diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi index f19058146..f092b270d 100644 --- a/doc/gpg.texi +++ b/doc/gpg.texi @@ -1,3625 +1,3634 @@ @c Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, @c 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc. @c This is part of the GnuPG manual. @c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi. @include defs.inc @node Invoking GPG @chapter Invoking GPG @cindex GPG command options @cindex command options @cindex options, GPG command @c Begin standard stuff @ifclear gpgtwohack @manpage gpg.1 @ifset manverb .B gpg \- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool @end ifset @mansect synopsis @ifset manverb .B gpg .RB [ \-\-homedir .IR dir ] .RB [ \-\-options .IR file ] .RI [ options ] .I command .RI [ args ] @end ifset @end ifclear @c End standard stuff @c Begin gpg2 hack stuff @ifset gpgtwohack @manpage gpg2.1 @ifset manverb .B gpg2 \- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool @end ifset @mansect synopsis @ifset manverb .B gpg2 .RB [ \-\-homedir .IR dir ] .RB [ \-\-options .IR file ] .RI [ options ] .I command .RI [ args ] @end ifset @end ifset @c End gpg2 hack stuff @mansect description @command{@gpgname} is the OpenPGP part of the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG). It is a tool to provide digital encryption and signing services using the OpenPGP standard. @command{@gpgname} features complete key management and all bells and whistles you can expect from a decent OpenPGP implementation. @ifclear gpgtwohack Note that this version of GnuPG features all modern algorithms and should thus be preferred over older GnuPG versions. If you are looking for version 1 of GnuPG, you may find that version installed under the name @command{gpg1}. @end ifclear @ifset gpgtwohack In contrast to the standalone command gpg from GnuPG 1.x, which might be better suited for server and embedded platforms, the 2.x version is commonly installed under the name @command{@gpgname} and targeted to the desktop as it requires several other modules to be installed. @end ifset @manpause @xref{Option Index}, for an index to @command{@gpgname}'s commands and options. @mancont @menu * GPG Commands:: List of all commands. * GPG Options:: List of all options. * GPG Configuration:: Configuration files. * GPG Examples:: Some usage examples. Developer information: * Unattended Usage of GPG:: Using @command{gpg} from other programs. @end menu @c * GPG Protocol:: The protocol the server mode uses. @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** COMMANDS **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect commands @node GPG Commands @section Commands Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that only one command is allowed. @command{@gpgname} may be run with no commands, in which case it will perform a reasonable action depending on the type of file it is given as input (an encrypted message is decrypted, a signature is verified, a file containing keys is listed). Please remember that option as well as command parsing stops as soon as a non-option is encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by using the special option @option{--}. @menu * General GPG Commands:: Commands not specific to the functionality. * Operational GPG Commands:: Commands to select the type of operation. * OpenPGP Key Management:: How to manage your keys. @end menu @c ******************************************* @c ********** GENERAL COMMANDS ************* @c ******************************************* @node General GPG Commands @subsection Commands not specific to the function @table @gnupgtabopt @item --version @opindex version Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you cannot abbreviate this command. @item --help @itemx -h @opindex help Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command line options. Note that you cannot abbreviate this command. @item --warranty @opindex warranty Print warranty information. @item --dump-options @opindex dump-options Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot abbreviate this command. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** OPERATIONAL COMMANDS *********** @c ******************************************* @node Operational GPG Commands @subsection Commands to select the type of operation @table @gnupgtabopt @item --sign @itemx -s @opindex sign Make a signature. This command may be combined with @option{--encrypt} (for a signed and encrypted message), @option{--symmetric} (for a signed and symmetrically encrypted message), or @option{--encrypt} and @option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase). The key to be used for signing is chosen by default or can be set with the @option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key} options. @item --clearsign @opindex clearsign Make a clear text signature. The content in a clear text signature is readable without any special software. OpenPGP software is only needed to verify the signature. Clear text signatures may modify end-of-line whitespace for platform independence and are not intended to be reversible. The key to be used for signing is chosen by default or can be set with the @option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key} options. @item --detach-sign @itemx -b @opindex detach-sign Make a detached signature. @item --encrypt @itemx -e @opindex encrypt Encrypt data. This option may be combined with @option{--sign} (for a signed and encrypted message), @option{--symmetric} (for a message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and @option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase). @item --symmetric @itemx -c @opindex symmetric Encrypt with a symmetric cipher using a passphrase. The default symmetric cipher used is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}, but may be chosen with the @option{--cipher-algo} option. This option may be combined with @option{--sign} (for a signed and symmetrically encrypted message), @option{--encrypt} (for a message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and @option{--encrypt} together (for a signed message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase). @item --store @opindex store Store only (make a simple literal data packet). @item --decrypt @itemx -d @opindex decrypt Decrypt the file given on the command line (or STDIN if no file is specified) and write it to STDOUT (or the file specified with @option{--output}). If the decrypted file is signed, the signature is also verified. This command differs from the default operation, as it never writes to the filename which is included in the file and it rejects files which don't begin with an encrypted message. @item --verify @opindex verify Assume that the first argument is a signed file and verify it without generating any output. With no arguments, the signature packet is read from STDIN. If only a one argument is given, it is expected to be a complete signature. With more than 1 argument, the first should be a detached signature and the remaining files ake up the the signed data. To read the signed data from STDIN, use @samp{-} as the second filename. For security reasons a detached signature cannot read the signed material from STDIN without denoting it in the above way. Note: If the option @option{--batch} is not used, @command{@gpgname} may assume that a single argument is a file with a detached signature and it will try to find a matching data file by stripping certain suffixes. Using this historical feature to verify a detached signature is strongly discouraged; always specify the data file too. Note: When verifying a cleartext signature, @command{gpg} verifies only what makes up the cleartext signed data and not any extra data outside of the cleartext signature or header lines following directly the dash marker line. The option @code{--output} may be used to write out the actual signed data; but there are other pitfalls with this format as well. It is suggested to avoid cleartext signatures in favor of detached signatures. @item --multifile @opindex multifile This modifies certain other commands to accept multiple files for processing on the command line or read from STDIN with each filename on a separate line. This allows for many files to be processed at once. @option{--multifile} may currently be used along with @option{--verify}, @option{--encrypt}, and @option{--decrypt}. Note that @option{--multifile --verify} may not be used with detached signatures. @item --verify-files @opindex verify-files Identical to @option{--multifile --verify}. @item --encrypt-files @opindex encrypt-files Identical to @option{--multifile --encrypt}. @item --decrypt-files @opindex decrypt-files Identical to @option{--multifile --decrypt}. @item --list-keys @itemx -k @itemx --list-public-keys @opindex list-keys List all keys from the public keyrings, or just the keys given on the command line. Avoid using the output of this command in scripts or other programs as it is likely to change as GnuPG changes. See @option{--with-colons} for a machine-parseable key listing command that is appropriate for use in scripts and other programs. @item --list-secret-keys @itemx -K @opindex list-secret-keys List all keys from the secret keyrings, or just the ones given on the command line. A @code{#} after the letters @code{sec} means that the secret key is not usable (for example, if it was created via @option{--export-secret-subkeys}). @item --list-sigs @opindex list-sigs Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the signatures are listed too. This command has the same effect as using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-list}. For each signature listed, there are several flags in between the "sig" tag and keyid. These flags give additional information about each signature. From left to right, they are the numbers 1-3 for certificate check level (see @option{--ask-cert-level}), "L" for a local or non-exportable signature (see @option{--lsign-key}), "R" for a nonRevocable signature (see the @option{--edit-key} command "nrsign"), "P" for a signature that contains a policy URL (see @option{--cert-policy-url}), "N" for a signature that contains a notation (see @option{--cert-notation}), "X" for an eXpired signature (see @option{--ask-cert-expire}), and the numbers 1-9 or "T" for 10 and above to indicate trust signature levels (see the @option{--edit-key} command "tsign"). @item --check-sigs @opindex check-sigs Same as @option{--list-sigs}, but the signatures are verified. Note that for performance reasons the revocation status of a signing key is not shown. This command has the same effect as using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-check}. The status of the verification is indicated by a flag directly following the "sig" tag (and thus before the flags described above for @option{--list-sigs}). A "!" indicates that the signature has been successfully verified, a "-" denotes a bad signature and a "%" is used if an error occurred while checking the signature (e.g. a non supported algorithm). @item --locate-keys @opindex locate-keys Locate the keys given as arguments. This command basically uses the same algorithm as used when locating keys for encryption or signing and may thus be used to see what keys @command{@gpgname} might use. In particular external methods as defined by @option{--auto-key-locate} may be used to locate a key. Only public keys are listed. @item --fingerprint @opindex fingerprint List all keys (or the specified ones) along with their fingerprints. This is the same output as @option{--list-keys} but with the additional output of a line with the fingerprint. May also be combined with @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}. If this command is given twice, the fingerprints of all secondary keys are -listed too. +listed too. This command also forces pretty printing of fingerprints +if the keyid format has been set to "none". @item --list-packets @opindex list-packets List only the sequence of packets. This is mainly useful for debugging. When used with option @option{--verbose} the actual MPI values are dumped and not only their lengths. @item --card-edit @opindex card-edit Present a menu to work with a smartcard. The subcommand "help" provides an overview on available commands. For a detailed description, please see the Card HOWTO at https://gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html#GnuPG-cardHOWTO . @item --card-status @opindex card-status Show the content of the smart card. @item --change-pin @opindex change-pin Present a menu to allow changing the PIN of a smartcard. This functionality is also available as the subcommand "passwd" with the @option{--card-edit} command. @item --delete-keys @code{name} @itemx --delete-keys @code{name} Remove key from the public keyring. In batch mode either @option{--yes} is required or the key must be specified by fingerprint. This is a safeguard against accidental deletion of multiple keys. @item --delete-secret-keys @code{name} @opindex delete-secret-keys gRemove key from the secret keyring. In batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint. The option @option{--yes} can be used to advice gpg-agent not to request a confirmation. This extra pre-caution is done because @command{gpg} can't be sure that the secret key (as controlled by gpg-agent) is only used for the given OpenPGP public key. @item --delete-secret-and-public-key @code{name} @opindex delete-secret-and-public-key Same as @option{--delete-key}, but if a secret key exists, it will be removed first. In batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint. The option @option{--yes} can be used to advice gpg-agent not to request a confirmation. @item --export @opindex export Either export all keys from all keyrings (default keyrings and those registered via option @option{--keyring}), or if at least one name is given, those of the given name. The exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. Use together with @option{--armor} to mail those keys. @item --send-keys @code{key IDs} @opindex send-keys Similar to @option{--export} but sends the keys to a keyserver. Fingerprints may be used instead of key IDs. Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this keyserver. Don't send your complete keyring to a keyserver --- select only those keys which are new or changed by you. If no key IDs are given, @command{gpg} does nothing. @item --export-secret-keys @itemx --export-secret-subkeys @opindex export-secret-keys @opindex export-secret-subkeys Same as @option{--export}, but exports the secret keys instead. The exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. This command is often used along with the option @option{--armor} to allow easy printing of the key for paper backup; however the external tool @command{paperkey} does a better job for creating backups on paper. Note that exporting a secret key can be a security risk if the exported keys are send over an insecure channel. The second form of the command has the special property to render the secret part of the primary key useless; this is a GNU extension to OpenPGP and other implementations can not be expected to successfully import such a key. Its intended use is to generated a full key with an additional signing subkey on a dedicated machine and then using this command to export the key without the primary key to the main machine. GnuPG may ask you to enter the passphrase for the key. This is required because the internal protection method of the secret key is different from the one specified by the OpenPGP protocol. @item --export-ssh-key @opindex export-ssh-key This command is used to export a key in the OpenSSH public key format. It requires the specification of one key by the usual means and exports the latest valid subkey which has an authentication capability to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. That output can directly be added to ssh's @file{authorized_key} file. By specifying the key to export using a key ID or a fingerprint suffixed with an exclamation mark (!), a specific subkey or the primary key can be exported. This does not even require that the key has the authentication capability flag set. @item --import @itemx --fast-import @opindex import Import/merge keys. This adds the given keys to the keyring. The fast version is currently just a synonym. There are a few other options which control how this command works. Most notable here is the @option{--import-options merge-only} option which does not insert new keys but does only the merging of new signatures, user-IDs and subkeys. @item --recv-keys @code{key IDs} @opindex recv-keys Import the keys with the given key IDs from a keyserver. Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this keyserver. @item --refresh-keys @opindex refresh-keys Request updates from a keyserver for keys that already exist on the local keyring. This is useful for updating a key with the latest signatures, user IDs, etc. Calling this with no arguments will refresh the entire keyring. Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of the keyserver for all keys that do not have preferred keyservers set (see @option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url}). @item --search-keys @code{names} @opindex search-keys Search the keyserver for the given names. Multiple names given here will be joined together to create the search string for the keyserver. Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this keyserver. Keyservers that support different search methods allow using the syntax specified in "How to specify a user ID" below. Note that different keyserver types support different search methods. Currently only LDAP supports them all. @item --fetch-keys @code{URIs} @opindex fetch-keys Retrieve keys located at the specified URIs. Note that different installations of GnuPG may support different protocols (HTTP, FTP, LDAP, etc.). When using HTTPS the system provided root certificates are used by this command. @item --update-trustdb @opindex update-trustdb Do trust database maintenance. This command iterates over all keys and builds the Web of Trust. This is an interactive command because it may have to ask for the "ownertrust" values for keys. The user has to give an estimation of how far she trusts the owner of the displayed key to correctly certify (sign) other keys. GnuPG only asks for the ownertrust value if it has not yet been assigned to a key. Using the @option{--edit-key} menu, the assigned value can be changed at any time. @item --check-trustdb @opindex check-trustdb Do trust database maintenance without user interaction. From time to time the trust database must be updated so that expired keys or signatures and the resulting changes in the Web of Trust can be tracked. Normally, GnuPG will calculate when this is required and do it automatically unless @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} is set. This command can be used to force a trust database check at any time. The processing is identical to that of @option{--update-trustdb} but it skips keys with a not yet defined "ownertrust". For use with cron jobs, this command can be used together with @option{--batch} in which case the trust database check is done only if a check is needed. To force a run even in batch mode add the option @option{--yes}. @anchor{option --export-ownertrust} @item --export-ownertrust @opindex export-ownertrust Send the ownertrust values to STDOUT. This is useful for backup purposes as these values are the only ones which can't be re-created from a corrupted trustdb. Example: @c man:.RS @example @gpgname{} --export-ownertrust > otrust.txt @end example @c man:.RE @item --import-ownertrust @opindex import-ownertrust Update the trustdb with the ownertrust values stored in @code{files} (or STDIN if not given); existing values will be overwritten. In case of a severely damaged trustdb and if you have a recent backup of the ownertrust values (e.g. in the file @file{otrust.txt}, you may re-create the trustdb using these commands: @c man:.RS @example cd ~/.gnupg rm trustdb.gpg @gpgname{} --import-ownertrust < otrust.txt @end example @c man:.RE @item --rebuild-keydb-caches @opindex rebuild-keydb-caches When updating from version 1.0.6 to 1.0.7 this command should be used to create signature caches in the keyring. It might be handy in other situations too. @item --print-md @code{algo} @itemx --print-mds @opindex print-md Print message digest of algorithm ALGO for all given files or STDIN. With the second form (or a deprecated "*" as algo) digests for all available algorithms are printed. @item --gen-random @code{0|1|2} @code{count} @opindex gen-random Emit @var{count} random bytes of the given quality level 0, 1 or 2. If @var{count} is not given or zero, an endless sequence of random bytes will be emitted. If used with @option{--armor} the output will be base64 encoded. PLEASE, don't use this command unless you know what you are doing; it may remove precious entropy from the system! @item --gen-prime @code{mode} @code{bits} @opindex gen-prime Use the source, Luke :-). The output format is still subject to change. @item --enarmor @item --dearmor @opindex enarmor @opindex dearmor Pack or unpack an arbitrary input into/from an OpenPGP ASCII armor. This is a GnuPG extension to OpenPGP and in general not very useful. @item --tofu-policy @code{auto|good|unknown|bad|ask} @code{key...} @opindex tofu-policy Set the TOFU policy for all the bindings associated with the specified keys. For more information about the meaning of the policies, @pxref{trust-model-tofu}. The keys may be specified either by their fingerprint (preferred) or their keyid. @c @item --server @c @opindex server @c Run gpg in server mode. This feature is not yet ready for use and @c thus not documented. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******* KEY MANGEMENT COMMANDS ********** @c ******************************************* @node OpenPGP Key Management @subsection How to manage your keys This section explains the main commands for key management @table @gnupgtabopt @item --quick-gen-key @code{user-id} [@code{algo} [@code{usage} [@code{expire}]]] @opindex quick-gen-key This is a simple command to generate a standard key with one user id. In contrast to @option{--gen-key} the key is generated directly without the need to answer a bunch of prompts. Unless the option @option{--yes} is given, the key creation will be canceled if the given user id already exists in the key ring. If invoked directly on the console without any special options an answer to a ``Continue?'' style confirmation prompt is required. In case the user id already exists in the key ring a second prompt to force the creation of the key will show up. If any of the optional arguments are given, only the primary key is created and no prompts are shown. For a description of these optional arguments see the command @code{--quick-addkey}. The @code{usage} accepts also the value ``cert'' which can be used to create a certification only primary key; the default is to a create certification and signing key. If this command is used with @option{--batch}, @option{--pinentry-mode} has been set to @code{loopback}, and one of the passphrase options (@option{--passphrase}, @option{--passphrase-fd}, or @option{passphrase-file}) is used, the supplied passphrase is used for the new key and the agent does not ask for it. To create a key without any protection @code{--passphrase ''} may be used. @item --quick-addkey @code{fpr} [@code{algo} [@code{usage} [@code{expire}]]] @opindex quick-addkey Directly add a subkey to the key identified by the fingerprint @code{fpr}. Without the optional arguments an encryption subkey is added. If any of the arguments are given a more specific subkey is added. @code{algo} may be any of the supported algorithms or curve names given in the format as used by key listings. To use the default algorithm the string ``default'' or ``-'' can be used. Supported algorithms are ``rsa'', ``dsa'', ``elg'', ``ed25519'', ``cv25519'', and other ECC curves. For example the string ``rsa'' adds an RSA key with the default key length; a string ``rsa4096'' requests that the key length is 4096 bits. Depending on the given @code{algo} the subkey may either be an encryption subkey or a signing subkey. If an algorithm is capable of signing and encryption and such a subkey is desired, a @code{usage} string must be given. This string is either ``default'' or ``-'' to keep the default or a comma delimited list of keywords: ``sign'' for a signing subkey, ``auth'' for an authentication subkey, and ``encr'' for an encryption subkey (``encrypt'' can be used as alias for ``encr''). The valid combinations depend on the algorithm. The @code{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date for the subkey. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO YYYY-MM-DD format is used. The values ``never'', ``none'', or ``-'' can be used for no expiration date. @item --gen-key @opindex gen-key Generate a new key pair using the current default parameters. This is the standard command to create a new key. In addition to the key a revocation certificate is created and stored in the @file{openpgp-revocs.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory. @item --full-gen-key @opindex gen-key Generate a new key pair with dialogs for all options. This is an extended version of @option{--gen-key}. There is also a feature which allows you to create keys in batch mode. See the manual section ``Unattended key generation'' on how to use this. @item --gen-revoke @code{name} @opindex gen-revoke Generate a revocation certificate for the complete key. To only revoke a subkey or a key signature, use the @option{--edit} command. This command merely creates the revocation certificate so that it can be used to revoke the key if that is ever needed. To actually revoke a key the created revocation certificate needs to be merged with the key to revoke. This is done by importing the revocation certificate using the @option{--import} command. Then the revoked key needs to be published, which is best done by sending the key to a keyserver (command @option{--send-key}) and by exporting (@option{--export}) it to a file which is then send to frequent communication partners. @item --desig-revoke @code{name} @opindex desig-revoke Generate a designated revocation certificate for a key. This allows a user (with the permission of the keyholder) to revoke someone else's key. @item --edit-key @opindex edit-key Present a menu which enables you to do most of the key management related tasks. It expects the specification of a key on the command line. @c ******** Begin Edit-key Options ********** @table @asis @item uid @code{n} @opindex keyedit:uid Toggle selection of user ID or photographic user ID with index @code{n}. Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all. @item key @code{n} @opindex keyedit:key Toggle selection of subkey with index @code{n} or key ID @code{n}. Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all. @item sign @opindex keyedit:sign Make a signature on key of user @code{name} If the key is not yet signed by the default user (or the users given with -u), the program displays the information of the key again, together with its fingerprint and asks whether it should be signed. This question is repeated for all users specified with -u. @item lsign @opindex keyedit:lsign Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-exportable and will therefore never be used by others. This may be used to make keys valid only in the local environment. @item nrsign @opindex keyedit:nrsign Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-revocable and can therefore never be revoked. @item tsign @opindex keyedit:tsign Make a trust signature. This is a signature that combines the notions of certification (like a regular signature), and trust (like the "trust" command). It is generally only useful in distinct communities or groups. For more information please read the sections ``Trust Signature'' and ``Regular Expression'' in RFC-4880. @end table @c man:.RS Note that "l" (for local / non-exportable), "nr" (for non-revocable, and "t" (for trust) may be freely mixed and prefixed to "sign" to create a signature of any type desired. @c man:.RE If the option @option{--only-sign-text-ids} is specified, then any non-text based user ids (e.g., photo IDs) will not be selected for signing. @table @asis @item delsig @opindex keyedit:delsig Delete a signature. Note that it is not possible to retract a signature, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revsig}. @item revsig @opindex keyedit:revsig Revoke a signature. For every signature which has been generated by one of the secret keys, GnuPG asks whether a revocation certificate should be generated. @item check @opindex keyedit:check Check the signatures on all selected user IDs. With the extra option @code{selfsig} only self-signatures are shown. @item adduid @opindex keyedit:adduid Create an additional user ID. @item addphoto @opindex keyedit:addphoto Create a photographic user ID. This will prompt for a JPEG file that will be embedded into the user ID. Note that a very large JPEG will make for a very large key. Also note that some programs will display your JPEG unchanged (GnuPG), and some programs will scale it to fit in a dialog box (PGP). @item showphoto @opindex keyedit:showphoto Display the selected photographic user ID. @item deluid @opindex keyedit:deluid Delete a user ID or photographic user ID. Note that it is not possible to retract a user id, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revuid}. @item revuid @opindex keyedit:revuid Revoke a user ID or photographic user ID. @item primary @opindex keyedit:primary Flag the current user id as the primary one, removes the primary user id flag from all other user ids and sets the timestamp of all affected self-signatures one second ahead. Note that setting a photo user ID as primary makes it primary over other photo user IDs, and setting a regular user ID as primary makes it primary over other regular user IDs. @item keyserver @opindex keyedit:keyserver Set a preferred keyserver for the specified user ID(s). This allows other users to know where you prefer they get your key from. See @option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url} for more on how this works. Setting a value of "none" removes an existing preferred keyserver. @item notation @opindex keyedit:notation Set a name=value notation for the specified user ID(s). See @option{--cert-notation} for more on how this works. Setting a value of "none" removes all notations, setting a notation prefixed with a minus sign (-) removes that notation, and setting a notation name (without the =value) prefixed with a minus sign removes all notations with that name. @item pref @opindex keyedit:pref List preferences from the selected user ID. This shows the actual preferences, without including any implied preferences. @item showpref @opindex keyedit:showpref More verbose preferences listing for the selected user ID. This shows the preferences in effect by including the implied preferences of 3DES (cipher), SHA-1 (digest), and Uncompressed (compression) if they are not already included in the preference list. In addition, the preferred keyserver and signature notations (if any) are shown. @item setpref @code{string} @opindex keyedit:setpref Set the list of user ID preferences to @code{string} for all (or just the selected) user IDs. Calling setpref with no arguments sets the preference list to the default (either built-in or set via @option{--default-preference-list}), and calling setpref with "none" as the argument sets an empty preference list. Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms. Note that while you can change the preferences on an attribute user ID (aka "photo ID"), GnuPG does not select keys via attribute user IDs so these preferences will not be used by GnuPG. When setting preferences, you should list the algorithms in the order which you'd like to see them used by someone else when encrypting a message to your key. If you don't include 3DES, it will be automatically added at the end. Note that there are many factors that go into choosing an algorithm (for example, your key may not be the only recipient), and so the remote OpenPGP application being used to send to you may or may not follow your exact chosen order for a given message. It will, however, only choose an algorithm that is present on the preference list of every recipient key. See also the INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below. @item addkey @opindex keyedit:addkey Add a subkey to this key. @item addcardkey @opindex keyedit:addcardkey Generate a subkey on a card and add it to this key. @item keytocard @opindex keyedit:keytocard Transfer the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey has been selected) to a smartcard. The secret key in the keyring will be replaced by a stub if the key could be stored successfully on the card and you use the save command later. Only certain key types may be transferred to the card. A sub menu allows you to select on what card to store the key. Note that it is not possible to get that key back from the card - if the card gets broken your secret key will be lost unless you have a backup somewhere. @item bkuptocard @code{file} @opindex keyedit:bkuptocard Restore the given file to a card. This command may be used to restore a backup key (as generated during card initialization) to a new card. In almost all cases this will be the encryption key. You should use this command only with the corresponding public key and make sure that the file given as argument is indeed the backup to restore. You should then select 2 to restore as encryption key. You will first be asked to enter the passphrase of the backup key and then for the Admin PIN of the card. @item delkey @opindex keyedit:delkey Remove a subkey (secondary key). Note that it is not possible to retract a subkey, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revkey}. @item revkey @opindex keyedit:revkey Revoke a subkey. @item expire @opindex keyedit:expire Change the key or subkey expiration time. If a subkey is selected, the expiration time of this subkey will be changed. With no selection, the key expiration of the primary key is changed. @item trust @opindex keyedit:trust Change the owner trust value for the key. This updates the trust-db immediately and no save is required. @item disable @itemx enable @opindex keyedit:disable @opindex keyedit:enable Disable or enable an entire key. A disabled key can not normally be used for encryption. @item addrevoker @opindex keyedit:addrevoker Add a designated revoker to the key. This takes one optional argument: "sensitive". If a designated revoker is marked as sensitive, it will not be exported by default (see export-options). @item passwd @opindex keyedit:passwd Change the passphrase of the secret key. @item toggle @opindex keyedit:toggle This is dummy command which exists only for backward compatibility. @item clean @opindex keyedit:clean Compact (by removing all signatures except the selfsig) any user ID that is no longer usable (e.g. revoked, or expired). Then, remove any signatures that are not usable by the trust calculations. Specifically, this removes any signature that does not validate, any signature that is superseded by a later signature, revoked signatures, and signatures issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. @item minimize @opindex keyedit:minimize Make the key as small as possible. This removes all signatures from each user ID except for the most recent self-signature. @item cross-certify @opindex keyedit:cross-certify Add cross-certification signatures to signing subkeys that may not currently have them. Cross-certification signatures protect against a subtle attack against signing subkeys. See @option{--require-cross-certification}. All new keys generated have this signature by default, so this option is only useful to bring older keys up to date. @item save @opindex keyedit:save Save all changes to the key rings and quit. @item quit @opindex keyedit:quit Quit the program without updating the key rings. @end table @c man:.RS The listing shows you the key with its secondary keys and all user ids. The primary user id is indicated by a dot, and selected keys or user ids are indicated by an asterisk. The trust value is displayed with the primary key: the first is the assigned owner trust and the second is the calculated trust value. Letters are used for the values: @c man:.RE @table @asis @item - No ownertrust assigned / not yet calculated. @item e Trust calculation has failed; probably due to an expired key. @item q Not enough information for calculation. @item n Never trust this key. @item m Marginally trusted. @item f Fully trusted. @item u Ultimately trusted. @end table @c ******** End Edit-key Options ********** @item --sign-key @code{name} @opindex sign-key Signs a public key with your secret key. This is a shortcut version of the subcommand "sign" from @option{--edit}. @item --lsign-key @code{name} @opindex lsign-key Signs a public key with your secret key but marks it as non-exportable. This is a shortcut version of the subcommand "lsign" from @option{--edit-key}. @item --quick-sign-key @code{fpr} [@code{names}] @itemx --quick-lsign-key @code{fpr} [@code{names}] @opindex quick-sign-key @opindex quick-lsign-key Directly sign a key from the passphrase without any further user interaction. The @code{fpr} must be the verified primary fingerprint of a key in the local keyring. If no @code{names} are given, all useful user ids are signed; with given [@code{names}] only useful user ids matching one of theses names are signed. By default, or if a name is prefixed with a '*', a case insensitive substring match is used. If a name is prefixed with a '=' a case sensitive exact match is done. The command @option{--quick-lsign-key} marks the signatures as non-exportable. If such a non-exportable signature already exists the @option{--quick-sign-key} turns it into a exportable signature. This command uses reasonable defaults and thus does not provide the full flexibility of the "sign" subcommand from @option{--edit-key}. Its intended use is to help unattended key signing by utilizing a list of verified fingerprints. @item --quick-adduid @var{user-id} @var{new-user-id} @opindex quick-adduid This command adds a new user id to an existing key. In contrast to the interactive sub-command @code{adduid} of @option{--edit-key} the @var{new-user-id} is added verbatim with only leading and trailing white space removed, it is expected to be UTF-8 encoded, and no checks on its form are applied. @item --passwd @var{user_id} @opindex passwd Change the passphrase of the secret key belonging to the certificate specified as @var{user_id}. This is a shortcut for the sub-command @code{passwd} of the edit key menu. @end table @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** OPTIONS **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect options @node GPG Options @section Option Summary @command{@gpgname} features a bunch of options to control the exact behaviour and to change the default configuration. @menu * GPG Configuration Options:: How to change the configuration. * GPG Key related Options:: Key related options. * GPG Input and Output:: Input and Output. * OpenPGP Options:: OpenPGP protocol specific options. * Compliance Options:: Compliance options. * GPG Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually don't want to do. * Deprecated Options:: Deprecated options. @end menu Long options can be put in an options file (default "~/.gnupg/gpg.conf"). Short option names will not work - for example, "armor" is a valid option for the options file, while "a" is not. Do not write the 2 dashes, but simply the name of the option and any required arguments. Lines with a hash ('#') as the first non-white-space character are ignored. Commands may be put in this file too, but that is not generally useful as the command will execute automatically with every execution of gpg. Please remember that option parsing stops as soon as a non-option is encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by using the special option @option{--}. @c ******************************************* @c ******** CONFIGURATION OPTIONS ********** @c ******************************************* @node GPG Configuration Options @subsection How to change the configuration These options are used to change the configuration and are usually found in the option file. @table @gnupgtabopt @item --default-key @var{name} @opindex default-key Use @var{name} as the default key to sign with. If this option is not used, the default key is the first key found in the secret keyring. Note that @option{-u} or @option{--local-user} overrides this option. This option may be given multiple times. In this case, the last key for which a secret key is available is used. If there is no secret key available for any of the specified values, GnuPG will not emit an error message but continue as if this option wasn't given. @item --default-recipient @var{name} @opindex default-recipient Use @var{name} as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is not used and don't ask if this is a valid one. @var{name} must be non-empty. @item --default-recipient-self @opindex default-recipient-self Use the default key as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is not used and don't ask if this is a valid one. The default key is the first one from the secret keyring or the one set with @option{--default-key}. @item --no-default-recipient @opindex no-default-recipient Reset @option{--default-recipient} and @option{--default-recipient-self}. @item -v, --verbose @opindex verbose Give more information during processing. If used twice, the input data is listed in detail. @item --no-verbose @opindex no-verbose Reset verbose level to 0. @item -q, --quiet @opindex quiet Try to be as quiet as possible. @item --batch @itemx --no-batch @opindex batch @opindex no-batch Use batch mode. Never ask, do not allow interactive commands. @option{--no-batch} disables this option. Note that even with a filename given on the command line, gpg might still need to read from STDIN (in particular if gpg figures that the input is a detached signature and no data file has been specified). Thus if you do not want to feed data via STDIN, you should connect STDIN to @file{/dev/null}. @item --no-tty @opindex no-tty Make sure that the TTY (terminal) is never used for any output. This option is needed in some cases because GnuPG sometimes prints warnings to the TTY even if @option{--batch} is used. @item --yes @opindex yes Assume "yes" on most questions. @item --no @opindex no Assume "no" on most questions. @item --list-options @code{parameters} @opindex list-options This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when listing keys and signatures (that is, @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-sigs}, @option{--list-public-keys}, @option{--list-secret-keys}, and the @option{--edit-key} functions). Options can be prepended with a @option{no-} (after the two dashes) to give the opposite meaning. The options are: @table @asis @item show-photos @opindex list-options:show-photos Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-sigs}, @option{--list-public-keys}, and @option{--list-secret-keys} to display any photo IDs attached to the key. Defaults to no. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. Does not work with @option{--with-colons}: see @option{--attribute-fd} for the appropriate way to get photo data for scripts and other frontends. @item show-usage @opindex list-options:show-usage Show usage information for keys and subkeys in the standard key listing. This is a list of letters indicating the allowed usage for a key (@code{E}=encryption, @code{S}=signing, @code{C}=certification, @code{A}=authentication). Defaults to yes. @item show-policy-urls @opindex list-options:show-policy-urls Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no. @item show-notations @itemx show-std-notations @itemx show-user-notations @opindex list-options:show-notations @opindex list-options:show-std-notations @opindex list-options:show-user-notations Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no. @item show-keyserver-urls @opindex list-options:show-keyserver-urls Show any preferred keyserver URL in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no. @item show-uid-validity @opindex list-options:show-uid-validity Display the calculated validity of user IDs during key listings. Defaults to yes. @item show-unusable-uids @opindex list-options:show-unusable-uids Show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings. Defaults to no. @item show-unusable-subkeys @opindex list-options:show-unusable-subkeys Show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings. Defaults to no. @item show-keyring @opindex list-options:show-keyring Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which keyring a given key resides on. Defaults to no. @item show-sig-expire @opindex list-options:show-sig-expire Show signature expiration dates (if any) during @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs} listings. Defaults to no. @item show-sig-subpackets @opindex list-options:show-sig-subpackets Include signature subpackets in the key listing. This option can take an optional argument list of the subpackets to list. If no argument is passed, list all subpackets. Defaults to no. This option is only meaningful when using @option{--with-colons} along with @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs}. @end table @item --verify-options @code{parameters} @opindex verify-options This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when verifying signatures. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the opposite meaning. The options are: @table @asis @item show-photos @opindex verify-options:show-photos Display any photo IDs present on the key that issued the signature. Defaults to no. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. @item show-policy-urls @opindex verify-options:show-policy-urls Show policy URLs in the signature being verified. Defaults to yes. @item show-notations @itemx show-std-notations @itemx show-user-notations @opindex verify-options:show-notations @opindex verify-options:show-std-notations @opindex verify-options:show-user-notations Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the signature being verified. Defaults to IETF standard. @item show-keyserver-urls @opindex verify-options:show-keyserver-urls Show any preferred keyserver URL in the signature being verified. Defaults to yes. @item show-uid-validity @opindex verify-options:show-uid-validity Display the calculated validity of the user IDs on the key that issued the signature. Defaults to yes. @item show-unusable-uids @opindex verify-options:show-unusable-uids Show revoked and expired user IDs during signature verification. Defaults to no. @item show-primary-uid-only @opindex verify-options:show-primary-uid-only Show only the primary user ID during signature verification. That is all the AKA lines as well as photo Ids are not shown with the signature verification status. @item pka-lookups @opindex verify-options:pka-lookups Enable PKA lookups to verify sender addresses. Note that PKA is based on DNS, and so enabling this option may disclose information on when and what signatures are verified or to whom data is encrypted. This is similar to the "web bug" described for the auto-key-retrieve feature. @item pka-trust-increase @opindex verify-options:pka-trust-increase Raise the trust in a signature to full if the signature passes PKA validation. This option is only meaningful if pka-lookups is set. @end table @item --enable-large-rsa @itemx --disable-large-rsa @opindex enable-large-rsa @opindex disable-large-rsa With --gen-key and --batch, enable the creation of RSA secret keys as large as 8192 bit. Note: 8192 bit is more than is generally recommended. These large keys don't significantly improve security, but they are more expensive to use, and their signatures and certifications are larger. This option is only available if the binary was build with large-secmem support. @item --enable-dsa2 @itemx --disable-dsa2 @opindex enable-dsa2 @opindex disable-dsa2 Enable hash truncation for all DSA keys even for old DSA Keys up to 1024 bit. This is also the default with @option{--openpgp}. Note that older versions of GnuPG also required this flag to allow the generation of DSA larger than 1024 bit. @item --photo-viewer @code{string} @opindex photo-viewer This is the command line that should be run to view a photo ID. "%i" will be expanded to a filename containing the photo. "%I" does the same, except the file will not be deleted once the viewer exits. Other flags are "%k" for the key ID, "%K" for the long key ID, "%f" for the key fingerprint, "%t" for the extension of the image type (e.g. "jpg"), "%T" for the MIME type of the image (e.g. "image/jpeg"), "%v" for the single-character calculated validity of the image being viewed (e.g. "f"), "%V" for the calculated validity as a string (e.g. "full"), "%U" for a base32 encoded hash of the user ID, and "%%" for an actual percent sign. If neither %i or %I are present, then the photo will be supplied to the viewer on standard input. The default viewer is "xloadimage -fork -quiet -title 'KeyID 0x%k' STDIN". Note that if your image viewer program is not secure, then executing it from GnuPG does not make it secure. @item --exec-path @code{string} @opindex exec-path Sets a list of directories to search for photo viewers and keyserver helpers. If not provided, keyserver helpers use the compiled-in default directory, and photo viewers use the $PATH environment variable. Note, that on W32 system this value is ignored when searching for keyserver helpers. @item --keyring @code{file} @opindex keyring Add @code{file} to the current list of keyrings. If @code{file} begins with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG home directory ("~/.gnupg" if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is not used). Note that this adds a keyring to the current list. If the intent is to use the specified keyring alone, use @option{--keyring} along with @option{--no-default-keyring}. @item --secret-keyring @code{file} @opindex secret-keyring This is an obsolete option and ignored. All secret keys are stored in the @file{private-keys-v1.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory. @item --primary-keyring @code{file} @opindex primary-keyring Designate @code{file} as the primary public keyring. This means that newly imported keys (via @option{--import} or keyserver @option{--recv-from}) will go to this keyring. @item --trustdb-name @code{file} @opindex trustdb-name Use @code{file} instead of the default trustdb. If @code{file} begins with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG home directory (@file{~/.gnupg} if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is not used). @include opt-homedir.texi @item --display-charset @code{name} @opindex display-charset Set the name of the native character set. This is used to convert some informational strings like user IDs to the proper UTF-8 encoding. Note that this has nothing to do with the character set of data to be encrypted or signed; GnuPG does not recode user-supplied data. If this option is not used, the default character set is determined from the current locale. A verbosity level of 3 shows the chosen set. Valid values for @code{name} are: @table @asis @item iso-8859-1 @opindex display-charset:iso-8859-1 This is the Latin 1 set. @item iso-8859-2 @opindex display-charset:iso-8859-2 The Latin 2 set. @item iso-8859-15 @opindex display-charset:iso-8859-15 This is currently an alias for the Latin 1 set. @item koi8-r @opindex display-charset:koi8-r The usual Russian set (rfc1489). @item utf-8 @opindex display-charset:utf-8 Bypass all translations and assume that the OS uses native UTF-8 encoding. @end table @item --utf8-strings @itemx --no-utf8-strings @opindex utf8-strings Assume that command line arguments are given as UTF8 strings. The default (@option{--no-utf8-strings}) is to assume that arguments are encoded in the character set as specified by @option{--display-charset}. These options affect all following arguments. Both options may be used multiple times. @anchor{gpg-option --options} @item --options @code{file} @opindex options Read options from @code{file} and do not try to read them from the default options file in the homedir (see @option{--homedir}). This option is ignored if used in an options file. @item --no-options @opindex no-options Shortcut for @option{--options /dev/null}. This option is detected before an attempt to open an option file. Using this option will also prevent the creation of a @file{~/.gnupg} homedir. @item -z @code{n} @itemx --compress-level @code{n} @itemx --bzip2-compress-level @code{n} @opindex compress-level @opindex bzip2-compress-level Set compression level to @code{n} for the ZIP and ZLIB compression algorithms. The default is to use the default compression level of zlib (normally 6). @option{--bzip2-compress-level} sets the compression level for the BZIP2 compression algorithm (defaulting to 6 as well). This is a different option from @option{--compress-level} since BZIP2 uses a significant amount of memory for each additional compression level. @option{-z} sets both. A value of 0 for @code{n} disables compression. @item --bzip2-decompress-lowmem @opindex bzip2-decompress-lowmem Use a different decompression method for BZIP2 compressed files. This alternate method uses a bit more than half the memory, but also runs at half the speed. This is useful under extreme low memory circumstances when the file was originally compressed at a high @option{--bzip2-compress-level}. @item --mangle-dos-filenames @itemx --no-mangle-dos-filenames @opindex mangle-dos-filenames @opindex no-mangle-dos-filenames Older version of Windows cannot handle filenames with more than one dot. @option{--mangle-dos-filenames} causes GnuPG to replace (rather than add to) the extension of an output filename to avoid this problem. This option is off by default and has no effect on non-Windows platforms. @item --ask-cert-level @itemx --no-ask-cert-level @opindex ask-cert-level When making a key signature, prompt for a certification level. If this option is not specified, the certification level used is set via @option{--default-cert-level}. See @option{--default-cert-level} for information on the specific levels and how they are used. @option{--no-ask-cert-level} disables this option. This option defaults to no. @item --default-cert-level @code{n} @opindex default-cert-level The default to use for the check level when signing a key. 0 means you make no particular claim as to how carefully you verified the key. 1 means you believe the key is owned by the person who claims to own it but you could not, or did not verify the key at all. This is useful for a "persona" verification, where you sign the key of a pseudonymous user. 2 means you did casual verification of the key. For example, this could mean that you verified the key fingerprint and checked the user ID on the key against a photo ID. 3 means you did extensive verification of the key. For example, this could mean that you verified the key fingerprint with the owner of the key in person, and that you checked, by means of a hard to forge document with a photo ID (such as a passport) that the name of the key owner matches the name in the user ID on the key, and finally that you verified (by exchange of email) that the email address on the key belongs to the key owner. Note that the examples given above for levels 2 and 3 are just that: examples. In the end, it is up to you to decide just what "casual" and "extensive" mean to you. This option defaults to 0 (no particular claim). @item --min-cert-level @opindex min-cert-level When building the trust database, treat any signatures with a certification level below this as invalid. Defaults to 2, which disregards level 1 signatures. Note that level 0 "no particular claim" signatures are always accepted. @item --trusted-key @code{long key ID} @opindex trusted-key Assume that the specified key (which must be given as a full 8 byte key ID) is as trustworthy as one of your own secret keys. This option is useful if you don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them) online but still want to be able to check the validity of a given recipient's or signator's key. @item --trust-model @code{pgp|classic|tofu|tofu+pgp|direct|always|auto} @opindex trust-model Set what trust model GnuPG should follow. The models are: @table @asis @item pgp @opindex trust-mode:pgp This is the Web of Trust combined with trust signatures as used in PGP 5.x and later. This is the default trust model when creating a new trust database. @item classic @opindex trust-mode:classic This is the standard Web of Trust as introduced by PGP 2. @item tofu @opindex trust-mode:tofu @anchor{trust-model-tofu} TOFU stands for Trust On First Use. In this trust model, the first time a key is seen, it is memorized. If later another key is seen with a user id with the same email address, a warning is displayed indicating that there is a conflict and that the key might be a forgery and an attempt at a man-in-the-middle attack. Because a potential attacker is able to control the email address and thereby circumvent the conflict detection algorithm by using an email address that is similar in appearance to a trusted email address, whenever a message is verified, statistics about the number of messages signed with the key are shown. In this way, a user can easily identify attacks using fake keys for regular correspondents. When compared with the Web of Trust, TOFU offers significantly weaker security guarantees. In particular, TOFU only helps ensure consistency (that is, that the binding between a key and email address doesn't change). A major advantage of TOFU is that it requires little maintenance to use correctly. To use the web of trust properly, you need to actively sign keys and mark users as trusted introducers. This is a time-consuming process and anecdotal evidence suggests that even security-conscious users rarely take the time to do this thoroughly and instead rely on an ad-hoc TOFU process. In the TOFU model, policies are associated with bindings between keys and email addresses (which are extracted from user ids and normalized). There are five policies, which can be set manually using the @option{--tofu-policy} option. The default policy can be set using the @option{--tofu-default-policy} policy. The TOFU policies are: @code{auto}, @code{good}, @code{unknown}, @code{bad} and @code{ask}. The @code{auto} policy is used by default (unless overridden by @option{--tofu-default-policy}) and marks a binding as marginally trusted. The @code{good}, @code{unknown} and @code{bad} policies mark a binding as fully trusted, as having unknown trust or as having trust never, respectively. The @code{unknown} policy is useful for just using TOFU to detect conflicts, but to never assign positive trust to a binding. The final policy, @code{ask} prompts the user to indicate the binding's trust. If batch mode is enabled (or input is inappropriate in the context), then the user is not prompted and the @code{undefined} trust level is returned. @item tofu+pgp @opindex trust-mode:tofu+pgp This trust model combines TOFU with the Web of Trust. This is done by computing the trust level for each model and then taking the maximum trust level where the trust levels are ordered as follows: @code{unknown < undefined < marginal < fully < ultimate < expired < never}. By setting @option{--tofu-default-policy=unknown}, this model can be used to implement the web of trust with TOFU's conflict detection algorithm, but without its assignment of positive trust values, which some security-conscious users don't like. @item direct @opindex trust-mode:direct Key validity is set directly by the user and not calculated via the Web of Trust. @item always @opindex trust-mode:always Skip key validation and assume that used keys are always fully valid. You generally won't use this unless you are using some external validation scheme. This option also suppresses the "[uncertain]" tag printed with signature checks when there is no evidence that the user ID is bound to the key. Note that this trust model still does not allow the use of expired, revoked, or disabled keys. @item auto @opindex trust-mode:auto Select the trust model depending on whatever the internal trust database says. This is the default model if such a database already exists. @end table @item --auto-key-locate @code{parameters} @itemx --no-auto-key-locate @opindex auto-key-locate GnuPG can automatically locate and retrieve keys as needed using this option. This happens when encrypting to an email address (in the "user@@example.com" form), and there are no user@@example.com keys on the local keyring. This option takes any number of the following mechanisms, in the order they are to be tried: @table @asis @item cert Locate a key using DNS CERT, as specified in rfc4398. @item pka Locate a key using DNS PKA. @item dane Locate a key using DANE, as specified in draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-05.txt. @item wkd Locate a key using the Web Key Directory protocol. This is an experimental method and semantics may change. @item ldap Using DNS Service Discovery, check the domain in question for any LDAP keyservers to use. If this fails, attempt to locate the key using the PGP Universal method of checking @samp{ldap://keys.(thedomain)}. @item keyserver Locate a key using whatever keyserver is defined using the @option{--keyserver} option. @item keyserver-URL In addition, a keyserver URL as used in the @option{--keyserver} option may be used here to query that particular keyserver. @item local Locate the key using the local keyrings. This mechanism allows to select the order a local key lookup is done. Thus using @samp{--auto-key-locate local} is identical to @option{--no-auto-key-locate}. @item nodefault This flag disables the standard local key lookup, done before any of the mechanisms defined by the @option{--auto-key-locate} are tried. The position of this mechanism in the list does not matter. It is not required if @code{local} is also used. @item clear Clear all defined mechanisms. This is useful to override mechanisms given in a config file. @end table @item --keyid-format @code{none|short|0xshort|long|0xlong} @opindex keyid-format Select how to display key IDs. "none" does not show the key ID at all but shows the fingerprint in a separate line. "short" is the traditional 8-character key ID. "long" is the more accurate (but less convenient) 16-character key ID. Add an "0x" to either to include an "0x" at the beginning of the key ID, as in 0x99242560. Note that this option is ignored if the option @option{--with-colons} is used. @item --keyserver @code{name} @opindex keyserver This option is deprecated - please use the @option{--keyserver} in @file{dirmngr.conf} instead. Use @code{name} as your keyserver. This is the server that @option{--recv-keys}, @option{--send-keys}, and @option{--search-keys} will communicate with to receive keys from, send keys to, and search for keys on. The format of the @code{name} is a URI: `scheme:[//]keyservername[:port]' The scheme is the type of keyserver: "hkp" for the HTTP (or compatible) keyservers, "ldap" for the LDAP keyservers, or "mailto" for the Graff email keyserver. Note that your particular installation of GnuPG may have other keyserver types available as well. Keyserver schemes are case-insensitive. After the keyserver name, optional keyserver configuration options may be provided. These are the same as the global @option{--keyserver-options} from below, but apply only to this particular keyserver. Most keyservers synchronize with each other, so there is generally no need to send keys to more than one server. The keyserver @code{hkp://keys.gnupg.net} uses round robin DNS to give a different keyserver each time you use it. @item --keyserver-options @code{name=value} @opindex keyserver-options This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for the keyserver. Options can be prefixed with a `no-' to give the opposite meaning. Valid import-options or export-options may be used here as well to apply to importing (@option{--recv-key}) or exporting (@option{--send-key}) a key from a keyserver. While not all options are available for all keyserver types, some common options are: @table @asis @item include-revoked When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that are marked on the keyserver as revoked. Note that not all keyservers differentiate between revoked and unrevoked keys, and for such keyservers this option is meaningless. Note also that most keyservers do not have cryptographic verification of key revocations, and so turning this option off may result in skipping keys that are incorrectly marked as revoked. @item include-disabled When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that are marked on the keyserver as disabled. Note that this option is not used with HKP keyservers. @item auto-key-retrieve This option enables the automatic retrieving of keys from a keyserver when verifying signatures made by keys that are not on the local keyring. Note that this option makes a "web bug" like behavior possible. Keyserver operators can see which keys you request, so by sending you a message signed by a brand new key (which you naturally will not have on your local keyring), the operator can tell both your IP address and the time when you verified the signature. @item honor-keyserver-url When using @option{--refresh-keys}, if the key in question has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to refresh the key from. In addition, if auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature being verified has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to fetch the key from. Note that this option introduces a "web bug": The creator of the key can see when the keys is refreshed. Thus this option is not enabled by default. @item honor-pka-record If auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature being verified has a PKA record, then use the PKA information to fetch the key. Defaults to "yes". @item include-subkeys When receiving a key, include subkeys as potential targets. Note that this option is not used with HKP keyservers, as they do not support retrieving keys by subkey id. @item timeout Tell the keyserver helper program how long (in seconds) to try and perform a keyserver action before giving up. Note that performing multiple actions at the same time uses this timeout value per action. For example, when retrieving multiple keys via @option{--recv-keys}, the timeout applies separately to each key retrieval, and not to the @option{--recv-keys} command as a whole. Defaults to 30 seconds. @item http-proxy=@code{value} This options is deprecated. Set the proxy to use for HTTP and HKP keyservers. This overrides any proxy defined in @file{dirmngr.conf}. @item verbose This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the @code{dirmngr} configuration options instead. @item debug This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the @code{dirmngr} configuration options instead. @item check-cert This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the @code{dirmngr} configuration options instead. @item ca-cert-file This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the @code{dirmngr} configuration options instead. @end table @item --completes-needed @code{n} @opindex compliant-needed Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new key signer (defaults to 1). @item --marginals-needed @code{n} @opindex marginals-needed Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new key signer (defaults to 3) @item --tofu-default-policy @code{auto|good|unknown|bad|ask} @opindex tofu-default-policy The default TOFU policy (defaults to @code{auto}). For more information about the meaning of this option, @xref{trust-model-tofu}. @item --tofu-db-format @code{auto|split|flat} @opindex tofu-default-policy The format for the TOFU DB. The split file format splits the data across many DBs under the @code{tofu.d} directory (one per email address and one per key). This makes it easier to automatically synchronize the data using a tool such as Unison (@url{https://www.cis.upenn.edu/~bcpierce/unison/}), since the individual files change rarely. The flat file format keeps all of the data in the single file @code{tofu.db}. This format results in better performance. If set to auto (which is the default), GnuPG will first check for the existence of @code{tofu.d} and @code{tofu.db}. If one of these exists, the corresponding format is used. If neither or both of these exist, then GnuPG defaults to the @code{split} format. In the latter case, a warning is emitted. @item --max-cert-depth @code{n} @opindex max-cert-depth Maximum depth of a certification chain (default is 5). @item --no-sig-cache @opindex no-sig-cache Do not cache the verification status of key signatures. Caching gives a much better performance in key listings. However, if you suspect that your public keyring is not save against write modifications, you can use this option to disable the caching. It probably does not make sense to disable it because all kind of damage can be done if someone else has write access to your public keyring. @item --auto-check-trustdb @itemx --no-auto-check-trustdb @opindex auto-check-trustdb If GnuPG feels that its information about the Web of Trust has to be updated, it automatically runs the @option{--check-trustdb} command internally. This may be a time consuming process. @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} disables this option. @item --use-agent @itemx --no-use-agent @opindex use-agent This is dummy option. @command{@gpgname} always requires the agent. @item --gpg-agent-info @opindex gpg-agent-info This is dummy option. It has no effect when used with @command{@gpgname}. @item --agent-program @var{file} @opindex agent-program Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The default value is determined by running @command{gpgconf} with the option @option{--list-dirs}. Note that the pipe symbol (@code{|}) is used for a regression test suite hack and may thus not be used in the file name. @item --dirmngr-program @var{file} @opindex dirmngr-program Specify a dirmngr program to be used for keyserver access. The default value is @file{@value{BINDIR}/dirmngr}. This is only used as a fallback when the environment variable @code{DIRMNGR_INFO} is not set or a running dirmngr cannot be connected. @item --no-autostart @opindex no-autostart Do not start the gpg-agent or the dirmngr if it has not yet been started and its service is required. This option is mostly useful on machines where the connection to gpg-agent has been redirected to another machines. If dirmngr is required on the remote machine, it may be started manually using @command{gpgconf --launch dirmngr}. @item --lock-once @opindex lock-once Lock the databases the first time a lock is requested and do not release the lock until the process terminates. @item --lock-multiple @opindex lock-multiple Release the locks every time a lock is no longer needed. Use this to override a previous @option{--lock-once} from a config file. @item --lock-never @opindex lock-never Disable locking entirely. This option should be used only in very special environments, where it can be assured that only one process is accessing those files. A bootable floppy with a stand-alone encryption system will probably use this. Improper usage of this option may lead to data and key corruption. @item --exit-on-status-write-error @opindex exit-on-status-write-error This option will cause write errors on the status FD to immediately terminate the process. That should in fact be the default but it never worked this way and thus we need an option to enable this, so that the change won't break applications which close their end of a status fd connected pipe too early. Using this option along with @option{--enable-progress-filter} may be used to cleanly cancel long running gpg operations. @item --limit-card-insert-tries @code{n} @opindex limit-card-insert-tries With @code{n} greater than 0 the number of prompts asking to insert a smartcard gets limited to N-1. Thus with a value of 1 gpg won't at all ask to insert a card if none has been inserted at startup. This option is useful in the configuration file in case an application does not know about the smartcard support and waits ad infinitum for an inserted card. @item --no-random-seed-file @opindex no-random-seed-file GnuPG uses a file to store its internal random pool over invocations. This makes random generation faster; however sometimes write operations are not desired. This option can be used to achieve that with the cost of slower random generation. @item --no-greeting @opindex no-greeting Suppress the initial copyright message. @item --no-secmem-warning @opindex no-secmem-warning Suppress the warning about "using insecure memory". @item --no-permission-warning @opindex permission-warning Suppress the warning about unsafe file and home directory (@option{--homedir}) permissions. Note that the permission checks that GnuPG performs are not intended to be authoritative, but rather they simply warn about certain common permission problems. Do not assume that the lack of a warning means that your system is secure. Note that the warning for unsafe @option{--homedir} permissions cannot be suppressed in the gpg.conf file, as this would allow an attacker to place an unsafe gpg.conf file in place, and use this file to suppress warnings about itself. The @option{--homedir} permissions warning may only be suppressed on the command line. @item --no-mdc-warning @opindex no-mdc-warning Suppress the warning about missing MDC integrity protection. @item --require-secmem @itemx --no-require-secmem @opindex require-secmem Refuse to run if GnuPG cannot get secure memory. Defaults to no (i.e. run, but give a warning). @item --require-cross-certification @itemx --no-require-cross-certification @opindex require-cross-certification When verifying a signature made from a subkey, ensure that the cross certification "back signature" on the subkey is present and valid. This protects against a subtle attack against subkeys that can sign. Defaults to @option{--require-cross-certification} for @command{@gpgname}. @item --expert @itemx --no-expert @opindex expert Allow the user to do certain nonsensical or "silly" things like signing an expired or revoked key, or certain potentially incompatible things like generating unusual key types. This also disables certain warning messages about potentially incompatible actions. As the name implies, this option is for experts only. If you don't fully understand the implications of what it allows you to do, leave this off. @option{--no-expert} disables this option. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** KEY RELATED OPTIONS ************ @c ******************************************* @node GPG Key related Options @subsection Key related options @table @gnupgtabopt @item --recipient @var{name} @itemx -r @opindex recipient Encrypt for user id @var{name}. If this option or @option{--hidden-recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user-id unless @option{--default-recipient} is given. @item --hidden-recipient @var{name} @itemx -R @opindex hidden-recipient Encrypt for user ID @var{name}, but hide the key ID of this user's key. This option helps to hide the receiver of the message and is a limited countermeasure against traffic analysis. If this option or @option{--recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user ID unless @option{--default-recipient} is given. @item --encrypt-to @code{name} @opindex encrypt-to Same as @option{--recipient} but this one is intended for use in the options file and may be used with your own user-id as an "encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked user id. No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even disabled keys can be used. @item --hidden-encrypt-to @code{name} @opindex hidden-encrypt-to Same as @option{--hidden-recipient} but this one is intended for use in the options file and may be used with your own user-id as a hidden "encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked user id. No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even disabled keys can be used. @item --encrypt-to-default-key @opindex encrypt-to-default-key If the default secret key is taken from @option{--default-key}, then also encrypt to that key. @item --no-encrypt-to @opindex no-encrypt-to Disable the use of all @option{--encrypt-to} and @option{--hidden-encrypt-to} keys. @item --group @code{name=value1 } @opindex group Sets up a named group, which is similar to aliases in email programs. Any time the group name is a recipient (@option{-r} or @option{--recipient}), it will be expanded to the values specified. Multiple groups with the same name are automatically merged into a single group. The values are @code{key IDs} or fingerprints, but any key description is accepted. Note that a value with spaces in it will be treated as two different values. Note also there is only one level of expansion --- you cannot make an group that points to another group. When used from the command line, it may be necessary to quote the argument to this option to prevent the shell from treating it as multiple arguments. @item --ungroup @code{name} @opindex ungroup Remove a given entry from the @option{--group} list. @item --no-groups @opindex no-groups Remove all entries from the @option{--group} list. @item --local-user @var{name} @itemx -u @opindex local-user Use @var{name} as the key to sign with. Note that this option overrides @option{--default-key}. @item --try-secret-key @var{name} @opindex try-secret-key For hidden recipients GPG needs to know the keys to use for trial decryption. The key set with @option{--default-key} is always tried first, but this is often not sufficient. This option allows to set more keys to be used for trial decryption. Although any valid user-id specification may be used for @var{name} it makes sense to use at least the long keyid to avoid ambiguities. Note that gpg-agent might pop up a pinentry for a lot keys to do the trial decryption. If you want to stop all further trial decryption you may use close-window button instead of the cancel button. @item --try-all-secrets @opindex try-all-secrets Don't look at the key ID as stored in the message but try all secret keys in turn to find the right decryption key. This option forces the behaviour as used by anonymous recipients (created by using @option{--throw-keyids} or @option{--hidden-recipient}) and might come handy in case where an encrypted message contains a bogus key ID. @item --skip-hidden-recipients @itemx --no-skip-hidden-recipients @opindex skip-hidden-recipients @opindex no-skip-hidden-recipients During decryption skip all anonymous recipients. This option helps in the case that people use the hidden recipients feature to hide there own encrypt-to key from others. If oneself has many secret keys this may lead to a major annoyance because all keys are tried in turn to decrypt something which was not really intended for it. The drawback of this option is that it is currently not possible to decrypt a message which includes real anonymous recipients. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** INPUT AND OUTPUT *************** @c ******************************************* @node GPG Input and Output @subsection Input and Output @table @gnupgtabopt @item --armor @itemx -a @opindex armor Create ASCII armored output. The default is to create the binary OpenPGP format. @item --no-armor @opindex no-armor Assume the input data is not in ASCII armored format. @item --output @var{file} @itemx -o @var{file} @opindex output Write output to @var{file}. @item --max-output @code{n} @opindex max-output This option sets a limit on the number of bytes that will be generated when processing a file. Since OpenPGP supports various levels of compression, it is possible that the plaintext of a given message may be significantly larger than the original OpenPGP message. While GnuPG works properly with such messages, there is often a desire to set a maximum file size that will be generated before processing is forced to stop by the OS limits. Defaults to 0, which means "no limit". @item --import-options @code{parameters} @opindex import-options This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for importing keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the opposite meaning. The options are: @table @asis @item import-local-sigs Allow importing key signatures marked as "local". This is not generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used. Defaults to no. @item keep-ownertrust Normally possible still existing ownertrust values of a key are cleared if a key is imported. This is in general desirable so that a formerly deleted key does not automatically gain an ownertrust values merely due to import. On the other hand it is sometimes necessary to re-import a trusted set of keys again but keeping already assigned ownertrust values. This can be achived by using this option. @item repair-pks-subkey-bug During import, attempt to repair the damage caused by the PKS keyserver bug (pre version 0.9.6) that mangles keys with multiple subkeys. Note that this cannot completely repair the damaged key as some crucial data is removed by the keyserver, but it does at least give you back one subkey. Defaults to no for regular @option{--import} and to yes for keyserver @option{--recv-keys}. @item merge-only During import, allow key updates to existing keys, but do not allow any new keys to be imported. Defaults to no. @item import-clean After import, compact (remove all signatures except the self-signature) any user IDs from the new key that are not usable. Then, remove any signatures from the new key that are not usable. This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "clean" after import. Defaults to no. @item import-minimal Import the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" after import. Defaults to no. @end table @item --export-options @code{parameters} @opindex export-options This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for exporting keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the opposite meaning. The options are: @table @asis @item export-local-sigs Allow exporting key signatures marked as "local". This is not generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used. Defaults to no. @item export-attributes Include attribute user IDs (photo IDs) while exporting. This is useful to export keys if they are going to be used by an OpenPGP program that does not accept attribute user IDs. Defaults to yes. @item export-sensitive-revkeys Include designated revoker information that was marked as "sensitive". Defaults to no. @c Since GnuPG 2.1 gpg-agent manages the secret key and thus the @c export-reset-subkey-passwd hack is not anymore justified. Such use @c cases may be implemented using a specialized secret key export @c tool. @c @item export-reset-subkey-passwd @c When using the @option{--export-secret-subkeys} command, this option resets @c the passphrases for all exported subkeys to empty. This is useful @c when the exported subkey is to be used on an unattended machine where @c a passphrase doesn't necessarily make sense. Defaults to no. @item export-clean Compact (remove all signatures from) user IDs on the key being exported if the user IDs are not usable. Also, do not export any signatures that are not usable. This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "clean" before export except that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to no. @item export-minimal Export the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" before export except that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to no. @end table @item --with-colons @opindex with-colons Print key listings delimited by colons. Note that the output will be encoded in UTF-8 regardless of any @option{--display-charset} setting. This format is useful when GnuPG is called from scripts and other programs as it is easily machine parsed. The details of this format are documented in the file @file{doc/DETAILS}, which is included in the GnuPG source distribution. @item --print-pka-records @opindex print-pka-records Modify the output of the list commands to print PKA records suitable to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before each record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone file. @item --print-dane-records @opindex print-dane-records Modify the output of the list commands to print OpenPGP DANE records suitable to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before each record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone file. @item --fixed-list-mode @opindex fixed-list-mode Do not merge primary user ID and primary key in @option{--with-colon} listing mode and print all timestamps as seconds since 1970-01-01. Since GnuPG 2.0.10, this mode is always used and thus this option is obsolete; it does not harm to use it though. @item --legacy-list-mode @opindex legacy-list-mode Revert to the pre-2.1 public key list mode. This only affects the human readable output and not the machine interface (i.e. @code{--with-colons}). Note that the legacy format does not allow to convey suitable information for elliptic curves. @item --with-fingerprint @opindex with-fingerprint Same as the command @option{--fingerprint} but changes only the format of the output and may be used together with another command. +@item --with-subkey-fingerprint +@opindex with-subkey-fingerprint +If a fingerprint is printed for the primary key, this option forces +printing of the fingerprint for all subkeys. This could also be +achieved by using the @option{--with-fingerprint} twice but by using +this option along with keyid-format "none" a compact fingerprint is +printed. + @item --with-icao-spelling @opindex with-icao-spelling Print the ICAO spelling of the fingerprint in addition to the hex digits. @item --with-keygrip @opindex with-keygrip Include the keygrip in the key listings. @item --with-wkd-hash @opindex with-wkd-hash Print a Web Key Directory indentifier along with each user ID in key listings. This is an experimental feature and semantics may change. @item --with-secret @opindex with-secret Include info about the presence of a secret key in public key listings done with @code{--with-colons}. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** OPENPGP OPTIONS **************** @c ******************************************* @node OpenPGP Options @subsection OpenPGP protocol specific options. @table @gnupgtabopt @item -t, --textmode @itemx --no-textmode @opindex textmode Treat input files as text and store them in the OpenPGP canonical text form with standard "CRLF" line endings. This also sets the necessary flags to inform the recipient that the encrypted or signed data is text and may need its line endings converted back to whatever the local system uses. This option is useful when communicating between two platforms that have different line ending conventions (UNIX-like to Mac, Mac to Windows, etc). @option{--no-textmode} disables this option, and is the default. @item --force-v3-sigs @itemx --no-force-v3-sigs @item --force-v4-certs @itemx --no-force-v4-certs These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.1. @item --force-mdc @opindex force-mdc Force the use of encryption with a modification detection code. This is always used with the newer ciphers (those with a blocksize greater than 64 bits), or if all of the recipient keys indicate MDC support in their feature flags. @item --disable-mdc @opindex disable-mdc Disable the use of the modification detection code. Note that by using this option, the encrypted message becomes vulnerable to a message modification attack. @item --personal-cipher-preferences @code{string} @opindex personal-cipher-preferences Set the list of personal cipher preferences to @code{string}. Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command. @item --personal-digest-preferences @code{string} @opindex personal-digest-preferences Set the list of personal digest preferences to @code{string}. Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked digest algorithm in this list is also used when signing without encryption (e.g. @option{--clearsign} or @option{--sign}). @item --personal-compress-preferences @code{string} @opindex personal-compress-preferences Set the list of personal compression preferences to @code{string}. Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked compression algorithm in this list is also used when there are no recipient keys to consider (e.g. @option{--symmetric}). @item --s2k-cipher-algo @code{name} @opindex s2k-cipher-algo Use @code{name} as the cipher algorithm for symmetric encryption with a passphrase if @option{--personal-cipher-preferences} and @option{--cipher-algo} are not given. The default is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}. @item --s2k-digest-algo @code{name} @opindex s2k-digest-algo Use @code{name} as the digest algorithm used to mangle the passphrases for symmetric encryption. The default is SHA-1. @item --s2k-mode @code{n} @opindex s2k-mode Selects how passphrases for symmetric encryption are mangled. If @code{n} is 0 a plain passphrase (which is in general not recommended) will be used, a 1 adds a salt (which should not be used) to the passphrase and a 3 (the default) iterates the whole process a number of times (see @option{--s2k-count}). @item --s2k-count @code{n} @opindex s2k-count Specify how many times the passphrases mangling for symmetric encryption is repeated. This value may range between 1024 and 65011712 inclusive. The default is inquired from gpg-agent. Note that not all values in the 1024-65011712 range are legal and if an illegal value is selected, GnuPG will round up to the nearest legal value. This option is only meaningful if @option{--s2k-mode} is set to the default of 3. @end table @c *************************** @c ******* Compliance ******** @c *************************** @node Compliance Options @subsection Compliance options These options control what GnuPG is compliant to. Only one of these options may be active at a time. Note that the default setting of this is nearly always the correct one. See the INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below before using one of these options. @table @gnupgtabopt @item --gnupg @opindex gnupg Use standard GnuPG behavior. This is essentially OpenPGP behavior (see @option{--openpgp}), but with some additional workarounds for common compatibility problems in different versions of PGP. This is the default option, so it is not generally needed, but it may be useful to override a different compliance option in the gpg.conf file. @item --openpgp @opindex openpgp Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict OpenPGP behavior. Use this option to reset all previous options like @option{--s2k-*}, @option{--cipher-algo}, @option{--digest-algo} and @option{--compress-algo} to OpenPGP compliant values. All PGP workarounds are disabled. @item --rfc4880 @opindex rfc4880 Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-4880 behavior. Note that this is currently the same thing as @option{--openpgp}. @item --rfc2440 @opindex rfc2440 Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-2440 behavior. @item --pgp6 @opindex pgp6 Set up all options to be as PGP 6 compliant as possible. This restricts you to the ciphers IDEA (if the IDEA plugin is installed), 3DES, and CAST5, the hashes MD5, SHA1 and RIPEMD160, and the compression algorithms none and ZIP. This also disables --throw-keyids, and making signatures with signing subkeys as PGP 6 does not understand signatures made by signing subkeys. This option implies @option{--disable-mdc --escape-from-lines}. @item --pgp7 @opindex pgp7 Set up all options to be as PGP 7 compliant as possible. This is identical to @option{--pgp6} except that MDCs are not disabled, and the list of allowable ciphers is expanded to add AES128, AES192, AES256, and TWOFISH. @item --pgp8 @opindex pgp8 Set up all options to be as PGP 8 compliant as possible. PGP 8 is a lot closer to the OpenPGP standard than previous versions of PGP, so all this does is disable @option{--throw-keyids} and set @option{--escape-from-lines}. All algorithms are allowed except for the SHA224, SHA384, and SHA512 digests. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** ESOTERIC OPTIONS *************** @c ******************************************* @node GPG Esoteric Options @subsection Doing things one usually doesn't want to do. @table @gnupgtabopt @item -n @itemx --dry-run @opindex dry-run Don't make any changes (this is not completely implemented). @item --list-only @opindex list-only Changes the behaviour of some commands. This is like @option{--dry-run} but different in some cases. The semantic of this command may be extended in the future. Currently it only skips the actual decryption pass and therefore enables a fast listing of the encryption keys. @item -i @itemx --interactive @opindex interactive Prompt before overwriting any files. @item --debug-level @var{level} @opindex debug-level Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be a numeric value or by a keyword: @table @code @item none No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of the keyword. @item basic Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used instead of the keyword. @item advanced More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used instead of the keyword. @item expert Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used instead of the keyword. @item guru All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is only enabled if the keyword is used. @end table How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are however carefully selected to best aid in debugging. @item --debug @var{flags} @opindex debug Set debugging flags. All flags are or-ed and @var{flags} may be given in C syntax (e.g. 0x0042) or as a comma separated list of flag names. To get a list of all supported flags the single word "help" can be used. @item --debug-all @opindex debug-all Set all useful debugging flags. @item --debug-iolbf @opindex debug-iolbf Set stdout into line buffered mode. This option is only honored when given on the command line. @item --faked-system-time @var{epoch} @opindex faked-system-time This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back or forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since the year 1970. Alternatively @var{epoch} may be given as a full ISO time string (e.g. "20070924T154812"). @item --enable-progress-filter @opindex enable-progress-filter Enable certain PROGRESS status outputs. This option allows frontends to display a progress indicator while gpg is processing larger files. There is a slight performance overhead using it. @item --status-fd @code{n} @opindex status-fd Write special status strings to the file descriptor @code{n}. See the file DETAILS in the documentation for a listing of them. @item --status-file @code{file} @opindex status-file Same as @option{--status-fd}, except the status data is written to file @code{file}. @item --logger-fd @code{n} @opindex logger-fd Write log output to file descriptor @code{n} and not to STDERR. @item --log-file @code{file} @itemx --logger-file @code{file} @opindex log-file Same as @option{--logger-fd}, except the logger data is written to file @code{file}. Note that @option{--log-file} is only implemented for GnuPG-2. @item --attribute-fd @code{n} @opindex attribute-fd Write attribute subpackets to the file descriptor @code{n}. This is most useful for use with @option{--status-fd}, since the status messages are needed to separate out the various subpackets from the stream delivered to the file descriptor. @item --attribute-file @code{file} @opindex attribute-file Same as @option{--attribute-fd}, except the attribute data is written to file @code{file}. @item --comment @code{string} @itemx --no-comments @opindex comment Use @code{string} as a comment string in clear text signatures and ASCII armored messages or keys (see @option{--armor}). The default behavior is not to use a comment string. @option{--comment} may be repeated multiple times to get multiple comment strings. @option{--no-comments} removes all comments. It is a good idea to keep the length of a single comment below 60 characters to avoid problems with mail programs wrapping such lines. Note that comment lines, like all other header lines, are not protected by the signature. @item --emit-version @itemx --no-emit-version @opindex emit-version Force inclusion of the version string in ASCII armored output. If given once only the name of the program and the major number is emitted (default), given twice the minor is also emitted, given triple the micro is added, and given quad an operating system identification is also emitted. @option{--no-emit-version} disables the version line. @item --sig-notation @code{name=value} @itemx --cert-notation @code{name=value} @itemx -N, --set-notation @code{name=value} @opindex sig-notation @opindex cert-notation @opindex set-notation Put the name value pair into the signature as notation data. @code{name} must consist only of printable characters or spaces, and must contain a '@@' character in the form keyname@@domain.example.com (substituting the appropriate keyname and domain name, of course). This is to help prevent pollution of the IETF reserved notation namespace. The @option{--expert} flag overrides the '@@' check. @code{value} may be any printable string; it will be encoded in UTF8, so you should check that your @option{--display-charset} is set correctly. If you prefix @code{name} with an exclamation mark (!), the notation data will be flagged as critical (rfc4880:5.2.3.16). @option{--sig-notation} sets a notation for data signatures. @option{--cert-notation} sets a notation for key signatures (certifications). @option{--set-notation} sets both. There are special codes that may be used in notation names. "%k" will be expanded into the key ID of the key being signed, "%K" into the long key ID of the key being signed, "%f" into the fingerprint of the key being signed, "%s" into the key ID of the key making the signature, "%S" into the long key ID of the key making the signature, "%g" into the fingerprint of the key making the signature (which might be a subkey), "%p" into the fingerprint of the primary key of the key making the signature, "%c" into the signature count from the OpenPGP smartcard, and "%%" results in a single "%". %k, %K, and %f are only meaningful when making a key signature (certification), and %c is only meaningful when using the OpenPGP smartcard. @item --sig-policy-url @code{string} @itemx --cert-policy-url @code{string} @itemx --set-policy-url @code{string} @opindex sig-policy-url @opindex cert-policy-url @opindex set-policy-url Use @code{string} as a Policy URL for signatures (rfc4880:5.2.3.20). If you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the policy URL packet will be flagged as critical. @option{--sig-policy-url} sets a policy url for data signatures. @option{--cert-policy-url} sets a policy url for key signatures (certifications). @option{--set-policy-url} sets both. The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well. @item --sig-keyserver-url @code{string} @opindex sig-keyserver-url Use @code{string} as a preferred keyserver URL for data signatures. If you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the keyserver URL packet will be flagged as critical. The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well. @item --set-filename @code{string} @opindex set-filename Use @code{string} as the filename which is stored inside messages. This overrides the default, which is to use the actual filename of the file being encrypted. Using the empty string for @var{string} effectively removes the filename from the output. @item --for-your-eyes-only @itemx --no-for-your-eyes-only @opindex for-your-eyes-only Set the `for your eyes only' flag in the message. This causes GnuPG to refuse to save the file unless the @option{--output} option is given, and PGP to use a "secure viewer" with a claimed Tempest-resistant font to display the message. This option overrides @option{--set-filename}. @option{--no-for-your-eyes-only} disables this option. @item --use-embedded-filename @itemx --no-use-embedded-filename @opindex use-embedded-filename Try to create a file with a name as embedded in the data. This can be a dangerous option as it allows to overwrite files. Defaults to no. @item --cipher-algo @code{name} @opindex cipher-algo Use @code{name} as cipher algorithm. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. If this is not used the cipher algorithm is selected from the preferences stored with the key. In general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. @option{--personal-cipher-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the same thing. @item --digest-algo @code{name} @opindex digest-algo Use @code{name} as the message digest algorithm. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. In general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. @option{--personal-digest-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the same thing. @item --compress-algo @code{name} @opindex compress-algo Use compression algorithm @code{name}. "zlib" is RFC-1950 ZLIB compression. "zip" is RFC-1951 ZIP compression which is used by PGP. "bzip2" is a more modern compression scheme that can compress some things better than zip or zlib, but at the cost of more memory used during compression and decompression. "uncompressed" or "none" disables compression. If this option is not used, the default behavior is to examine the recipient key preferences to see which algorithms the recipient supports. If all else fails, ZIP is used for maximum compatibility. ZLIB may give better compression results than ZIP, as the compression window size is not limited to 8k. BZIP2 may give even better compression results than that, but will use a significantly larger amount of memory while compressing and decompressing. This may be significant in low memory situations. Note, however, that PGP (all versions) only supports ZIP compression. Using any algorithm other than ZIP or "none" will make the message unreadable with PGP. In general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. @option{--personal-compress-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the same thing. @item --cert-digest-algo @code{name} @opindex cert-digest-algo Use @code{name} as the message digest algorithm used when signing a key. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. Be aware that if you choose an algorithm that GnuPG supports but other OpenPGP implementations do not, then some users will not be able to use the key signatures you make, or quite possibly your entire key. @item --disable-cipher-algo @code{name} @opindex disable-cipher-algo Never allow the use of @code{name} as cipher algorithm. The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm will still get disabled. @item --disable-pubkey-algo @code{name} @opindex disable-pubkey-algo Never allow the use of @code{name} as public key algorithm. The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm will still get disabled. @item --throw-keyids @itemx --no-throw-keyids @opindex throw-keyids Do not put the recipient key IDs into encrypted messages. This helps to hide the receivers of the message and is a limited countermeasure against traffic analysis.@footnote{Using a little social engineering anyone who is able to decrypt the message can check whether one of the other recipients is the one he suspects.} On the receiving side, it may slow down the decryption process because all available secret keys must be tried. @option{--no-throw-keyids} disables this option. This option is essentially the same as using @option{--hidden-recipient} for all recipients. @item --not-dash-escaped @opindex not-dash-escaped This option changes the behavior of cleartext signatures so that they can be used for patch files. You should not send such an armored file via email because all spaces and line endings are hashed too. You can not use this option for data which has 5 dashes at the beginning of a line, patch files don't have this. A special armor header line tells GnuPG about this cleartext signature option. @item --escape-from-lines @itemx --no-escape-from-lines @opindex escape-from-lines Because some mailers change lines starting with "From " to ">From " it is good to handle such lines in a special way when creating cleartext signatures to prevent the mail system from breaking the signature. Note that all other PGP versions do it this way too. Enabled by default. @option{--no-escape-from-lines} disables this option. @item --passphrase-repeat @code{n} @opindex passphrase-repeat Specify how many times @command{@gpgname} will request a new passphrase be repeated. This is useful for helping memorize a passphrase. Defaults to 1 repetition. @item --passphrase-fd @code{n} @opindex passphrase-fd Read the passphrase from file descriptor @code{n}. Only the first line will be read from file descriptor @code{n}. If you use 0 for @code{n}, the passphrase will be read from STDIN. This can only be used if only one passphrase is supplied. Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch} has also been given. This is different from GnuPG version 1.x. @item --passphrase-file @code{file} @opindex passphrase-file Read the passphrase from file @code{file}. Only the first line will be read from file @code{file}. This can only be used if only one passphrase is supplied. Obviously, a passphrase stored in a file is of questionable security if other users can read this file. Don't use this option if you can avoid it. Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch} has also been given. This is different from GnuPG version 1.x. @item --passphrase @code{string} @opindex passphrase Use @code{string} as the passphrase. This can only be used if only one passphrase is supplied. Obviously, this is of very questionable security on a multi-user system. Don't use this option if you can avoid it. Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch} has also been given. This is different from GnuPG version 1.x. @item --pinentry-mode @code{mode} @opindex pinentry-mode Set the pinentry mode to @code{mode}. Allowed values for @code{mode} are: @table @asis @item default Use the default of the agent, which is @code{ask}. @item ask Force the use of the Pinentry. @item cancel Emulate use of Pinentry's cancel button. @item error Return a Pinentry error (``No Pinentry''). @item loopback Redirect Pinentry queries to the caller. Note that in contrast to Pinentry the user is not prompted again if he enters a bad password. @end table @item --command-fd @code{n} @opindex command-fd This is a replacement for the deprecated shared-memory IPC mode. If this option is enabled, user input on questions is not expected from the TTY but from the given file descriptor. It should be used together with @option{--status-fd}. See the file doc/DETAILS in the source distribution for details on how to use it. @item --command-file @code{file} @opindex command-file Same as @option{--command-fd}, except the commands are read out of file @code{file} @item --allow-non-selfsigned-uid @itemx --no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid @opindex allow-non-selfsigned-uid Allow the import and use of keys with user IDs which are not self-signed. This is not recommended, as a non self-signed user ID is trivial to forge. @option{--no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid} disables. @item --allow-freeform-uid @opindex allow-freeform-uid Disable all checks on the form of the user ID while generating a new one. This option should only be used in very special environments as it does not ensure the de-facto standard format of user IDs. @item --ignore-time-conflict @opindex ignore-time-conflict GnuPG normally checks that the timestamps associated with keys and signatures have plausible values. However, sometimes a signature seems to be older than the key due to clock problems. This option makes these checks just a warning. See also @option{--ignore-valid-from} for timestamp issues on subkeys. @item --ignore-valid-from @opindex ignore-valid-from GnuPG normally does not select and use subkeys created in the future. This option allows the use of such keys and thus exhibits the pre-1.0.7 behaviour. You should not use this option unless there is some clock problem. See also @option{--ignore-time-conflict} for timestamp issues with signatures. @item --ignore-crc-error @opindex ignore-crc-error The ASCII armor used by OpenPGP is protected by a CRC checksum against transmission errors. Occasionally the CRC gets mangled somewhere on the transmission channel but the actual content (which is protected by the OpenPGP protocol anyway) is still okay. This option allows GnuPG to ignore CRC errors. @item --ignore-mdc-error @opindex ignore-mdc-error This option changes a MDC integrity protection failure into a warning. This can be useful if a message is partially corrupt, but it is necessary to get as much data as possible out of the corrupt message. However, be aware that a MDC protection failure may also mean that the message was tampered with intentionally by an attacker. @item --allow-weak-digest-algos @opindex allow-weak-digest-algos Signatures made with known-weak digest algorithms are normally rejected with an ``invalid digest algorithm'' message. This option allows the verification of signatures made with such weak algorithms. MD5 is the only digest algorithm considered weak by default. See also @option{--weak-digest} to reject other digest algorithms. @item --weak-digest @code{name} @opindex weak-digest Treat the specified digest algorithm as weak. Signatures made over weak digests algorithms are normally rejected. This option can be supplied multiple times if multiple algorithms should be considered weak. See also @option{--allow-weak-digest-algos} to disable rejection of weak digests. MD5 is always considered weak, and does not need to be listed explicitly. @item --no-default-keyring @opindex no-default-keyring Do not add the default keyrings to the list of keyrings. Note that GnuPG will not operate without any keyrings, so if you use this option and do not provide alternate keyrings via @option{--keyring} or @option{--secret-keyring}, then GnuPG will still use the default public or secret keyrings. @item --skip-verify @opindex skip-verify Skip the signature verification step. This may be used to make the decryption faster if the signature verification is not needed. @item --with-key-data @opindex with-key-data Print key listings delimited by colons (like @option{--with-colons}) and print the public key data. @item --fast-list-mode @opindex fast-list-mode Changes the output of the list commands to work faster; this is achieved by leaving some parts empty. Some applications don't need the user ID and the trust information given in the listings. By using this options they can get a faster listing. The exact behaviour of this option may change in future versions. If you are missing some information, don't use this option. @item --no-literal @opindex no-literal This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful. @item --set-filesize @opindex set-filesize This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful. @item --show-session-key @opindex show-session-key Display the session key used for one message. See @option{--override-session-key} for the counterpart of this option. We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing; however the user should have the freedom to decide whether to go to prison or to reveal the content of one specific message without compromising all messages ever encrypted for one secret key. You can also use this option if you receive an encrypted message which is abusive or offensive, to prove to the administrators of the messaging system that the ciphertext transmitted corresponds to an inappropriate plaintext so they can take action against the offending user. @item --override-session-key @code{string} @opindex override-session-key Don't use the public key but the session key @code{string}. The format of this string is the same as the one printed by @option{--show-session-key}. This option is normally not used but comes handy in case someone forces you to reveal the content of an encrypted message; using this option you can do this without handing out the secret key. @item --ask-sig-expire @itemx --no-ask-sig-expire @opindex ask-sig-expire When making a data signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this option is not specified, the expiration time set via @option{--default-sig-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-sig-expire} disables this option. @item --default-sig-expire @opindex default-sig-expire The default expiration time to use for signature expiration. Valid values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d (for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0". @item --ask-cert-expire @itemx --no-ask-cert-expire @opindex ask-cert-expire When making a key signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this option is not specified, the expiration time set via @option{--default-cert-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-cert-expire} disables this option. @item --default-cert-expire @opindex default-cert-expire The default expiration time to use for key signature expiration. Valid values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d (for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0". @item --allow-secret-key-import @opindex allow-secret-key-import This is an obsolete option and is not used anywhere. @item --allow-multiple-messages @item --no-allow-multiple-messages @opindex allow-multiple-messages Allow processing of multiple OpenPGP messages contained in a single file or stream. Some programs that call GPG are not prepared to deal with multiple messages being processed together, so this option defaults to no. Note that versions of GPG prior to 1.4.7 always allowed multiple messages. Warning: Do not use this option unless you need it as a temporary workaround! @item --enable-special-filenames @opindex enable-special-filenames This options enables a mode in which filenames of the form @file{-&n}, where n is a non-negative decimal number, refer to the file descriptor n and not to a file with that name. @item --no-expensive-trust-checks @opindex no-expensive-trust-checks Experimental use only. @item --preserve-permissions @opindex preserve-permissions Don't change the permissions of a secret keyring back to user read/write only. Use this option only if you really know what you are doing. @item --default-preference-list @code{string} @opindex default-preference-list Set the list of default preferences to @code{string}. This preference list is used for new keys and becomes the default for "setpref" in the edit menu. @item --default-keyserver-url @code{name} @opindex default-keyserver-url Set the default keyserver URL to @code{name}. This keyserver will be used as the keyserver URL when writing a new self-signature on a key, which includes key generation and changing preferences. @item --list-config @opindex list-config Display various internal configuration parameters of GnuPG. This option is intended for external programs that call GnuPG to perform tasks, and is thus not generally useful. See the file @file{doc/DETAILS} in the source distribution for the details of which configuration items may be listed. @option{--list-config} is only usable with @option{--with-colons} set. @item --list-gcrypt-config @opindex list-gcrypt-config Display various internal configuration parameters of Libgcrypt. @item --gpgconf-list @opindex gpgconf-list This command is similar to @option{--list-config} but in general only internally used by the @command{gpgconf} tool. @item --gpgconf-test @opindex gpgconf-test This is more or less dummy action. However it parses the configuration file and returns with failure if the configuration file would prevent @command{gpg} from startup. Thus it may be used to run a syntax check on the configuration file. @end table @c ******************************* @c ******* Deprecated ************ @c ******************************* @node Deprecated Options @subsection Deprecated options @table @gnupgtabopt @item --show-photos @itemx --no-show-photos @opindex show-photos Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-sigs}, @option{--list-public-keys}, @option{--list-secret-keys}, and verifying a signature to also display the photo ID attached to the key, if any. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-photos} and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-photos} instead. @item --show-keyring @opindex show-keyring Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which keyring a given key resides on. This option is deprecated: use @option{--list-options [no-]show-keyring} instead. @item --always-trust @opindex always-trust Identical to @option{--trust-model always}. This option is deprecated. @item --show-notation @itemx --no-show-notation @opindex show-notation Show signature notations in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs} listings as well as when verifying a signature with a notation in it. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-notation} and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-notation} instead. @item --show-policy-url @itemx --no-show-policy-url @opindex show-policy-url Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-sigs} or @option{--check-sigs} listings as well as when verifying a signature with a policy URL in it. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-policy-url} and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-policy-url} instead. @end table @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** FILES **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect files @node GPG Configuration @section Configuration files There are a few configuration files to control certain aspects of @command{@gpgname}'s operation. Unless noted, they are expected in the current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}). @table @file @item gpg.conf @cindex gpg.conf This is the standard configuration file read by @command{@gpgname} on startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated. This default name may be changed on the command line (@pxref{gpg-option --options}). You should backup this file. @end table @c man:.RE Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files into the directory @file{@value{SYSCONFSKELDIR}} so that newly created users start up with a working configuration. For existing users a small helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}). For internal purposes @command{@gpgname} creates and maintains a few other files; They all live in in the current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}). Only the @command{@gpgname} program may modify these files. @table @file @item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg The public keyring. You should backup this file. @item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg.lock The lock file for the public keyring. @item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx The public keyring using a different format. This file is sharred with @command{gpgsm}. You should backup this file. @item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx.lock The lock file for @file{pubring.kbx}. @item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg A secret keyring as used by GnuPG versions before 2.1. It is not used by GnuPG 2.1 and later. @item ~/.gnupg/.gpg-v21-migrated File indicating that a migration to GnuPG 2.1 has been done. @item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg The trust database. There is no need to backup this file; it is better to backup the ownertrust values (@pxref{option --export-ownertrust}). @item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg.lock The lock file for the trust database. @item ~/.gnupg/random_seed A file used to preserve the state of the internal random pool. @item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg.lock The lock file for the secret keyring. @item ~/.gnupg/openpgp-revocs.d/ This is the directory where gpg stores pre-generated revocation certificates. The file name corresponds to the OpenPGP fingerprint of the respective key. It is suggested to backup those certificates and if the primary private key is not stored on the disk to move them to an external storage device. Anyone who can access theses files is able to revoke the corresponding key. You may want to print them out. You should backup all files in this directory and take care to keep this backup closed away. @item @value{DATADIR}/options.skel The skeleton options file. @item @value{LIBDIR}/ Default location for extensions. @end table @c man:.RE Operation is further controlled by a few environment variables: @table @asis @item HOME Used to locate the default home directory. @item GNUPGHOME If set directory used instead of "~/.gnupg". @item GPG_AGENT_INFO This variable was used by GnuPG versions before 2.1 @item PINENTRY_USER_DATA This value is passed via gpg-agent to pinentry. It is useful to convey extra information to a custom pinentry. @item COLUMNS @itemx LINES Used to size some displays to the full size of the screen. @item LANGUAGE Apart from its use by GNU, it is used in the W32 version to override the language selection done through the Registry. If used and set to a valid and available language name (@var{langid}), the file with the translation is loaded from @code{@var{gpgdir}/gnupg.nls/@var{langid}.mo}. Here @var{gpgdir} is the directory out of which the gpg binary has been loaded. If it can't be loaded the Registry is tried and as last resort the native Windows locale system is used. @end table @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** EXAMPLES **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect examples @node GPG Examples @section Examples @table @asis @item gpg -se -r @code{Bob} @code{file} sign and encrypt for user Bob @item gpg --clearsign @code{file} make a clear text signature @item gpg -sb @code{file} make a detached signature @item gpg -u 0x12345678 -sb @code{file} make a detached signature with the key 0x12345678 @item gpg --list-keys @code{user_ID} show keys @item gpg --fingerprint @code{user_ID} show fingerprint @item gpg --verify @code{pgpfile} @itemx gpg --verify @code{sigfile} Verify the signature of the file but do not output the data. The second form is used for detached signatures, where @code{sigfile} is the detached signature (either ASCII armored or binary) and are the signed data; if this is not given, the name of the file holding the signed data is constructed by cutting off the extension (".asc" or ".sig") of @code{sigfile} or by asking the user for the filename. @end table @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** USER ID **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect how to specify a user id @ifset isman @include specify-user-id.texi @end ifset @mansect return value @chapheading RETURN VALUE The program returns 0 if everything was fine, 1 if at least a signature was bad, and other error codes for fatal errors. @mansect warnings @chapheading WARNINGS Use a *good* password for your user account and a *good* passphrase to protect your secret key. This passphrase is the weakest part of the whole system. Programs to do dictionary attacks on your secret keyring are very easy to write and so you should protect your "~/.gnupg/" directory very well. Keep in mind that, if this program is used over a network (telnet), it is *very* easy to spy out your passphrase! If you are going to verify detached signatures, make sure that the program knows about it; either give both filenames on the command line or use @samp{-} to specify STDIN. @mansect interoperability @chapheading INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS GnuPG tries to be a very flexible implementation of the OpenPGP standard. In particular, GnuPG implements many of the optional parts of the standard, such as the SHA-512 hash, and the ZLIB and BZIP2 compression algorithms. It is important to be aware that not all OpenPGP programs implement these optional algorithms and that by forcing their use via the @option{--cipher-algo}, @option{--digest-algo}, @option{--cert-digest-algo}, or @option{--compress-algo} options in GnuPG, it is possible to create a perfectly valid OpenPGP message, but one that cannot be read by the intended recipient. There are dozens of variations of OpenPGP programs available, and each supports a slightly different subset of these optional algorithms. For example, until recently, no (unhacked) version of PGP supported the BLOWFISH cipher algorithm. A message using BLOWFISH simply could not be read by a PGP user. By default, GnuPG uses the standard OpenPGP preferences system that will always do the right thing and create messages that are usable by all recipients, regardless of which OpenPGP program they use. Only override this safe default if you really know what you are doing. If you absolutely must override the safe default, or if the preferences on a given key are invalid for some reason, you are far better off using the @option{--pgp6}, @option{--pgp7}, or @option{--pgp8} options. These options are safe as they do not force any particular algorithms in violation of OpenPGP, but rather reduce the available algorithms to a "PGP-safe" list. @mansect bugs @chapheading BUGS On older systems this program should be installed as setuid(root). This is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents the operating system from writing memory pages (which may contain passphrases or other sensitive material) to disk. If you get no warning message about insecure memory your operating system supports locking without being root. The program drops root privileges as soon as locked memory is allocated. Note also that some systems (especially laptops) have the ability to ``suspend to disk'' (also known as ``safe sleep'' or ``hibernate''). This writes all memory to disk before going into a low power or even powered off mode. Unless measures are taken in the operating system to protect the saved memory, passphrases or other sensitive material may be recoverable from it later. Before you report a bug you should first search the mailing list archives for similar problems and second check whether such a bug has already been reported to our bug tracker at http://bugs.gnupg.org . @c ******************************************* @c *************** ************** @c *************** UNATTENDED ************** @c *************** ************** @c ******************************************* @manpause @node Unattended Usage of GPG @section Unattended Usage @command{gpg} is often used as a backend engine by other software. To help with this a machine interface has been defined to have an unambiguous way to do this. The options @option{--status-fd} and @option{--batch} are almost always required for this. @menu * Unattended GPG key generation:: Unattended key generation @end menu @node Unattended GPG key generation @subsection Unattended key generation The command @option{--gen-key} may be used along with the option @option{--batch} for unattended key generation. The parameters are either read from stdin or given as a file on the command line. The format of the parameter file is as follows: @itemize @bullet @item Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 characters. @item UTF-8 encoding must be used to specify non-ASCII characters. @item Empty lines are ignored. @item Leading and trailing while space is ignored. @item A hash sign as the first non white space character indicates a comment line. @item Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign, the arguments are separated by white space from the keyword. @item Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon. Arguments are separated by white space. @item The first parameter must be @samp{Key-Type}; control statements may be placed anywhere. @item The order of the parameters does not matter except for @samp{Key-Type} which must be the first parameter. The parameters are only used for the generated keyblock (primary and subkeys); parameters from previous sets are not used. Some syntactically checks may be performed. @item Key generation takes place when either the end of the parameter file is reached, the next @samp{Key-Type} parameter is encountered or at the control statement @samp{%commit} is encountered. @end itemize @noindent Control statements: @table @asis @item %echo @var{text} Print @var{text} as diagnostic. @item %dry-run Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking). @item %commit Perform the key generation. Note that an implicit commit is done at the next @asis{Key-Type} parameter. @item %pubring @var{filename} @itemx %secring @var{filename} Do not write the key to the default or commandline given keyring but to @var{filename}. This must be given before the first commit to take place, duplicate specification of the same filename is ignored, the last filename before a commit is used. The filename is used until a new filename is used (at commit points) and all keys are written to that file. If a new filename is given, this file is created (and overwrites an existing one). For GnuPG versions prior to 2.1, both control statements must be given. For GnuPG 2.1 and later @samp{%secring} is a no-op. @item %ask-passphrase @itemx %no-ask-passphrase This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later. @item %no-protection Using this option allows the creation of keys without any passphrase protection. This option is mainly intended for regression tests. @item %transient-key If given the keys are created using a faster and a somewhat less secure random number generator. This option may be used for keys which are only used for a short time and do not require full cryptographic strength. It takes only effect if used together with the control statement @samp{%no-protection}. @end table @noindent General Parameters: @table @asis @item Key-Type: @var{algo} Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the primary key. The algorithm must be capable of signing. This is a required parameter. @var{algo} may either be an OpenPGP algorithm number or a string with the algorithm name. The special value @samp{default} may be used for @var{algo} to create the default key type; in this case a @samp{Key-Usage} shall not be given and @samp{default} also be used for @samp{Subkey-Type}. @item Key-Length: @var{nbits} The requested length of the generated key in bits. The default is returned by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}. @item Key-Grip: @var{hexstring} This is optional and used to generate a CSR or certificate for an already existing key. Key-Length will be ignored when given. @item Key-Usage: @var{usage-list} Space or comma delimited list of key usages. Allowed values are @samp{encrypt}, @samp{sign}, and @samp{auth}. This is used to generate the key flags. Please make sure that the algorithm is capable of this usage. Note that OpenPGP requires that all primary keys are capable of certification, so no matter what usage is given here, the @samp{cert} flag will be on. If no @samp{Key-Usage} is specified and the @samp{Key-Type} is not @samp{default}, all allowed usages for that particular algorithm are used; if it is not given but @samp{default} is used the usage will be @samp{sign}. @item Subkey-Type: @var{algo} This generates a secondary key (subkey). Currently only one subkey can be handled. See also @samp{Key-Type} above. @item Subkey-Length: @var{nbits} Length of the secondary key (subkey) in bits. The default is returned by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}". @item Subkey-Usage: @var{usage-list} Key usage lists for a subkey; similar to @samp{Key-Usage}. @item Passphrase: @var{string} If you want to specify a passphrase for the secret key, enter it here. Default is to use the Pinentry dialog to ask for a passphrase. @item Name-Real: @var{name} @itemx Name-Comment: @var{comment} @itemx Name-Email: @var{email} The three parts of a user name. Remember to use UTF-8 encoding here. If you don't give any of them, no user ID is created. @item Expire-Date: @var{iso-date}|(@var{number}[d|w|m|y]) Set the expiration date for the key (and the subkey). It may either be entered in ISO date format (e.g. "20000815T145012") or as number of days, weeks, month or years after the creation date. The special notation "seconds=N" is also allowed to specify a number of seconds since creation. Without a letter days are assumed. Note that there is no check done on the overflow of the type used by OpenPGP for timestamps. Thus you better make sure that the given value make sense. Although OpenPGP works with time intervals, GnuPG uses an absolute value internally and thus the last year we can represent is 2105. @item Creation-Date: @var{iso-date} Set the creation date of the key as stored in the key information and which is also part of the fingerprint calculation. Either a date like "1986-04-26" or a full timestamp like "19860426T042640" may be used. The time is considered to be UTC. The special notation "seconds=N" may be used to directly specify a the number of seconds since Epoch (Unix time). If it is not given the current time is used. @item Preferences: @var{string} Set the cipher, hash, and compression preference values for this key. This expects the same type of string as the sub-command @samp{setpref} in the @option{--edit-key} menu. @item Revoker: @var{algo}:@var{fpr} [sensitive] Add a designated revoker to the generated key. Algo is the public key algorithm of the designated revoker (i.e. RSA=1, DSA=17, etc.) @var{fpr} is the fingerprint of the designated revoker. The optional @samp{sensitive} flag marks the designated revoker as sensitive information. Only v4 keys may be designated revokers. @item Keyserver: @var{string} This is an optional parameter that specifies the preferred keyserver URL for the key. @item Handle: @var{string} This is an optional parameter only used with the status lines KEY_CREATED and KEY_NOT_CREATED. @var{string} may be up to 100 characters and should not contain spaces. It is useful for batch key generation to associate a key parameter block with a status line. @end table @noindent Here is an example on how to create a key: @smallexample $ cat >foo < ssb 1024g/8F70E2C0 2000-03-09 @end smallexample @noindent If you want to create a key with the default algorithms you would use these parameters: @smallexample %echo Generating a default key Key-Type: default Subkey-Type: default Name-Real: Joe Tester Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar Expire-Date: 0 Passphrase: abc %pubring foo.pub %secring foo.sec # Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-) %commit %echo done @end smallexample @mansect see also @ifset isman @command{gpgv}(1), @command{gpgsm}(1), @command{gpg-agent}(1) @end ifset @include see-also-note.texi diff --git a/g10/gpg.c b/g10/gpg.c index d0be4ba3f..5b4fba611 100644 --- a/g10/gpg.c +++ b/g10/gpg.c @@ -1,5043 +1,5049 @@ /* gpg.c - The GnuPG utility (main for gpg) * Copyright (C) 1998-2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * Copyright (C) 1997-2016 Werner Koch * Copyright (C) 2015-2016 g10 Code GmbH * * This file is part of GnuPG. * * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, see . */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STAT #include /* for stat() */ #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM # ifdef HAVE_WINSOCK2_H # include # endif # include #endif #define INCLUDED_BY_MAIN_MODULE 1 #include "gpg.h" #include #include "../common/iobuf.h" #include "util.h" #include "packet.h" #include "membuf.h" #include "main.h" #include "options.h" #include "keydb.h" #include "trustdb.h" #include "filter.h" #include "ttyio.h" #include "i18n.h" #include "sysutils.h" #include "status.h" #include "keyserver-internal.h" #include "exec.h" #include "gc-opt-flags.h" #include "asshelp.h" #include "call-dirmngr.h" #include "tofu.h" #include "../common/init.h" #include "../common/shareddefs.h" #if defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM) || defined(__CYGWIN__) #define MY_O_BINARY O_BINARY #ifndef S_IRGRP # define S_IRGRP 0 # define S_IWGRP 0 #endif #else #define MY_O_BINARY 0 #endif enum cmd_and_opt_values { aNull = 0, oArmor = 'a', aDetachedSign = 'b', aSym = 'c', aDecrypt = 'd', aEncr = 'e', oInteractive = 'i', aListKeys = 'k', oDryRun = 'n', oOutput = 'o', oQuiet = 'q', oRecipient = 'r', oHiddenRecipient = 'R', aSign = 's', oTextmodeShort= 't', oLocalUser = 'u', oVerbose = 'v', oCompress = 'z', oSetNotation = 'N', aListSecretKeys = 'K', oBatch = 500, oMaxOutput, oSigNotation, oCertNotation, oShowNotation, oNoShowNotation, aEncrFiles, aEncrSym, aDecryptFiles, aClearsign, aStore, aQuickKeygen, aFullKeygen, aKeygen, aSignEncr, aSignEncrSym, aSignSym, aSignKey, aLSignKey, aQuickSignKey, aQuickLSignKey, aQuickAddUid, aQuickAddKey, aListConfig, aListGcryptConfig, aGPGConfList, aGPGConfTest, aListPackets, aEditKey, aDeleteKeys, aDeleteSecretKeys, aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys, aImport, aFastImport, aVerify, aVerifyFiles, aListSigs, aSendKeys, aRecvKeys, aLocateKeys, aSearchKeys, aRefreshKeys, aFetchKeys, aExport, aExportSecret, aExportSecretSub, aExportSshKey, aCheckKeys, aGenRevoke, aDesigRevoke, aPrimegen, aPrintMD, aPrintMDs, aCheckTrustDB, aUpdateTrustDB, aFixTrustDB, aListTrustDB, aListTrustPath, aExportOwnerTrust, aImportOwnerTrust, aDeArmor, aEnArmor, aGenRandom, aRebuildKeydbCaches, aCardStatus, aCardEdit, aChangePIN, aPasswd, aServer, aTOFUPolicy, oTextmode, oNoTextmode, oExpert, oNoExpert, oDefSigExpire, oAskSigExpire, oNoAskSigExpire, oDefCertExpire, oAskCertExpire, oNoAskCertExpire, oDefCertLevel, oMinCertLevel, oAskCertLevel, oNoAskCertLevel, oFingerprint, oWithFingerprint, + oWithSubkeyFingerprint, oWithICAOSpelling, oWithKeygrip, oWithSecret, oWithWKDHash, oAnswerYes, oAnswerNo, oKeyring, oPrimaryKeyring, oSecretKeyring, oShowKeyring, oDefaultKey, oDefRecipient, oDefRecipientSelf, oNoDefRecipient, oTrySecretKey, oOptions, oDebug, oDebugLevel, oDebugAll, oDebugIOLBF, oStatusFD, oStatusFile, oAttributeFD, oAttributeFile, oEmitVersion, oNoEmitVersion, oCompletesNeeded, oMarginalsNeeded, oMaxCertDepth, oLoadExtension, oGnuPG, oRFC2440, oRFC4880, oOpenPGP, oPGP6, oPGP7, oPGP8, oRFC2440Text, oNoRFC2440Text, oCipherAlgo, oDigestAlgo, oCertDigestAlgo, oCompressAlgo, oCompressLevel, oBZ2CompressLevel, oBZ2DecompressLowmem, oPassphrase, oPassphraseFD, oPassphraseFile, oPassphraseRepeat, oPinentryMode, oCommandFD, oCommandFile, oQuickRandom, oNoVerbose, oTrustDBName, oNoSecmemWarn, oRequireSecmem, oNoRequireSecmem, oNoPermissionWarn, oNoMDCWarn, oNoArmor, oNoDefKeyring, oNoGreeting, oNoTTY, oNoOptions, oNoBatch, oHomedir, oWithColons, oWithKeyData, oWithSigList, oWithSigCheck, oSkipVerify, oSkipHiddenRecipients, oNoSkipHiddenRecipients, oAlwaysTrust, oTrustModel, oForceOwnertrust, oSetFilename, oForYourEyesOnly, oNoForYourEyesOnly, oSetPolicyURL, oSigPolicyURL, oCertPolicyURL, oShowPolicyURL, oNoShowPolicyURL, oSigKeyserverURL, oUseEmbeddedFilename, oNoUseEmbeddedFilename, oComment, oDefaultComment, oNoComments, oThrowKeyids, oNoThrowKeyids, oShowPhotos, oNoShowPhotos, oPhotoViewer, oForceMDC, oNoForceMDC, oDisableMDC, oNoDisableMDC, oS2KMode, oS2KDigest, oS2KCipher, oS2KCount, oDisplayCharset, oNotDashEscaped, oEscapeFrom, oNoEscapeFrom, oLockOnce, oLockMultiple, oLockNever, oKeyServer, oKeyServerOptions, oImportOptions, oExportOptions, oListOptions, oVerifyOptions, oTempDir, oExecPath, oEncryptTo, oHiddenEncryptTo, oNoEncryptTo, oEncryptToDefaultKey, oLoggerFD, oLoggerFile, oUtf8Strings, oNoUtf8Strings, oDisableCipherAlgo, oDisablePubkeyAlgo, oAllowNonSelfsignedUID, oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID, oAllowFreeformUID, oNoAllowFreeformUID, oAllowSecretKeyImport, oEnableSpecialFilenames, oNoLiteral, oSetFilesize, oHonorHttpProxy, oFastListMode, oListOnly, oIgnoreTimeConflict, oIgnoreValidFrom, oIgnoreCrcError, oIgnoreMDCError, oShowSessionKey, oOverrideSessionKey, oNoRandomSeedFile, oAutoKeyRetrieve, oNoAutoKeyRetrieve, oUseAgent, oNoUseAgent, oGpgAgentInfo, oMergeOnly, oTryAllSecrets, oTrustedKey, oNoExpensiveTrustChecks, oFixedListMode, oLegacyListMode, oNoSigCache, oAutoCheckTrustDB, oNoAutoCheckTrustDB, oPreservePermissions, oDefaultPreferenceList, oDefaultKeyserverURL, oPersonalCipherPreferences, oPersonalDigestPreferences, oPersonalCompressPreferences, oAgentProgram, oDirmngrProgram, oDisplay, oTTYname, oTTYtype, oLCctype, oLCmessages, oXauthority, oGroup, oUnGroup, oNoGroups, oStrict, oNoStrict, oMangleDosFilenames, oNoMangleDosFilenames, oEnableProgressFilter, oMultifile, oKeyidFormat, oExitOnStatusWriteError, oLimitCardInsertTries, oReaderPort, octapiDriver, opcscDriver, oDisableCCID, oRequireCrossCert, oNoRequireCrossCert, oAutoKeyLocate, oNoAutoKeyLocate, oAllowMultisigVerification, oEnableLargeRSA, oDisableLargeRSA, oEnableDSA2, oDisableDSA2, oAllowMultipleMessages, oNoAllowMultipleMessages, oAllowWeakDigestAlgos, oFakedSystemTime, oNoAutostart, oPrintPKARecords, oPrintDANERecords, oTOFUDefaultPolicy, oTOFUDBFormat, oWeakDigest, oUnwrap, oOnlySignTextIDs, oNoop }; static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = { ARGPARSE_group (300, N_("@Commands:\n ")), ARGPARSE_c (aSign, "sign", N_("make a signature")), ARGPARSE_c (aClearsign, "clearsign", N_("make a clear text signature")), ARGPARSE_c (aDetachedSign, "detach-sign", N_("make a detached signature")), ARGPARSE_c (aEncr, "encrypt", N_("encrypt data")), ARGPARSE_c (aEncrFiles, "encrypt-files", "@"), ARGPARSE_c (aSym, "symmetric", N_("encryption only with symmetric cipher")), ARGPARSE_c (aStore, "store", "@"), ARGPARSE_c (aDecrypt, "decrypt", N_("decrypt data (default)")), ARGPARSE_c (aDecryptFiles, "decrypt-files", "@"), ARGPARSE_c (aVerify, "verify" , N_("verify a signature")), ARGPARSE_c (aVerifyFiles, "verify-files" , "@" ), ARGPARSE_c (aListKeys, "list-keys", N_("list keys")), ARGPARSE_c (aListKeys, "list-public-keys", "@" ), ARGPARSE_c (aListSigs, "list-sigs", N_("list keys and signatures")), ARGPARSE_c (aCheckKeys, "check-sigs",N_("list and check key signatures")), ARGPARSE_c (oFingerprint, "fingerprint", N_("list keys and fingerprints")), ARGPARSE_c (aListSecretKeys, "list-secret-keys", N_("list secret keys")), ARGPARSE_c (aKeygen, "gen-key", N_("generate a new key pair")), ARGPARSE_c (aQuickKeygen, "quick-gen-key" , N_("quickly generate a new key pair")), ARGPARSE_c (aQuickAddUid, "quick-adduid", N_("quickly add a new user-id")), ARGPARSE_c (aQuickAddKey, "quick-addkey", "@"), ARGPARSE_c (aFullKeygen, "full-gen-key" , N_("full featured key pair generation")), ARGPARSE_c (aGenRevoke, "gen-revoke",N_("generate a revocation certificate")), ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteKeys,"delete-keys", N_("remove keys from the public keyring")), ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteSecretKeys, "delete-secret-keys", N_("remove keys from the secret keyring")), ARGPARSE_c (aQuickSignKey, "quick-sign-key" , N_("quickly sign a key")), ARGPARSE_c (aQuickLSignKey, "quick-lsign-key", N_("quickly sign a key locally")), ARGPARSE_c (aSignKey, "sign-key" ,N_("sign a key")), ARGPARSE_c (aLSignKey, "lsign-key" ,N_("sign a key locally")), ARGPARSE_c (aEditKey, "edit-key" ,N_("sign or edit a key")), ARGPARSE_c (aEditKey, "key-edit" ,"@"), ARGPARSE_c (aPasswd, "passwd", N_("change a passphrase")), ARGPARSE_c (aDesigRevoke, "desig-revoke","@" ), ARGPARSE_c (aExport, "export" , N_("export keys") ), ARGPARSE_c (aSendKeys, "send-keys" , N_("export keys to a key server") ), ARGPARSE_c (aRecvKeys, "recv-keys" , N_("import keys from a key server") ), ARGPARSE_c (aSearchKeys, "search-keys" , N_("search for keys on a key server") ), ARGPARSE_c (aRefreshKeys, "refresh-keys", N_("update all keys from a keyserver")), ARGPARSE_c (aLocateKeys, "locate-keys", "@"), ARGPARSE_c (aFetchKeys, "fetch-keys" , "@" ), ARGPARSE_c (aExportSecret, "export-secret-keys" , "@" ), ARGPARSE_c (aExportSecretSub, "export-secret-subkeys" , "@" ), ARGPARSE_c (aExportSshKey, "export-ssh-key", "@" ), ARGPARSE_c (aImport, "import", N_("import/merge keys")), ARGPARSE_c (aFastImport, "fast-import", "@"), #ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT ARGPARSE_c (aCardStatus, "card-status", N_("print the card status")), ARGPARSE_c (aCardEdit, "card-edit", N_("change data on a card")), ARGPARSE_c (aChangePIN, "change-pin", N_("change a card's PIN")), #endif ARGPARSE_c (aListConfig, "list-config", "@"), ARGPARSE_c (aListGcryptConfig, "list-gcrypt-config", "@"), ARGPARSE_c (aGPGConfList, "gpgconf-list", "@" ), ARGPARSE_c (aGPGConfTest, "gpgconf-test", "@" ), ARGPARSE_c (aListPackets, "list-packets","@"), #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS ARGPARSE_c (aExportOwnerTrust, "export-ownertrust", "@"), ARGPARSE_c (aImportOwnerTrust, "import-ownertrust", "@"), ARGPARSE_c (aUpdateTrustDB,"update-trustdb", N_("update the trust database")), ARGPARSE_c (aCheckTrustDB, "check-trustdb", "@"), ARGPARSE_c (aFixTrustDB, "fix-trustdb", "@"), #endif ARGPARSE_c (aDeArmor, "dearmor", "@"), ARGPARSE_c (aDeArmor, "dearmour", "@"), ARGPARSE_c (aEnArmor, "enarmor", "@"), ARGPARSE_c (aEnArmor, "enarmour", "@"), ARGPARSE_c (aPrintMD, "print-md", N_("print message digests")), ARGPARSE_c (aPrimegen, "gen-prime", "@" ), ARGPARSE_c (aGenRandom,"gen-random", "@" ), ARGPARSE_c (aServer, "server", N_("run in server mode")), ARGPARSE_c (aTOFUPolicy, "tofu-policy", N_("|VALUE|set the TOFU policy for a key")), ARGPARSE_group (301, N_("@\nOptions:\n ")), ARGPARSE_s_n (oArmor, "armor", N_("create ascii armored output")), ARGPARSE_s_n (oArmor, "armour", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "recipient", N_("|USER-ID|encrypt for USER-ID")), ARGPARSE_s_s (oHiddenRecipient, "hidden-recipient", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "remote-user", "@"), /* (old option name) */ ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefRecipient, "default-recipient", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oDefRecipientSelf, "default-recipient-self", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDefRecipient, "no-default-recipient", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oTempDir, "temp-directory", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oExecPath, "exec-path", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oEncryptTo, "encrypt-to", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEncryptTo, "no-encrypt-to", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oHiddenEncryptTo, "hidden-encrypt-to", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oEncryptToDefaultKey, "encrypt-to-default-key", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oLocalUser, "local-user", N_("|USER-ID|use USER-ID to sign or decrypt")), ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrySecretKey, "try-secret-key", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oCompress, NULL, N_("|N|set compress level to N (0 disables)")), ARGPARSE_s_i (oCompressLevel, "compress-level", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oBZ2CompressLevel, "bzip2-compress-level", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oBZ2DecompressLowmem, "bzip2-decompress-lowmem", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oTextmodeShort, NULL, "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oTextmode, "textmode", N_("use canonical text mode")), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoTextmode, "no-textmode", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oExpert, "expert", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoExpert, "no-expert", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefSigExpire, "default-sig-expire", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oAskSigExpire, "ask-sig-expire", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAskSigExpire, "no-ask-sig-expire", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefCertExpire, "default-cert-expire", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oAskCertExpire, "ask-cert-expire", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAskCertExpire, "no-ask-cert-expire", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oDefCertLevel, "default-cert-level", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oMinCertLevel, "min-cert-level", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oAskCertLevel, "ask-cert-level", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAskCertLevel, "no-ask-cert-level", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oOutput, "output", N_("|FILE|write output to FILE")), ARGPARSE_p_u (oMaxOutput, "max-output", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oVerbose, "verbose", N_("verbose")), ARGPARSE_s_n (oQuiet, "quiet", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoTTY, "no-tty", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oForceMDC, "force-mdc", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoForceMDC, "no-force-mdc", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableMDC, "disable-mdc", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDisableMDC, "no-disable-mdc", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oDryRun, "dry-run", N_("do not make any changes")), ARGPARSE_s_n (oInteractive, "interactive", N_("prompt before overwriting")), ARGPARSE_s_n (oBatch, "batch", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oAnswerYes, "yes", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oAnswerNo, "no", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyring, "keyring", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oPrimaryKeyring, "primary-keyring", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oSecretKeyring, "secret-keyring", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowKeyring, "show-keyring", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultKey, "default-key", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyServer, "keyserver", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyServerOptions, "keyserver-options", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oImportOptions, "import-options", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oExportOptions, "export-options", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oListOptions, "list-options", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oVerifyOptions, "verify-options", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplayCharset, "display-charset", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplayCharset, "charset", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oOptions, "options", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oDebug, "debug", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oDebugLevel, "debug-level", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugAll, "debug-all", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugIOLBF, "debug-iolbf", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oStatusFD, "status-fd", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oStatusFile, "status-file", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oAttributeFD, "attribute-fd", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oAttributeFile, "attribute-file", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oCompletesNeeded, "completes-needed", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oMarginalsNeeded, "marginals-needed", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oMaxCertDepth, "max-cert-depth", "@" ), ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrustedKey, "trusted-key", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oLoadExtension, "load-extension", "@"), /* Dummy. */ ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "gnupg", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp2", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp6", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp7", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp8", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC2440, "rfc2440", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC4880, "rfc4880", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oOpenPGP, "openpgp", N_("use strict OpenPGP behavior")), ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP6, "pgp6", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP7, "pgp7", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP8, "pgp8", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC2440Text, "rfc2440-text", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRFC2440Text, "no-rfc2440-text", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oS2KMode, "s2k-mode", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oS2KDigest, "s2k-digest-algo", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oS2KCipher, "s2k-cipher-algo", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oS2KCount, "s2k-count", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oCipherAlgo, "cipher-algo", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oDigestAlgo, "digest-algo", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertDigestAlgo, "cert-digest-algo", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oCompressAlgo,"compress-algo", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oCompressAlgo, "compression-algo", "@"), /* Alias */ ARGPARSE_s_n (oThrowKeyids, "throw-keyids", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoThrowKeyids, "no-throw-keyids", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowPhotos, "show-photos", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoShowPhotos, "no-show-photos", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oPhotoViewer, "photo-viewer", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oSetNotation, "set-notation", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oSigNotation, "sig-notation", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertNotation, "cert-notation", "@"), ARGPARSE_group (302, N_( "@\n(See the man page for a complete listing of all commands and options)\n" )), ARGPARSE_group (303, N_("@\nExamples:\n\n" " -se -r Bob [file] sign and encrypt for user Bob\n" " --clearsign [file] make a clear text signature\n" " --detach-sign [file] make a detached signature\n" " --list-keys [names] show keys\n" " --fingerprint [names] show fingerprints\n")), /* More hidden commands and options. */ ARGPARSE_c (aPrintMDs, "print-mds", "@"), /* old */ #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS ARGPARSE_c (aListTrustDB, "list-trustdb", "@"), #endif /* Not yet used: ARGPARSE_c (aListTrustPath, "list-trust-path", "@"), */ ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys, "delete-secret-and-public-keys", "@"), ARGPARSE_c (aRebuildKeydbCaches, "rebuild-keydb-caches", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oPassphrase, "passphrase", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oPassphraseFD, "passphrase-fd", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oPassphraseFile, "passphrase-file", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oPassphraseRepeat,"passphrase-repeat", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oPinentryMode, "pinentry-mode", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oCommandFD, "command-fd", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oCommandFile, "command-file", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oQuickRandom, "debug-quick-random", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoVerbose, "no-verbose", "@"), #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrustDBName, "trustdb-name", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oAutoCheckTrustDB, "auto-check-trustdb", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutoCheckTrustDB, "no-auto-check-trustdb", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oForceOwnertrust, "force-ownertrust", "@"), #endif ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSecmemWarn, "no-secmem-warning", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequireSecmem, "require-secmem", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRequireSecmem, "no-require-secmem", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoPermissionWarn, "no-permission-warning", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoMDCWarn, "no-mdc-warning", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoArmor, "no-armor", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoArmor, "no-armour", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDefKeyring, "no-default-keyring", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoGreeting, "no-greeting", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoOptions, "no-options", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oHomedir, "homedir", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoBatch, "no-batch", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithColons, "with-colons", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeyData,"with-key-data", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSigList,"with-sig-list", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSigCheck,"with-sig-check", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (aListKeys, "list-key", "@"), /* alias */ ARGPARSE_s_n (aListSigs, "list-sig", "@"), /* alias */ ARGPARSE_s_n (aCheckKeys, "check-sig", "@"), /* alias */ ARGPARSE_s_n (oSkipVerify, "skip-verify", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oSkipHiddenRecipients, "skip-hidden-recipients", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSkipHiddenRecipients, "no-skip-hidden-recipients", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oDefCertLevel, "default-cert-check-level", "@"), /* old */ #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS ARGPARSE_s_n (oAlwaysTrust, "always-trust", "@"), #endif ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrustModel, "trust-model", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oTOFUDefaultPolicy, "tofu-default-policy", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oTOFUDBFormat, "tofu-db-format", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oSetFilename, "set-filename", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oForYourEyesOnly, "for-your-eyes-only", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoForYourEyesOnly, "no-for-your-eyes-only", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oSetPolicyURL, "set-policy-url", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oSigPolicyURL, "sig-policy-url", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertPolicyURL, "cert-policy-url", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowPolicyURL, "show-policy-url", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoShowPolicyURL, "no-show-policy-url", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oSigKeyserverURL, "sig-keyserver-url", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowNotation, "show-notation", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoShowNotation, "no-show-notation", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oComment, "comment", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oDefaultComment, "default-comment", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoComments, "no-comments", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oEmitVersion, "emit-version", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEmitVersion, "no-emit-version", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEmitVersion, "no-version", "@"), /* alias */ ARGPARSE_s_n (oNotDashEscaped, "not-dash-escaped", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oEscapeFrom, "escape-from-lines", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEscapeFrom, "no-escape-from-lines", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oLockOnce, "lock-once", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oLockMultiple, "lock-multiple", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oLockNever, "lock-never", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oLoggerFD, "logger-fd", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oLoggerFile, "log-file", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oLoggerFile, "logger-file", "@"), /* 1.4 compatibility. */ ARGPARSE_s_n (oUseEmbeddedFilename, "use-embedded-filename", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUseEmbeddedFilename, "no-use-embedded-filename", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oUtf8Strings, "utf8-strings", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUtf8Strings, "no-utf8-strings", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithFingerprint, "with-fingerprint", "@"), + ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSubkeyFingerprint, "with-subkey-fingerprint", "@"), + ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSubkeyFingerprint, "with-subkey-fingerprints", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithICAOSpelling, "with-icao-spelling", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeygrip, "with-keygrip", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSecret, "with-secret", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithWKDHash, "with-wkd-hash", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisableCipherAlgo, "disable-cipher-algo", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisablePubkeyAlgo, "disable-pubkey-algo", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowNonSelfsignedUID, "allow-non-selfsigned-uid", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID, "no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowFreeformUID, "allow-freeform-uid", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowFreeformUID, "no-allow-freeform-uid", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoLiteral, "no-literal", "@"), ARGPARSE_p_u (oSetFilesize, "set-filesize", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oFastListMode, "fast-list-mode", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oFixedListMode, "fixed-list-mode", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oLegacyListMode, "legacy-list-mode", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oListOnly, "list-only", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oPrintPKARecords, "print-pka-records", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oPrintDANERecords, "print-dane-records", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreTimeConflict, "ignore-time-conflict", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreValidFrom, "ignore-valid-from", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreCrcError, "ignore-crc-error", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreMDCError, "ignore-mdc-error", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowSessionKey, "show-session-key", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oOverrideSessionKey, "override-session-key", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRandomSeedFile, "no-random-seed-file", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oAutoKeyRetrieve, "auto-key-retrieve", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutoKeyRetrieve, "no-auto-key-retrieve", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSigCache, "no-sig-cache", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oMergeOnly, "merge-only", "@" ), ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowSecretKeyImport, "allow-secret-key-import", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oTryAllSecrets, "try-all-secrets", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableSpecialFilenames, "enable-special-filenames", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoExpensiveTrustChecks, "no-expensive-trust-checks", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oPreservePermissions, "preserve-permissions", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultPreferenceList, "default-preference-list", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultKeyserverURL, "default-keyserver-url", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCipherPreferences, "personal-cipher-preferences","@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalDigestPreferences, "personal-digest-preferences","@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCompressPreferences, "personal-compress-preferences", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oFakedSystemTime, "faked-system-time", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oWeakDigest, "weak-digest","@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oUnwrap, "unwrap", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oOnlySignTextIDs, "only-sign-text-ids", "@"), /* Aliases. I constantly mistype these, and assume other people do as well. */ ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCipherPreferences, "personal-cipher-prefs", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalDigestPreferences, "personal-digest-prefs", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCompressPreferences, "personal-compress-prefs", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oAgentProgram, "agent-program", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oDirmngrProgram, "dirmngr-program", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplay, "display", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oTTYname, "ttyname", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oTTYtype, "ttytype", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oLCctype, "lc-ctype", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oLCmessages, "lc-messages","@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oXauthority, "xauthority", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oGroup, "group", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oUnGroup, "ungroup", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoGroups, "no-groups", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oStrict, "strict", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoStrict, "no-strict", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oMangleDosFilenames, "mangle-dos-filenames", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoMangleDosFilenames, "no-mangle-dos-filenames", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableProgressFilter, "enable-progress-filter", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oMultifile, "multifile", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyidFormat, "keyid-format", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oExitOnStatusWriteError, "exit-on-status-write-error", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_i (oLimitCardInsertTries, "limit-card-insert-tries", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowMultisigVerification, "allow-multisig-verification", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableLargeRSA, "enable-large-rsa", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableLargeRSA, "disable-large-rsa", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableDSA2, "enable-dsa2", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableDSA2, "disable-dsa2", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowMultipleMessages, "allow-multiple-messages", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowMultipleMessages, "no-allow-multiple-messages", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowWeakDigestAlgos, "allow-weak-digest-algos", "@"), /* These two are aliases to help users of the PGP command line product use gpg with minimal pain. Many commands are common already as they seem to have borrowed commands from us. Now I'm returning the favor. */ ARGPARSE_s_s (oLocalUser, "sign-with", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "user", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequireCrossCert, "require-backsigs", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequireCrossCert, "require-cross-certification", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRequireCrossCert, "no-require-backsigs", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRequireCrossCert, "no-require-cross-certification", "@"), /* New options. Fixme: Should go more to the top. */ ARGPARSE_s_s (oAutoKeyLocate, "auto-key-locate", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutoKeyLocate, "no-auto-key-locate", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutostart, "no-autostart", "@"), /* Dummy options with warnings. */ ARGPARSE_s_n (oUseAgent, "use-agent", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUseAgent, "no-use-agent", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oGpgAgentInfo, "gpg-agent-info", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (oReaderPort, "reader-port", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (octapiDriver, "ctapi-driver", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_s (opcscDriver, "pcsc-driver", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableCCID, "disable-ccid", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oHonorHttpProxy, "honor-http-proxy", "@"), /* Dummy options. */ ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "sk-comments", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-sk-comments", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "compress-keys", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "compress-sigs", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "force-v3-sigs", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-force-v3-sigs", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "force-v4-certs", "@"), ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-force-v4-certs", "@"), ARGPARSE_end () }; /* The list of supported debug flags. */ static struct debug_flags_s debug_flags [] = { { DBG_PACKET_VALUE , "packet" }, { DBG_MPI_VALUE , "mpi" }, { DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE , "crypto" }, { DBG_FILTER_VALUE , "filter" }, { DBG_IOBUF_VALUE , "iobuf" }, { DBG_MEMORY_VALUE , "memory" }, { DBG_CACHE_VALUE , "cache" }, { DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE, "memstat" }, { DBG_TRUST_VALUE , "trust" }, { DBG_HASHING_VALUE, "hashing" }, { DBG_CARD_IO_VALUE, "cardio" }, { DBG_IPC_VALUE , "ipc" }, { DBG_CLOCK_VALUE , "clock" }, { DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE , "lookup" }, { DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE, "extprog" }, { 0, NULL } }; #ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS #define ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS 1 #else #define ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS 0 #endif int g10_errors_seen = 0; static int utf8_strings = 0; static int maybe_setuid = 1; static char *build_list( const char *text, char letter, const char *(*mapf)(int), int (*chkf)(int) ); static void set_cmd( enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd, enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd ); static void print_mds( const char *fname, int algo ); static void add_notation_data( const char *string, int which ); static void add_policy_url( const char *string, int which ); static void add_keyserver_url( const char *string, int which ); static void emergency_cleanup (void); static char * make_libversion (const char *libname, const char *(*getfnc)(const char*)) { const char *s; char *result; if (maybe_setuid) { gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 0, 0); /* Drop setuid. */ maybe_setuid = 0; } s = getfnc (NULL); result = xmalloc (strlen (libname) + 1 + strlen (s) + 1); strcpy (stpcpy (stpcpy (result, libname), " "), s); return result; } static int build_list_pk_test_algo (int algo) { /* Show only one "RSA" string. If RSA_E or RSA_S is available RSA is also available. */ if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S) return GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO; return openpgp_pk_test_algo (algo); } static const char * build_list_pk_algo_name (int algo) { return openpgp_pk_algo_name (algo); } static int build_list_cipher_test_algo (int algo) { return openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo); } static const char * build_list_cipher_algo_name (int algo) { return openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo); } static int build_list_md_test_algo (int algo) { /* By default we do not accept MD5 based signatures. To avoid confusion we do not announce support for it either. */ if (algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5) return GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO; return openpgp_md_test_algo (algo); } static const char * build_list_md_algo_name (int algo) { return openpgp_md_algo_name (algo); } static const char * my_strusage( int level ) { static char *digests, *pubkeys, *ciphers, *zips, *ver_gcry; const char *p; switch( level ) { case 11: p = "@GPG@ (@GNUPG@)"; break; case 13: p = VERSION; break; case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break; case 19: p = _("Please report bugs to <@EMAIL@>.\n"); break; case 20: if (!ver_gcry) ver_gcry = make_libversion ("libgcrypt", gcry_check_version); p = ver_gcry; break; #ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION case 25: p="NOTE: THIS IS A DEVELOPMENT VERSION!"; break; case 26: p="It is only intended for test purposes and should NOT be"; break; case 27: p="used in a production environment or with production keys!"; break; #endif case 1: case 40: p = _("Usage: @GPG@ [options] [files] (-h for help)"); break; case 41: p = _("Syntax: @GPG@ [options] [files]\n" "Sign, check, encrypt or decrypt\n" "Default operation depends on the input data\n"); break; case 31: p = "\nHome: "; break; #ifndef __riscos__ case 32: p = opt.homedir; break; #else /* __riscos__ */ case 32: p = make_filename(opt.homedir, NULL); break; #endif /* __riscos__ */ case 33: p = _("\nSupported algorithms:\n"); break; case 34: if (!pubkeys) pubkeys = build_list (_("Pubkey: "), 1, build_list_pk_algo_name, build_list_pk_test_algo ); p = pubkeys; break; case 35: if( !ciphers ) ciphers = build_list(_("Cipher: "), 'S', build_list_cipher_algo_name, build_list_cipher_test_algo ); p = ciphers; break; case 36: if( !digests ) digests = build_list(_("Hash: "), 'H', build_list_md_algo_name, build_list_md_test_algo ); p = digests; break; case 37: if( !zips ) zips = build_list(_("Compression: "),'Z', compress_algo_to_string, check_compress_algo); p = zips; break; default: p = NULL; } return p; } static char * build_list (const char *text, char letter, const char * (*mapf)(int), int (*chkf)(int)) { membuf_t mb; int indent; int i, j, len; const char *s; char *string; if (maybe_setuid) gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 0, 0); /* Drop setuid. */ indent = utf8_charcount (text, -1); len = 0; init_membuf (&mb, 512); for (i=0; i <= 110; i++ ) { if (!chkf (i) && (s = mapf (i))) { if (mb.len - len > 60) { put_membuf_str (&mb, ",\n"); len = mb.len; for (j=0; j < indent; j++) put_membuf_str (&mb, " "); } else if (mb.len) put_membuf_str (&mb, ", "); else put_membuf_str (&mb, text); put_membuf_str (&mb, s); if (opt.verbose && letter) { char num[20]; if (letter == 1) snprintf (num, sizeof num, " (%d)", i); else snprintf (num, sizeof num, " (%c%d)", letter, i); put_membuf_str (&mb, num); } } } if (mb.len) put_membuf_str (&mb, "\n"); put_membuf (&mb, "", 1); string = get_membuf (&mb, NULL); return xrealloc (string, strlen (string)+1); } static void wrong_args( const char *text) { es_fprintf (es_stderr, _("usage: %s [options] %s\n"), GPG_NAME, text); g10_exit(2); } static char * make_username( const char *string ) { char *p; if( utf8_strings ) p = xstrdup(string); else p = native_to_utf8( string ); return p; } static void set_opt_session_env (const char *name, const char *value) { gpg_error_t err; err = session_env_setenv (opt.session_env, name, value); if (err) log_fatal ("error setting session environment: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); } /* Setup the debugging. With a LEVEL of NULL only the active debug flags are propagated to the subsystems. With LEVEL set, a specific set of debug flags is set; thus overriding all flags already set. */ static void set_debug (const char *level) { int numok = (level && digitp (level)); int numlvl = numok? atoi (level) : 0; if (!level) ; else if (!strcmp (level, "none") || (numok && numlvl < 1)) opt.debug = 0; else if (!strcmp (level, "basic") || (numok && numlvl <= 2)) opt.debug = DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE; else if (!strcmp (level, "advanced") || (numok && numlvl <= 5)) opt.debug = DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE|DBG_TRUST_VALUE|DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE; else if (!strcmp (level, "expert") || (numok && numlvl <= 8)) opt.debug = (DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE|DBG_TRUST_VALUE|DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE |DBG_CACHE_VALUE|DBG_LOOKUP|DBG_FILTER_VALUE|DBG_PACKET_VALUE); else if (!strcmp (level, "guru") || numok) { opt.debug = ~0; /* Unless the "guru" string has been used we don't want to allow hashing debugging. The rationale is that people tend to select the highest debug value and would then clutter their disk with debug files which may reveal confidential data. */ if (numok) opt.debug &= ~(DBG_HASHING_VALUE); } else { log_error (_("invalid debug-level '%s' given\n"), level); g10_exit (2); } if (opt.debug & DBG_MEMORY_VALUE ) memory_debug_mode = 1; if (opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE ) memory_stat_debug_mode = 1; if (opt.debug & DBG_MPI_VALUE) gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 2); if (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE ) gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 1); if (opt.debug & DBG_IOBUF_VALUE ) iobuf_debug_mode = 1; gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose); if (opt.debug) parse_debug_flag (NULL, &opt.debug, debug_flags); } /* We need the home directory also in some other directories, so make sure that both variables are always in sync. */ static void set_homedir (const char *dir) { if (!dir) dir = ""; opt.homedir = dir; } /* We set the screen dimensions for UI purposes. Do not allow screens smaller than 80x24 for the sake of simplicity. */ static void set_screen_dimensions(void) { #ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM char *str; str=getenv("COLUMNS"); if(str) opt.screen_columns=atoi(str); str=getenv("LINES"); if(str) opt.screen_lines=atoi(str); #endif if(opt.screen_columns<80 || opt.screen_columns>255) opt.screen_columns=80; if(opt.screen_lines<24 || opt.screen_lines>255) opt.screen_lines=24; } /* Helper to open a file FNAME either for reading or writing to be used with --status-file etc functions. Not generally useful but it avoids the riscos specific functions and well some Windows people might like it too. Prints an error message and returns -1 on error. On success the file descriptor is returned. */ static int open_info_file (const char *fname, int for_write, int binary) { #ifdef __riscos__ return riscos_fdopenfile (fname, for_write); #elif defined (ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS) /* We can't allow these even when testing for a secured filename because files to be secured might not yet been secured. This is similar to the option file but in that case it is unlikely that sensitive information may be retrieved by means of error messages. */ (void)fname; (void)for_write; (void)binary; return -1; #else int fd; if (binary) binary = MY_O_BINARY; /* if (is_secured_filename (fname)) */ /* { */ /* fd = -1; */ /* gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); */ /* } */ /* else */ /* { */ do { if (for_write) fd = open (fname, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY | binary, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP); else fd = open (fname, O_RDONLY | binary); } while (fd == -1 && errno == EINTR); /* } */ if ( fd == -1) log_error ( for_write? _("can't create '%s': %s\n") : _("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno)); return fd; #endif } static void set_cmd( enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd, enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd ) { enum cmd_and_opt_values cmd = *ret_cmd; if( !cmd || cmd == new_cmd ) cmd = new_cmd; else if( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aEncr ) cmd = aSignEncr; else if( cmd == aEncr && new_cmd == aSign ) cmd = aSignEncr; else if( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aSym ) cmd = aSignSym; else if( cmd == aSym && new_cmd == aSign ) cmd = aSignSym; else if( cmd == aSym && new_cmd == aEncr ) cmd = aEncrSym; else if( cmd == aEncr && new_cmd == aSym ) cmd = aEncrSym; else if (cmd == aSignEncr && new_cmd == aSym) cmd = aSignEncrSym; else if (cmd == aSignSym && new_cmd == aEncr) cmd = aSignEncrSym; else if (cmd == aEncrSym && new_cmd == aSign) cmd = aSignEncrSym; else if( ( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aClearsign ) || ( cmd == aClearsign && new_cmd == aSign ) ) cmd = aClearsign; else { log_error(_("conflicting commands\n")); g10_exit(2); } *ret_cmd = cmd; } static void add_group(char *string) { char *name,*value; struct groupitem *item; /* Break off the group name */ name=strsep(&string,"="); if(string==NULL) { log_error(_("no = sign found in group definition '%s'\n"),name); return; } trim_trailing_ws(name,strlen(name)); /* Does this group already exist? */ for(item=opt.grouplist;item;item=item->next) if(strcasecmp(item->name,name)==0) break; if(!item) { item=xmalloc(sizeof(struct groupitem)); item->name=name; item->next=opt.grouplist; item->values=NULL; opt.grouplist=item; } /* Break apart the values */ while ((value= strsep(&string," \t"))) { if (*value) add_to_strlist2(&item->values,value,utf8_strings); } } static void rm_group(char *name) { struct groupitem *item,*last=NULL; trim_trailing_ws(name,strlen(name)); for(item=opt.grouplist;item;last=item,item=item->next) { if(strcasecmp(item->name,name)==0) { if(last) last->next=item->next; else opt.grouplist=item->next; free_strlist(item->values); xfree(item); break; } } } /* We need to check three things. 0) The homedir. It must be x00, a directory, and owned by the user. 1) The options/gpg.conf file. Okay unless it or its containing directory is group or other writable or not owned by us. Disable exec in this case. 2) Extensions. Same as #1. Returns true if the item is unsafe. */ static int check_permissions (const char *path, int item) { #if defined(HAVE_STAT) && !defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM) static int homedir_cache=-1; char *tmppath,*dir; struct stat statbuf,dirbuf; int homedir=0,ret=0,checkonly=0; int perm=0,own=0,enc_dir_perm=0,enc_dir_own=0; if(opt.no_perm_warn) return 0; log_assert(item==0 || item==1 || item==2); /* extensions may attach a path */ if(item==2 && path[0]!=DIRSEP_C) { if(strchr(path,DIRSEP_C)) tmppath=make_filename(path,NULL); else tmppath=make_filename(gnupg_libdir (),path,NULL); } else tmppath=xstrdup(path); /* If the item is located in the homedir, but isn't the homedir, don't continue if we already checked the homedir itself. This is to avoid user confusion with an extra options file warning which could be rectified if the homedir itself had proper permissions. */ if(item!=0 && homedir_cache>-1 && ascii_strncasecmp(opt.homedir,tmppath,strlen(opt.homedir))==0) { ret=homedir_cache; goto end; } /* It's okay if the file or directory doesn't exist */ if(stat(tmppath,&statbuf)!=0) { ret=0; goto end; } /* Now check the enclosing directory. Theoretically, we could walk this test up to the root directory /, but for the sake of sanity, I'm stopping at one level down. */ dir=make_dirname(tmppath); if(stat(dir,&dirbuf)!=0 || !S_ISDIR(dirbuf.st_mode)) { /* Weird error */ ret=1; goto end; } xfree(dir); /* Assume failure */ ret=1; if(item==0) { /* The homedir must be x00, a directory, and owned by the user. */ if(S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) { if(statbuf.st_uid==getuid()) { if((statbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO))==0) ret=0; else perm=1; } else own=1; homedir_cache=ret; } } else if(item==1 || item==2) { /* The options or extension file. Okay unless it or its containing directory is group or other writable or not owned by us or root. */ if(S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode)) { if(statbuf.st_uid==getuid() || statbuf.st_uid==0) { if((statbuf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH))==0) { /* it's not writable, so make sure the enclosing directory is also not writable */ if(dirbuf.st_uid==getuid() || dirbuf.st_uid==0) { if((dirbuf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH))==0) ret=0; else enc_dir_perm=1; } else enc_dir_own=1; } else { /* it's writable, so the enclosing directory had better not let people get to it. */ if(dirbuf.st_uid==getuid() || dirbuf.st_uid==0) { if((dirbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO))==0) ret=0; else perm=enc_dir_perm=1; /* unclear which one to fix! */ } else enc_dir_own=1; } } else own=1; } } else BUG(); if(!checkonly) { if(own) { if(item==0) log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on" " homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath); else if(item==1) log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on" " configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath); else log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on" " extension '%s'\n"),tmppath); } if(perm) { if(item==0) log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on" " homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath); else if(item==1) log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on" " configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath); else log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on" " extension '%s'\n"),tmppath); } if(enc_dir_own) { if(item==0) log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on" " homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath); else if(item==1) log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on" " configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath); else log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on" " extension '%s'\n"),tmppath); } if(enc_dir_perm) { if(item==0) log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on" " homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath); else if(item==1) log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on" " configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath); else log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on" " extension '%s'\n"),tmppath); } } end: xfree(tmppath); if(homedir) homedir_cache=ret; return ret; #else /*!(HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)*/ (void)path; (void)item; return 0; #endif /*!(HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)*/ } /* Print the OpenPGP defined algo numbers. */ static void print_algo_numbers(int (*checker)(int)) { int i,first=1; for(i=0;i<=110;i++) { if(!checker(i)) { if(first) first=0; else es_printf (";"); es_printf ("%d",i); } } } static void print_algo_names(int (*checker)(int),const char *(*mapper)(int)) { int i,first=1; for(i=0;i<=110;i++) { if(!checker(i)) { if(first) first=0; else es_printf (";"); es_printf ("%s",mapper(i)); } } } /* In the future, we can do all sorts of interesting configuration output here. For now, just give "group" as the Enigmail folks need it, and pubkey, cipher, hash, and compress as they may be useful for frontends. */ static void list_config(char *items) { int show_all = !items; char *name = NULL; const char *s; struct groupitem *giter; int first, iter; if(!opt.with_colons) return; while(show_all || (name=strsep(&items," "))) { int any=0; if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"group")==0) { for (giter = opt.grouplist; giter; giter = giter->next) { strlist_t sl; es_fprintf (es_stdout, "cfg:group:"); es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, giter->name, strlen(giter->name), ":", NULL); es_putc (':', es_stdout); for(sl=giter->values; sl; sl=sl->next) { es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sl->d, strlen (sl->d), ":;", NULL); if(sl->next) es_printf(";"); } es_printf("\n"); } any=1; } if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"version")==0) { es_printf("cfg:version:"); es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, VERSION, strlen(VERSION), ":", NULL); es_printf ("\n"); any=1; } if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"pubkey")==0) { es_printf ("cfg:pubkey:"); print_algo_numbers (build_list_pk_test_algo); es_printf ("\n"); any=1; } if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"pubkeyname")==0) { es_printf ("cfg:pubkeyname:"); print_algo_names (build_list_pk_test_algo, build_list_pk_algo_name); es_printf ("\n"); any=1; } if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"cipher")==0) { es_printf ("cfg:cipher:"); print_algo_numbers (build_list_cipher_test_algo); es_printf ("\n"); any=1; } if (show_all || !ascii_strcasecmp (name,"ciphername")) { es_printf ("cfg:ciphername:"); print_algo_names (build_list_cipher_test_algo, build_list_cipher_algo_name); es_printf ("\n"); any = 1; } if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"digest")==0 || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"hash")==0) { es_printf ("cfg:digest:"); print_algo_numbers (build_list_md_test_algo); es_printf ("\n"); any=1; } if (show_all || !ascii_strcasecmp(name,"digestname") || !ascii_strcasecmp(name,"hashname")) { es_printf ("cfg:digestname:"); print_algo_names (build_list_md_test_algo, build_list_md_algo_name); es_printf ("\n"); any=1; } if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"compress")==0) { es_printf ("cfg:compress:"); print_algo_numbers(check_compress_algo); es_printf ("\n"); any=1; } if (show_all || !ascii_strcasecmp(name,"ccid-reader-id")) { /* We ignore this for GnuPG 1.4 backward compatibility. */ any=1; } if (show_all || !ascii_strcasecmp (name,"curve")) { es_printf ("cfg:curve:"); for (iter=0, first=1; (s = openpgp_enum_curves (&iter)); first=0) es_printf ("%s%s", first?"":";", s); es_printf ("\n"); any=1; } /* Curve OIDs are rarely useful and thus only printed if requested. */ if (name && !ascii_strcasecmp (name,"curveoid")) { es_printf ("cfg:curveoid:"); for (iter=0, first=1; (s = openpgp_enum_curves (&iter)); first = 0) { s = openpgp_curve_to_oid (s, NULL); es_printf ("%s%s", first?"":";", s? s:"[?]"); } es_printf ("\n"); any=1; } if(show_all) break; if(!any) log_error(_("unknown configuration item '%s'\n"),name); } } /* List options and default values in the GPG Conf format. This is a new tool distributed with gnupg 1.9.x but we also want some limited support in older gpg versions. The output is the name of the configuration file and a list of options available for editing by gpgconf. */ static void gpgconf_list (const char *configfile) { char *configfile_esc = percent_escape (configfile, NULL); es_printf ("%s-%s.conf:%lu:\"%s\n", GPGCONF_NAME, GPG_NAME, GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT, configfile_esc ? configfile_esc : "/dev/null"); es_printf ("verbose:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE); es_printf ("quiet:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE); es_printf ("keyserver:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE); es_printf ("reader-port:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE); es_printf ("default-key:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE); es_printf ("encrypt-to:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE); es_printf ("try-secret-key:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE); es_printf ("auto-key-locate:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE); es_printf ("log-file:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE); es_printf ("debug-level:%lu:\"none:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT); es_printf ("group:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE); /* The next one is an info only item and should match the macros at the top of keygen.c */ es_printf ("default_pubkey_algo:%lu:\"%s:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT, "RSA-2048"); xfree (configfile_esc); } static int parse_subpacket_list(char *list) { char *tok; byte subpackets[128],i; int count=0; if(!list) { /* No arguments means all subpackets */ memset(subpackets+1,1,sizeof(subpackets)-1); count=127; } else { memset(subpackets,0,sizeof(subpackets)); /* Merge with earlier copy */ if(opt.show_subpackets) { byte *in; for(in=opt.show_subpackets;*in;in++) { if(*in>127 || *in<1) BUG(); if(!subpackets[*in]) count++; subpackets[*in]=1; } } while((tok=strsep(&list," ,"))) { if(!*tok) continue; i=atoi(tok); if(i>127 || i<1) return 0; if(!subpackets[i]) count++; subpackets[i]=1; } } xfree(opt.show_subpackets); opt.show_subpackets=xmalloc(count+1); opt.show_subpackets[count--]=0; for(i=1;i<128 && count>=0;i++) if(subpackets[i]) opt.show_subpackets[count--]=i; return 1; } static int parse_list_options(char *str) { char *subpackets=""; /* something that isn't NULL */ struct parse_options lopts[]= { {"show-photos",LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS,NULL, N_("display photo IDs during key listings")}, {"show-usage",LIST_SHOW_USAGE,NULL, N_("show key usage information during key listings")}, {"show-policy-urls",LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS,NULL, N_("show policy URLs during signature listings")}, {"show-notations",LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS,NULL, N_("show all notations during signature listings")}, {"show-std-notations",LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL, N_("show IETF standard notations during signature listings")}, {"show-standard-notations",LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL, NULL}, {"show-user-notations",LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS,NULL, N_("show user-supplied notations during signature listings")}, {"show-keyserver-urls",LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS,NULL, N_("show preferred keyserver URLs during signature listings")}, {"show-uid-validity",LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY,NULL, N_("show user ID validity during key listings")}, {"show-unusable-uids",LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS,NULL, N_("show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings")}, {"show-unusable-subkeys",LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS,NULL, N_("show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings")}, {"show-keyring",LIST_SHOW_KEYRING,NULL, N_("show the keyring name in key listings")}, {"show-sig-expire",LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE,NULL, N_("show expiration dates during signature listings")}, {"show-sig-subpackets",LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS,NULL, NULL}, {NULL,0,NULL,NULL} }; /* C99 allows for non-constant initializers, but we'd like to compile everywhere, so fill in the show-sig-subpackets argument here. Note that if the parse_options array changes, we'll have to change the subscript here. */ lopts[13].value=&subpackets; if(parse_options(str,&opt.list_options,lopts,1)) { if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS) { /* Unset so users can pass multiple lists in. */ opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS; if(!parse_subpacket_list(subpackets)) return 0; } else if(subpackets==NULL && opt.show_subpackets) { /* User did 'no-show-subpackets' */ xfree(opt.show_subpackets); opt.show_subpackets=NULL; } return 1; } else return 0; } /* Collapses argc/argv into a single string that must be freed */ static char * collapse_args(int argc,char *argv[]) { char *str=NULL; int i,first=1,len=0; for(i=0;iflags = KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_PRIMARY; break; case oShowKeyring: deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-keyring", "--list-options ","show-keyring"); opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_KEYRING; break; case oDebug: if (parse_debug_flag (pargs.r.ret_str, &opt.debug, debug_flags)) { pargs.r_opt = ARGPARSE_INVALID_ARG; pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR; } break; case oDebugAll: opt.debug = ~0; break; case oDebugLevel: debug_level = pargs.r.ret_str; break; case oDebugIOLBF: break; /* Already set in pre-parse step. */ case oStatusFD: set_status_fd ( translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1) ); break; case oStatusFile: set_status_fd ( open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 1, 0) ); break; case oAttributeFD: set_attrib_fd ( translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1) ); break; case oAttributeFile: set_attrib_fd ( open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 1, 1) ); break; case oLoggerFD: log_set_fd (translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1)); break; case oLoggerFile: logfile = pargs.r.ret_str; break; case oWithFingerprint: opt.with_fingerprint = 1; opt.fingerprint++; break; + case oWithSubkeyFingerprint: + opt.with_subkey_fingerprint = 1; + break; case oWithICAOSpelling: opt.with_icao_spelling = 1; break; case oFingerprint: opt.fingerprint++; fpr_maybe_cmd = 1; break; case oWithKeygrip: opt.with_keygrip = 1; break; case oWithSecret: opt.with_secret = 1; break; case oWithWKDHash: opt.with_wkd_hash = 1; break; case oSecretKeyring: /* Ignore this old option. */ break; case oOptions: /* config files may not be nested (silently ignore them) */ if( !configfp ) { xfree(configname); configname = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); goto next_pass; } break; case oNoArmor: opt.no_armor=1; opt.armor=0; break; case oNoDefKeyring: default_keyring = 0; break; case oNoGreeting: nogreeting = 1; break; case oNoVerbose: opt.verbose = 0; gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose); opt.list_sigs=0; break; case oQuickRandom: gcry_control (GCRYCTL_ENABLE_QUICK_RANDOM, 0); break; case oEmitVersion: opt.emit_version++; break; case oNoEmitVersion: opt.emit_version=0; break; case oCompletesNeeded: opt.completes_needed = pargs.r.ret_int; break; case oMarginalsNeeded: opt.marginals_needed = pargs.r.ret_int; break; case oMaxCertDepth: opt.max_cert_depth = pargs.r.ret_int; break; #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS case oTrustDBName: trustdb_name = pargs.r.ret_str; break; #endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/ case oDefaultKey: sl = add_to_strlist (&opt.def_secret_key, pargs.r.ret_str); sl->flags = (pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT); if (configfp) sl->flags |= PK_LIST_CONFIG; break; case oDefRecipient: if( *pargs.r.ret_str ) { xfree (opt.def_recipient); opt.def_recipient = make_username(pargs.r.ret_str); } break; case oDefRecipientSelf: xfree(opt.def_recipient); opt.def_recipient = NULL; opt.def_recipient_self = 1; break; case oNoDefRecipient: xfree(opt.def_recipient); opt.def_recipient = NULL; opt.def_recipient_self = 0; break; case oNoOptions: opt.no_homedir_creation = 1; break; /* no-options */ case oHomedir: break; case oNoBatch: opt.batch = 0; break; case oWithKeyData: opt.with_key_data=1; /*FALLTHRU*/ case oWithColons: opt.with_colons=':'; break; case oWithSigCheck: opt.check_sigs = 1; /*FALLTHRU*/ case oWithSigList: opt.list_sigs = 1; break; case oSkipVerify: opt.skip_verify=1; break; case oSkipHiddenRecipients: opt.skip_hidden_recipients = 1; break; case oNoSkipHiddenRecipients: opt.skip_hidden_recipients = 0; break; case aListSecretKeys: set_cmd( &cmd, aListSecretKeys); break; #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS /* There are many programs (like mutt) that call gpg with --always-trust so keep this option around for a long time. */ case oAlwaysTrust: opt.trust_model=TM_ALWAYS; break; case oTrustModel: parse_trust_model(pargs.r.ret_str); break; #endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/ case oTOFUDefaultPolicy: opt.tofu_default_policy = parse_tofu_policy (pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oTOFUDBFormat: opt.tofu_db_format = parse_tofu_db_format (pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oForceOwnertrust: log_info(_("Note: %s is not for normal use!\n"), "--force-ownertrust"); opt.force_ownertrust=string_to_trust_value(pargs.r.ret_str); if(opt.force_ownertrust==-1) { log_error("invalid ownertrust '%s'\n",pargs.r.ret_str); opt.force_ownertrust=0; } break; case oLoadExtension: /* Dummy so that gpg 1.4 conf files can work. Should eventually be removed. */ break; case oOpenPGP: case oRFC4880: /* This is effectively the same as RFC2440, but with "--enable-dsa2 --no-rfc2440-text --escape-from-lines --require-cross-certification". */ opt.compliance = CO_RFC4880; opt.flags.dsa2 = 1; opt.flags.require_cross_cert = 1; opt.rfc2440_text = 0; opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1; opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1; opt.escape_from = 1; opt.not_dash_escaped = 0; opt.def_cipher_algo = 0; opt.def_digest_algo = 0; opt.cert_digest_algo = 0; opt.compress_algo = -1; opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */ opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1; opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES; break; case oRFC2440: opt.compliance = CO_RFC2440; opt.flags.dsa2 = 0; opt.rfc2440_text = 1; opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1; opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1; opt.escape_from = 0; opt.not_dash_escaped = 0; opt.def_cipher_algo = 0; opt.def_digest_algo = 0; opt.cert_digest_algo = 0; opt.compress_algo = -1; opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */ opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1; opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES; break; case oPGP6: opt.compliance = CO_PGP6; break; case oPGP7: opt.compliance = CO_PGP7; break; case oPGP8: opt.compliance = CO_PGP8; break; case oGnuPG: opt.compliance = CO_GNUPG; break; case oRFC2440Text: opt.rfc2440_text=1; break; case oNoRFC2440Text: opt.rfc2440_text=0; break; case oSetFilename: if(utf8_strings) opt.set_filename = pargs.r.ret_str; else opt.set_filename = native_to_utf8(pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oForYourEyesOnly: eyes_only = 1; break; case oNoForYourEyesOnly: eyes_only = 0; break; case oSetPolicyURL: add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0); add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,1); break; case oSigPolicyURL: add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0); break; case oCertPolicyURL: add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,1); break; case oShowPolicyURL: deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-policy-url", "--list-options ","show-policy-urls"); deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-policy-url", "--verify-options ","show-policy-urls"); opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS; opt.verify_options|=VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS; break; case oNoShowPolicyURL: deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-policy-url", "--list-options ","no-show-policy-urls"); deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-policy-url", "--verify-options ","no-show-policy-urls"); opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS; opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS; break; case oSigKeyserverURL: add_keyserver_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0); break; case oUseEmbeddedFilename: opt.flags.use_embedded_filename=1; break; case oNoUseEmbeddedFilename: opt.flags.use_embedded_filename=0; break; case oComment: if(pargs.r.ret_str[0]) append_to_strlist(&opt.comments,pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oDefaultComment: deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno, "--default-comment","--no-comments",""); /* fall through */ case oNoComments: free_strlist(opt.comments); opt.comments=NULL; break; case oThrowKeyids: opt.throw_keyids = 1; break; case oNoThrowKeyids: opt.throw_keyids = 0; break; case oShowPhotos: deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-photos", "--list-options ","show-photos"); deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-photos", "--verify-options ","show-photos"); opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS; opt.verify_options|=VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS; break; case oNoShowPhotos: deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-photos", "--list-options ","no-show-photos"); deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-photos", "--verify-options ","no-show-photos"); opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS; opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS; break; case oPhotoViewer: opt.photo_viewer = pargs.r.ret_str; break; case oForceMDC: opt.force_mdc = 1; break; case oNoForceMDC: opt.force_mdc = 0; break; case oDisableMDC: opt.disable_mdc = 1; break; case oNoDisableMDC: opt.disable_mdc = 0; break; case oS2KMode: opt.s2k_mode = pargs.r.ret_int; break; case oS2KDigest: s2k_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oS2KCipher: s2k_cipher_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oS2KCount: if (pargs.r.ret_int) opt.s2k_count = encode_s2k_iterations (pargs.r.ret_int); else opt.s2k_count = 0; /* Auto-calibrate when needed. */ break; case oNoEncryptTo: opt.no_encrypt_to = 1; break; case oEncryptTo: /* store the recipient in the second list */ sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings ); sl->flags = ((pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT) | PK_LIST_ENCRYPT_TO); if (configfp) sl->flags |= PK_LIST_CONFIG; break; case oHiddenEncryptTo: /* store the recipient in the second list */ sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings ); sl->flags = ((pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT) | PK_LIST_ENCRYPT_TO|PK_LIST_HIDDEN); if (configfp) sl->flags |= PK_LIST_CONFIG; break; case oEncryptToDefaultKey: opt.encrypt_to_default_key = configfp ? 2 : 1; break; case oRecipient: /* store the recipient */ sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings ); sl->flags = (pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT); if (configfp) sl->flags |= PK_LIST_CONFIG; any_explicit_recipient = 1; break; case oHiddenRecipient: /* store the recipient with a flag */ sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings ); sl->flags = ((pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT) | PK_LIST_HIDDEN); if (configfp) sl->flags |= PK_LIST_CONFIG; any_explicit_recipient = 1; break; case oTrySecretKey: add_to_strlist2 (&opt.secret_keys_to_try, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings); break; case oTextmodeShort: opt.textmode = 2; break; case oTextmode: opt.textmode=1; break; case oNoTextmode: opt.textmode=0; break; case oExpert: opt.expert = 1; break; case oNoExpert: opt.expert = 0; break; case oDefSigExpire: if(*pargs.r.ret_str!='\0') { if(parse_expire_string(pargs.r.ret_str)==(u32)-1) log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid signature expiration\n"), pargs.r.ret_str); else opt.def_sig_expire=pargs.r.ret_str; } break; case oAskSigExpire: opt.ask_sig_expire = 1; break; case oNoAskSigExpire: opt.ask_sig_expire = 0; break; case oDefCertExpire: if(*pargs.r.ret_str!='\0') { if(parse_expire_string(pargs.r.ret_str)==(u32)-1) log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid signature expiration\n"), pargs.r.ret_str); else opt.def_cert_expire=pargs.r.ret_str; } break; case oAskCertExpire: opt.ask_cert_expire = 1; break; case oNoAskCertExpire: opt.ask_cert_expire = 0; break; case oDefCertLevel: opt.def_cert_level=pargs.r.ret_int; break; case oMinCertLevel: opt.min_cert_level=pargs.r.ret_int; break; case oAskCertLevel: opt.ask_cert_level = 1; break; case oNoAskCertLevel: opt.ask_cert_level = 0; break; case oLocalUser: /* store the local users */ sl = add_to_strlist2( &locusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings ); sl->flags = (pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT); if (configfp) sl->flags |= PK_LIST_CONFIG; break; case oCompress: /* this is the -z command line option */ opt.compress_level = opt.bz2_compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int; break; case oCompressLevel: opt.compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int; break; case oBZ2CompressLevel: opt.bz2_compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int; break; case oBZ2DecompressLowmem: opt.bz2_decompress_lowmem=1; break; case oPassphrase: set_passphrase_from_string(pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oPassphraseFD: pwfd = translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 0); break; case oPassphraseFile: pwfd = open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 0, 1); break; case oPassphraseRepeat: opt.passphrase_repeat = pargs.r.ret_int; break; case oPinentryMode: opt.pinentry_mode = parse_pinentry_mode (pargs.r.ret_str); if (opt.pinentry_mode == -1) log_error (_("invalid pinentry mode '%s'\n"), pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oCommandFD: opt.command_fd = translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 0); break; case oCommandFile: opt.command_fd = open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 0, 1); break; case oCipherAlgo: def_cipher_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oDigestAlgo: def_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oCompressAlgo: /* If it is all digits, stick a Z in front of it for later. This is for backwards compatibility with versions that took the compress algorithm number. */ { char *pt=pargs.r.ret_str; while(*pt) { if (!isascii (*pt) || !isdigit (*pt)) break; pt++; } if(*pt=='\0') { compress_algo_string=xmalloc(strlen(pargs.r.ret_str)+2); strcpy(compress_algo_string,"Z"); strcat(compress_algo_string,pargs.r.ret_str); } else compress_algo_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); } break; case oCertDigestAlgo: cert_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oNoSecmemWarn: gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM_WARN); break; case oRequireSecmem: require_secmem=1; break; case oNoRequireSecmem: require_secmem=0; break; case oNoPermissionWarn: opt.no_perm_warn=1; break; case oNoMDCWarn: opt.no_mdc_warn=1; break; case oDisplayCharset: if( set_native_charset( pargs.r.ret_str ) ) log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid character set\n"), pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oNotDashEscaped: opt.not_dash_escaped = 1; break; case oEscapeFrom: opt.escape_from = 1; break; case oNoEscapeFrom: opt.escape_from = 0; break; case oLockOnce: opt.lock_once = 1; break; case oLockNever: dotlock_disable (); break; case oLockMultiple: #ifndef __riscos__ opt.lock_once = 0; #else /* __riscos__ */ riscos_not_implemented("lock-multiple"); #endif /* __riscos__ */ break; case oKeyServer: { keyserver_spec_t keyserver; keyserver = parse_keyserver_uri (pargs.r.ret_str, 0); if (!keyserver) log_error (_("could not parse keyserver URL\n")); else { /* We only support a single keyserver. Later ones override earlier ones. (Since we parse the config file first and then the command line arguments, the command line takes precedence.) */ if (opt.keyserver) free_keyserver_spec (opt.keyserver); opt.keyserver = keyserver; } } break; case oKeyServerOptions: if(!parse_keyserver_options(pargs.r.ret_str)) { if(configname) log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid keyserver options\n"), configname,configlineno); else log_error(_("invalid keyserver options\n")); } break; case oImportOptions: if(!parse_import_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.import_options,1)) { if(configname) log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid import options\n"), configname,configlineno); else log_error(_("invalid import options\n")); } break; case oExportOptions: if(!parse_export_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.export_options,1)) { if(configname) log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid export options\n"), configname,configlineno); else log_error(_("invalid export options\n")); } break; case oListOptions: if(!parse_list_options(pargs.r.ret_str)) { if(configname) log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid list options\n"), configname,configlineno); else log_error(_("invalid list options\n")); } break; case oVerifyOptions: { struct parse_options vopts[]= { {"show-photos",VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS,NULL, N_("display photo IDs during signature verification")}, {"show-policy-urls",VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS,NULL, N_("show policy URLs during signature verification")}, {"show-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS,NULL, N_("show all notations during signature verification")}, {"show-std-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL, N_("show IETF standard notations during signature verification")}, {"show-standard-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL, NULL}, {"show-user-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS,NULL, N_("show user-supplied notations during signature verification")}, {"show-keyserver-urls",VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS,NULL, N_("show preferred keyserver URLs during signature verification")}, {"show-uid-validity",VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY,NULL, N_("show user ID validity during signature verification")}, {"show-unusable-uids",VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS,NULL, N_("show revoked and expired user IDs in signature verification")}, {"show-primary-uid-only",VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY,NULL, N_("show only the primary user ID in signature verification")}, {"pka-lookups",VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS,NULL, N_("validate signatures with PKA data")}, {"pka-trust-increase",VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE,NULL, N_("elevate the trust of signatures with valid PKA data")}, {NULL,0,NULL,NULL} }; if(!parse_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.verify_options,vopts,1)) { if(configname) log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid verify options\n"), configname,configlineno); else log_error(_("invalid verify options\n")); } } break; case oTempDir: opt.temp_dir=pargs.r.ret_str; break; case oExecPath: if(set_exec_path(pargs.r.ret_str)) log_error(_("unable to set exec-path to %s\n"),pargs.r.ret_str); else opt.exec_path_set=1; break; case oSetNotation: add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 0 ); add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 1 ); break; case oSigNotation: add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 0 ); break; case oCertNotation: add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 1 ); break; case oShowNotation: deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-notation", "--list-options ","show-notations"); deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-notation", "--verify-options ","show-notations"); opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS; opt.verify_options|=VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS; break; case oNoShowNotation: deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-notation", "--list-options ","no-show-notations"); deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-notation", "--verify-options ","no-show-notations"); opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS; opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS; break; case oUtf8Strings: utf8_strings = 1; break; case oNoUtf8Strings: utf8_strings = 0; break; case oDisableCipherAlgo: { int algo = string_to_cipher_algo (pargs.r.ret_str); gcry_cipher_ctl (NULL, GCRYCTL_DISABLE_ALGO, &algo, sizeof algo); } break; case oDisablePubkeyAlgo: { int algo = gcry_pk_map_name (pargs.r.ret_str); gcry_pk_ctl (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_ALGO, &algo, sizeof algo); } break; case oNoSigCache: opt.no_sig_cache = 1; break; case oAllowNonSelfsignedUID: opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1; break; case oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID: opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid=0; break; case oAllowFreeformUID: opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1; break; case oNoAllowFreeformUID: opt.allow_freeform_uid = 0; break; case oNoLiteral: opt.no_literal = 1; break; case oSetFilesize: opt.set_filesize = pargs.r.ret_ulong; break; case oFastListMode: opt.fast_list_mode = 1; break; case oFixedListMode: /* Dummy */ break; case oLegacyListMode: opt.legacy_list_mode = 1; break; case oPrintPKARecords: opt.print_pka_records = 1; break; case oPrintDANERecords: opt.print_dane_records = 1; break; case oListOnly: opt.list_only=1; break; case oIgnoreTimeConflict: opt.ignore_time_conflict = 1; break; case oIgnoreValidFrom: opt.ignore_valid_from = 1; break; case oIgnoreCrcError: opt.ignore_crc_error = 1; break; case oIgnoreMDCError: opt.ignore_mdc_error = 1; break; case oNoRandomSeedFile: use_random_seed = 0; break; case oAutoKeyRetrieve: case oNoAutoKeyRetrieve: if(pargs.r_opt==oAutoKeyRetrieve) opt.keyserver_options.options|=KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE; else opt.keyserver_options.options&=~KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE; deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno, pargs.r_opt==oAutoKeyRetrieve?"--auto-key-retrieve": "--no-auto-key-retrieve","--keyserver-options ", pargs.r_opt==oAutoKeyRetrieve?"auto-key-retrieve": "no-auto-key-retrieve"); break; case oShowSessionKey: opt.show_session_key = 1; break; case oOverrideSessionKey: opt.override_session_key = pargs.r.ret_str; break; case oMergeOnly: deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--merge-only", "--import-options ","merge-only"); opt.import_options|=IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY; break; case oAllowSecretKeyImport: /* obsolete */ break; case oTryAllSecrets: opt.try_all_secrets = 1; break; case oTrustedKey: register_trusted_key( pargs.r.ret_str ); break; case oEnableSpecialFilenames: iobuf_enable_special_filenames (1); break; case oNoExpensiveTrustChecks: opt.no_expensive_trust_checks=1; break; case oAutoCheckTrustDB: opt.no_auto_check_trustdb=0; break; case oNoAutoCheckTrustDB: opt.no_auto_check_trustdb=1; break; case oPreservePermissions: opt.preserve_permissions=1; break; case oDefaultPreferenceList: opt.def_preference_list = pargs.r.ret_str; break; case oDefaultKeyserverURL: { keyserver_spec_t keyserver; keyserver = parse_keyserver_uri (pargs.r.ret_str,1 ); if (!keyserver) log_error (_("could not parse keyserver URL\n")); else free_keyserver_spec (keyserver); opt.def_keyserver_url = pargs.r.ret_str; } break; case oPersonalCipherPreferences: pers_cipher_list=pargs.r.ret_str; break; case oPersonalDigestPreferences: pers_digest_list=pargs.r.ret_str; break; case oPersonalCompressPreferences: pers_compress_list=pargs.r.ret_str; break; case oAgentProgram: opt.agent_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break; case oDirmngrProgram: opt.dirmngr_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break; case oWeakDigest: additional_weak_digest(pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oUnwrap: opt.unwrap_encryption = 1; break; case oOnlySignTextIDs: opt.only_sign_text_ids = 1; break; case oDisplay: set_opt_session_env ("DISPLAY", pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oTTYname: set_opt_session_env ("GPG_TTY", pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oTTYtype: set_opt_session_env ("TERM", pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oXauthority: set_opt_session_env ("XAUTHORITY", pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oLCctype: opt.lc_ctype = pargs.r.ret_str; break; case oLCmessages: opt.lc_messages = pargs.r.ret_str; break; case oGroup: add_group(pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oUnGroup: rm_group(pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oNoGroups: while(opt.grouplist) { struct groupitem *iter=opt.grouplist; free_strlist(iter->values); opt.grouplist=opt.grouplist->next; xfree(iter); } break; case oStrict: case oNoStrict: /* Not used */ break; case oMangleDosFilenames: opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 1; break; case oNoMangleDosFilenames: opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 0; break; case oEnableProgressFilter: opt.enable_progress_filter = 1; break; case oMultifile: multifile=1; break; case oKeyidFormat: if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"short")==0) opt.keyid_format=KF_SHORT; else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"long")==0) opt.keyid_format=KF_LONG; else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"0xshort")==0) opt.keyid_format=KF_0xSHORT; else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"0xlong")==0) opt.keyid_format=KF_0xLONG; else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"none")==0) opt.keyid_format = KF_NONE; else log_error("unknown keyid-format '%s'\n",pargs.r.ret_str); break; case oExitOnStatusWriteError: opt.exit_on_status_write_error = 1; break; case oLimitCardInsertTries: opt.limit_card_insert_tries = pargs.r.ret_int; break; case oRequireCrossCert: opt.flags.require_cross_cert=1; break; case oNoRequireCrossCert: opt.flags.require_cross_cert=0; break; case oAutoKeyLocate: if(!parse_auto_key_locate(pargs.r.ret_str)) { if(configname) log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid auto-key-locate list\n"), configname,configlineno); else log_error(_("invalid auto-key-locate list\n")); } break; case oNoAutoKeyLocate: release_akl(); break; case oEnableLargeRSA: #if SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE >= 65536 opt.flags.large_rsa=1; #else if (configname) log_info("%s:%d: WARNING: gpg not built with large secure " "memory buffer. Ignoring enable-large-rsa\n", configname,configlineno); else log_info("WARNING: gpg not built with large secure " "memory buffer. Ignoring --enable-large-rsa\n"); #endif /* SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE >= 65536 */ break; case oDisableLargeRSA: opt.flags.large_rsa=0; break; case oEnableDSA2: opt.flags.dsa2=1; break; case oDisableDSA2: opt.flags.dsa2=0; break; case oAllowMultisigVerification: case oAllowMultipleMessages: opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages=1; break; case oNoAllowMultipleMessages: opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages=0; break; case oAllowWeakDigestAlgos: opt.flags.allow_weak_digest_algos = 1; break; case oFakedSystemTime: { time_t faked_time = isotime2epoch (pargs.r.ret_str); if (faked_time == (time_t)(-1)) faked_time = (time_t)strtoul (pargs.r.ret_str, NULL, 10); gnupg_set_time (faked_time, 0); } break; case oNoAutostart: opt.autostart = 0; break; case oNoop: break; default: pargs.err = configfp? ARGPARSE_PRINT_WARNING:ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR; break; } } if (configfp) { fclose( configfp ); configfp = NULL; /* Remember the first config file name. */ if (!save_configname) save_configname = configname; else xfree(configname); configname = NULL; goto next_pass; } xfree(configname); configname = NULL; if (log_get_errorcount (0)) g10_exit(2); /* The command --gpgconf-list is pretty simple and may be called directly after the option parsing. */ if (cmd == aGPGConfList) { gpgconf_list (save_configname ? save_configname : default_configname); g10_exit (0); } xfree (save_configname); xfree (default_configname); if( nogreeting ) greeting = 0; if( greeting ) { es_fprintf (es_stderr, "%s %s; %s\n", strusage(11), strusage(13), strusage(14) ); es_fprintf (es_stderr, "%s\n", strusage(15) ); } #ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION if (!opt.batch) { const char *s; if((s=strusage(25))) log_info("%s\n",s); if((s=strusage(26))) log_info("%s\n",s); if((s=strusage(27))) log_info("%s\n",s); } #endif /* FIXME: We should use logging to a file only in server mode; however we have not yet implemetyed that. Thus we try to get away with --batch as indication for logging to file required. */ if (logfile && opt.batch) { log_set_file (logfile); log_set_prefix (NULL, 1|2|4); } if (opt.verbose > 2) log_info ("using character set '%s'\n", get_native_charset ()); if( may_coredump && !opt.quiet ) log_info(_("WARNING: program may create a core file!\n")); if (eyes_only) { if (opt.set_filename) log_info(_("WARNING: %s overrides %s\n"), "--for-your-eyes-only","--set-filename"); opt.set_filename="_CONSOLE"; } if (opt.no_literal) { log_info(_("Note: %s is not for normal use!\n"), "--no-literal"); if (opt.textmode) log_error(_("%s not allowed with %s!\n"), "--textmode", "--no-literal" ); if (opt.set_filename) log_error(_("%s makes no sense with %s!\n"), eyes_only?"--for-your-eyes-only":"--set-filename", "--no-literal" ); } if (opt.set_filesize) log_info(_("Note: %s is not for normal use!\n"), "--set-filesize"); if( opt.batch ) tty_batchmode( 1 ); if (gnupg_faked_time_p ()) { gnupg_isotime_t tbuf; log_info (_("WARNING: running with faked system time: ")); gnupg_get_isotime (tbuf); dump_isotime (tbuf); log_printf ("\n"); } /* Print a warning if an argument looks like an option. */ if (!opt.quiet && !(pargs.flags & ARGPARSE_FLAG_STOP_SEEN)) { int i; for (i=0; i < argc; i++) if (argv[i][0] == '-' && argv[i][1] == '-') log_info (_("Note: '%s' is not considered an option\n"), argv[i]); } gcry_control (GCRYCTL_RESUME_SECMEM_WARN); if(require_secmem && !got_secmem) { log_info(_("will not run with insecure memory due to %s\n"), "--require-secmem"); g10_exit(2); } set_debug (debug_level); if (DBG_CLOCK) log_clock ("start"); /* Do these after the switch(), so they can override settings. */ if(PGP6) { /* That does not anymore work because we have no more support for v3 signatures. */ opt.disable_mdc=1; opt.escape_from=1; opt.ask_sig_expire=0; } else if(PGP7) { /* That does not anymore work because we have no more support for v3 signatures. */ opt.escape_from=1; opt.ask_sig_expire=0; } else if(PGP8) { opt.escape_from=1; } if( def_cipher_string ) { opt.def_cipher_algo = string_to_cipher_algo (def_cipher_string); xfree(def_cipher_string); def_cipher_string = NULL; if ( openpgp_cipher_test_algo (opt.def_cipher_algo) ) log_error(_("selected cipher algorithm is invalid\n")); } if( def_digest_string ) { opt.def_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo (def_digest_string); xfree(def_digest_string); def_digest_string = NULL; if ( openpgp_md_test_algo (opt.def_digest_algo) ) log_error(_("selected digest algorithm is invalid\n")); } if( compress_algo_string ) { opt.compress_algo = string_to_compress_algo(compress_algo_string); xfree(compress_algo_string); compress_algo_string = NULL; if( check_compress_algo(opt.compress_algo) ) log_error(_("selected compression algorithm is invalid\n")); } if( cert_digest_string ) { opt.cert_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo (cert_digest_string); xfree(cert_digest_string); cert_digest_string = NULL; if (openpgp_md_test_algo(opt.cert_digest_algo)) log_error(_("selected certification digest algorithm is invalid\n")); } if( s2k_cipher_string ) { opt.s2k_cipher_algo = string_to_cipher_algo (s2k_cipher_string); xfree(s2k_cipher_string); s2k_cipher_string = NULL; if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (opt.s2k_cipher_algo)) log_error(_("selected cipher algorithm is invalid\n")); } if( s2k_digest_string ) { opt.s2k_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo (s2k_digest_string); xfree(s2k_digest_string); s2k_digest_string = NULL; if (openpgp_md_test_algo(opt.s2k_digest_algo)) log_error(_("selected digest algorithm is invalid\n")); } if( opt.completes_needed < 1 ) log_error(_("completes-needed must be greater than 0\n")); if( opt.marginals_needed < 2 ) log_error(_("marginals-needed must be greater than 1\n")); if( opt.max_cert_depth < 1 || opt.max_cert_depth > 255 ) log_error(_("max-cert-depth must be in the range from 1 to 255\n")); if(opt.def_cert_level<0 || opt.def_cert_level>3) log_error(_("invalid default-cert-level; must be 0, 1, 2, or 3\n")); if( opt.min_cert_level < 1 || opt.min_cert_level > 3 ) log_error(_("invalid min-cert-level; must be 1, 2, or 3\n")); switch( opt.s2k_mode ) { case 0: log_info(_("Note: simple S2K mode (0) is strongly discouraged\n")); break; case 1: case 3: break; default: log_error(_("invalid S2K mode; must be 0, 1 or 3\n")); } /* This isn't actually needed, but does serve to error out if the string is invalid. */ if(opt.def_preference_list && keygen_set_std_prefs(opt.def_preference_list,0)) log_error(_("invalid default preferences\n")); if(pers_cipher_list && keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_cipher_list,PREFTYPE_SYM)) log_error(_("invalid personal cipher preferences\n")); if(pers_digest_list && keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_digest_list,PREFTYPE_HASH)) log_error(_("invalid personal digest preferences\n")); if(pers_compress_list && keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_compress_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP)) log_error(_("invalid personal compress preferences\n")); /* We don't support all possible commands with multifile yet */ if(multifile) { char *cmdname; switch(cmd) { case aSign: cmdname="--sign"; break; case aSignEncr: cmdname="--sign --encrypt"; break; case aClearsign: cmdname="--clearsign"; break; case aDetachedSign: cmdname="--detach-sign"; break; case aSym: cmdname="--symmetric"; break; case aEncrSym: cmdname="--symmetric --encrypt"; break; case aStore: cmdname="--store"; break; default: cmdname=NULL; break; } if(cmdname) log_error(_("%s does not yet work with %s\n"),cmdname,"--multifile"); } if( log_get_errorcount(0) ) g10_exit(2); if(opt.compress_level==0) opt.compress_algo=COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE; /* Check our chosen algorithms against the list of legal algorithms. */ if(!GNUPG) { const char *badalg=NULL; preftype_t badtype=PREFTYPE_NONE; if(opt.def_cipher_algo && !algo_available(PREFTYPE_SYM,opt.def_cipher_algo,NULL)) { badalg = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (opt.def_cipher_algo); badtype = PREFTYPE_SYM; } else if(opt.def_digest_algo && !algo_available(PREFTYPE_HASH,opt.def_digest_algo,NULL)) { badalg = gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo); badtype = PREFTYPE_HASH; } else if(opt.cert_digest_algo && !algo_available(PREFTYPE_HASH,opt.cert_digest_algo,NULL)) { badalg = gcry_md_algo_name (opt.cert_digest_algo); badtype = PREFTYPE_HASH; } else if(opt.compress_algo!=-1 && !algo_available(PREFTYPE_ZIP,opt.compress_algo,NULL)) { badalg = compress_algo_to_string(opt.compress_algo); badtype = PREFTYPE_ZIP; } if(badalg) { switch(badtype) { case PREFTYPE_SYM: log_info(_("you may not use cipher algorithm '%s'" " while in %s mode\n"), badalg,compliance_option_string()); break; case PREFTYPE_HASH: log_info(_("you may not use digest algorithm '%s'" " while in %s mode\n"), badalg,compliance_option_string()); break; case PREFTYPE_ZIP: log_info(_("you may not use compression algorithm '%s'" " while in %s mode\n"), badalg,compliance_option_string()); break; default: BUG(); } compliance_failure(); } } /* Set the random seed file. */ if( use_random_seed ) { char *p = make_filename(opt.homedir, "random_seed", NULL ); gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_RANDOM_SEED_FILE, p); if (!access (p, F_OK)) register_secured_file (p); xfree(p); } /* If there is no command but the --fingerprint is given, default to the --list-keys command. */ if (!cmd && fpr_maybe_cmd) { set_cmd (&cmd, aListKeys); } if( opt.verbose > 1 ) set_packet_list_mode(1); /* Add the keyrings, but not for some special commands. We always need to add the keyrings if we are running under SELinux, this is so that the rings are added to the list of secured files. */ if( ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS || (cmd != aDeArmor && cmd != aEnArmor && cmd != aGPGConfTest) ) { if (!nrings || default_keyring) /* Add default ring. */ keydb_add_resource ("pubring" EXTSEP_S GPGEXT_GPG, KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_DEFAULT); for (sl = nrings; sl; sl = sl->next ) keydb_add_resource (sl->d, sl->flags); } FREE_STRLIST(nrings); if (opt.pinentry_mode == PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK) /* In loopback mode, never ask for the password multiple times. */ { opt.passphrase_repeat = 0; } if (cmd == aGPGConfTest) g10_exit(0); if( pwfd != -1 ) /* Read the passphrase now. */ read_passphrase_from_fd( pwfd ); fname = argc? *argv : NULL; if(fname && utf8_strings) opt.flags.utf8_filename=1; ctrl = xcalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl); gpg_init_default_ctrl (ctrl); #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS switch (cmd) { case aPrimegen: case aPrintMD: case aPrintMDs: case aGenRandom: case aDeArmor: case aEnArmor: break; case aFixTrustDB: case aExportOwnerTrust: rc = setup_trustdb (0, trustdb_name); break; case aListTrustDB: rc = setup_trustdb (argc? 1:0, trustdb_name); break; default: /* If we are using TM_ALWAYS, we do not need to create the trustdb. */ rc = setup_trustdb (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS, trustdb_name); break; } if (rc) log_error (_("failed to initialize the TrustDB: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); #endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/ switch (cmd) { case aStore: case aSym: case aSign: case aSignSym: case aClearsign: if (!opt.quiet && any_explicit_recipient) log_info (_("WARNING: recipients (-r) given " "without using public key encryption\n")); break; default: break; } /* Check for certain command whether we need to migrate a secring.gpg to the gpg-agent. */ switch (cmd) { case aListSecretKeys: case aSign: case aSignEncr: case aSignEncrSym: case aSignSym: case aClearsign: case aDecrypt: case aSignKey: case aLSignKey: case aEditKey: case aPasswd: case aDeleteSecretKeys: case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys: case aQuickKeygen: case aQuickAddUid: case aQuickAddKey: case aFullKeygen: case aKeygen: case aImport: case aExportSecret: case aExportSecretSub: case aGenRevoke: case aDesigRevoke: case aCardEdit: case aChangePIN: migrate_secring (ctrl); break; case aListKeys: if (opt.with_secret) migrate_secring (ctrl); break; default: break; } /* The command dispatcher. */ switch( cmd ) { case aServer: gpg_server (ctrl); break; case aStore: /* only store the file */ if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args(_("--store [filename]")); if( (rc = encrypt_store(fname)) ) { write_status_failure ("store", rc); log_error ("storing '%s' failed: %s\n", print_fname_stdin(fname),gpg_strerror (rc) ); } break; case aSym: /* encrypt the given file only with the symmetric cipher */ if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args(_("--symmetric [filename]")); if( (rc = encrypt_symmetric(fname)) ) { write_status_failure ("symencrypt", rc); log_error (_("symmetric encryption of '%s' failed: %s\n"), print_fname_stdin(fname),gpg_strerror (rc) ); } break; case aEncr: /* encrypt the given file */ if(multifile) encrypt_crypt_files (ctrl, argc, argv, remusr); else { if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args(_("--encrypt [filename]")); if( (rc = encrypt_crypt (ctrl, -1, fname, remusr, 0, NULL, -1)) ) { write_status_failure ("encrypt", rc); log_error("%s: encryption failed: %s\n", print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) ); } } break; case aEncrSym: /* This works with PGP 8 in the sense that it acts just like a symmetric message. It doesn't work at all with 2 or 6. It might work with 7, but alas, I don't have a copy to test with right now. */ if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args(_("--symmetric --encrypt [filename]")); else if(opt.s2k_mode==0) log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --encrypt" " with --s2k-mode 0\n")); else if(PGP6 || PGP7) log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --encrypt" " while in %s mode\n"),compliance_option_string()); else { if( (rc = encrypt_crypt (ctrl, -1, fname, remusr, 1, NULL, -1)) ) { write_status_failure ("encrypt", rc); log_error ("%s: encryption failed: %s\n", print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) ); } } break; case aSign: /* sign the given file */ sl = NULL; if( detached_sig ) { /* sign all files */ for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) add_to_strlist( &sl, *argv ); } else { if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args(_("--sign [filename]")); if( argc ) { sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname)); strcpy(sl->d, fname); } } if ((rc = sign_file (ctrl, sl, detached_sig, locusr, 0, NULL, NULL))) { write_status_failure ("sign", rc); log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) ); } free_strlist(sl); break; case aSignEncr: /* sign and encrypt the given file */ if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args(_("--sign --encrypt [filename]")); if( argc ) { sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname)); strcpy(sl->d, fname); } else sl = NULL; if ((rc = sign_file (ctrl, sl, detached_sig, locusr, 1, remusr, NULL))) { write_status_failure ("sign-encrypt", rc); log_error("%s: sign+encrypt failed: %s\n", print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) ); } free_strlist(sl); break; case aSignEncrSym: /* sign and encrypt the given file */ if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args(_("--symmetric --sign --encrypt [filename]")); else if(opt.s2k_mode==0) log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --sign --encrypt" " with --s2k-mode 0\n")); else if(PGP6 || PGP7) log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --sign --encrypt" " while in %s mode\n"),compliance_option_string()); else { if( argc ) { sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname)); strcpy(sl->d, fname); } else sl = NULL; if ((rc = sign_file (ctrl, sl, detached_sig, locusr, 2, remusr, NULL))) { write_status_failure ("sign-encrypt", rc); log_error("%s: symmetric+sign+encrypt failed: %s\n", print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) ); } free_strlist(sl); } break; case aSignSym: /* sign and conventionally encrypt the given file */ if (argc > 1) wrong_args(_("--sign --symmetric [filename]")); rc = sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl, fname, locusr); if (rc) { write_status_failure ("sign-symencrypt", rc); log_error("%s: sign+symmetric failed: %s\n", print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) ); } break; case aClearsign: /* make a clearsig */ if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args(_("--clearsign [filename]")); if( (rc = clearsign_file (ctrl, fname, locusr, NULL)) ) { write_status_failure ("sign", rc); log_error("%s: clearsign failed: %s\n", print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) ); } break; case aVerify: if (multifile) { if ((rc = verify_files (ctrl, argc, argv))) log_error("verify files failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) ); } else { if ((rc = verify_signatures (ctrl, argc, argv))) log_error("verify signatures failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) ); } if (rc) write_status_failure ("verify", rc); break; case aDecrypt: if (multifile) decrypt_messages (ctrl, argc, argv); else { if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args(_("--decrypt [filename]")); if( (rc = decrypt_message (ctrl, fname) )) { write_status_failure ("decrypt", rc); log_error("decrypt_message failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) ); } } break; case aQuickSignKey: case aQuickLSignKey: { const char *fpr; if (argc < 1) wrong_args ("--quick-[l]sign-key fingerprint [userids]"); fpr = *argv++; argc--; sl = NULL; for( ; argc; argc--, argv++) append_to_strlist2 (&sl, *argv, utf8_strings); keyedit_quick_sign (ctrl, fpr, sl, locusr, (cmd == aQuickLSignKey)); free_strlist (sl); } break; case aSignKey: if( argc != 1 ) wrong_args(_("--sign-key user-id")); /* fall through */ case aLSignKey: if( argc != 1 ) wrong_args(_("--lsign-key user-id")); /* fall through */ sl=NULL; if(cmd==aSignKey) append_to_strlist(&sl,"sign"); else if(cmd==aLSignKey) append_to_strlist(&sl,"lsign"); else BUG(); append_to_strlist( &sl, "save" ); username = make_username( fname ); keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, sl, 0, 0 ); xfree(username); free_strlist(sl); break; case aEditKey: /* Edit a key signature */ if( !argc ) wrong_args(_("--edit-key user-id [commands]")); username = make_username( fname ); if( argc > 1 ) { sl = NULL; for( argc--, argv++ ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) append_to_strlist( &sl, *argv ); keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, sl, 0, 1 ); free_strlist(sl); } else keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, NULL, 0, 1 ); xfree(username); break; case aPasswd: if (argc != 1) wrong_args (_("--passwd ")); else { username = make_username (fname); keyedit_passwd (ctrl, username); xfree (username); } break; case aDeleteKeys: case aDeleteSecretKeys: case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys: sl = NULL; /* I'm adding these in reverse order as add_to_strlist2 reverses them again, and it's easier to understand in the proper order :) */ for( ; argc; argc-- ) add_to_strlist2( &sl, argv[argc-1], utf8_strings ); delete_keys(sl,cmd==aDeleteSecretKeys,cmd==aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys); free_strlist(sl); break; case aCheckKeys: opt.check_sigs = 1; case aListSigs: opt.list_sigs = 1; case aListKeys: sl = NULL; for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings ); public_key_list (ctrl, sl, 0); free_strlist(sl); break; case aListSecretKeys: sl = NULL; for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings ); secret_key_list (ctrl, sl); free_strlist(sl); break; case aLocateKeys: sl = NULL; for (; argc; argc--, argv++) add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings ); public_key_list (ctrl, sl, 1); free_strlist (sl); break; case aQuickKeygen: { const char *x_algo, *x_usage, *x_expire; if (argc < 1 || argc > 4) wrong_args("--quick-gen-key USER-ID [ALGO [USAGE [EXPIRE]]]"); username = make_username (fname); argv++, argc--; x_algo = ""; x_usage = ""; x_expire = ""; if (argc) { x_algo = *argv++; argc--; if (argc) { x_usage = *argv++; argc--; if (argc) x_expire = *argv++; argc--; } } quick_generate_keypair (ctrl, username, x_algo, x_usage, x_expire); xfree (username); } break; case aKeygen: /* generate a key */ if( opt.batch ) { if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args("--gen-key [parameterfile]"); generate_keypair (ctrl, 0, argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, 0); } else { if (opt.command_fd != -1 && argc) { if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args("--gen-key [parameterfile]"); opt.batch = 1; generate_keypair (ctrl, 0, argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, 0); } else if (argc) wrong_args ("--gen-key"); else generate_keypair (ctrl, 0, NULL, NULL, 0); } break; case aFullKeygen: /* Generate a key with all options. */ if (opt.batch) { if (argc > 1) wrong_args ("--full-gen-key [parameterfile]"); generate_keypair (ctrl, 1, argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, 0); } else { if (argc) wrong_args("--full-gen-key"); generate_keypair (ctrl, 1, NULL, NULL, 0); } break; case aQuickAddUid: { const char *uid, *newuid; if (argc != 2) wrong_args ("--quick-adduid USER-ID NEW-USER-ID"); uid = *argv++; argc--; newuid = *argv++; argc--; keyedit_quick_adduid (ctrl, uid, newuid); } break; case aQuickAddKey: { const char *x_fpr, *x_algo, *x_usage, *x_expire; if (argc < 1 || argc > 4) wrong_args ("--quick-addkey FINGERPRINT [ALGO [USAGE [EXPIRE]]]"); x_fpr = *argv++; argc--; x_algo = ""; x_usage = ""; x_expire = ""; if (argc) { x_algo = *argv++; argc--; if (argc) { x_usage = *argv++; argc--; if (argc) x_expire = *argv++; argc--; } } keyedit_quick_addkey (ctrl, x_fpr, x_algo, x_usage, x_expire); } break; case aFastImport: opt.import_options |= IMPORT_FAST; case aImport: import_keys (ctrl, argc? argv:NULL, argc, NULL, opt.import_options); break; /* TODO: There are a number of command that use this same "make strlist, call function, report error, free strlist" pattern. Join them together here and avoid all that duplicated code. */ case aExport: case aSendKeys: case aRecvKeys: sl = NULL; for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings ); if( cmd == aSendKeys ) rc = keyserver_export (ctrl, sl ); else if( cmd == aRecvKeys ) rc = keyserver_import (ctrl, sl ); else { export_stats_t stats = export_new_stats (); rc = export_pubkeys (ctrl, sl, opt.export_options, stats); export_print_stats (stats); export_release_stats (stats); } if(rc) { if(cmd==aSendKeys) { write_status_failure ("send-keys", rc); log_error(_("keyserver send failed: %s\n"),gpg_strerror (rc)); } else if(cmd==aRecvKeys) { write_status_failure ("recv-keys", rc); log_error (_("keyserver receive failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); } else { write_status_failure ("export", rc); log_error (_("key export failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); } } free_strlist(sl); break; case aExportSshKey: if (argc != 1) wrong_args ("--export-ssh-key "); rc = export_ssh_key (ctrl, argv[0]); if (rc) { write_status_failure ("export-ssh-key", rc); log_error (_("export as ssh key failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); } break; case aSearchKeys: sl = NULL; for (; argc; argc--, argv++) append_to_strlist2 (&sl, *argv, utf8_strings); rc = keyserver_search (ctrl, sl); if (rc) { write_status_failure ("search-keys", rc); log_error (_("keyserver search failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); } free_strlist (sl); break; case aRefreshKeys: sl = NULL; for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings ); rc = keyserver_refresh (ctrl, sl); if(rc) { write_status_failure ("refresh-keys", rc); log_error (_("keyserver refresh failed: %s\n"),gpg_strerror (rc)); } free_strlist(sl); break; case aFetchKeys: sl = NULL; for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings ); rc = keyserver_fetch (ctrl, sl); if(rc) { write_status_failure ("fetch-keys", rc); log_error ("key fetch failed: %s\n",gpg_strerror (rc)); } free_strlist(sl); break; case aExportSecret: sl = NULL; for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings ); { export_stats_t stats = export_new_stats (); export_seckeys (ctrl, sl, stats); export_print_stats (stats); export_release_stats (stats); } free_strlist(sl); break; case aExportSecretSub: sl = NULL; for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings ); { export_stats_t stats = export_new_stats (); export_secsubkeys (ctrl, sl, stats); export_print_stats (stats); export_release_stats (stats); } free_strlist(sl); break; case aGenRevoke: if( argc != 1 ) wrong_args("--gen-revoke user-id"); username = make_username(*argv); gen_revoke( username ); xfree( username ); break; case aDesigRevoke: if (argc != 1) wrong_args ("--desig-revoke user-id"); username = make_username (*argv); gen_desig_revoke (ctrl, username, locusr); xfree (username); break; case aDeArmor: if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args("--dearmor [file]"); rc = dearmor_file( argc? *argv: NULL ); if( rc ) { write_status_failure ("dearmor", rc); log_error (_("dearmoring failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); } break; case aEnArmor: if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args("--enarmor [file]"); rc = enarmor_file( argc? *argv: NULL ); if( rc ) { write_status_failure ("enarmor", rc); log_error (_("enarmoring failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); } break; case aPrimegen: #if 0 /*FIXME*/ { int mode = argc < 2 ? 0 : atoi(*argv); if( mode == 1 && argc == 2 ) { mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_public_prime( atoi(argv[1]) ), 1); } else if( mode == 2 && argc == 3 ) { mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_elg_prime( 0, atoi(argv[1]), atoi(argv[2]), NULL,NULL ), 1); } else if( mode == 3 && argc == 3 ) { MPI *factors; mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_elg_prime( 1, atoi(argv[1]), atoi(argv[2]), NULL,&factors ), 1); es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); mpi_print (es_stdout, factors[0], 1 ); /* print q */ } else if( mode == 4 && argc == 3 ) { MPI g = mpi_alloc(1); mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_elg_prime( 0, atoi(argv[1]), atoi(argv[2]), g, NULL ), 1); es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); mpi_print (es_stdout, g, 1 ); mpi_free (g); } else wrong_args("--gen-prime mode bits [qbits] "); es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); } #endif wrong_args("--gen-prime not yet supported "); break; case aGenRandom: { int level = argc ? atoi(*argv):0; int count = argc > 1 ? atoi(argv[1]): 0; int endless = !count; if( argc < 1 || argc > 2 || level < 0 || level > 2 || count < 0 ) wrong_args("--gen-random 0|1|2 [count]"); while( endless || count ) { byte *p; /* Wee need a multiple of 3, so that in case of armored output we get a correct string. No linefolding is done, as it is best to levae this to other tools */ size_t n = !endless && count < 99? count : 99; p = gcry_random_bytes (n, level); #ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM setmode ( fileno(stdout), O_BINARY ); #endif if (opt.armor) { char *tmp = make_radix64_string (p, n); es_fputs (tmp, es_stdout); xfree (tmp); if (n%3 == 1) es_putc ('=', es_stdout); if (n%3) es_putc ('=', es_stdout); } else { es_fwrite( p, n, 1, es_stdout ); } xfree(p); if( !endless ) count -= n; } if (opt.armor) es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); } break; case aPrintMD: if( argc < 1) wrong_args("--print-md algo [files]"); { int all_algos = (**argv=='*' && !(*argv)[1]); int algo = all_algos? 0 : gcry_md_map_name (*argv); if( !algo && !all_algos ) log_error(_("invalid hash algorithm '%s'\n"), *argv ); else { argc--; argv++; if( !argc ) print_mds(NULL, algo); else { for(; argc; argc--, argv++ ) print_mds(*argv, algo); } } } break; case aPrintMDs: /* old option */ if( !argc ) print_mds(NULL,0); else { for(; argc; argc--, argv++ ) print_mds(*argv,0); } break; #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS case aListTrustDB: if( !argc ) list_trustdb (es_stdout, NULL); else { for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) list_trustdb (es_stdout, *argv ); } break; case aUpdateTrustDB: if( argc ) wrong_args("--update-trustdb"); update_trustdb (ctrl); break; case aCheckTrustDB: /* Old versions allowed for arguments - ignore them */ check_trustdb (ctrl); break; case aFixTrustDB: how_to_fix_the_trustdb (); break; case aListTrustPath: if( !argc ) wrong_args("--list-trust-path "); for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) { username = make_username( *argv ); list_trust_path( username ); xfree(username); } break; case aExportOwnerTrust: if( argc ) wrong_args("--export-ownertrust"); export_ownertrust(); break; case aImportOwnerTrust: if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args("--import-ownertrust [file]"); import_ownertrust( argc? *argv:NULL ); break; #endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/ case aRebuildKeydbCaches: if (argc) wrong_args ("--rebuild-keydb-caches"); keydb_rebuild_caches (1); break; #ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT case aCardStatus: if (argc) wrong_args ("--card-status"); card_status (es_stdout, NULL, 0); break; case aCardEdit: if (argc) { sl = NULL; for (argc--, argv++ ; argc; argc--, argv++) append_to_strlist (&sl, *argv); card_edit (ctrl, sl); free_strlist (sl); } else card_edit (ctrl, NULL); break; case aChangePIN: if (!argc) change_pin (0,1); else if (argc == 1) change_pin (atoi (*argv),1); else wrong_args ("--change-pin [no]"); break; #endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/ case aListConfig: { char *str=collapse_args(argc,argv); list_config(str); xfree(str); } break; case aListGcryptConfig: /* Fixme: It would be nice to integrate that with --list-config but unfortunately there is no way yet to have libgcrypt print it to an estream for further parsing. */ gcry_control (GCRYCTL_PRINT_CONFIG, stdout); break; case aTOFUPolicy: #ifdef USE_TOFU { int policy; int i; KEYDB_HANDLE hd; if (argc < 2) wrong_args ("--tofu-policy POLICY KEYID [KEYID...]"); policy = parse_tofu_policy (argv[0]); hd = keydb_new (); if (! hd) g10_exit (1); for (i = 1; i < argc; i ++) { KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc; kbnode_t kb; rc = classify_user_id (argv[i], &desc, 0); if (rc) { log_error (_("error parsing key specification '%s': %s\n"), argv[i], gpg_strerror (rc)); g10_exit (1); } if (! (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID || desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID || desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16 || desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20 || desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR || desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_KEYGRIP)) { log_error (_("'%s' does not appear to be a valid" " key ID, fingerprint or keygrip\n"), argv[i]); g10_exit (1); } rc = keydb_search_reset (hd); if (rc) { /* This should not happen, thus no need to tranalate the string. */ log_error ("keydb_search_reset failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); g10_exit (1); } rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL); if (rc) { log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), argv[i], gpg_strerror (rc)); g10_exit (1); } rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &kb); if (rc) { log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); g10_exit (1); } merge_keys_and_selfsig (kb); if (tofu_set_policy (ctrl, kb, policy)) g10_exit (1); } keydb_release (hd); } #endif /*USE_TOFU*/ break; case aListPackets: opt.list_packets=2; default: if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args(_("[filename]")); /* Issue some output for the unix newbie */ if (!fname && !opt.outfile && gnupg_isatty (fileno (stdin)) && gnupg_isatty (fileno (stdout)) && gnupg_isatty (fileno (stderr))) log_info(_("Go ahead and type your message ...\n")); a = iobuf_open(fname); if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a))) { iobuf_close (a); a = NULL; gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); } if( !a ) log_error(_("can't open '%s'\n"), print_fname_stdin(fname)); else { if( !opt.no_armor ) { if( use_armor_filter( a ) ) { afx = new_armor_context (); push_armor_filter (afx, a); } } if( cmd == aListPackets ) { set_packet_list_mode(1); opt.list_packets=1; } rc = proc_packets (ctrl, NULL, a ); if( rc ) { write_status_failure ("-", rc); log_error ("processing message failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); } iobuf_close(a); } break; } /* cleanup */ gpg_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl); xfree (ctrl); release_armor_context (afx); FREE_STRLIST(remusr); FREE_STRLIST(locusr); g10_exit(0); return 8; /*NEVER REACHED*/ } /* Note: This function is used by signal handlers!. */ static void emergency_cleanup (void) { gcry_control (GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM ); } void g10_exit( int rc ) { gcry_control (GCRYCTL_UPDATE_RANDOM_SEED_FILE); if (DBG_CLOCK) log_clock ("stop"); if ( (opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE) ) { keydb_dump_stats (); gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_MEMORY_STATS); gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_RANDOM_STATS); } if (opt.debug) gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_SECMEM_STATS ); emergency_cleanup (); rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 : g10_errors_seen? 1 : 0; exit (rc); } /* Pretty-print hex hashes. This assumes at least an 80-character display, but there are a few other similar assumptions in the display code. */ static void print_hex (gcry_md_hd_t md, int algo, const char *fname) { int i,n,count,indent=0; const byte *p; if (fname) indent = es_printf("%s: ",fname); if (indent>40) { es_printf ("\n"); indent=0; } if (algo==DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160) indent += es_printf("RMD160 = "); else if (algo>0) indent += es_printf("%6s = ", gcry_md_algo_name (algo)); else algo = abs(algo); count = indent; p = gcry_md_read (md, algo); n = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo); count += es_printf ("%02X",*p++); for(i=1;i79) { es_printf ("\n%*s",indent," "); count = indent; } else count += es_printf(" "); if (!(i%8)) count += es_printf(" "); } else if (n==20) { if(!(i%2)) { if(count+4>79) { es_printf ("\n%*s",indent," "); count=indent; } else count += es_printf(" "); } if (!(i%10)) count += es_printf(" "); } else { if(!(i%4)) { if (count+8>79) { es_printf ("\n%*s",indent," "); count=indent; } else count += es_printf(" "); } } count += es_printf("%02X",*p); } es_printf ("\n"); } static void print_hashline( gcry_md_hd_t md, int algo, const char *fname ) { int i, n; const byte *p; if ( fname ) { for (p = fname; *p; p++ ) { if ( *p <= 32 || *p > 127 || *p == ':' || *p == '%' ) es_printf ("%%%02X", *p ); else es_putc (*p, es_stdout); } } es_putc (':', es_stdout); es_printf ("%d:", algo); p = gcry_md_read (md, algo); n = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo); for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ ) es_printf ("%02X", *p); es_fputs (":\n", es_stdout); } static void print_mds( const char *fname, int algo ) { estream_t fp; char buf[1024]; size_t n; gcry_md_hd_t md; if (!fname) { fp = es_stdin; es_set_binary (fp); } else { fp = es_fopen (fname, "rb" ); if (fp && is_secured_file (es_fileno (fp))) { es_fclose (fp); fp = NULL; gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); } } if (!fp) { log_error("%s: %s\n", fname?fname:"[stdin]", strerror(errno) ); return; } gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0); if (algo) gcry_md_enable (md, algo); else { if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_MD5)) gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_MD5); gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA1); if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_RMD160)) gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_RMD160); if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA224)) gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA224); if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA256)) gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA256); if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA384)) gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA384); if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA512)) gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA512); } while ((n=es_fread (buf, 1, DIM(buf), fp))) gcry_md_write (md, buf, n); if (es_ferror(fp)) log_error ("%s: %s\n", fname?fname:"[stdin]", strerror(errno)); else { gcry_md_final (md); if (opt.with_colons) { if ( algo ) print_hashline (md, algo, fname); else { if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_MD5)) print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_MD5, fname ); print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fname ); if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_RMD160)) print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_RMD160, fname ); if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA224)) print_hashline (md, GCRY_MD_SHA224, fname); if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA256)) print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_SHA256, fname ); if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA384)) print_hashline ( md, GCRY_MD_SHA384, fname ); if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA512)) print_hashline ( md, GCRY_MD_SHA512, fname ); } } else { if (algo) print_hex (md, -algo, fname); else { if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_MD5)) print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_MD5, fname); print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fname ); if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_RMD160)) print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_RMD160, fname ); if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA224)) print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA224, fname); if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA256)) print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA256, fname ); if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA384)) print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA384, fname ); if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA512)) print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA512, fname ); } } } gcry_md_close (md); if (fp != es_stdin) es_fclose (fp); } /**************** * Check the supplied name,value string and add it to the notation * data to be used for signatures. which==0 for sig notations, and 1 * for cert notations. */ static void add_notation_data( const char *string, int which ) { struct notation *notation; notation=string_to_notation(string,utf8_strings); if(notation) { if(which) { notation->next=opt.cert_notations; opt.cert_notations=notation; } else { notation->next=opt.sig_notations; opt.sig_notations=notation; } } } static void add_policy_url( const char *string, int which ) { unsigned int i,critical=0; strlist_t sl; if(*string=='!') { string++; critical=1; } for(i=0;iflags |= 1; } static void add_keyserver_url( const char *string, int which ) { unsigned int i,critical=0; strlist_t sl; if(*string=='!') { string++; critical=1; } for(i=0;iflags |= 1; } diff --git a/g10/keyid.c b/g10/keyid.c index 20efa01b7..4cdc41d2a 100644 --- a/g10/keyid.c +++ b/g10/keyid.c @@ -1,984 +1,987 @@ /* keyid.c - key ID and fingerprint handling * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, * 2004, 2006, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * Copyright (C) 2014 Werner Koch * Copyright (C) 2016 g10 Code GmbH * * This file is part of GnuPG. * * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, see . */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "gpg.h" #include "util.h" #include "main.h" #include "packet.h" #include "options.h" #include "keydb.h" #include "i18n.h" #include "rmd160.h" #include "host2net.h" #define KEYID_STR_SIZE 19 #ifdef HAVE_UNSIGNED_TIME_T # define IS_INVALID_TIME_T(a) ((a) == (time_t)(-1)) #else /* Error or 32 bit time_t and value after 2038-01-19. */ # define IS_INVALID_TIME_T(a) ((a) < 0) #endif /* Return a letter describing the public key algorithms. */ int pubkey_letter( int algo ) { switch (algo) { case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA: return 'R' ; case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E: return 'r' ; case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S: return 's' ; case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E: return 'g' ; case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL: return 'G' ; case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA: return 'D' ; case PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH: return 'e' ; /* ECC DH (encrypt only) */ case PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA: return 'E' ; /* ECC DSA (sign only) */ case PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA: return 'E' ; /* ECC EdDSA (sign only) */ default: return '?'; } } /* Return a string describing the public key algorithm and the keysize. For elliptic curves the functions prints the name of the curve because the keysize is a property of the curve. The string is copied to the supplied buffer up a length of BUFSIZE-1. Examples for the output are: "rsa2048" - RSA with 2048 bit "elg1024" - Elgamal with 1024 bit "ed25519" - ECC using the curve Ed25519. "E_1.2.3.4" - ECC using the unsupported curve with OID "1.2.3.4". "E_1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.12242973" ECC with a bogus OID. "unknown_N" - Unknown OpenPGP algorithm N. If the option --legacy-list-mode is active, the output use the legacy format: "2048R" - RSA with 2048 bit "1024g" - Elgamal with 1024 bit "256E" - ECDSA using a curve with 256 bit The macro PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE may be used to allocate a buffer with a suitable size.*/ char * pubkey_string (PKT_public_key *pk, char *buffer, size_t bufsize) { const char *prefix = NULL; if (opt.legacy_list_mode) { snprintf (buffer, bufsize, "%4u%c", nbits_from_pk (pk), pubkey_letter (pk->pubkey_algo)); return buffer; } switch (pk->pubkey_algo) { case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA: case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E: case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S: prefix = "rsa"; break; case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E: prefix = "elg"; break; case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA: prefix = "dsa"; break; case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL: prefix = "xxx"; break; case PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH: case PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA: case PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA: prefix = ""; break; } if (prefix && *prefix) snprintf (buffer, bufsize, "%s%u", prefix, nbits_from_pk (pk)); else if (prefix) { char *curve = openpgp_oid_to_str (pk->pkey[0]); const char *name = openpgp_oid_to_curve (curve, 0); if (name) snprintf (buffer, bufsize, "%s", name); else if (curve) snprintf (buffer, bufsize, "E_%s", curve); else snprintf (buffer, bufsize, "E_error"); xfree (curve); } else snprintf (buffer, bufsize, "unknown_%u", (unsigned int)pk->pubkey_algo); return buffer; } /* Hash a public key. This function is useful for v4 fingerprints and for v3 or v4 key signing. */ void hash_public_key (gcry_md_hd_t md, PKT_public_key *pk) { unsigned int n = 6; unsigned int nn[PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY]; byte *pp[PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY]; int i; unsigned int nbits; size_t nbytes; int npkey = pubkey_get_npkey (pk->pubkey_algo); /* FIXME: We can avoid the extra malloc by calling only the first mpi_print here which computes the required length and calling the real mpi_print only at the end. The speed advantage would only be for ECC (opaque MPIs) or if we could implement an mpi_print variant with a callback handler to do the hashing. */ if (npkey==0 && pk->pkey[0] && gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[0], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)) { pp[0] = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pk->pkey[0], &nbits); nn[0] = (nbits+7)/8; n+=nn[0]; } else { for (i=0; i < npkey; i++ ) { if (!pk->pkey[i]) { /* This case may only happen if the parsing of the MPI failed but the key was anyway created. May happen during "gpg KEYFILE". */ pp[i] = NULL; nn[i] = 0; } else if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)) { const void *p; p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pk->pkey[i], &nbits); pp[i] = xmalloc ((nbits+7)/8); if (p) memcpy (pp[i], p, (nbits+7)/8); else pp[i] = NULL; nn[i] = (nbits+7)/8; n += nn[i]; } else { if (gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, NULL, 0, &nbytes, pk->pkey[i])) BUG (); pp[i] = xmalloc (nbytes); if (gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, pp[i], nbytes, &nbytes, pk->pkey[i])) BUG (); nn[i] = nbytes; n += nn[i]; } } } gcry_md_putc ( md, 0x99 ); /* ctb */ /* What does it mean if n is greater than than 0xFFFF ? */ gcry_md_putc ( md, n >> 8 ); /* 2 byte length header */ gcry_md_putc ( md, n ); gcry_md_putc ( md, pk->version ); gcry_md_putc ( md, pk->timestamp >> 24 ); gcry_md_putc ( md, pk->timestamp >> 16 ); gcry_md_putc ( md, pk->timestamp >> 8 ); gcry_md_putc ( md, pk->timestamp ); gcry_md_putc ( md, pk->pubkey_algo ); if(npkey==0 && pk->pkey[0] && gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[0], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)) { if (pp[0]) gcry_md_write (md, pp[0], nn[0]); } else { for(i=0; i < npkey; i++ ) { if (pp[i]) gcry_md_write ( md, pp[i], nn[i] ); xfree(pp[i]); } } } static gcry_md_hd_t do_fingerprint_md( PKT_public_key *pk ) { gcry_md_hd_t md; if (gcry_md_open (&md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 0)) BUG (); hash_public_key(md,pk); gcry_md_final( md ); return md; } /* fixme: Check whether we can replace this function or if not describe why we need it. */ u32 v3_keyid (gcry_mpi_t a, u32 *ki) { byte *buffer, *p; size_t nbytes; if (gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, NULL, 0, &nbytes, a )) BUG (); /* fixme: allocate it on the stack */ buffer = xmalloc (nbytes); if (gcry_mpi_print( GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, buffer, nbytes, NULL, a )) BUG (); if (nbytes < 8) /* oops */ ki[0] = ki[1] = 0; else { p = buffer + nbytes - 8; ki[0] = buf32_to_u32 (p); p += 4; ki[1] = buf32_to_u32 (p); } xfree (buffer); return ki[1]; } /* Return PK's keyid. The memory is owned by PK. */ u32 * pk_keyid (PKT_public_key *pk) { keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL); /* Uncomment this for help tracking down bugs related to keyid or main_keyid not being set correctly. */ #if 0 if (! (pk->main_keyid[0] || pk->main_keyid[1])) log_bug ("pk->main_keyid not set!\n"); if (keyid_cmp (pk->keyid, pk->main_keyid) == 0 && ! pk->flags.primary) log_bug ("keyid and main_keyid are the same, but primary flag not set!\n"); if (keyid_cmp (pk->keyid, pk->main_keyid) != 0 && pk->flags.primary) log_bug ("keyid and main_keyid are different, but primary flag set!\n"); #endif return pk->keyid; } /* Return the keyid of the primary key associated with PK. The memory is owned by PK. */ u32 * pk_main_keyid (PKT_public_key *pk) { /* Uncomment this for help tracking down bugs related to keyid or main_keyid not being set correctly. */ #if 0 if (! (pk->main_keyid[0] || pk->main_keyid[1])) log_bug ("pk->main_keyid not set!\n"); #endif return pk->main_keyid; } /* Copy the keyid in SRC to DEST and return DEST. */ u32 * keyid_copy (u32 *dest, const u32 *src) { dest[0] = src[0]; dest[1] = src[1]; return dest; } char * format_keyid (u32 *keyid, int format, char *buffer, int len) { char tmp[KEYID_STR_SIZE]; if (! buffer) { buffer = tmp; len = sizeof (tmp); } if (format == KF_DEFAULT) format = opt.keyid_format; if (format == KF_DEFAULT) format = KF_SHORT; switch (format) { case KF_NONE: if (len) *buffer = 0; break; case KF_SHORT: snprintf (buffer, len, "%08lX", (ulong)keyid[1]); break; case KF_LONG: if (keyid[0]) snprintf (buffer, len, "%08lX%08lX", (ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1]); else snprintf (buffer, len, "%08lX", (ulong)keyid[1]); break; case KF_0xSHORT: snprintf (buffer, len, "0x%08lX", (ulong)keyid[1]); break; case KF_0xLONG: if(keyid[0]) snprintf (buffer, len, "0x%08lX%08lX", (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1]); else snprintf (buffer, len, "0x%08lX", (ulong)keyid[1]); break; default: BUG(); } if (buffer == tmp) return xstrdup (buffer); return buffer; } size_t keystrlen(void) { int format = opt.keyid_format; if (format == KF_DEFAULT) format = KF_SHORT; switch(format) { + case KF_NONE: + return 0; + case KF_SHORT: return 8; case KF_LONG: return 16; case KF_0xSHORT: return 10; case KF_0xLONG: return 18; default: BUG(); } } const char * keystr (u32 *keyid) { static char keyid_str[KEYID_STR_SIZE]; int format = opt.keyid_format; if (format == KF_NONE) format = KF_LONG; return format_keyid (keyid, format, keyid_str, sizeof (keyid_str)); } /* This function returns the key id of the main and possible the * subkey as one string. It is used by error messages. */ const char * keystr_with_sub (u32 *main_kid, u32 *sub_kid) { static char buffer[KEYID_STR_SIZE+1+KEYID_STR_SIZE]; char *p; int format = opt.keyid_format; if (format == KF_NONE) format = KF_LONG; format_keyid (main_kid, format, buffer, KEYID_STR_SIZE); if (sub_kid) { p = buffer + strlen (buffer); *p++ = '/'; format_keyid (sub_kid, format, p, KEYID_STR_SIZE); } return buffer; } const char * keystr_from_pk(PKT_public_key *pk) { keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL); return keystr(pk->keyid); } const char * keystr_from_pk_with_sub (PKT_public_key *main_pk, PKT_public_key *sub_pk) { keyid_from_pk (main_pk, NULL); if (sub_pk) keyid_from_pk (sub_pk, NULL); return keystr_with_sub (main_pk->keyid, sub_pk? sub_pk->keyid:NULL); } /* Return PK's key id as a string using the default format. PK owns the storage. */ const char * pk_keyid_str (PKT_public_key *pk) { return keystr (pk_keyid (pk)); } const char * keystr_from_desc(KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc) { switch(desc->mode) { case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID: case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID: return keystr(desc->u.kid); case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20: { u32 keyid[2]; keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (desc->u.fpr+12); keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (desc->u.fpr+16); return keystr(keyid); } case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16: return "?v3 fpr?"; default: BUG(); } } /* * Get the keyid from the public key and put it into keyid * if this is not NULL. Return the 32 low bits of the keyid. */ u32 keyid_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid) { u32 lowbits; u32 dummy_keyid[2]; if (!keyid) keyid = dummy_keyid; if( pk->keyid[0] || pk->keyid[1] ) { keyid[0] = pk->keyid[0]; keyid[1] = pk->keyid[1]; lowbits = keyid[1]; } else { const byte *dp; gcry_md_hd_t md; md = do_fingerprint_md(pk); if(md) { dp = gcry_md_read ( md, 0 ); keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (dp+12); keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (dp+16); lowbits = keyid[1]; gcry_md_close (md); pk->keyid[0] = keyid[0]; pk->keyid[1] = keyid[1]; } else pk->keyid[0]=pk->keyid[1]=keyid[0]=keyid[1]=lowbits=0xFFFFFFFF; } return lowbits; } /* * Get the keyid from the fingerprint. This function is simple for most * keys, but has to do a keylookup for old stayle keys. */ u32 keyid_from_fingerprint( const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len, u32 *keyid ) { u32 dummy_keyid[2]; if( !keyid ) keyid = dummy_keyid; if (fprint_len != 20) { /* This is special as we have to lookup the key first. */ PKT_public_key pk; int rc; memset (&pk, 0, sizeof pk); rc = get_pubkey_byfprint (&pk, NULL, fprint, fprint_len); if( rc ) { log_error("Oops: keyid_from_fingerprint: no pubkey\n"); keyid[0] = 0; keyid[1] = 0; } else keyid_from_pk (&pk, keyid); } else { const byte *dp = fprint; keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (dp+12); keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (dp+16); } return keyid[1]; } u32 keyid_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig, u32 *keyid) { if( keyid ) { keyid[0] = sig->keyid[0]; keyid[1] = sig->keyid[1]; } return sig->keyid[1]; } byte * namehash_from_uid (PKT_user_id *uid) { if (!uid->namehash) { uid->namehash = xmalloc (20); if (uid->attrib_data) rmd160_hash_buffer (uid->namehash, uid->attrib_data, uid->attrib_len); else rmd160_hash_buffer (uid->namehash, uid->name, uid->len); } return uid->namehash; } /* * Return the number of bits used in PK. */ unsigned int nbits_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk) { return pubkey_nbits (pk->pubkey_algo, pk->pkey); } static const char * mk_datestr (char *buffer, time_t atime) { struct tm *tp; if (IS_INVALID_TIME_T (atime)) strcpy (buffer, "????" "-??" "-??"); /* Mark this as invalid. */ else { tp = gmtime (&atime); sprintf (buffer,"%04d-%02d-%02d", 1900+tp->tm_year, tp->tm_mon+1, tp->tm_mday ); } return buffer; } /* * return a string with the creation date of the pk * Note: this is alloced in a static buffer. * Format is: yyyy-mm-dd */ const char * datestr_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk) { static char buffer[11+5]; time_t atime = pk->timestamp; return mk_datestr (buffer, atime); } const char * datestr_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig ) { static char buffer[11+5]; time_t atime = sig->timestamp; return mk_datestr (buffer, atime); } const char * expirestr_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk) { static char buffer[11+5]; time_t atime; if (!pk->expiredate) return _("never "); atime = pk->expiredate; return mk_datestr (buffer, atime); } const char * expirestr_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig) { static char buffer[11+5]; time_t atime; if (!sig->expiredate) return _("never "); atime=sig->expiredate; return mk_datestr (buffer, atime); } const char * revokestr_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk ) { static char buffer[11+5]; time_t atime; if(!pk->revoked.date) return _("never "); atime=pk->revoked.date; return mk_datestr (buffer, atime); } const char * usagestr_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, int fill) { static char buffer[10]; int i = 0; unsigned int use = pk->pubkey_usage; if ( use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG ) buffer[i++] = 'S'; if ( use & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT ) buffer[i++] = 'C'; if ( use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC ) buffer[i++] = 'E'; if ( (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) ) buffer[i++] = 'A'; while (fill && i < 4) buffer[i++] = ' '; buffer[i] = 0; return buffer; } const char * colon_strtime (u32 t) { static char buf[20]; if (!t) return ""; snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%lu", (ulong)t); return buf; } const char * colon_datestr_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk) { static char buf[20]; snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%lu", (ulong)pk->timestamp); return buf; } const char * colon_datestr_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig) { static char buf[20]; snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%lu", (ulong)sig->timestamp); return buf; } const char * colon_expirestr_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig) { static char buf[20]; if (!sig->expiredate) return ""; snprintf (buf, sizeof buf,"%lu", (ulong)sig->expiredate); return buf; } /* * Return a byte array with the fingerprint for the given PK/SK * The length of the array is returned in ret_len. Caller must free * the array or provide an array of length MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN. */ byte * fingerprint_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, byte *array, size_t *ret_len) { const byte *dp; size_t len; gcry_md_hd_t md; md = do_fingerprint_md(pk); dp = gcry_md_read( md, 0 ); len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (gcry_md_get_algo (md)); log_assert( len <= MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN ); if (!array) array = xmalloc ( len ); memcpy (array, dp, len ); pk->keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (dp+12); pk->keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (dp+16); gcry_md_close( md); if (ret_len) *ret_len = len; return array; } /* Return an allocated buffer with the fingerprint of PK formatted as a plain hexstring. If BUFFER is NULL the result is a malloc'd string. If BUFFER is not NULL the result will be copied into this buffer. In the latter case BUFLEN describes the length of the buffer; if this is too short the function terminates the process. Returns a malloc'ed string or BUFFER. A suitable length for BUFFER is (2*MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN + 1). */ char * hexfingerprint (PKT_public_key *pk, char *buffer, size_t buflen) { unsigned char fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN]; size_t len; fingerprint_from_pk (pk, fpr, &len); if (!buffer) buffer = xmalloc (2 * len + 1); else if (buflen < 2*len+1) log_fatal ("%s: buffer too short (%zu)\n", __func__, buflen); bin2hex (fpr, len, buffer); return buffer; } /* Pretty print a hex fingerprint. If BUFFER is NULL the result is a malloc'd string. If BUFFER is not NULL the result will be copied into this buffer. In the latter case BUFLEN describes the length of the buffer; if this is too short the function terminates the process. Returns a malloc'ed string or BUFFER. A suitable length for BUFFER is (MAX_FORMATTED_FINGERPRINT_LEN + 1). */ char * format_hexfingerprint (const char *fingerprint, char *buffer, size_t buflen) { int hexlen = strlen (fingerprint); int space; int i, j; if (hexlen == 40) /* v4 fingerprint */ { space = (/* The characters and the NUL. */ 40 + 1 /* After every fourth character, we add a space (except the last). */ + 40 / 4 - 1 /* Half way through we add a second space. */ + 1); } else /* Other fingerprint versions - print as is. */ { space = hexlen + 1; } if (!buffer) buffer = xmalloc (space); else if (buflen < space) log_fatal ("%s: buffer too short (%zu)\n", __func__, buflen); if (hexlen == 40) /* v4 fingerprint */ { for (i = 0, j = 0; i < 40; i ++) { if (i && i % 4 == 0) buffer[j ++] = ' '; if (i == 40 / 2) buffer[j ++] = ' '; buffer[j ++] = fingerprint[i]; } buffer[j ++] = 0; log_assert (j == space); } else { strcpy (buffer, fingerprint); } return buffer; } /* Return the so called KEYGRIP which is the SHA-1 hash of the public key parameters expressed as an canoncial encoded S-Exp. ARRAY must be 20 bytes long. Returns 0 on success or an error code. */ gpg_error_t keygrip_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned char *array) { gpg_error_t err; gcry_sexp_t s_pkey; if (DBG_PACKET) log_debug ("get_keygrip for public key\n"); switch (pk->pubkey_algo) { case GCRY_PK_DSA: err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_pkey, NULL, "(public-key(dsa(p%m)(q%m)(g%m)(y%m)))", pk->pkey[0], pk->pkey[1], pk->pkey[2], pk->pkey[3]); break; case GCRY_PK_ELG: case GCRY_PK_ELG_E: err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_pkey, NULL, "(public-key(elg(p%m)(g%m)(y%m)))", pk->pkey[0], pk->pkey[1], pk->pkey[2]); break; case GCRY_PK_RSA: case GCRY_PK_RSA_S: case GCRY_PK_RSA_E: err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_pkey, NULL, "(public-key(rsa(n%m)(e%m)))", pk->pkey[0], pk->pkey[1]); break; case PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA: case PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA: case PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH: { char *curve = openpgp_oid_to_str (pk->pkey[0]); if (!curve) err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); else { err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_pkey, NULL, pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA? "(public-key(ecc(curve%s)(flags eddsa)(q%m)))": (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH && openpgp_oid_is_crv25519 (pk->pkey[0]))? "(public-key(ecc(curve%s)(flags djb-tweak)(q%m)))": "(public-key(ecc(curve%s)(q%m)))", curve, pk->pkey[1]); xfree (curve); } } break; default: err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); break; } if (err) return err; if (!gcry_pk_get_keygrip (s_pkey, array)) { log_info ("error computing keygrip\n"); memset (array, 0, 20); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); } else { if (DBG_PACKET) log_printhex ("keygrip=", array, 20); /* FIXME: Save the keygrip in PK. */ } gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey); return err; } /* Store an allocated buffer with the keygrip of PK encoded as a hexstring at r_GRIP. Returns 0 on success. */ gpg_error_t hexkeygrip_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, char **r_grip) { gpg_error_t err; unsigned char grip[20]; *r_grip = NULL; err = keygrip_from_pk (pk, grip); if (!err) { char * buf = xtrymalloc (20*2+1); if (!buf) err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); else { bin2hex (grip, 20, buf); *r_grip = buf; } } return err; } diff --git a/g10/keylist.c b/g10/keylist.c index abd5ffa3e..231f3c00e 100644 --- a/g10/keylist.c +++ b/g10/keylist.c @@ -1,2040 +1,2053 @@ /* keylist.c - Print information about OpenPGP keys * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, * 2008, 2010, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * Copyright (C) 2013, 2014 Werner Koch * * This file is part of GnuPG. * * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, see . */ #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM # include /* for setmode() */ #endif #include "gpg.h" #include "options.h" #include "packet.h" #include "status.h" #include "keydb.h" #include "photoid.h" #include "util.h" #include "ttyio.h" #include "trustdb.h" #include "main.h" #include "i18n.h" #include "status.h" #include "call-agent.h" #include "mbox-util.h" #include "zb32.h" #include "tofu.h" static void list_all (ctrl_t, int, int); static void list_one (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names, int secret, int mark_secret); static void locate_one (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names); static void print_card_serialno (const char *serialno); struct keylist_context { int check_sigs; /* If set signatures shall be verified. */ int good_sigs; /* Counter used if CHECK_SIGS is set. */ int inv_sigs; /* Counter used if CHECK_SIGS is set. */ int no_key; /* Counter used if CHECK_SIGS is set. */ int oth_err; /* Counter used if CHECK_SIGS is set. */ }; static void list_keyblock (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int secret, int has_secret, int fpr, struct keylist_context *listctx); /* The stream used to write attribute packets to. */ static estream_t attrib_fp; /* Release resources from a keylist context. */ static void keylist_context_release (struct keylist_context *listctx) { (void)listctx; /* Nothing to release. */ } /* List the keys. If list is NULL, all available keys are listed. With LOCATE_MODE set the locate algorithm is used to find a key. */ void public_key_list (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t list, int locate_mode) { #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS if (opt.with_colons) { byte trust_model, marginals, completes, cert_depth, min_cert_level; ulong created, nextcheck; read_trust_options (&trust_model, &created, &nextcheck, &marginals, &completes, &cert_depth, &min_cert_level); es_fprintf (es_stdout, "tru:"); if (nextcheck && nextcheck <= make_timestamp ()) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "o"); if (trust_model != opt.trust_model) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "t"); if (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP || opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP) { if (marginals != opt.marginals_needed) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "m"); if (completes != opt.completes_needed) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "c"); if (cert_depth != opt.max_cert_depth) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "d"); if (min_cert_level != opt.min_cert_level) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "l"); } es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":%d:%lu:%lu", trust_model, created, nextcheck); /* Only show marginals, completes, and cert_depth in the classic or PGP trust models since they are not meaningful otherwise. */ if (trust_model == TM_PGP || trust_model == TM_CLASSIC) es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":%d:%d:%d", marginals, completes, cert_depth); es_fprintf (es_stdout, "\n"); } #endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/ /* We need to do the stale check right here because it might need to update the keyring while we already have the keyring open. This is very bad for W32 because of a sharing violation. For real OSes it might lead to false results if we are later listing a keyring which is associated with the inode of a deleted file. */ check_trustdb_stale (ctrl); #ifdef USE_TOFU tofu_begin_batch_update (); #endif if (locate_mode) locate_one (ctrl, list); else if (!list) list_all (ctrl, 0, opt.with_secret); else list_one (ctrl, list, 0, opt.with_secret); #ifdef USE_TOFU tofu_end_batch_update (); #endif } void secret_key_list (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t list) { (void)ctrl; check_trustdb_stale (ctrl); if (!list) list_all (ctrl, 1, 0); else /* List by user id */ list_one (ctrl, list, 1, 0); } char * format_seckey_info (PKT_public_key *pk) { u32 keyid[2]; char *p; char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE]; char *info; keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid); p = get_user_id_native (keyid); info = xtryasprintf ("sec %s/%s %s %s", pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf), keystr (keyid), datestr_from_pk (pk), p); xfree (p); return info; } void print_seckey_info (PKT_public_key *pk) { char *p = format_seckey_info (pk); tty_printf ("\n%s\n", p); xfree (p); } /* Print information about the public key. With FP passed as NULL, the tty output interface is used, otherwise output is directted to the given stream. */ void print_pubkey_info (estream_t fp, PKT_public_key *pk) { u32 keyid[2]; char *p; char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE]; keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid); /* If the pk was chosen by a particular user ID, that is the one to print. */ if (pk->user_id) p = utf8_to_native (pk->user_id->name, pk->user_id->len, 0); else p = get_user_id_native (keyid); if (fp) tty_printf ("\n"); tty_fprintf (fp, "%s %s/%s %s %s\n", pk->flags.primary? "pub":"sub", pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf), keystr (keyid), datestr_from_pk (pk), p); xfree (p); } /* Print basic information of a secret key including the card serial number information. */ #ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT void print_card_key_info (estream_t fp, kbnode_t keyblock) { kbnode_t node; char *hexgrip; char *serialno; int s2k_char; char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE]; int indent; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) { int rc; PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; serialno = NULL; rc = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip); if (rc) { log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); s2k_char = '?'; } else if (!agent_get_keyinfo (NULL, hexgrip, &serialno)) s2k_char = serialno? '>':' '; else s2k_char = '#'; /* Key not found. */ tty_fprintf (fp, "%s%c %s/%s %n", node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "sec" : "ssb", s2k_char, pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf), keystr_from_pk (pk), &indent); tty_fprintf (fp, _("created: %s"), datestr_from_pk (pk)); tty_fprintf (fp, " "); tty_fprintf (fp, _("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk)); if (serialno) { tty_fprintf (fp, "\n%*s%s", indent, "", _("card-no: ")); if (strlen (serialno) == 32 && !strncmp (serialno, "D27600012401", 12)) { /* This is an OpenPGP card. Print the relevant part. */ /* Example: D2760001240101010001000003470000 */ /* xxxxyyyyyyyy */ tty_fprintf (fp, "%.*s %.*s", 4, serialno+16, 8, serialno+20); } else tty_fprintf (fp, "%s", serialno); } tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); xfree (hexgrip); xfree (serialno); } } } #endif /*ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/ /* Flags = 0x01 hashed 0x02 critical. */ static void status_one_subpacket (sigsubpkttype_t type, size_t len, int flags, const byte * buf) { char status[40]; /* Don't print these. */ if (len > 256) return; snprintf (status, sizeof status, "%d %u %u ", type, flags, (unsigned int) len); write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_SIG_SUBPACKET, status, buf, len, 0); } /* Print a policy URL. Allowed values for MODE are: * 0 - print to stdout. * 1 - use log_info and emit status messages. * 2 - emit only status messages. */ void show_policy_url (PKT_signature * sig, int indent, int mode) { const byte *p; size_t len; int seq = 0, crit; estream_t fp = mode ? log_get_stream () : es_stdout; while ((p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_POLICY, &len, &seq, &crit))) { if (mode != 2) { int i; const char *str; for (i = 0; i < indent; i++) es_putc (' ', fp); if (crit) str = _("Critical signature policy: "); else str = _("Signature policy: "); if (mode) log_info ("%s", str); else es_fprintf (fp, "%s", str); print_utf8_buffer (fp, p, len); es_fprintf (fp, "\n"); } if (mode) write_status_buffer (STATUS_POLICY_URL, p, len, 0); } } /* mode=0 for stdout. mode=1 for log_info + status messages mode=2 for status messages only */ /* TODO: use this */ void show_keyserver_url (PKT_signature * sig, int indent, int mode) { const byte *p; size_t len; int seq = 0, crit; estream_t fp = mode ? log_get_stream () : es_stdout; while ((p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, &len, &seq, &crit))) { if (mode != 2) { int i; const char *str; for (i = 0; i < indent; i++) es_putc (' ', es_stdout); if (crit) str = _("Critical preferred keyserver: "); else str = _("Preferred keyserver: "); if (mode) log_info ("%s", str); else es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s", str); print_utf8_buffer (fp, p, len); es_fprintf (fp, "\n"); } if (mode) status_one_subpacket (SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, len, (crit ? 0x02 : 0) | 0x01, p); } } /* mode=0 for stdout. mode=1 for log_info + status messages mode=2 for status messages only Defined bits in WHICH: 1 == standard notations 2 == user notations */ void show_notation (PKT_signature * sig, int indent, int mode, int which) { estream_t fp = mode ? log_get_stream () : es_stdout; notation_t nd, notations; if (which == 0) which = 3; notations = sig_to_notation (sig); /* There may be multiple notations in the same sig. */ for (nd = notations; nd; nd = nd->next) { if (mode != 2) { int has_at = !!strchr (nd->name, '@'); if ((which & 1 && !has_at) || (which & 2 && has_at)) { int i; const char *str; for (i = 0; i < indent; i++) es_putc (' ', es_stdout); if (nd->flags.critical) str = _("Critical signature notation: "); else str = _("Signature notation: "); if (mode) log_info ("%s", str); else es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s", str); /* This is all UTF8 */ print_utf8_buffer (fp, nd->name, strlen (nd->name)); es_fprintf (fp, "="); print_utf8_buffer (fp, nd->value, strlen (nd->value)); /* (We need to use log_printf so that the next call to a log function does not insert an extra LF.) */ if (mode) log_printf ("\n"); else es_putc ('\n', fp); } } if (mode) { write_status_buffer (STATUS_NOTATION_NAME, nd->name, strlen (nd->name), 0); if (nd->flags.critical || nd->flags.human) write_status_text (STATUS_NOTATION_FLAGS, nd->flags.critical && nd->flags.human? "1 1" : nd->flags.critical? "1 0" : "0 1"); write_status_buffer (STATUS_NOTATION_DATA, nd->value, strlen (nd->value), 50); } } free_notation (notations); } static void print_signature_stats (struct keylist_context *s) { if (!s->check_sigs) return; /* Signature checking was not requested. */ if (s->good_sigs) log_info (ngettext("%d good signature\n", "%d good signatures\n", s->good_sigs), s->good_sigs); if (s->inv_sigs) log_info (ngettext("%d bad signature\n", "%d bad signatures\n", s->inv_sigs), s->inv_sigs); if (s->no_key) log_info (ngettext("%d signature not checked due to a missing key\n", "%d signatures not checked due to missing keys\n", s->no_key), s->no_key); if (s->oth_err) log_info (ngettext("%d signature not checked due to an error\n", "%d signatures not checked due to errors\n", s->oth_err), s->oth_err); } /* List all keys. If SECRET is true only secret keys are listed. If MARK_SECRET is true secret keys are indicated in a public key listing. */ static void list_all (ctrl_t ctrl, int secret, int mark_secret) { KEYDB_HANDLE hd; KBNODE keyblock = NULL; int rc = 0; int any_secret; const char *lastresname, *resname; struct keylist_context listctx; memset (&listctx, 0, sizeof (listctx)); if (opt.check_sigs) listctx.check_sigs = 1; hd = keydb_new (); if (!hd) rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); else rc = keydb_search_first (hd); if (rc) { if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND) log_error ("keydb_search_first failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } lastresname = NULL; do { rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock); if (rc) { if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_LEGACY_KEY) continue; /* Skip legacy keys. */ log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } if (secret || mark_secret) any_secret = !agent_probe_any_secret_key (NULL, keyblock); else any_secret = 0; if (secret && !any_secret) ; /* Secret key listing requested but this isn't one. */ else { if (!opt.with_colons) { resname = keydb_get_resource_name (hd); if (lastresname != resname) { int i; es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s\n", resname); for (i = strlen (resname); i; i--) es_putc ('-', es_stdout); es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); lastresname = resname; } } merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock); list_keyblock (ctrl, keyblock, secret, any_secret, opt.fingerprint, &listctx); } release_kbnode (keyblock); keyblock = NULL; } while (!(rc = keydb_search_next (hd))); es_fflush (es_stdout); if (rc && gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND) log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); if (keydb_get_skipped_counter (hd)) log_info (ngettext("Warning: %lu key skipped due to its large size\n", "Warning: %lu keys skipped due to their large sizes\n", keydb_get_skipped_counter (hd)), keydb_get_skipped_counter (hd)); if (opt.check_sigs && !opt.with_colons) print_signature_stats (&listctx); leave: keylist_context_release (&listctx); release_kbnode (keyblock); keydb_release (hd); } static void list_one (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names, int secret, int mark_secret) { int rc = 0; KBNODE keyblock = NULL; GETKEY_CTX ctx; const char *resname; const char *keyring_str = _("Keyring"); int i; struct keylist_context listctx; memset (&listctx, 0, sizeof (listctx)); if (!secret && opt.check_sigs) listctx.check_sigs = 1; /* fixme: using the bynames function has the disadvantage that we * don't know wether one of the names given was not found. OTOH, * this function has the advantage to list the names in the * sequence as defined by the keyDB and does not duplicate * outputs. A solution could be do test whether all given have * been listed (this needs a way to use the keyDB search * functions) or to have the search function return indicators for * found names. Yet another way is to use the keydb search * facilities directly. */ rc = getkey_bynames (&ctx, NULL, names, secret, &keyblock); if (rc) { log_error ("error reading key: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); getkey_end (ctx); return; } do { if ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_KEYRING) && !opt.with_colons) { resname = keydb_get_resource_name (get_ctx_handle (ctx)); es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s: %s\n", keyring_str, resname); for (i = strlen (resname) + strlen (keyring_str) + 2; i; i--) es_putc ('-', es_stdout); es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); } list_keyblock (ctrl, keyblock, secret, mark_secret, opt.fingerprint, &listctx); release_kbnode (keyblock); } while (!getkey_next (ctx, NULL, &keyblock)); getkey_end (ctx); if (opt.check_sigs && !opt.with_colons) print_signature_stats (&listctx); keylist_context_release (&listctx); } static void locate_one (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names) { int rc = 0; strlist_t sl; GETKEY_CTX ctx = NULL; KBNODE keyblock = NULL; struct keylist_context listctx; memset (&listctx, 0, sizeof (listctx)); if (opt.check_sigs) listctx.check_sigs = 1; for (sl = names; sl; sl = sl->next) { rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, &ctx, NULL, sl->d, &keyblock, NULL, 1, 0); if (rc) { if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY) log_error ("error reading key: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); else if (opt.verbose) log_info (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), sl->d, gpg_strerror (rc)); } else { do { list_keyblock (ctrl, keyblock, 0, 0, opt.fingerprint, &listctx); release_kbnode (keyblock); } while (ctx && !getkey_next (ctx, NULL, &keyblock)); getkey_end (ctx); ctx = NULL; } } if (opt.check_sigs && !opt.with_colons) print_signature_stats (&listctx); keylist_context_release (&listctx); } static void print_key_data (PKT_public_key * pk) { int n = pk ? pubkey_get_npkey (pk->pubkey_algo) : 0; int i; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { es_fprintf (es_stdout, "pkd:%d:%u:", i, mpi_get_nbits (pk->pkey[i])); mpi_print (es_stdout, pk->pkey[i], 1); es_putc (':', es_stdout); es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); } } static void print_capabilities (PKT_public_key *pk, KBNODE keyblock) { unsigned int use = pk->pubkey_usage; int c_printed = 0; if (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) es_putc ('e', es_stdout); if (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG) { es_putc ('s', es_stdout); if (pk->flags.primary) { es_putc ('c', es_stdout); /* The PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT flag was introduced later and we used to always print 'c' for a primary key. To avoid any regression here we better track whether we printed 'c' already. */ c_printed = 1; } } if ((use & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT) && !c_printed) es_putc ('c', es_stdout); if ((use & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)) es_putc ('a', es_stdout); if ((use & PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN)) es_putc ('?', es_stdout); if (keyblock) { /* Figure out the usable capabilities. */ KBNODE k; int enc = 0, sign = 0, cert = 0, auth = 0, disabled = 0; for (k = keyblock; k; k = k->next) { if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) { pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key; if (pk->flags.primary) disabled = pk_is_disabled (pk); if (pk->flags.valid && !pk->flags.revoked && !pk->has_expired) { if (pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) enc = 1; if (pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG) { sign = 1; if (pk->flags.primary) cert = 1; } if (pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT) cert = 1; if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)) auth = 1; } } } if (enc) es_putc ('E', es_stdout); if (sign) es_putc ('S', es_stdout); if (cert) es_putc ('C', es_stdout); if (auth) es_putc ('A', es_stdout); if (disabled) es_putc ('D', es_stdout); } es_putc (':', es_stdout); } /* FLAGS: 0x01 hashed 0x02 critical */ static void print_one_subpacket (sigsubpkttype_t type, size_t len, int flags, const byte * buf) { size_t i; es_fprintf (es_stdout, "spk:%d:%u:%u:", type, flags, (unsigned int) len); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { /* printable ascii other than : and % */ if (buf[i] >= 32 && buf[i] <= 126 && buf[i] != ':' && buf[i] != '%') es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%c", buf[i]); else es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%%%02X", buf[i]); } es_fprintf (es_stdout, "\n"); } void print_subpackets_colon (PKT_signature * sig) { byte *i; log_assert (opt.show_subpackets); for (i = opt.show_subpackets; *i; i++) { const byte *p; size_t len; int seq, crit; seq = 0; while ((p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, *i, &len, &seq, &crit))) print_one_subpacket (*i, len, 0x01 | (crit ? 0x02 : 0), p); seq = 0; while ((p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, *i, &len, &seq, &crit))) print_one_subpacket (*i, len, 0x00 | (crit ? 0x02 : 0), p); } } void dump_attribs (const PKT_user_id *uid, PKT_public_key *pk) { int i; if (!attrib_fp) return; for (i = 0; i < uid->numattribs; i++) { if (is_status_enabled ()) { byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p; char buf[(MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN * 2) + 90]; size_t j, n; if (!pk) BUG (); fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n); p = array; for (j = 0; j < n; j++, p++) sprintf (buf + 2 * j, "%02X", *p); sprintf (buf + strlen (buf), " %lu %u %u %u %lu %lu %u", (ulong) uid->attribs[i].len, uid->attribs[i].type, i + 1, uid->numattribs, (ulong) uid->created, (ulong) uid->expiredate, ((uid->is_primary ? 0x01 : 0) | (uid-> is_revoked ? 0x02 : 0) | (uid->is_expired ? 0x04 : 0))); write_status_text (STATUS_ATTRIBUTE, buf); } es_fwrite (uid->attribs[i].data, uid->attribs[i].len, 1, attrib_fp); es_fflush (attrib_fp); } } /* Print IPGP cert records instead of a standard key listing. */ static void list_keyblock_pka (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock) { kbnode_t kbctx; kbnode_t node; PKT_public_key *pk; char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE]; char *hexfpr; char *hexkeyblock = NULL; unsigned int hexkeyblocklen = 0; /* Init to avoid -Wmaybe-uninitialized. */ const char *s; /* Get the keyid from the keyblock. */ node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); if (!node) { log_error ("Oops; key lost!\n"); dump_kbnode (keyblock); return; } pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; /* First print an overview of the key with all userids. */ es_fprintf (es_stdout, ";; pub %s/%s %s\n;;", pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf), keystr_from_pk (pk), datestr_from_pk (pk)); print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 10); for (kbctx = NULL; (node = walk_kbnode (keyblock, &kbctx, 0));) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; if (pk && (uid->is_expired || uid->is_revoked) && !(opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS)) continue; es_fputs (";; uid ", es_stdout); print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, uid->name, uid->len); es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); } } hexfpr = hexfingerprint (pk, NULL, 0); if (opt.print_dane_records) { kbnode_t dummy_keyblock; void *data; size_t datalen; gpg_error_t err; /* We do not have an export function which allows to pass a keyblock, thus we need to search the key again. */ err = export_pubkey_buffer (ctrl, hexfpr, EXPORT_DANE_FORMAT, NULL, &dummy_keyblock, &data, &datalen); release_kbnode (dummy_keyblock); if (!err) { hexkeyblocklen = datalen; hexkeyblock = bin2hex (data, datalen, NULL); if (!hexkeyblock) err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); xfree (data); ascii_strlwr (hexkeyblock); } if (err) log_error (_("skipped \"%s\": %s\n"), hexfpr, gpg_strerror (err)); } for (kbctx = NULL; (node = walk_kbnode (keyblock, &kbctx, 0));) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; char *mbox; char *p; if (pk && (uid->is_expired || uid->is_revoked) && !(opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS)) continue; mbox = mailbox_from_userid (uid->name); if (mbox && (p = strchr (mbox, '@'))) { char hashbuf[32]; char *hash; unsigned int len; *p++ = 0; if (opt.print_pka_records) { es_fprintf (es_stdout, "$ORIGIN _pka.%s.\n; %s\n; ", p, hexfpr); print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, uid->name, uid->len); es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA1, hashbuf, mbox, strlen (mbox)); hash = zb32_encode (hashbuf, 8*20); if (hash) { len = strlen (hexfpr)/2; es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s TYPE37 \\# %u 0006 0000 00 %02X %s\n", hash, 6 + len, len, hexfpr); xfree (hash); } } if (opt.print_dane_records && hexkeyblock) { es_fprintf (es_stdout, "$ORIGIN _openpgpkey.%s.\n; %s\n; ", p, hexfpr); print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, uid->name, uid->len); es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA256, hashbuf, mbox, strlen (mbox)); hash = bin2hex (hashbuf, 28, NULL); if (hash) { ascii_strlwr (hash); es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s TYPE61 \\# %u (\n", hash, hexkeyblocklen); xfree (hash); s = hexkeyblock; for (;;) { es_fprintf (es_stdout, "\t%.64s\n", s); if (strlen (s) < 64) break; s += 64; } es_fputs ("\t)\n", es_stdout); } } } xfree (mbox); } } es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); xfree (hexkeyblock); xfree (hexfpr); } static void list_keyblock_print (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int secret, int fpr, struct keylist_context *listctx) { int rc; KBNODE kbctx; KBNODE node; PKT_public_key *pk; int skip_sigs = 0; char *hexgrip = NULL; char *serialno = NULL; /* Get the keyid from the keyblock. */ node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); if (!node) { log_error ("Oops; key lost!\n"); dump_kbnode (keyblock); return; } pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; if (secret || opt.with_keygrip) { rc = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip); if (rc) log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); } if (secret) { /* Encode some info about the secret key in SECRET. */ if (!agent_get_keyinfo (NULL, hexgrip, &serialno)) secret = serialno? 3 : 1; else secret = 2; /* Key not found. */ } check_trustdb_stale (ctrl); /* Print the "pub" line and in KF_NONE mode the fingerprint. */ print_key_line (es_stdout, pk, secret); if (fpr && opt.keyid_format != KF_NONE) print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 0); if (opt.with_keygrip && hexgrip) es_fprintf (es_stdout, " Keygrip = %s\n", hexgrip); if (serialno) print_card_serialno (serialno); if (opt.with_key_data) print_key_data (pk); for (kbctx = NULL; (node = walk_kbnode (keyblock, &kbctx, 0));) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; int indent; int kl = opt.keyid_format == KF_NONE? 10 : keystrlen (); if ((uid->is_expired || uid->is_revoked) && !(opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS)) { skip_sigs = 1; continue; } else skip_sigs = 0; if (attrib_fp && uid->attrib_data != NULL) dump_attribs (uid, pk); if ((uid->is_revoked || uid->is_expired) || (opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY)) { const char *validity; validity = uid_trust_string_fixed (ctrl, pk, uid); indent = ((kl + (opt.legacy_list_mode? 9:11)) - atoi (uid_trust_string_fixed (ctrl, NULL, NULL))); if (indent < 0 || indent > 40) indent = 0; es_fprintf (es_stdout, "uid%*s%s ", indent, "", validity); } else { indent = kl + (opt.legacy_list_mode? 10:12); es_fprintf (es_stdout, "uid%*s", indent, ""); } print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, uid->name, uid->len); es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); if (opt.with_wkd_hash) { char *mbox, *hash, *p; char hashbuf[32]; mbox = mailbox_from_userid (uid->name); if (mbox && (p = strchr (mbox, '@'))) { *p++ = 0; gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA1, hashbuf, mbox, strlen (mbox)); hash = zb32_encode (hashbuf, 8*20); if (hash) { es_fprintf (es_stdout, " %*s%s@%s\n", indent, "", hash, p); xfree (hash); } } xfree (mbox); } if ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS) && uid->attribs != NULL) show_photos (ctrl, uid->attribs, uid->numattribs, pk, uid); } else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) { PKT_public_key *pk2 = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; if ((pk2->flags.revoked || pk2->has_expired) && !(opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS)) { skip_sigs = 1; continue; } else skip_sigs = 0; xfree (serialno); serialno = NULL; xfree (hexgrip); hexgrip = NULL; if (secret || opt.with_keygrip) { rc = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk2, &hexgrip); if (rc) log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); } if (secret) { if (!agent_get_keyinfo (NULL, hexgrip, &serialno)) secret = serialno? 3 : 1; else secret = '2'; /* Key not found. */ } /* Print the "sub" line. */ print_key_line (es_stdout, pk2, secret); - if (fpr > 1) + if (fpr > 1 || opt.with_subkey_fingerprint) { print_fingerprint (NULL, pk2, 0); if (serialno) print_card_serialno (serialno); } if (opt.with_keygrip && hexgrip) es_fprintf (es_stdout, " Keygrip = %s\n", hexgrip); if (opt.with_key_data) print_key_data (pk2); } else if (opt.list_sigs && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !skip_sigs) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; int sigrc; char *sigstr; if (listctx->check_sigs) { rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, node, NULL); switch (gpg_err_code (rc)) { case 0: listctx->good_sigs++; sigrc = '!'; break; case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: listctx->inv_sigs++; sigrc = '-'; break; case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY: case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: listctx->no_key++; continue; default: listctx->oth_err++; sigrc = '%'; break; } /* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has the pk that issued it. See also keyedit.c:print_and_check_one_sig */ } else { rc = 0; sigrc = ' '; } if (sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x28 || sig->sig_class == 0x30) sigstr = "rev"; else if ((sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10) sigstr = "sig"; else if (sig->sig_class == 0x18) sigstr = "sig"; else if (sig->sig_class == 0x1F) sigstr = "sig"; else { es_fprintf (es_stdout, "sig " "[unexpected signature class 0x%02x]\n", sig->sig_class); continue; } es_fputs (sigstr, es_stdout); es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%c%c %c%c%c%c%c%c %s %s", sigrc, (sig->sig_class - 0x10 > 0 && sig->sig_class - 0x10 < 4) ? '0' + sig->sig_class - 0x10 : ' ', sig->flags.exportable ? ' ' : 'L', sig->flags.revocable ? ' ' : 'R', sig->flags.policy_url ? 'P' : ' ', sig->flags.notation ? 'N' : ' ', sig->flags.expired ? 'X' : ' ', (sig->trust_depth > 9) ? 'T' : (sig->trust_depth > 0) ? '0' + sig->trust_depth : ' ', keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig)); if (opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE) es_fprintf (es_stdout, " %s", expirestr_from_sig (sig)); es_fprintf (es_stdout, " "); if (sigrc == '%') es_fprintf (es_stdout, "[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc)); else if (sigrc == '?') ; else if (!opt.fast_list_mode) { size_t n; char *p = get_user_id (sig->keyid, &n); print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, p, n); xfree (p); } es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); if (sig->flags.policy_url && (opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS)) show_policy_url (sig, 3, 0); if (sig->flags.notation && (opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS)) show_notation (sig, 3, 0, ((opt. list_options & LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS) ? 1 : 0) + ((opt. list_options & LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS) ? 2 : 0)); if (sig->flags.pref_ks && (opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS)) show_keyserver_url (sig, 3, 0); /* fixme: check or list other sigs here */ } } es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); xfree (serialno); xfree (hexgrip); } void print_revokers (estream_t fp, PKT_public_key * pk) { /* print the revoker record */ if (!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys) BUG (); else { int i, j; for (i = 0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++) { byte *p; es_fprintf (fp, "rvk:::%d::::::", pk->revkey[i].algid); p = pk->revkey[i].fpr; for (j = 0; j < 20; j++, p++) es_fprintf (fp, "%02X", *p); es_fprintf (fp, ":%02x%s:\n", pk->revkey[i].class, (pk->revkey[i].class & 0x40) ? "s" : ""); } } } /* List a key in colon mode. If SECRET is true this is a secret key record (i.e. requested via --list-secret-key). If HAS_SECRET a secret key is available even if SECRET is not set. */ static void list_keyblock_colon (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int secret, int has_secret, int fpr) { int rc; KBNODE kbctx; KBNODE node; PKT_public_key *pk; u32 keyid[2]; int trustletter = 0; int ulti_hack = 0; int i; char *p; char *hexgrip = NULL; char *serialno = NULL; int stubkey; /* Get the keyid from the keyblock. */ node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); if (!node) { log_error ("Oops; key lost!\n"); dump_kbnode (keyblock); return; } pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; if (secret || has_secret || opt.with_keygrip || opt.with_key_data) { rc = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip); if (rc) log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); } stubkey = 0; if ((secret||has_secret) && agent_get_keyinfo (NULL, hexgrip, &serialno)) stubkey = 1; /* Key not found. */ keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid); es_fputs (secret? "sec:":"pub:", es_stdout); if (!pk->flags.valid) es_putc ('i', es_stdout); else if (pk->flags.revoked) es_putc ('r', es_stdout); else if (pk->has_expired) es_putc ('e', es_stdout); else if (opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks) ; else { trustletter = get_validity_info (ctrl, pk, NULL); if (trustletter == 'u') ulti_hack = 1; es_putc (trustletter, es_stdout); } es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::", nbits_from_pk (pk), pk->pubkey_algo, (ulong) keyid[0], (ulong) keyid[1], colon_datestr_from_pk (pk), colon_strtime (pk->expiredate)); if (!opt.fast_list_mode && !opt.no_expensive_trust_checks) es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (pk), es_stdout); es_putc (':', es_stdout); es_putc (':', es_stdout); es_putc (':', es_stdout); print_capabilities (pk, keyblock); es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 13. */ es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 14. */ if (secret || has_secret) { if (stubkey) es_putc ('#', es_stdout); else if (serialno) es_fputs (serialno, es_stdout); else if (has_secret) es_putc ('+', es_stdout); } es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 15. */ es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 16. */ if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) { char *curve = openpgp_oid_to_str (pk->pkey[0]); const char *name = openpgp_oid_to_curve (curve, 0); if (!name) name = curve; es_fputs (name, es_stdout); xfree (curve); } es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 17. */ es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 18. */ es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); print_revokers (es_stdout, pk); if (fpr) print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 0); if (opt.with_key_data || opt.with_keygrip) { if (hexgrip) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "grp:::::::::%s:\n", hexgrip); if (opt.with_key_data) print_key_data (pk); } for (kbctx = NULL; (node = walk_kbnode (keyblock, &kbctx, 0));) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { char *str; PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; if (attrib_fp && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data != NULL) dump_attribs (node->pkt->pkt.user_id, pk); /* * Fixme: We need a valid flag here too */ str = uid->attrib_data ? "uat" : "uid"; if (uid->is_revoked) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s:r::::", str); else if (uid->is_expired) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s:e::::", str); else if (opt.no_expensive_trust_checks) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s:::::", str); else { int uid_validity; if (!ulti_hack) uid_validity = get_validity_info (ctrl, pk, uid); else uid_validity = 'u'; es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s:%c::::", str, uid_validity); } es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s:", colon_strtime (uid->created)); es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s:", colon_strtime (uid->expiredate)); namehash_from_uid (uid); for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%02X", uid->namehash[i]); es_fprintf (es_stdout, "::"); if (uid->attrib_data) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%u %lu", uid->numattribs, uid->attrib_len); else es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, uid->name, uid->len, ":", NULL); es_fprintf (es_stdout, "::::::::"); if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP) { #ifdef USE_TOFU enum tofu_policy policy; if (! tofu_get_policy (ctrl, pk, uid, &policy) && policy != TOFU_POLICY_NONE) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%s", tofu_policy_str (policy)); #endif /*USE_TOFU*/ } es_putc (':', es_stdout); es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); } else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) { u32 keyid2[2]; PKT_public_key *pk2; pk2 = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; xfree (hexgrip); hexgrip = NULL; xfree (serialno); serialno = NULL; if (secret || has_secret || opt.with_keygrip || opt.with_key_data) { rc = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk2, &hexgrip); if (rc) log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); } stubkey = 0; if ((secret||has_secret) && agent_get_keyinfo (NULL, hexgrip, &serialno)) stubkey = 1; /* Key not found. */ keyid_from_pk (pk2, keyid2); es_fputs (secret? "ssb:":"sub:", es_stdout); if (!pk2->flags.valid) es_putc ('i', es_stdout); else if (pk2->flags.revoked) es_putc ('r', es_stdout); else if (pk2->has_expired) es_putc ('e', es_stdout); else if (opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks) ; else { /* TRUSTLETTER should always be defined here. */ if (trustletter) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%c", trustletter); } es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::::", nbits_from_pk (pk2), pk2->pubkey_algo, (ulong) keyid2[0], (ulong) keyid2[1], colon_datestr_from_pk (pk2), colon_strtime (pk2->expiredate) /* fixme: add LID and ownertrust here */ ); print_capabilities (pk2, NULL); es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 13. */ es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 14. */ if (secret || has_secret) { if (stubkey) es_putc ('#', es_stdout); else if (serialno) es_fputs (serialno, es_stdout); else if (has_secret) es_putc ('+', es_stdout); } es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 15. */ es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 16. */ if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) { char *curve = openpgp_oid_to_str (pk->pkey[0]); const char *name = openpgp_oid_to_curve (curve, 0); if (!name) name = curve; es_fputs (name, es_stdout); xfree (curve); } es_putc (':', es_stdout); /* End of field 17. */ es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); if (fpr > 1) print_fingerprint (NULL, pk2, 0); if (opt.with_key_data || opt.with_keygrip) { if (hexgrip) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "grp:::::::::%s:\n", hexgrip); if (opt.with_key_data) print_key_data (pk2); } } else if (opt.list_sigs && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; int sigrc, fprokay = 0; char *sigstr; size_t fplen; byte fparray[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN]; if (sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x28 || sig->sig_class == 0x30) sigstr = "rev"; else if ((sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10) sigstr = "sig"; else if (sig->sig_class == 0x18) sigstr = "sig"; else if (sig->sig_class == 0x1F) sigstr = "sig"; else { es_fprintf (es_stdout, "sig::::::::::%02x%c:\n", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable ? 'x' : 'l'); continue; } if (opt.check_sigs) { PKT_public_key *signer_pk = NULL; fflush (stdout); if (opt.no_sig_cache) signer_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (PKT_public_key)); rc = check_key_signature2 (keyblock, node, NULL, signer_pk, NULL, NULL, NULL); switch (gpg_err_code (rc)) { case 0: sigrc = '!'; break; case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: sigrc = '-'; break; case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY: case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break; default: sigrc = '%'; break; } if (opt.no_sig_cache) { if (!rc) { fingerprint_from_pk (signer_pk, fparray, &fplen); fprokay = 1; } free_public_key (signer_pk); } } else { rc = 0; sigrc = ' '; } es_fputs (sigstr, es_stdout); es_putc (':', es_stdout); if (sigrc != ' ') es_putc (sigrc, es_stdout); es_fprintf (es_stdout, "::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo, (ulong) sig->keyid[0], (ulong) sig->keyid[1], colon_datestr_from_sig (sig), colon_expirestr_from_sig (sig)); if (sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%d %d", sig->trust_depth, sig->trust_value); es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":"); if (sig->trust_regexp) es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sig->trust_regexp, strlen (sig->trust_regexp), ":", NULL); es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":"); if (sigrc == '%') es_fprintf (es_stdout, "[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc)); else if (sigrc == '?') ; else if (!opt.fast_list_mode) { size_t n; p = get_user_id (sig->keyid, &n); es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, p, n, ":", NULL); xfree (p); } es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":%02x%c::", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable ? 'x' : 'l'); if (opt.no_sig_cache && opt.check_sigs && fprokay) { for (i = 0; i < fplen; i++) es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%02X", fparray[i]); } es_fprintf (es_stdout, ":::%d:\n", sig->digest_algo); if (opt.show_subpackets) print_subpackets_colon (sig); /* fixme: check or list other sigs here */ } } xfree (hexgrip); xfree (serialno); } /* * Reorder the keyblock so that the primary user ID (and not attribute * packet) comes first. Fixme: Replace this by a generic sort * function. */ static void do_reorder_keyblock (KBNODE keyblock, int attr) { KBNODE primary = NULL, primary0 = NULL, primary2 = NULL; KBNODE last, node; for (node = keyblock; node; primary0 = node, node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && ((attr && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) || (!attr && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)) && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary) { primary = primary2 = node; for (node = node->next; node; primary2 = node, node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) { break; } } break; } } if (!primary) return; /* No primary key flag found (should not happen). */ for (last = NULL, node = keyblock; node; last = node, node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) break; } log_assert (node); log_assert (last); /* The user ID is never the first packet. */ log_assert (primary0); /* Ditto (this is the node before primary). */ if (node == primary) return; /* Already the first one. */ last->next = primary; primary0->next = primary2->next; primary2->next = node; } void reorder_keyblock (KBNODE keyblock) { do_reorder_keyblock (keyblock, 1); do_reorder_keyblock (keyblock, 0); } static void list_keyblock (ctrl_t ctrl, KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int has_secret, int fpr, struct keylist_context *listctx) { reorder_keyblock (keyblock); if (opt.print_pka_records || opt.print_dane_records) list_keyblock_pka (ctrl, keyblock); else if (opt.with_colons) list_keyblock_colon (ctrl, keyblock, secret, has_secret, fpr); else list_keyblock_print (ctrl, keyblock, secret, fpr, listctx); if (secret) es_fflush (es_stdout); } /* Public function used by keygen to list a keyblock. */ void list_keyblock_direct (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int secret, int has_secret, int fpr) { struct keylist_context listctx; memset (&listctx, 0, sizeof (listctx)); list_keyblock (ctrl, keyblock, secret, has_secret, fpr, &listctx); keylist_context_release (&listctx); } /* Print an hex digit in ICAO spelling. */ static void print_icao_hexdigit (estream_t fp, int c) { static const char *list[16] = { "Zero", "One", "Two", "Three", "Four", "Five", "Six", "Seven", "Eight", "Niner", "Alfa", "Bravo", "Charlie", "Delta", "Echo", "Foxtrot" }; tty_fprintf (fp, "%s", list[c&15]); } /* * Function to print the finperprint. * mode 0: as used in key listings, opt.with_colons is honored * 1: print using log_info () * 2: direct use of tty * 3: direct use of tty but only primary key. * 4: direct use of tty but only subkey. * 10: Same as 0 but with_colons etc is ignored. * 20: Same as 0 but using a compact format. * * Modes 1 and 2 will try and print both subkey and primary key * fingerprints. A MODE with bit 7 set is used internally. If * OVERRIDE_FP is not NULL that stream will be used in 0 instead * of es_stdout or instead of the TTY in modes 2 and 3. */ void print_fingerprint (estream_t override_fp, PKT_public_key *pk, int mode) { char hexfpr[2*MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN+1]; char *p; size_t i; estream_t fp; const char *text; int primary = 0; int with_colons = opt.with_colons; int with_icao = opt.with_icao_spelling; int compact = 0; if (mode == 10) { mode = 0; with_colons = 0; with_icao = 0; } else if (mode == 20) { mode = 0; with_colons = 0; compact = 1; } + if (!opt.fingerprint && !opt.with_fingerprint + && opt.with_subkey_fingerprint && opt.keyid_format == KF_NONE) + compact = 1; + if (pk->main_keyid[0] == pk->keyid[0] && pk->main_keyid[1] == pk->keyid[1]) primary = 1; /* Just to be safe */ if ((mode & 0x80) && !primary) { log_error ("primary key is not really primary!\n"); return; } mode &= ~0x80; if (!primary && (mode == 1 || mode == 2)) { PKT_public_key *primary_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*primary_pk)); get_pubkey (primary_pk, pk->main_keyid); print_fingerprint (override_fp, primary_pk, (mode | 0x80)); free_public_key (primary_pk); } if (mode == 1) { fp = log_get_stream (); if (primary) text = _("Primary key fingerprint:"); else text = _(" Subkey fingerprint:"); } else if (mode == 2) { fp = override_fp; /* Use tty or given stream. */ if (primary) /* TRANSLATORS: this should fit into 24 bytes so that the * fingerprint data is properly aligned with the user ID */ text = _(" Primary key fingerprint:"); else text = _(" Subkey fingerprint:"); } else if (mode == 3) { fp = override_fp; /* Use tty or given stream. */ text = _(" Key fingerprint ="); } else if (mode == 4) { fp = override_fp; /* Use tty or given stream. */ text = _(" Subkey fingerprint:"); } else { fp = override_fp? override_fp : es_stdout; - text = _(" Key fingerprint ="); + if (opt.keyid_format == KF_NONE) + { + text = " "; /* To indent ICAO spelling. */ + compact = 1; + } + else + text = _(" Key fingerprint ="); } hexfingerprint (pk, hexfpr, sizeof hexfpr); if (with_colons && !mode) { es_fprintf (fp, "fpr:::::::::%s:", hexfpr); } - else if (compact) + else if (compact && !opt.fingerprint && !opt.with_fingerprint) { tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s%s", 6, "", hexfpr); } else { char fmtfpr[MAX_FORMATTED_FINGERPRINT_LEN + 1]; format_hexfingerprint (hexfpr, fmtfpr, sizeof fmtfpr); - tty_fprintf (fp, "%s %s", text, fmtfpr); + if (compact) + tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s%s", 6, "", fmtfpr); + else + tty_fprintf (fp, "%s %s", text, fmtfpr); } tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); if (!with_colons && with_icao) { ; tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s\"", (int)strlen(text)+1, ""); for (i = 0, p = hexfpr; *p; i++, p++) { if (!i) ; else if (!(i%8)) tty_fprintf (fp, "\n%*s ", (int)strlen(text)+1, ""); else if (!(i%4)) tty_fprintf (fp, " "); else tty_fprintf (fp, " "); print_icao_hexdigit (fp, xtoi_1 (p)); } tty_fprintf (fp, "\"\n"); } } /* Print the serial number of an OpenPGP card if available. */ static void print_card_serialno (const char *serialno) { if (!serialno) return; if (opt.with_colons) return; /* Handled elsewhere. */ es_fputs (_(" Card serial no. ="), es_stdout); es_putc (' ', es_stdout); if (strlen (serialno) == 32 && !strncmp (serialno, "D27600012401", 12)) { /* This is an OpenPGP card. Print the relevant part. */ /* Example: D2760001240101010001000003470000 */ /* xxxxyyyyyyyy */ es_fprintf (es_stdout, "%.*s %.*s", 4, serialno+16, 8, serialno+20); } else es_fputs (serialno, es_stdout); es_putc ('\n', es_stdout); } /* Print a public or secret (sub)key line. Example: * * pub dsa2048 2007-12-31 [SC] [expires: 2018-12-31] * 80615870F5BAD690333686D0F2AD85AC1E42B367 * * Some global options may result in a different output format. If * SECRET is set, "sec" or "ssb" is used instead of "pub" or "sub" and * depending on the value a flag character is shown: * * 1 := ' ' Regular secret key * 2 := '#' Stub secret key * 3 := '>' Secret key is on a token. */ void print_key_line (estream_t fp, PKT_public_key *pk, int secret) { char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE]; tty_fprintf (fp, "%s%c %s", pk->flags.primary? (secret? "sec":"pub") /**/ : (secret? "ssb":"sub"), secret == 2? '#' : secret == 3? '>' : ' ', pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf)); if (opt.keyid_format != KF_NONE) tty_fprintf (fp, "/%s", keystr_from_pk (pk)); tty_fprintf (fp, " %s", datestr_from_pk (pk)); if ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_USAGE)) { tty_fprintf (fp, " [%s]", usagestr_from_pk (pk, 0)); } if (pk->flags.revoked) { tty_fprintf (fp, " ["); tty_fprintf (fp, _("revoked: %s"), revokestr_from_pk (pk)); tty_fprintf (fp, "]"); } else if (pk->has_expired) { tty_fprintf (fp, " ["); tty_fprintf (fp, _("expired: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk)); tty_fprintf (fp, "]"); } else if (pk->expiredate) { tty_fprintf (fp, " ["); tty_fprintf (fp, _("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk)); tty_fprintf (fp, "]"); } #if 0 /* I need to think about this some more. It's easy enough to include, but it looks sort of confusing in the listing... */ if (opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_VALIDITY) { int validity = get_validity (ctrl, pk, NULL, NULL, 0); tty_fprintf (fp, " [%s]", trust_value_to_string (validity)); } #endif if (pk->pubkey_algo >= 100) tty_fprintf (fp, " [experimental algorithm %d]", pk->pubkey_algo); tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); if (pk->flags.primary && opt.keyid_format == KF_NONE) print_fingerprint (fp, pk, 20); } void set_attrib_fd (int fd) { static int last_fd = -1; if (fd != -1 && last_fd == fd) return; /* Fixme: Do we need to check for the log stream here? */ if (attrib_fp && attrib_fp != log_get_stream ()) es_fclose (attrib_fp); attrib_fp = NULL; if (fd == -1) return; #ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM setmode (fd, O_BINARY); #endif if (fd == 1) attrib_fp = es_stdout; else if (fd == 2) attrib_fp = es_stderr; else attrib_fp = es_fdopen (fd, "wb"); if (!attrib_fp) { log_fatal ("can't open fd %d for attribute output: %s\n", fd, strerror (errno)); } last_fd = fd; } diff --git a/g10/options.h b/g10/options.h index 55f974a8f..2ae1724c3 100644 --- a/g10/options.h +++ b/g10/options.h @@ -1,382 +1,383 @@ /* options.h * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, * 2007, 2010, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * Copyright (C) 2015 g10 Code GmbH * * This file is part of GnuPG. * * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, see . */ #ifndef G10_OPTIONS_H #define G10_OPTIONS_H #include #include #include "main.h" #include "packet.h" #include "tofu.h" #include "../common/session-env.h" #ifndef EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE /* Norcraft can't cope with common symbols */ #if defined (__riscos__) && !defined (INCLUDED_BY_MAIN_MODULE) #define EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE extern #else #define EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE #endif #endif /* Declaration of a keyserver spec type. The definition is found in ../common/keyserver.h. */ struct keyserver_spec; typedef struct keyserver_spec *keyserver_spec_t; /* Global options for GPG. */ EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE struct { int verbose; int quiet; unsigned debug; int armor; char *outfile; estream_t outfp; /* Hack, sometimes used in place of outfile. */ off_t max_output; int dry_run; int autostart; int list_only; int textmode; int expert; const char *def_sig_expire; int ask_sig_expire; const char *def_cert_expire; int ask_cert_expire; int batch; /* run in batch mode */ int answer_yes; /* answer yes on most questions */ int answer_no; /* answer no on most questions */ int check_sigs; /* check key signatures */ int with_colons; int with_key_data; int with_icao_spelling; /* Print ICAO spelling with fingerprints. */ int with_fingerprint; /* Option --with-fingerprint active. */ + int with_subkey_fingerprint; /* Option --with-subkey-fingerprint active. */ int with_keygrip; /* Option --with-keygrip active. */ int with_secret; /* Option --with-secret active. */ int with_wkd_hash; /* Option --with-wkd-hash. */ int fingerprint; /* list fingerprints */ int list_sigs; /* list signatures */ int print_pka_records; int print_dane_records; int no_armor; int list_packets; /* list-packets mode: 1=normal, 2=invoked by command*/ int def_cipher_algo; int force_mdc; int disable_mdc; int def_digest_algo; int cert_digest_algo; int compress_algo; int compress_level; int bz2_compress_level; int bz2_decompress_lowmem; strlist_t def_secret_key; char *def_recipient; int def_recipient_self; strlist_t secret_keys_to_try; int def_cert_level; int min_cert_level; int ask_cert_level; int emit_version; /* 0 = none, 1 = major only, 2 = major and minor, 3 = full version, 4 = full version plus OS string. */ int marginals_needed; int completes_needed; int max_cert_depth; const char *homedir; const char *agent_program; const char *dirmngr_program; /* Options to be passed to the gpg-agent */ session_env_t session_env; char *lc_ctype; char *lc_messages; int skip_verify; int skip_hidden_recipients; /* TM_CLASSIC must be zero to accommodate trustdbs generated before we started storing the trust model inside the trustdb. */ enum { TM_CLASSIC=0, TM_PGP=1, TM_EXTERNAL=2, TM_ALWAYS, TM_DIRECT, TM_AUTO, TM_TOFU, TM_TOFU_PGP } trust_model; enum { TOFU_DB_AUTO=0, TOFU_DB_SPLIT, TOFU_DB_FLAT } tofu_db_format; enum tofu_policy tofu_default_policy; int force_ownertrust; enum { CO_GNUPG, CO_RFC4880, CO_RFC2440, CO_PGP6, CO_PGP7, CO_PGP8 } compliance; enum { KF_DEFAULT, KF_NONE, KF_SHORT, KF_LONG, KF_0xSHORT, KF_0xLONG } keyid_format; int shm_coprocess; const char *set_filename; strlist_t comments; int throw_keyids; const char *photo_viewer; int s2k_mode; int s2k_digest_algo; int s2k_cipher_algo; unsigned char s2k_count; /* This is the encoded form, not the raw count */ int not_dash_escaped; int escape_from; int lock_once; keyserver_spec_t keyserver; /* The list of configured keyservers. */ struct { unsigned int options; unsigned int import_options; unsigned int export_options; char *http_proxy; } keyserver_options; int exec_disable; int exec_path_set; unsigned int import_options; unsigned int export_options; unsigned int list_options; unsigned int verify_options; const char *def_preference_list; const char *def_keyserver_url; prefitem_t *personal_cipher_prefs; prefitem_t *personal_digest_prefs; prefitem_t *personal_compress_prefs; struct weakhash *weak_digests; int no_perm_warn; int no_mdc_warn; char *temp_dir; int no_encrypt_to; int encrypt_to_default_key; int interactive; struct notation *sig_notations; struct notation *cert_notations; strlist_t sig_policy_url; strlist_t cert_policy_url; strlist_t sig_keyserver_url; strlist_t cert_subpackets; strlist_t sig_subpackets; int allow_non_selfsigned_uid; int allow_freeform_uid; int no_literal; ulong set_filesize; int fast_list_mode; int legacy_list_mode; int ignore_time_conflict; int ignore_valid_from; int ignore_crc_error; int ignore_mdc_error; int command_fd; const char *override_session_key; int show_session_key; const char *gpg_agent_info; int try_all_secrets; int no_expensive_trust_checks; int no_sig_cache; int no_auto_check_trustdb; int preserve_permissions; int no_homedir_creation; struct groupitem *grouplist; int mangle_dos_filenames; int enable_progress_filter; unsigned int screen_columns; unsigned int screen_lines; byte *show_subpackets; int rfc2440_text; /* If true, let write failures on the status-fd exit the process. */ int exit_on_status_write_error; /* If > 0, limit the number of card insertion prompts to this value. */ int limit_card_insert_tries; struct { /* If set, require an 0x19 backsig to be present on signatures made by signing subkeys. If not set, a missing backsig is not an error (but an invalid backsig still is). */ unsigned int require_cross_cert:1; unsigned int use_embedded_filename:1; unsigned int utf8_filename:1; unsigned int dsa2:1; unsigned int allow_multiple_messages:1; unsigned int allow_weak_digest_algos:1; unsigned int large_rsa:1; } flags; /* Linked list of ways to find a key if the key isn't on the local keyring. */ struct akl { enum { AKL_NODEFAULT, AKL_LOCAL, AKL_CERT, AKL_PKA, AKL_DANE, AKL_WKD, AKL_LDAP, AKL_KEYSERVER, AKL_SPEC } type; keyserver_spec_t spec; struct akl *next; } *auto_key_locate; int passphrase_repeat; int pinentry_mode; int unwrap_encryption; int only_sign_text_ids; } opt; /* CTRL is used to keep some global variables we currently can't avoid. Future concurrent versions of gpg will put it into a per request structure CTRL. */ EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE struct { int in_auto_key_retrieve; /* True if we are doing an auto_key_retrieve. */ /* Hack to store the last error. We currently need it because the proc_packet machinery is not able to reliabale return error codes. Thus for the --server purposes we store some of the error codes here. FIXME! */ gpg_error_t lasterr; } glo_ctrl; #define DBG_PACKET_VALUE 1 /* debug packet reading/writing */ #define DBG_MPI_VALUE 2 /* debug mpi details */ #define DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE 4 /* debug crypto handling */ /* (may reveal sensitive data) */ #define DBG_FILTER_VALUE 8 /* debug internal filter handling */ #define DBG_IOBUF_VALUE 16 /* debug iobuf stuff */ #define DBG_MEMORY_VALUE 32 /* debug memory allocation stuff */ #define DBG_CACHE_VALUE 64 /* debug the caching */ #define DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE 128 /* show memory statistics */ #define DBG_TRUST_VALUE 256 /* debug the trustdb */ #define DBG_HASHING_VALUE 512 /* debug hashing operations */ #define DBG_IPC_VALUE 1024 /* debug assuan communication */ #define DBG_CARD_IO_VALUE 2048 /* debug smart card I/O. */ #define DBG_CLOCK_VALUE 4096 #define DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE 8192 /* debug the kety lookup */ #define DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE 16384 /* debug external program calls */ /* Tests for the debugging flags. */ #define DBG_PACKET (opt.debug & DBG_PACKET_VALUE) #define DBG_CRYPTO (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE) #define DBG_FILTER (opt.debug & DBG_FILTER_VALUE) #define DBG_CACHE (opt.debug & DBG_CACHE_VALUE) #define DBG_TRUST (opt.debug & DBG_TRUST_VALUE) #define DBG_HASHING (opt.debug & DBG_HASHING_VALUE) #define DBG_IPC (opt.debug & DBG_IPC_VALUE) #define DBG_CARD_IO (opt.debug & DBG_CARD_IO_VALUE) #define DBG_IPC (opt.debug & DBG_IPC_VALUE) #define DBG_CLOCK (opt.debug & DBG_CLOCK_VALUE) #define DBG_LOOKUP (opt.debug & DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE) #define DBG_EXTPROG (opt.debug & DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE) /* FIXME: We need to check whey we did not put this into opt. */ #define DBG_MEMORY memory_debug_mode #define DBG_MEMSTAT memory_stat_debug_mode EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE int memory_debug_mode; EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE int memory_stat_debug_mode; /* Compatibility flags. */ #define GNUPG (opt.compliance==CO_GNUPG) #define RFC2440 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC2440) #define RFC4880 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC4880) #define PGP6 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP6) #define PGP7 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP7) #define PGP8 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP8) #define PGPX (PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8) /* Various option flags. Note that there should be no common string names between the IMPORT_ and EXPORT_ flags as they can be mixed in the keyserver-options option. */ #define IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS (1<<0) #define IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG (1<<1) #define IMPORT_FAST (1<<2) #define IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY (1<<4) #define IMPORT_MINIMAL (1<<5) #define IMPORT_CLEAN (1<<6) #define IMPORT_NO_SECKEY (1<<7) #define IMPORT_KEEP_OWNERTTRUST (1<<8) #define EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS (1<<0) #define EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES (1<<1) #define EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS (1<<2) #define EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD (1<<3) #define EXPORT_MINIMAL (1<<4) #define EXPORT_CLEAN (1<<5) #define EXPORT_DANE_FORMAT (1<<6) #define LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS (1<<0) #define LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS (1<<1) #define LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS (1<<2) #define LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS (1<<3) #define LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS (LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS|LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS) #define LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS (1<<4) #define LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY (1<<5) #define LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS (1<<6) #define LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS (1<<7) #define LIST_SHOW_KEYRING (1<<8) #define LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE (1<<9) #define LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS (1<<10) #define LIST_SHOW_USAGE (1<<11) #define VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS (1<<0) #define VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS (1<<1) #define VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS (1<<2) #define VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS (1<<3) #define VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS (VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS|VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS) #define VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS (1<<4) #define VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY (1<<5) #define VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS (1<<6) #define VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS (1<<7) #define VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE (1<<8) #define VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY (1<<9) #define KEYSERVER_HTTP_PROXY (1<<0) #define KEYSERVER_TIMEOUT (1<<1) #define KEYSERVER_ADD_FAKE_V3 (1<<2) #define KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE (1<<3) #define KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL (1<<4) #define KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD (1<<5) #endif /*G10_OPTIONS_H*/