diff --git a/web/download/integrity_check.org b/web/download/integrity_check.org
index fa045ff..8a7a303 100644
--- a/web/download/integrity_check.org
+++ b/web/download/integrity_check.org
@@ -1,128 +1,128 @@
 #+TITLE: GnuPG - Integrity Check
 #+STARTUP: showall
 #+SETUPFILE: "../share/setup.inc"
 #+GPGWEB-NEED-SWDB
 #+OPTIONS:  ^:{}
 
 * Integrity Check
 #+index: integrity check
 
   You can check that the version of GnuPG that you want to install is
   original and unmodified by either verifying the file's signature or
   comparing the checksum with the one published in the release
   announcement.
 
 ** Verifying the File's Signature
 
   If you already have a trusted version of GnuPG installed, you can
   check the supplied signature.  For example, to check the signature
   of the file gnupg-{{{gnupg22_ver}}}.tar.bz2, you can use this command:
 
   {{{begin_example}}}
   $ gpg {{{twodashes}}}verify gnupg-{{{gnupg22_ver}}}.tar.bz2.sig gnupg-{{{gnupg22_ver}}}.tar.bz2
   {{{end_example}}}
 
   *Note: you should never use a GnuPG version you just downloaded to
   check the integrity of the source* --- use an existing, trusted GnuPG
   installation, e.g., the one provided by your distribution.
 
   If the output of the above command is similar to the following, then
   either you don't have our distribution keys (our [[../signature_key.org][signing keys are
   here]]) or the signature was generated by someone else and the file
   should be treated suspiciously.
 
   {{{begin_example}}}
   gpg: Signature made Fri 09 Oct 2015 05:41:55 PM CEST using RSA key ID 4F25E3B6
   gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
   gpg: Signature made Tue 13 Oct 2015 10:18:01 AM CEST using RSA key ID 33BD3F06
   gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
   {{{end_example}}}
 
   If you instead see:
 
   {{{begin_example}}}
   gpg: Good signature from "Werner Koch (dist sig)" [unknown]
   gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
   gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
   Primary key fingerprint: D869 2123 C406 5DEA 5E0F  3AB5 249B 39D2 4F25 E3B6
   gpg: Signature made Tue 13 Oct 2015 10:18:01 AM CEST using RSA key ID 33BD3F06
   gpg: Good signature from "NIIBE Yutaka (GnuPG Release Key) <gniibe@fsij.org>" [unknown]
   gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
   gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
   Primary key fingerprint: 031E C253 6E58 0D8E A286  A9F2 2071 B08A 33BD 3F06
   {{{end_example}}}
 
   then you have a copy of our keys and the signatures are valid, but
   either you have not marked the keys as trusted or the keys are a
   forgery.  In this case, at the very least, you should compare the
   fingerprints that are shown to those on the [[../signature_key.org][signing keys page]].  Even
   better is to compare the fingerprints with those shown on our
   business cards, which we handout at events that we attend.
 
   Ideally, you'll see something like:
 
   {{{begin_example}}}
   gpg: Signature made Fri 09 Oct 2015 05:41:55 PM CEST using RSA key ID 4F25E3B6
   gpg: Good signature from "Werner Koch (dist sig)" [full]
   gpg: Signature made Tue 13 Oct 2015 10:18:01 AM CEST using RSA key ID 33BD3F06
   gpg: Good signature from "NIIBE Yutaka (GnuPG Release Key) <gniibe@fsij.org>" [full]
   {{{end_example}}}
 
   This means that the signature is valid and that you trust this key
   (either you signed it or someone you trusted did).
 
 ** Comparing Checksums
 
    If you are not able to use an old version of GnuPG, you can still
    verify the file's SHA-1 checksum.  This is less secure, because if
    someone modified the files as they were transferred to you, it
    would not be much more effort to modify the checksums that you see
    on this webpage.  As such, if you use this method, you should
    compare the checksums with those in release announcement.  This is
    sent to the gnupg-announce mailing list (among others), which is
    widely mirrored.  Don't use the mailing list archive on this
    website, but find the announcement on several other websites and
    make sure the checksum is consistent.  This makes it more difficult
    for an attacker to trick you into installing a modified version of
    the software.
 
    Assuming you downloaded the file gnupg-{{{gnupg22_ver}}}.tar.bz2, you
    can run the =sha1sum= command like this:
 
    {{{begin_chksum}}}
    sha1sum gnupg-{{{gnupg22_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{end_chksum}}}
 
    and check that the output matches the SHA-1 checksum reported on
    this site. An example of a =sha1sum= output is:
 
    {{{begin_chksum}}}
    {{{gnupg22_sha1}}}  gnupg-{{{gnupg22_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{end_chksum}}}
 
 ** List of SHA-1 check-sums
 
    For your convenience, all SHA-1 check-sums available for software
    that can be downloaded from [[https://gnupg.org/ftp/][our site]], have been gathered below.
 
    {{{begin_chksum}}}
    {{{gnupg22_sha1}}}  gnupg-{{{gnupg22_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{gnupg22_w32_sha1}}}  gnupg-w32-{{{gnupg22_w32_ver}}}.exe
    {{{libgpg_error_sha1}}}  libgpg-error-{{{libgpg_error_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{libgcrypt_sha1}}}  libgcrypt-{{{libgcrypt_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{libksba_sha1}}}  libksba-{{{libksba_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{libassuan_sha1}}}  libassuan-{{{libassuan_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{ntbtls_sha1}}}  ntbtls-{{{ntbtls_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{npth_sha1}}}  npth-{{{npth_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{pinentry_sha1}}}  pinentry-{{{pinentry_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{gpgme_sha1}}}  gpgme-{{{gpgme_ver}}}.tar.bz2
-   {{{scute_sha1}}}  scute-{{{gpgme_ver}}}.tar.bz2
+   {{{scute_sha1}}}  scute-{{{scute_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{gpa_sha1}}}  gpa-{{{gpa_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{dirmngr_sha1}}}  dirmngr-{{{dirmngr_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{gnupg20_sha1}}}  gnupg-{{{gnupg20_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{gnupg1_sha1}}}  gnupg-{{{gnupg1_ver}}}.tar.bz2
    {{{gnupg1_w32cli_sha1}}}  gnupg-w32cli-{{{gnupg1_w32cli_ver}}}.exe
    {{{end_chksum}}}
 
 
 # eof #