diff --git a/agent/keyformat.txt b/agent/keyformat.txt index 687c0763d..88c3a2d36 100644 --- a/agent/keyformat.txt +++ b/agent/keyformat.txt @@ -1,466 +1,466 @@ keyformat.txt emacs, please switch to -*- org -*- mode ------------- Some notes on the format of the secret keys used with gpg-agent. * Location of keys The secret keys[1] are stored on a per file basis in a directory below the ~/.gnupg home directory. This directory is named private-keys-v1.d and should have permissions 700. The secret keys are stored in files with a name matching the hexadecimal representation of the keygrip[2] and suffixed with ".key". * Extended Private Key Format ** Overview GnuPG 2.3+ uses a new format to store private keys that is both more flexible and easier to read and edit by human beings. The new format stores name,value-pairs using the common mail and http header convention. Example (here indented with two spaces): Description: Key to sign all GnuPG released tarballs. The key is actually stored on a smart card. Use-for-ssh: yes OpenSSH-cert: long base64 encoded string wrapped so that this key file can be easily edited with a standard editor. Token: D2760001240102000005000011730000 OPENPGP.1 Token: FF020001008A77C1 PIV.9C Key: (shadowed-private-key (rsa (n #00AA1AD2A55FD8C8FDE9E1941772D9CC903FA43B268CB1B5A1BAFDC900 2961D8AEA153424DC851EF13B83AC64FBE365C59DC1BD3E83017C90D4365B4 83E02859FC13DB5842A00E969480DB96CE6F7D1C03600392B8E08EF0C01FC7 19F9F9086B25AD39B4F1C2A2DF3E2BE317110CFFF21D4A11455508FE407997 601260816C8422297C0637BB291C3A079B9CB38A92CE9E551F80AA0EBF4F0E 72C3F250461E4D31F23A7087857FC8438324A013634563D34EFDDCBF2EA80D F9662C9CCD4BEF2522D8BDFED24CEF78DC6B309317407EAC576D889F88ADA0 8C4FFB480981FB68C5C6CA27503381D41018E6CDC52AAAE46B166BDC10637A E186A02BA2497FDC5D1221#) (e #00010001#) (shadowed t1-v1 (#D2760001240102000005000011730000# OPENPGP.1) ))) GnuPG 2.2 is able to read and update keys using the new format, but will not create new files using the new format. Furthermore, it only makes use of the value stored under the name 'Key:'. Keys in the extended format can be recognized by looking at the first byte of the file. If it starts with a '(' it is a naked S-expression, otherwise it is a key in extended format. *** Names A name must start with a letter and end with a colon. Valid characters are all ASCII letters, numbers and the hyphen. Comparison of names is done case insensitively. Names may be used several times to represent an array of values. Note that the name "Key" is special in that it is madandory must occur only once. *** Values Values are UTF-8 encoded strings. Values can be wrapped at any point, and continued in the next line indicated by leading whitespace. A continuation line with one leading space does not introduce a blank so that the lines can be effectively concatenated. A blank line as part of a continuation line encodes a newline. *** Comments Lines containing only whitespace, and lines starting with whitespace followed by '#' are considered to be comments and are ignored. ** Well defined names *** Description This is a human readable string describing the key. *** Key The name "Key" is special in that it is mandatory and must occur only once. The associated value holds the actual S-expression with the cryptographic key. The S-expression is formatted using the 'Advanced Format' (GCRYSEXP_FMT_ADVANCED) that avoids non-printable characters so that the file can be easily inspected and edited. See section 'Private Key Format' below for details. *** Created The UTC time the key was created in ISO compressed format (yyyymmddThhmmss). This information can be used to re-create an OpenPGP key. *** Label This is a short human readable description for the key which can be used by the software to describe the key in a user interface. For example as part of the description in a prompt for a PIN or passphrase. It is often used instead of a comment element as present in the S-expression of the "Key" item. *** OpenSSH-cert This takes a base64 encoded string wrapped so that this key file can be easily edited with a standard editor. Several of such items can be used. *** Token If such an item exists it overrides the info given by the "shadow" parameter in the S-expression. Using this item makes it possible to describe a key which is stored on several tokens and also makes it easy to update this info using a standard editor. The syntax is the same as with the "shadow" parameter: - Serialnumber of the token - Key reference from the token in full format (e.g. "OpenPGP.2") - An optional fixed length of the PIN. *** Use-for-ssh If given and the value is "yes" or "1" the key is allowed for use by gpg-agent's ssh-agent implementation. This is thus the same as putting the keygrip into the 'sshcontrol' file. Only one such item should exist. * Private Key Format ** Unprotected Private Key Format The content of the file is an S-Expression like the ones used with Libgcrypt. Here is an example of an unprotected file: (private-key (rsa (n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#) (e #010001#) (d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#) (p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#) (q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#) (u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#) ) (created-at timestamp) (uri http://foo.bar x-foo:whatever_you_want) (comment whatever) ) "comment", "created-at" and "uri" are optional. "comment" is currently used to keep track of ssh key comments. "created-at" is used to keep track of the creation time stamp used with OpenPGP keys; it is optional but required for some operations to calculate the fingerprint of the key. This timestamp should be a string with the number of seconds since Epoch or an ISO time string (yyyymmddThhmmss). ** Protected Private Key Format A protected key is like this: (protected-private-key (rsa (n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#) (e #010001#) (protected mode (parms) encrypted_octet_string) (protected-at ) ) (uri http://foo.bar x-foo:whatever_you_want) (comment whatever) ) In this scheme the encrypted_octet_string is encrypted according to the algorithm described after the keyword protected; most protection algorithms need some parameters, which are given in a list before the encrypted_octet_string. The result of the decryption process is a list of the secret key parameters. The protected-at expression is optional; the isotimestamp is 15 bytes long (e.g. "19610711T172000"). The currently defined protection modes are: *** openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc This describes an algorithm using AES in CBC mode for encryption, SHA-1 for integrity protection and the String to Key algorithm 3 from OpenPGP (rfc4880). Example: (protected openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc ((sha1 16byte_salt no_of_iterations) 16byte_iv) encrypted_octet_string ) The encrypted_octet string should yield this S-Exp (in canonical representation) after decryption: ( ( (d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#) (p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#) (q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#) (u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#) ) (hash sha1 #...[hashvalue]...#) ) For padding reasons, random bytes are appended to this list - they can easily be stripped by looking for the end of the list. The hash is calculated on the concatenation of the public key and secret key parameter lists: i.e. it is required to hash the concatenation of these 6 canonical encoded lists for RSA, including the parenthesis, the algorithm keyword and (if used) the protected-at list. (rsa (n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#) (e #010001#) (d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#) (p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#) (q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#) (u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#) (protected-at "18950523T000000") ) After decryption the hash must be recalculated and compared against the stored one - If they don't match the integrity of the key is not given. *** openpgp-s2k3-ocb-aes This describes an algorithm using AES-128 in OCB mode, a nonce of 96 bit, a taglen of 128 bit, and the String to Key algorithm 3 from OpenPGP (rfc4880). Example: (protected openpgp-s2k3-ocb-aes ((sha1 16byte_salt no_of_iterations) 12byte_nonce) encrypted_octet_string ) The encrypted_octet string should yield this S-Exp (in canonical representation) after decryption: ( ( (d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#) (p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#) (q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#) (u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#) ) ) For padding reasons, random bytes may be appended to this list - they can easily be stripped by looking for the end of the list. The associated data required for this protection mode is the list - formiing the public key parameters. For the above example this is + forming the public key parameters. For the above example this is is this canonical encoded S-expression: (rsa (n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#) (e #010001#) (protected-at "18950523T000000") ) *** openpgp-native This is a wrapper around the OpenPGP Private Key Transport format which resembles the standard OpenPGP format and allows the use of an existing key without re-encrypting to the default protection format. Example: (protected openpgp-native (openpgp-private-key (version V) (algo PUBKEYALGO) (skey _ P1 _ P2 _ P3 ... e PN) (csum n) (protection PROTTYPE PROTALGO IV S2KMODE S2KHASH S2KSALT S2KCOUNT))) Note that the public key parameters in SKEY are duplicated and should be identical to their copies in the standard parameter elements. Here is an example of an entire protected private key using this format: (protected-private-key (rsa (n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#) (e #010001#) (protected openpgp-native (openpgp-private-key (version 4) (algo rsa) (skey _ #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51# _ #010001# e #.........................#) (protection sha1 aes #aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899# 3 sha1 #2596f93e85f41e53# 3:190)))) (uri http://foo.bar x-foo:whatever_you_want) (comment whatever)) ** Shadowed Private Key Format To keep track of keys stored on IC cards we use a third format for private kyes which are called shadow keys as they are only a reference to keys stored on a token: (shadowed-private-key (rsa (n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#) (e #010001#) (shadowed protocol (info)) ) (uri http://foo.bar x-foo:whatever_you_want) (comment whatever) ) The currently used protocol is "t1-v1" (token info version 1). The second list with the information has this layout: (card_serial_number id_string_of_key fixed_pin_length) FIXED_PIN_LENGTH is optional. It can be used to store the length of the PIN; a value of 0 indicates that this information is not available. The rationale for this field is that some pinpad equipped readers don't allow passing a variable length PIN. More items may be added to the list. ** OpenPGP Private Key Transfer Format This format is used to transfer keys between gpg and gpg-agent. (openpgp-private-key (version V) (algo PUBKEYALGO) (curve CURVENAME) (skey _ P1 _ P2 _ P3 ... e PN) (csum n) (protection PROTTYPE PROTALGO IV S2KMODE S2KHASH S2KSALT S2KCOUNT)) * V is the packet version number (3 or 4). * PUBKEYALGO is a Libgcrypt algo name * CURVENAME is the name of the curve - only used with ECC. * P1 .. PN are the parameters; the public parameters are never encrypted the secrect key parameters are encrypted if the "protection" list is given. To make this more explicit each parameter is preceded by a flag "_" for cleartext or "e" for encrypted text. * CSUM is the deprecated 16 bit checksum as defined by OpenPGP. This is an optional element. * If PROTTYPE is "sha1" the new style SHA1 checksum is used if it is "sum" the old 16 bit checksum (above) is used and if it is "none" no protection at all is used. * PROTALGO is a Libgcrypt style cipher algorithm name * IV is the initialization verctor. * S2KMODE is the value from RFC-4880. * S2KHASH is a libgcrypt style hash algorithm identifier. * S2KSALT is the 8 byte salt * S2KCOUNT is the count value from RFC-4880. ** Persistent Passphrase Format Note: That this has not yet been implemented. To allow persistent storage of cached passphrases we use a scheme similar to the private-key storage format. This is a master passphrase format where each file may protect several secrets under one master passphrase. It is possible to have several of those files each protected by a dedicated master passphrase. Clear text keywords allow listing the available protected passphrases. The name of the files with these protected secrets have this form: pw-.dat. STRING may be an arbitrary string, as a default name for the passphrase storage the name "pw-default.dat" is suggested. (protected-shared-secret ((desc descriptive_text) (key [key_1] (keyword_1 keyword_2 keyword_n)) (key [key_2] (keyword_21 keyword_22 keyword_2n)) (key [key_n] (keyword_n1 keyword_n2 keyword_nn)) (protected mode (parms) encrypted_octet_string) (protected-at ) ) ) After decryption the encrypted_octet_string yields this S-expression: ( ( (value key_1 value_1) (value key_2 value_2) (value key_n value_n) ) (hash sha1 #...[hashvalue]...#) ) The "descriptive_text" is displayed with the prompt to enter the unprotection passphrase. KEY_1 to KEY_N are unique identifiers for the shared secret, for example an URI. In case this information should be kept confidential as well, they may not appear in the unprotected part; however they are mandatory in the encrypted_octet_string. The list of keywords is optional. The order of the "key" lists and the order of the "value" lists must match, that is the first "key"-list is associated with the first "value" list in the encrypted_octet_string. The protection mode etc. is identical to the protection mode as described for the private key format. list of the secret key parameters. The protected-at expression is optional; the isotimestamp is 15 bytes long (e.g. "19610711T172000"). The "hash" in the encrypted_octet_string is calculated on the concatenation of the key list and value lists: i.e it is required to hash the concatenation of all these lists, including the parenthesis and (if used) the protected-at list. Example: (protected-shared-secret ((desc "List of system passphrases") (key "uid-1002" ("Knuth" "Donald Ervin Knuth")) (key "uid-1001" ("Dijkstra" "Edsger Wybe Dijkstra")) (key) (protected mode (parms) encrypted_octet_string) (protected-at "20100915T111722") ) ) with "encrypted_octet_string" decoding to: ( ( (value 4:1002 "signal flags at the lock") (value 4:1001 "taocp") (value 1:0 "premature optimization is the root of all evil") ) (hash sha1 #0102030405060708091011121314151617181920#) ) To compute the hash this S-expression (in canoncical format) was hashed: ((desc "List of system passphrases") (key "uid-1002" ("Knuth" "Donald Ervin Knuth")) (key "uid-1001" ("Dijkstra" "Edsger Wybe Dijkstra")) (key) (value 4:1002 "signal flags at the lock") (value 4:1001 "taocp") (value 1:0 "premature optimization is the root of all evil") (protected-at "20100915T111722") ) * Notes [1] I usually use the terms private and secret key exchangeable but prefer the term secret key because it can be visually be better distinguished from the term public key. [2] The keygrip is a unique identifier for a key pair, it is independent of any protocol, so that the same key can be used with different protocols. PKCS-15 calls this a subjectKeyHash; it can be calculated using Libgcrypt's gcry_pk_get_keygrip (). [3] Even when canonical representation are required we will show the S-expression here in a more readable representation. diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi index 48e52e98f..361c434fa 100644 --- a/doc/gpg.texi +++ b/doc/gpg.texi @@ -1,4470 +1,4470 @@ @c Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, @c 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc. @c This is part of the GnuPG manual. @c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi. @include defs.inc @node Invoking GPG @chapter Invoking GPG @cindex GPG command options @cindex command options @cindex options, GPG command @c Begin standard stuff @ifclear gpgtwohack @manpage gpg.1 @ifset manverb .B gpg \- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool @end ifset @mansect synopsis @ifset manverb .B gpg .RB [ \-\-homedir .IR dir ] .RB [ \-\-options .IR file ] .RI [ options ] .I command .RI [ args ] @end ifset @end ifclear @c End standard stuff @c Begin gpg2 hack stuff @ifset gpgtwohack @manpage gpg2.1 @ifset manverb .B gpg2 \- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool @end ifset @mansect synopsis @ifset manverb .B gpg2 .RB [ \-\-homedir .IR dir ] .RB [ \-\-options .IR file ] .RI [ options ] .I command .RI [ args ] @end ifset @end ifset @c End gpg2 hack stuff @mansect description @command{@gpgname} is the OpenPGP part of the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG). It is a tool to provide digital encryption and signing services using the OpenPGP standard. @command{@gpgname} features complete key management and all the bells and whistles you would expect from a full OpenPGP implementation. There are two main versions of GnuPG: GnuPG 1.x and GnuPG 2.x. GnuPG 2.x supports modern encryption algorithms and thus should be preferred over GnuPG 1.x. You only need to use GnuPG 1.x if your platform doesn't support GnuPG 2.x, or you need support for some features that GnuPG 2.x has deprecated, e.g., decrypting data created with PGP-2 keys. @ifclear gpgtwohack If you are looking for version 1 of GnuPG, you may find that version installed under the name @command{gpg1}. @end ifclear @ifset gpgtwohack In contrast to the standalone command @command{gpg} from GnuPG 1.x, the 2.x version is commonly installed under the name @command{@gpgname}. @end ifset @manpause @xref{Option Index}, for an index to @command{@gpgname}'s commands and options. @mancont @menu * GPG Commands:: List of all commands. * GPG Options:: List of all options. * GPG Configuration:: Configuration files. * GPG Examples:: Some usage examples. Developer information: * Unattended Usage of GPG:: Using @command{gpg} from other programs. @end menu @c * GPG Protocol:: The protocol the server mode uses. @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** COMMANDS **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect commands @node GPG Commands @section Commands Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that only one command is allowed. Generally speaking, irrelevant options are silently ignored, and may not be checked for correctness. @command{@gpgname} may be run with no commands. In this case it will print a warning perform a reasonable action depending on the type of file it is given as input (an encrypted message is decrypted, a signature is verified, a file containing keys is listed, etc.). If you run into any problems, please add the option @option{--verbose} to the invocation to see more diagnostics. @menu * General GPG Commands:: Commands not specific to the functionality. * Operational GPG Commands:: Commands to select the type of operation. * OpenPGP Key Management:: How to manage your keys. @end menu @c ******************************************* @c ********** GENERAL COMMANDS ************* @c ******************************************* @node General GPG Commands @subsection Commands not specific to the function @table @gnupgtabopt @item --version @opindex version Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you cannot abbreviate this command. @item --help @itemx -h @opindex help Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command-line options. Note that you cannot arbitrarily abbreviate this command (though you can use its short form @option{-h}). @item --warranty @opindex warranty Print warranty information. @item --dump-options @opindex dump-options Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot abbreviate this command. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** OPERATIONAL COMMANDS *********** @c ******************************************* @node Operational GPG Commands @subsection Commands to select the type of operation @table @gnupgtabopt @item --sign @itemx -s @opindex sign Sign a message. This command may be combined with @option{--encrypt} (to sign and encrypt a message), @option{--symmetric} (to sign and symmetrically encrypt a message), or both @option{--encrypt} and @option{--symmetric} (to sign and encrypt a message that can be decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase). The signing key is chosen by default or can be set explicitly using the @option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key} options. @item --clear-sign @opindex clear-sign @itemx --clearsign @opindex clearsign Make a cleartext signature. The content in a cleartext signature is readable without any special software. OpenPGP software is only needed to verify the signature. cleartext signatures may modify end-of-line whitespace for platform independence and are not intended to be reversible. The signing key is chosen by default or can be set explicitly using the @option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key} options. @item --detach-sign @itemx -b @opindex detach-sign Make a detached signature. @item --encrypt @itemx -e @opindex encrypt Encrypt data to one or more public keys. This command may be combined with @option{--sign} (to sign and encrypt a message), @option{--symmetric} (to encrypt a message that can be decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and @option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that can be decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase). @option{--recipient} and related options specify which public keys to use for encryption. @item --symmetric @itemx -c @opindex symmetric Encrypt with a symmetric cipher using a passphrase. The default symmetric cipher used is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}, but may be chosen with the @option{--cipher-algo} option. This command may be combined with @option{--sign} (for a signed and symmetrically encrypted message), @option{--encrypt} (for a message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and @option{--encrypt} together (for a signed message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase). @command{@gpgname} caches the passphrase used for symmetric encryption so that a decrypt operation may not require that the user needs to enter the passphrase. The option @option{--no-symkey-cache} can be used to disable this feature. @item --store @opindex store Store only (make a simple literal data packet). @item --decrypt @itemx -d @opindex decrypt Decrypt the file given on the command line (or STDIN if no file is specified) and write it to STDOUT (or the file specified with @option{--output}). If the decrypted file is signed, the signature is also verified. This command differs from the default operation, as it never writes to the filename which is included in the file and it rejects files that don't begin with an encrypted message. @item --verify @opindex verify Assume that the first argument is a signed file and verify it without generating any output. With no arguments, the signature packet is read from STDIN. If only one argument is given, the specified file is expected to include a complete signature. With more than one argument, the first argument should specify a file with a detached signature and the remaining files should contain the signed data. To read the signed data from STDIN, use @samp{-} as the second filename. For security reasons, a detached signature will not read the signed material from STDIN if not explicitly specified. Note: If the option @option{--batch} is not used, @command{@gpgname} may assume that a single argument is a file with a detached signature, and it will try to find a matching data file by stripping certain suffixes. Using this historical feature to verify a detached signature is strongly discouraged; you should always specify the data file explicitly. Note: When verifying a cleartext signature, @command{@gpgname} verifies only what makes up the cleartext signed data and not any extra data outside of the cleartext signature or the header lines directly following the dash marker line. The option @code{--output} may be used to write out the actual signed data, but there are other pitfalls with this format as well. It is suggested to avoid cleartext signatures in favor of detached signatures. Note: Sometimes the use of the @command{gpgv} tool is easier than using the full-fledged @command{gpg} with this option. @command{gpgv} is designed to compare signed data against a list of trusted keys and returns with success only for a good signature. It has its own manual page. @item --multifile @opindex multifile This modifies certain other commands to accept multiple files for processing on the command line or read from STDIN with each filename on a separate line. This allows for many files to be processed at once. @option{--multifile} may currently be used along with @option{--verify}, @option{--encrypt}, and @option{--decrypt}. Note that @option{--multifile --verify} may not be used with detached signatures. @item --verify-files @opindex verify-files Identical to @option{--multifile --verify}. @item --encrypt-files @opindex encrypt-files Identical to @option{--multifile --encrypt}. @item --decrypt-files @opindex decrypt-files Identical to @option{--multifile --decrypt}. @item --list-keys @itemx -k @itemx --list-public-keys @opindex list-keys List the specified keys. If no keys are specified, then all keys from the configured public keyrings are listed. Never use the output of this command in scripts or other programs. The output is intended only for humans and its format is likely to change. The @option{--with-colons} option emits the output in a stable, machine-parseable format, which is intended for use by scripts and other programs. @item --list-secret-keys @itemx -K @opindex list-secret-keys List the specified secret keys. If no keys are specified, then all known secret keys are listed. A @code{#} after the initial tags @code{sec} or @code{ssb} means that the secret key or subkey is currently not usable. We also say that this key has been taken offline (for example, a primary key can be taken offline by exporting the key using the command @option{--export-secret-subkeys}). A @code{>} after these tags indicate that the key is stored on a smartcard. See also @option{--list-keys}. @item --check-signatures @opindex check-signatures @itemx --check-sigs @opindex check-sigs Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the key signatures are verified and listed too. Note that for performance reasons the revocation status of a signing key is not shown. This command has the same effect as using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-check}. The status of the verification is indicated by a flag directly following the "sig" tag (and thus before the flags described below. A "!" indicates that the signature has been successfully verified, a "-" denotes a bad signature and a "%" is used if an error occurred while checking the signature (e.g. a non supported algorithm). Signatures where the public key is not available are not listed; to see their keyids the command @option{--list-sigs} can be used. For each signature listed, there are several flags in between the signature status flag and keyid. These flags give additional information about each key signature. From left to right, they are the numbers 1-3 for certificate check level (see @option{--ask-cert-level}), "L" for a local or non-exportable signature (see @option{--lsign-key}), "R" for a nonRevocable signature (see the @option{--edit-key} command "nrsign"), "P" for a signature that contains a policy URL (see @option{--cert-policy-url}), "N" for a signature that contains a notation (see @option{--cert-notation}), "X" for an eXpired signature (see @option{--ask-cert-expire}), and the numbers 1-9 or "T" for 10 and above to indicate trust signature levels (see the @option{--edit-key} command "tsign"). @item --locate-keys @itemx --locate-external-keys @opindex locate-keys @opindex locate-external-keys Locate the keys given as arguments. This command basically uses the same algorithm as used when locating keys for encryption and may thus be used to see what keys @command{@gpgname} might use. In particular external methods as defined by @option{--auto-key-locate} may be used to locate a key. Only public keys are listed. The variant @option{--locate-external-keys} does not consider a locally existing key and can thus be used to force the refresh of a key via the defined external methods. @item --show-keys @opindex show-keys This commands takes OpenPGP keys as input and prints information about them in the same way the command @option{--list-keys} does for locally stored key. In addition the list options @code{show-unusable-uids}, @code{show-unusable-subkeys}, @code{show-notations} and @code{show-policy-urls} are also enabled. As usual for automated processing, this command should be combined with the option @option{--with-colons}. @item --fingerprint @opindex fingerprint List all keys (or the specified ones) along with their fingerprints. This is the same output as @option{--list-keys} but with the additional output of a line with the fingerprint. May also be combined with @option{--check-signatures}. If this command is given twice, the fingerprints of all secondary keys are listed too. This command also forces pretty printing of fingerprints if the keyid format has been set to "none". @item --list-packets @opindex list-packets List only the sequence of packets. This command is only useful for debugging. When used with option @option{--verbose} the actual MPI values are dumped and not only their lengths. Note that the output of this command may change with new releases. @item --edit-card @opindex edit-card @itemx --card-edit @opindex card-edit Present a menu to work with a smartcard. The subcommand "help" provides an overview on available commands. For a detailed description, please see the Card HOWTO at https://gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html#GnuPG-cardHOWTO . @item --card-status @opindex card-status Show the content of the smart card. @item --change-pin @opindex change-pin Present a menu to allow changing the PIN of a smartcard. This functionality is also available as the subcommand "passwd" with the @option{--edit-card} command. @item --delete-keys @var{name} @opindex delete-keys Remove key from the public keyring. In batch mode either @option{--yes} is required or the key must be specified by fingerprint. This is a safeguard against accidental deletion of multiple keys. If the exclamation mark syntax is used with the fingerprint of a subkey only that subkey is deleted; if the exclamation mark is used with the fingerprint of the primary key the entire public key is deleted. @item --delete-secret-keys @var{name} @opindex delete-secret-keys Remove key from the secret keyring. In batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint. The option @option{--yes} can be used to -advice gpg-agent not to request a confirmation. This extra +advise gpg-agent not to request a confirmation. This extra pre-caution is done because @command{@gpgname} can't be sure that the secret key (as controlled by gpg-agent) is only used for the given OpenPGP public key. If the exclamation mark syntax is used with the fingerprint of a subkey only the secret part of that subkey is deleted; if the exclamation mark is used with the fingerprint of the primary key only the secret part of the primary key is deleted. @item --delete-secret-and-public-key @var{name} @opindex delete-secret-and-public-key Same as @option{--delete-key}, but if a secret key exists, it will be removed first. In batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint. -The option @option{--yes} can be used to advice gpg-agent not to +The option @option{--yes} can be used to advise gpg-agent not to request a confirmation. @item --export @opindex export Either export all keys from all keyrings (default keyrings and those registered via option @option{--keyring}), or if at least one name is given, those of the given name. The exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. Use together with @option{--armor} to mail those keys. @item --send-keys @var{keyIDs} @opindex send-keys Similar to @option{--export} but sends the keys to a keyserver. Fingerprints may be used instead of key IDs. Don't send your complete keyring to a keyserver --- select only those keys which are new or changed by you. If no @var{keyIDs} are given, @command{@gpgname} does nothing. Take care: Keyservers are by design write only systems and thus it is not possible to ever delete keys once they have been send to a keyserver. @item --export-secret-keys @itemx --export-secret-subkeys @opindex export-secret-keys @opindex export-secret-subkeys Same as @option{--export}, but exports the secret keys instead. The exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. This command is often used along with the option @option{--armor} to allow for easy printing of the key for paper backup; however the external tool @command{paperkey} does a better job of creating backups on paper. Note that exporting a secret key can be a security risk if the exported keys are sent over an insecure channel. The second form of the command has the special property to render the secret part of the primary key useless; this is a GNU extension to OpenPGP and other implementations can not be expected to successfully import such a key. Its intended use is in generating a full key with an additional signing subkey on a dedicated machine. This command then exports the key without the primary key to the main machine. GnuPG may ask you to enter the passphrase for the key. This is required, because the internal protection method of the secret key is different from the one specified by the OpenPGP protocol. @item --export-ssh-key @opindex export-ssh-key This command is used to export a key in the OpenSSH public key format. It requires the specification of one key by the usual means and exports the latest valid subkey which has an authentication capability to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. That output can directly be added to ssh's @file{authorized_key} file. By specifying the key to export using a key ID or a fingerprint suffixed with an exclamation mark (!), a specific subkey or the primary key can be exported. This does not even require that the key has the authentication capability flag set. @item --import @itemx --fast-import @opindex import Import/merge keys. This adds the given keys to the keyring. The fast version is currently just a synonym. There are a few other options which control how this command works. Most notable here is the @option{--import-options merge-only} option which does not insert new keys but does only the merging of new signatures, user-IDs and subkeys. @item --receive-keys @var{keyIDs} @opindex receive-keys @itemx --recv-keys @var{keyIDs} @opindex recv-keys Import the keys with the given @var{keyIDs} from a keyserver. @item --refresh-keys @opindex refresh-keys Request updates from a keyserver for keys that already exist on the local keyring. This is useful for updating a key with the latest signatures, user IDs, etc. Calling this with no arguments will refresh the entire keyring. @item --search-keys @var{names} @opindex search-keys Search the keyserver for the given @var{names}. Multiple names given here will be joined together to create the search string for the keyserver. Note that keyservers search for @var{names} in a different and simpler way than gpg does. The best choice is to use a mail address. Due to data privacy reasons keyservers may even not even allow searching by user id or mail address and thus may only return results when being used with the @option{--recv-key} command to search by key fingerprint or keyid. @item --fetch-keys @var{URIs} @opindex fetch-keys Retrieve keys located at the specified @var{URIs}. Note that different installations of GnuPG may support different protocols (HTTP, FTP, LDAP, etc.). When using HTTPS the system provided root certificates are used by this command. @item --update-trustdb @opindex update-trustdb Do trust database maintenance. This command iterates over all keys and builds the Web of Trust. This is an interactive command because it may have to ask for the "ownertrust" values for keys. The user has to give an estimation of how far she trusts the owner of the displayed key to correctly certify (sign) other keys. GnuPG only asks for the ownertrust value if it has not yet been assigned to a key. Using the @option{--edit-key} menu, the assigned value can be changed at any time. @item --check-trustdb @opindex check-trustdb Do trust database maintenance without user interaction. From time to time the trust database must be updated so that expired keys or signatures and the resulting changes in the Web of Trust can be tracked. Normally, GnuPG will calculate when this is required and do it automatically unless @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} is set. This command can be used to force a trust database check at any time. The processing is identical to that of @option{--update-trustdb} but it skips keys with a not yet defined "ownertrust". For use with cron jobs, this command can be used together with @option{--batch} in which case the trust database check is done only if a check is needed. To force a run even in batch mode add the option @option{--yes}. @anchor{option --export-ownertrust} @item --export-ownertrust @opindex export-ownertrust Send the ownertrust values to STDOUT. This is useful for backup purposes as these values are the only ones which can't be re-created from a corrupted trustdb. Example: @c man:.RS @example @gpgname{} --export-ownertrust > otrust.txt @end example @c man:.RE @item --import-ownertrust @opindex import-ownertrust Update the trustdb with the ownertrust values stored in @code{files} (or STDIN if not given); existing values will be overwritten. In case of a severely damaged trustdb and if you have a recent backup of the ownertrust values (e.g. in the file @file{otrust.txt}), you may re-create the trustdb using these commands: @c man:.RS @example cd ~/.gnupg rm trustdb.gpg @gpgname{} --import-ownertrust < otrust.txt @end example @c man:.RE @item --rebuild-keydb-caches @opindex rebuild-keydb-caches When updating from version 1.0.6 to 1.0.7 this command should be used to create signature caches in the keyring. It might be handy in other situations too. @item --print-md @var{algo} @itemx --print-mds @opindex print-md Print message digest of algorithm @var{algo} for all given files or STDIN. With the second form (or a deprecated "*" for @var{algo}) digests for all available algorithms are printed. @item --gen-random @var{0|1|2} @var{count} @opindex gen-random Emit @var{count} random bytes of the given quality level 0, 1 or 2. If @var{count} is not given or zero, an endless sequence of random bytes will be emitted. If used with @option{--armor} the output will be base64 encoded. PLEASE, don't use this command unless you know what you are doing; it may remove precious entropy from the system! @item --gen-prime @var{mode} @var{bits} @opindex gen-prime Use the source, Luke :-). The output format is subject to change with ant release. @item --enarmor @itemx --dearmor @opindex enarmor @opindex dearmor Pack or unpack an arbitrary input into/from an OpenPGP ASCII armor. This is a GnuPG extension to OpenPGP and in general not very useful. @item --unwrap @opindex unwrap This command is similar to @option{--decrypt} with the change that the output is not the usual plaintext but the original message with the decryption layer removed. Thus the output will be an OpenPGP data structure which often means a signed OpenPGP message. Note that this command may or may not remove a compression layer which is often found beneath the encryption layer. @item --tofu-policy @{auto|good|unknown|bad|ask@} @var{keys} @opindex tofu-policy Set the TOFU policy for all the bindings associated with the specified @var{keys}. For more information about the meaning of the policies, @pxref{trust-model-tofu}. The @var{keys} may be specified either by their fingerprint (preferred) or their keyid. @c @item --server @c @opindex server @c Run gpg in server mode. This feature is not yet ready for use and @c thus not documented. @end table @c ******************************************** @c ******* KEY MANAGEMENT COMMANDS ********** @c ******************************************** @node OpenPGP Key Management @subsection How to manage your keys This section explains the main commands for key management. @table @gnupgtabopt @item --quick-generate-key @var{user-id} [@var{algo} [@var{usage} [@var{expire}]]] @itemx --quick-gen-key @opindex quick-generate-key @opindex quick-gen-key This is a simple command to generate a standard key with one user id. In contrast to @option{--generate-key} the key is generated directly without the need to answer a bunch of prompts. Unless the option @option{--yes} is given, the key creation will be canceled if the given user id already exists in the keyring. If invoked directly on the console without any special options an answer to a ``Continue?'' style confirmation prompt is required. In case the user id already exists in the keyring a second prompt to force the creation of the key will show up. If @var{algo} or @var{usage} are given, only the primary key is created and no prompts are shown. To specify an expiration date but still create a primary and subkey use ``default'' or ``future-default'' for @var{algo} and ``default'' for @var{usage}. For a description of these optional arguments see the command @code{--quick-add-key}. The @var{usage} accepts also the value ``cert'' which can be used to create a certification only primary key; the default is to a create certification and signing key. The @var{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date for the key. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO formats ``YYYY-MM-DD'' or ``YYYYMMDDThhmmss'' are used. To make the key expire in N seconds, N days, N weeks, N months, or N years use ``seconds=N'', ``Nd'', ``Nw'', ``Nm'', or ``Ny'' respectively. Not specifying a value, or using ``-'' results in a key expiring in a reasonable default interval. The values ``never'', ``none'' can be used for no expiration date. If this command is used with @option{--batch}, @option{--pinentry-mode} has been set to @code{loopback}, and one of the passphrase options (@option{--passphrase}, @option{--passphrase-fd}, or @option{passphrase-file}) is used, the supplied passphrase is used for the new key and the agent does not ask for it. To create a key without any protection @code{--passphrase ''} may be used. To create an OpenPGP key from the keys available on the currently inserted smartcard, the special string ``card'' can be used for @var{algo}. If the card features an encryption and a signing key, gpg will figure them out and creates an OpenPGP key consisting of the usual primary key and one subkey. This works only with certain smartcards. Note that the interactive @option{--full-gen-key} command allows to do the same but with greater flexibility in the selection of the smartcard keys. Note that it is possible to create a primary key and a subkey using non-default algorithms by using ``default'' and changing the default parameters using the option @option{--default-new-key-algo}. @item --quick-set-expire @var{fpr} @var{expire} [*|@var{subfprs}] @opindex quick-set-expire With two arguments given, directly set the expiration time of the primary key identified by @var{fpr} to @var{expire}. To remove the expiration time @code{0} can be used. With three arguments and the third given as an asterisk, the expiration time of all non-revoked and not yet expired subkeys are set to @var{expire}. With more than two arguments and a list of fingerprints given for @var{subfprs}, all non-revoked subkeys matching these fingerprints are set to @var{expire}. @item --quick-add-key @var{fpr} [@var{algo} [@var{usage} [@var{expire}]]] @opindex quick-add-key Directly add a subkey to the key identified by the fingerprint @var{fpr}. Without the optional arguments an encryption subkey is added. If any of the arguments are given a more specific subkey is added. @var{algo} may be any of the supported algorithms or curve names given in the format as used by key listings. To use the default algorithm the string ``default'' or ``-'' can be used. Supported algorithms are ``rsa'', ``dsa'', ``elg'', ``ed25519'', ``cv25519'', and other ECC curves. For example the string ``rsa'' adds an RSA key with the default key length; a string ``rsa4096'' requests that the key length is 4096 bits. The string ``future-default'' is an alias for the algorithm which will likely be used as default algorithm in future versions of gpg. To list the supported ECC curves the command @code{gpg --with-colons --list-config curve} can be used. Depending on the given @var{algo} the subkey may either be an encryption subkey or a signing subkey. If an algorithm is capable of signing and encryption and such a subkey is desired, a @var{usage} string must be given. This string is either ``default'' or ``-'' to keep the default or a comma delimited list (or space delimited list) of keywords: ``sign'' for a signing subkey, ``auth'' for an authentication subkey, and ``encr'' for an encryption subkey (``encrypt'' can be used as alias for ``encr''). The valid combinations depend on the algorithm. The @var{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date for the key. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO formats ``YYYY-MM-DD'' or ``YYYYMMDDThhmmss'' are used. To make the key expire in N seconds, N days, N weeks, N months, or N years use ``seconds=N'', ``Nd'', ``Nw'', ``Nm'', or ``Ny'' respectively. Not specifying a value, or using ``-'' results in a key expiring in a reasonable default interval. The values ``never'', ``none'' can be used for no expiration date. @item --generate-key @opindex generate-key @itemx --gen-key @opindex gen-key Generate a new key pair using the current default parameters. This is the standard command to create a new key. In addition to the key a revocation certificate is created and stored in the @file{openpgp-revocs.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory. @item --full-generate-key @opindex full-generate-key @itemx --full-gen-key @opindex full-gen-key Generate a new key pair with dialogs for all options. This is an extended version of @option{--generate-key}. There is also a feature which allows you to create keys in batch mode. See the manual section ``Unattended key generation'' on how to use this. @item --generate-revocation @var{name} @opindex generate-revocation @itemx --gen-revoke @var{name} @opindex gen-revoke Generate a revocation certificate for the complete key. To only revoke a subkey or a key signature, use the @option{--edit} command. This command merely creates the revocation certificate so that it can be used to revoke the key if that is ever needed. To actually revoke a key the created revocation certificate needs to be merged with the key to revoke. This is done by importing the revocation certificate using the @option{--import} command. Then the revoked key needs to be published, which is best done by sending the key to a keyserver (command @option{--send-key}) and by exporting (@option{--export}) it to a file which is then send to frequent communication partners. @item --generate-designated-revocation @var{name} @opindex generate-designated-revocation @itemx --desig-revoke @var{name} @opindex desig-revoke Generate a designated revocation certificate for a key. This allows a user (with the permission of the keyholder) to revoke someone else's key. @item --edit-key @opindex edit-key Present a menu which enables you to do most of the key management related tasks. It expects the specification of a key on the command line. @c ******** Begin Edit-key Options ********** @table @asis @item uid @var{n} @opindex keyedit:uid Toggle selection of user ID or photographic user ID with index @var{n}. Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all. @item key @var{n} @opindex keyedit:key Toggle selection of subkey with index @var{n} or key ID @var{n}. Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all. @item sign @opindex keyedit:sign Make a signature on key of user @code{name}. If the key is not yet signed by the default user (or the users given with @option{-u}), the program displays the information of the key again, together with its fingerprint and asks whether it should be signed. This question is repeated for all users specified with @option{-u}. @item lsign @opindex keyedit:lsign Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-exportable and will therefore never be used by others. This may be used to make keys valid only in the local environment. @item nrsign @opindex keyedit:nrsign Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-revocable and can therefore never be revoked. @item tsign @opindex keyedit:tsign Make a trust signature. This is a signature that combines the notions of certification (like a regular signature), and trust (like the "trust" command). It is generally only useful in distinct communities or groups. For more information please read the sections ``Trust Signature'' and ``Regular Expression'' in RFC-4880. @end table @c man:.RS Note that "l" (for local / non-exportable), "nr" (for non-revocable, and "t" (for trust) may be freely mixed and prefixed to "sign" to create a signature of any type desired. @c man:.RE If the option @option{--only-sign-text-ids} is specified, then any non-text based user ids (e.g., photo IDs) will not be selected for signing. @table @asis @item delsig @opindex keyedit:delsig Delete a signature. Note that it is not possible to retract a signature, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revsig}. @item revsig @opindex keyedit:revsig Revoke a signature. For every signature which has been generated by one of the secret keys, GnuPG asks whether a revocation certificate should be generated. @item check @opindex keyedit:check Check the signatures on all selected user IDs. With the extra option @code{selfsig} only self-signatures are shown. @item adduid @opindex keyedit:adduid Create an additional user ID. @item addphoto @opindex keyedit:addphoto Create a photographic user ID. This will prompt for a JPEG file that will be embedded into the user ID. Note that a very large JPEG will make for a very large key. Also note that some programs will display your JPEG unchanged (GnuPG), and some programs will scale it to fit in a dialog box (PGP). @item showphoto @opindex keyedit:showphoto Display the selected photographic user ID. @item deluid @opindex keyedit:deluid Delete a user ID or photographic user ID. Note that it is not possible to retract a user id, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revuid}. @item revuid @opindex keyedit:revuid Revoke a user ID or photographic user ID. @item primary @opindex keyedit:primary Flag the current user id as the primary one, removes the primary user id flag from all other user ids and sets the timestamp of all affected self-signatures one second ahead. Note that setting a photo user ID as primary makes it primary over other photo user IDs, and setting a regular user ID as primary makes it primary over other regular user IDs. @item keyserver @opindex keyedit:keyserver Set a preferred keyserver for the specified user ID(s). This allows other users to know where you prefer they get your key from. See @option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url} for more on how this works. Setting a value of "none" removes an existing preferred keyserver. @item notation @opindex keyedit:notation Set a name=value notation for the specified user ID(s). See @option{--cert-notation} for more on how this works. Setting a value of "none" removes all notations, setting a notation prefixed with a minus sign (-) removes that notation, and setting a notation name (without the =value) prefixed with a minus sign removes all notations with that name. @item pref @opindex keyedit:pref List preferences from the selected user ID. This shows the actual preferences, without including any implied preferences. @item showpref @opindex keyedit:showpref More verbose preferences listing for the selected user ID. This shows the preferences in effect by including the implied preferences of 3DES (cipher), SHA-1 (digest), and Uncompressed (compression) if they are not already included in the preference list. In addition, the preferred keyserver and signature notations (if any) are shown. @item setpref @var{string} @opindex keyedit:setpref Set the list of user ID preferences to @var{string} for all (or just the selected) user IDs. Calling setpref with no arguments sets the preference list to the default (either built-in or set via @option{--default-preference-list}), and calling setpref with "none" as the argument sets an empty preference list. Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms. Note that while you can change the preferences on an attribute user ID (aka "photo ID"), GnuPG does not select keys via attribute user IDs so these preferences will not be used by GnuPG. When setting preferences, you should list the algorithms in the order which you'd like to see them used by someone else when encrypting a message to your key. If you don't include 3DES, it will be automatically added at the end. Note that there are many factors that go into choosing an algorithm (for example, your key may not be the only recipient), and so the remote OpenPGP application being used to send to you may or may not follow your exact chosen order for a given message. It will, however, only choose an algorithm that is present on the preference list of every recipient key. See also the INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below. @item addkey @opindex keyedit:addkey Add a subkey to this key. @item addcardkey @opindex keyedit:addcardkey Generate a subkey on a card and add it to this key. @item keytocard @opindex keyedit:keytocard Transfer the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey has been selected) to a smartcard. The secret key in the keyring will be replaced by a stub if the key could be stored successfully on the card and you use the save command later. Only certain key types may be transferred to the card. A sub menu allows you to select on what card to store the key. Note that it is not possible to get that key back from the card - if the card gets broken your secret key will be lost unless you have a backup somewhere. @item bkuptocard @var{file} @opindex keyedit:bkuptocard Restore the given @var{file} to a card. This command may be used to restore a backup key (as generated during card initialization) to a new card. In almost all cases this will be the encryption key. You should use this command only with the corresponding public key and make sure that the file given as argument is indeed the backup to restore. You should then select 2 to restore as encryption key. You will first be asked to enter the passphrase of the backup key and then for the Admin PIN of the card. @item delkey @opindex keyedit:delkey Remove a subkey (secondary key). Note that it is not possible to retract a subkey, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revkey}. Also note that this only deletes the public part of a key. @item revkey @opindex keyedit:revkey Revoke a subkey. @item expire @opindex keyedit:expire Change the key or subkey expiration time. If a subkey is selected, the expiration time of this subkey will be changed. With no selection, the key expiration of the primary key is changed. @item trust @opindex keyedit:trust Change the owner trust value for the key. This updates the trust-db immediately and no save is required. @item disable @itemx enable @opindex keyedit:disable @opindex keyedit:enable Disable or enable an entire key. A disabled key can not normally be used for encryption. @item addrevoker @opindex keyedit:addrevoker Add a designated revoker to the key. This takes one optional argument: "sensitive". If a designated revoker is marked as sensitive, it will not be exported by default (see export-options). @item passwd @opindex keyedit:passwd Change the passphrase of the secret key. @item toggle @opindex keyedit:toggle This is dummy command which exists only for backward compatibility. @item clean @opindex keyedit:clean Compact (by removing all signatures except the selfsig) any user ID that is no longer usable (e.g. revoked, or expired). Then, remove any signatures that are not usable by the trust calculations. Specifically, this removes any signature that does not validate, any signature that is superseded by a later signature, revoked signatures, and signatures issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. @item minimize @opindex keyedit:minimize Make the key as small as possible. This removes all signatures from each user ID except for the most recent self-signature. @item change-usage @opindex keyedit:change-usage Change the usage flags (capabilities) of the primary key or of subkeys. These usage flags (e.g. Certify, Sign, Authenticate, Encrypt) are set during key creation. Sometimes it is useful to have the opportunity to change them (for example to add Authenticate) after they have been created. Please take care when doing this; the allowed usage flags depend on the key algorithm. @item cross-certify @opindex keyedit:cross-certify Add cross-certification signatures to signing subkeys that may not currently have them. Cross-certification signatures protect against a subtle attack against signing subkeys. See @option{--require-cross-certification}. All new keys generated have this signature by default, so this command is only useful to bring older keys up to date. @item save @opindex keyedit:save Save all changes to the keyrings and quit. @item quit @opindex keyedit:quit Quit the program without updating the keyrings. @end table @c man:.RS The listing shows you the key with its secondary keys and all user IDs. The primary user ID is indicated by a dot, and selected keys or user IDs are indicated by an asterisk. The trust value is displayed with the primary key: "trust" is the assigned owner trust and "validity" is the calculated validity of the key. Validity values are also displayed for all user IDs. For possible values of trust, @pxref{trust-values}. @c man:.RE @c ******** End Edit-key Options ********** @item --sign-key @var{name} @opindex sign-key Signs a public key with your secret key. This is a shortcut version of the subcommand "sign" from @option{--edit}. @item --lsign-key @var{name} @opindex lsign-key Signs a public key with your secret key but marks it as non-exportable. This is a shortcut version of the subcommand "lsign" from @option{--edit-key}. @item --quick-sign-key @var{fpr} [@var{names}] @itemx --quick-lsign-key @var{fpr} [@var{names}] @opindex quick-sign-key @opindex quick-lsign-key Directly sign a key from the passphrase without any further user interaction. The @var{fpr} must be the verified primary fingerprint of a key in the local keyring. If no @var{names} are given, all useful user ids are signed; with given [@var{names}] only useful user ids matching one of these names are signed. By default, or if a name is prefixed with a '*', a case insensitive substring match is used. If a name is prefixed with a '=' a case sensitive exact match is done. The command @option{--quick-lsign-key} marks the signatures as non-exportable. If such a non-exportable signature already exists the @option{--quick-sign-key} turns it into a exportable signature. This command uses reasonable defaults and thus does not provide the full flexibility of the "sign" subcommand from @option{--edit-key}. Its intended use is to help unattended key signing by utilizing a list of verified fingerprints. @item --quick-add-uid @var{user-id} @var{new-user-id} @opindex quick-add-uid This command adds a new user id to an existing key. In contrast to the interactive sub-command @code{adduid} of @option{--edit-key} the @var{new-user-id} is added verbatim with only leading and trailing white space removed, it is expected to be UTF-8 encoded, and no checks on its form are applied. @item --quick-revoke-uid @var{user-id} @var{user-id-to-revoke} @opindex quick-revoke-uid This command revokes a user ID on an existing key. It cannot be used to revoke the last user ID on key (some non-revoked user ID must remain), with revocation reason ``User ID is no longer valid''. If you want to specify a different revocation reason, or to supply supplementary revocation text, you should use the interactive sub-command @code{revuid} of @option{--edit-key}. @item --quick-revoke-sig @var{fpr} @var{signing-fpr} [@var{names}] @opindex quick-revoke-sig This command revokes the key signatures made by @var{signing-fpr} from the key specified by the fingerprint @var{fpr}. With @var{names} given only the signatures on user ids of the key matching any of the given names are affected (see @option{--quick-sign-key}). If a revocation already exists a notice is printed instead of creating a new revocation; no error is returned in this case. Note that key signature revocations may be superseded by a newer key signature and in turn again revoked. @item --quick-set-primary-uid @var{user-id} @var{primary-user-id} @opindex quick-set-primary-uid This command sets or updates the primary user ID flag on an existing key. @var{user-id} specifies the key and @var{primary-user-id} the user ID which shall be flagged as the primary user ID. The primary user ID flag is removed from all other user ids and the timestamp of all affected self-signatures is set one second ahead. @item --change-passphrase @var{user-id} @opindex change-passphrase @itemx --passwd @var{user-id} @opindex passwd Change the passphrase of the secret key belonging to the certificate specified as @var{user-id}. This is a shortcut for the sub-command @code{passwd} of the edit key menu. When using together with the option @option{--dry-run} this will not actually change the passphrase but check that the current passphrase is correct. @end table @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** OPTIONS **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect options @node GPG Options @section Option Summary @command{@gpgname} features a bunch of options to control the exact behaviour and to change the default configuration. @menu * GPG Configuration Options:: How to change the configuration. * GPG Key related Options:: Key related options. * GPG Input and Output:: Input and Output. * OpenPGP Options:: OpenPGP protocol specific options. * Compliance Options:: Compliance options. * GPG Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually doesn't want to do. * Deprecated Options:: Deprecated options. @end menu Long options can be put in an options file (default "~/.gnupg/gpg.conf"). Short option names will not work - for example, "armor" is a valid option for the options file, while "a" is not. Do not write the 2 dashes, but simply the name of the option and any required arguments. Lines with a hash ('#') as the first non-white-space character are ignored. Commands may be put in this file too, but that is not generally useful as the command will execute automatically with every execution of gpg. Please remember that option parsing stops as soon as a non-option is encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by using the special option @option{--}. @c ******************************************* @c ******** CONFIGURATION OPTIONS ********** @c ******************************************* @node GPG Configuration Options @subsection How to change the configuration These options are used to change the configuration and are usually found in the option file. @table @gnupgtabopt @item --default-key @var{name} @opindex default-key Use @var{name} as the default key to sign with. If this option is not used, the default key is the first key found in the secret keyring. Note that @option{-u} or @option{--local-user} overrides this option. This option may be given multiple times. In this case, the last key for which a secret key is available is used. If there is no secret key available for any of the specified values, GnuPG will not emit an error message but continue as if this option wasn't given. @item --default-recipient @var{name} @opindex default-recipient Use @var{name} as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is not used and don't ask if this is a valid one. @var{name} must be non-empty. @item --default-recipient-self @opindex default-recipient-self Use the default key as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is not used and don't ask if this is a valid one. The default key is the first one from the secret keyring or the one set with @option{--default-key}. @item --no-default-recipient @opindex no-default-recipient Reset @option{--default-recipient} and @option{--default-recipient-self}. @item -v, --verbose @opindex verbose Give more information during processing. If used twice, the input data is listed in detail. @item --no-verbose @opindex no-verbose Reset verbose level to 0. @item -q, --quiet @opindex quiet Try to be as quiet as possible. @item --batch @itemx --no-batch @opindex batch @opindex no-batch Use batch mode. Never ask, do not allow interactive commands. @option{--no-batch} disables this option. Note that even with a filename given on the command line, gpg might still need to read from STDIN (in particular if gpg figures that the input is a detached signature and no data file has been specified). Thus if you do not want to feed data via STDIN, you should connect STDIN to g@file{/dev/null}. It is highly recommended to use this option along with the options @option{--status-fd} and @option{--with-colons} for any unattended use of @command{gpg}. @item --no-tty @opindex no-tty Make sure that the TTY (terminal) is never used for any output. This option is needed in some cases because GnuPG sometimes prints warnings to the TTY even if @option{--batch} is used. @item --yes @opindex yes Assume "yes" on most questions. @item --no @opindex no Assume "no" on most questions. @item --list-options @var{parameters} @opindex list-options This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when listing keys and signatures (that is, @option{--list-keys}, @option{--check-signatures}, @option{--list-public-keys}, @option{--list-secret-keys}, and the @option{--edit-key} functions). Options can be prepended with a @option{no-} (after the two dashes) to give the opposite meaning. The options are: @table @asis @item show-photos @opindex list-options:show-photos Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--check-signatures}, @option{--list-public-keys}, and @option{--list-secret-keys} to display any photo IDs attached to the key. Defaults to no. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. Does not work with @option{--with-colons}: see @option{--attribute-fd} for the appropriate way to get photo data for scripts and other frontends. @item show-usage @opindex list-options:show-usage Show usage information for keys and subkeys in the standard key listing. This is a list of letters indicating the allowed usage for a key (@code{E}=encryption, @code{S}=signing, @code{C}=certification, @code{A}=authentication). Defaults to yes. @item show-policy-urls @opindex list-options:show-policy-urls Show policy URLs in the @option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no. @item show-notations @itemx show-std-notations @itemx show-user-notations @opindex list-options:show-notations @opindex list-options:show-std-notations @opindex list-options:show-user-notations Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the @option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no. @item show-keyserver-urls @opindex list-options:show-keyserver-urls Show any preferred keyserver URL in the @option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no. @item show-uid-validity @opindex list-options:show-uid-validity Display the calculated validity of user IDs during key listings. Defaults to yes. @item show-unusable-uids @opindex list-options:show-unusable-uids Show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings. Defaults to no. @item show-unusable-subkeys @opindex list-options:show-unusable-subkeys Show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings. Defaults to no. @item show-keyring @opindex list-options:show-keyring Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which keyring a given key resides on. Defaults to no. @item show-sig-expire @opindex list-options:show-sig-expire Show signature expiration dates (if any) during @option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no. @item show-sig-subpackets @opindex list-options:show-sig-subpackets Include signature subpackets in the key listing. This option can take an optional argument list of the subpackets to list. If no argument is passed, list all subpackets. Defaults to no. This option is only meaningful when using @option{--with-colons} along with @option{--check-signatures}. @item show-only-fpr-mbox @opindex list-options:show-only-fpr-mbox For each user-id which has a valid mail address print only the fingerprint followed by the mail address. @item sort-sigs @opindex list-options:sort-sigs With --list-sigs and --check-sigs sort the signatures by keyID and creation time to make it easier to view the history of these signatures. The self-signature is also listed before other signatures. Defaults to yes. @end table @item --verify-options @var{parameters} @opindex verify-options This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when verifying signatures. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the opposite meaning. The options are: @table @asis @item show-photos @opindex verify-options:show-photos Display any photo IDs present on the key that issued the signature. Defaults to no. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. @item show-policy-urls @opindex verify-options:show-policy-urls Show policy URLs in the signature being verified. Defaults to yes. @item show-notations @itemx show-std-notations @itemx show-user-notations @opindex verify-options:show-notations @opindex verify-options:show-std-notations @opindex verify-options:show-user-notations Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the signature being verified. Defaults to IETF standard. @item show-keyserver-urls @opindex verify-options:show-keyserver-urls Show any preferred keyserver URL in the signature being verified. Defaults to yes. @item show-uid-validity @opindex verify-options:show-uid-validity Display the calculated validity of the user IDs on the key that issued the signature. Defaults to yes. @item show-unusable-uids @opindex verify-options:show-unusable-uids Show revoked and expired user IDs during signature verification. Defaults to no. @item show-primary-uid-only @opindex verify-options:show-primary-uid-only Show only the primary user ID during signature verification. That is all the AKA lines as well as photo Ids are not shown with the signature verification status. @item pka-lookups @opindex verify-options:pka-lookups Enable PKA lookups to verify sender addresses. Note that PKA is based on DNS, and so enabling this option may disclose information on when and what signatures are verified or to whom data is encrypted. This is similar to the "web bug" described for the @option{--auto-key-retrieve} option. @item pka-trust-increase @opindex verify-options:pka-trust-increase Raise the trust in a signature to full if the signature passes PKA validation. This option is only meaningful if pka-lookups is set. @end table @item --enable-large-rsa @itemx --disable-large-rsa @opindex enable-large-rsa @opindex disable-large-rsa With --generate-key and --batch, enable the creation of RSA secret keys as large as 8192 bit. Note: 8192 bit is more than is generally recommended. These large keys don't significantly improve security, but they are more expensive to use, and their signatures and certifications are larger. This option is only available if the binary was build with large-secmem support. @item --enable-dsa2 @itemx --disable-dsa2 @opindex enable-dsa2 @opindex disable-dsa2 Enable hash truncation for all DSA keys even for old DSA Keys up to 1024 bit. This is also the default with @option{--openpgp}. Note that older versions of GnuPG also required this flag to allow the generation of DSA larger than 1024 bit. @item --photo-viewer @var{string} @opindex photo-viewer This is the command line that should be run to view a photo ID. "%i" will be expanded to a filename containing the photo. "%I" does the same, except the file will not be deleted once the viewer exits. Other flags are "%k" for the key ID, "%K" for the long key ID, "%f" for the key fingerprint, "%t" for the extension of the image type (e.g. "jpg"), "%T" for the MIME type of the image (e.g. "image/jpeg"), "%v" for the single-character calculated validity of the image being viewed (e.g. "f"), "%V" for the calculated validity as a string (e.g. "full"), "%U" for a base32 encoded hash of the user ID, and "%%" for an actual percent sign. If neither %i or %I are present, then the photo will be supplied to the viewer on standard input. On Unix the default viewer is @code{xloadimage -fork -quiet -title 'KeyID 0x%k' STDIN} with a fallback to @code{display -title 'KeyID 0x%k' %i} and finally to @code{xdg-open %i}. On Windows @code{!ShellExecute 400 %i} is used; here the command is a meta command to use that API call followed by a wait time in milliseconds which is used to give the viewer time to read the temporary image file before gpg deletes it again. Note that if your image viewer program is not secure, then executing it from gpg does not make it secure. @item --exec-path @var{string} @opindex exec-path @efindex PATH Sets a list of directories to search for photo viewers If not provided photo viewers use the @code{PATH} environment variable. @item --keyring @var{file} @opindex keyring Add @var{file} to the current list of keyrings. If @var{file} begins with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG home directory ("~/.gnupg" if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is not used). Note that this adds a keyring to the current list. If the intent is to use the specified keyring alone, use @option{--keyring} along with @option{--no-default-keyring}. If the option @option{--no-keyring} has been used no keyrings will be used at all. @item --secret-keyring @var{file} @opindex secret-keyring This is an obsolete option and ignored. All secret keys are stored in the @file{private-keys-v1.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory. @item --primary-keyring @var{file} @opindex primary-keyring Designate @var{file} as the primary public keyring. This means that newly imported keys (via @option{--import} or keyserver @option{--recv-from}) will go to this keyring. @item --trustdb-name @var{file} @opindex trustdb-name Use @var{file} instead of the default trustdb. If @var{file} begins with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG home directory (@file{~/.gnupg} if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is not used). @include opt-homedir.texi @item --display-charset @var{name} @opindex display-charset Set the name of the native character set. This is used to convert some informational strings like user IDs to the proper UTF-8 encoding. Note that this has nothing to do with the character set of data to be encrypted or signed; GnuPG does not recode user-supplied data. If this option is not used, the default character set is determined from the current locale. A verbosity level of 3 shows the chosen set. Valid values for @var{name} are: @table @asis @item iso-8859-1 @opindex display-charset:iso-8859-1 This is the Latin 1 set. @item iso-8859-2 @opindex display-charset:iso-8859-2 The Latin 2 set. @item iso-8859-15 @opindex display-charset:iso-8859-15 This is currently an alias for the Latin 1 set. @item koi8-r @opindex display-charset:koi8-r The usual Russian set (RFC-1489). @item utf-8 @opindex display-charset:utf-8 Bypass all translations and assume that the OS uses native UTF-8 encoding. @end table @item --utf8-strings @itemx --no-utf8-strings @opindex utf8-strings Assume that command line arguments are given as UTF-8 strings. The default (@option{--no-utf8-strings}) is to assume that arguments are encoded in the character set as specified by @option{--display-charset}. These options affect all following arguments. Both options may be used multiple times. @anchor{gpg-option --options} @item --options @var{file} @opindex options Read options from @var{file} and do not try to read them from the default options file in the homedir (see @option{--homedir}). This option is ignored if used in an options file. @item --no-options @opindex no-options Shortcut for @option{--options /dev/null}. This option is detected before an attempt to open an option file. Using this option will also prevent the creation of a @file{~/.gnupg} homedir. @item -z @var{n} @itemx --compress-level @var{n} @itemx --bzip2-compress-level @var{n} @opindex compress-level @opindex bzip2-compress-level Set compression level to @var{n} for the ZIP and ZLIB compression algorithms. The default is to use the default compression level of zlib (normally 6). @option{--bzip2-compress-level} sets the compression level for the BZIP2 compression algorithm (defaulting to 6 as well). This is a different option from @option{--compress-level} since BZIP2 uses a significant amount of memory for each additional compression level. @option{-z} sets both. A value of 0 for @var{n} disables compression. @item --bzip2-decompress-lowmem @opindex bzip2-decompress-lowmem Use a different decompression method for BZIP2 compressed files. This alternate method uses a bit more than half the memory, but also runs at half the speed. This is useful under extreme low memory circumstances when the file was originally compressed at a high @option{--bzip2-compress-level}. @item --mangle-dos-filenames @itemx --no-mangle-dos-filenames @opindex mangle-dos-filenames @opindex no-mangle-dos-filenames Older version of Windows cannot handle filenames with more than one dot. @option{--mangle-dos-filenames} causes GnuPG to replace (rather than add to) the extension of an output filename to avoid this problem. This option is off by default and has no effect on non-Windows platforms. @item --ask-cert-level @itemx --no-ask-cert-level @opindex ask-cert-level When making a key signature, prompt for a certification level. If this option is not specified, the certification level used is set via @option{--default-cert-level}. See @option{--default-cert-level} for information on the specific levels and how they are used. @option{--no-ask-cert-level} disables this option. This option defaults to no. @item --default-cert-level @var{n} @opindex default-cert-level The default to use for the check level when signing a key. 0 means you make no particular claim as to how carefully you verified the key. 1 means you believe the key is owned by the person who claims to own it but you could not, or did not verify the key at all. This is useful for a "persona" verification, where you sign the key of a pseudonymous user. 2 means you did casual verification of the key. For example, this could mean that you verified the key fingerprint and checked the user ID on the key against a photo ID. 3 means you did extensive verification of the key. For example, this could mean that you verified the key fingerprint with the owner of the key in person, and that you checked, by means of a hard to forge document with a photo ID (such as a passport) that the name of the key owner matches the name in the user ID on the key, and finally that you verified (by exchange of email) that the email address on the key belongs to the key owner. Note that the examples given above for levels 2 and 3 are just that: examples. In the end, it is up to you to decide just what "casual" and "extensive" mean to you. This option defaults to 0 (no particular claim). @item --min-cert-level @opindex min-cert-level When building the trust database, treat any signatures with a certification level below this as invalid. Defaults to 2, which disregards level 1 signatures. Note that level 0 "no particular claim" signatures are always accepted. @item --trusted-key @var{long key ID or fingerprint} @opindex trusted-key Assume that the specified key (which must be given as a full 8 byte key ID, a 20 byte, or 32 byte fingerprint) is as trustworthy as one of your own secret keys. This option is useful if you don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them) online but still want to be able to check the validity of a given recipient's or signator's key. @item --trust-model @{pgp|classic|tofu|tofu+pgp|direct|always|auto@} @opindex trust-model Set what trust model GnuPG should follow. The models are: @table @asis @item pgp @opindex trust-model:pgp This is the Web of Trust combined with trust signatures as used in PGP 5.x and later. This is the default trust model when creating a new trust database. @item classic @opindex trust-model:classic This is the standard Web of Trust as introduced by PGP 2. @item tofu @opindex trust-model:tofu @anchor{trust-model-tofu} TOFU stands for Trust On First Use. In this trust model, the first time a key is seen, it is memorized. If later another key with a user id with the same email address is seen, both keys are marked as suspect. In that case, the next time either is used, a warning is displayed describing the conflict, why it might have occurred (either the user generated a new key and failed to cross sign the old and new keys, the key is forgery, or a man-in-the-middle attack is being attempted), and the user is prompted to manually confirm the validity of the key in question. Because a potential attacker is able to control the email address and thereby circumvent the conflict detection algorithm by using an email address that is similar in appearance to a trusted email address, whenever a message is verified, statistics about the number of messages signed with the key are shown. In this way, a user can easily identify attacks using fake keys for regular correspondents. When compared with the Web of Trust, TOFU offers significantly weaker security guarantees. In particular, TOFU only helps ensure consistency (that is, that the binding between a key and email address doesn't change). A major advantage of TOFU is that it requires little maintenance to use correctly. To use the web of trust properly, you need to actively sign keys and mark users as trusted introducers. This is a time-consuming process and anecdotal evidence suggests that even security-conscious users rarely take the time to do this thoroughly and instead rely on an ad-hoc TOFU process. In the TOFU model, policies are associated with bindings between keys and email addresses (which are extracted from user ids and normalized). There are five policies, which can be set manually using the @option{--tofu-policy} option. The default policy can be set using the @option{--tofu-default-policy} option. The TOFU policies are: @code{auto}, @code{good}, @code{unknown}, @code{bad} and @code{ask}. The @code{auto} policy is used by default (unless overridden by @option{--tofu-default-policy}) and marks a binding as marginally trusted. The @code{good}, @code{unknown} and @code{bad} policies mark a binding as fully trusted, as having unknown trust or as having trust never, respectively. The @code{unknown} policy is useful for just using TOFU to detect conflicts, but to never assign positive trust to a binding. The final policy, @code{ask} prompts the user to indicate the binding's trust. If batch mode is enabled (or input is inappropriate in the context), then the user is not prompted and the @code{undefined} trust level is returned. @item tofu+pgp @opindex trust-model:tofu+pgp This trust model combines TOFU with the Web of Trust. This is done by computing the trust level for each model and then taking the maximum trust level where the trust levels are ordered as follows: @code{unknown < undefined < marginal < fully < ultimate < expired < never}. By setting @option{--tofu-default-policy=unknown}, this model can be used to implement the web of trust with TOFU's conflict detection algorithm, but without its assignment of positive trust values, which some security-conscious users don't like. @item direct @opindex trust-model:direct Key validity is set directly by the user and not calculated via the Web of Trust. This model is solely based on the key and does not distinguish user IDs. Note that when changing to another trust model the trust values assigned to a key are transformed into ownertrust values, which also indicate how you trust the owner of the key to sign other keys. @item always @opindex trust-model:always Skip key validation and assume that used keys are always fully valid. You generally won't use this unless you are using some external validation scheme. This option also suppresses the "[uncertain]" tag printed with signature checks when there is no evidence that the user ID is bound to the key. Note that this trust model still does not allow the use of expired, revoked, or disabled keys. @item auto @opindex trust-model:auto Select the trust model depending on whatever the internal trust database says. This is the default model if such a database already exists. Note that a tofu trust model is not considered here and must be enabled explicitly. @end table @item --auto-key-locate @var{mechanisms} @itemx --no-auto-key-locate @opindex auto-key-locate GnuPG can automatically locate and retrieve keys as needed using this option. This happens when encrypting to an email address (in the "user@@example.com" form), and there are no "user@@example.com" keys on the local keyring. This option takes any number of the mechanisms listed below, in the order they are to be tried. Instead of listing the mechanisms as comma delimited arguments, the option may also be given several times to add more mechanism. The option @option{--no-auto-key-locate} or the mechanism "clear" resets the list. The default is "local,wkd". @table @asis @item cert Locate a key using DNS CERT, as specified in RFC-4398. @item pka Locate a key using DNS PKA. @item dane Locate a key using DANE, as specified in draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-05.txt. @item wkd Locate a key using the Web Key Directory protocol. @item ldap Using DNS Service Discovery, check the domain in question for any LDAP keyservers to use. If this fails, attempt to locate the key using the PGP Universal method of checking @samp{ldap://keys.(thedomain)}. @item keyserver Locate a key using a keyserver. @item keyserver-URL In addition, a keyserver URL as used in the @command{dirmngr} configuration may be used here to query that particular keyserver. @item local Locate the key using the local keyrings. This mechanism allows the user to select the order a local key lookup is done. Thus using @samp{--auto-key-locate local} is identical to @option{--no-auto-key-locate}. @item nodefault This flag disables the standard local key lookup, done before any of the mechanisms defined by the @option{--auto-key-locate} are tried. The position of this mechanism in the list does not matter. It is not required if @code{local} is also used. @item clear Clear all defined mechanisms. This is useful to override mechanisms given in a config file. Note that a @code{nodefault} in @var{mechanisms} will also be cleared unless it is given after the @code{clear}. @end table @item --auto-key-import @itemx --no-auto-key-import @opindex auto-key-import @opindex no-auto-key-import This is an offline mechanism to get a missing key for signature verification and for later encryption to this key. If this option is enabled and a signature includes an embedded key, that key is used to verify the signature and on verification success the key is imported. The default is @option{--no-auto-key-import}. On the sender (signing) site the option @option{--include-key-block} needs to be used to put the public part of the signing key as “Key Block subpacket” into the signature. @item --auto-key-retrieve @itemx --no-auto-key-retrieve @opindex auto-key-retrieve @opindex no-auto-key-retrieve These options enable or disable the automatic retrieving of keys from a keyserver when verifying signatures made by keys that are not on the local keyring. The default is @option{--no-auto-key-retrieve}. The order of methods tried to lookup the key is: 1. If the option @option{--auto-key-import} is set and the signatures includes an embedded key, that key is used to verify the signature and on verification success that key is imported. 2. If a preferred keyserver is specified in the signature and the option @option{honor-keyserver-url} is active (which is not the default), that keyserver is tried. Note that the creator of the signature uses the option @option{--sig-keyserver-url} to specify the preferred keyserver for data signatures. 3. If the signature has the Signer's UID set (e.g. using @option{--sender} while creating the signature) a Web Key Directory (WKD) lookup is done. This is the default configuration but can be disabled by removing WKD from the auto-key-locate list or by using the option @option{--disable-signer-uid}. 4. If the option @option{honor-pka-record} is active, the legacy PKA method is used. 5. If any keyserver is configured and the Issuer Fingerprint is part of the signature (since GnuPG 2.1.16), the configured keyservers are tried. Note that this option makes a "web bug" like behavior possible. Keyserver or Web Key Directory operators can see which keys you request, so by sending you a message signed by a brand new key (which you naturally will not have on your local keyring), the operator can tell both your IP address and the time when you verified the signature. @item --keyid-format @{none|short|0xshort|long|0xlong@} @opindex keyid-format Select how to display key IDs. "none" does not show the key ID at all but shows the fingerprint in a separate line. "short" is the traditional 8-character key ID. "long" is the more accurate (but less convenient) 16-character key ID. Add an "0x" to either to include an "0x" at the beginning of the key ID, as in 0x99242560. Note that this option is ignored if the option @option{--with-colons} is used. @item --keyserver @var{name} @opindex keyserver This option is deprecated - please use the @option{--keyserver} in @file{dirmngr.conf} instead. Use @var{name} as your keyserver. This is the server that @option{--receive-keys}, @option{--send-keys}, and @option{--search-keys} will communicate with to receive keys from, send keys to, and search for keys on. The format of the @var{name} is a URI: `scheme:[//]keyservername[:port]' The scheme is the type of keyserver: "hkp" for the HTTP (or compatible) keyservers, "ldap" for the LDAP keyservers, or "mailto" for the Graff email keyserver. Note that your particular installation of GnuPG may have other keyserver types available as well. Keyserver schemes are case-insensitive. After the keyserver name, optional keyserver configuration options may be provided. These are the same as the global @option{--keyserver-options} from below, but apply only to this particular keyserver. Most keyservers synchronize with each other, so there is generally no need to send keys to more than one server. The keyserver @code{hkp://keys.gnupg.net} uses round robin DNS to give a different keyserver each time you use it. @item --keyserver-options @{@var{name}=@var{value}@} @opindex keyserver-options This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for the keyserver. Options can be prefixed with a `no-' to give the opposite meaning. Valid import-options or export-options may be used here as well to apply to importing (@option{--recv-key}) or exporting (@option{--send-key}) a key from a keyserver. While not all options are available for all keyserver types, some common options are: @table @asis @item include-revoked When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that are marked on the keyserver as revoked. Note that not all keyservers differentiate between revoked and unrevoked keys, and for such keyservers this option is meaningless. Note also that most keyservers do not have cryptographic verification of key revocations, and so turning this option off may result in skipping keys that are incorrectly marked as revoked. @item include-disabled When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that are marked on the keyserver as disabled. Note that this option is not used with HKP keyservers. @item auto-key-retrieve This is an obsolete alias for the option @option{auto-key-retrieve}. Please do not use it; it will be removed in future versions.. @item honor-keyserver-url When using @option{--refresh-keys}, if the key in question has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to refresh the key from. In addition, if auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature being verified has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to fetch the key from. Note that this option introduces a "web bug": The creator of the key can see when the keys is refreshed. Thus this option is not enabled by default. @item honor-pka-record If @option{--auto-key-retrieve} is used, and the signature being verified has a PKA record, then use the PKA information to fetch the key. Defaults to "yes". @item include-subkeys When receiving a key, include subkeys as potential targets. Note that this option is not used with HKP keyservers, as they do not support retrieving keys by subkey id. @item timeout @itemx http-proxy=@var{value} @itemx verbose @itemx debug @itemx check-cert @item ca-cert-file These options have no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the @code{dirmngr} configuration options instead. @end table The default list of options is: "self-sigs-only, import-clean, repair-keys, repair-pks-subkey-bug, export-attributes, honor-pka-record". @item --completes-needed @var{n} @opindex compliant-needed Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new key signer (defaults to 1). @item --marginals-needed @var{n} @opindex marginals-needed Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new key signer (defaults to 3) @item --tofu-default-policy @{auto|good|unknown|bad|ask@} @opindex tofu-default-policy The default TOFU policy (defaults to @code{auto}). For more information about the meaning of this option, @pxref{trust-model-tofu}. @item --max-cert-depth @var{n} @opindex max-cert-depth Maximum depth of a certification chain (default is 5). @item --no-sig-cache @opindex no-sig-cache Do not cache the verification status of key signatures. Caching gives a much better performance in key listings. However, if you suspect that your public keyring is not safe against write modifications, you can use this option to disable the caching. It probably does not make sense to disable it because all kind of damage can be done if someone else has write access to your public keyring. @item --auto-check-trustdb @itemx --no-auto-check-trustdb @opindex auto-check-trustdb If GnuPG feels that its information about the Web of Trust has to be updated, it automatically runs the @option{--check-trustdb} command internally. This may be a time consuming process. @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} disables this option. @item --use-agent @itemx --no-use-agent @opindex use-agent This is dummy option. @command{@gpgname} always requires the agent. @item --gpg-agent-info @opindex gpg-agent-info This is dummy option. It has no effect when used with @command{@gpgname}. @item --agent-program @var{file} @opindex agent-program Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The default value is determined by running @command{gpgconf} with the option @option{--list-dirs}. Note that the pipe symbol (@code{|}) is used for a regression test suite hack and may thus not be used in the file name. @item --dirmngr-program @var{file} @opindex dirmngr-program Specify a dirmngr program to be used for keyserver access. The default value is @file{@value{BINDIR}/dirmngr}. @item --disable-dirmngr Entirely disable the use of the Dirmngr. @item --no-autostart @opindex no-autostart Do not start the gpg-agent or the dirmngr if it has not yet been started and its service is required. This option is mostly useful on machines where the connection to gpg-agent has been redirected to another machines. If dirmngr is required on the remote machine, it may be started manually using @command{gpgconf --launch dirmngr}. @item --lock-once @opindex lock-once Lock the databases the first time a lock is requested and do not release the lock until the process terminates. @item --lock-multiple @opindex lock-multiple Release the locks every time a lock is no longer needed. Use this to override a previous @option{--lock-once} from a config file. @item --lock-never @opindex lock-never Disable locking entirely. This option should be used only in very special environments, where it can be assured that only one process is accessing those files. A bootable floppy with a stand-alone encryption system will probably use this. Improper usage of this option may lead to data and key corruption. @item --exit-on-status-write-error @opindex exit-on-status-write-error This option will cause write errors on the status FD to immediately terminate the process. That should in fact be the default but it never worked this way and thus we need an option to enable this, so that the change won't break applications which close their end of a status fd connected pipe too early. Using this option along with @option{--enable-progress-filter} may be used to cleanly cancel long running gpg operations. @item --limit-card-insert-tries @var{n} @opindex limit-card-insert-tries With @var{n} greater than 0 the number of prompts asking to insert a smartcard gets limited to N-1. Thus with a value of 1 gpg won't at all ask to insert a card if none has been inserted at startup. This option is useful in the configuration file in case an application does not know about the smartcard support and waits ad infinitum for an inserted card. @item --no-random-seed-file @opindex no-random-seed-file GnuPG uses a file to store its internal random pool over invocations. This makes random generation faster; however sometimes write operations are not desired. This option can be used to achieve that with the cost of slower random generation. @item --no-greeting @opindex no-greeting Suppress the initial copyright message. @item --no-secmem-warning @opindex no-secmem-warning Suppress the warning about "using insecure memory". @item --no-permission-warning @opindex permission-warning Suppress the warning about unsafe file and home directory (@option{--homedir}) permissions. Note that the permission checks that GnuPG performs are not intended to be authoritative, but rather they simply warn about certain common permission problems. Do not assume that the lack of a warning means that your system is secure. Note that the warning for unsafe @option{--homedir} permissions cannot be suppressed in the gpg.conf file, as this would allow an attacker to place an unsafe gpg.conf file in place, and use this file to suppress warnings about itself. The @option{--homedir} permissions warning may only be suppressed on the command line. @item --require-secmem @itemx --no-require-secmem @opindex require-secmem Refuse to run if GnuPG cannot get secure memory. Defaults to no (i.e. run, but give a warning). @item --require-cross-certification @itemx --no-require-cross-certification @opindex require-cross-certification When verifying a signature made from a subkey, ensure that the cross certification "back signature" on the subkey is present and valid. This protects against a subtle attack against subkeys that can sign. Defaults to @option{--require-cross-certification} for @command{@gpgname}. @item --expert @itemx --no-expert @opindex expert Allow the user to do certain nonsensical or "silly" things like signing an expired or revoked key, or certain potentially incompatible things like generating unusual key types. This also disables certain warning messages about potentially incompatible actions. As the name implies, this option is for experts only. If you don't fully understand the implications of what it allows you to do, leave this off. @option{--no-expert} disables this option. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** KEY RELATED OPTIONS ************ @c ******************************************* @node GPG Key related Options @subsection Key related options @table @gnupgtabopt @item --recipient @var{name} @itemx -r @opindex recipient Encrypt for user id @var{name}. If this option or @option{--hidden-recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user-id unless @option{--default-recipient} is given. @item --hidden-recipient @var{name} @itemx -R @opindex hidden-recipient Encrypt for user ID @var{name}, but hide the key ID of this user's key. This option helps to hide the receiver of the message and is a limited countermeasure against traffic analysis. If this option or @option{--recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user ID unless @option{--default-recipient} is given. @item --recipient-file @var{file} @itemx -f @opindex recipient-file This option is similar to @option{--recipient} except that it encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{@gpgname} assumes that the key in this file is fully valid. @item --hidden-recipient-file @var{file} @itemx -F @opindex hidden-recipient-file This option is similar to @option{--hidden-recipient} except that it encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{@gpgname} assumes that the key in this file is fully valid. @item --encrypt-to @var{name} @opindex encrypt-to Same as @option{--recipient} but this one is intended for use in the options file and may be used with your own user-id as an "encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked user id. No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even disabled keys can be used. @item --hidden-encrypt-to @var{name} @opindex hidden-encrypt-to Same as @option{--hidden-recipient} but this one is intended for use in the options file and may be used with your own user-id as a hidden "encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked user id. No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even disabled keys can be used. @item --no-encrypt-to @opindex no-encrypt-to Disable the use of all @option{--encrypt-to} and @option{--hidden-encrypt-to} keys. @item --group @{@var{name}=@var{value}@} @opindex group Sets up a named group, which is similar to aliases in email programs. Any time the group name is a recipient (@option{-r} or @option{--recipient}), it will be expanded to the values specified. Multiple groups with the same name are automatically merged into a single group. The values are @code{key IDs} or fingerprints, but any key description is accepted. Note that a value with spaces in it will be treated as two different values. Note also there is only one level of expansion --- you cannot make an group that points to another group. When used from the command line, it may be necessary to quote the argument to this option to prevent the shell from treating it as multiple arguments. @item --ungroup @var{name} @opindex ungroup Remove a given entry from the @option{--group} list. @item --no-groups @opindex no-groups Remove all entries from the @option{--group} list. @item --local-user @var{name} @itemx -u @opindex local-user Use @var{name} as the key to sign with. Note that this option overrides @option{--default-key}. @item --sender @var{mbox} @opindex sender This option has two purposes. @var{mbox} must either be a complete user ID containing a proper mail address or just a plain mail address. The option can be given multiple times. When creating a signature this option tells gpg the signing key's user id used to make the signature and embeds that user ID into the created signature (using OpenPGP's ``Signer's User ID'' subpacket). If the option is given multiple times a suitable user ID is picked. However, if the signing key was specified directly by using a mail address (i.e. not by using a fingerprint or key ID) this option is used and the mail address is embedded in the created signature. When verifying a signature @var{mbox} is used to restrict the information printed by the TOFU code to matching user IDs. If the option is used and the signature contains a ``Signer's User ID'' subpacket that information is is also used to restrict the printed information. Note that GnuPG considers only the mail address part of a User ID. If this option or the said subpacket is available the TRUST lines as printed by option @option{status-fd} correspond to the corresponding User ID; if no User ID is known the TRUST lines are computed directly on the key and do not give any information about the User ID. In the latter case it his highly recommended to scripts and other frontends to evaluate the VALIDSIG line, retrieve the key and print all User IDs along with their validity (trust) information. @item --try-secret-key @var{name} @opindex try-secret-key For hidden recipients GPG needs to know the keys to use for trial decryption. The key set with @option{--default-key} is always tried first, but this is often not sufficient. This option allows setting more keys to be used for trial decryption. Although any valid user-id specification may be used for @var{name} it makes sense to use at least the long keyid to avoid ambiguities. Note that gpg-agent might pop up a pinentry for a lot keys to do the trial decryption. If you want to stop all further trial decryption you may use close-window button instead of the cancel button. @item --try-all-secrets @opindex try-all-secrets Don't look at the key ID as stored in the message but try all secret keys in turn to find the right decryption key. This option forces the behaviour as used by anonymous recipients (created by using @option{--throw-keyids} or @option{--hidden-recipient}) and might come handy in case where an encrypted message contains a bogus key ID. @item --skip-hidden-recipients @itemx --no-skip-hidden-recipients @opindex skip-hidden-recipients @opindex no-skip-hidden-recipients During decryption skip all anonymous recipients. This option helps in the case that people use the hidden recipients feature to hide their own encrypt-to key from others. If one has many secret keys this may lead to a major annoyance because all keys are tried in turn to decrypt something which was not really intended for it. The drawback of this option is that it is currently not possible to decrypt a message which includes real anonymous recipients. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** INPUT AND OUTPUT *************** @c ******************************************* @node GPG Input and Output @subsection Input and Output @table @gnupgtabopt @item --armor @itemx -a @opindex armor Create ASCII armored output. The default is to create the binary OpenPGP format. @item --no-armor @opindex no-armor Assume the input data is not in ASCII armored format. @item --output @var{file} @itemx -o @var{file} @opindex output Write output to @var{file}. To write to stdout use @code{-} as the filename. @item --max-output @var{n} @opindex max-output This option sets a limit on the number of bytes that will be generated when processing a file. Since OpenPGP supports various levels of compression, it is possible that the plaintext of a given message may be significantly larger than the original OpenPGP message. While GnuPG works properly with such messages, there is often a desire to set a maximum file size that will be generated before processing is forced to stop by the OS limits. Defaults to 0, which means "no limit". @item --chunk-size @var{n} @opindex chunk-size The AEAD encryption mode encrypts the data in chunks so that a receiving side can check for transmission errors or tampering at the end of each chunk and does not need to delay this until all data has been received. The used chunk size is 2^@var{n} byte. The lowest allowed value for @var{n} is 6 (64 byte) and the largest is the default of 27 which creates chunks not larger than 128 MiB. @item --input-size-hint @var{n} @opindex input-size-hint This option can be used to tell GPG the size of the input data in bytes. @var{n} must be a positive base-10 number. This option is only useful if the input is not taken from a file. GPG may use this hint to optimize its buffer allocation strategy. It is also used by the @option{--status-fd} line ``PROGRESS'' to provide a value for ``total'' if that is not available by other means. @item --key-origin @var{string}[,@var{url}] @opindex key-origin gpg can track the origin of a key. Certain origins are implicitly known (e.g. keyserver, web key directory) and set. For a standard import the origin of the keys imported can be set with this option. To list the possible values use "help" for @var{string}. Some origins can store an optional @var{url} argument. That URL can appended to @var{string} after a comma. @item --import-options @var{parameters} @opindex import-options This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for importing keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the opposite meaning. The options are: @table @asis @item import-local-sigs Allow importing key signatures marked as "local". This is not generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used. Defaults to no. @item keep-ownertrust Normally possible still existing ownertrust values of a key are cleared if a key is imported. This is in general desirable so that a formerly deleted key does not automatically gain an ownertrust values merely due to import. On the other hand it is sometimes necessary to re-import a trusted set of keys again but keeping already assigned ownertrust values. This can be achieved by using this option. @item repair-pks-subkey-bug During import, attempt to repair the damage caused by the PKS keyserver bug (pre version 0.9.6) that mangles keys with multiple subkeys. Note that this cannot completely repair the damaged key as some crucial data is removed by the keyserver, but it does at least give you back one subkey. Defaults to no for regular @option{--import} and to yes for keyserver @option{--receive-keys}. @item import-show @itemx show-only Show a listing of the key as imported right before it is stored. This can be combined with the option @option{--dry-run} to only look at keys; the option @option{show-only} is a shortcut for this combination. The command @option{--show-keys} is another shortcut for this. Note that suffixes like '#' for "sec" and "sbb" lines may or may not be printed. @item import-export Run the entire import code but instead of storing the key to the local keyring write it to the output. The export options @option{export-pka} and @option{export-dane} affect the output. This option can be used to remove all invalid parts from a key without the need to store it. @item merge-only During import, allow key updates to existing keys, but do not allow any new keys to be imported. Defaults to no. @item import-clean After import, compact (remove all signatures except the self-signature) any user IDs from the new key that are not usable. Then, remove any signatures from the new key that are not usable. This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "clean" after import. Defaults to no. @item import-drop-uids Do not import any user ids or their binding signatures. This option can be used to update only the subkeys or other non-user id related information. @item self-sigs-only Accept only self-signatures while importing a key. All other key signatures are skipped at an early import stage. This option can be used with @code{keyserver-options} to mitigate attempts to flood a key with bogus signatures from a keyserver. The drawback is that all other valid key signatures, as required by the Web of Trust are also not imported. Note that when using this option along with import-clean it suppresses the final clean step after merging the imported key into the existing key. @item repair-keys After import, fix various problems with the keys. For example, this reorders signatures, and strips duplicate signatures. Defaults to yes. @item bulk-import When used with --use-keyboxd do the import within a single transaction. This is an experimental feature. @item import-minimal Import the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" after import. Defaults to no. @item restore @itemx import-restore Import in key restore mode. This imports all data which is usually skipped during import; including all GnuPG specific data. All other contradicting options are overridden. @end table @item --import-filter @{@var{name}=@var{expr}@} @itemx --export-filter @{@var{name}=@var{expr}@} @opindex import-filter @opindex export-filter These options define an import/export filter which are applied to the imported/exported keyblock right before it will be stored/written. @var{name} defines the type of filter to use, @var{expr} the expression to evaluate. The option can be used several times which then appends more expression to the same @var{name}. @noindent The available filter types are: @table @asis @item keep-uid This filter will keep a user id packet and its dependent packets in the keyblock if the expression evaluates to true. @item drop-subkey This filter drops the selected subkeys. Currently only implemented for --export-filter. @item drop-sig This filter drops the selected key signatures on user ids. Self-signatures are not considered. Currently only implemented for --import-filter. @end table For the syntax of the expression see the chapter "FILTER EXPRESSIONS". The property names for the expressions depend on the actual filter type and are indicated in the following table. The available properties are: @table @asis @item uid A string with the user id. (keep-uid) @item mbox The addr-spec part of a user id with mailbox or the empty string. (keep-uid) @item key_algo A number with the public key algorithm of a key or subkey packet. (drop-subkey) @item key_created @itemx key_created_d The first is the timestamp a public key or subkey packet was created. The second is the same but given as an ISO string, e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-subkey) @item fpr The hexified fingerprint of the current subkey or primary key. (drop-subkey) @item primary Boolean indicating whether the user id is the primary one. (keep-uid) @item expired Boolean indicating whether a user id (keep-uid), a key (drop-subkey), or a signature (drop-sig) expired. @item revoked Boolean indicating whether a user id (keep-uid) or a key (drop-subkey) has been revoked. @item disabled Boolean indicating whether a primary key is disabled. (not used) @item secret Boolean indicating whether a key or subkey is a secret one. (drop-subkey) @item usage A string indicating the usage flags for the subkey, from the sequence ``ecsa?''. For example, a subkey capable of just signing and authentication would be an exact match for ``sa''. (drop-subkey) @item sig_created @itemx sig_created_d The first is the timestamp a signature packet was created. The second is the same but given as an ISO date string, e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-sig) @item sig_algo A number with the public key algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig) @item sig_digest_algo A number with the digest algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig) @end table @item --export-options @var{parameters} @opindex export-options This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for exporting keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the opposite meaning. The options are: @table @asis @item export-local-sigs Allow exporting key signatures marked as "local". This is not generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used. Defaults to no. @item export-attributes Include attribute user IDs (photo IDs) while exporting. Not including attribute user IDs is useful to export keys that are going to be used by an OpenPGP program that does not accept attribute user IDs. Defaults to yes. @item export-sensitive-revkeys Include designated revoker information that was marked as "sensitive". Defaults to no. @c Since GnuPG 2.1 gpg-agent manages the secret key and thus the @c export-reset-subkey-passwd hack is not anymore justified. Such use @c cases may be implemented using a specialized secret key export @c tool. @c @item export-reset-subkey-passwd @c When using the @option{--export-secret-subkeys} command, this option resets @c the passphrases for all exported subkeys to empty. This is useful @c when the exported subkey is to be used on an unattended machine where @c a passphrase doesn't necessarily make sense. Defaults to no. @item backup @itemx export-backup Export for use as a backup. The exported data includes all data which is needed to restore the key or keys later with GnuPG. The format is basically the OpenPGP format but enhanced with GnuPG specific data. All other contradicting options are overridden. @item export-clean Compact (remove all signatures from) user IDs on the key being exported if the user IDs are not usable. Also, do not export any signatures that are not usable. This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "clean" before export except that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to no. @item export-minimal Export the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" before export except that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to no. @item export-drop-uids Do no export any user id or attribute packets or their associates signatures. Note that due to missing user ids the resulting output is not strictly RFC-4880 compliant. @item export-pka Instead of outputting the key material output PKA records suitable to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before each record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone file. @item export-dane Instead of outputting the key material output OpenPGP DANE records suitable to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before each record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone file. @end table @item --with-colons @opindex with-colons Print key listings delimited by colons. Note that the output will be encoded in UTF-8 regardless of any @option{--display-charset} setting. This format is useful when GnuPG is called from scripts and other programs as it is easily machine parsed. The details of this format are documented in the file @file{doc/DETAILS}, which is included in the GnuPG source distribution. @item --fixed-list-mode @opindex fixed-list-mode Do not merge primary user ID and primary key in @option{--with-colon} listing mode and print all timestamps as seconds since 1970-01-01. Since GnuPG 2.0.10, this mode is always used and thus this option is obsolete; it does not harm to use it though. @item --legacy-list-mode @opindex legacy-list-mode Revert to the pre-2.1 public key list mode. This only affects the human readable output and not the machine interface (i.e. @code{--with-colons}). Note that the legacy format does not convey suitable information for elliptic curves. @item --with-fingerprint @opindex with-fingerprint Same as the command @option{--fingerprint} but changes only the format of the output and may be used together with another command. @item --with-subkey-fingerprint @opindex with-subkey-fingerprint If a fingerprint is printed for the primary key, this option forces printing of the fingerprint for all subkeys. This could also be achieved by using the @option{--with-fingerprint} twice but by using this option along with keyid-format "none" a compact fingerprint is printed. @item --with-icao-spelling @opindex with-icao-spelling Print the ICAO spelling of the fingerprint in addition to the hex digits. @item --with-keygrip @opindex with-keygrip Include the keygrip in the key listings. In @code{--with-colons} mode this is implicitly enable for secret keys. @item --with-key-origin @opindex with-key-origin Include the locally held information on the origin and last update of a key in a key listing. In @code{--with-colons} mode this is always printed. This data is currently experimental and shall not be considered part of the stable API. @item --with-wkd-hash @opindex with-wkd-hash Print a Web Key Directory identifier along with each user ID in key listings. This is an experimental feature and semantics may change. @item --with-secret @opindex with-secret Include info about the presence of a secret key in public key listings done with @code{--with-colons}. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** OPENPGP OPTIONS **************** @c ******************************************* @node OpenPGP Options @subsection OpenPGP protocol specific options @table @gnupgtabopt @item -t, --textmode @itemx --no-textmode @opindex textmode Treat input files as text and store them in the OpenPGP canonical text form with standard "CRLF" line endings. This also sets the necessary flags to inform the recipient that the encrypted or signed data is text and may need its line endings converted back to whatever the local system uses. This option is useful when communicating between two platforms that have different line ending conventions (UNIX-like to Mac, Mac to Windows, etc). @option{--no-textmode} disables this option, and is the default. @item --force-v3-sigs @itemx --no-force-v3-sigs @item --force-v4-certs @itemx --no-force-v4-certs These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.1. @item --force-aead @opindex force-aead Force the use of AEAD encryption over MDC encryption. AEAD is a modern and faster way to do authenticated encryption than the old MDC method. See also options @option{--aead-algo} and @option{--chunk-size}. @item --force-mdc @itemx --disable-mdc @opindex force-mdc @opindex disable-mdc These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.2.8. The MDC is always used unless the keys indicate that an AEAD algorithm can be used in which case AEAD is used. But note: If the creation of a legacy non-MDC message is exceptionally required, the option @option{--rfc2440} allows for this. @item --disable-signer-uid @opindex disable-signer-uid By default the user ID of the signing key is embedded in the data signature. As of now this is only done if the signing key has been specified with @option{local-user} using a mail address, or with @option{sender}. This information can be helpful for verifier to locate the key; see option @option{--auto-key-retrieve}. @item --include-key-block @itemx --no-include-key-block @opindex include-key-block @opindex no-include-key-block This option is used to embed the actual signing key into a data signature. The embedded key is stripped down to a single user id and includes only the signing subkey used to create the signature as well as as valid encryption subkeys. All other info is removed from the key to keep it and thus the signature small. This option is the OpenPGP counterpart to the @command{gpgsm} option @option{--include-certs} and allows the recipient of a signed message to reply encrypted to the sender without using any online directories to lookup the key. The default is @option{--no-include-key-block}. See also the option @option{--auto-key-import}. @item --personal-cipher-preferences @var{string} @opindex personal-cipher-preferences Set the list of personal cipher preferences to @var{string}. Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command. @item --personal-aead-preferences @var{string} @opindex personal-aead-preferences Set the list of personal AEAD preferences to @var{string}. Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command. @item --personal-digest-preferences @var{string} @opindex personal-digest-preferences Set the list of personal digest preferences to @var{string}. Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked digest algorithm in this list is also used when signing without encryption (e.g. @option{--clear-sign} or @option{--sign}). @item --personal-compress-preferences @var{string} @opindex personal-compress-preferences Set the list of personal compression preferences to @var{string}. Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked compression algorithm in this list is also used when there are no recipient keys to consider (e.g. @option{--symmetric}). @item --s2k-cipher-algo @var{name} @opindex s2k-cipher-algo Use @var{name} as the cipher algorithm for symmetric encryption with a passphrase if @option{--personal-cipher-preferences} and @option{--cipher-algo} are not given. The default is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}. @item --s2k-digest-algo @var{name} @opindex s2k-digest-algo Use @var{name} as the digest algorithm used to mangle the passphrases for symmetric encryption. The default is SHA-1. @item --s2k-mode @var{n} @opindex s2k-mode Selects how passphrases for symmetric encryption are mangled. If @var{n} is 0 a plain passphrase (which is in general not recommended) will be used, a 1 adds a salt (which should not be used) to the passphrase and a 3 (the default) iterates the whole process a number of times (see @option{--s2k-count}). @item --s2k-count @var{n} @opindex s2k-count Specify how many times the passphrases mangling for symmetric encryption is repeated. This value may range between 1024 and 65011712 inclusive. The default is inquired from gpg-agent. Note that not all values in the 1024-65011712 range are legal and if an illegal value is selected, GnuPG will round up to the nearest legal value. This option is only meaningful if @option{--s2k-mode} is set to the default of 3. @end table @c *************************** @c ******* Compliance ******** @c *************************** @node Compliance Options @subsection Compliance options These options control what GnuPG is compliant to. Only one of these options may be active at a time. Note that the default setting of this is nearly always the correct one. See the INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below before using one of these options. @table @gnupgtabopt @item --gnupg @opindex gnupg Use standard GnuPG behavior. This is essentially OpenPGP behavior (see @option{--openpgp}), but with extension from the proposed update to OpenPGP and with some additional workarounds for common compatibility problems in different versions of PGP. This is the default option, so it is not generally needed, but it may be useful to override a different compliance option in the gpg.conf file. @item --openpgp @opindex openpgp Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict OpenPGP behavior. Use this option to reset all previous options like @option{--s2k-*}, @option{--cipher-algo}, @option{--digest-algo} and @option{--compress-algo} to OpenPGP compliant values. All PGP workarounds are disabled. @item --rfc4880 @opindex rfc4880 Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-4880 behavior. Note that this is currently the same thing as @option{--openpgp}. @item --rfc4880bis @opindex rfc4880bis Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict according to the proposed updates of RFC-4880. @item --rfc2440 @opindex rfc2440 Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-2440 behavior. Note that by using this option encryption packets are created in a legacy mode without MDC protection. This is dangerous and should thus only be used for experiments. See also option @option{--ignore-mdc-error}. @item --pgp6 @opindex pgp6 This option is obsolete; it is handled as an alias for @option{--pgp7} @item --pgp7 @opindex pgp7 Set up all options to be as PGP 7 compliant as possible. This allowed the ciphers IDEA, 3DES, CAST5,AES128, AES192, AES256, and TWOFISH., the hashes MD5, SHA1 and RIPEMD160, and the compression algorithms none and ZIP. This option implies @option{--escape-from-lines} and disables @option{--throw-keyids}, @item --pgp8 @opindex pgp8 Set up all options to be as PGP 8 compliant as possible. PGP 8 is a lot closer to the OpenPGP standard than previous versions of PGP, so all this does is disable @option{--throw-keyids} and set @option{--escape-from-lines}. All algorithms are allowed except for the SHA224, SHA384, and SHA512 digests. @item --compliance @var{string} @opindex compliance This option can be used instead of one of the options above. Valid values for @var{string} are the above option names (without the double dash) and possibly others as shown when using "help" for @var{value}. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** ESOTERIC OPTIONS *************** @c ******************************************* @node GPG Esoteric Options @subsection Doing things one usually doesn't want to do @table @gnupgtabopt @item -n @itemx --dry-run @opindex dry-run Don't make any changes (this is not completely implemented). @item --list-only @opindex list-only Changes the behaviour of some commands. This is like @option{--dry-run} but different in some cases. The semantic of this option may be extended in the future. Currently it only skips the actual decryption pass and therefore enables a fast listing of the encryption keys. @item -i @itemx --interactive @opindex interactive Prompt before overwriting any files. @item --debug-level @var{level} @opindex debug-level Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be a numeric value or by a keyword: @table @code @item none No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of the keyword. @item basic Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used instead of the keyword. @item advanced More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used instead of the keyword. @item expert Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used instead of the keyword. @item guru All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is only enabled if the keyword is used. @end table How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are however carefully selected to best aid in debugging. @item --debug @var{flags} @opindex debug Set debug flags. All flags are or-ed and @var{flags} may be given in C syntax (e.g. 0x0042) or as a comma separated list of flag names. To get a list of all supported flags the single word "help" can be used. This option is only useful for debugging and the behavior may change at any time without notice. @item --debug-all @opindex debug-all Set all useful debugging flags. @item --debug-iolbf @opindex debug-iolbf Set stdout into line buffered mode. This option is only honored when given on the command line. @item --debug-set-iobuf-size @var{n} @opindex debug-iolbf Change the buffer size of the IOBUFs to @var{n} kilobyte. Using 0 prints the current size. Note well: This is a maintainer only option and may thus be changed or removed at any time without notice. @item --debug-allow-large-chunks @opindex debug-allow-large-chunks To facilitate in-memory decryption on the receiving site, the largest recommended chunk size is 128 MiB (@code{--chunk-size 27}). This option allows to specify a limit of up to 4 EiB (@code{--chunk-size 62}) for experiments. @item --faked-system-time @var{epoch} @opindex faked-system-time This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back or forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since the year 1970. Alternatively @var{epoch} may be given as a full ISO time string (e.g. "20070924T154812"). If you suffix @var{epoch} with an exclamation mark (!), the system time will appear to be frozen at the specified time. @item --full-timestrings @opindex full-timestrings Change the format of printed creation and expiration times from just the date to the date and time. This is in general not useful and the same information is anyway available in @option{--with-colons} mode. These longer strings are also not well aligned with other printed data. @item --enable-progress-filter @opindex enable-progress-filter Enable certain PROGRESS status outputs. This option allows frontends to display a progress indicator while gpg is processing larger files. There is a slight performance overhead using it. @item --status-fd @var{n} @opindex status-fd Write special status strings to the file descriptor @var{n}. See the file DETAILS in the documentation for a listing of them. @item --status-file @var{file} @opindex status-file Same as @option{--status-fd}, except the status data is written to file @var{file}. @item --logger-fd @var{n} @opindex logger-fd Write log output to file descriptor @var{n} and not to STDERR. @item --log-file @var{file} @itemx --logger-file @var{file} @opindex log-file Same as @option{--logger-fd}, except the logger data is written to file @var{file}. Use @file{socket://} to log to s socket. @item --attribute-fd @var{n} @opindex attribute-fd Write attribute subpackets to the file descriptor @var{n}. This is most useful for use with @option{--status-fd}, since the status messages are needed to separate out the various subpackets from the stream delivered to the file descriptor. @item --attribute-file @var{file} @opindex attribute-file Same as @option{--attribute-fd}, except the attribute data is written to file @var{file}. @item --comment @var{string} @itemx --no-comments @opindex comment Use @var{string} as a comment string in cleartext signatures and ASCII armored messages or keys (see @option{--armor}). The default behavior is not to use a comment string. @option{--comment} may be repeated multiple times to get multiple comment strings. @option{--no-comments} removes all comments. It is a good idea to keep the length of a single comment below 60 characters to avoid problems with mail programs wrapping such lines. Note that comment lines, like all other header lines, are not protected by the signature. @item --emit-version @itemx --no-emit-version @opindex emit-version Force inclusion of the version string in ASCII armored output. If given once only the name of the program and the major number is emitted, given twice the minor is also emitted, given thrice the micro is added, and given four times an operating system identification is also emitted. @option{--no-emit-version} (default) disables the version line. @item --sig-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@} @itemx --cert-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@} @itemx -N, --set-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@} @opindex sig-notation @opindex cert-notation @opindex set-notation Put the name value pair into the signature as notation data. @var{name} must consist only of printable characters or spaces, and must contain a '@@' character in the form keyname@@domain.example.com (substituting the appropriate keyname and domain name, of course). This is to help prevent pollution of the IETF reserved notation namespace. The @option{--expert} flag overrides the '@@' check. @var{value} may be any printable string; it will be encoded in UTF-8, so you should check that your @option{--display-charset} is set correctly. If you prefix @var{name} with an exclamation mark (!), the notation data will be flagged as critical (rfc4880:5.2.3.16). @option{--sig-notation} sets a notation for data signatures. @option{--cert-notation} sets a notation for key signatures (certifications). @option{--set-notation} sets both. There are special codes that may be used in notation names. "%k" will be expanded into the key ID of the key being signed, "%K" into the long key ID of the key being signed, "%f" into the fingerprint of the key being signed, "%s" into the key ID of the key making the signature, "%S" into the long key ID of the key making the signature, "%g" into the fingerprint of the key making the signature (which might be a subkey), "%p" into the fingerprint of the primary key of the key making the signature, "%c" into the signature count from the OpenPGP smartcard, and "%%" results in a single "%". %k, %K, and %f are only meaningful when making a key signature (certification), and %c is only meaningful when using the OpenPGP smartcard. @item --known-notation @var{name} @opindex known-notation Adds @var{name} to a list of known critical signature notations. The effect of this is that gpg will not mark a signature with a critical signature notation of that name as bad. Note that gpg already knows by default about a few critical signatures notation names. @item --sig-policy-url @var{string} @itemx --cert-policy-url @var{string} @itemx --set-policy-url @var{string} @opindex sig-policy-url @opindex cert-policy-url @opindex set-policy-url Use @var{string} as a Policy URL for signatures (rfc4880:5.2.3.20). If you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the policy URL packet will be flagged as critical. @option{--sig-policy-url} sets a policy url for data signatures. @option{--cert-policy-url} sets a policy url for key signatures (certifications). @option{--set-policy-url} sets both. The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well. @item --sig-keyserver-url @var{string} @opindex sig-keyserver-url Use @var{string} as a preferred keyserver URL for data signatures. If you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the keyserver URL packet will be flagged as critical. The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well. @item --set-filename @var{string} @opindex set-filename Use @var{string} as the filename which is stored inside messages. This overrides the default, which is to use the actual filename of the file being encrypted. Using the empty string for @var{string} effectively removes the filename from the output. @item --for-your-eyes-only @itemx --no-for-your-eyes-only @opindex for-your-eyes-only Set the `for your eyes only' flag in the message. This causes GnuPG to refuse to save the file unless the @option{--output} option is given, and PGP to use a "secure viewer" with a claimed Tempest-resistant font to display the message. This option overrides @option{--set-filename}. @option{--no-for-your-eyes-only} disables this option. @item --use-embedded-filename @itemx --no-use-embedded-filename @opindex use-embedded-filename Try to create a file with a name as embedded in the data. This can be a dangerous option as it enables overwriting files. Defaults to no. Note that the option @option{--output} overrides this option. @item --cipher-algo @var{name} @opindex cipher-algo Use @var{name} as cipher algorithm. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. If this is not used the cipher algorithm is selected from the preferences stored with the key. In general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option @option{--personal-cipher-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the same thing. @item --aead-algo @var{name} @opindex aead-algo Specify that the AEAD algorithm @var{name} is to be used. This is useful for symmetric encryption where no key preference are available to select the AEAD algorithm. Running @command{@gpgname} with option @option{--version} shows the available AEAD algorithms. In general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option @option{--personal-aead-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the same thing. @item --digest-algo @var{name} @opindex digest-algo Use @var{name} as the message digest algorithm. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. In general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option @option{--personal-digest-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the same thing. @item --compress-algo @var{name} @opindex compress-algo Use compression algorithm @var{name}. "zlib" is RFC-1950 ZLIB compression. "zip" is RFC-1951 ZIP compression which is used by PGP. "bzip2" is a more modern compression scheme that can compress some things better than zip or zlib, but at the cost of more memory used during compression and decompression. "uncompressed" or "none" disables compression. If this option is not used, the default behavior is to examine the recipient key preferences to see which algorithms the recipient supports. If all else fails, ZIP is used for maximum compatibility. ZLIB may give better compression results than ZIP, as the compression window size is not limited to 8k. BZIP2 may give even better compression results than that, but will use a significantly larger amount of memory while compressing and decompressing. This may be significant in low memory situations. Note, however, that PGP (all versions) only supports ZIP compression. Using any algorithm other than ZIP or "none" will make the message unreadable with PGP. In general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option @option{--personal-compress-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the same thing. @item --cert-digest-algo @var{name} @opindex cert-digest-algo Use @var{name} as the message digest algorithm used when signing a key. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. Be aware that if you choose an algorithm that GnuPG supports but other OpenPGP implementations do not, then some users will not be able to use the key signatures you make, or quite possibly your entire key. Note also that a public key algorithm must be compatible with the specified digest algorithm; thus selecting an arbitrary digest algorithm may result in error messages from lower crypto layers or lead to security flaws. @item --disable-cipher-algo @var{name} @opindex disable-cipher-algo Never allow the use of @var{name} as cipher algorithm. The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm will still get disabled. @item --disable-pubkey-algo @var{name} @opindex disable-pubkey-algo Never allow the use of @var{name} as public key algorithm. The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm will still get disabled. @item --throw-keyids @itemx --no-throw-keyids @opindex throw-keyids Do not put the recipient key IDs into encrypted messages. This helps to hide the receivers of the message and is a limited countermeasure against traffic analysis.@footnote{Using a little social engineering anyone who is able to decrypt the message can check whether one of the other recipients is the one he suspects.} On the receiving side, it may slow down the decryption process because all available secret keys must be tried. @option{--no-throw-keyids} disables this option. This option is essentially the same as using @option{--hidden-recipient} for all recipients. @item --not-dash-escaped @opindex not-dash-escaped This option changes the behavior of cleartext signatures so that they can be used for patch files. You should not send such an armored file via email because all spaces and line endings are hashed too. You can not use this option for data which has 5 dashes at the beginning of a line, patch files don't have this. A special armor header line tells GnuPG about this cleartext signature option. @item --escape-from-lines @itemx --no-escape-from-lines @opindex escape-from-lines Because some mailers change lines starting with "From " to ">From " it is good to handle such lines in a special way when creating cleartext signatures to prevent the mail system from breaking the signature. Note that all other PGP versions do it this way too. Enabled by default. @option{--no-escape-from-lines} disables this option. @item --passphrase-repeat @var{n} @opindex passphrase-repeat Specify how many times @command{@gpgname} will request a new passphrase be repeated. This is useful for helping memorize a passphrase. Defaults to 1 repetition; can be set to 0 to disable any passphrase repetition. Note that a @var{n} greater than 1 will pop up the pinentry window @var{n}+1 times even if a modern pinentry with two entry fields is used. @item --passphrase-fd @var{n} @opindex passphrase-fd Read the passphrase from file descriptor @var{n}. Only the first line will be read from file descriptor @var{n}. If you use 0 for @var{n}, the passphrase will be read from STDIN. This can only be used if only one passphrase is supplied. Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1 the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}. @item --passphrase-file @var{file} @opindex passphrase-file Read the passphrase from file @var{file}. Only the first line will be read from file @var{file}. This can only be used if only one passphrase is supplied. Obviously, a passphrase stored in a file is of questionable security if other users can read this file. Don't use this option if you can avoid it. Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1 the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}. @item --passphrase @var{string} @opindex passphrase Use @var{string} as the passphrase. This can only be used if only one passphrase is supplied. Obviously, this is of very questionable security on a multi-user system. Don't use this option if you can avoid it. Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1 the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}. @item --pinentry-mode @var{mode} @opindex pinentry-mode Set the pinentry mode to @var{mode}. Allowed values for @var{mode} are: @table @asis @item default Use the default of the agent, which is @code{ask}. @item ask Force the use of the Pinentry. @item cancel Emulate use of Pinentry's cancel button. @item error Return a Pinentry error (``No Pinentry''). @item loopback Redirect Pinentry queries to the caller. Note that in contrast to Pinentry the user is not prompted again if he enters a bad password. @end table @item --no-symkey-cache @opindex no-symkey-cache Disable the passphrase cache used for symmetrical en- and decryption. This cache is based on the message specific salt value (cf. @option{--s2k-mode}). @item --request-origin @var{origin} @opindex request-origin Tell gpg to assume that the operation ultimately originated at @var{origin}. Depending on the origin certain restrictions are applied and the Pinentry may include an extra note on the origin. Supported values for @var{origin} are: @code{local} which is the default, @code{remote} to indicate a remote origin or @code{browser} for an operation requested by a web browser. @item --command-fd @var{n} @opindex command-fd This is a replacement for the deprecated shared-memory IPC mode. If this option is enabled, user input on questions is not expected from the TTY but from the given file descriptor. It should be used together with @option{--status-fd}. See the file doc/DETAILS in the source distribution for details on how to use it. @item --command-file @var{file} @opindex command-file Same as @option{--command-fd}, except the commands are read out of file @var{file} @item --allow-non-selfsigned-uid @itemx --no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid @opindex allow-non-selfsigned-uid Allow the import and use of keys with user IDs which are not self-signed. This is not recommended, as a non self-signed user ID is trivial to forge. @option{--no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid} disables. @item --allow-freeform-uid @opindex allow-freeform-uid Disable all checks on the form of the user ID while generating a new one. This option should only be used in very special environments as it does not ensure the de-facto standard format of user IDs. @item --ignore-time-conflict @opindex ignore-time-conflict GnuPG normally checks that the timestamps associated with keys and signatures have plausible values. However, sometimes a signature seems to be older than the key due to clock problems. This option makes these checks just a warning. See also @option{--ignore-valid-from} for timestamp issues on subkeys. @item --ignore-valid-from @opindex ignore-valid-from GnuPG normally does not select and use subkeys created in the future. This option allows the use of such keys and thus exhibits the pre-1.0.7 behaviour. You should not use this option unless there is some clock problem. See also @option{--ignore-time-conflict} for timestamp issues with signatures. @item --ignore-crc-error @opindex ignore-crc-error The ASCII armor used by OpenPGP is protected by a CRC checksum against transmission errors. Occasionally the CRC gets mangled somewhere on the transmission channel but the actual content (which is protected by the OpenPGP protocol anyway) is still okay. This option allows GnuPG to ignore CRC errors. @item --ignore-mdc-error @opindex ignore-mdc-error This option changes a MDC integrity protection failure into a warning. It is required to decrypt old messages which did not use an MDC. It may also be useful if a message is partially garbled, but it is necessary to get as much data as possible out of that garbled message. Be aware that a missing or failed MDC can be an indication of an attack. Use with great caution; see also option @option{--rfc2440}. @item --allow-weak-digest-algos @opindex allow-weak-digest-algos Signatures made with known-weak digest algorithms are normally rejected with an ``invalid digest algorithm'' message. This option allows the verification of signatures made with such weak algorithms. MD5 is the only digest algorithm considered weak by default. See also @option{--weak-digest} to reject other digest algorithms. @item --weak-digest @var{name} @opindex weak-digest Treat the specified digest algorithm as weak. Signatures made over weak digests algorithms are normally rejected. This option can be supplied multiple times if multiple algorithms should be considered weak. See also @option{--allow-weak-digest-algos} to disable rejection of weak digests. MD5 is always considered weak, and does not need to be listed explicitly. @item --allow-weak-key-signatures @opindex allow-weak-key-signatures To avoid a minor risk of collision attacks on third-party key signatures made using SHA-1, those key signatures are considered invalid. This options allows to override this restriction. @item --no-default-keyring @opindex no-default-keyring Do not add the default keyrings to the list of keyrings. Note that GnuPG will not operate without any keyrings, so if you use this option and do not provide alternate keyrings via @option{--keyring} or @option{--secret-keyring}, then GnuPG will still use the default public or secret keyrings. @item --no-keyring @opindex no-keyring Do not use any keyring at all. This overrides the default and all options which specify keyrings. @item --skip-verify @opindex skip-verify Skip the signature verification step. This may be used to make the decryption faster if the signature verification is not needed. @item --with-key-data @opindex with-key-data Print key listings delimited by colons (like @option{--with-colons}) and print the public key data. @item --list-signatures @opindex list-signatures @itemx --list-sigs @opindex list-sigs Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the signatures are listed too. This command has the same effect as using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-list}. Note that in contrast to @option{--check-signatures} the key signatures are not verified. This command can be used to create a list of signing keys missing in the local keyring; for example: @example gpg --list-sigs --with-colons USERID | \ awk -F: '$1=="sig" && $2=="?" @{if($13)@{print $13@}else@{print $5@}@}' @end example @item --fast-list-mode @opindex fast-list-mode Changes the output of the list commands to work faster; this is achieved by leaving some parts empty. Some applications don't need the user ID and the trust information given in the listings. By using this options they can get a faster listing. The exact behaviour of this option may change in future versions. If you are missing some information, don't use this option. @item --no-literal @opindex no-literal This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful. @item --set-filesize @opindex set-filesize This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful. @item --show-session-key @opindex show-session-key Display the session key used for one message. See @option{--override-session-key} for the counterpart of this option. We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing; however the user should have the freedom to decide whether to go to prison or to reveal the content of one specific message without compromising all messages ever encrypted for one secret key. You can also use this option if you receive an encrypted message which is abusive or offensive, to prove to the administrators of the messaging system that the ciphertext transmitted corresponds to an inappropriate plaintext so they can take action against the offending user. @item --override-session-key @var{string} @itemx --override-session-key-fd @var{fd} @opindex override-session-key Don't use the public key but the session key @var{string} respective the session key taken from the first line read from file descriptor @var{fd}. The format of this string is the same as the one printed by @option{--show-session-key}. This option is normally not used but comes handy in case someone forces you to reveal the content of an encrypted message; using this option you can do this without handing out the secret key. Note that using @option{--override-session-key} may reveal the session key to all local users via the global process table. Often it is useful to combine this option with @option{--no-keyring}. @item --ask-sig-expire @itemx --no-ask-sig-expire @opindex ask-sig-expire When making a data signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this option is not specified, the expiration time set via @option{--default-sig-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-sig-expire} disables this option. @item --default-sig-expire @opindex default-sig-expire The default expiration time to use for signature expiration. Valid values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d (for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0". @item --ask-cert-expire @itemx --no-ask-cert-expire @opindex ask-cert-expire When making a key signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this option is not specified, the expiration time set via @option{--default-cert-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-cert-expire} disables this option. @item --default-cert-expire @opindex default-cert-expire The default expiration time to use for key signature expiration. Valid values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d (for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0". @item --default-new-key-algo @var{string} @opindex default-new-key-algo @var{string} This option can be used to change the default algorithms for key generation. The @var{string} is similar to the arguments required for the command @option{--quick-add-key} but slightly different. For example the current default of @code{"rsa2048/cert,sign+rsa2048/encr"} (or @code{"rsa3072"}) can be changed to the value of what we currently call future default, which is @code{"ed25519/cert,sign+cv25519/encr"}. You need to consult the source code to learn the details. Note that the advanced key generation commands can always be used to specify a key algorithm directly. @item --allow-secret-key-import @opindex allow-secret-key-import This is an obsolete option and is not used anywhere. @item --allow-multiple-messages @item --no-allow-multiple-messages These are obsolete options; they have no more effect since GnuPG 2.2.8. @item --enable-special-filenames @opindex enable-special-filenames This option enables a mode in which filenames of the form @file{-&n}, where n is a non-negative decimal number, refer to the file descriptor n and not to a file with that name. @item --no-expensive-trust-checks @opindex no-expensive-trust-checks Experimental use only. @item --preserve-permissions @opindex preserve-permissions Don't change the permissions of a secret keyring back to user read/write only. Use this option only if you really know what you are doing. @item --default-preference-list @var{string} @opindex default-preference-list Set the list of default preferences to @var{string}. This preference list is used for new keys and becomes the default for "setpref" in the edit menu. @item --default-keyserver-url @var{name} @opindex default-keyserver-url Set the default keyserver URL to @var{name}. This keyserver will be used as the keyserver URL when writing a new self-signature on a key, which includes key generation and changing preferences. @item --list-config @opindex list-config Display various internal configuration parameters of GnuPG. This option is intended for external programs that call GnuPG to perform tasks, and is thus not generally useful. See the file @file{doc/DETAILS} in the source distribution for the details of which configuration items may be listed. @option{--list-config} is only usable with @option{--with-colons} set. @item --list-gcrypt-config @opindex list-gcrypt-config Display various internal configuration parameters of Libgcrypt. @item --gpgconf-list @opindex gpgconf-list This command is similar to @option{--list-config} but in general only internally used by the @command{gpgconf} tool. @item --gpgconf-test @opindex gpgconf-test This is more or less dummy action. However it parses the configuration file and returns with failure if the configuration file would prevent @command{@gpgname} from startup. Thus it may be used to run a syntax check on the configuration file. @c @item --use-only-openpgp-card @c @opindex use-only-openpgp-card @c Only access OpenPGP card's and no other cards. This is a hidden @c option which could be used in case an old use case required the @c OpenPGP card while several cards are available. This option might be @c removed if it turns out that nobody requires it. @item --chuid @var{uid} @opindex chuid Change the current user to @var{uid} which may either be a number or a name. This can be used from the root account to run gpg for another user. If @var{uid} is not the current UID a standard PATH is set and the envvar GNUPGHOME is unset. To override the latter the option @option{--homedir} can be used. This option has only an effect when used on the command line. This option has currently no effect at all on Windows. @end table @c ******************************* @c ******* Deprecated ************ @c ******************************* @node Deprecated Options @subsection Deprecated options @table @gnupgtabopt @item --show-photos @itemx --no-show-photos @opindex show-photos Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-signatures}, @option{--list-public-keys}, @option{--list-secret-keys}, and verifying a signature to also display the photo ID attached to the key, if any. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-photos} and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-photos} instead. @item --show-keyring @opindex show-keyring Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which keyring a given key resides on. This option is deprecated: use @option{--list-options [no-]show-keyring} instead. @item --always-trust @opindex always-trust Identical to @option{--trust-model always}. This option is deprecated. @item --show-notation @itemx --no-show-notation @opindex show-notation Show signature notations in the @option{--list-signatures} or @option{--check-signatures} listings as well as when verifying a signature with a notation in it. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-notation} and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-notation} instead. @item --show-policy-url @itemx --no-show-policy-url @opindex show-policy-url Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-signatures} or @option{--check-signatures} listings as well as when verifying a signature with a policy URL in it. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-policy-url} and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-policy-url} instead. @end table @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** FILES **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect files @node GPG Configuration @section Configuration files There are a few configuration files to control certain aspects of @command{@gpgname}'s operation. Unless noted, they are expected in the current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}). @table @file @item gpg.conf @efindex gpg.conf This is the standard configuration file read by @command{@gpgname} on startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated. This default name may be changed on the command line (@pxref{gpg-option --options}). You should backup this file. @end table Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files into the directory @file{@value{SYSCONFSKELDIR}} so that newly created users start up with a working configuration. For existing users a small helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}). For internal purposes @command{@gpgname} creates and maintains a few other files; They all live in the current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}). Only the @command{@gpgname} program may modify these files. @table @file @item ~/.gnupg @efindex ~/.gnupg This is the default home directory which is used if neither the environment variable @code{GNUPGHOME} nor the option @option{--homedir} is given. @item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg @efindex pubring.gpg The public keyring using a legacy format. You should backup this file. If this file is not available, @command{gpg} defaults to the new keybox format and creates a file @file{pubring.kbx} unless that file already exists in which case that file will also be used for OpenPGP keys. Note that in the case that both files, @file{pubring.gpg} and @file{pubring.kbx} exists but the latter has no OpenPGP keys, the legacy file @file{pubring.gpg} will be used. Take care: GnuPG versions before 2.1 will always use the file @file{pubring.gpg} because they do not know about the new keybox format. In the case that you have to use GnuPG 1.4 to decrypt archived data you should keep this file. @item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg.lock The lock file for the public keyring. @item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx @efindex pubring.kbx The public keyring using the new keybox format. This file is shared with @command{gpgsm}. You should backup this file. See above for the relation between this file and it predecessor. To convert an existing @file{pubring.gpg} file to the keybox format, you first backup the ownertrust values, then rename @file{pubring.gpg} to @file{publickeys.backup}, so it won’t be recognized by any GnuPG version, run import, and finally restore the ownertrust values: @example $ cd ~/.gnupg $ gpg --export-ownertrust >otrust.lst $ mv pubring.gpg publickeys.backup $ gpg --import-options restore --import publickeys.backups $ gpg --import-ownertrust otrust.lst @end example @item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx.lock The lock file for @file{pubring.kbx}. @item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg @efindex secring.gpg The legacy secret keyring as used by GnuPG versions before 2.1. It is not used by GnuPG 2.1 and later. You may want to keep it in case you have to use GnuPG 1.4 to decrypt archived data. @item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg.lock The lock file for the legacy secret keyring. @item ~/.gnupg/.gpg-v21-migrated @efindex .gpg-v21-migrated File indicating that a migration to GnuPG 2.1 has been done. @item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg @efindex trustdb.gpg The trust database. There is no need to backup this file; it is better to backup the ownertrust values (@pxref{option --export-ownertrust}). @item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg.lock The lock file for the trust database. @item ~/.gnupg/random_seed @efindex random_seed A file used to preserve the state of the internal random pool. @item ~/.gnupg/openpgp-revocs.d/ @efindex openpgp-revocs.d This is the directory where gpg stores pre-generated revocation certificates. The file name corresponds to the OpenPGP fingerprint of the respective key. It is suggested to backup those certificates and if the primary private key is not stored on the disk to move them to an external storage device. Anyone who can access these files is able to revoke the corresponding key. You may want to print them out. You should backup all files in this directory and take care to keep this backup closed away. @end table Operation is further controlled by a few environment variables: @table @asis @item HOME @efindex HOME Used to locate the default home directory. @item GNUPGHOME @efindex GNUPGHOME If set directory used instead of "~/.gnupg". @item GPG_AGENT_INFO This variable is obsolete; it was used by GnuPG versions before 2.1. @item PINENTRY_USER_DATA @efindex PINENTRY_USER_DATA This value is passed via gpg-agent to pinentry. It is useful to convey extra information to a custom pinentry. @item COLUMNS @itemx LINES @efindex COLUMNS @efindex LINES Used to size some displays to the full size of the screen. @item LANGUAGE @efindex LANGUAGE Apart from its use by GNU, it is used in the W32 version to override the language selection done through the Registry. If used and set to a valid and available language name (@var{langid}), the file with the translation is loaded from @code{@var{gpgdir}/gnupg.nls/@var{langid}.mo}. Here @var{gpgdir} is the directory out of which the gpg binary has been loaded. If it can't be loaded the Registry is tried and as last resort the native Windows locale system is used. @end table When calling the gpg-agent component @command{@gpgname} sends a set of environment variables to gpg-agent. The names of these variables can be listed using the command: @example gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo std_env_names' /bye | awk '$1=="D" @{print $2@}' @end example @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** EXAMPLES **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect examples @node GPG Examples @section Examples @table @asis @item gpg -se -r @code{Bob} @code{file} sign and encrypt for user Bob @item gpg --clear-sign @code{file} make a cleartext signature @item gpg -sb @code{file} make a detached signature @item gpg -u 0x12345678 -sb @code{file} make a detached signature with the key 0x12345678 @item gpg --list-keys @code{user_ID} show keys @item gpg --fingerprint @code{user_ID} show fingerprint @item gpg --verify @code{pgpfile} @itemx gpg --verify @code{sigfile} [@code{datafile}] Verify the signature of the file but do not output the data unless requested. The second form is used for detached signatures, where @code{sigfile} is the detached signature (either ASCII armored or binary) and @code{datafile} are the signed data; if this is not given, the name of the file holding the signed data is constructed by cutting off the extension (".asc" or ".sig") of @code{sigfile} or by asking the user for the filename. If the option @option{--output} is also used the signed data is written to the file specified by that option; use @code{-} to write the signed data to stdout. @end table @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** USER ID **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect how to specify a user id @ifset isman @include specify-user-id.texi @end ifset @mansect filter expressions @chapheading FILTER EXPRESSIONS The options @option{--import-filter} and @option{--export-filter} use expressions with this syntax (square brackets indicate an optional part and curly braces a repetition, white space between the elements are allowed): @c man:.RS @example [lc] @{[@{flag@}] PROPNAME op VALUE [lc]@} @end example @c man:.RE The name of a property (@var{PROPNAME}) may only consist of letters, digits and underscores. The description for the filter type describes which properties are defined. If an undefined property is used it evaluates to the empty string. Unless otherwise noted, the @var{VALUE} must always be given and may not be the empty string. No quoting is defined for the value, thus the value may not contain the strings @code{&&} or @code{||}, which are used as logical connection operators. The flag @code{--} can be used to remove this restriction. Numerical values are computed as long int; standard C notation applies. @var{lc} is the logical connection operator; either @code{&&} for a conjunction or @code{||} for a disjunction. A conjunction is assumed at the begin of an expression. Conjunctions have higher precedence than disjunctions. If @var{VALUE} starts with one of the characters used in any @var{op} a space after the @var{op} is required. @noindent The supported operators (@var{op}) are: @table @asis @item =~ Substring must match. @item !~ Substring must not match. @item = The full string must match. @item <> The full string must not match. @item == The numerical value must match. @item != The numerical value must not match. @item <= The numerical value of the field must be LE than the value. @item < The numerical value of the field must be LT than the value. @item > The numerical value of the field must be GT than the value. @item >= The numerical value of the field must be GE than the value. @item -le The string value of the field must be less or equal than the value. @item -lt The string value of the field must be less than the value. @item -gt The string value of the field must be greater than the value. @item -ge The string value of the field must be greater or equal than the value. @item -n True if value is not empty (no value allowed). @item -z True if value is empty (no value allowed). @item -t Alias for "PROPNAME != 0" (no value allowed). @item -f Alias for "PROPNAME == 0" (no value allowed). @end table @noindent Values for @var{flag} must be space separated. The supported flags are: @table @asis @item -- @var{VALUE} spans to the end of the expression. @item -c The string match in this part is done case-sensitive. @end table The filter options concatenate several specifications for a filter of the same type. For example the four options in this example: @c man:.RS @example --import-filter keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa" --import-filter keep-uid="&& uid !~ Test" --import-filter keep-uid="|| uid =~ Alpha" --import-filter keep-uid="uid !~ Test" @end example @c man:.RE @noindent which is equivalent to @c man:.RS @example --import-filter \ keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa" && uid !~ Test" || uid =~ Alpha" && "uid !~ Test" @end example @c man:.RE imports only the user ids of a key containing the strings "Alfa" or "Alpha" but not the string "test". @mansect trust values @ifset isman @include trust-values.texi @end ifset @mansect return value @chapheading RETURN VALUE The program returns 0 if there are no severe errors, 1 if at least a signature was bad, and other error codes for fatal errors. Note that signature verification requires exact knowledge of what has been signed and by whom it has been signed. Using only the return code is thus not an appropriate way to verify a signature by a script. Either make proper use or the status codes or use the @command{gpgv} tool which has been designed to make signature verification easy for scripts. @mansect warnings @chapheading WARNINGS Use a good password for your user account and make sure that all security issues are always fixed on your machine. Also employ diligent physical protection to your machine. Consider to use a good passphrase as a last resort protection to your secret key in the case your machine gets stolen. It is important that your secret key is never leaked. Using an easy to carry around token or smartcard with the secret key is often a advisable. If you are going to verify detached signatures, make sure that the program knows about it; either give both filenames on the command line or use @samp{-} to specify STDIN. For scripted or other unattended use of @command{gpg} make sure to use the machine-parseable interface and not the default interface which is intended for direct use by humans. The machine-parseable interface provides a stable and well documented API independent of the locale or future changes of @command{gpg}. To enable this interface use the options @option{--with-colons} and @option{--status-fd}. For certain operations the option @option{--command-fd} may come handy too. See this man page and the file @file{DETAILS} for the specification of the interface. Note that the GnuPG ``info'' pages as well as the PDF version of the GnuPG manual features a chapter on unattended use of GnuPG. As an alternative the library @command{GPGME} can be used as a high-level abstraction on top of that interface. @mansect interoperability @chapheading INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS GnuPG tries to be a very flexible implementation of the OpenPGP standard. In particular, GnuPG implements many of the optional parts of the standard, such as the SHA-512 hash, and the ZLIB and BZIP2 compression algorithms. It is important to be aware that not all OpenPGP programs implement these optional algorithms and that by forcing their use via the @option{--cipher-algo}, @option{--digest-algo}, @option{--cert-digest-algo}, or @option{--compress-algo} options in GnuPG, it is possible to create a perfectly valid OpenPGP message, but one that cannot be read by the intended recipient. There are dozens of variations of OpenPGP programs available, and each supports a slightly different subset of these optional algorithms. For example, until recently, no (unhacked) version of PGP supported the BLOWFISH cipher algorithm. A message using BLOWFISH simply could not be read by a PGP user. By default, GnuPG uses the standard OpenPGP preferences system that will always do the right thing and create messages that are usable by all recipients, regardless of which OpenPGP program they use. Only override this safe default if you really know what you are doing. If you absolutely must override the safe default, or if the preferences on a given key are invalid for some reason, you are far better off using the @option{--pgp6}, @option{--pgp7}, or @option{--pgp8} options. These options are safe as they do not force any particular algorithms in violation of OpenPGP, but rather reduce the available algorithms to a "PGP-safe" list. @mansect bugs @chapheading BUGS On older systems this program should be installed as setuid(root). This is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents the operating system from writing memory pages (which may contain passphrases or other sensitive material) to disk. If you get no warning message about insecure memory your operating system supports locking without being root. The program drops root privileges as soon as locked memory is allocated. Note also that some systems (especially laptops) have the ability to ``suspend to disk'' (also known as ``safe sleep'' or ``hibernate''). This writes all memory to disk before going into a low power or even powered off mode. Unless measures are taken in the operating system to protect the saved memory, passphrases or other sensitive material may be recoverable from it later. Before you report a bug you should first search the mailing list archives for similar problems and second check whether such a bug has already been reported to our bug tracker at @url{https://bugs.gnupg.org}. @c ******************************************* @c *************** ************** @c *************** UNATTENDED ************** @c *************** ************** @c ******************************************* @manpause @node Unattended Usage of GPG @section Unattended Usage @command{@gpgname} is often used as a backend engine by other software. To help with this a machine interface has been defined to have an unambiguous way to do this. The options @option{--status-fd} and @option{--batch} are almost always required for this. @menu * Programmatic use of GnuPG:: Programmatic use of GnuPG * Ephemeral home directories:: Ephemeral home directories * The quick key manipulation interface:: The quick key manipulation interface * Unattended GPG key generation:: Unattended key generation @end menu @node Programmatic use of GnuPG @subsection Programmatic use of GnuPG Please consider using GPGME instead of calling @command{@gpgname} directly. GPGME offers a stable, backend-independent interface for many cryptographic operations. It supports OpenPGP and S/MIME, and also allows interaction with various GnuPG components. GPGME provides a C-API, and comes with bindings for C++, Qt, and Python. Bindings for other languages are available. @node Ephemeral home directories @subsection Ephemeral home directories Sometimes you want to contain effects of some operation, for example you want to import a key to inspect it, but you do not want this key to be added to your keyring. In earlier versions of GnuPG, it was possible to specify alternate keyring files for both public and secret keys. In modern GnuPG versions, however, we changed how secret keys are stored in order to better protect secret key material, and it was not possible to preserve this interface. The preferred way to do this is to use ephemeral home directories. This technique works across all versions of GnuPG. Create a temporary directory, create (or copy) a configuration that meets your needs, make @command{@gpgname} use this directory either using the environment variable @var{GNUPGHOME}, or the option @option{--homedir}. GPGME supports this too on a per-context basis, by modifying the engine info of contexts. Now execute whatever operation you like, import and export key material as necessary. Once finished, you can delete the directory. All GnuPG backend services that were started will detect this and shut down. @node The quick key manipulation interface @subsection The quick key manipulation interface Recent versions of GnuPG have an interface to manipulate keys without using the interactive command @option{--edit-key}. This interface was added mainly for the benefit of GPGME (please consider using GPGME, see the manual subsection ``Programmatic use of GnuPG''). This interface is described in the subsection ``How to manage your keys''. @node Unattended GPG key generation @subsection Unattended key generation The command @option{--generate-key} may be used along with the option @option{--batch} for unattended key generation. This is the most flexible way of generating keys, but it is also the most complex one. Consider using the quick key manipulation interface described in the previous subsection ``The quick key manipulation interface''. The parameters for the key are either read from stdin or given as a file on the command line. The format of the parameter file is as follows: @itemize @bullet @item Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 characters. @item UTF-8 encoding must be used to specify non-ASCII characters. @item Empty lines are ignored. @item Leading and trailing white space is ignored. @item A hash sign as the first non white space character indicates a comment line. @item Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign, the arguments are separated by white space from the keyword. @item Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon. Arguments are separated by white space. @item The first parameter must be @samp{Key-Type}; control statements may be placed anywhere. @item The order of the parameters does not matter except for @samp{Key-Type} which must be the first parameter. The parameters are only used for the generated keyblock (primary and subkeys); parameters from previous sets are not used. Some syntactically checks may be performed. @item Key generation takes place when either the end of the parameter file is reached, the next @samp{Key-Type} parameter is encountered or at the control statement @samp{%commit} is encountered. @end itemize @noindent Control statements: @table @asis @item %echo @var{text} Print @var{text} as diagnostic. @item %dry-run Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking). @item %commit Perform the key generation. Note that an implicit commit is done at the next @asis{Key-Type} parameter. @item %pubring @var{filename} Do not write the key to the default or commandline given keyring but to @var{filename}. This must be given before the first commit to take place, duplicate specification of the same filename is ignored, the last filename before a commit is used. The filename is used until a new filename is used (at commit points) and all keys are written to that file. If a new filename is given, this file is created (and overwrites an existing one). See the previous subsection ``Ephemeral home directories'' for a more robust way to contain side-effects. @item %secring @var{filename} This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later. See the previous subsection ``Ephemeral home directories''. @item %ask-passphrase @itemx %no-ask-passphrase This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later. @item %no-protection Using this option allows the creation of keys without any passphrase protection. This option is mainly intended for regression tests. @item %transient-key If given the keys are created using a faster and a somewhat less secure random number generator. This option may be used for keys which are only used for a short time and do not require full cryptographic strength. It takes only effect if used together with the control statement @samp{%no-protection}. @end table @noindent General Parameters: @table @asis @item Key-Type: @var{algo} Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the primary key. The algorithm must be capable of signing. This is a required parameter. @var{algo} may either be an OpenPGP algorithm number or a string with the algorithm name. The special value @samp{default} may be used for @var{algo} to create the default key type; in this case a @samp{Key-Usage} shall not be given and @samp{default} also be used for @samp{Subkey-Type}. @item Key-Length: @var{nbits} The requested length of the generated key in bits. The default is returned by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}. @item Key-Grip: @var{hexstring} This is optional and used to generate a CSR or certificate for an already existing key. Key-Length will be ignored when given. @item Key-Usage: @var{usage-list} Space or comma delimited list of key usages. Allowed values are @samp{encrypt}, @samp{sign}, and @samp{auth}. This is used to generate the key flags. Please make sure that the algorithm is capable of this usage. Note that OpenPGP requires that all primary keys are capable of certification, so no matter what usage is given here, the @samp{cert} flag will be on. If no @samp{Key-Usage} is specified and the @samp{Key-Type} is not @samp{default}, all allowed usages for that particular algorithm are used; if it is not given but @samp{default} is used the usage will be @samp{sign}. @item Subkey-Type: @var{algo} This generates a secondary key (subkey). Currently only one subkey can be handled. See also @samp{Key-Type} above. @item Subkey-Length: @var{nbits} Length of the secondary key (subkey) in bits. The default is returned by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}. @item Subkey-Usage: @var{usage-list} Key usage lists for a subkey; similar to @samp{Key-Usage}. @item Passphrase: @var{string} If you want to specify a passphrase for the secret key, enter it here. Default is to use the Pinentry dialog to ask for a passphrase. @item Name-Real: @var{name} @itemx Name-Comment: @var{comment} @itemx Name-Email: @var{email} The three parts of a user name. Remember to use UTF-8 encoding here. If you don't give any of them, no user ID is created. @item Expire-Date: @var{iso-date}|(@var{number}[d|w|m|y]) Set the expiration date for the key (and the subkey). It may either be entered in ISO date format (e.g. "20000815T145012") or as number of days, weeks, month or years after the creation date. The special notation "seconds=N" is also allowed to specify a number of seconds since creation. Without a letter days are assumed. Note that there is no check done on the overflow of the type used by OpenPGP for timestamps. Thus you better make sure that the given value make sense. Although OpenPGP works with time intervals, GnuPG uses an absolute value internally and thus the last year we can represent is 2105. @item Creation-Date: @var{iso-date} Set the creation date of the key as stored in the key information and which is also part of the fingerprint calculation. Either a date like "1986-04-26" or a full timestamp like "19860426T042640" may be used. The time is considered to be UTC. The special notation "seconds=N" may be used to directly specify a the number of seconds since Epoch (Unix time). If it is not given the current time is used. @item Preferences: @var{string} Set the cipher, hash, and compression preference values for this key. This expects the same type of string as the sub-command @samp{setpref} in the @option{--edit-key} menu. @item Revoker: @var{algo}:@var{fpr} [sensitive] Add a designated revoker to the generated key. Algo is the public key algorithm of the designated revoker (i.e. RSA=1, DSA=17, etc.) @var{fpr} is the fingerprint of the designated revoker. The optional @samp{sensitive} flag marks the designated revoker as sensitive information. Only v4 keys may be designated revokers. @item Keyserver: @var{string} This is an optional parameter that specifies the preferred keyserver URL for the key. @item Handle: @var{string} This is an optional parameter only used with the status lines KEY_CREATED and KEY_NOT_CREATED. @var{string} may be up to 100 characters and should not contain spaces. It is useful for batch key generation to associate a key parameter block with a status line. @end table @noindent Here is an example on how to create a key in an ephemeral home directory: @smallexample $ export GNUPGHOME="$(mktemp -d)" $ cat >foo < ssb elg1024 2016-12-16 [E] @end smallexample @noindent If you want to create a key with the default algorithms you would use these parameters: @smallexample %echo Generating a default key Key-Type: default Subkey-Type: default Name-Real: Joe Tester Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar Expire-Date: 0 Passphrase: abc # Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-) %commit %echo done @end smallexample @mansect see also @ifset isman @command{gpgv}(1), @command{gpgsm}(1), @command{gpg-agent}(1) @end ifset @include see-also-note.texi diff --git a/doc/gpgsm.texi b/doc/gpgsm.texi index 17e30d243..50a2595ae 100644 --- a/doc/gpgsm.texi +++ b/doc/gpgsm.texi @@ -1,1682 +1,1682 @@ @c Copyright (C) 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc. @c This is part of the GnuPG manual. @c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi. @include defs.inc @node Invoking GPGSM @chapter Invoking GPGSM @cindex GPGSM command options @cindex command options @cindex options, GPGSM command @manpage gpgsm.1 @ifset manverb .B gpgsm \- CMS encryption and signing tool @end ifset @mansect synopsis @ifset manverb .B gpgsm .RB [ \-\-homedir .IR dir ] .RB [ \-\-options .IR file ] .RI [ options ] .I command .RI [ args ] @end ifset @mansect description @command{gpgsm} is a tool similar to @command{gpg} to provide digital encryption and signing services on X.509 certificates and the CMS protocol. It is mainly used as a backend for S/MIME mail processing. @command{gpgsm} includes a full featured certificate management and complies with all rules defined for the German Sphinx project. @manpause @xref{Option Index}, for an index to @command{GPGSM}'s commands and options. @mancont @menu * GPGSM Commands:: List of all commands. * GPGSM Options:: List of all options. * GPGSM Configuration:: Configuration files. * GPGSM Examples:: Some usage examples. Developer information: * Unattended Usage:: Using @command{gpgsm} from other programs. * GPGSM Protocol:: The protocol the server mode uses. @end menu @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** COMMANDS **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect commands @node GPGSM Commands @section Commands Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that only one command is allowed. @menu * General GPGSM Commands:: Commands not specific to the functionality. * Operational GPGSM Commands:: Commands to select the type of operation. * Certificate Management:: How to manage certificates. @end menu @c ******************************************* @c ********** GENERAL COMMANDS ************* @c ******************************************* @node General GPGSM Commands @subsection Commands not specific to the function @table @gnupgtabopt @item --version @opindex version Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you cannot abbreviate this command. @item --help, -h @opindex help Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command-line options. Note that you cannot abbreviate this command. @item --warranty @opindex warranty Print warranty information. Note that you cannot abbreviate this command. @item --dump-options @opindex dump-options Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot abbreviate this command. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** OPERATIONAL COMMANDS *********** @c ******************************************* @node Operational GPGSM Commands @subsection Commands to select the type of operation @table @gnupgtabopt @item --encrypt @opindex encrypt Perform an encryption. The keys the data is encrypted to must be set using the option @option{--recipient}. @item --decrypt @opindex decrypt Perform a decryption; the type of input is automatically determined. It may either be in binary form or PEM encoded; automatic determination of base-64 encoding is not done. @item --sign @opindex sign Create a digital signature. The key used is either the fist one found in the keybox or those set with the @option{--local-user} option. @item --verify @opindex verify Check a signature file for validity. Depending on the arguments a detached signature may also be checked. @item --server @opindex server Run in server mode and wait for commands on the @code{stdin}. @item --call-dirmngr @var{command} [@var{args}] @opindex call-dirmngr Behave as a Dirmngr client issuing the request @var{command} with the optional list of @var{args}. The output of the Dirmngr is printed stdout. Please note that file names given as arguments should have an absolute file name (i.e. commencing with @code{/}) because they are passed verbatim to the Dirmngr and the working directory of the Dirmngr might not be the same as the one of this client. Currently it is not possible to pass data via stdin to the Dirmngr. @var{command} should not contain spaces. This is command is required for certain maintaining tasks of the dirmngr where a dirmngr must be able to call back to @command{gpgsm}. See the Dirmngr manual for details. @item --call-protect-tool @var{arguments} @opindex call-protect-tool Certain maintenance operations are done by an external program call @command{gpg-protect-tool}; this is usually not installed in a directory listed in the PATH variable. This command provides a simple wrapper to access this tool. @var{arguments} are passed verbatim to this command; use @samp{--help} to get a list of supported operations. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******* CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT ********** @c ******************************************* @node Certificate Management @subsection How to manage the certificates and keys @table @gnupgtabopt @item --generate-key @opindex generate-key @itemx --gen-key @opindex gen-key This command allows the creation of a certificate signing request or a self-signed certificate. It is commonly used along with the @option{--output} option to save the created CSR or certificate into a file. If used with the @option{--batch} a parameter file is used to create the CSR or certificate and it is further possible to create non-self-signed certificates. @item --list-keys @itemx -k @opindex list-keys List all available certificates stored in the local key database. Note that the displayed data might be reformatted for better human readability and illegal characters are replaced by safe substitutes. @item --list-secret-keys @itemx -K @opindex list-secret-keys List all available certificates for which a corresponding a secret key is available. @item --list-external-keys @var{pattern} @opindex list-keys List certificates matching @var{pattern} using an external server. This utilizes the @code{dirmngr} service. @item --list-chain @opindex list-chain Same as @option{--list-keys} but also prints all keys making up the chain. @item --dump-cert @itemx --dump-keys @opindex dump-cert @opindex dump-keys List all available certificates stored in the local key database using a format useful mainly for debugging. @item --dump-chain @opindex dump-chain Same as @option{--dump-keys} but also prints all keys making up the chain. @item --dump-secret-keys @opindex dump-secret-keys List all available certificates for which a corresponding a secret key is available using a format useful mainly for debugging. @item --dump-external-keys @var{pattern} @opindex dump-external-keys List certificates matching @var{pattern} using an external server. This utilizes the @code{dirmngr} service. It uses a format useful mainly for debugging. @item --keydb-clear-some-cert-flags @opindex keydb-clear-some-cert-flags This is a debugging aid to reset certain flags in the key database which are used to cache certain certificate statuses. It is especially useful if a bad CRL or a weird running OCSP responder did accidentally revoke certificate. There is no security issue with this command because @command{gpgsm} always make sure that the validity of a certificate is checked right before it is used. @item --delete-keys @var{pattern} @opindex delete-keys Delete the keys matching @var{pattern}. Note that there is no command to delete the secret part of the key directly. In case you need to do this, you should run the command @code{gpgsm --dump-secret-keys KEYID} before you delete the key, copy the string of hex-digits in the ``keygrip'' line and delete the file consisting of these hex-digits and the suffix @code{.key} from the @file{private-keys-v1.d} directory below our GnuPG home directory (usually @file{~/.gnupg}). @item --export [@var{pattern}] @opindex export Export all certificates stored in the Keybox or those specified by the optional @var{pattern}. Those pattern consist of a list of user ids (@pxref{how-to-specify-a-user-id}). When used along with the @option{--armor} option a few informational lines are prepended before each block. There is one limitation: As there is no commonly agreed upon way to pack more than one certificate into an ASN.1 structure, the binary export (i.e. without using @option{armor}) works only for the export of one certificate. Thus it is required to specify a @var{pattern} which yields exactly one certificate. Ephemeral certificate are only exported if all @var{pattern} are given as fingerprints or keygrips. @item --export-secret-key-p12 @var{key-id} @opindex export-secret-key-p12 Export the private key and the certificate identified by @var{key-id} using the PKCS#12 format. When used with the @code{--armor} option a few informational lines are prepended to the output. Note, that the PKCS#12 format is not very secure and proper transport security should be used to convey the exported key. (@xref{option --p12-charset}.) @item --export-secret-key-p8 @var{key-id} @itemx --export-secret-key-raw @var{key-id} @opindex export-secret-key-p8 @opindex export-secret-key-raw Export the private key of the certificate identified by @var{key-id} with any encryption stripped. The @code{...-raw} command exports in PKCS#1 format; the @code{...-p8} command exports in PKCS#8 format. When used with the @code{--armor} option a few informational lines are prepended to the output. These commands are useful to prepare a key for use on a TLS server. @item --import [@var{files}] @opindex import Import the certificates from the PEM or binary encoded files as well as from signed-only messages. This command may also be used to import a secret key from a PKCS#12 file. @item --learn-card @opindex learn-card Read information about the private keys from the smartcard and import the certificates from there. This command utilizes the @command{gpg-agent} and in turn the @command{scdaemon}. @item --change-passphrase @var{user_id} @opindex change-passphrase @itemx --passwd @var{user_id} @opindex passwd Change the passphrase of the private key belonging to the certificate specified as @var{user_id}. Note, that changing the passphrase/PIN of a smartcard is not yet supported. @end table @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** OPTIONS **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect options @node GPGSM Options @section Option Summary @command{GPGSM} features a bunch of options to control the exact behaviour and to change the default configuration. @menu * Configuration Options:: How to change the configuration. * Certificate Options:: Certificate related options. * Input and Output:: Input and Output. * CMS Options:: How to change how the CMS is created. * Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually do not want to do. @end menu @c ******************************************* @c ******** CONFIGURATION OPTIONS ********** @c ******************************************* @node Configuration Options @subsection How to change the configuration These options are used to change the configuration and are usually found in the option file. @table @gnupgtabopt @anchor{gpgsm-option --options} @item --options @var{file} @opindex options Reads configuration from @var{file} instead of from the default per-user configuration file. The default configuration file is named @file{gpgsm.conf} and expected in the @file{.gnupg} directory directly below the home directory of the user. @include opt-homedir.texi @item -v @item --verbose @opindex v @opindex verbose Outputs additional information while running. You can increase the verbosity by giving several verbose commands to @command{gpgsm}, such as @samp{-vv}. @item --keyserver @var{string} @opindex keyserver Add an LDAP server to use for certificate and CRL lookup. This option can be given multiple times to configure more than one LDAP server. Note that the @command{dirmngr} can in addition be configured with a default list of LDAP servers to be used after those configured with this option. The syntax of @var{string} is: @sc{hostname:port:username:password:base_dn:flags} The only defined flag is @code{ldaps} to specify that a TLS connections shall be used. Flags are comma delimited; unknown flags are ignored. Note that all parts of that string are expected to be UTF-8 encoded. This may lead to problems if the @sc{password} has originally been encoded as Latin-1; in such a case better configure such an LDAP server using the global configuration of @command{dirmngr}. Here is an example which uses the default port, no username, no password, and requests a TLS connection: @c man:.RS @example --keyserver ldap.pca.dfn.de::::o=DFN-Verein,c=DE:ldaps @end example @c man:.RE @item --policy-file @var{filename} @opindex policy-file Change the default name of the policy file to @var{filename}. The default name is @file{policies.txt}. @item --agent-program @var{file} @opindex agent-program Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The default value is determined by running the command @command{gpgconf}. Note that the pipe symbol (@code{|}) is used for a regression test suite hack and may thus not be used in the file name. @item --dirmngr-program @var{file} @opindex dirmngr-program Specify a dirmngr program to be used for @acronym{CRL} checks. The default value is @file{@value{BINDIR}/dirmngr}. @item --prefer-system-dirmngr @opindex prefer-system-dirmngr This option is obsolete and ignored. @item --disable-dirmngr Entirely disable the use of the Dirmngr. @item --no-autostart @opindex no-autostart Do not start the gpg-agent or the dirmngr if it has not yet been started and its service is required. This option is mostly useful on machines where the connection to gpg-agent has been redirected to another machines. If dirmngr is required on the remote machine, it may be started manually using @command{gpgconf --launch dirmngr}. @item --no-secmem-warning @opindex no-secmem-warning Do not print a warning when the so called "secure memory" cannot be used. @item --log-file @var{file} @opindex log-file When running in server mode, append all logging output to @var{file}. Use @file{socket://} to log to socket. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** CERTIFICATE OPTIONS ************ @c ******************************************* @node Certificate Options @subsection Certificate related options @table @gnupgtabopt @item --enable-policy-checks @itemx --disable-policy-checks @opindex enable-policy-checks @opindex disable-policy-checks By default policy checks are enabled. These options may be used to change it. @item --enable-crl-checks @itemx --disable-crl-checks @opindex enable-crl-checks @opindex disable-crl-checks By default the @acronym{CRL} checks are enabled and the DirMngr is used to check for revoked certificates. The disable option is most useful with an off-line network connection to suppress this check and also to avoid that new certificates introduce a web bug by including a certificate specific CRL DP. The disable option also disables an issuer certificate lookup via the authorityInfoAccess property of the certificate; the @option{--enable-issuer-key-retrieve} can be used to make use of that property anyway. @item --enable-trusted-cert-crl-check @itemx --disable-trusted-cert-crl-check @opindex enable-trusted-cert-crl-check @opindex disable-trusted-cert-crl-check By default the @acronym{CRL} for trusted root certificates are checked like for any other certificates. This allows a CA to revoke its own certificates voluntary without the need of putting all ever issued certificates into a CRL. The disable option may be used to switch this extra check off. Due to the caching done by the Dirmngr, there will not be any noticeable performance gain. Note, that this also disables possible OCSP checks for trusted root certificates. A more specific way of disabling this check is by adding the ``relax'' keyword to the root CA line of the @file{trustlist.txt} @item --force-crl-refresh @opindex force-crl-refresh Tell the dirmngr to reload the CRL for each request. For better performance, the dirmngr will actually optimize this by suppressing the loading for short time intervals (e.g. 30 minutes). This option is useful to make sure that a fresh CRL is available for certificates hold in the keybox. The suggested way of doing this is by using it along with the option @option{--with-validation} for a key listing command. This option should not be used in a configuration file. @item --enable-issuer-based-crl-check @opindex enable-issuer-based-crl-check Run a CRL check even for certificates which do not have any CRL distribution point. This requires that a suitable LDAP server has been configured in Dirmngr and that the CRL can be found using the issuer. This option reverts to what GnuPG did up to version 2.2.20. This option is in general not useful. @item --enable-ocsp @itemx --disable-ocsp @opindex enable-ocsp @opindex disable-ocsp By default @acronym{OCSP} checks are disabled. The enable option may be used to enable OCSP checks via Dirmngr. If @acronym{CRL} checks are also enabled, CRLs will be used as a fallback if for some reason an OCSP request will not succeed. Note, that you have to allow OCSP requests in Dirmngr's configuration too (option @option{--allow-ocsp}) and configure Dirmngr properly. If you do not do so you will get the error code @samp{Not supported}. @item --auto-issuer-key-retrieve @opindex auto-issuer-key-retrieve If a required certificate is missing while validating the chain of certificates, try to load that certificate from an external location. This usually means that Dirmngr is employed to search for the certificate. Note that this option makes a "web bug" like behavior possible. LDAP server operators can see which keys you request, so by sending you a message signed by a brand new key (which you naturally will not have on your local keybox), the operator can tell both your IP address and the time when you verified the signature. @anchor{gpgsm-option --validation-model} @item --validation-model @var{name} @opindex validation-model This option changes the default validation model. The only possible values are "shell" (which is the default), "chain" which forces the use of the chain model and "steed" for a new simplified model. The chain model is also used if an option in the @file{trustlist.txt} or an attribute of the certificate requests it. However the standard model (shell) is in that case always tried first. @item --ignore-cert-extension @var{oid} @opindex ignore-cert-extension Add @var{oid} to the list of ignored certificate extensions. The @var{oid} is expected to be in dotted decimal form, like @code{2.5.29.3}. This option may be used more than once. Critical flagged certificate extensions matching one of the OIDs in the list are treated as if they are actually handled and thus the certificate will not be rejected due to an unknown critical extension. Use this option with care because extensions are usually flagged as critical for a reason. @end table @c ******************************************* @c *********** INPUT AND OUTPUT ************ @c ******************************************* @node Input and Output @subsection Input and Output @table @gnupgtabopt @item --armor @itemx -a @opindex armor Create PEM encoded output. Default is binary output. @item --base64 @opindex base64 Create Base-64 encoded output; i.e. PEM without the header lines. @item --assume-armor @opindex assume-armor Assume the input data is PEM encoded. Default is to autodetect the encoding but this is may fail. @item --assume-base64 @opindex assume-base64 Assume the input data is plain base-64 encoded. @item --assume-binary @opindex assume-binary Assume the input data is binary encoded. @anchor{option --p12-charset} @item --p12-charset @var{name} @opindex p12-charset @command{gpgsm} uses the UTF-8 encoding when encoding passphrases for PKCS#12 files. This option may be used to force the passphrase to be encoded in the specified encoding @var{name}. This is useful if the application used to import the key uses a different encoding and thus will not be able to import a file generated by @command{gpgsm}. Commonly used values for @var{name} are @code{Latin1} and @code{CP850}. Note that @command{gpgsm} itself automagically imports any file with a passphrase encoded to the most commonly used encodings. @item --default-key @var{user_id} @opindex default-key Use @var{user_id} as the standard key for signing. This key is used if no other key has been defined as a signing key. Note, that the first @option{--local-users} option also sets this key if it has not yet been set; however @option{--default-key} always overrides this. @item --local-user @var{user_id} @item -u @var{user_id} @opindex local-user Set the user(s) to be used for signing. The default is the first secret key found in the database. @item --recipient @var{name} @itemx -r @opindex recipient Encrypt to the user id @var{name}. There are several ways a user id may be given (@pxref{how-to-specify-a-user-id}). @item --output @var{file} @itemx -o @var{file} @opindex output Write output to @var{file}. The default is to write it to stdout. @anchor{gpgsm-option --with-key-data} @item --with-key-data @opindex with-key-data Displays extra information with the @code{--list-keys} commands. Especially a line tagged @code{grp} is printed which tells you the keygrip of a key. This string is for example used as the file name of the secret key. Implies @code{--with-colons}. @anchor{gpgsm-option --with-validation} @item --with-validation @opindex with-validation When doing a key listing, do a full validation check for each key and print the result. This is usually a slow operation because it requires a CRL lookup and other operations. When used along with @option{--import}, a validation of the certificate to import is done and only imported if it succeeds the test. Note that this does not affect an already available certificate in the DB. This option is therefore useful to simply verify a certificate. @item --with-md5-fingerprint For standard key listings, also print the MD5 fingerprint of the certificate. @item --with-keygrip Include the keygrip in standard key listings. Note that the keygrip is always listed in @option{--with-colons} mode. @item --with-secret @opindex with-secret Include info about the presence of a secret key in public key listings done with @code{--with-colons}. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ************* CMS OPTIONS *************** @c ******************************************* @node CMS Options @subsection How to change how the CMS is created @table @gnupgtabopt @item --include-certs @var{n} @opindex include-certs Using @var{n} of -2 includes all certificate except for the root cert, -1 includes all certs, 0 does not include any certs, 1 includes only the signers cert and all other positive values include up to @var{n} certificates starting with the signer cert. The default is -2. @item --cipher-algo @var{oid} @opindex cipher-algo Use the cipher algorithm with the ASN.1 object identifier @var{oid} for encryption. For convenience the strings @code{3DES}, @code{AES} and @code{AES256} may be used instead of their OIDs. The default is @code{AES} (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2). @item --digest-algo @code{name} Use @code{name} as the message digest algorithm. Usually this algorithm is deduced from the respective signing certificate. This option forces the use of the given algorithm and may lead to severe interoperability problems. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** ESOTERIC OPTIONS *************** @c ******************************************* @node Esoteric Options @subsection Doing things one usually do not want to do @table @gnupgtabopt @item --chuid @var{uid} @opindex chuid Change the current user to @var{uid} which may either be a number or a name. This can be used from the root account to run gpgsm for another user. If @var{uid} is not the current UID a standard PATH is set and the envvar GNUPGHOME is unset. To override the latter the option @option{--homedir} can be used. This option has only an effect when used on the command line. This option has currently no effect at all on Windows. @item --extra-digest-algo @var{name} @opindex extra-digest-algo Sometimes signatures are broken in that they announce a different digest algorithm than actually used. @command{gpgsm} uses a one-pass data processing model and thus needs to rely on the announced digest algorithms to properly hash the data. As a workaround this option may be used to tell @command{gpgsm} to also hash the data using the algorithm @var{name}; this slows processing down a little bit but allows verification of such broken signatures. If @command{gpgsm} prints an error like ``digest algo 8 has not been enabled'' you may want to try this option, with @samp{SHA256} for @var{name}. @item --faked-system-time @var{epoch} @opindex faked-system-time This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back or forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since the year 1970. Alternatively @var{epoch} may be given as a full ISO time string (e.g. "20070924T154812"). @item --with-ephemeral-keys @opindex with-ephemeral-keys Include ephemeral flagged keys in the output of key listings. Note that they are included anyway if the key specification for a listing is given as fingerprint or keygrip. @item --debug-level @var{level} @opindex debug-level Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be a numeric value or by a keyword: @table @code @item none No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of the keyword. @item basic Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used instead of the keyword. @item advanced More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used instead of the keyword. @item expert Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used instead of the keyword. @item guru All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is only enabled if the keyword is used. @end table How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are however carefully selected to best aid in debugging. @item --debug @var{flags} @opindex debug Set debug flags. All flags are or-ed and @var{flags} may be given in C syntax (e.g. 0x0042) or as a comma separated list of flag names. To get a list of all supported flags the single word "help" can be used. This option is only useful for debugging and the behavior may change at any time without notice. Note, that all flags set using this option may get overridden by @code{--debug-level}. @item --debug-all @opindex debug-all Same as @code{--debug=0xffffffff} @item --debug-allow-core-dump @opindex debug-allow-core-dump Usually @command{gpgsm} tries to avoid dumping core by well written code and by disabling core dumps for security reasons. However, bugs are pretty durable beasts and to squash them it is sometimes useful to have a core dump. This option enables core dumps unless the Bad Thing happened before the option parsing. @item --debug-no-chain-validation @opindex debug-no-chain-validation This is actually not a debugging option but only useful as such. It lets @command{gpgsm} bypass all certificate chain validation checks. @item --debug-ignore-expiration @opindex debug-ignore-expiration This is actually not a debugging option but only useful as such. It lets @command{gpgsm} ignore all notAfter dates, this is used by the regression tests. @item --passphrase-fd @code{n} @opindex passphrase-fd Read the passphrase from file descriptor @code{n}. Only the first line will be read from file descriptor @code{n}. If you use 0 for @code{n}, the passphrase will be read from STDIN. This can only be used if only one passphrase is supplied. Note that this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch} has also been given. @item --pinentry-mode @code{mode} @opindex pinentry-mode Set the pinentry mode to @code{mode}. Allowed values for @code{mode} are: @table @asis @item default Use the default of the agent, which is @code{ask}. @item ask Force the use of the Pinentry. @item cancel Emulate use of Pinentry's cancel button. @item error Return a Pinentry error (``No Pinentry''). @item loopback Redirect Pinentry queries to the caller. Note that in contrast to Pinentry the user is not prompted again if he enters a bad password. @end table @item --request-origin @var{origin} @opindex request-origin Tell gpgsm to assume that the operation ultimately originated at @var{origin}. Depending on the origin certain restrictions are applied and the Pinentry may include an extra note on the origin. Supported values for @var{origin} are: @code{local} which is the default, @code{remote} to indicate a remote origin or @code{browser} for an operation requested by a web browser. @item --no-common-certs-import @opindex no-common-certs-import Suppress the import of common certificates on keybox creation. @end table All the long options may also be given in the configuration file after stripping off the two leading dashes. @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** USER ID **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect how to specify a user id @ifset isman @include specify-user-id.texi @end ifset @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** FILES **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect files @node GPGSM Configuration @section Configuration files There are a few configuration files to control certain aspects of @command{gpgsm}'s operation. Unless noted, they are expected in the current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}). @table @file @item gpgsm.conf @efindex gpgsm.conf This is the standard configuration file read by @command{gpgsm} on startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated. This default name may be changed on the command line (@pxref{gpgsm-option --options}). You should backup this file. @item policies.txt @efindex policies.txt This is a list of allowed CA policies. This file should list the object identifiers of the policies line by line. Empty lines and lines starting with a hash mark are ignored. Policies missing in this file and not marked as critical in the certificate will print only a warning; certificates with policies marked as critical and not listed in this file will fail the signature verification. You should backup this file. For example, to allow only the policy 2.289.9.9, the file should look like this: @c man:.RS @example # Allowed policies 2.289.9.9 @end example @c man:.RE @item qualified.txt @efindex qualified.txt This is the list of root certificates used for qualified certificates. They are defined as certificates capable of creating legally binding signatures in the same way as handwritten signatures are. Comments start with a hash mark and empty lines are ignored. Lines do have a length limit but this is not a serious limitation as the format of the entries is fixed and checked by @command{gpgsm}: A non-comment line starts with optional whitespace, followed by exactly 40 hex characters, white space and a lowercased 2 letter country code. Additional data delimited with by a white space is current ignored but might late be used for other purposes. Note that even if a certificate is listed in this file, this does not mean that the certificate is trusted; in general the certificates listed in this file need to be listed also in @file{trustlist.txt}. This is a global file an installed in the sysconf directory (e.g. @file{@value{SYSCONFDIR}/qualified.txt}). Every time @command{gpgsm} uses a certificate for signing or verification this file will be consulted to check whether the certificate under question has ultimately been issued by one of these CAs. If this is the case the user will be informed that the verified signature represents a legally binding (``qualified'') signature. When creating a signature using such a certificate an extra prompt will be issued to let the user confirm that such a legally binding signature shall really be created. Because this software has not yet been approved for use with such certificates, appropriate notices will be shown to indicate this fact. @item help.txt @efindex help.txt This is plain text file with a few help entries used with @command{pinentry} as well as a large list of help items for @command{gpg} and @command{gpgsm}. The standard file has English help texts; to install localized versions use filenames like @file{help.LL.txt} with LL denoting the locale. GnuPG comes with a set of predefined help files in the data directory (e.g. @file{@value{DATADIR}/gnupg/help.de.txt}) and allows overriding of any help item by help files stored in the system configuration directory (e.g. @file{@value{SYSCONFDIR}/help.de.txt}). For a reference of the help file's syntax, please see the installed @file{help.txt} file. @item com-certs.pem @efindex com-certs.pem This file is a collection of common certificates used to populated a newly created @file{pubring.kbx}. An administrator may replace this file with a custom one. The format is a concatenation of PEM encoded X.509 certificates. This global file is installed in the data directory (e.g. @file{@value{DATADIR}/com-certs.pem}). @end table @c man:.RE Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files into the directory @file{/etc/skel/.gnupg/} so that newly created users start up with a working configuration. For existing users a small helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}). For internal purposes @command{gpgsm} creates and maintains a few other files; they all live in the current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}). Only @command{gpgsm} may modify these files. @table @file @item pubring.kbx @efindex pubring.kbx This a database file storing the certificates as well as meta information. For debugging purposes the tool @command{kbxutil} may be used to show the internal structure of this file. You should backup this file. @item random_seed @efindex random_seed This content of this file is used to maintain the internal state of the random number generator across invocations. The same file is used by other programs of this software too. @item S.gpg-agent @efindex S.gpg-agent If this file exists @command{gpgsm} will first try to connect to this socket for accessing @command{gpg-agent} before starting a new @command{gpg-agent} instance. Under Windows this socket (which in reality be a plain file describing a regular TCP listening port) is the standard way of connecting the @command{gpg-agent}. @end table @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** EXAMPLES **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect examples @node GPGSM Examples @section Examples @example $ gpgsm -er goo@@bar.net ciphertext @end example @c ******************************************* @c *************** ************** @c *************** UNATTENDED ************** @c *************** ************** @c ******************************************* @manpause @node Unattended Usage @section Unattended Usage @command{gpgsm} is often used as a backend engine by other software. To help with this a machine interface has been defined to have an unambiguous way to do this. This is most likely used with the @code{--server} command but may also be used in the standard operation mode by using the @code{--status-fd} option. @menu * Automated signature checking:: Automated signature checking. * CSR and certificate creation:: CSR and certificate creation. @end menu @node Automated signature checking @subsection Automated signature checking It is very important to understand the semantics used with signature verification. Checking a signature is not as simple as it may sound and so the operation is a bit complicated. In most cases it is required to look at several status lines. Here is a table of all cases a signed message may have: @table @asis @item The signature is valid This does mean that the signature has been successfully verified, the certificates are all sane. However there are two subcases with important information: One of the certificates may have expired or a signature of a message itself as expired. It is a sound practise to consider such a signature still as valid but additional information should be displayed. Depending on the subcase @command{gpgsm} will issue these status codes: @table @asis @item signature valid and nothing did expire @code{GOODSIG}, @code{VALIDSIG}, @code{TRUST_FULLY} @item signature valid but at least one certificate has expired @code{EXPKEYSIG}, @code{VALIDSIG}, @code{TRUST_FULLY} @item signature valid but expired @code{EXPSIG}, @code{VALIDSIG}, @code{TRUST_FULLY} Note, that this case is currently not implemented. @end table @item The signature is invalid This means that the signature verification failed (this is an indication of a transfer error, a program error or tampering with the message). @command{gpgsm} issues one of these status codes sequences: @table @code @item @code{BADSIG} @item @code{GOODSIG}, @code{VALIDSIG} @code{TRUST_NEVER} @end table @item Error verifying a signature For some reason the signature could not be verified, i.e. it cannot be decided whether the signature is valid or invalid. A common reason for this is a missing certificate. @end table @node CSR and certificate creation @subsection CSR and certificate creation The command @option{--generate-key} may be used along with the option @option{--batch} to either create a certificate signing request (CSR) or an X.509 certificate. This is controlled by a parameter file; the format of this file is as follows: @itemize @bullet @item Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 characters. @item UTF-8 encoding must be used to specify non-ASCII characters. @item Empty lines are ignored. @item Leading and trailing while space is ignored. @item A hash sign as the first non white space character indicates a comment line. @item Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign, the arguments are separated by white space from the keyword. @item Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon. Arguments are separated by white space. @item The first parameter must be @samp{Key-Type}, control statements may be placed anywhere. @item The order of the parameters does not matter except for @samp{Key-Type} which must be the first parameter. The parameters are only used for the generated CSR/certificate; parameters from previous sets are not used. Some syntactically checks may be performed. @item Key generation takes place when either the end of the parameter file is reached, the next @samp{Key-Type} parameter is encountered or at the control statement @samp{%commit} is encountered. @end itemize @noindent Control statements: @table @asis @item %echo @var{text} Print @var{text} as diagnostic. @item %dry-run Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking). @item %commit Perform the key generation. Note that an implicit commit is done at the next @asis{Key-Type} parameter. @c %certfile <filename> @c [Not yet implemented!] @c Do not write the certificate to the keyDB but to <filename>. @c This must be given before the first @c commit to take place, duplicate specification of the same filename @c is ignored, the last filename before a commit is used. @c The filename is used until a new filename is used (at commit points) @c and all keys are written to that file. If a new filename is given, @c this file is created (and overwrites an existing one). @c Both control statements must be given. @end table @noindent General Parameters: @table @asis @item Key-Type: @var{algo} Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the primary key. The algorithm must be capable of signing. This is a required parameter. The supported values for @var{algo} are @samp{rsa}, @samp{ecdsa}, and @samp{eddsa}. @item Key-Length: @var{nbits} The requested length of a generated key in bits. Defaults to 3072. The value is ignored for ECC algorithms. @item Key-Grip: @var{hexstring} This is optional and used to generate a CSR or certificate for an already existing key. Key-Length will be ignored when given. @item Key-Usage: @var{usage-list} Space or comma delimited list of key usage, allowed values are @samp{encrypt}, @samp{sign} and @samp{cert}. This is used to generate the keyUsage extension. Please make sure that the algorithm is capable of this usage. Default is to allow encrypt and sign. @item Name-DN: @var{subject-name} This is the Distinguished Name (DN) of the subject in RFC-2253 format. @item Name-Email: @var{string} This is an email address for the altSubjectName. This parameter is optional but may occur several times to add several email addresses to a certificate. @item Name-DNS: @var{string} The is an DNS name for the altSubjectName. This parameter is optional but may occur several times to add several DNS names to a certificate. @item Name-URI: @var{string} This is an URI for the altSubjectName. This parameter is optional but may occur several times to add several URIs to a certificate. @end table @noindent Additional parameters used to create a certificate (in contrast to a certificate signing request): @table @asis @item Serial: @var{sn} If this parameter is given an X.509 certificate will be generated. @var{sn} is expected to be a hex string representing an unsigned integer of arbitrary length. The special value @samp{random} can be used to create a 64 bit random serial number. @item Issuer-DN: @var{issuer-name} This is the DN name of the issuer in RFC-2253 format. If it is not set it will default to the subject DN and a special GnuPG extension will be included in the certificate to mark it as a standalone certificate. @item Creation-Date: @var{iso-date} @itemx Not-Before: @var{iso-date} Set the notBefore date of the certificate. Either a date like @samp{1986-04-26} or @samp{1986-04-26 12:00} or a standard ISO timestamp like @samp{19860426T042640} may be used. The time is considered to be UTC. If it is not given the current date is used. @item Expire-Date: @var{iso-date} @itemx Not-After: @var{iso-date} Set the notAfter date of the certificate. Either a date like @samp{2063-04-05} or @samp{2063-04-05 17:00} or a standard ISO timestamp like @samp{20630405T170000} may be used. The time is considered to be UTC. If it is not given a default value in the not too far future is used. @item Signing-Key: @var{keygrip} This gives the keygrip of the key used to sign the certificate. If it is not given a self-signed certificate will be created. For compatibility with future versions, it is suggested to prefix the keygrip with a @samp{&}. @item Hash-Algo: @var{hash-algo} Use @var{hash-algo} for this CSR or certificate. The supported hash algorithms are: @samp{sha1}, @samp{sha256}, @samp{sha384} and @samp{sha512}; they may also be specified with uppercase letters. The default is @samp{sha256}. @item Authority-Key-Id: @var{hexstring} Insert the decoded value of @var{hexstring} as authorityKeyIdentifier. If this is not given and an ECC algorithm is used the public part of the certified public key is used as authorityKeyIdentifier. To inhibit any authorityKeyIdentifier use the special value @code{none} for @var{hexstring}. @item Subject-Key-Id: @var{hexstring} Insert the decoded value of @var{hexstring} as subjectKeyIdentifier. If this is not given and an ECC algorithm is used the public part of the signing key is used as authorityKeyIdentifier. To inhibit any subjectKeyIdentifier use the special value @code{none} for @var{hexstring}. @end table @c ******************************************* @c *************** ***************** @c *************** ASSSUAN ***************** @c *************** ***************** @c ******************************************* @node GPGSM Protocol @section The Protocol the Server Mode Uses Description of the protocol used to access @command{GPGSM}. @command{GPGSM} does implement the Assuan protocol and in addition provides a regular command line interface which exhibits a full client to this protocol (but uses internal linking). To start @command{gpgsm} as a server the command line the option @code{--server} must be used. Additional options are provided to select the communication method (i.e. the name of the socket). We assume that the connection has already been established; see the Assuan manual for details. @menu * GPGSM ENCRYPT:: Encrypting a message. * GPGSM DECRYPT:: Decrypting a message. * GPGSM SIGN:: Signing a message. * GPGSM VERIFY:: Verifying a message. * GPGSM GENKEY:: Generating a key. * GPGSM LISTKEYS:: List available keys. * GPGSM EXPORT:: Export certificates. * GPGSM IMPORT:: Import certificates. * GPGSM DELETE:: Delete certificates. * GPGSM GETAUDITLOG:: Retrieve an audit log. * GPGSM GETINFO:: Information about the process * GPGSM OPTION:: Session options. @end menu @node GPGSM ENCRYPT @subsection Encrypting a Message Before encryption can be done the recipient must be set using the command: @example RECIPIENT @var{userID} @end example Set the recipient for the encryption. @var{userID} should be the internal representation of the key; the server may accept any other way of specification. If this is a valid and trusted recipient the server does respond with OK, otherwise the return is an ERR with the reason why the recipient cannot be used, the encryption will then not be done for this recipient. If the policy is not to encrypt at all if not all recipients are valid, the client has to take care of this. All @code{RECIPIENT} commands are cumulative until a @code{RESET} or an successful @code{ENCRYPT} command. @example INPUT FD[=@var{n}] [--armor|--base64|--binary] @end example Set the file descriptor for the message to be encrypted to @var{n}. Obviously the pipe must be open at that point, the server establishes its own end. If the server returns an error the client should consider this session failed. If @var{n} is not given, this commands uses the last file descriptor passed to the application. @xref{fun-assuan_sendfd, ,the assuan_sendfd function,assuan,the Libassuan manual}, on how to do descriptor passing. -The @code{--armor} option may be used to advice the server that the -input data is in @acronym{PEM} format, @code{--base64} advices that a -raw base-64 encoding is used, @code{--binary} advices of raw binary +The @code{--armor} option may be used to advise the server that the +input data is in @acronym{PEM} format, @code{--base64} advises that a +raw base-64 encoding is used, @code{--binary} advises of raw binary input (@acronym{BER}). If none of these options is used, the server tries to figure out the used encoding, but this may not always be correct. @example OUTPUT FD[=@var{n}] [--armor|--base64] @end example Set the file descriptor to be used for the output (i.e. the encrypted message). Obviously the pipe must be open at that point, the server establishes its own end. If the server returns an error the client should consider this session failed. The option @option{--armor} encodes the output in @acronym{PEM} format, the @option{--base64} option applies just a base-64 encoding. No option creates binary output (@acronym{BER}). The actual encryption is done using the command @example ENCRYPT @end example It takes the plaintext from the @code{INPUT} command, writes to the ciphertext to the file descriptor set with the @code{OUTPUT} command, take the recipients from all the recipients set so far. If this command fails the clients should try to delete all output currently done or otherwise mark it as invalid. @command{GPGSM} does ensure that there will not be any security problem with leftover data on the output in this case. This command should in general not fail, as all necessary checks have been done while setting the recipients. The input and output pipes are closed. @node GPGSM DECRYPT @subsection Decrypting a message Input and output FDs are set the same way as in encryption, but @code{INPUT} refers to the ciphertext and @code{OUTPUT} to the plaintext. There is no need to set recipients. @command{GPGSM} automatically strips any @acronym{S/MIME} headers from the input, so it is valid to pass an entire MIME part to the INPUT pipe. The decryption is done by using the command @example DECRYPT @end example It performs the decrypt operation after doing some check on the internal state (e.g. that all needed data has been set). Because it utilizes the GPG-Agent for the session key decryption, there is no need to ask the client for a protecting passphrase - GpgAgent takes care of this by requesting this from the user. @node GPGSM SIGN @subsection Signing a Message Signing is usually done with these commands: @example INPUT FD[=@var{n}] [--armor|--base64|--binary] @end example This tells @command{GPGSM} to read the data to sign from file descriptor @var{n}. @example OUTPUT FD[=@var{m}] [--armor|--base64] @end example Write the output to file descriptor @var{m}. If a detached signature is requested, only the signature is written. @example SIGN [--detached] @end example Sign the data set with the @code{INPUT} command and write it to the sink set by @code{OUTPUT}. With @code{--detached}, a detached signature is created (surprise). The key used for signing is the default one or the one specified in the configuration file. To get finer control over the keys, it is possible to use the command @example SIGNER @var{userID} @end example to set the signer's key. @var{userID} should be the internal representation of the key; the server may accept any other way of specification. If this is a valid and trusted recipient the server does respond with OK, otherwise the return is an ERR with the reason why the key cannot be used, the signature will then not be created using this key. If the policy is not to sign at all if not all keys are valid, the client has to take care of this. All @code{SIGNER} commands are cumulative until a @code{RESET} is done. Note that a @code{SIGN} does not reset this list of signers which is in contrast to the @code{RECIPIENT} command. @node GPGSM VERIFY @subsection Verifying a Message To verify a message the command: @example VERIFY @end example is used. It does a verify operation on the message send to the input FD. The result is written out using status lines. If an output FD was given, the signed text will be written to that. If the signature is a detached one, the server will inquire about the signed material and the client must provide it. @node GPGSM GENKEY @subsection Generating a Key This is used to generate a new keypair, store the secret part in the @acronym{PSE} and the public key in the key database. We will probably add optional commands to allow the client to select whether a hardware token is used to store the key. Configuration options to @command{GPGSM} can be used to restrict the use of this command. @example GENKEY @end example @command{GPGSM} checks whether this command is allowed and then does an INQUIRY to get the key parameters, the client should then send the key parameters in the native format: @example S: INQUIRE KEY_PARAM native C: D foo:fgfgfg C: D bar C: END @end example Please note that the server may send Status info lines while reading the data lines from the client. After this the key generation takes place and the server eventually does send an ERR or OK response. Status lines may be issued as a progress indicator. @node GPGSM LISTKEYS @subsection List available keys @anchor{gpgsm-cmd listkeys} To list the keys in the internal database or using an external key provider, the command: @example LISTKEYS @var{pattern} @end example is used. To allow multiple patterns (which are ORed during the search) quoting is required: Spaces are to be translated into "+" or into "%20"; in turn this requires that the usual escape quoting rules are done. @example LISTSECRETKEYS @var{pattern} @end example Lists only the keys where a secret key is available. The list commands are affected by the option @example OPTION list-mode=@var{mode} @end example where mode may be: @table @code @item 0 Use default (which is usually the same as 1). @item 1 List only the internal keys. @item 2 List only the external keys. @item 3 List internal and external keys. @end table Note that options are valid for the entire session. @node GPGSM EXPORT @subsection Export certificates To export certificate from the internal key database the command: @example EXPORT [--data [--armor] [--base64]] [--] @var{pattern} @end example is used. To allow multiple patterns (which are ORed) quoting is required: Spaces are to be translated into "+" or into "%20"; in turn this requires that the usual escape quoting rules are done. If the @option{--data} option has not been given, the format of the output depends on what was set with the @code{OUTPUT} command. When using @acronym{PEM} encoding a few informational lines are prepended. If the @option{--data} has been given, a target set via @code{OUTPUT} is ignored and the data is returned inline using standard @code{D}-lines. This avoids the need for an extra file descriptor. In this case the options @option{--armor} and @option{--base64} may be used in the same way as with the @code{OUTPUT} command. @node GPGSM IMPORT @subsection Import certificates To import certificates into the internal key database, the command @example IMPORT [--re-import] @end example is used. The data is expected on the file descriptor set with the @code{INPUT} command. Certain checks are performed on the certificate. Note that the code will also handle PKCS#12 files and import private keys; a helper program is used for that. With the option @option{--re-import} the input data is expected to a be a linefeed separated list of fingerprints. The command will re-import the corresponding certificates; that is they are made permanent by removing their ephemeral flag. @node GPGSM DELETE @subsection Delete certificates To delete a certificate the command @example DELKEYS @var{pattern} @end example is used. To allow multiple patterns (which are ORed) quoting is required: Spaces are to be translated into "+" or into "%20"; in turn this requires that the usual escape quoting rules are done. The certificates must be specified unambiguously otherwise an error is returned. @node GPGSM GETAUDITLOG @subsection Retrieve an audit log @anchor{gpgsm-cmd getauditlog} This command is used to retrieve an audit log. @example GETAUDITLOG [--data] [--html] @end example If @option{--data} is used, the audit log is send using D-lines instead of being sent to the file descriptor given by an @code{OUTPUT} command. If @option{--html} is used, the output is formatted as an XHTML block. This is designed to be incorporated into a HTML document. @node GPGSM GETINFO @subsection Return information about the process This is a multipurpose function to return a variety of information. @example GETINFO @var{what} @end example The value of @var{what} specifies the kind of information returned: @table @code @item version Return the version of the program. @item pid Return the process id of the process. @item agent-check Return OK if the agent is running. @item cmd_has_option @var{cmd} @var{opt} Return OK if the command @var{cmd} implements the option @var{opt}. The leading two dashes usually used with @var{opt} shall not be given. @item offline Return OK if the connection is in offline mode. This may be either due to a @code{OPTION offline=1} or due to @command{gpgsm} being started with option @option{--disable-dirmngr}. @end table @node GPGSM OPTION @subsection Session options The standard Assuan option handler supports these options. @example OPTION @var{name}[=@var{value}] @end example These @var{name}s are recognized: @table @code @item putenv Change the session's environment to be passed via gpg-agent to Pinentry. @var{value} is a string of the form @code{<KEY>[=[<STRING>]]}. If only @code{<KEY>} is given the environment variable @code{<KEY>} is removed from the session environment, if @code{<KEY>=} is given that environment variable is set to the empty string, and if @code{<STRING>} is given it is set to that string. @item display @efindex DISPLAY Set the session environment variable @code{DISPLAY} is set to @var{value}. @item ttyname @efindex GPG_TTY Set the session environment variable @code{GPG_TTY} is set to @var{value}. @item ttytype @efindex TERM Set the session environment variable @code{TERM} is set to @var{value}. @item lc-ctype @efindex LC_CTYPE Set the session environment variable @code{LC_CTYPE} is set to @var{value}. @item lc-messages @efindex LC_MESSAGES Set the session environment variable @code{LC_MESSAGES} is set to @var{value}. @item xauthority @efindex XAUTHORITY Set the session environment variable @code{XAUTHORITY} is set to @var{value}. @item pinentry-user-data @efindex PINENTRY_USER_DATA Set the session environment variable @code{PINENTRY_USER_DATA} is set to @var{value}. @item include-certs This option overrides the command line option @option{--include-certs}. A @var{value} of -2 includes all certificates except for the root certificate, -1 includes all certificates, 0 does not include any certificates, 1 includes only the signers certificate and all other positive values include up to @var{value} certificates starting with the signer cert. @item list-mode @xref{gpgsm-cmd listkeys}. @item list-to-output If @var{value} is true the output of the list commands (@pxref{gpgsm-cmd listkeys}) is written to the file descriptor set with the last @code{OUTPUT} command. If @var{value} is false the output is written via data lines; this is the default. @item with-validation If @var{value} is true for each listed certificate the validation status is printed. This may result in the download of a CRL or the user being asked about the trustworthiness of a root certificate. The default is given by a command line option (@pxref{gpgsm-option --with-validation}). @item with-secret If @var{value} is true certificates with a corresponding private key are marked by the list commands. @item validation-model This option overrides the command line option @option{validation-model} for the session. (@xref{gpgsm-option --validation-model}.) @item with-key-data This option globally enables the command line option @option{--with-key-data}. (@xref{gpgsm-option --with-key-data}.) @item enable-audit-log If @var{value} is true data to write an audit log is gathered. (@xref{gpgsm-cmd getauditlog}.) @item allow-pinentry-notify If this option is used notifications about the launch of a Pinentry are passed back to the client. @item with-ephemeral-keys If @var{value} is true ephemeral certificates are included in the output of the list commands. @item no-encrypt-to If this option is used all keys set by the command line option @option{--encrypt-to} are ignored. @item offline If @var{value} is true or @var{value} is not given all network access is disabled for this session. This is the same as the command line option @option{--disable-dirmngr}. @end table @mansect see also @ifset isman @command{gpg2}(1), @command{gpg-agent}(1) @end ifset @include see-also-note.texi diff --git a/scd/app-openpgp.c b/scd/app-openpgp.c index b75ee6457..0e3b3daad 100644 --- a/scd/app-openpgp.c +++ b/scd/app-openpgp.c @@ -1,6250 +1,6250 @@ /* app-openpgp.c - The OpenPGP card application. * Copyright (C) 2003-2005, 2007-2009, * 2013-2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * Copyright (C) 2003-2005, 2007-2009, 2013-2015, 2020 g10 Code GmbH * * This file is part of GnuPG. * * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */ /* Some notes: CHV means Card Holder Verification and is nothing else than a PIN or password. That term seems to have been used originally with GSM cards. Version v2 of the specs changes the term to the clearer term PW for password. We use the terms here interchangeable because we do not want to change existing strings i18n wise. Version 2 of the specs also drops the separate PW2 which was required in v1 due to ISO requirements. It is now possible to have one physical PW but two reference to it so that they can be individually be verified (e.g. to implement a forced verification for one key). Thus you will noticed the use of PW2 with the verify command but not with change_reference_data because the latter operates directly on the physical PW. The Reset Code (RC) as implemented by v2 cards uses the same error counter as the PW2 of v1 cards. By default no RC is set and thus that error counter is set to 0. After setting the RC the error counter will be initialized to 3. */ #include <config.h> #include <errno.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdarg.h> #include <string.h> #include <assert.h> #include <time.h> #include "scdaemon.h" #include "../common/util.h" #include "../common/i18n.h" #include "iso7816.h" #include "../common/tlv.h" #include "../common/host2net.h" #include "../common/openpgpdefs.h" #define KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MIN 90 #define KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MAX 110 /* The AID of this application. */ static char const openpgp_aid[] = { 0xD2, 0x76, 0x00, 0x01, 0x24, 0x01 }; /* A table describing the DOs of the card. */ static struct { int tag; int constructed; int get_from; /* Constructed DO with this DO or 0 for direct access. */ unsigned int binary:1; unsigned int dont_cache:1; unsigned int flush_on_error:1; unsigned int get_immediate_in_v11:1; /* Enable a hack to bypass the cache of this data object if it is used in 1.1 and later versions of the card. This does not work with composite DO and is currently only useful for the CHV status bytes. */ unsigned int try_extlen:2; /* Large object; try to use an extended length APDU when !=0. The size is determined by extcap.max_certlen_3 when == 1, and by extcap.max_special_do when == 2. */ char *desc; } data_objects[] = { { 0x005E, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 2, "Login Data" }, { 0x5F50, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, "URL" }, { 0x5F52, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Historical Bytes" }, { 0x0065, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Cardholder Related Data"}, { 0x005B, 0, 0x65, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Name" }, { 0x5F2D, 0, 0x65, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Language preferences" }, { 0x5F35, 0, 0x65, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Salutation" }, { 0x006E, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Application Related Data" }, { 0x004F, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "AID" }, { 0x0073, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Discretionary Data Objects" }, { 0x0047, 0, 0x6E, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Card Capabilities" }, { 0x00C0, 0, 0x6E, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Extended Card Capabilities" }, { 0x00C1, 0, 0x6E, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Algorithm Attributes Signature" }, { 0x00C2, 0, 0x6E, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Algorithm Attributes Decryption" }, { 0x00C3, 0, 0x6E, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Algorithm Attributes Authentication" }, { 0x00C4, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, "CHV Status Bytes" }, { 0x00C5, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Fingerprints" }, { 0x00C6, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "CA Fingerprints" }, { 0x00CD, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Generation time" }, { 0x007A, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Security Support Template" }, { 0x0093, 0, 0x7A, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Digital Signature Counter" }, { 0x0101, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, "Private DO 1"}, { 0x0102, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, "Private DO 2"}, { 0x0103, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, "Private DO 3"}, { 0x0104, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, "Private DO 4"}, { 0x7F21, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, "Cardholder certificate"}, /* V3.0 */ { 0x7F74, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "General Feature Management"}, { 0x00D5, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "AES key data"}, { 0x00D6, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "UIF for Signature"}, { 0x00D7, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "UIF for Decryption"}, { 0x00D8, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "UIF for Authentication"}, { 0x00F9, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "KDF data object"}, { 0x00FA, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 2, "Algorithm Information"}, { 0 } }; /* Type of keys. */ typedef enum { KEY_TYPE_ECC, KEY_TYPE_RSA, } key_type_t; /* The format of RSA private keys. */ typedef enum { RSA_UNKNOWN_FMT, RSA_STD, RSA_STD_N, RSA_CRT, RSA_CRT_N } rsa_key_format_t; /* One cache item for DOs. */ struct cache_s { struct cache_s *next; int tag; size_t length; unsigned char data[1]; }; /* Object with application (i.e. OpenPGP card) specific data. */ struct app_local_s { /* A linked list with cached DOs. */ struct cache_s *cache; /* Keep track of the public keys. */ struct { int read_done; /* True if we have at least tried to read them. */ unsigned char *key; /* This is a malloced buffer with a canonical encoded S-expression encoding a public key. Might be NULL if key is not available. */ size_t keylen; /* The length of the above S-expression. This is usually only required for cross checks because the length of an S-expression is implicitly available. */ unsigned char keygrip_str[41]; /* The keygrip, null terminated */ } pk[3]; unsigned char status_indicator; /* The card status indicator. */ unsigned int manufacturer:16; /* Manufacturer ID from the s/n. */ /* Keep track of the ISO card capabilities. */ struct { unsigned int cmd_chaining:1; /* Command chaining is supported. */ unsigned int ext_lc_le:1; /* Extended Lc and Le are supported. */ } cardcap; /* Keep track of extended card capabilities. */ struct { unsigned int is_v2:1; /* Compatible to v2 or later. */ unsigned int extcap_v3:1; /* Extcap is in v3 format. */ unsigned int has_button:1; /* Has confirmation button or not. */ unsigned int sm_supported:1; /* Secure Messaging is supported. */ unsigned int get_challenge:1; unsigned int key_import:1; unsigned int change_force_chv:1; unsigned int private_dos:1; unsigned int algo_attr_change:1; /* Algorithm attributes changeable. */ unsigned int has_decrypt:1; /* Support symmetric decryption. */ unsigned int kdf_do:1; /* Support KDF DO. */ unsigned int sm_algo:2; /* Symmetric crypto algo for SM. */ unsigned int pin_blk2:1; /* PIN block 2 format supported. */ unsigned int mse:1; /* MSE command supported. */ unsigned int max_certlen_3:16; unsigned int max_get_challenge:16; /* Maximum size for get_challenge. */ unsigned int max_special_do:16; /* Maximum size for special DOs. */ } extcap; /* Flags used to control the application. */ struct { unsigned int no_sync:1; /* Do not sync CHV1 and CHV2 */ unsigned int def_chv2:1; /* Use 123456 for CHV2. */ } flags; /* Keep track on whether we cache a certain PIN so that we get it * from the cache only if we know we cached it. This inhibits the * use of the same cache entry for a card plugged in and out without * gpg-agent having noticed that due to a bug. */ struct { unsigned int maybe_chv1:1; unsigned int maybe_chv2:1; unsigned int maybe_chv3:1; } pincache; /* Pinpad request specified on card. */ struct { unsigned int disabled:1; /* No pinpad use because of KDF DO. */ unsigned int specified:1; int fixedlen_user; int fixedlen_admin; } pinpad; struct { key_type_t key_type; const char *keyalgo; /* Algorithm in standard string format. */ union { struct { unsigned int n_bits; /* Size of the modulus in bits. The rest of this strucuire is only valid if this is not 0. */ unsigned int e_bits; /* Size of the public exponent in bits. */ rsa_key_format_t format; } rsa; struct { const char *curve; int flags; } ecc; }; } keyattr[3]; }; #define ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK (1 << 0) #define ECC_FLAG_PUBKEY (1 << 1) /***** Local prototypes *****/ static unsigned long convert_sig_counter_value (const unsigned char *value, size_t valuelen); static unsigned long get_sig_counter (app_t app); static gpg_error_t do_auth (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyidstr, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg, const void *indata, size_t indatalen, unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen); static const char *get_algorithm_attribute_string (const unsigned char *buffer, size_t buflen); static void parse_algorithm_attribute (app_t app, int keyno); static gpg_error_t change_keyattr_from_string (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg, const char *keyref, const char *keyalgo, const void *value, size_t valuelen); /* Return the OpenPGP card manufacturer name. */ static const char * get_manufacturer (unsigned int no) { /* Note: Make sure that there is no colon or linefeed in the string. */ switch (no) { case 0x0001: return "PPC Card Systems"; case 0x0002: return "Prism"; case 0x0003: return "OpenFortress"; case 0x0004: return "Wewid"; case 0x0005: return "ZeitControl"; case 0x0006: return "Yubico"; case 0x0007: return "OpenKMS"; case 0x0008: return "LogoEmail"; case 0x0009: return "Fidesmo"; case 0x000A: return "Dangerous Things"; case 0x000B: return "Feitian Technologies"; case 0x002A: return "Magrathea"; case 0x0042: return "GnuPG e.V."; case 0x1337: return "Warsaw Hackerspace"; case 0x2342: return "warpzone"; /* hackerspace Muenster. */ case 0x4354: return "Confidential Technologies"; /* cotech.de */ case 0x5443: return "TIF-IT e.V."; case 0x63AF: return "Trustica"; case 0xBA53: return "c-base e.V."; case 0xBD0E: return "Paranoidlabs"; case 0xF517: return "FSIJ"; case 0xF5EC: return "F-Secure"; /* 0x0000 and 0xFFFF are defined as test cards per spec, * 0xFF00 to 0xFFFE are assigned for use with randomly created * serial numbers. */ case 0x0000: case 0xffff: return "test card"; default: return (no & 0xff00) == 0xff00? "unmanaged S/N range":"unknown"; } } /* Deconstructor. */ static void do_deinit (app_t app) { if (app && app->app_local) { struct cache_s *c, *c2; int i; for (c = app->app_local->cache; c; c = c2) { c2 = c->next; xfree (c); } for (i=0; i < DIM (app->app_local->pk); i++) { xfree (app->app_local->pk[i].key); app->app_local->pk[i].read_done = 0; } xfree (app->app_local); app->app_local = NULL; } } /* This is a helper to do a wipememory followed by a free. In general * we do not need this if the buffer has been allocated in secure * memory. However at some places we can't make that sure and thus we * better to an extra wipe here. */ static void wipe_and_free (void *p, size_t len) { if (p) { if (len) wipememory (p, len); xfree (p); } } /* Similar to wipe_and_free but assumes P is eitehr NULL or a proper * string. */ static void wipe_and_free_string (char *p) { if (p) { wipememory (p, strlen (p)); xfree (p); } } /* Wrapper around iso7816_get_data which first tries to get the data from the cache. With GET_IMMEDIATE passed as true, the cache is bypassed. With TRY_EXTLEN extended lengths APDUs are use if supported by the card. */ static gpg_error_t get_cached_data (app_t app, int tag, unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen, int get_immediate, int try_extlen) { gpg_error_t err; int i; unsigned char *p; size_t len; struct cache_s *c; int exmode; *result = NULL; *resultlen = 0; if (!get_immediate) { for (c=app->app_local->cache; c; c = c->next) if (c->tag == tag) { if(c->length) { p = xtrymalloc (c->length); if (!p) return gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno)); memcpy (p, c->data, c->length); *result = p; } *resultlen = c->length; return 0; } } if (try_extlen && app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le) { if (try_extlen == 1) exmode = app->app_local->extcap.max_certlen_3; else if (try_extlen == 2 && app->app_local->extcap.extcap_v3) exmode = app->app_local->extcap.max_special_do; else exmode = 0; } else exmode = 0; err = iso7816_get_data (app_get_slot (app), exmode, tag, &p, &len); if (err) return err; if (len) *result = p; *resultlen = len; /* Check whether we should cache this object. */ if (get_immediate) return 0; for (i=0; data_objects[i].tag; i++) if (data_objects[i].tag == tag) { if (data_objects[i].dont_cache) return 0; break; } /* Okay, cache it. */ for (c=app->app_local->cache; c; c = c->next) assert (c->tag != tag); c = xtrymalloc (sizeof *c + len); if (c) { if (len) memcpy (c->data, p, len); else xfree (p); c->length = len; c->tag = tag; c->next = app->app_local->cache; app->app_local->cache = c; } return 0; } /* Remove DO at TAG from the cache. */ static void flush_cache_item (app_t app, int tag) { struct cache_s *c, *cprev; int i; if (!app->app_local) return; for (c=app->app_local->cache, cprev=NULL; c ; cprev=c, c = c->next) if (c->tag == tag) { if (cprev) cprev->next = c->next; else app->app_local->cache = c->next; xfree (c); for (c=app->app_local->cache; c ; c = c->next) { assert (c->tag != tag); /* Oops: duplicated entry. */ } return; } /* Try again if we have an outer tag. */ for (i=0; data_objects[i].tag; i++) if (data_objects[i].tag == tag && data_objects[i].get_from && data_objects[i].get_from != tag) flush_cache_item (app, data_objects[i].get_from); } /* Flush all entries from the cache which might be out of sync after an error. */ static void flush_cache_after_error (app_t app) { int i; for (i=0; data_objects[i].tag; i++) if (data_objects[i].flush_on_error) flush_cache_item (app, data_objects[i].tag); } /* Flush the entire cache. */ static void flush_cache (app_t app) { if (app && app->app_local) { struct cache_s *c, *c2; for (c = app->app_local->cache; c; c = c2) { c2 = c->next; xfree (c); } app->app_local->cache = NULL; } } /* Get the DO identified by TAG from the card in SLOT and return a buffer with its content in RESULT and NBYTES. The return value is NULL if not found or a pointer which must be used to release the buffer holding value. */ static void * get_one_do (app_t app, int tag, unsigned char **result, size_t *nbytes, int *r_rc) { int rc, i; unsigned char *buffer; size_t buflen; unsigned char *value; size_t valuelen; int dummyrc; int exmode; if (!r_rc) r_rc = &dummyrc; *result = NULL; *nbytes = 0; *r_rc = 0; for (i=0; data_objects[i].tag && data_objects[i].tag != tag; i++) ; if (app->appversion > 0x0100 && data_objects[i].get_immediate_in_v11) { exmode = 0; rc = iso7816_get_data (app_get_slot (app), exmode, tag, &buffer, &buflen); if (rc) { *r_rc = rc; return NULL; } *result = buffer; *nbytes = buflen; return buffer; } value = NULL; rc = -1; if (data_objects[i].tag && data_objects[i].get_from) { rc = get_cached_data (app, data_objects[i].get_from, &buffer, &buflen, (data_objects[i].dont_cache || data_objects[i].get_immediate_in_v11), data_objects[i].try_extlen); if (!rc) { const unsigned char *s; s = find_tlv_unchecked (buffer, buflen, tag, &valuelen); if (!s) value = NULL; /* not found */ else if (valuelen > buflen - (s - buffer)) { log_error ("warning: constructed DO too short\n"); value = NULL; xfree (buffer); buffer = NULL; } else value = buffer + (s - buffer); } } if (!value) /* Not in a constructed DO, try simple. */ { rc = get_cached_data (app, tag, &buffer, &buflen, (data_objects[i].dont_cache || data_objects[i].get_immediate_in_v11), data_objects[i].try_extlen); if (!rc) { value = buffer; valuelen = buflen; } } if (!rc) { *nbytes = valuelen; *result = value; return buffer; } *r_rc = rc; return NULL; } static void dump_all_do (int slot) { int rc, i, j; unsigned char *buffer; size_t buflen; for (i=0; data_objects[i].tag; i++) { if (data_objects[i].get_from) continue; /* We don't try extended length APDU because such large DO would be pretty useless in a log file. */ rc = iso7816_get_data (slot, 0, data_objects[i].tag, &buffer, &buflen); if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) ; else if (rc) log_info ("DO '%s' not available: %s\n", data_objects[i].desc, gpg_strerror (rc)); else { if (data_objects[i].binary) { log_info ("DO '%s': ", data_objects[i].desc); log_printhex (buffer, buflen, ""); } else log_info ("DO '%s': '%.*s'\n", data_objects[i].desc, (int)buflen, buffer); /* FIXME: sanitize */ if (data_objects[i].constructed) { for (j=0; data_objects[j].tag; j++) { const unsigned char *value; size_t valuelen; if (j==i || data_objects[i].tag != data_objects[j].get_from) continue; value = find_tlv_unchecked (buffer, buflen, data_objects[j].tag, &valuelen); if (!value) ; /* not found */ else if (valuelen > buflen - (value - buffer)) log_error ("warning: constructed DO too short\n"); else { if (data_objects[j].binary) { log_info ("DO '%s': ", data_objects[j].desc); if (valuelen > 200) log_info ("[%u]\n", (unsigned int)valuelen); else log_printhex (value, valuelen, ""); } else log_info ("DO '%s': '%.*s'\n", data_objects[j].desc, (int)valuelen, value); /* FIXME: sanitize */ } } } } xfree (buffer); buffer = NULL; } } /* Count the number of bits, assuming the A represents an unsigned big integer of length LEN bytes. */ static unsigned int count_bits (const unsigned char *a, size_t len) { unsigned int n = len * 8; int i; for (; len && !*a; len--, a++, n -=8) ; if (len) { for (i=7; i && !(*a & (1<<i)); i--) n--; } return n; } /* GnuPG makes special use of the login-data DO, this function parses the login data to store the flags for later use. It may be called at any time and should be called after changing the login-data DO. Everything up to a LF is considered a mailbox or account name. If the first LF is followed by DC4 (0x14) control sequence are expected up to the next LF. Control sequences are separated by FS (0x18) and consist of key=value pairs. There are two keys defined: F=<flags> Where FLAGS is a plain hexadecimal number representing flag values. The lsb is here the rightmost bit. Defined flags bits are: Bit 0 = CHV1 and CHV2 are not synchronized Bit 1 = CHV2 has been set to the default PIN of "123456" (this implies that bit 0 is also set). P=<pinpad-request> Where PINPAD_REQUEST is in the format of: <n> or <n>,<m>. N for user PIN, M for admin PIN. If M is missing it means M=N. 0 means to force not to use pinpad. */ static void parse_login_data (app_t app) { unsigned char *buffer, *p; size_t buflen, len; void *relptr; /* Set defaults. */ app->app_local->flags.no_sync = 0; app->app_local->flags.def_chv2 = 0; app->app_local->pinpad.specified = 0; app->app_local->pinpad.fixedlen_user = -1; app->app_local->pinpad.fixedlen_admin = -1; /* Read the DO. */ relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x005E, &buffer, &buflen, NULL); if (!relptr) return; /* Ooops. */ for (; buflen; buflen--, buffer++) if (*buffer == '\n') break; if (buflen < 2 || buffer[1] != '\x14') { xfree (relptr); return; /* No control sequences. */ } buflen--; buffer++; do { buflen--; buffer++; if (buflen > 1 && *buffer == 'F' && buffer[1] == '=') { /* Flags control sequence found. */ int lastdig = 0; /* For now we are only interested in the last digit, so skip any leading digits but bail out on invalid characters. */ for (p=buffer+2, len = buflen-2; len && hexdigitp (p); p++, len--) lastdig = xtoi_1 (p); buffer = p; buflen = len; if (len && !(*p == '\n' || *p == '\x18')) goto next; /* Invalid characters in field. */ app->app_local->flags.no_sync = !!(lastdig & 1); app->app_local->flags.def_chv2 = (lastdig & 3) == 3; } else if (buflen > 1 && *buffer == 'P' && buffer[1] == '=') { /* Pinpad request control sequence found. */ buffer += 2; buflen -= 2; if (buflen) { if (digitp (buffer)) { char *q; int n, m; n = strtol (buffer, &q, 10); if (q >= (char *)buffer + buflen || *q == '\x18' || *q == '\n') m = n; else { if (*q++ != ',' || !digitp (q)) goto next; m = strtol (q, &q, 10); } if (buflen < ((unsigned char *)q - buffer)) break; buflen -= ((unsigned char *)q - buffer); buffer = q; if (buflen && !(*buffer == '\n' || *buffer == '\x18')) goto next; app->app_local->pinpad.specified = 1; app->app_local->pinpad.fixedlen_user = n; app->app_local->pinpad.fixedlen_admin = m; } } } next: /* Skip to FS (0x18) or LF (\n). */ for (; buflen && *buffer != '\x18' && *buffer != '\n'; buflen--) buffer++; } while (buflen && *buffer != '\n'); xfree (relptr); } #define MAX_ARGS_STORE_FPR 3 /* Note, that FPR must be at least 20 bytes. */ static gpg_error_t store_fpr (app_t app, int keynumber, u32 timestamp, unsigned char *fpr, int algo, ...) { unsigned int n, nbits; unsigned char *buffer, *p; int tag, tag2; int rc; const unsigned char *m[MAX_ARGS_STORE_FPR]; size_t mlen[MAX_ARGS_STORE_FPR]; va_list ap; int argc; int i; n = 6; /* key packet version, 4-byte timestamps, and algorithm */ if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) argc = 3; else argc = 2; va_start (ap, algo); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { m[i] = va_arg (ap, const unsigned char *); mlen[i] = va_arg (ap, size_t); if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA || i == 1) n += 2; n += mlen[i]; } va_end (ap); p = buffer = xtrymalloc (3 + n); if (!buffer) return gpg_error_from_syserror (); *p++ = 0x99; /* ctb */ *p++ = n >> 8; /* 2 byte length header */ *p++ = n; *p++ = 4; /* key packet version */ *p++ = timestamp >> 24; *p++ = timestamp >> 16; *p++ = timestamp >> 8; *p++ = timestamp; *p++ = algo; for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA || i == 1) { nbits = count_bits (m[i], mlen[i]); *p++ = nbits >> 8; *p++ = nbits; } memcpy (p, m[i], mlen[i]); p += mlen[i]; } gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA1, fpr, buffer, n+3); xfree (buffer); tag = (app->appversion > 0x0007? 0xC7 : 0xC6) + keynumber; flush_cache_item (app, 0xC5); tag2 = 0xCE + keynumber; flush_cache_item (app, 0xCD); rc = iso7816_put_data (app_get_slot (app), 0, tag, fpr, 20); if (rc) log_error (_("failed to store the fingerprint: %s\n"),gpg_strerror (rc)); if (!rc && app->appversion > 0x0100) { unsigned char buf[4]; buf[0] = timestamp >> 24; buf[1] = timestamp >> 16; buf[2] = timestamp >> 8; buf[3] = timestamp; rc = iso7816_put_data (app_get_slot (app), 0, tag2, buf, 4); if (rc) log_error (_("failed to store the creation date: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); } return rc; } static void send_fpr_if_not_null (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyword, int number, const unsigned char *fpr) { int i; char buf[41]; char numbuf[25]; for (i=0; i < 20 && !fpr[i]; i++) ; if (i==20) return; /* All zero. */ bin2hex (fpr, 20, buf); if (number == -1) *numbuf = 0; /* Don't print the key number */ else sprintf (numbuf, "%d", number); send_status_info (ctrl, keyword, numbuf, (size_t)strlen(numbuf), buf, (size_t)strlen (buf), NULL, 0); } static void send_fprtime_if_not_null (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyword, int number, const unsigned char *stamp) { char numbuf1[50], numbuf2[50]; unsigned long value; value = buf32_to_ulong (stamp); if (!value) return; sprintf (numbuf1, "%d", number); sprintf (numbuf2, "%lu", value); send_status_info (ctrl, keyword, numbuf1, (size_t)strlen(numbuf1), numbuf2, (size_t)strlen(numbuf2), NULL, 0); } static void send_key_data (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, const unsigned char *a, size_t alen) { char *buffer, *buf; size_t buflen; buffer = buf = bin2hex (a, alen, NULL); if (!buffer) { log_error ("memory allocation error in send_key_data\n"); return; } buflen = strlen (buffer); /* 768 is the hexified size for the modulus of an 3072 bit key. We use extra chunks to transmit larger data (i.e for 4096 bit). */ for ( ;buflen > 768; buflen -= 768, buf += 768) send_status_info (ctrl, "KEY-DATA", "-", 1, buf, 768, NULL, 0); send_status_info (ctrl, "KEY-DATA", name, (size_t)strlen(name), buf, buflen, NULL, 0); xfree (buffer); } static void send_key_attr (ctrl_t ctrl, app_t app, const char *keyword, int keyno) { char buffer[200]; log_assert (keyno >=0 && keyno < DIM(app->app_local->keyattr)); /* Note that the code in gpg-card supports prefixing the key number * with "OPENPGP." but older code does not yet support this. There * is also a discrepancy with the algorithm numbers: We should use * the gcrypt numbers but the current code assumes OpenPGP numbers. */ if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA) snprintf (buffer, sizeof buffer, "%d 1 rsa%u %u %d", keyno+1, app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits, app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.e_bits, app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format); else if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type == KEY_TYPE_ECC) { snprintf (buffer, sizeof buffer, "%d %d %s", keyno+1, keyno==1? PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH : (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)? PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA : PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA, app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.curve); } else snprintf (buffer, sizeof buffer, "%d 0 0 UNKNOWN", keyno+1); send_status_direct (ctrl, keyword, buffer); } #define RSA_SMALL_SIZE_KEY 1952 #define RSA_SMALL_SIZE_OP 2048 static int determine_rsa_response (app_t app, int keyno) { int size; size = 2 + 3 /* header */ + 4 /* tag+len */ + (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits+7)/8 + 2 /* tag+len */ + (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.e_bits+7)/8; return size; } /* Implement the GETATTR command. This is similar to the LEARN command but returns just one value via the status interface. */ static gpg_error_t do_getattr (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name) { static struct { const char *name; int tag; int special; } table[] = { { "DISP-NAME", 0x005B }, { "LOGIN-DATA", 0x005E }, { "DISP-LANG", 0x5F2D }, { "DISP-SEX", 0x5F35 }, { "PUBKEY-URL", 0x5F50 }, { "KEY-FPR", 0x00C5, 3 }, { "KEY-TIME", 0x00CD, 4 }, { "KEY-ATTR", 0x0000, -5 }, { "CA-FPR", 0x00C6, 3 }, { "CHV-STATUS", 0x00C4, 1 }, { "SIG-COUNTER", 0x0093, 2 }, { "SERIALNO", 0x004F, -1 }, { "AID", 0x004F }, { "EXTCAP", 0x0000, -2 }, { "PRIVATE-DO-1", 0x0101 }, { "PRIVATE-DO-2", 0x0102 }, { "PRIVATE-DO-3", 0x0103 }, { "PRIVATE-DO-4", 0x0104 }, { "$AUTHKEYID", 0x0000, -3 }, { "$ENCRKEYID", 0x0000, -6 }, { "$SIGNKEYID", 0x0000, -7 }, { "$DISPSERIALNO",0x0000, -4 }, { "UIF-1", 0x00D6, 0 }, { "UIF-2", 0x00D7, 0 }, { "UIF-3", 0x00D8, 0 }, { "KDF", 0x00F9, 5 }, { "MANUFACTURER", 0x0000, -8 }, { "UIF", 0x0000, -9 }, /* Shortcut for all UIF */ { "KEY-STATUS", 0x00DE, 6 }, { "KEY-ATTR-INFO", 0x00FA, 7 }, { NULL, 0 } }; int idx, i, rc; void *relptr; unsigned char *value; size_t valuelen; for (idx=0; table[idx].name && strcmp (table[idx].name, name); idx++) ; if (!table[idx].name) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME); if (table[idx].special == -1) { /* The serial number is very special. We could have used the AID DO to retrieve it. The AID DO is available anyway but not hex formatted. */ char *serial = app_get_serialno (app); if (serial) { send_status_direct (ctrl, "SERIALNO", serial); xfree (serial); } return 0; } if (table[idx].special == -2) { char tmp[110]; snprintf (tmp, sizeof tmp, "gc=%d ki=%d fc=%d pd=%d mcl3=%u aac=%d " "sm=%d si=%u dec=%d bt=%d kdf=%d", app->app_local->extcap.get_challenge, app->app_local->extcap.key_import, app->app_local->extcap.change_force_chv, app->app_local->extcap.private_dos, app->app_local->extcap.max_certlen_3, app->app_local->extcap.algo_attr_change, (app->app_local->extcap.sm_supported ? (app->app_local->extcap.sm_algo == 0? CIPHER_ALGO_3DES : (app->app_local->extcap.sm_algo == 1? CIPHER_ALGO_AES : CIPHER_ALGO_AES256)) : 0), app->app_local->status_indicator, app->app_local->extcap.has_decrypt, app->app_local->extcap.has_button, app->app_local->extcap.kdf_do); send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, tmp, strlen (tmp), NULL, 0); return 0; } if (table[idx].special == -3) { char const tmp[] = "OPENPGP.3"; send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, tmp, strlen (tmp), NULL, 0); return 0; } if (table[idx].special == -4) { char *serial = app_get_serialno (app); if (serial) { if (strlen (serial) > 16+12) { send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, serial+16, 12, NULL, 0); xfree (serial); return 0; } xfree (serial); } return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME); } if (table[idx].special == -5) { for (i=0; i < 3; i++) send_key_attr (ctrl, app, table[idx].name, i); return 0; } if (table[idx].special == -6) { char const tmp[] = "OPENPGP.2"; send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, tmp, strlen (tmp), NULL, 0); return 0; } if (table[idx].special == -7) { char const tmp[] = "OPENPGP.1"; send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, tmp, strlen (tmp), NULL, 0); return 0; } if (table[idx].special == -8) { return send_status_printf (ctrl, table[idx].name, "%u %s", app->app_local->manufacturer, get_manufacturer (app->app_local->manufacturer)); } if (table[idx].special == -9) { rc = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "UIF-1"); if (!rc) rc = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "UIF-2"); if (!rc) rc = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "UIF-3"); return rc; } relptr = get_one_do (app, table[idx].tag, &value, &valuelen, &rc); if (relptr) { if (table[idx].special == 1) { char numbuf[7*23]; for (i=0,*numbuf=0; i < valuelen && i < 7; i++) sprintf (numbuf+strlen (numbuf), " %d", value[i]); send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, numbuf, strlen (numbuf), NULL, 0); } else if (table[idx].special == 2) { char numbuf[50]; sprintf (numbuf, "%lu", convert_sig_counter_value (value, valuelen)); send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, numbuf, strlen (numbuf), NULL, 0); } else if (table[idx].special == 3) { if (valuelen >= 60) for (i=0; i < 3; i++) send_fpr_if_not_null (ctrl, table[idx].name, i+1, value+i*20); } else if (table[idx].special == 4) { if (valuelen >= 12) for (i=0; i < 3; i++) send_fprtime_if_not_null (ctrl, table[idx].name, i+1, value+i*4); } else if (table[idx].special == 5) { if ((valuelen == KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MIN || valuelen == KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MAX) && (value[2] == 0x03)) app->app_local->pinpad.disabled = 1; else app->app_local->pinpad.disabled = 0; send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, value, valuelen, NULL, 0); } else if (table[idx].special == 6) { for (i=0,rc=0; !rc && i+1 < valuelen; i += 2) rc = send_status_printf (ctrl, table[idx].name, "OPENPGP.%u %u", value[i], value[i+1]); if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED); } else if (table[idx].special == 7) { const unsigned char *p = value; int tag; size_t len; if (valuelen < 2) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); tag = p[0]; len = p[1]; /* Does it comes tag+len at the head? */ if (tag == 0x00FA) { p += 2; if (len == 0x81) { if (valuelen < 3) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); len = *p++; } else if (len == 0x82) { if (valuelen < 4) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); len = *p++; len = (len << 8) | *p++; } valuelen -= (p - value); value = (unsigned char *)p; if (valuelen != len) { if (opt.verbose) log_info ("Yubikey bug: length %zu != %zu", valuelen, len); if (app->card->cardtype != CARDTYPE_YUBIKEY) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); } } for (; p < value + valuelen; p += len) { const char *key_algo_str; int keyrefno; if (p + 2 > value + valuelen) break; tag = *p++; len = *p++; if (tag < 0xc1) continue; if (tag == 0xda) keyrefno = 0x81; else keyrefno = tag - 0xc1 + 1; if (p + len > value + valuelen) break; key_algo_str = get_algorithm_attribute_string (p, len); send_status_printf (ctrl, table[idx].name, "OPENPGP.%u %s", keyrefno, key_algo_str); } } else send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, value, valuelen, NULL, 0); xfree (relptr); } else { if (table[idx].special == 5) app->app_local->pinpad.disabled = 0; } return rc; } /* Return the DISP-NAME without any padding characters. Caller must * free the result. If not found or empty NULL is returned. */ static char * get_disp_name (app_t app) { int rc; void *relptr; unsigned char *value; size_t valuelen; char *string; char *p, *given; char *result; relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x005B, &value, &valuelen, &rc); if (!relptr) return NULL; string = xtrymalloc (valuelen + 1); if (!string) { xfree (relptr); return NULL; } memcpy (string, value, valuelen); string[valuelen] = 0; xfree (relptr); /* Swap surname and given name. */ given = strstr (string, "<<"); for (p = string; *p; p++) if (*p == '<') *p = ' '; if (given && given[2]) { *given = 0; given += 2; result = strconcat (given, " ", string, NULL); } else { result = string; string = NULL; } xfree (string); return result; } /* * Yubikey has its own serial number at app->serialno. When Yubikey * is used for OpenPGP card app, we get the serial number for OpenPGP * card from its AID data object. */ char * yubikey_get_serialno (app_t app) { void *relptr; unsigned char *buffer; size_t buflen; char *serial; relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x004F, &buffer, &buflen, NULL); if (!relptr) return NULL; if (buflen != 16) { xfree (relptr); return NULL; } serial = xtrymalloc (32 + 1); if (!serial) return NULL; serial[32] = 0; bin2hex (buffer, buflen, serial); xfree (relptr); return serial; } /* Return the pretty formatted serialnumber. On error NULL is * returned. */ static char * get_disp_serialno (app_t app) { char *serial = app_get_serialno (app); /* For our OpenPGP cards we do not want to show the entire serial * number but a nicely reformatted actual serial number. */ if (serial && strlen (serial) > 16+12) { memmove (serial, serial+16, 4); serial[4] = ' '; /* memmove (serial+5, serial+20, 4); */ /* serial[9] = ' '; */ /* memmove (serial+10, serial+24, 4); */ /* serial[14] = 0; */ memmove (serial+5, serial+20, 8); serial[13] = 0; } return serial; } /* Return the number of remaining tries for the standard or the admin * pw. Returns -1 on card error. */ static int get_remaining_tries (app_t app, int adminpw) { void *relptr; unsigned char *value; size_t valuelen; int remaining; relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C4, &value, &valuelen, NULL); if (!relptr || valuelen < 7) { log_error (_("error retrieving CHV status from card\n")); xfree (relptr); return -1; } remaining = value[adminpw? 6 : 4]; xfree (relptr); return remaining; } /* Retrieve the fingerprint from the card inserted in SLOT and write the according hex representation to FPR. Caller must have provide a buffer at FPR of least 41 bytes. Returns 0 on success or an error code. */ static gpg_error_t retrieve_fpr_from_card (app_t app, int keyno, char *fpr) { gpg_error_t err = 0; void *relptr; unsigned char *value; size_t valuelen; assert (keyno >=0 && keyno <= 2); relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C5, &value, &valuelen, NULL); if (relptr && valuelen >= 60) bin2hex (value+keyno*20, 20, fpr); else err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); xfree (relptr); return err; } /* Retrieve the creation time of the fingerprint for key KEYNO from * the card inserted in the slot of APP and store it at R_FPRTIME. * Returns 0 on success or an error code. */ static gpg_error_t retrieve_fprtime_from_card (app_t app, int keyno, u32 *r_fprtime) { gpg_error_t err = 0; void *relptr; unsigned char *value; size_t valuelen; u32 fprtime; log_assert (keyno >=0 && keyno <= 2); relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00CD, &value, &valuelen, NULL); if (relptr && valuelen >= 4*(keyno+1)) { fprtime = buf32_to_u32 (value + 4*keyno); if (!fprtime) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); else *r_fprtime = fprtime; } else err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); xfree (relptr); return err; } /* Retrieve the public key material for the RSA key, whose fingerprint is FPR, from gpg output, which can be read through the stream FP. The RSA modulus will be stored at the address of M and MLEN, the public exponent at E and ELEN. Returns zero on success, an error code on failure. Caller must release the allocated buffers at M and E if the function returns success. */ static gpg_error_t retrieve_key_material (FILE *fp, const char *hexkeyid, const unsigned char **m, size_t *mlen, const unsigned char **e, size_t *elen) { gcry_error_t err = 0; char *line = NULL; /* read_line() buffer. */ size_t line_size = 0; /* Helper for for read_line. */ int found_key = 0; /* Helper to find a matching key. */ unsigned char *m_new = NULL; unsigned char *e_new = NULL; size_t m_new_n = 0; size_t e_new_n = 0; /* Loop over all records until we have found the subkey corresponding to the fingerprint. Inm general the first record should be the pub record, but we don't rely on that. Given that we only need to look at one key, it is sufficient to compare the keyid so that we don't need to look at "fpr" records. */ for (;;) { char *p; char *fields[6] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; int nfields; size_t max_length; gcry_mpi_t mpi; int i; max_length = 4096; i = read_line (fp, &line, &line_size, &max_length); if (!i) break; /* EOF. */ if (i < 0) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; /* Error. */ } if (!max_length) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TRUNCATED); goto leave; /* Line truncated - we better stop processing. */ } /* Parse the line into fields. */ for (nfields=0, p=line; p && nfields < DIM (fields); nfields++) { fields[nfields] = p; p = strchr (p, ':'); if (p) *(p++) = 0; } if (!nfields) continue; /* No fields at all - skip line. */ if (!found_key) { if ( (!strcmp (fields[0], "sub") || !strcmp (fields[0], "pub") ) && nfields > 4 && !strcmp (fields[4], hexkeyid)) found_key = 1; continue; } if ( !strcmp (fields[0], "sub") || !strcmp (fields[0], "pub") ) break; /* Next key - stop. */ if ( strcmp (fields[0], "pkd") ) continue; /* Not a key data record. */ if ( nfields < 4 || (i = atoi (fields[1])) < 0 || i > 1 || (!i && m_new) || (i && e_new)) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); goto leave; /* Error: Invalid key data record or not an RSA key. */ } err = gcry_mpi_scan (&mpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, fields[3], 0, NULL); if (err) mpi = NULL; else if (!i) err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, &m_new, &m_new_n, mpi); else err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, &e_new, &e_new_n, mpi); gcry_mpi_release (mpi); if (err) goto leave; } if (m_new && e_new) { *m = m_new; *mlen = m_new_n; m_new = NULL; *e = e_new; *elen = e_new_n; e_new = NULL; } else err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); leave: xfree (m_new); xfree (e_new); xfree (line); return err; } static gpg_error_t rsa_read_pubkey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, u32 created_at, int keyno, const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, gcry_sexp_t *r_sexp) { gpg_error_t err; const unsigned char *m, *e; size_t mlen, elen; unsigned char *mbuf = NULL, *ebuf = NULL; m = find_tlv (data, datalen, 0x0081, &mlen); if (!m) { log_error (_("response does not contain the RSA modulus\n")); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); } e = find_tlv (data, datalen, 0x0082, &elen); if (!e) { log_error (_("response does not contain the RSA public exponent\n")); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); } if (ctrl) { send_key_data (ctrl, "n", m, mlen); send_key_data (ctrl, "e", e, elen); } for (; mlen && !*m; mlen--, m++) /* strip leading zeroes */ ; for (; elen && !*e; elen--, e++) /* strip leading zeroes */ ; if (ctrl) { unsigned char fprbuf[20]; err = store_fpr (app, keyno, created_at, fprbuf, PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA, m, mlen, e, elen); if (err) return err; send_fpr_if_not_null (ctrl, "KEY-FPR", -1, fprbuf); } mbuf = xtrymalloc (mlen + 1); if (!mbuf) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } /* Prepend numbers with a 0 if needed. */ if (mlen && (*m & 0x80)) { *mbuf = 0; memcpy (mbuf+1, m, mlen); mlen++; } else memcpy (mbuf, m, mlen); ebuf = xtrymalloc (elen + 1); if (!ebuf) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } /* Prepend numbers with a 0 if needed. */ if (elen && (*e & 0x80)) { *ebuf = 0; memcpy (ebuf+1, e, elen); elen++; } else memcpy (ebuf, e, elen); err = gcry_sexp_build (r_sexp, NULL, "(public-key(rsa(n%b)(e%b)))", (int)mlen, mbuf, (int)elen, ebuf); leave: xfree (mbuf); xfree (ebuf); return err; } /* Determine KDF hash algorithm and KEK encryption algorithm by CURVE. */ static const unsigned char* ecdh_params (const char *curve) { unsigned int nbits; openpgp_curve_to_oid (curve, &nbits, NULL); /* See RFC-6637 for those constants. 0x03: Number of bytes 0x01: Version for this parameter format KEK digest algorithm KEK cipher algorithm */ if (nbits <= 256) return (const unsigned char*)"\x03\x01\x08\x07"; else if (nbits <= 384) return (const unsigned char*)"\x03\x01\x09\x09"; else return (const unsigned char*)"\x03\x01\x0a\x09"; } static gpg_error_t ecc_read_pubkey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, u32 created_at, int keyno, const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, gcry_sexp_t *r_sexp) { gpg_error_t err; unsigned char *qbuf = NULL; const unsigned char *ecc_q; size_t ecc_q_len; gcry_mpi_t oid = NULL; int n; const char *curve; const char *oidstr; const unsigned char *oidbuf; size_t oid_len; int algo; const char *format; ecc_q = find_tlv (data, datalen, 0x0086, &ecc_q_len); if (!ecc_q) { log_error (_("response does not contain the EC public key\n")); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); } curve = app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.curve; oidstr = openpgp_curve_to_oid (curve, NULL, NULL); err = openpgp_oid_from_str (oidstr, &oid); if (err) return err; oidbuf = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (oid, &n); if (!oidbuf) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } oid_len = (n+7)/8; qbuf = xtrymalloc (ecc_q_len + 1); if (!qbuf) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } if ((app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)) { /* Prepend 0x40 prefix. */ *qbuf = 0x40; memcpy (qbuf+1, ecc_q, ecc_q_len); ecc_q_len++; } else memcpy (qbuf, ecc_q, ecc_q_len); if (ctrl) { send_key_data (ctrl, "q", qbuf, ecc_q_len); send_key_data (ctrl, "curve", oidbuf, oid_len); } if (keyno == 1) { if (ctrl) send_key_data (ctrl, "kdf/kek", ecdh_params (curve), (size_t)4); algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH; } else { if ((app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)) algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA; else algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA; } if (ctrl) { unsigned char fprbuf[20]; err = store_fpr (app, keyno, created_at, fprbuf, algo, oidbuf, oid_len, qbuf, ecc_q_len, ecdh_params (curve), (size_t)4); if (err) goto leave; send_fpr_if_not_null (ctrl, "KEY-FPR", -1, fprbuf); } if (!(app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)) format = "(public-key(ecc(curve%s)(q%b)))"; else if (keyno == 1) format = "(public-key(ecc(curve%s)(flags djb-tweak)(q%b)))"; else format = "(public-key(ecc(curve%s)(flags eddsa)(q%b)))"; err = gcry_sexp_build (r_sexp, NULL, format, app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.curve, (int)ecc_q_len, qbuf); leave: gcry_mpi_release (oid); xfree (qbuf); return err; } static gpg_error_t store_keygrip (app_t app, int keyno) { gpg_error_t err; unsigned char grip[20]; err = keygrip_from_canon_sexp (app->app_local->pk[keyno].key, app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen, grip); if (err) return err; bin2hex (grip, 20, app->app_local->pk[keyno].keygrip_str); return 0; } /* Parse tag-length-value data for public key in BUFFER of BUFLEN length. Key of KEYNO in APP is updated with an S-expression of public key. When CTRL is not NULL, fingerprint is computed with CREATED_AT, and fingerprint is written to the card, and key data and fingerprint are send back to the client side. */ static gpg_error_t read_public_key (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, u32 created_at, int keyno, const unsigned char *buffer, size_t buflen) { gpg_error_t err; const unsigned char *data; size_t datalen; gcry_sexp_t s_pkey = NULL; data = find_tlv (buffer, buflen, 0x7F49, &datalen); if (!data) { log_error (_("response does not contain the public key data\n")); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); } if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA) err = rsa_read_pubkey (app, ctrl, created_at, keyno, data, datalen, &s_pkey); else if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type == KEY_TYPE_ECC) err = ecc_read_pubkey (app, ctrl, created_at, keyno, data, datalen, &s_pkey); else err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); if (!err) { unsigned char *keybuf; size_t len; len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_pkey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0); keybuf = xtrymalloc (len); if (!data) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey); return err; } gcry_sexp_sprint (s_pkey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, keybuf, len); gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey); app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = keybuf; /* Decrement for trailing '\0' */ app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = len - 1; err = store_keygrip (app, keyno); } return err; } /* Get the public key for KEYNO and store it as an S-expression with the APP handle. On error that field gets cleared. If we already know about the public key we will just return. Note that this does not mean a key is available; this is solely indicated by the presence of the app->app_local->pk[KEYNO].key field. Note that GnuPG 1.x does not need this and it would be too time consuming to send it just for the fun of it. However, given that we use the same code in gpg 1.4, we can't use the gcry S-expression here but need to open encode it. */ static gpg_error_t get_public_key (app_t app, int keyno) { gpg_error_t err = 0; unsigned char *buffer; const unsigned char *m, *e; size_t buflen; size_t mlen = 0; size_t elen = 0; char *keybuf = NULL; gcry_sexp_t s_pkey; size_t len; if (keyno < 0 || keyno > 2) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); /* Already cached? */ if (app->app_local->pk[keyno].read_done) return 0; xfree (app->app_local->pk[keyno].key); app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = NULL; app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = 0; m = e = NULL; /* (avoid cc warning) */ if (app->appversion > 0x0100) { int exmode, le_value; /* We may simply read the public key out of these cards. */ if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le && app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA && app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits > RSA_SMALL_SIZE_KEY) { exmode = 1; /* Use extended length. */ le_value = determine_rsa_response (app, keyno); } else { exmode = 0; le_value = 256; /* Use legacy value. */ } err = iso7816_read_public_key (app_get_slot (app), exmode, (keyno == 0? "\xB6" : keyno == 1? "\xB8" : "\xA4"), 2, le_value, &buffer, &buflen); if (err) { /* Yubikey returns wrong code. Fix it up. */ if (app->card->cardtype == CARDTYPE_YUBIKEY) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ); log_error (_("reading public key failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } err = read_public_key (app, NULL, 0U, keyno, buffer, buflen); } else { /* Due to a design problem in v1.0 cards we can't get the public key out of these cards without doing a verify on CHV3. Clearly that is not an option and thus we try to locate the key using an external helper. The helper we use here is gpg itself, which should know about the key in any case. */ char fpr[41]; char *hexkeyid; char *command = NULL; FILE *fp; int ret; buffer = NULL; /* We don't need buffer. */ err = retrieve_fpr_from_card (app, keyno, fpr); if (err) { log_error ("error while retrieving fpr from card: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } hexkeyid = fpr + 24; ret = gpgrt_asprintf (&command, "%s --list-keys --with-colons --with-key-data '%s'", gnupg_module_name (GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_GPG), fpr); if (ret < 0) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } fp = popen (command, "r"); xfree (command); if (!fp) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); log_error ("running gpg failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } err = retrieve_key_material (fp, hexkeyid, &m, &mlen, &e, &elen); pclose (fp); if (err) { log_error ("error while retrieving key material through pipe: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_pkey, NULL, "(public-key(rsa(n%b)(e%b)))", (int)mlen, m, (int)elen, e); if (err) goto leave; len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_pkey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0); keybuf = xtrymalloc (len); if (!keybuf) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey); goto leave; } gcry_sexp_sprint (s_pkey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, keybuf, len); gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey); app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = (unsigned char*)keybuf; /* Decrement for trailing '\0' */ app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = len - 1; err = store_keygrip (app, keyno); } leave: /* Set a flag to indicate that we tried to read the key. */ if (!err) app->app_local->pk[keyno].read_done = 1; xfree (buffer); return err; } /* Send the KEYPAIRINFO back. KEY needs to be in the range [1,3]. This is used by the LEARN command. */ static gpg_error_t send_keypair_info (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, int key) { int keyno = key - 1; gpg_error_t err = 0; const char *usage; u32 fprtime; char *algostr = NULL; err = get_public_key (app, keyno); if (err) goto leave; assert (keyno >= 0 && keyno <= 2); if (!app->app_local->pk[keyno].key) goto leave; /* No such key - ignore. */ switch (keyno) { case 0: usage = "sc"; break; case 1: usage = "e"; break; case 2: usage = "sa"; break; default: usage = "-"; break; } if (retrieve_fprtime_from_card (app, keyno, &fprtime)) fprtime = 0; { gcry_sexp_t s_pkey; if (gcry_sexp_new (&s_pkey, app->app_local->pk[keyno].key, app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen, 0)) algostr = xtrystrdup ("?"); else { algostr = pubkey_algo_string (s_pkey, NULL); gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey); } } if (!algostr) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } err = send_status_printf (ctrl, "KEYPAIRINFO", "%s OPENPGP.%d %s %lu %s", app->app_local->pk[keyno].keygrip_str, keyno+1, usage, (unsigned long)fprtime, algostr); leave: xfree (algostr); return err; } /* Handle the LEARN command for OpenPGP. */ static gpg_error_t do_learn_status (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, unsigned int flags) { gpg_error_t err = 0; (void)flags; err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "EXTCAP"); if (!err) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "MANUFACTURER"); if (!err) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "DISP-NAME"); if (!err) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "DISP-LANG"); if (!err) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "DISP-SEX"); if (!err) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "PUBKEY-URL"); if (!err) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "LOGIN-DATA"); if (!err) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "KEY-FPR"); if (!err && app->appversion > 0x0100) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "KEY-TIME"); if (!err) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "CA-FPR"); if (!err) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "CHV-STATUS"); if (!err) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "SIG-COUNTER"); if (!err && app->app_local->extcap.kdf_do) { err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "KDF"); if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) err = 0; } if (!err && app->app_local->extcap.has_button) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "UIF"); if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) err = 0; if (!err && app->app_local->extcap.private_dos) { if (!err) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "PRIVATE-DO-1"); if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) err = 0; if (!err) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "PRIVATE-DO-2"); if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) err = 0; if (!err && app->did_chv2) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "PRIVATE-DO-3"); if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) err = 0; if (!err && app->did_chv3) err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "PRIVATE-DO-4"); if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) err = 0; } if (!err) err = send_keypair_info (app, ctrl, 1); if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) err = 0; if (!err) err = send_keypair_info (app, ctrl, 2); if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) err = 0; if (!err) err = send_keypair_info (app, ctrl, 3); if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) err = 0; /* Note: We do not send the Cardholder Certificate, because that is relatively long and for OpenPGP applications not really needed. */ return err; } /* Handle the READKEY command for OpenPGP. On success a canonical encoded S-expression with the public key will get stored at PK and its length (for assertions) at PKLEN; the caller must release that buffer. On error PK and PKLEN are not changed and an error code is returned. */ static gpg_error_t do_readkey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyid, unsigned int flags, unsigned char **pk, size_t *pklen) { gpg_error_t err; int keyno; unsigned char *buf; if (strlen (keyid) == 40) { const unsigned char *keygrip_str; for (keyno = 0; keyno < 3; keyno++) { keygrip_str = app->app_local->pk[keyno].keygrip_str; if (!strncmp (keygrip_str, keyid, 40)) break; } if (keyno >= 3) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); } else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.1")) keyno = 0; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.2")) keyno = 1; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.3")) keyno = 2; else return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); err = get_public_key (app, keyno); if (err) return err; buf = app->app_local->pk[keyno].key; if (!buf) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY); if ((flags & APP_READKEY_FLAG_INFO)) { err = send_keypair_info (app, ctrl, keyno+1); if (err) return err; } if (pk && pklen) { *pklen = app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen; *pk = xtrymalloc (*pklen); if (!*pk) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); *pklen = 0; return err; } memcpy (*pk, buf, *pklen); } return 0; } /* Read the standard certificate of an OpenPGP v2 card. It is returned in a freshly allocated buffer with that address stored at CERT and the length of the certificate stored at CERTLEN. CERTID needs to be set to "OPENPGP.3". */ static gpg_error_t do_readcert (app_t app, const char *certid, unsigned char **cert, size_t *certlen) { gpg_error_t err; unsigned char *buffer; size_t buflen; void *relptr; *cert = NULL; *certlen = 0; if (strcmp (certid, "OPENPGP.3")) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); if (!app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x7F21, &buffer, &buflen, NULL); if (!relptr) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); if (!buflen) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); else if (!(*cert = xtrymalloc (buflen))) err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); else { memcpy (*cert, buffer, buflen); *certlen = buflen; err = 0; } xfree (relptr); return err; } /* Decide if we use the pinpad of the reader for PIN input according to the user preference on the card, and the capability of the reader. This routine is only called when the reader has pinpad. Returns 0 if we use pinpad, 1 otherwise. */ static int check_pinpad_request (app_t app, pininfo_t *pininfo, int admin_pin) { if (app->app_local->pinpad.disabled) return 1; if (app->app_local->pinpad.specified == 0) /* No preference on card. */ { if (pininfo->fixedlen == 0) /* Reader has varlen capability. */ return 0; /* Then, use pinpad. */ else /* * Reader has limited capability, and it may not match PIN of * the card. */ return 1; } if (admin_pin) pininfo->fixedlen = app->app_local->pinpad.fixedlen_admin; else pininfo->fixedlen = app->app_local->pinpad.fixedlen_user; if (pininfo->fixedlen == 0 /* User requests disable pinpad. */ || pininfo->fixedlen < pininfo->minlen || pininfo->fixedlen > pininfo->maxlen /* Reader doesn't have the capability to input a PIN which * length is FIXEDLEN. */) return 1; return 0; } /* Return a string with information about the card for use in a * prompt. Returns NULL on memory failure. */ static char * get_prompt_info (app_t app, int chvno, unsigned long sigcount, int remaining) { char *serial, *disp_name, *rembuf, *tmpbuf, *result; serial = get_disp_serialno (app); if (!serial) return NULL; disp_name = get_disp_name (app); if (chvno == 1) { /* TRANSLATORS: Put a \x1f right before a colon. This can be * used by pinentry to nicely align the names and values. Keep * the %s at the start and end of the string. */ result = xtryasprintf (_("%s" "Number\x1f: %s%%0A" "Holder\x1f: %s%%0A" "Counter\x1f: %lu" "%s"), "\x1e", serial, disp_name? disp_name:"", sigcount, ""); } else { result = xtryasprintf (_("%s" "Number\x1f: %s%%0A" "Holder\x1f: %s" "%s"), "\x1e", serial, disp_name? disp_name:"", ""); } xfree (disp_name); xfree (serial); if (remaining != -1) { /* TRANSLATORS: This is the number of remaining attempts to * enter a PIN. Use %%0A (double-percent,0A) for a linefeed. */ rembuf = xtryasprintf (_("Remaining attempts: %d"), remaining); if (!rembuf) { xfree (result); return NULL; } tmpbuf = strconcat (result, "%0A%0A", rembuf, NULL); xfree (rembuf); if (!tmpbuf) { xfree (result); return NULL; } xfree (result); result = tmpbuf; } return result; } /* Compute hash if KDF-DO is available. CHVNO must be 0 for reset * code, 1 or 2 for user pin and 3 for admin pin. PIN is the original * PIN as entered by the user. R_PINVALUE and r_PINLEN will receive a * newly allocated buffer with a possible modified pin. */ static gpg_error_t pin2hash_if_kdf (app_t app, int chvno, const char *pin, char **r_pinvalue, size_t *r_pinlen) { gpg_error_t err = 0; void *relptr = NULL; unsigned char *buffer; size_t pinlen, buflen; char *dek = NULL; size_t deklen = 32; *r_pinvalue = NULL; *r_pinlen = 0; pinlen = strlen (pin); if (app->app_local->extcap.kdf_do && (relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00F9, &buffer, &buflen, NULL)) && buflen >= KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MIN && (buffer[2] == 0x03)) { const char *salt; unsigned long s2k_count; int salt_index; dek = xtrymalloc (deklen); if (!dek) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } s2k_count = (((unsigned int)buffer[8] << 24) | (buffer[9] << 16) | (buffer[10] << 8) | buffer[11]); if (buflen == KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MIN) salt_index =14; else if (buflen == KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MAX) salt_index = (chvno==3 ? 34 : (chvno==0 ? 24 : 14)); else { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); goto leave; } salt = &buffer[salt_index]; err = gcry_kdf_derive (pin, pinlen, GCRY_KDF_ITERSALTED_S2K, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256, salt, 8, s2k_count, deklen, dek); if (!err) { *r_pinlen = deklen; *r_pinvalue = dek; dek = NULL; } } else { /* Just copy the PIN to a malloced buffer. */ *r_pinvalue = xtrymalloc_secure (pinlen + 1); if (!*r_pinvalue) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } strcpy (*r_pinvalue, pin); *r_pinlen = pinlen; } leave: xfree (dek); xfree (relptr); return err; } static const char * chvno_to_keyref (int chvno) { const char *keyref; switch (chvno) { case 1: keyref = "1"; break; case 2: keyref = "2"; break; case 3: keyref = "3"; break; default: keyref = NULL; break; } return keyref; } /* Helper to cache a PIN. If PIN is NULL the cache is cleared. */ static void cache_pin (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, int chvno, const char *pin) { const char *keyref = chvno_to_keyref (chvno); if (!keyref) return; switch (app->card->cardtype) { case CARDTYPE_YUBIKEY: break; default: return; } pincache_put (ctrl, app_get_slot (app), "openpgp", keyref, pin, pin? strlen (pin):0); switch (chvno) { case 1: app->app_local->pincache.maybe_chv1 = !!pin; break; case 2: app->app_local->pincache.maybe_chv2 = !!pin; break; case 3: app->app_local->pincache.maybe_chv3 = !!pin; break; } } /* If the PIN cache is expected and really has a valid PIN return that * pin at R_PIN. Returns true if that is the case; otherwise * false. */ static int pin_from_cache (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, int chvno, char **r_pin) { const char *keyref = chvno_to_keyref (chvno); int maybe_cached; *r_pin = NULL; if (!keyref) return 0; switch (app->card->cardtype) { case CARDTYPE_YUBIKEY: break; default: return 0; } switch (chvno) { case 1: maybe_cached = app->app_local->pincache.maybe_chv1; break; case 2: maybe_cached = app->app_local->pincache.maybe_chv2; break; case 3: maybe_cached = app->app_local->pincache.maybe_chv3; break; default: maybe_cached = 0; break; } if (!maybe_cached) return 0; if (pincache_get (ctrl, app_get_slot (app), "openpgp", keyref, r_pin)) return 0; return 1; } /* Verify a CHV either using the pinentry or if possible by using a pinpad. PINCB and PINCB_ARG describe the usual callback for the pinentry. CHVNO must be either 1 or 2. SIGCOUNT is only used with CHV1. PINVALUE is the address of a pointer which will receive a newly allocated block with the actual PIN (this is useful in case that PIN shall be used for another verify operation). The caller needs to free this value. If the function returns with success and NULL is stored at PINVALUE, the caller should take this as an indication that the pinpad has been used. */ static gpg_error_t verify_a_chv (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg, int chvno, unsigned long sigcount, char **r_pinvalue, size_t *r_pinlen) { int rc = 0; char *prompt_buffer = NULL; const char *prompt; pininfo_t pininfo; int minlen = 6; int remaining; char *pin = NULL; log_assert (chvno == 1 || chvno == 2); *r_pinvalue = NULL; *r_pinlen = 0; remaining = get_remaining_tries (app, 0); if (remaining == -1) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); if (chvno == 2 && app->app_local->flags.def_chv2) { /* Special case for def_chv2 mechanism. */ if (opt.verbose) log_info (_("using default PIN as %s\n"), "CHV2"); rc = iso7816_verify (app_get_slot (app), 0x82, "123456", 6); if (rc) { /* Verification of CHV2 with the default PIN failed, although the card pretends to have the default PIN set as CHV2. We better disable the def_chv2 flag now. */ log_info (_("failed to use default PIN as %s: %s" " - disabling further default use\n"), "CHV2", gpg_strerror (rc)); app->app_local->flags.def_chv2 = 0; } return rc; } memset (&pininfo, 0, sizeof pininfo); pininfo.fixedlen = -1; pininfo.minlen = minlen; { const char *firstline = _("||Please unlock the card"); char *infoblock = get_prompt_info (app, chvno, sigcount, remaining < 3? remaining : -1); prompt_buffer = strconcat (firstline, "%0A%0A", infoblock, NULL); if (prompt_buffer) prompt = prompt_buffer; else prompt = firstline; /* ENOMEM fallback. */ xfree (infoblock); } if (!opt.disable_pinpad && !iso7816_check_pinpad (app_get_slot (app), ISO7816_VERIFY, &pininfo) && !check_pinpad_request (app, &pininfo, 0)) { /* The reader supports the verify command through the pinpad. * In this case we do not utilize the PIN cache because by using * a pinpad the PIN can't have been cached. * Note that the pincb appends a text to the prompt telling the * user to use the pinpad. */ rc = pincb (pincb_arg, prompt, NULL); prompt = NULL; xfree (prompt_buffer); prompt_buffer = NULL; if (rc) { log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); return rc; } rc = iso7816_verify_kp (app_get_slot (app), 0x80+chvno, &pininfo); /* Dismiss the prompt. */ pincb (pincb_arg, NULL, NULL); } else { /* The reader has no pinpad or we don't want to use it. If we * have at least the standard 3 remaining tries we first try to * get the PIN from the cache. With less remaining tries it is * better to let the user know about failed attempts (which * might be due to a bug in the PIN cache handling). */ if (remaining >= 3 && pin_from_cache (app, ctrl, chvno, &pin)) rc = 0; else rc = pincb (pincb_arg, prompt, &pin); prompt = NULL; xfree (prompt_buffer); prompt_buffer = NULL; if (rc) { log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); return rc; } if (strlen (pin) < minlen) { log_error (_("PIN for CHV%d is too short;" " minimum length is %d\n"), chvno, minlen); wipe_and_free_string (pin); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); } rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, chvno, pin, r_pinvalue, r_pinlen); if (!rc) rc = iso7816_verify (app_get_slot (app), 0x80 + chvno, *r_pinvalue, *r_pinlen); if (!rc) cache_pin (app, ctrl, chvno, pin); } wipe_and_free_string (pin); if (rc) { log_error (_("verify CHV%d failed: %s\n"), chvno, gpg_strerror (rc)); xfree (*r_pinvalue); *r_pinvalue = NULL; *r_pinlen = 0; flush_cache_after_error (app); } return rc; } /* Verify CHV2 if required. Depending on the configuration of the card CHV1 will also be verified. */ static gpg_error_t verify_chv2 (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg) { int rc; char *pinvalue; size_t pinlen; if (app->did_chv2) return 0; /* We already verified CHV2. */ if (app->app_local->pk[1].key || app->app_local->pk[2].key) { rc = verify_a_chv (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg, 2, 0, &pinvalue, &pinlen); if (rc) return rc; app->did_chv2 = 1; if (!app->did_chv1 && !app->force_chv1 && pinvalue) { /* For convenience we verify CHV1 here too. We do this only if the card is not configured to require a verification before each CHV1 controlled operation (force_chv1) and if we are not using the pinpad (PINVALUE == NULL). */ rc = iso7816_verify (app_get_slot (app), 0x81, pinvalue, pinlen); if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN) rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PIN_NOT_SYNCED); if (rc) { log_error (_("verify CHV%d failed: %s\n"), 1, gpg_strerror (rc)); flush_cache_after_error (app); } else { app->did_chv1 = 1; /* Note that we are not able to cache the CHV 1 here because * it is possible that due to the use of a KDF-DO PINVALUE * has the hashed binary PIN of length PINLEN. */ } } } else { rc = verify_a_chv (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg, 1, 0, &pinvalue, &pinlen); if (rc) return rc; } wipe_and_free (pinvalue, pinlen); return rc; } /* Build the prompt to enter the Admin PIN. The prompt depends on the * current state of the card. If R_REMAINING is not NULL the * remaining tries are stored there. */ static gpg_error_t build_enter_admin_pin_prompt (app_t app, char **r_prompt, int *r_remaining) { int remaining; char *prompt; char *infoblock; *r_prompt = NULL; if (r_remaining) *r_remaining = 0; remaining = get_remaining_tries (app, 1); if (remaining == -1) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); if (!remaining) { log_info (_("card is permanently locked!\n")); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); } log_info (ngettext("%d Admin PIN attempt remaining before card" " is permanently locked\n", "%d Admin PIN attempts remaining before card" " is permanently locked\n", remaining), remaining); infoblock = get_prompt_info (app, 3, 0, remaining < 3? remaining : -1); /* TRANSLATORS: Do not translate the "|A|" prefix but keep it at the start of the string. Use %0A (single percent) for a linefeed. */ prompt = strconcat (_("|A|Please enter the Admin PIN"), "%0A%0A", infoblock, NULL); xfree (infoblock); if (!prompt) return gpg_error_from_syserror (); *r_prompt = prompt; if (r_remaining) *r_remaining = remaining; return 0; } /* Verify CHV3 if required. */ static gpg_error_t verify_chv3 (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg) { int rc = 0; if (!opt.allow_admin) { log_info (_("access to admin commands is not configured\n")); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EACCES); } if (!app->did_chv3) { pininfo_t pininfo; int minlen = 8; char *prompt; int remaining; memset (&pininfo, 0, sizeof pininfo); pininfo.fixedlen = -1; pininfo.minlen = minlen; rc = build_enter_admin_pin_prompt (app, &prompt, &remaining); if (rc) return rc; if (!opt.disable_pinpad && !iso7816_check_pinpad (app_get_slot (app), ISO7816_VERIFY, &pininfo) && !check_pinpad_request (app, &pininfo, 1)) { /* The reader supports the verify command through the pinpad. */ rc = pincb (pincb_arg, prompt, NULL); xfree (prompt); prompt = NULL; if (rc) { log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); return rc; } rc = iso7816_verify_kp (app_get_slot (app), 0x83, &pininfo); /* Dismiss the prompt. */ pincb (pincb_arg, NULL, NULL); } else { char *pin; char *pinvalue; size_t pinlen; if (remaining >= 3 && pin_from_cache (app, ctrl, 3, &pin)) rc = 0; else rc = pincb (pincb_arg, prompt, &pin); xfree (prompt); prompt = NULL; if (rc) { log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); return rc; } if (strlen (pin) < minlen) { log_error (_("PIN for CHV%d is too short;" " minimum length is %d\n"), 3, minlen); wipe_and_free_string (pin); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); } rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, 3, pin, &pinvalue, &pinlen); if (!rc) rc = iso7816_verify (app_get_slot (app), 0x83, pinvalue, pinlen); if (!rc) cache_pin (app, ctrl, 3, pin); wipe_and_free_string (pin); wipe_and_free (pinvalue, pinlen); } if (rc) { log_error (_("verify CHV%d failed: %s\n"), 3, gpg_strerror (rc)); flush_cache_after_error (app); return rc; } app->did_chv3 = 1; } return rc; } /* Handle the SETATTR operation. All arguments are already basically checked. */ static gpg_error_t do_setattr (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg, const unsigned char *value, size_t valuelen) { gpg_error_t rc; int idx; static struct { const char *name; int tag; int flush_tag; /* The tag which needs to be flushed or 0. */ int need_chv; int special; unsigned int need_v2:1; } table[] = { { "DISP-NAME", 0x005B, 0, 3 }, { "LOGIN-DATA", 0x005E, 0, 3, 2 }, { "DISP-LANG", 0x5F2D, 0, 3 }, { "DISP-SEX", 0x5F35, 0, 3 }, { "PUBKEY-URL", 0x5F50, 0, 3 }, { "CHV-STATUS-1", 0x00C4, 0, 3, 1 }, { "CA-FPR-1", 0x00CA, 0x00C6, 3 }, { "CA-FPR-2", 0x00CB, 0x00C6, 3 }, { "CA-FPR-3", 0x00CC, 0x00C6, 3 }, { "PRIVATE-DO-1", 0x0101, 0, 2 }, { "PRIVATE-DO-2", 0x0102, 0, 3 }, { "PRIVATE-DO-3", 0x0103, 0, 2 }, { "PRIVATE-DO-4", 0x0104, 0, 3 }, { "CERT-3", 0x7F21, 0, 3, 0, 1 }, { "SM-KEY-ENC", 0x00D1, 0, 3, 0, 1 }, { "SM-KEY-MAC", 0x00D2, 0, 3, 0, 1 }, { "KEY-ATTR", 0, 0, 0, 3, 1 }, { "AESKEY", 0x00D5, 0, 3, 0, 1 }, { "UIF-1", 0x00D6, 0, 3, 5, 1 }, { "UIF-2", 0x00D7, 0, 3, 5, 1 }, { "UIF-3", 0x00D8, 0, 3, 5, 1 }, { "KDF", 0x00F9, 0, 0, 4, 1 }, { NULL, 0 } }; int exmode; for (idx=0; table[idx].name && strcmp (table[idx].name, name); idx++) ; if (!table[idx].name) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME); if (table[idx].need_v2 && !app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED); /* Not yet supported. */ if (table[idx].special == 5 && app->app_local->extcap.has_button == 0) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); if (table[idx].special == 3) return change_keyattr_from_string (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg, NULL, NULL, value, valuelen); switch (table[idx].need_chv) { case 2: rc = verify_chv2 (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg); break; case 3: rc = verify_chv3 (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg); break; default: rc = 0; } if (rc) return rc; /* Flush the cache before writing it, so that the next get operation will reread the data from the card and thus get synced in case of errors (e.g. data truncated by the card). */ flush_cache_item (app, table[idx].flush_tag? table[idx].flush_tag /* */ : table[idx].tag); if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le && valuelen > 254) exmode = 1; /* Use extended length w/o a limit. */ else if (app->app_local->cardcap.cmd_chaining && valuelen > 254) exmode = -254; /* Command chaining with max. 254 bytes. */ else exmode = 0; if (table[idx].special == 4) { if (app->card->cardtype == CARDTYPE_YUBIKEY || app->card->cardtype == CARDTYPE_GNUK) { rc = verify_chv3 (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg); if (rc) return rc; if (valuelen == 3 && app->card->cardtype == CARDTYPE_GNUK) { value = NULL; valuelen = 0; } cache_pin (app, ctrl, 1, NULL); cache_pin (app, ctrl, 2, NULL); cache_pin (app, ctrl, 3, NULL); } else { char *oldpinvalue = NULL; char *buffer1 = NULL; size_t bufferlen1; const char *u, *a; size_t ulen, alen; if (valuelen == 3) { u = "123456"; a = "12345678"; ulen = 6; alen = 8; } else if (valuelen == KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MAX) { u = (const char *)value + 44; a = u + 34; ulen = alen = 32; } else return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); if (!pin_from_cache (app, ctrl, 3, &oldpinvalue)) { char *prompt; rc = build_enter_admin_pin_prompt (app, &prompt, NULL); if (rc) return rc; rc = pincb (pincb_arg, prompt, &oldpinvalue); if (rc) { log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); return rc; } } rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, 3, oldpinvalue, &buffer1, &bufferlen1); if (!rc) rc = iso7816_change_reference_data (app_get_slot (app), 0x83, buffer1, bufferlen1, a, alen); if (!rc) rc = iso7816_verify (app_get_slot (app), 0x83, a, alen); if (!rc) cache_pin (app, ctrl, 3, "12345678"); if (!rc) rc = iso7816_reset_retry_counter (app_get_slot (app), 0x81, u, ulen); if (!rc) cache_pin (app, ctrl, 1, "123456"); if (!rc) rc = iso7816_put_data (app_get_slot (app), 0, 0xD3, NULL, 0); wipe_and_free (buffer1, bufferlen1); wipe_and_free_string (oldpinvalue); } /* Flush the cache again, because pin2hash_if_kdf uses the DO. */ flush_cache_item (app, 0x00F9); } rc = iso7816_put_data (app_get_slot (app), exmode, table[idx].tag, value, valuelen); if (rc) log_error ("failed to set '%s': %s\n", table[idx].name, gpg_strerror (rc)); if (table[idx].special == 1) app->force_chv1 = (valuelen && *value == 0); else if (table[idx].special == 2) parse_login_data (app); else if (table[idx].special == 4) { app->did_chv1 = 0; app->did_chv2 = 0; app->did_chv3 = 0; if ((valuelen == KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MIN || valuelen == KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MAX) && (value[2] == 0x03)) app->app_local->pinpad.disabled = 1; else app->app_local->pinpad.disabled = 0; } return rc; } /* Handle the WRITECERT command for OpenPGP. This writes the standard * certificate to the card; CERTID needs to be set to "OPENPGP.3". * PINCB and PINCB_ARG are the usual arguments for the pinentry * callback. */ static gpg_error_t do_writecert (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *certidstr, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg, const unsigned char *certdata, size_t certdatalen) { if (strcmp (certidstr, "OPENPGP.3")) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); if (!certdata || !certdatalen) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG); if (!app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED); if (certdatalen > app->app_local->extcap.max_certlen_3) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE); return do_setattr (app, ctrl, "CERT-3", pincb, pincb_arg, certdata, certdatalen); } static gpg_error_t clear_chv_status (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, int chvno) { unsigned char apdu[4]; gpg_error_t err; cache_pin (app, ctrl, chvno, NULL); if (!app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) return GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION; apdu[0] = 0x00; apdu[1] = ISO7816_VERIFY; apdu[2] = 0xff; apdu[3] = 0x80+chvno; err = iso7816_apdu_direct (app_get_slot (app), apdu, 4, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (err) { if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION); return err; } if (chvno == 1) { apdu[3]++; err = iso7816_apdu_direct (app_get_slot (app), apdu, 4, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL); app->did_chv1 = app->did_chv2 = 0; } else if (chvno == 2) app->did_chv2 = 0; else if (chvno == 3) app->did_chv3 = 0; return err; } /* Handle the PASSWD command. The following combinations are possible: Flags CHVNO Vers. Description RESET 1 1 Verify CHV3 and set a new CHV1 and CHV2 RESET 1 2 Verify PW3 and set a new PW1. RESET 2 1 Verify CHV3 and set a new CHV1 and CHV2. RESET 2 2 Verify PW3 and set a new Reset Code. RESET 3 any Returns GPG_ERR_INV_ID. - 1 1 Verify CHV2 and set a new CHV1 and CHV2. - 1 2 Verify PW1 and set a new PW1. - 2 1 Verify CHV2 and set a new CHV1 and CHV2. - 2 2 Verify Reset Code and set a new PW1. - 3 any Verify CHV3/PW3 and set a new CHV3/PW3. The CHVNO can be prefixed with "OPENPGP.". */ static gpg_error_t do_change_pin (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *chvnostr, unsigned int flags, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg) { int rc = 0; int chvno; char *resetcode = NULL; char *oldpinvalue = NULL; char *pinvalue = NULL; int reset_mode = !!(flags & APP_CHANGE_FLAG_RESET); int set_resetcode = 0; pininfo_t pininfo; int use_pinpad = 0; int minlen = 6; if (digitp (chvnostr)) chvno = atoi (chvnostr); else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (chvnostr, "OPENPGP.1")) chvno = 1; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (chvnostr, "OPENPGP.2")) chvno = 2; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (chvnostr, "OPENPGP.3")) chvno = 3; else return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); memset (&pininfo, 0, sizeof pininfo); pininfo.fixedlen = -1; pininfo.minlen = minlen; /* Better clear all the PIN caches first. */ cache_pin (app, ctrl, 1, NULL); cache_pin (app, ctrl, 2, NULL); cache_pin (app, ctrl, 3, NULL); if ((flags & APP_CHANGE_FLAG_CLEAR)) return clear_chv_status (app, ctrl, chvno); if (reset_mode && chvno == 3) { rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); goto leave; } if (!app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) { /* Version 1 cards. */ if (reset_mode || chvno == 3) { /* We always require that the PIN is entered. */ app->did_chv3 = 0; rc = verify_chv3 (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg); if (rc) goto leave; } else if (chvno == 1 || chvno == 2) { /* On a v1.x card CHV1 and CVH2 should always have the same value, thus we enforce it here. */ int save_force = app->force_chv1; app->force_chv1 = 0; app->did_chv1 = 0; app->did_chv2 = 0; rc = verify_chv2 (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg); app->force_chv1 = save_force; if (rc) goto leave; } else { rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); goto leave; } } else { /* Version 2 cards. */ if (!opt.disable_pinpad && !iso7816_check_pinpad (app_get_slot (app), ISO7816_CHANGE_REFERENCE_DATA, &pininfo) && !check_pinpad_request (app, &pininfo, chvno == 3)) use_pinpad = 1; if (reset_mode) { /* To reset a PIN the Admin PIN is required. */ use_pinpad = 0; app->did_chv3 = 0; rc = verify_chv3 (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg); if (rc) goto leave; if (chvno == 2) set_resetcode = 1; } else if (chvno == 1 || chvno == 3) { if (!use_pinpad) { char *promptbuf = NULL; const char *prompt; if (chvno == 3) { minlen = 8; rc = build_enter_admin_pin_prompt (app, &promptbuf, NULL); if (rc) goto leave; prompt = promptbuf; } else prompt = _("||Please enter the PIN"); rc = pincb (pincb_arg, prompt, &oldpinvalue); xfree (promptbuf); promptbuf = NULL; if (rc) { log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } if (strlen (oldpinvalue) < minlen) { log_info (_("PIN for CHV%d is too short;" " minimum length is %d\n"), chvno, minlen); rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); goto leave; } } } else if (chvno == 2) { /* There is no PW2 for v2 cards. We use this condition to allow a PW reset using the Reset Code. */ void *relptr; unsigned char *value; size_t valuelen; int remaining; use_pinpad = 0; minlen = 8; relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C4, &value, &valuelen, NULL); if (!relptr || valuelen < 7) { log_error (_("error retrieving CHV status from card\n")); xfree (relptr); rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); goto leave; } remaining = value[5]; xfree (relptr); if (!remaining) { log_error (_("Reset Code not or not anymore available\n")); rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); goto leave; } rc = pincb (pincb_arg, _("||Please enter the Reset Code for the card"), &resetcode); if (rc) { log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } if (strlen (resetcode) < minlen) { log_info (_("Reset Code is too short; minimum length is %d\n"), minlen); rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); goto leave; } } else { rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); goto leave; } } if (chvno == 3) app->did_chv3 = 0; else app->did_chv1 = app->did_chv2 = 0; if (!use_pinpad) { /* TRANSLATORS: Do not translate the "|*|" prefixes but keep it at the start of the string. We need this elsewhere to get some infos on the string. */ rc = pincb (pincb_arg, set_resetcode? _("|RN|New Reset Code") : chvno == 3? _("|AN|New Admin PIN") : _("|N|New PIN"), &pinvalue); if (rc || pinvalue == NULL) { log_error (_("error getting new PIN: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } } if (resetcode) { char *result1 = NULL; char *result2 = NULL; char *buffer = NULL; size_t resultlen1, resultlen2=0, bufferlen=0; rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, 0, resetcode, &result1, &resultlen1); if (!rc) rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, 0, pinvalue, &result2, &resultlen2); if (!rc) { bufferlen = resultlen1 + resultlen2; buffer = xtrymalloc (bufferlen); if (!buffer) rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); else { memcpy (buffer, result1, resultlen1); memcpy (buffer+resultlen1, result2, resultlen2); } } if (!rc) rc = iso7816_reset_retry_counter_with_rc (app_get_slot (app), 0x81, buffer, bufferlen); wipe_and_free (result1, resultlen1); wipe_and_free (result2, resultlen2); wipe_and_free (buffer, bufferlen); } else if (set_resetcode) { if (strlen (pinvalue) < 8) { log_error (_("Reset Code is too short; minimum length is %d\n"), 8); rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); } else { char *buffer = NULL; size_t bufferlen; rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, 0, pinvalue, &buffer, &bufferlen); if (!rc) rc = iso7816_put_data (app_get_slot (app), 0, 0xD3, buffer, bufferlen); wipe_and_free (buffer, bufferlen); } } else if (reset_mode) { char *buffer = NULL; size_t bufferlen; rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, 1, pinvalue, &buffer, &bufferlen); if (!rc) rc = iso7816_reset_retry_counter (app_get_slot (app), 0x81, buffer, bufferlen); if (!rc && !app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) rc = iso7816_reset_retry_counter (app_get_slot (app), 0x82, buffer, bufferlen); wipe_and_free (buffer, bufferlen); } else if (!app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) { /* Version 1 cards. */ if (chvno == 1 || chvno == 2) { rc = iso7816_change_reference_data (app_get_slot (app), 0x81, NULL, 0, pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue)); if (!rc) rc = iso7816_change_reference_data (app_get_slot (app), 0x82, NULL, 0, pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue)); } else /* CHVNO == 3 */ { rc = iso7816_change_reference_data (app_get_slot (app), 0x80 + chvno, NULL, 0, pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue)); } } else { /* Version 2 cards. */ assert (chvno == 1 || chvno == 3); if (use_pinpad) { rc = pincb (pincb_arg, chvno == 3 ? _("||Please enter the Admin PIN and New Admin PIN") : _("||Please enter the PIN and New PIN"), NULL); if (rc) { log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } rc = iso7816_change_reference_data_kp (app_get_slot (app), 0x80 + chvno, 0, &pininfo); pincb (pincb_arg, NULL, NULL); /* Dismiss the prompt. */ } else { char *buffer1 = NULL; char *buffer2 = NULL; size_t bufferlen1, bufferlen2 = 0; rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, chvno, oldpinvalue, &buffer1, &bufferlen1); if (!rc) rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, chvno, pinvalue, &buffer2, &bufferlen2); if (!rc) rc = iso7816_change_reference_data (app_get_slot (app), 0x80 + chvno, buffer1, bufferlen1, buffer2, bufferlen2); wipe_and_free (buffer1, bufferlen1); wipe_and_free (buffer2, bufferlen2); } } wipe_and_free_string (pinvalue); if (rc) flush_cache_after_error (app); leave: wipe_and_free_string (resetcode); wipe_and_free_string (oldpinvalue); return rc; } /* Check whether a key already exists. KEYIDX is the index of the key (0..2). If FORCE is TRUE a diagnositic will be printed but no error returned if the key already exists. The flag GENERATING is only used to print correct messages. */ static gpg_error_t does_key_exist (app_t app, int keyidx, int generating, int force) { const unsigned char *fpr; unsigned char *buffer; size_t buflen, n; int i; assert (keyidx >=0 && keyidx <= 2); if (iso7816_get_data (app_get_slot (app), 0, 0x006E, &buffer, &buflen)) { log_error (_("error reading application data\n")); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); } fpr = find_tlv (buffer, buflen, 0x00C5, &n); if (!fpr || n < 60) { log_error (_("error reading fingerprint DO\n")); xfree (buffer); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); } fpr += 20*keyidx; for (i=0; i < 20 && !fpr[i]; i++) ; xfree (buffer); if (i!=20 && !force) { log_error (_("key already exists\n")); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EEXIST); } else if (i!=20) log_info (_("existing key will be replaced\n")); else if (generating) log_info (_("generating new key\n")); else log_info (_("writing new key\n")); return 0; } /* Create a TLV tag and value and store it at BUFFER. Return the length of tag and length. A LENGTH greater than 65535 is truncated. */ static size_t add_tlv (unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int tag, size_t length) { unsigned char *p = buffer; assert (tag <= 0xffff); if ( tag > 0xff ) *p++ = tag >> 8; *p++ = tag; if (length < 128) *p++ = length; else if (length < 256) { *p++ = 0x81; *p++ = length; } else { if (length > 0xffff) length = 0xffff; *p++ = 0x82; *p++ = length >> 8; *p++ = length; } return p - buffer; } static gpg_error_t build_privkey_template (app_t app, int keyno, const unsigned char *rsa_n, size_t rsa_n_len, const unsigned char *rsa_e, size_t rsa_e_len, const unsigned char *rsa_p, size_t rsa_p_len, const unsigned char *rsa_q, size_t rsa_q_len, const unsigned char *rsa_u, size_t rsa_u_len, const unsigned char *rsa_dp, size_t rsa_dp_len, const unsigned char *rsa_dq, size_t rsa_dq_len, unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen) { size_t rsa_e_reqlen; unsigned char privkey[7*(1+3+3)]; size_t privkey_len; unsigned char exthdr[2+2+3]; size_t exthdr_len; unsigned char suffix[2+3]; size_t suffix_len; unsigned char *tp; size_t datalen; unsigned char *template; size_t template_size; *result = NULL; *resultlen = 0; switch (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format) { case RSA_STD: case RSA_STD_N: case RSA_CRT: case RSA_CRT_N: break; default: return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); } /* Get the required length for E. Rounded up to the nearest byte */ rsa_e_reqlen = (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.e_bits + 7) / 8; assert (rsa_e_len <= rsa_e_reqlen); /* Build the 7f48 cardholder private key template. */ datalen = 0; tp = privkey; tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x91, rsa_e_reqlen); datalen += rsa_e_reqlen; tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x92, rsa_p_len); datalen += rsa_p_len; tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x93, rsa_q_len); datalen += rsa_q_len; if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT || app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT_N) { tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x94, rsa_u_len); datalen += rsa_u_len; tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x95, rsa_dp_len); datalen += rsa_dp_len; tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x96, rsa_dq_len); datalen += rsa_dq_len; } if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_STD_N || app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT_N) { tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x97, rsa_n_len); datalen += rsa_n_len; } privkey_len = tp - privkey; /* Build the extended header list without the private key template. */ tp = exthdr; *tp++ = keyno ==0 ? 0xb6 : keyno == 1? 0xb8 : 0xa4; *tp++ = 0; tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x7f48, privkey_len); exthdr_len = tp - exthdr; /* Build the 5f48 suffix of the data. */ tp = suffix; tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x5f48, datalen); suffix_len = tp - suffix; /* Now concatenate everything. */ template_size = (1 + 3 /* 0x4d and len. */ + exthdr_len + privkey_len + suffix_len + datalen); tp = template = xtrymalloc_secure (template_size); if (!template) return gpg_error_from_syserror (); tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x4d, exthdr_len + privkey_len + suffix_len + datalen); memcpy (tp, exthdr, exthdr_len); tp += exthdr_len; memcpy (tp, privkey, privkey_len); tp += privkey_len; memcpy (tp, suffix, suffix_len); tp += suffix_len; memcpy (tp, rsa_e, rsa_e_len); if (rsa_e_len < rsa_e_reqlen) { /* Right justify E. */ memmove (tp + rsa_e_reqlen - rsa_e_len, tp, rsa_e_len); memset (tp, 0, rsa_e_reqlen - rsa_e_len); } tp += rsa_e_reqlen; memcpy (tp, rsa_p, rsa_p_len); tp += rsa_p_len; memcpy (tp, rsa_q, rsa_q_len); tp += rsa_q_len; if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT || app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT_N) { memcpy (tp, rsa_u, rsa_u_len); tp += rsa_u_len; memcpy (tp, rsa_dp, rsa_dp_len); tp += rsa_dp_len; memcpy (tp, rsa_dq, rsa_dq_len); tp += rsa_dq_len; } if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_STD_N || app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT_N) { memcpy (tp, rsa_n, rsa_n_len); tp += rsa_n_len; } /* Sanity check. We don't know the exact length because we allocated 3 bytes for the first length header. */ assert (tp - template <= template_size); *result = template; *resultlen = tp - template; return 0; } static gpg_error_t build_ecc_privkey_template (app_t app, int keyno, const unsigned char *ecc_d, size_t ecc_d_len, const unsigned char *ecc_q, size_t ecc_q_len, unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen) { unsigned char privkey[2*(1+3)]; size_t privkey_len; unsigned char exthdr[2+2+3]; size_t exthdr_len; unsigned char suffix[2+3]; size_t suffix_len; unsigned char *tp; size_t datalen; unsigned char *template; size_t template_size; int pubkey_required; pubkey_required = !!(app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_PUBKEY); *result = NULL; *resultlen = 0; /* Build the 7f48 cardholder private key template. */ datalen = 0; tp = privkey; tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x92, ecc_d_len); datalen += ecc_d_len; if (pubkey_required) { tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x99, ecc_q_len); datalen += ecc_q_len; } privkey_len = tp - privkey; /* Build the extended header list without the private key template. */ tp = exthdr; *tp++ = keyno ==0 ? 0xb6 : keyno == 1? 0xb8 : 0xa4; *tp++ = 0; tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x7f48, privkey_len); exthdr_len = tp - exthdr; /* Build the 5f48 suffix of the data. */ tp = suffix; tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x5f48, datalen); suffix_len = tp - suffix; /* Now concatenate everything. */ template_size = (1 + 1 /* 0x4d and len. */ + exthdr_len + privkey_len + suffix_len + datalen); if (exthdr_len + privkey_len + suffix_len + datalen >= 128) template_size++; tp = template = xtrymalloc_secure (template_size); if (!template) return gpg_error_from_syserror (); tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x4d, exthdr_len + privkey_len + suffix_len + datalen); memcpy (tp, exthdr, exthdr_len); tp += exthdr_len; memcpy (tp, privkey, privkey_len); tp += privkey_len; memcpy (tp, suffix, suffix_len); tp += suffix_len; memcpy (tp, ecc_d, ecc_d_len); tp += ecc_d_len; if (pubkey_required) { memcpy (tp, ecc_q, ecc_q_len); tp += ecc_q_len; } assert (tp - template == template_size); *result = template; *resultlen = tp - template; return 0; } -/* Helper for do_writekey to change the size of a key. Not ethat +/* Helper for do_writekey to change the size of a key. Note that this deletes the entire key without asking. */ static gpg_error_t change_keyattr (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, int keyno, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg) { gpg_error_t err; assert (keyno >=0 && keyno <= 2); /* Prepare for storing the key. */ err = verify_chv3 (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg); if (err) return err; /* Change the attribute. */ err = iso7816_put_data (app_get_slot (app), 0, 0xC1+keyno, buf, buflen); if (err) log_error ("error changing key attribute of OPENPGP.%d\n", keyno+1); else log_info ("key attribute of OPENPGP.%d changed\n", keyno+1); flush_cache (app); parse_algorithm_attribute (app, keyno); app->did_chv1 = 0; app->did_chv2 = 0; app->did_chv3 = 0; cache_pin (app, ctrl, 1, NULL); cache_pin (app, ctrl, 2, NULL); cache_pin (app, ctrl, 3, NULL); return err; } static gpg_error_t change_rsa_keyattr (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, int keyno, unsigned int nbits, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg) { gpg_error_t err = 0; unsigned char *buf; size_t buflen; void *relptr; /* Read the current attributes into a buffer. */ relptr = get_one_do (app, 0xC1+keyno, &buf, &buflen, NULL); if (!relptr) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); else if (buflen < 6) { /* Attributes too short. */ xfree (relptr); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); } else { /* If key attribute was RSA, we only change n_bits and don't touch anything else. Before we do so, we round up NBITS to a sensible way in the same way as gpg's key generation does it. This may help to sort out problems with a few bits too short keys. */ nbits = ((nbits + 31) / 32) * 32; buf[1] = (nbits >> 8); buf[2] = nbits; /* If it was not RSA, we need to fill other parts. */ if (buf[0] != PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA) { buf[0] = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA; buf[3] = 0; buf[4] = 32; buf[5] = 0; buflen = 6; } err = change_keyattr (app, ctrl, keyno, buf, buflen, pincb, pincb_arg); xfree (relptr); } return err; } /* Helper to process an setattr command for name KEY-ATTR. * * If KEYREF and KEYALGO are NULL (VALUE,VALUELEN) are expected to * contain one of the following strings: * RSA: "--force <key> <algo> rsa<nbits>" * ECC: "--force <key> <algo> <curvename>" * * If KEYREF and KEYALGO is given the key attribute for KEYREF are * changed to what is described by KEYALGO (e.g. "rsa3072", "rsa2048", * or "ed25519"). */ static gpg_error_t change_keyattr_from_string (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg, const char *keyref, const char *keyalgo, const void *value, size_t valuelen) { gpg_error_t err = 0; char *string = NULL; int key, keyno, algo; unsigned int nbits = 0; const char *oidstr = NULL; /* OID of the curve. */ char *endp; if (keyref && keyalgo && *keyref && *keyalgo) { if (!ascii_strcasecmp (keyref, "OPENPGP.1")) keyno = 0; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (keyref, "OPENPGP.2")) keyno = 1; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (keyref, "OPENPGP.3")) keyno = 2; else { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); goto leave; } if (!strncmp (keyalgo, "rsa", 3) && digitp (keyalgo+3)) { errno = 0; nbits = strtoul (keyalgo+3, &endp, 10); if (errno || *endp) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); goto leave; } algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA; } else if ((!strncmp (keyalgo, "dsa", 3) || !strncmp (keyalgo, "elg", 3)) && digitp (keyalgo+3)) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); goto leave; } else { nbits = 0; oidstr = openpgp_curve_to_oid (keyalgo, NULL, &algo); if (!oidstr) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); goto leave; } if (!algo) algo = keyno == 1? PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH : PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA; } } else if (!keyref && !keyalgo && value) { int n; /* VALUE is expected to be a string but not guaranteed to be * terminated. Thus copy it to an allocated buffer first. */ string = xtrymalloc (valuelen+1); if (!string) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } memcpy (string, value, valuelen); string[valuelen] = 0; /* Because this function deletes the key we require the string * "--force" in the data to make clear that something serious * might happen. */ n = 0; sscanf (string, "--force %d %d %n", &key, &algo, &n); if (n < 12) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); goto leave; } keyno = key - 1; if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA) { errno = 0; nbits = strtoul (string+n+3, NULL, 10); if (errno) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); goto leave; } } else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) { oidstr = openpgp_curve_to_oid (string+n, NULL, NULL); if (!oidstr) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); goto leave; } } else { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); goto leave; } } else { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG); goto leave; } if (keyno < 0 || keyno > 2) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA) { if (nbits < 1024) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT); else if (nbits > 4096) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE); else err = change_rsa_keyattr (app, ctrl, keyno, nbits, pincb, pincb_arg); } else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) { gcry_mpi_t oid; const unsigned char *oidbuf; size_t oid_len; unsigned int n; /* Check that the requested algo matches the properties of the * key slot. */ if (keyno == 1 && algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_PUBKEY_ALGO); else if (keyno != 1 && algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_PUBKEY_ALGO); else err = 0; if (err) goto leave; /* Convert the OID string to an OpenPGP formatted OID. */ err = openpgp_oid_from_str (oidstr, &oid); if (err) goto leave; oidbuf = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (oid, &n); oid_len = (n+7)/8; /* Create the template. */ xfree (string); string = xtrymalloc (1 + oid_len); if (!string) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } string[0] = algo; memcpy (string+1, oidbuf+1, oid_len-1); err = change_keyattr (app, ctrl,keyno, string, oid_len, pincb, pincb_arg); gcry_mpi_release (oid); } else err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); leave: xfree (string); return err; } static gpg_error_t rsa_writekey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg, int keyno, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, int depth) { gpg_error_t err; const unsigned char *tok; size_t toklen; int last_depth1, last_depth2; const unsigned char *rsa_n = NULL; const unsigned char *rsa_e = NULL; const unsigned char *rsa_p = NULL; const unsigned char *rsa_q = NULL; size_t rsa_n_len, rsa_e_len, rsa_p_len, rsa_q_len; unsigned int nbits; unsigned int maxbits; unsigned char *template = NULL; unsigned char *tp; size_t template_len; unsigned char fprbuf[20]; u32 created_at = 0; if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type != KEY_TYPE_RSA) { log_error (_("unsupported algorithm: %s"), "RSA"); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); goto leave; } last_depth1 = depth; while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) && depth && depth >= last_depth1) { if (tok) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); goto leave; } if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) goto leave; if (tok && toklen == 1) { const unsigned char **mpi; size_t *mpi_len; switch (*tok) { case 'n': mpi = &rsa_n; mpi_len = &rsa_n_len; break; case 'e': mpi = &rsa_e; mpi_len = &rsa_e_len; break; case 'p': mpi = &rsa_p; mpi_len = &rsa_p_len; break; case 'q': mpi = &rsa_q; mpi_len = &rsa_q_len;break; default: mpi = NULL; mpi_len = NULL; break; } if (mpi && *mpi) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_DUP_VALUE); goto leave; } if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) goto leave; if (tok && mpi) { /* Strip off leading zero bytes and save. */ for (;toklen && !*tok; toklen--, tok++) ; *mpi = tok; *mpi_len = toklen; } } /* Skip until end of list. */ last_depth2 = depth; while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) && depth && depth >= last_depth2) ; if (err) goto leave; } /* Parse other attributes. */ last_depth1 = depth; while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) && depth && depth >= last_depth1) { if (tok) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); goto leave; } if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) goto leave; if (tok && toklen == 10 && !memcmp ("created-at", tok, toklen)) { if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf,&buflen,&depth,&tok,&toklen))) goto leave; if (tok) { for (created_at=0; toklen && *tok && *tok >= '0' && *tok <= '9'; tok++, toklen--) created_at = created_at*10 + (*tok - '0'); } } /* Skip until end of list. */ last_depth2 = depth; while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) && depth && depth >= last_depth2) ; if (err) goto leave; } /* Check that we have all parameters and that they match the card description. */ if (!created_at) { log_error (_("creation timestamp missing\n")); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); goto leave; } maxbits = app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits; nbits = rsa_n? count_bits (rsa_n, rsa_n_len) : 0; if (opt.verbose) log_info ("RSA modulus size is %u bits\n", nbits); if (nbits && nbits != maxbits && app->app_local->extcap.algo_attr_change) { /* Try to switch the key to a new length. */ err = change_rsa_keyattr (app, ctrl, keyno, nbits, pincb, pincb_arg); if (!err) maxbits = app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits; } if (nbits != maxbits) { log_error (_("RSA modulus missing or not of size %d bits\n"), (int)maxbits); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); goto leave; } maxbits = app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.e_bits; if (maxbits > 32 && !app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) maxbits = 32; /* Our code for v1 does only support 32 bits. */ nbits = rsa_e? count_bits (rsa_e, rsa_e_len) : 0; if (nbits < 2 || nbits > maxbits) { log_error (_("RSA public exponent missing or larger than %d bits\n"), (int)maxbits); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); goto leave; } maxbits = app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits/2; nbits = rsa_p? count_bits (rsa_p, rsa_p_len) : 0; if (nbits != maxbits) { log_error (_("RSA prime %s missing or not of size %d bits\n"), "P", (int)maxbits); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); goto leave; } nbits = rsa_q? count_bits (rsa_q, rsa_q_len) : 0; if (nbits != maxbits) { log_error (_("RSA prime %s missing or not of size %d bits\n"), "Q", (int)maxbits); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); goto leave; } /* We need to remove the cached public key. */ xfree (app->app_local->pk[keyno].key); app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = NULL; app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = 0; app->app_local->pk[keyno].read_done = 0; if (app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) { unsigned char *rsa_u, *rsa_dp, *rsa_dq; size_t rsa_u_len, rsa_dp_len, rsa_dq_len; gcry_mpi_t mpi_e, mpi_p, mpi_q; gcry_mpi_t mpi_u = gcry_mpi_snew (0); gcry_mpi_t mpi_dp = gcry_mpi_snew (0); gcry_mpi_t mpi_dq = gcry_mpi_snew (0); gcry_mpi_t mpi_tmp = gcry_mpi_snew (0); int exmode; /* Calculate the u, dp and dq components needed by RSA_CRT cards */ gcry_mpi_scan (&mpi_e, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, rsa_e, rsa_e_len, NULL); gcry_mpi_scan (&mpi_p, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, rsa_p, rsa_p_len, NULL); gcry_mpi_scan (&mpi_q, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, rsa_q, rsa_q_len, NULL); gcry_mpi_invm (mpi_u, mpi_q, mpi_p); gcry_mpi_sub_ui (mpi_tmp, mpi_p, 1); gcry_mpi_invm (mpi_dp, mpi_e, mpi_tmp); gcry_mpi_sub_ui (mpi_tmp, mpi_q, 1); gcry_mpi_invm (mpi_dq, mpi_e, mpi_tmp); gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &rsa_u, &rsa_u_len, mpi_u); gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &rsa_dp, &rsa_dp_len, mpi_dp); gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &rsa_dq, &rsa_dq_len, mpi_dq); gcry_mpi_release (mpi_e); gcry_mpi_release (mpi_p); gcry_mpi_release (mpi_q); gcry_mpi_release (mpi_u); gcry_mpi_release (mpi_dp); gcry_mpi_release (mpi_dq); gcry_mpi_release (mpi_tmp); /* Build the private key template as described in section 4.3.3.7 of the OpenPGP card specs version 2.0. */ err = build_privkey_template (app, keyno, rsa_n, rsa_n_len, rsa_e, rsa_e_len, rsa_p, rsa_p_len, rsa_q, rsa_q_len, rsa_u, rsa_u_len, rsa_dp, rsa_dp_len, rsa_dq, rsa_dq_len, &template, &template_len); xfree(rsa_u); xfree(rsa_dp); xfree(rsa_dq); if (err) goto leave; /* Prepare for storing the key. */ err = verify_chv3 (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg); if (err) goto leave; /* Store the key. */ if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le && template_len > 254) exmode = 1; /* Use extended length w/o a limit. */ else if (app->app_local->cardcap.cmd_chaining && template_len > 254) exmode = -254; else exmode = 0; err = iso7816_put_data_odd (app_get_slot (app), exmode, 0x3fff, template, template_len); } else { /* Build the private key template as described in section 4.3.3.6 of the OpenPGP card specs version 1.1: 0xC0 <length> public exponent 0xC1 <length> prime p 0xC2 <length> prime q */ assert (rsa_e_len <= 4); template_len = (1 + 1 + 4 + 1 + 1 + rsa_p_len + 1 + 1 + rsa_q_len); template = tp = xtrymalloc_secure (template_len); if (!template) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } *tp++ = 0xC0; *tp++ = 4; memcpy (tp, rsa_e, rsa_e_len); if (rsa_e_len < 4) { /* Right justify E. */ memmove (tp+4-rsa_e_len, tp, rsa_e_len); memset (tp, 0, 4-rsa_e_len); } tp += 4; *tp++ = 0xC1; *tp++ = rsa_p_len; memcpy (tp, rsa_p, rsa_p_len); tp += rsa_p_len; *tp++ = 0xC2; *tp++ = rsa_q_len; memcpy (tp, rsa_q, rsa_q_len); tp += rsa_q_len; assert (tp - template == template_len); /* Prepare for storing the key. */ err = verify_chv3 (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg); if (err) goto leave; /* Store the key. */ err = iso7816_put_data (app_get_slot (app), 0, (app->appversion > 0x0007? 0xE0:0xE9)+keyno, template, template_len); } if (err) { log_error (_("failed to store the key: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } err = store_fpr (app, keyno, created_at, fprbuf, PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA, rsa_n, rsa_n_len, rsa_e, rsa_e_len); if (err) goto leave; leave: xfree (template); return err; } static gpg_error_t ecc_writekey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg, int keyno, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, int depth) { gpg_error_t err; const unsigned char *tok; size_t toklen; int last_depth1, last_depth2; const unsigned char *ecc_q = NULL; const unsigned char *ecc_d = NULL; size_t ecc_q_len, ecc_d_len; const char *curve = NULL; u32 created_at = 0; const char *oidstr; int flag_djb_tweak = 0; int algo; gcry_mpi_t oid = NULL; const unsigned char *oidbuf; unsigned int n; size_t oid_len; unsigned char fprbuf[20]; /* (private-key(ecc(curve%s)(q%m)(d%m))(created-at%d)): curve = "NIST P-256" */ /* (private-key(ecc(curve%s)(q%m)(d%m))(created-at%d)): curve = "secp256k1" */ /* (private-key(ecc(curve%s)(flags eddsa)(q%m)(d%m))(created-at%d)): curve = "Ed25519" */ last_depth1 = depth; while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) && depth && depth >= last_depth1) { if (tok) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); goto leave; } if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) goto leave; if (tok && toklen == 5 && !memcmp (tok, "curve", 5)) { char *curve_name; if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) goto leave; curve_name = xtrymalloc (toklen+1); if (!curve_name) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } memcpy (curve_name, tok, toklen); curve_name[toklen] = 0; curve = openpgp_is_curve_supported (curve_name, NULL, NULL); xfree (curve_name); } else if (tok && toklen == 5 && !memcmp (tok, "flags", 5)) { if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) goto leave; if (tok) { if ((toklen == 5 && !memcmp (tok, "eddsa", 5)) || (toklen == 9 && !memcmp (tok, "djb-tweak", 9))) flag_djb_tweak = 1; } } else if (tok && toklen == 1) { const unsigned char **buf2; size_t *buf2len; int native = flag_djb_tweak; switch (*tok) { case 'q': buf2 = &ecc_q; buf2len = &ecc_q_len; break; case 'd': buf2 = &ecc_d; buf2len = &ecc_d_len; native = 0; break; default: buf2 = NULL; buf2len = NULL; break; } if (buf2 && *buf2) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_DUP_VALUE); goto leave; } if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) goto leave; if (tok && buf2) { if (!native) /* Strip off leading zero bytes and save. */ for (;toklen && !*tok; toklen--, tok++) ; *buf2 = tok; *buf2len = toklen; } } /* Skip until end of list. */ last_depth2 = depth; while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) && depth && depth >= last_depth2) ; if (err) goto leave; } /* Parse other attributes. */ last_depth1 = depth; while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) && depth && depth >= last_depth1) { if (tok) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); goto leave; } if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) goto leave; if (tok && toklen == 10 && !memcmp ("created-at", tok, toklen)) { if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf,&buflen,&depth,&tok,&toklen))) goto leave; if (tok) { for (created_at=0; toklen && *tok && *tok >= '0' && *tok <= '9'; tok++, toklen--) created_at = created_at*10 + (*tok - '0'); } } /* Skip until end of list. */ last_depth2 = depth; while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) && depth && depth >= last_depth2) ; if (err) goto leave; } /* Check that we have all parameters and that they match the card description. */ if (!curve) { log_error (_("unsupported curve\n")); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); goto leave; } if (!created_at) { log_error (_("creation timestamp missing\n")); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); goto leave; } if (flag_djb_tweak && keyno != 1) algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA; else if (keyno == 1) algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH; else algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA; oidstr = openpgp_curve_to_oid (curve, NULL, NULL); err = openpgp_oid_from_str (oidstr, &oid); if (err) goto leave; oidbuf = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (oid, &n); if (!oidbuf) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } oid_len = (n+7)/8; if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type != KEY_TYPE_ECC || app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.curve != curve || (flag_djb_tweak != (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK))) { if (app->app_local->extcap.algo_attr_change) { unsigned char *keyattr; if (!oid_len) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); goto leave; } keyattr = xtrymalloc (oid_len); if (!keyattr) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } keyattr[0] = algo; memcpy (keyattr+1, oidbuf+1, oid_len-1); err = change_keyattr (app, ctrl, keyno, keyattr, oid_len, pincb, pincb_arg); xfree (keyattr); if (err) goto leave; } else { log_error ("key attribute on card doesn't match\n"); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); goto leave; } } if (opt.verbose) log_info ("ECC private key size is %u bytes\n", (unsigned int)ecc_d_len); /* We need to remove the cached public key. */ xfree (app->app_local->pk[keyno].key); app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = NULL; app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = 0; app->app_local->pk[keyno].read_done = 0; if (app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) { /* Build the private key template as described in section 4.3.3.7 of the OpenPGP card specs version 2.0. */ unsigned char *template; size_t template_len; int exmode; err = build_ecc_privkey_template (app, keyno, ecc_d, ecc_d_len, ecc_q, ecc_q_len, &template, &template_len); if (err) goto leave; /* Prepare for storing the key. */ err = verify_chv3 (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg); if (err) { xfree (template); goto leave; } /* Store the key. */ if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le && template_len > 254) exmode = 1; /* Use extended length w/o a limit. */ else if (app->app_local->cardcap.cmd_chaining && template_len > 254) exmode = -254; else exmode = 0; err = iso7816_put_data_odd (app_get_slot (app), exmode, 0x3fff, template, template_len); xfree (template); } else err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED); if (err) { log_error (_("failed to store the key: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } err = store_fpr (app, keyno, created_at, fprbuf, algo, oidbuf, oid_len, ecc_q, ecc_q_len, ecdh_params (curve), (size_t)4); leave: gcry_mpi_release (oid); return err; } /* Handle the WRITEKEY command for OpenPGP. This function expects a canonical encoded S-expression with the secret key in KEYDATA and its length (for assertions) in KEYDATALEN. KEYID needs to be the usual keyid which for OpenPGP is the string "OPENPGP.n" with n=1,2,3. Bit 0 of FLAGS indicates whether an existing key shall get overwritten. PINCB and PINCB_ARG are the usual arguments for the pinentry callback. */ static gpg_error_t do_writekey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyid, unsigned int flags, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg, const unsigned char *keydata, size_t keydatalen) { gpg_error_t err; int force = (flags & 1); int keyno; const unsigned char *buf, *tok; size_t buflen, toklen; int depth; (void)ctrl; if (!ascii_strcasecmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.1")) keyno = 0; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.2")) keyno = 1; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.3")) keyno = 2; else return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); err = does_key_exist (app, keyno, 0, force); if (err) return err; /* Parse the S-expression */ buf = keydata; buflen = keydatalen; depth = 0; if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) goto leave; if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) goto leave; if (!tok || toklen != 11 || memcmp ("private-key", tok, toklen)) { if (!tok) ; else if (toklen == 21 && !memcmp ("protected-private-key", tok, toklen)) log_info ("protected-private-key passed to writekey\n"); else if (toklen == 20 && !memcmp ("shadowed-private-key", tok, toklen)) log_info ("shadowed-private-key passed to writekey\n"); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); goto leave; } if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) goto leave; if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) goto leave; if (tok && toklen == 3 && memcmp ("rsa", tok, toklen) == 0) err = rsa_writekey (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg, keyno, buf, buflen, depth); else if (tok && toklen == 3 && memcmp ("ecc", tok, toklen) == 0) err = ecc_writekey (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg, keyno, buf, buflen, depth); else { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_PUBKEY_ALGO); goto leave; } leave: return err; } /* Handle the GENKEY command. */ static gpg_error_t do_genkey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyref, const char *keyalgo, unsigned int flags, time_t createtime, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg) { gpg_error_t err; char numbuf[30]; const char *keynostr; unsigned char *buffer = NULL; const unsigned char *keydata; size_t buflen, keydatalen; u32 created_at; int keyno; int force = !!(flags & APP_GENKEY_FLAG_FORCE); time_t start_at; int exmode = 0; int le_value = 256; /* Use legacy value. */ /* Strip the OpenPGP prefix which is for historical reasons optional. */ keynostr = keyref; if (!ascii_strncasecmp (keynostr, "OPENPGP.", 8)) keynostr += 8; keyno = atoi (keynostr) - 1; if (!digitp (keynostr) || keyno < 0 || keyno > 2) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); /* We flush the cache to increase the traffic before a key generation. This _might_ help a card to gather more entropy. */ flush_cache (app); /* Obviously we need to remove the cached public key. */ xfree (app->app_local->pk[keyno].key); app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = NULL; app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = 0; app->app_local->pk[keyno].read_done = 0; /* Check whether a key already exists. */ err = does_key_exist (app, keyno, 1, force); if (err) return err; if (keyalgo && app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].keyalgo && strcmp (keyalgo, app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].keyalgo)) { /* Specific algorithm requested which is not the currently * configured algorithm. Change it. */ log_info ("openpgp: changing key attribute from %s to %s\n", app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].keyalgo, keyalgo); err = change_keyattr_from_string (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg, keyref, keyalgo, NULL, 0); if (err) return err; } if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA) { unsigned int keybits = app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits; /* Because we send the key parameter back via status lines we need to put a limit on the max. allowed keysize. 2048 bit will already lead to a 527 byte long status line and thus a 4096 bit key would exceed the Assuan line length limit. */ if (keybits > 4096) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE); if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le && keybits > RSA_SMALL_SIZE_KEY && app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA) { exmode = 1; /* Use extended length w/o a limit. */ le_value = determine_rsa_response (app, keyno); /* No need to check le_value because it comes from a 16 bit value and thus can't create an overflow on a 32 bit system. */ } } /* Prepare for key generation by verifying the Admin PIN. */ err = verify_chv3 (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg); if (err) return err; log_info (_("please wait while key is being generated ...\n")); start_at = time (NULL); err = iso7816_generate_keypair (app_get_slot (app), exmode, 0x80, 0, (keyno == 0? "\xB6" : keyno == 1? "\xB8" : "\xA4"), 2, le_value, &buffer, &buflen); if (err) { log_error (_("generating key failed\n")); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); } { int nsecs = (int)(time (NULL) - start_at); log_info (ngettext("key generation completed (%d second)\n", "key generation completed (%d seconds)\n", nsecs), nsecs); } keydata = find_tlv (buffer, buflen, 0x7F49, &keydatalen); if (!keydata) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); log_error (_("response does not contain the public key data\n")); goto leave; } created_at = (u32)(createtime? createtime : gnupg_get_time ()); sprintf (numbuf, "%u", created_at); send_status_info (ctrl, "KEY-CREATED-AT", numbuf, (size_t)strlen(numbuf), NULL, 0); err = read_public_key (app, ctrl, created_at, keyno, buffer, buflen); leave: xfree (buffer); return err; } static unsigned long convert_sig_counter_value (const unsigned char *value, size_t valuelen) { unsigned long ul; if (valuelen == 3 ) ul = (value[0] << 16) | (value[1] << 8) | value[2]; else { log_error (_("invalid structure of OpenPGP card (DO 0x93)\n")); ul = 0; } return ul; } static unsigned long get_sig_counter (app_t app) { void *relptr; unsigned char *value; size_t valuelen; unsigned long ul; relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x0093, &value, &valuelen, NULL); if (!relptr) return 0; ul = convert_sig_counter_value (value, valuelen); xfree (relptr); return ul; } static gpg_error_t compare_fingerprint (app_t app, int keyno, unsigned char *sha1fpr) { const unsigned char *fpr; unsigned char *buffer; size_t buflen, n; int rc, i; assert (keyno >= 0 && keyno <= 2); rc = get_cached_data (app, 0x006E, &buffer, &buflen, 0, 0); if (rc) { log_error (_("error reading application data\n")); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); } fpr = find_tlv (buffer, buflen, 0x00C5, &n); if (!fpr || n < 60) { xfree (buffer); log_error (_("error reading fingerprint DO\n")); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); } fpr += keyno*20; for (i=0; i < 20; i++) if (sha1fpr[i] != fpr[i]) { xfree (buffer); log_info (_("fingerprint on card does not match requested one\n")); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY); } xfree (buffer); return 0; } /* If a fingerprint has been specified check it against the one on the card. This allows for a meaningful error message in case the key on the card has been replaced but the shadow information known to gpg has not been updated. If there is no fingerprint we assume that this is okay. */ static gpg_error_t check_against_given_fingerprint (app_t app, const char *fpr, int key) { unsigned char tmp[20]; const char *s; int n; for (s=fpr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++) ; if (n != 40) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); else if (!*s) ; /* okay */ else return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); for (s=fpr, n=0; n < 20; s += 2, n++) tmp[n] = xtoi_2 (s); return compare_fingerprint (app, key-1, tmp); } /* Check KEYIDSTR, if it's valid. When KEYNO is 0, it means it's for PIN check. Otherwise, KEYNO corresponds to the slot (signing, decipher and auth). KEYIDSTR is either: (1) Serial number (2) Serial number "/" fingerprint (3) Serial number "[CHV3]" (4) keygrip When KEYNO is 0 and KEYIDSTR is for a keygrip, the keygrip should be to be compared is the first one (keygrip for signing). When KEYNO is 1, KEYIDSTR is for a keygrip, and R_USE_AUTH is not NULL, OpenPGP.1 is first tested and then OpenPGP.3. In the latter case 1 is stored at R_USE_AUTH */ static int check_keyidstr (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, int keyno, int *r_use_auth) { int rc; const char *s; int n; const char *fpr = NULL; if (r_use_auth) *r_use_auth = 0; if (strlen (keyidstr) < 32) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); else { char *serial; for (s=keyidstr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++) ; /* Check if it's a keygrip */ if (n == 40) { const unsigned char *keygrip_str; keygrip_str = app->app_local->pk[keyno?keyno-1:0].keygrip_str; if (!strncmp (keygrip_str, keyidstr, 40)) return 0; else if (keyno == 1 && r_use_auth && !strncmp (app->app_local->pk[2].keygrip_str, keyidstr, 40)) { *r_use_auth = 1; return 0; } else return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); } if (n != 32 || strncmp (keyidstr, "D27600012401", 12)) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); else if (!*s) ; /* no fingerprint given: we allow this for now. */ else if (*s == '/') fpr = s + 1; serial = app_get_serialno (app); if (strncmp (serial, keyidstr, 32)) { xfree (serial); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD); } xfree (serial); } /* If a fingerprint has been specified check it against the one on the card. This is allows for a meaningful error message in case the key on the card has been replaced but the shadow information known to gpg was not updated. If there is no fingerprint, gpg will detect a bogus signature anyway due to the verify-after-signing feature. */ rc = (fpr&&keyno)? check_against_given_fingerprint (app, fpr, keyno) : 0; return rc; } /* Compute a digital signature on INDATA which is expected to be the raw message digest. For this application the KEYIDSTR consists of the serialnumber and the fingerprint delimited by a slash. Note that this function may return the error code GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD to indicate that the card currently present does not match the one required for the requested action (e.g. the serial number does not match). As a special feature a KEYIDSTR of "OPENPGP.3" redirects the operation to the auth command. */ static gpg_error_t do_sign (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyidstr, int hashalgo, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg, const void *indata, size_t indatalen, unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen ) { static unsigned char rmd160_prefix[15] = /* Object ID is 1.3.36.3.2.1 */ { 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14 }; static unsigned char sha1_prefix[15] = /* (1.3.14.3.2.26) */ { 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14 }; static unsigned char sha224_prefix[19] = /* (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.4) */ { 0x30, 0x2D, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C }; static unsigned char sha256_prefix[19] = /* (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1) */ { 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20 }; static unsigned char sha384_prefix[19] = /* (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2) */ { 0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30 }; static unsigned char sha512_prefix[19] = /* (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3) */ { 0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40 }; int rc; unsigned char data[19+64]; size_t datalen; unsigned long sigcount; int use_auth = 0; int exmode, le_value; if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); /* Strip off known prefixes. */ #define X(a,b,c,d) \ if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_ ## a \ && (d) \ && indatalen == sizeof b ## _prefix + (c) \ && !memcmp (indata, b ## _prefix, sizeof b ## _prefix)) \ { \ indata = (const char*)indata + sizeof b ## _prefix; \ indatalen -= sizeof b ## _prefix; \ } if (indatalen == 20) ; /* Assume a plain SHA-1 or RMD160 digest has been given. */ else X(SHA1, sha1, 20, 1) else X(RMD160, rmd160, 20, 1) else X(SHA224, sha224, 28, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) else X(SHA256, sha256, 32, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) else X(SHA384, sha384, 48, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) else X(SHA512, sha512, 64, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) else if ((indatalen == 28 || indatalen == 32 || indatalen == 48 || indatalen ==64) && app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) ; /* Assume a plain SHA-3 digest has been given. */ else { log_error (_("card does not support digest algorithm %s\n"), gcry_md_algo_name (hashalgo)); /* Or the supplied digest length does not match an algorithm. */ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); } #undef X /* Check whether an OpenPGP card of any version has been requested. */ if (!ascii_strcasecmp (keyidstr, "OPENPGP.1")) ; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (keyidstr, "OPENPGP.3")) use_auth = 1; else { rc = check_keyidstr (app, keyidstr, 1, &use_auth); if (rc) return rc; } /* Concatenate prefix and digest. */ #define X(a,b,d) \ if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_ ## a && (d) ) \ { \ datalen = sizeof b ## _prefix + indatalen; \ assert (datalen <= sizeof data); \ memcpy (data, b ## _prefix, sizeof b ## _prefix); \ memcpy (data + sizeof b ## _prefix, indata, indatalen); \ } if (use_auth || app->app_local->keyattr[use_auth? 2: 0].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA) { X(SHA1, sha1, 1) else X(RMD160, rmd160, 1) else X(SHA224, sha224, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) else X(SHA256, sha256, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) else X(SHA384, sha384, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) else X(SHA512, sha512, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) else return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); } else { datalen = indatalen; memcpy (data, indata, indatalen); } #undef X /* Redirect to the AUTH command if asked to. */ if (use_auth) { return do_auth (app, ctrl, "OPENPGP.3", pincb, pincb_arg, data, datalen, outdata, outdatalen); } /* Show the number of signature done using this key. */ sigcount = get_sig_counter (app); log_info (_("signatures created so far: %lu\n"), sigcount); /* Check CHV if needed. */ if (!app->did_chv1 || app->force_chv1) { char *pinvalue; size_t pinlen; rc = verify_a_chv (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg, 1, sigcount, &pinvalue, &pinlen); if (rc) return rc; app->did_chv1 = 1; /* For cards with versions < 2 we want to keep CHV1 and CHV2 in sync, thus we verify CHV2 here using the given PIN. Cards with version2 to not have the need for a separate CHV2 and internally use just one. Obviously we can't do that if the pinpad has been used. */ if (!app->did_chv2 && pinvalue && !app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) { rc = iso7816_verify (app_get_slot (app), 0x82, pinvalue, pinlen); if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN) rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PIN_NOT_SYNCED); if (rc) { log_error (_("verify CHV%d failed: %s\n"), 2, gpg_strerror (rc)); wipe_and_free (pinvalue, pinlen); flush_cache_after_error (app); return rc; } app->did_chv2 = 1; cache_pin (app, ctrl, 2, pinvalue); } wipe_and_free (pinvalue, pinlen); } if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le && app->app_local->keyattr[0].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA && app->app_local->keyattr[0].rsa.n_bits > RSA_SMALL_SIZE_OP) { exmode = 1; /* Use extended length. */ le_value = app->app_local->keyattr[0].rsa.n_bits / 8; } else { exmode = 0; le_value = 0; } rc = iso7816_compute_ds (app_get_slot (app), exmode, data, datalen, le_value, outdata, outdatalen); if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_TIMEOUT) clear_chv_status (app, ctrl, 1); else if (!rc && app->force_chv1) { app->did_chv1 = 0; cache_pin (app, ctrl, 1, NULL); } return rc; } /* Compute a digital signature using the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command on INDATA which is expected to be the raw message digest. For this application the KEYIDSTR consists of the serialnumber and the fingerprint delimited by a slash. Optionally the id OPENPGP.3 may be given. Note that this function may return the error code GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD to indicate that the card currently present does not match the one required for the requested action (e.g. the serial number does not match). */ static gpg_error_t do_auth (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyidstr, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg, const void *indata, size_t indatalen, unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen ) { int rc; if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); if (app->app_local->keyattr[2].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA && indatalen > 101) /* For a 2048 bit key. */ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); if (app->app_local->keyattr[2].key_type == KEY_TYPE_ECC) { if (!(app->app_local->keyattr[2].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK) && (indatalen == 51 || indatalen == 67 || indatalen == 83)) { const char *p = (const char *)indata + 19; indata = p; indatalen -= 19; } else { const char *p = (const char *)indata + 15; indata = p; indatalen -= 15; } } /* Check whether an OpenPGP card of any version has been requested. */ if (!ascii_strcasecmp (keyidstr, "OPENPGP.3")) ; else { rc = check_keyidstr (app, keyidstr, 3, NULL); if (rc) return rc; } rc = verify_chv2 (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg); if (!rc) { int exmode, le_value; if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le && app->app_local->keyattr[2].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA && app->app_local->keyattr[2].rsa.n_bits > RSA_SMALL_SIZE_OP) { exmode = 1; /* Use extended length. */ le_value = app->app_local->keyattr[2].rsa.n_bits / 8; } else { exmode = 0; le_value = 0; } rc = iso7816_internal_authenticate (app_get_slot (app), exmode, indata, indatalen, le_value, outdata, outdatalen); if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_TIMEOUT) clear_chv_status (app, ctrl, 1); } return rc; } static gpg_error_t do_decipher (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyidstr, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg, const void *indata, size_t indatalen, unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen, unsigned int *r_info) { int n; int rc; int exmode, le_value; unsigned char *fixbuf = NULL; int padind = 0; int fixuplen = 0; if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr || !indatalen) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); /* Check whether an OpenPGP card of any version has been requested. */ if (!ascii_strcasecmp (keyidstr, "OPENPGP.2")) ; else { rc = check_keyidstr (app, keyidstr, 2, NULL); if (rc) return rc; } rc = verify_chv2 (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg); if (rc) return rc; if ((indatalen == 16 + 1 || indatalen == 32 + 1) && ((char *)indata)[0] == 0x02) { /* PSO:DECIPHER with symmetric key. */ padind = -1; } else if (app->app_local->keyattr[1].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA) { /* We might encounter a couple of leading zeroes in the cryptogram. Due to internal use of MPIs these leading zeroes are stripped. However the OpenPGP card expects exactly 128 bytes for the cryptogram (for a 1k key). Thus we need to fix it up. We do this for up to 16 leading zero bytes; a cryptogram with more than this is with a very high probability anyway broken. If a signed conversion was used we may also encounter one leading zero followed by the correct length. We fix that as well. */ if (indatalen >= (128-16) && indatalen < 128) /* 1024 bit key. */ fixuplen = 128 - indatalen; else if (indatalen >= (192-16) && indatalen < 192) /* 1536 bit key. */ fixuplen = 192 - indatalen; else if (indatalen >= (256-16) && indatalen < 256) /* 2048 bit key. */ fixuplen = 256 - indatalen; else if (indatalen >= (384-16) && indatalen < 384) /* 3072 bit key. */ fixuplen = 384 - indatalen; else if (indatalen >= (512-16) && indatalen < 512) /* 4096 bit key. */ fixuplen = 512 - indatalen; else if (!*(const char *)indata && (indatalen == 129 || indatalen == 193 || indatalen == 257 || indatalen == 385 || indatalen == 513)) fixuplen = -1; else fixuplen = 0; if (fixuplen > 0) { /* While we have to prepend stuff anyway, we can also include the padding byte here so that iso1816_decipher does not need to do another data mangling. */ fixuplen++; fixbuf = xtrymalloc (fixuplen + indatalen); if (!fixbuf) return gpg_error_from_syserror (); memset (fixbuf, 0, fixuplen); memcpy (fixbuf+fixuplen, indata, indatalen); indata = fixbuf; indatalen = fixuplen + indatalen; padind = -1; /* Already padded. */ } else if (fixuplen < 0) { /* We use the extra leading zero as the padding byte. */ padind = -1; } } else if (app->app_local->keyattr[1].key_type == KEY_TYPE_ECC) { int old_format_len = 0; if ((app->app_local->keyattr[1].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)) { if (indatalen > 32 && (indatalen % 2)) { /* * Skip the prefix. It may be 0x40 (in new format), or MPI * head of 0x00 (in old format). */ indata = (const char *)indata + 1; indatalen--; } else if (indatalen < 32) { /* * Old format trancated by MPI handling. */ old_format_len = indatalen; indatalen = 32; } } n = 0; if (indatalen < 128) fixuplen = 7; else fixuplen = 10; fixbuf = xtrymalloc (fixuplen + indatalen); if (!fixbuf) return gpg_error_from_syserror (); /* Build 'Cipher DO' */ fixbuf[n++] = '\xa6'; if (indatalen < 128) fixbuf[n++] = (char)(indatalen+5); else { fixbuf[n++] = 0x81; fixbuf[n++] = (char)(indatalen+7); } fixbuf[n++] = '\x7f'; fixbuf[n++] = '\x49'; if (indatalen < 128) fixbuf[n++] = (char)(indatalen+2); else { fixbuf[n++] = 0x81; fixbuf[n++] = (char)(indatalen+3); } fixbuf[n++] = '\x86'; if (indatalen < 128) fixbuf[n++] = (char)indatalen; else { fixbuf[n++] = 0x81; fixbuf[n++] = (char)indatalen; } if (old_format_len) { memset (fixbuf+fixuplen, 0, 32 - old_format_len); memcpy (fixbuf+fixuplen + 32 - old_format_len, indata, old_format_len); } else { memcpy (fixbuf+fixuplen, indata, indatalen); } indata = fixbuf; indatalen = fixuplen + indatalen; padind = -1; } else return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le && (indatalen > 254 || (app->app_local->keyattr[1].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA && app->app_local->keyattr[1].rsa.n_bits > RSA_SMALL_SIZE_OP))) { exmode = 1; /* Extended length w/o a limit. */ le_value = app->app_local->keyattr[1].rsa.n_bits / 8; } else if (app->app_local->cardcap.cmd_chaining && indatalen > 254) { exmode = -254; /* Command chaining with max. 254 bytes. */ le_value = 0; } else exmode = le_value = 0; rc = iso7816_decipher (app_get_slot (app), exmode, indata, indatalen, le_value, padind, outdata, outdatalen); xfree (fixbuf); if (!rc && app->app_local->keyattr[1].key_type == KEY_TYPE_ECC) { unsigned char prefix = 0; if (app->app_local->keyattr[1].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK) prefix = 0x40; else if ((*outdatalen % 2) == 0) /* No 0x04 -> x-coordinate only */ prefix = 0x41; if (prefix) { /* Add the prefix */ fixbuf = xtrymalloc (*outdatalen + 1); if (!fixbuf) { xfree (*outdata); return gpg_error_from_syserror (); } fixbuf[0] = prefix; memcpy (fixbuf+1, *outdata, *outdatalen); xfree (*outdata); *outdata = fixbuf; *outdatalen = *outdatalen + 1; } } if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_TIMEOUT) clear_chv_status (app, ctrl, 1); if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CARD /* actual SW is 0x640a */ && app->app_local->manufacturer == 5 && app->appversion == 0x0200) log_info ("NOTE: Cards with manufacturer id 5 and s/n <= 346 (0x15a)" " do not work with encryption keys > 2048 bits\n"); *r_info |= APP_DECIPHER_INFO_NOPAD; return rc; } /* Perform a simple verify operation for CHV1 and CHV2, so that further operations won't ask for CHV2 and it is possible to do a cheap check on the PIN: If there is something wrong with the PIN entry system, only the regular CHV will get blocked and not the dangerous CHV3. KEYIDSTR is the usual card's serial number; an optional fingerprint part will be ignored. There is a special mode if the keyidstr is "<serialno>[CHV3]" with the "[CHV3]" being a literal string: The Admin Pin is checked if and only if the retry counter is still at 3. */ static gpg_error_t do_check_pin (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyidstr, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), void *pincb_arg) { int admin_pin = 0; int rc; if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); rc = check_keyidstr (app, keyidstr, 0, NULL); if (rc) return rc; if ((strlen (keyidstr) >= 32+6 && !strcmp (keyidstr+32, "[CHV3]")) || (strlen (keyidstr) >= 40+6 && !strcmp (keyidstr+40, "[CHV3]"))) admin_pin = 1; /* Yes, there is a race conditions: The user might pull the card right here and we won't notice that. However this is not a problem and the check above is merely for a graceful failure between operations. */ if (admin_pin) { void *relptr; unsigned char *value; size_t valuelen; int count; relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C4, &value, &valuelen, NULL); if (!relptr || valuelen < 7) { log_error (_("error retrieving CHV status from card\n")); xfree (relptr); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); } count = value[6]; xfree (relptr); if (!count) { log_info (_("card is permanently locked!\n")); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); } else if (count < 3) { log_info (_("verification of Admin PIN is currently prohibited " "through this command\n")); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); } app->did_chv3 = 0; /* Force verification. */ return verify_chv3 (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg); } else return verify_chv2 (app, ctrl, pincb, pincb_arg); } static void send_keyinfo_if_available (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, char *serial, int data, int i) { char idbuf[50]; if (app->app_local->pk[i].read_done) { sprintf (idbuf, "OPENPGP.%d", i+1); send_keyinfo (ctrl, data, app->app_local->pk[i].keygrip_str, serial, idbuf); } } static gpg_error_t do_with_keygrip (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, int action, const char *keygrip_str, int capability) { int i; /* Make sure we have load the public keys. */ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) get_public_key (app, i); if (action == KEYGRIP_ACTION_LOOKUP) { if (keygrip_str == NULL) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) if (app->app_local->pk[i].read_done && !strcmp (keygrip_str, app->app_local->pk[i].keygrip_str)) return 0; /* Found */ } else { int data = (action == KEYGRIP_ACTION_SEND_DATA); char *serial = app_get_serialno (app); if (keygrip_str == NULL) { if (capability == 0) { for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) send_keyinfo_if_available (app, ctrl, serial, data, i); } else { if (capability == GCRY_PK_USAGE_SIGN) i = 0; else if (capability == GCRY_PK_USAGE_ENCR) i = 1; else if (capability == GCRY_PK_USAGE_AUTH) i = 2; else i = -1; if (i >= 0) send_keyinfo_if_available (app, ctrl, serial, data, i); } xfree (serial); /* Return an error so that the dispatcher keeps on looping * over the other applications. Only for clarity we use a * different error code than for the not_found case. */ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TRUE); } else { for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) if (!strcmp (keygrip_str, app->app_local->pk[i].keygrip_str)) { send_keyinfo_if_available (app, ctrl, serial, data, i); xfree (serial); return 0; } xfree (serial); } } return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); } /* Show information about card capabilities. */ static void show_caps (struct app_local_s *s) { log_info ("Version-2+ .....: %s\n", s->extcap.is_v2? "yes":"no"); log_info ("Extcap-v3 ......: %s\n", s->extcap.extcap_v3? "yes":"no"); log_info ("Button .........: %s\n", s->extcap.has_button? "yes":"no"); log_info ("SM-Support .....: %s", s->extcap.sm_supported? "yes":"no"); if (s->extcap.sm_supported) log_printf (" (%s)", s->extcap.sm_algo==2? "3DES": (s->extcap.sm_algo==2? "AES-128" : "AES-256")); log_info ("Get-Challenge ..: %s", s->extcap.get_challenge? "yes":"no"); if (s->extcap.get_challenge) log_printf (" (%u bytes max)", s->extcap.max_get_challenge); log_info ("Key-Import .....: %s\n", s->extcap.key_import? "yes":"no"); log_info ("Change-Force-PW1: %s\n", s->extcap.change_force_chv? "yes":"no"); log_info ("Private-DOs ....: %s\n", s->extcap.private_dos? "yes":"no"); log_info ("Algo-Attr-Change: %s\n", s->extcap.algo_attr_change? "yes":"no"); log_info ("Symmetric Crypto: %s\n", s->extcap.has_decrypt? "yes":"no"); log_info ("KDF-Support ....: %s\n", s->extcap.kdf_do? "yes":"no"); log_info ("Max-Cert3-Len ..: %u\n", s->extcap.max_certlen_3); if (s->extcap.extcap_v3) { log_info ("PIN-Block-2 ....: %s\n", s->extcap.pin_blk2? "yes":"no"); log_info ("MSE-Support ....: %s\n", s->extcap.mse? "yes":"no"); log_info ("Max-Special-DOs : %u\n", s->extcap.max_special_do); } log_info ("Cmd-Chaining ...: %s\n", s->cardcap.cmd_chaining?"yes":"no"); log_info ("Ext-Lc-Le ......: %s\n", s->cardcap.ext_lc_le?"yes":"no"); log_info ("Status-Indicator: %02X\n", s->status_indicator); log_info ("GnuPG-No-Sync ..: %s\n", s->flags.no_sync? "yes":"no"); log_info ("GnuPG-Def-PW2 ..: %s\n", s->flags.def_chv2? "yes":"no"); } /* Parse the historical bytes in BUFFER of BUFLEN and store them in APPLOC. */ static void parse_historical (struct app_local_s *apploc, const unsigned char * buffer, size_t buflen) { /* Example buffer: 00 31 C5 73 C0 01 80 00 90 00 */ if (buflen < 4) { log_error ("warning: historical bytes are too short\n"); return; /* Too short. */ } if (*buffer) { log_error ("warning: bad category indicator in historical bytes\n"); return; } /* Skip category indicator. */ buffer++; buflen--; /* Get the status indicator. */ apploc->status_indicator = buffer[buflen-3]; buflen -= 3; /* Parse the compact TLV. */ while (buflen) { unsigned int tag = (*buffer & 0xf0) >> 4; unsigned int len = (*buffer & 0x0f); if (len+1 > buflen) { log_error ("warning: bad Compact-TLV in historical bytes\n"); return; /* Error. */ } buffer++; buflen--; if (tag == 7 && len == 3) { /* Card capabilities. */ apploc->cardcap.cmd_chaining = !!(buffer[2] & 0x80); apploc->cardcap.ext_lc_le = !!(buffer[2] & 0x40); } buffer += len; buflen -= len; } } /* * Check if the OID in an DER encoding is available by GnuPG/libgcrypt, * and return the canonical curve name. Return NULL if not available. * The constant string is not allocated dynamically, never free it. */ static const char * ecc_curve (const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) { gcry_mpi_t oid; char *oidstr; const char *result; unsigned char *oidbuf; oidbuf = xtrymalloc (buflen + 1); if (!oidbuf) return NULL; memcpy (oidbuf+1, buf, buflen); oidbuf[0] = buflen; oid = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, oidbuf, (buflen+1) * 8); if (!oid) { xfree (oidbuf); return NULL; } oidstr = openpgp_oid_to_str (oid); gcry_mpi_release (oid); if (!oidstr) return NULL; result = openpgp_oid_to_curve (oidstr, 1); xfree (oidstr); return result; } static const char * get_algorithm_attribute_string (const unsigned char *buffer, size_t buflen) { enum gcry_pk_algos galgo; const char *curve; unsigned int nbits = 0; galgo = map_openpgp_pk_to_gcry (*buffer); nbits = 0; curve = NULL; if (*buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA && (buflen == 5 || buflen == 6)) nbits = (buffer[1]<<8 | buffer[2]); else if (*buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH || *buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || *buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) { int oidlen = buflen - 1; if (buffer[buflen-1] == 0x00 || buffer[buflen-1] == 0xff) { /* Found "pubkey required"-byte for private key template. */ oidlen--; } curve = ecc_curve (buffer + 1, oidlen); } else if (opt.verbose) log_printhex (buffer, buflen, ""); return get_keyalgo_string (galgo, nbits, curve); } /* Parse and optionally show the algorithm attributes for KEYNO. KEYNO must be in the range 0..2. */ static void parse_algorithm_attribute (app_t app, int keyno) { unsigned char *buffer; size_t buflen; void *relptr; const char desc[3][5] = {"sign", "encr", "auth"}; enum gcry_pk_algos galgo; unsigned int nbits; const char *curve; log_assert (keyno >=0 && keyno <= 2); app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type = KEY_TYPE_RSA; app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits = 0; relptr = get_one_do (app, 0xC1+keyno, &buffer, &buflen, NULL); if (!relptr) { log_error ("error reading DO 0x%02X\n", 0xc1+keyno); return; } if (buflen < 1) { log_error ("error reading DO 0x%02X\n", 0xc1+keyno); xfree (relptr); return; } if (opt.verbose) log_info ("Key-Attr-%s ..: ", desc[keyno]); galgo = map_openpgp_pk_to_gcry (*buffer); nbits = 0; curve = NULL; if (*buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA && (buflen == 5 || buflen == 6)) { app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits = (buffer[1]<<8 | buffer[2]); app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.e_bits = (buffer[3]<<8 | buffer[4]); app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format = 0; if (buflen < 6) app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format = RSA_STD; else app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format = (buffer[5] == 0? RSA_STD : buffer[5] == 1? RSA_STD_N : buffer[5] == 2? RSA_CRT : buffer[5] == 3? RSA_CRT_N : RSA_UNKNOWN_FMT); nbits = app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits; if (opt.verbose) log_printf ("RSA, n=%u, e=%u, fmt=%s\n", app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits, app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.e_bits, app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_STD? "std" : app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_STD_N?"std+n": app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT? "crt" : app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT_N?"crt+n":"?"); } else if (*buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH || *buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || *buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) { int oidlen = buflen - 1; app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags = 0; if (buffer[buflen-1] == 0x00 || buffer[buflen-1] == 0xff) { /* Found "pubkey required"-byte for private key template. */ oidlen--; if (buffer[buflen-1] == 0xff) app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags |= ECC_FLAG_PUBKEY; } curve = ecc_curve (buffer + 1, oidlen); if (!curve) log_printhex (buffer+1, buflen-1, "Curve with OID not supported: "); else { app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type = KEY_TYPE_ECC; app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.curve = curve; if (*buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || (*buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH && !strcmp (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.curve, "Curve25519"))) app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags |= ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK; if (opt.verbose) log_printf ("ECC, curve=%s%s\n", app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.curve, !(app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)? "": keyno==1? " (djb-tweak)": " (eddsa)"); } } else if (opt.verbose) log_printhex (buffer, buflen, ""); app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].keyalgo = get_keyalgo_string (galgo, nbits, curve); if (opt.verbose) log_info ("Key-Algo-%s ..: %s\n", desc[keyno], app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].keyalgo); xfree (relptr); } /* Prepare a reselect of another application. This is used by cards * which support on-the-fly switching between applications. The * function is called to give us a chance to save state for a future * reselect of us again. */ static gpg_error_t do_prep_reselect (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl) { gpg_error_t err; (void)app; (void)ctrl; err = 0; return err; } /* Reselect the application. This is used by cards which support * on-the-fly switching between applications. */ static gpg_error_t do_reselect (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl) { gpg_error_t err; (void)ctrl; /* An extra check which should not be necessary because the caller * should have made sure that a re-select is only called for * appropriate cards. */ if (app->card->cardtype != CARDTYPE_YUBIKEY) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED); /* Note that the card can't cope with P2=0xCO, thus we need to pass * a special flag value. */ err = iso7816_select_application (app_get_slot (app), openpgp_aid, sizeof openpgp_aid, 0x0001); if (!err) { app->did_chv1 = 0; app->did_chv2 = 0; app->did_chv3 = 0; } return err; } /* Select the OpenPGP application on the card in SLOT. This function must be used before any other OpenPGP application functions. */ gpg_error_t app_select_openpgp (app_t app) { int slot = app_get_slot (app); int rc; unsigned char *buffer; size_t buflen; void *relptr; /* Note that the card can't cope with P2=0xCO, thus we need to pass a special flag value. */ rc = iso7816_select_application (slot, openpgp_aid, sizeof openpgp_aid, 0x0001); if (!rc) { unsigned int manufacturer; app->apptype = APPTYPE_OPENPGP; app->did_chv1 = 0; app->did_chv2 = 0; app->did_chv3 = 0; app->app_local = NULL; /* The OpenPGP card returns the serial number as part of the AID; because we prefer to use OpenPGP serial numbers, we replace a possibly already set one from a EF.GDO with this one. Note, that for current OpenPGP cards, no EF.GDO exists and thus it won't matter at all. */ rc = iso7816_get_data (slot, 0, 0x004F, &buffer, &buflen); if (rc) goto leave; if (opt.verbose) { log_info ("AID: "); log_printhex (buffer, buflen, ""); } app->appversion = buffer[6] << 8; app->appversion |= buffer[7]; manufacturer = (buffer[8]<<8 | buffer[9]); /* For Yubikey, serialno is set in app.c, already. */ if (app->card->cardtype == CARDTYPE_YUBIKEY) xfree (buffer); else { xfree (app->card->serialno); app->card->serialno = buffer; app->card->serialnolen = buflen; } buffer = NULL; app->app_local = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *app->app_local); if (!app->app_local) { rc = gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno)); goto leave; } app->app_local->manufacturer = manufacturer; if (app->appversion >= 0x0200) app->app_local->extcap.is_v2 = 1; if (app->appversion >= 0x0300) app->app_local->extcap.extcap_v3 = 1; /* Read the historical bytes. */ relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x5f52, &buffer, &buflen, NULL); if (relptr) { if (opt.verbose) { log_info ("Historical Bytes: "); log_printhex (buffer, buflen, ""); } parse_historical (app->app_local, buffer, buflen); xfree (relptr); } /* Read the force-chv1 flag. */ relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C4, &buffer, &buflen, NULL); if (!relptr) { log_error (_("can't access %s - invalid OpenPGP card?\n"), "CHV Status Bytes"); goto leave; } app->force_chv1 = (buflen && *buffer == 0); xfree (relptr); /* Read the extended capabilities. */ relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C0, &buffer, &buflen, NULL); if (!relptr) { log_error (_("can't access %s - invalid OpenPGP card?\n"), "Extended Capability Flags" ); goto leave; } if (buflen) { app->app_local->extcap.sm_supported = !!(*buffer & 0x80); app->app_local->extcap.get_challenge = !!(*buffer & 0x40); app->app_local->extcap.key_import = !!(*buffer & 0x20); app->app_local->extcap.change_force_chv = !!(*buffer & 0x10); app->app_local->extcap.private_dos = !!(*buffer & 0x08); app->app_local->extcap.algo_attr_change = !!(*buffer & 0x04); app->app_local->extcap.has_decrypt = !!(*buffer & 0x02); app->app_local->extcap.kdf_do = !!(*buffer & 0x01); } if (buflen >= 10) { /* Available with cards of v2 or later. */ app->app_local->extcap.sm_algo = buffer[1]; app->app_local->extcap.max_get_challenge = (buffer[2] << 8 | buffer[3]); app->app_local->extcap.max_certlen_3 = (buffer[4] << 8 | buffer[5]); /* Interpretation is different between v2 and v3, unfortunately. */ if (app->app_local->extcap.extcap_v3) { app->app_local->extcap.max_special_do = (buffer[6] << 8 | buffer[7]); app->app_local->extcap.pin_blk2 = !!(buffer[8] & 0x01); app->app_local->extcap.mse= !!(buffer[9] & 0x01); } } xfree (relptr); /* Some of the first cards accidentally don't set the CHANGE_FORCE_CHV bit but allow it anyway. */ if (app->appversion <= 0x0100 && manufacturer == 1) app->app_local->extcap.change_force_chv = 1; /* Check optional DO of "General Feature Management" for button. */ relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x7f74, &buffer, &buflen, NULL); if (relptr) /* It must be: 03 81 01 20 */ app->app_local->extcap.has_button = 1; parse_login_data (app); if (opt.verbose) show_caps (app->app_local); parse_algorithm_attribute (app, 0); parse_algorithm_attribute (app, 1); parse_algorithm_attribute (app, 2); if (opt.verbose > 1) dump_all_do (slot); app->fnc.deinit = do_deinit; app->fnc.prep_reselect = do_prep_reselect; app->fnc.reselect = do_reselect; app->fnc.learn_status = do_learn_status; app->fnc.readcert = do_readcert; app->fnc.readkey = do_readkey; app->fnc.getattr = do_getattr; app->fnc.setattr = do_setattr; app->fnc.writecert = do_writecert; app->fnc.writekey = do_writekey; app->fnc.genkey = do_genkey; app->fnc.sign = do_sign; app->fnc.auth = do_auth; app->fnc.decipher = do_decipher; app->fnc.change_pin = do_change_pin; app->fnc.check_pin = do_check_pin; app->fnc.with_keygrip = do_with_keygrip; } leave: if (rc) do_deinit (app); return rc; }