diff --git a/sm/certchain.c b/sm/certchain.c
index e23a1c427..ee17599d1 100644
--- a/sm/certchain.c
+++ b/sm/certchain.c
@@ -1,2392 +1,2395 @@
/* certchain.c - certificate chain validation
* Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
* 2006, 2007, 2008, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see .
*/
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include "gpgsm.h"
#include
#include
#include "keydb.h"
#include "../kbx/keybox.h" /* for KEYBOX_FLAG_* */
#include "../common/i18n.h"
#include "../common/tlv.h"
/* The OID for the authorityInfoAccess's caIssuers. */
static const char oidstr_caIssuers[] = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2";
/* Object to keep track of certain root certificates. */
struct marktrusted_info_s
{
struct marktrusted_info_s *next;
unsigned char fpr[20];
};
static struct marktrusted_info_s *marktrusted_info;
/* While running the validation function we want to keep track of the
certificates in the chain. This type is used for that. */
struct chain_item_s
{
struct chain_item_s *next;
ksba_cert_t cert; /* The certificate. */
int is_root; /* The certificate is the root certificate. */
};
typedef struct chain_item_s *chain_item_t;
static int is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert,
const char *issuerdn, const char *subjectdn);
static int get_regtp_ca_info (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int *chainlen);
/* This function returns true if we already asked during this session
whether the root certificate CERT shall be marked as trusted. */
static int
already_asked_marktrusted (ksba_cert_t cert)
{
unsigned char fpr[20];
struct marktrusted_info_s *r;
gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fpr, NULL);
/* No context switches in the loop! */
for (r=marktrusted_info; r; r= r->next)
if (!memcmp (r->fpr, fpr, 20))
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Flag certificate CERT as already asked whether it shall be marked
as trusted. */
static void
set_already_asked_marktrusted (ksba_cert_t cert)
{
unsigned char fpr[20];
struct marktrusted_info_s *r;
gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fpr, NULL);
for (r=marktrusted_info; r; r= r->next)
if (!memcmp (r->fpr, fpr, 20))
return; /* Already marked. */
r = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *r);
if (!r)
return;
memcpy (r->fpr, fpr, 20);
r->next = marktrusted_info;
marktrusted_info = r;
}
/* If LISTMODE is true, print FORMAT using LISTMODE to FP. If
LISTMODE is false, use the string to print an log_info or, if
IS_ERROR is true, and log_error. */
static void
do_list (int is_error, int listmode, estream_t fp, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list arg_ptr;
va_start (arg_ptr, format) ;
if (listmode)
{
if (fp)
{
es_fputs (" [", fp);
es_vfprintf (fp, format, arg_ptr);
es_fputs ("]\n", fp);
}
}
else
{
log_logv (is_error? GPGRT_LOGLVL_ERROR: GPGRT_LOGLVL_INFO,
format, arg_ptr);
log_printf ("\n");
}
va_end (arg_ptr);
}
/* Return 0 if A and B are equal. */
static int
compare_certs (ksba_cert_t a, ksba_cert_t b)
{
const unsigned char *img_a, *img_b;
size_t len_a, len_b;
img_a = ksba_cert_get_image (a, &len_a);
if (!img_a)
return 1;
img_b = ksba_cert_get_image (b, &len_b);
if (!img_b)
return 1;
return !(len_a == len_b && !memcmp (img_a, img_b, len_a));
}
/* Return true if CERT has the validityModel extensions and defines
the use of the chain model. */
static int
has_validation_model_chain (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t listfp)
{
gpg_error_t err;
int idx, yes;
const char *oid;
size_t off, derlen, objlen, hdrlen;
const unsigned char *der;
int class, tag, constructed, ndef;
char *oidbuf;
for (idx=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_extension (cert, idx,
&oid, NULL, &off, &derlen));idx++)
if (!strcmp (oid, "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5") )
break;
if (err)
return 0; /* Not found. */
der = ksba_cert_get_image (cert, NULL);
if (!der)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); /* Oops */
goto leave;
}
der += off;
err = parse_ber_header (&der, &derlen, &class, &tag, &constructed,
&ndef, &objlen, &hdrlen);
if (!err && (objlen > derlen || tag != TAG_SEQUENCE))
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
if (err)
goto leave;
derlen = objlen;
err = parse_ber_header (&der, &derlen, &class, &tag, &constructed,
&ndef, &objlen, &hdrlen);
if (!err && (objlen > derlen || tag != TAG_OBJECT_ID))
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
if (err)
goto leave;
oidbuf = ksba_oid_to_str (der, objlen);
if (!oidbuf)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
if (opt.verbose)
do_list (0, listmode, listfp,
_("validation model requested by certificate: %s"),
!strcmp (oidbuf, "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5.1")? _("chain") :
!strcmp (oidbuf, "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5.2")? _("shell") :
/* */ oidbuf);
yes = !strcmp (oidbuf, "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5.1");
ksba_free (oidbuf);
return yes;
leave:
log_error ("error parsing validityModel: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
return 0;
}
static int
unknown_criticals (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t fp)
{
static const char *known[] = {
"2.5.29.15", /* keyUsage */
"2.5.29.17", /* subjectAltName
Japanese DoCoMo certs mark them as critical. PKIX
only requires them as critical if subjectName is
empty. I don't know whether our code gracefully
handles such empry subjectNames but that is
another story. */
"2.5.29.19", /* basic Constraints */
"2.5.29.32", /* certificatePolicies */
"2.5.29.37", /* extendedKeyUsage - handled by certlist.c */
"1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5", /* validityModel - handled here. */
NULL
};
int rc = 0, i, idx, crit;
const char *oid;
gpg_error_t err;
int unsupported;
strlist_t sl;
for (idx=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_extension (cert, idx,
&oid, &crit, NULL, NULL));idx++)
{
if (!crit)
continue;
for (i=0; known[i] && strcmp (known[i],oid); i++)
;
unsupported = !known[i];
/* If this critical extension is not supported. Check the list
of to be ignored extensions to see whether we claim that it
is supported. */
if (unsupported && opt.ignored_cert_extensions)
{
for (sl=opt.ignored_cert_extensions;
sl && strcmp (sl->d, oid); sl = sl->next)
;
if (sl)
unsupported = 0;
}
if (unsupported)
{
do_list (1, listmode, fp,
_("critical certificate extension %s is not supported"),
oid);
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT);
}
}
/* We ignore the error codes EOF as well as no-value. The later will
occur for certificates with no extensions at all. */
if (err
&& gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF
&& gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_VALUE)
rc = err;
return rc;
}
/* Check whether CERT is an allowed certificate. This requires that
CERT matches all requirements for such a CA, i.e. the
BasicConstraints extension. The function returns 0 on success and
the allowed length of the chain at CHAINLEN. */
static int
allowed_ca (ctrl_t ctrl,
ksba_cert_t cert, int *chainlen, int listmode, estream_t fp)
{
gpg_error_t err;
int flag;
err = ksba_cert_is_ca (cert, &flag, chainlen);
if (err)
return err;
if (!flag)
{
if (get_regtp_ca_info (ctrl, cert, chainlen))
{
/* Note that dirmngr takes a different way to cope with such
certs. */
return 0; /* RegTP issued certificate. */
}
do_list (1, listmode, fp,_("issuer certificate is not marked as a CA"));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CA_CERT);
}
return 0;
}
static int
check_cert_policy (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t fplist)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *policies;
estream_t fp;
int any_critical;
err = ksba_cert_get_cert_policies (cert, &policies);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
return 0; /* No policy given. */
if (err)
return err;
/* STRING is a line delimited list of certificate policies as stored
in the certificate. The line itself is colon delimited where the
first field is the OID of the policy and the second field either
N or C for normal or critical extension */
if (opt.verbose > 1 && !listmode)
log_info ("certificate's policy list: %s\n", policies);
/* The check is very minimal but won't give false positives */
any_critical = !!strstr (policies, ":C");
if (!opt.policy_file)
{
xfree (policies);
if (any_critical)
{
do_list (1, listmode, fplist,
_("critical marked policy without configured policies"));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH);
}
return 0;
}
fp = es_fopen (opt.policy_file, "r");
if (!fp)
{
if (opt.verbose || errno != ENOENT)
log_info (_("failed to open '%s': %s\n"),
opt.policy_file, strerror (errno));
xfree (policies);
/* With no critical policies this is only a warning */
if (!any_critical)
{
if (!opt.quiet)
do_list (0, listmode, fplist,
_("Note: non-critical certificate policy not allowed"));
return 0;
}
do_list (1, listmode, fplist,
_("certificate policy not allowed"));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH);
}
for (;;)
{
int c;
char *p, line[256];
char *haystack, *allowed;
/* read line */
do
{
if (!es_fgets (line, DIM(line)-1, fp) )
{
gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
xfree (policies);
if (es_feof (fp))
{
es_fclose (fp);
/* With no critical policies this is only a warning */
if (!any_critical)
{
do_list (0, listmode, fplist,
_("Note: non-critical certificate policy not allowed"));
return 0;
}
do_list (1, listmode, fplist,
_("certificate policy not allowed"));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH);
}
es_fclose (fp);
return tmperr;
}
if (!*line || line[strlen(line)-1] != '\n')
{
/* eat until end of line */
while ((c = es_getc (fp)) != EOF && c != '\n')
;
es_fclose (fp);
xfree (policies);
return gpg_error (*line? GPG_ERR_LINE_TOO_LONG
: GPG_ERR_INCOMPLETE_LINE);
}
/* Allow for empty lines and spaces */
for (p=line; spacep (p); p++)
;
}
while (!*p || *p == '\n' || *p == '#');
/* Parse line. Note that the line has always a LF and spacep
does not consider a LF a space. Thus strpbrk will always
succeed. */
for (allowed=line; spacep (allowed); allowed++)
;
p = strpbrk (allowed, " :\n");
if (!*p || p == allowed)
{
es_fclose (fp);
xfree (policies);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CONFIGURATION);
}
*p = 0; /* strip the rest of the line */
/* See whether we find ALLOWED (which is an OID) in POLICIES */
for (haystack=policies; (p=strstr (haystack, allowed)); haystack = p+1)
{
if ( !(p == policies || p[-1] == '\n') )
continue; /* Does not match the begin of a line. */
if (p[strlen (allowed)] != ':')
continue; /* The length does not match. */
/* Yep - it does match so return okay. */
es_fclose (fp);
xfree (policies);
return 0;
}
}
}
/* Helper function for find_up. This resets the key handle and search
for an issuer ISSUER with a subjectKeyIdentifier of KEYID. Returns
0 on success or GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND when not found. */
static int
find_up_search_by_keyid (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
const char *issuer, ksba_sexp_t keyid)
{
int rc;
ksba_cert_t cert = NULL;
ksba_sexp_t subj = NULL;
ksba_isotime_t not_before, not_after, last_not_before, ne_last_not_before;
ksba_cert_t found_cert = NULL;
ksba_cert_t ne_found_cert = NULL;
keydb_search_reset (kh);
while (!(rc = keydb_search_subject (ctrl, kh, issuer)))
{
ksba_cert_release (cert); cert = NULL;
rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &cert);
if (rc)
{
- log_error ("keydb_get_cert() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
+ log_error ("keydb_get_cert failed in %s: %s <%s>\n",
+ __func__, gpg_strerror (rc), gpg_strsource (rc));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
goto leave;
}
xfree (subj);
if (!ksba_cert_get_subj_key_id (cert, NULL, &subj))
{
if (!cmp_simple_canon_sexp (keyid, subj))
{
/* Found matching cert. */
rc = ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 0, not_before);
if (!rc)
rc = ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 1, not_after);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("keydb_get_validity() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
goto leave;
}
if (!found_cert
|| strcmp (last_not_before, not_before) < 0)
{
/* This certificate is the first one found or newer
* than the previous one. This copes with
* re-issuing CA certificates while keeping the same
* key information. */
gnupg_copy_time (last_not_before, not_before);
ksba_cert_release (found_cert);
ksba_cert_ref ((found_cert = cert));
keydb_push_found_state (kh);
}
if (*not_after && strcmp (ctrl->current_time, not_after) > 0 )
; /* CERT has expired - don't consider it. */
else if (!ne_found_cert
|| strcmp (ne_last_not_before, not_before) < 0)
{
/* This certificate is the first non-expired one
* found or newer than the previous non-expired one. */
gnupg_copy_time (ne_last_not_before, not_before);
ksba_cert_release (ne_found_cert);
ksba_cert_ref ((ne_found_cert = cert));
}
}
}
}
if (!found_cert)
goto leave;
/* Take the last saved one. Note that push/pop_found_state are
* misnomers because there is no stack of states. Renaming them to
* save/restore_found_state would be better. */
keydb_pop_found_state (kh);
rc = 0; /* Ignore EOF or other error after the first cert. */
/* We need to consider some corner cases. It is possible that we
* have a long term certificate (e.g. valid from 2008 to 2033) as
* well as a re-issued (i.e. using the same key material) short term
* certificate (say from 2016 to 2019). Using the short term
* certificate is the proper solution. But we need to take care if
* there is no re-issued new short term certificate (e.g. from 2020
* to 2023) available. In that case it is better to use the long
* term certificate which is still valid. The code may run into
* minor problems in the case of the chain validation mode. Given
* that this corner case is due to non-diligent PKI management we
* ignore this problem. */
/* The most common case is that the found certificate is not expired
* and thus identical to the one found from the list of non-expired
* certs. We can stop here. */
if (found_cert == ne_found_cert)
goto leave;
/* If we do not have a non expired certificate the actual cert is
* expired and we can also stop here. */
if (!ne_found_cert)
goto leave;
/* Now we need to see whether the found certificate is expired and
* only in this case we return the certificate found in the list of
* non-expired certs. */
rc = ksba_cert_get_validity (found_cert, 1, not_after);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("keydb_get_validity() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
goto leave;
}
if (*not_after && strcmp (ctrl->current_time, not_after) > 0 )
{ /* CERT has expired. Use the NE_FOUND_CERT. Because we have no
* found state for this we need to search for it again. */
unsigned char fpr[20];
gpgsm_get_fingerprint (ne_found_cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fpr, NULL);
keydb_search_reset (kh);
rc = keydb_search_fpr (ctrl, kh, fpr);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("keydb_search_fpr() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
goto leave;
}
/* Ready. The NE_FOUND_CERT is available via keydb_get_cert. */
}
leave:
ksba_cert_release (found_cert);
ksba_cert_release (ne_found_cert);
ksba_cert_release (cert);
xfree (subj);
return rc? gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND) : 0;
}
struct find_up_store_certs_s
{
ctrl_t ctrl;
int count;
unsigned int want_fpr:1;
unsigned int got_fpr:1;
unsigned char fpr[20];
};
static void
find_up_store_certs_cb (void *cb_value, ksba_cert_t cert)
{
struct find_up_store_certs_s *parm = cb_value;
if (keydb_store_cert (parm->ctrl, cert, 1, NULL))
log_error ("error storing issuer certificate as ephemeral\n");
else if (parm->want_fpr && !parm->got_fpr)
{
if (!gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, 0, parm->fpr, NULL))
log_error (_("failed to get the fingerprint\n"));
else
parm->got_fpr = 1;
}
parm->count++;
}
/* Helper for find_up(). Locate the certificate for ISSUER using an
external lookup. KH is the keydb context we are currently using.
On success 0 is returned and the certificate may be retrieved from
the keydb using keydb_get_cert(). KEYID is the keyIdentifier from
the AKI or NULL. */
static int
find_up_external (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
const char *issuer, ksba_sexp_t keyid)
{
int rc;
strlist_t names = NULL;
struct find_up_store_certs_s find_up_store_certs_parm;
char *pattern;
const char *s;
find_up_store_certs_parm.ctrl = ctrl;
find_up_store_certs_parm.want_fpr = 0;
find_up_store_certs_parm.got_fpr = 0;
find_up_store_certs_parm.count = 0;
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("looking up issuer at external location\n"));
/* The Dirmngr process is confused about unknown attributes. As a
quick and ugly hack we locate the CN and use the issuer string
starting at this attribite. Fixme: we should have far better
parsing for external lookups in the Dirmngr. */
s = strstr (issuer, "CN=");
if (!s || s == issuer || s[-1] != ',')
s = issuer;
pattern = xtrymalloc (strlen (s)+2);
if (!pattern)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
strcpy (stpcpy (pattern, "/"), s);
add_to_strlist (&names, pattern);
xfree (pattern);
rc = gpgsm_dirmngr_lookup (ctrl, names, NULL, 0, find_up_store_certs_cb,
&find_up_store_certs_parm);
free_strlist (names);
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("number of issuers matching: %d\n"),
find_up_store_certs_parm.count);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("external key lookup failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
}
else if (!find_up_store_certs_parm.count)
rc = gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND;
else
{
int old;
/* The issuers are currently stored in the ephemeral key DB, so
we temporary switch to ephemeral mode. */
old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
if (keyid)
rc = find_up_search_by_keyid (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
else
{
keydb_search_reset (kh);
rc = keydb_search_subject (ctrl, kh, issuer);
}
keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
}
return rc;
}
/* Helper for find_up(). Locate the certificate for CERT using the
* caIssuer from the authorityInfoAccess. KH is the keydb context we
* are currently using. On success 0 is returned and the certificate
* may be retrieved from the keydb using keydb_get_cert(). If no
* suitable authorityInfoAccess is encoded in the certificate
* GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND is returned. */
static gpg_error_t
find_up_via_auth_info_access (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh, ksba_cert_t cert)
{
gpg_error_t err;
struct find_up_store_certs_s find_up_store_certs_parm;
char *url, *ldapurl;
int idx, i;
char *oid;
ksba_name_t name;
find_up_store_certs_parm.ctrl = ctrl;
find_up_store_certs_parm.want_fpr = 1;
find_up_store_certs_parm.got_fpr = 0;
find_up_store_certs_parm.count = 0;
/* Find suitable URLs; if there is a http scheme we prefer that. */
url = ldapurl = NULL;
for (idx=0;
!url && !(err = ksba_cert_get_authority_info_access (cert, idx,
&oid, &name));
idx++)
{
if (!strcmp (oid, oidstr_caIssuers))
{
for (i=0; !url && ksba_name_enum (name, i); i++)
{
char *p = ksba_name_get_uri (name, i);
if (p)
{
if (!strncmp (p, "http:", 5) || !strncmp (p, "https:", 6))
url = p;
else if (ldapurl)
xfree (p); /* We already got one. */
else if (!strncmp (p, "ldap:",5) || !strncmp (p, "ldaps:",6))
ldapurl = p;
}
else
xfree (p);
}
}
ksba_name_release (name);
ksba_free (oid);
}
if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF)
{
log_error (_("can't get authorityInfoAccess: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
if (!url && ldapurl)
{
/* No HTTP scheme; fallback to LDAP if available. */
url = ldapurl;
ldapurl = NULL;
}
xfree (ldapurl);
if (!url)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("looking up issuer via authorityInfoAccess.caIssuers\n");
err = gpgsm_dirmngr_lookup (ctrl, NULL, url, 0, find_up_store_certs_cb,
&find_up_store_certs_parm);
/* Although we might receive several certificates we use only the
* first one. Or more exacty the first one for which we retrieved
* the fingerprint. */
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("number of caIssuers found: %d\n",
find_up_store_certs_parm.count);
if (err)
{
log_error ("external URL lookup failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
}
else if (!find_up_store_certs_parm.got_fpr)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
else
{
int old;
/* The retrieved certificates are currently stored in the
* ephemeral key DB, so we temporary switch to ephemeral
* mode. */
old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
keydb_search_reset (kh);
err = keydb_search_fpr (ctrl, kh, find_up_store_certs_parm.fpr);
keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
}
return err;
}
/* Helper for find_up(). Ask the dirmngr for the certificate for
ISSUER with optional SERIALNO. KH is the keydb context we are
currently using. With SUBJECT_MODE set, ISSUER is searched as the
subject. On success 0 is returned and the certificate is available
in the ephemeral DB. */
static int
find_up_dirmngr (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
ksba_sexp_t serialno, const char *issuer, int subject_mode)
{
int rc;
strlist_t names = NULL;
struct find_up_store_certs_s find_up_store_certs_parm;
char *pattern;
(void)kh;
find_up_store_certs_parm.ctrl = ctrl;
find_up_store_certs_parm.count = 0;
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("looking up issuer from the Dirmngr cache\n"));
if (subject_mode)
{
pattern = xtrymalloc (strlen (issuer)+2);
if (pattern)
strcpy (stpcpy (pattern, "/"), issuer);
}
else if (serialno)
pattern = gpgsm_format_sn_issuer (serialno, issuer);
else
{
pattern = xtrymalloc (strlen (issuer)+3);
if (pattern)
strcpy (stpcpy (pattern, "#/"), issuer);
}
if (!pattern)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
add_to_strlist (&names, pattern);
xfree (pattern);
rc = gpgsm_dirmngr_lookup (ctrl, names, NULL, 1, find_up_store_certs_cb,
&find_up_store_certs_parm);
free_strlist (names);
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("number of matching certificates: %d\n"),
find_up_store_certs_parm.count);
if (rc && opt.verbose)
log_info (_("dirmngr cache-only key lookup failed: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (rc));
return ((!rc && find_up_store_certs_parm.count)
? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND));
}
/* Locate issuing certificate for CERT. ISSUER is the name of the
issuer used as a fallback if the other methods don't work. If
FIND_NEXT is true, the function shall return the next possible
issuer. The certificate itself is not directly returned but a
keydb_get_cert on the keydb context KH will return it. Returns 0
on success, GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND if not found or another error code. */
static gpg_error_t
find_up (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
ksba_cert_t cert, const char *issuer, int find_next)
{
ksba_name_t authid;
ksba_sexp_t authidno;
ksba_sexp_t keyid;
gpg_error_t err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
if (DBG_X509)
log_debug ("looking for parent certificate\n");
if (!ksba_cert_get_auth_key_id (cert, &keyid, &authid, &authidno))
{
const char *s = ksba_name_enum (authid, 0);
if (s && *authidno)
{
err = keydb_search_issuer_sn (ctrl, kh, s, authidno);
if (err)
keydb_search_reset (kh);
if (!err && DBG_X509)
log_debug (" found via authid and sn+issuer\n");
/* In case of an error, try to get the certificate from the
dirmngr. That is done by trying to put that certificate
into the ephemeral DB and let the code below do the
actual retrieve. Thus there is no error checking.
Skipped in find_next mode as usual. */
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && !find_next)
find_up_dirmngr (ctrl, kh, authidno, s, 0);
/* In case of an error try the ephemeral DB. We can't do
that in find_next mode because we can't keep the search
state then. */
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && !find_next)
{
int old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
if (!old)
{
err = keydb_search_issuer_sn (ctrl, kh, s, authidno);
if (err)
keydb_search_reset (kh);
if (!err && DBG_X509)
log_debug (" found via authid and sn+issuer (ephem)\n");
}
keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
}
if (err) /* Need to make sure to have this error code. */
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
}
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && keyid && !find_next)
{
/* Not found by AKI.issuer_sn. Lets try the AKI.ki
instead. Loop over all certificates with that issuer as
subject and stop for the one with a matching
subjectKeyIdentifier. */
/* Fixme: Should we also search in the dirmngr? */
err = find_up_search_by_keyid (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
if (!err && DBG_X509)
log_debug (" found via authid and keyid\n");
if (err)
{
int old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
if (!old)
err = find_up_search_by_keyid (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
if (!err && DBG_X509)
log_debug (" found via authid and keyid (ephem)\n");
keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
}
if (err) /* Need to make sure to have this error code. */
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
}
/* If we still didn't found it, try to find it via the subject
from the dirmngr-cache. */
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && !find_next)
{
if (!find_up_dirmngr (ctrl, kh, NULL, issuer, 1))
{
int old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
if (keyid)
err = find_up_search_by_keyid (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
else
{
keydb_search_reset (kh);
err = keydb_search_subject (ctrl, kh, issuer);
}
keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
}
if (err) /* Need to make sure to have this error code. */
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
if (!err && DBG_X509)
log_debug (" found via authid and issuer from dirmngr cache\n");
}
/* If we still didn't found it, try an external lookup. */
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND
&& !find_next && !ctrl->offline)
{
/* We allow AIA also if CRLs are enabled; both can be used
* as a web bug so it does not make sense to not use AIA if
* CRL checks are enabled. */
if ((opt.auto_issuer_key_retrieve || !opt.no_crl_check)
&& !find_up_via_auth_info_access (ctrl, kh, cert))
{
if (DBG_X509)
log_debug (" found via authorityInfoAccess.caIssuers\n");
err = 0;
}
else if (opt.auto_issuer_key_retrieve)
{
err = find_up_external (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
if (!err && DBG_X509)
log_debug (" found via authid and external lookup\n");
}
}
/* Print a note so that the user does not feel too helpless when
an issuer certificate was found and gpgsm prints BAD
signature because it is not the correct one. */
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && opt.quiet)
;
else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
{
if (!opt.quiet)
{
log_info ("%sissuer certificate ", find_next?"next ":"");
if (keyid)
{
log_printf ("{");
gpgsm_dump_serial (keyid);
log_printf ("} ");
}
if (authidno)
{
log_printf ("(#");
gpgsm_dump_serial (authidno);
log_printf ("/");
gpgsm_dump_string (s);
log_printf (") ");
}
log_printf ("not found using authorityKeyIdentifier\n");
}
}
else if (err)
log_error ("failed to find authorityKeyIdentifier: err=%d\n", err);
xfree (keyid);
ksba_name_release (authid);
xfree (authidno);
}
if (err) /* Not found via authorithyKeyIdentifier, try regular issuer name. */
err = keydb_search_subject (ctrl, kh, issuer);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && !find_next)
{
int old;
/* Also try to get it from the Dirmngr cache. The function
merely puts it into the ephemeral database. */
find_up_dirmngr (ctrl, kh, NULL, issuer, 0);
/* Not found, let us see whether we have one in the ephemeral key DB. */
old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
if (!old)
{
keydb_search_reset (kh);
err = keydb_search_subject (ctrl, kh, issuer);
}
keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
if (!err && DBG_X509)
log_debug (" found via issuer\n");
}
/* Still not found. If enabled, try an external lookup. */
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && !find_next && !ctrl->offline)
{
if ((opt.auto_issuer_key_retrieve || !opt.no_crl_check)
&& !find_up_via_auth_info_access (ctrl, kh, cert))
{
if (DBG_X509)
log_debug (" found via authorityInfoAccess.caIssuers\n");
err = 0;
}
else if (opt.auto_issuer_key_retrieve)
{
err = find_up_external (ctrl, kh, issuer, NULL);
if (!err && DBG_X509)
log_debug (" found via issuer and external lookup\n");
}
}
return err;
}
/* Return the next certificate up in the chain starting at START.
Returns GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND when there are no more certificates. */
gpg_error_t
gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t start, ksba_cert_t *r_next)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
char *issuer = NULL;
char *subject = NULL;
KEYDB_HANDLE kh = keydb_new (ctrl);
*r_next = NULL;
if (!kh)
{
log_error (_("failed to allocate keyDB handle\n"));
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
goto leave;
}
issuer = ksba_cert_get_issuer (start, 0);
subject = ksba_cert_get_subject (start, 0);
if (!issuer)
{
log_error ("no issuer found in certificate\n");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
goto leave;
}
if (!subject)
{
log_error ("no subject found in certificate\n");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
goto leave;
}
if (is_root_cert (start, issuer, subject))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); /* we are at the root */
goto leave;
}
err = find_up (ctrl, kh, start, issuer, 0);
if (err)
{
/* It is quite common not to have a certificate, so better don't
print an error here. */
if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && opt.verbose > 1)
log_error ("failed to find issuer's certificate: %s <%s>\n",
gpg_strerror (err), gpg_strsource (err));
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_ISSUER_CERT);
goto leave;
}
err = keydb_get_cert (kh, r_next);
if (err)
{
- log_error ("keydb_get_cert() failed: %s <%s>\n",
- gpg_strerror (err), gpg_strsource (err));
+ log_error ("keydb_get_cert failed in %s: %s <%s>\n",
+ __func__, gpg_strerror (err), gpg_strsource (err));
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
leave:
xfree (issuer);
xfree (subject);
keydb_release (kh);
return err;
}
/* Helper for gpgsm_is_root_cert. This one is used if the subject and
issuer DNs are already known. */
static int
is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert, const char *issuerdn, const char *subjectdn)
{
gpg_error_t err;
int result = 0;
ksba_sexp_t serialno;
ksba_sexp_t ak_keyid;
ksba_name_t ak_name;
ksba_sexp_t ak_sn;
const char *ak_name_str;
ksba_sexp_t subj_keyid = NULL;
if (!issuerdn || !subjectdn)
return 0; /* No. */
if (strcmp (issuerdn, subjectdn))
return 0; /* No. */
err = ksba_cert_get_auth_key_id (cert, &ak_keyid, &ak_name, &ak_sn);
if (err)
{
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
return 1; /* Yes. Without a authorityKeyIdentifier this needs
to be the Root certificate (our trust anchor). */
log_error ("error getting authorityKeyIdentifier: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
return 0; /* Well, it is broken anyway. Return No. */
}
serialno = ksba_cert_get_serial (cert);
if (!serialno)
{
log_error ("error getting serialno: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Check whether the auth name's matches the issuer name+sn. If
that is the case this is a root certificate. */
ak_name_str = ksba_name_enum (ak_name, 0);
if (ak_name_str
&& !strcmp (ak_name_str, issuerdn)
&& !cmp_simple_canon_sexp (ak_sn, serialno))
{
result = 1; /* Right, CERT is self-signed. */
goto leave;
}
/* Similar for the ak_keyid. */
if (ak_keyid && !ksba_cert_get_subj_key_id (cert, NULL, &subj_keyid)
&& !cmp_simple_canon_sexp (ak_keyid, subj_keyid))
{
result = 1; /* Right, CERT is self-signed. */
goto leave;
}
leave:
ksba_free (subj_keyid);
ksba_free (ak_keyid);
ksba_name_release (ak_name);
ksba_free (ak_sn);
ksba_free (serialno);
return result;
}
/* Check whether the CERT is a root certificate. Returns True if this
is the case. */
int
gpgsm_is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert)
{
char *issuer;
char *subject;
int yes;
issuer = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert, 0);
subject = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, 0);
yes = is_root_cert (cert, issuer, subject);
xfree (issuer);
xfree (subject);
return yes;
}
/* This is a helper for gpgsm_validate_chain. */
static gpg_error_t
is_cert_still_valid (ctrl_t ctrl, int force_ocsp, int lm, estream_t fp,
ksba_cert_t subject_cert, ksba_cert_t issuer_cert,
int *any_revoked, int *any_no_crl, int *any_crl_too_old)
{
gpg_error_t err;
if (ctrl->offline || (opt.no_crl_check && !ctrl->use_ocsp))
{
audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CRL_CHECK,
gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_ENABLED));
return 0;
}
if (!(force_ocsp || ctrl->use_ocsp)
&& !opt.enable_issuer_based_crl_check)
{
err = ksba_cert_get_crl_dist_point (subject_cert, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EOF)
{
/* No DP specified in the certificate. Thus the CA does not
* consider a CRL useful and the user of the certificate
* also does not consider this to be a critical thing. In
* this case we can conclude that the certificate shall not
* be revocable. Note that we reach this point here only if
* no OCSP responder shall be used. */
audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CRL_CHECK, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TRUE));
return 0;
}
}
err = gpgsm_dirmngr_isvalid (ctrl,
subject_cert, issuer_cert,
force_ocsp? 2 : !!ctrl->use_ocsp);
audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CRL_CHECK, err);
if (err)
{
if (!lm)
gpgsm_cert_log_name (NULL, subject_cert);
switch (gpg_err_code (err))
{
case GPG_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
do_list (1, lm, fp, _("certificate has been revoked"));
*any_revoked = 1;
/* Store that in the keybox so that key listings are able to
return the revoked flag. We don't care about error,
though. */
keydb_set_cert_flags (ctrl, subject_cert, 1, KEYBOX_FLAG_VALIDITY, 0,
~0, VALIDITY_REVOKED);
break;
case GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN:
do_list (1, lm, fp, _("no CRL found for certificate"));
*any_no_crl = 1;
break;
case GPG_ERR_NO_DATA:
do_list (1, lm, fp, _("the status of the certificate is unknown"));
*any_no_crl = 1;
break;
case GPG_ERR_CRL_TOO_OLD:
do_list (1, lm, fp, _("the available CRL is too old"));
if (!lm)
log_info (_("please make sure that the "
"\"dirmngr\" is properly installed\n"));
*any_crl_too_old = 1;
break;
default:
do_list (1, lm, fp, _("checking the CRL failed: %s"),
gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Helper for gpgsm_validate_chain to check the validity period of
SUBJECT_CERT. The caller needs to pass EXPTIME which will be
updated to the nearest expiration time seen. A DEPTH of 0 indicates
the target certificate, -1 the final root certificate and other
values intermediate certificates. */
static gpg_error_t
check_validity_period (ksba_isotime_t current_time,
ksba_cert_t subject_cert,
ksba_isotime_t exptime,
int listmode, estream_t listfp, int depth)
{
gpg_error_t err;
ksba_isotime_t not_before, not_after;
err = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 0, not_before);
if (!err)
err = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 1, not_after);
if (err)
{
do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
_("certificate with invalid validity: %s"), gpg_strerror (err));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
}
if (*not_after)
{
if (!*exptime)
gnupg_copy_time (exptime, not_after);
else if (strcmp (not_after, exptime) < 0 )
gnupg_copy_time (exptime, not_after);
}
if (*not_before && strcmp (current_time, not_before) < 0 )
{
do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
depth == 0 ? _("certificate not yet valid") :
depth == -1 ? _("root certificate not yet valid") :
/* other */ _("intermediate certificate not yet valid"));
if (!listmode)
{
log_info (" (valid from ");
dump_isotime (not_before);
log_printf (")\n");
}
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_TOO_YOUNG);
}
if (*not_after && strcmp (current_time, not_after) > 0 )
{
do_list (opt.ignore_expiration?0:1, listmode, listfp,
depth == 0 ? _("certificate has expired") :
depth == -1 ? _("root certificate has expired") :
/* other */ _("intermediate certificate has expired"));
if (!listmode)
{
log_info (" (expired at ");
dump_isotime (not_after);
log_printf (")\n");
}
if (opt.ignore_expiration)
log_info ("WARNING: ignoring expiration\n");
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED);
}
return 0;
}
/* This is a variant of check_validity_period used with the chain
model. The extra constraint here is that notBefore and notAfter
must exists and if the additional argument CHECK_TIME is given this
time is used to check the validity period of SUBJECT_CERT. */
static gpg_error_t
check_validity_period_cm (ksba_isotime_t current_time,
ksba_isotime_t check_time,
ksba_cert_t subject_cert,
ksba_isotime_t exptime,
int listmode, estream_t listfp, int depth)
{
gpg_error_t err;
ksba_isotime_t not_before, not_after;
err = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 0, not_before);
if (!err)
err = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 1, not_after);
if (err)
{
do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
_("certificate with invalid validity: %s"), gpg_strerror (err));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
}
if (!*not_before || !*not_after)
{
do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
_("required certificate attributes missing: %s%s%s"),
!*not_before? "notBefore":"",
(!*not_before && !*not_after)? ", ":"",
!*not_before? "notAfter":"");
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
}
if (strcmp (not_before, not_after) > 0 )
{
do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
_("certificate with invalid validity"));
log_info (" (valid from ");
dump_isotime (not_before);
log_printf (" expired at ");
dump_isotime (not_after);
log_printf (")\n");
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
}
if (!*exptime)
gnupg_copy_time (exptime, not_after);
else if (strcmp (not_after, exptime) < 0 )
gnupg_copy_time (exptime, not_after);
if (strcmp (current_time, not_before) < 0 )
{
do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
depth == 0 ? _("certificate not yet valid") :
depth == -1 ? _("root certificate not yet valid") :
/* other */ _("intermediate certificate not yet valid"));
if (!listmode)
{
log_info (" (valid from ");
dump_isotime (not_before);
log_printf (")\n");
}
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_TOO_YOUNG);
}
if (*check_time
&& (strcmp (check_time, not_before) < 0
|| strcmp (check_time, not_after) > 0))
{
/* Note that we don't need a case for the root certificate
because its own consistency has already been checked. */
do_list(opt.ignore_expiration?0:1, listmode, listfp,
depth == 0 ?
_("signature not created during lifetime of certificate") :
depth == 1 ?
_("certificate not created during lifetime of issuer") :
_("intermediate certificate not created during lifetime "
"of issuer"));
if (!listmode)
{
log_info (depth== 0? _(" ( signature created at ") :
/* */ _(" (certificate created at ") );
dump_isotime (check_time);
log_printf (")\n");
log_info (depth==0? _(" (certificate valid from ") :
/* */ _(" ( issuer valid from ") );
dump_isotime (not_before);
log_info (" to ");
dump_isotime (not_after);
log_printf (")\n");
}
if (opt.ignore_expiration)
log_info ("WARNING: ignoring expiration\n");
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED);
}
return 0;
}
/* Ask the user whether he wants to mark the certificate CERT trusted.
Returns true if the CERT is the trusted. We also check whether the
agent is at all enabled to allow marktrusted and don't call it in
this session again if it is not. */
static int
ask_marktrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode)
{
static int no_more_questions;
int rc;
char *fpr;
int success = 0;
fpr = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
log_info (_("fingerprint=%s\n"), fpr? fpr : "?");
xfree (fpr);
if (no_more_questions)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
else
rc = gpgsm_agent_marktrusted (ctrl, cert);
if (!rc)
{
log_info (_("root certificate has now been marked as trusted\n"));
success = 1;
}
else if (!listmode)
{
gpgsm_dump_cert ("issuer", cert);
log_info ("after checking the fingerprint, you may want "
"to add it manually to the list of trusted certificates.\n");
}
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED)
{
if (!no_more_questions)
log_info (_("interactive marking as trusted "
"not enabled in gpg-agent\n"));
no_more_questions = 1;
}
else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED)
{
log_info (_("interactive marking as trusted "
"disabled for this session\n"));
no_more_questions = 1;
}
else
set_already_asked_marktrusted (cert);
return success;
}
/* Validate a chain and optionally return the nearest expiration time
in R_EXPTIME. With LISTMODE set to 1 a special listmode is
activated where only information about the certificate is printed
to LISTFP and no output is send to the usual log stream. If
CHECKTIME_ARG is set, it is used only in the chain model instead of the
current time.
Defined flag bits
VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR - Do not do any dirmngr isvalid checks.
VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL - Check according to chain model.
VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED - Check according to the STEED model.
*/
static int
do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
int listmode, estream_t listfp, unsigned int flags,
struct rootca_flags_s *rootca_flags)
{
int rc = 0, depth, maxdepth;
char *issuer = NULL;
char *subject = NULL;
KEYDB_HANDLE kh = NULL;
ksba_cert_t subject_cert = NULL, issuer_cert = NULL;
ksba_isotime_t current_time;
ksba_isotime_t check_time;
ksba_isotime_t exptime;
int any_expired = 0;
int any_revoked = 0;
int any_no_crl = 0;
int any_crl_too_old = 0;
int any_no_policy_match = 0;
int is_qualified = -1; /* Indicates whether the certificate stems
from a qualified root certificate.
-1 = unknown, 0 = no, 1 = yes. */
chain_item_t chain = NULL; /* A list of all certificates in the chain. */
gnupg_get_isotime (current_time);
gnupg_copy_time (ctrl->current_time, current_time);
if ( (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL) )
{
if (!strcmp (checktime_arg, "19700101T000000"))
{
do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
_("WARNING: creation time of signature not known - "
"assuming current time"));
gnupg_copy_time (check_time, current_time);
}
else
gnupg_copy_time (check_time, checktime_arg);
}
else
*check_time = 0;
if (r_exptime)
*r_exptime = 0;
*exptime = 0;
if (opt.no_chain_validation && !listmode)
{
log_info ("WARNING: bypassing certificate chain validation\n");
return 0;
}
kh = keydb_new (ctrl);
if (!kh)
{
log_error (_("failed to allocate keyDB handle\n"));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
goto leave;
}
if (DBG_X509 && !listmode)
gpgsm_dump_cert ("target", cert);
subject_cert = cert;
ksba_cert_ref (subject_cert);
maxdepth = 50;
depth = 0;
for (;;)
{
int is_root;
gpg_error_t istrusted_rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED);
/* Put the certificate on our list. */
{
chain_item_t ci;
ci = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ci);
if (!ci)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
ksba_cert_ref (subject_cert);
ci->cert = subject_cert;
ci->next = chain;
chain = ci;
}
xfree (issuer);
xfree (subject);
issuer = ksba_cert_get_issuer (subject_cert, 0);
subject = ksba_cert_get_subject (subject_cert, 0);
if (!issuer)
{
do_list (1, listmode, listfp, _("no issuer found in certificate"));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
goto leave;
}
/* Is this a self-issued certificate (i.e. the root certificate)? */
is_root = is_root_cert (subject_cert, issuer, subject);
if (is_root)
{
chain->is_root = 1;
/* Check early whether the certificate is listed as trusted.
We used to do this only later but changed it to call the
check right here so that we can access special flags
associated with that specific root certificate. */
if (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (subject_cert))
{
memset (rootca_flags, 0, sizeof *rootca_flags);
istrusted_rc = ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)
? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED));
}
else
istrusted_rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted (ctrl, subject_cert, NULL,
rootca_flags);
audit_log_cert (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_ROOT_TRUSTED,
subject_cert, istrusted_rc);
/* If the chain model extended attribute is used, make sure
that our chain model flag is set. */
if (!(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)
&& has_validation_model_chain (subject_cert, listmode, listfp))
rootca_flags->chain_model = 1;
}
/* Check the validity period. */
if ( (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL) )
rc = check_validity_period_cm (current_time, check_time, subject_cert,
exptime, listmode, listfp,
(depth && is_root)? -1: depth);
else
rc = check_validity_period (current_time, subject_cert,
exptime, listmode, listfp,
(depth && is_root)? -1: depth);
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED)
any_expired = 1;
else if (rc)
goto leave;
/* Assert that we understand all critical extensions. */
rc = unknown_criticals (subject_cert, listmode, listfp);
if (rc)
goto leave;
/* Do a policy check. */
if (!opt.no_policy_check)
{
rc = check_cert_policy (subject_cert, listmode, listfp);
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH)
{
any_no_policy_match = 1;
rc = 1; /* Be on the safe side and set RC. */
}
else if (rc)
goto leave;
}
/* If this is the root certificate we are at the end of the chain. */
if (is_root)
{
if (!istrusted_rc)
; /* No need to check the certificate for a trusted one. */
else if (gpgsm_check_cert_sig (subject_cert, subject_cert) )
{
/* We only check the signature if the certificate is not
trusted for better diagnostics. */
do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
_("self-signed certificate has a BAD signature"));
if (DBG_X509)
{
gpgsm_dump_cert ("self-signing cert", subject_cert);
}
rc = gpg_error (depth? GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN
: GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
goto leave;
}
if (!rootca_flags->relax)
{
rc = allowed_ca (ctrl, subject_cert, NULL, listmode, listfp);
if (rc)
goto leave;
}
/* Set the flag for qualified signatures. This flag is
deduced from a list of root certificates allowed for
qualified signatures. */
if (is_qualified == -1 && !(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
{
gpg_error_t err;
size_t buflen;
char buf[1];
if (!ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "is_qualified",
&buf, sizeof (buf),
&buflen) && buflen)
{
/* We already checked this for this certificate,
thus we simply take it from the user data. */
is_qualified = !!*buf;
}
else
{
/* Need to consult the list of root certificates for
qualified signatures. */
err = gpgsm_is_in_qualified_list (ctrl, subject_cert, NULL);
if (!err)
is_qualified = 1;
else if ( gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
is_qualified = 0;
else
log_error ("checking the list of qualified "
"root certificates failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
if ( is_qualified != -1 )
{
/* Cache the result but don't care too much
about an error. */
buf[0] = !!is_qualified;
err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (subject_cert,
"is_qualified", buf, 1);
if (err)
log_error ("set_user_data(is_qualified) failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
}
}
}
/* Act on the check for a trusted root certificates. */
rc = istrusted_rc;
if (!rc)
;
else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED)
{
do_list (0, listmode, listfp,
_("root certificate is not marked trusted"));
/* If we already figured out that the certificate is
expired it does not make much sense to ask the user
whether they want to trust the root certificate. We
should do this only if the certificate under question
will then be usable. If the certificate has a well
known private key asking the user does not make any
sense. */
if ( !any_expired
&& !gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (subject_cert)
&& (!listmode || !already_asked_marktrusted (subject_cert))
&& ask_marktrusted (ctrl, subject_cert, listmode) )
rc = 0;
}
else
{
log_error (_("checking the trust list failed: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (rc));
}
if (rc)
goto leave;
/* Check for revocations etc. */
if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR))
;
else if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
; /* Fixme: check revocations via DNS. */
else if (opt.no_trusted_cert_crl_check || rootca_flags->relax)
;
else
rc = is_cert_still_valid (ctrl,
(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL),
listmode, listfp,
subject_cert, subject_cert,
&any_revoked, &any_no_crl,
&any_crl_too_old);
if (rc)
goto leave;
break; /* Okay: a self-signed certificate is an end-point. */
} /* End is_root. */
/* Take care that the chain does not get too long. */
if ((depth+1) > maxdepth)
{
do_list (1, listmode, listfp, _("certificate chain too long\n"));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN);
goto leave;
}
/* Find the next cert up the tree. */
keydb_search_reset (kh);
rc = find_up (ctrl, kh, subject_cert, issuer, 0);
if (rc)
{
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
{
do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("issuer certificate not found"));
if (!listmode && !opt.quiet)
{
log_info ("issuer certificate: #/");
gpgsm_dump_string (issuer);
log_printf ("\n");
}
}
else
log_error ("failed to find issuer's certificate: %s <%s>\n",
gpg_strerror (rc), gpg_strsource (rc));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_ISSUER_CERT);
goto leave;
}
ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert); issuer_cert = NULL;
rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &issuer_cert);
if (rc)
{
- log_error ("keydb_get_cert() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
+ log_error ("keydb_get_cert failed in %s: %s <%s>\n",
+ __func__, gpg_strerror (rc), gpg_strsource (rc));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
goto leave;
}
try_another_cert:
if (DBG_X509)
{
log_debug ("got issuer's certificate:\n");
gpgsm_dump_cert ("issuer", issuer_cert);
}
rc = gpgsm_check_cert_sig (issuer_cert, subject_cert);
if (rc)
{
do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("certificate has a BAD signature"));
if (DBG_X509)
{
gpgsm_dump_cert ("signing issuer", issuer_cert);
gpgsm_dump_cert ("signed subject", subject_cert);
}
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
{
/* We now try to find other issuer certificates which
might have been used. This is required because some
CAs are reusing the issuer and subject DN for new
root certificates. */
/* FIXME: Do this only if we don't have an
AKI.keyIdentifier */
rc = find_up (ctrl, kh, subject_cert, issuer, 1);
if (!rc)
{
ksba_cert_t tmp_cert;
rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &tmp_cert);
if (rc || !compare_certs (issuer_cert, tmp_cert))
{
/* The find next did not work or returned an
identical certificate. We better stop here
to avoid infinite checks. */
/* No need to set RC because it is not used:
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE); */
ksba_cert_release (tmp_cert);
}
else
{
do_list (0, listmode, listfp,
_("found another possible matching "
"CA certificate - trying again"));
ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
issuer_cert = tmp_cert;
goto try_another_cert;
}
}
}
/* We give a more descriptive error code than the one
returned from the signature checking. */
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN);
goto leave;
}
is_root = gpgsm_is_root_cert (issuer_cert);
istrusted_rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED);
/* Check that a CA is allowed to issue certificates. */
{
int chainlen;
rc = allowed_ca (ctrl, issuer_cert, &chainlen, listmode, listfp);
if (rc)
{
/* Not allowed. Check whether this is a trusted root
certificate and whether we allow special exceptions.
We could carry the result of the test over to the
regular root check at the top of the loop but for
clarity we won't do that. Given that the majority of
certificates carry proper BasicContraints our way of
overriding an error in the way is justified for
performance reasons. */
if (is_root)
{
if (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (issuer_cert))
{
memset (rootca_flags, 0, sizeof *rootca_flags);
istrusted_rc = ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)
? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED));
}
else
istrusted_rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted
(ctrl, issuer_cert, NULL, rootca_flags);
if (!istrusted_rc && rootca_flags->relax)
{
/* Ignore the error due to the relax flag. */
rc = 0;
chainlen = -1;
}
}
}
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (chainlen >= 0 && depth > chainlen)
{
do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
_("certificate chain longer than allowed by CA (%d)"),
chainlen);
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN);
goto leave;
}
}
/* Is the certificate allowed to sign other certificates. */
if (!listmode)
{
rc = gpgsm_cert_use_cert_p (issuer_cert);
if (rc)
{
char numbuf[50];
sprintf (numbuf, "%d", rc);
gpgsm_status2 (ctrl, STATUS_ERROR, "certcert.issuer.keyusage",
numbuf, NULL);
goto leave;
}
}
/* Check for revocations etc. Note that for a root certificate
this test is done a second time later. This should eventually
be fixed. */
if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR))
rc = 0;
else if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
rc = 0; /* Fixme: XXX */
else if (is_root && (opt.no_trusted_cert_crl_check
|| (!istrusted_rc && rootca_flags->relax)))
rc = 0;
else
rc = is_cert_still_valid (ctrl,
(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL),
listmode, listfp,
subject_cert, issuer_cert,
&any_revoked, &any_no_crl, &any_crl_too_old);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (opt.verbose && !listmode)
log_info (depth == 0 ? _("certificate is good\n") :
!is_root ? _("intermediate certificate is good\n") :
/* other */ _("root certificate is good\n"));
/* Under the chain model the next check time is the creation
time of the subject certificate. */
if ( (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL) )
{
rc = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 0, check_time);
if (rc)
{
/* That will never happen as we have already checked
this above. */
BUG ();
}
}
/* For the next round the current issuer becomes the new subject. */
keydb_search_reset (kh);
ksba_cert_release (subject_cert);
subject_cert = issuer_cert;
issuer_cert = NULL;
depth++;
} /* End chain traversal. */
if (!listmode && !opt.quiet)
{
if (opt.no_policy_check)
log_info ("policies not checked due to %s option\n",
"--disable-policy-checks");
if (ctrl->offline || (opt.no_crl_check && !ctrl->use_ocsp))
log_info ("CRLs not checked due to %s option\n",
ctrl->offline ? "offline" : "--disable-crl-checks");
}
if (!rc)
{ /* If we encountered an error somewhere during the checks, set
the error code to the most critical one */
if (any_revoked)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
else if (any_expired)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED);
else if (any_no_crl)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN);
else if (any_crl_too_old)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CRL_TOO_OLD);
else if (any_no_policy_match)
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH);
}
leave:
/* If we have traversed a complete chain up to the root we will
reset the ephemeral flag for all these certificates. This is done
regardless of any error because those errors may only be
transient. */
if (chain && chain->is_root)
{
gpg_error_t err;
chain_item_t ci;
for (ci = chain; ci; ci = ci->next)
{
/* Note that it is possible for the last certificate in the
chain (i.e. our target certificate) that it has not yet
been stored in the keybox and thus the flag can't be set.
We ignore this error because it will later be stored
anyway. */
err = keydb_set_cert_flags (ctrl, ci->cert, 1, KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB, 0,
KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_EPHEMERAL, 0);
if (!ci->next && gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
;
else if (err)
log_error ("clearing ephemeral flag failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
}
}
/* If we have figured something about the qualified signature
capability of the certificate under question, store the result as
user data in all certificates of the chain. We do this even if the
validation itself failed. */
if (is_qualified != -1 && !(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
{
gpg_error_t err;
chain_item_t ci;
char buf[1];
buf[0] = !!is_qualified;
for (ci = chain; ci; ci = ci->next)
{
err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (ci->cert, "is_qualified", buf, 1);
if (err)
{
log_error ("set_user_data(is_qualified) failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
if (!rc)
rc = err;
}
}
}
/* If auditing has been enabled, record what is in the chain. */
if (ctrl->audit)
{
chain_item_t ci;
audit_log (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CHAIN_BEGIN);
for (ci = chain; ci; ci = ci->next)
{
audit_log_cert (ctrl->audit,
ci->is_root? AUDIT_CHAIN_ROOTCERT : AUDIT_CHAIN_CERT,
ci->cert, 0);
}
audit_log (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CHAIN_END);
}
if (r_exptime)
gnupg_copy_time (r_exptime, exptime);
xfree (issuer);
xfree (subject);
keydb_release (kh);
while (chain)
{
chain_item_t ci_next = chain->next;
ksba_cert_release (chain->cert);
xfree (chain);
chain = ci_next;
}
ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
ksba_cert_release (subject_cert);
return rc;
}
/* Validate a certificate chain. For a description see
do_validate_chain. This function is a wrapper to handle a root
certificate with the chain_model flag set. If RETFLAGS is not
NULL, flags indicating now the verification was done are stored
there. The only defined vits for RETFLAGS are
VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL and VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED.
If you are verifying a signature you should set CHECKTIME to the
creation time of the signature. If your are verifying a
certificate, set it nil (i.e. the empty string). If the creation
date of the signature is not known use the special date
"19700101T000000" which is treated in a special way here. */
int
gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime,
ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
int listmode, estream_t listfp, unsigned int flags,
unsigned int *retflags)
{
int rc;
struct rootca_flags_s rootca_flags;
unsigned int dummy_retflags;
if (!retflags)
retflags = &dummy_retflags;
/* If the session requested a certain validation mode make sure the
corresponding flags are set. */
if (ctrl->validation_model == 1)
flags |= VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL;
else if (ctrl->validation_model == 2)
flags |= VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED;
/* If the chain model was forced, set this immediately into
RETFLAGS. */
*retflags = (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL);
memset (&rootca_flags, 0, sizeof rootca_flags);
rc = do_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, checktime,
r_exptime, listmode, listfp, flags,
&rootca_flags);
if (!rc && (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
{
*retflags |= VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED;
}
else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED
&& !(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL)
&& (rootca_flags.valid && rootca_flags.chain_model))
{
do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("switching to chain model"));
rc = do_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, checktime,
r_exptime, listmode, listfp,
(flags |= VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL),
&rootca_flags);
*retflags |= VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL;
}
if (opt.verbose)
do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("validation model used: %s"),
(*retflags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)?
"steed" :
(*retflags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL)?
_("chain"):_("shell"));
return rc;
}
/* Check that the given certificate is valid but DO NOT check any
constraints. We assume that the issuers certificate is already in
the DB and that this one is valid; which it should be because it
has been checked using this function. */
int
gpgsm_basic_cert_check (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert)
{
int rc = 0;
char *issuer = NULL;
char *subject = NULL;
KEYDB_HANDLE kh;
ksba_cert_t issuer_cert = NULL;
if (opt.no_chain_validation)
{
log_info ("WARNING: bypassing basic certificate checks\n");
return 0;
}
kh = keydb_new (ctrl);
if (!kh)
{
log_error (_("failed to allocate keyDB handle\n"));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
goto leave;
}
issuer = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert, 0);
subject = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, 0);
if (!issuer)
{
log_error ("no issuer found in certificate\n");
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
goto leave;
}
if (is_root_cert (cert, issuer, subject))
{
rc = gpgsm_check_cert_sig (cert, cert);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("self-signed certificate has a BAD signature: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
if (DBG_X509)
{
gpgsm_dump_cert ("self-signing cert", cert);
}
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
goto leave;
}
}
else
{
/* Find the next cert up the tree. */
keydb_search_reset (kh);
rc = find_up (ctrl, kh, cert, issuer, 0);
if (rc)
{
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
{
if (!opt.quiet)
{
log_info ("issuer certificate (#/");
gpgsm_dump_string (issuer);
log_printf (") not found\n");
}
}
else
log_error ("failed to find issuer's certificate: %s <%s>\n",
gpg_strerror (rc), gpg_strsource (rc));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_ISSUER_CERT);
goto leave;
}
ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert); issuer_cert = NULL;
rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &issuer_cert);
if (rc)
{
- log_error ("keydb_get_cert() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
+ log_error ("keydb_get_cert failed in %s: %s <%s>\n",
+ __func__, gpg_strerror (rc), gpg_strsource (rc));
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
goto leave;
}
rc = gpgsm_check_cert_sig (issuer_cert, cert);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("certificate has a BAD signature: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
if (DBG_X509)
{
gpgsm_dump_cert ("signing issuer", issuer_cert);
gpgsm_dump_cert ("signed subject", cert);
}
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
goto leave;
}
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("certificate is good\n"));
}
leave:
xfree (issuer);
xfree (subject);
keydb_release (kh);
ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
return rc;
}
/* Check whether the certificate CERT has been issued by the German
authority for qualified signature. They do not set the
basicConstraints and thus we need this workaround. It works by
looking up the root certificate and checking whether that one is
listed as a qualified certificate for Germany.
We also try to cache this data but as long as don't keep a
reference to the certificate this won't be used.
Returns: True if CERT is a RegTP issued CA cert (i.e. the root
certificate itself or one of the CAs). In that case CHAINLEN will
receive the length of the chain which is either 0 or 1.
*/
static int
get_regtp_ca_info (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int *chainlen)
{
gpg_error_t err;
ksba_cert_t next;
int rc = 0;
int i, depth;
char country[3];
ksba_cert_t array[4];
char buf[2];
size_t buflen;
int dummy_chainlen;
if (!chainlen)
chainlen = &dummy_chainlen;
*chainlen = 0;
err = ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "regtp_ca_chainlen",
&buf, sizeof (buf), &buflen);
if (!err)
{
/* Got info. */
if (buflen < 2 || !*buf)
return 0; /* Nothing found. */
*chainlen = buf[1];
return 1; /* This is a regtp CA. */
}
else if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
{
log_error ("ksba_cert_get_user_data(%s) failed: %s\n",
"regtp_ca_chainlen", gpg_strerror (err));
return 0; /* Nothing found. */
}
/* Need to gather the info. This requires to walk up the chain
until we have found the root. Because we are only interested in
German Bundesnetzagentur (former RegTP) derived certificates 3
levels are enough. (The German signature law demands a 3 tier
hierarchy; thus there is only one CA between the EE and the Root
CA.) */
memset (&array, 0, sizeof array);
depth = 0;
ksba_cert_ref (cert);
array[depth++] = cert;
ksba_cert_ref (cert);
while (depth < DIM(array) && !(rc=gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl, cert, &next)))
{
ksba_cert_release (cert);
ksba_cert_ref (next);
array[depth++] = next;
cert = next;
}
ksba_cert_release (cert);
if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND || !depth || depth == DIM(array) )
{
/* We did not reached the root. */
goto leave;
}
/* If this is a German signature law issued certificate, we store
additional information. */
if (!gpgsm_is_in_qualified_list (NULL, array[depth-1], country)
&& !strcmp (country, "de"))
{
/* Setting the pathlen for the root CA and the CA flag for the
next one is all what we need to do. */
err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (array[depth-1], "regtp_ca_chainlen",
"\x01\x01", 2);
if (!err && depth > 1)
err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (array[depth-2], "regtp_ca_chainlen",
"\x01\x00", 2);
if (err)
log_error ("ksba_set_user_data(%s) failed: %s\n",
"regtp_ca_chainlen", gpg_strerror (err));
for (i=0; i < depth; i++)
ksba_cert_release (array[i]);
*chainlen = (depth>1? 0:1);
return 1;
}
leave:
/* Nothing special with this certificate. Mark the target
certificate anyway to avoid duplicate lookups. */
err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (cert, "regtp_ca_chainlen", "", 1);
if (err)
log_error ("ksba_set_user_data(%s) failed: %s\n",
"regtp_ca_chainlen", gpg_strerror (err));
for (i=0; i < depth; i++)
ksba_cert_release (array[i]);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/sm/import.c b/sm/import.c
index 0b8fbadb6..d506913d0 100644
--- a/sm/import.c
+++ b/sm/import.c
@@ -1,986 +1,987 @@
/* import.c - Import certificates
* Copyright (C) 2001, 2003, 2004, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see .
*/
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include "gpgsm.h"
#include
#include
#include "keydb.h"
#include "../common/exechelp.h"
#include "../common/i18n.h"
#include "../common/sysutils.h"
#include "../kbx/keybox.h" /* for KEYBOX_FLAG_* */
#include "../common/membuf.h"
#include "minip12.h"
/* The arbitrary limit of one PKCS#12 object. */
#define MAX_P12OBJ_SIZE 128 /*kb*/
struct stats_s {
unsigned long count;
unsigned long imported;
unsigned long unchanged;
unsigned long not_imported;
unsigned long secret_read;
unsigned long secret_imported;
unsigned long secret_dups;
};
struct rsa_secret_key_s
{
gcry_mpi_t n; /* public modulus */
gcry_mpi_t e; /* public exponent */
gcry_mpi_t d; /* exponent */
gcry_mpi_t p; /* prime p. */
gcry_mpi_t q; /* prime q. */
gcry_mpi_t u; /* inverse of p mod q. */
};
static gpg_error_t parse_p12 (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_reader_t reader,
struct stats_s *stats);
static void
print_imported_status (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int new_cert)
{
char *fpr;
fpr = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
if (new_cert)
gpgsm_status2 (ctrl, STATUS_IMPORTED, fpr, "[X.509]", NULL);
gpgsm_status2 (ctrl, STATUS_IMPORT_OK,
new_cert? "1":"0", fpr, NULL);
xfree (fpr);
}
/* Print an IMPORT_PROBLEM status. REASON is one of:
0 := "No specific reason given".
1 := "Invalid Certificate".
2 := "Issuer Certificate missing".
3 := "Certificate Chain too long".
4 := "Error storing certificate".
*/
static void
print_import_problem (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int reason)
{
char *fpr = NULL;
char buf[25];
int i;
sprintf (buf, "%d", reason);
if (cert)
{
fpr = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
/* detetect an error (all high) value */
for (i=0; fpr[i] == 'F'; i++)
;
if (!fpr[i])
{
xfree (fpr);
fpr = NULL;
}
}
gpgsm_status2 (ctrl, STATUS_IMPORT_PROBLEM, buf, fpr, NULL);
xfree (fpr);
}
void
print_imported_summary (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats)
{
char buf[14*25];
if (!opt.quiet)
{
log_info (_("total number processed: %lu\n"), stats->count);
if (stats->imported)
{
log_info (_(" imported: %lu"), stats->imported );
log_printf ("\n");
}
if (stats->unchanged)
log_info (_(" unchanged: %lu\n"), stats->unchanged);
if (stats->secret_read)
log_info (_(" secret keys read: %lu\n"), stats->secret_read );
if (stats->secret_imported)
log_info (_(" secret keys imported: %lu\n"), stats->secret_imported );
if (stats->secret_dups)
log_info (_(" secret keys unchanged: %lu\n"), stats->secret_dups );
if (stats->not_imported)
log_info (_(" not imported: %lu\n"), stats->not_imported);
}
sprintf(buf, "%lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu",
stats->count,
0l /*stats->no_user_id*/,
stats->imported,
0l /*stats->imported_rsa*/,
stats->unchanged,
0l /*stats->n_uids*/,
0l /*stats->n_subk*/,
0l /*stats->n_sigs*/,
0l /*stats->n_revoc*/,
stats->secret_read,
stats->secret_imported,
stats->secret_dups,
0l /*stats->skipped_new_keys*/,
stats->not_imported
);
gpgsm_status (ctrl, STATUS_IMPORT_RES, buf);
}
static void
check_and_store (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats,
ksba_cert_t cert, int depth)
{
int rc;
if (stats)
stats->count++;
if ( depth >= 50 )
{
log_error (_("certificate chain too long\n"));
if (stats)
stats->not_imported++;
print_import_problem (ctrl, cert, 3);
return;
}
/* Some basic checks, but don't care about missing certificates;
this is so that we are able to import entire certificate chains
w/o requiring a special order (i.e. root-CA first). This used
to be different but because gpgsm_verify even imports
certificates without any checks, it doesn't matter much and the
code gets much cleaner. A housekeeping function to remove
certificates w/o an anchor would be nice, though.
Optionally we do a full validation in addition to the basic test.
*/
rc = gpgsm_basic_cert_check (ctrl, cert);
if (!rc && ctrl->with_validation)
rc = gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, "", NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL);
if (!rc || (!ctrl->with_validation
&& (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_MISSING_CERT
|| gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_MISSING_ISSUER_CERT)))
{
int existed;
if (!keydb_store_cert (ctrl, cert, 0, &existed))
{
ksba_cert_t next = NULL;
if (!existed)
{
print_imported_status (ctrl, cert, 1);
if (stats)
stats->imported++;
}
else
{
print_imported_status (ctrl, cert, 0);
if (stats)
stats->unchanged++;
}
if (opt.verbose > 1 && existed)
{
if (depth)
log_info ("issuer certificate already in DB\n");
else
log_info ("certificate already in DB\n");
}
else if (opt.verbose && !existed)
{
if (depth)
log_info ("issuer certificate imported\n");
else
log_info ("certificate imported\n");
}
/* Now lets walk up the chain and import all certificates up
the chain. This is required in case we already stored
parent certificates in the ephemeral keybox. Do not
update the statistics, though. */
if (!gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl, cert, &next))
{
check_and_store (ctrl, NULL, next, depth+1);
ksba_cert_release (next);
}
}
else
{
log_error (_("error storing certificate\n"));
if (stats)
stats->not_imported++;
print_import_problem (ctrl, cert, 4);
}
}
else
{
log_error (_("basic certificate checks failed - not imported\n"));
if (stats)
stats->not_imported++;
/* We keep the test for GPG_ERR_MISSING_CERT only in case
GPG_ERR_MISSING_CERT has been used instead of the newer
GPG_ERR_MISSING_ISSUER_CERT. */
print_import_problem
(ctrl, cert,
gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_MISSING_ISSUER_CERT? 2 :
gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_MISSING_CERT? 2 :
gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT? 1 : 0);
}
}
static int
import_one (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats, int in_fd)
{
int rc;
gnupg_ksba_io_t b64reader = NULL;
ksba_reader_t reader;
ksba_cert_t cert = NULL;
ksba_cms_t cms = NULL;
estream_t fp = NULL;
ksba_content_type_t ct;
int any = 0;
fp = es_fdopen_nc (in_fd, "rb");
if (!fp)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("fdopen() failed: %s\n", strerror (errno));
goto leave;
}
rc = gnupg_ksba_create_reader
(&b64reader, ((ctrl->is_pem? GNUPG_KSBA_IO_PEM : 0)
| (ctrl->is_base64? GNUPG_KSBA_IO_BASE64 : 0)
| (ctrl->autodetect_encoding? GNUPG_KSBA_IO_AUTODETECT : 0)
| GNUPG_KSBA_IO_MULTIPEM),
fp, &reader);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("can't create reader: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
/* We need to loop here to handle multiple PEM objects in one
file. */
do
{
ksba_cms_release (cms); cms = NULL;
ksba_cert_release (cert); cert = NULL;
ct = ksba_cms_identify (reader);
if (ct == KSBA_CT_SIGNED_DATA)
{ /* This is probably a signed-only message - import the certs */
ksba_stop_reason_t stopreason;
int i;
rc = ksba_cms_new (&cms);
if (rc)
goto leave;
rc = ksba_cms_set_reader_writer (cms, reader, NULL);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("ksba_cms_set_reader_writer failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
do
{
rc = ksba_cms_parse (cms, &stopreason);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("ksba_cms_parse failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
if (stopreason == KSBA_SR_BEGIN_DATA)
log_info ("not a certs-only message\n");
}
while (stopreason != KSBA_SR_READY);
for (i=0; (cert=ksba_cms_get_cert (cms, i)); i++)
{
check_and_store (ctrl, stats, cert, 0);
ksba_cert_release (cert);
cert = NULL;
}
if (!i)
log_error ("no certificate found\n");
else
any = 1;
}
else if (ct == KSBA_CT_PKCS12)
{
/* This seems to be a pkcs12 message. */
rc = parse_p12 (ctrl, reader, stats);
if (!rc)
any = 1;
}
else if (ct == KSBA_CT_NONE)
{ /* Failed to identify this message - assume a certificate */
rc = ksba_cert_new (&cert);
if (rc)
goto leave;
rc = ksba_cert_read_der (cert, reader);
if (rc)
goto leave;
check_and_store (ctrl, stats, cert, 0);
any = 1;
}
else
{
log_error ("can't extract certificates from input\n");
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
}
ksba_reader_clear (reader, NULL, NULL);
}
while (!gnupg_ksba_reader_eof_seen (b64reader));
leave:
if (any && gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EOF)
rc = 0;
ksba_cms_release (cms);
ksba_cert_release (cert);
gnupg_ksba_destroy_reader (b64reader);
es_fclose (fp);
return rc;
}
/* Re-import certifciates. IN_FD is a list of linefeed delimited
fingerprints t re-import. The actual re-import is done by clearing
the ephemeral flag. */
static int
reimport_one (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats, int in_fd)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
estream_t fp = NULL;
char line[100]; /* Sufficient for a fingerprint. */
KEYDB_HANDLE kh;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
ksba_cert_t cert = NULL;
unsigned int flags;
kh = keydb_new (ctrl);
if (!kh)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);;
log_error (_("failed to allocate keyDB handle\n"));
goto leave;
}
keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
fp = es_fdopen_nc (in_fd, "r");
if (!fp)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("es_fdopen(%d) failed: %s\n", in_fd, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
while (es_fgets (line, DIM(line)-1, fp) )
{
if (*line && line[strlen(line)-1] != '\n')
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_LINE_TOO_LONG);
goto leave;
}
trim_spaces (line);
if (!*line)
continue;
stats->count++;
err = classify_user_id (line, &desc, 0);
if (err)
{
print_import_problem (ctrl, NULL, 0);
stats->not_imported++;
continue;
}
keydb_search_reset (kh);
err = keydb_search (ctrl, kh, &desc, 1);
if (err)
{
print_import_problem (ctrl, NULL, 0);
stats->not_imported++;
continue;
}
ksba_cert_release (cert);
cert = NULL;
err = keydb_get_cert (kh, &cert);
if (err)
{
- log_error ("keydb_get_cert() failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
+ log_error ("keydb_get_cert failed in %s: %s <%s>\n",
+ __func__, gpg_strerror (err), gpg_strsource (err));
print_import_problem (ctrl, NULL, 1);
stats->not_imported++;
continue;
}
err = keydb_get_flags (kh, KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB, 0, &flags);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error getting stored flags: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
print_imported_status (ctrl, cert, 0);
stats->not_imported++;
continue;
}
if ( !(flags & KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_EPHEMERAL) )
{
print_imported_status (ctrl, cert, 0);
stats->unchanged++;
continue;
}
err = keydb_set_cert_flags (ctrl, cert, 1, KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB, 0,
KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_EPHEMERAL, 0);
if (err)
{
log_error ("clearing ephemeral flag failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
print_import_problem (ctrl, cert, 0);
stats->not_imported++;
continue;
}
print_imported_status (ctrl, cert, 1);
stats->imported++;
}
err = 0;
if (es_ferror (fp))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("error reading fd %d: %s\n", in_fd, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
leave:
ksba_cert_release (cert);
keydb_release (kh);
es_fclose (fp);
return err;
}
int
gpgsm_import (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, int reimport_mode)
{
int rc;
struct stats_s stats;
memset (&stats, 0, sizeof stats);
if (reimport_mode)
rc = reimport_one (ctrl, &stats, in_fd);
else
rc = import_one (ctrl, &stats, in_fd);
print_imported_summary (ctrl, &stats);
/* If we never printed an error message do it now so that a command
line invocation will return with an error (log_error keeps a
global errorcount) */
if (rc && !log_get_errorcount (0))
log_error (_("error importing certificate: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
return rc;
}
int
gpgsm_import_files (ctrl_t ctrl, int nfiles, char **files,
int (*of)(const char *fname))
{
int rc = 0;
struct stats_s stats;
memset (&stats, 0, sizeof stats);
if (!nfiles)
rc = import_one (ctrl, &stats, 0);
else
{
for (; nfiles && !rc ; nfiles--, files++)
{
int fd = of (*files);
rc = import_one (ctrl, &stats, fd);
close (fd);
if (rc == -1/* legacy*/ || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
rc = 0;
}
}
print_imported_summary (ctrl, &stats);
/* If we never printed an error message do it now so that a command
line invocation will return with an error (log_error keeps a
global errorcount) */
if (rc && !log_get_errorcount (0))
log_error (_("error importing certificate: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
return rc;
}
/* Check that the RSA secret key SKEY is valid. Swap parameters to
the libgcrypt standard. */
static gpg_error_t
rsa_key_check (struct rsa_secret_key_s *skey)
{
int err = 0;
gcry_mpi_t t = gcry_mpi_snew (0);
gcry_mpi_t t1 = gcry_mpi_snew (0);
gcry_mpi_t t2 = gcry_mpi_snew (0);
gcry_mpi_t phi = gcry_mpi_snew (0);
/* Check that n == p * q. */
gcry_mpi_mul (t, skey->p, skey->q);
if (gcry_mpi_cmp( t, skey->n) )
{
log_error ("RSA oops: n != p * q\n");
err++;
}
/* Check that p is less than q. */
if (gcry_mpi_cmp (skey->p, skey->q) > 0)
{
gcry_mpi_t tmp;
log_info ("swapping secret primes\n");
tmp = gcry_mpi_copy (skey->p);
gcry_mpi_set (skey->p, skey->q);
gcry_mpi_set (skey->q, tmp);
gcry_mpi_release (tmp);
/* Recompute u. */
gcry_mpi_invm (skey->u, skey->p, skey->q);
}
/* Check that e divides neither p-1 nor q-1. */
gcry_mpi_sub_ui (t, skey->p, 1 );
gcry_mpi_div (NULL, t, t, skey->e, 0);
if (!gcry_mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0) )
{
log_error ("RSA oops: e divides p-1\n");
err++;
}
gcry_mpi_sub_ui (t, skey->q, 1);
gcry_mpi_div (NULL, t, t, skey->e, 0);
if (!gcry_mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0))
{
log_info ("RSA oops: e divides q-1\n" );
err++;
}
/* Check that d is correct. */
gcry_mpi_sub_ui (t1, skey->p, 1);
gcry_mpi_sub_ui (t2, skey->q, 1);
gcry_mpi_mul (phi, t1, t2);
gcry_mpi_invm (t, skey->e, phi);
if (gcry_mpi_cmp (t, skey->d))
{
/* No: try universal exponent. */
gcry_mpi_gcd (t, t1, t2);
gcry_mpi_div (t, NULL, phi, t, 0);
gcry_mpi_invm (t, skey->e, t);
if (gcry_mpi_cmp (t, skey->d))
{
log_error ("RSA oops: bad secret exponent\n");
err++;
}
}
/* Check for correctness of u. */
gcry_mpi_invm (t, skey->p, skey->q);
if (gcry_mpi_cmp (t, skey->u))
{
log_info ("RSA oops: bad u parameter\n");
err++;
}
if (err)
log_info ("RSA secret key check failed\n");
gcry_mpi_release (t);
gcry_mpi_release (t1);
gcry_mpi_release (t2);
gcry_mpi_release (phi);
return err? gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY):0;
}
/* Object passed to store_cert_cb. */
struct store_cert_parm_s
{
gpg_error_t err; /* First error seen. */
struct stats_s *stats; /* The stats object. */
ctrl_t ctrl; /* The control object. */
};
/* Helper to store the DER encoded certificate CERTDATA of length
CERTDATALEN. */
static void
store_cert_cb (void *opaque,
const unsigned char *certdata, size_t certdatalen)
{
struct store_cert_parm_s *parm = opaque;
gpg_error_t err;
ksba_cert_t cert;
err = ksba_cert_new (&cert);
if (err)
{
if (!parm->err)
parm->err = err;
return;
}
err = ksba_cert_init_from_mem (cert, certdata, certdatalen);
if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to parse a certificate: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
if (!parm->err)
parm->err = err;
}
else
check_and_store (parm->ctrl, parm->stats, cert, 0);
ksba_cert_release (cert);
}
/* Assume that the reader is at a pkcs#12 message and try to import
certificates from that stupid format. We will transfer secret
keys to the agent. */
static gpg_error_t
parse_p12 (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_reader_t reader, struct stats_s *stats)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
char buffer[1024];
size_t ntotal, nread;
membuf_t p12mbuf;
char *p12buffer = NULL;
size_t p12buflen;
size_t p12bufoff;
gcry_mpi_t *kparms = NULL;
struct rsa_secret_key_s sk;
char *passphrase = NULL;
unsigned char *key = NULL;
size_t keylen;
void *kek = NULL;
size_t keklen;
unsigned char *wrappedkey = NULL;
size_t wrappedkeylen;
gcry_cipher_hd_t cipherhd = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t s_key = NULL;
unsigned char grip[20];
int bad_pass = 0;
char *curve = NULL;
int i;
struct store_cert_parm_s store_cert_parm;
memset (&store_cert_parm, 0, sizeof store_cert_parm);
store_cert_parm.ctrl = ctrl;
store_cert_parm.stats = stats;
init_membuf (&p12mbuf, 4096);
ntotal = 0;
while (!(err = ksba_reader_read (reader, buffer, sizeof buffer, &nread)))
{
if (ntotal >= MAX_P12OBJ_SIZE*1024)
{
/* Arbitrary limit to avoid DoS attacks. */
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
log_error ("pkcs#12 object is larger than %dk\n", MAX_P12OBJ_SIZE);
break;
}
put_membuf (&p12mbuf, buffer, nread);
ntotal += nread;
}
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EOF)
err = 0;
if (!err)
{
p12buffer = get_membuf (&p12mbuf, &p12buflen);
if (!p12buffer)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
}
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error reading input: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* GnuPG 2.0.4 accidentally created binary P12 files with the string
"The passphrase is %s encoded.\n\n" prepended to the ASN.1 data.
We fix that here. */
if (p12buflen > 29 && !memcmp (p12buffer, "The passphrase is ", 18))
{
for (p12bufoff=18;
p12bufoff < p12buflen && p12buffer[p12bufoff] != '\n';
p12bufoff++)
;
p12bufoff++;
if (p12bufoff < p12buflen && p12buffer[p12bufoff] == '\n')
p12bufoff++;
}
else
p12bufoff = 0;
err = gpgsm_agent_ask_passphrase
(ctrl,
i18n_utf8 (N_("Please enter the passphrase to unprotect the PKCS#12 object.")),
0, &passphrase);
if (err)
goto leave;
kparms = p12_parse (p12buffer + p12bufoff, p12buflen - p12bufoff,
passphrase, store_cert_cb,
&store_cert_parm, &bad_pass, &curve);
xfree (passphrase);
passphrase = NULL;
if (!kparms)
{
log_error ("error parsing or decrypting the PKCS#12 file\n");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
goto leave;
}
if (curve)
{
gcry_ctx_t ecctx = NULL;
/* log_debug ("curve: %s\n", curve); */
/* gcry_log_debugmpi ("MPI[0]", kparms[0]); */
/* We need to get the public key. */
err = gcry_mpi_ec_new (&ecctx, NULL, curve);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error creating context for curve '%s': %s\n",
curve, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
err = gcry_mpi_ec_set_mpi ("d", kparms[0], ecctx);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error setting 'd' into context of curve '%s': %s\n",
curve, gpg_strerror (err));
gcry_ctx_release (ecctx);
goto leave;
}
kparms[1] = gcry_mpi_ec_get_mpi ("q", ecctx, 1);
if (!kparms[1])
{
log_error ("error computing 'q' from 'd' for curve '%s'\n", curve);
gcry_ctx_release (ecctx);
goto leave;
}
gcry_ctx_release (ecctx);
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_key, NULL,
"(private-key(ecc(curve %s)(q%m)(d%m)))",
curve, kparms[1], kparms[0], NULL);
}
else /* RSA */
{
/* print_mpi (" n", kparms[0]); */
/* print_mpi (" e", kparms[1]); */
/* print_mpi (" d", kparms[2]); */
/* print_mpi (" p", kparms[3]); */
/* print_mpi (" q", kparms[4]); */
/* print_mpi ("dmp1", kparms[5]); */
/* print_mpi ("dmq1", kparms[6]); */
/* print_mpi (" u", kparms[7]); */
sk.n = kparms[0];
sk.e = kparms[1];
sk.d = kparms[2];
sk.q = kparms[3];
sk.p = kparms[4];
sk.u = kparms[7];
err = rsa_key_check (&sk);
if (err)
goto leave;
/* print_mpi (" n", sk.n); */
/* print_mpi (" e", sk.e); */
/* print_mpi (" d", sk.d); */
/* print_mpi (" p", sk.p); */
/* print_mpi (" q", sk.q); */
/* print_mpi (" u", sk.u); */
/* Create an S-expression from the parameters. */
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_key, NULL,
"(private-key(rsa(n%m)(e%m)(d%m)(p%m)(q%m)(u%m)))",
sk.n, sk.e, sk.d, sk.p, sk.q, sk.u, NULL);
}
/* The next is very ugly - we really should not rely on our
* knowledge of p12_parse internals. */
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
gcry_mpi_release (kparms[i]);
gcry_free (kparms);
kparms = NULL;
if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to create S-expression from key: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Compute the keygrip. */
if (!gcry_pk_get_keygrip (s_key, grip))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
log_error ("can't calculate keygrip\n");
goto leave;
}
if (DBG_X509)
log_printhex (grip, 20, "keygrip:");
/* Convert to canonical encoding using a function which pads it to a
multiple of 64 bits. We need this padding for AESWRAP. */
err = make_canon_sexp_pad (s_key, 1, &key, &keylen);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error creating canonical S-expression\n");
goto leave;
}
gcry_sexp_release (s_key);
s_key = NULL;
/* Get the current KEK. */
err = gpgsm_agent_keywrap_key (ctrl, 0, &kek, &keklen);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error getting the KEK: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Wrap the key. */
err = gcry_cipher_open (&cipherhd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP, 0);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (cipherhd, kek, keklen);
if (err)
goto leave;
xfree (kek);
kek = NULL;
wrappedkeylen = keylen + 8;
wrappedkey = xtrymalloc (wrappedkeylen);
if (!wrappedkey)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
err = gcry_cipher_encrypt (cipherhd, wrappedkey, wrappedkeylen, key, keylen);
if (err)
goto leave;
xfree (key);
key = NULL;
gcry_cipher_close (cipherhd);
cipherhd = NULL;
/* Send the wrapped key to the agent. */
err = gpgsm_agent_import_key (ctrl, wrappedkey, wrappedkeylen);
if (!err)
{
stats->count++;
stats->secret_read++;
stats->secret_imported++;
}
else if ( gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EEXIST )
{
err = 0;
stats->count++;
stats->secret_read++;
stats->secret_dups++;
}
/* If we did not get an error from storing the secret key we return
a possible error from parsing the certificates. We do this after
storing the secret keys so that a bad certificate does not
inhibit our chance to store the secret key. */
if (!err && store_cert_parm.err)
err = store_cert_parm.err;
leave:
if (kparms)
{
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
gcry_mpi_release (kparms[i]);
gcry_free (kparms);
kparms = NULL;
}
xfree (key);
gcry_sexp_release (s_key);
xfree (passphrase);
gcry_cipher_close (cipherhd);
xfree (wrappedkey);
xfree (kek);
xfree (get_membuf (&p12mbuf, NULL));
xfree (p12buffer);
xfree (curve);
if (bad_pass)
{
/* We only write a plain error code and not direct
BAD_PASSPHRASE because the pkcs12 parser might issue this
message multiple times, BAD_PASSPHRASE in general requires a
keyID and parts of the import might actually succeed so that
IMPORT_PROBLEM is also not appropriate. */
gpgsm_status_with_err_code (ctrl, STATUS_ERROR,
"import.parsep12", GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
}
return err;
}
diff --git a/sm/keydb.c b/sm/keydb.c
index 990f63a61..048d04d31 100644
--- a/sm/keydb.c
+++ b/sm/keydb.c
@@ -1,2134 +1,2155 @@
/* keydb.c - key database dispatcher
* Copyright (C) 2001, 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2014, 2020 g10 Code GmbH
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see .
*/
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include "gpgsm.h"
#include
#include "../kbx/keybox.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "../common/i18n.h"
#include "../common/asshelp.h"
#include "../kbx/kbx-client-util.h"
typedef enum {
KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE = 0,
KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX
} KeydbResourceType;
#define MAX_KEYDB_RESOURCES 20
struct resource_item {
KeydbResourceType type;
union {
KEYBOX_HANDLE kr;
} u;
void *token;
};
/* Data used to keep track of keybox daemon sessions. This allows us
* to use several sessions with the keyboxd and also to re-use already
* established sessions. Note that gpgdm.h defines the type
* keydb_local_t for this structure. */
struct keydb_local_s
{
/* Link to other keyboxd contexts which are used simultaneously. */
struct keydb_local_s *next;
/* The active Assuan context. */
assuan_context_t ctx;
/* The client data helper context. */
kbx_client_data_t kcd;
/* I/O buffer with the last search result or NULL. Used if
* D-lines are used to convey the keyblocks. */
struct {
char *buf;
size_t len;
} search_result;
+ /* The "stack" used by keydb_push_found_state. */
+ struct {
+ char *buf;
+ size_t len;
+ } saved_search_result;
/* This flag set while an operation is running on this context. */
unsigned int is_active : 1;
/* Flag indicating that a search reset is required. */
unsigned int need_search_reset : 1;
};
static struct resource_item all_resources[MAX_KEYDB_RESOURCES];
static int used_resources;
/* Whether we have successfully registered any resource. */
static int any_registered;
/* Number of active handles. */
static int active_handles;
struct keydb_handle {
/* CTRL object passed to keydb_new. */
ctrl_t ctrl;
/* If set the keyboxdd is used instead of the local files. */
int use_keyboxd;
/* BEGIN USE_KEYBOXD */
/* (These fields are only valid if USE_KEYBOXD is set.) */
/* Connection info which also keeps the local state. (This points
* into the CTRL->keybox_local list.) */
keydb_local_t kbl;
/* Various flags. */
unsigned int last_ubid_valid:1;
unsigned int last_is_ephemeral; /* Last found key is ephemeral. */
/* The UBID of the last returned keyblock. */
unsigned char last_ubid[UBID_LEN];
/* END USE_KEYBOXD */
/* BEGIN !USE_KEYBOXD */
/* (The remaining fields are only valid if USE_KEYBOXD is cleared.) */
/* If this flag is set the resources is locked. */
int locked;
/* If this flag is set a lock will only be released by
* keydb_release. */
int keep_lock;
int found;
int saved_found;
int current;
int is_ephemeral;
int used; /* items in active */
struct resource_item active[MAX_KEYDB_RESOURCES];
/* END !USE_KEYBOXD */
};
static int lock_all (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);
static void unlock_all (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);
/* Deinitialize all session resources pertaining to the keyboxd. */
void
gpgsm_keydb_deinit_session_data (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
keydb_local_t kbl;
while ((kbl = ctrl->keydb_local))
{
ctrl->keydb_local = kbl->next;
if (kbl->is_active)
log_error ("oops: trying to cleanup an active keydb context\n");
else
{
kbx_client_data_release (kbl->kcd);
kbl->kcd = NULL;
assuan_release (kbl->ctx);
kbl->ctx = NULL;
}
xfree (kbl);
}
}
static void
try_make_homedir (const char *fname)
{
if ( opt.dry_run || opt.no_homedir_creation )
return;
gnupg_maybe_make_homedir (fname, opt.quiet);
}
/* Handle the creation of a keybox if it does not yet exist. Take
into account that other processes might have the keybox already
locked. This lock check does not work if the directory itself is
not yet available. If R_CREATED is not NULL it will be set to true
if the function created a new keybox. */
static gpg_error_t
maybe_create_keybox (char *filename, int force, int *r_created)
{
gpg_err_code_t ec;
dotlock_t lockhd = NULL;
estream_t fp;
int rc;
mode_t oldmask;
char *last_slash_in_filename;
int save_slash;
if (r_created)
*r_created = 0;
/* A quick test whether the filename already exists. */
if (!gnupg_access (filename, F_OK))
return !gnupg_access (filename, R_OK)? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EACCES);
/* If we don't want to create a new file at all, there is no need to
go any further - bail out right here. */
if (!force)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOENT);
/* First of all we try to create the home directory. Note, that we
don't do any locking here because any sane application of gpg
would create the home directory by itself and not rely on gpg's
tricky auto-creation which is anyway only done for some home
directory name patterns. */
last_slash_in_filename = strrchr (filename, DIRSEP_C);
#if HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
{
/* Windows may either have a slash or a backslash. Take care of it. */
char *p = strrchr (filename, '/');
if (!last_slash_in_filename || p > last_slash_in_filename)
last_slash_in_filename = p;
}
#endif /*HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
if (!last_slash_in_filename)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOENT); /* No slash at all - should
not happen though. */
save_slash = *last_slash_in_filename;
*last_slash_in_filename = 0;
if (gnupg_access(filename, F_OK))
{
static int tried;
if (!tried)
{
tried = 1;
try_make_homedir (filename);
}
if ((ec = gnupg_access (filename, F_OK)))
{
rc = gpg_error (ec);
*last_slash_in_filename = save_slash;
goto leave;
}
}
*last_slash_in_filename = save_slash;
/* To avoid races with other instances of gpg trying to create or
update the keybox (it is removed during an update for a short
time), we do the next stuff in a locked state. */
lockhd = dotlock_create (filename, 0);
if (!lockhd)
{
/* A reason for this to fail is that the directory is not
writable. However, this whole locking stuff does not make
sense if this is the case. An empty non-writable directory
with no keyring is not really useful at all. */
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("can't allocate lock for '%s'\n", filename );
if (!force)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOENT);
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
if ( dotlock_take (lockhd, -1) )
{
/* This is something bad. Probably a stale lockfile. */
log_info ("can't lock '%s'\n", filename);
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
goto leave;
}
/* Now the real test while we are locked. */
if (!access(filename, F_OK))
{
rc = 0; /* Okay, we may access the file now. */
goto leave;
}
/* The file does not yet exist, create it now. */
oldmask = umask (077);
fp = es_fopen (filename, "wb");
if (!fp)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
umask (oldmask);
log_error (_("error creating keybox '%s': %s\n"),
filename, gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
umask (oldmask);
/* Make sure that at least one record is in a new keybox file, so
that the detection magic for OpenPGP keyboxes works the next time
it is used. */
rc = _keybox_write_header_blob (fp, 0);
if (rc)
{
es_fclose (fp);
log_error (_("error creating keybox '%s': %s\n"),
filename, gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
if (!opt.quiet)
log_info (_("keybox '%s' created\n"), filename);
if (r_created)
*r_created = 1;
es_fclose (fp);
rc = 0;
leave:
if (lockhd)
{
dotlock_release (lockhd);
dotlock_destroy (lockhd);
}
return rc;
}
/*
* Register a resource (which currently may only be a keybox file).
* The first keybox which is added by this function is created if it
* does not exist. If AUTO_CREATED is not NULL it will be set to true
* if the function has created a new keybox.
*/
gpg_error_t
keydb_add_resource (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *url, int force, int *auto_created)
{
const char *resname = url;
char *filename = NULL;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
KeydbResourceType rt = KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE;
if (auto_created)
*auto_created = 0;
/* Do we have an URL?
gnupg-kbx:filename := this is a plain keybox
filename := See what it is, but create as plain keybox.
*/
if (strlen (resname) > 10)
{
if (!strncmp (resname, "gnupg-kbx:", 10) )
{
rt = KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX;
resname += 10;
}
#if !defined(HAVE_DRIVE_LETTERS) && !defined(__riscos__)
else if (strchr (resname, ':'))
{
log_error ("invalid key resource URL '%s'\n", url );
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
goto leave;
}
#endif /* !HAVE_DRIVE_LETTERS && !__riscos__ */
}
if (*resname != DIRSEP_C )
{ /* do tilde expansion etc */
if (strchr(resname, DIRSEP_C) )
filename = make_filename (resname, NULL);
else
filename = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), resname, NULL);
}
else
filename = xstrdup (resname);
if (!force)
force = !any_registered;
/* see whether we can determine the filetype */
if (rt == KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE)
{
estream_t fp;
fp = es_fopen( filename, "rb" );
if (fp)
{
u32 magic;
/* FIXME: check for the keybox magic */
if (es_fread (&magic, 4, 1, fp) == 1 )
{
if (magic == 0x13579ace || magic == 0xce9a5713)
; /* GDBM magic - no more support */
else
rt = KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX;
}
else /* maybe empty: assume keybox */
rt = KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX;
es_fclose (fp);
}
else /* no file yet: create keybox */
rt = KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX;
}
switch (rt)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
log_error ("unknown type of key resource '%s'\n", url );
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
goto leave;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
err = maybe_create_keybox (filename, force, auto_created);
if (err)
goto leave;
/* Now register the file */
{
void *token;
err = keybox_register_file (filename, 0, &token);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EEXIST)
; /* Already registered - ignore. */
else if (err)
; /* Other error. */
else if (used_resources >= MAX_KEYDB_RESOURCES)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_RESOURCE_LIMIT);
else
{
KEYBOX_HANDLE kbxhd;
all_resources[used_resources].type = rt;
all_resources[used_resources].u.kr = NULL; /* Not used here */
all_resources[used_resources].token = token;
/* Do a compress run if needed and the keybox is not locked. */
kbxhd = keybox_new_x509 (token, 0);
if (kbxhd)
{
if (!keybox_lock (kbxhd, 1, 0))
{
keybox_compress (kbxhd);
keybox_lock (kbxhd, 0, 0);
}
keybox_release (kbxhd);
}
used_resources++;
}
}
break;
default:
log_error ("resource type of '%s' not supported\n", url);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
goto leave;
}
/* fixme: check directory permissions and print a warning */
leave:
if (err)
{
log_error ("keyblock resource '%s': %s\n", filename, gpg_strerror (err));
gpgsm_status_with_error (ctrl, STATUS_ERROR,
"add_keyblock_resource", err);
}
else
any_registered = 1;
xfree (filename);
return err;
}
/* Print a warning if the server's version number is less than our
version number. Returns an error code on a connection problem. */
static gpg_error_t
warn_version_mismatch (ctrl_t ctrl, assuan_context_t ctx,
const char *servername)
{
return warn_server_version_mismatch (ctx, servername, 0,
gpgsm_status2, ctrl,
!opt.quiet);
}
/* Connect to the keybox daemon and launch it if necessary. Handle
* the server's initial greeting and set global options. Returns a
* new assuan context or an error. */
static gpg_error_t
create_new_context (ctrl_t ctrl, assuan_context_t *r_ctx)
{
gpg_error_t err;
assuan_context_t ctx;
*r_ctx = NULL;
err = start_new_keyboxd (&ctx,
GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT,
opt.keyboxd_program,
opt.autostart, opt.verbose, DBG_IPC,
NULL, ctrl);
if (!opt.autostart && gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_KEYBOXD)
{
static int shown;
if (!shown)
{
shown = 1;
log_info (_("no keyboxd running in this session\n"));
}
}
else if (!err && !(err = warn_version_mismatch (ctrl, ctx, KEYBOXD_NAME)))
{
/* Place to emit global options. */
}
if (err)
assuan_release (ctx);
else
*r_ctx = ctx;
return err;
}
/* Get a context for accessing keyboxd. If no context is available a
* new one is created and if necessary keyboxd is started. R_KBL
* receives a pointer to the local context object. */
static gpg_error_t
open_context (ctrl_t ctrl, keydb_local_t *r_kbl)
{
gpg_error_t err;
keydb_local_t kbl;
*r_kbl = NULL;
for (;;)
{
for (kbl = ctrl->keydb_local; kbl && kbl->is_active; kbl = kbl->next)
;
if (kbl)
{
/* Found an inactive keyboxd session - return that. */
log_assert (!kbl->is_active);
kbl->is_active = 1;
kbl->need_search_reset = 1;
*r_kbl = kbl;
return 0;
}
/* None found. Create a new session and retry. */
kbl = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *kbl);
if (!kbl)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
err = create_new_context (ctrl, &kbl->ctx);
if (err)
{
xfree (kbl);
return err;
}
err = kbx_client_data_new (&kbl->kcd, kbl->ctx, 1);
if (err)
{
assuan_release (kbl->ctx);
xfree (kbl);
return err;
}
/* For thread-saftey we add it to the list and retry; this is
* easier than to employ a lock. */
kbl->next = ctrl->keydb_local;
ctrl->keydb_local = kbl;
}
/*NOTREACHED*/
}
KEYDB_HANDLE
keydb_new (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
gpg_error_t err;
KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
int rc, i, j;
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: enter\n", __func__);
hd = xcalloc (1, sizeof *hd);
hd->found = -1;
hd->saved_found = -1;
hd->use_keyboxd = opt.use_keyboxd;
hd->ctrl = ctrl;
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
{
err = open_context (ctrl, &hd->kbl);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error opening key DB: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (hd);
hd = NULL;
if (!(rc = gpg_err_code_to_errno (err)))
rc = gpg_err_code_to_errno (GPG_ERR_EIO);
gpg_err_set_errno (rc);
goto leave;
}
}
else /* Use the local keybox. */
{
log_assert (used_resources <= MAX_KEYDB_RESOURCES);
for (i=j=0; i < used_resources; i++)
{
switch (all_resources[i].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE: /* ignore */
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
hd->active[j].type = all_resources[i].type;
hd->active[j].token = all_resources[i].token;
hd->active[j].u.kr = keybox_new_x509 (all_resources[i].token, 0);
if (!hd->active[j].u.kr)
{
xfree (hd);
return NULL; /* fixme: free all previously allocated handles*/
}
j++;
break;
}
}
hd->used = j;
}
active_handles++;
leave:
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: leave (hd=%p)\n", __func__, hd);
return hd;
}
void
keydb_release (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
{
keydb_local_t kbl;
int i;
if (!hd)
return;
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: enter (hd=%p)\n", __func__, hd);
log_assert (active_handles > 0);
active_handles--;
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
{
kbl = hd->kbl;
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("close_context (found)");
if (!kbl->is_active)
log_fatal ("closing inactive keyboxd context %p\n", kbl);
kbl->is_active = 0;
hd->kbl = NULL;
}
else
{
hd->keep_lock = 0;
unlock_all (hd);
for (i=0; i < hd->used; i++)
{
switch (hd->active[i].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
keybox_release (hd->active[i].u.kr);
break;
}
}
}
xfree (hd);
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: leave\n", __func__);
}
/* Return the name of the current resource. This is function first
looks for the last found found, then for the current search
position, and last returns the first available resource. The
returned string is only valid as long as the handle exists. This
function does only return NULL if no handle is specified, in all
other error cases an empty string is returned. */
const char *
keydb_get_resource_name (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
{
int idx;
const char *s = NULL;
if (!hd)
return NULL;
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
return "[keyboxd]";
if ( hd->found >= 0 && hd->found < hd->used)
idx = hd->found;
else if ( hd->current >= 0 && hd->current < hd->used)
idx = hd->current;
else
idx = 0;
switch (hd->active[idx].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
s = NULL;
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
s = keybox_get_resource_name (hd->active[idx].u.kr);
break;
}
return s? s: "";
}
/* Switch the handle into ephemeral mode and return the original value. */
int
keydb_set_ephemeral (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, int yes)
{
int i;
if (!hd)
return 0;
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
return 0; /* FIXME: No support yet. */
yes = !!yes;
if (hd->is_ephemeral != yes)
{
for (i=0; i < hd->used; i++)
{
switch (hd->active[i].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
keybox_set_ephemeral (hd->active[i].u.kr, yes);
break;
}
}
}
i = hd->is_ephemeral;
hd->is_ephemeral = yes;
return i;
}
/* If the keyring has not yet been locked, lock it now. This
* operation is required before any update operation; it is optional
* for an insert operation. The lock is kept until a keydb_release so
* that internal unlock_all calls have no effect. */
gpg_error_t
keydb_lock (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
{
gpg_error_t err;
if (!hd)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_HANDLE);
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
return 0;
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: enter (hd=%p)\n", __func__, hd);
err = lock_all (hd);
if (!err)
hd->keep_lock = 1;
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: leave (err=%s)\n", __func__, gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
static int
lock_all (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
{
int i, rc = 0;
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
return 0;
/* Fixme: This locking scheme may lead to deadlock if the resources
are not added in the same order by all processes. We are
currently only allowing one resource so it is not a problem. */
for (i=0; i < hd->used; i++)
{
switch (hd->active[i].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
rc = keybox_lock (hd->active[i].u.kr, 1, -1);
break;
}
if (rc)
break;
}
if (rc)
{
/* Revert the already set locks. */
for (i--; i >= 0; i--)
{
switch (hd->active[i].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
keybox_lock (hd->active[i].u.kr, 0, 0);
break;
}
}
}
else
hd->locked = 1;
return rc;
}
static void
unlock_all (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
{
int i;
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
return;
if (!hd->locked || hd->keep_lock)
return;
for (i=hd->used-1; i >= 0; i--)
{
switch (hd->active[i].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
keybox_lock (hd->active[i].u.kr, 0, 0);
break;
}
}
hd->locked = 0;
}
-/* Push the last found state if any. */
+/* Push the last found state if any. Only one state is saved. */
void
keydb_push_found_state (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
{
if (!hd)
return;
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
- return; /* FIXME: Do we need this? */
-
- if (hd->found < 0 || hd->found >= hd->used)
{
- hd->saved_found = -1;
- return;
+ xfree (hd->kbl->saved_search_result.buf);
+ hd->kbl->saved_search_result.buf = hd->kbl->search_result.buf;
+ hd->kbl->saved_search_result.len = hd->kbl->search_result.len;
+ hd->kbl->search_result.buf = NULL;
+ hd->kbl->search_result.len = 0;
}
-
- switch (hd->active[hd->found].type)
+ else
{
- case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
- break;
- case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
- keybox_push_found_state (hd->active[hd->found].u.kr);
- break;
+ if (hd->found < 0 || hd->found >= hd->used)
+ hd->saved_found = -1;
+ else
+ {
+ switch (hd->active[hd->found].type)
+ {
+ case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+ break;
+ case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
+ keybox_push_found_state (hd->active[hd->found].u.kr);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ hd->saved_found = hd->found;
+ hd->found = -1;
+ }
}
- hd->saved_found = hd->found;
- hd->found = -1;
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: done (hd=%p)\n", __func__, hd);
}
/* Pop the last found state. */
void
keydb_pop_found_state (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
{
if (!hd)
return;
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
- return; /* FIXME: Do we need this? */
-
- hd->found = hd->saved_found;
- hd->saved_found = -1;
- if (hd->found < 0 || hd->found >= hd->used)
- return;
-
- switch (hd->active[hd->found].type)
{
- case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
- break;
- case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
- keybox_pop_found_state (hd->active[hd->found].u.kr);
- break;
+ xfree (hd->kbl->search_result.buf);
+ hd->kbl->search_result.buf = hd->kbl->saved_search_result.buf;
+ hd->kbl->search_result.len = hd->kbl->saved_search_result.len;
+ hd->kbl->saved_search_result.buf = NULL;
+ hd->kbl->saved_search_result.len = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ hd->found = hd->saved_found;
+ hd->saved_found = -1;
+ if (hd->found < 0 || hd->found >= hd->used)
+ ;
+ else
+ {
+ switch (hd->active[hd->found].type)
+ {
+ case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+ break;
+ case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
+ keybox_pop_found_state (hd->active[hd->found].u.kr);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
}
+
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: done (hd=%p)\n", __func__, hd);
}
/* Return the last found certificate. Caller must free it. */
int
keydb_get_cert (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, ksba_cert_t *r_cert)
{
int err = 0;
if (!hd)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: enter (hd=%p)\n", __func__, hd);
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
{
ksba_cert_t cert;
/* Fixme: We should clear that also in non-keyboxd mode but we
* did not in the past and thus all code should be checked
* whether this is okay. If we run into error in keyboxd mode,
* this is a not as severe because keyboxd is currently
* experimental. */
*r_cert = NULL;
if (!hd->kbl->search_result.buf || !hd->kbl->search_result.len)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_VALUE_NOT_FOUND);
goto leave;
}
err = ksba_cert_new (&cert);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = ksba_cert_init_from_mem (cert,
hd->kbl->search_result.buf,
hd->kbl->search_result.len);
if (err)
{
ksba_cert_release (cert);
goto leave;
}
- xfree (hd->kbl->search_result.buf);
- hd->kbl->search_result.buf = NULL;
- hd->kbl->search_result.len = 0;
*r_cert = cert;
goto leave;
}
if ( hd->found < 0 || hd->found >= hd->used)
{
/* Fixme: It would be better to use GPG_ERR_VALUE_NOT_FOUND here
* but for now we use NOT_FOUND because that is our standard
* replacement for the formerly used (-1). */
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); /* nothing found */
goto leave;
}
err = GPG_ERR_BUG;
switch (hd->active[hd->found].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); /* oops */
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
err = keybox_get_cert (hd->active[hd->found].u.kr, r_cert);
break;
}
leave:
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: leave (rc=%d)\n", __func__, err);
return err;
}
/* Return a flag of the last found object. WHICH is the flag requested;
it should be one of the KEYBOX_FLAG_ values. If the operation is
successful, the flag value will be stored at the address given by
VALUE. Return 0 on success or an error code. */
gpg_error_t
keydb_get_flags (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, int which, int idx, unsigned int *value)
{
gpg_error_t err;
if (!hd)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: enter (hd=%p)\n", __func__, hd);
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
{
/* FIXME */
*value = 0;
err = 0;
goto leave;
}
if ( hd->found < 0 || hd->found >= hd->used)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOTHING_FOUND);
goto leave;
}
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);
switch (hd->active[hd->found].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); /* oops */
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
err = keybox_get_flags (hd->active[hd->found].u.kr, which, idx, value);
break;
}
leave:
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: leave (err=%s)\n", __func__, gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
/* Set a flag of the last found object. WHICH is the flag to be set; it
should be one of the KEYBOX_FLAG_ values. If the operation is
successful, the flag value will be stored in the keybox. Note,
that some flag values can't be updated and thus may return an
error, some other flag values may be masked out before an update.
Returns 0 on success or an error code. */
gpg_error_t
keydb_set_flags (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, int which, int idx, unsigned int value)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
if (!hd)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: enter (hd=%p)\n", __func__, hd);
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
{
/* FIXME */
goto leave;
}
if ( hd->found < 0 || hd->found >= hd->used)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOTHING_FOUND);
goto leave;
}
if (!hd->locked)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_LOCKED);
goto leave;
}
switch (hd->active[hd->found].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); /* oops */
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
err = keybox_set_flags (hd->active[hd->found].u.kr, which, idx, value);
break;
}
leave:
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: leave (err=%s)\n", __func__, gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
/* Communication object for Keyboxd STORE commands. */
struct store_parm_s
{
assuan_context_t ctx;
const void *data; /* The certificate in X.509 binary format. */
size_t datalen; /* The length of DATA. */
};
/* Handle the inquiries from the STORE command. */
static gpg_error_t
store_inq_cb (void *opaque, const char *line)
{
struct store_parm_s *parm = opaque;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
if (has_leading_keyword (line, "BLOB"))
{
if (parm->data)
err = assuan_send_data (parm->ctx, parm->data, parm->datalen);
}
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_INQUIRE);
return err;
}
/*
* Insert a new Certificate into one of the resources.
*/
gpg_error_t
keydb_insert_cert (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, ksba_cert_t cert)
{
gpg_error_t err;
int idx;
unsigned char digest[20];
if (!hd)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (opt.dry_run)
return 0;
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: enter (hd=%p)\n", __func__, hd);
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
{
struct store_parm_s parm;
parm.ctx = hd->kbl->ctx;
parm.data = ksba_cert_get_image (cert, &parm.datalen);
if (!parm.data)
{
log_debug ("broken ksba cert object\n");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
goto leave;
}
err = assuan_transact (hd->kbl->ctx, "STORE --insert",
NULL, NULL,
store_inq_cb, &parm,
NULL, NULL);
goto leave;
}
if ( hd->found >= 0 && hd->found < hd->used)
idx = hd->found;
else if ( hd->current >= 0 && hd->current < hd->used)
idx = hd->current;
else
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
goto leave;
}
if (!hd->locked)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_LOCKED);
goto leave;
}
gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1, digest, NULL); /* kludge*/
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);
switch (hd->active[idx].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
err = keybox_insert_cert (hd->active[idx].u.kr, cert, digest);
break;
}
unlock_all (hd);
leave:
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: leave (err=%s)\n", __func__, gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
/* Update the current keyblock with KB. */
/* Note: This function is currently not called. */
gpg_error_t
keydb_update_cert (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, ksba_cert_t cert)
{
(void)hd;
(void)cert;
return GPG_ERR_BUG;
#if 0
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char digest[20];
if (!hd)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if ( hd->found < 0 || hd->found >= hd->used)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
if (opt.dry_run)
return 0;
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: enter (hd=%p)\n", __func__, hd);
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
{
/* FIXME */
goto leave;
}
err = lock_all (hd);
if (err)
goto leave;
gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1, digest, NULL); /* kludge*/
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);
switch (hd->active[hd->found].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); /* oops */
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
err = keybox_update_cert (hd->active[hd->found].u.kr, cert, digest);
break;
}
unlock_all (hd);
leave:
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: leave (err=%s)\n", __func__, gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
#endif /*0*/
}
/*
* The current keyblock or cert will be deleted.
*/
gpg_error_t
keydb_delete (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
{
gpg_error_t err;
if (!hd)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (!hd->use_keyboxd && (hd->found < 0 || hd->found >= hd->used))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
if (opt.dry_run)
return 0;
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: enter (hd=%p)\n", __func__, hd);
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
{
unsigned char hexubid[UBID_LEN * 2 + 1];
char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
if (!hd->last_ubid_valid)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_VALUE_NOT_FOUND);
goto leave;
}
bin2hex (hd->last_ubid, UBID_LEN, hexubid);
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "DELETE %s", hexubid);
err = assuan_transact (hd->kbl->ctx, line,
NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL);
goto leave;
}
if (!hd->locked)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_LOCKED);
goto leave;
}
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);
switch (hd->active[hd->found].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
err = keybox_delete (hd->active[hd->found].u.kr);
break;
}
unlock_all (hd);
leave:
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: leave (err=%s)\n", __func__, gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
/*
* Locate the default writable key resource, so that the next
* operation (which is only relevant for inserts) will be done on this
* resource.
*/
static gpg_error_t
keydb_locate_writable (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, const char *reserved)
{
int rc;
(void)reserved;
if (!hd)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
return 0; /* Not required. */
rc = keydb_search_reset (hd); /* this does reset hd->current */
if (rc)
return rc;
for ( ; hd->current >= 0 && hd->current < hd->used; hd->current++)
{
switch (hd->active[hd->current].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
BUG();
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
if (keybox_is_writable (hd->active[hd->current].token))
return 0; /* found (hd->current is set to it) */
break;
}
}
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
}
/*
* Rebuild the caches of all key resources.
*/
void
keydb_rebuild_caches (void)
{
int i;
/* This function does nothing and thus we don't need to handle keyboxd in a
* special way. */
for (i=0; i < used_resources; i++)
{
switch (all_resources[i].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE: /* ignore */
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
/* rc = keybox_rebuild_cache (all_resources[i].token); */
/* if (rc) */
/* log_error (_("failed to rebuild keybox cache: %s\n"), */
/* g10_errstr (rc)); */
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Start the next search on this handle right at the beginning
*/
gpg_error_t
keydb_search_reset (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
int i;
if (!hd)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: enter (hd=%p)\n", __func__, hd);
hd->current = 0;
hd->found = -1;
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
{
/* All we need is to tell search that a reset is pending. Note that
* keydb_new sets this flag as well. To comply with the
* specification of keydb_delete_keyblock we also need to clear the
* ubid flag so that after a reset a delete can't be performed. */
hd->kbl->need_search_reset = 1;
hd->last_ubid_valid = 0;
}
else
{
/* Reset all resources */
for (i=0; !err && i < hd->used; i++)
{
switch (hd->active[i].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
err = keybox_search_reset (hd->active[i].u.kr);
break;
}
}
}
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: leave (err=%s)\n", __func__, gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
char *
keydb_search_desc_dump (struct keydb_search_desc *desc)
{
char *fpr;
char *result;
switch (desc->mode)
{
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_EXACT:
return xasprintf ("EXACT: '%s'", desc->u.name);
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR:
return xasprintf ("SUBSTR: '%s'", desc->u.name);
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAIL:
return xasprintf ("MAIL: '%s'", desc->u.name);
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILSUB:
return xasprintf ("MAILSUB: '%s'", desc->u.name);
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILEND:
return xasprintf ("MAILEND: '%s'", desc->u.name);
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_WORDS:
return xasprintf ("WORDS: '%s'", desc->u.name);
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID:
return xasprintf ("SHORT_KID: '%08lX'", (ulong)desc->u.kid[1]);
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID:
return xasprintf ("LONG_KID: '%08lX%08lX'",
(ulong)desc->u.kid[0], (ulong)desc->u.kid[1]);
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR:
fpr = bin2hexcolon (desc->u.fpr, desc->fprlen, NULL);
result = xasprintf ("FPR%02d: '%s'", desc->fprlen, fpr);
xfree (fpr);
return result;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_ISSUER:
return xasprintf ("ISSUER: '%s'", desc->u.name);
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_ISSUER_SN:
return xasprintf ("ISSUER_SN: '#%.*s/%s'",
(int)desc->snlen,desc->sn, desc->u.name);
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SN:
return xasprintf ("SN: '%.*s'",
(int)desc->snlen, desc->sn);
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBJECT:
return xasprintf ("SUBJECT: '%s'", desc->u.name);
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_KEYGRIP:
return xasprintf ("KEYGRIP: %s", desc->u.grip);
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST:
return xasprintf ("FIRST");
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT:
return xasprintf ("NEXT");
default:
return xasprintf ("Bad search mode (%d)", desc->mode);
}
}
/* Status callback for SEARCH and NEXT operaions. */
static gpg_error_t
search_status_cb (void *opaque, const char *line)
{
KEYDB_HANDLE hd = opaque;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
const char *s;
unsigned int n;
if ((s = has_leading_keyword (line, "PUBKEY_INFO")))
{
if (atoi (s) != PUBKEY_TYPE_X509)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_BLOB_TYPE);
else
{
hd->last_ubid_valid = 0;
while (*s && !spacep (s))
s++;
if (!(n=hex2fixedbuf (s, hd->last_ubid, sizeof hd->last_ubid)))
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
else
{
hd->last_ubid_valid = 1;
s += n;
hd->last_is_ephemeral = (*s == 'e');
}
}
}
return err;
}
/* Search through all keydb resources, starting at the current
* position, for a keyblock which contains one of the keys described
* in the DESC array. In keyboxd mode the search is instead delegated
* to the keyboxd.
*
* DESC is an array of search terms with NDESC entries. The search
* terms are or'd together. That is, the next entry in the DB that
* matches any of the descriptions will be returned.
*
* Note: this function resumes searching where the last search left
* off (i.e., at the current file position). If you want to search
* from the start of the database, then you need to first call
* keydb_search_reset().
*
* If no key matches the search description, the error code
* GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND is retruned. If there was a match, 0 is
* returned. If an error occurred, that error code is returned.
*
* The returned key is considered to be selected and the certificate
* can be detched via keydb_get_cert. */
gpg_error_t
keydb_search (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd,
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc, size_t ndesc)
{
gpg_error_t err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
unsigned long skipped;
int i;
if (!hd)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (!any_registered && !hd->use_keyboxd)
{
gpgsm_status_with_error (ctrl, STATUS_ERROR, "keydb_search",
gpg_error (GPG_ERR_KEYRING_OPEN));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
}
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: enter (hd=%p)\n", __func__, hd);
if (DBG_LOOKUP)
{
log_debug ("%s: %zd search description(s):\n", __func__, ndesc);
for (i = 0; i < ndesc; i ++)
{
char *t = keydb_search_desc_dump (&desc[i]);
log_debug ("%s: %d: %s\n", __func__, i, t);
xfree (t);
}
}
if (hd->use_keyboxd)
{
char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
/* Clear the result objects. */
if (hd->kbl->search_result.buf)
{
xfree (hd->kbl->search_result.buf);
hd->kbl->search_result.buf = NULL;
hd->kbl->search_result.len = 0;
}
/* Check whether this is a NEXT search. */
if (!hd->kbl->need_search_reset)
{
/* A reset was not requested thus continue the search. The
* keyboxd keeps the context of the search and thus the NEXT
* operates on the last search pattern. This is the way how
* we always used the keydb functions. In theory we were
* able to modify the search pattern between searches but
* that is not anymore supported by keyboxd and a cursory
* check does not show that we actually made use of that
* misfeature. */
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "NEXT --x509");
goto do_search;
}
hd->kbl->need_search_reset = 0;
if (!ndesc)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG);
goto leave;
}
/* FIXME: Implement --multi */
switch (desc->mode)
{
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_EXACT:
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 =%s", desc[0].u.name);
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR:
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 *%s", desc[0].u.name);
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAIL:
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 <%s",
desc[0].u.name + (desc[0].u.name[0] == '<'));
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILSUB:
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 @%s", desc[0].u.name);
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILEND:
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 .%s", desc[0].u.name);
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_WORDS:
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 +%s", desc[0].u.name);
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID:
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 0x%08lX",
(ulong)desc->u.kid[1]);
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID:
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 0x%08lX%08lX",
(ulong)desc->u.kid[0], (ulong)desc->u.kid[1]);
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR:
{
unsigned char hexfpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN * 2 + 1];
log_assert (desc[0].fprlen <= MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
bin2hex (desc[0].u.fpr, desc[0].fprlen, hexfpr);
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 0x%s", hexfpr);
}
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_ISSUER:
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 #/%s", desc[0].u.name);
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_ISSUER_SN:
if (desc[0].snhex)
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 #%.*s/%s",
(int)desc[0].snlen, desc[0].sn, desc[0].u.name);
else
{
char *hexsn = bin2hex (desc[0].sn, desc[0].snlen, NULL);
if (!hexsn)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 #%s/%s",
hexsn, desc[0].u.name);
xfree (hexsn);
}
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SN:
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 #%s", desc[0].u.name);
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBJECT:
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 /%s", desc[0].u.name);
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_KEYGRIP:
{
unsigned char hexgrip[KEYGRIP_LEN * 2 + 1];
bin2hex (desc[0].u.grip, KEYGRIP_LEN, hexgrip);
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 &%s", hexgrip);
}
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_UBID:
{
unsigned char hexubid[UBID_LEN * 2 + 1];
bin2hex (desc[0].u.ubid, UBID_LEN, hexubid);
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509 ^%s", hexubid);
}
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST:
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "SEARCH --x509");
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT:
log_debug ("%s: mode next - we should not get to here!\n", __func__);
snprintf (line, sizeof line, "NEXT --x509");
break;
default:
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG);
goto leave;
}
do_search:
hd->last_ubid_valid = 0;
/* To avoid silent truncation we error out on a too long line. */
if (strlen (line) + 5 >= sizeof line)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_LINE_TOO_LONG);
else
err = kbx_client_data_cmd (hd->kbl->kcd, line, search_status_cb, hd);
if (!err && !(err = kbx_client_data_wait (hd->kbl->kcd,
&hd->kbl->search_result.buf,
&hd->kbl->search_result.len)))
{
/* if (hd->last_ubid_valid) */
/* log_printhex (hd->last_ubid, 20, "found UBID%s:", */
/* hd->last_is_ephemeral? "(ephemeral)":""); */
}
}
else /* Local keyring search. */
{
while (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EOF
&& hd->current >= 0 && hd->current < hd->used)
{
switch (hd->active[hd->current].type)
{
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
BUG(); /* we should never see it here */
break;
case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX:
err = keybox_search (hd->active[hd->current].u.kr, desc, ndesc,
KEYBOX_BLOBTYPE_X509,
NULL, &skipped);
if (err == -1) /* Map legacy code. */
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
break;
}
if (DBG_LOOKUP)
log_debug ("%s: searched %s (resource %d of %d) => %s\n",
__func__,
hd->active[hd->current].type==KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYBOX
? "keybox" : "unknown type",
hd->current, hd->used, gpg_strerror (err));
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EOF)
{ /* EOF -> switch to next resource */
hd->current++;
}
else if (!err)
hd->found = hd->current;
}
}
leave:
/* The NOTHING_FOUND error is triggered by a NEXT command. */
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EOF
|| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOTHING_FOUND)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
if (DBG_CLOCK)
log_clock ("%s: leave (%s)\n", __func__, gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
int
keydb_search_first (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
{
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
return keydb_search (ctrl, hd, &desc, 1);
}
int
keydb_search_next (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
{
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;
return keydb_search (ctrl, hd, &desc, 1);
}
int
keydb_search_kid (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd, u32 *kid)
{
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
(void)kid;
memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
desc.u.kid[0] = kid[0];
desc.u.kid[1] = kid[1];
return keydb_search (ctrl, hd, &desc, 1);
}
int
keydb_search_fpr (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd, const byte *fpr)
{
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR;
memcpy (desc.u.fpr, fpr, 20);
desc.fprlen = 20;
return keydb_search (ctrl, hd, &desc, 1);
}
int
keydb_search_issuer (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd, const char *issuer)
{
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
int rc;
memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_ISSUER;
desc.u.name = issuer;
rc = keydb_search (ctrl, hd, &desc, 1);
return rc;
}
int
keydb_search_issuer_sn (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd,
const char *issuer, ksba_const_sexp_t serial)
{
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
int rc;
const unsigned char *s;
memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_ISSUER_SN;
s = serial;
if (*s !='(')
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
s++;
for (desc.snlen = 0; digitp (s); s++)
desc.snlen = 10*desc.snlen + atoi_1 (s);
if (*s !=':')
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
desc.sn = s+1;
desc.u.name = issuer;
rc = keydb_search (ctrl, hd, &desc, 1);
return rc;
}
int
keydb_search_subject (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd, const char *name)
{
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
int rc;
memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBJECT;
desc.u.name = name;
rc = keydb_search (ctrl, hd, &desc, 1);
return rc;
}
/* Store the certificate in the key DB but make sure that it does not
already exists. We do this simply by comparing the fingerprint.
If EXISTED is not NULL it will be set to true if the certificate
was already in the DB. */
int
keydb_store_cert (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int ephemeral, int *existed)
{
KEYDB_HANDLE kh;
int rc;
unsigned char fpr[20];
if (existed)
*existed = 0;
if (!gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, 0, fpr, NULL))
{
log_error (_("failed to get the fingerprint\n"));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
kh = keydb_new (ctrl);
if (!kh)
{
log_error (_("failed to allocate keyDB handle\n"));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);;
}
/* Set the ephemeral flag so that the search looks at all
records. */
keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
if (!kh->use_keyboxd)
{
rc = lock_all (kh);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
rc = keydb_search_fpr (ctrl, kh, fpr);
if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
{
keydb_release (kh);
if (!rc)
{
if (existed)
*existed = 1;
if (!ephemeral)
{
/* Remove ephemeral flags from existing certificate to "store"
it permanently. */
rc = keydb_set_cert_flags (ctrl, cert, 1, KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB, 0,
KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_EPHEMERAL, 0);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("clearing ephemeral flag failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
return rc;
}
}
return 0; /* okay */
}
log_error (_("problem looking for existing certificate: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (rc));
return rc;
}
/* Reset the ephemeral flag if not requested. */
if (!ephemeral)
keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 0);
rc = keydb_locate_writable (kh, 0);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error finding writable keyDB: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
keydb_release (kh);
return rc;
}
rc = keydb_insert_cert (kh, cert);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("error storing certificate: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
keydb_release (kh);
return rc;
}
keydb_release (kh);
return 0;
}
/* This is basically keydb_set_flags but it implements a complete
transaction by locating the certificate in the DB and updating the
flags. */
gpg_error_t
keydb_set_cert_flags (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int ephemeral,
int which, int idx,
unsigned int mask, unsigned int value)
{
KEYDB_HANDLE kh;
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char fpr[20];
unsigned int old_value;
if (!gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, 0, fpr, NULL))
{
log_error (_("failed to get the fingerprint\n"));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
kh = keydb_new (ctrl);
if (!kh)
{
log_error (_("failed to allocate keyDB handle\n"));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);;
}
if (ephemeral)
keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
if (!kh->use_keyboxd)
{
err = keydb_lock (kh);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error locking keybox: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
keydb_release (kh);
return err;
}
}
err = keydb_search_fpr (ctrl, kh, fpr);
if (err)
{
if (gpg_err_code (err) != gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND))
log_error (_("problem re-searching certificate: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (err));
keydb_release (kh);
return err;
}
err = keydb_get_flags (kh, which, idx, &old_value);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error getting stored flags: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
keydb_release (kh);
return err;
}
value = ((old_value & ~mask) | (value & mask));
if (value != old_value)
{
err = keydb_set_flags (kh, which, idx, value);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error storing flags: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
keydb_release (kh);
return err;
}
}
keydb_release (kh);
return 0;
}
/* Reset all the certificate flags we have stored with the certificates
for performance reasons. */
void
keydb_clear_some_cert_flags (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names)
{
gpg_error_t err;
KEYDB_HANDLE hd = NULL;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc = NULL;
int ndesc;
strlist_t sl;
int rc=0;
unsigned int old_value, value;
(void)ctrl;
hd = keydb_new (ctrl);
if (!hd)
{
log_error ("keydb_new failed\n");
goto leave;
}
if (!names)
ndesc = 1;
else
{
for (sl=names, ndesc=0; sl; sl = sl->next, ndesc++)
;
}
desc = xtrycalloc (ndesc, sizeof *desc);
if (!ndesc)
{
log_error ("allocating memory failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (out_of_core ()));
goto leave;
}
if (!names)
desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
else
{
for (ndesc=0, sl=names; sl; sl = sl->next)
{
rc = classify_user_id (sl->d, desc+ndesc, 0);
if (rc)
log_error ("key '%s' not found: %s\n", sl->d, gpg_strerror (rc));
else
ndesc++;
}
}
if (!hd->use_keyboxd)
{
err = keydb_lock (hd);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error locking keybox: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
}
while (!(rc = keydb_search (ctrl, hd, desc, ndesc)))
{
if (!names)
desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;
err = keydb_get_flags (hd, KEYBOX_FLAG_VALIDITY, 0, &old_value);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error getting stored flags: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
value = (old_value & ~VALIDITY_REVOKED);
if (value != old_value)
{
err = keydb_set_flags (hd, KEYBOX_FLAG_VALIDITY, 0, value);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error storing flags: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
}
}
if (rc && gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
log_error ("keydb_search failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
leave:
xfree (desc);
keydb_release (hd);
}