diff --git a/common/openpgp-oid.c b/common/openpgp-oid.c
index 8fda23028..55f8f432d 100644
--- a/common/openpgp-oid.c
+++ b/common/openpgp-oid.c
@@ -1,645 +1,645 @@
 /* openpgp-oids.c - OID helper for OpenPGP
  * Copyright (C) 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  * Copyright (C) 2013 Werner Koch
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of either
  *
  *   - the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by the Free
  *     Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at
  *     your option) any later version.
  *
  * or
  *
  *   - the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
  *     Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at
  *     your option) any later version.
  *
  * or both in parallel, as here.
  *
  * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
  * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
  * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
  * GNU General Public License for more details.
  *
  * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
  * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  */
 
 #include <config.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 
 #include "util.h"
 #include "openpgpdefs.h"
 
 /* A table with all our supported OpenPGP curves.  */
 static struct {
   const char *name;   /* Standard name.  */
   const char *oidstr; /* IETF formatted OID.  */
   unsigned int nbits; /* Nominal bit length of the curve.  */
   const char *alias;  /* NULL or alternative name of the curve.  */
   int pubkey_algo;    /* Required OpenPGP algo or 0 for ECDSA/ECDH.  */
 } oidtable[] = {
 
   { "Curve25519", "1.3.6.1.4.1.3029.1.5.1", 255, "cv25519", PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH },
   { "Ed25519",    "1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.15.1", 255, "ed25519", PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA },
 
   { "NIST P-256",      "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7",    256, "nistp256" },
   { "NIST P-384",      "1.3.132.0.34",           384, "nistp384" },
   { "NIST P-521",      "1.3.132.0.35",           521, "nistp521" },
 
   { "brainpoolP256r1", "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7",   256 },
   { "brainpoolP384r1", "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11",  384 },
   { "brainpoolP512r1", "1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.13",  512 },
 
   { "secp256k1",       "1.3.132.0.10",           256 },
 
   { NULL, NULL, 0}
 };
 
 
 /* The OID for Curve Ed25519 in OpenPGP format.  */
 static const char oid_ed25519[] =
   { 0x09, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0xda, 0x47, 0x0f, 0x01 };
 
 /* The OID for Curve25519 in OpenPGP format.  */
 static const char oid_cv25519[] =
   { 0x0a, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x97, 0x55, 0x01, 0x05, 0x01 };
 
 /* A table to store keyalgo strings like "rsa2048 or "ed25519" so that
  * we do not need to allocate them.  This is currently a simple array
  * but may eventually be changed to a fast data structure.  Noet that
  * unknown algorithms are stored with (NBITS,CURVE) set to (0,NULL). */
 struct keyalgo_string_s
 {
   enum gcry_pk_algos algo;   /* Mandatory. */
   unsigned int nbits;        /* Size for classical algos.  */
   char *curve;               /* Curvename (OID) or NULL.   */
   char *name;                /* Allocated name.  */
 };
 static struct keyalgo_string_s *keyalgo_strings;  /* The table.       */
 static size_t keyalgo_strings_size;               /* Allocated size.  */
 static size_t keyalgo_strings_used;               /* Used size.       */
 
 
 /* Helper for openpgp_oid_from_str.  */
 static size_t
 make_flagged_int (unsigned long value, char *buf, size_t buflen)
 {
   int more = 0;
   int shift;
 
   /* fixme: figure out the number of bits in an ulong and start with
      that value as shift (after making it a multiple of 7) a more
      straigtforward implementation is to do it in reverse order using
      a temporary buffer - saves a lot of compares */
   for (more=0, shift=28; shift > 0; shift -= 7)
     {
       if (more || value >= (1<<shift))
         {
           buf[buflen++] = 0x80 | (value >> shift);
           value -= (value >> shift) << shift;
           more = 1;
         }
     }
   buf[buflen++] = value;
   return buflen;
 }
 
 
 /* Convert the OID given in dotted decimal form in STRING to an DER
  * encoding and store it as an opaque value at R_MPI.  The format of
  * the DER encoded is not a regular ASN.1 object but the modified
  * format as used by OpenPGP for the ECC curve description.  On error
  * the function returns and error code an NULL is stored at R_BUG.
  * Note that scanning STRING stops at the first white space
  * character.  */
 gpg_error_t
 openpgp_oid_from_str (const char *string, gcry_mpi_t *r_mpi)
 {
   unsigned char *buf;
   size_t buflen;
   unsigned long val1, val;
   const char *endp;
   int arcno;
 
   *r_mpi = NULL;
 
   if (!string || !*string)
     return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
 
   /* We can safely assume that the encoded OID is shorter than the string. */
   buf = xtrymalloc (1 + strlen (string) + 2);
   if (!buf)
     return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
   /* Save the first byte for the length.  */
   buflen = 1;
 
   val1 = 0; /* Avoid compiler warning.  */
   arcno = 0;
   do {
     arcno++;
     val = strtoul (string, (char**)&endp, 10);
     if (!digitp (string) || !(*endp == '.' || !*endp))
       {
         xfree (buf);
         return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OID_STRING);
       }
     if (*endp == '.')
       string = endp+1;
 
     if (arcno == 1)
       {
         if (val > 2)
           break; /* Not allowed, error caught below.  */
         val1 = val;
       }
     else if (arcno == 2)
       { /* Need to combine the first two arcs in one octet.  */
         if (val1 < 2)
           {
             if (val > 39)
               {
                 xfree (buf);
                 return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OID_STRING);
               }
             buf[buflen++] = val1*40 + val;
           }
         else
           {
             val += 80;
             buflen = make_flagged_int (val, buf, buflen);
           }
       }
     else
       {
         buflen = make_flagged_int (val, buf, buflen);
       }
   } while (*endp == '.');
 
   if (arcno == 1 || buflen < 2 || buflen > 254 )
     { /* It is not possible to encode only the first arc.  */
       xfree (buf);
       return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OID_STRING);
     }
 
   *buf = buflen - 1;
   *r_mpi = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, buf, buflen * 8);
   if (!*r_mpi)
     {
       xfree (buf);
       return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
     }
   return 0;
 }
 
 
 /* Return a malloced string representation of the OID in the buffer
  * (BUF,LEN).  In case of an error NULL is returned and ERRNO is set.
  * As per OpenPGP spec the first byte of the buffer is the length of
  * the rest; the function performs a consistency check.  */
 char *
 openpgp_oidbuf_to_str (const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
 {
   char *string, *p;
   int n = 0;
   unsigned long val, valmask;
 
   valmask = (unsigned long)0xfe << (8 * (sizeof (valmask) - 1));
   /* The first bytes gives the length; check consistency.  */
 
   if (!len || buf[0] != len -1)
     {
       gpg_err_set_errno (EINVAL);
       return NULL;
     }
   /* Skip length byte.  */
   len--;
   buf++;
 
   /* To calculate the length of the string we can safely assume an
      upper limit of 3 decimal characters per byte.  Two extra bytes
      account for the special first octet */
   string = p = xtrymalloc (len*(1+3)+2+1);
   if (!string)
     return NULL;
   if (!len)
     {
       *p = 0;
       return string;
     }
 
   if (buf[0] < 40)
     p += sprintf (p, "0.%d", buf[n]);
   else if (buf[0] < 80)
     p += sprintf (p, "1.%d", buf[n]-40);
   else {
     val = buf[n] & 0x7f;
     while ( (buf[n]&0x80) && ++n < len )
       {
         if ( (val & valmask) )
           goto badoid;  /* Overflow.  */
         val <<= 7;
         val |= buf[n] & 0x7f;
       }
     if (val < 80)
       goto badoid;
     val -= 80;
     sprintf (p, "2.%lu", val);
     p += strlen (p);
   }
   for (n++; n < len; n++)
     {
       val = buf[n] & 0x7f;
       while ( (buf[n]&0x80) && ++n < len )
         {
           if ( (val & valmask) )
             goto badoid;  /* Overflow.  */
           val <<= 7;
           val |= buf[n] & 0x7f;
         }
       sprintf (p, ".%lu", val);
       p += strlen (p);
     }
 
   *p = 0;
   return string;
 
  badoid:
   /* Return a special OID (gnu.gnupg.badoid) to indicate the error
      case.  The OID is broken and thus we return one which can't do
      any harm.  Formally this does not need to be a bad OID but an OID
      with an arc that can't be represented in a 32 bit word is more
      than likely corrupt.  */
   xfree (string);
   return xtrystrdup ("1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.12242973");
 }
 
 
 /* Return a malloced string representation of the OID in the opaque
  * MPI A.  In case of an error NULL is returned and ERRNO is set.  */
 char *
 openpgp_oid_to_str (gcry_mpi_t a)
 {
   const unsigned char *buf;
   unsigned int lengthi;
 
   if (!a
       || !gcry_mpi_get_flag (a, GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)
       || !(buf = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (a, &lengthi)))
     {
       gpg_err_set_errno (EINVAL);
       return NULL;
     }
 
   return openpgp_oidbuf_to_str (buf, (lengthi+7)/8);
 }
 
 
 /* Return true if (BUF,LEN) represents the OID for Ed25519.  */
 int
 openpgp_oidbuf_is_ed25519 (const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
   return (buf && len == DIM (oid_ed25519)
           && !memcmp (buf, oid_ed25519, DIM (oid_ed25519)));
 }
 
 
 /* Return true if A represents the OID for Ed25519.  */
 int
 openpgp_oid_is_ed25519 (gcry_mpi_t a)
 {
   const unsigned char *buf;
   unsigned int nbits;
 
   if (!a || !gcry_mpi_get_flag (a, GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
     return 0;
 
   buf = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (a, &nbits);
   return openpgp_oidbuf_is_ed25519 (buf, (nbits+7)/8);
 }
 
 
 /* Return true if (BUF,LEN) represents the OID for Curve25519.  */
 int
 openpgp_oidbuf_is_cv25519 (const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
   return (buf && len == DIM (oid_cv25519)
           && !memcmp (buf, oid_cv25519, DIM (oid_cv25519)));
 }
 
 
 /* Return true if the MPI A represents the OID for Curve25519.  */
 int
 openpgp_oid_is_cv25519 (gcry_mpi_t a)
 {
   const unsigned char *buf;
   unsigned int nbits;
 
   if (!a || !gcry_mpi_get_flag (a, GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
     return 0;
 
   buf = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (a, &nbits);
   return openpgp_oidbuf_is_cv25519 (buf, (nbits+7)/8);
 }
 
 
 /* Map the Libgcrypt ECC curve NAME to an OID.  If R_NBITS is not NULL
    store the bit size of the curve there.  Returns NULL for unknown
    curve names.  If R_ALGO is not NULL and a specific ECC algorithm is
    required for this curve its OpenPGP algorithm number is stored
    there; otherwise 0 is stored which indicates that ECDSA or ECDH can
    be used. */
 const char *
 openpgp_curve_to_oid (const char *name, unsigned int *r_nbits, int *r_algo)
 {
   int i;
   unsigned int nbits = 0;
   const char *oidstr = NULL;
   int algo = 0;
 
   if (name)
     {
       for (i=0; oidtable[i].name; i++)
         if (!strcmp (oidtable[i].name, name)
             || (oidtable[i].alias && !strcmp (oidtable[i].alias, name)))
           {
             oidstr = oidtable[i].oidstr;
             nbits  = oidtable[i].nbits;
             algo   = oidtable[i].pubkey_algo;
             break;
           }
       if (!oidtable[i].name)
         {
           /* If not found assume the input is already an OID and check
              whether we support it.  */
           for (i=0; oidtable[i].name; i++)
             if (!strcmp (name, oidtable[i].oidstr))
               {
                 oidstr = oidtable[i].oidstr;
                 nbits  = oidtable[i].nbits;
                 algo   = oidtable[i].pubkey_algo;
                 break;
               }
         }
     }
 
   if (r_nbits)
     *r_nbits = nbits;
   if (r_algo)
     *r_algo = algo;
   return oidstr;
 }
 
 
 /* Map an OpenPGP OID to the Libgcrypt curve name.  Returns NULL for
  * unknown curve names.  Unless CANON is set we prefer an alias name
  * here which is more suitable for printing.  */
 const char *
 openpgp_oid_to_curve (const char *oidstr, int canon)
 {
   int i;
 
   if (!oidstr)
     return NULL;
 
   for (i=0; oidtable[i].name; i++)
     if (!strcmp (oidtable[i].oidstr, oidstr))
       return !canon && oidtable[i].alias? oidtable[i].alias : oidtable[i].name;
 
   return NULL;
 }
 
 
 /* Map an OpenPGP OID, name or alias to the Libgcrypt curve name.
  * Returns NULL for unknown curve names.  Unless CANON is set we
  * prefer an alias name here which is more suitable for printing.  */
 const char *
 openpgp_oid_or_name_to_curve (const char *oidname, int canon)
 {
   int i;
 
   if (!oidname)
     return NULL;
 
   for (i=0; oidtable[i].name; i++)
     if (!strcmp (oidtable[i].oidstr, oidname)
         || !strcmp (oidtable[i].name, oidname)
         || (oidtable[i].alias &&!strcmp (oidtable[i].alias, oidname)))
       return !canon && oidtable[i].alias? oidtable[i].alias : oidtable[i].name;
 
   return NULL;
 }
 
 
 /* Return true if the curve with NAME is supported.  */
 static int
 curve_supported_p (const char *name)
 {
   int result = 0;
   gcry_sexp_t keyparms;
 
   if (!gcry_sexp_build (&keyparms, NULL, "(public-key(ecc(curve %s)))", name))
     {
       result = !!gcry_pk_get_curve (keyparms, 0, NULL);
       gcry_sexp_release (keyparms);
     }
   return result;
 }
 
 
 /* Enumerate available and supported OpenPGP curves.  The caller needs
    to set the integer variable at ITERP to zero and keep on calling
    this function until NULL is returned.  */
 const char *
 openpgp_enum_curves (int *iterp)
 {
   int idx = *iterp;
 
   while (idx >= 0 && idx < DIM (oidtable) && oidtable[idx].name)
     {
       if (curve_supported_p (oidtable[idx].name))
         {
           *iterp = idx + 1;
           return oidtable[idx].alias? oidtable[idx].alias : oidtable[idx].name;
         }
       idx++;
     }
   *iterp = idx;
   return NULL;
 }
 
 
 /* Return the Libgcrypt name for the gpg curve NAME if supported.  If
  * R_ALGO is not NULL the required OpenPGP public key algo or 0 is
  * stored at that address.  If R_NBITS is not NULL the nominal bitsize
  * of the curves is stored there.  NULL is returned if the curve is
  * not supported. */
 const char *
 openpgp_is_curve_supported (const char *name, int *r_algo,
                             unsigned int *r_nbits)
 {
   int idx;
 
   if (r_algo)
     *r_algo = 0;
   if (r_nbits)
     *r_nbits = 0;
   for (idx = 0; idx < DIM (oidtable) && oidtable[idx].name; idx++)
     {
       if ((!strcmp (name, oidtable[idx].name)
            || (oidtable[idx].alias && !strcmp (name, (oidtable[idx].alias))))
           && curve_supported_p (oidtable[idx].name))
         {
           if (r_algo)
             *r_algo = oidtable[idx].pubkey_algo;
           if (r_nbits)
             *r_nbits = oidtable[idx].nbits;
           return oidtable[idx].name;
         }
     }
   return NULL;
 }
 
 
 /* Map a Gcrypt public key algorithm number to the used by OpenPGP.
  * Returns 0 for unknown gcry algorithm.  */
 pubkey_algo_t
 map_gcry_pk_to_openpgp (enum gcry_pk_algos algo)
 {
   switch (algo)
     {
     case GCRY_PK_EDDSA:  return PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA;
     case GCRY_PK_ECDSA:  return PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA;
     case GCRY_PK_ECDH:   return PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH;
     default: return algo < 110 ? (pubkey_algo_t)algo : 0;
     }
 }
 
 
 /* Map an OpenPGP public key algorithm number to the one used by
  * Libgcrypt.  Returns 0 for unknown gcry algorithm.  */
 enum gcry_pk_algos
 map_openpgp_pk_to_gcry (pubkey_algo_t algo)
 {
   switch (algo)
     {
     case PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA:  return GCRY_PK_EDDSA;
     case PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA:  return GCRY_PK_ECDSA;
     case PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH:   return GCRY_PK_ECDH;
     default: return algo < 110 ? algo : 0;
     }
 }
 
 
 /* Return a string describing the public key algorithm and the
  * keysize.  For elliptic curves the function prints the name of the
  * curve because the keysize is a property of the curve.  ALGO is the
- * Gcrypt algorithmj number, curve is either NULL or give the PID of
- * the curve, NBITS is either 0 or the size of the algorithms for RSA
- * etc.  The returned string is taken from permanent table.  Examples
+ * Gcrypt algorithm number, CURVE is either NULL or gives the OID of
+ * the curve, NBITS is either 0 or the size for algorithms like RSA.
+ * The returned string is taken from permanent table.  Examples
  * for the output are:
  *
  * "rsa3072"    - RSA with 3072 bit
  * "elg1024"    - Elgamal with 1024 bit
  * "ed25519"    - ECC using the curve Ed25519.
  * "E_1.2.3.4"  - ECC using the unsupported curve with OID "1.2.3.4".
  * "E_1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.12242973" - ECC with a bogus OID.
  * "unknown_N"  - Unknown OpenPGP algorithm N.
  *                If N is > 110 this is a gcrypt algo.
  */
 const char *
 get_keyalgo_string (enum gcry_pk_algos algo,
                     unsigned int nbits, const char *curve)
 {
   const char *prefix;
   int i;
   char *name, *curvebuf;
 
   switch (algo)
     {
     case GCRY_PK_RSA:   prefix = "rsa"; break;
     case GCRY_PK_ELG:   prefix = "elg"; break;
     case GCRY_PK_DSA:	prefix = "dsa"; break;
     case GCRY_PK_ECC:
     case GCRY_PK_ECDH:
     case GCRY_PK_ECDSA:
     case GCRY_PK_EDDSA: prefix = "";    break;
     default:            prefix = NULL;  break;
     }
 
   if (prefix && *prefix && nbits)
     {
       for (i=0; i < keyalgo_strings_used; i++)
         {
           if (keyalgo_strings[i].algo == algo
               && keyalgo_strings[i].nbits
               && keyalgo_strings[i].nbits == nbits)
             return keyalgo_strings[i].name;
         }
       /* Not yet in the table - add it.  */
       name = xasprintf ("%s%u", prefix, nbits);
       nbits = nbits? nbits : 1;  /* No nbits - oops - use 1 instead.  */
       curvebuf = NULL;
     }
   else if (prefix && !*prefix)
     {
       const char *curvename;
 
       for (i=0; i < keyalgo_strings_used; i++)
         {
           if (keyalgo_strings[i].algo == algo
               && keyalgo_strings[i].curve
               && !strcmp (keyalgo_strings[i].curve, curve))
             return keyalgo_strings[i].name;
         }
 
       /* Not yet in the table - add it.  */
       curvename = openpgp_oid_or_name_to_curve (curve, 0);
       if (curvename)
         name = xasprintf ("%s", curvename);
       else if (curve)
         name = xasprintf ("E_%s", curve);
       else
         name = xasprintf ("E_error");
       nbits = 0;
       curvebuf = xstrdup (curve);
     }
   else
     {
       for (i=0; i < keyalgo_strings_used; i++)
         {
           if (keyalgo_strings[i].algo == algo
               && !keyalgo_strings[i].nbits
               && !keyalgo_strings[i].curve)
             return keyalgo_strings[i].name;
         }
       /* Not yet in the table - add it.  */
       name = xasprintf ("unknown_%u", (unsigned int)algo);
       nbits = 0;
       curvebuf = NULL;
     }
 
   /* Store a new entry.  This is a loop because of a possible nPth
    * thread switch during xrealloc.  */
   while (keyalgo_strings_used >= keyalgo_strings_size)
     {
       keyalgo_strings_size += 10;
       if (keyalgo_strings_size > 1024*1024)
         log_fatal ("%s: table getting too large - possible DoS\n", __func__);
       keyalgo_strings = xrealloc (keyalgo_strings, (keyalgo_strings_size
                                                     * sizeof *keyalgo_strings));
     }
   keyalgo_strings[keyalgo_strings_used].algo = algo;
   keyalgo_strings[keyalgo_strings_used].nbits = nbits;
   keyalgo_strings[keyalgo_strings_used].curve = curvebuf;
   keyalgo_strings[keyalgo_strings_used].name = name;
   keyalgo_strings_used++;
 
   return name;  /* Note that this is in the table.  */
 }
diff --git a/doc/DETAILS b/doc/DETAILS
index 7655489a5..a1c53b88e 100644
--- a/doc/DETAILS
+++ b/doc/DETAILS
@@ -1,1621 +1,1621 @@
 # doc/DETAILS                                                -*- org -*-
 #+TITLE: GnuPG Details
 # Globally disable superscripts and subscripts:
 #+OPTIONS: ^:{}
 #
 
 # Note: This file uses org-mode; it should be easy to read as plain
 # text but be aware of some markup peculiarities: Verbatim code is
 # enclosed in #+begin-example, #+end-example blocks or marked by a
 # colon as the first non-white-space character, words bracketed with
 # equal signs indicate a monospace font, and the usual /italics/,
 # *bold*, and _underline_ conventions are recognized.
 
 This is the DETAILS file for GnuPG which specifies some internals and
 parts of the external API for GPG and GPGSM.
 
 * Format of the colon listings
 
   The format is a based on colon separated record, each recods starts
   with a tag string and extends to the end of the line.  Here is an
   example:
 #+begin_example
 $ gpg --with-colons --list-keys \
       --with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint wk@gnupg.org
 pub:f:1024:17:6C7EE1B8621CC013:899817715:1055898235::m:::scESC:
 fpr:::::::::ECAF7590EB3443B5C7CF3ACB6C7EE1B8621CC013:
 uid:f::::::::Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>:
 uid:f::::::::Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>:
 sub:f:1536:16:06AD222CADF6A6E1:919537416:1036177416:::::e:
 fpr:::::::::CF8BCC4B18DE08FCD8A1615906AD222CADF6A6E1:
 sub:r:1536:20:5CE086B5B5A18FF4:899817788:1025961788:::::esc:
 fpr:::::::::AB059359A3B81F410FCFF97F5CE086B5B5A18FF4:
 #+end_example
 
 Note that new version of GnuPG or the use of certain options may add
 new fields to the output.  Parsers should not assume a limit on the
 number of fields per line.  Some fields are not yet used or only used
 with certain record types; parsers should ignore fields they are not
 aware of.  New versions of GnuPG or the use of certain options may add
 new types of records as well.  Parsers should ignore any record whose
 type they do not recognize for forward-compatibility.
 
 The double =--with-fingerprint= prints the fingerprint for the subkeys
 too.  Old versions of gpg used a slightly different format and required
 the use of the option =--fixed-list-mode= to conform to the format
 described here.
 
 
 ** Description of the fields
 *** Field 1 - Type of record
 
     - pub :: Public key
     - crt :: X.509 certificate
     - crs :: X.509 certificate and private key available
     - sub :: Subkey (secondary key)
     - sec :: Secret key
     - ssb :: Secret subkey (secondary key)
     - uid :: User id
     - uat :: User attribute (same as user id except for field 10).
     - sig :: Signature
     - rev :: Revocation signature
     - rvs :: Revocation signature (standalone) [since 2.2.9]
     - fpr :: Fingerprint (fingerprint is in field 10)
     - pkd :: Public key data [*]
     - grp :: Keygrip
     - rvk :: Revocation key
     - tfs :: TOFU statistics [*]
     - tru :: Trust database information [*]
     - spk :: Signature subpacket [*]
     - cfg :: Configuration data [*]
 
     Records marked with an asterisk are described at [[*Special%20field%20formats][*Special fields]].
 
 *** Field 2 - Validity
 
     This is a letter describing the computed validity of a key.
     Currently this is a single letter, but be prepared that additional
     information may follow in some future versions. Note that GnuPG <
     2.1 does not set this field for secret key listings.
 
     - o :: Unknown (this key is new to the system)
     - i :: The key is invalid (e.g. due to a missing self-signature)
     - d :: The key has been disabled
 	   (deprecated - use the 'D' in field 12 instead)
     - r :: The key has been revoked
     - e :: The key has expired
     - - :: Unknown validity (i.e. no value assigned)
     - q :: Undefined validity.  '-' and 'q' may safely be treated as
            the same value for most purposes
     - n :: The key is not valid
     - m :: The key is marginal valid.
     - f :: The key is fully valid
     - u :: The key is ultimately valid.  This often means that the
            secret key is available, but any key may be marked as
            ultimately valid.
     - w :: The key has a well known private part.
     - s :: The key has special validity.  This means that it might be
            self-signed and expected to be used in the STEED system.
 
     If the validity information is given for a UID or UAT record, it
     describes the validity calculated based on this user ID.  If given
     for a key record it describes the validity taken from the best
     rated user ID.
 
     For X.509 certificates a 'u' is used for a trusted root
     certificate (i.e. for the trust anchor) and an 'f' for all other
     valid certificates.
 
     In "sig" records, this field may have one of these values as first
     character:
 
     - ! :: Signature is good.
     - - :: Signature is bad.
     - ? :: No public key to verify signature or public key is not usable.
     - % :: Other error verifying a signature
 
     More values may be added later.  The field may also be empty if
     gpg has been invoked in a non-checking mode (--list-sigs) or in a
     fast checking mode.  Since 2.2.7 '?' will also be printed by the
     command --list-sigs if the key is not in the local keyring.
 
 *** Field 3 - Key length
 
     The length of key in bits.
 
 *** Field 4 - Public key algorithm
 
     The values here are those from the OpenPGP specs or if they are
     greater than 255 the algorithm ids as used by Libgcrypt.
 
 *** Field 5 - KeyID
 
     This is the 64 bit keyid as specified by OpenPGP and the last 64
     bit of the SHA-1 fingerprint of an X.509 certifciate.
 
 *** Field 6 - Creation date
 
     The creation date of the key is given in UTC.  For UID and UAT
     records, this is used for the self-signature date.  Note that the
     date is usually printed in seconds since epoch, however, we are
     migrating to an ISO 8601 format (e.g. "19660205T091500").  This is
     currently only relevant for X.509.  A simple way to detect the new
     format is to scan for the 'T'.  Note that old versions of gpg
     without using the =--fixed-list-mode= option used a "yyyy-mm-tt"
     format.
 
 *** Field 7 - Expiration date
 
     Key or UID/UAT expiration date or empty if it does not expire.
 
 *** Field 8 - Certificate S/N, UID hash, trust signature info
 
     Used for serial number in crt records.  For UID and UAT records,
     this is a hash of the user ID contents used to represent that
     exact user ID.  For trust signatures, this is the trust depth
     separated by the trust value by a space.
 
 *** Field 9 -  Ownertrust
 
     This is only used on primary keys.  This is a single letter, but
     be prepared that additional information may follow in future
     versions.  For trust signatures with a regular expression, this is
     the regular expression value, quoted as in field 10.
 
 *** Field 10 - User-ID
 
     The value is quoted like a C string to avoid control characters
     (the colon is quoted =\x3a=).  For a "pub" record this field is
     not used on --fixed-list-mode.  A UAT record puts the attribute
     subpacket count here, a space, and then the total attribute
     subpacket size.  In gpgsm the issuer name comes here.  A FPR
     record stores the fingerprint here.  The fingerprint of a
     revocation key is stored here.
 
 *** Field 11 - Signature class
 
     Signature class as per RFC-4880.  This is a 2 digit hexnumber
     followed by either the letter 'x' for an exportable signature or
     the letter 'l' for a local-only signature.  The class byte of an
     revocation key is also given here, by a 2 digit hexnumber and
     optionally followed by the letter 's' for the "sensitive"
     flag.  This field is not used for X.509.
 
     "rev" and "rvs" may be followed by a comma and a 2 digit hexnumber
     with the revocation reason.
 
 *** Field 12 - Key capabilities
 
     The defined capabilities are:
 
     - e :: Encrypt
     - s :: Sign
     - c :: Certify
     - a :: Authentication
     - ? :: Unknown capability
 
     A key may have any combination of them in any order.  In addition
     to these letters, the primary key has uppercase versions of the
     letters to denote the _usable_ capabilities of the entire key, and
     a potential letter 'D' to indicate a disabled key.
 
 *** Field 13 - Issuer certificate fingerprint or other info
 
     Used in FPR records for S/MIME keys to store the fingerprint of
     the issuer certificate.  This is useful to build the certificate
     path based on certificates stored in the local key database it is
     only filled if the issuer certificate is available. The root has
     been reached if this is the same string as the fingerprint. The
     advantage of using this value is that it is guaranteed to have
     been built by the same lookup algorithm as gpgsm uses.
 
     For "uid" records this field lists the preferences in the same way
     gpg's --edit-key menu does.
 
     For "sig", "rev" and "rvs" records, this is the fingerprint of the
     key that issued the signature.  Note that this may only be filled
     if the signature verified correctly.  Note also that for various
     technical reasons, this fingerprint is only available if
     --no-sig-cache is used.  Since 2.2.7 this field will also be set
     if the key is missing but the signature carries an issuer
     fingerprint as meta data.
 
 *** Field 14 - Flag field
 
     Flag field used in the --edit menu output
 
 *** Field 15 - S/N of a token
 
     Used in sec/ssb to print the serial number of a token (internal
     protect mode 1002) or a '#' if that key is a simple stub (internal
     protect mode 1001).  If the option --with-secret is used and a
     secret key is available for the public key, a '+' indicates this.
 
 *** Field 16 - Hash algorithm
 
     For sig records, this is the used hash algorithm.  For example:
     2 = SHA-1, 8 = SHA-256.
 
 *** Field 17 - Curve name
 
-    For pub, sub, sec, and ssb records this field is used for the ECC
-    curve name.
+    For pub, sub, sec, ssb, crt, and crs records this field is used
+    for the ECC curve name.
 
 *** Field 18 - Compliance flags
 
     Space separated list of asserted compliance modes and
     screening result for this key.
 
     Valid values are:
 
     - 8  :: The key is compliant with RFC4880bis
     - 23 :: The key is compliant with compliance mode "de-vs".
     - 6001 :: Screening hit on the ROCA vulnerability.
 
 *** Field 19 - Last update
 
     The timestamp of the last update of a key or user ID.  The update
     time of a key is defined a lookup of the key via its unique
     identifier (fingerprint); the field is empty if not known.  The
     update time of a user ID is defined by a lookup of the key using a
     trusted mapping from mail address to key.
 
 *** Field 20 - Origin
 
     The origin of the key or the user ID.  This is an integer
     optionally followed by a space and an URL.  This goes along with
     the previous field.  The URL is quoted in C style.
 
 *** Field 21 - Comment
 
     This is currently only used in "rev" and "rvs" records to carry
     the the comment field of the recocation reason.  The value is
     quoted in C style.
 
 ** Special fields
 
 *** PKD - Public key data
 
     If field 1 has the tag "pkd", a listing looks like this:
 #+begin_example
 pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB:
     !  !   !-- the value
     !  !------ for information number of bits in the value
     !--------- index (eg. DSA goes from 0 to 3: p,q,g,y)
 #+end_example
 
 *** TFS - TOFU statistics
 
     This field may follows a UID record to convey information about
     the TOFU database.  The information is similar to a TOFU_STATS
     status line.
 
     - Field 2 :: tfs record version (must be 1)
     - Field 3 :: validity -  A number with validity code.
     - Field 4 :: signcount - The number of signatures seen.
     - Field 5 :: encrcount - The number of encryptions done.
     - Field 6 :: policy - A string with the policy
     - Field 7 :: signture-first-seen - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
     - Field 8 :: signature-most-recent-seen - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
     - Field 9 :: encryption-first-done - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
     - Field 10 :: encryption-most-recent-done - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
 
 *** TRU - Trust database information
     Example for a "tru" trust base record:
 #+begin_example
     tru:o:0:1166697654:1:3:1:5
 #+end_example
 
     - Field 2 :: Reason for staleness of trust.  If this field is
                  empty, then the trustdb is not stale.  This field may
                  have multiple flags in it:
 
                  - o :: Trustdb is old
                  - t :: Trustdb was built with a different trust model
                         than the one we are using now.
 
     - Field 3 :: Trust model
 
                  - 0 :: Classic trust model, as used in PGP 2.x.
                  - 1 :: PGP trust model, as used in PGP 6 and later.
                         This is the same as the classic trust model,
                         except for the addition of trust signatures.
 
                  GnuPG before version 1.4 used the classic trust model
                  by default. GnuPG 1.4 and later uses the PGP trust
                  model by default.
 
     - Field 4 :: Date trustdb was created in seconds since Epoch.
     - Field 5 :: Date trustdb will expire in seconds since Epoch.
     - Field 6 :: Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
                  key signer (gpg's option --marginals-needed).
     - Field 7 :: Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
                  key signer.  (gpg's option --completes-needed)
 
     - Field 8 :: Maximum depth of a certification chain. (gpg's option
                  --max-cert-depth)
 
 *** SPK - Signature subpacket records
 
     - Field 2 :: Subpacket number as per RFC-4880 and later.
     - Field 3 :: Flags in hex.  Currently the only two bits assigned
                  are 1, to indicate that the subpacket came from the
                  hashed part of the signature, and 2, to indicate the
                  subpacket was marked critical.
     - Field 4 :: Length of the subpacket.  Note that this is the
                  length of the subpacket, and not the length of field
                  5 below.  Due to the need for %-encoding, the length
                  of field 5 may be up to 3x this value.
     - Field 5 :: The subpacket data.  Printable ASCII is shown as
                  ASCII, but other values are rendered as %XX where XX
                  is the hex value for the byte.
 
 *** CFG - Configuration data
 
     --list-config outputs information about the GnuPG configuration
     for the benefit of frontends or other programs that call GnuPG.
     There are several list-config items, all colon delimited like the
     rest of the --with-colons output.  The first field is always "cfg"
     to indicate configuration information.  The second field is one of
     (with examples):
 
     - version :: The third field contains the version of GnuPG.
 
                  : cfg:version:1.3.5
 
     - pubkey :: The third field contains the public key algorithms
                 this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
                 semicolons.  The algorithm numbers are as specified in
                 RFC-4880.  Note that in contrast to the --status-fd
                 interface these are _not_ the Libgcrypt identifiers.
                 Using =pubkeyname= prints names instead of numbers.
 
                  : cfg:pubkey:1;2;3;16;17
 
     - cipher :: The third field contains the symmetric ciphers this
                 version of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons.
                 The cipher numbers are as specified in RFC-4880.
                 Using =ciphername= prints names instead of numbers.
 
                  : cfg:cipher:2;3;4;7;8;9;10
 
     - digest :: The third field contains the digest (hash) algorithms
                 this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
                 semicolons.  The digest numbers are as specified in
                 RFC-4880.  Using =digestname= prints names instead of
                 numbers.
 
                  : cfg:digest:1;2;3;8;9;10
 
     - compress :: The third field contains the compression algorithms
                   this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
                   semicolons.  The algorithm numbers are as specified
                   in RFC-4880.
 
                  : cfg:compress:0;1;2;3
 
     - group :: The third field contains the name of the group, and the
                fourth field contains the values that the group expands
                to, separated by semicolons.
 
                For example, a group of:
                  : group mynames = paige 0x12345678 joe patti
                would result in:
                  : cfg:group:mynames:patti;joe;0x12345678;paige
 
     - curve :: The third field contains the curve names this version
                of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons. Using
                =curveoid= prints OIDs instead of numbers.
 
                  : cfg:curve:ed25519;nistp256;nistp384;nistp521
 
 
 * Format of the --status-fd output
 
   Every line is prefixed with "[GNUPG:] ", followed by a keyword with
   the type of the status line and some arguments depending on the type
   (maybe none); an application should always be willing to ignore
   unknown keywords that may be emitted by future versions of GnuPG.
   Also, new versions of GnuPG may add arguments to existing keywords.
   Any additional arguments should be ignored for forward-compatibility.
 
 ** General status codes
 *** NEWSIG [<signers_uid>]
     Is issued right before a signature verification starts.  This is
     useful to define a context for parsing ERROR status messages.
     If SIGNERS_UID is given and is not "-" this is the percent-escaped
     value of the OpenPGP Signer's User ID signature sub-packet.
 
 *** GOODSIG  <long_keyid_or_fpr>  <username>
     The signature with the keyid is good.  For each signature only one
     of the codes GOODSIG, BADSIG, EXPSIG, EXPKEYSIG, REVKEYSIG or
     ERRSIG will be emitted.  In the past they were used as a marker
     for a new signature; new code should use the NEWSIG status
     instead.  The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
     escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if
     it is available.  This is the case with CMS and might eventually
     also be available for OpenPGP.
 
 *** EXPSIG  <long_keyid_or_fpr>  <username>
     The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature is
     expired. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
     escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if
     it is available.  This is the case with CMS and might eventually
     also be available for OpenPGP.
 
 *** EXPKEYSIG  <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
     The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made
     by an expired key. The username is the primary one encoded in
     UTF-8 and %XX escaped.  The fingerprint may be used instead of the
     long keyid if it is available.  This is the case with CMS and
     might eventually also be available for OpenPGP.
 
 *** REVKEYSIG  <long_keyid_or_fpr>  <username>
     The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made
     by a revoked key. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8
     and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long
     keyid if it is available.  This is the case with CMS and might
     eventually also beñ available for OpenPGP.
 
 *** BADSIG  <long_keyid_or_fpr>  <username>
     The signature with the keyid has not been verified okay.  The
     username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The
     fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if it is
     available.  This is the case with CMS and might eventually also be
     available for OpenPGP.
 
 *** ERRSIG  <keyid>  <pkalgo> <hashalgo> <sig_class> <time> <rc> <fpr>
     It was not possible to check the signature.  This may be caused by
     a missing public key or an unsupported algorithm.  A RC of 4
     indicates unknown algorithm, a 9 indicates a missing public
     key. The other fields give more information about this signature.
     sig_class is a 2 byte hex-value.  The fingerprint may be used
     instead of the long_keyid_or_fpr if it is available.  This is the
     case with gpgsm and might eventually also be available for
     OpenPGP.  The ERRSIG line has FPR filed which is only available
     since 2.2.7; that FPR may either be missing or - if the signature
     has no fingerprint as meta data.
 
     Note, that TIME may either be the number of seconds since Epoch or
     an ISO 8601 string.  The latter can be detected by the presence of
     the letter 'T'.
 
 *** VALIDSIG <args>
 
     The args are:
 
     - <fingerprint_in_hex>
     - <sig_creation_date>
     - <sig-timestamp>
     - <expire-timestamp>
     - <sig-version>
     - <reserved>
     - <pubkey-algo>
     - <hash-algo>
     - <sig-class>
     - [ <primary-key-fpr> ]
 
     This status indicates that the signature is cryptographically
     valid. This is similar to GOODSIG, EXPSIG, EXPKEYSIG, or REVKEYSIG
     (depending on the date and the state of the signature and signing
     key) but has the fingerprint as the argument. Multiple status
     lines (VALIDSIG and the other appropriate *SIG status) are emitted
     for a valid signature.  All arguments here are on one long line.
     sig-timestamp is the signature creation time in seconds after the
     epoch. expire-timestamp is the signature expiration time in
     seconds after the epoch (zero means "does not
     expire"). sig-version, pubkey-algo, hash-algo, and sig-class (a
     2-byte hex value) are all straight from the signature packet.
     PRIMARY-KEY-FPR is the fingerprint of the primary key or identical
     to the first argument.  This is useful to get back to the primary
     key without running gpg again for this purpose.
 
     The primary-key-fpr parameter is used for OpenPGP and not
     available for CMS signatures.  The sig-version as well as the sig
     class is not defined for CMS and currently set to 0 and 00.
 
     Note, that *-TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
     Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
     of the letter 'T'.
 
 *** SIG_ID  <radix64_string>  <sig_creation_date>  <sig-timestamp>
     This is emitted only for signatures of class 0 or 1 which have
     been verified okay.  The string is a signature id and may be used
     in applications to detect replay attacks of signed messages.  Note
     that only DLP algorithms give unique ids - others may yield
     duplicated ones when they have been created in the same second.
 
     Note, that SIG-TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
     Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
     of the letter 'T'.
 
 *** ENC_TO  <long_keyid>  <keytype>  <keylength>
     The message is encrypted to this LONG_KEYID.  KEYTYPE is the
     numerical value of the public key algorithm or 0 if it is not
     known, KEYLENGTH is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known
     (which is currently always the case).  Gpg prints this line
     always; Gpgsm only if it knows the certificate.
 
 *** BEGIN_DECRYPTION
     Mark the start of the actual decryption process.  This is also
     emitted when in --list-only mode.
 *** END_DECRYPTION
     Mark the end of the actual decryption process.  This are also
     emitted when in --list-only mode.
 *** DECRYPTION_KEY <fpr> <fpr2> <otrust>
     This line is emitted when a public key decryption succeeded in
     providing a session key.  <fpr> is the hexified fingerprint of the
     actual key used for decryption.  <fpr2> is the fingerprint of the
     primary key.  <otrust> is the letter with the ownertrust; this is
     in general a 'u' which stands for ultimately trusted.
 *** DECRYPTION_INFO <mdc_method> <sym_algo> [<aead_algo>]
     Print information about the symmetric encryption algorithm and the
     MDC method.  This will be emitted even if the decryption fails.
     For an AEAD algorithm AEAD_ALGO is not 0.  GPGSM currently does
     not print such a status.
 
 *** DECRYPTION_FAILED
     The symmetric decryption failed - one reason could be a wrong
     passphrase for a symmetrical encrypted message.
 
 *** DECRYPTION_OKAY
     The decryption process succeeded.  This means, that either the
     correct secret key has been used or the correct passphrase for a
     symmetric encrypted message was given.  The program itself may
     return an errorcode because it may not be possible to verify a
     signature for some reasons.
 
 *** SESSION_KEY <algo>:<hexdigits>
     The session key used to decrypt the message.  This message will
     only be emitted if the option --show-session-key is used.  The
     format is suitable to be passed as value for the option
     --override-session-key.  It is not an indication that the
     decryption will or has succeeded.
 
 *** BEGIN_ENCRYPTION  <mdc_method> <sym_algo> [<aead_algo>]
     Mark the start of the actual encryption process.
     MDC_METHOD shall be 0 if an AEAD_ALGO is not 0.  Users should
     however ignore MDC_METHOD if AEAD_ALGO is not 0.
 
 *** END_ENCRYPTION
     Mark the end of the actual encryption process.
 
 *** FILE_START <what> <filename>
     Start processing a file <filename>.  <what> indicates the performed
     operation:
     - 1 :: verify
     - 2 :: encrypt
     - 3 :: decrypt
 
 *** FILE_DONE
     Marks the end of a file processing which has been started
     by FILE_START.
 
 *** BEGIN_SIGNING
     Mark the start of the actual signing process. This may be used as
     an indication that all requested secret keys are ready for use.
 
 *** ALREADY_SIGNED <long-keyid>
     Warning: This is experimental and might be removed at any time.
 
 *** SIG_CREATED <type> <pk_algo> <hash_algo> <class> <timestamp> <keyfpr>
     A signature has been created using these parameters.
     Values for type <type> are:
       - D :: detached
       - C :: cleartext
       - S :: standard
     (only the first character should be checked)
 
     <class> are 2 hex digits with the OpenPGP signature class.
 
     Note, that TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since Epoch
     or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence of the
     letter 'T'.
 
 *** NOTATION_
     There are actually three related status codes to convey notation
     data:
 
     - NOTATION_NAME <name>
     - NOTATION_FLAGS <critical> <human_readable>
     - NOTATION_DATA <string>
 
     <name> and <string> are %XX escaped.  The data may be split among
     several NOTATION_DATA lines.  NOTATION_FLAGS is emitted after
     NOTATION_NAME and gives the critical and human readable flags;
     the flag values are either 0 or 1.
 
 *** POLICY_URL <string>
     Note that URL in <string> is %XX escaped.
 
 *** PLAINTEXT <format> <timestamp> <filename>
     This indicates the format of the plaintext that is about to be
     written.  The format is a 1 byte hex code that shows the format of
     the plaintext: 62 ('b') is binary data, 74 ('t') is text data with
     no character set specified, and 75 ('u') is text data encoded in
     the UTF-8 character set.  The timestamp is in seconds since the
     epoch.  If a filename is available it gets printed as the third
     argument, percent-escaped as usual.
 
 *** PLAINTEXT_LENGTH <length>
     This indicates the length of the plaintext that is about to be
     written.  Note that if the plaintext packet has partial length
     encoding it is not possible to know the length ahead of time.  In
     that case, this status tag does not appear.  The length is only
     exact for binary formats; other formats ('t', 'u') may do post
     processing like line ending conversion so that the actual number
     of bytes written may be differ.
 
 *** ATTRIBUTE <arguments>
     The list or arguments are:
     - <fpr>
     - <octets>
     - <type>
     - <index>
     - <count>
     - <timestamp>
     - <expiredate>
     - <flags>
 
     This is one long line issued for each attribute subpacket when an
     attribute packet is seen during key listing.  <fpr> is the
     fingerprint of the key.  <octets> is the length of the attribute
     subpacket.  <type> is the attribute type (e.g. 1 for an image).
     <index> and <count> indicate that this is the N-th indexed
     subpacket of count total subpackets in this attribute packet.
     <timestamp> and <expiredate> are from the self-signature on the
     attribute packet.  If the attribute packet does not have a valid
     self-signature, then the timestamp is 0.  <flags> are a bitwise OR
     of:
     - 0x01 :: this attribute packet is a primary uid
     - 0x02 :: this attribute packet is revoked
     - 0x04 :: this attribute packet is expired
 
 *** SIG_SUBPACKET <type> <flags> <len> <data>
     This indicates that a signature subpacket was seen.  The format is
     the same as the "spk" record above.
 
 *** ENCRYPTION_COMPLIANCE_MODE <flags>
     Indicates that the current encryption operation was in compliance
     with the given set of modes for all recipients.  "flags" is a
     space separated list of numerical flags, see "Field 18 -
     Compliance flags" above.
 
 *** DECRYPTION_COMPLIANCE_MODE <flags>
     Indicates that the current decryption operation is in compliance
     with the given set of modes.  "flags" is a space separated list of
     numerical flags, see "Field 18 - Compliance flags" above.
 
 *** VERIFICATION_COMPLIANCE_MODE <flags>
     Indicates that the current signature verification operation is in
     compliance with the given set of modes.  "flags" is a space
     separated list of numerical flags, see "Field 18 - Compliance
     flags" above.
 
 ** Key related
 *** INV_RECP, INV_SGNR
     The two similar status codes:
 
     - INV_RECP <reason> <requested_recipient>
     - INV_SGNR <reason> <requested_sender>
 
     are issued for each unusable recipient/sender. The reasons codes
     currently in use are:
 
        -  0 :: No specific reason given
        -  1 :: Not Found
        -  2 :: Ambiguous specification
        -  3 :: Wrong key usage
        -  4 :: Key revoked
        -  5 :: Key expired
        -  6 :: No CRL known
        -  7 :: CRL too old
        -  8 :: Policy mismatch
        -  9 :: Not a secret key
        - 10 :: Key not trusted
        - 11 :: Missing certificate
        - 12 :: Missing issuer certificate
        - 13 :: Key disabled
        - 14 :: Syntax error in specification
 
     If no specific reason was given a previously emitted status code
     KEY_CONSIDERED may be used to analyzed the problem.
 
     Note that for historical reasons the INV_RECP status is also used
     for gpgsm's SIGNER command where it relates to signer's of course.
     Newer GnuPG versions are using INV_SGNR; applications should
     ignore the INV_RECP during the sender's command processing once
     they have seen an INV_SGNR.  Different codes are used so that they
     can be distinguish while doing an encrypt+sign operation.
 
 *** NO_RECP <reserved>
     Issued if no recipients are usable.
 
 *** NO_SGNR <reserved>
     Issued if no senders are usable.
 
 *** KEY_CONSIDERED <fpr> <flags>
     Issued to explain the lookup of a key.  FPR is the hexified
     fingerprint of the primary key.  The bit values for FLAGS are:
 
     - 1 :: The key has not been selected.
     - 2 :: All subkeys of the key are expired or have been revoked.
 
 *** KEYEXPIRED <expire-timestamp>
     The key has expired.  expire-timestamp is the expiration time in
     seconds since Epoch.  This status line is not very useful because
     it will also be emitted for expired subkeys even if this subkey is
     not used.  To check whether a key used to sign a message has
     expired, the EXPKEYSIG status line is to be used.
 
     Note, that the TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
     Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
     of the letter 'T'.
 
 *** KEYREVOKED
     The used key has been revoked by its owner.  No arguments yet.
 
 *** NO_PUBKEY  <long keyid>
     The public key is not available.  Note the arg should in general
     not be used because it is better to take it from the ERRSIG
     status line which is printed right before this one.
 
 *** NO_SECKEY  <long keyid>
     The secret key is not available
 
 *** KEY_CREATED <type> <fingerprint> [<handle>]
     A key has been created.  Values for <type> are:
       - B :: primary and subkey
       - P :: primary
       - S :: subkey
     The fingerprint is one of the primary key for type B and P and the
     one of the subkey for S.  Handle is an arbitrary non-whitespace
     string used to match key parameters from batch key creation run.
 
 *** KEY_NOT_CREATED [<handle>]
     The key from batch run has not been created due to errors.
 
 *** TRUST_
     These are several similar status codes:
 
     - TRUST_UNDEFINED <error_token>
     - TRUST_NEVER     <error_token>
     - TRUST_MARGINAL  [0  [<validation_model>]]
     - TRUST_FULLY     [0  [<validation_model>]]
     - TRUST_ULTIMATE  [0  [<validation_model>]]
 
     For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted to
     indicate the validity of the key used to create the signature.
     The error token values are currently only emitted by gpgsm.
 
     VALIDATION_MODEL describes the algorithm used to check the
     validity of the key.  The defaults are the standard Web of Trust
     model for gpg and the standard X.509 model for gpgsm.  The
     defined values are
 
        - pgp   :: The standard PGP WoT.
        - shell :: The standard X.509 model.
        - chain :: The chain model.
        - steed :: The STEED model.
        - tofu  :: The TOFU model
 
     Note that the term =TRUST_= in the status names is used for
     historic reasons; we now speak of validity.
 
 *** TOFU_USER <fingerprint_in_hex> <mbox>
 
     This status identifies the key and the userid for all following
     Tofu information.  The fingerprint is the fingerprint of the
     primary key and the mbox is in general the addr-spec part of the
     userid encoded in UTF-8 and percent escaped.  The fingerprint is
     identical for all TOFU_USER lines up to a NEWSIG line.
 
 *** TOFU_STATS <MANY_ARGS>
 
     Statistics for the current user id.
 
     The <MANY_ARGS> are the usual space delimited arguments.  Here we
     have too many of them to fit on one printed line and thus they are
     given on 3 printed lines:
 
     : <summary> <sign-count> <encryption-count>
     : [<policy> [<tm1> <tm2> <tm3> <tm4>
     : [<validity> [<sign-days> <encrypt-days>]]]]
 
     Values for SUMMARY are:
     - 0 :: attention, an interaction with the user is required (conflict)
     - 1 :: key with no verification/encryption history
     - 2 :: key with little history
     - 3 :: key with enough history for basic trust
     - 4 :: key with a lot of history
 
     Values for POLICY are:
     - none    :: No Policy set
     - auto    :: Policy is "auto"
     - good    :: Policy is "good"
     - bad     :: Policy is "bad"
     - ask     :: Policy is "ask"
     - unknown :: Policy is "unknown" (TOFU information does not
                  contribute to the key's validity)
 
     TM1 is the time the first message was verified.  TM2 is the time
     the most recent message was verified.  TM3 is the time the first
     message was encrypted.  TM4 is the most recent encryption. All may
     either be seconds since Epoch or an ISO time string
     (yyyymmddThhmmss).
 
     VALIDITY is the same as SUMMARY with the exception that VALIDITY
     doesn't reflect whether the key needs attention.  That is it never
     takes on value 0.  Instead, if there is a conflict, VALIDITY still
     reflects the key's validity (values: 1-4).
 
     SUMMARY values use the euclidean distance (m = sqrt(a² + b²)) rather
     then the sum of the magnitudes (m = a + b) to ensure a balance between
     verified signatures and encrypted messages.
 
     Values are calculated based on the number of days where a key was used
     for verifying a signature or to encrypt to it.
     The ranges for the values are:
 
     - 1 :: signature_days + encryption_days == 0
     - 2 :: 1 <= sqrt(signature_days² + encryption_days²) < 8
     - 3 :: 8 <= sqrt(signature_days² + encryption_days²) < 42
     - 4 :: sqrt(signature_days² + encryption_days²) >= 42
 
     SIGN-COUNT and ENCRYPTION-COUNT are the number of messages that we
     have seen that have been signed by this key / encryption to this
     key.
 
     SIGN-DAYS and ENCRYPTION-DAYS are similar, but the number of days
     (in UTC) on which we have seen messages signed by this key /
     encrypted to this key.
 
 *** TOFU_STATS_SHORT <long_string>
 
     Information about the TOFU binding for the signature.
     Example: "15 signatures verified. 10 messages encrypted"
 
 *** TOFU_STATS_LONG <long_string>
 
     Information about the TOFU binding for the signature in verbose
     format.  The LONG_STRING is percent escaped.
     Example: 'Verified 9 messages signed by "Werner Koch
     (dist sig)" in the past 3 minutes, 40 seconds.  The most
     recent message was verified 4 seconds ago.'
 
 *** PKA_TRUST_
     This is one of:
 
     - PKA_TRUST_GOOD <addr-spec>
     - PKA_TRUST_BAD  <addr-spec>
 
     Depending on the outcome of the PKA check one of the above status
     codes is emitted in addition to a =TRUST_*= status.
 
 ** Remote control
 *** GET_BOOL, GET_LINE, GET_HIDDEN, GOT_IT
 
     These status line are used with --command-fd for interactive
     control of the process.
 
 *** USERID_HINT <long main keyid> <string>
     Give a hint about the user ID for a certain keyID.
 
 *** NEED_PASSPHRASE <long keyid> <long main keyid> <keytype> <keylength>
     Issued whenever a passphrase is needed.  KEYTYPE is the numerical
     value of the public key algorithm or 0 if this is not applicable,
     KEYLENGTH is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known (this
     is currently always the case).
 
 *** NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM <cipher_algo> <s2k_mode> <s2k_hash>
     Issued whenever a passphrase for symmetric encryption is needed.
 
 *** NEED_PASSPHRASE_PIN <card_type> <chvno> [<serialno>]
     Issued whenever a PIN is requested to unlock a card.
 
 *** MISSING_PASSPHRASE
     No passphrase was supplied.  An application which encounters this
     message may want to stop parsing immediately because the next
     message will probably be a BAD_PASSPHRASE.  However, if the
     application is a wrapper around the key edit menu functionality it
     might not make sense to stop parsing but simply ignoring the
     following BAD_PASSPHRASE.
 
 *** BAD_PASSPHRASE <long keyid>
     The supplied passphrase was wrong or not given.  In the latter
     case you may have seen a MISSING_PASSPHRASE.
 
 *** GOOD_PASSPHRASE
     The supplied passphrase was good and the secret key material
     is therefore usable.
 
 ** Import/Export
 *** IMPORT_CHECK <long keyid> <fingerprint> <user ID>
     This status is emitted in interactive mode right before
     the "import.okay" prompt.
 
 *** IMPORTED   <long keyid>  <username>
     The keyid and name of the signature just imported
 
 *** IMPORT_OK  <reason> [<fingerprint>]
     The key with the primary key's FINGERPRINT has been imported.
     REASON flags are:
 
     - 0 :: Not actually changed
     - 1 :: Entirely new key.
     - 2 :: New user IDs
     - 4 :: New signatures
     - 8 :: New subkeys
     - 16 :: Contains private key.
 
     The flags may be ORed.
 
 *** IMPORT_PROBLEM <reason> [<fingerprint>]
     Issued for each import failure.  Reason codes are:
 
     - 0 :: No specific reason given.
     - 1 :: Invalid Certificate.
     - 2 :: Issuer Certificate missing.
     - 3 :: Certificate Chain too long.
     - 4 :: Error storing certificate.
 
 *** IMPORT_RES <args>
     Final statistics on import process (this is one long line). The
     args are a list of unsigned numbers separated by white space:
 
     - <count>
     - <no_user_id>
     - <imported>
     - always 0 (formerly used for the number of RSA keys)
     - <unchanged>
     - <n_uids>
     - <n_subk>
     - <n_sigs>
     - <n_revoc>
     - <sec_read>
     - <sec_imported>
     - <sec_dups>
     - <skipped_new_keys>
     - <not_imported>
     - <skipped_v3_keys>
 
 *** EXPORTED  <fingerprint>
     The key with <fingerprint> has been exported.  The fingerprint is
     the fingerprint of the primary key even if the primary key has
     been replaced by a stub key during secret key export.
 
 *** EXPORT_RES <args>
 
     Final statistics on export process (this is one long line). The
     args are a list of unsigned numbers separated by white space:
 
     - <count>
     - <secret_count>
     - <exported>
 
 
 ** Smartcard related
 *** CARDCTRL <what> [<serialno>]
     This is used to control smartcard operations.  Defined values for
     WHAT are:
 
       - 1 :: Request insertion of a card.  Serialnumber may be given
              to request a specific card.  Used by gpg 1.4 w/o
              scdaemon
       - 2 :: Request removal of a card.  Used by gpg 1.4 w/o scdaemon.
       - 3 :: Card with serialnumber detected
       - 4 :: No card available
       - 5 :: No card reader available
       - 6 :: No card support available
       - 7 :: Card is in termination state
 
 *** SC_OP_FAILURE [<code>]
     An operation on a smartcard definitely failed.  Currently there is
     no indication of the actual error code, but application should be
     prepared to later accept more arguments.  Defined values for
     <code> are:
 
       - 0 :: unspecified error (identically to a missing CODE)
       - 1 :: canceled
       - 2 :: bad PIN
 
 *** SC_OP_SUCCESS
     A smart card operation succeeded.  This status is only printed for
     certain operation and is mostly useful to check whether a PIN
     change really worked.
 
 ** Miscellaneous status codes
 *** NODATA  <what>
     No data has been found.  Codes for WHAT are:
 
     - 1 :: No armored data.
     - 2 :: Expected a packet but did not found one.
     - 3 :: Invalid packet found, this may indicate a non OpenPGP
            message.
     - 4 :: Signature expected but not found
 
     You may see more than one of these status lines.
 
 *** UNEXPECTED <what>
     Unexpected data has been encountered.  Codes for WHAT are:
     - 0 :: Not further specified
     - 1 :: Corrupted message structure
 
 *** TRUNCATED <maxno>
     The output was truncated to MAXNO items.  This status code is
     issued for certain external requests.
 
 *** ERROR <error location> <error code> [<more>]
     This is a generic error status message, it might be followed by
     error location specific data. <error code> and <error_location>
     should not contain spaces.  The error code is a either a string
     commencing with a letter or such a string prefixed with a
     numerical error code and an underscore; e.g.: "151011327_EOF".
 *** WARNING <location> <error code> [<text>]
     This is a generic warning status message, it might be followed by
     error location specific data. <location> and <error code> may not
     contain spaces.  The <location> may be used to indicate a class of
     warnings.  The error code is a either a string commencing with a
     letter or such a string prefixed with a numerical error code and
     an underscore; e.g.: "151011327_EOF".
 *** NOTE <location> <error code> [<text>]
     This is a generic info status message the same syntax as for
     WARNING messages is used.
 *** SUCCESS [<location>]
     Positive confirmation that an operation succeeded.  It is used
     similar to ISO-C's EXIT_SUCCESS.  <location> is optional but if
     given should not contain spaces.  Used only with a few commands.
 
 *** FAILURE <location> <error_code>
     This is the counterpart to SUCCESS and used to indicate a program
     failure.  It is used similar to ISO-C's EXIT_FAILURE but allows
     conveying more information, in particular a gpg-error error code.
     That numerical error code may optionally have a suffix made of an
     underscore and a string with an error symbol like "151011327_EOF".
     A dash may be used instead of <location>.
 
 *** BADARMOR
     The ASCII armor is corrupted.  No arguments yet.
 
 *** DELETE_PROBLEM <reason_code>
     Deleting a key failed.  Reason codes are:
     - 1 :: No such key
     - 2 :: Must delete secret key first
     - 3 :: Ambiguous specification
     - 4 :: Key is stored on a smartcard.
 
 *** PROGRESS <what> <char> <cur> <total> [<units>]
     Used by the primegen and public key functions to indicate
     progress.  <char> is the character displayed with no --status-fd
     enabled, with the linefeed replaced by an 'X'.  <cur> is the
     current amount done and <total> is amount to be done; a <total> of
     0 indicates that the total amount is not known. Both are
     non-negative integers.  The condition
       :       TOTAL && CUR == TOTAL
     may be used to detect the end of an operation.
 
     Well known values for <what> are:
 
            - pk_dsa   :: DSA key generation
            - pk_elg   :: Elgamal key generation
            - primegen :: Prime generation
            - need_entropy :: Waiting for new entropy in the RNG
            - tick :: Generic tick without any special meaning - useful
                      for letting clients know that the server is still
                      working.
            - starting_agent :: A gpg-agent was started because it is not
                                 running as a daemon.
            - learncard :: Send by the agent and gpgsm while learing
                           the data of a smartcard.
            - card_busy :: A smartcard is still working
 
     When <what> refers to a file path, it may be truncated.
 
     <units> is sometimes used to describe the units for <current> and
     <total>.  For example "B", "KiB", or "MiB".
 
 *** BACKUP_KEY_CREATED <fingerprint> <fname>
     A backup of a key identified by <fingerprint> has been writte to
     the file <fname>; <fname> is percent-escaped.
 
 *** MOUNTPOINT <name>
     <name> is a percent-plus escaped filename describing the
     mountpoint for the current operation (e.g. used by "g13 --mount").
     This may either be the specified mountpoint or one randomly
     chosen by g13.
 
 *** PINENTRY_LAUNCHED <pid>[:<extra>]
     This status line is emitted by gpg to notify a client that a
     Pinentry has been launched.  <pid> is the PID of the Pinentry.  It
     may be used to display a hint to the user but can't be used to
     synchronize with Pinentry.  Note that there is also an Assuan
     inquiry line with the same name used internally or, if enabled,
     send to the client instead of this status line.  Such an inquiry
     may be used to sync with Pinentry
 
 ** Obsolete status codes
 *** SIGEXPIRED
     Removed on 2011-02-04.  This is deprecated in favor of KEYEXPIRED.
 *** RSA_OR_IDEA
     Obsolete.  This status message used to be emitted for requests to
     use the IDEA or RSA algorithms.  It has been dropped from GnuPG
     2.1 after the respective patents expired.
 *** SHM_INFO, SHM_GET, SHM_GET_BOOL, SHM_GET_HIDDEN
     These were used for the ancient shared memory based co-processing.
 *** BEGIN_STREAM, END_STREAM
     Used to issued by the experimental pipemode.
 
 ** Inter-component codes
    Status codes are also used between the components of the GnuPG
    system via the Assuan S lines.  Some of them are documented here:
 
 *** PUBKEY_INFO <n> <ubid>
     The type of the public key in the following D-lines or
     communicated via a pipe.  <n> is the value of =enum pubkey_types=
     and <ubid> the Unique Blob ID (UBID) which is the fingerprint of
     the primary key truncated to 20 octets and formatted in hex.  Note
     that the keyboxd SEARCH command can be used to lookup the public
     key using the <ubid> prefixed with a caret (^).
 
 *** KEYPAIRINFO <grip> <keyref> [<usage>] [<keytime>]
 
     This status is emitted by scdaemon and gpg-agent to convey brief
     information about keypairs stored on tokens.  <grip> is the
     hexified keygrip of the key or, if no key is stored, an "X".
     <keyref> is the ID of a card's key; for example "OPENPGP.2" for
     the second key slot of an OpenPGP card.  <usage> is optional and
     returns technically possible key usages, this is a string of
     single letters describing the usage ('c' for certify, 'e' for
     encryption, 's' for signing, 'a' for authentication). A '-' can be
     used to tell that usage flags are not conveyed.  <keytime> is used
     by OpenPGP cards for the stored key creation time.  A '-' means no
     info available.  The format is the usual ISO string are a number
     with the seconds since Epoch.
 *** MANUFACTURER <n> [<string>]
 
     This status returns the Manufactorer ID as the unsigned number N.
     For OpenPGP this is weel defined; for other cards this is 0.  The
     name of the manufacturer is also given as <string>; spaces are not
     escaped.  For PKCS#15 cards <string> is TokenInfo.manufactorerID.
 
 * Format of the --attribute-fd output
 
   When --attribute-fd is set, during key listings (--list-keys,
   --list-secret-keys) GnuPG dumps each attribute packet to the file
   descriptor specified.  --attribute-fd is intended for use with
   --status-fd as part of the required information is carried on the
   ATTRIBUTE status tag (see above).
 
   The contents of the attribute data is specified by RFC 4880.  For
   convenience, here is the Photo ID format, as it is currently the
   only attribute defined:
 
   - Byte 0-1 :: The length of the image header.  Due to a historical
                 accident (i.e. oops!) back in the NAI PGP days, this
                 is a little-endian number.  Currently 16 (0x10 0x00).
 
   - Byte 2 :: The image header version.  Currently 0x01.
 
   - Byte 3 :: Encoding format.  0x01 == JPEG.
 
   - Byte 4-15 :: Reserved, and currently unused.
 
   All other data after this header is raw image (JPEG) data.
 
 
 * Layout of the TrustDB
 
   The TrustDB is built from fixed length records, where the first byte
   describes the record type.  All numeric values are stored in network
   byte order.  The length of each record is 40 bytes.  The first
   record of the DB is always of type 1 and this is the only record of
   this type.
 
   The record types: directory(2), key(3), uid(4), pref(5), sigrec(6),
   and shadow directory(8) are not anymore used by version 2 of the
   TrustDB.
 
 ** Record type 0
 
    Unused record or deleted, can be reused for any purpose.  Such
    records should in general not exist because deleted records are of
    type 254 and kept in a linked list.
 
 ** Version info (RECTYPE_VER, 1)
 
    Version information for this TrustDB.  This is always the first
    record of the DB and the only one of this type.
 
    - 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 1).
    - 3 byte :: Magic value ("gpg")
    - 1 u8 :: TrustDB version (value: 2).
    - 1 u8 :: =marginals=. How many marginal trusted keys are required.
    - 1 u8 :: =completes=. How many completely trusted keys are
              required.
    - 1 u8 :: =max_cert_depth=.  How deep is the WoT evaluated.  Along
              with =marginals= and =completes=, this value is used to
              check whether the cached validity value from a [FIXME
              dir] record can be used.
    - 1 u8 :: =trust_model=
    - 1 u8 :: =min_cert_level=
    - 2 byte :: Not used
    - 1 u32 :: =created=. Timestamp of trustdb creation.
    - 1 u32 :: =nextcheck=. Timestamp of last modification which may
               affect the validity of keys in the trustdb.  This value
               is checked against the validity timestamp in the dir
               records.
    - 1 u32 :: =reserved=.  Not used.
    - 1 u32 :: =reserved2=. Not used.
    - 1 u32 :: =firstfree=. Number of the record with the head record
               of the RECTYPE_FREE linked list.
    - 1 u32 :: =reserved3=. Not used.
    - 1 u32 :: =trusthashtbl=. Record number of the trusthashtable.
 
 
 ** Hash table (RECTYPE_HTBL, 10)
 
    Due to the fact that we use fingerprints to lookup keys, we can
    implement quick access by some simple hash methods, and avoid the
    overhead of gdbm.  A property of fingerprints is that they can be
    used directly as hash values.  What we use is a dynamic multilevel
    architecture, which combines hash tables, record lists, and linked
    lists.
 
    This record is a hash table of 256 entries with the property that
    all these records are stored consecutively to make one big
    table. The hash value is simple the 1st, 2nd, ... byte of the
    fingerprint (depending on the indirection level).
 
    - 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 10).
    - 1 u8 :: Reserved
    - n u32 :: =recnum=.  A table with the hash table items fitting into
               this record.  =n= depends on the record length:
               $n=(reclen-2)/4$ which yields 9 for oure current record
               length of 40 bytes.
 
    The total number of hash table records to form the table is:
    $m=(256+n-1)/n$.  This is 29 for our record length of 40.
 
    To look up a key we use the first byte of the fingerprint to get
    the recnum from this hash table and then look up the addressed
    record:
 
    - If that record is another hash table, we use 2nd byte to index
      that hash table and so on;
    - if that record is a hash list, we walk all entries until we find
      a matching one; or
    - if that record is a key record, we compare the fingerprint to
      decide whether it is the requested key;
 
 
 ** Hash list (RECTYPE_HLST, 11)
 
    See hash table above on how it is used.  It may also be used for
    other purposes.
 
    - 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 11).
    - 1 u8 :: Reserved.
    - 1 u32 :: =next=.  Record number of the next hash list record or 0
               if none.
    - n u32 :: =rnum=.  Array with record numbers to values.  With
               $n=(reclen-5)/5$ and our record length of 40, n is 7.
 
 ** Trust record (RECTYPE_TRUST, 12)
 
    - 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 12).
    - 1 u8 :: Reserved.
    - 20 byte :: =fingerprint=.
    - 1 u8 :: =ownertrust=.
    - 1 u8 :: =depth=.
    - 1 u8 :: =min_ownertrust=.
    - 1 byte :: Not used.
    - 1 u32 :: =validlist=.
    - 10 byte :: Not used.
 
 ** Validity record (RECTYPE_VALID, 13)
 
    - 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 13).
    - 1 u8 :: Reserved.
    - 20 byte :: =namehash=.
    - 1 u8 :: =validity=
    - 1 u32 :: =next=.
    - 1 u8 :: =full_count=.
    - 1 u8 :: =marginal_count=.
    - 11 byte :: Not used.
 
 ** Free record (RECTYPE_FREE, 254)
 
    All these records form a linked list of unused records in the TrustDB.
 
    - 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 254)
    - 1 u8 :: Reserved.
    - 1 u32 :: =next=.  Record number of the next rcord of this type.
               The record number to the head of this linked list is
               stored in the version info record.
 
 
 * Database scheme for the TOFU info
 
 #+begin_src sql
 --
 -- The VERSION table holds the version of our TOFU data structures.
 --
 CREATE TABLE version (
   version integer -- As of now this is always 1
 );
 
 --
 -- The BINDINGS table associates mail addresses with keys.
 --
 CREATE TABLE bindings (
   oid integer primary key autoincrement,
   fingerprint text, -- The key's fingerprint in hex
   email text,       -- The normalized mail address destilled from user_id
   user_id text,     -- The unmodified user id
   time integer,     -- The time this binding was first observed.
   policy boolean check
        (policy in (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)), -- The trust policy with the values:
                                     --   1 := Auto
                                     --   2 := Good
                                     --   3 := Unknown
                                     --   4 := Bad
                                     --   5 := Ask
   conflict string,  -- NULL or a hex formatted fingerprint.
   unique (fingerprint, email)
 );
 
 CREATE INDEX bindings_fingerprint_email on bindings (fingerprint, email);
 CREATE INDEX bindings_email on bindings (email);
 
 --
 -- The SIGNATURES table records all data signatures we verified
 --
 CREATE TABLE signatures (
   binding integer not null, -- Link to bindings table,
                             -- references bindings.oid.
   sig_digest text,          -- The digest of the signed message.
   origin text,              -- String describing who initially fed
                             -- the signature to gpg (e.g. "email:claws").
   sig_time integer,         -- Timestamp from the signature.
   time integer,             -- Time this record was created.
   primary key (binding, sig_digest, origin)
 );
 #+end_src
 
 
 * GNU extensions to the S2K algorithm
 
   1 octet  - S2K Usage: either 254 or 255.
   1 octet  - S2K Cipher Algo: 0
   1 octet  - S2K Specifier: 101
   3 octets - "GNU"
   1 octet  - GNU S2K Extension Number.
 
   If such a GNU extension is used neither an IV nor any kind of
   checksum is used.  The defined GNU S2K Extension Numbers are:
 
   - 1 :: Do not store the secret part at all.  No specific data
          follows.
 
   - 2 :: A stub to access smartcards.  This data follows:
          - One octet with the length of the following serial number.
          - The serial number. Regardless of what the length octet
            indicates no more than 16 octets are stored.
 
   Note that gpg stores the GNU S2K Extension Number internally as an
   S2K Specifier with an offset of 1000.
 
 
 * Format of the OpenPGP TRUST packet
 
   According to RFC4880 (5.10), the trust packet (aka ring trust) is
   only used within keyrings and contains data that records the user's
   specifications of which key holds trusted introducers.  The RFC also
   states that the format of this packet is implementation defined and
   SHOULD NOT be emitted to output streams or should be ignored on
   import.  GnuPG uses this packet in several additional ways:
 
   - 1 octet :: Trust-Value (only used by Subtype SIG)
   - 1 octet :: Signature-Cache (only used by Subtype SIG; value must
                be less than 128)
   - 3 octets :: Fixed value: "gpg"
   - 1 octet  :: Subtype
                - 0 :: Signature cache (SIG)
                - 1 :: Key source on the primary key (KEY)
                - 2 :: Key source on a user id (UID)
   - 1 octet :: Key Source; i.e. the origin of the key:
                - 0 :: Unknown source.
                - 1 :: Public keyserver.
                - 2 :: Preferred keyserver.
                - 3 :: OpenPGP DANE.
                - 4 :: Web Key Directory.
                - 5 :: Import from a trusted URL.
                - 6 :: Import from a trusted file.
                - 7 :: Self generated.
   - 4 octets :: Time of last update.  This is a a four-octet scalar
                 with the seconds since Epoch.
   - 1 octet  :: Scalar with the length of the following field.
   - N octets :: String with the URL of the source.  This may be a
                 zero-length string.
 
   If the packets contains only two octets a Subtype of 0 is assumed;
   this is the only format recognized by GnuPG versions < 2.1.18.
   Trust-Value and Signature-Cache must be zero for all subtypes other
   than SIG.
 
 
 * Keyserver helper message format
 
   *This information is obsolete*
   (Keyserver helpers have been replaced by dirmngr)
 
   The keyserver may be contacted by a Unix Domain socket or via TCP.
 
   The format of a request is:
 #+begin_example
   command-tag
   "Content-length:" digits
   CRLF
 #+end_example
 
   Where command-tag is
 
 #+begin_example
   NOOP
   GET <user-name>
   PUT
   DELETE <user-name>
 #+end_example
 
 The format of a response is:
 
 #+begin_example
   "GNUPG/1.0" status-code status-text
   "Content-length:" digits
   CRLF
 #+end_example
 followed by <digits> bytes of data
 
 Status codes are:
 
   - 1xx :: Informational - Request received, continuing process
 
   - 2xx :: Success - The action was successfully received, understood,
            and accepted
 
   - 4xx :: Client Error - The request contains bad syntax or cannot be
            fulfilled
 
   - 5xx :: Server Error - The server failed to fulfill an apparently
            valid request
 
 
 * Object identifiers
 
   OIDs below the GnuPG arc:
 
 #+begin_example
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2          GnuPG
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1          notation
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1.1          pkaAddress
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2          X.509 extensions
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.1          standaloneCertificate
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.2          wellKnownPrivateKey
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.12242973   invalid encoded OID
 #+end_example
 
 
 
 * Debug flags
 
 This tables gives the flag values for the --debug option along with
 the alternative names used by the components.
 
 |       | gpg     | gpgsm   | agent   | scd     | dirmngr | g13     | wks     |
 |-------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------|
 |     1 | packet  | x509    |         |         | x509    | mount   | mime    |
 |     2 | mpi     | mpi     | mpi     | mpi     |         |         | parser  |
 |     4 | crypto  | crypto  | crypto  | crypto  | crypto  | crypto  | crypto  |
 |     8 | filter  |         |         |         |         |         |         |
 |    16 | iobuf   |         |         |         | dns     |         |         |
 |    32 | memory  | memory  | memory  | memory  | memory  | memory  | memory  |
 |    64 | cache   | cache   | cache   | cache   | cache   |         |         |
 |   128 | memstat | memstat | memstat | memstat | memstat | memstat | memstat |
 |   256 | trust   |         |         |         |         |         |         |
 |   512 | hashing | hashing | hashing | hashing | hashing |         |         |
 |  1024 | ipc     | ipc     | ipc     | ipc     | ipc     | ipc     | ipc     |
 |  2048 |         |         |         | cardio  | network |         |         |
 |  4096 | clock   |         |         | reader  |         |         |         |
 |  8192 | lookup  |         |         |         | lookup  |         |         |
 | 16384 | extprog |         |         |         |         |         | extprog |
 
 Description of some debug flags:
 
   - cardio :: Used by scdaemon to trace the APDUs exchange with the
               card.
   - clock  :: Show execution times of certain functions.
   - crypto :: Trace crypto operations.
   - hashing :: Create files with the hashed data.
   - ipc :: Trace the Assuan commands.
   - mpi :: Show the values of the MPIs.
   - reader :: Used by scdaemon to trace card reader related code.  For
               example: Open and close reader.
 
 
 
 * Miscellaneous notes
 
 ** v3 fingerprints
    For packet version 3 we calculate the keyids this way:
     - RSA :: Low 64 bits of n
     - ELGAMAL :: Build a v3 pubkey packet (with CTB 0x99) and
                  calculate a RMD160 hash value from it. This is used
                  as the fingerprint and the low 64 bits are the keyid.
 
 ** Simplified revocation certificates
   Revocation certificates consist only of the signature packet;
   "--import" knows how to handle this.  The rationale behind it is to
   keep them small.
 
 ** Documentation on HKP (the http keyserver protocol):
 
    A minimalistic HTTP server on port 11371 recognizes a GET for
    /pks/lookup.  The standard http URL encoded query parameters are
    this (always key=value):
 
    - op=index (like pgp -kv), op=vindex (like pgp -kvv) and op=get (like
      pgp -kxa)
 
    - search=<stringlist>. This is a list of words that must occur in the key.
      The words are delimited with space, points, @ and so on. The delimiters
      are not searched for and the order of the words doesn't matter (but see
      next option).
 
    - exact=on. This switch tells the hkp server to only report exact matching
      keys back. In this case the order and the "delimiters" are important.
 
    - fingerprint=on. Also reports the fingerprints when used with 'index' or
      'vindex'
 
    The keyserver also recognizes http-POSTs to /pks/add. Use this to upload
    keys.
 
 
    A better way to do this would be a request like:
 
       /pks/lookup/<gnupg_formatierte_user_id>?op=<operation>
 
    This can be implemented using Hurd's translator mechanism.
    However, I think the whole keyserver stuff has to be re-thought;
    I have some ideas and probably create a white paper.
 ** Algorithm names for the "keygen.algo" prompt
 
   When using a --command-fd controlled key generation or "addkey"
   there is way to know the number to enter on the "keygen.algo"
   prompt.  The displayed numbers are for human reception and may
   change with releases.  To provide a stable way to enter a desired
   algorithm choice the prompt also accepts predefined names for the
   algorithms, which will not change.
 
    | Name    | No | Description                     |
    |---------+----+---------------------------------|
    | rsa+rsa |  1 | RSA and RSA (default)           |
    | dsa+elg |  2 | DSA and Elgamal                 |
    | dsa     |  3 | DSA (sign only)                 |
    | rsa/s   |  4 | RSA (sign only)                 |
    | elg     |  5 | Elgamal (encrypt only)          |
    | rsa/e   |  6 | RSA (encrypt only)              |
    | dsa/*   |  7 | DSA (set your own capabilities) |
    | rsa/*   |  8 | RSA (set your own capabilities) |
    | ecc+ecc |  9 | ECC and ECC                     |
    | ecc/s   | 10 | ECC (sign only)                 |
    | ecc/*   | 11 | ECC (set your own capabilities) |
    | ecc/e   | 12 | ECC (encrypt only)              |
    | keygrip | 13 | Existing key                    |
    | cardkey | 14 | Existing key from card          |
 
    If one of the "foo/*" names are used a "keygen.flags" prompt needs
    to be answered as well.  Instead of toggling the predefined flags,
    it is also possible to set them direct: Use a "=" character
    directly followed by a combination of "a" (for authentication), "s"
    (for signing), or "c" (for certification).
diff --git a/sm/fingerprint.c b/sm/fingerprint.c
index ca44e1bc4..c3c37c2d6 100644
--- a/sm/fingerprint.c
+++ b/sm/fingerprint.c
@@ -1,409 +1,475 @@
 /* fingerprint.c - Get the fingerprint
  *	Copyright (C) 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
  * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
  * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
  * (at your option) any later version.
  *
  * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
  * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
  * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
  * GNU General Public License for more details.
  *
  * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
  * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  */
 
 #include <config.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <time.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 
 
 #include "gpgsm.h"
 #include <gcrypt.h>
 #include <ksba.h>
 
 #include "../common/host2net.h"
 
 
 /* Return the fingerprint of the certificate (we can't put this into
    libksba because we need libgcrypt support).  The caller must
    provide an array of sufficient length or NULL so that the function
    allocates the array.  If r_len is not NULL, the length of the
    digest is returned; well, this can also be done by using
    gcry_md_get_algo_dlen().  If algo is 0, a SHA-1 will be used.
 
    If there is a problem , the function does never return NULL but a
    digest of all 0xff.
  */
 unsigned char *
 gpgsm_get_fingerprint (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo,
                        unsigned char *array, int *r_len)
 {
   gcry_md_hd_t md;
   int rc, len;
 
   if (!algo)
     algo = GCRY_MD_SHA1;
 
   len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
   assert (len);
   if (!array)
     array = xmalloc (len);
 
   if (r_len)
     *r_len = len;
 
   /* Fist check whether we have cached the fingerprint.  */
   if (algo == GCRY_MD_SHA1)
     {
       size_t buflen;
 
       assert (len >= 20);
       if (!ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "sha1-fingerprint",
                                     array, len, &buflen)
           && buflen == 20)
         return array;
     }
 
   /* No, need to compute it.  */
   rc = gcry_md_open (&md, algo, 0);
   if (rc)
     {
       log_error ("md_open failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
       memset (array, 0xff, len); /* better return an invalid fpr than NULL */
       return array;
     }
 
   rc = ksba_cert_hash (cert, 0, HASH_FNC, md);
   if (rc)
     {
       log_error ("ksba_cert_hash failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
       gcry_md_close (md);
       memset (array, 0xff, len); /* better return an invalid fpr than NULL */
       return array;
     }
   gcry_md_final (md);
   memcpy (array, gcry_md_read(md, algo), len );
   gcry_md_close (md);
 
   /* Cache an SHA-1 fingerprint.  */
   if ( algo == GCRY_MD_SHA1 )
     ksba_cert_set_user_data (cert, "sha1-fingerprint", array, 20);
 
   return array;
 }
 
 
 /* Return an allocated buffer with the formatted fingerprint */
 char *
 gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo)
 {
   unsigned char digest[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
   char *buf;
   int len;
 
   if (!algo)
     algo = GCRY_MD_SHA1;
 
   len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
   assert (len <= MAX_DIGEST_LEN );
   gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, algo, digest, NULL);
   buf = xmalloc (len*3+1);
   bin2hexcolon (digest, len, buf);
   return buf;
 }
 
 /* Return an allocated buffer with the formatted fingerprint as one
    large hexnumber */
 char *
 gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo)
 {
   unsigned char digest[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
   char *buf;
   int len;
 
   if (!algo)
     algo = GCRY_MD_SHA1;
 
   len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
   assert (len <= MAX_DIGEST_LEN );
   gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, algo, digest, NULL);
   buf = xmalloc (len*2+1);
   bin2hex (digest, len, buf);
   return buf;
 }
 
 /* Return a certificate ID.  These are the last 4 bytes of the SHA-1
    fingerprint.  If R_HIGH is not NULL the next 4 bytes are stored
    there. */
 unsigned long
 gpgsm_get_short_fingerprint (ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned long *r_high)
 {
   unsigned char digest[20];
 
   gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1, digest, NULL);
   if (r_high)
     *r_high = buf32_to_ulong (digest+12);
   return buf32_to_ulong (digest + 16);
 }
 
 
 /* Return the so called KEYGRIP which is the SHA-1 hash of the public
    key parameters expressed as an canonical encoded S-Exp.  ARRAY must
    be 20 bytes long.  Returns ARRAY or a newly allocated buffer if ARRAY was
    given as NULL.  May return NULL on error.  */
 unsigned char *
 gpgsm_get_keygrip (ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned char *array)
 {
   gcry_sexp_t s_pkey;
   int rc;
   ksba_sexp_t p;
   size_t n;
 
   p = ksba_cert_get_public_key (cert);
   if (!p)
     return NULL; /* oops */
 
   if (DBG_X509)
     log_debug ("get_keygrip for public key\n");
   n = gcry_sexp_canon_len (p, 0, NULL, NULL);
   if (!n)
     {
       log_error ("libksba did not return a proper S-Exp\n");
       return NULL;
     }
   rc = gcry_sexp_sscan ( &s_pkey, NULL, (char*)p, n);
   xfree (p);
   if (rc)
     {
       log_error ("gcry_sexp_scan failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
       return NULL;
     }
   array = gcry_pk_get_keygrip (s_pkey, array);
   gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey);
   if (!array)
     {
       log_error ("can't calculate keygrip\n");
       return NULL;
     }
   if (DBG_X509)
     log_printhex (array, 20, "keygrip:");
 
   return array;
 }
 
 /* Return an allocated buffer with the keygrip of CERT encoded as a
    hexstring.  NULL is returned in case of error.  */
 char *
 gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (ksba_cert_t cert)
 {
   unsigned char grip[20];
   char *buf;
 
   if (!gpgsm_get_keygrip (cert, grip))
     return NULL;
   buf = xtrymalloc (20*2+1);
   if (buf)
     bin2hex (grip, 20, buf);
   return buf;
 }
 
 
 /* Return the PK algorithm used by CERT as well as the length in bits
-   of the public key at NBITS. */
+ * of the public key at NBITS.  If R_CURVE is not NULL and an ECC
+ * algorithm is used the name or OID of the curve is stored there; the
+ * caller needs to free this value.  */
 int
-gpgsm_get_key_algo_info (ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned int *nbits)
+gpgsm_get_key_algo_info2 (ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned int *nbits, char **r_curve)
 {
   gcry_sexp_t s_pkey;
   int rc;
   ksba_sexp_t p;
   size_t n;
   gcry_sexp_t l1, l2;
+  const char *curve;
   const char *name;
   char namebuf[128];
 
   if (nbits)
     *nbits = 0;
+  if (r_curve)
+    *r_curve = NULL;
 
   p = ksba_cert_get_public_key (cert);
   if (!p)
     return 0;
   n = gcry_sexp_canon_len (p, 0, NULL, NULL);
   if (!n)
     {
       xfree (p);
       return 0;
     }
   rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_pkey, NULL, (char *)p, n);
   xfree (p);
   if (rc)
     return 0;
 
   if (nbits)
     *nbits = gcry_pk_get_nbits (s_pkey);
 
   /* Breaking the algorithm out of the S-exp is a bit of a challenge ... */
   l1 = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_pkey, "public-key", 0);
   if (!l1)
     {
       gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey);
       return 0;
     }
+
+  if (r_curve)
+    {
+      curve = gcry_pk_get_curve (l1, 0, NULL);
+      if (curve)
+        {
+          name = openpgp_oid_to_curve (openpgp_curve_to_oid (curve,
+                                                             NULL, NULL), 0);
+          *r_curve = xtrystrdup (name? name : curve);
+          if (!*r_curve)
+            {
+              gcry_sexp_release (l1);
+              gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey);
+              return 0;  /* Out of core.  */
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
   l2 = gcry_sexp_cadr (l1);
   gcry_sexp_release (l1);
   l1 = l2;
   name = gcry_sexp_nth_data (l1, 0, &n);
   if (name)
     {
       if (n > sizeof namebuf -1)
         n = sizeof namebuf -1;
       memcpy (namebuf, name, n);
       namebuf[n] = 0;
     }
   else
     *namebuf = 0;
   gcry_sexp_release (l1);
   gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey);
   return gcry_pk_map_name (namebuf);
 }
 
 
+int
+gpgsm_get_key_algo_info (ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned int *nbits)
+{
+  return gpgsm_get_key_algo_info2 (cert, nbits, NULL);
+}
+
+
+/* This is a wrapper around pubkey_algo_string which takesa KSA
+ * certitificate instead of a Gcrypt public key.  Note that this
+ * function may return NULL on error.  */
+char *
+gpgsm_pubkey_algo_string (ksba_cert_t cert, int *r_algoid)
+{
+  gpg_error_t err;
+  gcry_sexp_t s_pkey;
+  ksba_sexp_t p;
+  size_t n;
+  enum gcry_pk_algos algoid;
+  char *algostr;
+
+  p = ksba_cert_get_public_key (cert);
+  if (!p)
+    return NULL;
+  n = gcry_sexp_canon_len (p, 0, NULL, NULL);
+  if (!n)
+    {
+      xfree (p);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_pkey, NULL, (char *)p, n);
+  xfree (p);
+  if (err)
+    return NULL;
+
+  algostr = pubkey_algo_string (s_pkey, r_algoid? &algoid : NULL);
+  if (algostr && r_algoid)
+    *r_algoid = algoid;
+
+  gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey);
+  return algostr;
+}
+
+
 /* If KEY is an RSA key, return its modulus.  For non-RSA keys or on
  * error return NULL.  */
 gcry_mpi_t
 gpgsm_get_rsa_modulus (ksba_cert_t cert)
 {
   gpg_error_t err;
   gcry_sexp_t key;
   gcry_sexp_t list = NULL;
   gcry_sexp_t l2 = NULL;
   char *name = NULL;
   gcry_mpi_t modulus = NULL;
 
   {
     ksba_sexp_t ckey;
     size_t n;
 
     ckey = ksba_cert_get_public_key (cert);
     if (!ckey)
       return NULL;
     n = gcry_sexp_canon_len (ckey, 0, NULL, NULL);
     if (!n)
       {
         xfree (ckey);
         return NULL;
       }
     err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&key, NULL, (char *)ckey, n);
     xfree (ckey);
     if (err)
       return NULL;
   }
 
   list = gcry_sexp_find_token (key, "public-key", 0);
   if (!list)
     list = gcry_sexp_find_token (key, "private-key", 0);
   if (!list)
     list = gcry_sexp_find_token (key, "protected-private-key", 0);
   if (!list)
     list = gcry_sexp_find_token (key, "shadowed-private-key", 0);
 
   gcry_sexp_release (key);
   if (!list)
     return NULL;  /* No suitable key.  */
 
   l2 = gcry_sexp_cadr (list);
   gcry_sexp_release (list);
   list = l2;
   l2 = NULL;
 
   name = gcry_sexp_nth_string (list, 0);
   if (!name)
     ;
   else if (gcry_pk_map_name (name) == GCRY_PK_RSA)
     {
       l2 = gcry_sexp_find_token (list, "n", 1);
       if (l2)
         modulus = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (l2, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
     }
 
   gcry_free (name);
   gcry_sexp_release (l2);
   gcry_sexp_release (list);
   return modulus;
 }
 
 
 
 /* For certain purposes we need a certificate id which has an upper
    limit of the size.  We use the hash of the issuer name and the
    serial number for this.  In most cases the serial number is not
    that large and the resulting string can be passed on an assuan
    command line.  Everything is hexencoded with the serialnumber
    delimited from the hash by a dot.
 
    The caller must free the string.
 */
 char *
 gpgsm_get_certid (ksba_cert_t cert)
 {
   ksba_sexp_t serial;
   char *p;
   char *endp;
   unsigned char hash[20];
   unsigned long n;
   char *certid;
   int i;
 
   p = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert, 0);
   if (!p)
     return NULL; /* Ooops: No issuer */
   gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA1, hash, p, strlen (p));
   xfree (p);
 
   serial = ksba_cert_get_serial (cert);
   if (!serial)
     return NULL; /* oops: no serial number */
   p = (char *)serial;
   if (*p != '(')
     {
       log_error ("Ooops: invalid serial number\n");
       xfree (serial);
       return NULL;
     }
   p++;
   n = strtoul (p, &endp, 10);
   p = endp;
   if (*p != ':')
     {
       log_error ("Ooops: invalid serial number (no colon)\n");
       xfree (serial);
       return NULL;
     }
   p++;
 
   certid = xtrymalloc ( 40 + 1 + n*2 + 1);
   if (!certid)
     {
       xfree (serial);
       return NULL; /* out of core */
     }
 
   for (i=0, endp = certid; i < 20; i++, endp += 2 )
     sprintf (endp, "%02X", hash[i]);
   *endp++ = '.';
   for (i=0; i < n; i++, endp += 2)
     sprintf (endp, "%02X", ((unsigned char*)p)[i]);
   *endp = 0;
 
   xfree (serial);
   return certid;
 }
diff --git a/sm/gpgsm.h b/sm/gpgsm.h
index 580f2d6f6..c4df8496e 100644
--- a/sm/gpgsm.h
+++ b/sm/gpgsm.h
@@ -1,470 +1,473 @@
 /* gpgsm.h - Global definitions for GpgSM
  * Copyright (C) 2001, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2009,
  *               2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
  * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
  * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
  * (at your option) any later version.
  *
  * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
  * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
  * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
  * GNU General Public License for more details.
  *
  * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
  * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  */
 
 #ifndef GPGSM_H
 #define GPGSM_H
 
 #ifdef GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT
 #error GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT already defined
 #endif
 #define GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT  GPG_ERR_SOURCE_GPGSM
 #include <gpg-error.h>
 
 
 #include <ksba.h>
 #include "../common/util.h"
 #include "../common/status.h"
 #include "../common/audit.h"
 #include "../common/session-env.h"
 #include "../common/ksba-io-support.h"
 #include "../common/compliance.h"
 
 
 #define MAX_DIGEST_LEN 64
 
 struct keyserver_spec
 {
   struct keyserver_spec *next;
 
   char *host;
   int port;
   char *user;
   char *pass;
   char *base;
   unsigned int use_ldaps:1;
 };
 
 
 /* A large struct named "opt" to keep global flags. */
 EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
 struct
 {
   unsigned int debug; /* debug flags (DBG_foo_VALUE) */
   int verbose;      /* verbosity level */
   int quiet;        /* be as quiet as possible */
   int batch;        /* run in batch mode, i.e w/o any user interaction */
   int answer_yes;   /* assume yes on most questions */
   int answer_no;    /* assume no on most questions */
   int dry_run;      /* don't change any persistent data */
   int no_homedir_creation;
 
   const char *config_filename; /* Name of the used config file. */
   const char *agent_program;
 
   session_env_t session_env;
   char *lc_ctype;
   char *lc_messages;
 
   int autostart;
   const char *dirmngr_program;
   int disable_dirmngr;        /* Do not do any dirmngr calls.  */
   const char *protect_tool_program;
   char *outfile;    /* name of output file */
 
   int with_key_data;/* include raw key in the column delimited output */
 
   int fingerprint;  /* list fingerprints in all key listings */
 
   int with_md5_fingerprint; /* Also print an MD5 fingerprint for
                                standard key listings. */
 
   int with_keygrip; /* Option --with-keygrip active.  */
 
   int with_key_screening; /* Option  --with-key-screening active.  */
 
   int pinentry_mode;
   int request_origin;
 
   int armor;        /* force base64 armoring (see also ctrl.with_base64) */
   int no_armor;     /* don't try to figure out whether data is base64 armored*/
 
   const char *p12_charset; /* Use this charset for encoding the
                               pkcs#12 passphrase.  */
 
 
   const char *def_cipher_algoid;  /* cipher algorithm to use if
                                      nothing else is specified */
 
   int def_compress_algo;  /* Ditto for compress algorithm */
 
   int forced_digest_algo; /* User forced hash algorithm. */
 
   char *def_recipient;    /* userID of the default recipient */
   int def_recipient_self; /* The default recipient is the default key */
 
   int no_encrypt_to;      /* Ignore all as encrypt to marked recipients. */
 
   char *local_user;       /* NULL or argument to -u */
 
   int extra_digest_algo;  /* A digest algorithm also used for
                              verification of signatures.  */
 
   int always_trust;       /* Trust the given keys even if there is no
                              valid certification chain */
   int skip_verify;        /* do not check signatures on data */
 
   int lock_once;          /* Keep lock once they are set */
 
   int ignore_time_conflict; /* Ignore certain time conflicts */
 
   int no_crl_check;         /* Don't do a CRL check */
   int no_trusted_cert_crl_check; /* Don't run a CRL check for trusted certs. */
   int force_crl_refresh;    /* Force refreshing the CRL. */
   int enable_issuer_based_crl_check; /* Backward compatibility hack.  */
   int enable_ocsp;          /* Default to use OCSP checks. */
 
   char *policy_file;        /* full pathname of policy file */
   int no_policy_check;      /* ignore certificate policies */
   int no_chain_validation;  /* Bypass all cert chain validity tests */
   int ignore_expiration;    /* Ignore the notAfter validity checks. */
 
   int auto_issuer_key_retrieve; /* try to retrieve a missing issuer key. */
 
   int qualsig_approval;     /* Set to true if this software has
                                officially been approved to create an
                                verify qualified signatures.  This is a
                                runtime option in case we want to check
                                the integrity of the software at
                                runtime. */
 
   struct keyserver_spec *keyserver;
 
   /* A list of certificate extension OIDs which are ignored so that
      one can claim that a critical extension has been handled.  One
      OID per string.  */
   strlist_t ignored_cert_extensions;
 
   enum gnupg_compliance_mode compliance;
 
   /* Enable creation of authenticode signatures.  */
   int authenticode;
 
   /* A list of extra attributes put into a signed data object.  For a
    * signed each attribute each string has the format:
    *   <oid>:s:<hex_or_filename>
    * and for an unsigned attribute
    *   <oid>:u:<hex_or_filename>
    * The OID is in the usual dotted decimal for. The HEX_OR_FILENAME
    * is either a list of hex digits or a filename with the DER encoded
    * value.  A filename is detected by the presence of a slash in the
    * HEX_OR_FILENAME.  The actual value needs to be encoded as a SET OF
    * attribute values.  */
   strlist_t attributes;
 } opt;
 
 /* Debug values and macros.  */
 #define DBG_X509_VALUE    1	/* debug x.509 data reading/writing */
 #define DBG_MPI_VALUE	  2	/* debug mpi details */
 #define DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE  4	/* debug low level crypto */
 #define DBG_MEMORY_VALUE  32	/* debug memory allocation stuff */
 #define DBG_CACHE_VALUE   64	/* debug the caching */
 #define DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE 128	/* show memory statistics */
 #define DBG_HASHING_VALUE 512	/* debug hashing operations */
 #define DBG_IPC_VALUE     1024  /* debug assuan communication */
 #define DBG_CLOCK_VALUE   4096
 #define DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE  8192	/* debug the key lookup */
 
 #define DBG_X509    (opt.debug & DBG_X509_VALUE)
 #define DBG_CRYPTO  (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE)
 #define DBG_MEMORY  (opt.debug & DBG_MEMORY_VALUE)
 #define DBG_CACHE   (opt.debug & DBG_CACHE_VALUE)
 #define DBG_HASHING (opt.debug & DBG_HASHING_VALUE)
 #define DBG_IPC     (opt.debug & DBG_IPC_VALUE)
 #define DBG_CLOCK   (opt.debug & DBG_CLOCK_VALUE)
 #define DBG_LOOKUP  (opt.debug & DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE)
 
 /* Forward declaration for an object defined in server.c */
 struct server_local_s;
 
 /* Session control object.  This object is passed down to most
    functions.  Note that the default values for it are set by
    gpgsm_init_default_ctrl(). */
 struct server_control_s
 {
   int no_server;      /* We are not running under server control */
   int  status_fd;     /* Only for non-server mode */
   struct server_local_s *server_local;
 
   audit_ctx_t audit;  /* NULL or a context for the audit subsystem.  */
   int agent_seen;     /* Flag indicating that the gpg-agent has been
                          accessed.  */
 
   int with_colons;    /* Use column delimited output format */
   int with_secret;    /* Mark secret keys in a public key listing.  */
   int with_chain;     /* Include the certifying certs in a listing */
   int with_validation;/* Validate each key while listing. */
   int with_ephemeral_keys;  /* Include ephemeral flagged keys in the
                                keylisting. */
 
   int autodetect_encoding; /* Try to detect the input encoding */
   int is_pem;         /* Is in PEM format */
   int is_base64;      /* is in plain base-64 format */
 
   int create_base64;  /* Create base64 encoded output */
   int create_pem;     /* create PEM output */
   const char *pem_name; /* PEM name to use */
 
   int include_certs;  /* -1 to send all certificates in the chain
                          along with a signature or the number of
                          certificates up the chain (0 = none, 1 = only
                          signer) */
   int use_ocsp;       /* Set to true if OCSP should be used. */
   int validation_model; /* 0 := standard model (shell),
                            1 := chain model,
                            2 := STEED model. */
   int offline;        /* If true gpgsm won't do any network access.  */
 
   /* The current time.  Used as a helper in certchain.c.  */
   ksba_isotime_t current_time;
 };
 
 
 /* An object to keep a list of certificates. */
 struct certlist_s
 {
   struct certlist_s *next;
   ksba_cert_t cert;
   int is_encrypt_to; /* True if the certificate has been set through
                         the --encrypto-to option. */
   int hash_algo;     /* Used to track the hash algorithm to use.  */
   const char *hash_algo_oid;  /* And the corresponding OID.  */
 };
 typedef struct certlist_s *certlist_t;
 
 
 /* A structure carrying information about trusted root certificates. */
 struct rootca_flags_s
 {
   unsigned int valid:1;  /* The rest of the structure has valid
                             information.  */
   unsigned int relax:1;  /* Relax checking of root certificates.  */
   unsigned int chain_model:1; /* Root requires the use of the chain model.  */
 };
 
 
 
 /*-- gpgsm.c --*/
 void gpgsm_exit (int rc);
 void gpgsm_init_default_ctrl (struct server_control_s *ctrl);
 int  gpgsm_parse_validation_model (const char *model);
 
 /*-- server.c --*/
 void gpgsm_server (certlist_t default_recplist);
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_status (ctrl_t ctrl, int no, const char *text);
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_status2 (ctrl_t ctrl, int no, ...) GPGRT_ATTR_SENTINEL(0);
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_status_with_err_code (ctrl_t ctrl, int no, const char *text,
                                         gpg_err_code_t ec);
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_status_with_error (ctrl_t ctrl, int no, const char *text,
                                      gpg_error_t err);
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_proxy_pinentry_notify (ctrl_t ctrl,
                                          const unsigned char *line);
 
 /*-- fingerprint --*/
 unsigned char *gpgsm_get_fingerprint (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo,
                                       unsigned char *array, int *r_len);
 char *gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo);
 char *gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo);
 unsigned long gpgsm_get_short_fingerprint (ksba_cert_t cert,
                                            unsigned long *r_high);
 unsigned char *gpgsm_get_keygrip (ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned char *array);
 char *gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (ksba_cert_t cert);
 int  gpgsm_get_key_algo_info (ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned int *nbits);
+int  gpgsm_get_key_algo_info2 (ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned int *nbits,
+                               char **r_curve);
+char *gpgsm_pubkey_algo_string (ksba_cert_t cert, int *r_algoid);
 gcry_mpi_t gpgsm_get_rsa_modulus (ksba_cert_t cert);
 char *gpgsm_get_certid (ksba_cert_t cert);
 
 
 /*-- certdump.c --*/
 void gpgsm_print_serial (estream_t fp, ksba_const_sexp_t p);
 void gpgsm_print_time (estream_t fp, ksba_isotime_t t);
 void gpgsm_print_name2 (FILE *fp, const char *string, int translate);
 void gpgsm_print_name (FILE *fp, const char *string);
 void gpgsm_es_print_name (estream_t fp, const char *string);
 void gpgsm_es_print_name2 (estream_t fp, const char *string, int translate);
 
 void gpgsm_cert_log_name (const char *text, ksba_cert_t cert);
 
 void gpgsm_dump_cert (const char *text, ksba_cert_t cert);
 void gpgsm_dump_serial (ksba_const_sexp_t p);
 void gpgsm_dump_time (ksba_isotime_t t);
 void gpgsm_dump_string (const char *string);
 
 char *gpgsm_format_serial (ksba_const_sexp_t p);
 char *gpgsm_format_name2 (const char *name, int translate);
 char *gpgsm_format_name (const char *name);
 char *gpgsm_format_sn_issuer (ksba_sexp_t sn, const char *issuer);
 
 char *gpgsm_fpr_and_name_for_status (ksba_cert_t cert);
 
 char *gpgsm_format_keydesc (ksba_cert_t cert);
 
 
 /*-- certcheck.c --*/
 int gpgsm_check_cert_sig (ksba_cert_t issuer_cert, ksba_cert_t cert);
 int gpgsm_check_cms_signature (ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_const_sexp_t sigval,
                                gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo, int *r_pkalgo);
 /* fixme: move create functions to another file */
 int gpgsm_create_cms_signature (ctrl_t ctrl,
                                 ksba_cert_t cert, gcry_md_hd_t md, int mdalgo,
                                 unsigned char **r_sigval);
 
 
 /*-- certchain.c --*/
 
 /* Flags used with  gpgsm_validate_chain.  */
 #define VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR  1
 #define VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL 2
 #define VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED       4
 
 int gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl,
                            ksba_cert_t start, ksba_cert_t *r_next);
 int gpgsm_is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert);
 int gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert,
                           ksba_isotime_t checktime,
                           ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
                           int listmode, estream_t listfp,
                           unsigned int flags, unsigned int *retflags);
 int gpgsm_basic_cert_check (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert);
 
 /*-- certlist.c --*/
 int gpgsm_cert_use_sign_p (ksba_cert_t cert, int silent);
 int gpgsm_cert_use_encrypt_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
 int gpgsm_cert_use_verify_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
 int gpgsm_cert_use_decrypt_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
 int gpgsm_cert_use_cert_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
 int gpgsm_cert_use_ocsp_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
 int gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (ksba_cert_t cert);
 int gpgsm_certs_identical_p (ksba_cert_t cert_a, ksba_cert_t cert_b);
 int gpgsm_add_cert_to_certlist (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert,
                                 certlist_t *listaddr, int is_encrypt_to);
 int gpgsm_add_to_certlist (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, int secret,
                            certlist_t *listaddr, int is_encrypt_to);
 void gpgsm_release_certlist (certlist_t list);
 int gpgsm_find_cert (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, ksba_sexp_t keyid,
                      ksba_cert_t *r_cert, int allow_ambiguous);
 
 /*-- keylist.c --*/
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_list_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names,
                              estream_t fp, unsigned int mode);
 
 /*-- import.c --*/
 int gpgsm_import (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, int reimport_mode);
 int gpgsm_import_files (ctrl_t ctrl, int nfiles, char **files,
                         int (*of)(const char *fname));
 
 /*-- export.c --*/
 void gpgsm_export (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names, estream_t stream);
 void gpgsm_p12_export (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, estream_t stream,
                        int rawmode);
 
 /*-- delete.c --*/
 int gpgsm_delete (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names);
 
 /*-- verify.c --*/
 int gpgsm_verify (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, int data_fd, estream_t out_fp);
 
 /*-- sign.c --*/
 int gpgsm_get_default_cert (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t *r_cert);
 int gpgsm_sign (ctrl_t ctrl, certlist_t signerlist,
                 int data_fd, int detached, estream_t out_fp);
 
 /*-- encrypt.c --*/
 int gpgsm_encrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, certlist_t recplist,
                    int in_fd, estream_t out_fp);
 
 /*-- decrypt.c --*/
 gpg_error_t hash_ecc_cms_shared_info (gcry_md_hd_t hash_hd,
                                       const char *wrap_algo_str,
                                       unsigned int keylen,
                                       const void *ukm, unsigned int ukmlen);
 int gpgsm_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, estream_t out_fp);
 
 /*-- certreqgen.c --*/
 int gpgsm_genkey (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t in_stream, estream_t out_stream);
 
 /*-- certreqgen-ui.c --*/
 void gpgsm_gencertreq_tty (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t out_stream);
 
 
 /*-- qualified.c --*/
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_is_in_qualified_list (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert,
                                         char *country);
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_qualified_consent (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert);
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_not_qualified_warning (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert);
 
 /*-- call-agent.c --*/
 int gpgsm_agent_pksign (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keygrip, const char *desc,
                         unsigned char *digest,
                         size_t digestlen,
                         int digestalgo,
                         unsigned char **r_buf, size_t *r_buflen);
 int gpgsm_scd_pksign (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyid, const char *desc,
                       unsigned char *digest, size_t digestlen, int digestalgo,
                       unsigned char **r_buf, size_t *r_buflen);
 int gpgsm_agent_pkdecrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keygrip, const char *desc,
                            ksba_const_sexp_t ciphertext,
                            char **r_buf, size_t *r_buflen);
 int gpgsm_agent_genkey (ctrl_t ctrl,
                         ksba_const_sexp_t keyparms, ksba_sexp_t *r_pubkey);
 int gpgsm_agent_readkey (ctrl_t ctrl, int fromcard, const char *hexkeygrip,
                          ksba_sexp_t *r_pubkey);
 int gpgsm_agent_scd_serialno (ctrl_t ctrl, char **r_serialno);
 int gpgsm_agent_scd_keypairinfo (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t *r_list);
 int gpgsm_agent_istrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, const char *hexfpr,
                            struct rootca_flags_s *rootca_flags);
 int gpgsm_agent_havekey (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *hexkeygrip);
 int gpgsm_agent_marktrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert);
 int gpgsm_agent_learn (ctrl_t ctrl);
 int gpgsm_agent_passwd (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *hexkeygrip, const char *desc);
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_get_confirmation (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc);
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_send_nop (ctrl_t ctrl);
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_keyinfo (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *hexkeygrip,
                                  char **r_serialno);
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_ask_passphrase (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_msg,
                                         int repeat, char **r_passphrase);
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_keywrap_key (ctrl_t ctrl, int forexport,
                                      void **r_kek, size_t *r_keklen);
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_import_key (ctrl_t ctrl,
                                     const void *key, size_t keylen);
 gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_export_key (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keygrip,
                                     const char *desc,
                                     unsigned char **r_result,
                                     size_t *r_resultlen);
 
 /*-- call-dirmngr.c --*/
 int gpgsm_dirmngr_isvalid (ctrl_t ctrl,
                            ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_cert_t issuer_cert,
                            int use_ocsp);
 int gpgsm_dirmngr_lookup (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names, const char *uri,
                           int cache_only,
                           void (*cb)(void*, ksba_cert_t), void *cb_value);
 int gpgsm_dirmngr_run_command (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *command,
                                int argc, char **argv);
 
 
 /*-- misc.c --*/
 void setup_pinentry_env (void);
 gpg_error_t transform_sigval (const unsigned char *sigval, size_t sigvallen,
                               int mdalgo,
                               unsigned char **r_newsigval,
                               size_t *r_newsigvallen);
 
 
 
 #endif /*GPGSM_H*/
diff --git a/sm/keylist.c b/sm/keylist.c
index 1fd2892ce..c1e5bf5c4 100644
--- a/sm/keylist.c
+++ b/sm/keylist.c
@@ -1,1682 +1,1683 @@
 /* keylist.c - Print certificates in various formats.
  * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2009,
  *               2010, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
  * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
  * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
  * (at your option) any later version.
  *
  * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
  * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
  * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
  * GNU General Public License for more details.
  *
  * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
  * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  */
 
 #include <config.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <time.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 
 #include "gpgsm.h"
 
 #include <gcrypt.h>
 #include <ksba.h>
 
 #include "keydb.h"
 #include "../kbx/keybox.h" /* for KEYBOX_FLAG_* */
 #include "../common/i18n.h"
 #include "../common/tlv.h"
 #include "../common/compliance.h"
 #include "../common/pkscreening.h"
 
 struct list_external_parm_s
 {
   ctrl_t ctrl;
   estream_t fp;
   int print_header;
   int with_colons;
   int with_chain;
   int raw_mode;
 };
 
 
 /* This table is to map Extended Key Usage OIDs to human readable
    names.  */
 struct
 {
   const char *oid;
   const char *name;
 } key_purpose_map[] = {
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1",  "serverAuth" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2",  "clientAuth" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3",  "codeSigning" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4",  "emailProtection" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.5",  "ipsecEndSystem" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.6",  "ipsecTunnel" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.7",  "ipsecUser" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.8",  "timeStamping" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9",  "ocspSigning" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.10", "dvcs" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.11", "sbgpCertAAServerAuth" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.13", "eapOverPPP" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.14", "wlanSSID" },
 
   { "2.16.840.1.113730.4.1", "serverGatedCrypto.ns" }, /* Netscape. */
   { "1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.3", "serverGatedCrypto.ms"}, /* Microsoft. */
 
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.5", "ocspNoCheck" },
 
   { NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 
 /* Do not print this extension in the list of extensions.  This is set
    for oids which are already available via ksba functions. */
 #define OID_FLAG_SKIP 1
 /* The extension is a simple UTF8String and should be printed.  */
 #define OID_FLAG_UTF8 2
 /* The extension can be trnted as a hex string.  */
 #define OID_FLAG_HEX  4
 
 /* A table mapping OIDs to a descriptive string. */
 static struct
 {
   char *oid;
   char *name;
   unsigned int flag; /* A flag as described above.  */
 } oidtranstbl[] = {
 
   /* Algorithms. */
   { "1.2.840.10040.4.1", "dsa" },
   { "1.2.840.10040.4.3", "dsaWithSha1" },
 
   { "1.2.840.113549.1.1.1", "rsaEncryption" },
   { "1.2.840.113549.1.1.2", "md2WithRSAEncryption" },
   { "1.2.840.113549.1.1.3", "md4WithRSAEncryption" },
   { "1.2.840.113549.1.1.4", "md5WithRSAEncryption" },
   { "1.2.840.113549.1.1.5", "sha1WithRSAEncryption" },
   { "1.2.840.113549.1.1.7", "rsaOAEP" },
   { "1.2.840.113549.1.1.8", "rsaOAEP-MGF" },
   { "1.2.840.113549.1.1.9", "rsaOAEP-pSpecified" },
   { "1.2.840.113549.1.1.10", "rsaPSS" },
   { "1.2.840.113549.1.1.11", "sha256WithRSAEncryption" },
   { "1.2.840.113549.1.1.12", "sha384WithRSAEncryption" },
   { "1.2.840.113549.1.1.13", "sha512WithRSAEncryption" },
 
   { "1.3.14.3.2.26", "sha1" },
   { "1.3.14.3.2.29",  "sha-1WithRSAEncryption" },
   { "1.3.36.3.3.1.2", "rsaSignatureWithripemd160" },
 
 
   /* Telesec extensions. */
   { "0.2.262.1.10.12.0", "certExtensionLiabilityLimitationExt" },
   { "0.2.262.1.10.12.1", "telesecCertIdExt" },
   { "0.2.262.1.10.12.2", "telesecPolicyIdentifier" },
   { "0.2.262.1.10.12.3", "telesecPolicyQualifierID" },
   { "0.2.262.1.10.12.4", "telesecCRLFilteredExt" },
   { "0.2.262.1.10.12.5", "telesecCRLFilterExt"},
   { "0.2.262.1.10.12.6", "telesecNamingAuthorityExt" },
 #define OIDSTR_restriction \
     "1.3.36.8.3.8"
   { OIDSTR_restriction,      "restriction", OID_FLAG_UTF8 },
 
 
   /* PKIX private extensions. */
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1", "authorityInfoAccess" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.2", "biometricInfo" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.3", "qcStatements" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.4", "acAuditIdentity" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.5", "acTargeting" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.6", "acAaControls" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.7", "sbgp-ipAddrBlock" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.8", "sbgp-autonomousSysNum" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.9", "sbgp-routerIdentifier" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.10", "acProxying" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11", "subjectInfoAccess" },
 
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1", "ocsp" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2", "caIssuers" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.3", "timeStamping" },
   { "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.5", "caRepository" },
 
   /* X.509 id-ce */
   { "2.5.29.14", "subjectKeyIdentifier", OID_FLAG_SKIP},
   { "2.5.29.15", "keyUsage", OID_FLAG_SKIP},
   { "2.5.29.16", "privateKeyUsagePeriod" },
   { "2.5.29.17", "subjectAltName", OID_FLAG_SKIP},
   { "2.5.29.18", "issuerAltName", OID_FLAG_SKIP},
   { "2.5.29.19", "basicConstraints", OID_FLAG_SKIP},
   { "2.5.29.20", "cRLNumber" },
   { "2.5.29.21", "cRLReason" },
   { "2.5.29.22", "expirationDate" },
   { "2.5.29.23", "instructionCode" },
   { "2.5.29.24", "invalidityDate" },
   { "2.5.29.27", "deltaCRLIndicator" },
   { "2.5.29.28", "issuingDistributionPoint" },
   { "2.5.29.29", "certificateIssuer" },
   { "2.5.29.30", "nameConstraints" },
   { "2.5.29.31", "cRLDistributionPoints", OID_FLAG_SKIP},
   { "2.5.29.32", "certificatePolicies", OID_FLAG_SKIP},
   { "2.5.29.32.0", "anyPolicy" },
   { "2.5.29.33", "policyMappings" },
   { "2.5.29.35", "authorityKeyIdentifier", OID_FLAG_SKIP},
   { "2.5.29.36", "policyConstraints" },
   { "2.5.29.37", "extKeyUsage", OID_FLAG_SKIP},
   { "2.5.29.46", "freshestCRL" },
   { "2.5.29.54", "inhibitAnyPolicy" },
 
   /* Netscape certificate extensions. */
   { "2.16.840.1.113730.1.1", "netscape-cert-type" },
   { "2.16.840.1.113730.1.2", "netscape-base-url" },
   { "2.16.840.1.113730.1.3", "netscape-revocation-url" },
   { "2.16.840.1.113730.1.4", "netscape-ca-revocation-url" },
   { "2.16.840.1.113730.1.7", "netscape-cert-renewal-url" },
   { "2.16.840.1.113730.1.8", "netscape-ca-policy-url" },
   { "2.16.840.1.113730.1.9", "netscape-homePage-url" },
   { "2.16.840.1.113730.1.10", "netscape-entitylogo" },
   { "2.16.840.1.113730.1.11", "netscape-userPicture" },
   { "2.16.840.1.113730.1.12", "netscape-ssl-server-name" },
   { "2.16.840.1.113730.1.13", "netscape-comment" },
 
   /* GnuPG extensions */
   { "1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1.1", "pkaAddress" },
   { "1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.1", "standaloneCertificate" },
   { "1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.2", "wellKnownPrivateKey" },
 
   /* Extensions used by the Bundesnetzagentur.  */
   { "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5", "validityModel" },
 
   /* Yubikey extensions for attestation certificates.  */
   { "1.3.6.1.4.1.41482.3.3", "yubikey-firmware-version", OID_FLAG_HEX },
   { "1.3.6.1.4.1.41482.3.7", "yubikey-serial-number", OID_FLAG_HEX },
   { "1.3.6.1.4.1.41482.3.8", "yubikey-pin-touch-policy", OID_FLAG_HEX },
   { "1.3.6.1.4.1.41482.3.9", "yubikey-formfactor", OID_FLAG_HEX },
 
   { NULL }
 };
 
 
 /* Return the description for OID; if no description is available
    NULL is returned. */
 static const char *
 get_oid_desc (const char *oid, unsigned int *flag)
 {
   int i;
 
   if (oid)
     for (i=0; oidtranstbl[i].oid; i++)
       if (!strcmp (oidtranstbl[i].oid, oid))
         {
           if (flag)
             *flag = oidtranstbl[i].flag;
           return oidtranstbl[i].name;
         }
   if (flag)
     *flag = 0;
   return NULL;
 }
 
 
 static void
 print_key_data (ksba_cert_t cert, estream_t fp)
 {
 #if 0
   int n = pk ? pubkey_get_npkey( pk->pubkey_algo ) : 0;
   int i;
 
   for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
     {
       es_fprintf (fp, "pkd:%d:%u:", i, mpi_get_nbits( pk->pkey[i] ) );
       mpi_print(stdout, pk->pkey[i], 1 );
       putchar(':');
       putchar('\n');
     }
 #else
   (void)cert;
   (void)fp;
 #endif
 }
 
 
 /* Various public key screenings.  (Right now just ROCA).  With
  * COLON_MODE set the output is formatted for use in the compliance
  * field of a colon listing.  */
 static void
 print_pk_screening (ksba_cert_t cert, int colon_mode, estream_t fp)
 {
   gpg_error_t err;
   gcry_mpi_t modulus;
 
   modulus = gpgsm_get_rsa_modulus (cert);
   if (modulus)
     {
       err = screen_key_for_roca (modulus);
       if (!err)
         ;
       else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_TRUE)
         {
           if (colon_mode)
             es_fprintf (fp, colon_mode > 1? " %d":"%d", 6001);
           else
             es_fprintf (fp, "    screening: ROCA vulnerability detected\n");
         }
       else if (!colon_mode)
         es_fprintf (fp, "    screening: [ROCA check failed: %s]\n",
                     gpg_strerror (err));
       gcry_mpi_release (modulus);
     }
 
 }
 
 
 static void
 print_capabilities (ksba_cert_t cert, estream_t fp)
 {
   gpg_error_t err;
   unsigned int use;
   size_t buflen;
   char buffer[1];
 
   err = ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "is_qualified",
                                  &buffer, sizeof (buffer), &buflen);
   if (!err && buflen)
     {
       if (*buffer)
         es_putc ('q', fp);
     }
   else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
     ; /* Don't know - will not get marked as 'q' */
   else
     log_debug ("get_user_data(is_qualified) failed: %s\n",
                gpg_strerror (err));
 
   err = ksba_cert_get_key_usage (cert, &use);
   if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
     {
       es_putc ('e', fp);
       es_putc ('s', fp);
       es_putc ('c', fp);
       es_putc ('E', fp);
       es_putc ('S', fp);
       es_putc ('C', fp);
       return;
     }
   if (err)
     {
       log_error (_("error getting key usage information: %s\n"),
                  gpg_strerror (err));
       return;
     }
 
   if ((use & (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT)))
     es_putc ('e', fp);
   if ((use & (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KSBA_KEYUSAGE_NON_REPUDIATION)))
     es_putc ('s', fp);
   if ((use & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
     es_putc ('c', fp);
   if ((use & (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT)))
     es_putc ('E', fp);
   if ((use & (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KSBA_KEYUSAGE_NON_REPUDIATION)))
     es_putc ('S', fp);
   if ((use & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
     es_putc ('C', fp);
 }
 
 
 static void
 print_time (gnupg_isotime_t t, estream_t fp)
 {
   if (!t || !*t)
     ;
   else
     es_fputs (t, fp);
 }
 
 
 /* Return an allocated string with the email address extracted from a
    DN.  Note hat we use this code also in ../kbx/keybox-blob.c.  */
 static char *
 email_kludge (const char *name)
 {
   const char *p, *string;
   unsigned char *buf;
   int n;
 
   string = name;
   for (;;)
     {
       p = strstr (string, "1.2.840.113549.1.9.1=#");
       if (!p)
         return NULL;
       if (p == name || (p > string+1 && p[-1] == ',' && p[-2] != '\\'))
         {
           name = p + 22;
           break;
         }
       string = p + 22;
     }
 
 
   /* This looks pretty much like an email address in the subject's DN
      we use this to add an additional user ID entry.  This way,
      OpenSSL generated keys get a nicer and usable listing.  */
   for (n=0, p=name; hexdigitp (p) && hexdigitp (p+1); p +=2, n++)
     ;
   if (!n)
     return NULL;
   buf = xtrymalloc (n+3);
   if (!buf)
     return NULL; /* oops, out of core */
   *buf = '<';
   for (n=1, p=name; hexdigitp (p); p +=2, n++)
     buf[n] = xtoi_2 (p);
   buf[n++] = '>';
   buf[n] = 0;
   return (char*)buf;
 }
 
 
 /* Print the compliance flags to field 18.  ALGO is the gcrypt algo
  * number.  NBITS is the length of the key in bits.  */
 static void
 print_compliance_flags (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo, unsigned int nbits,
                         estream_t fp)
 {
   int indent = 0;
   int hashalgo;
 
   if (gnupg_pk_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, algo, NULL, nbits, NULL))
     {
       hashalgo = gcry_md_map_name (ksba_cert_get_digest_algo (cert));
       if (gnupg_digest_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, hashalgo))
         {
           es_fputs (gnupg_status_compliance_flag (CO_DE_VS), fp);
           indent = 1;
         }
     }
 
   if (opt.with_key_screening)
     print_pk_screening (cert, 1+indent, fp);
 }
 
 
 /* List one certificate in colon mode */
 static void
 list_cert_colon (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned int validity,
                  estream_t fp, int have_secret)
 {
   int rc;
   int idx;
   char truststring[2];
   char *p;
   ksba_sexp_t sexp;
   char *fpr;
   ksba_isotime_t t;
   gpg_error_t valerr;
   int algo;
   unsigned int nbits;
+  char *curve = NULL;
   const char *chain_id;
   char *chain_id_buffer = NULL;
   int is_root = 0;
   char *kludge_uid;
 
   if (ctrl->with_validation)
     valerr = gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, "", NULL, 1, NULL, 0, NULL);
   else
     valerr = 0;
 
 
   /* We need to get the fingerprint and the chaining ID in advance. */
   fpr = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
   {
     ksba_cert_t next;
 
     rc = gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl, cert, &next);
     if (!rc) /* We known the issuer's certificate. */
       {
         p = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (next, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
         chain_id_buffer = p;
         chain_id = chain_id_buffer;
         ksba_cert_release (next);
       }
     else if (rc == -1)  /* We have reached the root certificate. */
       {
         chain_id = fpr;
         is_root = 1;
       }
     else
       chain_id = NULL;
   }
 
 
   es_fputs (have_secret? "crs:":"crt:", fp);
 
   /* Note: We can't use multiple flags, like "ei", because the
      validation check does only return one error.  */
   truststring[0] = 0;
   truststring[1] = 0;
   if ((validity & VALIDITY_REVOKED)
       || gpg_err_code (valerr) == GPG_ERR_CERT_REVOKED)
     *truststring = 'r';
   else if (gpg_err_code (valerr) == GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED)
     *truststring = 'e';
   else
     {
       /* Lets also check whether the certificate under question
          expired.  This is merely a hack until we found a proper way
          to store the expiration flag in the keybox. */
       ksba_isotime_t current_time, not_after;
 
       gnupg_get_isotime (current_time);
       if (!opt.ignore_expiration
           && !ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 1, not_after)
           && *not_after && strcmp (current_time, not_after) > 0 )
         *truststring = 'e';
       else if (valerr)
         {
           if (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (cert))
             *truststring = 'w';  /* Well, this is dummy CA.  */
           else
             *truststring = 'i';
         }
       else if (ctrl->with_validation && !is_root)
         *truststring = 'f';
     }
 
   /* If we have no truststring yet (i.e. the certificate might be
      good) and this is a root certificate, we ask the agent whether
      this is a trusted root certificate. */
   if (!*truststring && is_root)
     {
       struct rootca_flags_s dummy_flags;
 
       if (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (cert))
         *truststring = 'w';  /* Well, this is dummy CA.  */
       else
         {
           rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted (ctrl, cert, NULL, &dummy_flags);
           if (!rc)
             *truststring = 'u';  /* Yes, we trust this one (ultimately). */
           else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED)
             *truststring = 'n';  /* No, we do not trust this one. */
           /* (in case of an error we can't tell anything.) */
         }
     }
 
   if (*truststring)
     es_fputs (truststring, fp);
 
-  algo = gpgsm_get_key_algo_info (cert, &nbits);
+  algo = gpgsm_get_key_algo_info2 (cert, &nbits, &curve);
   es_fprintf (fp, ":%u:%d:%s:", nbits, algo, fpr+24);
 
   ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 0, t);
   print_time (t, fp);
   es_putc (':', fp);
   ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 1, t);
   print_time ( t, fp);
   es_putc (':', fp);
   /* Field 8, serial number: */
   if ((sexp = ksba_cert_get_serial (cert)))
     {
       int len;
       const unsigned char *s = sexp;
 
       if (*s == '(')
         {
           s++;
           for (len=0; *s && *s != ':' && digitp (s); s++)
             len = len*10 + atoi_1 (s);
           if (*s == ':')
             for (s++; len; len--, s++)
               es_fprintf (fp,"%02X", *s);
         }
       xfree (sexp);
     }
   es_putc (':', fp);
   /* Field 9, ownertrust - not used here */
   es_putc (':', fp);
   /* field 10, old user ID - we use it here for the issuer DN */
   if ((p = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert,0)))
     {
       es_write_sanitized (fp, p, strlen (p), ":", NULL);
       xfree (p);
     }
   es_putc (':', fp);
   /* Field 11, signature class - not used */
   es_putc (':', fp);
   /* Field 12, capabilities: */
   print_capabilities (cert, fp);
   es_putc (':', fp);
   /* Field 13, not used: */
   es_putc (':', fp);
   /* Field 14, not used: */
   es_putc (':', fp);
   if (have_secret || ctrl->with_secret)
     {
       char *cardsn;
 
       p = gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (cert);
       if (!gpgsm_agent_keyinfo (ctrl, p, &cardsn)
           && (cardsn || ctrl->with_secret))
         {
           /* Field 15:  Token serial number or secret key indicator.  */
           if (cardsn)
             es_fputs (cardsn, fp);
           else if (ctrl->with_secret)
             es_putc ('+', fp);
         }
       xfree (cardsn);
       xfree (p);
     }
   es_putc (':', fp);  /* End of field 15. */
   es_putc (':', fp);  /* End of field 16. */
+  if (curve)
+    es_fputs (curve, fp);
   es_putc (':', fp);  /* End of field 17. */
   print_compliance_flags (cert, algo, nbits, fp);
   es_putc (':', fp);  /* End of field 18. */
   es_putc ('\n', fp);
 
   /* FPR record */
   es_fprintf (fp, "fpr:::::::::%s:::", fpr);
   /* Print chaining ID (field 13)*/
   if (chain_id)
     es_fputs (chain_id, fp);
   es_putc (':', fp);
   es_putc ('\n', fp);
   xfree (fpr); fpr = NULL; chain_id = NULL;
   xfree (chain_id_buffer); chain_id_buffer = NULL;
 
   /* Always print the keygrip.  */
   if ( (p = gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (cert)))
     {
       es_fprintf (fp, "grp:::::::::%s:\n", p);
       xfree (p);
     }
 
   if (opt.with_key_data)
     print_key_data (cert, fp);
 
   kludge_uid = NULL;
   for (idx=0; (p = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert,idx)); idx++)
     {
       /* In the case that the same email address is in the subject DN
          as well as in an alternate subject name we avoid printing it
          a second time. */
       if (kludge_uid && !strcmp (kludge_uid, p))
         continue;
 
       es_fprintf (fp, "uid:%s::::::::", truststring);
       es_write_sanitized (fp, p, strlen (p), ":", NULL);
       es_putc (':', fp);
       es_putc (':', fp);
       es_putc ('\n', fp);
       if (!idx)
         {
           /* It would be better to get the faked email address from
              the keydb.  But as long as we don't have a way to pass
              the meta data back, we just check it the same way as the
              code used to create the keybox meta data does */
           kludge_uid = email_kludge (p);
           if (kludge_uid)
             {
               es_fprintf (fp, "uid:%s::::::::", truststring);
               es_write_sanitized (fp, kludge_uid, strlen (kludge_uid),
                                   ":", NULL);
               es_putc (':', fp);
               es_putc (':', fp);
               es_putc ('\n', fp);
             }
         }
       xfree (p);
     }
   xfree (kludge_uid);
+  xfree (curve);
 }
 
 
 static void
 print_name_raw (estream_t fp, const char *string)
 {
   if (!string)
     es_fputs ("[error]", fp);
   else
     es_write_sanitized (fp, string, strlen (string), NULL, NULL);
 }
 
 static void
 print_names_raw (estream_t fp, int indent, ksba_name_t name)
 {
   int idx;
   const char *s;
   int indent_all;
 
   if ((indent_all = (indent < 0)))
     indent = - indent;
 
   if (!name)
     {
       es_fputs ("none\n", fp);
       return;
     }
 
   for (idx=0; (s = ksba_name_enum (name, idx)); idx++)
     {
       char *p = ksba_name_get_uri (name, idx);
       es_fprintf (fp, "%*s", idx||indent_all?indent:0, "");
       es_write_sanitized (fp, p?p:s, strlen (p?p:s), NULL, NULL);
       es_putc ('\n', fp);
       xfree (p);
     }
 }
 
 
 static void
 print_utf8_extn_raw (estream_t fp, int indent,
                      const unsigned char *der, size_t derlen)
 {
   gpg_error_t err;
   int class, tag, constructed, ndef;
   size_t objlen, hdrlen;
 
   if (indent < 0)
     indent = - indent;
 
   err = parse_ber_header (&der, &derlen, &class, &tag, &constructed,
                           &ndef, &objlen, &hdrlen);
   if (!err && (objlen > derlen || tag != TAG_UTF8_STRING))
     err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
   if (err)
     {
       es_fprintf (fp, "%*s[%s]\n", indent, "", gpg_strerror (err));
       return;
     }
   es_fprintf (fp, "%*s(%.*s)\n", indent, "", (int)objlen, der);
 }
 
 
 static void
 print_utf8_extn (estream_t fp, int indent,
                  const unsigned char *der, size_t derlen)
 {
   gpg_error_t err;
   int class, tag, constructed, ndef;
   size_t objlen, hdrlen;
   int indent_all;
 
   if ((indent_all = (indent < 0)))
     indent = - indent;
 
   err = parse_ber_header (&der, &derlen, &class, &tag, &constructed,
                           &ndef, &objlen, &hdrlen);
   if (!err && (objlen > derlen || tag != TAG_UTF8_STRING))
     err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
   if (err)
     {
       es_fprintf (fp, "%*s[%s%s]\n",
                   indent_all? indent:0, "", _("Error - "), gpg_strerror (err));
       return;
     }
   es_fprintf (fp, "%*s\"", indent_all? indent:0, "");
   /* Fixme: we should implement word wrapping */
   es_write_sanitized (fp, der, objlen, "\"", NULL);
   es_fputs ("\"\n", fp);
 }
 
 
 /* Print the extension described by (DER,DERLEN) in hex.  */
 static void
 print_hex_extn (estream_t fp, int indent,
                 const unsigned char *der, size_t derlen)
 {
   if (indent < 0)
     indent = - indent;
 
   es_fprintf (fp, "%*s(", indent, "");
   for (; derlen; der++, derlen--)
     es_fprintf (fp, "%02X%s", *der, derlen > 1? " ":"");
   es_fprintf (fp, ")\n");
 }
 
 
 /* List one certificate in raw mode useful to have a closer look at
    the certificate.  This one does no beautification and only minimal
    output sanitation.  It is mainly useful for debugging. */
 static void
 list_cert_raw (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd,
                ksba_cert_t cert, estream_t fp, int have_secret,
                int with_validation)
 {
   gpg_error_t err;
   size_t off, len;
   ksba_sexp_t sexp, keyid;
   char *dn;
   ksba_isotime_t t;
   int idx, i;
   int is_ca, chainlen;
   unsigned int kusage;
   char *string, *p, *pend;
   const char *oid, *s;
   ksba_name_t name, name2;
   unsigned int reason;
   const unsigned char *cert_der = NULL;
 
   (void)have_secret;
 
   es_fprintf (fp, "           ID: 0x%08lX\n",
               gpgsm_get_short_fingerprint (cert, NULL));
 
   sexp = ksba_cert_get_serial (cert);
   es_fputs ("          S/N: ", fp);
   gpgsm_print_serial (fp, sexp);
   ksba_free (sexp);
   es_putc ('\n', fp);
 
   dn = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert, 0);
   es_fputs ("       Issuer: ", fp);
   print_name_raw (fp, dn);
   ksba_free (dn);
   es_putc ('\n', fp);
   for (idx=1; (dn = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert, idx)); idx++)
     {
       es_fputs ("          aka: ", fp);
       print_name_raw (fp, dn);
       ksba_free (dn);
       es_putc ('\n', fp);
     }
 
   dn = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, 0);
   es_fputs ("      Subject: ", fp);
   print_name_raw (fp, dn);
   ksba_free (dn);
   es_putc ('\n', fp);
   for (idx=1; (dn = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, idx)); idx++)
     {
       es_fputs ("          aka: ", fp);
       print_name_raw (fp, dn);
       ksba_free (dn);
       es_putc ('\n', fp);
     }
 
   dn = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (cert, 0);
   es_fprintf (fp, "     sha1_fpr: %s\n", dn?dn:"error");
   xfree (dn);
 
   dn = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (cert, GCRY_MD_MD5);
   es_fprintf (fp, "      md5_fpr: %s\n", dn?dn:"error");
   xfree (dn);
 
   dn = gpgsm_get_certid (cert);
   es_fprintf (fp, "       certid: %s\n", dn?dn:"error");
   xfree (dn);
 
   dn = gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (cert);
   es_fprintf (fp, "      keygrip: %s\n", dn?dn:"error");
   xfree (dn);
 
   ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 0, t);
   es_fputs ("    notBefore: ", fp);
   gpgsm_print_time (fp, t);
   es_putc ('\n', fp);
   es_fputs ("     notAfter: ", fp);
   ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 1, t);
   gpgsm_print_time (fp, t);
   es_putc ('\n', fp);
 
   oid = ksba_cert_get_digest_algo (cert);
   s = get_oid_desc (oid, NULL);
   es_fprintf (fp, "     hashAlgo: %s%s%s%s\n", oid, s?" (":"",s?s:"",s?")":"");
 
   {
-    const char *algoname;
-    unsigned int nbits;
+    char *algostr;
 
-    algoname = gcry_pk_algo_name (gpgsm_get_key_algo_info (cert, &nbits));
-    es_fprintf (fp, "      keyType: %u bit %s\n",
-                nbits, algoname? algoname:"?");
+    algostr = gpgsm_pubkey_algo_string (cert, NULL);
+    es_fprintf (fp, "      keyType: %s\n", algostr? algostr : "[error]");
+    xfree (algostr);
   }
 
   /* subjectKeyIdentifier */
   es_fputs ("    subjKeyId: ", fp);
   err = ksba_cert_get_subj_key_id (cert, NULL, &keyid);
   if (!err || gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
     {
       if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
         es_fputs ("[none]\n", fp);
       else
         {
           gpgsm_print_serial (fp, keyid);
           ksba_free (keyid);
           es_putc ('\n', fp);
         }
     }
   else
     es_fputs ("[?]\n", fp);
 
 
   /* authorityKeyIdentifier */
   es_fputs ("    authKeyId: ", fp);
   err = ksba_cert_get_auth_key_id (cert, &keyid, &name, &sexp);
   if (!err || gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
     {
       if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA || !name)
         es_fputs ("[none]\n", fp);
       else
         {
           gpgsm_print_serial (fp, sexp);
           ksba_free (sexp);
           es_putc ('\n', fp);
           print_names_raw (fp, -15, name);
           ksba_name_release (name);
         }
       if (keyid)
         {
           es_fputs (" authKeyId.ki: ", fp);
           gpgsm_print_serial (fp, keyid);
           ksba_free (keyid);
           es_putc ('\n', fp);
         }
     }
   else
     es_fputs ("[?]\n", fp);
 
   es_fputs ("     keyUsage:", fp);
   err = ksba_cert_get_key_usage (cert, &kusage);
   if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
     {
       if (err)
         es_fprintf (fp, " [error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
       else
         {
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
             es_fputs (" digitalSignature", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_NON_REPUDIATION))
             es_fputs (" nonRepudiation", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
             es_fputs (" keyEncipherment", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT))
             es_fputs (" dataEncipherment", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_AGREEMENT))
             es_fputs (" keyAgreement", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
             es_fputs (" certSign", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_CRL_SIGN))
             es_fputs (" crlSign", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_ENCIPHER_ONLY))
             es_fputs (" encipherOnly", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DECIPHER_ONLY))
             es_fputs (" decipherOnly", fp);
         }
       es_putc ('\n', fp);
     }
   else
     es_fputs (" [none]\n", fp);
 
   es_fputs ("  extKeyUsage: ", fp);
   err = ksba_cert_get_ext_key_usages (cert, &string);
   if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
     {
       if (err)
         es_fprintf (fp, "[error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
       else
         {
           p = string;
           while (p && (pend=strchr (p, ':')))
             {
               *pend++ = 0;
               for (i=0; key_purpose_map[i].oid; i++)
                 if ( !strcmp (key_purpose_map[i].oid, p) )
                   break;
               es_fputs (key_purpose_map[i].oid?key_purpose_map[i].name:p, fp);
               p = pend;
               if (*p != 'C')
                 es_fputs (" (suggested)", fp);
               if ((p = strchr (p, '\n')))
                 {
                   p++;
                   es_fputs ("\n               ", fp);
                 }
             }
           xfree (string);
         }
       es_putc ('\n', fp);
     }
   else
     es_fputs ("[none]\n", fp);
 
 
   es_fputs ("     policies: ", fp);
   err = ksba_cert_get_cert_policies (cert, &string);
   if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
     {
       if (err)
         es_fprintf (fp, "[error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
       else
         {
           p = string;
           while (p && (pend=strchr (p, ':')))
             {
               *pend++ = 0;
               for (i=0; key_purpose_map[i].oid; i++)
                 if ( !strcmp (key_purpose_map[i].oid, p) )
                   break;
               es_fputs (p, fp);
               p = pend;
               if (*p == 'C')
                 es_fputs (" (critical)", fp);
               if ((p = strchr (p, '\n')))
                 {
                   p++;
                   es_fputs ("\n               ", fp);
                 }
             }
           xfree (string);
         }
       es_putc ('\n', fp);
     }
   else
     es_fputs ("[none]\n", fp);
 
   es_fputs ("  chainLength: ", fp);
   err = ksba_cert_is_ca (cert, &is_ca, &chainlen);
   if (err || is_ca)
     {
       if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_VALUE )
         es_fprintf (fp, "[none]");
       else if (err)
         es_fprintf (fp, "[error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
       else if (chainlen == -1)
         es_fputs ("unlimited", fp);
       else
         es_fprintf (fp, "%d", chainlen);
       es_putc ('\n', fp);
     }
   else
     es_fputs ("not a CA\n", fp);
 
 
   /* CRL distribution point */
   for (idx=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_crl_dist_point (cert, idx, &name, &name2,
                                                   &reason)) ;idx++)
     {
       es_fputs ("        crlDP: ", fp);
       print_names_raw (fp, 15, name);
       if (reason)
         {
           es_fputs ("               reason: ", fp);
           if ( (reason & KSBA_CRLREASON_UNSPECIFIED))
             es_fputs (" unused", fp);
           if ( (reason & KSBA_CRLREASON_KEY_COMPROMISE))
             es_fputs (" keyCompromise", fp);
           if ( (reason & KSBA_CRLREASON_CA_COMPROMISE))
             es_fputs (" caCompromise", fp);
           if ( (reason & KSBA_CRLREASON_AFFILIATION_CHANGED))
             es_fputs (" affiliationChanged", fp);
           if ( (reason & KSBA_CRLREASON_SUPERSEDED))
             es_fputs (" superseded", fp);
           if ( (reason & KSBA_CRLREASON_CESSATION_OF_OPERATION))
             es_fputs (" cessationOfOperation", fp);
           if ( (reason & KSBA_CRLREASON_CERTIFICATE_HOLD))
             es_fputs (" certificateHold", fp);
           es_putc ('\n', fp);
         }
       es_fputs ("               issuer: ", fp);
       print_names_raw (fp, 23, name2);
       ksba_name_release (name);
       ksba_name_release (name2);
     }
   if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF
       && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_VALUE)
     es_fputs ("        crlDP: [error]\n", fp);
   else if (!idx)
     es_fputs ("        crlDP: [none]\n", fp);
 
 
   /* authorityInfoAccess. */
   for (idx=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_authority_info_access (cert, idx, &string,
                                                          &name)); idx++)
     {
       es_fputs ("     authInfo: ", fp);
       s = get_oid_desc (string, NULL);
       es_fprintf (fp, "%s%s%s%s\n", string, s?" (":"", s?s:"", s?")":"");
       print_names_raw (fp, -15, name);
       ksba_name_release (name);
       ksba_free (string);
     }
   if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF
       && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_VALUE)
     es_fputs ("     authInfo: [error]\n", fp);
   else if (!idx)
     es_fputs ("     authInfo: [none]\n", fp);
 
   /* subjectInfoAccess. */
   for (idx=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_subject_info_access (cert, idx, &string,
                                                          &name)); idx++)
     {
       es_fputs ("  subjectInfo: ", fp);
       s = get_oid_desc (string, NULL);
       es_fprintf (fp, "%s%s%s%s\n", string, s?" (":"", s?s:"", s?")":"");
       print_names_raw (fp, -15, name);
       ksba_name_release (name);
       ksba_free (string);
     }
   if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF
       && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_VALUE)
     es_fputs ("     subjInfo: [error]\n", fp);
   else if (!idx)
     es_fputs ("     subjInfo: [none]\n", fp);
 
 
   for (idx=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_extension (cert, idx,
                                              &oid, &i, &off, &len));idx++)
     {
       unsigned int flag;
 
       s = get_oid_desc (oid, &flag);
       if ((flag & OID_FLAG_SKIP))
         continue;
 
       es_fprintf (fp, "     %s: %s%s%s%s",
                   i? "critExtn":"    extn",
                   oid, s?" (":"", s?s:"", s?")":"");
       if ((flag & OID_FLAG_UTF8))
         {
           if (!cert_der)
             cert_der = ksba_cert_get_image (cert, NULL);
           log_assert (cert_der);
           es_fprintf (fp, "\n");
           print_utf8_extn_raw (fp, -15, cert_der+off, len);
         }
       else if ((flag & OID_FLAG_HEX))
         {
           if (!cert_der)
             cert_der = ksba_cert_get_image (cert, NULL);
           log_assert (cert_der);
           es_fprintf (fp, "\n");
           print_hex_extn (fp, -15, cert_der+off, len);
         }
       else
         es_fprintf (fp, "  [%d octets]\n", (int)len);
     }
 
 
   if (with_validation)
     {
       err = gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, "", NULL, 1, fp, 0, NULL);
       if (!err)
         es_fprintf (fp, "  [certificate is good]\n");
       else
         es_fprintf (fp, "  [certificate is bad: %s]\n", gpg_strerror (err));
     }
 
   if (hd)
     {
       unsigned int blobflags;
 
       err = keydb_get_flags (hd, KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB, 0, &blobflags);
       if (err)
         es_fprintf (fp, "  [error getting keyflags: %s]\n",gpg_strerror (err));
       else if ((blobflags & KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_EPHEMERAL))
         es_fprintf (fp, "  [stored as ephemeral]\n");
     }
 
 }
 
 
 
 
 /* List one certificate in standard mode */
 static void
 list_cert_std (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, estream_t fp, int have_secret,
                int with_validation)
 {
   gpg_error_t err;
   ksba_sexp_t sexp;
   char *dn;
   ksba_isotime_t t;
   int idx, i;
   int is_ca, chainlen;
   unsigned int kusage;
   char *string, *p, *pend;
   size_t off, len;
   const char *oid;
   const unsigned char *cert_der = NULL;
 
 
   es_fprintf (fp, "           ID: 0x%08lX\n",
               gpgsm_get_short_fingerprint (cert, NULL));
 
   sexp = ksba_cert_get_serial (cert);
   es_fputs ("          S/N: ", fp);
   gpgsm_print_serial (fp, sexp);
   ksba_free (sexp);
   es_putc ('\n', fp);
 
   dn = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert, 0);
   es_fputs ("       Issuer: ", fp);
   gpgsm_es_print_name (fp, dn);
   ksba_free (dn);
   es_putc ('\n', fp);
   for (idx=1; (dn = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert, idx)); idx++)
     {
       es_fputs ("          aka: ", fp);
       gpgsm_es_print_name (fp, dn);
       ksba_free (dn);
       es_putc ('\n', fp);
     }
 
   dn = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, 0);
   es_fputs ("      Subject: ", fp);
   gpgsm_es_print_name (fp, dn);
   ksba_free (dn);
   es_putc ('\n', fp);
   for (idx=1; (dn = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, idx)); idx++)
     {
       es_fputs ("          aka: ", fp);
       gpgsm_es_print_name (fp, dn);
       ksba_free (dn);
       es_putc ('\n', fp);
     }
 
   ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 0, t);
   es_fputs ("     validity: ", fp);
   gpgsm_print_time (fp, t);
   es_fputs (" through ", fp);
   ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 1, t);
   gpgsm_print_time (fp, t);
   es_putc ('\n', fp);
 
 
   {
-    const char *algoname;
-    unsigned int nbits;
+    char *algostr;
 
-    algoname = gcry_pk_algo_name (gpgsm_get_key_algo_info (cert, &nbits));
-    es_fprintf (fp, "     key type: %u bit %s\n",
-                nbits, algoname? algoname:"?");
+    algostr = gpgsm_pubkey_algo_string (cert, NULL);
+    es_fprintf (fp, "     key type: %s\n", algostr? algostr : "[error]");
+    xfree (algostr);
   }
 
-
   err = ksba_cert_get_key_usage (cert, &kusage);
   if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
     {
       es_fputs ("    key usage:", fp);
       if (err)
         es_fprintf (fp, " [error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
       else
         {
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
             es_fputs (" digitalSignature", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_NON_REPUDIATION))
             es_fputs (" nonRepudiation", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
             es_fputs (" keyEncipherment", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT))
             es_fputs (" dataEncipherment", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_AGREEMENT))
             es_fputs (" keyAgreement", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
             es_fputs (" certSign", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_CRL_SIGN))
             es_fputs (" crlSign", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_ENCIPHER_ONLY))
             es_fputs (" encipherOnly", fp);
           if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DECIPHER_ONLY))
             es_fputs (" decipherOnly", fp);
         }
       es_putc ('\n', fp);
     }
 
   err = ksba_cert_get_ext_key_usages (cert, &string);
   if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
     {
       es_fputs ("ext key usage: ", fp);
       if (err)
         es_fprintf (fp, "[error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
       else
         {
           p = string;
           while (p && (pend=strchr (p, ':')))
             {
               *pend++ = 0;
               for (i=0; key_purpose_map[i].oid; i++)
                 if ( !strcmp (key_purpose_map[i].oid, p) )
                   break;
               es_fputs (key_purpose_map[i].oid?key_purpose_map[i].name:p, fp);
               p = pend;
               if (*p != 'C')
                 es_fputs (" (suggested)", fp);
               if ((p = strchr (p, '\n')))
                 {
                   p++;
                   es_fputs (", ", fp);
                 }
             }
           xfree (string);
         }
       es_putc ('\n', fp);
     }
 
   /* Print restrictions.  */
   for (idx=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_extension (cert, idx,
                                              &oid, NULL, &off, &len));idx++)
     {
       if (!strcmp (oid, OIDSTR_restriction) )
         {
           if (!cert_der)
             cert_der = ksba_cert_get_image (cert, NULL);
           assert (cert_der);
           es_fputs ("  restriction: ", fp);
           print_utf8_extn (fp, 15, cert_der+off, len);
         }
     }
 
   /* Print policies.  */
   err = ksba_cert_get_cert_policies (cert, &string);
   if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
     {
       es_fputs ("     policies: ", fp);
       if (err)
         es_fprintf (fp, "[error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
       else
         {
           for (p=string; *p; p++)
             {
               if (*p == '\n')
                 *p = ',';
             }
           es_write_sanitized (fp, string, strlen (string), NULL, NULL);
           xfree (string);
         }
       es_putc ('\n', fp);
     }
 
   err = ksba_cert_is_ca (cert, &is_ca, &chainlen);
   if (err || is_ca)
     {
       es_fputs (" chain length: ", fp);
       if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_VALUE )
         es_fprintf (fp, "none");
       else if (err)
         es_fprintf (fp, "[error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
       else if (chainlen == -1)
         es_fputs ("unlimited", fp);
       else
         es_fprintf (fp, "%d", chainlen);
       es_putc ('\n', fp);
     }
 
   if (opt.with_md5_fingerprint)
     {
       dn = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (cert, GCRY_MD_MD5);
       es_fprintf (fp, "      md5 fpr: %s\n", dn?dn:"error");
       xfree (dn);
     }
 
   dn = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (cert, 0);
   es_fprintf (fp, "  fingerprint: %s\n", dn?dn:"error");
   xfree (dn);
 
   if (opt.with_keygrip)
     {
       dn = gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (cert);
       if (dn)
         {
           es_fprintf (fp, "      keygrip: %s\n", dn);
           xfree (dn);
         }
     }
 
   if (opt.with_key_screening)
     print_pk_screening (cert, 0, fp);
 
   if (have_secret)
     {
       char *cardsn;
 
       p = gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (cert);
       if (!gpgsm_agent_keyinfo (ctrl, p, &cardsn) && cardsn)
         es_fprintf (fp, "     card s/n: %s\n", cardsn);
       xfree (cardsn);
       xfree (p);
     }
 
   if (with_validation)
     {
       gpg_error_t tmperr;
       size_t buflen;
       char buffer[1];
 
       err = gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, "", NULL, 1, fp, 0, NULL);
       tmperr = ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "is_qualified",
                                         &buffer, sizeof (buffer), &buflen);
       if (!tmperr && buflen)
         {
           if (*buffer)
             es_fputs ("  [qualified]\n", fp);
         }
       else if (gpg_err_code (tmperr) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
         ; /* Don't know - will not get marked as 'q' */
       else
         log_debug ("get_user_data(is_qualified) failed: %s\n",
                    gpg_strerror (tmperr));
 
       if (!err)
         es_fprintf (fp, "  [certificate is good]\n");
       else
         es_fprintf (fp, "  [certificate is bad: %s]\n", gpg_strerror (err));
     }
   if (opt.debug)
     es_fflush (fp);
 }
 
 
 /* Same as standard mode list all certifying certs too. */
 static void
 list_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd,
                  ksba_cert_t cert, int raw_mode,
                  estream_t fp, int with_validation)
 {
   ksba_cert_t next = NULL;
 
   if (raw_mode)
     list_cert_raw (ctrl, hd, cert, fp, 0, with_validation);
   else
     list_cert_std (ctrl, cert, fp, 0, with_validation);
   ksba_cert_ref (cert);
   while (!gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl, cert, &next))
     {
       ksba_cert_release (cert);
       es_fputs ("Certified by\n", fp);
       if (raw_mode)
         list_cert_raw (ctrl, hd, next, fp, 0, with_validation);
       else
         list_cert_std (ctrl, next, fp, 0, with_validation);
       cert = next;
     }
   ksba_cert_release (cert);
   es_putc ('\n', fp);
 }
 
 
 
 /* List all internal keys or just the keys given as NAMES.  MODE is a
    bit vector to specify what keys are to be included; see
    gpgsm_list_keys (below) for details.  If RAW_MODE is true, the raw
    output mode will be used instead of the standard beautified one.
  */
 static gpg_error_t
 list_internal_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names, estream_t fp,
                     unsigned int mode, int raw_mode)
 {
   KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
   KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc = NULL;
   strlist_t sl;
   int ndesc;
   ksba_cert_t cert = NULL;
   ksba_cert_t lastcert = NULL;
   gpg_error_t rc = 0;
   const char *lastresname, *resname;
   int have_secret;
   int want_ephemeral = ctrl->with_ephemeral_keys;
 
   hd = keydb_new ();
   if (!hd)
     {
       log_error ("keydb_new failed\n");
       rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
       goto leave;
     }
 
   if (!names)
     ndesc = 1;
   else
     {
       for (sl=names, ndesc=0; sl; sl = sl->next, ndesc++)
         ;
     }
 
   desc = xtrycalloc (ndesc, sizeof *desc);
   if (!ndesc)
     {
       rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
       log_error ("out of core\n");
       goto leave;
     }
 
   if (!names)
     desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
   else
     {
       for (ndesc=0, sl=names; sl; sl = sl->next)
         {
           rc = classify_user_id (sl->d, desc+ndesc, 0);
           if (rc)
             {
               log_error ("key '%s' not found: %s\n",
                          sl->d, gpg_strerror (rc));
               rc = 0;
             }
           else
             ndesc++;
         }
 
     }
 
   /* If all specifications are done by fingerprint or keygrip, we
      switch to ephemeral mode so that _all_ currently available and
      matching certificates are listed.  */
   if (!want_ephemeral && names && ndesc)
     {
       int i;
 
       for (i=0; (i < ndesc
                  && (desc[i].mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
                      || desc[i].mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_KEYGRIP)); i++)
         ;
       if (i == ndesc)
         want_ephemeral = 1;
     }
 
   if (want_ephemeral)
     keydb_set_ephemeral (hd, 1);
 
   /* It would be nice to see which of the given users did actually
      match one in the keyring.  To implement this we need to have a
      found flag for each entry in desc and to set this we must check
      all those entries after a match to mark all matched one -
      currently we stop at the first match.  To do this we need an
      extra flag to enable this feature so */
 
   /* Suppress duplicates at least when they follow each other.  */
   lastresname = NULL;
   while (!(rc = keydb_search (ctrl, hd, desc, ndesc)))
     {
       unsigned int validity;
 
       if (!names)
         desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;
 
       rc = keydb_get_flags (hd, KEYBOX_FLAG_VALIDITY, 0, &validity);
       if (rc)
         {
           log_error ("keydb_get_flags failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
           goto leave;
         }
       rc = keydb_get_cert (hd, &cert);
       if (rc)
         {
           log_error ("keydb_get_cert failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
           goto leave;
         }
       /* Skip duplicated certificates, at least if they follow each
 	 others.  This works best if a single key is searched for and
 	 expected.  FIXME: Non-sequential duplicates remain.  */
       if (gpgsm_certs_identical_p (cert, lastcert))
 	{
 	  ksba_cert_release (cert);
           cert = NULL;
 	  continue;
 	}
 
       resname = keydb_get_resource_name (hd);
 
       if (lastresname != resname )
         {
           int i;
 
           if (ctrl->no_server)
             {
               es_fprintf (fp, "%s\n", resname );
               for (i=strlen(resname); i; i-- )
                 es_putc ('-', fp);
               es_putc ('\n', fp);
               lastresname = resname;
             }
         }
 
       have_secret = 0;
       if (mode)
         {
           char *p = gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (cert);
           if (p)
             {
               rc = gpgsm_agent_havekey (ctrl, p);
               if (!rc)
                 have_secret = 1;
               else if ( gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
                 goto leave;
               rc = 0;
               xfree (p);
             }
         }
 
       if (!mode          || ((mode & 1) && !have_secret)
           || ((mode & 2) && have_secret)  )
         {
           if (ctrl->with_colons)
             list_cert_colon (ctrl, cert, validity, fp, have_secret);
           else if (ctrl->with_chain)
             list_cert_chain (ctrl, hd, cert,
                              raw_mode, fp, ctrl->with_validation);
           else
             {
               if (raw_mode)
                 list_cert_raw (ctrl, hd, cert, fp, have_secret,
                                ctrl->with_validation);
               else
                 list_cert_std (ctrl, cert, fp, have_secret,
                                ctrl->with_validation);
               es_putc ('\n', fp);
             }
         }
 
       ksba_cert_release (lastcert);
       lastcert = cert;
       cert = NULL;
     }
   if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EOF || rc == -1 )
     rc = 0;
   if (rc)
     log_error ("keydb_search failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
 
  leave:
   ksba_cert_release (cert);
   ksba_cert_release (lastcert);
   xfree (desc);
   keydb_release (hd);
   return rc;
 }
 
 
 
 static void
 list_external_cb (void *cb_value, ksba_cert_t cert)
 {
   struct list_external_parm_s *parm = cb_value;
 
   if (keydb_store_cert (parm->ctrl, cert, 1, NULL))
     log_error ("error storing certificate as ephemeral\n");
 
   if (parm->print_header)
     {
       const char *resname = "[external keys]";
       int i;
 
       es_fprintf (parm->fp, "%s\n", resname );
       for (i=strlen(resname); i; i-- )
         es_putc('-', parm->fp);
       es_putc ('\n', parm->fp);
       parm->print_header = 0;
     }
 
   if (parm->with_colons)
     list_cert_colon (parm->ctrl, cert, 0, parm->fp, 0);
   else if (parm->with_chain)
     list_cert_chain (parm->ctrl, NULL, cert, parm->raw_mode, parm->fp, 0);
   else
     {
       if (parm->raw_mode)
         list_cert_raw (parm->ctrl, NULL, cert, parm->fp, 0, 0);
       else
         list_cert_std (parm->ctrl, cert, parm->fp, 0, 0);
       es_putc ('\n', parm->fp);
     }
 }
 
 
 /* List external keys similar to internal one.  Note: mode does not
    make sense here because it would be unwise to list external secret
    keys */
 static gpg_error_t
 list_external_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names, estream_t fp, int raw_mode)
 {
   int rc;
   struct list_external_parm_s parm;
 
   parm.fp = fp;
   parm.ctrl = ctrl,
   parm.print_header = ctrl->no_server;
   parm.with_colons = ctrl->with_colons;
   parm.with_chain = ctrl->with_chain;
   parm.raw_mode  = raw_mode;
 
   rc = gpgsm_dirmngr_lookup (ctrl, names, NULL, 0, list_external_cb, &parm);
   if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EOF || rc == -1
       || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
     rc = 0; /* "Not found" is not an error here. */
   if (rc)
     log_error ("listing external keys failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
   return rc;
 }
 
 /* List all keys or just the key given as NAMES.
    MODE controls the operation mode:
     Bit 0-2:
       0 = list all public keys but don't flag secret ones
       1 = list only public keys
       2 = list only secret keys
       3 = list secret and public keys
     Bit 6: list internal keys
     Bit 7: list external keys
     Bit 8: Do a raw format dump.
  */
 gpg_error_t
 gpgsm_list_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names, estream_t fp,
                  unsigned int mode)
 {
   gpg_error_t err = 0;
 
   if ((mode & (1<<6)))
     err = list_internal_keys (ctrl, names, fp, (mode & 3), (mode&256));
   if (!err && (mode & (1<<7)))
     err = list_external_keys (ctrl, names, fp, (mode&256));
   return err;
 }