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	diff --git a/web/faq/gnupg-faq.org b/web/faq/gnupg-faq.org
	index 16f6472..d62e270 100644
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	# gpgfaq.org -- coding: utf-8; --
	#+TITLE: GnuPG Frequently Asked Questions
	#+EMAIL: gnupg-doc@gnupg.org
	#+AUTHOR: Robert J. Hansen et al.
	#+LANGUAGE: en
	#+LINK: gnupgweb https://www.gnupg.org/
	#+LINK: roundup https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue
	#+OPTIONS: H:3 num:2 toc:nil \n:nil @:t ::t \|:t ^:{} -:t f:t *:t TeX:t LaTeX:t skip:nil d:nil tags:not-in-toc
	#+HTML_HEAD: <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="https://www.gnupg.org/share/site.css" />
	#+STARTUP: overview indent

	* Foreword
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: foreword
	:END:

	Welcome to the GnuPG Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)! Before we
	begin, there’s just a few things that need to be addressed. It’s
	regrettable these things have to be included, but society has become
	very litigious.


	** Trademark notice
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: trademarks
	:END:

	- Linux is a trademark of Linus Torvalds.
	+- GNU is a trademark of the Free Software Foundation.
	- Macintosh, OS X and Mac OS X are all trademarks of the Apple
	Corporation.
	- PGP is a trademark of Symantec Corporation.
	- Solaris is a trademark of Oracle Corporation.
	- UNIX is a trademark of The Open Group.
	- Windows is a trademark of the Microsoft Corporation.
	- Some cryptographic algorithms mentioned in this FAQ may be
	trademarked.

	The use of these, or any other, marks is solely for identification
	purposes.


	** Licensing
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: documentation_license
	:END:

	This document is © 2012-2015, Robert J. Hansen <[[mailto:rjh@sixdemonbag.org?subject=The%20GnuPG%20FAQ][rjh@sixdemonbag.org]]> and
	A.M. Kuchling <[[mailto:amk@amk.ca?subject=The%20GnuPG%20FAQ][amk@amk.ca]]>. You are free to make use of this document
	in accordance with the [[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/][Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0
	license]]; alternately, you may make use of it under terms of the
	GNU General Public License (version 3 or, at your discretion, any
	later version).
	#+HTML:<!--disable-copyright-footer-->


	** Disclaimer of liability
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: liability
	:END:

	Although the contents of this document are believed to be correct, the
	author(s) cannot promise it is error-free and cannot assume liability
	for any errors.

	# We want the TOC to appear after the foreword.
	#+TOC: headlines 2

	* Welcome
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: welcome
	:END:

	Welcome to the official GnuPG FAQ. Like all FAQs, this is a work in
	progress. If you have questions that you think should be on it but
	aren't, please feel free to email the FAQ maintainer (Rob Hansen,
	[[mailto:rjh@sixdemonbag.org?subject=The%20GnuPG%20FAQ][rjh@sixdemonbag.org]])
	or bring your suggestion up on GnuPG-Users.

	** Is this available in other languages?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM ID: translations
	:END:

	Thanks to the Free Software Foundation, this FAQ is also available in
	[[https://www.gnu.org/server/standards/translations/ru/gnupg/gnupg-faq.ru.html][Russian]].

	** How do I get help?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: gethelp
	:END:

	First, please don’t send emails directly to people in GnuPG. While we will
	try to help to people who send email directly to us, those emails quickly
	accumulate. Helping just six people a day can take an hour of time, and that's
	an hour less we have to work on making GnuPG better. Please reach out to the
	GnuPG community via the
	[[http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users][GnuPG-Users mailing list]],
	not individual people within
	GnuPG.

	Second, tell us your operating environment. Be as specific as possible.
	What operating system are you using? Which version of GnuPG are you using?
	Where did you get GnuPG from? If your problem is related to email, which email
	client are you using? Which version number? Is GnuPG supported natively, or
	is there a plugin? If so, what's the version number of that?

	Third, tell us your problem. Be as specific as possible.

	Do this, and you might be surprised at how quickly your problem is solved.
	An example of a good question would be, “I’m running GnuPG 1.4.14 on an
	Ubuntu 15.04 x64 box. I'm using Thunderbird with Enigmail. Everything was
	fine until I did a software update. Ever since then I can't use GnuPG with
	email. What happened?” This question gives us enough to work with, and in
	short order someone will have an answer for you.

	A bad question would be, “How do I uninstall GnuPG?” We can’t help you at all;
	you've not given us any of the information we need to answer your question.

	** Who maintains this FAQ?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: maintainer
	:END:

	[[mailto:rjh@sixdemonbag.org?subject%3DThe%20GnuPG%20FAQ][Rob Hansen]]. Please feel free to contact me should there be an
	error in this FAQ, whether typographical, grammatical, or factual.

	When writing, the editorial “we” refers to the general consensus of
	the GnuPG community. This consensus is hammered out on the GnuPG-Users
	mailing list. All members of the GnuPG community are invited to
	participate. Individual people within the community may give their
	own editorial comments: these will be set off by square brackets,
	italicized, and initialed by their author. The different editors are:

	- wk: Werner Koch <[[mailto:wk@gnupg.org?subject%3DThe%20GnuPG%20FAQ][wk@gnupg.org]]>
	- rjh: Robert J. Hansen <[[mailto:rjh@sixdemonbag.org?subject=The%20GnuPG%20FAQ][rjh@sixdemonbag.org]]>


	** Is this the official GnuPG FAQ?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: is_it_official
	:END:

	Yes.


	** When was this FAQ last checked for accuracy?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: last_checked
	:END:

	-February 2016.
	-
	+October 2017.

	* General questions
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: general
	:END:

	** What’s GnuPG?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: whats_gnupg
	:END:

	GnuPG is cryptographic software that helps people ensure the
	confidentiality, integrity and assurance of their data. Let’s try
	that again: GnuPG is…

	- /Cryptographic./ The word “cryptography” is derived from two Greek
	words, κρυπτός (pronounced “kryptos,” meaning “hidden”) and γράφω
	(pronounced “graphein,” meaning “writing”). Cryptography is the
	mathematical study of codes and ciphers.
	- /Software./ This one should already be obvious.
	- /Confidentiality./ No one except authorized parties should be able
	to read your data.
	- /Integrity./ It shouldn’t be possible to tamper with a message
	unnoticeably.
	- /Assurance./ An assurance is not a guarantee. There are no
	guarantees in life, and software is no different. An assurance just
	means there is good reason to be confident of something — here, it
	means that when GnuPG is correctly used, people may be confident the
	data is confidential and/or possesses integrity.

	GnuPG may be used by itself as a command-line application (i.e., to be
	run at a Terminal prompt or a Windows command prompt), or integrated
	into popular email clients. It’s also used by some instant messaging
	clients, such as Psi.


	** How do I pronounce GnuPG?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: pronunciation
	:END:

	“guh-NEW-pee-gee.”


	** Is it compatible with Symantec’s PGP?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: compatible
	:END:

	Largely, yes. It can be made to interoperate with anything from PGP
	5 and onwards, and has excellent interoperability with the most
	recent releases.


	** Which operating systems does it run on?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: oses
	:END:

	Too many to list! It’s known to run on Microsoft Windows, Mac OS X,
	the various free Unixes, AIX, Solaris, HPUX, OpenVMS, and more. People
	are even working on porting it to smartphones such as Android.


	** How much does it cost?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: free_as_in_beer
	:END:

	There is no fixed price. Many sites on the internet offer legal
	downloads of it for free.


	** From where can I download it…
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: get_gnupg
	:END:

	Lots of different places, but no one site hosts binaries for all
	operating systems.


	*** … for Microsoft Windows?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: get_gnupg_win32
	:END:

	A convenient Windows installer is available from [[http://www.gpg4win.org][GPG4WIN]].


	*** … for Mac OS X?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: get_gnupg_osx
	:END:

	The [[http://www.gpgtools.org][GPGtools project]] has everything needed to get started.
	However, GPGTools only offers GnuPG 2.0; if you want the latest-and-greatest 2.1, look
	at Patrick Brunschwig’s [[http://sourceforge.net/projects/gpgosx/][GnuPG for OS X]] project
	on SourceForge.


	*** … for Linux?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: get_gnupg_linux
	:END:

	The bad news is there is no single, consistent way to install GnuPG on
	Linux systems. The good news is that it’s usually installed by
	default, so nothing needs to be downloaded!


	+**** … for Android?
	+ :PROPERTIES:
	+ :CUSTOM_ID: get_gnupg_android
	+ :END:
	+
	+Both OpenKeychain and the Android Privacy Guard are available in the
	+Android app store.
	+
	**** … for Debian GNU/Linux or Ubuntu?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: get_gnupg_debian
	:END:

	At a terminal window type =sudo apt-get install gnupg2=.


	**** … for OpenSUSE?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: get_gnupg_opensuse
	:END:

	At a terminal window type =sudo zypper install gnupg2=.

	-installation.
	-

	**** … for Fedora, CentOS, or RHEL?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: get_gnupg_fedora
	:END:

	For Fedora 22 and later: at a terminal window type =sudo dnf install gnupg2=.

	For Fedora 21 and earlier, CentOS, or RHEL: at a terminal window type =sudo yum install gnupg2=.


	**** … for Slackware?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: get_gnupg_slack
	:END:

	Install the =gnupg= package for GnuPG 1.4, or the =gnupg2= package for
	GnuPG 2.0.


	**** … for Gentoo?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: get_gnupg_gentoo
	:END:

	To install GnuPG on Gentoo, run the following command as root:

	=emerge gnupg=

	The Gentoo documentation includes a [[http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/gnupg-user.xml][GnuPG User Guide]].


	*** … for FreeBSD?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: get_gnupg_freebsd
	:END:

	GnuPG is included in the ports collection. To install it, run the
	following commands as root:

	#+begin_example
	cd /usr/ports/security/gnupg
	make install clean
	#+end_example

	Alternatively, you can install GnuPG using a package manager:

	#+begin_example
	sudo pkg_add -r gnupg
	#+end_example

	*** … for VMS?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: get_gnupg_vms
	:END:

	A port to VMS is maintained by Steven M. Schweda at [[http://www.antinode.info/dec/sw/gnupg.html][antinode.info]].


	** Is there source code available for it?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: source_code
	:END:

	Yes! The person, business or group that provided you with the GnuPG
	binary is required to give you the source code upon your request.


	** What’s Free Software, and why does it matter?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: gpl
	:END:

	The word “free” should evoke ideas of liberty, not price. An awful
	-lot of the software industry does not respect your freedoms: your
	-freedom to use the software for any purpose, your freedom to study and
	-learn from how it works, your freedom to share it with others who
	+lot of the software industry does not <a href="https://gnu.org/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html">respect your freedoms</a>:
	+your freedom to use the software for any purpose, your freedom to study
	+and learn from how it works, your freedom to share it with others who
	might benefit from it, and more. Free Software is the antithesis of
	this: Free Software is meant to respect your rights. You may use the
	software for any purpose: you may inspect and modify the source code:
	you may share the software and/or your modifications with others.


	** How can I donate money to the GnuPG project?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: donate
	:END:

	The best way is to visit the [[https://gnupg.org/donate/][donation page]].


	** How can I help with GnuPG development?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: develop
	:END:

	Development discussion takes place on the gnupg-devel mailing list.
	Go to the [[https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/mailing-lists.en.html][GnuPG mailing list page]] for links to subscribe and to the
	list's archives.

	The [[https://bugs.gnupg.org/gnupg/][GnuPG project's bug tracker]] is also publicly available.



	* Where can I get more information?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: more_info
	:END:

	The good news is the internet is a treasure trove of information. The
	bad news is that the internet is a festering sewer of misinformation,
	conspiracy theories, and half-informed speculations all masquerading
	as informed commentary.

	The following mailing lists and web pages are generally known for
	having a strong signal-to-noise ratio. Nevertheless, we strongly urge
	you to keep a skeptical mind at all times.

	** Help! I lost my passphrase.
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: lost_passphrase
	:END:

	Unfortunately, we can’t help you. If you lose your passphrase, you’ll be
	unable to use that certificate to sign any new documents or decrypt any
	existing documents. You can still use it to verify signatures, though.
	(Technically you could encrypt documents, too, but without the passphrase
	there’s really not much point: how would you ever decrypt them?)

	If you can’t remember your passphrase, the best thing to do is use your
	pre-made revocation certificate to revoke your old certificate, upload the
	revocation to the keyserver network, and start anew with a fresh certificate.

	** How can I spot the charlatans?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: fraudsters
	:END:

	First, beware of all absolutes. Almost every question in either the
	fields of computer security or cryptography can honestly be answered
	with, “it depends.” Real experts will avoid giving blanket yes-or-no
	answers except to the simplest and most routine of questions. They
	will instead hem and haw and explain the several different factors
	that must be weighed. Hucksters will promise you absolute truth.

	Second, the experts really don’t care whether you take their advice.
	Hucksters often want to be seen as authorities, and if you fail to
	take their advice they may harangue you about how you’re taking
	chances with your data, how you’re acting irresponsibly, and so on.

	Third, experts genuinely don’t want you to trust them. An expert will
	instead point to the published literature (usually in a dead-tree
	edition with the imprimatur of a reputable publishing house) and tell
	you what the reference books say. They want you to trust the
	reference books, not them. Hucksters will go on about their extensive
	personal experience or refer to papers that have only ever been
	self-published on websites.

	Fourth, experts try not to scare people. The world is a scary enough
	place without it being made moreso. Hucksters will try to scare you,
	in order to keep you listening to them and dependent on them for
	information on how to be ‘safe.’

	Fifth, experts will quickly admit when they are wrong and give credit
	to the person bringing the error to their attention. Hucksters tend
	to take challenges as personal affronts.


	** What are some useful mailing lists?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: mailing_lists
	:END:

	There are many excellent mailing lists out there. The following is
	a list of just some of them that we’ve found to be high-quality.
	There are undoubtedly many more that we’ve missed.


	*** The GnuPG-Users mailing list
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: gnupg-users_list
	:END:


	- Subscribing :: visit the [[http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users][GnuPG-Users webpage]]
	- Unsubscribing :: see above
	- List moderator :: <[[mailto:gnupg-users-owner@gnupg.org?subject%3DThe%20GnuPG-Users%20list][gnupg-users-owner@gnupg.org]]>
	- Supports PGP/MIME? :: Yes
	- Languages supported :: English

	GnuPG-Users is home to the largest community of GnuPG users on the
	net. The list is very lightly moderated and somewhat freewheeling, but
	overall it has an excellent signal-to-noise ratio. The level of
	technical discussion is sometimes a little daunting for the newcomer,
	but on the whole it’s a wonderful resource.



	*** The Enigmail mailing list
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: enigmail_list
	:END:


	- Subscribing :: Visit the [[https://admin.hostpoint.ch/mailman/listinfo/enigmail-users_enigmail.net][Enigmail mailing list page]]
	- Unsubscribing :: See above
	- List moderator(s) ::
	- John Clizbe <[[mailto:john@enigmail.net?subject=The%20Enigmail%20list][john@enigmail.net]]>
	- Olav Seyfarth <[[mailto:olav@enigmail.net?subject=The%20Enigmail%20list][olav@enigmail.net]]>
	- Patrick Brunschwig <[[mailto:patrick@enigmail.net?subject=The%20Enigmail%20list][patrick@enigmail.net]]>
	- Ludwig Hügelschäfer <[[mailto:ludwig@enigmail.net?subject=The%20Enigmail%20list][ludwig@enigmail.net]]>
	- Daniele Raffo <[[mailto:dan@enigmail.net?subject=The%20Enigmail%20list][dan@enigmail.net]]>
	- Robert J. Hansen <[[mailto:rob@enigmail.net?subject=The%20Enigmail%20list][rob@enigmail.net]]>
	- Supports PGP/MIME :: Yes
	- Languages supported :: English, Deutsch, Schwyzerdütsch, Español

	Enigmail integrates GnuPG with [[http://www.getthunderbird.com][Mozilla Thunderbird]] and/or [[http://www.seamonkey-project.org/][Mozilla
	Seamonkey]]. It’s one of the most popular ways to use GnuPG, and the
	mailing list provides a friendly place to learn how it works and get
	started using it.

	The list is lightly moderated.


	*** PGP-Basics
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: pgp-basics_list
	:END:


	- Subscribing :: visit the [[http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/PGP-Basics][PGP-Basics webpage]]
	- Unsubscribing :: see above
	- List moderator :: Mike Daigle <[[mailto:mdaigle@gswot.org?subject=The%20PGP-Basics%20list][mdaigle@gswot.org]]>
	- Supports PGP/MIME :: No
	- Languages supported :: English

	PGP-Basics was established over a decade ago specifically to provide a
	communications security. The list is low-volume, lightly-moderated,
	place where newcomers to GnuPG and PGP could learn about
	and remarkably friendly to new users.


	*** PGPNET
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: pgpnet_list
	:END:


	- Subscribing :: visit the [[http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/PGPNET][PGPNET page]]
	- Unsubscribing :: see above
	- List moderator(s) :: Unknown
	- Supports PGP/MIME? :: No
	- Languages supported :: Unknown

	PGPNET exists to provide people with the opportunity to practice
	sending and receiving encrypted, signed, and encrypted-and-signed
	traffic in a group environment.



	** What are some useful webpages?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: webpages
	:END:

	As a general rule, the huckster quotient of webpages at-large is
	fairly high. That said, there are some web resources we recommend.
	They can be broken up into homepages for specific GnuPG-related
	projects, and sites of general interest.


	*** Where can I find the homepage for…
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: homepages
	:END:

	Many of the projects associated with GnuPG maintain their own
	websites. If you have problems with an associated project, please
	check their website first: they might be able to give you faster and
	better help than the GnuPG community can.


	**** … GnuPG?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: gnupg_homepage
	:END:

	GnuPG’s homepage can be found at [[https://www.gnupg.org][https://www.gnupg.org]]. It is also
	available in the [[https://torproject.org][Tor]] network as =ic6au7wa3f6naxjq.onion=.


	**** … Enigmail?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: enigmail_homepage
	:END:

	Enigmail, a plugin for Mozilla Thunderbird that adds strong GnuPG
	support, can be found at [[http://enigmail.net][http://enigmail.net]].


	**** … GPGTools?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: gpgtools_homepage
	:END:

	Mac OS X users may wish to visit the GPGTools project at
	[[http://www.gpgtools.org][http://www.gpgtools.org]].


	**** … GPG4WIN?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: gpg4win_homepage
	:END:

	GPG4WIN, the Windows port of GnuPG, maintains a homepage at
	[[http://www.gpg4win.org][http://www.gpg4win.org]].


	*** Where can I find webpages covering…
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: pages_about
	:END:

	Although the GnuPG community generally finds these websites to be
	useful, your mileage may significantly vary. There are wide
	differences of opinion about some of them. They’re worth visiting and
	worth reading, but make sure to read skeptically.


	**** … an easy introduction to cryptography?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: pages_about_introduction_to_crypto
	:END:

	There is no such thing as an easy introduction to cryptography.
	However, PGP Corporation has a well-regarded [[http://www.cs.unibo.it/babaoglu/courses/security/resources/documents/intro-to-crypto.pdf][/Introduction to
	Cryptography/]].


	**** … the deeper mathematics of cryptography?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: pages_about_cryptographic_mathematics
	:END:

	The maintainer of this list also keeps a gentle(-ish) [[http://sixdemonbag.org/cryptofaq.xhtml][introduction to
	the mathematics and computer science of cryptography]].


	**** … best practices for using GnuPG?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: pages_about_best_practices
	:END:

	At present, there are no reputable web pages detailing GnuPG best
	practices.


	**** … the politics of cryptography?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: pages_about_politics
	:END:

	The inclusion of a site on this list is not an endorsement of that
	site’s political leanings.

	Probably the best-known organization is the [[http://www.eff.org][Electronic Frontier
	Foundation]], which has been at the vanguard of electronic civil
	liberties for over twenty years.

	The [[http://www.fsf.org][Free Software Foundation]] is also deeply involved in these matters,
	although in a different way than the EFF.


	* What email clients support GnuPG on…
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: email_clients
	:END:

	Many email clients offer strong GnuPG integration.

	The column “Active” in the tables below indicate whether the software
	is actively developed.

	** … Microsoft Windows?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: email_clients_win32
	:END:

	\| Name \| Plugins \| see \|
	\|-------------+----------------+-----\|
	\| Thunderbird \| yes (Enigmail) \| (1) \|
	\| Kontact \| native \| (2) \|
	\| Claws-Mail \| yes (internal) \| (3) \|

	(1) With the Enigmail plugin, Thunderbird becomes one of the most
	popular GnuPG-aware email clients. It’s under active development
	and is compatible with the latest Thunderbird releases, with a
	friendly and welcoming user community.

	(2) Kontact is KDE’s integrated personal information manager of KDE.
	It runs anywhere that KDE does, and even on some mobile devices as
	Kontact Touch.

	(3) Claws-Mail for Windows is included in the [[http://www.gpg4win.org][Gpg4win]] installer.


	** … Mac OS X?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: email_clients_osx
	:END:

	\| Name \| Plugins \| see \|
	\|-------------+----------------+-----\|
	\| Thunderbird \| yes (Enigmail) \| (1) \|
	\| Gnus \| yes ([[http://www.emacswiki.org/emacs/EasyPG][EasyPG]]) \| (2) \|
	\| Mutt \| native \| (3) \|
	\| Apple Mail \| yes ([[http://www.gpgtools.org][GPGtools]]) \| (4) \|

	(1) With the Enigmail plugin, Thunderbird becomes one of the most
	popular GnuPG-aware email clients. it’s under active development
	and is compatible with the latest Thunderbird releases, with a
	friendly and welcoming user community.

	(2) EasyPG is part of Emacs 23, proper. Thus there is no more need to
	install the plugin. See the Gnus manual for configuration hints.

	(3) For best experience make sure to put ~set crypt_use_gpgme~ in your
	=~/.muttrc= file.

	(4) As of this writing, Apple Mail is incompatible with PGP/MIME. This
	is a known bug and people are working on it.


	-** … Linux or FreeBSD?
	+** … Free UNIX systems?
	:PROPERTIES:
	- :CUSTOM_ID: email_clients_linux
	+ :CUSTOM_ID: email_clients_free_unix
	:END:

	\| Name \| Plugins \| see \|
	\|-------------+----------------+-----\|
	\| Thunderbird \| yes (Enigmail) \| (1) \|
	\| Gnus \| yes ([[http://www.emacswiki.org/emacs/EasyPG][EasyPG]]) \| (2) \|
	\| Mutt \| native \| (3) \|
	\| Kontact \| native \| (4) \|
	\| Evolution \| native \| \|
	\| Claws-Mail \| yes (internal) \| \|

	(1) With the Enigmail plugin, Thunderbird becomes one of the most
	popular GnuPG-aware email clients. it’s under active development
	and is compatible with the latest Thunderbird releases, with a
	friendly and welcoming user community.

	(2) EasyPG is part of Emacs 23, proper. Thus there is no more need to
	install the plugin. See the Gnus manual for configuration hints.

	(3) For best experience make sure to put ~set crypt_use_gpgme~ in your
	=~/.muttrc= file.

	(4) Kontact is KDE’s integrated personal information manager of KDE.
	It runs anywhere that KDE does, and even on some mobile devices as
	Kontact Touch.

	* Is GnuPG available as a ‘portable app’?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: portable_app
	:END:

	Yes, but we don't recommend it. Sharing a USB token between lots of
	random computers is a great way to get infested with malware, and that's
	not something you want to happen to the token you're using for secure
	email. If you're going to do this, please show caution with respect to
	which computers you use the portable app on.

	That said, Windows users should check [[http://portableapps.com/apps/internet/thunderbird_portable][PortableApps]].
	Or, to build your own, use the /mkportable/ tool which comes with
	[[http://www.gpg4win.org][Gpg4win]].


	* What do all these strange words mean?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: glossary
	:END:

	Cryptography tends to use a whole lot of specialized language and
	jargon. In this section some of it will be deciphered.


	** What’s ‘public-key cryptography’?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_asymc
	:END:


	In the 1970s new ideas came to the forefront of the cryptanalytic
	world. One of the most important was the development of asymmetric
	cryptography (also often called “public-key cryptography”).

	Asymmetric cryptography is built around problems that are very hard in
	one direction, and very easy in another. Consider the number 2,701.
	If you were to be asked for its prime factors, you would find it a
	daunting challenge. If you were to be given the numbers 37 and 73,
	though, it wouldn’t take but a minute to discover the answer was
	2,701. Multiplying two numbers to yield a third number is easy:
	finding those two numbers, given the third, is hard.

	Asymmetric cryptography uses these asymmetric problems as the
	building-blocks of cryptography. It’s easy to create an encrypted
	message which neither you nor anyone else save the intended recipient
	can decrypt. To continue the metaphor, you and everyone else get to
	wrestle with the hard problem (“factor 2,701”). The intended
	recipient knows a secret piece of information which makes the problem
	easy (“factor 2,701, given that one of the factors is 73”).

	This manages to overcome the major flaw with symmetric cryptography.
	Your public key can be shared with the entire world, even your
	enemies, and your communications will still be secure. Compare this
	to symmetric cryptography, where as soon as the key became public
	knowledge the entire system was broken.



	** What’s ‘symmetric cryptography’?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_symc
	:END:


	One of the earliest ciphers was the shift cipher, which was allegedly
	used by Julius Caesar in his campaign against the Gauls. He took his
	plaintext and shifted each letter three positions up in the alphabet,
	wrapping around once he reached the end (so that ‘Z’ would become
	‘C’). His correspondents would reverse the process: by moving each
	letter in the encrypted text down three letters the original message
	would be recovered. Knowing how to encrypt the text also gave the
	knowledge of how to decrypt the text: the process wasn’t identical
	(one shifted up, the other shifted down), but knowing one process the
	other one could trivially be discovered.

	This trait, that of encryption and decryption being two sides of the
	same coin, is the defining trait of symmetric cryptography.
	Modern-day symmetric ciphers are much more complex than Caesar’s
	scheme, but they still work in fundamentally the same way. Knowledge
	of how to encrypt reveals knowledge of how to decrypt, and vice-versa.
	The symmetry between those two operations leads to the name “symmetric
	cryptography”.

	Symmetric cryptography is fast, well-studied, and safe. It has one
	critical drawback, though: you have to have a secure communications
	channel by which you can share the key with someone. If you already
	have a secure communications channel, though, do you really need
	cryptography?



	** What’s a ‘key’?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_key
	:END:


	The word ‘key’ is unfortunately ambiguous. It can either refer to the
	mathematical structures that allow encryption, decryption, signing and
	verification to occur, or to the rather large blobs of data that
	contain those mathematical structures as well as information about the
	person associated with it, additional subkeys, and so forth.

	With respect to the large blobs of data, it is preferable to call them
	‘certificates’, so that the word ‘key’ may be unambiguously recognized
	as meaning just the mathematical structures. Unfortunately, this is a
	custom that seems to be honored mostly in the breach.



	** What’s a ‘certificate’?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_certificate
	:END:


	A certificate is a large data structure that contains one or more
	[[#define_keys][keys]], and optionally information that identifies the user, designated
	revokers, who has vouched for this certificate, and so on.



	** What’s a ‘keyserver’?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_keyserver
	:END:

	A keyserver is a service that publishes public-key certificates and
	makes them searchable. You can upload your certificate to a keyserver
	so that other users can find it. There are distributed networks of
	keyservers that share keys, so you only need to upload your key once
	to that network.

	One widely-used keyserver network is [[http://www.sks-keyservers.net/][sks-keyservers.net]]. SKS stands
	for “Synchronising Key Server”. You can use this network by supplying
	the =--keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net= option.



	** What’s RSA?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_rsa
	:END:


	RSA is the world’s premier [[#define_asymc][asymmetric cryptographic algorithm]], and is
	built on the difficulty of factoring extremely large composites.
	GnuPG supports RSA with [[#define_key][key]] sizes of between 1024 and 4096 bits.



	** What’s DSA?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_dsa
	:END:


	The United States’ National Institute for Standards and Technology
	([[http://www.nist.gov][NIST]]) established the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) as a
	government standard for digital signatures. Originally, it supported
	key lengths between 512 and 1024 bits. Recently, NIST has declared
	512-bit keys obsolete: now, DSA is available in 1024, 2048 and
	3072-bit lengths.

	DSA belongs to the Elgamal family of algorithms, and is very
	well-regarded.



	** What’s Elgamal?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_elgamal
	:END:


	Elgamal may refer to either a family of cryptographic algorithms built
	around the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in a finite
	field, or one particular [[#define_asymc][asymmetric encryption algorithm]] based on that
	problem. The former is normally referred to as “the Elgamal family,”
	and the latter is normally referred to as simply “Elgamal.”

	GnuPG supports the Elgamal asymmetric encryption algorithm in [[#define_key][key]]
	lengths ranging from 1024 to 4096 bits.

	There is also an Elgamal signature algorithm, which GnuPG no longer
	supports.



	** What’s AES?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_aes
	:END:


	Leading up to the year 2000, it was obvious that the old Data
	Encryption Standard (DES) was on its last legs and needed to be
	replaced. 3DES was available as a stopgap measure, but there was a
	lot of pressure to make a new encryption standard that made use of the
	last few decades of cryptologic research.

	The United States National Institute of Standards and Technology
	([[http://www.nist.gov][NIST]]) held an open competition to select the new encryption standard.
	In the summer of 2000, a cipher named Rijndael (pronounced
	“RAIN-doll”) was selected as the new Advanced Encryption Standard, or
	AES.

	AES is a thoroughly modern cipher design and may be used with
	confidence.



	** What are Twofish and Blowfish?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_fish
	:END:


	Blowfish and Twofish are well-regarded symmetric ciphers. Blowfish
	should not be used to encrypt files larger than 4Gb in size, but
	Twofish has no such restrictions. These algorithms are modern, and
	may be used with confidence.



	** What’s 3DES?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_3des
	:END:


	In the 1970s, IBM developed a new symmetric cipher called the Data
	Encryption Standard (DES). They overdesigned it horribly: even after
	three decades, the only way to break DES is by brute force.
	Unfortunately, standard DES has a small enough keyspace to be
	susceptible to brute-forcing.

	A new variant of DES was needed. 3DES, which is made of three DES
	algorithms running together with three independent keys, was the
	result. 3DES is ungainly, ugly, slow, and has all the aesthetics of a
	Soviet workers’ housing bloc. It has also withstood three decades of
	cryptanalysis and is still going strong.

	Due to its 1970s-era 64-bit block size, it should not be used to
	encrypt more than about 4Gb of data. Beyond that, though, it is solid
	as a rock, and very few GnuPG users will ever notice a problem with
	it. Provided you’re not encrypting more than 4Gb of data you may use
	3DES with confidence.

	** What are CAST, CAST5, and CAST5-128?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_cast
	:END:


	Carlisle Adams and Stafford Tavares (the “CA” and the “ST” in “CAST”)
	developed the CAST algorithm in 1996. It was later approved for
	Canadian government use.

	CAST has many names: CAST, CAST5, CAST5-128 and CAST-128 all refer to
	the same algorithm.

	Internally, CAST is distinctly similar to Blowfish, another
	well-respected algorithm. Like 3DES, its 64-bit block size means it
	should not be used to encrypt files larger than 4Gb in size. With
	that said, though, CAST is a modern cipher and may be used with
	confidence.


	** What’s Camellia?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_camellia
	:END:


	During roughly the same time period that [[http://www.nist.gov][NIST]] was running the Advanced
	Encryption Standard trials, Japan’s [[http://www.cryptrec.jp/english/][CRYPTREC]] and the European Union's
	[[http://www.cryptonessie.org/][NESSIE]] were running their own similar trials. Camellia is the cipher
	that won the NESSIE and CRYPTREC trials, much in the same way that
	Rijndael won the United States’ AES trials.

	Camellia is a thoroughly modern cipher design and may be used with
	confidence.



	** What are SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and SHA-3?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_sha
	:END:


	The Secure Hash Algorithms are cryptographic hash functions originally
	devised by the United States’ National Security Agency. The
	algorithms have been made publicly available and have been subjected
	to an astonishing amount of peer review.

	- SHA and/or SHA-0: the original Secure Hash Algorithm, generating
	160-bit outputs. Flaws were discovered in it almost immediately.
	SHA-0 never gained much traction in the cryptologic community, and
	it is not present in GnuPG.
	- SHA-1: This is SHA-0 with the flaws fixed, and not much else in
	the way of changes. It still generates 160-bit outputs. SHA-1 has
	not aged well. Although it is still believed to be safe, it would
	be advisable to use another, different hash function if possible.
	- SHA-224, 256, 384, or 512: This is a massively-overhauled SHA-1 which
	generates larger hashes (224, 256, 384, or 512 bits). Right now,
	these are the strongest hashes in GnuPG.
	- SHA-3: SHA-3 is a completely new hash algorithm that makes a clean
	break with the previous SHAs. It is believed to be safe, with no
	warnings about its usage. It hasn't yet been officially introduced
	into the OpenPGP standard, and for that reason GnuPG doesn't support
	it. However, SHA-3 will probably be incorporated into the spec, and
	GnuPG will support it as soon as it does.


	** What’s MD5?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_md5
	:END:


	MD5 is a 128-bit cryptographic hash function invented by Ron Rivest
	(the ‘R’ of ‘RSA’) in the early 1990s. For many years it was one of
	the standard algorithms of the field, but is now completely obsolete.
	For that reason, MD5 is not supported by GnuPG.


	** What are ZLIB, ZIP and BZIP?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_compress
	:END:


	ZLIB, ZIP and BZIP refer to different kinds of compression algorithms.
	GnuPG will use one of these three algorithms to compress your data
	before encrypting it, unless GnuPG can see the data is already
	compressed.



	** What’s a ‘revocation certificate’?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_rev_cert
	:END:


	A revocation certificate is a [[#define_certificate][certificate]] that possesses the
	information necessary to mark another certificate as unusable. This
	is called ‘revoking’ the certificate.

	We recommended you create a revocation certificate immediately after
	generating a new GnuPG certificate. Store it somewhere safe.
	Consult [[#generate_revocation_certificate][the FAQ instructions]] on
	how to do this.



	** What’s a ‘designated revoker’?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_desig_revkr
	:END:


	A designated revoker is a person, identified by a certificate, that
	has the authority to revoke another certificate held by a different
	person. For instance, if you were using GnuPG in a corporate
	environment the IT staff might be listed as a designated revoker for
	your certificate, so that when you left the company the IT staff could
	revoke your certificate.



	** What does ‘validity’ mean?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_validity
	:END:


	Although a certificate makes certain assertions about identity, these
	assertions cannot be blindly trusted. (Consider, for instance,
	whether you should trust a certificate that claims to belong to
	=obama@whitehouse.gov=.)

	If you trust the certificate’s assertions, you are said to have
	‘validated’ the certificate. Validation can be done by fiat or as the
	result of a process. For instance, you validate your own certificate
	by fiat: “this certificate says it belongs to me, and I trust it.”
	Validating other certificates, though, should probably have a little
	more rigor involved. How much rigor will depend entirely on your own
	particular needs and the threats you face.




	** What does ‘trust’ mean?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_trust
	:END:


	‘Trust’ refers to how thoroughly a certificate has been [[#define_validity][validated]].
	The terms are used somewhat interchangeably.



	** What does ‘ownertrust’ mean?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: define_ownertrust
	:END:


	If a certificate has been [[#define_validity][validated]], and if you trust the person
	owning that certificate to do proper validation of certificates, you
	can tell GnuPG “I am willing to trust this person’s validations as if
	they were my own.”

	For instance: Alice has fully validated Bob’s certificate. She further
	believes, based on her knowledge of Bob, that he will be as careful as
	she is about the certificates he validates. Alice declares she has
	ownertrust in Bob. Now, any certificates that Bob validates will appear
	to Alice as valid, too.


	* How do I start using GnuPG?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: starting_out
	:END:

	The very first thing is to join the [[#gnupg-users_list][GnuPG-Users mailing list]]. You’ll
	find it to be a welcoming community that’s friendly to newcomers and
	is eager to help out.



	** Does GnuPG need to be ‘tuned’ before use?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: tuning
	:END:

	No. GnuPG has sensible defaults right out of the box. You don’t need
	to tune GnuPG before you can use it.



	** How large should my key be?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: new_key_size
	:END:

	The overwhelming majority of users will be well-served by generating
	2048-bit RSA keys. This is the default behavior for GnuPG.


	** What algorithm should I use?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: new_key_algo
	:END:

	The overwhelming majority of users will be well-served by generating
	2048-bit RSA keys. This is the default behavior for GnuPG.


	** Why does it take so long to generate a certificate?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: new_key_generate_time
	:END:

	The short answer is, “your computer is doing a lot of work.” But
	don’t worry: although generating new certificates can take a while,
	actually using them once they’re made is quite fast.


	** What should I do after making my certificate?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: new_key_after_generation
	:END:

	Generate a revocation certificate, and store it in a safe place.
	Alternately, you may wish to appoint [[#define_desig_revkr][a designated revoker]].


	*** How do I appoint a designated revoker?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: appoint_revoker
	:END:

	A designated revoker is someone whom you trust to revoke your
	certificates on your behalf. This person may revoke your certificates
	without needing a revocation certificate. For instance, you may wish
	to appoint your lawyer as your designated revoker so that, in the
	event of your untimely death, your lawyer may revoke your
	certificates.

	To add a revoker, use the following command line:

	=gpg --edit-key= /[your key ID here]/ =addrevoker=

	When prompted, enter the key ID of the person whom you wish to appoint
	as a revoker. The revoker’s key must be fully validated.



	*** How do I generate a revocation certificate?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: generate_revocation_certificate
	:END:


	A [[#define_rev_cert][revocation certificate]] marks another certificate as unusable.

	To generate a revocation certificate for your key, do:

	=gpg --armor --output revoke.asc --gen-revoke= /[your key ID]/

	Copy =revoke.asc= to a safe place.


	*** How do I send my certificate to the keyserver network?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: send_to_keyservers
	:END:


	=gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --send-key= /[your certificate ID]/

	You should only upload your own certificates to the keyservers, or
	obtain the certificate holder's permission before doing so. In some
	circles it's considered rude to upload someone else's certificate; not
	everyone wants to publish their key publicly.



	** Where does GnuPG look for configuration options?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: location_gpg_conf_file
	:END:


	GnuPG looks at a file called =gpg.conf= to determine various runtime
	parameters. On UNIX systems this file can be found in =~/.gnupg=. On
	Windows systems open Explorer and go to =%APPDATA%\Roaming\GnuPG=.

	** What options should I put in my configuration file?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: new_user_gpg_conf
	:END:

	The good news is, you really shouldn’t need to. That said, the
	following is Rob Hansen’s =gpg.conf= file.

	#+begin_example

	# Tell GnuPG that I want maximum OpenPGP conformance.
	openpgp

	# Disable a few messages from GnuPG that I know I don't need.
	no-greeting
	no-secmem-warning

	# Don't include a version number or a comment in my output.
	no-emit-version
	no-comments

	# Use full 16-character key IDs, not short 8-character key IDs.
	keyid-format long

	# Use the global keyserver network for certificate lookups.
	# Further, whenever I send or receive something to/from the
	# keyserver network, clean up what I get or send.
	keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net
	keyserver-options import-clean-sigs import-clean-uids export-clean-sigs export-clean-uids

	# If I don't explicitly state which certificate to use, use this one.
	default-key 1DCBDC01B44427C7

	# Always include signatures from these two certificates.
	local-user 1DCBDC01B44427C7

	# Always add these two certificates to my recipients list.
	encrypt-to 1DCBDC01B44427C7

	# Turn "From" into "> From", in order to play nice with UNIX mailboxes.
	escape-from-lines

	# Prefer strong hashes whenever possible.
	personal-digest-preferences SHA256 SHA384 SHA512 SHA224 RIPEMD160

	# Prefer more modern ciphers over older ones.
	personal-cipher-preferences CAMELLIA256 AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA192 AES192 CAMELLIA128 AES BLOWFISH CAST5 3DES

	# Turn up the compression level and prefer BZIP2 over ZIP and ZLIB.
	bzip2-compress-level 9
	compress-level 9
	personal-compress-preferences BZIP2 ZIP ZLIB
	#+end_example



	** Is there any particular keyserver I should use?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: new_user_default_keyserver
	:END:


	Many people have had excellent luck with =pool.sks-keyservers.net=. On OS X,
	some people have needed to use =ipv4.pool.sks-keyservers.net= instead.


	** What’s the difference between an ‘option’ and a ‘command’?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: diff_option_commands
	:END:

	Commands tell GnuPG what to do: options tell GnuPG how to do it. For
	instance, =encrypt= is a command, and =armor= is an option that tells
	GnuPG to ensure the output contains only printable characters.


	** What are the most commonly used options?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: common_options
	:END:

	Produce more output explaining what GnuPG is doing:

	=-v=, =--verbose=

	Some of the most commonly used options are:

	Make no changes; this is useful for testing a command line that will
	modify keys or generate output:

	=-n=, =--dry-run=

	Send output to the named file:

	=-o= /FILE/, =--output= /FILE/

	Create ASCII-armored output that can be safely e-mailed, instead of
	binary output:

	=-a=, =--armor=

	When encrypting a message, you will usually supply at least one
	recipient ID with the recipient option. This option can be supplied
	multiple times to encrypt a message to multiple recipients:

	=-r= /KEYID/, =--recipient= /KEYID=/ /specify a recipient ID/


	** What are the most commonly used commands?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: common_commands
	:END:

	GnuPG's primary functions are to encrypt and decrypt messages, and to
	sign and verify them. It's possible to sign without encrypting or
	encrypt without signing.

	Signing a file's content is done with the =-s= or =--sign= commands.
	A variation is =-b= or =--detach-sign=, which produces a separate
	signature without including the file's content; this is useful for
	signing a software archive or other large file. The key to use for
	the signature can be specified with the =local-user= setting in your
	=gpg.conf= file, or with the =-u=, =--local-user= options.

	Encrypting a file's content is done with the =-e= or =--encrypt=
	commands. Recipients are specified with the =-r= or =--recipient=
	options.

	GnuPG's default action is to decrypt and verify its input file,
	writing the contents to standard output or to the filename specified
	by the =-o= or =--output= options. The =--verify= command will only
	verify the signature without writing the file's contents anywhere.

	These commands are the most commonly used. GnuPG has many more
	commands, largely for managing your keyring containing your private
	keys and the certificates of others.


	** How do I use another person’s certificate?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: using_certificates
	:END:

	In order to send an encrypted message or verify a signature, you must
	obtain the certificate for the recipient’s/signer’s public key.

	Occasionally you might obtain the certificate physically, by meeting
	the certificate holder face-to-face and exchanging the certificate on
	some storage medium such as a USB stick, memory card, or portable
	disk. Or you might download a copy of the certificate from the
	holder's web site.

	Once obtained in one of these ways, you can add the certificate to
	your collection of public keys by doing:

	=gpg --import certificate.txt=

	More commonly, you'll download a correspondent's certificate from a
	keyserver.



	*** How do I search the keyserver for someone’s certificate?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: searching_keyservers
	:END:


	There is also a network of public keyservers, accessible under the
	collective hostname =pool.sks-keyservers.net=. GnuPG users can upload
	their certificates to the keyservers, and other users can then search
	for and download them.

	=gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --search= /[email address, name, key ID, etc.]/

	GnuPG will list matching certificates and prompt you to select which
	ones you wish to download and add to your keyring.

	People will obtain new signatures for their certificates from time to
	time. =gpg --refresh-keys= will recheck all of the certificates on
	your public key and download any new signatures for those keys.



	*** How do I retrieve a certificate if I already know its fingerprint?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: retrieving_by_fingerprint
	:END:


	=gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-key= /[fingerprint]/



	*** Why do I need to validate certificates?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: why_validate
	:END:


	If you were to receive a letter in the mail that claimed to be from
	the President of the United States, would you believe it? Probably
	not, because anyone can put together official-looking letterhead:
	you’d insist on doing some kind of checking to make sure that no one
	was fooling with you.

	The same applies to email. A certificate can claim to be from anyone.
	You have to make sure that the certificate really belongs to whom it
	claims it belongs to. That process of making sure is called
	‘validation’.



	*** How do I validate certificates?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: how_to_validate
	:END:


	This advice is controversial.

	It’s controversial for a simple reason: every Tom, Dick and Harry has
	their own idea about the “right way” to validate certificates. Some
	of these people are well-informed and some of them are just plain
	unhinged. In the end, you are responsible for making your own
	decisions. That said, the following is generally agreed upon as being
	a reasonable procedure:

	1. Meet the certificate holder face-to-face.
	2. Ask to see two forms of government-issued identification.
	3. Upon verifying the person really is who they claim to be, ask this
	person to provide their certificate’s fingerprint, their email
	address, and where you can obtain a copy of their certificate.
	(Example: “My fingerprint is =4541 BB01 8EA4 8F99 19CA 3701 2380
	6BE5 D6B9 8E10=, and you can find it on
	=pool.sks-keyservers.net=.”)
	4. On your own computer, retrieve the person’s certificate from the
	specified location. Check to make sure the email address they gave
	you is one that’s also listed on the certificate. Check to make
	sure the fingerprint of the certificate you’ve downloaded matches
	the fingerprint the person gave you.
	5. =gpg --edit-key= /[their certificate ID]/ =sign=
	6. Once signed, =gpg --armor --output signed_cert.asc --export=
	/[their certificate ID]/
	7. Send the file =signed_cert.asc= to the address they gave you

	By following this process you first ensure that you’re speaking to the
	right person. By comparing the fingerprints of the certificate you
	have against the fingerprint they specified, you’re ensuring that you
	have the right certificate. Checking to make sure the email address
	they gave you is also listed on the certificate is one more check to
	make sure. Once that’s done, presto, Bob’s your uncle: there’s
	nothing left to do except sign it and return the newly-signed
	certificate to the other person.


	** Why can’t I read emails I’ve sent, and how do I fix it?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: encrypt_to_self
	:END:


	You encrypted a message to Alice, which means that it requires Alice’s
	private key to read it. Only Alice has her private key. That’s why
	you can’t read encrypted traffic you generated: only Alice can read
	it.

	To get around this, add yourself as a recipient (=--recipient = /[your
	certificate ID]/).



	** How do I encrypt a file for multiple recipients?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: multiple_recipients
	:END:


	Use multiple =--recipient= options. Remember, options come before
	commands!




	** How do I sign a file with multiple certificates?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: multiple_signers
	:END:


	Use multiple =--local-user= options. Remember, options come before
	commands!



	** How do I combine encryption with signing?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: encrypt_and_sign
	:END:


	=gpg --armor --recipient= /[first recipient’s key ID]/ =--local-user= /[your key ID]/ =--sign --encrypt= /[filename]/



	** How do I force GnuPG to make printable-text output?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: ascii_armor
	:END:

	Normally, computers use eight-bit binary code. This often presents
	trouble for email, which often requires that only printable
	(seven-bit) characters may be used. By using the =--armor= flag,
	GnuPG will generate output containing only printable characters.


	** How do I create an ‘inline signature’?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: generate_inline_signature
	:END:

	An inline signature wraps a textual header and footer around the text
	to be signed, leaving the text readable without running GnuPG. This
	doesn't conceal the text at all and therefore provides no secrecy, but
	if someone edits the text GnuPG will report that the signature is bad.

	To generate an inline signature, run

	=gpg --armor --output signed_file.asc --local-user= /[your key ID]/ =--clearsign message_file.txt=

	To verify the resulting file, simply invoke GnuPG with the filename of
	the signed file:

	=gpg signed_file.asc=


	** How can I use GnuPG to verify a file I've downloaded?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: how_do_i_verify_signed_packages
	:END:

	1. Get a copy of the author’s public certificate and import it to your
	keyring. It’s important to get the author’s certificate through a
	trusted source. On the internet, anyone can be pretend to be anyone.
	Particularly, be careful if the certificate you have doesn’t match the
	one used for prior code releases.

	2. Once you're confident you have the correct certificate, give it a local
	signature. Assuming you want to locally sign certificate
	1DCBDC01B44427C7, you’d type:

	=gpg --edit-key 1DCBDC01B44427C7 lsign=

	3. Download the software package. Let’s assume it’s called “foo.zip”.

	4. Download the detached signature for the package. Let’s assume it’s
	called “foo.zip.asc”.

	5. Run:

	=gpg foo.zip.asc=

	GnuPG will assume the original file is in foo.zip. (If GnuPG can’t find
	foo.zip, GnuPG will prompt you for the name of the original package.) If
	all goes well, GnuPG will report good signatures and you may be confident
	you've received the package as the author intended.

	Please note that a good signature doesn’t mean a piece of software is
	trustworthy, reliable, or bug-free. It just means nobody tampered with it and
	you’re receiving it as the author intends. Keep a healthy dose of
	skepticism, and remember that cryptography cannot save us from
	our own foolishness.

	** How can I use GnuPG in an automated environment?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: automated_use
	:END:

	You should use the =--batch= option. Don't bother to use a passphrase
	because there's usually no way to store it more securely than on the
	secret keyring itself.

	The suggested way to create keys for an automated environment is as
	follows. First, on a secure machine:

	1. If you want to do automatic signing, create a signing subkey for
	your key. Use the interactive key editing menu by issuing the
	command:

	=gpg --edit-key= /keyID/

	Enter "addkey" and select the DSA key type.

	2. Make sure that you use a passphrase; this is required by the
	current implementation to let you export the secret key.

	3. Run:

	=gpg --export-secret-subkeys --no-comment= /newsubkeyID/ => secring.auto=

	4. Copy =secring.auto= and the public keyring to a test directory.

	5. Change to the test directory.

	6. Run the command:

	=gpg --homedir . --edit= /newsubkeyID/

	Use the sub-command =passwd= to remove the passphrase from the
	subkeys. You may also want to remove all unused subkeys by doing
	=key N= and then =delkey= for each subkey.

	7. Copy =secring.auto= to the target box somehow.

	On the target machine, install =secring.auto= as the secret keyring
	and begin writing scripts that invoke GnuPG.

	It's a good idea to install an intrusion detection system so that
	you will get notice of a successful intrusion. If that happens,
	you can revoke all the subkeys installed on that machine and
	install new subkeys once the machine is secured again.


	** I’m a programmer and I need a GnuPG library. Is there one?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: yes_gpgme
	:END:


	Check out [[https://www.gnupg.org/related_software/gpgme/][GPGME (GnuPG Made Easy)]].



	** I’m a programmer and I need a way to call GnuPG internals directly. Is there a library for this?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: keep_dreaming
	:END:

	No, nor will there be.


	* What common problems come up?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: common_problems
	:END:


	** Why is GnuPG warning me this certificate might not belong to whom I think it does?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: you_need_to_validate
	:END:


	If you received an email claiming to be from a Nigerian oil tycoon,
	would you believe it? Or would you insist on doing some kind of
	verification first, in order to make sure that you’re not being
	scammed or swindled?

	The same principle applies here. If you’re using a certificate that
	claims to belong to Alice, but there’s no evidence it actually belongs
	to Alice, GnuPG will warn you that you’re using an untrusted
	certificate.

	You probably want to validate the certificate; see [[#how_to_validate][this FAQ's
	instructions]].



	** Why is GnuPG warning me about using insecure memory?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: insecure_memory
	:END:


	GnuPG tries to lock memory so that no other process can see it and so
	that the memory will not be written to swap. If for some reason it’s
	not able to do this (for instance, certain platforms don’t support
	this kind of memory locking), GnuPG will warn you that it’s using
	insecure memory.

	While it’s almost always better to use secure memory, it’s not
	necessarily a bad thing to use insecure memory. If you own the
	machine and you’re confident it’s not harboring malware, then this
	warning can probably be ignored.



	** Why is GnuPG changing my message?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: escaped_dashes
	:END:

	GnuPG uses special lines to denote the beginning of a message, the
	beginning of a signature, and so forth. These lines start with
	“=----- BEGIN=…”. If your text contains a line beginning with a dash,
	that line will be slightly mangled in order to prevent GnuPG from
	misinterpreting your data as one of its special lines.


	* What are some common best practices?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: best_practices
	:END:

	It’s very hard to give advice on this subject, because everyone will
	have their own opinion. That said, here are some good guidelines:

	- Join the community. Join [[gnupg-users_list][GnuPG-Users]] and get involved in the
	discussions. The conversation is wide-ranging and you’ll encounter
	a great variety of thoughts and opinions. Reading GnuPG-Users is
	one of the best ways to educate yourself.
	- Practice. If you don’t practice these skills before they become
	necessary, you won’t be able to use these skills effectively.
	- Generate a revocation certificate and keep it safe.
	- Use a strong passphrase.
	- Keep your computer free of malware.
	- Validate certificates correctly.



	** How can I choose a strong passphrase?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: strong_passphrase
	:END:

	If someone manages to obtain your secret key, the only thing
	protecting the key will be your passphrase. A passphrase should be 1)
	difficult to guess for someone who knows you, and 2) difficult to
	brute-force by trying every possible combination of characters.

	To meet requirement 1), the passphrase shouldn't be based on
	publicly-available information about you: your birthday, your spouse's
	name, your school's motto, a line of text from a book, etc. To meet
	requirement 2), the passphrase should be long: commercially available
	hardware can try 2.8 billion passwords in a day, which is sufficient
	to crack a 10-letter all-lowercase password.

	One simple approach that produces easy-to-remember passphrases is to
	generate four to six random words, as illustrated by the XKCD cartoon
	[[http://xkcd.com/936/][“Correct, horse! Battery staple!”]].



	** How can I keep my revocation certificate safe?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: keep_rev_cert_safe
	:END:

	Good places include safe deposit boxes, kept on file with your lawyer,
	placed in a fireproof safe, and so forth. It should be treated as an
	important document that needs to be kept safe.


	** How can I keep my computer safe from malware?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: malware
	:END:


	Although there is no guaranteed way of keeping your system free of
	malware, you can reduce your risk quite a lot by following some basic
	rules.

	1. Keep your system up-to-date. Always apply the latest patches.
	2. Stop using old versions of Internet Explorer. If possible, use
	[[http://www.getfirefox.com][Mozilla Firefox]] or [[http://download-chromium.appspot.com/][Chromium]].
	3. Don’t open email attachments unless they are expected and come
	from someone you know.
	4. Don’t click on email links unless they are expected and come from
	someone you know.
	5. Be suspicious of requests for personal information, especially if
	it’s more detail than is strictly necessary to solve a problem.


	** Should I use encrypted disk software like TrueCrypt, BitLocker or FileVault?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: disk_encryption
	:END:

	You can if you want, but it won’t make your private key any more
	secure. Your private key is already encrypted: your passphrase is the
	key used to decrypt your private key.



	* Advanced topics
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: advanced_topics
	:END:


	These topics are ‘advanced’ in the sense that you really don’t need to
	understand them in order to safely and correctly use GnuPG. That
	said, if you have a more technical question about GnuPG, you may find
	some of the answers in this section.


	** Which ciphers are recommended, and why?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: recommended_ciphers
	:END:

	Although all the ciphers in GnuPG are believed strong, they are not all
	equally recommended. For asymmetric ciphers we recommend RSA over
	DSA and/or Elgamal; for symmetric ciphers we recommend AES, Camellia, and/or
	Twofish over all the others.

	With respect to our RSA recommendation, there is no reason to believe RSA
	is any better or worse than DSA and/or Elgamal in a cryptographic sense.
	However, if you ever want to migrate your certificate to a smart card or
	other cryptographic token, you'll find RSA is much better supported.

	With respect to our symmetric cipher recommendations, we have to explain a
	little bit about cryptanalysis.

	First, ciphers are deterministic: given the same inputs, they generate the same
	outputs.

	Second, ciphers don't operate on individual bytes. They work on blocks of
	data, either eight or sixteen bytes large, depending on the cipher.

	Third, the OpenPGP standard requires that ciphers run in what's
	called a “feedback mode.” In feedback mode, a cipher has two inputs: the
	random session key used for the message, and the output of the previous block.

	Put it all together and imagine what would happen if, within the same message,
	two identical ciphertext blocks were created. Since the cipher is
	deterministic (always generates the same output for the same inputs), and
	since the key and the previous block are the same, the output of this block
	would be the same. This repetition creates a distinctive pattern which a
	cryptanalyst might be able to potentially exploit.

	For a cipher with an eight-byte block size, you'll probably repeat a block
	after about 32 gigabytes of data. This means if you encrypt a single message
	larger than 32 gigabytes, it's pretty much a statistical guarantee you'll have
	a repeated block. That's bad. For this reason, we recommend you not use
	ciphers with eight-byte data blocks if you're going to be doing bulk
	encryption. It's very unlikely you'll have any problems if you keep your
	messages under 4 gigabytes in size.

	For a cipher with a sixteen-byte block size, you'd need to encrypt a single
	message that contained more data than is found in the entire internet. In
	other words, it's no longer an issue.

	Twofish, AES, and Camellia all operate on sixteen bytes at a time. The others
	all operate on eight bytes at a time.

	** Why does GnuPG default to 2048 bit RSA-2048?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: default_rsa2048
	:END:

	At the time the decision was made, 2048-bit RSA was thought to provide
	reasonable security for the next decade or more while still being
	compatible with the overwhelming majority of the OpenPGP ecosystem.

	*** Is that still the case?
	Largely, yes. According to NIST Special Publication 800-57, published
	in July 2012, 2048-bit RSA is believed safe until 2030. At present,
	no reputable cryptographer or research group has cast doubt on the
	safety of RSA-2048. That said, many are suggesting shifting to larger
	keys, and GnuPG will be making such a shift in the near future.

	*** What do other groups have to say about 2048-bit RSA?
	In 2014, the German Bundesnetzagentur fuer Elektrizitaet, Gas,
	Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen recommended using RSA-2048 for
	long-term security in electronic signatures.

	In 2012, ECRYPT-II published their “Yearly Report on Algorithms and
	Keysizes” wherein they expressed their belief RSA-1776 will suffice
	until at least 2020, and RSA-2432 until 2030.

	In 2010, France’s Agence Nationale de la Securite des Systems
	d’Information stated they had confidence in RSA-2048 until at
	least 2020.

	*** Is there a general recommendation that 3072-bit keys be used for new applications?
	No, although some respected people and groups within the cryptographic
	community have made such recommendations. Some even recommend
	4096-bit keys.

	*** Will GnuPG ever support RSA-3072 or RSA-4096 by default?
	Probably not. The future is elliptical-curve cryptography, which will
	bring a level of safety comparable to RSA-16384. Every minute we
	spend arguing about whether we should change the defaults to RSA-3072
	or more is one minute the shift to ECC is delayed. Frankly, we think
	ECC is a really good idea and we'd like to see it deployed as soon as
	humanly possible.

	*** I think I need larger key sizes.
	By all means, feel free to generate certificates with larger keys.
	GnuPG supports up to 4096-bit keys.


	** Do other high-security applications use RSA-2048?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: rsa2048_in_the_real_world
	:END:

	2048-bit RSA is commonly used to secure SSL root signing certificates.
	It’s also used to sign operating system patches, Authenticode
	signatures, Java applets and more. RSA-2048 is believed to be safe
	against attack until at least the year 2030, so use it with
	confidence.


	** Why doesn’t GnuPG default to using RSA-4096?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: no_default_of_rsa4096
	:END:

	Because it gives us almost nothing, while costing us quite a lot.

	Breaking an RSA-10 key requires you to try each prime number between
	two and one hundred. There are twenty-five of these, meaning RSA-10
	is equivalent to about a 5-bit symmetric cipher. Breaking an RSA-20
	key requires you to try each prime number between two and one
	thousand: there are 168 of them, meaning RSA-20 is equivalent to about
	an 8-bit cipher. Doubling the keylength (from RSA-10 to RSA-20)
	didn't give us the benefit that we naively expected. Each additional
	bit gives correspondingly less in the way of additional security, and
	we quickly reach a point of diminishing returns.

	That point of diminishing returns happens around RSA-2048. Once you
	move past RSA-2048, you’re really not gaining very much. At the same
	time, moving past RSA-2048 means you lose the ability to migrate your
	certificate to a smartcard, or to effectively use it on some mobile
	devices, or to interoperate with other OpenPGP applications that don’t
	handle large keys gracefully.

	If you really want a 4096-bit RSA key there’s nothing stopping you:
	but we sincerely believe the overwhelming majority of users will be
	well-served with RSA-2048.



	** Why do people advise against using RSA-4096?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: please_use_ecc
	:END:

	Almost always when people use 4096-bit RSA they’re doing so because
	they believe RSA-4096 to be much stronger than it is. The United
	States’ National Institute of Standards and Technology ([[http://www.nist.gov][NIST]]) states
	that RSA-2048 gives roughly 112 bits of security and RSA-3072 gives
	roughly 128. There is no formal recommendation on where RSA-4096
	lies, but the general consensus is that it would come in somewhere
	around 140 bits — 28 bits of improvement over RSA-2048. This is an
	improvement so marginal that it’s really not worth mentioning.

	If you need more security than RSA-2048 offers, the way to go would be
	to switch to elliptical curve cryptography — not to continue using
	RSA.



	** Why does GnuPG support RSA-4096 if it’s such a bad idea?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: not_a_bad_idea_just_unnecessary
	:END:

	RSA-4096 is not a bad idea: it’s just, generally speaking,
	unnecessary. You gain very little in the way of additional resistance
	to brute-forcing and cryptanalysis.



	** Can any of the ciphers in GnuPG be brute-forced?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: brute_force
	:END:


	No.

	The laws of physics require that a certain amount of heat be used in
	computation. This is a consequence of the Second Law of
	Thermodynamics, and may not be violated under our current
	understanding of the laws of physics.

	Further, physics requires that a certain amount of time be used in
	computation. This is a consequence of the Heisenberg Uncertainty
	Principle, and may not be violated under our current understanding of
	the laws of physics.

	Using these two principles (the [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer_bound][Landauer bound]] and the
	[[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margolus%E2%80%93Levitin_theorem][Margolus–Levitin limit]]), we can determine quite accurately how much
	heat would be released by a computer that brute-forced a 128-bit
	cipher. The results are profoundly silly: it’s enough to boil the
	oceans and leave the planet as a charred, smoking ruin.

	This is not to say that GnuPG cannot be successfully attacked. It is
	only to say that none of the ciphers in GnuPG are susceptible to
	brute-forcing.



	** Has GnuPG ever been successfully attacked?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: successful_attacks
	:END:


	This depends entirely on what is meant by “successful attack.”

	If you mean, “has GnuPG traffic ever been successfully
	cryptanalyzed?”, the answer is a flat ‘no’. We are unaware of any
	credible reports of any of the ciphers used in GnuPG having ever been
	successfully cryptanalyzed.

	If you mean, “have people figured out ways to obtain the plaintext
	anyway?”, the answer is an emphatic ‘yes.’ In [[http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9741357-7.html][a 2007 Drug Enforcement
	Administration case]], a keylogger was installed on a suspect's
	computer.

	GnuPG protects your traffic against cryptanalysis, but it is not magic
	fairy dust that can be sprinkled over your data to make it safe
	against all threats.



	** Should I use PGP/MIME for my emails?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: use_pgpmime
	:END:

	Almost certainly. In the past this was a controversial question, but
	recently there's come to be a consensus: use PGP/MIME whenever possible.
	The reason for this is that it's possible to armor email headers and
	metadata with PGP/MIME, but sending messages inline leaves this data
	exposed. As recent years have taught us, the metadata is often as
	sensitive as the contents of the message. PGP/MIME can protect metadata;
	inline can't.

	However, please be aware that not all mail servers handle PGP/MIME
	properly. Some mailing lists are incompatible with it (PGP-Basics, for
	instance). Some mailing list software mangles PGP/MIME (old versions of
	Mailman, for instance).

	If you have any problems with PGP/MIME, consider carefully whether you
	need metadata protection. If you don't, then fall back to inline.


	** What are the best algorithms in GnuPG?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: no_best_algo
	:END:


	MD5 and SHA-1 should be avoided if possible, and for bulk encryption
	it’s best to use Camellia, Twofish, or AES. Beyond that guidance there is no
	“best algorithm” in GnuPG. It’s sort of like
	asking whether Godzilla or King Kong is better at terrorizing urban
	cities: there is no clear-cut winner.

	This is not to say you shouldn’t have preferences, though. It is only
	to say that GnuPG’s algorithms are so well-designed for what they do
	that there is no single “best”. There’s just a lot of personal,
	subjective choice.


	** Why is my DSA key limited to 3072 bits?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: no_dsa4096
	:END:


	The United States’ National Institute of Standards and Technology
	([[http://www.nist.gov][NIST]]) is responsible for the DSA specification. NIST has not
	published a 4096-bit DSA variant, and thus GnuPG doesn’t offer it.



	** Why does my DSA-1024 key use a different digest algorithm than my DSA-2048 or DSA-3072 key?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: hash_widths_in_dsa
	:END:


	The DSA algorithm has gone through several revisions.

	GnuPG’s original implementation of DSA supported 1024-bit keys that
	used either SHA-1 or RIPEMD-160 as hashes.

	When the United States’ National Institute of Standards and Technology
	([[http://www.nist.gov][NIST]]) revised the specification to support 2048- and 3072-bit keys,
	they also required longer hashes be used. DSA-2048 required a 224-bit
	hash (SHA-224, or a longer hash cut down to 224 bits), and DSA-3072
	required a 256-bit hash (SHA-256, or a longer hash cut down to 256
	bits). They also now allowed for stronger hashes to be used for
	DSA-1024: if they were more than 160 bits, they would simply be cut
	down.

	So, depending on how you have GnuPG configured, GnuPG might be forced
	to use SHA-1 and/or RIPEMD-160 with DSA-1024; GnuPG might be able to
	use any of the longer SHAs with DSA-1024; GnuPG might use SHA-224,
	-256, -384 or -512 for DSA-2048; GnuPG might use SHA-256, SHA-384 or
	SHA-512 for DSA-3072.

	** Why can't I decrypt things I encrypted twenty years ago with PGP 2.6?
	:PROPERTIES:
	:CUSTOM_ID: pgp_26
	:END:

	Twenty years ago, PGP 2.6 was released. It was very successful, but there
	were some unfortunate things about its design. Soon after a better version
	was released, and this was ultimately standardized as RFC 4880.

	GnuPG supports RFC 4880. It does not support PGP 2.6. This shouldn't be
	surprising: all software ultimately breaks compatibility with what came
	before it. Word processors of 2015 don't support the WordStar document
	format, just like you can't put a Kaypro floppy disk in a modern PC.

	If you absolutely must have PGP 2.6 support, we recommend you use PGP 2.6.
	It's easy to find on the internet. Barring that, you could use GnuPG 1.4,
	which is an older branch of GnuPG that had some (but by no means complete)
	PGP 2.6 support.



	* COMMENT HTML style specifications

	#+begin_src emacs-lisp
	(defun org-faq-make-target ()
	"Make hard target for current headline."
	(interactive)
	(if (not (org-on-heading-p))
	(error "Not on a headline"))
	(let ((h (org-trim (org-get-heading 'no-tags))))
	(if (string-match "[ \t]*\\?\\'" h)
	(setq h (replace-match "" t t h)))
	(while (string-match "[ \t]+" h)
	(setq h (replace-match "-" t t h)))
	(setq h (downcase h))
	(org-entry-put nil "CUSTOM_ID" h)))
	#+end_src


	# End:
	# Local Variables:

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