diff --git a/dirmngr/ocsp.c b/dirmngr/ocsp.c
index 0da96ba15..7267d623e 100644
--- a/dirmngr/ocsp.c
+++ b/dirmngr/ocsp.c
@@ -1,947 +1,950 @@
 /* ocsp.c - OCSP management
  *      Copyright (C) 2004, 2007 g10 Code GmbH
  *
  * This file is part of DirMngr.
  *
  * DirMngr is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
  * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
  * (at your option) any later version.
  *
  * DirMngr is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
  * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
  * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
  * GNU General Public License for more details.
  *
  * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
  * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
  * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
  */
 
 #include <config.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 
 #include "dirmngr.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "http.h"
 #include "validate.h"
 #include "certcache.h"
 #include "ocsp.h"
 
 /* The maximum size we allow as a response from an OCSP reponder. */
 #define MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE 65536
 
 
 static const char oidstr_ocsp[] = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1";
 
 
 /* Telesec attribute used to implement a positive confirmation.
 
    CertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
       HashAlgorithm    AlgorithmIdentifier,
       certificateHash OCTET STRING }
  */
 /* static const char oidstr_certHash[] = "1.3.36.8.3.13"; */
 
 
 
 
 /* Read from FP and return a newly allocated buffer in R_BUFFER with the
    entire data read from FP. */
 static gpg_error_t
 read_response (estream_t fp, unsigned char **r_buffer, size_t *r_buflen)
 {
   gpg_error_t err;
   unsigned char *buffer;
   size_t bufsize, nbytes;
 
   *r_buffer = NULL;
   *r_buflen = 0;
 
   bufsize = 4096;
   buffer = xtrymalloc (bufsize);
   if (!buffer)
     return gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
 
   nbytes = 0;
   for (;;)
     {
       unsigned char *tmp;
       size_t nread = 0;
 
       assert (nbytes < bufsize);
       nread = es_fread (buffer+nbytes, 1, bufsize-nbytes, fp);
       if (nread < bufsize-nbytes && es_ferror (fp))
         {
           err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
           log_error (_("error reading from responder: %s\n"),
                      strerror (errno));
           xfree (buffer);
           return err;
         }
       if ( !(nread == bufsize-nbytes && !es_feof (fp)))
         { /* Response successfully received. */
           nbytes += nread;
           *r_buffer = buffer;
           *r_buflen = nbytes;
           return 0;
         }
 
       nbytes += nread;
 
       /* Need to enlarge the buffer. */
       if (bufsize >= MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE)
         {
           log_error (_("response from server too large; limit is %d bytes\n"),
                      MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE);
           xfree (buffer);
           return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
         }
 
       bufsize += 4096;
       tmp = xtryrealloc (buffer, bufsize);
       if (!tmp)
         {
           err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
           xfree (buffer);
           return err;
         }
       buffer = tmp;
     }
 }
 
 
 /* Construct an OCSP request, send it to the configured OCSP responder
    and parse the response. On success the OCSP context may be used to
    further process the response.  The signature value and the
    production date are returned at R_SIGVAL and R_PRODUCED_AT; they
    may be NULL or an empty string if not available.  A new hash
    context is returned at R_MD.  */
 static gpg_error_t
 do_ocsp_request (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_ocsp_t ocsp,
                  const char *url, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_cert_t issuer_cert,
                  ksba_sexp_t *r_sigval, ksba_isotime_t r_produced_at,
                  gcry_md_hd_t *r_md)
 {
   gpg_error_t err;
   unsigned char *request, *response;
   size_t requestlen, responselen;
   http_t http;
   ksba_ocsp_response_status_t response_status;
   const char *t;
   int redirects_left = 2;
   char *free_this = NULL;
 
   (void)ctrl;
 
   *r_sigval = NULL;
   *r_produced_at = 0;
   *r_md = NULL;
 
   if (dirmngr_use_tor ())
     {
       /* For now we do not allow OCSP via Tor due to possible privacy
          concerns.  Needs further research.  */
       const char *msg = _("OCSP request not possible due to Tor mode");
       err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
       log_error ("%s", msg);
       dirmngr_status_printf (ctrl, "NOTE", "no_ocsp_due_to_tor %u %s", err,msg);
       return err;
     }
 
   if (opt.disable_http)
     {
       log_error (_("OCSP request not possible due to disabled HTTP\n"));
       return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
     }
 
   err = ksba_ocsp_add_target (ocsp, cert, issuer_cert);
   if (err)
     {
       log_error (_("error setting OCSP target: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
       return err;
     }
 
   {
     size_t n;
     unsigned char nonce[32];
 
     n = ksba_ocsp_set_nonce (ocsp, NULL, 0);
     if (n > sizeof nonce)
       n = sizeof nonce;
     gcry_create_nonce (nonce, n);
     ksba_ocsp_set_nonce (ocsp, nonce, n);
   }
 
   err = ksba_ocsp_build_request (ocsp, &request, &requestlen);
   if (err)
     {
       log_error (_("error building OCSP request: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
       return err;
     }
 
  once_more:
   err = http_open (ctrl, &http, HTTP_REQ_POST, url, NULL, NULL,
                    ((opt.honor_http_proxy? HTTP_FLAG_TRY_PROXY:0)
                     | (dirmngr_use_tor ()? HTTP_FLAG_FORCE_TOR:0)
                     | (opt.disable_ipv4? HTTP_FLAG_IGNORE_IPv4 : 0)
                     | (opt.disable_ipv6? HTTP_FLAG_IGNORE_IPv6 : 0)),
                    ctrl->http_proxy, NULL, NULL, NULL);
   if (err)
     {
       log_error (_("error connecting to '%s': %s\n"), url, gpg_strerror (err));
       xfree (free_this);
       return err;
     }
 
   es_fprintf (http_get_write_ptr (http),
 	      "Content-Type: application/ocsp-request\r\n"
 	      "Content-Length: %lu\r\n",
 	      (unsigned long)requestlen );
   http_start_data (http);
   if (es_fwrite (request, requestlen, 1, http_get_write_ptr (http)) != 1)
     {
       err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
       log_error ("error sending request to '%s': %s\n", url, strerror (errno));
       http_close (http, 0);
       xfree (request);
       xfree (free_this);
       return err;
     }
   xfree (request);
   request = NULL;
 
   err = http_wait_response (http);
   if (err || http_get_status_code (http) != 200)
     {
       if (err)
         log_error (_("error reading HTTP response for '%s': %s\n"),
                    url, gpg_strerror (err));
       else
         {
           switch (http_get_status_code (http))
             {
             case 301:
             case 302:
               {
                 const char *s = http_get_header (http, "Location");
 
                 log_info (_("URL '%s' redirected to '%s' (%u)\n"),
                           url, s?s:"[none]", http_get_status_code (http));
                 if (s && *s && redirects_left-- )
                   {
                     xfree (free_this); url = NULL;
                     free_this = xtrystrdup (s);
                     if (!free_this)
                       err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
                     else
                       {
                         url = free_this;
                         http_close (http, 0);
                         goto once_more;
                       }
                   }
                 else
                   err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
                 log_error (_("too many redirections\n"));
               }
               break;
 
             case 413:  /* Payload too large */
               err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
               break;
 
             default:
               log_error (_("error accessing '%s': http status %u\n"),
                          url, http_get_status_code (http));
               err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
               break;
             }
         }
       http_close (http, 0);
       xfree (free_this);
       return err;
     }
 
   err = read_response (http_get_read_ptr (http), &response, &responselen);
   http_close (http, 0);
   if (err)
     {
       log_error (_("error reading HTTP response for '%s': %s\n"),
                  url, gpg_strerror (err));
       xfree (free_this);
       return err;
     }
   /* log_printhex (response, responselen, "ocsp response"); */
 
   err = ksba_ocsp_parse_response (ocsp, response, responselen,
                                   &response_status);
   if (err)
     {
       log_error (_("error parsing OCSP response for '%s': %s\n"),
                  url, gpg_strerror (err));
       xfree (response);
       xfree (free_this);
       return err;
     }
 
   switch (response_status)
     {
     case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_SUCCESS:      t = "success"; break;
     case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_MALFORMED:    t = "malformed"; break;
     case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_INTERNAL:     t = "internal error"; break;
     case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_TRYLATER:     t = "try later"; break;
     case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_SIGREQUIRED:  t = "must sign request"; break;
     case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_UNAUTHORIZED: t = "unauthorized"; break;
     case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_REPLAYED:     t = "replay detected"; break;
     case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_OTHER:        t = "other (unknown)"; break;
     case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_NONE:         t = "no status"; break;
     default:                               t = "[unknown status]"; break;
     }
   if (response_status == KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_SUCCESS)
     {
       int hash_algo;
 
       if (opt.verbose)
         log_info (_("OCSP responder at '%s' status: %s\n"), url, t);
 
       /* Get the signature value now because we can call this function
        * only once.  */
       *r_sigval = ksba_ocsp_get_sig_val (ocsp, r_produced_at);
 
       hash_algo = hash_algo_from_sigval (*r_sigval);
       if (!hash_algo)
         {
           if (opt.verbose)
             log_info ("ocsp: using SHA-256 as fallback hash algo.\n");
           hash_algo = GCRY_MD_SHA256;
         }
       err = gcry_md_open (r_md, hash_algo, 0);
       if (err)
         {
           log_error (_("failed to establish a hashing context for OCSP: %s\n"),
                      gpg_strerror (err));
           goto leave;
         }
       if (DBG_HASHING)
         gcry_md_debug (*r_md, "ocsp");
 
       err = ksba_ocsp_hash_response (ocsp, response, responselen,
                                      HASH_FNC, *r_md);
       if (err)
         log_error (_("hashing the OCSP response for '%s' failed: %s\n"),
                    url, gpg_strerror (err));
     }
   else
     {
       log_error (_("OCSP responder at '%s' status: %s\n"), url, t);
       err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
     }
 
  leave:
   xfree (response);
   xfree (free_this);
   if (err)
     {
       xfree (*r_sigval);
       *r_sigval = NULL;
       *r_produced_at = 0;
       gcry_md_close (*r_md);
       *r_md = NULL;
     }
   return err;
 }
 
 
 /* Validate that CERT is indeed valid to sign an OCSP response. If
    SIGNER_FPR_LIST is not NULL we simply check that CERT matches one
    of the fingerprints in this list. */
 static gpg_error_t
 validate_responder_cert (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert,
                          fingerprint_list_t signer_fpr_list)
 {
   gpg_error_t err;
   char *fpr;
 
   if (signer_fpr_list)
     {
       fpr = get_fingerprint_hexstring (cert);
       for (; signer_fpr_list && strcmp (signer_fpr_list->hexfpr, fpr);
            signer_fpr_list = signer_fpr_list->next)
         ;
       if (signer_fpr_list)
         err = 0;
       else
         {
           log_error (_("not signed by a default OCSP signer's certificate"));
           err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CA_CERT);
         }
       xfree (fpr);
     }
   else
     {
       /* We avoid duplicating the entire certificate validation code
          from gpgsm here.  Because we have no way calling back to the
          client and letting it compute the validity, we use the ugly
          hack of telling the client that the response will only be
          valid if the certificate given in this status message is
          valid.
 
          Note, that in theory we could simply ask the client via an
          inquire to validate a certificate but this might involve
          calling DirMngr again recursively - we can't do that as of now
          (neither DirMngr nor gpgsm have the ability for concurrent
          access to DirMngr.   */
 
       /* FIXME: We should cache this certificate locally, so that the next
          call to dirmngr won't need to look it up - if this works at
          all. */
       fpr = get_fingerprint_hexstring (cert);
       dirmngr_status (ctrl, "ONLY_VALID_IF_CERT_VALID", fpr, NULL);
       xfree (fpr);
       err = 0;
     }
 
   return err;
 }
 
 
 /* Helper for check_signature.  MD is the finalized hash context.  */
 static gpg_error_t
 check_signature_core (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, gcry_sexp_t s_sig,
                       gcry_md_hd_t md, fingerprint_list_t signer_fpr_list)
 {
   gpg_error_t err;
   gcry_sexp_t s_pkey = NULL;
   gcry_sexp_t s_hash = NULL;
   const char *s;
   int mdalgo, mdlen;
 
   /* Get the public key as a gcrypt s-expression.  */
   {
     ksba_sexp_t pk = ksba_cert_get_public_key (cert);
     if (!pk)
       err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
     else
       {
         err = canon_sexp_to_gcry (pk, &s_pkey);
         xfree (pk);
       }
     if (err)
       goto leave;
   }
 
   mdalgo = gcry_md_get_algo (md);
   mdlen  = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (mdalgo);
 
   if (pk_algo_from_sexp (s_pkey) == GCRY_PK_ECC)
     {
       unsigned int qbits0, qbits;
 
       qbits0 = gcry_pk_get_nbits (s_pkey);
       qbits = qbits0 == 521? 512 : qbits0;
 
       if ((qbits%8))
 	{
 	  log_error ("ECDSA requires the hash length to be a"
                      " multiple of 8 bits\n");
 	  err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
           goto leave;
 	}
 
       /* Don't allow any Q smaller than 160 bits.  */
       if (qbits < 160)
 	{
 	  log_error (_("%s key uses an unsafe (%u bit) hash\n"),
                      "ECDSA", qbits0);
 	  err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
           goto leave;
 	}
 
       /* Check if we're too short.  */
       if (mdlen < qbits/8)
         {
 	  log_error (_("a %u bit hash is not valid for a %u bit %s key\n"),
                      (unsigned int)mdlen*8,
                      qbits0,
                      "ECDSA");
           if (mdlen < 20)
             {
               err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
               goto leave;
             }
         }
 
       /* Truncate.  */
       if (mdlen > qbits/8)
         mdlen = qbits/8;
 
       err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_hash, NULL, "(data(flags raw)(value %b))",
                              (int)mdlen, gcry_md_read (md, mdalgo));
     }
   else if (mdalgo && (s = gcry_md_algo_name (mdalgo)) && strlen (s) < 16)
     {
       /* Assume RSA */
       char hashalgostr[16+1];
       int i;
 
       for (i=0; s[i]; i++)
         hashalgostr[i] = ascii_tolower (s[i]);
       hashalgostr[i] = 0;
       err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_hash, NULL, "(data(flags pkcs1)(hash %s %b))",
                              hashalgostr,
                              (int)mdlen,
                              gcry_md_read (md, mdalgo));
     }
   else
     err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO);
   if (err)
     {
       log_error (_("creating S-expression failed: %s\n"), gcry_strerror (err));
       goto leave;
     }
 
-  gcry_log_debugsxp ("sig ", s_sig);
-  gcry_log_debugsxp ("hash", s_hash);
+  if (DBG_CRYPTO)
+    {
+      gcry_log_debugsxp ("sig ", s_sig);
+      gcry_log_debugsxp ("hash", s_hash);
+    }
 
   err = gcry_pk_verify (s_sig, s_hash, s_pkey);
   if (err)
     goto leave;
 
   err = validate_responder_cert (ctrl, cert, signer_fpr_list);
 
  leave:
   gcry_sexp_release (s_hash);
   gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey);
   return err;
 }
 
 
 /* Check the signature of an OCSP response.  OCSP is the context,
    S_SIG the signature value and MD the handle of the hash we used for
    the response.  This function automagically finds the correct public
    key.  If SIGNER_FPR_LIST is not NULL, the default OCSP reponder has been
    used and thus the certificate is one of those identified by
    the fingerprints. */
 static gpg_error_t
 check_signature (ctrl_t ctrl,
                  ksba_ocsp_t ocsp, gcry_sexp_t s_sig, gcry_md_hd_t md,
                  fingerprint_list_t signer_fpr_list)
 {
   gpg_error_t err;
   int cert_idx;
   ksba_cert_t cert;
 
   /* Create a suitable S-expression with the hash value of our response. */
   gcry_md_final (md);
 
   /* Get rid of old OCSP specific certificate references. */
   release_ctrl_ocsp_certs (ctrl);
 
   if (signer_fpr_list && !signer_fpr_list->next)
     {
       /* There is exactly one signer fingerprint given. Thus we use
          the default OCSP responder's certificate and instantly know
          the certificate to use.  */
       cert = get_cert_byhexfpr (signer_fpr_list->hexfpr);
       if (!cert)
         cert = get_cert_local (ctrl, signer_fpr_list->hexfpr);
       if (cert)
         {
           err = check_signature_core (ctrl, cert, s_sig, md,
                                       signer_fpr_list);
           ksba_cert_release (cert);
           cert = NULL;
           if (!err)
             {
               return 0; /* Successfully verified the signature. */
             }
         }
     }
   else
     {
       char *name;
       ksba_sexp_t keyid;
 
       /* Put all certificates included in the response into the cache
          and setup a list of those certificate which will later be
          preferred used when locating certificates.  */
       for (cert_idx=0; (cert = ksba_ocsp_get_cert (ocsp, cert_idx));
            cert_idx++)
         {
           cert_ref_t cref;
 
           /* dump_cert ("from ocsp response", cert); */
           cref = xtrymalloc (sizeof *cref);
           if (!cref)
             {
               err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
               log_error (_("allocating list item failed: %s\n"),
                          gpg_strerror (err));
             }
           else if (!cache_cert_silent (cert, &cref->fpr))
             {
               cref->next = ctrl->ocsp_certs;
               ctrl->ocsp_certs = cref;
             }
           else
             xfree (cref);
         }
 
       /* Get the certificate by means of the responder ID. */
       err = ksba_ocsp_get_responder_id (ocsp, &name, &keyid);
       if (err)
         {
           log_error (_("error getting responder ID: %s\n"),
                      gcry_strerror (err));
           return err;
         }
       cert = find_cert_bysubject (ctrl, name, keyid);
       if (!cert)
         {
           log_error ("responder certificate ");
           if (name)
             log_printf ("'/%s' ", name);
           if (keyid)
             {
               log_printf ("{");
               dump_serial (keyid);
               log_printf ("} ");
             }
           log_printf ("not found\n");
         }
 
       if (cert)
         {
           err = check_signature_core (ctrl, cert, s_sig, md, signer_fpr_list);
           ksba_cert_release (cert);
           if (!err)
             {
               ksba_free (name);
               ksba_free (keyid);
               return 0; /* Successfully verified the signature. */
             }
           log_error ("responder certificate ");
           if (name)
             log_printf ("'/%s' ", name);
           if (keyid)
             {
               log_printf ("{");
               dump_serial (keyid);
               log_printf ("} ");
             }
           log_printf ("did not verify: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
         }
       ksba_free (name);
       ksba_free (keyid);
     }
 
   log_error (_("no suitable certificate found to verify the OCSP response\n"));
   return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
 }
 
 
 /* Check whether the certificate either given by fingerprint CERT_FPR
    or directly through the CERT object is valid by running an OCSP
    transaction.  With FORCE_DEFAULT_RESPONDER set only the configured
    default responder is used. */
 gpg_error_t
 ocsp_isvalid (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, const char *cert_fpr,
               int force_default_responder)
 {
   gpg_error_t err;
   ksba_ocsp_t ocsp = NULL;
   ksba_cert_t issuer_cert = NULL;
   ksba_sexp_t sigval = NULL;
   gcry_sexp_t s_sig = NULL;
   ksba_isotime_t current_time;
   ksba_isotime_t this_update, next_update, revocation_time, produced_at;
   ksba_isotime_t tmp_time;
   ksba_status_t status;
   ksba_crl_reason_t reason;
   char *url_buffer = NULL;
   const char *url;
   gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL;
   int i, idx;
   char *oid;
   ksba_name_t name;
   fingerprint_list_t default_signer = NULL;
 
   /* Get the certificate.  */
   if (cert)
     {
       ksba_cert_ref (cert);
 
       err = find_issuing_cert (ctrl, cert, &issuer_cert);
       if (err)
         {
           log_error (_("issuer certificate not found: %s\n"),
                      gpg_strerror (err));
           goto leave;
         }
     }
   else
     {
       cert = get_cert_local (ctrl, cert_fpr);
       if (!cert)
         {
           log_error (_("caller did not return the target certificate\n"));
           err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
           goto leave;
         }
       issuer_cert = get_issuing_cert_local (ctrl, NULL);
       if (!issuer_cert)
         {
           log_error (_("caller did not return the issuing certificate\n"));
           err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
           goto leave;
         }
     }
 
   /* Create an OCSP instance.  */
   err = ksba_ocsp_new (&ocsp);
   if (err)
     {
       log_error (_("failed to allocate OCSP context: %s\n"),
                  gpg_strerror (err));
       goto leave;
     }
 
   /* Figure out the OCSP responder to use.
      1. Try to get the reponder from the certificate.
         We do only take http and https style URIs into account.
      2. If this fails use the default responder, if any.
    */
   url = NULL;
   for (idx=0; !url && !opt.ignore_ocsp_service_url && !force_default_responder
          && !(err=ksba_cert_get_authority_info_access (cert, idx,
                                                        &oid, &name)); idx++)
     {
       if ( !strcmp (oid, oidstr_ocsp) )
         {
           for (i=0; !url && ksba_name_enum (name, i); i++)
             {
               char *p = ksba_name_get_uri (name, i);
               if (p && (!ascii_strncasecmp (p, "http:", 5)
                         || !ascii_strncasecmp (p, "https:", 6)))
                 url = url_buffer = p;
               else
                 xfree (p);
             }
         }
       ksba_name_release (name);
       ksba_free (oid);
     }
   if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF)
     {
       log_error (_("can't get authorityInfoAccess: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
       goto leave;
     }
   if (!url)
     {
       if (!opt.ocsp_responder || !*opt.ocsp_responder)
         {
           log_info (_("no default OCSP responder defined\n"));
           err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CONFIGURATION);
           goto leave;
         }
       if (!opt.ocsp_signer)
         {
           log_info (_("no default OCSP signer defined\n"));
           err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CONFIGURATION);
           goto leave;
         }
       url = opt.ocsp_responder;
       default_signer = opt.ocsp_signer;
       if (opt.verbose)
         log_info (_("using default OCSP responder '%s'\n"), url);
     }
   else
     {
       if (opt.verbose)
         log_info (_("using OCSP responder '%s'\n"), url);
     }
 
   /* Ask the OCSP responder. */
   err = do_ocsp_request (ctrl, ocsp, url, cert, issuer_cert,
                          &sigval, produced_at, &md);
   if (err)
     goto leave;
 
   /* It is sometimes useful to know the responder ID. */
   if (opt.verbose)
     {
       char *resp_name;
       ksba_sexp_t resp_keyid;
 
       err = ksba_ocsp_get_responder_id (ocsp, &resp_name, &resp_keyid);
       if (err)
         log_info (_("error getting responder ID: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
       else
         {
           log_info ("responder id: ");
           if (resp_name)
             log_printf ("'/%s' ", resp_name);
           if (resp_keyid)
             {
               log_printf ("{");
               dump_serial (resp_keyid);
               log_printf ("} ");
             }
           log_printf ("\n");
         }
       ksba_free (resp_name);
       ksba_free (resp_keyid);
       err = 0;
     }
 
   /* We got a useful answer, check that the answer has a valid signature. */
   if (!sigval || !*produced_at || !md)
     {
       err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
       goto leave;
     }
   if ( (err = canon_sexp_to_gcry (sigval, &s_sig)) )
     goto leave;
   xfree (sigval);
   sigval = NULL;
   err = check_signature (ctrl, ocsp, s_sig, md, default_signer);
   if (err)
     goto leave;
 
   /* We only support one certificate per request.  Check that the
      answer matches the right certificate. */
   err = ksba_ocsp_get_status (ocsp, cert,
                               &status, this_update, next_update,
                               revocation_time, &reason);
   if (err)
     {
       log_error (_("error getting OCSP status for target certificate: %s\n"),
                  gpg_strerror (err));
       goto leave;
     }
 
   /* In case the certificate has been revoked, we better invalidate
      our cached validation status. */
   if (status == KSBA_STATUS_REVOKED)
     {
       time_t validated_at = 0; /* That is: No cached validation available. */
       err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (cert, "validated_at",
                                      &validated_at, sizeof (validated_at));
       if (err)
         {
           log_error ("set_user_data(validated_at) failed: %s\n",
                      gpg_strerror (err));
           err = 0; /* The certificate is anyway revoked, and that is a
                       more important message than the failure of our
                       cache. */
         }
     }
 
 
   if (opt.verbose)
     {
       log_info (_("certificate status is: %s  (this=%s  next=%s)\n"),
                 status == KSBA_STATUS_GOOD? _("good"):
                 status == KSBA_STATUS_REVOKED? _("revoked"):
                 status == KSBA_STATUS_UNKNOWN? _("unknown"):
                 status == KSBA_STATUS_NONE? _("none"): "?",
                 this_update, next_update);
       if (status == KSBA_STATUS_REVOKED)
         log_info (_("certificate has been revoked at: %s due to: %s\n"),
                   revocation_time,
                   reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_UNSPECIFIED?   "unspecified":
                   reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_KEY_COMPROMISE? "key compromise":
                   reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_CA_COMPROMISE?   "CA compromise":
                   reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_AFFILIATION_CHANGED?
                                                       "affiliation changed":
                   reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_SUPERSEDED?   "superseded":
                   reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_CESSATION_OF_OPERATION?
                                                   "cessation of operation":
                   reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_CERTIFICATE_HOLD?
                                                   "certificate on hold":
                   reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL?
                                                   "removed from CRL":
                   reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_PRIVILEGE_WITHDRAWN?
                                                   "privilege withdrawn":
                   reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_AA_COMPROMISE? "AA compromise":
                   reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_OTHER?   "other":"?");
 
     }
 
 
   if (status == KSBA_STATUS_REVOKED)
     err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
   else if (status == KSBA_STATUS_UNKNOWN)
     err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
   else if (status != KSBA_STATUS_GOOD)
     err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
 
   /* Allow for some clock skew. */
   gnupg_get_isotime (current_time);
   add_seconds_to_isotime (current_time, opt.ocsp_max_clock_skew);
 
   if (strcmp (this_update, current_time) > 0 )
     {
       log_error (_("OCSP responder returned a status in the future\n"));
       log_info ("used now: %s  this_update: %s\n", current_time, this_update);
       if (!err)
         err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TIME_CONFLICT);
     }
 
   /* Check that THIS_UPDATE is not too far back in the past. */
   gnupg_copy_time (tmp_time, this_update);
   add_seconds_to_isotime (tmp_time,
                           opt.ocsp_max_period+opt.ocsp_max_clock_skew);
   if (!*tmp_time || strcmp (tmp_time, current_time) < 0 )
     {
       log_error (_("OCSP responder returned a non-current status\n"));
       log_info ("used now: %s  this_update: %s\n",
                 current_time, this_update);
       if (!err)
         err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TIME_CONFLICT);
     }
 
   /* Check that we are not beyond NEXT_UPDATE  (plus some extra time). */
   if (*next_update)
     {
       gnupg_copy_time (tmp_time, next_update);
       add_seconds_to_isotime (tmp_time,
                               opt.ocsp_current_period+opt.ocsp_max_clock_skew);
       if (!*tmp_time && strcmp (tmp_time, current_time) < 0 )
         {
           log_error (_("OCSP responder returned an too old status\n"));
           log_info ("used now: %s  next_update: %s\n",
                     current_time, next_update);
           if (!err)
             err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TIME_CONFLICT);
         }
     }
 
 
  leave:
   gcry_md_close (md);
   gcry_sexp_release (s_sig);
   xfree (sigval);
   ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
   ksba_cert_release (cert);
   ksba_ocsp_release (ocsp);
   xfree (url_buffer);
   return err;
 }
 
 
 /* Release the list of OCSP certificates hold in the CTRL object. */
 void
 release_ctrl_ocsp_certs (ctrl_t ctrl)
 {
   while (ctrl->ocsp_certs)
     {
       cert_ref_t tmp = ctrl->ocsp_certs->next;
       xfree (ctrl->ocsp_certs);
       ctrl->ocsp_certs = tmp;
     }
 }
diff --git a/doc/DETAILS b/doc/DETAILS
index 70dabe0f8..9581f3032 100644
--- a/doc/DETAILS
+++ b/doc/DETAILS
@@ -1,1787 +1,1791 @@
 # doc/DETAILS                                                -*- org -*-
 #+TITLE: GnuPG Details
 # Globally disable superscripts and subscripts:
 #+OPTIONS: ^:{}
 #+STARTUP: showall
 
 # Note: This file uses org-mode; it should be easy to read as plain
 # text but be aware of some markup peculiarities: Verbatim code is
 # enclosed in #+begin-example, #+end-example blocks or marked by a
 # colon as the first non-white-space character, words bracketed with
 # equal signs indicate a monospace font, and the usual /italics/,
 # *bold*, and _underline_ conventions are recognized.
 
 This is the DETAILS file for GnuPG which specifies some internals and
 parts of the external API for GPG and GPGSM.
 
 * Format of the colon listings
 
   The format is a based on colon separated record, each recods starts
   with a tag string and extends to the end of the line.  Here is an
   example:
 #+begin_example
 $ gpg --with-colons --list-keys \
       --with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint wk@gnupg.org
 pub:f:1024:17:6C7EE1B8621CC013:899817715:1055898235::m:::scESC:
 fpr:::::::::ECAF7590EB3443B5C7CF3ACB6C7EE1B8621CC013:
 uid:f::::::::Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>:
 uid:f::::::::Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>:
 sub:f:1536:16:06AD222CADF6A6E1:919537416:1036177416:::::e:
 fpr:::::::::CF8BCC4B18DE08FCD8A1615906AD222CADF6A6E1:
 sub:r:1536:20:5CE086B5B5A18FF4:899817788:1025961788:::::esc:
 fpr:::::::::AB059359A3B81F410FCFF97F5CE086B5B5A18FF4:
 #+end_example
 
 Note that new version of GnuPG or the use of certain options may add
 new fields to the output.  Parsers should not assume a limit on the
 number of fields per line.  Some fields are not yet used or only used
 with certain record types; parsers should ignore fields they are not
 aware of.  New versions of GnuPG or the use of certain options may add
 new types of records as well.  Parsers should ignore any record whose
 type they do not recognize for forward-compatibility.
 
 The double =--with-fingerprint= prints the fingerprint for the subkeys
 too.  Old versions of gpg used a slightly different format and required
 the use of the option =--fixed-list-mode= to conform to the format
 described here.
 
 
 ** Description of the fields
 *** Field 1 - Type of record
 
     - pub :: Public key
     - crt :: X.509 certificate
     - crs :: X.509 certificate and private key available
     - sub :: Subkey (secondary key)
     - sec :: Secret key
     - ssb :: Secret subkey (secondary key)
     - uid :: User id
     - uat :: User attribute (same as user id except for field 10).
     - sig :: Signature
     - rev :: Revocation signature
     - rvs :: Revocation signature (standalone) [since 2.2.9]
     - fpr :: Fingerprint (fingerprint is in field 10)
     - fp2 :: SHA-256 fingerprint (fingerprint is in field 10)
     - pkd :: Public key data [*]
     - grp :: Keygrip
     - rvk :: Revocation key
     - tfs :: TOFU statistics [*]
     - tru :: Trust database information [*]
     - spk :: Signature subpacket [*]
     - cfg :: Configuration data [*]
 
     Records marked with an asterisk are described at [[*Special%20field%20formats][*Special fields]].
 
 *** Field 2 - Validity
 
     This is a letter describing the computed validity of a key.
     Currently this is a single letter, but be prepared that additional
     information may follow in some future versions. Note that GnuPG <
     2.1 does not set this field for secret key listings.
 
     - o :: Unknown (this key is new to the system)
     - i :: The key is invalid (e.g. due to a missing self-signature)
     - d :: The key has been disabled
 	   (deprecated - use the 'D' in field 12 instead)
     - r :: The key has been revoked
     - e :: The key has expired
     - - :: Unknown validity (i.e. no value assigned)
     - q :: Undefined validity.  '-' and 'q' may safely be treated as
            the same value for most purposes
     - n :: The key is not valid
     - m :: The key is marginal valid.
     - f :: The key is fully valid
     - u :: The key is ultimately valid.  This often means that the
            secret key is available, but any key may be marked as
            ultimately valid.
     - w :: The key has a well known private part.
     - s :: The key has special validity.  This means that it might be
            self-signed and expected to be used in the STEED system.
 
     If the validity information is given for a UID or UAT record, it
     describes the validity calculated based on this user ID.  If given
     for a key record it describes the validity taken from the best
     rated user ID.
 
     For X.509 certificates a 'u' is used for a trusted root
     certificate (i.e. for the trust anchor) and an 'f' for all other
     valid certificates.
 
     In "sig" records, this field may have one of these values as first
     character:
 
     - ! :: Signature is good.
     - - :: Signature is bad.
     - ? :: No public key to verify signature or public key is not usable.
     - % :: Other error verifying a signature
 
     More values may be added later.  The field may also be empty if
     gpg has been invoked in a non-checking mode (--list-sigs) or in a
     fast checking mode.  Since 2.2.7 '?' will also be printed by the
     command --list-sigs if the key is not in the local keyring.
 
 *** Field 3 - Key length
 
     The length of key in bits.
 
 *** Field 4 - Public key algorithm
 
     The values here are those from the OpenPGP specs or if they are
     greater than 255 the algorithm ids as used by Libgcrypt.
 
 *** Field 5 - KeyID
 
     This is the 64 bit keyid as specified by OpenPGP and the last 64
     bit of the SHA-1 fingerprint of an X.509 certifciate.
 
 *** Field 6 - Creation date
 
     The creation date of the key is given in UTC.  For UID and UAT
     records, this is used for the self-signature date.  Note that the
     date is usually printed in seconds since epoch, however, we are
     migrating to an ISO 8601 format (e.g. "19660205T091500").  This is
     currently only relevant for X.509.  A simple way to detect the new
     format is to scan for the 'T'.  Note that old versions of gpg
     without using the =--fixed-list-mode= option used a "yyyy-mm-tt"
     format.
 
 *** Field 7 - Expiration date
 
     Key or UID/UAT expiration date or empty if it does not expire.
 
 *** Field 8 - Certificate S/N, UID hash, trust signature info
 
     Used for serial number in crt records.  For UID and UAT records,
     this is a hash of the user ID contents used to represent that
     exact user ID.  For trust signatures, this is the trust depth
     separated by the trust value by a space.
 
 *** Field 9 -  Ownertrust
 
     This is only used on primary keys.  This is a single letter, but
     be prepared that additional information may follow in future
     versions.  For trust signatures with a regular expression, this is
     the regular expression value, quoted as in field 10.
 
 *** Field 10 - User-ID
 
     The value is quoted like a C string to avoid control characters
     (the colon is quoted =\x3a=).  For a "pub" record this field is
     not used on --fixed-list-mode.  A UAT record puts the attribute
     subpacket count here, a space, and then the total attribute
     subpacket size.  In gpgsm the issuer name comes here.  The FPR and FP2
     records store the fingerprints here.  The fingerprint of a
     revocation key is stored here.
 
 *** Field 11 - Signature class
 
     Signature class as per RFC-4880.  This is a 2 digit hexnumber
     followed by either the letter 'x' for an exportable signature or
     the letter 'l' for a local-only signature.  The class byte of an
     revocation key is also given here, by a 2 digit hexnumber and
     optionally followed by the letter 's' for the "sensitive"
     flag.  This field is not used for X.509.
 
     "rev" and "rvs" may be followed by a comma and a 2 digit hexnumber
     with the revocation reason.
 
 *** Field 12 - Key capabilities
 
     The defined capabilities are:
 
     - e :: Encrypt
     - s :: Sign
     - c :: Certify
     - a :: Authentication
     - r :: Restricted encryption (subkey only use)
     - t :: Timestamping
     - g :: Group key
     - ? :: Unknown capability
 
     A key may have any combination of them in any order.  In addition
     to these letters, the primary key has uppercase versions of the
     letters to denote the _usable_ capabilities of the entire key, and
     a potential letter 'D' to indicate a disabled key.
 
 *** Field 13 - Issuer certificate fingerprint or other info
 
     Used in FPR records for S/MIME keys to store the fingerprint of
     the issuer certificate.  This is useful to build the certificate
     path based on certificates stored in the local key database it is
     only filled if the issuer certificate is available. The root has
     been reached if this is the same string as the fingerprint. The
     advantage of using this value is that it is guaranteed to have
     been built by the same lookup algorithm as gpgsm uses.
 
     For "uid" records this field lists the preferences in the same way
     gpg's --edit-key menu does.
 
     For "sig", "rev" and "rvs" records, this is the fingerprint of the
     key that issued the signature.  Note that this may only be filled
     if the signature verified correctly.  Note also that for various
     technical reasons, this fingerprint is only available if
     --no-sig-cache is used.  Since 2.2.7 this field will also be set
     if the key is missing but the signature carries an issuer
     fingerprint as meta data.
 
 *** Field 14 - Flag field
 
     Flag field used in the --edit-key menu output
 
 *** Field 15 - S/N of a token
 
     Used in sec/ssb to print the serial number of a token (internal
     protect mode 1002) or a '#' if that key is a simple stub (internal
     protect mode 1001).  If the option --with-secret is used and a
     secret key is available for the public key, a '+' indicates this.
 
 *** Field 16 - Hash algorithm
 
     For sig records, this is the used hash algorithm.  For example:
     2 = SHA-1, 8 = SHA-256.
 
 *** Field 17 - Curve name
 
     For pub, sub, sec, ssb, crt, and crs records this field is used
     for the ECC curve name.
 
 *** Field 18 - Compliance flags
 
     Space separated list of asserted compliance modes and
     screening result for this key.
 
     Valid values are:
 
     - 8  :: The key is compliant with RFC4880bis
     - 23 :: The key is compliant with compliance mode "de-vs".
     - 6001 :: Screening hit on the ROCA vulnerability.
 
 *** Field 19 - Last update
 
     The timestamp of the last update of a key or user ID.  The update
     time of a key is defined a lookup of the key via its unique
     identifier (fingerprint); the field is empty if not known.  The
     update time of a user ID is defined by a lookup of the key using a
     trusted mapping from mail address to key.
 
 *** Field 20 - Origin
 
     The origin of the key or the user ID.  This is an integer
     optionally followed by a space and an URL.  This goes along with
     the previous field.  The URL is quoted in C style.
 
 *** Field 21 - Comment
 
     This is currently only used in "rev" and "rvs" records to carry
     the the comment field of the recocation reason.  The value is
     quoted in C style.
 
 ** Special fields
 
 *** PKD - Public key data
 
     If field 1 has the tag "pkd", a listing looks like this:
 #+begin_example
 pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB:
     !  !   !-- the value
     !  !------ for information number of bits in the value
     !--------- index (eg. DSA goes from 0 to 3: p,q,g,y)
 #+end_example
 
 *** TFS - TOFU statistics
 
     This field may follows a UID record to convey information about
     the TOFU database.  The information is similar to a TOFU_STATS
     status line.
 
     - Field 2 :: tfs record version (must be 1)
     - Field 3 :: validity -  A number with validity code.
     - Field 4 :: signcount - The number of signatures seen.
     - Field 5 :: encrcount - The number of encryptions done.
     - Field 6 :: policy - A string with the policy
     - Field 7 :: signture-first-seen - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
     - Field 8 :: signature-most-recent-seen - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
     - Field 9 :: encryption-first-done - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
     - Field 10 :: encryption-most-recent-done - a timestamp or 0 if not known.
 
 *** TRU - Trust database information
     Example for a "tru" trust base record:
 #+begin_example
     tru:o:0:1166697654:1:3:1:5
 #+end_example
 
     - Field 2 :: Reason for staleness of trust.  If this field is
                  empty, then the trustdb is not stale.  This field may
                  have multiple flags in it:
 
                  - o :: Trustdb is old
                  - t :: Trustdb was built with a different trust model
                         than the one we are using now.
 
     - Field 3 :: Trust model
 
                  - 0 :: Classic trust model, as used in PGP 2.x.
                  - 1 :: PGP trust model, as used in PGP 6 and later.
                         This is the same as the classic trust model,
                         except for the addition of trust signatures.
 
                  GnuPG before version 1.4 used the classic trust model
                  by default. GnuPG 1.4 and later uses the PGP trust
                  model by default.
 
     - Field 4 :: Date trustdb was created in seconds since Epoch.
     - Field 5 :: Date trustdb will expire in seconds since Epoch.
     - Field 6 :: Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
                  key signer (gpg's option --marginals-needed).
     - Field 7 :: Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
                  key signer.  (gpg's option --completes-needed)
 
     - Field 8 :: Maximum depth of a certification chain. (gpg's option
                  --max-cert-depth)
 
 *** SPK - Signature subpacket records
 
     - Field 2 :: Subpacket number as per RFC-4880 and later.
     - Field 3 :: Flags in hex.  Currently the only two bits assigned
                  are 1, to indicate that the subpacket came from the
                  hashed part of the signature, and 2, to indicate the
                  subpacket was marked critical.
     - Field 4 :: Length of the subpacket.  Note that this is the
                  length of the subpacket, and not the length of field
                  5 below.  Due to the need for %-encoding, the length
                  of field 5 may be up to 3x this value.
     - Field 5 :: The subpacket data.  Printable ASCII is shown as
                  ASCII, but other values are rendered as %XX where XX
                  is the hex value for the byte.
 
 *** CFG - Configuration data
 
     --list-config outputs information about the GnuPG configuration
     for the benefit of frontends or other programs that call GnuPG.
     There are several list-config items, all colon delimited like the
     rest of the --with-colons output.  The first field is always "cfg"
     to indicate configuration information.  The second field is one of
     (with examples):
 
     - version :: The third field contains the version of GnuPG.
 
                  : cfg:version:1.3.5
 
     - pubkey :: The third field contains the public key algorithms
                 this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
                 semicolons.  The algorithm numbers are as specified in
                 RFC-4880.  Note that in contrast to the --status-fd
                 interface these are _not_ the Libgcrypt identifiers.
                 Using =pubkeyname= prints names instead of numbers.
 
                  : cfg:pubkey:1;2;3;16;17
 
     - cipher :: The third field contains the symmetric ciphers this
                 version of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons.
                 The cipher numbers are as specified in RFC-4880.
                 Using =ciphername= prints names instead of numbers.
 
                  : cfg:cipher:2;3;4;7;8;9;10
 
     - digest :: The third field contains the digest (hash) algorithms
                 this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
                 semicolons.  The digest numbers are as specified in
                 RFC-4880.  Using =digestname= prints names instead of
                 numbers.
 
                  : cfg:digest:1;2;3;8;9;10
 
     - compress :: The third field contains the compression algorithms
                   this version of GnuPG supports, separated by
                   semicolons.  The algorithm numbers are as specified
                   in RFC-4880.
 
                  : cfg:compress:0;1;2;3
 
     - group :: The third field contains the name of the group, and the
                fourth field contains the values that the group expands
                to, separated by semicolons.
 
                For example, a group of:
                  : group mynames = paige 0x12345678 joe patti
                would result in:
                  : cfg:group:mynames:patti;joe;0x12345678;paige
 
     - curve :: The third field contains the curve names this version
                of GnuPG supports, separated by semicolons. Using
                =curveoid= prints OIDs instead of numbers.
 
                  : cfg:curve:ed25519;nistp256;nistp384;nistp521
 
 
 * Format of the --status-fd output
 
   Every line is prefixed with "[GNUPG:] ", followed by a keyword with
   the type of the status line and some arguments depending on the type
   (maybe none); an application should always be willing to ignore
   unknown keywords that may be emitted by future versions of GnuPG.
   Also, new versions of GnuPG may add arguments to existing keywords.
   Any additional arguments should be ignored for forward-compatibility.
 
 ** General status codes
 *** NEWSIG [<signers_uid>]
     Is issued right before a signature verification starts.  This is
     useful to define a context for parsing ERROR status messages.
     If SIGNERS_UID is given and is not "-" this is the percent-escaped
     value of the OpenPGP Signer's User ID signature sub-packet.
 
 *** GOODSIG  <long_keyid_or_fpr>  <username>
     The signature with the keyid is good.  For each signature only one
     of the codes GOODSIG, BADSIG, EXPSIG, EXPKEYSIG, REVKEYSIG or
     ERRSIG will be emitted.  In the past they were used as a marker
     for a new signature; new code should use the NEWSIG status
     instead.  The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
     escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if
     it is available.  This is the case with CMS and might eventually
     also be available for OpenPGP.
 
 *** EXPSIG  <long_keyid_or_fpr>  <username>
     The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature is
     expired. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX
     escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if
     it is available.  This is the case with CMS and might eventually
     also be available for OpenPGP.
 
 *** EXPKEYSIG  <long_keyid_or_fpr> <username>
     The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made
     by an expired key. The username is the primary one encoded in
     UTF-8 and %XX escaped.  The fingerprint may be used instead of the
     long keyid if it is available.  This is the case with CMS and
     might eventually also be available for OpenPGP.
 
 *** REVKEYSIG  <long_keyid_or_fpr>  <username>
     The signature with the keyid is good, but the signature was made
     by a revoked key. The username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8
     and %XX escaped. The fingerprint may be used instead of the long
     keyid if it is available.  This is the case with CMS and might
     eventually also beñ available for OpenPGP.
 
 *** BADSIG  <long_keyid_or_fpr>  <username>
     The signature with the keyid has not been verified okay.  The
     username is the primary one encoded in UTF-8 and %XX escaped. The
     fingerprint may be used instead of the long keyid if it is
     available.  This is the case with CMS and might eventually also be
     available for OpenPGP.
 
 *** ERRSIG  <keyid>  <pkalgo> <hashalgo> <sig_class> <time> <rc> <fpr>
     It was not possible to check the signature.  This may be caused by
     a missing public key or an unsupported algorithm.  A RC of 4
     indicates unknown algorithm, a 9 indicates a missing public
     key. The other fields give more information about this signature.
     sig_class is a 2 byte hex-value.  The fingerprint may be used
     instead of the long_keyid_or_fpr if it is available.  This is the
     case with gpgsm and might eventually also be available for
     OpenPGP.  The ERRSIG line has FPR filed which is only available
     since 2.2.7; that FPR may either be missing or - if the signature
     has no fingerprint as meta data.
 
     Note, that TIME may either be the number of seconds since Epoch or
     an ISO 8601 string.  The latter can be detected by the presence of
     the letter 'T'.
 
 *** VALIDSIG <args>
 
     The args are:
 
     - <fingerprint_in_hex>
     - <sig_creation_date>
     - <sig-timestamp>
     - <expire-timestamp>
     - <sig-version>
     - <reserved>
     - <pubkey-algo>
     - <hash-algo>
     - <sig-class>
     - [ <primary-key-fpr> ]
 
     This status indicates that the signature is cryptographically
     valid. This is similar to GOODSIG, EXPSIG, EXPKEYSIG, or REVKEYSIG
     (depending on the date and the state of the signature and signing
     key) but has the fingerprint as the argument. Multiple status
     lines (VALIDSIG and the other appropriate *SIG status) are emitted
     for a valid signature.  All arguments here are on one long line.
     sig-timestamp is the signature creation time in seconds after the
     epoch. expire-timestamp is the signature expiration time in
     seconds after the epoch (zero means "does not
     expire"). sig-version, pubkey-algo, hash-algo, and sig-class (a
     2-byte hex value) are all straight from the signature packet.
     PRIMARY-KEY-FPR is the fingerprint of the primary key or identical
     to the first argument.  This is useful to get back to the primary
     key without running gpg again for this purpose.
 
     The primary-key-fpr parameter is used for OpenPGP and not
     available for CMS signatures.  The sig-version as well as the sig
     class is not defined for CMS and currently set to 0 and 00.
 
     Note, that *-TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
     Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
     of the letter 'T'.
 
 *** SIG_ID  <radix64_string>  <sig_creation_date>  <sig-timestamp>
     This is emitted only for signatures of class 0 or 1 which have
     been verified okay.  The string is a signature id and may be used
     in applications to detect replay attacks of signed messages.  Note
     that only DLP algorithms give unique ids - others may yield
     duplicated ones when they have been created in the same second.
 
     Note, that SIG-TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
     Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
     of the letter 'T'.
 
 *** ENC_TO  <long_keyid>  <keytype>  <keylength>
     The message is encrypted to this LONG_KEYID.  KEYTYPE is the
     numerical value of the public key algorithm or 0 if it is not
     known, KEYLENGTH is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known
     (which is currently always the case).  Gpg prints this line
     always; Gpgsm only if it knows the certificate.
 
 *** BEGIN_DECRYPTION
     Mark the start of the actual decryption process.  This is also
     emitted when in --list-only mode.
 *** END_DECRYPTION
     Mark the end of the actual decryption process.  This is also
     emitted when in --list-only mode.
 *** DECRYPTION_KEY <fpr> <fpr2> <otrust>
     This line is emitted when a public key decryption succeeded in
     providing a session key.  <fpr> is the hexified fingerprint of the
     actual key used for decryption.  <fpr2> is the fingerprint of the
     primary key.  <otrust> is the letter with the ownertrust; this is
     in general a 'u' which stands for ultimately trusted.
 *** DECRYPTION_INFO <mdc_method> <sym_algo> [<aead_algo>]
     Print information about the symmetric encryption algorithm and the
     MDC method.  This will be emitted even if the decryption fails.
     For an AEAD algorithm AEAD_ALGO is not 0.  GPGSM currently does
     not print such a status.
 
 *** DECRYPTION_FAILED
     The symmetric decryption failed - one reason could be a wrong
     passphrase for a symmetrical encrypted message.
 
 *** DECRYPTION_OKAY
     The decryption process succeeded.  This means, that either the
     correct secret key has been used or the correct passphrase for a
     symmetric encrypted message was given.  The program itself may
     return an errorcode because it may not be possible to verify a
     signature for some reasons.
 
 *** SESSION_KEY <algo>:<hexdigits>
     The session key used to decrypt the message.  This message will
     only be emitted if the option --show-session-key is used.  The
     format is suitable to be passed as value for the option
     --override-session-key.  It is not an indication that the
     decryption will or has succeeded.
 
 *** BEGIN_ENCRYPTION  <mdc_method> <sym_algo> [<aead_algo>]
     Mark the start of the actual encryption process.
     MDC_METHOD shall be 0 if an AEAD_ALGO is not 0.  Users should
     however ignore MDC_METHOD if AEAD_ALGO is not 0.
 
 *** END_ENCRYPTION
     Mark the end of the actual encryption process.
 
 *** FILE_START <what> <filename>
     Start processing a file <filename>.  <what> indicates the performed
     operation:
     - 1 :: verify
     - 2 :: encrypt
     - 3 :: decrypt
 
 *** FILE_DONE
     Marks the end of a file processing which has been started
     by FILE_START.
 
 *** BEGIN_SIGNING
     Mark the start of the actual signing process. This may be used as
     an indication that all requested secret keys are ready for use.
 
 *** ALREADY_SIGNED <long-keyid>
     Warning: This is experimental and might be removed at any time.
 
 *** SIG_CREATED <type> <pk_algo> <hash_algo> <class> <timestamp> <keyfpr>
     A signature has been created using these parameters.
     Values for type <type> are:
       - D :: detached
       - C :: cleartext
       - S :: standard
     (only the first character should be checked)
 
     <class> are 2 hex digits with the OpenPGP signature class.
 
     Note, that TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since Epoch
     or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence of the
     letter 'T'.
 
 *** NOTATION_
     There are actually three related status codes to convey notation
     data:
 
     - NOTATION_NAME <name>
     - NOTATION_FLAGS <critical> <human_readable>
     - NOTATION_DATA <string>
 
     <name> and <string> are %XX escaped.  The data may be split among
     several NOTATION_DATA lines.  NOTATION_FLAGS is emitted after
     NOTATION_NAME and gives the critical and human readable flags;
     the flag values are either 0 or 1.
 
 *** POLICY_URL <string>
     Note that URL in <string> is %XX escaped.
 
 *** PLAINTEXT <format> <timestamp> <filename>
     This indicates the format of the plaintext that is about to be
     written.  The format is a 1 byte hex code that shows the format of
     the plaintext: 62 ('b') is binary data, 74 ('t') is text data with
     no character set specified, and 75 ('u') is text data encoded in
     the UTF-8 character set.  The timestamp is in seconds since the
     epoch.  If a filename is available it gets printed as the third
     argument, percent-escaped as usual.
 
 *** PLAINTEXT_LENGTH <length>
     This indicates the length of the plaintext that is about to be
     written.  Note that if the plaintext packet has partial length
     encoding it is not possible to know the length ahead of time.  In
     that case, this status tag does not appear.  The length is only
     exact for binary formats; other formats ('t', 'u') may do post
     processing like line ending conversion so that the actual number
     of bytes written may be differ.
 
 *** ATTRIBUTE <arguments>
     The list or arguments are:
     - <fpr>
     - <octets>
     - <type>
     - <index>
     - <count>
     - <timestamp>
     - <expiredate>
     - <flags>
 
     This is one long line issued for each attribute subpacket when an
     attribute packet is seen during key listing.  <fpr> is the
     fingerprint of the key.  <octets> is the length of the attribute
     subpacket.  <type> is the attribute type (e.g. 1 for an image).
     <index> and <count> indicate that this is the N-th indexed
     subpacket of count total subpackets in this attribute packet.
     <timestamp> and <expiredate> are from the self-signature on the
     attribute packet.  If the attribute packet does not have a valid
     self-signature, then the timestamp is 0.  <flags> are a bitwise OR
     of:
     - 0x01 :: this attribute packet is a primary uid
     - 0x02 :: this attribute packet is revoked
     - 0x04 :: this attribute packet is expired
 
 *** SIG_SUBPACKET <type> <flags> <len> <data>
     This indicates that a signature subpacket was seen.  The format is
     the same as the "spk" record above.
 
 *** ENCRYPTION_COMPLIANCE_MODE <flags>
     Indicates that the current encryption operation was in compliance
     with the given set of modes for all recipients.  "flags" is a
     space separated list of numerical flags, see "Field 18 -
     Compliance flags" above.
 
 *** DECRYPTION_COMPLIANCE_MODE <flags>
     Indicates that the current decryption operation is in compliance
     with the given set of modes.  "flags" is a space separated list of
     numerical flags, see "Field 18 - Compliance flags" above.
 
 *** VERIFICATION_COMPLIANCE_MODE <flags>
     Indicates that the current signature verification operation is in
     compliance with the given set of modes.  "flags" is a space
     separated list of numerical flags, see "Field 18 - Compliance
     flags" above.
 
 ** Key related
 *** INV_RECP, INV_SGNR
     The two similar status codes:
 
     - INV_RECP <reason> <requested_recipient>
     - INV_SGNR <reason> <requested_sender>
 
     are issued for each unusable recipient/sender. The reasons codes
     currently in use are:
 
        -  0 :: No specific reason given
        -  1 :: Not Found
        -  2 :: Ambiguous specification
        -  3 :: Wrong key usage
        -  4 :: Key revoked
        -  5 :: Key expired
        -  6 :: No CRL known
        -  7 :: CRL too old
        -  8 :: Policy mismatch
        -  9 :: Not a secret key
        - 10 :: Key not trusted
        - 11 :: Missing certificate
        - 12 :: Missing issuer certificate
        - 13 :: Key disabled
        - 14 :: Syntax error in specification
 
     If no specific reason was given a previously emitted status code
     KEY_CONSIDERED may be used to analyzed the problem.
 
     Note that for historical reasons the INV_RECP status is also used
     for gpgsm's SIGNER command where it relates to signer's of course.
     Newer GnuPG versions are using INV_SGNR; applications should
     ignore the INV_RECP during the sender's command processing once
     they have seen an INV_SGNR.  Different codes are used so that they
     can be distinguish while doing an encrypt+sign operation.
 
 *** NO_RECP <reserved>
     Issued if no recipients are usable.
 
 *** NO_SGNR <reserved>
     Issued if no senders are usable.
 
 *** KEY_CONSIDERED <fpr> <flags>
     Issued to explain the lookup of a key.  FPR is the hexified
     fingerprint of the primary key.  The bit values for FLAGS are:
 
     - 1 :: The key has not been selected.
     - 2 :: All subkeys of the key are expired or have been revoked.
 
 *** KEYEXPIRED <expire-timestamp>
     The key has expired.  expire-timestamp is the expiration time in
     seconds since Epoch.  This status line is not very useful because
     it will also be emitted for expired subkeys even if this subkey is
     not used.  To check whether a key used to sign a message has
     expired, the EXPKEYSIG status line is to be used.
 
     Note, that the TIMESTAMP may either be a number of seconds since
     Epoch or an ISO 8601 string which can be detected by the presence
     of the letter 'T'.
 
 *** KEYREVOKED
     The used key has been revoked by its owner.  No arguments yet.
 
 *** NO_PUBKEY  <long keyid>
     The public key is not available.  Note the arg should in general
     not be used because it is better to take it from the ERRSIG
     status line which is printed right before this one.
 
 *** NO_SECKEY  <long keyid>
     The secret key is not available
 
 *** KEY_CREATED <type> <fingerprint> [<handle>]
     A key has been created.  Values for <type> are:
       - B :: primary and subkey
       - P :: primary
       - S :: subkey
     The fingerprint is one of the primary key for type B and P and the
     one of the subkey for S.  Handle is an arbitrary non-whitespace
     string used to match key parameters from batch key creation run.
 
 *** KEY_NOT_CREATED [<handle>]
     The key from batch run has not been created due to errors.
 
 *** TRUST_
     These are several similar status codes:
 
 #+begin_src
     - TRUST_UNDEFINED <error_token> [<validation_model> [<mbox>]]
     - TRUST_NEVER     <error_token> [<validation_model> [<mbox>]]
     - TRUST_MARGINAL  0  [<validation_model> [<mbox>]]
     - TRUST_FULLY     0  [<validation_model> [<mbox>]]
     - TRUST_ULTIMATE  0  [<validation_model> [<mbox>]]
 #+end_src
 
     For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted to
     indicate the validity of the key used to create the signature.
     <error_token> values other that a literal zero are currently only
     emitted by gpgsm.
 
     VALIDATION_MODEL describes the algorithm used to check the
     validity of the key.  The defaults are the standard Web of Trust
     model for gpg and the standard X.509 model for gpgsm.  The
     defined values are
 
        - classic  :: The classic PGP WoT model.
        - pgp      :: The standard PGP WoT.
        - external :: The external PGP trust model.
        - tofu     :: The GPG Trust-On-First-Use model.
        - tofu+pgp :: Ditto but combined with mopdel "pgp".
        - always   :: The Always trust model.
        - direct   :: The Direct Trust model.
        - shell    :: The Standard X.509 model.
        - chain    :: The Chain model.
        - steed    :: The STEED model.
        - unknown  :: An unknown trust model.
 
     Note that the term =TRUST_= in the status names is used for
     historic reasons; we now speak of validity.
 
     MBOX is the UTF-8 encoded and percent escaped addr-spec of the
     User ID used to compute the validity of a signature.  If this is
     not known the validity is computed on the key with no specific
     User ID.  Note that MBOX is always the addr-spec of the User ID;
     for User IDs without a proper addr-spec a dash is used to
     distinguish this from the case that no User ID at all is known.
     The MBOX is either taken from the Signer's User ID signature
     sub-packet or from the addr-spec passed to gpg using the --sender
     option.  If both are available and they don't match
     TRUST_UNDEFINED along with an error code is emitted.  MBOX is not
     used by gpgsm.
 
 *** TOFU_USER <fingerprint_in_hex> <mbox>
 
     This status identifies the key and the userid for all following
     Tofu information.  The fingerprint is the fingerprint of the
     primary key and the mbox is in general the addr-spec part of the
     userid encoded in UTF-8 and percent escaped.  The fingerprint is
     identical for all TOFU_USER lines up to a NEWSIG line.
 
 *** TOFU_STATS <MANY_ARGS>
 
     Statistics for the current user id.
 
     The <MANY_ARGS> are the usual space delimited arguments.  Here we
     have too many of them to fit on one printed line and thus they are
     given on 3 printed lines:
 
     : <summary> <sign-count> <encryption-count>
     : [<policy> [<tm1> <tm2> <tm3> <tm4>
     : [<validity> [<sign-days> <encrypt-days>]]]]
 
     Values for SUMMARY are:
     - 0 :: attention, an interaction with the user is required (conflict)
     - 1 :: key with no verification/encryption history
     - 2 :: key with little history
     - 3 :: key with enough history for basic trust
     - 4 :: key with a lot of history
 
     Values for POLICY are:
     - none    :: No Policy set
     - auto    :: Policy is "auto"
     - good    :: Policy is "good"
     - bad     :: Policy is "bad"
     - ask     :: Policy is "ask"
     - unknown :: Policy is "unknown" (TOFU information does not
                  contribute to the key's validity)
 
     TM1 is the time the first message was verified.  TM2 is the time
     the most recent message was verified.  TM3 is the time the first
     message was encrypted.  TM4 is the most recent encryption. All may
     either be seconds since Epoch or an ISO time string
     (yyyymmddThhmmss).
 
     VALIDITY is the same as SUMMARY with the exception that VALIDITY
     doesn't reflect whether the key needs attention.  That is it never
     takes on value 0.  Instead, if there is a conflict, VALIDITY still
     reflects the key's validity (values: 1-4).
 
     SUMMARY values use the euclidean distance (m = sqrt(a² + b²)) rather
     then the sum of the magnitudes (m = a + b) to ensure a balance between
     verified signatures and encrypted messages.
 
     Values are calculated based on the number of days where a key was used
     for verifying a signature or to encrypt to it.
     The ranges for the values are:
 
     - 1 :: signature_days + encryption_days == 0
     - 2 :: 1 <= sqrt(signature_days² + encryption_days²) < 8
     - 3 :: 8 <= sqrt(signature_days² + encryption_days²) < 42
     - 4 :: sqrt(signature_days² + encryption_days²) >= 42
 
     SIGN-COUNT and ENCRYPTION-COUNT are the number of messages that we
     have seen that have been signed by this key / encryption to this
     key.
 
     SIGN-DAYS and ENCRYPTION-DAYS are similar, but the number of days
     (in UTC) on which we have seen messages signed by this key /
     encrypted to this key.
 
 *** TOFU_STATS_SHORT <long_string>
 
     Information about the TOFU binding for the signature.
     Example: "15 signatures verified. 10 messages encrypted"
 
 *** TOFU_STATS_LONG <long_string>
 
     Information about the TOFU binding for the signature in verbose
     format.  The LONG_STRING is percent escaped.
     Example: 'Verified 9 messages signed by "Werner Koch
     (dist sig)" in the past 3 minutes, 40 seconds.  The most
     recent message was verified 4 seconds ago.'
 
 *** PKA_TRUST_
     This is one of:
 
     - PKA_TRUST_GOOD <addr-spec>
     - PKA_TRUST_BAD  <addr-spec>
 
     Depending on the outcome of the PKA check one of the above status
     codes is emitted in addition to a =TRUST_*= status.
 
 ** Remote control
 *** GET_BOOL, GET_LINE, GET_HIDDEN, GOT_IT
 
     These status line are used with --command-fd for interactive
     control of the process.
 
 *** USERID_HINT <long main keyid> <string>
     Give a hint about the user ID for a certain keyID.
 
 *** NEED_PASSPHRASE <long keyid> <long main keyid> <keytype> <keylength>
     Issued whenever a passphrase is needed.  KEYTYPE is the numerical
     value of the public key algorithm or 0 if this is not applicable,
     KEYLENGTH is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known (this
     is currently always the case).
 
 *** NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM <cipher_algo> <s2k_mode> <s2k_hash>
     Issued whenever a passphrase for symmetric encryption is needed.
 
 *** NEED_PASSPHRASE_PIN <card_type> <chvno> [<serialno>]
     Issued whenever a PIN is requested to unlock a card.
 
 *** MISSING_PASSPHRASE
     No passphrase was supplied.  An application which encounters this
     message may want to stop parsing immediately because the next
     message will probably be a BAD_PASSPHRASE.  However, if the
     application is a wrapper around the key edit menu functionality it
     might not make sense to stop parsing but simply ignoring the
     following BAD_PASSPHRASE.
 
 *** BAD_PASSPHRASE <long keyid>
     The supplied passphrase was wrong or not given.  In the latter
     case you may have seen a MISSING_PASSPHRASE.
 
 *** GOOD_PASSPHRASE
     The supplied passphrase was good and the secret key material
     is therefore usable.
 
 ** Import/Export
 *** IMPORT_CHECK <long keyid> <fingerprint> <user ID>
     This status is emitted in interactive mode right before
     the "import.okay" prompt.
 
 *** IMPORTED   <long keyid>  <username>
     The keyid and name of the signature just imported
 
 *** IMPORT_OK  <reason> [<fingerprint>]
     The key with the primary key's FINGERPRINT has been imported.
     REASON flags are:
 
     - 0 :: Not actually changed
     - 1 :: Entirely new key.
     - 2 :: New user IDs
     - 4 :: New signatures
     - 8 :: New subkeys
     - 16 :: Contains private key.
 
     The flags may be ORed.
 
 *** IMPORT_PROBLEM <reason> [<fingerprint>]
     Issued for each import failure.  Reason codes are:
 
     - 0 :: No specific reason given.
     - 1 :: Invalid Certificate.
     - 2 :: Issuer Certificate missing.
     - 3 :: Certificate Chain too long.
     - 4 :: Error storing certificate.
 
 *** IMPORT_RES <args>
     Final statistics on import process (this is one long line). The
     args are a list of unsigned numbers separated by white space:
 
     - <count>
     - <no_user_id>
     - <imported>
     - always 0 (formerly used for the number of RSA keys)
     - <unchanged>
     - <n_uids>
     - <n_subk>
     - <n_sigs>
     - <n_revoc>
     - <sec_read>
     - <sec_imported>
     - <sec_dups>
     - <skipped_new_keys>
     - <not_imported>
     - <skipped_v3_keys>
 
 *** EXPORTED  <fingerprint>
     The key with <fingerprint> has been exported.  The fingerprint is
     the fingerprint of the primary key even if the primary key has
     been replaced by a stub key during secret key export.
 
 *** EXPORT_RES <args>
 
     Final statistics on export process (this is one long line). The
     args are a list of unsigned numbers separated by white space:
 
     - <count>
     - <secret_count>
     - <exported>
 
 
 ** Smartcard related
 *** CARDCTRL <what> [<serialno>]
     This is used to control smartcard operations.  Defined values for
     WHAT are:
 
       - 1 :: Request insertion of a card.  Serialnumber may be given
              to request a specific card.  Used by gpg 1.4 w/o
              scdaemon
       - 2 :: Request removal of a card.  Used by gpg 1.4 w/o scdaemon.
       - 3 :: Card with serialnumber detected
       - 4 :: No card available
       - 5 :: No card reader available
       - 6 :: No card support available
       - 7 :: Card is in termination state
 
 *** SC_OP_FAILURE [<code>]
     An operation on a smartcard definitely failed.  Currently there is
     no indication of the actual error code, but application should be
     prepared to later accept more arguments.  Defined values for
     <code> are:
 
       - 0 :: unspecified error (identically to a missing CODE)
       - 1 :: canceled
       - 2 :: bad PIN
 
 *** SC_OP_SUCCESS
     A smart card operation succeeded.  This status is only printed for
     certain operation and is mostly useful to check whether a PIN
     change really worked.
 
 ** Miscellaneous status codes
 *** NODATA  <what>
     No data has been found.  Codes for WHAT are:
 
     - 1 :: No armored data.
     - 2 :: Expected a packet but did not found one.
     - 3 :: Invalid packet found, this may indicate a non OpenPGP
            message.
     - 4 :: Signature expected but not found
 
     You may see more than one of these status lines.
 
 *** UNEXPECTED <what>
     Unexpected data has been encountered.  Codes for WHAT are:
     - 0 :: Not further specified
     - 1 :: Corrupted message structure
 
 *** TRUNCATED <maxno>
     The output was truncated to MAXNO items.  This status code is
     issued for certain external requests.
 
 *** ERROR <error location> <error code> [<more>]
     This is a generic error status message, it might be followed by
     error location specific data. <error code> and <error_location>
     should not contain spaces.  The error code is a either a string
     commencing with a letter or such a string prefixed with a
     numerical error code and an underscore; e.g.: "151011327_EOF".
 
     Some of the error locations are:
 
     - decryption.early_plaintext :: The OpenPGP message contains more
          than one plaintext.
     - genkey :: Problem generating a key.  The error code further
                 describes the problem.
     - get_passphrase :: Problem getting the passphrase from the
                         gpg-agent.
     - keyedit.passwd :: Changing the password failed.
     - nomdc_with_legacy_cipher :: The message was not MDC protected.
          Use the command line to lern about a workaround.
     - random-compliance :: The random number generator or the used
          version of Libgcrypt do not fulfill the requirements of the
          current compliance setting.  The error code is often
          GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN.
     - set_expire :: Changing the expiration time failed.
 
 *** WARNING <location> <error code> [<text>]
     This is a generic warning status message, it might be followed by
     error location specific data. <location> and <error code> may not
     contain spaces.  The <location> may be used to indicate a class of
     warnings.  The error code is a either a string commencing with a
     letter or such a string prefixed with a numerical error code and
     an underscore; e.g.: "151011327_EOF".
 *** NOTE <location> <error code> [<text>]
     This is a generic info status message the same syntax as for
     WARNING messages is used.
 *** SUCCESS [<location>]
     Positive confirmation that an operation succeeded.  It is used
     similar to ISO-C's EXIT_SUCCESS.  <location> is optional but if
     given should not contain spaces.  Used only with a few commands.
 
 *** FAILURE <location> <error_code>
     This is the counterpart to SUCCESS and used to indicate a program
     failure.  It is used similar to ISO-C's EXIT_FAILURE but allows
     conveying more information, in particular a gpg-error error code.
     That numerical error code may optionally have a suffix made of an
     underscore and a string with an error symbol like "151011327_EOF".
     A dash may be used instead of <location>.
 
 *** BADARMOR
     The ASCII armor is corrupted.  No arguments yet.
 
 *** DELETE_PROBLEM <reason_code>
     Deleting a key failed.  Reason codes are:
     - 1 :: No such key
     - 2 :: Must delete secret key first
     - 3 :: Ambiguous specification
     - 4 :: Key is stored on a smartcard.
 
 *** PROGRESS <what> <char> <cur> <total> [<units>]
     Used by the primegen and public key functions to indicate
     progress.  <char> is the character displayed with no --status-fd
     enabled, with the linefeed replaced by an 'X'.  <cur> is the
     current amount done and <total> is amount to be done; a <total> of
     0 indicates that the total amount is not known. Both are
     non-negative integers.  The condition
       :       TOTAL && CUR == TOTAL
     may be used to detect the end of an operation.
 
     Well known values for <what> are:
 
            - pk_dsa   :: DSA key generation
            - pk_elg   :: Elgamal key generation
            - primegen :: Prime generation
            - need_entropy :: Waiting for new entropy in the RNG
            - tick :: Generic tick without any special meaning - useful
                      for letting clients know that the server is still
                      working.
            - starting_agent :: A gpg-agent was started because it is not
                                 running as a daemon.
            - learncard :: Send by the agent and gpgsm while learing
                           the data of a smartcard.
            - card_busy :: A smartcard is still working
            - scd_locked :: Waiting for other clients to unlock the scdaemon
 
     When <what> refers to a file path, it may be truncated.
 
     <units> is sometimes used to describe the units for <current> and
     <total>.  For example "B", "KiB", or "MiB".
 
 *** BACKUP_KEY_CREATED <fingerprint> <fname>
     A backup of a key identified by <fingerprint> has been writte to
     the file <fname>; <fname> is percent-escaped.
 
 *** MOUNTPOINT <name>
     <name> is a percent-plus escaped filename describing the
     mountpoint for the current operation (e.g. used by "g13 --mount").
     This may either be the specified mountpoint or one randomly
     chosen by g13.
 
 *** PINENTRY_LAUNCHED <pid>[:<extra>]
     This status line is emitted by gpg to notify a client that a
     Pinentry has been launched.  <pid> is the PID of the Pinentry.  It
     may be used to display a hint to the user but can't be used to
     synchronize with Pinentry.  Note that there is also an Assuan
     inquiry line with the same name used internally or, if enabled,
     send to the client instead of this status line.  Such an inquiry
     may be used to sync with Pinentry
 
 ** Obsolete status codes
 *** SIGEXPIRED
     Removed on 2011-02-04.  This is deprecated in favor of KEYEXPIRED.
 *** RSA_OR_IDEA
     Obsolete.  This status message used to be emitted for requests to
     use the IDEA or RSA algorithms.  It has been dropped from GnuPG
     2.1 after the respective patents expired.
 *** SHM_INFO, SHM_GET, SHM_GET_BOOL, SHM_GET_HIDDEN
     These were used for the ancient shared memory based co-processing.
 *** BEGIN_STREAM, END_STREAM
     Used to issued by the experimental pipemode.
 *** GOODMDC
     This is not anymore needed. Checking the DECRYPTION_OKAY status is
     sufficient.
 *** BADMDC
     This is not anymore needed.
 
 ** Inter-component codes
    Status codes are also used between the components of the GnuPG
    system via the Assuan S lines.  Some of them are documented here:
 
 *** PUBKEY_INFO <n> <ubid> <flags> <uidno> <pkno>
     The type of the public key in the following D-lines or
     communicated via a pipe.  <n> is the value of =enum pubkey_types=
     and <ubid> the Unique Blob ID (UBID) which is the fingerprint of
     the primary key truncated to 20 octets and formatted in hex.  Note
     that the keyboxd SEARCH command can be used to lookup the public
     key using the <ubid> prefixed with a caret (^).
 
     <flags> is a string extra information about the blob.  The first
     byte is either '-' for standard key or 'e' for an ephemeral key.
     The second byte is either '-' or 'r' for a known revoked key.
 
     <uidno> and <pkno> are the ordinal numbers for the the user id or
     public key which matches the search criteria.  A value of 0 means
     not known.
 
 *** KEYPAIRINFO <grip> <keyref> [<usage>] [<keytime>] [<algostr>]
 
     This status is emitted by scdaemon and gpg-agent to convey brief
     information about keypairs stored on tokens.  <grip> is the
     hexified keygrip of the key or, if no key is stored, an "X".
     <keyref> is the ID of a card's key; for example "OPENPGP.2" for
     the second key slot of an OpenPGP card.  <usage> is optional and
     returns technically possible key usages, this is a string of
     single letters describing the usage ('c' for certify, 'e' for
     encryption, 's' for signing, 'a' for authentication). A '-' can be
     used to tell that usage flags are not conveyed.  <keytime> is used
     by OpenPGP cards for the stored key creation time.  A '-' means no
     info available.  The format is the usual ISO string or a number
     with the seconds since Epoch.  <algostr> is the algorithm or curve
     this key uses (e.g. "rsa2048") or a "-" if not known.
 
 *** CERTINFO <certtype> <certref> [<label>]
 
     This status is emitted for X.509 certifcates.
     CERTTYPE is a number indicating the type of the certificate:
      0   := Unknown
      100 := Regular X.509 cert
      101 := Trusted X.509 cert
      102 := Useful X.509 cert
      110 := Root CA cert in a special format (e.g. DINSIG)
      111 := Root CA cert as standard X509 cert
 
     CERTREF identifies the certificate uniquely on the card and may be
     used to match it with a key's KEYREF.  LABEL is an optional human
     readable decription of the certificate; it won't have any space in
     it and is percent encoded.
 
 *** MANUFACTURER <n> [<string>]
 
     This status returns the Manufactorer ID as the unsigned number N.
     For OpenPGP this is well defined; for other cards this is 0.  The
     name of the manufacturer is also given as <string>; spaces are not
     escaped.  For PKCS#15 cards <string> is TokenInfo.manufactorerID;
     a string in brackets describing GnuPG's own card product name may
     be appended to <string>.
 
 *** KEY-STATUS <keyref> <status>
     This is the response from scdaemon on GETATTR KEY-STATUS for
     OpenPGP cards.  <keyref> is the usual keyref (e.g. OPENPGP.1 or
     OPENPGP.129) and <status> is an integer describing the status of
     the key: 0 = key is not present, 1 = key generated on card, 2 =
     key imported.  See section 4.4.3.8 of the OpenPGP Smart Card
     Application V3.4.
 
 *** KEY-ATTR-INFO <keyref> <string>
     This is the response from scdaemon on GETATTR KEY-ATTR-INFO for
     OpenPGP cards.  <keyref> is the usual keyref (e.g. OPENPGP.1 or
     OPENPGP.129) and <string> is the algoritm or curve name, which
     is available for the key.
 
 *** KEY-TIME <n> <timestamp>
     This is a response from scdaemon on GETATTR KEY-TIME.  A keyref N
     of 1 gives the timestamp for the standard OpenPGP signing key, 2
     for the encryption key, and 3 for an authentication key.  Note
     that a KEYPAIRINFO status lines carries the same information and
     should be preferred.
 
 *** KEY-LABEL <keyref> <label>
     This returns the human readbable label for the keys given by
     KEYREF.  LABEL won't have any space in it and is percent encoded.
     This info shall only be used for dispaly purposes.
 
 * Format of the --attribute-fd output
 
   When --attribute-fd is set, during key listings (--list-keys,
   --list-secret-keys) GnuPG dumps each attribute packet to the file
   descriptor specified.  --attribute-fd is intended for use with
   --status-fd as part of the required information is carried on the
   ATTRIBUTE status tag (see above).
 
   The contents of the attribute data is specified by RFC 4880.  For
   convenience, here is the Photo ID format, as it is currently the
   only attribute defined:
 
   - Byte 0-1 :: The length of the image header.  Due to a historical
                 accident (i.e. oops!) back in the NAI PGP days, this
                 is a little-endian number.  Currently 16 (0x10 0x00).
 
   - Byte 2 :: The image header version.  Currently 0x01.
 
   - Byte 3 :: Encoding format.  0x01 == JPEG.
 
   - Byte 4-15 :: Reserved, and currently unused.
 
   All other data after this header is raw image (JPEG) data.
 
 
 * Layout of the TrustDB
 
   The TrustDB is built from fixed length records, where the first byte
   describes the record type.  All numeric values are stored in network
   byte order.  The length of each record is 40 bytes.  The first
   record of the DB is always of type 1 and this is the only record of
   this type.
 
   The record types: directory(2), key(3), uid(4), pref(5), sigrec(6),
   and shadow directory(8) are not anymore used by version 2 of the
   TrustDB.
 
 ** Record type 0
 
    Unused record or deleted, can be reused for any purpose.  Such
    records should in general not exist because deleted records are of
    type 254 and kept in a linked list.
 
 ** Version info (RECTYPE_VER, 1)
 
    Version information for this TrustDB.  This is always the first
    record of the DB and the only one of this type.
 
    - 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 1).
    - 3 byte :: Magic value ("gpg")
    - 1 u8 :: TrustDB version (value: 2).
    - 1 u8 :: =marginals=. How many marginal trusted keys are required.
    - 1 u8 :: =completes=. How many completely trusted keys are
              required.
    - 1 u8 :: =max_cert_depth=.  How deep is the WoT evaluated.  Along
              with =marginals= and =completes=, this value is used to
              check whether the cached validity value from a [FIXME
              dir] record can be used.
    - 1 u8 :: =trust_model=
    - 1 u8 :: =min_cert_level=
    - 2 byte :: Not used
    - 1 u32 :: =created=. Timestamp of trustdb creation.
    - 1 u32 :: =nextcheck=. Timestamp of last modification which may
               affect the validity of keys in the trustdb.  This value
               is checked against the validity timestamp in the dir
               records.
    - 1 u32 :: =reserved=.  Not used.
    - 1 u32 :: =reserved2=. Not used.
    - 1 u32 :: =firstfree=. Number of the record with the head record
               of the RECTYPE_FREE linked list.
    - 1 u32 :: =reserved3=. Not used.
    - 1 u32 :: =trusthashtbl=. Record number of the trusthashtable.
 
 
 ** Hash table (RECTYPE_HTBL, 10)
 
    Due to the fact that we use fingerprints to lookup keys, we can
    implement quick access by some simple hash methods, and avoid the
    overhead of gdbm.  A property of fingerprints is that they can be
    used directly as hash values.  What we use is a dynamic multilevel
    architecture, which combines hash tables, record lists, and linked
    lists.
 
    This record is a hash table of 256 entries with the property that
    all these records are stored consecutively to make one big
    table. The hash value is simple the 1st, 2nd, ... byte of the
    fingerprint (depending on the indirection level).
 
    - 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 10).
    - 1 u8 :: Reserved
    - n u32 :: =recnum=.  A table with the hash table items fitting into
               this record.  =n= depends on the record length:
               $n=(reclen-2)/4$ which yields 9 for oure current record
               length of 40 bytes.
 
    The total number of hash table records to form the table is:
    $m=(256+n-1)/n$.  This is 29 for our record length of 40.
 
    To look up a key we use the first byte of the fingerprint to get
    the recnum from this hash table and then look up the addressed
    record:
 
    - If that record is another hash table, we use 2nd byte to index
      that hash table and so on;
    - if that record is a hash list, we walk all entries until we find
      a matching one; or
    - if that record is a key record, we compare the fingerprint to
      decide whether it is the requested key;
 
 
 ** Hash list (RECTYPE_HLST, 11)
 
    See hash table above on how it is used.  It may also be used for
    other purposes.
 
    - 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 11).
    - 1 u8 :: Reserved.
    - 1 u32 :: =next=.  Record number of the next hash list record or 0
               if none.
    - n u32 :: =rnum=.  Array with record numbers to values.  With
               $n=(reclen-5)/5$ and our record length of 40, n is 7.
 
 ** Trust record (RECTYPE_TRUST, 12)
 
    - 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 12).
    - 1 u8 :: Reserved.
    - 20 byte :: =fingerprint=.
    - 1 u8 :: =ownertrust=.
    - 1 u8 :: =depth=.
    - 1 u8 :: =min_ownertrust=.
    - 1 byte :: =flags=.
    - 1 u32 :: =validlist=.
    - 10 byte :: Not used.
 
 ** Validity record (RECTYPE_VALID, 13)
 
    - 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 13).
    - 1 u8 :: Reserved.
    - 20 byte :: =namehash=.
    - 1 u8 :: =validity=
    - 1 u32 :: =next=.
    - 1 u8 :: =full_count=.
    - 1 u8 :: =marginal_count=.
    - 11 byte :: Not used.
 
 ** Free record (RECTYPE_FREE, 254)
 
    All these records form a linked list of unused records in the TrustDB.
 
    - 1 u8 :: Record type (value: 254)
    - 1 u8 :: Reserved.
    - 1 u32 :: =next=.  Record number of the next rcord of this type.
               The record number to the head of this linked list is
               stored in the version info record.
 
 
 * Database scheme for the TOFU info
 
 #+begin_src sql
 --
 -- The VERSION table holds the version of our TOFU data structures.
 --
 CREATE TABLE version (
   version integer -- As of now this is always 1
 );
 
 --
 -- The BINDINGS table associates mail addresses with keys.
 --
 CREATE TABLE bindings (
   oid integer primary key autoincrement,
   fingerprint text, -- The key's fingerprint in hex
   email text,       -- The normalized mail address destilled from user_id
   user_id text,     -- The unmodified user id
   time integer,     -- The time this binding was first observed.
   policy boolean check
        (policy in (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)), -- The trust policy with the values:
                                     --   1 := Auto
                                     --   2 := Good
                                     --   3 := Unknown
                                     --   4 := Bad
                                     --   5 := Ask
   conflict string,  -- NULL or a hex formatted fingerprint.
   unique (fingerprint, email)
 );
 
 CREATE INDEX bindings_fingerprint_email on bindings (fingerprint, email);
 CREATE INDEX bindings_email on bindings (email);
 
 --
 -- The SIGNATURES table records all data signatures we verified
 --
 CREATE TABLE signatures (
   binding integer not null, -- Link to bindings table,
                             -- references bindings.oid.
   sig_digest text,          -- The digest of the signed message.
   origin text,              -- String describing who initially fed
                             -- the signature to gpg (e.g. "email:claws").
   sig_time integer,         -- Timestamp from the signature.
   time integer,             -- Time this record was created.
   primary key (binding, sig_digest, origin)
 );
 #+end_src
 
 
 * GNU extensions to the S2K algorithm
 
   1 octet  - S2K Usage: either 254 or 255.
   1 octet  - S2K Cipher Algo: 0
   1 octet  - S2K Specifier: 101
   3 octets - "GNU"
   1 octet  - GNU S2K Extension Number.
 
   If such a GNU extension is used neither an IV nor any kind of
   checksum is used.  The defined GNU S2K Extension Numbers are:
 
   - 1 :: Do not store the secret part at all.  No specific data
          follows.
 
   - 2 :: A stub to access smartcards.  This data follows:
          - One octet with the length of the following serial number.
          - The serial number. Regardless of what the length octet
            indicates no more than 16 octets are stored.
 
   Note that gpg stores the GNU S2K Extension Number internally as an
   S2K Specifier with an offset of 1000.
 
 
 * Format of the OpenPGP TRUST packet
 
   According to RFC4880 (5.10), the trust packet (aka ring trust) is
   only used within keyrings and contains data that records the user's
   specifications of which key holds trusted introducers.  The RFC also
   states that the format of this packet is implementation defined and
   SHOULD NOT be emitted to output streams or should be ignored on
   import.  GnuPG uses this packet in several additional ways:
 
   - 1 octet :: Trust-Value (only used by Subtype SIG)
   - 1 octet :: Signature-Cache (only used by Subtype SIG; value must
                be less than 128)
   - 3 octets :: Fixed value: "gpg"
   - 1 octet  :: Subtype
                - 0 :: Signature cache (SIG)
                - 1 :: Key source on the primary key (KEY)
                - 2 :: Key source on a user id (UID)
   - 1 octet :: Key Source; i.e. the origin of the key:
                - 0 :: Unknown source.
                - 1 :: Public keyserver.
                - 2 :: Preferred keyserver.
                - 3 :: OpenPGP DANE.
                - 4 :: Web Key Directory.
                - 5 :: Import from a trusted URL.
                - 6 :: Import from a trusted file.
                - 7 :: Self generated.
   - 4 octets :: Time of last update.  This is a four-octet scalar
                 with the seconds since Epoch.
   - 1 octet  :: Scalar with the length of the following field.
   - N octets :: String with the URL of the source.  This may be a
                 zero-length string.
 
   If the packets contains only two octets a Subtype of 0 is assumed;
   this is the only format recognized by GnuPG versions < 2.1.18.
   Trust-Value and Signature-Cache must be zero for all subtypes other
   than SIG.
 
 
 * Keyserver helper message format
 
   *This information is obsolete*
   (Keyserver helpers have been replaced by dirmngr)
 
   The keyserver may be contacted by a Unix Domain socket or via TCP.
 
   The format of a request is:
 #+begin_example
   command-tag
   "Content-length:" digits
   CRLF
 #+end_example
 
   Where command-tag is
 
 #+begin_example
   NOOP
   GET <user-name>
   PUT
   DELETE <user-name>
 #+end_example
 
 The format of a response is:
 
 #+begin_example
   "GNUPG/1.0" status-code status-text
   "Content-length:" digits
   CRLF
 #+end_example
 followed by <digits> bytes of data
 
 Status codes are:
 
   - 1xx :: Informational - Request received, continuing process
 
   - 2xx :: Success - The action was successfully received, understood,
            and accepted
 
   - 4xx :: Client Error - The request contains bad syntax or cannot be
            fulfilled
 
   - 5xx :: Server Error - The server failed to fulfill an apparently
            valid request
 
 
 * Object identifiers
 
   OIDs below the GnuPG arc:
 
 #+begin_example
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2          GnuPG
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1          notation
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1.1          pkaAddress
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2          X.509 extensions
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.1          standaloneCertificate
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.2          wellKnownPrivateKey
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.10         OpenPGP KDF/KEK parameter
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.3          CMS contentType
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.3.1          OpenPGP keyblock (as octet string)
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.4          LDAP stuff
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.4.1          attributes
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.4.1.1          gpgFingerprint attribute
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.4.1.2          gpgSubFingerprint attribute
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.4.1.3          gpgMailbox attribute
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.4.1.4          gpgSubCertID attribute
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.5          LDAP URL extensions
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.5.1          gpgNtds=1 (auth. with current AD user)
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.6          GnuPG extended key usage
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.6.1          use for certification key
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.6.2          use for signing key
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.6.3          use for encryption key
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.6.4          use for authentication key
   1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.12242973   invalid encoded OID
 #+end_example
 
 The OpenPGP KDF/KEK parameter extension is used to convey additional
 info for OpenPGP keys as an X.509 extensions.
 
 
 * Debug flags
 
 This tables gives the flag values for the --debug option along with
 the alternative names used by the components.
 
 |       | gpg     | gpgsm   | agent   | scd     | dirmngr | g13     | wks     |
 |-------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------|
 |     1 | packet  | x509    |         |         | x509    | mount   | mime    |
 |     2 | mpi     | mpi     | mpi     | mpi     |         |         | parser  |
 |     4 | crypto  | crypto  | crypto  | crypto  | crypto  | crypto  | crypto  |
 |     8 | filter  |         |         |         |         |         |         |
 |    16 | iobuf   |         |         |         | dns     |         |         |
 |    32 | memory  | memory  | memory  | memory  | memory  | memory  | memory  |
 |    64 | cache   | cache   | cache   | cache   | cache   |         |         |
 |   128 | memstat | memstat | memstat | memstat | memstat | memstat | memstat |
 |   256 | trust   |         |         |         |         |         |         |
 |   512 | hashing | hashing | hashing | hashing | hashing |         |         |
 |  1024 | ipc     | ipc     | ipc     | ipc     | ipc     | ipc     | ipc     |
 |  2048 |         |         |         | cardio  | network |         |         |
 |  4096 | clock   |         |         | reader  |         |         |         |
 |  8192 | lookup  |         |         |         | lookup  |         |         |
 | 16384 | extprog |         |         |         |         |         | extprog |
 
 Description of some debug flags:
 
   - cardio :: Used by scdaemon to trace the APDUs exchange with the
               card.
   - clock  :: Show execution times of certain functions.
   - crypto :: Trace crypto operations.
   - hashing :: Create files with the hashed data.
   - ipc :: Trace the Assuan commands.
   - mpi :: Show the values of the MPIs.
   - reader :: Used by scdaemon to trace card reader related code.  For
               example: Open and close reader.
 
 
 
 * Miscellaneous notes
 ** List of useful RFCs and I-D.
   - RFC-1423 :: PEM, Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers
   - RFC-1750 :: Randomness Recommendations for Security
   - RFC-1991 :: PGP Message Exchange Formats (obsolete)
   - RFC-2144 :: The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm
   - RFC-2279 :: UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646
   - RFC-2440 :: OpenPGP (obsolete).
   - RFC-3156 :: MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP).
   - RFC-3447 :: PKCS  #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1
   - RFC-4880 :: OpenPGP
   - RFC-5083 :: CMS - Authenticated-Enveloped-Data
   - RFC-5084 :: CMS - AES-GCM
   - RFC-5280 :: X.509 PKI Certificate and CRL Profile
   - RFC-5480 :: ECC Subject Public Key Information
   - RFC-5639 :: ECC Brainpool Standard Curves
   - RFC-5652 :: CMS (STD0070)
   - RFC-5753 :: ECC in CMS
   - RFC-5758 :: CMS - Additional Algorithms for DSA and ECDSA
   - RFC-6818 :: Updates to the X.509 PKI Certificate and CRL Profile
   - RFC-6960 :: Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP
   - RFC-8954 :: Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension
   - RFC-8398 :: Internationalized Email Addresses in X.509 Certificates
   - RFC-8399 :: Internationalization Updates to RFC 5280
   - RFC-8813 :: Clarifications for ECC Subject Public Key
   - RFC-5915 :: ECC Private Key Structure
   - RFC-5958 :: Asymmetric Key Packages
   - RFC-6337 :: ECC in OpenPGP
   - RFC-7292 :: PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax v1.1
   - RFC-8351 :: The PKCS #8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo Media Type
+  - RFC-8550 :: S/MIME Version 4.0 Certificate Handling
+  - RFC-8551 :: S/MIME Version 4.0 Message Specification
+  - RFC-2634 :: Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME
+  - RFC-5035 :: Enhanced Security Services (ESS) Update
 
   - draft-koch-openpgp-2015-rfc4880bis :: Updates to RFC-4880
 
 ** v3 fingerprints
    For packet version 3 we calculate the keyids this way:
     - RSA :: Low 64 bits of n
     - ELGAMAL :: Build a v3 pubkey packet (with CTB 0x99) and
                  calculate a RMD160 hash value from it. This is used
                  as the fingerprint and the low 64 bits are the keyid.
 
 ** gnupg.org notations
 
   - adsk@gnupg.org :: Additional decryption subkey.  This notation
                       gives a list of keys an implementation SHOULD
                       also encrypt to.  The data consists of an array
                       of eight-octet numbers holding the Key ID of an
                       encryption subkey.  This notation is only valid
                       on an encryption subkey (i.e. with first octet
                       of the key flags 0x04 or 0x08).  Subkeys not on
                       the same keyblock MUST NOT be considered.  For
                       interoperability this notation SHOULD NOT be
                       marked as criticial.  Due to its nature it MUST
                       NOT be marked as human readable.
 
 ** Simplified revocation certificates
   Revocation certificates consist only of the signature packet;
   "--import" knows how to handle this.  The rationale behind it is to
   keep them small.
 
 ** Documentation on HKP (the http keyserver protocol):
 
    A minimalistic HTTP server on port 11371 recognizes a GET for
    /pks/lookup.  The standard http URL encoded query parameters are
    this (always key=value):
 
    - op=index (like pgp -kv), op=vindex (like pgp -kvv) and op=get (like
      pgp -kxa)
 
    - search=<stringlist>. This is a list of words that must occur in the key.
      The words are delimited with space, points, @ and so on. The delimiters
      are not searched for and the order of the words doesn't matter (but see
      next option).
 
    - exact=on. This switch tells the hkp server to only report exact matching
      keys back. In this case the order and the "delimiters" are important.
 
    - fingerprint=on. Also reports the fingerprints when used with 'index' or
      'vindex'
 
    The keyserver also recognizes http-POSTs to /pks/add. Use this to upload
    keys.
 
 
    A better way to do this would be a request like:
 
       /pks/lookup/<gnupg_formatierte_user_id>?op=<operation>
 
    This can be implemented using Hurd's translator mechanism.
    However, I think the whole keyserver stuff has to be re-thought;
    I have some ideas and probably create a white paper.
 ** Algorithm names for the "keygen.algo" prompt
 
   When using a --command-fd controlled key generation or "addkey"
   there is way to know the number to enter on the "keygen.algo"
   prompt.  The displayed numbers are for human reception and may
   change with releases.  To provide a stable way to enter a desired
   algorithm choice the prompt also accepts predefined names for the
   algorithms, which will not change.
 
    | Name    | No | Description                     |
    |---------+----+---------------------------------|
    | rsa+rsa |  1 | RSA and RSA (default)           |
    | dsa+elg |  2 | DSA and Elgamal                 |
    | dsa     |  3 | DSA (sign only)                 |
    | rsa/s   |  4 | RSA (sign only)                 |
    | elg     |  5 | Elgamal (encrypt only)          |
    | rsa/e   |  6 | RSA (encrypt only)              |
    | dsa/*   |  7 | DSA (set your own capabilities) |
    | rsa/*   |  8 | RSA (set your own capabilities) |
    | ecc+ecc |  9 | ECC and ECC                     |
    | ecc/s   | 10 | ECC (sign only)                 |
    | ecc/*   | 11 | ECC (set your own capabilities) |
    | ecc/e   | 12 | ECC (encrypt only)              |
    | keygrip | 13 | Existing key                    |
    | cardkey | 14 | Existing key from card          |
 
    If one of the "foo/*" names are used a "keygen.flags" prompt needs
    to be answered as well.  Instead of toggling the predefined flags,
    it is also possible to set them direct: Use a "=" character
    directly followed by a combination of "a" (for authentication), "s"
    (for signing), or "c" (for certification).
diff --git a/sm/verify.c b/sm/verify.c
index 10d5d5c35..2e40c021f 100644
--- a/sm/verify.c
+++ b/sm/verify.c
@@ -1,741 +1,741 @@
 /* verify.c - Verify a messages signature
  * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2007,
  *               2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  * Copyright (C) 2001-2019 Werner Koch
  * Copyright (C) 2015-2020 g10 Code GmbH
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
  * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
  * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
  * (at your option) any later version.
  *
  * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
  * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
  * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
  * GNU General Public License for more details.
  *
  * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
  * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
  */
 
 #include <config.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <time.h>
 
 #include "gpgsm.h"
 #include <gcrypt.h>
 #include <ksba.h>
 
 #include "keydb.h"
 #include "../common/i18n.h"
 #include "../common/compliance.h"
 
 static char *
 strtimestamp_r (ksba_isotime_t atime)
 {
   char *buffer = xmalloc (15);
 
   if (!atime || !*atime)
     strcpy (buffer, "none");
   else
     sprintf (buffer, "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", atime, atime+4, atime+6);
   return buffer;
 }
 
 
 
 /* Hash the data for a detached signature.  Returns 0 on success.  */
 static gpg_error_t
 hash_data (int fd, gcry_md_hd_t md)
 {
   gpg_error_t err = 0;
   estream_t fp;
   char buffer[4096];
   int nread;
 
   fp = es_fdopen_nc (fd, "rb");
   if (!fp)
     {
       err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
       log_error ("fdopen(%d) failed: %s\n", fd, gpg_strerror (err));
       return err;
     }
 
   do
     {
       nread = es_fread (buffer, 1, DIM(buffer), fp);
       gcry_md_write (md, buffer, nread);
     }
   while (nread);
   if (es_ferror (fp))
     {
       err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
       log_error ("read error on fd %d: %s\n", fd, gpg_strerror (err));
     }
   es_fclose (fp);
   return err;
 }
 
 
 
 
 /* Perform a verify operation.  To verify detached signatures, DATA_FD
    must be different than -1.  With OUT_FP given and a non-detached
    signature, the signed material is written to that stream.  */
 int
 gpgsm_verify (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, int data_fd, estream_t out_fp)
 {
   int i, rc;
   gnupg_ksba_io_t b64reader = NULL;
   gnupg_ksba_io_t b64writer = NULL;
   ksba_reader_t reader;
   ksba_writer_t writer = NULL;
   ksba_cms_t cms = NULL;
   ksba_stop_reason_t stopreason;
   ksba_cert_t cert;
   KEYDB_HANDLE kh;
   gcry_md_hd_t data_md = NULL;
   int signer;
   const char *algoid;
   int algo;
   int is_detached;
   estream_t in_fp = NULL;
   char *p;
 
   audit_set_type (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_TYPE_VERIFY);
 
   kh = keydb_new (ctrl);
   if (!kh)
     {
       log_error (_("failed to allocate keyDB handle\n"));
       rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
       goto leave;
     }
 
 
   in_fp = es_fdopen_nc (in_fd, "rb");
   if (!in_fp)
     {
       rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
       log_error ("fdopen() failed: %s\n", strerror (errno));
       goto leave;
     }
 
   rc = gnupg_ksba_create_reader
     (&b64reader, ((ctrl->is_pem? GNUPG_KSBA_IO_PEM : 0)
                   | (ctrl->is_base64? GNUPG_KSBA_IO_BASE64 : 0)
                   | (ctrl->autodetect_encoding? GNUPG_KSBA_IO_AUTODETECT : 0)),
      in_fp, &reader);
   if (rc)
     {
       log_error ("can't create reader: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
       goto leave;
     }
 
   if (out_fp)
     {
       rc = gnupg_ksba_create_writer
         (&b64writer, ((ctrl->create_pem? GNUPG_KSBA_IO_PEM : 0)
                       | (ctrl->create_base64? GNUPG_KSBA_IO_BASE64 : 0)),
          ctrl->pem_name, out_fp, &writer);
       if (rc)
         {
           log_error ("can't create writer: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
           goto leave;
         }
     }
 
   rc = ksba_cms_new (&cms);
   if (rc)
     goto leave;
 
   rc = ksba_cms_set_reader_writer (cms, reader, writer);
   if (rc)
     {
       log_error ("ksba_cms_set_reader_writer failed: %s\n",
                  gpg_strerror (rc));
       goto leave;
     }
 
   rc = gcry_md_open (&data_md, 0, 0);
   if (rc)
     {
       log_error ("md_open failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
       goto leave;
     }
   if (DBG_HASHING)
     gcry_md_debug (data_md, "vrfy.data");
 
   audit_log (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SETUP_READY);
 
   is_detached = 0;
   do
     {
       rc = ksba_cms_parse (cms, &stopreason);
       if (rc)
         {
           log_error ("ksba_cms_parse failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
           goto leave;
         }
 
       if (stopreason == KSBA_SR_NEED_HASH)
         {
           is_detached = 1;
           audit_log (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_DETACHED_SIGNATURE);
           if (opt.verbose)
             log_info ("detached signature\n");
         }
 
       if (stopreason == KSBA_SR_NEED_HASH
           || stopreason == KSBA_SR_BEGIN_DATA)
         {
           audit_log (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_GOT_DATA);
 
           /* We are now able to enable the hash algorithms */
           for (i=0; (algoid=ksba_cms_get_digest_algo_list (cms, i)); i++)
             {
               algo = gcry_md_map_name (algoid);
               if (!algo)
                 {
                   log_error ("unknown hash algorithm '%s'\n",
                              algoid? algoid:"?");
                   if (algoid
                       && (  !strcmp (algoid, "1.2.840.113549.1.1.2")
                           ||!strcmp (algoid, "1.2.840.113549.2.2")))
                     log_info (_("(this is the MD2 algorithm)\n"));
                   audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_BAD_DATA_HASH_ALGO, algoid);
                 }
               else
                 {
                   if (DBG_X509)
                     log_debug ("enabling hash algorithm %d (%s)\n",
                                algo, algoid? algoid:"");
                   gcry_md_enable (data_md, algo);
                   audit_log_i (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_DATA_HASH_ALGO, algo);
                 }
             }
           if (opt.extra_digest_algo)
             {
               if (DBG_X509)
                 log_debug ("enabling extra hash algorithm %d\n",
                            opt.extra_digest_algo);
               gcry_md_enable (data_md, opt.extra_digest_algo);
               audit_log_i (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_DATA_HASH_ALGO,
                            opt.extra_digest_algo);
             }
           if (is_detached)
             {
               if (data_fd == -1)
                 {
                   log_info ("detached signature w/o data "
                             "- assuming certs-only\n");
                   audit_log (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CERT_ONLY_SIG);
                 }
               else
                 audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_DATA_HASHING,
                               hash_data (data_fd, data_md));
             }
           else
             {
               ksba_cms_set_hash_function (cms, HASH_FNC, data_md);
             }
         }
       else if (stopreason == KSBA_SR_END_DATA)
         { /* The data bas been hashed */
           audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_DATA_HASHING, 0);
         }
     }
   while (stopreason != KSBA_SR_READY);
 
   if (b64writer)
     {
       rc = gnupg_ksba_finish_writer (b64writer);
       if (rc)
         {
           log_error ("write failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
           audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_WRITE_ERROR, rc);
           goto leave;
         }
     }
 
   if (data_fd != -1 && !is_detached)
     {
       log_error ("data given for a non-detached signature\n");
       rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CONFLICT);
       audit_log (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_USAGE_ERROR);
       goto leave;
     }
 
   for (i=0; (cert=ksba_cms_get_cert (cms, i)); i++)
     {
       /* Fixme: it might be better to check the validity of the
          certificate first before entering it into the DB.  This way
          we would avoid cluttering the DB with invalid
          certificates. */
       audit_log_cert (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SAVE_CERT, cert,
                       keydb_store_cert (ctrl, cert, 0, NULL));
       ksba_cert_release (cert);
     }
 
   cert = NULL;
   for (signer=0; ; signer++)
     {
       char *issuer = NULL;
       gcry_sexp_t sigval = NULL;
       ksba_isotime_t sigtime, keyexptime;
       ksba_sexp_t serial;
       char *msgdigest = NULL;
       size_t msgdigestlen;
       char *ctattr;
       int sigval_hash_algo;
       int info_pkalgo;
       unsigned int nbits;
       int pkalgo;
       char *pkalgostr = NULL;
       char *pkfpr = NULL;
       unsigned int pkalgoflags, verifyflags;
 
       rc = ksba_cms_get_issuer_serial (cms, signer, &issuer, &serial);
       if (!signer && gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA
           && data_fd == -1 && is_detached)
         {
           log_info ("certs-only message accepted\n");
           rc = 0;
           break;
         }
       if (rc)
         {
           if (signer && rc == -1)
             rc = 0;
           break;
         }
 
       gpgsm_status (ctrl, STATUS_NEWSIG, NULL);
       audit_log_i (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_NEW_SIG, signer);
 
       if (DBG_X509)
         {
           log_debug ("signer %d - issuer: '%s'\n",
                      signer, issuer? issuer:"[NONE]");
           log_debug ("signer %d - serial: ", signer);
           gpgsm_dump_serial (serial);
           log_printf ("\n");
         }
       if (ctrl->audit)
         {
           char *tmpstr = gpgsm_format_sn_issuer (serial, issuer);
           audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SIG_NAME, tmpstr);
           xfree (tmpstr);
         }
 
       rc = ksba_cms_get_signing_time (cms, signer, sigtime);
       if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
         *sigtime = 0;
       else if (rc)
         {
           log_error ("error getting signing time: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
           *sigtime = 0; /* (we can't encode an error in the time string.) */
         }
 
       rc = ksba_cms_get_message_digest (cms, signer,
                                         &msgdigest, &msgdigestlen);
       if (!rc)
         {
           algoid = ksba_cms_get_digest_algo (cms, signer);
           algo = gcry_md_map_name (algoid);
           if (DBG_X509)
             log_debug ("signer %d - digest algo: %d\n", signer, algo);
           if (! gcry_md_is_enabled (data_md, algo))
             {
               log_error ("digest algo %d (%s) has not been enabled\n",
                          algo, algoid?algoid:"");
               audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SIG_STATUS, "unsupported");
               goto next_signer;
             }
         }
       else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
         {
           log_assert (!msgdigest);
           rc = 0;
           algoid = NULL;
           algo = 0;
         }
       else /* real error */
         {
           audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SIG_STATUS, "error");
           break;
         }
 
       rc = ksba_cms_get_sigattr_oids (cms, signer,
                                       "1.2.840.113549.1.9.3", &ctattr);
       if (!rc)
         {
           const char *s;
 
           if (DBG_X509)
             log_debug ("signer %d - content-type attribute: %s",
                        signer, ctattr);
 
           s = ksba_cms_get_content_oid (cms, 1);
           if (!s || strcmp (ctattr, s))
             {
               log_error ("content-type attribute does not match "
                          "actual content-type\n");
               ksba_free (ctattr);
               ctattr = NULL;
               audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SIG_STATUS, "bad");
               goto next_signer;
             }
           ksba_free (ctattr);
           ctattr = NULL;
         }
       else if (rc != -1)
         {
           log_error ("error getting content-type attribute: %s\n",
                      gpg_strerror (rc));
           audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SIG_STATUS, "bad");
           goto next_signer;
         }
       rc = 0;
 
 
       sigval = gpgsm_ksba_cms_get_sig_val (cms, signer);
       if (!sigval)
         {
           log_error ("no signature value available\n");
           audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SIG_STATUS, "bad");
           goto next_signer;
         }
 
       sigval_hash_algo = gpgsm_get_hash_algo_from_sigval (sigval, &pkalgoflags);
       if (DBG_X509)
         {
           log_debug ("signer %d - signature available (sigval hash=%d pkaf=%u)",
                      signer, sigval_hash_algo, pkalgoflags);
         }
       if (!sigval_hash_algo)
         sigval_hash_algo = algo; /* Fallback used e.g. with old libksba. */
 
       /* Find the certificate of the signer */
       keydb_search_reset (kh);
       rc = keydb_search_issuer_sn (ctrl, kh, issuer, serial);
       if (rc)
         {
           if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
             {
               log_error ("certificate not found\n");
               rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
             }
           else
             log_error ("failed to find the certificate: %s\n",
                        gpg_strerror(rc));
           {
             char numbuf[50];
             sprintf (numbuf, "%d", rc);
 
             gpgsm_status2 (ctrl, STATUS_ERROR, "verify.findkey",
                            numbuf, NULL);
           }
           audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SIG_STATUS, "no-cert");
           goto next_signer;
         }
 
       rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &cert);
       if (rc)
         {
           log_error ("failed to get cert: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
           audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SIG_STATUS, "error");
           goto next_signer;
         }
 
       pkfpr = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
       pkalgostr = gpgsm_pubkey_algo_string (cert, NULL);
       pkalgo = gpgsm_get_key_algo_info (cert, &nbits);
       /* Remap the ECC algo to the algo we use.  Note that EdDSA has
        * already been mapped.  */
       if (pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECC)
         pkalgo = GCRY_PK_ECDSA;
 
       /* Print infos about the signature.  */
       log_info (_("Signature made "));
       if (*sigtime)
         {
           /* We take the freedom as noted in RFC3339 to use a space
            * instead of the "T" delimiter between date and time.  We
            * also append a separate UTC instead of a "Z" or "+00:00"
            * suffix because that makes it clear to everyone what kind
            * of time this is.  */
           dump_isotime (sigtime);
           log_printf (" UTC");
         }
       else
         log_printf (_("[date not given]"));
       log_info (_("               using %s key %s\n"), pkalgostr, pkfpr);
       if (opt.verbose)
         {
           log_info (_("algorithm:"));
           log_printf (" %s + %s",
                       pubkey_algo_to_string (pkalgo),
                       gcry_md_algo_name (sigval_hash_algo));
           if (algo != sigval_hash_algo)
             log_printf (" (%s)", gcry_md_algo_name (algo));
           log_printf ("\n");
         }
 
       audit_log_i (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_DATA_HASH_ALGO, algo);
 
       /* Check compliance.  */
       if (! gnupg_pk_is_allowed (opt.compliance, PK_USE_VERIFICATION,
                                  pkalgo, pkalgoflags, NULL, nbits, NULL))
         {
           char  kidstr[10+1];
 
           snprintf (kidstr, sizeof kidstr, "0x%08lX",
                     gpgsm_get_short_fingerprint (cert, NULL));
           log_error (_("key %s may not be used for signing in %s mode\n"),
                      kidstr,
                      gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
           goto next_signer;
         }
 
       if (! gnupg_digest_is_allowed (opt.compliance, 0, sigval_hash_algo))
         {
           log_error (_("digest algorithm '%s' may not be used in %s mode\n"),
                      gcry_md_algo_name (sigval_hash_algo),
                      gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
           goto next_signer;
         }
 
       /* Check compliance with CO_DE_VS.  */
       if (gnupg_pk_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, pkalgo, pkalgoflags,
                                  NULL, nbits, NULL)
           && gnupg_gcrypt_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS)
           && gnupg_digest_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, sigval_hash_algo))
         gpgsm_status (ctrl, STATUS_VERIFICATION_COMPLIANCE_MODE,
                       gnupg_status_compliance_flag (CO_DE_VS));
       else if (opt.require_compliance
                && opt.compliance == CO_DE_VS)
         {
           log_error (_("operation forced to fail due to"
                        " unfulfilled compliance rules\n"));
           gpgsm_errors_seen = 1;
         }
 
 
       /* Now we can check the signature.  */
       if (msgdigest)
         { /* Signed attributes are available. */
           gcry_md_hd_t md;
           unsigned char *s;
 
           /* Check that the message digest in the signed attributes
              matches the one we calculated on the data.  */
           s = gcry_md_read (data_md, algo);
           if ( !s || !msgdigestlen
                || gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo) != msgdigestlen
                || memcmp (s, msgdigest, msgdigestlen) )
             {
               char *fpr;
 
               log_error (_("invalid signature: message digest attribute "
                            "does not match computed one\n"));
               if (DBG_X509)
                 {
                   if (msgdigest)
                     log_printhex (msgdigest, msgdigestlen, "message:  ");
                   if (s)
                     log_printhex (s, gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo),
                                   "computed: ");
                 }
               fpr = gpgsm_fpr_and_name_for_status (cert);
               gpgsm_status (ctrl, STATUS_BADSIG, fpr);
               xfree (fpr);
               audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SIG_STATUS, "bad");
               goto next_signer;
             }
 
           audit_log_i (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_ATTR_HASH_ALGO, sigval_hash_algo);
           rc = gcry_md_open (&md, sigval_hash_algo, 0);
           if (rc)
             {
               log_error ("md_open failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
               audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SIG_STATUS, "error");
               goto next_signer;
             }
           if (DBG_HASHING)
             gcry_md_debug (md, "vrfy.attr");
 
           ksba_cms_set_hash_function (cms, HASH_FNC, md);
           rc = ksba_cms_hash_signed_attrs (cms, signer);
           if (rc)
             {
               log_error ("hashing signed attrs failed: %s\n",
                          gpg_strerror (rc));
               gcry_md_close (md);
               audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SIG_STATUS, "error");
               goto next_signer;
             }
           rc = gpgsm_check_cms_signature (cert, sigval, md, sigval_hash_algo,
                                           pkalgoflags, &info_pkalgo);
           gcry_md_close (md);
         }
       else
         {
           rc = gpgsm_check_cms_signature (cert, sigval, data_md,
                                           algo, pkalgoflags, &info_pkalgo);
         }
 
       if (rc)
         {
           char *fpr;
 
           log_error ("invalid signature: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
           fpr = gpgsm_fpr_and_name_for_status (cert);
           gpgsm_status (ctrl, STATUS_BADSIG, fpr);
           xfree (fpr);
           audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SIG_STATUS, "bad");
           goto next_signer;
         }
       rc = gpgsm_cert_use_verify_p (cert); /*(this displays an info message)*/
       if (rc)
         {
           gpgsm_status_with_err_code (ctrl, STATUS_ERROR, "verify.keyusage",
                                       gpg_err_code (rc));
           rc = 0;
         }
 
       if (DBG_X509)
         log_debug ("signature okay - checking certs\n");
       audit_log (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_VALIDATE_CHAIN);
       rc = gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl, cert,
                                  *sigtime? sigtime : "19700101T000000",
                                  keyexptime, 0,
                                  NULL, 0, &verifyflags);
       {
         char *fpr, *buf, *tstr;
 
         fpr = gpgsm_fpr_and_name_for_status (cert);
         if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED)
           {
             gpgsm_status (ctrl, STATUS_EXPKEYSIG, fpr);
             rc = 0;
           }
         else
           gpgsm_status (ctrl, STATUS_GOODSIG, fpr);
 
         xfree (fpr);
 
         /* FIXME: INFO_PKALGO correctly shows ECDSA but PKALGO is then
          * ECC.  We should use the ECDSA here and need to find a way to
-         * figure this oult without using the bodus assumtion in
-         * gpgsm_check_cms_signature that ECC is alwas ECDSA.  */
+         * figure this out without using the bogus assumption in
+         * gpgsm_check_cms_signature that ECC is always ECDSA.  */
 
         fpr = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
         tstr = strtimestamp_r (sigtime);
         buf = xasprintf ("%s %s %s %s 0 0 %d %d 00", fpr, tstr,
                          *sigtime? sigtime : "0",
                          *keyexptime? keyexptime : "0",
                          info_pkalgo, algo);
         xfree (tstr);
         xfree (fpr);
         gpgsm_status (ctrl, STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf);
         xfree (buf);
       }
 
       audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CHAIN_STATUS, rc);
       if (rc) /* of validate_chain */
         {
           log_error ("invalid certification chain: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
           if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN
               || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT
               || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_CA_CERT
               || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CERT_REVOKED)
             gpgsm_status_with_err_code (ctrl, STATUS_TRUST_NEVER, NULL,
                                         gpg_err_code (rc));
           else
             gpgsm_status_with_err_code (ctrl, STATUS_TRUST_UNDEFINED, NULL,
                                         gpg_err_code (rc));
           audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SIG_STATUS, "bad");
           goto next_signer;
         }
 
       audit_log_s (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_SIG_STATUS, "good");
 
       for (i=0; (p = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, i)); i++)
         {
           log_info (!i? _("Good signature from")
                       : _("                aka"));
           log_printf (" \"");
           gpgsm_es_print_name (log_get_stream (), p);
           log_printf ("\"\n");
           ksba_free (p);
         }
 
 
       /* Print a note if this is a qualified signature.  */
       {
         size_t qualbuflen;
         char qualbuffer[1];
 
         rc = ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "is_qualified", &qualbuffer,
                                       sizeof (qualbuffer), &qualbuflen);
         if (!rc && qualbuflen)
           {
             if (*qualbuffer)
               {
                 log_info (_("This is a qualified signature\n"));
                 if (!opt.qualsig_approval)
                   log_info
                     (_("Note, that this software is not officially approved "
                        "to create or verify such signatures.\n"));
               }
           }
         else if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
           log_error ("get_user_data(is_qualified) failed: %s\n",
                      gpg_strerror (rc));
       }
 
       gpgsm_status (ctrl, STATUS_TRUST_FULLY,
                     (verifyflags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)?
                     "0 steed":
                     (verifyflags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL)?
                     "0 chain": "0 shell");
 
     next_signer:
       rc = 0;
       xfree (issuer);
       xfree (serial);
       gcry_sexp_release (sigval);
       xfree (msgdigest);
       xfree (pkalgostr);
       xfree (pkfpr);
       ksba_cert_release (cert);
       cert = NULL;
     }
   rc = 0;
 
  leave:
   ksba_cms_release (cms);
   gnupg_ksba_destroy_reader (b64reader);
   gnupg_ksba_destroy_writer (b64writer);
   keydb_release (kh);
   gcry_md_close (data_md);
   es_fclose (in_fp);
 
   if (rc)
     {
       char numbuf[50];
       sprintf (numbuf, "%d", rc );
       gpgsm_status2 (ctrl, STATUS_ERROR, "verify.leave",
                      numbuf, NULL);
     }
 
   return rc;
 }