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pksign.c
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/* pksign.c - public key signing (well, actually using a secret key)
* Copyright (C) 2001-2004, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2001-2004, 2010, 2013 Werner Koch
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include
<config.h>
#include
<errno.h>
#include
<stdio.h>
#include
<stdlib.h>
#include
<string.h>
#include
<ctype.h>
#include
<sys/stat.h>
#include
"agent.h"
#include
"../common/i18n.h"
static
int
do_encode_md
(
const
byte
*
md
,
size_t
mdlen
,
int
algo
,
gcry_sexp_t
*
r_hash
,
int
raw_value
)
{
gcry_sexp_t
hash
;
int
rc
;
if
(
!
raw_value
)
{
const
char
*
s
;
char
tmp
[
16
+
1
];
int
i
;
s
=
gcry_md_algo_name
(
algo
);
if
(
!
s
||
strlen
(
s
)
>=
16
)
{
hash
=
NULL
;
rc
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO
);
}
else
{
for
(
i
=
0
;
s
[
i
];
i
++
)
tmp
[
i
]
=
ascii_tolower
(
s
[
i
]);
tmp
[
i
]
=
'\0'
;
rc
=
gcry_sexp_build
(
&
hash
,
NULL
,
"(data (flags pkcs1) (hash %s %b))"
,
tmp
,
(
int
)
mdlen
,
md
);
}
}
else
{
rc
=
gcry_sexp_build
(
&
hash
,
NULL
,
"(data (flags raw) (value %b))"
,
(
int
)
mdlen
,
md
);
}
*
r_hash
=
hash
;
return
rc
;
}
/* Return the number of bits of the Q parameter from the DSA key
KEY. */
static
unsigned
int
get_dsa_qbits
(
gcry_sexp_t
key
)
{
gcry_sexp_t
l1
,
l2
;
gcry_mpi_t
q
;
unsigned
int
nbits
;
l1
=
gcry_sexp_find_token
(
key
,
"private-key"
,
0
);
if
(
!
l1
)
l1
=
gcry_sexp_find_token
(
key
,
"protected-private-key"
,
0
);
if
(
!
l1
)
l1
=
gcry_sexp_find_token
(
key
,
"shadowed-private-key"
,
0
);
if
(
!
l1
)
l1
=
gcry_sexp_find_token
(
key
,
"public-key"
,
0
);
if
(
!
l1
)
return
0
;
/* Does not contain a key object. */
l2
=
gcry_sexp_cadr
(
l1
);
gcry_sexp_release
(
l1
);
l1
=
gcry_sexp_find_token
(
l2
,
"q"
,
1
);
gcry_sexp_release
(
l2
);
if
(
!
l1
)
return
0
;
/* Invalid object. */
q
=
gcry_sexp_nth_mpi
(
l1
,
1
,
GCRYMPI_FMT_USG
);
gcry_sexp_release
(
l1
);
if
(
!
q
)
return
0
;
/* Missing value. */
nbits
=
gcry_mpi_get_nbits
(
q
);
gcry_mpi_release
(
q
);
return
nbits
;
}
/* Return an appropriate hash algorithm to be used with RFC-6979 for a
message digest of length MDLEN. Although a fallback of SHA-256 is
used the current implementation in Libgcrypt will reject a hash
algorithm which does not match the length of the message. */
static
const
char
*
rfc6979_hash_algo_string
(
size_t
mdlen
)
{
switch
(
mdlen
)
{
case
20
:
return
"sha1"
;
case
28
:
return
"sha224"
;
case
32
:
return
"sha256"
;
case
48
:
return
"sha384"
;
case
64
:
return
"sha512"
;
default
:
return
"sha256"
;
}
}
/* Encode a message digest for use with the EdDSA algorithm
(i.e. curve Ed25519). */
static
gpg_error_t
do_encode_eddsa
(
size_t
nbits
,
const
byte
*
md
,
size_t
mdlen
,
gcry_sexp_t
*
r_hash
)
{
gpg_error_t
err
;
gcry_sexp_t
hash
;
const
char
*
fmt
;
if
(
nbits
==
448
)
fmt
=
"(data(value %b))"
;
else
fmt
=
"(data(flags eddsa)(hash-algo sha512)(value %b))"
;
*
r_hash
=
NULL
;
err
=
gcry_sexp_build
(
&
hash
,
NULL
,
fmt
,
(
int
)
mdlen
,
md
);
if
(
!
err
)
*
r_hash
=
hash
;
return
err
;
}
/* Encode a message digest for use with an DSA algorithm. */
static
gpg_error_t
do_encode_dsa
(
const
byte
*
md
,
size_t
mdlen
,
int
pkalgo
,
gcry_sexp_t
pkey
,
gcry_sexp_t
*
r_hash
)
{
gpg_error_t
err
;
gcry_sexp_t
hash
;
unsigned
int
qbits
;
*
r_hash
=
NULL
;
if
(
pkalgo
==
GCRY_PK_ECC
)
qbits
=
gcry_pk_get_nbits
(
pkey
);
else
if
(
pkalgo
==
GCRY_PK_DSA
)
qbits
=
get_dsa_qbits
(
pkey
);
else
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_WRONG_PUBKEY_ALGO
);
if
(
pkalgo
==
GCRY_PK_DSA
&&
(
qbits
%
8
))
{
/* FIXME: We check the QBITS but print a message about the hash
length. */
log_error
(
_
(
"DSA requires the hash length to be a"
" multiple of 8 bits
\n
"
));
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH
);
}
/* Don't allow any Q smaller than 160 bits. We don't want someone
to issue signatures from a key with a 16-bit Q or something like
that, which would look correct but allow trivial forgeries. Yes,
I know this rules out using MD5 with DSA. ;) */
if
(
qbits
<
160
)
{
log_error
(
_
(
"%s key uses an unsafe (%u bit) hash
\n
"
),
gcry_pk_algo_name
(
pkalgo
),
qbits
);
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH
);
}
/* ECDSA 521 is special as it is larger than the largest hash
we have (SHA-512). Thus we change the size for further
processing to 512. */
if
(
pkalgo
==
GCRY_PK_ECC
&&
qbits
>
512
)
qbits
=
512
;
/* Check if we're too short. Too long is safe as we'll
automatically left-truncate. */
if
(
mdlen
<
qbits
/
8
)
{
log_error
(
_
(
"a %zu bit hash is not valid for a %u bit %s key
\n
"
),
mdlen
*
8
,
gcry_pk_get_nbits
(
pkey
),
gcry_pk_algo_name
(
pkalgo
));
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH
);
}
/* Truncate. */
if
(
mdlen
>
qbits
/
8
)
mdlen
=
qbits
/
8
;
/* Create the S-expression. */
err
=
gcry_sexp_build
(
&
hash
,
NULL
,
"(data (flags rfc6979) (hash %s %b))"
,
rfc6979_hash_algo_string
(
mdlen
),
(
int
)
mdlen
,
md
);
if
(
!
err
)
*
r_hash
=
hash
;
return
err
;
}
/* Special version of do_encode_md to take care of pkcs#1 padding.
For TLS-MD5SHA1 we need to do the padding ourself as Libgrypt does
not know about this special scheme. Fixme: We should have a
pkcs1-only-padding flag for Libgcrypt. */
static
int
do_encode_raw_pkcs1
(
const
byte
*
md
,
size_t
mdlen
,
unsigned
int
nbits
,
gcry_sexp_t
*
r_hash
)
{
int
rc
;
gcry_sexp_t
hash
;
unsigned
char
*
frame
;
size_t
i
,
n
,
nframe
;
nframe
=
(
nbits
+
7
)
/
8
;
if
(
!
mdlen
||
mdlen
+
8
+
4
>
nframe
)
{
/* Can't encode this hash into a frame of size NFRAME. */
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT
);
}
frame
=
xtrymalloc
(
nframe
);
if
(
!
frame
)
return
gpg_error_from_syserror
();
/* Assemble the pkcs#1 block type 1. */
n
=
0
;
frame
[
n
++
]
=
0
;
frame
[
n
++
]
=
1
;
/* Block type. */
i
=
nframe
-
mdlen
-
3
;
log_assert
(
i
>=
8
);
/* At least 8 bytes of padding. */
memset
(
frame
+
n
,
0xff
,
i
);
n
+=
i
;
frame
[
n
++
]
=
0
;
memcpy
(
frame
+
n
,
md
,
mdlen
);
n
+=
mdlen
;
log_assert
(
n
==
nframe
);
/* Create the S-expression. */
rc
=
gcry_sexp_build
(
&
hash
,
NULL
,
"(data (flags raw) (value %b))"
,
(
int
)
nframe
,
frame
);
xfree
(
frame
);
*
r_hash
=
hash
;
return
rc
;
}
/* SIGN whatever information we have accumulated in CTRL and return
* the signature S-expression. LOOKUP is an optional function to
* provide a way for lower layers to ask for the caching TTL. If a
* CACHE_NONCE is given that cache item is first tried to get a
* passphrase. If OVERRIDEDATA is not NULL, OVERRIDEDATALEN bytes
* from this buffer are used instead of the data in CTRL. The
* override feature is required to allow the use of Ed25519 with ssh
* because Ed25519 does the hashing itself. */
gpg_error_t
agent_pksign_do
(
ctrl_t
ctrl
,
const
char
*
cache_nonce
,
const
char
*
desc_text
,
gcry_sexp_t
*
signature_sexp
,
cache_mode_t
cache_mode
,
lookup_ttl_t
lookup_ttl
,
const
void
*
overridedata
,
size_t
overridedatalen
)
{
gpg_error_t
err
=
0
;
gcry_sexp_t
s_skey
=
NULL
;
gcry_sexp_t
s_sig
=
NULL
;
gcry_sexp_t
s_hash
=
NULL
;
gcry_sexp_t
s_pkey
=
NULL
;
unsigned
char
*
shadow_info
=
NULL
;
int
no_shadow_info
=
0
;
const
unsigned
char
*
data
;
int
datalen
;
int
check_signature
=
0
;
int
algo
;
if
(
overridedata
)
{
data
=
overridedata
;
datalen
=
overridedatalen
;
}
else
if
(
ctrl
->
digest
.
data
)
{
data
=
ctrl
->
digest
.
data
;
datalen
=
ctrl
->
digest
.
valuelen
;
}
else
{
data
=
ctrl
->
digest
.
value
;
datalen
=
ctrl
->
digest
.
valuelen
;
}
if
(
!
ctrl
->
have_keygrip
)
return
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY
);
err
=
agent_key_from_file
(
ctrl
,
cache_nonce
,
desc_text
,
NULL
,
&
shadow_info
,
cache_mode
,
lookup_ttl
,
&
s_skey
,
NULL
,
NULL
);
if
(
gpg_err_code
(
err
)
==
GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY
)
no_shadow_info
=
1
;
else
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
"failed to read the secret key
\n
"
);
goto
leave
;
}
else
algo
=
get_pk_algo_from_key
(
s_skey
);
if
(
shadow_info
||
no_shadow_info
)
{
/* Divert operation to the smartcard. With NO_SHADOW_INFO set
* we don't have the keystub but we want to see whether the key
* is on the active card. */
size_t
len
;
unsigned
char
*
buf
=
NULL
;
if
(
no_shadow_info
)
{
/* Try to get the public key from the card or fail with the
* original NO_SECKEY error. We also write a stub file (we
* are here only because no stub exists). */
char
*
serialno
;
unsigned
char
*
pkbuf
=
NULL
;
size_t
pkbuflen
;
char
hexgrip
[
2
*
KEYGRIP_LEN
+
1
];
char
*
keyref
;
if
(
agent_card_serialno
(
ctrl
,
&
serialno
,
NULL
))
{
/* No card available or error reading the card. */
err
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY
);
goto
leave
;
}
bin2hex
(
ctrl
->
keygrip
,
KEYGRIP_LEN
,
hexgrip
);
if
(
agent_card_readkey
(
ctrl
,
hexgrip
,
&
pkbuf
,
&
keyref
))
{
/* No such key on the card. */
xfree
(
serialno
);
err
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY
);
goto
leave
;
}
pkbuflen
=
gcry_sexp_canon_len
(
pkbuf
,
0
,
NULL
,
NULL
);
err
=
gcry_sexp_sscan
(
&
s_pkey
,
NULL
,
(
char
*
)
pkbuf
,
pkbuflen
);
if
(
err
)
{
xfree
(
serialno
);
xfree
(
pkbuf
);
xfree
(
keyref
);
log_error
(
"%s: corrupted key returned by scdaemon
\n
"
,
__func__
);
goto
leave
;
}
if
(
keyref
)
agent_write_shadow_key
(
ctrl
->
keygrip
,
serialno
,
keyref
,
pkbuf
,
0
);
algo
=
get_pk_algo_from_key
(
s_pkey
);
xfree
(
serialno
);
xfree
(
pkbuf
);
xfree
(
keyref
);
}
else
{
/* Get the public key from the stub file. */
err
=
agent_public_key_from_file
(
ctrl
,
ctrl
->
keygrip
,
&
s_pkey
);
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
"failed to read the public key
\n
"
);
goto
leave
;
}
}
{
if
(
agent_is_tpm2_key
(
s_skey
))
err
=
divert_tpm2_pksign
(
ctrl
,
data
,
datalen
,
ctrl
->
digest
.
algo
,
shadow_info
,
&
buf
,
&
len
);
else
err
=
divert_pksign
(
ctrl
,
ctrl
->
keygrip
,
data
,
datalen
,
ctrl
->
digest
.
algo
,
&
buf
,
&
len
);
}
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
"smartcard signing failed: %s
\n
"
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
goto
leave
;
}
if
(
algo
==
GCRY_PK_RSA
)
{
unsigned
char
*
p
=
buf
;
check_signature
=
1
;
/*
* Smartcard returns fixed-size data, which is good for
* PKCS1. If variable-size unsigned MPI is needed, remove
* zeros.
*/
if
(
ctrl
->
digest
.
algo
==
MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1
||
ctrl
->
digest
.
raw_value
)
{
int
i
;
for
(
i
=
0
;
i
<
len
-
1
;
i
++
)
if
(
p
[
i
])
break
;
p
+=
i
;
len
-=
i
;
}
err
=
gcry_sexp_build
(
&
s_sig
,
NULL
,
"(sig-val(rsa(s%b)))"
,
(
int
)
len
,
p
);
}
else
if
(
algo
==
GCRY_PK_EDDSA
)
{
err
=
gcry_sexp_build
(
&
s_sig
,
NULL
,
"(sig-val(eddsa(r%b)(s%b)))"
,
(
int
)
len
/
2
,
buf
,
(
int
)
len
/
2
,
buf
+
len
/
2
);
}
else
if
(
algo
==
GCRY_PK_ECC
)
{
unsigned
char
*
r_buf
,
*
s_buf
;
int
r_buflen
,
s_buflen
;
int
i
;
r_buflen
=
s_buflen
=
len
/
2
;
/*
* Smartcard returns fixed-size data. For ECDSA signature,
* variable-size unsigned MPI is assumed, thus, remove
* zeros.
*/
r_buf
=
buf
;
for
(
i
=
0
;
i
<
r_buflen
-
1
;
i
++
)
if
(
r_buf
[
i
])
break
;
r_buf
+=
i
;
r_buflen
-=
i
;
s_buf
=
buf
+
len
/
2
;
for
(
i
=
0
;
i
<
s_buflen
-
1
;
i
++
)
if
(
s_buf
[
i
])
break
;
s_buf
+=
i
;
s_buflen
-=
i
;
err
=
gcry_sexp_build
(
&
s_sig
,
NULL
,
"(sig-val(ecdsa(r%b)(s%b)))"
,
r_buflen
,
r_buf
,
s_buflen
,
s_buf
);
}
else
err
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED
);
xfree
(
buf
);
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
"failed to convert sigbuf returned by divert_pksign "
"into S-Exp: %s"
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
goto
leave
;
}
}
else
{
/* No smartcard, but a private key (in S_SKEY). */
/* Put the hash into a sexp */
if
(
algo
==
GCRY_PK_EDDSA
)
err
=
do_encode_eddsa
(
gcry_pk_get_nbits
(
s_skey
),
data
,
datalen
,
&
s_hash
);
else
if
(
ctrl
->
digest
.
algo
==
MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1
)
err
=
do_encode_raw_pkcs1
(
data
,
datalen
,
gcry_pk_get_nbits
(
s_skey
),
&
s_hash
);
else
if
(
algo
==
GCRY_PK_DSA
||
algo
==
GCRY_PK_ECC
)
err
=
do_encode_dsa
(
data
,
datalen
,
algo
,
s_skey
,
&
s_hash
);
else
if
(
ctrl
->
digest
.
is_pss
)
{
log_info
(
"signing with rsaPSS is currently only supported"
" for (some) smartcards
\n
"
);
err
=
gpg_error
(
GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED
);
}
else
err
=
do_encode_md
(
data
,
datalen
,
ctrl
->
digest
.
algo
,
&
s_hash
,
ctrl
->
digest
.
raw_value
);
if
(
err
)
goto
leave
;
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
{
gcry_log_debugsxp
(
"skey"
,
s_skey
);
gcry_log_debugsxp
(
"hash"
,
s_hash
);
}
/* sign */
err
=
gcry_pk_sign
(
&
s_sig
,
s_hash
,
s_skey
);
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
"signing failed: %s
\n
"
,
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
goto
leave
;
}
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
gcry_log_debugsxp
(
"rslt"
,
s_sig
);
}
/* Check that the signature verification worked and nothing is
* fooling us e.g. by a bug in the signature create code or by
* deliberately introduced faults. Because Libgcrypt 1.7 does this
* for RSA internally there is no need to do it here again. We do
* this always for card based RSA keys, though. */
if
(
check_signature
)
{
gcry_sexp_t
sexp_key
=
s_pkey
?
s_pkey
:
s_skey
;
if
(
s_hash
==
NULL
)
{
if
(
ctrl
->
digest
.
is_pss
)
{
err
=
gcry_sexp_build
(
&
s_hash
,
NULL
,
"(data (flags raw) (value %b))"
,
(
int
)
datalen
,
data
);
}
else
if
(
algo
==
GCRY_PK_DSA
||
algo
==
GCRY_PK_ECC
)
err
=
do_encode_dsa
(
data
,
datalen
,
algo
,
sexp_key
,
&
s_hash
);
else
if
(
ctrl
->
digest
.
algo
==
MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1
)
err
=
do_encode_raw_pkcs1
(
data
,
datalen
,
gcry_pk_get_nbits
(
sexp_key
),
&
s_hash
);
else
err
=
do_encode_md
(
data
,
datalen
,
ctrl
->
digest
.
algo
,
&
s_hash
,
ctrl
->
digest
.
raw_value
);
}
if
(
!
err
)
err
=
gcry_pk_verify
(
s_sig
,
s_hash
,
sexp_key
);
if
(
err
)
{
log_error
(
_
(
"checking created signature failed: %s
\n
"
),
gpg_strerror
(
err
));
if
(
DBG_CRYPTO
)
{
gcry_log_debugsxp
(
"verify s_hsh"
,
s_hash
);
gcry_log_debugsxp
(
"verify s_sig"
,
s_sig
);
gcry_log_debugsxp
(
"verify s_key"
,
sexp_key
);
}
gcry_sexp_release
(
s_sig
);
s_sig
=
NULL
;
}
}
leave
:
*
signature_sexp
=
s_sig
;
gcry_sexp_release
(
s_pkey
);
gcry_sexp_release
(
s_skey
);
gcry_sexp_release
(
s_hash
);
xfree
(
shadow_info
);
return
err
;
}
/* SIGN whatever information we have accumulated in CTRL and write it
* back to OUTFP. If a CACHE_NONCE is given that cache item is first
* tried to get a passphrase. */
gpg_error_t
agent_pksign
(
ctrl_t
ctrl
,
const
char
*
cache_nonce
,
const
char
*
desc_text
,
membuf_t
*
outbuf
,
cache_mode_t
cache_mode
)
{
gpg_error_t
err
;
gcry_sexp_t
s_sig
=
NULL
;
char
*
buf
=
NULL
;
size_t
len
=
0
;
err
=
agent_pksign_do
(
ctrl
,
cache_nonce
,
desc_text
,
&
s_sig
,
cache_mode
,
NULL
,
NULL
,
0
);
if
(
err
)
goto
leave
;
len
=
gcry_sexp_sprint
(
s_sig
,
GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON
,
NULL
,
0
);
log_assert
(
len
);
buf
=
xtrymalloc
(
len
);
if
(
!
buf
)
{
err
=
gpg_error_from_syserror
();
goto
leave
;
}
len
=
gcry_sexp_sprint
(
s_sig
,
GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON
,
buf
,
len
);
log_assert
(
len
);
put_membuf
(
outbuf
,
buf
,
len
);
leave
:
gcry_sexp_release
(
s_sig
);
xfree
(
buf
);
return
err
;
}
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Expires
Tue, Oct 7, 3:49 AM (1 d, 10 h)
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Storage Handle
cf/54/3da829a59e5fff42f87cb8f74a84
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