diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi index d3b7be598..df807fafc 100644 --- a/doc/gpg.texi +++ b/doc/gpg.texi @@ -1,4248 +1,4252 @@ @c Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, @c 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc. @c This is part of the GnuPG manual. @c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi. @include defs.inc @node Invoking GPG @chapter Invoking GPG @cindex GPG command options @cindex command options @cindex options, GPG command @c Begin standard stuff @ifclear gpgtwohack @manpage gpg.1 @ifset manverb .B gpg \- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool @end ifset @mansect synopsis @ifset manverb .B gpg .RB [ \-\-homedir .IR dir ] .RB [ \-\-options .IR file ] .RI [ options ] .I command .RI [ args ] @end ifset @end ifclear @c End standard stuff @c Begin gpg2 hack stuff @ifset gpgtwohack @manpage gpg2.1 @ifset manverb .B gpg2 \- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool @end ifset @mansect synopsis @ifset manverb .B gpg2 .RB [ \-\-homedir .IR dir ] .RB [ \-\-options .IR file ] .RI [ options ] .I command .RI [ args ] @end ifset @end ifset @c End gpg2 hack stuff @mansect description @command{@gpgname} is the OpenPGP part of the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG). It is a tool to provide digital encryption and signing services using the OpenPGP standard. @command{@gpgname} features complete key management and all the bells and whistles you would expect from a full OpenPGP implementation. There are two main versions of GnuPG: GnuPG 1.x and GnuPG 2.x. GnuPG 2.x supports modern encryption algorithms and thus should be preferred over GnuPG 1.x. You only need to use GnuPG 1.x if your platform doesn't support GnuPG 2.x, or you need support for some features that GnuPG 2.x has deprecated, e.g., decrypting data created with PGP-2 keys. @ifclear gpgtwohack If you are looking for version 1 of GnuPG, you may find that version installed under the name @command{gpg1}. @end ifclear @ifset gpgtwohack In contrast to the standalone command @command{gpg} from GnuPG 1.x, the 2.x version is commonly installed under the name @command{@gpgname}. @end ifset @manpause @xref{Option Index}, for an index to @command{@gpgname}'s commands and options. @mancont @menu * GPG Commands:: List of all commands. * GPG Options:: List of all options. * GPG Configuration:: Configuration files. * GPG Examples:: Some usage examples. Developer information: * Unattended Usage of GPG:: Using @command{gpg} from other programs. @end menu @c * GPG Protocol:: The protocol the server mode uses. @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** COMMANDS **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect commands @node GPG Commands @section Commands Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that only one command is allowed. Generally speaking, irrelevant options are silently ignored, and may not be checked for correctness. @command{@gpgname} may be run with no commands. In this case it will perform a reasonable action depending on the type of file it is given as input (an encrypted message is decrypted, a signature is verified, a file containing keys is listed, etc.). @menu * General GPG Commands:: Commands not specific to the functionality. * Operational GPG Commands:: Commands to select the type of operation. * OpenPGP Key Management:: How to manage your keys. @end menu @c ******************************************* @c ********** GENERAL COMMANDS ************* @c ******************************************* @node General GPG Commands @subsection Commands not specific to the function @table @gnupgtabopt @item --version @opindex version Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you cannot abbreviate this command. @item --help @itemx -h @opindex help Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command-line options. Note that you cannot arbitrarily abbreviate this command (though you can use its short form @option{-h}). @item --warranty @opindex warranty Print warranty information. @item --dump-options @opindex dump-options Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot abbreviate this command. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** OPERATIONAL COMMANDS *********** @c ******************************************* @node Operational GPG Commands @subsection Commands to select the type of operation @table @gnupgtabopt @item --sign @itemx -s @opindex sign Sign a message. This command may be combined with @option{--encrypt} (to sign and encrypt a message), @option{--symmetric} (to sign and symmetrically encrypt a message), or both @option{--encrypt} and @option{--symmetric} (to sign and encrypt a message that can be decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase). The signing key is chosen by default or can be set explicitly using the @option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key} options. @item --clear-sign @opindex clear-sign @itemx --clearsign @opindex clearsign Make a cleartext signature. The content in a cleartext signature is readable without any special software. OpenPGP software is only needed to verify the signature. cleartext signatures may modify end-of-line whitespace for platform independence and are not intended to be reversible. The signing key is chosen by default or can be set explicitly using the @option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key} options. @item --detach-sign @itemx -b @opindex detach-sign Make a detached signature. @item --encrypt @itemx -e @opindex encrypt Encrypt data to one or more public keys. This command may be combined with @option{--sign} (to sign and encrypt a message), @option{--symmetric} (to encrypt a message that can decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and @option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that can be decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase). @option{--recipient} and related options specify which public keys to use for encryption. @item --symmetric @itemx -c @opindex symmetric Encrypt with a symmetric cipher using a passphrase. The default symmetric cipher used is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}, but may be chosen with the @option{--cipher-algo} option. This command may be combined with @option{--sign} (for a signed and symmetrically encrypted message), @option{--encrypt} (for a message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and @option{--encrypt} together (for a signed message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a passphrase). @command{@gpgname} caches the passphrase used for symmetric encryption so that a decrypt operation may not require that the user needs to enter the passphrase. The option @option{--no-symkey-cache} can be used to disable this feature. @item --store @opindex store Store only (make a simple literal data packet). @item --decrypt @itemx -d @opindex decrypt Decrypt the file given on the command line (or STDIN if no file is specified) and write it to STDOUT (or the file specified with @option{--output}). If the decrypted file is signed, the signature is also verified. This command differs from the default operation, as it never writes to the filename which is included in the file and it rejects files that don't begin with an encrypted message. @item --verify @opindex verify Assume that the first argument is a signed file and verify it without generating any output. With no arguments, the signature packet is read from STDIN. If only one argument is given, the specified file is expected to include a complete signature. With more than one argument, the first argument should specify a file with a detached signature and the remaining files should contain the signed data. To read the signed data from STDIN, use @samp{-} as the second filename. For security reasons, a detached signature will not read the signed material from STDIN if not explicitly specified. Note: If the option @option{--batch} is not used, @command{@gpgname} may assume that a single argument is a file with a detached signature, and it will try to find a matching data file by stripping certain suffixes. Using this historical feature to verify a detached signature is strongly discouraged; you should always specify the data file explicitly. Note: When verifying a cleartext signature, @command{@gpgname} verifies only what makes up the cleartext signed data and not any extra data outside of the cleartext signature or the header lines directly following the dash marker line. The option @code{--output} may be used to write out the actual signed data, but there are other pitfalls with this format as well. It is suggested to avoid cleartext signatures in favor of detached signatures. Note: Sometimes the use of the @command{gpgv} tool is easier than using the full-fledged @command{gpg} with this option. @command{gpgv} is designed to compare signed data against a list of trusted keys and returns with success only for a good signature. It has its own manual page. @item --multifile @opindex multifile This modifies certain other commands to accept multiple files for processing on the command line or read from STDIN with each filename on a separate line. This allows for many files to be processed at once. @option{--multifile} may currently be used along with @option{--verify}, @option{--encrypt}, and @option{--decrypt}. Note that @option{--multifile --verify} may not be used with detached signatures. @item --verify-files @opindex verify-files Identical to @option{--multifile --verify}. @item --encrypt-files @opindex encrypt-files Identical to @option{--multifile --encrypt}. @item --decrypt-files @opindex decrypt-files Identical to @option{--multifile --decrypt}. @item --list-keys @itemx -k @itemx --list-public-keys @opindex list-keys List the specified keys. If no keys are specified, then all keys from the configured public keyrings are listed. Never use the output of this command in scripts or other programs. The output is intended only for humans and its format is likely to change. The @option{--with-colons} option emits the output in a stable, machine-parseable format, which is intended for use by scripts and other programs. @item --list-secret-keys @itemx -K @opindex list-secret-keys List the specified secret keys. If no keys are specified, then all known secret keys are listed. A @code{#} after the initial tags @code{sec} or @code{ssb} means that the secret key or subkey is currently not usable. We also say that this key has been taken offline (for example, a primary key can be taken offline by exporting the key using the command @option{--export-secret-subkeys}). A @code{>} after these tags indicate that the key is stored on a smartcard. See also @option{--list-keys}. @item --check-signatures @opindex check-signatures @itemx --check-sigs @opindex check-sigs Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the key signatures are verified and listed too. Note that for performance reasons the revocation status of a signing key is not shown. This command has the same effect as using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-check}. The status of the verification is indicated by a flag directly following the "sig" tag (and thus before the flags described below. A "!" indicates that the signature has been successfully verified, a "-" denotes a bad signature and a "%" is used if an error occurred while checking the signature (e.g. a non supported algorithm). Signatures where the public key is not available are not listed; to see their keyids the command @option{--list-sigs} can be used. For each signature listed, there are several flags in between the signature status flag and keyid. These flags give additional information about each key signature. From left to right, they are the numbers 1-3 for certificate check level (see @option{--ask-cert-level}), "L" for a local or non-exportable signature (see @option{--lsign-key}), "R" for a nonRevocable signature (see the @option{--edit-key} command "nrsign"), "P" for a signature that contains a policy URL (see @option{--cert-policy-url}), "N" for a signature that contains a notation (see @option{--cert-notation}), "X" for an eXpired signature (see @option{--ask-cert-expire}), and the numbers 1-9 or "T" for 10 and above to indicate trust signature levels (see the @option{--edit-key} command "tsign"). @item --locate-keys @opindex locate-keys Locate the keys given as arguments. This command basically uses the same algorithm as used when locating keys for encryption or signing and may thus be used to see what keys @command{@gpgname} might use. In particular external methods as defined by @option{--auto-key-locate} may be used to locate a key. Only public keys are listed. @item --show-keys @opindex show-keys This commands takes OpenPGP keys as input and prints information about them in the same way the command @option{--list-keys} does for locally stored key. In addition the list options @code{show-unusable-uids}, @code{show-unusable-subkeys}, @code{show-notations} and @code{show-policy-urls} are also enabled. As usual for automated processing, this command should be combined with the option @option{--with-colons}. @item --fingerprint @opindex fingerprint List all keys (or the specified ones) along with their fingerprints. This is the same output as @option{--list-keys} but with the additional output of a line with the fingerprint. May also be combined with @option{--check-signatures}. If this command is given twice, the fingerprints of all secondary keys are listed too. This command also forces pretty printing of fingerprints if the keyid format has been set to "none". @item --list-packets @opindex list-packets List only the sequence of packets. This command is only useful for debugging. When used with option @option{--verbose} the actual MPI values are dumped and not only their lengths. Note that the output of this command may change with new releases. @item --edit-card @opindex edit-card @itemx --card-edit @opindex card-edit Present a menu to work with a smartcard. The subcommand "help" provides an overview on available commands. For a detailed description, please see the Card HOWTO at https://gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html#GnuPG-cardHOWTO . @item --card-status @opindex card-status Show the content of the smart card. @item --change-pin @opindex change-pin Present a menu to allow changing the PIN of a smartcard. This functionality is also available as the subcommand "passwd" with the @option{--edit-card} command. @item --delete-keys @var{name} @opindex delete-keys Remove key from the public keyring. In batch mode either @option{--yes} is required or the key must be specified by fingerprint. This is a safeguard against accidental deletion of multiple keys. @item --delete-secret-keys @var{name} @opindex delete-secret-keys Remove key from the secret keyring. In batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint. The option @option{--yes} can be used to advice gpg-agent not to request a confirmation. This extra pre-caution is done because @command{@gpgname} can't be sure that the secret key (as controlled by gpg-agent) is only used for the given OpenPGP public key. @item --delete-secret-and-public-key @var{name} @opindex delete-secret-and-public-key Same as @option{--delete-key}, but if a secret key exists, it will be removed first. In batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint. The option @option{--yes} can be used to advice gpg-agent not to request a confirmation. @item --export @opindex export Either export all keys from all keyrings (default keyrings and those registered via option @option{--keyring}), or if at least one name is given, those of the given name. The exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. Use together with @option{--armor} to mail those keys. @item --send-keys @var{keyIDs} @opindex send-keys Similar to @option{--export} but sends the keys to a keyserver. Fingerprints may be used instead of key IDs. Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this keyserver. Don't send your complete keyring to a keyserver --- select only those keys which are new or changed by you. If no @var{keyIDs} are given, @command{@gpgname} does nothing. @item --export-secret-keys @itemx --export-secret-subkeys @opindex export-secret-keys @opindex export-secret-subkeys Same as @option{--export}, but exports the secret keys instead. The exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. This command is often used along with the option @option{--armor} to allow for easy printing of the key for paper backup; however the external tool @command{paperkey} does a better job of creating backups on paper. Note that exporting a secret key can be a security risk if the exported keys are sent over an insecure channel. The second form of the command has the special property to render the secret part of the primary key useless; this is a GNU extension to OpenPGP and other implementations can not be expected to successfully import such a key. Its intended use is in generating a full key with an additional signing subkey on a dedicated machine. This command then exports the key without the primary key to the main machine. GnuPG may ask you to enter the passphrase for the key. This is required, because the internal protection method of the secret key is different from the one specified by the OpenPGP protocol. @item --export-ssh-key @opindex export-ssh-key This command is used to export a key in the OpenSSH public key format. It requires the specification of one key by the usual means and exports the latest valid subkey which has an authentication capability to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. That output can directly be added to ssh's @file{authorized_key} file. By specifying the key to export using a key ID or a fingerprint suffixed with an exclamation mark (!), a specific subkey or the primary key can be exported. This does not even require that the key has the authentication capability flag set. @item --import @itemx --fast-import @opindex import Import/merge keys. This adds the given keys to the keyring. The fast version is currently just a synonym. There are a few other options which control how this command works. Most notable here is the @option{--import-options merge-only} option which does not insert new keys but does only the merging of new signatures, user-IDs and subkeys. @item --receive-keys @var{keyIDs} @opindex receive-keys @itemx --recv-keys @var{keyIDs} @opindex recv-keys Import the keys with the given @var{keyIDs} from a keyserver. Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this keyserver. @item --refresh-keys @opindex refresh-keys Request updates from a keyserver for keys that already exist on the local keyring. This is useful for updating a key with the latest signatures, user IDs, etc. Calling this with no arguments will refresh the entire keyring. Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of the keyserver for all keys that do not have preferred keyservers set (see @option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url}). @item --search-keys @var{names} @opindex search-keys Search the keyserver for the given @var{names}. Multiple names given here will be joined together to create the search string for the keyserver. Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this keyserver. Keyservers that support different search methods allow using the syntax specified in "How to specify a user ID" below. Note that different keyserver types support different search methods. Currently only LDAP supports them all. @item --fetch-keys @var{URIs} @opindex fetch-keys Retrieve keys located at the specified @var{URIs}. Note that different installations of GnuPG may support different protocols (HTTP, FTP, LDAP, etc.). When using HTTPS the system provided root certificates are used by this command. @item --update-trustdb @opindex update-trustdb Do trust database maintenance. This command iterates over all keys and builds the Web of Trust. This is an interactive command because it may have to ask for the "ownertrust" values for keys. The user has to give an estimation of how far she trusts the owner of the displayed key to correctly certify (sign) other keys. GnuPG only asks for the ownertrust value if it has not yet been assigned to a key. Using the @option{--edit-key} menu, the assigned value can be changed at any time. @item --check-trustdb @opindex check-trustdb Do trust database maintenance without user interaction. From time to time the trust database must be updated so that expired keys or signatures and the resulting changes in the Web of Trust can be tracked. Normally, GnuPG will calculate when this is required and do it automatically unless @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} is set. This command can be used to force a trust database check at any time. The processing is identical to that of @option{--update-trustdb} but it skips keys with a not yet defined "ownertrust". For use with cron jobs, this command can be used together with @option{--batch} in which case the trust database check is done only if a check is needed. To force a run even in batch mode add the option @option{--yes}. @anchor{option --export-ownertrust} @item --export-ownertrust @opindex export-ownertrust Send the ownertrust values to STDOUT. This is useful for backup purposes as these values are the only ones which can't be re-created from a corrupted trustdb. Example: @c man:.RS @example @gpgname{} --export-ownertrust > otrust.txt @end example @c man:.RE @item --import-ownertrust @opindex import-ownertrust Update the trustdb with the ownertrust values stored in @code{files} (or STDIN if not given); existing values will be overwritten. In case of a severely damaged trustdb and if you have a recent backup of the ownertrust values (e.g. in the file @file{otrust.txt}), you may re-create the trustdb using these commands: @c man:.RS @example cd ~/.gnupg rm trustdb.gpg @gpgname{} --import-ownertrust < otrust.txt @end example @c man:.RE @item --rebuild-keydb-caches @opindex rebuild-keydb-caches When updating from version 1.0.6 to 1.0.7 this command should be used to create signature caches in the keyring. It might be handy in other situations too. @item --print-md @var{algo} @itemx --print-mds @opindex print-md Print message digest of algorithm @var{algo} for all given files or STDIN. With the second form (or a deprecated "*" for @var{algo}) digests for all available algorithms are printed. @item --gen-random @var{0|1|2} @var{count} @opindex gen-random Emit @var{count} random bytes of the given quality level 0, 1 or 2. If @var{count} is not given or zero, an endless sequence of random bytes will be emitted. If used with @option{--armor} the output will be base64 encoded. PLEASE, don't use this command unless you know what you are doing; it may remove precious entropy from the system! @item --gen-prime @var{mode} @var{bits} @opindex gen-prime Use the source, Luke :-). The output format is subject to change with ant release. @item --enarmor @itemx --dearmor @opindex enarmor @opindex dearmor Pack or unpack an arbitrary input into/from an OpenPGP ASCII armor. This is a GnuPG extension to OpenPGP and in general not very useful. @item --tofu-policy @{auto|good|unknown|bad|ask@} @var{keys} @opindex tofu-policy Set the TOFU policy for all the bindings associated with the specified @var{keys}. For more information about the meaning of the policies, @pxref{trust-model-tofu}. The @var{keys} may be specified either by their fingerprint (preferred) or their keyid. @c @item --server @c @opindex server @c Run gpg in server mode. This feature is not yet ready for use and @c thus not documented. @end table @c ******************************************** @c ******* KEY MANAGEMENT COMMANDS ********** @c ******************************************** @node OpenPGP Key Management @subsection How to manage your keys This section explains the main commands for key management. @table @gnupgtabopt @item --quick-generate-key @var{user-id} [@var{algo} [@var{usage} [@var{expire}]]] @itemx --quick-gen-key @opindex quick-generate-key @opindex quick-gen-key This is a simple command to generate a standard key with one user id. In contrast to @option{--generate-key} the key is generated directly without the need to answer a bunch of prompts. Unless the option @option{--yes} is given, the key creation will be canceled if the given user id already exists in the keyring. If invoked directly on the console without any special options an answer to a ``Continue?'' style confirmation prompt is required. In case the user id already exists in the keyring a second prompt to force the creation of the key will show up. If @var{algo} or @var{usage} are given, only the primary key is created and no prompts are shown. To specify an expiration date but still create a primary and subkey use ``default'' or ``future-default'' for @var{algo} and ``default'' for @var{usage}. For a description of these optional arguments see the command @code{--quick-add-key}. The @var{usage} accepts also the value ``cert'' which can be used to create a certification only primary key; the default is to a create certification and signing key. The @var{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date for the key. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO formats ``YYYY-MM-DD'' or ``YYYYMMDDThhmmss'' are used. To make the key expire in N seconds, N days, N weeks, N months, or N years use ``seconds=N'', ``Nd'', ``Nw'', ``Nm'', or ``Ny'' respectively. Not specifying a value, or using ``-'' results in a key expiring in a reasonable default interval. The values ``never'', ``none'' can be used for no expiration date. If this command is used with @option{--batch}, @option{--pinentry-mode} has been set to @code{loopback}, and one of the passphrase options (@option{--passphrase}, @option{--passphrase-fd}, or @option{passphrase-file}) is used, the supplied passphrase is used for the new key and the agent does not ask for it. To create a key without any protection @code{--passphrase ''} may be used. Note that it is possible to create a primary key and a subkey using non-default algorithms by using ``default'' and changing the default parameters using the option @option{--default-new-key-algo}. @item --quick-set-expire @var{fpr} @var{expire} [*|@var{subfprs}] @opindex quick-set-expire With two arguments given, directly set the expiration time of the primary key identified by @var{fpr} to @var{expire}. To remove the expiration time @code{0} can be used. With three arguments and the third given as an asterisk, the expiration time of all non-revoked and not yet expired subkeys are set to @var{expire}. With more than two arguments and a list of fingerprints given for @var{subfprs}, all non-revoked subkeys matching these fingerprints are set to @var{expire}. @item --quick-add-key @var{fpr} [@var{algo} [@var{usage} [@var{expire}]]] @opindex quick-add-key Directly add a subkey to the key identified by the fingerprint @var{fpr}. Without the optional arguments an encryption subkey is added. If any of the arguments are given a more specific subkey is added. @var{algo} may be any of the supported algorithms or curve names given in the format as used by key listings. To use the default algorithm the string ``default'' or ``-'' can be used. Supported algorithms are ``rsa'', ``dsa'', ``elg'', ``ed25519'', ``cv25519'', and other ECC curves. For example the string ``rsa'' adds an RSA key with the default key length; a string ``rsa4096'' requests that the key length is 4096 bits. The string ``future-default'' is an alias for the algorithm which will likely be used as default algorithm in future versions of gpg. To list the supported ECC curves the command @code{gpg --with-colons --list-config curve} can be used. Depending on the given @var{algo} the subkey may either be an encryption subkey or a signing subkey. If an algorithm is capable of signing and encryption and such a subkey is desired, a @var{usage} string must be given. This string is either ``default'' or ``-'' to keep the default or a comma delimited list (or space delimited list) of keywords: ``sign'' for a signing subkey, ``auth'' for an authentication subkey, and ``encr'' for an encryption subkey (``encrypt'' can be used as alias for ``encr''). The valid combinations depend on the algorithm. The @var{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date for the key. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO formats ``YYYY-MM-DD'' or ``YYYYMMDDThhmmss'' are used. To make the key expire in N seconds, N days, N weeks, N months, or N years use ``seconds=N'', ``Nd'', ``Nw'', ``Nm'', or ``Ny'' respectively. Not specifying a value, or using ``-'' results in a key expiring in a reasonable default interval. The values ``never'', ``none'' can be used for no expiration date. @item --generate-key @opindex generate-key @itemx --gen-key @opindex gen-key Generate a new key pair using the current default parameters. This is the standard command to create a new key. In addition to the key a revocation certificate is created and stored in the @file{openpgp-revocs.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory. @item --full-generate-key @opindex full-generate-key @itemx --full-gen-key @opindex full-gen-key Generate a new key pair with dialogs for all options. This is an extended version of @option{--generate-key}. There is also a feature which allows you to create keys in batch mode. See the manual section ``Unattended key generation'' on how to use this. @item --generate-revocation @var{name} @opindex generate-revocation @itemx --gen-revoke @var{name} @opindex gen-revoke Generate a revocation certificate for the complete key. To only revoke a subkey or a key signature, use the @option{--edit} command. This command merely creates the revocation certificate so that it can be used to revoke the key if that is ever needed. To actually revoke a key the created revocation certificate needs to be merged with the key to revoke. This is done by importing the revocation certificate using the @option{--import} command. Then the revoked key needs to be published, which is best done by sending the key to a keyserver (command @option{--send-key}) and by exporting (@option{--export}) it to a file which is then send to frequent communication partners. @item --generate-designated-revocation @var{name} @opindex generate-designated-revocation @itemx --desig-revoke @var{name} @opindex desig-revoke Generate a designated revocation certificate for a key. This allows a user (with the permission of the keyholder) to revoke someone else's key. @item --edit-key @opindex edit-key Present a menu which enables you to do most of the key management related tasks. It expects the specification of a key on the command line. @c ******** Begin Edit-key Options ********** @table @asis @item uid @var{n} @opindex keyedit:uid Toggle selection of user ID or photographic user ID with index @var{n}. Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all. @item key @var{n} @opindex keyedit:key Toggle selection of subkey with index @var{n} or key ID @var{n}. Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all. @item sign @opindex keyedit:sign Make a signature on key of user @code{name}. If the key is not yet signed by the default user (or the users given with @option{-u}), the program displays the information of the key again, together with its fingerprint and asks whether it should be signed. This question is repeated for all users specified with @option{-u}. @item lsign @opindex keyedit:lsign Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-exportable and will therefore never be used by others. This may be used to make keys valid only in the local environment. @item nrsign @opindex keyedit:nrsign Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-revocable and can therefore never be revoked. @item tsign @opindex keyedit:tsign Make a trust signature. This is a signature that combines the notions of certification (like a regular signature), and trust (like the "trust" command). It is generally only useful in distinct communities or groups. For more information please read the sections ``Trust Signature'' and ``Regular Expression'' in RFC-4880. @end table @c man:.RS Note that "l" (for local / non-exportable), "nr" (for non-revocable, and "t" (for trust) may be freely mixed and prefixed to "sign" to create a signature of any type desired. @c man:.RE If the option @option{--only-sign-text-ids} is specified, then any non-text based user ids (e.g., photo IDs) will not be selected for signing. @table @asis @item delsig @opindex keyedit:delsig Delete a signature. Note that it is not possible to retract a signature, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revsig}. @item revsig @opindex keyedit:revsig Revoke a signature. For every signature which has been generated by one of the secret keys, GnuPG asks whether a revocation certificate should be generated. @item check @opindex keyedit:check Check the signatures on all selected user IDs. With the extra option @code{selfsig} only self-signatures are shown. @item adduid @opindex keyedit:adduid Create an additional user ID. @item addphoto @opindex keyedit:addphoto Create a photographic user ID. This will prompt for a JPEG file that will be embedded into the user ID. Note that a very large JPEG will make for a very large key. Also note that some programs will display your JPEG unchanged (GnuPG), and some programs will scale it to fit in a dialog box (PGP). @item showphoto @opindex keyedit:showphoto Display the selected photographic user ID. @item deluid @opindex keyedit:deluid Delete a user ID or photographic user ID. Note that it is not possible to retract a user id, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revuid}. @item revuid @opindex keyedit:revuid Revoke a user ID or photographic user ID. @item primary @opindex keyedit:primary Flag the current user id as the primary one, removes the primary user id flag from all other user ids and sets the timestamp of all affected self-signatures one second ahead. Note that setting a photo user ID as primary makes it primary over other photo user IDs, and setting a regular user ID as primary makes it primary over other regular user IDs. @item keyserver @opindex keyedit:keyserver Set a preferred keyserver for the specified user ID(s). This allows other users to know where you prefer they get your key from. See @option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url} for more on how this works. Setting a value of "none" removes an existing preferred keyserver. @item notation @opindex keyedit:notation Set a name=value notation for the specified user ID(s). See @option{--cert-notation} for more on how this works. Setting a value of "none" removes all notations, setting a notation prefixed with a minus sign (-) removes that notation, and setting a notation name (without the =value) prefixed with a minus sign removes all notations with that name. @item pref @opindex keyedit:pref List preferences from the selected user ID. This shows the actual preferences, without including any implied preferences. @item showpref @opindex keyedit:showpref More verbose preferences listing for the selected user ID. This shows the preferences in effect by including the implied preferences of 3DES (cipher), SHA-1 (digest), and Uncompressed (compression) if they are not already included in the preference list. In addition, the preferred keyserver and signature notations (if any) are shown. @item setpref @var{string} @opindex keyedit:setpref Set the list of user ID preferences to @var{string} for all (or just the selected) user IDs. Calling setpref with no arguments sets the preference list to the default (either built-in or set via @option{--default-preference-list}), and calling setpref with "none" as the argument sets an empty preference list. Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms. Note that while you can change the preferences on an attribute user ID (aka "photo ID"), GnuPG does not select keys via attribute user IDs so these preferences will not be used by GnuPG. When setting preferences, you should list the algorithms in the order which you'd like to see them used by someone else when encrypting a message to your key. If you don't include 3DES, it will be automatically added at the end. Note that there are many factors that go into choosing an algorithm (for example, your key may not be the only recipient), and so the remote OpenPGP application being used to send to you may or may not follow your exact chosen order for a given message. It will, however, only choose an algorithm that is present on the preference list of every recipient key. See also the INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below. @item addkey @opindex keyedit:addkey Add a subkey to this key. @item addcardkey @opindex keyedit:addcardkey Generate a subkey on a card and add it to this key. @item keytocard @opindex keyedit:keytocard Transfer the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey has been selected) to a smartcard. The secret key in the keyring will be replaced by a stub if the key could be stored successfully on the card and you use the save command later. Only certain key types may be transferred to the card. A sub menu allows you to select on what card to store the key. Note that it is not possible to get that key back from the card - if the card gets broken your secret key will be lost unless you have a backup somewhere. @item bkuptocard @var{file} @opindex keyedit:bkuptocard Restore the given @var{file} to a card. This command may be used to restore a backup key (as generated during card initialization) to a new card. In almost all cases this will be the encryption key. You should use this command only with the corresponding public key and make sure that the file given as argument is indeed the backup to restore. You should then select 2 to restore as encryption key. You will first be asked to enter the passphrase of the backup key and then for the Admin PIN of the card. @item delkey @opindex keyedit:delkey Remove a subkey (secondary key). Note that it is not possible to retract a subkey, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revkey}. Also note that this only deletes the public part of a key. @item revkey @opindex keyedit:revkey Revoke a subkey. @item expire @opindex keyedit:expire Change the key or subkey expiration time. If a subkey is selected, the expiration time of this subkey will be changed. With no selection, the key expiration of the primary key is changed. @item trust @opindex keyedit:trust Change the owner trust value for the key. This updates the trust-db immediately and no save is required. @item disable @itemx enable @opindex keyedit:disable @opindex keyedit:enable Disable or enable an entire key. A disabled key can not normally be used for encryption. @item addrevoker @opindex keyedit:addrevoker Add a designated revoker to the key. This takes one optional argument: "sensitive". If a designated revoker is marked as sensitive, it will not be exported by default (see export-options). @item passwd @opindex keyedit:passwd Change the passphrase of the secret key. @item toggle @opindex keyedit:toggle This is dummy command which exists only for backward compatibility. @item clean @opindex keyedit:clean Compact (by removing all signatures except the selfsig) any user ID that is no longer usable (e.g. revoked, or expired). Then, remove any signatures that are not usable by the trust calculations. Specifically, this removes any signature that does not validate, any signature that is superseded by a later signature, revoked signatures, and signatures issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. @item minimize @opindex keyedit:minimize Make the key as small as possible. This removes all signatures from each user ID except for the most recent self-signature. @item change-usage @opindex keyedit:change-usage Change the usage flags (capabilities) of the primary key or of subkeys. These usage flags (e.g. Certify, Sign, Authenticate, Encrypt) are set during key creation. Sometimes it is useful to have the opportunity to change them (for example to add Authenticate) after they have been created. Please take care when doing this; the allowed usage flags depend on the key algorithm. @item cross-certify @opindex keyedit:cross-certify Add cross-certification signatures to signing subkeys that may not currently have them. Cross-certification signatures protect against a subtle attack against signing subkeys. See @option{--require-cross-certification}. All new keys generated have this signature by default, so this command is only useful to bring older keys up to date. @item save @opindex keyedit:save Save all changes to the keyrings and quit. @item quit @opindex keyedit:quit Quit the program without updating the keyrings. @end table @c man:.RS The listing shows you the key with its secondary keys and all user IDs. The primary user ID is indicated by a dot, and selected keys or user IDs are indicated by an asterisk. The trust value is displayed with the primary key: "trust" is the assigned owner trust and "validity" is the calculated validity of the key. Validity values are also displayed for all user IDs. For possible values of trust, @pxref{trust-values}. @c man:.RE @c ******** End Edit-key Options ********** @item --sign-key @var{name} @opindex sign-key Signs a public key with your secret key. This is a shortcut version of the subcommand "sign" from @option{--edit}. @item --lsign-key @var{name} @opindex lsign-key Signs a public key with your secret key but marks it as non-exportable. This is a shortcut version of the subcommand "lsign" from @option{--edit-key}. @item --quick-sign-key @var{fpr} [@var{names}] @itemx --quick-lsign-key @var{fpr} [@var{names}] @opindex quick-sign-key @opindex quick-lsign-key Directly sign a key from the passphrase without any further user interaction. The @var{fpr} must be the verified primary fingerprint of a key in the local keyring. If no @var{names} are given, all useful user ids are signed; with given [@var{names}] only useful user ids matching one of theses names are signed. By default, or if a name is prefixed with a '*', a case insensitive substring match is used. If a name is prefixed with a '=' a case sensitive exact match is done. The command @option{--quick-lsign-key} marks the signatures as non-exportable. If such a non-exportable signature already exists the @option{--quick-sign-key} turns it into a exportable signature. This command uses reasonable defaults and thus does not provide the full flexibility of the "sign" subcommand from @option{--edit-key}. Its intended use is to help unattended key signing by utilizing a list of verified fingerprints. @item --quick-add-uid @var{user-id} @var{new-user-id} @opindex quick-add-uid This command adds a new user id to an existing key. In contrast to the interactive sub-command @code{adduid} of @option{--edit-key} the @var{new-user-id} is added verbatim with only leading and trailing white space removed, it is expected to be UTF-8 encoded, and no checks on its form are applied. @item --quick-revoke-uid @var{user-id} @var{user-id-to-revoke} @opindex quick-revoke-uid This command revokes a user ID on an existing key. It cannot be used to revoke the last user ID on key (some non-revoked user ID must remain), with revocation reason ``User ID is no longer valid''. If you want to specify a different revocation reason, or to supply supplementary revocation text, you should use the interactive sub-command @code{revuid} of @option{--edit-key}. @item --quick-set-primary-uid @var{user-id} @var{primary-user-id} @opindex quick-set-primary-uid This command sets or updates the primary user ID flag on an existing key. @var{user-id} specifies the key and @var{primary-user-id} the user ID which shall be flagged as the primary user ID. The primary user ID flag is removed from all other user ids and the timestamp of all affected self-signatures is set one second ahead. @item --change-passphrase @var{user-id} @opindex change-passphrase @itemx --passwd @var{user-id} @opindex passwd Change the passphrase of the secret key belonging to the certificate specified as @var{user-id}. This is a shortcut for the sub-command @code{passwd} of the edit key menu. When using together with the option @option{--dry-run} this will not actually change the passphrase but check that the current passphrase is correct. @end table @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** OPTIONS **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect options @node GPG Options @section Option Summary @command{@gpgname} features a bunch of options to control the exact behaviour and to change the default configuration. @menu * GPG Configuration Options:: How to change the configuration. * GPG Key related Options:: Key related options. * GPG Input and Output:: Input and Output. * OpenPGP Options:: OpenPGP protocol specific options. * Compliance Options:: Compliance options. * GPG Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually doesn't want to do. * Deprecated Options:: Deprecated options. @end menu Long options can be put in an options file (default "~/.gnupg/gpg.conf"). Short option names will not work - for example, "armor" is a valid option for the options file, while "a" is not. Do not write the 2 dashes, but simply the name of the option and any required arguments. Lines with a hash ('#') as the first non-white-space character are ignored. Commands may be put in this file too, but that is not generally useful as the command will execute automatically with every execution of gpg. Please remember that option parsing stops as soon as a non-option is encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by using the special option @option{--}. @c ******************************************* @c ******** CONFIGURATION OPTIONS ********** @c ******************************************* @node GPG Configuration Options @subsection How to change the configuration These options are used to change the configuration and are usually found in the option file. @table @gnupgtabopt @item --default-key @var{name} @opindex default-key Use @var{name} as the default key to sign with. If this option is not used, the default key is the first key found in the secret keyring. Note that @option{-u} or @option{--local-user} overrides this option. This option may be given multiple times. In this case, the last key for which a secret key is available is used. If there is no secret key available for any of the specified values, GnuPG will not emit an error message but continue as if this option wasn't given. @item --default-recipient @var{name} @opindex default-recipient Use @var{name} as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is not used and don't ask if this is a valid one. @var{name} must be non-empty. @item --default-recipient-self @opindex default-recipient-self Use the default key as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is not used and don't ask if this is a valid one. The default key is the first one from the secret keyring or the one set with @option{--default-key}. @item --no-default-recipient @opindex no-default-recipient Reset @option{--default-recipient} and @option{--default-recipient-self}. @item -v, --verbose @opindex verbose Give more information during processing. If used twice, the input data is listed in detail. @item --no-verbose @opindex no-verbose Reset verbose level to 0. @item -q, --quiet @opindex quiet Try to be as quiet as possible. @item --batch @itemx --no-batch @opindex batch @opindex no-batch Use batch mode. Never ask, do not allow interactive commands. @option{--no-batch} disables this option. Note that even with a filename given on the command line, gpg might still need to read from STDIN (in particular if gpg figures that the input is a detached signature and no data file has been specified). Thus if you do not want to feed data via STDIN, you should connect STDIN to g@file{/dev/null}. It is highly recommended to use this option along with the options @option{--status-fd} and @option{--with-colons} for any unattended use of @command{gpg}. @item --no-tty @opindex no-tty Make sure that the TTY (terminal) is never used for any output. This option is needed in some cases because GnuPG sometimes prints warnings to the TTY even if @option{--batch} is used. @item --yes @opindex yes Assume "yes" on most questions. @item --no @opindex no Assume "no" on most questions. @item --list-options @var{parameters} @opindex list-options This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when listing keys and signatures (that is, @option{--list-keys}, @option{--check-signatures}, @option{--list-public-keys}, @option{--list-secret-keys}, and the @option{--edit-key} functions). Options can be prepended with a @option{no-} (after the two dashes) to give the opposite meaning. The options are: @table @asis @item show-photos @opindex list-options:show-photos Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--check-signatures}, @option{--list-public-keys}, and @option{--list-secret-keys} to display any photo IDs attached to the key. Defaults to no. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. Does not work with @option{--with-colons}: see @option{--attribute-fd} for the appropriate way to get photo data for scripts and other frontends. @item show-usage @opindex list-options:show-usage Show usage information for keys and subkeys in the standard key listing. This is a list of letters indicating the allowed usage for a key (@code{E}=encryption, @code{S}=signing, @code{C}=certification, @code{A}=authentication). Defaults to yes. @item show-policy-urls @opindex list-options:show-policy-urls Show policy URLs in the @option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no. @item show-notations @itemx show-std-notations @itemx show-user-notations @opindex list-options:show-notations @opindex list-options:show-std-notations @opindex list-options:show-user-notations Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the @option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no. @item show-keyserver-urls @opindex list-options:show-keyserver-urls Show any preferred keyserver URL in the @option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no. @item show-uid-validity @opindex list-options:show-uid-validity Display the calculated validity of user IDs during key listings. Defaults to yes. @item show-unusable-uids @opindex list-options:show-unusable-uids Show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings. Defaults to no. @item show-unusable-subkeys @opindex list-options:show-unusable-subkeys Show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings. Defaults to no. @item show-keyring @opindex list-options:show-keyring Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which keyring a given key resides on. Defaults to no. @item show-sig-expire @opindex list-options:show-sig-expire Show signature expiration dates (if any) during @option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no. @item show-sig-subpackets @opindex list-options:show-sig-subpackets Include signature subpackets in the key listing. This option can take an optional argument list of the subpackets to list. If no argument is passed, list all subpackets. Defaults to no. This option is only meaningful when using @option{--with-colons} along with @option{--check-signatures}. @item show-only-fpr-mbox @opindex list-options:show-only-fpr-mbox For each valid user-id which also has a valid mail address print only the fingerprint and the mail address. @end table @item --verify-options @var{parameters} @opindex verify-options This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when verifying signatures. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the opposite meaning. The options are: @table @asis @item show-photos @opindex verify-options:show-photos Display any photo IDs present on the key that issued the signature. Defaults to no. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. @item show-policy-urls @opindex verify-options:show-policy-urls Show policy URLs in the signature being verified. Defaults to yes. @item show-notations @itemx show-std-notations @itemx show-user-notations @opindex verify-options:show-notations @opindex verify-options:show-std-notations @opindex verify-options:show-user-notations Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the signature being verified. Defaults to IETF standard. @item show-keyserver-urls @opindex verify-options:show-keyserver-urls Show any preferred keyserver URL in the signature being verified. Defaults to yes. @item show-uid-validity @opindex verify-options:show-uid-validity Display the calculated validity of the user IDs on the key that issued the signature. Defaults to yes. @item show-unusable-uids @opindex verify-options:show-unusable-uids Show revoked and expired user IDs during signature verification. Defaults to no. @item show-primary-uid-only @opindex verify-options:show-primary-uid-only Show only the primary user ID during signature verification. That is all the AKA lines as well as photo Ids are not shown with the signature verification status. @item pka-lookups @opindex verify-options:pka-lookups Enable PKA lookups to verify sender addresses. Note that PKA is based on DNS, and so enabling this option may disclose information on when and what signatures are verified or to whom data is encrypted. This is similar to the "web bug" described for the @option{--auto-key-retrieve} option. @item pka-trust-increase @opindex verify-options:pka-trust-increase Raise the trust in a signature to full if the signature passes PKA validation. This option is only meaningful if pka-lookups is set. @end table @item --enable-large-rsa @itemx --disable-large-rsa @opindex enable-large-rsa @opindex disable-large-rsa With --generate-key and --batch, enable the creation of RSA secret keys as large as 8192 bit. Note: 8192 bit is more than is generally recommended. These large keys don't significantly improve security, but they are more expensive to use, and their signatures and certifications are larger. This option is only available if the binary was build with large-secmem support. @item --enable-dsa2 @itemx --disable-dsa2 @opindex enable-dsa2 @opindex disable-dsa2 Enable hash truncation for all DSA keys even for old DSA Keys up to 1024 bit. This is also the default with @option{--openpgp}. Note that older versions of GnuPG also required this flag to allow the generation of DSA larger than 1024 bit. @item --photo-viewer @var{string} @opindex photo-viewer This is the command line that should be run to view a photo ID. "%i" will be expanded to a filename containing the photo. "%I" does the same, except the file will not be deleted once the viewer exits. Other flags are "%k" for the key ID, "%K" for the long key ID, "%f" for the key fingerprint, "%t" for the extension of the image type (e.g. "jpg"), "%T" for the MIME type of the image (e.g. "image/jpeg"), "%v" for the single-character calculated validity of the image being viewed (e.g. "f"), "%V" for the calculated validity as a string (e.g. "full"), "%U" for a base32 encoded hash of the user ID, and "%%" for an actual percent sign. If neither %i or %I are present, then the photo will be supplied to the viewer on standard input. The default viewer is "xloadimage -fork -quiet -title 'KeyID 0x%k' STDIN". Note that if your image viewer program is not secure, then executing it from GnuPG does not make it secure. @item --exec-path @var{string} @opindex exec-path @efindex PATH Sets a list of directories to search for photo viewers and keyserver helpers. If not provided, keyserver helpers use the compiled-in default directory, and photo viewers use the @code{PATH} environment variable. Note, that on W32 system this value is ignored when searching for keyserver helpers. @item --keyring @var{file} @opindex keyring Add @var{file} to the current list of keyrings. If @var{file} begins with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG home directory ("~/.gnupg" if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is not used). Note that this adds a keyring to the current list. If the intent is to use the specified keyring alone, use @option{--keyring} along with @option{--no-default-keyring}. If the option @option{--no-keyring} has been used no keyrings will be used at all. @item --secret-keyring @var{file} @opindex secret-keyring This is an obsolete option and ignored. All secret keys are stored in the @file{private-keys-v1.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory. @item --primary-keyring @var{file} @opindex primary-keyring Designate @var{file} as the primary public keyring. This means that newly imported keys (via @option{--import} or keyserver @option{--recv-from}) will go to this keyring. @item --trustdb-name @var{file} @opindex trustdb-name Use @var{file} instead of the default trustdb. If @var{file} begins with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG home directory (@file{~/.gnupg} if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is not used). @include opt-homedir.texi @item --display-charset @var{name} @opindex display-charset Set the name of the native character set. This is used to convert some informational strings like user IDs to the proper UTF-8 encoding. Note that this has nothing to do with the character set of data to be encrypted or signed; GnuPG does not recode user-supplied data. If this option is not used, the default character set is determined from the current locale. A verbosity level of 3 shows the chosen set. Valid values for @var{name} are: @table @asis @item iso-8859-1 @opindex display-charset:iso-8859-1 This is the Latin 1 set. @item iso-8859-2 @opindex display-charset:iso-8859-2 The Latin 2 set. @item iso-8859-15 @opindex display-charset:iso-8859-15 This is currently an alias for the Latin 1 set. @item koi8-r @opindex display-charset:koi8-r The usual Russian set (RFC-1489). @item utf-8 @opindex display-charset:utf-8 Bypass all translations and assume that the OS uses native UTF-8 encoding. @end table @item --utf8-strings @itemx --no-utf8-strings @opindex utf8-strings Assume that command line arguments are given as UTF-8 strings. The default (@option{--no-utf8-strings}) is to assume that arguments are encoded in the character set as specified by @option{--display-charset}. These options affect all following arguments. Both options may be used multiple times. @anchor{gpg-option --options} @item --options @var{file} @opindex options Read options from @var{file} and do not try to read them from the default options file in the homedir (see @option{--homedir}). This option is ignored if used in an options file. @item --no-options @opindex no-options Shortcut for @option{--options /dev/null}. This option is detected before an attempt to open an option file. Using this option will also prevent the creation of a @file{~/.gnupg} homedir. @item -z @var{n} @itemx --compress-level @var{n} @itemx --bzip2-compress-level @var{n} @opindex compress-level @opindex bzip2-compress-level Set compression level to @var{n} for the ZIP and ZLIB compression algorithms. The default is to use the default compression level of zlib (normally 6). @option{--bzip2-compress-level} sets the compression level for the BZIP2 compression algorithm (defaulting to 6 as well). This is a different option from @option{--compress-level} since BZIP2 uses a significant amount of memory for each additional compression level. @option{-z} sets both. A value of 0 for @var{n} disables compression. @item --bzip2-decompress-lowmem @opindex bzip2-decompress-lowmem Use a different decompression method for BZIP2 compressed files. This alternate method uses a bit more than half the memory, but also runs at half the speed. This is useful under extreme low memory circumstances when the file was originally compressed at a high @option{--bzip2-compress-level}. @item --mangle-dos-filenames @itemx --no-mangle-dos-filenames @opindex mangle-dos-filenames @opindex no-mangle-dos-filenames Older version of Windows cannot handle filenames with more than one dot. @option{--mangle-dos-filenames} causes GnuPG to replace (rather than add to) the extension of an output filename to avoid this problem. This option is off by default and has no effect on non-Windows platforms. @item --ask-cert-level @itemx --no-ask-cert-level @opindex ask-cert-level When making a key signature, prompt for a certification level. If this option is not specified, the certification level used is set via @option{--default-cert-level}. See @option{--default-cert-level} for information on the specific levels and how they are used. @option{--no-ask-cert-level} disables this option. This option defaults to no. @item --default-cert-level @var{n} @opindex default-cert-level The default to use for the check level when signing a key. 0 means you make no particular claim as to how carefully you verified the key. 1 means you believe the key is owned by the person who claims to own it but you could not, or did not verify the key at all. This is useful for a "persona" verification, where you sign the key of a pseudonymous user. 2 means you did casual verification of the key. For example, this could mean that you verified the key fingerprint and checked the user ID on the key against a photo ID. 3 means you did extensive verification of the key. For example, this could mean that you verified the key fingerprint with the owner of the key in person, and that you checked, by means of a hard to forge document with a photo ID (such as a passport) that the name of the key owner matches the name in the user ID on the key, and finally that you verified (by exchange of email) that the email address on the key belongs to the key owner. Note that the examples given above for levels 2 and 3 are just that: examples. In the end, it is up to you to decide just what "casual" and "extensive" mean to you. This option defaults to 0 (no particular claim). @item --min-cert-level @opindex min-cert-level When building the trust database, treat any signatures with a certification level below this as invalid. Defaults to 2, which disregards level 1 signatures. Note that level 0 "no particular claim" signatures are always accepted. @item --trusted-key @var{long key ID} @opindex trusted-key Assume that the specified key (which must be given as a full 8 byte key ID) is as trustworthy as one of your own secret keys. This option is useful if you don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them) online but still want to be able to check the validity of a given recipient's or signator's key. @item --trust-model @{pgp|classic|tofu|tofu+pgp|direct|always|auto@} @opindex trust-model Set what trust model GnuPG should follow. The models are: @table @asis @item pgp @opindex trust-model:pgp This is the Web of Trust combined with trust signatures as used in PGP 5.x and later. This is the default trust model when creating a new trust database. @item classic @opindex trust-model:classic This is the standard Web of Trust as introduced by PGP 2. @item tofu @opindex trust-model:tofu @anchor{trust-model-tofu} TOFU stands for Trust On First Use. In this trust model, the first time a key is seen, it is memorized. If later another key with a user id with the same email address is seen, both keys are marked as suspect. In that case, the next time either is used, a warning is displayed describing the conflict, why it might have occurred (either the user generated a new key and failed to cross sign the old and new keys, the key is forgery, or a man-in-the-middle attack is being attempted), and the user is prompted to manually confirm the validity of the key in question. Because a potential attacker is able to control the email address and thereby circumvent the conflict detection algorithm by using an email address that is similar in appearance to a trusted email address, whenever a message is verified, statistics about the number of messages signed with the key are shown. In this way, a user can easily identify attacks using fake keys for regular correspondents. When compared with the Web of Trust, TOFU offers significantly weaker security guarantees. In particular, TOFU only helps ensure consistency (that is, that the binding between a key and email address doesn't change). A major advantage of TOFU is that it requires little maintenance to use correctly. To use the web of trust properly, you need to actively sign keys and mark users as trusted introducers. This is a time-consuming process and anecdotal evidence suggests that even security-conscious users rarely take the time to do this thoroughly and instead rely on an ad-hoc TOFU process. In the TOFU model, policies are associated with bindings between keys and email addresses (which are extracted from user ids and normalized). There are five policies, which can be set manually using the @option{--tofu-policy} option. The default policy can be set using the @option{--tofu-default-policy} option. The TOFU policies are: @code{auto}, @code{good}, @code{unknown}, @code{bad} and @code{ask}. The @code{auto} policy is used by default (unless overridden by @option{--tofu-default-policy}) and marks a binding as marginally trusted. The @code{good}, @code{unknown} and @code{bad} policies mark a binding as fully trusted, as having unknown trust or as having trust never, respectively. The @code{unknown} policy is useful for just using TOFU to detect conflicts, but to never assign positive trust to a binding. The final policy, @code{ask} prompts the user to indicate the binding's trust. If batch mode is enabled (or input is inappropriate in the context), then the user is not prompted and the @code{undefined} trust level is returned. @item tofu+pgp @opindex trust-model:tofu+pgp This trust model combines TOFU with the Web of Trust. This is done by computing the trust level for each model and then taking the maximum trust level where the trust levels are ordered as follows: @code{unknown < undefined < marginal < fully < ultimate < expired < never}. By setting @option{--tofu-default-policy=unknown}, this model can be used to implement the web of trust with TOFU's conflict detection algorithm, but without its assignment of positive trust values, which some security-conscious users don't like. @item direct @opindex trust-model:direct Key validity is set directly by the user and not calculated via the Web of Trust. This model is solely based on the key and does not distinguish user IDs. Note that when changing to another trust model the trust values assigned to a key are transformed into ownertrust values, which also indicate how you trust the owner of the key to sign other keys. @item always @opindex trust-model:always Skip key validation and assume that used keys are always fully valid. You generally won't use this unless you are using some external validation scheme. This option also suppresses the "[uncertain]" tag printed with signature checks when there is no evidence that the user ID is bound to the key. Note that this trust model still does not allow the use of expired, revoked, or disabled keys. @item auto @opindex trust-model:auto Select the trust model depending on whatever the internal trust database says. This is the default model if such a database already exists. Note that a tofu trust model is not considered here and must be enabled explicitly. @end table @item --auto-key-locate @var{mechanisms} @itemx --no-auto-key-locate @opindex auto-key-locate GnuPG can automatically locate and retrieve keys as needed using this option. This happens when encrypting to an email address (in the "user@@example.com" form), and there are no "user@@example.com" keys on the local keyring. This option takes any number of the mechanisms listed below, in the order they are to be tried. Instead of listing the mechanisms as comma delimited arguments, the option may also be given several times to add more mechanism. The option @option{--no-auto-key-locate} or the mechanism "clear" resets the list. The default is "local,wkd". @table @asis @item cert Locate a key using DNS CERT, as specified in RFC-4398. @item pka Locate a key using DNS PKA. @item dane Locate a key using DANE, as specified in draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-05.txt. @item wkd Locate a key using the Web Key Directory protocol. @item ldap Using DNS Service Discovery, check the domain in question for any LDAP keyservers to use. If this fails, attempt to locate the key using the PGP Universal method of checking @samp{ldap://keys.(thedomain)}. @item keyserver Locate a key using whatever keyserver is defined using the @option{--keyserver} option. @item keyserver-URL In addition, a keyserver URL as used in the @option{--keyserver} option may be used here to query that particular keyserver. @item local Locate the key using the local keyrings. This mechanism allows the user to select the order a local key lookup is done. Thus using @samp{--auto-key-locate local} is identical to @option{--no-auto-key-locate}. @item nodefault This flag disables the standard local key lookup, done before any of the mechanisms defined by the @option{--auto-key-locate} are tried. The position of this mechanism in the list does not matter. It is not required if @code{local} is also used. @item clear Clear all defined mechanisms. This is useful to override mechanisms given in a config file. Note that a @code{nodefault} in @var{mechanisms} will also be cleared unless it is given after the @code{clear}. @end table @item --auto-key-retrieve @itemx --no-auto-key-retrieve @opindex auto-key-retrieve @opindex no-auto-key-retrieve These options enable or disable the automatic retrieving of keys from a keyserver when verifying signatures made by keys that are not on the local keyring. The default is @option{--no-auto-key-retrieve}. If the method "wkd" is included in the list of methods given to @option{auto-key-locate}, the signer's user ID is part of the signature, and the option @option{--disable-signer-uid} is not used, the "wkd" method may also be used to retrieve a key. Note that this option makes a "web bug" like behavior possible. Keyserver or Web Key Directory operators can see which keys you request, so by sending you a message signed by a brand new key (which you naturally will not have on your local keyring), the operator can tell both your IP address and the time when you verified the signature. @item --keyid-format @{none|short|0xshort|long|0xlong@} @opindex keyid-format Select how to display key IDs. "none" does not show the key ID at all but shows the fingerprint in a separate line. "short" is the traditional 8-character key ID. "long" is the more accurate (but less convenient) 16-character key ID. Add an "0x" to either to include an "0x" at the beginning of the key ID, as in 0x99242560. Note that this option is ignored if the option @option{--with-colons} is used. @item --keyserver @var{name} @opindex keyserver This option is deprecated - please use the @option{--keyserver} in @file{dirmngr.conf} instead. Use @var{name} as your keyserver. This is the server that @option{--receive-keys}, @option{--send-keys}, and @option{--search-keys} will communicate with to receive keys from, send keys to, and search for keys on. The format of the @var{name} is a URI: `scheme:[//]keyservername[:port]' The scheme is the type of keyserver: "hkp" for the HTTP (or compatible) keyservers, "ldap" for the LDAP keyservers, or "mailto" for the Graff email keyserver. Note that your particular installation of GnuPG may have other keyserver types available as well. Keyserver schemes are case-insensitive. After the keyserver name, optional keyserver configuration options may be provided. These are the same as the global @option{--keyserver-options} from below, but apply only to this particular keyserver. Most keyservers synchronize with each other, so there is generally no need to send keys to more than one server. The keyserver @code{hkp://keys.gnupg.net} uses round robin DNS to give a different keyserver each time you use it. @item --keyserver-options @{@var{name}=@var{value}@} @opindex keyserver-options This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for the keyserver. Options can be prefixed with a `no-' to give the opposite meaning. Valid import-options or export-options may be used here as well to apply to importing (@option{--recv-key}) or exporting (@option{--send-key}) a key from a keyserver. While not all options are available for all keyserver types, some common options are: @table @asis @item include-revoked When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that are marked on the keyserver as revoked. Note that not all keyservers differentiate between revoked and unrevoked keys, and for such keyservers this option is meaningless. Note also that most keyservers do not have cryptographic verification of key revocations, and so turning this option off may result in skipping keys that are incorrectly marked as revoked. @item include-disabled When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that are marked on the keyserver as disabled. Note that this option is not used with HKP keyservers. @item auto-key-retrieve This is an obsolete alias for the option @option{auto-key-retrieve}. Please do not use it; it will be removed in future versions.. @item honor-keyserver-url When using @option{--refresh-keys}, if the key in question has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to refresh the key from. In addition, if auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature being verified has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to fetch the key from. Note that this option introduces a "web bug": The creator of the key can see when the keys is refreshed. Thus this option is not enabled by default. @item honor-pka-record If @option{--auto-key-retrieve} is used, and the signature being verified has a PKA record, then use the PKA information to fetch the key. Defaults to "yes". @item include-subkeys When receiving a key, include subkeys as potential targets. Note that this option is not used with HKP keyservers, as they do not support retrieving keys by subkey id. @item timeout @itemx http-proxy=@var{value} @itemx verbose @itemx debug @itemx check-cert @item ca-cert-file These options have no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the @code{dirmngr} configuration options instead. @end table @item --completes-needed @var{n} @opindex compliant-needed Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new key signer (defaults to 1). @item --marginals-needed @var{n} @opindex marginals-needed Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new key signer (defaults to 3) @item --tofu-default-policy @{auto|good|unknown|bad|ask@} @opindex tofu-default-policy The default TOFU policy (defaults to @code{auto}). For more information about the meaning of this option, @pxref{trust-model-tofu}. @item --max-cert-depth @var{n} @opindex max-cert-depth Maximum depth of a certification chain (default is 5). @item --no-sig-cache @opindex no-sig-cache Do not cache the verification status of key signatures. Caching gives a much better performance in key listings. However, if you suspect that your public keyring is not safe against write modifications, you can use this option to disable the caching. It probably does not make sense to disable it because all kind of damage can be done if someone else has write access to your public keyring. @item --auto-check-trustdb @itemx --no-auto-check-trustdb @opindex auto-check-trustdb If GnuPG feels that its information about the Web of Trust has to be updated, it automatically runs the @option{--check-trustdb} command internally. This may be a time consuming process. @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} disables this option. @item --use-agent @itemx --no-use-agent @opindex use-agent This is dummy option. @command{@gpgname} always requires the agent. @item --gpg-agent-info @opindex gpg-agent-info This is dummy option. It has no effect when used with @command{@gpgname}. @item --agent-program @var{file} @opindex agent-program Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The default value is determined by running @command{gpgconf} with the option @option{--list-dirs}. Note that the pipe symbol (@code{|}) is used for a regression test suite hack and may thus not be used in the file name. @item --dirmngr-program @var{file} @opindex dirmngr-program Specify a dirmngr program to be used for keyserver access. The default value is @file{@value{BINDIR}/dirmngr}. @item --disable-dirmngr Entirely disable the use of the Dirmngr. @item --no-autostart @opindex no-autostart Do not start the gpg-agent or the dirmngr if it has not yet been started and its service is required. This option is mostly useful on machines where the connection to gpg-agent has been redirected to another machines. If dirmngr is required on the remote machine, it may be started manually using @command{gpgconf --launch dirmngr}. @item --lock-once @opindex lock-once Lock the databases the first time a lock is requested and do not release the lock until the process terminates. @item --lock-multiple @opindex lock-multiple Release the locks every time a lock is no longer needed. Use this to override a previous @option{--lock-once} from a config file. @item --lock-never @opindex lock-never Disable locking entirely. This option should be used only in very special environments, where it can be assured that only one process is accessing those files. A bootable floppy with a stand-alone encryption system will probably use this. Improper usage of this option may lead to data and key corruption. @item --exit-on-status-write-error @opindex exit-on-status-write-error This option will cause write errors on the status FD to immediately terminate the process. That should in fact be the default but it never worked this way and thus we need an option to enable this, so that the change won't break applications which close their end of a status fd connected pipe too early. Using this option along with @option{--enable-progress-filter} may be used to cleanly cancel long running gpg operations. @item --limit-card-insert-tries @var{n} @opindex limit-card-insert-tries With @var{n} greater than 0 the number of prompts asking to insert a smartcard gets limited to N-1. Thus with a value of 1 gpg won't at all ask to insert a card if none has been inserted at startup. This option is useful in the configuration file in case an application does not know about the smartcard support and waits ad infinitum for an inserted card. @item --no-random-seed-file @opindex no-random-seed-file GnuPG uses a file to store its internal random pool over invocations. This makes random generation faster; however sometimes write operations are not desired. This option can be used to achieve that with the cost of slower random generation. @item --no-greeting @opindex no-greeting Suppress the initial copyright message. @item --no-secmem-warning @opindex no-secmem-warning Suppress the warning about "using insecure memory". @item --no-permission-warning @opindex permission-warning Suppress the warning about unsafe file and home directory (@option{--homedir}) permissions. Note that the permission checks that GnuPG performs are not intended to be authoritative, but rather they simply warn about certain common permission problems. Do not assume that the lack of a warning means that your system is secure. Note that the warning for unsafe @option{--homedir} permissions cannot be suppressed in the gpg.conf file, as this would allow an attacker to place an unsafe gpg.conf file in place, and use this file to suppress warnings about itself. The @option{--homedir} permissions warning may only be suppressed on the command line. @item --require-secmem @itemx --no-require-secmem @opindex require-secmem Refuse to run if GnuPG cannot get secure memory. Defaults to no (i.e. run, but give a warning). @item --require-cross-certification @itemx --no-require-cross-certification @opindex require-cross-certification When verifying a signature made from a subkey, ensure that the cross certification "back signature" on the subkey is present and valid. This protects against a subtle attack against subkeys that can sign. Defaults to @option{--require-cross-certification} for @command{@gpgname}. @item --expert @itemx --no-expert @opindex expert Allow the user to do certain nonsensical or "silly" things like signing an expired or revoked key, or certain potentially incompatible things like generating unusual key types. This also disables certain warning messages about potentially incompatible actions. As the name implies, this option is for experts only. If you don't fully understand the implications of what it allows you to do, leave this off. @option{--no-expert} disables this option. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** KEY RELATED OPTIONS ************ @c ******************************************* @node GPG Key related Options @subsection Key related options @table @gnupgtabopt @item --recipient @var{name} @itemx -r @opindex recipient Encrypt for user id @var{name}. If this option or @option{--hidden-recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user-id unless @option{--default-recipient} is given. @item --hidden-recipient @var{name} @itemx -R @opindex hidden-recipient Encrypt for user ID @var{name}, but hide the key ID of this user's key. This option helps to hide the receiver of the message and is a limited countermeasure against traffic analysis. If this option or @option{--recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user ID unless @option{--default-recipient} is given. @item --recipient-file @var{file} @itemx -f @opindex recipient-file This option is similar to @option{--recipient} except that it encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{@gpgname} assumes that the key in this file is fully valid. @item --hidden-recipient-file @var{file} @itemx -F @opindex hidden-recipient-file This option is similar to @option{--hidden-recipient} except that it encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{@gpgname} assumes that the key in this file is fully valid. @item --encrypt-to @var{name} @opindex encrypt-to Same as @option{--recipient} but this one is intended for use in the options file and may be used with your own user-id as an "encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked user id. No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even disabled keys can be used. @item --hidden-encrypt-to @var{name} @opindex hidden-encrypt-to Same as @option{--hidden-recipient} but this one is intended for use in the options file and may be used with your own user-id as a hidden "encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked user id. No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even disabled keys can be used. @item --no-encrypt-to @opindex no-encrypt-to Disable the use of all @option{--encrypt-to} and @option{--hidden-encrypt-to} keys. @item --group @{@var{name}=@var{value}@} @opindex group Sets up a named group, which is similar to aliases in email programs. Any time the group name is a recipient (@option{-r} or @option{--recipient}), it will be expanded to the values specified. Multiple groups with the same name are automatically merged into a single group. The values are @code{key IDs} or fingerprints, but any key description is accepted. Note that a value with spaces in it will be treated as two different values. Note also there is only one level of expansion --- you cannot make an group that points to another group. When used from the command line, it may be necessary to quote the argument to this option to prevent the shell from treating it as multiple arguments. @item --ungroup @var{name} @opindex ungroup Remove a given entry from the @option{--group} list. @item --no-groups @opindex no-groups Remove all entries from the @option{--group} list. @item --local-user @var{name} @itemx -u @opindex local-user Use @var{name} as the key to sign with. Note that this option overrides @option{--default-key}. @item --sender @var{mbox} @opindex sender This option has two purposes. @var{mbox} must either be a complete user id with a proper mail address or just a mail address. When creating a signature this option tells gpg the user id of a key used to make a signature if the key was not directly specified by a user id. When verifying a signature the @var{mbox} is used to restrict the information printed by the TOFU code to matching user ids. @item --try-secret-key @var{name} @opindex try-secret-key For hidden recipients GPG needs to know the keys to use for trial decryption. The key set with @option{--default-key} is always tried first, but this is often not sufficient. This option allows setting more keys to be used for trial decryption. Although any valid user-id specification may be used for @var{name} it makes sense to use at least the long keyid to avoid ambiguities. Note that gpg-agent might pop up a pinentry for a lot keys to do the trial decryption. If you want to stop all further trial decryption you may use close-window button instead of the cancel button. @item --try-all-secrets @opindex try-all-secrets Don't look at the key ID as stored in the message but try all secret keys in turn to find the right decryption key. This option forces the behaviour as used by anonymous recipients (created by using @option{--throw-keyids} or @option{--hidden-recipient}) and might come handy in case where an encrypted message contains a bogus key ID. @item --skip-hidden-recipients @itemx --no-skip-hidden-recipients @opindex skip-hidden-recipients @opindex no-skip-hidden-recipients During decryption skip all anonymous recipients. This option helps in the case that people use the hidden recipients feature to hide their own encrypt-to key from others. If one has many secret keys this may lead to a major annoyance because all keys are tried in turn to decrypt something which was not really intended for it. The drawback of this option is that it is currently not possible to decrypt a message which includes real anonymous recipients. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** INPUT AND OUTPUT *************** @c ******************************************* @node GPG Input and Output @subsection Input and Output @table @gnupgtabopt @item --armor @itemx -a @opindex armor Create ASCII armored output. The default is to create the binary OpenPGP format. @item --no-armor @opindex no-armor Assume the input data is not in ASCII armored format. @item --output @var{file} @itemx -o @var{file} @opindex output Write output to @var{file}. To write to stdout use @code{-} as the filename. @item --max-output @var{n} @opindex max-output This option sets a limit on the number of bytes that will be generated when processing a file. Since OpenPGP supports various levels of compression, it is possible that the plaintext of a given message may be significantly larger than the original OpenPGP message. While GnuPG works properly with such messages, there is often a desire to set a maximum file size that will be generated before processing is forced to stop by the OS limits. Defaults to 0, which means "no limit". @item --chunk-size @var{n} @opindex chunk-size The AEAD encryption mode encrypts the data in chunks so that a receiving side can check for transmission errors or tampering at the end of each chunk and does not need to delay this until all data has been received. The used chunk size is 2^@var{n} byte. The lowest allowed value for @var{n} is 6 (64 byte) and the largest is the default of 27 which creates chunks not larger than 128 MiB. @item --input-size-hint @var{n} @opindex input-size-hint This option can be used to tell GPG the size of the input data in bytes. @var{n} must be a positive base-10 number. This option is only useful if the input is not taken from a file. GPG may use this hint to optimize its buffer allocation strategy. It is also used by the @option{--status-fd} line ``PROGRESS'' to provide a value for ``total'' if that is not available by other means. @item --key-origin @var{string}[,@var{url}] @opindex key-origin gpg can track the origin of a key. Certain origins are implicitly known (e.g. keyserver, web key directory) and set. For a standard import the origin of the keys imported can be set with this option. To list the possible values use "help" for @var{string}. Some origins can store an optional @var{url} argument. That URL can appended to @var{string} after a comma. @item --import-options @var{parameters} @opindex import-options This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for importing keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the opposite meaning. The options are: @table @asis @item import-local-sigs Allow importing key signatures marked as "local". This is not generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used. Defaults to no. @item keep-ownertrust Normally possible still existing ownertrust values of a key are cleared if a key is imported. This is in general desirable so that a formerly deleted key does not automatically gain an ownertrust values merely due to import. On the other hand it is sometimes necessary to re-import a trusted set of keys again but keeping already assigned ownertrust values. This can be achieved by using this option. @item repair-pks-subkey-bug During import, attempt to repair the damage caused by the PKS keyserver bug (pre version 0.9.6) that mangles keys with multiple subkeys. Note that this cannot completely repair the damaged key as some crucial data is removed by the keyserver, but it does at least give you back one subkey. Defaults to no for regular @option{--import} and to yes for keyserver @option{--receive-keys}. @item import-show @itemx show-only Show a listing of the key as imported right before it is stored. This can be combined with the option @option{--dry-run} to only look at keys; the option @option{show-only} is a shortcut for this combination. The command @option{--show-keys} is another shortcut for this. Note that suffixes like '#' for "sec" and "sbb" lines may or may not be printed. @item import-export Run the entire import code but instead of storing the key to the local keyring write it to the output. The export options @option{export-pka} and @option{export-dane} affect the output. This option can be used to remove all invalid parts from a key without the need to store it. @item merge-only During import, allow key updates to existing keys, but do not allow any new keys to be imported. Defaults to no. @item import-clean After import, compact (remove all signatures except the self-signature) any user IDs from the new key that are not usable. Then, remove any signatures from the new key that are not usable. This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "clean" after import. Defaults to no. @item import-drop-uids Do not import any user ids or their binding signatures. This option can be used to update only the subkeys or other non-user id related information. @item repair-keys After import, fix various problems with the keys. For example, this reorders signatures, and strips duplicate signatures. Defaults to yes. @item import-minimal Import the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" after import. Defaults to no. @item restore @itemx import-restore Import in key restore mode. This imports all data which is usually skipped during import; including all GnuPG specific data. All other contradicting options are overridden. @end table @item --import-filter @{@var{name}=@var{expr}@} @itemx --export-filter @{@var{name}=@var{expr}@} @opindex import-filter @opindex export-filter These options define an import/export filter which are applied to the imported/exported keyblock right before it will be stored/written. @var{name} defines the type of filter to use, @var{expr} the expression to evaluate. The option can be used several times which then appends more expression to the same @var{name}. @noindent The available filter types are: @table @asis @item keep-uid This filter will keep a user id packet and its dependent packets in the keyblock if the expression evaluates to true. @item drop-subkey This filter drops the selected subkeys. Currently only implemented for --export-filter. @item drop-sig This filter drops the selected key signatures on user ids. Self-signatures are not considered. Currently only implemented for --import-filter. @end table For the syntax of the expression see the chapter "FILTER EXPRESSIONS". The property names for the expressions depend on the actual filter type and are indicated in the following table. The available properties are: @table @asis @item uid A string with the user id. (keep-uid) @item mbox The addr-spec part of a user id with mailbox or the empty string. (keep-uid) @item key_algo A number with the public key algorithm of a key or subkey packet. (drop-subkey) @item key_created @itemx key_created_d The first is the timestamp a public key or subkey packet was created. The second is the same but given as an ISO string, e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-subkey) @item primary Boolean indicating whether the user id is the primary one. (keep-uid) @item expired Boolean indicating whether a user id (keep-uid), a key (drop-subkey), or a signature (drop-sig) expired. @item revoked Boolean indicating whether a user id (keep-uid) or a key (drop-subkey) has been revoked. @item disabled Boolean indicating whether a primary key is disabled. (not used) @item secret Boolean indicating whether a key or subkey is a secret one. (drop-subkey) @item usage A string indicating the usage flags for the subkey, from the sequence ``ecsa?''. For example, a subkey capable of just signing and authentication would be an exact match for ``sa''. (drop-subkey) @item sig_created @itemx sig_created_d The first is the timestamp a signature packet was created. The second is the same but given as an ISO date string, e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-sig) @item sig_algo A number with the public key algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig) @item sig_digest_algo A number with the digest algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig) @end table @item --export-options @var{parameters} @opindex export-options This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for exporting keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the opposite meaning. The options are: @table @asis @item export-local-sigs Allow exporting key signatures marked as "local". This is not generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used. Defaults to no. @item export-attributes Include attribute user IDs (photo IDs) while exporting. Not including attribute user IDs is useful to export keys that are going to be used by an OpenPGP program that does not accept attribute user IDs. Defaults to yes. @item export-sensitive-revkeys Include designated revoker information that was marked as "sensitive". Defaults to no. @c Since GnuPG 2.1 gpg-agent manages the secret key and thus the @c export-reset-subkey-passwd hack is not anymore justified. Such use @c cases may be implemented using a specialized secret key export @c tool. @c @item export-reset-subkey-passwd @c When using the @option{--export-secret-subkeys} command, this option resets @c the passphrases for all exported subkeys to empty. This is useful @c when the exported subkey is to be used on an unattended machine where @c a passphrase doesn't necessarily make sense. Defaults to no. @item backup @itemx export-backup Export for use as a backup. The exported data includes all data which is needed to restore the key or keys later with GnuPG. The format is basically the OpenPGP format but enhanced with GnuPG specific data. All other contradicting options are overridden. @item export-clean Compact (remove all signatures from) user IDs on the key being exported if the user IDs are not usable. Also, do not export any signatures that are not usable. This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "clean" before export except that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to no. @item export-minimal Export the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" before export except that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to no. @item export-drop-uids Do no export any user id or attribute packets or their associates signatures. Note that due to missing user ids the resulting output is not strictly RFC-4880 compliant. @item export-pka Instead of outputting the key material output PKA records suitable to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before each record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone file. @item export-dane Instead of outputting the key material output OpenPGP DANE records suitable to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before each record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone file. @end table @item --with-colons @opindex with-colons Print key listings delimited by colons. Note that the output will be encoded in UTF-8 regardless of any @option{--display-charset} setting. This format is useful when GnuPG is called from scripts and other programs as it is easily machine parsed. The details of this format are documented in the file @file{doc/DETAILS}, which is included in the GnuPG source distribution. @item --fixed-list-mode @opindex fixed-list-mode Do not merge primary user ID and primary key in @option{--with-colon} listing mode and print all timestamps as seconds since 1970-01-01. Since GnuPG 2.0.10, this mode is always used and thus this option is obsolete; it does not harm to use it though. @item --legacy-list-mode @opindex legacy-list-mode Revert to the pre-2.1 public key list mode. This only affects the human readable output and not the machine interface (i.e. @code{--with-colons}). Note that the legacy format does not convey suitable information for elliptic curves. @item --with-fingerprint @opindex with-fingerprint Same as the command @option{--fingerprint} but changes only the format of the output and may be used together with another command. @item --with-subkey-fingerprint @opindex with-subkey-fingerprint If a fingerprint is printed for the primary key, this option forces printing of the fingerprint for all subkeys. This could also be achieved by using the @option{--with-fingerprint} twice but by using this option along with keyid-format "none" a compact fingerprint is printed. @item --with-icao-spelling @opindex with-icao-spelling Print the ICAO spelling of the fingerprint in addition to the hex digits. @item --with-keygrip @opindex with-keygrip Include the keygrip in the key listings. In @code{--with-colons} mode this is implicitly enable for secret keys. @item --with-key-origin @opindex with-key-origin Include the locally held information on the origin and last update of a key in a key listing. In @code{--with-colons} mode this is always printed. This data is currently experimental and shall not be considered part of the stable API. @item --with-wkd-hash @opindex with-wkd-hash Print a Web Key Directory identifier along with each user ID in key listings. This is an experimental feature and semantics may change. @item --with-secret @opindex with-secret Include info about the presence of a secret key in public key listings done with @code{--with-colons}. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** OPENPGP OPTIONS **************** @c ******************************************* @node OpenPGP Options @subsection OpenPGP protocol specific options @table @gnupgtabopt @item -t, --textmode @itemx --no-textmode @opindex textmode Treat input files as text and store them in the OpenPGP canonical text form with standard "CRLF" line endings. This also sets the necessary flags to inform the recipient that the encrypted or signed data is text and may need its line endings converted back to whatever the local system uses. This option is useful when communicating between two platforms that have different line ending conventions (UNIX-like to Mac, Mac to Windows, etc). @option{--no-textmode} disables this option, and is the default. @item --force-v3-sigs @itemx --no-force-v3-sigs @item --force-v4-certs @itemx --no-force-v4-certs These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.1. @item --force-aead @opindex force-aead Force the use of AEAD encryption over MDC encryption. AEAD is a modern and faster way to do authenticated encryption than the old MDC method. See also options @option{--aead-algo} and @option{--chunk-size}. As of now this option requires the use of option @option{--rfc4880bis} to declare that a not yet standardized feature is used. @item --force-mdc @itemx --disable-mdc @opindex force-mdc @opindex disable-mdc These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.2.8. The MDC is always used unless the keys indicate that an AEAD algorithm can be used in which case AEAD is used. But note: If the creation of a legacy non-MDC message is exceptionally required, the option @option{--rfc2440} allows for this. @item --disable-signer-uid @opindex disable-signer-uid By default the user ID of the signing key is embedded in the data signature. As of now this is only done if the signing key has been specified with @option{local-user} using a mail address. This information can be helpful for verifier to locate the key; see option @option{--auto-key-retrieve}. @item --personal-cipher-preferences @var{string} @opindex personal-cipher-preferences Set the list of personal cipher preferences to @var{string}. Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command. @item --personal-aead-preferences @var{string} @opindex personal-aead-preferences Set the list of personal AEAD preferences to @var{string}. Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command. @item --personal-digest-preferences @var{string} @opindex personal-digest-preferences Set the list of personal digest preferences to @var{string}. Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked digest algorithm in this list is also used when signing without encryption (e.g. @option{--clear-sign} or @option{--sign}). @item --personal-compress-preferences @var{string} @opindex personal-compress-preferences Set the list of personal compression preferences to @var{string}. Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked compression algorithm in this list is also used when there are no recipient keys to consider (e.g. @option{--symmetric}). @item --s2k-cipher-algo @var{name} @opindex s2k-cipher-algo Use @var{name} as the cipher algorithm for symmetric encryption with a passphrase if @option{--personal-cipher-preferences} and @option{--cipher-algo} are not given. The default is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}. @item --s2k-digest-algo @var{name} @opindex s2k-digest-algo Use @var{name} as the digest algorithm used to mangle the passphrases for symmetric encryption. The default is SHA-1. @item --s2k-mode @var{n} @opindex s2k-mode Selects how passphrases for symmetric encryption are mangled. If @var{n} is 0 a plain passphrase (which is in general not recommended) will be used, a 1 adds a salt (which should not be used) to the passphrase and a 3 (the default) iterates the whole process a number of times (see @option{--s2k-count}). @item --s2k-count @var{n} @opindex s2k-count Specify how many times the passphrases mangling for symmetric encryption is repeated. This value may range between 1024 and 65011712 inclusive. The default is inquired from gpg-agent. Note that not all values in the 1024-65011712 range are legal and if an illegal value is selected, GnuPG will round up to the nearest legal value. This option is only meaningful if @option{--s2k-mode} is set to the default of 3. @end table @c *************************** @c ******* Compliance ******** @c *************************** @node Compliance Options @subsection Compliance options These options control what GnuPG is compliant to. Only one of these options may be active at a time. Note that the default setting of this is nearly always the correct one. See the INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below before using one of these options. @table @gnupgtabopt @item --gnupg @opindex gnupg Use standard GnuPG behavior. This is essentially OpenPGP behavior (see @option{--openpgp}), but with some additional workarounds for common compatibility problems in different versions of PGP. This is the default option, so it is not generally needed, but it may be useful to override a different compliance option in the gpg.conf file. @item --openpgp @opindex openpgp Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict OpenPGP behavior. Use this option to reset all previous options like @option{--s2k-*}, @option{--cipher-algo}, @option{--digest-algo} and @option{--compress-algo} to OpenPGP compliant values. All PGP workarounds are disabled. @item --rfc4880 @opindex rfc4880 Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-4880 behavior. Note that this is currently the same thing as @option{--openpgp}. @item --rfc4880bis @opindex rfc4880bis Enable experimental features from proposed updates to RFC-4880. This option can be used in addition to the other compliance options. Warning: The behavior may change with any GnuPG release and created keys or data may not be usable with future GnuPG versions. @item --rfc2440 @opindex rfc2440 Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-2440 behavior. Note that by using this option encryption packets are created in a legacy mode without MDC protection. This is dangerous and should thus only be used for experiments. See also option @option{--ignore-mdc-error}. @item --pgp6 @opindex pgp6 This option is obsolete; it is handled as an alias for @option{--pgp7} @item --pgp7 @opindex pgp7 Set up all options to be as PGP 7 compliant as possible. This allowed the ciphers IDEA, 3DES, CAST5,AES128, AES192, AES256, and TWOFISH., the hashes MD5, SHA1 and RIPEMD160, and the compression algorithms none and ZIP. This option implies @option{--escape-from-lines} and disables @option{--throw-keyids}, @item --pgp8 @opindex pgp8 Set up all options to be as PGP 8 compliant as possible. PGP 8 is a lot closer to the OpenPGP standard than previous versions of PGP, so all this does is disable @option{--throw-keyids} and set @option{--escape-from-lines}. All algorithms are allowed except for the SHA224, SHA384, and SHA512 digests. @item --compliance @var{string} @opindex compliance This option can be used instead of one of the options above. Valid values for @var{string} are the above option names (without the double dash) and possibly others as shown when using "help" for @var{value}. @end table @c ******************************************* @c ******** ESOTERIC OPTIONS *************** @c ******************************************* @node GPG Esoteric Options @subsection Doing things one usually doesn't want to do @table @gnupgtabopt @item -n @itemx --dry-run @opindex dry-run Don't make any changes (this is not completely implemented). @item --list-only @opindex list-only Changes the behaviour of some commands. This is like @option{--dry-run} but different in some cases. The semantic of this option may be extended in the future. Currently it only skips the actual decryption pass and therefore enables a fast listing of the encryption keys. @item -i @itemx --interactive @opindex interactive Prompt before overwriting any files. @item --debug-level @var{level} @opindex debug-level Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be a numeric value or by a keyword: @table @code @item none No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of the keyword. @item basic Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used instead of the keyword. @item advanced More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used instead of the keyword. @item expert Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used instead of the keyword. @item guru All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is only enabled if the keyword is used. @end table How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are however carefully selected to best aid in debugging. @item --debug @var{flags} @opindex debug Set debugging flags. All flags are or-ed and @var{flags} may be given in C syntax (e.g. 0x0042) or as a comma separated list of flag names. To get a list of all supported flags the single word "help" can be used. @item --debug-all @opindex debug-all Set all useful debugging flags. @item --debug-iolbf @opindex debug-iolbf Set stdout into line buffered mode. This option is only honored when given on the command line. @item --debug-set-iobuf-size @var{n} @opindex debug-iolbf Change the buffer size of the IOBUFs to @var{n} kilobyte. Using 0 prints the current size. Note well: This is a maintainer only option and may thus be changed or removed at any time without notice. @item --debug-allow-large-chunks @opindex debug-allow-large-chunks To facilitate in-memory decryption on the receiving site, the largest recommended chunk size is 128 MiB (@code{--chunk-size 27}). This option allows to specify a limit of up to 4 EiB (@code{--chunk-size 62}) for experiments. @item --faked-system-time @var{epoch} @opindex faked-system-time This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back or forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since the year 1970. Alternatively @var{epoch} may be given as a full ISO time string (e.g. "20070924T154812"). If you suffix @var{epoch} with an exclamation mark (!), the system time will appear to be frozen at the specified time. @item --enable-progress-filter @opindex enable-progress-filter Enable certain PROGRESS status outputs. This option allows frontends to display a progress indicator while gpg is processing larger files. There is a slight performance overhead using it. @item --status-fd @var{n} @opindex status-fd Write special status strings to the file descriptor @var{n}. See the file DETAILS in the documentation for a listing of them. @item --status-file @var{file} @opindex status-file Same as @option{--status-fd}, except the status data is written to file @var{file}. @item --logger-fd @var{n} @opindex logger-fd Write log output to file descriptor @var{n} and not to STDERR. @item --log-file @var{file} @itemx --logger-file @var{file} @opindex log-file Same as @option{--logger-fd}, except the logger data is written to file @var{file}. Use @file{socket://} to log to s socket. @item --attribute-fd @var{n} @opindex attribute-fd Write attribute subpackets to the file descriptor @var{n}. This is most useful for use with @option{--status-fd}, since the status messages are needed to separate out the various subpackets from the stream delivered to the file descriptor. @item --attribute-file @var{file} @opindex attribute-file Same as @option{--attribute-fd}, except the attribute data is written to file @var{file}. @item --comment @var{string} @itemx --no-comments @opindex comment Use @var{string} as a comment string in cleartext signatures and ASCII armored messages or keys (see @option{--armor}). The default behavior is not to use a comment string. @option{--comment} may be repeated multiple times to get multiple comment strings. @option{--no-comments} removes all comments. It is a good idea to keep the length of a single comment below 60 characters to avoid problems with mail programs wrapping such lines. Note that comment lines, like all other header lines, are not protected by the signature. @item --emit-version @itemx --no-emit-version @opindex emit-version Force inclusion of the version string in ASCII armored output. If given once only the name of the program and the major number is emitted, given twice the minor is also emitted, given thrice the micro is added, and given four times an operating system identification is also emitted. @option{--no-emit-version} (default) disables the version line. @item --sig-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@} @itemx --cert-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@} @itemx -N, --set-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@} @opindex sig-notation @opindex cert-notation @opindex set-notation Put the name value pair into the signature as notation data. @var{name} must consist only of printable characters or spaces, and must contain a '@@' character in the form keyname@@domain.example.com (substituting the appropriate keyname and domain name, of course). This is to help prevent pollution of the IETF reserved notation namespace. The @option{--expert} flag overrides the '@@' check. @var{value} may be any printable string; it will be encoded in UTF-8, so you should check that your @option{--display-charset} is set correctly. If you prefix @var{name} with an exclamation mark (!), the notation data will be flagged as critical (rfc4880:5.2.3.16). @option{--sig-notation} sets a notation for data signatures. @option{--cert-notation} sets a notation for key signatures (certifications). @option{--set-notation} sets both. There are special codes that may be used in notation names. "%k" will be expanded into the key ID of the key being signed, "%K" into the long key ID of the key being signed, "%f" into the fingerprint of the key being signed, "%s" into the key ID of the key making the signature, "%S" into the long key ID of the key making the signature, "%g" into the fingerprint of the key making the signature (which might be a subkey), "%p" into the fingerprint of the primary key of the key making the signature, "%c" into the signature count from the OpenPGP smartcard, and "%%" results in a single "%". %k, %K, and %f are only meaningful when making a key signature (certification), and %c is only meaningful when using the OpenPGP smartcard. @item --known-notation @var{name} @opindex known-notation Adds @var{name} to a list of known critical signature notations. The effect of this is that gpg will not mark a signature with a critical signature notation of that name as bad. Note that gpg already knows by default about a few critical signatures notation names. @item --sig-policy-url @var{string} @itemx --cert-policy-url @var{string} @itemx --set-policy-url @var{string} @opindex sig-policy-url @opindex cert-policy-url @opindex set-policy-url Use @var{string} as a Policy URL for signatures (rfc4880:5.2.3.20). If you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the policy URL packet will be flagged as critical. @option{--sig-policy-url} sets a policy url for data signatures. @option{--cert-policy-url} sets a policy url for key signatures (certifications). @option{--set-policy-url} sets both. The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well. @item --sig-keyserver-url @var{string} @opindex sig-keyserver-url Use @var{string} as a preferred keyserver URL for data signatures. If you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the keyserver URL packet will be flagged as critical. The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well. @item --set-filename @var{string} @opindex set-filename Use @var{string} as the filename which is stored inside messages. This overrides the default, which is to use the actual filename of the file being encrypted. Using the empty string for @var{string} effectively removes the filename from the output. @item --for-your-eyes-only @itemx --no-for-your-eyes-only @opindex for-your-eyes-only Set the `for your eyes only' flag in the message. This causes GnuPG to refuse to save the file unless the @option{--output} option is given, and PGP to use a "secure viewer" with a claimed Tempest-resistant font to display the message. This option overrides @option{--set-filename}. @option{--no-for-your-eyes-only} disables this option. @item --use-embedded-filename @itemx --no-use-embedded-filename @opindex use-embedded-filename Try to create a file with a name as embedded in the data. This can be a dangerous option as it enables overwriting files. Defaults to no. @item --cipher-algo @var{name} @opindex cipher-algo Use @var{name} as cipher algorithm. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. If this is not used the cipher algorithm is selected from the preferences stored with the key. In general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option @option{--personal-cipher-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the same thing. @item --aead-algo @var{name} @opindex aead-algo Specify that the AEAD algorithm @var{name} is to be used. This is useful for symmetric encryption where no key preference are available to select the AEAD algorithm. Running @command{@gpgname} with option @option{--version} shows the available AEAD algorithms. In general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option @option{--personal-aead-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the same thing. @item --digest-algo @var{name} @opindex digest-algo Use @var{name} as the message digest algorithm. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. In general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option @option{--personal-digest-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the same thing. @item --compress-algo @var{name} @opindex compress-algo Use compression algorithm @var{name}. "zlib" is RFC-1950 ZLIB compression. "zip" is RFC-1951 ZIP compression which is used by PGP. "bzip2" is a more modern compression scheme that can compress some things better than zip or zlib, but at the cost of more memory used during compression and decompression. "uncompressed" or "none" disables compression. If this option is not used, the default behavior is to examine the recipient key preferences to see which algorithms the recipient supports. If all else fails, ZIP is used for maximum compatibility. ZLIB may give better compression results than ZIP, as the compression window size is not limited to 8k. BZIP2 may give even better compression results than that, but will use a significantly larger amount of memory while compressing and decompressing. This may be significant in low memory situations. Note, however, that PGP (all versions) only supports ZIP compression. Using any algorithm other than ZIP or "none" will make the message unreadable with PGP. In general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option @option{--personal-compress-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the same thing. @item --cert-digest-algo @var{name} @opindex cert-digest-algo Use @var{name} as the message digest algorithm used when signing a key. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a -list of supported algorithms. Be aware that if you choose an algorithm -that GnuPG supports but other OpenPGP implementations do not, then some -users will not be able to use the key signatures you make, or quite -possibly your entire key. +list of supported algorithms. Be aware that if you choose an +algorithm that GnuPG supports but other OpenPGP implementations do +not, then some users will not be able to use the key signatures you +make, or quite possibly your entire key. Note also that a public key +algorithm must be compatible with the specified digest algorithm; thus +selecting an arbitrary digest algorithm may result in error messages +from lower crypto layers or lead to security flaws. + @item --disable-cipher-algo @var{name} @opindex disable-cipher-algo Never allow the use of @var{name} as cipher algorithm. The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm will still get disabled. @item --disable-pubkey-algo @var{name} @opindex disable-pubkey-algo Never allow the use of @var{name} as public key algorithm. The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm will still get disabled. @item --throw-keyids @itemx --no-throw-keyids @opindex throw-keyids Do not put the recipient key IDs into encrypted messages. This helps to hide the receivers of the message and is a limited countermeasure against traffic analysis.@footnote{Using a little social engineering anyone who is able to decrypt the message can check whether one of the other recipients is the one he suspects.} On the receiving side, it may slow down the decryption process because all available secret keys must be tried. @option{--no-throw-keyids} disables this option. This option is essentially the same as using @option{--hidden-recipient} for all recipients. @item --not-dash-escaped @opindex not-dash-escaped This option changes the behavior of cleartext signatures so that they can be used for patch files. You should not send such an armored file via email because all spaces and line endings are hashed too. You can not use this option for data which has 5 dashes at the beginning of a line, patch files don't have this. A special armor header line tells GnuPG about this cleartext signature option. @item --escape-from-lines @itemx --no-escape-from-lines @opindex escape-from-lines Because some mailers change lines starting with "From " to ">From " it is good to handle such lines in a special way when creating cleartext signatures to prevent the mail system from breaking the signature. Note that all other PGP versions do it this way too. Enabled by default. @option{--no-escape-from-lines} disables this option. @item --passphrase-repeat @var{n} @opindex passphrase-repeat Specify how many times @command{@gpgname} will request a new passphrase be repeated. This is useful for helping memorize a passphrase. Defaults to 1 repetition. @item --passphrase-fd @var{n} @opindex passphrase-fd Read the passphrase from file descriptor @var{n}. Only the first line will be read from file descriptor @var{n}. If you use 0 for @var{n}, the passphrase will be read from STDIN. This can only be used if only one passphrase is supplied. Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1 the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}. @item --passphrase-file @var{file} @opindex passphrase-file Read the passphrase from file @var{file}. Only the first line will be read from file @var{file}. This can only be used if only one passphrase is supplied. Obviously, a passphrase stored in a file is of questionable security if other users can read this file. Don't use this option if you can avoid it. Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1 the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}. @item --passphrase @var{string} @opindex passphrase Use @var{string} as the passphrase. This can only be used if only one passphrase is supplied. Obviously, this is of very questionable security on a multi-user system. Don't use this option if you can avoid it. Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1 the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}. @item --pinentry-mode @var{mode} @opindex pinentry-mode Set the pinentry mode to @var{mode}. Allowed values for @var{mode} are: @table @asis @item default Use the default of the agent, which is @code{ask}. @item ask Force the use of the Pinentry. @item cancel Emulate use of Pinentry's cancel button. @item error Return a Pinentry error (``No Pinentry''). @item loopback Redirect Pinentry queries to the caller. Note that in contrast to Pinentry the user is not prompted again if he enters a bad password. @end table @item --no-symkey-cache @opindex no-symkey-cache Disable the passphrase cache used for symmetrical en- and decryption. This cache is based on the message specific salt value (cf. @option{--s2k-mode}). @item --request-origin @var{origin} @opindex request-origin Tell gpg to assume that the operation ultimately originated at @var{origin}. Depending on the origin certain restrictions are applied and the Pinentry may include an extra note on the origin. Supported values for @var{origin} are: @code{local} which is the default, @code{remote} to indicate a remote origin or @code{browser} for an operation requested by a web browser. @item --command-fd @var{n} @opindex command-fd This is a replacement for the deprecated shared-memory IPC mode. If this option is enabled, user input on questions is not expected from the TTY but from the given file descriptor. It should be used together with @option{--status-fd}. See the file doc/DETAILS in the source distribution for details on how to use it. @item --command-file @var{file} @opindex command-file Same as @option{--command-fd}, except the commands are read out of file @var{file} @item --allow-non-selfsigned-uid @itemx --no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid @opindex allow-non-selfsigned-uid Allow the import and use of keys with user IDs which are not self-signed. This is not recommended, as a non self-signed user ID is trivial to forge. @option{--no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid} disables. @item --allow-freeform-uid @opindex allow-freeform-uid Disable all checks on the form of the user ID while generating a new one. This option should only be used in very special environments as it does not ensure the de-facto standard format of user IDs. @item --ignore-time-conflict @opindex ignore-time-conflict GnuPG normally checks that the timestamps associated with keys and signatures have plausible values. However, sometimes a signature seems to be older than the key due to clock problems. This option makes these checks just a warning. See also @option{--ignore-valid-from} for timestamp issues on subkeys. @item --ignore-valid-from @opindex ignore-valid-from GnuPG normally does not select and use subkeys created in the future. This option allows the use of such keys and thus exhibits the pre-1.0.7 behaviour. You should not use this option unless there is some clock problem. See also @option{--ignore-time-conflict} for timestamp issues with signatures. @item --ignore-crc-error @opindex ignore-crc-error The ASCII armor used by OpenPGP is protected by a CRC checksum against transmission errors. Occasionally the CRC gets mangled somewhere on the transmission channel but the actual content (which is protected by the OpenPGP protocol anyway) is still okay. This option allows GnuPG to ignore CRC errors. @item --ignore-mdc-error @opindex ignore-mdc-error This option changes a MDC integrity protection failure into a warning. It is required to decrypt old messages which did not use an MDC. It may also be useful if a message is partially garbled, but it is necessary to get as much data as possible out of that garbled message. Be aware that a missing or failed MDC can be an indication of an attack. Use with great caution; see also option @option{--rfc2440}. @item --allow-weak-digest-algos @opindex allow-weak-digest-algos Signatures made with known-weak digest algorithms are normally rejected with an ``invalid digest algorithm'' message. This option allows the verification of signatures made with such weak algorithms. MD5 is the only digest algorithm considered weak by default. See also @option{--weak-digest} to reject other digest algorithms. @item --weak-digest @var{name} @opindex weak-digest Treat the specified digest algorithm as weak. Signatures made over weak digests algorithms are normally rejected. This option can be supplied multiple times if multiple algorithms should be considered weak. See also @option{--allow-weak-digest-algos} to disable rejection of weak digests. MD5 is always considered weak, and does not need to be listed explicitly. @item --no-default-keyring @opindex no-default-keyring Do not add the default keyrings to the list of keyrings. Note that GnuPG will not operate without any keyrings, so if you use this option and do not provide alternate keyrings via @option{--keyring} or @option{--secret-keyring}, then GnuPG will still use the default public or secret keyrings. @item --no-keyring @opindex no-keyring Do not use any keyring at all. This overrides the default and all options which specify keyrings. @item --skip-verify @opindex skip-verify Skip the signature verification step. This may be used to make the decryption faster if the signature verification is not needed. @item --with-key-data @opindex with-key-data Print key listings delimited by colons (like @option{--with-colons}) and print the public key data. @item --list-signatures @opindex list-signatures @itemx --list-sigs @opindex list-sigs Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the signatures are listed too. This command has the same effect as using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-list}. Note that in contrast to @option{--check-signatures} the key signatures are not verified. This command can be used to create a list of signing keys missing in the local keyring; for example: @example gpg --list-sigs --with-colons USERID | \ awk -F: '$1=="sig" && $2=="?" @{if($13)@{print $13@}else@{print $5@}@}' @end example @item --fast-list-mode @opindex fast-list-mode Changes the output of the list commands to work faster; this is achieved by leaving some parts empty. Some applications don't need the user ID and the trust information given in the listings. By using this options they can get a faster listing. The exact behaviour of this option may change in future versions. If you are missing some information, don't use this option. @item --no-literal @opindex no-literal This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful. @item --set-filesize @opindex set-filesize This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful. @item --show-session-key @opindex show-session-key Display the session key used for one message. See @option{--override-session-key} for the counterpart of this option. We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing; however the user should have the freedom to decide whether to go to prison or to reveal the content of one specific message without compromising all messages ever encrypted for one secret key. You can also use this option if you receive an encrypted message which is abusive or offensive, to prove to the administrators of the messaging system that the ciphertext transmitted corresponds to an inappropriate plaintext so they can take action against the offending user. @item --override-session-key @var{string} @itemx --override-session-key-fd @var{fd} @opindex override-session-key Don't use the public key but the session key @var{string} respective the session key taken from the first line read from file descriptor @var{fd}. The format of this string is the same as the one printed by @option{--show-session-key}. This option is normally not used but comes handy in case someone forces you to reveal the content of an encrypted message; using this option you can do this without handing out the secret key. Note that using @option{--override-session-key} may reveal the session key to all local users via the global process table. Often it is useful to combine this option with @option{--no-keyring}. @item --ask-sig-expire @itemx --no-ask-sig-expire @opindex ask-sig-expire When making a data signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this option is not specified, the expiration time set via @option{--default-sig-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-sig-expire} disables this option. @item --default-sig-expire @opindex default-sig-expire The default expiration time to use for signature expiration. Valid values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d (for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0". @item --ask-cert-expire @itemx --no-ask-cert-expire @opindex ask-cert-expire When making a key signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this option is not specified, the expiration time set via @option{--default-cert-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-cert-expire} disables this option. @item --default-cert-expire @opindex default-cert-expire The default expiration time to use for key signature expiration. Valid values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d (for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0". @item --default-new-key-algo @var{string} @opindex default-new-key-algo @var{string} This option can be used to change the default algorithms for key generation. The @var{string} is similar to the arguments required for the command @option{--quick-add-key} but slightly different. For example the current default of @code{"rsa2048/cert,sign+rsa2048/encr"} (or @code{"rsa3072"}) can be changed to the value of what we currently call future default, which is @code{"ed25519/cert,sign+cv25519/encr"}. You need to consult the source code to learn the details. Note that the advanced key generation commands can always be used to specify a key algorithm directly. @item --allow-secret-key-import @opindex allow-secret-key-import This is an obsolete option and is not used anywhere. @item --allow-multiple-messages @item --no-allow-multiple-messages These are obsolete options; they have no more effect since GnuPG 2.2.8. @item --enable-special-filenames @opindex enable-special-filenames This option enables a mode in which filenames of the form @file{-&n}, where n is a non-negative decimal number, refer to the file descriptor n and not to a file with that name. @item --no-expensive-trust-checks @opindex no-expensive-trust-checks Experimental use only. @item --preserve-permissions @opindex preserve-permissions Don't change the permissions of a secret keyring back to user read/write only. Use this option only if you really know what you are doing. @item --default-preference-list @var{string} @opindex default-preference-list Set the list of default preferences to @var{string}. This preference list is used for new keys and becomes the default for "setpref" in the edit menu. @item --default-keyserver-url @var{name} @opindex default-keyserver-url Set the default keyserver URL to @var{name}. This keyserver will be used as the keyserver URL when writing a new self-signature on a key, which includes key generation and changing preferences. @item --list-config @opindex list-config Display various internal configuration parameters of GnuPG. This option is intended for external programs that call GnuPG to perform tasks, and is thus not generally useful. See the file @file{doc/DETAILS} in the source distribution for the details of which configuration items may be listed. @option{--list-config} is only usable with @option{--with-colons} set. @item --list-gcrypt-config @opindex list-gcrypt-config Display various internal configuration parameters of Libgcrypt. @item --gpgconf-list @opindex gpgconf-list This command is similar to @option{--list-config} but in general only internally used by the @command{gpgconf} tool. @item --gpgconf-test @opindex gpgconf-test This is more or less dummy action. However it parses the configuration file and returns with failure if the configuration file would prevent @command{@gpgname} from startup. Thus it may be used to run a syntax check on the configuration file. @end table @c ******************************* @c ******* Deprecated ************ @c ******************************* @node Deprecated Options @subsection Deprecated options @table @gnupgtabopt @item --show-photos @itemx --no-show-photos @opindex show-photos Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-signatures}, @option{--list-public-keys}, @option{--list-secret-keys}, and verifying a signature to also display the photo ID attached to the key, if any. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-photos} and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-photos} instead. @item --show-keyring @opindex show-keyring Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which keyring a given key resides on. This option is deprecated: use @option{--list-options [no-]show-keyring} instead. @item --always-trust @opindex always-trust Identical to @option{--trust-model always}. This option is deprecated. @item --show-notation @itemx --no-show-notation @opindex show-notation Show signature notations in the @option{--list-signatures} or @option{--check-signatures} listings as well as when verifying a signature with a notation in it. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-notation} and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-notation} instead. @item --show-policy-url @itemx --no-show-policy-url @opindex show-policy-url Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-signatures} or @option{--check-signatures} listings as well as when verifying a signature with a policy URL in it. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-policy-url} and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-policy-url} instead. @end table @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** FILES **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect files @node GPG Configuration @section Configuration files There are a few configuration files to control certain aspects of @command{@gpgname}'s operation. Unless noted, they are expected in the current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}). @table @file @item gpg.conf @efindex gpg.conf This is the standard configuration file read by @command{@gpgname} on startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated. This default name may be changed on the command line (@pxref{gpg-option --options}). You should backup this file. @end table Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files into the directory @file{@value{SYSCONFSKELDIR}} so that newly created users start up with a working configuration. For existing users a small helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}). For internal purposes @command{@gpgname} creates and maintains a few other files; They all live in the current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}). Only the @command{@gpgname} program may modify these files. @table @file @item ~/.gnupg @efindex ~/.gnupg This is the default home directory which is used if neither the environment variable @code{GNUPGHOME} nor the option @option{--homedir} is given. @item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg @efindex pubring.gpg The public keyring. You should backup this file. @item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg.lock The lock file for the public keyring. @item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx @efindex pubring.kbx The public keyring using a different format. This file is shared with @command{gpgsm}. You should backup this file. @item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx.lock The lock file for @file{pubring.kbx}. @item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg @efindex secring.gpg A secret keyring as used by GnuPG versions before 2.1. It is not used by GnuPG 2.1 and later. @item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg.lock The lock file for the secret keyring. @item ~/.gnupg/.gpg-v21-migrated @efindex .gpg-v21-migrated File indicating that a migration to GnuPG 2.1 has been done. @item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg @efindex trustdb.gpg The trust database. There is no need to backup this file; it is better to backup the ownertrust values (@pxref{option --export-ownertrust}). @item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg.lock The lock file for the trust database. @item ~/.gnupg/random_seed @efindex random_seed A file used to preserve the state of the internal random pool. @item ~/.gnupg/openpgp-revocs.d/ @efindex openpgp-revocs.d This is the directory where gpg stores pre-generated revocation certificates. The file name corresponds to the OpenPGP fingerprint of the respective key. It is suggested to backup those certificates and if the primary private key is not stored on the disk to move them to an external storage device. Anyone who can access theses files is able to revoke the corresponding key. You may want to print them out. You should backup all files in this directory and take care to keep this backup closed away. @end table Operation is further controlled by a few environment variables: @table @asis @item HOME @efindex HOME Used to locate the default home directory. @item GNUPGHOME @efindex GNUPGHOME If set directory used instead of "~/.gnupg". @item GPG_AGENT_INFO This variable is obsolete; it was used by GnuPG versions before 2.1. @item PINENTRY_USER_DATA @efindex PINENTRY_USER_DATA This value is passed via gpg-agent to pinentry. It is useful to convey extra information to a custom pinentry. @item COLUMNS @itemx LINES @efindex COLUMNS @efindex LINES Used to size some displays to the full size of the screen. @item LANGUAGE @efindex LANGUAGE Apart from its use by GNU, it is used in the W32 version to override the language selection done through the Registry. If used and set to a valid and available language name (@var{langid}), the file with the translation is loaded from @code{@var{gpgdir}/gnupg.nls/@var{langid}.mo}. Here @var{gpgdir} is the directory out of which the gpg binary has been loaded. If it can't be loaded the Registry is tried and as last resort the native Windows locale system is used. @end table When calling the gpg-agent component @command{@gpgname} sends a set of environment variables to gpg-agent. The names of these variables can be listed using the command: @example gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo std_env_names' /bye | awk '$1=="D" @{print $2@}' @end example @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** EXAMPLES **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect examples @node GPG Examples @section Examples @table @asis @item gpg -se -r @code{Bob} @code{file} sign and encrypt for user Bob @item gpg --clear-sign @code{file} make a cleartext signature @item gpg -sb @code{file} make a detached signature @item gpg -u 0x12345678 -sb @code{file} make a detached signature with the key 0x12345678 @item gpg --list-keys @code{user_ID} show keys @item gpg --fingerprint @code{user_ID} show fingerprint @item gpg --verify @code{pgpfile} @itemx gpg --verify @code{sigfile} [@code{datafile}] Verify the signature of the file but do not output the data unless requested. The second form is used for detached signatures, where @code{sigfile} is the detached signature (either ASCII armored or binary) and @code{datafile} are the signed data; if this is not given, the name of the file holding the signed data is constructed by cutting off the extension (".asc" or ".sig") of @code{sigfile} or by asking the user for the filename. If the option @option{--output} is also used the signed data is written to the file specified by that option; use @code{-} to write the signed data to stdout. @end table @c ******************************************* @c *************** **************** @c *************** USER ID **************** @c *************** **************** @c ******************************************* @mansect how to specify a user id @ifset isman @include specify-user-id.texi @end ifset @mansect filter expressions @chapheading FILTER EXPRESSIONS The options @option{--import-filter} and @option{--export-filter} use expressions with this syntax (square brackets indicate an optional part and curly braces a repetition, white space between the elements are allowed): @c man:.RS @example [lc] @{[@{flag@}] PROPNAME op VALUE [lc]@} @end example @c man:.RE The name of a property (@var{PROPNAME}) may only consist of letters, digits and underscores. The description for the filter type describes which properties are defined. If an undefined property is used it evaluates to the empty string. Unless otherwise noted, the @var{VALUE} must always be given and may not be the empty string. No quoting is defined for the value, thus the value may not contain the strings @code{&&} or @code{||}, which are used as logical connection operators. The flag @code{--} can be used to remove this restriction. Numerical values are computed as long int; standard C notation applies. @var{lc} is the logical connection operator; either @code{&&} for a conjunction or @code{||} for a disjunction. A conjunction is assumed at the begin of an expression. Conjunctions have higher precedence than disjunctions. If @var{VALUE} starts with one of the characters used in any @var{op} a space after the @var{op} is required. @noindent The supported operators (@var{op}) are: @table @asis @item =~ Substring must match. @item !~ Substring must not match. @item = The full string must match. @item <> The full string must not match. @item == The numerical value must match. @item != The numerical value must not match. @item <= The numerical value of the field must be LE than the value. @item < The numerical value of the field must be LT than the value. @item > The numerical value of the field must be GT than the value. @item >= The numerical value of the field must be GE than the value. @item -le The string value of the field must be less or equal than the value. @item -lt The string value of the field must be less than the value. @item -gt The string value of the field must be greater than the value. @item -ge The string value of the field must be greater or equal than the value. @item -n True if value is not empty (no value allowed). @item -z True if value is empty (no value allowed). @item -t Alias for "PROPNAME != 0" (no value allowed). @item -f Alias for "PROPNAME == 0" (no value allowed). @end table @noindent Values for @var{flag} must be space separated. The supported flags are: @table @asis @item -- @var{VALUE} spans to the end of the expression. @item -c The string match in this part is done case-sensitive. @end table The filter options concatenate several specifications for a filter of the same type. For example the four options in this example: @c man:.RS @example --import-option keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa" --import-option keep-uid="&& uid !~ Test" --import-option keep-uid="|| uid =~ Alpha" --import-option keep-uid="uid !~ Test" @end example @c man:.RE @noindent which is equivalent to @c man:.RS @example --import-option \ keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa" && uid !~ Test" || uid =~ Alpha" && "uid !~ Test" @end example @c man:.RE imports only the user ids of a key containing the strings "Alfa" or "Alpha" but not the string "test". @mansect trust values @ifset isman @include trust-values.texi @end ifset @mansect return value @chapheading RETURN VALUE The program returns 0 if everything was fine, 1 if at least a signature was bad, and other error codes for fatal errors. @mansect warnings @chapheading WARNINGS Use a *good* password for your user account and a *good* passphrase to protect your secret key. This passphrase is the weakest part of the whole system. Programs to do dictionary attacks on your secret keyring are very easy to write and so you should protect your "~/.gnupg/" directory very well. Keep in mind that, if this program is used over a network (telnet), it is *very* easy to spy out your passphrase! If you are going to verify detached signatures, make sure that the program knows about it; either give both filenames on the command line or use @samp{-} to specify STDIN. For scripted or other unattended use of @command{gpg} make sure to use the machine-parseable interface and not the default interface which is intended for direct use by humans. The machine-parseable interface provides a stable and well documented API independent of the locale or future changes of @command{gpg}. To enable this interface use the options @option{--with-colons} and @option{--status-fd}. For certain operations the option @option{--command-fd} may come handy too. See this man page and the file @file{DETAILS} for the specification of the interface. Note that the GnuPG ``info'' pages as well as the PDF version of the GnuPG manual features a chapter on unattended use of GnuPG. As an alternative the library @command{GPGME} can be used as a high-level abstraction on top of that interface. @mansect interoperability @chapheading INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS GnuPG tries to be a very flexible implementation of the OpenPGP standard. In particular, GnuPG implements many of the optional parts of the standard, such as the SHA-512 hash, and the ZLIB and BZIP2 compression algorithms. It is important to be aware that not all OpenPGP programs implement these optional algorithms and that by forcing their use via the @option{--cipher-algo}, @option{--digest-algo}, @option{--cert-digest-algo}, or @option{--compress-algo} options in GnuPG, it is possible to create a perfectly valid OpenPGP message, but one that cannot be read by the intended recipient. There are dozens of variations of OpenPGP programs available, and each supports a slightly different subset of these optional algorithms. For example, until recently, no (unhacked) version of PGP supported the BLOWFISH cipher algorithm. A message using BLOWFISH simply could not be read by a PGP user. By default, GnuPG uses the standard OpenPGP preferences system that will always do the right thing and create messages that are usable by all recipients, regardless of which OpenPGP program they use. Only override this safe default if you really know what you are doing. If you absolutely must override the safe default, or if the preferences on a given key are invalid for some reason, you are far better off using the @option{--pgp6}, @option{--pgp7}, or @option{--pgp8} options. These options are safe as they do not force any particular algorithms in violation of OpenPGP, but rather reduce the available algorithms to a "PGP-safe" list. @mansect bugs @chapheading BUGS On older systems this program should be installed as setuid(root). This is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents the operating system from writing memory pages (which may contain passphrases or other sensitive material) to disk. If you get no warning message about insecure memory your operating system supports locking without being root. The program drops root privileges as soon as locked memory is allocated. Note also that some systems (especially laptops) have the ability to ``suspend to disk'' (also known as ``safe sleep'' or ``hibernate''). This writes all memory to disk before going into a low power or even powered off mode. Unless measures are taken in the operating system to protect the saved memory, passphrases or other sensitive material may be recoverable from it later. Before you report a bug you should first search the mailing list archives for similar problems and second check whether such a bug has already been reported to our bug tracker at @url{https://bugs.gnupg.org}. @c ******************************************* @c *************** ************** @c *************** UNATTENDED ************** @c *************** ************** @c ******************************************* @manpause @node Unattended Usage of GPG @section Unattended Usage @command{@gpgname} is often used as a backend engine by other software. To help with this a machine interface has been defined to have an unambiguous way to do this. The options @option{--status-fd} and @option{--batch} are almost always required for this. @menu * Programmatic use of GnuPG:: Programmatic use of GnuPG * Ephemeral home directories:: Ephemeral home directories * The quick key manipulation interface:: The quick key manipulation interface * Unattended GPG key generation:: Unattended key generation @end menu @node Programmatic use of GnuPG @subsection Programmatic use of GnuPG Please consider using GPGME instead of calling @command{@gpgname} directly. GPGME offers a stable, backend-independent interface for many cryptographic operations. It supports OpenPGP and S/MIME, and also allows interaction with various GnuPG components. GPGME provides a C-API, and comes with bindings for C++, Qt, and Python. Bindings for other languages are available. @node Ephemeral home directories @subsection Ephemeral home directories Sometimes you want to contain effects of some operation, for example you want to import a key to inspect it, but you do not want this key to be added to your keyring. In earlier versions of GnuPG, it was possible to specify alternate keyring files for both public and secret keys. In modern GnuPG versions, however, we changed how secret keys are stored in order to better protect secret key material, and it was not possible to preserve this interface. The preferred way to do this is to use ephemeral home directories. This technique works across all versions of GnuPG. Create a temporary directory, create (or copy) a configuration that meets your needs, make @command{@gpgname} use this directory either using the environment variable @var{GNUPGHOME}, or the option @option{--homedir}. GPGME supports this too on a per-context basis, by modifying the engine info of contexts. Now execute whatever operation you like, import and export key material as necessary. Once finished, you can delete the directory. All GnuPG backend services that were started will detect this and shut down. @node The quick key manipulation interface @subsection The quick key manipulation interface Recent versions of GnuPG have an interface to manipulate keys without using the interactive command @option{--edit-key}. This interface was added mainly for the benefit of GPGME (please consider using GPGME, see the manual subsection ``Programmatic use of GnuPG''). This interface is described in the subsection ``How to manage your keys''. @node Unattended GPG key generation @subsection Unattended key generation The command @option{--generate-key} may be used along with the option @option{--batch} for unattended key generation. This is the most flexible way of generating keys, but it is also the most complex one. Consider using the quick key manipulation interface described in the previous subsection ``The quick key manipulation interface''. The parameters for the key are either read from stdin or given as a file on the command line. The format of the parameter file is as follows: @itemize @bullet @item Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 characters. @item UTF-8 encoding must be used to specify non-ASCII characters. @item Empty lines are ignored. @item Leading and trailing white space is ignored. @item A hash sign as the first non white space character indicates a comment line. @item Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign, the arguments are separated by white space from the keyword. @item Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon. Arguments are separated by white space. @item The first parameter must be @samp{Key-Type}; control statements may be placed anywhere. @item The order of the parameters does not matter except for @samp{Key-Type} which must be the first parameter. The parameters are only used for the generated keyblock (primary and subkeys); parameters from previous sets are not used. Some syntactically checks may be performed. @item Key generation takes place when either the end of the parameter file is reached, the next @samp{Key-Type} parameter is encountered or at the control statement @samp{%commit} is encountered. @end itemize @noindent Control statements: @table @asis @item %echo @var{text} Print @var{text} as diagnostic. @item %dry-run Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking). @item %commit Perform the key generation. Note that an implicit commit is done at the next @asis{Key-Type} parameter. @item %pubring @var{filename} Do not write the key to the default or commandline given keyring but to @var{filename}. This must be given before the first commit to take place, duplicate specification of the same filename is ignored, the last filename before a commit is used. The filename is used until a new filename is used (at commit points) and all keys are written to that file. If a new filename is given, this file is created (and overwrites an existing one). See the previous subsection ``Ephemeral home directories'' for a more robust way to contain side-effects. @item %secring @var{filename} This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later. See the previous subsection ``Ephemeral home directories''. @item %ask-passphrase @itemx %no-ask-passphrase This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later. @item %no-protection Using this option allows the creation of keys without any passphrase protection. This option is mainly intended for regression tests. @item %transient-key If given the keys are created using a faster and a somewhat less secure random number generator. This option may be used for keys which are only used for a short time and do not require full cryptographic strength. It takes only effect if used together with the control statement @samp{%no-protection}. @end table @noindent General Parameters: @table @asis @item Key-Type: @var{algo} Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the primary key. The algorithm must be capable of signing. This is a required parameter. @var{algo} may either be an OpenPGP algorithm number or a string with the algorithm name. The special value @samp{default} may be used for @var{algo} to create the default key type; in this case a @samp{Key-Usage} shall not be given and @samp{default} also be used for @samp{Subkey-Type}. @item Key-Length: @var{nbits} The requested length of the generated key in bits. The default is returned by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}. @item Key-Grip: @var{hexstring} This is optional and used to generate a CSR or certificate for an already existing key. Key-Length will be ignored when given. @item Key-Usage: @var{usage-list} Space or comma delimited list of key usages. Allowed values are @samp{encrypt}, @samp{sign}, and @samp{auth}. This is used to generate the key flags. Please make sure that the algorithm is capable of this usage. Note that OpenPGP requires that all primary keys are capable of certification, so no matter what usage is given here, the @samp{cert} flag will be on. If no @samp{Key-Usage} is specified and the @samp{Key-Type} is not @samp{default}, all allowed usages for that particular algorithm are used; if it is not given but @samp{default} is used the usage will be @samp{sign}. @item Subkey-Type: @var{algo} This generates a secondary key (subkey). Currently only one subkey can be handled. See also @samp{Key-Type} above. @item Subkey-Length: @var{nbits} Length of the secondary key (subkey) in bits. The default is returned by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}. @item Subkey-Usage: @var{usage-list} Key usage lists for a subkey; similar to @samp{Key-Usage}. @item Passphrase: @var{string} If you want to specify a passphrase for the secret key, enter it here. Default is to use the Pinentry dialog to ask for a passphrase. @item Name-Real: @var{name} @itemx Name-Comment: @var{comment} @itemx Name-Email: @var{email} The three parts of a user name. Remember to use UTF-8 encoding here. If you don't give any of them, no user ID is created. @item Expire-Date: @var{iso-date}|(@var{number}[d|w|m|y]) Set the expiration date for the key (and the subkey). It may either be entered in ISO date format (e.g. "20000815T145012") or as number of days, weeks, month or years after the creation date. The special notation "seconds=N" is also allowed to specify a number of seconds since creation. Without a letter days are assumed. Note that there is no check done on the overflow of the type used by OpenPGP for timestamps. Thus you better make sure that the given value make sense. Although OpenPGP works with time intervals, GnuPG uses an absolute value internally and thus the last year we can represent is 2105. @item Creation-Date: @var{iso-date} Set the creation date of the key as stored in the key information and which is also part of the fingerprint calculation. Either a date like "1986-04-26" or a full timestamp like "19860426T042640" may be used. The time is considered to be UTC. The special notation "seconds=N" may be used to directly specify a the number of seconds since Epoch (Unix time). If it is not given the current time is used. @item Preferences: @var{string} Set the cipher, hash, and compression preference values for this key. This expects the same type of string as the sub-command @samp{setpref} in the @option{--edit-key} menu. @item Revoker: @var{algo}:@var{fpr} [sensitive] Add a designated revoker to the generated key. Algo is the public key algorithm of the designated revoker (i.e. RSA=1, DSA=17, etc.) @var{fpr} is the fingerprint of the designated revoker. The optional @samp{sensitive} flag marks the designated revoker as sensitive information. Only v4 keys may be designated revokers. @item Keyserver: @var{string} This is an optional parameter that specifies the preferred keyserver URL for the key. @item Handle: @var{string} This is an optional parameter only used with the status lines KEY_CREATED and KEY_NOT_CREATED. @var{string} may be up to 100 characters and should not contain spaces. It is useful for batch key generation to associate a key parameter block with a status line. @end table @noindent Here is an example on how to create a key in an ephemeral home directory: @smallexample $ export GNUPGHOME="$(mktemp -d)" $ cat >foo < ssb elg1024 2016-12-16 [E] @end smallexample @noindent If you want to create a key with the default algorithms you would use these parameters: @smallexample %echo Generating a default key Key-Type: default Subkey-Type: default Name-Real: Joe Tester Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar Expire-Date: 0 Passphrase: abc # Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-) %commit %echo done @end smallexample @mansect see also @ifset isman @command{gpgv}(1), @command{gpgsm}(1), @command{gpg-agent}(1) @end ifset @include see-also-note.texi diff --git a/g10/gpgcompose.c b/g10/gpgcompose.c index e882fa8e3..9e6d51a57 100644 --- a/g10/gpgcompose.c +++ b/g10/gpgcompose.c @@ -1,3103 +1,3110 @@ /* gpgcompose.c - Maintainer tool to create OpenPGP messages by hand. * Copyright (C) 2016 g10 Code GmbH * * This file is part of GnuPG. * * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, see . */ #include #include #include "gpg.h" #include "packet.h" #include "keydb.h" #include "main.h" #include "options.h" #include "call-agent.h" static int do_debug; #define debug(fmt, ...) \ do { if (do_debug) log_debug (fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__); } while (0) /* --encryption, for instance, adds a filter in front of out. There is an operator (--encryption-pop) to end this. We use the following infrastructure to make it easy to pop the state. */ struct filter { void *func; void *context; int pkttype; int partial_block_mode; struct filter *next; }; /* Hack to ass CTRL to some functions. */ static ctrl_t global_ctrl; static struct filter *filters; static void filter_push (iobuf_t out, void *func, void *context, int type, int partial_block_mode) { gpg_error_t err; struct filter *f = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*f)); f->next = filters; f->func = func; f->context = context; f->pkttype = type; f->partial_block_mode = partial_block_mode; filters = f; err = iobuf_push_filter (out, func, context); if (err) log_fatal ("Adding filter: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); } static void filter_pop (iobuf_t out, int expected_type) { gpg_error_t err; struct filter *f = filters; log_assert (f); if (f->pkttype != expected_type) log_fatal ("Attempted to pop a %s container, " "but current container is a %s container.\n", pkttype_str (f->pkttype), pkttype_str (expected_type)); if (f->pkttype == PKT_ENCRYPTED) { err = iobuf_pop_filter (out, f->func, f->context); if (err) log_fatal ("Popping encryption filter: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); } else log_fatal ("FILTERS appears to be corrupted.\n"); if (f->partial_block_mode) iobuf_set_partial_body_length_mode (out, 0); filters = f->next; xfree (f); } /* Return if CIPHER_ID is a valid cipher. */ static int valid_cipher (int cipher_id) { return (cipher_id == CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA || cipher_id == CIPHER_ALGO_3DES || cipher_id == CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5 || cipher_id == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH || cipher_id == CIPHER_ALGO_AES || cipher_id == CIPHER_ALGO_AES192 || cipher_id == CIPHER_ALGO_AES256 || cipher_id == CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH || cipher_id == CIPHER_ALGO_CAMELLIA128 || cipher_id == CIPHER_ALGO_CAMELLIA192 || cipher_id == CIPHER_ALGO_CAMELLIA256); } /* Parse a session key encoded as a string of the form x:HEXDIGITS where x is the algorithm id. (This is the format emitted by gpg --show-session-key.) */ struct session_key { int algo; int keylen; char *key; }; static struct session_key parse_session_key (const char *option, char *p, int require_algo) { char *tail; struct session_key sk; memset (&sk, 0, sizeof (sk)); /* Check for the optional "cipher-id:" at the start of the string. */ errno = 0; sk.algo = strtol (p, &tail, 10); if (! errno && tail && *tail == ':') { if (! valid_cipher (sk.algo)) log_info ("%s: %d is not a known cipher (but using anyways)\n", option, sk.algo); p = tail + 1; } else if (require_algo) log_fatal ("%s: Session key must have the form algo:HEXCHARACTERS.\n", option); else sk.algo = 0; /* Ignore a leading 0x. */ if (p[0] == '0' && p[1] == 'x') p += 2; if (strlen (p) % 2 != 0) log_fatal ("%s: session key must consist of an even number of hexadecimal characters.\n", option); sk.keylen = strlen (p) / 2; sk.key = xmalloc (sk.keylen); if (hex2bin (p, sk.key, sk.keylen) == -1) log_fatal ("%s: Session key must only contain hexadecimal characters\n", option); return sk; } /* A callback. OPTION_STR is the option that was matched. ARGC is the number of arguments following the option and ARGV are those arguments. (Thus, argv[0] is the first string following the option and argv[-1] is the option.) COOKIE is the opaque value passed to process_options. */ typedef int (*option_prcessor_t) (const char *option_str, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie); struct option { /* The option that this matches. This must start with "--" or be the empty string. The empty string matches bare arguments. */ const char *option; /* The function to call to process this option. */ option_prcessor_t func; /* Documentation. */ const char *help; }; /* Merge two lists of options. Note: this makes a shallow copy! The caller must xfree() the result. */ static struct option * merge_options (struct option a[], struct option b[]) { int i, j; struct option *c; for (i = 0; a[i].option; i ++) ; for (j = 0; b[j].option; j ++) ; c = xmalloc ((i + j + 1) * sizeof (struct option)); memcpy (c, a, i * sizeof (struct option)); memcpy (&c[i], b, j * sizeof (struct option)); c[i + j].option = NULL; if (a[i].help && b[j].help) c[i + j].help = xasprintf ("%s\n\n%s", a[i].help, b[j].help); else if (a[i].help) c[i + j].help = a[i].help; else if (b[j].help) c[i + j].help = b[j].help; return c; } /* Returns whether ARG is an option. All options start with --. */ static int is_option (const char *arg) { return arg[0] == '-' && arg[1] == '-'; } /* OPTIONS is a NULL terminated array of struct option:s. Finds the entry that is the same as ARG. Returns -1 if no entry is found. The empty string option matches bare arguments. */ static int match_option (const struct option options[], const char *arg) { int i; int bare_arg = ! is_option (arg); for (i = 0; options[i].option; i ++) if ((! bare_arg && strcmp (options[i].option, arg) == 0) /* Non-options match the empty string. */ || (bare_arg && options[i].option[0] == '\0')) return i; return -1; } static void show_help (struct option options[]) { int i; int max_length = 0; int space; for (i = 0; options[i].option; i ++) { const char *option = options[i].option[0] ? options[i].option : "ARG"; int l = strlen (option); if (l > max_length) max_length = l; } space = 72 - (max_length + 2); if (space < 40) space = 40; for (i = 0; ; i ++) { const char *option = options[i].option; const char *help = options[i].help; int l; int j; char *tmp; char *formatted; char *p; char *newline; if (! option && ! help) break; if (option) { const char *o = option[0] ? option : "ARG"; l = strlen (o); fprintf (stdout, "%s", o); } if (! help) { fputc ('\n', stdout); continue; } if (option) for (j = l; j < max_length + 2; j ++) fputc (' ', stdout); #define BOLD_START "\033[1m" #define NORMAL_RESTORE "\033[0m" #define BOLD(x) BOLD_START x NORMAL_RESTORE if (! option || options[i].func) tmp = (char *) help; else tmp = xasprintf ("%s " BOLD("(Unimplemented.)"), help); if (! option) space = 72; formatted = format_text (tmp, space, space + 4); if (!formatted) abort (); if (tmp != help) xfree (tmp); if (! option) { printf ("\n%s\n", formatted); break; } for (p = formatted; p && *p; p = (*newline == '\0') ? newline : newline + 1) { newline = strchr (p, '\n'); if (! newline) newline = &p[strlen (p)]; l = (size_t) newline - (size_t) p; if (p != formatted) for (j = 0; j < max_length + 2; j ++) fputc (' ', stdout); fwrite (p, l, 1, stdout); fputc ('\n', stdout); } xfree (formatted); } } /* Return value is number of consumed argv elements. */ static int process_options (const char *parent_option, struct option break_options[], struct option local_options[], void *lcookie, struct option global_options[], void *gcookie, int argc, char *argv[]) { int i; for (i = 0; i < argc; i ++) { int j; struct option *option; void *cookie; int bare_arg; option_prcessor_t func; int consumed; if (break_options) { j = match_option (break_options, argv[i]); if (j != -1) /* Match. Break out. */ return i; } j = match_option (local_options, argv[i]); if (j == -1) { if (global_options) j = match_option (global_options, argv[i]); if (j == -1) { if (strcmp (argv[i], "--help") == 0) { if (! global_options) show_help (local_options); else { struct option *combined = merge_options (local_options, global_options); show_help (combined); xfree (combined); } g10_exit (0); } if (parent_option) log_fatal ("%s: Unknown option: %s\n", parent_option, argv[i]); else log_fatal ("Unknown option: %s\n", argv[i]); } option = &global_options[j]; cookie = gcookie; } else { option = &local_options[j]; cookie = lcookie; } bare_arg = strcmp (option->option, "") == 0; func = option->func; if (! func) { if (bare_arg) log_fatal ("Bare arguments unimplemented.\n"); else log_fatal ("Unimplemented option: %s\n", option->option); } consumed = func (bare_arg ? parent_option : argv[i], argc - i - !bare_arg, &argv[i + !bare_arg], cookie); i += consumed; if (bare_arg) i --; } return i; } /* The keys, subkeys, user ids and user attributes in the order that they were added. */ PACKET components[20]; /* The number of components. */ int ncomponents; static int add_component (int pkttype, void *component) { int i = ncomponents ++; log_assert (i < sizeof (components) / sizeof (components[0])); log_assert (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY || pkttype == PKT_USER_ID || pkttype == PKT_ATTRIBUTE); components[i].pkttype = pkttype; components[i].pkt.generic = component; return i; } static void dump_component (PACKET *pkt) { struct kbnode_struct kbnode; if (! do_debug) return; memset (&kbnode, 0, sizeof (kbnode)); kbnode.pkt = pkt; dump_kbnode (&kbnode); } /* Returns the first primary key in COMPONENTS or NULL if there is none. */ static PKT_public_key * primary_key (void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < ncomponents; i ++) if (components[i].pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) return components[i].pkt.public_key; return NULL; } /* The last session key (updated when adding a SK-ESK, PK-ESK or SED packet. */ static DEK session_key; static int user_id (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie); static int public_key (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie); static int sk_esk (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie); static int pk_esk (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie); static int encrypted (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie); static int encrypted_pop (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie); static int literal (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie); static int signature (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie); static int copy (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie); static struct option major_options[] = { { "--user-id", user_id, "Create a user id packet." }, { "--public-key", public_key, "Create a public key packet." }, { "--private-key", NULL, "Create a private key packet." }, { "--public-subkey", public_key, "Create a subkey packet." }, { "--private-subkey", NULL, "Create a private subkey packet." }, { "--sk-esk", sk_esk, "Create a symmetric-key encrypted session key packet." }, { "--pk-esk", pk_esk, "Create a public-key encrypted session key packet." }, { "--encrypted", encrypted, "Create a symmetrically encrypted data packet." }, { "--encrypted-mdc", encrypted, "Create a symmetrically encrypted and integrity protected data packet." }, { "--encrypted-pop", encrypted_pop, "Pop the most recent encryption container started by either" " --encrypted or --encrypted-mdc." }, { "--compressed", NULL, "Create a compressed data packet." }, { "--literal", literal, "Create a literal (plaintext) data packet." }, { "--signature", signature, "Create a signature packet." }, { "--onepass-sig", NULL, "Create a one-pass signature packet." }, { "--copy", copy, "Copy the specified file." }, { NULL, NULL, "To get more information about a given command, use:\n\n" " $ gpgcompose --command --help to list a command's options."}, }; static struct option global_options[] = { { NULL, NULL, NULL }, }; /* Make our lives easier and use a static limit for the user name. 10k is way more than enough anyways... */ const int user_id_max_len = 10 * 1024; static int user_id_name (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { PKT_user_id *uid = cookie; int l; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s USER_ID\n", option); if (uid->len) log_fatal ("Attempt to set user id multiple times.\n"); l = strlen (argv[0]); if (l > user_id_max_len) log_fatal ("user id too long (max: %d)\n", user_id_max_len); memcpy (uid->name, argv[0], l); uid->name[l] = 0; uid->len = l; return 1; } static struct option user_id_options[] = { { "", user_id_name, "Set the user id. This is usually in the format " "\"Name (comment) \"" }, { NULL, NULL, "Example:\n\n" " $ gpgcompose --user-id \"USERID\" | " GPG_NAME " --list-packets" } }; static int user_id (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { iobuf_t out = cookie; gpg_error_t err; PKT_user_id *uid = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*uid) + user_id_max_len); int c = add_component (PKT_USER_ID, uid); int processed; processed = process_options (option, major_options, user_id_options, uid, global_options, NULL, argc, argv); if (! uid->len) log_fatal ("%s: user id not given", option); err = build_packet (out, &components[c]); if (err) log_fatal ("Serializing user id packet: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); debug ("Wrote user id packet:\n"); dump_component (&components[c]); return processed; } static int pk_search_terms (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { gpg_error_t err; KEYDB_HANDLE hd; KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc; kbnode_t kb; PKT_public_key *pk = cookie; PKT_public_key *pk_ref; int i; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s KEYID\n", option); if (pk->pubkey_algo) log_fatal ("%s: multiple keys provided\n", option); err = classify_user_id (argv[0], &desc, 0); if (err) log_fatal ("search terms '%s': %s\n", argv[0], gpg_strerror (err)); hd = keydb_new (); err = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL); if (err) log_fatal ("looking up '%s': %s\n", argv[0], gpg_strerror (err)); err = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &kb); if (err) log_fatal ("retrieving keyblock for '%s': %s\n", argv[0], gpg_strerror (err)); keydb_release (hd); pk_ref = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key; /* Copy the timestamp (if not already set), algo and public key parameters. */ if (! pk->timestamp) pk->timestamp = pk_ref->timestamp; pk->pubkey_algo = pk_ref->pubkey_algo; for (i = 0; i < pubkey_get_npkey (pk->pubkey_algo); i ++) pk->pkey[i] = gcry_mpi_copy (pk_ref->pkey[i]); release_kbnode (kb); return 1; } static int pk_timestamp (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { PKT_public_key *pk = cookie; char *tail = NULL; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s TIMESTAMP\n", option); errno = 0; pk->timestamp = parse_timestamp (argv[0], &tail); if (errno || (tail && *tail)) log_fatal ("Invalid value passed to %s (%s)\n", option, argv[0]); return 1; } #define TIMESTAMP_HELP \ "Either as seconds since the epoch or as an ISO 8601 formatted " \ "string (yyyymmddThhmmss, where the T is a literal)." static struct option pk_options[] = { { "--timestamp", pk_timestamp, "The creation time. " TIMESTAMP_HELP }, { "", pk_search_terms, "The key to copy the creation time and public key parameters from." }, { NULL, NULL, "Example:\n\n" " $ gpgcompose --public-key $KEYID --user-id \"USERID\" \\\n" " | " GPG_NAME " --list-packets" } }; static int public_key (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { gpg_error_t err; iobuf_t out = cookie; PKT_public_key *pk; int c; int processed; int t = (strcmp (option, "--public-key") == 0 ? PKT_PUBLIC_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY); (void) option; pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*pk)); pk->version = 4; c = add_component (t, pk); processed = process_options (option, major_options, pk_options, pk, global_options, NULL, argc, argv); if (! pk->pubkey_algo) log_fatal ("%s: key to extract public key parameters from not given", option); /* Clear the keyid in case we updated one of the relevant fields after accessing it. */ pk->keyid[0] = pk->keyid[1] = 0; err = build_packet (out, &components[c]); if (err) log_fatal ("serializing %s packet: %s\n", t == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "public key" : "subkey", gpg_strerror (err)); debug ("Wrote %s packet:\n", t == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "public key" : "subkey"); dump_component (&components[c]); return processed; } struct signinfo { /* Key with which to sign. */ kbnode_t issuer_kb; PKT_public_key *issuer_pk; /* Overrides the issuer's key id. */ u32 issuer_keyid[2]; /* Sets the issuer's keyid to the primary key's key id. */ int issuer_keyid_self; /* Key to sign. */ PKT_public_key *pk; /* Subkey to sign. */ PKT_public_key *sk; /* User id to sign. */ PKT_user_id *uid; int class; int digest_algo; u32 timestamp; u32 key_expiration; byte *cipher_algorithms; int cipher_algorithms_len; byte *digest_algorithms; int digest_algorithms_len; byte *compress_algorithms; int compress_algorithms_len; u32 expiration; int exportable_set; int exportable; int revocable_set; int revocable; int trust_level_set; byte trust_args[2]; char *trust_scope; struct revocation_key *revocation_key; int nrevocation_keys; struct notation *notations; byte *key_server_preferences; int key_server_preferences_len; char *key_server; int primary_user_id_set; int primary_user_id; char *policy_uri; byte *key_flags; int key_flags_len; char *signers_user_id; byte reason_for_revocation_code; char *reason_for_revocation; byte *features; int features_len; /* Whether to corrupt the signature. */ int corrupt; }; static int sig_issuer (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { gpg_error_t err; KEYDB_HANDLE hd; KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc; struct signinfo *si = cookie; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s KEYID\n", option); if (si->issuer_pk) log_fatal ("%s: multiple keys provided\n", option); err = classify_user_id (argv[0], &desc, 0); if (err) log_fatal ("search terms '%s': %s\n", argv[0], gpg_strerror (err)); hd = keydb_new (); err = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL); if (err) log_fatal ("looking up '%s': %s\n", argv[0], gpg_strerror (err)); err = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &si->issuer_kb); if (err) log_fatal ("retrieving keyblock for '%s': %s\n", argv[0], gpg_strerror (err)); keydb_release (hd); si->issuer_pk = si->issuer_kb->pkt->pkt.public_key; return 1; } static int sig_issuer_keyid (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { gpg_error_t err; KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc; struct signinfo *si = cookie; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s KEYID|self\n", option); if (si->issuer_keyid[0] || si->issuer_keyid[1] || si->issuer_keyid_self) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.\n", option); if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "self") == 0) { si->issuer_keyid_self = 1; return 1; } err = classify_user_id (argv[0], &desc, 0); if (err) log_fatal ("search terms '%s': %s\n", argv[0], gpg_strerror (err)); if (desc.mode != KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID) log_fatal ("%s is not a valid long key id.\n", argv[0]); keyid_copy (si->issuer_keyid, desc.u.kid); return 1; } static int sig_pk (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct signinfo *si = cookie; int i; char *tail = NULL; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s COMPONENT_INDEX\n", option); errno = 0; i = strtoul (argv[0], &tail, 10); if (errno || (tail && *tail)) log_fatal ("Invalid value passed to %s (%s)\n", option, argv[0]); if (i >= ncomponents) log_fatal ("%d: No such component (have %d components so far)\n", i, ncomponents); if (! (components[i].pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || components[i].pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)) log_fatal ("Component %d is not a public key or a subkey.", i); if (strcmp (option, "--pk") == 0) { if (si->pk) log_fatal ("%s already given.\n", option); si->pk = components[i].pkt.public_key; } else if (strcmp (option, "--sk") == 0) { if (si->sk) log_fatal ("%s already given.\n", option); si->sk = components[i].pkt.public_key; } else log_fatal ("Cannot handle %s\n", option); return 1; } static int sig_user_id (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct signinfo *si = cookie; int i; char *tail = NULL; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s COMPONENT_INDEX\n", option); if (si->uid) log_fatal ("%s already given.\n", option); errno = 0; i = strtoul (argv[0], &tail, 10); if (errno || (tail && *tail)) log_fatal ("Invalid value passed to %s (%s)\n", option, argv[0]); if (i >= ncomponents) log_fatal ("%d: No such component (have %d components so far)\n", i, ncomponents); if (! (components[i].pkttype != PKT_USER_ID || components[i].pkttype == PKT_ATTRIBUTE)) log_fatal ("Component %d is not a public key or a subkey.", i); si->uid = components[i].pkt.user_id; return 1; } static int sig_class (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct signinfo *si = cookie; int i; char *tail = NULL; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s CLASS\n", option); errno = 0; i = strtoul (argv[0], &tail, 0); if (errno || (tail && *tail)) log_fatal ("Invalid value passed to %s (%s)\n", option, argv[0]); si->class = i; return 1; } static int sig_digest (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct signinfo *si = cookie; int i; char *tail = NULL; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s DIGEST_ALGO\n", option); errno = 0; i = strtoul (argv[0], &tail, 10); if (errno || (tail && *tail)) log_fatal ("Invalid value passed to %s (%s)\n", option, argv[0]); si->digest_algo = i; return 1; } static int sig_timestamp (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct signinfo *si = cookie; char *tail = NULL; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s TIMESTAMP\n", option); errno = 0; si->timestamp = parse_timestamp (argv[0], &tail); if (errno || (tail && *tail)) log_fatal ("Invalid value passed to %s (%s)\n", option, argv[0]); return 1; } static int sig_expiration (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct signinfo *si = cookie; int is_expiration = strcmp (option, "--expiration") == 0; u32 *i = is_expiration ? &si->expiration : &si->key_expiration; if (! is_expiration) log_assert (strcmp (option, "--key-expiration") == 0); if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s DURATION\n", option); *i = parse_expire_string (argv[0]); if (*i == (u32)-1) log_fatal ("Invalid value passed to %s (%s)\n", option, argv[0]); return 1; } static int sig_int_list (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct signinfo *si = cookie; int nvalues = 1; char *values = xmalloc (nvalues * sizeof (values[0])); char *tail = argv[0]; int i; byte **a; int *n; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s VALUE[,VALUE...]\n", option); for (i = 0; tail && *tail; i ++) { int v; char *old_tail = tail; errno = 0; v = strtol (tail, &tail, 0); if (errno || old_tail == tail || (tail && !(*tail == ',' || *tail == 0))) log_fatal ("Invalid value passed to %s (%s). " "Expected a list of comma separated numbers\n", option, argv[0]); if (! (0 <= v && v <= 255)) log_fatal ("%s: %d is out of range (Expected: 0-255)\n", option, v); if (i == nvalues) { nvalues *= 2; values = xrealloc (values, nvalues * sizeof (values[0])); } values[i] = v; if (*tail == ',') tail ++; else log_assert (*tail == 0); } if (strcmp ("--cipher-algos", option) == 0) { a = &si->cipher_algorithms; n = &si->cipher_algorithms_len; } else if (strcmp ("--digest-algos", option) == 0) { a = &si->digest_algorithms; n = &si->digest_algorithms_len; } else if (strcmp ("--compress-algos", option) == 0) { a = &si->compress_algorithms; n = &si->compress_algorithms_len; } else log_fatal ("Cannot handle %s\n", option); if (*a) log_fatal ("Option %s given multiple times.\n", option); *a = values; *n = i; return 1; } static int sig_flag (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct signinfo *si = cookie; int range[2] = {0, 255}; char *tail; int v; if (strcmp (option, "--primary-user-id") == 0) range[1] = 1; if (argc <= 1) { if (range[0] == 0 && range[1] == 1) log_fatal ("Usage: %s 0|1\n", option); else log_fatal ("Usage: %s %d-%d\n", option, range[0], range[1]); } errno = 0; v = strtol (argv[0], &tail, 0); if (errno || (tail && *tail) || !(range[0] <= v && v <= range[1])) log_fatal ("Invalid value passed to %s (%s). Expected %d-%d\n", option, argv[0], range[0], range[1]); if (strcmp (option, "--exportable") == 0) { si->exportable_set = 1; si->exportable = v; } else if (strcmp (option, "--revocable") == 0) { si->revocable_set = 1; si->revocable = v; } else if (strcmp (option, "--primary-user-id") == 0) { si->primary_user_id_set = 1; si->primary_user_id = v; } else log_fatal ("Cannot handle %s\n", option); return 1; } static int sig_trust_level (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct signinfo *si = cookie; int i; char *tail; if (argc <= 1) log_fatal ("Usage: %s DEPTH TRUST_AMOUNT\n", option); for (i = 0; i < sizeof (si->trust_args) / sizeof (si->trust_args[0]); i ++) { int v; errno = 0; v = strtol (argv[i], &tail, 0); if (errno || (tail && *tail) || !(0 <= v && v <= 255)) log_fatal ("Invalid value passed to %s (%s). Expected 0-255\n", option, argv[i]); si->trust_args[i] = v; } si->trust_level_set = 1; return 2; } static int sig_string_arg (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct signinfo *si = cookie; char *p = argv[0]; char **s; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s STRING\n", option); if (strcmp (option, "--trust-scope") == 0) s = &si->trust_scope; else if (strcmp (option, "--key-server") == 0) s = &si->key_server; else if (strcmp (option, "--signers-user-id") == 0) s = &si->signers_user_id; else if (strcmp (option, "--policy-uri") == 0) s = &si->policy_uri; else log_fatal ("Cannot handle %s\n", option); if (*s) log_fatal ("%s already given.\n", option); *s = xstrdup (p); return 1; } static int sig_revocation_key (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { gpg_error_t err; struct signinfo *si = cookie; int v; char *tail; PKT_public_key pk; struct revocation_key *revkey; if (argc < 2) log_fatal ("Usage: %s CLASS KEYID\n", option); memset (&pk, 0, sizeof (pk)); errno = 0; v = strtol (argv[0], &tail, 16); if (errno || (tail && *tail) || !(0 <= v && v <= 255)) log_fatal ("%s: Invalid class value (%s). Expected 0-255\n", option, argv[0]); pk.req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; err = get_pubkey_byname (NULL, NULL, &pk, argv[1], NULL, NULL, 1, 1); if (err) log_fatal ("looking up key %s: %s\n", argv[1], gpg_strerror (err)); si->nrevocation_keys ++; si->revocation_key = xrealloc (si->revocation_key, si->nrevocation_keys * sizeof (*si->revocation_key)); revkey = &si->revocation_key[si->nrevocation_keys - 1]; revkey->class = v; revkey->algid = pk.pubkey_algo; fingerprint_from_pk (&pk, revkey->fpr, NULL); release_public_key_parts (&pk); return 2; } static int sig_notation (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct signinfo *si = cookie; int is_blob = strcmp (option, "--notation") != 0; struct notation *notation; char *p = argv[0]; int p_free = 0; char *data; int data_size; int data_len; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s [!<]name=value\n", option); if ((p[0] == '!' && p[1] == '<') || p[0] == '<') /* Read from a file. */ { char *filename = NULL; iobuf_t in; int prefix; if (p[0] == '<') p ++; else { /* Remove the '<', which string_to_notation does not understand, and preserve the '!'. */ p = xstrdup (&p[1]); p_free = 1; p[0] = '!'; } filename = strchr (p, '='); if (! filename) log_fatal ("No value specified. Usage: %s [!<]name=value\n", option); filename ++; prefix = (size_t) filename - (size_t) p; errno = 0; in = iobuf_open (filename); if (! in) log_fatal ("Opening '%s': %s\n", filename, errno ? strerror (errno): "unknown error"); /* A notation can be at most about a few dozen bytes short of 64k. Since this is relatively small, we just allocate that much instead of trying to dynamically size a buffer. */ data_size = 64 * 1024; data = xmalloc (data_size); log_assert (prefix <= data_size); memcpy (data, p, prefix); data_len = iobuf_read (in, &data[prefix], data_size - prefix - 1); if (data_len == -1) /* EOF => 0 bytes read. */ data_len = 0; if (data_len == data_size - prefix - 1) /* Technically, we should do another read and check for EOF, but what's one byte more or less? */ log_fatal ("Notation data doesn't fit in the packet.\n"); iobuf_close (in); /* NUL terminate it. */ data[prefix + data_len] = 0; if (p_free) xfree (p); p = data; p_free = 1; data = &p[prefix]; if (is_blob) p[prefix - 1] = 0; } else if (is_blob) { data = strchr (p, '='); if (! data) { data = p; data_len = 0; } else { p = xstrdup (p); p_free = 1; data = strchr (p, '='); log_assert (data); /* NUL terminate the name. */ *data = 0; data ++; data_len = strlen (data); } } if (is_blob) notation = blob_to_notation (p, data, data_len); else notation = string_to_notation (p, 1); if (! notation) log_fatal ("creating notation: an unknown error occurred.\n"); notation->next = si->notations; si->notations = notation; if (p_free) xfree (p); return 1; } static int sig_big_endian_arg (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct signinfo *si = cookie; char *p = argv[0]; int i; int l; char *bytes; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s HEXDIGITS\n", option); /* Skip a leading "0x". */ if (p[0] == '0' && p[1] == 'x') p += 2; for (i = 0; i < strlen (p); i ++) if (!hexdigitp (&p[i])) log_fatal ("%s: argument ('%s') must consist of hex digits.\n", option, p); if (strlen (p) % 2 != 0) log_fatal ("%s: argument ('%s') must contain an even number of hex digits.\n", option, p); l = strlen (p) / 2; bytes = xmalloc (l); hex2bin (p, bytes, l); if (strcmp (option, "--key-server-preferences") == 0) { if (si->key_server_preferences) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.\n", option); si->key_server_preferences = bytes; si->key_server_preferences_len = l; } else if (strcmp (option, "--key-flags") == 0) { if (si->key_flags) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.\n", option); si->key_flags = bytes; si->key_flags_len = l; } else if (strcmp (option, "--features") == 0) { if (si->features) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.\n", option); si->features = bytes; si->features_len = l; } else log_fatal ("Cannot handle %s\n", option); return 1; } static int sig_reason_for_revocation (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct signinfo *si = cookie; int v; char *tail; if (argc < 2) log_fatal ("Usage: %s REASON_CODE REASON_STRING\n", option); errno = 0; v = strtol (argv[0], &tail, 16); if (errno || (tail && *tail) || !(0 <= v && v <= 255)) log_fatal ("%s: Invalid reason code (%s). Expected 0-255\n", option, argv[0]); if (si->reason_for_revocation) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.\n", option); si->reason_for_revocation_code = v; si->reason_for_revocation = xstrdup (argv[1]); return 2; } static int sig_corrupt (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct signinfo *si = cookie; (void) option; (void) argc; (void) argv; (void) cookie; si->corrupt = 1; return 0; } static struct option sig_options[] = { { "--issuer", sig_issuer, "The key to use to generate the signature."}, { "--issuer-keyid", sig_issuer_keyid, "Set the issuer's key id. This is useful for creating a " "self-signature. As a special case, the value \"self\" refers " "to the primary key's key id. " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.5)" }, { "--pk", sig_pk, "The primary keyas an index into the components (keys and uids) " "created so far where the first component has the index 0." }, { "--sk", sig_pk, "The subkey as an index into the components (keys and uids) created " "so far where the first component has the index 0. Only needed for " "0x18, 0x19, and 0x28 signatures." }, { "--user-id", sig_user_id, "The user id as an index into the components (keys and uids) created " "so far where the first component has the index 0. Only needed for " "0x10-0x13 and 0x30 signatures." }, { "--class", sig_class, "The signature's class. Valid values are " "0x10-0x13 (user id and primary-key certification), " "0x18 (subkey binding), " "0x19 (primary key binding), " "0x1f (direct primary key signature), " "0x20 (key revocation), " "0x28 (subkey revocation), and " "0x30 (certification revocation)." }, { "--digest", sig_digest, "The digest algorithm" }, { "--timestamp", sig_timestamp, "The signature's creation time. " TIMESTAMP_HELP " 0 means now. " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.4)" }, { "--key-expiration", sig_expiration, "The number of days until the associated key expires. To specify " "seconds, prefix the value with \"seconds=\". It is also possible " "to use 'y', 'm' and 'w' as simple multipliers. For instance, 2y " "means 2 years, etc. " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.6)" }, { "--cipher-algos", sig_int_list, "A comma separated list of the preferred cipher algorithms (identified by " "their number, see RFC 4880, Section 9). " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.7)" }, { "--digest-algos", sig_int_list, "A comma separated list of the preferred algorithms (identified by " "their number, see RFC 4880, Section 9). " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.8)" }, { "--compress-algos", sig_int_list, "A comma separated list of the preferred algorithms (identified by " "their number, see RFC 4880, Section 9)." "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.9)" }, { "--expiration", sig_expiration, "The number of days until the signature expires. To specify seconds, " "prefix the value with \"seconds=\". It is also possible to use 'y', " "'m' and 'w' as simple multipliers. For instance, 2y means 2 years, " "etc. " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.10)" }, { "--exportable", sig_flag, "Mark this signature as exportable (1) or local (0). " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.11)" }, { "--revocable", sig_flag, "Mark this signature as revocable (1, revocations are ignored) " "or non-revocable (0). " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.12)" }, { "--trust-level", sig_trust_level, "Set the trust level. This takes two integer arguments (0-255): " "the trusted-introducer level and the degree of trust. " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.13.)" }, { "--trust-scope", sig_string_arg, "A regular expression that limits the scope of --trust-level. " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.14.)" }, { "--revocation-key", sig_revocation_key, "Specify a designated revoker. Takes two arguments: the class " "(normally 0x80 or 0xC0 (sensitive)) and the key id of the " "designatured revoker. May be given multiple times. " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.15)" }, { "--notation", sig_notation, "Add a human-readable notation of the form \"[!<]name=value\" where " "\"!\" means that the critical flag should be set and \"<\" means " "that VALUE is a file to read the data from. " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.16)" }, { "--notation-binary", sig_notation, "Add a binary notation of the form \"[!<]name=value\" where " "\"!\" means that the critical flag should be set and \"<\" means " "that VALUE is a file to read the data from. " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.16)" }, { "--key-server-preferences", sig_big_endian_arg, "Big-endian number encoding the keyserver preferences. " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.17)" }, { "--key-server", sig_string_arg, "The preferred keyserver. (RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.18)" }, { "--primary-user-id", sig_flag, "Sets the primary user id flag. (RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.19)" }, { "--policy-uri", sig_string_arg, "URI of a document that describes the issuer's signing policy. " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.20)" }, { "--key-flags", sig_big_endian_arg, "Big-endian number encoding the key flags. " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.21)" }, { "--signers-user-id", sig_string_arg, "The user id (as a string) responsible for the signing. " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.22)" }, { "--reason-for-revocation", sig_reason_for_revocation, "Takes two arguments: a reason for revocation code and a " "user-provided string. " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.23)" }, { "--features", sig_big_endian_arg, "Big-endian number encoding the feature flags. " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.24)" }, { "--signature-target", NULL, "Takes three arguments: the target signature's public key algorithm " " (as an integer), the hash algorithm (as an integer) and the hash " " (as a hexadecimal string). " "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.25)" }, { "--embedded-signature", NULL, "An embedded signature. This must be immediately followed by a " "signature packet (created using --signature ...) or a filename " "containing the packet." "(RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.26)" }, { "--hashed", NULL, "The following attributes will be placed in the hashed area of " "the signature. (This is the default and it reset at the end of" "each signature.)" }, { "--unhashed", NULL, "The following attributes will be placed in the unhashed area of " "the signature (and thus not integrity protected)." }, { "--corrupt", sig_corrupt, "Corrupt the signature." }, { NULL, NULL, "Example:\n\n" " $ gpgcompose --public-key $KEYID --user-id USERID \\\n" " --signature --class 0x10 --issuer $KEYID --issuer-keyid self \\\n" " | " GPG_NAME " --list-packets"} }; static int mksubpkt_callback (PKT_signature *sig, void *cookie) { struct signinfo *si = cookie; int i; if (si->key_expiration) { char buf[4]; buf[0] = (si->key_expiration >> 24) & 0xff; buf[1] = (si->key_expiration >> 16) & 0xff; buf[2] = (si->key_expiration >> 8) & 0xff; buf[3] = si->key_expiration & 0xff; build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, buf, 4); } if (si->cipher_algorithms) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM, si->cipher_algorithms, si->cipher_algorithms_len); if (si->digest_algorithms) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH, si->digest_algorithms, si->digest_algorithms_len); if (si->compress_algorithms) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR, si->compress_algorithms, si->compress_algorithms_len); if (si->exportable_set) { char buf = si->exportable; build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE, &buf, 1); } if (si->trust_level_set) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_TRUST, si->trust_args, sizeof (si->trust_args)); if (si->trust_scope) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP, si->trust_scope, strlen (si->trust_scope)); for (i = 0; i < si->nrevocation_keys; i ++) { struct revocation_key *revkey = &si->revocation_key[i]; gpg_error_t err = keygen_add_revkey (sig, revkey); if (err) { u32 keyid[2]; keyid_from_fingerprint (global_ctrl, revkey->fpr, 20, keyid); log_fatal ("adding revocation key %s: %s\n", keystr (keyid), gpg_strerror (err)); } } /* keygen_add_revkey sets revocable=0 so be sure to do this after adding the rev keys. */ if (si->revocable_set) { char buf = si->revocable; build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE, &buf, 1); } keygen_add_notations (sig, si->notations); if (si->key_server_preferences) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS, si->key_server_preferences, si->key_server_preferences_len); if (si->key_server) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, si->key_server, strlen (si->key_server)); if (si->primary_user_id_set) { char buf = si->primary_user_id; build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, &buf, 1); } if (si->policy_uri) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_POLICY, si->policy_uri, strlen (si->policy_uri)); if (si->key_flags) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS, si->key_flags, si->key_flags_len); if (si->signers_user_id) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID, si->signers_user_id, strlen (si->signers_user_id)); if (si->reason_for_revocation) { int len = 1 + strlen (si->reason_for_revocation); char *buf; buf = xmalloc (len); buf[0] = si->reason_for_revocation_code; memcpy (&buf[1], si->reason_for_revocation, len - 1); build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON, buf, len); xfree (buf); } if (si->features) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, si->features, si->features_len); return 0; } static int signature (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { gpg_error_t err; iobuf_t out = cookie; struct signinfo si; int processed; PKT_public_key *pk; PKT_signature *sig; PACKET pkt; u32 keyid_orig[2], keyid[2]; (void) option; memset (&si, 0, sizeof (si)); memset (&pkt, 0, sizeof (pkt)); processed = process_options (option, major_options, sig_options, &si, global_options, NULL, argc, argv); if (ncomponents) { int pkttype = components[ncomponents - 1].pkttype; if (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) { if (! si.class) /* Direct key sig. */ si.class = 0x1F; } else if (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) { if (! si.sk) si.sk = components[ncomponents - 1].pkt.public_key; if (! si.class) /* Subkey binding sig. */ si.class = 0x18; } else if (pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { if (! si.uid) si.uid = components[ncomponents - 1].pkt.user_id; if (! si.class) /* Certification of a user id and public key packet. */ si.class = 0x10; } } pk = NULL; if (! si.pk || ! si.issuer_pk) /* No primary key specified. Default to the first one that we find. */ { int i; for (i = 0; i < ncomponents; i ++) if (components[i].pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) { pk = components[i].pkt.public_key; break; } } if (! si.pk) { if (! pk) log_fatal ("%s: no primary key given and no primary key available", "--pk"); si.pk = pk; } if (! si.issuer_pk) { if (! pk) log_fatal ("%s: no issuer key given and no primary key available", "--issuer"); si.issuer_pk = pk; } if (si.class == 0x18 || si.class == 0x19 || si.class == 0x28) /* Requires the primary key and a subkey. */ { if (! si.sk) log_fatal ("sig class 0x%x requires a subkey (--sk)\n", si.class); } else if (si.class == 0x10 || si.class == 0x11 || si.class == 0x12 || si.class == 0x13 || si.class == 0x30) /* Requires the primary key and a user id. */ { if (! si.uid) log_fatal ("sig class 0x%x requires a uid (--uid)\n", si.class); } else if (si.class == 0x1F || si.class == 0x20) /* Just requires the primary key. */ ; else log_fatal ("Unsupported signature class: 0x%x\n", si.class); sig = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*sig)); /* Save SI.ISSUER_PK->KEYID. */ keyid_copy (keyid_orig, pk_keyid (si.issuer_pk)); if (si.issuer_keyid[0] || si.issuer_keyid[1]) keyid_copy (si.issuer_pk->keyid, si.issuer_keyid); else if (si.issuer_keyid_self) { PKT_public_key *pripk = primary_key(); if (! pripk) log_fatal ("--issuer-keyid self given, but no primary key available.\n"); keyid_copy (si.issuer_pk->keyid, pk_keyid (pripk)); } + /* The reuse of core gpg stuff by this tool is questionable when it + * requires adding extra code to the actual gpg code. It does not + * make sense to pass an extra parameter and in particular not given + * that gpg already has opt.cert_digest_algo to override it. */ + if (si.digest_algo) + log_info ("note: digest algo can't be passed to make_keysig_packet\n"); + /* Changing the issuer's key id is fragile. Check to make sure make_keysig_packet didn't recompute the keyid. */ keyid_copy (keyid, si.issuer_pk->keyid); err = make_keysig_packet (global_ctrl, &sig, si.pk, si.uid, si.sk, si.issuer_pk, - si.class, si.digest_algo, + si.class, si.timestamp, si.expiration, mksubpkt_callback, &si, NULL); log_assert (keyid_cmp (keyid, si.issuer_pk->keyid) == 0); if (err) log_fatal ("Generating signature: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); /* Restore SI.PK->KEYID. */ keyid_copy (si.issuer_pk->keyid, keyid_orig); if (si.corrupt) { /* Set the top 32-bits to 0xBAD0DEAD. */ int bits = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sig->data[0]); gcry_mpi_t x = gcry_mpi_new (0); gcry_mpi_add_ui (x, x, 0xBAD0DEAD); gcry_mpi_lshift (x, x, bits > 32 ? bits - 32 : bits); gcry_mpi_clear_highbit (sig->data[0], bits > 32 ? bits - 32 : 0); gcry_mpi_add (sig->data[0], sig->data[0], x); gcry_mpi_release (x); } pkt.pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; pkt.pkt.signature = sig; err = build_packet (out, &pkt); if (err) log_fatal ("serializing public key packet: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); debug ("Wrote signature packet:\n"); dump_component (&pkt); free_seckey_enc (sig); release_kbnode (si.issuer_kb); xfree (si.revocation_key); return processed; } struct sk_esk_info { /* The cipher used for encrypting the session key (when a session key is used). */ int cipher; /* The cipher used for encryping the SED packet. */ int sed_cipher; /* S2K related data. */ int hash; int mode; int mode_set; byte salt[8]; int salt_set; int iterations; /* If applying the S2K function to the passphrase is the session key or if it is the decryption key for the session key. */ int s2k_is_session_key; /* Generate a new, random session key. */ int new_session_key; /* The unencrypted session key. */ int session_key_len; char *session_key; char *password; }; static int sk_esk_cipher (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct sk_esk_info *si = cookie; char *usage = "integer|IDEA|3DES|CAST5|BLOWFISH|AES|AES192|AES256|CAMELLIA128|CAMELLIA192|CAMELLIA256"; int cipher; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s %s\n", option, usage); if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "IDEA") == 0) cipher = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "3DES") == 0) cipher = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "CAST5") == 0) cipher = CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "BLOWFISH") == 0) cipher = CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "AES") == 0) cipher = CIPHER_ALGO_AES; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "AES192") == 0) cipher = CIPHER_ALGO_AES192; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "TWOFISH") == 0) cipher = CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "CAMELLIA128") == 0) cipher = CIPHER_ALGO_CAMELLIA128; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "CAMELLIA192") == 0) cipher = CIPHER_ALGO_CAMELLIA192; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "CAMELLIA256") == 0) cipher = CIPHER_ALGO_CAMELLIA256; else { char *tail; int v; errno = 0; v = strtol (argv[0], &tail, 0); if (errno || (tail && *tail) || ! valid_cipher (v)) log_fatal ("Invalid or unsupported value. Usage: %s %s\n", option, usage); cipher = v; } if (strcmp (option, "--cipher") == 0) { if (si->cipher) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.", option); si->cipher = cipher; } else if (strcmp (option, "--sed-cipher") == 0) { if (si->sed_cipher) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.", option); si->sed_cipher = cipher; } return 1; } static int sk_esk_mode (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct sk_esk_info *si = cookie; char *usage = "integer|simple|salted|iterated"; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s %s\n", option, usage); if (si->mode) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.", option); if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "simple") == 0) si->mode = 0; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "salted") == 0) si->mode = 1; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "iterated") == 0) si->mode = 3; else { char *tail; int v; errno = 0; v = strtol (argv[0], &tail, 0); if (errno || (tail && *tail) || ! (v == 0 || v == 1 || v == 3)) log_fatal ("Invalid or unsupported value. Usage: %s %s\n", option, usage); si->mode = v; } si->mode_set = 1; return 1; } static int sk_esk_hash_algorithm (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct sk_esk_info *si = cookie; char *usage = "integer|MD5|SHA1|RMD160|SHA256|SHA384|SHA512|SHA224"; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s %s\n", option, usage); if (si->hash) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.", option); if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "MD5") == 0) si->hash = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "SHA1") == 0) si->hash = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "RMD160") == 0) si->hash = DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "SHA256") == 0) si->hash = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "SHA384") == 0) si->hash = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA384; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "SHA512") == 0) si->hash = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512; else if (strcasecmp (argv[0], "SHA224") == 0) si->hash = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA224; else { char *tail; int v; errno = 0; v = strtol (argv[0], &tail, 0); if (errno || (tail && *tail) || ! (v == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 || v == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 || v == DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 || v == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256 || v == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA384 || v == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512 || v == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA224)) log_fatal ("Invalid or unsupported value. Usage: %s %s\n", option, usage); si->hash = v; } return 1; } static int sk_esk_salt (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct sk_esk_info *si = cookie; char *usage = "16-HEX-CHARACTERS"; char *p = argv[0]; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s %s\n", option, usage); if (si->salt_set) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.", option); if (p[0] == '0' && p[1] == 'x') p += 2; if (strlen (p) != 16) log_fatal ("%s: Salt must be exactly 16 hexadecimal characters (have: %zd)\n", option, strlen (p)); if (hex2bin (p, si->salt, sizeof (si->salt)) == -1) log_fatal ("%s: Salt must only contain hexadecimal characters\n", option); si->salt_set = 1; return 1; } static int sk_esk_iterations (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct sk_esk_info *si = cookie; char *usage = "ITERATION-COUNT"; char *tail; int v; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s %s\n", option, usage); errno = 0; v = strtol (argv[0], &tail, 0); if (errno || (tail && *tail) || v < 0) log_fatal ("%s: Non-negative integer expected.\n", option); si->iterations = v; return 1; } static int sk_esk_session_key (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct sk_esk_info *si = cookie; char *usage = "HEX-CHARACTERS|auto|none"; char *p = argv[0]; struct session_key sk; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s %s\n", option, usage); if (si->session_key || si->s2k_is_session_key || si->new_session_key) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.", option); if (strcasecmp (p, "none") == 0) { si->s2k_is_session_key = 1; return 1; } if (strcasecmp (p, "new") == 0) { si->new_session_key = 1; return 1; } if (strcasecmp (p, "auto") == 0) return 1; sk = parse_session_key (option, p, 0); if (si->session_key) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.", option); if (sk.algo) si->sed_cipher = sk.algo; si->session_key_len = sk.keylen; si->session_key = sk.key; return 1; } static int sk_esk_password (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct sk_esk_info *si = cookie; char *usage = "PASSWORD"; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: --sk-esk %s\n", usage); if (si->password) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.", option); si->password = xstrdup (argv[0]); return 1; } static struct option sk_esk_options[] = { { "--cipher", sk_esk_cipher, "The encryption algorithm for encrypting the session key. " "One of IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES (default), AES192, " "AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, or CAMELLIA256." }, { "--sed-cipher", sk_esk_cipher, "The encryption algorithm for encrypting the SED packet. " "One of IDEA, 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, " "AES256 (default), TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, or CAMELLIA256." }, { "--mode", sk_esk_mode, "The S2K mode. Either one of the strings \"simple\", \"salted\" " "or \"iterated\" or an integer." }, { "--hash", sk_esk_hash_algorithm, "The hash algorithm to used to derive the key. One of " "MD5, SHA1 (default), RMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, or SHA224." }, { "--salt", sk_esk_salt, "The S2K salt encoded as 16 hexadecimal characters. One needed " "if the S2K function is in salted or iterated mode." }, { "--iterations", sk_esk_iterations, "The iteration count. If not provided, a reasonable value is chosen. " "Note: due to the encoding scheme, not every value is valid. For " "convenience, the provided value will be rounded appropriately. " "Only needed if the S2K function is in iterated mode." }, { "--session-key", sk_esk_session_key, "The session key to be encrypted by the S2K function as a hexadecimal " "string. If this is \"new\", then a new session key is generated." "If this is \"auto\", then either the last session key is " "used, if the was none, one is generated. If this is \"none\", then " "the session key is the result of applying the S2K algorithms to the " "password. The session key may be prefaced with an integer and a colon " "to indicate the cipher to use for the SED packet (making --sed-cipher " "unnecessary and allowing the direct use of the result of " "\"" GPG_NAME " --show-session-key\")." }, { "", sk_esk_password, "The password." }, { NULL, NULL, "Example:\n\n" " $ gpgcompose --sk-esk foobar --encrypted \\\n" " --literal --value foo | " GPG_NAME " --list-packets" } }; static int sk_esk (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { iobuf_t out = cookie; gpg_error_t err; int processed; struct sk_esk_info si; DEK sesdek; DEK s2kdek; PKT_symkey_enc *ske; PACKET pkt; memset (&si, 0, sizeof (si)); processed = process_options (option, major_options, sk_esk_options, &si, global_options, NULL, argc, argv); if (! si.password) log_fatal ("%s: missing password. Usage: %s PASSWORD", option, option); /* Fill in defaults, if appropriate. */ if (! si.cipher) si.cipher = CIPHER_ALGO_AES; if (! si.sed_cipher) si.sed_cipher = CIPHER_ALGO_AES256; if (! si.hash) si.hash = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1; if (! si.mode_set) /* Salted and iterated. */ si.mode = 3; if (si.mode != 0 && ! si.salt_set) /* Generate a salt. */ gcry_randomize (si.salt, 8, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM); if (si.mode == 0) { if (si.iterations) log_info ("%s: --iterations provided, but not used for mode=0\n", option); si.iterations = 0; } else if (! si.iterations) si.iterations = 10000; memset (&sesdek, 0, sizeof (sesdek)); /* The session key is used to encrypt the SED packet. */ sesdek.algo = si.sed_cipher; if (si.session_key) /* Copy the unencrypted session key into SESDEK. */ { sesdek.keylen = openpgp_cipher_get_algo_keylen (sesdek.algo); if (sesdek.keylen != si.session_key_len) log_fatal ("%s: Cipher algorithm requires a %d byte session key, but provided session key is %d bytes.", option, sesdek.keylen, si.session_key_len); log_assert (sesdek.keylen <= sizeof (sesdek.key)); memcpy (sesdek.key, si.session_key, sesdek.keylen); } else if (! si.s2k_is_session_key || si.new_session_key) /* We need a session key, but one wasn't provided. Generate it. */ make_session_key (&sesdek); /* The encrypted session key needs 1 + SESDEK.KEYLEN bytes of space. */ ske = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*ske) + sesdek.keylen); ske->version = 4; ske->cipher_algo = si.cipher; ske->s2k.mode = si.mode; ske->s2k.hash_algo = si.hash; log_assert (sizeof (si.salt) == sizeof (ske->s2k.salt)); memcpy (ske->s2k.salt, si.salt, sizeof (ske->s2k.salt)); if (! si.s2k_is_session_key) { if (!si.iterations) ske->s2k.count = encode_s2k_iterations (agent_get_s2k_count ()); else ske->s2k.count = encode_s2k_iterations (si.iterations); } /* Derive the symmetric key that is either the session key or the key used to encrypt the session key. */ memset (&s2kdek, 0, sizeof (s2kdek)); s2kdek.algo = si.cipher; s2kdek.keylen = openpgp_cipher_get_algo_keylen (s2kdek.algo); err = gcry_kdf_derive (si.password, strlen (si.password), ske->s2k.mode == 3 ? GCRY_KDF_ITERSALTED_S2K : ske->s2k.mode == 1 ? GCRY_KDF_SALTED_S2K : GCRY_KDF_SIMPLE_S2K, ske->s2k.hash_algo, ske->s2k.salt, 8, S2K_DECODE_COUNT (ske->s2k.count), /* The size of the desired key and its buffer. */ s2kdek.keylen, s2kdek.key); if (err) log_fatal ("gcry_kdf_derive failed: %s", gpg_strerror (err)); if (si.s2k_is_session_key) { ske->seskeylen = 0; session_key = s2kdek; } else /* Encrypt the session key using the s2k specifier. */ { DEK *sesdekp = &sesdek; void *enckey; size_t enckeylen; /* Now encrypt the session key (or rather, the algorithm used to encrypt the SKESK plus the session key) using S2KDEK. */ err = encrypt_seskey (&s2kdek, 0, &sesdekp, &enckey, &enckeylen); if (err) log_fatal ("encrypt_seskey failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); if (enckeylen - 1 > sesdek.keylen) log_fatal ("key size is too big: %zu\n", enckeylen); else { ske->seskeylen = (byte)enckeylen; memcpy (ske->seskey, enckey, enckeylen); } /* Save the session key for later. */ session_key = sesdek; xfree (enckey); } pkt.pkttype = PKT_SYMKEY_ENC; pkt.pkt.symkey_enc = ske; err = build_packet (out, &pkt); if (err) log_fatal ("Serializing sym-key encrypted packet: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); debug ("Wrote sym-key encrypted packet:\n"); dump_component (&pkt); xfree (si.session_key); xfree (si.password); xfree (ske); return processed; } struct pk_esk_info { int session_key_set; int new_session_key; int sed_cipher; int session_key_len; char *session_key; int throw_keyid; char *keyid; }; static int pk_esk_session_key (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct pk_esk_info *pi = cookie; char *usage = "HEX-CHARACTERS|auto|none"; char *p = argv[0]; struct session_key sk; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s %s\n", option, usage); if (pi->session_key_set) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.", option); pi->session_key_set = 1; if (strcasecmp (p, "new") == 0) { pi->new_session_key = 1; return 1; } if (strcasecmp (p, "auto") == 0) return 1; sk = parse_session_key (option, p, 0); if (pi->session_key) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.", option); if (sk.algo) pi->sed_cipher = sk.algo; pi->session_key_len = sk.keylen; pi->session_key = sk.key; return 1; } static int pk_esk_throw_keyid (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct pk_esk_info *pi = cookie; (void) option; (void) argc; (void) argv; pi->throw_keyid = 1; return 0; } static int pk_esk_keyid (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct pk_esk_info *pi = cookie; char *usage = "KEYID"; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s %s\n", option, usage); if (pi->keyid) log_fatal ("Multiple key ids given, but only one is allowed."); pi->keyid = xstrdup (argv[0]); return 1; } static struct option pk_esk_options[] = { { "--session-key", pk_esk_session_key, "The session key to be encrypted by the S2K function as a hexadecimal " "string. If this is not given or is \"auto\", then the current " "session key is used. If there is no session key or this is \"new\", " "then a new session key is generated. The session key may be " "prefaced with an integer and a colon to indicate the cipher to use " "for the SED packet (making --sed-cipher unnecessary and allowing the " "direct use of the result of \"" GPG_NAME " --show-session-key\")." }, { "--throw-keyid", pk_esk_throw_keyid, "Throw the keyid." }, { "", pk_esk_keyid, "The key id." }, { NULL, NULL, "Example:\n\n" " $ gpgcompose --pk-esk $KEYID --encrypted --literal --value foo \\\n" " | " GPG_NAME " --list-packets"} }; static int pk_esk (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { iobuf_t out = cookie; gpg_error_t err; int processed; struct pk_esk_info pi; PKT_public_key pk; memset (&pi, 0, sizeof (pi)); processed = process_options (option, major_options, pk_esk_options, &pi, global_options, NULL, argc, argv); if (! pi.keyid) log_fatal ("%s: missing keyid. Usage: %s KEYID", option, option); memset (&pk, 0, sizeof (pk)); pk.req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC; err = get_pubkey_byname (NULL, NULL, &pk, pi.keyid, NULL, NULL, 1, 1); if (err) log_fatal ("%s: looking up key %s: %s\n", option, pi.keyid, gpg_strerror (err)); if (pi.sed_cipher) /* Have a session key. */ { session_key.algo = pi.sed_cipher; session_key.keylen = pi.session_key_len; log_assert (session_key.keylen <= sizeof (session_key.key)); memcpy (session_key.key, pi.session_key, session_key.keylen); } if (pi.new_session_key || ! session_key.algo) { if (! pi.new_session_key) /* Default to AES256. */ session_key.algo = CIPHER_ALGO_AES256; make_session_key (&session_key); } err = write_pubkey_enc (global_ctrl, &pk, pi.throw_keyid, &session_key, out); if (err) log_fatal ("%s: writing pk_esk packet for %s: %s\n", option, pi.keyid, gpg_strerror (err)); debug ("Wrote pk_esk packet for %s\n", pi.keyid); xfree (pi.keyid); xfree (pi.session_key); return processed; } struct encinfo { int saw_session_key; }; static int encrypted_session_key (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct encinfo *ei = cookie; char *usage = "HEX-CHARACTERS|auto"; char *p = argv[0]; struct session_key sk; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s %s\n", option, usage); if (ei->saw_session_key) log_fatal ("%s given multiple times.", option); ei->saw_session_key = 1; if (strcasecmp (p, "auto") == 0) return 1; sk = parse_session_key (option, p, 1); session_key.algo = sk.algo; log_assert (sk.keylen <= sizeof (session_key.key)); memcpy (session_key.key, sk.key, sk.keylen); xfree (sk.key); return 1; } static struct option encrypted_options[] = { { "--session-key", encrypted_session_key, "The session key to be encrypted by the S2K function as a hexadecimal " "string. If this is not given or is \"auto\", then the last session key " "is used. If there was none, then an error is raised. The session key " "must be prefaced with an integer and a colon to indicate the cipher " "to use (this is format used by \"" GPG_NAME " --show-session-key\")." }, { NULL, NULL, "After creating the packet, this command clears the current " "session key.\n\n" "Example: nested encryption packets:\n\n" " $ gpgcompose --sk-esk foo --encrypted-mdc \\\n" " --sk-esk bar --encrypted-mdc \\\n" " --literal --value 123 --encrypted-pop --encrypted-pop | " GPG_NAME" -d" } }; static int encrypted (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { iobuf_t out = cookie; int processed; struct encinfo ei; PKT_encrypted e; cipher_filter_context_t *cfx; memset (&ei, 0, sizeof (ei)); processed = process_options (option, major_options, encrypted_options, &ei, global_options, NULL, argc, argv); if (! session_key.algo) log_fatal ("%s: no session key configured\n" " (use e.g. --sk-esk PASSWORD or --pk-esk KEYID).\n", option); memset (&e, 0, sizeof (e)); /* We only need to set E->LEN, E->EXTRALEN (if E->LEN is not 0), and E->NEW_CTB. */ e.len = 0; e.new_ctb = 1; /* Register the cipher filter. */ cfx = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*cfx)); /* Copy the session key. */ cfx->dek = xmalloc (sizeof (*cfx->dek)); *cfx->dek = session_key; if (do_debug) { char *buf; buf = xmalloc (2 * session_key.keylen + 1); debug ("session key: algo: %d; keylen: %d; key: %s\n", session_key.algo, session_key.keylen, bin2hex (session_key.key, session_key.keylen, buf)); xfree (buf); } if (strcmp (option, "--encrypted-mdc") == 0) cfx->dek->use_mdc = 1; else if (strcmp (option, "--encrypted") == 0) cfx->dek->use_mdc = 0; else log_fatal ("%s: option not handled by this function!\n", option); cfx->datalen = 0; filter_push (out, cipher_filter_cfb, cfx, PKT_ENCRYPTED, cfx->datalen == 0); debug ("Wrote encrypted packet:\n"); /* Clear the current session key. */ memset (&session_key, 0, sizeof (session_key)); return processed; } static struct option encrypted_pop_options[] = { { NULL, NULL, "Example:\n\n" " $ gpgcompose --sk-esk PASSWORD \\\n" " --encrypted-mdc \\\n" " --literal --value foo \\\n" " --encrypted-pop | " GPG_NAME " --list-packets" } }; static int encrypted_pop (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { iobuf_t out = cookie; int processed; processed = process_options (option, major_options, encrypted_pop_options, NULL, global_options, NULL, argc, argv); /* We only support a single option, --help, which causes the program * to exit. */ log_assert (processed == 0); filter_pop (out, PKT_ENCRYPTED); debug ("Popped encryption container.\n"); return processed; } struct data { int file; union { char *data; char *filename; }; struct data *next; }; /* This must be the first member of the struct to be able to use add_value! */ struct datahead { struct data *head; struct data **last_next; }; static int add_value (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct datahead *dh = cookie; struct data *d = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (struct data)); d->file = strcmp ("--file", option) == 0; if (! d->file) log_assert (strcmp ("--value", option) == 0); if (argc == 0) { if (d->file) log_fatal ("Usage: %s FILENAME\n", option); else log_fatal ("Usage: %s STRING\n", option); } if (! dh->last_next) /* First time through. Initialize DH->LAST_NEXT. */ { log_assert (! dh->head); dh->last_next = &dh->head; } if (d->file) d->filename = argv[0]; else d->data = argv[0]; /* Append it. */ *dh->last_next = d; dh->last_next = &d->next; return 1; } struct litinfo { /* This must be the first element for add_value to work! */ struct datahead data; int timestamp_set; u32 timestamp; char mode; int partial_body_length_encoding; char *name; }; static int literal_timestamp (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct litinfo *li = cookie; char *tail = NULL; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s TIMESTAMP\n", option); errno = 0; li->timestamp = parse_timestamp (argv[0], &tail); if (errno || (tail && *tail)) log_fatal ("Invalid value passed to %s (%s)\n", option, argv[0]); li->timestamp_set = 1; return 1; } static int literal_mode (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct litinfo *li = cookie; if (argc == 0 || ! (strcmp (argv[0], "b") == 0 || strcmp (argv[0], "t") == 0 || strcmp (argv[0], "u") == 0)) log_fatal ("Usage: %s [btu]\n", option); li->mode = argv[0][0]; return 1; } static int literal_partial_body_length (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct litinfo *li = cookie; char *tail; int v; int range[2] = {0, 1}; if (argc <= 1) log_fatal ("Usage: %s [0|1]\n", option); errno = 0; v = strtol (argv[0], &tail, 0); if (errno || (tail && *tail) || !(range[0] <= v && v <= range[1])) log_fatal ("Invalid value passed to %s (%s). Expected %d-%d\n", option, argv[0], range[0], range[1]); li->partial_body_length_encoding = v; return 1; } static int literal_name (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { struct litinfo *li = cookie; if (argc <= 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s NAME\n", option); if (strlen (argv[0]) > 255) log_fatal ("%s: name is too long (%zd > 255 characters).\n", option, strlen (argv[0])); li->name = argv[0]; return 1; } static struct option literal_options[] = { { "--value", add_value, "A string to store in the literal packet." }, { "--file", add_value, "A file to copy into the literal packet." }, { "--timestamp", literal_timestamp, "The literal packet's time stamp. This defaults to the current time." }, { "--mode", literal_mode, "The content's mode (normally 'b' (default), 't' or 'u')." }, { "--partial-body-length", literal_partial_body_length, "Force partial body length encoding." }, { "--name", literal_name, "The literal's name." }, { NULL, NULL, "Example:\n\n" " $ gpgcompose --literal --value foobar | " GPG_NAME " -d"} }; static int literal (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { iobuf_t out = cookie; gpg_error_t err; int processed; struct litinfo li; PKT_plaintext *pt; PACKET pkt; struct data *data; memset (&li, 0, sizeof (li)); processed = process_options (option, major_options, literal_options, &li, global_options, NULL, argc, argv); if (! li.data.head) log_fatal ("%s: no data provided (use --value or --file)", option); pt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*pt) + (li.name ? strlen (li.name) : 0)); pt->new_ctb = 1; if (li.timestamp_set) pt->timestamp = li.timestamp; else /* Default to the current time. */ pt->timestamp = make_timestamp (); pt->mode = li.mode; if (! pt->mode) /* Default to binary. */ pt->mode = 'b'; if (li.name) { strcpy (pt->name, li.name); pt->namelen = strlen (pt->name); } pkt.pkttype = PKT_PLAINTEXT; pkt.pkt.plaintext = pt; if (! li.partial_body_length_encoding) /* Compute the amount of data. */ { pt->len = 0; for (data = li.data.head; data; data = data->next) { if (data->file) { iobuf_t in; int overflow; off_t off; in = iobuf_open (data->filename); if (! in) /* An error opening the file. We do error handling below so just break here. */ { pt->len = 0; break; } off = iobuf_get_filelength (in, &overflow); iobuf_close (in); if (overflow || off == 0) /* Length is unknown or there was an error (unfortunately, iobuf_get_filelength doesn't distinguish between 0 length files and an error!). Fall back to partial body mode. */ { pt->len = 0; break; } pt->len += off; } else pt->len += strlen (data->data); } } err = build_packet (out, &pkt); if (err) log_fatal ("Serializing literal packet: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); /* Write out the data. */ for (data = li.data.head; data; data = data->next) { if (data->file) { iobuf_t in; errno = 0; in = iobuf_open (data->filename); if (! in) log_fatal ("Opening '%s': %s\n", data->filename, errno ? strerror (errno): "unknown error"); iobuf_copy (out, in); if (iobuf_error (in)) log_fatal ("Reading from %s: %s\n", data->filename, gpg_strerror (iobuf_error (in))); if (iobuf_error (out)) log_fatal ("Writing literal data from %s: %s\n", data->filename, gpg_strerror (iobuf_error (out))); iobuf_close (in); } else { err = iobuf_write (out, data->data, strlen (data->data)); if (err) log_fatal ("Writing literal data: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); } } if (! pt->len) { /* Disable partial body length mode. */ log_assert (pt->new_ctb == 1); iobuf_set_partial_body_length_mode (out, 0); } debug ("Wrote literal packet:\n"); dump_component (&pkt); while (li.data.head) { data = li.data.head->next; xfree (li.data.head); li.data.head = data; } xfree (pt); return processed; } static int copy_file (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { char **filep = cookie; if (argc == 0) log_fatal ("Usage: %s FILENAME\n", option); *filep = argv[0]; return 1; } static struct option copy_options[] = { { "", copy_file, "Copy the specified file to stdout." }, { NULL, NULL, "Example:\n\n" " $ gpgcompose --copy /etc/hostname\n\n" "This is particularly useful when combined with gpgsplit." } }; static int copy (const char *option, int argc, char *argv[], void *cookie) { iobuf_t out = cookie; char *file = NULL; iobuf_t in; int processed; processed = process_options (option, major_options, copy_options, &file, global_options, NULL, argc, argv); if (! file) log_fatal ("Usage: %s FILE\n", option); errno = 0; in = iobuf_open (file); if (! in) log_fatal ("Error opening %s: %s.\n", file, errno ? strerror (errno): "unknown error"); iobuf_copy (out, in); if (iobuf_error (out)) log_fatal ("Copying data to destination: %s\n", gpg_strerror (iobuf_error (out))); if (iobuf_error (in)) log_fatal ("Reading data from %s: %s\n", argv[0], gpg_strerror (iobuf_error (in))); iobuf_close (in); return processed; } int main (int argc, char *argv[]) { const char *filename = "-"; iobuf_t out; int preprocessed = 1; int processed; ctrl_t ctrl; opt.ignore_time_conflict = 1; /* Allow notations in the IETF space, for instance. */ opt.expert = 1; global_ctrl = ctrl = xcalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl); keydb_add_resource ("pubring" EXTSEP_S GPGEXT_GPG, KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_DEFAULT); if (argc == 1) /* Nothing to do. */ return 0; if (strcmp (argv[1], "--output") == 0 || strcmp (argv[1], "-o") == 0) { filename = argv[2]; log_info ("Writing to %s\n", filename); preprocessed += 2; } out = iobuf_create (filename, 0); if (! out) log_fatal ("Failed to open stdout for writing\n"); processed = process_options (NULL, NULL, major_options, out, global_options, NULL, argc - preprocessed, &argv[preprocessed]); if (processed != argc - preprocessed) log_fatal ("Didn't process %d options.\n", argc - preprocessed - processed); iobuf_close (out); return 0; } /* Stubs duplicated from gpg.c. */ int g10_errors_seen = 0; /* Note: This function is used by signal handlers!. */ static void emergency_cleanup (void) { gcry_control (GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM ); } void g10_exit( int rc ) { gcry_control (GCRYCTL_UPDATE_RANDOM_SEED_FILE); emergency_cleanup (); rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 : g10_errors_seen? 1 : 0; exit (rc); } void keyedit_menu (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, strlist_t locusr, strlist_t commands, int quiet, int seckey_check) { (void) ctrl; (void) username; (void) locusr; (void) commands; (void) quiet; (void) seckey_check; } void show_basic_key_info (ctrl_t ctrl, KBNODE keyblock, int made_from_sec) { (void)ctrl; (void)keyblock; (void)made_from_sec; } int keyedit_print_one_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp, int rc, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t node, int *inv_sigs, int *no_key, int *oth_err, int is_selfsig, int print_without_key, int extended) { (void) ctrl; (void) fp; (void) rc; (void) keyblock; (void) node; (void) inv_sigs; (void) no_key; (void) oth_err; (void) is_selfsig; (void) print_without_key; (void) extended; return 0; } diff --git a/g10/keyedit.c b/g10/keyedit.c index c28a565b1..7f4c5a509 100644 --- a/g10/keyedit.c +++ b/g10/keyedit.c @@ -1,6273 +1,6274 @@ /* keyedit.c - Edit properties of a key * Copyright (C) 1998-2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * Copyright (C) 1998-2017 Werner Koch * Copyright (C) 2015, 2016 g10 Code GmbH * * This file is part of GnuPG. * * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, see . */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE # define GNUPG_LIBREADLINE_H_INCLUDED # include #endif #include "gpg.h" #include "options.h" #include "packet.h" #include "../common/status.h" #include "../common/iobuf.h" #include "keydb.h" #include "photoid.h" #include "../common/util.h" #include "main.h" #include "trustdb.h" #include "filter.h" #include "../common/ttyio.h" #include "../common/status.h" #include "../common/i18n.h" #include "keyserver-internal.h" #include "call-agent.h" #include "../common/host2net.h" #include "tofu.h" #include "key-check.h" #include "key-clean.h" #include "keyedit.h" static void show_prefs (PKT_user_id * uid, PKT_signature * selfsig, int verbose); static void show_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp, kbnode_t keyblock, PKT_public_key * pk, unsigned int flag, int with_prefs); static void show_key_with_all_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp, KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked, int with_revoker, int with_fpr, int with_subkeys, int with_prefs, int nowarn); static void show_key_and_fingerprint (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int with_subkeys); static void show_key_and_grip (kbnode_t keyblock); static void subkey_expire_warning (kbnode_t keyblock); static int menu_adduid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int photo, const char *photo_name, const char *uidstr); static void menu_deluid (KBNODE pub_keyblock); static int menu_delsig (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock); static int menu_clean (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int self_only); static void menu_delkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock); static int menu_addrevoker (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int sensitive); static gpg_error_t menu_expire (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int unattended, u32 newexpiration); static int menu_changeusage (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock); static int menu_backsign (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock); static int menu_set_primary_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock); static int menu_set_preferences (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock); static int menu_set_keyserver_url (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *url, kbnode_t pub_keyblock); static int menu_set_notation (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *string, kbnode_t pub_keyblock); static int menu_select_uid (KBNODE keyblock, int idx); static int menu_select_uid_namehash (KBNODE keyblock, const char *namehash); static int menu_select_key (KBNODE keyblock, int idx, char *p); static int count_uids (KBNODE keyblock); static int count_uids_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag); static int count_keys_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag); static int count_selected_uids (KBNODE keyblock); static int real_uids_left (KBNODE keyblock); static int count_selected_keys (KBNODE keyblock); static int menu_revsig (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock); static int menu_revuid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock); static int core_revuid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, KBNODE node, const struct revocation_reason_info *reason, int *modified); static int menu_revkey (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock); static int menu_revsubkey (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock); #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS static int enable_disable_key (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int disable); #endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/ static void menu_showphoto (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock); static int update_trust = 0; #define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1) struct sign_attrib { int non_exportable, non_revocable; struct revocation_reason_info *reason; byte trust_depth, trust_value; char *trust_regexp; }; /* TODO: Fix duplicated code between here and the check-sigs/list-sigs code in keylist.c. */ static int print_and_check_one_sig_colon (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t node, int *inv_sigs, int *no_key, int *oth_err, int *is_selfsig, int print_without_key) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; int rc, sigrc; /* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has the pk that issued it. See also keylist.c:list_keyblock_print */ rc = check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, node, is_selfsig); switch (gpg_err_code (rc)) { case 0: node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_BADSIG | NODFLG_NOKEY | NODFLG_SIGERR); sigrc = '!'; break; case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: node->flag = NODFLG_BADSIG; sigrc = '-'; if (inv_sigs) ++ * inv_sigs; break; case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY: case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: node->flag = NODFLG_NOKEY; sigrc = '?'; if (no_key) ++ * no_key; break; default: node->flag = NODFLG_SIGERR; sigrc = '%'; if (oth_err) ++ * oth_err; break; } if (sigrc != '?' || print_without_key) { es_printf ("sig:%c::%d:%08lX%08lX:%lu:%lu:", sigrc, sig->pubkey_algo, (ulong) sig->keyid[0], (ulong) sig->keyid[1], (ulong) sig->timestamp, (ulong) sig->expiredate); if (sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value) es_printf ("%d %d", sig->trust_depth, sig->trust_value); es_printf (":"); if (sig->trust_regexp) es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sig->trust_regexp, strlen (sig->trust_regexp), ":", NULL); es_printf ("::%02x%c\n", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable ? 'x' : 'l'); if (opt.show_subpackets) print_subpackets_colon (sig); } return (sigrc == '!'); } /* * Print information about a signature (rc is its status), check it * and return true if the signature is okay. NODE must be a signature * packet. With EXTENDED set all possible signature list options will * always be printed. */ int keyedit_print_one_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp, int rc, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t node, int *inv_sigs, int *no_key, int *oth_err, int is_selfsig, int print_without_key, int extended) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; int sigrc; int is_rev = sig->sig_class == 0x30; /* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has the pk that issued it. See also keylist.c:list_keyblock_print */ switch (gpg_err_code (rc)) { case 0: node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_BADSIG | NODFLG_NOKEY | NODFLG_SIGERR); sigrc = '!'; break; case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: node->flag = NODFLG_BADSIG; sigrc = '-'; if (inv_sigs) ++ * inv_sigs; break; case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY: case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: node->flag = NODFLG_NOKEY; sigrc = '?'; if (no_key) ++ * no_key; break; default: node->flag = NODFLG_SIGERR; sigrc = '%'; if (oth_err) ++ * oth_err; break; } if (sigrc != '?' || print_without_key) { tty_fprintf (fp, "%s%c%c %c%c%c%c%c%c %s %s", is_rev ? "rev" : "sig", sigrc, (sig->sig_class - 0x10 > 0 && sig->sig_class - 0x10 < 4) ? '0' + sig->sig_class - 0x10 : ' ', sig->flags.exportable ? ' ' : 'L', sig->flags.revocable ? ' ' : 'R', sig->flags.policy_url ? 'P' : ' ', sig->flags.notation ? 'N' : ' ', sig->flags.expired ? 'X' : ' ', (sig->trust_depth > 9) ? 'T' : (sig->trust_depth > 0) ? '0' + sig->trust_depth : ' ', keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig)); if ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE) || extended ) tty_fprintf (fp, " %s", expirestr_from_sig (sig)); tty_fprintf (fp, " "); if (sigrc == '%') tty_fprintf (fp, "[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc)); else if (sigrc == '?') ; else if (is_selfsig) { tty_fprintf (fp, is_rev ? _("[revocation]") : _("[self-signature]")); if (extended && sig->flags.chosen_selfsig) tty_fprintf (fp, "*"); } else { size_t n; char *p = get_user_id (ctrl, sig->keyid, &n, NULL); tty_print_utf8_string2 (fp, p, n, opt.screen_columns - keystrlen () - 26 - ((opt. list_options & LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE) ? 11 : 0)); xfree (p); } if (fp == log_get_stream ()) log_printf ("\n"); else tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); if (sig->flags.policy_url && ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS) || extended)) show_policy_url (sig, 3, (!fp? -1 : fp == log_get_stream ()? 1 : 0)); if (sig->flags.notation && ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS) || extended)) show_notation (sig, 3, (!fp? -1 : fp == log_get_stream ()? 1 : 0), ((opt. list_options & LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS) ? 1 : 0) + ((opt. list_options & LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS) ? 2 : 0)); if (sig->flags.pref_ks && ((opt.list_options & LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS) || extended)) show_keyserver_url (sig, 3, (!fp? -1 : fp == log_get_stream ()? 1 : 0)); if (extended) { PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key; const unsigned char *s; s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL); if (s && *s) tty_fprintf (fp, " [primary]\n"); s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL); if (s && buf32_to_u32 (s)) tty_fprintf (fp, " [expires: %s]\n", isotimestamp (pk->timestamp + buf32_to_u32 (s))); } } return (sigrc == '!'); } static int print_and_check_one_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t node, int *inv_sigs, int *no_key, int *oth_err, int *is_selfsig, int print_without_key, int extended) { int rc; rc = check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, node, is_selfsig); return keyedit_print_one_sig (ctrl, NULL, rc, keyblock, node, inv_sigs, no_key, oth_err, *is_selfsig, print_without_key, extended); } static int sign_mk_attrib (PKT_signature * sig, void *opaque) { struct sign_attrib *attrib = opaque; byte buf[8]; if (attrib->non_exportable) { buf[0] = 0; /* not exportable */ build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE, buf, 1); } if (attrib->non_revocable) { buf[0] = 0; /* not revocable */ build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE, buf, 1); } if (attrib->reason) revocation_reason_build_cb (sig, attrib->reason); if (attrib->trust_depth) { /* Not critical. If someone doesn't understand trust sigs, this can still be a valid regular signature. */ buf[0] = attrib->trust_depth; buf[1] = attrib->trust_value; build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_TRUST, buf, 2); /* Critical. If someone doesn't understands regexps, this whole sig should be invalid. Note the +1 for the length - regexps are null terminated. */ if (attrib->trust_regexp) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL | SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP, attrib->trust_regexp, strlen (attrib->trust_regexp) + 1); } return 0; } static void trustsig_prompt (byte * trust_value, byte * trust_depth, char **regexp) { char *p; *trust_value = 0; *trust_depth = 0; *regexp = NULL; /* Same string as pkclist.c:do_edit_ownertrust */ tty_printf (_ ("Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify" " other users' keys\n(by looking at passports, checking" " fingerprints from different sources, etc.)\n")); tty_printf ("\n"); tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust marginally\n"), 1); tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust fully\n"), 2); tty_printf ("\n"); while (*trust_value == 0) { p = cpr_get ("trustsig_prompt.trust_value", _("Your selection? ")); trim_spaces (p); cpr_kill_prompt (); /* 60 and 120 are as per RFC2440 */ if (p[0] == '1' && !p[1]) *trust_value = 60; else if (p[0] == '2' && !p[1]) *trust_value = 120; xfree (p); } tty_printf ("\n"); tty_printf (_("Please enter the depth of this trust signature.\n" "A depth greater than 1 allows the key you are" " signing to make\n" "trust signatures on your behalf.\n")); tty_printf ("\n"); while (*trust_depth == 0) { p = cpr_get ("trustsig_prompt.trust_depth", _("Your selection? ")); trim_spaces (p); cpr_kill_prompt (); *trust_depth = atoi (p); xfree (p); } tty_printf ("\n"); tty_printf (_("Please enter a domain to restrict this signature, " "or enter for none.\n")); tty_printf ("\n"); p = cpr_get ("trustsig_prompt.trust_regexp", _("Your selection? ")); trim_spaces (p); cpr_kill_prompt (); if (strlen (p) > 0) { char *q = p; int regexplen = 100, ind; *regexp = xmalloc (regexplen); /* Now mangle the domain the user entered into a regexp. To do this, \-escape everything that isn't alphanumeric, and attach "<[^>]+[@.]" to the front, and ">$" to the end. */ strcpy (*regexp, "<[^>]+[@.]"); ind = strlen (*regexp); while (*q) { if (!((*q >= 'A' && *q <= 'Z') || (*q >= 'a' && *q <= 'z') || (*q >= '0' && *q <= '9'))) (*regexp)[ind++] = '\\'; (*regexp)[ind++] = *q; if ((regexplen - ind) < 3) { regexplen += 100; *regexp = xrealloc (*regexp, regexplen); } q++; } (*regexp)[ind] = '\0'; strcat (*regexp, ">$"); } xfree (p); tty_printf ("\n"); } /* * Loop over all LOCUSR and sign the uids after asking. If no * user id is marked, all user ids will be signed; if some user_ids * are marked only those will be signed. If QUICK is true the * function won't ask the user and use sensible defaults. */ static int sign_uids (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp, kbnode_t keyblock, strlist_t locusr, int *ret_modified, int local, int nonrevocable, int trust, int interactive, int quick) { int rc = 0; SK_LIST sk_list = NULL; SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL; PKT_public_key *pk = NULL; KBNODE node, uidnode; PKT_public_key *primary_pk = NULL; int select_all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock) || interactive; /* Build a list of all signators. * * We use the CERT flag to request the primary which must always * be one which is capable of signing keys. I can't see a reason * why to sign keys using a subkey. Implementation of USAGE_CERT * is just a hack in getkey.c and does not mean that a subkey * marked as certification capable will be used. */ rc = build_sk_list (ctrl, locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT); if (rc) goto leave; /* Loop over all signators. */ for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) { u32 sk_keyid[2], pk_keyid[2]; char *p, *trust_regexp = NULL; int class = 0, selfsig = 0; u32 duration = 0, timestamp = 0; byte trust_depth = 0, trust_value = 0; pk = sk_rover->pk; keyid_from_pk (pk, sk_keyid); /* Set mark A for all selected user ids. */ for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)) node->flag |= NODFLG_MARK_A; else node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; } /* Reset mark for uids which are already signed. */ uidnode = NULL; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) { primary_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; keyid_from_pk (primary_pk, pk_keyid); /* Is this a self-sig? */ if (pk_keyid[0] == sk_keyid[0] && pk_keyid[1] == sk_keyid[1]) selfsig = 1; } else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { uidnode = (node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) ? node : NULL; if (uidnode) { int yesreally = 0; char *user; user = utf8_to_native (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0); if (opt.only_sign_text_ids && uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs) { tty_fprintf (fp, _("Skipping user ID \"%s\"," " which is not a text ID.\n"), user); uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; uidnode = NULL; } else if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked) { tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is revoked."), user); if (selfsig) tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); else if (opt.expert && !quick) { tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); /* No, so remove the mark and continue */ if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.revoke_okay", _("Are you sure you " "still want to sign " "it? (y/N) "))) { uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; uidnode = NULL; } else if (interactive) yesreally = 1; } else { uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; uidnode = NULL; tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n")); } } else if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired) { tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is expired."), user); if (selfsig) tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); else if (opt.expert && !quick) { tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); /* No, so remove the mark and continue */ if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.expire_okay", _("Are you sure you " "still want to sign " "it? (y/N) "))) { uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; uidnode = NULL; } else if (interactive) yesreally = 1; } else { uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; uidnode = NULL; tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n")); } } else if (!uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->created && !selfsig) { tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is not self-signed."), user); if (opt.expert && !quick) { tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); /* No, so remove the mark and continue */ if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.nosig_okay", _("Are you sure you " "still want to sign " "it? (y/N) "))) { uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; uidnode = NULL; } else if (interactive) yesreally = 1; } else { uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; uidnode = NULL; tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n")); } } if (uidnode && interactive && !yesreally && !quick) { tty_fprintf (fp, _("User ID \"%s\" is signable. "), user); if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.sign_okay", _("Sign it? (y/N) "))) { uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; uidnode = NULL; } } xfree (user); } } else if (uidnode && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10) { if (sk_keyid[0] == node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0] && sk_keyid[1] == node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]) { char buf[50]; char *user; user = utf8_to_native (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0); /* It's a v3 self-sig. Make it into a v4 self-sig? */ if (node->pkt->pkt.signature->version < 4 && selfsig && !quick) { tty_fprintf (fp, _("The self-signature on \"%s\"\n" "is a PGP 2.x-style signature.\n"), user); /* Note that the regular PGP2 warning below still applies if there are no v4 sigs on this key at all. */ if (opt.expert) if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.v4_promote_okay", _("Do you want to promote " "it to an OpenPGP self-" "signature? (y/N) "))) { node->flag |= NODFLG_DELSIG; xfree (user); continue; } } /* Is the current signature expired? */ if (node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.expired) { tty_fprintf (fp, _("Your current signature on \"%s\"\n" "has expired.\n"), user); if (quick || cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.replace_expired_okay", _("Do you want to issue a " "new signature to replace " "the expired one? (y/N) "))) { /* Mark these for later deletion. We don't want to delete them here, just in case the replacement signature doesn't happen for some reason. We only delete these after the replacement is already in place. */ node->flag |= NODFLG_DELSIG; xfree (user); continue; } } if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable && !local) { /* It's a local sig, and we want to make a exportable sig. */ tty_fprintf (fp, _("Your current signature on \"%s\"\n" "is a local signature.\n"), user); if (quick || cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.local_promote_okay", _("Do you want to promote " "it to a full exportable " "signature? (y/N) "))) { /* Mark these for later deletion. We don't want to delete them here, just in case the replacement signature doesn't happen for some reason. We only delete these after the replacement is already in place. */ node->flag |= NODFLG_DELSIG; xfree (user); continue; } } /* Fixme: see whether there is a revocation in which * case we should allow signing it again. */ if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable && local) tty_fprintf ( fp, _("\"%s\" was already locally signed by key %s\n"), user, keystr_from_pk (pk)); else tty_fprintf (fp, _("\"%s\" was already signed by key %s\n"), user, keystr_from_pk (pk)); if (opt.expert && !quick && cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.dupe_okay", _("Do you want to sign it " "again anyway? (y/N) "))) { /* Don't delete the old sig here since this is an --expert thing. */ xfree (user); continue; } snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX", (ulong) pk->keyid[0], (ulong) pk->keyid[1]); write_status_text (STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED, buf); uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; /* remove mark */ xfree (user); } } } /* Check whether any uids are left for signing. */ if (!count_uids_with_flag (keyblock, NODFLG_MARK_A)) { tty_fprintf (fp, _("Nothing to sign with key %s\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk)); continue; } /* Ask whether we really should sign these user id(s). */ tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, fp, keyblock, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0); tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); if (primary_pk->expiredate && !selfsig) { /* Static analyzer note: A claim that PRIMARY_PK might be NULL is not correct because it set from the public key packet which is always the first packet in a keyblock and parsed in the above loop over the keyblock. In case the keyblock has no packets at all and thus the loop was not entered the above count_uids_with_flag would have detected this case. */ u32 now = make_timestamp (); if (primary_pk->expiredate <= now) { tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key has expired!")); if (opt.expert && !quick) { tty_fprintf (fp, " "); if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.expired_okay", _("Are you sure you still " "want to sign it? (y/N) "))) continue; } else { tty_fprintf (fp, _(" Unable to sign.\n")); continue; } } else { tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key is due to expire on %s.\n"), expirestr_from_pk (primary_pk)); if (opt.ask_cert_expire && !quick) { char *answer = cpr_get ("sign_uid.expire", _("Do you want your signature to " "expire at the same time? (Y/n) ")); if (answer_is_yes_no_default (answer, 1)) { /* This fixes the signature timestamp we're going to make as now. This is so the expiration date is exactly correct, and not a few seconds off (due to the time it takes to answer the questions, enter the passphrase, etc). */ timestamp = now; duration = primary_pk->expiredate - now; } cpr_kill_prompt (); xfree (answer); } } } /* Only ask for duration if we haven't already set it to match the expiration of the pk */ if (!duration && !selfsig) { if (opt.ask_cert_expire && !quick) duration = ask_expire_interval (1, opt.def_cert_expire); else duration = parse_expire_string (opt.def_cert_expire); } if (selfsig) ; else { if (opt.batch || !opt.ask_cert_level || quick) class = 0x10 + opt.def_cert_level; else { char *answer; tty_fprintf (fp, _("How carefully have you verified the key you are " "about to sign actually belongs\nto the person " "named above? If you don't know what to " "answer, enter \"0\".\n")); tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (0) I will not answer.%s\n"), opt.def_cert_level == 0 ? " (default)" : ""); tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (1) I have not checked at all.%s\n"), opt.def_cert_level == 1 ? " (default)" : ""); tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (2) I have done casual checking.%s\n"), opt.def_cert_level == 2 ? " (default)" : ""); tty_fprintf (fp, _(" (3) I have done very careful checking.%s\n"), opt.def_cert_level == 3 ? " (default)" : ""); tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); while (class == 0) { answer = cpr_get ("sign_uid.class", _("Your selection? " "(enter '?' for more information): ")); if (answer[0] == '\0') class = 0x10 + opt.def_cert_level; /* Default */ else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "0") == 0) class = 0x10; /* Generic */ else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "1") == 0) class = 0x11; /* Persona */ else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "2") == 0) class = 0x12; /* Casual */ else if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "3") == 0) class = 0x13; /* Positive */ else tty_fprintf (fp, _("Invalid selection.\n")); xfree (answer); } } if (trust && !quick) trustsig_prompt (&trust_value, &trust_depth, &trust_regexp); } if (!quick) { p = get_user_id_native (ctrl, sk_keyid); tty_fprintf (fp, _("Are you sure that you want to sign this key with your\n" "key \"%s\" (%s)\n"), p, keystr_from_pk (pk)); xfree (p); } if (selfsig) { tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); tty_fprintf (fp, _("This will be a self-signature.\n")); if (local) { tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); tty_fprintf (fp, _("WARNING: the signature will not be marked " "as non-exportable.\n")); } if (nonrevocable) { tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); tty_fprintf (fp, _("WARNING: the signature will not be marked " "as non-revocable.\n")); } } else { if (local) { tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); tty_fprintf (fp, _("The signature will be marked as non-exportable.\n")); } if (nonrevocable) { tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); tty_fprintf (fp, _("The signature will be marked as non-revocable.\n")); } switch (class) { case 0x11: tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); tty_fprintf (fp, _("I have not checked this key at all.\n")); break; case 0x12: tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); tty_fprintf (fp, _("I have checked this key casually.\n")); break; case 0x13: tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); tty_fprintf (fp, _("I have checked this key very carefully.\n")); break; } } tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); if (opt.batch && opt.answer_yes) ; else if (quick) ; else if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("sign_uid.okay", _("Really sign? (y/N) "))) continue; /* Now we can sign the user ids. */ reloop: /* (Must use this, because we are modifying the list.) */ primary_pk = NULL; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) primary_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A)) { PACKET *pkt; PKT_signature *sig; struct sign_attrib attrib; log_assert (primary_pk); memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib); attrib.non_exportable = local; attrib.non_revocable = nonrevocable; attrib.trust_depth = trust_depth; attrib.trust_value = trust_value; attrib.trust_regexp = trust_regexp; node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; /* We force creation of a v4 signature for local * signatures, otherwise we would not generate the * subpacket with v3 keys and the signature becomes * exportable. */ if (selfsig) rc = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, primary_pk, node->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, pk, - 0x13, 0, 0, 0, + 0x13, + 0, 0, keygen_add_std_prefs, primary_pk, NULL); else rc = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, primary_pk, node->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, pk, - class, 0, + class, timestamp, duration, sign_mk_attrib, &attrib, NULL); if (rc) { write_status_error ("keysig", rc); log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } *ret_modified = 1; /* We changed the keyblock. */ update_trust = 1; pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt); pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; pkt->pkt.signature = sig; insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE); goto reloop; } } /* Delete any sigs that got promoted */ for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) if (node->flag & NODFLG_DELSIG) delete_kbnode (node); } /* End loop over signators. */ leave: release_sk_list (sk_list); return rc; } /* * Change the passphrase of the primary and all secondary keys. Note * that it is common to use only one passphrase for the primary and * all subkeys. However, this is now (since GnuPG 2.1) all up to the * gpg-agent. Returns 0 on success or an error code. */ static gpg_error_t change_passphrase (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock) { gpg_error_t err; kbnode_t node; PKT_public_key *pk; int any; u32 keyid[2], subid[2]; char *hexgrip = NULL; char *cache_nonce = NULL; char *passwd_nonce = NULL; node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); if (!node) { log_error ("Oops; public key missing!\n"); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); goto leave; } pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid); /* Check whether it is likely that we will be able to change the passphrase for any subkey. */ for (any = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) { char *serialno; pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; keyid_from_pk (pk, subid); xfree (hexgrip); err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip); if (err) goto leave; err = agent_get_keyinfo (ctrl, hexgrip, &serialno, NULL); if (!err && serialno) ; /* Key on card. */ else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND) ; /* Maybe stub key. */ else if (!err) any = 1; /* Key is known. */ else log_error ("key %s: error getting keyinfo from agent: %s\n", keystr_with_sub (keyid, subid), gpg_strerror (err)); xfree (serialno); } } err = 0; if (!any) { tty_printf (_("Key has only stub or on-card key items - " "no passphrase to change.\n")); goto leave; } /* Change the passphrase for all keys. */ for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) { char *desc; pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; keyid_from_pk (pk, subid); xfree (hexgrip); err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip); if (err) goto leave; /* Note that when using --dry-run we don't change the * passphrase but merely verify the current passphrase. */ desc = gpg_format_keydesc (ctrl, pk, FORMAT_KEYDESC_NORMAL, 1); err = agent_passwd (ctrl, hexgrip, desc, !!opt.dry_run, &cache_nonce, &passwd_nonce); xfree (desc); if (err) log_log ((gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED || gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED) ? GPGRT_LOGLVL_INFO : GPGRT_LOGLVL_ERROR, _("key %s: error changing passphrase: %s\n"), keystr_with_sub (keyid, subid), gpg_strerror (err)); if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED) break; } } leave: xfree (hexgrip); xfree (cache_nonce); xfree (passwd_nonce); return err; } /* Fix various problems in the keyblock. Returns true if the keyblock was changed. Note that a pointer to the keyblock must be given and the function may change it (i.e. replacing the first node). */ static int fix_keyblock (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t *keyblockp) { int changed = 0; if (collapse_uids (keyblockp)) changed++; if (key_check_all_keysigs (ctrl, 1, *keyblockp, 0, 1)) changed++; reorder_keyblock (*keyblockp); /* If we modified the keyblock, make sure the flags are right. */ if (changed) merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, *keyblockp); return changed; } static int parse_sign_type (const char *str, int *localsig, int *nonrevokesig, int *trustsig) { const char *p = str; while (*p) { if (ascii_strncasecmp (p, "l", 1) == 0) { *localsig = 1; p++; } else if (ascii_strncasecmp (p, "nr", 2) == 0) { *nonrevokesig = 1; p += 2; } else if (ascii_strncasecmp (p, "t", 1) == 0) { *trustsig = 1; p++; } else return 0; } return 1; } /* * Menu driven key editor. If seckey_check is true, then a secret key * that matches username will be looked for. If it is false, not all * commands will be available. * * Note: to keep track of certain selections we use node->mark MARKBIT_xxxx. */ /* Need an SK for this command */ #define KEYEDIT_NEED_SK 1 /* Need an SUB KEY for this command */ #define KEYEDIT_NEED_SUBSK 2 /* Match the tail of the string */ #define KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH 8 enum cmdids { cmdNONE = 0, cmdQUIT, cmdHELP, cmdFPR, cmdLIST, cmdSELUID, cmdCHECK, cmdSIGN, cmdREVSIG, cmdREVKEY, cmdREVUID, cmdDELSIG, cmdPRIMARY, cmdDEBUG, cmdSAVE, cmdADDUID, cmdADDPHOTO, cmdDELUID, cmdADDKEY, cmdDELKEY, cmdADDREVOKER, cmdTOGGLE, cmdSELKEY, cmdPASSWD, cmdTRUST, cmdPREF, cmdEXPIRE, cmdCHANGEUSAGE, cmdBACKSIGN, #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS cmdENABLEKEY, cmdDISABLEKEY, #endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/ cmdSHOWPREF, cmdSETPREF, cmdPREFKS, cmdNOTATION, cmdINVCMD, cmdSHOWPHOTO, cmdUPDTRUST, cmdCHKTRUST, cmdADDCARDKEY, cmdKEYTOCARD, cmdBKUPTOCARD, cmdCLEAN, cmdMINIMIZE, cmdGRIP, cmdNOP }; static struct { const char *name; enum cmdids id; int flags; const char *desc; } cmds[] = { { "quit", cmdQUIT, 0, N_("quit this menu")}, { "q", cmdQUIT, 0, NULL}, { "save", cmdSAVE, 0, N_("save and quit")}, { "help", cmdHELP, 0, N_("show this help")}, { "?", cmdHELP, 0, NULL}, { "fpr", cmdFPR, 0, N_("show key fingerprint")}, { "grip", cmdGRIP, 0, N_("show the keygrip")}, { "list", cmdLIST, 0, N_("list key and user IDs")}, { "l", cmdLIST, 0, NULL}, { "uid", cmdSELUID, 0, N_("select user ID N")}, { "key", cmdSELKEY, 0, N_("select subkey N")}, { "check", cmdCHECK, 0, N_("check signatures")}, { "c", cmdCHECK, 0, NULL}, { "change-usage", cmdCHANGEUSAGE, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL}, { "cross-certify", cmdBACKSIGN, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL}, { "backsign", cmdBACKSIGN, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL}, { "sign", cmdSIGN, KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH, N_("sign selected user IDs [* see below for related commands]")}, { "s", cmdSIGN, 0, NULL}, /* "lsign" and friends will never match since "sign" comes first and it is a tail match. They are just here so they show up in the help menu. */ { "lsign", cmdNOP, 0, N_("sign selected user IDs locally")}, { "tsign", cmdNOP, 0, N_("sign selected user IDs with a trust signature")}, { "nrsign", cmdNOP, 0, N_("sign selected user IDs with a non-revocable signature")}, { "debug", cmdDEBUG, 0, NULL}, { "adduid", cmdADDUID, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("add a user ID")}, { "addphoto", cmdADDPHOTO, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("add a photo ID")}, { "deluid", cmdDELUID, 0, N_("delete selected user IDs")}, /* delphoto is really deluid in disguise */ { "delphoto", cmdDELUID, 0, NULL}, { "addkey", cmdADDKEY, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("add a subkey")}, #ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT { "addcardkey", cmdADDCARDKEY, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("add a key to a smartcard")}, { "keytocard", cmdKEYTOCARD, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SUBSK, N_("move a key to a smartcard")}, { "bkuptocard", cmdBKUPTOCARD, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SUBSK, N_("move a backup key to a smartcard")}, #endif /*ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */ { "delkey", cmdDELKEY, 0, N_("delete selected subkeys")}, { "addrevoker", cmdADDREVOKER, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("add a revocation key")}, { "delsig", cmdDELSIG, 0, N_("delete signatures from the selected user IDs")}, { "expire", cmdEXPIRE, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SUBSK, N_("change the expiration date for the key or selected subkeys")}, { "primary", cmdPRIMARY, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("flag the selected user ID as primary")}, { "toggle", cmdTOGGLE, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL}, /* Dummy command. */ { "t", cmdTOGGLE, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL}, { "pref", cmdPREF, 0, N_("list preferences (expert)")}, { "showpref", cmdSHOWPREF, 0, N_("list preferences (verbose)")}, { "setpref", cmdSETPREF, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("set preference list for the selected user IDs")}, { "updpref", cmdSETPREF, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL}, { "keyserver", cmdPREFKS, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("set the preferred keyserver URL for the selected user IDs")}, { "notation", cmdNOTATION, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("set a notation for the selected user IDs")}, { "passwd", cmdPASSWD, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SUBSK, N_("change the passphrase")}, { "password", cmdPASSWD, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK | KEYEDIT_NEED_SUBSK, NULL}, #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS { "trust", cmdTRUST, 0, N_("change the ownertrust")}, #endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/ { "revsig", cmdREVSIG, 0, N_("revoke signatures on the selected user IDs")}, { "revuid", cmdREVUID, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("revoke selected user IDs")}, { "revphoto", cmdREVUID, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL}, { "revkey", cmdREVKEY, KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, N_("revoke key or selected subkeys")}, #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS { "enable", cmdENABLEKEY, 0, N_("enable key")}, { "disable", cmdDISABLEKEY, 0, N_("disable key")}, #endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/ { "showphoto", cmdSHOWPHOTO, 0, N_("show selected photo IDs")}, { "clean", cmdCLEAN, 0, N_("compact unusable user IDs and remove unusable signatures from key")}, { "minimize", cmdMINIMIZE, 0, N_("compact unusable user IDs and remove all signatures from key")}, { NULL, cmdNONE, 0, NULL} }; #ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE /* These two functions are used by readline for command completion. */ static char * command_generator (const char *text, int state) { static int list_index, len; const char *name; /* If this is a new word to complete, initialize now. This includes saving the length of TEXT for efficiency, and initializing the index variable to 0. */ if (!state) { list_index = 0; len = strlen (text); } /* Return the next partial match */ while ((name = cmds[list_index].name)) { /* Only complete commands that have help text */ if (cmds[list_index++].desc && strncmp (name, text, len) == 0) return strdup (name); } return NULL; } static char ** keyedit_completion (const char *text, int start, int end) { /* If we are at the start of a line, we try and command-complete. If not, just do nothing for now. */ (void) end; if (start == 0) return rl_completion_matches (text, command_generator); rl_attempted_completion_over = 1; return NULL; } #endif /* HAVE_LIBREADLINE */ /* Main function of the menu driven key editor. */ void keyedit_menu (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, strlist_t locusr, strlist_t commands, int quiet, int seckey_check) { enum cmdids cmd = 0; gpg_error_t err = 0; KBNODE keyblock = NULL; KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL; int have_seckey = 0; int have_anyseckey = 0; char *answer = NULL; int redisplay = 1; int modified = 0; int sec_shadowing = 0; int run_subkey_warnings = 0; int have_commands = !!commands; if (opt.command_fd != -1) ; else if (opt.batch && !have_commands) { log_error (_("can't do this in batch mode\n")); goto leave; } #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM /* Due to Windows peculiarities we need to make sure that the trustdb stale check is done before we open another file (i.e. by searching for a key). In theory we could make sure that the files are closed after use but the open/close caches inhibits that and flushing the cache right before the stale check is not easy to implement. Thus we take the easy way out and run the stale check as early as possible. Note, that for non- W32 platforms it is run indirectly trough a call to get_validity (). */ check_trustdb_stale (ctrl); #endif /* Get the public key */ err = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, NULL, username, &keyblock, &kdbhd, 1, 1); if (err) { log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), username, gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } if (fix_keyblock (ctrl, &keyblock)) modified++; /* See whether we have a matching secret key. */ if (seckey_check) { have_anyseckey = !agent_probe_any_secret_key (ctrl, keyblock); if (have_anyseckey && !agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key)) { /* The primary key is also available. */ have_seckey = 1; } if (have_seckey && !quiet) tty_printf (_("Secret key is available.\n")); else if (have_anyseckey && !quiet) tty_printf (_("Secret subkeys are available.\n")); } /* Main command loop. */ for (;;) { int i, arg_number, photo; const char *arg_string = ""; char *p; PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key; tty_printf ("\n"); if (redisplay && !quiet) { /* Show using flags: with_revoker, with_subkeys. */ show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0); tty_printf ("\n"); redisplay = 0; } if (run_subkey_warnings) { run_subkey_warnings = 0; if (!count_selected_keys (keyblock)) subkey_expire_warning (keyblock); } do { xfree (answer); if (have_commands) { if (commands) { answer = xstrdup (commands->d); commands = commands->next; } else if (opt.batch) { answer = xstrdup ("quit"); } else have_commands = 0; } if (!have_commands) { #ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE tty_enable_completion (keyedit_completion); #endif answer = cpr_get_no_help ("keyedit.prompt", GPG_NAME "> "); cpr_kill_prompt (); tty_disable_completion (); } trim_spaces (answer); } while (*answer == '#'); arg_number = 0; /* Here is the init which egcc complains about. */ photo = 0; /* Same here. */ if (!*answer) cmd = cmdLIST; else if (*answer == CONTROL_D) cmd = cmdQUIT; else if (digitp (answer)) { cmd = cmdSELUID; arg_number = atoi (answer); } else { if ((p = strchr (answer, ' '))) { *p++ = 0; trim_spaces (answer); trim_spaces (p); arg_number = atoi (p); arg_string = p; } for (i = 0; cmds[i].name; i++) { if (cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH) { size_t l = strlen (cmds[i].name); size_t a = strlen (answer); if (a >= l) { if (!ascii_strcasecmp (&answer[a - l], cmds[i].name)) { answer[a - l] = '\0'; break; } } } else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (answer, cmds[i].name)) break; } if ((cmds[i].flags & (KEYEDIT_NEED_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SUBSK)) && !(((cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_NEED_SK) && have_seckey) || ((cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_NEED_SUBSK) && have_anyseckey))) { tty_printf (_("Need the secret key to do this.\n")); cmd = cmdNOP; } else cmd = cmds[i].id; } /* Dispatch the command. */ switch (cmd) { case cmdHELP: for (i = 0; cmds[i].name; i++) { if ((cmds[i].flags & (KEYEDIT_NEED_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SUBSK)) && !(((cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_NEED_SK) && have_seckey) ||((cmds[i].flags&KEYEDIT_NEED_SUBSK)&&have_anyseckey))) ; /* Skip those item if we do not have the secret key. */ else if (cmds[i].desc) tty_printf ("%-11s %s\n", cmds[i].name, _(cmds[i].desc)); } tty_printf ("\n"); tty_printf (_("* The 'sign' command may be prefixed with an 'l' for local " "signatures (lsign),\n" " a 't' for trust signatures (tsign), an 'nr' for " "non-revocable signatures\n" " (nrsign), or any combination thereof (ltsign, " "tnrsign, etc.).\n")); break; case cmdLIST: redisplay = 1; break; case cmdFPR: show_key_and_fingerprint (ctrl, keyblock, (*arg_string == '*' && (!arg_string[1] || spacep (arg_string + 1)))); break; case cmdGRIP: show_key_and_grip (keyblock); break; case cmdSELUID: if (strlen (arg_string) == NAMEHASH_LEN * 2) redisplay = menu_select_uid_namehash (keyblock, arg_string); else { if (*arg_string == '*' && (!arg_string[1] || spacep (arg_string + 1))) arg_number = -1; /* Select all. */ redisplay = menu_select_uid (keyblock, arg_number); } break; case cmdSELKEY: { if (*arg_string == '*' && (!arg_string[1] || spacep (arg_string + 1))) arg_number = -1; /* Select all. */ if (menu_select_key (keyblock, arg_number, p)) redisplay = 1; } break; case cmdCHECK: if (key_check_all_keysigs (ctrl, -1, keyblock, count_selected_uids (keyblock), !strcmp (arg_string, "selfsig"))) modified = 1; break; case cmdSIGN: { int localsig = 0, nonrevokesig = 0, trustsig = 0, interactive = 0; if (pk->flags.revoked) { tty_printf (_("Key is revoked.")); if (opt.expert) { tty_printf (" "); if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.sign_revoked.okay", _("Are you sure you still want to sign it? (y/N) "))) break; } else { tty_printf (_(" Unable to sign.\n")); break; } } if (count_uids (keyblock) > 1 && !count_selected_uids (keyblock)) { int result; if (opt.only_sign_text_ids) result = cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.sign_all.okay", _("Really sign all text user IDs? (y/N) ")); else result = cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.sign_all.okay", _("Really sign all user IDs? (y/N) ")); if (! result) { if (opt.interactive) interactive = 1; else { tty_printf (_("Hint: Select the user IDs to sign\n")); have_commands = 0; break; } } } /* What sort of signing are we doing? */ if (!parse_sign_type (answer, &localsig, &nonrevokesig, &trustsig)) { tty_printf (_("Unknown signature type '%s'\n"), answer); break; } sign_uids (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, locusr, &modified, localsig, nonrevokesig, trustsig, interactive, 0); } break; case cmdDEBUG: dump_kbnode (keyblock); break; case cmdTOGGLE: /* The toggle command is a leftover from old gpg versions where we worked with a secret and a public keyring. It is not necessary anymore but we keep this command for the sake of scripts using it. */ redisplay = 1; break; case cmdADDPHOTO: if (RFC2440) { tty_printf (_("This command is not allowed while in %s mode.\n"), gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance)); break; } photo = 1; /* fall through */ case cmdADDUID: if (menu_adduid (ctrl, keyblock, photo, arg_string, NULL)) { update_trust = 1; redisplay = 1; modified = 1; merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); } break; case cmdDELUID: { int n1; if (!(n1 = count_selected_uids (keyblock))) { tty_printf (_("You must select at least one user ID.\n")); if (!opt.expert) tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "uid"); } else if (real_uids_left (keyblock) < 1) tty_printf (_("You can't delete the last user ID!\n")); else if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.remove.uid.okay", n1 > 1 ? _("Really remove all selected user IDs? (y/N) ") : _("Really remove this user ID? (y/N) "))) { menu_deluid (keyblock); redisplay = 1; modified = 1; } } break; case cmdDELSIG: { int n1; if (!(n1 = count_selected_uids (keyblock))) { tty_printf (_("You must select at least one user ID.\n")); if (!opt.expert) tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "uid"); } else if (menu_delsig (ctrl, keyblock)) { /* No redisplay here, because it may scroll away some * of the status output of this command. */ modified = 1; } } break; case cmdADDKEY: if (!generate_subkeypair (ctrl, keyblock, NULL, NULL, NULL)) { redisplay = 1; modified = 1; merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); } break; #ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT case cmdADDCARDKEY: if (!card_generate_subkey (ctrl, keyblock)) { redisplay = 1; modified = 1; merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); } break; case cmdKEYTOCARD: { KBNODE node = NULL; switch (count_selected_keys (keyblock)) { case 0: if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.keytocard.use_primary", /* TRANSLATORS: Please take care: This is about moving the key and not about removing it. */ _("Really move the primary key? (y/N) "))) node = keyblock; break; case 1: for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY && node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY) break; } break; default: tty_printf (_("You must select exactly one key.\n")); break; } if (node) { PKT_public_key *xxpk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; if (card_store_subkey (node, xxpk ? xxpk->pubkey_usage : 0)) { redisplay = 1; sec_shadowing = 1; } } } break; case cmdBKUPTOCARD: { /* Ask for a filename, check whether this is really a backup key as generated by the card generation, parse that key and store it on card. */ KBNODE node; char *fname; PACKET *pkt; IOBUF a; struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx; if (!*arg_string) { tty_printf (_("Command expects a filename argument\n")); break; } if (*arg_string == DIRSEP_C) fname = xstrdup (arg_string); else if (*arg_string == '~') fname = make_filename (arg_string, NULL); else fname = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), arg_string, NULL); /* Open that file. */ a = iobuf_open (fname); if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a))) { iobuf_close (a); a = NULL; gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); } if (!a) { tty_printf (_("Can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror (errno)); xfree (fname); break; } /* Parse and check that file. */ pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt); init_packet (pkt); init_parse_packet (&parsectx, a); err = parse_packet (&parsectx, pkt); deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx); iobuf_close (a); iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE, 0, (char *) fname); if (!err && pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY && pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) err = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY; if (err) { tty_printf (_("Error reading backup key from '%s': %s\n"), fname, gpg_strerror (err)); xfree (fname); free_packet (pkt, NULL); xfree (pkt); break; } xfree (fname); node = new_kbnode (pkt); /* Transfer it to gpg-agent which handles secret keys. */ err = transfer_secret_keys (ctrl, NULL, node, 1, 1, 0); /* Treat the pkt as a public key. */ pkt->pkttype = PKT_PUBLIC_KEY; /* Ask gpg-agent to store the secret key to card. */ if (card_store_subkey (node, 0)) { redisplay = 1; sec_shadowing = 1; } release_kbnode (node); } break; #endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */ case cmdDELKEY: { int n1; if (!(n1 = count_selected_keys (keyblock))) { tty_printf (_("You must select at least one key.\n")); if (!opt.expert) tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "key"); } else if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.remove.subkey.okay", n1 > 1 ? _("Do you really want to delete the " "selected keys? (y/N) ") : _("Do you really want to delete this key? (y/N) "))) ; else { menu_delkey (keyblock); redisplay = 1; modified = 1; } } break; case cmdADDREVOKER: { int sensitive = 0; if (ascii_strcasecmp (arg_string, "sensitive") == 0) sensitive = 1; if (menu_addrevoker (ctrl, keyblock, sensitive)) { redisplay = 1; modified = 1; merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); } } break; case cmdREVUID: { int n1; if (!(n1 = count_selected_uids (keyblock))) { tty_printf (_("You must select at least one user ID.\n")); if (!opt.expert) tty_printf (_("(Use the '%s' command.)\n"), "uid"); } else if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.revoke.uid.okay", n1 > 1 ? _("Really revoke all selected user IDs? (y/N) ") : _("Really revoke this user ID? (y/N) "))) { if (menu_revuid (ctrl, keyblock)) { modified = 1; redisplay = 1; } } } break; case cmdREVKEY: { int n1; if (!(n1 = count_selected_keys (keyblock))) { if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.revoke.subkey.okay", _("Do you really want to revoke" " the entire key? (y/N) "))) { if (menu_revkey (ctrl, keyblock)) modified = 1; redisplay = 1; } } else if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.revoke.subkey.okay", n1 > 1 ? _("Do you really want to revoke" " the selected subkeys? (y/N) ") : _("Do you really want to revoke" " this subkey? (y/N) "))) { if (menu_revsubkey (ctrl, keyblock)) modified = 1; redisplay = 1; } if (modified) merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); } break; case cmdEXPIRE: if (gpg_err_code (menu_expire (ctrl, keyblock, 0, 0)) == GPG_ERR_TRUE) { merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); run_subkey_warnings = 1; modified = 1; redisplay = 1; } break; case cmdCHANGEUSAGE: if (menu_changeusage (ctrl, keyblock)) { merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); modified = 1; redisplay = 1; } break; case cmdBACKSIGN: if (menu_backsign (ctrl, keyblock)) { modified = 1; redisplay = 1; } break; case cmdPRIMARY: if (menu_set_primary_uid (ctrl, keyblock)) { merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); modified = 1; redisplay = 1; } break; case cmdPASSWD: change_passphrase (ctrl, keyblock); break; #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS case cmdTRUST: if (opt.trust_model == TM_EXTERNAL) { tty_printf (_("Owner trust may not be set while " "using a user provided trust database\n")); break; } show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0); tty_printf ("\n"); if (edit_ownertrust (ctrl, find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)->pkt->pkt. public_key, 1)) { redisplay = 1; /* No real need to set update_trust here as edit_ownertrust() calls revalidation_mark() anyway. */ update_trust = 1; } break; #endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/ case cmdPREF: { int count = count_selected_uids (keyblock); log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); show_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, count ? NODFLG_SELUID : 0, 1); } break; case cmdSHOWPREF: { int count = count_selected_uids (keyblock); log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); show_names (ctrl, NULL, keyblock, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, count ? NODFLG_SELUID : 0, 2); } break; case cmdSETPREF: { PKT_user_id *tempuid; keygen_set_std_prefs (!*arg_string ? "default" : arg_string, 0); tempuid = keygen_get_std_prefs (); tty_printf (_("Set preference list to:\n")); show_prefs (tempuid, NULL, 1); free_user_id (tempuid); if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.setpref.okay", count_selected_uids (keyblock) ? _("Really update the preferences" " for the selected user IDs? (y/N) ") : _("Really update the preferences? (y/N) "))) { if (menu_set_preferences (ctrl, keyblock)) { merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); modified = 1; redisplay = 1; } } } break; case cmdPREFKS: if (menu_set_keyserver_url (ctrl, *arg_string ? arg_string : NULL, keyblock)) { merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); modified = 1; redisplay = 1; } break; case cmdNOTATION: if (menu_set_notation (ctrl, *arg_string ? arg_string : NULL, keyblock)) { merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); modified = 1; redisplay = 1; } break; case cmdNOP: break; case cmdREVSIG: if (menu_revsig (ctrl, keyblock)) { redisplay = 1; modified = 1; } break; #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS case cmdENABLEKEY: case cmdDISABLEKEY: if (enable_disable_key (ctrl, keyblock, cmd == cmdDISABLEKEY)) { redisplay = 1; modified = 1; } break; #endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/ case cmdSHOWPHOTO: menu_showphoto (ctrl, keyblock); break; case cmdCLEAN: if (menu_clean (ctrl, keyblock, 0)) redisplay = modified = 1; break; case cmdMINIMIZE: if (menu_clean (ctrl, keyblock, 1)) redisplay = modified = 1; break; case cmdQUIT: if (have_commands) goto leave; if (!modified && !sec_shadowing) goto leave; if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.save.okay", _("Save changes? (y/N) "))) { if (cpr_enabled () || cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.cancel.okay", _("Quit without saving? (y/N) "))) goto leave; break; } /* fall through */ case cmdSAVE: if (modified) { err = keydb_update_keyblock (ctrl, kdbhd, keyblock); if (err) { log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); break; } } if (sec_shadowing) { err = agent_scd_learn (NULL, 1); if (err) { log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); break; } } if (!modified && !sec_shadowing) tty_printf (_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n")); if (update_trust) { revalidation_mark (ctrl); update_trust = 0; } goto leave; case cmdINVCMD: default: tty_printf ("\n"); tty_printf (_("Invalid command (try \"help\")\n")); break; } } /* End of the main command loop. */ leave: release_kbnode (keyblock); keydb_release (kdbhd); xfree (answer); } /* Change the passphrase of the secret key identified by USERNAME. */ void keyedit_passwd (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username) { gpg_error_t err; PKT_public_key *pk; kbnode_t keyblock = NULL; pk = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pk); if (!pk) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } err = getkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, pk, username, 1, &keyblock); if (err) goto leave; err = change_passphrase (ctrl, keyblock); leave: release_kbnode (keyblock); free_public_key (pk); if (err) { log_info ("error changing the passphrase for '%s': %s\n", username, gpg_strerror (err)); write_status_error ("keyedit.passwd", err); } else write_status_text (STATUS_SUCCESS, "keyedit.passwd"); } /* Helper for quick commands to find the keyblock for USERNAME. * Returns on success the key database handle at R_KDBHD and the * keyblock at R_KEYBLOCK. */ static gpg_error_t quick_find_keyblock (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, KEYDB_HANDLE *r_kdbhd, kbnode_t *r_keyblock) { gpg_error_t err; KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL; kbnode_t keyblock = NULL; KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc; kbnode_t node; *r_kdbhd = NULL; *r_keyblock = NULL; /* Search the key; we don't want the whole getkey stuff here. */ kdbhd = keydb_new (); if (!kdbhd) { /* Note that keydb_new has already used log_error. */ err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } err = classify_user_id (username, &desc, 1); if (!err) err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL); if (!err) { err = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock); if (err) { log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } /* Now with the keyblock retrieved, search again to detect an ambiguous specification. We need to save the found state so that we can do an update later. */ keydb_push_found_state (kdbhd); err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL); if (!err) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_AMBIGUOUS_NAME); else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND) err = 0; keydb_pop_found_state (kdbhd); if (!err) { /* We require the secret primary key to set the primary UID. */ node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); log_assert (node); err = agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, node->pkt->pkt.public_key); } } else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY); if (err) { log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), username, gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } fix_keyblock (ctrl, &keyblock); merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); *r_keyblock = keyblock; keyblock = NULL; *r_kdbhd = kdbhd; kdbhd = NULL; leave: release_kbnode (keyblock); keydb_release (kdbhd); return err; } /* Unattended adding of a new keyid. USERNAME specifies the key. NEWUID is the new user id to add to the key. */ void keyedit_quick_adduid (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, const char *newuid) { gpg_error_t err; KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL; kbnode_t keyblock = NULL; char *uidstring = NULL; uidstring = xstrdup (newuid); trim_spaces (uidstring); if (!*uidstring) { log_error ("%s\n", gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_INV_USER_ID)); goto leave; } #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM /* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */ check_trustdb_stale (ctrl); #endif /* Search the key; we don't want the whole getkey stuff here. */ err = quick_find_keyblock (ctrl, username, &kdbhd, &keyblock); if (err) goto leave; if (menu_adduid (ctrl, keyblock, 0, NULL, uidstring)) { err = keydb_update_keyblock (ctrl, kdbhd, keyblock); if (err) { log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } if (update_trust) revalidation_mark (ctrl); } leave: xfree (uidstring); release_kbnode (keyblock); keydb_release (kdbhd); } /* Unattended revocation of a keyid. USERNAME specifies the key. UIDTOREV is the user id revoke from the key. */ void keyedit_quick_revuid (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, const char *uidtorev) { gpg_error_t err; KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL; kbnode_t keyblock = NULL; kbnode_t node; int modified = 0; size_t revlen; size_t valid_uids; #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM /* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */ check_trustdb_stale (ctrl); #endif /* Search the key; we don't want the whole getkey stuff here. */ err = quick_find_keyblock (ctrl, username, &kdbhd, &keyblock); if (err) goto leave; /* Too make sure that we do not revoke the last valid UID, we first count how many valid UIDs there are. */ valid_uids = 0; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) valid_uids += (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired); /* Find the right UID. */ revlen = strlen (uidtorev); for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && revlen == node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len && !memcmp (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, uidtorev, revlen)) { struct revocation_reason_info *reason; /* Make sure that we do not revoke the last valid UID. */ if (valid_uids == 1 && ! node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked && ! node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired) { log_error (_("cannot revoke the last valid user ID.\n")); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_USER_ID); goto leave; } reason = get_default_uid_revocation_reason (); err = core_revuid (ctrl, keyblock, node, reason, &modified); release_revocation_reason_info (reason); if (err) goto leave; err = keydb_update_keyblock (ctrl, kdbhd, keyblock); if (err) { log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } revalidation_mark (ctrl); goto leave; } } err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_USER_ID); leave: if (err) { log_error (_("revoking the user ID failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); write_status_error ("keyedit.revoke.uid", err); } release_kbnode (keyblock); keydb_release (kdbhd); } /* Unattended setting of the primary uid. USERNAME specifies the key. PRIMARYUID is the user id which shall be primary. */ void keyedit_quick_set_primary (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, const char *primaryuid) { gpg_error_t err; KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL; kbnode_t keyblock = NULL; kbnode_t node; size_t primaryuidlen; int any; #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM /* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */ check_trustdb_stale (ctrl); #endif err = quick_find_keyblock (ctrl, username, &kdbhd, &keyblock); if (err) goto leave; /* Find and mark the UID - we mark only the first valid one. */ primaryuidlen = strlen (primaryuid); any = 0; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !any && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired && primaryuidlen == node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len && !memcmp (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, primaryuid, primaryuidlen)) { node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID; any = 1; } else node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID; } if (!any) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_USER_ID); else if (menu_set_primary_uid (ctrl, keyblock)) { merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); err = keydb_update_keyblock (ctrl, kdbhd, keyblock); if (err) { log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } revalidation_mark (ctrl); } else err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); if (err) log_error (_("setting the primary user ID failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); leave: release_kbnode (keyblock); keydb_release (kdbhd); } /* Find a keyblock by fingerprint because only this uniquely * identifies a key and may thus be used to select a key for * unattended subkey creation os key signing. */ static gpg_error_t find_by_primary_fpr (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fpr, kbnode_t *r_keyblock, KEYDB_HANDLE *r_kdbhd) { gpg_error_t err; kbnode_t keyblock = NULL; KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL; KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc; byte fprbin[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN]; size_t fprlen; *r_keyblock = NULL; *r_kdbhd = NULL; if (classify_user_id (fpr, &desc, 1) || desc.mode != KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR) { log_error (_("\"%s\" is not a fingerprint\n"), fpr); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME); goto leave; } err = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, NULL, fpr, &keyblock, &kdbhd, 1, 1); if (err) { log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), fpr, gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } /* Check that the primary fingerprint has been given. */ fingerprint_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, fprbin, &fprlen); if (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR && fprlen == desc.fprlen && !memcmp (fprbin, desc.u.fpr, fprlen)) ; else { log_error (_("\"%s\" is not the primary fingerprint\n"), fpr); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME); goto leave; } *r_keyblock = keyblock; keyblock = NULL; *r_kdbhd = kdbhd; kdbhd = NULL; err = 0; leave: release_kbnode (keyblock); keydb_release (kdbhd); return err; } /* Unattended key signing function. If the key specifified by FPR is available and FPR is the primary fingerprint all user ids of the key are signed using the default signing key. If UIDS is an empty list all usable UIDs are signed, if it is not empty, only those user ids matching one of the entries of the list are signed. With LOCAL being true the signatures are marked as non-exportable. */ void keyedit_quick_sign (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fpr, strlist_t uids, strlist_t locusr, int local) { gpg_error_t err; kbnode_t keyblock = NULL; KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL; int modified = 0; PKT_public_key *pk; kbnode_t node; strlist_t sl; int any; #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM /* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */ check_trustdb_stale (ctrl); #endif /* We require a fingerprint because only this uniquely identifies a key and may thus be used to select a key for unattended key signing. */ if (find_by_primary_fpr (ctrl, fpr, &keyblock, &kdbhd)) goto leave; if (fix_keyblock (ctrl, &keyblock)) modified++; /* Give some info in verbose. */ if (opt.verbose) { show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0, 1/*with_revoker*/, 1/*with_fingerprint*/, 0, 0, 1); es_fflush (es_stdout); } pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key; if (pk->flags.revoked) { if (!opt.verbose) show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); log_error ("%s%s", _("Key is revoked."), _(" Unable to sign.\n")); goto leave; } /* Set the flags according to the UIDS list. Fixme: We may want to use classify_user_id along with dedicated compare functions so that we match the same way as in the key lookup. */ any = 0; menu_select_uid (keyblock, 0); /* Better clear the flags first. */ for (sl=uids; sl; sl = sl->next) { const char *name = sl->d; int count = 0; sl->flags &= ~(1|2); /* Clear flags used for error reporting. */ for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; if (uid->attrib_data) ; else if (*name == '=' && strlen (name+1) == uid->len && !memcmp (uid->name, name + 1, uid->len)) { /* Exact match - we don't do a check for ambiguity * in this case. */ node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID; if (any != -1) { sl->flags |= 1; /* Report as found. */ any = 1; } } else if (ascii_memistr (uid->name, uid->len, *name == '*'? name+1:name)) { node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID; if (any != -1) { sl->flags |= 1; /* Report as found. */ any = 1; } count++; } } } if (count > 1) { any = -1; /* Force failure at end. */ sl->flags |= 2; /* Report as ambiguous. */ } } /* Check whether all given user ids were found. */ for (sl=uids; sl; sl = sl->next) if (!(sl->flags & 1)) any = -1; /* That user id was not found. */ /* Print an error if there was a problem with the user ids. */ if (uids && any < 1) { if (!opt.verbose) show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); es_fflush (es_stdout); for (sl=uids; sl; sl = sl->next) { if ((sl->flags & 2)) log_info (_("Invalid user ID '%s': %s\n"), sl->d, gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_AMBIGUOUS_NAME)); else if (!(sl->flags & 1)) log_info (_("Invalid user ID '%s': %s\n"), sl->d, gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)); } log_error ("%s %s", _("No matching user IDs."), _("Nothing to sign.\n")); goto leave; } /* Sign. */ sign_uids (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, locusr, &modified, local, 0, 0, 0, 1); es_fflush (es_stdout); if (modified) { err = keydb_update_keyblock (ctrl, kdbhd, keyblock); if (err) { log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } } else log_info (_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n")); if (update_trust) revalidation_mark (ctrl); leave: release_kbnode (keyblock); keydb_release (kdbhd); } /* Unattended subkey creation function. * */ void keyedit_quick_addkey (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fpr, const char *algostr, const char *usagestr, const char *expirestr) { gpg_error_t err; kbnode_t keyblock; KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd; int modified = 0; PKT_public_key *pk; #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM /* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */ check_trustdb_stale (ctrl); #endif /* We require a fingerprint because only this uniquely identifies a * key and may thus be used to select a key for unattended subkey * creation. */ if (find_by_primary_fpr (ctrl, fpr, &keyblock, &kdbhd)) goto leave; if (fix_keyblock (ctrl, &keyblock)) modified++; pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key; if (pk->flags.revoked) { if (!opt.verbose) show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); log_error ("%s%s", _("Key is revoked."), "\n"); goto leave; } /* Create the subkey. Note that the called function already prints * an error message. */ if (!generate_subkeypair (ctrl, keyblock, algostr, usagestr, expirestr)) modified = 1; es_fflush (es_stdout); /* Store. */ if (modified) { err = keydb_update_keyblock (ctrl, kdbhd, keyblock); if (err) { log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } } else log_info (_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n")); leave: release_kbnode (keyblock); keydb_release (kdbhd); } /* Unattended expiration setting function for the main key. If * SUBKEYFPRS is not NULL and SUBKEYSFPRS[0] is neither NULL, it is * expected to be an array of fingerprints for subkeys to change. It * may also be an array which just one item "*" to indicate that all * keys shall be set to that expiration date. */ void keyedit_quick_set_expire (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fpr, const char *expirestr, char **subkeyfprs) { gpg_error_t err; kbnode_t keyblock, node; KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd; int modified = 0; PKT_public_key *pk; u32 expire; int primary_only = 0; int idx; #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM /* See keyedit_menu for why we need this. */ check_trustdb_stale (ctrl); #endif /* We require a fingerprint because only this uniquely identifies a * key and may thus be used to select a key for unattended * expiration setting. */ err = find_by_primary_fpr (ctrl, fpr, &keyblock, &kdbhd); if (err) goto leave; if (fix_keyblock (ctrl, &keyblock)) modified++; pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key; if (pk->flags.revoked) { if (!opt.verbose) show_key_with_all_names (ctrl, es_stdout, keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1); log_error ("%s%s", _("Key is revoked."), "\n"); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_REVOKED); goto leave; } expire = parse_expire_string (expirestr); if (expire == (u32)-1 ) { log_error (_("'%s' is not a valid expiration time\n"), expirestr); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); goto leave; } if (expire) expire += make_timestamp (); /* Check whether a subkey's expiration time shall be changed or the * expiration time of all keys. */ if (!subkeyfprs || !subkeyfprs[0]) primary_only = 1; else if ( !strcmp (subkeyfprs[0], "*") && !subkeyfprs[1]) { /* Change all subkeys keys which have not been revoked and are * not yet expired. */ merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY && (pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key) && !pk->flags.revoked && !pk->has_expired) node->flag |= NODFLG_SELKEY; } } else { /* Change specified subkeys. */ KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc; byte fprbin[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN]; size_t fprlen; err = 0; merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); for (idx=0; subkeyfprs[idx]; idx++) { int any = 0; /* Parse the fingerprint. */ if (classify_user_id (subkeyfprs[idx], &desc, 1) || desc.mode != KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR) { log_error (_("\"%s\" is not a proper fingerprint\n"), subkeyfprs[idx] ); if (!err) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME); continue; } /* Set the flag for the matching non revoked subkey. */ for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY && (pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key) && !pk->flags.revoked ) { fingerprint_from_pk (pk, fprbin, &fprlen); if (fprlen == 20 && !memcmp (fprbin, desc.u.fpr, 20)) { node->flag |= NODFLG_SELKEY; any = 1; } } } if (!any) { log_error (_("subkey \"%s\" not found\n"), subkeyfprs[idx]); if (!err) err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); } } if (err) goto leave; } /* Set the new expiration date. */ err = menu_expire (ctrl, keyblock, primary_only? 1 : 2, expire); if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_TRUE) modified = 1; else if (err) goto leave; es_fflush (es_stdout); /* Store. */ if (modified) { err = keydb_update_keyblock (ctrl, kdbhd, keyblock); if (err) { log_error (_("update failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } if (update_trust) revalidation_mark (ctrl); } else log_info (_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n")); leave: release_kbnode (keyblock); keydb_release (kdbhd); if (err) write_status_error ("set_expire", err); } static void tty_print_notations (int indent, PKT_signature * sig) { int first = 1; struct notation *notation, *nd; if (indent < 0) { first = 0; indent = -indent; } notation = sig_to_notation (sig); for (nd = notation; nd; nd = nd->next) { if (!first) tty_printf ("%*s", indent, ""); else first = 0; tty_print_utf8_string (nd->name, strlen (nd->name)); tty_printf ("="); tty_print_utf8_string (nd->value, strlen (nd->value)); tty_printf ("\n"); } free_notation (notation); } /* * Show preferences of a public keyblock. */ static void show_prefs (PKT_user_id * uid, PKT_signature * selfsig, int verbose) { const prefitem_t fake = { 0, 0 }; const prefitem_t *prefs; int i; if (!uid) return; if (uid->prefs) prefs = uid->prefs; else if (verbose) prefs = &fake; else return; if (verbose) { int any, des_seen = 0, sha1_seen = 0, uncomp_seen = 0; tty_printf (" "); tty_printf (_("Cipher: ")); for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++) { if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM) { if (any) tty_printf (", "); any = 1; /* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */ if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (prefs[i].value) && prefs[i].value < 100) tty_printf ("%s", openpgp_cipher_algo_name (prefs[i].value)); else tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value); if (prefs[i].value == CIPHER_ALGO_3DES) des_seen = 1; } } if (!des_seen) { if (any) tty_printf (", "); tty_printf ("%s", openpgp_cipher_algo_name (CIPHER_ALGO_3DES)); } tty_printf ("\n "); tty_printf (_("AEAD: ")); for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++) { if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_AEAD) { if (any) tty_printf (", "); any = 1; /* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */ if (!openpgp_aead_test_algo (prefs[i].value) && prefs[i].value < 100) tty_printf ("%s", openpgp_aead_algo_name (prefs[i].value)); else tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value); } } tty_printf ("\n "); tty_printf (_("Digest: ")); for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++) { if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH) { if (any) tty_printf (", "); any = 1; /* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */ if (!gcry_md_test_algo (prefs[i].value) && prefs[i].value < 100) tty_printf ("%s", gcry_md_algo_name (prefs[i].value)); else tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value); if (prefs[i].value == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1) sha1_seen = 1; } } if (!sha1_seen) { if (any) tty_printf (", "); tty_printf ("%s", gcry_md_algo_name (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1)); } tty_printf ("\n "); tty_printf (_("Compression: ")); for (i = any = 0; prefs[i].type; i++) { if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP) { const char *s = compress_algo_to_string (prefs[i].value); if (any) tty_printf (", "); any = 1; /* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */ if (s && prefs[i].value < 100) tty_printf ("%s", s); else tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value); if (prefs[i].value == COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE) uncomp_seen = 1; } } if (!uncomp_seen) { if (any) tty_printf (", "); else { tty_printf ("%s", compress_algo_to_string (COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP)); tty_printf (", "); } tty_printf ("%s", compress_algo_to_string (COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE)); } if (uid->flags.mdc || uid->flags.aead || !uid->flags.ks_modify) { tty_printf ("\n "); tty_printf (_("Features: ")); any = 0; if (uid->flags.mdc) { tty_printf ("MDC"); any = 1; } if (!uid->flags.aead) { if (any) tty_printf (", "); tty_printf ("AEAD"); } if (!uid->flags.ks_modify) { if (any) tty_printf (", "); tty_printf (_("Keyserver no-modify")); } } tty_printf ("\n"); if (selfsig) { const byte *pref_ks; size_t pref_ks_len; pref_ks = parse_sig_subpkt (selfsig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, &pref_ks_len); if (pref_ks && pref_ks_len) { tty_printf (" "); tty_printf (_("Preferred keyserver: ")); tty_print_utf8_string (pref_ks, pref_ks_len); tty_printf ("\n"); } if (selfsig->flags.notation) { tty_printf (" "); tty_printf (_("Notations: ")); tty_print_notations (5 + strlen (_("Notations: ")), selfsig); } } } else { tty_printf (" "); for (i = 0; prefs[i].type; i++) { tty_printf (" %c%d", prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ? 'S' : prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_AEAD ? 'A' : prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ? 'H' : prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z' : '?', prefs[i].value); } if (uid->flags.mdc) tty_printf (" [mdc]"); if (uid->flags.aead) tty_printf (" [aead]"); if (!uid->flags.ks_modify) tty_printf (" [no-ks-modify]"); tty_printf ("\n"); } } /* This is the version of show_key_with_all_names used when opt.with_colons is used. It prints all available data in a easy to parse format and does not translate utf8 */ static void show_key_with_all_names_colon (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp, kbnode_t keyblock) { KBNODE node; int i, j, ulti_hack = 0; byte pk_version = 0; PKT_public_key *primary = NULL; int have_seckey; if (!fp) fp = es_stdout; /* the keys */ for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)) { PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; u32 keyid[2]; if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) { pk_version = pk->version; primary = pk; } keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid); have_seckey = !agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, pk); if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) es_fputs (have_seckey? "sec:" : "pub:", fp); else es_fputs (have_seckey? "ssb:" : "sub:", fp); if (!pk->flags.valid) es_putc ('i', fp); else if (pk->flags.revoked) es_putc ('r', fp); else if (pk->has_expired) es_putc ('e', fp); else if (!(opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks)) { int trust = get_validity_info (ctrl, keyblock, pk, NULL); if (trust == 'u') ulti_hack = 1; es_putc (trust, fp); } es_fprintf (fp, ":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%lu:%lu::", nbits_from_pk (pk), pk->pubkey_algo, (ulong) keyid[0], (ulong) keyid[1], (ulong) pk->timestamp, (ulong) pk->expiredate); if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY && !(opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks)) es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (ctrl, pk, 0), fp); es_putc (':', fp); es_putc (':', fp); es_putc (':', fp); /* Print capabilities. */ if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)) es_putc ('e', fp); if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)) es_putc ('s', fp); if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT)) es_putc ('c', fp); if ((pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)) es_putc ('a', fp); es_putc ('\n', fp); print_fingerprint (ctrl, fp, pk, 0); print_revokers (fp, pk); } } /* the user ids */ i = 0; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; ++i; if (uid->attrib_data) es_fputs ("uat:", fp); else es_fputs ("uid:", fp); if (uid->flags.revoked) es_fputs ("r::::::::", fp); else if (uid->flags.expired) es_fputs ("e::::::::", fp); else if (opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks) es_fputs ("::::::::", fp); else { int uid_validity; if (primary && !ulti_hack) uid_validity = get_validity_info (ctrl, keyblock, primary, uid); else uid_validity = 'u'; es_fprintf (fp, "%c::::::::", uid_validity); } if (uid->attrib_data) es_fprintf (fp, "%u %lu", uid->numattribs, uid->attrib_len); else es_write_sanitized (fp, uid->name, uid->len, ":", NULL); es_putc (':', fp); /* signature class */ es_putc (':', fp); /* capabilities */ es_putc (':', fp); /* preferences */ if (pk_version > 3 || uid->selfsigversion > 3) { const prefitem_t *prefs = uid->prefs; for (j = 0; prefs && prefs[j].type; j++) { if (j) es_putc (' ', fp); es_fprintf (fp, "%c%d", prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ? 'S' : prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ? 'H' : prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z' : '?', prefs[j].value); } if (uid->flags.mdc) es_fputs (",mdc", fp); if (uid->flags.aead) es_fputs (",aead", fp); if (!uid->flags.ks_modify) es_fputs (",no-ks-modify", fp); } es_putc (':', fp); /* flags */ es_fprintf (fp, "%d,", i); if (uid->flags.primary) es_putc ('p', fp); if (uid->flags.revoked) es_putc ('r', fp); if (uid->flags.expired) es_putc ('e', fp); if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)) es_putc ('s', fp); if ((node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A)) es_putc ('m', fp); es_putc (':', fp); if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP) { #ifdef USE_TOFU enum tofu_policy policy; if (! tofu_get_policy (ctrl, primary, uid, &policy) && policy != TOFU_POLICY_NONE) es_fprintf (fp, "%s", tofu_policy_str (policy)); #endif /*USE_TOFU*/ } es_putc (':', fp); es_putc ('\n', fp); } } } static void show_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp, kbnode_t keyblock, PKT_public_key * pk, unsigned int flag, int with_prefs) { KBNODE node; int i = 0; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !is_deleted_kbnode (node)) { PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; ++i; if (!flag || (flag && (node->flag & flag))) { if (!(flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) && pk) tty_fprintf (fp, "%s ", uid_trust_string_fixed (ctrl, pk, uid)); if (flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) tty_fprintf (fp, " "); else if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) tty_fprintf (fp, "(%d)* ", i); else if (uid->flags.primary) tty_fprintf (fp, "(%d). ", i); else tty_fprintf (fp, "(%d) ", i); tty_print_utf8_string2 (fp, uid->name, uid->len, 0); tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); if (with_prefs && pk) { if (pk->version > 3 || uid->selfsigversion > 3) { PKT_signature *selfsig = NULL; KBNODE signode; for (signode = node->next; signode && signode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; signode = signode->next) { if (signode->pkt->pkt.signature-> flags.chosen_selfsig) { selfsig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature; break; } } show_prefs (uid, selfsig, with_prefs == 2); } else tty_fprintf (fp, _("There are no preferences on a" " PGP 2.x-style user ID.\n")); } } } } } /* * Display the key a the user ids, if only_marked is true, do only so * for user ids with mark A flag set and do not display the index * number. If FP is not NULL print to the given stream and not to the * tty (ignored in with-colons mode). */ static void show_key_with_all_names (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp, KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked, int with_revoker, int with_fpr, int with_subkeys, int with_prefs, int nowarn) { gpg_error_t err; kbnode_t node; int i; int do_warn = 0; int have_seckey = 0; char *serialno = NULL; PKT_public_key *primary = NULL; char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE]; if (opt.with_colons) { show_key_with_all_names_colon (ctrl, fp, keyblock); return; } /* the keys */ for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || (with_subkeys && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY && !is_deleted_kbnode (node))) { PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; const char *otrust = "err"; const char *trust = "err"; if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) { /* do it here, so that debug messages don't clutter the * output */ static int did_warn = 0; trust = get_validity_string (ctrl, pk, NULL); otrust = get_ownertrust_string (ctrl, pk, 0); /* Show a warning once */ if (!did_warn && (get_validity (ctrl, keyblock, pk, NULL, NULL, 0) & TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK)) { did_warn = 1; do_warn = 1; } primary = pk; } if (pk->flags.revoked) { char *user = get_user_id_string_native (ctrl, pk->revoked.keyid); tty_fprintf (fp, _("The following key was revoked on" " %s by %s key %s\n"), revokestr_from_pk (pk), gcry_pk_algo_name (pk->revoked.algo), user); xfree (user); } if (with_revoker) { if (!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys) BUG (); else for (i = 0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++) { u32 r_keyid[2]; char *user; const char *algo; algo = gcry_pk_algo_name (pk->revkey[i].algid); keyid_from_fingerprint (ctrl, pk->revkey[i].fpr, pk->revkey[i].fprlen, r_keyid); user = get_user_id_string_native (ctrl, r_keyid); tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key may be revoked by %s key %s"), algo ? algo : "?", user); if (pk->revkey[i].class & 0x40) { tty_fprintf (fp, " "); tty_fprintf (fp, _("(sensitive)")); } tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); xfree (user); } } keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL); xfree (serialno); serialno = NULL; { char *hexgrip; err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip); if (err) { log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); have_seckey = 0; } else have_seckey = !agent_get_keyinfo (ctrl, hexgrip, &serialno, NULL); xfree (hexgrip); } tty_fprintf (fp, "%s%c %s/%s", node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY && have_seckey? "sec" : node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ? "pub" : have_seckey ? "ssb" : "sub", (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY) ? '*' : ' ', pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf), keystr (pk->keyid)); if (opt.legacy_list_mode) tty_fprintf (fp, " "); else tty_fprintf (fp, "\n "); tty_fprintf (fp, _("created: %s"), datestr_from_pk (pk)); tty_fprintf (fp, " "); if (pk->flags.revoked) tty_fprintf (fp, _("revoked: %s"), revokestr_from_pk (pk)); else if (pk->has_expired) tty_fprintf (fp, _("expired: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk)); else tty_fprintf (fp, _("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk)); tty_fprintf (fp, " "); tty_fprintf (fp, _("usage: %s"), usagestr_from_pk (pk, 1)); tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); if (serialno) { /* The agent told us that a secret key is available and that it has been stored on a card. */ tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s%s", opt.legacy_list_mode? 21:5, "", _("card-no: ")); if (strlen (serialno) == 32 && !strncmp (serialno, "D27600012401", 12)) { /* This is an OpenPGP card. Print the relevant part. */ /* Example: D2760001240101010001000003470000 */ /* xxxxyyyyyyyy */ tty_fprintf (fp, "%.*s %.*s\n", 4, serialno+16, 8, serialno+20); } else tty_fprintf (fp, "%s\n", serialno); } else if (pk->seckey_info && pk->seckey_info->is_protected && pk->seckey_info->s2k.mode == 1002) { /* FIXME: Check whether this code path is still used. */ tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s%s", opt.legacy_list_mode? 21:5, "", _("card-no: ")); if (pk->seckey_info->ivlen == 16 && !memcmp (pk->seckey_info->iv, "\xD2\x76\x00\x01\x24\x01", 6)) { /* This is an OpenPGP card. */ for (i = 8; i < 14; i++) { if (i == 10) tty_fprintf (fp, " "); tty_fprintf (fp, "%02X", pk->seckey_info->iv[i]); } } else { /* Unknown card: Print all. */ for (i = 0; i < pk->seckey_info->ivlen; i++) tty_fprintf (fp, "%02X", pk->seckey_info->iv[i]); } tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); } if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) { if (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS) { tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s", opt.legacy_list_mode? ((int) keystrlen () + 13):5, ""); /* Ownertrust is only meaningful for the PGP or classic trust models, or PGP combined with TOFU */ if (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP || opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP) { int width = 14 - strlen (otrust); if (width <= 0) width = 1; tty_fprintf (fp, _("trust: %s"), otrust); tty_fprintf (fp, "%*s", width, ""); } tty_fprintf (fp, _("validity: %s"), trust); tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); } if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY && (get_ownertrust (ctrl, pk) & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED)) { tty_fprintf (fp, "*** "); tty_fprintf (fp, _("This key has been disabled")); tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); } } if ((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) && with_fpr) { print_fingerprint (ctrl, fp, pk, 2); tty_fprintf (fp, "\n"); } } } show_names (ctrl, fp, keyblock, primary, only_marked ? NODFLG_MARK_A : 0, with_prefs); if (do_warn && !nowarn) tty_fprintf (fp, _("Please note that the shown key validity" " is not necessarily correct\n" "unless you restart the program.\n")); xfree (serialno); } /* Display basic key information. This function is suitable to show * information on the key without any dependencies on the trustdb or * any other internal GnuPG stuff. KEYBLOCK may either be a public or * a secret key. This function may be called with KEYBLOCK containing * secret keys and thus the printing of "pub" vs. "sec" does only * depend on the packet type and not by checking with gpg-agent. If * PRINT_SEC ist set "sec" is printed instead of "pub". */ void show_basic_key_info (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int print_sec) { KBNODE node; int i; char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE]; /* The primary key */ for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) { PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; const char *tag; if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY || print_sec) tag = "sec"; else tag = "pub"; /* Note, we use the same format string as in other show functions to make the translation job easier. */ tty_printf ("%s %s/%s ", tag, pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf), keystr_from_pk (pk)); tty_printf (_("created: %s"), datestr_from_pk (pk)); tty_printf (" "); tty_printf (_("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk)); tty_printf ("\n"); print_fingerprint (ctrl, NULL, pk, 3); tty_printf ("\n"); } } /* The user IDs. */ for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; ++i; tty_printf (" "); if (uid->flags.revoked) tty_printf ("[%s] ", _("revoked")); else if (uid->flags.expired) tty_printf ("[%s] ", _("expired")); tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len); tty_printf ("\n"); } } } static void show_key_and_fingerprint (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int with_subkeys) { kbnode_t node; PKT_public_key *pk = NULL; char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE]; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) { pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; tty_printf ("pub %s/%s %s ", pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf), keystr_from_pk(pk), datestr_from_pk (pk)); } else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len); break; } } tty_printf ("\n"); if (pk) print_fingerprint (ctrl, NULL, pk, 2); if (with_subkeys) { for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) { pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; tty_printf ("sub %s/%s %s [%s]\n", pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf), keystr_from_pk(pk), datestr_from_pk (pk), usagestr_from_pk (pk, 0)); print_fingerprint (ctrl, NULL, pk, 4); } } } } /* Show a listing of the primary and its subkeys along with their keygrips. */ static void show_key_and_grip (kbnode_t keyblock) { kbnode_t node; PKT_public_key *pk = NULL; char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE]; char *hexgrip; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) { pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; tty_printf ("%s %s/%s %s [%s]\n", node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY? "pub":"sub", pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf), keystr_from_pk(pk), datestr_from_pk (pk), usagestr_from_pk (pk, 0)); if (!hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip)) { tty_printf (" Keygrip: %s\n", hexgrip); xfree (hexgrip); } } } } /* Show a warning if no uids on the key have the primary uid flag set. */ static void no_primary_warning (KBNODE keyblock) { KBNODE node; int have_primary = 0, uid_count = 0; /* TODO: if we ever start behaving differently with a primary or non-primary attribute ID, we will need to check for attributes here as well. */ for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data == NULL) { uid_count++; if (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary == 2) { have_primary = 1; break; } } } if (uid_count > 1 && !have_primary) log_info (_ ("WARNING: no user ID has been marked as primary. This command" " may\n cause a different user ID to become" " the assumed primary.\n")); } /* Print a warning if the latest encryption subkey expires soon. This function is called after the expire data of the primary key has been changed. */ static void subkey_expire_warning (kbnode_t keyblock) { u32 curtime = make_timestamp (); kbnode_t node; PKT_public_key *pk; /* u32 mainexpire = 0; */ u32 subexpire = 0; u32 latest_date = 0; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { /* if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) */ /* { */ /* pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; */ /* mainexpire = pk->expiredate; */ /* } */ if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) continue; pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; if (!pk->flags.valid) continue; if (pk->flags.revoked) continue; if (pk->timestamp > curtime) continue; /* Ignore future keys. */ if (!(pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)) continue; /* Not an encryption key. */ if (pk->timestamp > latest_date || (!pk->timestamp && !latest_date)) { latest_date = pk->timestamp; subexpire = pk->expiredate; } } if (!subexpire) return; /* No valid subkey with an expiration time. */ if (curtime + (10*86400) > subexpire) { log_info (_("WARNING: Your encryption subkey expires soon.\n")); log_info (_("You may want to change its expiration date too.\n")); } } /* * Ask for a new user id, add the self-signature, and update the * keyblock. If UIDSTRING is not NULL the user ID is generated * unattended using that string. UIDSTRING is expected to be utf-8 * encoded and white space trimmed. Returns true if there is a new * user id. */ static int menu_adduid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int photo, const char *photo_name, const char *uidstring) { PKT_user_id *uid; PKT_public_key *pk = NULL; PKT_signature *sig = NULL; PACKET *pkt; KBNODE node; KBNODE pub_where = NULL; gpg_error_t err; if (photo && uidstring) return 0; /* Not allowed. */ for (node = pub_keyblock; node; pub_where = node, node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) break; } if (!node) /* No subkey. */ pub_where = NULL; log_assert (pk); if (photo) { int hasattrib = 0; for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data != NULL) { hasattrib = 1; break; } /* It is legal but bad for compatibility to add a photo ID to a v3 key as it means that PGP2 will not be able to use that key anymore. Also, PGP may not expect a photo on a v3 key. Don't bother to ask this if the key already has a photo - any damage has already been done at that point. -dms */ if (pk->version == 3 && !hasattrib) { if (opt.expert) { tty_printf (_("WARNING: This is a PGP2-style key. " "Adding a photo ID may cause some versions\n" " of PGP to reject this key.\n")); if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.v3_photo.okay", _("Are you sure you still want " "to add it? (y/N) "))) return 0; } else { tty_printf (_("You may not add a photo ID to " "a PGP2-style key.\n")); return 0; } } uid = generate_photo_id (ctrl, pk, photo_name); } else uid = generate_user_id (pub_keyblock, uidstring); if (!uid) { if (uidstring) { write_status_error ("adduid", gpg_error (304)); log_error ("%s", _("Such a user ID already exists on this key!\n")); } return 0; } - err = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, pk, uid, NULL, pk, 0x13, 0, 0, 0, + err = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, pk, uid, NULL, pk, 0x13, 0, 0, keygen_add_std_prefs, pk, NULL); if (err) { write_status_error ("keysig", err); log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); free_user_id (uid); return 0; } /* Insert/append to public keyblock */ pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt); pkt->pkttype = PKT_USER_ID; pkt->pkt.user_id = uid; node = new_kbnode (pkt); if (pub_where) insert_kbnode (pub_where, node, 0); else add_kbnode (pub_keyblock, node); pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt); pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; pkt->pkt.signature = sig; if (pub_where) insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), 0); else add_kbnode (pub_keyblock, new_kbnode (pkt)); return 1; } /* * Remove all selected userids from the keyring */ static void menu_deluid (KBNODE pub_keyblock) { KBNODE node; int selected = 0; for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID; if (selected) { /* Only cause a trust update if we delete a non-revoked user id */ if (!node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked) update_trust = 1; delete_kbnode (node); } } else if (selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE) delete_kbnode (node); else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) selected = 0; } commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock); } static int menu_delsig (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock) { KBNODE node; PKT_user_id *uid = NULL; int changed = 0; for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { uid = (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) ? node->pkt->pkt.user_id : NULL; } else if (uid && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE) { int okay, valid, selfsig, inv_sig, no_key, other_err; tty_printf ("uid "); tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len); tty_printf ("\n"); okay = inv_sig = no_key = other_err = 0; if (opt.with_colons) valid = print_and_check_one_sig_colon (ctrl, pub_keyblock, node, &inv_sig, &no_key, &other_err, &selfsig, 1); else valid = print_and_check_one_sig (ctrl, pub_keyblock, node, &inv_sig, &no_key, &other_err, &selfsig, 1, 0); if (valid) { okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit ("keyedit.delsig.valid", _("Delete this good signature? (y/N/q)")); /* Only update trust if we delete a good signature. The other two cases do not affect trust. */ if (okay) update_trust = 1; } else if (inv_sig || other_err) okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit ("keyedit.delsig.invalid", _("Delete this invalid signature? (y/N/q)")); else if (no_key) okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit ("keyedit.delsig.unknown", _("Delete this unknown signature? (y/N/q)")); if (okay == -1) break; if (okay && selfsig && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.delsig.selfsig", _("Really delete this self-signature? (y/N)"))) okay = 0; if (okay) { delete_kbnode (node); changed++; } } else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) uid = NULL; } if (changed) { commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock); tty_printf (ngettext("Deleted %d signature.\n", "Deleted %d signatures.\n", changed), changed); } else tty_printf (_("Nothing deleted.\n")); return changed; } static int menu_clean (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int self_only) { KBNODE uidnode; int modified = 0, select_all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock); for (uidnode = keyblock->next; uidnode && uidnode->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; uidnode = uidnode->next) { if (uidnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (uidnode->flag & NODFLG_SELUID || select_all)) { int uids = 0, sigs = 0; char *user = utf8_to_native (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0); clean_one_uid (ctrl, keyblock, uidnode, opt.verbose, self_only, &uids, &sigs); if (uids) { const char *reason; if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked) reason = _("revoked"); else if (uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired) reason = _("expired"); else reason = _("invalid"); tty_printf (_("User ID \"%s\" compacted: %s\n"), user, reason); modified = 1; } else if (sigs) { tty_printf (ngettext("User ID \"%s\": %d signature removed\n", "User ID \"%s\": %d signatures removed\n", sigs), user, sigs); modified = 1; } else { tty_printf (self_only == 1 ? _("User ID \"%s\": already minimized\n") : _("User ID \"%s\": already clean\n"), user); } xfree (user); } } return modified; } /* * Remove some of the secondary keys */ static void menu_delkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock) { KBNODE node; int selected = 0; for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) { selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY; if (selected) delete_kbnode (node); } else if (selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE) delete_kbnode (node); else selected = 0; } commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock); /* No need to set update_trust here since signing keys are no longer used to certify other keys, so there is no change in trust when revoking/removing them. */ } /* * Ask for a new revoker, create the self-signature and put it into * the keyblock. Returns true if there is a new revoker. */ static int menu_addrevoker (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int sensitive) { PKT_public_key *pk = NULL; PKT_public_key *revoker_pk = NULL; PKT_signature *sig = NULL; PACKET *pkt; struct revocation_key revkey; size_t fprlen; int rc; log_assert (pub_keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key; if (pk->numrevkeys == 0 && pk->version == 3) { /* It is legal but bad for compatibility to add a revoker to a v3 key as it means that PGP2 will not be able to use that key anymore. Also, PGP may not expect a revoker on a v3 key. Don't bother to ask this if the key already has a revoker - any damage has already been done at that point. -dms */ if (opt.expert) { tty_printf (_("WARNING: This is a PGP 2.x-style key. " "Adding a designated revoker may cause\n" " some versions of PGP to reject this key.\n")); if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.v3_revoker.okay", _("Are you sure you still want " "to add it? (y/N) "))) return 0; } else { tty_printf (_("You may not add a designated revoker to " "a PGP 2.x-style key.\n")); return 0; } } for (;;) { char *answer; free_public_key (revoker_pk); revoker_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*revoker_pk)); tty_printf ("\n"); answer = cpr_get_utf8 ("keyedit.add_revoker", _("Enter the user ID of the designated revoker: ")); if (answer[0] == '\0' || answer[0] == CONTROL_D) { xfree (answer); goto fail; } /* Note that I'm requesting CERT here, which usually implies primary keys only, but some casual testing shows that PGP and GnuPG both can handle a designated revocation from a subkey. */ revoker_pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT; rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, revoker_pk, answer, NULL, NULL, 1, 1); if (rc) { log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), answer, gpg_strerror (rc)); xfree (answer); continue; } xfree (answer); fingerprint_from_pk (revoker_pk, revkey.fpr, &fprlen); if (fprlen != 20 && fprlen != 32) { log_error (_("cannot appoint a PGP 2.x style key as a " "designated revoker\n")); continue; } revkey.fprlen = fprlen; revkey.class = 0x80; if (sensitive) revkey.class |= 0x40; revkey.algid = revoker_pk->pubkey_algo; if (cmp_public_keys (revoker_pk, pk) == 0) { /* This actually causes no harm (after all, a key that designates itself as a revoker is the same as a regular key), but it's easy enough to check. */ log_error (_("you cannot appoint a key as its own " "designated revoker\n")); continue; } keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL); /* Does this revkey already exist? */ if (!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys) BUG (); else { int i; for (i = 0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++) { if (memcmp (&pk->revkey[i], &revkey, sizeof (struct revocation_key)) == 0) { char buf[50]; log_error (_("this key has already been designated " "as a revoker\n")); format_keyid (pk_keyid (pk), KF_LONG, buf, sizeof (buf)); write_status_text (STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED, buf); break; } } if (i < pk->numrevkeys) continue; } print_pubkey_info (ctrl, NULL, revoker_pk); print_fingerprint (ctrl, NULL, revoker_pk, 2); tty_printf ("\n"); tty_printf (_("WARNING: appointing a key as a designated revoker " "cannot be undone!\n")); tty_printf ("\n"); if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.add_revoker.okay", _("Are you sure you want to appoint this " "key as a designated revoker? (y/N) "))) continue; free_public_key (revoker_pk); revoker_pk = NULL; break; } - rc = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk, 0x1F, 0, 0, 0, + rc = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk, 0x1F, 0, 0, keygen_add_revkey, &revkey, NULL); if (rc) { write_status_error ("keysig", rc); log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); goto fail; } /* Insert into public keyblock. */ pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt); pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; pkt->pkt.signature = sig; insert_kbnode (pub_keyblock, new_kbnode (pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE); return 1; fail: if (sig) free_seckey_enc (sig); free_public_key (revoker_pk); return 0; } /* With FORCE_MAINKEY cleared this function handles the interactive * menu option "expire". With UNATTENDED set to 1 this function only * sets the expiration date of the primary key to NEWEXPIRATION and * avoid all interactivity; with a value of 2 only the flagged subkeys * are set to NEWEXPIRATION. Returns 0 if nothing was done, * GPG_ERR_TRUE if the key was modified, or any other error code. */ static gpg_error_t menu_expire (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int unattended, u32 newexpiration) { int signumber, rc; u32 expiredate; int only_mainkey; /* Set if only the mainkey is to be updated. */ PKT_public_key *main_pk, *sub_pk; PKT_user_id *uid; kbnode_t node; u32 keyid[2]; if (unattended) { only_mainkey = (unattended == 1); expiredate = newexpiration; } else { int n1; only_mainkey = 0; n1 = count_selected_keys (pub_keyblock); if (n1 > 1) { if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.expire_multiple_subkeys.okay", _("Are you sure you want to change the" " expiration time for multiple subkeys? (y/N) "))) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CANCELED);; } else if (n1) tty_printf (_("Changing expiration time for a subkey.\n")); else { tty_printf (_("Changing expiration time for the primary key.\n")); only_mainkey = 1; no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock); } expiredate = ask_expiredate (); } /* Now we can actually change the self-signature(s) */ main_pk = sub_pk = NULL; uid = NULL; signumber = 0; for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) { main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid); main_pk->expiredate = expiredate; } else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) { if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY) && unattended != 1) { /* The flag is set and we do not want to set the * expiration date only for the main key. */ sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; sub_pk->expiredate = expiredate; } else sub_pk = NULL; } else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; else if (main_pk && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && (only_mainkey || sub_pk)) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] && ((only_mainkey && uid && uid->created && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10) || (!only_mainkey && sig->sig_class == 0x18)) && sig->flags.chosen_selfsig) { /* This is a self-signature which is to be replaced. */ PKT_signature *newsig; PACKET *newpkt; signumber++; if ((only_mainkey && main_pk->version < 4) || (!only_mainkey && sub_pk->version < 4)) { log_info (_("You can't change the expiration date of a v3 key\n")); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_LEGACY_KEY); } if (only_mainkey) rc = update_keysig_packet (ctrl, &newsig, sig, main_pk, uid, NULL, main_pk, keygen_add_key_expire, main_pk); else rc = update_keysig_packet (ctrl, &newsig, sig, main_pk, NULL, sub_pk, main_pk, keygen_add_key_expire, sub_pk); if (rc) { log_error ("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_TRUE) rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; return rc; } /* Replace the packet. */ newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt); newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig; free_packet (node->pkt, NULL); xfree (node->pkt); node->pkt = newpkt; sub_pk = NULL; } } } update_trust = 1; return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TRUE); } /* Change the capability of a selected key. This command should only * be used to rectify badly created keys and as such is not suggested * for general use. */ static int menu_changeusage (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock) { int n1, rc; int mainkey = 0; PKT_public_key *main_pk, *sub_pk; PKT_user_id *uid; kbnode_t node; u32 keyid[2]; n1 = count_selected_keys (keyblock); if (n1 > 1) { tty_printf (_("You must select exactly one key.\n")); return 0; } else if (n1) tty_printf (_("Changing usage of a subkey.\n")); else { tty_printf (_("Changing usage of the primary key.\n")); mainkey = 1; } /* Now we can actually change the self-signature(s) */ main_pk = sub_pk = NULL; uid = NULL; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) { main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid); } else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) { if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY) sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; else sub_pk = NULL; } else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; else if (main_pk && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && (mainkey || sub_pk)) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] && ((mainkey && uid && uid->created && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10) || (!mainkey && sig->sig_class == 0x18)) && sig->flags.chosen_selfsig) { /* This is the self-signature which is to be replaced. */ PKT_signature *newsig; PACKET *newpkt; if ((mainkey && main_pk->version < 4) || (!mainkey && sub_pk->version < 4)) { /* Note: This won't happen because we don't support * v3 keys anymore. */ log_info ("You can't change the capabilities of a v3 key\n"); return 0; } if (mainkey) main_pk->pubkey_usage = ask_key_flags (main_pk->pubkey_algo, 0, main_pk->pubkey_usage); else sub_pk->pubkey_usage = ask_key_flags (sub_pk->pubkey_algo, 1, sub_pk->pubkey_usage); if (mainkey) rc = update_keysig_packet (ctrl, &newsig, sig, main_pk, uid, NULL, main_pk, keygen_add_key_flags, main_pk); else rc = update_keysig_packet (ctrl, &newsig, sig, main_pk, NULL, sub_pk, main_pk, keygen_add_key_flags, sub_pk); if (rc) { log_error ("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); return 0; } /* Replace the packet. */ newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt); newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig; free_packet (node->pkt, NULL); xfree (node->pkt); node->pkt = newpkt; sub_pk = NULL; break; } } } return 1; } static int menu_backsign (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock) { int rc, modified = 0; PKT_public_key *main_pk; KBNODE node; u32 timestamp; log_assert (pub_keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, pub_keyblock); main_pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key; keyid_from_pk (main_pk, NULL); /* We use the same timestamp for all backsigs so that we don't reveal information about the used machine. */ timestamp = make_timestamp (); for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) { PKT_public_key *sub_pk = NULL; KBNODE node2, sig_pk = NULL /*,sig_sk = NULL*/; /* char *passphrase; */ /* Find a signing subkey with no backsig */ if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) { if (node->pkt->pkt.public_key->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG) { if (node->pkt->pkt.public_key->flags.backsig) tty_printf (_ ("signing subkey %s is already cross-certified\n"), keystr_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key)); else sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; } else tty_printf (_("subkey %s does not sign and so does" " not need to be cross-certified\n"), keystr_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key)); } if (!sub_pk) continue; /* Find the selected selfsig on this subkey */ for (node2 = node->next; node2 && node2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; node2 = node2->next) if (node2->pkt->pkt.signature->version >= 4 && node2->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig) { sig_pk = node2; break; } if (!sig_pk) continue; /* Find the secret subkey that matches the public subkey */ log_debug ("FIXME: Check whether a secret subkey is available.\n"); /* if (!sub_sk) */ /* { */ /* tty_printf (_("no secret subkey for public subkey %s - ignoring\n"), */ /* keystr_from_pk (sub_pk)); */ /* continue; */ /* } */ /* Now we can get to work. */ rc = make_backsig (ctrl, sig_pk->pkt->pkt.signature, main_pk, sub_pk, sub_pk, timestamp, NULL); if (!rc) { PKT_signature *newsig; PACKET *newpkt; rc = update_keysig_packet (ctrl, &newsig, sig_pk->pkt->pkt.signature, main_pk, NULL, sub_pk, main_pk, NULL, NULL); if (!rc) { /* Put the new sig into place on the pubkey */ newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*newpkt)); newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig; free_packet (sig_pk->pkt, NULL); xfree (sig_pk->pkt); sig_pk->pkt = newpkt; modified = 1; } else { log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); break; } } else { log_error ("make_backsig failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); break; } } return modified; } static int change_primary_uid_cb (PKT_signature * sig, void *opaque) { byte buf[1]; /* first clear all primary uid flags so that we are sure none are * lingering around */ delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID); delete_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID); /* if opaque is set,we want to set the primary id */ if (opaque) { buf[0] = 1; build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, buf, 1); } return 0; } /* * Set the primary uid flag for the selected UID. We will also reset * all other primary uid flags. For this to work we have to update * all the signature timestamps. If we would do this with the current * time, we lose quite a lot of information, so we use a kludge to * do this: Just increment the timestamp by one second which is * sufficient to updated a signature during import. */ static int menu_set_primary_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock) { PKT_public_key *main_pk; PKT_user_id *uid; KBNODE node; u32 keyid[2]; int selected; int attribute = 0; int modified = 0; if (count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock) != 1) { tty_printf (_("Please select exactly one user ID.\n")); return 0; } main_pk = NULL; uid = NULL; selected = 0; /* Is our selected uid an attribute packet? */ for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) attribute = (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data != NULL); for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) break; /* No more user ids expected - ready. */ if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) { main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid); } else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID; } else if (main_pk && uid && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] && (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10) && attribute == (uid->attrib_data != NULL) && sig->flags.chosen_selfsig) { if (sig->version < 4) { char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0); log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"), user); xfree (user); } else { /* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced. We can just ignore v3 signatures because they are not able to carry the primary ID flag. We also ignore self-sigs on user IDs that are not of the same type that we are making primary. That is, if we are making a user ID primary, we alter user IDs. If we are making an attribute packet primary, we alter attribute packets. */ /* FIXME: We must make sure that we only have one self-signature per user ID here (not counting revocations) */ PKT_signature *newsig; PACKET *newpkt; const byte *p; int action; /* See whether this signature has the primary UID flag. */ p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL); if (!p) p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL); if (p && *p) /* yes */ action = selected ? 0 : -1; else /* no */ action = selected ? 1 : 0; if (action) { int rc = update_keysig_packet (ctrl, &newsig, sig, main_pk, uid, NULL, main_pk, change_primary_uid_cb, action > 0 ? "x" : NULL); if (rc) { log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); return 0; } /* replace the packet */ newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt); newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig; free_packet (node->pkt, NULL); xfree (node->pkt); node->pkt = newpkt; modified = 1; } } } } } return modified; } /* * Set preferences to new values for the selected user IDs */ static int menu_set_preferences (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock) { PKT_public_key *main_pk; PKT_user_id *uid; KBNODE node; u32 keyid[2]; int selected, select_all; int modified = 0; no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock); select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock); /* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */ main_pk = NULL; uid = NULL; selected = 0; for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) break; /* No more user-ids expected - ready. */ if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) { main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid); } else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; selected = select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID); } else if (main_pk && uid && selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] && (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10) && sig->flags.chosen_selfsig) { if (sig->version < 4) { char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0); log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"), user); xfree (user); } else { /* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced * We have to ignore v3 signatures because they are * not able to carry the preferences. */ PKT_signature *newsig; PACKET *newpkt; int rc; rc = update_keysig_packet (ctrl, &newsig, sig, main_pk, uid, NULL, main_pk, keygen_upd_std_prefs, NULL); if (rc) { log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); return 0; } /* replace the packet */ newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt); newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig; free_packet (node->pkt, NULL); xfree (node->pkt); node->pkt = newpkt; modified = 1; } } } } return modified; } static int menu_set_keyserver_url (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *url, kbnode_t pub_keyblock) { PKT_public_key *main_pk; PKT_user_id *uid; KBNODE node; u32 keyid[2]; int selected, select_all; int modified = 0; char *answer, *uri; no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock); if (url) answer = xstrdup (url); else { answer = cpr_get_utf8 ("keyedit.add_keyserver", _("Enter your preferred keyserver URL: ")); if (answer[0] == '\0' || answer[0] == CONTROL_D) { xfree (answer); return 0; } } if (ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "none") == 0) uri = NULL; else { struct keyserver_spec *keyserver = NULL; /* Sanity check the format */ keyserver = parse_keyserver_uri (answer, 1); xfree (answer); if (!keyserver) { log_info (_("could not parse keyserver URL\n")); return 0; } uri = xstrdup (keyserver->uri); free_keyserver_spec (keyserver); } select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock); /* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */ main_pk = NULL; uid = NULL; selected = 0; for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) break; /* ready */ if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) { main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid); } else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; selected = select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID); } else if (main_pk && uid && selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] && (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10) && sig->flags.chosen_selfsig) { char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0); if (sig->version < 4) log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"), user); else { /* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced * We have to ignore v3 signatures because they are * not able to carry the subpacket. */ PKT_signature *newsig; PACKET *newpkt; int rc; const byte *p; size_t plen; p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS, &plen); if (p && plen) { tty_printf ("Current preferred keyserver for user" " ID \"%s\": ", user); tty_print_utf8_string (p, plen); tty_printf ("\n"); if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.confirm_keyserver", uri ? _("Are you sure you want to replace it? (y/N) ") : _("Are you sure you want to delete it? (y/N) "))) continue; } else if (uri == NULL) { /* There is no current keyserver URL, so there is no point in trying to un-set it. */ continue; } rc = update_keysig_packet (ctrl, &newsig, sig, main_pk, uid, NULL, main_pk, keygen_add_keyserver_url, uri); if (rc) { log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); xfree (uri); return 0; } /* replace the packet */ newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt); newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig; free_packet (node->pkt, NULL); xfree (node->pkt); node->pkt = newpkt; modified = 1; } xfree (user); } } } xfree (uri); return modified; } static int menu_set_notation (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *string, KBNODE pub_keyblock) { PKT_public_key *main_pk; PKT_user_id *uid; KBNODE node; u32 keyid[2]; int selected, select_all; int modified = 0; char *answer; struct notation *notation; no_primary_warning (pub_keyblock); if (string) answer = xstrdup (string); else { answer = cpr_get_utf8 ("keyedit.add_notation", _("Enter the notation: ")); if (answer[0] == '\0' || answer[0] == CONTROL_D) { xfree (answer); return 0; } } if (!ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "none") || !ascii_strcasecmp (answer, "-")) notation = NULL; /* Delete them all. */ else { notation = string_to_notation (answer, 0); if (!notation) { xfree (answer); return 0; } } xfree (answer); select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock); /* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */ main_pk = NULL; uid = NULL; selected = 0; for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) break; /* ready */ if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) { main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; keyid_from_pk (main_pk, keyid); } else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; selected = select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID); } else if (main_pk && uid && selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] && (uid && (sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10) && sig->flags.chosen_selfsig) { char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, strlen (uid->name), 0); if (sig->version < 4) log_info (_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"), user); else { PKT_signature *newsig; PACKET *newpkt; int rc, skip = 0, addonly = 1; if (sig->flags.notation) { tty_printf ("Current notations for user ID \"%s\":\n", user); tty_print_notations (-9, sig); } else { tty_printf ("No notations on user ID \"%s\"\n", user); if (notation == NULL) { /* There are no current notations, so there is no point in trying to un-set them. */ continue; } } if (notation) { struct notation *n; int deleting = 0; notation->next = sig_to_notation (sig); for (n = notation->next; n; n = n->next) if (strcmp (n->name, notation->name) == 0) { if (notation->value) { if (strcmp (n->value, notation->value) == 0) { if (notation->flags.ignore) { /* Value match with a delete flag. */ n->flags.ignore = 1; deleting = 1; } else { /* Adding the same notation twice, so don't add it at all. */ skip = 1; tty_printf ("Skipping notation:" " %s=%s\n", notation->name, notation->value); break; } } } else { /* No value, so it means delete. */ n->flags.ignore = 1; deleting = 1; } if (n->flags.ignore) { tty_printf ("Removing notation: %s=%s\n", n->name, n->value); addonly = 0; } } if (!notation->flags.ignore && !skip) tty_printf ("Adding notation: %s=%s\n", notation->name, notation->value); /* We tried to delete, but had no matches. */ if (notation->flags.ignore && !deleting) continue; } else { tty_printf ("Removing all notations\n"); addonly = 0; } if (skip || (!addonly && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.confirm_notation", _("Proceed? (y/N) ")))) continue; rc = update_keysig_packet (ctrl, &newsig, sig, main_pk, uid, NULL, main_pk, keygen_add_notations, notation); if (rc) { log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); free_notation (notation); xfree (user); return 0; } /* replace the packet */ newpkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *newpkt); newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig; free_packet (node->pkt, NULL); xfree (node->pkt); node->pkt = newpkt; modified = 1; if (notation) { /* Snip off the notation list from the sig */ free_notation (notation->next); notation->next = NULL; } xfree (user); } } } } free_notation (notation); return modified; } /* * Select one user id or remove all selection if IDX is 0 or select * all if IDX is -1. Returns: True if the selection changed. */ static int menu_select_uid (KBNODE keyblock, int idx) { KBNODE node; int i; if (idx == -1) /* Select all. */ { for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID; return 1; } else if (idx) /* Toggle. */ { for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) if (++i == idx) break; } if (!node) { tty_printf (_("No user ID with index %d\n"), idx); return 0; } for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { if (++i == idx) { if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)) node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID; else node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID; } } } } else /* Unselect all */ { for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID; } return 1; } /* Search in the keyblock for a uid that matches namehash */ static int menu_select_uid_namehash (KBNODE keyblock, const char *namehash) { byte hash[NAMEHASH_LEN]; KBNODE node; int i; log_assert (strlen (namehash) == NAMEHASH_LEN * 2); for (i = 0; i < NAMEHASH_LEN; i++) hash[i] = hextobyte (&namehash[i * 2]); for (node = keyblock->next; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { namehash_from_uid (node->pkt->pkt.user_id); if (memcmp (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->namehash, hash, NAMEHASH_LEN) == 0) { if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID; else node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID; break; } } } if (!node) { tty_printf (_("No user ID with hash %s\n"), namehash); return 0; } return 1; } /* * Select secondary keys * Returns: True if the selection changed. */ static int menu_select_key (KBNODE keyblock, int idx, char *p) { KBNODE node; int i, j; int is_hex_digits; is_hex_digits = p && strlen (p) >= 8; if (is_hex_digits) { /* Skip initial spaces. */ while (spacep (p)) p ++; /* If the id starts with 0x accept and ignore it. */ if (p[0] == '0' && p[1] == 'x') p += 2; for (i = 0, j = 0; p[i]; i ++) if (hexdigitp (&p[i])) { p[j] = toupper (p[i]); j ++; } else if (spacep (&p[i])) /* Skip spaces. */ { } else { is_hex_digits = 0; break; } if (is_hex_digits) /* In case we skipped some spaces, add a new NUL terminator. */ { p[j] = 0; /* If we skipped some spaces, make sure that we still have at least 8 characters. */ is_hex_digits = (/* Short keyid. */ strlen (p) == 8 /* Long keyid. */ || strlen (p) == 16 /* Fingerprints are (currently) 32 or 40 characters. */ || strlen (p) >= 32); } } if (is_hex_digits) { int found_one = 0; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) { int match = 0; if (strlen (p) == 8 || strlen (p) == 16) { u32 kid[2]; char kid_str[17]; keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid); format_keyid (kid, strlen (p) == 8 ? KF_SHORT : KF_LONG, kid_str, sizeof (kid_str)); if (strcmp (p, kid_str) == 0) match = 1; } else { char fp[2*MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN + 1]; hexfingerprint (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, fp, sizeof (fp)); if (strcmp (fp, p) == 0) match = 1; } if (match) { if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)) node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY; else node->flag |= NODFLG_SELKEY; found_one = 1; } } if (found_one) return 1; tty_printf (_("No subkey with key ID '%s'.\n"), p); return 0; } if (idx == -1) /* Select all. */ { for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) node->flag |= NODFLG_SELKEY; } else if (idx) /* Toggle selection. */ { for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) if (++i == idx) break; } if (!node) { tty_printf (_("No subkey with index %d\n"), idx); return 0; } for (i = 0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) if (++i == idx) { if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)) node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY; else node->flag |= NODFLG_SELKEY; } } } else /* Unselect all. */ { for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY; } return 1; } static int count_uids_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag) { KBNODE node; int i = 0; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & flag)) i++; return i; } static int count_keys_with_flag (KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag) { KBNODE node; int i = 0; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) if ((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) && (node->flag & flag)) i++; return i; } static int count_uids (KBNODE keyblock) { KBNODE node; int i = 0; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) i++; return i; } /* * Returns true if there is at least one selected user id */ static int count_selected_uids (KBNODE keyblock) { return count_uids_with_flag (keyblock, NODFLG_SELUID); } static int count_selected_keys (KBNODE keyblock) { return count_keys_with_flag (keyblock, NODFLG_SELKEY); } /* Returns how many real (i.e. not attribute) uids are unmarked. */ static int real_uids_left (KBNODE keyblock) { KBNODE node; int real = 0; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) real++; return real; } /* * Ask whether the signature should be revoked. If the user commits this, * flag bit MARK_A is set on the signature and the user ID. */ static void ask_revoke_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t node) { int doit = 0; PKT_user_id *uid; PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; KBNODE unode = find_prev_kbnode (keyblock, node, PKT_USER_ID); if (!unode) { log_error ("Oops: no user ID for signature\n"); return; } uid = unode->pkt->pkt.user_id; if (opt.with_colons) { if (uid->attrib_data) printf ("uat:::::::::%u %lu", uid->numattribs, uid->attrib_len); else { es_printf ("uid:::::::::"); es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, uid->name, uid->len, ":", NULL); } es_printf ("\n"); print_and_check_one_sig_colon (ctrl, keyblock, node, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1); } else { char *p = utf8_to_native (unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0); tty_printf (_("user ID: \"%s\"\n"), p); xfree (p); tty_printf (_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"), keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig), sig->flags.exportable ? "" : _(" (non-exportable)"), ""); } if (sig->flags.expired) { tty_printf (_("This signature expired on %s.\n"), expirestr_from_sig (sig)); /* Use a different question so we can have different help text */ doit = cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("ask_revoke_sig.expired", _("Are you sure you still want to revoke it? (y/N) ")); } else doit = cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("ask_revoke_sig.one", _("Create a revocation certificate for this signature? (y/N) ")); if (doit) { node->flag |= NODFLG_MARK_A; unode->flag |= NODFLG_MARK_A; } } /* * Display all user ids of the current public key together with signatures * done by one of our keys. Then walk over all this sigs and ask the user * whether he wants to revoke this signature. * Return: True when the keyblock has changed. */ static int menu_revsig (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock) { PKT_signature *sig; PKT_public_key *primary_pk; KBNODE node; int changed = 0; int rc, any, skip = 1, all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock); struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL; log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); /* First check whether we have any signatures at all. */ any = 0; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_SELSIG | NODFLG_MARK_A); if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID || all) skip = 0; else skip = 1; } else if (!skip && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && ((sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature), have_secret_key_with_kid (sig->keyid))) { if ((sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10) { any = 1; break; } } } if (!any) { tty_printf (_("Not signed by you.\n")); return 0; } /* FIXME: detect duplicates here */ tty_printf (_("You have signed these user IDs on key %s:\n"), keystr_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key)); for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_SELSIG | NODFLG_MARK_A); if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { if (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID || all) { PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; /* Hmmm: Should we show only UIDs with a signature? */ tty_printf (" "); tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len); tty_printf ("\n"); skip = 0; } else skip = 1; } else if (!skip && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && ((sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature), have_secret_key_with_kid (sig->keyid))) { if ((sig->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10) { tty_printf (" "); tty_printf (_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"), keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig), sig->flags.exportable ? "" : _(" (non-exportable)"), sig->flags.revocable ? "" : _(" (non-revocable)")); if (sig->flags.revocable) node->flag |= NODFLG_SELSIG; } else if (sig->sig_class == 0x30) { tty_printf (" "); tty_printf (_("revoked by your key %s on %s\n"), keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig)); } } } tty_printf ("\n"); /* ask */ for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (!(node->flag & NODFLG_SELSIG)) continue; ask_revoke_sig (ctrl, keyblock, node); } /* present selected */ any = 0; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (!(node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A)) continue; if (!any) { any = 1; tty_printf (_("You are about to revoke these signatures:\n")); } if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; tty_printf (" "); tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len); tty_printf ("\n"); } else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE) { sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; tty_printf (" "); tty_printf (_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"), keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig (sig), "", sig->flags.exportable ? "" : _(" (non-exportable)")); } } if (!any) return 0; /* none selected */ if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("ask_revoke_sig.okay", _("Really create the revocation certificates? (y/N) "))) return 0; /* forget it */ reason = ask_revocation_reason (0, 1, 0); if (!reason) { /* user decided to cancel */ return 0; } /* now we can sign the user ids */ reloop: /* (must use this, because we are modifying the list) */ primary_pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key; for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { KBNODE unode; PACKET *pkt; struct sign_attrib attrib; PKT_public_key *signerkey; if (!(node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) || node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE) continue; unode = find_prev_kbnode (keyblock, node, PKT_USER_ID); log_assert (unode); /* we already checked this */ memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib); attrib.reason = reason; attrib.non_exportable = !node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable; node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; signerkey = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *signerkey); if (get_seckey (ctrl, signerkey, node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid)) { log_info (_("no secret key\n")); free_public_key (signerkey); continue; } rc = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, primary_pk, unode->pkt->pkt.user_id, - NULL, signerkey, 0x30, 0, 0, 0, + NULL, signerkey, 0x30, 0, 0, sign_mk_attrib, &attrib, NULL); free_public_key (signerkey); if (rc) { write_status_error ("keysig", rc); log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); release_revocation_reason_info (reason); return changed; } changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */ update_trust = 1; /* Are we revoking our own uid? */ if (primary_pk->keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && primary_pk->keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]) unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked = 1; pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt); pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; pkt->pkt.signature = sig; insert_kbnode (unode, new_kbnode (pkt), 0); goto reloop; } release_revocation_reason_info (reason); return changed; } /* return 0 if revocation of NODE (which must be a User ID) was successful, non-zero if there was an error. *modified will be set to 1 if a change was made. */ static int core_revuid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, KBNODE node, const struct revocation_reason_info *reason, int *modified) { PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key; gpg_error_t rc; if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID) { rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_USER_ID); write_status_error ("keysig", rc); log_error (_("tried to revoke a non-user ID: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); return 1; } else { PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; if (uid->flags.revoked) { char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, uid->len, 0); log_info (_("user ID \"%s\" is already revoked\n"), user); xfree (user); } else { PACKET *pkt; PKT_signature *sig; struct sign_attrib attrib; u32 timestamp = make_timestamp (); if (uid->created >= timestamp) { /* Okay, this is a problem. The user ID selfsig was created in the future, so we need to warn the user and set our revocation timestamp one second after that so everything comes out clean. */ log_info (_("WARNING: a user ID signature is dated %d" " seconds in the future\n"), uid->created - timestamp); timestamp = uid->created + 1; } memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib); /* should not need to cast away const here; but revocation_reason_build_cb needs to take a non-const - void* in order to meet the function signtuare for the + void* in order to meet the function signutare for the mksubpkt argument to make_keysig_packet */ attrib.reason = (struct revocation_reason_info *)reason; - rc = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, pk, uid, NULL, pk, 0x30, 0, + rc = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, pk, uid, NULL, pk, 0x30, timestamp, 0, sign_mk_attrib, &attrib, NULL); if (rc) { write_status_error ("keysig", rc); log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); return 1; } else { pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt); pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; pkt->pkt.signature = sig; insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), 0); #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS /* If the trustdb has an entry for this key+uid then the trustdb needs an update. */ if (!update_trust && ((get_validity (ctrl, keyblock, pk, uid, NULL, 0) & TRUST_MASK) >= TRUST_UNDEFINED)) update_trust = 1; #endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/ node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked = 1; if (modified) *modified = 1; } } return 0; } } /* Revoke a user ID (i.e. revoke a user ID selfsig). Return true if keyblock changed. */ static int menu_revuid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock) { PKT_public_key *pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key; KBNODE node; int changed = 0; int rc; struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL; size_t valid_uids; /* Note that this is correct as per the RFCs, but nevertheless somewhat meaningless in the real world. 1991 did define the 0x30 sig class, but PGP 2.x did not actually implement it, so it would probably be safe to use v4 revocations everywhere. -ds */ for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) if (pk->version > 3 || (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->selfsigversion > 3)) { if ((reason = ask_revocation_reason (0, 1, 4))) break; else goto leave; } /* Too make sure that we do not revoke the last valid UID, we first count how many valid UIDs there are. */ valid_uids = 0; for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) valid_uids += node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && ! node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked && ! node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired; reloop: /* (better this way because we are modifying the keyring) */ for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)) { int modified = 0; /* Make sure that we do not revoke the last valid UID. */ if (valid_uids == 1 && ! node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked && ! node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired) { log_error (_("Cannot revoke the last valid user ID.\n")); goto leave; } rc = core_revuid (ctrl, pub_keyblock, node, reason, &modified); if (rc) goto leave; if (modified) { node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID; changed = 1; goto reloop; } } if (changed) commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock); leave: release_revocation_reason_info (reason); return changed; } /* * Revoke the whole key. */ static int menu_revkey (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock) { PKT_public_key *pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key; int rc, changed = 0; struct revocation_reason_info *reason; PACKET *pkt; PKT_signature *sig; if (pk->flags.revoked) { tty_printf (_("Key %s is already revoked.\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk)); return 0; } reason = ask_revocation_reason (1, 0, 0); /* user decided to cancel */ if (!reason) return 0; rc = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk, - 0x20, 0, 0, 0, + 0x20, 0, 0, revocation_reason_build_cb, reason, NULL); if (rc) { write_status_error ("keysig", rc); log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); goto scram; } changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */ pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt); pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; pkt->pkt.signature = sig; insert_kbnode (pub_keyblock, new_kbnode (pkt), 0); commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock); update_trust = 1; scram: release_revocation_reason_info (reason); return changed; } static int menu_revsubkey (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock) { PKT_public_key *mainpk; KBNODE node; int changed = 0; int rc; struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL; reason = ask_revocation_reason (1, 0, 0); if (!reason) return 0; /* User decided to cancel. */ reloop: /* (better this way because we are modifying the keyring) */ mainpk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key; for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY && (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)) { PACKET *pkt; PKT_signature *sig; PKT_public_key *subpk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; struct sign_attrib attrib; if (subpk->flags.revoked) { tty_printf (_("Subkey %s is already revoked.\n"), keystr_from_pk (subpk)); continue; } memset (&attrib, 0, sizeof attrib); attrib.reason = reason; node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY; rc = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, mainpk, NULL, subpk, mainpk, - 0x28, 0, 0, 0, sign_mk_attrib, &attrib, + 0x28, 0, 0, sign_mk_attrib, &attrib, NULL); if (rc) { write_status_error ("keysig", rc); log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); release_revocation_reason_info (reason); return changed; } changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */ pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt); pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; pkt->pkt.signature = sig; insert_kbnode (node, new_kbnode (pkt), 0); goto reloop; } } commit_kbnode (&pub_keyblock); /* No need to set update_trust here since signing keys no longer are used to certify other keys, so there is no change in trust when revoking/removing them */ release_revocation_reason_info (reason); return changed; } /* Note that update_ownertrust is going to mark the trustdb dirty when enabling or disabling a key. This is arguably sub-optimal as disabled keys are still counted in the web of trust, but perhaps not worth adding extra complexity to change. -ds */ #ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS static int enable_disable_key (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int disable) { PKT_public_key *pk = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)->pkt->pkt.public_key; unsigned int trust, newtrust; trust = newtrust = get_ownertrust (ctrl, pk); newtrust &= ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED; if (disable) newtrust |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED; if (trust == newtrust) return 0; /* already in that state */ update_ownertrust (ctrl, pk, newtrust); return 0; } #endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/ static void menu_showphoto (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock) { KBNODE node; int select_all = !count_selected_uids (keyblock); int count = 0; PKT_public_key *pk = NULL; /* Look for the public key first. We have to be really, really, explicit as to which photo this is, and what key it is a UID on since people may want to sign it. */ for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; count++; if ((select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)) && uid->attribs != NULL) { int i; for (i = 0; i < uid->numattribs; i++) { byte type; u32 size; if (uid->attribs[i].type == ATTRIB_IMAGE && parse_image_header (&uid->attribs[i], &type, &size)) { tty_printf (_("Displaying %s photo ID of size %ld for " "key %s (uid %d)\n"), image_type_to_string (type, 1), (ulong) size, keystr_from_pk (pk), count); show_photos (ctrl, &uid->attribs[i], 1, pk, uid); } } } } } } diff --git a/g10/keygen.c b/g10/keygen.c index 22ac6f0b5..ac6bcc890 100644 --- a/g10/keygen.c +++ b/g10/keygen.c @@ -1,5772 +1,5772 @@ /* keygen.c - Generate a key pair * Copyright (C) 1998-2007, 2009-2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * Copyright (C) 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 Werner Koch * * This file is part of GnuPG. * * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, see . */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "gpg.h" #include "../common/util.h" #include "main.h" #include "packet.h" #include "../common/ttyio.h" #include "options.h" #include "keydb.h" #include "trustdb.h" #include "../common/status.h" #include "../common/i18n.h" #include "keyserver-internal.h" #include "call-agent.h" #include "pkglue.h" #include "../common/shareddefs.h" #include "../common/host2net.h" #include "../common/mbox-util.h" /* The default algorithms. If you change them, you should ensure the value is inside the bounds enforced by ask_keysize and gen_xxx. See also get_keysize_range which encodes the allowed ranges. */ #define DEFAULT_STD_KEY_PARAM "rsa3072/cert,sign+rsa3072/encr" #define FUTURE_STD_KEY_PARAM "ed25519/cert,sign+cv25519/encr" /* When generating keys using the streamlined key generation dialog, use this as a default expiration interval. */ const char *default_expiration_interval = "2y"; /* Flag bits used during key generation. */ #define KEYGEN_FLAG_NO_PROTECTION 1 #define KEYGEN_FLAG_TRANSIENT_KEY 2 #define KEYGEN_FLAG_CREATE_V5_KEY 4 /* Maximum number of supported algorithm preferences. */ #define MAX_PREFS 30 enum para_name { pKEYTYPE, pKEYLENGTH, pKEYCURVE, pKEYUSAGE, pSUBKEYTYPE, pSUBKEYLENGTH, pSUBKEYCURVE, pSUBKEYUSAGE, pAUTHKEYTYPE, pNAMEREAL, pNAMEEMAIL, pNAMECOMMENT, pPREFERENCES, pREVOKER, pUSERID, pCREATIONDATE, pKEYCREATIONDATE, /* Same in seconds since epoch. */ pEXPIREDATE, pKEYEXPIRE, /* in n seconds */ pSUBKEYEXPIRE, /* in n seconds */ pPASSPHRASE, pSERIALNO, pCARDBACKUPKEY, pHANDLE, pKEYSERVER, pKEYGRIP, pSUBKEYGRIP, pVERSION, /* Desired version of the key packet. */ pSUBVERSION, /* Ditto for the subpacket. */ }; struct para_data_s { struct para_data_s *next; int lnr; enum para_name key; union { u32 expire; u32 creation; unsigned int usage; struct revocation_key revkey; char value[1]; } u; }; struct output_control_s { int lnr; int dryrun; unsigned int keygen_flags; int use_files; struct { char *fname; char *newfname; IOBUF stream; armor_filter_context_t *afx; } pub; }; struct opaque_data_usage_and_pk { unsigned int usage; PKT_public_key *pk; }; /* FIXME: These globals vars are ugly. And using MAX_PREFS even for * aeads is useless, given that we don't expects more than a very few * algorithms. */ static int prefs_initialized = 0; static byte sym_prefs[MAX_PREFS]; static int nsym_prefs; static byte hash_prefs[MAX_PREFS]; static int nhash_prefs; static byte zip_prefs[MAX_PREFS]; static int nzip_prefs; static byte aead_prefs[MAX_PREFS]; static int naead_prefs; static int mdc_available; static int ks_modify; static int aead_available; static gpg_error_t parse_algo_usage_expire (ctrl_t ctrl, int for_subkey, const char *algostr, const char *usagestr, const char *expirestr, int *r_algo, unsigned int *r_usage, u32 *r_expire, unsigned int *r_nbits, const char **r_curve, int *r_version); static void do_generate_keypair (ctrl_t ctrl, struct para_data_s *para, struct output_control_s *outctrl, int card ); static int write_keyblock (iobuf_t out, kbnode_t node); static gpg_error_t gen_card_key (int keyno, int algo, int is_primary, kbnode_t pub_root, u32 *timestamp, u32 expireval, int keygen_flags); static unsigned int get_keysize_range (int algo, unsigned int *min, unsigned int *max); /* Return the algo string for a default new key. */ const char * get_default_pubkey_algo (void) { if (opt.def_new_key_algo) { if (*opt.def_new_key_algo && !strchr (opt.def_new_key_algo, ':')) return opt.def_new_key_algo; /* To avoid checking that option every time we delay that until * here. The only thing we really need to make sure is that * there is no colon in the string so that the --gpgconf-list * command won't mess up its output. */ log_info (_("invalid value for option '%s'\n"), "--default-new-key-algo"); } return DEFAULT_STD_KEY_PARAM; } static void print_status_key_created (int letter, PKT_public_key *pk, const char *handle) { byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *s; char *buf, *p; size_t i, n; if (!handle) handle = ""; buf = xmalloc (MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+31 + strlen (handle) + 1); p = buf; if (letter || pk) { *p++ = letter; if (pk) { *p++ = ' '; fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n); s = array; /* Fixme: Use bin2hex */ for (i=0; i < n ; i++, s++, p += 2) snprintf (p, 3, "%02X", *s); } } if (*handle) { *p++ = ' '; for (i=0; handle[i] && i < 100; i++) *p++ = isspace ((unsigned int)handle[i])? '_':handle[i]; } *p = 0; write_status_text ((letter || pk)?STATUS_KEY_CREATED:STATUS_KEY_NOT_CREATED, buf); xfree (buf); } static void print_status_key_not_created (const char *handle) { print_status_key_created (0, NULL, handle); } static void write_uid( KBNODE root, const char *s ) { PACKET *pkt = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *pkt ); size_t n = strlen(s); pkt->pkttype = PKT_USER_ID; pkt->pkt.user_id = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt->pkt.user_id + n); pkt->pkt.user_id->len = n; pkt->pkt.user_id->ref = 1; strcpy(pkt->pkt.user_id->name, s); add_kbnode( root, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); } static void do_add_key_flags (PKT_signature *sig, unsigned int use) { byte buf[1]; buf[0] = 0; /* The spec says that all primary keys MUST be able to certify. */ if(sig->sig_class!=0x18) buf[0] |= 0x01; if (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG) buf[0] |= 0x02; if (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) buf[0] |= 0x04 | 0x08; if (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) buf[0] |= 0x20; build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS, buf, 1); } int keygen_add_key_expire (PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque) { PKT_public_key *pk = opaque; byte buf[8]; u32 u; if (pk->expiredate) { if (pk->expiredate > pk->timestamp) u = pk->expiredate - pk->timestamp; else u = 1; buf[0] = (u >> 24) & 0xff; buf[1] = (u >> 16) & 0xff; buf[2] = (u >> 8) & 0xff; buf[3] = u & 0xff; build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, buf, 4); } else { /* Make sure we don't leave a key expiration subpacket lying around */ delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE); } return 0; } /* Add the key usage (i.e. key flags) in SIG from the public keys * pubkey_usage field. OPAQUE has the public key. */ int keygen_add_key_flags (PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque) { PKT_public_key *pk = opaque; do_add_key_flags (sig, pk->pubkey_usage); return 0; } static int keygen_add_key_flags_and_expire (PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque) { struct opaque_data_usage_and_pk *oduap = opaque; do_add_key_flags (sig, oduap->usage); return keygen_add_key_expire (sig, oduap->pk); } static int set_one_pref (int val, int type, const char *item, byte *buf, int *nbuf) { int i; for (i=0; i < *nbuf; i++ ) if (buf[i] == val) { log_info (_("preference '%s' duplicated\n"), item); return -1; } if (*nbuf >= MAX_PREFS) { if(type==1) log_info(_("too many cipher preferences\n")); else if(type==2) log_info(_("too many digest preferences\n")); else if(type==3) log_info(_("too many compression preferences\n")); else if(type==4) log_info(_("too many AEAD preferences\n")); else BUG(); return -1; } buf[(*nbuf)++] = val; return 0; } /* * Parse the supplied string and use it to set the standard * preferences. The string may be in a form like the one printed by * "pref" (something like: "S10 S3 H3 H2 Z2 Z1") or the actual * cipher/hash/compress names. Use NULL to set the default * preferences. Returns: 0 = okay */ int keygen_set_std_prefs (const char *string,int personal) { byte sym[MAX_PREFS], hash[MAX_PREFS], zip[MAX_PREFS], aead[MAX_PREFS]; int nsym=0, nhash=0, nzip=0, naead=0, val, rc=0; int mdc=1, modify=0; /* mdc defaults on, modify defaults off. */ char dummy_string[25*4+1]; /* Enough for 25 items. */ if (!string || !ascii_strcasecmp (string, "default")) { if (opt.def_preference_list) string=opt.def_preference_list; else { int any_compress = 0; dummy_string[0]='\0'; /* The rationale why we use the order AES256,192,128 is for compatibility reasons with PGP. If gpg would define AES128 first, we would get the somewhat confusing situation: gpg -r pgpkey -r gpgkey ---gives--> AES256 gpg -r gpgkey -r pgpkey ---gives--> AES Note that by using --personal-cipher-preferences it is possible to prefer AES128. */ /* Make sure we do not add more than 15 items here, as we could overflow the size of dummy_string. We currently have at most 12. */ if ( !openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_AES256) ) strcat(dummy_string,"S9 "); if ( !openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_AES192) ) strcat(dummy_string,"S8 "); if ( !openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_AES) ) strcat(dummy_string,"S7 "); strcat(dummy_string,"S2 "); /* 3DES */ if (opt.flags.rfc4880bis && !openpgp_aead_test_algo (AEAD_ALGO_OCB)) strcat(dummy_string,"A2 "); if (opt.flags.rfc4880bis && !openpgp_aead_test_algo (AEAD_ALGO_EAX)) strcat(dummy_string,"A1 "); if (personal) { /* The default internal hash algo order is: * SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-224, SHA-1. */ if (!openpgp_md_test_algo (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256)) strcat (dummy_string, "H8 "); if (!openpgp_md_test_algo (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA384)) strcat (dummy_string, "H9 "); if (!openpgp_md_test_algo (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512)) strcat (dummy_string, "H10 "); } else { /* The default advertised hash algo order is: * SHA-512, SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-224, SHA-1. */ if (!openpgp_md_test_algo (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512)) strcat (dummy_string, "H10 "); if (!openpgp_md_test_algo (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA384)) strcat (dummy_string, "H9 "); if (!openpgp_md_test_algo (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256)) strcat (dummy_string, "H8 "); } if (!openpgp_md_test_algo (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA224)) strcat (dummy_string, "H11 "); strcat (dummy_string, "H2 "); /* SHA-1 */ if(!check_compress_algo(COMPRESS_ALGO_ZLIB)) { strcat(dummy_string,"Z2 "); any_compress = 1; } if(!check_compress_algo(COMPRESS_ALGO_BZIP2)) { strcat(dummy_string,"Z3 "); any_compress = 1; } if(!check_compress_algo(COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP)) { strcat(dummy_string,"Z1 "); any_compress = 1; } /* In case we have no compress algo at all, declare that we prefer no compression. */ if (!any_compress) strcat(dummy_string,"Z0 "); /* Remove the trailing space. */ if (*dummy_string && dummy_string[strlen (dummy_string)-1] == ' ') dummy_string[strlen (dummy_string)-1] = 0; string=dummy_string; } } else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (string, "none")) string = ""; if(strlen(string)) { char *prefstringbuf; char *tok, *prefstring; /* We need a writable string. */ prefstring = prefstringbuf = xstrdup (string); while((tok=strsep(&prefstring," ,"))) { if((val=string_to_cipher_algo (tok))) { if(set_one_pref(val,1,tok,sym,&nsym)) rc=-1; } else if((val=string_to_digest_algo (tok))) { if(set_one_pref(val,2,tok,hash,&nhash)) rc=-1; } else if((val=string_to_compress_algo(tok))>-1) { if(set_one_pref(val,3,tok,zip,&nzip)) rc=-1; } else if ((val=string_to_aead_algo (tok))) { if (set_one_pref (val, 4, tok, aead, &naead)) rc = -1; } else if (ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"mdc")==0) mdc=1; else if (ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"no-mdc")==0) mdc=0; else if (ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"ks-modify")==0) modify=1; else if (ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"no-ks-modify")==0) modify=0; else { log_info (_("invalid item '%s' in preference string\n"),tok); rc=-1; } } xfree (prefstringbuf); } if(!rc) { if(personal) { if(personal==PREFTYPE_SYM) { xfree(opt.personal_cipher_prefs); if(nsym==0) opt.personal_cipher_prefs=NULL; else { int i; opt.personal_cipher_prefs= xmalloc(sizeof(prefitem_t *)*(nsym+1)); for (i=0; iref=1; uid->prefs = xmalloc ((sizeof(prefitem_t *)* (nsym_prefs+naead_prefs+nhash_prefs+nzip_prefs+1))); for(i=0;iprefs[j].type=PREFTYPE_SYM; uid->prefs[j].value=sym_prefs[i]; } for (i=0; i < naead_prefs; i++, j++) { uid->prefs[j].type = PREFTYPE_AEAD; uid->prefs[j].value = aead_prefs[i]; } for(i=0;iprefs[j].type=PREFTYPE_HASH; uid->prefs[j].value=hash_prefs[i]; } for(i=0;iprefs[j].type=PREFTYPE_ZIP; uid->prefs[j].value=zip_prefs[i]; } uid->prefs[j].type=PREFTYPE_NONE; uid->prefs[j].value=0; uid->flags.mdc = mdc_available; uid->flags.aead = aead_available; uid->flags.ks_modify = ks_modify; return uid; } static void add_feature_mdc (PKT_signature *sig,int enabled) { const byte *s; size_t n; int i; char *buf; s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, &n ); /* Already set or cleared */ if (s && n && ((enabled && (s[0] & 0x01)) || (!enabled && !(s[0] & 0x01)))) return; if (!s || !n) { /* create a new one */ n = 1; buf = xmalloc_clear (n); } else { buf = xmalloc (n); memcpy (buf, s, n); } if(enabled) buf[0] |= 0x01; /* MDC feature */ else buf[0] &= ~0x01; /* Are there any bits set? */ for(i=0;ihashed, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES); else build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, buf, n); xfree (buf); } static void add_feature_aead (PKT_signature *sig, int enabled) { const byte *s; size_t n; int i; char *buf; s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, &n ); if (s && n && ((enabled && (s[0] & 0x02)) || (!enabled && !(s[0] & 0x02)))) return; /* Already set or cleared */ if (!s || !n) { /* Create a new one */ n = 1; buf = xmalloc_clear (n); } else { buf = xmalloc (n); memcpy (buf, s, n); } if (enabled) buf[0] |= 0x02; /* AEAD supported */ else buf[0] &= ~0x02; /* Are there any bits set? */ for (i=0; i < n; i++) if (buf[i]) break; if (i == n) delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES); else build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, buf, n); xfree (buf); } static void add_feature_v5 (PKT_signature *sig, int enabled) { const byte *s; size_t n; int i; char *buf; s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, &n ); if (s && n && ((enabled && (s[0] & 0x04)) || (!enabled && !(s[0] & 0x04)))) return; /* Already set or cleared */ if (!s || !n) { /* Create a new one */ n = 1; buf = xmalloc_clear (n); } else { buf = xmalloc (n); memcpy (buf, s, n); } if (enabled) buf[0] |= 0x04; /* v5 key supported */ else buf[0] &= ~0x04; /* Are there any bits set? */ for (i=0; i < n; i++) if (buf[i]) break; if (i == n) delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES); else build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, buf, n); xfree (buf); } static void add_keyserver_modify (PKT_signature *sig,int enabled) { const byte *s; size_t n; int i; char *buf; /* The keyserver modify flag is a negative flag (i.e. no-modify) */ enabled=!enabled; s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS, &n ); /* Already set or cleared */ if (s && n && ((enabled && (s[0] & 0x80)) || (!enabled && !(s[0] & 0x80)))) return; if (!s || !n) { /* create a new one */ n = 1; buf = xmalloc_clear (n); } else { buf = xmalloc (n); memcpy (buf, s, n); } if(enabled) buf[0] |= 0x80; /* no-modify flag */ else buf[0] &= ~0x80; /* Are there any bits set? */ for(i=0;ihashed, SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS); else build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS, buf, n); xfree (buf); } int keygen_upd_std_prefs (PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque) { (void)opaque; if (!prefs_initialized) keygen_set_std_prefs (NULL, 0); if (nsym_prefs) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM, sym_prefs, nsym_prefs); else { delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM); delete_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM); } if (naead_prefs) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD, aead_prefs, naead_prefs); else { delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD); delete_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD); } if (nhash_prefs) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH, hash_prefs, nhash_prefs); else { delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH); delete_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH); } if (nzip_prefs) build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR, zip_prefs, nzip_prefs); else { delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR); delete_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR); } /* Make sure that the MDC feature flag is set if needed. */ add_feature_mdc (sig,mdc_available); add_feature_aead (sig, aead_available); add_feature_v5 (sig, opt.flags.rfc4880bis); add_keyserver_modify (sig,ks_modify); keygen_add_keyserver_url(sig,NULL); return 0; } /**************** * Add preference to the self signature packet. * This is only called for packets with version > 3. */ int keygen_add_std_prefs (PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque) { PKT_public_key *pk = opaque; do_add_key_flags (sig, pk->pubkey_usage); keygen_add_key_expire (sig, opaque ); keygen_upd_std_prefs (sig, opaque); keygen_add_keyserver_url (sig,NULL); return 0; } int keygen_add_keyserver_url(PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque) { const char *url=opaque; if(!url) url=opt.def_keyserver_url; if(url) build_sig_subpkt(sig,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,url,strlen(url)); else delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS); return 0; } int keygen_add_notations(PKT_signature *sig,void *opaque) { struct notation *notation; /* We always start clean */ delete_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION); delete_sig_subpkt(sig->unhashed,SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION); sig->flags.notation=0; for(notation=opaque;notation;notation=notation->next) if(!notation->flags.ignore) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned int n1,n2; n1=strlen(notation->name); if(notation->altvalue) n2=strlen(notation->altvalue); else if(notation->bdat) n2=notation->blen; else n2=strlen(notation->value); buf = xmalloc( 8 + n1 + n2 ); /* human readable or not */ buf[0] = notation->bdat?0:0x80; buf[1] = buf[2] = buf[3] = 0; buf[4] = n1 >> 8; buf[5] = n1; buf[6] = n2 >> 8; buf[7] = n2; memcpy(buf+8, notation->name, n1 ); if(notation->altvalue) memcpy(buf+8+n1, notation->altvalue, n2 ); else if(notation->bdat) memcpy(buf+8+n1, notation->bdat, n2 ); else memcpy(buf+8+n1, notation->value, n2 ); build_sig_subpkt( sig, SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION | (notation->flags.critical?SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL:0), buf, 8+n1+n2 ); xfree(buf); } return 0; } int keygen_add_revkey (PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque) { struct revocation_key *revkey = opaque; byte buf[2+MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN]; log_assert (revkey->fprlen <= MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN); buf[0] = revkey->class; buf[1] = revkey->algid; memcpy (buf + 2, revkey->fpr, revkey->fprlen); memset (buf + 2 + revkey->fprlen, 0, sizeof (revkey->fpr) - revkey->fprlen); build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY, buf, 2+revkey->fprlen); /* All sigs with revocation keys set are nonrevocable. */ sig->flags.revocable = 0; buf[0] = 0; build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE, buf, 1); parse_revkeys (sig); return 0; } /* Create a back-signature. If TIMESTAMP is not NULL, use it for the signature creation time. */ gpg_error_t make_backsig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_public_key *sub_pk, PKT_public_key *sub_psk, u32 timestamp, const char *cache_nonce) { gpg_error_t err; PKT_signature *backsig; cache_public_key (sub_pk); err = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &backsig, pk, NULL, sub_pk, sub_psk, 0x19, - 0, timestamp, 0, NULL, NULL, cache_nonce); + timestamp, 0, NULL, NULL, cache_nonce); if (err) log_error ("make_keysig_packet failed for backsig: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); else { /* Get it into a binary packed form. */ IOBUF backsig_out = iobuf_temp(); PACKET backsig_pkt; init_packet (&backsig_pkt); backsig_pkt.pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; backsig_pkt.pkt.signature = backsig; err = build_packet (backsig_out, &backsig_pkt); free_packet (&backsig_pkt, NULL); if (err) log_error ("build_packet failed for backsig: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); else { size_t pktlen = 0; byte *buf = iobuf_get_temp_buffer (backsig_out); /* Remove the packet header. */ if(buf[0]&0x40) { if (buf[1] < 192) { pktlen = buf[1]; buf += 2; } else if(buf[1] < 224) { pktlen = (buf[1]-192)*256; pktlen += buf[2]+192; buf += 3; } else if (buf[1] == 255) { pktlen = buf32_to_size_t (buf+2); buf += 6; } else BUG (); } else { int mark = 1; switch (buf[0]&3) { case 3: BUG (); break; case 2: pktlen = (size_t)buf[mark++] << 24; pktlen |= buf[mark++] << 16; /* fall through */ case 1: pktlen |= buf[mark++] << 8; /* fall through */ case 0: pktlen |= buf[mark++]; } buf += mark; } /* Now make the binary blob into a subpacket. */ build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE, buf, pktlen); iobuf_close (backsig_out); } } return err; } /* Write a direct key signature to the first key in ROOT using the key PSK. REVKEY is describes the direct key signature and TIMESTAMP is the timestamp to set on the signature. */ static gpg_error_t write_direct_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t root, PKT_public_key *psk, struct revocation_key *revkey, u32 timestamp, const char *cache_nonce) { gpg_error_t err; PACKET *pkt; PKT_signature *sig; KBNODE node; PKT_public_key *pk; if (opt.verbose) log_info (_("writing direct signature\n")); /* Get the pk packet from the pub_tree. */ node = find_kbnode (root, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); if (!node) BUG (); pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; /* We have to cache the key, so that the verification of the signature creation is able to retrieve the public key. */ cache_public_key (pk); /* Make the signature. */ err = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, pk, NULL,NULL, psk, 0x1F, - 0, timestamp, 0, + timestamp, 0, keygen_add_revkey, revkey, cache_nonce); if (err) { log_error ("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err) ); return err; } pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt); pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; pkt->pkt.signature = sig; add_kbnode (root, new_kbnode (pkt)); return err; } /* Write a self-signature to the first user id in ROOT using the key PSK. USE and TIMESTAMP give the extra data we need for the signature. */ static gpg_error_t write_selfsigs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t root, PKT_public_key *psk, unsigned int use, u32 timestamp, const char *cache_nonce) { gpg_error_t err; PACKET *pkt; PKT_signature *sig; PKT_user_id *uid; KBNODE node; PKT_public_key *pk; if (opt.verbose) log_info (_("writing self signature\n")); /* Get the uid packet from the list. */ node = find_kbnode (root, PKT_USER_ID); if (!node) BUG(); /* No user id packet in tree. */ uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id; /* Get the pk packet from the pub_tree. */ node = find_kbnode (root, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); if (!node) BUG(); pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; /* The usage has not yet been set - do it now. */ pk->pubkey_usage = use; /* We have to cache the key, so that the verification of the signature creation is able to retrieve the public key. */ cache_public_key (pk); /* Make the signature. */ err = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, pk, uid, NULL, psk, 0x13, - 0, timestamp, 0, + timestamp, 0, keygen_add_std_prefs, pk, cache_nonce); if (err) { log_error ("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); return err; } pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt); pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; pkt->pkt.signature = sig; add_kbnode (root, new_kbnode (pkt)); return err; } /* Write the key binding signature. If TIMESTAMP is not NULL use the signature creation time. PRI_PSK is the key use for signing. SUB_PSK is a key used to create a back-signature; that one is only used if USE has the PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG capability. */ static int write_keybinding (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t root, PKT_public_key *pri_psk, PKT_public_key *sub_psk, unsigned int use, u32 timestamp, const char *cache_nonce) { gpg_error_t err; PACKET *pkt; PKT_signature *sig; KBNODE node; PKT_public_key *pri_pk, *sub_pk; struct opaque_data_usage_and_pk oduap; if (opt.verbose) log_info(_("writing key binding signature\n")); /* Get the primary pk packet from the tree. */ node = find_kbnode (root, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); if (!node) BUG(); pri_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; /* We have to cache the key, so that the verification of the * signature creation is able to retrieve the public key. */ cache_public_key (pri_pk); /* Find the last subkey. */ sub_pk = NULL; for (node = root; node; node = node->next ) { if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; } if (!sub_pk) BUG(); /* Make the signature. */ oduap.usage = use; oduap.pk = sub_pk; err = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, pri_pk, NULL, sub_pk, pri_psk, 0x18, - 0, timestamp, 0, + timestamp, 0, keygen_add_key_flags_and_expire, &oduap, cache_nonce); if (err) { log_error ("make_keysig_packeto failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); return err; } /* Make a backsig. */ if (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG) { err = make_backsig (ctrl, sig, pri_pk, sub_pk, sub_psk, timestamp, cache_nonce); if (err) return err; } pkt = xmalloc_clear ( sizeof *pkt ); pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; pkt->pkt.signature = sig; add_kbnode (root, new_kbnode (pkt) ); return err; } static gpg_error_t ecckey_from_sexp (gcry_mpi_t *array, gcry_sexp_t sexp, int algo) { gpg_error_t err; gcry_sexp_t list, l2; char *curve = NULL; int i; const char *oidstr; unsigned int nbits; array[0] = NULL; array[1] = NULL; array[2] = NULL; list = gcry_sexp_find_token (sexp, "public-key", 0); if (!list) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); l2 = gcry_sexp_cadr (list); gcry_sexp_release (list); list = l2; if (!list) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ); l2 = gcry_sexp_find_token (list, "curve", 0); if (!l2) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ); goto leave; } curve = gcry_sexp_nth_string (l2, 1); if (!curve) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ); goto leave; } gcry_sexp_release (l2); oidstr = openpgp_curve_to_oid (curve, &nbits); if (!oidstr) { /* That can't happen because we used one of the curves gpg_curve_to_oid knows about. */ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); goto leave; } err = openpgp_oid_from_str (oidstr, &array[0]); if (err) goto leave; l2 = gcry_sexp_find_token (list, "q", 0); if (!l2) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ); goto leave; } array[1] = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (l2, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG); gcry_sexp_release (l2); if (!array[1]) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); goto leave; } gcry_sexp_release (list); if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) { array[2] = pk_ecdh_default_params (nbits); if (!array[2]) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } } leave: xfree (curve); if (err) { for (i=0; i < 3; i++) { gcry_mpi_release (array[i]); array[i] = NULL; } } return err; } /* Extract key parameters from SEXP and store them in ARRAY. ELEMS is a string where each character denotes a parameter name. TOPNAME is the name of the top element above the elements. */ static int key_from_sexp (gcry_mpi_t *array, gcry_sexp_t sexp, const char *topname, const char *elems) { gcry_sexp_t list, l2; const char *s; int i, idx; int rc = 0; list = gcry_sexp_find_token (sexp, topname, 0); if (!list) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); l2 = gcry_sexp_cadr (list); gcry_sexp_release (list); list = l2; if (!list) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ); for (idx=0,s=elems; *s; s++, idx++) { l2 = gcry_sexp_find_token (list, s, 1); if (!l2) { rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ); /* required parameter not found */ goto leave; } array[idx] = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (l2, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG); gcry_sexp_release (l2); if (!array[idx]) { rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); /* required parameter invalid */ goto leave; } } gcry_sexp_release (list); leave: if (rc) { for (i=0; itimestamp = timestamp; pk->version = (keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_CREATE_V5_KEY)? 5 : 4; if (expireval) pk->expiredate = pk->timestamp + expireval; pk->pubkey_algo = algo; if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH ) err = ecckey_from_sexp (pk->pkey, s_key, algo); else err = key_from_sexp (pk->pkey, s_key, "public-key", algoelem); if (err) { log_error ("key_from_sexp failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err) ); gcry_sexp_release (s_key); free_public_key (pk); return err; } gcry_sexp_release (s_key); pkt = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pkt); if (!pkt) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); free_public_key (pk); return err; } pkt->pkttype = is_subkey ? PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY; pkt->pkt.public_key = pk; add_kbnode (pub_root, new_kbnode (pkt)); return 0; } /* Common code for the key generation function gen_xxx. */ static int common_gen (const char *keyparms, int algo, const char *algoelem, kbnode_t pub_root, u32 timestamp, u32 expireval, int is_subkey, int keygen_flags, const char *passphrase, char **cache_nonce_addr, char **passwd_nonce_addr) { int err; PACKET *pkt; PKT_public_key *pk; gcry_sexp_t s_key; err = agent_genkey (NULL, cache_nonce_addr, passwd_nonce_addr, keyparms, !!(keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_NO_PROTECTION), passphrase, &s_key); if (err) { log_error ("agent_genkey failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err) ); return err; } pk = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pk); if (!pk) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); gcry_sexp_release (s_key); return err; } pk->timestamp = timestamp; pk->version = (keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_CREATE_V5_KEY)? 5 : 4; if (expireval) pk->expiredate = pk->timestamp + expireval; pk->pubkey_algo = algo; if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH ) err = ecckey_from_sexp (pk->pkey, s_key, algo); else err = key_from_sexp (pk->pkey, s_key, "public-key", algoelem); if (err) { log_error ("key_from_sexp failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err) ); gcry_sexp_release (s_key); free_public_key (pk); return err; } gcry_sexp_release (s_key); pkt = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pkt); if (!pkt) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); free_public_key (pk); return err; } pkt->pkttype = is_subkey ? PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY; pkt->pkt.public_key = pk; add_kbnode (pub_root, new_kbnode (pkt)); return 0; } /* * Generate an Elgamal key. */ static int gen_elg (int algo, unsigned int nbits, KBNODE pub_root, u32 timestamp, u32 expireval, int is_subkey, int keygen_flags, const char *passphrase, char **cache_nonce_addr, char **passwd_nonce_addr) { int err; char *keyparms; char nbitsstr[35]; log_assert (is_ELGAMAL (algo)); if (nbits < 1024) { nbits = 2048; log_info (_("keysize invalid; using %u bits\n"), nbits ); } else if (nbits > 4096) { nbits = 4096; log_info (_("keysize invalid; using %u bits\n"), nbits ); } if ((nbits % 32)) { nbits = ((nbits + 31) / 32) * 32; log_info (_("keysize rounded up to %u bits\n"), nbits ); } /* Note that we use transient-key only if no-protection has also been enabled. */ snprintf (nbitsstr, sizeof nbitsstr, "%u", nbits); keyparms = xtryasprintf ("(genkey(%s(nbits %zu:%s)%s))", algo == GCRY_PK_ELG_E ? "openpgp-elg" : algo == GCRY_PK_ELG ? "elg" : "x-oops" , strlen (nbitsstr), nbitsstr, ((keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_TRANSIENT_KEY) && (keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_NO_PROTECTION))? "(transient-key)" : "" ); if (!keyparms) err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); else { err = common_gen (keyparms, algo, "pgy", pub_root, timestamp, expireval, is_subkey, keygen_flags, passphrase, cache_nonce_addr, passwd_nonce_addr); xfree (keyparms); } return err; } /* * Generate an DSA key */ static gpg_error_t gen_dsa (unsigned int nbits, KBNODE pub_root, u32 timestamp, u32 expireval, int is_subkey, int keygen_flags, const char *passphrase, char **cache_nonce_addr, char **passwd_nonce_addr) { int err; unsigned int qbits; char *keyparms; char nbitsstr[35]; char qbitsstr[35]; if (nbits < 768) { nbits = 2048; log_info(_("keysize invalid; using %u bits\n"), nbits ); } else if ( nbits > 3072 ) { nbits = 3072; log_info(_("keysize invalid; using %u bits\n"), nbits ); } if( (nbits % 64) ) { nbits = ((nbits + 63) / 64) * 64; log_info(_("keysize rounded up to %u bits\n"), nbits ); } /* To comply with FIPS rules we round up to the next value unless in expert mode. */ if (!opt.expert && nbits > 1024 && (nbits % 1024)) { nbits = ((nbits + 1023) / 1024) * 1024; log_info(_("keysize rounded up to %u bits\n"), nbits ); } /* Figure out a q size based on the key size. FIPS 180-3 says: L = 1024, N = 160 L = 2048, N = 224 L = 2048, N = 256 L = 3072, N = 256 2048/256 is an odd pair since there is also a 2048/224 and 3072/256. Matching sizes is not a very exact science. We'll do 256 qbits for nbits over 2047, 224 for nbits over 1024 but less than 2048, and 160 for 1024 (DSA1). */ if (nbits > 2047) qbits = 256; else if ( nbits > 1024) qbits = 224; else qbits = 160; if (qbits != 160 ) log_info (_("WARNING: some OpenPGP programs can't" " handle a DSA key with this digest size\n")); snprintf (nbitsstr, sizeof nbitsstr, "%u", nbits); snprintf (qbitsstr, sizeof qbitsstr, "%u", qbits); keyparms = xtryasprintf ("(genkey(dsa(nbits %zu:%s)(qbits %zu:%s)%s))", strlen (nbitsstr), nbitsstr, strlen (qbitsstr), qbitsstr, ((keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_TRANSIENT_KEY) && (keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_NO_PROTECTION))? "(transient-key)" : "" ); if (!keyparms) err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); else { err = common_gen (keyparms, PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA, "pqgy", pub_root, timestamp, expireval, is_subkey, keygen_flags, passphrase, cache_nonce_addr, passwd_nonce_addr); xfree (keyparms); } return err; } /* * Generate an ECC key */ static gpg_error_t gen_ecc (int algo, const char *curve, kbnode_t pub_root, u32 timestamp, u32 expireval, int is_subkey, int keygen_flags, const char *passphrase, char **cache_nonce_addr, char **passwd_nonce_addr) { gpg_error_t err; char *keyparms; log_assert (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH); if (!curve || !*curve) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_CURVE); /* Map the displayed short forms of some curves to their canonical * names. */ if (!ascii_strcasecmp (curve, "cv25519")) curve = "Curve25519"; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (curve, "ed25519")) curve = "Ed25519"; /* Note that we use the "comp" flag with EdDSA to request the use of a 0x40 compression prefix octet. */ if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) keyparms = xtryasprintf ("(genkey(ecc(curve %zu:%s)(flags eddsa comp%s)))", strlen (curve), curve, (((keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_TRANSIENT_KEY) && (keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_NO_PROTECTION))? " transient-key" : "")); else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH && !strcmp (curve, "Curve25519")) keyparms = xtryasprintf ("(genkey(ecc(curve %zu:%s)(flags djb-tweak comp%s)))", strlen (curve), curve, (((keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_TRANSIENT_KEY) && (keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_NO_PROTECTION))? " transient-key" : "")); else keyparms = xtryasprintf ("(genkey(ecc(curve %zu:%s)(flags nocomp%s)))", strlen (curve), curve, (((keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_TRANSIENT_KEY) && (keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_NO_PROTECTION))? " transient-key" : "")); if (!keyparms) err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); else { err = common_gen (keyparms, algo, "", pub_root, timestamp, expireval, is_subkey, keygen_flags, passphrase, cache_nonce_addr, passwd_nonce_addr); xfree (keyparms); } return err; } /* * Generate an RSA key. */ static int gen_rsa (int algo, unsigned int nbits, KBNODE pub_root, u32 timestamp, u32 expireval, int is_subkey, int keygen_flags, const char *passphrase, char **cache_nonce_addr, char **passwd_nonce_addr) { int err; char *keyparms; char nbitsstr[35]; const unsigned maxsize = (opt.flags.large_rsa ? 8192 : 4096); log_assert (is_RSA(algo)); if (!nbits) nbits = get_keysize_range (algo, NULL, NULL); if (nbits < 1024) { nbits = 3072; log_info (_("keysize invalid; using %u bits\n"), nbits ); } else if (nbits > maxsize) { nbits = maxsize; log_info (_("keysize invalid; using %u bits\n"), nbits ); } if ((nbits % 32)) { nbits = ((nbits + 31) / 32) * 32; log_info (_("keysize rounded up to %u bits\n"), nbits ); } snprintf (nbitsstr, sizeof nbitsstr, "%u", nbits); keyparms = xtryasprintf ("(genkey(rsa(nbits %zu:%s)%s))", strlen (nbitsstr), nbitsstr, ((keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_TRANSIENT_KEY) && (keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_NO_PROTECTION))? "(transient-key)" : "" ); if (!keyparms) err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); else { err = common_gen (keyparms, algo, "ne", pub_root, timestamp, expireval, is_subkey, keygen_flags, passphrase, cache_nonce_addr, passwd_nonce_addr); xfree (keyparms); } return err; } /**************** * check valid days: * return 0 on error or the multiplier */ static int check_valid_days( const char *s ) { if( !digitp(s) ) return 0; for( s++; *s; s++) if( !digitp(s) ) break; if( !*s ) return 1; if( s[1] ) return 0; /* e.g. "2323wc" */ if( *s == 'd' || *s == 'D' ) return 1; if( *s == 'w' || *s == 'W' ) return 7; if( *s == 'm' || *s == 'M' ) return 30; if( *s == 'y' || *s == 'Y' ) return 365; return 0; } static void print_key_flags(int flags) { if(flags&PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG) tty_printf("%s ",_("Sign")); if(flags&PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT) tty_printf("%s ",_("Certify")); if(flags&PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) tty_printf("%s ",_("Encrypt")); if(flags&PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) tty_printf("%s ",_("Authenticate")); } /* Ask for the key flags and return them. CURRENT gives the current * usage which should normally be given as 0. MASK gives the allowed * flags. */ unsigned int ask_key_flags_with_mask (int algo, int subkey, unsigned int current, unsigned int mask) { /* TRANSLATORS: Please use only plain ASCII characters for the * translation. If this is not possible use single digits. The * string needs to 8 bytes long. Here is a description of the * functions: * * s = Toggle signing capability * e = Toggle encryption capability * a = Toggle authentication capability * q = Finish */ const char *togglers = _("SsEeAaQq"); char *answer = NULL; const char *s; unsigned int possible; if ( strlen(togglers) != 8 ) { tty_printf ("NOTE: Bad translation at %s:%d. " "Please report.\n", __FILE__, __LINE__); togglers = "11223300"; } /* Mask the possible usage flags. This is for example used for a * card based key. */ possible = (openpgp_pk_algo_usage (algo) & mask); /* However, only primary keys may certify. */ if (subkey) possible &= ~PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT; /* Preload the current set with the possible set, without * authentication if CURRENT is 0. If CURRENT is non-zero we mask * with all possible usages. */ if (current) current &= possible; else current = (possible&~PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH); for (;;) { tty_printf("\n"); tty_printf(_("Possible actions for this %s key: "), (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) ? "ECDSA/EdDSA" : openpgp_pk_algo_name (algo)); print_key_flags(possible); tty_printf("\n"); tty_printf(_("Current allowed actions: ")); print_key_flags(current); tty_printf("\n\n"); if(possible&PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG) tty_printf(_(" (%c) Toggle the sign capability\n"), togglers[0]); if(possible&PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) tty_printf(_(" (%c) Toggle the encrypt capability\n"), togglers[2]); if(possible&PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) tty_printf(_(" (%c) Toggle the authenticate capability\n"), togglers[4]); tty_printf(_(" (%c) Finished\n"),togglers[6]); tty_printf("\n"); xfree(answer); answer = cpr_get("keygen.flags",_("Your selection? ")); cpr_kill_prompt(); if (*answer == '=') { /* Hack to allow direct entry of the capabilities. */ current = 0; for (s=answer+1; *s; s++) { if ((*s == 's' || *s == 'S') && (possible&PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)) current |= PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; else if ((*s == 'e' || *s == 'E') && (possible&PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)) current |= PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC; else if ((*s == 'a' || *s == 'A') && (possible&PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)) current |= PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH; else if (!subkey && *s == 'c') { /* Accept 'c' for the primary key because USAGE_CERT will be set anyway. This is for folks who want to experiment with a cert-only primary key. */ current |= PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT; } } break; } else if (strlen(answer)>1) tty_printf(_("Invalid selection.\n")); else if(*answer=='\0' || *answer==togglers[6] || *answer==togglers[7]) break; else if((*answer==togglers[0] || *answer==togglers[1]) && possible&PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG) { if(current&PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG) current&=~PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; else current|=PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; } else if((*answer==togglers[2] || *answer==togglers[3]) && possible&PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) { if(current&PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) current&=~PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC; else current|=PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC; } else if((*answer==togglers[4] || *answer==togglers[5]) && possible&PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) { if(current&PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) current&=~PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH; else current|=PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH; } else tty_printf(_("Invalid selection.\n")); } xfree(answer); return current; } unsigned int ask_key_flags (int algo, int subkey, unsigned int current) { return ask_key_flags_with_mask (algo, subkey, current, ~0); } /* Check whether we have a key for the key with HEXGRIP. Returns 0 if there is no such key or the OpenPGP algo number for the key. */ static int check_keygrip (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *hexgrip) { gpg_error_t err; unsigned char *public; size_t publiclen; int algo; if (hexgrip[0] == '&') hexgrip++; err = agent_readkey (ctrl, 0, hexgrip, &public); if (err) return 0; publiclen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (public, 0, NULL, NULL); algo = get_pk_algo_from_canon_sexp (public, publiclen); xfree (public); return map_pk_gcry_to_openpgp (algo); } /* Ask for an algorithm. The function returns the algorithm id to * create. If ADDMODE is false the function won't show an option to * create the primary and subkey combined and won't set R_USAGE * either. If a combined algorithm has been selected, the subkey * algorithm is stored at R_SUBKEY_ALGO. If R_KEYGRIP is given, the * user has the choice to enter the keygrip of an existing key. That * keygrip is then stored at this address. The caller needs to free * it. */ static int ask_algo (ctrl_t ctrl, int addmode, int *r_subkey_algo, unsigned int *r_usage, char **r_keygrip) { gpg_error_t err; char *keygrip = NULL; char *answer = NULL; int algo; int dummy_algo; char *p; if (!r_subkey_algo) r_subkey_algo = &dummy_algo; tty_printf (_("Please select what kind of key you want:\n")); #if GPG_USE_RSA if (!addmode) tty_printf (_(" (%d) RSA and RSA (default)\n"), 1 ); #endif if (!addmode && opt.compliance != CO_DE_VS) tty_printf (_(" (%d) DSA and Elgamal\n"), 2 ); if (opt.compliance != CO_DE_VS) tty_printf (_(" (%d) DSA (sign only)\n"), 3 ); #if GPG_USE_RSA tty_printf (_(" (%d) RSA (sign only)\n"), 4 ); #endif if (addmode) { if (opt.compliance != CO_DE_VS) tty_printf (_(" (%d) Elgamal (encrypt only)\n"), 5 ); #if GPG_USE_RSA tty_printf (_(" (%d) RSA (encrypt only)\n"), 6 ); #endif } if (opt.expert) { if (opt.compliance != CO_DE_VS) tty_printf (_(" (%d) DSA (set your own capabilities)\n"), 7 ); #if GPG_USE_RSA tty_printf (_(" (%d) RSA (set your own capabilities)\n"), 8 ); #endif } #if GPG_USE_ECDSA || GPG_USE_ECDH || GPG_USE_EDDSA if (opt.expert && !addmode) tty_printf (_(" (%d) ECC and ECC\n"), 9 ); if (opt.expert) tty_printf (_(" (%d) ECC (sign only)\n"), 10 ); if (opt.expert) tty_printf (_(" (%d) ECC (set your own capabilities)\n"), 11 ); if (opt.expert && addmode) tty_printf (_(" (%d) ECC (encrypt only)\n"), 12 ); #endif if (opt.expert && r_keygrip) tty_printf (_(" (%d) Existing key\n"), 13 ); if (r_keygrip) tty_printf (_(" (%d) Existing key from card\n"), 14 ); for (;;) { *r_usage = 0; *r_subkey_algo = 0; xfree (answer); answer = cpr_get ("keygen.algo", _("Your selection? ")); cpr_kill_prompt (); algo = *answer? atoi (answer) : 1; if (opt.compliance == CO_DE_VS && (algo == 2 || algo == 3 || algo == 5 || algo == 7)) { tty_printf (_("Invalid selection.\n")); } else if ((algo == 1 || !strcmp (answer, "rsa+rsa")) && !addmode) { algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA; *r_subkey_algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA; break; } else if ((algo == 2 || !strcmp (answer, "dsa+elg")) && !addmode) { algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA; *r_subkey_algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E; break; } else if (algo == 3 || !strcmp (answer, "dsa")) { algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA; *r_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; break; } else if (algo == 4 || !strcmp (answer, "rsa/s")) { algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA; *r_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; break; } else if ((algo == 5 || !strcmp (answer, "elg")) && addmode) { algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E; *r_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC; break; } else if ((algo == 6 || !strcmp (answer, "rsa/e")) && addmode) { algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA; *r_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC; break; } else if ((algo == 7 || !strcmp (answer, "dsa/*")) && opt.expert) { algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA; *r_usage = ask_key_flags (algo, addmode, 0); break; } else if ((algo == 8 || !strcmp (answer, "rsa/*")) && opt.expert) { algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA; *r_usage = ask_key_flags (algo, addmode, 0); break; } else if ((algo == 9 || !strcmp (answer, "ecc+ecc")) && opt.expert && !addmode) { algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA; *r_subkey_algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH; break; } else if ((algo == 10 || !strcmp (answer, "ecc/s")) && opt.expert) { algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA; *r_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; break; } else if ((algo == 11 || !strcmp (answer, "ecc/*")) && opt.expert) { algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA; *r_usage = ask_key_flags (algo, addmode, 0); break; } else if ((algo == 12 || !strcmp (answer, "ecc/e")) && opt.expert && addmode) { algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH; *r_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC; break; } else if ((algo == 13 || !strcmp (answer, "keygrip")) && opt.expert && r_keygrip) { for (;;) { xfree (answer); answer = tty_get (_("Enter the keygrip: ")); tty_kill_prompt (); trim_spaces (answer); if (!*answer) { xfree (answer); answer = NULL; continue; } if (strlen (answer) != 40 && !(answer[0] == '&' && strlen (answer+1) == 40)) tty_printf (_("Not a valid keygrip (expecting 40 hex digits)\n")); else if (!(algo = check_keygrip (ctrl, answer)) ) tty_printf (_("No key with this keygrip\n")); else break; /* Okay. */ } xfree (keygrip); keygrip = answer; answer = NULL; *r_usage = ask_key_flags (algo, addmode, 0); break; } else if ((algo == 14 || !strcmp (answer, "cardkey")) && r_keygrip) { char *serialno; strlist_t keypairlist, sl; int count, selection; err = agent_scd_serialno (&serialno, NULL); if (err) { tty_printf (_("error reading the card: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); goto ask_again; } tty_printf (_("Serial number of the card: %s\n"), serialno); xfree (serialno); err = agent_scd_keypairinfo (ctrl, NULL, &keypairlist); if (err) { tty_printf (_("error reading the card: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); goto ask_again; } do { tty_printf (_("Available keys:\n")); for (count=1,sl=keypairlist; sl; sl = sl->next, count++) { gcry_sexp_t s_pkey; char *algostr = NULL; enum gcry_pk_algos algoid = 0; const char *keyref; int any = 0; keyref = strchr (sl->d, ' '); if (keyref) { keyref++; if (!agent_scd_readkey (keyref, &s_pkey)) { algostr = pubkey_algo_string (s_pkey, &algoid); gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey); } } /* We use the flags also encode the algo for use * below. We need to tweak the algo in case * GCRY_PK_ECC is returned becuase pubkey_algo_string * is not aware of the OpenPGP algo mapping. * FIXME: This is an ugly hack. */ sl->flags &= 0xff; if (algoid == GCRY_PK_ECC && algostr && !strncmp (algostr, "nistp", 5) && !(sl->flags & GCRY_PK_USAGE_ENCR)) sl->flags |= (PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA << 8); else sl->flags |= (map_pk_gcry_to_openpgp (algoid) << 8); tty_printf (" (%d) %s %s", count, sl->d, algostr); if ((sl->flags & GCRY_PK_USAGE_CERT)) { tty_printf ("%scert", any?",":" ("); any = 1; } if ((sl->flags & GCRY_PK_USAGE_SIGN)) { tty_printf ("%ssign", any?",":" ("); any = 1; } if ((sl->flags & GCRY_PK_USAGE_AUTH)) { tty_printf ("%sauth", any?",":" ("); any = 1; } if ((sl->flags & GCRY_PK_USAGE_ENCR)) { tty_printf ("%sencr", any?",":" ("); any = 1; } tty_printf ("%s\n", any?")":""); xfree (algostr); } xfree (answer); answer = cpr_get ("keygen.cardkey", _("Your selection? ")); cpr_kill_prompt (); trim_spaces (answer); selection = atoi (answer); } while (!(selection > 0 && selection < count)); for (count=1,sl=keypairlist; sl; sl = sl->next, count++) if (count == selection) break; if (!sl) { /* Just in case COUNT is zero (no keys). */ free_strlist (keypairlist); goto ask_again; } xfree (keygrip); keygrip = xstrdup (sl->d); if ((p = strchr (keygrip, ' '))) *p = 0; algo = (sl->flags >>8); if (opt.expert) *r_usage = ask_key_flags_with_mask (algo, addmode, (sl->flags & 0xff), (sl->flags & 0xff)); else { *r_usage = (sl->flags & 0xff); if (addmode) *r_usage &= ~GCRY_PK_USAGE_CERT; } free_strlist (keypairlist); break; } else tty_printf (_("Invalid selection.\n")); ask_again: ; } xfree(answer); if (r_keygrip) *r_keygrip = keygrip; return algo; } static unsigned int get_keysize_range (int algo, unsigned int *min, unsigned int *max) { unsigned int def; unsigned int dummy1, dummy2; if (!min) min = &dummy1; if (!max) max = &dummy2; switch(algo) { case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA: *min = opt.expert? 768 : 1024; *max=3072; def=2048; break; case PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA: case PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH: *min=256; *max=521; def=256; break; case PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA: *min=255; *max=441; def=255; break; default: *min = opt.compliance == CO_DE_VS ? 2048: 1024; *max = 4096; def = 3072; break; } return def; } /* Return a fixed up keysize depending on ALGO. */ static unsigned int fixup_keysize (unsigned int nbits, int algo, int silent) { if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA && (nbits % 64)) { nbits = ((nbits + 63) / 64) * 64; if (!silent) tty_printf (_("rounded up to %u bits\n"), nbits); } else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) { if (nbits != 255 && nbits != 441) { if (nbits < 256) nbits = 255; else nbits = 441; if (!silent) tty_printf (_("rounded to %u bits\n"), nbits); } } else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) { if (nbits != 256 && nbits != 384 && nbits != 521) { if (nbits < 256) nbits = 256; else if (nbits < 384) nbits = 384; else nbits = 521; if (!silent) tty_printf (_("rounded to %u bits\n"), nbits); } } else if ((nbits % 32)) { nbits = ((nbits + 31) / 32) * 32; if (!silent) tty_printf (_("rounded up to %u bits\n"), nbits ); } return nbits; } /* Ask for the key size. ALGO is the algorithm. If PRIMARY_KEYSIZE is not 0, the function asks for the size of the encryption subkey. */ static unsigned ask_keysize (int algo, unsigned int primary_keysize) { unsigned int nbits; unsigned int min, def, max; int for_subkey = !!primary_keysize; int autocomp = 0; def = get_keysize_range (algo, &min, &max); if (primary_keysize && !opt.expert) { /* Deduce the subkey size from the primary key size. */ if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA && primary_keysize > 3072) nbits = 3072; /* For performance reasons we don't support more than 3072 bit DSA. However we won't see this case anyway because DSA can't be used as an encryption subkey ;-). */ else nbits = primary_keysize; autocomp = 1; goto leave; } tty_printf(_("%s keys may be between %u and %u bits long.\n"), openpgp_pk_algo_name (algo), min, max); for (;;) { char *prompt, *answer; if (for_subkey) prompt = xasprintf (_("What keysize do you want " "for the subkey? (%u) "), def); else prompt = xasprintf (_("What keysize do you want? (%u) "), def); answer = cpr_get ("keygen.size", prompt); cpr_kill_prompt (); nbits = *answer? atoi (answer): def; xfree(prompt); xfree(answer); if(nbitsmax) tty_printf(_("%s keysizes must be in the range %u-%u\n"), openpgp_pk_algo_name (algo), min, max); else break; } tty_printf (_("Requested keysize is %u bits\n"), nbits); leave: nbits = fixup_keysize (nbits, algo, autocomp); return nbits; } /* Ask for the curve. ALGO is the selected algorithm which this function may adjust. Returns a const string of the name of the curve. */ const char * ask_curve (int *algo, int *subkey_algo, const char *current) { /* NB: We always use a complete algo list so that we have stable numbers in the menu regardless on how Gpg was configured. */ struct { const char *name; const char* eddsa_curve; /* Corresponding EdDSA curve. */ const char *pretty_name; unsigned int supported : 1; /* Supported by gpg. */ unsigned int de_vs : 1; /* Allowed in CO_DE_VS. */ unsigned int expert_only : 1; /* Only with --expert */ unsigned int available : 1; /* Available in Libycrypt (runtime checked) */ } curves[] = { #if GPG_USE_ECDSA || GPG_USE_ECDH # define MY_USE_ECDSADH 1 #else # define MY_USE_ECDSADH 0 #endif { "Curve25519", "Ed25519", "Curve 25519", !!GPG_USE_EDDSA, 0, 0, 0 }, { "Curve448", "Ed448", "Curve 448", 0/*reserved*/ , 0, 1, 0 }, { "NIST P-256", NULL, NULL, MY_USE_ECDSADH, 0, 1, 0 }, { "NIST P-384", NULL, NULL, MY_USE_ECDSADH, 0, 0, 0 }, { "NIST P-521", NULL, NULL, MY_USE_ECDSADH, 0, 1, 0 }, { "brainpoolP256r1", NULL, "Brainpool P-256", MY_USE_ECDSADH, 1, 1, 0 }, { "brainpoolP384r1", NULL, "Brainpool P-384", MY_USE_ECDSADH, 1, 1, 0 }, { "brainpoolP512r1", NULL, "Brainpool P-512", MY_USE_ECDSADH, 1, 1, 0 }, { "secp256k1", NULL, NULL, MY_USE_ECDSADH, 0, 1, 0 }, }; #undef MY_USE_ECDSADH int idx; char *answer; const char *result = NULL; gcry_sexp_t keyparms; tty_printf (_("Please select which elliptic curve you want:\n")); keyparms = NULL; for (idx=0; idx < DIM(curves); idx++) { int rc; curves[idx].available = 0; if (!curves[idx].supported) continue; if (opt.compliance==CO_DE_VS) { if (!curves[idx].de_vs) continue; /* Not allowed. */ } else if (!opt.expert && curves[idx].expert_only) continue; /* We need to switch from the ECDH name of the curve to the EDDSA name of the curve if we want a signing key. */ gcry_sexp_release (keyparms); rc = gcry_sexp_build (&keyparms, NULL, "(public-key(ecc(curve %s)))", curves[idx].eddsa_curve? curves[idx].eddsa_curve /**/ : curves[idx].name); if (rc) continue; if (!gcry_pk_get_curve (keyparms, 0, NULL)) continue; if (subkey_algo && curves[idx].eddsa_curve) { /* Both Curve 25519 (or 448) keys are to be created. Check that Libgcrypt also supports the real Curve25519 (or 448). */ gcry_sexp_release (keyparms); rc = gcry_sexp_build (&keyparms, NULL, "(public-key(ecc(curve %s)))", curves[idx].name); if (rc) continue; if (!gcry_pk_get_curve (keyparms, 0, NULL)) continue; } curves[idx].available = 1; tty_printf (" (%d) %s\n", idx + 1, curves[idx].pretty_name? curves[idx].pretty_name:curves[idx].name); } gcry_sexp_release (keyparms); for (;;) { answer = cpr_get ("keygen.curve", _("Your selection? ")); cpr_kill_prompt (); idx = *answer? atoi (answer) : 1; if (!*answer && current) { xfree(answer); return NULL; } else if (*answer && !idx) { /* See whether the user entered the name of the curve. */ for (idx=0; idx < DIM(curves); idx++) { if (!opt.expert && curves[idx].expert_only) continue; if (!stricmp (curves[idx].name, answer) || (curves[idx].pretty_name && !stricmp (curves[idx].pretty_name, answer))) break; } if (idx == DIM(curves)) idx = -1; } else idx--; xfree(answer); answer = NULL; if (idx < 0 || idx >= DIM (curves) || !curves[idx].available) tty_printf (_("Invalid selection.\n")); else { /* If the user selected a signing algorithm and Curve25519 we need to set the algo to EdDSA and update the curve name. If switching away from EdDSA, we need to set the algo back to ECDSA. */ if (*algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || *algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) { if (curves[idx].eddsa_curve) { if (subkey_algo && *subkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) *subkey_algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA; *algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA; result = curves[idx].eddsa_curve; } else { if (subkey_algo && *subkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) *subkey_algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA; *algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA; result = curves[idx].name; } } else result = curves[idx].name; break; } } if (!result) result = curves[0].name; return result; } /**************** * Parse an expire string and return its value in seconds. * Returns (u32)-1 on error. * This isn't perfect since scan_isodatestr returns unix time, and * OpenPGP actually allows a 32-bit time *plus* a 32-bit offset. * Because of this, we only permit setting expirations up to 2106, but * OpenPGP could theoretically allow up to 2242. I think we'll all * just cope for the next few years until we get a 64-bit time_t or * similar. */ u32 parse_expire_string( const char *string ) { int mult; u32 seconds; u32 abs_date = 0; u32 curtime = make_timestamp (); time_t tt; if (!string || !*string || !strcmp (string, "none") || !strcmp (string, "never") || !strcmp (string, "-")) seconds = 0; else if (!strncmp (string, "seconds=", 8)) seconds = atoi (string+8); else if ((abs_date = scan_isodatestr(string)) && (abs_date+86400/2) > curtime) seconds = (abs_date+86400/2) - curtime; else if ((tt = isotime2epoch (string)) != (time_t)(-1)) seconds = (u32)tt - curtime; else if ((mult = check_valid_days (string))) seconds = atoi (string) * 86400L * mult; else seconds = (u32)(-1); return seconds; } /* Parse a Creation-Date string which is either "1986-04-26" or "19860426T042640". Returns 0 on error. */ static u32 parse_creation_string (const char *string) { u32 seconds; if (!*string) seconds = 0; else if ( !strncmp (string, "seconds=", 8) ) seconds = atoi (string+8); else if ( !(seconds = scan_isodatestr (string))) { time_t tmp = isotime2epoch (string); seconds = (tmp == (time_t)(-1))? 0 : tmp; } return seconds; } /* object == 0 for a key, and 1 for a sig */ u32 ask_expire_interval(int object,const char *def_expire) { u32 interval; char *answer; switch(object) { case 0: if(def_expire) BUG(); tty_printf(_("Please specify how long the key should be valid.\n" " 0 = key does not expire\n" " = key expires in n days\n" " w = key expires in n weeks\n" " m = key expires in n months\n" " y = key expires in n years\n")); break; case 1: if(!def_expire) BUG(); tty_printf(_("Please specify how long the signature should be valid.\n" " 0 = signature does not expire\n" " = signature expires in n days\n" " w = signature expires in n weeks\n" " m = signature expires in n months\n" " y = signature expires in n years\n")); break; default: BUG(); } /* Note: The elgamal subkey for DSA has no expiration date because * it must be signed with the DSA key and this one has the expiration * date */ answer = NULL; for(;;) { u32 curtime; xfree(answer); if(object==0) answer = cpr_get("keygen.valid",_("Key is valid for? (0) ")); else { char *prompt; prompt = xasprintf (_("Signature is valid for? (%s) "), def_expire); answer = cpr_get("siggen.valid",prompt); xfree(prompt); if(*answer=='\0') answer=xstrdup(def_expire); } cpr_kill_prompt(); trim_spaces(answer); curtime = make_timestamp (); interval = parse_expire_string( answer ); if( interval == (u32)-1 ) { tty_printf(_("invalid value\n")); continue; } if( !interval ) { tty_printf((object==0) ? _("Key does not expire at all\n") : _("Signature does not expire at all\n")); } else { tty_printf(object==0 ? _("Key expires at %s\n") : _("Signature expires at %s\n"), asctimestamp((ulong)(curtime + interval) ) ); #if SIZEOF_TIME_T <= 4 && !defined (HAVE_UNSIGNED_TIME_T) if ( (time_t)((ulong)(curtime+interval)) < 0 ) tty_printf (_("Your system can't display dates beyond 2038.\n" "However, it will be correctly handled up to" " 2106.\n")); else #endif /*SIZEOF_TIME_T*/ if ( (time_t)((unsigned long)(curtime+interval)) < curtime ) { tty_printf (_("invalid value\n")); continue; } } if( cpr_enabled() || cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keygen.valid.okay", _("Is this correct? (y/N) ")) ) break; } xfree(answer); return interval; } u32 ask_expiredate() { u32 x = ask_expire_interval(0,NULL); return x? make_timestamp() + x : 0; } static PKT_user_id * uid_from_string (const char *string) { size_t n; PKT_user_id *uid; n = strlen (string); uid = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *uid + n); uid->len = n; strcpy (uid->name, string); uid->ref = 1; return uid; } /* Return true if the user id UID already exists in the keyblock. */ static int uid_already_in_keyblock (kbnode_t keyblock, const char *uid) { PKT_user_id *uidpkt = uid_from_string (uid); kbnode_t node; int result = 0; for (node=keyblock; node && !result; node=node->next) if (!is_deleted_kbnode (node) && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !cmp_user_ids (uidpkt, node->pkt->pkt.user_id)) result = 1; free_user_id (uidpkt); return result; } /* Ask for a user ID. With a MODE of 1 an extra help prompt is printed for use during a new key creation. If KEYBLOCK is not NULL the function prevents the creation of an already existing user ID. IF FULL is not set some prompts are not shown. */ static char * ask_user_id (int mode, int full, KBNODE keyblock) { char *answer; char *aname, *acomment, *amail, *uid; if ( !mode ) { /* TRANSLATORS: This is the new string telling the user what gpg is now going to do (i.e. ask for the parts of the user ID). Note that if you do not translate this string, a different string will be used, which might still have a correct translation. */ const char *s1 = N_("\n" "GnuPG needs to construct a user ID to identify your key.\n" "\n"); const char *s2 = _(s1); if (!strcmp (s1, s2)) { /* There is no translation for the string thus we to use the old info text. gettext has no way to tell whether a translation is actually available, thus we need to to compare again. */ /* TRANSLATORS: This string is in general not anymore used but you should keep your existing translation. In case the new string is not translated this old string will be used. */ const char *s3 = N_("\n" "You need a user ID to identify your key; " "the software constructs the user ID\n" "from the Real Name, Comment and Email Address in this form:\n" " \"Heinrich Heine (Der Dichter) \"\n\n"); const char *s4 = _(s3); if (strcmp (s3, s4)) s2 = s3; /* A translation exists - use it. */ } tty_printf ("%s", s2) ; } uid = aname = acomment = amail = NULL; for(;;) { char *p; int fail=0; if( !aname ) { for(;;) { xfree(aname); aname = cpr_get("keygen.name",_("Real name: ")); trim_spaces(aname); cpr_kill_prompt(); if( opt.allow_freeform_uid ) break; if( strpbrk( aname, "<>" ) ) { tty_printf(_("Invalid character in name\n")); tty_printf(_("The characters '%s' and '%s' may not " "appear in name\n"), "<", ">"); } else if( digitp(aname) ) tty_printf(_("Name may not start with a digit\n")); else if (*aname && strlen (aname) < 5) { tty_printf(_("Name must be at least 5 characters long\n")); /* However, we allow an empty name. */ } else break; } } if( !amail ) { for(;;) { xfree(amail); amail = cpr_get("keygen.email",_("Email address: ")); trim_spaces(amail); cpr_kill_prompt(); if( !*amail || opt.allow_freeform_uid ) break; /* no email address is okay */ else if ( !is_valid_mailbox (amail) ) tty_printf(_("Not a valid email address\n")); else break; } } if (!acomment) { if (full) { for(;;) { xfree(acomment); acomment = cpr_get("keygen.comment",_("Comment: ")); trim_spaces(acomment); cpr_kill_prompt(); if( !*acomment ) break; /* no comment is okay */ else if( strpbrk( acomment, "()" ) ) tty_printf(_("Invalid character in comment\n")); else break; } } else { xfree (acomment); acomment = xstrdup (""); } } xfree(uid); uid = p = xmalloc(strlen(aname)+strlen(amail)+strlen(acomment)+12+10); if (!*aname && *amail && !*acomment && !random_is_faked ()) { /* Empty name and comment but with mail address. Use simplified form with only the non-angle-bracketed mail address. */ p = stpcpy (p, amail); } else { p = stpcpy (p, aname ); if (*acomment) p = stpcpy(stpcpy(stpcpy(p," ("), acomment),")"); if (*amail) p = stpcpy(stpcpy(stpcpy(p," <"), amail),">"); } /* Append a warning if the RNG is switched into fake mode. */ if ( random_is_faked () ) strcpy(p, " (insecure!)" ); /* print a note in case that UTF8 mapping has to be done */ for(p=uid; *p; p++ ) { if( *p & 0x80 ) { tty_printf(_("You are using the '%s' character set.\n"), get_native_charset() ); break; } } tty_printf(_("You selected this USER-ID:\n \"%s\"\n\n"), uid); if( !*amail && !opt.allow_freeform_uid && (strchr( aname, '@' ) || strchr( acomment, '@'))) { fail = 1; tty_printf(_("Please don't put the email address " "into the real name or the comment\n") ); } if (!fail && keyblock) { if (uid_already_in_keyblock (keyblock, uid)) { tty_printf (_("Such a user ID already exists on this key!\n")); fail = 1; } } for(;;) { /* TRANSLATORS: These are the allowed answers in lower and uppercase. Below you will find the matching string which should be translated accordingly and the letter changed to match the one in the answer string. n = Change name c = Change comment e = Change email o = Okay (ready, continue) q = Quit */ const char *ansstr = _("NnCcEeOoQq"); if( strlen(ansstr) != 10 ) BUG(); if( cpr_enabled() ) { answer = xstrdup (ansstr + (fail?8:6)); answer[1] = 0; } else if (full) { answer = cpr_get("keygen.userid.cmd", fail? _("Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (Q)uit? ") : _("Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay/(Q)uit? ")); cpr_kill_prompt(); } else { answer = cpr_get("keygen.userid.cmd", fail? _("Change (N)ame, (E)mail, or (Q)uit? ") : _("Change (N)ame, (E)mail, or (O)kay/(Q)uit? ")); cpr_kill_prompt(); } if( strlen(answer) > 1 ) ; else if( *answer == ansstr[0] || *answer == ansstr[1] ) { xfree(aname); aname = NULL; break; } else if( *answer == ansstr[2] || *answer == ansstr[3] ) { xfree(acomment); acomment = NULL; break; } else if( *answer == ansstr[4] || *answer == ansstr[5] ) { xfree(amail); amail = NULL; break; } else if( *answer == ansstr[6] || *answer == ansstr[7] ) { if( fail ) { tty_printf(_("Please correct the error first\n")); } else { xfree(aname); aname = NULL; xfree(acomment); acomment = NULL; xfree(amail); amail = NULL; break; } } else if( *answer == ansstr[8] || *answer == ansstr[9] ) { xfree(aname); aname = NULL; xfree(acomment); acomment = NULL; xfree(amail); amail = NULL; xfree(uid); uid = NULL; break; } xfree(answer); } xfree(answer); if (!amail && !acomment) break; xfree(uid); uid = NULL; } if( uid ) { char *p = native_to_utf8( uid ); xfree( uid ); uid = p; } return uid; } /* Basic key generation. Here we divert to the actual generation routines based on the requested algorithm. */ static int do_create (int algo, unsigned int nbits, const char *curve, kbnode_t pub_root, u32 timestamp, u32 expiredate, int is_subkey, int keygen_flags, const char *passphrase, char **cache_nonce_addr, char **passwd_nonce_addr) { gpg_error_t err; /* Fixme: The entropy collecting message should be moved to a libgcrypt progress handler. */ if (!opt.batch) tty_printf (_( "We need to generate a lot of random bytes. It is a good idea to perform\n" "some other action (type on the keyboard, move the mouse, utilize the\n" "disks) during the prime generation; this gives the random number\n" "generator a better chance to gain enough entropy.\n") ); if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E) err = gen_elg (algo, nbits, pub_root, timestamp, expiredate, is_subkey, keygen_flags, passphrase, cache_nonce_addr, passwd_nonce_addr); else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA) err = gen_dsa (nbits, pub_root, timestamp, expiredate, is_subkey, keygen_flags, passphrase, cache_nonce_addr, passwd_nonce_addr); else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) err = gen_ecc (algo, curve, pub_root, timestamp, expiredate, is_subkey, keygen_flags, passphrase, cache_nonce_addr, passwd_nonce_addr); else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA) err = gen_rsa (algo, nbits, pub_root, timestamp, expiredate, is_subkey, keygen_flags, passphrase, cache_nonce_addr, passwd_nonce_addr); else BUG(); return err; } /* Generate a new user id packet or return NULL if canceled. If KEYBLOCK is not NULL the function prevents the creation of an already existing user ID. If UIDSTR is not NULL the user is not asked but UIDSTR is used to create the user id packet; if the user id already exists NULL is returned. UIDSTR is expected to be utf-8 encoded and should have already been checked for a valid length etc. */ PKT_user_id * generate_user_id (KBNODE keyblock, const char *uidstr) { PKT_user_id *uid; char *p; if (uidstr) { if (uid_already_in_keyblock (keyblock, uidstr)) return NULL; /* Already exists. */ uid = uid_from_string (uidstr); } else { p = ask_user_id (1, 1, keyblock); if (!p) return NULL; /* Canceled. */ uid = uid_from_string (p); xfree (p); } return uid; } /* Helper for parse_key_parameter_string for one part of the * specification string; i.e. ALGO/FLAGS. If STRING is NULL or empty * success is returned. On error an error code is returned. Note * that STRING may be modified by this function. NULL may be passed * for any parameter. FOR_SUBKEY shall be true if this is used as a * subkey. If CLEAR_CERT is set a default CERT usage will be cleared; * this is useful if for example the default algorithm is used for a * subkey. If R_KEYVERSION is not NULL it will receive the version of * the key; this is currently 4 but can be changed with the flag "v5" * to create a v5 key. */ static gpg_error_t parse_key_parameter_part (char *string, int for_subkey, int clear_cert, int *r_algo, unsigned int *r_size, unsigned int *r_keyuse, char const **r_curve, int *r_keyversion) { char *flags; int algo; char *endp; const char *curve = NULL; int ecdh_or_ecdsa = 0; unsigned int size; int keyuse; int keyversion = 4; int i; const char *s; if (!string || !*string) return 0; /* Success. */ flags = strchr (string, '/'); if (flags) *flags++ = 0; algo = 0; if (strlen (string) >= 3 && (digitp (string+3) || !string[3])) { if (!ascii_memcasecmp (string, "rsa", 3)) algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA; else if (!ascii_memcasecmp (string, "dsa", 3)) algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA; else if (!ascii_memcasecmp (string, "elg", 3)) algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E; } if (algo) { if (!string[3]) size = get_keysize_range (algo, NULL, NULL); else { size = strtoul (string+3, &endp, 10); if (size < 512 || size > 16384 || *endp) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); } } else if ((curve = openpgp_is_curve_supported (string, &algo, &size))) { if (!algo) { algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH; /* Default ECC algorithm. */ ecdh_or_ecdsa = 1; /* We may need to switch the algo. */ } } else return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_CURVE); /* Parse the flags. */ keyuse = 0; if (flags) { char **tokens = NULL; tokens = strtokenize (flags, ","); if (!tokens) return gpg_error_from_syserror (); for (i=0; (s = tokens[i]); i++) { if (!*s) ; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (s, "sign")) keyuse |= PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (s, "encrypt") || !ascii_strcasecmp (s, "encr")) keyuse |= PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (s, "auth")) keyuse |= PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (s, "cert")) keyuse |= PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (s, "ecdsa")) { if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA; else { xfree (tokens); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_FLAG); } ecdh_or_ecdsa = 0; } else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (s, "ecdh")) { if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH; else { xfree (tokens); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_FLAG); } ecdh_or_ecdsa = 0; } else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (s, "eddsa")) { /* Not required but we allow it for consistency. */ if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) ; else { xfree (tokens); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_FLAG); } } else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (s, "v5")) { if (opt.flags.rfc4880bis) keyversion = 5; } else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (s, "v4")) keyversion = 4; else { xfree (tokens); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_FLAG); } } xfree (tokens); } /* If not yet decided switch between ecdh and ecdsa. */ if (ecdh_or_ecdsa && keyuse) algo = (keyuse & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)? PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH : PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA; else if (ecdh_or_ecdsa) algo = for_subkey? PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH : PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA; /* Set or fix key usage. */ if (!keyuse) { if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA) keyuse = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA) keyuse = for_subkey? PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC : PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; else keyuse = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC; } else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA) { keyuse &= ~PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC; /* Forbid encryption. */ } else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E) { keyuse = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC; /* Allow only encryption. */ } /* Make sure a primary key can certify. */ if (!for_subkey) keyuse |= PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT; /* But if requested remove th cert usage. */ if (clear_cert) keyuse &= ~PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT; /* Check that usage is actually possible. */ if (/**/((keyuse & (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH|PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT)) && !pubkey_get_nsig (algo)) || ((keyuse & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) && !pubkey_get_nenc (algo)) || (for_subkey && (keyuse & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT))) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE); /* Return values. */ if (r_algo) *r_algo = algo; if (r_size) { unsigned int min, def, max; /* Make sure the keysize is in the allowed range. */ def = get_keysize_range (algo, &min, &max); if (!size) size = def; else if (size < min) size = min; else if (size > max) size = max; *r_size = fixup_keysize (size, algo, 1); } if (r_keyuse) *r_keyuse = keyuse; if (r_curve) *r_curve = curve; if (r_keyversion) *r_keyversion = keyversion; return 0; } /* Parse and return the standard key generation parameter. * The string is expected to be in this format: * * ALGO[/FLAGS][+SUBALGO[/FLAGS]] * * Here ALGO is a string in the same format as printed by the * keylisting. For example: * * rsa3072 := RSA with 3072 bit. * dsa2048 := DSA with 2048 bit. * elg2048 := Elgamal with 2048 bit. * ed25519 := EDDSA using curve Ed25519. * cv25519 := ECDH using curve Curve25519. * nistp256:= ECDSA or ECDH using curve NIST P-256 * * All strings with an unknown prefix are considered an elliptic * curve. Curves which have no implicit algorithm require that FLAGS * is given to select whether ECDSA or ECDH is used; this can eoither * be done using an algorithm keyword or usage keywords. * * FLAGS is a comma delimited string of keywords: * * cert := Allow usage Certify * sign := Allow usage Sign * encr := Allow usage Encrypt * auth := Allow usage Authentication * encrypt := Alias for "encr" * ecdsa := Use algorithm ECDSA. * eddsa := Use algorithm EdDSA. * ecdh := Use algorithm ECDH. * v5 := Create version 5 key (requires option --rfc4880bis) * * There are several defaults and fallbacks depending on the * algorithm. PART can be used to select which part of STRING is * used: * -1 := Both parts * 0 := Only the part of the primary key * 1 := If there is one part parse that one, if there are * two parts parse the part which best matches the * SUGGESTED_USE or in case that can't be evaluated the second part. * Always return using the args for the primary key (R_ALGO,....). * */ gpg_error_t parse_key_parameter_string (const char *string, int part, unsigned int suggested_use, int *r_algo, unsigned int *r_size, unsigned int *r_keyuse, char const **r_curve, int *r_version, int *r_subalgo, unsigned int *r_subsize, unsigned int *r_subkeyuse, char const **r_subcurve, int *r_subversion) { gpg_error_t err = 0; char *primary, *secondary; if (r_algo) *r_algo = 0; if (r_size) *r_size = 0; if (r_keyuse) *r_keyuse = 0; if (r_curve) *r_curve = NULL; if (r_version) *r_version = 4; if (r_subalgo) *r_subalgo = 0; if (r_subsize) *r_subsize = 0; if (r_subkeyuse) *r_subkeyuse = 0; if (r_subcurve) *r_subcurve = NULL; if (r_subversion) *r_subversion = 4; if (!string || !*string || !ascii_strcasecmp (string, "default") || !strcmp (string, "-")) string = get_default_pubkey_algo (); else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (string, "future-default") || !ascii_strcasecmp (string, "futuredefault")) string = FUTURE_STD_KEY_PARAM; primary = xstrdup (string); secondary = strchr (primary, '+'); if (secondary) *secondary++ = 0; if (part == -1 || part == 0) { err = parse_key_parameter_part (primary, 0, 0, r_algo, r_size, r_keyuse, r_curve, r_version); if (!err && part == -1) err = parse_key_parameter_part (secondary, 1, 0, r_subalgo, r_subsize, r_subkeyuse, r_subcurve, r_subversion); } else if (part == 1) { /* If we have SECONDARY, use that part. If there is only one * part consider this to be the subkey algo. In case a * SUGGESTED_USE has been given and the usage of the secondary * part does not match SUGGESTED_USE try again using the primary * part. Note that when falling back to the primary key we need * to force clearing the cert usage. */ if (secondary) { err = parse_key_parameter_part (secondary, 1, 0, r_algo, r_size, r_keyuse, r_curve, r_version); if (!err && suggested_use && r_keyuse && !(suggested_use & *r_keyuse)) err = parse_key_parameter_part (primary, 1, 1 /*(clear cert)*/, r_algo, r_size, r_keyuse, r_curve, r_version); } else err = parse_key_parameter_part (primary, 1, 0, r_algo, r_size, r_keyuse, r_curve, r_version); } xfree (primary); return err; } /* Append R to the linked list PARA. */ static void append_to_parameter (struct para_data_s *para, struct para_data_s *r) { log_assert (para); while (para->next) para = para->next; para->next = r; } /* Release the parameter list R. */ static void release_parameter_list (struct para_data_s *r) { struct para_data_s *r2; for (; r ; r = r2) { r2 = r->next; if (r->key == pPASSPHRASE && *r->u.value) wipememory (r->u.value, strlen (r->u.value)); xfree (r); } } static struct para_data_s * get_parameter( struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key ) { struct para_data_s *r; for( r = para; r && r->key != key; r = r->next ) ; return r; } static const char * get_parameter_value( struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key ) { struct para_data_s *r = get_parameter( para, key ); return (r && *r->u.value)? r->u.value : NULL; } /* This is similar to get_parameter_value but also returns the empty string. This is required so that quick_generate_keypair can use an empty Passphrase to specify no-protection. */ static const char * get_parameter_passphrase (struct para_data_s *para) { struct para_data_s *r = get_parameter (para, pPASSPHRASE); return r ? r->u.value : NULL; } static int get_parameter_algo( struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key, int *r_default) { int i; struct para_data_s *r = get_parameter( para, key ); if (r_default) *r_default = 0; if (!r) return -1; /* Note that we need to handle the ECC algorithms specified as strings directly because Libgcrypt folds them all to ECC. */ if (!ascii_strcasecmp (r->u.value, "default")) { /* Note: If you change this default algo, remember to change it * also in gpg.c:gpgconf_list. */ /* FIXME: We only allow the algo here and have a separate thing * for the curve etc. That is a ugly but demanded for backward * compatibility with the batch key generation. It would be * better to make full use of parse_key_parameter_string. */ parse_key_parameter_string (NULL, 0, 0, &i, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (r_default) *r_default = 1; } else if (digitp (r->u.value)) i = atoi( r->u.value ); else if (!strcmp (r->u.value, "ELG-E") || !strcmp (r->u.value, "ELG")) i = PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (r->u.value, "EdDSA")) i = PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (r->u.value, "ECDSA")) i = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (r->u.value, "ECDH")) i = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH; else i = map_pk_gcry_to_openpgp (gcry_pk_map_name (r->u.value)); if (i == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E || i == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S) i = 0; /* we don't want to allow generation of these algorithms */ return i; } /* Parse a usage string. The usage keywords "auth", "sign", "encr" * may be delimited by space, tab, or comma. On error -1 is returned * instead of the usage flags. */ static int parse_usagestr (const char *usagestr) { gpg_error_t err; char **tokens = NULL; const char *s; int i; unsigned int use = 0; tokens = strtokenize (usagestr, " \t,"); if (!tokens) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); log_error ("strtokenize failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); return -1; } for (i=0; (s = tokens[i]); i++) { if (!*s) ; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (s, "sign")) use |= PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (s, "encrypt") || !ascii_strcasecmp (s, "encr")) use |= PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (s, "auth")) use |= PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH; else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (s, "cert")) use |= PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT; else { xfree (tokens); return -1; /* error */ } } xfree (tokens); return use; } /* * Parse the usage parameter and set the keyflags. Returns -1 on * error, 0 for no usage given or 1 for usage available. */ static int parse_parameter_usage (const char *fname, struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key) { struct para_data_s *r = get_parameter( para, key ); int i; if (!r) return 0; /* none (this is an optional parameter)*/ i = parse_usagestr (r->u.value); if (i == -1) { log_error ("%s:%d: invalid usage list\n", fname, r->lnr ); return -1; /* error */ } r->u.usage = i; return 1; } static int parse_revocation_key (const char *fname, struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key) { struct para_data_s *r = get_parameter( para, key ); struct revocation_key revkey; char *pn; int i; if( !r ) return 0; /* none (this is an optional parameter) */ pn = r->u.value; revkey.class=0x80; revkey.algid=atoi(pn); if(!revkey.algid) goto fail; /* Skip to the fpr */ while(*pn && *pn!=':') pn++; if(*pn!=':') goto fail; pn++; for(i=0;iu.revkey,&revkey,sizeof(struct revocation_key)); return 0; fail: log_error("%s:%d: invalid revocation key\n", fname, r->lnr ); return -1; /* error */ } static u32 get_parameter_u32( struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key ) { struct para_data_s *r = get_parameter( para, key ); if( !r ) return 0; if( r->key == pKEYCREATIONDATE ) return r->u.creation; if( r->key == pKEYEXPIRE || r->key == pSUBKEYEXPIRE ) return r->u.expire; if( r->key == pKEYUSAGE || r->key == pSUBKEYUSAGE ) return r->u.usage; return (unsigned int)strtoul( r->u.value, NULL, 10 ); } static unsigned int get_parameter_uint( struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key ) { return get_parameter_u32( para, key ); } static struct revocation_key * get_parameter_revkey( struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key ) { struct para_data_s *r = get_parameter( para, key ); return r? &r->u.revkey : NULL; } static int proc_parameter_file (ctrl_t ctrl, struct para_data_s *para, const char *fname, struct output_control_s *outctrl, int card ) { struct para_data_s *r; const char *s1, *s2, *s3; size_t n; char *p; int is_default = 0; int have_user_id = 0; int err, algo; /* Check that we have all required parameters. */ r = get_parameter( para, pKEYTYPE ); if(r) { algo = get_parameter_algo (para, pKEYTYPE, &is_default); if (openpgp_pk_test_algo2 (algo, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)) { log_error ("%s:%d: invalid algorithm\n", fname, r->lnr ); return -1; } } else { log_error ("%s: no Key-Type specified\n",fname); return -1; } err = parse_parameter_usage (fname, para, pKEYUSAGE); if (!err) { /* Default to algo capabilities if key-usage is not provided and no default algorithm has been requested. */ r = xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*r)); r->key = pKEYUSAGE; r->u.usage = (is_default ? (PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT | PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG) : openpgp_pk_algo_usage(algo)); append_to_parameter (para, r); } else if (err == -1) return -1; else { r = get_parameter (para, pKEYUSAGE); if (r && (r->u.usage & ~openpgp_pk_algo_usage (algo))) { log_error ("%s:%d: specified Key-Usage not allowed for algo %d\n", fname, r->lnr, algo); return -1; } } is_default = 0; r = get_parameter( para, pSUBKEYTYPE ); if(r) { algo = get_parameter_algo (para, pSUBKEYTYPE, &is_default); if (openpgp_pk_test_algo (algo)) { log_error ("%s:%d: invalid algorithm\n", fname, r->lnr ); return -1; } err = parse_parameter_usage (fname, para, pSUBKEYUSAGE); if (!err) { /* Default to algo capabilities if subkey-usage is not provided */ r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof(*r)); r->key = pSUBKEYUSAGE; r->u.usage = (is_default ? PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC : openpgp_pk_algo_usage (algo)); append_to_parameter (para, r); } else if (err == -1) return -1; else { r = get_parameter (para, pSUBKEYUSAGE); if (r && (r->u.usage & ~openpgp_pk_algo_usage (algo))) { log_error ("%s:%d: specified Subkey-Usage not allowed" " for algo %d\n", fname, r->lnr, algo); return -1; } } } if( get_parameter_value( para, pUSERID ) ) have_user_id=1; else { /* create the formatted user ID */ s1 = get_parameter_value( para, pNAMEREAL ); s2 = get_parameter_value( para, pNAMECOMMENT ); s3 = get_parameter_value( para, pNAMEEMAIL ); if( s1 || s2 || s3 ) { n = (s1?strlen(s1):0) + (s2?strlen(s2):0) + (s3?strlen(s3):0); r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + n + 20 ); r->key = pUSERID; p = r->u.value; if( s1 ) p = stpcpy(p, s1 ); if( s2 ) p = stpcpy(stpcpy(stpcpy(p," ("), s2 ),")"); if( s3 ) { /* If we have only the email part, do not add the space * and the angle brackets. */ if (*r->u.value) p = stpcpy(stpcpy(stpcpy(p," <"), s3 ),">"); else p = stpcpy (p, s3); } append_to_parameter (para, r); have_user_id=1; } } if(!have_user_id) { log_error("%s: no User-ID specified\n",fname); return -1; } /* Set preferences, if any. */ keygen_set_std_prefs(get_parameter_value( para, pPREFERENCES ), 0); /* Set keyserver, if any. */ s1=get_parameter_value( para, pKEYSERVER ); if(s1) { struct keyserver_spec *spec; spec = parse_keyserver_uri (s1, 1); if(spec) { free_keyserver_spec(spec); opt.def_keyserver_url=s1; } else { r = get_parameter (para, pKEYSERVER); log_error("%s:%d: invalid keyserver url\n", fname, r->lnr ); return -1; } } /* Set revoker, if any. */ if (parse_revocation_key (fname, para, pREVOKER)) return -1; /* Make KEYCREATIONDATE from Creation-Date. */ r = get_parameter (para, pCREATIONDATE); if (r && *r->u.value) { u32 seconds; seconds = parse_creation_string (r->u.value); if (!seconds) { log_error ("%s:%d: invalid creation date\n", fname, r->lnr ); return -1; } r->u.creation = seconds; r->key = pKEYCREATIONDATE; /* Change that entry. */ } /* Make KEYEXPIRE from Expire-Date. */ r = get_parameter( para, pEXPIREDATE ); if( r && *r->u.value ) { u32 seconds; seconds = parse_expire_string( r->u.value ); if( seconds == (u32)-1 ) { log_error("%s:%d: invalid expire date\n", fname, r->lnr ); return -1; } r->u.expire = seconds; r->key = pKEYEXPIRE; /* change hat entry */ /* also set it for the subkey */ r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = pSUBKEYEXPIRE; r->u.expire = seconds; append_to_parameter (para, r); } do_generate_keypair (ctrl, para, outctrl, card ); return 0; } /**************** * Kludge to allow non interactive key generation controlled * by a parameter file. * Note, that string parameters are expected to be in UTF-8 */ static void read_parameter_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname ) { static struct { const char *name; enum para_name key; } keywords[] = { { "Key-Type", pKEYTYPE}, { "Key-Length", pKEYLENGTH }, { "Key-Curve", pKEYCURVE }, { "Key-Usage", pKEYUSAGE }, { "Subkey-Type", pSUBKEYTYPE }, { "Subkey-Length", pSUBKEYLENGTH }, { "Subkey-Curve", pSUBKEYCURVE }, { "Subkey-Usage", pSUBKEYUSAGE }, { "Name-Real", pNAMEREAL }, { "Name-Email", pNAMEEMAIL }, { "Name-Comment", pNAMECOMMENT }, { "Expire-Date", pEXPIREDATE }, { "Creation-Date", pCREATIONDATE }, { "Passphrase", pPASSPHRASE }, { "Preferences", pPREFERENCES }, { "Revoker", pREVOKER }, { "Handle", pHANDLE }, { "Keyserver", pKEYSERVER }, { "Keygrip", pKEYGRIP }, { "Key-Grip", pKEYGRIP }, { "Subkey-grip", pSUBKEYGRIP }, { "Key-Version", pVERSION }, { "Subkey-Version", pSUBVERSION }, { NULL, 0 } }; IOBUF fp; byte *line; unsigned int maxlen, nline; char *p; int lnr; const char *err = NULL; struct para_data_s *para, *r; int i; struct output_control_s outctrl; memset( &outctrl, 0, sizeof( outctrl ) ); outctrl.pub.afx = new_armor_context (); if( !fname || !*fname) fname = "-"; fp = iobuf_open (fname); if (fp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (fp))) { iobuf_close (fp); fp = NULL; gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); } if (!fp) { log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) ); return; } iobuf_ioctl (fp, IOBUF_IOCTL_NO_CACHE, 1, NULL); lnr = 0; err = NULL; para = NULL; maxlen = 1024; line = NULL; while ( iobuf_read_line (fp, &line, &nline, &maxlen) ) { char *keyword, *value; lnr++; if( !maxlen ) { err = "line too long"; break; } for( p = line; isspace(*(byte*)p); p++ ) ; if( !*p || *p == '#' ) continue; keyword = p; if( *keyword == '%' ) { for( ; !isspace(*(byte*)p); p++ ) ; if( *p ) *p++ = 0; for( ; isspace(*(byte*)p); p++ ) ; value = p; trim_trailing_ws( value, strlen(value) ); if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keyword, "%echo" ) ) log_info("%s\n", value ); else if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keyword, "%dry-run" ) ) outctrl.dryrun = 1; else if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keyword, "%ask-passphrase" ) ) ; /* Dummy for backward compatibility. */ else if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keyword, "%no-ask-passphrase" ) ) ; /* Dummy for backward compatibility. */ else if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keyword, "%no-protection" ) ) outctrl.keygen_flags |= KEYGEN_FLAG_NO_PROTECTION; else if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keyword, "%transient-key" ) ) outctrl.keygen_flags |= KEYGEN_FLAG_TRANSIENT_KEY; else if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keyword, "%commit" ) ) { outctrl.lnr = lnr; if (proc_parameter_file (ctrl, para, fname, &outctrl, 0 )) print_status_key_not_created (get_parameter_value (para, pHANDLE)); release_parameter_list( para ); para = NULL; } else if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keyword, "%pubring" ) ) { if( outctrl.pub.fname && !strcmp( outctrl.pub.fname, value ) ) ; /* still the same file - ignore it */ else { xfree( outctrl.pub.newfname ); outctrl.pub.newfname = xstrdup( value ); outctrl.use_files = 1; } } else if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keyword, "%secring" ) ) { /* Ignore this command. */ } else log_info("skipping control '%s' (%s)\n", keyword, value ); continue; } if( !(p = strchr( p, ':' )) || p == keyword ) { err = "missing colon"; break; } if( *p ) *p++ = 0; for( ; isspace(*(byte*)p); p++ ) ; if( !*p ) { err = "missing argument"; break; } value = p; trim_trailing_ws( value, strlen(value) ); for(i=0; keywords[i].name; i++ ) { if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keywords[i].name, keyword ) ) break; } if( !keywords[i].name ) { err = "unknown keyword"; break; } if( keywords[i].key != pKEYTYPE && !para ) { err = "parameter block does not start with \"Key-Type\""; break; } if( keywords[i].key == pKEYTYPE && para ) { outctrl.lnr = lnr; if (proc_parameter_file (ctrl, para, fname, &outctrl, 0 )) print_status_key_not_created (get_parameter_value (para, pHANDLE)); release_parameter_list( para ); para = NULL; } else { for( r = para; r; r = r->next ) { if( r->key == keywords[i].key ) break; } if( r ) { err = "duplicate keyword"; break; } } if (!opt.flags.rfc4880bis && (keywords[i].key == pVERSION || keywords[i].key == pSUBVERSION)) ; /* Ignore version unless --rfc4880bis is active. */ else { r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + strlen( value ) ); r->lnr = lnr; r->key = keywords[i].key; strcpy( r->u.value, value ); r->next = para; para = r; } } if( err ) log_error("%s:%d: %s\n", fname, lnr, err ); else if( iobuf_error (fp) ) { log_error("%s:%d: read error\n", fname, lnr); } else if( para ) { outctrl.lnr = lnr; if (proc_parameter_file (ctrl, para, fname, &outctrl, 0 )) print_status_key_not_created (get_parameter_value (para, pHANDLE)); } if( outctrl.use_files ) { /* close open streams */ iobuf_close( outctrl.pub.stream ); /* Must invalidate that ugly cache to actually close it. */ if (outctrl.pub.fname) iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE, 0, (char*)outctrl.pub.fname); xfree( outctrl.pub.fname ); xfree( outctrl.pub.newfname ); } xfree (line); release_parameter_list( para ); iobuf_close (fp); release_armor_context (outctrl.pub.afx); } /* Helper for quick_generate_keypair. */ static struct para_data_s * quickgen_set_para (struct para_data_s *para, int for_subkey, int algo, int nbits, const char *curve, unsigned int use, int version) { struct para_data_s *r; r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r + 30); r->key = for_subkey? pSUBKEYUSAGE : pKEYUSAGE; if (use) snprintf (r->u.value, 30, "%s%s%s%s", (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)? "encr " : "", (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)? "sign " : "", (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)? "auth " : "", (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT)? "cert " : ""); else strcpy (r->u.value, for_subkey ? "encr" : "sign"); r->next = para; para = r; r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r + 20); r->key = for_subkey? pSUBKEYTYPE : pKEYTYPE; snprintf (r->u.value, 20, "%d", algo); r->next = para; para = r; if (curve) { r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r + strlen (curve)); r->key = for_subkey? pSUBKEYCURVE : pKEYCURVE; strcpy (r->u.value, curve); r->next = para; para = r; } else { r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r + 20); r->key = for_subkey? pSUBKEYLENGTH : pKEYLENGTH; sprintf (r->u.value, "%u", nbits); r->next = para; para = r; } if (opt.flags.rfc4880bis) { r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r + 20); r->key = for_subkey? pSUBVERSION : pVERSION; snprintf (r->u.value, 20, "%d", version); r->next = para; para = r; } return para; } /* * Unattended generation of a standard key. */ void quick_generate_keypair (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *uid, const char *algostr, const char *usagestr, const char *expirestr) { gpg_error_t err; struct para_data_s *para = NULL; struct para_data_s *r; struct output_control_s outctrl; int use_tty; memset (&outctrl, 0, sizeof outctrl); use_tty = (!opt.batch && !opt.answer_yes && !*algostr && !*usagestr && !*expirestr && !cpr_enabled () && gnupg_isatty (fileno (stdin)) && gnupg_isatty (fileno (stdout)) && gnupg_isatty (fileno (stderr))); r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r + strlen (uid)); r->key = pUSERID; strcpy (r->u.value, uid); r->next = para; para = r; uid = trim_spaces (r->u.value); if (!*uid || (!opt.allow_freeform_uid && !is_valid_user_id (uid))) { log_error (_("Key generation failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_INV_USER_ID)); goto leave; } /* If gpg is directly used on the console ask whether a key with the given user id shall really be created. */ if (use_tty) { tty_printf (_("About to create a key for:\n \"%s\"\n\n"), uid); if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes_def ("quick_keygen.okay", _("Continue? (Y/n) "), 1)) goto leave; } /* Check whether such a user ID already exists. */ { KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd; KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc; memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc); desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_EXACT; desc.u.name = uid; kdbhd = keydb_new (); if (!kdbhd) goto leave; err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL); keydb_release (kdbhd); if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND) { log_info (_("A key for \"%s\" already exists\n"), uid); if (opt.answer_yes) ; else if (!use_tty || !cpr_get_answer_is_yes_def ("quick_keygen.force", _("Create anyway? (y/N) "), 0)) { write_status_error ("genkey", gpg_error (304)); log_inc_errorcount (); /* we used log_info */ goto leave; } log_info (_("creating anyway\n")); } } if (!*expirestr || strcmp (expirestr, "-") == 0) expirestr = default_expiration_interval; if ((!*algostr || !ascii_strcasecmp (algostr, "default") || !ascii_strcasecmp (algostr, "future-default") || !ascii_strcasecmp (algostr, "futuredefault")) && (!*usagestr || !ascii_strcasecmp (usagestr, "default") || !strcmp (usagestr, "-"))) { /* Use default key parameters. */ int algo, subalgo, version, subversion; unsigned int size, subsize; unsigned int keyuse, subkeyuse; const char *curve, *subcurve; err = parse_key_parameter_string (algostr, -1, 0, &algo, &size, &keyuse, &curve, &version, &subalgo, &subsize, &subkeyuse, &subcurve, &subversion); if (err) { log_error (_("Key generation failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } para = quickgen_set_para (para, 0, algo, size, curve, keyuse, version); if (subalgo) para = quickgen_set_para (para, 1, subalgo, subsize, subcurve, subkeyuse, subversion); if (*expirestr) { u32 expire; expire = parse_expire_string (expirestr); if (expire == (u32)-1 ) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); log_error (_("Key generation failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r + 20); r->key = pKEYEXPIRE; r->u.expire = expire; r->next = para; para = r; } } else { /* Extended unattended mode. Creates only the primary key. */ int algo, version; unsigned int use; u32 expire; unsigned int nbits; const char *curve; err = parse_algo_usage_expire (ctrl, 0, algostr, usagestr, expirestr, &algo, &use, &expire, &nbits, &curve, &version); if (err) { log_error (_("Key generation failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err) ); goto leave; } para = quickgen_set_para (para, 0, algo, nbits, curve, use, version); r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r + 20); r->key = pKEYEXPIRE; r->u.expire = expire; r->next = para; para = r; } /* If the pinentry loopback mode is not and we have a static passphrase (i.e. set with --passphrase{,-fd,-file} while in batch mode), we use that passphrase for the new key. */ if (opt.pinentry_mode != PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK && have_static_passphrase ()) { const char *s = get_static_passphrase (); r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r + strlen (s)); r->key = pPASSPHRASE; strcpy (r->u.value, s); r->next = para; para = r; } proc_parameter_file (ctrl, para, "[internal]", &outctrl, 0); leave: release_parameter_list (para); } /* * Generate a keypair (fname is only used in batch mode) If * CARD_SERIALNO is not NULL the function will create the keys on an * OpenPGP Card. If CARD_BACKUP_KEY has been set and CARD_SERIALNO is * NOT NULL, the encryption key for the card is generated on the host, * imported to the card and a backup file created by gpg-agent. If * FULL is not set only the basic prompts are used (except for batch * mode). */ void generate_keypair (ctrl_t ctrl, int full, const char *fname, const char *card_serialno, int card_backup_key) { gpg_error_t err; unsigned int nbits; char *uid = NULL; int algo; unsigned int use; int both = 0; u32 expire; struct para_data_s *para = NULL; struct para_data_s *r; struct output_control_s outctrl; #ifndef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT (void)card_backup_key; #endif memset( &outctrl, 0, sizeof( outctrl ) ); if (opt.batch && card_serialno) { /* We don't yet support unattended key generation with a card * serial number. */ log_error (_("can't do this in batch mode\n")); print_further_info ("key generation with card serial number"); return; } if (opt.batch) { read_parameter_file (ctrl, fname); return; } if (card_serialno) { #ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT struct agent_card_info_s info; memset (&info, 0, sizeof (info)); err = agent_scd_getattr ("KEY-ATTR", &info); if (err) { log_error (_("error getting current key info: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); return; } r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + strlen (card_serialno) ); r->key = pSERIALNO; strcpy( r->u.value, card_serialno); r->next = para; para = r; r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = pKEYTYPE; sprintf( r->u.value, "%d", info.key_attr[0].algo ); r->next = para; para = r; r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = pKEYUSAGE; strcpy (r->u.value, "sign"); r->next = para; para = r; r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = pSUBKEYTYPE; sprintf( r->u.value, "%d", info.key_attr[1].algo ); r->next = para; para = r; r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = pSUBKEYUSAGE; strcpy (r->u.value, "encrypt"); r->next = para; para = r; if (info.key_attr[1].algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA) { r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = pSUBKEYLENGTH; sprintf( r->u.value, "%u", info.key_attr[1].nbits); r->next = para; para = r; } else if (info.key_attr[1].algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || info.key_attr[1].algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || info.key_attr[1].algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) { r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + strlen (info.key_attr[1].curve)); r->key = pSUBKEYCURVE; strcpy (r->u.value, info.key_attr[1].curve); r->next = para; para = r; } r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = pAUTHKEYTYPE; sprintf( r->u.value, "%d", info.key_attr[2].algo ); r->next = para; para = r; if (card_backup_key) { r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + 1); r->key = pCARDBACKUPKEY; strcpy (r->u.value, "1"); r->next = para; para = r; } #endif /*ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/ } else if (full) /* Full featured key generation. */ { int subkey_algo; char *key_from_hexgrip = NULL; algo = ask_algo (ctrl, 0, &subkey_algo, &use, &key_from_hexgrip); if (key_from_hexgrip) { r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = pKEYTYPE; sprintf( r->u.value, "%d", algo); r->next = para; para = r; if (use) { r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 25 ); r->key = pKEYUSAGE; sprintf( r->u.value, "%s%s%s", (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)? "sign ":"", (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)? "encrypt ":"", (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)? "auth":"" ); r->next = para; para = r; } r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 40 ); r->key = pKEYGRIP; strcpy (r->u.value, key_from_hexgrip); r->next = para; para = r; xfree (key_from_hexgrip); } else { const char *curve = NULL; if (subkey_algo) { /* Create primary and subkey at once. */ both = 1; if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) { curve = ask_curve (&algo, &subkey_algo, NULL); r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = pKEYTYPE; sprintf( r->u.value, "%d", algo); r->next = para; para = r; nbits = 0; r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r + strlen (curve)); r->key = pKEYCURVE; strcpy (r->u.value, curve); r->next = para; para = r; } else { r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = pKEYTYPE; sprintf( r->u.value, "%d", algo); r->next = para; para = r; nbits = ask_keysize (algo, 0); r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = pKEYLENGTH; sprintf( r->u.value, "%u", nbits); r->next = para; para = r; } r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = pKEYUSAGE; strcpy( r->u.value, "sign" ); r->next = para; para = r; r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = pSUBKEYTYPE; sprintf( r->u.value, "%d", subkey_algo); r->next = para; para = r; r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = pSUBKEYUSAGE; strcpy( r->u.value, "encrypt" ); r->next = para; para = r; if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) { if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA && subkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) { /* Need to switch to a different curve for the encryption key. */ curve = "Curve25519"; } r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r + strlen (curve)); r->key = pSUBKEYCURVE; strcpy (r->u.value, curve); r->next = para; para = r; } } else /* Create only a single key. */ { /* For ECC we need to ask for the curve before storing the algo because ask_curve may change the algo. */ if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) { curve = ask_curve (&algo, NULL, NULL); r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r + strlen (curve)); r->key = pKEYCURVE; strcpy (r->u.value, curve); r->next = para; para = r; } r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = pKEYTYPE; sprintf( r->u.value, "%d", algo ); r->next = para; para = r; if (use) { r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 25 ); r->key = pKEYUSAGE; sprintf( r->u.value, "%s%s%s", (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)? "sign ":"", (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)? "encrypt ":"", (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)? "auth":"" ); r->next = para; para = r; } nbits = 0; } if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) { /* The curve has already been set. */ } else { nbits = ask_keysize (both? subkey_algo : algo, nbits); r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 ); r->key = both? pSUBKEYLENGTH : pKEYLENGTH; sprintf( r->u.value, "%u", nbits); r->next = para; para = r; } } } else /* Default key generation. */ { int subalgo, version, subversion; unsigned int size, subsize; unsigned int keyuse, subkeyuse; const char *curve, *subcurve; tty_printf ( _("Note: Use \"%s %s\"" " for a full featured key generation dialog.\n"), #if USE_GPG2_HACK GPG_NAME "2" #else GPG_NAME #endif , "--full-generate-key" ); err = parse_key_parameter_string (NULL, -1, 0, &algo, &size, &keyuse, &curve, &version, &subalgo, &subsize, &subkeyuse, &subcurve, &subversion); if (err) { log_error (_("Key generation failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); return; } para = quickgen_set_para (para, 0, algo, size, curve, keyuse, version); if (subalgo) para = quickgen_set_para (para, 1, subalgo, subsize, subcurve, subkeyuse, subversion); } expire = full? ask_expire_interval (0, NULL) : parse_expire_string (default_expiration_interval); r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + 20); r->key = pKEYEXPIRE; r->u.expire = expire; r->next = para; para = r; r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + 20); r->key = pSUBKEYEXPIRE; r->u.expire = expire; r->next = para; para = r; uid = ask_user_id (0, full, NULL); if (!uid) { log_error(_("Key generation canceled.\n")); release_parameter_list( para ); return; } r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + strlen (uid)); r->key = pUSERID; strcpy (r->u.value, uid); r->next = para; para = r; proc_parameter_file (ctrl, para, "[internal]", &outctrl, !!card_serialno); release_parameter_list (para); } /* Create and delete a dummy packet to start off a list of kbnodes. */ static void start_tree(KBNODE *tree) { PACKET *pkt; pkt=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*pkt)); pkt->pkttype=PKT_NONE; *tree=new_kbnode(pkt); delete_kbnode(*tree); } /* Write the *protected* secret key to the file. */ static gpg_error_t card_write_key_to_backup_file (PKT_public_key *sk, const char *backup_dir) { gpg_error_t err = 0; int rc; char keyid_buffer[2 * 8 + 1]; char name_buffer[50]; char *fname; IOBUF fp; mode_t oldmask; PACKET *pkt = NULL; format_keyid (pk_keyid (sk), KF_LONG, keyid_buffer, sizeof (keyid_buffer)); snprintf (name_buffer, sizeof name_buffer, "sk_%s.gpg", keyid_buffer); fname = make_filename (backup_dir, name_buffer, NULL); /* Note that the umask call is not anymore needed because iobuf_create now takes care of it. However, it does not harm and thus we keep it. */ oldmask = umask (077); if (is_secured_filename (fname)) { fp = NULL; gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); } else fp = iobuf_create (fname, 1); umask (oldmask); if (!fp) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); log_error (_("can't create backup file '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror (errno) ); goto leave; } pkt = xcalloc (1, sizeof *pkt); pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_KEY; pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk; rc = build_packet (fp, pkt); if (rc) { log_error ("build packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); iobuf_cancel (fp); } else { char *fprbuf; iobuf_close (fp); iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE, 0, (char*)fname); log_info (_("Note: backup of card key saved to '%s'\n"), fname); fprbuf = hexfingerprint (sk, NULL, 0); if (!fprbuf) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_BACKUP_KEY_CREATED, fprbuf, fname, strlen (fname), 0); xfree (fprbuf); } leave: xfree (pkt); xfree (fname); return err; } /* Store key to card and make a backup file in OpenPGP format. */ static gpg_error_t card_store_key_with_backup (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *sub_psk, const char *backup_dir) { PKT_public_key *sk; gnupg_isotime_t timestamp; gpg_error_t err; char *hexgrip; int rc; struct agent_card_info_s info; gcry_cipher_hd_t cipherhd = NULL; char *cache_nonce = NULL; void *kek = NULL; size_t keklen; sk = copy_public_key (NULL, sub_psk); if (!sk) return gpg_error_from_syserror (); epoch2isotime (timestamp, (time_t)sk->timestamp); err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (sk, &hexgrip); if (err) return err; memset(&info, 0, sizeof (info)); rc = agent_scd_getattr ("SERIALNO", &info); if (rc) return (gpg_error_t)rc; rc = agent_keytocard (hexgrip, 2, 1, info.serialno, timestamp); xfree (info.serialno); if (rc) { err = (gpg_error_t)rc; goto leave; } err = agent_keywrap_key (ctrl, 1, &kek, &keklen); if (err) { log_error ("error getting the KEK: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } err = gcry_cipher_open (&cipherhd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP, 0); if (!err) err = gcry_cipher_setkey (cipherhd, kek, keklen); if (err) { log_error ("error setting up an encryption context: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } err = receive_seckey_from_agent (ctrl, cipherhd, 0, &cache_nonce, hexgrip, sk); if (err) { log_error ("error getting secret key from agent: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); goto leave; } err = card_write_key_to_backup_file (sk, backup_dir); if (err) log_error ("writing card key to backup file: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); else /* Remove secret key data in agent side. */ agent_scd_learn (NULL, 1); leave: xfree (cache_nonce); gcry_cipher_close (cipherhd); xfree (kek); xfree (hexgrip); free_public_key (sk); return err; } static void do_generate_keypair (ctrl_t ctrl, struct para_data_s *para, struct output_control_s *outctrl, int card) { gpg_error_t err; KBNODE pub_root = NULL; const char *s; PKT_public_key *pri_psk = NULL; PKT_public_key *sub_psk = NULL; struct revocation_key *revkey; int did_sub = 0; u32 timestamp; char *cache_nonce = NULL; int algo; u32 expire; const char *key_from_hexgrip = NULL; unsigned int keygen_flags; if (outctrl->dryrun) { log_info("dry-run mode - key generation skipped\n"); return; } if ( outctrl->use_files ) { if ( outctrl->pub.newfname ) { iobuf_close(outctrl->pub.stream); outctrl->pub.stream = NULL; if (outctrl->pub.fname) iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE, 0, (char*)outctrl->pub.fname); xfree( outctrl->pub.fname ); outctrl->pub.fname = outctrl->pub.newfname; outctrl->pub.newfname = NULL; if (is_secured_filename (outctrl->pub.fname) ) { outctrl->pub.stream = NULL; gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); } else outctrl->pub.stream = iobuf_create (outctrl->pub.fname, 0); if (!outctrl->pub.stream) { log_error(_("can't create '%s': %s\n"), outctrl->pub.newfname, strerror(errno) ); return; } if (opt.armor) { outctrl->pub.afx->what = 1; push_armor_filter (outctrl->pub.afx, outctrl->pub.stream); } } log_assert( outctrl->pub.stream ); if (opt.verbose) log_info (_("writing public key to '%s'\n"), outctrl->pub.fname ); } /* We create the packets as a tree of kbnodes. Because the structure we create is known in advance we simply generate a linked list. The first packet is a dummy packet which we flag as deleted. The very first packet must always be a KEY packet. */ start_tree (&pub_root); timestamp = get_parameter_u32 (para, pKEYCREATIONDATE); if (!timestamp) timestamp = make_timestamp (); /* Note that, depending on the backend (i.e. the used scdaemon version), the card key generation may update TIMESTAMP for each key. Thus we need to pass TIMESTAMP to all signing function to make sure that the binding signature is done using the timestamp of the corresponding (sub)key and not that of the primary key. An alternative implementation could tell the signing function the node of the subkey but that is more work than just to pass the current timestamp. */ algo = get_parameter_algo( para, pKEYTYPE, NULL ); expire = get_parameter_u32( para, pKEYEXPIRE ); key_from_hexgrip = get_parameter_value (para, pKEYGRIP); keygen_flags = outctrl->keygen_flags; if (get_parameter_uint (para, pVERSION) == 5) keygen_flags |= KEYGEN_FLAG_CREATE_V5_KEY; if (key_from_hexgrip) err = do_create_from_keygrip (ctrl, algo, key_from_hexgrip, pub_root, timestamp, expire, 0, keygen_flags); else if (!card) err = do_create (algo, get_parameter_uint( para, pKEYLENGTH ), get_parameter_value (para, pKEYCURVE), pub_root, timestamp, expire, 0, keygen_flags, get_parameter_passphrase (para), &cache_nonce, NULL); else err = gen_card_key (1, algo, 1, pub_root, ×tamp, expire, keygen_flags); /* Get the pointer to the generated public key packet. */ if (!err) { pri_psk = pub_root->next->pkt->pkt.public_key; log_assert (pri_psk); /* Make sure a few fields are correctly set up before going further. */ pri_psk->flags.primary = 1; keyid_from_pk (pri_psk, NULL); /* We don't use pk_keyid to get keyid, because it also asserts that main_keyid is set! */ keyid_copy (pri_psk->main_keyid, pri_psk->keyid); } if (!err && (revkey = get_parameter_revkey (para, pREVOKER))) err = write_direct_sig (ctrl, pub_root, pri_psk, revkey, timestamp, cache_nonce); if (!err && (s = get_parameter_value (para, pUSERID))) { write_uid (pub_root, s ); err = write_selfsigs (ctrl, pub_root, pri_psk, get_parameter_uint (para, pKEYUSAGE), timestamp, cache_nonce); } /* Write the auth key to the card before the encryption key. This is a partial workaround for a PGP bug (as of this writing, all versions including 8.1), that causes it to try and encrypt to the most recent subkey regardless of whether that subkey is actually an encryption type. In this case, the auth key is an RSA key so it succeeds. */ if (!err && card && get_parameter (para, pAUTHKEYTYPE)) { err = gen_card_key (3, get_parameter_algo( para, pAUTHKEYTYPE, NULL ), 0, pub_root, ×tamp, expire, keygen_flags); if (!err) err = write_keybinding (ctrl, pub_root, pri_psk, NULL, PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH, timestamp, cache_nonce); } if (!err && get_parameter (para, pSUBKEYTYPE)) { int subkey_algo = get_parameter_algo (para, pSUBKEYTYPE, NULL); s = NULL; key_from_hexgrip = get_parameter_value (para, pSUBKEYGRIP); keygen_flags = outctrl->keygen_flags; if (get_parameter_uint (para, pSUBVERSION) == 5) keygen_flags |= KEYGEN_FLAG_CREATE_V5_KEY; if (key_from_hexgrip) err = do_create_from_keygrip (ctrl, subkey_algo, key_from_hexgrip, pub_root, timestamp, get_parameter_u32 (para, pSUBKEYEXPIRE), 1, keygen_flags); else if (!card || (s = get_parameter_value (para, pCARDBACKUPKEY))) { err = do_create (subkey_algo, get_parameter_uint (para, pSUBKEYLENGTH), get_parameter_value (para, pSUBKEYCURVE), pub_root, timestamp, get_parameter_u32 (para, pSUBKEYEXPIRE), 1, s? KEYGEN_FLAG_NO_PROTECTION : keygen_flags, get_parameter_passphrase (para), &cache_nonce, NULL); /* Get the pointer to the generated public subkey packet. */ if (!err) { kbnode_t node; for (node = pub_root; node; node = node->next) if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) sub_psk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; log_assert (sub_psk); if (s) err = card_store_key_with_backup (ctrl, sub_psk, gnupg_homedir ()); } } else { err = gen_card_key (2, subkey_algo, 0, pub_root, ×tamp, expire, keygen_flags); } if (!err) err = write_keybinding (ctrl, pub_root, pri_psk, sub_psk, get_parameter_uint (para, pSUBKEYUSAGE), timestamp, cache_nonce); did_sub = 1; } if (!err && outctrl->use_files) /* Direct write to specified files. */ { err = write_keyblock (outctrl->pub.stream, pub_root); if (err) log_error ("can't write public key: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); } else if (!err) /* Write to the standard keyrings. */ { KEYDB_HANDLE pub_hd; pub_hd = keydb_new (); if (!pub_hd) err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); else { err = keydb_locate_writable (pub_hd); if (err) log_error (_("no writable public keyring found: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); } if (!err && opt.verbose) { log_info (_("writing public key to '%s'\n"), keydb_get_resource_name (pub_hd)); } if (!err) { err = keydb_insert_keyblock (pub_hd, pub_root); if (err) log_error (_("error writing public keyring '%s': %s\n"), keydb_get_resource_name (pub_hd), gpg_strerror (err)); } keydb_release (pub_hd); if (!err) { int no_enc_rsa; PKT_public_key *pk; no_enc_rsa = ((get_parameter_algo (para, pKEYTYPE, NULL) == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA) && get_parameter_uint (para, pKEYUSAGE) && !((get_parameter_uint (para, pKEYUSAGE) & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)) ); pk = find_kbnode (pub_root, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)->pkt->pkt.public_key; keyid_from_pk (pk, pk->main_keyid); register_trusted_keyid (pk->main_keyid); update_ownertrust (ctrl, pk, ((get_ownertrust (ctrl, pk) & ~TRUST_MASK) | TRUST_ULTIMATE )); gen_standard_revoke (ctrl, pk, cache_nonce); /* Get rid of the first empty packet. */ commit_kbnode (&pub_root); if (!opt.batch) { tty_printf (_("public and secret key created and signed.\n") ); tty_printf ("\n"); merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, pub_root); list_keyblock_direct (ctrl, pub_root, 0, 1, opt.fingerprint || opt.with_fingerprint, 1); } if (!opt.batch && (get_parameter_algo (para, pKEYTYPE, NULL) == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA || no_enc_rsa ) && !get_parameter (para, pSUBKEYTYPE) ) { tty_printf(_("Note that this key cannot be used for " "encryption. You may want to use\n" "the command \"--edit-key\" to generate a " "subkey for this purpose.\n") ); } } } if (err) { if (opt.batch) log_error ("key generation failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err) ); else tty_printf (_("Key generation failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err) ); write_status_error (card? "card_key_generate":"key_generate", err); print_status_key_not_created ( get_parameter_value (para, pHANDLE) ); } else { PKT_public_key *pk = find_kbnode (pub_root, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)->pkt->pkt.public_key; print_status_key_created (did_sub? 'B':'P', pk, get_parameter_value (para, pHANDLE)); } release_kbnode (pub_root); xfree (cache_nonce); } static gpg_error_t parse_algo_usage_expire (ctrl_t ctrl, int for_subkey, const char *algostr, const char *usagestr, const char *expirestr, int *r_algo, unsigned int *r_usage, u32 *r_expire, unsigned int *r_nbits, const char **r_curve, int *r_version) { gpg_error_t err; int algo; unsigned int use, nbits; u32 expire; int wantuse; int version = 4; const char *curve = NULL; *r_curve = NULL; nbits = 0; /* Parse the algo string. */ if (algostr && *algostr == '&' && strlen (algostr) == 41) { /* Take algo from existing key. */ algo = check_keygrip (ctrl, algostr+1); /* FIXME: We need the curve name as well. */ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); } err = parse_key_parameter_string (algostr, for_subkey? 1 : 0, usagestr? parse_usagestr (usagestr):0, &algo, &nbits, &use, &curve, &version, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (err) return err; /* Parse the usage string. */ if (!usagestr || !*usagestr || !ascii_strcasecmp (usagestr, "default") || !strcmp (usagestr, "-")) ; /* Keep usage from parse_key_parameter_string. */ else if ((wantuse = parse_usagestr (usagestr)) != -1) use = wantuse; else return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); /* Make sure a primary key has the CERT usage. */ if (!for_subkey) use |= PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT; /* Check that usage is possible. NB: We have the same check in * parse_key_parameter_string but need it here again in case the * separate usage value has been given. */ if (/**/((use & (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH|PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT)) && !pubkey_get_nsig (algo)) || ((use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) && !pubkey_get_nenc (algo)) || (for_subkey && (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT))) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE); /* Parse the expire string. */ expire = parse_expire_string (expirestr); if (expire == (u32)-1 ) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); if (curve) *r_curve = curve; *r_algo = algo; *r_usage = use; *r_expire = expire; *r_nbits = nbits; *r_version = version; return 0; } /* Add a new subkey to an existing key. Returns 0 if a new key has been generated and put into the keyblocks. If any of ALGOSTR, USAGESTR, or EXPIRESTR is NULL interactive mode is used. */ gpg_error_t generate_subkeypair (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, const char *algostr, const char *usagestr, const char *expirestr) { gpg_error_t err = 0; int interactive; kbnode_t node; PKT_public_key *pri_psk = NULL; PKT_public_key *sub_psk = NULL; int algo; unsigned int use; u32 expire; unsigned int nbits = 0; const char *curve = NULL; u32 cur_time; char *key_from_hexgrip = NULL; char *hexgrip = NULL; char *serialno = NULL; char *cache_nonce = NULL; char *passwd_nonce = NULL; int keygen_flags = 0; interactive = (!algostr || !usagestr || !expirestr); /* Break out the primary key. */ node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); if (!node) { log_error ("Oops; primary key missing in keyblock!\n"); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG); goto leave; } pri_psk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; cur_time = make_timestamp (); if (pri_psk->timestamp > cur_time) { ulong d = pri_psk->timestamp - cur_time; log_info ( d==1 ? _("key has been created %lu second " "in future (time warp or clock problem)\n") : _("key has been created %lu seconds " "in future (time warp or clock problem)\n"), d ); if (!opt.ignore_time_conflict) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TIME_CONFLICT); goto leave; } } if (pri_psk->version < 4) { log_info (_("Note: creating subkeys for v3 keys " "is not OpenPGP compliant\n")); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CONFLICT); goto leave; } err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pri_psk, &hexgrip); if (err) goto leave; if (agent_get_keyinfo (NULL, hexgrip, &serialno, NULL)) { if (interactive) tty_printf (_("Secret parts of primary key are not available.\n")); else log_info ( _("Secret parts of primary key are not available.\n")); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY); goto leave; } if (serialno) { if (interactive) tty_printf (_("Secret parts of primary key are stored on-card.\n")); else log_info ( _("Secret parts of primary key are stored on-card.\n")); } if (interactive) { algo = ask_algo (ctrl, 1, NULL, &use, &key_from_hexgrip); log_assert (algo); if (key_from_hexgrip) nbits = 0; else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) curve = ask_curve (&algo, NULL, NULL); else nbits = ask_keysize (algo, 0); expire = ask_expire_interval (0, NULL); if (!cpr_enabled() && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keygen.sub.okay", _("Really create? (y/N) "))) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CANCELED); goto leave; } } else /* Unattended mode. */ { int version; err = parse_algo_usage_expire (ctrl, 1, algostr, usagestr, expirestr, &algo, &use, &expire, &nbits, &curve, &version); if (err) goto leave; if (version == 5) keygen_flags |= KEYGEN_FLAG_CREATE_V5_KEY; } /* Verify the passphrase now so that we get a cache item for the * primary key passphrase. The agent also returns a passphrase * nonce, which we can use to set the passphrase for the subkey to * that of the primary key. */ { char *desc = gpg_format_keydesc (ctrl, pri_psk, FORMAT_KEYDESC_NORMAL, 1); err = agent_passwd (ctrl, hexgrip, desc, 1 /*=verify*/, &cache_nonce, &passwd_nonce); xfree (desc); if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED && gpg_err_source (err) == GPG_ERR_SOURCE_GPGAGENT) err = 0; /* Very likely that the key is on a card. */ if (err) goto leave; } /* Start creation. */ if (key_from_hexgrip) { err = do_create_from_keygrip (ctrl, algo, key_from_hexgrip, keyblock, cur_time, expire, 1, keygen_flags); } else { const char *passwd; /* If the pinentry loopback mode is not and we have a static passphrase (i.e. set with --passphrase{,-fd,-file} while in batch mode), we use that passphrase for the new subkey. */ if (opt.pinentry_mode != PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK && have_static_passphrase ()) passwd = get_static_passphrase (); else passwd = NULL; err = do_create (algo, nbits, curve, keyblock, cur_time, expire, 1, keygen_flags, passwd, &cache_nonce, &passwd_nonce); } if (err) goto leave; /* Get the pointer to the generated public subkey packet. */ for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) sub_psk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; /* Write the binding signature. */ err = write_keybinding (ctrl, keyblock, pri_psk, sub_psk, use, cur_time, cache_nonce); if (err) goto leave; print_status_key_created ('S', sub_psk, NULL); leave: xfree (key_from_hexgrip); xfree (hexgrip); xfree (serialno); xfree (cache_nonce); xfree (passwd_nonce); if (err) log_error (_("Key generation failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err) ); return err; } #ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT /* Generate a subkey on a card. */ gpg_error_t generate_card_subkeypair (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int keyno, const char *serialno) { gpg_error_t err = 0; kbnode_t node; PKT_public_key *pri_pk = NULL; unsigned int use; u32 expire; u32 cur_time; struct para_data_s *para = NULL; PKT_public_key *sub_pk = NULL; int algo; struct agent_card_info_s info; int keygen_flags = 0; /* FIXME!!! */ log_assert (keyno >= 1 && keyno <= 3); memset (&info, 0, sizeof (info)); err = agent_scd_getattr ("KEY-ATTR", &info); if (err) { log_error (_("error getting current key info: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); return err; } algo = info.key_attr[keyno-1].algo; para = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *para + strlen (serialno) ); if (!para) { err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } para->key = pSERIALNO; strcpy (para->u.value, serialno); /* Break out the primary secret key */ node = find_kbnode (pub_keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); if (!node) { log_error ("Oops; public key lost!\n"); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); goto leave; } pri_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; cur_time = make_timestamp(); if (pri_pk->timestamp > cur_time) { ulong d = pri_pk->timestamp - cur_time; log_info (d==1 ? _("key has been created %lu second " "in future (time warp or clock problem)\n") : _("key has been created %lu seconds " "in future (time warp or clock problem)\n"), d ); if (!opt.ignore_time_conflict) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TIME_CONFLICT); goto leave; } } if (pri_pk->version < 4) { log_info (_("Note: creating subkeys for v3 keys " "is not OpenPGP compliant\n")); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED); goto leave; } expire = ask_expire_interval (0, NULL); if (keyno == 1) use = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; else if (keyno == 2) use = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC; else use = PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH; if (!cpr_enabled() && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keygen.cardsub.okay", _("Really create? (y/N) "))) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CANCELED); goto leave; } /* Note, that depending on the backend, the card key generation may update CUR_TIME. */ err = gen_card_key (keyno, algo, 0, pub_keyblock, &cur_time, expire, keygen_flags); /* Get the pointer to the generated public subkey packet. */ if (!err) { for (node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next) if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; log_assert (sub_pk); err = write_keybinding (ctrl, pub_keyblock, pri_pk, sub_pk, use, cur_time, NULL); } leave: if (err) log_error (_("Key generation failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err) ); else print_status_key_created ('S', sub_pk, NULL); release_parameter_list (para); return err; } #endif /* !ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */ /* * Write a keyblock to an output stream */ static int write_keyblock( IOBUF out, KBNODE node ) { for( ; node ; node = node->next ) { if(!is_deleted_kbnode(node)) { int rc = build_packet( out, node->pkt ); if( rc ) { log_error("build_packet(%d) failed: %s\n", node->pkt->pkttype, gpg_strerror (rc) ); return rc; } } } return 0; } /* Note that timestamp is an in/out arg. * FIXME: Does not yet support v5 keys. */ static gpg_error_t gen_card_key (int keyno, int algo, int is_primary, kbnode_t pub_root, u32 *timestamp, u32 expireval, int keygen_flags) { #ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT gpg_error_t err; PACKET *pkt; PKT_public_key *pk; char keyid[10]; unsigned char *public; gcry_sexp_t s_key; snprintf (keyid, DIM(keyid), "OPENPGP.%d", keyno); pk = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pk ); if (!pk) return gpg_error_from_syserror (); pkt = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pkt); if (!pkt) { xfree (pk); return gpg_error_from_syserror (); } /* Note: SCD knows the serialnumber, thus there is no point in passing it. */ err = agent_scd_genkey (keyno, 1, timestamp); /* The code below is not used because we force creation of * the a card key (3rd arg). * if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EEXIST) * { * tty_printf ("\n"); * log_error ("WARNING: key does already exists!\n"); * tty_printf ("\n"); * if ( cpr_get_answer_is_yes( "keygen.card.replace_key", * _("Replace existing key? "))) * rc = agent_scd_genkey (keyno, 1, timestamp); * } */ if (err) { log_error ("key generation failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); xfree (pkt); xfree (pk); return err; } /* Send the READKEY command so that the agent creates a shadow key for card key. We need to do that now so that we are able to create the self-signatures. */ err = agent_readkey (NULL, 1, keyid, &public); if (err) return err; err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_key, NULL, public, gcry_sexp_canon_len (public, 0, NULL, NULL)); xfree (public); if (err) return err; if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA) err = key_from_sexp (pk->pkey, s_key, "public-key", "ne"); else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH ) err = ecckey_from_sexp (pk->pkey, s_key, algo); else err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); gcry_sexp_release (s_key); if (err) { log_error ("key_from_sexp failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err) ); free_public_key (pk); return err; } pk->timestamp = *timestamp; pk->version = (keygen_flags & KEYGEN_FLAG_CREATE_V5_KEY)? 5 : 4; if (expireval) pk->expiredate = pk->timestamp + expireval; pk->pubkey_algo = algo; pkt->pkttype = is_primary ? PKT_PUBLIC_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; pkt->pkt.public_key = pk; add_kbnode (pub_root, new_kbnode (pkt)); return 0; #else (void)keyno; (void)is_primary; (void)pub_root; (void)timestamp; (void)expireval; return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED); #endif /*!ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/ } diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h index d05a8f0f2..d787bde9e 100644 --- a/g10/packet.h +++ b/g10/packet.h @@ -1,952 +1,952 @@ /* packet.h - OpenPGP packet definitions * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, * 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * Copyright (C) 2015 g10 Code GmbH * * This file is part of GnuPG. * * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, see . */ #ifndef G10_PACKET_H #define G10_PACKET_H #include "../common/types.h" #include "../common/iobuf.h" #include "../common/strlist.h" #include "dek.h" #include "filter.h" #include "../common/openpgpdefs.h" #include "../common/userids.h" #include "../common/util.h" #define DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET 1 /* Constants to allocate static MPI arrays. */ #define PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY OPENPGP_MAX_NPKEY #define PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY OPENPGP_MAX_NSKEY #define PUBKEY_MAX_NSIG OPENPGP_MAX_NSIG #define PUBKEY_MAX_NENC OPENPGP_MAX_NENC /* Usage flags */ #define PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG GCRY_PK_USAGE_SIGN /* Good for signatures. */ #define PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC GCRY_PK_USAGE_ENCR /* Good for encryption. */ #define PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT GCRY_PK_USAGE_CERT /* Also good to certify keys.*/ #define PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH GCRY_PK_USAGE_AUTH /* Good for authentication. */ #define PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN GCRY_PK_USAGE_UNKN /* Unknown usage flag. */ #define PUBKEY_USAGE_NONE 256 /* No usage given. */ #if (GCRY_PK_USAGE_SIGN | GCRY_PK_USAGE_ENCR | GCRY_PK_USAGE_CERT \ | GCRY_PK_USAGE_AUTH | GCRY_PK_USAGE_UNKN) >= 256 # error Please choose another value for PUBKEY_USAGE_NONE #endif /* Helper macros. */ #define is_RSA(a) ((a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA || (a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E \ || (a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S ) #define is_ELGAMAL(a) ((a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E) #define is_DSA(a) ((a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA) /* A pointer to the packet object. */ typedef struct packet_struct PACKET; /* PKT_GPG_CONTROL types */ typedef enum { CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START = 1, CTRLPKT_PIPEMODE = 2, CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK =3 } ctrlpkttype_t; typedef enum { PREFTYPE_NONE = 0, PREFTYPE_SYM = 1, PREFTYPE_HASH = 2, PREFTYPE_ZIP = 3, PREFTYPE_AEAD = 4 } preftype_t; typedef struct { byte type; byte value; } prefitem_t; /* A string-to-key specifier as defined in RFC 4880, Section 3.7. */ typedef struct { int mode; /* Must be an integer due to the GNU modes 1001 et al. */ byte hash_algo; byte salt[8]; /* The *coded* (i.e., the serialized version) iteration count. */ u32 count; } STRING2KEY; /* A symmetric-key encrypted session key packet as defined in RFC 4880, Section 5.3. All fields are serialized. */ typedef struct { /* We support version 4 (rfc4880) and 5 (rfc4880bis). */ byte version; /* The cipher algorithm used to encrypt the session key. Note that * this may be different from the algorithm that is used to encrypt * bulk data. */ byte cipher_algo; /* The AEAD algorithm or 0 for CFB encryption. */ byte aead_algo; /* The string-to-key specifier. */ STRING2KEY s2k; /* The length of SESKEY in bytes or 0 if this packet does not encrypt a session key. (In the latter case, the results of the S2K function on the password is the session key. See RFC 4880, Section 5.3.) */ byte seskeylen; /* The session key as encrypted by the S2K specifier. For AEAD this * includes the nonce and the authentication tag. */ byte seskey[1]; } PKT_symkey_enc; /* A public-key encrypted session key packet as defined in RFC 4880, Section 5.1. All fields are serialized. */ typedef struct { /* The 64-bit keyid. */ u32 keyid[2]; /* The packet's version. Currently, only version 3 is defined. */ byte version; /* The algorithm used for the public key encryption scheme. */ byte pubkey_algo; /* Whether to hide the key id. This value is not directly serialized. */ byte throw_keyid; /* The session key. */ gcry_mpi_t data[PUBKEY_MAX_NENC]; } PKT_pubkey_enc; /* An object to build a list of public-key encrypted session key. */ struct pubkey_enc_list { struct pubkey_enc_list *next; u32 keyid[2]; int pubkey_algo; int result; gcry_mpi_t data[PUBKEY_MAX_NENC]; }; /* A one-pass signature packet as defined in RFC 4880, Section 5.4. All fields are serialized. */ typedef struct { u32 keyid[2]; /* The 64-bit keyid */ /* The signature's classification (RFC 4880, Section 5.2.1). */ byte sig_class; byte digest_algo; /* algorithm used for digest */ byte pubkey_algo; /* algorithm used for public key scheme */ /* A message can be signed by multiple keys. In this case, there are n one-pass signature packets before the message to sign and n signatures packets after the message. It is conceivable that someone wants to not only sign the message, but all of the signatures. Now we need to distinguish between signing the message and signing the message plus the surrounding signatures. This is the point of this flag. If set, it means: I sign all of the data starting at the next packet. */ byte last; } PKT_onepass_sig; /* A v4 OpenPGP signature has a hashed and unhashed area containing co-called signature subpackets (RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3). These areas are described by this data structure. Use enum_sig_subpkt to parse this area. */ typedef struct { size_t size; /* allocated */ size_t len; /* used (serialized) */ byte data[1]; /* the serialized subpackes (serialized) */ } subpktarea_t; /* The in-memory representation of a designated revoker signature subpacket (RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.15). */ struct revocation_key { /* A bit field. 0x80 must be set. 0x40 means this information is sensitive (and should not be uploaded to a keyserver by default). */ byte class; /* The public-key algorithm ID. */ byte algid; /* The length of the fingerprint. */ byte fprlen; /* The fingerprint of the authorized key. */ byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN]; }; /* Object to keep information about a PKA DNS record. */ typedef struct { int valid; /* An actual PKA record exists for EMAIL. */ int checked; /* Set to true if the FPR has been checked against the actual key. */ char *uri; /* Malloced string with the URI. NULL if the URI is not available.*/ unsigned char fpr[20]; /* The fingerprint as stored in the PKA RR. */ char email[1];/* The email address from the notation data. */ } pka_info_t; /* A signature packet (RFC 4880, Section 5.2). Only a subset of these fields are directly serialized (these are marked as such); the rest are read from the subpackets, which are not synthesized when serializing this data structure (i.e., when using build_packet()). Instead, the subpackets must be created by hand. */ typedef struct { struct { unsigned checked:1; /* Signature has been checked. */ unsigned valid:1; /* Signature is good (if checked is set). */ unsigned chosen_selfsig:1; /* A selfsig that is the chosen one. */ unsigned unknown_critical:1; unsigned exportable:1; unsigned revocable:1; unsigned policy_url:1; /* At least one policy URL is present */ unsigned notation:1; /* At least one notation is present */ unsigned pref_ks:1; /* At least one preferred keyserver is present */ unsigned expired:1; unsigned pka_tried:1; /* Set if we tried to retrieve the PKA record. */ } flags; /* The key that allegedly generated this signature. (Directly serialized in v3 sigs; for v4 sigs, this must be explicitly added as an issuer subpacket (5.2.3.5.) */ u32 keyid[2]; /* When the signature was made (seconds since the Epoch). (Directly serialized in v3 sigs; for v4 sigs, this must be explicitly added as a signature creation time subpacket (5.2.3.4).) */ u32 timestamp; u32 expiredate; /* Expires at this date or 0 if not at all. */ /* The serialization format used / to use. If 0, then defaults to version 3. (Serialized.) */ byte version; /* The signature type. (See RFC 4880, Section 5.2.1.) */ byte sig_class; /* Algorithm used for public key scheme (e.g., PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA). (Serialized.) */ byte pubkey_algo; /* Algorithm used for digest (e.g., DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1). (Serialized.) */ byte digest_algo; byte trust_depth; byte trust_value; const byte *trust_regexp; struct revocation_key *revkey; int numrevkeys; int help_counter; /* Used internally bu some functions. */ pka_info_t *pka_info; /* Malloced PKA data or NULL if not available. See also flags.pka_tried. */ char *signers_uid; /* Malloced value of the SIGNERS_UID * subpacket or NULL. This string has * already been sanitized. */ subpktarea_t *hashed; /* All subpackets with hashed data (v4 only). */ subpktarea_t *unhashed; /* Ditto for unhashed data. */ /* First 2 bytes of the digest. (Serialized. Note: this is not automatically filled in when serializing a signature!) */ byte digest_start[2]; /* The signature. (Serialized.) */ gcry_mpi_t data[PUBKEY_MAX_NSIG]; /* The message digest and its length (in bytes). Note the maximum digest length is 512 bits (64 bytes). If DIGEST_LEN is 0, then the digest's value has not been saved here. */ byte digest[512 / 8]; int digest_len; } PKT_signature; #define ATTRIB_IMAGE 1 /* This is the cooked form of attributes. */ struct user_attribute { byte type; const byte *data; u32 len; }; /* A user id (RFC 4880, Section 5.11) or a user attribute packet (RFC 4880, Section 5.12). Only a subset of these fields are directly serialized (these are marked as such); the rest are read from the self-signatures in merge_keys_and_selfsig()). */ typedef struct { int ref; /* reference counter */ /* The length of NAME. */ int len; struct user_attribute *attribs; int numattribs; /* If this is not NULL, the packet is a user attribute rather than a user id (See RFC 4880 5.12). (Serialized.) */ byte *attrib_data; /* The length of ATTRIB_DATA. */ unsigned long attrib_len; byte *namehash; int help_key_usage; u32 help_key_expire; int help_full_count; int help_marginal_count; u32 expiredate; /* expires at this date or 0 if not at all */ prefitem_t *prefs; /* list of preferences (may be NULL)*/ u32 created; /* according to the self-signature */ u32 keyupdate; /* From the ring trust packet. */ char *updateurl; /* NULL or the URL of the last update origin. */ byte keyorg; /* From the ring trust packet. */ byte selfsigversion; struct { unsigned int mdc:1; unsigned int aead:1; unsigned int ks_modify:1; unsigned int compacted:1; unsigned int primary:2; /* 2 if set via the primary flag, 1 if calculated */ unsigned int revoked:1; unsigned int expired:1; } flags; char *mbox; /* NULL or the result of mailbox_from_userid. */ /* The text contained in the user id packet, which is normally the * name and email address of the key holder (See RFC 4880 5.11). * (Serialized.). For convenience an extra Nul is always appended. */ char name[1]; } PKT_user_id; struct revoke_info { /* revoked at this date */ u32 date; /* the keyid of the revoking key (selfsig or designated revoker) */ u32 keyid[2]; /* the algo of the revoking key */ byte algo; }; /* Information pertaining to secret keys. */ struct seckey_info { int is_protected:1; /* The secret info is protected and must */ /* be decrypted before use, the protected */ /* MPIs are simply (void*) pointers to memory */ /* and should never be passed to a mpi_xxx() */ int sha1chk:1; /* SHA1 is used instead of a 16 bit checksum */ u16 csum; /* Checksum for old protection modes. */ byte algo; /* Cipher used to protect the secret information. */ STRING2KEY s2k; /* S2K parameter. */ byte ivlen; /* Used length of the IV. */ byte iv[16]; /* Initialization vector for CFB mode. */ }; /**************** * The in-memory representation of a public key (RFC 4880, Section * 5.5). Note: this structure contains significantly more information * than is contained in an OpenPGP public key packet. This * information is derived from the self-signed signatures (by * merge_keys_and_selfsig()) and is ignored when serializing the * packet. The fields that are actually written out when serializing * this packet are marked as accordingly. * * We assume that secret keys have the same number of parameters as * the public key and that the public parameters are the first items * in the PKEY array. Thus NPKEY is always less than NSKEY and it is * possible to compare the secret and public keys by comparing the * first NPKEY elements of the PKEY array. Note that since GnuPG 2.1 * we don't use secret keys anymore directly because they are managed * by gpg-agent. However for parsing OpenPGP key files we need a way * to temporary store those secret keys. We do this by putting them * into the public key structure and extending the PKEY field to NSKEY * elements; the extra secret key information are stored in the * SECKEY_INFO field. */ typedef struct { /* When the key was created. (Serialized.) */ u32 timestamp; u32 expiredate; /* expires at this date or 0 if not at all */ u32 max_expiredate; /* must not expire past this date */ struct revoke_info revoked; /* An OpenPGP packet consists of a header and a body. This is the size of the header. If this is 0, an appropriate size is automatically chosen based on the size of the body. (Serialized.) */ byte hdrbytes; /* The serialization format. If 0, the default version (4) is used when serializing. (Serialized.) */ byte version; byte selfsigversion; /* highest version of all of the self-sigs */ /* The public key algorithm. (Serialized.) */ byte pubkey_algo; byte pubkey_usage; /* for now only used to pass it to getkey() */ byte req_usage; /* hack to pass a request to getkey() */ byte fprlen; /* 0 or length of FPR. */ u32 has_expired; /* set to the expiration date if expired */ /* keyid of the primary key. Never access this value directly. Instead, use pk_main_keyid(). */ u32 main_keyid[2]; /* keyid of this key. Never access this value directly! Instead, use pk_keyid(). */ u32 keyid[2]; /* Fingerprint of the key. Only valid if FPRLEN is not 0. */ byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN]; prefitem_t *prefs; /* list of preferences (may be NULL) */ struct { unsigned int mdc:1; /* MDC feature set. */ unsigned int aead:1; /* AEAD feature set. */ unsigned int disabled_valid:1;/* The next flag is valid. */ unsigned int disabled:1; /* The key has been disabled. */ unsigned int primary:1; /* This is a primary key. */ unsigned int revoked:2; /* Key has been revoked. 1 = revoked by the owner 2 = revoked by designated revoker. */ unsigned int maybe_revoked:1; /* A designated revocation is present, but without the key to check it. */ unsigned int valid:1; /* Key (especially subkey) is valid. */ unsigned int dont_cache:1; /* Do not cache this key. */ unsigned int backsig:2; /* 0=none, 1=bad, 2=good. */ unsigned int serialno_valid:1;/* SERIALNO below is valid. */ unsigned int exact:1; /* Found via exact (!) search. */ } flags; PKT_user_id *user_id; /* If != NULL: found by that uid. */ struct revocation_key *revkey; int numrevkeys; u32 trust_timestamp; byte trust_depth; byte trust_value; byte keyorg; /* From the ring trust packet. */ u32 keyupdate; /* From the ring trust packet. */ char *updateurl; /* NULL or the URL of the last update origin. */ const byte *trust_regexp; char *serialno; /* Malloced hex string or NULL if it is likely not on a card. See also flags.serialno_valid. */ /* If not NULL this malloced structure describes a secret key. (Serialized.) */ struct seckey_info *seckey_info; /* The public key. Contains pubkey_get_npkey (pubkey_algo) + pubkey_get_nskey (pubkey_algo) MPIs. (If pubkey_get_npkey returns 0, then the algorithm is not understood and the PKEY contains a single opaque MPI.) (Serialized.) */ gcry_mpi_t pkey[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY]; /* Right, NSKEY elements. */ } PKT_public_key; /* Evaluates as true if the pk is disabled, and false if it isn't. If there is no disable value cached, fill one in. */ #define pk_is_disabled(a) \ (((a)->flags.disabled_valid)? \ ((a)->flags.disabled):(cache_disabled_value(ctrl,(a)))) typedef struct { int len; /* length of data */ char data[1]; } PKT_comment; /* A compression packet (RFC 4880, Section 5.6). */ typedef struct { /* Not used. */ u32 len; /* Whether the serialized version of the packet used / should use the new format. */ byte new_ctb; /* The compression algorithm. */ byte algorithm; /* An iobuf holding the data to be decompressed. (This is not used for compression!) */ iobuf_t buf; } PKT_compressed; /* A symmetrically encrypted data packet (RFC 4880, Section 5.7) or a symmetrically encrypted integrity protected data packet (Section 5.13) */ typedef struct { /* Remaining length of encrypted data. */ u32 len; /* When encrypting in CFB mode, the first block size bytes of data * are random data and the following 2 bytes are copies of the last * two bytes of the random data (RFC 4880, Section 5.7). This * provides a simple check that the key is correct. EXTRALEN is the * size of this extra data or, in AEAD mode, the length of the * headers and the tags. This is used by build_packet when writing * out the packet's header. */ int extralen; /* Whether the serialized version of the packet used / should use the new format. */ byte new_ctb; /* Whether the packet has an indeterminate length (old format) or was encoded using partial body length headers (new format). Note: this is ignored when encrypting. */ byte is_partial; /* If 0, MDC is disabled. Otherwise, the MDC method that was used (only DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 has ever been defined). */ byte mdc_method; /* If 0, AEAD is not used. Otherwise, the used AEAD algorithm. * MDC_METHOD (above) shall be zero if AEAD is used. */ byte aead_algo; /* The cipher algo for/from the AEAD packet. 0 for other encryption * packets. */ byte cipher_algo; /* The chunk byte from the AEAD packet. */ byte chunkbyte; /* An iobuf holding the data to be decrypted. (This is not used for encryption!) */ iobuf_t buf; } PKT_encrypted; typedef struct { byte hash[20]; } PKT_mdc; /* Subtypes for the ring trust packet. */ #define RING_TRUST_SIG 0 /* The classical signature cache. */ #define RING_TRUST_KEY 1 /* A KEYORG on a primary key. */ #define RING_TRUST_UID 2 /* A KEYORG on a user id. */ /* The local only ring trust packet which OpenPGP declares as * implementation defined. GnuPG uses this to cache signature * verification status and since 2.1.18 also to convey information * about the origin of a key. Note that this packet is not part * struct packet_struct because we use it only local in the packet * parser and builder. */ typedef struct { unsigned int trustval; unsigned int sigcache; unsigned char subtype; /* The subtype of this ring trust packet. */ unsigned char keyorg; /* The origin of the key (KEYORG_*). */ u32 keyupdate; /* The wall time the key was last updated. */ char *url; /* NULL or the URL of the source. */ } PKT_ring_trust; /* A plaintext packet (see RFC 4880, 5.9). */ typedef struct { /* The length of data in BUF or 0 if unknown. */ u32 len; /* A buffer containing the data stored in the packet's body. */ iobuf_t buf; byte new_ctb; byte is_partial; /* partial length encoded */ /* The data's formatting. This is either 'b', 't', 'u', 'l' or '1' (however, the last two are deprecated). */ int mode; u32 timestamp; /* The name of the file. This can be at most 255 characters long, since namelen is just a byte in the serialized format. */ int namelen; char name[1]; } PKT_plaintext; typedef struct { int control; size_t datalen; char data[1]; } PKT_gpg_control; /* combine all packets into a union */ struct packet_struct { pkttype_t pkttype; union { void *generic; PKT_symkey_enc *symkey_enc; /* PKT_SYMKEY_ENC */ PKT_pubkey_enc *pubkey_enc; /* PKT_PUBKEY_ENC */ PKT_onepass_sig *onepass_sig; /* PKT_ONEPASS_SIG */ PKT_signature *signature; /* PKT_SIGNATURE */ PKT_public_key *public_key; /* PKT_PUBLIC_[SUB]KEY */ PKT_public_key *secret_key; /* PKT_SECRET_[SUB]KEY */ PKT_comment *comment; /* PKT_COMMENT */ PKT_user_id *user_id; /* PKT_USER_ID */ PKT_compressed *compressed; /* PKT_COMPRESSED */ PKT_encrypted *encrypted; /* PKT_ENCRYPTED[_MDC] */ PKT_mdc *mdc; /* PKT_MDC */ PKT_plaintext *plaintext; /* PKT_PLAINTEXT */ PKT_gpg_control *gpg_control; /* PKT_GPG_CONTROL */ } pkt; }; #define init_packet(a) do { (a)->pkttype = 0; \ (a)->pkt.generic = NULL; \ } while(0) /* A notation. See RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.16. */ struct notation { /* The notation's name. */ char *name; /* If the notation is human readable, then the value is stored here as a NUL-terminated string. If it is not human readable a human readable approximation of the binary value _may_ be stored here. */ char *value; /* Sometimes we want to %-expand the value. In these cases, we save that transformed value here. */ char *altvalue; /* If the notation is not human readable, then the value is stored here. */ unsigned char *bdat; /* The amount of data stored in BDAT. Note: if this is 0 and BDAT is NULL, this does not necessarily mean that the value is human readable. It could be that we have a 0-length value. To determine whether the notation is human readable, always check if VALUE is not NULL. This works, because if a human-readable value has a length of 0, we will still allocate space for the NUL byte. */ size_t blen; struct { /* The notation is critical. */ unsigned int critical:1; /* The notation is human readable. */ unsigned int human:1; /* The notation should be deleted. */ unsigned int ignore:1; } flags; /* A field to facilitate creating a list of notations. */ struct notation *next; }; typedef struct notation *notation_t; /*-- mainproc.c --*/ void reset_literals_seen(void); int proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *ctx, iobuf_t a ); int proc_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *ctx, iobuf_t a, strlist_t signedfiles, const char *sigfile ); int proc_signature_packets_by_fd (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, IOBUF a, int signed_data_fd ); int proc_encryption_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *ctx, iobuf_t a); int list_packets( iobuf_t a ); const byte *issuer_fpr_raw (PKT_signature *sig, size_t *r_len); char *issuer_fpr_string (PKT_signature *sig); /*-- parse-packet.c --*/ void register_known_notation (const char *string); /* Sets the packet list mode to MODE (i.e., whether we are dumping a packet or not). Returns the current mode. This allows for temporarily suspending dumping by doing the following: int saved_mode = set_packet_list_mode (0); ... set_packet_list_mode (saved_mode); */ int set_packet_list_mode( int mode ); /* A context used with parse_packet. */ struct parse_packet_ctx_s { iobuf_t inp; /* The input stream with the packets. */ struct packet_struct last_pkt; /* The last parsed packet. */ int free_last_pkt; /* Indicates that LAST_PKT must be freed. */ int skip_meta; /* Skip ring trust packets. */ unsigned int n_parsed_packets; /* Number of parsed packets. */ }; typedef struct parse_packet_ctx_s *parse_packet_ctx_t; #define init_parse_packet(a,i) do { \ (a)->inp = (i); \ (a)->last_pkt.pkttype = 0; \ (a)->last_pkt.pkt.generic= NULL;\ (a)->free_last_pkt = 0; \ (a)->skip_meta = 0; \ (a)->n_parsed_packets = 0; \ } while (0) #define deinit_parse_packet(a) do { \ if ((a)->free_last_pkt) \ free_packet (NULL, (a)); \ } while (0) #if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET /* There are debug functions and should not be used directly. */ int dbg_search_packet (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt, off_t *retpos, int with_uid, const char* file, int lineno ); int dbg_parse_packet (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *ret_pkt, const char *file, int lineno); int dbg_copy_all_packets( iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out, const char* file, int lineno ); int dbg_copy_some_packets( iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out, off_t stopoff, const char* file, int lineno ); int dbg_skip_some_packets( iobuf_t inp, unsigned n, const char* file, int lineno ); #define search_packet( a,b,c,d ) \ dbg_search_packet( (a), (b), (c), (d), __FILE__, __LINE__ ) #define parse_packet( a, b ) \ dbg_parse_packet( (a), (b), __FILE__, __LINE__ ) #define copy_all_packets( a,b ) \ dbg_copy_all_packets((a),(b), __FILE__, __LINE__ ) #define copy_some_packets( a,b,c ) \ dbg_copy_some_packets((a),(b),(c), __FILE__, __LINE__ ) #define skip_some_packets( a,b ) \ dbg_skip_some_packets((a),(b), __FILE__, __LINE__ ) #else /* Return the next valid OpenPGP packet in *PKT. (This function will * skip any packets whose type is 0.) CTX must have been setup prior to * calling this function. * * Returns 0 on success, -1 if EOF is reached, and an error code * otherwise. In the case of an error, the packet in *PKT may be * partially constructed. As such, even if there is an error, it is * necessary to free *PKT to avoid a resource leak. To detect what * has been allocated, clear *PKT before calling this function. */ int parse_packet (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt); /* Return the first OpenPGP packet in *PKT that contains a key (either * a public subkey, a public key, a secret subkey or a secret key) or, * if WITH_UID is set, a user id. * * Saves the position in the pipeline of the start of the returned * packet (according to iobuf_tell) in RETPOS, if it is not NULL. * * The return semantics are the same as parse_packet. */ int search_packet (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt, off_t *retpos, int with_uid); /* Copy all packets (except invalid packets, i.e., those with a type * of 0) from INP to OUT until either an error occurs or EOF is * reached. * * Returns -1 when end of file is reached or an error code, if an * error occurred. (Note: this function never returns 0, because it * effectively keeps going until it gets an EOF.) */ int copy_all_packets (iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out ); /* Like copy_all_packets, but stops at the first packet that starts at * or after STOPOFF (as indicated by iobuf_tell). * * Example: if STOPOFF is 100, the first packet in INP goes from * 0 to 110 and the next packet starts at offset 111, then the packet * starting at offset 0 will be completely processed (even though it * extends beyond STOPOFF) and the packet starting at offset 111 will * not be processed at all. */ int copy_some_packets (iobuf_t inp, iobuf_t out, off_t stopoff); /* Skips the next N packets from INP. * * If parsing a packet returns an error code, then the function stops * immediately and returns the error code. Note: in the case of an * error, this function does not indicate how many packets were * successfully processed. */ int skip_some_packets (iobuf_t inp, unsigned int n); #endif /* Parse a signature packet and store it in *SIG. The signature packet is read from INP. The OpenPGP header (the tag and the packet's length) have already been read; the next byte read from INP should be the first byte of the packet's contents. The packet's type (as extract from the tag) must be passed as PKTTYPE and the packet's length must be passed as PKTLEN. This is used as the upper bound on the amount of data read from INP. If the packet is shorter than PKTLEN, the data at the end will be silently skipped. If an error occurs, an error code will be returned. -1 means the EOF was encountered. 0 means parsing was successful. */ int parse_signature( iobuf_t inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PKT_signature *sig ); /* Given a subpacket area (typically either PKT_signature.hashed or PKT_signature.unhashed), either: - test whether there are any subpackets with the critical bit set that we don't understand, - list the subpackets, or, - find a subpacket with a specific type. REQTYPE indicates the type of operation. If REQTYPE is SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL, then this function checks whether there are any subpackets that have the critical bit and which GnuPG cannot handle. If GnuPG understands all subpackets whose critical bit is set, then this function returns simply returns SUBPKTS. If there is a subpacket whose critical bit is set and which GnuPG does not understand, then this function returns NULL and, if START is not NULL, sets *START to the 1-based index of the subpacket that violates the constraint. If REQTYPE is SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED or SIGSUBPKT_LIST_UNHASHED, the packets are dumped. Note: if REQTYPE is SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED, this function does not check whether the hash is correct; this is merely an indication of the section that the subpackets came from. If REQTYPE is anything else, then this function interprets the values as a subpacket type and looks for the first subpacket with that type. If such a packet is found, *CRITICAL (if not NULL) is set if the critical bit was set, *RET_N is set to the offset of the subpacket's content within the SUBPKTS buffer, *START is set to the 1-based index of the subpacket within the buffer, and returns &SUBPKTS[*RET_N]. *START is the number of initial subpackets to not consider. Thus, if *START is 2, then the first 2 subpackets are ignored. */ const byte *enum_sig_subpkt ( const subpktarea_t *subpkts, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype, size_t *ret_n, int *start, int *critical ); /* Shorthand for: enum_sig_subpkt (buffer, reqtype, ret_n, NULL, NULL); */ const byte *parse_sig_subpkt ( const subpktarea_t *buffer, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype, size_t *ret_n ); /* This calls parse_sig_subpkt first on the hashed signature area in SIG and then, if that returns NULL, calls parse_sig_subpkt on the unhashed subpacket area in SIG. */ const byte *parse_sig_subpkt2 ( PKT_signature *sig, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype); /* Returns whether the N byte large buffer BUFFER is sufficient to hold a subpacket of type TYPE. Note: the buffer refers to the contents of the subpacket (not the header) and it must already be initialized: for some subpackets, it checks some internal constraints. Returns 0 if the size is acceptable. Returns -2 if the buffer is definitely too short. To check for an error, check whether the return value is less than 0. */ int parse_one_sig_subpkt( const byte *buffer, size_t n, int type ); /* Looks for revocation key subpackets (see RFC 4880 5.2.3.15) in the hashed area of the signature packet. Any that are found are added to SIG->REVKEY and SIG->NUMREVKEYS is updated appropriately. */ void parse_revkeys(PKT_signature *sig); /* Extract the attributes from the buffer at UID->ATTRIB_DATA and update UID->ATTRIBS and UID->NUMATTRIBS accordingly. */ int parse_attribute_subpkts(PKT_user_id *uid); /* Set the UID->NAME field according to the attributes. MAX_NAMELEN must be at least 71. */ void make_attribute_uidname(PKT_user_id *uid, size_t max_namelen); /* Allocate and initialize a new GPG control packet. DATA is the data to save in the packet. */ PACKET *create_gpg_control ( ctrlpkttype_t type, const byte *data, size_t datalen ); /*-- build-packet.c --*/ int build_packet (iobuf_t out, PACKET *pkt); gpg_error_t build_packet_and_meta (iobuf_t out, PACKET *pkt); gpg_error_t gpg_mpi_write (iobuf_t out, gcry_mpi_t a, unsigned int *t_nwritten); gpg_error_t gpg_mpi_write_nohdr (iobuf_t out, gcry_mpi_t a); u32 calc_packet_length( PACKET *pkt ); void build_sig_subpkt( PKT_signature *sig, sigsubpkttype_t type, const byte *buffer, size_t buflen ); void build_sig_subpkt_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig, PKT_public_key *pksk); int delete_sig_subpkt(subpktarea_t *buffer, sigsubpkttype_t type ); void build_attribute_subpkt(PKT_user_id *uid,byte type, const void *buf,u32 buflen, const void *header,u32 headerlen); struct notation *string_to_notation(const char *string,int is_utf8); struct notation *blob_to_notation(const char *name, const char *data, size_t len); struct notation *sig_to_notation(PKT_signature *sig); void free_notation(struct notation *notation); /*-- free-packet.c --*/ void free_symkey_enc( PKT_symkey_enc *enc ); void free_pubkey_enc( PKT_pubkey_enc *enc ); void free_seckey_enc( PKT_signature *enc ); void release_public_key_parts( PKT_public_key *pk ); void free_public_key( PKT_public_key *key ); void free_attributes(PKT_user_id *uid); void free_user_id( PKT_user_id *uid ); void free_comment( PKT_comment *rem ); void free_packet (PACKET *pkt, parse_packet_ctx_t parsectx); prefitem_t *copy_prefs (const prefitem_t *prefs); PKT_public_key *copy_public_key( PKT_public_key *d, PKT_public_key *s ); PKT_signature *copy_signature( PKT_signature *d, PKT_signature *s ); PKT_user_id *scopy_user_id (PKT_user_id *sd ); int cmp_public_keys( PKT_public_key *a, PKT_public_key *b ); int cmp_signatures( PKT_signature *a, PKT_signature *b ); int cmp_user_ids( PKT_user_id *a, PKT_user_id *b ); /*-- sig-check.c --*/ /* Check a signature. This is shorthand for check_signature2 with the unnamed arguments passed as NULL. */ int check_signature (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest); /* Check a signature. Looks up the public key from the key db. (If * R_PK is not NULL, it is stored at RET_PK.) DIGEST contains a * valid hash context that already includes the signed data. This * function adds the relevant meta-data to the hash before finalizing * it and verifying the signature. */ gpg_error_t check_signature2 (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t digest, const void *extrahash, size_t extrahashlen, u32 *r_expiredate, int *r_expired, int *r_revoked, PKT_public_key **r_pk); /*-- pubkey-enc.c --*/ gpg_error_t get_session_key (ctrl_t ctrl, struct pubkey_enc_list *k, DEK *dek); gpg_error_t get_override_session_key (DEK *dek, const char *string); /*-- compress.c --*/ int handle_compressed (ctrl_t ctrl, void *ctx, PKT_compressed *cd, int (*callback)(iobuf_t, void *), void *passthru ); /*-- encr-data.c --*/ int decrypt_data (ctrl_t ctrl, void *ctx, PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek ); /*-- plaintext.c --*/ gpg_error_t get_output_file (const byte *embedded_name, int embedded_namelen, iobuf_t data, char **fnamep, estream_t *fpp); int handle_plaintext( PKT_plaintext *pt, md_filter_context_t *mfx, int nooutput, int clearsig ); int ask_for_detached_datafile( gcry_md_hd_t md, gcry_md_hd_t md2, const char *inname, int textmode ); /*-- sign.c --*/ int make_keysig_packet (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid, PKT_public_key *subpk, - PKT_public_key *pksk, int sigclass, int digest_algo, + PKT_public_key *pksk, int sigclass, u32 timestamp, u32 duration, int (*mksubpkt)(PKT_signature *, void *), void *opaque, const char *cache_nonce); gpg_error_t update_keysig_packet (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_signature *orig_sig, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid, PKT_public_key *subpk, PKT_public_key *pksk, int (*mksubpkt)(PKT_signature *, void *), void *opaque ); /*-- keygen.c --*/ PKT_user_id *generate_user_id (kbnode_t keyblock, const char *uidstr); #endif /*G10_PACKET_H*/ diff --git a/g10/revoke.c b/g10/revoke.c index e8ce3544c..e63060cb9 100644 --- a/g10/revoke.c +++ b/g10/revoke.c @@ -1,904 +1,904 @@ /* revoke.c - Create recovation certificates. * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, * 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * * This file is part of GnuPG. * * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, see . */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "gpg.h" #include "options.h" #include "packet.h" #include "../common/status.h" #include "keydb.h" #include "../common/util.h" #include "main.h" #include "../common/ttyio.h" #include "../common/i18n.h" #include "call-agent.h" struct revocation_reason_info { int code; char *desc; }; int revocation_reason_build_cb( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque ) { struct revocation_reason_info *reason = opaque; char *ud = NULL; byte *buffer; size_t buflen = 1; if(!reason) return 0; if( reason->desc ) { ud = native_to_utf8( reason->desc ); buflen += strlen(ud); } buffer = xmalloc( buflen ); *buffer = reason->code; if( ud ) { memcpy(buffer+1, ud, strlen(ud) ); xfree( ud ); } build_sig_subpkt( sig, SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON, buffer, buflen ); xfree( buffer ); return 0; } /* Outputs a minimal pk (as defined by 2440) from a keyblock. A minimal pk consists of the public key packet and a user ID. We try and pick a user ID that has a uid signature, and include it if possible. */ static int export_minimal_pk(IOBUF out,KBNODE keyblock, PKT_signature *revsig,PKT_signature *revkey) { KBNODE node; PACKET pkt; PKT_user_id *uid=NULL; PKT_signature *selfsig=NULL; u32 keyid[2]; int rc; node=find_kbnode(keyblock,PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); if(!node) { log_error("key incomplete\n"); return GPG_ERR_GENERAL; } keyid_from_pk(node->pkt->pkt.public_key,keyid); pkt=*node->pkt; rc=build_packet(out,&pkt); if(rc) { log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc) ); return rc; } init_packet(&pkt); pkt.pkttype=PKT_SIGNATURE; /* the revocation itself, if any. 2440 likes this to come first. */ if(revsig) { pkt.pkt.signature=revsig; rc=build_packet(out,&pkt); if(rc) { log_error("build_packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) ); return rc; } } /* If a revkey in a 1F sig is present, include it too */ if(revkey) { pkt.pkt.signature=revkey; rc=build_packet(out,&pkt); if(rc) { log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc) ); return rc; } } while(!selfsig) { KBNODE signode; node=find_next_kbnode(node,PKT_USER_ID); if(!node) { /* We're out of user IDs - none were self-signed. */ if(uid) break; else { log_error(_("key %s has no user IDs\n"),keystr(keyid)); return GPG_ERR_GENERAL; } } if(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) continue; uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id; signode=node; while((signode=find_next_kbnode(signode,PKT_SIGNATURE))) { if(keyid[0]==signode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0] && keyid[1]==signode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] && IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature)) { selfsig=signode->pkt->pkt.signature; break; } } } pkt.pkttype=PKT_USER_ID; pkt.pkt.user_id=uid; rc=build_packet(out,&pkt); if(rc) { log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc) ); return rc; } if(selfsig) { pkt.pkttype=PKT_SIGNATURE; pkt.pkt.signature=selfsig; rc=build_packet(out,&pkt); if(rc) { log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc) ); return rc; } } return 0; } /**************** * Generate a revocation certificate for UNAME via a designated revoker */ int gen_desig_revoke (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *uname, strlist_t locusr) { int rc = 0; armor_filter_context_t *afx; PKT_public_key *pk = NULL; PKT_public_key *pk2 = NULL; PKT_signature *sig = NULL; IOBUF out = NULL; struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL; KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd; KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc; KBNODE keyblock=NULL,node; u32 keyid[2]; int i,any=0; SK_LIST sk_list=NULL; if( opt.batch ) { log_error(_("can't do this in batch mode\n")); return GPG_ERR_GENERAL; } afx = new_armor_context (); kdbhd = keydb_new (); if (!kdbhd) { rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } rc = classify_user_id (uname, &desc, 1); if (!rc) rc = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL); if (rc) { log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),uname, gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } rc = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock ); if( rc ) { log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc) ); goto leave; } /* To parse the revkeys */ merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock); /* get the key from the keyblock */ node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ); if( !node ) BUG (); pk=node->pkt->pkt.public_key; keyid_from_pk(pk,keyid); if(locusr) { rc = build_sk_list (ctrl, locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT); if(rc) goto leave; } /* Are we a designated revoker for this key? */ if(!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys) BUG(); for(i=0;inumrevkeys;i++) { SK_LIST list; free_public_key (pk2); pk2 = NULL; if(sk_list) { for(list=sk_list;list;list=list->next) { byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN]; size_t fprlen; fingerprint_from_pk (list->pk, fpr, &fprlen); /* Don't get involved with keys that don't have a v4 * or v5 fingerprint */ if (fprlen != 20 && fprlen != 32) continue; if (!memcmp(fpr,pk->revkey[i].fpr, fprlen)) break; } if (list) pk2 = copy_public_key (NULL, list->pk); else continue; } else { pk2 = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk2); rc = get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, pk2, NULL, pk->revkey[i].fpr, pk->revkey[i].fprlen); } /* We have the revocation key. */ if(!rc) { PKT_signature *revkey = NULL; any = 1; print_pubkey_info (ctrl, NULL, pk); tty_printf ("\n"); tty_printf (_("To be revoked by:\n")); print_seckey_info (ctrl, pk2); if(pk->revkey[i].class&0x40) tty_printf(_("(This is a sensitive revocation key)\n")); tty_printf("\n"); rc = agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, pk2); if (rc) { tty_printf (_("Secret key is not available.\n")); continue; } if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("gen_desig_revoke.okay", _("Create a designated revocation certificate for this key? (y/N) "))) continue; /* get the reason for the revocation (this is always v4) */ reason = ask_revocation_reason( 1, 0, 1 ); if( !reason ) continue; if( !opt.armor ) tty_printf(_("ASCII armored output forced.\n")); if( (rc = open_outfile (-1, NULL, 0, 1, &out )) ) goto leave; afx->what = 1; afx->hdrlines = "Comment: A designated revocation certificate" " should follow\n"; push_armor_filter (afx, out); /* create it */ - rc = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk2, 0x20, 0, + rc = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk2, 0x20, 0, 0, revocation_reason_build_cb, reason, NULL); if( rc ) { log_error(_("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } /* Spit out a minimal pk as well, since otherwise there is no way to know which key to attach this revocation to. Also include the direct key signature that contains this revocation key. We're allowed to include sensitive revocation keys along with a revocation, as this may be the only time the recipient has seen it. Note that this means that if we have multiple different sensitive revocation keys in a given direct key signature, we're going to include them all here. This is annoying, but the good outweighs the bad, since without including this a sensitive revoker can't really do their job. People should not include multiple sensitive revocation keys in one signature: 2440 says "Note that it may be appropriate to isolate this subpacket within a separate signature so that it is not combined with other subpackets that need to be exported." -dms */ while(!revkey) { KBNODE signode; signode=find_next_kbnode(node,PKT_SIGNATURE); if(!signode) break; node=signode; if(keyid[0]==signode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0] && keyid[1]==signode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] && IS_KEY_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature)) { int j; for(j=0;jpkt->pkt.signature->numrevkeys;j++) { if (pk->revkey[i].class == signode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[j].class && pk->revkey[i].algid == signode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[j].algid && pk->revkey[i].fprlen == signode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[j].fprlen && !memcmp (pk->revkey[i].fpr, signode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[j].fpr, pk->revkey[i].fprlen)) { revkey = signode->pkt->pkt.signature; break; } } } } if(!revkey) BUG(); rc=export_minimal_pk(out,keyblock,sig,revkey); if(rc) goto leave; /* and issue a usage notice */ tty_printf(_("Revocation certificate created.\n")); break; } } if(!any) log_error(_("no revocation keys found for \"%s\"\n"),uname); leave: free_public_key (pk); free_public_key (pk2); if( sig ) free_seckey_enc( sig ); release_sk_list(sk_list); if( rc ) iobuf_cancel(out); else iobuf_close(out); release_revocation_reason_info( reason ); release_armor_context (afx); return rc; } /* Common core to create the revocation. FILENAME may be NULL to write to stdout or the filename given by --output. REASON describes the revocation reason. PSK is the public primary key - we expect that a corresponding secret key is available. KEYBLOCK is the entire KEYBLOCK which is used in PGP mode to write a minimal key and not just the naked revocation signature; it may be NULL. If LEADINTEXT is not NULL, it is written right before the (armored) output.*/ static int create_revocation (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *filename, struct revocation_reason_info *reason, PKT_public_key *psk, kbnode_t keyblock, const char *leadintext, int suffix, const char *cache_nonce) { int rc; iobuf_t out = NULL; armor_filter_context_t *afx; PKT_signature *sig = NULL; PACKET pkt; afx = new_armor_context (); if ((rc = open_outfile (-1, filename, suffix, 1, &out))) goto leave; if (leadintext ) iobuf_writestr (out, leadintext); afx->what = 1; afx->hdrlines = "Comment: This is a revocation certificate\n"; push_armor_filter (afx, out); - rc = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, psk, NULL, NULL, psk, 0x20, 0, + rc = make_keysig_packet (ctrl, &sig, psk, NULL, NULL, psk, 0x20, 0, 0, revocation_reason_build_cb, reason, cache_nonce); if (rc) { log_error (_("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } if (keyblock && (PGP7 || PGP8)) { /* Use a minimal pk for PGPx mode, since PGP can't import bare revocation certificates. */ rc = export_minimal_pk (out, keyblock, sig, NULL); if (rc) goto leave; } else { init_packet (&pkt); pkt.pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; pkt.pkt.signature = sig; rc = build_packet (out, &pkt); if (rc) { log_error (_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } } leave: if (sig) free_seckey_enc (sig); if (rc) iobuf_cancel (out); else iobuf_close (out); release_armor_context (afx); return rc; } /* This function is used to generate a standard revocation certificate by gpg's interactive key generation function. The certificate is stored at a dedicated place in a slightly modified form to avoid an accidental import. PSK is the primary key; a corresponding secret key must be available. CACHE_NONCE is optional but can be used to help gpg-agent to avoid an extra passphrase prompt. */ int gen_standard_revoke (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *psk, const char *cache_nonce) { int rc; estream_t memfp; struct revocation_reason_info reason; char *dir, *tmpstr, *fname; void *leadin; size_t len; u32 keyid[2]; int kl; char *orig_codeset; char *old_outfile; dir = get_openpgp_revocdir (gnupg_homedir ()); tmpstr = hexfingerprint (psk, NULL, 0); if (!tmpstr) { rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); xfree (dir); return rc; } fname = strconcat (dir, DIRSEP_S, tmpstr, NULL); if (!fname) { rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); xfree (tmpstr); xfree (dir); return rc; } xfree (tmpstr); xfree (dir); keyid_from_pk (psk, keyid); memfp = es_fopenmem (0, "r+"); if (!memfp) log_fatal ("error creating memory stream\n"); orig_codeset = i18n_switchto_utf8 (); es_fprintf (memfp, "%s\n\n", _("This is a revocation certificate for the OpenPGP key:")); print_key_line (ctrl, memfp, psk, 0); if (opt.keyid_format != KF_NONE) print_fingerprint (ctrl, memfp, psk, 3); kl = opt.keyid_format == KF_NONE? 0 : keystrlen (); tmpstr = get_user_id (ctrl, keyid, &len, NULL); es_fprintf (memfp, "uid%*s%.*s\n\n", kl + 10, "", (int)len, tmpstr); xfree (tmpstr); es_fprintf (memfp, "%s\n\n%s\n\n%s\n\n:", _("A revocation certificate is a kind of \"kill switch\" to publicly\n" "declare that a key shall not anymore be used. It is not possible\n" "to retract such a revocation certificate once it has been published."), _("Use it to revoke this key in case of a compromise or loss of\n" "the secret key. However, if the secret key is still accessible,\n" "it is better to generate a new revocation certificate and give\n" "a reason for the revocation. For details see the description of\n" "of the gpg command \"--generate-revocation\" in the " "GnuPG manual."), _("To avoid an accidental use of this file, a colon has been inserted\n" "before the 5 dashes below. Remove this colon with a text editor\n" "before importing and publishing this revocation certificate.")); es_putc (0, memfp); i18n_switchback (orig_codeset); if (es_fclose_snatch (memfp, &leadin, NULL)) log_fatal ("error snatching memory stream\n"); reason.code = 0x00; /* No particular reason. */ reason.desc = NULL; old_outfile = opt.outfile; opt.outfile = NULL; rc = create_revocation (ctrl, fname, &reason, psk, NULL, leadin, 3, cache_nonce); opt.outfile = old_outfile; if (!rc && !opt.quiet) log_info (_("revocation certificate stored as '%s.rev'\n"), fname); xfree (leadin); xfree (fname); return rc; } /**************** * Generate a revocation certificate for UNAME */ int gen_revoke (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *uname) { int rc = 0; PKT_public_key *psk; u32 keyid[2]; kbnode_t keyblock = NULL; kbnode_t node; KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd; struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL; KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc; if( opt.batch ) { log_error(_("can't do this in batch mode\n")); return GPG_ERR_GENERAL; } /* Search the userid; we don't want the whole getkey stuff here. */ kdbhd = keydb_new (); if (!kdbhd) { rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } rc = classify_user_id (uname, &desc, 1); if (!rc) rc = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL); if (rc) { if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND) log_error (_("secret key \"%s\" not found\n"), uname); else log_error (_("secret key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), uname, gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } rc = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock ); if (rc) { log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc) ); goto leave; } rc = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL); if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND) /* Not ambiguous. */ { } else if (rc == 0) /* Ambiguous. */ { char *info; /* TRANSLATORS: The %s prints a key specification which for example has been given at the command line. Several lines lines with secret key infos are printed after this message. */ log_error (_("'%s' matches multiple secret keys:\n"), uname); info = format_seckey_info (ctrl, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key); log_error (" %s\n", info); xfree (info); release_kbnode (keyblock); rc = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock); while (! rc) { info = format_seckey_info (ctrl, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key); log_info (" %s\n", info); xfree (info); release_kbnode (keyblock); keyblock = NULL; rc = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL); if (! rc) rc = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock); } rc = GPG_ERR_AMBIGUOUS_NAME; goto leave; } else { log_error (_("error searching the keyring: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } /* Get the keyid from the keyblock. */ node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); if (!node) BUG (); psk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; rc = agent_probe_secret_key (NULL, psk); if (rc) { log_error (_("secret key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), uname, gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } keyid_from_pk (psk, keyid ); print_seckey_info (ctrl, psk); tty_printf("\n"); if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("gen_revoke.okay", _("Create a revocation certificate for this key? (y/N) "))) { rc = 0; goto leave; } /* Get the reason for the revocation. */ reason = ask_revocation_reason (1, 0, 1); if (!reason) { /* User decided to cancel. */ rc = 0; goto leave; } if (!opt.armor) tty_printf (_("ASCII armored output forced.\n")); rc = create_revocation (ctrl, NULL, reason, psk, keyblock, NULL, 0, NULL); if (rc) goto leave; /* and issue a usage notice */ tty_printf (_( "Revocation certificate created.\n\n" "Please move it to a medium which you can hide away; if Mallory gets\n" "access to this certificate he can use it to make your key unusable.\n" "It is smart to print this certificate and store it away, just in case\n" "your media become unreadable. But have some caution: The print system of\n" "your machine might store the data and make it available to others!\n")); leave: release_kbnode (keyblock); keydb_release (kdbhd); release_revocation_reason_info( reason ); return rc; } struct revocation_reason_info * ask_revocation_reason( int key_rev, int cert_rev, int hint ) { int code=-1; char *description = NULL; struct revocation_reason_info *reason; const char *text_0 = _("No reason specified"); const char *text_1 = _("Key has been compromised"); const char *text_2 = _("Key is superseded"); const char *text_3 = _("Key is no longer used"); const char *text_4 = _("User ID is no longer valid"); const char *code_text = NULL; do { code=-1; xfree(description); description = NULL; tty_printf(_("Please select the reason for the revocation:\n")); tty_printf( " 0 = %s\n", text_0 ); if( key_rev ) tty_printf(" 1 = %s\n", text_1 ); if( key_rev ) tty_printf(" 2 = %s\n", text_2 ); if( key_rev ) tty_printf(" 3 = %s\n", text_3 ); if( cert_rev ) tty_printf(" 4 = %s\n", text_4 ); tty_printf( " Q = %s\n", _("Cancel") ); if( hint ) tty_printf(_("(Probably you want to select %d here)\n"), hint ); while(code==-1) { int n; char *answer = cpr_get("ask_revocation_reason.code", _("Your decision? ")); trim_spaces( answer ); cpr_kill_prompt(); if( *answer == 'q' || *answer == 'Q') return NULL; /* cancel */ if( hint && !*answer ) n = hint; else if(!digitp( answer ) ) n = -1; else n = atoi(answer); xfree(answer); if( n == 0 ) { code = 0x00; /* no particular reason */ code_text = text_0; } else if( key_rev && n == 1 ) { code = 0x02; /* key has been compromised */ code_text = text_1; } else if( key_rev && n == 2 ) { code = 0x01; /* key is superseded */ code_text = text_2; } else if( key_rev && n == 3 ) { code = 0x03; /* key is no longer used */ code_text = text_3; } else if( cert_rev && n == 4 ) { code = 0x20; /* uid is no longer valid */ code_text = text_4; } else tty_printf(_("Invalid selection.\n")); } tty_printf(_("Enter an optional description; " "end it with an empty line:\n") ); for(;;) { char *answer = cpr_get("ask_revocation_reason.text", "> " ); trim_trailing_ws( answer, strlen(answer) ); cpr_kill_prompt(); if( !*answer ) { xfree(answer); break; } { char *p = make_printable_string( answer, strlen(answer), 0 ); xfree(answer); answer = p; } if( !description ) description = xstrdup(answer); else { char *p = xmalloc( strlen(description) + strlen(answer) + 2 ); strcpy(stpcpy(stpcpy( p, description),"\n"),answer); xfree(description); description = p; } xfree(answer); } tty_printf(_("Reason for revocation: %s\n"), code_text ); if( !description ) tty_printf(_("(No description given)\n") ); else tty_printf("%s\n", description ); } while( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("ask_revocation_reason.okay", _("Is this okay? (y/N) ")) ); reason = xmalloc( sizeof *reason ); reason->code = code; reason->desc = description; return reason; } struct revocation_reason_info * get_default_uid_revocation_reason(void) { struct revocation_reason_info *reason; reason = xmalloc( sizeof *reason ); reason->code = 0x20; /* uid is no longer valid */ reason->desc = strdup(""); /* no text */ return reason; } void release_revocation_reason_info( struct revocation_reason_info *reason ) { if( reason ) { xfree( reason->desc ); xfree( reason ); } } diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c index 176940bff..132b94101 100644 --- a/g10/sign.c +++ b/g10/sign.c @@ -1,1793 +1,1785 @@ /* sign.c - sign data * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, * 2007, 2010, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * * This file is part of GnuPG. * * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, see . */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "gpg.h" #include "options.h" #include "packet.h" #include "../common/status.h" #include "../common/iobuf.h" #include "keydb.h" #include "../common/util.h" #include "main.h" #include "filter.h" #include "../common/ttyio.h" #include "trustdb.h" #include "../common/status.h" #include "../common/i18n.h" #include "pkglue.h" #include "../common/sysutils.h" #include "call-agent.h" #include "../common/mbox-util.h" #include "../common/compliance.h" #ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM #define LF "\r\n" #else #define LF "\n" #endif /* Hack */ static int recipient_digest_algo; /* A type for the extra data we hash into v5 signature packets. */ struct pt_extra_hash_data_s { unsigned char mode; u32 timestamp; unsigned char namelen; char name[1]; }; typedef struct pt_extra_hash_data_s *pt_extra_hash_data_t; /* * Create notations and other stuff. It is assumed that the strings in * STRLIST are already checked to contain only printable data and have * a valid NAME=VALUE format. */ static void mk_notation_policy_etc (PKT_signature *sig, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_public_key *pksk) { const char *string; char *p = NULL; strlist_t pu = NULL; struct notation *nd = NULL; struct expando_args args; log_assert (sig->version >= 4); memset (&args, 0, sizeof(args)); args.pk = pk; args.pksk = pksk; /* Notation data. */ if (IS_SIG(sig) && opt.sig_notations) nd = opt.sig_notations; else if (IS_CERT(sig) && opt.cert_notations) nd = opt.cert_notations; if (nd) { struct notation *item; for (item = nd; item; item = item->next) { item->altvalue = pct_expando (item->value,&args); if (!item->altvalue) log_error (_("WARNING: unable to %%-expand notation " "(too large). Using unexpanded.\n")); } keygen_add_notations (sig, nd); for (item = nd; item; item = item->next) { xfree (item->altvalue); item->altvalue = NULL; } } /* Set policy URL. */ if (IS_SIG(sig) && opt.sig_policy_url) pu = opt.sig_policy_url; else if (IS_CERT(sig) && opt.cert_policy_url) pu = opt.cert_policy_url; for (; pu; pu = pu->next) { string = pu->d; p = pct_expando (string, &args); if (!p) { log_error(_("WARNING: unable to %%-expand policy URL " "(too large). Using unexpanded.\n")); p = xstrdup(string); } build_sig_subpkt (sig, (SIGSUBPKT_POLICY | ((pu->flags & 1)?SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL:0)), p, strlen (p)); xfree (p); } /* Preferred keyserver URL. */ if (IS_SIG(sig) && opt.sig_keyserver_url) pu = opt.sig_keyserver_url; for (; pu; pu = pu->next) { string = pu->d; p = pct_expando (string, &args); if (!p) { log_error (_("WARNING: unable to %%-expand preferred keyserver URL" " (too large). Using unexpanded.\n")); p = xstrdup (string); } build_sig_subpkt (sig, (SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS | ((pu->flags & 1)?SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL:0)), p, strlen (p)); xfree (p); } /* Set signer's user id. */ if (IS_SIG (sig) && !opt.flags.disable_signer_uid) { char *mbox; /* For now we use the uid which was used to locate the key. */ if (pksk->user_id && (mbox = mailbox_from_userid (pksk->user_id->name, 0))) { if (DBG_LOOKUP) log_debug ("setting Signer's UID to '%s'\n", mbox); build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID, mbox, strlen (mbox)); xfree (mbox); } else if (opt.sender_list) { /* If a list of --sender was given we scan that list and use * the first one matching a user id of the current key. */ /* FIXME: We need to get the list of user ids for the PKSK * packet. That requires either a function to look it up * again or we need to extend the key packet struct to link * to the primary key which in turn could link to the user * ids. Too much of a change right now. Let's take just * one from the supplied list and hope that the caller * passed a matching one. */ build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID, opt.sender_list->d, strlen (opt.sender_list->d)); } } } /* * Helper to hash a user ID packet. */ static void hash_uid (gcry_md_hd_t md, int sigversion, const PKT_user_id *uid) { byte buf[5]; (void)sigversion; if (uid->attrib_data) { buf[0] = 0xd1; /* Indicates an attribute packet. */ buf[1] = uid->attrib_len >> 24; /* Always use 4 length bytes. */ buf[2] = uid->attrib_len >> 16; buf[3] = uid->attrib_len >> 8; buf[4] = uid->attrib_len; } else { buf[0] = 0xb4; /* Indicates a userid packet. */ buf[1] = uid->len >> 24; /* Always use 4 length bytes. */ buf[2] = uid->len >> 16; buf[3] = uid->len >> 8; buf[4] = uid->len; } gcry_md_write( md, buf, 5 ); if (uid->attrib_data) gcry_md_write (md, uid->attrib_data, uid->attrib_len ); else gcry_md_write (md, uid->name, uid->len ); } /* * Helper to hash some parts from the signature. EXTRAHASH gives the * extra data to be hashed into v5 signatures; it may by NULL for * detached signatures. */ static void hash_sigversion_to_magic (gcry_md_hd_t md, const PKT_signature *sig, pt_extra_hash_data_t extrahash) { byte buf[10]; int i; size_t n; gcry_md_putc (md, sig->version); gcry_md_putc (md, sig->sig_class); gcry_md_putc (md, sig->pubkey_algo); gcry_md_putc (md, sig->digest_algo); if (sig->hashed) { n = sig->hashed->len; gcry_md_putc (md, (n >> 8) ); gcry_md_putc (md, n ); gcry_md_write (md, sig->hashed->data, n ); n += 6; } else { gcry_md_putc (md, 0); /* Always hash the length of the subpacket. */ gcry_md_putc (md, 0); n = 6; } /* Hash data from the literal data packet. */ if (sig->version >= 5 && (sig->sig_class == 0x00 || sig->sig_class == 0x01)) { /* - One octet content format * - File name (one octet length followed by the name) * - Four octet timestamp */ if (extrahash) { buf[0] = extrahash->mode; buf[1] = extrahash->namelen; gcry_md_write (md, buf, 2); if (extrahash->namelen) gcry_md_write (md, extrahash->name, extrahash->namelen); buf[0] = extrahash->timestamp >> 24; buf[1] = extrahash->timestamp >> 16; buf[2] = extrahash->timestamp >> 8; buf[3] = extrahash->timestamp; gcry_md_write (md, buf, 4); } else /* Detached signatures */ { memset (buf, 0, 6); gcry_md_write (md, buf, 6); } } /* Add some magic. */ i = 0; buf[i++] = sig->version; buf[i++] = 0xff; if (sig->version >= 5) { /* Note: We don't hashed any data larger than 2^32 and thus we * can always use 0 here. See also note below. */ buf[i++] = 0; buf[i++] = 0; buf[i++] = 0; buf[i++] = 0; } buf[i++] = n >> 24; /* (n is only 16 bit, so this is always 0) */ buf[i++] = n >> 16; buf[i++] = n >> 8; buf[i++] = n; gcry_md_write (md, buf, i); } /* Perform the sign operation. If CACHE_NONCE is given the agent is advised to use that cached passphrase for the key. */ static int do_sign (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pksk, PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_hd_t md, int mdalgo, const char *cache_nonce) { gpg_error_t err; byte *dp; char *hexgrip; if (pksk->timestamp > sig->timestamp ) { ulong d = pksk->timestamp - sig->timestamp; log_info (ngettext("key %s was created %lu second" " in the future (time warp or clock problem)\n", "key %s was created %lu seconds" " in the future (time warp or clock problem)\n", d), keystr_from_pk (pksk), d); if (!opt.ignore_time_conflict) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TIME_CONFLICT); } print_pubkey_algo_note (pksk->pubkey_algo); if (!mdalgo) mdalgo = gcry_md_get_algo (md); /* Check compliance. */ if (! gnupg_digest_is_allowed (opt.compliance, 1, mdalgo)) { log_error (_("digest algorithm '%s' may not be used in %s mode\n"), gcry_md_algo_name (mdalgo), gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance)); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO); goto leave; } if (! gnupg_pk_is_allowed (opt.compliance, PK_USE_SIGNING, pksk->pubkey_algo, pksk->pkey, nbits_from_pk (pksk), NULL)) { log_error (_("key %s may not be used for signing in %s mode\n"), keystr_from_pk (pksk), gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance)); err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); goto leave; } if (!gnupg_rng_is_compliant (opt.compliance)) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN); log_error (_("%s is not compliant with %s mode\n"), "RNG", gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance)); write_status_error ("random-compliance", err); goto leave; } print_digest_algo_note (mdalgo); dp = gcry_md_read (md, mdalgo); sig->digest_algo = mdalgo; sig->digest_start[0] = dp[0]; sig->digest_start[1] = dp[1]; mpi_release (sig->data[0]); sig->data[0] = NULL; mpi_release (sig->data[1]); sig->data[1] = NULL; err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pksk, &hexgrip); if (!err) { char *desc; gcry_sexp_t s_sigval; desc = gpg_format_keydesc (ctrl, pksk, FORMAT_KEYDESC_NORMAL, 1); err = agent_pksign (NULL/*ctrl*/, cache_nonce, hexgrip, desc, pksk->keyid, pksk->main_keyid, pksk->pubkey_algo, dp, gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (mdalgo), mdalgo, &s_sigval); xfree (desc); if (err) ; else if (pksk->pubkey_algo == GCRY_PK_RSA || pksk->pubkey_algo == GCRY_PK_RSA_S) sig->data[0] = get_mpi_from_sexp (s_sigval, "s", GCRYMPI_FMT_USG); else if (openpgp_oid_is_ed25519 (pksk->pkey[0])) { sig->data[0] = get_mpi_from_sexp (s_sigval, "r", GCRYMPI_FMT_OPAQUE); sig->data[1] = get_mpi_from_sexp (s_sigval, "s", GCRYMPI_FMT_OPAQUE); } else { sig->data[0] = get_mpi_from_sexp (s_sigval, "r", GCRYMPI_FMT_USG); sig->data[1] = get_mpi_from_sexp (s_sigval, "s", GCRYMPI_FMT_USG); } gcry_sexp_release (s_sigval); } xfree (hexgrip); leave: if (err) log_error (_("signing failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); else { if (opt.verbose) { char *ustr = get_user_id_string_native (ctrl, sig->keyid); log_info (_("%s/%s signature from: \"%s\"\n"), openpgp_pk_algo_name (pksk->pubkey_algo), openpgp_md_algo_name (sig->digest_algo), ustr); xfree (ustr); } } return err; } static int complete_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig, PKT_public_key *pksk, gcry_md_hd_t md, const char *cache_nonce) { int rc; /* if (!(rc = check_secret_key (pksk, 0))) */ rc = do_sign (ctrl, pksk, sig, md, 0, cache_nonce); return rc; } /* Return true if the key seems to be on a version 1 OpenPGP card. This works by asking the agent and may fail if the card has not yet been used with the agent. */ static int openpgp_card_v1_p (PKT_public_key *pk) { gpg_error_t err; int result; /* Shortcut if we are not using RSA: The v1 cards only support RSA thus there is no point in looking any further. */ if (!is_RSA (pk->pubkey_algo)) return 0; if (!pk->flags.serialno_valid) { char *hexgrip; err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip); if (err) { log_error ("error computing a keygrip: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); return 0; /* Ooops. */ } xfree (pk->serialno); agent_get_keyinfo (NULL, hexgrip, &pk->serialno, NULL); xfree (hexgrip); pk->flags.serialno_valid = 1; } if (!pk->serialno) result = 0; /* Error from a past agent_get_keyinfo or no card. */ else { /* The version number of the card is included in the serialno. */ result = !strncmp (pk->serialno, "D2760001240101", 14); } return result; } static int match_dsa_hash (unsigned int qbytes) { if (qbytes <= 20) return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1; if (qbytes <= 28) return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA224; if (qbytes <= 32) return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256; if (qbytes <= 48) return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA384; if (qbytes <= 66 ) /* 66 corresponds to 521 (64 to 512) */ return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512; return DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO; /* DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO will certainly fail, but it's the best wrong answer we have if a digest larger than 512 bits is requested. */ } /* First try --digest-algo. If that isn't set, see if the recipient has a preferred algorithm (which is also filtered through --personal-digest-prefs). If we're making a signature without a particular recipient (i.e. signing, rather than signing+encrypting) then take the first algorithm in --personal-digest-prefs that is usable for the pubkey algorithm. If --personal-digest-prefs isn't set, then take the OpenPGP default (i.e. SHA-1). Note that Ed25519+EdDSA takes an input of arbitrary length and thus we don't enforce any particular algorithm like we do for standard ECDSA. However, we use SHA256 as the default algorithm. Possible improvement: Use the highest-ranked usable algorithm from the signing key prefs either before or after using the personal list? */ static int hash_for (PKT_public_key *pk) { if (opt.def_digest_algo) { return opt.def_digest_algo; } else if (recipient_digest_algo) { return recipient_digest_algo; } else if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA && openpgp_oid_is_ed25519 (pk->pkey[0])) { if (opt.personal_digest_prefs) return opt.personal_digest_prefs[0].value; else return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256; } else if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA || pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) { unsigned int qbytes = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (pk->pkey[1]); if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) qbytes = ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (qbytes); qbytes = qbytes/8; /* It's a DSA key, so find a hash that is the same size as q or larger. If q is 160, assume it is an old DSA key and use a 160-bit hash unless --enable-dsa2 is set, in which case act like a new DSA key that just happens to have a 160-bit q (i.e. allow truncation). If q is not 160, by definition it must be a new DSA key. */ if (opt.personal_digest_prefs) { prefitem_t *prefs; if (qbytes != 20 || opt.flags.dsa2) { for (prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs; prefs->type; prefs++) if (gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (prefs->value) >= qbytes) return prefs->value; } else { for (prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs; prefs->type; prefs++) if (gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (prefs->value) == qbytes) return prefs->value; } } return match_dsa_hash(qbytes); } else if (openpgp_card_v1_p (pk)) { /* The sk lives on a smartcard, and old smartcards only handle SHA-1 and RIPEMD/160. Newer smartcards (v2.0) don't have this restriction anymore. Fortunately the serial number encodes the version of the card and thus we know that this key is on a v1 card. */ if(opt.personal_digest_prefs) { prefitem_t *prefs; for (prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs;prefs->type;prefs++) if (prefs->value==DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 || prefs->value==DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160) return prefs->value; } return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1; } else if (opt.personal_digest_prefs) { /* It's not DSA, so we can use whatever the first hash algorithm is in the pref list */ return opt.personal_digest_prefs[0].value; } else return DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO; } static void print_status_sig_created (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, int what) { byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN]; char buf[100+MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2]; size_t n; snprintf (buf, sizeof buf - 2*MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN, "%c %d %d %02x %lu ", what, sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo, sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp ); fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n); bin2hex (array, n, buf + strlen (buf)); write_status_text( STATUS_SIG_CREATED, buf ); } /* * Loop over the secret certificates in SK_LIST and build the one pass * signature packets. OpenPGP says that the data should be bracket by * the onepass-sig and signature-packet; so we build these onepass * packet here in reverse order. */ static int write_onepass_sig_packets (SK_LIST sk_list, IOBUF out, int sigclass ) { int skcount; SK_LIST sk_rover; for (skcount=0, sk_rover=sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) skcount++; for (; skcount; skcount--) { PKT_public_key *pk; PKT_onepass_sig *ops; PACKET pkt; int i, rc; for (i=0, sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) if (++i == skcount) break; pk = sk_rover->pk; ops = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *ops); ops->sig_class = sigclass; ops->digest_algo = hash_for (pk); ops->pubkey_algo = pk->pubkey_algo; keyid_from_pk (pk, ops->keyid); ops->last = (skcount == 1); init_packet (&pkt); pkt.pkttype = PKT_ONEPASS_SIG; pkt.pkt.onepass_sig = ops; rc = build_packet (out, &pkt); free_packet (&pkt, NULL); if (rc) { log_error ("build onepass_sig packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); return rc; } } return 0; } /* * Helper to write the plaintext (literal data) packet. At * R_EXTRAHASH a malloced object with the with the extra data hashed * into v5 signatures is stored. */ static int write_plaintext_packet (iobuf_t out, iobuf_t inp, const char *fname, int ptmode, pt_extra_hash_data_t *r_extrahash) { PKT_plaintext *pt = NULL; u32 filesize; int rc = 0; if (!opt.no_literal) pt = setup_plaintext_name (fname, inp); /* Try to calculate the length of the data. */ if ( !iobuf_is_pipe_filename (fname) && *fname) { off_t tmpsize; int overflow; if (!(tmpsize = iobuf_get_filelength (inp, &overflow)) && !overflow && opt.verbose) log_info (_("WARNING: '%s' is an empty file\n"), fname); /* We can't encode the length of very large files because * OpenPGP uses only 32 bit for file sizes. So if the size of a * file is larger than 2^32 minus some bytes for packet headers, * we switch to partial length encoding. */ if (tmpsize < (IOBUF_FILELENGTH_LIMIT - 65536)) filesize = tmpsize; else filesize = 0; /* Because the text_filter modifies the length of the * data, it is not possible to know the used length * without a double read of the file - to avoid that * we simple use partial length packets. */ if (ptmode == 't' || ptmode == 'u' || ptmode == 'm') filesize = 0; } else filesize = opt.set_filesize? opt.set_filesize : 0; /* stdin */ if (!opt.no_literal) { PACKET pkt; /* Note that PT has been initialized above in no_literal mode. */ pt->timestamp = make_timestamp (); pt->mode = ptmode; pt->len = filesize; pt->new_ctb = !pt->len; pt->buf = inp; init_packet (&pkt); pkt.pkttype = PKT_PLAINTEXT; pkt.pkt.plaintext = pt; /*cfx.datalen = filesize? calc_packet_length( &pkt ) : 0;*/ if ((rc = build_packet (out, &pkt))) log_error ("build_packet(PLAINTEXT) failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) ); *r_extrahash = xtrymalloc (sizeof **r_extrahash + pt->namelen); if (!*r_extrahash) rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); else { (*r_extrahash)->mode = pt->mode; (*r_extrahash)->timestamp = pt->timestamp; (*r_extrahash)->namelen = pt->namelen; /* Note that the last byte of NAME won't be initialized * because we don't need it. */ memcpy ((*r_extrahash)->name, pt->name, pt->namelen); } pt->buf = NULL; free_packet (&pkt, NULL); } else { byte copy_buffer[4096]; int bytes_copied; *r_extrahash = xtrymalloc (sizeof **r_extrahash); if (!*r_extrahash) { rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); goto leave; } /* FIXME: We need to parse INP to get the to be hashed data from * it. */ (*r_extrahash)->mode = 0; (*r_extrahash)->timestamp = 0; (*r_extrahash)->namelen = 0; while ((bytes_copied = iobuf_read (inp, copy_buffer, 4096)) != -1) if ((rc = iobuf_write (out, copy_buffer, bytes_copied))) { log_error ("copying input to output failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); break; } wipememory (copy_buffer, 4096); /* burn buffer */ } leave: return rc; } /* * Write the signatures from the SK_LIST to OUT. HASH must be a * non-finalized hash which will not be changes here. EXTRAHASH is * either NULL or the extra data tro be hashed into v5 signatures. */ static int write_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, SK_LIST sk_list, IOBUF out, gcry_md_hd_t hash, pt_extra_hash_data_t extrahash, int sigclass, u32 timestamp, u32 duration, int status_letter, const char *cache_nonce) { SK_LIST sk_rover; /* Loop over the certificates with secret keys. */ for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) { PKT_public_key *pk; PKT_signature *sig; gcry_md_hd_t md; int rc; pk = sk_rover->pk; /* Build the signature packet. */ sig = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *sig); if (!sig) return gpg_error_from_syserror (); if (pk->version >= 5) sig->version = 5; /* Required for v5 keys. */ else sig->version = 4; /* Required. */ keyid_from_pk (pk, sig->keyid); sig->digest_algo = hash_for (pk); sig->pubkey_algo = pk->pubkey_algo; if (timestamp) sig->timestamp = timestamp; else sig->timestamp = make_timestamp(); if (duration) sig->expiredate = sig->timestamp + duration; sig->sig_class = sigclass; if (gcry_md_copy (&md, hash)) BUG (); build_sig_subpkt_from_sig (sig, pk); mk_notation_policy_etc (sig, NULL, pk); hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig, extrahash); gcry_md_final (md); rc = do_sign (ctrl, pk, sig, md, hash_for (pk), cache_nonce); gcry_md_close (md); if (!rc) { /* Write the packet. */ PACKET pkt; init_packet (&pkt); pkt.pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE; pkt.pkt.signature = sig; rc = build_packet (out, &pkt); if (!rc && is_status_enabled()) print_status_sig_created (pk, sig, status_letter); free_packet (&pkt, NULL); if (rc) log_error ("build signature packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); } else free_seckey_enc (sig); if (rc) return rc; } return 0; } /* * Sign the files whose names are in FILENAME. * If DETACHED has the value true, * make a detached signature. If FILENAMES->d is NULL read from stdin * and ignore the detached mode. Sign the file with all secret keys * which can be taken from LOCUSR, if this is NULL, use the default one * If ENCRYPTFLAG is true, use REMUSER (or ask if it is NULL) to encrypt the * signed data for these users. * If OUTFILE is not NULL; this file is used for output and the function * does not ask for overwrite permission; output is then always * uncompressed, non-armored and in binary mode. */ int sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr, int encryptflag, strlist_t remusr, const char *outfile ) { const char *fname; armor_filter_context_t *afx; compress_filter_context_t zfx; md_filter_context_t mfx; text_filter_context_t tfx; progress_filter_context_t *pfx; encrypt_filter_context_t efx; iobuf_t inp = NULL; iobuf_t out = NULL; PACKET pkt; int rc = 0; PK_LIST pk_list = NULL; SK_LIST sk_list = NULL; SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL; int multifile = 0; u32 duration=0; pt_extra_hash_data_t extrahash = NULL; pfx = new_progress_context (); afx = new_armor_context (); memset (&zfx, 0, sizeof zfx); memset (&mfx, 0, sizeof mfx); memset (&efx, 0, sizeof efx); efx.ctrl = ctrl; init_packet (&pkt); if (filenames) { fname = filenames->d; multifile = !!filenames->next; } else fname = NULL; if (fname && filenames->next && (!detached || encryptflag)) log_bug ("multiple files can only be detached signed"); if (encryptflag == 2 && (rc = setup_symkey (&efx.symkey_s2k, &efx.symkey_dek))) goto leave; if (opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch) duration = ask_expire_interval(1,opt.def_sig_expire); else duration = parse_expire_string(opt.def_sig_expire); /* Note: In the old non-agent version the following call used to * unprotect the secret key. This is now done on demand by the agent. */ if ((rc = build_sk_list (ctrl, locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG ))) goto leave; if (encryptflag && (rc = build_pk_list (ctrl, remusr, &pk_list))) goto leave; /* Prepare iobufs. */ if (multifile) /* have list of filenames */ inp = NULL; /* we do it later */ else { inp = iobuf_open(fname); if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp))) { iobuf_close (inp); inp = NULL; gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); } if (!inp) { rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname? fname: "[stdin]", strerror (errno)); goto leave; } handle_progress (pfx, inp, fname); } if (outfile) { if (is_secured_filename (outfile)) { out = NULL; gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); } else out = iobuf_create (outfile, 0); if (!out) { rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); log_error (_("can't create '%s': %s\n"), outfile, gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } else if (opt.verbose) log_info (_("writing to '%s'\n"), outfile); } else if ((rc = open_outfile (-1, fname, opt.armor? 1 : detached? 2 : 0, 0, &out))) { goto leave; } /* Prepare to calculate the MD over the input. */ if (opt.textmode && !outfile && !multifile) { memset (&tfx, 0, sizeof tfx); iobuf_push_filter (inp, text_filter, &tfx); } if (gcry_md_open (&mfx.md, 0, 0)) BUG (); if (DBG_HASHING) gcry_md_debug (mfx.md, "sign"); /* If we're encrypting and signing, it is reasonable to pick the * hash algorithm to use out of the recipient key prefs. This is * best effort only, as in a DSA2 and smartcard world there are * cases where we cannot please everyone with a single hash (DSA2 * wants >160 and smartcards want =160). In the future this could * be more complex with different hashes for each sk, but the * current design requires a single hash for all SKs. */ if (pk_list) { if (opt.def_digest_algo) { if (!opt.expert && select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH, opt.def_digest_algo, NULL) != opt.def_digest_algo) { log_info (_("WARNING: forcing digest algorithm %s (%d)" " violates recipient preferences\n"), gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo), opt.def_digest_algo); } } else { int algo; int smartcard=0; union pref_hint hint; hint.digest_length = 0; /* Of course, if the recipient asks for something * unreasonable (like the wrong hash for a DSA key) then * don't do it. Check all sk's - if any are DSA or live * on a smartcard, then the hash has restrictions and we * may not be able to give the recipient what they want. * For DSA, pass a hint for the largest q we have. Note * that this means that a q>160 key will override a q=160 * key and force the use of truncation for the q=160 key. * The alternative would be to ignore the recipient prefs * completely and get a different hash for each DSA key in * hash_for(). The override behavior here is more or less * reasonable as it is under the control of the user which * keys they sign with for a given message and the fact * that the message with multiple signatures won't be * usable on an implementation that doesn't understand * DSA2 anyway. */ for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) { if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA || sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) { int temp_hashlen = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk_rover->pk->pkey[1]); if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA) temp_hashlen = ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (temp_hashlen); temp_hashlen = (temp_hashlen+7)/8; /* Pick a hash that is large enough for our largest Q */ if (hint.digest_length < temp_hashlen) hint.digest_length = temp_hashlen; } /* FIXME: need to check gpg-agent for this. */ /* else if (sk_rover->pk->is_protected */ /* && sk_rover->pk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002) */ /* smartcard = 1; */ } /* Current smartcards only do 160-bit hashes. If we have * to have a >160-bit hash, then we can't use the * recipient prefs as we'd need both =160 and >160 at the * same time and recipient prefs currently require a * single hash for all signatures. All this may well have * to change as the cards add algorithms. */ if ((!smartcard || (smartcard && hint.digest_length==20)) && ((algo = select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list, PREFTYPE_HASH, -1, &hint)) > 0)) { recipient_digest_algo = algo; } } } for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) gcry_md_enable (mfx.md, hash_for (sk_rover->pk)); if (!multifile) iobuf_push_filter (inp, md_filter, &mfx); if (detached && !encryptflag) afx->what = 2; if (opt.armor && !outfile) push_armor_filter (afx, out); if (encryptflag) { efx.pk_list = pk_list; /* fixme: set efx.cfx.datalen if known */ iobuf_push_filter (out, encrypt_filter, &efx); } if (opt.compress_algo && !outfile && !detached) { int compr_algo = opt.compress_algo; /* If not forced by user */ if (compr_algo==-1) { /* If we're not encrypting, then select_algo_from_prefs * will fail and we'll end up with the default. If we are * encrypting, select_algo_from_prefs cannot fail since * there is an assumed preference for uncompressed data. * Still, if it did fail, we'll also end up with the * default. */ if ((compr_algo = select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list, PREFTYPE_ZIP, -1, NULL)) == -1) { compr_algo = default_compress_algo(); } } else if (!opt.expert && pk_list && select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list, PREFTYPE_ZIP, compr_algo, NULL) != compr_algo) { log_info (_("WARNING: forcing compression algorithm %s (%d)" " violates recipient preferences\n"), compress_algo_to_string (compr_algo), compr_algo); } /* Algo 0 means no compression. */ if (compr_algo) push_compress_filter (out, &zfx, compr_algo); } /* Write the one-pass signature packets if needed */ if (!detached) { rc = write_onepass_sig_packets (sk_list, out, opt.textmode && !outfile ? 0x01:0x00); if (rc) goto leave; } write_status_begin_signing (mfx.md); /* Setup the inner packet. */ if (detached) { if (multifile) { strlist_t sl; if (opt.verbose) log_info (_("signing:") ); /* Must walk reverse trough this list. */ for (sl = strlist_last(filenames); sl; sl = strlist_prev( filenames, sl)) { inp = iobuf_open (sl->d); if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp))) { iobuf_close (inp); inp = NULL; gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); } if (!inp) { rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), sl->d, gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } handle_progress (pfx, inp, sl->d); if (opt.verbose) log_printf (" '%s'", sl->d ); if (opt.textmode) { memset (&tfx, 0, sizeof tfx); iobuf_push_filter (inp, text_filter, &tfx); } iobuf_push_filter (inp, md_filter, &mfx); while (iobuf_get (inp) != -1) ; iobuf_close (inp); inp = NULL; } if (opt.verbose) log_printf ("\n"); } else { /* Read, so that the filter can calculate the digest. */ while (iobuf_get(inp) != -1) ; } } else { rc = write_plaintext_packet (out, inp, fname, (opt.textmode && !outfile) ? (opt.mimemode? 'm' : 't') : 'b', &extrahash); } /* Catch errors from above. */ if (rc) goto leave; /* Write the signatures. */ rc = write_signature_packets (ctrl, sk_list, out, mfx.md, extrahash, opt.textmode && !outfile? 0x01 : 0x00, 0, duration, detached ? 'D':'S', NULL); if (rc) goto leave; leave: if (rc) iobuf_cancel (out); else { iobuf_close (out); if (encryptflag) write_status (STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION); } iobuf_close (inp); gcry_md_close (mfx.md); release_sk_list (sk_list); release_pk_list (pk_list); recipient_digest_algo = 0; release_progress_context (pfx); release_armor_context (afx); xfree (extrahash); return rc; } /* * Make a clear signature. Note that opt.armor is not needed. */ int clearsign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr, const char *outfile) { armor_filter_context_t *afx; progress_filter_context_t *pfx; gcry_md_hd_t textmd = NULL; iobuf_t inp = NULL; iobuf_t out = NULL; PACKET pkt; int rc = 0; SK_LIST sk_list = NULL; SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL; u32 duration = 0; pfx = new_progress_context (); afx = new_armor_context (); init_packet( &pkt ); if (opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch) duration = ask_expire_interval (1, opt.def_sig_expire); else duration = parse_expire_string (opt.def_sig_expire); /* Note: In the old non-agent version the following call used to * unprotect the secret key. This is now done on demand by the agent. */ if ((rc=build_sk_list (ctrl, locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG))) goto leave; /* Prepare iobufs. */ inp = iobuf_open (fname); if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp))) { iobuf_close (inp); inp = NULL; gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); } if (!inp) { rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname? fname: "[stdin]", gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } handle_progress (pfx, inp, fname); if (outfile) { if (is_secured_filename (outfile)) { outfile = NULL; gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); } else out = iobuf_create (outfile, 0); if (!out) { rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); log_error (_("can't create '%s': %s\n"), outfile, gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } else if (opt.verbose) log_info (_("writing to '%s'\n"), outfile); } else if ((rc = open_outfile (-1, fname, 1, 0, &out))) { goto leave; } iobuf_writestr (out, "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" LF); { const char *s; int any = 0; byte hashs_seen[256]; memset (hashs_seen, 0, sizeof hashs_seen); iobuf_writestr (out, "Hash: " ); for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) { int i = hash_for (sk_rover->pk); if (!hashs_seen[ i & 0xff ]) { s = gcry_md_algo_name (i); if (s) { hashs_seen[ i & 0xff ] = 1; if (any) iobuf_put (out, ','); iobuf_writestr (out, s); any = 1; } } } log_assert (any); iobuf_writestr (out, LF); } if (opt.not_dash_escaped) iobuf_writestr (out, "NotDashEscaped: You need "GPG_NAME " to verify this message" LF); iobuf_writestr (out, LF ); if (gcry_md_open (&textmd, 0, 0)) BUG (); for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) gcry_md_enable (textmd, hash_for(sk_rover->pk)); if (DBG_HASHING) gcry_md_debug (textmd, "clearsign"); copy_clearsig_text (out, inp, textmd, !opt.not_dash_escaped, opt.escape_from); /* fixme: check for read errors */ /* Now write the armor. */ afx->what = 2; push_armor_filter (afx, out); /* Write the signatures. */ rc = write_signature_packets (ctrl, sk_list, out, textmd, NULL, 0x01, 0, duration, 'C', NULL); if (rc) goto leave; leave: if (rc) iobuf_cancel (out); else iobuf_close (out); iobuf_close (inp); gcry_md_close (textmd); release_sk_list (sk_list); release_progress_context (pfx); release_armor_context (afx); return rc; } /* * Sign and conventionally encrypt the given file. * FIXME: Far too much code is duplicated - revamp the whole file. */ int sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr) { armor_filter_context_t *afx; progress_filter_context_t *pfx; compress_filter_context_t zfx; md_filter_context_t mfx; text_filter_context_t tfx; cipher_filter_context_t cfx; iobuf_t inp = NULL; iobuf_t out = NULL; PACKET pkt; STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL; int rc = 0; SK_LIST sk_list = NULL; SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL; int algo; u32 duration = 0; int canceled; pt_extra_hash_data_t extrahash = NULL; pfx = new_progress_context (); afx = new_armor_context (); memset (&zfx, 0, sizeof zfx); memset (&mfx, 0, sizeof mfx); memset (&tfx, 0, sizeof tfx); memset (&cfx, 0, sizeof cfx); init_packet (&pkt); if (opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch) duration = ask_expire_interval (1, opt.def_sig_expire); else duration = parse_expire_string (opt.def_sig_expire); /* Note: In the old non-agent version the following call used to * unprotect the secret key. This is now done on demand by the agent. */ rc = build_sk_list (ctrl, locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG); if (rc) goto leave; /* Prepare iobufs. */ inp = iobuf_open (fname); if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp))) { iobuf_close (inp); inp = NULL; gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); } if (!inp) { rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname? fname: "[stdin]", gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } handle_progress (pfx, inp, fname); /* Prepare key. */ s2k = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *s2k); s2k->mode = opt.s2k_mode; s2k->hash_algo = S2K_DIGEST_ALGO; algo = default_cipher_algo (); cfx.dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, s2k, 1, 1, NULL, &canceled); if (!cfx.dek || !cfx.dek->keylen) { rc = gpg_error (canceled?GPG_ERR_CANCELED:GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE); log_error (_("error creating passphrase: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); goto leave; } cfx.dek->use_aead = use_aead (NULL, cfx.dek->algo); if (!cfx.dek->use_aead) cfx.dek->use_mdc = !!use_mdc (NULL, cfx.dek->algo); if (!opt.quiet || !opt.batch) log_info (_("%s.%s encryption will be used\n"), openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo), cfx.dek->use_aead? openpgp_aead_algo_name (cfx.dek->use_aead) /**/ : "CFB"); /* Now create the outfile. */ rc = open_outfile (-1, fname, opt.armor? 1:0, 0, &out); if (rc) goto leave; /* Prepare to calculate the MD over the input. */ if (opt.textmode) iobuf_push_filter (inp, text_filter, &tfx); if (gcry_md_open (&mfx.md, 0, 0)) BUG (); if (DBG_HASHING) gcry_md_debug (mfx.md, "symc-sign"); for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) gcry_md_enable (mfx.md, hash_for (sk_rover->pk)); iobuf_push_filter (inp, md_filter, &mfx); /* Push armor output filter */ if (opt.armor) push_armor_filter (afx, out); /* Write the symmetric key packet */ /* (current filters: armor)*/ { PKT_symkey_enc *enc = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *enc ); enc->version = 4; enc->cipher_algo = cfx.dek->algo; enc->s2k = *s2k; pkt.pkttype = PKT_SYMKEY_ENC; pkt.pkt.symkey_enc = enc; if ((rc = build_packet (out, &pkt))) log_error ("build symkey packet failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); xfree (enc); } /* Push the encryption filter */ iobuf_push_filter (out, cfx.dek->use_aead? cipher_filter_aead /**/ : cipher_filter_cfb, &cfx); /* Push the compress filter */ if (default_compress_algo()) { if (cfx.dek && (cfx.dek->use_mdc || cfx.dek->use_aead)) zfx.new_ctb = 1; push_compress_filter (out, &zfx,default_compress_algo() ); } /* Write the one-pass signature packets */ /* (current filters: zip - encrypt - armor) */ rc = write_onepass_sig_packets (sk_list, out, opt.textmode? 0x01:0x00); if (rc) goto leave; write_status_begin_signing (mfx.md); /* Pipe data through all filters; i.e. write the signed stuff. */ /* (current filters: zip - encrypt - armor) */ rc = write_plaintext_packet (out, inp, fname, opt.textmode ? (opt.mimemode?'m':'t'):'b', &extrahash); if (rc) goto leave; /* Write the signatures. */ /* (current filters: zip - encrypt - armor) */ rc = write_signature_packets (ctrl, sk_list, out, mfx.md, extrahash, opt.textmode? 0x01 : 0x00, 0, duration, 'S', NULL); if (rc) goto leave; leave: if (rc) iobuf_cancel (out); else { iobuf_close (out); write_status (STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION); } iobuf_close (inp); release_sk_list (sk_list); gcry_md_close (mfx.md); xfree (cfx.dek); xfree (s2k); release_progress_context (pfx); release_armor_context (afx); xfree (extrahash); return rc; } /* * Create a v4 signature in *RET_SIG. * * PK is the primary key to sign (required for all sigs) * UID is the user id to sign (required for 0x10..0x13, 0x30) * SUBPK is subkey to sign (required for 0x18, 0x19, 0x28) * * PKSK is the signing key * * SIGCLASS is the type of signature to create. * * DIGEST_ALGO is the digest algorithm. If it is 0 the function * selects an appropriate one. * * TIMESTAMP is the timestamp to use for the signature. 0 means "now" * * DURATION is the amount of time (in seconds) until the signature * expires. * * This function creates the following subpackets: issuer, created, * and expire (if duration is not 0). Additional subpackets can be * added using MKSUBPKT, which is called after these subpackets are * added and before the signature is generated. OPAQUE is passed to * MKSUBPKT. */ int make_keysig_packet (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid, PKT_public_key *subpk, PKT_public_key *pksk, - int sigclass, int digest_algo, + int sigclass, u32 timestamp, u32 duration, int (*mksubpkt)(PKT_signature *, void *), void *opaque, const char *cache_nonce) { PKT_signature *sig; int rc = 0; int sigversion; + int digest_algo; gcry_md_hd_t md; log_assert ((sigclass >= 0x10 && sigclass <= 0x13) || sigclass == 0x1F || sigclass == 0x20 || sigclass == 0x18 || sigclass == 0x19 || sigclass == 0x30 || sigclass == 0x28 ); if (pksk->version >= 5) sigversion = 5; else sigversion = 4; - if (!digest_algo) + /* Select the digest algo to use. */ + if (opt.cert_digest_algo) /* Forceful override by the user. */ + digest_algo = opt.cert_digest_algo; + else if (pksk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA) /* Meet DSA requirements. */ + digest_algo = match_dsa_hash (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (pksk->pkey[1])/8); + else if (pksk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA /* Meet ECDSA requirements. */ + || pksk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) { - /* Basically, this means use SHA1 always unless the user - * specified something (use whatever they said), or it's DSA - * (use the best match). They still can't pick an inappropriate - * hash for DSA or the signature will fail. Note that this - * still allows the caller of make_keysig_packet to override the - * user setting if it must. */ - - if (opt.cert_digest_algo) - digest_algo = opt.cert_digest_algo; - else if (pksk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA) - digest_algo = match_dsa_hash (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (pksk->pkey[1])/8); - else if (pksk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA - || pksk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) - { - if (openpgp_oid_is_ed25519 (pksk->pkey[0])) - digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256; - else - digest_algo = match_dsa_hash - (ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (pksk->pkey[1]))/8); - } + if (openpgp_oid_is_ed25519 (pksk->pkey[0])) + digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256; else - digest_algo = DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO; + digest_algo = match_dsa_hash + (ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (pksk->pkey[1]))/8); } + else /* Use the default. */ + digest_algo = DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO; if (gcry_md_open (&md, digest_algo, 0)) BUG (); /* Hash the public key certificate. */ hash_public_key (md, pk); if (sigclass == 0x18 || sigclass == 0x19 || sigclass == 0x28) { /* Hash the subkey binding/backsig/revocation. */ hash_public_key (md, subpk); } else if (sigclass != 0x1F && sigclass != 0x20) { /* Hash the user id. */ hash_uid (md, sigversion, uid); } /* Make the signature packet. */ sig = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *sig); sig->version = sigversion; sig->flags.exportable = 1; sig->flags.revocable = 1; keyid_from_pk (pksk, sig->keyid); sig->pubkey_algo = pksk->pubkey_algo; sig->digest_algo = digest_algo; sig->timestamp = timestamp? timestamp : make_timestamp (); if (duration) sig->expiredate = sig->timestamp + duration; sig->sig_class = sigclass; build_sig_subpkt_from_sig (sig, pksk); mk_notation_policy_etc (sig, pk, pksk); /* Crucial that the call to mksubpkt comes LAST before the calls * to finalize the sig as that makes it possible for the mksubpkt * function to get a reliable pointer to the subpacket area. */ if (mksubpkt) rc = (*mksubpkt)(sig, opaque); if (!rc) { hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig, NULL); gcry_md_final (md); rc = complete_sig (ctrl, sig, pksk, md, cache_nonce); } gcry_md_close (md); if (rc) free_seckey_enc (sig); else *ret_sig = sig; return rc; } /* * Create a new signature packet based on an existing one. * Only user ID signatures are supported for now. * PK is the public key to work on. * PKSK is the key used to make the signature. * * TODO: Merge this with make_keysig_packet. */ gpg_error_t update_keysig_packet (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_signature *orig_sig, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid, PKT_public_key *subpk, PKT_public_key *pksk, int (*mksubpkt)(PKT_signature *, void *), void *opaque) { PKT_signature *sig; gpg_error_t rc = 0; int digest_algo; gcry_md_hd_t md; if ((!orig_sig || !pk || !pksk) || (orig_sig->sig_class >= 0x10 && orig_sig->sig_class <= 0x13 && !uid) || (orig_sig->sig_class == 0x18 && !subpk)) return GPG_ERR_GENERAL; if (opt.cert_digest_algo) digest_algo = opt.cert_digest_algo; else digest_algo = orig_sig->digest_algo; if (gcry_md_open (&md, digest_algo, 0)) BUG (); /* Hash the public key certificate and the user id. */ hash_public_key (md, pk); if (orig_sig->sig_class == 0x18) hash_public_key (md, subpk); else hash_uid (md, orig_sig->version, uid); /* Create a new signature packet. */ sig = copy_signature (NULL, orig_sig); sig->digest_algo = digest_algo; /* We need to create a new timestamp so that new sig expiration * calculations are done correctly... */ sig->timestamp = make_timestamp(); /* ... but we won't make a timestamp earlier than the existing * one. */ { int tmout = 0; while (sig->timestamp <= orig_sig->timestamp) { if (++tmout > 5 && !opt.ignore_time_conflict) { rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TIME_CONFLICT); goto leave; } gnupg_sleep (1); sig->timestamp = make_timestamp(); } } /* Note that already expired sigs will remain expired (with a * duration of 1) since build-packet.c:build_sig_subpkt_from_sig * detects this case. */ /* Put the updated timestamp into the sig. Note that this will * automagically lower any sig expiration dates to correctly * correspond to the differences in the timestamps (i.e. the * duration will shrink). */ build_sig_subpkt_from_sig (sig, pksk); if (mksubpkt) rc = (*mksubpkt)(sig, opaque); if (!rc) { hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig, NULL); gcry_md_final (md); rc = complete_sig (ctrl, sig, pksk, md, NULL); } leave: gcry_md_close (md); if (rc) free_seckey_enc (sig); else *ret_sig = sig; return rc; }