diff --git a/.git-blame-ignore-revs b/.git-blame-ignore-revs index ec5aae1c7..1313cbe04 100644 --- a/.git-blame-ignore-revs +++ b/.git-blame-ignore-revs @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ # indent: Modernize mem2str. 6a80d6f9206eae2c867c45daa5cd3e7d6c6ad114 # doc: Fix spelling errors found by lintian. 2ed1f68b48db7b5503045386de0500fddf70077e +# indent: Re-indent a function +869d1df270c0ccc3a9f792167b96d678a932b37e diff --git a/agent/pkdecrypt.c b/agent/pkdecrypt.c index 79d832520..ba42a265d 100644 --- a/agent/pkdecrypt.c +++ b/agent/pkdecrypt.c @@ -1,478 +1,531 @@ /* pkdecrypt.c - public key decryption (well, actually using a secret key) * Copyright (C) 2001, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * * This file is part of GnuPG. * * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, see . */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "agent.h" #include "../common/openpgpdefs.h" /* DECRYPT the stuff in ciphertext which is expected to be a S-Exp. Try to get the key from CTRL and write the decoded stuff back to OUTFP. The padding information is stored at R_PADDING with -1 for not known. */ gpg_error_t agent_pkdecrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text, const unsigned char *ciphertext, size_t ciphertextlen, membuf_t *outbuf, int *r_padding) { gcry_sexp_t s_skey = NULL, s_cipher = NULL, s_plain = NULL; unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL; gpg_error_t err = 0; int no_shadow_info = 0; char *buf = NULL; size_t len; *r_padding = -1; if (!ctrl->have_keygrip) { log_error ("speculative decryption not yet supported\n"); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY); goto leave; } err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_cipher, NULL, (char*)ciphertext, ciphertextlen); if (err) { log_error ("failed to convert ciphertext: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); goto leave; } if (DBG_CRYPTO) { log_printhex (ctrl->keygrip, 20, "keygrip:"); log_printhex (ciphertext, ciphertextlen, "cipher: "); } err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text, NULL, &shadow_info, CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey, NULL, NULL); if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY) no_shadow_info = 1; else if (err) { log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n"); goto leave; } if (shadow_info || no_shadow_info) { /* divert operation to the smartcard */ if (!gcry_sexp_canon_len (ciphertext, ciphertextlen, NULL, NULL)) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); goto leave; } if (s_skey && agent_is_tpm2_key (s_skey)) err = divert_tpm2_pkdecrypt (ctrl, ciphertext, shadow_info, &buf, &len, r_padding); else err = divert_pkdecrypt (ctrl, ctrl->keygrip, ciphertext, &buf, &len, r_padding); if (err) { /* We restore the original error (ie. no seckey) is no card * has been found and we have no shadow key. This avoids a * surprising "card removed" error code. */ if ((gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CARD_REMOVED || gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CARD_NOT_PRESENT) && no_shadow_info) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY); else log_error ("smartcard decryption failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } put_membuf_printf (outbuf, "(5:value%u:", (unsigned int)len); put_membuf (outbuf, buf, len); put_membuf (outbuf, ")", 2); } else { /* No smartcard, but a private key */ /* if (DBG_CRYPTO ) */ /* { */ /* log_debug ("skey: "); */ /* gcry_sexp_dump (s_skey); */ /* } */ err = gcry_pk_decrypt (&s_plain, s_cipher, s_skey); if (err) { log_error ("decryption failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } if (DBG_CRYPTO) { log_debug ("plain: "); gcry_sexp_dump (s_plain); } len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_plain, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0); log_assert (len); buf = xmalloc (len); len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_plain, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, buf, len); log_assert (len); if (*buf == '(') put_membuf (outbuf, buf, len); else { /* Old style libgcrypt: This is only an S-expression part. Turn it into a complete S-expression. */ put_membuf (outbuf, "(5:value", 8); put_membuf (outbuf, buf, len); put_membuf (outbuf, ")", 2); } } leave: gcry_sexp_release (s_skey); gcry_sexp_release (s_plain); gcry_sexp_release (s_cipher); xfree (buf); xfree (shadow_info); return err; } /* Reverse BUFFER to change the endianness. */ static void reverse_buffer (unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int length) { unsigned int tmp, i; for (i=0; i < length/2; i++) { tmp = buffer[i]; buffer[i] = buffer[length-1-i]; buffer[length-1-i] = tmp; } } /* For composite PGP KEM (ECC+ML-KEM), decrypt CIPHERTEXT using KEM API. First keygrip is for ECC, second keygrip is for PQC. CIPHERTEXT should follow the format of: - (enc-val(pqc(c%u)(e%m)(k%m)(s%m)(fixed-info&))) + (enc-val(pqc(c%d)(e%m)(k%m)(s%m)(fixed-info&))) c: cipher identifier (symmetric) e: ECDH ciphertext k: ML-KEM ciphertext s: encrypted session key fixed-info: A buffer with the fixed info. FIXME: For now, possible keys on smartcard are not supported. */ static gpg_error_t composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text, gcry_sexp_t s_cipher, membuf_t *outbuf) { #if GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010b00 gcry_sexp_t s_skey0 = NULL; gcry_sexp_t s_skey1 = NULL; unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL; gpg_error_t err = 0; unsigned int nbits; const unsigned char *p; size_t len; int algo; gcry_mpi_t encrypted_sessionkey_mpi = NULL; const unsigned char *encrypted_sessionkey; size_t encrypted_sessionkey_len; gcry_mpi_t ecc_sk_mpi = NULL; unsigned char ecc_sk[32]; gcry_mpi_t ecc_pk_mpi = NULL; unsigned char ecc_pk[32]; gcry_mpi_t ecc_ct_mpi = NULL; const unsigned char *ecc_ct; size_t ecc_ct_len; unsigned char ecc_ecdh[32]; unsigned char ecc_ss[32]; gcry_mpi_t mlkem_sk_mpi = NULL; gcry_mpi_t mlkem_ct_mpi = NULL; const unsigned char *mlkem_sk; const unsigned char *mlkem_ct; unsigned char mlkem_ss[GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_SHARED_LEN]; unsigned char kek[32]; size_t kek_len = 32; /* AES-256 is mandatory */ gcry_cipher_hd_t hd; unsigned char sessionkey[256]; size_t sessionkey_len; gcry_buffer_t fixed_info = { 0, 0, 0, NULL }; gcry_sexp_t curve = NULL; const char *curve_name; err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text, ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info, CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey0, NULL, NULL); if (err) { log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n"); goto leave; } err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text, ctrl->keygrip1, &shadow_info, CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey1, NULL, NULL); if (err) { log_error ("failed to read the another secret key\n"); goto leave; } /* Here assumes no smartcard, but private keys */ - gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_cipher, NULL, "%uc/eks&'fixed-info'", - &algo, &ecc_ct_mpi, &mlkem_ct_mpi, - &encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, &fixed_info, NULL); + err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_cipher, NULL, "%dc/eks&'fixed-info'", + &algo, &ecc_ct_mpi, &mlkem_ct_mpi, + &encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, &fixed_info, NULL); if (err) - goto leave; + { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("%s: extracting parameters failed\n", __func__); + goto leave; + } len = gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (algo); encrypted_sessionkey = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, &nbits); encrypted_sessionkey_len = (nbits+7)/8; if (len == 0 || encrypted_sessionkey_len != len + 8) { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("%s: encrypted session key length %zu" + " does not match the length for algo %d\n", + __func__, encrypted_sessionkey_len, algo); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); goto leave; } /* Fistly, ECC part. FIXME: For now, we assume X25519. */ curve = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_skey0, "curve", 0); if (!curve) { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("%s: no curve given\n", __func__); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); goto leave; } curve_name = gcry_sexp_nth_data (curve, 1, &len); if (len != 10 || memcmp (curve_name, "Curve25519", len)) { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("%s: curve '%s' not supported\n", __func__, curve_name); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); goto leave; } err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_skey0, NULL, "/qd", &ecc_pk_mpi, &ecc_sk_mpi, NULL); if (err) - goto leave; + { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("%s: extracting q and d from ECC key failed\n", __func__); + goto leave; + } p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (ecc_pk_mpi, &nbits); len = (nbits+7)/8; + if (len != 33) + { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("%s: ECC public key length invalid (%zu)\n", __func__, len); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); + goto leave; + } memcpy (ecc_pk, p+1, 32); /* Remove the 0x40 prefix */ + mpi_release (ecc_pk_mpi); + p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (ecc_sk_mpi, &nbits); len = (nbits+7)/8; if (len > 32) { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("%s: ECC secret key too long (%zu)\n", __func__, len); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); goto leave; } memset (ecc_sk, 0, 32); memcpy (ecc_sk + 32 - len, p, len); reverse_buffer (ecc_sk, 32); - mpi_release (ecc_pk_mpi); mpi_release (ecc_sk_mpi); ecc_pk_mpi = NULL; ecc_sk_mpi = NULL; ecc_ct = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (ecc_ct_mpi, &nbits); ecc_ct_len = (nbits+7)/8; if (ecc_ct_len != 32) { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("%s: ECC cipher text length invalid (%zu)\n", + __func__, ecc_ct_len); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); goto leave; } err = gcry_kem_decap (GCRY_KEM_RAW_X25519, ecc_sk, 32, ecc_ct, ecc_ct_len, ecc_ecdh, 32, NULL, 0); if (err) - goto leave; + { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("%s: gcry_kem_decap for ECC failed\n", __func__); + goto leave; + } err = gnupg_ecc_kem_kdf (ecc_ss, 32, GCRY_MD_SHA3_256, ecc_ecdh, 32, ecc_ct, 32, ecc_pk, 32); if (err) - goto leave; + { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("%s: kdf for ECC failed\n", __func__); + goto leave; + } /* Secondly, PQC part. For now, we assume ML-KEM. */ - gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_skey1, NULL, "/s", &mlkem_sk_mpi, NULL); + err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_skey1, NULL, "/s", &mlkem_sk_mpi, NULL); + if (err) + { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("%s: extracting s from PQ key failed\n", __func__); + goto leave; + } mlkem_sk = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (mlkem_sk_mpi, &nbits); len = (nbits+7)/8; if (len != GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_SECKEY_LEN) { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("%s: PQ key length invalid (%zu)\n", __func__, len); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); goto leave; } mlkem_ct = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (mlkem_ct_mpi, &nbits); len = (nbits+7)/8; if (len != GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_CIPHER_LEN) { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("%s: PQ cipher text length invalid (%zu)\n", __func__, len); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); goto leave; } err = gcry_kem_decap (GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768, mlkem_sk, GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_SECKEY_LEN, mlkem_ct, GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_CIPHER_LEN, mlkem_ss, GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_SHARED_LEN, NULL, 0); if (err) - goto leave; + { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("%s: gcry_kem_decap for PQ failed\n", __func__); + goto leave; + } mpi_release (mlkem_sk_mpi); mlkem_sk_mpi = NULL; /* Then, combine two shared secrets and ciphertexts into one KEK */ err = gnupg_kem_combiner (kek, kek_len, ecc_ss, 32, ecc_ct, 32, mlkem_ss, GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_SHARED_LEN, mlkem_ct, GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_CIPHER_LEN, fixed_info.data, fixed_info.size); if (err) { - log_error ("KEM combiner failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("%s: KEM combiner failed\n", __func__); goto leave; } mpi_release (ecc_ct_mpi); mpi_release (mlkem_ct_mpi); ecc_ct_mpi = NULL; mlkem_ct_mpi = NULL; if (DBG_CRYPTO) { log_printhex (kek, kek_len, "KEK key: "); } err = gcry_cipher_open (&hd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES256, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP, 0); if (err) { - log_error ("ecdh failed to initialize AESWRAP: %s\n", - gpg_strerror (err)); + if (opt.verbose) + log_error ("ecdh failed to initialize AESWRAP: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, kek, kek_len); sessionkey_len = encrypted_sessionkey_len - 8; err = gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, sessionkey, sessionkey_len, encrypted_sessionkey, encrypted_sessionkey_len); gcry_cipher_close (hd); mpi_release (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi); encrypted_sessionkey_mpi = NULL; if (err) { log_error ("KEM decrypt failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } put_membuf_printf (outbuf, "(5:value%u:", (unsigned int)sessionkey_len); put_membuf (outbuf, sessionkey, sessionkey_len); put_membuf (outbuf, ")", 2); leave: mpi_release (mlkem_sk_mpi); mpi_release (ecc_pk_mpi); mpi_release (ecc_sk_mpi); mpi_release (ecc_ct_mpi); mpi_release (mlkem_ct_mpi); mpi_release (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi); gcry_free (fixed_info.data); gcry_sexp_release (curve); gcry_sexp_release (s_skey0); gcry_sexp_release (s_skey1); return err; #else return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); #endif } /* DECRYPT the encrypted stuff (like encrypted session key) in CIPHERTEXT using KEM API, with KEMID. Keys (or a key) are specified in CTRL. DESC_TEXT is used to retrieve private key. OPTION can be specified for upper layer option for KEM. Decrypted stuff (like session key) is written to OUTBUF. */ gpg_error_t agent_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text, int kemid, const unsigned char *ciphertext, size_t ciphertextlen, const unsigned char *option, size_t optionlen, membuf_t *outbuf) { gcry_sexp_t s_cipher = NULL; gpg_error_t err = 0; /* For now, only PQC-PGP is supported. */ if (kemid != KEM_PQC_PGP) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); (void)optionlen; if (kemid == KEM_PQC_PGP && option) { log_error ("PQC-PGP requires no option\n"); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG); } if (!ctrl->have_keygrip) { log_error ("speculative decryption not yet supported\n"); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY); } if (!ctrl->have_keygrip1) { log_error ("Composite KEM requires two KEYGRIPs\n"); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY); } err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_cipher, NULL, (char*)ciphertext, ciphertextlen); if (err) { log_error ("failed to convert ciphertext: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); } if (DBG_CRYPTO) { - log_printhex (ctrl->keygrip, 20, "keygrip:"); + log_printhex (ctrl->keygrip, 20, "keygrip0:"); log_printhex (ctrl->keygrip1, 20, "keygrip1:"); - log_printhex (ciphertext, ciphertextlen, "cipher: "); + gcry_log_debugsxp ("cipher", s_cipher); } err = composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl, desc_text, s_cipher, outbuf); gcry_sexp_release (s_cipher); return err; }