diff --git a/cipher/dsa-common.c b/cipher/dsa-common.c
index 6f2c2f9e..8c0a6843 100644
--- a/cipher/dsa-common.c
+++ b/cipher/dsa-common.c
@@ -1,394 +1,394 @@
 /* dsa-common.c - Common code for DSA
  * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  * Copyright (C) 2013  g10 Code GmbH
  *
  * This file is part of Libgcrypt.
  *
  * Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
  * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
  * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
  *
  * Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
  * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
  * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
  * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
  *
  * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
  * License along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  */
 
 #include <config.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
 #include "g10lib.h"
 #include "mpi.h"
 #include "cipher.h"
 #include "pubkey-internal.h"
 
 
 /*
  * Generate a random secret exponent K less than Q.
  * Note that ECDSA uses this code also to generate D.
  */
 gcry_mpi_t
 _gcry_dsa_gen_k (gcry_mpi_t q, int security_level)
 {
   gcry_mpi_t k        = mpi_alloc_secure (mpi_get_nlimbs (q));
   unsigned int nbits  = mpi_get_nbits (q);
   unsigned int nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
   char *rndbuf = NULL;
 
   /* To learn why we don't use mpi_mod to get the requested bit size,
      read the paper: "The Insecurity of the Digital Signature
      Algorithm with Partially Known Nonces" by Nguyen and Shparlinski.
      Journal of Cryptology, New York. Vol 15, nr 3 (2003)  */
 
   if (DBG_CIPHER)
     log_debug ("choosing a random k of %u bits at seclevel %d\n",
                nbits, security_level);
   for (;;)
     {
       if ( !rndbuf || nbits < 32 )
         {
           xfree (rndbuf);
           rndbuf = _gcry_random_bytes_secure (nbytes, security_level);
 	}
       else
         { /* Change only some of the higher bits.  We could improve
 	     this by directly requesting more memory at the first call
 	     to get_random_bytes() and use these extra bytes here.
 	     However the required management code is more complex and
 	     thus we better use this simple method.  */
           char *pp = _gcry_random_bytes_secure (4, security_level);
           memcpy (rndbuf, pp, 4);
           xfree (pp);
 	}
       _gcry_mpi_set_buffer (k, rndbuf, nbytes, 0);
 
       /* Make sure we have the requested number of bits.  This code
          looks a bit funny but it is easy to understand if you
          consider that mpi_set_highbit clears all higher bits.  We
          don't have a clear_highbit, thus we first set the high bit
          and then clear it again.  */
       if (mpi_test_bit (k, nbits-1))
         mpi_set_highbit (k, nbits-1);
       else
         {
           mpi_set_highbit (k, nbits-1);
           mpi_clear_bit (k, nbits-1);
 	}
 
       if (!(mpi_cmp (k, q) < 0))    /* check: k < q */
         {
           if (DBG_CIPHER)
             log_debug ("\tk too large - again\n");
           continue; /* no  */
         }
       if (!(mpi_cmp_ui (k, 0) > 0)) /* check: k > 0 */
         {
           if (DBG_CIPHER)
             log_debug ("\tk is zero - again\n");
           continue; /* no */
         }
       break;	/* okay */
     }
   xfree (rndbuf);
 
   return k;
 }
 
 
 /* Turn VALUE into an octet string and store it in an allocated buffer
    at R_FRAME.  If the resulting octet string is shorter than NBYTES
    the result will be left padded with zeroes.  If VALUE does not fit
    into NBYTES an error code is returned.  */
 static gpg_err_code_t
 int2octets (unsigned char **r_frame, gcry_mpi_t value, size_t nbytes)
 {
   gpg_err_code_t rc;
   size_t nframe, noff, n;
   unsigned char *frame;
 
   rc = _gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, NULL, 0, &nframe, value);
   if (rc)
     return rc;
   if (nframe > nbytes)
     return GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE; /* Value too long to fit into NBYTES.  */
 
   noff = (nframe < nbytes)? nbytes - nframe : 0;
   n = nframe + noff;
   frame = mpi_is_secure (value)? xtrymalloc_secure (n) : xtrymalloc (n);
   if (!frame)
     return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
   if (noff)
     memset (frame, 0, noff);
   nframe += noff;
   rc = _gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, frame+noff, nframe-noff, NULL, value);
   if (rc)
     {
       xfree (frame);
       return rc;
     }
 
   *r_frame = frame;
   return 0;
 }
 
 
 /* Connert the bit string BITS of length NBITS into an octet string
    with a length of (QBITS+7)/8 bytes.  On success store the result at
    R_FRAME.  */
 static gpg_err_code_t
 bits2octets (unsigned char **r_frame,
              const void *bits, unsigned int nbits,
              gcry_mpi_t q, unsigned int qbits)
 {
   gpg_err_code_t rc;
   gcry_mpi_t z1;
 
   /* z1 = bits2int (b) */
   rc = _gcry_mpi_scan (&z1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, bits, (nbits+7)/8, NULL);
   if (rc)
     return rc;
   if (nbits > qbits)
     mpi_rshift (z1, z1, nbits - qbits);
 
   /* z2 - z1 mod q */
   if (mpi_cmp (z1, q) >= 0)
     mpi_sub (z1, z1, q);
 
   /* Convert to an octet string.  */
   rc = int2octets (r_frame, z1, (qbits+7)/8);
 
   mpi_free (z1);
   return rc;
 }
 
 
 /*
  * Generate a deterministic secret exponent K less than DSA_Q.  H1 is
  * the to be signed digest with a length of HLEN bytes.  HALGO is the
  * algorithm used to create the hash.  On success the value for K is
  * stored at R_K.
  */
 gpg_err_code_t
 _gcry_dsa_gen_rfc6979_k (gcry_mpi_t *r_k,
                          gcry_mpi_t dsa_q, gcry_mpi_t dsa_x,
                          const unsigned char *h1, unsigned int hlen,
                          int halgo, unsigned int extraloops)
 {
   gpg_err_code_t rc;
   unsigned char *V = NULL;
   unsigned char *K = NULL;
   unsigned char *x_buf = NULL;
   unsigned char *h1_buf = NULL;
   gcry_md_hd_t hd = NULL;
   unsigned char *t = NULL;
   gcry_mpi_t k = NULL;
   unsigned int tbits, qbits;
   int i;
 
   qbits = mpi_get_nbits (dsa_q);
 
   if (!qbits || !h1 || !hlen)
     return GPG_ERR_EINVAL;
 
   if (_gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (halgo) != hlen)
     return GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
 
   /* Step b:  V = 0x01 0x01 0x01 ... 0x01 */
   V = xtrymalloc (hlen);
   if (!V)
     {
       rc = gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
       goto leave;
     }
   for (i=0; i < hlen; i++)
     V[i] = 1;
 
   /* Step c:  K = 0x00 0x00 0x00 ... 0x00 */
   K = xtrycalloc (1, hlen);
   if (!K)
     {
       rc = gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
       goto leave;
     }
 
   rc = int2octets (&x_buf, dsa_x, (qbits+7)/8);
   if (rc)
     goto leave;
 
   rc = bits2octets (&h1_buf, h1, hlen*8, dsa_q, qbits);
   if (rc)
     goto leave;
 
   /* Create a handle to compute the HMACs.  */
   rc = _gcry_md_open (&hd, halgo, (GCRY_MD_FLAG_SECURE | GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC));
   if (rc)
     goto leave;
 
   /* Step d:  K = HMAC_K(V || 0x00 || int2octets(x) || bits2octets(h1) */
   rc = _gcry_md_setkey (hd, K, hlen);
   if (rc)
     goto leave;
   _gcry_md_write (hd, V, hlen);
   _gcry_md_write (hd, "", 1);
   _gcry_md_write (hd, x_buf, (qbits+7)/8);
   _gcry_md_write (hd, h1_buf, (qbits+7)/8);
   memcpy (K, _gcry_md_read (hd, 0), hlen);
 
   /* Step e:  V = HMAC_K(V) */
   rc = _gcry_md_setkey (hd, K, hlen);
   if (rc)
     goto leave;
   _gcry_md_write (hd, V, hlen);
   memcpy (V, _gcry_md_read (hd, 0), hlen);
 
   /* Step f:  K = HMAC_K(V || 0x01 || int2octets(x) || bits2octets(h1) */
   rc = _gcry_md_setkey (hd, K, hlen);
   if (rc)
     goto leave;
   _gcry_md_write (hd, V, hlen);
   _gcry_md_write (hd, "\x01", 1);
   _gcry_md_write (hd, x_buf, (qbits+7)/8);
   _gcry_md_write (hd, h1_buf, (qbits+7)/8);
   memcpy (K, _gcry_md_read (hd, 0), hlen);
 
   /* Step g:  V = HMAC_K(V) */
   rc = _gcry_md_setkey (hd, K, hlen);
   if (rc)
     goto leave;
   _gcry_md_write (hd, V, hlen);
   memcpy (V, _gcry_md_read (hd, 0), hlen);
 
   /* Step h. */
-  t = xtrymalloc ((qbits+7)/8+hlen);
+  t = xtrymalloc_secure ((qbits+7)/8+hlen);
   if (!t)
     {
       rc = gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
       goto leave;
     }
 
  again:
   for (tbits = 0; tbits < qbits;)
     {
       /* V = HMAC_K(V) */
       rc = _gcry_md_setkey (hd, K, hlen);
       if (rc)
         goto leave;
       _gcry_md_write (hd, V, hlen);
       memcpy (V, _gcry_md_read (hd, 0), hlen);
 
       /* T = T || V */
       memcpy (t+(tbits+7)/8, V, hlen);
       tbits += 8*hlen;
     }
 
   /* k = bits2int (T) */
   mpi_free (k);
   k = NULL;
   rc = _gcry_mpi_scan (&k, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, t, (tbits+7)/8, NULL);
   if (rc)
     goto leave;
   if (tbits > qbits)
     mpi_rshift (k, k, tbits - qbits);
 
   /* Check: k < q and k > 1 */
   if (!(mpi_cmp (k, dsa_q) < 0 && mpi_cmp_ui (k, 0) > 0))
     {
       /* K = HMAC_K(V || 0x00) */
       rc = _gcry_md_setkey (hd, K, hlen);
       if (rc)
         goto leave;
       _gcry_md_write (hd, V, hlen);
       _gcry_md_write (hd, "", 1);
       memcpy (K, _gcry_md_read (hd, 0), hlen);
 
       /* V = HMAC_K(V) */
       rc = _gcry_md_setkey (hd, K, hlen);
       if (rc)
         goto leave;
       _gcry_md_write (hd, V, hlen);
       memcpy (V, _gcry_md_read (hd, 0), hlen);
 
       goto again;
     }
 
   /* The caller may have requested that we introduce some extra loops.
      This is for example useful if the caller wants another value for
      K because the last returned one yielded an R of 0.  Because this
      is very unlikely we implement it in a straightforward way.  */
   if (extraloops)
     {
       extraloops--;
 
       /* K = HMAC_K(V || 0x00) */
       rc = _gcry_md_setkey (hd, K, hlen);
       if (rc)
         goto leave;
       _gcry_md_write (hd, V, hlen);
       _gcry_md_write (hd, "", 1);
       memcpy (K, _gcry_md_read (hd, 0), hlen);
 
       /* V = HMAC_K(V) */
       rc = _gcry_md_setkey (hd, K, hlen);
       if (rc)
         goto leave;
       _gcry_md_write (hd, V, hlen);
       memcpy (V, _gcry_md_read (hd, 0), hlen);
 
       goto again;
     }
 
   /* log_mpidump ("  k", k); */
 
  leave:
   xfree (t);
   _gcry_md_close (hd);
   xfree (h1_buf);
   xfree (x_buf);
   xfree (K);
   xfree (V);
 
   if (rc)
     mpi_free (k);
   else
     *r_k = k;
   return rc;
 }
 
 /*
  * Truncate opaque hash value to qbits for DSA.
  * Non-opaque input is not truncated, in hope that user
  * knows what is passed. It is not possible to correctly
  * trucate non-opaque inputs.
  */
 gpg_err_code_t
 _gcry_dsa_normalize_hash (gcry_mpi_t input,
                           gcry_mpi_t *out,
                           unsigned int qbits)
 {
   gpg_err_code_t rc = 0;
   const void *abuf;
   unsigned int abits;
   gcry_mpi_t hash;
 
   if (mpi_is_opaque (input))
     {
       abuf = mpi_get_opaque (input, &abits);
       rc = _gcry_mpi_scan (&hash, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, abuf, (abits+7)/8, NULL);
       if (rc)
         return rc;
       if (abits > qbits)
         mpi_rshift (hash, hash, abits - qbits);
     }
   else
     hash = input;
 
   *out = hash;
 
   return rc;
 }