if test "$USE_MAINTAINER_MODE" = "yes"; then
	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -O3 -Wall -Wcast-align -Wshadow -Wstrict-prototypes"
	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wformat -Wno-format-y2k -Wformat-security"
	if test x"$_gcc_silent_wno" = xyes ; then
	_gcc_wopt=yes
	else
	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if gcc supports -Wno-missing-field-initializers])
	_gcc_cflags_save=$CFLAGS
	CFLAGS="-Wno-missing-field-initializers"
	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([],[])],
	[_gcc_wopt=yes],[_gcc_wopt=no])
	AC_MSG_RESULT($_gcc_wopt)
	CFLAGS=$_gcc_cflags_save;
	fi
	if test x"$_gcc_wopt" = xyes ; then
	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -W -Wno-sign-compare -Wno-missing-field-initializers"
	fi

	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if gcc supports -Wdeclaration-after-statement])
	_gcc_cflags_save=$CFLAGS
	CFLAGS="-Wdeclaration-after-statement"
	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([],[])],_gcc_wopt=yes,_gcc_wopt=no)
	AC_MSG_RESULT($_gcc_wopt)
	CFLAGS=$_gcc_cflags_save;
	if test x"$_gcc_wopt" = xyes ; then
	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wdeclaration-after-statement"
	fi
	else
	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wall"
	fi

	if test x"$_gcc_silent_wno" = xyes ; then
	_gcc_psign=yes
	else
	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if gcc supports -Wno-pointer-sign])
	_gcc_cflags_save=$CFLAGS
	CFLAGS="-Wno-pointer-sign"
	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([],[])],
	[_gcc_psign=yes],[_gcc_psign=no])
	AC_MSG_RESULT($_gcc_psign)
	CFLAGS=$_gcc_cflags_save;
	fi
	if test x"$_gcc_psign" = xyes ; then
	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wno-pointer-sign"
	fi

	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if gcc supports -Wpointer-arith])
	_gcc_cflags_save=$CFLAGS
	CFLAGS="-Wpointer-arith"
	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([],[])],_gcc_psign=yes,_gcc_psign=no)
	AC_MSG_RESULT($_gcc_psign)
	CFLAGS=$_gcc_cflags_save;
	if test x"$_gcc_psign" = xyes ; then
	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wpointer-arith"
	fi
	fi


	#
	# This is handy for debugging so the compiler doesn't rearrange
	# things and eliminate variables.
	#
	AC_ARG_ENABLE(optimization,
	AC_HELP_STRING([--disable-optimization],
	[disable compiler optimization]),
	[if test $enableval = no ; then
	CFLAGS=`echo $CFLAGS \| sed s/-O[[1-9]]\ /-O0\ /g`
	fi])

	#
	# Decide what to build
	#

	build_scdaemon_extra=""
	if test "$build_scdaemon" = "yes"; then
	if test $have_libusb = no; then
	build_scdaemon_extra="without internal CCID driver"
	fi
	if test -n "$build_scdaemon_extra"; then
	build_scdaemon_extra="(${build_scdaemon_extra})"
	fi
	fi


	#
	# Set variables for use by automake makefiles.
	#
	AM_CONDITIONAL(BUILD_GPG, test "$build_gpg" = "yes")
	AM_CONDITIONAL(BUILD_GPGSM, test "$build_gpgsm" = "yes")
	AM_CONDITIONAL(BUILD_AGENT, test "$build_agent" = "yes")
	AM_CONDITIONAL(BUILD_SCDAEMON, test "$build_scdaemon" = "yes")
	AM_CONDITIONAL(BUILD_G13, test "$build_g13" = "yes")
	AM_CONDITIONAL(BUILD_DIRMNGR, test "$build_dirmngr" = "yes")
	AM_CONDITIONAL(BUILD_TOOLS, test "$build_tools" = "yes")
	AM_CONDITIONAL(BUILD_DOC, test "$build_doc" = "yes")
	AM_CONDITIONAL(BUILD_SYMCRYPTRUN, test "$build_symcryptrun" = "yes")
	AM_CONDITIONAL(BUILD_GPGTAR, test "$build_gpgtar" = "yes")

	AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT, test "$card_support" = yes)
	AM_CONDITIONAL(NO_TRUST_MODELS, test "$use_trust_models" = no)

	AM_CONDITIONAL(RUN_GPG_TESTS,
	test x$cross_compiling = xno -a "$build_gpg" = yes )

	#
	# Set some defines for use gpgconf.
	#
	if test "$build_gpg" = yes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(BUILD_WITH_GPG,1,[Defined if GPG is to be build])
	fi
	if test "$build_gpgsm" = yes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(BUILD_WITH_GPGSM,1,[Defined if GPGSM is to be build])
	fi
	if test "$build_agent" = yes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(BUILD_WITH_AGENT,1,[Defined if GPG-AGENT is to be build])
	fi
	if test "$build_scdaemon" = yes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(BUILD_WITH_SCDAEMON,1,[Defined if SCDAEMON is to be build])
	fi
	if test "$build_dirmngr" = yes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(BUILD_WITH_DIRMNGR,1,[Defined if SCDAEMON is to be build])
	fi
	if test "$build_g13" = yes ; then
	AC_DEFINE(BUILD_WITH_G13,1,[Defined if G13 is to be build])
	fi


	#
	# Define Name strings
	#
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GNUPG_NAME, "GnuPG", [The name of the project])

	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPG_NAME, "gpg", [The name of the OpenPGP tool])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPG_DISP_NAME, "GnuPG", [The displayed name of gpg])

	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPGSM_NAME, "gpgsm", [The name of the S/MIME tool])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPGSM_DISP_NAME, "GPGSM", [The displayed name of gpgsm])

	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPG_AGENT_NAME, "gpg-agent", [The name of the agent])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPG_AGENT_DISP_NAME, "GPG Agent",
	[The displayed name of gpg-agent])

	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SCDAEMON_NAME, "scdaemon", [The name of the scdaemon])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SCDAEMON_DISP_NAME, "SCDaemon",
	[The displayed name of scdaemon])

	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DIRMNGR_NAME, "dirmngr", [The name of the dirmngr])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DIRMNGR_DISP_NAME, "DirMngr",
	[The displayed name of dirmngr])

	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(G13_NAME, "g13", [The name of the g13 tool])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(G13_DISP_NAME, "G13", [The displayed name of g13])

	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPGCONF_NAME, "gpgconf", [The name of the gpgconf tool])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPGCONF_DISP_NAME, "GPGConf",
	[The displayed name of gpgconf])

	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPGTAR_NAME, "gpgtar", [The name of the gpgtar tool])

	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPG_AGENT_SOCK_NAME, "S.gpg-agent",
	[The name of the agent socket])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPG_AGENT_SSH_SOCK_NAME, "S.gpg-agent.ssh",
	[The name of the agent socket for ssh])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DIRMNGR_INFO_NAME, "DIRMNGR_INFO",
	[The name of the dirmngr info envvar])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SCDAEMON_SOCK_NAME, "S.scdaemon",
	[The name of the SCdaemon socket])
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DIRMNGR_SOCK_NAME, "S.dirmngr",
	[The name of the dirmngr socket])

	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPGEXT_GPG, "gpg", [The standard binary file suffix])

	if test "$have_w32_system" = yes; then
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GNUPG_REGISTRY_DIR, "\\\\Software\\\\GNU\\\\GnuPG",
	[The directory part of the W32 registry keys])
	fi


	#
	# Provide information about the build.
	#
	BUILD_REVISION="mym4_revision"
	AC_SUBST(BUILD_REVISION)
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(BUILD_REVISION, "$BUILD_REVISION",
	[GIT commit id revision used to build this package])

	changequote(,)dnl
	BUILD_VERSION=`echo "$VERSION" \| sed 's/$[0-9.]$./\1./'`
	changequote([,])dnl
	BUILD_VERSION="${BUILD_VERSION}mym4_revision_dec"
	BUILD_FILEVERSION=`echo "${BUILD_VERSION}" \| tr . ,`
	AC_SUBST(BUILD_VERSION)
	AC_SUBST(BUILD_FILEVERSION)

	AC_ARG_ENABLE([build-timestamp],
	AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-build-timestamp],
	[set an explicit build timestamp for reproducibility.
	(default is the current time in ISO-8601 format)]),
	[if test "$enableval" = "yes"; then
	BUILD_TIMESTAMP=`date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M+0000 2>/dev/null \|\| date`
	else
	BUILD_TIMESTAMP="$enableval"
	fi],
	[BUILD_TIMESTAMP="<none>"])
	AC_SUBST(BUILD_TIMESTAMP)
	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(BUILD_TIMESTAMP, "$BUILD_TIMESTAMP",
	[The time this package was configured for a build])
	BUILD_HOSTNAME="$ac_hostname"
	AC_SUBST(BUILD_HOSTNAME)


	#
	# Print errors here so that they are visible all
	# together and the user can acquire them all together.
	#
	die=no
	if test "$have_gpg_error" = "no"; then
	die=yes
	AC_MSG_NOTICE([[
	***
	*** You need libgpg-error to build this program.
	** This library is for example available at
	*** ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgpg-error
	*** (at least version $NEED_GPG_ERROR_VERSION is required.)
	***]])
	fi
	if test "$have_libgcrypt" = "no"; then
	die=yes
	AC_MSG_NOTICE([[
	***
	*** You need libgcrypt to build this program.
	** This library is for example available at
	*** ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libgcrypt/
	*** (at least version $NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION (API $NEED_LIBGCRYPT_API) is required.)
	***]])
	fi
	if test "$have_libassuan" = "no"; then
	die=yes
	AC_MSG_NOTICE([[
	***
	*** You need libassuan to build this program.
	*** This library is for example available at
	*** ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libassuan/
	*** (at least version $NEED_LIBASSUAN_VERSION (API $NEED_LIBASSUAN_API) is required).
	***]])
	fi
	if test "$have_ksba" = "no"; then
	die=yes
	AC_MSG_NOTICE([[
	***
	*** You need libksba to build this program.
	*** This library is for example available at
	*** ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/libksba/
	*** (at least version $NEED_KSBA_VERSION using API $NEED_KSBA_API is required).
	***]])
	fi
	if test "$gnupg_have_ldap" = yes; then
	if test "$have_w32ce_system" = yes; then
	AC_MSG_NOTICE([[
	*** Note that CeGCC might be broken, a package fixing this is:
	*** http://files.kolab.org/local/windows-ce/
	*** source/wldap32_0.1-mingw32ce.orig.tar.gz
	*** binary/wldap32-ce-arm-dev_0.1-1_all.deb
	***]])
	fi
	fi
	if test "$have_npth" = "no"; then
	die=yes
	AC_MSG_NOTICE([[
	***
	*** It is now required to build with support for the
	*** New Portable Threads Library (nPth). Please install this
	*** library first. The library is for example available at
	*** ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/npth/
	*** (at least version $NEED_NPTH_VERSION (API $NEED_NPTH_API) is required).
	***]])
	fi

	if test "$require_iconv" = yes; then
	if test "$am_func_iconv" != yes; then
	die=yes
	AC_MSG_NOTICE([[
	***
	*** The system does not provide a working iconv function. Please
	*** install a suitable library; for example GNU Libiconv which is
	*** available at:
	*** http://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/libiconv/
	***]])
	fi
	fi

	if test "$die" = "yes"; then
	AC_MSG_ERROR([[
	***
	*** Required libraries not found. Please consult the above messages
	*** and install them before running configure again.
	***]])
	fi



	AC_CONFIG_FILES([ m4/Makefile
	Makefile
	po/Makefile.in
	common/Makefile
	common/w32info-rc.h
	kbx/Makefile
	g10/Makefile
	sm/Makefile
	agent/Makefile
	scd/Makefile
	g13/Makefile
	dirmngr/Makefile
	tools/gpg-zip
	tools/Makefile
	doc/Makefile
	tests/Makefile
	tests/openpgp/Makefile
	tests/pkits/Makefile
	g10/gpg.w32-manifest
	])


	AC_OUTPUT


	echo "
	GnuPG v${VERSION} has been configured as follows:

	Revision: mym4_revision (mym4_revision_dec)
	Platform: $PRINTABLE_OS_NAME ($host)

	OpenPGP: $build_gpg
	S/MIME: $build_gpgsm
	Agent: $build_agent
	Smartcard: $build_scdaemon $build_scdaemon_extra
	G13: $build_g13
	Dirmngr: $build_dirmngr
	Gpgtar: $build_gpgtar

	Protect tool: $show_gnupg_protect_tool_pgm
	LDAP wrapper: $show_gnupg_dirmngr_ldap_pgm
	Default agent: $show_gnupg_agent_pgm
	Default pinentry: $show_gnupg_pinentry_pgm
	Default scdaemon: $show_gnupg_scdaemon_pgm
	Default dirmngr: $show_gnupg_dirmngr_pgm

	Dirmngr auto start: $dirmngr_auto_start
	Readline support: $gnupg_cv_have_readline
	LDAP support: $gnupg_have_ldap
	DNS SRV support: $use_dns_srv
	TLS support: $use_tls_library
	"
	if test x"$use_regex" != xyes ; then
	echo "
	Warning: No regular expression support available.
	OpenPGP trust signatures won't work.
	gpg-check-pattern will not be built.
	"
	fi
	if test "x${gpg_config_script_warn}" != x; then
	cat <<G10EOF
	Warning: Mismatches between the target platform and the
	to be used libraries have been detected for:
	${gpg_config_script_warn}
	Please check above for more warning messages.

	G10EOF
	fi
	diff --git a/doc/DETAILS b/doc/DETAILS
	index 811b1055a..97079b0f0 100644
	--- a/doc/DETAILS
	+++ b/doc/DETAILS
	@@ -1,1221 +1,1225 @@
	# doc/DETAILS -- org --
	#+TITLE: GnuPG Details
	# Globally disable superscripts and subscripts:
	#+OPTIONS: ^:{}
	#

	# Note: This file uses org-mode; it should be easy to read as plain
	# text but be aware of some markup peculiarities: Verbatim code is
	# enclosed in #+begin-example, #+end-example blocks or marked by a
	# colon as the first non-white-space character, words bracketed with
	# equal signs indicate a monospace font, and the usual /italics/,
	# bold, and _underline_ conventions are recognized.

	This is the DETAILS file for GnuPG which specifies some internals and
	parts of the external API for GPG and GPGSM.

	* Format of the colon listings
	The format is a based on colon separated record, each recods starts
	with a tag string and extends to the end of the line. Here is an
	example:
	#+begin_example
	$ gpg --with-colons --list-keys \
	--with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint wk@gnupg.org
	pub:f:1024:17:6C7EE1B8621CC013:899817715:1055898235::m:::scESC:
	fpr:::::::::ECAF7590EB3443B5C7CF3ACB6C7EE1B8621CC013:
	uid:f::::::::Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>:
	uid:f::::::::Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>:
	sub:f:1536:16:06AD222CADF6A6E1:919537416:1036177416:::::e:
	fpr:::::::::CF8BCC4B18DE08FCD8A1615906AD222CADF6A6E1:
	sub:r:1536:20:5CE086B5B5A18FF4:899817788:1025961788:::::esc:
	fpr:::::::::AB059359A3B81F410FCFF97F5CE086B5B5A18FF4:
	#+end_example

	The double =--with-fingerprint= prints the fingerprint for the subkeys
	too. Old versions of gpg used a slightly different format and required
	the use of the option =--fixed-list-mode= to conform to the format
	described here.

	** Description of the fields
	*** Field 1 - Type of record

	- pub :: Public key
	- crt :: X.509 certificate
	- crs :: X.509 certificate and private key available
	- sub :: Subkey (secondary key)
	- sec :: Secret key
	- ssb :: Secret subkey (secondary key)
	- uid :: User id (only field 10 is used).
	- uat :: User attribute (same as user id except for field 10).
	- sig :: Signature
	- rev :: Revocation signature
	- fpr :: Fingerprint (fingerprint is in field 10)
	- pkd :: Public key data [*]
	- grp :: Keygrip
	- rvk :: Revocation key
	- tru :: Trust database information [*]
	- spk :: Signature subpacket [*]
	- cfg :: Configuration data [*]

	Records marked with an asterisk are described at [[Special%20field%20formats][Special fields]].

	*** Field 2 - Validity

	This is a letter describing the computed validity of a key.
	Currently this is a single letter, but be prepared that additional
	information may follow in some future versions. Note that GnuPG <
	2.1 does not set this field for secret key listings.

	- o :: Unknown (this key is new to the system)
	- i :: The key is invalid (e.g. due to a missing self-signature)
	- d :: The key has been disabled
	(deprecated - use the 'D' in field 12 instead)
	- r :: The key has been revoked
	- e :: The key has expired
	- - :: Unknown validity (i.e. no value assigned)
	- q :: Undefined validity. '-' and 'q' may safely be treated as
	the same value for most purposes
	- n :: The key is not valid
	- m :: The key is marginal valid.
	- f :: The key is fully valid
	- u :: The key is ultimately valid. This often means that the
	secret key is available, but any key may be marked as
	ultimately valid.
	- w :: The key has a well known private part.
	- s :: The key has special validity. This means that it might be
	self-signed and expected to be used in the STEED sytem.

	If the validity information is given for a UID or UAT record, it
	describes the validity calculated based on this user ID. If given
	for a key record it describes the validity taken from the best
	rated user ID.

	For X.509 certificates a 'u' is used for a trusted root
	certificate (i.e. for the trust anchor) and an 'f' for all other
	valid certificates.

	*** Field 3 - Key length

	The length of key in bits.

	*** Field 4 - Public key algorithm

	The values here are those from the OpenPGP specs or if they are
	greather than 255 the algorithm ids as used by Libgcrypt.

	*** Field 5 - KeyID

	This is the 64 bit keyid as specified by OpenPGP and the last 64
	bit of the SHA-1 fingerprint of an X.509 certifciate.

	*** Field 6 - Creation date

	The creation date of the key is given in UTC. For UID and UAT
	records, this is used for the self-signature date. Note that the
	date is usally printed in seconds since epoch, however, we are
	migrating to an ISO 8601 format (e.g. "19660205T091500"). This is
	currently only relevant for X.509. A simple way to detect the new
	format is to scan for the 'T'. Note that old versions of gpg
	without using the =--fixed-list-mode= option used a "yyyy-mm-tt"
	format.

	*** Field 7 - Expiration date

	Key or UID/UAT expiration date or empty if it does not expire.

	*** Field 8 - Certificate S/N, UID hash, trust signature info

	Used for serial number in crt records. For UID and UAT records,
	this is a hash of the user ID contents used to represent that
	exact user ID. For trust signatures, this is the trust depth
	seperated by the trust value by a space.

	*** Field 9 - Ownertrust

	This is only used on primary keys. This is a single letter, but
	be prepared that additional information may follow in future
	versions. For trust signatures with a regular expression, this is
	the regular expression value, quoted as in field 10.

	*** Field 10 - User-ID
	The value is quoted like a C string to avoid control characters
	(the colon is quoted =\x3a=). For a "pub" record this field is
	not used on --fixed-list-mode. A UAT record puts the attribute
	subpacket count here, a space, and then the total attribute
	subpacket size. In gpgsm the issuer name comes here. A FPR
	record stores the fingerprint here. The fingerprint of a
	revocation key is stored here.
	*** Field 11 - Signature class

	Signature class as per RFC-4880. This is a 2 digit hexnumber
	followed by either the letter 'x' for an exportable signature or
	the letter 'l' for a local-only signature. The class byte of an
	revocation key is also given here, 'x' and 'l' is used the same
	way. This field if not used for X.509.

	*** Field 12 - Key capabilities

	The defined capabilities are:

	- e :: Encrypt
	- s :: Sign
	- c :: Certify
	- a :: Authentication
	- ? :: Unknown capability

	A key may have any combination of them in any order. In addition
	to these letters, the primary key has uppercase versions of the
	letters to denote the _usable_ capabilities of the entire key, and
	a potential letter 'D' to indicate a disabled key.

	*** Field 13 - Issuer certificate fingerprint or other info

	Used in FPR records for S/MIME keys to store the fingerprint of
	the issuer certificate. This is useful to build the certificate
	path based on certificates stored in the local key database it is
	only filled if the issuer certificate is available. The root has
	been reached if this is the same string as the fingerprint. The
	advantage of using this value is that it is guaranteed to have
	been been build by the same lookup algorithm as gpgsm uses.

	For "uid" records this field lists the preferences in the same way
	gpg's --edit-key menu does.

	For "sig" records, this is the fingerprint of the key that issued
	the signature. Note that this is only filled in if the signature
	verified correctly. Note also that for various technical reasons,
	this fingerprint is only available if --no-sig-cache is used.

	*** Field 14 - Flag field

	Flag field used in the --edit menu output

	*** Field 15 - S/N of a token

	Used in sec/ssb to print the serial number of a token (internal
	protect mode 1002) or a '#' if that key is a simple stub (internal
	protect mode 1001). If the option --with-secret is used and a
	secret key is available for the public key, a '+' indicates this.

	*** Field 16 - Hash algorithm

	For sig records, this is the used hash algorithm. For example:
	2 = SHA-1, 8 = SHA-256.

	*** Field 17 - Curve name

	For pub, sub, sec, and ssb records this field is used for the ECC
	curve name.
	+*** Field 18 - TOFU Policy
	+
	+ This is the TOFU policy. It is either good, bad, unknown, ask or
	+ auto. This is only shows for uid records.

	** Special fields

	*** PKD - Public key data

	If field 1 has the tag "pkd", a listing looks like this:
	#+begin_example
	pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB:
	! ! !-- the value
	! !------ for information number of bits in the value
	!--------- index (eg. DSA goes from 0 to 3: p,q,g,y)
	#+end_example

	*** TRU - Trust database information
	Example for a "tru" trust base record:
	#+begin_example
	tru:o:0:1166697654:1:3:1:5
	#+end_example

	- Field 2 :: Reason for staleness of trust. If this field is
	empty, then the trustdb is not stale. This field may
	have multiple flags in it:

	- o :: Trustdb is old
	- t :: Trustdb was built with a different trust model
	than the one we are using now.

	- Field 3 :: Trust model

	- 0 :: Classic trust model, as used in PGP 2.x.
	- 1 :: PGP trust model, as used in PGP 6 and later.
	This is the same as the classic trust model,
	except for the addition of trust signatures.

	GnuPG before version 1.4 used the classic trust model
	by default. GnuPG 1.4 and later uses the PGP trust
	model by default.

	- Field 4 :: Date trustdb was created in seconds since Epoch.
	- Field 5 :: Date trustdb will expire in seconds since Epoch.
	- Field 6 :: Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (gpg's option --marginals-needed).
	- Field 7 :: Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer. (gpg's option --completes-needed)

	- Field 8 :: Maximum depth of a certification chain. (gpg's option
	--max-cert-depth)

	*** SPK - Signature subpacket records

	- Field 2 :: Subpacket number as per RFC-4880 and later.
	- Field 3 :: Flags in hex. Currently the only two bits assigned
	are 1, to indicate that the subpacket came from the
	hashed part of the signature, and 2, to indicate the
	subpacket was marked critical.
	- Field 4 :: Length of the subpacket. Note that this is the
	length of the subpacket, and not the length of field
	5 below. Due to the need for %-encoding, the length
	of field 5 may be up to 3x this value.
	- Field 5 :: The subpacket data. Printable ASCII is shown as
	ASCII, but other values are rendered as %XX where XX
	is the hex value for the byte.

	*** CFG - Configuration data

	--list-config outputs information about the GnuPG configuration
	for the benefit of frontends or other programs that call GnuPG.
	There are several list-config items, all colon delimited like the
	rest of the --with-colons output. The first field is always "cfg"
	to indicate configuration information. The second field is one of
	(with examples):

	- version :: The third field contains the version of GnuPG.

	: cfg:version:1.3.5

	- pubkey :: The third field contains the public key algorithms
	this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
	semicolons. The algorithm numbers are as specified in
	RFC-4880. Note that in contrast to the --status-fd
	interface these are _not_ the Libgcrypt identifiers.
	Using =pubkeyname= prints names instead of numbers.

	: cfg:pubkey:1;2;3;16;17

	- cipher :: The third field contains the symmetric ciphers this
	version of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons.
	The cipher numbers are as specified in RFC-4880.
	Using =ciphername= prints names instead of numbers.

	: cfg:cipher:2;3;4;7;8;9;10

	- digest :: The third field contains the digest (hash) algorithms
	this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
	semicolons. The digest numbers are as specified in
	RFC-4880. Using =digestname= prints names instead of
	numbers.

	: cfg:digest:1;2;3;8;9;10

	- compress :: The third field contains the compression algorithms
	this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
	semicolons. The algorithm numbers are as specified
	in RFC-4880.

	: cfg:compress:0;1;2;3

	- group :: The third field contains the name of the group, and the
	fourth field contains the values that the group expands
	to, separated by semicolons.

	For example, a group of:
	: group mynames = paige 0x12345678 joe patti
	would result in:
	: cfg:group:mynames:patti;joe;0x12345678;paige

	- curve :: The third field contains the curve names this version
	of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons. Using
	=curveoid= prints OIDs instead of numbers.

	: cfg:curve:ed25519;nistp256;nistp384;nistp521


	* Format of the --status-fd output

	Every line is prefixed with "[GNUPG:] ", followed by a keyword with
	the type of the status line and some arguments depending on the type
	(maybe none); an application should always be prepared to see more
	arguments in future versions.

	** General status codes
	*** NEWSIG
	Is issued right before a signature verification starts. This is
	useful to define a context for parsing ERROR status messages. No
	arguments are currently defined.

	*** GOODSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
	The signature with the keyid is good. For each signature only one
	of the codes GOODSIG, BADSIG, EXPSIG, EXPKEYSIG, REVKEYSIG or
	ERRSIG will be emitted. In the past they were used as a marker
	for a new signature; new code should use the NEWSIG status
	instead. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
	escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if
	it is available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually
	also be available for OpenPGP.

	*** EXPSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
	The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature is
	expired. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
	escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if
	it is available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually
	also be available for OpenPGP.

	*** EXPKEYSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
	The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made
	by an expired key. The username is the primary one encoded in
	UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the
	long keyid if it is available. This is the case with CMS and
	might eventually also be available for OpenPGP.

	*** REVKEYSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
	The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made
	by a revoked key. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8
	and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long
	keyid if it is available. This is the case with CMS and might
	eventually also beñ available for OpenPGP.

	*** BADSIG <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
	The signature with the keyid has not been verified okay. The
	username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The
	fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if it is
	available. This is the case with CMS and might eventually also be
	available for OpenPGP.

	*** ERRSIG <keyid> <pkalgo> <hashalgo> <sig_class> <time> <rc>
	It was not possible to check the signature. This may be caused by
	a missing public key or an unsupported algorithm. A RC of 4
	indicates unknown algorithm, a 9 indicates a missing public
	key. The other fields give more information about this signature.
	sig_class is a 2 byte hex-value. The fingerprint may be used
	instead of the keyid if it is available. This is the case with
	gpgsm and might eventually also be available for OpenPGP.

	Note, that TIME may either be the number of seconds since Epoch or
	an ISO 8601 string. The latter can be detected by the presence of
	the letter 'T'.

	*** VALIDSIG <args>

	The args are:

	- <fingerprint_in_hex>
	- <sig_creation_date>
	- <sig-timestamp>
	- <expire-timestamp>
	- <sig-version>
	- <reserved>
	- <pubkey-algo>
	- <hash-algo>
	- <sig-class>
	- [ <primary-key-fpr> ]

	This status indicates that the signature is cryptographically
	valid. This is similar to GOODSIG, EXPSIG, EXPKEYSIG, or REVKEYSIG
	(depending on the date and the state of the signature and signing
	key) but has the fingerprint as the argument. Multiple status
	lines (VALIDSIG and the other appropriate *SIG status) are emitted
	for a valid signature. All arguments here are on one long line.
	sig-timestamp is the signature creation time in seconds after the
	epoch. expire-timestamp is the signature expiration time in
	seconds after the epoch (zero means "does not
	expire"). sig-version, pubkey-algo, hash-algo, and sig-class (a
	2-byte hex value) are all straight from the signature packet.
	PRIMARY-KEY-FPR is the fingerprint of the primary key or identical
	to the first argument. This is useful to get back to the primary
	key without running gpg again for this purpose.

	The primary-key-fpr parameter is used for OpenPGP and not
	available for CMS signatures. The sig-version as well as the sig
	class is not defined for CMS and currently set to 0 and 00.

	Note, that *-TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
	Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
	of the letter 'T'.

	*** SIG_ID <radix64_string> <sig_creation_date> <sig-timestamp>
	This is emitted only for signatures of class 0 or 1 which have
	been verified okay. The string is a signature id and may be used
	in applications to detect replay attacks of signed messages. Note
	that only DLP algorithms give unique ids - others may yield
	duplicated ones when they have been created in the same second.

	Note, that SIG-TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
	Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
	of the letter 'T'.

	*** ENC_TO <long_keyid> <keytype> <keylength>
	The message is encrypted to this LONG_KEYID. KEYTYPE is the
	numerical value of the public key algorithm or 0 if it is not
	known, KEYLENGTH is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known
	(which is currently always the case). Gpg prints this line
	always; Gpgsm only if it knows the certificate.

	*** BEGIN_DECRYPTION
	Mark the start of the actual decryption process. This is also
	emitted when in --list-only mode.
	*** END_DECRYPTION
	Mark the end of the actual decryption process. This are also
	emitted when in --list-only mode.
	*** DECRYPTION_INFO <mdc_method> <sym_algo>
	Print information about the symmetric encryption algorithm and the
	MDC method. This will be emitted even if the decryption fails.

	*** DECRYPTION_FAILED
	The symmetric decryption failed - one reason could be a wrong
	passphrase for a symmetrical encrypted message.

	*** DECRYPTION_OKAY
	The decryption process succeeded. This means, that either the
	correct secret key has been used or the correct passphrase for a
	symmetric encrypted message was given. The program itself may
	return an errorcode because it may not be possible to verify a
	signature for some reasons.

	*** SESSION_KEY <algo>:<hexdigits>
	The session key used to decrypt the message. This message will
	only be emitted if the option --show-session-key is used. The
	format is suitable to be passed as value for the option
	--override-session-key. It is not an indication that the
	decryption will or has succeeded.

	*** BEGIN_ENCRYPTION <mdc_method> <sym_algo>
	Mark the start of the actual encryption process.

	*** END_ENCRYPTION
	Mark the end of the actual encryption process.

	*** FILE_START <what> <filename>
	Start processing a file <filename>. <what> indicates the performed
	operation:
	- 1 :: verify
	- 2 :: encrypt
	- 3 :: decrypt

	*** FILE_DONE
	Marks the end of a file processing which has been started
	by FILE_START.

	*** BEGIN_SIGNING
	Mark the start of the actual signing process. This may be used as
	an indication that all requested secret keys are ready for use.

	*** ALREADY_SIGNED <long-keyid>
	Warning: This is experimental and might be removed at any time.

	*** SIG_CREATED <type> <pk_algo> <hash_algo> <class> <timestamp> <keyfpr>
	A signature has been created using these parameters.
	Values for type <type> are:
	- D :: detached
	- C :: cleartext
	- S :: standard
	(only the first character should be checked)

	<class> are 2 hex digits with the OpenPGP signature class.

	Note, that TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since Epoch
	or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence of the
	letter 'T'.

	*** NOTATION_
	There are actually two related status codes to convey notation
	data:

	- NOTATION_NAME <name>
	- NOTATION_DATA <string>

	<name> and <string> are %XX escaped; the data may be split among
	several NOTATION_DATA lines.

	*** POLICY_URL <string>
	Note that URL in <string> is %XX escaped.

	*** PLAINTEXT <format> <timestamp> <filename>
	This indicates the format of the plaintext that is about to be
	written. The format is a 1 byte hex code that shows the format of
	the plaintext: 62 ('b') is binary data, 74 ('t') is text data with
	no character set specified, and 75 ('u') is text data encoded in
	the UTF-8 character set. The timestamp is in seconds since the
	epoch. If a filename is available it gets printed as the third
	argument, percent-escaped as usual.

	*** PLAINTEXT_LENGTH <length>
	This indicates the length of the plaintext that is about to be
	written. Note that if the plaintext packet has partial length
	encoding it is not possible to know the length ahead of time. In
	that case, this status tag does not appear.

	*** ATTRIBUTE <arguments>
	The list or argemnts are:
	- <fpr>
	- <octets>
	- <type>
	- <index>
	- <count>
	- <timestamp>
	- <expiredate>
	- <flags>

	This is one long line issued for each attribute subpacket when an
	attribute packet is seen during key listing. <fpr> is the
	fingerprint of the key. <octets> is the length of the attribute
	subpacket. <type> is the attribute type (e.g. 1 for an image).
	<index> and <count> indicate that this is the N-th indexed
	subpacket of count total subpackets in this attribute packet.
	<timestamp> and <expiredate> are from the self-signature on the
	attribute packet. If the attribute packet does not have a valid
	self-signature, then the timestamp is 0. <flags> are a bitwise OR
	of:
	- 0x01 :: this attribute packet is a primary uid
	- 0x02 :: this attribute packet is revoked
	- 0x04 :: this attribute packet is expired

	*** SIG_SUBPACKET <type> <flags> <len> <data>
	This indicates that a signature subpacket was seen. The format is
	the same as the "spk" record above.

	** Key related
	*** INV_RECP, INV_SGNR
	The two similar status codes:

	- INV_RECP <reason> <requested_recipient>
	- INV_SGNR <reason> <requested_sender>

	are issued for each unusable recipient/sender. The reasons codes
	currently in use are:

	- 0 :: No specific reason given
	- 1 :: Not Found
	- 2 :: Ambigious specification
	- 3 :: Wrong key usage
	- 4 :: Key revoked
	- 5 :: Key expired
	- 6 :: No CRL known
	- 7 :: CRL too old
	- 8 :: Policy mismatch
	- 9 :: Not a secret key
	- 10 :: Key not trusted
	- 11 :: Missing certificate
	- 12 :: Missing issuer certificate
	- 13 :: Key disabled
	- 14 :: Syntax error in specification

	Note that for historical reasons the INV_RECP status is also used
	for gpgsm's SIGNER command where it relates to signer's of course.
	Newer GnuPG versions are using INV_SGNR; applications should
	ignore the INV_RECP during the sender's command processing once
	they have seen an INV_SGNR. Different codes are used so that they
	can be distinguish while doing an encrypt+sign operation.
	*** NO_RECP <reserved>
	Issued if no recipients are usable.

	*** NO_SGNR <reserved>
	Issued if no senders are usable.

	*** KEYEXPIRED <expire-timestamp>
	The key has expired. expire-timestamp is the expiration time in
	seconds since Epoch. This status line is not very useful because
	it will also be emitted for expired subkeys even if this subkey is
	not used. To check whether a key used to sign a message has
	expired, the EXPKEYSIG status line is to be used.

	Note, that the TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
	Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
	of the letter 'T'.

	*** KEYREVOKED
	The used key has been revoked by its owner. No arguments yet.

	*** NO_PUBKEY <long keyid>
	The public key is not available

	*** NO_SECKEY <long keyid>
	The secret key is not available

	*** KEY_CREATED <type> <fingerprint> [<handle>]
	A key has been created. Values for <type> are:
	- B :: primary and subkey
	- P :: primary
	- S :: subkey
	The fingerprint is one of the primary key for type B and P and the
	one of the subkey for S. Handle is an arbitrary non-whitespace
	string used to match key parameters from batch key creation run.

	*** KEY_NOT_CREATED [<handle>]
	The key from batch run has not been created due to errors.

	*** TRUST_
	These are several similar status codes:

	- TRUST_UNDEFINED <error_token>
	- TRUST_NEVER <error_token>
	- TRUST_MARGINAL [0 [<validation_model>]]
	- TRUST_FULLY [0 [<validation_model>]]
	- TRUST_ULTIMATE [0 [<validation_model>]]

	For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted to
	indicate the validity of the key used to create the signature.
	The error token values are currently only emitted by gpgsm.

	VALIDATION_MODEL describes the algorithm used to check the
	validity of the key. The defaults are the standard Web of Trust
	model for gpg and the the standard X.509 model for gpgsm. The
	defined values are

	- pgp :: The standard PGP WoT.
	- shell :: The standard X.509 model.
	- chain :: The chain model.
	- steed :: The STEED model.

	Note that the term =TRUST_= in the status names is used for
	historic reasons; we now speak of validity.

	*** PKA_TRUST_
	This is is one:

	- PKA_TRUST_GOOD <mailbox>
	- PKA_TRUST_BAD <mailbox>

	Depending on the outcome of the PKA check one of the above status
	codes is emitted in addition to a =TRUST_*= status.

	** Remote control
	*** GET_BOOL, GET_LINE, GET_HIDDEN, GOT_IT

	These status line are used with --command-fd for interactive
	control of the process.

	*** USERID_HINT <long main keyid> <string>
	Give a hint about the user ID for a certain keyID.

	*** NEED_PASSPHRASE <long keyid> <long main keyid> <keytype> <keylength>
	Issued whenever a passphrase is needed. KEYTYPE is the numerical
	value of the public key algorithm or 0 if this is not applicable,
	KEYLENGTH is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known (this
	is currently always the case).

	*** NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM <cipher_algo> <s2k_mode> <s2k_hash>
	Issued whenever a passphrase for symmetric encryption is needed.

	*** NEED_PASSPHRASE_PIN <card_type> <chvno> [<serialno>]
	Issued whenever a PIN is requested to unlock a card.

	*** MISSING_PASSPHRASE
	No passphrase was supplied. An application which encounters this
	message may want to stop parsing immediately because the next
	message will probably be a BAD_PASSPHRASE. However, if the
	application is a wrapper around the key edit menu functionality it
	might not make sense to stop parsing but simply ignoring the
	following BAD_PASSPHRASE.

	*** BAD_PASSPHRASE <long keyid>
	The supplied passphrase was wrong or not given. In the latter
	case you may have seen a MISSING_PASSPHRASE.

	*** GOOD_PASSPHRASE
	The supplied passphrase was good and the secret key material
	is therefore usable.

	** Import/Export
	*** IMPORT_CHECK <long keyid> <fingerprint> <user ID>
	This status is emitted in interactive mode right before
	the "import.okay" prompt.

	*** IMPORTED <long keyid> <username>
	The keyid and name of the signature just imported

	*** IMPORT_OK <reason> [<fingerprint>]
	The key with the primary key's FINGERPRINT has been imported.
	REASON flags are:

	- 0 :: Not actually changed
	- 1 :: Entirely new key.
	- 2 :: New user IDs
	- 4 :: New signatures
	- 8 :: New subkeys
	- 16 :: Contains private key.

	The flags may be ORed.

	*** IMPORT_PROBLEM <reason> [<fingerprint>]
	Issued for each import failure. Reason codes are:

	- 0 :: No specific reason given.
	- 1 :: Invalid Certificate.
	- 2 :: Issuer Certificate missing.
	- 3 :: Certificate Chain too long.
	- 4 :: Error storing certificate.

	*** IMPORT_RES <args>
	Final statistics on import process (this is one long line). The
	args are a list of unsigned numbers separated by white space:

	- <count>
	- <no_user_id>
	- <imported>
	- always 0 (formerly used for the number of RSA keys)
	- <unchanged>
	- <n_uids>
	- <n_subk>
	- <n_sigs>
	- <n_revoc>
	- <sec_read>
	- <sec_imported>
	- <sec_dups>
	- <skipped_new_keys>
	- <not_imported>
	- <skipped_v3_keys>

	** Smartcard related
	*** CARDCTRL <what> [<serialno>]
	This is used to control smartcard operations. Defined values for
	WHAT are:

	- 1 :: Request insertion of a card. Serialnumber may be given
	to request a specific card. Used by gpg 1.4 w/o
	scdaemon
	- 2 :: Request removal of a card. Used by gpg 1.4 w/o scdaemon.
	- 3 :: Card with serialnumber detected
	- 4 :: No card available
	- 5 :: No card reader available
	- 6 :: No card support available
	- 7 :: Card is in termination state

	*** SC_OP_FAILURE [<code>]
	An operation on a smartcard definitely failed. Currently there is
	no indication of the actual error code, but application should be
	prepared to later accept more arguments. Defined values for
	<code> are:

	- 0 :: unspecified error (identically to a missing CODE)
	- 1 :: canceled
	- 2 :: bad PIN

	*** SC_OP_SUCCESS
	A smart card operaion succeeded. This status is only printed for
	certain operation and is mostly useful to check whether a PIN
	change really worked.

	** Miscellaneous status codes
	*** NODATA <what>
	No data has been found. Codes for WHAT are:

	- 1 :: No armored data.
	- 2 :: Expected a packet but did not found one.
	- 3 :: Invalid packet found, this may indicate a non OpenPGP
	message.
	- 4 :: Signature expected but not found

	You may see more than one of these status lines.

	*** UNEXPECTED <what>
	Unexpected data has been encountered. Codes for WHAT are:
	- 0 :: Not further specified
	- 1 :: Corrupted message structure

	*** TRUNCATED <maxno>
	The output was truncated to MAXNO items. This status code is
	issued for certain external requests.

	*** ERROR <error location> <error code> [<more>]
	This is a generic error status message, it might be followed by
	error location specific data. <error code> and <error_location>
	should not contain spaces. The error code is a either a string
	commencing with a letter or such a string prefixed with a
	numerical error code and an underscore; e.g.: "151011327_EOF".

	*** SUCCESS [<location>]
	Postive confirmation that an operation succeeded. It is used
	similar to ISO-C's EXIT_SUCCESS. <location> is optional but if
	given should not contain spaces. Used only with a few commands.

	*** FAILURE <location> <error_code>
	This is the counterpart to SUCCESS and used to indicate a program
	failure. It is used similar to ISO-C's EXIT_FAILURE but allows to
	convey more information, in particular an gpg-error error code.
	That numerical error code may optionally have a suffix made of an
	underscore and a string with an error symbol like "151011327_EOF".
	A dash may be used instead of <location>.

	*** BADARMOR
	The ASCII armor is corrupted. No arguments yet.

	*** DELETE_PROBLEM <reason_code>
	Deleting a key failed. Reason codes are:
	- 1 :: No such key
	- 2 :: Must delete secret key first
	- 3 :: Ambigious specification
	- 4 :: Key is stored on a smartcard.

	*** PROGRESS <what> <char> <cur> <total>
	Used by the primegen and Public key functions to indicate
	progress. <char> is the character displayed with no --status-fd
	enabled, with the linefeed replaced by an 'X'. <cur> is the
	current amount done and <total> is amount to be done; a <total> of
	0 indicates that the total amount is not known. The condition
	: TOTAL && CUR == TOTAL
	may be used to detect the end of an operation.

	Well known values for WHAT are:

	- pk_dsa :: DSA key generation
	- pk_elg :: Elgamal key generation
	- primegen :: Prime generation
	- need_entropy :: Waiting for new entropy in the RNG
	- tick :: Generic tick without any special meaning - useful
	for letting clients know that the server is still
	working.
	- starting_agent :: A gpg-agent was started because it is not
	running as a daemon.
	- learncard :: Send by the agent and gpgsm while learing
	the data of a smartcard.
	- card_busy :: A smartcard is still working

	*** BACKUP_KEY_CREATED <fingerprint> <fname>
	A backup of a key identified by <fingerprint> has been writte to
	the file <fname>; <fname> is percent-escaped.

	*** MOUNTPOINT <name>
	<name> is a percent-plus escaped filename describing the
	mountpoint for the current operation (e.g. used by "g13 --mount").
	This may either be the specified mountpoint or one randomly
	choosen by g13.

	*** PINENTRY_LAUNCHED <pid>
	This status line is emitted by gpg to notify a client that a
	Pinentry has been launched. <pid> is the PID of the Pinentry. It
	may be used to display a hint to the user but can't be used to
	synchronize with Pinentry. Note that there is also an Assuan
	inquiry line with the same name used internally or, if enabled,
	send to the client instead of this status line. Such an inquiry
	may be used to sync with Pinentry

	** Obsolete status codes
	*** SIGEXPIRED
	Removed on 2011-02-04. This is deprecated in favor of KEYEXPIRED.
	*** RSA_OR_IDEA
	Obsolete. This status message used to be emitted for requests to
	use the IDEA or RSA algorithms. It has been dropped from GnuPG
	2.1 after the respective patents expired.
	*** SHM_INFO, SHM_GET, SHM_GET_BOOL, SHM_GET_HIDDEN
	These were used for the ancient shared memory based co-processing.
	*** BEGIN_STREAM, END_STREAM
	Used to issued by the experimental pipemode.


	* Format of the --attribute-fd output

	When --attribute-fd is set, during key listings (--list-keys,
	--list-secret-keys) GnuPG dumps each attribute packet to the file
	descriptor specified. --attribute-fd is intended for use with
	--status-fd as part of the required information is carried on the
	ATTRIBUTE status tag (see above).

	The contents of the attribute data is specified by RFC 4880. For
	convenience, here is the Photo ID format, as it is currently the
	only attribute defined:

	- Byte 0-1 :: The length of the image header. Due to a historical
	accident (i.e. oops!) back in the NAI PGP days, this
	is a little-endian number. Currently 16 (0x10 0x00).

	- Byte 2 :: The image header version. Currently 0x01.

	- Byte 3 :: Encoding format. 0x01 == JPEG.

	- Byte 4-15 :: Reserved, and currently unused.

	All other data after this header is raw image (JPEG) data.


	* Unattended key generation

	Please see the GnuPG manual for a description.


	* Layout of the TrustDB

	The TrustDB is built from fixed length records, where the first byte
	describes the record type. All numeric values are stored in network
	byte order. The length of each record is 40 bytes. The first
	record of the DB is always of type 1 and this is the only record of
	this type.

	The record types: directory(2), key(3), uid(4), pref(5), sigrec(6),
	and shadow directory(8) are not anymore used by version 2 of the
	TrustDB.

	** Record type 0

	Unused record or deleted, can be reused for any purpose. Such
	records should in general not exist because deleted records are of
	type 254 and kept in a linked list.

	** Version info (RECTYPE_VER, 1)

	Version information for this TrustDB. This is always the first
	record of the DB and the only one of this type.

	- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 1).
	- 3 byte :: Magic value ("gpg")
	- 1 u8 :: TrustDB version (value: 2).
	- 1 u8 :: =marginals=. How many marginal trusted keys are required.
	- 1 u8 :: =completes=. How many completely trusted keys are
	required.
	- 1 u8 :: =max_cert_depth=. How deep is the WoT evaluated. Along
	with =marginals= and =completes=, this value is used to
	check whether the cached validity value from a [FIXME
	dir] record can be used.
	- 1 u8 :: =trust_model=
	- 1 u8 :: =min_cert_level=
	- 2 byte :: Not used
	- 1 u32 :: =created=. Timestamp of trustdb creation.
	- 1 u32 :: =nextcheck=. Timestamp of last modification which may
	affect the validity of keys in the trustdb. This value
	is checked against the validity timestamp in the dir
	records.
	- 1 u32 :: =reserved=. Not used.
	- 1 u32 :: =reserved2=. Not used.
	- 1 u32 :: =firstfree=. Number of the record with the head record
	of the RECTYPE_FREE linked list.
	- 1 u32 :: =reserved3=. Not used.
	- 1 u32 :: =trusthashtbl=. Record number of the trusthashtable.


	** Hash table (RECTYPE_HTBL, 10)

	Due to the fact that we use fingerprints to lookup keys, we can
	implement quick access by some simple hash methods, and avoid the
	overhead of gdbm. A property of fingerprints is that they can be
	used directly as hash values. What we use is a dynamic multilevel
	architecture, which combines hash tables, record lists, and linked
	lists.

	This record is a hash table of 256 entries with the property that
	all these records are stored consecutively to make one big
	table. The hash value is simple the 1st, 2nd, ... byte of the
	fingerprint (depending on the indirection level).

	- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 10).
	- 1 u8 :: Reserved
	- n u32 :: =recnum=. A table with the hash table items fitting into
	this record. =n= depends on the record length:
	$n=(reclen-2)/4$ which yields 9 for oure current record
	length of 40 bytes.

	The total number of hash table records to form the table is:
	$m=(256+n-1)/n$. This is 29 for our record length of 40.

	To look up a key we use the first byte of the fingerprint to get
	the recnum from this hash table and then look up the addressed
	record:

	- If that record is another hash table, we use 2nd byte to index
	that hash table and so on;
	- if that record is a hash list, we walk all entries until we find
	a matching one; or
	- if that record is a key record, we compare the fingerprint to
	decide whether it is the requested key;


	** Hash list (RECTYPE_HLST, 11)

	See hash table above on how it is used. It may also be used for
	other purposes.

	- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 11).
	- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
	- 1 u32 :: =next=. Record number of the next hash list record or 0
	if none.
	- n u32 :: =rnum=. Array with record numbers to values. With
	$n=(reclen-5)/5$ and our record length of 40, n is 7.

	** Trust record (RECTYPE_TRUST, 12)

	- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 12).
	- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
	- 20 byte :: =fingerprint=.
	- 1 u8 :: =ownertrust=.
	- 1 u8 :: =depth=.
	- 1 u8 :: =min_ownertrust=.
	- 1 byte :: Not used.
	- 1 u32 :: =validlist=.
	- 10 byte :: Not used.

	** Validity record (RECTYPE_VALID, 13)

	- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 13).
	- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
	- 20 byte :: =namehash=.
	- 1 u8 :: =validity=
	- 1 u32 :: =next=.
	- 1 u8 :: =full_count=.
	- 1 u8 :: =marginal_count=.
	- 11 byte :: Not used.

	** Free record (RECTYPE_FREE, 254)

	All these records form a linked list of unused records in the TrustDB.

	- 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 254)
	- 1 u8 :: Reserved.
	- 1 u32 :: =next=. Record number of the next rcord of this type.
	The record number to the head of this linked list is
	stored in the version info record.


	* GNU extensions to the S2K algorithm

	1 octet - S2K Usage: either 254 or 255.
	1 octet - S2K Cipher Algo: 0
	1 octet - S2K Specifier: 101
	3 octets - "GNU"
	1 octet - GNU S2K Extension Number.

	If such a GNU extension is used neither an IV nor any kind of
	checksum is used. The defined GNU S2K Extension Numbers are:

	- 1 :: Do not store the secret part at all. No specific data
	follows.

	- 2 :: A stub to access smartcards. This data follows:
	- One octet with the length of the following serial number.
	- The serial number. Regardless of what the length octet
	indicates no more than 16 octets are stored.

	Note that gpg stores the GNU S2K Extension Number internally as an
	S2K Specifier with an offset of 1000.


	* Keyserver helper message format

	The keyserver may be contacted by a Unix Domain socket or via TCP.

	The format of a request is:
	#+begin_example
	command-tag
	"Content-length:" digits
	CRLF
	#+end_example

	Where command-tag is

	#+begin_example
	NOOP
	GET <user-name>
	PUT
	DELETE <user-name>
	#+end_example

	The format of a response is:

	#+begin_example
	"GNUPG/1.0" status-code status-text
	"Content-length:" digits
	CRLF
	#+end_example
	followed by <digits> bytes of data

	Status codes are:

	- 1xx :: Informational - Request received, continuing process

	- 2xx :: Success - The action was successfully received, understood,
	and accepted

	- 4xx :: Client Error - The request contains bad syntax or cannot be
	fulfilled

	- 5xx :: Server Error - The server failed to fulfill an apparently
	valid request


	* Object identifiers

	OIDs below the GnuPG arc:

	#+begin_example
	1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2 GnuPG
	1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1 notation
	1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1.1 pkaAddress
	1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2 X.509 extensions
	1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.1 standaloneCertificate
	1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.2 wellKnownPrivateKey
	1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.12242973 invalid encoded OID
	#+end_example



	* Miscellaneous notes

	** v3 fingerprints
	For packet version 3 we calculate the keyids this way:
	- RSA :: Low 64 bits of n
	- ELGAMAL :: Build a v3 pubkey packet (with CTB 0x99) and
	calculate a RMD160 hash value from it. This is used
	as the fingerprint and the low 64 bits are the keyid.

	** Simplified revocation certificates
	Revocation certificates consist only of the signature packet;
	"--import" knows how to handle this. The rationale behind it is to
	keep them small.

	** Documentation on HKP (the http keyserver protocol):

	A minimalistic HTTP server on port 11371 recognizes a GET for
	/pks/lookup. The standard http URL encoded query parameters are
	this (always key=value):

	- op=index (like pgp -kv), op=vindex (like pgp -kvv) and op=get (like
	pgp -kxa)

	- search=<stringlist>. This is a list of words that must occur in the key.
	The words are delimited with space, points, @ and so on. The delimiters
	are not searched for and the order of the words doesn't matter (but see
	next option).

	- exact=on. This switch tells the hkp server to only report exact matching
	keys back. In this case the order and the "delimiters" are important.

	- fingerprint=on. Also reports the fingerprints when used with 'index' or
	'vindex'

	The keyserver also recognizes http-POSTs to /pks/add. Use this to upload
	keys.


	A better way to do this would be a request like:

	/pks/lookup/<gnupg_formatierte_user_id>?op=<operation>

	This can be implemented using Hurd's translator mechanism.
	However, I think the whole key server stuff has to be re-thought;
	I have some ideas and probably create a white paper.
	** Algorithm names for the "keygen.algo" prompt

	When using a --command-fd controlled key generation or "addkey"
	there is way to know the number to enter on the "keygen.algo"
	prompt. The displayed numbers are for human reception and may
	change with releases. To provide a stable way to enter a desired
	algorithm choice the prompt also accepts predefined names for the
	algorithms, which will not change.

	\| Name \| No \| Description \|
	\|---------+----+---------------------------------\|
	\| rsa+rsa \| 1 \| RSA and RSA (default) \|
	\| dsa+elg \| 2 \| DSA and Elgamal \|
	\| dsa \| 3 \| DSA (sign only) \|
	\| rsa/s \| 4 \| RSA (sign only) \|
	\| elg \| 5 \| Elgamal (encrypt only) \|
	\| rsa/e \| 6 \| RSA (encrypt only) \|
	\| dsa/* \| 7 \| DSA (set your own capabilities) \|
	\| rsa/* \| 8 \| RSA (set your own capabilities) \|
	\| ecc+ecc \| 9 \| ECC and ECC \|
	\| ecc/s \| 10 \| ECC (sign only) \|
	\| ecc/* \| 11 \| ECC (set your own capabilities) \|
	\| ecc/e \| 12 \| ECC (encrypt only) \|
	\| keygrip \| 13 \| Existing key \|

	If one of the "foo/*" names are used a "keygen.flags" prompt needs
	to be answered as well. Instead of toggling the predefined flags,
	it is also possible to set them direct: Use a "=" character
	directly followed by a comination of "a" (for authentication), "s"
	(for signing), or "c" (for certification).
	diff --git a/doc/gnupg.texi b/doc/gnupg.texi
	index 1fddeb007..42d9dc00c 100644
	--- a/doc/gnupg.texi
	+++ b/doc/gnupg.texi
	@@ -1,217 +1,218 @@
	\input texinfo @c --texinfo--
	@c %**start of header
	@setfilename gnupg.info
	@include defs.inc
	@settitle Using the GNU Privacy Guard

	@c A couple of macros with no effect on texinfo
	@c but used by the yat2m processor.
	@macro manpage {a}
	@end macro
	@macro mansect {a}
	@end macro
	@macro manpause
	@end macro
	@macro mancont
	@end macro

	@c Create a separate index for command line options.
	@defcodeindex op
	@c Merge the standard indexes into a single one.
	@syncodeindex fn cp
	@syncodeindex vr cp
	@syncodeindex ky cp
	@syncodeindex pg cp
	@syncodeindex tp cp
	@c %**end of header
	@copying
	This is the @cite{The GNU Privacy Guard Manual} (version
	@value{VERSION}, @value{UPDATED-MONTH}).

	@iftex
	Published by The GnuPG Project@*
	@url{https://gnupg.org}@*
	(or @url{http://ic6au7wa3f6naxjq.onion})
	@end iftex

	@copyright{} 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.@*
	-@copyright{} 2013, 2014, 2015 Werner Koch.
	+@copyright{} 2013, 2014, 2015 Werner Koch.@*
	+@copyright{} 2015 g10code Gmbh.

	@quotation
	Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document
	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
	Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your
	option) any later version. The text of the license can be found in the
	section entitled ``Copying''.
	@end quotation
	@end copying


	@dircategory GNU Utilities
	@direntry
	* gpg2: (gnupg). OpenPGP encryption and signing tool.
	* gpgsm: (gnupg). S/MIME encryption and signing tool.
	* gpg-agent: (gnupg). The secret key daemon.
	* dirmngr: (gnupg). X.509 CRL and OCSP server.
	* dirmngr-client: (gnupg). X.509 CRL and OCSP client.
	@end direntry


	@c
	@c Printing stuff taken from gcc.
	@c
	@macro gnupgtabopt{body}
	@code{\body\}
	@end macro
	@macro gnupgoptlist{body}
	@smallexample
	\body\
	@end smallexample
	@end macro
	@c Makeinfo handles the above macro OK, TeX needs manual line breaks;
	@c they get lost at some point in handling the macro. But if @macro is
	@c used here rather than @alias, it produces double line breaks.
	@iftex
	@alias gol = *
	@end iftex
	@ifnottex
	@macro gol
	@end macro
	@end ifnottex


	@c
	@c Titlepage
	@c
	@setchapternewpage odd
	@titlepage
	@title Using the GNU Privacy Guard
	@subtitle Version @value{VERSION}
	@subtitle @value{UPDATED-MONTH}

	@sp 3

	@image{gnupg-logo,,,The GnuPG Logo}

	@sp 3

	@author The GnuPG Project (@url{https://gnupg.org})

	@page
	@vskip 0pt plus 1filll
	@insertcopying
	@end titlepage

	@ifnothtml
	@summarycontents
	@contents
	@page
	@end ifnothtml

	@ifhtml
	@center @image{gnupg-logo-tr,6cm,,The GnuPG Logo}
	@end ifhtml

	@ifnottex
	@node Top
	@top
	@insertcopying

	This manual documents how to use the GNU Privacy Guard system as well as
	the administration and the architecture.
	@end ifnottex

	@menu
	* Installation:: A short installation guide.

	* Invoking GPG-AGENT:: How to launch the secret key daemon.
	* Invoking DIRMNGR:: How to launch the CRL and OCSP daemon.
	* Invoking GPG:: Using the OpenPGP protocol.
	* Invoking GPGSM:: Using the S/MIME protocol.
	* Invoking SCDAEMON:: How to handle Smartcards.
	* Specify a User ID:: How to Specify a User Id.

	* Helper Tools:: Description of small helper tools

	* Howtos:: How to do certain things.
	* System Notes:: Notes pertaining to certain OSes.
	* Debugging:: How to solve problems

	* Copying:: GNU General Public License says
	how you can copy and share GnuPG
	* Contributors:: People who have contributed to GnuPG.

	* Glossary:: Short description of terms used.
	* Option Index:: Index to command line options.
	* Index:: Index of concepts and symbol names.
	@end menu


	@ifhtml
	@page
	@summarycontents
	@contents
	@end ifhtml


	@include instguide.texi

	@include gpg-agent.texi
	@include dirmngr.texi
	@include gpg.texi
	@include gpgsm.texi
	@include scdaemon.texi

	@node Specify a User ID
	@chapter How to Specify a User Id
	@anchor{how-to-specify-a-user-id}
	@include specify-user-id.texi


	@include tools.texi

	@include howtos.texi

	@include sysnotes.texi

	@include debugging.texi

	@include gpl.texi

	@include contrib.texi

	@c ---------------------------------------------------------------------
	@c Indexes
	@c ---------------------------------------------------------------------

	@include glossary.texi

	@node Option Index
	@unnumbered Option Index

	@printindex op

	@node Index
	@unnumbered Index

	@printindex cp

	@c ---------------------------------------------------------------------
	@c Epilogue
	@c ---------------------------------------------------------------------

	@c @node History
	@c @unnumbered History
	@c
	@c Here are the notices from the old dirmngr manual:
	@c
	@c @itemize
	@c @item Using DirMngr, 2002, Steffen Hansen, Klar"alvdalens Datakonsult AB.
	@c @item Using DirMngr, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008 Werner Koch, g10 Code GmbH.
	@c @end itemize
	@c


	@bye


	diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi
	index 35291a821..a70204043 100644
	--- a/doc/gpg.texi
	+++ b/doc/gpg.texi
	@@ -1,3425 +1,3514 @@
	@c Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
	@c 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	@c This is part of the GnuPG manual.
	@c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi.

	@include defs.inc

	@node Invoking GPG
	@chapter Invoking GPG
	@cindex GPG command options
	@cindex command options
	@cindex options, GPG command

	@macro gpgname
	gpg2
	@end macro
	@manpage gpg2.1
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
	@end ifset

	@mansect synopsis
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	.RB [ \-\-homedir
	.IR dir ]
	.RB [ \-\-options
	.IR file ]
	.RI [ options ]
	.I command
	.RI [ args ]
	@end ifset


	@mansect description
	@command{@gpgname} is the OpenPGP part of the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG). It
	is a tool to provide digital encryption and signing services using the
	OpenPGP standard. @command{@gpgname} features complete key management and
	all bells and whistles you can expect from a decent OpenPGP
	implementation.

	In contrast to the standalone command gpg from GnuPG 1.x, which is
	might be better suited for server and embedded platforms, the 2.x
	version is commonly installed under the name @command{gpg2} and
	targeted to the desktop as it requires several other modules to be
	installed.

	@manpause
	The old 1.x version will be kept maintained and it is possible to
	install both versions on the same system. Documentation for the old
	GnuPG 1.x command is available as a man page and at
	@inforef{Top,GnuPG 1,gpg}.

	@xref{Option Index}, for an index to @command{@gpgname}'s commands and options.
	@mancont

	@menu
	* GPG Commands:: List of all commands.
	* GPG Options:: List of all options.
	* GPG Configuration:: Configuration files.
	* GPG Examples:: Some usage examples.

	Developer information:
	* Unattended Usage of GPG:: Using @command{gpg} from other programs.
	@end menu

	@c * GPG Protocol:: The protocol the server mode uses.


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* COMMANDS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect commands
	@node GPG Commands
	@section Commands

	Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that
	only one command is allowed.

	@command{@gpgname} may be run with no commands, in which case it will
	perform a reasonable action depending on the type of file it is given
	as input (an encrypted message is decrypted, a signature is verified,
	a file containing keys is listed).

	Please remember that option as well as command parsing stops as soon as
	a non-option is encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by
	using the special option @option{--}.


	@menu
	* General GPG Commands:: Commands not specific to the functionality.
	* Operational GPG Commands:: Commands to select the type of operation.
	* OpenPGP Key Management:: How to manage your keys.
	@end menu


	@c *******************************************
	@c ******** GENERAL COMMANDS ***********
	@c *******************************************
	@node General GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands not specific to the function

	@table @gnupgtabopt
	@item --version
	@opindex version
	Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you
	cannot abbreviate this command.

	@item --help
	@itemx -h
	@opindex help
	Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command line options.
	Note that you cannot abbreviate this command.

	@item --warranty
	@opindex warranty
	Print warranty information.

	@item --dump-options
	@opindex dump-options
	Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot
	abbreviate this command.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPERATIONAL COMMANDS *********
	@c *******************************************
	@node Operational GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands to select the type of operation


	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --sign
	@itemx -s
	@opindex sign
	Make a signature. This command may be combined with @option{--encrypt}
	(for a signed and encrypted message), @option{--symmetric} (for a
	signed and symmetrically encrypted message), or @option{--encrypt} and
	@option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that may be
	decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase). The key to be used for
	signing is chosen by default or can be set with the
	@option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key} options.

	@item --clearsign
	@opindex clearsign
	Make a clear text signature. The content in a clear text signature is
	readable without any special software. OpenPGP software is only needed
	to verify the signature. Clear text signatures may modify end-of-line
	whitespace for platform independence and are not intended to be
	reversible. The key to be used for signing is chosen by default or
	can be set with the @option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key}
	options.


	@item --detach-sign
	@itemx -b
	@opindex detach-sign
	Make a detached signature.

	@item --encrypt
	@itemx -e
	@opindex encrypt
	Encrypt data. This option may be combined with @option{--sign} (for a
	signed and encrypted message), @option{--symmetric} (for a message that
	may be decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase), or @option{--sign}
	and @option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that may be
	decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase).

	@item --symmetric
	@itemx -c
	@opindex symmetric
	Encrypt with a symmetric cipher using a passphrase. The default
	symmetric cipher used is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}, but may be chosen with the
	@option{--cipher-algo} option. This option may be combined with
	@option{--sign} (for a signed and symmetrically encrypted message),
	@option{--encrypt} (for a message that may be decrypted via a secret key
	or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and @option{--encrypt} together
	(for a signed message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a
	passphrase).

	@item --store
	@opindex store
	Store only (make a simple RFC1991 literal data packet).

	@item --decrypt
	@itemx -d
	@opindex decrypt
	Decrypt the file given on the command line (or STDIN if no file
	is specified) and write it to STDOUT (or the file specified with
	@option{--output}). If the decrypted file is signed, the signature is also
	verified. This command differs from the default operation, as it never
	writes to the filename which is included in the file and it rejects
	files which don't begin with an encrypted message.

	@item --verify
	@opindex verify
	Assume that the first argument is a signed file and verify it without
	generating any output. With no arguments, the signature packet is
	read from STDIN. If only a one argument is given, it is expected to
	be a complete signature.

	With more than 1 argument, the first should be a detached signature
	and the remaining files ake up the the signed data. To read the signed
	data from STDIN, use @samp{-} as the second filename. For security
	reasons a detached signature cannot read the signed material from
	STDIN without denoting it in the above way.

	Note: If the option @option{--batch} is not used, @command{@gpgname}
	may assume that a single argument is a file with a detached signature
	and it will try to find a matching data file by stripping certain
	suffixes. Using this historical feature to verify a detached
	signature is strongly discouraged; always specify the data file too.

	Note: When verifying a cleartext signature, @command{gpg} verifies
	only what makes up the cleartext signed data and not any extra data
	outside of the cleartext signature or header lines following directly
	the dash marker line. The option @code{--output} may be used to write
	out the actual signed data; but there are other pitfalls with this
	format as well. It is suggested to avoid cleartext signatures in
	favor of detached signatures.

	@item --multifile
	@opindex multifile
	This modifies certain other commands to accept multiple files for
	processing on the command line or read from STDIN with each filename on
	a separate line. This allows for many files to be processed at
	once. @option{--multifile} may currently be used along with
	@option{--verify}, @option{--encrypt}, and @option{--decrypt}. Note that
	@option{--multifile --verify} may not be used with detached signatures.

	@item --verify-files
	@opindex verify-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --verify}.

	@item --encrypt-files
	@opindex encrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --encrypt}.

	@item --decrypt-files
	@opindex decrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --decrypt}.

	@item --list-keys
	@itemx -k
	@itemx --list-public-keys
	@opindex list-keys
	List all keys from the public keyrings, or just the keys given on the
	command line.

	Avoid using the output of this command in scripts or other programs as
	it is likely to change as GnuPG changes. See @option{--with-colons} for a
	machine-parseable key listing command that is appropriate for use in
	scripts and other programs.

	@item --list-secret-keys
	@itemx -K
	@opindex list-secret-keys
	List all keys from the secret keyrings, or just the ones given on the
	command line. A @code{#} after the letters @code{sec} means that the
	secret key is not usable (for example, if it was created via
	@option{--export-secret-subkeys}).

	@item --list-sigs
	@opindex list-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the signatures are listed too.
	This command has the same effect as
	using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-list}.

	For each signature listed, there are several flags in between the "sig"
	tag and keyid. These flags give additional information about each
	signature. From left to right, they are the numbers 1-3 for certificate
	check level (see @option{--ask-cert-level}), "L" for a local or
	non-exportable signature (see @option{--lsign-key}), "R" for a
	nonRevocable signature (see the @option{--edit-key} command "nrsign"),
	"P" for a signature that contains a policy URL (see
	@option{--cert-policy-url}), "N" for a signature that contains a
	notation (see @option{--cert-notation}), "X" for an eXpired signature
	(see @option{--ask-cert-expire}), and the numbers 1-9 or "T" for 10 and
	above to indicate trust signature levels (see the @option{--edit-key}
	command "tsign").

	@item --check-sigs
	@opindex check-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-sigs}, but the signatures are verified. Note
	that for performance reasons the revocation status of a signing key is
	not shown.
	This command has the same effect as
	using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-check}.

	The status of the verification is indicated by a flag directly following
	the "sig" tag (and thus before the flags described above for
	@option{--list-sigs}). A "!" indicates that the signature has been
	successfully verified, a "-" denotes a bad signature and a "%" is used
	if an error occurred while checking the signature (e.g. a non supported
	algorithm).

	@item --locate-keys
	@opindex locate-keys
	Locate the keys given as arguments. This command basically uses the
	same algorithm as used when locating keys for encryption or signing and
	may thus be used to see what keys @command{@gpgname} might use. In
	particular external methods as defined by @option{--auto-key-locate} may
	be used to locate a key. Only public keys are listed.

	@item --fingerprint
	@opindex fingerprint
	List all keys (or the specified ones) along with their
	fingerprints. This is the same output as @option{--list-keys} but with
	the additional output of a line with the fingerprint. May also be
	combined with @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}. If this
	command is given twice, the fingerprints of all secondary keys are
	listed too.

	@item --list-packets
	@opindex list-packets
	List only the sequence of packets. This is mainly useful for
	debugging. When used with option @option{--verbose} the actual MPI
	values are dumped and not only their lengths.


	@item --card-edit
	@opindex card-edit
	Present a menu to work with a smartcard. The subcommand "help" provides
	an overview on available commands. For a detailed description, please
	see the Card HOWTO at
	https://gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html#GnuPG-cardHOWTO .

	@item --card-status
	@opindex card-status
	Show the content of the smart card.

	@item --change-pin
	@opindex change-pin
	Present a menu to allow changing the PIN of a smartcard. This
	functionality is also available as the subcommand "passwd" with the
	@option{--card-edit} command.

	@item --delete-keys @code{name}
	@itemx --delete-keys @code{name}
	Remove key from the public keyring. In batch mode either @option{--yes} is
	required or the key must be specified by fingerprint. This is a
	safeguard against accidental deletion of multiple keys.

	@item --delete-secret-keys @code{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-keys
	Remove key from the secret keyring. In batch mode the key
	must be specified by fingerprint.

	@item --delete-secret-and-public-key @code{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-and-public-key
	Same as @option{--delete-key}, but if a secret key exists, it will be
	removed first. In batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint.

	@item --export
	@opindex export
	Either export all keys from all keyrings (default keyrings and those
	registered via option @option{--keyring}), or if at least one name is given,
	those of the given name. The exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the
	file given with option @option{--output}. Use together with
	@option{--armor} to mail those keys.

	@item --send-keys @code{key IDs}
	@opindex send-keys
	Similar to @option{--export} but sends the keys to a keyserver.
	Fingerprints may be used instead of key IDs. Option @option{--keyserver}
	must be used to give the name of this keyserver. Don't send your
	complete keyring to a keyserver --- select only those keys which are new
	or changed by you. If no key IDs are given, @command{gpg} does nothing.

	@item --export-secret-keys
	@itemx --export-secret-subkeys
	@opindex export-secret-keys
	@opindex export-secret-subkeys
	Same as @option{--export}, but exports the secret keys instead. The
	exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the file given with option
	@option{--output}. This command is often used along with the option
	@option{--armor} to allow easy printing of the key for paper backup;
	however the external tool @command{paperkey} does a better job for
	creating backups on paper. Note that exporting a secret key can be a
	security risk if the exported keys are send over an insecure channel.

	The second form of the command has the special property to render the
	secret part of the primary key useless; this is a GNU extension to
	OpenPGP and other implementations can not be expected to successfully
	import such a key. Its intended use is to generated a full key with
	an additional signing subkey on a dedicated machine and then using
	this command to export the key without the primary key to the main
	machine.

	GnuPG may ask you to enter the passphrase for the key. This is
	required because the internal protection method of the secret key is
	different from the one specified by the OpenPGP protocol.

	@item --import
	@itemx --fast-import
	@opindex import
	Import/merge keys. This adds the given keys to the
	keyring. The fast version is currently just a synonym.

	There are a few other options which control how this command works.
	Most notable here is the @option{--import-options merge-only} option
	which does not insert new keys but does only the merging of new
	signatures, user-IDs and subkeys.

	@item --recv-keys @code{key IDs}
	@opindex recv-keys
	Import the keys with the given key IDs from a keyserver. Option
	@option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this keyserver.

	@item --refresh-keys
	@opindex refresh-keys
	Request updates from a keyserver for keys that already exist on the
	local keyring. This is useful for updating a key with the latest
	signatures, user IDs, etc. Calling this with no arguments will refresh
	the entire keyring. Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the
	name of the keyserver for all keys that do not have preferred keyservers
	set (see @option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url}).

	@item --search-keys @code{names}
	@opindex search-keys
	Search the keyserver for the given names. Multiple names given here will
	be joined together to create the search string for the keyserver.
	Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this
	keyserver. Keyservers that support different search methods allow using
	the syntax specified in "How to specify a user ID" below. Note that
	different keyserver types support different search methods. Currently
	only LDAP supports them all.

	@item --fetch-keys @code{URIs}
	@opindex fetch-keys
	Retrieve keys located at the specified URIs. Note that different
	installations of GnuPG may support different protocols (HTTP, FTP,
	LDAP, etc.)

	@item --update-trustdb
	@opindex update-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance. This command iterates over all keys and
	builds the Web of Trust. This is an interactive command because it may
	have to ask for the "ownertrust" values for keys. The user has to give
	an estimation of how far she trusts the owner of the displayed key to
	correctly certify (sign) other keys. GnuPG only asks for the ownertrust
	value if it has not yet been assigned to a key. Using the
	@option{--edit-key} menu, the assigned value can be changed at any time.

	@item --check-trustdb
	@opindex check-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance without user interaction. From time to
	time the trust database must be updated so that expired keys or
	signatures and the resulting changes in the Web of Trust can be
	tracked. Normally, GnuPG will calculate when this is required and do it
	automatically unless @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} is set. This
	command can be used to force a trust database check at any time. The
	processing is identical to that of @option{--update-trustdb} but it
	skips keys with a not yet defined "ownertrust".

	For use with cron jobs, this command can be used together with
	@option{--batch} in which case the trust database check is done only if
	a check is needed. To force a run even in batch mode add the option
	@option{--yes}.

	@anchor{option --export-ownertrust}
	@item --export-ownertrust
	@opindex export-ownertrust
	Send the ownertrust values to STDOUT. This is useful for backup purposes
	as these values are the only ones which can't be re-created from a
	corrupted trustdb. Example:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	@gpgname{} --export-ownertrust > otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --import-ownertrust
	@opindex import-ownertrust
	Update the trustdb with the ownertrust values stored in @code{files} (or
	STDIN if not given); existing values will be overwritten. In case of a
	severely damaged trustdb and if you have a recent backup of the
	ownertrust values (e.g. in the file @file{otrust.txt}, you may re-create
	the trustdb using these commands:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	cd ~/.gnupg
	rm trustdb.gpg
	@gpgname{} --import-ownertrust < otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --rebuild-keydb-caches
	@opindex rebuild-keydb-caches
	When updating from version 1.0.6 to 1.0.7 this command should be used
	to create signature caches in the keyring. It might be handy in other
	situations too.

	@item --print-md @code{algo}
	@itemx --print-mds
	@opindex print-md
	Print message digest of algorithm ALGO for all given files or STDIN.
	With the second form (or a deprecated "*" as algo) digests for all
	available algorithms are printed.

	@item --gen-random @code{0\|1\|2} @code{count}
	@opindex gen-random
	Emit @var{count} random bytes of the given quality level 0, 1 or 2. If
	@var{count} is not given or zero, an endless sequence of random bytes
	will be emitted. If used with @option{--armor} the output will be
	base64 encoded. PLEASE, don't use this command unless you know what
	you are doing; it may remove precious entropy from the system!

	@item --gen-prime @code{mode} @code{bits}
	@opindex gen-prime
	Use the source, Luke :-). The output format is still subject to change.


	@item --enarmor
	@item --dearmor
	@opindex enarmor
	@opindex dearmor
	Pack or unpack an arbitrary input into/from an OpenPGP ASCII armor.
	This is a GnuPG extension to OpenPGP and in general not very useful.

	+@item --tofu-set-policy @code{auto\|good\|unknown\|bad\|ask} @code{key...}
	+@opindex tofu-set-policy
	+Set the TOFU policy for all the bindings associated with the specified
	+keys. For more information about the meaning of the policies,
	+@pxref{trust-model-tofu}. The keys may be specified either by their
	+fingerprint (preferred) or their keyid.

	@c @item --server
	@c @opindex server
	@c Run gpg in server mode. This feature is not yet ready for use and
	@c thus not documented.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ***** KEY MANGEMENT COMMANDS ********
	@c *******************************************
	@node OpenPGP Key Management
	@subsection How to manage your keys

	This section explains the main commands for key management

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --quick-gen-key @code{user-id}
	@opindex quick-gen-key
	This is a simple command to generate a standard key with one user id.
	In contrast to @option{--gen-key} the key is generated directly
	without the need to answer a bunch of prompts. Unless the option
	@option{--yes} is given, the key creation will be canceled if the
	given user id already exists in the key ring.

	If invoked directly on the console without any special options an
	answer to a ``Continue?'' style confirmation prompt is required. In
	case the user id already exists in the key ring a second prompt to
	force the creation of the key will show up.

	If this command is used with @option{--batch},
	@option{--pinentry-mode} has been set to @code{loopback}, and one of
	the passphrase options (@option{--passphrase},
	@option{--passphrase-fd}, or @option{passphrase-file}) is used, the
	supplied passphrase is used for the new key and the agent does not ask
	for it. To create a key without any protection @code{--passphrase ''}
	may be used.

	@item --gen-key
	@opindex gen-key
	Generate a new key pair using the current default parameters. This is
	the standard command to create a new key.

	@item --full-gen-key
	@opindex gen-key
	Generate a new key pair with dialogs for all options. This is an
	extended version of @option{--gen-key}.

	There is also a feature which allows you to create keys in batch
	mode. See the the manual section ``Unattended key generation'' on how
	to use this.

	@item --gen-revoke @code{name}
	@opindex gen-revoke
	Generate a revocation certificate for the complete key. To revoke
	a subkey or a signature, use the @option{--edit} command.

	@item --desig-revoke @code{name}
	@opindex desig-revoke
	Generate a designated revocation certificate for a key. This allows a
	user (with the permission of the keyholder) to revoke someone else's
	key.


	@item --edit-key
	@opindex edit-key
	Present a menu which enables you to do most of the key management
	related tasks. It expects the specification of a key on the command
	line.

	@c ****** Begin Edit-key Options ********
	@table @asis

	@item uid @code{n}
	@opindex keyedit:uid
	Toggle selection of user ID or photographic user ID with index @code{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item key @code{n}
	@opindex keyedit:key
	Toggle selection of subkey with index @code{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item sign
	@opindex keyedit:sign
	Make a signature on key of user @code{name} If the key is not yet
	signed by the default user (or the users given with -u), the program
	displays the information of the key again, together with its
	fingerprint and asks whether it should be signed. This question is
	repeated for all users specified with
	-u.

	@item lsign
	@opindex keyedit:lsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-exportable and will
	therefore never be used by others. This may be used to make keys
	valid only in the local environment.

	@item nrsign
	@opindex keyedit:nrsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-revocable and can
	therefore never be revoked.

	@item tsign
	@opindex keyedit:tsign
	Make a trust signature. This is a signature that combines the notions
	of certification (like a regular signature), and trust (like the
	"trust" command). It is generally only useful in distinct communities
	or groups.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	Note that "l" (for local / non-exportable), "nr" (for non-revocable,
	and "t" (for trust) may be freely mixed and prefixed to "sign" to
	create a signature of any type desired.
	@c man:.RE

	@table @asis

	@item delsig
	@opindex keyedit:delsig
	Delete a signature. Note that it is not possible to retract a signature,
	once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case
	you better use @code{revsig}.

	@item revsig
	@opindex keyedit:revsig
	Revoke a signature. For every signature which has been generated by
	one of the secret keys, GnuPG asks whether a revocation certificate
	should be generated.

	@item check
	@opindex keyedit:check
	Check the signatures on all selected user IDs. With the extra
	option @code{selfsig} only self-signatures are shown.

	@item adduid
	@opindex keyedit:adduid
	Create an additional user ID.

	@item addphoto
	@opindex keyedit:addphoto
	Create a photographic user ID. This will prompt for a JPEG file that
	will be embedded into the user ID. Note that a very large JPEG will make
	for a very large key. Also note that some programs will display your
	JPEG unchanged (GnuPG), and some programs will scale it to fit in a
	dialog box (PGP).

	@item showphoto
	@opindex keyedit:showphoto
	Display the selected photographic user ID.

	@item deluid
	@opindex keyedit:deluid
	Delete a user ID or photographic user ID. Note that it is not
	possible to retract a user id, once it has been send to the public
	(i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revuid}.

	@item revuid
	@opindex keyedit:revuid
	Revoke a user ID or photographic user ID.

	@item primary
	@opindex keyedit:primary
	Flag the current user id as the primary one, removes the primary user
	id flag from all other user ids and sets the timestamp of all affected
	self-signatures one second ahead. Note that setting a photo user ID
	as primary makes it primary over other photo user IDs, and setting a
	regular user ID as primary makes it primary over other regular user
	IDs.

	@item keyserver
	@opindex keyedit:keyserver
	Set a preferred keyserver for the specified user ID(s). This allows
	other users to know where you prefer they get your key from. See
	@option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url} for more on how this
	works. Setting a value of "none" removes an existing preferred
	keyserver.

	@item notation
	@opindex keyedit:notation
	Set a name=value notation for the specified user ID(s). See
	@option{--cert-notation} for more on how this works. Setting a value of
	"none" removes all notations, setting a notation prefixed with a minus
	sign (-) removes that notation, and setting a notation name (without the
	=value) prefixed with a minus sign removes all notations with that name.

	@item pref
	@opindex keyedit:pref
	List preferences from the selected user ID. This shows the actual
	preferences, without including any implied preferences.

	@item showpref
	@opindex keyedit:showpref
	More verbose preferences listing for the selected user ID. This shows
	the preferences in effect by including the implied preferences of 3DES
	(cipher), SHA-1 (digest), and Uncompressed (compression) if they are
	not already included in the preference list. In addition, the
	preferred keyserver and signature notations (if any) are shown.

	@item setpref @code{string}
	@opindex keyedit:setpref
	Set the list of user ID preferences to @code{string} for all (or just
	the selected) user IDs. Calling setpref with no arguments sets the
	preference list to the default (either built-in or set via
	@option{--default-preference-list}), and calling setpref with "none"
	as the argument sets an empty preference list. Use @command{@gpgname
	--version} to get a list of available algorithms. Note that while you
	can change the preferences on an attribute user ID (aka "photo ID"),
	GnuPG does not select keys via attribute user IDs so these preferences
	will not be used by GnuPG.

	When setting preferences, you should list the algorithms in the order
	which you'd like to see them used by someone else when encrypting a
	message to your key. If you don't include 3DES, it will be
	automatically added at the end. Note that there are many factors that
	go into choosing an algorithm (for example, your key may not be the
	only recipient), and so the remote OpenPGP application being used to
	send to you may or may not follow your exact chosen order for a given
	message. It will, however, only choose an algorithm that is present
	on the preference list of every recipient key. See also the
	INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below.

	@item addkey
	@opindex keyedit:addkey
	Add a subkey to this key.

	@item addcardkey
	@opindex keyedit:addcardkey
	Generate a subkey on a card and add it to this key.

	@item keytocard
	@opindex keyedit:keytocard
	Transfer the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey
	has been selected) to a smartcard. The secret key in the keyring will
	be replaced by a stub if the key could be stored successfully on the
	card and you use the save command later. Only certain key types may be
	transferred to the card. A sub menu allows you to select on what card
	to store the key. Note that it is not possible to get that key back
	from the card - if the card gets broken your secret key will be lost
	unless you have a backup somewhere.

	@item bkuptocard @code{file}
	@opindex keyedit:bkuptocard
	Restore the given file to a card. This command may be used to restore a
	backup key (as generated during card initialization) to a new card. In
	almost all cases this will be the encryption key. You should use this
	command only with the corresponding public key and make sure that the
	file given as argument is indeed the backup to restore. You should then
	select 2 to restore as encryption key. You will first be asked to enter
	the passphrase of the backup key and then for the Admin PIN of the card.

	@item delkey
	@opindex keyedit:delkey
	Remove a subkey (secondary key). Note that it is not possible to retract
	a subkey, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In
	that case you better use @code{revkey}.

	@item revkey
	@opindex keyedit:revkey
	Revoke a subkey.

	@item expire
	@opindex keyedit:expire
	Change the key or subkey expiration time. If a subkey is selected, the
	expiration time of this subkey will be changed. With no selection, the
	key expiration of the primary key is changed.

	@item trust
	@opindex keyedit:trust
	Change the owner trust value for the key. This updates the trust-db
	immediately and no save is required.

	@item disable
	@itemx enable
	@opindex keyedit:disable
	@opindex keyedit:enable
	Disable or enable an entire key. A disabled key can not normally be
	used for encryption.

	@item addrevoker
	@opindex keyedit:addrevoker
	Add a designated revoker to the key. This takes one optional argument:
	"sensitive". If a designated revoker is marked as sensitive, it will
	not be exported by default (see export-options).

	@item passwd
	@opindex keyedit:passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key.

	@item toggle
	@opindex keyedit:toggle
	This is dummy command which exists only for backward compatibility.

	@item clean
	@opindex keyedit:clean
	Compact (by removing all signatures except the selfsig) any user ID
	that is no longer usable (e.g. revoked, or expired). Then, remove any
	signatures that are not usable by the trust calculations.
	Specifically, this removes any signature that does not validate, any
	signature that is superseded by a later signature, revoked signatures,
	and signatures issued by keys that are not present on the keyring.

	@item minimize
	@opindex keyedit:minimize
	Make the key as small as possible. This removes all signatures from
	each user ID except for the most recent self-signature.

	@item cross-certify
	@opindex keyedit:cross-certify
	Add cross-certification signatures to signing subkeys that may not
	currently have them. Cross-certification signatures protect against a
	subtle attack against signing subkeys. See
	@option{--require-cross-certification}. All new keys generated have
	this signature by default, so this option is only useful to bring
	older keys up to date.

	@item save
	@opindex keyedit:save
	Save all changes to the key rings and quit.

	@item quit
	@opindex keyedit:quit
	Quit the program without updating the
	key rings.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	The listing shows you the key with its secondary keys and all user
	ids. The primary user id is indicated by a dot, and selected keys or
	user ids are indicated by an asterisk. The trust
	value is displayed with the primary key: the first is the assigned owner
	trust and the second is the calculated trust value. Letters are used for
	the values:
	@c man:.RE

	@table @asis

	@item -
	No ownertrust assigned / not yet calculated.

	@item e
	Trust
	calculation has failed; probably due to an expired key.

	@item q
	Not enough information for calculation.

	@item n
	Never trust this key.

	@item m
	Marginally trusted.

	@item f
	Fully trusted.

	@item u
	Ultimately trusted.

	@end table
	@c ****** End Edit-key Options ********

	@item --sign-key @code{name}
	@opindex sign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key. This is a shortcut version of
	the subcommand "sign" from @option{--edit}.

	@item --lsign-key @code{name}
	@opindex lsign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key but marks it as
	non-exportable. This is a shortcut version of the subcommand "lsign"
	from @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --quick-sign-key @code{fpr} [@code{names}]
	@itemx --quick-lsign-key @code{fpr} [@code{names}]
	@opindex quick-sign-key
	@opindex quick-lsign-key
	Directly sign a key from the passphrase without any further user
	interaction. The @code{fpr} must be the verified primary fingerprint
	of a key in the local keyring. If no @code{names} are given, all
	useful user ids are signed; with given [@code{names}] only useful user
	ids matching one of theses names are signed. The command
	@option{--quick-lsign-key} marks the signatures as non-exportable. If
	such a non-exportable signature already exists the
	@option{--quick-sign-key} turns it into a exportable signature.

	This command uses reasonable defaults and thus does not provide the
	full flexibility of the "sign" subcommand from @option{--edit-key}.
	Its intended use is to help unattended key signing by utilizing a list
	of verified fingerprints.

	@item --quick-adduid @var{user-id} @var{new-user-id}
	@opindex quick-adduid
	This command adds a new user id to an existing key. In contrast to
	the interactive sub-command @code{adduid} of @option{--edit-key} the
	@var{new-user-id} is added verbatim with only leading and trailing
	white space removed, it is expected to be UTF-8 encoded, and no checks
	on its form are applied.

	@item --passwd @var{user_id}
	@opindex passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key belonging to the certificate
	specified as @var{user_id}. This is a shortcut for the sub-command
	@code{passwd} of the edit key menu.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* OPTIONS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect options
	@node GPG Options
	@section Option Summary

	@command{@gpgname} features a bunch of options to control the exact
	behaviour and to change the default configuration.

	@menu
	* GPG Configuration Options:: How to change the configuration.
	* GPG Key related Options:: Key related options.
	* GPG Input and Output:: Input and Output.
	* OpenPGP Options:: OpenPGP protocol specific options.
	* Compliance Options:: Compliance options.
	* GPG Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually don't want to do.
	* Deprecated Options:: Deprecated options.
	@end menu

	Long options can be put in an options file (default
	"~/.gnupg/gpg.conf"). Short option names will not work - for example,
	"armor" is a valid option for the options file, while "a" is not. Do not
	write the 2 dashes, but simply the name of the option and any required
	arguments. Lines with a hash ('#') as the first non-white-space
	character are ignored. Commands may be put in this file too, but that is
	not generally useful as the command will execute automatically with
	every execution of gpg.

	Please remember that option parsing stops as soon as a non-option is
	encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by using the special option
	@option{--}.

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** CONFIGURATION OPTIONS ********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Configuration Options
	@subsection How to change the configuration

	These options are used to change the configuration and are usually found
	in the option file.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --default-key @var{name}
	@opindex default-key
	Use @var{name} as the default key to sign with. If this option is not
	used, the default key is the first key found in the secret keyring.
	Note that @option{-u} or @option{--local-user} overrides this option.

	@item --default-recipient @var{name}
	@opindex default-recipient
	Use @var{name} as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is
	not used and don't ask if this is a valid one. @var{name} must be
	non-empty.

	@item --default-recipient-self
	@opindex default-recipient-self
	Use the default key as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is not
	used and don't ask if this is a valid one. The default key is the first
	one from the secret keyring or the one set with @option{--default-key}.

	@item --no-default-recipient
	@opindex no-default-recipient
	Reset @option{--default-recipient} and @option{--default-recipient-self}.

	@item -v, --verbose
	@opindex verbose
	Give more information during processing. If used
	twice, the input data is listed in detail.

	@item --no-verbose
	@opindex no-verbose
	Reset verbose level to 0.

	@item -q, --quiet
	@opindex quiet
	Try to be as quiet as possible.

	@item --batch
	@itemx --no-batch
	@opindex batch
	@opindex no-batch
	Use batch mode. Never ask, do not allow interactive commands.
	@option{--no-batch} disables this option. Note that even with a
	filename given on the command line, gpg might still need to read from
	STDIN (in particular if gpg figures that the input is a
	detached signature and no data file has been specified). Thus if you
	do not want to feed data via STDIN, you should connect STDIN to
	@file{/dev/null}.

	@item --no-tty
	@opindex no-tty
	Make sure that the TTY (terminal) is never used for any output.
	This option is needed in some cases because GnuPG sometimes prints
	warnings to the TTY even if @option{--batch} is used.

	@item --yes
	@opindex yes
	Assume "yes" on most questions.

	@item --no
	@opindex no
	Assume "no" on most questions.


	@item --list-options @code{parameters}
	@opindex list-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	listing keys and signatures (that is, @option{--list-keys},
	@option{--list-sigs}, @option{--list-public-keys},
	@option{--list-secret-keys}, and the @option{--edit-key} functions).
	Options can be prepended with a @option{no-} (after the two dashes) to
	give the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex list-options:show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-sigs},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, and @option{--list-secret-keys} to
	display any photo IDs attached to the key. Defaults to no. See also
	@option{--photo-viewer}. Does not work with @option{--with-colons}:
	see @option{--attribute-fd} for the appropriate way to get photo data
	for scripts and other frontends.

	@item show-usage
	@opindex list-options:show-usage
	Show usage information for keys and subkeys in the standard key
	listing. This is a list of letters indicating the allowed usage for a
	key (@code{E}=encryption, @code{S}=signing, @code{C}=certification,
	@code{A}=authentication). Defaults to no.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}
	listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	@option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the @option{--list-sigs} or
	@option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex list-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of user IDs during key listings.
	Defaults to no.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-unusable-subkeys
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-subkeys
	Show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-keyring
	@opindex list-options:show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-expire
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-expire
	Show signature expiration dates (if any) during @option{--list-sigs} or
	@option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-subpackets
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-subpackets
	Include signature subpackets in the key listing. This option can take an
	optional argument list of the subpackets to list. If no argument is
	passed, list all subpackets. Defaults to no. This option is only
	meaningful when using @option{--with-colons} along with
	@option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}.

	@end table

	@item --verify-options @code{parameters}
	@opindex verify-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	verifying signatures. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give
	the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex verify-options:show-photos
	Display any photo IDs present on the key that issued the signature.
	Defaults to no. See also @option{--photo-viewer}.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the signature being verified. Defaults to no.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	signature being verified. Defaults to IETF standard.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the signature being verified.
	Defaults to no.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex verify-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of the user IDs on the key that issued
	the signature. Defaults to no.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex verify-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs during signature verification.
	Defaults to no.

	@item show-primary-uid-only
	@opindex verify-options:show-primary-uid-only
	Show only the primary user ID during signature verification. That is
	all the AKA lines as well as photo Ids are not shown with the signature
	verification status.

	@item pka-lookups
	@opindex verify-options:pka-lookups
	Enable PKA lookups to verify sender addresses. Note that PKA is based
	on DNS, and so enabling this option may disclose information on when
	and what signatures are verified or to whom data is encrypted. This
	is similar to the "web bug" described for the auto-key-retrieve
	feature.

	@item pka-trust-increase
	@opindex verify-options:pka-trust-increase
	Raise the trust in a signature to full if the signature passes PKA
	validation. This option is only meaningful if pka-lookups is set.
	@end table

	@item --enable-large-rsa
	@itemx --disable-large-rsa
	@opindex enable-large-rsa
	@opindex disable-large-rsa
	With --gen-key and --batch, enable the creation of larger RSA secret
	keys than is generally recommended (up to 8192 bits). These large
	keys are more expensive to use, and their signatures and
	certifications are also larger.

	@item --enable-dsa2
	@itemx --disable-dsa2
	@opindex enable-dsa2
	@opindex disable-dsa2
	Enable hash truncation for all DSA keys even for old DSA Keys up to
	1024 bit. This is also the default with @option{--openpgp}. Note
	that older versions of GnuPG also required this flag to allow the
	generation of DSA larger than 1024 bit.

	@item --photo-viewer @code{string}
	@opindex photo-viewer
	This is the command line that should be run to view a photo ID. "%i"
	will be expanded to a filename containing the photo. "%I" does the
	same, except the file will not be deleted once the viewer exits.
	Other flags are "%k" for the key ID, "%K" for the long key ID, "%f"
	for the key fingerprint, "%t" for the extension of the image type
	(e.g. "jpg"), "%T" for the MIME type of the image (e.g. "image/jpeg"),
	"%v" for the single-character calculated validity of the image being
	viewed (e.g. "f"), "%V" for the calculated validity as a string (e.g.
	"full"), "%U" for a base32 encoded hash of the user ID,
	and "%%" for an actual percent sign. If neither %i or %I are present,
	then the photo will be supplied to the viewer on standard input.

	The default viewer is "xloadimage -fork -quiet -title 'KeyID 0x%k'
	STDIN". Note that if your image viewer program is not secure, then
	executing it from GnuPG does not make it secure.

	@item --exec-path @code{string}
	@opindex exec-path
	Sets a list of directories to search for photo viewers and keyserver
	helpers. If not provided, keyserver helpers use the compiled-in
	default directory, and photo viewers use the $PATH environment
	variable.
	Note, that on W32 system this value is ignored when searching for
	keyserver helpers.

	@item --keyring @code{file}
	@opindex keyring
	Add @code{file} to the current list of keyrings. If @code{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory ("~/.gnupg" if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is not
	used).

	Note that this adds a keyring to the current list. If the intent is to
	use the specified keyring alone, use @option{--keyring} along with
	@option{--no-default-keyring}.

	@item --secret-keyring @code{file}
	@opindex secret-keyring
	This is an obsolete option and ignored. All secret keys are stored in
	the @file{private-keys-v1.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory.

	@item --primary-keyring @code{file}
	@opindex primary-keyring
	Designate @code{file} as the primary public keyring. This means that
	newly imported keys (via @option{--import} or keyserver
	@option{--recv-from}) will go to this keyring.

	@item --trustdb-name @code{file}
	@opindex trustdb-name
	Use @code{file} instead of the default trustdb. If @code{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory (@file{~/.gnupg} if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is
	not used).

	@include opt-homedir.texi


	@item --display-charset @code{name}
	@opindex display-charset
	Set the name of the native character set. This is used to convert
	some informational strings like user IDs to the proper UTF-8 encoding.
	Note that this has nothing to do with the character set of data to be
	encrypted or signed; GnuPG does not recode user-supplied data. If
	this option is not used, the default character set is determined from
	the current locale. A verbosity level of 3 shows the chosen set.
	Valid values for @code{name} are:

	@table @asis

	@item iso-8859-1
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-1
	This is the Latin 1 set.

	@item iso-8859-2
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-2
	The Latin 2 set.

	@item iso-8859-15
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-15
	This is currently an alias for
	the Latin 1 set.

	@item koi8-r
	@opindex display-charset:koi8-r
	The usual Russian set (rfc1489).

	@item utf-8
	@opindex display-charset:utf-8
	Bypass all translations and assume
	that the OS uses native UTF-8 encoding.
	@end table

	@item --utf8-strings
	@itemx --no-utf8-strings
	@opindex utf8-strings
	Assume that command line arguments are given as UTF8 strings. The
	default (@option{--no-utf8-strings}) is to assume that arguments are
	encoded in the character set as specified by
	@option{--display-charset}. These options affect all following
	arguments. Both options may be used multiple times.

	@anchor{gpg-option --options}
	@item --options @code{file}
	@opindex options
	Read options from @code{file} and do not try to read them from the
	default options file in the homedir (see @option{--homedir}). This
	option is ignored if used in an options file.

	@item --no-options
	@opindex no-options
	Shortcut for @option{--options /dev/null}. This option is detected
	before an attempt to open an option file. Using this option will also
	prevent the creation of a @file{~/.gnupg} homedir.

	@item -z @code{n}
	@itemx --compress-level @code{n}
	@itemx --bzip2-compress-level @code{n}
	@opindex compress-level
	@opindex bzip2-compress-level
	Set compression level to @code{n} for the ZIP and ZLIB compression
	algorithms. The default is to use the default compression level of zlib
	(normally 6). @option{--bzip2-compress-level} sets the compression level
	for the BZIP2 compression algorithm (defaulting to 6 as well). This is a
	different option from @option{--compress-level} since BZIP2 uses a
	significant amount of memory for each additional compression level.
	@option{-z} sets both. A value of 0 for @code{n} disables compression.

	@item --bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	@opindex bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	Use a different decompression method for BZIP2 compressed files. This
	alternate method uses a bit more than half the memory, but also runs
	at half the speed. This is useful under extreme low memory
	circumstances when the file was originally compressed at a high
	@option{--bzip2-compress-level}.


	@item --mangle-dos-filenames
	@itemx --no-mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex no-mangle-dos-filenames
	Older version of Windows cannot handle filenames with more than one
	dot. @option{--mangle-dos-filenames} causes GnuPG to replace (rather
	than add to) the extension of an output filename to avoid this
	problem. This option is off by default and has no effect on non-Windows
	platforms.

	@item --ask-cert-level
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-level
	@opindex ask-cert-level
	When making a key signature, prompt for a certification level. If this
	option is not specified, the certification level used is set via
	@option{--default-cert-level}. See @option{--default-cert-level} for
	information on the specific levels and how they are
	used. @option{--no-ask-cert-level} disables this option. This option
	defaults to no.

	@item --default-cert-level @code{n}
	@opindex default-cert-level
	The default to use for the check level when signing a key.

	0 means you make no particular claim as to how carefully you verified
	the key.

	1 means you believe the key is owned by the person who claims to own
	it but you could not, or did not verify the key at all. This is
	useful for a "persona" verification, where you sign the key of a
	pseudonymous user.

	2 means you did casual verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint and checked the
	user ID on the key against a photo ID.

	3 means you did extensive verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint with the owner of the
	key in person, and that you checked, by means of a hard to forge
	document with a photo ID (such as a passport) that the name of the key
	owner matches the name in the user ID on the key, and finally that you
	verified (by exchange of email) that the email address on the key
	belongs to the key owner.

	Note that the examples given above for levels 2 and 3 are just that:
	examples. In the end, it is up to you to decide just what "casual"
	and "extensive" mean to you.

	This option defaults to 0 (no particular claim).

	@item --min-cert-level
	@opindex min-cert-level
	When building the trust database, treat any signatures with a
	certification level below this as invalid. Defaults to 2, which
	disregards level 1 signatures. Note that level 0 "no particular
	claim" signatures are always accepted.

	@item --trusted-key @code{long key ID}
	@opindex trusted-key
	Assume that the specified key (which must be given
	as a full 8 byte key ID) is as trustworthy as one of
	your own secret keys. This option is useful if you
	don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them)
	online but still want to be able to check the validity of a given
	recipient's or signator's key.

	-@item --trust-model @code{pgp\|classic\|direct\|always\|auto}
	+@item --trust-model @code{pgp\|classic\|tofu\|tofu+pgp\|direct\|always\|auto}
	@opindex trust-model
	Set what trust model GnuPG should follow. The models are:

	@table @asis

	@item pgp
	@opindex trust-mode:pgp
	This is the Web of Trust combined with trust signatures as used in PGP
	5.x and later. This is the default trust model when creating a new
	trust database.

	@item classic
	@opindex trust-mode:classic
	This is the standard Web of Trust as introduced by PGP 2.

	+ @item tofu
	+ @opindex trust-mode:tofu
	+ @anchor{trust-model-tofu}
	+ TOFU stands for Trust On First Use. In this trust model, the first
	+ time a key is seen, it is memorized. If later another key is seen
	+ with a user id with the same email address, a warning is displayed
	+ indicating that there is a conflict and that the key might be a
	+ forgery and an attempt at a man-in-the-middle attack.
	+
	+ Because a potential attacker is able to control the email address
	+ and thereby circumvent the conflict detection algorithm by using an
	+ email address that is similar in appearance to a trusted email
	+ address, whenever a message is verified, statistics about the number
	+ of messages signed with the key are shown. In this way, a user can
	+ easily identify attacks using fake keys for regular correspondents.
	+
	+ When compared with the Web of Trust, TOFU offers significantly
	+ weaker security guarantees. In particular, TOFU only helps ensure
	+ consistency (that is, that the binding between a key and email
	+ address doesn't change). A major advantage of TOFU is that it
	+ requires little maintenance to use correctly. To use the web of
	+ trust properly, you need to actively sign keys and mark users as
	+ trusted introducers. This is a time-consuming process and anecdotal
	+ evidence suggests that even security-conscious users rarely take the
	+ time to do this thoroughly and instead rely on an ad-hoc TOFU
	+ process.
	+
	+ In the TOFU model, policies are associated with bindings between
	+ keys and email addresses (which are extracted from user ids and
	+ normalized). There are five policies, which can be set manually
	+ using the @option{--tofu-policy} option. The default policy can be
	+ set using the @option{--tofu-default-policy} policy.
	+
	+ The TOFU policies are: @code{auto}, @code{good}, @code{unknown},
	+ @code{bad} and @code{ask}. The @code{auto} policy is used by
	+ default (unless overridden by @option{--tofu-default-policy}) and
	+ marks a binding as marginally trusted. The @code{good},
	+ @code{unknown} and @code{bad} policies mark a binding as fully
	+ trusted, as having unknown trust or as having trust never,
	+ respectively. The @code{unknown} policy is useful for just using
	+ TOFU to detect conflicts, but to never assign positive trust to a
	+ binding. The final policy, @code{ask} prompts the user to indicate
	+ the binding's trust. If batch mode is enabled (or input is
	+ inappropriate in the context), then the user is not prompted and the
	+ @code{undefined} trust level is returned.
	+
	+ @item tofu+pgp
	+ @opindex trust-mode:tofu+pgp
	+ This trust model combines TOFU with the Web of Trust. This is done
	+ by computing the trust level for each model and then taking the
	+ maximum trust level where the trust levels are ordered as follows:
	+ @code{unknown < undefined < marginal < fully < ultimate < expired <
	+ never}.
	+
	+ By setting @option{--tofu-default-policy=unknown}, this model can be
	+ used to implement the web of trust with TOFU's conflict detection
	+ algorithm, but without its assignment of positive trust values,
	+ which some security-conscious users don't like.
	+
	@item direct
	@opindex trust-mode:direct
	Key validity is set directly by the user and not calculated via the
	Web of Trust.

	@item always
	@opindex trust-mode:always
	Skip key validation and assume that used keys are always fully
	valid. You generally won't use this unless you are using some
	external validation scheme. This option also suppresses the
	"[uncertain]" tag printed with signature checks when there is no
	evidence that the user ID is bound to the key. Note that this
	trust model still does not allow the use of expired, revoked, or
	disabled keys.

	@item auto
	@opindex trust-mode:auto
	Select the trust model depending on whatever the internal trust
	database says. This is the default model if such a database already
	exists.
	@end table

	@item --auto-key-locate @code{parameters}
	@itemx --no-auto-key-locate
	@opindex auto-key-locate
	GnuPG can automatically locate and retrieve keys as needed using this
	option. This happens when encrypting to an email address (in the
	"user@@example.com" form), and there are no user@@example.com keys on
	the local keyring. This option takes any number of the following
	mechanisms, in the order they are to be tried:

	@table @asis

	@item cert
	Locate a key using DNS CERT, as specified in rfc4398.

	@item pka
	Locate a key using DNS PKA.

	@item dane
	Locate a key using DANE, as specified
	in draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-05.txt.

	@item ldap
	Using DNS Service Discovery, check the domain in question for any LDAP
	keyservers to use. If this fails, attempt to locate the key using the
	PGP Universal method of checking @samp{ldap://keys.(thedomain)}.

	@item keyserver
	Locate a key using whatever keyserver is defined using the
	@option{--keyserver} option.

	@item keyserver-URL
	In addition, a keyserver URL as used in the @option{--keyserver} option
	may be used here to query that particular keyserver.

	@item local
	Locate the key using the local keyrings. This mechanism allows to
	select the order a local key lookup is done. Thus using
	@samp{--auto-key-locate local} is identical to
	@option{--no-auto-key-locate}.

	@item nodefault
	This flag disables the standard local key lookup, done before any of the
	mechanisms defined by the @option{--auto-key-locate} are tried. The
	position of this mechanism in the list does not matter. It is not
	required if @code{local} is also used.

	@item clear
	Clear all defined mechanisms. This is useful to override
	mechanisms given in a config file.

	@end table

	@item --keyid-format @code{short\|0xshort\|long\|0xlong}
	@opindex keyid-format
	Select how to display key IDs. "short" is the traditional 8-character
	key ID. "long" is the more accurate (but less convenient)
	16-character key ID. Add an "0x" to either to include an "0x" at the
	beginning of the key ID, as in 0x99242560. Note that this option is
	ignored if the option --with-colons is used.

	@item --keyserver @code{name}
	@opindex keyserver
	This option is deprecated - please use the @option{--keyserver} in
	@file{dirmngr.conf} instead.

	Use @code{name} as your keyserver. This is the server that
	@option{--recv-keys}, @option{--send-keys}, and @option{--search-keys}
	will communicate with to receive keys from, send keys to, and search for
	keys on. The format of the @code{name} is a URI:
	`scheme:[//]keyservername[:port]' The scheme is the type of keyserver:
	"hkp" for the HTTP (or compatible) keyservers, "ldap" for the LDAP
	keyservers, or "mailto" for the Graff email keyserver. Note that your
	particular installation of GnuPG may have other keyserver types
	available as well. Keyserver schemes are case-insensitive. After the
	keyserver name, optional keyserver configuration options may be
	provided. These are the same as the global @option{--keyserver-options}
	from below, but apply only to this particular keyserver.

	Most keyservers synchronize with each other, so there is generally no
	need to send keys to more than one server. The keyserver
	@code{hkp://keys.gnupg.net} uses round robin DNS to give a different
	keyserver each time you use it.

	@item --keyserver-options @code{name=value}
	@opindex keyserver-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for the
	keyserver. Options can be prefixed with a `no-' to give the opposite
	meaning. Valid import-options or export-options may be used here as
	well to apply to importing (@option{--recv-key}) or exporting
	(@option{--send-key}) a key from a keyserver. While not all options
	are available for all keyserver types, some common options are:

	@table @asis

	@item include-revoked
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as revoked. Note that not all keyservers
	differentiate between revoked and unrevoked keys, and for such
	keyservers this option is meaningless. Note also that most keyservers do
	not have cryptographic verification of key revocations, and so turning
	this option off may result in skipping keys that are incorrectly marked
	as revoked.

	@item include-disabled
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as disabled. Note that this option is not
	used with HKP keyservers.

	@item auto-key-retrieve
	This option enables the automatic retrieving of keys from a keyserver
	when verifying signatures made by keys that are not on the local
	keyring.

	Note that this option makes a "web bug" like behavior possible.
	Keyserver operators can see which keys you request, so by sending you
	a message signed by a brand new key (which you naturally will not have
	on your local keyring), the operator can tell both your IP address and
	the time when you verified the signature.

	@item honor-keyserver-url
	When using @option{--refresh-keys}, if the key in question has a preferred
	keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to refresh the key
	from. In addition, if auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature
	being verified has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred
	keyserver to fetch the key from. Note that this option introduces a
	"web bug": The creator of the key can see when the keys is
	refreshed. Thus this option is not enabled by default.

	@item honor-pka-record
	If auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature being verified has a
	PKA record, then use the PKA information to fetch the key. Defaults
	to "yes".

	@item include-subkeys
	When receiving a key, include subkeys as potential targets. Note that
	this option is not used with HKP keyservers, as they do not support
	retrieving keys by subkey id.

	@item timeout
	Tell the keyserver helper program how long (in seconds) to try and
	perform a keyserver action before giving up. Note that performing
	multiple actions at the same time uses this timeout value per action.
	For example, when retrieving multiple keys via @option{--recv-keys}, the
	timeout applies separately to each key retrieval, and not to the
	@option{--recv-keys} command as a whole. Defaults to 30 seconds.

	@item http-proxy=@code{value}
	This options is deprecated.
	Set the proxy to use for HTTP and HKP keyservers.
	This overrides any proxy defined in @file{dirmngr.conf}.

	@item verbose
	This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@item debug
	This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@item check-cert
	This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@item ca-cert-file
	This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@end table

	@item --completes-needed @code{n}
	@opindex compliant-needed
	Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 1).

	@item --marginals-needed @code{n}
	@opindex marginals-needed
	Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 3)

	+@item --tofu-default-policy @code{auto\|good\|unknown\|bad\|ask}
	+@opindex tofu-default-policy
	+The default TOFU policy (defaults to @code{auto}). For more
	+information about the meaning of this option, @xref{trust-model-tofu}.
	+
	+@item --tofu-db-format @code{auto\|split\|flat}
	+@opindex tofu-default-policy
	+The format for the TOFU DB.
	+
	+The split file format splits the data across many DBs under the
	+@code{tofu.d} directory (one per email address and one per key). This
	+makes it easier to automatically synchronize the data using a tool
	+such as Unison (@url{https://www.cis.upenn.edu/~bcpierce/unison/}),
	+since the individual files change rarely.
	+
	+The flat file format keeps all of the data in the single file
	+@code{tofu.db}. This format results in better performance.
	+
	+If set to auto (which is the default), GnuPG will first check for the
	+existence of @code{tofu.d} and @code{tofu.db}. If one of these
	+exists, the corresponding format is used. If neither or both of these
	+exist, then GnuPG defaults to the @code{split} format. In the latter
	+case, a warning is emitted.
	+
	@item --max-cert-depth @code{n}
	@opindex max-cert-depth
	Maximum depth of a certification chain (default is 5).

	@item --no-sig-cache
	@opindex no-sig-cache
	Do not cache the verification status of key signatures.
	Caching gives a much better performance in key listings. However, if
	you suspect that your public keyring is not save against write
	modifications, you can use this option to disable the caching. It
	probably does not make sense to disable it because all kind of damage
	can be done if someone else has write access to your public keyring.

	@item --auto-check-trustdb
	@itemx --no-auto-check-trustdb
	@opindex auto-check-trustdb
	If GnuPG feels that its information about the Web of Trust has to be
	updated, it automatically runs the @option{--check-trustdb} command
	internally. This may be a time consuming
	process. @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} disables this option.

	@item --use-agent
	@itemx --no-use-agent
	@opindex use-agent
	This is dummy option. @command{@gpgname} always requires the agent.

	@item --gpg-agent-info
	@opindex gpg-agent-info
	This is dummy option. It has no effect when used with @command{gpg2}.


	@item --agent-program @var{file}
	@opindex agent-program
	Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The
	default value is determined by running @command{gpgconf} with the
	option @option{--list-dirs}. Note that the pipe symbol (@code{\|}) is
	used for a regression test suite hack and may thus not be used in the
	file name.

	@item --dirmngr-program @var{file}
	@opindex dirmngr-program
	Specify a dirmngr program to be used for keyserver access. The
	default value is @file{@value{BINDIR}/dirmngr}. This is only used as a
	fallback when the environment variable @code{DIRMNGR_INFO} is not set or
	a running dirmngr cannot be connected.

	@item --no-autostart
	@opindex no-autostart
	Do not start the gpg-agent or the dirmngr if it has not yet been
	started and its service is required. This option is mostly useful on
	machines where the connection to gpg-agent has been redirected to
	another machines. If dirmngr is required on the remote machine, it
	may be started manually using @command{gpgconf --launch dirmngr}.

	@item --lock-once
	@opindex lock-once
	Lock the databases the first time a lock is requested
	and do not release the lock until the process
	terminates.

	@item --lock-multiple
	@opindex lock-multiple
	Release the locks every time a lock is no longer
	needed. Use this to override a previous @option{--lock-once}
	from a config file.

	@item --lock-never
	@opindex lock-never
	Disable locking entirely. This option should be used only in very
	special environments, where it can be assured that only one process
	is accessing those files. A bootable floppy with a stand-alone
	encryption system will probably use this. Improper usage of this
	option may lead to data and key corruption.

	@item --exit-on-status-write-error
	@opindex exit-on-status-write-error
	This option will cause write errors on the status FD to immediately
	terminate the process. That should in fact be the default but it never
	worked this way and thus we need an option to enable this, so that the
	change won't break applications which close their end of a status fd
	connected pipe too early. Using this option along with
	@option{--enable-progress-filter} may be used to cleanly cancel long
	running gpg operations.

	@item --limit-card-insert-tries @code{n}
	@opindex limit-card-insert-tries
	With @code{n} greater than 0 the number of prompts asking to insert a
	smartcard gets limited to N-1. Thus with a value of 1 gpg won't at
	all ask to insert a card if none has been inserted at startup. This
	option is useful in the configuration file in case an application does
	not know about the smartcard support and waits ad infinitum for an
	inserted card.

	@item --no-random-seed-file
	@opindex no-random-seed-file
	GnuPG uses a file to store its internal random pool over invocations.
	This makes random generation faster; however sometimes write operations
	are not desired. This option can be used to achieve that with the cost of
	slower random generation.

	@item --no-greeting
	@opindex no-greeting
	Suppress the initial copyright message.

	@item --no-secmem-warning
	@opindex no-secmem-warning
	Suppress the warning about "using insecure memory".

	@item --no-permission-warning
	@opindex permission-warning
	Suppress the warning about unsafe file and home directory (@option{--homedir})
	permissions. Note that the permission checks that GnuPG performs are
	not intended to be authoritative, but rather they simply warn about
	certain common permission problems. Do not assume that the lack of a
	warning means that your system is secure.

	Note that the warning for unsafe @option{--homedir} permissions cannot be
	suppressed in the gpg.conf file, as this would allow an attacker to
	place an unsafe gpg.conf file in place, and use this file to suppress
	warnings about itself. The @option{--homedir} permissions warning may only be
	suppressed on the command line.

	@item --no-mdc-warning
	@opindex no-mdc-warning
	Suppress the warning about missing MDC integrity protection.

	@item --require-secmem
	@itemx --no-require-secmem
	@opindex require-secmem
	Refuse to run if GnuPG cannot get secure memory. Defaults to no
	(i.e. run, but give a warning).


	@item --require-cross-certification
	@itemx --no-require-cross-certification
	@opindex require-cross-certification
	When verifying a signature made from a subkey, ensure that the cross
	certification "back signature" on the subkey is present and valid. This
	protects against a subtle attack against subkeys that can sign.
	Defaults to @option{--require-cross-certification} for
	@command{@gpgname}.

	@item --expert
	@itemx --no-expert
	@opindex expert
	Allow the user to do certain nonsensical or "silly" things like
	signing an expired or revoked key, or certain potentially incompatible
	things like generating unusual key types. This also disables certain
	warning messages about potentially incompatible actions. As the name
	implies, this option is for experts only. If you don't fully
	understand the implications of what it allows you to do, leave this
	off. @option{--no-expert} disables this option.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** KEY RELATED OPTIONS **********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Key related Options
	@subsection Key related options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -r
	@opindex recipient
	Encrypt for user id @var{name}. If this option or
	@option{--hidden-recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user-id
	unless @option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --hidden-recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -R
	@opindex hidden-recipient
	Encrypt for user ID @var{name}, but hide the key ID of this user's
	key. This option helps to hide the receiver of the message and is a
	limited countermeasure against traffic analysis. If this option or
	@option{--recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user ID unless
	@option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --encrypt-to @code{name}
	@opindex encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as an
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked
	user id. No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even
	disabled keys can be used.

	@item --hidden-encrypt-to @code{name}
	@opindex hidden-encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--hidden-recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as a hidden
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked user id.
	No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even disabled
	keys can be used.

	@item --no-encrypt-to
	@opindex no-encrypt-to
	Disable the use of all @option{--encrypt-to} and
	@option{--hidden-encrypt-to} keys.

	@item --group @code{name=value1 }
	@opindex group
	Sets up a named group, which is similar to aliases in email programs.
	Any time the group name is a recipient (@option{-r} or
	@option{--recipient}), it will be expanded to the values
	specified. Multiple groups with the same name are automatically merged
	into a single group.

	The values are @code{key IDs} or fingerprints, but any key description
	is accepted. Note that a value with spaces in it will be treated as
	two different values. Note also there is only one level of expansion
	--- you cannot make an group that points to another group. When used
	from the command line, it may be necessary to quote the argument to
	this option to prevent the shell from treating it as multiple
	arguments.

	@item --ungroup @code{name}
	@opindex ungroup
	Remove a given entry from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --no-groups
	@opindex no-groups
	Remove all entries from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --local-user @var{name}
	@itemx -u
	@opindex local-user
	Use @var{name} as the key to sign with. Note that this option overrides
	@option{--default-key}.

	@item --try-secret-key @var{name}
	@opindex try-secret-key
	For hidden recipients GPG needs to know the keys to use for trial
	decryption. The key set with @option{--default-key} is always tried
	first, but this is often not sufficient. This option allows to set more
	keys to be used for trial decryption. Although any valid user-id
	specification may be used for @var{name} it makes sense to use at least
	the long keyid to avoid ambiguities. Note that gpg-agent might pop up a
	pinentry for a lot keys to do the trial decryption. If you want to stop
	all further trial decryption you may use close-window button instead of
	the cancel button.

	@item --try-all-secrets
	@opindex try-all-secrets
	Don't look at the key ID as stored in the message but try all secret
	keys in turn to find the right decryption key. This option forces the
	behaviour as used by anonymous recipients (created by using
	@option{--throw-keyids} or @option{--hidden-recipient}) and might come
	handy in case where an encrypted message contains a bogus key ID.

	@item --skip-hidden-recipients
	@itemx --no-skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex no-skip-hidden-recipients
	During decryption skip all anonymous recipients. This option helps in
	the case that people use the hidden recipients feature to hide there
	own encrypt-to key from others. If oneself has many secret keys this
	may lead to a major annoyance because all keys are tried in turn to
	decrypt something which was not really intended for it. The drawback
	of this option is that it is currently not possible to decrypt a
	message which includes real anonymous recipients.


	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** INPUT AND OUTPUT *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Input and Output
	@subsection Input and Output

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --armor
	@itemx -a
	@opindex armor
	Create ASCII armored output. The default is to create the binary
	OpenPGP format.

	@item --no-armor
	@opindex no-armor
	Assume the input data is not in ASCII armored format.

	@item --output @var{file}
	@itemx -o @var{file}
	@opindex output
	Write output to @var{file}.

	@item --max-output @code{n}
	@opindex max-output
	This option sets a limit on the number of bytes that will be generated
	when processing a file. Since OpenPGP supports various levels of
	compression, it is possible that the plaintext of a given message may be
	significantly larger than the original OpenPGP message. While GnuPG
	works properly with such messages, there is often a desire to set a
	maximum file size that will be generated before processing is forced to
	stop by the OS limits. Defaults to 0, which means "no limit".

	@item --import-options @code{parameters}
	@opindex import-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	importing keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item import-local-sigs
	Allow importing key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	@item keep-ownertrust
	Normally possible still existing ownertrust values of a key are
	cleared if a key is imported. This is in general desirable so that
	a formerly deleted key does not automatically gain an ownertrust
	values merely due to import. On the other hand it is sometimes
	necessary to re-import a trusted set of keys again but keeping
	already assigned ownertrust values. This can be achived by using
	this option.

	@item repair-pks-subkey-bug
	During import, attempt to repair the damage caused by the PKS keyserver
	bug (pre version 0.9.6) that mangles keys with multiple subkeys. Note
	that this cannot completely repair the damaged key as some crucial data
	is removed by the keyserver, but it does at least give you back one
	subkey. Defaults to no for regular @option{--import} and to yes for
	keyserver @option{--recv-keys}.

	@item merge-only
	During import, allow key updates to existing keys, but do not allow
	any new keys to be imported. Defaults to no.

	@item import-clean
	After import, compact (remove all signatures except the
	self-signature) any user IDs from the new key that are not usable.
	Then, remove any signatures from the new key that are not usable.
	This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are not present
	on the keyring. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key}
	command "clean" after import. Defaults to no.

	@item import-minimal
	Import the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except
	the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the
	same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" after import.
	Defaults to no.
	@end table

	@item --export-options @code{parameters}
	@opindex export-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	exporting keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item export-local-sigs
	Allow exporting key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	@item export-attributes
	Include attribute user IDs (photo IDs) while exporting. This is
	useful to export keys if they are going to be used by an OpenPGP
	program that does not accept attribute user IDs. Defaults to yes.

	@item export-sensitive-revkeys
	Include designated revoker information that was marked as
	"sensitive". Defaults to no.

	@c Since GnuPG 2.1 gpg-agent manages the secret key and thus the
	@c export-reset-subkey-passwd hack is not anymore justified. Such use
	@c cases may be implemented using a specialized secret key export
	@c tool.
	@c @item export-reset-subkey-passwd
	@c When using the @option{--export-secret-subkeys} command, this option resets
	@c the passphrases for all exported subkeys to empty. This is useful
	@c when the exported subkey is to be used on an unattended machine where
	@c a passphrase doesn't necessarily make sense. Defaults to no.

	@item export-clean
	Compact (remove all signatures from) user IDs on the key being
	exported if the user IDs are not usable. Also, do not export any
	signatures that are not usable. This includes signatures that were
	issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. This option is
	the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "clean" before export
	except that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to
	no.

	@item export-minimal
	Export the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except the
	most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the same as
	running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" before export except
	that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to no.
	@end table

	@item --with-colons
	@opindex with-colons
	Print key listings delimited by colons. Note that the output will be
	encoded in UTF-8 regardless of any @option{--display-charset} setting. This
	format is useful when GnuPG is called from scripts and other programs
	as it is easily machine parsed. The details of this format are
	documented in the file @file{doc/DETAILS}, which is included in the GnuPG
	source distribution.


	@item --print-pka-records
	@opindex print-pka-records
	Modify the output of the list commands to print PKA records suitable
	to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before each
	record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone file.

	@item --print-dane-records
	@opindex print-dane-records
	Modify the output of the list commands to print OpenPGP DANE records
	suitable to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before
	each record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone
	file.

	@item --fixed-list-mode
	@opindex fixed-list-mode
	Do not merge primary user ID and primary key in @option{--with-colon}
	listing mode and print all timestamps as seconds since 1970-01-01.
	Since GnuPG 2.0.10, this mode is always used and thus this option is
	obsolete; it does not harm to use it though.

	@item --legacy-list-mode
	@opindex legacy-list-mode
	Revert to the pre-2.1 public key list mode. This only affects the
	human readable output and not the machine interface
	(i.e. @code{--with-colons}). Note that the legacy format does not
	allow to convey suitable information for elliptic curves.

	@item --with-fingerprint
	@opindex with-fingerprint
	Same as the command @option{--fingerprint} but changes only the format
	of the output and may be used together with another command.

	@item --with-icao-spelling
	@opindex with-icao-spelling
	Print the ICAO spelling of the fingerprint in addition to the hex digits.

	@item --with-keygrip
	@opindex with-keygrip
	Include the keygrip in the key listings.

	@item --with-secret
	@opindex with-secret
	Include info about the presence of a secret key in public key listings
	done with @code{--with-colons}.

	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPENPGP OPTIONS **************
	@c *******************************************
	@node OpenPGP Options
	@subsection OpenPGP protocol specific options.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -t, --textmode
	@itemx --no-textmode
	@opindex textmode
	Treat input files as text and store them in the OpenPGP canonical text
	form with standard "CRLF" line endings. This also sets the necessary
	flags to inform the recipient that the encrypted or signed data is text
	and may need its line endings converted back to whatever the local
	system uses. This option is useful when communicating between two
	platforms that have different line ending conventions (UNIX-like to Mac,
	Mac to Windows, etc). @option{--no-textmode} disables this option, and
	is the default.

	@item --force-v3-sigs
	@itemx --no-force-v3-sigs
	@item --force-v4-certs
	@itemx --no-force-v4-certs
	These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.1.

	@item --force-mdc
	@opindex force-mdc
	Force the use of encryption with a modification detection code. This
	is always used with the newer ciphers (those with a blocksize greater
	than 64 bits), or if all of the recipient keys indicate MDC support in
	their feature flags.

	@item --disable-mdc
	@opindex disable-mdc
	Disable the use of the modification detection code. Note that by
	using this option, the encrypted message becomes vulnerable to a
	message modification attack.

	@item --personal-cipher-preferences @code{string}
	@opindex personal-cipher-preferences
	Set the list of personal cipher preferences to @code{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also
	used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command.

	@item --personal-digest-preferences @code{string}
	@opindex personal-digest-preferences
	Set the list of personal digest preferences to @code{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked digest algorithm in this list
	is also used when signing without encryption
	(e.g. @option{--clearsign} or @option{--sign}).

	@item --personal-compress-preferences @code{string}
	@opindex personal-compress-preferences
	Set the list of personal compression preferences to @code{string}.
	Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available
	algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This
	allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the
	recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that
	is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked compression
	algorithm in this list is also used when there are no recipient keys
	to consider (e.g. @option{--symmetric}).

	@item --s2k-cipher-algo @code{name}
	@opindex s2k-cipher-algo
	Use @code{name} as the cipher algorithm used to protect secret keys.
	The default cipher is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}. This cipher is also used
	for symmetric encryption with a passphrase if
	@option{--personal-cipher-preferences} and @option{--cipher-algo} is
	not given.

	@item --s2k-digest-algo @code{name}
	@opindex s2k-digest-algo
	Use @code{name} as the digest algorithm used to mangle the passphrases.
	The default algorithm is SHA-1.

	@item --s2k-mode @code{n}
	@opindex s2k-mode
	Selects how passphrases are mangled. If @code{n} is 0 a plain
	passphrase (which is not recommended) will be used, a 1 adds a salt to
	the passphrase and a 3 (the default) iterates the whole process a
	number of times (see --s2k-count). Unless @option{--rfc1991} is used,
	this mode is also used for symmetric encryption with a passphrase.

	@item --s2k-count @code{n}
	@opindex s2k-count
	Specify how many times the passphrase mangling is repeated. This
	value may range between 1024 and 65011712 inclusive. The default is
	inquired from gpg-agent. Note that not all values in the
	1024-65011712 range are legal and if an illegal value is selected,
	GnuPG will round up to the nearest legal value. This option is only
	meaningful if @option{--s2k-mode} is 3.


	@end table

	@c ***************************
	@c ***** Compliance ******
	@c ***************************
	@node Compliance Options
	@subsection Compliance options

	These options control what GnuPG is compliant to. Only one of these
	options may be active at a time. Note that the default setting of
	this is nearly always the correct one. See the INTEROPERABILITY WITH
	OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below before using one of these
	options.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --gnupg
	@opindex gnupg
	Use standard GnuPG behavior. This is essentially OpenPGP behavior
	(see @option{--openpgp}), but with some additional workarounds for common
	compatibility problems in different versions of PGP. This is the
	default option, so it is not generally needed, but it may be useful to
	override a different compliance option in the gpg.conf file.

	@item --openpgp
	@opindex openpgp
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict OpenPGP
	behavior. Use this option to reset all previous options like
	@option{--s2k-*}, @option{--cipher-algo}, @option{--digest-algo} and
	@option{--compress-algo} to OpenPGP compliant values. All PGP
	workarounds are disabled.

	@item --rfc4880
	@opindex rfc4880
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-4880
	behavior. Note that this is currently the same thing as
	@option{--openpgp}.

	@item --rfc2440
	@opindex rfc2440
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-2440
	behavior.

	@ifclear gpgtowone
	@item --rfc1991
	@opindex rfc1991
	Try to be more RFC-1991 (PGP 2.x) compliant. This option is
	deprecated will be removed in GnuPG 2.1.

	@item --pgp2
	@opindex pgp2
	Set up all options to be as PGP 2.x compliant as possible, and warn if
	an action is taken (e.g. encrypting to a non-RSA key) that will create
	a message that PGP 2.x will not be able to handle. Note that `PGP
	2.x' here means `MIT PGP 2.6.2'. There are other versions of PGP 2.x
	available, but the MIT release is a good common baseline.

	This option implies
	@option{--rfc1991 --disable-mdc --no-force-v4-certs
	--escape-from-lines --force-v3-sigs --allow-weak-digest-algos
	--cipher-algo IDEA --digest-algo MD5 --compress-algo ZIP}.
	It also disables @option{--textmode} when encrypting.

	This option is deprecated will be removed in GnuPG 2.1. The reason
	for dropping PGP-2 support is that the PGP 2 format is not anymore
	considered safe (for example due to the use of the broken MD5 algorithm).
	Note that the decryption of PGP-2 created messages will continue to work.
	@end ifclear

	@item --pgp6
	@opindex pgp6
	Set up all options to be as PGP 6 compliant as possible. This
	restricts you to the ciphers IDEA (if the IDEA plugin is installed),
	3DES, and CAST5, the hashes MD5, SHA1 and RIPEMD160, and the
	compression algorithms none and ZIP. This also disables
	--throw-keyids, and making signatures with signing subkeys as PGP 6
	does not understand signatures made by signing subkeys.

	This option implies @option{--disable-mdc --escape-from-lines}.

	@item --pgp7
	@opindex pgp7
	Set up all options to be as PGP 7 compliant as possible. This is
	identical to @option{--pgp6} except that MDCs are not disabled, and the
	list of allowable ciphers is expanded to add AES128, AES192, AES256, and
	TWOFISH.

	@item --pgp8
	@opindex pgp8
	Set up all options to be as PGP 8 compliant as possible. PGP 8 is a lot
	closer to the OpenPGP standard than previous versions of PGP, so all
	this does is disable @option{--throw-keyids} and set
	@option{--escape-from-lines}. All algorithms are allowed except for the
	SHA224, SHA384, and SHA512 digests.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** ESOTERIC OPTIONS *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Esoteric Options
	@subsection Doing things one usually doesn't want to do.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -n
	@itemx --dry-run
	@opindex dry-run
	Don't make any changes (this is not completely implemented).

	@item --list-only
	@opindex list-only
	Changes the behaviour of some commands. This is like @option{--dry-run} but
	different in some cases. The semantic of this command may be extended in
	the future. Currently it only skips the actual decryption pass and
	therefore enables a fast listing of the encryption keys.

	@item -i
	@itemx --interactive
	@opindex interactive
	Prompt before overwriting any files.

	@item --debug-level @var{level}
	@opindex debug-level
	Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be
	a numeric value or by a keyword:

	@table @code
	@item none
	No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of
	the keyword.
	@item basic
	Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item advanced
	More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item expert
	Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item guru
	All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be
	used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is
	only enabled if the keyword is used.
	@end table

	How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not
	specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are
	however carefully selected to best aid in debugging.

	@item --debug @var{flags}
	@opindex debug
	Set debugging flags. All flags are or-ed and @var{flags} may be given
	in C syntax (e.g. 0x0042) or as a comma separated list of flag names.
	To get a list of all supported flags the single word "help" can be
	used.

	@item --debug-all
	@opindex debug-all
	Set all useful debugging flags.

	@item --debug-iolbf
	@opindex debug-iolbf
	Set stdout into line buffered mode. This option is only honored when
	given on the command line.

	@item --faked-system-time @var{epoch}
	@opindex faked-system-time
	This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back or
	forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since the year
	1970. Alternatively @var{epoch} may be given as a full ISO time string
	(e.g. "20070924T154812").

	@item --enable-progress-filter
	@opindex enable-progress-filter
	Enable certain PROGRESS status outputs. This option allows frontends
	to display a progress indicator while gpg is processing larger files.
	There is a slight performance overhead using it.

	@item --status-fd @code{n}
	@opindex status-fd
	Write special status strings to the file descriptor @code{n}.
	See the file DETAILS in the documentation for a listing of them.

	@item --status-file @code{file}
	@opindex status-file
	Same as @option{--status-fd}, except the status data is written to file
	@code{file}.

	@item --logger-fd @code{n}
	@opindex logger-fd
	Write log output to file descriptor @code{n} and not to STDERR.

	@item --log-file @code{file}
	@itemx --logger-file @code{file}
	@opindex log-file
	Same as @option{--logger-fd}, except the logger data is written to file
	@code{file}. Note that @option{--log-file} is only implemented for
	GnuPG-2.

	@item --attribute-fd @code{n}
	@opindex attribute-fd
	Write attribute subpackets to the file descriptor @code{n}. This is most
	useful for use with @option{--status-fd}, since the status messages are
	needed to separate out the various subpackets from the stream delivered
	to the file descriptor.

	@item --attribute-file @code{file}
	@opindex attribute-file
	Same as @option{--attribute-fd}, except the attribute data is written to
	file @code{file}.

	@item --comment @code{string}
	@itemx --no-comments
	@opindex comment
	Use @code{string} as a comment string in clear text signatures and ASCII
	armored messages or keys (see @option{--armor}). The default behavior is
	not to use a comment string. @option{--comment} may be repeated multiple
	times to get multiple comment strings. @option{--no-comments} removes
	all comments. It is a good idea to keep the length of a single comment
	below 60 characters to avoid problems with mail programs wrapping such
	lines. Note that comment lines, like all other header lines, are not
	protected by the signature.

	@item --emit-version
	@itemx --no-emit-version
	@opindex emit-version
	Force inclusion of the version string in ASCII armored output. If
	given once only the name of the program and the major number is
	emitted (default), given twice the minor is also emitted, given triple
	the micro is added, and given quad an operating system identification
	is also emitted. @option{--no-emit-version} disables the version
	line.

	@item --sig-notation @code{name=value}
	@itemx --cert-notation @code{name=value}
	@itemx -N, --set-notation @code{name=value}
	@opindex sig-notation
	@opindex cert-notation
	@opindex set-notation
	Put the name value pair into the signature as notation data.
	@code{name} must consist only of printable characters or spaces, and
	must contain a '@@' character in the form keyname@@domain.example.com
	(substituting the appropriate keyname and domain name, of course). This
	is to help prevent pollution of the IETF reserved notation
	namespace. The @option{--expert} flag overrides the '@@'
	check. @code{value} may be any printable string; it will be encoded in
	UTF8, so you should check that your @option{--display-charset} is set
	correctly. If you prefix @code{name} with an exclamation mark (!), the
	notation data will be flagged as critical
	(rfc4880:5.2.3.16). @option{--sig-notation} sets a notation for data
	signatures. @option{--cert-notation} sets a notation for key signatures
	(certifications). @option{--set-notation} sets both.

	There are special codes that may be used in notation names. "%k" will
	be expanded into the key ID of the key being signed, "%K" into the
	long key ID of the key being signed, "%f" into the fingerprint of the
	key being signed, "%s" into the key ID of the key making the
	signature, "%S" into the long key ID of the key making the signature,
	"%g" into the fingerprint of the key making the signature (which might
	be a subkey), "%p" into the fingerprint of the primary key of the key
	making the signature, "%c" into the signature count from the OpenPGP
	smartcard, and "%%" results in a single "%". %k, %K, and %f are only
	meaningful when making a key signature (certification), and %c is only
	meaningful when using the OpenPGP smartcard.

	@item --sig-policy-url @code{string}
	@itemx --cert-policy-url @code{string}
	@itemx --set-policy-url @code{string}
	@opindex sig-policy-url
	@opindex cert-policy-url
	@opindex set-policy-url
	Use @code{string} as a Policy URL for signatures (rfc4880:5.2.3.20). If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the policy URL packet will
	be flagged as critical. @option{--sig-policy-url} sets a policy url for
	data signatures. @option{--cert-policy-url} sets a policy url for key
	signatures (certifications). @option{--set-policy-url} sets both.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --sig-keyserver-url @code{string}
	@opindex sig-keyserver-url
	Use @code{string} as a preferred keyserver URL for data signatures. If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the keyserver URL packet
	will be flagged as critical.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --set-filename @code{string}
	@opindex set-filename
	Use @code{string} as the filename which is stored inside messages.
	This overrides the default, which is to use the actual filename of the
	file being encrypted. Using the empty string for @var{string}
	effectively removes the filename from the output.

	@item --for-your-eyes-only
	@itemx --no-for-your-eyes-only
	@opindex for-your-eyes-only
	Set the `for your eyes only' flag in the message. This causes GnuPG to
	refuse to save the file unless the @option{--output} option is given,
	and PGP to use a "secure viewer" with a claimed Tempest-resistant font
	to display the message. This option overrides @option{--set-filename}.
	@option{--no-for-your-eyes-only} disables this option.

	@item --use-embedded-filename
	@itemx --no-use-embedded-filename
	@opindex use-embedded-filename
	Try to create a file with a name as embedded in the data. This can be
	a dangerous option as it allows to overwrite files. Defaults to no.

	@item --cipher-algo @code{name}
	@opindex cipher-algo
	Use @code{name} as cipher algorithm. Running the program with the
	command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. If
	this is not used the cipher algorithm is selected from the preferences
	stored with the key. In general, you do not want to use this option as
	it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard.
	@option{--personal-cipher-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the
	same thing.

	@item --digest-algo @code{name}
	@opindex digest-algo
	Use @code{name} as the message digest algorithm. Running the program
	with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. In
	general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to
	violate the OpenPGP standard. @option{--personal-digest-preferences} is the
	safe way to accomplish the same thing.

	@item --compress-algo @code{name}
	@opindex compress-algo
	Use compression algorithm @code{name}. "zlib" is RFC-1950 ZLIB
	compression. "zip" is RFC-1951 ZIP compression which is used by PGP.
	"bzip2" is a more modern compression scheme that can compress some
	things better than zip or zlib, but at the cost of more memory used
	during compression and decompression. "uncompressed" or "none"
	disables compression. If this option is not used, the default
	behavior is to examine the recipient key preferences to see which
	algorithms the recipient supports. If all else fails, ZIP is used for
	maximum compatibility.

	ZLIB may give better compression results than ZIP, as the compression
	window size is not limited to 8k. BZIP2 may give even better
	compression results than that, but will use a significantly larger
	amount of memory while compressing and decompressing. This may be
	significant in low memory situations. Note, however, that PGP (all
	versions) only supports ZIP compression. Using any algorithm other
	than ZIP or "none" will make the message unreadable with PGP. In
	general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to
	violate the OpenPGP standard. @option{--personal-compress-preferences} is the
	safe way to accomplish the same thing.

	@item --cert-digest-algo @code{name}
	@opindex cert-digest-algo
	Use @code{name} as the message digest algorithm used when signing a
	key. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a
	list of supported algorithms. Be aware that if you choose an algorithm
	that GnuPG supports but other OpenPGP implementations do not, then some
	users will not be able to use the key signatures you make, or quite
	possibly your entire key.

	@item --disable-cipher-algo @code{name}
	@opindex disable-cipher-algo
	Never allow the use of @code{name} as cipher algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --disable-pubkey-algo @code{name}
	@opindex disable-pubkey-algo
	Never allow the use of @code{name} as public key algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --throw-keyids
	@itemx --no-throw-keyids
	@opindex throw-keyids
	Do not put the recipient key IDs into encrypted messages. This helps to
	hide the receivers of the message and is a limited countermeasure
	against traffic analysis.@footnote{Using a little social engineering
	anyone who is able to decrypt the message can check whether one of the
	other recipients is the one he suspects.} On the receiving side, it may
	slow down the decryption process because all available secret keys must
	be tried. @option{--no-throw-keyids} disables this option. This option
	is essentially the same as using @option{--hidden-recipient} for all
	recipients.

	@item --not-dash-escaped
	@opindex not-dash-escaped
	This option changes the behavior of cleartext signatures
	so that they can be used for patch files. You should not
	send such an armored file via email because all spaces
	and line endings are hashed too. You can not use this
	option for data which has 5 dashes at the beginning of a
	line, patch files don't have this. A special armor header
	line tells GnuPG about this cleartext signature option.

	@item --escape-from-lines
	@itemx --no-escape-from-lines
	@opindex escape-from-lines
	Because some mailers change lines starting with "From " to ">From " it
	is good to handle such lines in a special way when creating cleartext
	signatures to prevent the mail system from breaking the signature. Note
	that all other PGP versions do it this way too. Enabled by
	default. @option{--no-escape-from-lines} disables this option.

	@item --passphrase-repeat @code{n}
	@opindex passphrase-repeat
	Specify how many times @command{@gpgname} will request a new
	passphrase be repeated. This is useful for helping memorize a
	passphrase. Defaults to 1 repetition.

	@item --passphrase-fd @code{n}
	@opindex passphrase-fd
	Read the passphrase from file descriptor @code{n}. Only the first line
	will be read from file descriptor @code{n}. If you use 0 for @code{n},
	the passphrase will be read from STDIN. This can only be used if only
	one passphrase is supplied.

	Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch}
	has also been given. This is different from GnuPG version 1.x.

	@item --passphrase-file @code{file}
	@opindex passphrase-file
	Read the passphrase from file @code{file}. Only the first line will
	be read from file @code{file}. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, a passphrase stored in a file is
	of questionable security if other users can read this file. Don't use
	this option if you can avoid it.
	Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch}
	has also been given. This is different from GnuPG version 1.x.

	@item --passphrase @code{string}
	@opindex passphrase
	Use @code{string} as the passphrase. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, this is of very questionable
	security on a multi-user system. Don't use this option if you can
	avoid it.
	Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch}
	has also been given. This is different from GnuPG version 1.x.

	@item --pinentry-mode @code{mode}
	@opindex pinentry-mode
	Set the pinentry mode to @code{mode}. Allowed values for @code{mode}
	are:
	@table @asis
	@item default
	Use the default of the agent, which is @code{ask}.
	@item ask
	Force the use of the Pinentry.
	@item cancel
	Emulate use of Pinentry's cancel button.
	@item error
	Return a Pinentry error (``No Pinentry'').
	@item loopback
	Redirect Pinentry queries to the caller. Note that in contrast to
	Pinentry the user is not prompted again if he enters a bad password.
	@end table

	@item --command-fd @code{n}
	@opindex command-fd
	This is a replacement for the deprecated shared-memory IPC mode.
	If this option is enabled, user input on questions is not expected
	from the TTY but from the given file descriptor. It should be used
	together with @option{--status-fd}. See the file doc/DETAILS in the source
	distribution for details on how to use it.

	@item --command-file @code{file}
	@opindex command-file
	Same as @option{--command-fd}, except the commands are read out of file
	@code{file}

	@item --allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@itemx --no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@opindex allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	Allow the import and use of keys with user IDs which are not
	self-signed. This is not recommended, as a non self-signed user ID is
	trivial to forge. @option{--no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid} disables.

	@item --allow-freeform-uid
	@opindex allow-freeform-uid
	Disable all checks on the form of the user ID while generating a new
	one. This option should only be used in very special environments as
	it does not ensure the de-facto standard format of user IDs.

	@item --ignore-time-conflict
	@opindex ignore-time-conflict
	GnuPG normally checks that the timestamps associated with keys and
	signatures have plausible values. However, sometimes a signature
	seems to be older than the key due to clock problems. This option
	makes these checks just a warning. See also @option{--ignore-valid-from} for
	timestamp issues on subkeys.

	@item --ignore-valid-from
	@opindex ignore-valid-from
	GnuPG normally does not select and use subkeys created in the future.
	This option allows the use of such keys and thus exhibits the
	pre-1.0.7 behaviour. You should not use this option unless there
	is some clock problem. See also @option{--ignore-time-conflict} for timestamp
	issues with signatures.

	@item --ignore-crc-error
	@opindex ignore-crc-error
	The ASCII armor used by OpenPGP is protected by a CRC checksum against
	transmission errors. Occasionally the CRC gets mangled somewhere on
	the transmission channel but the actual content (which is protected by
	the OpenPGP protocol anyway) is still okay. This option allows GnuPG
	to ignore CRC errors.

	@item --ignore-mdc-error
	@opindex ignore-mdc-error
	This option changes a MDC integrity protection failure into a warning.
	This can be useful if a message is partially corrupt, but it is
	necessary to get as much data as possible out of the corrupt message.
	However, be aware that a MDC protection failure may also mean that the
	message was tampered with intentionally by an attacker.

	@item --allow-weak-digest-algos
	@opindex allow-weak-digest-algos
	Signatures made with the broken MD5 algorithm are normally rejected
	with an ``invalid digest algorithm'' message. This option allows the
	verification of signatures made with such weak algorithms.

	@item --no-default-keyring
	@opindex no-default-keyring
	Do not add the default keyrings to the list of keyrings. Note that
	GnuPG will not operate without any keyrings, so if you use this option
	and do not provide alternate keyrings via @option{--keyring} or
	@option{--secret-keyring}, then GnuPG will still use the default public or
	secret keyrings.

	@item --skip-verify
	@opindex skip-verify
	Skip the signature verification step. This may be
	used to make the decryption faster if the signature
	verification is not needed.

	@item --with-key-data
	@opindex with-key-data
	Print key listings delimited by colons (like @option{--with-colons}) and
	print the public key data.

	@item --fast-list-mode
	@opindex fast-list-mode
	Changes the output of the list commands to work faster; this is achieved
	by leaving some parts empty. Some applications don't need the user ID
	and the trust information given in the listings. By using this options
	they can get a faster listing. The exact behaviour of this option may
	change in future versions. If you are missing some information, don't
	use this option.

	@item --no-literal
	@opindex no-literal
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --set-filesize
	@opindex set-filesize
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --show-session-key
	@opindex show-session-key
	Display the session key used for one message. See
	@option{--override-session-key} for the counterpart of this option.

	We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing; however the user should have
	the freedom to decide whether to go to prison or to reveal the content
	of one specific message without compromising all messages ever
	encrypted for one secret key.

	You can also use this option if you receive an encrypted message which
	is abusive or offensive, to prove to the administrators of the
	messaging system that the ciphertext transmitted corresponds to an
	inappropriate plaintext so they can take action against the offending
	user.

	@item --override-session-key @code{string}
	@opindex override-session-key
	Don't use the public key but the session key @code{string}. The format
	of this string is the same as the one printed by
	@option{--show-session-key}. This option is normally not used but comes
	handy in case someone forces you to reveal the content of an encrypted
	message; using this option you can do this without handing out the
	secret key.

	@item --ask-sig-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-sig-expire
	@opindex ask-sig-expire
	When making a data signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-sig-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-sig-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-sig-expire
	@opindex default-sig-expire
	The default expiration time to use for signature expiration. Valid
	values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d
	(for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for
	example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an absolute
	date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --ask-cert-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-expire
	@opindex ask-cert-expire
	When making a key signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-cert-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-cert-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-cert-expire
	@opindex default-cert-expire
	The default expiration time to use for key signature expiration.
	Valid values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the
	letter d (for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years)
	(for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an
	absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --allow-secret-key-import
	@opindex allow-secret-key-import
	This is an obsolete option and is not used anywhere.

	@item --allow-multiple-messages
	@item --no-allow-multiple-messages
	@opindex allow-multiple-messages
	Allow processing of multiple OpenPGP messages contained in a single file
	or stream. Some programs that call GPG are not prepared to deal with
	multiple messages being processed together, so this option defaults to
	no. Note that versions of GPG prior to 1.4.7 always allowed multiple
	messages.

	Warning: Do not use this option unless you need it as a temporary
	workaround!


	@item --enable-special-filenames
	@opindex enable-special-filenames
	This options enables a mode in which filenames of the form
	@file{-&n}, where n is a non-negative decimal number,
	refer to the file descriptor n and not to a file with that name.

	@item --no-expensive-trust-checks
	@opindex no-expensive-trust-checks
	Experimental use only.

	@item --preserve-permissions
	@opindex preserve-permissions
	Don't change the permissions of a secret keyring back to user
	read/write only. Use this option only if you really know what you are doing.

	@item --default-preference-list @code{string}
	@opindex default-preference-list
	Set the list of default preferences to @code{string}. This preference
	list is used for new keys and becomes the default for "setpref" in the
	edit menu.

	@item --default-keyserver-url @code{name}
	@opindex default-keyserver-url
	Set the default keyserver URL to @code{name}. This keyserver will be
	used as the keyserver URL when writing a new self-signature on a key,
	which includes key generation and changing preferences.

	@item --list-config
	@opindex list-config
	Display various internal configuration parameters of GnuPG. This option
	is intended for external programs that call GnuPG to perform tasks, and
	is thus not generally useful. See the file @file{doc/DETAILS} in the
	source distribution for the details of which configuration items may be
	listed. @option{--list-config} is only usable with
	@option{--with-colons} set.

	@item --list-gcrypt-config
	@opindex list-gcrypt-config
	Display various internal configuration parameters of Libgcrypt.

	@item --gpgconf-list
	@opindex gpgconf-list
	This command is similar to @option{--list-config} but in general only
	internally used by the @command{gpgconf} tool.

	@item --gpgconf-test
	@opindex gpgconf-test
	This is more or less dummy action. However it parses the configuration
	file and returns with failure if the configuration file would prevent
	@command{gpg} from startup. Thus it may be used to run a syntax check
	on the configuration file.

	@end table

	@c *******************************
	@c ***** Deprecated **********
	@c *******************************
	@node Deprecated Options
	@subsection Deprecated options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --show-photos
	@itemx --no-show-photos
	@opindex show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-sigs},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, @option{--list-secret-keys}, and verifying
	a signature to also display the photo ID attached to the key, if
	any. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. These options are deprecated. Use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-photos} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-photos} instead.

	@item --show-keyring
	@opindex show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. This option is deprecated: use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-keyring} instead.

	@item --always-trust
	@opindex always-trust
	Identical to @option{--trust-model always}. This option is deprecated.

	@item --show-notation
	@itemx --no-show-notation
	@opindex show-notation
	Show signature notations in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs} listings
	as well as when verifying a signature with a notation in it. These
	options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-notation}
	and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-notation} instead.

	@item --show-policy-url
	@itemx --no-show-policy-url
	@opindex show-policy-url
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}
	listings as well as when verifying a signature with a policy URL in
	it. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} instead.


	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* FILES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect files
	@node GPG Configuration
	@section Configuration files

	There are a few configuration files to control certain aspects of
	@command{@gpgname}'s operation. Unless noted, they are expected in the
	current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}).

	@table @file

	@item gpg.conf
	@cindex gpg.conf
	This is the standard configuration file read by @command{@gpgname} on
	startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes
	may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated. This default
	name may be changed on the command line (@pxref{gpg-option --options}).
	You should backup this file.

	@end table

	@c man:.RE
	Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files
	into the directory @file{@value{SYSCONFSKELDIR}} so that
	newly created users start up with a working configuration.
	For existing users a small
	helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}).

	For internal purposes @command{@gpgname} creates and maintains a few other
	files; They all live in in the current home directory (@pxref{option
	--homedir}). Only the @command{@gpgname} program may modify these files.


	@table @file
	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg
	The public keyring. You should backup this file.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the public keyring.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
	The public keyring using a different format. This file is sharred
	with @command{gpgsm}. You should backup this file.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx.lock
	The lock file for @file{pubring.kbx}.

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg
	A secret keyring as used by GnuPG versions before 2.1. It is not
	used by GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	@item ~/.gnupg/.gpg-v21-migrated
	File indicating that a migration to GnuPG 2.1 has been done.

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg
	The trust database. There is no need to backup this file; it is better
	to backup the ownertrust values (@pxref{option --export-ownertrust}).

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the trust database.

	@item ~/.gnupg/random_seed
	A file used to preserve the state of the internal random pool.

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the secret keyring.

	@item ~/.gnupg/openpgp-revocs.d/
	This is the directory where gpg stores pre-generated revocation
	certificates. The file name corresponds to the OpenPGP fingerprint of
	the respective key. It is suggested to backup those certificates and
	if the primary private key is not stored on the disk to move them to
	an external storage device. Anyone who can access theses files is
	able to revoke the corresponding key. You may want to print them out.
	You should backup all files in this directory and take care to keep
	this backup closed away.

	@item @value{DATADIR}/options.skel
	The skeleton options file.

	@item @value{LIBDIR}/
	Default location for extensions.

	@end table

	@c man:.RE
	Operation is further controlled by a few environment variables:

	@table @asis

	@item HOME
	Used to locate the default home directory.

	@item GNUPGHOME
	If set directory used instead of "~/.gnupg".

	@item GPG_AGENT_INFO
	This variable was used by GnuPG versions before 2.1

	@item PINENTRY_USER_DATA
	This value is passed via gpg-agent to pinentry. It is useful to convey
	extra information to a custom pinentry.

	@item COLUMNS
	@itemx LINES
	Used to size some displays to the full size of the screen.


	@item LANGUAGE
	Apart from its use by GNU, it is used in the W32 version to override the
	language selection done through the Registry. If used and set to a
	valid and available language name (@var{langid}), the file with the
	translation is loaded from

	@code{@var{gpgdir}/gnupg.nls/@var{langid}.mo}. Here @var{gpgdir} is the
	directory out of which the gpg binary has been loaded. If it can't be
	loaded the Registry is tried and as last resort the native Windows
	locale system is used.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* EXAMPLES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect examples
	@node GPG Examples
	@section Examples

	@table @asis

	@item gpg -se -r @code{Bob} @code{file}
	sign and encrypt for user Bob

	@item gpg --clearsign @code{file}
	make a clear text signature

	@item gpg -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature

	@item gpg -u 0x12345678 -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature with the key 0x12345678

	@item gpg --list-keys @code{user_ID}
	show keys

	@item gpg --fingerprint @code{user_ID}
	show fingerprint

	@item gpg --verify @code{pgpfile}
	@itemx gpg --verify @code{sigfile}
	Verify the signature of the file but do not output the data. The
	second form is used for detached signatures, where @code{sigfile}
	is the detached signature (either ASCII armored or binary) and
	are the signed data; if this is not given, the name of
	the file holding the signed data is constructed by cutting off the
	extension (".asc" or ".sig") of @code{sigfile} or by asking the
	user for the filename.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* USER ID **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect how to specify a user id
	@ifset isman
	@include specify-user-id.texi
	@end ifset

	@mansect return value
	@chapheading RETURN VALUE

	The program returns 0 if everything was fine, 1 if at least
	a signature was bad, and other error codes for fatal errors.

	@mansect warnings
	@chapheading WARNINGS

	Use a good password for your user account and a good passphrase
	to protect your secret key. This passphrase is the weakest part of the
	whole system. Programs to do dictionary attacks on your secret keyring
	are very easy to write and so you should protect your "~/.gnupg/"
	directory very well.

	Keep in mind that, if this program is used over a network (telnet), it
	is very easy to spy out your passphrase!

	If you are going to verify detached signatures, make sure that the
	program knows about it; either give both filenames on the command line
	or use @samp{-} to specify STDIN.

	@mansect interoperability
	@chapheading INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS

	GnuPG tries to be a very flexible implementation of the OpenPGP
	standard. In particular, GnuPG implements many of the optional parts
	of the standard, such as the SHA-512 hash, and the ZLIB and BZIP2
	compression algorithms. It is important to be aware that not all
	OpenPGP programs implement these optional algorithms and that by
	forcing their use via the @option{--cipher-algo},
	@option{--digest-algo}, @option{--cert-digest-algo}, or
	@option{--compress-algo} options in GnuPG, it is possible to create a
	perfectly valid OpenPGP message, but one that cannot be read by the
	intended recipient.

	There are dozens of variations of OpenPGP programs available, and each
	supports a slightly different subset of these optional algorithms.
	For example, until recently, no (unhacked) version of PGP supported
	the BLOWFISH cipher algorithm. A message using BLOWFISH simply could
	not be read by a PGP user. By default, GnuPG uses the standard
	OpenPGP preferences system that will always do the right thing and
	create messages that are usable by all recipients, regardless of which
	OpenPGP program they use. Only override this safe default if you
	really know what you are doing.

	If you absolutely must override the safe default, or if the preferences
	on a given key are invalid for some reason, you are far better off using
	the @option{--pgp6}, @option{--pgp7}, or @option{--pgp8} options. These
	options are safe as they do not force any particular algorithms in
	violation of OpenPGP, but rather reduce the available algorithms to a
	"PGP-safe" list.

	@mansect bugs
	@chapheading BUGS

	On older systems this program should be installed as setuid(root). This
	is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents the
	operating system from writing memory pages (which may contain
	passphrases or other sensitive material) to disk. If you get no
	warning message about insecure memory your operating system supports
	locking without being root. The program drops root privileges as soon
	as locked memory is allocated.

	Note also that some systems (especially laptops) have the ability to
	``suspend to disk'' (also known as ``safe sleep'' or ``hibernate'').
	This writes all memory to disk before going into a low power or even
	powered off mode. Unless measures are taken in the operating system
	to protect the saved memory, passphrases or other sensitive material
	may be recoverable from it later.

	Before you report a bug you should first search the mailing list
	archives for similar problems and second check whether such a bug has
	already been reported to our bug tracker at http://bugs.gnupg.org .

	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* ************
	@c ************* UNATTENDED ************
	@c ************* ************
	@c *******************************************
	@manpause
	@node Unattended Usage of GPG
	@section Unattended Usage

	@command{gpg} is often used as a backend engine by other software. To help
	with this a machine interface has been defined to have an unambiguous
	way to do this. The options @option{--status-fd} and @option{--batch}
	are almost always required for this.

	@menu
	* Unattended GPG key generation:: Unattended key generation
	@end menu


	@node Unattended GPG key generation
	@subsection Unattended key generation

	The command @option{--gen-key} may be used along with the option
	@option{--batch} for unattended key generation. The parameters are
	either read from stdin or given as a file on the command line.
	The format of the parameter file is as follows:

	@itemize @bullet
	@item Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 characters.
	@item UTF-8 encoding must be used to specify non-ASCII characters.
	@item Empty lines are ignored.
	@item Leading and trailing while space is ignored.
	@item A hash sign as the first non white space character indicates
	a comment line.
	@item Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign, the
	arguments are separated by white space from the keyword.
	@item Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon. Arguments
	are separated by white space.
	@item
	The first parameter must be @samp{Key-Type}; control statements may be
	placed anywhere.
	@item
	The order of the parameters does not matter except for @samp{Key-Type}
	which must be the first parameter. The parameters are only used for
	the generated keyblock (primary and subkeys); parameters from previous
	sets are not used. Some syntactically checks may be performed.
	@item
	Key generation takes place when either the end of the parameter file
	is reached, the next @samp{Key-Type} parameter is encountered or at the
	control statement @samp{%commit} is encountered.
	@end itemize

	@noindent
	Control statements:

	@table @asis

	@item %echo @var{text}
	Print @var{text} as diagnostic.

	@item %dry-run
	Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking).

	@item %commit
	Perform the key generation. Note that an implicit commit is done at
	the next @asis{Key-Type} parameter.

	@item %pubring @var{filename}
	@itemx %secring @var{filename}
	Do not write the key to the default or commandline given keyring but
	to @var{filename}. This must be given before the first commit to take
	place, duplicate specification of the same filename is ignored, the
	last filename before a commit is used. The filename is used until a
	new filename is used (at commit points) and all keys are written to
	that file. If a new filename is given, this file is created (and
	overwrites an existing one). For GnuPG versions prior to 2.1, both
	control statements must be given. For GnuPG 2.1 and later
	@samp{%secring} is a no-op.

	@item %ask-passphrase
	@itemx %no-ask-passphrase
	This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	@item %no-protection
	Using this option allows the creation of keys without any passphrase
	protection. This option is mainly intended for regression tests.

	@item %transient-key
	If given the keys are created using a faster and a somewhat less
	secure random number generator. This option may be used for keys
	which are only used for a short time and do not require full
	cryptographic strength. It takes only effect if used together with
	the control statement @samp{%no-protection}.

	@end table

	@noindent
	General Parameters:

	@table @asis

	@item Key-Type: @var{algo}
	Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the primary
	key. The algorithm must be capable of signing. This is a required
	parameter. @var{algo} may either be an OpenPGP algorithm number or a
	string with the algorithm name. The special value @samp{default} may
	be used for @var{algo} to create the default key type; in this case a
	@samp{Key-Usage} shall not be given and @samp{default} also be used
	for @samp{Subkey-Type}.

	@item Key-Length: @var{nbits}
	The requested length of the generated key in bits. The default is
	returned by running the command @samp{gpg2 --gpgconf-list}.

	@item Key-Grip: @var{hexstring}
	This is optional and used to generate a CSR or certificate for an
	already existing key. Key-Length will be ignored when given.

	@item Key-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Space or comma delimited list of key usages. Allowed values are
	@samp{encrypt}, @samp{sign}, and @samp{auth}. This is used to
	generate the key flags. Please make sure that the algorithm is
	capable of this usage. Note that OpenPGP requires that all primary
	keys are capable of certification, so no matter what usage is given
	here, the @samp{cert} flag will be on. If no @samp{Key-Usage} is
	specified and the @samp{Key-Type} is not @samp{default}, all allowed
	usages for that particular algorithm are used; if it is not given but
	@samp{default} is used the usage will be @samp{sign}.

	@item Subkey-Type: @var{algo}
	This generates a secondary key (subkey). Currently only one subkey
	can be handled. See also @samp{Key-Type} above.

	@item Subkey-Length: @var{nbits}
	Length of the secondary key (subkey) in bits. The default is returned
	by running the command @samp{gpg2 --gpgconf-list}".

	@item Subkey-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Key usage lists for a subkey; similar to @samp{Key-Usage}.

	@item Passphrase: @var{string}
	If you want to specify a passphrase for the secret key, enter it here.
	Default is to use the Pinentry dialog to ask for a passphrase.

	@item Name-Real: @var{name}
	@itemx Name-Comment: @var{comment}
	@itemx Name-Email: @var{email}
	The three parts of a user name. Remember to use UTF-8 encoding here.
	If you don't give any of them, no user ID is created.

	@item Expire-Date: @var{iso-date}\|(@var{number}[d\|w\|m\|y])
	Set the expiration date for the key (and the subkey). It may either
	be entered in ISO date format (e.g. "20000815T145012") or as number of
	days, weeks, month or years after the creation date. The special
	notation "seconds=N" is also allowed to specify a number of seconds
	since creation. Without a letter days are assumed. Note that there
	is no check done on the overflow of the type used by OpenPGP for
	timestamps. Thus you better make sure that the given value make
	sense. Although OpenPGP works with time intervals, GnuPG uses an
	absolute value internally and thus the last year we can represent is
	2105.

	@item Creation-Date: @var{iso-date}
	Set the creation date of the key as stored in the key information and
	which is also part of the fingerprint calculation. Either a date like
	"1986-04-26" or a full timestamp like "19860426T042640" may be used.
	The time is considered to be UTC. The special notation "seconds=N"
	may be used to directly specify a the number of seconds since Epoch
	(Unix time). If it is not given the current time is used.

	@item Preferences: @var{string}
	Set the cipher, hash, and compression preference values for this key.
	This expects the same type of string as the sub-command @samp{setpref}
	in the @option{--edit-key} menu.

	@item Revoker: @var{algo}:@var{fpr} [sensitive]
	Add a designated revoker to the generated key. Algo is the public key
	algorithm of the designated revoker (i.e. RSA=1, DSA=17, etc.)
	@var{fpr} is the fingerprint of the designated revoker. The optional
	@samp{sensitive} flag marks the designated revoker as sensitive
	information. Only v4 keys may be designated revokers.

	@item Keyserver: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter that specifies the preferred keyserver
	URL for the key.

	@item Handle: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter only used with the status lines
	KEY_CREATED and KEY_NOT_CREATED. @var{string} may be up to 100
	characters and should not contain spaces. It is useful for batch key
	generation to associate a key parameter block with a status line.

	@end table

	@noindent
	Here is an example on how to create a key:
	@smallexample
	$ cat >foo <<EOF
	%echo Generating a basic OpenPGP key
	Key-Type: DSA
	Key-Length: 1024
	Subkey-Type: ELG-E
	Subkey-Length: 1024
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	%pubring foo.pub
	%secring foo.sec
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	EOF
	$ gpg2 --batch --gen-key foo
	[...]
	$ gpg2 --no-default-keyring --secret-keyring ./foo.sec \
	--keyring ./foo.pub --list-secret-keys
	/home/wk/work/gnupg-stable/scratch/foo.sec
	------------------------------------------
	sec 1024D/915A878D 2000-03-09 Joe Tester (with stupid passphrase) <joe@@foo.bar>
	ssb 1024g/8F70E2C0 2000-03-09
	@end smallexample


	@noindent
	If you want to create a key with the default algorithms you would use
	these parameters:
	@smallexample
	%echo Generating a default key
	Key-Type: default
	Subkey-Type: default
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	%pubring foo.pub
	%secring foo.sec
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	@end smallexample




	@mansect see also
	@ifset isman
	@command{gpgv}(1),
	@command{gpgsm}(1),
	@command{gpg-agent}(1)
	@end ifset
	@include see-also-note.texi
	diff --git a/g10/Makefile.am b/g10/Makefile.am
	index cd121833a..73578435d 100644
	--- a/g10/Makefile.am
	+++ b/g10/Makefile.am
	@@ -1,184 +1,185 @@
	# Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
	# 2003, 2006, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	#
	# This file is part of GnuPG.
	#
	# GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	# (at your option) any later version.
	#
	# GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	# GNU General Public License for more details.
	#
	# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	# along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.

	## Process this file with automake to produce Makefile.in

	EXTRA_DIST = options.skel dirmngr-conf.skel distsigkey.gpg \
	ChangeLog-2011 gpg-w32info.rc \
	gpg.w32-manifest.in test.c t-keydb-keyring.kbx

	AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/common

	include $(top_srcdir)/am/cmacros.am

	-AM_CFLAGS = $(LIBGCRYPT_CFLAGS) \
	+AM_CFLAGS = $(SQLITE3_CFLAGS) $(LIBGCRYPT_CFLAGS) \
	$(LIBASSUAN_CFLAGS) $(GPG_ERROR_CFLAGS)

	needed_libs = ../kbx/libkeybox.a $(libcommon)

	bin_PROGRAMS = gpg2
	if !HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM
	bin_PROGRAMS += gpgv2
	endif
	noinst_PROGRAMS = $(module_tests)
	TESTS = $(module_tests)

	if ENABLE_BZIP2_SUPPORT
	bzip2_source = compress-bz2.c
	else
	bzip2_source =
	endif

	if ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	card_source = card-util.c
	else
	card_source =
	endif

	if NO_TRUST_MODELS
	trust_source =
	else
	trust_source = trustdb.c trustdb.h tdbdump.c tdbio.c tdbio.h
	endif


	if HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	resource_objs += gpg-w32info.o

	gpg-w32info.o : gpg.w32-manifest

	endif

	common_source = \
	gpg.h \
	dek.h \
	build-packet.c \
	compress.c \
	$(bzip2_source) \
	filter.h \
	free-packet.c \
	getkey.c \
	keydb.c keydb.h \
	keyring.c keyring.h \
	seskey.c \
	kbnode.c \
	main.h \
	mainproc.c \
	armor.c \
	mdfilter.c \
	textfilter.c \
	progress.c \
	misc.c \
	rmd160.c rmd160.h \
	options.h \
	openfile.c \
	keyid.c \
	packet.h \
	parse-packet.c \
	cpr.c \
	plaintext.c \
	sig-check.c \
	keylist.c \
	pkglue.c pkglue.h \
	ecdh.c

	gpg2_SOURCES = gpg.c \
	server.c \
	$(common_source) \
	pkclist.c \
	skclist.c \
	pubkey-enc.c \
	passphrase.c \
	decrypt.c \
	decrypt-data.c \
	cipher.c \
	encrypt.c \
	sign.c \
	verify.c \
	revoke.c \
	keyedit.c \
	dearmor.c \
	import.c \
	export.c \
	migrate.c \
	delkey.c \
	keygen.c \
	helptext.c \
	keyserver.c \
	keyserver-internal.h \
	call-dirmngr.c call-dirmngr.h \
	photoid.c photoid.h \
	call-agent.c call-agent.h \
	trust.c $(trust_source) \
	$(card_source) \
	- exec.c exec.h
	+ exec.c exec.h \
	+ tofu.h tofu.c

	gpgv2_SOURCES = gpgv.c \
	$(common_source) \
	verify.c

	#gpgd_SOURCES = gpgd.c \
	# ks-proto.h \
	# ks-proto.c \
	# ks-db.c \
	# ks-db.h \
	# $(common_source)

	LDADD = $(needed_libs) ../common/libgpgrl.a \
	$(ZLIBS) $(LIBINTL) $(CAPLIBS) $(NETLIBS)
	-gpg2_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBGCRYPT_LIBS) $(LIBREADLINE) \
	+gpg2_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(SQLITE3_LIBS) $(LIBGCRYPT_LIBS) $(LIBREADLINE) \
	$(LIBASSUAN_LIBS) $(GPG_ERROR_LIBS) \
	$(LIBICONV) $(resource_objs) $(extra_sys_libs)
	gpg2_LDFLAGS = $(extra_bin_ldflags)
	gpgv2_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBGCRYPT_LIBS) \
	$(GPG_ERROR_LIBS) \
	$(LIBICONV) $(resource_objs) $(extra_sys_libs)
	gpgv2_LDFLAGS = $(extra_bin_ldflags)

	t_common_ldadd =
	module_tests = t-rmd160 t-keydb
	t_rmd160_SOURCES = t-rmd160.c rmd160.c
	t_rmd160_LDADD = $(t_common_ldadd)
	t_keydb_SOURCES = t-keydb.c test-stubs.c $(common_source)
	t_keydb_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBGCRYPT_LIBS) $(GPG_ERROR_LIBS) \
	$(LIBICONV) $(t_common_ldadd)


	$(PROGRAMS): $(needed_libs) ../common/libgpgrl.a

	install-data-local:
	$(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(pkgdatadir)
	$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/options.skel \
	$(DESTDIR)$(pkgdatadir)/gpg-conf.skel
	$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/dirmngr-conf.skel \
	$(DESTDIR)$(pkgdatadir)/dirmngr-conf.skel
	$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/distsigkey.gpg \
	$(DESTDIR)$(pkgdatadir)/distsigkey.gpg

	uninstall-local:
	-@rm $(DESTDIR)$(pkgdatadir)/gpg-conf.skel
	-@rm $(DESTDIR)$(pkgdatadir)/dirmngr-conf.skel
	-@rm $(DESTDIR)$(pkgdatadir)/distsigkey.gpg


	# There has never been a gpg for WindowsCE, thus we don't need a gpg2 here
	if HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM
	install-exec-hook:
	mv -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/gpg2$(EXEEXT) \
	$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/gpg$(EXEEXT)
	endif
	diff --git a/g10/gpg.c b/g10/gpg.c
	index 39cc2e5bf..ada913c0a 100644
	--- a/g10/gpg.c
	+++ b/g10/gpg.c
	@@ -1,4747 +1,4887 @@
	/* gpg.c - The GnuPG utility (main for gpg)
	* Copyright (C) 1998-2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 1997-2014 Werner Koch
	* Copyright (C) 2015 g10 Code GmbH
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <errno.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <ctype.h>
	#include <unistd.h>
	#include <assert.h>
	#ifdef HAVE_STAT
	#include <sys/stat.h> /* for stat() */
	#endif
	#include <fcntl.h>
	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	# ifdef HAVE_WINSOCK2_H
	# include <winsock2.h>
	# endif
	# include <windows.h>
	#endif

	#define INCLUDED_BY_MAIN_MODULE 1
	#include "gpg.h"
	#include <assuan.h>
	#include "../common/iobuf.h"
	#include "util.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "membuf.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "filter.h"
	#include "ttyio.h"
	#include "i18n.h"
	#include "sysutils.h"
	#include "status.h"
	#include "keyserver-internal.h"
	#include "exec.h"
	#include "gc-opt-flags.h"
	#include "asshelp.h"
	#include "call-dirmngr.h"
	+#include "tofu.h"
	#include "../common/init.h"
	#include "../common/shareddefs.h"

	#if defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM) \|\| defined(__CYGWIN__)
	#define MY_O_BINARY O_BINARY
	#ifndef S_IRGRP
	# define S_IRGRP 0
	# define S_IWGRP 0
	#endif
	#else
	#define MY_O_BINARY 0
	#endif


	enum cmd_and_opt_values
	{
	aNull = 0,
	oArmor = 'a',
	aDetachedSign = 'b',
	aSym = 'c',
	aDecrypt = 'd',
	aEncr = 'e',
	oInteractive = 'i',
	aListKeys = 'k',
	oDryRun = 'n',
	oOutput = 'o',
	oQuiet = 'q',
	oRecipient = 'r',
	oHiddenRecipient = 'R',
	aSign = 's',
	oTextmodeShort= 't',
	oLocalUser = 'u',
	oVerbose = 'v',
	oCompress = 'z',
	oSetNotation = 'N',
	aListSecretKeys = 'K',
	oBatch = 500,
	oMaxOutput,
	oSigNotation,
	oCertNotation,
	oShowNotation,
	oNoShowNotation,
	aEncrFiles,
	aEncrSym,
	aDecryptFiles,
	aClearsign,
	aStore,
	aQuickKeygen,
	aFullKeygen,
	aKeygen,
	aSignEncr,
	aSignEncrSym,
	aSignSym,
	aSignKey,
	aLSignKey,
	aQuickSignKey,
	aQuickLSignKey,
	aQuickAddUid,
	aListConfig,
	aListGcryptConfig,
	aGPGConfList,
	aGPGConfTest,
	aListPackets,
	aEditKey,
	aDeleteKeys,
	aDeleteSecretKeys,
	aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys,
	aImport,
	aFastImport,
	aVerify,
	aVerifyFiles,
	aListSigs,
	aSendKeys,
	aRecvKeys,
	aLocateKeys,
	aSearchKeys,
	aRefreshKeys,
	aFetchKeys,
	aExport,
	aExportSecret,
	aExportSecretSub,
	aCheckKeys,
	aGenRevoke,
	aDesigRevoke,
	aPrimegen,
	aPrintMD,
	aPrintMDs,
	aCheckTrustDB,
	aUpdateTrustDB,
	aFixTrustDB,
	aListTrustDB,
	aListTrustPath,
	aExportOwnerTrust,
	aImportOwnerTrust,
	aDeArmor,
	aEnArmor,
	aGenRandom,
	aRebuildKeydbCaches,
	aCardStatus,
	aCardEdit,
	aChangePIN,
	aPasswd,
	aServer,
	+ aTOFUPolicy,

	oTextmode,
	oNoTextmode,
	oExpert,
	oNoExpert,
	oDefSigExpire,
	oAskSigExpire,
	oNoAskSigExpire,
	oDefCertExpire,
	oAskCertExpire,
	oNoAskCertExpire,
	oDefCertLevel,
	oMinCertLevel,
	oAskCertLevel,
	oNoAskCertLevel,
	oFingerprint,
	oWithFingerprint,
	oWithICAOSpelling,
	oWithKeygrip,
	oWithSecret,
	oAnswerYes,
	oAnswerNo,
	oKeyring,
	oPrimaryKeyring,
	oSecretKeyring,
	oShowKeyring,
	oDefaultKey,
	oDefRecipient,
	oDefRecipientSelf,
	oNoDefRecipient,
	oTrySecretKey,
	oOptions,
	oDebug,
	oDebugLevel,
	oDebugAll,
	oDebugIOLBF,
	oStatusFD,
	oStatusFile,
	oAttributeFD,
	oAttributeFile,
	oEmitVersion,
	oNoEmitVersion,
	oCompletesNeeded,
	oMarginalsNeeded,
	oMaxCertDepth,
	oLoadExtension,
	oGnuPG,
	oRFC2440,
	oRFC4880,
	oOpenPGP,
	oPGP6,
	oPGP7,
	oPGP8,
	oRFC2440Text,
	oNoRFC2440Text,
	oCipherAlgo,
	oDigestAlgo,
	oCertDigestAlgo,
	oCompressAlgo,
	oCompressLevel,
	oBZ2CompressLevel,
	oBZ2DecompressLowmem,
	oPassphrase,
	oPassphraseFD,
	oPassphraseFile,
	oPassphraseRepeat,
	oPinentryMode,
	oCommandFD,
	oCommandFile,
	oQuickRandom,
	oNoVerbose,
	oTrustDBName,
	oNoSecmemWarn,
	oRequireSecmem,
	oNoRequireSecmem,
	oNoPermissionWarn,
	oNoMDCWarn,
	oNoArmor,
	oNoDefKeyring,
	oNoGreeting,
	oNoTTY,
	oNoOptions,
	oNoBatch,
	oHomedir,
	oWithColons,
	oWithKeyData,
	oWithSigList,
	oWithSigCheck,
	oSkipVerify,
	oSkipHiddenRecipients,
	oNoSkipHiddenRecipients,
	oAlwaysTrust,
	oTrustModel,
	oForceOwnertrust,
	oSetFilename,
	oForYourEyesOnly,
	oNoForYourEyesOnly,
	oSetPolicyURL,
	oSigPolicyURL,
	oCertPolicyURL,
	oShowPolicyURL,
	oNoShowPolicyURL,
	oSigKeyserverURL,
	oUseEmbeddedFilename,
	oNoUseEmbeddedFilename,
	oComment,
	oDefaultComment,
	oNoComments,
	oThrowKeyids,
	oNoThrowKeyids,
	oShowPhotos,
	oNoShowPhotos,
	oPhotoViewer,
	oForceMDC,
	oNoForceMDC,
	oDisableMDC,
	oNoDisableMDC,
	oS2KMode,
	oS2KDigest,
	oS2KCipher,
	oS2KCount,
	oDisplayCharset,
	oNotDashEscaped,
	oEscapeFrom,
	oNoEscapeFrom,
	oLockOnce,
	oLockMultiple,
	oLockNever,
	oKeyServer,
	oKeyServerOptions,
	oImportOptions,
	oExportOptions,
	oListOptions,
	oVerifyOptions,
	oTempDir,
	oExecPath,
	oEncryptTo,
	oHiddenEncryptTo,
	oNoEncryptTo,
	oLoggerFD,
	oLoggerFile,
	oUtf8Strings,
	oNoUtf8Strings,
	oDisableCipherAlgo,
	oDisablePubkeyAlgo,
	oAllowNonSelfsignedUID,
	oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID,
	oAllowFreeformUID,
	oNoAllowFreeformUID,
	oAllowSecretKeyImport,
	oEnableSpecialFilenames,
	oNoLiteral,
	oSetFilesize,
	oHonorHttpProxy,
	oFastListMode,
	oListOnly,
	oIgnoreTimeConflict,
	oIgnoreValidFrom,
	oIgnoreCrcError,
	oIgnoreMDCError,
	oShowSessionKey,
	oOverrideSessionKey,
	oNoRandomSeedFile,
	oAutoKeyRetrieve,
	oNoAutoKeyRetrieve,
	oUseAgent,
	oNoUseAgent,
	oGpgAgentInfo,
	oMergeOnly,
	oTryAllSecrets,
	oTrustedKey,
	oNoExpensiveTrustChecks,
	oFixedListMode,
	oLegacyListMode,
	oNoSigCache,
	oAutoCheckTrustDB,
	oNoAutoCheckTrustDB,
	oPreservePermissions,
	oDefaultPreferenceList,
	oDefaultKeyserverURL,
	oPersonalCipherPreferences,
	oPersonalDigestPreferences,
	oPersonalCompressPreferences,
	oAgentProgram,
	oDirmngrProgram,
	oDisplay,
	oTTYname,
	oTTYtype,
	oLCctype,
	oLCmessages,
	oXauthority,
	oGroup,
	oUnGroup,
	oNoGroups,
	oStrict,
	oNoStrict,
	oMangleDosFilenames,
	oNoMangleDosFilenames,
	oEnableProgressFilter,
	oMultifile,
	oKeyidFormat,
	oExitOnStatusWriteError,
	oLimitCardInsertTries,
	oReaderPort,
	octapiDriver,
	opcscDriver,
	oDisableCCID,
	oRequireCrossCert,
	oNoRequireCrossCert,
	oAutoKeyLocate,
	oNoAutoKeyLocate,
	oAllowMultisigVerification,
	oEnableLargeRSA,
	oDisableLargeRSA,
	oEnableDSA2,
	oDisableDSA2,
	oAllowMultipleMessages,
	oNoAllowMultipleMessages,
	oAllowWeakDigestAlgos,
	oFakedSystemTime,
	oNoAutostart,
	oPrintPKARecords,
	oPrintDANERecords,
	+ oTOFUDefaultPolicy,
	+ oTOFUDBFormat,

	oNoop
	};


	static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {

	ARGPARSE_group (300, N_("@Commands:\n ")),

	ARGPARSE_c (aSign, "sign", N_("make a signature")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aClearsign, "clearsign", N_("make a clear text signature")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDetachedSign, "detach-sign", N_("make a detached signature")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEncr, "encrypt", N_("encrypt data")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEncrFiles, "encrypt-files", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aSym, "symmetric", N_("encryption only with symmetric cipher")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aStore, "store", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDecrypt, "decrypt", N_("decrypt data (default)")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDecryptFiles, "decrypt-files", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aVerify, "verify" , N_("verify a signature")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aVerifyFiles, "verify-files" , "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListKeys, "list-keys", N_("list keys")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListKeys, "list-public-keys", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListSigs, "list-sigs", N_("list keys and signatures")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aCheckKeys, "check-sigs",N_("list and check key signatures")),
	ARGPARSE_c (oFingerprint, "fingerprint", N_("list keys and fingerprints")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListSecretKeys, "list-secret-keys", N_("list secret keys")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aKeygen, "gen-key",
	N_("generate a new key pair")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickKeygen, "quick-gen-key" ,
	N_("quickly generate a new key pair")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickAddUid, "quick-adduid",
	N_("quickly add a new user-id")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aFullKeygen, "full-gen-key" ,
	N_("full featured key pair generation")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aGenRevoke, "gen-revoke",N_("generate a revocation certificate")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteKeys,"delete-keys",
	N_("remove keys from the public keyring")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteSecretKeys, "delete-secret-keys",
	N_("remove keys from the secret keyring")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickSignKey, "quick-sign-key" ,
	N_("quickly sign a key")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickLSignKey, "quick-lsign-key",
	N_("quickly sign a key locally")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aSignKey, "sign-key" ,N_("sign a key")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aLSignKey, "lsign-key" ,N_("sign a key locally")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEditKey, "edit-key" ,N_("sign or edit a key")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEditKey, "key-edit" ,"@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aPasswd, "passwd", N_("change a passphrase")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDesigRevoke, "desig-revoke","@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aExport, "export" , N_("export keys") ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aSendKeys, "send-keys" , N_("export keys to a key server") ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aRecvKeys, "recv-keys" , N_("import keys from a key server") ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aSearchKeys, "search-keys" ,
	N_("search for keys on a key server") ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aRefreshKeys, "refresh-keys",
	N_("update all keys from a keyserver")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aLocateKeys, "locate-keys", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aFetchKeys, "fetch-keys" , "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aExportSecret, "export-secret-keys" , "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aExportSecretSub, "export-secret-subkeys" , "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aImport, "import", N_("import/merge keys")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aFastImport, "fast-import", "@"),
	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	ARGPARSE_c (aCardStatus, "card-status", N_("print the card status")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aCardEdit, "card-edit", N_("change data on a card")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aChangePIN, "change-pin", N_("change a card's PIN")),
	#endif
	ARGPARSE_c (aListConfig, "list-config", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListGcryptConfig, "list-gcrypt-config", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aGPGConfList, "gpgconf-list", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aGPGConfTest, "gpgconf-test", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListPackets, "list-packets","@"),

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	ARGPARSE_c (aExportOwnerTrust, "export-ownertrust", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aImportOwnerTrust, "import-ownertrust", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aUpdateTrustDB,"update-trustdb",
	N_("update the trust database")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aCheckTrustDB, "check-trustdb", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aFixTrustDB, "fix-trustdb", "@"),
	#endif

	ARGPARSE_c (aDeArmor, "dearmor", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDeArmor, "dearmour", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEnArmor, "enarmor", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEnArmor, "enarmour", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aPrintMD, "print-md", N_("print message digests")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aPrimegen, "gen-prime", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aGenRandom,"gen-random", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aServer, "server", N_("run in server mode")),
	+ ARGPARSE_c (aTOFUPolicy, "tofu-policy",
	+ N_("\|VALUE\|set the TOFU policy for a key (good, unknown, bad, ask, auto)")),

	ARGPARSE_group (301, N_("@\nOptions:\n ")),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oArmor, "armor", N_("create ascii armored output")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oArmor, "armour", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "recipient", N_("\|USER-ID\|encrypt for USER-ID")),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oHiddenRecipient, "hidden-recipient", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "remote-user", "@"), /* (old option name) */
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefRecipient, "default-recipient", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDefRecipientSelf, "default-recipient-self", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDefRecipient, "no-default-recipient", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTempDir, "temp-directory", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oExecPath, "exec-path", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oEncryptTo, "encrypt-to", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEncryptTo, "no-encrypt-to", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oHiddenEncryptTo, "hidden-encrypt-to", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLocalUser, "local-user",
	N_("\|USER-ID\|use USER-ID to sign or decrypt")),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrySecretKey, "try-secret-key", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_i (oCompress, NULL,
	N_("\|N\|set compress level to N (0 disables)")),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oCompressLevel, "compress-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oBZ2CompressLevel, "bzip2-compress-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oBZ2DecompressLowmem, "bzip2-decompress-lowmem", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oTextmodeShort, NULL, "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oTextmode, "textmode", N_("use canonical text mode")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoTextmode, "no-textmode", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oExpert, "expert", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoExpert, "no-expert", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefSigExpire, "default-sig-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAskSigExpire, "ask-sig-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAskSigExpire, "no-ask-sig-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefCertExpire, "default-cert-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAskCertExpire, "ask-cert-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAskCertExpire, "no-ask-cert-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oDefCertLevel, "default-cert-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oMinCertLevel, "min-cert-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAskCertLevel, "ask-cert-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAskCertLevel, "no-ask-cert-level", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oOutput, "output", N_("\|FILE\|write output to FILE")),
	ARGPARSE_p_u (oMaxOutput, "max-output", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oVerbose, "verbose", N_("verbose")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oQuiet, "quiet", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoTTY, "no-tty", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oForceMDC, "force-mdc", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoForceMDC, "no-force-mdc", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableMDC, "disable-mdc", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDisableMDC, "no-disable-mdc", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDryRun, "dry-run", N_("do not make any changes")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oInteractive, "interactive", N_("prompt before overwriting")),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oBatch, "batch", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAnswerYes, "yes", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAnswerNo, "no", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyring, "keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPrimaryKeyring, "primary-keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSecretKeyring, "secret-keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowKeyring, "show-keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultKey, "default-key", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyServer, "keyserver", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyServerOptions, "keyserver-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oImportOptions, "import-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oExportOptions, "export-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oListOptions, "list-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oVerifyOptions, "verify-options", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplayCharset, "display-charset", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplayCharset, "charset", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oOptions, "options", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDebug, "debug", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDebugLevel, "debug-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugAll, "debug-all", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugIOLBF, "debug-iolbf", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oStatusFD, "status-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oStatusFile, "status-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oAttributeFD, "attribute-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oAttributeFile, "attribute-file", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_i (oCompletesNeeded, "completes-needed", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oMarginalsNeeded, "marginals-needed", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oMaxCertDepth, "max-cert-depth", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrustedKey, "trusted-key", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLoadExtension, "load-extension", "@"), /* Dummy. */

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "gnupg", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp2", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp6", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp7", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp8", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC2440, "rfc2440", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC4880, "rfc4880", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oOpenPGP, "openpgp", N_("use strict OpenPGP behavior")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP6, "pgp6", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP7, "pgp7", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP8, "pgp8", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC2440Text, "rfc2440-text", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRFC2440Text, "no-rfc2440-text", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oS2KMode, "s2k-mode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oS2KDigest, "s2k-digest-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oS2KCipher, "s2k-cipher-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oS2KCount, "s2k-count", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCipherAlgo, "cipher-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDigestAlgo, "digest-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertDigestAlgo, "cert-digest-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCompressAlgo,"compress-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCompressAlgo, "compression-algo", "@"), /* Alias */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oThrowKeyids, "throw-keyids", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoThrowKeyids, "no-throw-keyids", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowPhotos, "show-photos", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoShowPhotos, "no-show-photos", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPhotoViewer, "photo-viewer", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSetNotation, "set-notation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSigNotation, "sig-notation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertNotation, "cert-notation", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_group (302, N_(
	"@\n(See the man page for a complete listing of all commands and options)\n"
	)),

	ARGPARSE_group (303, N_("@\nExamples:\n\n"
	" -se -r Bob [file] sign and encrypt for user Bob\n"
	" --clearsign [file] make a clear text signature\n"
	" --detach-sign [file] make a detached signature\n"
	" --list-keys [names] show keys\n"
	" --fingerprint [names] show fingerprints\n")),

	/* More hidden commands and options. */
	ARGPARSE_c (aPrintMDs, "print-mds", "@"), /* old */
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	ARGPARSE_c (aListTrustDB, "list-trustdb", "@"),
	#endif

	/* Not yet used:
	ARGPARSE_c (aListTrustPath, "list-trust-path", "@"), */
	ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys,
	"delete-secret-and-public-keys", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aRebuildKeydbCaches, "rebuild-keydb-caches", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPassphrase, "passphrase", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oPassphraseFD, "passphrase-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPassphraseFile, "passphrase-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oPassphraseRepeat,"passphrase-repeat", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPinentryMode, "pinentry-mode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oCommandFD, "command-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCommandFile, "command-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oQuickRandom, "debug-quick-random", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoVerbose, "no-verbose", "@"),

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrustDBName, "trustdb-name", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAutoCheckTrustDB, "auto-check-trustdb", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutoCheckTrustDB, "no-auto-check-trustdb", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oForceOwnertrust, "force-ownertrust", "@"),
	#endif

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSecmemWarn, "no-secmem-warning", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequireSecmem, "require-secmem", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRequireSecmem, "no-require-secmem", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoPermissionWarn, "no-permission-warning", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoMDCWarn, "no-mdc-warning", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoArmor, "no-armor", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoArmor, "no-armour", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDefKeyring, "no-default-keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoGreeting, "no-greeting", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoOptions, "no-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oHomedir, "homedir", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoBatch, "no-batch", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithColons, "with-colons", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeyData,"with-key-data", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSigList,"with-sig-list", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSigCheck,"with-sig-check", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (aListKeys, "list-key", "@"), /* alias */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (aListSigs, "list-sig", "@"), /* alias */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (aCheckKeys, "check-sig", "@"), /* alias */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oSkipVerify, "skip-verify", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oSkipHiddenRecipients, "skip-hidden-recipients", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSkipHiddenRecipients, "no-skip-hidden-recipients", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oDefCertLevel, "default-cert-check-level", "@"), /* old */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAlwaysTrust, "always-trust", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrustModel, "trust-model", "@"),
	+ ARGPARSE_s_s (oTOFUDefaultPolicy, "tofu-default-policy", "@"),
	+ ARGPARSE_s_s (oTOFUDBFormat, "tofu-db-format", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSetFilename, "set-filename", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oForYourEyesOnly, "for-your-eyes-only", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoForYourEyesOnly, "no-for-your-eyes-only", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSetPolicyURL, "set-policy-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSigPolicyURL, "sig-policy-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertPolicyURL, "cert-policy-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowPolicyURL, "show-policy-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoShowPolicyURL, "no-show-policy-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSigKeyserverURL, "sig-keyserver-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowNotation, "show-notation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoShowNotation, "no-show-notation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oComment, "comment", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDefaultComment, "default-comment", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoComments, "no-comments", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEmitVersion, "emit-version", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEmitVersion, "no-emit-version", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEmitVersion, "no-version", "@"), /* alias */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNotDashEscaped, "not-dash-escaped", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEscapeFrom, "escape-from-lines", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEscapeFrom, "no-escape-from-lines", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oLockOnce, "lock-once", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oLockMultiple, "lock-multiple", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oLockNever, "lock-never", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oLoggerFD, "logger-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLoggerFile, "log-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLoggerFile, "logger-file", "@"), /* 1.4 compatibility. */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oUseEmbeddedFilename, "use-embedded-filename", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUseEmbeddedFilename, "no-use-embedded-filename", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oUtf8Strings, "utf8-strings", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUtf8Strings, "no-utf8-strings", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithFingerprint, "with-fingerprint", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithICAOSpelling, "with-icao-spelling", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeygrip, "with-keygrip", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSecret, "with-secret", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisableCipherAlgo, "disable-cipher-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisablePubkeyAlgo, "disable-pubkey-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowNonSelfsignedUID, "allow-non-selfsigned-uid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID, "no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowFreeformUID, "allow-freeform-uid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowFreeformUID, "no-allow-freeform-uid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoLiteral, "no-literal", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_p_u (oSetFilesize, "set-filesize", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oFastListMode, "fast-list-mode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oFixedListMode, "fixed-list-mode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oLegacyListMode, "legacy-list-mode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oListOnly, "list-only", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPrintPKARecords, "print-pka-records", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPrintDANERecords, "print-dane-records", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreTimeConflict, "ignore-time-conflict", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreValidFrom, "ignore-valid-from", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreCrcError, "ignore-crc-error", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreMDCError, "ignore-mdc-error", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowSessionKey, "show-session-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oOverrideSessionKey, "override-session-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRandomSeedFile, "no-random-seed-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAutoKeyRetrieve, "auto-key-retrieve", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutoKeyRetrieve, "no-auto-key-retrieve", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSigCache, "no-sig-cache", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oMergeOnly, "merge-only", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowSecretKeyImport, "allow-secret-key-import", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oTryAllSecrets, "try-all-secrets", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableSpecialFilenames, "enable-special-filenames", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoExpensiveTrustChecks, "no-expensive-trust-checks", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPreservePermissions, "preserve-permissions", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultPreferenceList, "default-preference-list", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultKeyserverURL, "default-keyserver-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCipherPreferences, "personal-cipher-preferences","@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalDigestPreferences, "personal-digest-preferences","@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCompressPreferences,
	"personal-compress-preferences", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oFakedSystemTime, "faked-system-time", "@"),

	/* Aliases. I constantly mistype these, and assume other people do
	as well. */
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCipherPreferences, "personal-cipher-prefs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalDigestPreferences, "personal-digest-prefs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCompressPreferences, "personal-compress-prefs", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oAgentProgram, "agent-program", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDirmngrProgram, "dirmngr-program", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplay, "display", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTTYname, "ttyname", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTTYtype, "ttytype", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLCctype, "lc-ctype", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLCmessages, "lc-messages","@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oXauthority, "xauthority", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oGroup, "group", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oUnGroup, "ungroup", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoGroups, "no-groups", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oStrict, "strict", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoStrict, "no-strict", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oMangleDosFilenames, "mangle-dos-filenames", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoMangleDosFilenames, "no-mangle-dos-filenames", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableProgressFilter, "enable-progress-filter", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oMultifile, "multifile", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyidFormat, "keyid-format", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oExitOnStatusWriteError, "exit-on-status-write-error", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oLimitCardInsertTries, "limit-card-insert-tries", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowMultisigVerification,
	"allow-multisig-verification", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableLargeRSA, "enable-large-rsa", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableLargeRSA, "disable-large-rsa", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableDSA2, "enable-dsa2", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableDSA2, "disable-dsa2", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowMultipleMessages, "allow-multiple-messages", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowMultipleMessages, "no-allow-multiple-messages", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowWeakDigestAlgos, "allow-weak-digest-algos", "@"),

	/* These two are aliases to help users of the PGP command line
	product use gpg with minimal pain. Many commands are common
	already as they seem to have borrowed commands from us. Now I'm
	returning the favor. */
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLocalUser, "sign-with", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "user", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequireCrossCert, "require-backsigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequireCrossCert, "require-cross-certification", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRequireCrossCert, "no-require-backsigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRequireCrossCert, "no-require-cross-certification", "@"),

	/* New options. Fixme: Should go more to the top. */
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oAutoKeyLocate, "auto-key-locate", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutoKeyLocate, "no-auto-key-locate", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutostart, "no-autostart", "@"),

	/* Dummy options with warnings. */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oUseAgent, "use-agent", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUseAgent, "no-use-agent", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oGpgAgentInfo, "gpg-agent-info", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oReaderPort, "reader-port", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (octapiDriver, "ctapi-driver", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (opcscDriver, "pcsc-driver", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableCCID, "disable-ccid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oHonorHttpProxy, "honor-http-proxy", "@"),

	/* Dummy options. */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "sk-comments", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-sk-comments", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "compress-keys", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "compress-sigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "force-v3-sigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-force-v3-sigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "force-v4-certs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-force-v4-certs", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_end ()
	};


	/* The list of supported debug flags. */
	static struct debug_flags_s debug_flags [] =
	{
	{ DBG_PACKET_VALUE , "packet" },
	{ DBG_MPI_VALUE , "mpi" },
	{ DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE , "crypto" },
	{ DBG_FILTER_VALUE , "filter" },
	{ DBG_IOBUF_VALUE , "iobuf" },
	{ DBG_MEMORY_VALUE , "memory" },
	{ DBG_CACHE_VALUE , "cache" },
	{ DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE, "memstat" },
	{ DBG_TRUST_VALUE , "trust" },
	{ DBG_HASHING_VALUE, "hashing" },
	{ DBG_CARD_IO_VALUE, "cardio" },
	{ DBG_IPC_VALUE , "ipc" },
	{ DBG_CLOCK_VALUE , "clock" },
	{ DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE , "lookup" },
	{ DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE, "extprog" },
	{ 0, NULL }
	};


	#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
	#define ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS 1
	#else
	#define ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS 0
	#endif


	int g10_errors_seen = 0;

	static int utf8_strings = 0;
	static int maybe_setuid = 1;

	static char build_list( const char text, char letter,
	const char (mapf)(int), int (*chkf)(int) );
	static void set_cmd( enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd,
	enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd );
	static void print_mds( const char *fname, int algo );
	static void add_notation_data( const char *string, int which );
	static void add_policy_url( const char *string, int which );
	static void add_keyserver_url( const char *string, int which );
	static void emergency_cleanup (void);


	static char *
	make_libversion (const char libname, const char (getfnc)(const char))
	{
	const char *s;
	char *result;

	if (maybe_setuid)
	{
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 0, 0); /* Drop setuid. */
	maybe_setuid = 0;
	}
	s = getfnc (NULL);
	result = xmalloc (strlen (libname) + 1 + strlen (s) + 1);
	strcpy (stpcpy (stpcpy (result, libname), " "), s);
	return result;
	}


	static int
	build_list_pk_test_algo (int algo)
	{
	/* Show only one "RSA" string. If RSA_E or RSA_S is available RSA
	is also available. */
	if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E
	\|\| algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S)
	return GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;

	return openpgp_pk_test_algo (algo);
	}

	static const char *
	build_list_pk_algo_name (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_pk_algo_name (algo);
	}

	static int
	build_list_cipher_test_algo (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo);
	}

	static const char *
	build_list_cipher_algo_name (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
	}

	static int
	build_list_md_test_algo (int algo)
	{
	/* By default we do not accept MD5 based signatures. To avoid
	confusion we do not announce support for it either. */
	if (algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5)
	return GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;

	return openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
	}

	static const char *
	build_list_md_algo_name (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_md_algo_name (algo);
	}


	static const char *
	my_strusage( int level )
	{
	static char digests, pubkeys, ciphers, zips, *ver_gcry;
	const char *p;

	switch( level ) {
	case 11: p = "@GPG@ (@GNUPG@)";
	break;
	case 13: p = VERSION; break;
	case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break;
	case 19: p = _("Please report bugs to <@EMAIL@>.\n"); break;

	case 20:
	if (!ver_gcry)
	ver_gcry = make_libversion ("libgcrypt", gcry_check_version);
	p = ver_gcry;
	break;

	#ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION
	case 25:
	p="NOTE: THIS IS A DEVELOPMENT VERSION!";
	break;
	case 26:
	p="It is only intended for test purposes and should NOT be";
	break;
	case 27:
	p="used in a production environment or with production keys!";
	break;
	#endif

	case 1:
	case 40: p =
	_("Usage: @GPG@ [options] [files] (-h for help)");
	break;
	case 41: p =
	_("Syntax: @GPG@ [options] [files]\n"
	"Sign, check, encrypt or decrypt\n"
	"Default operation depends on the input data\n");
	break;

	case 31: p = "\nHome: "; break;
	#ifndef __riscos__
	case 32: p = opt.homedir; break;
	#else /* __riscos__ */
	case 32: p = make_filename(opt.homedir, NULL); break;
	#endif /* __riscos__ */
	case 33: p = _("\nSupported algorithms:\n"); break;
	case 34:
	if (!pubkeys)
	pubkeys = build_list (_("Pubkey: "), 1,
	build_list_pk_algo_name,
	build_list_pk_test_algo );
	p = pubkeys;
	break;
	case 35:
	if( !ciphers )
	ciphers = build_list(_("Cipher: "), 'S',
	build_list_cipher_algo_name,
	build_list_cipher_test_algo );
	p = ciphers;
	break;
	case 36:
	if( !digests )
	digests = build_list(_("Hash: "), 'H',
	build_list_md_algo_name,
	build_list_md_test_algo );
	p = digests;
	break;
	case 37:
	if( !zips )
	zips = build_list(_("Compression: "),'Z',
	compress_algo_to_string,
	check_compress_algo);
	p = zips;
	break;

	default: p = NULL;
	}
	return p;
	}


	static char *
	build_list (const char *text, char letter,
	const char * (mapf)(int), int (chkf)(int))
	{
	membuf_t mb;
	int indent;
	int i, j, len;
	const char *s;
	char *string;

	if (maybe_setuid)
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 0, 0); /* Drop setuid. */

	indent = utf8_charcount (text);
	len = 0;
	init_membuf (&mb, 512);

	for (i=0; i <= 110; i++ )
	{
	if (!chkf (i) && (s = mapf (i)))
	{
	if (mb.len - len > 60)
	{
	put_membuf_str (&mb, ",\n");
	len = mb.len;
	for (j=0; j < indent; j++)
	put_membuf_str (&mb, " ");
	}
	else if (mb.len)
	put_membuf_str (&mb, ", ");
	else
	put_membuf_str (&mb, text);

	put_membuf_str (&mb, s);
	if (opt.verbose && letter)
	{
	char num[20];
	if (letter == 1)
	snprintf (num, sizeof num, " (%d)", i);
	else
	snprintf (num, sizeof num, " (%c%d)", letter, i);
	put_membuf_str (&mb, num);
	}
	}
	}
	if (mb.len)
	put_membuf_str (&mb, "\n");
	put_membuf (&mb, "", 1);

	string = get_membuf (&mb, NULL);
	return xrealloc (string, strlen (string)+1);
	}


	static void
	wrong_args( const char *text)
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stderr, _("usage: %s [options] %s\n"), GPG_NAME, text);
	g10_exit(2);
	}


	static char *
	make_username( const char *string )
	{
	char *p;
	if( utf8_strings )
	p = xstrdup(string);
	else
	p = native_to_utf8( string );
	return p;
	}


	static void
	set_opt_session_env (const char name, const char value)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;

	err = session_env_setenv (opt.session_env, name, value);
	if (err)
	log_fatal ("error setting session environment: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	}


	/* Setup the debugging. With a LEVEL of NULL only the active debug
	flags are propagated to the subsystems. With LEVEL set, a specific
	set of debug flags is set; thus overriding all flags already
	set. */
	static void
	set_debug (const char *level)
	{
	int numok = (level && digitp (level));
	int numlvl = numok? atoi (level) : 0;

	if (!level)
	;
	else if (!strcmp (level, "none") \|\| (numok && numlvl < 1))
	opt.debug = 0;
	else if (!strcmp (level, "basic") \|\| (numok && numlvl <= 2))
	opt.debug = DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE;
	else if (!strcmp (level, "advanced") \|\| (numok && numlvl <= 5))
	opt.debug = DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE\|DBG_TRUST_VALUE\|DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE;
	else if (!strcmp (level, "expert") \|\| (numok && numlvl <= 8))
	opt.debug = (DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE\|DBG_TRUST_VALUE\|DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE
	\|DBG_CACHE_VALUE\|DBG_LOOKUP\|DBG_FILTER_VALUE\|DBG_PACKET_VALUE);
	else if (!strcmp (level, "guru") \|\| numok)
	{
	opt.debug = ~0;
	/* Unless the "guru" string has been used we don't want to allow
	hashing debugging. The rationale is that people tend to
	select the highest debug value and would then clutter their
	disk with debug files which may reveal confidential data. */
	if (numok)
	opt.debug &= ~(DBG_HASHING_VALUE);
	}
	else
	{
	log_error (_("invalid debug-level '%s' given\n"), level);
	g10_exit (2);
	}

	if (opt.debug & DBG_MEMORY_VALUE )
	memory_debug_mode = 1;
	if (opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE )
	memory_stat_debug_mode = 1;
	if (opt.debug & DBG_MPI_VALUE)
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 2);
	if (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE )
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 1);
	if (opt.debug & DBG_IOBUF_VALUE )
	iobuf_debug_mode = 1;
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);

	if (opt.debug)
	parse_debug_flag (NULL, &opt.debug, debug_flags);
	}



	/* We need the home directory also in some other directories, so make
	sure that both variables are always in sync. */
	static void
	set_homedir (const char *dir)
	{
	if (!dir)
	dir = "";
	opt.homedir = dir;
	}


	/* We set the screen dimensions for UI purposes. Do not allow screens
	smaller than 80x24 for the sake of simplicity. */
	static void
	set_screen_dimensions(void)
	{
	#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	char *str;

	str=getenv("COLUMNS");
	if(str)
	opt.screen_columns=atoi(str);

	str=getenv("LINES");
	if(str)
	opt.screen_lines=atoi(str);
	#endif

	if(opt.screen_columns<80 \|\| opt.screen_columns>255)
	opt.screen_columns=80;

	if(opt.screen_lines<24 \|\| opt.screen_lines>255)
	opt.screen_lines=24;
	}


	/* Helper to open a file FNAME either for reading or writing to be
	used with --status-file etc functions. Not generally useful but it
	avoids the riscos specific functions and well some Windows people
	might like it too. Prints an error message and returns -1 on
	error. On success the file descriptor is returned. */
	static int
	open_info_file (const char *fname, int for_write, int binary)
	{
	#ifdef __riscos__
	return riscos_fdopenfile (fname, for_write);
	#elif defined (ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS)
	/* We can't allow these even when testing for a secured filename
	because files to be secured might not yet been secured. This is
	similar to the option file but in that case it is unlikely that
	sensitive information may be retrieved by means of error
	messages. */
	(void)fname;
	(void)for_write;
	(void)binary;
	return -1;
	#else
	int fd;

	if (binary)
	binary = MY_O_BINARY;

	/* if (is_secured_filename (fname)) */
	/* { */
	/* fd = -1; */
	/* gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); */
	/* } */
	/* else */
	/* { */
	do
	{
	if (for_write)
	fd = open (fname, O_CREAT \| O_TRUNC \| O_WRONLY \| binary,
	S_IRUSR \| S_IWUSR \| S_IRGRP \| S_IWGRP);
	else
	fd = open (fname, O_RDONLY \| binary);
	}
	while (fd == -1 && errno == EINTR);
	/* } */
	if ( fd == -1)
	log_error ( for_write? _("can't create '%s': %s\n")
	: _("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno));

	return fd;
	#endif
	}

	static void
	set_cmd( enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd, enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd )
	{
	enum cmd_and_opt_values cmd = *ret_cmd;

	if( !cmd \|\| cmd == new_cmd )
	cmd = new_cmd;
	else if( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aEncr )
	cmd = aSignEncr;
	else if( cmd == aEncr && new_cmd == aSign )
	cmd = aSignEncr;
	else if( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aSym )
	cmd = aSignSym;
	else if( cmd == aSym && new_cmd == aSign )
	cmd = aSignSym;
	else if( cmd == aSym && new_cmd == aEncr )
	cmd = aEncrSym;
	else if( cmd == aEncr && new_cmd == aSym )
	cmd = aEncrSym;
	else if (cmd == aSignEncr && new_cmd == aSym)
	cmd = aSignEncrSym;
	else if (cmd == aSignSym && new_cmd == aEncr)
	cmd = aSignEncrSym;
	else if (cmd == aEncrSym && new_cmd == aSign)
	cmd = aSignEncrSym;
	else if( ( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aClearsign )
	\|\| ( cmd == aClearsign && new_cmd == aSign ) )
	cmd = aClearsign;
	else {
	log_error(_("conflicting commands\n"));
	g10_exit(2);
	}

	*ret_cmd = cmd;
	}


	static void
	add_group(char *string)
	{
	char name,value;
	struct groupitem *item;

	/* Break off the group name */
	name=strsep(&string,"=");
	if(string==NULL)
	{
	log_error(_("no = sign found in group definition '%s'\n"),name);
	return;
	}

	trim_trailing_ws(name,strlen(name));

	/* Does this group already exist? */
	for(item=opt.grouplist;item;item=item->next)
	if(strcasecmp(item->name,name)==0)
	break;

	if(!item)
	{
	item=xmalloc(sizeof(struct groupitem));
	item->name=name;
	item->next=opt.grouplist;
	item->values=NULL;
	opt.grouplist=item;
	}

	/* Break apart the values */
	while ((value= strsep(&string," \t")))
	{
	if (*value)
	add_to_strlist2(&item->values,value,utf8_strings);
	}
	}


	static void
	rm_group(char *name)
	{
	struct groupitem item,last=NULL;

	trim_trailing_ws(name,strlen(name));

	for(item=opt.grouplist;item;last=item,item=item->next)
	{
	if(strcasecmp(item->name,name)==0)
	{
	if(last)
	last->next=item->next;
	else
	opt.grouplist=item->next;

	free_strlist(item->values);
	xfree(item);
	break;
	}
	}
	}


	/* We need to check three things.

	0) The homedir. It must be x00, a directory, and owned by the
	user.

	1) The options/gpg.conf file. Okay unless it or its containing
	directory is group or other writable or not owned by us. Disable
	exec in this case.

	2) Extensions. Same as #1.

	Returns true if the item is unsafe. */
	static int
	check_permissions (const char *path, int item)
	{
	#if defined(HAVE_STAT) && !defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)
	static int homedir_cache=-1;
	char tmppath,dir;
	struct stat statbuf,dirbuf;
	int homedir=0,ret=0,checkonly=0;
	int perm=0,own=0,enc_dir_perm=0,enc_dir_own=0;

	if(opt.no_perm_warn)
	return 0;

	assert(item==0 \|\| item==1 \|\| item==2);

	/* extensions may attach a path */
	if(item==2 && path[0]!=DIRSEP_C)
	{
	if(strchr(path,DIRSEP_C))
	tmppath=make_filename(path,NULL);
	else
	tmppath=make_filename(gnupg_libdir (),path,NULL);
	}
	else
	tmppath=xstrdup(path);

	/* If the item is located in the homedir, but isn't the homedir,
	don't continue if we already checked the homedir itself. This is
	to avoid user confusion with an extra options file warning which
	could be rectified if the homedir itself had proper
	permissions. */
	if(item!=0 && homedir_cache>-1
	&& ascii_strncasecmp(opt.homedir,tmppath,strlen(opt.homedir))==0)
	{
	ret=homedir_cache;
	goto end;
	}

	/* It's okay if the file or directory doesn't exist */
	if(stat(tmppath,&statbuf)!=0)
	{
	ret=0;
	goto end;
	}

	/* Now check the enclosing directory. Theoretically, we could walk
	this test up to the root directory /, but for the sake of sanity,
	I'm stopping at one level down. */
	dir=make_dirname(tmppath);

	if(stat(dir,&dirbuf)!=0 \|\| !S_ISDIR(dirbuf.st_mode))
	{
	/* Weird error */
	ret=1;
	goto end;
	}

	xfree(dir);

	/* Assume failure */
	ret=1;

	if(item==0)
	{
	/* The homedir must be x00, a directory, and owned by the user. */

	if(S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode))
	{
	if(statbuf.st_uid==getuid())
	{
	if((statbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG\|S_IRWXO))==0)
	ret=0;
	else
	perm=1;
	}
	else
	own=1;

	homedir_cache=ret;
	}
	}
	else if(item==1 \|\| item==2)
	{
	/* The options or extension file. Okay unless it or its
	containing directory is group or other writable or not owned
	by us or root. */

	if(S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
	{
	if(statbuf.st_uid==getuid() \|\| statbuf.st_uid==0)
	{
	if((statbuf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP\|S_IWOTH))==0)
	{
	/* it's not writable, so make sure the enclosing
	directory is also not writable */
	if(dirbuf.st_uid==getuid() \|\| dirbuf.st_uid==0)
	{
	if((dirbuf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP\|S_IWOTH))==0)
	ret=0;
	else
	enc_dir_perm=1;
	}
	else
	enc_dir_own=1;
	}
	else
	{
	/* it's writable, so the enclosing directory had
	better not let people get to it. */
	if(dirbuf.st_uid==getuid() \|\| dirbuf.st_uid==0)
	{
	if((dirbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG\|S_IRWXO))==0)
	ret=0;
	else
	perm=enc_dir_perm=1; /* unclear which one to fix! */
	}
	else
	enc_dir_own=1;
	}
	}
	else
	own=1;
	}
	}
	else
	BUG();

	if(!checkonly)
	{
	if(own)
	{
	if(item==0)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on"
	" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else if(item==1)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on"
	" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on"
	" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	}
	if(perm)
	{
	if(item==0)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on"
	" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else if(item==1)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on"
	" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on"
	" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	}
	if(enc_dir_own)
	{
	if(item==0)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on"
	" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else if(item==1)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on"
	" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on"
	" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	}
	if(enc_dir_perm)
	{
	if(item==0)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on"
	" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else if(item==1)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on"
	" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on"
	" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	}
	}

	end:
	xfree(tmppath);

	if(homedir)
	homedir_cache=ret;

	return ret;

	#else /!(HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)/
	(void)path;
	(void)item;
	return 0;
	#endif /!(HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)/
	}


	/* Print the OpenPGP defined algo numbers. */
	static void
	print_algo_numbers(int (*checker)(int))
	{
	int i,first=1;

	for(i=0;i<=110;i++)
	{
	if(!checker(i))
	{
	if(first)
	first=0;
	else
	es_printf (";");
	es_printf ("%d",i);
	}
	}
	}


	static void
	print_algo_names(int (checker)(int),const char (*mapper)(int))
	{
	int i,first=1;

	for(i=0;i<=110;i++)
	{
	if(!checker(i))
	{
	if(first)
	first=0;
	else
	es_printf (";");
	es_printf ("%s",mapper(i));
	}
	}
	}

	/* In the future, we can do all sorts of interesting configuration
	output here. For now, just give "group" as the Enigmail folks need
	it, and pubkey, cipher, hash, and compress as they may be useful
	for frontends. */
	static void
	list_config(char *items)
	{
	int show_all = !items;
	char *name = NULL;
	const char *s;
	struct groupitem *giter;
	int first, iter;

	if(!opt.with_colons)
	return;

	while(show_all \|\| (name=strsep(&items," ")))
	{
	int any=0;

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"group")==0)
	{
	for (giter = opt.grouplist; giter; giter = giter->next)
	{
	strlist_t sl;

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "cfg:group:");
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, giter->name, strlen(giter->name),
	":", NULL);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);

	for(sl=giter->values; sl; sl=sl->next)
	{
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sl->d, strlen (sl->d),
	":;", NULL);
	if(sl->next)
	es_printf(";");
	}

	es_printf("\n");
	}

	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"version")==0)
	{
	es_printf("cfg:version:");
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, VERSION, strlen(VERSION), ":", NULL);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"pubkey")==0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:pubkey:");
	print_algo_numbers (build_list_pk_test_algo);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"pubkeyname")==0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:pubkeyname:");
	print_algo_names (build_list_pk_test_algo,
	build_list_pk_algo_name);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"cipher")==0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:cipher:");
	print_algo_numbers (build_list_cipher_test_algo);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if (show_all \|\| !ascii_strcasecmp (name,"ciphername"))
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:ciphername:");
	print_algo_names (build_list_cipher_test_algo,
	build_list_cipher_algo_name);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any = 1;
	}

	if(show_all
	\|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"digest")==0
	\|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"hash")==0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:digest:");
	print_algo_numbers (build_list_md_test_algo);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if (show_all
	\|\| !ascii_strcasecmp(name,"digestname")
	\|\| !ascii_strcasecmp(name,"hashname"))
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:digestname:");
	print_algo_names (build_list_md_test_algo,
	build_list_md_algo_name);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"compress")==0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:compress:");
	print_algo_numbers(check_compress_algo);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if (show_all \|\| !ascii_strcasecmp(name,"ccid-reader-id"))
	{
	/* We ignore this for GnuPG 1.4 backward compatibility. */
	any=1;
	}

	if (show_all \|\| !ascii_strcasecmp (name,"curve"))
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:curve:");
	for (iter=0, first=1; (s = openpgp_enum_curves (&iter)); first=0)
	es_printf ("%s%s", first?"":";", s);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	/* Curve OIDs are rarely useful and thus only printed if requested. */
	if (name && !ascii_strcasecmp (name,"curveoid"))
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:curveoid:");
	for (iter=0, first=1; (s = openpgp_enum_curves (&iter)); first = 0)
	{
	s = openpgp_curve_to_oid (s, NULL);
	es_printf ("%s%s", first?"":";", s? s:"[?]");
	}
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all)
	break;

	if(!any)
	log_error(_("unknown configuration item '%s'\n"),name);
	}
	}


	/* List options and default values in the GPG Conf format. This is a
	new tool distributed with gnupg 1.9.x but we also want some limited
	support in older gpg versions. The output is the name of the
	configuration file and a list of options available for editing by
	gpgconf. */
	static void
	gpgconf_list (const char *configfile)
	{
	char *configfile_esc = percent_escape (configfile, NULL);

	es_printf ("%s-%s.conf:%lu:\"%s\n",
	GPGCONF_NAME, GPG_NAME,
	GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT,
	configfile_esc ? configfile_esc : "/dev/null");
	es_printf ("verbose:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("quiet:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("keyserver:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("reader-port:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("default-key:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("encrypt-to:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("try-secret-key:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("auto-key-locate:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("log-file:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("debug-level:%lu:\"none:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT);
	es_printf ("group:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);

	/* The next one is an info only item and should match the macros at
	the top of keygen.c */
	es_printf ("default_pubkey_algo:%lu:\"%s:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT,
	"RSA-2048");

	xfree (configfile_esc);
	}


	static int
	parse_subpacket_list(char *list)
	{
	char *tok;
	byte subpackets[128],i;
	int count=0;

	if(!list)
	{
	/* No arguments means all subpackets */
	memset(subpackets+1,1,sizeof(subpackets)-1);
	count=127;
	}
	else
	{
	memset(subpackets,0,sizeof(subpackets));

	/* Merge with earlier copy */
	if(opt.show_subpackets)
	{
	byte *in;

	for(in=opt.show_subpackets;*in;in++)
	{
	if(in>127 \|\| in<1)
	BUG();

	if(!subpackets[*in])
	count++;
	subpackets[*in]=1;
	}
	}

	while((tok=strsep(&list," ,")))
	{
	if(!*tok)
	continue;

	i=atoi(tok);
	if(i>127 \|\| i<1)
	return 0;

	if(!subpackets[i])
	count++;
	subpackets[i]=1;
	}
	}

	xfree(opt.show_subpackets);
	opt.show_subpackets=xmalloc(count+1);
	opt.show_subpackets[count--]=0;

	for(i=1;i<128 && count>=0;i++)
	if(subpackets[i])
	opt.show_subpackets[count--]=i;

	return 1;
	}


	static int
	parse_list_options(char *str)
	{
	char subpackets=""; / something that isn't NULL */
	struct parse_options lopts[]=
	{
	{"show-photos",LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS,NULL,
	N_("display photo IDs during key listings")},
	{"show-usage",LIST_SHOW_USAGE,NULL,
	N_("show key usage information during key listings")},
	{"show-policy-urls",LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS,NULL,
	N_("show policy URLs during signature listings")},
	{"show-notations",LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show all notations during signature listings")},
	{"show-std-notations",LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show IETF standard notations during signature listings")},
	{"show-standard-notations",LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	NULL},
	{"show-user-notations",LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show user-supplied notations during signature listings")},
	{"show-keyserver-urls",LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS,NULL,
	N_("show preferred keyserver URLs during signature listings")},
	{"show-uid-validity",LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY,NULL,
	N_("show user ID validity during key listings")},
	{"show-unusable-uids",LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS,NULL,
	N_("show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings")},
	{"show-unusable-subkeys",LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS,NULL,
	N_("show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings")},
	{"show-keyring",LIST_SHOW_KEYRING,NULL,
	N_("show the keyring name in key listings")},
	{"show-sig-expire",LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE,NULL,
	N_("show expiration dates during signature listings")},
	{"show-sig-subpackets",LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS,NULL,
	NULL},
	{NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
	};

	/* C99 allows for non-constant initializers, but we'd like to
	compile everywhere, so fill in the show-sig-subpackets argument
	here. Note that if the parse_options array changes, we'll have
	to change the subscript here. */
	lopts[13].value=&subpackets;

	if(parse_options(str,&opt.list_options,lopts,1))
	{
	if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS)
	{
	/* Unset so users can pass multiple lists in. */
	opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS;
	if(!parse_subpacket_list(subpackets))
	return 0;
	}
	else if(subpackets==NULL && opt.show_subpackets)
	{
	/* User did 'no-show-subpackets' */
	xfree(opt.show_subpackets);
	opt.show_subpackets=NULL;
	}

	return 1;
	}
	else
	return 0;
	}


	/* Collapses argc/argv into a single string that must be freed */
	static char *
	collapse_args(int argc,char *argv[])
	{
	char *str=NULL;
	int i,first=1,len=0;

	for(i=0;i<argc;i++)
	{
	len+=strlen(argv[i])+2;
	str=xrealloc(str,len);
	if(first)
	{
	str[0]='\0';
	first=0;
	}
	else
	strcat(str," ");

	strcat(str,argv[i]);
	}

	return str;
	}


	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	static void
	parse_trust_model(const char *model)
	{
	if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"pgp")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_PGP;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"classic")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_CLASSIC;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"always")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_ALWAYS;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"direct")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_DIRECT;
	+ else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"tofu")==0)
	+ opt.trust_model=TM_TOFU;
	+ else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"tofu+pgp")==0)
	+ opt.trust_model=TM_TOFU_PGP;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"auto")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_AUTO;
	else
	log_error("unknown trust model '%s'\n",model);
	}
	#endif /NO_TRUST_MODELS/

	+static int
	+parse_tofu_policy (const char *policy)
	+{
	+ if (ascii_strcasecmp (policy, "auto") == 0)
	+ return TOFU_POLICY_AUTO;
	+ else if (ascii_strcasecmp (policy, "good") == 0)
	+ return TOFU_POLICY_GOOD;
	+ else if (ascii_strcasecmp (policy, "unknown") == 0)
	+ return TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN;
	+ else if (ascii_strcasecmp (policy, "bad") == 0)
	+ return TOFU_POLICY_BAD;
	+ else if (ascii_strcasecmp (policy, "ask") == 0)
	+ return TOFU_POLICY_ASK;
	+ else
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("unknown TOFU policy '%s'\n"), policy);
	+ g10_exit (1);
	+ }
	+}
	+
	+static int
	+parse_tofu_db_format (const char *db_format)
	+{
	+ if (ascii_strcasecmp (db_format, "auto") == 0)
	+ return TOFU_DB_AUTO;
	+ else if (ascii_strcasecmp (db_format, "split") == 0)
	+ return TOFU_DB_SPLIT;
	+ else if (ascii_strcasecmp (db_format, "flat") == 0)
	+ return TOFU_DB_FLAT;
	+ else
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("unknown TOFU DB format '%s'\n"), db_format);
	+ g10_exit (1);
	+ }
	+}

	/* This fucntion called to initialized a new control object. It is
	assumed that this object has been zeroed out before calling this
	function. */
	static void
	gpg_init_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	(void)ctrl;
	}


	/* This function is called to deinitialize a control object. It is
	not deallocated. */
	static void
	gpg_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	gpg_dirmngr_deinit_session_data (ctrl);
	}


	char *
	get_default_configname (void)
	{
	char *configname = NULL;
	char *name = xstrdup (GPG_NAME EXTSEP_S "conf-" SAFE_VERSION);
	char *ver = &name[strlen (GPG_NAME EXTSEP_S "conf-")];

	do
	{
	if (configname)
	{
	char *tok;

	xfree (configname);
	configname = NULL;

	if ((tok = strrchr (ver, SAFE_VERSION_DASH)))
	*tok='\0';
	else if ((tok = strrchr (ver, SAFE_VERSION_DOT)))
	*tok='\0';
	else
	break;
	}

	configname = make_filename (opt.homedir, name, NULL);
	}
	while (access (configname, R_OK));

	xfree(name);

	if (! configname)
	configname = make_filename (opt.homedir, GPG_NAME EXTSEP_S "conf", NULL);
	if (! access (configname, R_OK))
	{
	/* Print a warning when both config files are present. */
	char *p = make_filename (opt.homedir, "options", NULL);
	if (! access (p, R_OK))
	log_info (_("Note: old default options file '%s' ignored\n"), p);
	xfree (p);
	}
	else
	{
	/* Use the old default only if it exists. */
	char *p = make_filename (opt.homedir, "options", NULL);
	if (!access (p, R_OK))
	{
	xfree (configname);
	configname = p;
	}
	else
	xfree (p);
	}

	return configname;
	}


	int
	main (int argc, char **argv)
	{
	ARGPARSE_ARGS pargs;
	IOBUF a;
	int rc=0;
	int orig_argc;
	char **orig_argv;
	const char *fname;
	char *username;
	int may_coredump;
	strlist_t sl, remusr= NULL, locusr=NULL;
	strlist_t nrings = NULL;
	armor_filter_context_t *afx = NULL;
	int detached_sig = 0;
	FILE *configfp = NULL;
	char *configname = NULL;
	char *save_configname = NULL;
	char *default_configname = NULL;
	unsigned configlineno;
	int parse_debug = 0;
	int default_config = 1;
	int default_keyring = 1;
	int greeting = 0;
	int nogreeting = 0;
	char *logfile = NULL;
	int use_random_seed = 1;
	enum cmd_and_opt_values cmd = 0;
	const char *debug_level = NULL;
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	const char *trustdb_name = NULL;
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	char *def_cipher_string = NULL;
	char *def_digest_string = NULL;
	char *compress_algo_string = NULL;
	char *cert_digest_string = NULL;
	char *s2k_cipher_string = NULL;
	char *s2k_digest_string = NULL;
	char *pers_cipher_list = NULL;
	char *pers_digest_list = NULL;
	char *pers_compress_list = NULL;
	int eyes_only=0;
	int multifile=0;
	int pwfd = -1;
	int fpr_maybe_cmd = 0; /* --fingerprint maybe a command. */
	int any_explicit_recipient = 0;
	int require_secmem=0,got_secmem=0;
	struct assuan_malloc_hooks malloc_hooks;
	ctrl_t ctrl;

	#ifdef __riscos__
	opt.lock_once = 1;
	#endif /* __riscos__ */


	/* Please note that we may running SUID(ROOT), so be very CAREFUL
	when adding any stuff between here and the call to
	secmem_init() somewhere after the option parsing. */
	early_system_init ();
	gnupg_reopen_std (GPG_NAME);
	trap_unaligned ();
	gnupg_rl_initialize ();
	set_strusage (my_strusage);
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SUSPEND_SECMEM_WARN);
	log_set_prefix (GPG_NAME, 1);

	/* Make sure that our subsystems are ready. */
	i18n_init();
	init_common_subsystems (&argc, &argv);

	/* Check that the libraries are suitable. Do it right here because the
	option parsing may need services of the library. */
	if (!gcry_check_version (NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION) )
	{
	log_fatal ( _("libgcrypt is too old (need %s, have %s)\n"),
	NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION, gcry_check_version (NULL) );
	}

	/* Use our own logging handler for Libcgrypt. */
	setup_libgcrypt_logging ();

	/* Put random number into secure memory */
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_USE_SECURE_RNDPOOL);

	may_coredump = disable_core_dumps();

	gnupg_init_signals (0, emergency_cleanup);

	dotlock_create (NULL, 0); /* Register lock file cleanup. */

	opt.autostart = 1;
	opt.session_env = session_env_new ();
	if (!opt.session_env)
	log_fatal ("error allocating session environment block: %s\n",
	strerror (errno));

	opt.command_fd = -1; /* no command fd */
	opt.compress_level = -1; /* defaults to standard compress level */
	opt.bz2_compress_level = -1; /* defaults to standard compress level */
	/* note: if you change these lines, look at oOpenPGP */
	opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
	opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.cert_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.compress_algo = -1; /* defaults to DEFAULT_COMPRESS_ALGO */
	opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
	opt.s2k_count = 0; /* Auto-calibrate when needed. */
	opt.s2k_cipher_algo = DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO;
	opt.completes_needed = 1;
	opt.marginals_needed = 3;
	opt.max_cert_depth = 5;
	opt.escape_from = 1;
	opt.flags.require_cross_cert = 1;
	opt.import_options = 0;
	opt.export_options = EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES;
	opt.keyserver_options.import_options = IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG;
	opt.keyserver_options.export_options = EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES;
	opt.keyserver_options.options = KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD;
	opt.verify_options = (LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY
	\| VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS
	\| VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS
	\| VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS);
	opt.list_options = LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY;
	#ifdef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	opt.trust_model = TM_ALWAYS;
	#else
	opt.trust_model = TM_AUTO;
	#endif
	+ opt.tofu_default_policy = TOFU_POLICY_AUTO;
	+ opt.tofu_db_format = TOFU_DB_AUTO;
	opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 0;
	opt.min_cert_level = 2;
	set_screen_dimensions ();
	opt.keyid_format = KF_SHORT;
	opt.def_sig_expire = "0";
	opt.def_cert_expire = "0";
	set_homedir (default_homedir ());
	opt.passphrase_repeat = 1;
	opt.emit_version = 1; /* Limit to the major number. */

	/* Check whether we have a config file on the command line. */
	orig_argc = argc;
	orig_argv = argv;
	pargs.argc = &argc;
	pargs.argv = &argv;
	pargs.flags= (ARGPARSE_FLAG_KEEP \| ARGPARSE_FLAG_NOVERSION);
	while( arg_parse( &pargs, opts) ) {
	if( pargs.r_opt == oDebug \|\| pargs.r_opt == oDebugAll )
	parse_debug++;
	else if (pargs.r_opt == oDebugIOLBF)
	es_setvbuf (es_stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
	else if( pargs.r_opt == oOptions ) {
	/* yes there is one, so we do not try the default one, but
	* read the option file when it is encountered at the commandline
	*/
	default_config = 0;
	}
	else if( pargs.r_opt == oNoOptions )
	{
	default_config = 0; /* --no-options */
	opt.no_homedir_creation = 1;
	}
	else if( pargs.r_opt == oHomedir )
	set_homedir ( pargs.r.ret_str );
	else if( pargs.r_opt == oNoPermissionWarn )
	opt.no_perm_warn=1;
	else if (pargs.r_opt == oStrict )
	{
	/* Not used */
	}
	else if (pargs.r_opt == oNoStrict )
	{
	/* Not used */
	}
	}

	#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
	if ( strchr (opt.homedir,'\\') ) {
	char d, buf = xmalloc (strlen (opt.homedir)+1);
	const char *s = opt.homedir;
	for (d=buf,s=opt.homedir; *s; s++)
	{
	d++ = s == '\\'? '/': *s;
	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	if (s[1] && IsDBCSLeadByte (*s))
	d++ = ++s;
	#endif
	}
	*d = 0;
	set_homedir (buf);
	}
	#endif

	/* Initialize the secure memory. */
	if (!gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE, 0))
	got_secmem = 1;
	#if defined(HAVE_GETUID) && defined(HAVE_GETEUID)
	/* There should be no way to get to this spot while still carrying
	setuid privs. Just in case, bomb out if we are. */
	if ( getuid () != geteuid () )
	BUG ();
	#endif
	maybe_setuid = 0;

	/* Okay, we are now working under our real uid */

	/* malloc hooks go here ... */
	malloc_hooks.malloc = gcry_malloc;
	malloc_hooks.realloc = gcry_realloc;
	malloc_hooks.free = gcry_free;
	assuan_set_malloc_hooks (&malloc_hooks);
	assuan_set_gpg_err_source (GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT);
	setup_libassuan_logging (&opt.debug);

	/* Try for a version specific config file first */
	default_configname = get_default_configname ();
	if (default_config)
	configname = xstrdup (default_configname);

	argc = orig_argc;
	argv = orig_argv;
	pargs.argc = &argc;
	pargs.argv = &argv;
	pargs.flags= ARGPARSE_FLAG_KEEP;

	/* By this point we have a homedir, and cannot change it. */
	check_permissions(opt.homedir,0);

	next_pass:
	if( configname ) {
	if(check_permissions(configname,1))
	{
	/* If any options file is unsafe, then disable any external
	programs for keyserver calls or photo IDs. Since the
	external program to call is set in the options file, a
	unsafe options file can lead to an arbitrary program
	being run. */

	opt.exec_disable=1;
	}

	configlineno = 0;
	configfp = fopen( configname, "r" );
	if (configfp && is_secured_file (fileno (configfp)))
	{
	fclose (configfp);
	configfp = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	if( !configfp ) {
	if( default_config ) {
	if( parse_debug )
	log_info(_("Note: no default option file '%s'\n"),
	configname );
	}
	else {
	log_error(_("option file '%s': %s\n"),
	configname, strerror(errno) );
	g10_exit(2);
	}
	xfree(configname); configname = NULL;
	}
	if( parse_debug && configname )
	log_info(_("reading options from '%s'\n"), configname );
	default_config = 0;
	}

	while( optfile_parse( configfp, configname, &configlineno,
	&pargs, opts) )
	{
	switch( pargs.r_opt )
	{
	case aCheckKeys:
	case aListConfig:
	case aListGcryptConfig:
	case aGPGConfList:
	case aGPGConfTest:
	case aListPackets:
	case aImport:
	case aFastImport:
	case aSendKeys:
	case aRecvKeys:
	case aSearchKeys:
	case aRefreshKeys:
	case aFetchKeys:
	case aExport:
	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	case aCardStatus:
	case aCardEdit:
	case aChangePIN:
	#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
	case aListKeys:
	case aLocateKeys:
	case aListSigs:
	case aExportSecret:
	case aExportSecretSub:
	case aSym:
	case aClearsign:
	case aGenRevoke:
	case aDesigRevoke:
	case aPrimegen:
	case aGenRandom:
	case aPrintMD:
	case aPrintMDs:
	case aListTrustDB:
	case aCheckTrustDB:
	case aUpdateTrustDB:
	case aFixTrustDB:
	case aListTrustPath:
	case aDeArmor:
	case aEnArmor:
	case aSign:
	case aQuickSignKey:
	case aQuickLSignKey:
	case aSignKey:
	case aLSignKey:
	case aStore:
	case aQuickKeygen:
	case aQuickAddUid:
	case aExportOwnerTrust:
	case aImportOwnerTrust:
	case aRebuildKeydbCaches:
	set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
	break;

	case aKeygen:
	case aFullKeygen:
	case aEditKey:
	case aDeleteSecretKeys:
	case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys:
	case aDeleteKeys:
	case aPasswd:
	set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
	greeting=1;
	break;

	case aDetachedSign: detached_sig = 1; set_cmd( &cmd, aSign ); break;

	case aDecryptFiles: multifile=1; /* fall through */
	case aDecrypt: set_cmd( &cmd, aDecrypt); break;

	case aEncrFiles: multifile=1; /* fall through */
	case aEncr: set_cmd( &cmd, aEncr); break;

	case aVerifyFiles: multifile=1; /* fall through */
	case aVerify: set_cmd( &cmd, aVerify); break;

	case aServer:
	set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
	opt.batch = 1;
	break;

	+ case aTOFUPolicy:
	+ set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
	+ break;
	+
	case oArmor: opt.armor = 1; opt.no_armor=0; break;
	case oOutput: opt.outfile = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
	case oMaxOutput: opt.max_output = pargs.r.ret_ulong; break;
	case oQuiet: opt.quiet = 1; break;
	case oNoTTY: tty_no_terminal(1); break;
	case oDryRun: opt.dry_run = 1; break;
	case oInteractive: opt.interactive = 1; break;
	case oVerbose:
	opt.verbose++;
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS;
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS;
	break;

	case oBatch:
	opt.batch = 1;
	nogreeting = 1;
	break;

	case oUseAgent: /* Dummy. */
	break;

	case oNoUseAgent:
	obsolete_option (configname, configlineno, "no-use-agent");
	break;
	case oGpgAgentInfo:
	obsolete_option (configname, configlineno, "gpg-agent-info");
	break;
	case oReaderPort:
	obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, configlineno, "reader-port");
	break;
	case octapiDriver:
	obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, configlineno, "ctapi-driver");
	break;
	case opcscDriver:
	obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, configlineno, "pcsc-driver");
	break;
	case oDisableCCID:
	obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, configlineno, "disable-ccid");
	break;
	case oHonorHttpProxy:
	obsolete_option (configname, configlineno, "honor-http-proxy");
	break;

	case oAnswerYes: opt.answer_yes = 1; break;
	case oAnswerNo: opt.answer_no = 1; break;
	case oKeyring: append_to_strlist( &nrings, pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oPrimaryKeyring:
	sl = append_to_strlist (&nrings, pargs.r.ret_str);
	sl->flags = KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_PRIMARY;
	break;
	case oShowKeyring:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-keyring",
	"--list-options ","show-keyring");
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_KEYRING;
	break;

	case oDebug:
	if (parse_debug_flag (pargs.r.ret_str, &opt.debug, debug_flags))
	{
	pargs.r_opt = ARGPARSE_INVALID_ARG;
	pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR;
	}
	break;

	case oDebugAll: opt.debug = ~0; break;
	case oDebugLevel: debug_level = pargs.r.ret_str; break;

	case oDebugIOLBF: break; /* Already set in pre-parse step. */

	case oStatusFD:
	set_status_fd ( translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1) );
	break;
	case oStatusFile:
	set_status_fd ( open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 1, 0) );
	break;
	case oAttributeFD:
	set_attrib_fd ( translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1) );
	break;
	case oAttributeFile:
	set_attrib_fd ( open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 1, 1) );
	break;
	case oLoggerFD:
	log_set_fd (translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1));
	break;
	case oLoggerFile:
	logfile = pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;

	case oWithFingerprint:
	opt.with_fingerprint = 1;
	opt.fingerprint++;
	break;
	case oWithICAOSpelling:
	opt.with_icao_spelling = 1;
	break;
	case oFingerprint:
	opt.fingerprint++;
	fpr_maybe_cmd = 1;
	break;

	case oWithKeygrip:
	opt.with_keygrip = 1;
	break;

	case oWithSecret:
	opt.with_secret = 1;
	break;

	case oSecretKeyring:
	/* Ignore this old option. */
	break;

	case oOptions:
	/* config files may not be nested (silently ignore them) */
	if( !configfp ) {
	xfree(configname);
	configname = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
	goto next_pass;
	}
	break;
	case oNoArmor: opt.no_armor=1; opt.armor=0; break;
	case oNoDefKeyring: default_keyring = 0; break;
	case oNoGreeting: nogreeting = 1; break;
	case oNoVerbose:
	opt.verbose = 0;
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);
	opt.list_sigs=0;
	break;
	case oQuickRandom:
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_ENABLE_QUICK_RANDOM, 0);
	break;
	case oEmitVersion: opt.emit_version++; break;
	case oNoEmitVersion: opt.emit_version=0; break;
	case oCompletesNeeded: opt.completes_needed = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oMarginalsNeeded: opt.marginals_needed = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oMaxCertDepth: opt.max_cert_depth = pargs.r.ret_int; break;

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	case oTrustDBName: trustdb_name = pargs.r.ret_str; break;

	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	case oDefaultKey: opt.def_secret_key = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
	case oDefRecipient:
	if( *pargs.r.ret_str )
	opt.def_recipient = make_username(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oDefRecipientSelf:
	xfree(opt.def_recipient); opt.def_recipient = NULL;
	opt.def_recipient_self = 1;
	break;
	case oNoDefRecipient:
	xfree(opt.def_recipient); opt.def_recipient = NULL;
	opt.def_recipient_self = 0;
	break;
	case oNoOptions: opt.no_homedir_creation = 1; break; /* no-options */
	case oHomedir: break;
	case oNoBatch: opt.batch = 0; break;

	case oWithKeyData: opt.with_key_data=1; /FALLTHRU/
	case oWithColons: opt.with_colons=':'; break;

	case oWithSigCheck: opt.check_sigs = 1; /FALLTHRU/
	case oWithSigList: opt.list_sigs = 1; break;

	case oSkipVerify: opt.skip_verify=1; break;

	case oSkipHiddenRecipients: opt.skip_hidden_recipients = 1; break;
	case oNoSkipHiddenRecipients: opt.skip_hidden_recipients = 0; break;

	case aListSecretKeys: set_cmd( &cmd, aListSecretKeys); break;

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	/* There are many programs (like mutt) that call gpg with
	--always-trust so keep this option around for a long
	time. */
	case oAlwaysTrust: opt.trust_model=TM_ALWAYS; break;
	case oTrustModel:
	parse_trust_model(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	+ case oTOFUDefaultPolicy:
	+ opt.tofu_default_policy = parse_tofu_policy (pargs.r.ret_str);
	+ break;
	+ case oTOFUDBFormat:
	+ opt.tofu_db_format = parse_tofu_db_format (pargs.r.ret_str);
	+ break;

	case oForceOwnertrust:
	log_info(_("Note: %s is not for normal use!\n"),
	"--force-ownertrust");
	opt.force_ownertrust=string_to_trust_value(pargs.r.ret_str);
	if(opt.force_ownertrust==-1)
	{
	log_error("invalid ownertrust '%s'\n",pargs.r.ret_str);
	opt.force_ownertrust=0;
	}
	break;
	case oLoadExtension:
	/* Dummy so that gpg 1.4 conf files can work. Should
	eventually be removed. */
	break;
	case oOpenPGP:
	case oRFC4880:
	/* This is effectively the same as RFC2440, but with
	"--enable-dsa2 --no-rfc2440-text --escape-from-lines
	--require-cross-certification". */
	opt.compliance = CO_RFC4880;
	opt.flags.dsa2 = 1;
	opt.flags.require_cross_cert = 1;
	opt.rfc2440_text = 0;
	opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1;
	opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1;
	opt.escape_from = 1;
	opt.not_dash_escaped = 0;
	opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
	opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.cert_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.compress_algo = -1;
	opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
	opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
	opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;
	break;
	case oRFC2440:
	opt.compliance = CO_RFC2440;
	opt.flags.dsa2 = 0;
	opt.rfc2440_text = 1;
	opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1;
	opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1;
	opt.escape_from = 0;
	opt.not_dash_escaped = 0;
	opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
	opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.cert_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.compress_algo = -1;
	opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
	opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
	opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;
	break;
	case oPGP6: opt.compliance = CO_PGP6; break;
	case oPGP7: opt.compliance = CO_PGP7; break;
	case oPGP8: opt.compliance = CO_PGP8; break;
	case oGnuPG: opt.compliance = CO_GNUPG; break;
	case oRFC2440Text: opt.rfc2440_text=1; break;
	case oNoRFC2440Text: opt.rfc2440_text=0; break;
	case oSetFilename:
	if(utf8_strings)
	opt.set_filename = pargs.r.ret_str;
	else
	opt.set_filename = native_to_utf8(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oForYourEyesOnly: eyes_only = 1; break;
	case oNoForYourEyesOnly: eyes_only = 0; break;
	case oSetPolicyURL:
	add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0);
	add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,1);
	break;
	case oSigPolicyURL: add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0); break;
	case oCertPolicyURL: add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,1); break;
	case oShowPolicyURL:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-policy-url",
	"--list-options ","show-policy-urls");
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-policy-url",
	"--verify-options ","show-policy-urls");
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
	opt.verify_options\|=VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
	break;
	case oNoShowPolicyURL:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-policy-url",
	"--list-options ","no-show-policy-urls");
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-policy-url",
	"--verify-options ","no-show-policy-urls");
	opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
	opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
	break;
	case oSigKeyserverURL: add_keyserver_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0); break;
	case oUseEmbeddedFilename:
	opt.flags.use_embedded_filename=1;
	break;
	case oNoUseEmbeddedFilename:
	opt.flags.use_embedded_filename=0;
	break;
	case oComment:
	if(pargs.r.ret_str[0])
	append_to_strlist(&opt.comments,pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oDefaultComment:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,
	"--default-comment","--no-comments","");
	/* fall through */
	case oNoComments:
	free_strlist(opt.comments);
	opt.comments=NULL;
	break;
	case oThrowKeyids: opt.throw_keyids = 1; break;
	case oNoThrowKeyids: opt.throw_keyids = 0; break;
	case oShowPhotos:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-photos",
	"--list-options ","show-photos");
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-photos",
	"--verify-options ","show-photos");
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS;
	opt.verify_options\|=VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS;
	break;
	case oNoShowPhotos:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-photos",
	"--list-options ","no-show-photos");
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-photos",
	"--verify-options ","no-show-photos");
	opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS;
	opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS;
	break;
	case oPhotoViewer: opt.photo_viewer = pargs.r.ret_str; break;

	case oForceMDC: opt.force_mdc = 1; break;
	case oNoForceMDC: opt.force_mdc = 0; break;
	case oDisableMDC: opt.disable_mdc = 1; break;
	case oNoDisableMDC: opt.disable_mdc = 0; break;
	case oS2KMode: opt.s2k_mode = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oS2KDigest: s2k_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oS2KCipher: s2k_cipher_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oS2KCount:
	if (pargs.r.ret_int)
	opt.s2k_count = encode_s2k_iterations (pargs.r.ret_int);
	else
	opt.s2k_count = 0; /* Auto-calibrate when needed. */
	break;
	case oNoEncryptTo: opt.no_encrypt_to = 1; break;
	case oEncryptTo: /* store the recipient in the second list */
	sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
	sl->flags = 1;
	break;
	case oHiddenEncryptTo: /* store the recipient in the second list */
	sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
	sl->flags = 1\|2;
	break;
	case oRecipient: /* store the recipient */
	add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
	any_explicit_recipient = 1;
	break;
	case oHiddenRecipient: /* store the recipient with a flag */
	sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
	sl->flags = 2;
	any_explicit_recipient = 1;
	break;

	case oTrySecretKey:
	add_to_strlist2 (&opt.secret_keys_to_try,
	pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings);
	break;

	case oTextmodeShort: opt.textmode = 2; break;
	case oTextmode: opt.textmode=1; break;
	case oNoTextmode: opt.textmode=0; break;
	case oExpert: opt.expert = 1; break;
	case oNoExpert: opt.expert = 0; break;
	case oDefSigExpire:
	if(*pargs.r.ret_str!='\0')
	{
	if(parse_expire_string(pargs.r.ret_str)==(u32)-1)
	log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid signature expiration\n"),
	pargs.r.ret_str);
	else
	opt.def_sig_expire=pargs.r.ret_str;
	}
	break;
	case oAskSigExpire: opt.ask_sig_expire = 1; break;
	case oNoAskSigExpire: opt.ask_sig_expire = 0; break;
	case oDefCertExpire:
	if(*pargs.r.ret_str!='\0')
	{
	if(parse_expire_string(pargs.r.ret_str)==(u32)-1)
	log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid signature expiration\n"),
	pargs.r.ret_str);
	else
	opt.def_cert_expire=pargs.r.ret_str;
	}
	break;
	case oAskCertExpire: opt.ask_cert_expire = 1; break;
	case oNoAskCertExpire: opt.ask_cert_expire = 0; break;
	case oDefCertLevel: opt.def_cert_level=pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oMinCertLevel: opt.min_cert_level=pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oAskCertLevel: opt.ask_cert_level = 1; break;
	case oNoAskCertLevel: opt.ask_cert_level = 0; break;
	case oLocalUser: /* store the local users */
	add_to_strlist2( &locusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
	break;
	case oCompress:
	/* this is the -z command line option */
	opt.compress_level = opt.bz2_compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int;
	break;
	case oCompressLevel: opt.compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oBZ2CompressLevel: opt.bz2_compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oBZ2DecompressLowmem: opt.bz2_decompress_lowmem=1; break;
	case oPassphrase:
	set_passphrase_from_string(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oPassphraseFD:
	pwfd = translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 0);
	break;
	case oPassphraseFile:
	pwfd = open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 0, 1);
	break;
	case oPassphraseRepeat:
	opt.passphrase_repeat = pargs.r.ret_int;
	break;

	case oPinentryMode:
	opt.pinentry_mode = parse_pinentry_mode (pargs.r.ret_str);
	if (opt.pinentry_mode == -1)
	log_error (_("invalid pinentry mode '%s'\n"), pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oCommandFD:
	opt.command_fd = translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 0);
	break;
	case oCommandFile:
	opt.command_fd = open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 0, 1);
	break;
	case oCipherAlgo:
	def_cipher_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oDigestAlgo:
	def_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oCompressAlgo:
	/* If it is all digits, stick a Z in front of it for
	later. This is for backwards compatibility with
	versions that took the compress algorithm number. */
	{
	char *pt=pargs.r.ret_str;
	while(*pt)
	{
	if (!isascii (pt) \|\| !isdigit (pt))
	break;

	pt++;
	}

	if(*pt=='\0')
	{
	compress_algo_string=xmalloc(strlen(pargs.r.ret_str)+2);
	strcpy(compress_algo_string,"Z");
	strcat(compress_algo_string,pargs.r.ret_str);
	}
	else
	compress_algo_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
	}
	break;
	case oCertDigestAlgo:
	cert_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oNoSecmemWarn:
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM_WARN);
	break;

	case oRequireSecmem: require_secmem=1; break;
	case oNoRequireSecmem: require_secmem=0; break;
	case oNoPermissionWarn: opt.no_perm_warn=1; break;
	case oNoMDCWarn: opt.no_mdc_warn=1; break;
	case oDisplayCharset:
	if( set_native_charset( pargs.r.ret_str ) )
	log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid character set\n"),
	pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oNotDashEscaped: opt.not_dash_escaped = 1; break;
	case oEscapeFrom: opt.escape_from = 1; break;
	case oNoEscapeFrom: opt.escape_from = 0; break;
	case oLockOnce: opt.lock_once = 1; break;
	case oLockNever:
	dotlock_disable ();
	break;
	case oLockMultiple:
	#ifndef __riscos__
	opt.lock_once = 0;
	#else /* __riscos__ */
	riscos_not_implemented("lock-multiple");
	#endif /* __riscos__ */
	break;
	case oKeyServer:
	{
	keyserver_spec_t keyserver;
	keyserver = parse_keyserver_uri (pargs.r.ret_str, 0);
	if (!keyserver)
	log_error (_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
	else
	{
	/* We only support a single keyserver. Later ones
	override earlier ones. (Since we parse the
	config file first and then the command line
	arguments, the command line takes
	precedence.) */
	if (opt.keyserver)
	free_keyserver_spec (opt.keyserver);
	opt.keyserver = keyserver;
	}
	}
	break;
	case oKeyServerOptions:
	if(!parse_keyserver_options(pargs.r.ret_str))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid keyserver options\n"),
	configname,configlineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid keyserver options\n"));
	}
	break;
	case oImportOptions:
	if(!parse_import_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.import_options,1))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid import options\n"),
	configname,configlineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid import options\n"));
	}
	break;
	case oExportOptions:
	if(!parse_export_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.export_options,1))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid export options\n"),
	configname,configlineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid export options\n"));
	}
	break;
	case oListOptions:
	if(!parse_list_options(pargs.r.ret_str))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid list options\n"),
	configname,configlineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid list options\n"));
	}
	break;
	case oVerifyOptions:
	{
	struct parse_options vopts[]=
	{
	{"show-photos",VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS,NULL,
	N_("display photo IDs during signature verification")},
	{"show-policy-urls",VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS,NULL,
	N_("show policy URLs during signature verification")},
	{"show-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show all notations during signature verification")},
	{"show-std-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show IETF standard notations during signature verification")},
	{"show-standard-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	NULL},
	{"show-user-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show user-supplied notations during signature verification")},
	{"show-keyserver-urls",VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS,NULL,
	N_("show preferred keyserver URLs during signature verification")},
	{"show-uid-validity",VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY,NULL,
	N_("show user ID validity during signature verification")},
	{"show-unusable-uids",VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS,NULL,
	N_("show revoked and expired user IDs in signature verification")},
	{"show-primary-uid-only",VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY,NULL,
	N_("show only the primary user ID in signature verification")},
	{"pka-lookups",VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS,NULL,
	N_("validate signatures with PKA data")},
	{"pka-trust-increase",VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE,NULL,
	N_("elevate the trust of signatures with valid PKA data")},
	{NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
	};

	if(!parse_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.verify_options,vopts,1))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid verify options\n"),
	configname,configlineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid verify options\n"));
	}
	}
	break;
	case oTempDir: opt.temp_dir=pargs.r.ret_str; break;
	case oExecPath:
	if(set_exec_path(pargs.r.ret_str))
	log_error(_("unable to set exec-path to %s\n"),pargs.r.ret_str);
	else
	opt.exec_path_set=1;
	break;
	case oSetNotation:
	add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 0 );
	add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 1 );
	break;
	case oSigNotation: add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 0 ); break;
	case oCertNotation: add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 1 ); break;
	case oShowNotation:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-notation",
	"--list-options ","show-notations");
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-notation",
	"--verify-options ","show-notations");
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
	opt.verify_options\|=VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
	break;
	case oNoShowNotation:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-notation",
	"--list-options ","no-show-notations");
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-notation",
	"--verify-options ","no-show-notations");
	opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
	opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
	break;
	case oUtf8Strings: utf8_strings = 1; break;
	case oNoUtf8Strings: utf8_strings = 0; break;
	case oDisableCipherAlgo:
	{
	int algo = string_to_cipher_algo (pargs.r.ret_str);
	gcry_cipher_ctl (NULL, GCRYCTL_DISABLE_ALGO, &algo, sizeof algo);
	}
	break;
	case oDisablePubkeyAlgo:
	{
	int algo = gcry_pk_map_name (pargs.r.ret_str);
	gcry_pk_ctl (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_ALGO, &algo, sizeof algo);
	}
	break;
	case oNoSigCache: opt.no_sig_cache = 1; break;
	case oAllowNonSelfsignedUID: opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1; break;
	case oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID: opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid=0; break;
	case oAllowFreeformUID: opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1; break;
	case oNoAllowFreeformUID: opt.allow_freeform_uid = 0; break;
	case oNoLiteral: opt.no_literal = 1; break;
	case oSetFilesize: opt.set_filesize = pargs.r.ret_ulong; break;
	case oFastListMode: opt.fast_list_mode = 1; break;
	case oFixedListMode: /* Dummy */ break;
	case oLegacyListMode: opt.legacy_list_mode = 1; break;
	case oPrintPKARecords: opt.print_pka_records = 1; break;
	case oPrintDANERecords: opt.print_dane_records = 1; break;
	case oListOnly: opt.list_only=1; break;
	case oIgnoreTimeConflict: opt.ignore_time_conflict = 1; break;
	case oIgnoreValidFrom: opt.ignore_valid_from = 1; break;
	case oIgnoreCrcError: opt.ignore_crc_error = 1; break;
	case oIgnoreMDCError: opt.ignore_mdc_error = 1; break;
	case oNoRandomSeedFile: use_random_seed = 0; break;
	case oAutoKeyRetrieve:
	case oNoAutoKeyRetrieve:
	if(pargs.r_opt==oAutoKeyRetrieve)
	opt.keyserver_options.options\|=KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE;
	else
	opt.keyserver_options.options&=~KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE;

	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,
	pargs.r_opt==oAutoKeyRetrieve?"--auto-key-retrieve":
	"--no-auto-key-retrieve","--keyserver-options ",
	pargs.r_opt==oAutoKeyRetrieve?"auto-key-retrieve":
	"no-auto-key-retrieve");
	break;
	case oShowSessionKey: opt.show_session_key = 1; break;
	case oOverrideSessionKey:
	opt.override_session_key = pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oMergeOnly:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--merge-only",
	"--import-options ","merge-only");
	opt.import_options\|=IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY;
	break;
	case oAllowSecretKeyImport: /* obsolete */ break;
	case oTryAllSecrets: opt.try_all_secrets = 1; break;
	case oTrustedKey: register_trusted_key( pargs.r.ret_str ); break;
	case oEnableSpecialFilenames:
	iobuf_enable_special_filenames (1);
	break;
	case oNoExpensiveTrustChecks: opt.no_expensive_trust_checks=1; break;
	case oAutoCheckTrustDB: opt.no_auto_check_trustdb=0; break;
	case oNoAutoCheckTrustDB: opt.no_auto_check_trustdb=1; break;
	case oPreservePermissions: opt.preserve_permissions=1; break;
	case oDefaultPreferenceList:
	opt.def_preference_list = pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oDefaultKeyserverURL:
	{
	keyserver_spec_t keyserver;
	keyserver = parse_keyserver_uri (pargs.r.ret_str,1 );
	if (!keyserver)
	log_error (_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
	else
	free_keyserver_spec (keyserver);

	opt.def_keyserver_url = pargs.r.ret_str;
	}
	break;
	case oPersonalCipherPreferences:
	pers_cipher_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oPersonalDigestPreferences:
	pers_digest_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oPersonalCompressPreferences:
	pers_compress_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oAgentProgram: opt.agent_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
	case oDirmngrProgram: opt.dirmngr_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;

	case oDisplay:
	set_opt_session_env ("DISPLAY", pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oTTYname:
	set_opt_session_env ("GPG_TTY", pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oTTYtype:
	set_opt_session_env ("TERM", pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oXauthority:
	set_opt_session_env ("XAUTHORITY", pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oLCctype: opt.lc_ctype = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
	case oLCmessages: opt.lc_messages = pargs.r.ret_str; break;

	case oGroup: add_group(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oUnGroup: rm_group(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oNoGroups:
	while(opt.grouplist)
	{
	struct groupitem *iter=opt.grouplist;
	free_strlist(iter->values);
	opt.grouplist=opt.grouplist->next;
	xfree(iter);
	}
	break;

	case oStrict:
	case oNoStrict:
	/* Not used */
	break;

	case oMangleDosFilenames: opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 1; break;
	case oNoMangleDosFilenames: opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 0; break;
	case oEnableProgressFilter: opt.enable_progress_filter = 1; break;
	case oMultifile: multifile=1; break;
	case oKeyidFormat:
	if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"short")==0)
	opt.keyid_format=KF_SHORT;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"long")==0)
	opt.keyid_format=KF_LONG;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"0xshort")==0)
	opt.keyid_format=KF_0xSHORT;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"0xlong")==0)
	opt.keyid_format=KF_0xLONG;
	else
	log_error("unknown keyid-format '%s'\n",pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oExitOnStatusWriteError:
	opt.exit_on_status_write_error = 1;
	break;

	case oLimitCardInsertTries:
	opt.limit_card_insert_tries = pargs.r.ret_int;
	break;

	case oRequireCrossCert: opt.flags.require_cross_cert=1; break;
	case oNoRequireCrossCert: opt.flags.require_cross_cert=0; break;

	case oAutoKeyLocate:
	if(!parse_auto_key_locate(pargs.r.ret_str))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid auto-key-locate list\n"),
	configname,configlineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid auto-key-locate list\n"));
	}
	break;
	case oNoAutoKeyLocate:
	release_akl();
	break;

	case oEnableLargeRSA:
	#if SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE >= 65536
	opt.flags.large_rsa=1;
	#else
	if (configname)
	log_info("%s:%d: WARNING: gpg not built with large secure "
	"memory buffer. Ignoring enable-large-rsa\n",
	configname,configlineno);
	else
	log_info("WARNING: gpg not built with large secure "
	"memory buffer. Ignoring --enable-large-rsa\n");
	#endif /* SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE >= 65536 */
	break;
	case oDisableLargeRSA: opt.flags.large_rsa=0;
	break;

	case oEnableDSA2: opt.flags.dsa2=1; break;
	case oDisableDSA2: opt.flags.dsa2=0; break;

	case oAllowMultisigVerification:
	case oAllowMultipleMessages:
	opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages=1;
	break;

	case oNoAllowMultipleMessages:
	opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages=0;
	break;

	case oAllowWeakDigestAlgos:
	opt.flags.allow_weak_digest_algos = 1;
	break;

	case oFakedSystemTime:
	{
	time_t faked_time = isotime2epoch (pargs.r.ret_str);
	if (faked_time == (time_t)(-1))
	faked_time = (time_t)strtoul (pargs.r.ret_str, NULL, 10);
	gnupg_set_time (faked_time, 0);
	}
	break;

	case oNoAutostart: opt.autostart = 0; break;

	case oNoop: break;

	default:
	pargs.err = configfp? ARGPARSE_PRINT_WARNING:ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR;
	break;
	}
	}

	if (configfp)
	{
	fclose( configfp );
	configfp = NULL;
	/* Remember the first config file name. */
	if (!save_configname)
	save_configname = configname;
	else
	xfree(configname);
	configname = NULL;
	goto next_pass;
	}
	xfree(configname); configname = NULL;
	if (log_get_errorcount (0))
	g10_exit(2);

	/* The command --gpgconf-list is pretty simple and may be called
	directly after the option parsing. */
	if (cmd == aGPGConfList)
	{
	gpgconf_list (save_configname ? save_configname : default_configname);
	g10_exit (0);
	}
	xfree (save_configname);
	xfree (default_configname);

	if( nogreeting )
	greeting = 0;

	if( greeting )
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stderr, "%s %s; %s\n",
	strusage(11), strusage(13), strusage(14) );
	es_fprintf (es_stderr, "%s\n", strusage(15) );
	}
	#ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION
	if (!opt.batch)
	{
	const char *s;

	if((s=strusage(25)))
	log_info("%s\n",s);
	if((s=strusage(26)))
	log_info("%s\n",s);
	if((s=strusage(27)))
	log_info("%s\n",s);
	}
	#endif

	/* FIXME: We should use logging to a file only in server mode;
	however we have not yet implemetyed that. Thus we try to get
	away with --batch as indication for logging to file
	required. */
	if (logfile && opt.batch)
	{
	log_set_file (logfile);
	log_set_prefix (NULL, 1\|2\|4);
	}

	if (opt.verbose > 2)
	log_info ("using character set '%s'\n", get_native_charset ());

	if( may_coredump && !opt.quiet )
	log_info(_("WARNING: program may create a core file!\n"));

	if (eyes_only) {
	if (opt.set_filename)
	log_info(_("WARNING: %s overrides %s\n"),
	"--for-your-eyes-only","--set-filename");

	opt.set_filename="_CONSOLE";
	}

	if (opt.no_literal) {
	log_info(_("Note: %s is not for normal use!\n"), "--no-literal");
	if (opt.textmode)
	log_error(_("%s not allowed with %s!\n"),
	"--textmode", "--no-literal" );
	if (opt.set_filename)
	log_error(_("%s makes no sense with %s!\n"),
	eyes_only?"--for-your-eyes-only":"--set-filename",
	"--no-literal" );
	}


	if (opt.set_filesize)
	log_info(_("Note: %s is not for normal use!\n"), "--set-filesize");
	if( opt.batch )
	tty_batchmode( 1 );

	if (gnupg_faked_time_p ())
	{
	gnupg_isotime_t tbuf;

	log_info (_("WARNING: running with faked system time: "));
	gnupg_get_isotime (tbuf);
	dump_isotime (tbuf);
	log_printf ("\n");
	}

	/* Print a warning if an argument looks like an option. */
	if (!opt.quiet && !(pargs.flags & ARGPARSE_FLAG_STOP_SEEN))
	{
	int i;

	for (i=0; i < argc; i++)
	if (argv[i][0] == '-' && argv[i][1] == '-')
	log_info (_("Note: '%s' is not considered an option\n"), argv[i]);
	}


	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_RESUME_SECMEM_WARN);

	if(require_secmem && !got_secmem)
	{
	log_info(_("will not run with insecure memory due to %s\n"),
	"--require-secmem");
	g10_exit(2);
	}

	set_debug (debug_level);
	if (DBG_CLOCK)
	log_clock ("start");

	/* Do these after the switch(), so they can override settings. */
	if(PGP6)
	{
	/* That does not anymore work becuase we have no more support
	for v3 signatures. */
	opt.disable_mdc=1;
	opt.escape_from=1;
	opt.ask_sig_expire=0;
	}
	else if(PGP7)
	{
	/* That does not anymore work because we have no more support
	for v3 signatures. */
	opt.escape_from=1;
	opt.ask_sig_expire=0;
	}
	else if(PGP8)
	{
	opt.escape_from=1;
	}


	if( def_cipher_string ) {
	opt.def_cipher_algo = string_to_cipher_algo (def_cipher_string);
	xfree(def_cipher_string); def_cipher_string = NULL;
	if ( openpgp_cipher_test_algo (opt.def_cipher_algo) )
	log_error(_("selected cipher algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( def_digest_string ) {
	opt.def_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo (def_digest_string);
	xfree(def_digest_string); def_digest_string = NULL;
	if ( openpgp_md_test_algo (opt.def_digest_algo) )
	log_error(_("selected digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( compress_algo_string ) {
	opt.compress_algo = string_to_compress_algo(compress_algo_string);
	xfree(compress_algo_string); compress_algo_string = NULL;
	if( check_compress_algo(opt.compress_algo) )
	log_error(_("selected compression algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( cert_digest_string ) {
	opt.cert_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo (cert_digest_string);
	xfree(cert_digest_string); cert_digest_string = NULL;
	if (openpgp_md_test_algo(opt.cert_digest_algo))
	log_error(_("selected certification digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( s2k_cipher_string ) {
	opt.s2k_cipher_algo = string_to_cipher_algo (s2k_cipher_string);
	xfree(s2k_cipher_string); s2k_cipher_string = NULL;
	if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (opt.s2k_cipher_algo))
	log_error(_("selected cipher algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( s2k_digest_string ) {
	opt.s2k_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo (s2k_digest_string);
	xfree(s2k_digest_string); s2k_digest_string = NULL;
	if (openpgp_md_test_algo(opt.s2k_digest_algo))
	log_error(_("selected digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( opt.completes_needed < 1 )
	log_error(_("completes-needed must be greater than 0\n"));
	if( opt.marginals_needed < 2 )
	log_error(_("marginals-needed must be greater than 1\n"));
	if( opt.max_cert_depth < 1 \|\| opt.max_cert_depth > 255 )
	log_error(_("max-cert-depth must be in the range from 1 to 255\n"));
	if(opt.def_cert_level<0 \|\| opt.def_cert_level>3)
	log_error(_("invalid default-cert-level; must be 0, 1, 2, or 3\n"));
	if( opt.min_cert_level < 1 \|\| opt.min_cert_level > 3 )
	log_error(_("invalid min-cert-level; must be 1, 2, or 3\n"));
	switch( opt.s2k_mode ) {
	case 0:
	log_info(_("Note: simple S2K mode (0) is strongly discouraged\n"));
	break;
	case 1: case 3: break;
	default:
	log_error(_("invalid S2K mode; must be 0, 1 or 3\n"));
	}

	/* This isn't actually needed, but does serve to error out if the
	string is invalid. */
	if(opt.def_preference_list &&
	keygen_set_std_prefs(opt.def_preference_list,0))
	log_error(_("invalid default preferences\n"));

	if(pers_cipher_list &&
	keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_cipher_list,PREFTYPE_SYM))
	log_error(_("invalid personal cipher preferences\n"));

	if(pers_digest_list &&
	keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_digest_list,PREFTYPE_HASH))
	log_error(_("invalid personal digest preferences\n"));

	if(pers_compress_list &&
	keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_compress_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP))
	log_error(_("invalid personal compress preferences\n"));

	/* We don't support all possible commands with multifile yet */
	if(multifile)
	{
	char *cmdname;

	switch(cmd)
	{
	case aSign:
	cmdname="--sign";
	break;
	case aClearsign:
	cmdname="--clearsign";
	break;
	case aDetachedSign:
	cmdname="--detach-sign";
	break;
	case aSym:
	cmdname="--symmetric";
	break;
	case aEncrSym:
	cmdname="--symmetric --encrypt";
	break;
	case aStore:
	cmdname="--store";
	break;
	default:
	cmdname=NULL;
	break;
	}

	if(cmdname)
	log_error(_("%s does not yet work with %s\n"),cmdname,"--multifile");
	}

	if( log_get_errorcount(0) )
	g10_exit(2);

	if(opt.compress_level==0)
	opt.compress_algo=COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE;

	/* Check our chosen algorithms against the list of legal
	algorithms. */

	if(!GNUPG)
	{
	const char *badalg=NULL;
	preftype_t badtype=PREFTYPE_NONE;

	if(opt.def_cipher_algo
	&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_SYM,opt.def_cipher_algo,NULL))
	{
	badalg = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (opt.def_cipher_algo);
	badtype = PREFTYPE_SYM;
	}
	else if(opt.def_digest_algo
	&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_HASH,opt.def_digest_algo,NULL))
	{
	badalg = gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo);
	badtype = PREFTYPE_HASH;
	}
	else if(opt.cert_digest_algo
	&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_HASH,opt.cert_digest_algo,NULL))
	{
	badalg = gcry_md_algo_name (opt.cert_digest_algo);
	badtype = PREFTYPE_HASH;
	}
	else if(opt.compress_algo!=-1
	&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_ZIP,opt.compress_algo,NULL))
	{
	badalg = compress_algo_to_string(opt.compress_algo);
	badtype = PREFTYPE_ZIP;
	}

	if(badalg)
	{
	switch(badtype)
	{
	case PREFTYPE_SYM:
	log_info(_("you may not use cipher algorithm '%s'"
	" while in %s mode\n"),
	badalg,compliance_option_string());
	break;
	case PREFTYPE_HASH:
	log_info(_("you may not use digest algorithm '%s'"
	" while in %s mode\n"),
	badalg,compliance_option_string());
	break;
	case PREFTYPE_ZIP:
	log_info(_("you may not use compression algorithm '%s'"
	" while in %s mode\n"),
	badalg,compliance_option_string());
	break;
	default:
	BUG();
	}

	compliance_failure();
	}
	}

	/* Set the random seed file. */
	if( use_random_seed ) {
	char *p = make_filename(opt.homedir, "random_seed", NULL );
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_RANDOM_SEED_FILE, p);
	if (!access (p, F_OK))
	register_secured_file (p);
	xfree(p);
	}

	/* If there is no command but the --fingerprint is given, default
	to the --list-keys command. */
	if (!cmd && fpr_maybe_cmd)
	{
	set_cmd (&cmd, aListKeys);
	}


	if( opt.verbose > 1 )
	set_packet_list_mode(1);

	/* Add the keyrings, but not for some special commands.
	We always need to add the keyrings if we are running under
	SELinux, this is so that the rings are added to the list of
	secured files. */
	if( ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS
	\|\| (cmd != aDeArmor && cmd != aEnArmor && cmd != aGPGConfTest) )
	{
	if (!nrings \|\| default_keyring) /* Add default ring. */
	keydb_add_resource ("pubring" EXTSEP_S GPGEXT_GPG,
	KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_DEFAULT);
	for (sl = nrings; sl; sl = sl->next )
	keydb_add_resource (sl->d, sl->flags);
	}
	FREE_STRLIST(nrings);

	if (opt.pinentry_mode == PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK)
	/* In loopback mode, never ask for the password multiple
	times. */
	{
	opt.passphrase_repeat = 0;
	}

	if (cmd == aGPGConfTest)
	g10_exit(0);


	if( pwfd != -1 ) /* Read the passphrase now. */
	read_passphrase_from_fd( pwfd );

	fname = argc? *argv : NULL;

	if(fname && utf8_strings)
	opt.flags.utf8_filename=1;

	ctrl = xcalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl);
	gpg_init_default_ctrl (ctrl);

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	switch (cmd)
	{
	case aPrimegen:
	case aPrintMD:
	case aPrintMDs:
	case aGenRandom:
	case aDeArmor:
	case aEnArmor:
	break;
	case aFixTrustDB:
	case aExportOwnerTrust:
	rc = setup_trustdb (0, trustdb_name);
	break;
	case aListTrustDB:
	rc = setup_trustdb (argc? 1:0, trustdb_name);
	break;
	default:
	/* If we are using TM_ALWAYS, we do not need to create the
	trustdb. */
	rc = setup_trustdb (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS, trustdb_name);
	break;
	}
	if (rc)
	log_error (_("failed to initialize the TrustDB: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/

	switch (cmd)
	{
	case aStore:
	case aSym:
	case aSign:
	case aSignSym:
	case aClearsign:
	if (!opt.quiet && any_explicit_recipient)
	log_info (_("WARNING: recipients (-r) given "
	"without using public key encryption\n"));
	break;
	default:
	break;
	}


	/* Check for certain command whether we need to migrate a
	secring.gpg to the gpg-agent. */
	switch (cmd)
	{
	case aListSecretKeys:
	case aSign:
	case aSignEncr:
	case aSignEncrSym:
	case aSignSym:
	case aClearsign:
	case aDecrypt:
	case aSignKey:
	case aLSignKey:
	case aEditKey:
	case aPasswd:
	case aDeleteSecretKeys:
	case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys:
	case aQuickKeygen:
	case aQuickAddUid:
	case aFullKeygen:
	case aKeygen:
	case aImport:
	case aExportSecret:
	case aExportSecretSub:
	case aGenRevoke:
	case aDesigRevoke:
	case aCardEdit:
	case aChangePIN:
	migrate_secring (ctrl);
	break;
	case aListKeys:
	if (opt.with_secret)
	migrate_secring (ctrl);
	break;
	default:
	break;
	}

	/* The command dispatcher. */
	switch( cmd )
	{
	case aServer:
	gpg_server (ctrl);
	break;

	case aStore: /* only store the file */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args(_("--store [filename]"));
	if( (rc = encrypt_store(fname)) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("store", rc);
	log_error ("storing '%s' failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname),gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	break;
	case aSym: /* encrypt the given file only with the symmetric cipher */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args(_("--symmetric [filename]"));
	if( (rc = encrypt_symmetric(fname)) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("symencrypt", rc);
	log_error (_("symmetric encryption of '%s' failed: %s\n"),
	print_fname_stdin(fname),gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	break;

	case aEncr: /* encrypt the given file */
	if(multifile)
	encrypt_crypt_files (ctrl, argc, argv, remusr);
	else
	{
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args(_("--encrypt [filename]"));
	if( (rc = encrypt_crypt (ctrl, -1, fname, remusr, 0, NULL, -1)) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("encrypt", rc);
	log_error("%s: encryption failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	}
	break;

	case aEncrSym:
	/* This works with PGP 8 in the sense that it acts just like a
	symmetric message. It doesn't work at all with 2 or 6. It
	might work with 7, but alas, I don't have a copy to test
	with right now. */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args(_("--symmetric --encrypt [filename]"));
	else if(opt.s2k_mode==0)
	log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --encrypt"
	" with --s2k-mode 0\n"));
	else if(PGP6 \|\| PGP7)
	log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --encrypt"
	" while in %s mode\n"),compliance_option_string());
	else
	{
	if( (rc = encrypt_crypt (ctrl, -1, fname, remusr, 1, NULL, -1)) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("encrypt", rc);
	log_error ("%s: encryption failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	}
	break;

	case aSign: /* sign the given file */
	sl = NULL;
	if( detached_sig ) { /* sign all files */
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	add_to_strlist( &sl, *argv );
	}
	else {
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args(_("--sign [filename]"));
	if( argc ) {
	sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname));
	strcpy(sl->d, fname);
	}
	}
	if ((rc = sign_file (ctrl, sl, detached_sig, locusr, 0, NULL, NULL)))
	{
	write_status_failure ("sign", rc);
	log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aSignEncr: /* sign and encrypt the given file */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args(_("--sign --encrypt [filename]"));
	if( argc ) {
	sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname));
	strcpy(sl->d, fname);
	}
	else
	sl = NULL;
	if ((rc = sign_file (ctrl, sl, detached_sig, locusr, 1, remusr, NULL)))
	{
	write_status_failure ("sign-encrypt", rc);
	log_error("%s: sign+encrypt failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aSignEncrSym: /* sign and encrypt the given file */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args(_("--symmetric --sign --encrypt [filename]"));
	else if(opt.s2k_mode==0)
	log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --sign --encrypt"
	" with --s2k-mode 0\n"));
	else if(PGP6 \|\| PGP7)
	log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --sign --encrypt"
	" while in %s mode\n"),compliance_option_string());
	else
	{
	if( argc )
	{
	sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname));
	strcpy(sl->d, fname);
	}
	else
	sl = NULL;
	if ((rc = sign_file (ctrl, sl, detached_sig, locusr,
	2, remusr, NULL)))
	{
	write_status_failure ("sign-encrypt", rc);
	log_error("%s: symmetric+sign+encrypt failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	}
	break;

	case aSignSym: /* sign and conventionally encrypt the given file */
	if (argc > 1)
	wrong_args(_("--sign --symmetric [filename]"));
	rc = sign_symencrypt_file (fname, locusr);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_failure ("sign-symencrypt", rc);
	log_error("%s: sign+symmetric failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	break;

	case aClearsign: /* make a clearsig */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args(_("--clearsign [filename]"));
	if( (rc = clearsign_file(fname, locusr, NULL)) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("sign", rc);
	log_error("%s: clearsign failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	break;

	case aVerify:
	rc = 0;
	if (multifile)
	{
	if ((rc = verify_files (ctrl, argc, argv)))
	log_error("verify files failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	else
	{
	if ((rc = verify_signatures (ctrl, argc, argv)))
	log_error("verify signatures failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	if (rc)
	write_status_failure ("verify", rc);
	break;

	case aDecrypt:
	if (multifile)
	decrypt_messages (ctrl, argc, argv);
	else
	{
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args(_("--decrypt [filename]"));
	if( (rc = decrypt_message (ctrl, fname) ))
	{
	write_status_failure ("decrypt", rc);
	log_error("decrypt_message failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	}
	break;

	case aQuickSignKey:
	case aQuickLSignKey:
	{
	const char *fpr;

	if (argc < 1)
	wrong_args ("--quick-[l]sign-key fingerprint [userids]");
	fpr = *argv++; argc--;
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++)
	append_to_strlist2 (&sl, *argv, utf8_strings);
	keyedit_quick_sign (ctrl, fpr, sl, locusr, (cmd == aQuickLSignKey));
	free_strlist (sl);
	}
	break;

	case aSignKey:
	if( argc != 1 )
	wrong_args(_("--sign-key user-id"));
	/* fall through */
	case aLSignKey:
	if( argc != 1 )
	wrong_args(_("--lsign-key user-id"));
	/* fall through */

	sl=NULL;

	if(cmd==aSignKey)
	append_to_strlist(&sl,"sign");
	else if(cmd==aLSignKey)
	append_to_strlist(&sl,"lsign");
	else
	BUG();

	append_to_strlist( &sl, "save" );
	username = make_username( fname );
	keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, sl, 0, 0 );
	xfree(username);
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aEditKey: /* Edit a key signature */
	if( !argc )
	wrong_args(_("--edit-key user-id [commands]"));
	username = make_username( fname );
	if( argc > 1 ) {
	sl = NULL;
	for( argc--, argv++ ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	append_to_strlist( &sl, *argv );
	keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, sl, 0, 1 );
	free_strlist(sl);
	}
	else
	keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, NULL, 0, 1 );
	xfree(username);
	break;

	case aPasswd:
	if (argc != 1)
	wrong_args (_("--passwd <user-id>"));
	else
	{
	username = make_username (fname);
	keyedit_passwd (ctrl, username);
	xfree (username);
	}
	break;

	case aDeleteKeys:
	case aDeleteSecretKeys:
	case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	/* I'm adding these in reverse order as add_to_strlist2
	reverses them again, and it's easier to understand in the
	proper order :) */
	for( ; argc; argc-- )
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, argv[argc-1], utf8_strings );
	delete_keys(sl,cmd==aDeleteSecretKeys,cmd==aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys);
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aCheckKeys:
	opt.check_sigs = 1;
	case aListSigs:
	opt.list_sigs = 1;
	case aListKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	public_key_list (ctrl, sl, 0);
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;
	case aListSecretKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	secret_key_list (ctrl, sl);
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;
	case aLocateKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for (; argc; argc--, argv++)
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	public_key_list (ctrl, sl, 1);
	free_strlist (sl);
	break;

	case aQuickKeygen:
	if (argc != 1 )
	wrong_args("--gen-key user-id");
	username = make_username (fname);
	quick_generate_keypair (ctrl, username);
	xfree (username);
	break;

	case aKeygen: /* generate a key */
	if( opt.batch ) {
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--gen-key [parameterfile]");
	generate_keypair (ctrl, 0, argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, 0);
	}
	else {
	if (opt.command_fd != -1 && argc)
	{
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--gen-key [parameterfile]");

	opt.batch = 1;
	generate_keypair (ctrl, 0, argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, 0);
	}
	else if (argc)
	wrong_args ("--gen-key");
	else
	generate_keypair (ctrl, 0, NULL, NULL, 0);
	}
	break;

	case aFullKeygen: /* Generate a key with all options. */
	if (opt.batch)
	{
	if (argc > 1)
	wrong_args ("--full-gen-key [parameterfile]");
	generate_keypair (ctrl, 1, argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, 0);
	}
	else
	{
	if (argc)
	wrong_args("--full-gen-key");
	generate_keypair (ctrl, 1, NULL, NULL, 0);
	}
	break;

	case aQuickAddUid:
	{
	const char uid, newuid;

	if (argc != 2)
	wrong_args ("--quick-adduid USER-ID NEW-USER-ID");
	uid = *argv++; argc--;
	newuid = *argv++; argc--;
	keyedit_quick_adduid (ctrl, uid, newuid);
	}
	break;

	case aFastImport:
	opt.import_options \|= IMPORT_FAST;
	case aImport:
	import_keys (ctrl, argc? argv:NULL, argc, NULL, opt.import_options);
	break;

	/* TODO: There are a number of command that use this same
	"make strlist, call function, report error, free strlist"
	pattern. Join them together here and avoid all that
	duplicated code. */

	case aExport:
	case aSendKeys:
	case aRecvKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	if( cmd == aSendKeys )
	rc = keyserver_export (ctrl, sl );
	else if( cmd == aRecvKeys )
	rc = keyserver_import (ctrl, sl );
	else
	rc = export_pubkeys (ctrl, sl, opt.export_options);
	if(rc)
	{
	if(cmd==aSendKeys)
	{
	write_status_failure ("send-keys", rc);
	log_error(_("keyserver send failed: %s\n"),gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	else if(cmd==aRecvKeys)
	{
	write_status_failure ("recv-keys", rc);
	log_error (_("keyserver receive failed: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	else
	{
	write_status_failure ("export", rc);
	log_error (_("key export failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aSearchKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for (; argc; argc--, argv++)
	append_to_strlist2 (&sl, *argv, utf8_strings);
	rc = keyserver_search (ctrl, sl);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_failure ("search-keys", rc);
	log_error (_("keyserver search failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	free_strlist (sl);
	break;

	case aRefreshKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	rc = keyserver_refresh (ctrl, sl);
	if(rc)
	{
	write_status_failure ("refresh-keys", rc);
	log_error (_("keyserver refresh failed: %s\n"),gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aFetchKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	rc = keyserver_fetch (ctrl, sl);
	if(rc)
	{
	write_status_failure ("fetch-keys", rc);
	log_error ("key fetch failed: %s\n",gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aExportSecret:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	export_seckeys (ctrl, sl);
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aExportSecretSub:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	export_secsubkeys (ctrl, sl);
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aGenRevoke:
	if( argc != 1 )
	wrong_args("--gen-revoke user-id");
	username = make_username(*argv);
	gen_revoke( username );
	xfree( username );
	break;

	case aDesigRevoke:
	if( argc != 1 )
	wrong_args("--desig-revoke user-id");
	username = make_username(*argv);
	gen_desig_revoke( username, locusr );
	xfree( username );
	break;

	case aDeArmor:
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--dearmor [file]");
	rc = dearmor_file( argc? *argv: NULL );
	if( rc )
	{
	write_status_failure ("dearmor", rc);
	log_error (_("dearmoring failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	break;

	case aEnArmor:
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--enarmor [file]");
	rc = enarmor_file( argc? *argv: NULL );
	if( rc )
	{
	write_status_failure ("enarmor", rc);
	log_error (_("enarmoring failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	break;


	case aPrimegen:
	#if 0 /FIXME/
	{ int mode = argc < 2 ? 0 : atoi(*argv);

	if( mode == 1 && argc == 2 ) {
	mpi_print (es_stdout,
	generate_public_prime( atoi(argv[1]) ), 1);
	}
	else if( mode == 2 && argc == 3 ) {
	mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_elg_prime(
	0, atoi(argv[1]),
	atoi(argv[2]), NULL,NULL ), 1);
	}
	else if( mode == 3 && argc == 3 ) {
	MPI *factors;
	mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_elg_prime(
	1, atoi(argv[1]),
	atoi(argv[2]), NULL,&factors ), 1);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	mpi_print (es_stdout, factors[0], 1 ); /* print q */
	}
	else if( mode == 4 && argc == 3 ) {
	MPI g = mpi_alloc(1);
	mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_elg_prime(
	0, atoi(argv[1]),
	atoi(argv[2]), g, NULL ), 1);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	mpi_print (es_stdout, g, 1 );
	mpi_free (g);
	}
	else
	wrong_args("--gen-prime mode bits [qbits] ");
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	#endif
	wrong_args("--gen-prime not yet supported ");
	break;

	case aGenRandom:
	{
	int level = argc ? atoi(*argv):0;
	int count = argc > 1 ? atoi(argv[1]): 0;
	int endless = !count;

	if( argc < 1 \|\| argc > 2 \|\| level < 0 \|\| level > 2 \|\| count < 0 )
	wrong_args("--gen-random 0\|1\|2 [count]");

	while( endless \|\| count ) {
	byte *p;
	/* Wee need a multiple of 3, so that in case of
	armored output we get a correct string. No
	linefolding is done, as it is best to levae this to
	other tools */
	size_t n = !endless && count < 99? count : 99;

	p = gcry_random_bytes (n, level);
	#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
	setmode ( fileno(stdout), O_BINARY );
	#endif
	if (opt.armor) {
	char *tmp = make_radix64_string (p, n);
	es_fputs (tmp, es_stdout);
	xfree (tmp);
	if (n%3 == 1)
	es_putc ('=', es_stdout);
	if (n%3)
	es_putc ('=', es_stdout);
	} else {
	es_fwrite( p, n, 1, es_stdout );
	}
	xfree(p);
	if( !endless )
	count -= n;
	}
	if (opt.armor)
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	break;

	case aPrintMD:
	if( argc < 1)
	wrong_args("--print-md algo [files]");
	{
	int all_algos = (*argv=='' && !(*argv)[1]);
	int algo = all_algos? 0 : gcry_md_map_name (*argv);

	if( !algo && !all_algos )
	log_error(_("invalid hash algorithm '%s'\n"), *argv );
	else {
	argc--; argv++;
	if( !argc )
	print_mds(NULL, algo);
	else {
	for(; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	print_mds(*argv, algo);
	}
	}
	}
	break;

	case aPrintMDs: /* old option */
	if( !argc )
	print_mds(NULL,0);
	else {
	for(; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	print_mds(*argv,0);
	}
	break;

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	case aListTrustDB:
	if( !argc )
	list_trustdb (es_stdout, NULL);
	else {
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	list_trustdb (es_stdout, *argv );
	}
	break;

	case aUpdateTrustDB:
	if( argc )
	wrong_args("--update-trustdb");
	update_trustdb();
	break;

	case aCheckTrustDB:
	/* Old versions allowed for arguments - ignore them */
	check_trustdb();
	break;

	case aFixTrustDB:
	how_to_fix_the_trustdb ();
	break;

	case aListTrustPath:
	if( !argc )
	wrong_args("--list-trust-path <user-ids>");
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) {
	username = make_username( *argv );
	list_trust_path( username );
	xfree(username);
	}
	break;

	case aExportOwnerTrust:
	if( argc )
	wrong_args("--export-ownertrust");
	export_ownertrust();
	break;

	case aImportOwnerTrust:
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--import-ownertrust [file]");
	import_ownertrust( argc? *argv:NULL );
	break;
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/

	case aRebuildKeydbCaches:
	if (argc)
	wrong_args ("--rebuild-keydb-caches");
	keydb_rebuild_caches (1);
	break;

	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	case aCardStatus:
	if (argc)
	wrong_args ("--card-status");
	card_status (es_stdout, NULL, 0);
	break;

	case aCardEdit:
	if (argc) {
	sl = NULL;
	for (argc--, argv++ ; argc; argc--, argv++)
	append_to_strlist (&sl, *argv);
	card_edit (ctrl, sl);
	free_strlist (sl);
	}
	else
	card_edit (ctrl, NULL);
	break;

	case aChangePIN:
	if (!argc)
	change_pin (0,1);
	else if (argc == 1)
	change_pin (atoi (*argv),1);
	else
	wrong_args ("--change-pin [no]");
	break;
	#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/

	case aListConfig:
	{
	char *str=collapse_args(argc,argv);
	list_config(str);
	xfree(str);
	}
	break;

	case aListGcryptConfig:
	/* Fixme: It would be nice to integrate that with
	--list-config but unfortunately there is no way yet to have
	libgcrypt print it to an estream for further parsing. */
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_PRINT_CONFIG, stdout);
	break;

	+ case aTOFUPolicy:
	+ {
	+ int policy;
	+ int i;
	+ KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
	+
	+ if (argc < 2)
	+ wrong_args("--tofu-policy POLICY KEYID [KEYID...]");
	+
	+ policy = parse_tofu_policy (argv[0]);
	+
	+ hd = keydb_new ();
	+ if (! hd)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("Failed to open the keyring DB.\n"));
	+ g10_exit (1);
	+ }
	+
	+ for (i = 1; i < argc; i ++)
	+ {
	+ KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
	+ kbnode_t kb;
	+
	+ rc = classify_user_id (argv[i], &desc, 0);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("Failed to parse '%s'.\n"), argv[i]);
	+ g10_exit (1);
	+ }
	+
	+ if (! (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID
	+ \|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID
	+ \|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
	+ \|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20
	+ \|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
	+ \|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_KEYGRIP))
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("'%s' does not appear to be a valid"
	+ " key id, fingerprint or key grip.\n"),
	+ argv[i]);
	+ g10_exit (1);
	+ }
	+
	+ rc = keydb_search_reset (hd);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("Failed to reset keyring handle.\n"));
	+ g10_exit (1);
	+ }
	+
	+ rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL);
	+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("Key '%s' is not available\n"), argv[i]);
	+ g10_exit (1);
	+ }
	+ else if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("Failed to find key '%s'\n"), argv[i]);
	+ g10_exit (1);
	+ }
	+
	+ rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &kb);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("Failed to read key '%s' from the keyring\n"),
	+ argv[i]);
	+ g10_exit (1);
	+ }
	+
	+ merge_keys_and_selfsig (kb);
	+
	+ if (tofu_set_policy (kb, policy))
	+ g10_exit (1);
	+ }
	+
	+ keydb_release (hd);
	+
	+ }
	+ break;
	+
	case aListPackets:
	opt.list_packets=2;
	default:
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args(_("[filename]"));
	/* Issue some output for the unix newbie */
	if (!fname && !opt.outfile
	&& gnupg_isatty (fileno (stdin))
	&& gnupg_isatty (fileno (stdout))
	&& gnupg_isatty (fileno (stderr)))
	log_info(_("Go ahead and type your message ...\n"));

	a = iobuf_open(fname);
	if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a)))
	{
	iobuf_close (a);
	a = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	if( !a )
	log_error(_("can't open '%s'\n"), print_fname_stdin(fname));
	else {

	if( !opt.no_armor ) {
	if( use_armor_filter( a ) ) {
	afx = new_armor_context ();
	push_armor_filter (afx, a);
	}
	}
	if( cmd == aListPackets ) {
	set_packet_list_mode(1);
	opt.list_packets=1;
	}
	rc = proc_packets (ctrl, NULL, a );
	if( rc )
	{
	write_status_failure ("-", rc);
	log_error ("processing message failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	iobuf_close(a);
	}
	break;
	}

	/* cleanup */
	gpg_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl);
	xfree (ctrl);
	release_armor_context (afx);
	FREE_STRLIST(remusr);
	FREE_STRLIST(locusr);
	g10_exit(0);
	return 8; /NEVER REACHED/
	}


	/* Note: This function is used by signal handlers!. */
	static void
	emergency_cleanup (void)
	{
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM );
	}


	void
	g10_exit( int rc )
	{
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_UPDATE_RANDOM_SEED_FILE);
	if (DBG_CLOCK)
	log_clock ("stop");

	if ( (opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE) )
	{
	keydb_dump_stats ();
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_MEMORY_STATS);
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_RANDOM_STATS);
	}
	if (opt.debug)
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_SECMEM_STATS );

	emergency_cleanup ();

	rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 : g10_errors_seen? 1 : 0;
	exit (rc);
	}


	/* Pretty-print hex hashes. This assumes at least an 80-character
	display, but there are a few other similar assumptions in the
	display code. */
	static void
	print_hex (gcry_md_hd_t md, int algo, const char *fname)
	{
	int i,n,count,indent=0;
	const byte *p;

	if (fname)
	indent = es_printf("%s: ",fname);

	if (indent>40)
	{
	es_printf ("\n");
	indent=0;
	}

	if (algo==DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160)
	indent += es_printf("RMD160 = ");
	else if (algo>0)
	indent += es_printf("%6s = ", gcry_md_algo_name (algo));
	else
	algo = abs(algo);

	count = indent;

	p = gcry_md_read (md, algo);
	n = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);

	count += es_printf ("%02X",*p++);

	for(i=1;i<n;i++,p++)
	{
	if(n==16)
	{
	if(count+2>79)
	{
	es_printf ("\n%*s",indent," ");
	count = indent;
	}
	else
	count += es_printf(" ");

	if (!(i%8))
	count += es_printf(" ");
	}
	else if (n==20)
	{
	if(!(i%2))
	{
	if(count+4>79)
	{
	es_printf ("\n%*s",indent," ");
	count=indent;
	}
	else
	count += es_printf(" ");
	}

	if (!(i%10))
	count += es_printf(" ");
	}
	else
	{
	if(!(i%4))
	{
	if (count+8>79)
	{
	es_printf ("\n%*s",indent," ");
	count=indent;
	}
	else
	count += es_printf(" ");
	}
	}

	count += es_printf("%02X",*p);
	}

	es_printf ("\n");
	}

	static void
	print_hashline( gcry_md_hd_t md, int algo, const char *fname )
	{
	int i, n;
	const byte *p;

	if ( fname )
	{
	for (p = fname; *p; p++ )
	{
	if ( p <= 32 \|\| p > 127 \|\| p == ':' \|\| p == '%' )
	es_printf ("%%%02X", *p );
	else
	es_putc (*p, es_stdout);
	}
	}
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	es_printf ("%d:", algo);
	p = gcry_md_read (md, algo);
	n = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
	for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ )
	es_printf ("%02X", *p);
	es_fputs (":\n", es_stdout);
	}


	static void
	print_mds( const char *fname, int algo )
	{
	estream_t fp;
	char buf[1024];
	size_t n;
	gcry_md_hd_t md;

	if (!fname)
	{
	fp = es_stdin;
	es_set_binary (fp);
	}
	else
	{
	fp = es_fopen (fname, "rb" );
	if (fp && is_secured_file (es_fileno (fp)))
	{
	es_fclose (fp);
	fp = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	}
	if (!fp)
	{
	log_error("%s: %s\n", fname?fname:"[stdin]", strerror(errno) );
	return;
	}

	gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0);
	if (algo)
	gcry_md_enable (md, algo);
	else
	{
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_MD5))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_MD5);
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_RMD160))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_RMD160);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA224))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA224);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA256))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA256);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA384))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA384);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA512))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA512);
	}

	while ((n=es_fread (buf, 1, DIM(buf), fp)))
	gcry_md_write (md, buf, n);

	if (es_ferror(fp))
	log_error ("%s: %s\n", fname?fname:"[stdin]", strerror(errno));
	else
	{
	gcry_md_final (md);
	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	if ( algo )
	print_hashline (md, algo, fname);
	else
	{
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_MD5))
	print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_MD5, fname );
	print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_RMD160))
	print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_RMD160, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA224))
	print_hashline (md, GCRY_MD_SHA224, fname);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA256))
	print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_SHA256, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA384))
	print_hashline ( md, GCRY_MD_SHA384, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA512))
	print_hashline ( md, GCRY_MD_SHA512, fname );
	}
	}
	else
	{
	if (algo)
	print_hex (md, -algo, fname);
	else
	{
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_MD5))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_MD5, fname);
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_RMD160))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_RMD160, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA224))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA224, fname);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA256))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA256, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA384))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA384, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA512))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA512, fname );
	}
	}
	}
	gcry_md_close (md);

	if (fp != es_stdin)
	es_fclose (fp);
	}


	/****************
	* Check the supplied name,value string and add it to the notation
	* data to be used for signatures. which==0 for sig notations, and 1
	* for cert notations.
	*/
	static void
	add_notation_data( const char *string, int which )
	{
	struct notation *notation;

	notation=string_to_notation(string,utf8_strings);
	if(notation)
	{
	if(which)
	{
	notation->next=opt.cert_notations;
	opt.cert_notations=notation;
	}
	else
	{
	notation->next=opt.sig_notations;
	opt.sig_notations=notation;
	}
	}
	}

	static void
	add_policy_url( const char *string, int which )
	{
	unsigned int i,critical=0;
	strlist_t sl;

	if(*string=='!')
	{
	string++;
	critical=1;
	}

	for(i=0;i<strlen(string);i++)
	if( !isascii (string[i]) \|\| iscntrl(string[i]))
	break;

	if(i==0 \|\| i<strlen(string))
	{
	if(which)
	log_error(_("the given certification policy URL is invalid\n"));
	else
	log_error(_("the given signature policy URL is invalid\n"));
	}

	if(which)
	sl=add_to_strlist( &opt.cert_policy_url, string );
	else
	sl=add_to_strlist( &opt.sig_policy_url, string );

	if(critical)
	sl->flags \|= 1;
	}

	static void
	add_keyserver_url( const char *string, int which )
	{
	unsigned int i,critical=0;
	strlist_t sl;

	if(*string=='!')
	{
	string++;
	critical=1;
	}

	for(i=0;i<strlen(string);i++)
	if( !isascii (string[i]) \|\| iscntrl(string[i]))
	break;

	if(i==0 \|\| i<strlen(string))
	{
	if(which)
	BUG();
	else
	log_error(_("the given preferred keyserver URL is invalid\n"));
	}

	if(which)
	BUG();
	else
	sl=add_to_strlist( &opt.sig_keyserver_url, string );

	if(critical)
	sl->flags \|= 1;
	}
	diff --git a/g10/gpgv.c b/g10/gpgv.c
	index 8bb3fc41a..0807622a6 100644
	--- a/g10/gpgv.c
	+++ b/g10/gpgv.c
	@@ -1,608 +1,634 @@
	/* gpgv.c - The GnuPG signature verify utility
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006,
	* 2008, 2009, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <errno.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <ctype.h>
	#include <unistd.h>
	#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
	#include <fcntl.h> /* for setmode() */
	#endif
	#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
	#define GNUPG_LIBREADLINE_H_INCLUDED
	#include <readline/readline.h>
	#endif

	#define INCLUDED_BY_MAIN_MODULE 1
	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "util.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "iobuf.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "filter.h"
	#include "ttyio.h"
	#include "i18n.h"
	#include "sysutils.h"
	#include "status.h"
	#include "call-agent.h"
	#include "../common/init.h"


	enum cmd_and_opt_values {
	aNull = 0,
	oQuiet = 'q',
	oVerbose = 'v',
	oBatch = 500,
	oKeyring,
	oIgnoreTimeConflict,
	oStatusFD,
	oLoggerFD,
	oHomedir,
	aTest
	};


	static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
	ARGPARSE_group (300, N_("@\nOptions:\n ")),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oVerbose, "verbose", N_("verbose")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oQuiet, "quiet", N_("be somewhat more quiet")),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyring, "keyring",
	N_("\|FILE\|take the keys from the keyring FILE")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreTimeConflict, "ignore-time-conflict",
	N_("make timestamp conflicts only a warning")),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oStatusFD, "status-fd",
	N_("\|FD\|write status info to this FD")),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oLoggerFD, "logger-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oHomedir, "homedir", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_end ()
	};



	int g10_errors_seen = 0;


	static char *
	make_libversion (const char libname, const char (getfnc)(const char))
	{
	const char *s;
	char *result;

	s = getfnc (NULL);
	result = xmalloc (strlen (libname) + 1 + strlen (s) + 1);
	strcpy (stpcpy (stpcpy (result, libname), " "), s);
	return result;
	}

	static const char *
	my_strusage( int level )
	{
	static char *ver_gcry;
	const char *p;

	switch (level)
	{
	case 11: p = "@GPG@v (GnuPG)";
	break;
	case 13: p = VERSION; break;
	case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break;
	case 19: p = _("Please report bugs to <@EMAIL@>.\n"); break;

	case 1:
	case 40: p = _("Usage: gpgv [options] [files] (-h for help)");
	break;
	case 41: p = _("Syntax: gpgv [options] [files]\n"
	"Check signatures against known trusted keys\n");
	break;

	case 20:
	if (!ver_gcry)
	ver_gcry = make_libversion ("libgcrypt", gcry_check_version);
	p = ver_gcry;
	break;


	default: p = NULL;
	}
	return p;
	}



	int
	main( int argc, char **argv )
	{
	ARGPARSE_ARGS pargs;
	int rc=0;
	strlist_t sl;
	strlist_t nrings = NULL;
	unsigned configlineno;
	ctrl_t ctrl;

	early_system_init ();
	set_strusage (my_strusage);
	log_set_prefix ("gpgv", 1);

	/* Make sure that our subsystems are ready. */
	i18n_init();
	init_common_subsystems (&argc, &argv);

	if (!gcry_check_version (NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION) )
	{
	log_fatal ( _("%s is too old (need %s, have %s)\n"), "libgcrypt",
	NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION, gcry_check_version (NULL) );
	}
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM, 0);

	gnupg_init_signals (0, NULL);

	opt.command_fd = -1; /* no command fd */
	opt.keyserver_options.options \|= KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE;
	opt.trust_model = TM_ALWAYS;
	opt.batch = 1;

	opt.homedir = default_homedir ();

	tty_no_terminal(1);
	tty_batchmode(1);
	dotlock_disable ();
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);

	pargs.argc = &argc;
	pargs.argv = &argv;
	pargs.flags= 1; /* do not remove the args */
	while (optfile_parse( NULL, NULL, &configlineno, &pargs, opts))
	{
	switch (pargs.r_opt)
	{
	case oQuiet: opt.quiet = 1; break;
	case oVerbose:
	opt.verbose++;
	opt.list_sigs=1;
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);
	break;
	case oKeyring: append_to_strlist( &nrings, pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oStatusFD: set_status_fd( pargs.r.ret_int ); break;
	case oLoggerFD:
	log_set_fd (translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1));
	break;
	case oHomedir: opt.homedir = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
	case oIgnoreTimeConflict: opt.ignore_time_conflict = 1; break;
	default : pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR; break;
	}
	}

	if (log_get_errorcount (0))
	g10_exit(2);

	if (opt.verbose > 1)
	set_packet_list_mode(1);

	/* Note: We open all keyrings in read-only mode. */
	if (!nrings) /* No keyring given: use default one. */
	keydb_add_resource ("trustedkeys" EXTSEP_S "kbx",
	(KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_READONLY
	\|KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_GPGVDEF));
	for (sl = nrings; sl; sl = sl->next)
	keydb_add_resource (sl->d, KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_READONLY);

	FREE_STRLIST (nrings);

	ctrl = xcalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl);

	if ((rc = verify_signatures (ctrl, argc, argv)))
	log_error("verify signatures failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );

	xfree (ctrl);

	/* cleanup */
	g10_exit (0);
	return 8; /NOTREACHED/
	}


	void
	g10_exit( int rc )
	{
	rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 : g10_errors_seen? 1 : 0;
	exit(rc );
	}


	/* Stub:
	* We have to override the trustcheck from pkclist.c becuase
	* this utility assumes that all keys in the keyring are trustworthy
	*/
	int
	check_signatures_trust( PKT_signature *sig )
	{
	(void)sig;
	return 0;
	}

	void
	read_trust_options(byte trust_model, ulong created, ulong *nextcheck,
	byte marginals, byte completes, byte *cert_depth,
	byte *min_cert_level)
	{
	(void)trust_model;
	(void)created;
	(void)nextcheck;
	(void)marginals;
	(void)completes;
	(void)cert_depth;
	(void)min_cert_level;
	}

	/* Stub:
	* We don't have the trustdb , so we have to provide some stub functions
	* instead
	*/

	int
	cache_disabled_value(PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	(void)pk;
	return 0;
	}

	void
	check_trustdb_stale(void)
	{
	}

	int
	get_validity_info (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid)
	{
	(void)pk;
	(void)uid;
	return '?';
	}

	unsigned int
	-get_validity (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid)
	+get_validity (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid, PKT_signature *sig,
	+ int may_ask)
	{
	(void)pk;
	(void)uid;
	+ (void)sig;
	+ (void)may_ask;
	return 0;
	}

	const char *
	trust_value_to_string (unsigned int value)
	{
	(void)value;
	return "err";
	}

	const char *
	uid_trust_string_fixed (PKT_public_key key, PKT_user_id uid)
	{
	(void)key;
	(void)uid;
	return "err";
	}

	int
	get_ownertrust_info (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	(void)pk;
	return '?';
	}

	unsigned int
	get_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	(void)pk;
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	}


	/* Stubs:
	* Because we only work with trusted keys, it does not make sense to
	* get them from a keyserver
	*/

	struct keyserver_spec *
	keyserver_match (struct keyserver_spec *spec)
	{
	(void)spec;
	return NULL;
	}

	int
	keyserver_import_keyid (u32 keyid, void dummy)
	{
	(void)keyid;
	(void)dummy;
	return -1;
	}

	int
	keyserver_import_cert (const char *name)
	{
	(void)name;
	return -1;
	}

	int
	keyserver_import_pka (const char name,unsigned char fpr)
	{
	(void)name;
	(void)fpr;
	return -1;
	}

	int
	keyserver_import_name (const char name,struct keyserver_spec spec)
	{
	(void)name;
	(void)spec;
	return -1;
	}

	int
	keyserver_import_ldap (const char *name)
	{
	(void)name;
	return -1;
	}

	/* Stub:
	* No encryption here but mainproc links to these functions.
	*/
	gpg_error_t
	get_session_key (PKT_pubkey_enc k, DEK dek)
	{
	(void)k;
	(void)dek;
	return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
	}

	/* Stub: */
	gpg_error_t
	get_override_session_key (DEK dek, const char string)
	{
	(void)dek;
	(void)string;
	return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
	}

	/* Stub: */
	int
	decrypt_data (ctrl_t ctrl, void procctx, PKT_encrypted ed, DEK *dek)
	{
	(void)ctrl;
	(void)procctx;
	(void)ed;
	(void)dek;
	return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
	}


	/* Stub:
	* No interactive commands, so we don't need the helptexts
	*/
	void
	display_online_help (const char *keyword)
	{
	(void)keyword;
	}

	/* Stub:
	* We don't use secret keys, but getkey.c links to this
	*/
	int
	check_secret_key (PKT_public_key *pk, int n)
	{
	(void)pk;
	(void)n;
	return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
	}

	/* Stub:
	* No secret key, so no passphrase needed
	*/
	DEK *
	passphrase_to_dek (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
	int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k, int mode,
	const char tmp, int canceled)
	{
	(void)keyid;
	(void)pubkey_algo;
	(void)cipher_algo;
	(void)s2k;
	(void)mode;
	(void)tmp;

	if (canceled)
	*canceled = 0;
	return NULL;
	}

	void
	passphrase_clear_cache (u32 keyid, const char cacheid, int algo)
	{
	(void)keyid;
	(void)cacheid;
	(void)algo;
	}

	struct keyserver_spec *
	parse_preferred_keyserver(PKT_signature *sig)
	{
	(void)sig;
	return NULL;
	}

	struct keyserver_spec *
	parse_keyserver_uri (const char *uri, int require_scheme,
	const char *configname, unsigned int configlineno)
	{
	(void)uri;
	(void)require_scheme;
	(void)configname;
	(void)configlineno;
	return NULL;
	}

	void
	free_keyserver_spec (struct keyserver_spec *keyserver)
	{
	(void)keyserver;
	}

	/* Stubs to avoid linking to photoid.c */
	void
	show_photos (const struct user_attribute attrs, int count, PKT_public_key pk)
	{
	(void)attrs;
	(void)count;
	(void)pk;
	}

	int
	parse_image_header (const struct user_attribute attr, byte type, u32 *len)
	{
	(void)attr;
	(void)type;
	(void)len;
	return 0;
	}

	char *
	image_type_to_string (byte type, int string)
	{
	(void)type;
	(void)string;
	return NULL;
	}

	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	int
	agent_scd_getattr (const char name, struct agent_card_info_s info)
	{
	(void)name;
	(void)info;
	return 0;
	}
	#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */

	/* We do not do any locking, so use these stubs here */
	void
	dotlock_disable (void)
	{
	}

	dotlock_t
	dotlock_create (const char *file_to_lock, unsigned int flags)
	{
	(void)file_to_lock;
	(void)flags;
	return NULL;
	}

	void
	dotlock_destroy (dotlock_t h)
	{
	(void)h;
	}

	int
	dotlock_take (dotlock_t h, long timeout)
	{
	(void)h;
	(void)timeout;
	return 0;
	}

	int
	dotlock_release (dotlock_t h)
	{
	(void)h;
	return 0;
	}

	void
	dotlock_remove_lockfiles (void)
	{
	}

	gpg_error_t
	agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	(void)ctrl;
	(void)pk;
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
	}

	gpg_error_t
	agent_probe_any_secret_key (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	(void)ctrl;
	(void)keyblock;
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
	}

	gpg_error_t
	agent_get_keyinfo (ctrl_t ctrl, const char hexkeygrip, char *r_serialno)
	{
	(void)ctrl;
	(void)hexkeygrip;
	*r_serialno = NULL;
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
	}

	gpg_error_t
	gpg_dirmngr_get_pka (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *userid,
	unsigned char *r_fpr, size_t r_fprlen,
	char **r_url)
	{
	(void)ctrl;
	(void)userid;
	if (r_fpr)
	*r_fpr = NULL;
	if (r_fprlen)
	*r_fprlen = 0;
	if (r_url)
	*r_url = NULL;
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
	}

	gpg_error_t
	export_pubkey_buffer (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyspec, unsigned int options,
	kbnode_t r_keyblock, void r_data, size_t r_datalen)
	{
	(void)ctrl;
	(void)keyspec;
	(void)options;

	*r_keyblock = NULL;
	*r_data = NULL;
	*r_datalen = 0;
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
	}
	+
	+enum tofu_policy
	+ {
	+ tofu_policy
	+ };
	+
	+gpg_error_t
	+tofu_get_policy (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id user_id,
	+ enum tofu_policy *policy)
	+{
	+ (void)pk;
	+ (void)user_id;
	+ (void)policy;
	+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	+}
	+
	+const char *
	+tofu_policy_str (enum tofu_policy policy)
	+{
	+ (void)policy;
	+
	+ return "unknown";
	+}
	diff --git a/g10/keyedit.c b/g10/keyedit.c
	index 4803f9ebe..432ba8663 100644
	--- a/g10/keyedit.c
	+++ b/g10/keyedit.c
	@@ -1,5542 +1,5552 @@
	/* keyedit.c - Edit properties of a key
	* Copyright (C) 1998-2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 1998-2015 Werner Koch
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <errno.h>
	#include <assert.h>
	#include <ctype.h>
	#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
	# define GNUPG_LIBREADLINE_H_INCLUDED
	# include <readline/readline.h>
	#endif

	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "status.h"
	#include "iobuf.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "photoid.h"
	#include "util.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "filter.h"
	#include "ttyio.h"
	#include "status.h"
	#include "i18n.h"
	#include "keyserver-internal.h"
	#include "call-agent.h"
	#include "host2net.h"
	+#include "tofu.h"

	static void show_prefs (PKT_user_id * uid, PKT_signature * selfsig,
	int verbose);
	static void show_names (estream_t fp, KBNODE keyblock, PKT_public_key * pk,
	unsigned int flag, int with_prefs);
	static void show_key_with_all_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
	KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked,
	int with_revoker, int with_fpr,
	int with_subkeys, int with_prefs,
	int nowarn);
	static void show_key_and_fingerprint (kbnode_t keyblock, int with_subkeys);
	static void show_key_and_grip (kbnode_t keyblock);
	static void subkey_expire_warning (kbnode_t keyblock);
	static int menu_adduid (KBNODE keyblock, int photo, const char *photo_name,
	const char *uidstr);
	static void menu_deluid (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_delsig (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_clean (KBNODE keyblock, int self_only);
	static void menu_delkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_addrevoker (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int sensitive);
	static int menu_expire (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_backsign (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_set_primary_uid (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_set_preferences (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_set_keyserver_url (const char *url, KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_set_notation (const char *string, KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_select_uid (KBNODE keyblock, int idx);
	static int menu_select_uid_namehash (KBNODE keyblock, const char *namehash);
	static int menu_select_key (KBNODE keyblock, int idx);
	static int count_uids (KBNODE keyblock);
	static int count_uids_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag);
	static int count_keys_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag);
	static int count_selected_uids (KBNODE keyblock);
	static int real_uids_left (KBNODE keyblock);
	static int count_selected_keys (KBNODE keyblock);
	static int menu_revsig (KBNODE keyblock);
	static int menu_revuid (KBNODE keyblock);
	static int menu_revkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	static int menu_revsubkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock);
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	static int enable_disable_key (KBNODE keyblock, int disable);
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	static void menu_showphoto (KBNODE keyblock);

	static int update_trust = 0;

	#define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)

	#define NODFLG_BADSIG (1<<0) /* Bad signature. */
	#define NODFLG_NOKEY (1<<1) /* No public key. */
	#define NODFLG_SIGERR (1<<2) /* Other sig error. */

	#define NODFLG_MARK_A (1<<4) /* Temporary mark. */
	#define NODFLG_DELSIG (1<<5) /* To be deleted. */

	#define NODFLG_SELUID (1<<8) /* Indicate the selected userid. */
	#define NODFLG_SELKEY (1<<9) /* Indicate the selected key. */
	#define NODFLG_SELSIG (1<<10) /* Indicate a selected signature. */

	struct sign_attrib
	{
	int non_exportable, non_revocable;
	struct revocation_reason_info *reason;
	byte trust_depth, trust_value;
	char *trust_regexp;
	};



	/* TODO: Fix duplicated code between here and the check-sigs/list-sigs
	code in keylist.c. */
	static int
	print_and_check_one_sig_colon (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node,
	int inv_sigs, int no_key, int *oth_err,
	int *is_selfsig, int print_without_key)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	int rc, sigrc;

	/* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has the pk that
	issued it. See also keylist.c:list_keyblock_print */

	rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, node, is_selfsig);
	switch (gpg_err_code (rc))
	{
	case 0:
	node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_BADSIG \| NODFLG_NOKEY \| NODFLG_SIGERR);
	sigrc = '!';
	break;
	case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
	node->flag = NODFLG_BADSIG;
	sigrc = '-';
	if (inv_sigs)
	++ * inv_sigs;
	break;
	case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
	case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY:
	node->flag = NODFLG_NOKEY;
	sigrc = '?';
	if (no_key)
	++ * no_key;
	break;
	default:
	node->flag = NODFLG_SIGERR;
	sigrc = '%';
	if (oth_err)
	++ * oth_err;
	break;
	}

	if (sigrc != '?' \|\| print_without_key)
	{
	es_printf ("sig:%c::%d:%08lX%08lX:%lu:%lu:",
	sigrc, sig->pubkey_algo, (ulong) sig->keyid[0],
	(ulong) sig->keyid[1], (ulong) sig->timestamp,
	(ulong) sig->expiredate);

	if (sig->trust_depth \|\| sig->trust_value)
	es_printf ("%d %d", sig->trust_depth, sig->trust_value);

	es_printf (":");

	if (sig->trust_regexp)
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout,
	sig->trust_regexp, strlen (sig->trust_regexp),
	":", NULL);

	es_printf ("::%02x%c\n", sig->sig_class,
	sig->flags.exportable ? 'x' : 'l');

	if (opt.show_subpackets)
	print_subpackets_colon (sig);
	}

	return (sigrc == '!');
	}


	/*
	* Print information about a signature, check it and return true if
	* the signature is okay. NODE must be a signature packet. With
	* EXTENDED set all possible signature list options will always be
	* printed.
	*/
	static int
	print_and_check_one_sig (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node,
	int inv_sigs, int no_key, int *oth_err,
	int *is_selfsig, int print_without_key, int extended)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	int rc, sigrc;
	int is_rev = sig->sig_class == 0x30;

	/* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has the pk that
	issued it. See also keylist.c:list_keyblock_print */

	rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, node, is_selfsig);
	switch (gpg_err_code (rc))
	{
	case 0:
	node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_BADSIG \| NODFLG_NOKEY \| NODFLG_SIGERR);
	sigrc = '!';
	break;
	case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
	node->flag = NODFLG_BADSIG;
	sigrc = '-';
	if (inv_sigs)
	++ * inv_sigs;
	break;
	case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
	case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY:
	node->flag = NODFLG_NOKEY;
	sigrc = '?';
	if (no_key)
	++ * no_key;
	break;
	default:
	node->flag = NODFLG_SIGERR;
	sigrc = '%';
	if (oth_err)
	++ * oth_err;
	break;
	}
	if (sigrc != '?' \|\| print_without_key)
	{
	tty_printf ("%s%c%c %c%c%c%c%c%c %s %s",
	is_rev ? "rev" : "sig", sigrc,
	(sig->sig_class - 0x10 > 0 &&
	sig->sig_class - 0x10 <
	4) ? '0' + sig->sig_class - 0x10 : ' ',
	sig->flags.exportable ? ' ' : 'L',
	sig->flags.revocable ? ' ' : 'R',
	sig->flags.policy_url ? 'P' : ' ',
	sig->flags.notation ? 'N' : ' ',
	sig->flags.expired ? 'X' : ' ',
	(sig->trust_depth > 9) ? 'T' : (sig->trust_depth >
	0) ? '0' +
	sig->trust_depth : ' ',
	keystr (sig->keyid),
	datestr_from_sig (sig));
	if ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE) \|\| extended )
	tty_printf (" %s", expirestr_from_sig (sig));
	tty_printf (" ");
	if (sigrc == '%')
	tty_printf ("[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc));
	else if (sigrc == '?')
	;
	else if (*is_selfsig)
	{
	tty_printf (is_rev ? _("[revocation]") : _("[self-signature]"));
	if (extended && sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	tty_printf ("*");
	}
	else
	{
	size_t n;
	char *p = get_user_id (sig->keyid, &n);
	tty_print_utf8_string2 (NULL, p, n,
	opt.screen_columns - keystrlen () - 26 -
	((opt.
	list_options & LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE) ? 11
	: 0));
	xfree (p);
	}
	tty_printf ("\n");

	if (sig->flags.policy_url
	&& ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS) \|\| extended))
	show_policy_url (sig, 3, 0);

	if (sig->flags.notation
	&& ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS) \|\| extended))
	show_notation (sig, 3, 0,
	((opt.
	list_options & LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS) ? 1 : 0) +
	((opt.
	list_options & LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS) ? 2 : 0));

	if (sig->flags.pref_ks
	&& ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS) \|\| extended))
	show_keyserver_url (sig, 3, 0);

	if (extended)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	const unsigned char *s;

	s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL);
	if (s && *s)
	tty_printf (" [primary]\n");

	s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
	if (s && buf32_to_u32 (s))
	tty_printf (" [expires: %s]\n",
	isotimestamp (pk->timestamp + buf32_to_u32 (s)));
	}
	}

	return (sigrc == '!');
	}



	/*
	* Check the keysigs and set the flags to indicate errors.
	* Returns true if error found.
	*/
	static int
	check_all_keysigs (KBNODE keyblock, int only_selected, int only_selfsigs)
	{
	KBNODE kbctx;
	KBNODE node;
	int inv_sigs = 0;
	int no_key = 0;
	int oth_err = 0;
	int has_selfsig = 0;
	int mis_selfsig = 0;
	int selected = !only_selected;
	int anyuid = 0;
	u32 keyid[2];

	for (kbctx = NULL; (node = walk_kbnode (keyblock, &kbctx, 0));)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	if (only_selfsigs)
	keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	if (only_selected)
	selected = (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
	if (selected)
	{
	tty_printf ("uid ");
	tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	if (anyuid && !has_selfsig)
	mis_selfsig++;
	has_selfsig = 0;
	anyuid = 1;
	}
	}
	else if (selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& ((node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10
	\|\| node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x30))
	{
	int selfsig;
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;

	if (only_selfsigs
	&& !(keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]))
	; /* Not a selfsig but we want only selfsigs - skip. */
	else if (print_and_check_one_sig (keyblock, node, &inv_sigs,
	&no_key, &oth_err, &selfsig,
	0, only_selfsigs))
	{
	if (selfsig)
	has_selfsig = 1;
	}
	/* Hmmm: should we update the trustdb here? */
	}
	}
	if (!has_selfsig)
	mis_selfsig++;
	if (inv_sigs == 1)
	tty_printf (_("1 bad signature\n"));
	else if (inv_sigs)
	tty_printf (_("%d bad signatures\n"), inv_sigs);
	if (no_key == 1)
	tty_printf (_("1 signature not checked due to a missing key\n"));
	else if (no_key)
	tty_printf (_("%d signatures not checked due to missing keys\n"), no_key);
	if (oth_err == 1)
	tty_printf (_("1 signature not checked due to an error\n"));
	else if (oth_err)
	tty_printf (_("%d signatures not checked due to errors\n"), oth_err);
	if (mis_selfsig == 1)
	tty_printf (_("1 user ID without valid self-signature detected\n"));
	else if (mis_selfsig)
	tty_printf (_("%d user IDs without valid self-signatures detected\n"),
	mis_selfsig);

	return inv_sigs \|\| no_key \|\| oth_err \|\| mis_selfsig;
	}


	static int
	sign_mk_attrib (PKT_signature * sig, void *opaque)
	{
	struct sign_attrib *attrib = opaque;
	byte buf[8];

	if (attrib->non_exportable)
	{
	buf[0] = 0; /* not exportable */
	build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE, buf, 1);
	}

	if (attrib->non_revocable)
	{
	buf[0] = 0; /* not revocable */
	build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE, buf, 1);
	}

	if (attrib->reason)
	revocation_reason_build_cb (sig, attrib->reason);

	if (attrib->trust_depth)
	{
	/* Not critical. If someone doesn't understand trust sigs,
	this can still be a valid regular signature. */
	buf[0] = attrib->trust_depth;
	buf[1] = attrib->trust_value;
	build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_TRUST, buf, 2);

	/* Critical. If someone doesn't understands regexps, this
	whole sig should be invalid. Note the +1 for the length -
	regexps are null terminated. */
	if (attrib->trust_regexp)
	build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL \| SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP,
	attrib->trust_regexp,
	strlen (attrib->trust_regexp) + 1);
	}

	return 0;
	}


	static void
	trustsig_prompt (byte * trust_value, byte * trust_depth, char **regexp)
	{
	char *p;

	*trust_value = 0;
	*trust_depth = 0;
	*regexp = NULL;

	/* Same string as pkclist.c:do_edit_ownertrust */
	tty_printf (_
	("Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify"
	" other users' keys\n(by looking at passports, checking"
	" fingerprints from different sources, etc.)\n"));
	tty_printf ("\n");
	tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust marginally\n"), 1);
	tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust fully\n"), 2);
	tty_printf ("\n");

	while (*trust_value == 0)
	{
	p = cpr_get ("trustsig_prompt.trust_value", _("Your selection? "));
	trim_spaces (p);
	cpr_kill_prompt ();
	/* 60 and 120 are as per RFC2440 */
	if (p[0] == '1' && !p[1])
	*trust_value = 60;
	else if (p[0] == '2' && !p[1])
	*trust_value = 120;
	xfree (p);
	}

	tty_printf ("\n");

	tty_printf (_("Please enter the depth of this trust signature.\n"
	"A depth greater than 1 allows the key you are signing to make\n"
	"trust signatures on your behalf.\n"));
	tty_printf ("\n");

	while (*trust_depth == 0)
	{
	p = cpr_get ("trustsig_prompt.trust_depth", _("Your selection? "));
	trim_spaces (p);
	cpr_kill_prompt ();
	*trust_depth = atoi (p);
	xfree (p);
	}

	tty_printf ("\n");

	tty_printf (_("Please enter a domain to restrict this signature, "
	"or enter for none.\n"));

	tty_printf ("\n");

	p = cpr_get ("trustsig_prompt.trust_regexp", _("Your selection? "));
	trim_spaces (p);
	cpr_kill_prompt ();

	if (strlen (p) > 0)
	{
	char *q = p;
	int regexplen = 100, ind;

	*regexp = xmalloc (regexplen);

	/* Now mangle the domain the user entered into a regexp. To do
	this, \-escape everything that isn't alphanumeric, and attach
	"<[^>]+[@.]" to the front, and ">$" to the end. */

	strcpy (*regexp, "<[^>]+[@.]");
	ind = strlen (*regexp);

	while (*q)
	{
	if (!((q >= 'A' && q <= 'Z')
	\|\| (q >= 'a' && q <= 'z') \|\| (q >= '0' && q <= '9')))
	(*regexp)[ind++] = '\\';

	(regexp)[ind++] = q;

	if ((regexplen - ind) < 3)
	{
	regexplen += 100;
	regexp = xrealloc (regexp, regexplen);
	}

	q++;
	}

	(*regexp)[ind] = '\0';
	strcat (*regexp, ">$");
	}

	xfree (p);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	}


	/*
	* Loop over all LOCUSR and and sign the uids after asking. If no
	* user id is marked, all user ids will be signed; if some user_ids
	* are marked only those will be signed. If QUICK is true the
	* function won't ask the user and use sensible defaults.
	*/
	static int
	sign_uids (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
	kbnode_t keyblock, strlist_t locusr, int *ret_modified,
	int local, int nonrevocable, int trust, int interactive,
	int quick)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
	SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
	KBNODE node, uidnode;
	PKT_public_key *primary_pk = NULL;
	int select_all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock) \|\| interactive;

	/* Build a list of all signators.
	*
	* We use the CERT flag to request the primary which must always
	* be one which is capable of signing keys. I can't see a reason
	* why to sign keys using a subkey. Implementation of USAGE_CERT
	* is just a hack in getkey.c and does not mean that a subkey
	* marked as certification capable will be used. */
	rc = build_sk_list (locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	/* Loop over all signators. */
	for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
	{
	u32 sk_keyid[2], pk_keyid[2];
	char p, trust_regexp = NULL;
	int class = 0, selfsig = 0;
	u32 duration = 0, timestamp = 0;
	byte trust_depth = 0, trust_value = 0;

	pk = sk_rover->pk;
	keyid_from_pk (pk, sk_keyid);

	/* Set mark A for all selected user ids. */
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (select_all \|\| (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_MARK_A;
	else
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	}

	/* Reset mark for uids which are already signed. */
	uidnode = NULL;
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	primary_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (primary_pk, pk_keyid);

	/* Is this a self-sig? */
	if (pk_keyid[0] == sk_keyid[0] && pk_keyid[1] == sk_keyid[1])
	selfsig = 1;
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	uidnode = (node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) ? node : NULL;
	if (uidnode)
	{
	int yesreally = 0;
	char *user;

	user = utf8_to_native (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);

	if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is revoked."), user);

	if (selfsig)
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	else if (opt.expert && !quick)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.revoke_okay",
	_("Are you sure you "
	"still want to sign "
	"it? (y/N) ")))
	{
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	uidnode = NULL;
	}
	else if (interactive)
	yesreally = 1;
	}
	else
	{
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	uidnode = NULL;
	tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
	}
	}
	else if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is expired."), user);

	if (selfsig)
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	else if (opt.expert && !quick)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.expire_okay",
	_("Are you sure you "
	"still want to sign "
	"it? (y/N) ")))
	{
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	uidnode = NULL;
	}
	else if (interactive)
	yesreally = 1;
	}
	else
	{
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	uidnode = NULL;
	tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
	}
	}
	else if (!uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->created && !selfsig)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is not self-signed."),
	user);

	if (opt.expert && !quick)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.nosig_okay",
	_("Are you sure you "
	"still want to sign "
	"it? (y/N) ")))
	{
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	uidnode = NULL;
	}
	else if (interactive)
	yesreally = 1;
	}
	else
	{
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	uidnode = NULL;
	tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
	}
	}

	if (uidnode && interactive && !yesreally && !quick)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("User ID \"%s\" is signable. "), user);
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.sign_okay",
	_("Sign it? (y/N) ")))
	{
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	uidnode = NULL;
	}
	}

	xfree (user);
	}
	}
	else if (uidnode && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	{
	if (sk_keyid[0] == node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
	&& sk_keyid[1] == node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1])
	{
	char buf[50];
	char *user;

	user = utf8_to_native (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);

	/* It's a v3 self-sig. Make it into a v4 self-sig? */
	if (node->pkt->pkt.signature->version < 4
	&& selfsig && !quick)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("The self-signature on \"%s\"\n"
	"is a PGP 2.x-style signature.\n"), user);

	/* Note that the regular PGP2 warning below
	still applies if there are no v4 sigs on
	this key at all. */

	if (opt.expert)
	if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.v4_promote_okay",
	_("Do you want to promote "
	"it to an OpenPGP self-"
	"signature? (y/N) ")))
	{
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_DELSIG;
	xfree (user);
	continue;
	}
	}

	/* Is the current signature expired? */
	if (node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.expired)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("Your current signature on \"%s\"\n"
	"has expired.\n"), user);

	if (quick \|\| cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("sign_uid.replace_expired_okay",
	_("Do you want to issue a "
	"new signature to replace "
	"the expired one? (y/N) ")))
	{
	/* Mark these for later deletion. We
	don't want to delete them here, just in
	case the replacement signature doesn't
	happen for some reason. We only delete
	these after the replacement is already
	in place. */

	node->flag \|= NODFLG_DELSIG;
	xfree (user);
	continue;
	}
	}

	if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable && !local)
	{
	/* It's a local sig, and we want to make a
	exportable sig. */
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("Your current signature on \"%s\"\n"
	"is a local signature.\n"), user);

	if (quick \|\| cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("sign_uid.local_promote_okay",
	_("Do you want to promote "
	"it to a full exportable " "signature? (y/N) ")))
	{
	/* Mark these for later deletion. We
	don't want to delete them here, just in
	case the replacement signature doesn't
	happen for some reason. We only delete
	these after the replacement is already
	in place. */

	node->flag \|= NODFLG_DELSIG;
	xfree (user);
	continue;
	}
	}

	/* Fixme: see whether there is a revocation in which
	* case we should allow to sign it again. */
	if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable && local)
	tty_fprintf ( fp,
	_("\"%s\" was already locally signed by key %s\n"),
	user, keystr_from_pk (pk));
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("\"%s\" was already signed by key %s\n"),
	user, keystr_from_pk (pk));

	if (opt.expert && !quick
	&& cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.dupe_okay",
	_("Do you want to sign it "
	"again anyway? (y/N) ")))
	{
	/* Don't delete the old sig here since this is
	an --expert thing. */
	xfree (user);
	continue;
	}

	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
	(ulong) pk->keyid[0], (ulong) pk->keyid[1]);
	write_status_text (STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED, buf);
	uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; /* remove mark */

	xfree (user);
	}
	}
	}

	/* Check whether any uids are left for signing. */
	if (!count_uids_with_flag (keyblock, NODFLG_MARK_A))
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("Nothing to sign with key %s\n"),
	keystr_from_pk (pk));
	continue;
	}

	/* Ask whether we really should sign these user id(s). */
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, fp, keyblock, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0);
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");

	if (primary_pk->expiredate && !selfsig)
	{
	u32 now = make_timestamp ();

	if (primary_pk->expiredate <= now)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key has expired!"));

	if (opt.expert && !quick)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.expired_okay",
	_("Are you sure you still "
	"want to sign it? (y/N) ")))
	continue;
	}
	else
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
	continue;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key is due to expire on %s.\n"),
	expirestr_from_pk (primary_pk));

	if (opt.ask_cert_expire && !quick)
	{
	char *answer = cpr_get ("sign_uid.expire",
	_("Do you want your signature to "
	"expire at the same time? (Y/n) "));
	if (answer_is_yes_no_default (answer, 1))
	{
	/* This fixes the signature timestamp we're
	going to make as now. This is so the
	expiration date is exactly correct, and not
	a few seconds off (due to the time it takes
	to answer the questions, enter the
	passphrase, etc). */
	timestamp = now;
	duration = primary_pk->expiredate - now;
	}

	cpr_kill_prompt ();
	xfree (answer);
	}
	}
	}

	/* Only ask for duration if we haven't already set it to match
	the expiration of the pk */
	if (!duration && !selfsig)
	{
	if (opt.ask_cert_expire && !quick)
	duration = ask_expire_interval (1, opt.def_cert_expire);
	else
	duration = parse_expire_string (opt.def_cert_expire);
	}

	if (selfsig)
	;
	else
	{
	if (opt.batch \|\| !opt.ask_cert_level \|\| quick)
	class = 0x10 + opt.def_cert_level;
	else
	{
	char *answer;

	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("How carefully have you verified the key you are "
	"about to sign actually belongs\nto the person "
	"named above? If you don't know what to "
	"answer, enter \"0\".\n"));
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (0) I will not answer.%s\n"),
	opt.def_cert_level == 0 ? " (default)" : "");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (1) I have not checked at all.%s\n"),
	opt.def_cert_level == 1 ? " (default)" : "");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (2) I have done casual checking.%s\n"),
	opt.def_cert_level == 2 ? " (default)" : "");
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_(" (3) I have done very careful checking.%s\n"),
	opt.def_cert_level == 3 ? " (default)" : "");
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");

	while (class == 0)
	{
	answer = cpr_get ("sign_uid.class",
	_("Your selection? "
	"(enter '?' for more information): "));
	if (answer[0] == '\0')
	class = 0x10 + opt.def_cert_level; /* Default */
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "0") == 0)
	class = 0x10; /* Generic */
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "1") == 0)
	class = 0x11; /* Persona */
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "2") == 0)
	class = 0x12; /* Casual */
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "3") == 0)
	class = 0x13; /* Positive */
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("Invalid selection.\n"));

	xfree (answer);
	}
	}

	if (trust && !quick)
	trustsig_prompt (&trust_value, &trust_depth, &trust_regexp);
	}

	if (!quick)
	{
	p = get_user_id_native (sk_keyid);
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("Are you sure that you want to sign this key with your\n"
	"key \"%s\" (%s)\n"), p, keystr_from_pk (pk));
	xfree (p);
	}

	if (selfsig)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("This will be a self-signature.\n"));

	if (local)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("WARNING: the signature will not be marked "
	"as non-exportable.\n"));
	}

	if (nonrevocable)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("WARNING: the signature will not be marked "
	"as non-revocable.\n"));
	}
	}
	else
	{
	if (local)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("The signature will be marked as non-exportable.\n"));
	}

	if (nonrevocable)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("The signature will be marked as non-revocable.\n"));
	}

	switch (class)
	{
	case 0x11:
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("I have not checked this key at all.\n"));
	break;

	case 0x12:
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("I have checked this key casually.\n"));
	break;

	case 0x13:
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("I have checked this key very carefully.\n"));
	break;
	}
	}

	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");

	if (opt.batch && opt.answer_yes)
	;
	else if (quick)
	;
	else if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.okay",
	_("Really sign? (y/N) ")))
	continue;

	/* Now we can sign the user ids. */
	reloop: /* (Must use this, because we are modifing the list.) */
	primary_pk = NULL;
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	primary_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& (node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A))
	{
	PACKET *pkt;
	PKT_signature *sig;
	struct sign_attrib attrib;

	assert (primary_pk);
	memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
	attrib.non_exportable = local;
	attrib.non_revocable = nonrevocable;
	attrib.trust_depth = trust_depth;
	attrib.trust_value = trust_value;
	attrib.trust_regexp = trust_regexp;
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;

	/* We force creation of a v4 signature for local
	* signatures, otherwise we would not generate the
	* subpacket with v3 keys and the signature becomes
	* exportable. */

	if (selfsig)
	rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, primary_pk,
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
	NULL,
	pk,
	0x13, 0, 0, 0,
	keygen_add_std_prefs, primary_pk,
	NULL);
	else
	rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, primary_pk,
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
	NULL,
	pk,
	class, 0,
	timestamp, duration,
	sign_mk_attrib, &attrib,
	NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
	log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto leave;
	}

	ret_modified = 1; / We changed the keyblock. */
	update_trust = 1;

	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
	insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE);
	goto reloop;
	}
	}

	/* Delete any sigs that got promoted */
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->flag & NODFLG_DELSIG)
	delete_kbnode (node);
	} /* End loop over signators. */

	leave:
	release_sk_list (sk_list);
	return rc;
	}


	/*
	* Change the passphrase of the primary and all secondary keys. Note
	* that it is common to use only one passphrase for the primary and
	* all subkeys. However, this is now (since GnuPG 2.1) all up to the
	* gpg-agent. Returns 0 on success or an error code.
	*/
	static gpg_error_t
	change_passphrase (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	kbnode_t node;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	int any;
	u32 keyid[2], subid[2];
	char *hexgrip = NULL;
	char *cache_nonce = NULL;
	char *passwd_nonce = NULL;

	node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	if (!node)
	{
	log_error ("Oops; public key missing!\n");
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
	goto leave;
	}
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);

	/* Check whether it is likely that we will be able to change the
	passphrase for any subkey. */
	for (any = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	char *serialno;

	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (pk, subid);

	xfree (hexgrip);
	err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
	if (err)
	goto leave;
	err = agent_get_keyinfo (ctrl, hexgrip, &serialno);
	if (!err && serialno)
	; /* Key on card. */
	else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	; /* Maybe stub key. */
	else if (!err)
	any = 1; /* Key is known. */
	else
	log_error ("key %s: error getting keyinfo from agent: %s\n",
	keystr_with_sub (keyid, subid), gpg_strerror (err));
	xfree (serialno);
	}
	}
	err = 0;
	if (!any)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Key has only stub or on-card key items - "
	"no passphrase to change.\n"));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Change the passphrase for all keys. */
	for (any = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	char *desc;

	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (pk, subid);

	xfree (hexgrip);
	err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
	if (err)
	goto leave;

	desc = gpg_format_keydesc (pk, FORMAT_KEYDESC_NORMAL, 1);
	err = agent_passwd (ctrl, hexgrip, desc, &cache_nonce, &passwd_nonce);
	xfree (desc);

	if (err)
	log_log ((gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED
	\|\| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
	? GPGRT_LOG_INFO : GPGRT_LOG_ERROR,
	_("key %s: error changing passphrase: %s\n"),
	keystr_with_sub (keyid, subid),
	gpg_strerror (err));
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
	break;
	}
	}

	leave:
	xfree (hexgrip);
	xfree (cache_nonce);
	xfree (passwd_nonce);
	return err;
	}



	/*
	* There are some keys out (due to a bug in gnupg), where the sequence
	* of the packets is wrong. This function fixes that.
	* Returns: true if the keyblock has been fixed.
	*
	* Note: This function does not work if there is more than one user ID.
	*/
	static int
	fix_key_signature_order (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node, last, subkey;
	int fixed = 0;

	/* Locate key signatures of class 0x10..0x13 behind sub key packets. */
	for (subkey = last = NULL, node = keyblock; node;
	last = node, node = node->next)
	{
	switch (node->pkt->pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
	if (!subkey)
	subkey = last; /* Actually it is the one before the subkey. */
	break;
	case PKT_SIGNATURE:
	if (subkey)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (sig->sig_class >= 0x10 && sig->sig_class <= 0x13)
	{
	log_info (_("moving a key signature to the correct place\n"));
	last->next = node->next;
	node->next = subkey->next;
	subkey->next = node;
	node = last;
	fixed = 1;
	}
	}
	break;
	default:
	break;
	}
	}

	return fixed;
	}


	/* Fix various problems in the keyblock. Returns true if the keyblock
	was changed. Note that a pointer to the keyblock must be given and
	the function may change it (i.e. replacing the first node). */
	static int
	fix_keyblock (kbnode_t *keyblockp)
	{
	int changed = 0;

	if (fix_key_signature_order (*keyblockp))
	changed++;
	if (collapse_uids (keyblockp))
	changed++;
	reorder_keyblock (*keyblockp);
	/* If we modified the keyblock, make sure the flags are right. */
	if (changed)
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (*keyblockp);

	return changed;
	}


	static int
	parse_sign_type (const char str, int localsig, int *nonrevokesig,
	int *trustsig)
	{
	const char *p = str;

	while (*p)
	{
	if (ascii_strncasecmp (p, "l", 1) == 0)
	{
	*localsig = 1;
	p++;
	}
	else if (ascii_strncasecmp (p, "nr", 2) == 0)
	{
	*nonrevokesig = 1;
	p += 2;
	}
	else if (ascii_strncasecmp (p, "t", 1) == 0)
	{
	*trustsig = 1;
	p++;
	}
	else
	return 0;
	}

	return 1;
	}



	/*
	* Menu driven key editor. If seckey_check is true, then a secret key
	* that matches username will be looked for. If it is false, not all
	* commands will be available.
	*
	* Note: to keep track of certain selections we use node->mark MARKBIT_xxxx.
	*/

	/* Need an SK for this command */
	#define KEYEDIT_NEED_SK 1
	/* Cannot be viewing the SK for this command */
	#define KEYEDIT_NOT_SK 2
	/* Must be viewing the SK for this command */
	#define KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK 4
	/* Match the tail of the string */
	#define KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH 8

	enum cmdids
	{
	cmdNONE = 0,
	cmdQUIT, cmdHELP, cmdFPR, cmdLIST, cmdSELUID, cmdCHECK, cmdSIGN,
	cmdREVSIG, cmdREVKEY, cmdREVUID, cmdDELSIG, cmdPRIMARY, cmdDEBUG,
	cmdSAVE, cmdADDUID, cmdADDPHOTO, cmdDELUID, cmdADDKEY, cmdDELKEY,
	cmdADDREVOKER, cmdTOGGLE, cmdSELKEY, cmdPASSWD, cmdTRUST, cmdPREF,
	cmdEXPIRE, cmdBACKSIGN,
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	cmdENABLEKEY, cmdDISABLEKEY,
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	cmdSHOWPREF,
	cmdSETPREF, cmdPREFKS, cmdNOTATION, cmdINVCMD, cmdSHOWPHOTO, cmdUPDTRUST,
	cmdCHKTRUST, cmdADDCARDKEY, cmdKEYTOCARD, cmdBKUPTOCARD, cmdCHECKBKUPKEY,
	cmdCLEAN, cmdMINIMIZE, cmdGRIP, cmdNOP
	};

	static struct
	{
	const char *name;
	enum cmdids id;
	int flags;
	const char *desc;
	} cmds[] =
	{
	{ "quit", cmdQUIT, 0, N_("quit this menu")},
	{ "q", cmdQUIT, 0, NULL},
	{ "save", cmdSAVE, 0, N_("save and quit")},
	{ "help", cmdHELP, 0, N_("show this help")},
	{ "?", cmdHELP, 0, NULL},
	{ "fpr", cmdFPR, 0, N_("show key fingerprint")},
	{ "grip", cmdGRIP, 0, N_("show the keygrip")},
	{ "list", cmdLIST, 0, N_("list key and user IDs")},
	{ "l", cmdLIST, 0, NULL},
	{ "uid", cmdSELUID, 0, N_("select user ID N")},
	{ "key", cmdSELKEY, 0, N_("select subkey N")},
	{ "check", cmdCHECK, 0, N_("check signatures")},
	{ "c", cmdCHECK, 0, NULL},
	{ "cross-certify", cmdBACKSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
	{ "backsign", cmdBACKSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
	{ "sign", cmdSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH,
	N_("sign selected user IDs [* see below for related commands]")},
	{ "s", cmdSIGN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, NULL},
	/* "lsign" and friends will never match since "sign" comes first
	and it is a tail match. They are just here so they show up in
	the help menu. */
	{ "lsign", cmdNOP, 0, N_("sign selected user IDs locally")},
	{ "tsign", cmdNOP, 0, N_("sign selected user IDs with a trust signature")},
	{ "nrsign", cmdNOP, 0,
	N_("sign selected user IDs with a non-revocable signature")},
	{ "debug", cmdDEBUG, 0, NULL},
	{ "adduid", cmdADDUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("add a user ID")},
	{ "addphoto", cmdADDPHOTO, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("add a photo ID")},
	{ "deluid", cmdDELUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("delete selected user IDs")},
	/* delphoto is really deluid in disguise */
	{ "delphoto", cmdDELUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, NULL},
	{ "addkey", cmdADDKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("add a subkey")},
	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	{ "addcardkey", cmdADDCARDKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("add a key to a smartcard")},
	{ "keytocard", cmdKEYTOCARD, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK \| KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK,
	N_("move a key to a smartcard")},
	{ "bkuptocard", cmdBKUPTOCARD, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK \| KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK,
	N_("move a backup key to a smartcard")},
	{ "checkbkupkey", cmdCHECKBKUPKEY, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK \| KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK, NULL},
	#endif /ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT /
	{ "delkey", cmdDELKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("delete selected subkeys")},
	{ "addrevoker", cmdADDREVOKER, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("add a revocation key")},
	{ "delsig", cmdDELSIG, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
	N_("delete signatures from the selected user IDs")},
	{ "expire", cmdEXPIRE, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("change the expiration date for the key or selected subkeys")},
	{ "primary", cmdPRIMARY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("flag the selected user ID as primary")},
	{ "toggle", cmdTOGGLE, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL}, /* Dummy command. */
	{ "t", cmdTOGGLE, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
	{ "pref", cmdPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("list preferences (expert)")},
	{ "showpref", cmdSHOWPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("list preferences (verbose)")},
	{ "setpref", cmdSETPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("set preference list for the selected user IDs")},
	{ "updpref", cmdSETPREF, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
	{ "keyserver", cmdPREFKS, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("set the preferred keyserver URL for the selected user IDs")},
	{ "notation", cmdNOTATION, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("set a notation for the selected user IDs")},
	{ "passwd", cmdPASSWD, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("change the passphrase")},
	{ "password", cmdPASSWD, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	{ "trust", cmdTRUST, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("change the ownertrust")},
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	{ "revsig", cmdREVSIG, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
	N_("revoke signatures on the selected user IDs")},
	{ "revuid", cmdREVUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("revoke selected user IDs")},
	{ "revphoto", cmdREVUID, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL},
	{ "revkey", cmdREVKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK \| KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
	N_("revoke key or selected subkeys")},
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	{ "enable", cmdENABLEKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("enable key")},
	{ "disable", cmdDISABLEKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("disable key")},
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	{ "showphoto", cmdSHOWPHOTO, 0, N_("show selected photo IDs")},
	{ "clean", cmdCLEAN, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
	N_("compact unusable user IDs and remove unusable signatures from key")},
	{ "minimize", cmdMINIMIZE, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
	N_("compact unusable user IDs and remove all signatures from key")},

	{ NULL, cmdNONE, 0, NULL}
	};



	#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE

	/*
	These two functions are used by readline for command completion.
	*/

	static char *
	command_generator (const char *text, int state)
	{
	static int list_index, len;
	const char *name;

	/* If this is a new word to complete, initialize now. This includes
	saving the length of TEXT for efficiency, and initializing the
	index variable to 0. */
	if (!state)
	{
	list_index = 0;
	len = strlen (text);
	}

	/* Return the next partial match */
	while ((name = cmds[list_index].name))
	{
	/* Only complete commands that have help text */
	if (cmds[list_index++].desc && strncmp (name, text, len) == 0)
	return strdup (name);
	}

	return NULL;
	}

	static char **
	keyedit_completion (const char *text, int start, int end)
	{
	/* If we are at the start of a line, we try and command-complete.
	If not, just do nothing for now. */

	(void) end;

	if (start == 0)
	return rl_completion_matches (text, command_generator);

	rl_attempted_completion_over = 1;

	return NULL;
	}
	#endif /* HAVE_LIBREADLINE */



	/* Main function of the menu driven key editor. */
	void
	keyedit_menu (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, strlist_t locusr,
	strlist_t commands, int quiet, int seckey_check)
	{
	enum cmdids cmd = 0;
	gpg_error_t err = 0;
	KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
	int have_seckey = 0;
	char *answer = NULL;
	int redisplay = 1;
	int modified = 0;
	int sec_shadowing = 0;
	int run_subkey_warnings = 0;
	int have_commands = !!commands;

	if (opt.command_fd != -1)
	;
	else if (opt.batch && !have_commands)
	{
	log_error (_("can't do this in batch mode\n"));
	goto leave;
	}

	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	/* Due to Windows peculiarities we need to make sure that the
	trustdb stale check is done before we open another file
	(i.e. by searching for a key). In theory we could make sure
	that the files are closed after use but the open/close caches
	inhibits that and flushing the cache right before the stale
	check is not easy to implement. Thus we take the easy way out
	and run the stale check as early as possible. Note, that for
	non- W32 platforms it is run indirectly trough a call to
	get_validity (). */
	check_trustdb_stale ();
	#endif

	/* Get the public key */
	err = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, NULL, username, &keyblock, &kdbhd, 1, 1);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), username, gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	if (fix_keyblock (&keyblock))
	modified++;

	/* See whether we have a matching secret key. */
	if (seckey_check)
	{
	have_seckey = !agent_probe_any_secret_key (ctrl, keyblock);
	if (have_seckey && !quiet)
	tty_printf (_("Secret key is available.\n"));
	}

	/* Main command loop. */
	for (;;)
	{
	int i, arg_number, photo;
	const char *arg_string = "";
	char *p;
	PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	tty_printf ("\n");

	if (redisplay && !quiet)
	{
	/* Show using flags: with_revoker, with_subkeys. */
	show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	redisplay = 0;
	}

	if (run_subkey_warnings)
	{
	run_subkey_warnings = 0;
	if (!count_selected_keys (keyblock))
	subkey_expire_warning (keyblock);
	}

	do
	{
	xfree (answer);
	if (have_commands)
	{
	if (commands)
	{
	answer = xstrdup (commands->d);
	commands = commands->next;
	}
	else if (opt.batch)
	{
	answer = xstrdup ("quit");
	}
	else
	have_commands = 0;
	}
	if (!have_commands)
	{
	#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
	tty_enable_completion (keyedit_completion);
	#endif
	answer = cpr_get_no_help ("keyedit.prompt", GPG_NAME "> ");
	cpr_kill_prompt ();
	tty_disable_completion ();
	}
	trim_spaces (answer);
	}
	while (*answer == '#');

	arg_number = 0; /* Here is the init which egcc complains about. */
	photo = 0; /* Same here. */
	if (!*answer)
	cmd = cmdLIST;
	else if (*answer == CONTROL_D)
	cmd = cmdQUIT;
	else if (digitp (answer))
	{
	cmd = cmdSELUID;
	arg_number = atoi (answer);
	}
	else
	{
	if ((p = strchr (answer, ' ')))
	{
	*p++ = 0;
	trim_spaces (answer);
	trim_spaces (p);
	arg_number = atoi (p);
	arg_string = p;
	}

	for (i = 0; cmds[i].name; i++)
	{
	if (cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH)
	{
	size_t l = strlen (cmds[i].name);
	size_t a = strlen (answer);
	if (a >= l)
	{
	if (!ascii_strcasecmp (&answer[a - l], cmds[i].name))
	{
	answer[a - l] = '\0';
	break;
	}
	}
	}
	else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (answer, cmds[i].name))
	break;
	}
	if ((cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_NEED_SK) && !have_seckey)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Need the secret key to do this.\n"));
	cmd = cmdNOP;
	}
	else
	cmd = cmds[i].id;
	}

	/* Dispatch the command. */
	switch (cmd)
	{
	case cmdHELP:
	for (i = 0; cmds[i].name; i++)
	{
	if ((cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_NEED_SK) && !have_seckey)
	; /* Skip those item if we do not have the secret key. */
	else if (cmds[i].desc)
	tty_printf ("%-11s %s\n", cmds[i].name, _(cmds[i].desc));
	}

	tty_printf ("\n");
	tty_printf
	(_("* The 'sign' command may be prefixed with an 'l' for local "
	"signatures (lsign),\n"
	" a 't' for trust signatures (tsign), an 'nr' for "
	"non-revocable signatures\n"
	" (nrsign), or any combination thereof (ltsign, "
	"tnrsign, etc.).\n"));
	break;

	case cmdLIST:
	redisplay = 1;
	break;

	case cmdFPR:
	show_key_and_fingerprint
	(keyblock, (arg_string == ''
	&& (!arg_string[1] \|\| spacep (arg_string + 1))));
	break;

	case cmdGRIP:
	show_key_and_grip (keyblock);
	break;

	case cmdSELUID:
	if (strlen (arg_string) == NAMEHASH_LEN * 2)
	redisplay = menu_select_uid_namehash (keyblock, arg_string);
	else
	{
	if (arg_string == ''
	&& (!arg_string[1] \|\| spacep (arg_string + 1)))
	arg_number = -1; /* Select all. */
	redisplay = menu_select_uid (keyblock, arg_number);
	}
	break;

	case cmdSELKEY:
	{
	if (arg_string == ''
	&& (!arg_string[1] \|\| spacep (arg_string + 1)))
	arg_number = -1; /* Select all. */
	if (menu_select_key (keyblock, arg_number))
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	break;

	case cmdCHECK:
	check_all_keysigs (keyblock, count_selected_uids (keyblock),
	!strcmp (arg_string, "selfsig"));
	break;

	case cmdSIGN:
	{
	int localsig = 0, nonrevokesig = 0, trustsig = 0, interactive = 0;

	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Key is revoked."));

	if (opt.expert)
	{
	tty_printf (" ");
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.sign_revoked.okay",
	_("Are you sure you still want to sign it? (y/N) ")))
	break;
	}
	else
	{
	tty_printf (_(" Unable to sign.\n"));
	break;
	}
	}

	if (count_uids (keyblock) > 1 && !count_selected_uids (keyblock)
	&& !cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.sign_all.okay",
	_("Really sign all user IDs?"
	" (y/N) ")))
	{
	if (opt.interactive)
	interactive = 1;
	else
	{
	tty_printf (_("Hint: Select the user IDs to sign\n"));
	have_commands = 0;
	break;
	}

	}
	/* What sort of signing are we doing? */
	if (!parse_sign_type
	(answer, &localsig, &nonrevokesig, &trustsig))
	{
	tty_printf (_("Unknown signature type '%s'\n"), answer);
	break;
	}

	sign_uids (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, locusr, &modified,
	localsig, nonrevokesig, trustsig, interactive, 0);
	}
	break;

	case cmdDEBUG:
	dump_kbnode (keyblock);
	break;

	case cmdTOGGLE:
	/* The toggle command is a leftover from old gpg versions
	where we worked with a secret and a public keyring. It
	is not necessary anymore but we keep this command for the
	sake of scripts using it. */
	redisplay = 1;
	break;

	case cmdADDPHOTO:
	if (RFC2440)
	{
	tty_printf (_("This command is not allowed while in %s mode.\n"),
	compliance_option_string ());
	break;
	}
	photo = 1;
	/* fall through */
	case cmdADDUID:
	if (menu_adduid (keyblock, photo, arg_string, NULL))
	{
	update_trust = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	}
	break;

	case cmdDELUID:
	{
	int n1;

	if (!(n1 = count_selected_uids (keyblock)))
	{
	tty_printf (_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
	if (!opt.expert)
	tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "uid");
	}
	else if (real_uids_left (keyblock) < 1)
	tty_printf (_("You can't delete the last user ID!\n"));
	else if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.remove.uid.okay",
	n1 > 1 ? _("Really remove all selected user IDs? (y/N) ")
	: _("Really remove this user ID? (y/N) ")))
	{
	menu_deluid (keyblock);
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	}
	}
	break;

	case cmdDELSIG:
	{
	int n1;

	if (!(n1 = count_selected_uids (keyblock)))
	{
	tty_printf (_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
	if (!opt.expert)
	tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "uid");
	}
	else if (menu_delsig (keyblock))
	{
	/* No redisplay here, because it may scroll away some
	* of the status output of this command. */
	modified = 1;
	}
	}
	break;

	case cmdADDKEY:
	if (!generate_subkeypair (ctrl, keyblock))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	}
	break;

	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	case cmdADDCARDKEY:
	if (!card_generate_subkey (keyblock))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	}
	break;

	case cmdKEYTOCARD:
	{
	KBNODE node = NULL;
	switch (count_selected_keys (keyblock))
	{
	case 0:
	if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.keytocard.use_primary",
	/* TRANSLATORS: Please take care: This is about
	moving the key and not about removing it. */
	_("Really move the primary key? (y/N) ")))
	node = keyblock;
	break;
	case 1:
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)
	break;
	}
	break;
	default:
	tty_printf (_("You must select exactly one key.\n"));
	break;
	}
	if (node)
	{
	PKT_public_key *xxpk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (card_store_subkey (node, xxpk ? xxpk->pubkey_usage : 0))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	sec_shadowing = 1;
	}
	}
	}
	break;

	case cmdBKUPTOCARD:
	case cmdCHECKBKUPKEY:
	log_debug ("FIXME: This needs to be changed\n");
	{
	/* Ask for a filename, check whether this is really a
	backup key as generated by the card generation, parse
	that key and store it on card. */
	KBNODE node;
	const char *fname;
	PACKET *pkt;
	IOBUF a;

	fname = arg_string;
	if (!*fname)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Command expects a filename argument\n"));
	break;
	}

	/* Open that file. */
	a = iobuf_open (fname);
	if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a)))
	{
	iobuf_close (a);
	a = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	if (!a)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Can't open '%s': %s\n"),
	fname, strerror (errno));
	break;
	}

	/* Parse and check that file. */
	pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
	init_packet (pkt);
	err = parse_packet (a, pkt);
	iobuf_close (a);
	iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE, 0, (char *) fname);
	if (!err && pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY
	&& pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	err = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
	if (err)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Error reading backup key from '%s': %s\n"),
	fname, gpg_strerror (err));
	free_packet (pkt);
	xfree (pkt);
	break;
	}
	node = new_kbnode (pkt);

	if (cmd == cmdCHECKBKUPKEY)
	{
	/* PKT_public_key sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key; /
	/* switch (is_secret_key_protected (sk)) */
	/* { */
	/* case 0: /\* Not protected. \/ /
	/* tty_printf (_("This key is not protected.\n")); */
	/* break; */
	/* case -1: */
	/* log_error (_("unknown key protection algorithm\n")); */
	/* break; */
	/* default: */
	/* if (sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001) */
	/* tty_printf (_("Secret parts of key" */
	/* " are not available.\n")); */
	/* if (sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002) */
	/* tty_printf (_("Secret parts of key" */
	/* " are stored on-card.\n")); */
	/* else */
	/* check_secret_key (sk, 0); */
	/* } */
	}
	else /* Store it. */
	{
	if (card_store_subkey (node, 0))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	sec_shadowing = 1;
	}
	}
	release_kbnode (node);
	}
	break;

	#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */

	case cmdDELKEY:
	{
	int n1;

	if (!(n1 = count_selected_keys (keyblock)))
	{
	tty_printf (_("You must select at least one key.\n"));
	if (!opt.expert)
	tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "key");
	}
	else if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.remove.subkey.okay",
	n1 > 1 ? _("Do you really want to delete the "
	"selected keys? (y/N) ")
	: _("Do you really want to delete this key? (y/N) ")))
	;
	else
	{
	menu_delkey (keyblock);
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	}
	}
	break;

	case cmdADDREVOKER:
	{
	int sensitive = 0;

	if (ascii_strcasecmp (arg_string, "sensitive") == 0)
	sensitive = 1;
	if (menu_addrevoker (ctrl, keyblock, sensitive))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	}
	}
	break;

	case cmdREVUID:
	{
	int n1;

	if (!(n1 = count_selected_uids (keyblock)))
	{
	tty_printf (_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
	if (!opt.expert)
	tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "uid");
	}
	else if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.revoke.uid.okay",
	n1 > 1 ? _("Really revoke all selected user IDs? (y/N) ")
	: _("Really revoke this user ID? (y/N) ")))
	{
	if (menu_revuid (keyblock))
	{
	modified = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	}
	}
	break;

	case cmdREVKEY:
	{
	int n1;

	if (!(n1 = count_selected_keys (keyblock)))
	{
	if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.revoke.subkey.okay",
	_("Do you really want to revoke"
	" the entire key? (y/N) ")))
	{
	if (menu_revkey (keyblock))
	modified = 1;

	redisplay = 1;
	}
	}
	else if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.revoke.subkey.okay",
	n1 > 1 ?
	_("Do you really want to revoke"
	" the selected subkeys? (y/N) ")
	: _("Do you really want to revoke"
	" this subkey? (y/N) ")))
	{
	if (menu_revsubkey (keyblock))
	modified = 1;

	redisplay = 1;
	}

	if (modified)
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	}
	break;

	case cmdEXPIRE:
	if (menu_expire (keyblock))
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	run_subkey_warnings = 1;
	modified = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	break;

	case cmdBACKSIGN:
	if (menu_backsign (keyblock))
	{
	modified = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	break;

	case cmdPRIMARY:
	if (menu_set_primary_uid (keyblock))
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	modified = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	break;

	case cmdPASSWD:
	change_passphrase (ctrl, keyblock);
	break;

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	case cmdTRUST:
	if (opt.trust_model == TM_EXTERNAL)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Owner trust may not be set while "
	"using a user provided trust database\n"));
	break;
	}

	show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	if (edit_ownertrust (find_kbnode (keyblock,
	PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)->pkt->pkt.
	public_key, 1))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	/* No real need to set update_trust here as
	edit_ownertrust() calls revalidation_mark()
	anyway. */
	update_trust = 1;
	}
	break;
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/

	case cmdPREF:
	{
	int count = count_selected_uids (keyblock);
	assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	show_names (NULL, keyblock, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
	count ? NODFLG_SELUID : 0, 1);
	}
	break;

	case cmdSHOWPREF:
	{
	int count = count_selected_uids (keyblock);
	assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	show_names (NULL, keyblock, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
	count ? NODFLG_SELUID : 0, 2);
	}
	break;

	case cmdSETPREF:
	{
	PKT_user_id *tempuid;

	keygen_set_std_prefs (!*arg_string ? "default" : arg_string, 0);

	tempuid = keygen_get_std_prefs ();
	tty_printf (_("Set preference list to:\n"));
	show_prefs (tempuid, NULL, 1);
	free_user_id (tempuid);

	if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.setpref.okay",
	count_selected_uids (keyblock) ?
	_("Really update the preferences"
	" for the selected user IDs? (y/N) ")
	: _("Really update the preferences? (y/N) ")))
	{
	if (menu_set_preferences (keyblock))
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	modified = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	}
	}
	break;

	case cmdPREFKS:
	if (menu_set_keyserver_url (*arg_string ? arg_string : NULL,
	keyblock))
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	modified = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	break;

	case cmdNOTATION:
	if (menu_set_notation (*arg_string ? arg_string : NULL,
	keyblock))
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	modified = 1;
	redisplay = 1;
	}
	break;

	case cmdNOP:
	break;

	case cmdREVSIG:
	if (menu_revsig (keyblock))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	}
	break;

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	case cmdENABLEKEY:
	case cmdDISABLEKEY:
	if (enable_disable_key (keyblock, cmd == cmdDISABLEKEY))
	{
	redisplay = 1;
	modified = 1;
	}
	break;
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/

	case cmdSHOWPHOTO:
	menu_showphoto (keyblock);
	break;

	case cmdCLEAN:
	if (menu_clean (keyblock, 0))
	redisplay = modified = 1;
	break;

	case cmdMINIMIZE:
	if (menu_clean (keyblock, 1))
	redisplay = modified = 1;
	break;

	case cmdQUIT:
	if (have_commands)
	goto leave;
	if (!modified && !sec_shadowing)
	goto leave;
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.save.okay",
	_("Save changes? (y/N) ")))
	{
	if (cpr_enabled ()
	\|\| cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.cancel.okay",
	_("Quit without saving? (y/N) ")))
	goto leave;
	break;
	}
	/* fall thru */
	case cmdSAVE:
	if (modified)
	{
	err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	break;
	}
	}

	if (sec_shadowing)
	{
	err = agent_scd_learn (NULL, 1);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	break;
	}
	}

	if (!modified && !sec_shadowing)
	tty_printf (_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n"));

	if (update_trust)
	{
	revalidation_mark ();
	update_trust = 0;
	}
	goto leave;

	case cmdINVCMD:
	default:
	tty_printf ("\n");
	tty_printf (_("Invalid command (try \"help\")\n"));
	break;
	}
	} /* End of the main command loop. */

	leave:
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	keydb_release (kdbhd);
	xfree (answer);
	}


	/* Change the passphrase of the secret key identified by USERNAME. */
	void
	keyedit_passwd (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;

	pk = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pk);
	if (!pk)
	{
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	goto leave;
	}
	err = getkey_byname (NULL, pk, username, 1, &keyblock);
	if (err)
	goto leave;

	err = change_passphrase (ctrl, keyblock);

	leave:
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	free_public_key (pk);
	if (err)
	{
	log_info ("error changing the passphrase for '%s': %s\n",
	username, gpg_strerror (err));
	write_status_error ("keyedit.passwd", err);
	}
	else
	write_status_text (STATUS_SUCCESS, "keyedit.passwd");
	}


	/* Unattended adding of a new keyid. USERNAME specifies the
	key. NEWUID is the new user id to add to the key. */
	void
	keyedit_quick_adduid (ctrl_t ctrl, const char username, const char newuid)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
	kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
	kbnode_t node;
	char *uidstring = NULL;

	uidstring = xstrdup (newuid);
	trim_spaces (uidstring);
	if (!*uidstring)
	{
	log_error ("%s\n", gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_INV_USER_ID));
	goto leave;
	}

	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	/* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */
	check_trustdb_stale ();
	#endif

	/* Search the key; we don't want the whole getkey stuff here. */
	kdbhd = keydb_new ();
	err = classify_user_id (username, &desc, 1);
	if (!err)
	err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL);
	if (!err)
	{
	err = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}
	/* Now with the keyblock retrieved, search again to detect an
	ambiguous specification. We need to save the found state so
	that we can do an update later. */
	keydb_push_found_state (kdbhd);
	err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL);
	if (!err)
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_AMBIGUOUS_NAME);
	else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	err = 0;
	keydb_pop_found_state (kdbhd);

	if (!err)
	{
	/* We require the secret primary key to add a UID. */
	node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	if (!node)
	BUG ();
	err = agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, node->pkt->pkt.public_key);
	}
	}
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("secret key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),
	username, gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	fix_keyblock (&keyblock);

	if (menu_adduid (keyblock, 0, NULL, uidstring))
	{
	err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	if (update_trust)
	revalidation_mark ();
	}

	leave:
	xfree (uidstring);
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	keydb_release (kdbhd);
	}


	/* Unattended key signing function. If the key specifified by FPR is
	availabale and FPR is the primary fingerprint all user ids of the
	user ids of the key are signed using the default signing key. If
	UIDS is an empty list all usable UIDs are signed, if it is not
	empty, only those user ids matching one of the entries of the loist
	are signed. With LOCAL being true kthe signatures are marked as
	non-exportable. */
	void
	keyedit_quick_sign (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fpr, strlist_t uids,
	strlist_t locusr, int local)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
	int modified = 0;
	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	kbnode_t node;
	strlist_t sl;
	int any;

	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	/* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */
	check_trustdb_stale ();
	#endif

	/* We require a fingerprint because only this uniquely identifies a
	key and may thus be used to select a key for unattended key
	signing. */
	if (classify_user_id (fpr, &desc, 1)
	\|\| !(desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
	\|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
	\|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20))
	{
	log_error (_("\"%s\" is not a fingerprint\n"), fpr);
	goto leave;
	}
	err = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, NULL, fpr, &keyblock, &kdbhd, 1, 1);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), fpr, gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Check that the primary fingerprint has been given. */
	{
	byte fprbin[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	size_t fprlen;

	fingerprint_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, fprbin, &fprlen);
	if (fprlen == 16 && desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
	&& !memcmp (fprbin, desc.u.fpr, 16))
	;
	else if (fprlen == 16 && desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
	&& !memcmp (fprbin, desc.u.fpr, 16)
	&& !desc.u.fpr[16]
	&& !desc.u.fpr[17]
	&& !desc.u.fpr[18]
	&& !desc.u.fpr[19])
	;
	else if (fprlen == 20 && (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20
	\|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR)
	&& !memcmp (fprbin, desc.u.fpr, 20))
	;
	else
	{
	log_error (_("\"%s\" is not the primary fingerprint\n"), fpr);
	goto leave;
	}
	}

	if (fix_keyblock (&keyblock))
	modified++;

	/* Give some info in verbose. */
	if (opt.verbose)
	{
	show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0,
	1/with_revoker/, 1/with_fingerprint/,
	0, 0, 1);
	es_fflush (es_stdout);
	}

	pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	if (!opt.verbose)
	show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1);
	log_error ("%s%s", _("Key is revoked."), _(" Unable to sign.\n"));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Set the flags according to the UIDS list. Fixme: We may want to
	use classify_user_id along with dedicated compare functions so
	that we match the same way as in the key lookup. */
	any = 0;
	menu_select_uid (keyblock, 0); /* Better clear the flags first. */
	for (sl=uids; sl; sl = sl->next)
	{
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	if (!uid->attrib_data
	&& ascii_memistr (uid->name, uid->len, sl->d))
	{
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELUID;
	any = 1;
	}
	}
	}
	}

	if (uids && !any)
	{
	if (!opt.verbose)
	show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1);
	es_fflush (es_stdout);
	log_error ("%s %s", _("No matching user IDs."), _("Nothing to sign.\n"));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Sign. */
	sign_uids (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, locusr, &modified, local, 0, 0, 0, 1);
	es_fflush (es_stdout);

	if (modified)
	{
	err = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}
	}
	else
	log_info (_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n"));

	if (update_trust)
	revalidation_mark ();


	leave:
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	keydb_release (kdbhd);
	}



	static void
	tty_print_notations (int indent, PKT_signature * sig)
	{
	int first = 1;
	struct notation notation, nd;

	if (indent < 0)
	{
	first = 0;
	indent = -indent;
	}

	notation = sig_to_notation (sig);

	for (nd = notation; nd; nd = nd->next)
	{
	if (!first)
	tty_printf ("%*s", indent, "");
	else
	first = 0;

	tty_print_utf8_string (nd->name, strlen (nd->name));
	tty_printf ("=");
	tty_print_utf8_string (nd->value, strlen (nd->value));
	tty_printf ("\n");
	}

	free_notation (notation);
	}


	/*
	* Show preferences of a public keyblock.
	*/
	static void
	show_prefs (PKT_user_id * uid, PKT_signature * selfsig, int verbose)
	{
	const prefitem_t fake = { 0, 0 };
	const prefitem_t *prefs;
	int i;

	if (!uid)
	return;

	if (uid->prefs)
	prefs = uid->prefs;
	else if (verbose)
	prefs = &fake;
	else
	return;

	if (verbose)
	{
	int any, des_seen = 0, sha1_seen = 0, uncomp_seen = 0;

	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_printf (_("Cipher: "));
	for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
	{
	if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM)
	{
	if (any)
	tty_printf (", ");
	any = 1;
	/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
	if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (prefs[i].value)
	&& prefs[i].value < 100)
	tty_printf ("%s", openpgp_cipher_algo_name (prefs[i].value));
	else
	tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
	if (prefs[i].value == CIPHER_ALGO_3DES)
	des_seen = 1;
	}
	}
	if (!des_seen)
	{
	if (any)
	tty_printf (", ");
	tty_printf ("%s", openpgp_cipher_algo_name (CIPHER_ALGO_3DES));
	}
	tty_printf ("\n ");
	tty_printf (_("Digest: "));
	for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
	{
	if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH)
	{
	if (any)
	tty_printf (", ");
	any = 1;
	/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (prefs[i].value) && prefs[i].value < 100)
	tty_printf ("%s", gcry_md_algo_name (prefs[i].value));
	else
	tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
	if (prefs[i].value == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1)
	sha1_seen = 1;
	}
	}
	if (!sha1_seen)
	{
	if (any)
	tty_printf (", ");
	tty_printf ("%s", gcry_md_algo_name (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1));
	}
	tty_printf ("\n ");
	tty_printf (_("Compression: "));
	for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
	{
	if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP)
	{
	const char *s = compress_algo_to_string (prefs[i].value);

	if (any)
	tty_printf (", ");
	any = 1;
	/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
	if (s && prefs[i].value < 100)
	tty_printf ("%s", s);
	else
	tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
	if (prefs[i].value == COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE)
	uncomp_seen = 1;
	}
	}
	if (!uncomp_seen)
	{
	if (any)
	tty_printf (", ");
	else
	{
	tty_printf ("%s", compress_algo_to_string (COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP));
	tty_printf (", ");
	}
	tty_printf ("%s", compress_algo_to_string (COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE));
	}
	if (uid->flags.mdc \|\| !uid->flags.ks_modify)
	{
	tty_printf ("\n ");
	tty_printf (_("Features: "));
	any = 0;
	if (uid->flags.mdc)
	{
	tty_printf ("MDC");
	any = 1;
	}
	if (!uid->flags.ks_modify)
	{
	if (any)
	tty_printf (", ");
	tty_printf (_("Keyserver no-modify"));
	}
	}
	tty_printf ("\n");

	if (selfsig)
	{
	const byte *pref_ks;
	size_t pref_ks_len;

	pref_ks = parse_sig_subpkt (selfsig->hashed,
	SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, &pref_ks_len);
	if (pref_ks && pref_ks_len)
	{
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_printf (_("Preferred keyserver: "));
	tty_print_utf8_string (pref_ks, pref_ks_len);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	}

	if (selfsig->flags.notation)
	{
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_printf (_("Notations: "));
	tty_print_notations (5 + strlen (_("Notations: ")), selfsig);
	}
	}
	}
	else
	{
	tty_printf (" ");
	for (i = 0; prefs[i].type; i++)
	{
	tty_printf (" %c%d", prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ? 'S' :
	prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ? 'H' :
	prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z' : '?',
	prefs[i].value);
	}
	if (uid->flags.mdc)
	tty_printf (" [mdc]");
	if (!uid->flags.ks_modify)
	tty_printf (" [no-ks-modify]");
	tty_printf ("\n");
	}
	}


	/* This is the version of show_key_with_all_names used when
	opt.with_colons is used. It prints all available data in a easy to
	parse format and does not translate utf8 */
	static void
	show_key_with_all_names_colon (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp, kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i, j, ulti_hack = 0;
	byte pk_version = 0;
	PKT_public_key *primary = NULL;
	int have_seckey;

	if (!fp)
	fp = es_stdout;

	/* the keys */
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY))
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	u32 keyid[2];

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	pk_version = pk->version;
	primary = pk;
	}

	keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
	have_seckey = !agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, pk);

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	es_fputs (have_seckey? "sec:" : "pub:", fp);
	else
	es_fputs (have_seckey? "ssb:" : "sub:", fp);

	if (!pk->flags.valid)
	es_putc ('i', fp);
	else if (pk->flags.revoked)
	es_putc ('r', fp);
	else if (pk->has_expired)
	es_putc ('e', fp);
	else if (!(opt.fast_list_mode \|\| opt.no_expensive_trust_checks))
	{
	int trust = get_validity_info (pk, NULL);
	if (trust == 'u')
	ulti_hack = 1;
	es_putc (trust, fp);
	}

	es_fprintf (fp, ":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%lu:%lu::",
	nbits_from_pk (pk),
	pk->pubkey_algo,
	(ulong) keyid[0], (ulong) keyid[1],
	(ulong) pk->timestamp, (ulong) pk->expiredate);
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	&& !(opt.fast_list_mode \|\| opt.no_expensive_trust_checks))
	es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (pk), fp);
	es_putc (':', fp);
	es_putc (':', fp);
	es_putc (':', fp);
	/* Print capabilities. */
	if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC))
	es_putc ('e', fp);
	if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG))
	es_putc ('s', fp);
	if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT))
	es_putc ('c', fp);
	if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH))
	es_putc ('a', fp);
	es_putc ('\n', fp);

	print_fingerprint (fp, pk, 0);
	print_revokers (fp, pk);
	}
	}

	/* the user ids */
	i = 0;
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	++i;

	if (uid->attrib_data)
	es_fputs ("uat:", fp);
	else
	es_fputs ("uid:", fp);

	if (uid->is_revoked)
	es_fputs ("r::::::::", fp);
	else if (uid->is_expired)
	es_fputs ("e::::::::", fp);
	else if (opt.fast_list_mode \|\| opt.no_expensive_trust_checks)
	es_fputs ("::::::::", fp);
	else
	{
	int uid_validity;

	if (primary && !ulti_hack)
	uid_validity = get_validity_info (primary, uid);
	else
	uid_validity = 'u';
	es_fprintf (fp, "%c::::::::", uid_validity);
	}

	if (uid->attrib_data)
	es_fprintf (fp, "%u %lu", uid->numattribs, uid->attrib_len);
	else
	es_write_sanitized (fp, uid->name, uid->len, ":", NULL);

	es_putc (':', fp);
	/* signature class */
	es_putc (':', fp);
	/* capabilities */
	es_putc (':', fp);
	/* preferences */
	if (pk_version > 3 \|\| uid->selfsigversion > 3)
	{
	const prefitem_t *prefs = uid->prefs;

	for (j = 0; prefs && prefs[j].type; j++)
	{
	if (j)
	es_putc (' ', fp);
	es_fprintf (fp,
	"%c%d", prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ? 'S' :
	prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ? 'H' :
	prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z' : '?',
	prefs[j].value);
	}
	if (uid->flags.mdc)
	es_fputs (",mdc", fp);
	if (!uid->flags.ks_modify)
	es_fputs (",no-ks-modify", fp);
	}
	es_putc (':', fp);
	/* flags */
	es_fprintf (fp, "%d,", i);
	if (uid->is_primary)
	es_putc ('p', fp);
	if (uid->is_revoked)
	es_putc ('r', fp);
	if (uid->is_expired)
	es_putc ('e', fp);
	if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
	es_putc ('s', fp);
	if ((node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A))
	es_putc ('m', fp);
	es_putc (':', fp);
	+ if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
	+ {
	+ enum tofu_policy policy;
	+ if (! tofu_get_policy (primary, uid, &policy)
	+ && policy != TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, "%s", tofu_policy_str (policy));
	+ }
	+ es_putc (':', fp);
	es_putc ('\n', fp);
	}
	}
	}


	static void
	show_names (estream_t fp,
	KBNODE keyblock, PKT_public_key * pk, unsigned int flag,
	int with_prefs)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i = 0;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !is_deleted_kbnode (node))
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	++i;
	if (!flag \|\| (flag && (node->flag & flag)))
	{
	if (!(flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) && pk)
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%s ", uid_trust_string_fixed (pk, uid));

	if (flag & NODFLG_MARK_A)
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	else if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)
	tty_fprintf (fp, "(%d)* ", i);
	else if (uid->is_primary)
	tty_fprintf (fp, "(%d). ", i);
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp, "(%d) ", i);
	tty_print_utf8_string2 (fp, uid->name, uid->len, 0);
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	if (with_prefs && pk)
	{
	if (pk->version > 3 \|\| uid->selfsigversion > 3)
	{
	PKT_signature *selfsig = NULL;
	KBNODE signode;

	for (signode = node->next;
	signode && signode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE;
	signode = signode->next)
	{
	if (signode->pkt->pkt.signature->
	flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	selfsig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
	break;
	}
	}

	show_prefs (uid, selfsig, with_prefs == 2);
	}
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("There are no preferences on a"
	" PGP 2.x-style user ID.\n"));
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}


	/*
	* Display the key a the user ids, if only_marked is true, do only so
	* for user ids with mark A flag set and do not display the index
	* number. If FP is not NULL print to the given stream and not to the
	* tty (ignored in with-colons mode).
	*/
	static void
	show_key_with_all_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
	KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked, int with_revoker,
	int with_fpr, int with_subkeys, int with_prefs,
	int nowarn)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	kbnode_t node;
	int i;
	int do_warn = 0;
	int have_seckey = 0;
	char *serialno = NULL;
	PKT_public_key *primary = NULL;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	show_key_with_all_names_colon (ctrl, fp, keyblock);
	return;
	}

	/* the keys */
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| (with_subkeys && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& !is_deleted_kbnode (node)))
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	const char *otrust = "err";
	const char *trust = "err";

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	/* do it here, so that debug messages don't clutter the
	* output */
	static int did_warn = 0;

	trust = get_validity_string (pk, NULL);
	otrust = get_ownertrust_string (pk);

	/* Show a warning once */
	if (!did_warn
	- && (get_validity (pk, NULL) & TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK))
	+ && (get_validity (pk, NULL, NULL, 0)
	+ & TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK))
	{
	did_warn = 1;
	do_warn = 1;
	}

	primary = pk;
	}

	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	char *user = get_user_id_string_native (pk->revoked.keyid);
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("The following key was revoked on"
	" %s by %s key %s\n"),
	revokestr_from_pk (pk),
	gcry_pk_algo_name (pk->revoked.algo), user);
	xfree (user);
	}

	if (with_revoker)
	{
	if (!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys)
	BUG ();
	else
	for (i = 0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++)
	{
	u32 r_keyid[2];
	char *user;
	const char *algo;

	algo = gcry_pk_algo_name (pk->revkey[i].algid);
	keyid_from_fingerprint (pk->revkey[i].fpr,
	MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN, r_keyid);

	user = get_user_id_string_native (r_keyid);
	tty_fprintf (fp,
	_("This key may be revoked by %s key %s"),
	algo ? algo : "?", user);

	if (pk->revkey[i].class & 0x40)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("(sensitive)"));
	}

	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	xfree (user);
	}
	}

	keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL);

	xfree (serialno);
	serialno = NULL;
	{
	char *hexgrip;

	err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	have_seckey = 0;
	}
	else
	have_seckey = !agent_get_keyinfo (ctrl, hexgrip, &serialno);
	xfree (hexgrip);
	}

	tty_fprintf
	(fp, "%s%c %s/%s",
	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY && have_seckey? "sec" :
	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "pub" :
	have_seckey ? "ssb" :
	"sub",
	(node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY) ? '*' : ' ',
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr (pk->keyid));

	if (opt.legacy_list_mode)
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n ");

	tty_fprintf (fp, _("created: %s"), datestr_from_pk (pk));
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("revoked: %s"), revokestr_from_pk (pk));
	else if (pk->has_expired)
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("expired: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("usage: %s"), usagestr_from_pk (pk, 1));
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");

	if (serialno)
	{
	/* The agent told us that a secret key is available and
	that it has been stored on a card. */
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s%s", opt.legacy_list_mode? 21:5, "",
	_("card-no: "));
	if (strlen (serialno) == 32
	&& !strncmp (serialno, "D27600012401", 12))
	{
	/* This is an OpenPGP card. Print the relevant part. */
	/* Example: D2760001240101010001000003470000 */
	/* xxxxyyyyyyyy */
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%.s %.s\n",
	4, serialno+16, 8, serialno+20);
	}
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%s\n", serialno);

	}
	else if (pk->seckey_info
	&& pk->seckey_info->is_protected
	&& pk->seckey_info->s2k.mode == 1002)
	{
	/* FIXME: Check wether this code path is still used. */
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s%s", opt.legacy_list_mode? 21:5, "",
	_("card-no: "));
	if (pk->seckey_info->ivlen == 16
	&& !memcmp (pk->seckey_info->iv,
	"\xD2\x76\x00\x01\x24\x01", 6))
	{
	/* This is an OpenPGP card. */
	for (i = 8; i < 14; i++)
	{
	if (i == 10)
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%02X", pk->seckey_info->iv[i]);
	}
	}
	else
	{
	/* Unknown card: Print all. */
	for (i = 0; i < pk->seckey_info->ivlen; i++)
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%02X", pk->seckey_info->iv[i]);
	}
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	}

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	{
	if (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s",
	opt.legacy_list_mode?
	((int) keystrlen () + 13):5, "");
	/* Ownertrust is only meaningful for the PGP or
	classic trust models */
	if (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP
	\|\| opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC)
	{
	int width = 14 - strlen (otrust);
	if (width <= 0)
	width = 1;
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("trust: %s"), otrust);
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s", width, "");
	}

	tty_fprintf (fp, _("validity: %s"), trust);
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	}
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	&& (get_ownertrust (pk) & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "*** ");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key has been disabled"));
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	}
	}

	if ((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) && with_fpr)
	{
	print_fingerprint (fp, pk, 2);
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	}
	}
	}

	show_names (fp,
	keyblock, primary, only_marked ? NODFLG_MARK_A : 0, with_prefs);

	if (do_warn && !nowarn)
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("Please note that the shown key validity"
	" is not necessarily correct\n"
	"unless you restart the program.\n"));

	xfree (serialno);
	}


	/* Display basic key information. This function is suitable to show
	information on the key without any dependencies on the trustdb or
	any other internal GnuPG stuff. KEYBLOCK may either be a public or
	a secret key. This function may be called with KEYBLOCK containing
	secret keys and thus the printing of "pub" vs. "sec" does only
	depend on the packet type and not by checking with gpg-agent. */
	void
	show_basic_key_info (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

	/* The primary key */
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	/* Note, we use the same format string as in other show
	functions to make the translation job easier. */
	tty_printf ("%s %s/%s ",
	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "pub" :
	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ? "sub" :
	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ? "sec" :"ssb",
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr_from_pk (pk));
	tty_printf (_("created: %s"), datestr_from_pk (pk));
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_printf (_("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
	tty_printf ("\n");
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 3);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	}
	}

	/* The user IDs. */
	for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	++i;

	tty_printf (" ");
	if (uid->is_revoked)
	tty_printf ("[%s] ", _("revoked"));
	else if (uid->is_expired)
	tty_printf ("[%s] ", _("expired"));
	tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	}
	}
	}


	static void
	show_key_and_fingerprint (kbnode_t keyblock, int with_subkeys)
	{
	kbnode_t node;
	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	tty_printf ("pub %s/%s %s ",
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr_from_pk(pk),
	datestr_from_pk (pk));
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
	break;
	}
	}
	tty_printf ("\n");
	if (pk)
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 2);
	if (with_subkeys)
	{
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	tty_printf ("sub %s/%s %s [%s]\n",
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr_from_pk(pk),
	datestr_from_pk (pk),
	usagestr_from_pk (pk, 0));

	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 4);
	}
	}
	}
	}


	/* Show a listing of the primary and its subkeys along with their
	keygrips. */
	static void
	show_key_and_grip (kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	kbnode_t node;
	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
	char *hexgrip;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	tty_printf ("%s %s/%s %s [%s]\n",
	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY? "pub":"sub",
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr_from_pk(pk),
	datestr_from_pk (pk),
	usagestr_from_pk (pk, 0));

	if (!hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip))
	{
	tty_printf (" Keygrip: %s\n", hexgrip);
	xfree (hexgrip);
	}
	}
	}
	}


	/* Show a warning if no uids on the key have the primary uid flag
	set. */
	static void
	no_primary_warning (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int have_primary = 0, uid_count = 0;

	/* TODO: if we ever start behaving differently with a primary or
	non-primary attribute ID, we will need to check for attributes
	here as well. */

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data == NULL)
	{
	uid_count++;

	if (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary == 2)
	{
	have_primary = 1;
	break;
	}
	}
	}

	if (uid_count > 1 && !have_primary)
	log_info (_
	("WARNING: no user ID has been marked as primary. This command"
	" may\n cause a different user ID to become"
	" the assumed primary.\n"));
	}


	/* Print a warning if the latest encryption subkey expires soon. This
	function is called after the expire data of the primary key has
	been changed. */
	static void
	subkey_expire_warning (kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
	kbnode_t node;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	/* u32 mainexpire = 0; */
	u32 subexpire = 0;
	u32 latest_date = 0;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	/* if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) */
	/* { */
	/* pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; */
	/* mainexpire = pk->expiredate; */
	/* } */

	if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	continue;
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	if (!pk->flags.valid)
	continue;
	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	continue;
	if (pk->timestamp > curtime)
	continue; /* Ignore future keys. */
	if (!(pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC))
	continue; /* Not an encryption key. */

	if (pk->timestamp > latest_date \|\| (!pk->timestamp && !latest_date))
	{
	latest_date = pk->timestamp;
	subexpire = pk->expiredate;
	}
	}

	if (!subexpire)
	return; /* No valid subkey with an expiration time. */

	if (curtime + (10*86400) > subexpire)
	{
	log_info (_("WARNING: Your encryption subkey expires soon.\n"));
	log_info (_("You may want to change its expiration date too.\n"));
	}
	}


	/*
	* Ask for a new user id, add the self-signature, and update the
	* keyblock. If UIDSTRING is not NULL the user ID is generated
	* unattended using that string. UIDSTRING is expected to be utf-8
	* encoded and white space trimmed. Returns true if there is a new
	* user id.
	*/
	static int
	menu_adduid (kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int photo, const char *photo_name,
	const char *uidstring)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid;
	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
	PKT_signature *sig = NULL;
	PACKET *pkt;
	KBNODE node;
	KBNODE pub_where = NULL;
	gpg_error_t err;

	if (photo && uidstring)
	return 0; /* Not allowed. */

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; pub_where = node, node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	break;
	}
	if (!node) /* No subkey. */
	pub_where = NULL;
	assert (pk);

	if (photo)
	{
	int hasattrib = 0;

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data != NULL)
	{
	hasattrib = 1;
	break;
	}

	/* It is legal but bad for compatibility to add a photo ID to a
	v3 key as it means that PGP2 will not be able to use that key
	anymore. Also, PGP may not expect a photo on a v3 key.
	Don't bother to ask this if the key already has a photo - any
	damage has already been done at that point. -dms */
	if (pk->version == 3 && !hasattrib)
	{
	if (opt.expert)
	{
	tty_printf (_("WARNING: This is a PGP2-style key. "
	"Adding a photo ID may cause some versions\n"
	" of PGP to reject this key.\n"));

	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.v3_photo.okay",
	_("Are you sure you still want "
	"to add it? (y/N) ")))
	return 0;
	}
	else
	{
	tty_printf (_("You may not add a photo ID to "
	"a PGP2-style key.\n"));
	return 0;
	}
	}

	uid = generate_photo_id (pk, photo_name);
	}
	else
	uid = generate_user_id (pub_keyblock, uidstring);
	if (!uid)
	{
	if (uidstring)
	log_error ("%s", _("Such a user ID already exists on this key!\n"));
	return 0;
	}

	err = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, uid, NULL, pk, 0x13, 0, 0, 0,
	keygen_add_std_prefs, pk, NULL);
	if (err)
	{
	write_status_error ("keysig", err);
	log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	free_user_id (uid);
	return 0;
	}

	/* Insert/append to public keyblock */
	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_USER_ID;
	pkt->pkt.user_id = uid;
	node = new_kbnode (pkt);
	if (pub_where)
	insert_kbnode (pub_where, node, 0);
	else
	add_kbnode (pub_keyblock, node);
	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = copy_signature (NULL, sig);
	if (pub_where)
	insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
	else
	add_kbnode (pub_keyblock, new_kbnode (pkt));
	return 1;
	}


	/*
	* Remove all selected userids from the keyring
	*/
	static void
	menu_deluid (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int selected = 0;

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID;
	if (selected)
	{
	/* Only cause a trust update if we delete a
	non-revoked user id */
	if (!node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
	update_trust = 1;
	delete_kbnode (node);
	}
	}
	else if (selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	delete_kbnode (node);
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	selected = 0;
	}
	commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
	}


	static int
	menu_delsig (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	PKT_user_id *uid = NULL;
	int changed = 0;

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	uid = (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) ? node->pkt->pkt.user_id : NULL;
	}
	else if (uid && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	int okay, valid, selfsig, inv_sig, no_key, other_err;

	tty_printf ("uid ");
	tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
	tty_printf ("\n");

	okay = inv_sig = no_key = other_err = 0;
	if (opt.with_colons)
	valid = print_and_check_one_sig_colon (pub_keyblock, node,
	&inv_sig, &no_key,
	&other_err, &selfsig, 1);
	else
	valid = print_and_check_one_sig (pub_keyblock, node,
	&inv_sig, &no_key, &other_err,
	&selfsig, 1, 0);

	if (valid)
	{
	okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit
	("keyedit.delsig.valid",
	_("Delete this good signature? (y/N/q)"));

	/* Only update trust if we delete a good signature.
	The other two cases do not affect trust. */
	if (okay)
	update_trust = 1;
	}
	else if (inv_sig \|\| other_err)
	okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit
	("keyedit.delsig.invalid",
	_("Delete this invalid signature? (y/N/q)"));
	else if (no_key)
	okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit
	("keyedit.delsig.unknown",
	_("Delete this unknown signature? (y/N/q)"));

	if (okay == -1)
	break;
	if (okay && selfsig
	&& !cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.delsig.selfsig",
	_("Really delete this self-signature? (y/N)")))
	okay = 0;
	if (okay)
	{
	delete_kbnode (node);
	changed++;
	}

	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	uid = NULL;
	}

	if (changed)
	{
	commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);
	tty_printf (changed == 1 ? _("Deleted %d signature.\n")
	: _("Deleted %d signatures.\n"), changed);
	}
	else
	tty_printf (_("Nothing deleted.\n"));

	return changed;
	}


	static int
	menu_clean (KBNODE keyblock, int self_only)
	{
	KBNODE uidnode;
	int modified = 0, select_all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock);

	for (uidnode = keyblock->next;
	uidnode && uidnode->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
	uidnode = uidnode->next)
	{
	if (uidnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& (uidnode->flag & NODFLG_SELUID \|\| select_all))
	{
	int uids = 0, sigs = 0;
	char *user = utf8_to_native (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,
	0);

	clean_one_uid (keyblock, uidnode, opt.verbose, self_only, &uids,
	&sigs);
	if (uids)
	{
	const char *reason;

	if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
	reason = _("revoked");
	else if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
	reason = _("expired");
	else
	reason = _("invalid");

	tty_printf (_("User ID \"%s\" compacted: %s\n"), user, reason);

	modified = 1;
	}
	else if (sigs)
	{
	tty_printf (sigs == 1 ?
	_("User ID \"%s\": %d signature removed\n") :
	_("User ID \"%s\": %d signatures removed\n"),
	user, sigs);

	modified = 1;
	}
	else
	{
	tty_printf (self_only == 1 ?
	_("User ID \"%s\": already minimized\n") :
	_("User ID \"%s\": already clean\n"), user);
	}

	xfree (user);
	}
	}

	return modified;
	}


	/*
	* Remove some of the secondary keys
	*/
	static void
	menu_delkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int selected = 0;

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY;
	if (selected)
	delete_kbnode (node);
	}
	else if (selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	delete_kbnode (node);
	else
	selected = 0;
	}
	commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);

	/* No need to set update_trust here since signing keys are no
	longer used to certify other keys, so there is no change in
	trust when revoking/removing them. */
	}


	/*
	* Ask for a new revoker, create the self-signature and put it into
	* the keyblock. Returns true if there is a new revoker.
	*/
	static int
	menu_addrevoker (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int sensitive)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
	PKT_public_key *revoker_pk = NULL;
	PKT_signature *sig = NULL;
	PACKET *pkt;
	struct revocation_key revkey;
	size_t fprlen;
	int rc;

	assert (pub_keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);

	pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	if (pk->numrevkeys == 0 && pk->version == 3)
	{
	/* It is legal but bad for compatibility to add a revoker to a
	v3 key as it means that PGP2 will not be able to use that key
	anymore. Also, PGP may not expect a revoker on a v3 key.
	Don't bother to ask this if the key already has a revoker -
	any damage has already been done at that point. -dms */
	if (opt.expert)
	{
	tty_printf (_("WARNING: This is a PGP 2.x-style key. "
	"Adding a designated revoker may cause\n"
	" some versions of PGP to reject this key.\n"));

	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.v3_revoker.okay",
	_("Are you sure you still want "
	"to add it? (y/N) ")))
	return 0;
	}
	else
	{
	tty_printf (_("You may not add a designated revoker to "
	"a PGP 2.x-style key.\n"));
	return 0;
	}
	}

	for (;;)
	{
	char *answer;

	free_public_key (revoker_pk);
	revoker_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*revoker_pk));

	tty_printf ("\n");

	answer = cpr_get_utf8
	("keyedit.add_revoker",
	_("Enter the user ID of the designated revoker: "));
	if (answer[0] == '\0' \|\| answer[0] == CONTROL_D)
	{
	xfree (answer);
	goto fail;
	}

	/* Note that I'm requesting CERT here, which usually implies
	primary keys only, but some casual testing shows that PGP and
	GnuPG both can handle a designated revocation from a subkey. */
	revoker_pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT;
	rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, revoker_pk, answer, NULL, NULL, 1, 1);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), answer,
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	xfree (answer);
	continue;
	}

	xfree (answer);

	fingerprint_from_pk (revoker_pk, revkey.fpr, &fprlen);
	if (fprlen != 20)
	{
	log_error (_("cannot appoint a PGP 2.x style key as a "
	"designated revoker\n"));
	continue;
	}

	revkey.class = 0x80;
	if (sensitive)
	revkey.class \|= 0x40;
	revkey.algid = revoker_pk->pubkey_algo;

	if (cmp_public_keys (revoker_pk, pk) == 0)
	{
	/* This actually causes no harm (after all, a key that
	designates itself as a revoker is the same as a
	regular key), but it's easy enough to check. */
	log_error (_("you cannot appoint a key as its own "
	"designated revoker\n"));

	continue;
	}

	keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL);

	/* Does this revkey already exist? */
	if (!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys)
	BUG ();
	else
	{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++)
	{
	if (memcmp (&pk->revkey[i], &revkey,
	sizeof (struct revocation_key)) == 0)
	{
	char buf[50];

	log_error (_("this key has already been designated "
	"as a revoker\n"));

	sprintf (buf, "%08lX%08lX",
	(ulong) pk->keyid[0], (ulong) pk->keyid[1]);
	write_status_text (STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED, buf);

	break;
	}
	}

	if (i < pk->numrevkeys)
	continue;
	}

	print_pubkey_info (NULL, revoker_pk);
	print_fingerprint (NULL, revoker_pk, 2);
	tty_printf ("\n");

	tty_printf (_("WARNING: appointing a key as a designated revoker "
	"cannot be undone!\n"));

	tty_printf ("\n");

	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.add_revoker.okay",
	_("Are you sure you want to appoint this "
	"key as a designated revoker? (y/N) ")))
	continue;

	free_public_key (revoker_pk);
	revoker_pk = NULL;
	break;
	}

	rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk, 0x1F, 0, 0, 0,
	keygen_add_revkey, &revkey, NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
	log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto fail;
	}

	/* Insert into public keyblock. */
	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
	insert_kbnode (pub_keyblock, new_kbnode (pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE);

	return 1;

	fail:
	if (sig)
	free_seckey_enc (sig);
	free_public_key (revoker_pk);

	return 0;
	}


	static int
	menu_expire (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	int n1, signumber, rc;
	u32 expiredate;
	int mainkey = 0;
	PKT_public_key main_pk, sub_pk;
	PKT_user_id *uid;
	KBNODE node;
	u32 keyid[2];

	n1 = count_selected_keys (pub_keyblock);
	if (n1 > 1)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Please select at most one subkey.\n"));
	return 0;
	}
	else if (n1)
	tty_printf (_("Changing expiration time for a subkey.\n"));
	else
	{
	tty_printf (_("Changing expiration time for the primary key.\n"));
	mainkey = 1;
	no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);
	}

	expiredate = ask_expiredate ();

	/* Now we can actually change the self-signature(s) */
	main_pk = sub_pk = NULL;
	uid = NULL;
	signumber = 0;
	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
	main_pk->expiredate = expiredate;
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
	{
	sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	sub_pk->expiredate = expiredate;
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	else if (main_pk && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& (mainkey \|\| sub_pk))
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
	&& ((mainkey && uid
	&& uid->created && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	\|\| (!mainkey && sig->sig_class == 0x18))
	&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	/* This is a self-signature which is to be replaced. */
	PKT_signature *newsig;
	PACKET *newpkt;

	signumber++;

	if ((mainkey && main_pk->version < 4)
	\|\| (!mainkey && sub_pk->version < 4))
	{
	log_info
	(_("You can't change the expiration date of a v3 key\n"));
	return 0;
	}

	if (mainkey)
	rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig, main_pk, uid, NULL,
	main_pk, keygen_add_key_expire,
	main_pk);
	else
	rc =
	update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig, main_pk, NULL, sub_pk,
	main_pk, keygen_add_key_expire, sub_pk);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	return 0;
	}

	/* Replace the packet. */
	newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
	newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
	free_packet (node->pkt);
	xfree (node->pkt);
	node->pkt = newpkt;
	sub_pk = NULL;
	}
	}
	}

	update_trust = 1;
	return 1;
	}


	static int
	menu_backsign (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	int rc, modified = 0;
	PKT_public_key *main_pk;
	KBNODE node;
	u32 timestamp;

	assert (pub_keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);

	merge_keys_and_selfsig (pub_keyblock);
	main_pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (main_pk, NULL);

	/* We use the same timestamp for all backsigs so that we don't
	reveal information about the used machine. */
	timestamp = make_timestamp ();

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	PKT_public_key *sub_pk = NULL;
	KBNODE node2, sig_pk = NULL /,sig_sk = NULL/;
	/* char passphrase; /

	/* Find a signing subkey with no backsig */
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkt.public_key->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkt.public_key->flags.backsig)
	tty_printf (_
	("signing subkey %s is already cross-certified\n"),
	keystr_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key));
	else
	sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	}
	else
	tty_printf (_("subkey %s does not sign and so does"
	" not need to be cross-certified\n"),
	keystr_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key));
	}

	if (!sub_pk)
	continue;

	/* Find the selected selfsig on this subkey */
	for (node2 = node->next;
	node2 && node2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; node2 = node2->next)
	if (node2->pkt->pkt.signature->version >= 4
	&& node2->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	sig_pk = node2;
	break;
	}

	if (!sig_pk)
	continue;

	/* Find the secret subkey that matches the public subkey */
	log_debug ("FIXME: Check whether a secret subkey is available.\n");
	/* if (!sub_sk) */
	/* { */
	/* tty_printf (_("no secret subkey for public subkey %s - ignoring\n"), */
	/* keystr_from_pk (sub_pk)); */
	/* continue; */
	/* } */


	/* Now we can get to work. */

	rc = make_backsig (sig_pk->pkt->pkt.signature, main_pk, sub_pk, sub_pk,
	timestamp, NULL);
	if (!rc)
	{
	PKT_signature *newsig;
	PACKET *newpkt;

	rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig_pk->pkt->pkt.signature,
	main_pk, NULL, sub_pk, main_pk,
	NULL, NULL);
	if (!rc)
	{
	/* Put the new sig into place on the pubkey */
	newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*newpkt));
	newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
	free_packet (sig_pk->pkt);
	xfree (sig_pk->pkt);
	sig_pk->pkt = newpkt;

	modified = 1;
	}
	else
	{
	log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	break;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	log_error ("make_backsig failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	break;
	}
	}

	return modified;
	}


	static int
	change_primary_uid_cb (PKT_signature * sig, void *opaque)
	{
	byte buf[1];

	/* first clear all primary uid flags so that we are sure none are
	* lingering around */
	delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID);
	delete_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID);

	/* if opaque is set,we want to set the primary id */
	if (opaque)
	{
	buf[0] = 1;
	build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, buf, 1);
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/*
	* Set the primary uid flag for the selected UID. We will also reset
	* all other primary uid flags. For this to work with have to update
	* all the signature timestamps. If we would do this with the current
	* time, we lose quite a lot of information, so we use a a kludge to
	* do this: Just increment the timestamp by one second which is
	* sufficient to updated a signature during import.
	*/
	static int
	menu_set_primary_uid (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	PKT_public_key *main_pk;
	PKT_user_id *uid;
	KBNODE node;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int selected;
	int attribute = 0;
	int modified = 0;

	if (count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock) != 1)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Please select exactly one user ID.\n"));
	return 0;
	}

	main_pk = NULL;
	uid = NULL;
	selected = 0;

	/* Is our selected uid an attribute packet? */
	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)
	attribute = (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data != NULL);

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	break; /* No more user ids expected - ready. */

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID;
	}
	else if (main_pk && uid && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
	&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	&& attribute == (uid->attrib_data != NULL)
	&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	if (sig->version < 4)
	{
	char *user =
	utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);

	log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
	user);
	xfree (user);
	}
	else
	{
	/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced.
	We can just ignore v3 signatures because they are
	not able to carry the primary ID flag. We also
	ignore self-sigs on user IDs that are not of the
	same type that we are making primary. That is, if
	we are making a user ID primary, we alter user IDs.
	If we are making an attribute packet primary, we
	alter attribute packets. */

	/* FIXME: We must make sure that we only have one
	self-signature per user ID here (not counting
	revocations) */
	PKT_signature *newsig;
	PACKET *newpkt;
	const byte *p;
	int action;

	/* See whether this signature has the primary UID flag. */
	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,
	SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL);
	if (!p)
	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed,
	SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL);
	if (p && p) / yes */
	action = selected ? 0 : -1;
	else /* no */
	action = selected ? 1 : 0;

	if (action)
	{
	int rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
	main_pk, uid, NULL,
	main_pk,
	change_primary_uid_cb,
	action > 0 ? "x" : NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	return 0;
	}
	/* replace the packet */
	newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
	newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
	free_packet (node->pkt);
	xfree (node->pkt);
	node->pkt = newpkt;
	modified = 1;
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}

	return modified;
	}


	/*
	* Set preferences to new values for the selected user IDs
	*/
	static int
	menu_set_preferences (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	PKT_public_key *main_pk;
	PKT_user_id *uid;
	KBNODE node;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int selected, select_all;
	int modified = 0;

	no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);

	select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);

	/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
	main_pk = NULL;
	uid = NULL;
	selected = 0;
	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	break; /* No more user-ids expected - ready. */

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	selected = select_all \|\| (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
	}
	else if (main_pk && uid && selected
	&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
	&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	if (sig->version < 4)
	{
	char *user =
	utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);

	log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
	user);
	xfree (user);
	}
	else
	{
	/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced
	* We have to ignore v3 signatures because they are
	* not able to carry the preferences. */
	PKT_signature *newsig;
	PACKET *newpkt;
	int rc;

	rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
	main_pk, uid, NULL, main_pk,
	keygen_upd_std_prefs, NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	return 0;
	}
	/* replace the packet */
	newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
	newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
	free_packet (node->pkt);
	xfree (node->pkt);
	node->pkt = newpkt;
	modified = 1;
	}
	}
	}
	}

	return modified;
	}


	static int
	menu_set_keyserver_url (const char *url, KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	PKT_public_key *main_pk;
	PKT_user_id *uid;
	KBNODE node;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int selected, select_all;
	int modified = 0;
	char answer, uri;

	no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);

	if (url)
	answer = xstrdup (url);
	else
	{
	answer = cpr_get_utf8 ("keyedit.add_keyserver",
	_("Enter your preferred keyserver URL: "));
	if (answer[0] == '\0' \|\| answer[0] == CONTROL_D)
	{
	xfree (answer);
	return 0;
	}
	}

	if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "none") == 0)
	uri = NULL;
	else
	{
	struct keyserver_spec *keyserver = NULL;
	/* Sanity check the format */
	keyserver = parse_keyserver_uri (answer, 1);
	xfree (answer);
	if (!keyserver)
	{
	log_info (_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
	return 0;
	}
	uri = xstrdup (keyserver->uri);
	free_keyserver_spec (keyserver);
	}

	select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);

	/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
	main_pk = NULL;
	uid = NULL;
	selected = 0;
	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	break; /* ready */

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	selected = select_all \|\| (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
	}
	else if (main_pk && uid && selected
	&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
	&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);
	if (sig->version < 4)
	log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
	user);
	else
	{
	/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced
	* We have to ignore v3 signatures because they are
	* not able to carry the subpacket. */
	PKT_signature *newsig;
	PACKET *newpkt;
	int rc;
	const byte *p;
	size_t plen;

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, &plen);
	if (p && plen)
	{
	tty_printf ("Current preferred keyserver for user"
	" ID \"%s\": ", user);
	tty_print_utf8_string (p, plen);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("keyedit.confirm_keyserver",
	uri
	? _("Are you sure you want to replace it? (y/N) ")
	: _("Are you sure you want to delete it? (y/N) ")))
	continue;
	}
	else if (uri == NULL)
	{
	/* There is no current keyserver URL, so there
	is no point in trying to un-set it. */
	continue;
	}

	rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
	main_pk, uid, NULL,
	main_pk,
	keygen_add_keyserver_url, uri);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	xfree (uri);
	return 0;
	}
	/* replace the packet */
	newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
	newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
	free_packet (node->pkt);
	xfree (node->pkt);
	node->pkt = newpkt;
	modified = 1;
	}

	xfree (user);
	}
	}
	}

	xfree (uri);
	return modified;
	}

	static int
	menu_set_notation (const char *string, KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	PKT_public_key *main_pk;
	PKT_user_id *uid;
	KBNODE node;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int selected, select_all;
	int modified = 0;
	char *answer;
	struct notation *notation;

	no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock);

	if (string)
	answer = xstrdup (string);
	else
	{
	answer = cpr_get_utf8 ("keyedit.add_notation",
	_("Enter the notation: "));
	if (answer[0] == '\0' \|\| answer[0] == CONTROL_D)
	{
	xfree (answer);
	return 0;
	}
	}

	if (!ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "none")
	\|\| !ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "-"))
	notation = NULL; /* Delete them all. */
	else
	{
	notation = string_to_notation (answer, 0);
	if (!notation)
	{
	xfree (answer);
	return 0;
	}
	}

	xfree (answer);

	select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);

	/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
	main_pk = NULL;
	uid = NULL;
	selected = 0;
	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	break; /* ready */

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	selected = select_all \|\| (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
	}
	else if (main_pk && uid && selected
	&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
	&& (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0);
	if (sig->version < 4)
	log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
	user);
	else
	{
	PKT_signature *newsig;
	PACKET *newpkt;
	int rc, skip = 0, addonly = 1;

	if (sig->flags.notation)
	{
	tty_printf ("Current notations for user ID \"%s\":\n",
	user);
	tty_print_notations (-9, sig);
	}
	else
	{
	tty_printf ("No notations on user ID \"%s\"\n", user);
	if (notation == NULL)
	{
	/* There are no current notations, so there
	is no point in trying to un-set them. */
	continue;
	}
	}

	if (notation)
	{
	struct notation *n;
	int deleting = 0;

	notation->next = sig_to_notation (sig);

	for (n = notation->next; n; n = n->next)
	if (strcmp (n->name, notation->name) == 0)
	{
	if (notation->value)
	{
	if (strcmp (n->value, notation->value) == 0)
	{
	if (notation->flags.ignore)
	{
	/* Value match with a delete
	flag. */
	n->flags.ignore = 1;
	deleting = 1;
	}
	else
	{
	/* Adding the same notation
	twice, so don't add it at
	all. */
	skip = 1;
	tty_printf ("Skipping notation:"
	" %s=%s\n",
	notation->name,
	notation->value);
	break;
	}
	}
	}
	else
	{
	/* No value, so it means delete. */
	n->flags.ignore = 1;
	deleting = 1;
	}

	if (n->flags.ignore)
	{
	tty_printf ("Removing notation: %s=%s\n",
	n->name, n->value);
	addonly = 0;
	}
	}

	if (!notation->flags.ignore && !skip)
	tty_printf ("Adding notation: %s=%s\n",
	notation->name, notation->value);

	/* We tried to delete, but had no matches. */
	if (notation->flags.ignore && !deleting)
	continue;
	}
	else
	{
	tty_printf ("Removing all notations\n");
	addonly = 0;
	}

	if (skip
	\|\| (!addonly
	&&
	!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.confirm_notation",
	_("Proceed? (y/N) "))))
	continue;

	rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
	main_pk, uid, NULL,
	main_pk,
	keygen_add_notations, notation);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	free_notation (notation);
	xfree (user);
	return 0;
	}

	/* replace the packet */
	newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt);
	newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
	free_packet (node->pkt);
	xfree (node->pkt);
	node->pkt = newpkt;
	modified = 1;

	if (notation)
	{
	/* Snip off the notation list from the sig */
	free_notation (notation->next);
	notation->next = NULL;
	}

	xfree (user);
	}
	}
	}
	}

	free_notation (notation);
	return modified;
	}


	/*
	* Select one user id or remove all selection if IDX is 0 or select
	* all if IDX is -1. Returns: True if the selection changed.
	*/
	static int
	menu_select_uid (KBNODE keyblock, int idx)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i;

	if (idx == -1) /* Select all. */
	{
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELUID;
	return 1;
	}
	else if (idx) /* Toggle. */
	{
	for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	if (++i == idx)
	break;
	}
	if (!node)
	{
	tty_printf (_("No user ID with index %d\n"), idx);
	return 0;
	}

	for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	if (++i == idx)
	{
	if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
	else
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELUID;
	}
	}
	}
	}
	else /* Unselect all */
	{
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
	}

	return 1;
	}


	/* Search in the keyblock for a uid that matches namehash */
	static int
	menu_select_uid_namehash (KBNODE keyblock, const char *namehash)
	{
	byte hash[NAMEHASH_LEN];
	KBNODE node;
	int i;

	assert (strlen (namehash) == NAMEHASH_LEN * 2);

	for (i = 0; i < NAMEHASH_LEN; i++)
	hash[i] = hextobyte (&namehash[i * 2]);

	for (node = keyblock->next; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	namehash_from_uid (node->pkt->pkt.user_id);
	if (memcmp (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->namehash, hash, NAMEHASH_LEN) ==
	0)
	{
	if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
	else
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELUID;

	break;
	}
	}
	}

	if (!node)
	{
	tty_printf (_("No user ID with hash %s\n"), namehash);
	return 0;
	}

	return 1;
	}


	/*
	* Select secondary keys
	* Returns: True if the selection changed.
	*/
	static int
	menu_select_key (KBNODE keyblock, int idx)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i;

	if (idx == -1) /* Select all. */
	{
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELKEY;
	}
	else if (idx) /* Toggle selection. */
	{
	for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	if (++i == idx)
	break;
	}
	if (!node)
	{
	tty_printf (_("No subkey with index %d\n"), idx);
	return 0;
	}

	for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	if (++i == idx)
	{
	if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
	else
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELKEY;
	}
	}
	}
	else /* Unselect all. */
	{
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
	}

	return 1;
	}


	static int
	count_uids_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i = 0;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & flag))
	i++;
	return i;
	}


	static int
	count_keys_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i = 0;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if ((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) && (node->flag & flag))
	i++;
	return i;
	}


	static int
	count_uids (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int i = 0;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	i++;
	return i;
	}


	/*
	* Returns true if there is at least one selected user id
	*/
	static int
	count_selected_uids (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	return count_uids_with_flag (keyblock, NODFLG_SELUID);
	}


	static int
	count_selected_keys (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	return count_keys_with_flag (keyblock, NODFLG_SELKEY);
	}


	/* Returns how many real (i.e. not attribute) uids are unmarked. */
	static int
	real_uids_left (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int real = 0;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) &&
	!node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
	real++;

	return real;
	}


	/*
	* Ask whether the signature should be revoked. If the user commits this,
	* flag bit MARK_A is set on the signature and the user ID.
	*/
	static void
	ask_revoke_sig (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node)
	{
	int doit = 0;
	PKT_user_id *uid;
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	KBNODE unode = find_prev_kbnode (keyblock, node, PKT_USER_ID);

	if (!unode)
	{
	log_error ("Oops: no user ID for signature\n");
	return;
	}

	uid = unode->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	if (uid->attrib_data)
	printf ("uat:::::::::%u %lu", uid->numattribs, uid->attrib_len);
	else
	{
	es_printf ("uid:::::::::");
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, uid->name, uid->len, ":", NULL);
	}

	es_printf ("\n");

	print_and_check_one_sig_colon (keyblock, node, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
	1);
	}
	else
	{
	char *p = utf8_to_native (unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
	tty_printf (_("user ID: \"%s\"\n"), p);
	xfree (p);

	tty_printf (_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"),
	keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig),
	sig->flags.exportable ? "" : _(" (non-exportable)"), "");
	}
	if (sig->flags.expired)
	{
	tty_printf (_("This signature expired on %s.\n"),
	expirestr_from_sig (sig));
	/* Use a different question so we can have different help text */
	doit = cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("ask_revoke_sig.expired",
	_("Are you sure you still want to revoke it? (y/N) "));
	}
	else
	doit = cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("ask_revoke_sig.one",
	_("Create a revocation certificate for this signature? (y/N) "));

	if (doit)
	{
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_MARK_A;
	unode->flag \|= NODFLG_MARK_A;
	}
	}


	/*
	* Display all user ids of the current public key together with signatures
	* done by one of our keys. Then walk over all this sigs and ask the user
	* whether he wants to revoke this signature.
	* Return: True when the keyblock has changed.
	*/
	static int
	menu_revsig (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig;
	PKT_public_key *primary_pk;
	KBNODE node;
	int changed = 0;
	int rc, any, skip = 1, all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock);
	struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;

	assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);

	/* First check whether we have any signatures at all. */
	any = 0;
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_SELSIG \| NODFLG_MARK_A);
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID \|\| all)
	skip = 0;
	else
	skip = 1;
	}
	else if (!skip && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& ((sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature),
	have_secret_key_with_kid (sig->keyid)))
	{
	if ((sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	{
	any = 1;
	break;
	}
	}
	}

	if (!any)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Not signed by you.\n"));
	return 0;
	}


	/* FIXME: detect duplicates here */
	tty_printf (_("You have signed these user IDs on key %s:\n"),
	keystr_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key));
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_SELSIG \| NODFLG_MARK_A);
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID \|\| all)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	/* Hmmm: Should we show only UIDs with a signature? */
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	skip = 0;
	}
	else
	skip = 1;
	}
	else if (!skip && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& ((sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature),
	have_secret_key_with_kid (sig->keyid)))
	{
	if ((sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	{
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_printf (_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"),
	keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig),
	sig->flags.exportable ? "" : _(" (non-exportable)"),
	sig->flags.revocable ? "" : _(" (non-revocable)"));
	if (sig->flags.revocable)
	node->flag \|= NODFLG_SELSIG;
	}
	else if (sig->sig_class == 0x30)
	{
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_printf (_("revoked by your key %s on %s\n"),
	keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig));
	}
	}
	}

	tty_printf ("\n");

	/* ask */
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (!(node->flag & NODFLG_SELSIG))
	continue;
	ask_revoke_sig (keyblock, node);
	}

	/* present selected */
	any = 0;
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (!(node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A))
	continue;
	if (!any)
	{
	any = 1;
	tty_printf (_("You are about to revoke these signatures:\n"));
	}
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
	tty_printf ("\n");
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	tty_printf (" ");
	tty_printf (_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"),
	keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig), "",
	sig->flags.exportable ? "" : _(" (non-exportable)"));
	}
	}
	if (!any)
	return 0; /* none selected */

	if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes
	("ask_revoke_sig.okay",
	_("Really create the revocation certificates? (y/N) ")))
	return 0; /* forget it */

	reason = ask_revocation_reason (0, 1, 0);
	if (!reason)
	{ /* user decided to cancel */
	return 0;
	}

	/* now we can sign the user ids */
	reloop: /* (must use this, because we are modifing the list) */
	primary_pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	KBNODE unode;
	PACKET *pkt;
	struct sign_attrib attrib;
	PKT_public_key *signerkey;

	if (!(node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A)
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
	continue;
	unode = find_prev_kbnode (keyblock, node, PKT_USER_ID);
	assert (unode); /* we already checked this */

	memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
	attrib.reason = reason;
	attrib.non_exportable = !node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable;

	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
	signerkey = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *signerkey);
	if (get_seckey (signerkey, node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid))
	{
	log_info (_("no secret key\n"));
	free_public_key (signerkey);
	continue;
	}
	rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, primary_pk,
	unode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
	NULL, signerkey, 0x30, 0, 0, 0,
	sign_mk_attrib, &attrib, NULL);
	free_public_key (signerkey);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
	log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
	return changed;
	}
	changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */
	update_trust = 1;
	/* Are we revoking our own uid? */
	if (primary_pk->keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] &&
	primary_pk->keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
	unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked = 1;
	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
	insert_kbnode (unode, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
	goto reloop;
	}

	release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
	return changed;
	}


	/* Revoke a user ID (i.e. revoke a user ID selfsig). Return true if
	keyblock changed. */
	static int
	menu_revuid (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	KBNODE node;
	int changed = 0;
	int rc;
	struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;

	/* Note that this is correct as per the RFCs, but nevertheless
	somewhat meaningless in the real world. 1991 did define the 0x30
	sig class, but PGP 2.x did not actually implement it, so it would
	probably be safe to use v4 revocations everywhere. -ds */

	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (pk->version > 3 \|\| (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id->selfsigversion > 3))
	{
	if ((reason = ask_revocation_reason (0, 1, 4)))
	break;
	else
	goto leave;
	}

	reloop: /* (better this way because we are modifing the keyring) */
	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	if (uid->is_revoked)
	{
	char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, uid->len, 0);
	log_info (_("user ID \"%s\" is already revoked\n"), user);
	xfree (user);
	}
	else
	{
	PACKET *pkt;
	PKT_signature *sig;
	struct sign_attrib attrib;
	u32 timestamp = make_timestamp ();

	if (uid->created >= timestamp)
	{
	/* Okay, this is a problem. The user ID selfsig was
	created in the future, so we need to warn the user and
	set our revocation timestamp one second after that so
	everything comes out clean. */

	log_info (_("WARNING: a user ID signature is dated %d"
	" seconds in the future\n"),
	uid->created - timestamp);

	timestamp = uid->created + 1;
	}

	memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
	attrib.reason = reason;

	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;

	rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, uid, NULL, pk, 0x30, 0,
	timestamp, 0,
	sign_mk_attrib, &attrib, NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
	log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto leave;
	}
	else
	{
	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
	insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	/* If the trustdb has an entry for this key+uid then the
	trustdb needs an update. */
	if (!update_trust
	- && (get_validity (pk, uid) & TRUST_MASK) >=
	+ && (get_validity (pk, uid, NULL, 0) & TRUST_MASK) >=
	TRUST_UNDEFINED)
	update_trust = 1;
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/

	changed = 1;
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked = 1;

	goto reloop;
	}
	}
	}

	if (changed)
	commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);

	leave:
	release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
	return changed;
	}


	/*
	* Revoke the whole key.
	*/
	static int
	menu_revkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	int rc, changed = 0;
	struct revocation_reason_info *reason;
	PACKET *pkt;
	PKT_signature *sig;

	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Key %s is already revoked.\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk));
	return 0;
	}

	reason = ask_revocation_reason (1, 0, 0);
	/* user decided to cancel */
	if (!reason)
	return 0;

	rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk,
	0x20, 0, 0, 0,
	revocation_reason_build_cb, reason, NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
	log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto scram;
	}

	changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */

	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
	insert_kbnode (pub_keyblock, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
	commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);

	update_trust = 1;

	scram:
	release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
	return changed;
	}


	static int
	menu_revsubkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
	{
	PKT_public_key *mainpk;
	KBNODE node;
	int changed = 0;
	int rc;
	struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;

	reason = ask_revocation_reason (1, 0, 0);
	if (!reason)
	return 0; /* User decided to cancel. */

	reloop: /* (better this way because we are modifing the keyring) */
	mainpk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	&& (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY))
	{
	PACKET *pkt;
	PKT_signature *sig;
	PKT_public_key *subpk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	struct sign_attrib attrib;

	if (subpk->flags.revoked)
	{
	tty_printf (_("Subkey %s is already revoked.\n"),
	keystr_from_pk (subpk));
	continue;
	}

	memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib);
	attrib.reason = reason;

	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
	rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, mainpk, NULL, subpk, mainpk,
	0x28, 0, 0, 0, sign_mk_attrib, &attrib,
	NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_error ("keysig", rc);
	log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
	return changed;
	}
	changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */

	pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
	pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
	insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), 0);
	goto reloop;
	}
	}
	commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock);

	/* No need to set update_trust here since signing keys no longer
	are used to certify other keys, so there is no change in trust
	when revoking/removing them */

	release_revocation_reason_info (reason);
	return changed;
	}


	/* Note that update_ownertrust is going to mark the trustdb dirty when
	enabling or disabling a key. This is arguably sub-optimal as
	disabled keys are still counted in the web of trust, but perhaps
	not worth adding extra complexity to change. -ds */
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	static int
	enable_disable_key (KBNODE keyblock, int disable)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk =
	find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	unsigned int trust, newtrust;

	trust = newtrust = get_ownertrust (pk);
	newtrust &= ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
	if (disable)
	newtrust \|= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
	if (trust == newtrust)
	return 0; /* already in that state */
	update_ownertrust (pk, newtrust);
	return 0;
	}
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/


	static void
	menu_showphoto (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int select_all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock);
	int count = 0;
	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;

	/* Look for the public key first. We have to be really, really,
	explicit as to which photo this is, and what key it is a UID on
	since people may want to sign it. */

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	count++;

	if ((select_all \|\| (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)) &&
	uid->attribs != NULL)
	{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < uid->numattribs; i++)
	{
	byte type;
	u32 size;

	if (uid->attribs[i].type == ATTRIB_IMAGE &&
	parse_image_header (&uid->attribs[i], &type, &size))
	{
	tty_printf (_("Displaying %s photo ID of size %ld for "
	"key %s (uid %d)\n"),
	image_type_to_string (type, 1),
	(ulong) size, keystr_from_pk (pk), count);
	show_photos (&uid->attribs[i], 1, pk, uid);
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}
	diff --git a/g10/keylist.c b/g10/keylist.c
	index 3814f1c7c..154169718 100644
	--- a/g10/keylist.c
	+++ b/g10/keylist.c
	@@ -1,1986 +1,1997 @@
	/* keylist.c - Print information about OpenPGP keys
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
	* 2008, 2010, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 2013, 2014 Werner Koch
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <errno.h>
	#include <assert.h>
	#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
	#include <fcntl.h> /* for setmode() */
	#endif

	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "status.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "photoid.h"
	#include "util.h"
	#include "ttyio.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "i18n.h"
	#include "status.h"
	#include "call-agent.h"
	#include "mbox-util.h"
	+#include "tofu.h"


	static void list_all (ctrl_t, int, int);
	static void list_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
	strlist_t names, int secret, int mark_secret);
	static void locate_one (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names);
	static void print_card_serialno (const char *serialno);

	struct keylist_context
	{
	int check_sigs; /* If set signatures shall be verified. */
	int good_sigs; /* Counter used if CHECK_SIGS is set. */
	int inv_sigs; /* Counter used if CHECK_SIGS is set. */
	int no_key; /* Counter used if CHECK_SIGS is set. */
	int oth_err; /* Counter used if CHECK_SIGS is set. */
	};


	static void list_keyblock (ctrl_t ctrl,
	kbnode_t keyblock, int secret, int has_secret,
	int fpr, struct keylist_context *listctx);


	/* The stream used to write attribute packets to. */
	static estream_t attrib_fp;


	/* Release resources from a keylist context. */
	static void
	keylist_context_release (struct keylist_context *listctx)
	{
	(void)listctx; /* Nothing to release. */
	}


	/* List the keys. If list is NULL, all available keys are listed.
	With LOCATE_MODE set the locate algorithm is used to find a
	key. */
	void
	public_key_list (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t list, int locate_mode)
	{
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	byte trust_model, marginals, completes, cert_depth, min_cert_level;
	ulong created, nextcheck;

	read_trust_options (&trust_model, &created, &nextcheck,
	&marginals, &completes, &cert_depth, &min_cert_level);

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "tru:");

	if (nextcheck && nextcheck <= make_timestamp ())
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "o");
	if (trust_model != opt.trust_model)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "t");
	- if (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC)
	+ if (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC
	+ \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
	{
	if (marginals != opt.marginals_needed)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "m");
	if (completes != opt.completes_needed)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "c");
	if (cert_depth != opt.max_cert_depth)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "d");
	if (min_cert_level != opt.min_cert_level)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "l");
	}

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":%d:%lu:%lu", trust_model, created, nextcheck);

	/* Only show marginals, completes, and cert_depth in the classic
	or PGP trust models since they are not meaningful
	otherwise. */

	if (trust_model == TM_PGP \|\| trust_model == TM_CLASSIC)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":%d:%d:%d", marginals, completes, cert_depth);
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "\n");
	}
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/

	/* We need to do the stale check right here because it might need to
	update the keyring while we already have the keyring open. This
	is very bad for W32 because of a sharing violation. For real OSes
	it might lead to false results if we are later listing a keyring
	which is associated with the inode of a deleted file. */
	check_trustdb_stale ();

	if (locate_mode)
	locate_one (ctrl, list);
	else if (!list)
	list_all (ctrl, 0, opt.with_secret);
	else
	list_one (ctrl, list, 0, opt.with_secret);
	}


	void
	secret_key_list (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t list)
	{
	(void)ctrl;

	check_trustdb_stale ();

	if (!list)
	list_all (ctrl, 1, 0);
	else /* List by user id */
	list_one (ctrl, list, 1, 0);
	}

	void
	print_seckey_info (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	u32 keyid[2];
	char *p;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

	keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
	p = get_user_id_native (keyid);

	tty_printf ("\nsec %s/%s %s %s\n",
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr (keyid), datestr_from_pk (pk), p);

	xfree (p);
	}

	/* Print information about the public key. With FP passed as NULL,
	the tty output interface is used, otherwise output is directted to
	the given stream. */
	void
	print_pubkey_info (estream_t fp, PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	u32 keyid[2];
	char *p;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

	keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);

	/* If the pk was chosen by a particular user ID, that is the one to
	print. */
	if (pk->user_id)
	p = utf8_to_native (pk->user_id->name, pk->user_id->len, 0);
	else
	p = get_user_id_native (keyid);

	if (fp)
	tty_printf ("\n");
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%s %s/%s %s %s\n",
	pk->flags.primary? "pub":"sub",
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr (keyid), datestr_from_pk (pk), p);
	xfree (p);
	}


	/* Print basic information of a secret key including the card serial
	number information. */
	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	void
	print_card_key_info (estream_t fp, kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	kbnode_t node;
	char *hexgrip;
	char *serialno;
	int s2k_char;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
	int indent;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	int rc;
	PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	serialno = NULL;
	rc = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	s2k_char = '?';
	}
	else if (!agent_get_keyinfo (NULL, hexgrip, &serialno))
	s2k_char = serialno? '>':' ';
	else
	s2k_char = '#'; /* Key not found. */

	tty_fprintf (fp, "%s%c %s/%s %n",
	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "sec" : "ssb",
	s2k_char,
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr_from_pk (pk),
	&indent);
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("created: %s"), datestr_from_pk (pk));
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	tty_fprintf (fp, _("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
	if (serialno)
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n%*s%s", indent, "", _("card-no: "));
	if (strlen (serialno) == 32
	&& !strncmp (serialno, "D27600012401", 12))
	{
	/* This is an OpenPGP card. Print the relevant part. */
	/* Example: D2760001240101010001000003470000 */
	/* xxxxyyyyyyyy */
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%.s %.s", 4, serialno+16, 8, serialno+20);
	}
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%s", serialno);
	}
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	xfree (hexgrip);
	xfree (serialno);
	}
	}
	}
	#endif /ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT/


	/* Flags = 0x01 hashed 0x02 critical. */
	static void
	status_one_subpacket (sigsubpkttype_t type, size_t len, int flags,
	const byte * buf)
	{
	char status[40];

	/* Don't print these. */
	if (len > 256)
	return;

	snprintf (status, sizeof status,
	"%d %u %u ", type, flags, (unsigned int) len);

	write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_SIG_SUBPACKET, status, buf, len, 0);
	}


	/* Print a policy URL. Allowed values for MODE are:
	* 0 - print to stdout.
	* 1 - use log_info and emit status messages.
	* 2 - emit only status messages.
	*/
	void
	show_policy_url (PKT_signature * sig, int indent, int mode)
	{
	const byte *p;
	size_t len;
	int seq = 0, crit;
	estream_t fp = mode ? log_get_stream () : es_stdout;

	while ((p =
	enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_POLICY, &len, &seq, &crit)))
	{
	if (mode != 2)
	{
	int i;
	const char *str;

	for (i = 0; i < indent; i++)
	es_putc (' ', fp);

	if (crit)
	str = _("Critical signature policy: ");
	else
	str = _("Signature policy: ");
	if (mode)
	log_info ("%s", str);
	else
	es_fprintf (fp, "%s", str);
	print_utf8_buffer (fp, p, len);
	es_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	}

	if (mode)
	write_status_buffer (STATUS_POLICY_URL, p, len, 0);
	}
	}


	/*
	mode=0 for stdout.
	mode=1 for log_info + status messages
	mode=2 for status messages only
	*/
	/* TODO: use this */
	void
	show_keyserver_url (PKT_signature * sig, int indent, int mode)
	{
	const byte *p;
	size_t len;
	int seq = 0, crit;
	estream_t fp = mode ? log_get_stream () : es_stdout;

	while ((p =
	enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, &len, &seq,
	&crit)))
	{
	if (mode != 2)
	{
	int i;
	const char *str;

	for (i = 0; i < indent; i++)
	es_putc (' ', es_stdout);

	if (crit)
	str = _("Critical preferred keyserver: ");
	else
	str = _("Preferred keyserver: ");
	if (mode)
	log_info ("%s", str);
	else
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s", str);
	print_utf8_buffer (fp, p, len);
	es_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	}

	if (mode)
	status_one_subpacket (SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, len,
	(crit ? 0x02 : 0) \| 0x01, p);
	}
	}

	/*
	mode=0 for stdout.
	mode=1 for log_info + status messages
	mode=2 for status messages only

	Defined bits in WHICH:
	1 == standard notations
	2 == user notations
	*/
	void
	show_notation (PKT_signature * sig, int indent, int mode, int which)
	{
	estream_t fp = mode ? log_get_stream () : es_stdout;
	struct notation nd, notations;

	if (which == 0)
	which = 3;

	notations = sig_to_notation (sig);

	/* There may be multiple notations in the same sig. */
	for (nd = notations; nd; nd = nd->next)
	{
	if (mode != 2)
	{
	int has_at = !!strchr (nd->name, '@');

	if ((which & 1 && !has_at) \|\| (which & 2 && has_at))
	{
	int i;
	const char *str;

	for (i = 0; i < indent; i++)
	es_putc (' ', es_stdout);

	if (nd->flags.critical)
	str = _("Critical signature notation: ");
	else
	str = _("Signature notation: ");
	if (mode)
	log_info ("%s", str);
	else
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s", str);
	/* This is all UTF8 */
	print_utf8_buffer (fp, nd->name, strlen (nd->name));
	es_fprintf (fp, "=");
	print_utf8_buffer (fp, nd->value, strlen (nd->value));
	/* (We need to use log_printf so that the next call to a
	log function does not insert an extra LF.) */
	if (mode)
	log_printf ("\n");
	else
	es_putc ('\n', fp);
	}
	}

	if (mode)
	{
	write_status_buffer (STATUS_NOTATION_NAME,
	nd->name, strlen (nd->name), 0);
	write_status_buffer (STATUS_NOTATION_DATA,
	nd->value, strlen (nd->value), 50);
	}
	}

	free_notation (notations);
	}


	static void
	print_signature_stats (struct keylist_context *s)
	{
	if (!s->check_sigs)
	return; /* Signature checking was not requested. */

	if (s->good_sigs == 1)
	log_info (_("1 good signature\n"));
	else if (s->good_sigs)
	log_info (_("%d good signatures\n"), s->good_sigs);

	if (s->inv_sigs == 1)
	log_info (_("1 bad signature\n"));
	else if (s->inv_sigs)
	log_info (_("%d bad signatures\n"), s->inv_sigs);

	if (s->no_key == 1)
	log_info (_("1 signature not checked due to a missing key\n"));
	else if (s->no_key)
	log_info (_("%d signatures not checked due to missing keys\n"), s->no_key);

	if (s->oth_err == 1)
	log_info (_("1 signature not checked due to an error\n"));
	else if (s->oth_err)
	log_info (_("%d signatures not checked due to errors\n"), s->oth_err);
	}


	/* List all keys. If SECRET is true only secret keys are listed. If
	MARK_SECRET is true secret keys are indicated in a public key
	listing. */
	static void
	list_all (ctrl_t ctrl, int secret, int mark_secret)
	{
	KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
	KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
	int rc = 0;
	int any_secret;
	const char lastresname, resname;
	struct keylist_context listctx;

	memset (&listctx, 0, sizeof (listctx));
	if (opt.check_sigs)
	listctx.check_sigs = 1;

	hd = keydb_new ();
	if (!hd)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	else
	rc = keydb_search_first (hd);
	if (rc)
	{
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	log_error ("keydb_search_first failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto leave;
	}

	lastresname = NULL;
	do
	{
	rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
	if (rc)
	{
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_LEGACY_KEY)
	continue; /* Skip legacy keys. */
	log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto leave;
	}

	if (secret \|\| mark_secret)
	any_secret = !agent_probe_any_secret_key (NULL, keyblock);
	else
	any_secret = 0;

	if (secret && !any_secret)
	; /* Secret key listing requested but this isn't one. */
	else
	{
	if (!opt.with_colons)
	{
	resname = keydb_get_resource_name (hd);
	if (lastresname != resname)
	{
	int i;

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s\n", resname);
	for (i = strlen (resname); i; i--)
	es_putc ('-', es_stdout);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	lastresname = resname;
	}
	}
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	list_keyblock (ctrl, keyblock, secret, any_secret, opt.fingerprint,
	&listctx);
	}
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	keyblock = NULL;
	}
	while (!(rc = keydb_search_next (hd)));
	es_fflush (es_stdout);
	if (rc && gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	if (keydb_get_skipped_counter (hd))
	log_info (_("Warning: %lu key(s) skipped due to their large size\n"),
	keydb_get_skipped_counter (hd));

	if (opt.check_sigs && !opt.with_colons)
	print_signature_stats (&listctx);

	leave:
	keylist_context_release (&listctx);
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	keydb_release (hd);
	}


	static void
	list_one (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names, int secret, int mark_secret)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
	GETKEY_CTX ctx;
	const char *resname;
	const char *keyring_str = _("Keyring");
	int i;
	struct keylist_context listctx;

	memset (&listctx, 0, sizeof (listctx));
	if (!secret && opt.check_sigs)
	listctx.check_sigs = 1;

	/* fixme: using the bynames function has the disadvantage that we
	* don't know wether one of the names given was not found. OTOH,
	* this function has the advantage to list the names in the
	* sequence as defined by the keyDB and does not duplicate
	* outputs. A solution could be do test whether all given have
	* been listed (this needs a way to use the keyDB search
	* functions) or to have the search function return indicators for
	* found names. Yet another way is to use the keydb search
	* facilities directly. */
	rc = getkey_bynames (&ctx, NULL, names, secret, &keyblock);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("error reading key: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	getkey_end (ctx);
	return;
	}

	do
	{
	if ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_KEYRING) && !opt.with_colons)
	{
	resname = keydb_get_resource_name (get_ctx_handle (ctx));
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s: %s\n", keyring_str, resname);
	for (i = strlen (resname) + strlen (keyring_str) + 2; i; i--)
	es_putc ('-', es_stdout);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	list_keyblock (ctrl,
	keyblock, secret, mark_secret, opt.fingerprint, &listctx);
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	}
	while (!getkey_next (ctx, NULL, &keyblock));
	getkey_end (ctx);

	if (opt.check_sigs && !opt.with_colons)
	print_signature_stats (&listctx);

	keylist_context_release (&listctx);
	}


	static void
	locate_one (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	strlist_t sl;
	GETKEY_CTX ctx = NULL;
	KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
	struct keylist_context listctx;

	memset (&listctx, 0, sizeof (listctx));
	if (opt.check_sigs)
	listctx.check_sigs = 1;

	for (sl = names; sl; sl = sl->next)
	{
	rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, &ctx, NULL, sl->d, &keyblock, NULL, 1, 0);
	if (rc)
	{
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
	log_error ("error reading key: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	else if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),
	sl->d, gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	else
	{
	do
	{
	list_keyblock (ctrl, keyblock, 0, 0, opt.fingerprint, &listctx);
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	}
	while (ctx && !getkey_next (ctx, NULL, &keyblock));
	getkey_end (ctx);
	ctx = NULL;
	}
	}

	if (opt.check_sigs && !opt.with_colons)
	print_signature_stats (&listctx);

	keylist_context_release (&listctx);
	}


	static void
	print_key_data (PKT_public_key * pk)
	{
	int n = pk ? pubkey_get_npkey (pk->pubkey_algo) : 0;
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "pkd:%d:%u:", i, mpi_get_nbits (pk->pkey[i]));
	mpi_print (es_stdout, pk->pkey[i], 1);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	}

	static void
	print_capabilities (PKT_public_key *pk, KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	unsigned int use = pk->pubkey_usage;
	int c_printed = 0;

	if (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)
	es_putc ('e', es_stdout);

	if (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)
	{
	es_putc ('s', es_stdout);
	if (pk->flags.primary)
	{
	es_putc ('c', es_stdout);
	/* The PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT flag was introduced later and we
	used to always print 'c' for a primary key. To avoid any
	regression here we better track whether we printed 'c'
	already. */
	c_printed = 1;
	}
	}

	if ((use & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT) && !c_printed)
	es_putc ('c', es_stdout);

	if ((use & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH))
	es_putc ('a', es_stdout);

	if ((use & PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN))
	es_putc ('?', es_stdout);

	if (keyblock)
	{
	/* Figure out the usable capabilities. */
	KBNODE k;
	int enc = 0, sign = 0, cert = 0, auth = 0, disabled = 0;

	for (k = keyblock; k; k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	if (pk->flags.primary)
	disabled = pk_is_disabled (pk);

	if (pk->flags.valid && !pk->flags.revoked && !pk->has_expired)
	{
	if (pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)
	enc = 1;
	if (pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)
	{
	sign = 1;
	if (pk->flags.primary)
	cert = 1;
	}
	if (pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT)
	cert = 1;
	if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH))
	auth = 1;
	}
	}
	}
	if (enc)
	es_putc ('E', es_stdout);
	if (sign)
	es_putc ('S', es_stdout);
	if (cert)
	es_putc ('C', es_stdout);
	if (auth)
	es_putc ('A', es_stdout);
	if (disabled)
	es_putc ('D', es_stdout);
	}

	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	}


	/* FLAGS: 0x01 hashed
	0x02 critical */
	static void
	print_one_subpacket (sigsubpkttype_t type, size_t len, int flags,
	const byte * buf)
	{
	size_t i;

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "spk:%d:%u:%u:", type, flags, (unsigned int) len);

	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
	{
	/* printable ascii other than : and % */
	if (buf[i] >= 32 && buf[i] <= 126 && buf[i] != ':' && buf[i] != '%')
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%c", buf[i]);
	else
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%%%02X", buf[i]);
	}

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "\n");
	}


	void
	print_subpackets_colon (PKT_signature * sig)
	{
	byte *i;

	assert (opt.show_subpackets);

	for (i = opt.show_subpackets; *i; i++)
	{
	const byte *p;
	size_t len;
	int seq, crit;

	seq = 0;

	while ((p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, *i, &len, &seq, &crit)))
	print_one_subpacket (*i, len, 0x01 \| (crit ? 0x02 : 0), p);

	seq = 0;

	while ((p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, *i, &len, &seq, &crit)))
	print_one_subpacket (*i, len, 0x00 \| (crit ? 0x02 : 0), p);
	}
	}


	void
	dump_attribs (const PKT_user_id uid, PKT_public_key pk)
	{
	int i;

	if (!attrib_fp)
	return;

	for (i = 0; i < uid->numattribs; i++)
	{
	if (is_status_enabled ())
	{
	byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
	char buf[(MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN * 2) + 90];
	size_t j, n;

	if (!pk)
	BUG ();
	fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n);

	p = array;
	for (j = 0; j < n; j++, p++)
	sprintf (buf + 2 * j, "%02X", *p);

	sprintf (buf + strlen (buf), " %lu %u %u %u %lu %lu %u",
	(ulong) uid->attribs[i].len, uid->attribs[i].type, i + 1,
	uid->numattribs, (ulong) uid->created,
	(ulong) uid->expiredate,
	((uid->is_primary ? 0x01 : 0) \| (uid->
	is_revoked ? 0x02 : 0) \|
	(uid->is_expired ? 0x04 : 0)));
	write_status_text (STATUS_ATTRIBUTE, buf);
	}

	es_fwrite (uid->attribs[i].data, uid->attribs[i].len, 1, attrib_fp);
	es_fflush (attrib_fp);
	}
	}


	/* Print IPGP cert records instead of a standard key listing. */
	static void
	list_keyblock_pka (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	kbnode_t kbctx;
	kbnode_t node;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
	char *hexfpr;
	char *hexkeyblock = NULL;
	unsigned int hexkeyblocklen;
	const char *s;

	/* Get the keyid from the keyblock. */
	node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	if (!node)
	{
	log_error ("Oops; key lost!\n");
	dump_kbnode (keyblock);
	return;
	}

	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	/* First print an overview of the key with all userids. */
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, ";; pub %s/%s %s\n;;",
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr_from_pk (pk), datestr_from_pk (pk));
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 10);
	for (kbctx = NULL; (node = walk_kbnode (keyblock, &kbctx, 0));)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	if (pk && (uid->is_expired \|\| uid->is_revoked)
	&& !(opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
	continue;

	es_fputs (";; uid ", es_stdout);
	print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, uid->name, uid->len);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	}


	hexfpr = hexfingerprint (pk);
	if (opt.print_dane_records)
	{
	kbnode_t dummy_keyblock;
	void *data;
	size_t datalen;
	gpg_error_t err;

	/* We do not have an export fucntion which allows to pass a
	keyblock, thus we need to search the key again. */
	err = export_pubkey_buffer (ctrl, hexfpr,
	EXPORT_DANE_FORMAT,
	&dummy_keyblock, &data, &datalen);
	release_kbnode (dummy_keyblock);
	if (!err)
	{
	hexkeyblocklen = datalen;
	hexkeyblock = bin2hex (data, datalen, NULL);
	if (!hexkeyblock)
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	xfree (data);
	ascii_strlwr (hexkeyblock);
	}
	if (err)
	log_error (_("skipped \"%s\": %s\n"), hexfpr, gpg_strerror (err));

	}

	for (kbctx = NULL; (node = walk_kbnode (keyblock, &kbctx, 0));)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	char *mbox;
	char *p;

	if (pk && (uid->is_expired \|\| uid->is_revoked)
	&& !(opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
	continue;

	mbox = mailbox_from_userid (uid->name);
	if (mbox && (p = strchr (mbox, '@')))
	{
	char hashbuf[32];
	char *hash;
	unsigned int len;

	*p++ = 0;
	if (opt.print_pka_records)
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "$ORIGIN _pka.%s.\n; %s\n; ",
	p, hexfpr);
	print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, uid->name, uid->len);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA1, hashbuf,
	mbox, strlen (mbox));
	hash = zb32_encode (hashbuf, 8*20);
	if (hash)
	{
	len = strlen (hexfpr)/2;
	es_fprintf (es_stdout,
	"%s TYPE37 \\# %u 0006 0000 00 %02X %s\n",
	hash, 6 + len, len, hexfpr);
	xfree (hash);
	}
	}
	if (opt.print_dane_records && hexkeyblock)
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "$ORIGIN _openpgpkey.%s.\n; %s\n; ",
	p, hexfpr);
	print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, uid->name, uid->len);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA256, hashbuf,
	mbox, strlen (mbox));
	hash = bin2hex (hashbuf, 28, NULL);
	if (hash)
	{
	ascii_strlwr (hash);
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s TYPE61 \\# %u (\n",
	hash, hexkeyblocklen);
	xfree (hash);
	s = hexkeyblock;
	for (;;)
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "\t%.64s\n", s);
	if (strlen (s) < 64)
	break;
	s += 64;
	}
	es_fputs ("\t)\n", es_stdout);
	}
	}
	}
	xfree (mbox);
	}

	}
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);

	xfree (hexkeyblock);
	xfree (hexfpr);
	}


	static void
	list_keyblock_print (KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int fpr,
	struct keylist_context *listctx)
	{
	int rc;
	KBNODE kbctx;
	KBNODE node;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	int skip_sigs = 0;
	int s2k_char;
	char *hexgrip = NULL;
	char *serialno = NULL;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

	/* Get the keyid from the keyblock. */
	node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	if (!node)
	{
	log_error ("Oops; key lost!\n");
	dump_kbnode (keyblock);
	return;
	}

	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	if (secret \|\| opt.with_keygrip)
	{
	rc = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
	if (rc)
	log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	}

	if (secret)
	{
	if (!agent_get_keyinfo (NULL, hexgrip, &serialno))
	s2k_char = serialno? '>':' ';
	else
	s2k_char = '#'; /* Key not found. */
	}
	else
	s2k_char = ' ';

	check_trustdb_stale ();


	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s%c %s/%s %s",
	secret? "sec":"pub",
	s2k_char,
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr_from_pk (pk), datestr_from_pk (pk));

	if ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_USAGE))
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " [%s]", usagestr_from_pk (pk, 0));
	}
	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " [");
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, _("revoked: %s"), revokestr_from_pk (pk));
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "]");
	}
	else if (pk->has_expired)
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " [");
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, _("expired: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "]");
	}
	else if (pk->expiredate)
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " [");
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, _("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "]");
	}

	#if 0
	/* I need to think about this some more. It's easy enough to
	include, but it looks sort of confusing in the listing... */
	if (opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_VALIDITY)
	{
	- int validity = get_validity (pk, NULL);
	+ int validity = get_validity (pk, NULL, NULL, 0);
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " [%s]", trust_value_to_string (validity));
	}
	#endif

	if (pk->pubkey_algo >= 100)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " [experimental algorithm %d]", pk->pubkey_algo);

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "\n");

	if (fpr)
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 0);

	if (opt.with_keygrip && hexgrip)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " Keygrip = %s\n", hexgrip);

	if (serialno)
	print_card_serialno (serialno);

	if (opt.with_key_data)
	print_key_data (pk);

	for (kbctx = NULL; (node = walk_kbnode (keyblock, &kbctx, 0));)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	if ((uid->is_expired \|\| uid->is_revoked)
	&& !(opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
	{
	skip_sigs = 1;
	continue;
	}
	else
	skip_sigs = 0;

	if (attrib_fp && uid->attrib_data != NULL)
	dump_attribs (uid, pk);

	if ((uid->is_revoked \|\| uid->is_expired)
	\|\| (opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
	{
	const char *validity;
	int indent;

	validity = uid_trust_string_fixed (pk, uid);
	indent =
	(keystrlen () + (opt.legacy_list_mode? 9:11)) -
	atoi (uid_trust_string_fixed (NULL, NULL));

	if (indent < 0 \|\| indent > 40)
	indent = 0;

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "uid%*s%s ", indent, "", validity);
	}
	else
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "uid%*s",
	(int) keystrlen () + (opt.legacy_list_mode? 10:12), "");

	print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, uid->name, uid->len);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);

	if ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS) && uid->attribs != NULL)
	show_photos (uid->attribs, uid->numattribs, pk, uid);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk2 = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	if ((pk2->flags.revoked \|\| pk2->has_expired)
	&& !(opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS))
	{
	skip_sigs = 1;
	continue;
	}
	else
	skip_sigs = 0;

	xfree (serialno); serialno = NULL;
	xfree (hexgrip); hexgrip = NULL;
	if (secret \|\| opt.with_keygrip)
	{
	rc = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk2, &hexgrip);
	if (rc)
	log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	if (secret)
	{
	if (!agent_get_keyinfo (NULL, hexgrip, &serialno))
	s2k_char = serialno? '>':' ';
	else
	s2k_char = '#'; /* Key not found. */
	}
	else
	s2k_char = ' ';

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s%c %s/%s %s",
	secret? "ssb":"sub",
	s2k_char,
	pubkey_string (pk2, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr_from_pk (pk2), datestr_from_pk (pk2));

	if ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_USAGE))
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " [%s]", usagestr_from_pk (pk2, 0));
	}
	if (pk2->flags.revoked)
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " [");
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, _("revoked: %s"), revokestr_from_pk (pk2));
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "]");
	}
	else if (pk2->has_expired)
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " [");
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, _("expired: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk2));
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "]");
	}
	else if (pk2->expiredate)
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " [");
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, _("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk2));
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "]");
	}
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	if (fpr > 1)
	{
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk2, 0);
	if (serialno)
	print_card_serialno (serialno);
	}
	if (opt.with_keygrip && hexgrip)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " Keygrip = %s\n", hexgrip);
	if (opt.with_key_data)
	print_key_data (pk2);
	}
	else if (opt.list_sigs
	&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !skip_sigs)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	int sigrc;
	char *sigstr;

	if (listctx->check_sigs)
	{
	rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, node, NULL);
	switch (gpg_err_code (rc))
	{
	case 0:
	listctx->good_sigs++;
	sigrc = '!';
	break;
	case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
	listctx->inv_sigs++;
	sigrc = '-';
	break;
	case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
	case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY:
	listctx->no_key++;
	continue;
	default:
	listctx->oth_err++;
	sigrc = '%';
	break;
	}

	/* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has
	the pk that issued it. See also
	keyedit.c:print_and_check_one_sig */
	}
	else
	{
	rc = 0;
	sigrc = ' ';
	}

	if (sig->sig_class == 0x20 \|\| sig->sig_class == 0x28
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x30)
	sigstr = "rev";
	else if ((sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	sigstr = "sig";
	else if (sig->sig_class == 0x18)
	sigstr = "sig";
	else if (sig->sig_class == 0x1F)
	sigstr = "sig";
	else
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "sig "
	"[unexpected signature class 0x%02x]\n",
	sig->sig_class);
	continue;
	}

	es_fputs (sigstr, es_stdout);
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%c%c %c%c%c%c%c%c %s %s",
	sigrc, (sig->sig_class - 0x10 > 0 &&
	sig->sig_class - 0x10 <
	4) ? '0' + sig->sig_class - 0x10 : ' ',
	sig->flags.exportable ? ' ' : 'L',
	sig->flags.revocable ? ' ' : 'R',
	sig->flags.policy_url ? 'P' : ' ',
	sig->flags.notation ? 'N' : ' ',
	sig->flags.expired ? 'X' : ' ',
	(sig->trust_depth > 9) ? 'T' : (sig->trust_depth >
	0) ? '0' +
	sig->trust_depth : ' ', keystr (sig->keyid),
	datestr_from_sig (sig));
	if (opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " %s", expirestr_from_sig (sig));
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, " ");
	if (sigrc == '%')
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc));
	else if (sigrc == '?')
	;
	else if (!opt.fast_list_mode)
	{
	size_t n;
	char *p = get_user_id (sig->keyid, &n);
	print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, p, n);
	xfree (p);
	}
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);

	if (sig->flags.policy_url
	&& (opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS))
	show_policy_url (sig, 3, 0);

	if (sig->flags.notation && (opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS))
	show_notation (sig, 3, 0,
	((opt.
	list_options & LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS) ? 1 : 0)
	+
	((opt.
	list_options & LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS) ? 2 :
	0));

	if (sig->flags.pref_ks
	&& (opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS))
	show_keyserver_url (sig, 3, 0);

	/* fixme: check or list other sigs here */
	}
	}
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	xfree (serialno);
	xfree (hexgrip);
	}

	void
	print_revokers (estream_t fp, PKT_public_key * pk)
	{
	/* print the revoker record */
	if (!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys)
	BUG ();
	else
	{
	int i, j;

	for (i = 0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++)
	{
	byte *p;

	es_fprintf (fp, "rvk:::%d::::::", pk->revkey[i].algid);
	p = pk->revkey[i].fpr;
	for (j = 0; j < 20; j++, p++)
	es_fprintf (fp, "%02X", *p);
	es_fprintf (fp, ":%02x%s:\n",
	pk->revkey[i].class,
	(pk->revkey[i].class & 0x40) ? "s" : "");
	}
	}
	}


	/* List a key in colon mode. If SECRET is true this is a secret key
	record (i.e. requested via --list-secret-key). If HAS_SECRET a
	secret key is available even if SECRET is not set. */
	static void
	list_keyblock_colon (KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int has_secret, int fpr)
	{
	int rc;
	KBNODE kbctx;
	KBNODE node;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int trustletter = 0;
	int ulti_hack = 0;
	int i;
	char *p;
	char *hexgrip = NULL;
	char *serialno = NULL;
	int stubkey;

	/* Get the keyid from the keyblock. */
	node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	if (!node)
	{
	log_error ("Oops; key lost!\n");
	dump_kbnode (keyblock);
	return;
	}

	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (secret \|\| has_secret \|\| opt.with_keygrip \|\| opt.with_key_data)
	{
	rc = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
	if (rc)
	log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	stubkey = 0;
	if ((secret\|\|has_secret) && agent_get_keyinfo (NULL, hexgrip, &serialno))
	stubkey = 1; /* Key not found. */

	keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
	es_fputs (secret? "sec:":"pub:", es_stdout);
	if (!pk->flags.valid)
	es_putc ('i', es_stdout);
	else if (pk->flags.revoked)
	es_putc ('r', es_stdout);
	else if (pk->has_expired)
	es_putc ('e', es_stdout);
	else if (opt.fast_list_mode \|\| opt.no_expensive_trust_checks)
	;
	else
	{
	trustletter = get_validity_info (pk, NULL);
	if (trustletter == 'u')
	ulti_hack = 1;
	es_putc (trustletter, es_stdout);
	}

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
	nbits_from_pk (pk),
	pk->pubkey_algo,
	(ulong) keyid[0], (ulong) keyid[1],
	colon_datestr_from_pk (pk), colon_strtime (pk->expiredate));

	if (!opt.fast_list_mode && !opt.no_expensive_trust_checks)
	es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (pk), es_stdout);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);

	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	print_capabilities (pk, keyblock);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 13. */
	es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 14. */
	if (secret \|\| has_secret)
	{
	if (stubkey)
	es_putc ('#', es_stdout);
	else if (serialno)
	es_fputs (serialno, es_stdout);
	else if (has_secret)
	es_putc ('+', es_stdout);
	}
	es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 15. */
	es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 16. */
	if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
	\|\| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA
	\|\| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
	{
	char *curve = openpgp_oid_to_str (pk->pkey[0]);
	const char *name = openpgp_oid_to_curve (curve, 0);
	if (!name)
	name = curve;
	es_fputs (name, es_stdout);
	xfree (curve);
	}
	es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 17. */
	+ es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 18. */
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);

	print_revokers (es_stdout, pk);
	if (fpr)
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 0);
	if (opt.with_key_data \|\| opt.with_keygrip)
	{
	if (hexgrip)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "grp:::::::::%s:\n", hexgrip);
	if (opt.with_key_data)
	print_key_data (pk);
	}

	for (kbctx = NULL; (node = walk_kbnode (keyblock, &kbctx, 0));)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	char *str;
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	if (attrib_fp && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data != NULL)
	dump_attribs (node->pkt->pkt.user_id, pk);
	/*
	* Fixme: We need a valid flag here too
	*/
	str = uid->attrib_data ? "uat" : "uid";
	if (uid->is_revoked)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s:r::::", str);
	else if (uid->is_expired)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s:e::::", str);
	else if (opt.no_expensive_trust_checks)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s:::::", str);
	else
	{
	int uid_validity;

	if (!ulti_hack)
	uid_validity = get_validity_info (pk, uid);
	else
	uid_validity = 'u';
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s:%c::::", str, uid_validity);
	}

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s:", colon_strtime (uid->created));
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s:", colon_strtime (uid->expiredate));

	namehash_from_uid (uid);

	for (i = 0; i < 20; i++)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%02X", uid->namehash[i]);

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "::");

	if (uid->attrib_data)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%u %lu", uid->numattribs, uid->attrib_len);
	else
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, uid->name, uid->len, ":", NULL);
	+ es_fprintf (es_stdout, "::::::::");
	+ if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
	+ {
	+ enum tofu_policy policy;
	+ if (! tofu_get_policy (pk, uid, &policy)
	+ && policy != TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
	+ es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s", tofu_policy_str (policy));
	+ }
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	u32 keyid2[2];
	PKT_public_key *pk2;

	pk2 = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	xfree (hexgrip); hexgrip = NULL;
	xfree (serialno); serialno = NULL;
	if (secret \|\| has_secret \|\| opt.with_keygrip \|\| opt.with_key_data)
	{
	rc = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk2, &hexgrip);
	if (rc)
	log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	stubkey = 0;
	if ((secret\|\|has_secret)
	&& agent_get_keyinfo (NULL, hexgrip, &serialno))
	stubkey = 1; /* Key not found. */

	keyid_from_pk (pk2, keyid2);
	es_fputs (secret? "ssb:":"sub:", es_stdout);
	if (!pk2->flags.valid)
	es_putc ('i', es_stdout);
	else if (pk2->flags.revoked)
	es_putc ('r', es_stdout);
	else if (pk2->has_expired)
	es_putc ('e', es_stdout);
	else if (opt.fast_list_mode \|\| opt.no_expensive_trust_checks)
	;
	else
	{
	/* TRUSTLETTER should always be defined here. */
	if (trustletter)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%c", trustletter);
	}
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::::",
	nbits_from_pk (pk2),
	pk2->pubkey_algo,
	(ulong) keyid2[0], (ulong) keyid2[1],
	colon_datestr_from_pk (pk2), colon_strtime (pk2->expiredate)
	/* fixme: add LID and ownertrust here */
	);
	print_capabilities (pk2, NULL);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 13. */
	es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 14. */
	if (secret \|\| has_secret)
	{
	if (stubkey)
	es_putc ('#', es_stdout);
	else if (serialno)
	es_fputs (serialno, es_stdout);
	else if (has_secret)
	es_putc ('+', es_stdout);
	}
	es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 15. */
	es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 16. */
	if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
	\|\| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA
	\|\| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
	{
	char *curve = openpgp_oid_to_str (pk->pkey[0]);
	const char *name = openpgp_oid_to_curve (curve, 0);
	if (!name)
	name = curve;
	es_fputs (name, es_stdout);
	xfree (curve);
	}
	es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 17. */
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	if (fpr > 1)
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk2, 0);
	if (opt.with_key_data \|\| opt.with_keygrip)
	{
	if (hexgrip)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "grp:::::::::%s:\n", hexgrip);
	if (opt.with_key_data)
	print_key_data (pk2);
	}
	}
	else if (opt.list_sigs && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	int sigrc, fprokay = 0;
	char *sigstr;
	size_t fplen;
	byte fparray[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];

	if (sig->sig_class == 0x20 \|\| sig->sig_class == 0x28
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x30)
	sigstr = "rev";
	else if ((sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	sigstr = "sig";
	else if (sig->sig_class == 0x18)
	sigstr = "sig";
	else if (sig->sig_class == 0x1F)
	sigstr = "sig";
	else
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "sig::::::::::%02x%c:\n",
	sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable ? 'x' : 'l');
	continue;
	}

	if (opt.check_sigs)
	{
	PKT_public_key *signer_pk = NULL;

	fflush (stdout);
	if (opt.no_sig_cache)
	signer_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (PKT_public_key));

	rc = check_key_signature2 (keyblock, node, NULL, signer_pk,
	NULL, NULL, NULL);
	switch (gpg_err_code (rc))
	{
	case 0:
	sigrc = '!';
	break;
	case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
	sigrc = '-';
	break;
	case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
	case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY:
	sigrc = '?';
	break;
	default:
	sigrc = '%';
	break;
	}

	if (opt.no_sig_cache)
	{
	if (!rc)
	{
	fingerprint_from_pk (signer_pk, fparray, &fplen);
	fprokay = 1;
	}
	free_public_key (signer_pk);
	}
	}
	else
	{
	rc = 0;
	sigrc = ' ';
	}
	es_fputs (sigstr, es_stdout);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	if (sigrc != ' ')
	es_putc (sigrc, es_stdout);
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
	(ulong) sig->keyid[0], (ulong) sig->keyid[1],
	colon_datestr_from_sig (sig),
	colon_expirestr_from_sig (sig));

	if (sig->trust_depth \|\| sig->trust_value)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%d %d", sig->trust_depth, sig->trust_value);
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":");

	if (sig->trust_regexp)
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sig->trust_regexp,
	strlen (sig->trust_regexp), ":", NULL);
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":");

	if (sigrc == '%')
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc));
	else if (sigrc == '?')
	;
	else if (!opt.fast_list_mode)
	{
	size_t n;
	p = get_user_id (sig->keyid, &n);
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, p, n, ":", NULL);
	xfree (p);
	}
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":%02x%c::", sig->sig_class,
	sig->flags.exportable ? 'x' : 'l');

	if (opt.no_sig_cache && opt.check_sigs && fprokay)
	{
	for (i = 0; i < fplen; i++)
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%02X", fparray[i]);
	}

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":::%d:\n", sig->digest_algo);

	if (opt.show_subpackets)
	print_subpackets_colon (sig);

	/* fixme: check or list other sigs here */
	}
	}

	xfree (hexgrip);
	xfree (serialno);
	}

	/*
	* Reorder the keyblock so that the primary user ID (and not attribute
	* packet) comes first. Fixme: Replace this by a generic sort
	* function. */
	static void
	do_reorder_keyblock (KBNODE keyblock, int attr)
	{
	KBNODE primary = NULL, primary0 = NULL, primary2 = NULL;
	KBNODE last, node;

	for (node = keyblock; node; primary0 = node, node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
	((attr && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) \|\|
	(!attr && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)) &&
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary)
	{
	primary = primary2 = node;
	for (node = node->next; node; primary2 = node, node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	{
	break;
	}
	}
	break;
	}
	}
	if (!primary)
	return; /* No primary key flag found (should not happen). */

	for (last = NULL, node = keyblock; node; last = node, node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	break;
	}
	assert (node);
	assert (last); /* The user ID is never the first packet. */
	assert (primary0); /* Ditto (this is the node before primary). */
	if (node == primary)
	return; /* Already the first one. */

	last->next = primary;
	primary0->next = primary2->next;
	primary2->next = node;
	}

	void
	reorder_keyblock (KBNODE keyblock)
	{
	do_reorder_keyblock (keyblock, 1);
	do_reorder_keyblock (keyblock, 0);
	}

	static void
	list_keyblock (ctrl_t ctrl,
	KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int has_secret, int fpr,
	struct keylist_context *listctx)
	{
	reorder_keyblock (keyblock);
	if (opt.print_pka_records \|\| opt.print_dane_records)
	list_keyblock_pka (ctrl, keyblock);
	else if (opt.with_colons)
	list_keyblock_colon (keyblock, secret, has_secret, fpr);
	else
	list_keyblock_print (keyblock, secret, fpr, listctx);
	if (secret)
	es_fflush (es_stdout);
	}


	/* Public function used by keygen to list a keyblock. */
	void
	list_keyblock_direct (ctrl_t ctrl,
	kbnode_t keyblock, int secret, int has_secret, int fpr)
	{
	struct keylist_context listctx;

	memset (&listctx, 0, sizeof (listctx));
	list_keyblock (ctrl, keyblock, secret, has_secret, fpr, &listctx);
	keylist_context_release (&listctx);
	}


	/* Print an hex digit in ICAO spelling. */
	static void
	print_icao_hexdigit (estream_t fp, int c)
	{
	static const char *list[16] = {
	"Zero", "One", "Two", "Three", "Four", "Five", "Six", "Seven",
	"Eight", "Niner", "Alfa", "Bravo", "Charlie", "Delta", "Echo", "Foxtrot"
	};

	tty_fprintf (fp, "%s", list[c&15]);
	}


	/*
	* Function to print the finperprint.
	* mode 0: as used in key listings, opt.with_colons is honored
	* 1: print using log_info ()
	* 2: direct use of tty
	* 3: direct use of tty but only primary key.
	* 4: direct use of tty but only subkey.
	* 10: Same as 0 but with_colons etc is ignored.
	*
	* Modes 1 and 2 will try and print both subkey and primary key
	* fingerprints. A MODE with bit 7 set is used internally. If
	* OVERRIDE_FP is not NULL that stream will be used in 0 instead
	* of es_stdout or instead of the TTY in modes 2 and 3.
	*/
	void
	print_fingerprint (estream_t override_fp, PKT_public_key *pk, int mode)
	{
	byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
	size_t i, n;
	estream_t fp;
	const char *text;
	int primary = 0;
	int with_colons = opt.with_colons;
	int with_icao = opt.with_icao_spelling;

	if (mode == 10)
	{
	mode = 0;
	with_colons = 0;
	with_icao = 0;
	}

	if (pk->main_keyid[0] == pk->keyid[0]
	&& pk->main_keyid[1] == pk->keyid[1])
	primary = 1;

	/* Just to be safe */
	if ((mode & 0x80) && !primary)
	{
	log_error ("primary key is not really primary!\n");
	return;
	}

	mode &= ~0x80;

	if (!primary && (mode == 1 \|\| mode == 2))
	{
	PKT_public_key primary_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (primary_pk));
	get_pubkey (primary_pk, pk->main_keyid);
	print_fingerprint (override_fp, primary_pk, (mode \| 0x80));
	free_public_key (primary_pk);
	}

	if (mode == 1)
	{
	fp = log_get_stream ();
	if (primary)
	text = _("Primary key fingerprint:");
	else
	text = _(" Subkey fingerprint:");
	}
	else if (mode == 2)
	{
	fp = override_fp; /* Use tty or given stream. */
	if (primary)
	/* TRANSLATORS: this should fit into 24 bytes so that the
	* fingerprint data is properly aligned with the user ID */
	text = _(" Primary key fingerprint:");
	else
	text = _(" Subkey fingerprint:");
	}
	else if (mode == 3)
	{
	fp = override_fp; /* Use tty or given stream. */
	text = _(" Key fingerprint =");
	}
	else if (mode == 4)
	{
	fp = override_fp; /* Use tty or given stream. */
	text = _(" Subkey fingerprint:");
	}
	else
	{
	fp = override_fp? override_fp : es_stdout;
	text = _(" Key fingerprint =");
	}

	fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n);
	p = array;
	if (with_colons && !mode)
	{
	es_fprintf (fp, "fpr:::::::::");
	for (i = 0; i < n; i++, p++)
	es_fprintf (fp, "%02X", *p);
	es_putc (':', fp);
	}
	else
	{
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%s", text);
	if (n == 20)
	{
	for (i = 0; i < n; i++, i++, p += 2)
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%s %02X%02X", i==10? " ":"", *p, p[1]);
	}
	else
	{
	for (i = 0; i < n; i++, p++)
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%s %02X", (i && !(i % 8))? " ":"", *p);
	}
	}
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	if (!with_colons && with_icao)
	{
	p = array;
	tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s\"", (int)strlen(text)+1, "");
	for (i = 0; i < n; i++, p++)
	{
	if (!i)
	;
	else if (!(i%4))
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\n%*s ", (int)strlen(text)+1, "");
	else if (!(i%2))
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	else
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	print_icao_hexdigit (fp, *p >> 4);
	tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
	print_icao_hexdigit (fp, *p & 15);
	}
	tty_fprintf (fp, "\"\n");
	}
	}

	/* Print the serial number of an OpenPGP card if available. */
	static void
	print_card_serialno (const char *serialno)
	{
	if (!serialno)
	return;
	if (opt.with_colons)
	return; /* Handled elsewhere. */

	es_fputs (_(" Card serial no. ="), es_stdout);
	es_putc (' ', es_stdout);
	if (strlen (serialno) == 32 && !strncmp (serialno, "D27600012401", 12))
	{
	/* This is an OpenPGP card. Print the relevant part. */
	/* Example: D2760001240101010001000003470000 */
	/* xxxxyyyyyyyy */
	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%.s %.s", 4, serialno+16, 8, serialno+20);
	}
	else
	es_fputs (serialno, es_stdout);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}



	void
	set_attrib_fd (int fd)
	{
	static int last_fd = -1;

	if (fd != -1 && last_fd == fd)
	return;

	/* Fixme: Do we need to check for the log stream here? */
	if (attrib_fp && attrib_fp != log_get_stream ())
	es_fclose (attrib_fp);
	attrib_fp = NULL;
	if (fd == -1)
	return;

	#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
	setmode (fd, O_BINARY);
	#endif
	if (fd == 1)
	attrib_fp = es_stdout;
	else if (fd == 2)
	attrib_fp = es_stderr;
	else
	attrib_fp = es_fdopen (fd, "wb");
	if (!attrib_fp)
	{
	log_fatal ("can't open fd %d for attribute output: %s\n",
	fd, strerror (errno));
	}

	last_fd = fd;
	}
	diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
	index 9f02b1555..af5098717 100644
	--- a/g10/mainproc.c
	+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
	@@ -1,2343 +1,2361 @@
	/* mainproc.c - handle packets
	* Copyright (C) 1998-2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 2013-2014 Werner Koch
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <assert.h>
	#include <time.h>

	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "util.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "iobuf.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "filter.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "status.h"
	#include "i18n.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "keyserver-internal.h"
	#include "photoid.h"
	#include "mbox-util.h"
	#include "call-dirmngr.h"

	/* Put an upper limit on nested packets. The 32 is an arbitrary
	value, a much lower should actually be sufficient. */
	#define MAX_NESTING_DEPTH 32


	/* An object to build a list of keyid related info. */
	struct kidlist_item
	{
	struct kidlist_item *next;
	u32 kid[2];
	int pubkey_algo;
	int reason;
	};


	/*
	* Object to hold the processing context.
	*/
	typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX;
	struct mainproc_context
	{
	ctrl_t ctrl;
	struct mainproc_context anchor; / May be useful in the future. */
	PKT_public_key *last_pubkey;
	PKT_user_id *last_user_id;
	md_filter_context_t mfx;
	int sigs_only; /* Process only signatures and reject all other stuff. */
	int encrypt_only; /* Process only encryption messages. */

	/* Name of the file with the complete signature or the file with the
	detached signature. This is currently only used to deduce the
	file name of the data file if that has not been given. */
	const char *sigfilename;

	/* A structure to describe the signed data in case of a detached
	signature. */
	struct
	{
	/* A file descriptor of the the signed data. Only used if not -1. */
	int data_fd;
	/* A list of filenames with the data files or NULL. This is only
	used if DATA_FD is -1. */
	strlist_t data_names;
	/* Flag to indicated that either one of the next previous fields
	is used. This is only needed for better readability. */
	int used;
	} signed_data;

	DEK *dek;
	int last_was_session_key;
	kbnode_t list; /* The current list of packets. */
	iobuf_t iobuf; /* Used to get the filename etc. */
	int trustletter; /* Temporary usage in list_node. */
	ulong symkeys;
	struct kidlist_item pkenc_list; / List of encryption packets. */
	struct {
	unsigned int sig_seen:1; /* Set to true if a signature packet
	has been seen. */
	unsigned int data:1; /* Any data packet seen */
	unsigned int uncompress_failed:1;
	} any;
	};


	/* Local prototypes. */
	static int do_proc_packets (CTX c, iobuf_t a);
	static void list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
	static void proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
	static int literals_seen;


	/* Functions. */


	void
	reset_literals_seen(void)
	{
	literals_seen = 0;
	}


	static void
	release_list( CTX c )
	{
	if (!c->list)
	return;
	proc_tree (c, c->list);
	release_kbnode (c->list);
	while (c->pkenc_list)
	{
	struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
	xfree (c->pkenc_list);
	c->pkenc_list = tmp;
	}
	c->pkenc_list = NULL;
	c->list = NULL;
	c->any.data = 0;
	c->any.uncompress_failed = 0;
	c->last_was_session_key = 0;
	xfree (c->dek);
	c->dek = NULL;
	}


	static int
	add_onepass_sig (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	kbnode_t node;

	if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
	add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
	else /* Insert the first one. */
	c->list = node = new_kbnode (pkt);

	return 1;
	}


	static int
	add_gpg_control (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
	{
	/* New clear text signature.
	* Process the last one and reset everything */
	release_list(c);
	}

	if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
	add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
	else /* Insert the first one. */
	c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);

	return 1;
	}


	static int
	add_user_id (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	if (!c->list)
	{
	log_error ("orphaned user ID\n");
	return 0;
	}
	add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
	return 1;
	}


	static int
	add_subkey (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	if (!c->list)
	{
	log_error ("subkey w/o mainkey\n");
	return 0;
	}
	add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
	return 1;
	}


	static int
	add_ring_trust (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	if (!c->list)
	{
	log_error ("ring trust w/o key\n");
	return 0;
	}
	add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
	return 1;
	}


	static int
	add_signature (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	kbnode_t node;

	c->any.sig_seen = 1;
	if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list)
	{
	/* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
	* GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses
	* onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method
	* of prepending the signature to the data is
	* that it is not possible to make a signature from data read
	* from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */
	node = new_kbnode (pkt);
	c->list = node;
	return 1;
	}
	else if (!c->list)
	return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/
	else if (!c->list->pkt)
	BUG(); /* so nicht */

	/* Add a new signature node item at the end. */
	node = new_kbnode (pkt);
	add_kbnode (c->list, node);

	return 1;
	}

	static int
	symkey_decrypt_seskey (DEK dek, byte seskey, size_t slen)
	{
	gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;

	if(slen < 17 \|\| slen > 33)
	{
	log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"),
	(int)slen);
	return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
	}

	if (openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1))
	BUG ();
	if (gcry_cipher_setkey ( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ))
	BUG ();
	gcry_cipher_setiv ( hd, NULL, 0 );
	gcry_cipher_decrypt ( hd, seskey, slen, NULL, 0 );
	gcry_cipher_close ( hd );

	/* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
	decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */

	dek->keylen=slen-1;
	dek->algo=seskey[0];

	if(dek->keylen > DIM(dek->key))
	BUG ();

	memcpy(dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);

	/log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );/

	return 0;
	}


	static void
	proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	PKT_symkey_enc *enc;

	enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
	if (!enc)
	log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n");
	else if(!c->dek)
	{
	int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
	const char *s = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);

	if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo))
	{
	if (!opt.quiet)
	{
	if (enc->seskeylen)
	log_info (_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s );
	else
	log_info (_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
	}
	}
	else
	log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo);

	if (openpgp_md_test_algo (enc->s2k.hash_algo))
	{
	log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest"
	" algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo);
	s = NULL;
	}

	c->last_was_session_key = 2;
	if (!s \|\| opt.list_only)
	goto leave;

	if (opt.override_session_key)
	{
	c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
	if (get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key))
	{
	xfree (c->dek);
	c->dek = NULL;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 3, NULL, NULL);
	if (c->dek)
	{
	c->dek->symmetric = 1;

	/* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric key
	comes before a public key in the message - if the
	user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is a
	chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen to
	be a valid one, which will make the returned dek
	appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that
	come later. */
	if (enc->seskeylen)
	{
	if (symkey_decrypt_seskey (c->dek,
	enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen))
	{
	xfree (c->dek);
	c->dek = NULL;
	}
	}
	else
	c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
	}
	}
	}

	leave:
	c->symkeys++;
	free_packet (pkt);
	}


	static void
	proc_pubkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	PKT_pubkey_enc *enc;
	int result = 0;

	/* Check whether the secret key is available and store in this case. */
	c->last_was_session_key = 1;
	enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
	/printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );/
	/* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
	* function to check it. */
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("public key is %s\n"), keystr (enc->keyid));

	if (is_status_enabled())
	{
	char buf[50];
	/* FIXME: For ECC support we need to map the OpenPGP algo number
	to the Libgcrypt defined one. This is due a chicken-egg
	problem: We need to have code in Libgcrypt for a new
	algorithm so to implement a proposed new algorithm before the
	IANA will finally assign an OpenPGP indentifier. */
	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
	(ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo);
	write_status_text (STATUS_ENC_TO, buf);
	}

	if (!opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key)
	{
	/* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
	* secure memory because it has already been passed on the
	* command line and the GCHQ knows about it. */
	c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
	result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
	if (result)
	{
	xfree (c->dek);
	c->dek = NULL;
	}
	}
	else if (enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E
	\|\| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
	\|\| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
	\|\| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E
	\|\| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL)
	{
	/* Note that we also allow type 20 Elgamal keys for decryption.
	There are still a couple of those keys in active use as a
	subkey. */

	/* FIXME: Store this all in a list and process it later so that
	we can prioritize what key to use. This gives a better user
	experience if wildcard keyids are used. */
	if (!c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
	\|\| opt.try_all_secrets
	\|\| have_secret_key_with_kid (enc->keyid)))
	{
	if(opt.list_only)
	result = -1;
	else
	{
	c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
	if ((result = get_session_key (enc, c->dek)))
	{
	/* Error: Delete the DEK. */
	xfree (c->dek);
	c->dek = NULL;
	}
	}
	}
	else
	result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
	}
	else
	result = GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;

	if (result == -1)
	;
	else
	{
	/* Store it for later display. */
	struct kidlist_item x = xmalloc (sizeof x);
	x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
	x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
	x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
	x->reason = result;
	x->next = c->pkenc_list;
	c->pkenc_list = x;

	if (!result && opt.verbose > 1)
	log_info (_("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n"));
	}

	free_packet(pkt);
	}


	/*
	* Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could
	* not decrypt.
	*/
	static void
	print_pkenc_list (struct kidlist_item *list, int failed)
	{
	for (; list; list = list->next)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	const char *algstr;

	if (failed && !list->reason)
	continue;
	if (!failed && list->reason)
	continue;

	algstr = openpgp_pk_algo_name (list->pubkey_algo);
	pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);

	if (!algstr)
	algstr = "[?]";
	pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
	if (!get_pubkey (pk, list->kid))
	{
	char *p;
	log_info (_("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
	nbits_from_pk (pk), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
	strtimestamp (pk->timestamp));
	p = get_user_id_native (list->kid);
	log_printf (_(" \"%s\"\n"), p);
	xfree (p);
	}
	else
	log_info (_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"),
	algstr, keystr(list->kid));

	free_public_key (pk);

	if (gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
	{
	if (is_status_enabled())
	{
	char buf[20];
	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
	(ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1]);
	write_status_text (STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf);
	}
	}
	else if (list->reason)
	{
	log_info (_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (list->reason));
	write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", list->reason);
	}
	}
	}


	static void
	proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	int result = 0;

	if (!opt.quiet)
	{
	if (c->symkeys>1)
	log_info (_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"), c->symkeys);
	else if (c->symkeys == 1)
	log_info (_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n"));
	print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 );
	print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 );
	}

	/* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */

	write_status (STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION);

	/log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");/
	if (opt.list_only)
	result = -1;
	else if (!c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key)
	{
	int algo;
	STRING2KEY s2kbuf;
	STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
	int canceled;

	if (opt.override_session_key)
	{
	c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
	result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
	if (result)
	{
	xfree (c->dek);
	c->dek = NULL;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	/* Assume this is old style conventional encrypted data. */
	algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
	if (algo)
	log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
	openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
	else if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA))
	{
	algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
	if (!algo)
	algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
	log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
	"optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
	openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
	}
	else
	{
	algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
	if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo)
	{
	/* If no digest is given we assume SHA-1. */
	s2kbuf.mode = 0;
	s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
	s2k = &s2kbuf;
	}
	log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
	}

	c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 3, NULL, &canceled);
	if (c->dek)
	c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
	else if (canceled)
	result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CANCELED);
	else
	result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PASSPHRASE);
	}
	}
	else if (!c->dek)
	result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;

	if (!result)
	result = decrypt_data (c->ctrl, c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );

	if (result == -1)
	;
	else if (!result
	&& !opt.ignore_mdc_error
	&& !pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method
	&& openpgp_cipher_get_algo_blklen (c->dek->algo) != 8
	&& c->dek->algo != CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH)
	{
	/* The message has been decrypted but has no MDC despite that a
	modern cipher (blocklength != 64 bit, except for Twofish) is
	used and the option to ignore MDC errors is not used: To
	avoid attacks changing an MDC message to a non-MDC message,
	we fail here. */
	log_error (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
	if (opt.verbose > 1)
	log_info ("decryption forced to fail\n");
	write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
	}
	else if (!result \|\| (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
	&& opt.ignore_mdc_error))
	{
	write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY);
	if (opt.verbose > 1)
	log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
	if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result)
	write_status (STATUS_GOODMDC);
	else if (!opt.no_mdc_warn)
	log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
	{
	glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
	log_error (_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
	write_status (STATUS_BADMDC);
	write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
	}
	else
	{
	if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
	&& *c->dek->s2k_cacheid != '\0')
	{
	log_debug (_("cleared passphrase cached with ID: %s\n"),
	c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
	passphrase_clear_cache (NULL, c->dek->s2k_cacheid, 0);
	}
	glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
	write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
	log_error (_("decryption failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (result));
	/* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
	* ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK). */
	}

	xfree (c->dek);
	c->dek = NULL;
	free_packet (pkt);
	c->last_was_session_key = 0;
	write_status (STATUS_END_DECRYPTION);
	}


	static void
	proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
	{
	PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext;
	int any, clearsig, rc;
	kbnode_t n;

	literals_seen++;

	if (pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8))
	log_info (_("Note: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
	else if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name);

	free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
	if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0))
	BUG ();
	/* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1
	* and no armoring - Not yet tested
	* Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1
	* Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1??
	* See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09
	*/
	any = clearsig = 0;
	for (n=c->list; n; n = n->next )
	{
	if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
	{
	/* The onepass signature case. */
	if (n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo)
	{
	gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo);
	any = 1;
	}
	}
	else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
	&& n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
	{
	/* The clearsigned message case. */
	size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
	const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;

	/* Check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash. */
	if (datalen < 2)
	log_fatal ("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
	/* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
	* documents. */
	clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
	for (data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++)
	gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, *data);
	any = 1;
	break; /* Stop here as one-pass signature packets are not
	expected. */
	}
	else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	/* The SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use. */
	gcry_md_enable ( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo );
	any = 1;
	}
	}

	if (!any && !opt.skip_verify)
	{
	/* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case. It's not legal
	according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that often.
	There is no good way to specify what algorithms to use in
	that case, so these there are the historical answer. */
	gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160);
	gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1);
	}
	if (DBG_HASHING)
	{
	gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
	if (c->mfx.md2)
	gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
	}

	rc=0;

	if (literals_seen > 1)
	{
	log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n"));

	if (!opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages)
	{
	write_status_text (STATUS_ERROR, "proc_pkt.plaintext 89_BAD_DATA");
	log_inc_errorcount ();
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
	}
	}

	if (!rc)
	{
	rc = handle_plaintext (pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig);
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EACCES && !c->sigs_only)
	{
	/* Can't write output but we hash it anyway to check the
	signature. */
	rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
	}
	}

	if (rc)
	log_error ("handle plaintext failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));

	free_packet(pkt);
	c->last_was_session_key = 0;

	/* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
	* This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences. */
	n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
	if (c->list)
	add_kbnode (c->list, n);
	else
	c->list = n;
	}


	static int
	proc_compressed_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info)
	{
	if ( ((CTX)info)->signed_data.used
	&& ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
	return proc_signature_packets_by_fd (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
	((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd);
	else
	return proc_signature_packets (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
	((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_names,
	((CTX)info)->sigfilename );
	}


	static int
	proc_encrypt_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info )
	{
	CTX c = info;
	return proc_encryption_packets (c->ctrl, info, a );
	}


	static int
	proc_compressed (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed;
	int rc;

	/printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");/
	if (c->sigs_only)
	rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c);
	else if( c->encrypt_only )
	rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c);
	else
	rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, NULL, NULL);

	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA)
	{
	if (!c->any.uncompress_failed)
	{
	CTX cc;

	for (cc=c; cc; cc = cc->anchor)
	cc->any.uncompress_failed = 1;
	log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	}
	else if (rc)
	log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));

	free_packet(pkt);
	c->last_was_session_key = 0;
	return rc;
	}


	/*
	* check the signature
	* Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code
	*/
	static int
	do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, int *is_selfsig,
	int is_expkey, int is_revkey)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig;
	gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL;
	gcry_md_hd_t md2 = NULL;
	+ gcry_md_hd_t md_good = NULL;
	int algo, rc;

	assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
	if (is_selfsig)
	*is_selfsig = 0;
	sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;

	algo = sig->digest_algo;
	rc = openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
	if (rc)
	return rc;

	if (sig->sig_class == 0x00)
	{
	if (c->mfx.md)
	{
	if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
	BUG ();
	}
	else /* detached signature */
	{
	/* signature_check() will enable the md. */
	if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
	BUG ();
	}
	}
	else if (sig->sig_class == 0x01)
	{
	/* How do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text
	in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */
	if (c->mfx.md)
	{
	if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
	BUG ();
	if (c->mfx.md2 && gcry_md_copy (&md2, c->mfx.md2))
	BUG ();
	}
	else /* detached signature */
	{
	log_debug ("Do we really need this here?");
	/* signature_check() will enable the md*/
	if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
	BUG ();
	if (gcry_md_open (&md2, 0, 0 ))
	BUG ();
	}
	}
	else if ((sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x18
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x1f
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x20
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x28
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x30)
	{
	if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig );
	}
	else if (sig->sig_class == 0x20)
	{
	log_error (_("standalone revocation - "
	"use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n"));
	return GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
	}
	else
	{
	log_error ("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n", sig->sig_class);
	return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
	}
	}
	else
	return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;

	rc = signature_check2 (sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL);
	- if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2)
	- rc = signature_check2 (sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL);
	+ if (! rc)
	+ md_good = md;
	+ else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2)
	+ {
	+ rc = signature_check2 (sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL);
	+ if (! rc)
	+ md_good = md2;
	+ }
	+
	+ if (md_good)
	+ {
	+ unsigned char *buffer = gcry_md_read (md_good, 0);
	+ sig->digest_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (map_md_openpgp_to_gcry (algo));
	+ memcpy (sig->digest, buffer, sig->digest_len);
	+ }

	gcry_md_close (md);
	gcry_md_close (md2);

	return rc;
	}


	static void
	print_userid (PACKET *pkt)
	{
	if (!pkt)
	BUG();

	if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	es_printf ("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype );
	return;
	}
	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	if (pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
	es_printf("%u %lu",
	pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
	pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
	else
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ":", NULL);
	}
	else
	print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
	}


	/*
	* List the keyblock in a user friendly way
	*/
	static void
	list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
	{
	int mainkey;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

	if (!node)
	;
	else if ((mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY))
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	u32 keyid[2];

	keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
	if (mainkey)
	c->trustletter = (opt.fast_list_mode?
	0 : get_validity_info( pk, NULL));
	es_printf ("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" );
	if (c->trustletter)
	es_putc (c->trustletter, es_stdout);
	es_printf (":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
	nbits_from_pk( pk ),
	pk->pubkey_algo,
	(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
	colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
	colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
	if (mainkey && !opt.fast_list_mode)
	es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (pk), es_stdout);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	}
	else
	es_printf ("%s %s/%s %s",
	mainkey? "pub":"sub",
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr_from_pk (pk),
	datestr_from_pk (pk));

	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	es_printf (" [");
	es_printf (_("revoked: %s"), revokestr_from_pk (pk));
	es_printf ("]\n");
	}
	else if( pk->expiredate && !opt.with_colons)
	{
	es_printf (" [");
	es_printf (_("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
	es_printf ("]\n");
	}
	else
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);

	if ((mainkey && opt.fingerprint) \|\| opt.fingerprint > 1)
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 0);

	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	if (node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST)
	es_printf ("rtv:1:%u:\n",
	node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval);
	}

	if (mainkey)
	{
	/* Now list all userids with their signatures. */
	for (node = node->next; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	list_node (c, node );
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	if (opt.with_colons)
	es_printf ("%s:::::::::",
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
	else
	es_printf ("uid%*s",
	(int)keystrlen ()+(opt.legacy_list_mode? 9:11),
	"" );
	print_userid (node->pkt);
	if (opt.with_colons)
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	if (opt.with_colons
	&& node->next
	&& node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST)
	{
	es_printf ("rtv:2:%u:\n",
	node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust?
	node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval : 0);
	}
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	list_node(c, node );
	}
	}
	}
	}
	else if ((mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) )
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	{

	log_debug ("FIXME: No way to print secret key packets here\n");
	/* fixme: We may use a fucntion to turn a secret key packet into
	a public key one and use that here. */
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	int is_selfsig = 0;
	int rc2 = 0;
	size_t n;
	char *p;
	int sigrc = ' ';

	if (!opt.verbose)
	return;

	if (sig->sig_class == 0x20 \|\| sig->sig_class == 0x30)
	es_fputs ("rev", es_stdout);
	else
	es_fputs ("sig", es_stdout);
	if (opt.check_sigs)
	{
	fflush (stdout);
	rc2 = do_check_sig (c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL);
	switch (gpg_err_code (rc2))
	{
	case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
	case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: sigrc = '-'; break;
	case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
	case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
	default: sigrc = '%'; break;
	}
	}
	else /* Check whether this is a self signature. */
	{
	u32 keyid[2];

	if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
	{
	keyid_from_pk (c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);

	if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
	is_selfsig = 1;
	}
	}

	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	if (sigrc != ' ')
	es_putc (sigrc, es_stdout);
	es_printf ("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
	(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
	colon_datestr_from_sig (sig),
	colon_expirestr_from_sig (sig));

	if (sig->trust_depth \|\| sig->trust_value)
	es_printf ("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);

	if (sig->trust_regexp)
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sig->trust_regexp,
	strlen (sig->trust_regexp), ":", NULL);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	}
	else
	es_printf ("%c %s %s ",
	sigrc, keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig));
	if (sigrc == '%')
	es_printf ("[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc2) );
	else if (sigrc == '?')
	;
	else if (is_selfsig)
	{
	if (opt.with_colons)
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	es_fputs (sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", es_stdout);
	if (opt.with_colons)
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	}
	else if (!opt.fast_list_mode)
	{
	p = get_user_id (sig->keyid, &n);
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, p, n,
	opt.with_colons?":":NULL, NULL );
	xfree (p);
	}
	if (opt.with_colons)
	es_printf (":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	else
	log_error ("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype);
	}


	int
	proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
	{
	int rc;
	CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);

	c->ctrl = ctrl;
	c->anchor = anchor;
	rc = do_proc_packets (c, a);
	xfree (c);

	return rc;
	}


	int
	proc_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a,
	strlist_t signedfiles, const char *sigfilename )
	{
	CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
	int rc;

	c->ctrl = ctrl;
	c->anchor = anchor;
	c->sigs_only = 1;

	c->signed_data.data_fd = -1;
	c->signed_data.data_names = signedfiles;
	c->signed_data.used = !!signedfiles;

	c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
	rc = do_proc_packets ( c, a );

	/* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
	messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
	Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
	error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
	with an error. */
	if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
	{
	write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
	log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_DATA;
	}

	/* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
	so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
	if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
	c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;

	xfree (c);
	return rc;
	}


	int
	proc_signature_packets_by_fd (ctrl_t ctrl,
	void *anchor, iobuf_t a, int signed_data_fd )
	{
	int rc;
	CTX c;

	c = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *c);
	if (!c)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();

	c->ctrl = ctrl;
	c->anchor = anchor;
	c->sigs_only = 1;

	c->signed_data.data_fd = signed_data_fd;
	c->signed_data.data_names = NULL;
	c->signed_data.used = (signed_data_fd != -1);

	rc = do_proc_packets ( c, a );

	/* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
	messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
	Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
	error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
	with an error. */
	if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
	{
	write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
	log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
	}

	/* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
	so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
	if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
	c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;

	xfree ( c );
	return rc;
	}


	int
	proc_encryption_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
	{
	CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
	int rc;

	c->ctrl = ctrl;
	c->anchor = anchor;
	c->encrypt_only = 1;
	rc = do_proc_packets (c, a);
	xfree (c);
	return rc;
	}


	static int
	check_nesting (CTX c)
	{
	int level;

	for (level=0; c; c = c->anchor)
	level++;

	if (level > MAX_NESTING_DEPTH)
	{
	log_error ("input data with too deeply nested packets\n");
	write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "1");
	return GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA;
	}

	return 0;
	}


	static int
	do_proc_packets (CTX c, iobuf_t a)
	{
	PACKET *pkt;
	int rc = 0;
	int any_data = 0;
	int newpkt;

	rc = check_nesting (c);
	if (rc)
	return rc;

	pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
	c->iobuf = a;
	init_packet(pkt);
	while ((rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1)
	{
	any_data = 1;
	if (rc)
	{
	free_packet (pkt);
	/* Stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered
	* but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets. */
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
	&& opt.list_packets != 2 )
	break;
	continue;
	}
	newpkt = -1;
	if (opt.list_packets)
	{
	switch (pkt->pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
	default: newpkt = 0; break;
	}
	}
	else if (c->sigs_only)
	{
	switch (pkt->pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
	case PKT_USER_ID:
	case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
	case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
	write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
	rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
	goto leave;

	case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
	default: newpkt = 0; break;
	}
	}
	else if (c->encrypt_only)
	{
	switch (pkt->pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
	case PKT_USER_ID:
	write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0");
	rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
	goto leave;

	case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
	default: newpkt = 0; break;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	switch (pkt->pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
	release_list (c);
	c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
	newpkt = 1;
	break;
	case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
	newpkt = add_subkey (c, pkt);
	break;
	case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust (c, pkt); break;
	default: newpkt = 0; break;
	}
	}

	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	/* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
	* I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
	* The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
	* packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right
	* when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just
	* an extra layer.
	* Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
	*/
	if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC)
	c->any.data = (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT);

	if (newpkt == -1)
	;
	else if (newpkt)
	{
	pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
	init_packet (pkt);
	}
	else
	free_packet(pkt);
	}

	if (rc == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET)
	write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "3");

	if (any_data)
	rc = 0;
	else if (rc == -1)
	write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "2");


	leave:
	release_list (c);
	xfree(c->dek);
	free_packet (pkt);
	xfree (pkt);
	free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
	return rc;
	}


	/* Helper for pka_uri_from_sig to parse the to-be-verified address out
	of the notation data. */
	static pka_info_t *
	get_pka_address (PKT_signature *sig)
	{
	pka_info_t *pka = NULL;
	struct notation nd,notation;

	notation=sig_to_notation(sig);

	for(nd=notation;nd;nd=nd->next)
	{
	if(strcmp(nd->name,"pka-address@gnupg.org")!=0)
	continue; /* Not the notation we want. */

	/* For now we only use the first valid PKA notation. In future
	we might want to keep additional PKA notations in a linked
	list. */
	if (is_valid_mailbox (nd->value))
	{
	pka = xmalloc (sizeof *pka + strlen(nd->value));
	pka->valid = 0;
	pka->checked = 0;
	pka->uri = NULL;
	strcpy (pka->email, nd->value);
	break;
	}
	}

	free_notation(notation);

	return pka;
	}


	/* Return the URI from a DNS PKA record. If this record has already
	be retrieved for the signature we merely return it; if not we go
	out and try to get that DNS record. */
	static const char *
	pka_uri_from_sig (CTX c, PKT_signature *sig)
	{
	if (!sig->flags.pka_tried)
	{
	assert (!sig->pka_info);
	sig->flags.pka_tried = 1;
	sig->pka_info = get_pka_address (sig);
	if (sig->pka_info)
	{
	char *url;
	unsigned char *fpr;
	size_t fprlen;

	if (!gpg_dirmngr_get_pka (c->ctrl, sig->pka_info->email,
	&fpr, &fprlen, &url))
	{
	if (fpr && fprlen == sizeof sig->pka_info->fpr)
	{
	memcpy (sig->pka_info->fpr, fpr, fprlen);
	if (url)
	{
	sig->pka_info->valid = 1;
	if (!*url)
	xfree (url);
	else
	sig->pka_info->uri = url;
	url = NULL;
	}
	}
	xfree (fpr);
	xfree (url);
	}
	}
	}
	return sig->pka_info? sig->pka_info->uri : NULL;
	}


	static void
	print_good_bad_signature (int statno, const char *keyid_str, kbnode_t un,
	PKT_signature *sig, int rc)
	{
	char *p;

	write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
	un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
	un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3,
	-1);

	if (un)
	p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
	else
	p = xstrdup ("[?]");

	if (rc)
	log_info (_("BAD signature from \"%s\""), p);
	else if (sig->flags.expired)
	log_info (_("Expired signature from \"%s\""), p);
	else
	log_info (_("Good signature from \"%s\""), p);

	xfree (p);
	}


	static int
	check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	const char *astr;
	int rc;
	int is_expkey = 0;
	int is_revkey = 0;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

	*pkstrbuf = 0;

	if (opt.skip_verify)
	{
	log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n"));
	return 0;
	}

	/* Check that the message composition is valid.

	Per RFC-2440bis (-15) allowed:

	S{1,n} -- detached signature.
	S{1,n} P -- old style PGP2 signature
	O{1,n} P S{1,n} -- standard OpenPGP signature.
	C P S{1,n} -- cleartext signature.


	O = One-Pass Signature packet.
	S = Signature packet.
	P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted \| Compressed \| Literal)
	(Note that the current rfc2440bis draft also allows
	for a signed message but that does not work as it
	introduces ambiguities.)
	We keep track of these packages using the marker packet
	CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK.
	C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures.

	We reject all other messages.

	Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of
	each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently
	introduce a bug here.
	*/
	{
	kbnode_t n;
	int n_onepass, n_sig;

	/* log_debug ("checking signature packet composition\n"); */
	/* dump_kbnode (c->list); */

	n = c->list;
	assert (n);
	if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
	{
	/* This is either "S{1,n}" case (detached signature) or
	"S{1,n} P" (old style PGP2 signature). */
	for (n = n->next; n; n = n->next)
	if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
	break;
	if (!n)
	; /* Okay, this is a detached signature. */
	else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
	&& (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
	== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK) )
	{
	if (n->next)
	goto ambiguous; /* We only allow one P packet. */
	}
	else
	goto ambiguous;
	}
	else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
	{
	/* This is the "O{1,n} P S{1,n}" case (standard signature). */
	for (n_onepass=1, n = n->next;
	n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG; n = n->next)
	n_onepass++;
	if (!n \|\| !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
	&& (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
	== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
	goto ambiguous;
	for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
	n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
	n_sig++;
	if (!n_sig)
	goto ambiguous;

	/* If we wanted to disallow multiple sig verification, we'd do
	something like this:

	if (n && !opt.allow_multisig_verification)
	goto ambiguous;

	However, now that we have --allow-multiple-messages, this
	can stay allowable as we can't get here unless multiple
	messages (i.e. multiple literals) are allowed. */

	if (n_onepass != n_sig)
	{
	log_info ("number of one-pass packets does not match "
	"number of signature packets\n");
	goto ambiguous;
	}
	}
	else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
	&& n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
	{
	/* This is the "C P S{1,n}" case (clear text signature). */
	n = n->next;
	if (!n \|\| !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
	&& (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
	== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
	goto ambiguous;
	for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
	n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
	n_sig++;
	if (n \|\| !n_sig)
	goto ambiguous;
	}
	else
	{
	ambiguous:
	log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n"));
	return 0;
	}
	}

	write_status_text (STATUS_NEWSIG, NULL);

	astr = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( sig->pubkey_algo );
	if (keystrlen () > 8)
	{
	log_info (_("Signature made %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
	log_info (_(" using %s key %s\n"),
	astr? astr: "?",keystr(sig->keyid));
	}
	else
	log_info (_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"),
	asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?",
	keystr(sig->keyid));

	rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );

	/* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver */

	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks)
	{
	const byte *p;
	int seq = 0;
	size_t n;

	while ((p=enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
	{
	/* According to my favorite copy editor, in English grammar,
	you say "at" if the key is located on a web page, but
	"from" if it is located on a keyserver. I'm not going to
	even try to make two strings here :) */
	log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
	print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream(), p, n);
	log_printf ("\n");

	if (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
	&& opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL)
	{
	struct keyserver_spec *spec;

	spec = parse_preferred_keyserver (sig);
	if (spec)
	{
	int res;

	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid,spec);
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	if (!res)
	rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
	free_keyserver_spec (spec);

	if (!rc)
	break;
	}
	}
	}
	}

	/* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work, our second
	try is to use the URI from a DNS PKA record. */
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
	&& (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
	&& (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD))
	{
	const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig);

	if (uri)
	{
	/* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the
	fingerprint instead of the keyid. */
	int res;
	struct keyserver_spec *spec;

	spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1);
	if (spec)
	{
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, spec);
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	free_keyserver_spec (spec);
	if (!res)
	rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
	}
	}
	}

	/* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work and we got
	no information from the DNS PKA, this is a third try. */

	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
	&& opt.keyserver
	&& (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE))
	{
	int res;

	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	res=keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, opt.keyserver );
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	if (!res)
	rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
	}

	if (!rc \|\| gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
	{
	kbnode_t un, keyblock;
	int count = 0;
	int statno;
	char keyid_str[50];
	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;

	if (rc)
	statno = STATUS_BADSIG;
	else if (sig->flags.expired)
	statno = STATUS_EXPSIG;
	else if (is_expkey)
	statno = STATUS_EXPKEYSIG;
	else if(is_revkey)
	statno = STATUS_REVKEYSIG;
	else
	statno = STATUS_GOODSIG;

	keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (sig->keyid);

	snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
	(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);

	/* Find and print the primary user ID. */
	for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
	{
	int valid;

	if (un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	pk=un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	continue;
	}
	if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
	continue;
	if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created)
	continue;
	if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
	continue;
	if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
	continue;
	if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary)
	continue;
	/* We want the textual primary user ID here */
	if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
	continue;

	assert (pk);

	- /* Get it before we print anything to avoid interrupting the
	- output with the "please do a --check-trustdb" line. */
	- valid = get_validity (pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
	+ /* Since this is just informational, don't actually ask the
	+ user to update any trust information. (Note: we register
	+ the signature later.) */
	+ valid = get_validity (pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, 0);

	keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */

	print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);

	if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
	log_printf (" [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
	else
	log_printf ("\n");

	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf);
	count++;
	}

	if (!count) /* Just in case that we have no valid textual userid */
	{
	/* Try for an invalid textual userid */
	for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
	{
	if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
	break;
	}

	/* Try for any userid at all */
	if (!un)
	{
	for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
	{
	if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	break;
	}
	}

	if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS \|\| !un)
	keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */

	print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);

	if (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS && un)
	log_printf (" %s",_("[uncertain]") );
	log_printf ("\n");
	}

	/* If we have a good signature and already printed
	* the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
	if (count
	&& !rc
	&& !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY))
	{
	char *p;
	for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
	{
	if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
	continue;
	if ((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
	\|\| un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
	&& !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
	continue;
	/* Only skip textual primaries */
	if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary
	&& !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
	continue;

	if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
	{
	dump_attribs (un->pkt->pkt.user_id, pk);

	if (opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
	show_photos (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
	un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
	pk ,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
	}

	p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
	log_info (_(" aka \"%s\""), p);
	xfree (p);

	if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
	{
	const char *valid;

	if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
	valid = _("revoked");
	else if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
	valid = _("expired");
	else
	+ /* Since this is just informational, don't
	+ actually ask the user to update any trust
	+ information. */
	valid = (trust_value_to_string
	- (get_validity (pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id)));
	+ (get_validity (pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id, sig, 0)));
	log_printf (" [%s]\n",valid);
	}
	else
	log_printf ("\n");
	}
	}
	release_kbnode( keyblock );

	if (!rc)
	{
	if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS))
	show_policy_url (sig, 0, 1);
	else
	show_policy_url (sig, 0, 2);

	if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS))
	show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 1);
	else
	show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 2);

	if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS))
	show_notation
	(sig, 0, 1,
	(((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)
	+ ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0)));
	else
	show_notation (sig, 0, 2, 0);
	}

	if (!rc && is_status_enabled ())
	{
	/* Print a status response with the fingerprint. */
	PKT_public_key vpk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof vpk);

	if (!get_pubkey (vpk, sig->keyid))
	{
	byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
	char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN4+90], bufp;
	size_t i, n;

	bufp = buf;
	fingerprint_from_pk (vpk, array, &n);
	p = array;
	for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
	sprintf (bufp, "%02X", *p );
	/* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below
	with bits for status flags (policy url, notation,
	etc.). Remember to make the buffer larger to match! */
	sprintf (bufp, " %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X ",
	strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ),
	(ulong)sig->timestamp,(ulong)sig->expiredate,
	sig->version,sig->pubkey_algo,sig->digest_algo,
	sig->sig_class);
	bufp = bufp + strlen (bufp);
	if (!vpk->flags.primary)
	{
	u32 akid[2];

	akid[0] = vpk->main_keyid[0];
	akid[1] = vpk->main_keyid[1];
	free_public_key (vpk);
	vpk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *vpk);
	if (get_pubkey (vpk, akid))
	{
	/* Impossible error, we simply return a zeroed out fpr */
	n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN < 20? MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN : 20;
	memset (array, 0, n);
	}
	else
	fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
	}
	p = array;
	for (i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
	sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
	write_status_text (STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf);
	}
	free_public_key (vpk);
	}

	if (!rc)
	{
	if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS))
	pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */
	rc = check_signatures_trust (sig);
	}

	if (sig->flags.expired)
	{
	log_info (_("Signature expired %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
	rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Need a better error here? */
	}
	else if (sig->expiredate)
	log_info (_("Signature expires %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));

	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s%s%s\n"),
	sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"):
	sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"),
	gcry_md_algo_name (sig->digest_algo),
	*pkstrbuf?_(", key algorithm "):"",
	pkstrbuf);

	if (!rc && !c->signed_data.used)
	{
	/* Signature is basically good but we test whether the
	deprecated command
	gpg --verify FILE.sig
	was used instead of
	gpg --verify FILE.sig FILE
	to verify a detached signature. If we figure out that a
	data file with a matching name exists, we print a warning.

	The problem is that the first form would also verify a
	standard signature. This behavior could be used to
	create a made up .sig file for a tarball by creating a
	standard signature from a valid detached signature packet
	(for example from a signed git tag). Then replace the
	sig file on the FTP server along with a changed tarball.
	Using the first form the verify command would correctly
	verify the signature but don't even consider the tarball. */
	kbnode_t n;
	char *dfile;

	dfile = get_matching_datafile (c->sigfilename);
	if (dfile)
	{
	for (n = c->list; n; n = n->next)
	if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
	break;
	if (n)
	{
	/* Not only signature packets in the tree thus this
	is not a detached signature. */
	log_info (_("WARNING: not a detached signature; "
	"file '%s' was NOT verified!\n"), dfile);
	}
	xfree (dfile);
	}
	}

	if (rc)
	g10_errors_seen = 1;
	if (opt.batch && rc)
	g10_exit (1);
	}
	else
	{
	char buf[50];

	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d",
	(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
	sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo,
	sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp, rc);
	write_status_text (STATUS_ERRSIG, buf);
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
	{
	buf[16] = 0;
	write_status_text (STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, buf);
	}
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED)
	log_error (_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}

	return rc;
	}


	/*
	* Process the tree which starts at node
	*/
	static void
	proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
	{
	kbnode_t n1;
	int rc;

	if (opt.list_packets \|\| opt.list_only)
	return;

	/* We must skip our special plaintext marker packets here because
	they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in
	addional checks and skipping them here doesn't matter. */
	while (node
	&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
	&& node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)
	{
	node = node->next;
	}
	if (!node)
	return;

	c->trustletter = ' ';
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (node);
	list_node (c, node);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (node);
	list_node (c, node);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
	{
	/* Check all signatures. */
	if (!c->any.data)
	{
	int use_textmode = 0;

	free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
	/* Prepare to create all requested message digests. */
	rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0);
	if (rc)
	goto hash_err;

	/* Fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not the
	one-pass packet? */
	for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
	gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);

	if (n1 && n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01)
	use_textmode = 1;

	/* Ask for file and hash it. */
	if (c->sigs_only)
	{
	if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
	rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, NULL,
	c->signed_data.data_fd,
	use_textmode);
	else
	rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, NULL,
	c->signed_data.data_names,
	c->sigfilename,
	use_textmode);
	}
	else
	{
	rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
	iobuf_get_real_fname (c->iobuf),
	use_textmode);
	}

	hash_err:
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	return;
	}
	}
	else if (c->signed_data.used)
	{
	log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
	return;
	}

	for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
	check_sig_and_print (c, n1);

	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
	&& node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
	{
	/* Clear text signed message. */
	if (!c->any.data)
	{
	log_error ("cleartext signature without data\n");
	return;
	}
	else if (c->signed_data.used)
	{
	log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
	return;
	}

	for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
	check_sig_and_print (c, n1);

	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	int multiple_ok = 1;

	n1 = find_next_kbnode (node, PKT_SIGNATURE);
	if (n1)
	{
	byte class = sig->sig_class;
	byte hash = sig->digest_algo;

	for (; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
	{
	/* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
	different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have
	to run a different hash context for each), but if
	they are all the same, make an exception. */
	if (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class != class
	\|\| n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo != hash)
	{
	multiple_ok = 0;
	log_info (_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. "
	"Only the first will be checked.\n"));
	break;
	}
	}
	}

	if (sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01)
	{
	log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"), sig->sig_class);
	}
	else if (!c->any.data)
	{
	/* Detached signature */
	free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
	rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, sig->digest_algo, 0);
	if (rc)
	goto detached_hash_err;

	if (RFC2440 \|\| RFC4880)
	; /* Strict RFC mode. */
	else if (sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
	&& sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
	&& sig->sig_class == 0x01)
	{
	/* Enable a workaround for a pgp5 bug when the detached
	* signature has been created in textmode. */
	rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md2, sig->digest_algo, 0);
	if (rc)
	goto detached_hash_err;
	}

	/* Here we used to have another hack to work around a pgp
	* 2 bug: It worked by not using the textmode for detached
	* signatures; this would let the first signature check
	* (on md) fail but the second one (on md2), which adds an
	* extra CR would then have produced the "correct" hash.
	* This is very, very ugly hack but it may haved help in
	* some cases (and break others).
	* c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01)
	*/

	if (DBG_HASHING)
	{
	gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
	if (c->mfx.md2)
	gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
	}

	if (c->sigs_only)
	{
	if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
	rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
	c->signed_data.data_fd,
	(sig->sig_class == 0x01));
	else
	rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
	c->signed_data.data_names,
	c->sigfilename,
	(sig->sig_class == 0x01));
	}
	else
	{
	rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
	iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
	(sig->sig_class == 0x01));
	}

	detached_hash_err:
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	return;
	}
	}
	else if (c->signed_data.used)
	{
	log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
	return;
	}
	else if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"));

	if (multiple_ok)
	{
	for (n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
	check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
	}
	else
	check_sig_and_print (c, node);

	}
	else
	{
	dump_kbnode (c->list);
	log_error ("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n");
	dump_kbnode (node);
	}
	}
	diff --git a/g10/options.h b/g10/options.h
	index d57ab5d11..2135aa0b9 100644
	--- a/g10/options.h
	+++ b/g10/options.h
	@@ -1,374 +1,382 @@
	/* options.h
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
	* 2007, 2010, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/
	#ifndef G10_OPTIONS_H
	#define G10_OPTIONS_H

	#include <sys/types.h>
	#include <types.h>
	#include "main.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "../common/session-env.h"

	#ifndef EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	/* Norcraft can't cope with common symbols */
	#if defined (__riscos__) && !defined (INCLUDED_BY_MAIN_MODULE)
	#define EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE extern
	#else
	#define EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	#endif
	#endif

	/* Declaration of a keyserver spec type. The definition is found in
	../common/keyserver.h. */
	struct keyserver_spec;
	typedef struct keyserver_spec *keyserver_spec_t;


	/* Global options for GPG. */
	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	struct
	{
	int verbose;
	int quiet;
	unsigned debug;
	int armor;
	char *outfile;
	estream_t outfp; /* Hack, sometimes used in place of outfile. */
	off_t max_output;
	int dry_run;
	int autostart;
	int list_only;
	int textmode;
	int expert;
	const char *def_sig_expire;
	int ask_sig_expire;
	const char *def_cert_expire;
	int ask_cert_expire;
	int batch; /* run in batch mode */
	int answer_yes; /* answer yes on most questions */
	int answer_no; /* answer no on most questions */
	int check_sigs; /* check key signatures */
	int with_colons;
	int with_key_data;
	int with_icao_spelling; /* Print ICAO spelling with fingerprints. */
	int with_fingerprint; /* Option --with-fingerprint active. */
	int with_keygrip; /* Option --with-keygrip active. */
	int with_secret; /* Option --with-secret active. */
	int fingerprint; /* list fingerprints */
	int list_sigs; /* list signatures */
	int print_pka_records;
	int print_dane_records;
	int no_armor;
	int list_packets; /* list-packets mode: 1=normal, 2=invoked by command*/
	int def_cipher_algo;
	int force_mdc;
	int disable_mdc;
	int def_digest_algo;
	int cert_digest_algo;
	int compress_algo;
	int compress_level;
	int bz2_compress_level;
	int bz2_decompress_lowmem;
	const char *def_secret_key;
	char *def_recipient;
	int def_recipient_self;
	strlist_t secret_keys_to_try;

	int def_cert_level;
	int min_cert_level;
	int ask_cert_level;
	int emit_version; /* 0 = none,
	1 = major only,
	2 = major and minor,
	3 = full version,
	4 = full version plus OS string. */
	int marginals_needed;
	int completes_needed;
	int max_cert_depth;
	const char *homedir;
	const char *agent_program;
	const char *dirmngr_program;

	/* Options to be passed to the gpg-agent */
	session_env_t session_env;
	char *lc_ctype;
	char *lc_messages;

	int skip_verify;
	int skip_hidden_recipients;

	/* TM_CLASSIC must be zero to accomodate trustdbs generated before
	we started storing the trust model inside the trustdb. */
	enum
	{
	- TM_CLASSIC=0, TM_PGP=1, TM_EXTERNAL=2, TM_ALWAYS, TM_DIRECT, TM_AUTO
	+ TM_CLASSIC=0, TM_PGP=1, TM_EXTERNAL=2,
	+ TM_ALWAYS, TM_DIRECT, TM_AUTO, TM_TOFU, TM_TOFU_PGP
	} trust_model;
	+ enum
	+ {
	+ TOFU_DB_AUTO=0, TOFU_DB_SPLIT, TOFU_DB_FLAT
	+ } tofu_db_format;
	+ /* TOFU_BINDING_BAD, TOFU_BINDING_ASK, TOFU_BINDING_AUTO, or
	+ TOFU_BINDING_GOOD. */
	+ int tofu_default_policy;
	int force_ownertrust;
	enum
	{
	CO_GNUPG, CO_RFC4880, CO_RFC2440,
	CO_PGP6, CO_PGP7, CO_PGP8
	} compliance;
	enum
	{
	KF_SHORT, KF_LONG, KF_0xSHORT, KF_0xLONG
	} keyid_format;
	int shm_coprocess;
	const char *set_filename;
	strlist_t comments;
	int throw_keyids;
	const char *photo_viewer;
	int s2k_mode;
	int s2k_digest_algo;
	int s2k_cipher_algo;
	unsigned char s2k_count; /* This is the encoded form, not the raw
	count */
	int not_dash_escaped;
	int escape_from;
	int lock_once;
	keyserver_spec_t keyserver; /* The list of configured keyservers. */
	struct
	{
	unsigned int options;
	unsigned int import_options;
	unsigned int export_options;
	char *http_proxy;
	} keyserver_options;
	int exec_disable;
	int exec_path_set;
	unsigned int import_options;
	unsigned int export_options;
	unsigned int list_options;
	unsigned int verify_options;
	const char *def_preference_list;
	const char *def_keyserver_url;
	prefitem_t *personal_cipher_prefs;
	prefitem_t *personal_digest_prefs;
	prefitem_t *personal_compress_prefs;
	int no_perm_warn;
	int no_mdc_warn;
	char *temp_dir;
	int no_encrypt_to;
	int interactive;
	struct notation *sig_notations;
	struct notation *cert_notations;
	strlist_t sig_policy_url;
	strlist_t cert_policy_url;
	strlist_t sig_keyserver_url;
	strlist_t cert_subpackets;
	strlist_t sig_subpackets;
	int allow_non_selfsigned_uid;
	int allow_freeform_uid;
	int no_literal;
	ulong set_filesize;
	int fast_list_mode;
	int legacy_list_mode;
	int ignore_time_conflict;
	int ignore_valid_from;
	int ignore_crc_error;
	int ignore_mdc_error;
	int command_fd;
	const char *override_session_key;
	int show_session_key;

	const char *gpg_agent_info;
	int try_all_secrets;
	int no_expensive_trust_checks;
	int no_sig_cache;
	int no_auto_check_trustdb;
	int preserve_permissions;
	int no_homedir_creation;
	struct groupitem *grouplist;
	int mangle_dos_filenames;
	int enable_progress_filter;
	unsigned int screen_columns;
	unsigned int screen_lines;
	byte *show_subpackets;
	int rfc2440_text;

	/* If true, let write failures on the status-fd exit the process. */
	int exit_on_status_write_error;

	/* If > 0, limit the number of card insertion prompts to this
	value. */
	int limit_card_insert_tries;

	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	/* FIXME: We don't needs this here as it is done in scdaemon. */
	const char ctapi_driver; / Library to access the ctAPI. */
	const char pcsc_driver; / Library to access the PC/SC system. */
	int disable_ccid; /* Disable the use of the internal CCID driver. */
	#endif /ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT/

	struct
	{
	/* If set, require an 0x19 backsig to be present on signatures
	made by signing subkeys. If not set, a missing backsig is not
	an error (but an invalid backsig still is). */
	unsigned int require_cross_cert:1;

	unsigned int use_embedded_filename:1;
	unsigned int utf8_filename:1;
	unsigned int dsa2:1;
	unsigned int allow_multiple_messages:1;
	unsigned int allow_weak_digest_algos:1;
	unsigned int large_rsa:1;
	} flags;

	/* Linked list of ways to find a key if the key isn't on the local
	keyring. */
	struct akl
	{
	enum {
	AKL_NODEFAULT,
	AKL_LOCAL,
	AKL_CERT,
	AKL_PKA,
	AKL_DANE,
	AKL_LDAP,
	AKL_KEYSERVER,
	AKL_SPEC
	} type;
	keyserver_spec_t spec;
	struct akl *next;
	} *auto_key_locate;

	int passphrase_repeat;
	int pinentry_mode;
	} opt;

	/* CTRL is used to keep some global variables we currently can't
	avoid. Future concurrent versions of gpg will put it into a per
	request structure CTRL. */
	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	struct {
	int in_auto_key_retrieve; /* True if we are doing an
	auto_key_retrieve. */
	/* Hack to store the last error. We currently need it because the
	proc_packet machinery is not able to reliabale return error
	codes. Thus for the --server purposes we store some of the error
	codes here. FIXME! */
	gpg_error_t lasterr;
	} glo_ctrl;

	#define DBG_PACKET_VALUE 1 /* debug packet reading/writing */
	#define DBG_MPI_VALUE 2 /* debug mpi details */
	#define DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE 4 /* debug crypto handling */
	/* (may reveal sensitive data) */
	#define DBG_FILTER_VALUE 8 /* debug internal filter handling */
	#define DBG_IOBUF_VALUE 16 /* debug iobuf stuff */
	#define DBG_MEMORY_VALUE 32 /* debug memory allocation stuff */
	#define DBG_CACHE_VALUE 64 /* debug the caching */
	#define DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE 128 /* show memory statistics */
	#define DBG_TRUST_VALUE 256 /* debug the trustdb */
	#define DBG_HASHING_VALUE 512 /* debug hashing operations */
	#define DBG_IPC_VALUE 1024 /* debug assuan communication */
	#define DBG_CARD_IO_VALUE 2048 /* debug smart card I/O. */
	#define DBG_CLOCK_VALUE 4096
	#define DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE 8192 /* debug the kety lookup */
	#define DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE 16384 /* debug external program calls */

	/* Tests for the debugging flags. */
	#define DBG_PACKET (opt.debug & DBG_PACKET_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CRYPTO (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE)
	#define DBG_FILTER (opt.debug & DBG_FILTER_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CACHE (opt.debug & DBG_CACHE_VALUE)
	#define DBG_TRUST (opt.debug & DBG_TRUST_VALUE)
	#define DBG_HASHING (opt.debug & DBG_HASHING_VALUE)
	#define DBG_IPC (opt.debug & DBG_IPC_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CARD_IO (opt.debug & DBG_CARD_IO_VALUE)
	#define DBG_IPC (opt.debug & DBG_IPC_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CLOCK (opt.debug & DBG_CLOCK_VALUE)
	#define DBG_LOOKUP (opt.debug & DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE)
	#define DBG_EXTPROG (opt.debug & DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE)

	/* FIXME: We need to check whey we did not put this into opt. */
	#define DBG_MEMORY memory_debug_mode
	#define DBG_MEMSTAT memory_stat_debug_mode

	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE int memory_debug_mode;
	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE int memory_stat_debug_mode;


	/* Compatibility flags. */
	#define GNUPG (opt.compliance==CO_GNUPG)
	#define RFC2440 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC2440)
	#define RFC4880 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC4880)
	#define PGP6 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP6)
	#define PGP7 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP7)
	#define PGP8 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP8)
	#define PGPX (PGP6 \|\| PGP7 \|\| PGP8)

	/* Various option flags. Note that there should be no common string
	names between the IMPORT_ and EXPORT_ flags as they can be mixed in
	the keyserver-options option. */

	#define IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS (1<<0)
	#define IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG (1<<1)
	#define IMPORT_FAST (1<<2)
	#define IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY (1<<4)
	#define IMPORT_MINIMAL (1<<5)
	#define IMPORT_CLEAN (1<<6)
	#define IMPORT_NO_SECKEY (1<<7)
	#define IMPORT_KEEP_OWNERTTRUST (1<<8)

	#define EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS (1<<0)
	#define EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES (1<<1)
	#define EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS (1<<2)
	#define EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD (1<<3)
	#define EXPORT_MINIMAL (1<<4)
	#define EXPORT_CLEAN (1<<5)
	#define EXPORT_DANE_FORMAT (1<<6)

	#define LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS (1<<0)
	#define LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS (1<<1)
	#define LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS (1<<2)
	#define LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS (1<<3)
	#define LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS (LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS\|LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)
	#define LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS (1<<4)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY (1<<5)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS (1<<6)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS (1<<7)
	#define LIST_SHOW_KEYRING (1<<8)
	#define LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE (1<<9)
	#define LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS (1<<10)
	#define LIST_SHOW_USAGE (1<<11)

	#define VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS (1<<0)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS (1<<1)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS (1<<2)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS (1<<3)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS (VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS\|VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS (1<<4)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY (1<<5)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS (1<<6)
	#define VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS (1<<7)
	#define VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE (1<<8)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY (1<<9)

	#define KEYSERVER_HTTP_PROXY (1<<0)
	#define KEYSERVER_TIMEOUT (1<<1)
	#define KEYSERVER_ADD_FAKE_V3 (1<<2)
	#define KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE (1<<3)
	#define KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL (1<<4)
	#define KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD (1<<5)


	#endif /G10_OPTIONS_H/
	diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h
	index eb7da7520..2c1b478c1 100644
	--- a/g10/packet.h
	+++ b/g10/packet.h
	@@ -1,678 +1,683 @@
	/* packet.h - OpenPGP packet definitions
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
	* 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 2015 g10 Code GmbH
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#ifndef G10_PACKET_H
	#define G10_PACKET_H

	#include "types.h"
	#include "../common/iobuf.h"
	#include "../common/strlist.h"
	#include "dek.h"
	#include "filter.h"
	#include "../common/openpgpdefs.h"
	#include "../common/userids.h"

	#define DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET 1


	/* Constants to allocate static MPI arrays. */
	#define PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY 5
	#define PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY 7
	#define PUBKEY_MAX_NSIG 2
	#define PUBKEY_MAX_NENC 2

	/* Usage flags */
	#define PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG GCRY_PK_USAGE_SIGN /* Good for signatures. */
	#define PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC GCRY_PK_USAGE_ENCR /* Good for encryption. */
	#define PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT GCRY_PK_USAGE_CERT /* Also good to certify keys.*/
	#define PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH GCRY_PK_USAGE_AUTH /* Good for authentication. */
	#define PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN GCRY_PK_USAGE_UNKN /* Unknown usage flag. */
	#define PUBKEY_USAGE_NONE 256 /* No usage given. */
	#if (GCRY_PK_USAGE_SIGN \| GCRY_PK_USAGE_ENCR \| GCRY_PK_USAGE_CERT \
	\| GCRY_PK_USAGE_AUTH \| GCRY_PK_USAGE_UNKN) >= 256
	# error Please choose another value for PUBKEY_USAGE_NONE
	#endif

	/* Helper macros. */
	#define is_RSA(a) ((a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA \|\| (a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E \
	\|\| (a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S )
	#define is_ELGAMAL(a) ((a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E)
	#define is_DSA(a) ((a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA)

	/* A pointer to the packet object. */
	typedef struct packet_struct PACKET;

	/* PKT_GPG_CONTROL types */
	typedef enum {
	CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START = 1,
	CTRLPKT_PIPEMODE = 2,
	CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK =3
	} ctrlpkttype_t;

	typedef enum {
	PREFTYPE_NONE = 0,
	PREFTYPE_SYM = 1,
	PREFTYPE_HASH = 2,
	PREFTYPE_ZIP = 3
	} preftype_t;

	typedef struct {
	byte type;
	byte value;
	} prefitem_t;

	typedef struct
	{
	int mode; /* Must be an integer due to the GNU modes 1001 et al. */
	byte hash_algo;
	byte salt[8];
	u32 count;
	} STRING2KEY;

	typedef struct {
	byte version;
	byte cipher_algo; /* cipher algorithm used */
	STRING2KEY s2k;
	byte seskeylen; /* keylength in byte or 0 for no seskey */
	byte seskey[1];
	} PKT_symkey_enc;

	typedef struct {
	u32 keyid[2]; /* 64 bit keyid */
	byte version;
	byte pubkey_algo; /* algorithm used for public key scheme */
	byte throw_keyid;
	gcry_mpi_t data[PUBKEY_MAX_NENC];
	} PKT_pubkey_enc;


	typedef struct {
	u32 keyid[2]; /* 64 bit keyid */
	byte sig_class; /* sig classification */
	byte digest_algo; /* algorithm used for digest */
	byte pubkey_algo; /* algorithm used for public key scheme */
	byte last; /* a stupid flag */
	} PKT_onepass_sig;


	typedef struct {
	size_t size; /* allocated */
	size_t len; /* used */
	byte data[1];
	} subpktarea_t;

	struct revocation_key {
	byte class;
	byte algid;
	byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	};


	/* Object to keep information about a PKA DNS record. */
	typedef struct
	{
	int valid; /* An actual PKA record exists for EMAIL. */
	int checked; /* Set to true if the FPR has been checked against the
	actual key. */
	char uri; / Malloced string with the URI. NULL if the URI is
	not available.*/
	unsigned char fpr[20]; /* The fingerprint as stored in the PKA RR. */
	char email[1];/* The email address from the notation data. */
	} pka_info_t;


	/* Object to keep information pertaining to a signature. */
	typedef struct
	{
	struct
	{
	unsigned checked:1; /* Signature has been checked. */
	unsigned valid:1; /* Signature is good (if checked is set). */
	unsigned chosen_selfsig:1; /* A selfsig that is the chosen one. */
	unsigned unknown_critical:1;
	unsigned exportable:1;
	unsigned revocable:1;
	unsigned policy_url:1; /* At least one policy URL is present */
	unsigned notation:1; /* At least one notation is present */
	unsigned pref_ks:1; /* At least one preferred keyserver is present */
	unsigned expired:1;
	unsigned pka_tried:1; /* Set if we tried to retrieve the PKA record. */
	} flags;
	u32 keyid[2]; /* 64 bit keyid */
	u32 timestamp; /* Signature made (seconds since Epoch). */
	u32 expiredate; /* Expires at this date or 0 if not at all. */
	byte version;
	byte sig_class; /* Sig classification, append for MD calculation. */
	byte pubkey_algo; /* Algorithm used for public key scheme */
	/* (PUBKEY_ALGO_xxx) */
	byte digest_algo; /* Algorithm used for digest (DIGEST_ALGO_xxxx). */
	byte trust_depth;
	byte trust_value;
	const byte *trust_regexp;
	struct revocation_key *revkey;
	int numrevkeys;
	pka_info_t pka_info; / Malloced PKA data or NULL if not
	available. See also flags.pka_tried. */
	subpktarea_t hashed; / All subpackets with hashed data (v4 only). */
	subpktarea_t unhashed; / Ditto for unhashed data. */
	byte digest_start[2]; /* First 2 bytes of the digest. */
	gcry_mpi_t data[PUBKEY_MAX_NSIG];
	+ /* The message digest and its length (in bytes). Note the maximum
	+ digest length is 512 bits (64 bytes). If DIGEST_LEN is 0, then
	+ the digest's value has not been saved here. */
	+ byte digest[512 / 8];
	+ int digest_len;
	} PKT_signature;

	#define ATTRIB_IMAGE 1

	/* This is the cooked form of attributes. */
	struct user_attribute {
	byte type;
	const byte *data;
	u32 len;
	};


	/* (See also keybox-search-desc.h) */
	struct gpg_pkt_user_id_s
	{
	int ref; /* reference counter */
	int len; /* length of the name */
	struct user_attribute *attribs;
	int numattribs;
	byte attrib_data; / if this is not NULL, the packet is an attribute */
	unsigned long attrib_len;
	byte *namehash;
	int help_key_usage;
	u32 help_key_expire;
	int help_full_count;
	int help_marginal_count;
	int is_primary; /* 2 if set via the primary flag, 1 if calculated */
	int is_revoked;
	int is_expired;
	u32 expiredate; /* expires at this date or 0 if not at all */
	prefitem_t prefs; / list of preferences (may be NULL)*/
	u32 created; /* according to the self-signature */
	byte selfsigversion;
	struct
	{
	/* TODO: Move more flags here */
	unsigned int mdc:1;
	unsigned int ks_modify:1;
	unsigned int compacted:1;
	} flags;
	char name[1];
	};
	typedef struct gpg_pkt_user_id_s PKT_user_id;



	struct revoke_info
	{
	/* revoked at this date */
	u32 date;
	/* the keyid of the revoking key (selfsig or designated revoker) */
	u32 keyid[2];
	/* the algo of the revoking key */
	byte algo;
	};


	/* Information pertaining to secret keys. */
	struct seckey_info
	{
	int is_protected:1; /* The secret info is protected and must */
	/* be decrypted before use, the protected */
	/* MPIs are simply (void) pointers to memory /
	/* and should never be passed to a mpi_xxx() */
	int sha1chk:1; /* SHA1 is used instead of a 16 bit checksum */
	u16 csum; /* Checksum for old protection modes. */
	byte algo; /* Cipher used to protect the secret information. */
	STRING2KEY s2k; /* S2K parameter. */
	byte ivlen; /* Used length of the IV. */
	byte iv[16]; /* Initialization vector for CFB mode. */
	};


	/****************
	* We assume that secret keys have the same number of parameters as
	* the public key and that the public parameters are the first items
	* in the PKEY array. Thus NPKEY is always less than NSKEY and it is
	* possible to compare the secret and public keys by comparing the
	* first NPKEY elements of the PKEY array. Note that since GnuPG 2.1
	* we don't use secret keys anymore directly because they are managed
	* by gpg-agent. However for parsing OpenPGP key files we need a way
	* to temporary store those secret keys. We do this by putting them
	* into the public key structure and extending the PKEY field to NSKEY
	* elements; the extra secret key information are stored in the
	* SECKEY_INFO field.
	*/
	typedef struct
	{
	u32 timestamp; /* key made */
	u32 expiredate; /* expires at this date or 0 if not at all */
	u32 max_expiredate; /* must not expire past this date */
	struct revoke_info revoked;
	byte hdrbytes; /* number of header bytes */
	byte version;
	byte selfsigversion; /* highest version of all of the self-sigs */
	byte pubkey_algo; /* algorithm used for public key scheme */
	byte pubkey_usage; /* for now only used to pass it to getkey() */
	byte req_usage; /* hack to pass a request to getkey() */
	u32 has_expired; /* set to the expiration date if expired */
	u32 main_keyid[2]; /* keyid of the primary key */
	u32 keyid[2]; /* calculated by keyid_from_pk() */
	prefitem_t prefs; / list of preferences (may be NULL) */
	struct
	{
	unsigned int mdc:1; /* MDC feature set. */
	unsigned int disabled_valid:1;/* The next flag is valid. */
	unsigned int disabled:1; /* The key has been disabled. */
	unsigned int primary:1; /* This is a primary key. */
	unsigned int revoked:2; /* Key has been revoked.
	1 = revoked by the owner
	2 = revoked by designated revoker. */
	unsigned int maybe_revoked:1; /* A designated revocation is
	present, but without the key to
	check it. */
	unsigned int valid:1; /* Key (especially subkey) is valid. */
	unsigned int dont_cache:1; /* Do not cache this key. */
	unsigned int backsig:2; /* 0=none, 1=bad, 2=good. */
	unsigned int serialno_valid:1;/* SERIALNO below is valid. */
	} flags;
	PKT_user_id user_id; / If != NULL: found by that uid. */
	struct revocation_key *revkey;
	int numrevkeys;
	u32 trust_timestamp;
	byte trust_depth;
	byte trust_value;
	const byte *trust_regexp;
	char serialno; / Malloced hex string or NULL if it is
	likely not on a card. See also
	flags.serialno_valid. */
	struct seckey_info seckey_info; / If not NULL this malloced
	structure describes a secret
	key. */
	gcry_mpi_t pkey[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY]; /* Right, NSKEY elements. */
	} PKT_public_key;

	/* Evaluates as true if the pk is disabled, and false if it isn't. If
	there is no disable value cached, fill one in. */
	#define pk_is_disabled(a) \
	(((a)->flags.disabled_valid)? \
	((a)->flags.disabled):(cache_disabled_value((a))))


	typedef struct {
	int len; /* length of data */
	char data[1];
	} PKT_comment;

	typedef struct {
	u32 len; /* reserved */
	byte new_ctb;
	byte algorithm;
	iobuf_t buf; /* IOBUF reference */
	} PKT_compressed;

	typedef struct {
	u32 len; /* Remaining length of encrypted data. */
	int extralen; /* This is (blocksize+2). Used by build_packet. */
	byte new_ctb; /* uses a new CTB */
	byte is_partial; /* partial length encoded */
	byte mdc_method; /* > 0: integrity protected encrypted data packet */
	iobuf_t buf; /* IOBUF reference */
	} PKT_encrypted;

	typedef struct {
	byte hash[20];
	} PKT_mdc;

	typedef struct {
	unsigned int trustval;
	unsigned int sigcache;
	} PKT_ring_trust;

	typedef struct {
	u32 len; /* length of encrypted data */
	iobuf_t buf; /* IOBUF reference */
	byte new_ctb;
	byte is_partial; /* partial length encoded */
	int mode;
	u32 timestamp;
	int namelen;
	char name[1];
	} PKT_plaintext;

	typedef struct {
	int control;
	size_t datalen;
	char data[1];
	} PKT_gpg_control;

	/* combine all packets into a union */
	struct packet_struct {
	pkttype_t pkttype;
	union {
	void *generic;
	PKT_symkey_enc symkey_enc; / PKT_SYMKEY_ENC */
	PKT_pubkey_enc pubkey_enc; / PKT_PUBKEY_ENC */
	PKT_onepass_sig onepass_sig; / PKT_ONEPASS_SIG */
	PKT_signature signature; / PKT_SIGNATURE */
	PKT_public_key public_key; / PKT_PUBLIC_[SUB]KEY */
	PKT_public_key secret_key; / PKT_SECRET_[SUB]KEY */
	PKT_comment comment; / PKT_COMMENT */
	PKT_user_id user_id; / PKT_USER_ID */
	PKT_compressed compressed; / PKT_COMPRESSED */
	PKT_encrypted encrypted; / PKT_ENCRYPTED[_MDC] */
	PKT_mdc mdc; / PKT_MDC */
	PKT_ring_trust ring_trust; / PKT_RING_TRUST */
	PKT_plaintext plaintext; / PKT_PLAINTEXT */
	PKT_gpg_control gpg_control; / PKT_GPG_CONTROL */
	} pkt;
	};

	#define init_packet(a) do { (a)->pkttype = 0; \
	(a)->pkt.generic = NULL; \
	} while(0)


	struct notation
	{
	char *name;
	char *value;
	char *altvalue;
	unsigned char *bdat;
	size_t blen;
	struct
	{
	unsigned int critical:1;
	unsigned int ignore:1;
	} flags;
	struct notation *next;
	};

	/-- mainproc.c --/
	void reset_literals_seen(void);
	int proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *ctx, iobuf_t a );
	int proc_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *ctx, iobuf_t a,
	strlist_t signedfiles, const char *sigfile );
	int proc_signature_packets_by_fd (ctrl_t ctrl,
	void *anchor, IOBUF a, int signed_data_fd );
	int proc_encryption_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *ctx, iobuf_t a);
	int list_packets( iobuf_t a );

	/-- parse-packet.c --/

	/* Sets the packet list mode to MODE (i.e., whether we are dumping a
	packet or not). Returns the current mode. This allows for
	temporarily suspending dumping by doing the following:

	int saved_mode = set_packet_list_mode (0);
	...
	set_packet_list_mode (saved_mode);
	*/
	int set_packet_list_mode( int mode );

	#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
	/* There are debug functions and should not be used directly. */
	int dbg_search_packet( iobuf_t inp, PACKET pkt, off_t retpos, int with_uid,
	const char* file, int lineno );
	int dbg_parse_packet( iobuf_t inp, PACKET *ret_pkt,
	const char* file, int lineno );
	int dbg_copy_all_packets( iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out,
	const char* file, int lineno );
	int dbg_copy_some_packets( iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out, off_t stopoff,
	const char* file, int lineno );
	int dbg_skip_some_packets( iobuf_t inp, unsigned n,
	const char* file, int lineno );
	#define search_packet( a,b,c,d ) \
	dbg_search_packet( (a), (b), (c), (d), __FILE__, __LINE__ )
	#define parse_packet( a, b ) \
	dbg_parse_packet( (a), (b), __FILE__, __LINE__ )
	#define copy_all_packets( a,b ) \
	dbg_copy_all_packets((a),(b), __FILE__, __LINE__ )
	#define copy_some_packets( a,b,c ) \
	dbg_copy_some_packets((a),(b),(c), __FILE__, __LINE__ )
	#define skip_some_packets( a,b ) \
	dbg_skip_some_packets((a),(b), __FILE__, __LINE__ )
	#else
	/* Return the next valid OpenPGP packet in *PKT. (This function will
	skip any packets whose type is 0.)

	Returns 0 on success, -1 if EOF is reached, and an error code
	otherwise. In the case of an error, the packet in *PKT may be
	partially constructed. As such, even if there is an error, it is
	necessary to free *PKT to avoid a resource leak. To detect what
	has been allocated, clear PKT before calling this function. /
	int parse_packet( iobuf_t inp, PACKET *pkt);

	/* Return the first OpenPGP packet in *PKT that contains a key (either
	a public subkey, a public key, a secret subkey or a secret key) or,
	if WITH_UID is set, a user id.

	Saves the position in the pipeline of the start of the returned
	packet (according to iobuf_tell) in RETPOS, if it is not NULL.

	The return semantics are the same as parse_packet. */
	int search_packet( iobuf_t inp, PACKET pkt, off_t retpos, int with_uid );

	/* Copy all packets (except invalid packets, i.e., those with a type
	of 0) from INP to OUT until either an error occurs or EOF is
	reached.

	Returns -1 when end of file is reached or an error code, if an
	error occured. (Note: this function never returns 0, because it
	effectively keeps going until it gets an EOF.) */
	int copy_all_packets( iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out );

	/* Like copy_all_packets, but stops at the first packet that starts at
	or after STOPOFF (as indicated by iobuf_tell).

	Example: if STOPOFF is 100, the first packet in INP goes from 0 to
	110 and the next packet starts at offset 111, then the packet
	starting at offset 0 will be completely processed (even though it
	extends beyond STOPOFF) and the packet starting at offset 111 will
	not be processed at all. */
	int copy_some_packets( iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out, off_t stopoff );

	/* Skips the next N packets from INP.

	If parsing a packet returns an error code, then the function stops
	immediately and returns the error code. Note: in the case of an
	error, this function does not indicate how many packets were
	successfully processed. */
	int skip_some_packets( iobuf_t inp, unsigned n );
	#endif

	/* Parse a signature packet and store it in *SIG.

	The signature packet is read from INP. The OpenPGP header (the tag
	and the packet's length) have already been read; the next byte read
	from INP should be the first byte of the packet's contents. The
	packet's type (as extract from the tag) must be passed as PKTTYPE
	and the packet's length must be passed as PKTLEN. This is used as
	the upper bound on the amount of data read from INP. If the packet
	is shorter than PKTLEN, the data at the end will be silently
	skipped. If an error occurs, an error code will be returned. -1
	means the EOF was encountered. 0 means parsing was successful. */
	int parse_signature( iobuf_t inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
	PKT_signature *sig );

	/* Given a subpacket area (typically either PKT_signature.hashed or
	PKT_signature.unhashed), either:

	- test whether there are any subpackets with the critical bit set
	that we don't understand,

	- list the subpackets, or,

	- find a subpacket with a specific type.

	REQTYPE indicates the type of operation.

	If REQTYPE is SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL, then this function checks
	whether there are any subpackets that have the critical bit and
	which GnuPG cannot handle. If GnuPG understands all subpackets
	whose critical bit is set, then this function returns simply
	returns SUBPKTS. If there is a subpacket whose critical bit is set
	and which GnuPG does not understand, then this function returns
	NULL and, if START is not NULL, sets *START to the 1-based index of
	the subpacket that violates the constraint.

	If REQTYPE is SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED or SIGSUBPKT_LIST_UNHASHED, the
	packets are dumped. Note: if REQTYPE is SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED,
	this function does not check whether the hash is correct; this is
	merely an indication of the section that the subpackets came from.

	If REQTYPE is anything else, then this function interprets the
	values as a subpacket type and looks for the first subpacket with
	that type. If such a packet is found, *CRITICAL (if not NULL) is
	set if the critical bit was set, *RET_N is set to the offset of the
	subpacket's content within the SUBPKTS buffer, *START is set to the
	1-based index of the subpacket within the buffer, and returns
	&SUBPKTS[*RET_N].

	*START is the number of initial subpackets to not consider. Thus,
	if START is 2, then the first 2 subpackets are ignored. /
	const byte enum_sig_subpkt ( const subpktarea_t subpkts,
	sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
	size_t ret_n, int start, int *critical );

	/* Shorthand for:

	enum_sig_subpkt (buffer, reqtype, ret_n, NULL, NULL); */
	const byte parse_sig_subpkt ( const subpktarea_t buffer,
	sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
	size_t *ret_n );

	/* This calls parse_sig_subpkt first on the hashed signature area in
	SIG and then, if that returns NULL, calls parse_sig_subpkt on the
	unhashed subpacket area in SIG. */
	const byte parse_sig_subpkt2 ( PKT_signature sig,
	sigsubpkttype_t reqtype);

	/* Returns whether the N byte large buffer BUFFER is sufficient to
	hold a subpacket of type TYPE. Note: the buffer refers to the
	contents of the subpacket (not the header) and it must already be
	initialized: for some subpackets, it checks some internal
	constraints.

	Returns 0 if the size is acceptable. Returns -2 if the buffer is
	definately too short. To check for an error, check whether the
	return value is less than 0. */
	int parse_one_sig_subpkt( const byte *buffer, size_t n, int type );

	/* Looks for revocation key subpackets (see RFC 4880 5.2.3.15) in the
	hashed area of the signature packet. Any that are found are added
	to SIG->REVKEY and SIG->NUMREVKEYS is updated appropriately. */
	void parse_revkeys(PKT_signature *sig);

	/* Extract the attributes from the buffer at UID->ATTRIB_DATA and
	update UID->ATTRIBS and UID->NUMATTRIBS accordingly. */
	int parse_attribute_subpkts(PKT_user_id *uid);

	/* Set the UID->NAME field according to the attributes. MAX_NAMELEN
	must be at least 71. */
	void make_attribute_uidname(PKT_user_id *uid, size_t max_namelen);

	/* Allocate and initialize a new GPG control packet. DATA is the data
	to save in the packet. */
	PACKET *create_gpg_control ( ctrlpkttype_t type,
	const byte *data,
	size_t datalen );

	/-- build-packet.c --/
	int build_packet( iobuf_t inp, PACKET *pkt );
	gpg_error_t gpg_mpi_write (iobuf_t out, gcry_mpi_t a);
	gpg_error_t gpg_mpi_write_nohdr (iobuf_t out, gcry_mpi_t a);
	u32 calc_packet_length( PACKET *pkt );
	void build_sig_subpkt( PKT_signature *sig, sigsubpkttype_t type,
	const byte *buffer, size_t buflen );
	void build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( PKT_signature *sig );
	int delete_sig_subpkt(subpktarea_t *buffer, sigsubpkttype_t type );
	void build_attribute_subpkt(PKT_user_id *uid,byte type,
	const void *buf,u32 buflen,
	const void *header,u32 headerlen);
	struct notation string_to_notation(const char string,int is_utf8);
	struct notation sig_to_notation(PKT_signature sig);
	void free_notation(struct notation *notation);

	/-- free-packet.c --/
	void free_symkey_enc( PKT_symkey_enc *enc );
	void free_pubkey_enc( PKT_pubkey_enc *enc );
	void free_seckey_enc( PKT_signature *enc );
	int digest_algo_from_sig( PKT_signature *sig );
	void release_public_key_parts( PKT_public_key *pk );
	void free_public_key( PKT_public_key *key );
	void free_attributes(PKT_user_id *uid);
	void free_user_id( PKT_user_id *uid );
	void free_comment( PKT_comment *rem );
	void free_packet( PACKET *pkt );
	prefitem_t copy_prefs (const prefitem_t prefs);
	PKT_public_key copy_public_key( PKT_public_key d, PKT_public_key *s );
	PKT_signature copy_signature( PKT_signature d, PKT_signature *s );
	PKT_user_id scopy_user_id (PKT_user_id sd );
	int cmp_public_keys( PKT_public_key a, PKT_public_key b );
	int cmp_signatures( PKT_signature a, PKT_signature b );
	int cmp_user_ids( PKT_user_id a, PKT_user_id b );


	/-- sig-check.c --/
	int signature_check( PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest );
	int signature_check2( PKT_signature sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest, u32 r_expiredate,
	int r_expired, int r_revoked, PKT_public_key *ret_pk );


	/-- pubkey-enc.c --/
	gpg_error_t get_session_key (PKT_pubkey_enc k, DEK dek);
	gpg_error_t get_override_session_key (DEK dek, const char string);

	/-- compress.c --/
	int handle_compressed (ctrl_t ctrl, void ctx, PKT_compressed cd,
	int (callback)(iobuf_t, void ), void *passthru );

	/-- encr-data.c --/
	int decrypt_data (ctrl_t ctrl, void ctx, PKT_encrypted ed, DEK *dek );

	/-- plaintext.c --/
	int handle_plaintext( PKT_plaintext pt, md_filter_context_t mfx,
	int nooutput, int clearsig );
	int ask_for_detached_datafile( gcry_md_hd_t md, gcry_md_hd_t md2,
	const char *inname, int textmode );

	/-- sign.c --/
	int make_keysig_packet( PKT_signature *ret_sig, PKT_public_key pk,
	PKT_user_id uid, PKT_public_key subpk,
	PKT_public_key *pksk, int sigclass, int digest_algo,
	u32 timestamp, u32 duration,
	int (mksubpkt)(PKT_signature , void *),
	void *opaque,
	const char *cache_nonce);
	gpg_error_t update_keysig_packet (PKT_signature **ret_sig,
	PKT_signature *orig_sig,
	PKT_public_key *pk,
	PKT_user_id *uid,
	PKT_public_key *subpk,
	PKT_public_key *pksk,
	int (mksubpkt)(PKT_signature , void *),
	void *opaque );

	/-- keygen.c --/
	PKT_user_id generate_user_id (kbnode_t keyblock, const char uidstr);

	#endif /G10_PACKET_H/
	diff --git a/g10/pkclist.c b/g10/pkclist.c
	index 9996d1828..06ba86e08 100644
	--- a/g10/pkclist.c
	+++ b/g10/pkclist.c
	@@ -1,1569 +1,1570 @@
	/* pkclist.c - create a list of public keys
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
	* 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <errno.h>
	#include <assert.h>

	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "status.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "util.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "ttyio.h"
	#include "status.h"
	#include "photoid.h"
	#include "i18n.h"
	+#include "tofu.h"

	#define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)

	static void
	send_status_inv_recp (int reason, const char *name)
	{
	char buf[40];

	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%d ", reason);
	write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, buf,
	name, strlen (name),
	-1);
	}


	/****************
	* Show the revocation reason as it is stored with the given signature
	*/
	static void
	do_show_revocation_reason( PKT_signature *sig )
	{
	size_t n, nn;
	const byte p, pp;
	int seq = 0;
	const char *text;

	while( (p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON,
	&n, &seq, NULL )) ) {
	if( !n )
	continue; /* invalid - just skip it */

	if( *p == 0 )
	text = _("No reason specified");
	else if( *p == 0x01 )
	text = _("Key is superseded");
	else if( *p == 0x02 )
	text = _("Key has been compromised");
	else if( *p == 0x03 )
	text = _("Key is no longer used");
	else if( *p == 0x20 )
	text = _("User ID is no longer valid");
	else
	text = NULL;

	log_info ( _("reason for revocation: "));
	if (text)
	log_printf ("%s\n", text);
	else
	log_printf ("code=%02x\n", *p );
	n--; p++;
	pp = NULL;
	do {
	/* We don't want any empty lines, so skip them */
	while( n && *p == '\n' ) {
	p++;
	n--;
	}
	if( n ) {
	pp = memchr( p, '\n', n );
	nn = pp? pp - p : n;
	log_info ( _("revocation comment: ") );
	es_write_sanitized (log_get_stream(), p, nn, NULL, NULL);
	log_printf ("\n");
	p += nn; n -= nn;
	}
	} while( pp );
	}
	}

	/* Mode 0: try and find the revocation based on the pk (i.e. check
	subkeys, etc.) Mode 1: use only the revocation on the main pk */

	void
	show_revocation_reason( PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
	{
	/* Hmmm, this is not so easy becuase we have to duplicate the code
	* used in the trustbd to calculate the keyflags. We need to find
	* a clean way to check revocation certificates on keys and
	* signatures. And there should be no duplicate code. Because we
	* enter this function only when the trustdb told us that we have
	* a revoked key, we could simply look for a revocation cert and
	* display this one, when there is only one. Let's try to do this
	* until we have a better solution. */
	KBNODE node, keyblock = NULL;
	byte fingerprint[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	size_t fingerlen;
	int rc;

	/* get the keyblock */
	fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fingerprint, &fingerlen );
	rc = get_pubkey_byfprint(NULL, &keyblock, fingerprint, fingerlen);
	if( rc ) { /* that should never happen */
	log_debug( "failed to get the keyblock\n");
	return;
	}

	for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
	if( (mode && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) \|\|
	( ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
	&& !cmp_public_keys( node->pkt->pkt.public_key, pk ) ) )
	break;
	}
	if( !node ) {
	log_debug("Oops, PK not in keyblock\n");
	release_kbnode( keyblock );
	return;
	}
	/* now find the revocation certificate */
	for( node = node->next; node ; node = node->next ) {
	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
	break;
	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20
	\|\| node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28 ) ) {
	/* FIXME: we should check the signature here */
	do_show_revocation_reason ( node->pkt->pkt.signature );
	break;
	}
	}

	/* We didn't find it, so check if the whole key is revoked */
	if(!node && !mode)
	show_revocation_reason(pk,1);

	release_kbnode( keyblock );
	}


	/****************
	* mode: 0 = standard
	* 1 = Without key info and additional menu option 'm'
	* this does also add an option to set the key to ultimately trusted.
	* Returns:
	* -2 = nothing changed - caller should show some additional info
	* -1 = quit operation
	* 0 = nothing changed
	* 1 = new ownertrust now in new_trust
	*/
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	static int
	do_edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode,
	unsigned *new_trust, int defer_help )
	{
	char *p;
	u32 keyid[2];
	int changed=0;
	int quit=0;
	int show=0;
	int min_num;
	int did_help=defer_help;
	unsigned int minimum = tdb_get_min_ownertrust (pk);
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

	switch(minimum)
	{
	default:
	case TRUST_UNDEFINED: min_num=1; break;
	case TRUST_NEVER: min_num=2; break;
	case TRUST_MARGINAL: min_num=3; break;
	case TRUST_FULLY: min_num=4; break;
	}

	keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
	for(;;) {
	/* A string with valid answers.

	TRANSLATORS: These are the allowed answers in lower and
	uppercase. Below you will find the matching strings which
	should be translated accordingly and the letter changed to
	match the one in the answer string.

	i = please show me more information
	m = back to the main menu
	s = skip this key
	q = quit
	*/
	const char *ans = _("iImMqQsS");

	if( !did_help )
	{
	if( !mode )
	{
	KBNODE keyblock, un;

	tty_printf(_("No trust value assigned to:\n"));
	tty_printf("%s/%s %s\n",
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr(keyid), datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
	p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
	tty_printf(_(" \"%s\"\n"),p);
	xfree(p);

	keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (keyid);
	if (!keyblock)
	BUG ();
	for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
	{
	if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
	continue;
	if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
	continue;
	if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired )
	continue;
	/* Only skip textual primaries */
	if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary
	&& !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
	continue;

	if((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
	&& un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
	show_photos (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
	un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs, pk,
	un->pkt->pkt.user_id);

	p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);

	tty_printf(_(" aka \"%s\"\n"),p);
	}

	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 2);
	tty_printf("\n");
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	}

	if(opt.trust_model==TM_DIRECT)
	{
	tty_printf(_("How much do you trust that this key actually "
	"belongs to the named user?\n"));
	tty_printf("\n");
	}
	else
	{
	/* This string also used in keyedit.c:trustsig_prompt */
	tty_printf(_("Please decide how far you trust this user to"
	" correctly verify other users' keys\n"
	"(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from"
	" different sources, etc.)\n"));
	tty_printf("\n");
	}

	if(min_num<=1)
	tty_printf (_(" %d = I don't know or won't say\n"), 1);
	if(min_num<=2)
	tty_printf (_(" %d = I do NOT trust\n"), 2);
	if(min_num<=3)
	tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust marginally\n"), 3);
	if(min_num<=4)
	tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust fully\n"), 4);
	if (mode)
	tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust ultimately\n"), 5);
	#if 0
	/* not yet implemented */
	tty_printf (" i = please show me more information\n");
	#endif
	if( mode )
	tty_printf(_(" m = back to the main menu\n"));
	else
	{
	tty_printf(_(" s = skip this key\n"));
	tty_printf(_(" q = quit\n"));
	}
	tty_printf("\n");
	if(minimum)
	tty_printf(_("The minimum trust level for this key is: %s\n\n"),
	trust_value_to_string(minimum));
	did_help = 1;
	}
	if( strlen(ans) != 8 )
	BUG();
	p = cpr_get("edit_ownertrust.value",_("Your decision? "));
	trim_spaces(p);
	cpr_kill_prompt();
	if( !*p )
	did_help = 0;
	else if( *p && p[1] )
	;
	else if( !p[1] && ((p >= '0'+min_num) && p <= (mode?'5':'4')) )
	{
	unsigned int trust;
	switch( *p )
	{
	case '1': trust = TRUST_UNDEFINED; break;
	case '2': trust = TRUST_NEVER ; break;
	case '3': trust = TRUST_MARGINAL ; break;
	case '4': trust = TRUST_FULLY ; break;
	case '5': trust = TRUST_ULTIMATE ; break;
	default: BUG();
	}
	if (trust == TRUST_ULTIMATE
	&& !cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("edit_ownertrust.set_ultimate.okay",
	_("Do you really want to set this key"
	" to ultimate trust? (y/N) ")))
	; /* no */
	else
	{
	*new_trust = trust;
	changed = 1;
	break;
	}
	}
	#if 0
	/* not yet implemented */
	else if( p == ans[0] \|\| p == ans[1] )
	{
	tty_printf(_("Certificates leading to an ultimately trusted key:\n"));
	show = 1;
	break;
	}
	#endif
	else if( mode && (p == ans[2] \|\| p == ans[3] \|\| *p == CONTROL_D ) )
	{
	break ; /* back to the menu */
	}
	else if( !mode && (p == ans[6] \|\| p == ans[7] ) )
	{
	break; /* skip */
	}
	else if( !mode && (p == ans[4] \|\| p == ans[5] ) )
	{
	quit = 1;
	break ; /* back to the menu */
	}
	xfree(p); p = NULL;
	}
	xfree(p);
	return show? -2: quit? -1 : changed;
	}
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/


	/*
	* Display a menu to change the ownertrust of the key PK (which should
	* be a primary key).
	* For mode values see do_edit_ownertrust ()
	*/
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	int
	edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
	{
	unsigned int trust = 0;
	int no_help = 0;

	for(;;)
	{
	switch ( do_edit_ownertrust (pk, mode, &trust, no_help ) )
	{
	case -1: /* quit */
	return -1;
	case -2: /* show info */
	no_help = 1;
	break;
	case 1: /* trust value set */
	trust &= ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
	trust \|= get_ownertrust (pk) & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
	update_ownertrust (pk, trust );
	return 1;
	default:
	return 0;
	}
	}
	}
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/


	/****************
	* Check whether we can trust this pk which has a trustlevel of TRUSTLEVEL
	* Returns: true if we trust.
	*/
	static int
	do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
	{
	/* We should not be able to get here with a revoked or expired
	key */
	if(trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED
	\|\| trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED
	\|\| (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_EXPIRED)
	BUG();

	if( opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS )
	{
	if( opt.verbose )
	log_info("No trust check due to '--trust-model always' option\n");
	return 1;
	}

	switch(trustlevel & TRUST_MASK)
	{
	default:
	log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
	trustlevel);
	/* fall thru */
	case TRUST_UNKNOWN:
	case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
	log_info(_("%s: There is no assurance this key belongs"
	" to the named user\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
	return 0; /* no */

	case TRUST_MARGINAL:
	log_info(_("%s: There is limited assurance this key belongs"
	" to the named user\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
	return 1; /* yes */

	case TRUST_FULLY:
	if( opt.verbose )
	log_info(_("This key probably belongs to the named user\n"));
	return 1; /* yes */

	case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
	if( opt.verbose )
	log_info(_("This key belongs to us\n"));
	return 1; /* yes */
	}

	return 1; /NOTREACHED/
	}


	/****************
	* wrapper around do_we_trust, so we can ask whether to use the
	* key anyway.
	*/
	static int
	do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
	{
	int rc;

	rc = do_we_trust( pk, trustlevel );

	if( !opt.batch && !rc )
	{
	print_pubkey_info(NULL,pk);
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 2);
	tty_printf("\n");

	tty_printf(
	_("It is NOT certain that the key belongs to the person named\n"
	"in the user ID. If you really know what you are doing,\n"
	"you may answer the next question with yes.\n"));

	tty_printf("\n");


	if (is_status_enabled ())
	{
	u32 kid[2];
	char *hint_str;

	keyid_from_pk (pk, kid);
	hint_str = get_long_user_id_string ( kid );
	write_status_text ( STATUS_USERID_HINT, hint_str );
	xfree (hint_str);
	}

	if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes("untrusted_key.override",
	_("Use this key anyway? (y/N) ")) )
	rc = 1;

	/* Hmmm: Should we set a flag to tell the user about
	* his decision the next time he encrypts for this recipient?
	*/
	}

	return rc;
	}


	/****************
	* Check whether we can trust this signature.
	- * Returns: Error if we shall not trust this signatures.
	+ * Returns an error code if we should not trust this signature.
	*/
	int
	check_signatures_trust( PKT_signature *sig )
	{
	PKT_public_key pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof pk );
	- unsigned int trustlevel;
	+ unsigned int trustlevel = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	int rc=0;

	rc = get_pubkey( pk, sig->keyid );
	if (rc)
	{ /* this should not happen */
	log_error("Ooops; the key vanished - can't check the trust\n");
	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
	goto leave;
	}

	if ( opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS )
	{
	if( !opt.quiet )
	log_info(_("WARNING: Using untrusted key!\n"));
	if (opt.with_fingerprint)
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 1);
	goto leave;
	}

	if(pk->flags.maybe_revoked && !pk->flags.revoked)
	log_info(_("WARNING: this key might be revoked (revocation key"
	" not present)\n"));

	- trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL);
	+ trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL, sig, 1);

	if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) )
	{
	write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
	if(pk->flags.revoked == 2)
	log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its"
	" designated revoker!\n"));
	else
	log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
	log_info(_(" This could mean that the signature is forged.\n"));
	show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
	}
	else if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) )
	{
	write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
	log_info(_("WARNING: This subkey has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
	show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
	}

	if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
	log_info (_("Note: This key has been disabled.\n"));

	/* If we have PKA information adjust the trustlevel. */
	if (sig->pka_info && sig->pka_info->valid)
	{
	unsigned char fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	PKT_public_key *primary_pk;
	size_t fprlen;
	int okay;


	primary_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *primary_pk);
	get_pubkey (primary_pk, pk->main_keyid);
	fingerprint_from_pk (primary_pk, fpr, &fprlen);
	free_public_key (primary_pk);

	if ( fprlen == 20 && !memcmp (sig->pka_info->fpr, fpr, 20) )
	{
	okay = 1;
	write_status_text (STATUS_PKA_TRUST_GOOD, sig->pka_info->email);
	log_info (_("Note: Verified signer's address is '%s'\n"),
	sig->pka_info->email);
	}
	else
	{
	okay = 0;
	write_status_text (STATUS_PKA_TRUST_BAD, sig->pka_info->email);
	log_info (_("Note: Signer's address '%s' "
	"does not match DNS entry\n"), sig->pka_info->email);
	}

	switch ( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) )
	{
	case TRUST_UNKNOWN:
	case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
	case TRUST_MARGINAL:
	if (okay && opt.verify_options&VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE)
	{
	trustlevel = ((trustlevel & ~TRUST_MASK) \| TRUST_FULLY);
	log_info (_("trustlevel adjusted to FULL"
	" due to valid PKA info\n"));
	}
	/* (fall through) */
	case TRUST_FULLY:
	if (!okay)
	{
	trustlevel = ((trustlevel & ~TRUST_MASK) \| TRUST_NEVER);
	log_info (_("trustlevel adjusted to NEVER"
	" due to bad PKA info\n"));
	}
	break;
	}
	}

	/* Now let the user know what up with the trustlevel. */
	switch ( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) )
	{
	case TRUST_EXPIRED:
	log_info(_("Note: This key has expired!\n"));
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 1);
	break;

	default:
	log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
	trustlevel);
	/* fall thru */
	case TRUST_UNKNOWN:
	case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
	write_status( STATUS_TRUST_UNDEFINED );
	log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
	" a trusted signature!\n"));
	log_info(_(" There is no indication that the "
	"signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 1);
	break;

	case TRUST_NEVER:
	/* currently we won't get that status */
	write_status( STATUS_TRUST_NEVER );
	log_info(_("WARNING: We do NOT trust this key!\n"));
	log_info(_(" The signature is probably a FORGERY.\n"));
	if (opt.with_fingerprint)
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 1);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
	break;

	case TRUST_MARGINAL:
	write_status( STATUS_TRUST_MARGINAL );
	log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
	" sufficiently trusted signatures!\n"));
	log_info(_(" It is not certain that the"
	" signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 1);
	break;

	case TRUST_FULLY:
	write_status( STATUS_TRUST_FULLY );
	if (opt.with_fingerprint)
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 1);
	break;

	case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
	write_status( STATUS_TRUST_ULTIMATE );
	if (opt.with_fingerprint)
	print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 1);
	break;
	}

	leave:
	free_public_key( pk );
	return rc;
	}


	void
	release_pk_list (pk_list_t pk_list)
	{
	PK_LIST pk_rover;

	for ( ; pk_list; pk_list = pk_rover)
	{
	pk_rover = pk_list->next;
	free_public_key ( pk_list->pk );
	xfree ( pk_list );
	}
	}


	static int
	key_present_in_pk_list(PK_LIST pk_list, PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	for( ; pk_list; pk_list = pk_list->next)
	if (cmp_public_keys(pk_list->pk, pk) == 0)
	return 0;

	return -1;
	}


	/****************
	* Return a malloced string with a default recipient if there is any
	*/
	static char *
	default_recipient(void)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
	size_t n;
	char *p;
	int i;

	if( opt.def_recipient )
	return xstrdup( opt.def_recipient );
	if( !opt.def_recipient_self )
	return NULL;
	pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
	i = get_seckey_default (pk);
	if( i ) {
	free_public_key( pk );
	return NULL;
	}
	n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN;
	fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fpr, &n );
	free_public_key( pk );
	p = xmalloc( 2*n+3 );
	*p++ = '0';
	*p++ = 'x';
	for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
	sprintf( p+2*i, "%02X", fpr[i] );
	p -= 2;
	return p;
	}

	static int
	expand_id(const char id,strlist_t into,unsigned int flags)
	{
	struct groupitem *groups;
	int count=0;

	for(groups=opt.grouplist;groups;groups=groups->next)
	{
	/* need strcasecmp() here, as this should be localized */
	if(strcasecmp(groups->name,id)==0)
	{
	strlist_t each,sl;

	/* this maintains the current utf8-ness */
	for(each=groups->values;each;each=each->next)
	{
	sl=add_to_strlist(into,each->d);
	sl->flags=flags;
	count++;
	}

	break;
	}
	}

	return count;
	}

	/* For simplicity, and to avoid potential loops, we only expand once -
	you can't make an alias that points to an alias. */
	static strlist_t
	expand_group(strlist_t input)
	{
	strlist_t sl,output=NULL,rover;

	for(rover=input;rover;rover=rover->next)
	if(expand_id(rover->d,&output,rover->flags)==0)
	{
	/* Didn't find any groups, so use the existing string */
	sl=add_to_strlist(&output,rover->d);
	sl->flags=rover->flags;
	}

	return output;
	}


	/* Helper for build_pk_list to find and check one key. This helper is
	also used directly in server mode by the RECIPIENTS command. On
	success the new key is added to PK_LIST_ADDR. NAME is the user id
	of the key. USE the requested usage and a set MARK_HIDDEN will mark
	the key in the updated list as a hidden recipient. */
	gpg_error_t
	find_and_check_key (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, unsigned int use,
	int mark_hidden, pk_list_t *pk_list_addr)
	{
	int rc;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	int trustlevel;

	if (!name \|\| !*name)
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_USER_ID);

	pk = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pk);
	if (!pk)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	pk->req_usage = use;

	rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, pk, name, NULL, NULL, 0, 0);
	if (rc)
	{
	int code;

	/* Key not found or other error. */
	log_error (_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), name, gpg_strerror (rc) );
	switch (gpg_err_code (rc))
	{
	case GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY:
	case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY: code = 1; break;
	case GPG_ERR_INV_USER_ID: code = 14; break;
	default: code = 0; break;
	}
	send_status_inv_recp (code, name);
	free_public_key (pk);
	return rc;
	}

	rc = openpgp_pk_test_algo2 (pk->pubkey_algo, use);
	if (rc)
	{
	/* Key found but not usable for us (e.g. sign-only key). */
	send_status_inv_recp (3, name); /* Wrong key usage */
	log_error (_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), name, gpg_strerror (rc) );
	free_public_key (pk);
	return rc;
	}

	/* Key found and usable. Check validity. */
	- trustlevel = get_validity (pk, pk->user_id);
	+ trustlevel = get_validity (pk, pk->user_id, NULL, 1);
	if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
	{
	/* Key has been disabled. */
	send_status_inv_recp (13, name);
	log_info (_("%s: skipped: public key is disabled\n"), name);
	free_public_key (pk);
	return GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY;
	}

	if ( !do_we_trust_pre (pk, trustlevel) )
	{
	/* We don't trust this key. */
	send_status_inv_recp (10, name);
	free_public_key (pk);
	return GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY;
	}
	/* Note: do_we_trust may have changed the trustlevel. */

	/* Skip the actual key if the key is already present in the
	list. */
	if (!key_present_in_pk_list (*pk_list_addr, pk))
	{
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("%s: skipped: public key already present\n"), name);
	free_public_key (pk);
	}
	else
	{
	pk_list_t r;

	r = xtrymalloc (sizeof *r);
	if (!r)
	{
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	free_public_key (pk);
	return rc;
	}
	r->pk = pk;
	r->next = *pk_list_addr;
	r->flags = mark_hidden? 1:0;
	*pk_list_addr = r;
	}

	return 0;
	}



	/* This is the central function to collect the keys for recipients.
	It is thus used to prepare a public key encryption. encrypt-to
	keys, default keys and the keys for the actual recipients are all
	collected here. When not in batch mode and no recipient has been
	passed on the commandline, the function will also ask for
	recipients.

	RCPTS is a string list with the recipients; NULL is an allowed
	value but not very useful. Group expansion is done on these names;
	they may be in any of the user Id formats we can handle. The flags
	bits for each string in the string list are used for:
	Bit 0: This is an encrypt-to recipient.
	Bit 1: This is a hidden recipient.

	USE is the desired use for the key - usually PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC.

	On success a list of keys is stored at the address RET_PK_LIST; the
	caller must free this list. On error the value at this address is
	not changed.
	*/
	int
	build_pk_list (ctrl_t ctrl,
	strlist_t rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned int use )
	{
	PK_LIST pk_list = NULL;
	PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
	int rc=0;
	int any_recipients=0;
	strlist_t rov,remusr;
	char *def_rec = NULL;
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

	/* Try to expand groups if any have been defined. */
	if (opt.grouplist)
	remusr = expand_group (rcpts);
	else
	remusr = rcpts;

	/* Check whether there are any recipients in the list and build the
	* list of the encrypt-to ones (we always trust them). */
	for ( rov = remusr; rov; rov = rov->next )
	{
	if ( !(rov->flags & 1) )
	{
	/* This is a regular recipient; i.e. not an encrypt-to
	one. */
	any_recipients = 1;

	/* Hidden recipients are not allowed while in PGP mode,
	issue a warning and switch into GnuPG mode. */
	if ((rov->flags&2) && (PGP6 \|\| PGP7 \|\| PGP8))
	{
	log_info(_("you may not use %s while in %s mode\n"),
	"--hidden-recipient",
	compliance_option_string());

	compliance_failure();
	}
	}
	else if ( (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) && !opt.no_encrypt_to )
	{
	/* Encryption has been requested and --encrypt-to has not
	been disabled. Check this encrypt-to key. */
	pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
	pk->req_usage = use;

	/* We explicitly allow encrypt-to to an disabled key; thus
	we pass 1 for the second last argument and 1 as the last
	argument to disable AKL. */
	if ( (rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl,
	NULL, pk, rov->d, NULL, NULL, 1, 1)) )
	{
	free_public_key ( pk ); pk = NULL;
	log_error (_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), rov->d, gpg_strerror (rc) );
	send_status_inv_recp (0, rov->d);
	goto fail;
	}
	else if ( !(rc=openpgp_pk_test_algo2 (pk->pubkey_algo, use)) )
	{
	/* Skip the actual key if the key is already present
	* in the list. Add it to our list if not. */
	if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0)
	{
	free_public_key (pk); pk = NULL;
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("%s: skipped: public key already present\n"),
	rov->d);
	}
	else
	{
	PK_LIST r;
	r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
	r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
	r->next = pk_list;
	r->flags = (rov->flags&2)?1:0;
	pk_list = r;

	/* Hidden encrypt-to recipients are not allowed while
	in PGP mode, issue a warning and switch into
	GnuPG mode. */
	if ((r->flags&1) && (PGP6 \|\| PGP7 \|\| PGP8))
	{
	log_info(_("you may not use %s while in %s mode\n"),
	"--hidden-encrypt-to",
	compliance_option_string());

	compliance_failure();
	}
	}
	}
	else
	{
	/* The public key is not usable for encryption. */
	free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
	log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), rov->d, gpg_strerror (rc) );
	send_status_inv_recp (3, rov->d); /* Wrong key usage */
	goto fail;
	}
	}
	}

	/* If we don't have any recipients yet and we are not in batch mode
	drop into interactive selection mode. */
	if ( !any_recipients && !opt.batch )
	{
	int have_def_rec;
	char *answer = NULL;
	strlist_t backlog = NULL;

	if (pk_list)
	any_recipients = 1;
	def_rec = default_recipient();
	have_def_rec = !!def_rec;
	if ( !have_def_rec )
	tty_printf(_("You did not specify a user ID. (you may use \"-r\")\n"));

	for (;;)
	{
	rc = 0;
	xfree(answer);
	if ( have_def_rec )
	{
	/* A default recipient is taken as the first entry. */
	answer = def_rec;
	def_rec = NULL;
	}
	else if (backlog)
	{
	/* This is part of our trick to expand and display groups. */
	answer = strlist_pop (&backlog);
	}
	else
	{
	/* Show the list of already collected recipients and ask
	for more. */
	PK_LIST iter;

	tty_printf("\n");
	tty_printf(_("Current recipients:\n"));
	for (iter=pk_list;iter;iter=iter->next)
	{
	u32 keyid[2];

	keyid_from_pk(iter->pk,keyid);
	tty_printf ("%s/%s %s \"",
	pubkey_string (iter->pk,
	pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
	keystr(keyid),
	datestr_from_pk (iter->pk));

	if (iter->pk->user_id)
	tty_print_utf8_string(iter->pk->user_id->name,
	iter->pk->user_id->len);
	else
	{
	size_t n;
	char *p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
	tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
	xfree(p);
	}
	tty_printf("\"\n");
	}

	answer = cpr_get_utf8("pklist.user_id.enter",
	_("\nEnter the user ID. "
	"End with an empty line: "));
	trim_spaces(answer);
	cpr_kill_prompt();
	}

	if ( !answer \|\| !*answer )
	{
	xfree(answer);
	break; /* No more recipients entered - get out of loop. */
	}

	/* Do group expand here too. The trick here is to continue
	the loop if any expansion occured. The code above will
	then list all expanded keys. */
	if (expand_id(answer,&backlog,0))
	continue;

	/* Get and check key for the current name. */
	free_public_key (pk);
	pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
	pk->req_usage = use;
	rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, pk, answer, NULL, NULL, 0, 0 );
	if (rc)
	tty_printf(_("No such user ID.\n"));
	else if ( !(rc=openpgp_pk_test_algo2 (pk->pubkey_algo, use)) )
	{
	if ( have_def_rec )
	{
	/* No validation for a default recipient. */
	if (!key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk))
	{
	free_public_key (pk);
	pk = NULL;
	log_info (_("skipped: public key "
	"already set as default recipient\n") );
	}
	else
	{
	PK_LIST r = xmalloc (sizeof *r);
	r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
	r->next = pk_list;
	r->flags = 0; /* No throwing default ids. */
	pk_list = r;
	}
	any_recipients = 1;
	continue;
	}
	else
	{ /* Check validity of this key. */
	int trustlevel;

	- trustlevel = get_validity (pk, pk->user_id);
	+ trustlevel = get_validity (pk, pk->user_id, NULL, 1);
	if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
	{
	tty_printf (_("Public key is disabled.\n") );
	}
	else if ( do_we_trust_pre (pk, trustlevel) )
	{
	/* Skip the actual key if the key is already
	* present in the list */
	if (!key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk))
	{
	free_public_key (pk);
	pk = NULL;
	log_info(_("skipped: public key already set\n") );
	}
	else
	{
	PK_LIST r;
	r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
	r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
	r->next = pk_list;
	r->flags = 0; /* No throwing interactive ids. */
	pk_list = r;
	}
	any_recipients = 1;
	continue;
	}
	}
	}
	xfree(def_rec); def_rec = NULL;
	have_def_rec = 0;
	}
	if ( pk )
	{
	free_public_key( pk );
	pk = NULL;
	}
	}
	else if ( !any_recipients && (def_rec = default_recipient()) )
	{
	/* We are in batch mode and have only a default recipient. */
	pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
	pk->req_usage = use;

	/* The default recipient is allowed to be disabled; thus pass 1
	as second last argument. We also don't want an AKL. */
	rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, pk, def_rec, NULL, NULL, 1, 1);
	if (rc)
	log_error(_("unknown default recipient \"%s\"\n"), def_rec );
	else if ( !(rc=openpgp_pk_test_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use)) )
	{
	/* Mark any_recipients here since the default recipient
	would have been used if it wasn't already there. It
	doesn't really matter if we got this key from the default
	recipient or an encrypt-to. */
	any_recipients = 1;
	if (!key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk))
	log_info (_("skipped: public key already set "
	"as default recipient\n"));
	else
	{
	PK_LIST r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
	r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
	r->next = pk_list;
	r->flags = 0; /* No throwing default ids. */
	pk_list = r;
	}
	}
	if ( pk )
	{
	free_public_key( pk );
	pk = NULL;
	}
	xfree(def_rec); def_rec = NULL;
	}
	else
	{
	/* General case: Check all keys. */
	any_recipients = 0;
	for (; remusr; remusr = remusr->next )
	{
	if ( (remusr->flags & 1) )
	continue; /* encrypt-to keys are already handled. */

	rc = find_and_check_key (ctrl, remusr->d, use, !!(remusr->flags&2),
	&pk_list);
	if (rc)
	goto fail;
	any_recipients = 1;
	}
	}

	if ( !rc && !any_recipients )
	{
	log_error(_("no valid addressees\n"));
	write_status_text (STATUS_NO_RECP, "0");
	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_USER_ID;
	}

	fail:

	if ( rc )
	release_pk_list( pk_list );
	else
	*ret_pk_list = pk_list;
	if (opt.grouplist)
	free_strlist(remusr);
	return rc;
	}


	/* In pgp6 mode, disallow all ciphers except IDEA (1), 3DES (2), and
	CAST5 (3), all hashes except MD5 (1), SHA1 (2), and RIPEMD160 (3),
	and all compressions except none (0) and ZIP (1). pgp7 and pgp8
	mode expands the cipher list to include AES128 (7), AES192 (8),
	AES256 (9), and TWOFISH (10). pgp8 adds the SHA-256 hash (8). For
	a true PGP key all of this is unneeded as they are the only items
	present in the preferences subpacket, but checking here covers the
	weird case of encrypting to a key that had preferences from a
	different implementation which was then used with PGP. I am not
	completely comfortable with this as the right thing to do, as it
	slightly alters the list of what the user is supposedly requesting.
	It is not against the RFC however, as the preference chosen will
	never be one that the user didn't specify somewhere ("The
	implementation may use any mechanism to pick an algorithm in the
	intersection"), and PGP has no mechanism to fix such a broken
	preference list, so I'm including it. -dms */

	int
	algo_available( preftype_t preftype, int algo, const union pref_hint *hint)
	{
	if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM )
	{
	if(PGP6 && (algo != CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA
	&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_3DES
	&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5))
	return 0;

	if(PGP7 && (algo != CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA
	&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_3DES
	&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5
	&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES
	&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES192
	&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES256
	&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH))
	return 0;

	/* PGP8 supports all the ciphers we do.. */

	return algo && !openpgp_cipher_test_algo ( algo );
	}
	else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_HASH )
	{
	if (hint && hint->digest_length)
	{
	if (hint->digest_length!=20 \|\| opt.flags.dsa2)
	{
	/* If --enable-dsa2 is set or the hash isn't 160 bits
	(which implies DSA2), then we'll accept a hash that
	is larger than we need. Otherwise we won't accept
	any hash that isn't exactly the right size. */
	if (hint->digest_length > gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo))
	return 0;
	}
	else if (hint->digest_length != gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo))
	return 0;
	}

	if((PGP6 \|\| PGP7) && (algo != DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
	&& algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
	&& algo != DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160))
	return 0;


	if(PGP8 && (algo != DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
	&& algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
	&& algo != DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160
	&& algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256))
	return 0;

	return algo && !openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
	}
	else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP )
	{
	if((PGP6 \|\| PGP7) && (algo != COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE
	&& algo != COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP))
	return 0;

	/* PGP8 supports all the compression algos we do */

	return !check_compress_algo( algo );
	}
	else
	return 0;
	}

	/****************
	* Return -1 if we could not find an algorithm.
	*/
	int
	select_algo_from_prefs(PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype,
	int request, const union pref_hint *hint)
	{
	PK_LIST pkr;
	u32 bits[8];
	const prefitem_t *prefs;
	int result=-1,i;
	u16 scores[256];

	if( !pk_list )
	return -1;

	memset(bits,0xFF,sizeof(bits));
	memset(scores,0,sizeof(scores));

	for( pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next )
	{
	u32 mask[8];
	int rank=1,implicit=-1;

	memset(mask,0,sizeof(mask));

	switch(preftype)
	{
	case PREFTYPE_SYM:
	/* IDEA is implicitly there for v3 keys with v3 selfsigs if
	--pgp2 mode is on. This was a 2440 thing that was
	dropped from 4880 but is still relevant to GPG's 1991
	support. All this doesn't mean IDEA is actually
	available, of course. */
	implicit=CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;

	break;

	case PREFTYPE_HASH:
	/* While I am including this code for completeness, note
	that currently --pgp2 mode locks the hash at MD5, so this
	code will never even be called. Even if the hash wasn't
	locked at MD5, we don't support sign+encrypt in --pgp2
	mode, and that's the only time PREFTYPE_HASH is used
	anyway. -dms */

	implicit=DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;

	break;

	case PREFTYPE_ZIP:
	/* Uncompressed is always an option. */
	implicit=COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE;
	}

	if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
	prefs = pkr->pk->user_id->prefs;
	else
	prefs = pkr->pk->prefs;

	if( prefs )
	{
	for (i=0; prefs[i].type; i++ )
	{
	if( prefs[i].type == preftype )
	{
	/* Make sure all scores don't add up past 0xFFFF
	(and roll around) */
	if(rank+scores[prefs[i].value]<=0xFFFF)
	scores[prefs[i].value]+=rank;
	else
	scores[prefs[i].value]=0xFFFF;

	mask[prefs[i].value/32] \|= 1<<(prefs[i].value%32);

	rank++;

	/* We saw the implicit algorithm, so we don't need
	tack it on the end ourselves. */
	if(implicit==prefs[i].value)
	implicit=-1;
	}
	}
	}

	if(rank==1 && preftype==PREFTYPE_ZIP)
	{
	/* If the compression preferences are not present, they are
	assumed to be ZIP, Uncompressed (RFC4880:13.3.1) */
	scores[1]=1; /* ZIP is first choice */
	scores[0]=2; /* Uncompressed is second choice */
	mask[0]\|=3;
	}

	/* If the key didn't have the implicit algorithm listed
	explicitly, add it here at the tail of the list. */
	if(implicit>-1)
	{
	scores[implicit]+=rank;
	mask[implicit/32] \|= 1<<(implicit%32);
	}

	for(i=0;i<8;i++)
	bits[i]&=mask[i];
	}

	/* We've now scored all of the algorithms, and the usable ones have
	bits set. Let's pick the winner. */

	/* The caller passed us a request. Can we use it? */
	if(request>-1 && (bits[request/32] & (1<<(request%32))) &&
	algo_available(preftype,request,hint))
	result=request;

	if(result==-1)
	{
	/* If we have personal prefs set, use them. */
	prefs=NULL;
	if(preftype==PREFTYPE_SYM && opt.personal_cipher_prefs)
	prefs=opt.personal_cipher_prefs;
	else if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH && opt.personal_digest_prefs)
	prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs;
	else if(preftype==PREFTYPE_ZIP && opt.personal_compress_prefs)
	prefs=opt.personal_compress_prefs;

	if( prefs )
	for(i=0; prefs[i].type; i++ )
	{
	if(bits[prefs[i].value/32] & (1<<(prefs[i].value%32))
	&& algo_available( preftype, prefs[i].value, hint))
	{
	result = prefs[i].value;
	break;
	}
	}
	}

	if(result==-1)
	{
	unsigned int best=-1;

	/* At this point, we have not selected an algorithm due to a
	special request or via personal prefs. Pick the highest
	ranked algorithm (i.e. the one with the lowest score). */

	if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH && scores[DIGEST_ALGO_MD5])
	{
	/* "If you are building an authentication system, the recipient
	may specify a preferred signing algorithm. However, the
	signer would be foolish to use a weak algorithm simply
	because the recipient requests it." (RFC4880:14). If any
	other hash algorithm is available, pretend that MD5 isn't.
	Note that if the user intentionally chose MD5 by putting it
	in their personal prefs, then we do what the user said (as we
	never reach this code). */

	for(i=DIGEST_ALGO_MD5+1;i<256;i++)
	if(scores[i])
	{
	scores[DIGEST_ALGO_MD5]=0;
	break;
	}
	}

	for(i=0;i<256;i++)
	{
	/* Note the '<' here. This means in case of a tie, we will
	favor the lower algorithm number. We have a choice
	between the lower number (probably an older algorithm
	with more time in use), or the higher number (probably a
	newer algorithm with less time in use). Older is
	probably safer here, even though the newer algorithms
	tend to be "stronger". */
	if(scores[i] && scores[i]<best
	&& (bits[i/32] & (1<<(i%32)))
	&& algo_available(preftype,i,hint))
	{
	best=scores[i];
	result=i;
	}
	}
	}

	return result;
	}

	/*
	* Select the MDC flag from the pk_list. We can only use MDC if all
	* recipients support this feature.
	*/
	int
	select_mdc_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list)
	{
	PK_LIST pkr;

	if ( !pk_list )
	return 0;

	for (pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next)
	{
	int mdc;

	if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
	mdc = pkr->pk->user_id->flags.mdc;
	else
	mdc = pkr->pk->flags.mdc;
	if (!mdc)
	return 0; /* At least one recipient does not support it. */
	}
	return 1; /* Can be used. */
	}


	/* Print a warning for all keys in PK_LIST missing the MDC feature. */
	void
	warn_missing_mdc_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list)
	{
	PK_LIST pkr;

	for (pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next)
	{
	int mdc;

	if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
	mdc = pkr->pk->user_id->flags.mdc;
	else
	mdc = pkr->pk->flags.mdc;
	if (!mdc)
	log_info (_("Note: key %s has no %s feature\n"),
	keystr_from_pk (pkr->pk), "MDC");
	}
	}

	void
	warn_missing_aes_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list)
	{
	PK_LIST pkr;

	for (pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next)
	{
	const prefitem_t *prefs;
	int i;
	int gotit = 0;

	prefs = pkr->pk->user_id? pkr->pk->user_id->prefs : pkr->pk->prefs;
	if (prefs)
	{
	for (i=0; !gotit && prefs[i].type; i++ )
	if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM
	&& prefs[i].value == CIPHER_ALGO_AES)
	gotit++;
	}
	if (!gotit)
	log_info (_("Note: key %s has no preference for %s\n"),
	keystr_from_pk (pkr->pk), "AES");
	}
	}
	diff --git a/g10/test-stubs.c b/g10/test-stubs.c
	index f3155fd1f..dba603498 100644
	--- a/g10/test-stubs.c
	+++ b/g10/test-stubs.c
	@@ -1,427 +1,453 @@
	/* test-stubs.c - The GnuPG signature verify utility
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006,
	* 2008, 2009, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <errno.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <ctype.h>
	#include <unistd.h>

	#define INCLUDED_BY_MAIN_MODULE 1
	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "util.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "iobuf.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "filter.h"
	#include "ttyio.h"
	#include "i18n.h"
	#include "sysutils.h"
	#include "status.h"
	#include "call-agent.h"

	int g10_errors_seen;


	void
	g10_exit( int rc )
	{
	rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 : g10_errors_seen? 1 : 0;
	exit(rc );
	}


	/* Stub:
	* We have to override the trustcheck from pkclist.c becuase
	* this utility assumes that all keys in the keyring are trustworthy
	*/
	int
	check_signatures_trust( PKT_signature *sig )
	{
	(void)sig;
	return 0;
	}

	void
	read_trust_options(byte trust_model, ulong created, ulong *nextcheck,
	byte marginals, byte completes, byte *cert_depth,
	byte *min_cert_level)
	{
	(void)trust_model;
	(void)created;
	(void)nextcheck;
	(void)marginals;
	(void)completes;
	(void)cert_depth;
	(void)min_cert_level;
	}

	/* Stub:
	* We don't have the trustdb , so we have to provide some stub functions
	* instead
	*/

	int
	cache_disabled_value(PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	(void)pk;
	return 0;
	}

	void
	check_trustdb_stale(void)
	{
	}

	int
	get_validity_info (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid)
	{
	(void)pk;
	(void)uid;
	return '?';
	}

	unsigned int
	-get_validity (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid)
	+get_validity (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid, PKT_signature *sig,
	+ int may_ask)
	{
	(void)pk;
	(void)uid;
	+ (void)sig;
	+ (void)may_ask;
	return 0;
	}

	const char *
	trust_value_to_string (unsigned int value)
	{
	(void)value;
	return "err";
	}

	const char *
	uid_trust_string_fixed (PKT_public_key key, PKT_user_id uid)
	{
	(void)key;
	(void)uid;
	return "err";
	}

	int
	get_ownertrust_info (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	(void)pk;
	return '?';
	}

	unsigned int
	get_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	(void)pk;
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	}


	/* Stubs:
	* Because we only work with trusted keys, it does not make sense to
	* get them from a keyserver
	*/

	struct keyserver_spec *
	keyserver_match (struct keyserver_spec *spec)
	{
	(void)spec;
	return NULL;
	}

	int
	keyserver_import_keyid (u32 keyid, void dummy)
	{
	(void)keyid;
	(void)dummy;
	return -1;
	}

	int
	keyserver_import_cert (const char *name)
	{
	(void)name;
	return -1;
	}

	int
	keyserver_import_pka (const char name,unsigned char fpr)
	{
	(void)name;
	(void)fpr;
	return -1;
	}

	int
	keyserver_import_name (const char name,struct keyserver_spec spec)
	{
	(void)name;
	(void)spec;
	return -1;
	}

	int
	keyserver_import_ldap (const char *name)
	{
	(void)name;
	return -1;
	}

	/* Stub:
	* No encryption here but mainproc links to these functions.
	*/
	gpg_error_t
	get_session_key (PKT_pubkey_enc k, DEK dek)
	{
	(void)k;
	(void)dek;
	return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
	}

	/* Stub: */
	gpg_error_t
	get_override_session_key (DEK dek, const char string)
	{
	(void)dek;
	(void)string;
	return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
	}

	/* Stub: */
	int
	decrypt_data (ctrl_t ctrl, void procctx, PKT_encrypted ed, DEK *dek)
	{
	(void)ctrl;
	(void)procctx;
	(void)ed;
	(void)dek;
	return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
	}


	/* Stub:
	* No interactive commands, so we don't need the helptexts
	*/
	void
	display_online_help (const char *keyword)
	{
	(void)keyword;
	}

	/* Stub:
	* We don't use secret keys, but getkey.c links to this
	*/
	int
	check_secret_key (PKT_public_key *pk, int n)
	{
	(void)pk;
	(void)n;
	return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
	}

	/* Stub:
	* No secret key, so no passphrase needed
	*/
	DEK *
	passphrase_to_dek (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
	int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k, int mode,
	const char tmp, int canceled)
	{
	(void)keyid;
	(void)pubkey_algo;
	(void)cipher_algo;
	(void)s2k;
	(void)mode;
	(void)tmp;

	if (canceled)
	*canceled = 0;
	return NULL;
	}

	void
	passphrase_clear_cache (u32 keyid, const char cacheid, int algo)
	{
	(void)keyid;
	(void)cacheid;
	(void)algo;
	}

	struct keyserver_spec *
	parse_preferred_keyserver(PKT_signature *sig)
	{
	(void)sig;
	return NULL;
	}

	struct keyserver_spec *
	parse_keyserver_uri (const char *uri, int require_scheme,
	const char *configname, unsigned int configlineno)
	{
	(void)uri;
	(void)require_scheme;
	(void)configname;
	(void)configlineno;
	return NULL;
	}

	void
	free_keyserver_spec (struct keyserver_spec *keyserver)
	{
	(void)keyserver;
	}

	/* Stubs to avoid linking to photoid.c */
	void
	show_photos (const struct user_attribute attrs, int count, PKT_public_key pk)
	{
	(void)attrs;
	(void)count;
	(void)pk;
	}

	int
	parse_image_header (const struct user_attribute attr, byte type, u32 *len)
	{
	(void)attr;
	(void)type;
	(void)len;
	return 0;
	}

	char *
	image_type_to_string (byte type, int string)
	{
	(void)type;
	(void)string;
	return NULL;
	}

	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	int
	agent_scd_getattr (const char name, struct agent_card_info_s info)
	{
	(void)name;
	(void)info;
	return 0;
	}
	#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */

	/* We do not do any locking, so use these stubs here */
	void
	dotlock_disable (void)
	{
	}

	dotlock_t
	dotlock_create (const char *file_to_lock, unsigned int flags)
	{
	(void)file_to_lock;
	(void)flags;
	return NULL;
	}

	void
	dotlock_destroy (dotlock_t h)
	{
	(void)h;
	}

	int
	dotlock_take (dotlock_t h, long timeout)
	{
	(void)h;
	(void)timeout;
	return 0;
	}

	int
	dotlock_release (dotlock_t h)
	{
	(void)h;
	return 0;
	}

	void
	dotlock_remove_lockfiles (void)
	{
	}

	gpg_error_t
	agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	(void)ctrl;
	(void)pk;
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
	}

	gpg_error_t
	agent_probe_any_secret_key (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	(void)ctrl;
	(void)keyblock;
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
	}

	gpg_error_t
	agent_get_keyinfo (ctrl_t ctrl, const char hexkeygrip, char *r_serialno)
	{
	(void)ctrl;
	(void)hexkeygrip;
	*r_serialno = NULL;
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
	}

	gpg_error_t
	gpg_dirmngr_get_pka (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *userid,
	unsigned char *r_fpr, size_t r_fprlen,
	char **r_url)
	{
	(void)ctrl;
	(void)userid;
	if (r_fpr)
	*r_fpr = NULL;
	if (r_fprlen)
	*r_fprlen = 0;
	if (r_url)
	*r_url = NULL;
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
	}

	gpg_error_t
	export_pubkey_buffer (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyspec, unsigned int options,
	kbnode_t r_keyblock, void r_data, size_t r_datalen)
	{
	(void)ctrl;
	(void)keyspec;
	(void)options;

	*r_keyblock = NULL;
	*r_data = NULL;
	*r_datalen = 0;
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
	}
	+
	+enum tofu_policy
	+ {
	+ tofu_policy
	+ };
	+
	+gpg_error_t
	+tofu_get_policy (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id user_id,
	+ enum tofu_policy *policy)
	+{
	+ (void)pk;
	+ (void)user_id;
	+ (void)policy;
	+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	+}
	+
	+const char *
	+tofu_policy_str (enum tofu_policy policy)
	+{
	+ (void)policy;
	+
	+ return "unknown";
	+}
	diff --git a/g10/tofu.c b/g10/tofu.c
	new file mode 100644
	index 000000000..39377cb14
	--- /dev/null
	+++ b/g10/tofu.c
	@@ -0,0 +1,2472 @@
	+/* tofu.c - TOFU trust model.
	+ * Copyright (C) 2015 g10 Code GmbH
	+ *
	+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
	+ *
	+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	+ * (at your option) any later version.
	+ *
	+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
	+ *
	+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	+ * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	+ */
	+
	+/* TODO:
	+
	+ - Format the fingerprints nicely when printing (similar to gpg
	+ --list-keys)
	+ */
	+
	+#include <config.h>
	+#include <stdio.h>
	+#include <sys/stat.h>
	+#include <assert.h>
	+#include <sqlite3.h>
	+
	+#include "gpg.h"
	+#include "types.h"
	+#include "logging.h"
	+#include "stringhelp.h"
	+#include "options.h"
	+#include "mbox-util.h"
	+#include "i18n.h"
	+#include "trustdb.h"
	+#include "mkdir_p.h"
	+
	+#include "tofu.h"
	+
	+/* The TOFU data can be saved in two different formats: either in a
	+ single combined database (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_FLAT) or in
	+ a split file format (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_SPLIT). In the
	+ split format, there is one database per normalized email address
	+ (DB_EMAIL) and one per key (DB_KEY). */
	+enum db_type
	+ {
	+ DB_COMBINED,
	+ DB_EMAIL,
	+ DB_KEY
	+ };
	+
	+/* A list of open DBs.
	+
	+ In the flat format, this consists of a single element with the type
	+ DB_COMBINED and whose name is the empty string.
	+
	+ In the split format, the first element is a dummy element (DB is
	+ NULL) whose type is DB_COMBINED and whose name is the empty string.
	+ Any following elements describe either DB_EMAIL or DB_KEY DBs. In
	+ theis case, NAME is either the normalized email address or the
	+ fingerprint.
	+
	+ To initialize this data structure, call opendbs(). When you are
	+ done, clean it up using closedbs(). To get a handle to a database,
	+ use the getdb() function. This will either return an existing
	+ handle or open a new DB connection, as appropriate. */
	+struct db
	+{
	+ struct db *next;
	+
	+ enum db_type type;
	+
	+ sqlite3 *db;
	+
	+ /* If TYPE is DB_COMBINED, this is "". Otherwise, it is either the
	+ fingerprint (type == DB_KEY) or the normalized email address
	+ (type == DB_EMAIL). */
	+ char name[1];
	+};
	+
	+const char *
	+tofu_policy_str (enum tofu_policy policy)
	+{
	+ switch (policy)
	+ {
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_NONE: return "none";
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_AUTO: return "auto";
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_GOOD: return "good";
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN: return "unknown";
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_BAD: return "bad";
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_ASK: return "ask";
	+ default: return "???";
	+ }
	+}
	+
	+/* Convert a binding policy (e.g., TOFU_POLICY_BAD) to a trust level
	+ (e.g., TRUST_BAD) in light of the current configuration. */
	+int
	+tofu_policy_to_trust_level (enum tofu_policy policy)
	+{
	+ if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO)
	+ /* If POLICY is AUTO, fallback to OPT.TOFU_DEFAULT_POLICY. */
	+ policy = opt.tofu_default_policy;
	+
	+ switch (policy)
	+ {
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_AUTO:
	+ /* If POLICY and OPT.TOFU_DEFAULT_POLICY are both AUTO, default
	+ to marginal trust. */
	+ return TRUST_MARGINAL;
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_GOOD:
	+ return TRUST_FULLY;
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN:
	+ return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_BAD:
	+ return TRUST_NEVER;
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_ASK:
	+ return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	+ default:
	+ log_bug ("Bad value for trust policy: %d\n",
	+ opt.tofu_default_policy);
	+ return 0;
	+ }
	+}
	+
	+/* This is a convenience function that combines sqlite3_mprintf and
	+ sqlite3_exec. */
	+static int
	+sqlite3_exec_printf (sqlite3 *db,
	+ int (callback)(void,int,char,char), void *cookie,
	+ char **errmsg,
	+ const char *sql, ...)
	+{
	+ va_list ap;
	+ int rc;
	+ char *sql2;
	+
	+ va_start (ap, sql);
	+ sql2 = sqlite3_vmprintf (sql, ap);
	+ va_end (ap);
	+
	+#if 0
	+ log_debug ("tofo db: executing: '%s'\n", sql2);
	+#endif
	+
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec (db, sql2, callback, cookie, errmsg);
	+
	+ sqlite3_free (sql2);
	+
	+ return rc;
	+}
	+
	+
	+/* Collect results of a select count (*) ...; style query. Aborts if
	+ the argument is not a valid integer (or real of the form X.0). */
	+static int
	+get_single_unsigned_long_cb (void cookie, int argc, char *argv,
	+ char **azColName)
	+{
	+ unsigned long int *count = cookie;
	+ char *tail = NULL;
	+
	+ (void) azColName;
	+
	+ assert (argc == 1);
	+
	+ errno = 0;
	+ *count = strtoul (argv[0], &tail, 0);
	+ if (errno \|\| ! (strcmp (tail, ".0") == 0 \|\| *tail == '\0'))
	+ /* Abort. */
	+ return 1;
	+ return 0;
	+}
	+
	+/* We expect a single integer column whose name is "version". COOKIE
	+ must point to an int. This function always aborts. On error or a
	+ if the version is bad, sets VERSION to -1. /
	+static int
	+version_check_cb (void cookie, int argc, char argv, char *azColName)
	+{
	+ int *version = cookie;
	+
	+ if (argc != 1 \|\| strcmp (azColName[0], "version") != 0)
	+ {
	+ *version = -1;
	+ return 1;
	+ }
	+
	+ if (strcmp (argv[0], "1") == 0)
	+ *version = 1;
	+ else
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("unsupported TOFU DB version: %s\n"), argv[0]);
	+ *version = -1;
	+ }
	+
	+ /* Don't run again. */
	+ return 1;
	+}
	+
	+
	+/* If the DB is new, initialize it. Otherwise, check the DB's
	+ version.
	+
	+ Return 0 if the database is okay and 1 otherwise. */
	+static int
	+initdb (sqlite3 *db, enum db_type type)
	+{
	+ char *err = NULL;
	+ int rc;
	+ unsigned long int count;
	+ int version = -1;
	+
	+ /* If the DB has no tables, then assume this is a new DB that needs
	+ to be initialized. */
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec (db,
	+ "select count(*) from sqlite_master where type='table';",
	+ get_single_unsigned_long_cb, &count, &err);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error querying TOFU DB's available tables: %s\n"),
	+ err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ return 1;
	+ }
	+ else if (count != 0)
	+ /* Assume that the DB is already initialized. Make sure the
	+ version is okay. */
	+ {
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec (db, "select version from version;", version_check_cb,
	+ &version, &err);
	+ if (rc == SQLITE_ABORT && version == 1)
	+ /* Happy, happy, joy, joy. */
	+ {
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ return 0;
	+ }
	+ else if (rc == SQLITE_ABORT && version == -1)
	+ /* Unsupported version. */
	+ {
	+ /* An error message was already displayed. */
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ return 1;
	+ }
	+ else if (rc)
	+ /* Some error. */
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error determining TOFU DB's version: %s\n"), err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ return 1;
	+ }
	+ else
	+ /* Unexpected success. This can only happen if there are no
	+ rows. */
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error determining TOFU DB's version: %s\n"),
	+ "select returned 0, but expected ABORT");
	+ return 1;
	+ }
	+ }
	+
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec (db, "begin transaction;", NULL, NULL, &err);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error beginning transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
	+ err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ return 1;
	+ }
	+
	+ /* Create the version table. */
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec (db,
	+ "create table version (version INTEGER);",
	+ NULL, NULL, &err);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error initializing TOFU database (%s): %s\n"),
	+ "version", err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+
	+ /* Initialize the version table, which contains a single integer
	+ value. */
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec (db,
	+ "insert into version values (1);",
	+ NULL, NULL, &err);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error initializing TOFU database (%s): %s\n"),
	+ "version, init", err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+
	+ /* The list of <fingerprint, email> bindings and auxiliary data.
	+
	+ OID is a unique ID identifying this binding (and used by the
	+ signatures table, see below). Note: OIDs will never be
	+ reused.
	+
	+ FINGERPRINT: The key's fingerprint.
	+
	+ EMAIL: The normalized email address.
	+
	+ USER_ID: The unmodified user id from which EMAIL was extracted.
	+
	+ TIME: The time this binding was first observed.
	+
	+ POLICY: The trust policy (-1, 0, 1, or 2; see the
	+ documentation for TOFU_POLICY_BAD, etc. above).
	+
	+ CONFLICT is either NULL or a fingerprint. Assume that we have
	+ a binding <0xdeadbeef, foo@example.com> and then we observe
	+ <0xbaddecaf, foo@example.com>. There two bindings conflict
	+ (they have the same email address). When we observe the
	+ latter binding, we warn the user about the conflict and ask
	+ for a policy decision about the new binding. We also change
	+ the old binding's policy to ask if it was auto. So that we
	+ know why this occured, we also set conflict to 0xbaddecaf.
	+ */
	+ if (type == DB_EMAIL \|\| type == DB_COMBINED)
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec_printf
	+ (db, NULL, NULL, &err,
	+ "create table bindings\n"
	+ " (oid INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,\n"
	+ " fingerprint TEXT, email TEXT, user_id TEXT, time INTEGER,\n"
	+ " policy BOOLEAN CHECK (policy in (%d, %d, %d, %d, %d)),\n"
	+ " conflict STRING,\n"
	+ " unique (fingerprint, email));\n"
	+ "create index bindings_fingerprint_email\n"
	+ " on bindings (fingerprint, email);\n"
	+ "create index bindings_email on bindings (email);\n",
	+ TOFU_POLICY_AUTO, TOFU_POLICY_GOOD, TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN,
	+ TOFU_POLICY_BAD, TOFU_POLICY_ASK);
	+ else
	+ /* In the split DB case, the fingerprint DB only contains a subset
	+ of the fields. This reduces the amount of duplicated data.
	+
	+ Note: since the data is split on the email address, there is no
	+ need to index the email column. */
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec_printf
	+ (db, NULL, NULL, &err,
	+ "create table bindings\n"
	+ " (oid INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,\n"
	+ " fingerprint TEXT, email TEXT, user_id,\n"
	+ " unique (fingerprint, email));\n"
	+ "create index bindings_fingerprint\n"
	+ " on bindings (fingerprint);\n");
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error initializing TOFU database (%s): %s\n"),
	+ "bindings", err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+
	+ if (type != DB_KEY)
	+ {
	+ /* The signatures that we have observed.
	+
	+ BINDING refers to a record in the bindings table, which
	+ describes the binding (i.e., this is a foreign key that
	+ references bindings.oid).
	+
	+ SIG_DIGEST is the digest stored in the signature.
	+
	+ SIG_TIME is the timestamp stored in the signature.
	+
	+ ORIGIN is a free-form string that describes who fed this
	+ signature to GnuPG (e.g., email:claws).
	+
	+ TIME is the time this signature was registered. */
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec (db,
	+ "create table signatures "
	+ " (binding INTEGER NOT NULL, sig_digest TEXT,"
	+ " origin TEXT, sig_time INTEGER, time INTEGER,"
	+ " primary key (binding, sig_digest, origin));",
	+ NULL, NULL, &err);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error initializing TOFU database (%s): %s\n"),
	+ "signatures", err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ }
	+
	+ out:
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec (db, "rollback;", NULL, NULL, &err);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error aborting transaction on TOFU DB: %s\n"),
	+ err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ }
	+ return 1;
	+ }
	+ else
	+ {
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec (db, "commit transaction;", NULL, NULL, &err);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error committing transaction on TOFU DB: %s\n"),
	+ err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ return 1;
	+ }
	+ return 0;
	+ }
	+}
	+
	+static sqlite3 *combined_db;
	+
	+/* Open and initialize a low-level TOFU database. Returns NULL on
	+ failure. This function should not normally be directly called to
	+ get a database handle. Instead, use getdb(). */
	+static sqlite3 *
	+opendb (char *filename, enum db_type type)
	+{
	+ sqlite3 *db;
	+ int filename_free = 0;
	+ int rc;
	+
	+ if (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_FLAT)
	+ {
	+ assert (! filename);
	+ assert (type == DB_COMBINED);
	+
	+ if (combined_db)
	+ return combined_db;
	+
	+ filename = make_filename (opt.homedir, "tofu.db", NULL);
	+ filename_free = 1;
	+ }
	+ else
	+ assert (type == DB_EMAIL \|\| type == DB_KEY);
	+
	+ assert (filename);
	+
	+ rc = sqlite3_open (filename, &db);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("can't open TOFU DB ('%s'): %s\n"),
	+ filename, sqlite3_errmsg (db));
	+ /* Even if an error occurs, DB is guaranteed to be valid. */
	+ sqlite3_close (db);
	+ db = NULL;
	+ }
	+
	+ if (filename_free)
	+ xfree (filename);
	+
	+ if (db && initdb (db, type))
	+ {
	+ sqlite3_close (db);
	+ db = NULL;
	+ }
	+
	+ if (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_FLAT)
	+ combined_db = db;
	+
	+ return db;
	+}
	+
	+/* Return a database handle. <type, name> describes the required
	+ database. If there is a cached handle in DBS, that handle is
	+ returned. Otherwise, the database is opened and cached in DBS.
	+
	+ NAME is the name of the DB and may not be NULL.
	+
	+ TYPE must be either DB_MAIL or DB_KEY. In the combined format, the
	+ combined DB is always returned. */
	+static sqlite3 *
	+getdb (struct db dbs, const char name, enum db_type type)
	+{
	+ struct db *t = NULL;
	+ sqlite3 *sqlitedb = NULL;
	+ char *name_sanitized = NULL;
	+ char *filename = NULL;
	+ int i;
	+
	+ assert (name);
	+ assert (type == DB_EMAIL \|\| type == DB_KEY);
	+
	+ assert (dbs);
	+ /* The first entry is always for the combined DB. */
	+ assert (dbs->type == DB_COMBINED);
	+ assert (! dbs->name[0]);
	+
	+ if (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_FLAT)
	+ /* When using the flat format, we only have a single combined
	+ DB. */
	+ {
	+ assert (dbs->db);
	+ assert (! dbs->next);
	+ return dbs->db;
	+ }
	+ else
	+ /* When using the split format the first entry on the DB list is a
	+ dummy entry. */
	+ assert (! dbs->db);
	+
	+ /* We have the split format. */
	+
	+ /* Only allow alpha-numeric characters in the filename. */
	+ name_sanitized = xstrdup (name);
	+ for (i = 0; name[i]; i ++)
	+ {
	+ char c = name_sanitized[i];
	+ if (! (('a' <= c && c <= 'z')
	+ \|\| ('A' <= c && c <= 'Z')
	+ \|\| ('0' <= c && c <= '9')))
	+ name_sanitized[i] = '_';
	+ }
	+
	+ /* See if the DB is cached. */
	+ for (t = dbs->next; t; t = t->next)
	+ if (type == t->type && strcmp (t->name, name_sanitized) == 0)
	+ goto out;
	+
	+ /* Open the DB. The filename has the form:
	+
	+ tofu.d/TYPE/PREFIX/NAME.db
	+
	+ We use a short prefix to try to avoid having many files in a
	+ single directory. */
	+ {
	+ char *type_str = type == DB_EMAIL ? "email" : "key";
	+ char prefix[3] = { name_sanitized[0], name_sanitized[1], 0 };
	+ char *name_db;
	+
	+ /* Make the directory. */
	+ if (gnupg_mkdir_p (opt.homedir, "tofu.d", type_str, prefix, NULL) != 0)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("unable to create directory %s/%s/%s/%s"),
	+ opt.homedir, "tofu.d", type_str, prefix);
	+ g10_exit (1);
	+ }
	+
	+ name_db = xstrconcat (name_sanitized, ".db", NULL);
	+ filename = make_filename
	+ (opt.homedir, "tofu.d", type_str, prefix, name_db, NULL);
	+ xfree (name_db);
	+ }
	+
	+ sqlitedb = opendb (filename, type);
	+ if (! sqlitedb)
	+ goto out;
	+
	+ t = xmalloc (sizeof (struct db) + strlen (name_sanitized));
	+ t->type = type;
	+ t->db = sqlitedb;
	+ strcpy (t->name, name_sanitized);
	+
	+ /* Insert it immediately after the first element. */
	+ t->next = dbs->next;
	+ dbs->next = t;
	+
	+ out:
	+ xfree (filename);
	+ xfree (name_sanitized);
	+
	+ if (! t)
	+ return NULL;
	+ return t->db;
	+}
	+
	+
	+/* Create a new DB meta-handle. Returns NULL on error. */
	+static struct db *
	+opendbs (void)
	+{
	+ sqlite3 *db = NULL;
	+ struct db *dbs;
	+
	+ if (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_AUTO)
	+ {
	+ char *filename = make_filename (opt.homedir, "tofu.db", NULL);
	+ struct stat s;
	+ int have_tofu_db = 0;
	+ int have_tofu_d = 0;
	+
	+ if (stat (filename, &s) == 0)
	+ {
	+ have_tofu_db = 1;
	+ if (DBG_TRUST)
	+ log_debug ("%s exists.\n", filename);
	+ }
	+ else
	+ {
	+ if (DBG_TRUST)
	+ log_debug ("%s does not exist.\n", filename);
	+ }
	+
	+ /* We now have tofu.d. */
	+ filename[strlen (filename) - 1] = '\0';
	+ if (stat (filename, &s) == 0)
	+ {
	+ have_tofu_d = 1;
	+ if (DBG_TRUST)
	+ log_debug ("%s exists.\n", filename);
	+ }
	+ else
	+ {
	+ if (DBG_TRUST)
	+ log_debug ("%s does not exist.\n", filename);
	+ }
	+
	+ xfree (filename);
	+
	+ if (have_tofu_db && have_tofu_d)
	+ {
	+ log_info (_("Warning: Home directory contains both tofu.db and tofu.d. Using split format for TOFU DB.\n"));
	+ opt.tofu_db_format = TOFU_DB_SPLIT;
	+ }
	+ else if (have_tofu_db)
	+ {
	+ opt.tofu_db_format = TOFU_DB_FLAT;
	+ if (DBG_TRUST)
	+ log_debug ("Using flat format for TOFU DB.\n");
	+ }
	+ else if (have_tofu_d)
	+ {
	+ opt.tofu_db_format = TOFU_DB_SPLIT;
	+ if (DBG_TRUST)
	+ log_debug ("Using split format for TOFU DB.\n");
	+ }
	+ else
	+ {
	+ opt.tofu_db_format = TOFU_DB_SPLIT;
	+ if (DBG_TRUST)
	+ log_debug ("Using split format for TOFU DB.\n");
	+ }
	+ }
	+
	+ if (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_FLAT)
	+ {
	+ db = opendb (NULL, DB_COMBINED);
	+ if (! db)
	+ return NULL;
	+ }
	+ else
	+ /* Create a dummy entry so that we have a handle. */
	+ ;
	+
	+ dbs = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*dbs));
	+ dbs->db = db;
	+ dbs->type = DB_COMBINED;
	+
	+ return dbs;
	+}
	+
	+/* Release all of the resources associated with a DB meta-handle. */
	+static void
	+closedbs (struct db *dbs)
	+{
	+ struct db *db;
	+ struct db *n;
	+
	+ /* The first entry is always the combined DB. */
	+ assert (dbs->type == DB_COMBINED);
	+ if (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_FLAT)
	+ {
	+ /* If we are using the flat format, then there is only ever the
	+ combined DB. */
	+ assert (! dbs->next);
	+ assert (dbs->db);
	+ assert (dbs->db == combined_db);
	+ }
	+ else
	+ /* In the split format, the combined record is just a place holder
	+ so that we have a stable handle. */
	+ assert (! dbs->db);
	+
	+ for (db = dbs; db; db = n)
	+ {
	+ n = db->next;
	+
	+ if (combined_db && db->db == combined_db)
	+ {
	+ assert (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_FLAT);
	+ assert (dbs == db);
	+ assert (db->type == DB_COMBINED);
	+ assert (! db->name[0]);
	+ }
	+ else if (db->db)
	+ /* Not the dummy entry. */
	+ {
	+ if (dbs == db)
	+ /* The first entry. */
	+ {
	+ assert (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_FLAT);
	+ assert (db->type == DB_COMBINED);
	+ assert (! db->name[0]);
	+ }
	+ else
	+ /* Not the first entry. */
	+ {
	+ assert (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_SPLIT);
	+ assert (db->type != DB_COMBINED);
	+ assert (db->name[0]);
	+ }
	+
	+ sqlite3_close (db->db);
	+ }
	+ else
	+ /* The dummy entry. */
	+ {
	+ assert (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_SPLIT);
	+ assert (dbs == db);
	+ assert (db->type == DB_COMBINED);
	+ assert (! db->name[0]);
	+ }
	+
	+ xfree (db);
	+ }
	+}
	+
	+
	+/* Collect results of a select min (foo) ...; style query. Aborts if
	+ the argument is not a valid integer (or real of the form X.0). */
	+static int
	+get_single_long_cb (void cookie, int argc, char argv, char *azColName)
	+{
	+ long *count = cookie;
	+ char *tail = NULL;
	+
	+ (void) azColName;
	+
	+ assert (argc == 1);
	+
	+ errno = 0;
	+ *count = strtol (argv[0], &tail, 0);
	+ if (errno \|\| ! (strcmp (tail, ".0") == 0 \|\| *tail == '\0'))
	+ /* Abort. */
	+ return 1;
	+ return 0;
	+}
	+
	+
	+/* Record (or update) a trust policy about a (possibly new)
	+ binding.
	+
	+ If SHOW_OLD is set, the binding's old policy is displayed. */
	+static gpg_error_t
	+record_binding (struct db dbs, const char fingerprint, const char *email,
	+ const char *user_id, enum tofu_policy policy, int show_old)
	+{
	+ sqlite3 db_email = NULL, db_key = NULL;
	+ int rc;
	+ char *err = NULL;
	+ enum tofu_policy policy_old = TOFU_POLICY_NONE;
	+
	+ if (! (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO
	+ \|\| policy == TOFU_POLICY_GOOD
	+ \|\| policy == TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN
	+ \|\| policy == TOFU_POLICY_BAD
	+ \|\| policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK))
	+ log_bug ("%s: Bad value for policy (%d)!\n", __func__, policy);
	+
	+ db_email = getdb (dbs, email, DB_EMAIL);
	+ if (! db_email)
	+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	+
	+ if (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_SPLIT)
	+ /* In the split format, we need to update two DBs. To keep them
	+ consistent, we start a transaction on each. Note: this is the
	+ only place where we start two transaction and we always start
	+ transaction on the DB_KEY DB first, thus deadlock is not
	+ possible. */
	+ {
	+ db_key = getdb (dbs, fingerprint, DB_KEY);
	+ if (! db_key)
	+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	+
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec (db_email, "begin transaction;", NULL, NULL, &err);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error beginning transaction on TOFU %s database: %s\n"),
	+ "email", err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	+ }
	+
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec (db_key, "begin transaction;", NULL, NULL, &err);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error beginning transaction on TOFU %s database: %s\n"),
	+ "key", err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ goto out_revert_one;
	+ }
	+ }
	+
	+ if (show_old)
	+ /* Get the old policy. Since this is just for informational
	+ purposes, there is no need to start a transaction or to die if
	+ there is a failure. */
	+ {
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec_printf
	+ (db_email, get_single_long_cb, &policy_old, &err,
	+ "select policy from bindings where fingerprint = %Q and email = %Q",
	+ fingerprint, email);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_debug ("TOFU: Error reading from binding database"
	+ " (reading policy for <%s, %s>): %s\n",
	+ fingerprint, email, err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ }
	+ }
	+
	+ if (DBG_TRUST)
	+ {
	+ if (policy_old != TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
	+ log_debug ("Changing TOFU trust policy for binding <%s, %s>"
	+ " from %s to %s.\n",
	+ fingerprint, email,
	+ tofu_policy_str (policy_old),
	+ tofu_policy_str (policy));
	+ else
	+ log_debug ("Set TOFU trust policy for binding <%s, %s> to %s.\n",
	+ fingerprint, email,
	+ tofu_policy_str (policy));
	+ }
	+
	+ if (policy_old == policy)
	+ /* Nothing to do. */
	+ goto out;
	+
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec_printf
	+ (db_email, NULL, NULL, &err,
	+ "insert or replace into bindings\n"
	+ " (oid, fingerprint, email, user_id, time, policy)\n"
	+ " values (\n"
	+ /* If we don't explicitly reuse the OID, then SQLite will
	+ reallocate a new one. We just need to search for the OID
	+ based on the fingerprint and email since they are unique. */
	+ " (select oid from bindings where fingerprint = %Q and email = %Q),\n"
	+ " %Q, %Q, %Q, strftime('%%s','now'), %d);",
	+ fingerprint, email, fingerprint, email, user_id, policy);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error updating TOFU binding database"
	+ " (inserting <%s, %s> = %s): %s\n"),
	+ fingerprint, email, tofu_policy_str (policy),
	+ err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+
	+ if (db_key)
	+ /* We also need to update the key DB. */
	+ {
	+ assert (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_SPLIT);
	+
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec_printf
	+ (db_key, NULL, NULL, &err,
	+ "insert or replace into bindings\n"
	+ " (oid, fingerprint, email, user_id)\n"
	+ " values (\n"
	+ /* If we don't explicitly reuse the OID, then SQLite will
	+ reallocate a new one. We just need to search for the OID
	+ based on the fingerprint and email since they are unique. */
	+ " (select oid from bindings where fingerprint = %Q and email = %Q),\n"
	+ " %Q, %Q, %Q);",
	+ fingerprint, email, fingerprint, email, user_id);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error updating TOFU binding database"
	+ " (inserting <%s, %s>): %s\n"),
	+ fingerprint, email, err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ }
	+ else
	+ assert (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_FLAT);
	+
	+ out:
	+ if (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_SPLIT)
	+ /* We only need a transaction for the split format. */
	+ {
	+ int rc2;
	+
	+ rc2 = sqlite3_exec_printf (db_key, NULL, NULL, &err,
	+ rc ? "rollback;" : "end transaction;");
	+ if (rc2)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error ending transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
	+ err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ }
	+
	+ out_revert_one:
	+ rc2 = sqlite3_exec_printf (db_email, NULL, NULL, &err,
	+ rc ? "rollback;" : "end transaction;");
	+ if (rc2)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error ending transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"),
	+ err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ }
	+ }
	+
	+ if (rc)
	+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	+ return 0;
	+}
	+
	+
	+/* Collect the strings returned by a query in a simply string list.
	+ Any NULL values are converted to the empty string.
	+
	+ If a result has 3 rows and each row contains two columns, then the
	+ results are added to the list as follows (the value is parentheses
	+ is the 1-based index in the final list):
	+
	+ row 1, col 2 (6)
	+ row 1, col 1 (5)
	+ row 2, col 2 (4)
	+ row 2, col 1 (3)
	+ row 3, col 2 (2)
	+ row 3, col 1 (1)
	+
	+ This is because add_to_strlist pushes the results onto the front of
	+ the list. The end result is that the rows are backwards, but the
	+ columns are in the expected order. */
	+static int
	+strings_collect_cb (void cookie, int argc, char argv, char *azColName)
	+{
	+ int i;
	+ strlist_t *strlist = cookie;
	+
	+ (void) azColName;
	+
	+ for (i = argc - 1; i >= 0; i --)
	+ add_to_strlist (strlist, argv[i] ? argv[i] : "");
	+
	+ return 0;
	+}
	+
	+/* Auxiliary data structure to collect statistics about
	+ signatures. */
	+struct signature_stats
	+{
	+ struct signature_stats *next;
	+
	+ /* The user-assigned policy for this binding. */
	+ enum tofu_policy policy;
	+
	+ /* How long ago the signature was created (rounded to a multiple of
	+ TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL, etc.). */
	+ long time_ago;
	+ /* Number of signatures during this time. */
	+ unsigned long count;
	+
	+ /* The key that generated this signature. */
	+ char fingerprint[1];
	+};
	+
	+static void
	+signature_stats_free (struct signature_stats *stats)
	+{
	+ while (stats)
	+ {
	+ struct signature_stats *next = stats->next;
	+ xfree (stats);
	+ stats = next;
	+ }
	+}
	+
	+static void
	+signature_stats_prepend (struct signature_stats **statsp,
	+ const char *fingerprint,
	+ enum tofu_policy policy,
	+ long time_ago,
	+ unsigned long count)
	+{
	+ struct signature_stats *stats =
	+ xmalloc (sizeof (*stats) + strlen (fingerprint));
	+
	+ stats->next = *statsp;
	+ *statsp = stats;
	+
	+ strcpy (stats->fingerprint, fingerprint);
	+ stats->policy = policy;
	+ stats->time_ago = time_ago;
	+ stats->count = count;
	+}
	+
	+
	+/* Process rows that contain the four columns:
	+
	+ <fingerprint, policy, time ago, count>. */
	+static int
	+signature_stats_collect_cb (void cookie, int argc, char *argv,
	+ char **azColName)
	+{
	+ struct signature_stats **statsp = cookie;
	+ char *tail;
	+ int i = 0;
	+ enum tofu_policy policy;
	+ long time_ago;
	+ unsigned long count;
	+
	+ (void) azColName;
	+
	+ i ++;
	+
	+ tail = NULL;
	+ errno = 0;
	+ policy = strtol (argv[i], &tail, 0);
	+ if (errno \|\| ! (strcmp (tail, ".0") == 0 \|\| *tail == '\0'))
	+ {
	+ /* Abort. */
	+ log_error ("%s: Error converting %s to an integer (tail = '%s')\n",
	+ __func__, argv[i], tail);
	+ return 1;
	+ }
	+ i ++;
	+
	+ tail = NULL;
	+ errno = 0;
	+ time_ago = strtol (argv[i], &tail, 0);
	+ if (errno \|\| ! (strcmp (tail, ".0") == 0 \|\| *tail == '\0'))
	+ {
	+ /* Abort. */
	+ log_error ("%s: Error converting %s to an integer (tail = '%s')\n",
	+ __func__, argv[i], tail);
	+ return 1;
	+ }
	+ i ++;
	+
	+ tail = NULL;
	+ errno = 0;
	+ count = strtoul (argv[i], &tail, 0);
	+ if (errno \|\| ! (strcmp (tail, ".0") == 0 \|\| *tail == '\0'))
	+ {
	+ /* Abort. */
	+ log_error ("%s: Error converting %s to an integer (tail = '%s')\n",
	+ __func__, argv[i], tail);
	+ return 1;
	+ }
	+ i ++;
	+
	+ assert (argc == i);
	+
	+ signature_stats_prepend (statsp, argv[0], policy, time_ago, count);
	+
	+ return 0;
	+}
	+
	+/* The grouping parameters when collecting signature statistics. */
	+
	+/* If a message is signed a couple of hours in the future, just assume
	+ some clock skew. */
	+#define TIME_AGO_FUTURE_IGNORE (2 * 60 * 60)
	+#if 0
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL 60
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL_NAME _("minute")
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL_NAME_PLURAL _("minutes")
	+# define TIME_AGO_MEDIUM_THRESHOLD (60 * TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL)
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM (60 * 60)
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM_NAME _("hour")
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM_NAME_PLURAL _("hours")
	+# define TIME_AGO_LARGE_THRESHOLD (24 * 60 * TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL)
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE (24 * 60 * 60)
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE_NAME _("day")
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE_NAME_PLURAL _("days")
	+#else
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL (24 * 60 * 60)
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL_NAME _("day")
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL_NAME_PLURAL _("days")
	+# define TIME_AGO_MEDIUM_THRESHOLD (4 * TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL)
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM (7 * 24 * 60 * 60)
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM_NAME _("week")
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM_NAME_PLURAL _("weeks")
	+# define TIME_AGO_LARGE_THRESHOLD (28 * TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL)
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE (30 * 24 * 60 * 60)
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE_NAME _("month")
	+# define TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE_NAME_PLURAL _("months")
	+#endif
	+
	+/* Convert from seconds to time units.
	+
	+ Note: T should already be a multiple of TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL or
	+ TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM or TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE. */
	+signed long
	+time_ago_scale (signed long t)
	+{
	+ if (t < TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM)
	+ return t / TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL;
	+ if (t < TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE)
	+ return t / TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM;
	+ return t / TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE;
	+}
	+
	+/* Return the appropriate unit (respecting whether it is plural or
	+ singular). */
	+const char *
	+time_ago_unit (signed long t)
	+{
	+ signed long t_scaled = time_ago_scale (t);
	+
	+ if (t < TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM)
	+ {
	+ if (t_scaled == 1)
	+ return TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL_NAME;
	+ return TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL_NAME_PLURAL;
	+ }
	+ if (t < TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE)
	+ {
	+ if (t_scaled == 1)
	+ return TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM_NAME;
	+ return TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM_NAME_PLURAL;
	+ }
	+ if (t_scaled == 1)
	+ return TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE_NAME;
	+ return TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE_NAME_PLURAL;
	+}
	+
	+
	+#define GET_POLICY_ERROR 100
	+
	+/* Return the policy for the binding <FINGERPRINT, EMAIL> (email has
	+ already been normalized) and any conflict information in *CONFLICT
	+ if CONFLICT is not NULL. Returns GET_POLICY_ERROR if an error
	+ occurs. */
	+static enum tofu_policy
	+get_policy (struct db dbs, const char fingerprint, const char *email,
	+ char **conflict)
	+{
	+ sqlite3 *db;
	+ int rc;
	+ char *err = NULL;
	+ strlist_t strlist = NULL;
	+ char *tail = NULL;
	+ enum tofu_policy policy = GET_POLICY_ERROR;
	+
	+ assert (GET_POLICY_ERROR != TOFU_POLICY_NONE
	+ && GET_POLICY_ERROR != TOFU_POLICY_AUTO
	+ && GET_POLICY_ERROR != TOFU_POLICY_GOOD
	+ && GET_POLICY_ERROR != TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN
	+ && GET_POLICY_ERROR != TOFU_POLICY_BAD
	+ && GET_POLICY_ERROR != TOFU_POLICY_ASK);
	+
	+ db = getdb (dbs, email, DB_EMAIL);
	+ if (! db)
	+ return GET_POLICY_ERROR;
	+
	+ /* Check if the <FINGERPRINT, EMAIL> binding is known
	+ (TOFU_POLICY_NONE cannot appear in the DB. Thus, if POLICY is
	+ still TOFU_POLICY_NONE after executing the query, then the
	+ result set was empty.) */
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec_printf
	+ (db, strings_collect_cb, &strlist, &err,
	+ "select policy, conflict from bindings\n"
	+ " where fingerprint = %Q and email = %Q",
	+ fingerprint, email);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error reading from TOFU database"
	+ " (checking for existing bad bindings): %s\n"),
	+ err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+
	+ if (strlist_length (strlist) == 0)
	+ /* No results. */
	+ {
	+ policy = TOFU_POLICY_NONE;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ else if (strlist_length (strlist) != 2)
	+ /* The result has the wrong form. */
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error reading from TOFU database"
	+ " (checking for existing bad bindings):"
	+ " expected 2 results, got %d\n"),
	+ strlist_length (strlist));
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+
	+ /* The result has the right form. */
	+
	+ errno = 0;
	+ policy = strtol (strlist->d, &tail, 0);
	+ if (errno \|\| *tail != '\0')
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error reading from TOFU database: bad value for policy: %s\n"),
	+ strlist->d);
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+
	+ if (! (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO
	+ \|\| policy == TOFU_POLICY_GOOD
	+ \|\| policy == TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN
	+ \|\| policy == TOFU_POLICY_BAD
	+ \|\| policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK))
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("TOFU DB is corrupted. Invalid value for policy (%d).\n"),
	+ policy);
	+ policy = GET_POLICY_ERROR;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+
	+
	+ /* If CONFLICT is set, then policy should be TOFU_POLICY_ASK. But,
	+ just in case, we do the check again here and ignore the conflict
	+ is POLICY is not TOFU_POLICY_ASK. */
	+ if (conflict)
	+ {
	+ if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK && *strlist->next->d)
	+ *conflict = xstrdup (strlist->next->d);
	+ else
	+ *conflict = NULL;
	+ }
	+
	+ out:
	+ assert (policy == GET_POLICY_ERROR
	+ \|\| policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE
	+ \|\| policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO
	+ \|\| policy == TOFU_POLICY_GOOD
	+ \|\| policy == TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN
	+ \|\| policy == TOFU_POLICY_BAD
	+ \|\| policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK);
	+
	+ free_strlist (strlist);
	+
	+ return policy;
	+}
	+
	+#define GET_TRUST_ERROR 100
	+
	+/* Return the trust level (TRUST_NEVER, etc.) for the binding
	+ <FINGERPRINT, EMAIL> (email is already normalized). If no policy
	+ is registered, returns TOFU_POLICY_NONE. If an error occurs,
	+ returns GET_TRUST_ERROR.
	+
	+ USER_ID is the unadultered user id.
	+
	+ If MAY_ASK is set, then we may interact with the user. This is
	+ necessary if there is a conflict or the binding's policy is
	+ TOFU_POLICY_ASK. In the case of a conflict, we set the new
	+ conflicting binding's policy to TOFU_POLICY_ASK. In either case,
	+ we return TRUST_UNDEFINED. */
	+static enum tofu_policy
	+get_trust (struct db dbs, const char fingerprint, const char *email,
	+ const char *user_id, int may_ask)
	+{
	+ sqlite3 *db;
	+ enum tofu_policy policy;
	+ char *conflict = NULL;
	+ int rc;
	+ char *err = NULL;
	+ strlist_t bindings_with_this_email = NULL;
	+ int bindings_with_this_email_count;
	+ int change_conflicting_to_ask = 0;
	+ int trust_level = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	+
	+ if (opt.batch)
	+ may_ask = 0;
	+
	+ /* Make sure GET_TRUST_ERROR isn't equal to any of the trust
	+ levels. */
	+ assert (GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_UNKNOWN
	+ && GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_EXPIRED
	+ && GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_UNDEFINED
	+ && GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_NEVER
	+ && GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_MARGINAL
	+ && GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_FULLY
	+ && GET_TRUST_ERROR != TRUST_ULTIMATE);
	+
	+ db = getdb (dbs, email, DB_EMAIL);
	+ if (! db)
	+ return GET_TRUST_ERROR;
	+
	+ policy = get_policy (dbs, fingerprint, email, &conflict);
	+ if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO)
	+ {
	+ policy = opt.tofu_default_policy;
	+ if (DBG_TRUST)
	+ log_debug ("TOFU: binding <%s, %s>'s policy is auto (default: %s).\n",
	+ fingerprint, email,
	+ tofu_policy_str (opt.tofu_default_policy));
	+ }
	+ switch (policy)
	+ {
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_AUTO:
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_GOOD:
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN:
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_BAD:
	+ /* The saved judgement is auto -> auto, good, unknown or bad.
	+ We don't need to ask the user anything. */
	+ if (DBG_TRUST)
	+ log_debug ("TOFU: Known binding <%s, %s>'s policy: %s\n",
	+ fingerprint, email, tofu_policy_str (policy));
	+ trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (policy);
	+ goto out;
	+
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_ASK:
	+ /* We need to ask the user what to do. Case #1 or #2 below. */
	+ if (! may_ask)
	+ {
	+ trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+
	+ break;
	+
	+ case TOFU_POLICY_NONE:
	+ /* The binding is new, we need to check for conflicts. Case #3
	+ below. */
	+ break;
	+
	+ case GET_POLICY_ERROR:
	+ trust_level = GET_TRUST_ERROR;
	+ goto out;
	+
	+ default:
	+ log_bug ("%s: Impossible value for policy (%d)\n", __func__, policy);
	+ }
	+
	+
	+ /* We get here if:
	+
	+ 1. The saved policy is auto and the default policy is ask
	+ (get_policy() == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO
	+ && opt.tofu_default_policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK)
	+
	+ 2. The saved policy is ask (either last time the user selected
	+ accept once or reject once or there was a conflict and this
	+ binding's policy was changed from auto to ask)
	+ (policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK), or,
	+
	+ 3. We don't have a saved policy (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
	+ (need to check for a conflict).
	+ */
	+
	+ /* Look for conflicts. This is need in all 3 cases.
	+
	+ Get the fingerprints of any bindings that share the email
	+ address. Note: if the binding in question is in the DB, it will
	+ also be returned. Thus, if the result set is empty, then this is
	+ a new binding. */
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec_printf
	+ (db, strings_collect_cb, &bindings_with_this_email, &err,
	+ "select distinct fingerprint from bindings where email = %Q;",
	+ email);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error reading from TOFU database"
	+ " (listing fingerprints): %s\n"),
	+ err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+
	+ bindings_with_this_email_count = strlist_length (bindings_with_this_email);
	+ if (bindings_with_this_email_count == 0
	+ && opt.tofu_default_policy != TOFU_POLICY_ASK)
	+ /* New binding with no conflict and a concrete default policy.
	+
	+ We've never observed a binding with this email address
	+ (BINDINGS_WITH_THIS_EMAIL_COUNT is 0 and the above query would return
	+ the current binding if it were in the DB) and we have a default
	+ policy, which is not to ask the user. */
	+ {
	+ /* If we've seen this binding, then we've seen this email and
	+ policy couldn't possibly be TOFU_POLICY_NONE. */
	+ assert (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE);
	+
	+ if (DBG_TRUST)
	+ log_debug ("TOFU: New binding <%s, %s>, no conflict.\n",
	+ email, fingerprint);
	+
	+ if (record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id,
	+ TOFU_POLICY_AUTO, 0) != 0)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error setting TOFU binding's trust level to %s\n"),
	+ "auto");
	+ trust_level = GET_TRUST_ERROR;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+
	+ trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (TOFU_POLICY_AUTO);
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+
	+ if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
	+ /* This is a new binding and we have a conflict. Mark any
	+ conflicting bindings that have an automatic policy as now
	+ requiring confirmation. Note: we delay this until after we ask
	+ for confirmation so that when the current policy is printed, it
	+ is correct. */
	+ change_conflicting_to_ask = 1;
	+
	+ if (! may_ask)
	+ /* We can only get here in the third case (no saved policy) and if
	+ there is a conflict. (If the policy was ask (cases #1 and #2)
	+ and we weren't allowed to ask, we'd have already exited). */
	+ {
	+ assert (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE);
	+
	+ if (record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id,
	+ TOFU_POLICY_ASK, 0) != 0)
	+ log_error (_("error setting TOFU binding's trust level to %s\n"),
	+ "ask");
	+
	+ trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+
	+ /* If we get here, we need to ask the user about the binding. There
	+ are three ways we could end up here:
	+
	+ - This is a new binding and there is a conflict
	+ (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE && bindings_with_this_email_count > 0),
	+
	+ - This is a new binding and opt.tofu_default_policy is set to
	+ ask. (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE && opt.tofu_default_policy ==
	+ TOFU_POLICY_ASK), or,
	+
	+ - The policy is ask (the user deferred last time) (policy ==
	+ TOFU_POLICY_ASK).
	+ */
	+ {
	+ int is_conflict =
	+ ((policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE && bindings_with_this_email_count > 0)
	+ \|\| (policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK && conflict));
	+ estream_t fp;
	+ char *binding;
	+ int binding_shown;
	+ strlist_t other_user_ids = NULL;
	+ struct signature_stats *stats = NULL;
	+ struct signature_stats *stats_iter = NULL;
	+ char *prompt;
	+ char *choices;
	+
	+ fp = es_fopenmem (0, "rw,samethread");
	+ if (! fp)
	+ log_fatal ("Error creating memory stream\n");
	+
	+ binding = xasprintf ("<%s, %s>", fingerprint, email);
	+ binding_shown = 0;
	+
	+ if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_NONE)
	+ {
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("The binding %s is NOT known. "), binding);
	+ binding_shown = 1;
	+ }
	+ else if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_ASK && conflict)
	+ {
	+ es_fprintf (fp,
	+ _("%s raised a conflict with this binding. Since this"
	+ " binding's policy was 'auto', it was changed to 'ask'. "),
	+ binding);
	+ binding_shown = 1;
	+ }
	+ es_fprintf (fp,
	+ _("Please indicate whether you believe the binding %s%s"
	+ "is legitimate (the key belongs to the stated owner) "
	+ "or a forgery (bad).\n\n"),
	+ binding_shown ? "" : binding,
	+ binding_shown ? "" : " ");
	+
	+ xfree (binding);
	+
	+ /* Find other user ids associated with this key and whether the
	+ bindings are marked as good or bad. */
	+ {
	+ sqlite3 *db_key;
	+
	+ if (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_SPLIT)
	+ /* In the split format, we need to search in the fingerprint
	+ DB for all the emails associated with this key, not the
	+ email DB. */
	+ db_key = getdb (dbs, fingerprint, DB_KEY);
	+ else
	+ db_key = db;
	+
	+ if (db_key)
	+ {
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec_printf
	+ (db_key, strings_collect_cb, &other_user_ids, &err,
	+ "select user_id, %s from bindings where fingerprint = %Q;",
	+ opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_SPLIT ? "email" : "policy",
	+ fingerprint);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error gathering other user ids: %s.\n"), err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ err = NULL;
	+ }
	+ }
	+ }
	+
	+ if (other_user_ids)
	+ {
	+ strlist_t strlist_iter;
	+
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("Known user ids associated with this key:\n"));
	+ for (strlist_iter = other_user_ids;
	+ strlist_iter;
	+ strlist_iter = strlist_iter->next)
	+ {
	+ char *other_user_id = strlist_iter->d;
	+ char *other_thing;
	+ enum tofu_policy other_policy;
	+
	+ assert (strlist_iter->next);
	+ strlist_iter = strlist_iter->next;
	+ other_thing = strlist_iter->d;
	+
	+ if (opt.tofu_db_format == TOFU_DB_SPLIT)
	+ other_policy = get_policy (dbs, fingerprint, other_thing, NULL);
	+ else
	+ other_policy = atoi (other_thing);
	+
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _(" %s (policy: %s)\n"),
	+ other_user_id,
	+ tofu_policy_str (other_policy));
	+ }
	+ es_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	+
	+ free_strlist (other_user_ids);
	+ }
	+
	+ /* Find other keys associated with this email address. */
	+ /* XXX: When generating the statistics, do we want the time
	+ embedded in the signature (column 'sig_time') or the time that
	+ we first verified the signature (column 'time'). */
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec_printf
	+ (db, signature_stats_collect_cb, &stats, &err,
	+ "select fingerprint, policy, time_ago, count(*)\n"
	+ " from (select bindings.*,\n"
	+ " case\n"
	+ /* From the future (but if its just a couple of hours in the
	+ future don't turn it into a warning)? Or should we use
	+ small, medium or large units? (Note: whatever we do, we
	+ keep the value in seconds. Then when we group, everything
	+ that rounds to the same number of seconds is grouped.) */
	+ " when delta < -%d then -1\n"
	+ " when delta < %d then max(0, round(delta / %d) * %d)\n"
	+ " when delta < %d then round(delta / %d) * %d\n"
	+ " else round(delta / %d) * %d\n"
	+ " end time_ago,\n"
	+ " delta time_ago_raw\n"
	+ " from (select *,\n"
	+ " cast(strftime('%%s','now') - sig_time as real) delta\n"
	+ " from signatures) ss\n"
	+ " left join bindings on ss.binding = bindings.oid)\n"
	+ " where email = %Q\n"
	+ " group by fingerprint, time_ago\n"
	+ /* Make sure the current key is first. */
	+ " order by fingerprint = %Q asc, fingerprint desc, time_ago desc;\n",
	+ TIME_AGO_FUTURE_IGNORE,
	+ TIME_AGO_MEDIUM_THRESHOLD, TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL, TIME_AGO_UNIT_SMALL,
	+ TIME_AGO_LARGE_THRESHOLD, TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM, TIME_AGO_UNIT_MEDIUM,
	+ TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE, TIME_AGO_UNIT_LARGE,
	+ email, fingerprint);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ strlist_t strlist_iter;
	+
	+ log_error (_("error gathering signature stats: %s.\n"),
	+ err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ err = NULL;
	+
	+ es_fprintf
	+ (fp, _("The email address (%s) is associated with %d keys:\n"),
	+ email, bindings_with_this_email_count);
	+ for (strlist_iter = bindings_with_this_email;
	+ strlist_iter;
	+ strlist_iter = strlist_iter->next)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _(" %s\n"), strlist_iter->d);
	+ }
	+ else
	+ {
	+ char *key = NULL;
	+
	+ if (! stats \|\| strcmp (stats->fingerprint, fingerprint) != 0)
	+ /* If we have already added this key to the DB, then it will
	+ be first (see the above select). Since the first key on
	+ the list is not this key, we must not yet have verified
	+ any messages signed by this key. Add a dummy entry. */
	+ signature_stats_prepend (&stats, fingerprint, TOFU_POLICY_AUTO, 0, 0);
	+
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("Statistics for keys with the email '%s':\n"),
	+ email);
	+ for (stats_iter = stats; stats_iter; stats_iter = stats_iter->next)
	+ {
	+ if (! key \|\| strcmp (key, stats_iter->fingerprint) != 0)
	+ {
	+ int this_key;
	+ key = stats_iter->fingerprint;
	+ this_key = strcmp (key, fingerprint) == 0;
	+ if (this_key)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _(" %s (this key):"), key);
	+ else
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _(" %s (policy: %s):"),
	+ key, tofu_policy_str (stats_iter->policy));
	+ es_fprintf (fp, "\n");
	+ }
	+
	+ if (stats_iter->time_ago == -1)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _(" %ld %s signed in the future.\n"),
	+ stats_iter->count,
	+ stats_iter->count == 1
	+ ? _("message") : _("messages"));
	+ else if (stats_iter->count == 0)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _(" 0 signed messages.\n"));
	+ else
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _(" %ld %s signed over the past %ld %s.\n"),
	+ stats_iter->count,
	+ stats_iter->count == 1
	+ ? _("message") : _("messages"),
	+ time_ago_scale (stats_iter->time_ago),
	+ time_ago_unit (stats_iter->time_ago));
	+ }
	+ }
	+
	+ if (is_conflict)
	+ {
	+ /* TRANSLATORS: translate the below text. We don't directly
	+ internationalize that text so that we can tweak it without
	+ breaking translations. */
	+ char *text = _("TOFU detected a binding conflict");
	+ if (strcmp (text, "TOFU detected a binding conflict") == 0)
	+ /* No translation. Use the English text. */
	+ text =
	+ "Normally, there is only a single key associated with an email"
	+ "address. However, people sometimes generate a new key if"
	+ "their key is too old or they think it might be compromised."
	+ "Alternatively, a new key may indicate a man-in-the-middle attack!"
	+ "Before accepting this key, you should talk to or call the person"
	+ "to make sure this new key is legitimate.";
	+ es_fprintf (fp, "\n%s\n", text);
	+ }
	+
	+ es_fputc ('\n', fp);
	+ /* TRANSLATORS: Two letters (normally the lower and upper case
	+ version of the hotkey) for each of the five choices. If there
	+ is only one choice in your language, repeat it. */
	+ choices = _("gG" "aA" "uU" "rR" "bB");
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("(G)ood/(A)ccept once/(U)nknown/(R)eject once/(B)ad? "));
	+
	+ /* Add a NUL terminator. */
	+ es_fputc (0, fp);
	+ if (es_fclose_snatch (fp, (void **) &prompt, NULL))
	+ log_fatal ("error snatching memory stream\n");
	+
	+ while (1)
	+ {
	+ char *response;
	+
	+ if (strlen (choices) != 10)
	+ log_bug ("Bad TOFU conflict translation! Please report.");
	+
	+ response = cpr_get ("tofu conflict", prompt);
	+ trim_spaces (response);
	+ cpr_kill_prompt ();
	+ if (strlen (response) == 1)
	+ {
	+ char choice = strchr (choices, response);
	+ if (choice)
	+ {
	+ int c = ((size_t) choice - (size_t) choices) / 2;
	+ assert (0 <= c && c <= 3);
	+
	+ switch (c)
	+ {
	+ case 0: /* Good. */
	+ policy = TOFU_POLICY_GOOD;
	+ trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (policy);
	+ break;
	+ case 1: /* Accept once. */
	+ policy = TOFU_POLICY_ASK;
	+ trust_level =
	+ tofu_policy_to_trust_level (TOFU_POLICY_GOOD);
	+ break;
	+ case 2: /* Unknown. */
	+ policy = TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN;
	+ trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (policy);
	+ break;
	+ case 3: /* Reject once. */
	+ policy = TOFU_POLICY_ASK;
	+ trust_level =
	+ tofu_policy_to_trust_level (TOFU_POLICY_BAD);
	+ break;
	+ case 4: /* Bad. */
	+ policy = TOFU_POLICY_BAD;
	+ trust_level = tofu_policy_to_trust_level (policy);
	+ break;
	+ default:
	+ log_bug ("c should be between 0 and 4 but it is %d!", c);
	+ }
	+
	+ if (record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id,
	+ policy, 0) != 0)
	+ /* If there's an error registering the
	+ binding, don't save the signature. */
	+ trust_level = GET_TRUST_ERROR;
	+
	+ break;
	+ }
	+ }
	+ xfree (response);
	+ }
	+
	+ xfree (prompt);
	+
	+ signature_stats_free (stats);
	+ }
	+
	+ out:
	+ if (change_conflicting_to_ask)
	+ {
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec_printf
	+ (db, NULL, NULL, &err,
	+ "update bindings set policy = %d, conflict = %Q"
	+ " where email = %Q and fingerprint != %Q and policy = %d;",
	+ TOFU_POLICY_ASK, fingerprint, email, fingerprint, TOFU_POLICY_AUTO);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error changing TOFU policy: %s\n"), err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+ }
	+
	+ xfree (conflict);
	+ free_strlist (bindings_with_this_email);
	+
	+ return trust_level;
	+}
	+
	+static void
	+show_statistics (struct db dbs, const char fingerprint,
	+ const char email, const char user_id,
	+ const char *sig_exclude)
	+{
	+ sqlite3 *db;
	+ int rc;
	+ strlist_t strlist = NULL;
	+ char *err = NULL;
	+
	+ db = getdb (dbs, email, DB_EMAIL);
	+ if (! db)
	+ return;
	+
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec_printf
	+ (db, strings_collect_cb, &strlist, &err,
	+ "select count (*), strftime('%%s','now') - min (signatures.time)\n"
	+ " from signatures\n"
	+ " left join bindings on signatures.binding = bindings.oid\n"
	+ " where fingerprint = %Q and email = %Q and sig_digest %s%s%s;",
	+ fingerprint, email,
	+ /* We want either: sig_digest != 'SIG_EXCLUDE' or sig_digest is
	+ not NULL. */
	+ sig_exclude ? "!= '" : "is not NULL",
	+ sig_exclude ? sig_exclude : "",
	+ sig_exclude ? "'" : "");
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error reading from TOFU database"
	+ " (getting statistics): %s\n"),
	+ err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ goto out;
	+ }
	+
	+ if (! strlist)
	+ log_info (_("Have never verified a message signed by key %s!\n"),
	+ fingerprint);
	+ else
	+ {
	+ char *tail = NULL;
	+ signed long messages;
	+ signed long first_seen_ago;
	+
	+ assert (strlist_length (strlist) == 2);
	+
	+ errno = 0;
	+ messages = strtol (strlist->d, &tail, 0);
	+ if (errno \|\| *tail != '\0')
	+ /* Abort. */
	+ {
	+ log_debug ("%s:%d: Couldn't convert %s (messages) to an int: %s.\n",
	+ __func__, __LINE__, strlist->d, strerror (errno));
	+ messages = -1;
	+ }
	+
	+ if (messages == 0 && *strlist->next->d == '\0')
	+ /* min(NULL) => NULL => "". */
	+ first_seen_ago = -1;
	+ else
	+ {
	+ errno = 0;
	+ first_seen_ago = strtol (strlist->next->d, &tail, 0);
	+ if (errno \|\| *tail != '\0')
	+ /* Abort. */
	+ {
	+ log_debug ("%s:%d: Cound't convert %s (first_seen) to an int: %s.\n",
	+ __func__, __LINE__,
	+ strlist->next->d, strerror (errno));
	+ first_seen_ago = 0;
	+ }
	+ }
	+
	+ if (messages == -1 \|\| first_seen_ago == 0)
	+ log_info (_("Failed to collect signature statistics for \"%s\" (key %s)\n"),
	+ user_id, fingerprint);
	+ else
	+ {
	+ enum tofu_policy policy = get_policy (dbs, fingerprint, email, NULL);
	+ estream_t fp;
	+ char *msg;
	+
	+ fp = es_fopenmem (0, "rw,samethread");
	+ if (! fp)
	+ log_fatal ("error creating memory stream\n");
	+
	+ if (messages == 0)
	+ es_fprintf (fp,
	+ _("Verified 0 messages signed by \"%s\""
	+ " (key: %s, policy %s)."),
	+ user_id, fingerprint, tofu_policy_str (policy));
	+ else
	+ {
	+ int years = 0;
	+ int months = 0;
	+ int days = 0;
	+ int hours = 0;
	+ int minutes = 0;
	+ int seconds = 0;
	+
	+ /* The number of units that we've printed so far. */
	+ int count = 0;
	+ /* The first unit that we printed (year = 0, month = 1,
	+ etc.). */
	+ int first = -1;
	+ /* The current unit. */
	+ int i = 0;
	+
	+ es_fprintf (fp,
	+ _("Verified %ld messages signed by \"%s\""
	+ " (key: %s, policy: %s) in the past "),
	+ messages, user_id,
	+ fingerprint, tofu_policy_str (policy));
	+
	+ /* It would be nice to use a macro to do this, but gettext
	+ works on the unpreprocessed code. */
	+#define MIN_SECS (60)
	+#define HOUR_SECS (60 * MIN_SECS)
	+#define DAY_SECS (24 * HOUR_SECS)
	+#define MONTH_SECS (30 * DAY_SECS)
	+#define YEAR_SECS (365 * DAY_SECS)
	+
	+ if (first_seen_ago > YEAR_SECS)
	+ {
	+ years = first_seen_ago / YEAR_SECS;
	+ first_seen_ago -= years * YEAR_SECS;
	+ }
	+ if (first_seen_ago > MONTH_SECS)
	+ {
	+ months = first_seen_ago / MONTH_SECS;
	+ first_seen_ago -= months * MONTH_SECS;
	+ }
	+ if (first_seen_ago > DAY_SECS)
	+ {
	+ days = first_seen_ago / DAY_SECS;
	+ first_seen_ago -= days * DAY_SECS;
	+ }
	+ if (first_seen_ago > HOUR_SECS)
	+ {
	+ hours = first_seen_ago / HOUR_SECS;
	+ first_seen_ago -= hours * HOUR_SECS;
	+ }
	+ if (first_seen_ago > MIN_SECS)
	+ {
	+ minutes = first_seen_ago / MIN_SECS;
	+ first_seen_ago -= minutes * MIN_SECS;
	+ }
	+ seconds = first_seen_ago;
	+
	+ if (years)
	+ {
	+ if (years > 1)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("%d years"), years);
	+ else
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("%d year"), years);
	+ count ++;
	+ first = i;
	+ }
	+ i ++;
	+ if ((first == -1 \|\| i - first <= 3) && months)
	+ {
	+ if (count)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _(", "));
	+
	+ if (months > 1)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("%d months"), months);
	+ else
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("%d month"), months);
	+ count ++;
	+ first = i;
	+ }
	+ i ++;
	+ if ((first == -1 \|\| i - first <= 3) && count < 2 && days)
	+ {
	+ if (count)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _(", "));
	+
	+ if (days > 1)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("%d days"), days);
	+ else
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("%d day"), days);
	+ count ++;
	+ first = i;
	+ }
	+ i ++;
	+ if ((first == -1 \|\| i - first <= 3) && count < 2 && hours)
	+ {
	+ if (count)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _(", "));
	+
	+ if (hours > 1)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("%d hours"), hours);
	+ else
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("%d hour"), hours);
	+ count ++;
	+ first = i;
	+ }
	+ i ++;
	+ if ((first == -1 \|\| i - first <= 3) && count < 2 && minutes)
	+ {
	+ if (count)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _(", "));
	+
	+ if (minutes > 1)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("%d minutes"), minutes);
	+ else
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("%d minute"), minutes);
	+ count ++;
	+ first = i;
	+ }
	+ i ++;
	+ if ((first == -1 \|\| i - first <= 3) && count < 2)
	+ {
	+ if (count)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _(", "));
	+
	+ if (seconds > 1)
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("%d seconds"), seconds);
	+ else
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("%d second"), seconds);
	+ }
	+
	+ es_fprintf (fp, _("."));
	+ }
	+
	+ es_fputc (0, fp);
	+ if (es_fclose_snatch (fp, (void **) &msg, NULL))
	+ log_fatal ("error snatching memory stream\n");
	+
	+ log_info ("%s\n", msg);
	+
	+ if (policy == TOFU_POLICY_AUTO && messages < 10)
	+ {
	+ char *set_policy_command;
	+ const char *text;
	+
	+ if (messages == 0)
	+ log_info (_("Warning: we've have yet to see a message signed by this key!\n"));
	+ else if (messages == 1)
	+ log_info (_("Warning: we've only seen a single message signed by this key!\n"));
	+
	+ set_policy_command =
	+ xasprintf ("gpg --tofu-policy bad \"%s\"", fingerprint);
	+ /* TRANSLATORS: translate the below text. We don't
	+ directly internationalize that text so that we can
	+ tweak it without breaking translations. */
	+ text = _("TOFU: few signatures %s");
	+ if (strcmp (text, "TOFU: few signatures %s") == 0)
	+ text =
	+ "Warning: if this value is unexpectedly low, this might "
	+ "indicate that this key is a forgery! Carefully examine "
	+ "the email address for small variations (e.g., additional "
	+ "white space). If the key is suspect, then use '%s' to "
	+ "mark the key as being bad.\n";
	+ log_info (text, set_policy_command);
	+ free (set_policy_command);
	+ }
	+ }
	+ }
	+
	+ out:
	+ free_strlist (strlist);
	+
	+ return;
	+}
	+
	+/* Extract the email address from a user id and normalize it. If the
	+ user id doesn't contain an email address, then we use the whole
	+ user_id and normalize that. The returned string must be freed. */
	+static char *
	+email_from_user_id (const char *user_id)
	+{
	+ char *email = mailbox_from_userid (user_id);
	+ if (! email)
	+ /* Hmm, no email address was provided. Just take the lower-case
	+ version of the whole user id. It could be a hostname, for
	+ instance. */
	+ email = ascii_strlwr (xstrdup (user_id));
	+
	+ return email;
	+}
	+
	+/* Pretty print a MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN-byte binary fingerprint into a
	+ malloc'd string. */
	+static char *
	+fingerprint_pp (const byte *fingerprint_bin)
	+{
	+ char fingerprint[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN * 2 + 1];
	+ char *fingerprint_pretty;
	+ int space = (/* The characters and the NUL. */
	+ sizeof (fingerprint)
	+ /* After every fourth character, we add a space (except
	+ the last). */
	+ + (sizeof (fingerprint) - 1) / 4 - 1
	+ /* Half way through we add a second space. */
	+ + 1);
	+ int i;
	+ int j;
	+
	+ bin2hex (fingerprint_bin, MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN, fingerprint);
	+
	+ fingerprint_pretty = xmalloc (space);
	+
	+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN * 2; i ++)
	+ {
	+ if (i && i % 4 == 0)
	+ fingerprint_pretty[j ++] = ' ';
	+ if (i == MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN * 2 / 2)
	+ fingerprint_pretty[j ++] = ' ';
	+
	+ fingerprint_pretty[j ++] = fingerprint[i];
	+ }
	+ fingerprint_pretty[j ++] = 0;
	+ assert (j == space);
	+
	+ return fingerprint_pretty;
	+}
	+
	+/* Register the signature with the binding <FINGERPRINT_BIN, USER_ID>.
	+ FINGERPRINT must be MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN bytes long.
	+
	+ SIG_DIGEST_BIN is the binary representation of the message's
	+ digest. SIG_DIGEST_BIN_LEN is its length.
	+
	+ SIG_TIME is the time that the signature was generated.
	+
	+ ORIGIN is a free-formed string describing the origin of the
	+ signature. If this was from an email and the Claws MUA was used,
	+ then this should be something like: "email:claws". If this is
	+ NULL, the default is simply "unknown".
	+
	+ If MAY_ASK is 1, then this function may interact with the user.
	+ This is necessary if there is a conflict or the binding's policy is
	+ TOFU_POLICY_ASK.
	+
	+ This function returns the binding's trust level on return. If an
	+ error occurs, this function returns TRUST_UNKNOWN. */
	+int
	+tofu_register (const byte fingerprint_bin, const char user_id,
	+ const byte *sig_digest_bin, int sig_digest_bin_len,
	+ time_t sig_time, const char *origin, int may_ask)
	+{
	+ struct db *dbs;
	+ sqlite3 *db;
	+ char *fingerprint = NULL;
	+ char *email = NULL;
	+ char *err = NULL;
	+ int rc;
	+ int trust_level = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	+ char *sig_digest;
	+ unsigned long c;
	+ int already_verified = 0;
	+
	+ dbs = opendbs ();
	+ if (! dbs)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error opening TOFU DB.\n"));
	+ goto die;
	+ }
	+
	+ fingerprint = fingerprint_pp (fingerprint_bin);
	+
	+ if (! *user_id)
	+ {
	+ log_debug ("TOFU: user id is empty. Can't continue.\n");
	+ goto die;
	+ }
	+
	+ email = email_from_user_id (user_id);
	+
	+ if (! origin)
	+ /* The default origin is simply "unknown". */
	+ origin = "unknown";
	+
	+ /* It's necessary to get the trust so that we are certain that the
	+ binding has been registered. */
	+ trust_level = get_trust (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id, may_ask);
	+ if (trust_level == GET_TRUST_ERROR)
	+ /* An error. */
	+ {
	+ trust_level = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	+ goto die;
	+ }
	+
	+ /* Save the observed signature in the DB. */
	+ sig_digest = make_radix64_string (sig_digest_bin, sig_digest_bin_len);
	+
	+ db = getdb (dbs, email, DB_EMAIL);
	+ if (! db)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error opening TOFU DB.\n"));
	+ goto die;
	+ }
	+
	+ /* We do a query and then an insert. Make sure they are atomic
	+ by wrapping them in a transaction. */
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec (db, "begin transaction;", NULL, NULL, &err);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error beginning transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ goto die;
	+ }
	+
	+ /* If we've already seen this signature before, then don't add
	+ it again. */
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec_printf
	+ (db, get_single_unsigned_long_cb, &c, &err,
	+ "select count (*)\n"
	+ " from signatures left join bindings\n"
	+ " on signatures.binding = bindings.oid\n"
	+ " where fingerprint = %Q and email = %Q and sig_time = 0x%lx\n"
	+ " and sig_digest = %Q",
	+ fingerprint, email, (unsigned long) sig_time, sig_digest);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error reading from signatures database"
	+ " (checking existence): %s\n"),
	+ err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ }
	+ else if (c > 1)
	+ /* Duplicates! This should not happen. In particular,
	+ because <fingerprint, email, sig_time, sig_digest> is the
	+ primary key! */
	+ log_debug ("SIGNATURES DB contains duplicate records"
	+ " <key: %s, %s, time: 0x%lx, sig: %s, %s>."
	+ " Please report.\n",
	+ fingerprint, email, (unsigned long) sig_time,
	+ sig_digest, origin);
	+ else if (c == 1)
	+ {
	+ already_verified = 1;
	+ if (DBG_TRUST)
	+ log_debug ("Already observed the signature"
	+ " <key: %s, %s, time: 0x%lx, sig: %s, %s>\n",
	+ fingerprint, email, (unsigned long) sig_time,
	+ sig_digest, origin);
	+ }
	+ else
	+ /* This is the first time that we've seen this signature.
	+ Record it. */
	+ {
	+ if (DBG_TRUST)
	+ log_debug ("TOFU: Saving signature <%s, %s, %s>\n",
	+ fingerprint, email, sig_digest);
	+
	+ assert (c == 0);
	+
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec_printf
	+ (db, NULL, NULL, &err,
	+ "insert into signatures\n"
	+ " (binding, sig_digest, origin, sig_time, time)\n"
	+ " values\n"
	+ " ((select oid from bindings\n"
	+ " where fingerprint = %Q and email = %Q),\n"
	+ " %Q, %Q, 0x%lx, strftime('%%s', 'now'));",
	+ fingerprint, email, sig_digest, origin, (unsigned long) sig_time);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error updating TOFU DB"
	+ " (inserting into signatures table): %s\n"),
	+ err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ }
	+ }
	+
	+ /* It only matters whether we abort or commit the transaction
	+ (so long as we do something) if we execute the insert. */
	+ if (rc)
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec (db, "rollback;", NULL, NULL, &err);
	+ else
	+ rc = sqlite3_exec (db, "commit transaction;", NULL, NULL, &err);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error ending transaction on TOFU database: %s\n"), err);
	+ sqlite3_free (err);
	+ goto die;
	+ }
	+
	+ die:
	+ if (may_ask)
	+ /* It's only appropriate to show the statistics in an interactive
	+ context. */
	+ show_statistics (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id,
	+ already_verified ? NULL : sig_digest);
	+
	+ xfree (email);
	+ xfree (fingerprint);
	+ if (dbs)
	+ closedbs (dbs);
	+
	+ return trust_level;
	+}
	+
	+/* Combine a trust level returned from the TOFU trust model with a
	+ trust level returned by the PGP trust model. This is primarily of
	+ interest when the trust model is tofu+pgp (TM_TOFU_PGP).
	+
	+ This function ors together the upper bits (the values not covered
	+ by TRUST_MASK, i.e., TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED, etc.). */
	+int
	+tofu_wot_trust_combine (int tofu_base, int wot_base)
	+{
	+ int tofu = tofu_base & TRUST_MASK;
	+ int wot = wot_base & TRUST_MASK;
	+ int upper = (tofu_base & ~TRUST_MASK) \| (wot_base & ~TRUST_MASK);
	+
	+ assert (tofu == TRUST_UNKNOWN
	+ \|\| tofu == TRUST_EXPIRED
	+ \|\| tofu == TRUST_UNDEFINED
	+ \|\| tofu == TRUST_NEVER
	+ \|\| tofu == TRUST_MARGINAL
	+ \|\| tofu == TRUST_FULLY
	+ \|\| tofu == TRUST_ULTIMATE);
	+ assert (wot == TRUST_UNKNOWN
	+ \|\| wot == TRUST_EXPIRED
	+ \|\| wot == TRUST_UNDEFINED
	+ \|\| wot == TRUST_NEVER
	+ \|\| wot == TRUST_MARGINAL
	+ \|\| wot == TRUST_FULLY
	+ \|\| wot == TRUST_ULTIMATE);
	+
	+ /* We first consider negative trust policys. These trump positive
	+ trust policies. */
	+ if (tofu == TRUST_NEVER \|\| wot == TRUST_NEVER)
	+ /* TRUST_NEVER trumps everything else. */
	+ return upper \| TRUST_NEVER;
	+ if (tofu == TRUST_EXPIRED \|\| wot == TRUST_EXPIRED)
	+ /* TRUST_EXPIRED trumps everything but TRUST_NEVER. */
	+ return upper \| TRUST_EXPIRED;
	+
	+ /* Now we only have positive or neutral trust policies. We take
	+ the max. */
	+ if (tofu == TRUST_ULTIMATE \|\| wot == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
	+ return upper \| TRUST_ULTIMATE;
	+ if (tofu == TRUST_FULLY \|\| wot == TRUST_FULLY)
	+ return upper \| TRUST_FULLY;
	+ if (tofu == TRUST_MARGINAL \|\| wot == TRUST_MARGINAL)
	+ return upper \| TRUST_MARGINAL;
	+ if (tofu == TRUST_UNDEFINED \|\| wot == TRUST_UNDEFINED)
	+ return upper \| TRUST_UNDEFINED;
	+ return upper \| TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	+}
	+
	+/* Return the validity (TRUST_NEVER, etc.) of the binding
	+ <FINGERPRINT, USER_ID>.
	+
	+ FINGERPRINT must be a MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN-byte fingerprint.
	+
	+ If MAY_ASK is 1 and the policy is TOFU_POLICY_ASK, then the user
	+ will be prompted to choose a different policy. If MAY_ASK is 0 and
	+ the policy is TOFU_POLICY_ASK, then TRUST_UNKNOWN is returned.
	+
	+ Returns TRUST_UNDEFINED if an error occurs. */
	+int
	+tofu_get_validity (const byte fingerprint_bin, const char user_id,
	+ int may_ask)
	+{
	+ struct db *dbs;
	+ char *fingerprint = NULL;
	+ char *email = NULL;
	+ int trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
	+
	+ dbs = opendbs ();
	+ if (! dbs)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error opening TOFU DB.\n"));
	+ goto die;
	+ }
	+
	+ fingerprint = fingerprint_pp (fingerprint_bin);
	+
	+ if (! *user_id)
	+ {
	+ log_debug ("user id is empty. Can't get TOFU validity for this binding.\n");
	+ goto die;
	+ }
	+
	+ email = email_from_user_id (user_id);
	+
	+ trust_level = get_trust (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id, may_ask);
	+ if (trust_level == GET_TRUST_ERROR)
	+ /* An error. */
	+ trust_level = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
	+
	+ if (may_ask)
	+ show_statistics (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id, NULL);
	+
	+ die:
	+ xfree (email);
	+ xfree (fingerprint);
	+ if (dbs)
	+ closedbs (dbs);
	+
	+ return trust_level;
	+}
	+
	+/* Set the policy for all non-revoked user ids in the keyblock KB to
	+ POLICY.
	+
	+ If no key is available with the specified key id, then this
	+ function returns GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY.
	+
	+ Returns 0 on success and an error code otherwise. */
	+gpg_error_t
	+tofu_set_policy (kbnode_t kb, enum tofu_policy policy)
	+{
	+ struct db *dbs;
	+ PKT_public_key *pk;
	+ char fingerprint_bin[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	+ size_t fingerprint_bin_len = sizeof (fingerprint_bin);
	+ char *fingerprint = NULL;
	+
	+ assert (kb->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	+ pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	+
	+ dbs = opendbs ();
	+ if (! dbs)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error opening TOFU DB.\n"));
	+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	+ }
	+
	+ if (DBG_TRUST)
	+ log_debug ("Setting TOFU policy for %s to %s\n",
	+ keystr (pk->keyid), tofu_policy_str (policy));
	+ if (! (pk->main_keyid[0] == pk->keyid[0]
	+ && pk->main_keyid[1] == pk->keyid[1]))
	+ log_bug ("%s: Passed a subkey, but expecting a primary key.\n", __func__);
	+
	+ fingerprint_from_pk (pk, fingerprint_bin, &fingerprint_bin_len);
	+ assert (fingerprint_bin_len == sizeof (fingerprint_bin));
	+
	+ fingerprint = fingerprint_pp (fingerprint_bin);
	+
	+ for (; kb; kb = kb->next)
	+ {
	+ PKT_user_id *user_id;
	+ char *email;
	+
	+ if (kb->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
	+ continue;
	+
	+ user_id = kb->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	+ if (user_id->is_revoked)
	+ /* Skip revoked user ids. (Don't skip expired user ids, the
	+ expiry can be changed.) */
	+ continue;
	+
	+ email = email_from_user_id (user_id->name);
	+
	+ record_binding (dbs, fingerprint, email, user_id->name, policy, 1);
	+
	+ xfree (email);
	+ }
	+
	+ xfree (fingerprint);
	+ closedbs (dbs);
	+
	+ return 0;
	+}
	+
	+/* Set the TOFU policy for all non-revoked user ids in the KEY with
	+ the key id KEYID to POLICY.
	+
	+ If no key is available with the specified key id, then this
	+ function returns GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY.
	+
	+ Returns 0 on success and an error code otherwise. */
	+gpg_error_t
	+tofu_set_policy_by_keyid (u32 *keyid, enum tofu_policy policy)
	+{
	+ kbnode_t keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (keyid);
	+ if (! keyblock)
	+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
	+
	+ return tofu_set_policy (keyblock, policy);
	+}
	+
	+/* Return the TOFU policy for the specified binding in *POLICY. If no
	+ policy has been set for the binding, sets *POLICY to
	+ TOFU_POLICY_NONE.
	+
	+ PK is a primary public key and USER_ID is a user id.
	+
	+ Returns 0 on success and an error code otherwise. */
	+gpg_error_t
	+tofu_get_policy (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id user_id,
	+ enum tofu_policy *policy)
	+{
	+ struct db *dbs;
	+ char fingerprint_bin[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	+ size_t fingerprint_bin_len = sizeof (fingerprint_bin);
	+ char *fingerprint;
	+ char *email;
	+
	+ /* Make sure PK is a primary key. */
	+ assert (pk->main_keyid[0] == pk->keyid[0]
	+ && pk->main_keyid[1] == pk->keyid[1]);
	+
	+ dbs = opendbs ();
	+ if (! dbs)
	+ {
	+ log_error (_("error opening TOFU DB.\n"));
	+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	+ }
	+
	+ fingerprint_from_pk (pk, fingerprint_bin, &fingerprint_bin_len);
	+ assert (fingerprint_bin_len == sizeof (fingerprint_bin));
	+
	+ fingerprint = fingerprint_pp (fingerprint_bin);
	+
	+ email = email_from_user_id (user_id->name);
	+
	+ *policy = get_policy (dbs, fingerprint, email, NULL);
	+
	+ xfree (email);
	+ xfree (fingerprint);
	+ closedbs (dbs);
	+
	+ if (*policy == GET_POLICY_ERROR)
	+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	+ return 0;
	+}
	diff --git a/g10/tofu.h b/g10/tofu.h
	new file mode 100644
	index 000000000..75166849e
	--- /dev/null
	+++ b/g10/tofu.h
	@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
	+/* tofu.h - TOFU trust model.
	+ * Copyright (C) 2015 g10 Code GmbH
	+ *
	+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
	+ *
	+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	+ * (at your option) any later version.
	+ *
	+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
	+ *
	+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	+ * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	+ */
	+
	+#ifndef G10_TOFU_H
	+#define G10_TOFU_H
	+
	+#include <config.h>
	+
	+/* For each binding, we have a trust policy. */
	+enum tofu_policy
	+ {
	+ /* This value can be returned by tofu_get_policy to indicate that
	+ there is no policy set for the specified binding. */
	+ TOFU_POLICY_NONE = 0,
	+
	+ /* We made a default policy decision. This is only done if there
	+ is no conflict with another binding (that is, the email address
	+ is not part of another known key). The default policy is
	+ configurable (and specified using: --tofu-default-policy).
	+
	+ Note: when using the default policy, we save TOFU_POLICY_AUTO
	+ with the binding, not the policy that was in effect. This way,
	+ if the user invokes gpg again, but with a different value for
	+ --tofu-default-policy, a different decision is made. */
	+ TOFU_POLICY_AUTO = 1,
	+
	+ /* The user explicitly marked the binding as good. In this case,
	+ we return TRUST_FULLY. */
	+ TOFU_POLICY_GOOD = 2,
	+
	+ /* The user explicitly marked the binding as unknown. In this
	+ case, we return TRUST_UNKNOWN. */
	+ TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN = 3,
	+
	+ /* The user explicitly marked the binding as bad. In this case,
	+ we always return TRUST_NEVER. */
	+ TOFU_POLICY_BAD = 4,
	+
	+ /* The user deferred a definitive policy decision about the
	+ binding (by selecting accept once or reject once). The next
	+ time we see this binding, we should ask the user what to
	+ do. */
	+ TOFU_POLICY_ASK = 5
	+ };
	+
	+/* Return a string representation of a trust policy. Returns "???" if
	+ POLICY is not valid. */
	+const char *tofu_policy_str (enum tofu_policy policy);
	+
	+/* Convert a binding policy (e.g., TOFU_POLICY_BAD) to a trust level
	+ (e.g., TRUST_BAD) in light of the current configuration. */
	+int tofu_policy_to_trust_level (enum tofu_policy policy);
	+
	+/* Register the binding <FINGERPRINT, USER_ID> and the signature
	+ described by SIGS_DIGEST and SIG_TIME, which it generated. Origin
	+ describes where the signed data came from, e.g., "email:claws"
	+ (default: "unknown"). If MAY_ASK is 1, then this function may
	+ interact with the user in the case of a conflict or if the
	+ binding's policy is ask. This function returns the binding's trust
	+ level. If an error occurs, it returns TRUST_UNKNOWN. */
	+int tofu_register (const byte fingerprint, const char user_id,
	+ const byte *sigs_digest, int sigs_digest_len,
	+ time_t sig_time, const char *origin, int may_ask);
	+
	+/* Combine a trust level returned from the TOFU trust model with a
	+ trust level returned by the PGP trust model. This is primarily of
	+ interest when the trust model is tofu+pgp (TM_TOFU_PGP). */
	+int tofu_wot_trust_combine (int tofu, int wot);
	+
	+/* Determine the validity (TRUST_NEVER, etc.) of the binding
	+ <FINGERPRINT, USER_ID>. If MAY_ASK is 1, then this function may
	+ interact with the user. If not, TRUST_UNKNOWN is returned. If an
	+ error occurs, TRUST_UNDEFINED is returned. */
	+int tofu_get_validity (const byte fingerprint, const char user_id,
	+ int may_ask);
	+
	+/* Set the policy for all non-revoked user ids in the keyblock KB to
	+ POLICY. */
	+gpg_error_t tofu_set_policy (kbnode_t kb, enum tofu_policy policy);
	+
	+/* Set the TOFU policy for all non-revoked users in the key with the
	+ key id KEYID to POLICY. */
	+gpg_error_t tofu_set_policy_by_keyid (u32 *keyid, enum tofu_policy policy);
	+
	+/* Return the TOFU policy for the specified binding in POLICY. /
	+gpg_error_t tofu_get_policy (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id user_id,
	+ enum tofu_policy *policy);
	+
	+#endif
	diff --git a/g10/trust.c b/g10/trust.c
	index 316fe2fe1..38d957e41 100644
	--- a/g10/trust.c
	+++ b/g10/trust.c
	@@ -1,741 +1,742 @@
	/* trust.c - High level trust functions
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
	* 2008, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 2014 Werner Koch
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <assert.h>

	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "util.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "i18n.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "host2net.h"


	/* Return true if key is disabled. Note that this is usually used via
	the pk_is_disabled macro. */
	int
	cache_disabled_value (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	#ifdef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	(void)pk;
	return 0;
	#else
	return tdb_cache_disabled_value (pk);
	#endif
	}


	void
	register_trusted_keyid (u32 *keyid)
	{
	#ifdef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	(void)keyid;
	#else
	tdb_register_trusted_keyid (keyid);
	#endif
	}


	void
	register_trusted_key (const char *string)
	{
	#ifdef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	(void)string;
	#else
	tdb_register_trusted_key (string);
	#endif
	}



	/*
	* This function returns a letter for a trust value. Trust flags
	* are ignored.
	*/
	static int
	trust_letter (unsigned int value)
	{
	switch( (value & TRUST_MASK) )
	{
	case TRUST_UNKNOWN: return '-';
	case TRUST_EXPIRED: return 'e';
	case TRUST_UNDEFINED: return 'q';
	case TRUST_NEVER: return 'n';
	case TRUST_MARGINAL: return 'm';
	case TRUST_FULLY: return 'f';
	case TRUST_ULTIMATE: return 'u';
	default: return '?';
	}
	}


	/* The strings here are similar to those in
	pkclist.c:do_edit_ownertrust() */
	const char *
	trust_value_to_string (unsigned int value)
	{
	switch ((value & TRUST_MASK))
	{
	case TRUST_UNKNOWN: return _("unknown");
	case TRUST_EXPIRED: return _("expired");
	case TRUST_UNDEFINED: return _("undefined");
	case TRUST_NEVER: return _("never");
	case TRUST_MARGINAL: return _("marginal");
	case TRUST_FULLY: return _("full");
	case TRUST_ULTIMATE: return _("ultimate");
	default: return "err";
	}
	}


	int
	string_to_trust_value (const char *str)
	{
	if (!ascii_strcasecmp (str, "undefined"))
	return TRUST_UNDEFINED;
	else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (str, "never"))
	return TRUST_NEVER;
	else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (str, "marginal"))
	return TRUST_MARGINAL;
	else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (str, "full"))
	return TRUST_FULLY;
	else if (!ascii_strcasecmp(str, "ultimate"))
	return TRUST_ULTIMATE;
	else
	return -1;
	}


	const char *
	uid_trust_string_fixed (PKT_public_key key, PKT_user_id uid)
	{
	if (!key && !uid)
	{
	/* TRANSLATORS: these strings are similar to those in
	trust_value_to_string(), but are a fixed length. This is needed to
	make attractive information listings where columns line up
	properly. The value "10" should be the length of the strings you
	choose to translate to. This is the length in printable columns.
	It gets passed to atoi() so everything after the number is
	essentially a comment and need not be translated. Either key and
	uid are both NULL, or neither are NULL. */
	return _("10 translator see trust.c:uid_trust_string_fixed");
	}
	else if(uid->is_revoked \|\| (key && key->flags.revoked))
	return _("[ revoked]");
	else if(uid->is_expired)
	return _("[ expired]");
	else if(key)
	{
	- switch (get_validity(key,uid)&TRUST_MASK)
	+ switch (get_validity (key, uid, NULL, 0) & TRUST_MASK)
	{
	case TRUST_UNKNOWN: return _("[ unknown]");
	case TRUST_EXPIRED: return _("[ expired]");
	case TRUST_UNDEFINED: return _("[ undef ]");
	case TRUST_MARGINAL: return _("[marginal]");
	case TRUST_FULLY: return _("[ full ]");
	case TRUST_ULTIMATE: return _("[ultimate]");
	}
	}

	return "err";
	}



	/*
	* Return the assigned ownertrust value for the given public key.
	* The key should be the primary key.
	*/
	unsigned int
	get_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	#ifdef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	(void)pk;
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	#else
	return tdb_get_ownertrust (pk);
	#endif
	}


	/*
	* Same as get_ownertrust but this takes the minimum ownertrust value
	* into into account, and will bump up the value as needed.
	*/
	static int
	get_ownertrust_with_min (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	#ifdef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	(void)pk;
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	#else
	unsigned int otrust, otrust_min;

	otrust = (tdb_get_ownertrust (pk) & TRUST_MASK);
	otrust_min = tdb_get_min_ownertrust (pk);
	if (otrust < otrust_min)
	{
	/* If the trust that the user has set is less than the trust
	that was calculated from a trust signature chain, use the
	higher of the two. We do this here and not in
	get_ownertrust since the underlying ownertrust should not
	really be set - just the appearance of the ownertrust. */

	otrust = otrust_min;
	}

	return otrust;
	#endif
	}


	/*
	* Same as get_ownertrust but return a trust letter instead of an
	* value. This takes the minimum ownertrust value into account.
	*/
	int
	get_ownertrust_info (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	return trust_letter (get_ownertrust_with_min (pk));
	}


	/*
	* Same as get_ownertrust but return a trust string instead of an
	* value. This takes the minimum ownertrust value into account.
	*/
	const char *
	get_ownertrust_string (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	return trust_value_to_string (get_ownertrust_with_min (pk));
	}


	/*
	* Set the trust value of the given public key to the new value.
	* The key should be a primary one.
	*/
	void
	update_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int new_trust)
	{
	#ifdef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	(void)pk;
	(void)new_trust;
	#else
	tdb_update_ownertrust (pk, new_trust);
	#endif
	}


	int
	clear_ownertrusts (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	#ifdef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	(void)pk;
	return 0;
	#else
	return tdb_clear_ownertrusts (pk);
	#endif
	}


	void
	revalidation_mark (void)
	{
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	tdb_revalidation_mark ();
	#endif
	}


	void
	check_trustdb_stale (void)
	{
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	tdb_check_trustdb_stale ();
	#endif
	}


	void
	check_or_update_trustdb (void)
	{
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	tdb_check_or_update ();
	#endif
	}


	/*
	* Return the validity information for PK. If the namehash is not
	* NULL, the validity of the corresponsing user ID is returned,
	* otherwise, a reasonable value for the entire key is returned.
	*/
	unsigned int
	-get_validity (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid)
	+get_validity (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid, PKT_signature *sig,
	+ int may_ask)
	{
	int rc;
	unsigned int validity;
	u32 kid[2];
	PKT_public_key *main_pk;

	if (uid)
	namehash_from_uid (uid);

	keyid_from_pk (pk, kid);
	if (pk->main_keyid[0] != kid[0] \|\| pk->main_keyid[1] != kid[1])
	{
	/* This is a subkey - get the mainkey. */
	main_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *main_pk);
	rc = get_pubkey (main_pk, pk->main_keyid);
	if (rc)
	{
	char *tempkeystr = xstrdup (keystr (pk->main_keyid));
	log_error ("error getting main key %s of subkey %s: %s\n",
	tempkeystr, keystr (kid), gpg_strerror (rc));
	xfree (tempkeystr);
	validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	goto leave;
	}
	}
	else
	main_pk = pk;

	#ifdef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	#else
	- validity = tdb_get_validity_core (pk, uid, main_pk);
	+ validity = tdb_get_validity_core (pk, uid, main_pk, sig, may_ask);
	#endif

	leave:
	/* Set some flags direct from the key */
	if (main_pk->flags.revoked)
	validity \|= TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED;
	if (main_pk != pk && pk->flags.revoked)
	validity \|= TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED;
	/* Note: expiration is a trust value and not a flag - don't know why
	* I initially designed it that way. */
	if (main_pk->has_expired \|\| pk->has_expired)
	validity = ((validity & (~TRUST_MASK \| TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK))
	\| TRUST_EXPIRED);

	if (main_pk != pk)
	free_public_key (main_pk);
	return validity;
	}


	int
	get_validity_info (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid)
	{
	int trustlevel;

	if (!pk)
	return '?'; /* Just in case a NULL PK is passed. */

	- trustlevel = get_validity (pk, uid);
	+ trustlevel = get_validity (pk, uid, NULL, 0);
	if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED))
	return 'r';
	return trust_letter (trustlevel);
	}


	const char *
	get_validity_string (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid)
	{
	int trustlevel;

	if (!pk)
	return "err"; /* Just in case a NULL PK is passed. */

	- trustlevel = get_validity (pk, uid);
	+ trustlevel = get_validity (pk, uid, NULL, 0);
	if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED))
	return _("revoked");
	return trust_value_to_string (trustlevel);
	}



	/*
	* Mark the signature of the given UID which are used to certify it.
	* To do this, we first revmove all signatures which are not valid and
	* from the remain ones we look for the latest one. If this is not a
	* certification revocation signature we mark the signature by setting
	* node flag bit 8. Revocations are marked with flag 11, and sigs
	* from unavailable keys are marked with flag 12. Note that flag bits
	* 9 and 10 are used for internal purposes.
	*/
	void
	mark_usable_uid_certs (kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
	u32 main_kid, struct key_item klist,
	u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
	{
	kbnode_t node;
	PKT_signature *sig;

	/* First check all signatures. */
	for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next)
	{
	int rc;

	node->flag &= ~(1<<8 \| 1<<9 \| 1<<10 \| 1<<11 \| 1<<12);
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	break; /* ready */
	if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
	continue;
	sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (main_kid
	&& sig->keyid[0] == main_kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == main_kid[1])
	continue; /* ignore self-signatures if we pass in a main_kid */
	if (!IS_UID_SIG(sig) && !IS_UID_REV(sig))
	continue; /* we only look at these signature classes */
	if(sig->sig_class>=0x11 && sig->sig_class<=0x13 &&
	sig->sig_class-0x10<opt.min_cert_level)
	continue; /* treat anything under our min_cert_level as an
	invalid signature */
	if (klist && !is_in_klist (klist, sig))
	continue; /* no need to check it then */
	if ((rc=check_key_signature (keyblock, node, NULL)))
	{
	/* we ignore anything that won't verify, but tag the
	no_pubkey case */
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
	node->flag \|= 1<<12;
	continue;
	}
	node->flag \|= 1<<9;
	}
	/* Reset the remaining flags. */
	for (; node; node = node->next)
	node->flag &= ~(1<<8 \| 1<<9 \| 1<<10 \| 1<<11 \| 1<<12);

	/* kbnode flag usage: bit 9 is here set for signatures to consider,
	* bit 10 will be set by the loop to keep track of keyIDs already
	* processed, bit 8 will be set for the usable signatures, and bit
	* 11 will be set for usable revocations. */

	/* For each cert figure out the latest valid one. */
	for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next)
	{
	KBNODE n, signode;
	u32 kid[2];
	u32 sigdate;

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	break;
	if ( !(node->flag & (1<<9)) )
	continue; /* not a node to look at */
	if ( (node->flag & (1<<10)) )
	continue; /* signature with a keyID already processed */
	node->flag \|= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */
	sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	signode = node;
	sigdate = sig->timestamp;
	kid[0] = sig->keyid[0]; kid[1] = sig->keyid[1];

	/* Now find the latest and greatest signature */
	for (n=uidnode->next; n; n = n->next)
	{
	if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	break;
	if ( !(n->flag & (1<<9)) )
	continue;
	if ( (n->flag & (1<<10)) )
	continue; /* shortcut already processed signatures */
	sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (kid[0] != sig->keyid[0] \|\| kid[1] != sig->keyid[1])
	continue;
	n->flag \|= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */

	/* If signode is nonrevocable and unexpired and n isn't,
	then take signode (skip). It doesn't matter which is
	older: if signode was older then we don't want to take n
	as signode is nonrevocable. If n was older then we're
	automatically fine. */

	if(((IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
	!signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
	(signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 \|\|
	signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
	(!(IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
	!n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
	(n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 \|\|
	n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
	continue;

	/* If n is nonrevocable and unexpired and signode isn't,
	then take n. Again, it doesn't matter which is older: if
	n was older then we don't want to take signode as n is
	nonrevocable. If signode was older then we're
	automatically fine. */

	if((!(IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
	!signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
	(signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 \|\|
	signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
	((IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
	!n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
	(n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 \|\|
	n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
	{
	signode = n;
	sigdate = sig->timestamp;
	continue;
	}

	/* At this point, if it's newer, it goes in as the only
	remaining possibilities are signode and n are both either
	revocable or expired or both nonrevocable and unexpired.
	If the timestamps are equal take the later ordered
	packet, presuming that the key packets are hopefully in
	their original order. */

	if (sig->timestamp >= sigdate)
	{
	signode = n;
	sigdate = sig->timestamp;
	}
	}

	sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (IS_UID_SIG (sig))
	{ /* this seems to be a usable one which is not revoked.
	* Just need to check whether there is an expiration time,
	* We do the expired certification after finding a suitable
	* certification, the assumption is that a signator does not
	* want that after the expiration of his certificate the
	* system falls back to an older certification which has a
	* different expiration time */
	const byte *p;
	u32 expire;

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE, NULL );
	expire = p? sig->timestamp + buf32_to_u32(p) : 0;

	if (expire==0 \|\| expire > curtime )
	{
	signode->flag \|= (1<<8); /* yeah, found a good cert */
	if (next_expire && expire && expire < *next_expire)
	*next_expire = expire;
	}
	}
	else
	signode->flag \|= (1<<11);
	}
	}


	static int
	clean_sigs_from_uid (kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
	int noisy, int self_only)
	{
	int deleted = 0;
	kbnode_t node;
	u32 keyid[2];

	assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);

	keyid_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);

	/* Passing in a 0 for current time here means that we'll never weed
	out an expired sig. This is correct behavior since we want to
	keep the most recent expired sig in a series. */
	mark_usable_uid_certs (keyblock, uidnode, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);

	/* What we want to do here is remove signatures that are not
	considered as part of the trust calculations. Thus, all invalid
	signatures are out, as are any signatures that aren't the last of
	a series of uid sigs or revocations It breaks down like this:
	coming out of mark_usable_uid_certs, if a sig is unflagged, it is
	not even a candidate. If a sig has flag 9 or 10, that means it
	was selected as a candidate and vetted. If a sig has flag 8 it
	is a usable signature. If a sig has flag 11 it is a usable
	revocation. If a sig has flag 12 it was issued by an unavailable
	key. "Usable" here means the most recent valid
	signature/revocation in a series from a particular signer.

	Delete everything that isn't a usable uid sig (which might be
	expired), a usable revocation, or a sig from an unavailable
	key. */

	for (node=uidnode->next;
	node && node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE;
	node=node->next)
	{
	int keep;

	keep = self_only? (node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0] == keyid[0]
	&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] == keyid[1]) : 1;

	/* Keep usable uid sigs ... */
	if ((node->flag & (1<<8)) && keep)
	continue;

	/* ... and usable revocations... */
	if ((node->flag & (1<<11)) && keep)
	continue;

	/* ... and sigs from unavailable keys. */
	/* disabled for now since more people seem to want sigs from
	unavailable keys removed altogether. */
	/*
	if(node->flag & (1<<12))
	continue;
	*/

	/* Everything else we delete */

	/* At this point, if 12 is set, the signing key was unavailable.
	If 9 or 10 is set, it's superseded. Otherwise, it's
	invalid. */

	if (noisy)
	log_info ("removing signature from key %s on user ID \"%s\": %s\n",
	keystr (node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid),
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	node->flag&(1<<12)? "key unavailable":
	node->flag&(1<<9)? "signature superseded"
	/* */ :"invalid signature" );

	delete_kbnode (node);
	deleted++;
	}

	return deleted;
	}


	/* This is substantially easier than clean_sigs_from_uid since we just
	have to establish if the uid has a valid self-sig, is not revoked,
	and is not expired. Note that this does not take into account
	whether the uid has a trust path to it - just whether the keyholder
	themselves has certified the uid. Returns true if the uid was
	compacted. To "compact" a user ID, we simply remove ALL signatures
	except the self-sig that caused the user ID to be remove-worthy.
	We don't actually remove the user ID packet itself since it might
	be ressurected in a later merge. Note that this function requires
	that the caller has already done a merge_keys_and_selfsig().

	TODO: change the import code to allow importing a uid with only a
	revocation if the uid already exists on the keyring. */

	static int
	clean_uid_from_key (kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode, int noisy)
	{
	kbnode_t node;
	PKT_user_id *uid = uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	int deleted = 0;

	assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	assert (uidnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID);

	/* Skip valid user IDs, compacted user IDs, and non-self-signed user
	IDs if --allow-non-selfsigned-uid is set. */
	if (uid->created
	\|\| uid->flags.compacted
	\|\| (!uid->is_expired && !uid->is_revoked && opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid))
	return 0;

	for (node=uidnode->next;
	node && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE;
	node=node->next)
	{
	if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig)
	{
	delete_kbnode (node);
	deleted = 1;
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.compacted = 1;
	}
	}

	if (noisy)
	{
	const char *reason;
	char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, uid->len, 0);

	if (uid->is_revoked)
	reason = _("revoked");
	else if (uid->is_expired)
	reason = _("expired");
	else
	reason = _("invalid");

	log_info ("compacting user ID \"%s\" on key %s: %s\n",
	user, keystr_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key),
	reason);

	xfree (user);
	}

	return deleted;
	}


	/* Needs to be called after a merge_keys_and_selfsig() */
	void
	clean_one_uid (kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode, int noisy, int self_only,
	int uids_cleaned, int sigs_cleaned)
	{
	int dummy;

	assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
	assert (uidnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID);

	if (!uids_cleaned)
	uids_cleaned = &dummy;

	if (!sigs_cleaned)
	sigs_cleaned = &dummy;

	/* Do clean_uid_from_key first since if it fires off, we don't have
	to bother with the other. */
	*uids_cleaned += clean_uid_from_key (keyblock, uidnode, noisy);
	if (!uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.compacted)
	*sigs_cleaned += clean_sigs_from_uid (keyblock, uidnode, noisy, self_only);
	}


	void
	clean_key (kbnode_t keyblock, int noisy, int self_only,
	int uids_cleaned, int sigs_cleaned)
	{
	kbnode_t uidnode;

	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);

	for (uidnode = keyblock->next;
	uidnode && uidnode->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
	uidnode = uidnode->next)
	{
	if (uidnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	clean_one_uid (keyblock, uidnode,noisy, self_only,
	uids_cleaned, sigs_cleaned);
	}
	}
	diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c
	index b16682da1..170c04122 100644
	--- a/g10/trustdb.c
	+++ b/g10/trustdb.c
	@@ -1,2000 +1,2094 @@
	/* trustdb.c
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
	* 2008, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <assert.h>

	#ifndef DISABLE_REGEX
	#include <sys/types.h>
	#include <regex.h>
	#endif /* !DISABLE_REGEX */

	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "status.h"
	#include "iobuf.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "util.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "i18n.h"
	#include "tdbio.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	+#include "tofu.h"


	typedef struct key_item *KeyHashTable; / see new_key_hash_table() */

	/*
	* Structure to keep track of keys, this is used as an array wherre
	* the item right after the last one has a keyblock set to NULL.
	* Maybe we can drop this thing and replace it by key_item
	*/
	struct key_array
	{
	KBNODE keyblock;
	};


	/* Control information for the trust DB. */
	static struct
	{
	int init;
	int level;
	char *dbname;
	int no_trustdb;
	} trustdb_args;

	/* Some globals. */
	static struct key_item user_utk_list; / temp. used to store --trusted-keys */
	static struct key_item utk_list; / all ultimately trusted keys */

	static int pending_check_trustdb;

	static int validate_keys (int interactive);


	/**********************************************
	*********** some helpers *****************
	**********************************************/

	static struct key_item *
	new_key_item (void)
	{
	struct key_item *k;

	k = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *k);
	return k;
	}

	static void
	release_key_items (struct key_item *k)
	{
	struct key_item *k2;

	for (; k; k = k2)
	{
	k2 = k->next;
	xfree (k->trust_regexp);
	xfree (k);
	}
	}

	#define KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE 1024

	/*
	* For fast keylook up we need a hash table. Each byte of a KeyID
	* should be distributed equally over the 256 possible values (except
	* for v3 keyIDs but we consider them as not important here). So we
	* can just use 10 bits to index a table of KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE key items.
	* Possible optimization: Do not use key_items but other hash_table when the
	* duplicates lists get too large.
	*/
	static KeyHashTable
	new_key_hash_table (void)
	{
	struct key_item **tbl;

	tbl = xmalloc_clear (KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE * sizeof *tbl);
	return tbl;
	}

	static void
	release_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl)
	{
	int i;

	if (!tbl)
	return;
	for (i=0; i < KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
	release_key_items (tbl[i]);
	xfree (tbl);
	}

	/*
	* Returns: True if the keyID is in the given hash table
	*/
	static int
	test_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
	{
	struct key_item *k;

	for (k = tbl[(kid[1] % KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE)]; k; k = k->next)
	if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
	return 1;
	return 0;
	}

	/*
	* Add a new key to the hash table. The key is identified by its key ID.
	*/
	static void
	add_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
	{
	int i = kid[1] % KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE;
	struct key_item k, kk;

	for (k = tbl[i]; k; k = k->next)
	if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
	return; /* already in table */

	kk = new_key_item ();
	kk->kid[0] = kid[0];
	kk->kid[1] = kid[1];
	kk->next = tbl[i];
	tbl[i] = kk;
	}

	/*
	* Release a key_array
	*/
	static void
	release_key_array ( struct key_array *keys )
	{
	struct key_array *k;

	if (keys) {
	for (k=keys; k->keyblock; k++)
	release_kbnode (k->keyblock);
	xfree (keys);
	}
	}


	/*********************************************
	******** Initialization ***************
	*********************************************/



	/*
	* Used to register extra ultimately trusted keys - this has to be done
	* before initializing the validation module.
	* FIXME: Should be replaced by a function to add those keys to the trustdb.
	*/
	void
	tdb_register_trusted_keyid (u32 *keyid)
	{
	struct key_item *k;

	k = new_key_item ();
	k->kid[0] = keyid[0];
	k->kid[1] = keyid[1];
	k->next = user_utk_list;
	user_utk_list = k;
	}

	void
	tdb_register_trusted_key( const char *string )
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;

	err = classify_user_id (string, &desc, 1);
	if (err \|\| desc.mode != KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID )
	{
	log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid long keyID\n"), string );
	return;
	}

	register_trusted_keyid(desc.u.kid);
	}

	/*
	* Helper to add a key to the global list of ultimately trusted keys.
	* Retruns: true = inserted, false = already in in list.
	*/
	static int
	add_utk (u32 *kid)
	{
	struct key_item *k;

	for (k = utk_list; k; k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
	{
	return 0;
	}
	}

	k = new_key_item ();
	k->kid[0] = kid[0];
	k->kid[1] = kid[1];
	k->ownertrust = TRUST_ULTIMATE;
	k->next = utk_list;
	utk_list = k;
	if( opt.verbose > 1 )
	log_info(_("key %s: accepted as trusted key\n"), keystr(kid));
	return 1;
	}


	/****************
	* Verify that all our secret keys are usable and put them into the utk_list.
	*/
	static void
	verify_own_keys(void)
	{
	TRUSTREC rec;
	ulong recnum;
	int rc;
	struct key_item *k;

	if (utk_list)
	return;

	/* scan the trustdb to find all ultimately trusted keys */
	for (recnum=1; !tdbio_read_record (recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ )
	{
	if ( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_TRUST
	&& (rec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
	{
	byte *fpr = rec.r.trust.fingerprint;
	int fprlen;
	u32 kid[2];

	/* Problem: We do only use fingerprints in the trustdb but
	* we need the keyID here to indetify the key; we can only
	* use that ugly hack to distinguish between 16 and 20
	* butes fpr - it does not work always so we better change
	* the whole validation code to only work with
	* fingerprints */
	fprlen = (!fpr[16] && !fpr[17] && !fpr[18] && !fpr[19])? 16:20;
	keyid_from_fingerprint (fpr, fprlen, kid);
	if (!add_utk (kid))
	log_info(_("key %s occurs more than once in the trustdb\n"),
	keystr(kid));
	}
	}

	/* Put any --trusted-key keys into the trustdb */
	for (k = user_utk_list; k; k = k->next)
	{
	if ( add_utk (k->kid) )
	{ /* not yet in trustDB as ultimately trusted */
	PKT_public_key pk;

	memset (&pk, 0, sizeof pk);
	rc = get_pubkey (&pk, k->kid);
	if (rc)
	log_info(_("key %s: no public key for trusted key - skipped\n"),
	keystr(k->kid));
	else
	{
	tdb_update_ownertrust (&pk,
	((tdb_get_ownertrust (&pk) & ~TRUST_MASK)
	\| TRUST_ULTIMATE ));
	release_public_key_parts (&pk);
	}

	log_info (_("key %s marked as ultimately trusted\n"),keystr(k->kid));
	}
	}

	/* release the helper table table */
	release_key_items (user_utk_list);
	user_utk_list = NULL;
	return;
	}


	/*********************************************
	********* TrustDB stuff *****************
	*********************************************/

	/*
	* Read a record but die if it does not exist
	*/
	static void
	read_record (ulong recno, TRUSTREC *rec, int rectype )
	{
	int rc = tdbio_read_record (recno, rec, rectype);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error(_("trust record %lu, req type %d: read failed: %s\n"),
	recno, rec->rectype, gpg_strerror (rc) );
	tdbio_invalid();
	}
	if (rectype != rec->rectype)
	{
	log_error(_("trust record %lu is not of requested type %d\n"),
	rec->recnum, rectype);
	tdbio_invalid();
	}
	}

	/*
	* Write a record and die on error
	*/
	static void
	write_record (TRUSTREC *rec)
	{
	int rc = tdbio_write_record (rec);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error(_("trust record %lu, type %d: write failed: %s\n"),
	rec->recnum, rec->rectype, gpg_strerror (rc) );
	tdbio_invalid();
	}
	}

	/*
	* sync the TrustDb and die on error
	*/
	static void
	do_sync(void)
	{
	int rc = tdbio_sync ();
	if(rc)
	{
	log_error (_("trustdb: sync failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	g10_exit(2);
	}
	}

	static const char *
	trust_model_string(void)
	{
	switch(opt.trust_model)
	{
	case TM_CLASSIC: return "classic";
	case TM_PGP: return "PGP";
	case TM_EXTERNAL: return "external";
	+ case TM_TOFU: return "TOFU";
	+ case TM_TOFU_PGP: return "TOFU+PGP";
	case TM_ALWAYS: return "always";
	case TM_DIRECT: return "direct";
	default: return "unknown";
	}
	}

	/****************
	* Perform some checks over the trustdb
	* level 0: only open the db
	* 1: used for initial program startup
	*/
	int
	setup_trustdb( int level, const char *dbname )
	{
	/* just store the args */
	if( trustdb_args.init )
	return 0;
	trustdb_args.level = level;
	trustdb_args.dbname = dbname? xstrdup(dbname): NULL;
	return 0;
	}

	void
	how_to_fix_the_trustdb ()
	{
	const char *name = trustdb_args.dbname;

	if (!name)
	name = "trustdb.gpg";

	log_info (_("You may try to re-create the trustdb using the commands:\n"));
	log_info (" cd %s\n", default_homedir ());
	log_info (" gpg2 --export-ownertrust > otrust.tmp\n");
	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	log_info (" del %s\n", name);
	#else
	log_info (" rm %s\n", name);
	#endif
	log_info (" gpg2 --import-ownertrust < otrust.tmp\n");
	log_info (_("If that does not work, please consult the manual\n"));
	}


	void
	init_trustdb ()
	{
	int level = trustdb_args.level;
	const char* dbname = trustdb_args.dbname;

	if( trustdb_args.init )
	return;

	trustdb_args.init = 1;

	if(level==0 \|\| level==1)
	{
	int rc = tdbio_set_dbname( dbname, !!level, &trustdb_args.no_trustdb);
	if( rc )
	log_fatal("can't init trustdb: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	else
	BUG();

	if(opt.trust_model==TM_AUTO)
	{
	/* Try and set the trust model off of whatever the trustdb says
	it is. */
	opt.trust_model=tdbio_read_model();

	/* Sanity check this ;) */
	if(opt.trust_model!=TM_CLASSIC
	&& opt.trust_model!=TM_PGP
	&& opt.trust_model!=TM_EXTERNAL)
	{
	log_info(_("unable to use unknown trust model (%d) - "
	"assuming %s trust model\n"),opt.trust_model,"PGP");
	opt.trust_model=TM_PGP;
	}

	if(opt.verbose)
	log_info(_("using %s trust model\n"),trust_model_string());
	}

	if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP \|\| opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
	{
	/* Verify the list of ultimately trusted keys and move the
	--trusted-keys list there as well. */
	if(level==1)
	verify_own_keys();

	if(!tdbio_db_matches_options())
	pending_check_trustdb=1;
	}
	}


	/****************
	* Recreate the WoT but do not ask for new ownertrusts. Special
	* feature: In batch mode and without a forced yes, this is only done
	* when a check is due. This can be used to run the check from a crontab
	*/
	void
	check_trustdb ()
	{
	init_trustdb();
	if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP \|\| opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
	{
	if (opt.batch && !opt.answer_yes)
	{
	ulong scheduled;

	scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck ();
	if (!scheduled)
	{
	log_info (_("no need for a trustdb check\n"));
	return;
	}

	if (scheduled > make_timestamp ())
	{
	log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"),
	strtimestamp (scheduled));
	return;
	}
	}

	validate_keys (0);
	}
	else
	log_info (_("no need for a trustdb check with '%s' trust model\n"),
	trust_model_string());
	}


	/*
	* Recreate the WoT.
	*/
	void
	update_trustdb()
	{
	init_trustdb();
	if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP \|\| opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
	validate_keys (1);
	else
	log_info (_("no need for a trustdb update with '%s' trust model\n"),
	trust_model_string());
	}

	void
	tdb_revalidation_mark (void)
	{
	init_trustdb();
	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	return;

	/* We simply set the time for the next check to 1 (far back in 1970)
	so that a --update-trustdb will be scheduled. */
	if (tdbio_write_nextcheck (1))
	do_sync ();
	pending_check_trustdb = 1;
	}

	int
	trustdb_pending_check(void)
	{
	return pending_check_trustdb;
	}

	/* If the trustdb is dirty, and we're interactive, update it.
	Otherwise, check it unless no-auto-check-trustdb is set. */
	void
	tdb_check_or_update (void)
	{
	if(trustdb_pending_check())
	{
	if(opt.interactive)
	update_trustdb();
	else if(!opt.no_auto_check_trustdb)
	check_trustdb();
	}
	}

	void
	read_trust_options(byte trust_model,ulong created,ulong *nextcheck,
	byte marginals,byte completes,byte *cert_depth,
	byte *min_cert_level)
	{
	TRUSTREC opts;

	init_trustdb();
	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	memset (&opts, 0, sizeof opts);
	else
	read_record (0, &opts, RECTYPE_VER);

	if(trust_model)
	*trust_model=opts.r.ver.trust_model;
	if(created)
	*created=opts.r.ver.created;
	if(nextcheck)
	*nextcheck=opts.r.ver.nextcheck;
	if(marginals)
	*marginals=opts.r.ver.marginals;
	if(completes)
	*completes=opts.r.ver.completes;
	if(cert_depth)
	*cert_depth=opts.r.ver.cert_depth;
	if(min_cert_level)
	*min_cert_level=opts.r.ver.min_cert_level;
	}

	/***********************************************
	********* Ownertrust et al. **************
	***********************************************/

	static int
	read_trust_record (PKT_public_key pk, TRUSTREC rec)
	{
	int rc;

	init_trustdb();
	rc = tdbio_search_trust_bypk (pk, rec);
	if (rc)
	{
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	log_error ("trustdb: searching trust record failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	return rc;
	}

	if (rec->rectype != RECTYPE_TRUST)
	{
	log_error ("trustdb: record %lu is not a trust record\n",
	rec->recnum);
	return GPG_ERR_TRUSTDB;
	}

	return 0;
	}

	/****************
	* Return the assigned ownertrust value for the given public key.
	* The key should be the primary key.
	*/
	unsigned int
	tdb_get_ownertrust ( PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	TRUSTREC rec;
	gpg_error_t err;

	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN;

	err = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* no record yet */
	if (err)
	{
	tdbio_invalid ();
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* actually never reached */
	}

	return rec.r.trust.ownertrust;
	}


	unsigned int
	tdb_get_min_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	TRUSTREC rec;
	gpg_error_t err;

	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN;

	err = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* no record yet */
	if (err)
	{
	tdbio_invalid ();
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* actually never reached */
	}

	return rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust;
	}


	/*
	* Set the trust value of the given public key to the new value.
	* The key should be a primary one.
	*/
	void
	tdb_update_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int new_trust )
	{
	TRUSTREC rec;
	gpg_error_t err;

	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	return;

	err = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
	if (!err)
	{
	if (DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug ("update ownertrust from %u to %u\n",
	(unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust, new_trust );
	if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust != new_trust)
	{
	rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust;
	write_record( &rec );
	tdb_revalidation_mark ();
	do_sync ();
	}
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{ /* no record yet - create a new one */
	size_t dummy;

	if (DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug ("insert ownertrust %u\n", new_trust );

	memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec);
	rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
	rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
	fingerprint_from_pk (pk, rec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
	rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust;
	write_record (&rec);
	tdb_revalidation_mark ();
	do_sync ();
	err = 0;
	}
	else
	{
	tdbio_invalid ();
	}
	}

	static void
	update_min_ownertrust (u32 *kid, unsigned int new_trust )
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	TRUSTREC rec;
	gpg_error_t err;

	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	return;

	pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
	err = get_pubkey (pk, kid);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("public key %s not found: %s\n"),
	keystr (kid), gpg_strerror (err));
	return;
	}

	err = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
	if (!err)
	{
	if (DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug ("key %08lX%08lX: update min_ownertrust from %u to %u\n",
	(ulong)kid[0],(ulong)kid[1],
	(unsigned int)rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust,
	new_trust );
	if (rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust != new_trust)
	{
	rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = new_trust;
	write_record( &rec );
	tdb_revalidation_mark ();
	do_sync ();
	}
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{ /* no record yet - create a new one */
	size_t dummy;

	if (DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug ("insert min_ownertrust %u\n", new_trust );

	memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec);
	rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
	rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
	fingerprint_from_pk (pk, rec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
	rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = new_trust;
	write_record (&rec);
	tdb_revalidation_mark ();
	do_sync ();
	err = 0;
	}
	else
	{
	tdbio_invalid ();
	}
	}


	/*
	* Clear the ownertrust and min_ownertrust values.
	*
	* Return: True if a change actually happened.
	*/
	int
	tdb_clear_ownertrusts (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	TRUSTREC rec;
	gpg_error_t err;

	init_trustdb ();

	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	return 0;

	err = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
	if (!err)
	{
	if (DBG_TRUST)
	{
	log_debug ("clearing ownertrust (old value %u)\n",
	(unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust);
	log_debug ("clearing min_ownertrust (old value %u)\n",
	(unsigned int)rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust);
	}
	if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust \|\| rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust)
	{
	rec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0;
	rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = 0;
	write_record( &rec );
	tdb_revalidation_mark ();
	do_sync ();
	return 1;
	}
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	tdbio_invalid ();
	}
	return 0;
	}

	/*
	* Note: Caller has to do a sync
	*/
	static void
	update_validity (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid,
	int depth, int validity)
	{
	TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
	gpg_error_t err;
	ulong recno;

	namehash_from_uid(uid);

	err = read_trust_record (pk, &trec);
	if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	tdbio_invalid ();
	return;
	}
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	/* No record yet - create a new one. */
	size_t dummy;

	err = 0;
	memset (&trec, 0, sizeof trec);
	trec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
	trec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
	fingerprint_from_pk (pk, trec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
	trec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0;
	}

	/* locate an existing one */
	recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
	while (recno)
	{
	read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
	if ( !memcmp (vrec.r.valid.namehash, uid->namehash, 20) )
	break;
	recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
	}

	if (!recno) /* insert a new validity record */
	{
	memset (&vrec, 0, sizeof vrec);
	vrec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
	vrec.rectype = RECTYPE_VALID;
	memcpy (vrec.r.valid.namehash, uid->namehash, 20);
	vrec.r.valid.next = trec.r.trust.validlist;
	trec.r.trust.validlist = vrec.recnum;
	}
	vrec.r.valid.validity = validity;
	vrec.r.valid.full_count = uid->help_full_count;
	vrec.r.valid.marginal_count = uid->help_marginal_count;
	write_record (&vrec);
	trec.r.trust.depth = depth;
	write_record (&trec);
	}


	/***********************************************
	******* Query trustdb values ************
	***********************************************/

	/* Return true if key is disabled. Note that this is usually used via
	the pk_is_disabled macro. */
	int
	tdb_cache_disabled_value (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	TRUSTREC trec;
	int disabled = 0;

	if (pk->flags.disabled_valid)
	return pk->flags.disabled;

	init_trustdb();

	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb)
	return 0; /* No trustdb => not disabled. */

	err = read_trust_record (pk, &trec);
	if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	tdbio_invalid ();
	goto leave;
	}
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	/* No record found, so assume not disabled. */
	goto leave;
	}

	if ((trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
	disabled = 1;

	/* Cache it for later so we don't need to look at the trustdb every
	time */
	pk->flags.disabled = disabled;
	pk->flags.disabled_valid = 1;

	leave:
	return disabled;
	}


	void
	tdb_check_trustdb_stale (void)
	{
	static int did_nextcheck=0;

	init_trustdb ();

	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb)
	return; /* No trustdb => can't be stale. */

	if (!did_nextcheck
	&& (opt.trust_model==TM_PGP \|\| opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC))
	{
	ulong scheduled;

	did_nextcheck = 1;
	scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck ();
	if ((scheduled && scheduled <= make_timestamp ())
	\|\| pending_check_trustdb)
	{
	if (opt.no_auto_check_trustdb)
	{
	pending_check_trustdb = 1;
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("please do a --check-trustdb\n"));
	}
	else
	{
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("checking the trustdb\n"));
	validate_keys (0);
	}
	}
	}
	}

	/*
	* Return the validity information for PK. This is the core of
	- * get_validity.
	+ * get_validity. If SIG is not NULL, then the trust is being
	+ * evaluated in the context of the provided signature. This is used
	+ * by the TOFU code to record statistics.
	*/
	unsigned int
	tdb_get_validity_core (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid,
	- PKT_public_key *main_pk)
	+ PKT_public_key *main_pk,
	+ PKT_signature *sig,
	+ int may_ask)
	{
	TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
	gpg_error_t err;
	ulong recno;
	- unsigned int validity;
	+ unsigned int tofu_validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	+ unsigned int validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;

	init_trustdb ();

	/* If we have no trustdb (which also means it has not been created)
	and the trust-model is always, we don't know the validity -
	return immediately. If we won't do that the tdbio code would try
	to open the trustdb and run into a fatal error. */
	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN;

	check_trustdb_stale();

	if(opt.trust_model==TM_DIRECT)
	{
	/* Note that this happens BEFORE any user ID stuff is checked.
	The direct trust model applies to keys as a whole. */
	validity = tdb_get_ownertrust (main_pk);
	goto leave;
	}

	- err = read_trust_record (main_pk, &trec);
	- if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	- {
	- tdbio_invalid ();
	- return 0;
	- }
	- if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	+ if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
	{
	- /* No record found. */
	- validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	- goto leave;
	- }
	+ kbnode_t user_id_node;
	+ int user_ids = 0;
	+ int user_ids_expired = 0;

	- /* Loop over all user IDs */
	- recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
	- validity = 0;
	- while (recno)
	- {
	- read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
	+ char fingerprint[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	+ size_t fingerprint_len = sizeof (fingerprint);
	+
	+ fingerprint_from_pk (main_pk, fingerprint, &fingerprint_len);
	+ assert (fingerprint_len == sizeof (fingerprint));

	- if(uid)
	+ /* If the caller didn't supply a user id then iterate over all
	+ uids. */
	+ if (! uid)
	+ user_id_node = get_pubkeyblock (main_pk->keyid);
	+
	+ while (uid
	+ \|\| (user_id_node = find_next_kbnode (user_id_node, PKT_USER_ID)))
	{
	- /* If a user ID is given we return the validity for that
	- user ID ONLY. If the namehash is not found, then there
	- is no validity at all (i.e. the user ID wasn't
	- signed). */
	- if(memcmp(vrec.r.valid.namehash,uid->namehash,20)==0)
	+ unsigned int tl;
	+ PKT_user_id *user_id;
	+
	+ if (uid)
	+ user_id = uid;
	+ else
	+ user_id = user_id_node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	+
	+ if (user_id->is_revoked \|\| user_id->is_expired)
	+ /* If the user id is revoked or expired, then skip it. */
	{
	- validity=(vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
	- break;
	+ char *s;
	+ if (user_id->is_revoked && user_id->is_expired)
	+ s = "revoked and expired";
	+ else if (user_id->is_revoked)
	+ s = "revoked";
	+ else
	+ s = "expire";
	+
	+ log_info ("TOFU: Ignoring %s user id (%s)\n", s, user_id->name);
	+
	+ continue;
	}
	+
	+ user_ids ++;
	+
	+ if (sig)
	+ tl = tofu_register (fingerprint, user_id->name,
	+ sig->digest, sig->digest_len,
	+ sig->timestamp, "unknown",
	+ may_ask);
	+ else
	+ tl = tofu_get_validity (fingerprint, user_id->name, may_ask);
	+
	+ if (tl == TRUST_EXPIRED)
	+ user_ids_expired ++;
	+ else if (tl == TRUST_UNDEFINED \|\| tl == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
	+ ;
	+ else if (tl == TRUST_NEVER)
	+ tofu_validity = TRUST_NEVER;
	+ else
	+ {
	+ assert (tl == TRUST_MARGINAL
	+ \|\| tl == TRUST_FULLY
	+ \|\| tl == TRUST_ULTIMATE);
	+
	+ if (tl > tofu_validity)
	+ /* XXX: We we really want the max? */
	+ tofu_validity = tl;
	+ }
	+
	+ if (uid)
	+ /* If the caller specified a user id, then we stop
	+ now. */
	+ break;
	}
	- else
	+ }
	+
	+ if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP
	+ \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC
	+ \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_PGP)
	+ {
	+ err = read_trust_record (main_pk, &trec);
	+ if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	- /* If no namehash is given, we take the maximum validity
	- over all user IDs */
	- if ( validity < (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK) )
	- validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
	+ tdbio_invalid ();
	+ return 0;
	+ }
	+ if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	+ {
	+ /* No record found. */
	+ validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	+ goto leave;
	}

	- recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
	- }
	+ /* Loop over all user IDs */
	+ recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
	+ validity = 0;
	+ while (recno)
	+ {
	+ read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);

	- if ( (trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
	- {
	- validity \|= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
	- pk->flags.disabled = 1;
	+ if(uid)
	+ {
	+ /* If a user ID is given we return the validity for that
	+ user ID ONLY. If the namehash is not found, then
	+ there is no validity at all (i.e. the user ID wasn't
	+ signed). */
	+ if(memcmp(vrec.r.valid.namehash,uid->namehash,20)==0)
	+ {
	+ validity=(vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
	+ break;
	+ }
	+ }
	+ else
	+ {
	+ /* If no user ID is given, we take the maximum validity
	+ over all user IDs */
	+ if (validity < (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK))
	+ validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
	+ }
	+
	+ recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
	+ }
	+
	+ if ((trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
	+ {
	+ validity \|= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
	+ pk->flags.disabled = 1;
	+ }
	+ else
	+ pk->flags.disabled = 0;
	+ pk->flags.disabled_valid = 1;
	}
	- else
	- pk->flags.disabled = 0;
	- pk->flags.disabled_valid = 1;

	leave:
	- if (pending_check_trustdb)
	+ validity = tofu_wot_trust_combine (tofu_validity, validity);
	+
	+ if (opt.trust_model != TM_TOFU
	+ && pending_check_trustdb)
	validity \|= TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK;

	return validity;
	}


	static void
	get_validity_counts (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid)
	{
	TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
	ulong recno;

	if(pk==NULL \|\| uid==NULL)
	BUG();

	namehash_from_uid(uid);

	uid->help_marginal_count=uid->help_full_count=0;

	init_trustdb ();

	if(read_trust_record (pk, &trec))
	return;

	/* loop over all user IDs */
	recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
	while (recno)
	{
	read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);

	if(memcmp(vrec.r.valid.namehash,uid->namehash,20)==0)
	{
	uid->help_marginal_count=vrec.r.valid.marginal_count;
	uid->help_full_count=vrec.r.valid.full_count;
	/* es_printf("Fetched marginal %d, full %d\n",uid->help_marginal_count,uid->help_full_count); */
	break;
	}

	recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
	}
	}

	void
	list_trust_path( const char *username )
	{
	(void)username;
	}

	/****************
	* Enumerate all keys, which are needed to build all trust paths for
	* the given key. This function does not return the key itself or
	* the ultimate key (the last point in cerificate chain). Only
	* certificate chains which ends up at an ultimately trusted key
	* are listed. If ownertrust or validity is not NULL, the corresponding
	* value for the returned LID is also returned in these variable(s).
	*
	* 1) create a void pointer and initialize it to NULL
	* 2) pass this void pointer by reference to this function.
	* Set lid to the key you want to enumerate and pass it by reference.
	* 3) call this function as long as it does not return -1
	* to indicate EOF. LID does contain the next key used to build the web
	* 4) Always call this function a last time with LID set to NULL,
	* so that it can free its context.
	*
	* Returns: -1 on EOF or the level of the returned LID
	*/
	int
	enum_cert_paths( void *context, ulong lid,
	unsigned ownertrust, unsigned validity )
	{
	(void)context;
	(void)lid;
	(void)ownertrust;
	(void)validity;
	return -1;
	}


	/****************
	* Print the current path
	*/
	void
	enum_cert_paths_print (void *context, FILE fp,
	int refresh, ulong selected_lid)
	{
	(void)context;
	(void)fp;
	(void)refresh;
	(void)selected_lid;
	}



	/****************************************
	********* NEW NEW NEW **************
	****************************************/

	static int
	ask_ownertrust (u32 *kid,int minimum)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	int rc;
	int ot;

	pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
	rc = get_pubkey (pk, kid);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("public key %s not found: %s\n"),
	keystr(kid), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	}

	if(opt.force_ownertrust)
	{
	log_info("force trust for key %s to %s\n",
	keystr(kid),trust_value_to_string(opt.force_ownertrust));
	tdb_update_ownertrust (pk, opt.force_ownertrust);
	ot=opt.force_ownertrust;
	}
	else
	{
	ot=edit_ownertrust(pk,0);
	if(ot>0)
	ot = tdb_get_ownertrust (pk);
	else if(ot==0)
	ot = minimum?minimum:TRUST_UNDEFINED;
	else
	ot = -1; /* quit */
	}

	free_public_key( pk );

	return ot;
	}


	static void
	mark_keyblock_seen (KeyHashTable tbl, KBNODE node)
	{
	for ( ;node; node = node->next )
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	u32 aki[2];

	keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, aki);
	add_key_hash_table (tbl, aki);
	}
	}


	static void
	dump_key_array (int depth, struct key_array *keys)
	{
	struct key_array *kar;

	for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
	{
	KBNODE node = kar->keyblock;
	u32 kid[2];

	keyid_from_pk(node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
	es_printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:K::%c::::\n",
	depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1], '?');

	for (; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	int len = node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len;

	if (len > 30)
	len = 30;
	es_printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:U:::%c:::",
	depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1],
	(node->flag & 4)? 'f':
	(node->flag & 2)? 'm':
	(node->flag & 1)? 'q':'-');
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	len, ":", NULL);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	}
	}
	}


	static void
	store_validation_status (int depth, KBNODE keyblock, KeyHashTable stored)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int status;
	int any = 0;

	for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	if (node->flag & 4)
	status = TRUST_FULLY;
	else if (node->flag & 2)
	status = TRUST_MARGINAL;
	else if (node->flag & 1)
	status = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
	else
	status = 0;

	if (status)
	{
	update_validity (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
	uid, depth, status);

	mark_keyblock_seen(stored,keyblock);

	any = 1;
	}
	}
	}

	if (any)
	do_sync ();
	}


	/* Returns a sanitized copy of the regexp (which might be "", but not
	NULL). */
	#ifndef DISABLE_REGEX
	static char *
	sanitize_regexp(const char *old)
	{
	size_t start=0,len=strlen(old),idx=0;
	int escaped=0,standard_bracket=0;
	char new=xmalloc((len2)+1); /* enough to \-escape everything if we
	have to */

	/* There are basically two commonly-used regexps here. GPG and most
	versions of PGP use "<[^>]+[@.]example\.com>$" and PGP (9)
	command line uses "example.com" (i.e. whatever the user specfies,
	and we can't expect users know to use "\." instead of "."). So
	here are the rules: we're allowed to start with "<[^>]+[@.]" and
	end with ">$" or start and end with nothing. In between, the
	only legal regex character is ".", and everything else gets
	escaped. Part of the gotcha here is that some regex packages
	allow more than RFC-4880 requires. For example, 4880 has no "{}"
	operator, but GNU regex does. Commenting removes these operators
	from consideration. A possible future enhancement is to use
	commenting to effectively back off a given regex to the Henry
	Spencer syntax in 4880. -dshaw */

	/* Are we bracketed between "<[^>]+[@.]" and ">$" ? */
	if(len>=12 && strncmp(old,"<[^>]+[@.]",10)==0
	&& old[len-2]=='>' && old[len-1]=='$')
	{
	strcpy(new,"<[^>]+[@.]");
	idx=strlen(new);
	standard_bracket=1;
	start+=10;
	len-=2;
	}

	/* Walk the remaining characters and ensure that everything that is
	left is not an operational regex character. */
	for(;start<len;start++)
	{
	if(!escaped && old[start]=='\\')
	escaped=1;
	else if(!escaped && old[start]!='.')
	new[idx++]='\\';
	else
	escaped=0;

	new[idx++]=old[start];
	}

	new[idx]='\0';

	/* Note that the (sub)string we look at might end with a bare "\".
	If it does, leave it that way. If the regexp actually ended with
	">$", then it was escaping the ">" and is fine. If the regexp
	actually ended with the bare "\", then it's an illegal regexp and
	regcomp should kick it out. */

	if(standard_bracket)
	strcat(new,">$");

	return new;
	}
	#endif /!DISABLE_REGEX/

	/* Used by validate_one_keyblock to confirm a regexp within a trust
	signature. Returns 1 for match, and 0 for no match or regex
	error. */
	static int
	check_regexp(const char expr,const char string)
	{
	#ifdef DISABLE_REGEX
	(void)expr;
	(void)string;
	/* When DISABLE_REGEX is defined, assume all regexps do not
	match. */
	return 0;
	#else
	int ret;
	char *regexp;

	regexp=sanitize_regexp(expr);

	#ifdef __riscos__
	ret=riscos_check_regexp(expr, string, DBG_TRUST);
	#else
	{
	regex_t pat;

	ret=regcomp(&pat,regexp,REG_ICASE\|REG_NOSUB\|REG_EXTENDED);
	if(ret==0)
	{
	ret=regexec(&pat,string,0,NULL,0);
	regfree(&pat);
	ret=(ret==0);
	}
	}
	#endif

	if(DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug("regexp '%s' ('%s') on '%s': %s\n",
	regexp,expr,string,ret==0?"YES":"NO");

	xfree(regexp);

	return ret;
	#endif
	}

	/*
	* Return true if the key is signed by one of the keys in the given
	* key ID list. User IDs with a valid signature are marked by node
	* flags as follows:
	* flag bit 0: There is at least one signature
	* 1: There is marginal confidence that this is a legitimate uid
	* 2: There is full confidence that this is a legitimate uid.
	* 8: Used for internal purposes.
	* 9: Ditto (in mark_usable_uid_certs())
	* 10: Ditto (ditto)
	* This function assumes that all kbnode flags are cleared on entry.
	*/
	static int
	validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist,
	u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
	{
	struct key_item *kr;
	KBNODE node, uidnode=NULL;
	PKT_user_id *uid=NULL;
	PKT_public_key *pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	u32 main_kid[2];
	int issigned=0, any_signed = 0;

	keyid_from_pk(pk, main_kid);
	for (node=kb; node; node = node->next)
	{
	/* A bit of discussion here: is it better for the web of trust
	to be built among only self-signed uids? On the one hand, a
	self-signed uid is a statement that the key owner definitely
	intended that uid to be there, but on the other hand, a
	signed (but not self-signed) uid does carry trust, of a sort,
	even if it is a statement being made by people other than the
	key owner "through" the uids on the key owner's key. I'm
	going with the latter. However, if the user ID was
	explicitly revoked, or passively allowed to expire, that
	should stop validity through the user ID until it is
	resigned. -dshaw */

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
	&& !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
	{
	if (uidnode && issigned)
	{
	if (uid->help_full_count >= opt.completes_needed
	\|\| uid->help_marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
	uidnode->flag \|= 4;
	else if (uid->help_full_count \|\| uid->help_marginal_count)
	uidnode->flag \|= 2;
	uidnode->flag \|= 1;
	any_signed = 1;
	}
	uidnode = node;
	uid=uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	/* If the selfsig is going to expire... */
	if(uid->expiredate && uid->expiredate<*next_expire)
	*next_expire = uid->expiredate;

	issigned = 0;
	get_validity_counts(pk,uid);
	mark_usable_uid_certs (kb, uidnode, main_kid, klist,
	curtime, next_expire);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& (node->flag & (1<<8)) && uid)
	{
	/* Note that we are only seeing unrevoked sigs here */
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;

	kr = is_in_klist (klist, sig);
	/* If the trust_regexp does not match, it's as if the sig
	did not exist. This is safe for non-trust sigs as well
	since we don't accept a regexp on the sig unless it's a
	trust sig. */
	if (kr && (!kr->trust_regexp
	\|\| opt.trust_model != TM_PGP
	\|\| (uidnode
	&& check_regexp(kr->trust_regexp,
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name))))
	{
	/* Are we part of a trust sig chain? We always favor
	the latest trust sig, rather than the greater or
	lesser trust sig or value. I could make a decent
	argument for any of these cases, but this seems to be
	what PGP does, and I'd like to be compatible. -dms */
	if (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP
	&& sig->trust_depth
	&& pk->trust_timestamp <= sig->timestamp)
	{
	unsigned char depth;

	/* If the depth on the signature is less than the
	chain currently has, then use the signature depth
	so we don't increase the depth beyond what the
	signer wanted. If the depth on the signature is
	more than the chain currently has, then use the
	chain depth so we use as much of the signature
	depth as the chain will permit. An ultimately
	trusted signature can restart the depth to
	whatever level it likes. */

	if (sig->trust_depth < kr->trust_depth
	\|\| kr->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
	depth = sig->trust_depth;
	else
	depth = kr->trust_depth;

	if (depth)
	{
	if(DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug ("trust sig on %s, sig depth is %d,"
	" kr depth is %d\n",
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	sig->trust_depth,
	kr->trust_depth);

	/* If we got here, we know that:

	this is a trust sig.

	it's a newer trust sig than any previous trust
	sig on this key (not uid).

	it is legal in that it was either generated by an
	ultimate key, or a key that was part of a trust
	chain, and the depth does not violate the
	original trust sig.

	if there is a regexp attached, it matched
	successfully.
	*/

	if (DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug ("replacing trust value %d with %d and "
	"depth %d with %d\n",
	pk->trust_value,sig->trust_value,
	pk->trust_depth,depth);

	pk->trust_value = sig->trust_value;
	pk->trust_depth = depth-1;

	/* If the trust sig contains a regexp, record it
	on the pk for the next round. */
	if (sig->trust_regexp)
	pk->trust_regexp = sig->trust_regexp;
	}
	}

	if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
	uid->help_full_count = opt.completes_needed;
	else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY)
	uid->help_full_count++;
	else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL)
	uid->help_marginal_count++;
	issigned = 1;
	}
	}
	}

	if (uidnode && issigned)
	{
	if (uid->help_full_count >= opt.completes_needed
	\|\| uid->help_marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
	uidnode->flag \|= 4;
	else if (uid->help_full_count \|\| uid->help_marginal_count)
	uidnode->flag \|= 2;
	uidnode->flag \|= 1;
	any_signed = 1;
	}

	return any_signed;
	}


	static int
	search_skipfnc (void opaque, u32 kid, int dummy_uid_no)
	{
	(void)dummy_uid_no;
	return test_key_hash_table ((KeyHashTable)opaque, kid);
	}


	/*
	* Scan all keys and return a key_array of all suitable keys from
	* kllist. The caller has to pass keydb handle so that we don't use
	* to create our own. Returns either a key_array or NULL in case of
	* an error. No results found are indicated by an empty array.
	* Caller hast to release the returned array.
	*/
	static struct key_array *
	validate_key_list (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KeyHashTable full_trust,
	struct key_item klist, u32 curtime, u32 next_expire)
	{
	KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
	struct key_array *keys = NULL;
	size_t nkeys, maxkeys;
	int rc;
	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;

	maxkeys = 1000;
	keys = xmalloc ((maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys);
	nkeys = 0;

	rc = keydb_search_reset (hd);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_search_reset failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	xfree (keys);
	return NULL;
	}

	memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
	desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
	desc.skipfnc = search_skipfnc;
	desc.skipfncvalue = full_trust;
	rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL);
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
	return keys;
	}
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_search_first failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	xfree (keys);
	return NULL;
	}

	desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT; /* change mode */
	do
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk;

	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_LEGACY_KEY)
	continue;

	rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	xfree (keys);
	return NULL;
	}

	if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	log_debug ("ooops: invalid pkttype %d encountered\n",
	keyblock->pkt->pkttype);
	dump_kbnode (keyblock);
	release_kbnode(keyblock);
	continue;
	}

	/* prepare the keyblock for further processing */
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
	clear_kbnode_flags (keyblock);
	pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (pk->has_expired \|\| pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	/* it does not make sense to look further at those keys */
	mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock);
	}
	else if (validate_one_keyblock (keyblock, klist, curtime, next_expire))
	{
	KBNODE node;

	if (pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= curtime
	&& pk->expiredate < *next_expire)
	*next_expire = pk->expiredate;

	if (nkeys == maxkeys) {
	maxkeys += 1000;
	keys = xrealloc (keys, (maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys);
	}
	keys[nkeys++].keyblock = keyblock;

	/* Optimization - if all uids are fully trusted, then we
	never need to consider this key as a candidate again. */

	for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & 4))
	break;

	if(node==NULL)
	mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock);

	keyblock = NULL;
	}

	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	keyblock = NULL;
	}
	while (!(rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL))
	\|\| gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_LEGACY_KEY);

	if (rc && gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	xfree (keys);
	return NULL;
	}

	keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
	return keys;
	}

	/* Caller must sync */
	static void
	reset_trust_records(void)
	{
	TRUSTREC rec;
	ulong recnum;
	int count = 0, nreset = 0;

	for (recnum=1; !tdbio_read_record (recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ )
	{
	if(rec.rectype==RECTYPE_TRUST)
	{
	count++;
	if(rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust)
	{
	rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust=0;
	write_record(&rec);
	}

	}
	else if(rec.rectype==RECTYPE_VALID
	&& ((rec.r.valid.validity&TRUST_MASK)
	\|\| rec.r.valid.marginal_count
	\|\| rec.r.valid.full_count))
	{
	rec.r.valid.validity &= ~TRUST_MASK;
	rec.r.valid.marginal_count=rec.r.valid.full_count=0;
	nreset++;
	write_record(&rec);
	}

	}

	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("%d keys processed (%d validity counts cleared)\n"),
	count, nreset);
	}

	/*
	* Run the key validation procedure.
	*
	* This works this way:
	* Step 1: Find all ultimately trusted keys (UTK).
	* mark them all as seen and put them into klist.
	* Step 2: loop max_cert_times
	* Step 3: if OWNERTRUST of any key in klist is undefined
	* ask user to assign ownertrust
	* Step 4: Loop over all keys in the keyDB which are not marked seen
	* Step 5: if key is revoked or expired
	* mark key as seen
	* continue loop at Step 4
	* Step 6: For each user ID of that key signed by a key in klist
	* Calculate validity by counting trusted signatures.
	* Set validity of user ID
	* Step 7: If any signed user ID was found
	* mark key as seen
	* End Loop
	* Step 8: Build a new klist from all fully trusted keys from step 6
	* End Loop
	* Ready
	*
	*/
	static int
	validate_keys (int interactive)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	int quit=0;
	struct key_item *klist = NULL;
	struct key_item *k;
	struct key_array *keys = NULL;
	struct key_array *kar;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kdb = NULL;
	KBNODE node;
	int depth;
	int ot_unknown, ot_undefined, ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate;
	KeyHashTable stored,used,full_trust;
	u32 start_time, next_expire;

	/* Make sure we have all sigs cached. TODO: This is going to
	require some architectual re-thinking, as it is agonizingly slow.
	Perhaps combine this with reset_trust_records(), or only check
	the caches on keys that are actually involved in the web of
	trust. */
	keydb_rebuild_caches(0);

	start_time = make_timestamp ();
	next_expire = 0xffffffff; /* set next expire to the year 2106 */
	stored = new_key_hash_table ();
	used = new_key_hash_table ();
	full_trust = new_key_hash_table ();

	kdb = keydb_new ();
	reset_trust_records();

	/* Fixme: Instead of always building a UTK list, we could just build it
	* here when needed */
	if (!utk_list)
	{
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("no ultimately trusted keys found\n"));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* mark all UTKs as used and fully_trusted and set validity to
	ultimate */
	for (k=utk_list; k; k = k->next)
	{
	KBNODE keyblock;
	PKT_public_key *pk;

	keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (k->kid);
	if (!keyblock)
	{
	log_error (_("public key of ultimately"
	" trusted key %s not found\n"), keystr(k->kid));
	continue;
	}
	mark_keyblock_seen (used, keyblock);
	mark_keyblock_seen (stored, keyblock);
	mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock);
	pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	update_validity (pk, node->pkt->pkt.user_id, 0, TRUST_ULTIMATE);
	}
	if ( pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= start_time
	&& pk->expiredate < next_expire)
	next_expire = pk->expiredate;

	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	do_sync ();
	}

	klist = utk_list;

	log_info(_("%d marginal(s) needed, %d complete(s) needed, %s trust model\n"),
	opt.marginals_needed,opt.completes_needed,trust_model_string());

	for (depth=0; depth < opt.max_cert_depth; depth++)
	{
	int valids=0,key_count;
	/* See whether we should assign ownertrust values to the keys in
	klist. */
	ot_unknown = ot_undefined = ot_never = 0;
	ot_marginal = ot_full = ot_ultimate = 0;
	for (k=klist; k; k = k->next)
	{
	int min=0;

	/* 120 and 60 are as per RFC2440 */
	if(k->trust_value>=120)
	min=TRUST_FULLY;
	else if(k->trust_value>=60)
	min=TRUST_MARGINAL;

	if(min!=k->min_ownertrust)
	update_min_ownertrust(k->kid,min);

	if (interactive && k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
	{
	k->ownertrust = ask_ownertrust (k->kid,min);

	if (k->ownertrust == (unsigned int)(-1))
	{
	quit=1;
	goto leave;
	}
	}

	/* This can happen during transition from an old trustdb
	before trust sigs. It can also happen if a user uses two
	different versions of GnuPG or changes the --trust-model
	setting. */
	if(k->ownertrust<min)
	{
	if(DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug("key %08lX%08lX:"
	" overriding ownertrust '%s' with '%s'\n",
	(ulong)k->kid[0],(ulong)k->kid[1],
	trust_value_to_string(k->ownertrust),
	trust_value_to_string(min));

	k->ownertrust=min;
	}

	if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
	ot_unknown++;
	else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNDEFINED)
	ot_undefined++;
	else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_NEVER)
	ot_never++;
	else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL)
	ot_marginal++;
	else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY)
	ot_full++;
	else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
	ot_ultimate++;

	valids++;
	}

	/* Find all keys which are signed by a key in kdlist */
	keys = validate_key_list (kdb, full_trust, klist,
	start_time, &next_expire);
	if (!keys)
	{
	log_error ("validate_key_list failed\n");
	rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
	goto leave;
	}

	for (key_count=0, kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++, key_count++)
	;

	/* Store the calculated valididation status somewhere */
	if (opt.verbose > 1 && DBG_TRUST)
	dump_key_array (depth, keys);

	for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
	store_validation_status (depth, kar->keyblock, stored);

	log_info (_("depth: %d valid: %3d signed: %3d"
	" trust: %d-, %dq, %dn, %dm, %df, %du\n"),
	depth, valids, key_count, ot_unknown, ot_undefined,
	ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate );

	/* Build a new kdlist from all fully valid keys in KEYS */
	if (klist != utk_list)
	release_key_items (klist);
	klist = NULL;
	for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
	{
	for (node=kar->keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & 4))
	{
	u32 kid[2];

	/* have we used this key already? */
	keyid_from_pk (kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
	if(test_key_hash_table(used,kid)==0)
	{
	/* Normally we add both the primary and subkey
	ids to the hash via mark_keyblock_seen, but
	since we aren't using this hash as a skipfnc,
	that doesn't matter here. */
	add_key_hash_table (used,kid);
	k = new_key_item ();
	k->kid[0]=kid[0];
	k->kid[1]=kid[1];
	k->ownertrust =
	(tdb_get_ownertrust
	(kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key) & TRUST_MASK);
	k->min_ownertrust = tdb_get_min_ownertrust
	(kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key);
	k->trust_depth=
	kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_depth;
	k->trust_value=
	kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_value;
	if(kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_regexp)
	k->trust_regexp=
	xstrdup(kar->keyblock->pkt->
	pkt.public_key->trust_regexp);
	k->next = klist;
	klist = k;
	break;
	}
	}
	}
	}
	release_key_array (keys);
	keys = NULL;
	if (!klist)
	break; /* no need to dive in deeper */
	}

	leave:
	keydb_release (kdb);
	release_key_array (keys);
	release_key_items (klist);
	release_key_hash_table (full_trust);
	release_key_hash_table (used);
	release_key_hash_table (stored);
	if (!rc && !quit) /* mark trustDB as checked */
	{
	if (next_expire == 0xffffffff \|\| next_expire < start_time )
	tdbio_write_nextcheck (0);
	else
	{
	tdbio_write_nextcheck (next_expire);
	log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"),
	strtimestamp (next_expire));
	}

	if(tdbio_update_version_record()!=0)
	{
	log_error(_("unable to update trustdb version record: "
	"write failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	tdbio_invalid();
	}

	do_sync ();
	pending_check_trustdb = 0;
	}

	return rc;
	}
	diff --git a/g10/trustdb.h b/g10/trustdb.h
	index 771a821fd..2c3f86553 100644
	--- a/g10/trustdb.h
	+++ b/g10/trustdb.h
	@@ -1,151 +1,153 @@
	/* trustdb.h - Trust database
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
	* 2005, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#ifndef G10_TRUSTDB_H
	#define G10_TRUSTDB_H

	/* Trust values must be sorted in ascending order */
	#define TRUST_MASK 15
	#define TRUST_UNKNOWN 0 /* o: not yet calculated/assigned */
	#define TRUST_EXPIRED 1 /* e: calculation may be invalid */
	#define TRUST_UNDEFINED 2 /* q: not enough information for calculation */
	#define TRUST_NEVER 3 /* n: never trust this pubkey */
	#define TRUST_MARGINAL 4 /* m: marginally trusted */
	#define TRUST_FULLY 5 /* f: fully trusted */
	#define TRUST_ULTIMATE 6 /* u: ultimately trusted */
	/* trust values not covered by the mask */
	#define TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED 32 /* r: revoked */
	#define TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED 64 /* r: revoked but for subkeys */
	#define TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED 128 /* d: key/uid disabled */
	#define TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK 256 /* a check-trustdb is pending */

	#define NAMEHASH_LEN 20


	/*
	* A structure to store key identification as well as some stuff needed
	* for validation
	*/
	struct key_item {
	struct key_item *next;
	unsigned int ownertrust,min_ownertrust;
	byte trust_depth;
	byte trust_value;
	char *trust_regexp;
	u32 kid[2];
	};


	/*
	* Check whether the signature SIG is in the klist K.
	*/
	static inline struct key_item *
	is_in_klist (struct key_item k, PKT_signature sig)
	{
	for (; k; k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->kid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && k->kid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
	return k;
	}
	return NULL;
	}



	/-- trust.c --/
	int cache_disabled_value (PKT_public_key *pk);
	void register_trusted_keyid (u32 *keyid);
	void register_trusted_key (const char *string);

	const char *trust_value_to_string (unsigned int value);
	int string_to_trust_value (const char *str);
	const char uid_trust_string_fixed (PKT_public_key key, PKT_user_id *uid);

	unsigned int get_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk);
	void update_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int new_trust);
	int clear_ownertrusts (PKT_public_key *pk);

	void revalidation_mark (void);
	void check_trustdb_stale (void);
	void check_or_update_trustdb (void);

	-unsigned int get_validity (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid);
	+unsigned int get_validity (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid,
	+ PKT_signature *sig, int may_ask);
	int get_validity_info (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid);
	const char get_validity_string (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id *uid);

	void mark_usable_uid_certs (kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
	u32 main_kid, struct key_item klist,
	u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire);

	void clean_one_uid (kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
	int noisy, int self_only,
	int uids_cleaned, int sigs_cleaned);
	void clean_key (kbnode_t keyblock, int noisy, int self_only,
	int uids_cleaned,int sigs_cleaned);



	/-- trustdb.c --/
	void tdb_register_trusted_keyid (u32 *keyid);
	void tdb_register_trusted_key (const char *string);
	void check_trustdb (void);
	void update_trustdb (void);
	int setup_trustdb( int level, const char *dbname );
	void how_to_fix_the_trustdb (void);
	void init_trustdb( void );
	void tdb_check_trustdb_stale (void);
	void sync_trustdb( void );

	void tdb_revalidation_mark (void);
	int trustdb_pending_check(void);
	void tdb_check_or_update (void);

	int tdb_cache_disabled_value (PKT_public_key *pk);

	unsigned int tdb_get_validity_core (PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid,
	- PKT_public_key *main_pk);
	+ PKT_public_key *main_pk,
	+ PKT_signature *sig, int may_ask);

	void list_trust_path( const char *username );
	int enum_cert_paths( void *context, ulong lid,
	unsigned ownertrust, unsigned validity );
	void enum_cert_paths_print( void *context, FILE fp,
	int refresh, ulong selected_lid );

	void read_trust_options(byte trust_model,ulong created,ulong *nextcheck,
	byte marginals,byte completes,byte *cert_depth,
	byte *min_cert_level);

	unsigned int tdb_get_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk);
	unsigned int tdb_get_min_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk);
	int get_ownertrust_info (PKT_public_key *pk);
	const char get_ownertrust_string (PKT_public_key pk);

	void tdb_update_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int new_trust);
	int tdb_clear_ownertrusts (PKT_public_key *pk);

	/-- tdbdump.c --/
	void list_trustdb (estream_t fp, const char *username);
	void export_ownertrust(void);
	void import_ownertrust(const char *fname);

	/-- pkclist.c --/
	int edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode );

	#endif /G10_TRUSTDB_H/
	diff --git a/tests/openpgp/Makefile.am b/tests/openpgp/Makefile.am
	index 95bb92c1c..f82fc1d80 100644
	--- a/tests/openpgp/Makefile.am
	+++ b/tests/openpgp/Makefile.am
	@@ -1,106 +1,109 @@
	# Makefile.am - For tests/openpgp
	# Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003,
	# 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	#
	# This file is part of GnuPG.
	#
	# GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	# (at your option) any later version.
	#
	# GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	# GNU General Public License for more details.
	#
	# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	# along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	# Process this file with automake to create Makefile.in


	# Programs required before we can run these tests.
	required_pgms = ../../g10/gpg2 ../../agent/gpg-agent \
	../../tools/gpg-connect-agent ../../tools/mk-tdata

	TESTS_ENVIRONMENT = GNUPGHOME=$(abs_builddir) GPG_AGENT_INFO= LC_ALL=C

	# Note: version.test needs to be the first test to run and finish.test
	# the last one
	TESTS = version.test mds.test \
	decrypt.test decrypt-dsa.test \
	sigs.test sigs-dsa.test \
	encrypt.test encrypt-dsa.test \
	seat.test clearsig.test encryptp.test detach.test \
	armsigs.test armencrypt.test armencryptp.test \
	signencrypt.test signencrypt-dsa.test \
	armsignencrypt.test armdetach.test \
	armdetachm.test detachm.test genkey1024.test \
	conventional.test conventional-mdc.test \
	multisig.test verify.test armor.test \
	- import.test ecc.test 4gb-packet.test finish.test
	+ import.test ecc.test 4gb-packet.test tofu.test \
	+ finish.test


	TEST_FILES = pubring.asc secring.asc plain-1o.asc plain-2o.asc plain-3o.asc \
	plain-1.asc plain-2.asc plain-3.asc plain-1-pgp.asc \
	pubring.pkr.asc secring.skr.asc secdemo.asc pubdemo.asc \
	gpg.conf.tmpl gpg-agent.conf.tmpl \
	bug537-test.data.asc bug894-test.asc \
	- bug1223-good.asc bug1223-bogus.asc 4gb-packet.asc
	+ bug1223-good.asc bug1223-bogus.asc 4gb-packet.asc \
	+ tofu-keys.asc tofu-keys-secret.asc \
	+ tofu-2183839A-1.txt tofu-BC15C85A-1.txt tofu-EE37CF96-1.txt

	data_files = data-500 data-9000 data-32000 data-80000 plain-large

	priv_keys = privkeys/50B2D4FA4122C212611048BC5FC31BD44393626E.asc \
	privkeys/7E201E28B6FEB2927B321F443205F4724EBE637E.asc \
	privkeys/13FDB8809B17C5547779F9D205C45F47CE0217CE.asc \
	privkeys/343D8AF79796EE107D645A2787A9D9252F924E6F.asc \
	privkeys/8B5ABF3EF9EB8D96B91A0B8C2C4401C91C834C34.asc \
	privkeys/0D6F6AD4C4C803B25470F9104E9F4E6A4CA64255.asc \
	privkeys/FD692BD59D6640A84C8422573D469F84F3B98E53.asc \
	privkeys/76F7E2B35832976B50A27A282D9B87E44577EB66.asc \
	privkeys/A0747D5F9425E6664F4FFBEED20FBCA79FDED2BD.asc \
	privkeys/0DD40284FF992CD24DC4AAC367037E066FCEE26A.asc \
	privkeys/2BC997C0B8691D41D29A4EC81CCBCF08454E4961.asc \
	privkeys/3C9D5ECA70130C2DBB1FC6AC0076BEEEC197716F.asc \
	privkeys/449E644892C951A37525654730DD32C202079926.asc \
	privkeys/58FFE844087634E62440224908BDE44BEA7EB730.asc \
	privkeys/4DF9172D6FF428C97A0E9AA96F03E8BCE3B2F188.asc \
	privkeys/9D7CD8F53F2F14C3E2177D1E9D1D11F39513A4A4.asc \
	privkeys/6E6B7ED0BD4425018FFC54F3921D5467A3AE00EB.asc \
	privkeys/C905D0AB6AE9655C5A35975939997BBF3325D6DD.asc \
	privkeys/B2BAA7144303DF19BB6FDE23781DD3FDD97918D4.asc \
	privkeys/CF60965BF51F67CF80DECE853E0D2D343468571D.asc \
	privkeys/DF00E361D34F80868D06879AC21D7A7D4E4FAD76.asc


	sample_keys = samplekeys/ecc-sample-1-pub.asc \
	samplekeys/ecc-sample-2-pub.asc \
	samplekeys/ecc-sample-3-pub.asc \
	samplekeys/ecc-sample-1-sec.asc \
	samplekeys/ecc-sample-2-sec.asc \
	samplekeys/ecc-sample-3-sec.asc \
	samplekeys/eddsa-sample-1-pub.asc \
	samplekeys/eddsa-sample-1-sec.asc \
	samplekeys/dda252ebb8ebe1af-1.asc \
	samplekeys/dda252ebb8ebe1af-2.asc \
	samplekeys/whats-new-in-2.1.asc \
	samplekeys/e2e-p256-1-clr.asc \
	samplekeys/e2e-p256-1-prt.asc

	EXTRA_DIST = defs.inc pinentry.sh $(TESTS) $(TEST_FILES) ChangeLog-2011 \
	mkdemodirs signdemokey $(priv_keys) $(sample_keys)

	CLEANFILES = prepared.stamp x y yy z out err $(data_files) \
	plain-1 plain-2 plain-3 trustdb.gpg .lock .\#lk \
	*.test.log gpg_dearmor gpg.conf gpg-agent.conf S.gpg-agent \
	pubring.gpg pubring.gpg~ pubring.kbx pubring.kbx~ \
	secring.gpg pubring.pkr secring.skr \
	- gnupg-test.stop random_seed gpg-agent.log
	+ gnupg-test.stop random_seed gpg-agent.log tofu.db

	clean-local:
	- -rm -rf private-keys-v1.d openpgp-revocs.d
	+ -rm -rf private-keys-v1.d openpgp-revocs.d tofu.d


	# We need to depend on a couple of programs so that the tests don't
	# start before all programs are built.
	all-local: $(required_pgms)
	diff --git a/tests/openpgp/tofu-2183839A-1.txt b/tests/openpgp/tofu-2183839A-1.txt
	new file mode 100644
	index 000000000..521b3bba4
	Binary files /dev/null and b/tests/openpgp/tofu-2183839A-1.txt differ
	diff --git a/tests/openpgp/tofu-BC15C85A-1.txt b/tests/openpgp/tofu-BC15C85A-1.txt
	new file mode 100644
	index 000000000..88cc64935
	--- /dev/null
	+++ b/tests/openpgp/tofu-BC15C85A-1.txt
	@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
	+-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
	+Version: GnuPG v2
	+
	+owGbwMvMwMF46tzNaXtET0QxnmZPYgj9/c+Sq2MOCwMjBwMbKxOIy8DFKQBTo/SK
	+hWFThVuj19r3R/6VzQkpaZuQx7s3r9BQ46v8KXkjb58dSjmXyr7enlCzb7dg1zE7
	+aynbc6YTF+wXZI4IlAgPuLJhUeSXo0+WllxbFXUz39407cv15TcXThLj+3tFkSnZ
	+YFXwM9+nfAoHpt6I/ZY96SJT3XFZKzO1jeZNJhZsV4Vfrjp0UmnH3E4A
	+=X9WM
	+-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
	diff --git a/tests/openpgp/tofu-EE37CF96-1.txt b/tests/openpgp/tofu-EE37CF96-1.txt
	new file mode 100644
	index 000000000..33a38db2c
	--- /dev/null
	+++ b/tests/openpgp/tofu-EE37CF96-1.txt
	@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
	+-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
	+Version: GnuPG v2
	+
	+owGbwMvMwMEY0Tqz9J35+WmMp9mTGEJ//xPk6pjDwsDIwcDGygTiMnBxCsDULFZm
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	+jmra+ZdN9+XBhml//i7v6XrfuWu56OuEI/fXH0i3P5HELb+j++6SO85VemLq/tvO
	+hNvWtddvuZ7+z2JJaqnP4wiu2t+sEze/MWKZ9zz+u2FV6a3OIyJxjwA=
	+=JMtb
	+-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
	diff --git a/tests/openpgp/tofu-keys-secret.asc b/tests/openpgp/tofu-keys-secret.asc
	new file mode 100755
	index 000000000..68e0d201c
	--- /dev/null
	+++ b/tests/openpgp/tofu-keys-secret.asc
	@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
	+-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
	+Version: GnuPG v2
	+
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	+=2SlE
	+-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
	diff --git a/tests/openpgp/tofu-keys.asc b/tests/openpgp/tofu-keys.asc
	new file mode 100755
	index 000000000..2de1cf792
	--- /dev/null
	+++ b/tests/openpgp/tofu-keys.asc
	@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
	+-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
	+Version: GnuPG v2
	+
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	+=Btw1
	+-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
	diff --git a/tests/openpgp/tofu.test b/tests/openpgp/tofu.test
	new file mode 100755
	index 000000000..18c17562c
	--- /dev/null
	+++ b/tests/openpgp/tofu.test
	@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
	+#!/bin/sh
	+
	+. $srcdir/defs.inc \|\| exit 3
	+
	+# set -x
	+
	+KEYS="2183839A BC15C85A EE37CF96"
	+
	+# Make sure $srcdir is set.
	+if test "x$srcdir" = x
	+then
	+ echo srcdir environment variable not set!
	+ exit 1
	+fi
	+
	+# Make sure $GNUPGHOME is set.
	+if test "x$GNUPGHOME" = x
	+then
	+ echo "GNUPGHOME not set."
	+ exit 1
	+fi
	+
	+# Import the test keys.
	+$GPG --import $srcdir/tofu-keys.asc
	+
	+# Make sure the keys are imported.
	+for k in $KEYS
	+do
	+ if ! $GPG --list-keys $k >/dev/null 2>&1
	+ then
	+ echo Missing key $k
	+ exit 1
	+ fi
	+done
	+
	+format=auto
	+
	+debug()
	+{
	+ echo "$@" >&2
	+}
	+
	+debug_exec()
	+{
	+ debug "Running GNUPGHOME=$GNUPGHOME $@"
	+ ${@:+"$@"}
	+}
	+
	+# $1 is the keyid of the policy to lookup. Any remaining arguments
	+# are simply passed to GPG.
	+#
	+# This function only supports keys with a single user id.
	+getpolicy()
	+{
	+ keyid=$1
	+ if test x$keyid = x
	+ then
	+ echo No keyid supplied!
	+ exit 1
	+ fi
	+ shift
	+
	+ policy=$(debug_exec $GPG --tofu-db-format=$format --trust-model=tofu \
	+ --with-colons $@ --list-keys "$keyid" \
	+ \| awk -F: '/^uid:/ { print $18 }')
	+ if test $(echo "$policy" \| wc -l) -ne 1
	+ then
	+ echo "Got: $policy" >&2
	+ echo "error"
	+ else
	+ case $policy in
	+ auto\|good\|unknown\|bad\|ask) echo $policy ;;
	+ *) echo "error" ;;
	+ esac
	+ fi
	+}
	+
	+# $1 is the key id
	+# $2 is the expected policy
	+# The rest are additional options to pass to gpg.
	+checkpolicy()
	+{
	+ debug
	+ debug "checkpolicy($@)"
	+
	+ keyid=$1
	+ shift
	+ expected_policy=$1
	+ shift
	+ policy=$(getpolicy "$keyid" ${@:+"$@"})
	+ if test "x$policy" != "x$expected_policy"
	+ then
	+ echo "$keyid: Expected policy to be \`$expected_policy', but got \`$policy'."
	+ exit 1
	+ fi
	+}
	+
	+# $1 is the keyid of the trust level to lookup. Any remaining
	+# arguments are simply passed to GPG.
	+#
	+# This function only supports keys with a single user id.
	+gettrust()
	+{
	+ keyid=$1
	+ if test x$keyid = x
	+ then
	+ echo No keyid supplied!
	+ exit 1
	+ fi
	+ shift
	+
	+ trust=$(debug_exec $GPG --tofu-db-format=$format --trust-model=tofu \
	+ --with-colons $@ --list-keys "$keyid" \
	+ \| awk -F: '/^pub:/ { print $2 }')
	+ if test $(echo "$trust" \| wc -l) -ne 1
	+ then
	+ echo "error"
	+ else
	+ case $trust in
	+ [oidreqnmfuws-]) echo $trust ;;
	+ *) echo "Bad trust value: $trust" >&2; echo "error" ;;
	+ esac
	+ fi
	+}
	+
	+# $1 is the key id
	+# $2 is the expected trust level
	+# The rest are additional options to pass to gpg.
	+checktrust()
	+{
	+ debug
	+ debug "checktrust($@)"
	+
	+ keyid=$1
	+ shift
	+ expected_trust=$1
	+ shift
	+ trust=$(gettrust "$keyid" ${@:+"$@"})
	+ if test "x$trust" != "x$expected_trust"
	+ then
	+ echo "$keyid: Expected trust to be \`$expected_trust', but got \`$trust'."
	+ exit 1
	+ fi
	+}
	+
	+# Set key $1's policy to $2. Any remaining arguments are passed as
	+# options to gpg.
	+setpolicy()
	+{
	+ debug
	+ debug "setpolicy($@)"
	+
	+ keyid=$1
	+ shift
	+ policy=$1
	+ shift
	+
	+ debug_exec $GPG --tofu-db-format=$format \
	+ --trust-model=tofu ${@:+"$@"} --tofu-policy $policy $keyid
	+}
	+
	+for format in split flat
	+do
	+ debug
	+ debug "Testing with db format $format"
	+
	+ # Carefully remove the TOFU db.
	+ test -e $GNUPGHOME/tofu.db && rm $GNUPGHOME/tofu.db
	+ test -e $GNUPGHOME/tofu.d/email && rm -r $GNUPGHOME/tofu.d/email
	+ test -e $GNUPGHOME/tofu.d/key && rm -r $GNUPGHOME/tofu.d/key
	+ # This will fail if the directory is not empty.
	+ test -e $GNUPGHOME/tofu.d && rmdir $GNUPGHOME/tofu.d
	+
	+ # Verify a message. There should be no conflict and the trust policy
	+ # should be set to auto.
	+ debug_exec $GPG --tofu-db-format=$format --trust-model=tofu \
	+ --verify $srcdir/tofu-2183839A-1.txt
	+
	+ checkpolicy 2183839A auto
	+
	+ trust=$(gettrust 2183839A)
	+ debug "default trust = $trust"
	+ if test "x$trust" != xm
	+ then
	+ echo "Wrong default trust. Got: \`$trust', expected \`m'"
	+ exit 1
	+ fi
	+
	+ # Trust should be derived lazily. Thus, if the policy is set to auto
	+ # and we change --tofu-default-policy, then the trust should change as
	+ # well. Try it.
	+ checktrust 2183839A f --tofu-default-policy=good
	+ checktrust 2183839A - --tofu-default-policy=unknown
	+ checktrust 2183839A n --tofu-default-policy=bad
	+
	+ # Change the policy to something other than auto and make sure the
	+ # policy and the trust are correct.
	+ for policy in good unknown bad
	+ do
	+ if test $policy = good
	+ then
	+ expected_trust='f'
	+ elif test $policy = unknown
	+ then
	+ expected_trust='-'
	+ else
	+ expected_trust='n'
	+ fi
	+
	+ debug
	+ debug "Setting TOFU policy to $policy"
	+ setpolicy 2183839A $policy
	+
	+ # Since we have a fixed policy, the trust level shouldn't
	+ # change if we change the default policy.
	+ for default_policy in auto good unknown bad ask
	+ do
	+ checkpolicy 2183839A $policy --tofu-default-policy=$default_policy
	+ checktrust 2183839A $expected_trust \
	+ --tofu-default-policy=$default_policy
	+ done
	+ done
	+
	+ # BC15C85A conflicts with 2183839A. On conflict, this will set
	+ # BC15C85A to ask. If 2183839A is auto (it's not, it's bad), then
	+ # it will be set to ask.
	+ debug_exec $GPG --tofu-db-format=$format --trust-model=tofu \
	+ --verify $srcdir/tofu-BC15C85A-1.txt
	+ checkpolicy BC15C85A ask
	+ checkpolicy 2183839A bad
	+
	+ # EE37CF96 conflicts with 2183839A and BC15C85A. We change
	+ # BC15C85A's policy to auto and leave 2183839A's policy at bad.
	+ # This conflict should cause BC15C85A's policy to be changed to
	+ # ask (since it is auto), but not affect 2183839A's policy.
	+ setpolicy BC15C85A auto
	+ checkpolicy BC15C85A auto
	+ debug_exec $GPG --tofu-db-format=$format --trust-model=tofu \
	+ --verify $srcdir/tofu-EE37CF96-1.txt
	+ checkpolicy BC15C85A ask
	+ checkpolicy 2183839A bad
	+ checkpolicy EE37CF96 ask
	+done
	+
	+exit 0

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