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	diff --git a/sm/certchain.c b/sm/certchain.c
	index a361acaf0..f59dc7573 100644
	--- a/sm/certchain.c
	+++ b/sm/certchain.c
	@@ -1,2153 +1,2224 @@
	/* certchain.c - certificate chain validation
	* Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
	* 2006, 2007, 2008, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <errno.h>
	#include <unistd.h>
	#include <time.h>
	#include <stdarg.h>
	#include <assert.h>

	#include "gpgsm.h"
	#include <gcrypt.h>
	#include <ksba.h>

	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "../kbx/keybox.h" /* for KEYBOX_FLAG_* */
	#include "../common/i18n.h"
	#include "../common/tlv.h"


	/* Object to keep track of certain root certificates. */
	struct marktrusted_info_s
	{
	struct marktrusted_info_s *next;
	unsigned char fpr[20];
	};
	static struct marktrusted_info_s *marktrusted_info;


	/* While running the validation function we want to keep track of the
	certificates in the chain. This type is used for that. */
	struct chain_item_s
	{
	struct chain_item_s *next;
	ksba_cert_t cert; /* The certificate. */
	int is_root; /* The certificate is the root certificate. */
	};
	typedef struct chain_item_s *chain_item_t;


	static int is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert,
	const char issuerdn, const char subjectdn);
	static int get_regtp_ca_info (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int *chainlen);


	/* This function returns true if we already asked during this session
	whether the root certificate CERT shall be marked as trusted. */
	static int
	already_asked_marktrusted (ksba_cert_t cert)
	{
	unsigned char fpr[20];
	struct marktrusted_info_s *r;

	gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fpr, NULL);
	/* No context switches in the loop! */
	for (r=marktrusted_info; r; r= r->next)
	if (!memcmp (r->fpr, fpr, 20))
	return 1;
	return 0;
	}

	/* Flag certificate CERT as already asked whether it shall be marked
	as trusted. */
	static void
	set_already_asked_marktrusted (ksba_cert_t cert)
	{
	unsigned char fpr[20];
	struct marktrusted_info_s *r;

	gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fpr, NULL);
	for (r=marktrusted_info; r; r= r->next)
	if (!memcmp (r->fpr, fpr, 20))
	return; /* Already marked. */
	r = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *r);
	if (!r)
	return;
	memcpy (r->fpr, fpr, 20);
	r->next = marktrusted_info;
	marktrusted_info = r;
	}

	/* If LISTMODE is true, print FORMAT using LISTMODE to FP. If
	LISTMODE is false, use the string to print an log_info or, if
	IS_ERROR is true, and log_error. */
	static void
	do_list (int is_error, int listmode, estream_t fp, const char *format, ...)
	{
	va_list arg_ptr;

	va_start (arg_ptr, format) ;
	if (listmode)
	{
	if (fp)
	{
	es_fputs (" [", fp);
	es_vfprintf (fp, format, arg_ptr);
	es_fputs ("]\n", fp);
	}
	}
	else
	{
	log_logv (is_error? GPGRT_LOG_ERROR: GPGRT_LOG_INFO, format, arg_ptr);
	log_printf ("\n");
	}
	va_end (arg_ptr);
	}

	/* Return 0 if A and B are equal. */
	static int
	compare_certs (ksba_cert_t a, ksba_cert_t b)
	{
	const unsigned char img_a, img_b;
	size_t len_a, len_b;

	img_a = ksba_cert_get_image (a, &len_a);
	if (!img_a)
	return 1;
	img_b = ksba_cert_get_image (b, &len_b);
	if (!img_b)
	return 1;
	return !(len_a == len_b && !memcmp (img_a, img_b, len_a));
	}


	/* Return true if CERT has the validityModel extensions and defines
	the use of the chain model. */
	static int
	has_validation_model_chain (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t listfp)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	int idx, yes;
	const char *oid;
	size_t off, derlen, objlen, hdrlen;
	const unsigned char *der;
	int class, tag, constructed, ndef;
	char *oidbuf;

	for (idx=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_extension (cert, idx,
	&oid, NULL, &off, &derlen));idx++)
	if (!strcmp (oid, "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5") )
	break;
	if (err)
	return 0; /* Not found. */
	der = ksba_cert_get_image (cert, NULL);
	if (!der)
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); /* Oops */
	goto leave;
	}
	der += off;

	err = parse_ber_header (&der, &derlen, &class, &tag, &constructed,
	&ndef, &objlen, &hdrlen);
	if (!err && (objlen > derlen \|\| tag != TAG_SEQUENCE))
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
	if (err)
	goto leave;
	derlen = objlen;
	err = parse_ber_header (&der, &derlen, &class, &tag, &constructed,
	&ndef, &objlen, &hdrlen);
	if (!err && (objlen > derlen \|\| tag != TAG_OBJECT_ID))
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
	if (err)
	goto leave;
	oidbuf = ksba_oid_to_str (der, objlen);
	if (!oidbuf)
	{
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	goto leave;
	}

	if (opt.verbose)
	do_list (0, listmode, listfp,
	_("validation model requested by certificate: %s"),
	!strcmp (oidbuf, "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5.1")? _("chain") :
	!strcmp (oidbuf, "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5.2")? _("shell") :
	/* */ oidbuf);
	yes = !strcmp (oidbuf, "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5.1");
	ksba_free (oidbuf);
	return yes;


	leave:
	log_error ("error parsing validityModel: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	return 0;
	}



	static int
	unknown_criticals (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t fp)
	{
	static const char *known[] = {
	"2.5.29.15", /* keyUsage */
	"2.5.29.17", /* subjectAltName
	Japanese DoCoMo certs mark them as critical. PKIX
	only requires them as critical if subjectName is
	empty. I don't know whether our code gracefully
	handles such empry subjectNames but that is
	another story. */
	"2.5.29.19", /* basic Constraints */
	"2.5.29.32", /* certificatePolicies */
	"2.5.29.37", /* extendedKeyUsage - handled by certlist.c */
	"1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5", /* validityModel - handled here. */
	NULL
	};
	int rc = 0, i, idx, crit;
	const char *oid;
	gpg_error_t err;
	int unsupported;
	strlist_t sl;

	for (idx=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_extension (cert, idx,
	&oid, &crit, NULL, NULL));idx++)
	{
	if (!crit)
	continue;
	for (i=0; known[i] && strcmp (known[i],oid); i++)
	;
	unsupported = !known[i];

	/* If this critical extension is not supported. Check the list
	of to be ignored extensions to see whether we claim that it
	is supported. */
	if (unsupported && opt.ignored_cert_extensions)
	{
	for (sl=opt.ignored_cert_extensions;
	sl && strcmp (sl->d, oid); sl = sl->next)
	;
	if (sl)
	unsupported = 0;
	}
	if (unsupported)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, fp,
	_("critical certificate extension %s is not supported"),
	oid);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT);
	}
	}
	/* We ignore the error codes EOF as well as no-value. The later will
	occur for certificates with no extensions at all. */
	if (err
	&& gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF
	&& gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_VALUE)
	rc = err;

	return rc;
	}


	/* Check whether CERT is an allowed certificate. This requires that
	CERT matches all requirements for such a CA, i.e. the
	BasicConstraints extension. The function returns 0 on success and
	the allowed length of the chain at CHAINLEN. */
	static int
	allowed_ca (ctrl_t ctrl,
	ksba_cert_t cert, int *chainlen, int listmode, estream_t fp)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	int flag;

	err = ksba_cert_is_ca (cert, &flag, chainlen);
	if (err)
	return err;
	if (!flag)
	{
	if (get_regtp_ca_info (ctrl, cert, chainlen))
	{
	/* Note that dirmngr takes a different way to cope with such
	certs. */
	return 0; /* RegTP issued certificate. */
	}

	do_list (1, listmode, fp,_("issuer certificate is not marked as a CA"));
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CA_CERT);
	}
	return 0;
	}


	static int
	check_cert_policy (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t fplist)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	char *policies;
	FILE *fp;
	int any_critical;

	err = ksba_cert_get_cert_policies (cert, &policies);
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
	return 0; /* No policy given. */
	if (err)
	return err;

	/* STRING is a line delimited list of certificate policies as stored
	in the certificate. The line itself is colon delimited where the
	first field is the OID of the policy and the second field either
	N or C for normal or critical extension */

	if (opt.verbose > 1 && !listmode)
	log_info ("certificate's policy list: %s\n", policies);

	/* The check is very minimal but won't give false positives */
	any_critical = !!strstr (policies, ":C");

	if (!opt.policy_file)
	{
	xfree (policies);
	if (any_critical)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, fplist,
	_("critical marked policy without configured policies"));
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH);
	}
	return 0;
	}

	fp = fopen (opt.policy_file, "r");
	if (!fp)
	{
	if (opt.verbose \|\| errno != ENOENT)
	log_info (_("failed to open '%s': %s\n"),
	opt.policy_file, strerror (errno));
	xfree (policies);
	/* With no critical policies this is only a warning */
	if (!any_critical)
	{
	if (!opt.quiet)
	do_list (0, listmode, fplist,
	_("Note: non-critical certificate policy not allowed"));
	return 0;
	}
	do_list (1, listmode, fplist,
	_("certificate policy not allowed"));
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH);
	}

	for (;;)
	{
	int c;
	char *p, line[256];
	char haystack, allowed;

	/* read line */
	do
	{
	if (!fgets (line, DIM(line)-1, fp) )
	{
	gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno));

	xfree (policies);
	if (feof (fp))
	{
	fclose (fp);
	/* With no critical policies this is only a warning */
	if (!any_critical)
	{
	do_list (0, listmode, fplist,
	_("Note: non-critical certificate policy not allowed"));
	return 0;
	}
	do_list (1, listmode, fplist,
	_("certificate policy not allowed"));
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH);
	}
	fclose (fp);
	return tmperr;
	}

	if (!*line \|\| line[strlen(line)-1] != '\n')
	{
	/* eat until end of line */
	while ( (c=getc (fp)) != EOF && c != '\n')
	;
	fclose (fp);
	xfree (policies);
	return gpg_error (*line? GPG_ERR_LINE_TOO_LONG
	: GPG_ERR_INCOMPLETE_LINE);
	}

	/* Allow for empty lines and spaces */
	for (p=line; spacep (p); p++)
	;
	}
	while (!p \|\| p == '\n' \|\| *p == '#');

	/* Parse line. Note that the line has always a LF and spacep
	does not consider a LF a space. Thus strpbrk will always
	succeed. */
	for (allowed=line; spacep (allowed); allowed++)
	;
	p = strpbrk (allowed, " :\n");
	if (!*p \|\| p == allowed)
	{
	fclose (fp);
	xfree (policies);
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CONFIGURATION);
	}
	p = 0; / strip the rest of the line */
	/* See whether we find ALLOWED (which is an OID) in POLICIES */
	for (haystack=policies; (p=strstr (haystack, allowed)); haystack = p+1)
	{
	if ( !(p == policies \|\| p[-1] == '\n') )
	continue; /* Does not match the begin of a line. */
	if (p[strlen (allowed)] != ':')
	continue; /* The length does not match. */
	/* Yep - it does match so return okay. */
	fclose (fp);
	xfree (policies);
	return 0;
	}
	}
	}


	/* Helper function for find_up. This resets the key handle and search
	for an issuer ISSUER with a subjectKeyIdentifier of KEYID. Returns
	0 on success or -1 when not found. */
	static int
	find_up_search_by_keyid (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
	const char *issuer, ksba_sexp_t keyid)
	{
	int rc;
	ksba_cert_t cert = NULL;
	ksba_sexp_t subj = NULL;
	- int anyfound = 0;
	- ksba_isotime_t not_before, last_not_before;
	+ ksba_isotime_t not_before, not_after, last_not_before, ne_last_not_before;
	+ ksba_cert_t found_cert = NULL;
	+ ksba_cert_t ne_found_cert = NULL;

	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	while (!(rc = keydb_search_subject (ctrl, kh, issuer)))
	{
	ksba_cert_release (cert); cert = NULL;
	rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &cert);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_cert() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
	rc = -1;
	- break;
	+ goto leave;
	}
	xfree (subj);
	if (!ksba_cert_get_subj_key_id (cert, NULL, &subj))
	{
	if (!cmp_simple_canon_sexp (keyid, subj))
	{
	/* Found matching cert. */
	rc = ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 0, not_before);
	+ if (!rc)
	+ rc = ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 1, not_after);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_validity() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
	rc = -1;
	- break;
	+ goto leave;
	}

	- if (!anyfound \|\| strcmp (last_not_before, not_before) < 0)
	+ if (!found_cert
	+ \|\| strcmp (last_not_before, not_before) < 0)
	{
	/* This certificate is the first one found or newer
	- than the previous one. This copes with
	- re-issuing CA certificates while keeping the same
	- key information. */
	- anyfound = 1;
	+ * than the previous one. This copes with
	+ * re-issuing CA certificates while keeping the same
	+ * key information. */
	gnupg_copy_time (last_not_before, not_before);
	+ ksba_cert_release (found_cert);
	+ ksba_cert_ref ((found_cert = cert));
	keydb_push_found_state (kh);
	}
	+
	+ if (*not_after && strcmp (ctrl->current_time, not_after) > 0 )
	+ ; /* CERT has expired - don't consider it. */
	+ else if (!ne_found_cert
	+ \|\| strcmp (ne_last_not_before, not_before) < 0)
	+ {
	+ /* This certificate is the first non-expired one
	+ * found or newer than the previous non-expired one. */
	+ gnupg_copy_time (ne_last_not_before, not_before);
	+ ksba_cert_release (ne_found_cert);
	+ ksba_cert_ref ((ne_found_cert = cert));
	+ }
	}
	}
	}

	- if (anyfound)
	+ if (!found_cert)
	+ goto leave;
	+
	+ /* Take the last saved one. Note that push/pop_found_state are
	+ * misnomers because there is no stack of states. Renaming them to
	+ * save/restore_found_state would be better. */
	+ keydb_pop_found_state (kh);
	+ rc = 0; /* Ignore EOF or other error after the first cert. */
	+
	+ /* We need to consider some corner cases. It is possible that we
	+ * have a long term certificate (e.g. valid from 2008 to 2033) as
	+ * well as a re-issued (i.e. using the same key material) short term
	+ * certificate (say from 2016 to 2019). Using the short term
	+ * certificate is the proper solution. But we need to take care if
	+ * there is no re-issued new short term certificate (e.g. from 2020
	+ * to 2023) available. In that case it is better to use the long
	+ * term certificate which is still valid. The code may run into
	+ * minor problems in the case of the chain validation mode. Given
	+ * that this corner case is due to non-diligent PKI management we
	+ * ignore this problem. */
	+
	+ /* The most common case is that the found certificate is not expired
	+ * and thus identical to the one found from the list of non-expired
	+ * certs. We can stop here. */
	+ if (found_cert == ne_found_cert)
	+ goto leave;
	+ /* If we do not have a non expired certificate the actual cert is
	+ * expired and we can also stop here. */
	+ if (!ne_found_cert)
	+ goto leave;
	+ /* Now we need to see whether the found certificate is expired and
	+ * only in this case we return the certificate found in the list of
	+ * non-expired certs. */
	+ rc = ksba_cert_get_validity (found_cert, 1, not_after);
	+ if (rc)
	{
	- /* Take the last saved one. */
	- keydb_pop_found_state (kh);
	- rc = 0; /* Ignore EOF or other error after the first cert. */
	+ log_error ("keydb_get_validity() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
	+ rc = -1;
	+ goto leave;
	}
	+ if (*not_after && strcmp (ctrl->current_time, not_after) > 0 )
	+ { /* CERT has expired. Use the NE_FOUND_CERT. Because we have no
	+ * found state for this we need to search for it again. */
	+ unsigned char fpr[20];

	+ gpgsm_get_fingerprint (ne_found_cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fpr, NULL);
	+ keydb_search_reset (kh);
	+ rc = keydb_search_fpr (ctrl, kh, fpr);
	+ if (rc)
	+ {
	+ log_error ("keydb_search_fpr() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
	+ rc = -1;
	+ goto leave;
	+ }
	+ /* Ready. The NE_FOUND_CERT is availabale via keydb_get_cert. */
	+ }
	+
	+ leave:
	+ ksba_cert_release (found_cert);
	+ ksba_cert_release (ne_found_cert);
	ksba_cert_release (cert);
	xfree (subj);
	return rc? -1:0;
	}


	struct find_up_store_certs_s
	{
	ctrl_t ctrl;
	int count;
	};

	static void
	find_up_store_certs_cb (void *cb_value, ksba_cert_t cert)
	{
	struct find_up_store_certs_s *parm = cb_value;

	if (keydb_store_cert (parm->ctrl, cert, 1, NULL))
	log_error ("error storing issuer certificate as ephemeral\n");
	parm->count++;
	}


	/* Helper for find_up(). Locate the certificate for ISSUER using an
	external lookup. KH is the keydb context we are currently using.
	On success 0 is returned and the certificate may be retrieved from
	the keydb using keydb_get_cert(). KEYID is the keyIdentifier from
	the AKI or NULL. */
	static int
	find_up_external (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
	const char *issuer, ksba_sexp_t keyid)
	{
	int rc;
	strlist_t names = NULL;
	struct find_up_store_certs_s find_up_store_certs_parm;
	char *pattern;
	const char *s;

	find_up_store_certs_parm.ctrl = ctrl;
	find_up_store_certs_parm.count = 0;

	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("looking up issuer at external location\n"));
	/* The Dirmngr process is confused about unknown attributes. As a
	quick and ugly hack we locate the CN and use the issuer string
	starting at this attribite. Fixme: we should have far better
	parsing for external lookups in the Dirmngr. */
	s = strstr (issuer, "CN=");
	if (!s \|\| s == issuer \|\| s[-1] != ',')
	s = issuer;
	pattern = xtrymalloc (strlen (s)+2);
	if (!pattern)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	strcpy (stpcpy (pattern, "/"), s);
	add_to_strlist (&names, pattern);
	xfree (pattern);

	rc = gpgsm_dirmngr_lookup (ctrl, names, 0, find_up_store_certs_cb,
	&find_up_store_certs_parm);
	free_strlist (names);

	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("number of issuers matching: %d\n"),
	find_up_store_certs_parm.count);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("external key lookup failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	rc = -1;
	}
	else if (!find_up_store_certs_parm.count)
	rc = -1;
	else
	{
	int old;
	/* The issuers are currently stored in the ephemeral key DB, so
	we temporary switch to ephemeral mode. */
	old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
	if (keyid)
	rc = find_up_search_by_keyid (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
	else
	{
	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	rc = keydb_search_subject (ctrl, kh, issuer);
	}
	keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
	}
	return rc;
	}


	/* Helper for find_up(). Ask the dirmngr for the certificate for
	ISSUER with optional SERIALNO. KH is the keydb context we are
	currently using. With SUBJECT_MODE set, ISSUER is searched as the
	subject. On success 0 is returned and the certificate is available
	in the ephemeral DB. */
	static int
	find_up_dirmngr (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
	ksba_sexp_t serialno, const char *issuer, int subject_mode)
	{
	int rc;
	strlist_t names = NULL;
	struct find_up_store_certs_s find_up_store_certs_parm;
	char *pattern;

	(void)kh;

	find_up_store_certs_parm.ctrl = ctrl;
	find_up_store_certs_parm.count = 0;

	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("looking up issuer from the Dirmngr cache\n"));
	if (subject_mode)
	{
	pattern = xtrymalloc (strlen (issuer)+2);
	if (pattern)
	strcpy (stpcpy (pattern, "/"), issuer);
	}
	else if (serialno)
	pattern = gpgsm_format_sn_issuer (serialno, issuer);
	else
	{
	pattern = xtrymalloc (strlen (issuer)+3);
	if (pattern)
	strcpy (stpcpy (pattern, "#/"), issuer);
	}
	if (!pattern)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	add_to_strlist (&names, pattern);
	xfree (pattern);

	rc = gpgsm_dirmngr_lookup (ctrl, names, 1, find_up_store_certs_cb,
	&find_up_store_certs_parm);
	free_strlist (names);

	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("number of matching certificates: %d\n"),
	find_up_store_certs_parm.count);
	if (rc && !opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("dirmngr cache-only key lookup failed: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	return (!rc && find_up_store_certs_parm.count)? 0 : -1;
	}



	/* Locate issuing certificate for CERT. ISSUER is the name of the
	issuer used as a fallback if the other methods don't work. If
	FIND_NEXT is true, the function shall return the next possible
	issuer. The certificate itself is not directly returned but a
	- keydb_get_cert on the keyDb context KH will return it. Returns 0
	+ keydb_get_cert on the keydb context KH will return it. Returns 0
	on success, -1 if not found or an error code. */
	static int
	find_up (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE kh,
	ksba_cert_t cert, const char *issuer, int find_next)
	{
	ksba_name_t authid;
	ksba_sexp_t authidno;
	ksba_sexp_t keyid;
	int rc = -1;

	if (DBG_X509)
	log_debug ("looking for parent certificate\n");
	if (!ksba_cert_get_auth_key_id (cert, &keyid, &authid, &authidno))
	{
	const char *s = ksba_name_enum (authid, 0);
	if (s && *authidno)
	{
	rc = keydb_search_issuer_sn (ctrl, kh, s, authidno);
	if (rc)
	keydb_search_reset (kh);

	if (!rc && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via authid and sn+issuer\n");

	/* In case of an error, try to get the certificate from the
	dirmngr. That is done by trying to put that certifcate
	into the ephemeral DB and let the code below do the
	actual retrieve. Thus there is no error checking.
	Skipped in find_next mode as usual. */
	if (rc == -1 && !find_next)
	find_up_dirmngr (ctrl, kh, authidno, s, 0);

	/* In case of an error try the ephemeral DB. We can't do
	that in find_next mode because we can't keep the search
	state then. */
	if (rc == -1 && !find_next)
	{
	int old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
	if (!old)
	{
	rc = keydb_search_issuer_sn (ctrl, kh, s, authidno);
	if (rc)
	keydb_search_reset (kh);

	if (!rc && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via authid and sn+issuer (ephem)\n");
	}
	keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
	}
	if (rc)
	rc = -1; /* Need to make sure to have this error code. */
	}

	if (rc == -1 && keyid && !find_next)
	{
	- /* Not found by AIK.issuer_sn. Lets try the AIK.ki
	+ /* Not found by AKI.issuer_sn. Lets try the AKI.ki
	instead. Loop over all certificates with that issuer as
	subject and stop for the one with a matching
	subjectKeyIdentifier. */
	/* Fixme: Should we also search in the dirmngr? */
	rc = find_up_search_by_keyid (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
	if (!rc && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via authid and keyid\n");
	if (rc)
	{
	int old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
	if (!old)
	rc = find_up_search_by_keyid (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
	if (!rc && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via authid and keyid (ephem)\n");
	keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
	}
	if (rc)
	rc = -1; /* Need to make sure to have this error code. */
	}

	/* If we still didn't found it, try to find it via the subject
	from the dirmngr-cache. */
	if (rc == -1 && !find_next)
	{
	if (!find_up_dirmngr (ctrl, kh, NULL, issuer, 1))
	{
	int old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
	if (keyid)
	rc = find_up_search_by_keyid (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
	else
	{
	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	rc = keydb_search_subject (ctrl, kh, issuer);
	}
	keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);
	}
	if (rc)
	rc = -1; /* Need to make sure to have this error code. */

	if (!rc && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via authid and issuer from dirmngr cache\n");
	}

	/* If we still didn't found it, try an external lookup. */
	if (rc == -1 && opt.auto_issuer_key_retrieve && !find_next)
	{
	rc = find_up_external (ctrl, kh, issuer, keyid);
	if (!rc && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via authid and external lookup\n");
	}


	/* Print a note so that the user does not feel too helpless when
	an issuer certificate was found and gpgsm prints BAD
	signature because it is not the correct one. */
	if (rc == -1 && opt.quiet)
	;
	else if (rc == -1)
	{
	log_info ("%sissuer certificate ", find_next?"next ":"");
	if (keyid)
	{
	log_printf ("{");
	gpgsm_dump_serial (keyid);
	log_printf ("} ");
	}
	if (authidno)
	{
	log_printf ("(#");
	gpgsm_dump_serial (authidno);
	log_printf ("/");
	gpgsm_dump_string (s);
	log_printf (") ");
	}
	log_printf ("not found using authorityKeyIdentifier\n");
	}
	else if (rc)
	log_error ("failed to find authorityKeyIdentifier: rc=%d\n", rc);
	xfree (keyid);
	ksba_name_release (authid);
	xfree (authidno);
	}

	if (rc) /* Not found via authorithyKeyIdentifier, try regular issuer name. */
	rc = keydb_search_subject (ctrl, kh, issuer);
	if (rc == -1 && !find_next)
	{
	int old;

	/* Also try to get it from the Dirmngr cache. The function
	merely puts it into the ephemeral database. */
	find_up_dirmngr (ctrl, kh, NULL, issuer, 0);

	/* Not found, let us see whether we have one in the ephemeral key DB. */
	old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
	if (!old)
	{
	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	rc = keydb_search_subject (ctrl, kh, issuer);
	}
	keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, old);

	if (!rc && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via issuer\n");
	}

	/* Still not found. If enabled, try an external lookup. */
	if (rc == -1 && opt.auto_issuer_key_retrieve && !find_next)
	{
	rc = find_up_external (ctrl, kh, issuer, NULL);
	if (!rc && DBG_X509)
	log_debug (" found via issuer and external lookup\n");
	}

	return rc;
	}


	/* Return the next certificate up in the chain starting at START.
	Returns -1 when there are no more certificates. */
	int
	gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t start, ksba_cert_t *r_next)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	char *issuer = NULL;
	char *subject = NULL;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kh = keydb_new ();

	*r_next = NULL;
	if (!kh)
	{
	log_error (_("failed to allocate keyDB handle\n"));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	goto leave;
	}

	issuer = ksba_cert_get_issuer (start, 0);
	subject = ksba_cert_get_subject (start, 0);
	if (!issuer)
	{
	log_error ("no issuer found in certificate\n");
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}
	if (!subject)
	{
	log_error ("no subject found in certificate\n");
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}

	if (is_root_cert (start, issuer, subject))
	{
	rc = -1; /* we are at the root */
	goto leave;
	}

	rc = find_up (ctrl, kh, start, issuer, 0);
	if (rc)
	{
	/* It is quite common not to have a certificate, so better don't
	print an error here. */
	if (rc != -1 && opt.verbose > 1)
	log_error ("failed to find issuer's certificate: rc=%d\n", rc);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_ISSUER_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}

	rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, r_next);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_cert() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	}

	leave:
	xfree (issuer);
	xfree (subject);
	keydb_release (kh);
	return rc;
	}


	/* Helper for gpgsm_is_root_cert. This one is used if the subject and
	issuer DNs are already known. */
	static int
	is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert, const char issuerdn, const char subjectdn)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	int result = 0;
	ksba_sexp_t serialno;
	ksba_sexp_t ak_keyid;
	ksba_name_t ak_name;
	ksba_sexp_t ak_sn;
	const char *ak_name_str;
	ksba_sexp_t subj_keyid = NULL;

	if (!issuerdn \|\| !subjectdn)
	return 0; /* No. */

	if (strcmp (issuerdn, subjectdn))
	return 0; /* No. */

	err = ksba_cert_get_auth_key_id (cert, &ak_keyid, &ak_name, &ak_sn);
	if (err)
	{
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
	return 1; /* Yes. Without a authorityKeyIdentifier this needs
	to be the Root certifcate (our trust anchor). */
	log_error ("error getting authorityKeyIdentifier: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	return 0; /* Well, it is broken anyway. Return No. */
	}

	serialno = ksba_cert_get_serial (cert);
	if (!serialno)
	{
	log_error ("error getting serialno: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Check whether the auth name's matches the issuer name+sn. If
	that is the case this is a root certificate. */
	ak_name_str = ksba_name_enum (ak_name, 0);
	if (ak_name_str
	&& !strcmp (ak_name_str, issuerdn)
	&& !cmp_simple_canon_sexp (ak_sn, serialno))
	{
	result = 1; /* Right, CERT is self-signed. */
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Similar for the ak_keyid. */
	if (ak_keyid && !ksba_cert_get_subj_key_id (cert, NULL, &subj_keyid)
	&& !cmp_simple_canon_sexp (ak_keyid, subj_keyid))
	{
	result = 1; /* Right, CERT is self-signed. */
	goto leave;
	}


	leave:
	ksba_free (subj_keyid);
	ksba_free (ak_keyid);
	ksba_name_release (ak_name);
	ksba_free (ak_sn);
	ksba_free (serialno);
	return result;
	}



	/* Check whether the CERT is a root certificate. Returns True if this
	is the case. */
	int
	gpgsm_is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert)
	{
	char *issuer;
	char *subject;
	int yes;

	issuer = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert, 0);
	subject = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, 0);
	yes = is_root_cert (cert, issuer, subject);
	xfree (issuer);
	xfree (subject);
	return yes;
	}


	/* This is a helper for gpgsm_validate_chain. */
	static gpg_error_t
	is_cert_still_valid (ctrl_t ctrl, int force_ocsp, int lm, estream_t fp,
	ksba_cert_t subject_cert, ksba_cert_t issuer_cert,
	int any_revoked, int any_no_crl, int *any_crl_too_old)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;

	if (ctrl->offline \|\| (opt.no_crl_check && !ctrl->use_ocsp))
	{
	audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CRL_CHECK,
	gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_ENABLED));
	return 0;
	}

	err = gpgsm_dirmngr_isvalid (ctrl,
	subject_cert, issuer_cert,
	force_ocsp? 2 : !!ctrl->use_ocsp);
	audit_log_ok (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CRL_CHECK, err);

	if (err)
	{
	if (!lm)
	gpgsm_cert_log_name (NULL, subject_cert);
	switch (gpg_err_code (err))
	{
	case GPG_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
	do_list (1, lm, fp, _("certificate has been revoked"));
	*any_revoked = 1;
	/* Store that in the keybox so that key listings are able to
	return the revoked flag. We don't care about error,
	though. */
	keydb_set_cert_flags (ctrl, subject_cert, 1, KEYBOX_FLAG_VALIDITY, 0,
	~0, VALIDITY_REVOKED);
	break;

	case GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN:
	do_list (1, lm, fp, _("no CRL found for certificate"));
	*any_no_crl = 1;
	break;

	case GPG_ERR_NO_DATA:
	do_list (1, lm, fp, _("the status of the certificate is unknown"));
	*any_no_crl = 1;
	break;

	case GPG_ERR_CRL_TOO_OLD:
	do_list (1, lm, fp, _("the available CRL is too old"));
	if (!lm)
	log_info (_("please make sure that the "
	"\"dirmngr\" is properly installed\n"));
	*any_crl_too_old = 1;
	break;

	default:
	do_list (1, lm, fp, _("checking the CRL failed: %s"),
	gpg_strerror (err));
	return err;
	}
	}
	return 0;
	}


	/* Helper for gpgsm_validate_chain to check the validity period of
	SUBJECT_CERT. The caller needs to pass EXPTIME which will be
	updated to the nearest expiration time seen. A DEPTH of 0 indicates
	- the target certifciate, -1 the final root certificate and other
	+ the target certificate, -1 the final root certificate and other
	values intermediate certificates. */
	static gpg_error_t
	check_validity_period (ksba_isotime_t current_time,
	ksba_cert_t subject_cert,
	ksba_isotime_t exptime,
	int listmode, estream_t listfp, int depth)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	ksba_isotime_t not_before, not_after;

	err = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 0, not_before);
	if (!err)
	err = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 1, not_after);
	if (err)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	_("certificate with invalid validity: %s"), gpg_strerror (err));
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	}

	if (*not_after)
	{
	if (!*exptime)
	gnupg_copy_time (exptime, not_after);
	else if (strcmp (not_after, exptime) < 0 )
	gnupg_copy_time (exptime, not_after);
	}

	if (*not_before && strcmp (current_time, not_before) < 0 )
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	depth == 0 ? _("certificate not yet valid") :
	depth == -1 ? _("root certificate not yet valid") :
	/* other */ _("intermediate certificate not yet valid"));
	if (!listmode)
	{
	log_info (" (valid from ");
	dump_isotime (not_before);
	log_printf (")\n");
	}
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_TOO_YOUNG);
	}

	if (*not_after && strcmp (current_time, not_after) > 0 )
	{
	do_list (opt.ignore_expiration?0:1, listmode, listfp,
	depth == 0 ? _("certificate has expired") :
	depth == -1 ? _("root certificate has expired") :
	/* other */ _("intermediate certificate has expired"));
	if (!listmode)
	{
	log_info (" (expired at ");
	dump_isotime (not_after);
	log_printf (")\n");
	}
	if (opt.ignore_expiration)
	log_info ("WARNING: ignoring expiration\n");
	else
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED);
	}

	return 0;
	}

	/* This is a variant of check_validity_period used with the chain
	model. The dextra contraint here is that notBefore and notAfter
	must exists and if the additional argument CHECK_TIME is given this
	time is used to check the validity period of SUBJECT_CERT. */
	static gpg_error_t
	check_validity_period_cm (ksba_isotime_t current_time,
	ksba_isotime_t check_time,
	ksba_cert_t subject_cert,
	ksba_isotime_t exptime,
	int listmode, estream_t listfp, int depth)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	ksba_isotime_t not_before, not_after;

	err = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 0, not_before);
	if (!err)
	err = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 1, not_after);
	if (err)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	_("certificate with invalid validity: %s"), gpg_strerror (err));
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	}
	if (!not_before \|\| !not_after)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	_("required certificate attributes missing: %s%s%s"),
	!*not_before? "notBefore":"",
	(!not_before && !not_after)? ", ":"",
	!*not_before? "notAfter":"");
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	}
	if (strcmp (not_before, not_after) > 0 )
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	_("certificate with invalid validity"));
	log_info (" (valid from ");
	dump_isotime (not_before);
	log_printf (" expired at ");
	dump_isotime (not_after);
	log_printf (")\n");
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	}

	if (!*exptime)
	gnupg_copy_time (exptime, not_after);
	else if (strcmp (not_after, exptime) < 0 )
	gnupg_copy_time (exptime, not_after);

	if (strcmp (current_time, not_before) < 0 )
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	depth == 0 ? _("certificate not yet valid") :
	depth == -1 ? _("root certificate not yet valid") :
	/* other */ _("intermediate certificate not yet valid"));
	if (!listmode)
	{
	log_info (" (valid from ");
	dump_isotime (not_before);
	log_printf (")\n");
	}
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_TOO_YOUNG);
	}

	if (*check_time
	&& (strcmp (check_time, not_before) < 0
	\|\| strcmp (check_time, not_after) > 0))
	{
	/* Note that we don't need a case for the root certificate
	because its own consitency has already been checked. */
	do_list(opt.ignore_expiration?0:1, listmode, listfp,
	depth == 0 ?
	_("signature not created during lifetime of certificate") :
	depth == 1 ?
	_("certificate not created during lifetime of issuer") :
	_("intermediate certificate not created during lifetime "
	"of issuer"));
	if (!listmode)
	{
	log_info (depth== 0? _(" ( signature created at ") :
	/* */ _(" (certificate created at ") );
	dump_isotime (check_time);
	log_printf (")\n");
	log_info (depth==0? _(" (certificate valid from ") :
	/* */ _(" ( issuer valid from ") );
	dump_isotime (not_before);
	log_info (" to ");
	dump_isotime (not_after);
	log_printf (")\n");
	}
	if (opt.ignore_expiration)
	log_info ("WARNING: ignoring expiration\n");
	else
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED);
	}

	return 0;
	}



	/* Ask the user whether he wants to mark the certificate CERT trusted.
	Returns true if the CERT is the trusted. We also check whether the
	agent is at all enabled to allow marktrusted and don't call it in
	this session again if it is not. */
	static int
	ask_marktrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode)
	{
	static int no_more_questions;
	int rc;
	char *fpr;
	int success = 0;

	fpr = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
	log_info (_("fingerprint=%s\n"), fpr? fpr : "?");
	xfree (fpr);

	if (no_more_questions)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
	else
	rc = gpgsm_agent_marktrusted (ctrl, cert);
	if (!rc)
	{
	log_info (_("root certificate has now been marked as trusted\n"));
	success = 1;
	}
	else if (!listmode)
	{
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("issuer", cert);
	log_info ("after checking the fingerprint, you may want "
	"to add it manually to the list of trusted certificates.\n");
	}

	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED)
	{
	if (!no_more_questions)
	log_info (_("interactive marking as trusted "
	"not enabled in gpg-agent\n"));
	no_more_questions = 1;
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED)
	{
	log_info (_("interactive marking as trusted "
	"disabled for this session\n"));
	no_more_questions = 1;
	}
	else
	set_already_asked_marktrusted (cert);

	return success;
	}




	/* Validate a chain and optionally return the nearest expiration time
	in R_EXPTIME. With LISTMODE set to 1 a special listmode is
	activated where only information about the certificate is printed
	to LISTFP and no output is send to the usual log stream. If
	CHECKTIME_ARG is set, it is used only in the chain model instead of the
	current time.

	Defined flag bits

	VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR - Do not do any dirmngr isvalid checks.
	VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL - Check according to chain model.
	VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED - Check according to the STEED model.
	*/
	static int
	do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
	ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
	int listmode, estream_t listfp, unsigned int flags,
	struct rootca_flags_s *rootca_flags)
	{
	int rc = 0, depth, maxdepth;
	char *issuer = NULL;
	char *subject = NULL;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kh = NULL;
	ksba_cert_t subject_cert = NULL, issuer_cert = NULL;
	ksba_isotime_t current_time;
	ksba_isotime_t check_time;
	ksba_isotime_t exptime;
	int any_expired = 0;
	int any_revoked = 0;
	int any_no_crl = 0;
	int any_crl_too_old = 0;
	int any_no_policy_match = 0;
	int is_qualified = -1; /* Indicates whether the certificate stems
	from a qualified root certificate.
	-1 = unknown, 0 = no, 1 = yes. */
	chain_item_t chain = NULL; /* A list of all certificates in the chain. */


	gnupg_get_isotime (current_time);
	+ gnupg_copy_time (ctrl->current_time, current_time);

	if ( (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL) )
	{
	if (!strcmp (checktime_arg, "19700101T000000"))
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	_("WARNING: creation time of signature not known - "
	"assuming current time"));
	gnupg_copy_time (check_time, current_time);
	}
	else
	gnupg_copy_time (check_time, checktime_arg);
	}
	else
	*check_time = 0;

	if (r_exptime)
	*r_exptime = 0;
	*exptime = 0;

	if (opt.no_chain_validation && !listmode)
	{
	log_info ("WARNING: bypassing certificate chain validation\n");
	return 0;
	}

	kh = keydb_new ();
	if (!kh)
	{
	log_error (_("failed to allocate keyDB handle\n"));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	goto leave;
	}

	if (DBG_X509 && !listmode)
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("target", cert);

	subject_cert = cert;
	ksba_cert_ref (subject_cert);
	maxdepth = 50;
	depth = 0;

	for (;;)
	{
	int is_root;
	gpg_error_t istrusted_rc = -1;

	/* Put the certificate on our list. */
	{
	chain_item_t ci;

	ci = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ci);
	if (!ci)
	{
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	goto leave;
	}
	ksba_cert_ref (subject_cert);
	ci->cert = subject_cert;
	ci->next = chain;
	chain = ci;
	}

	xfree (issuer);
	xfree (subject);
	issuer = ksba_cert_get_issuer (subject_cert, 0);
	subject = ksba_cert_get_subject (subject_cert, 0);

	if (!issuer)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp, _("no issuer found in certificate"));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}


	/* Is this a self-issued certificate (i.e. the root certificate)? */
	is_root = is_root_cert (subject_cert, issuer, subject);
	if (is_root)
	{
	chain->is_root = 1;
	/* Check early whether the certificate is listed as trusted.
	We used to do this only later but changed it to call the
	check right here so that we can access special flags
	associated with that specific root certificate. */
	if (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (subject_cert))
	{
	memset (rootca_flags, 0, sizeof *rootca_flags);
	istrusted_rc = ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)
	? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED));
	}
	else
	istrusted_rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted (ctrl, subject_cert, NULL,
	rootca_flags);
	audit_log_cert (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_ROOT_TRUSTED,
	subject_cert, istrusted_rc);
	/* If the chain model extended attribute is used, make sure
	that our chain model flag is set. */
	if (!(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)
	&& has_validation_model_chain (subject_cert, listmode, listfp))
	rootca_flags->chain_model = 1;
	}


	/* Check the validity period. */
	if ( (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL) )
	rc = check_validity_period_cm (current_time, check_time, subject_cert,
	exptime, listmode, listfp,
	(depth && is_root)? -1: depth);
	else
	rc = check_validity_period (current_time, subject_cert,
	exptime, listmode, listfp,
	(depth && is_root)? -1: depth);
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED)
	any_expired = 1;
	else if (rc)
	goto leave;


	/* Assert that we understand all critical extensions. */
	rc = unknown_criticals (subject_cert, listmode, listfp);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	/* Do a policy check. */
	if (!opt.no_policy_check)
	{
	rc = check_cert_policy (subject_cert, listmode, listfp);
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH)
	{
	any_no_policy_match = 1;
	rc = 1; /* Be on the safe side and set RC. */
	}
	else if (rc)
	goto leave;
	}


	/* If this is the root certificate we are at the end of the chain. */
	if (is_root)
	{
	if (!istrusted_rc)
	; /* No need to check the certificate for a trusted one. */
	else if (gpgsm_check_cert_sig (subject_cert, subject_cert) )
	{
	/* We only check the signature if the certificate is not
	trusted for better diagnostics. */
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	_("self-signed certificate has a BAD signature"));
	if (DBG_X509)
	{
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("self-signing cert", subject_cert);
	}
	rc = gpg_error (depth? GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN
	: GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}
	if (!rootca_flags->relax)
	{
	rc = allowed_ca (ctrl, subject_cert, NULL, listmode, listfp);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;
	}


	/* Set the flag for qualified signatures. This flag is
	deduced from a list of root certificates allowed for
	qualified signatures. */
	if (is_qualified == -1 && !(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	size_t buflen;
	char buf[1];

	if (!ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "is_qualified",
	&buf, sizeof (buf),
	&buflen) && buflen)
	{
	/* We already checked this for this certificate,
	thus we simply take it from the user data. */
	is_qualified = !!*buf;
	}
	else
	{
	/* Need to consult the list of root certificates for
	qualified signatures. */
	err = gpgsm_is_in_qualified_list (ctrl, subject_cert, NULL);
	if (!err)
	is_qualified = 1;
	else if ( gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	is_qualified = 0;
	else
	log_error ("checking the list of qualified "
	"root certificates failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	if ( is_qualified != -1 )
	{
	/* Cache the result but don't care too much
	about an error. */
	buf[0] = !!is_qualified;
	err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (subject_cert,
	"is_qualified", buf, 1);
	if (err)
	log_error ("set_user_data(is_qualified) failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	}
	}
	}


	/* Act on the check for a trusted root certificates. */
	rc = istrusted_rc;
	if (!rc)
	;
	else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED)
	{
	do_list (0, listmode, listfp,
	_("root certificate is not marked trusted"));
	/* If we already figured out that the certificate is
	expired it does not make much sense to ask the user
	- whether we wants to trust the root certificate. We
	+ whether they want to trust the root certificate. We
	should do this only if the certificate under question
	will then be usable. If the certificate has a well
	known private key asking the user does not make any
	sense. */
	if ( !any_expired
	&& !gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (subject_cert)
	&& (!listmode \|\| !already_asked_marktrusted (subject_cert))
	&& ask_marktrusted (ctrl, subject_cert, listmode) )
	rc = 0;
	}
	else
	{
	log_error (_("checking the trust list failed: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	}

	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	/* Check for revocations etc. */
	if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR))
	;
	else if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
	; /* Fixme: check revocations via DNS. */
	else if (opt.no_trusted_cert_crl_check \|\| rootca_flags->relax)
	;
	else
	rc = is_cert_still_valid (ctrl,
	(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL),
	listmode, listfp,
	subject_cert, subject_cert,
	&any_revoked, &any_no_crl,
	&any_crl_too_old);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	break; /* Okay: a self-signed certicate is an end-point. */
	} /* End is_root. */


	/* Take care that the chain does not get too long. */
	if ((depth+1) > maxdepth)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp, _("certificate chain too long\n"));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN);
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Find the next cert up the tree. */
	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	rc = find_up (ctrl, kh, subject_cert, issuer, 0);
	if (rc)
	{
	if (rc == -1)
	{
	do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("issuer certificate not found"));
	if (!listmode)
	{
	log_info ("issuer certificate: #/");
	gpgsm_dump_string (issuer);
	log_printf ("\n");
	}
	}
	else
	log_error ("failed to find issuer's certificate: rc=%d\n", rc);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_ISSUER_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}

	ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert); issuer_cert = NULL;
	rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &issuer_cert);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_cert() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	goto leave;
	}

	try_another_cert:
	if (DBG_X509)
	{
	log_debug ("got issuer's certificate:\n");
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("issuer", issuer_cert);
	}

	rc = gpgsm_check_cert_sig (issuer_cert, subject_cert);
	if (rc)
	{
	do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("certificate has a BAD signature"));
	if (DBG_X509)
	{
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("signing issuer", issuer_cert);
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("signed subject", subject_cert);
	}
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
	{
	/* We now try to find other issuer certificates which
	might have been used. This is required because some
	CAs are reusing the issuer and subject DN for new
	root certificates. */
	/* FIXME: Do this only if we don't have an
	AKI.keyIdentifier */
	rc = find_up (ctrl, kh, subject_cert, issuer, 1);
	if (!rc)
	{
	ksba_cert_t tmp_cert;

	rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &tmp_cert);
	if (rc \|\| !compare_certs (issuer_cert, tmp_cert))
	{
	/* The find next did not work or returned an
	identical certificate. We better stop here
	to avoid infinite checks. */
	/* No need to set RC because it is not used:
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE); */
	ksba_cert_release (tmp_cert);
	}
	else
	{
	do_list (0, listmode, listfp,
	_("found another possible matching "
	"CA certificate - trying again"));
	ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
	issuer_cert = tmp_cert;
	goto try_another_cert;
	}
	}
	}

	/* We give a more descriptive error code than the one
	returned from the signature checking. */
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN);
	goto leave;
	}

	is_root = gpgsm_is_root_cert (issuer_cert);
	istrusted_rc = -1;


	/* Check that a CA is allowed to issue certificates. */
	{
	int chainlen;

	rc = allowed_ca (ctrl, issuer_cert, &chainlen, listmode, listfp);
	if (rc)
	{
	/* Not allowed. Check whether this is a trusted root
	certificate and whether we allow special exceptions.
	We could carry the result of the test over to the
	regular root check at the top of the loop but for
	clarity we won't do that. Given that the majority of
	certificates carry proper BasicContraints our way of
	overriding an error in the way is justified for
	performance reasons. */
	if (is_root)
	{
	if (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (issuer_cert))
	{
	memset (rootca_flags, 0, sizeof *rootca_flags);
	istrusted_rc = ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)
	? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED));
	}
	else
	istrusted_rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted
	(ctrl, issuer_cert, NULL, rootca_flags);

	if (!istrusted_rc && rootca_flags->relax)
	{
	/* Ignore the error due to the relax flag. */
	rc = 0;
	chainlen = -1;
	}
	}
	}
	if (rc)
	goto leave;
	if (chainlen >= 0 && depth > chainlen)
	{
	do_list (1, listmode, listfp,
	_("certificate chain longer than allowed by CA (%d)"),
	chainlen);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN);
	goto leave;
	}
	}

	/* Is the certificate allowed to sign other certificates. */
	if (!listmode)
	{
	rc = gpgsm_cert_use_cert_p (issuer_cert);
	if (rc)
	{
	char numbuf[50];
	sprintf (numbuf, "%d", rc);
	gpgsm_status2 (ctrl, STATUS_ERROR, "certcert.issuer.keyusage",
	numbuf, NULL);
	goto leave;
	}
	}

	/* Check for revocations etc. Note that for a root certificate
	this test is done a second time later. This should eventually
	be fixed. */
	if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR))
	rc = 0;
	else if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
	rc = 0; /* Fixme: XXX */
	else if (is_root && (opt.no_trusted_cert_crl_check
	\|\| (!istrusted_rc && rootca_flags->relax)))
	rc = 0;
	else
	rc = is_cert_still_valid (ctrl,
	(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL),
	listmode, listfp,
	subject_cert, issuer_cert,
	&any_revoked, &any_no_crl, &any_crl_too_old);
	if (rc)
	goto leave;


	if (opt.verbose && !listmode)
	log_info (depth == 0 ? _("certificate is good\n") :
	!is_root ? _("intermediate certificate is good\n") :
	/* other */ _("root certificate is good\n"));

	/* Under the chain model the next check time is the creation
	time of the subject certificate. */
	if ( (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL) )
	{
	rc = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 0, check_time);
	if (rc)
	{
	/* That will never happen as we have already checked
	this above. */
	BUG ();
	}
	}

	/* For the next round the current issuer becomes the new subject. */
	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	ksba_cert_release (subject_cert);
	subject_cert = issuer_cert;
	issuer_cert = NULL;
	depth++;
	} /* End chain traversal. */

	if (!listmode && !opt.quiet)
	{
	if (opt.no_policy_check)
	log_info ("policies not checked due to %s option\n",
	"--disable-policy-checks");
	if (ctrl->offline \|\| (opt.no_crl_check && !ctrl->use_ocsp))
	log_info ("CRLs not checked due to %s option\n",
	ctrl->offline ? "offline" : "--disable-crl-checks");
	}

	if (!rc)
	{ /* If we encountered an error somewhere during the checks, set
	the error code to the most critical one */
	if (any_revoked)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
	else if (any_expired)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED);
	else if (any_no_crl)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN);
	else if (any_crl_too_old)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CRL_TOO_OLD);
	else if (any_no_policy_match)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH);
	}

	leave:
	/* If we have traversed a complete chain up to the root we will
	reset the ephemeral flag for all these certificates. This is done
	regardless of any error because those errors may only be
	transient. */
	if (chain && chain->is_root)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	chain_item_t ci;

	for (ci = chain; ci; ci = ci->next)
	{
	/* Note that it is possible for the last certificate in the
	chain (i.e. our target certificate) that it has not yet
	been stored in the keybox and thus the flag can't be set.
	We ignore this error because it will later be stored
	anyway. */
	err = keydb_set_cert_flags (ctrl, ci->cert, 1, KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB, 0,
	KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_EPHEMERAL, 0);
	if (!ci->next && gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	;
	else if (err)
	log_error ("clearing ephemeral flag failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	}
	}

	/* If we have figured something about the qualified signature
	capability of the certificate under question, store the result as
	user data in all certificates of the chain. We do this even if the
	validation itself failed. */
	if (is_qualified != -1 && !(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	chain_item_t ci;
	char buf[1];

	buf[0] = !!is_qualified;

	for (ci = chain; ci; ci = ci->next)
	{
	err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (ci->cert, "is_qualified", buf, 1);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("set_user_data(is_qualified) failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	if (!rc)
	rc = err;
	}
	}
	}

	/* If auditing has been enabled, record what is in the chain. */
	if (ctrl->audit)
	{
	chain_item_t ci;

	audit_log (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CHAIN_BEGIN);
	for (ci = chain; ci; ci = ci->next)
	{
	audit_log_cert (ctrl->audit,
	ci->is_root? AUDIT_CHAIN_ROOTCERT : AUDIT_CHAIN_CERT,
	ci->cert, 0);
	}
	audit_log (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_CHAIN_END);
	}

	if (r_exptime)
	gnupg_copy_time (r_exptime, exptime);
	xfree (issuer);
	xfree (subject);
	keydb_release (kh);
	while (chain)
	{
	chain_item_t ci_next = chain->next;
	ksba_cert_release (chain->cert);
	xfree (chain);
	chain = ci_next;
	}
	ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
	ksba_cert_release (subject_cert);
	return rc;
	}


	/* Validate a certificate chain. For a description see
	do_validate_chain. This function is a wrapper to handle a root
	certificate with the chain_model flag set. If RETFLAGS is not
	NULL, flags indicating now the verification was done are stored
	there. The only defined vits for RETFLAGS are
	VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL and VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED.

	If you are verifying a signature you should set CHECKTIME to the
	creation time of the signature. If your are verifying a
	certificate, set it nil (i.e. the empty string). If the creation
	date of the signature is not known use the special date
	"19700101T000000" which is treated in a special way here. */
	int
	gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime,
	ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
	int listmode, estream_t listfp, unsigned int flags,
	unsigned int *retflags)
	{
	int rc;
	struct rootca_flags_s rootca_flags;
	unsigned int dummy_retflags;

	if (!retflags)
	retflags = &dummy_retflags;

	/* If the session requested a certain validation mode make sure the
	corresponding flags are set. */
	if (ctrl->validation_model == 1)
	flags \|= VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL;
	else if (ctrl->validation_model == 2)
	flags \|= VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED;

	/* If the chain model was forced, set this immediately into
	RETFLAGS. */
	*retflags = (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL);

	memset (&rootca_flags, 0, sizeof rootca_flags);

	rc = do_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, checktime,
	r_exptime, listmode, listfp, flags,
	&rootca_flags);
	if (!rc && (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
	{
	*retflags \|= VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED;
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED
	&& !(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL)
	&& (rootca_flags.valid && rootca_flags.chain_model))
	{
	do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("switching to chain model"));
	rc = do_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, checktime,
	r_exptime, listmode, listfp,
	(flags \|= VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL),
	&rootca_flags);
	*retflags \|= VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL;
	}

	if (opt.verbose)
	do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("validation model used: %s"),
	(*retflags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)?
	"steed" :
	(*retflags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL)?
	_("chain"):_("shell"));

	return rc;
	}


	/* Check that the given certificate is valid but DO NOT check any
	constraints. We assume that the issuers certificate is already in
	the DB and that this one is valid; which it should be because it
	has been checked using this function. */
	int
	gpgsm_basic_cert_check (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	char *issuer = NULL;
	char *subject = NULL;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kh;
	ksba_cert_t issuer_cert = NULL;

	if (opt.no_chain_validation)
	{
	log_info ("WARNING: bypassing basic certificate checks\n");
	return 0;
	}

	kh = keydb_new ();
	if (!kh)
	{
	log_error (_("failed to allocate keyDB handle\n"));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	goto leave;
	}

	issuer = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert, 0);
	subject = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, 0);
	if (!issuer)
	{
	log_error ("no issuer found in certificate\n");
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}

	if (is_root_cert (cert, issuer, subject))
	{
	rc = gpgsm_check_cert_sig (cert, cert);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("self-signed certificate has a BAD signature: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	if (DBG_X509)
	{
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("self-signing cert", cert);
	}
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	/* Find the next cert up the tree. */
	keydb_search_reset (kh);
	rc = find_up (ctrl, kh, cert, issuer, 0);
	if (rc)
	{
	if (rc == -1)
	{
	log_info ("issuer certificate (#/");
	gpgsm_dump_string (issuer);
	log_printf (") not found\n");
	}
	else
	log_error ("failed to find issuer's certificate: rc=%d\n", rc);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_ISSUER_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}

	ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert); issuer_cert = NULL;
	rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &issuer_cert);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_cert() failed: rc=%d\n", rc);
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
	goto leave;
	}

	rc = gpgsm_check_cert_sig (issuer_cert, cert);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("certificate has a BAD signature: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	if (DBG_X509)
	{
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("signing issuer", issuer_cert);
	gpgsm_dump_cert ("signed subject", cert);
	}
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT);
	goto leave;
	}
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("certificate is good\n"));
	}

	leave:
	xfree (issuer);
	xfree (subject);
	keydb_release (kh);
	ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
	return rc;
	}



	/* Check whether the certificate CERT has been issued by the German
	authority for qualified signature. They do not set the
	basicConstraints and thus we need this workaround. It works by
	looking up the root certificate and checking whether that one is
	listed as a qualified certificate for Germany.

	We also try to cache this data but as long as don't keep a
	reference to the certificate this won't be used.

	Returns: True if CERT is a RegTP issued CA cert (i.e. the root
	certificate itself or one of the CAs). In that case CHAINLEN will
	receive the length of the chain which is either 0 or 1.
	*/
	static int
	get_regtp_ca_info (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int *chainlen)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	ksba_cert_t next;
	int rc = 0;
	int i, depth;
	char country[3];
	ksba_cert_t array[4];
	char buf[2];
	size_t buflen;
	int dummy_chainlen;

	if (!chainlen)
	chainlen = &dummy_chainlen;

	*chainlen = 0;
	err = ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "regtp_ca_chainlen",
	&buf, sizeof (buf), &buflen);
	if (!err)
	{
	/* Got info. */
	if (buflen < 2 \|\| !*buf)
	return 0; /* Nothing found. */
	*chainlen = buf[1];
	return 1; /* This is a regtp CA. */
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	log_error ("ksba_cert_get_user_data(%s) failed: %s\n",
	"regtp_ca_chainlen", gpg_strerror (err));
	return 0; /* Nothing found. */
	}

	/* Need to gather the info. This requires to walk up the chain
	until we have found the root. Because we are only interested in
	German Bundesnetzagentur (former RegTP) derived certificates 3
	levels are enough. (The German signature law demands a 3 tier
	hierarchy; thus there is only one CA between the EE and the Root
	CA.) */
	memset (&array, 0, sizeof array);

	depth = 0;
	ksba_cert_ref (cert);
	array[depth++] = cert;
	ksba_cert_ref (cert);
	while (depth < DIM(array) && !(rc=gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl, cert, &next)))
	{
	ksba_cert_release (cert);
	ksba_cert_ref (next);
	array[depth++] = next;
	cert = next;
	}
	ksba_cert_release (cert);
	if (rc != -1 \|\| !depth \|\| depth == DIM(array) )
	{
	/* We did not reached the root. */
	goto leave;
	}

	/* If this is a German signature law issued certificate, we store
	additional information. */
	if (!gpgsm_is_in_qualified_list (NULL, array[depth-1], country)
	&& !strcmp (country, "de"))
	{
	/* Setting the pathlen for the root CA and the CA flag for the
	next one is all what we need to do. */
	err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (array[depth-1], "regtp_ca_chainlen",
	"\x01\x01", 2);
	if (!err && depth > 1)
	err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (array[depth-2], "regtp_ca_chainlen",
	"\x01\x00", 2);
	if (err)
	log_error ("ksba_set_user_data(%s) failed: %s\n",
	"regtp_ca_chainlen", gpg_strerror (err));
	for (i=0; i < depth; i++)
	ksba_cert_release (array[i]);
	*chainlen = (depth>1? 0:1);
	return 1;
	}

	leave:
	/* Nothing special with this certificate. Mark the target
	certificate anyway to avoid duplicate lookups. */
	err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (cert, "regtp_ca_chainlen", "", 1);
	if (err)
	log_error ("ksba_set_user_data(%s) failed: %s\n",
	"regtp_ca_chainlen", gpg_strerror (err));
	for (i=0; i < depth; i++)
	ksba_cert_release (array[i]);
	return 0;
	}
	diff --git a/sm/gpgsm.h b/sm/gpgsm.h
	index 0ce96ff55..addd857b1 100644
	--- a/sm/gpgsm.h
	+++ b/sm/gpgsm.h
	@@ -1,437 +1,440 @@
	/* gpgsm.h - Global definitions for GpgSM
	* Copyright (C) 2001, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2009,
	* 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#ifndef GPGSM_H
	#define GPGSM_H

	#ifdef GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT
	#error GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT already defined
	#endif
	#define GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT GPG_ERR_SOURCE_GPGSM
	#include <gpg-error.h>


	#include <ksba.h>
	#include "../common/util.h"
	#include "../common/status.h"
	#include "../common/audit.h"
	#include "../common/session-env.h"
	#include "../common/ksba-io-support.h"
	#include "../common/compliance.h"


	#define MAX_DIGEST_LEN 64

	struct keyserver_spec
	{
	struct keyserver_spec *next;

	char *host;
	int port;
	char *user;
	char *pass;
	char *base;
	};


	/* A large struct named "opt" to keep global flags. */
	struct
	{
	unsigned int debug; /* debug flags (DBG_foo_VALUE) */
	int verbose; /* verbosity level */
	int quiet; /* be as quiet as possible */
	int batch; /* run in batch mode, i.e w/o any user interaction */
	int answer_yes; /* assume yes on most questions */
	int answer_no; /* assume no on most questions */
	int dry_run; /* don't change any persistent data */
	int no_homedir_creation;

	const char config_filename; / Name of the used config file. */
	const char *agent_program;

	session_env_t session_env;
	char *lc_ctype;
	char *lc_messages;

	int autostart;
	const char *dirmngr_program;
	int disable_dirmngr; /* Do not do any dirmngr calls. */
	const char *protect_tool_program;
	char outfile; / name of output file */

	int with_key_data;/* include raw key in the column delimted output */

	int fingerprint; /* list fingerprints in all key listings */

	int with_md5_fingerprint; /* Also print an MD5 fingerprint for
	standard key listings. */

	int with_keygrip; /* Option --with-keygrip active. */

	int pinentry_mode;
	int request_origin;

	int armor; /* force base64 armoring (see also ctrl.with_base64) */
	int no_armor; /* don't try to figure out whether data is base64 armored*/

	const char p12_charset; / Use this charset for encoding the
	pkcs#12 passphrase. */


	const char def_cipher_algoid; / cipher algorithm to use if
	nothing else is specified */

	int def_compress_algo; /* Ditto for compress algorithm */

	int forced_digest_algo; /* User forced hash algorithm. */

	char def_recipient; / userID of the default recipient */
	int def_recipient_self; /* The default recipient is the default key */

	int no_encrypt_to; /* Ignore all as encrypt to marked recipients. */

	char local_user; / NULL or argument to -u */

	int extra_digest_algo; /* A digest algorithm also used for
	verification of signatures. */

	int always_trust; /* Trust the given keys even if there is no
	valid certification chain */
	int skip_verify; /* do not check signatures on data */

	int lock_once; /* Keep lock once they are set */

	int ignore_time_conflict; /* Ignore certain time conflicts */

	int no_crl_check; /* Don't do a CRL check */
	int no_trusted_cert_crl_check; /* Don't run a CRL check for trusted certs. */
	int force_crl_refresh; /* Force refreshing the CRL. */
	int enable_ocsp; /* Default to use OCSP checks. */

	char policy_file; / full pathname of policy file */
	int no_policy_check; /* ignore certificate policies */
	int no_chain_validation; /* Bypass all cert chain validity tests */
	int ignore_expiration; /* Ignore the notAfter validity checks. */

	int auto_issuer_key_retrieve; /* try to retrieve a missing issuer key. */

	int qualsig_approval; /* Set to true if this software has
	officially been approved to create an
	verify qualified signatures. This is a
	runtime option in case we want to check
	the integrity of the software at
	runtime. */

	struct keyserver_spec *keyserver;

	/* A list of certificate extension OIDs which are ignored so that
	one can claim that a critical extension has been handled. One
	OID per string. */
	strlist_t ignored_cert_extensions;

	enum gnupg_compliance_mode compliance;
	} opt;

	/* Debug values and macros. */
	#define DBG_X509_VALUE 1 /* debug x.509 data reading/writing */
	#define DBG_MPI_VALUE 2 /* debug mpi details */
	#define DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE 4 /* debug low level crypto */
	#define DBG_MEMORY_VALUE 32 /* debug memory allocation stuff */
	#define DBG_CACHE_VALUE 64 /* debug the caching */
	#define DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE 128 /* show memory statistics */
	#define DBG_HASHING_VALUE 512 /* debug hashing operations */
	#define DBG_IPC_VALUE 1024 /* debug assuan communication */

	#define DBG_X509 (opt.debug & DBG_X509_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CRYPTO (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE)
	#define DBG_MEMORY (opt.debug & DBG_MEMORY_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CACHE (opt.debug & DBG_CACHE_VALUE)
	#define DBG_HASHING (opt.debug & DBG_HASHING_VALUE)
	#define DBG_IPC (opt.debug & DBG_IPC_VALUE)

	/* Forward declaration for an object defined in server.c */
	struct server_local_s;

	/* Session control object. This object is passed down to most
	functions. Note that the default values for it are set by
	gpgsm_init_default_ctrl(). */
	struct server_control_s
	{
	int no_server; /* We are not running under server control */
	int status_fd; /* Only for non-server mode */
	struct server_local_s *server_local;

	audit_ctx_t audit; /* NULL or a context for the audit subsystem. */
	int agent_seen; /* Flag indicating that the gpg-agent has been
	accessed. */

	int with_colons; /* Use column delimited output format */
	int with_secret; /* Mark secret keys in a public key listing. */
	int with_chain; /* Include the certifying certs in a listing */
	int with_validation;/* Validate each key while listing. */
	int with_ephemeral_keys; /* Include ephemeral flagged keys in the
	keylisting. */

	int autodetect_encoding; /* Try to detect the input encoding */
	int is_pem; /* Is in PEM format */
	int is_base64; /* is in plain base-64 format */

	int create_base64; /* Create base64 encoded output */
	int create_pem; /* create PEM output */
	const char pem_name; / PEM name to use */

	int include_certs; /* -1 to send all certificates in the chain
	along with a signature or the number of
	certificates up the chain (0 = none, 1 = only
	signer) */
	int use_ocsp; /* Set to true if OCSP should be used. */
	int validation_model; /* 0 := standard model (shell),
	1 := chain model,
	2 := STEED model. */
	int offline; /* If true gpgsm won't do any network access. */
	+
	+ /* The current time. Used as a helper in certchain.c. */
	+ ksba_isotime_t current_time;
	};


	/* An object to keep a list of certificates. */
	struct certlist_s
	{
	struct certlist_s *next;
	ksba_cert_t cert;
	int is_encrypt_to; /* True if the certificate has been set through
	the --encrypto-to option. */
	int hash_algo; /* Used to track the hash algorithm to use. */
	const char hash_algo_oid; / And the corresponding OID. */
	};
	typedef struct certlist_s *certlist_t;


	/* A structure carrying information about trusted root certificates. */
	struct rootca_flags_s
	{
	unsigned int valid:1; /* The rest of the structure has valid
	information. */
	unsigned int relax:1; /* Relax checking of root certificates. */
	unsigned int chain_model:1; /* Root requires the use of the chain model. */
	};



	/-- gpgsm.c --/
	void gpgsm_exit (int rc);
	void gpgsm_init_default_ctrl (struct server_control_s *ctrl);
	int gpgsm_parse_validation_model (const char *model);

	/-- server.c --/
	void gpgsm_server (certlist_t default_recplist);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_status (ctrl_t ctrl, int no, const char *text);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_status2 (ctrl_t ctrl, int no, ...) GPGRT_ATTR_SENTINEL(0);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_status_with_err_code (ctrl_t ctrl, int no, const char *text,
	gpg_err_code_t ec);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_status_with_error (ctrl_t ctrl, int no, const char *text,
	gpg_error_t err);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_proxy_pinentry_notify (ctrl_t ctrl,
	const unsigned char *line);

	/-- fingerprint --/
	unsigned char *gpgsm_get_fingerprint (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo,
	unsigned char array, int r_len);
	char *gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo);
	char *gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo);
	unsigned long gpgsm_get_short_fingerprint (ksba_cert_t cert,
	unsigned long *r_high);
	unsigned char gpgsm_get_keygrip (ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned char array);
	char *gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_get_key_algo_info (ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned int *nbits);
	char *gpgsm_get_certid (ksba_cert_t cert);


	/-- certdump.c --/
	void gpgsm_print_serial (estream_t fp, ksba_const_sexp_t p);
	void gpgsm_print_time (estream_t fp, ksba_isotime_t t);
	void gpgsm_print_name2 (FILE fp, const char string, int translate);
	void gpgsm_print_name (FILE fp, const char string);
	void gpgsm_es_print_name (estream_t fp, const char *string);
	void gpgsm_es_print_name2 (estream_t fp, const char *string, int translate);

	void gpgsm_cert_log_name (const char *text, ksba_cert_t cert);

	void gpgsm_dump_cert (const char *text, ksba_cert_t cert);
	void gpgsm_dump_serial (ksba_const_sexp_t p);
	void gpgsm_dump_time (ksba_isotime_t t);
	void gpgsm_dump_string (const char *string);

	char *gpgsm_format_serial (ksba_const_sexp_t p);
	char gpgsm_format_name2 (const char name, int translate);
	char gpgsm_format_name (const char name);
	char gpgsm_format_sn_issuer (ksba_sexp_t sn, const char issuer);

	char *gpgsm_fpr_and_name_for_status (ksba_cert_t cert);

	char *gpgsm_format_keydesc (ksba_cert_t cert);


	/-- certcheck.c --/
	int gpgsm_check_cert_sig (ksba_cert_t issuer_cert, ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_check_cms_signature (ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_const_sexp_t sigval,
	gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo, int *r_pkalgo);
	/* fixme: move create functions to another file */
	int gpgsm_create_cms_signature (ctrl_t ctrl,
	ksba_cert_t cert, gcry_md_hd_t md, int mdalgo,
	unsigned char **r_sigval);


	/-- certchain.c --/

	/* Flags used with gpgsm_validate_chain. */
	#define VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR 1
	#define VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL 2
	#define VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED 4

	int gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl,
	ksba_cert_t start, ksba_cert_t *r_next);
	int gpgsm_is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert,
	ksba_isotime_t checktime,
	ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
	int listmode, estream_t listfp,
	unsigned int flags, unsigned int *retflags);
	int gpgsm_basic_cert_check (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert);

	/-- certlist.c --/
	int gpgsm_cert_use_sign_p (ksba_cert_t cert, int silent);
	int gpgsm_cert_use_encrypt_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_cert_use_verify_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_cert_use_decrypt_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_cert_use_cert_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_cert_use_ocsp_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_certs_identical_p (ksba_cert_t cert_a, ksba_cert_t cert_b);
	int gpgsm_add_cert_to_certlist (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert,
	certlist_t *listaddr, int is_encrypt_to);
	int gpgsm_add_to_certlist (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, int secret,
	certlist_t *listaddr, int is_encrypt_to);
	void gpgsm_release_certlist (certlist_t list);
	int gpgsm_find_cert (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, ksba_sexp_t keyid,
	ksba_cert_t *r_cert, int allow_ambiguous);

	/-- keylist.c --/
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_list_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names,
	estream_t fp, unsigned int mode);

	/-- import.c --/
	int gpgsm_import (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, int reimport_mode);
	int gpgsm_import_files (ctrl_t ctrl, int nfiles, char **files,
	int (of)(const char fname));

	/-- export.c --/
	void gpgsm_export (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names, estream_t stream);
	void gpgsm_p12_export (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, estream_t stream,
	int rawmode);

	/-- delete.c --/
	int gpgsm_delete (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names);

	/-- verify.c --/
	int gpgsm_verify (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, int data_fd, estream_t out_fp);

	/-- sign.c --/
	int gpgsm_get_default_cert (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t *r_cert);
	int gpgsm_sign (ctrl_t ctrl, certlist_t signerlist,
	int data_fd, int detached, estream_t out_fp);

	/-- encrypt.c --/
	int gpgsm_encrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, certlist_t recplist,
	int in_fd, estream_t out_fp);

	/-- decrypt.c --/
	int gpgsm_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, estream_t out_fp);

	/-- certreqgen.c --/
	int gpgsm_genkey (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t in_stream, estream_t out_stream);

	/-- certreqgen-ui.c --/
	void gpgsm_gencertreq_tty (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t out_stream);


	/-- qualified.c --/
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_is_in_qualified_list (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert,
	char *country);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_qualified_consent (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_not_qualified_warning (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert);

	/-- call-agent.c --/
	int gpgsm_agent_pksign (ctrl_t ctrl, const char keygrip, const char desc,
	unsigned char *digest,
	size_t digestlen,
	int digestalgo,
	unsigned char *r_buf, size_t r_buflen);
	int gpgsm_scd_pksign (ctrl_t ctrl, const char keyid, const char desc,
	unsigned char *digest, size_t digestlen, int digestalgo,
	unsigned char *r_buf, size_t r_buflen);
	int gpgsm_agent_pkdecrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char keygrip, const char desc,
	ksba_const_sexp_t ciphertext,
	char *r_buf, size_t r_buflen);
	int gpgsm_agent_genkey (ctrl_t ctrl,
	ksba_const_sexp_t keyparms, ksba_sexp_t *r_pubkey);
	int gpgsm_agent_readkey (ctrl_t ctrl, int fromcard, const char *hexkeygrip,
	ksba_sexp_t *r_pubkey);
	int gpgsm_agent_scd_serialno (ctrl_t ctrl, char **r_serialno);
	int gpgsm_agent_scd_keypairinfo (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t *r_list);
	int gpgsm_agent_istrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, const char *hexfpr,
	struct rootca_flags_s *rootca_flags);
	int gpgsm_agent_havekey (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *hexkeygrip);
	int gpgsm_agent_marktrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert);
	int gpgsm_agent_learn (ctrl_t ctrl);
	int gpgsm_agent_passwd (ctrl_t ctrl, const char hexkeygrip, const char desc);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_get_confirmation (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_send_nop (ctrl_t ctrl);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_keyinfo (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *hexkeygrip,
	char **r_serialno);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_ask_passphrase (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_msg,
	int repeat, char **r_passphrase);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_keywrap_key (ctrl_t ctrl, int forexport,
	void *r_kek, size_t r_keklen);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_import_key (ctrl_t ctrl,
	const void *key, size_t keylen);
	gpg_error_t gpgsm_agent_export_key (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keygrip,
	const char *desc,
	unsigned char **r_result,
	size_t *r_resultlen);

	/-- call-dirmngr.c --/
	int gpgsm_dirmngr_isvalid (ctrl_t ctrl,
	ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_cert_t issuer_cert,
	int use_ocsp);
	int gpgsm_dirmngr_lookup (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names, int cache_only,
	void (cb)(void, ksba_cert_t), void *cb_value);
	int gpgsm_dirmngr_run_command (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *command,
	int argc, char **argv);


	/-- misc.c --/
	void setup_pinentry_env (void);
	gpg_error_t transform_sigval (const unsigned char *sigval, size_t sigvallen,
	int mdalgo,
	unsigned char **r_newsigval,
	size_t *r_newsigvallen);



	#endif /GPGSM_H/

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