diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 894743db5..bbf2ad253 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -1,5234 +1,5239 @@
Noteworthy changes in version 2.4.1 (unreleased)
------------------------------------------------
* If the ~/.gnupg directory does not exist, the keyboxd is now
automagically enabled.
* gpg: New option --add-desig-revoker. [rG3d094e2bcf]
* gpg: New option --assert-signer.
* gpg: New list-option "show-unusable-sigs". Also show
"[self-signature]" instead of the user-id in key signature
listings. [rG103acfe9ca]
* gpg: For symmetric encryption the default S2K hash is now SHA256.
[T6367]
* gpgsm: Verification of detached signatures does now strip trailing
zeroes from the input if --assume-binary is used. [rG2a13f7f9dc]
* gpgsm: Non-armored detached signature are now created without
using indefinite form length octets. This improves compatibility
with some PDF signature verification software. [rG8996b0b655]
* dirmngr: The LDAP modifyTimestamp is now returned by some
keyserver commands. [rG56d309133f]
+ * ssh: Allow specification of the order keys are presented to ssh.
+ See the man page entry for --enable-ssh-support. [T5996]
+
* gpg: Make list-options "show-sig-subpackets" work again.
Fixes regression in 2.4.0. [rG5a223303d7]
+ Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T6454
+
Noteworthy changes in version 2.4.0 (2022-12-16)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: New command --quick-update-pref. [rGd40d23b233]
* gpg: New list-options show-pref and show-pref-verbose.
[rG811cfa34cb]
* gpg: New option --list-filter to restrict key listings like
gpg -k --list-filter 'select=revoked-f && sub/algostr=ed25519'
[rG1324dc3490]
* gpg: New --export-filter export-revocs. [rGc985b52e71]
* gpg: Also import stray revocation certificates. [rG7aaedfb107]
* gpg: Add a notation to encryption subkeys in de-vs mode. [T6279]
* gpg: Improve signature verification speed by a factor of more than
four. Double detached signing speed. [T5826]
* gpg: Allow only OCB for AEAD encryption. [rG5a2cef801d]
* gpg: Fix trusted introducer for mbox only user-ids. [T6238]
* gpg: Report an error via status-fd for receiving a key from the
agent. [T5151]
* gpg: Make --require-compliance work without the --status-fd
option. [rG2aacd843ad]
* gpg: Fix verification of cleartext signatures with overlong lines.
[T6272]
* agent: Fix import of protected OpenPGP v5 keys. [T6294]
* gpgsm: Change the default cipher algorithm from AES128 to AES256.
Also announce support for this in signatures. [rG2d8ac55d26]
* gpgsm: Always use the chain validation model if the root-CA
requests this. [rG7fa1d3cc82]
* gpgsm: Print OCSP revocation date and reason in cert listings.
[rGb6abaed2b5]
* agent: Support Win32-OpenSSH emulation by gpg-agent. [T3883]
* scd: Support the Telesec Signature Card v2.0. [T6252]
* scd: Redact --debug cardio output of a VERIFY APDU. [T5085]
* scd: Skip deleted pkcs#15 records in CARDOS 5. [rG061efac03f]
* dirmngr: Fix build with no LDAP support. [T6239]
* dirmngr: Fix verification of ECDSA signed CRLs. [rG868dabb402]
* wkd: New option --add-revocs for gpg-wks-client. [rGc3f9f2d497]
* wkd: Ignore expired user-ids in gpg-wks-client. [T6292]
* card: New commands "gpg" and "gpgsm". [rG9c4691c73e]
See-also: gnupg-announce/2022q4/000477.html
Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T6303
Noteworthy changes in version 2.3.8 (2022-10-13)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Do not consider unknown public keys as non-compliant while
decrypting. [T6205]
* gpg: Avoid to emit a compliance mode line if Libgcrypt is
non-compliant. [T6221]
* gpg: Improve --edit-key setpref command to ease c+p. [rG1908fa8b83]
* gpg: Emit an ERROR status if --quick-set-primary-uid fails and
allow to pass the user ID by hash. [T6126]
* gpg: Actually show symmetric+pubkey encrypted data as de-vs
compliant. Add extra compliance checks for symkey_enc packets.
[T6119]
* gpg: In de-vs mode use SHA-256 instead of SHA-1 as implicit
preference. [T6043]
* gpgsm: Fix reporting of bad passphrase error during PKCS#11
import. [T5713,T6037]
* agent: Fix a regression in "READKEY --format=ssh". [T6012]
* agent: New option --need-attr for KEYINFO. [rG989eae648c]
* agent: New attribute "Remote-list" for use by KEYINFO.
[r1383aa4750]
* scd: Fix problem with Yubikey 5.4 firmware. [T6070]
* dirmngr: Fix CRL Distribution Point fallback to other schemes.
[rG0c8299e2b5]
* dirmngr: New LDAP server flag "areconly" (A-record-only).
[rGd65a0335e5]
* dirmngr: Fix upload of multiple keys for an LDAP server specified
using the colon format. [rG536b5cd663]
* dirmngr: Use LDAP schema v2 when a Base DN is specified. [T6047]
* dirmngr: Avoid caching expired certificates. [T6142]
* wkd: Fix path traversal attack in gpg-wks-server. Add the mail
address to the pending request data. [rG8a63a8c825,T6098]
* wkd: New command --mirror for gpg-wks-client. [T6224]
* gpg-auth: New tool for authentication. [T5862]
* New common.conf option no-autostart. [rG203dcc19eb]
* Silence warnings from AllowSetForegroundWindow unless
GNUPG_EXEC_DEBUG_FLAGS is used. [rG4ef8516a79]
Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T6106
See-also: gnupg-announce/2022q4/000476.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.3.7 (2022-07-11)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Fix possibly garbled status messages in NOTATION_DATA. This
bug could trick GPGME and other parsers to accept faked status
lines. [T6027, CVE-2022-34903]
* gpg: Look up user ID to revoke by UID hash. [T5936]
* gpg: Setup the 'usage' filter property for export. [rG7aabd94b81]
* gpg,w32: Allow Unicode filenames for iobuf_cancel. [rG4ee2009083]
* gpg: Fix reading AEAD preference. [T6019]
* gpgsm: New option --compatibility-flags. [rGf0b373cec9]
* gpgsm: Rework the PKCS#12 parser to support DFN issued keys.
[T6037]
* agent: New option --no-user-trustlist and --sys-trustlist-name.
[T5990]
* agent: Pop up dialog window for confirmation, when specified so.
[T5099]
* agent: Show "Label:" field of private key when prompt the
insertion. [T5986]
* agent: Handle USAGE information in KEYINFO. [rG295a6a7591]
* agent,ssh: Make not-inserted OpenPGP.3 keys available for SSH.
[T5996]
* agent,ssh: Support "Use-for-ssh" flag in private key. [T5985]
* agent: New field "Prompt" to prevent asking card key insertion.
[T5987]
* agent: Support --format=ssh option for READKEY. [T6012]
* agent: Add KEYATTR command. [T5988]
* agent: Flush before calling ftruncate. [T6035]
* agent: Do not consider --min-passphrase-len for the magic wand.
[rGae2f1f0785]
* kbx: Fix a race condition which results no status report. [T5948]
* scd:openpgp: Fix a segv for cards supporting unknown curves.
[T5963]
* scd:p15: Fix reading certificates without length info.
* scd:p15: Improve the displayed S/N for Technology Nexus cards.
* scd:openpgp: Add workaround for ECC attribute on Yubikey. [T5963]
* scd,piv: Fix status report of KEYPAIRINFO. [rG64c8786105]
* scd:nks: Support the Telesec ESIGN application. [T5219, T4938]
* scd: Fix use of SCardListReaders for PC/SC. [T5979]
* scd: Support automatic card selection for READCERT with keygrip.
[T6003]
* scd: Support specifying keygrip for learn command. [T6002]
* dirmngr: Fix for Windows when build against GNUTLS. [T5899]
* gpg-connect-agent: Add --unbuffered option.
* gpg-connect-agent: Add a way to cancel an INQUIRE. [T6010]
* gpgconf: New short options -V and -X
Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T5947
See-also: gnupg-announce/2022q3/000474.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.3.6 (2022-04-25)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Fix regression in 2.3.5 importing longer keys. [T5941]
* gpg: Emit an ERROR status as hint for a bad passphrase. [T5943]
* gpg: Avoid NULL-ptr access due to corrupted packets. [T5940]
* gpgsm: Improve the "Certificate not found" error message. [T5821]
* agent: Pass pattern directly to gpg-check-pattern. [rGe529c54fe3]
* scd: Fix hard-coded constant for RSA authentication key OpenPGP.3.
[rG2848fe4c84]
Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T5937
See-also: gnupg-announce/2022q2/000473.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.3.5 (2022-04-21)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Up to five times faster verification of detached signatures.
Doubled detached signing speed. [T5826,rG4e27b9defc,rGf8943ce098]
* gpg: Threefold decryption speedup for large files.
[T5820,rGab177eed51]
* gpg: Nearly double the AES256.OCB encryption speed. [rG99e2c178c7]
* gpg: Removed EAX from the preference list. [rG253fcb9777]
* gpg: Allow --dearmor to decode all kinds of armor files.
[rG34ea19aff9]
* gpg: Remove restrictions for the name part of a user-id.
[rG8945f1aedf]
* gpg: Allow decryption of symmetric encrypted data even for
non-compliant cipher. [rG8631d4cfe2]
* gpg,gpgsm: New option --require-compliance. [rGee013c5350]
* gpgsm: New option --ignore-cert-with-oid. [rGe23dc755fa]
* gpgtar: Create and handle extended headers to support long file
names. [T5754]
* gpgtar: Support file names longer than MAX_PATH on Windows.
[rG70b738f93f]
* gpgtar: Use a pipe for decryption and thus avoid memory
exhaustion. [rGe5ef5e3b91]
* gpgtar: New option --with-log. [rGed53d41b4c]
* agent: New flag "qual" for the trustlist.txt. [rG7c8c606061]
* scdaemon: Add support for GeNUA cards. [rG0dcc249852]
* scdaemon: Add --challenge-response option to PK_AUTH for OpenPGP
cards. [T5862]
* dirmngr: Support the use of ECDSA for CRLs and OCSP.
[rGde87c8e1ea,rG890e9849b5]
* dirmngr: Map all gnupg.net addresses to the Ubuntu keyserver.
[T5751]
* ssh: Return a faked response for the new session-bind extension.
[T5931]
* gpgconf: Add command aliases -L -K -R. [rGec4a1cffb8]
* gpg: Request keygrip of key to add via command interface. [T5771]
* gpg: Print Yubikey version correctly. [T5787]
* gpg: Always use version >= 4 to generate key signature. [T5809]
* gpg: Fix generating AEAD packet. [T5853]
* gpg: Fix version on symmetric encrypted AEAD files if the force
option is used. [T5856]
* gpg: Fix adding the list of ultimate trusted keys. [T5742]
* gpgsm: Fix parsing of certain PKCS#12 files. [T5793]
* gpgsm: Print diagnostic about CRL problems due to Tor mode.
[rG137e59a6a5]
* agent: Use "Created:" field for creation time. [T5538]
* scdaemon Fix error handling for a PC/SC reader selected with
reader-port. [T5758]
* scdaemon: Fix DEVINFO with no --watch. [rGc6dd9ff929]
* scdaemon: Fix socket resource leak on Windwos. [T5029]
* scdaemon: Use extended mode for pkcs#15 already for rsa2048.
[rG597253ca17]
* scdaemon: Enhance PASSWD command to accept KEYGRIP optionally.
[T5862]
* scdaemon: Fix memory leak in ccid-driver. [rG8ac92f0e80]
* tpm: Always use hexgrip when storing a key password.
[rGaf2fbd9b01]
* dirmngr: Make WKD lookups work for resolvers not handling SRV
records. [T4729]
* dirmngr: Avoid initial delay on the first keyserver access in
presence of --no-use-tor. [rG57d546674d]
* dirmngr: Workaround for a certain broken LDAP URL. [rG90caa7ad59]
* dirmngr: Escape more characters in WKD requests. [T5902]
* dirmngr: Suppress error message on trial reading as PEM format.
[T5531]
* gpgconf: Fix component table when not building without TPM
support. [T5701]
* gpgconf: Silence warnings from parsing the option files. [T5874]
* gpgconf: Do not list ignored options and mark forced options as
read-only. [rG42785d7c8a]
* gpgconf: Tweak the use of the ldapserver option. [T5801]
* ssh: Fix adding an ed25519 key with a zero length comment. [T5794]
* kbx: Fix searching for FPR20 in version 2 blob. [T5888]
* Fix early homedir creation. [T5895]
* Improve removing of stale lockfiles under Unix. [T5884]
Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T5743
See-also: gnupg-announce/2022q2/000472.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.3.4 (2021-12-20)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: New option --min-rsa-length. [rG5f39db70c0]
* gpg: New option --forbid-gen-key. [rGc397ba3ac0]
* gpg: New option --override-compliance-check. [T5655]
* gpgconf: New command --show-configs. [rGa0fb78ee0f]
* agent,dirmngr,keyboxd: New option --steal-socket.
[rGb0079ab39d,rGdd708f60d5]
* gpg: Fix printing of binary notations. [T5667]
* gpg: Remove stale ultimately trusted keys from the trustdb.
[T5685,T5742]
* gpg: Fix indentation of --print-mds and --print-md sha512. [T5679]
* gpg: Emit gpg 2.2 compatible Ed25519 signature. [T5331]
* gpgsm: Detect circular chains in --list-chain. [rG74c5b35062]
* dirmngr: Make reading resolv.conf more robust. [T5657]
* dirmngr: Ask keyservers to provide the key fingerprints. [T5741]
* gpgconf: Allow changing gpg's deprecated keyserver option. [T5462]
* gpg-wks-server: Fix created file permissions. [rG60be00b033]
* scd: Support longer data for ssh-agent authentication with openpgp
cards. [T5682]
* scd: Modify DEVINFO behavior to support looping forever. [T5359]
* Support gpgconf.ctl for NetBSD and Solaris. [T5656,T5671]
* Silence "Garbled console data" warning under Windows in most
cases. [rGe293da3b21]
* Silence warning about the rootdir under Unices w/o a mounted /proc
file system. [T5656]
* Fix possible build problems about missing include files. [T5592]
Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T5654
See-also: gnupg-announce/2021q4/000468.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.3.3 (2021-10-12)
------------------------------------------------
* agent: Fix segv in GET_PASSPHRASE (regression). [#5577]
* dirmngr: Fix Let's Encrypt certificate chain validation. [#5639]
* gpg: Change default and maximum AEAD chunk size to 4 MiB.
[ad3dabc9fb]
* gpg: Print a warning when importing a bad cv25519 secret key.
[#5464]
* gpg: Fix --list-packets for undecryptable AEAD packets. [#5584]
* gpg: Verify backsigs for v5 keys correctly. [#5628]
* keyboxd: Fix checksum computation for no UBID entry on disk.
[#5573]
* keyboxd: Fix "invalid object" error with cv448 keys. [#5609]
* dirmngr: New option --ignore-cert. [4b3e9a44b5]
* agent: Fix calibrate_get_time use of clock_gettime. [#5623]
* Silence process spawning diagnostics on Windows. [f2b01025c3]
* Support a gpgconf.ctl file under Unix and use this for the
regression tests. [#5999]
Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T5565
See-also: gnupg-announce/2021q4/000466.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.3.2 (2021-08-24)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Allow fingerprint based lookup with --locate-external-key.
[ec36eca08c]
* gpg: Allow decryption w/o public key but with correct card
inserted. [50293ec2eb]
* gpg: Auto import keys specified with --trusted-keys. [100037ac0f]
* gpg: Do not use import-clean for LDAP keyserver imports. [#5387]
* gpg: Fix mailbox based search via AKL keyserver method. [4fcfac6feb]
* gpg: Fix memory corruption with --clearsign introduced with 2.3.1.
[#5430]
* gpg: Use a more descriptive prompt for symmetric decryption.
[6dfae2f402]
* gpg: Improve speed of secret key listing. [40da61b89b]
* gpg: Support keygrip search with traditional keyring. [#5469]
* gpg: Let --fetch-key return an exit code on failure. [#5376]
* gpg: Emit the NO_SECKEY status again for decryption. [#5562]
* gpgsm: Support decryption of password based encryption (pwri).
[eeb65d3bbd]
* gpgsm: Support AES-GCM decryption. [4980fb3c6d]
* gpgsm: Let --dump-cert --show-cert also print an OpenPGP
fingerprint. [52bbdc731f]
* gpgsm: Fix finding of issuer in use-keyboxd mode. [6b76693ff5]
* gpgsm: New option --ldapserver as an alias for --keyserver.
[89df86157e]
* agent: Use SHA-256 for SSH fingerprint by default. [#5434]
* agent: Fix calling handle_pincache_put. [#5436]
* agent: Fix importing protected secret key. [#5122]
* agent: Fix a regression in agent_get_shadow_info_type. [#5393]
* agent: Add translatable text for Caps Lock hint. [#4950]
* agent: New option --pinentry-formatted-passphrase. [#5517]
* agent: Add checkpin inquiry for pinentry. [#5517,#5532]
* agent: New option --check-sym-passphrase-pattern. [#5517]
* agent: Use the sysconfdir for a pattern file.
* agent: Make QT_QPA_PLATFORMTHEME=qt5ct work for the pinentry.
[1305baf099]
* dirmngr: LDAP search by a mailbox now ignores revoked keys.
[1406f551f1]
* dirmngr: For KS_SEARCH return the fingerprint also with LDAP.
[#5441]
* dirmngr: Allow for non-URL specified ldap keyservers. [#5405,#5452]
* dirmngr: New option --ldapserver. [52cf32ce2f]
* dirmngr: Fix regression in KS_GET for mail address pattern.
[#5497]
* card: New option --shadow for the list command. [2fce99d73a]
* tests: Make sure the built keyboxd is used. [#5406]
* scd: Fix computing shared secrets for 512 bit curves.
[9e24f2a45c]
* scd: Fix unblock PIN by a Reset Code with KDF. [#5413]
* scd: Fix PC/SC removed card problem. [8d81fd7c01]
* scd: Recover the partial match for PORTSTR for PC/SC.
[53bdc6288f]
* scd: Make sure to release the PC/SC context. [#5416]
* scd: Fix zero-byte handling in ECC. [#5163]
* scd: Fix serial number detection for Yubikey 5. [#5442]
* scd: Add basic support for AET JCOP cards. [544ec7872a]
* scd: Detect external interference when --pcsc-shared is in use.
[#5484]
* scd: Fix access to the list of cards. [#5524]
* gpgconf: Do not list a disabled tpm2d. [#5408]
* gpgconf: Make runtime changes with different homedir work.
[31c0aa2ff3]
* keyboxd: Fix searching for exact mail adddress. [f79e9540ca]
* keyboxd: Fix searching with multiple patterns. [101ba4f18a]
* gpgtar: Fix file size computation under Windows. [14e36bdbe1]
* tools: Extend gpg-check-pattern. [73c03e0232]
* wkd: Fix client issue with leading or trailing spaces in
user-ids. [b4345f7521]
* Under Windows add a fallback in case the console can't cope with
Unicode. [#5491]
* Under Windows use LOCAL_APPDATA for the socket directory. [#5537]
* Pass XDG_SESSION_TYPE and QT_QPA_PLATFORM envvars to Pinentry.
[#3659]
* Change the default keyserver to keyserver.ubuntu.com. This is a
temporary change due to the shutdown of the SKS keyserver pools.
[55b5928099]
Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T5405
See-also: gnupg-announce/2021q3/000462.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.3.1 (2021-04-20)
------------------------------------------------
* The new configuration file common.conf is now used to enable the
use of the key database daemon with "use-keyboxd". Using this
option in gpg.conf and gpgsm.conf is supported for a transitional
period. See doc/example/common.conf for more.
* gpg: Force version 5 key creation for ed448 and cv448 algorithms.
* gpg: By default do not use the self-sigs-only option when
importing from an LDAP keyserver. [#5387]
* gpg: Lookup a missing public key of the active card via LDAP.
[d7e707170f]
* gpgsm: New command --show-certs. [51419d6341]
* scd: Fix CCID driver for SCM SPR332/SPR532. [#5297]
* scd: Further improvements for PKCS#15 cards.
* Fix build problems on Fedora. [#5389]
* Fix build problems on macOS. [#5400]
* New configure option --with-tss to allow the selection of the TSS
library. [93c88d0af3]
Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T5386
See-also: gnupg-announce/2021q2/000459.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.3.0 (2021-04-07)
------------------------------------------------
* A new experimental key database daemon is provided. To enable it
put "use-keyboxd" into gpg.conf and gpgsm.conf. Keys are stored
in a SQLite database and make key lookup much faster.
* New tool gpg-card as a flexible frontend for all types of
supported smartcards.
* New option --chuid for gpg, gpgsm, gpgconf, gpg-card, and
gpg-connect-agent.
* The gpg-wks-client tool is now installed under bin; a wrapper for
its old location at libexec is also installed.
* tpm2d: New daemon to physically bind keys to the local machine.
* gpg: Switch to ed25519/cv25519 as default public key algorithms.
* gpg: Verification results now depend on the --sender option and
the signer's UID subpacket. [T4735]
* gpg: Do not use any 64-bit block size cipher algorithm for
encryption. Use AES as last resort cipher preference instead of
3DES. This can be reverted using --allow-old-cipher-algos.
* gpg: Support AEAD encryption mode using OCB or EAX.
* gpg: Support v5 keys and signatures.
* gpg: Support curve X448 (ed448, cv448).
* gpg: Allow use of group names in key listings. [e825aea2ba]
* gpg: New option --full-timestrings to print date and time.
* gpg: New option --force-sign-key. [#4584]
* gpg: New option --no-auto-trust-new-key.
* gpg: The legacy key discovery method PKA is no longer supported.
The command --print-pka-records and the PKA related import and
export options have been removed.
* gpg: Support export of Ed448 Secure Shell keys.
* gpgsm: Add basic ECC support.
* gpgsm: Support creation of EdDSA certificates. [#4888]
* agent: Allow the use of "Label:" in a key file to customize the
pinentry prompt. [5388537806]
* agent: Support ssh-agent extensions for environment variables.
With a patched version of OpenSSH this avoids the need for the
"updatestartuptty" kludge. [224e26cf7b]
* scd: Improve support for multiple card readers and tokens.
* scd: Support PIV cards.
* scd: Support for Rohde&Schwarz Cybersecurity cards.
* scd: Support Telesec Signature Cards v2.0
* scd: Support multiple application on certain smartcard.
* scd: New option --application-priority.
* scd: New option --pcsc-shared; see man page for important notes.
* dirmngr: Support a gpgNtds parameter in LDAP keyserver URLs.
* The symcryptrun tool, a wrapper for the now obsolete external
Chiasmus tool, has been removed.
* Full Unicode support for the command line. [#4398]
Changes also found in 2.2.27:
* gpg: Fix regression in 2.2.24 for gnupg_remove function under
Windows. [#5230]
* gpgconf: Fix case with neither local nor global gpg.conf. [9f37d3e6f3]
* gpgconf: Fix description of two new options. [#5221]
* Build Windows installer without timestamps. Note that the
Authenticode signatures still carry a timestamp.
Changes also found in 2.2.26:
* gpg: New AKL method "ntds". [559efd23e9]
* gpg: Fix --trusted-key with fingerprint arg. [8a2e5025eb]
* scd: Fix writing of ECC keys to an OpenPGP card. [#5163]
* scd: Make an USB error fix specific to SPR532 readers. [#5167]
* dirmngr: With new LDAP keyservers store the new attributes. Never
store the useless pgpSignerID. Fix a long standing bug storing
some keys on an ldap server. [0e88c73bc9,e47de85382]
* dirmngr: Support the new Active Direcory LDAP schema for
keyservers. [ac8ece9266]
* dirmngr: Allow LDAP OpenPGP searches via fingerprint.
[c75fd75532]
* dirmngr: Do not block other threads during keyserver LDAP calls.
[15bfd189c0]
* Support global configuration files. [#4788,a028f24136]
* Fix the iconv fallback handling to UTF-8. [#5038]
Changes also found in 2.2.25:
* scd: Fix regression in 2.2.24 requiring gpg --card-status before
signing or decrypting. [#5065]
* gpgsm: Using Libksba 1.5.0 signatures with a rarely used
combination of attributes can now be verified. [#5146]
Changes also found in 2.2.24:
* Allow Unicode file names on Windows almost everywhere. Note that
it is still not possible to use Unicode strings on the command
line. This change also fixes a regression in 2.2.22 related to
non-ascii file names. [#5098]
* Fix localized time printing on Windows. [#5073]
* gpg: New command --quick-revoke-sig. [#5093]
* gpg: Do not use weak digest algos if selected by recipient
preference during sign+encrypt. [4c181d51a6]
* gpg: Switch to AES256 for symmetric encryption in de-vs mode.
[166e779634]
* gpg: Silence weak digest warnings with --quiet. [#4893]
* gpg: Print new status line CANCELED_BY_USER for a cancel during
symmetric encryption. [f05d1772c4]
* gpg: Fix the encrypt+sign hash algo preference selection for
ECDSA. This is in particular needed for keys created from
existing smartcard based keys. [aeed0b93ff]
* agent: Keep some permissions of private-keys-v1.d. [#2312]
* dirmngr: Align sks-keyservers.netCA.pem use between ntbtls and
gnutls builds. [e4f3b74c91]
* dirmngr: Fix the pool keyserver case for a single host in the
pool. [72e04b03b1a7]
* scd: Fix the use case of verify_chv2 by CHECKPIN. [61aea64b3c]
* scd: Various improvements to the ccid-driver. [#4616,#5065]
* scd: Minor fixes for Yubikey [25bec16d0b]
* gpgconf: New option --show-versions.
* w32: Install gpg-check-pattern and example profiles. Install
Windows subsystem variant of gpgconf (gpgconf-w32).
Changes also found in 2.2.23:
* gpg: Fix a possible segv in the key cleaning code.
* gpgsm: Fix a minor RFC2253 parser bug. [#5037]
* scdaemon: Fix a PIN verify failure on certain OpenPGP card
implementations. Regression in 2.2.22. [#5039]
Changes also found in 2.2.22:
* gpg: Change the default key algorithm to rsa3072.
* gpg: Add regular expression support for Trust Signatures on all
platforms. [#4843]
* gpg: Fix regression in 2.2.21 with non-default --passphrase-repeat
option. [#4991]
* gpg: Ignore --personal-digest-prefs for ECDSA keys. [#5021]
* gpgsm: Make rsaPSS a de-vs compliant scheme.
* gpgsm: Show also the SHA256 fingerprint in key listings.
* gpgsm: Do not require a default keyring for --gpgconf-list. [#4867]
* gpg-agent: Default to extended key format and record the creation
time of keys. Add new option --disable-extended-key-format.
* gpg-agent: Support the WAYLAND_DISPLAY envvar. [#5016]
* gpg-agent: Allow using --gpgconf-list even if HOME does not
exist. [#4866]
* gpg-agent: Make the Pinentry work even if the envvar TERM is set
to the empty string. [#4137]
* scdaemon: Add a workaround for Gnuk tokens <= 2.15 which wrongly
incremented the error counter when using the "verify" command of
"gpg --edit-key" with only the signature key being present.
* dirmngr: Better handle systems with disabled IPv6. [#4977]
* gpgpslit: Install tool. It was not installed in the past to avoid
conflicts with the version installed by GnuPG 1.4. [#5023]
* gpgtar: Handle Unicode file names on Windows correctly. [#4083]
* gpgtar: Make --files-from and --null work as documented. [#5027]
* Build the Windows installer with the new Ntbtls 0.2.0 so that TLS
connections succeed for servers demanding GCM.
Changes also found in 2.2.21:
* gpg: Add option --no-include-key-block. [#4856]
* gpg: Allow for extra padding in ECDH. [#4908]
* gpg: Only a single pinentry is shown for symmetric encryption if
the pinentry supports this. [#4971]
* gpg: Print a note if no keys are given to --delete-key. [#4959]
* gpg,gpgsm: The ridiculous passphrase quality bar is not anymore
shown. [#2103]
* gpgsm: Certificates without a CRL distribution point are now
considered valid without looking up a CRL. The new option
--enable-issuer-based-crl-check can be used to revert to the
former behaviour.
* gpgsm: Support rsaPSS signature verification. [#4538]
* gpgsm: Unless CRL checking is disabled lookup a missing issuer
certificate using the certificate's authorityInfoAccess. [#4898]
* gpgsm: Print the certificate's serial number also in decimal
notation.
* gpgsm: Fix possible NULL-deref in messages of --gen-key. [#4895]
* scd: Support the CardOS 5 based D-Trust Card 3.1.
* dirmngr: Allow http URLs with "LOOKUP --url".
* wkd: Take name of sendmail from configure. Fixes an OpenBSD
specific bug. [#4886]
* Support a command history file in gpg-card and gpg-connect-agent.
Changes also found in 2.2.20:
* In constrast to 2.2 no explicit protection against overflow of the
error counter is needed because libgpg-error takes care of this.
* gpg: Make really sure that --verify-files always returns an error.
* gpg: Fix key listing --with-secret if a pattern is given. [#4061]
* gpg: Fix detection of certain keys used as default-key. [#4810]
* gpg: Fix default-key selection when a card is available. [#4850]
* gpg: Fix key expiration and key usage for keys created with a
creation date of zero. [4670]
* gpgsm: Fix import of some CR,LF terminated certificates. [#4847]
* gpg: New options --include-key-block and --auto-key-import to
allow encrypted replies after an initial signed message. [#4856]
* gpg: Allow the use of a fingerprint with --trusted-key. [#4855]
* gpg: New property "fpr" for use by --export-filter.
* scdaemon: Disable the pinpad if a KDF DO is used. [#4832]
* dirmngr: Improve finding OCSP certificates. [#4536]
* Avoid build problems with LTO or gcc-10. [#4831]
Changes also found in 2.2.19:
* gpg: Only in 2.2.19; not requird in master: Fix double free when
decrypting for hidden recipients. Regression in 2.2.18. [#4762].
* gpg: Use auto-key-locate for encryption even for mail addresses
given with angle brackets. [#4726]
* gpgsm: Add special case for certain expired intermediate
certificates. [#4696]
Changes also found in 2.2.18:
* gpg: Changed the way keys are detected on a smartcards; this
allows the use of non-OpenPGP cards. In the case of a not very
likely regression the new option --use-only-openpgp-card is
available. [#4681]
* gpg: The commands --full-gen-key and --quick-gen-key now allow
direct key generation from supported cards. [#4681]
* gpg: Prepare against chosen-prefix SHA-1 collisions in key
signatures. This change removes all SHA-1 based key signature
from the web-of-trust. Note that this includes all key signature
created with dsa1024 keys. (Version 2.2.18 limits this to key
signatures newer than 2019-01-19.) The new option
--allow-weak-key-signatues can be used to override the new and
safer behaviour. [#4755,CVE-2019-14855]
* gpg: Improve performance for import of large keyblocks. [#4592]
* gpg: Implement a keybox compression run. [#4644]
* gpg: Show warnings from dirmngr about redirect and certificate
problems (details require --verbose as usual).
* gpg: Allow to pass the empty string for the passphrase if the
'--passphase=' syntax is used. [#4633]
* gpg: Fix printing of the KDF object attributes.
* gpg: Avoid surprises with --locate-external-key and certain
--auto-key-locate settings. [#4662]
* gpg: Improve selection of best matching key. [#4713]
* gpg: Delete key binding signature when deleting a subkey.
[#4665,#4457]
* gpg: Fix a potential loss of key signatures during import with
self-sigs-only active. [#4628]
* gpg: Silence "marked as ultimately trusted" diagnostics if
option --quiet is used. [#4634]
* gpg: Silence some diagnostics during in key listsing even with
option --verbose. [#4627]
* gpg, gpgsm: Change parsing of agent's pkdecrypt results. [#4652]
* gpgsm: Support AES-256 keys.
* gpgsm: Fix a bug in triggering a keybox compression run if
--faked-system-time is used.
* dirmngr: System CA certificates are no longer used for the SKS
pool if GNUTLS instead of NTBTLS is used as TLS library. [#4594]
* dirmngr: On Windows detect usability of IPv4 and IPv6 interfaces
to avoid long timeouts. [#4165]
* scd: Fix BWI value for APDU level transfers to make Gemalto Ezio
Shield and Trustica Cryptoucan work. [#4654,#4566]
* wkd: gpg-wks-client --install-key now installs the required policy
file.
Changes also found in 2.2.17:
* gpg: Ignore all key-signatures received from keyservers. This
change is required to mitigate a DoS due to keys flooded with
faked key-signatures. The old behaviour can be achieved by adding
keyserver-options no-self-sigs-only,no-import-clean
to your gpg.conf. [#4607]
* gpg: If an imported keyblocks is too large to be stored in the
keybox (pubring.kbx) do not error out but fallback to an import
using the options "self-sigs-only,import-clean". [#4591]
* gpg: New command --locate-external-key which can be used to
refresh keys from the Web Key Directory or via other methods
configured with --auto-key-locate.
* gpg: New import option "self-sigs-only".
* gpg: In --auto-key-retrieve prefer WKD over keyservers. [#4595]
* dirmngr: Support the "openpgpkey" subdomain feature from
draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-07. [#4590].
* dirmngr: Add an exception for the "openpgpkey" subdomain to the
CSRF protection. [#4603]
* dirmngr: Fix endless loop due to http errors 503 and 504. [#4600]
* dirmngr: Fix TLS bug during redirection of HKP requests. [#4566]
* gpgconf: Fix a race condition when killing components. [#4577]
Changes also found in 2.2.16:
* gpg,gpgsm: Fix deadlock on Windows due to a keybox sharing
violation. [#4505]
* gpg: Allow deletion of subkeys with --delete-key. This finally
makes the bang-suffix work as expected for that command. [#4457]
* gpg: Replace SHA-1 by SHA-256 in self-signatures when updating
them with --quick-set-expire or --quick-set-primary-uid. [#4508]
* gpg: Improve the photo image viewer selection. [#4334]
* gpg: Fix decryption with --use-embedded-filename. [#4500]
* gpg: Remove hints on using the --keyserver option. [#4512]
* gpg: Fix export of certain secret keys with comments. [#4490]
* gpg: Reject too long user-ids in --quick-gen-key. [#4532]
* gpg: Fix a double free in the best key selection code. [#4462]
* gpg: Fix the key generation dialog for switching back from EdDSA
to ECDSA.
* gpg: Use AES-192 with SHA-384 to comply with RFC-6637.
* gpg: Use only the addrspec from the Signer's UID subpacket to
mitigate a problem with another implementation.
* gpg: Skip invalid packets during a keyring listing and sync
diagnostics with the output.
* gpgsm: Avoid confusing diagnostic when signing with the default
key. [#4535]
* agent: Do not delete any secret key in --dry-run mode.
* agent: Fix failures on 64 bit big-endian boxes related to URIs in
a keyfile. [#4501]
* agent: Stop scdaemon after a reload with disable-scdaemon newly
configured. [#4326]
* dirmngr: Improve caching algorithm for WKD domains.
* dirmngr: Support other hash algorithms than SHA-1 for OCSP. [#3966]
* gpgconf: Make --homedir work for --launch. [#4496]
* gpgconf: Before --launch check for a valid config file. [#4497]
* wkd: Do not import more than 5 keys from one WKD address.
* wkd: Accept keys which are stored in armored format in the
directory.
* The installer for Windows now comes with signed binaries.
Changes also found in 2.2.15:
* sm: Fix --logger-fd and --status-fd on Windows for non-standard
file descriptors.
* sm: Allow decryption even if expired keys are configured. [#4431]
* agent: Change command KEYINFO to print ssh fingerprints with other
hash algos.
* dirmngr: Fix build problems on Solaris due to the use of reserved
symbol names. [#4420]
* wkd: New commands --print-wkd-hash and --print-wkd-url for
gpg-wks-client.
Changes also found in 2.2.14:
* gpg: Allow import of PGP desktop exported secret keys. Also avoid
importing secret keys if the secret keyblock is not valid. [#4392]
* gpg: Make invalid primary key algo obvious in key listings.
* sm: Do not mark a certificate in a key listing as de-vs compliant
if its use for a signature will not be possible.
* sm: Fix certificate creation with key on card.
* sm: Create rsa3072 bit certificates by default.
* sm: Print Yubikey attestation extensions with --dump-cert.
* agent: Fix cancellation handling for scdaemon.
* agent: Support --mode=ssh option for CLEAR_PASSPHRASE. [#4340]
* scd: Fix flushing of the CA-FPR DOs in app-openpgp.
* scd: Avoid a conflict error with the "undefined" app.
* dirmngr: Add CSRF protection exception for protonmail.
* dirmngr: Fix build problems with gcc 9 in libdns.
* gpgconf: New option --show-socket for use with --launch.
* gpgtar: Make option -C work for archive creation.
Changes also found in 2.2.13:
* gpg: Implement key lookup via keygrip (using the & prefix).
* gpg: Allow generating Ed25519 key from existing key.
* gpg: Emit an ERROR status line if no key was found with -k.
* gpg: Stop early when trying to create a primary Elgamal key. [#4329]
* gpgsm: Print the card's key algorithms along with their keygrips
in interactive key generation.
* agent: Clear bogus pinentry cache in the error case. [#4348]
* scd: Support "acknowledge button" feature.
* scd: Fix for USB INTERRUPT transfer. [#4308]
* wks: Do no use compression for the the encrypted challenge and
response.
Changes also found in 2.2.12:
* tools: New commands --install-key and --remove-key for
gpg-wks-client. This allows to prepare a Web Key Directory on a
local file system for later upload to a web server.
* gpg: New --list-option "show-only-fpr-mbox". This makes the use
of the new gpg-wks-client --install-key command easier on Windows.
* gpg: Improve processing speed when --skip-verify is used.
* gpg: Fix a bug where a LF was accidentally written to the console.
* gpg: --card-status now shows whether a card has the new KDF
feature enabled.
* agent: New runtime option --s2k-calibration=MSEC. New configure
option --with-agent-s2k-calibration=MSEC. [#3399]
* dirmngr: Try another keyserver from the pool on receiving a 502,
503, or 504 error. [#4175]
* dirmngr: Avoid possible CSRF attacks via http redirects. A HTTP
query will not anymore follow a 3xx redirect unless the Location
header gives the same host. If the host is different only the
host and port is taken from the Location header and the original
path and query parts are kept.
* dirmngr: New command FLUSHCRL to flush all CRLS from disk and
memory. [#3967]
* New simplified Chinese translation (zh_CN).
Changes also found in 2.2.11:
* gpgsm: Fix CRL loading when intermediate certificates are not yet
trusted.
* gpgsm: Fix an error message about the digest algo. [#4219]
* gpg: Fix a wrong warning due to new sign usage check introduced
with 2.2.9. [#4014]
* gpg: Print the "data source" even for an unsuccessful keyserver
query.
* gpg: Do not store the TOFU trust model in the trustdb. This
allows to enable or disable a TOFO model without triggering a
trustdb rebuild. [#4134]
* scd: Fix cases of "Bad PIN" after using "forcesig". [#4177]
* agent: Fix possible hang in the ssh handler. [#4221]
* dirmngr: Tack the unmodified mail address to a WKD request. See
commit a2bd4a64e5b057f291a60a9499f881dd47745e2f for details.
* dirmngr: Tweak diagnostic about missing LDAP server file.
* dirmngr: In verbose mode print the OCSP responder id.
* dirmngr: Fix parsing of the LDAP port. [#4230]
* wks: Add option --directory/-C to the server. Always build the
server on Unix systems.
* wks: Add option --with-colons to the client. Support sites which
use the policy file instead of the submission-address file.
* Fix EBADF when gpg et al. are called by broken CGI scripts.
* Fix some minor memory leaks and bugs.
Changes also found in 2.2.10:
* gpg: Refresh expired keys originating from the WKD. [#2917]
* gpg: Use a 256 KiB limit for a WKD imported key.
* gpg: New option --known-notation. [#4060]
* scd: Add support for the Trustica Cryptoucan reader.
* agent: Speed up starting during on-demand launching. [#3490]
* dirmngr: Validate SRV records in WKD queries.
Changes also found in 2.2.9:
* dirmngr: Fix recursive resolver mode and other bugs in the libdns
code. [#3374,#3803,#3610]
* dirmngr: When using libgpg-error 1.32 or later a GnuPG build with
NTBTLS support (e.g. the standard Windows installer) does not
anymore block for dozens of seconds before returning data.
* gpg: Fix bug in --show-keys which actually imported revocation
certificates. [#4017]
* gpg: Ignore too long user-ID and comment packets. [#4022]
* gpg: Fix crash due to bad German translation. Improved printf
format compile time check.
* gpg: Handle missing ISSUER sub packet gracefully in the presence of
the new ISSUER_FPR. [#4046]
* gpg: Allow decryption using several passphrases in most cases.
[#3795,#4050]
* gpg: Command --show-keys now enables the list options
show-unusable-uids, show-unusable-subkeys, show-notations and
show-policy-urls by default.
* gpg: Command --show-keys now prints revocation certificates. [#4018]
* gpg: Add revocation reason to the "rev" and "rvs" records of the
option --with-colons. [#1173]
* gpg: Export option export-clean does now remove certain expired
subkeys; export-minimal removes all expired subkeys. [#3622]
* gpg: New "usage" property for the drop-subkey filters. [#4019]
Changes also found in 2.2.8:
* gpg: Decryption of messages not using the MDC mode will now lead
to a hard failure even if a legacy cipher algorithm was used. The
option --ignore-mdc-error can be used to turn this failure into a
warning. Take care: Never use that option unconditionally or
without a prior warning.
* gpg: The MDC encryption mode is now always used regardless of the
cipher algorithm or any preferences. For testing --rfc2440 can be
used to create a message without an MDC.
* gpg: Sanitize the diagnostic output of the original file name in
verbose mode. [#4012,CVE-2018-12020]
* gpg: Detect suspicious multiple plaintext packets in a more
reliable way. [#4000]
* gpg: Fix the duplicate key signature detection code. [#3994]
* gpg: The options --no-mdc-warn, --force-mdc, --no-force-mdc,
--disable-mdc and --no-disable-mdc have no more effect.
* gpg: New command --show-keys.
* agent: Add DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS and a few other envvars to the
list of startup environment variables. [#3947]
Changes also found in 2.2.7:
* gpg: New option --no-symkey-cache to disable the passphrase cache
for symmetrical en- and decryption.
* gpg: The ERRSIG status now prints the fingerprint if that is part
of the signature.
* gpg: Relax emitting of FAILURE status lines
* gpg: Add a status flag to "sig" lines printed with --list-sigs.
* gpg: Fix "Too many open files" when using --multifile. [#3951]
* ssh: Return an error for unknown ssh-agent flags. [#3880]
* dirmngr: Fix a regression since 2.1.16 which caused corrupted CRL
caches under Windows. [#2448,#3923]
* dirmngr: Fix a CNAME problem with pools and TLS. Also use a fixed
mapping of keys.gnupg.net to sks-keyservers.net. [#3755]
* dirmngr: Try resurrecting dead hosts earlier (from 3 to 1.5 hours).
* dirmngr: Fallback to CRL if no default OCSP responder is configured.
* dirmngr: Implement CRL fetching via https. Here a redirection to
http is explicitly allowed.
* dirmngr: Make LDAP searching and CRL fetching work under Windows.
This stopped working with 2.1. [#3937]
* agent,dirmngr: New sub-command "getenv" for "getinfo" to ease
debugging.
Changes also found in 2.2.6:
* gpg,gpgsm: New option --request-origin to pretend requests coming
from a browser or a remote site.
* gpg: Fix race condition on trustdb.gpg updates due to too early
released lock. [#3839]
* gpg: Emit FAILURE status lines in almost all cases. [#3872]
* gpg: Implement --dry-run for --passwd to make checking a key's
passphrase straightforward.
* gpg: Make sure to only accept a certification capable key for key
signatures. [#3844]
* gpg: Better user interaction in --card-edit for the factory-reset
sub-command.
* gpg: Improve changing key attributes in --card-edit by adding an
explicit "key-attr" sub-command. [#3781]
* gpg: Print the keygrips in the --card-status.
* scd: Support KDF DO setup. [#3823]
* scd: Fix some issues with PC/SC on Windows. [#3825]
* scd: Fix suspend/resume handling in the CCID driver.
* agent: Evict cached passphrases also via a timer. [#3829]
* agent: Use separate passphrase caches depending on the request
origin. [#3858]
* ssh: Support signature flags. [#3880]
* dirmngr: Handle failures related to missing IPv6 support
gracefully. [#3331]
* Fix corner cases related to specified home directory with
drive letter on Windows. [#3720]
* Allow the use of UNC directory names as homedir. [#3818]
Changes also found in 2.2.5:
* gpg: Allow the use of the "cv25519" and "ed25519" short names in
addition to the canonical curve names in --batch --gen-key.
* gpg: Make sure to print all secret keys with option --list-only
and --decrypt. [#3718]
* gpg: Fix the use of future-default with --quick-add-key for
signing keys. [#3747]
* gpg: Select a secret key by checking availability under gpg-agent.
[#1967]
* gpg: Fix reversed prompt texts for --only-sign-text-ids. [#3787]
* gpg,gpgsm: Fix detection of bogus keybox blobs on 32 bit systems.
[#3770]
* gpgsm: Fix regression since 2.1 in --export-secret-key-raw which
got $d mod (q-1)$ wrong. Note that most tools automatically fixup
that parameter anyway.
* ssh: Fix a regression in getting the client'd PID on *BSD and
macOS.
* scd: Support the KDF Data Object of the OpenPGP card 3.3. [#3152]
* scd: Fix a regression in the internal CCID driver for certain card
readers. [#3508]
* scd: Fix a problem on NetBSD killing scdaemon on gpg-agent
shutdown. [#3778]
* dirmngr: Improve returned error description on failure of DNS
resolving. [#3756]
* wks: Implement command --install-key for gpg-wks-server.
* Add option STATIC=1 to the Speedo build system to allow a build
with statically linked versions of the core GnuPG libraries. Also
use --enable-wks-tools by default by Speedo builds for Unix.
Changes also found in 2.2.4:
* gpg: Change default preferences to prefer SHA512.
* gpg: Print a warning when more than 150 MiB are encrypted using a
cipher with 64 bit block size.
* gpg: Print a warning if the MDC feature has not been used for a
message.
* gpg: Fix regular expression of domain addresses in trust
signatures. [#2923]
* agent: New option --auto-expand-secmem to help with high numbers
of concurrent connections. Requires libgcrypt 1.8.2 for having
an effect. [#3530]
* dirmngr: Cache responses of WKD queries.
* gpgconf: Add option --status-fd.
* wks: Add commands --check and --remove-key to gpg-wks-server.
* Increase the backlog parameter of the daemons to 64 and add
option --listen-backlog.
* New configure option --enable-run-gnupg-user-socket to first try a
socket directory which is not removed by systemd at session end.
Changes also found in 2.2.3:
* gpgsm: Fix initial keybox creation on Windows. [#3507]
* dirmngr: Fix crash in case of a CRL loading error. [#3510]
* Fix the name of the Windows registry key. [Git#4f5afaf1fd]
* gpgtar: Fix wrong behaviour of --set-filename. [#3500]
* gpg: Silence AKL retrieval messages. [#3504]
* agent: Use clock or clock_gettime for calibration. [#3056]
* agent: Improve robustness of the shutdown pending
state. [Git#7ffedfab89]
Changes also found in 2.2.2:
* gpg: Avoid duplicate key imports by concurrently running gpg
processes. [#3446]
* gpg: Fix creating on-disk subkey with on-card primary key. [#3280]
* gpg: Fix validity retrieval for multiple keyrings. [Debian#878812]
* gpg: Fix --dry-run and import option show-only for secret keys.
* gpg: Print "sec" or "sbb" for secret keys with import option
import-show. [#3431]
* gpg: Make import less verbose. [#3397]
* gpg: Add alias "Key-Grip" for parameter "Keygrip" and new
parameter "Subkey-Grip" to unattended key generation. [#3478]
* gpg: Improve "factory-reset" command for OpenPGP cards. [#3286]
* gpg: Ease switching Gnuk tokens into ECC mode by using the magic
keysize value 25519.
* gpgsm: Fix --with-colon listing in crt records for fields > 12.
* gpgsm: Do not expect X.509 keyids to be unique. [#1644]
* agent: Fix stuck Pinentry when using --max-passphrase-days. [#3190]
* agent: New option --s2k-count. [#3276 (workaround)]
* dirmngr: Do not follow https-to-http redirects. [#3436]
* dirmngr: Reduce default LDAP timeout from 100 to 15 seconds. [#3487]
* gpgconf: Ignore non-installed components for commands
--apply-profile and --apply-defaults. [#3313]
* Add configure option --enable-werror. [#2423]
Changes also found in 2.2.1:
* gpg: Fix formatting of the user id in batch mode key generation
if only "name-email" is given.
* gpgv: Fix annoying "not suitable for" warnings.
* wks: Convey only the newest user id to the provider. This is the
case if different names are used with the same addr-spec.
* wks: Create a complying user id for provider policy mailbox-only.
* wks: Add workaround for posteo.de.
* scd: Fix the use of large ECC keys with an OpenPGP card.
* dirmngr: Use system provided root certificates if no specific HKP
certificates are configured. If build with GNUTLS, this was
already the case.
Release-info: https://dev.gnupg.org/T5343
See-also: gnupg-announce/2021q2/000458.html
Release dates of 2.2 versions
-----------------------------
Version 2.2.40 (2022-10-10) https://dev.gnupg.org/T6181
Version 2.2.39 (2022-09-02) https://dev.gnupg.org/T6175
Version 2.2.38 (2022-09-01) https://dev.gnupg.org/T6159
Version 2.2.37 (2022-08-24) https://dev.gnupg.org/T6105
Version 2.2.36 (2022-07-06) https://dev.gnupg.org/T5949
Version 2.2.35 (2022-04-25) https://dev.gnupg.org/T5928
Version 2.2.34 (2022-02-07) https://dev.gnupg.org/T5703
Version 2.2.33 (2021-11-23) https://dev.gnupg.org/T5641
Version 2.2.32 (2021-10-06) https://dev.gnupg.org/T5601
Version 2.2.31 (2021-09-15) https://dev.gnupg.org/T5571
Version 2.2.30 (2021-08-26) https://dev.gnupg.org/T5519
Version 2.2.29 (2021-07-04) https://dev.gnupg.org/T5498
Version 2.2.28 (2021-06-10) https://dev.gnupg.org/T5482
Version 2.2.27 (2021-01-11) https://dev.gnupg.org/T5234
Version 2.2.26 (2020-12-21) https://dev.gnupg.org/T5153
Version 2.2.25 (2020-11-23) https://dev.gnupg.org/T5140
Version 2.2.24 (2020-11-17) https://dev.gnupg.org/T5052
Version 2.2.23 (2020-09-03) https://dev.gnupg.org/T5045
Version 2.2.22 (2020-08-27) https://dev.gnupg.org/T5030
Version 2.2.21 (2020-07-09) https://dev.gnupg.org/T4897
Version 2.2.20 (2020-03-20) https://dev.gnupg.org/T4860
Version 2.2.19 (2019-12-07) https://dev.gnupg.org/T4768
Version 2.2.18 (2019-11-25) https://dev.gnupg.org/T4684
Version 2.2.17 (2019-07-09) https://dev.gnupg.org/T4606
Version 2.2.16 (2019-05-28) https://dev.gnupg.org/T4509
Version 2.2.15 (2019-03-26) https://dev.gnupg.org/T4434
Version 2.2.14 (2019-03-19) https://dev.gnupg.org/T4412
Version 2.2.13 (2019-02-12) https://dev.gnupg.org/T4290
Version 2.2.12 (2018-12-14) https://dev.gnupg.org/T4289
Version 2.2.11 (2018-11-06) https://dev.gnupg.org/T4233
Version 2.2.10 (2018-08-30) https://dev.gnupg.org/T4112
Version 2.2.9 (2018-07-12) https://dev.gnupg.org/T4036
Version 2.2.8 (2018-06-08)
Version 2.2.7 (2018-05-02)
Version 2.2.6 (2018-04-09)
Version 2.2.5 (2018-02-22)
Version 2.2.4 (2017-12-20)
Version 2.2.3 (2017-11-20)
Version 2.2.2 (2017-11-07)
Version 2.2.1 (2017-09-19)
Noteworthy changes in version 2.2.0 (2017-08-28)
------------------------------------------------
This is the new long term stable branch. This branch will only see
bug fixes and no new features.
* gpg: Reverted change in 2.1.23 so that --no-auto-key-retrieve is
again the default.
* Fixed a few minor bugs.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2017q3/000413.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.23 (2017-08-09)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: "gpg" is now installed as "gpg" and not anymore as "gpg2".
If needed, the new configure option --enable-gpg-is-gpg2 can be
used to revert this.
* gpg: Options --auto-key-retrieve and --auto-key-locate "local,wkd"
are now used by default. Note: this enables keyserver and Web Key
Directory operators to notice when a signature from a locally
non-available key is being verified for the first time or when
you intend to encrypt to a mail address without having the key
locally. This new behaviour will eventually make key discovery
much easier and mostly automatic. Disable this by adding
no-auto-key-retrieve
auto-key-locate local
to your gpg.conf.
* agent: Option --no-grab is now the default. The new option --grab
allows to revert this.
* gpg: New import option "show-only".
* gpg: New option --disable-dirmngr to entirely disable network
access for gpg.
* gpg,gpgsm: Tweaked DE-VS compliance behaviour.
* New configure flag --enable-all-tests to run more extensive tests
during "make check".
* gpgsm: The keygrip is now always printed in colon mode as
documented in the man page.
* Fixed connection timeout problem under Windows.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2017q3/000412.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.22 (2017-07-28)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Extend command --quick-set-expire to allow for setting the
expiration time of subkeys.
* gpg: By default try to repair keys during import. New sub-option
no-repair-keys for --import-options.
* gpg,gpgsm: Improved checking and reporting of DE-VS compliance.
* gpg: New options --key-origin and --with-key-origin. Store the
time of the last key update from keyservers, WKD, or DANE.
* agent: New option --ssh-fingerprint-digest.
* dimngr: Lower timeouts on keyserver connection attempts and made
it configurable.
* dirmngr: Tor will now automatically be detected and used. The
option --no-use-tor disables Tor detection.
* dirmngr: Now detects a changed /etc/resolv.conf.
* agent,dirmngr: Initiate shutdown on removal of the GnuPG home
directory.
* gpg: Avoid caching passphrase for failed symmetric encryption.
* agent: Support for unprotected ssh keys.
* dirmngr: Fixed name resolving on systems using only v6
nameservers.
* dirmngr: Allow the use of TLS over http proxies.
* w32: Change directory of the daemons after startup.
* wks: New man pages for client and server.
* Many other bug fixes.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2017q3/000411.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.21 (2017-05-15)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg,gpgsm: Fix corruption of old style keyring.gpg files. This
bug was introduced with version 2.1.20. Note that the default
pubring.kbx format was not affected.
* gpg,dirmngr: Removed the skeleton config file support. The
system's standard methods for providing default configuration
files should be used instead.
* w32: The Windows installer now allows installation of GnuPG
without Administrator permissions.
* gpg: Fixed import filter property match bug.
* scd: Removed Linux support for Cardman 4040 PCMCIA reader.
* scd: Fixed some corner case bugs in resume/suspend handling.
* Many minor bug fixes and code cleanup.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2017q2/000405.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.20 (2017-04-03)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: New properties 'expired', 'revoked', and 'disabled' for the
import and export filters.
* gpg: New command --quick-set-primary-uid.
* gpg: New compliance field for the --with-colon key listing.
* gpg: Changed the key parser to generalize the processing of local
meta data packets.
* gpg: Fixed assertion failure in the TOFU trust model.
* gpg: Fixed exporting of zero length user ID packets.
* scd: Improved support for multiple readers.
* scd: Fixed timeout handling for key generation.
* agent: New option --enable-extended-key-format.
* dirmngr: Do not add a keyserver to a new dirmngr.conf. Dirmngr
uses a default keyserver.
* dimngr: Do not treat TLS warning alerts as severe error when
building with GNUTLS.
* dirmngr: Actually take /etc/hosts in account.
* wks: Fixed client problems on Windows. Published keys are now set
to world-readable.
* tests: Fixed creation of temporary directories.
* A socket directory for a non standard GNUGHOME is now created on
the fly under /run/user. Thus "gpgconf --create-socketdir" is now
optional. The use of "gpgconf --remove-socketdir" to clean up
obsolete socket directories is however recommended to avoid
cluttering /run/user with useless directories.
* Fixed build problems on some platforms.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2017q2/000404.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.19 (2017-03-01)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Print a warning if Tor mode is requested but the Tor daemon
is not running.
* gpg: New status code DECRYPTION_KEY to print the actual private
key used for decryption.
* gpgv: New options --log-file and --debug.
* gpg-agent: Revamp the prompts to ask for card PINs.
* scd: Support for multiple card readers.
* scd: Removed option --debug-disable-ticker. Ticker is used
only when it is required to watch removal of device/card.
* scd: Improved detection of card inserting and removal.
* dirmngr: New option --disable-ipv4.
* dirmngr: New option --no-use-tor to explicitly disable the use of
Tor.
* dirmngr: The option --allow-version-check is now required even if
the option --use-tor is also used.
* dirmngr: Handle a missing nsswitch.conf gracefully.
* dirmngr: Avoid PTR lookups for keyserver pools. The are only done
for the debug command "keyserver --hosttable".
* dirmngr: Rework the internal certificate cache to support classes
of certificates. Load system provided certificates on startup.
Add options --tls, --no-crl, and --systrust to the "VALIDATE"
command.
* dirmngr: Add support for the ntbtls library.
* wks: Create mails with a "WKS-Phase" header. Fix detection of
Draft-2 mode.
* The Windows installer is now build with limited TLS support.
* Many other bug fixes and new regression tests.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2017q1/000402.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.18 (2017-01-23)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Remove bogus subkey signature while cleaning a key (with
export-clean, import-clean, or --edit-key's sub-command clean)
* gpg: Allow freezing the clock with --faked-system-time.
* gpg: New --export-option flag "backup", new --import-option flag
"restore".
* gpg-agent: Fixed long delay due to a regression in the progress
callback code.
* scd: Lots of code cleanup and internal changes.
* scd: Improved the internal CCID driver.
* dirmngr: Fixed problem with the DNS glue code (removal of the
trailing dot in domain names).
* dirmngr: Make sure that Tor is actually enabled after changing the
conf file and sending SIGHUP or "gpgconf --reload dirmngr".
* dirmngr: Fixed Tor access to IPv6 addresses. Note that current
versions of Tor may require that the flag "IPv6Traffic" is used
with the option "SocksPort" in torrc to actually allow IPv6
traffic.
* dirmngr: Fixed HKP for literally given IPv6 addresses.
* dirmngr: Enabled reverse DNS lookups via Tor.
* dirmngr: Added experimental SRV record lookup for WKD.
See commit 88dc3af3d4ae1afe1d5e136bc4c38bc4e7d4cd10 for details.
* dirmngr: For HKP use "pgpkey-hkps" and "pgpkey-hkp" in SRV record
lookups. Avoid SRV record lookup when a port is explicitly
specified. This fixes a regression from the 1.4 and 2.0 behavior.
* dirmngr: Gracefully handle a missing /etc/nsswitch.conf. Ignore
negation terms (e.g. "[!UNAVAIL=return]" instead of bailing out.
* dirmngr: Better debug output for flags "dns" and "network".
* dirmngr: On reload mark all known HKP servers alive.
* gpgconf: Allow keyword "all" for --launch, --kill, and --reload.
* tools: gpg-wks-client now ignores a missing policy file on the
server.
* Avoid unnecessary ambiguity error message in the option parsing.
* Further improvements of the regression test suite.
* Fixed building with --disable-libdns configure option.
* Fixed a crash running the tests on 32 bit architectures.
* Fixed spurious failures on BSD system in the spawn functions.
This affected for example gpg-wks-client and gpgconf.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2017q1/000401.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.17 (2016-12-20)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: By default new keys expire after 2 years.
* gpg: New command --quick-set-expire to conveniently change the
expiration date of keys.
* gpg: Option and command names have been changed for easier
comprehension. The old names are still available as aliases.
* gpg: Improved the TOFU trust model.
* gpg: New option --default-new-key-algo.
* scd: Support OpenPGP card V3 for RSA.
* dirmngr: Support for the ADNS library has been removed. Instead
William Ahern's Libdns is now source included and used on all
platforms. This enables Tor support on all platforms. The new
option --standard-resolver can be used to disable this code at
runtime. In case of build problems the new configure option
--disable-libdns can be used to build without Libdns.
* dirmngr: Lazily launch ldap reaper thread.
* tools: New options --check and --status-fd for gpg-wks-client.
* The UTF-8 byte order mark is now skipped when reading conf files.
* Fixed many bugs and regressions.
* Major improvements to the test suite. For example it is possible
to run the external test suite of GPGME.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2016q4/000400.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.16 (2016-11-18)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: New algorithm for selecting the best ranked public key when
using a mail address with -r, -R, or --locate-key.
* gpg: New option --with-tofu-info to print a new "tfs" record in
colon formatted key listings.
* gpg: New option --compliance as an alternative way to specify
options like --rfc2440, --rfc4880, et al.
* gpg: Many changes to the TOFU implementation.
* gpg: Improve usability of --quick-gen-key.
* gpg: In --verbose mode print a diagnostic when a pinentry is
launched.
* gpg: Remove code which warns for old versions of gnome-keyring.
* gpg: New option --override-session-key-fd.
* gpg: Option --output does now work with --verify.
* gpgv: New option --output to allow saving the verified data.
* gpgv: New option --enable-special-filenames.
* agent, dirmngr: New --supervised mode for use by systemd and alike.
* agent: By default listen on all available sockets using standard
names.
* agent: Invoke scdaemon with --homedir.
* dirmngr: On Linux now detects the removal of its own socket and
terminates.
* scd: Support ECC key generation.
* scd: Support more card readers.
* dirmngr: New option --allow-version-check to download a software
version database in the background.
* dirmngr: Use system provided CAs if no --hkp-cacert is given.
* dirmngr: Use a default keyserver if none is explicitly set
* gpgconf: New command --query-swdb to check software versions
against an copy of an online database.
* gpgconf: Print the socket directory with --list-dirs.
* tools: The WKS tools now support draft version -02.
* tools: Always build gpg-wks-client and install under libexec.
* tools: New option --supported for gpg-wks-client.
* The log-file option now accepts a value "socket://" to log to the
socket named "S.log" in the standard socket directory.
* Provide fake pinentries for use by tests cases of downstream
developers.
* Fixed many bugs and regressions.
* Many changes and improvements for the test suite.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2016q4/000398.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.15 (2016-08-18)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Remove the --tofu-db-format option and support for the split
TOFU database.
* gpg: Add option --sender to prepare for coming features.
* gpg: Add option --input-size-hint to help progress indicators.
* gpg: Extend the PROGRESS status line with the counted unit.
* gpg: Avoid publishing the GnuPG version by default with --armor.
* gpg: Properly ignore legacy keys in the keyring cache.
* gpg: Always print fingerprint records in --with-colons mode.
* gpg: Make sure that keygrips are printed for each subkey in
--with-colons mode.
* gpg: New import filter "drop-sig".
* gpgsm: Fix a bug in the machine-readable key listing.
* gpg,gpgsm: Block signals during keyring updates to limits the
effects of a Ctrl-C at the wrong time.
* g13: Add command --umount and other fixes for dm-crypt.
* agent: Fix regression in SIGTERM handling.
* agent: Cleanup of the ssh-agent code.
* agent: Allow import of overly long keys.
* scd: Fix problems with card removal.
* dirmngr: Remove all code for running as a system service.
* tools: Make gpg-wks-client conforming to the specs.
* tests: Improve the output of the new regression test tool.
* tests: Distribute the standalone test runner.
* tests: Run each test in a clean environment.
* Spelling and grammar fixes.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2016q3/000396.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.14 (2016-07-14)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Removed options --print-dane-records and --print-pka-records.
The new export options "export-pka" and "export-dane" can instead
be used with the export command.
* gpg: New options --import-filter and --export-filter.
* gpg: New import options "import-show" and "import-export".
* gpg: New option --no-keyring.
* gpg: New command --quick-revuid.
* gpg: New options -f/--recipient-file and -F/--hidden-recipient-file
to directly specify encryption keys.
* gpg: New option --mimemode to indicate that the content is a MIME
part. Does only enable --textmode right now.
* gpg: New option --rfc4880bis to allow experiments with proposed
changes to the current OpenPGP specs.
* gpg: Fix regression in the "fetch" sub-command of --card-edit.
* gpg: Fix regression since 2.1 in option --try-all-secrets.
* gpgv: Change default options for extra security.
* gpgsm: No more root certificates are installed by default.
* agent: "updatestartuptty" does now affect more environment
variables.
* scd: The option --homedir does now work with scdaemon.
* scd: Support some more GEMPlus card readers.
* gpgtar: Fix handling of '-' as file name.
* gpgtar: New commands --create and --extract.
* gpgconf: Tweak for --list-dirs to better support shell scripts.
* tools: Add programs gpg-wks-client and gpg-wks-server to implement
a Web Key Service. The configure option --enable-wks-tools is
required to build them; they should be considered Beta software.
* tests: Complete rework of the openpgp part of the test suite. The
test scripts have been changed from Bourne shell scripts to Scheme
programs. A customized scheme interpreter (gpgscm) is included.
This change was triggered by the need to run the test suite on
non-Unix platforms.
* The rendering of the man pages has been improved.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2016q3/000393.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.13 (2016-06-16)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: New command --quick-addkey. Extend the --quick-gen-key
command.
* gpg: New --keyid-format "none" which is now also the default.
* gpg: New option --with-subkey-fingerprint.
* gpg: Include Signer's UID subpacket in signatures if the secret key
has been specified using a mail address and the new option
--disable-signer-uid is not used.
* gpg: Allow unattended deletion of a secret key.
* gpg: Allow export of non-passphrase protected secret keys.
* gpg: New status lines KEY_CONSIDERED and NOTATION_FLAGS.
* gpg: Change status line TOFU_STATS_LONG to use '~' as
a non-breaking-space character.
* gpg: Speedup key listings in Tofu mode.
* gpg: Make sure that the current and total values of a PROGRESS
status line are small enough.
* gpgsm: Allow the use of AES192 and SERPENT ciphers.
* dirmngr: Adjust WKD lookup to current specs.
* dirmngr: Fallback to LDAP v3 if v2 is is not supported.
* gpgconf: New commands --create-socketdir and --remove-socketdir,
new option --homedir.
* If a /run/user/$UID directory exists, that directory is now used
for IPC sockets instead of the GNUPGHOME directory. This fixes
problems with NFS and too long socket names and thus avoids the
need for redirection files.
* The Speedo build systems now uses the new versions.gnupg.org server
to retrieve the default package versions.
* Fix detection of libusb on FreeBSD.
* Speedup fd closing after a fork.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2016q2/000390.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.12 (2016-05-04)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: New --edit-key sub-command "change-usage" for testing
purposes.
* gpg: Out of order key-signatures are now systematically detected
and fixed by --edit-key.
* gpg: Improved detection of non-armored messages.
* gpg: Removed the extra prompt needed to create Curve25519 keys.
* gpg: Improved user ID selection for --quick-sign-key.
* gpg: Use the root CAs provided by the system with --fetch-key.
* gpg: Add support for the experimental Web Key Directory key
location service.
* gpg: Improve formatting of Tofu messages and emit new Tofu specific
status lines.
* gpgsm: Add option --pinentry-mode to support a loopback pinentry.
* gpgsm: A new pubring.kbx is now created with the header blob so
that gpg can detect that the keybox format needs to be used.
* agent: Add read support for the new private key protection format
openpgp-s2k-ocb-aes.
* agent: Add read support for the new extended private key format.
* agent: Default to --allow-loopback-pinentry and add option
--no-allow-loopback-pinentry.
* scd: Changed to use the new libusb 1.0 API for the internal CCID
driver.
* dirmngr: The dirmngr-client does now auto-detect the PEM format.
* g13: Add experimental support for dm-crypt.
* w32: Tofu support is now available with the Speedo build method.
* w32: Removed the need for libiconv.dll.
* The man pages for gpg and gpgv are now installed under the correct
name (gpg2 or gpg - depending on a configure option).
* Lots of internal cleanups and bug fixes.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2016q2/000387.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.11 (2016-01-26)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: New command --export-ssh-key to replace the gpgkey2ssh tool.
* gpg: Allow to generate mail address only keys with --gen-key.
* gpg: "--list-options show-usage" is now the default.
* gpg: Make lookup of DNS CERT records holding an URL work.
* gpg: Emit PROGRESS status lines during key generation.
* gpg: Don't check for ambiguous or non-matching key specification in
the config file or given to --encrypt-to. This feature will return
in 2.3.x.
* gpg: Lock keybox files while updating them.
* gpg: Solve rare error on Windows during keyring and Keybox updates.
* gpg: Fix possible keyring corruption. (bug#2193)
* gpg: Fix regression of "bkuptocard" sub-command in --edit-key and
remove "checkbkupkey" sub-command introduced with 2.1. (bug#2169)
* gpg: Fix internal error in gpgv when using default keyid-format.
* gpg: Fix --auto-key-retrieve to work with dirmngr.conf configured
keyservers. (bug#2147).
* agent: New option --pinentry-timeout.
* scd: Improve unplugging of USB readers under Windows.
* scd: Fix regression for generating RSA keys on card.
* dirmmgr: All configured keyservers are now searched.
* dirmngr: Install CA certificate for hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net.
Use this certificate even if --hkp-cacert is not used.
* gpgtar: Add actual encryption code. gpgtar does now fully replace
gpg-zip.
* gpgtar: Fix filename encoding problem on Windows.
* Print a warning if a GnuPG component is using an older version of
gpg-agent, dirmngr, or scdaemon.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2016q1/000383.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.10 (2015-12-04)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg: New trust models "tofu" and "tofu+pgp".
* gpg: New command --tofu-policy. New options --tofu-default-policy
and --tofu-db-format.
* gpg: New option --weak-digest to specify hash algorithms which
should be considered weak.
* gpg: Allow the use of multiple --default-key options; take the last
available key.
* gpg: New option --encrypt-to-default-key.
* gpg: New option --unwrap to only strip the encryption layer.
* gpg: New option --only-sign-text-ids to exclude photo IDs from key
signing.
* gpg: Check for ambiguous or non-matching key specification in the
config file or given to --encrypt-to.
* gpg: Show the used card reader with --card-status.
* gpg: Print export statistics and an EXPORTED status line.
* gpg: Allow selecting subkeys by keyid in --edit-key.
* gpg: Allow updating the expiration time of multiple subkeys at
once.
* dirmngr: New option --use-tor. For full support this requires
libassuan version 2.4.2 and a patched version of libadns
(e.g. adns-1.4-g10-7 as used by the standard Windows installer).
* dirmngr: New option --nameserver to specify the nameserver used in
Tor mode.
* dirmngr: Keyservers may again be specified by IP address.
* dirmngr: Fixed problems in resolving keyserver pools.
* dirmngr: Fixed handling of premature termination of TLS streams so
that large numbers of keys can be refreshed via hkps.
* gpg: Fixed a regression in --locate-key [since 2.1.9].
* gpg: Fixed another bug for keyrings with legacy keys.
* gpgsm: Allow combinations of usage flags in --gen-key.
* Make tilde expansion work with most options.
* Many other cleanups and bug fixes.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2015q4/000381.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.9 (2015-10-09)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Allow fetching keys via OpenPGP DANE (--auto-key-locate). New
option --print-dane-records. [Update: --print-dane-records replaced
in 2.1.4.]
* gpg: Fix for a problem with PGP-2 keys in a keyring.
* gpg: Fail with an error instead of a warning if a modern cipher
algorithm is used without a MDC.
* agent: New option --pinentry-invisible-char.
* agent: Always do a RSA signature verification after creation.
* agent: Fix a regression in ssh-add-ing Ed25519 keys.
* agent: Fix ssh fingerprint computation for nistp384 and EdDSA.
* agent: Fix crash during passphrase entry on some platforms.
* scd: Change timeout to fix problems with some 2.1 cards.
* dirmngr: Displayed name is now Key Acquirer.
* dirmngr: Add option --keyserver. Deprecate that option for gpg.
Install a dirmngr.conf file from a skeleton for new installations.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2015q4/000380.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.8 (2015-09-10)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Sending very large keys to the keyservers works again.
* gpg: Validity strings in key listings are now again translatable.
* gpg: Emit FAILURE status lines to help GPGME.
* gpg: Does not anymore link to Libksba to reduce dependencies.
* gpgsm: Export of secret keys via Assuan is now possible.
* agent: Raise the maximum passphrase length from 100 to 255 bytes.
* agent: Fix regression using EdDSA keys with ssh.
* Does not anymore use a build timestamp by default.
* The fallback encoding for broken locale settings changed
from Latin-1 to UTF-8.
* Many code cleanups and improved internal documentation.
* Various minor bug fixes.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2015q3/000379.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.7 (2015-08-11)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Support encryption with Curve25519 if Libgcrypt 1.7 is used.
* gpg: In the --edit-key menu: Removed the need for "toggle", changed
how secret keys are indicated, new commands "fpr *" and "grip".
* gpg: More fixes related to legacy keys in a keyring.
* gpgv: Does now also work with a "trustedkeys.kbx" file.
* scd: Support some feature from the OpenPGP card 3.0 specs.
* scd: Improved ECC support
* agent: New option --force for the DELETE_KEY command.
* w32: Look for the Pinentry at more places.
* Dropped deprecated gpgsm-gencert.sh
* Various other bug fixes.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2015q3/000371.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.6 (2015-07-01)
------------------------------------------------
* agent: New option --verify for the PASSWD command.
* gpgsm: Add command option "offline" as an alternative to
--disable-dirmngr.
* gpg: Do not prompt multiple times for a password in pinentry
loopback mode.
* Allow the use of debug category names with --debug.
* Using gpg-agent and gpg/gpgsm with different locales will now show
the correct translations in Pinentry.
* gpg: Improve speed of --list-sigs and --check-sigs.
* gpg: Make --list-options show-sig-subpackets work again.
* gpg: Fix an export problem for old keyrings with PGP-2 keys.
* scd: Support PIN-pads on more readers.
* dirmngr: Properly cleanup zombie LDAP helper processes and avoid
hangs on dirmngr shutdown.
* Various other bug fixes.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2015q3/000370.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.5 (2015-06-11)
------------------------------------------------
* Support for an external passphrase cache.
* Support for the forthcoming version 3 OpenPGP smartcard.
* Manuals now show the actual used file names.
* Prepared for improved integration with Emacs.
* Code cleanups and minor bug fixes.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2015q2/000369.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.4 (2015-05-12)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Add command --quick-adduid to non-interactively add a new user
id to an existing key.
* gpg: Do no enable honor-keyserver-url by default. Make it work if
enabled.
* gpg: Display the serial number in the --card-status output again.
* agent: Support for external password managers.
Add option --no-allow-external-cache.
* scdaemon: Improved handling of extended APDUs.
* Make HTTP proxies work again.
* All network access including DNS as been moved to Dirmngr.
* Allow building without LDAP support.
* Fixed lots of smaller bugs.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2015q2/000366.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.3 (2015-04-11)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: LDAP keyservers are now supported by 2.1.
* gpg: New option --with-icao-spelling.
* gpg: New option --print-pka-records. Changed the PKA method to use
CERT records and hashed names. [Update: --print-pka-records
replaced in 2.1.14.]
* gpg: New command --list-gcrypt-config. New parameter "curve"
for --list-config.
* gpg: Print a NEWSIG status line like gpgsm always did.
* gpg: Print MPI values with --list-packets and --verbose.
* gpg: Write correct MPI lengths with ECC keys.
* gpg: Skip legacy PGP-2 keys while searching.
* gpg: Improved searching for mail addresses when using a keybox.
* gpgsm: Changed default algos to AES-128 and SHA-256.
* gpgtar: Fixed extracting files with sizes of a multiple of 512.
* dirmngr: Fixed SNI handling for hkps pools.
* dirmngr: extra-certs and trusted-certs are now always loaded from
the sysconfig dir instead of the homedir.
* Fixed possible problems due to compiler optimization, two minor
regressions, and other bugs.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2015q2/000365.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.2 (2015-02-11)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: The parameter 'Passphrase' for batch key generation works
again.
* gpg: Using a passphrase option in batch mode now has the expected
effect on --quick-gen-key.
* gpg: Improved reporting of unsupported PGP-2 keys.
* gpg: Added support for algo names when generating keys using
--command-fd.
* gpg: Fixed DoS based on bogus and overlong key packets.
* agent: When setting --default-cache-ttl the value
for --max-cache-ttl is adjusted to be not lower than the former.
* agent: Fixed problems with the new --extra-socket.
* agent: Made --allow-loopback-pinentry changeable with gpgconf.
* agent: Fixed importing of unprotected openpgp keys.
* agent: Now tries to use a fallback pinentry if the standard
pinentry is not installed.
* scd: Added support for ECDH.
* Fixed several bugs related to bogus keyrings and improved some
other code.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2015q1/000361.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.1 (2014-12-16)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg: Detect faulty use of --verify on detached signatures.
* gpg: New import option "keep-ownertrust".
* gpg: New sub-command "factory-reset" for --card-edit.
* gpg: A stub key for smartcards is now created by --card-status.
* gpg: Fixed regression in --refresh-keys.
* gpg: Fixed regression in %g and %p codes for --sig-notation.
* gpg: Fixed best matching hash algo detection for ECDSA and EdDSA.
* gpg: Improved perceived speed of secret key listisngs.
* gpg: Print number of skipped PGP-2 keys on import.
* gpg: Removed the option aliases --throw-keyid and --notation-data;
use --throw-keyids and --set-notation instead.
* gpg: New import option "keep-ownertrust".
* gpg: Skip too large keys during import.
* gpg,gpgsm: New option --no-autostart to avoid starting gpg-agent or
dirmngr.
* gpg-agent: New option --extra-socket to provide a restricted
command set for use with remote clients.
* gpgconf --kill does not anymore start a service only to kill it.
* gpg-pconnect-agent: Add convenience option --uiserver.
* Fixed keyserver access for Windows.
* Fixed build problems on Mac OS X
* The Windows installer does now install development files
* More translations (but most of them are not complete).
* To support remotely mounted home directories, the IPC sockets may
now be redirected. This feature requires Libassuan 2.2.0.
* Improved portability and the usual bunch of bug fixes.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2014q4/000360.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0 (2014-11-06)
------------------------------------------------
This release introduces a lot of changes. Most of them are internal
and thus not user visible. However, some long standing behavior has
slightly changed and it is strongly suggested that an existing
"~/.gnupg" directory is backed up before this version is used.
A verbose description of the major new features and changes can be
found in the file doc/whats-new-in-2.1.txt.
* gpg: All support for v3 (PGP 2) keys has been dropped. All
signatures are now created as v4 signatures. v3 keys will be
removed from the keyring.
* gpg: With pinentry-0.9.0 the passphrase "enter again" prompt shows
up in the same window as the "new passphrase" prompt.
* gpg: Allow importing keys with duplicated long key ids.
* dirmngr: May now be build without support for LDAP.
* For a complete list of changes see the lists of changes for the
2.1.0 beta versions below. Note that all relevant fixes from
versions 2.0.14 to 2.0.26 are also applied to this version.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0-beta864 (2014-10-03)]
* gpg: Removed the GPG_AGENT_INFO related code. GnuPG does now
always use a fixed socket name in its home directory.
* gpg: Renamed --gen-key to --full-gen-key and re-added a --gen-key
command with less choices.
* gpg: Use SHA-256 for all signature types also on RSA keys.
* gpg: Default keyring is now created with a .kbx suffix.
* gpg: Add a shortcut to the key capabilities menu (e.g. "=e" sets the
encryption capabilities).
* gpg: Fixed obsolete options parsing.
* Further improvements for the alternative speedo build system.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0-beta834 (2014-09-18)]
* gpg: Improved passphrase caching.
* gpg: Switched to algorithm number 22 for EdDSA.
* gpg: Removed CAST5 from the default preferences.
* gpg: Order SHA-1 last in the hash preferences.
* gpg: Changed default cipher for --symmetric to AES-128.
* gpg: Fixed export of ECC keys and import of EdDSA keys.
* dirmngr: Fixed the KS_FETCH command.
* The speedo build system now downloads related packages and works
for non-Windows platforms.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0-beta783 (2014-08-14)]
* gpg: Add command --quick-gen-key.
* gpg: Make --quick-sign-key promote local key signatures.
* gpg: Added "show-usage" sub-option to --list-options.
* gpg: Screen keyserver responses to avoid importing unwanted keys
from rogue servers.
* gpg: Removed the option --pgp2 and --rfc1991 and the ability to
create PGP-2 compatible messages.
* gpg: Removed options --compress-keys and --compress-sigs.
* gpg: Cap attribute packets at 16MB.
* gpg: Improved output of --list-packets.
* gpg: Make with-colons output of --search-keys work again.
* gpgsm: Auto-create the ".gnupg" directory like gpg does.
* agent: Fold new passphrase warning prompts into one.
* scdaemon: Add support for the Smartcard-HSM card.
* scdaemon: Remove the use of the pcsc-wrapper.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0-beta751 (2014-07-03)]
* gpg: Create revocation certificates during key generation.
* gpg: Create exported secret keys and revocation certifciates with
mode 0700
* gpg: The validity of user ids is now shown by default. To revert
this add "list-options no-show-uid-validity" to gpg.conf.
* gpg: Make export of secret keys work again.
* gpg: The output of --list-packets does now print the offset of the
packet and information about the packet header.
* gpg: Avoid DoS due to garbled compressed data packets. [CVE-2014-4617]
* gpg: Print more specific reason codes with the INV_RECP status.
* gpg: Cap RSA and Elgamal keysize at 4096 bit also for unattended
key generation.
* scdaemon: Support reader Gemalto IDBridge CT30 and pinpad of SCT
cyberJack go.
* The speedo build system has been improved. It is now also possible
to build a partly working installer for Windows.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0-beta442 (2014-06-05)]
* gpg: Changed the format of key listings. To revert to the old
format the option --legacy-list-mode is available.
* gpg: Add experimental signature support using curve Ed25519 and
with a patched Libgcrypt also encryption support with Curve25519.
[Update: this encryption support has been removed from 2.1.0 until
we have agreed on a suitable format.]
* gpg: Allow use of Brainpool curves.
* gpg: Accepts a space separated fingerprint as user ID. This
allows to copy and paste the fingerprint from the key listing.
* gpg: The hash algorithm is now printed for signature records in key
listings.
* gpg: Reject signatures made using the MD5 hash algorithm unless the
new option --allow-weak-digest-algos or --pgp2 are given.
* gpg: Print a warning if the Gnome-Keyring-Daemon intercepts the
communication with the gpg-agent.
* gpg: New option --pinentry-mode.
* gpg: Fixed decryption using an OpenPGP card.
* gpg: Fixed bug with deeply nested compressed packets.
* gpg: Only the major version number is by default included in the
armored output.
* gpg: Do not create a trustdb file if --trust-model=always is used.
* gpg: Protect against rogue keyservers sending secret keys.
* gpg: The format of the fallback key listing ("gpg KEYFILE") is now
more aligned to the regular key listing ("gpg -k").
* gpg: The option--show-session-key prints its output now before the
decryption of the bulk message starts.
* gpg: New %U expando for the photo viewer.
* gpg,gpgsm: New option --with-secret.
* gpgsm: By default the users are now asked via the Pinentry whether
they trust an X.509 root key. To prohibit interactive marking of
such keys, the new option --no-allow-mark-trusted may be used.
* gpgsm: New commands to export a secret RSA key in PKCS#1 or PKCS#8
format.
* gpgsm: Improved handling of re-issued CA certificates.
* agent: The included ssh agent does now support ECDSA keys.
* agent: New option --enable-putty-support to allow gpg-agent on
Windows to act as a Pageant replacement with full smartcard support.
* scdaemon: New option --enable-pinpad-varlen.
* scdaemon: Various fixes for pinpad equipped card readers.
* scdaemon: Rename option --disable-pinpad (was --disable-keypad).
* scdaemon: Better support for CCID readers. Now, internal CCID
driver supports readers with no auto configuration feature.
* dirmngr: Removed support for the original HKP keyserver which is
not anymore used by any site.
* dirmngr: Improved support for keyserver pools.
* tools: New option --dirmngr for gpg-connect-agent.
* The GNU Pth library has been replaced by the new nPth library.
* Support installation as portable application under Windows.
* All kind of other improvements - see the git log.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0beta3 (2011-12-20)]
* gpg: Fixed regression in the secret key export function.
* gpg: Allow generation of card keys up to 4096 bit.
* gpgsm: Preliminary support for the validation model "steed".
* gpgsm: Improved certificate creation.
* agent: Support the SSH confirm flag.
* agent: New option to select a passphrase mode. The loopback
mode may be used to bypass Pinentry.
* agent: The Assuan commands KILLAGENT and KILLSCD are working again.
* scdaemon: Does not anymore block after changing a card (regression
fix).
* tools: gpg-connect-agent does now properly display the help output
for "SCD HELP" commands.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0beta2 (2011-03-08)]
* gpg: ECC support as described by draft-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-06.txt
[Update: now known as RFC-6637].
* gpg: Print "AES128" instead of "AES". This change introduces a
little incompatibility for tools using "gpg --list-config". We
hope that these tools are written robust enough to accept this new
algorithm name as well.
* gpgsm: New feature to create certificates from a parameter file.
Add prompt to the --gen-key UI to create self-signed certificates.
* agent: TMPDIR is now also honored when creating a socket using
the --no-standard-socket option and with symcryptrun's temp files.
* scdaemon: Fixed a bug where scdaemon sends a signal to gpg-agent
running in non-daemon mode.
* dirmngr: Fixed CRL loading under W32 (bug#1010).
* Dirmngr has taken over the function of the keyserver helpers. Thus
we now have a specified direct interface to keyservers via Dirmngr.
LDAP, DNS and mail backends are not yet implemented.
* Fixed TTY management for pinentries and session variable update
problem.
[Noteworthy changes in version 2.1.0beta1 (2010-10-26)]
* gpg: secring.gpg is not anymore used but all secret key operations
are delegated to gpg-agent. The import command moves secret keys
to the agent.
* gpg: The OpenPGP import command is now able to merge secret keys.
* gpg: Encrypted OpenPGP messages with trailing data (e.g. other
OpenPGP packets) are now correctly parsed.
* gpg: Given sufficient permissions Dirmngr is started automagically.
* gpg: Fixed output of "gpgconf --check-options".
* gpg: Removed options --export-options(export-secret-subkey-passwd)
and --simple-sk-checksum.
* gpg: New options --try-secret-key.
* gpg: Support DNS lookups for SRV, PKA and CERT on W32.
* gpgsm: The --audit-log feature is now more complete.
* gpgsm: The default for --include-cert is now to include all
certificates in the chain except for the root certificate.
* gpgsm: New option --ignore-cert-extension.
* g13: The G13 tool for disk encryption key management has been
added.
* agent: If the agent's --use-standard-socket option is active, all
tools try to start and daemonize the agent on the fly. In the past
this was only supported on W32; on non-W32 systems the new
configure option --disable-standard-socket may now be used to
disable this new default.
* agent: New and changed passphrases are now created with an
iteration count requiring about 100ms of CPU work.
* dirmngr: Dirmngr is now a part of this package. It is now also
expected to run as a system service and the configuration
directories are changed to the GnuPG name space. [Update: 2.1.0
starts dirmngr on demand as user daemon.]
* Support for Windows CE. [Update: This has not been tested for the
2.1.0 release]
* Numerical values may now be used as an alternative to the
debug-level keywords.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2014q4/000358.html
Version 2.0.28 (2015-06-02)
Version 2.0.27 (2015-02-18)
Version 2.0.26 (2014-08-12)
Version 2.0.25 (2014-06-30)
Version 2.0.24 (2014-06-24)
Version 2.0.23 (2014-06-03)
Version 2.0.22 (2013-10-04)
Version 2.0.21 (2013-08-19)
Version 2.0.20 (2013-05-10)
Version 2.0.19 (2012-03-27)
Version 2.0.18 (2011-08-04)
Version 2.0.17 (2011-01-13)
Version 2.0.16 (2010-07-19)
Version 2.0.15 (2010-03-09)
Version 2.0.14 (2009-12-21)
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.13 (2009-09-04)
-------------------------------------------------
* GPG now generates 2048 bit RSA keys by default. The default hash
algorithm preferences has changed to prefer SHA-256 over SHA-1.
2048 bit DSA keys are now generated to use a 256 bit hash algorithm
* The envvars XMODIFIERS, GTK_IM_MODULE and QT_IM_MODULE are now
passed to the Pinentry to make SCIM work.
* The GPGSM command --gen-key features a --batch mode and implements
all features of gpgsm-gencert.sh in standard mode.
* New option --re-import for GPGSM's IMPORT server command.
* Enhanced writing of existing keys to OpenPGP v2 cards.
* Add hack to the internal CCID driver to allow the use of some
Omnikey based card readers with 2048 bit keys.
* GPG now repeatedly asks the user to insert the requested OpenPGP
card. This can be disabled with --limit-card-insert-tries=1.
* Minor bug fixes.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2009q3/000294.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.12 (2009-06-17)
-------------------------------------------------
* GPGSM now always lists ephemeral certificates if specified by
fingerprint or keygrip.
* New command "KEYINFO" for GPG_AGENT. GPGSM now also returns
information about smartcards.
* Made sure not to leak file descriptors if running gpg-agent with a
command. Restore the signal mask to solve a problem in Mono.
* Changed order of the confirmation questions for root certificates
and store negative answers in trustlist.txt.
* Better synchronization of concurrent smartcard sessions.
* Support 2048 bit OpenPGP cards.
* Support Telesec Netkey 3 cards.
* The gpg-protect-tool now uses gpg-agent via libassuan. Under
Windows the Pinentry will now be put into the foreground.
* Changed code to avoid a possible Mac OS X system freeze.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2009q2/000288.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.11 (2009-03-03)
-------------------------------------------------
* Fixed a problem in SCDAEMON which caused unexpected card resets.
* SCDAEMON is now aware of the Geldkarte.
* The SCDAEMON option --allow-admin is now used by default.
* GPGCONF now restarts SCdaemon if necessary.
* The default cipher algorithm in GPGSM is now again 3DES. This is
due to interoperability problems with Outlook 2003 which still
can't cope with AES.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2009q1/000287.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.10 (2009-01-12)
-------------------------------------------------
* [gpg] New keyserver helper gpg2keys_kdns as generic DNS CERT
lookup. Run with --help for a short description. Requires the
ADNS library.
* [gpg] New mechanisms "local" and "nodefault" for --auto-key-locate.
Fixed a few problems with this option.
* [gpg] New command --locate-keys.
* [gpg] New options --with-sig-list and --with-sig-check.
* [gpg] The option "-sat" is no longer an alias for --clearsign.
* [gpg] The option --fixed-list-mode is now implicitly used and obsolete.
* [gpg] New control statement %ask-passphrase for the unattended key
generation.
* [gpg] The algorithm to compute the SIG_ID status has been changed.
* [gpgsm] Now uses AES by default.
* [gpgsm] Made --output option work with --export-secret-key-p12.
* [gpg-agent] Terminate process if the own listening socket is not
anymore served by ourself.
* [scdaemon] Made it more robust on W32.
* [gpg-connect-agent] Accept commands given as command line arguments.
* [w32] Initialized the socket subsystem for all keyserver helpers.
* [w32] The sysconf directory has been moved from a subdirectory of
the installation directory to %CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA%/GNU/etc/gnupg.
* [w32] The gnupg2.nls directory is not anymore used. The standard
locale directory is now used.
* [w32] Fixed a race condition between gpg and gpgsm in the use of
temporary file names.
* The gpg-preset-passphrase mechanism works again. An arbitrary
string may now be used for a custom cache ID.
* Admin PINs are cached again (bug in 2.0.9).
* Support for version 2 OpenPGP cards.
* Libgcrypt 1.4 is now required.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2009q1/000284.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.9 (2008-03-26)
------------------------------------------------
* Gpgsm always tries to locate missing certificates from a running
Dirmngr's cache.
* Tweaks for Windows.
* The Admin PIN for OpenPGP cards may now be entered with the pinpad.
* Improved certificate chain construction.
* Extended the PKITS framework.
* Fixed a bug in the ambiguous name detection.
* Fixed possible memory corruption while importing OpenPGP keys (bug
introduced with 2.0.8). [CVE-2008-1530]
* Minor bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.8 (2007-12-20)
------------------------------------------------
* Enhanced gpg-connect-agent with a small scripting language.
* New option --list-config for gpgconf.
* Fixed a crash in gpgconf.
* Gpg-agent now supports the passphrase quality bar of the latest
Pinentry.
* The envvars XAUTHORITY and PINENTRY_USER_DATA are now passed to the
Pinentry.
* Fixed the auto creation of the key stub for smartcards.
* Fixed a rare bug in decryption using the OpenPGP card.
* Creating DSA2 keys is now possible.
* New option --extra-digest-algo for gpgsm to allow verification of
broken signatures.
* Allow encryption with legacy Elgamal sign+encrypt keys with option
--rfc2440.
* Windows is now a supported platform.
* Made sure that under Windows the file permissions of the socket are
taken into account. This required a change of our socket emulation
code and changed the IPC protocol under Windows.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2007q4/000267.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.7 (2007-09-10)
------------------------------------------------
* Fixed encryption problem if duplicate certificates are in the
keybox.
* Made it work on Windows Vista. Note that the entire Windows port
is still considered Beta.
* Add new options min-passphrase-nonalpha, check-passphrase-pattern,
enforce-passphrase-constraints and max-passphrase-days to
gpg-agent.
* Add command --check-components to gpgconf. Gpgconf now uses the
installed versions of the programs and does not anymore search via
PATH for them.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2007q3/000259.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.6 (2007-08-16)
------------------------------------------------
* GPGSM does now grok --default-key.
* GPGCONF is now aware of --default-key and --encrypt-to.
* GPGSM does again correctly print the serial number as well the the
various keyids. This was broken since 2.0.4.
* New option --validation-model and support for the chain-model.
* Improved Windows support.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2007q3/000258.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.5 (2007-07-05)
------------------------------------------------
* Switched license to GPLv3.
* Basic support for Windows. Run "./autogen.sh --build-w32" to build
it. As usual the mingw cross compiling toolchain is required.
* Fixed bug when using the --p12-charset without --armor.
* The command --gen-key may now be used instead of the
gpgsm-gencert.sh script.
* Changed key generation to reveal less information about the
machine. Bug fixes for gpg2's card key generation.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2007q3/000255.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.4 (2007-05-09)
------------------------------------------------
* The server mode key listing commands are now also working for
systems without the funopen/fopencookie API.
* PKCS#12 import now tries several encodings in case the passphrase
was not utf-8 encoded. New option --p12-charset for gpgsm.
* Improved the libgcrypt logging support in all modules.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2007q2/000254.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.3 (2007-03-08)
------------------------------------------------
* By default, do not allow processing multiple plaintexts in a single
stream. Many programs that called GnuPG were assuming that GnuPG
did not permit this, and were thus not using the plaintext boundary
status tags that GnuPG provides. This change makes GnuPG reject
such messages by default which makes those programs safe again.
--allow-multiple-messages returns to the old behavior. [CVE-2007-1263].
* New --verify-option show-primary-uid-only.
* gpgconf may now reads a global configuration file to select which
options are changeable by a frontend. The new applygnupgdefaults
tool may be used by an admin to set default options for all users.
* The PIN pad of the Cherry XX44 keyboard is now supported. The
DINSIG and the NKS applications are now also aware of PIN pads.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2007q1/000252.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.2 (2007-01-31)
------------------------------------------------
* Fixed a serious and exploitable bug in processing encrypted
packages. [CVE-2006-6235].
* Added --passphrase-repeat to set the number of times GPG will
prompt for a new passphrase to be repeated. This is useful to help
memorize a new passphrase. The default is 1 repetition.
* Using a PIN pad does now also work for the signing key.
* A warning is displayed by gpg-agent if a new passphrase is too
short. New option --min-passphrase-len defaults to 8.
* The status code BEGIN_SIGNING now shows the used hash algorithms.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2007q1/000249.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.1 (2006-11-28)
------------------------------------------------
* Experimental support for the PIN pads of the SPR 532 and the Kaan
Advanced card readers. Add "disable-keypad" scdaemon.conf if you
don't want it. Does currently only work for the OpenPGP card and
its authentication and decrypt keys.
* Fixed build problems on some some platforms and crashes on amd64.
* Fixed a buffer overflow in gpg2. [bug#728,CVE-2006-6169]
See-also: gnupg-announce/2006q4/000242.html
Noteworthy changes in version 2.0.0 (2006-11-11)
------------------------------------------------
* First stable version of a GnuPG integrating OpenPGP and S/MIME.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2006q4/000239.html
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.95 (2006-11-06)
-------------------------------------------------
* Minor bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.94 (2006-10-24)
-------------------------------------------------
* Keys for gpgsm may now be specified using a keygrip. A keygrip is
indicated by a prefixing it with an ampersand.
* gpgconf now supports switching the CMS cipher algo (e.g. to AES).
* New command --gpgconf-test for all major tools. This may be used to
check whether the configuration file is sane.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.93 (2006-10-18)
-------------------------------------------------
* In --with-validation mode gpgsm will now also ask whether a root
certificate should be trusted.
* Link to Pth only if really necessary.
* Fixed a pubring corruption bug in gpg2 occurring when importing
signatures or keys with insane lengths.
* Fixed v3 keyID calculation bug in gpg2.
* More tweaks for certificates without extensions.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.92 (2006-10-11)
-------------------------------------------------
* Bug fixes.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2006q4/000236.html
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.91 (2006-10-04)
-------------------------------------------------
* New "relax" flag for trustlist.txt to allow root CA certificates
without BasicContraints.
* [gpg2] Removed the -k PGP 2 compatibility hack. -k is now an
alias for --list-keys.
* [gpg2] Print a warning if "-sat" is used instead of "--clearsign".
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.90 (2006-09-25)
-------------------------------------------------
* Made readline work for gpg.
* Cleanups und minor bug fixes.
* Included translations from gnupg 1.4.5.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.23 (2006-09-18)
-------------------------------------------------
* Regular man pages for most tools are now build directly from the
Texinfo source.
* The gpg code from 1.4.5 has been fully merged into this release.
The configure option --enable-gpg is still required to build this
gpg part. For production use of OpenPGP the gpg version 1.4.5 is
still recommended. Note, that gpg will be installed under the name
gpg2 to allow coexisting with an 1.4.x gpg.
* API change in gpg-agent's pkdecrypt command. Thus an older gpgsm
may not be used with the current gpg-agent.
* The scdaemon will now call a script on reader status changes.
* gpgsm now allows file descriptor passing for "INPUT", "OUTPUT" and
"MESSAGE".
* The gpgsm server may now output a key listing to the output file
handle. This needs to be enabled using "OPTION list-to-output=1".
* The --output option of gpgsm has now an effect on list-keys.
* New gpgsm commands --dump-chain and list-chain.
* gpg-connect-agent has new options to utilize descriptor passing.
* A global trustlist may now be used. See doc/examples/trustlist.txt.
* When creating a new pubring.kbx keybox common certificates are
imported.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.22 (2006-07-27)
-------------------------------------------------
* Enhanced pkcs#12 support to allow import from simple keyBags.
* Exporting to pkcs#12 now create bag attributes so that Mozilla is
able to import the files.
* Fixed uploading of certain keys to the smart card.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.21 (2006-06-20)
-------------------------------------------------
* New command APDU for scdaemon to allow using it for general card
access. Might be used through gpg-connect-agent by using the SCD
prefix command.
* Support for the CardMan 4040 PCMCIA reader (Linux 2.6.15 required).
* Scdaemon does not anymore reset cards at the end of a connection.
* Kludge to allow use of Bundesnetzagentur issued X.509 certificates.
* Added --hash=xxx option to scdaemon's PKSIGN command.
* Pkcs#12 files are now created with a MAC. This is for better
interoperability.
* Collected bug fixes and minor other changes.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.20 (2005-12-20)
-------------------------------------------------
* Importing pkcs#12 files created be recent versions of Mozilla works
again.
* Basic support for qualified signatures.
* New debug tool gpgparsemail.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.19 (2005-09-12)
-------------------------------------------------
* The Belgian eID card is now supported for signatures and ssh.
Other pkcs#15 cards should work as well.
* Fixed bug in --export-secret-key-p12 so that certificates are again
included.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.18 (2005-08-01)
-------------------------------------------------
* [gpgsm] Now allows for more than one email address as well as URIs
and dnsNames in certificate request generation. A keygrip may be
given to create a request from an existing key.
* A couple of minor bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.17 (2005-06-20)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg-connect-agent has now features to handle Assuan INQUIRE
commands.
* Internal changes for OpenPGP cards. New Assuan command WRITEKEY.
* GNU Pth is now a hard requirement.
* [scdaemon] Support for OpenSC has been removed. Instead a new and
straightforward pkcs#15 modules has been written. As of now it
does allows only signing using TCOS cards but we are going to
enhance it to match all the old capabilities.
* [gpg-agent] New option --write-env-file and Assuan command
UPDATESTARTUPTTY.
* [gpg-agent] New option --default-cache-ttl-ssh to set the TTL for
SSH passphrase caching independent from the other passphrases.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.16 (2005-04-21)
-------------------------------------------------
* gpg-agent does now support the ssh-agent protocol and thus allows
to use the pinentry as well as the OpenPGP smartcard with ssh.
* New tool gpg-connect-agent as a general client for the gpg-agent.
* New tool symcryptrun as a wrapper for certain encryption tools.
* The gpg tool is not anymore build by default because those gpg
versions available in the gnupg 1.4 series are far more matured.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.15 (2005-01-13)
-------------------------------------------------
* Fixed passphrase caching bug.
* Better support for CCID readers; the reader from Cherry RS 6700 USB
does now work.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.14 (2004-12-22)
-------------------------------------------------
* [gpg-agent] New option --use-standard-socket to allow the use of a
fixed socket. gpgsm falls back to this socket if GPG_AGENT_INFO
has not been set.
* Ported to MS Windows with some functional limitations.
* New tool gpg-preset-passphrase.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.13 (2004-12-03)
-------------------------------------------------
* [gpgsm] New option --prefer-system-dirmngr.
* Minor cleanups and debugging aids.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.12 (2004-10-22)
-------------------------------------------------
* [scdaemon] Partly rewrote the PC/SC code.
* Removed the sc-investigate tool. It is now in a separate package
available at ftp://ftp.g10code.com/g10code/gscutils/ .
* [gpg-agent] Fixed logging problem.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.11 (2004-10-01)
-------------------------------------------------
* When using --import along with --with-validation, the imported
certificates are validated and only imported if they are fully
valid.
* [gpg-agent] New option --max-cache-ttl.
* [gpg-agent] When used without --daemon or --server, gpg-agent now
check whether a agent is already running and usable.
* Fixed some i18n problems.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.10 (2004-07-22)
-------------------------------------------------
* Fixed a serious bug in the checking of trusted root certificates.
* New configure option --enable-agent-pnly allows to build and
install just the agent.
* Fixed a problem with the log file handling.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.9 (2004-06-08)
------------------------------------------------
* [gpg-agent] The new option --allow-mark-trusted is now required to
allow gpg-agent to add a key to the trustlist.txt after user
confirmation.
* Creating PKCS#10 requests does now honor the key usage.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.8 (2004-04-29)
------------------------------------------------
* [scdaemon] Overhauled the internal CCID driver.
* [scdaemon] Status files named ~/.gnupg/reader_<n>.status are now
written when using the internal CCID driver.
* [gpgsm] New commands --dump-{,secret,external}-keys to show a very
detailed view of the certificates.
* The keybox gets now compressed after 3 hours and ephemeral
stored certificates are deleted after about a day.
* [gpg] Usability fixes for --card-edit. Note, that this has already
been ported back to gnupg-1.3
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.7 (2004-04-06)
------------------------------------------------
* Instrumented the modules for gpgconf.
* Added support for DINSIG card applications.
* Include the smimeCapabilities attribute with signed messages.
* Now uses the gettext domain "gnupg2" to avoid conflicts with gnupg
versions < 1.9.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.6 (2004-03-06)
------------------------------------------------
* Code cleanups and bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.5 (2004-02-21)
------------------------------------------------
* gpg-protect-tool gets now installed into libexec as it ought to be.
Cleaned up the build system to better comply with the coding
standards.
* [gpgsm] The --import command is now able to autodetect pkcs#12
files and import secret and private keys from this file format.
A new command --export-secret-key-p12 is provided to allow
exporting of secret keys in PKCS\#12 format.
* [gpgsm] The pinentry will now present a description of the key for
whom the passphrase is requested.
* [gpgsm] New option --with-validation to check the validity of key
while listing it.
* New option --debug-level={none,basic,advanced,expert,guru} to map
the debug flags to sensitive levels on a per program base.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.4 (2004-01-30)
------------------------------------------------
* Added support for the Telesec NKS 2.0 card application.
* Added simple tool addgnupghome to create .gnupg directories from
/etc/skel/.gnupg.
* Various minor bug fixes and cleanups; mainly gpgsm and gpg-agent
related.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.3 (2003-12-23)
------------------------------------------------
* New gpgsm options --{enable,disable}-ocsp to validate keys using
OCSP. This option requires a not yet released DirMngr version.
Default is disabled.
* The --log-file option may now be used to print logs to a socket.
Prefix the socket name with "socket://" to enable this. This does
not work on all systems and falls back to stderr if there is a
problem with the socket.
* The options --encrypt-to and --no-encrypt-to now work the same in
gpgsm as in gpg. Note, they are also used in server mode.
* Duplicated recipients are now silently removed in gpgsm.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.2 (2003-11-17)
------------------------------------------------
* On card key generation is no longer done using the --gen-key
command but from the menu provided by the new --card-edit command.
* PINs are now properly cached and there are only 2 PINs visible.
The 3rd PIN (CHV2) is internally synchronized with the regular PIN.
* All kind of other internal stuff.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.1 (2003-09-06)
------------------------------------------------
* Support for OpenSC is back. scdaemon supports a --disable-opensc to
disable OpenSC use at runtime, so that PC/SC or ct-API can still be
used directly.
* Rudimentary support for the SCR335 smartcard reader using an
internal driver. Requires current libusb from CVS.
* Bug fixes.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.9.0 (2003-08-05)
------------------------------------------------
====== PLEASE SEE README-alpha =======
* gpg has been renamed to gpg2 and gpgv to gpgv2. This is a
temporary change to allow co-existing with stable gpg versions.
* ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf-1.9.0 is fist tried as config file before the
usual gpg.conf.
* Removed the -k, -kv and -kvv commands. -k is now an alias to
--list-keys. New command -K as alias for --list-secret-keys.
* Removed --run-as-shm-coprocess feature.
* gpg does now also use libgcrypt, libgpg-error is required.
* New gpgsm commands --call-dirmngr and --call-protect-tool.
* Changing a passphrase is now possible using "gpgsm --passwd"
* The content-type attribute is now recognized and created.
* The agent does now reread certain options on receiving a HUP.
* The pinentry is now forked for each request so that clients with
different environments are supported. When running in daemon mode
and --keep-display is not used the DISPLAY variable is ignored.
* Merged stuff from the newpg branch and started this new
development branch.
Version 1.4.19 (2015-02-27)
Version 1.4.18 (2014-06-30)
Version 1.4.17 (2014-06-23)
Version 1.4.16 (2013-12-18)
Version 1.4.15 (2013-10-04)
Version 1.4.14 (2013-07-25)
Version 1.4.13 (2012-12-20)
Version 1.4.12 (2012-01-30)
Version 1.4.11 (2010-10-18)
Version 1.4.10 (2009-09-02)
Version 1.4.9 (2008-03-26)
Version 1.4.8 (2007-12-20)
Version 1.4.7 (2007-03-05)
Version 1.4.6 (2006-12-06)
Version 1.4.5 (2006-08-01)
Version 1.4.4 (2006-06-25)
Version 1.4.3 (2006-04-03)
Version 1.4.2 (2005-07-26)
Version 1.4.1 (2005-03-15)
Version 1.4.0 (2004-12-16)
Noteworthy changes in version 1.3.2 (2003-05-27)
------------------------------------------------
* New "--gnupg" option (set by default) that disables --openpgp,
and the various --pgpX emulation options. This replaces
--no-openpgp, and --no-pgpX, and also means that GnuPG has
finally grown a --gnupg option to make GnuPG act like GnuPG.
* A bug in key validation has been fixed. This bug only affects
keys with more than one user ID (photo IDs do not count here),
and results in all user IDs on a given key being treated with
the validity of the most-valid user ID on that key.
* Notation names that do not contain a '@' are no longer allowed
unless --expert is set. This is to help prevent pollution of
the (as yet unused) IETF notation namespace.
* Multiple trust models are now supported via the --trust-model
option. The options are "pgp" (web-of-trust plus trust
signatures), "classic" (web-of-trust only), and "always"
(identical to the --always-trust option).
* The --personal-{cipher|digest|compression}-preferences are now
consulted to get default algorithms before resorting to the
last-ditch defaults of --s2k-cipher-algo, SHA1, and ZIP
respectively. This allows a user to set algorithms to use in a
safe manner so they are used when legal to do so, without
forcing them on for all messages.
* New --primary-keyring option to designate the keyring that the
user wants new keys imported into.
* --s2k-digest-algo is now used for all password mangling.
Earlier versions used both --s2k-digest-algo and --digest-algo
for passphrase mangling.
* Handling of --hidden-recipient or --throw-keyid messages is now
easier - the user only needs to give their passphrase once, and
GnuPG will try it against all of the available secret keys.
* Care is taken to prevent compiler optimization from removing
memory wiping code.
* New option --no-mangle-dos-filenames so that filenames are not
truncated in the W32 version.
* A "convert-from-106" script has been added. This is a simple
script that automates the conversion from a 1.0.6 or earlier
version of GnuPG to a 1.0.7 or later version.
* Disabled keys are now skipped when selecting keys for
encryption. If you are using the --with-colons key listings to
detect disabled keys, please see doc/DETAILS for a minor format
change in this release.
* Minor trustdb changes to make the trust calculations match
common usage.
* New command "revuid" in the --edit-key menu to revoke a user ID.
This is a simpler interface to the old method (which still
works) of revoking the user ID self-signature.
* Status VALIDSIG does now also print the primary key's
fingerprint, as well as the signature version, pubkey algorithm,
hash algorithm, and signature class.
* Add read-only support for the SHA-256 hash, and optional
read-only support for the SHA-384 and SHA-512 hashes.
* New option --enable-progress-filter for use with frontends.
* DNS SRV records are used in HKP keyserver lookups to allow
administrators to load balance and select keyserver ports
automatically. This is as specified in
draft-shaw-openpgp-hkp-00.txt.
* When using the "keyid!" syntax during a key export, only that
specified key is exported. If the key in question is a subkey,
the primary key plus only that subkey is exported.
* configure --disable-xxx options to disable individual algorithms
at build time. This can be used to build a smaller gpg binary
for embedded uses where space is tight. See the README file for
the algorithms that can be used with this option, or use
--enable-minimal to build the smallest gpg possible (disables
all optional algorithms, disables keyserver access, and disables
photo IDs).
* The keyserver no-modify flag on a key can now be displayed and
modified.
* Note that the TIGER/192 digest algorithm is in the process of
being dropped from the OpenPGP standard. While this release of
GnuPG still contains it, it is disabled by default. To ensure
you will still be able to use your messages with future versions
of GnuPG and other OpenPGP programs, please do not use this
algorithm.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2003q2/000153.html
Noteworthy changes in version 1.3.1 (2002-11-12)
------------------------------------------------
* Trust signature support. This is based on the Maurer trust
model where a user can specify the trust level along with the
signature with multiple levels so users can delegate
certification ability to other users, possibly restricted by a
regular expression on the user ID. Note that full trust
signature support requires a regular expression parsing library.
The regexp code from glibc 2.3.1 is included for those platforms
that don't have working regexp functions available. The
configure option --disable-regex may be used to disable any
regular expression code, which will make GnuPG ignore any trust
signature with a regular expression included.
* Two new commands --hidden-recipient (-R) and --hidden-encrypt-to
encrypt to a user, but hide the identity of that user. This is
the same functionality as --throw-keyid, but can be used on a
per-user basis.
* Full algorithm names (e.g. "3DES", "SHA1", "ZIP") can now be
used interchangeably with the short algorithm names (e.g. "S2",
"H2", "Z1") anywhere algorithm names are used in GnuPG.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.3.0 (2002-10-18)
------------------------------------------------
* The last piece of internal keyserver support has been removed,
and now all keyserver access is done via the keyserver plugins.
There is also a newer keyserver protocol used between GnuPG and
the plugins, so plugins from earlier versions of GnuPG may not
work properly.
* The HKP keyserver plugin supports the new machine-readable key
listing format for those keyservers that provide it.
* When using a HKP keyserver with multiple DNS records (such as
wwwkeys.pgp.net which has the addresses of multiple servers
around the world), try all records until one succeeds. Note
that it depends on the LDAP library used whether the LDAP
keyserver plugin does this as well.
* The library dependencies for OpenLDAP seem to change fairly
frequently, and GnuPG's configure script cannot guess all the
combinations. Use ./configure LDAPLIBS="-L libdir -l libs" to
override the script and use the libraries selected.
* Secret keys generated with --export-secret-subkeys are now
indicated in key listings with a '#' after the "sec", and in
--with-colons listings by showing no capabilities (no lowercase
characters).
* --trusted-key has been un-obsoleted, as it is useful for adding
ultimately trusted keys from the config file. It is identical
to using --edit and "trust" to change a key to ultimately
trusted.
* Translations other than de are no longer distributed with the
development branch. This is due to the frequent text changes
during development, which cause the translations to rapidly go
out of date.
Version 1.2.8 (2006-12-07)
Version 1.2.7 (2004-12-27)
Version 1.2.6 (2004-08-25)
Version 1.2.5 (2004-07-26)
Version 1.2.4 (2003-12-23)
Version 1.2.3 (2003-08-21)
Version 1.2.2 (2003-05-01)
Version 1.2.1 (2002-10-25)
Version 1.2.0 (2002-09-21)
Noteworthy changes in version 1.1.92 (2002-09-11)
-------------------------------------------------
* [IMPORTANT] The default configuration file is now
~/.gnupg/gpg.conf. If an old ~/.gnupg/options is found it will
still be used. This change is required to have a more
consistent naming scheme with forthcoming tools.
* The use of MDCs have increased. A MDC will be used if the
recipients directly request it, if the recipients have AES,
AES192, AES256, or TWOFISH in their cipher preferences, or if
the chosen cipher has a blocksize not equal to 64 bits
(currently this is also AES, AES192, AES256, and TWOFISH).
* GnuPG will no longer automatically disable compression when
processing an already-compressed file unless a MDC is being
used. This is to give the message a certain amount of
resistance to the chosen-ciphertext attack while communicating
with other programs (most commonly PGP earlier than version 7.x)
that do not support MDCs.
* The option --interactive now has the desired effect when
importing keys.
* The file permission and ownership checks on files have been
clarified. Specifically, the homedir (usually ~/.gnupg) is
checked to protect everything within it. If the user specifies
keyrings outside this homedir, they are presumed to be shared
keyrings and therefore *not* checked. Configuration files
specified with the --options option and the IDEA cipher
extension specified with --load-extension are checked, along
with their enclosing directories.
* The configure option --with-static-rnd=auto allows to build gpg
with all available entropy gathering modules included. At
runtime the best usable one will be selected from the list
linux, egd, unix. This is also the default for systems lacking
a /dev/random device.
* The default character set is now taken from the current locale;
it can still be overridden by the --charset option. Using the
option -vvv shows the used character set.
* [REMOVED] --emulate-checksum-bug and --emulate-3des-s2k-bug have
been removed.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.1.91 (2002-08-04)
-------------------------------------------------
* All modules are now linked statically; the --load-extension
option is in general not useful anymore. The only exception is
to specify the deprecated idea cipher.
* The IDEA plugin has changed. Previous versions of the IDEA
plugin will no longer work with GnuPG. However, the current
version of the plugin will work with earlier GnuPG versions.
* When using --batch with one of the --delete-key commands, the
key must be specified by fingerprint. See the man page for
details.
* There are now various ways to restrict the ability GnuPG has to
exec external programs (for the keyserver helpers or photo ID
viewers). Read the README file for the complete list.
* New export option to leave off attribute packets (photo IDs)
during export. This is useful when exporting to HKP keyservers
which do not understand attribute packets.
* New import option to repair during import the HKP keyserver
mangling multiple subkeys bug. Note that this cannot completely
repair the damaged key as some crucial data is removed by the
keyserver, but it does at least give you back one subkey. This
is on by default for keyserver --recv-keys, and off by default
for regular --import.
* The keyserver helper programs now live in
/usr/[local/]libexec/gnupg by default. If you are upgrading
from 1.0.7, you might want to delete your old copies in
/usr/[local/]bin. If you use an OS that does not use libexec
for whatever reason, use configure --libexecdir=/usr/local/lib
to place the keyserver helpers there.
* The LDAP keyserver handler now works properly with very old
(version 1) LDAP keyservers.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.1.90 (2002-07-01)
-------------------------------------------------
* New commands: --personal-cipher-preferences,
--personal-digest-preferences, and
--personal-compress-preferences allow the user to specify which
algorithms are to be preferred. Note that this does not permit
using an algorithm that is not present in the recipient's
preferences (which would violate the OpenPGP standard). This
just allows sorting the preferences differently.
* New "group" command to refer to several keys with one name.
* A warning is issued if the user forces the use of an algorithm
that is not listed in the recipient's preferences.
* Full revocation key (aka "designated revoker") support.
* The preferred hash algorithms on a key are consulted when
encrypting a signed message to that key. Note that this is
disabled by default by a SHA1 preference in
--personal-digest-preferences.
* --cert-digest-algo allows the user to specify the hash algorithm
to use when signing a key rather than the default SHA1 (or MD5
for PGP2 keys). Do not use this feature unless you fully
understand the implications of this.
* --pgp7 mode automatically sets all necessary options to ensure
that the resulting message will be usable by a user of PGP 7.x.
* New --attribute-fd command for frontends and scripts to get the
contents of attribute packets (i.e. photos)
* In expert mode, the user can now re-sign a v3 key with a v4
self-signature. This does not change the v3 key into a v4 key,
but it does allow the user to use preferences, primary ID flags,
etc.
* Significantly improved photo ID support on non-unixlike
platforms.
* The version number has jumped ahead to 1.1.90 to skip over the
old version 1.1 and to get ready for the upcoming 1.2.
* ElGamal sign and encrypt is not anymore allowed in the key
generation dialog unless in expert mode. RSA sign and encrypt
has been added with the same restrictions.
* [W32] Keyserver access does work with Windows NT.
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.7 (2002-04-29)
------------------------------------------------
* Secret keys are now stored and exported in a new format which
uses SHA-1 for integrity checks. This format renders the
Rosa/Klima attack useless. Other OpenPGP implementations might
not yet support this, so the option --simple-sk-checksum creates
the old vulnerable format.
* The default cipher algorithm for encryption is now CAST5,
default hash algorithm is SHA-1. This will give us better
interoperability with other OpenPGP implementations.
* Symmetric encrypted messages now use a fixed file size if
possible. This is a tradeoff: it breaks PGP 5, but fixes PGP 2,
6, and 7. Note this was only an issue with RFC-1991 style
symmetric messages.
* Photographic user ID support. This uses an external program to
view the images.
* Enhanced keyserver support via keyserver "plugins". GnuPG comes
with plugins for the NAI LDAP keyserver as well as the HKP email
keyserver. It retains internal support for the HKP HTTP
keyserver.
* Nonrevocable signatures are now supported. If a user signs a
key nonrevocably, this signature cannot be taken back so be
careful!
* Multiple signature classes are usable when signing a key to
specify how carefully the key information (fingerprint, photo
ID, etc) was checked.
* --pgp2 mode automatically sets all necessary options to ensure
that the resulting message will be usable by a user of PGP 2.x.
* --pgp6 mode automatically sets all necessary options to ensure
that the resulting message will be usable by a user of PGP 6.x.
* Signatures may now be given an expiration date. When signing a
key with an expiration date, the user is prompted whether they
want their signature to expire at the same time.
* Revocation keys (designated revokers) are now supported if
present. There is currently no way to designate new keys as
designated revokers.
* Permissions on the .gnupg directory and its files are checked
for safety.
* --expert mode enables certain silly things such as signing a
revoked user id, expired key, or revoked key.
* Some fixes to build cleanly under Cygwin32.
* New tool gpgsplit to split OpenPGP data formats into packets.
* New option --preserve-permissions.
* Subkeys created in the future are not used for encryption or
signing unless the new option --ignore-valid-from is used.
* Revoked user-IDs are not listed unless signatures are listed too
or we are in verbose mode.
* There is no default comment string with ascii armors anymore
except for revocation certificates and --enarmor mode.
* The command "primary" in the edit menu can be used to change the
primary UID, "setpref" and "updpref" can be used to change the
preferences.
* Fixed the preference handling; since 1.0.5 they were erroneously
matched against against the latest user ID and not the given one.
* RSA key generation.
* Merged Stefan's patches for RISC OS in. See comments in
scripts/build-riscos.
* It is now possible to sign and conventional encrypt a message (-cs).
* The MDC feature flag is supported and can be set by using
the "updpref" edit command.
* The status messages GOODSIG and BADSIG are now returning the primary
UID, encoded using %XX escaping (but with spaces left as spaces,
so that it should not break too much)
* Support for GDBM based keyrings has been removed.
* The entire keyring management has been revamped.
* The way signature stati are store has changed so that v3
signatures can be supported. To increase the speed of many
operations for existing keyrings you can use the new
--rebuild-keydb-caches command.
* The entire key validation process (trustdb) has been revamped.
See the man page entries for --update-trustdb, --check-trustdb
and --no-auto-check-trustdb.
* --trusted-keys is again obsolete, --edit can be used to set the
ownertrust of any key to ultimately trusted.
* A subkey is never used to sign keys.
* Read only keyrings are now handled as expected.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2002q2/000135.html
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.6 (2001-05-29)
------------------------------------------------
* Security fix for a format string bug in the tty code.
* Fixed format string bugs in all PO files.
* Removed Russian translation due to too many bugs. The FTP
server has an unofficial but better translation in the contrib
directory.
* Fixed expire time calculation and keyserver access.
* The usual set of minor bug fixes and enhancements.
* non-writable keyrings are now correctly handled.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2001q2/000123.html
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.5 (2001-04-29)
------------------------------------------------
* WARNING: The semantics of --verify have changed to address a
problem with detached signature detection. --verify now ignores
signed material given on stdin unless this is requested by using
a "-" as the name for the file with the signed material. Please
check all your detached signature handling applications and make
sure that they don't pipe the signed material to stdin without
using a filename together with "-" on the the command line.
* WARNING: Corrected hash calculation for input data larger than
512M - it was just wrong, so you might notice bad signature in
some very big files. It may be wise to keep an old copy of
GnuPG around.
* Secret keys are no longer imported unless you use the new option
--allow-secret-key-import. This is a kludge and future versions will
handle it in another way.
* New command "showpref" in the --edit-key menu to show an easier
to understand preference listing.
* There is now the notation of a primary user ID. For example, it
is printed with a signature verification as the first user ID;
revoked user IDs are not printed there anymore. In general the
primary user ID is the one with the latest self-signature.
* New --charset=utf-8 to bypass all internal conversions.
* Large File Support (LFS) is now working.
* New options: --ignore-crc-error, --no-sig-create-check,
--no-sig-cache, --fixed-list-mode, --no-expensive-trust-checks,
--enable-special-filenames and --use-agent. See man page.
* New command --pipemode, which can be used to run gpg as a
co-process. Currently only the verification of detached
signatures are working. See doc/DETAILS.
* Keyserver support for the W32 version.
* Rewritten key selection code so that GnuPG can better cope with
multiple subkeys, expire dates and so. The drawback is that it
is slower.
* A whole lot of bug fixes.
* The verification status of self-signatures are now cached. To
increase the speed of key list operations for existing keys you
can do the following in your GnuPG homedir (~/.gnupg):
cp pubring.gpg pubring.gpg.save && gpg --export-all >x && \
rm pubring.gpg && gpg --import x
Only v4 keys (i.e not the old RSA keys) benefit from this caching.
* New translations: Estonian, Turkish.
See-also: gnupg-announce/2001q2/000122.html
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.4 (2000-10-17)
------------------------------------------------
* Fixed a serious bug which could lead to false signature verification
results when more than one signature is fed to gpg. This is the
primary reason for releasing this version.
* New utility gpgv which is a stripped down version of gpg to
be used to verify signatures against a list of trusted keys.
* Rijndael (AES) is now supported and listed with top preference.
* --with-colons now works with --print-md[s].
See-also: gnupg-announce/2000q4/000082.html
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.3 (2000-09-18)
------------------------------------------------
* Fixed problems with piping to/from other MS-Windows software
* Expiration time of the primary key can be changed again.
* Revoked user IDs are now marked in the output of --list-key
* New options --show-session-key and --override-session-key
to help the British folks to somewhat minimize the danger
of this Orwellian RIP bill.
* New options --merge-only and --try-all-secrets.
* New configuration option --with-egd-socket.
* The --trusted-key option is back after it left us with 0.9.5
* RSA is supported. Key generation does not yet work but will come
soon.
* CAST5 and SHA-1 are now the default algorithms to protect the key
and for symmetric-only encryption. This should solve a couple
of compatibility problems because the old algorithms are optional
according to RFC2440
* Twofish and MDC enhanced encryption is now used. PGP 7 supports
this. Older versions of GnuPG don't support it, so they should be
upgraded to at least 1.0.2
See-also: gnupg-announce/2000q3/000075.html
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.2 (2000-07-12)
----------------------------------------------
* Fixed expiration handling of encryption keys.
* Add an experimental feature to do unattended key generation.
* The user is now asked for the reason of revocation as required
by the new OpenPGP draft.
* There is a ~/.gnupg/random_seed file now which saves the
state of the internal RNG and increases system performance
somewhat. This way the full entropy source is only used in
cases were it is really required.
Use the option --no-random-seed-file to disable this feature.
* New options --ignore-time-conflict and --lock-never.
* Some fixes for the W32 version.
* The entropy.dll is not anymore used by the W32 version but replaced
by code derived from Cryptlib.
* Encryption is now much faster: About 2 times for 1k bit keys
and 8 times for 4k keys.
* New encryption keys are generated in a way which allows a much
faster decryption.
* New command --export-secret-subkeys which outputs the
the _primary_ key with it's secret parts deleted. This is
useful for automated decryption/signature creation as it
allows to keep the real secret primary key offline and
thereby protecting the key certificates and allowing to
create revocations for the subkeys. See the FAQ for a
procedure to install such secret keys.
* Keygeneration now writes to the first writeable keyring or
as default to the one in the homedirectory. Prior versions
ignored all --keyring options.
* New option --command-fd to take user input from a file descriptor;
to be used with --status-fd by software which uses GnuPG as a backend.
* There is a new status PROGRESS which is used to show progress during
key generation.
* Support for the new MDC encryption packets. To create them either
--force-mdc must be use or cipher algorithm with a blocksize other
than 64 bits is to be used. --openpgp currently disables MDC packets
entirely. This option should not yet be used.
* New option --no-auto-key-retrieve to disable retrieving of
a missing public key from a keyserver, when a keyserver has been set.
* Danish translation
See-also: gnupg-announce/2000q3/000069.html
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.1 (1999-12-16)
-----------------------------------
* New command --verify-files. New option --fast-list-mode.
* $http_proxy is now used when --honor-http-proxy is set.
* Fixed some minor bugs and the problem with conventional encrypted
packets which did use the gpg v3 partial length headers.
* Add Indonesian and Portuguese translations.
* Fixed a bug with symmetric-only encryption using the non-default 3DES.
The option --emulate-3des-s2k-bug may be used to decrypt documents
which have been encrypted this way; this should be done immediately
as this workaround will be remove in 1.1
* Can now handle (but not display) PGP's photo IDs. I don't know the
format of that packet but after stripping a few bytes from the start
it looks like a JPEG (at least my test data). Handling of this
package is required because otherwise it would mix up the
self signatures and you can't import those keys.
* Passing non-ascii user IDs on the commandline should now work in all
cases.
* New keys are now generated with an additional preference to Blowfish.
* Removed the GNU Privacy Handbook from the distribution as it will go
into a separate one.
See-also: gnupg-announce/1999q4/000050.html
Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.0 (1999-09-07)
-----------------------------------
* Add a very preliminary version of the GNU Privacy Handbook to
the distribution (lynx doc/gph/index.html).
* Changed the version number to GnuPG 2001 ;-)
See-also: gnupg-announce/1999q3/000037.html
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.11 (1999-09-03)
------------------------------------
* UTF-8 strings are now correctly printed (if --charset is set correctly).
Output of --with-colons remains C-style escaped UTF-8.
* Workaround for a problem with PGP 5 detached signature in textmode.
* Fixed a problem when importing new subkeys (duplicated signatures).
See-also: gnupg-announce/1999q3/000036.html
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.10 (1999-07-23)
------------------------------------
* Some strange new options to help pgpgpg
* Cleaned up the dox a bit.
See-also: gnupg-announce/1999q3/000034.html
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.9
-----------------------------------
* New options --[no-]utf8-strings.
* New edit-menu commands "enable" and "disable" for entire keys.
* You will be asked for a filename if gpg cannot deduce one.
* Changes to support libtool which is needed for the development
of libgcrypt.
* New script tools/lspgpot to help transferring assigned
trustvalues from PGP to GnuPG.
* New commands --lsign-key and made --sign-key a shortcut for --edit
and sign.
* New options (#122--126 ;-) --[no-]default-recipient[-self],
--disable-{cipher,pubkey}-algo. See the man page.
* Enhanced info output in case of multiple recipients and fixed exit code.
* New option --allow-non-selfsigned-uid to work around a problem with
the German IN way of separating signing and encryption keys.
See-also: gnupg-announce/1999q3/000028.html
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.8 (1999-06-26)
-----------------------------------
* New subcommand "delsig" in the edit menu.
* The name of the output file is not anymore the one which is
embedded in the processed message, but the used filename with
the extension stripped. To revert to the old behaviour you can
use the option --use-embedded-filename.
* Another hack to cope with pgp2 generated detached signatures.
* latin-2 character set works (--charset=iso-8859-2).
* New option --with-key-data to list the public key parameters.
New option -N to insert notations and a --set-policy-url.
A couple of other options to allow resetting of options.
* Better support for HPUX.
See-also: gnupg-announce/1999q2/000016.html
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.7 (1999-05-23)
-----------------------------------
* Add some work arounds for a bugs in pgp 2 which led to bad signatures
when used with canonical texts in some cases.
* Enhanced some status outputs.
See-also: gnupg-announce/1999q2/000000.html
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.6 (1999-05-06)
-----------------------------------
* Twofish is now statically linked by default. The experimental 128 bit
version is now disabled. Full support will be available as soon as
the OpenPGP WG has decided on an interpretation of rfc2440.
* Dropped support for the ancient Blowfish160 which is not OpenPGP.
* Merged gpgm and gpg into one binary.
* Add "revsig" and "revkey" commands to the edit menu. It is now
possible to revoke signature and subkeys.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.5 (1999-03-20)
-----------------------------------
* New command "lsign" in the keyedit menu to create non-exportable
signatures. Removed --trusted-keys option.
* A bunch of changes to the key validation code.
* --list-trust-path now has an optional --with-colons format.
* New command --recv-keys to import keys from an keyserver.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.4 (1999-03-08)
-----------------------------------
* New configure option --enable-static-rnd=[egd|linux|unix|none]
to select a random gathering module for static linking.
* The original text is now verbatim copied to a cleartext signed message.
* Bugfixes but there are still a couple of bugs.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.3 (1999-02-19)
-----------------------------------
* Changed the internal design of getkey which now allows a
efficient lookup of multiple keys and add a word match mode.
* New options --[no-]encrypt-to.
* Some changes to the configure stuff. Switched to automake 1.4.
Removed intl/ from CVS, autogen.sh now uses gettextize.
* Preferences now include Twofish. Removed preference to Blowfish with
a special hack to suppress the "not listed in preferences" warning;
this is to allow us to switch completely to Twofish in the near future.
* Changed the locking stuff.
* Print all user ids of a good signature.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.2 (1999-01-01)
-----------------------------------
* add some additional time warp checks.
* Option --keyserver and command --send-keys to utilize HKP servers.
* Upgraded to zlib 1.1.3 and fixed an inflate bug
* More cleanup on the cleartext signatures.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.1 (1999-01-01)
-----------------------------------
* Polish language support.
* When querying the passphrase, the key ID of the primary key is
displayed along with the one of the used secondary key.
* Fixed a bug occurring when decrypting pgp 5 encrypted messages,
fixed an infinite loop bug in the 3DES code and in the code
which looks for trusted signatures.
* Fixed a bug in the mpi library which caused signatures not to
compare okay.
* Rewrote the handling of cleartext signatures; the code is now
better maintainable (I hope so).
* New status output VALIDSIG only for valid signatures together
with the fingerprint of the signer's key.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.0 (1998-12-23)
-----------------------------------
* --export does now only exports rfc2440 compatible keys; the
old behaviour is available with --export-all.
Generation of v3 ElGamal (sign and encrypt) keys is not longer
supported.
* Fixed the uncompress bug.
* Rewrote the rndunix module. There are two environment variables
used for debugging now: GNUPG_RNDUNIX_DBG give the file to write
debugging information (use "-" for stdout) and if GNUPG_RNDUNIX_DBGALL
is set, all programs which are only tried are also printed.
* New option --escape-from-lines to "dash-escape" "From " lines to
prevent mailers to change them to ">From ". This is not enabled by
default because it is not in compliance with rfc2440 - however, you
should turn it on.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.5 (1998-12-08)
-----------------------------------
* The keyrings and the trustdb is now locked, so that
other GnuPG processes won't damage these files. You
may want to put the option --lock-once into your options file.
* The latest self-signatures are now used; this enables --import
to see updated preferences etc.
* Import of subkeys should now work.
* Random gathering modules may now be loaded as extensions. Add
such a module for most Unices but it is very experimental!
* Brazilian language support.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.4 (1998-11-20)
-----------------------------------
* Fixed the way the key expiration time is stored. If you have
an expiration time on your key you should fix it with --edit-key
and the command "expire". I apologize for this inconvenience.
* Add option --charset to support "koi8-r" encoding of user ids.
(Not yet tested).
* Preferences should now work again. You should run
"gpgm --check-trustdb \*" to rebuild all preferences.
* Checking of certificates should now work but this needs a lot
of testing. Key validation values are now cached in the
trustdb; they should be recalculated as needed, but you may
use --check-trustdb or --update-trustdb to do this.
* Spanish translation by Urko Lusa.
* Patch files are from now on signed. See the man page
for the new option --not-dash-escaped.
* New syntax: --edit-key <userID> [<commands>]
If you run it without --batch the commands are executed and then
you are put into normal mode unless you use "quit" or "save" as
one of the commands. When in batch mode, the program quits after
the last command, so you have to use "save" if you did some changes.
It does not yet work completely, but may be used to list so the
keys etc.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.3 (1998-11-08)
-----------------------------------
* Fixed the gettext configure bug.
* Kludge for RSA keys: keyid and length of a RSA key are
correctly reported, but you get an error if you try to use
this key (If you do not have the non-US version).
* Experimental support for keyrings stored in a GDBM database.
This is *much* faster than a standard keyring. You will notice
that the import gets slower with time; the reason is that all
new keys are used to verify signatures of previous inserted
keys. Use "--keyring gnupg-gdbm:<name-of-gdbm-file>". This is
not (yet) supported for secret keys.
* A Russian language file in the distribution (alternatives are in
the contrib directory of the FTP servers)
* commandline option processing now works as expected for GNU programs
with the exception that you can't mix options and normal arguments.
* Now --list-key lists all matching keys. This is needed in some
other places too.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.2 (1998-10-18)
-----------------------------------
* This is only a snapshot: There are still a few bugs.
* Fixed this huge memory leak.
* Redesigned the trust database: You should run "gpgm --check-trustdb".
New command --update-trustdb, which adds new key from the public
keyring into your trustdb
* Fixed a bug in the armor code, leading to invalid packet errors.
(a workaround for this was to use --no-armor). The shorten line
length (64 instead of 72) fixes a problem with pgp5 and keyservers.
* comment packets are not anymore generated. "--export" filters
them out. One Exception: The comment packets in a secret keyring
are still used because they carry the factorization of the public
prime product.
* --import now only looks for KEYBLOCK headers, so you can now simply
remove the "- " in front of such a header if someone accidentally signed
such a message or the keyblock is part of a cleartext signed message.
* --with-colons now lists the key expiration time and not anymore
the valid period.
* Some keyblocks created with old releases have a wrong sequence
of packets, so that the keyservers don't accept these keys.
Simply using "--edit-key" fixes the problem.
* New option --force-v3-sigs to generate signed messages which are
compatible to PGP 5.
* Add some code to support DLD (for non ELF systems) - but this is
not tested because my BSD box is currently broken.
* New command "expire" in the edit-key menu.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.1 (1998-10-07)
-----------------------------------
* A secondary key is used when the primary key is specified but cannot
be used for the operation (if it is a sign-only key).
* GNUPG can now handle concatenated armored messages: There is still a
bug if different kinds of messages are mixed.
* Iterated+Salted passphrases now work. If want to be sure that PGP5
is able to handle them you may want to use the options
"--s2k-mode 3 --s2k-cipher-algo cast5 --s2k-digest-algo sha1"
when changing a passphrase.
* doc/OpenPGP talks about OpenPGP compliance, doc/HACKING gives
a few hints about the internal structure.
* Checked gnupg against the August 1998 draft (07) and I believe
it is in compliance with this document (except for one point).
* Fixed some bugs in the import merging code and rewrote some
code for the trustdb.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.0 (1998-09-18)
-----------------------------------
* Triple DES is now supported. Michael Roth did this piece of
needed work. We have now all the coded needed to be OpenPGP
compliant.
* Added a simple rpm spec file (see INSTALL).
* detached and armored signatures are now using "PGP SIGNATURE",
except when --rfc1991 is used.
* All times which are not in the yyyy-mm-dd format are now printed
in local time.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.3.5 (1998-09-14)
-----------------------------------
* New option --throw-keyid to create anonymous enciphered messages.
If gpg detects such a message it tires all available secret keys
in turn so decode it. This is a gnupg extension and not in OpenPGP
but it has been discussed there and afaik some products use this
scheme too (Suggested by Nimrod Zimmerman).
* Fixed a bug with 5 byte length headers.
* --delete-[secret-]key is now also available in gpgm.
* cleartext signatures are not anymore converted to LF only.
* Fixed a trustdb problem. Run "gpgm --check-trustdb" to fix old
trust dbs.
* Building in another directory should now work.
* Weak key detection mechanism (Niklas Hernaeus).
Noteworthy changes in version 0.3.4 (1998-08-11)
-----------------------------------
* New options --comment and --set-filename; see g10/OPTIONS
* yes/no, y/n localized.
* Fixed some bugs.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.3.3 (1998-08-08)
-----------------------------------
* IMPORTANT: I found yet another bug in the way the secret keys
are encrypted - I did it the way pgp 2.x did it, but OpenPGP
and pgp 5.x specify another (in some aspects simpler) method.
To convert your secret keys you have to do this:
1. Build the new release but don't install it and keep
a copy of the old program.
2. Disable the network, make sure that you are the only
user, be sure that there are no Trojan horses etc ....
3. Use your old gpg (version 0.3.1 or 0.3.2) and set the
passphrases of ALL your secret keys to empty!
(gpg --change-passphrase your-user-id).
4. Save your ownertrusts (see the next point)
5. rm ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg
6. install the new version of gpg (0.3.3)
7. For every secret key call "gpg --edit-key your-user-id",
enter "passwd" at the prompt, follow the instructions and
change your password back, enter "save" to store it.
8. Restore the ownertrust (see next point).
* The format of the trust database has changed; you must delete
the old one, so gnupg can create a new one.
IMPORTANT: Use version 0.3.1 or .2 to save your assigned ownertrusts
("gpgm --list-ownertrust >saved-trust"); then build this new version
and restore the ownertrust with this new version
("gpgm --import-ownertrust saved-trust"). Please note that
--list-ownertrust has been renamed to --export-ownertrust in this
release and it does now only export defined ownertrusts.
* The command --edit-key now provides a commandline driven menu
which can be used for various tasks. --sign-key is only an
an alias to --edit-key and maybe removed in future: use the
command "sign" of this new menu - you can select which user ids
you want to sign.
* Alternate user ids can now be created an signed.
* Owner trust values can now be changed with --edit-key (trust)
* GNUPG can now run as a coprocess; this enables sophisticated
frontends. tools/shmtest.c is a simple sample implementation.
This needs some more work: all tty_xxx() are to be replaced
by cpr_xxx() and some changes in the display logics is needed.
* Removed options --gen-prime and --gen-random.
* Removed option --add-key; use --edit-key instead.
* Removed option --change-passphrase; use --edit-key instead.
* Signatures are now checked even if the output file could not
be created. Command "--verify" tries to find the detached data.
* gpg now disables core dumps.
* compress and symmetric cipher preferences are now used.
Because there is no 3DES yet, this is replaced by Blowfish.
* We have added the Twofish as an experimental cipher algorithm.
Many thanks to Matthew Skala for doing this work.
Twofish is the AES submission from Schneier et al.; see
"www.counterpane.com/twofish.html" for more information.
* Started with a help system: If you enter a question mark at some
prompt; you should get a specific help for this prompt.
* There is no more backup copy of the secret keyring.
* A lot of new bugs. I think this release is not as stable as
the previous one.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.3.2 (1998-07-09)
-----------------------------------
* Fixed some bugs when using --textmode (-seat)
* Now displays the trust status of a positive verified message.
* Keyrings are now scanned in the sequence they are added with
--[secret-]keyring. Note that the default keyring is implicitly
added as the very first one unless --no-default-keyring is used.
* Fixed setuid and dlopen bug.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.3.1 (1998-07-06)
-----------------------------------
* Partial headers are now written in the OpenPGP format if
a key in a v4 packet is used.
* Removed some unused options, removed the gnupg.sig stuff.
* Key lookup by name now returns a key which can be used for
the desired action.
* New options --list-ownertrust (gpgm) to make a backup copy
of the ownertrust values you assigned.
* clear signature headers are now in compliance with OpenPGP.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.3.0 (1998-06-25)
-----------------------------------
* New option --emulate-checksum-bug. If your passphrase does not
work anymore, use this option and --change-passphrase to rewrite
your passphrase.
* More complete v4 key support: Preferences and expiration time
is set into the self signature.
* Key generation defaults to DSA/ElGamal keys, so that new keys are
interoperable with pgp5
* DSA key generation is faster and key generation does not anymore
remove entropy from the random generator (the primes are public
parameters, so there is really no need for a cryptographic secure
prime number generator which we had used).
* A complete new structure for representing the key parameters.
* Removed most public key knowledge into the cipher library.
* Support for dynamic loading of new algorithms.
* Moved tiger to an extension module.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.19 (1998-05-29)
------------------------------------
* Replaced /dev/urandom in checks with new tool mk-tdata.
* Some assembler file cleanups; some more functions for the Alpha.
* Tiger has now the OpenPGP assigned number 6. Because the OID has
changed, old signatures using this algorithm can't be verified.
* gnupg now encrypts the compressed packed and not any longer in the
reverse order; anyway it can decrypt both versions. Thanks to Tom
for telling me this (not security related) bug.
* --add-key works and you are now able to generate subkeys.
* It is now possible to generate ElGamal keys in v4 packets to create
valid OpenPGP keys.
* Some new features for better integration into MUAs.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.18 (1998-05-15)
------------------------------------
* Split cipher/random.c, add new option "--disable-dev-random"
to configure to support the development of a random source for
other systems. Prepared sourcefiles rand-unix.c, rand-w32.c
and rand-dummy.c (which is used to allow compilation on systems
without a random source).
* Fixed a small bug in the key generation (it was possible that 48 bits
of a key were not taken from the random pool)
* Add key generation for DSA and v4 signatures.
* Add a function trap_unaligned(), so that a SIGBUS is issued on
Alphas and not the slow emulation code is used. And success: rmd160
raised a SIGBUS.
* Enhanced the formatting facility of argparse and changed the use of
\r,\v to @ because gettext does not like it.
* New option "--compress-algo 1" to allow the creation of compressed
messages which are readable by PGP and "--print-md" (gpgm) to make
speed measurement easier.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.17 (1998-05-04)
------------------------------------
* Comment packets are now of private type 61.
* Passphrase code still used a 160 bit blowfish key, added a
silly workaround. Please change your passphrase again - sorry.
* Conventional encryption now uses a type 3 packet to describe the
used algorithms.
* The new algorithm number for Blowfish is 20, 16 is still used for
encryption only; for signing it is only used when it is in a v3 packet,
so that GNUPG keys are still valid.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.16 (1998-04-28)
------------------------------------
* Add experimental support for the TIGER/192 message digest algorithm.
(But there is only a dummy ASN OID).
* Standard cipher is now Blowfish with 128 bit key in OpenPGP's CFB
mode. I renamed the old cipher to Blowfish160. Because the OpenPGP
group refused to assign me a number for Blowfish160, I have to
drop support for this in the future. You should use
"--change-passphrase" to recode your current passphrase with 128
bit Blowfish.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.15 (1998-04-09)
------------------------------------
* Fixed a bug with the old checksum calculation for secret keys.
If you run the program without --batch, a warning does inform
you if your secret key needs to be converted; simply use
--change-passphrase to recalculate the checksum. Please do this
soon, as the compatible mode will be removed sometime in the future.
* CAST5 works (using the PGP's special CFB mode).
* Again somewhat more PGP 5 compatible.
* Some new test cases
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.14 (1998-04-02)
------------------------------------
* Changed the internal handling of keyrings.
* Add support to list PGP 5 keyrings with subkeys
* Timestamps of signatures are now verified.
* A expiration time can now be specified during key generation.
* Some speedups for Blowfish and SHA-1, rewrote SHA-1 transform.
Reduced the amount of random bytes needed for key generation in
some cases.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.13 (1998-03-10)
------------------------------------
* Verify of DSA signatures works.
* Re-implemented the slower random number generator.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.12 (1998-03-07)
------------------------------------
* --delete-key checks that there is no secret key. The new
option --delete-secret-key maybe used to delete a secret key.
* "-kv" now works as expected. Options "--list-{keys,sigs]"
and "--check-sigs" are now working.
* New options "--verify" and "--decrypt" to better support integration
into MUAs (partly done for Mutt).
* New option "--with-colons" to make parsing of key lists easier.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.11 (1998-03-02)
------------------------------------
* GPG now asks for a recipient's name if option "-r" is not used.
* If there is no good trust path, the program asks whether to use
the public keys anyway.
* "--delete-key" works for public keys. What semantics shall I use
when there is a secret key too? Delete the secret key or leave him
and auto-regenerate the public key, next time the secret key is used?
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.10 (1998-02-27)
------------------------------------
* Code for the alpha is much faster (about 20 times); the data
was misaligned and the kernel traps this, so nearly all time
was used by system to trap the misalignments and to write
syslog messages. Shame on me and thanks to Ralph for
pointing me at this while drinking some beer yesterday.
* Changed some configure options and add an option
--disable-m-guard to remove the memory checking code
and to compile everything with optimization on.
* New environment variable GNUPGHOME, which can be used to set
another homedir than ~/.gnupg. Changed default homedir for
Windoze version to c:/gnupg.
* Fixed detached signatures; detached PGP signatures caused a SEGV.
* The Windoze version works (as usual w/o a strong RNG).
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.9 (1998-02-26)
-----------------------------------
* Fixed FreeBSD bug.
* Added a simple man page.
* Switched to automake1.2f and a newer gettext.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.8 (1998-02-24)
-----------------------------------
* Changed the name to GNUPG, the binaries are called gpg and gpgm.
You must rename rename the directory "~/.g10" to ~/.gnupg/, rename
{pub,sec}ring.g10 to {pub,sec}ring.gpg, trustdb.g10 to trustdb.gpg
and g10.sig to gnupg.sig.
* New or changed passphrases are now salted.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.7 (1998-02-18)
-----------------------------------
* New command "gen-revoke" to create a key revocation certificate.
* New option "homedir" to set the homedir (which defaults to "~/.g10").
This directory is created if it does not exists (only the last
part of the name and not the complete hierarchy)
* Command "import" works. (Try: "finger gcrypt@ftp.guug.de|g10 --import")
* New commands "dearmor/enarmor" for g10maint. These are mainly
used for internal test purposes.
* Option --version now conforming to the GNU standards and lists
the available ciphers, message digests and public key algorithms.
* Assembler code for m68k (not tested).
* "make check" works.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.6 (1998-02-13)
-----------------------------------
* Option "--export" works.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.5 (1998-02-12)
-----------------------------------
* Added zlib for systems which don't have it.
Use "./configure --with-zlib" to link with the static version.
* Generalized some more functions and rewrote the encoding of
message digests into MPIs.
* Enhanced the checkit script
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.4 (1998-02-11)
-----------------------------------
* nearly doubled the speed of the ElGamal signature verification.
* backup copies of keyrings are created.
* assembler stuff for Pentium; gives about 15% better performance.
* fixed a lot of bugs.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.3 (1998-02-09)
-----------------------------------
* Found a bug in the calculation of ELG fingerprints. This is now
fixed, but all existing fingerprints and keyids for ELG keys
are not any more valid.
* armor should now work; including clear signed text.
* moved some options to the new program g10maint
* It's now 64 bit clean and runs fine on an alpha--linux.
* Key generation is much faster now. I fixed this by using not
so strong random number for the primes (this was a bug because the
ElGamal primes are public parameters and it does not make sense
to generate them from strong random). The real secret is the x value
which is still generated from strong (okay: /dev/random) random bits.
* added option "--status-fd": see g10/OPTIONS
* We have secure memory on systems which support mlock().
It is not complete yet, because we do not have signal handler
which does a cleanup in very case.
We should also check the ulimit for the user in the case
that the admin does not have set a limit on locked pages.
* started with internationalization support.
* The logic to handle the web of trust is now implemented. It is
has some bugs; but I'm going to change the algorithm anyway.
It works by calculating the trustlevel on the fly. It may ask
you to provide trust parameters if the calculated trust probability
is too low. I will write a paper which discusses this new approach.
* a couple of changes to the configure script.
* New option "--quick-random" which uses a much quicker random
number generator. Keys generated while this option is in effect
are flags with "INSECURE!" in the user-id. This is a development
only option.
* Read support for new version packets (OpenPGP).
* Comment packets are now of correct OpenPGP type 16. Old comment
packets written by G10 are detected because they always start with
a hash which is an invalid version byte.
* The string "(INSECURE!)" is appended to a new user-id if this
is generated on a system without a good random number generator.
Version 0.2.2 (1998-02-09)
Version 0.2.1 (1998-01-28)
Version 0.2.0 (1998-01-25)
Version 0.1.3 (1998-01-12)
Version 0.1.2 (1998-01-07)
Version 0.1.1 (1998-01-07)
Version 0.1.0 (1998-01-05)
Version 0.0.0 (1997-12-20)
Copyright (C) 1998-2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
Copyright (C) 1997-2017 Werner Koch
This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives
unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without
modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the
implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
diff --git a/agent/command-ssh.c b/agent/command-ssh.c
index b41177be6..51111a60d 100644
--- a/agent/command-ssh.c
+++ b/agent/command-ssh.c
@@ -1,4104 +1,4112 @@
/* command-ssh.c - gpg-agent's implementation of the ssh-agent protocol.
* Copyright (C) 2004-2006, 2009, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2004-2006, 2009, 2012-2014 Werner Koch
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
/* Only v2 of the ssh-agent protocol is implemented. Relevant RFCs
are:
RFC-4250 - Protocol Assigned Numbers
RFC-4251 - Protocol Architecture
RFC-4252 - Authentication Protocol
RFC-4253 - Transport Layer Protocol
RFC-5656 - ECC support
The protocol for the agent is defined in:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#endif /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UCRED_H
#include <sys/ucred.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UCRED_H
#include <ucred.h>
#endif
#include "agent.h"
#include "../common/i18n.h"
#include "../common/util.h"
#include "../common/ssh-utils.h"
/* Request types. */
#define SSH_REQUEST_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11
#define SSH_REQUEST_SIGN_REQUEST 13
#define SSH_REQUEST_ADD_IDENTITY 17
#define SSH_REQUEST_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18
#define SSH_REQUEST_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19
#define SSH_REQUEST_LOCK 22
#define SSH_REQUEST_UNLOCK 23
#define SSH_REQUEST_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25
#define SSH_REQUEST_EXTENSION 27
/* Options. */
#define SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1
#define SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2
#define SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN 3
#define SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION 255
/* Response types. */
#define SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS 6
#define SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE 5
#define SSH_RESPONSE_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12
#define SSH_RESPONSE_SIGN_RESPONSE 14
#define SSH_RESPONSE_EXTENSION_FAILURE 28
/* Other constants. */
#define SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING 20
#define SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_ELEMS 2
#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256 0x02
#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512 0x04
#define SPEC_FLAG_USE_PKCS1V2 (1 << 0)
#define SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA (1 << 1)
#define SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA (1 << 2) /*(lowercase 'd' on purpose.)*/
#define SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT (1 << 7)
/* The name of the control file. */
#define SSH_CONTROL_FILE_NAME "sshcontrol"
/* The blurb we put into the header of a newly created control file. */
static const char sshcontrolblurb[] =
"# List of allowed ssh keys. Only keys present in this file are used\n"
"# in the SSH protocol. The ssh-add tool may add new entries to this\n"
"# file to enable them; you may also add them manually. Comment\n"
"# lines, like this one, as well as empty lines are ignored. Lines do\n"
"# have a certain length limit but this is not serious limitation as\n"
"# the format of the entries is fixed and checked by gpg-agent. A\n"
"# non-comment line starts with optional white spaces, followed by the\n"
"# keygrip of the key given as 40 hex digits, optionally followed by a\n"
"# caching TTL in seconds, and another optional field for arbitrary\n"
"# flags. Prepend the keygrip with an '!' mark to disable it.\n"
"\n";
/* Macros. */
/* Return a new uint32 with b0 being the most significant byte and b3
being the least significant byte. */
#define uint32_construct(b0, b1, b2, b3) \
((b0 << 24) | (b1 << 16) | (b2 << 8) | b3)
/*
* Basic types.
*/
/* Type for a request handler. */
typedef gpg_error_t (*ssh_request_handler_t) (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
struct ssh_key_type_spec;
typedef struct ssh_key_type_spec ssh_key_type_spec_t;
/* Type, which is used for associating request handlers with the
appropriate request IDs. */
typedef struct ssh_request_spec
{
unsigned char type;
ssh_request_handler_t handler;
const char *identifier;
unsigned int secret_input;
} ssh_request_spec_t;
/* Type for "key modifier functions", which are necessary since
OpenSSH and GnuPG treat key material slightly different. A key
modifier is called right after a new key identity has been received
in order to "sanitize" the material. */
typedef gpg_error_t (*ssh_key_modifier_t) (const char *elems,
gcry_mpi_t *mpis);
/* The encoding of a generated signature is dependent on the
algorithm; therefore algorithm specific signature encoding
functions are necessary. */
typedef gpg_error_t (*ssh_signature_encoder_t) (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t signature_blob,
gcry_sexp_t sig);
/* Type, which is used for bundling all the algorithm specific
information together in a single object. */
struct ssh_key_type_spec
{
/* Algorithm identifier as used by OpenSSH. */
const char *ssh_identifier;
/* Human readable name of the algorithm. */
const char *name;
/* Algorithm identifier as used by GnuPG. */
int algo;
/* List of MPI names for secret keys; order matches the one of the
agent protocol. */
const char *elems_key_secret;
/* List of MPI names for public keys; order matches the one of the
agent protocol. */
const char *elems_key_public;
/* List of MPI names for signature data. */
const char *elems_signature;
/* List of MPI names for secret keys; order matches the one, which
is required by gpg-agent's key access layer. */
const char *elems_sexp_order;
/* Key modifier function. Key modifier functions are necessary in
order to fix any inconsistencies between the representation of
keys on the SSH and on the GnuPG side. */
ssh_key_modifier_t key_modifier;
/* Signature encoder function. Signature encoder functions are
necessary since the encoding of signatures depends on the used
algorithm. */
ssh_signature_encoder_t signature_encoder;
/* The name of the ECC curve or NULL for non-ECC algos. This is the
* canonical name for the curve as specified by RFC-5656. */
const char *curve_name;
/* An alias for curve_name or NULL. Actually this is Libcgrypt's
* primary name of the curve. */
const char *alt_curve_name;
/* The hash algorithm to be used with this key. 0 for using the
default. */
int hash_algo;
/* Misc flags. */
unsigned int flags;
};
/* Definition of an object to access the sshcontrol file. */
struct ssh_control_file_s
{
char *fname; /* Name of the file. */
estream_t fp; /* This is never NULL. */
int lnr; /* The current line number. */
struct {
int valid; /* True if the data of this structure is valid. */
int disabled; /* The item is disabled. */
int ttl; /* The TTL of the item. */
int confirm; /* The confirm flag is set. */
char hexgrip[40+1]; /* The hexgrip of the item (uppercase). */
} item;
};
/* Two objects definition to hold keys for later sorting. */
struct key_collection_item_s
{
gcry_sexp_t key; /* Public key. (owned by us) */
char *cardsn; /* Serial number of a card or NULL. (owned by us) */
int order; /* Computed ordinal */
};
struct key_collection_s
{
struct key_collection_item_s *items;
size_t allocated;
size_t nitems;
};
/* Prototypes. */
static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_request_identities (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_sign_request (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_add_identity (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_remove_identity (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_remove_all_identities (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_lock (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_unlock (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_extension (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request,
estream_t response);
static gpg_error_t ssh_key_modifier_rsa (const char *elems, gcry_mpi_t *mpis);
static gpg_error_t ssh_signature_encoder_rsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t signature_blob,
gcry_sexp_t signature);
static gpg_error_t ssh_signature_encoder_dsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t signature_blob,
gcry_sexp_t signature);
static gpg_error_t ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t signature_blob,
gcry_sexp_t signature);
static gpg_error_t ssh_signature_encoder_eddsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t signature_blob,
gcry_sexp_t signature);
static gpg_error_t ssh_key_extract_comment (gcry_sexp_t key, char **comment);
struct peer_info_s
{
unsigned long pid;
int uid;
};
/* Global variables. */
/* Associating request types with the corresponding request
handlers. */
static const ssh_request_spec_t request_specs[] =
{
#define REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE(id, name, secret_input) \
{ SSH_REQUEST_##id, ssh_handler_##name, #name, secret_input }
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (REQUEST_IDENTITIES, request_identities, 1),
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (SIGN_REQUEST, sign_request, 0),
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (ADD_IDENTITY, add_identity, 1),
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED, add_identity, 1),
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (REMOVE_IDENTITY, remove_identity, 0),
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES, remove_all_identities, 0),
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (LOCK, lock, 0),
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (UNLOCK, unlock, 0),
REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (EXTENSION, extension, 0)
#undef REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE
};
/* Table holding key type specifications. */
static const ssh_key_type_spec_t ssh_key_types[] =
{
{
"ssh-ed25519", "Ed25519", GCRY_PK_EDDSA, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_eddsa,
"Ed25519", NULL, 0, SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA
},
{
"ssh-rsa", "RSA", GCRY_PK_RSA, "nedupq", "en", "s", "nedpqu",
ssh_key_modifier_rsa, ssh_signature_encoder_rsa,
NULL, NULL, 0, SPEC_FLAG_USE_PKCS1V2
},
{
"ssh-dss", "DSA", GCRY_PK_DSA, "pqgyx", "pqgy", "rs", "pqgyx",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_dsa,
NULL, NULL, 0, 0
},
{
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ECDSA", GCRY_PK_ECC, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa,
"nistp256", "NIST P-256", GCRY_MD_SHA256, SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA
},
{
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ECDSA", GCRY_PK_ECC, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa,
"nistp384", "NIST P-384", GCRY_MD_SHA384, SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA
},
{
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521", "ECDSA", GCRY_PK_ECC, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa,
"nistp521", "NIST P-521", GCRY_MD_SHA512, SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA
},
{
"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "Ed25519",
GCRY_PK_EDDSA, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_eddsa,
"Ed25519", NULL, 0, SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA | SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT
},
{
"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA",
GCRY_PK_RSA, "nedupq", "en", "s", "nedpqu",
ssh_key_modifier_rsa, ssh_signature_encoder_rsa,
NULL, NULL, 0, SPEC_FLAG_USE_PKCS1V2 | SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT
},
{
"ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "DSA",
GCRY_PK_DSA, "pqgyx", "pqgy", "rs", "pqgyx",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_dsa,
NULL, NULL, 0, SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT | SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT
},
{
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA",
GCRY_PK_ECC, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa,
"nistp256", "NIST P-256", GCRY_MD_SHA256,
SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA | SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT
},
{
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA",
GCRY_PK_ECC, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa,
"nistp384", "NIST P-384", GCRY_MD_SHA384,
SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA | SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT
},
{
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA",
GCRY_PK_ECC, "qd", "q", "rs", "qd",
NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa,
"nistp521", "NIST P-521", GCRY_MD_SHA512,
SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA | SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT
}
};
/*
General utility functions.
*/
/* A secure realloc, i.e. it makes sure to allocate secure memory if A
is NULL. This is required because the standard gcry_realloc does
not know whether to allocate secure or normal if NULL is passed as
existing buffer. */
static void *
realloc_secure (void *a, size_t n)
{
void *p;
if (a)
p = gcry_realloc (a, n);
else
p = gcry_malloc_secure (n);
return p;
}
/* Lookup the ssh-identifier for the ECC curve CURVE_NAME. Returns
* NULL if not found. If found the ssh indetifier is returned and a
* pointer to the canonical curve name as specified for ssh is stored
* at R_CANON_NAME. */
static const char *
ssh_identifier_from_curve_name (const char *curve_name,
const char **r_canon_name)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < DIM (ssh_key_types); i++)
if (ssh_key_types[i].curve_name
&& (!strcmp (ssh_key_types[i].curve_name, curve_name)
|| (ssh_key_types[i].alt_curve_name
&& !strcmp (ssh_key_types[i].alt_curve_name, curve_name))))
{
*r_canon_name = ssh_key_types[i].curve_name;
return ssh_key_types[i].ssh_identifier;
}
return NULL;
}
/*
Primitive I/O functions.
*/
/* Read a byte from STREAM, store it in B. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_byte (estream_t stream, unsigned char *b)
{
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
ret = es_fgetc (stream);
if (ret == EOF)
{
if (es_ferror (stream))
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
*b = 0;
}
else
{
*b = ret & 0xFF;
err = 0;
}
return err;
}
/* Write the byte contained in B to STREAM. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_write_byte (estream_t stream, unsigned char b)
{
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
ret = es_fputc (b, stream);
if (ret == EOF)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Read a uint32 from STREAM, store it in UINT32. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_uint32 (estream_t stream, u32 *uint32)
{
unsigned char buffer[4];
size_t bytes_read;
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
ret = es_read (stream, buffer, sizeof (buffer), &bytes_read);
if (ret)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
if (bytes_read != sizeof (buffer))
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
else
{
u32 n;
n = uint32_construct (buffer[0], buffer[1], buffer[2], buffer[3]);
*uint32 = n;
err = 0;
}
}
return err;
}
/* Write the uint32 contained in UINT32 to STREAM. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_write_uint32 (estream_t stream, u32 uint32)
{
unsigned char buffer[4];
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
buffer[0] = uint32 >> 24;
buffer[1] = uint32 >> 16;
buffer[2] = uint32 >> 8;
buffer[3] = uint32 >> 0;
ret = es_write (stream, buffer, sizeof (buffer), NULL);
if (ret)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Read SIZE bytes from STREAM into BUFFER. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_data (estream_t stream, unsigned char *buffer, size_t size)
{
gpg_error_t err;
size_t bytes_read;
int ret;
ret = es_read (stream, buffer, size, &bytes_read);
if (ret)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
if (bytes_read != size)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
else
err = 0;
}
return err;
}
/* Skip over SIZE bytes from STREAM. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_skip (estream_t stream, size_t size)
{
char buffer[128];
size_t bytes_to_read, bytes_read;
int ret;
do
{
bytes_to_read = size;
if (bytes_to_read > sizeof buffer)
bytes_to_read = sizeof buffer;
ret = es_read (stream, buffer, bytes_to_read, &bytes_read);
if (ret)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else if (bytes_read != bytes_to_read)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
else
size -= bytes_to_read;
}
while (size);
return 0;
}
/* Write SIZE bytes from BUFFER to STREAM. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_write_data (estream_t stream, const unsigned char *buffer, size_t size)
{
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
ret = es_write (stream, buffer, size, NULL);
if (ret)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Read a binary string from STREAM into STRING, store size of string
in STRING_SIZE. Append a hidden nul so that the result may
directly be used as a C string. Depending on SECURE use secure
memory for STRING. If STRING is NULL do only a dummy read. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_string (estream_t stream, unsigned int secure,
unsigned char **string, u32 *string_size)
{
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
u32 length = 0;
if (string_size)
*string_size = 0;
/* Read string length. */
err = stream_read_uint32 (stream, &length);
if (err)
goto out;
if (string)
{
/* Allocate space. */
if (secure)
buffer = xtrymalloc_secure (length + 1);
else
buffer = xtrymalloc (length + 1);
if (! buffer)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
/* Read data. */
err = length? stream_read_data (stream, buffer, length) : 0;
if (err)
goto out;
/* Finalize string object. */
buffer[length] = 0;
*string = buffer;
}
else /* Dummy read requested. */
{
err = length? stream_read_skip (stream, length) : 0;
if (err)
goto out;
}
if (string_size)
*string_size = length;
out:
if (err)
xfree (buffer);
return err;
}
/* Read a binary string from STREAM and store it as an opaque MPI at
R_MPI, adding 0x40 (this is the prefix for EdDSA key in OpenPGP).
Depending on SECURE use secure memory. If the string is too large
for key material return an error. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_blob (estream_t stream, unsigned int secure, gcry_mpi_t *r_mpi)
{
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
u32 length = 0;
*r_mpi = NULL;
/* Read string length. */
err = stream_read_uint32 (stream, &length);
if (err)
goto leave;
/* To avoid excessive use of secure memory we check that an MPI is
not too large. */
if (length > (4096/8) + 8)
{
log_error (_("ssh keys greater than %d bits are not supported\n"), 4096);
err = GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE;
goto leave;
}
/* Allocate space. */
if (secure)
buffer = xtrymalloc_secure (length+1);
else
buffer = xtrymalloc (length+1);
if (!buffer)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
/* Read data. */
err = stream_read_data (stream, buffer + 1, length);
if (err)
goto leave;
buffer[0] = 0x40;
*r_mpi = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, buffer, 8*(length+1));
buffer = NULL;
leave:
xfree (buffer);
return err;
}
/* Read a C-string from STREAM, store copy in STRING. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_cstring (estream_t stream, char **string)
{
return stream_read_string (stream, 0, (unsigned char **)string, NULL);
}
/* Write a binary string from STRING of size STRING_N to STREAM. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_write_string (estream_t stream,
const unsigned char *string, u32 string_n)
{
gpg_error_t err;
err = stream_write_uint32 (stream, string_n);
if (err)
goto out;
err = stream_write_data (stream, string, string_n);
out:
return err;
}
/* Write a C-string from STRING to STREAM. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_write_cstring (estream_t stream, const char *string)
{
gpg_error_t err;
err = stream_write_string (stream,
(const unsigned char *) string, strlen (string));
return err;
}
/* Read an MPI from STREAM, store it in MPINT. Depending on SECURE
use secure memory. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_read_mpi (estream_t stream, unsigned int secure, gcry_mpi_t *mpint)
{
unsigned char *mpi_data;
u32 mpi_data_size;
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_mpi_t mpi;
mpi_data = NULL;
err = stream_read_string (stream, secure, &mpi_data, &mpi_data_size);
if (err)
goto out;
/* To avoid excessive use of secure memory we check that an MPI is
not too large. */
if (mpi_data_size > 520)
{
log_error (_("ssh keys greater than %d bits are not supported\n"), 4096);
err = GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE;
goto out;
}
err = gcry_mpi_scan (&mpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, mpi_data, mpi_data_size, NULL);
if (err)
goto out;
*mpint = mpi;
out:
xfree (mpi_data);
return err;
}
/* Write the MPI contained in MPINT to STREAM. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_write_mpi (estream_t stream, gcry_mpi_t mpint)
{
unsigned char *mpi_buffer;
size_t mpi_buffer_n;
gpg_error_t err;
mpi_buffer = NULL;
err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, &mpi_buffer, &mpi_buffer_n, mpint);
if (err)
goto out;
err = stream_write_string (stream, mpi_buffer, mpi_buffer_n);
out:
xfree (mpi_buffer);
return err;
}
/* Copy data from SRC to DST until EOF is reached. */
static gpg_error_t
stream_copy (estream_t dst, estream_t src)
{
char buffer[BUFSIZ];
size_t bytes_read;
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
err = 0;
while (1)
{
ret = es_read (src, buffer, sizeof (buffer), &bytes_read);
if (ret || (! bytes_read))
{
if (ret)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
break;
}
ret = es_write (dst, buffer, bytes_read, NULL);
if (ret)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
break;
}
}
return err;
}
/* Open the ssh control file and create it if not available. With
APPEND passed as true the file will be opened in append mode,
otherwise in read only mode. On success 0 is returned and a new
control file object stored at R_CF. On error an error code is
returned and NULL is stored at R_CF. */
static gpg_error_t
open_control_file (ssh_control_file_t *r_cf, int append)
{
gpg_error_t err;
ssh_control_file_t cf;
cf = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *cf);
if (!cf)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
/* Note: As soon as we start to use non blocking functions here
(i.e. where Pth might switch threads) we need to employ a
mutex. */
cf->fname = make_filename_try (gnupg_homedir (), SSH_CONTROL_FILE_NAME, NULL);
if (!cf->fname)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
/* FIXME: With "a+" we are not able to check whether this will
be created and thus the blurb needs to be written first. */
cf->fp = es_fopen (cf->fname, append? "a+":"r");
if (!cf->fp && errno == ENOENT)
{
estream_t stream = es_fopen (cf->fname, "wx,mode=-rw-r");
if (!stream)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error (_("can't create '%s': %s\n"),
cf->fname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
es_fputs (sshcontrolblurb, stream);
es_fclose (stream);
cf->fp = es_fopen (cf->fname, append? "a+":"r");
}
if (!cf->fp)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"),
cf->fname, gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
err = 0;
leave:
if (err && cf)
{
if (cf->fp)
es_fclose (cf->fp);
xfree (cf->fname);
xfree (cf);
}
else
*r_cf = cf;
return err;
}
static void
rewind_control_file (ssh_control_file_t cf)
{
es_fseek (cf->fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
cf->lnr = 0;
es_clearerr (cf->fp);
}
static void
close_control_file (ssh_control_file_t cf)
{
if (!cf)
return;
es_fclose (cf->fp);
xfree (cf->fname);
xfree (cf);
}
/* Read the next line from the control file and store the data in CF.
Returns 0 on success, GPG_ERR_EOF on EOF, or other error codes. */
static gpg_error_t
read_control_file_item (ssh_control_file_t cf)
{
int c, i, n;
char *p, *pend, line[256];
long ttl = 0;
cf->item.valid = 0;
es_clearerr (cf->fp);
do
{
if (!es_fgets (line, DIM(line)-1, cf->fp) )
{
if (es_feof (cf->fp))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
}
cf->lnr++;
if (!*line || line[strlen(line)-1] != '\n')
{
/* Eat until end of line */
while ((c = es_getc (cf->fp)) != EOF && c != '\n')
;
return gpg_error (*line? GPG_ERR_LINE_TOO_LONG
: GPG_ERR_INCOMPLETE_LINE);
}
/* Allow for empty lines and spaces */
for (p=line; spacep (p); p++)
;
}
while (!*p || *p == '\n' || *p == '#');
cf->item.disabled = 0;
if (*p == '!')
{
cf->item.disabled = 1;
for (p++; spacep (p); p++)
;
}
for (i=0; hexdigitp (p) && i < 40; p++, i++)
cf->item.hexgrip[i] = (*p >= 'a'? (*p & 0xdf): *p);
cf->item.hexgrip[i] = 0;
if (i != 40 || !(spacep (p) || *p == '\n'))
{
log_error ("%s:%d: invalid formatted line\n", cf->fname, cf->lnr);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
}
ttl = strtol (p, &pend, 10);
p = pend;
if (!(spacep (p) || *p == '\n') || (int)ttl < -1)
{
log_error ("%s:%d: invalid TTL value; assuming 0\n", cf->fname, cf->lnr);
cf->item.ttl = 0;
}
cf->item.ttl = ttl;
/* Now check for key-value pairs of the form NAME[=VALUE]. */
cf->item.confirm = 0;
while (*p)
{
for (; spacep (p) && *p != '\n'; p++)
;
if (!*p || *p == '\n')
break;
n = strcspn (p, "= \t\n");
if (p[n] == '=')
{
log_error ("%s:%d: assigning a value to a flag is not yet supported; "
"flag ignored\n", cf->fname, cf->lnr);
p++;
}
else if (n == 7 && !memcmp (p, "confirm", 7))
{
cf->item.confirm = 1;
}
else
log_error ("%s:%d: invalid flag '%.*s'; ignored\n",
cf->fname, cf->lnr, n, p);
p += n;
}
/* log_debug ("%s:%d: grip=%s ttl=%d%s%s\n", */
/* cf->fname, cf->lnr, */
/* cf->item.hexgrip, cf->item.ttl, */
/* cf->item.disabled? " disabled":"", */
/* cf->item.confirm? " confirm":""); */
cf->item.valid = 1;
return 0; /* Okay: valid entry found. */
}
/* Search the control file CF from the beginning until a matching
HEXGRIP is found; return success in this case and store true at
DISABLED if the found key has been disabled. If R_TTL is not NULL
a specified TTL for that key is stored there. If R_CONFIRM is not
NULL it is set to 1 if the key has the confirm flag set. The line
number where the item was found is stored at R_LNR. */
static gpg_error_t
search_control_file (ssh_control_file_t cf, const char *hexgrip,
int *r_disabled, int *r_ttl, int *r_confirm, int *r_lnr)
{
gpg_error_t err;
log_assert (strlen (hexgrip) == 40 );
if (r_disabled)
*r_disabled = 0;
if (r_ttl)
*r_ttl = 0;
if (r_confirm)
*r_confirm = 0;
if (r_lnr)
*r_lnr = -1;
rewind_control_file (cf);
while (!(err=read_control_file_item (cf)))
{
if (!cf->item.valid)
continue; /* Should not happen. */
if (!strcmp (hexgrip, cf->item.hexgrip))
break;
}
if (!err)
{
if (r_disabled)
*r_disabled = cf->item.disabled;
if (r_ttl)
*r_ttl = cf->item.ttl;
if (r_confirm)
*r_confirm = cf->item.confirm;
if (r_lnr)
*r_lnr = cf->lnr;
}
return err;
}
/* Add an entry to the control file to mark the key with the keygrip
HEXGRIP as usable for SSH; i.e. it will be returned when ssh asks
for it. FMTFPR is the fingerprint string. This function is in
general used to add a key received through the ssh-add function.
We can assume that the user wants to allow ssh using this key. */
static gpg_error_t
add_control_entry (ctrl_t ctrl, ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
const char *hexgrip, gcry_sexp_t key,
int ttl, int confirm)
{
gpg_error_t err;
ssh_control_file_t cf;
int disabled;
char *fpr_md5 = NULL;
char *fpr_sha256 = NULL;
(void)ctrl;
err = open_control_file (&cf, 1);
if (err)
return err;
err = search_control_file (cf, hexgrip, &disabled, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (err && gpg_err_code(err) == GPG_ERR_EOF)
{
struct tm *tp;
time_t atime = time (NULL);
err = ssh_get_fingerprint_string (key, GCRY_MD_MD5, &fpr_md5);
/* ignore the errors as MD5 is not available in FIPS mode */
if (err)
fpr_md5 = NULL;
err = ssh_get_fingerprint_string (key, GCRY_MD_SHA256, &fpr_sha256);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Not yet in the file - add it. Because the file has been
opened in append mode, we simply need to write to it. */
tp = localtime (&atime);
es_fprintf (cf->fp,
("# %s key added on: %04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n"
"# Fingerprints: %s\n"
"# %s\n"
"%s %d%s\n"),
spec->name,
1900+tp->tm_year, tp->tm_mon+1, tp->tm_mday,
tp->tm_hour, tp->tm_min, tp->tm_sec,
fpr_md5? fpr_md5:"", fpr_sha256, hexgrip, ttl,
confirm? " confirm":"");
}
out:
xfree (fpr_md5);
xfree (fpr_sha256);
close_control_file (cf);
return 0;
}
/* Scan the sshcontrol file and return the TTL. */
static int
ttl_from_sshcontrol (const char *hexgrip)
{
ssh_control_file_t cf;
int disabled, ttl;
if (!hexgrip || strlen (hexgrip) != 40)
return 0; /* Wrong input: Use global default. */
if (open_control_file (&cf, 0))
return 0; /* Error: Use the global default TTL. */
if (search_control_file (cf, hexgrip, &disabled, &ttl, NULL, NULL)
|| disabled)
ttl = 0; /* Use the global default if not found or disabled. */
close_control_file (cf);
return ttl;
}
/* Scan the sshcontrol file and return the confirm flag. */
static int
confirm_flag_from_sshcontrol (const char *hexgrip)
{
ssh_control_file_t cf;
int disabled, confirm;
if (!hexgrip || strlen (hexgrip) != 40)
return 1; /* Wrong input: Better ask for confirmation. */
if (open_control_file (&cf, 0))
return 1; /* Error: Better ask for confirmation. */
if (search_control_file (cf, hexgrip, &disabled, NULL, &confirm, NULL)
|| disabled)
confirm = 0; /* If not found or disabled, there is no reason to
ask for confirmation. */
close_control_file (cf);
return confirm;
}
/* Open the ssh control file for reading. This is a public version of
open_control_file. The caller must use ssh_close_control_file to
release the returned handle. */
ssh_control_file_t
ssh_open_control_file (void)
{
ssh_control_file_t cf;
/* Then look at all the registered and non-disabled keys. */
if (open_control_file (&cf, 0))
return NULL;
return cf;
}
/* Close an ssh control file handle. This is the public version of
close_control_file. CF may be NULL. */
void
ssh_close_control_file (ssh_control_file_t cf)
{
close_control_file (cf);
}
/* Read the next item from the ssh control file. The function returns
0 if a item was read, GPG_ERR_EOF on eof or another error value.
R_HEXGRIP shall either be null or a BUFFER of at least 41 byte.
R_DISABLED, R_TTLm and R_CONFIRM return flags from the control
file; they are only set on success. */
gpg_error_t
ssh_read_control_file (ssh_control_file_t cf,
char *r_hexgrip,
int *r_disabled, int *r_ttl, int *r_confirm)
{
gpg_error_t err;
do
err = read_control_file_item (cf);
while (!err && !cf->item.valid);
if (!err)
{
if (r_hexgrip)
strcpy (r_hexgrip, cf->item.hexgrip);
if (r_disabled)
*r_disabled = cf->item.disabled;
if (r_ttl)
*r_ttl = cf->item.ttl;
if (r_confirm)
*r_confirm = cf->item.confirm;
}
return err;
}
/* Search for a key with HEXGRIP in sshcontrol and return all
info. */
gpg_error_t
ssh_search_control_file (ssh_control_file_t cf,
const char *hexgrip,
int *r_disabled, int *r_ttl, int *r_confirm)
{
gpg_error_t err;
int i;
const char *s;
char uphexgrip[41];
/* We need to make sure that HEXGRIP is all uppercase. The easiest
way to do this and also check its length is by copying to a
second buffer. */
for (i=0, s=hexgrip; i < 40 && *s; s++, i++)
uphexgrip[i] = *s >= 'a'? (*s & 0xdf): *s;
uphexgrip[i] = 0;
if (i != 40)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH);
else
err = search_control_file (cf, uphexgrip, r_disabled, r_ttl, r_confirm,
NULL);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EOF)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
return err;
}
/*
MPI lists.
*/
/* Free the list of MPIs MPI_LIST. */
static void
mpint_list_free (gcry_mpi_t *mpi_list)
{
if (mpi_list)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; mpi_list[i]; i++)
gcry_mpi_release (mpi_list[i]);
xfree (mpi_list);
}
}
/* Receive key material MPIs from STREAM according to KEY_SPEC;
depending on SECRET expect a public key or secret key. CERT is the
certificate blob used if KEY_SPEC indicates the certificate format;
it needs to be positioned to the end of the nonce. The newly
allocated list of MPIs is stored in MPI_LIST. Returns usual error
code. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_receive_mpint_list (estream_t stream, int secret,
ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec, estream_t cert,
gcry_mpi_t **mpi_list)
{
const char *elems_public;
unsigned int elems_n;
const char *elems;
int elem_is_secret;
gcry_mpi_t *mpis = NULL;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
unsigned int i;
if (secret)
elems = spec->elems_key_secret;
else
elems = spec->elems_key_public;
elems_n = strlen (elems);
elems_public = spec->elems_key_public;
/* Check that either both, CERT and the WITH_CERT flag, are given or
none of them. */
if (!(!!(spec->flags & SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT) ^ !cert))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CERT_OBJ);
goto out;
}
mpis = xtrycalloc (elems_n + 1, sizeof *mpis );
if (!mpis)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
elem_is_secret = 0;
for (i = 0; i < elems_n; i++)
{
if (secret)
elem_is_secret = !strchr (elems_public, elems[i]);
if (cert && !elem_is_secret)
err = stream_read_mpi (cert, elem_is_secret, &mpis[i]);
else
err = stream_read_mpi (stream, elem_is_secret, &mpis[i]);
if (err)
goto out;
}
*mpi_list = mpis;
mpis = NULL;
out:
if (err)
mpint_list_free (mpis);
return err;
}
/* Key modifier function for RSA. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_key_modifier_rsa (const char *elems, gcry_mpi_t *mpis)
{
gcry_mpi_t p;
gcry_mpi_t q;
gcry_mpi_t u;
if (strcmp (elems, "nedupq"))
/* Modifying only necessary for secret keys. */
goto out;
u = mpis[3];
p = mpis[4];
q = mpis[5];
if (gcry_mpi_cmp (p, q) > 0)
{
/* P shall be smaller then Q! Swap primes. iqmp becomes u. */
gcry_mpi_t tmp;
tmp = mpis[4];
mpis[4] = mpis[5];
mpis[5] = tmp;
}
else
/* U needs to be recomputed. */
gcry_mpi_invm (u, p, q);
out:
return 0;
}
/* Signature encoder function for RSA. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_signature_encoder_rsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t signature_blob,
gcry_sexp_t s_signature)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
gcry_sexp_t valuelist = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t sublist = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t sig_value = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t *mpis = NULL;
const char *elems;
size_t elems_n;
int i;
unsigned char *data;
size_t data_n;
gcry_mpi_t s;
valuelist = gcry_sexp_nth (s_signature, 1);
if (!valuelist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
elems = spec->elems_signature;
elems_n = strlen (elems);
mpis = xtrycalloc (elems_n + 1, sizeof *mpis);
if (!mpis)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < elems_n; i++)
{
sublist = gcry_sexp_find_token (valuelist, spec->elems_signature + i, 1);
if (!sublist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
break;
}
sig_value = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (sublist, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
if (!sig_value)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); /* FIXME? */
break;
}
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
sublist = NULL;
mpis[i] = sig_value;
}
if (err)
goto out;
/* RSA specific */
s = mpis[0];
err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &data, &data_n, s);
if (err)
goto out;
err = stream_write_string (signature_blob, data, data_n);
xfree (data);
out:
gcry_sexp_release (valuelist);
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
mpint_list_free (mpis);
return err;
}
/* Signature encoder function for DSA. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_signature_encoder_dsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t signature_blob,
gcry_sexp_t s_signature)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
gcry_sexp_t valuelist = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t sublist = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t sig_value = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t *mpis = NULL;
const char *elems;
size_t elems_n;
int i;
unsigned char buffer[SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING * SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_ELEMS];
unsigned char *data = NULL;
size_t data_n;
valuelist = gcry_sexp_nth (s_signature, 1);
if (!valuelist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
elems = spec->elems_signature;
elems_n = strlen (elems);
mpis = xtrycalloc (elems_n + 1, sizeof *mpis);
if (!mpis)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < elems_n; i++)
{
sublist = gcry_sexp_find_token (valuelist, spec->elems_signature + i, 1);
if (!sublist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
break;
}
sig_value = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (sublist, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
if (!sig_value)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); /* FIXME? */
break;
}
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
sublist = NULL;
mpis[i] = sig_value;
}
if (err)
goto out;
/* DSA specific code. */
/* FIXME: Why this complicated code? Why collecting both mpis in a
buffer instead of writing them out one after the other? */
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
{
err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &data, &data_n, mpis[i]);
if (err)
break;
if (data_n > SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); /* FIXME? */
break;
}
memset (buffer + (i * SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING), 0,
SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING - data_n);
memcpy (buffer + (i * SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING)
+ (SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING - data_n), data, data_n);
xfree (data);
data = NULL;
}
if (err)
goto out;
err = stream_write_string (signature_blob, buffer, sizeof (buffer));
out:
xfree (data);
gcry_sexp_release (valuelist);
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
mpint_list_free (mpis);
return err;
}
/* Signature encoder function for ECDSA. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_signature_encoder_ecdsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t stream, gcry_sexp_t s_signature)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
gcry_sexp_t valuelist = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t sublist = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t sig_value = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t *mpis = NULL;
const char *elems;
size_t elems_n;
int i;
unsigned char *data[2] = {NULL, NULL};
size_t data_n[2];
size_t innerlen;
valuelist = gcry_sexp_nth (s_signature, 1);
if (!valuelist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
elems = spec->elems_signature;
elems_n = strlen (elems);
mpis = xtrycalloc (elems_n + 1, sizeof *mpis);
if (!mpis)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < elems_n; i++)
{
sublist = gcry_sexp_find_token (valuelist, spec->elems_signature + i, 1);
if (!sublist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
break;
}
sig_value = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (sublist, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
if (!sig_value)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); /* FIXME? */
break;
}
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
sublist = NULL;
mpis[i] = sig_value;
}
if (err)
goto out;
/* ECDSA specific */
innerlen = 0;
for (i = 0; i < DIM(data); i++)
{
err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, &data[i], &data_n[i], mpis[i]);
if (err)
goto out;
innerlen += 4 + data_n[i];
}
err = stream_write_uint32 (stream, innerlen);
if (err)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < DIM(data); i++)
{
err = stream_write_string (stream, data[i], data_n[i]);
if (err)
goto out;
}
out:
for (i = 0; i < DIM(data); i++)
xfree (data[i]);
gcry_sexp_release (valuelist);
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
mpint_list_free (mpis);
return err;
}
/* Signature encoder function for EdDSA. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_signature_encoder_eddsa (ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
estream_t stream, gcry_sexp_t s_signature)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
gcry_sexp_t valuelist = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t sublist = NULL;
const char *elems;
size_t elems_n;
int i;
unsigned char *data[2] = {NULL, NULL};
size_t data_n[2];
size_t totallen = 0;
valuelist = gcry_sexp_nth (s_signature, 1);
if (!valuelist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
elems = spec->elems_signature;
elems_n = strlen (elems);
if (elems_n != DIM(data))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < DIM(data); i++)
{
sublist = gcry_sexp_find_token (valuelist, spec->elems_signature + i, 1);
if (!sublist)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
break;
}
data[i] = gcry_sexp_nth_buffer (sublist, 1, &data_n[i]);
if (!data[i])
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); /* FIXME? */
break;
}
totallen += data_n[i];
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
sublist = NULL;
}
if (err)
goto out;
err = stream_write_uint32 (stream, totallen);
if (err)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < DIM(data); i++)
{
err = stream_write_data (stream, data[i], data_n[i]);
if (err)
goto out;
}
out:
for (i = 0; i < DIM(data); i++)
xfree (data[i]);
gcry_sexp_release (valuelist);
gcry_sexp_release (sublist);
return err;
}
/*
S-Expressions.
*/
/* This function constructs a new S-Expression for the key identified
by the KEY_SPEC, SECRET, CURVE_NAME, MPIS, and COMMENT, which is to
be stored at R_SEXP. Returns an error code. */
static gpg_error_t
sexp_key_construct (gcry_sexp_t *r_sexp,
ssh_key_type_spec_t key_spec, int secret,
const char *curve_name, gcry_mpi_t *mpis,
const char *comment)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t sexp_new = NULL;
void *formatbuf = NULL;
void **arg_list = NULL;
estream_t format = NULL;
char *algo_name = NULL;
/* We can't encode an empty string in an S-expression, thus to keep
* the code simple we use "(none)" instead. */
if (!comment || !*comment)
comment = "(none)";
if ((key_spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA))
{
/* It is much easier and more readable to use a separate code
path for EdDSA. */
if (!curve_name)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CURVE);
else if (!mpis[0] || !gcry_mpi_get_flag (mpis[0], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY);
else if (secret
&& (!mpis[1]
|| !gcry_mpi_get_flag (mpis[1], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)))
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
else if (secret)
err = gcry_sexp_build (&sexp_new, NULL,
"(private-key(ecc(curve %s)"
"(flags eddsa)(q %m)(d %m))"
"(comment%s))",
curve_name,
mpis[0], mpis[1],
comment);
else
err = gcry_sexp_build (&sexp_new, NULL,
"(public-key(ecc(curve %s)"
"(flags eddsa)(q %m))"
"(comment%s))",
curve_name,
mpis[0],
comment);
}
else
{
const char *key_identifier[] = { "public-key", "private-key" };
int arg_idx;
const char *elems;
size_t elems_n;
unsigned int i, j;
if (secret)
elems = key_spec.elems_sexp_order;
else
elems = key_spec.elems_key_public;
elems_n = strlen (elems);
format = es_fopenmem (0, "a+b");
if (!format)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
/* Key identifier, algorithm identifier, mpis, comment, and a NULL
as a safeguard. */
arg_list = xtrymalloc (sizeof (*arg_list) * (2 + 1 + elems_n + 1 + 1));
if (!arg_list)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
arg_idx = 0;
es_fputs ("(%s(%s", format);
arg_list[arg_idx++] = &key_identifier[secret];
algo_name = xtrystrdup (gcry_pk_algo_name (key_spec.algo));
if (!algo_name)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
strlwr (algo_name);
arg_list[arg_idx++] = &algo_name;
if (curve_name)
{
es_fputs ("(curve%s)", format);
arg_list[arg_idx++] = &curve_name;
}
for (i = 0; i < elems_n; i++)
{
es_fprintf (format, "(%c%%m)", elems[i]);
if (secret)
{
for (j = 0; j < elems_n; j++)
if (key_spec.elems_key_secret[j] == elems[i])
break;
}
else
j = i;
arg_list[arg_idx++] = &mpis[j];
}
es_fputs (")(comment%s))", format);
arg_list[arg_idx++] = &comment;
arg_list[arg_idx] = NULL;
es_putc (0, format);
if (es_ferror (format))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
if (es_fclose_snatch (format, &formatbuf, NULL))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
format = NULL;
err = gcry_sexp_build_array (&sexp_new, NULL, formatbuf, arg_list);
}
if (!err)
*r_sexp = sexp_new;
out:
es_fclose (format);
xfree (arg_list);
xfree (formatbuf);
xfree (algo_name);
return err;
}
/* This function extracts the key from the s-expression SEXP according
to KEY_SPEC and stores it in ssh format at (R_BLOB, R_BLOBLEN). If
WITH_SECRET is true, the secret key parts are also extracted if
possible. Returns 0 on success or an error code. Note that data
stored at R_BLOB must be freed using es_free! */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_key_to_blob (gcry_sexp_t sexp, int with_secret,
ssh_key_type_spec_t key_spec,
void **r_blob, size_t *r_blob_size)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
gcry_sexp_t value_list = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t value_pair = NULL;
estream_t stream = NULL;
void *blob = NULL;
size_t blob_size;
const char *elems, *p_elems;
const char *data;
size_t datalen;
*r_blob = NULL;
*r_blob_size = 0;
stream = es_fopenmem (0, "r+b");
if (!stream)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
/* Get the type of the key expression. */
data = gcry_sexp_nth_data (sexp, 0, &datalen);
if (!data)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
if ((datalen == 10 && !strncmp (data, "public-key", 10))
|| (datalen == 21 && !strncmp (data, "protected-private-key", 21))
|| (datalen == 20 && !strncmp (data, "shadowed-private-key", 20)))
elems = key_spec.elems_key_public;
else if (datalen == 11 && !strncmp (data, "private-key", 11))
elems = with_secret? key_spec.elems_key_secret : key_spec.elems_key_public;
else
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
/* Get key value list. */
value_list = gcry_sexp_cadr (sexp);
if (!value_list)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
/* Write the ssh algorithm identifier. */
if ((key_spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA))
{
/* Map the curve name to the ssh name. */
const char *name, *sshname, *canon_name;
name = gcry_pk_get_curve (sexp, 0, NULL);
if (!name)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CURVE);
goto out;
}
sshname = ssh_identifier_from_curve_name (name, &canon_name);
if (!sshname)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_CURVE);
goto out;
}
err = stream_write_cstring (stream, sshname);
if (err)
goto out;
err = stream_write_cstring (stream, canon_name);
if (err)
goto out;
}
else
{
/* Note: This is also used for EdDSA. */
err = stream_write_cstring (stream, key_spec.ssh_identifier);
if (err)
goto out;
}
/* Write the parameters. */
for (p_elems = elems; *p_elems; p_elems++)
{
gcry_sexp_release (value_pair);
value_pair = gcry_sexp_find_token (value_list, p_elems, 1);
if (!value_pair)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
if ((key_spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA))
{
data = gcry_sexp_nth_data (value_pair, 1, &datalen);
if (!data)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
if (*p_elems == 'q' && (datalen & 1) && *data == 0x40)
{ /* Remove the prefix 0x40. */
data++;
datalen--;
}
err = stream_write_string (stream, data, datalen);
if (err)
goto out;
}
else
{
gcry_mpi_t mpi;
/* Note that we need to use STD format; i.e. prepend a 0x00
to indicate a positive number if the high bit is set. */
mpi = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (value_pair, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_STD);
if (!mpi)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
goto out;
}
err = stream_write_mpi (stream, mpi);
gcry_mpi_release (mpi);
if (err)
goto out;
}
}
if (es_fclose_snatch (stream, &blob, &blob_size))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
stream = NULL;
*r_blob = blob;
blob = NULL;
*r_blob_size = blob_size;
out:
gcry_sexp_release (value_list);
gcry_sexp_release (value_pair);
es_fclose (stream);
es_free (blob);
return err;
}
/*
Key I/O.
*/
/* Search for a key specification entry. If SSH_NAME is not NULL,
search for an entry whose "ssh_name" is equal to SSH_NAME;
otherwise, search for an entry whose algorithm is equal to ALGO.
Store found entry in SPEC on success, return error otherwise. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_key_type_lookup (const char *ssh_name, int algo,
ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec)
{
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < DIM (ssh_key_types); i++)
if ((ssh_name && (! strcmp (ssh_name, ssh_key_types[i].ssh_identifier)))
|| algo == ssh_key_types[i].algo)
break;
if (i == DIM (ssh_key_types))
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
else
{
*spec = ssh_key_types[i];
err = 0;
}
return err;
}
/* Receive a key from STREAM, according to the key specification given
as KEY_SPEC. Depending on SECRET, receive a secret or a public
key. If READ_COMMENT is true, receive a comment string as well.
Constructs a new S-Expression from received data and stores it in
KEY_NEW. Returns zero on success or an error code. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_receive_key (estream_t stream, gcry_sexp_t *key_new, int secret,
int read_comment, ssh_key_type_spec_t *key_spec)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *key_type = NULL;
char *comment = NULL;
estream_t cert = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t key = NULL;
ssh_key_type_spec_t spec;
gcry_mpi_t *mpi_list = NULL;
const char *elems;
const char *curve_name = NULL;
err = stream_read_cstring (stream, &key_type);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_key_type_lookup (key_type, 0, &spec);
if (err)
goto out;
if ((spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT))
{
/* This is an OpenSSH certificate+private key. The certificate
is an SSH string and which we store in an estream object. */
unsigned char *buffer;
u32 buflen;
char *cert_key_type;
err = stream_read_string (stream, 0, &buffer, &buflen);
if (err)
goto out;
cert = es_fopenmem_init (0, "rb", buffer, buflen);
xfree (buffer);
if (!cert)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
/* Check that the key type matches. */
err = stream_read_cstring (cert, &cert_key_type);
if (err)
goto out;
if (strcmp (cert_key_type, key_type) )
{
xfree (cert_key_type);
log_error ("key types in received ssh certificate do not match\n");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CERT_OBJ);
goto out;
}
xfree (cert_key_type);
/* Skip the nonce. */
err = stream_read_string (cert, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (err)
goto out;
}
if ((spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA))
{
/* The format of an EdDSA key is:
* string key_type ("ssh-ed25519")
* string public_key
* string private_key
*
* Note that the private key is the concatenation of the private
* key with the public key. Thus there's are 64 bytes; however
* we only want the real 32 byte private key - Libgcrypt expects
* this.
*/
/* For now, it's only Ed25519. In future, Ed448 will come. */
curve_name = "Ed25519";
mpi_list = xtrycalloc (3, sizeof *mpi_list);
if (!mpi_list)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
err = stream_read_blob (cert? cert : stream, 0, &mpi_list[0]);
if (err)
goto out;
if (secret)
{
u32 len = 0;
unsigned char *buffer;
/* Read string length. */
err = stream_read_uint32 (stream, &len);
if (err)
goto out;
if (len != 32 && len != 64)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
goto out;
}
buffer = xtrymalloc_secure (32);
if (!buffer)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
err = stream_read_data (stream, buffer, 32);
if (err)
{
xfree (buffer);
goto out;
}
mpi_list[1] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, buffer, 8*32);
buffer = NULL;
if (len == 64)
{
err = stream_read_skip (stream, 32);
if (err)
goto out;
}
}
}
else if ((spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_IS_ECDSA))
{
/* The format of an ECDSA key is:
* string key_type ("ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" |
* "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384" |
* "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521" )
* string ecdsa_curve_name
* string ecdsa_public_key
* mpint ecdsa_private
*
* Note that we use the mpint reader instead of the string
* reader for ecsa_public_key. For the certificate variante
* ecdsa_curve_name+ecdsa_public_key are replaced by the
* certificate.
*/
unsigned char *buffer;
err = stream_read_string (cert? cert : stream, 0, &buffer, NULL);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Get the canonical name. Should be the same as the read
* string but we use this mapping to validate that name. */
if (!ssh_identifier_from_curve_name (buffer, &curve_name))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_CURVE);
xfree (buffer);
goto out;
}
xfree (buffer);
err = ssh_receive_mpint_list (stream, secret, &spec, cert, &mpi_list);
if (err)
goto out;
}
else
{
err = ssh_receive_mpint_list (stream, secret, &spec, cert, &mpi_list);
if (err)
goto out;
}
if (read_comment)
{
err = stream_read_cstring (stream, &comment);
if (err)
goto out;
}
if (secret)
elems = spec.elems_key_secret;
else
elems = spec.elems_key_public;
if (spec.key_modifier)
{
err = (*spec.key_modifier) (elems, mpi_list);
if (err)
goto out;
}
err = sexp_key_construct (&key, spec, secret, curve_name, mpi_list,
comment? comment:"");
if (!err)
{
if (key_spec)
*key_spec = spec;
*key_new = key;
}
out:
es_fclose (cert);
mpint_list_free (mpi_list);
xfree (key_type);
xfree (comment);
return err;
}
/* Write the public key from KEY to STREAM in SSH key format. If
OVERRIDE_COMMENT is not NULL, it will be used instead of the
comment stored in the key. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_send_key_public (estream_t stream, gcry_sexp_t key,
const char *override_comment)
{
ssh_key_type_spec_t spec;
int algo;
char *comment = NULL;
void *blob = NULL;
size_t bloblen;
gpg_error_t err = 0;
algo = get_pk_algo_from_key (key);
if (algo == 0)
goto out;
err = ssh_key_type_lookup (NULL, algo, &spec);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_key_to_blob (key, 0, spec, &blob, &bloblen);
if (err)
goto out;
err = stream_write_string (stream, blob, bloblen);
if (err)
goto out;
if (override_comment)
err = stream_write_cstring (stream, override_comment);
else
{
err = ssh_key_extract_comment (key, &comment);
if (err)
err = stream_write_cstring (stream, "(none)");
else
err = stream_write_cstring (stream, comment);
}
if (err)
goto out;
out:
xfree (comment);
es_free (blob);
return err;
}
/* Read a public key out of BLOB/BLOB_SIZE according to the key
specification given as KEY_SPEC, storing the new key in KEY_PUBLIC.
Returns zero on success or an error code. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_read_key_public_from_blob (unsigned char *blob, size_t blob_size,
gcry_sexp_t *key_public,
ssh_key_type_spec_t *key_spec)
{
gpg_error_t err;
estream_t blob_stream;
blob_stream = es_fopenmem (0, "r+b");
if (!blob_stream)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
err = stream_write_data (blob_stream, blob, blob_size);
if (err)
goto out;
err = es_fseek (blob_stream, 0, SEEK_SET);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_receive_key (blob_stream, key_public, 0, 0, key_spec);
out:
es_fclose (blob_stream);
return err;
}
/* This function calculates the key grip for the key contained in the
S-Expression KEY and writes it to BUFFER, which must be large
enough to hold it. Returns usual error code. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_key_grip (gcry_sexp_t key, unsigned char *buffer)
{
if (!gcry_pk_get_keygrip (key, buffer))
{
gpg_error_t err = gcry_pk_testkey (key);
return err? err : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
}
return 0;
}
/* Check whether a key of KEYGRIP on smartcard is available and
whether it has a usable key. Store a copy of that key at R_PK and
return 0. If no key is available store NULL at R_PK and return an
error code. If CARDSN is not NULL, a string with the serial number
of the card will be a malloced and stored there. */
static gpg_error_t
card_key_available (ctrl_t ctrl, const struct card_key_info_s *keyinfo,
gcry_sexp_t *r_pk, char **cardsn)
{
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char *pkbuf;
size_t pkbuflen;
gcry_sexp_t s_pk;
unsigned char grip[20];
*r_pk = NULL;
if (cardsn)
*cardsn = NULL;
/* Read the public key. */
err = agent_card_readkey (ctrl, keyinfo->keygrip, &pkbuf, NULL);
if (err)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("no suitable card key found: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
pkbuflen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (pkbuf, 0, NULL, NULL);
err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_pk, NULL, (char*)pkbuf, pkbuflen);
if (err)
{
log_error ("failed to build S-Exp from received card key: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (pkbuf);
return err;
}
hex2bin (keyinfo->keygrip, grip, sizeof (grip));
if ( agent_key_available (grip) )
{
/* (Shadow)-key is not available in our key storage. */
err = agent_write_shadow_key (grip, keyinfo->serialno,
keyinfo->idstr, pkbuf, 0);
if (err)
{
xfree (pkbuf);
gcry_sexp_release (s_pk);
return err;
}
}
if (cardsn)
{
char *dispsn;
char *p;
/* If the card handler is able to return a short serialnumber,
use that one, else use the complete serialno. */
if (!agent_card_getattr (ctrl, "$DISPSERIALNO", &dispsn,
keyinfo->keygrip))
{
*cardsn = xtryasprintf ("cardno:%s", dispsn);
xfree (dispsn);
}
else
*cardsn = xtryasprintf ("cardno:%s", keyinfo->serialno);
if (!*cardsn)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
xfree (pkbuf);
gcry_sexp_release (s_pk);
return err;
}
/* Let's avoid blanks in the comment. */
for (p=*cardsn; *p; p++)
if (spacep (p))
*p = '_';
}
xfree (pkbuf);
*r_pk = s_pk;
return 0;
}
static struct card_key_info_s *
get_ssh_keyinfo_on_cards (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
struct card_key_info_s *keyinfo_on_cards = NULL;
gpg_error_t err;
char *serialno;
if (opt.disable_daemon[DAEMON_SCD])
return NULL;
/* Scan for new device(s). */
err = agent_card_serialno (ctrl, &serialno, NULL);
if (err)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("error getting list of cards: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (err));
return NULL;
}
xfree (serialno);
err = agent_card_keyinfo (ctrl, NULL, GCRY_PK_USAGE_AUTH, &keyinfo_on_cards);
if (err)
return NULL;
return keyinfo_on_cards;
}
/* Append (KEY,CARDSN,LNR,ORDER) to ARRAY. The array must initially
* be passed as a cleared struct. ARRAY takes ownership of KEY and
* CARDSN. */
static gpg_error_t
add_to_key_array (struct key_collection_s *array, gcry_sexp_t key,
char *cardsn, int order)
{
if (array->nitems == array->allocated)
{
struct key_collection_item_s *newitems;
size_t newsize = ((array->allocated + 63)/64 + 1) * 64;
newitems = xtryreallocarray (array->items, array->allocated, newsize+1,
sizeof *newitems);
if (!newitems)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
array->allocated = newsize;
array->items = newitems;
}
array->items[array->nitems].key = key;
array->items[array->nitems].cardsn = cardsn;
array->items[array->nitems].order = order;
array->nitems++;
return 0;
}
/* Release the content of ARRAY. */
static void
free_key_array (struct key_collection_s *array)
{
if (array && array->items)
{
unsigned int n;
for (n = 0; n < array->nitems; n++)
{
gcry_sexp_release (array->items[n].key);
xfree (array->items[n].cardsn);
}
xfree (array->items);
}
}
/* Helper for the qsort in ssh_send_available_keys. */
static int
compare_key_collection_items (const void *arg_a, const void *arg_b)
{
const struct key_collection_item_s *a
= (const struct key_collection_item_s *)arg_a;
const struct key_collection_item_s *b
= (const struct key_collection_item_s *)arg_b;
int res;
res = a->order - b->order;
/* If we are comparing two cards we sort by serial number. */
if (!res && a->order == 1)
res = strcmp (a->cardsn?a->cardsn:"", b->cardsn?b->cardsn:"");
return res;
}
static gpg_error_t
ssh_send_available_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t key_blobs, u32 *r_key_counter)
{
gpg_error_t err;
char *dirname;
gnupg_dir_t dir = NULL;
gnupg_dirent_t dir_entry;
char hexgrip[41];
ssh_control_file_t cf = NULL;
struct card_key_info_s *keyinfo_on_cards, *l;
char *cardsn;
gcry_sexp_t key_public = NULL;
int count;
struct key_collection_s keyarray = { NULL };
err = open_control_file (&cf, 0);
if (err)
return err;
/* First, get information keys available on cards on-line. */
keyinfo_on_cards = get_ssh_keyinfo_on_cards (ctrl);
/* Look at all the registered and non-disabled keys, in sshcontrol. */
/* And, look at all keys with "Use-for-ssh:" flag. */
dirname = make_filename_try (gnupg_homedir (),
GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR, NULL);
if (!dirname)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
agent_card_free_keyinfo (keyinfo_on_cards);
return err;
}
dir = gnupg_opendir (dirname);
if (!dir)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
xfree (dirname);
agent_card_free_keyinfo (keyinfo_on_cards);
return err;
}
xfree (dirname);
while ( (dir_entry = gnupg_readdir (dir)) )
{
struct card_key_info_s *l_prev = NULL;
int disabled, is_ssh, lnr, order;
unsigned char grip[20];
cardsn = NULL;
if (strlen (dir_entry->d_name) != 44
|| strcmp (dir_entry->d_name + 40, ".key"))
continue;
strncpy (hexgrip, dir_entry->d_name, 40);
hexgrip[40] = 0;
if ( hex2bin (hexgrip, grip, 20) < 0 )
continue; /* Bad hex string. */
/* Check if it's a key on card. */
for (l = keyinfo_on_cards; l; l = l->next)
if (!memcmp (l->keygrip, hexgrip, 40))
break;
else
l_prev = l;
/* Check if it's listed in "ssh_control" file. */
disabled = is_ssh = 0;
err = search_control_file (cf, hexgrip, &disabled, NULL, NULL, &lnr);
if (!err)
{
if (!disabled)
{
is_ssh = 1;
}
}
else if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF)
break;
/* Clamp LNR value and set the ordinal.
* Current use of ordinals:
- * 1..99999 - inserted cards (right now only 1)
+ * 1..999 - low value Use-for-ssh.
+ * 1000..99999 - inserted cards (right now only 1000)
* 100000..199999 - listed in sshcontrol
* 200000..299999 - order taken from Use-for-ssh
*/
if (is_ssh)
{
if (lnr < 1)
lnr = 0;
else if (lnr > 99999)
lnr = 99999;
order = lnr + 100000;
}
if (l)
{
err = card_key_available (ctrl, l, &key_public, &cardsn);
/* Remove the entry from the list of KEYINFO_ON_CARD */
if (l_prev)
l_prev->next = l->next;
else
keyinfo_on_cards = l->next;
xfree (l->serialno);
xfree (l->idstr);
xfree (l->usage);
xfree (l);
l = NULL;
/* If we want to allow that the user to change the sorting
* order of card keys (which are sorted by their s/n), we
* would need to get the use-for-ssh: value from the stub
* file and set an appropriate ordinal. */
- order = 1;
+ order = 1000;
}
else if (is_ssh)
err = agent_public_key_from_file (ctrl, grip, &key_public);
else /* Examine the file if it's suitable for SSH. */
{
err = agent_ssh_key_from_file (ctrl, grip, &key_public, &order);
- if (order < 0 || err)
+ if (err)
order = 0;
+ else if (order < 0)
+ {
+ order = -order;
+ if (order > 999)
+ order = 999;
+ }
else if (order > 99999)
- order = 99999;
- order += 200000;
+ order = 299999;
+ else
+ order += 200000;
}
if (err)
{
/* Clear ERR, skipping the key in question. */
err = 0;
continue;
}
err = add_to_key_array (&keyarray, key_public, cardsn, order);
if (err)
{
gcry_sexp_release (key_public);
xfree (cardsn);
goto leave;
}
}
gnupg_closedir (dir);
ssh_close_control_file (cf);
/* Lastly, handle remaining keys which don't have the stub files. */
for (l = keyinfo_on_cards, count=0; l; l = l->next, count++)
{
cardsn = NULL;
if (card_key_available (ctrl, l, &key_public, &cardsn))
continue;
err = add_to_key_array (&keyarray, key_public, cardsn, 300000+count);
if (err)
{
gcry_sexp_release (key_public);
xfree (cardsn);
goto leave;
}
}
/* Sort the array. */
qsort (keyarray.items, keyarray.nitems, sizeof *keyarray.items,
compare_key_collection_items);
if (opt.debug)
for (count=0; count < keyarray.nitems; count++)
log_debug ("sshkeys[%d]: order=%d, pubkey=%p sn=%s\n",
count, keyarray.items[count].order,
keyarray.items[count].key, keyarray.items[count].cardsn);
/* And print the keys. */
for (count=0; count < keyarray.nitems; count++)
{
err = ssh_send_key_public (key_blobs, keyarray.items[count].key,
keyarray.items[count].cardsn);
if (err)
{
if (opt.debug)
gcry_log_debugsxp ("pubkey", keyarray.items[count].key);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_CURVE
|| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_INV_CURVE)
{
/* For example a Brainpool curve or a curve we don't
* support at all but a smartcard lists that curve.
* We ignore them. */
}
else
goto leave;
}
}
*r_key_counter = count;
leave:
agent_card_free_keyinfo (keyinfo_on_cards);
free_key_array (&keyarray);
return err;
}
/*
Request handler. Each handler is provided with a CTRL context, a
REQUEST object and a RESPONSE object. The actual request is to be
read from REQUEST, the response needs to be written to RESPONSE.
*/
/* Handler for the "request_identities" command. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_handler_request_identities (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request, estream_t response)
{
u32 key_counter;
estream_t key_blobs;
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
gpg_error_t ret_err;
(void)request;
/* Prepare buffer stream. */
key_counter = 0;
key_blobs = es_fopenmem (0, "r+b");
if (! key_blobs)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
err = ssh_send_available_keys (ctrl, key_blobs, &key_counter);
if (!err)
{
ret = es_fseek (key_blobs, 0, SEEK_SET);
if (ret)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
}
out:
/* Send response. */
if (!err)
{
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_IDENTITIES_ANSWER);
if (!ret_err)
ret_err = stream_write_uint32 (response, key_counter);
if (!ret_err)
ret_err = stream_copy (response, key_blobs);
}
else
{
log_error ("ssh request identities failed: %s <%s>\n",
gpg_strerror (err), gpg_strsource (err));
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
}
es_fclose (key_blobs);
return ret_err;
}
/* This function hashes the data contained in DATA of size DATA_N
according to the message digest algorithm specified by MD_ALGORITHM
and writes the message digest to HASH, which needs to large enough
for the digest. */
static gpg_error_t
data_hash (unsigned char *data, size_t data_n,
int md_algorithm, unsigned char *hash)
{
gcry_md_hash_buffer (md_algorithm, hash, data, data_n);
return 0;
}
/* This function signs the data described by CTRL. If HASH is not
NULL, (HASH,HASHLEN) overrides the hash stored in CTRL. This is to
allow the use of signature algorithms that implement the hashing
internally (e.g. Ed25519). On success the created signature is
stored in ssh format at R_SIG and it's size at R_SIGLEN; the caller
must use es_free to release this memory. */
static gpg_error_t
data_sign (ctrl_t ctrl, ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
const void *hash, size_t hashlen,
unsigned char **r_sig, size_t *r_siglen)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t signature_sexp = NULL;
estream_t stream = NULL;
void *blob = NULL;
size_t bloblen;
char hexgrip[40+1];
*r_sig = NULL;
*r_siglen = 0;
/* Quick check to see whether we have a valid keygrip and convert it
to hex. */
if (!ctrl->have_keygrip)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
goto out;
}
bin2hex (ctrl->keygrip, 20, hexgrip);
/* Ask for confirmation if needed. */
if (confirm_flag_from_sshcontrol (hexgrip))
{
gcry_sexp_t key;
char *fpr, *prompt;
char *comment = NULL;
err = agent_raw_key_from_file (ctrl, ctrl->keygrip, &key, NULL);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_get_fingerprint_string (key, opt.ssh_fingerprint_digest, &fpr);
if (!err)
{
gcry_sexp_t tmpsxp = gcry_sexp_find_token (key, "comment", 0);
if (tmpsxp)
comment = gcry_sexp_nth_string (tmpsxp, 1);
gcry_sexp_release (tmpsxp);
}
gcry_sexp_release (key);
if (err)
goto out;
prompt = xtryasprintf (L_("An ssh process requested the use of key%%0A"
" %s%%0A"
" (%s)%%0A"
"Do you want to allow this?"),
fpr, comment? comment:"");
xfree (fpr);
gcry_free (comment);
err = agent_get_confirmation (ctrl, prompt, L_("Allow"), L_("Deny"), 0);
xfree (prompt);
if (err)
goto out;
}
/* Create signature. */
ctrl->use_auth_call = 1;
err = agent_pksign_do (ctrl, NULL,
L_("Please enter the passphrase "
"for the ssh key%%0A %F%%0A (%c)"),
&signature_sexp,
CACHE_MODE_SSH, ttl_from_sshcontrol,
hash, hashlen);
ctrl->use_auth_call = 0;
if (err)
goto out;
stream = es_fopenmem (0, "r+b");
if (!stream)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
err = stream_write_cstring (stream, spec->ssh_identifier);
if (err)
goto out;
err = spec->signature_encoder (spec, stream, signature_sexp);
if (err)
goto out;
err = es_fclose_snatch (stream, &blob, &bloblen);
if (err)
goto out;
stream = NULL;
*r_sig = blob; blob = NULL;
*r_siglen = bloblen;
out:
xfree (blob);
es_fclose (stream);
gcry_sexp_release (signature_sexp);
return err;
}
/* Handler for the "sign_request" command. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_handler_sign_request (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t request, estream_t response)
{
gcry_sexp_t key = NULL;
ssh_key_type_spec_t spec;
unsigned char hash[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
unsigned int hash_n;
unsigned char key_grip[20];
unsigned char *key_blob = NULL;
u32 key_blob_size;
unsigned char *data = NULL;
unsigned char *sig = NULL;
size_t sig_n;
u32 data_size;
gpg_error_t err;
gpg_error_t ret_err;
int hash_algo;
/* Receive key. */
err = stream_read_string (request, 0, &key_blob, &key_blob_size);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_read_key_public_from_blob (key_blob, key_blob_size, &key, &spec);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Receive data to sign. */
err = stream_read_string (request, 0, &data, &data_size);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Flag processing. */
{
u32 flags;
err = stream_read_uint32 (request, &flags);
if (err)
goto out;
if (spec.algo == GCRY_PK_RSA)
{
if ((flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512))
{
flags &= ~SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512;
spec.ssh_identifier = "rsa-sha2-512";
spec.hash_algo = GCRY_MD_SHA512;
}
if ((flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256))
{
/* Note: We prefer SHA256 over SHA512. */
flags &= ~SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256;
spec.ssh_identifier = "rsa-sha2-256";
spec.hash_algo = GCRY_MD_SHA256;
}
}
/* Some flag is present that we do not know about. Note that
* processed or known flags have been cleared at this point. */
if (flags)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_OPTION);
goto out;
}
}
hash_algo = spec.hash_algo;
if (!hash_algo)
hash_algo = GCRY_MD_SHA1; /* Use the default. */
ctrl->digest.algo = hash_algo;
xfree (ctrl->digest.data);
ctrl->digest.data = NULL;
ctrl->digest.is_pss = 0;
if ((spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_USE_PKCS1V2))
ctrl->digest.raw_value = 0;
else
ctrl->digest.raw_value = 1;
/* Calculate key grip. */
err = ssh_key_grip (key, key_grip);
if (err)
goto out;
ctrl->have_keygrip = 1;
memcpy (ctrl->keygrip, key_grip, 20);
/* Hash data unless we use EdDSA. */
if ((spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA))
{
ctrl->digest.valuelen = 0;
}
else
{
hash_n = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo);
if (!hash_n)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
goto out;
}
err = data_hash (data, data_size, hash_algo, hash);
if (err)
goto out;
memcpy (ctrl->digest.value, hash, hash_n);
ctrl->digest.valuelen = hash_n;
}
/* Sign data. */
if ((spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_IS_EdDSA))
err = data_sign (ctrl, &spec, data, data_size, &sig, &sig_n);
else
err = data_sign (ctrl, &spec, NULL, 0, &sig, &sig_n);
out:
/* Done. */
if (!err)
{
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SIGN_RESPONSE);
if (ret_err)
goto leave;
ret_err = stream_write_string (response, sig, sig_n);
if (ret_err)
goto leave;
}
else
{
log_error ("ssh sign request failed: %s <%s>\n",
gpg_strerror (err), gpg_strsource (err));
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
if (ret_err)
goto leave;
}
leave:
gcry_sexp_release (key);
xfree (key_blob);
xfree (data);
es_free (sig);
return ret_err;
}
/* This function extracts the comment contained in the key
s-expression KEY and stores a copy in COMMENT. Returns usual error
code. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_key_extract_comment (gcry_sexp_t key, char **r_comment)
{
gcry_sexp_t comment_list;
*r_comment = NULL;
comment_list = gcry_sexp_find_token (key, "comment", 0);
if (!comment_list)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
*r_comment = gcry_sexp_nth_string (comment_list, 1);
gcry_sexp_release (comment_list);
if (!*r_comment)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
return 0;
}
/* This function converts the key contained in the S-Expression KEY
into a buffer, which is protected by the passphrase PASSPHRASE.
If PASSPHRASE is the empty passphrase, the key is not protected.
Returns usual error code. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_key_to_protected_buffer (gcry_sexp_t key, const char *passphrase,
unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buffer_n)
{
unsigned char *buffer_new;
unsigned int buffer_new_n;
gpg_error_t err;
buffer_new_n = gcry_sexp_sprint (key, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0);
buffer_new = xtrymalloc_secure (buffer_new_n);
if (! buffer_new)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
buffer_new_n = gcry_sexp_sprint (key, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON,
buffer_new, buffer_new_n);
if (*passphrase)
err = agent_protect (buffer_new, passphrase, buffer, buffer_n, 0);
else
{
/* The key derivation function does not support zero length
* strings. Store key unprotected if the user wishes so. */
*buffer = buffer_new;
*buffer_n = buffer_new_n;
buffer_new = NULL;
err = 0;
}
out:
xfree (buffer_new);
return err;
}
/* Callback function to compare the first entered PIN with the one
currently being entered. */
static gpg_error_t
reenter_compare_cb (struct pin_entry_info_s *pi)
{
const char *pin1 = pi->check_cb_arg;
if (!strcmp (pin1, pi->pin))
return 0; /* okay */
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
}
/* Store the ssh KEY into our local key storage and protect it after
asking for a passphrase. Cache that passphrase. TTL is the
maximum caching time for that key. If the key already exists in
our key storage, don't do anything. When entering a key also add
an entry to the sshcontrol file. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_identity_register (ctrl_t ctrl, ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec,
gcry_sexp_t key, int ttl, int confirm)
{
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char key_grip_raw[20];
char key_grip[41];
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
size_t buffer_n;
char *description = NULL;
const char *description2 = L_("Please re-enter this passphrase");
char *comment = NULL;
char *key_fpr = NULL;
const char *initial_errtext = NULL;
struct pin_entry_info_s *pi = NULL;
struct pin_entry_info_s *pi2 = NULL;
err = ssh_key_grip (key, key_grip_raw);
if (err)
goto out;
bin2hex (key_grip_raw, 20, key_grip);
err = ssh_get_fingerprint_string (key, opt.ssh_fingerprint_digest, &key_fpr);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Check whether the key is already in our key storage. Don't do
anything then besides (re-)adding it to sshcontrol. */
if ( !agent_key_available (key_grip_raw) )
goto key_exists; /* Yes, key is available. */
err = ssh_key_extract_comment (key, &comment);
if (err)
goto out;
if ( asprintf (&description,
L_("Please enter a passphrase to protect"
" the received secret key%%0A"
" %s%%0A"
" %s%%0A"
"within gpg-agent's key storage"),
key_fpr, comment ? comment : "") < 0)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
pi = gcry_calloc_secure (1, sizeof (*pi) + MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN + 1);
if (!pi)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
pi2 = gcry_calloc_secure (1, sizeof (*pi2) + MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN + 1);
if (!pi2)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
pi->max_length = MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN + 1;
pi->max_tries = 1;
pi->with_repeat = 1;
pi2->max_length = MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN + 1;
pi2->max_tries = 1;
pi2->check_cb = reenter_compare_cb;
pi2->check_cb_arg = pi->pin;
next_try:
err = agent_askpin (ctrl, description, NULL, initial_errtext, pi, NULL, 0);
initial_errtext = NULL;
if (err)
goto out;
/* Unless the passphrase is empty or the pinentry told us that
it already did the repetition check, ask to confirm it. */
if (*pi->pin && !pi->repeat_okay)
{
err = agent_askpin (ctrl, description2, NULL, NULL, pi2, NULL, 0);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE)
{ /* The re-entered one did not match and the user did not
hit cancel. */
initial_errtext = L_("does not match - try again");
goto next_try;
}
}
err = ssh_key_to_protected_buffer (key, pi->pin, &buffer, &buffer_n);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Store this key to our key storage. We do not store a creation
* timestamp because we simply do not know. */
err = agent_write_private_key (key_grip_raw, buffer, buffer_n, 0,
NULL, NULL, 0);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Cache this passphrase. */
err = agent_put_cache (ctrl, key_grip, CACHE_MODE_SSH, pi->pin, ttl);
if (err)
goto out;
key_exists:
/* And add an entry to the sshcontrol file. */
err = add_control_entry (ctrl, spec, key_grip, key, ttl, confirm);
out:
if (pi2 && pi2->max_length)
wipememory (pi2->pin, pi2->max_length);
xfree (pi2);
if (pi && pi->max_length)
wipememory (pi->pin, pi->max_length);
xfree (pi);
xfree (buffer);
xfree (comment);
xfree (key_fpr);
xfree (description);
return err;
}
/* This function removes the key contained in the S-Expression KEY
from the local key storage, in case it exists there. Returns usual
error code. FIXME: this function is a stub. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_identity_drop (gcry_sexp_t key)
{
unsigned char key_grip[21] = { 0 };
gpg_error_t err;
err = ssh_key_grip (key, key_grip);
if (err)
goto out;
key_grip[sizeof (key_grip) - 1] = 0;
/* FIXME: What to do here - forgetting the passphrase or deleting
the key from key cache? */
out:
return err;
}
/* Handler for the "add_identity" command. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_handler_add_identity (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t request, estream_t response)
{
gpg_error_t ret_err;
ssh_key_type_spec_t spec;
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t key;
unsigned char b;
int confirm;
int ttl;
confirm = 0;
key = NULL;
ttl = 0;
/* FIXME? */
err = ssh_receive_key (request, &key, 1, 1, &spec);
if (err)
goto out;
while (1)
{
err = stream_read_byte (request, &b);
if (err)
{
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EOF)
err = 0;
break;
}
switch (b)
{
case SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
{
u32 n = 0;
err = stream_read_uint32 (request, &n);
if (! err)
ttl = n;
break;
}
case SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
{
confirm = 1;
break;
}
case SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN:
case SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION:
/* Not yet implemented. */
break;
default:
/* FIXME: log/bad? */
break;
}
}
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_identity_register (ctrl, &spec, key, ttl, confirm);
out:
gcry_sexp_release (key);
if (! err)
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
else
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
return ret_err;
}
/* Handler for the "remove_identity" command. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_handler_remove_identity (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request, estream_t response)
{
unsigned char *key_blob;
u32 key_blob_size;
gcry_sexp_t key;
gpg_error_t ret_err;
gpg_error_t err;
(void)ctrl;
/* Receive key. */
key_blob = NULL;
key = NULL;
err = stream_read_string (request, 0, &key_blob, &key_blob_size);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_read_key_public_from_blob (key_blob, key_blob_size, &key, NULL);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ssh_identity_drop (key);
out:
xfree (key_blob);
gcry_sexp_release (key);
if (! err)
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
else
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
return ret_err;
}
/* FIXME: stub function. Actually useful? */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_identities_remove_all (void)
{
gpg_error_t err;
err = 0;
/* FIXME: shall we remove _all_ cache entries or only those
registered through the ssh-agent protocol? */
return err;
}
/* Handler for the "remove_all_identities" command. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_handler_remove_all_identities (ctrl_t ctrl,
estream_t request, estream_t response)
{
gpg_error_t ret_err;
gpg_error_t err;
(void)ctrl;
(void)request;
err = ssh_identities_remove_all ();
if (! err)
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
else
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
return ret_err;
}
/* Lock agent? FIXME: stub function. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_lock (void)
{
gpg_error_t err;
/* FIXME */
log_error ("ssh-agent's lock command is not implemented\n");
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Unock agent? FIXME: stub function. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_unlock (void)
{
gpg_error_t err;
log_error ("ssh-agent's unlock command is not implemented\n");
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Handler for the "lock" command. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_handler_lock (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t request, estream_t response)
{
gpg_error_t ret_err;
gpg_error_t err;
(void)ctrl;
(void)request;
err = ssh_lock ();
if (! err)
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
else
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
return ret_err;
}
/* Handler for the "unlock" command. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_handler_unlock (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t request, estream_t response)
{
gpg_error_t ret_err;
gpg_error_t err;
(void)ctrl;
(void)request;
err = ssh_unlock ();
if (! err)
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
else
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
return ret_err;
}
/* Handler for the "extension" command. */
static gpg_error_t
ssh_handler_extension (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t request, estream_t response)
{
gpg_error_t ret_err;
gpg_error_t err;
char *exttype = NULL;
char *name = NULL;
char *value = NULL;
err = stream_read_cstring (request, &exttype);
if (err)
goto leave;
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("ssh-agent extension '%s' received\n", exttype);
if (!strcmp (exttype, "ssh-env@gnupg.org"))
{
for (;;)
{
xfree (name); name = NULL;
err = stream_read_cstring (request, &name);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EOF)
break; /* ready. */
if (err)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_error ("error reading ssh-agent env name\n");
goto leave;
}
xfree (value); value = NULL;
err = stream_read_cstring (request, &value);
if (err)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_error ("error reading ssh-agent env value\n");
goto leave;
}
if (opt.debug)
log_debug ("ssh-agent env '%s'='%s'\n", name, value);
err = session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, name,
*value? value : NULL);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error setting ssh-agent env value: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
}
err = 0;
}
else if (!strcmp (exttype, "ssh-envnames@gnupg.org"))
{
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
if (!ret_err)
ret_err = stream_write_cstring
(response, session_env_list_stdenvnames (NULL, NULL));
goto finalleave;
}
else if (!strcmp (exttype, "session-bind@openssh.org"))
{
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
log_info ("ssh-agent extension '%s' ignored - returning success anyway\n",
exttype);
goto finalleave;
}
else
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("ssh-agent extension '%s' not supported\n", exttype);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
}
leave:
if (!err)
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
else
ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
finalleave:
xfree (exttype);
xfree (name);
xfree (value);
return ret_err;
}
/* Return the request specification for the request identified by TYPE
or NULL in case the requested request specification could not be
found. */
static const ssh_request_spec_t *
request_spec_lookup (int type)
{
const ssh_request_spec_t *spec;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < DIM (request_specs); i++)
if (request_specs[i].type == type)
break;
if (i == DIM (request_specs))
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("ssh request %u is not supported\n", type);
spec = NULL;
}
else
spec = request_specs + i;
return spec;
}
/* Process a single request. The request is read from and the
response is written to STREAM_SOCK. Uses CTRL as context. Returns
zero in case of success, non zero in case of failure. */
static int
ssh_request_process (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t stream_sock)
{
const ssh_request_spec_t *spec;
estream_t response = NULL;
estream_t request = NULL;
unsigned char request_type;
gpg_error_t err;
int send_err = 0;
int ret;
unsigned char *request_data = NULL;
u32 request_data_size;
u32 response_size;
/* Create memory streams for request/response data. The entire
request will be stored in secure memory, since it might contain
secret key material. The response does not have to be stored in
secure memory, since we never give out secret keys.
Note: we only have little secure memory, but there is NO
possibility of DoS here; only trusted clients are allowed to
connect to the agent. What could happen is that the agent
returns out-of-secure-memory errors on requests in case the
agent's owner floods his own agent with many large messages.
-moritz */
/* Retrieve request. */
err = stream_read_string (stream_sock, 1, &request_data, &request_data_size);
if (err)
goto out;
if (opt.verbose > 1)
log_info ("received ssh request of length %u\n",
(unsigned int)request_data_size);
if (! request_data_size)
{
send_err = 1;
goto out;
/* Broken request; FIXME. */
}
request_type = request_data[0];
spec = request_spec_lookup (request_type);
if (! spec)
{
send_err = 1;
goto out;
/* Unknown request; FIXME. */
}
if (spec->secret_input)
request = es_mopen (NULL, 0, 0, 1, realloc_secure, gcry_free, "r+b");
else
request = es_mopen (NULL, 0, 0, 1, gcry_realloc, gcry_free, "r+b");
if (! request)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
ret = es_setvbuf (request, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
if (ret)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
err = stream_write_data (request, request_data + 1, request_data_size - 1);
if (err)
goto out;
es_rewind (request);
response = es_fopenmem (0, "r+b");
if (! response)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto out;
}
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("ssh request handler for %s (%u) started\n",
spec->identifier, spec->type);
err = (*spec->handler) (ctrl, request, response);
if (opt.verbose)
{
if (err)
log_info ("ssh request handler for %s (%u) failed: %s\n",
spec->identifier, spec->type, gpg_strerror (err));
else
log_info ("ssh request handler for %s (%u) ready\n",
spec->identifier, spec->type);
}
if (err)
{
send_err = 1;
goto out;
}
response_size = es_ftell (response);
if (opt.verbose > 1)
log_info ("sending ssh response of length %u\n",
(unsigned int)response_size);
err = es_fseek (response, 0, SEEK_SET);
if (err)
{
send_err = 1;
goto out;
}
err = stream_write_uint32 (stream_sock, response_size);
if (err)
{
send_err = 1;
goto out;
}
err = stream_copy (stream_sock, response);
if (err)
goto out;
err = es_fflush (stream_sock);
if (err)
goto out;
out:
if (err && es_feof (stream_sock))
log_error ("error occurred while processing request: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
if (send_err)
{
if (opt.verbose > 1)
log_info ("sending ssh error response\n");
err = stream_write_uint32 (stream_sock, 1);
if (err)
goto leave;
err = stream_write_byte (stream_sock, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE);
if (err)
goto leave;
}
leave:
es_fclose (request);
es_fclose (response);
xfree (request_data);
return !!err;
}
/* Return the peer's pid. */
static void
get_client_info (gnupg_fd_t fd, struct peer_info_s *out)
{
pid_t client_pid = (pid_t)(-1);
int client_uid = -1;
#ifdef SO_PEERCRED
{
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKPEERCRED_PID
struct sockpeercred cr;
#else
struct ucred cr;
#endif
socklen_t cl = sizeof cr;
if (!getsockopt (FD2INT (fd), SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cr, &cl))
{
#if defined (HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKPEERCRED_PID) || defined (HAVE_STRUCT_UCRED_PID)
client_pid = cr.pid;
client_uid = (int)cr.uid;
#elif defined (HAVE_STRUCT_UCRED_CR_PID)
client_pid = cr.cr_pid;
client_uid = (int)cr.cr_uid;
#else
#error "Unknown SO_PEERCRED struct"
#endif
}
}
#elif defined (LOCAL_PEERPID)
{
socklen_t len = sizeof (pid_t);
getsockopt (FD2INT (fd), SOL_LOCAL, LOCAL_PEERPID, &client_pid, &len);
#if defined (LOCAL_PEERCRED)
{
struct xucred cr;
len = sizeof (struct xucred);
if (!getsockopt (FD2INT (fd), SOL_LOCAL, LOCAL_PEERCRED, &cr, &len))
client_uid = (int)cr.cr_uid;
}
#endif
}
#elif defined (LOCAL_PEEREID)
{
struct unpcbid unp;
socklen_t unpl = sizeof unp;
if (getsockopt (FD2INT (fd), 0, LOCAL_PEEREID, &unp, &unpl) != -1)
{
client_pid = unp.unp_pid;
client_uid = (int)unp.unp_euid;
}
}
#elif defined (HAVE_GETPEERUCRED)
{
ucred_t *ucred = NULL;
if (getpeerucred (FD2INT (fd), &ucred) != -1)
{
client_pid = ucred_getpid (ucred);
client_uid = (int)ucred_geteuid (ucred);
ucred_free (ucred);
}
}
#else
(void)fd;
#endif
out->pid = (client_pid == (pid_t)(-1)? 0 : (unsigned long)client_pid);
out->uid = client_uid;
}
/* Start serving client on STREAM. */
void
start_command_handler_ssh_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t stream)
{
gpg_error_t err;
int ret;
err = agent_copy_startup_env (ctrl);
if (err)
goto out;
/* We have to disable the estream buffering, because the estream
core doesn't know about secure memory. */
ret = es_setvbuf (stream, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
if (ret)
{
log_error ("failed to disable buffering on socket stream: %s\n",
strerror (errno));
goto out;
}
/* Main processing loop. */
while ( !ssh_request_process (ctrl, stream) )
{
/* Check whether we have reached EOF before trying to read
another request. */
int c;
c = es_fgetc (stream);
if (c == EOF)
break;
es_ungetc (c, stream);
}
/* Reset the daemon in case it has been used. */
agent_reset_daemon (ctrl);
out:
es_fclose (stream);
}
/* Start serving client on SOCK_CLIENT. */
void
start_command_handler_ssh (ctrl_t ctrl, gnupg_fd_t sock_client)
{
estream_t stream_sock;
struct peer_info_s peer_info;
es_syshd_t syshd;
syshd.type = ES_SYSHD_SOCK;
syshd.u.sock = sock_client;
get_client_info (sock_client, &peer_info);
ctrl->client_pid = peer_info.pid;
ctrl->client_uid = peer_info.uid;
/* Create stream from socket. */
stream_sock = es_sysopen (&syshd, "r+");
if (!stream_sock)
{
log_error (_("failed to create stream from socket: %s\n"),
strerror (errno));
return;
}
start_command_handler_ssh_stream (ctrl, stream_sock);
}
#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
/* Serve one ssh-agent request. This is used for the Putty support.
REQUEST is the mmapped memory which may be accessed up to a
length of MAXREQLEN. Returns 0 on success which also indicates
that a valid SSH response message is now in REQUEST. */
int
serve_mmapped_ssh_request (ctrl_t ctrl,
unsigned char *request, size_t maxreqlen)
{
gpg_error_t err;
int send_err = 0;
int valid_response = 0;
const ssh_request_spec_t *spec;
u32 msglen;
estream_t request_stream, response_stream;
if (agent_copy_startup_env (ctrl))
goto leave; /* Error setting up the environment. */
if (maxreqlen < 5)
goto leave; /* Caller error. */
msglen = uint32_construct (request[0], request[1], request[2], request[3]);
if (msglen < 1 || msglen > maxreqlen - 4)
{
log_error ("ssh message len (%u) out of range", (unsigned int)msglen);
goto leave;
}
spec = request_spec_lookup (request[4]);
if (!spec)
{
send_err = 1; /* Unknown request type. */
goto leave;
}
/* Create a stream object with the data part of the request. */
if (spec->secret_input)
request_stream = es_mopen (NULL, 0, 0, 1, realloc_secure, gcry_free, "r+");
else
request_stream = es_mopen (NULL, 0, 0, 1, gcry_realloc, gcry_free, "r+");
if (!request_stream)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
/* We have to disable the estream buffering, because the estream
core doesn't know about secure memory. */
if (es_setvbuf (request_stream, NULL, _IONBF, 0))
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
/* Copy the request to the stream but omit the request type. */
err = stream_write_data (request_stream, request + 5, msglen - 1);
if (err)
goto leave;
es_rewind (request_stream);
response_stream = es_fopenmem (0, "r+b");
if (!response_stream)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("ssh request handler for %s (%u) started\n",
spec->identifier, spec->type);
err = (*spec->handler) (ctrl, request_stream, response_stream);
if (opt.verbose)
{
if (err)
log_info ("ssh request handler for %s (%u) failed: %s\n",
spec->identifier, spec->type, gpg_strerror (err));
else
log_info ("ssh request handler for %s (%u) ready\n",
spec->identifier, spec->type);
}
es_fclose (request_stream);
request_stream = NULL;
if (err)
{
send_err = 1;
goto leave;
}
/* Put the response back into the mmapped buffer. */
{
void *response_data;
size_t response_size;
/* NB: In contrast to the request-stream, the response stream
includes the message type byte. */
if (es_fclose_snatch (response_stream, &response_data, &response_size))
{
log_error ("snatching ssh response failed: %s",
gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror ()));
send_err = 1; /* Ooops. */
goto leave;
}
if (opt.verbose > 1)
log_info ("sending ssh response of length %u\n",
(unsigned int)response_size);
if (response_size > maxreqlen - 4)
{
log_error ("invalid length of the ssh response: %s",
gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL));
es_free (response_data);
send_err = 1;
goto leave;
}
request[0] = response_size >> 24;
request[1] = response_size >> 16;
request[2] = response_size >> 8;
request[3] = response_size >> 0;
memcpy (request+4, response_data, response_size);
es_free (response_data);
valid_response = 1;
}
leave:
if (send_err)
{
request[0] = 0;
request[1] = 0;
request[2] = 0;
request[3] = 1;
request[4] = SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE;
valid_response = 1;
}
/* Reset the daemon in case it has been used. */
agent_reset_daemon (ctrl);
return valid_response? 0 : -1;
}
#endif /*HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
diff --git a/agent/keyformat.txt b/agent/keyformat.txt
index bbcaa7e2c..fbe999ca1 100644
--- a/agent/keyformat.txt
+++ b/agent/keyformat.txt
@@ -1,504 +1,510 @@
keyformat.txt emacs, please switch to -*- org -*- mode
-------------
Some notes on the format of the secret keys used with gpg-agent.
* Location of keys
The secret keys[1] are stored on a per file basis in a directory below
the ~/.gnupg home directory. This directory is named
private-keys-v1.d
and should have permissions 700.
The secret keys are stored in files with a name matching the
hexadecimal representation of the keygrip[2] and suffixed with ".key".
* Extended Private Key Format
** Overview
GnuPG 2.3+ uses a new format to store private keys that is both
more flexible and easier to read and edit by human beings. The new
format stores name,value-pairs using the common mail and http header
convention. Example (here indented with two spaces):
Description: Key to sign all GnuPG released tarballs.
The key is actually stored on a smart card.
Use-for-ssh: yes
OpenSSH-cert: long base64 encoded string wrapped so that this
key file can be easily edited with a standard editor.
Token: D2760001240102000005000011730000 OPENPGP.1 -
Token: FF020001008A77C1 PIV.9C -
Key: (shadowed-private-key
(rsa
(n #00AA1AD2A55FD8C8FDE9E1941772D9CC903FA43B268CB1B5A1BAFDC900
2961D8AEA153424DC851EF13B83AC64FBE365C59DC1BD3E83017C90D4365B4
83E02859FC13DB5842A00E969480DB96CE6F7D1C03600392B8E08EF0C01FC7
19F9F9086B25AD39B4F1C2A2DF3E2BE317110CFFF21D4A11455508FE407997
601260816C8422297C0637BB291C3A079B9CB38A92CE9E551F80AA0EBF4F0E
72C3F250461E4D31F23A7087857FC8438324A013634563D34EFDDCBF2EA80D
F9662C9CCD4BEF2522D8BDFED24CEF78DC6B309317407EAC576D889F88ADA0
8C4FFB480981FB68C5C6CA27503381D41018E6CDC52AAAE46B166BDC10637A
E186A02BA2497FDC5D1221#)
(e #00010001#)
(shadowed t1-v1
(#D2760001240102000005000011730000# OPENPGP.1)
)))
GnuPG 2.2 is also able to read and write keys using the new format
However, it only makes use of some of the values.
Keys in the extended format can be recognized by looking at the first
byte of the file. If it starts with a '(' it is a naked S-expression,
otherwise it is a key in extended format.
*** Names
A name must start with a letter and end with a colon. Valid
characters are all ASCII letters, numbers and the hyphen. Comparison
of names is done case insensitively. Names may be used several times
to represent an array of values. Note that the name "Key" is special
in that it is madandory must occur only once.
*** Values
Values are UTF-8 encoded strings. Values can be wrapped at any point,
and continued in the next line indicated by leading whitespace. A
continuation line with one leading space does not introduce a blank so
that the lines can be effectively concatenated. A blank line as part
of a continuation line encodes a newline.
*** Comments
Lines containing only whitespace, and lines starting with whitespace
followed by '#' are considered to be comments and are ignored.
** Well known names
*** Description
This is a human readable string describing the key.
*** Key
The name "Key" is special in that it is mandatory and must occur only
once. The associated value holds the actual S-expression with the
cryptographic key. The S-expression is formatted using the 'Advanced
Format' (GCRYSEXP_FMT_ADVANCED) that avoids non-printable characters
so that the file can be easily inspected and edited. See section
'Private Key Format' below for details.
*** Created
The UTC time the key was created in ISO compressed format
(yyyymmddThhmmss). This information can be used to re-create an
OpenPGP key.
*** Label
This is a short human readable description for the key which can be
used by the software to describe the key in a user interface. For
example as part of the description in a prompt for a PIN or
passphrase. It is often used instead of a comment element as present
in the S-expression of the "Key" item.
*** OpenSSH-cert
This takes a base64 encoded string wrapped so that this
key file can be easily edited with a standard editor. Several of such
items can be used.
*** Token
If such an item exists it overrides the info given by the "shadow"
parameter in the S-expression. Using this item makes it possible to
describe a key which is stored on several tokens and also makes it
easy to update this info using a standard editor. The syntax is
similar to the "shadow" parameter:
- Serialnumber of the token.
- Key reference from the token in full format (e.g. "OpenPGP.2").
- An optional fixed length of the PIN or "-".
- The human readable serial number of a card. This is usually what is
printed on the actual card. This value is taken directly from the
card but when asking to insert a card it is useful to have this
value available. GnuPG takes care of creating and possibly updating
this entry. This is percent-plus-escaped.
*** Use-for-ssh
If given and the value is "yes" or "1" the key is allowed for use by
gpg-agent's ssh-agent implementation. This is thus the same as
putting the keygrip into the 'sshcontrol' file. Only one such item
should exist. If another non-zero value between 1 and 99999 is used,
this is taken to establish the order in which the keys are returned to
-ssh; lower numbers are returned first.
+ssh; lower numbers are returned first. If a negative value is used
+this overrides currently active (inserted) cards and thus allows to
+prefer on-disk keys over inserted cards. A value of -1 has the
+highest priority; values are capped at -999 and have a lower priority
+but still above the positive values, inserted cards or the order in
+sshcontrol.
+
*** Use-for-p11
If given and the value is "yes" or "1" the key is allowed for use by
GnuPG's PKCS#11 interface (Scute). Note that Scute needs to be
configured to use this optimization.
*** Remote-list
Allow to list the key with the KEYINFO command from a remote machine
via the extra socket. A boolean value is expected; the default is
"no". Note that KEYINFO will anyway provide information if the
keygrip is specified.
*** Confirm
If given and the value is "yes", a user will be asked confirmation by
a dialog window when the key is about to be used for
PKSIGN/PKAUTH/PKDECRYPT operation. If the value is "restricted", it
is only asked for the access through extra/browser socket.
*** Prompt
This field is for card key. If given and the value is "yes"
(default), a user will be prompted about insertion of the card by a
dialog window when card is not available. When the value is "no", a
card operation is refused with GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_SECKEY error.
* Private Key Format
** Unprotected Private Key Format
The content of the file is an S-Expression like the ones used with
Libgcrypt. Here is an example of an unprotected file:
(private-key
(rsa
(n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#)
(e #010001#)
(d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#)
(p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#)
(q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#)
(u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#)
)
(created-at timestamp)
(uri http://foo.bar x-foo:whatever_you_want)
(comment whatever)
)
"comment", "created-at" and "uri" are optional. "comment" is
currently used to keep track of ssh key comments. "created-at" is used
to keep track of the creation time stamp used with OpenPGP keys; it is
optional but required for some operations to calculate the fingerprint
of the key. This timestamp should be a string with the number of
seconds since Epoch or an ISO time string (yyyymmddThhmmss).
** Protected Private Key Format
A protected key is like this:
(protected-private-key
(rsa
(n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#)
(e #010001#)
(protected mode (parms) encrypted_octet_string)
(protected-at <isotimestamp>)
)
(uri http://foo.bar x-foo:whatever_you_want)
(comment whatever)
)
In this scheme the encrypted_octet_string is encrypted according to
the algorithm described after the keyword protected; most protection
algorithms need some parameters, which are given in a list before the
encrypted_octet_string. The result of the decryption process is a
list of the secret key parameters. The protected-at expression is
optional; the isotimestamp is 15 bytes long (e.g. "19610711T172000").
The currently defined protection modes are:
*** openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc
This describes an algorithm using AES in CBC mode for
encryption, SHA-1 for integrity protection and the String to Key
algorithm 3 from OpenPGP (rfc4880).
Example:
(protected openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc
((sha1 16byte_salt no_of_iterations) 16byte_iv)
encrypted_octet_string
)
The encrypted_octet string should yield this S-Exp (in canonical
representation) after decryption:
(
(
(d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#)
(p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#)
(q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#)
(u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#)
)
(hash sha1 #...[hashvalue]...#)
)
For padding reasons, random bytes are appended to this list - they can
easily be stripped by looking for the end of the list.
The hash is calculated on the concatenation of the public key and
secret key parameter lists: i.e. it is required to hash the
concatenation of these 6 canonical encoded lists for RSA, including
the parenthesis, the algorithm keyword and (if used) the protected-at
list.
(rsa
(n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#)
(e #010001#)
(d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#)
(p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#)
(q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#)
(u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#)
(protected-at "18950523T000000")
)
After decryption the hash must be recalculated and compared against
the stored one - If they don't match the integrity of the key is not
given.
*** openpgp-s2k3-ocb-aes
This describes an algorithm using AES-128 in OCB mode, a nonce
of 96 bit, a taglen of 128 bit, and the String to Key algorithm 3
from OpenPGP (rfc4880).
Example:
(protected openpgp-s2k3-ocb-aes
((sha1 16byte_salt no_of_iterations) 12byte_nonce)
encrypted_octet_string
)
The encrypted_octet string should yield this S-Exp (in canonical
representation) after decryption:
(
(
(d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#)
(p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#)
(q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#)
(u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#)
)
)
For padding reasons, random bytes may be appended to this list -
they can easily be stripped by looking for the end of the list.
The associated data required for this protection mode is the list
forming the public key parameters. For the above example this is
is this canonical encoded S-expression:
(rsa
(n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#)
(e #010001#)
(protected-at "18950523T000000")
)
*** openpgp-native
This is a wrapper around the OpenPGP Private Key Transport format
which resembles the standard OpenPGP format and allows the use of an
existing key without re-encrypting to the default protection format.
Example:
(protected openpgp-native
(openpgp-private-key
(version V)
(algo PUBKEYALGO)
(skey _ P1 _ P2 _ P3 ... e PN)
(csum n)
(protection PROTTYPE PROTALGO IV S2KMODE S2KHASH S2KSALT S2KCOUNT)))
Note that the public key parameters in SKEY are duplicated and
should be identical to their copies in the standard parameter
elements. Here is an example of an entire protected private key
using this format:
(protected-private-key
(rsa
(n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#)
(e #010001#)
(protected openpgp-native
(openpgp-private-key
(version 4)
(algo rsa)
(skey _ #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#
_ #010001#
e #.........................#)
(protection sha1 aes #aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899#
3 sha1 #2596f93e85f41e53# 3:190))))
(uri http://foo.bar x-foo:whatever_you_want)
(comment whatever))
** Shadowed Private Key Format
To keep track of keys stored on IC cards we use a third format for
private kyes which are called shadow keys as they are only a reference
to keys stored on a token:
(shadowed-private-key
(rsa
(n #00e0ce9..[some bytes not shown]..51#)
(e #010001#)
(shadowed protocol (info))
)
(uri http://foo.bar x-foo:whatever_you_want)
(comment whatever)
)
The currently used protocols are "t1-v1" (token info version 1) and
"tpm2-v1" (TPM format key information). The second list with the
information has this layout for "t1-v1":
(card_serial_number id_string_of_key fixed_pin_length)
FIXED_PIN_LENGTH is optional. It can be used to store the length of
the PIN; a value of 0 indicates that this information is not
available. The rationale for this field is that some pinpad equipped
readers don't allow passing a variable length PIN.
This is the (info) layout for "tpm2-v1":
(parent tpm_private_string tpm_public_string)
Although this precise format is encapsulated inside the tpm2daemon
itself and nothing in gpg ever uses this.
More items may be added to the list.
** OpenPGP Private Key Transfer Format
This format is used to transfer keys between gpg and gpg-agent.
(openpgp-private-key
(version V)
(algo PUBKEYALGO)
(curve CURVENAME)
(skey _ P1 _ P2 _ P3 ... e PN)
(csum n)
(protection PROTTYPE PROTALGO IV S2KMODE S2KHASH S2KSALT S2KCOUNT))
* V is the packet version number (3 or 4).
* PUBKEYALGO is a Libgcrypt algo name
* CURVENAME is the name of the curve - only used with ECC.
* P1 .. PN are the parameters; the public parameters are never encrypted
the secrect key parameters are encrypted if the "protection" list is
given. To make this more explicit each parameter is preceded by a
flag "_" for cleartext or "e" for encrypted text.
* CSUM is the deprecated 16 bit checksum as defined by OpenPGP. This
is an optional element.
* If PROTTYPE is "sha1" the new style SHA1 checksum is used if it is "sum"
the old 16 bit checksum (above) is used and if it is "none" no
protection at all is used.
* PROTALGO is a Libgcrypt style cipher algorithm name
* IV is the initialization verctor.
* S2KMODE is the value from RFC-4880.
* S2KHASH is a libgcrypt style hash algorithm identifier.
* S2KSALT is the 8 byte salt
* S2KCOUNT is the count value from RFC-4880.
** Persistent Passphrase Format
Note: That this has not yet been implemented.
To allow persistent storage of cached passphrases we use a scheme
similar to the private-key storage format. This is a master
passphrase format where each file may protect several secrets under
one master passphrase. It is possible to have several of those files
each protected by a dedicated master passphrase. Clear text keywords
allow listing the available protected passphrases.
The name of the files with these protected secrets have this form:
pw-<string>.dat. STRING may be an arbitrary string, as a default name
for the passphrase storage the name "pw-default.dat" is suggested.
(protected-shared-secret
((desc descriptive_text)
(key [key_1] (keyword_1 keyword_2 keyword_n))
(key [key_2] (keyword_21 keyword_22 keyword_2n))
(key [key_n] (keyword_n1 keyword_n2 keyword_nn))
(protected mode (parms) encrypted_octet_string)
(protected-at <isotimestamp>)
)
)
After decryption the encrypted_octet_string yields this S-expression:
(
(
(value key_1 value_1)
(value key_2 value_2)
(value key_n value_n)
)
(hash sha1 #...[hashvalue]...#)
)
The "descriptive_text" is displayed with the prompt to enter the
unprotection passphrase.
KEY_1 to KEY_N are unique identifiers for the shared secret, for
example an URI. In case this information should be kept confidential
as well, they may not appear in the unprotected part; however they are
mandatory in the encrypted_octet_string. The list of keywords is
optional. The order of the "key" lists and the order of the "value"
lists must match, that is the first "key"-list is associated with the
first "value" list in the encrypted_octet_string.
The protection mode etc. is identical to the protection mode as
described for the private key format.
list of the secret key parameters. The protected-at expression is
optional; the isotimestamp is 15 bytes long (e.g. "19610711T172000").
The "hash" in the encrypted_octet_string is calculated on the
concatenation of the key list and value lists: i.e it is required to
hash the concatenation of all these lists, including the
parenthesis and (if used) the protected-at list.
Example:
(protected-shared-secret
((desc "List of system passphrases")
(key "uid-1002" ("Knuth" "Donald Ervin Knuth"))
(key "uid-1001" ("Dijkstra" "Edsger Wybe Dijkstra"))
(key)
(protected mode (parms) encrypted_octet_string)
(protected-at "20100915T111722")
)
)
with "encrypted_octet_string" decoding to:
(
(
(value 4:1002 "signal flags at the lock")
(value 4:1001 "taocp")
(value 1:0 "premature optimization is the root of all evil")
)
(hash sha1 #0102030405060708091011121314151617181920#)
)
To compute the hash this S-expression (in canoncical format) was
hashed:
((desc "List of system passphrases")
(key "uid-1002" ("Knuth" "Donald Ervin Knuth"))
(key "uid-1001" ("Dijkstra" "Edsger Wybe Dijkstra"))
(key)
(value 4:1002 "signal flags at the lock")
(value 4:1001 "taocp")
(value 1:0 "premature optimization is the root of all evil")
(protected-at "20100915T111722")
)
* Notes
[1] I usually use the terms private and secret key exchangeable but prefer the
term secret key because it can be visually be better distinguished
from the term public key.
[2] The keygrip is a unique identifier for a key pair, it is
independent of any protocol, so that the same key can be used with
different protocols. PKCS-15 calls this a subjectKeyHash; it can be
calculated using Libgcrypt's gcry_pk_get_keygrip ().
[3] Even when canonical representation are required we will show the
S-expression here in a more readable representation.
diff --git a/doc/gpg-agent.texi b/doc/gpg-agent.texi
index c8080c7c2..902de56f4 100644
--- a/doc/gpg-agent.texi
+++ b/doc/gpg-agent.texi
@@ -1,1661 +1,1696 @@
@c Copyright (C) 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
@c This is part of the GnuPG manual.
@c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi.
@include defs.inc
@node Invoking GPG-AGENT
@chapter Invoking GPG-AGENT
@cindex GPG-AGENT command options
@cindex command options
@cindex options, GPG-AGENT command
@manpage gpg-agent.1
@ifset manverb
.B gpg-agent
\- Secret key management for GnuPG
@end ifset
@mansect synopsis
@ifset manverb
.B gpg-agent
.RB [ \-\-homedir
.IR dir ]
.RB [ \-\-options
.IR file ]
.RI [ options ]
.br
.B gpg-agent
.RB [ \-\-homedir
.IR dir ]
.RB [ \-\-options
.IR file ]
.RI [ options ]
.B \-\-server
.br
.B gpg-agent
.RB [ \-\-homedir
.IR dir ]
.RB [ \-\-options
.IR file ]
.RI [ options ]
.B \-\-daemon
.RI [ command_line ]
@end ifset
@mansect description
@command{gpg-agent} is a daemon to manage secret (private) keys
independently from any protocol. It is used as a backend for
@command{gpg} and @command{gpgsm} as well as for a couple of other
utilities.
The agent is automatically started on demand by @command{gpg},
@command{gpgsm}, @command{gpgconf}, or @command{gpg-connect-agent}.
Thus there is no reason to start it manually. In case you want to use
the included Secure Shell Agent you may start the agent using:
@c From dkg on gnupg-devel on 2016-04-21:
@c
@c Here's an attempt at writing a short description of the goals of an
@c isolated cryptographic agent:
@c
@c A cryptographic agent should control access to secret key material.
@c The agent permits use of the secret key material by a supplicant
@c without providing a copy of the secret key material to the supplicant.
@c
@c An isolated cryptographic agent separates the request for use of
@c secret key material from permission for use of secret key material.
@c That is, the system or process requesting use of the key (the
@c "supplicant") can be denied use of the key by the owner/operator of
@c the agent (the "owner"), which the supplicant has no control over.
@c
@c One way of enforcing this split is a per-key or per-session
@c passphrase, known only by the owner, which must be supplied to the
@c agent to permit the use of the secret key material. Another way is
@c with an out-of-band permission mechanism (e.g. a button or GUI
@c interface that the owner has access to, but the supplicant does not).
@c
@c The rationale for this separation is that it allows access to the
@c secret key to be tightly controlled and audited, and it doesn't permit
@c the supplicant to either copy the key or to override the owner's
@c intentions.
@example
gpg-connect-agent /bye
@end example
@noindent
If you want to manually terminate the currently-running agent, you can
safely do so with:
@example
gpgconf --kill gpg-agent
@end example
@noindent
@efindex GPG_TTY
You should always add the following lines to your @code{.bashrc} or
whatever initialization file is used for all shell invocations:
@smallexample
GPG_TTY=$(tty)
export GPG_TTY
@end smallexample
@noindent
It is important that this environment variable always reflects the
output of the @code{tty} command. For W32 systems this option is not
required.
Please make sure that a proper pinentry program has been installed
under the default filename (which is system dependent) or use the
option @option{pinentry-program} to specify the full name of that program.
It is often useful to install a symbolic link from the actual used
pinentry (e.g. @file{@value{BINDIR}/pinentry-gtk}) to the expected
one (e.g. @file{@value{BINDIR}/pinentry}).
@manpause
@noindent
@xref{Option Index}, for an index to @command{GPG-AGENT}'s commands and options.
@mancont
@menu
* Agent Commands:: List of all commands.
* Agent Options:: List of all options.
* Agent Configuration:: Configuration files.
* Agent Signals:: Use of some signals.
* Agent Examples:: Some usage examples.
* Agent Protocol:: The protocol the agent uses.
@end menu
@mansect commands
@node Agent Commands
@section Commands
Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that
only one command is allowed.
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item --version
@opindex version
Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you cannot
abbreviate this command.
@item --help
@itemx -h
@opindex help
Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command-line options.
Note that you cannot abbreviate this command.
@item --dump-options
@opindex dump-options
Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot
abbreviate this command.
@item --server
@opindex server
Run in server mode and wait for commands on the @code{stdin}. The
default mode is to create a socket and listen for commands there.
@item --daemon [@var{command line}]
@opindex daemon
Start the gpg-agent as a daemon; that is, detach it from the console
and run it in the background.
As an alternative you may create a new process as a child of
gpg-agent: @code{gpg-agent --daemon /bin/sh}. This way you get a new
shell with the environment setup properly; after you exit from this
shell, gpg-agent terminates within a few seconds.
@item --supervised
@opindex supervised
Run in the foreground, sending logs by default to stderr, and
listening on provided file descriptors, which must already be bound to
listening sockets. This option is deprecated and not supported on
Windows.
If in @file{common.conf} the option @option{no-autostart} is set, any
start attempts will be ignored.
In --supervised mode, different file descriptors can be provided for
use as different socket types (e.g. ssh, extra) as long as they are
identified in the environment variable @code{LISTEN_FDNAMES} (see
sd_listen_fds(3) on some Linux distributions for more information on
this convention).
@end table
@mansect options
@node Agent Options
@section Option Summary
Options may either be used on the command line or, after stripping off
the two leading dashes, in the configuration file.
@table @gnupgtabopt
@anchor{option --options}
@item --options @var{file}
@opindex options
Reads configuration from @var{file} instead of from the default
per-user configuration file. The default configuration file is named
@file{gpg-agent.conf} and expected in the @file{.gnupg} directory
directly below the home directory of the user. This option is ignored
if used in an options file.
@anchor{option --homedir}
@include opt-homedir.texi
@item -v
@itemx --verbose
@opindex verbose
Outputs additional information while running.
You can increase the verbosity by giving several
verbose commands to @command{gpg-agent}, such as @samp{-vv}.
@item -q
@itemx --quiet
@opindex quiet
Try to be as quiet as possible.
@item --batch
@opindex batch
Don't invoke a pinentry or do any other thing requiring human interaction.
@item --faked-system-time @var{epoch}
@opindex faked-system-time
This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back or
forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since the year
1970.
@item --debug-level @var{level}
@opindex debug-level
Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be
a numeric value or a keyword:
@table @code
@item none
No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of
the keyword.
@item basic
Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used
instead of the keyword.
@item advanced
More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used
instead of the keyword.
@item expert
Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used
instead of the keyword.
@item guru
All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be
used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is
only enabled if the keyword is used.
@end table
How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not
specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are
however carefully selected to best aid in debugging.
@item --debug @var{flags}
@opindex debug
Set debug flags. All flags are or-ed and @var{flags} may be given
in C syntax (e.g. 0x0042) or as a comma separated list of flag names.
To get a list of all supported flags the single word "help" can be
used. This option is only useful for debugging and the behavior may
change at any time without notice.
@item --debug-all
@opindex debug-all
Same as @code{--debug=0xffffffff}
@item --debug-wait @var{n}
@opindex debug-wait
When running in server mode, wait @var{n} seconds before entering the
actual processing loop and print the pid. This gives time to attach a
debugger.
@item --debug-quick-random
@opindex debug-quick-random
This option inhibits the use of the very secure random quality level
(Libgcrypt’s @code{GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM}) and degrades all request
down to standard random quality. It is only used for testing and
should not be used for any production quality keys. This option is
only effective when given on the command line.
On GNU/Linux, another way to quickly generate insecure keys is to use
@command{rngd} to fill the kernel's entropy pool with lower quality
random data. @command{rngd} is typically provided by the
@command{rng-tools} package. It can be run as follows: @samp{sudo
rngd -f -r /dev/urandom}.
@item --debug-pinentry
@opindex debug-pinentry
This option enables extra debug information pertaining to the
Pinentry. As of now it is only useful when used along with
@code{--debug 1024}.
@item --no-detach
@opindex no-detach
Don't detach the process from the console. This is mainly useful for
debugging.
@item --steal-socket
@opindex steal-socket
In @option{--daemon} mode, gpg-agent detects an already running
gpg-agent and does not allow to start a new instance. This option can
be used to override this check: the new gpg-agent process will try to
take over the communication sockets from the already running process
and start anyway. This option should in general not be used.
@item -s
@itemx --sh
@itemx -c
@itemx --csh
@opindex sh
@opindex csh
@efindex SHELL
Format the info output in daemon mode for use with the standard Bourne
shell or the C-shell respectively. The default is to guess it based on
the environment variable @code{SHELL} which is correct in almost all
cases.
@item --grab
@itemx --no-grab
@opindex grab
@opindex no-grab
Tell the pinentry to grab the keyboard and mouse. This option should
be used on X-Servers to avoid X-sniffing attacks. Any use of the
option @option{--grab} overrides an used option @option{--no-grab}.
The default is @option{--no-grab}.
@anchor{option --log-file}
@item --log-file @var{file}
@opindex log-file
@efindex HKCU\Software\GNU\GnuPG:DefaultLogFile
Append all logging output to @var{file}. This is very helpful in
seeing what the agent actually does. Use @file{socket://} to log to
socket. If neither a log file nor a log file descriptor has been set
on a Windows platform, the Registry entry
@code{HKCU\Software\GNU\GnuPG:DefaultLogFile}, if set, is used to
specify the logging output.
@anchor{option --no-allow-mark-trusted}
@item --no-allow-mark-trusted
@opindex no-allow-mark-trusted
Do not allow clients to mark keys as trusted, i.e. put them into the
@file{trustlist.txt} file. This makes it harder for users to inadvertently
accept Root-CA keys.
@anchor{option --no-user-trustlist}
@item --no-user-trustlist
@opindex no-user-trustlist
Entirely ignore the user trust list and consider only the global
trustlist (@file{@value{SYSCONFDIR}/trustlist.txt}). This
implies the @ref{option --no-allow-mark-trusted}.
@item --sys-trustlist-name @var{file}
@opindex sys-trustlist-name
Changes the default name for the global trustlist from "trustlist.txt"
to @var{file}. If @var{file} does not contain any slashes and does
not start with "~/" it is searched in the system configuration
directory (@file{@value{SYSCONFDIR}}).
@anchor{option --allow-preset-passphrase}
@item --allow-preset-passphrase
@opindex allow-preset-passphrase
This option allows the use of @command{gpg-preset-passphrase} to seed the
internal cache of @command{gpg-agent} with passphrases.
@anchor{option --no-allow-loopback-pinentry}
@item --no-allow-loopback-pinentry
@item --allow-loopback-pinentry
@opindex no-allow-loopback-pinentry
@opindex allow-loopback-pinentry
Disallow or allow clients to use the loopback pinentry features; see
the option @option{pinentry-mode} for details. Allow is the default.
The @option{--force} option of the Assuan command @command{DELETE_KEY}
is also controlled by this option: The option is ignored if a loopback
pinentry is disallowed.
@item --no-allow-external-cache
@opindex no-allow-external-cache
Tell Pinentry not to enable features which use an external cache for
passphrases.
Some desktop environments prefer to unlock all
credentials with one master password and may have installed a Pinentry
which employs an additional external cache to implement such a policy.
By using this option the Pinentry is advised not to make use of such a
cache and instead always ask the user for the requested passphrase.
@item --allow-emacs-pinentry
@opindex allow-emacs-pinentry
Tell Pinentry to allow features to divert the passphrase entry to a
running Emacs instance. How this is exactly handled depends on the
version of the used Pinentry.
@item --ignore-cache-for-signing
@opindex ignore-cache-for-signing
This option will let @command{gpg-agent} bypass the passphrase cache for all
signing operation. Note that there is also a per-session option to
control this behavior but this command line option takes precedence.
@item --default-cache-ttl @var{n}
@opindex default-cache-ttl
Set the time a cache entry is valid to @var{n} seconds. The default
is 600 seconds. Each time a cache entry is accessed, the entry's
timer is reset. To set an entry's maximum lifetime, use
@command{max-cache-ttl}. Note that a cached passphrase may not be
evicted immediately from memory if no client requests a cache
operation. This is due to an internal housekeeping function which is
only run every few seconds.
@item --default-cache-ttl-ssh @var{n}
@opindex default-cache-ttl
Set the time a cache entry used for SSH keys is valid to @var{n}
seconds. The default is 1800 seconds. Each time a cache entry is
accessed, the entry's timer is reset. To set an entry's maximum
lifetime, use @command{max-cache-ttl-ssh}.
@item --max-cache-ttl @var{n}
@opindex max-cache-ttl
Set the maximum time a cache entry is valid to @var{n} seconds. After
this time a cache entry will be expired even if it has been accessed
recently or has been set using @command{gpg-preset-passphrase}. The
default is 2 hours (7200 seconds).
@item --max-cache-ttl-ssh @var{n}
@opindex max-cache-ttl-ssh
Set the maximum time a cache entry used for SSH keys is valid to
@var{n} seconds. After this time a cache entry will be expired even
if it has been accessed recently or has been set using
@command{gpg-preset-passphrase}. The default is 2 hours (7200
seconds).
@item --enforce-passphrase-constraints
@opindex enforce-passphrase-constraints
Enforce the passphrase constraints by not allowing the user to bypass
them using the ``Take it anyway'' button.
@item --min-passphrase-len @var{n}
@opindex min-passphrase-len
Set the minimal length of a passphrase. When entering a new passphrase
shorter than this value a warning will be displayed. Defaults to 8.
@item --min-passphrase-nonalpha @var{n}
@opindex min-passphrase-nonalpha
Set the minimal number of digits or special characters required in a
passphrase. When entering a new passphrase with less than this number
of digits or special characters a warning will be displayed. Defaults
to 1.
@item --check-passphrase-pattern @var{file}
@itemx --check-sym-passphrase-pattern @var{file}
@opindex check-passphrase-pattern
@opindex check-sym-passphrase-pattern
Check the passphrase against the pattern given in @var{file}. When
entering a new passphrase matching one of these pattern a warning will
be displayed. If @var{file} does not contain any slashes and does not
start with "~/" it is searched in the system configuration directory
(@file{@value{SYSCONFDIR}}). The default is not to use any
pattern file. The second version of this option is only used when
creating a new symmetric key to allow the use of different patterns
for such passphrases.
Security note: It is known that checking a passphrase against a list of
pattern or even against a complete dictionary is not very effective to
enforce good passphrases. Users will soon figure up ways to bypass such
a policy. A better policy is to educate users on good security
behavior and optionally to run a passphrase cracker regularly on all
users passphrases to catch the very simple ones.
@item --max-passphrase-days @var{n}
@opindex max-passphrase-days
Ask the user to change the passphrase if @var{n} days have passed since
the last change. With @option{--enforce-passphrase-constraints} set the
user may not bypass this check.
@item --enable-passphrase-history
@opindex enable-passphrase-history
This option does nothing yet.
@item --pinentry-invisible-char @var{char}
@opindex pinentry-invisible-char
This option asks the Pinentry to use @var{char} for displaying hidden
characters. @var{char} must be one character UTF-8 string. A
Pinentry may or may not honor this request.
@item --pinentry-timeout @var{n}
@opindex pinentry-timeout
This option asks the Pinentry to timeout after @var{n} seconds with no
user input. The default value of 0 does not ask the pinentry to
timeout, however a Pinentry may use its own default timeout value in
this case. A Pinentry may or may not honor this request.
@item --pinentry-formatted-passphrase
@opindex pinentry-formatted-passphrase
This option asks the Pinentry to enable passphrase formatting when asking the
user for a new passphrase and masking of the passphrase is turned off.
If passphrase formatting is enabled, then all non-breaking space characters
are stripped from the entered passphrase. Passphrase formatting is mostly
useful in combination with passphrases generated with the GENPIN
feature of some Pinentries. Note that such a generated
passphrase, if not modified by the user, skips all passphrase
constraints checking because such constraints would actually weaken
the generated passphrase.
@item --pinentry-program @var{filename}
@opindex pinentry-program
Use program @var{filename} as the PIN entry. The default is
installation dependent. With the default configuration the name of
the default pinentry is @file{pinentry}; if that file does not exist
but a @file{pinentry-basic} exist the latter is used.
On a Windows platform the default is to use the first existing program
from this list:
@file{bin\pinentry.exe},
@file{..\Gpg4win\bin\pinentry.exe},
@file{..\Gpg4win\pinentry.exe},
@file{..\GNU\GnuPG\pinentry.exe},
@file{..\GNU\bin\pinentry.exe},
@file{bin\pinentry-basic.exe}
where the file names are relative to the GnuPG installation directory.
@item --pinentry-touch-file @var{filename}
@opindex pinentry-touch-file
By default the filename of the socket gpg-agent is listening for
requests is passed to Pinentry, so that it can touch that file before
exiting (it does this only in curses mode). This option changes the
file passed to Pinentry to @var{filename}. The special name
@code{/dev/null} may be used to completely disable this feature. Note
that Pinentry will not create that file, it will only change the
modification and access time.
@item --scdaemon-program @var{filename}
@opindex scdaemon-program
Use program @var{filename} as the Smartcard daemon. The default is
installation dependent and can be shown with the @command{gpgconf}
command.
@item --disable-scdaemon
@opindex disable-scdaemon
Do not make use of the scdaemon tool. This option has the effect of
disabling the ability to do smartcard operations. Note, that enabling
this option at runtime does not kill an already forked scdaemon.
@item --disable-check-own-socket
@opindex disable-check-own-socket
@command{gpg-agent} employs a periodic self-test to detect a stolen
socket. This usually means a second instance of @command{gpg-agent}
has taken over the socket and @command{gpg-agent} will then terminate
itself. This option may be used to disable this self-test for
debugging purposes.
@item --use-standard-socket
@itemx --no-use-standard-socket
@itemx --use-standard-socket-p
@opindex use-standard-socket
@opindex no-use-standard-socket
@opindex use-standard-socket-p
Since GnuPG 2.1 the standard socket is always used. These options
have no more effect. The command @code{gpg-agent
--use-standard-socket-p} will thus always return success.
@item --display @var{string}
@itemx --ttyname @var{string}
@itemx --ttytype @var{string}
@itemx --lc-ctype @var{string}
@itemx --lc-messages @var{string}
@itemx --xauthority @var{string}
@opindex display
@opindex ttyname
@opindex ttytype
@opindex lc-ctype
@opindex lc-messages
@opindex xauthority
These options are used with the server mode to pass localization
information.
@item --keep-tty
@itemx --keep-display
@opindex keep-tty
@opindex keep-display
Ignore requests to change the current @code{tty} or X window system's
@code{DISPLAY} variable respectively. This is useful to lock the
pinentry to pop up at the @code{tty} or display you started the agent.
@item --listen-backlog @var{n}
@opindex listen-backlog
Set the size of the queue for pending connections. The default is 64.
@anchor{option --extra-socket}
@item --extra-socket @var{name}
@opindex extra-socket
The extra socket is created by default, you may use this option to
change the name of the socket. To disable the creation of the socket
use ``none'' or ``/dev/null'' for @var{name}.
Also listen on native gpg-agent connections on the given socket. The
intended use for this extra socket is to setup a Unix domain socket
forwarding from a remote machine to this socket on the local machine.
A @command{gpg} running on the remote machine may then connect to the
local gpg-agent and use its private keys. This enables decrypting or
signing data on a remote machine without exposing the private keys to the
remote machine.
@item --enable-extended-key-format
@itemx --disable-extended-key-format
@opindex enable-extended-key-format
@opindex disable-extended-key-format
These options are obsolete and have no effect. The extended key format
is used for years now and has been supported since 2.1.12. Existing
keys in the old format are migrated to the new format as soon as they
are touched.
@anchor{option --enable-ssh-support}
@item --enable-ssh-support
@itemx --enable-putty-support
@opindex enable-ssh-support
@opindex enable-putty-support
The OpenSSH Agent protocol is always enabled, but @command{gpg-agent}
will only set the @code{SSH_AUTH_SOCK} variable if this flag is given.
In this mode of operation, the agent does not only implement the
gpg-agent protocol, but also the agent protocol used by OpenSSH
(through a separate socket). Consequently, it should be possible to use
the gpg-agent as a drop-in replacement for the well known ssh-agent.
SSH Keys, which are to be used through the agent, need to be added to
the gpg-agent initially through the ssh-add utility. When a key is
added, ssh-add will ask for the password of the provided key file and
send the unprotected key material to the agent; this causes the
gpg-agent to ask for a passphrase, which is to be used for encrypting
the newly received key and storing it in a gpg-agent specific
directory.
Once a key has been added to the gpg-agent this way, the gpg-agent
will be ready to use the key.
Note: in case the gpg-agent receives a signature request, the user might
need to be prompted for a passphrase, which is necessary for decrypting
the stored key. Since the ssh-agent protocol does not contain a
mechanism for telling the agent on which display/terminal it is running,
gpg-agent's ssh-support will use the TTY or X display where gpg-agent
has been started. To switch this display to the current one, the
following command may be used:
@smallexample
gpg-connect-agent updatestartuptty /bye
@end smallexample
Although all GnuPG components try to start the gpg-agent as needed, this
is not possible for the ssh support because ssh does not know about it.
Thus if no GnuPG tool which accesses the agent has been run, there is no
guarantee that ssh is able to use gpg-agent for authentication. To fix
this you may start gpg-agent if needed using this simple command:
@smallexample
gpg-connect-agent /bye
@end smallexample
Adding the @option{--verbose} shows the progress of starting the agent.
The @option{--enable-putty-support} is only available under Windows
and allows the use of gpg-agent with the ssh implementation
@command{putty}. This is similar to the regular ssh-agent support but
makes use of Windows message queue as required by @command{putty}.
+
+The order in which keys are presented to ssh are:
+@table @code
+
+@item Negative Use-for-ssh values
+ If a key file has the attribute "Use-for-ssh" and its value is
+ negative, these keys are presented first to ssh. The negative
+ values are capped at -999 with -999 beeing lower ranked than -1.
+ These values can be used to prefer on-disk keys over keys taken
+ from active cards.
+
+@item Active cards
+ Active cards (inserted into a card reader or plugged in tokens)
+ are always tried; they are ordered by their serial numbers.
+
+@item Keys listed in the sshcontrol file
+ Non-disabled keys from the sshcontrol file are presented in the
+ order they appear in this file. Note that the sshcontrol file
+ is deprecated.
+
+@item Positive Use-for-ssh values
+ If a key file has the attribute "Use-for-ssh" and its value is
+ "yes", "true", or any positive number the key is presented in
+ the order of their values. "yes" and "true" have a value of 1;
+ other values are capped at 99999.
+
+@end table
+
+Editing the "Use-for-ssh" values can be done with an editor or using
+@command{gpg-connect-agent} and "KEYATTR" (Remember to append a colon
+to the key; i.e. use "Use-for-ssh:").
+
+
@anchor{option --ssh-fingerprint-digest}
@item --ssh-fingerprint-digest
@opindex ssh-fingerprint-digest
Select the digest algorithm used to compute ssh fingerprints that are
communicated to the user, e.g. in pinentry dialogs. OpenSSH has
transitioned from using MD5 to the more secure SHA256.
@item --auto-expand-secmem @var{n}
@opindex auto-expand-secmem
Allow Libgcrypt to expand its secure memory area as required. The
optional value @var{n} is a non-negative integer with a suggested size
in bytes of each additionally allocated secure memory area. The value
is rounded up to the next 32 KiB; usual C style prefixes are allowed.
For an heavy loaded gpg-agent with many concurrent connection this
option avoids sign or decrypt errors due to out of secure memory error
returns.
@item --s2k-calibration @var{milliseconds}
@opindex s2k-calibration
Change the default calibration time to @var{milliseconds}. The given
value is capped at 60 seconds; a value of 0 resets to the compiled-in
default. This option is re-read on a SIGHUP (or @code{gpgconf
--reload gpg-agent}) and the S2K count is then re-calibrated.
@item --s2k-count @var{n}
@opindex s2k-count
Specify the iteration count used to protect the passphrase. This
option can be used to override the auto-calibration done by default.
The auto-calibration computes a count which requires by default 100ms
to mangle a given passphrase. See also @option{--s2k-calibration}.
To view the actually used iteration count and the milliseconds
required for an S2K operation use:
@example
gpg-connect-agent 'GETINFO s2k_count' /bye
gpg-connect-agent 'GETINFO s2k_time' /bye
@end example
To view the auto-calibrated count use:
@example
gpg-connect-agent 'GETINFO s2k_count_cal' /bye
@end example
@end table
@mansect files
@node Agent Configuration
@section Configuration
There are a few configuration files needed for the operation of the
agent. By default they may all be found in the current home directory
(@pxref{option --homedir}).
@table @file
@item gpg-agent.conf
@efindex gpg-agent.conf
This is the standard configuration file read by @command{gpg-agent} on
startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading
two dashes may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated.
This file is also read after a @code{SIGHUP} however only a few
options will actually have an effect. This default name may be
changed on the command line (@pxref{option --options}).
You should backup this file.
@item trustlist.txt
@efindex trustlist.txt
This is the list of trusted keys. You should backup this file.
Comment lines, indicated by a leading hash mark, as well as empty
lines are ignored. To mark a key as trusted you need to enter its
fingerprint followed by a space and a capital letter @code{S}. Colons
may optionally be used to separate the bytes of a fingerprint; this
enables cutting and pasting the fingerprint from a key listing output. If
the line is prefixed with a @code{!} the key is explicitly marked as
not trusted.
Here is an example where two keys are marked as ultimately trusted
and one as not trusted:
@cartouche
@smallexample
# CN=Wurzel ZS 3,O=Intevation GmbH,C=DE
A6935DD34EF3087973C706FC311AA2CCF733765B S
# CN=PCA-1-Verwaltung-02/O=PKI-1-Verwaltung/C=DE
DC:BD:69:25:48:BD:BB:7E:31:6E:BB:80:D3:00:80:35:D4:F8:A6:CD S
# CN=Root-CA/O=Schlapphuete/L=Pullach/C=DE
!14:56:98:D3:FE:9C:CA:5A:31:6E:BC:81:D3:11:4E:00:90:A3:44:C2 S
@end smallexample
@end cartouche
Before entering a key into this file, you need to ensure its
authenticity. How to do this depends on your organisation; your
administrator might have already entered those keys which are deemed
trustworthy enough into this file. Places where to look for the
fingerprint of a root certificate are letters received from the CA or
the website of the CA (after making 100% sure that this is indeed the
website of that CA). You may want to consider disallowing interactive
updates of this file by using the @ref{option --no-allow-mark-trusted}.
It might even be advisable to change the permissions to read-only so
that this file can't be changed inadvertently.
As a special feature a line @code{include-default} will include a global
list of trusted certificates (e.g. @file{@value{SYSCONFDIR}/trustlist.txt}).
This global list is also used if the local list is not available;
the @ref{option --no-user-trustlist} enforces the use of only
this global list.
It is possible to add further flags after the @code{S} for use by the
caller:
@table @code
@item relax
@cindex relax
Relax checking of some root certificate requirements. As of now this
flag allows the use of root certificates with a missing basicConstraints
attribute (despite that it is a MUST for CA certificates) and disables
CRL checking for the root certificate.
@item cm
If validation of a certificate finally issued by a CA with this flag set
fails, try again using the chain validation model.
@item qual
The CA is allowed to issue certificates for qualified signatures.
This flag has an effect only if used in the global list. This is now
the preferred way to mark such CA; the old way of having a separate
file @file{qualified.txt} is still supported.
@item de-vs
The CA is part of an approved PKI for the German classification level
VS-NfD. It is only valid in the global trustlist. As of now this is
used only for documentation purpose.
@end table
@item sshcontrol
@efindex sshcontrol
This file is used when support for the secure shell agent protocol has
been enabled (@pxref{option --enable-ssh-support}). Only keys present in
this file are used in the SSH protocol. You should backup this file.
+This file is deprecated in favor of the "Use-for-ssh" attribute in the
+key files.
+
The @command{ssh-add} tool may be used to add new entries to this file;
you may also add them manually. Comment lines, indicated by a leading
hash mark, as well as empty lines are ignored. An entry starts with
optional whitespace, followed by the keygrip of the key given as 40 hex
digits, optionally followed by the caching TTL in seconds and another
optional field for arbitrary flags. A non-zero TTL overrides the global
default as set by @option{--default-cache-ttl-ssh}.
The only flag support is @code{confirm}. If this flag is found for a
key, each use of the key will pop up a pinentry to confirm the use of
that key. The flag is automatically set if a new key was loaded into
@code{gpg-agent} using the option @option{-c} of the @code{ssh-add}
command.
The keygrip may be prefixed with a @code{!} to disable an entry.
The following example lists exactly one key. Note that keys available
through a OpenPGP smartcard in the active smartcard reader are
implicitly added to this list; i.e. there is no need to list them.
@cartouche
@smallexample
# Key added on: 2011-07-20 20:38:46
# Fingerprint: 5e:8d:c4:ad:e7:af:6e:27:8a:d6:13:e4:79:ad:0b:81
34B62F25E277CF13D3C6BCEBFD3F85D08F0A864B 0 confirm
@end smallexample
@end cartouche
@item private-keys-v1.d/
@efindex private-keys-v1.d
This is the directory where gpg-agent stores the private keys. Each
key is stored in a file with the name made up of the keygrip and the
suffix @file{key}. You should backup all files in this directory
and take great care to keep this backup closed away.
@end table
Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined
files into the directory @file{@value{SYSCONFSKELDIR}} so that newly created
users start up with a working configuration. For existing users the
a small helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}).
-
@c
@c Agent Signals
@c
@mansect signals
@node Agent Signals
@section Use of some signals
A running @command{gpg-agent} may be controlled by signals, i.e. using
the @command{kill} command to send a signal to the process.
Here is a list of supported signals:
@table @gnupgtabopt
@item SIGHUP
@cpindex SIGHUP
This signal flushes all cached passphrases and if the program has been
started with a configuration file, the configuration file is read
again. Only certain options are honored: @code{quiet},
@code{verbose}, @code{debug}, @code{debug-all}, @code{debug-level},
@code{debug-pinentry},
@code{no-grab},
@code{pinentry-program},
@code{pinentry-invisible-char},
@code{default-cache-ttl},
@code{max-cache-ttl}, @code{ignore-cache-for-signing},
@code{s2k-count},
@code{no-allow-external-cache}, @code{allow-emacs-pinentry},
@code{no-allow-mark-trusted}, @code{disable-scdaemon}, and
@code{disable-check-own-socket}. @code{scdaemon-program} is also
supported but due to the current implementation, which calls the
scdaemon only once, it is not of much use unless you manually kill the
scdaemon.
@item SIGTERM
@cpindex SIGTERM
Shuts down the process but waits until all current requests are
fulfilled. If the process has received 3 of these signals and requests
are still pending, a shutdown is forced.
@item SIGINT
@cpindex SIGINT
Shuts down the process immediately.
@item SIGUSR1
@cpindex SIGUSR1
Dump internal information to the log file.
@item SIGUSR2
@cpindex SIGUSR2
This signal is used for internal purposes.
@end table
@c
@c Examples
@c
@mansect examples
@node Agent Examples
@section Examples
It is important to set the environment variable @code{GPG_TTY} in
your login shell, for example in the @file{~/.bashrc} init script:
@cartouche
@example
export GPG_TTY=$(tty)
@end example
@end cartouche
If you enabled the Ssh Agent Support, you also need to tell ssh about
it by adding this to your init script:
@cartouche
@example
unset SSH_AGENT_PID
if [ "$@{gnupg_SSH_AUTH_SOCK_by:-0@}" -ne $$ ]; then
export SSH_AUTH_SOCK="$(gpgconf --list-dirs agent-ssh-socket)"
fi
@end example
@end cartouche
@c
@c Assuan Protocol
@c
@manpause
@node Agent Protocol
@section Agent's Assuan Protocol
Note: this section does only document the protocol, which is used by
GnuPG components; it does not deal with the ssh-agent protocol. To
see the full specification of each command, use
@example
gpg-connect-agent 'help COMMAND' /bye
@end example
@noindent
or just 'help' to list all available commands.
@noindent
The @command{gpg-agent} daemon is started on demand by the GnuPG
components.
To identify a key we use a thing called keygrip which is the SHA-1 hash
of an canonical encoded S-Expression of the public key as used in
Libgcrypt. For the purpose of this interface the keygrip is given as a
hex string. The advantage of using this and not the hash of a
certificate is that it will be possible to use the same keypair for
different protocols, thereby saving space on the token used to keep the
secret keys.
The @command{gpg-agent} may send status messages during a command or when
returning from a command to inform a client about the progress or result of an
operation. For example, the @var{INQUIRE_MAXLEN} status message may be sent
during a server inquire to inform the client of the maximum usable length of
the inquired data (which should not be exceeded).
@menu
* Agent PKDECRYPT:: Decrypting a session key
* Agent PKSIGN:: Signing a Hash
* Agent GENKEY:: Generating a Key
* Agent IMPORT:: Importing a Secret Key
* Agent EXPORT:: Exporting a Secret Key
* Agent ISTRUSTED:: Importing a Root Certificate
* Agent GET_PASSPHRASE:: Ask for a passphrase
* Agent CLEAR_PASSPHRASE:: Expire a cached passphrase
* Agent PRESET_PASSPHRASE:: Set a passphrase for a keygrip
* Agent GET_CONFIRMATION:: Ask for confirmation
* Agent HAVEKEY:: Check whether a key is available
* Agent LEARN:: Register a smartcard
* Agent PASSWD:: Change a Passphrase
* Agent UPDATESTARTUPTTY:: Change the Standard Display
* Agent GETEVENTCOUNTER:: Get the Event Counters
* Agent GETINFO:: Return information about the process
* Agent OPTION:: Set options for the session
@end menu
@node Agent PKDECRYPT
@subsection Decrypting a session key
The client asks the server to decrypt a session key. The encrypted
session key should have all information needed to select the
appropriate secret key or to delegate it to a smartcard.
@example
SETKEY <keyGrip>
@end example
Tell the server about the key to be used for decryption. If this is
not used, @command{gpg-agent} may try to figure out the key by trying to
decrypt the message with each key available.
@example
PKDECRYPT
@end example
The agent checks whether this command is allowed and then does an
INQUIRY to get the ciphertext the client should then send the cipher
text.
@example
S: INQUIRE CIPHERTEXT
C: D (xxxxxx
C: D xxxx)
C: END
@end example
Please note that the server may send status info lines while reading the
data lines from the client. The data send is a SPKI like S-Exp with
this structure:
@example
(enc-val
(<algo>
(<param_name1> <mpi>)
...
(<param_namen> <mpi>)))
@end example
Where algo is a string with the name of the algorithm; see the libgcrypt
documentation for a list of valid algorithms. The number and names of
the parameters depend on the algorithm. The agent does return an error
if there is an inconsistency.
If the decryption was successful the decrypted data is returned by
means of "D" lines.
Here is an example session:
@cartouche
@smallexample
C: PKDECRYPT
S: INQUIRE CIPHERTEXT
C: D (enc-val elg (a 349324324)
C: D (b 3F444677CA)))
C: END
S: # session key follows
S: S PADDING 0
S: D (value 1234567890ABCDEF0)
S: OK decryption successful
@end smallexample
@end cartouche
The “PADDING” status line is only send if gpg-agent can tell what kind
of padding is used. As of now only the value 0 is used to indicate
that the padding has been removed.
@node Agent PKSIGN
@subsection Signing a Hash
The client asks the agent to sign a given hash value. A default key
will be chosen if no key has been set. To set a key a client first
uses:
@example
SIGKEY <keyGrip>
@end example
This can be used multiple times to create multiple signature, the list
of keys is reset with the next PKSIGN command or a RESET. The server
tests whether the key is a valid key to sign something and responds with
okay.
@example
SETHASH --hash=<name>|<algo> <hexstring>
@end example
The client can use this command to tell the server about the data <hexstring>
(which usually is a hash) to be signed. <algo> is the decimal encoded hash
algorithm number as used by Libgcrypt. Either <algo> or --hash=<name>
must be given. Valid names for <name> are:
@table @code
@item sha1
The SHA-1 hash algorithm
@item sha256
The SHA-256 hash algorithm
@item rmd160
The RIPE-MD160 hash algorithm
@item md5
The old and broken MD5 hash algorithm
@item tls-md5sha1
A combined hash algorithm as used by the TLS protocol.
@end table
@noindent
The actual signing is done using
@example
PKSIGN <options>
@end example
Options are not yet defined, but may later be used to choose among
different algorithms. The agent does then some checks, asks for the
passphrase and as a result the server returns the signature as an SPKI
like S-expression in "D" lines:
@example
(sig-val
(<algo>
(<param_name1> <mpi>)
...
(<param_namen> <mpi>)))
@end example
The operation is affected by the option
@example
OPTION use-cache-for-signing=0|1
@end example
The default of @code{1} uses the cache. Setting this option to @code{0}
will lead @command{gpg-agent} to ignore the passphrase cache. Note, that there is
also a global command line option for @command{gpg-agent} to globally disable the
caching.
Here is an example session:
@cartouche
@smallexample
C: SIGKEY <keyGrip>
S: OK key available
C: SIGKEY <keyGrip>
S: OK key available
C: PKSIGN
S: # I did ask the user whether he really wants to sign
S: # I did ask the user for the passphrase
S: INQUIRE HASHVAL
C: D ABCDEF012345678901234
C: END
S: # signature follows
S: D (sig-val rsa (s 45435453654612121212))
S: OK
@end smallexample
@end cartouche
@node Agent GENKEY
@subsection Generating a Key
This is used to create a new keypair and store the secret key inside the
active PSE --- which is in most cases a Soft-PSE. A not-yet-defined
option allows choosing the storage location. To get the secret key out
of the PSE, a special export tool has to be used.
@example
GENKEY [--no-protection] [--preset] [<cache_nonce>]
@end example
Invokes the key generation process and the server will then inquire
on the generation parameters, like:
@example
S: INQUIRE KEYPARM
C: D (genkey (rsa (nbits 1024)))
C: END
@end example
The format of the key parameters which depends on the algorithm is of
the form:
@example
(genkey
(algo
(parameter_name_1 ....)
....
(parameter_name_n ....)))
@end example
If everything succeeds, the server returns the *public key* in a SPKI
like S-Expression like this:
@example
(public-key
(rsa
(n <mpi>)
(e <mpi>)))
@end example
Here is an example session:
@cartouche
@smallexample
C: GENKEY
S: INQUIRE KEYPARM
C: D (genkey (rsa (nbits 1024)))
C: END
S: D (public-key
S: D (rsa (n 326487324683264) (e 10001)))
S OK key created
@end smallexample
@end cartouche
The @option{--no-protection} option may be used to prevent prompting for a
passphrase to protect the secret key while leaving the secret key unprotected.
The @option{--preset} option may be used to add the passphrase to the cache
using the default cache parameters.
The @option{--inq-passwd} option may be used to create the key with a
supplied passphrase. When used the agent does an inquiry with the
keyword @code{NEWPASSWD} to retrieve that passphrase. This option
takes precedence over @option{--no-protection}; however if the client
sends a empty (zero-length) passphrase, this is identical to
@option{--no-protection}.
@node Agent IMPORT
@subsection Importing a Secret Key
This operation is not yet supported by GpgAgent. Specialized tools
are to be used for this.
There is no actual need because we can expect that secret keys
created by a 3rd party are stored on a smartcard. If we have
generated the key ourselves, we do not need to import it.
@node Agent EXPORT
@subsection Export a Secret Key
Not implemented.
Should be done by an extra tool.
@node Agent ISTRUSTED
@subsection Importing a Root Certificate
Actually we do not import a Root Cert but provide a way to validate
any piece of data by storing its Hash along with a description and
an identifier in the PSE. Here is the interface description:
@example
ISTRUSTED <fingerprint>
@end example
Check whether the OpenPGP primary key or the X.509 certificate with the
given fingerprint is an ultimately trusted key or a trusted Root CA
certificate. The fingerprint should be given as a hexstring (without
any blanks or colons or whatever in between) and may be left padded with
00 in case of an MD5 fingerprint. GPGAgent will answer with:
@example
OK
@end example
The key is in the table of trusted keys.
@example
ERR 304 (Not Trusted)
@end example
The key is not in this table.
Gpg needs the entire list of trusted keys to maintain the web of
trust; the following command is therefore quite helpful:
@example
LISTTRUSTED
@end example
GpgAgent returns a list of trusted keys line by line:
@example
S: D 000000001234454556565656677878AF2F1ECCFF P
S: D 340387563485634856435645634856438576457A P
S: D FEDC6532453745367FD83474357495743757435D S
S: OK
@end example
The first item on a line is the hexified fingerprint where MD5
fingerprints are @code{00} padded to the left and the second item is a
flag to indicate the type of key (so that gpg is able to only take care
of PGP keys). P = OpenPGP, S = S/MIME. A client should ignore the rest
of the line, so that we can extend the format in the future.
Finally a client should be able to mark a key as trusted:
@example
MARKTRUSTED @var{fingerprint} "P"|"S"
@end example
The server will then pop up a window to ask the user whether she
really trusts this key. For this it will probably ask for a text to
be displayed like this:
@example
S: INQUIRE TRUSTDESC
C: D Do you trust the key with the fingerprint @@FPR@@
C: D bla fasel blurb.
C: END
S: OK
@end example
Known sequences with the pattern @@foo@@ are replaced according to this
table:
@table @code
@item @@FPR16@@
Format the fingerprint according to gpg rules for a v3 keys.
@item @@FPR20@@
Format the fingerprint according to gpg rules for a v4 keys.
@item @@FPR@@
Choose an appropriate format to format the fingerprint.
@item @@@@
Replaced by a single @code{@@}.
@end table
@node Agent GET_PASSPHRASE
@subsection Ask for a passphrase
This function is usually used to ask for a passphrase to be used for
symmetric encryption, but may also be used by programs which need
special handling of passphrases. This command uses a syntax which helps
clients to use the agent with minimum effort.
@example
GET_PASSPHRASE [--data] [--check] [--no-ask] [--repeat[=N]] \
[--qualitybar] @var{cache_id} \
[@var{error_message} @var{prompt} @var{description}]
@end example
@var{cache_id} is expected to be a string used to identify a cached
passphrase. Use a @code{X} to bypass the cache. With no other
arguments the agent returns a cached passphrase or an error. By
convention either the hexified fingerprint of the key shall be used for
@var{cache_id} or an arbitrary string prefixed with the name of the
calling application and a colon: Like @code{gpg:somestring}.
@var{error_message} is either a single @code{X} for no error message or
a string to be shown as an error message like (e.g. "invalid
passphrase"). Blanks must be percent escaped or replaced by @code{+}'.
@var{prompt} is either a single @code{X} for a default prompt or the
text to be shown as the prompt. Blanks must be percent escaped or
replaced by @code{+}.
@var{description} is a text shown above the entry field. Blanks must be
percent escaped or replaced by @code{+}.
The agent either returns with an error or with a OK followed by the hex
encoded passphrase. Note that the length of the strings is implicitly
limited by the maximum length of a command. If the option
@option{--data} is used, the passphrase is not returned on the OK line
but by regular data lines; this is the preferred method.
If the option @option{--check} is used, the standard passphrase
constraints checks are applied. A check is not done if the passphrase
has been found in the cache.
If the option @option{--no-ask} is used and the passphrase is not in the
cache the user will not be asked to enter a passphrase but the error
code @code{GPG_ERR_NO_DATA} is returned.
If the option @option{--qualitybar} is used and a minimum passphrase
length has been configured, a visual indication of the entered
passphrase quality is shown.
@example
CLEAR_PASSPHRASE @var{cache_id}
@end example
may be used to invalidate the cache entry for a passphrase. The
function returns with OK even when there is no cached passphrase.
@node Agent CLEAR_PASSPHRASE
@subsection Remove a cached passphrase
Use this command to remove a cached passphrase.
@example
CLEAR_PASSPHRASE [--mode=normal] <cache_id>
@end example
The @option{--mode=normal} option can be used to clear a @var{cache_id} that
was set by gpg-agent.
@node Agent PRESET_PASSPHRASE
@subsection Set a passphrase for a keygrip
This command adds a passphrase to the cache for the specified @var{keygrip}.
@example
PRESET_PASSPHRASE [--inquire] <string_or_keygrip> <timeout> [<hexstring>]
@end example
The passphrase is a hexadecimal string when specified. When not specified, the
passphrase will be retrieved from the pinentry module unless the
@option{--inquire} option was specified in which case the passphrase will be
retrieved from the client.
The @var{timeout} parameter keeps the passphrase cached for the specified
number of seconds. A value of @code{-1} means infinite while @code{0} means
the default (currently only a timeout of -1 is allowed, which means to never
expire it).
@node Agent GET_CONFIRMATION
@subsection Ask for confirmation
This command may be used to ask for a simple confirmation by
presenting a text and 2 buttons: Okay and Cancel.
@example
GET_CONFIRMATION @var{description}
@end example
@var{description}is displayed along with a Okay and Cancel
button. Blanks must be percent escaped or replaced by @code{+}. A
@code{X} may be used to display confirmation dialog with a default
text.
The agent either returns with an error or with a OK. Note, that the
length of @var{description} is implicitly limited by the maximum
length of a command.
@node Agent HAVEKEY
@subsection Check whether a key is available
This can be used to see whether a secret key is available. It does
not return any information on whether the key is somehow protected.
@example
HAVEKEY @var{keygrips}
@end example
The agent answers either with OK or @code{No_Secret_Key} (208). The
caller may want to check for other error codes as well. More than one
keygrip may be given. In this case the command returns success if at
least one of the keygrips corresponds to an available secret key.
@node Agent LEARN
@subsection Register a smartcard
@example
LEARN [--send]
@end example
This command is used to register a smartcard. With the @option{--send}
option given the certificates are sent back.
@node Agent PASSWD
@subsection Change a Passphrase
@example
PASSWD [--cache-nonce=<c>] [--passwd-nonce=<s>] [--preset] @var{keygrip}
@end example
This command is used to interactively change the passphrase of the key
identified by the hex string @var{keygrip}. The @option{--preset}
option may be used to add the new passphrase to the cache using the
default cache parameters.
@node Agent UPDATESTARTUPTTY
@subsection Change the standard display
@example
UPDATESTARTUPTTY
@end example
Set the startup TTY and X-DISPLAY variables to the values of this
session. This command is useful to direct future pinentry invocations
to another screen. It is only required because there is no way in the
ssh-agent protocol to convey this information.
@node Agent GETEVENTCOUNTER
@subsection Get the Event Counters
@example
GETEVENTCOUNTER
@end example
This function return one status line with the current values of the
event counters. The event counters are useful to avoid polling by
delaying a poll until something has changed. The values are decimal
numbers in the range @code{0} to @code{UINT_MAX} and wrapping around to
0. The actual values should not be relied upon; they shall only be used
to detect a change.
The currently defined counters are:
@table @code
@item ANY
Incremented with any change of any of the other counters.
@item KEY
Incremented for added or removed private keys.
@item CARD
Incremented for each change of the card reader's status.
@end table
@node Agent GETINFO
@subsection Return information about the process
This is a multipurpose function to return a variety of information.
@example
GETINFO @var{what}
@end example
The value of @var{what} specifies the kind of information returned:
@table @code
@item version
Return the version of the program.
@item pid
Return the process id of the process.
@item socket_name
Return the name of the socket used to connect the agent.
@item ssh_socket_name
Return the name of the socket used for SSH connections. If SSH support
has not been enabled the error @code{GPG_ERR_NO_DATA} will be returned.
@end table
@node Agent OPTION
@subsection Set options for the session
Here is a list of session options which are not yet described with
other commands. The general syntax for an Assuan option is:
@smallexample
OPTION @var{key}=@var{value}
@end smallexample
@noindent
Supported @var{key}s are:
@table @code
@item agent-awareness
This may be used to tell gpg-agent of which gpg-agent version the
client is aware of. gpg-agent uses this information to enable
features which might break older clients.
@item putenv
Change the session's environment to be used for the
Pinentry. Valid values are:
@table @code
@item @var{name}
Delete envvar @var{name}
@item @var{name}=
Set envvar @var{name} to the empty string
@item @var{name}=@var{value}
Set envvar @var{name} to the string @var{value}.
@end table
@item use-cache-for-signing
See Assuan command @code{PKSIGN}.
@item allow-pinentry-notify
This does not need any value. It is used to enable the
PINENTRY_LAUNCHED inquiry.
@item pinentry-mode
This option is used to change the operation mode of the pinentry. The
following values are defined:
@table @code
@item ask
This is the default mode which pops up a pinentry as needed.
@item cancel
Instead of popping up a pinentry, return the error code
@code{GPG_ERR_CANCELED}.
@item error
Instead of popping up a pinentry, return the error code
@code{GPG_ERR_NO_PIN_ENTRY}.
@item loopback
Use a loopback pinentry. This fakes a pinentry by using inquiries
back to the caller to ask for a passphrase. This option may only be
set if the agent has been configured for that.
To disable this feature use @ref{option --no-allow-loopback-pinentry}.
@end table
@item cache-ttl-opt-preset
This option sets the cache TTL for new entries created by GENKEY and
PASSWD commands when using the @option{--preset} option. It is not
used a default value is used.
@item s2k-count
Instead of using the standard S2K count (which is computed on the
fly), the given S2K count is used for new keys or when changing the
passphrase of a key. Values below 65536 are considered to be 0. This
option is valid for the entire session or until reset to 0. This
option is useful if the key is later used on boxes which are either
much slower or faster than the actual box.
@item pretend-request-origin
This option switches the connection into a restricted mode which
handles all further commands in the same way as they would be handled
when originating from the extra or browser socket. Note that this
option is not available in the restricted mode. Valid values for this
option are:
@table @code
@item none
@itemx local
This is a NOP and leaves the connection in the standard way.
@item remote
Pretend to come from a remote origin in the same way as connections
from the @option{--extra-socket}.
@item browser
Pretend to come from a local web browser in the same way as connections
from the @option{--browser-socket}.
@end table
@end table
@mansect see also
@ifset isman
@command{@gpgname}(1),
@command{gpgsm}(1),
@command{gpgconf}(1),
@command{gpg-connect-agent}(1),
@command{scdaemon}(1)
@end ifset
@include see-also-note.texi