No OneTemporary
Actions

Size

438 KB

Subscribers

None

View Options

This file is larger than 256 KB, so syntax highlighting was skipped.

	diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi
	index 00ac03308..7b142cc19 100644
	--- a/doc/gpg.texi
	+++ b/doc/gpg.texi
	@@ -1,4223 +1,4219 @@
	@c Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
	@c 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	@c This is part of the GnuPG manual.
	@c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi.

	@include defs.inc

	@node Invoking GPG
	@chapter Invoking GPG
	@cindex GPG command options
	@cindex command options
	@cindex options, GPG command


	@c Begin standard stuff
	@ifclear gpgtwohack
	@manpage gpg.1
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg
	\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
	@end ifset

	@mansect synopsis
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg
	.RB [ \-\-homedir
	.IR dir ]
	.RB [ \-\-options
	.IR file ]
	.RI [ options ]
	.I command
	.RI [ args ]
	@end ifset
	@end ifclear
	@c End standard stuff

	@c Begin gpg2 hack stuff
	@ifset gpgtwohack
	@manpage gpg2.1
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
	@end ifset

	@mansect synopsis
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	.RB [ \-\-homedir
	.IR dir ]
	.RB [ \-\-options
	.IR file ]
	.RI [ options ]
	.I command
	.RI [ args ]
	@end ifset
	@end ifset
	@c End gpg2 hack stuff


	@mansect description
	@command{@gpgname} is the OpenPGP part of the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG). It
	is a tool to provide digital encryption and signing services using the
	OpenPGP standard. @command{@gpgname} features complete key management and
	all the bells and whistles you would expect from a full OpenPGP
	implementation.

	There are two main versions of GnuPG: GnuPG 1.x and GnuPG 2.x. GnuPG
	2.x supports modern encryption algorithms and thus should be preferred
	over GnuPG 1.x. You only need to use GnuPG 1.x if your platform
	doesn't support GnuPG 2.x, or you need support for some features that
	GnuPG 2.x has deprecated, e.g., decrypting data created with PGP-2
	keys.

	@ifclear gpgtwohack
	If you are looking for version 1 of GnuPG, you may find that version
	installed under the name @command{gpg1}.
	@end ifclear
	@ifset gpgtwohack
	In contrast to the standalone command @command{gpg} from GnuPG 1.x,
	the 2.x version is commonly installed under the name
	@command{@gpgname}.
	@end ifset

	@manpause

	@xref{Option Index}, for an index to @command{@gpgname}'s commands and options.
	@mancont

	@menu
	* GPG Commands:: List of all commands.
	* GPG Options:: List of all options.
	* GPG Configuration:: Configuration files.
	* GPG Examples:: Some usage examples.

	Developer information:
	* Unattended Usage of GPG:: Using @command{gpg} from other programs.
	@end menu

	@c * GPG Protocol:: The protocol the server mode uses.


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* COMMANDS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect commands
	@node GPG Commands
	@section Commands

	Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that
	only one command is allowed. Generally speaking, irrelevant options
	are silently ignored, and may not be checked for correctness.

	@command{@gpgname} may be run with no commands. In this case it will
	perform a reasonable action depending on the type of file it is given
	as input (an encrypted message is decrypted, a signature is verified,
	a file containing keys is listed, etc.).


	@menu
	* General GPG Commands:: Commands not specific to the functionality.
	* Operational GPG Commands:: Commands to select the type of operation.
	* OpenPGP Key Management:: How to manage your keys.
	@end menu


	@c *******************************************
	@c ******** GENERAL COMMANDS ***********
	@c *******************************************
	@node General GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands not specific to the function

	@table @gnupgtabopt
	@item --version
	@opindex version
	Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you
	cannot abbreviate this command.

	@item --help
	@itemx -h
	@opindex help
	Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command-line options.
	Note that you cannot arbitrarily abbreviate this command
	(though you can use its short form @option{-h}).

	@item --warranty
	@opindex warranty
	Print warranty information.

	@item --dump-options
	@opindex dump-options
	Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot
	abbreviate this command.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPERATIONAL COMMANDS *********
	@c *******************************************
	@node Operational GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands to select the type of operation


	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --sign
	@itemx -s
	@opindex sign
	Sign a message. This command may be combined with @option{--encrypt}
	(to sign and encrypt a message), @option{--symmetric} (to sign and
	symmetrically encrypt a message), or both @option{--encrypt} and
	@option{--symmetric} (to sign and encrypt a message that can be
	decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase). The signing key is
	chosen by default or can be set explicitly using the
	@option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key} options.

	@item --clear-sign
	@opindex clear-sign
	@itemx --clearsign
	@opindex clearsign
	Make a cleartext signature. The content in a cleartext signature is
	readable without any special software. OpenPGP software is only needed
	to verify the signature. cleartext signatures may modify end-of-line
	whitespace for platform independence and are not intended to be
	reversible. The signing key is chosen by default or can be set
	explicitly using the @option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key}
	options.


	@item --detach-sign
	@itemx -b
	@opindex detach-sign
	Make a detached signature.

	@item --encrypt
	@itemx -e
	@opindex encrypt
	Encrypt data to one or more public keys. This command may be combined
	with @option{--sign} (to sign and encrypt a message),
	@option{--symmetric} (to encrypt a message that can decrypted using a
	secret key or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and
	@option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that can be
	decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase). @option{--recipient}
	and related options specify which public keys to use for encryption.

	@item --symmetric
	@itemx -c
	@opindex symmetric
	Encrypt with a symmetric cipher using a passphrase. The default
	symmetric cipher used is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}, but may be chosen with the
	@option{--cipher-algo} option. This command may be combined with
	@option{--sign} (for a signed and symmetrically encrypted message),
	@option{--encrypt} (for a message that may be decrypted via a secret key
	or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and @option{--encrypt} together
	(for a signed message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a
	passphrase). @command{@gpgname} caches the passphrase used for
	symmetric encryption so that a decrypt operation may not require that
	the user needs to enter the passphrase. The option
	@option{--no-symkey-cache} can be used to disable this feature.

	@item --store
	@opindex store
	Store only (make a simple literal data packet).

	@item --decrypt
	@itemx -d
	@opindex decrypt
	Decrypt the file given on the command line (or STDIN if no file
	is specified) and write it to STDOUT (or the file specified with
	@option{--output}). If the decrypted file is signed, the signature is also
	verified. This command differs from the default operation, as it never
	writes to the filename which is included in the file and it rejects
	files that don't begin with an encrypted message.

	@item --verify
	@opindex verify
	Assume that the first argument is a signed file and verify it without
	generating any output. With no arguments, the signature packet is
	read from STDIN. If only one argument is given, the specified file is
	expected to include a complete signature.

	With more than one argument, the first argument should specify a file
	with a detached signature and the remaining files should contain the
	signed data. To read the signed data from STDIN, use @samp{-} as the
	second filename. For security reasons, a detached signature will not
	read the signed material from STDIN if not explicitly specified.

	Note: If the option @option{--batch} is not used, @command{@gpgname}
	may assume that a single argument is a file with a detached signature,
	and it will try to find a matching data file by stripping certain
	suffixes. Using this historical feature to verify a detached
	signature is strongly discouraged; you should always specify the data file
	explicitly.

	Note: When verifying a cleartext signature, @command{@gpgname} verifies
	only what makes up the cleartext signed data and not any extra data
	outside of the cleartext signature or the header lines directly following
	the dash marker line. The option @code{--output} may be used to write
	out the actual signed data, but there are other pitfalls with this
	format as well. It is suggested to avoid cleartext signatures in
	favor of detached signatures.

	Note: Sometimes the use of the @command{gpgv} tool is easier than
	using the full-fledged @command{gpg} with this option. @command{gpgv}
	is designed to compare signed data against a list of trusted keys and
	returns with success only for a good signature. It has its own manual
	page.


	@item --multifile
	@opindex multifile
	This modifies certain other commands to accept multiple files for
	processing on the command line or read from STDIN with each filename on
	a separate line. This allows for many files to be processed at
	once. @option{--multifile} may currently be used along with
	@option{--verify}, @option{--encrypt}, and @option{--decrypt}. Note that
	@option{--multifile --verify} may not be used with detached signatures.

	@item --verify-files
	@opindex verify-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --verify}.

	@item --encrypt-files
	@opindex encrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --encrypt}.

	@item --decrypt-files
	@opindex decrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --decrypt}.

	@item --list-keys
	@itemx -k
	@itemx --list-public-keys
	@opindex list-keys
	List the specified keys. If no keys are specified, then all keys from
	the configured public keyrings are listed.

	Never use the output of this command in scripts or other programs.
	The output is intended only for humans and its format is likely to
	change. The @option{--with-colons} option emits the output in a
	stable, machine-parseable format, which is intended for use by scripts
	and other programs.

	@item --list-secret-keys
	@itemx -K
	@opindex list-secret-keys
	List the specified secret keys. If no keys are specified, then all
	known secret keys are listed. A @code{#} after the initial tags
	@code{sec} or @code{ssb} means that the secret key or subkey is
	currently not usable. We also say that this key has been taken
	offline (for example, a primary key can be taken offline by exporting
	the key using the command @option{--export-secret-subkeys}). A
	@code{>} after these tags indicate that the key is stored on a
	smartcard. See also @option{--list-keys}.

	@item --check-signatures
	@opindex check-signatures
	@itemx --check-sigs
	@opindex check-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the key signatures are verified and
	listed too. Note that for performance reasons the revocation status
	of a signing key is not shown. This command has the same effect as
	using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-check}.

	The status of the verification is indicated by a flag directly
	following the "sig" tag (and thus before the flags described below. A
	"!" indicates that the signature has been successfully verified, a "-"
	denotes a bad signature and a "%" is used if an error occurred while
	checking the signature (e.g. a non supported algorithm). Signatures
	where the public key is not availabale are not listed; to see their
	keyids the command @option{--list-sigs} can be used.

	For each signature listed, there are several flags in between the
	signature status flag and keyid. These flags give additional
	information about each key signature. From left to right, they are
	the numbers 1-3 for certificate check level (see
	@option{--ask-cert-level}), "L" for a local or non-exportable
	signature (see @option{--lsign-key}), "R" for a nonRevocable signature
	(see the @option{--edit-key} command "nrsign"), "P" for a signature
	that contains a policy URL (see @option{--cert-policy-url}), "N" for a
	signature that contains a notation (see @option{--cert-notation}), "X"
	for an eXpired signature (see @option{--ask-cert-expire}), and the
	numbers 1-9 or "T" for 10 and above to indicate trust signature levels
	(see the @option{--edit-key} command "tsign").


	@item --locate-keys
	@opindex locate-keys
	Locate the keys given as arguments. This command basically uses the
	same algorithm as used when locating keys for encryption or signing and
	may thus be used to see what keys @command{@gpgname} might use. In
	particular external methods as defined by @option{--auto-key-locate} may
	be used to locate a key. Only public keys are listed.

	@item --fingerprint
	@opindex fingerprint
	List all keys (or the specified ones) along with their
	fingerprints. This is the same output as @option{--list-keys} but with
	the additional output of a line with the fingerprint. May also be
	combined with @option{--check-signatures}. If this
	command is given twice, the fingerprints of all secondary keys are
	listed too. This command also forces pretty printing of fingerprints
	if the keyid format has been set to "none".

	@item --list-packets
	@opindex list-packets
	List only the sequence of packets. This command is only useful for
	debugging. When used with option @option{--verbose} the actual MPI
	values are dumped and not only their lengths. Note that the output of
	this command may change with new releases.


	@item --edit-card
	@opindex edit-card
	@itemx --card-edit
	@opindex card-edit
	Present a menu to work with a smartcard. The subcommand "help" provides
	an overview on available commands. For a detailed description, please
	see the Card HOWTO at
	https://gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html#GnuPG-cardHOWTO .

	@item --card-status
	@opindex card-status
	Show the content of the smart card.

	@item --change-pin
	@opindex change-pin
	Present a menu to allow changing the PIN of a smartcard. This
	functionality is also available as the subcommand "passwd" with the
	@option{--edit-card} command.

	@item --delete-keys @var{name}
	@opindex delete-keys
	Remove key from the public keyring. In batch mode either @option{--yes} is
	required or the key must be specified by fingerprint. This is a
	safeguard against accidental deletion of multiple keys.

	@item --delete-secret-keys @var{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-keys
	Remove key from the secret keyring. In batch mode the key must be
	specified by fingerprint. The option @option{--yes} can be used to
	advice gpg-agent not to request a confirmation. This extra
	pre-caution is done because @command{@gpgname} can't be sure that the
	secret key (as controlled by gpg-agent) is only used for the given
	OpenPGP public key.


	@item --delete-secret-and-public-key @var{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-and-public-key
	Same as @option{--delete-key}, but if a secret key exists, it will be
	removed first. In batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint.
	The option @option{--yes} can be used to advice gpg-agent not to
	request a confirmation.

	@item --export
	@opindex export
	Either export all keys from all keyrings (default keyrings and those
	registered via option @option{--keyring}), or if at least one name is given,
	those of the given name. The exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the
	file given with option @option{--output}. Use together with
	@option{--armor} to mail those keys.

	@item --send-keys @var{keyIDs}
	@opindex send-keys
	Similar to @option{--export} but sends the keys to a keyserver.
	Fingerprints may be used instead of key IDs. Option
	@option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this
	keyserver. Don't send your complete keyring to a keyserver --- select
	only those keys which are new or changed by you. If no @var{keyIDs}
	are given, @command{@gpgname} does nothing.

	@item --export-secret-keys
	@itemx --export-secret-subkeys
	@opindex export-secret-keys
	@opindex export-secret-subkeys
	Same as @option{--export}, but exports the secret keys instead. The
	exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the file given with option
	@option{--output}. This command is often used along with the option
	@option{--armor} to allow for easy printing of the key for paper backup;
	however the external tool @command{paperkey} does a better job of
	creating backups on paper. Note that exporting a secret key can be a
	security risk if the exported keys are sent over an insecure channel.

	The second form of the command has the special property to render the
	secret part of the primary key useless; this is a GNU extension to
	OpenPGP and other implementations can not be expected to successfully
	import such a key. Its intended use is in generating a full key with
	an additional signing subkey on a dedicated machine. This command
	then exports the key without the primary key to the main machine.

	GnuPG may ask you to enter the passphrase for the key. This is
	required, because the internal protection method of the secret key is
	different from the one specified by the OpenPGP protocol.

	@item --export-ssh-key
	@opindex export-ssh-key
	This command is used to export a key in the OpenSSH public key format.
	It requires the specification of one key by the usual means and
	exports the latest valid subkey which has an authentication capability
	to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. That
	output can directly be added to ssh's @file{authorized_key} file.

	By specifying the key to export using a key ID or a fingerprint
	suffixed with an exclamation mark (!), a specific subkey or the
	primary key can be exported. This does not even require that the key
	has the authentication capability flag set.

	@item --import
	@itemx --fast-import
	@opindex import
	Import/merge keys. This adds the given keys to the
	keyring. The fast version is currently just a synonym.

	There are a few other options which control how this command works.
	Most notable here is the @option{--import-options merge-only} option
	which does not insert new keys but does only the merging of new
	signatures, user-IDs and subkeys.

	@item --receive-keys @var{keyIDs}
	@opindex receive-keys
	@itemx --recv-keys @var{keyIDs}
	@opindex recv-keys
	Import the keys with the given @var{keyIDs} from a keyserver. Option
	@option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this keyserver.

	@item --refresh-keys
	@opindex refresh-keys
	Request updates from a keyserver for keys that already exist on the
	local keyring. This is useful for updating a key with the latest
	signatures, user IDs, etc. Calling this with no arguments will refresh
	the entire keyring. Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the
	name of the keyserver for all keys that do not have preferred keyservers
	set (see @option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url}).

	@item --search-keys @var{names}
	@opindex search-keys
	Search the keyserver for the given @var{names}. Multiple names given here will
	be joined together to create the search string for the keyserver.
	Option @option{--keyserver} must be used to give the name of this
	keyserver. Keyservers that support different search methods allow using
	the syntax specified in "How to specify a user ID" below. Note that
	different keyserver types support different search methods. Currently
	only LDAP supports them all.

	@item --fetch-keys @var{URIs}
	@opindex fetch-keys
	Retrieve keys located at the specified @var{URIs}. Note that different
	installations of GnuPG may support different protocols (HTTP, FTP,
	LDAP, etc.). When using HTTPS the system provided root certificates
	are used by this command.

	@item --update-trustdb
	@opindex update-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance. This command iterates over all keys and
	builds the Web of Trust. This is an interactive command because it may
	have to ask for the "ownertrust" values for keys. The user has to give
	an estimation of how far she trusts the owner of the displayed key to
	correctly certify (sign) other keys. GnuPG only asks for the ownertrust
	value if it has not yet been assigned to a key. Using the
	@option{--edit-key} menu, the assigned value can be changed at any time.

	@item --check-trustdb
	@opindex check-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance without user interaction. From time to
	time the trust database must be updated so that expired keys or
	signatures and the resulting changes in the Web of Trust can be
	tracked. Normally, GnuPG will calculate when this is required and do it
	automatically unless @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} is set. This
	command can be used to force a trust database check at any time. The
	processing is identical to that of @option{--update-trustdb} but it
	skips keys with a not yet defined "ownertrust".

	For use with cron jobs, this command can be used together with
	@option{--batch} in which case the trust database check is done only if
	a check is needed. To force a run even in batch mode add the option
	@option{--yes}.

	@anchor{option --export-ownertrust}
	@item --export-ownertrust
	@opindex export-ownertrust
	Send the ownertrust values to STDOUT. This is useful for backup purposes
	as these values are the only ones which can't be re-created from a
	corrupted trustdb. Example:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	@gpgname{} --export-ownertrust > otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --import-ownertrust
	@opindex import-ownertrust
	Update the trustdb with the ownertrust values stored in @code{files} (or
	STDIN if not given); existing values will be overwritten. In case of a
	severely damaged trustdb and if you have a recent backup of the
	ownertrust values (e.g. in the file @file{otrust.txt}), you may re-create
	the trustdb using these commands:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	cd ~/.gnupg
	rm trustdb.gpg
	@gpgname{} --import-ownertrust < otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --rebuild-keydb-caches
	@opindex rebuild-keydb-caches
	When updating from version 1.0.6 to 1.0.7 this command should be used
	to create signature caches in the keyring. It might be handy in other
	situations too.

	@item --print-md @var{algo}
	@itemx --print-mds
	@opindex print-md
	Print message digest of algorithm @var{algo} for all given files or STDIN.
	With the second form (or a deprecated "*" for @var{algo}) digests for all
	available algorithms are printed.

	@item --gen-random @var{0\|1\|2} @var{count}
	@opindex gen-random
	Emit @var{count} random bytes of the given quality level 0, 1 or 2. If
	@var{count} is not given or zero, an endless sequence of random bytes
	will be emitted. If used with @option{--armor} the output will be
	base64 encoded. PLEASE, don't use this command unless you know what
	you are doing; it may remove precious entropy from the system!

	@item --gen-prime @var{mode} @var{bits}
	@opindex gen-prime
	Use the source, Luke :-). The output format is subject to change
	with ant release.


	@item --enarmor
	@itemx --dearmor
	@opindex enarmor
	@opindex dearmor
	Pack or unpack an arbitrary input into/from an OpenPGP ASCII armor.
	This is a GnuPG extension to OpenPGP and in general not very useful.

	@item --tofu-policy @{auto\|good\|unknown\|bad\|ask@} @var{keys}
	@opindex tofu-policy
	Set the TOFU policy for all the bindings associated with the specified
	@var{keys}. For more information about the meaning of the policies,
	@pxref{trust-model-tofu}. The @var{keys} may be specified either by their
	fingerprint (preferred) or their keyid.

	@c @item --server
	@c @opindex server
	@c Run gpg in server mode. This feature is not yet ready for use and
	@c thus not documented.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ***** KEY MANGEMENT COMMANDS ********
	@c *******************************************
	@node OpenPGP Key Management
	@subsection How to manage your keys

	This section explains the main commands for key management.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --quick-generate-key @var{user-id} [@var{algo} [@var{usage} [@var{expire}]]]
	@itemx --quick-gen-key
	@opindex quick-generate-key
	@opindex quick-gen-key
	This is a simple command to generate a standard key with one user id.
	In contrast to @option{--generate-key} the key is generated directly
	without the need to answer a bunch of prompts. Unless the option
	@option{--yes} is given, the key creation will be canceled if the
	given user id already exists in the keyring.

	If invoked directly on the console without any special options an
	answer to a ``Continue?'' style confirmation prompt is required. In
	case the user id already exists in the keyring a second prompt to
	force the creation of the key will show up.

	If @var{algo} or @var{usage} are given, only the primary key is
	created and no prompts are shown. To specify an expiration date but
	still create a primary and subkey use ``default'' or
	``future-default'' for @var{algo} and ``default'' for @var{usage}.
	For a description of these optional arguments see the command
	@code{--quick-add-key}. The @var{usage} accepts also the value
	``cert'' which can be used to create a certification only primary key;
	the default is to a create certification and signing key.

	The @var{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date
	for the key. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO formats
	``YYYY-MM-DD'' or ``YYYYMMDDThhmmss'' are used. To make the key
	expire in N seconds, N days, N weeks, N months, or N years use
	``seconds=N'', ``Nd'', ``Nw'', ``Nm'', or ``Ny'' respectively. Not
	specifying a value, or using ``-'' results in a key expiring in a
	reasonable default interval. The values ``never'', ``none'' can be
	used for no expiration date.

	If this command is used with @option{--batch},
	@option{--pinentry-mode} has been set to @code{loopback}, and one of
	the passphrase options (@option{--passphrase},
	@option{--passphrase-fd}, or @option{passphrase-file}) is used, the
	supplied passphrase is used for the new key and the agent does not ask
	for it. To create a key without any protection @code{--passphrase ''}
	may be used.

	@item --quick-set-expire @var{fpr} @var{expire} [*\|@var{subfprs}]
	@opindex quick-set-expire
	With two arguments given, directly set the expiration time of the
	primary key identified by @var{fpr} to @var{expire}. To remove the
	expiration time @code{0} can be used. With three arguments and the
	third given as an asterisk, the expiration time of all non-revoked and
	not yet expired subkeys are set to @var{expire}. With more than two
	arguments and a list of fingerprints given for @var{subfprs}, all
	non-revoked subkeys matching these fingerprints are set to
	@var{expire}.


	@item --quick-add-key @var{fpr} [@var{algo} [@var{usage} [@var{expire}]]]
	@opindex quick-add-key
	Directly add a subkey to the key identified by the fingerprint
	@var{fpr}. Without the optional arguments an encryption subkey is
	added. If any of the arguments are given a more specific subkey is
	added.

	@var{algo} may be any of the supported algorithms or curve names
	given in the format as used by key listings. To use the default
	algorithm the string ``default'' or ``-'' can be used. Supported
	algorithms are ``rsa'', ``dsa'', ``elg'', ``ed25519'', ``cv25519'',
	and other ECC curves. For example the string ``rsa'' adds an RSA key
	with the default key length; a string ``rsa4096'' requests that the
	key length is 4096 bits. The string ``future-default'' is an alias
	for the algorithm which will likely be used as default algorithm in
	future versions of gpg.

	Depending on the given @var{algo} the subkey may either be an
	encryption subkey or a signing subkey. If an algorithm is capable of
	signing and encryption and such a subkey is desired, a @var{usage}
	string must be given. This string is either ``default'' or ``-'' to
	keep the default or a comma delimited list (or space delimited list)
	of keywords: ``sign'' for a signing subkey, ``auth'' for an
	authentication subkey, and ``encr'' for an encryption subkey
	(``encrypt'' can be used as alias for ``encr''). The valid
	combinations depend on the algorithm.

	The @var{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date
	for the key. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO formats
	``YYYY-MM-DD'' or ``YYYYMMDDThhmmss'' are used. To make the key
	expire in N seconds, N days, N weeks, N months, or N years use
	``seconds=N'', ``Nd'', ``Nw'', ``Nm'', or ``Ny'' respectively. Not
	specifying a value, or using ``-'' results in a key expiring in a
	reasonable default interval. The values ``never'', ``none'' can be
	used for no expiration date.

	@item --generate-key
	@opindex generate-key
	@itemx --gen-key
	@opindex gen-key
	Generate a new key pair using the current default parameters. This is
	the standard command to create a new key. In addition to the key a
	revocation certificate is created and stored in the
	@file{openpgp-revocs.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory.

	@item --full-generate-key
	@opindex full-generate-key
	@itemx --full-gen-key
	@opindex full-gen-key
	Generate a new key pair with dialogs for all options. This is an
	extended version of @option{--generate-key}.

	There is also a feature which allows you to create keys in batch
	mode. See the manual section ``Unattended key generation'' on how
	to use this.


	@item --generate-revocation @var{name}
	@opindex generate-revocation
	@itemx --gen-revoke @var{name}
	@opindex gen-revoke
	Generate a revocation certificate for the complete key. To only revoke
	a subkey or a key signature, use the @option{--edit} command.

	This command merely creates the revocation certificate so that it can
	be used to revoke the key if that is ever needed. To actually revoke
	a key the created revocation certificate needs to be merged with the
	key to revoke. This is done by importing the revocation certificate
	using the @option{--import} command. Then the revoked key needs to be
	published, which is best done by sending the key to a keyserver
	(command @option{--send-key}) and by exporting (@option{--export}) it
	to a file which is then send to frequent communication partners.


	@item --generate-designated-revocation @var{name}
	@opindex generate-designated-revocation
	@itemx --desig-revoke @var{name}
	@opindex desig-revoke
	Generate a designated revocation certificate for a key. This allows a
	user (with the permission of the keyholder) to revoke someone else's
	key.


	@item --edit-key
	@opindex edit-key
	Present a menu which enables you to do most of the key management
	related tasks. It expects the specification of a key on the command
	line.

	@c ****** Begin Edit-key Options ********
	@table @asis

	@item uid @var{n}
	@opindex keyedit:uid
	Toggle selection of user ID or photographic user ID with index @var{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item key @var{n}
	@opindex keyedit:key
	Toggle selection of subkey with index @var{n} or key ID @var{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item sign
	@opindex keyedit:sign
	Make a signature on key of user @code{name}. If the key is not yet
	signed by the default user (or the users given with @option{-u}), the program
	displays the information of the key again, together with its
	fingerprint and asks whether it should be signed. This question is
	repeated for all users specified with
	@option{-u}.

	@item lsign
	@opindex keyedit:lsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-exportable and will
	therefore never be used by others. This may be used to make keys
	valid only in the local environment.

	@item nrsign
	@opindex keyedit:nrsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-revocable and can
	therefore never be revoked.

	@item tsign
	@opindex keyedit:tsign
	Make a trust signature. This is a signature that combines the notions
	of certification (like a regular signature), and trust (like the
	"trust" command). It is generally only useful in distinct communities
	or groups. For more information please read the sections
	``Trust Signature'' and ``Regular Expression'' in RFC-4880.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	Note that "l" (for local / non-exportable), "nr" (for non-revocable,
	and "t" (for trust) may be freely mixed and prefixed to "sign" to
	create a signature of any type desired.
	@c man:.RE

	If the option @option{--only-sign-text-ids} is specified, then any
	non-text based user ids (e.g., photo IDs) will not be selected for
	signing.

	@table @asis

	@item delsig
	@opindex keyedit:delsig
	Delete a signature. Note that it is not possible to retract a signature,
	once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case
	you better use @code{revsig}.

	@item revsig
	@opindex keyedit:revsig
	Revoke a signature. For every signature which has been generated by
	one of the secret keys, GnuPG asks whether a revocation certificate
	should be generated.

	@item check
	@opindex keyedit:check
	Check the signatures on all selected user IDs. With the extra
	option @code{selfsig} only self-signatures are shown.

	@item adduid
	@opindex keyedit:adduid
	Create an additional user ID.

	@item addphoto
	@opindex keyedit:addphoto
	Create a photographic user ID. This will prompt for a JPEG file that
	will be embedded into the user ID. Note that a very large JPEG will make
	for a very large key. Also note that some programs will display your
	JPEG unchanged (GnuPG), and some programs will scale it to fit in a
	dialog box (PGP).

	@item showphoto
	@opindex keyedit:showphoto
	Display the selected photographic user ID.

	@item deluid
	@opindex keyedit:deluid
	Delete a user ID or photographic user ID. Note that it is not
	possible to retract a user id, once it has been send to the public
	(i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revuid}.

	@item revuid
	@opindex keyedit:revuid
	Revoke a user ID or photographic user ID.

	@item primary
	@opindex keyedit:primary
	Flag the current user id as the primary one, removes the primary user
	id flag from all other user ids and sets the timestamp of all affected
	self-signatures one second ahead. Note that setting a photo user ID
	as primary makes it primary over other photo user IDs, and setting a
	regular user ID as primary makes it primary over other regular user
	IDs.

	@item keyserver
	@opindex keyedit:keyserver
	Set a preferred keyserver for the specified user ID(s). This allows
	other users to know where you prefer they get your key from. See
	@option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url} for more on how this
	works. Setting a value of "none" removes an existing preferred
	keyserver.

	@item notation
	@opindex keyedit:notation
	Set a name=value notation for the specified user ID(s). See
	@option{--cert-notation} for more on how this works. Setting a value of
	"none" removes all notations, setting a notation prefixed with a minus
	sign (-) removes that notation, and setting a notation name (without the
	=value) prefixed with a minus sign removes all notations with that name.

	@item pref
	@opindex keyedit:pref
	List preferences from the selected user ID. This shows the actual
	preferences, without including any implied preferences.

	@item showpref
	@opindex keyedit:showpref
	More verbose preferences listing for the selected user ID. This shows
	the preferences in effect by including the implied preferences of 3DES
	(cipher), SHA-1 (digest), and Uncompressed (compression) if they are
	not already included in the preference list. In addition, the
	preferred keyserver and signature notations (if any) are shown.

	@item setpref @var{string}
	@opindex keyedit:setpref
	Set the list of user ID preferences to @var{string} for all (or just
	the selected) user IDs. Calling setpref with no arguments sets the
	preference list to the default (either built-in or set via
	@option{--default-preference-list}), and calling setpref with "none"
	as the argument sets an empty preference list. Use @command{@gpgname
	--version} to get a list of available algorithms. Note that while you
	can change the preferences on an attribute user ID (aka "photo ID"),
	GnuPG does not select keys via attribute user IDs so these preferences
	will not be used by GnuPG.

	When setting preferences, you should list the algorithms in the order
	which you'd like to see them used by someone else when encrypting a
	message to your key. If you don't include 3DES, it will be
	automatically added at the end. Note that there are many factors that
	go into choosing an algorithm (for example, your key may not be the
	only recipient), and so the remote OpenPGP application being used to
	send to you may or may not follow your exact chosen order for a given
	message. It will, however, only choose an algorithm that is present
	on the preference list of every recipient key. See also the
	INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below.

	@item addkey
	@opindex keyedit:addkey
	Add a subkey to this key.

	@item addcardkey
	@opindex keyedit:addcardkey
	Generate a subkey on a card and add it to this key.

	@item keytocard
	@opindex keyedit:keytocard
	Transfer the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey
	has been selected) to a smartcard. The secret key in the keyring will
	be replaced by a stub if the key could be stored successfully on the
	card and you use the save command later. Only certain key types may be
	transferred to the card. A sub menu allows you to select on what card
	to store the key. Note that it is not possible to get that key back
	from the card - if the card gets broken your secret key will be lost
	unless you have a backup somewhere.

	@item bkuptocard @var{file}
	@opindex keyedit:bkuptocard
	Restore the given @var{file} to a card. This command may be used to restore a
	backup key (as generated during card initialization) to a new card. In
	almost all cases this will be the encryption key. You should use this
	command only with the corresponding public key and make sure that the
	file given as argument is indeed the backup to restore. You should then
	select 2 to restore as encryption key. You will first be asked to enter
	the passphrase of the backup key and then for the Admin PIN of the card.

	@item delkey
	@opindex keyedit:delkey
	Remove a subkey (secondary key). Note that it is not possible to retract
	a subkey, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In
	that case you better use @code{revkey}. Also note that this only
	deletes the public part of a key.

	@item revkey
	@opindex keyedit:revkey
	Revoke a subkey.

	@item expire
	@opindex keyedit:expire
	Change the key or subkey expiration time. If a subkey is selected, the
	expiration time of this subkey will be changed. With no selection, the
	key expiration of the primary key is changed.

	@item trust
	@opindex keyedit:trust
	Change the owner trust value for the key. This updates the trust-db
	immediately and no save is required.

	@item disable
	@itemx enable
	@opindex keyedit:disable
	@opindex keyedit:enable
	Disable or enable an entire key. A disabled key can not normally be
	used for encryption.

	@item addrevoker
	@opindex keyedit:addrevoker
	Add a designated revoker to the key. This takes one optional argument:
	"sensitive". If a designated revoker is marked as sensitive, it will
	not be exported by default (see export-options).

	@item passwd
	@opindex keyedit:passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key.

	@item toggle
	@opindex keyedit:toggle
	This is dummy command which exists only for backward compatibility.

	@item clean
	@opindex keyedit:clean
	Compact (by removing all signatures except the selfsig) any user ID
	that is no longer usable (e.g. revoked, or expired). Then, remove any
	signatures that are not usable by the trust calculations.
	Specifically, this removes any signature that does not validate, any
	signature that is superseded by a later signature, revoked signatures,
	and signatures issued by keys that are not present on the keyring.

	@item minimize
	@opindex keyedit:minimize
	Make the key as small as possible. This removes all signatures from
	each user ID except for the most recent self-signature.

	@item change-usage
	@opindex keyedit:change-usage
	Change the usage flags (capabilities) of the primary key or of
	subkeys. These usage flags (e.g. Certify, Sign, Authenticate,
	Encrypt) are set during key creation. Sometimes it is useful to
	have the opportunity to change them (for example to add
	Authenticate) after they have been created. Please take care when
	doing this; the allowed usage flags depend on the key algorithm.

	@item cross-certify
	@opindex keyedit:cross-certify
	Add cross-certification signatures to signing subkeys that may not
	currently have them. Cross-certification signatures protect against a
	subtle attack against signing subkeys. See
	@option{--require-cross-certification}. All new keys generated have
	this signature by default, so this command is only useful to bring
	older keys up to date.

	@item save
	@opindex keyedit:save
	Save all changes to the keyrings and quit.

	@item quit
	@opindex keyedit:quit
	Quit the program without updating the
	keyrings.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	The listing shows you the key with its secondary keys and all user
	IDs. The primary user ID is indicated by a dot, and selected keys or
	user IDs are indicated by an asterisk. The trust
	value is displayed with the primary key: "trust" is the assigned owner
	trust and "validity" is the calculated validity of the key. Validity
	values are also displayed for all user IDs.
	For possible values of trust, @pxref{trust-values}.
	@c man:.RE
	@c ****** End Edit-key Options ********

	@item --sign-key @var{name}
	@opindex sign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key. This is a shortcut version of
	the subcommand "sign" from @option{--edit}.

	@item --lsign-key @var{name}
	@opindex lsign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key but marks it as
	non-exportable. This is a shortcut version of the subcommand "lsign"
	from @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --quick-sign-key @var{fpr} [@var{names}]
	@itemx --quick-lsign-key @var{fpr} [@var{names}]
	@opindex quick-sign-key
	@opindex quick-lsign-key
	Directly sign a key from the passphrase without any further user
	interaction. The @var{fpr} must be the verified primary fingerprint
	of a key in the local keyring. If no @var{names} are given, all
	useful user ids are signed; with given [@var{names}] only useful user
	ids matching one of theses names are signed. By default, or if a name
	is prefixed with a '*', a case insensitive substring match is used.
	If a name is prefixed with a '=' a case sensitive exact match is done.

	The command @option{--quick-lsign-key} marks the signatures as
	non-exportable. If such a non-exportable signature already exists the
	@option{--quick-sign-key} turns it into a exportable signature.

	This command uses reasonable defaults and thus does not provide the
	full flexibility of the "sign" subcommand from @option{--edit-key}.
	Its intended use is to help unattended key signing by utilizing a list
	of verified fingerprints.

	@item --quick-add-uid @var{user-id} @var{new-user-id}
	@opindex quick-add-uid
	This command adds a new user id to an existing key. In contrast to
	the interactive sub-command @code{adduid} of @option{--edit-key} the
	@var{new-user-id} is added verbatim with only leading and trailing
	white space removed, it is expected to be UTF-8 encoded, and no checks
	on its form are applied.

	@item --quick-revoke-uid @var{user-id} @var{user-id-to-revoke}
	@opindex quick-revoke-uid
	This command revokes a user ID on an existing key. It cannot be used
	to revoke the last user ID on key (some non-revoked user ID must
	remain), with revocation reason ``User ID is no longer valid''. If
	you want to specify a different revocation reason, or to supply
	supplementary revocation text, you should use the interactive
	sub-command @code{revuid} of @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --quick-set-primary-uid @var{user-id} @var{primary-user-id}
	@opindex quick-set-primary-uid
	This command sets or updates the primary user ID flag on an existing
	key. @var{user-id} specifies the key and @var{primary-user-id} the
	user ID which shall be flagged as the primary user ID. The primary
	user ID flag is removed from all other user ids and the timestamp of
	all affected self-signatures is set one second ahead.


	@item --change-passphrase @var{user-id}
	@opindex change-passphrase
	@itemx --passwd @var{user-id}
	@opindex passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key belonging to the certificate
	specified as @var{user-id}. This is a shortcut for the sub-command
	@code{passwd} of the edit key menu. When using together with the
	option @option{--dry-run} this will not actually change the passphrase
	but check that the current passphrase is correct.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* OPTIONS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect options
	@node GPG Options
	@section Option Summary

	@command{@gpgname} features a bunch of options to control the exact
	behaviour and to change the default configuration.

	@menu
	* GPG Configuration Options:: How to change the configuration.
	* GPG Key related Options:: Key related options.
	* GPG Input and Output:: Input and Output.
	* OpenPGP Options:: OpenPGP protocol specific options.
	* Compliance Options:: Compliance options.
	* GPG Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually doesn't want to do.
	* Deprecated Options:: Deprecated options.
	@end menu

	Long options can be put in an options file (default
	"~/.gnupg/gpg.conf"). Short option names will not work - for example,
	"armor" is a valid option for the options file, while "a" is not. Do not
	write the 2 dashes, but simply the name of the option and any required
	arguments. Lines with a hash ('#') as the first non-white-space
	character are ignored. Commands may be put in this file too, but that is
	not generally useful as the command will execute automatically with
	every execution of gpg.

	Please remember that option parsing stops as soon as a non-option is
	encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by using the special option
	@option{--}.

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** CONFIGURATION OPTIONS ********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Configuration Options
	@subsection How to change the configuration

	These options are used to change the configuration and are usually found
	in the option file.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --default-key @var{name}
	@opindex default-key
	Use @var{name} as the default key to sign with. If this option is not
	used, the default key is the first key found in the secret keyring.
	Note that @option{-u} or @option{--local-user} overrides this option.
	This option may be given multiple times. In this case, the last key
	for which a secret key is available is used. If there is no secret
	key available for any of the specified values, GnuPG will not emit an
	error message but continue as if this option wasn't given.

	@item --default-recipient @var{name}
	@opindex default-recipient
	Use @var{name} as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is
	not used and don't ask if this is a valid one. @var{name} must be
	non-empty.

	@item --default-recipient-self
	@opindex default-recipient-self
	Use the default key as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is not
	used and don't ask if this is a valid one. The default key is the first
	one from the secret keyring or the one set with @option{--default-key}.

	@item --no-default-recipient
	@opindex no-default-recipient
	Reset @option{--default-recipient} and @option{--default-recipient-self}.

	@item -v, --verbose
	@opindex verbose
	Give more information during processing. If used
	twice, the input data is listed in detail.

	@item --no-verbose
	@opindex no-verbose
	Reset verbose level to 0.

	@item -q, --quiet
	@opindex quiet
	Try to be as quiet as possible.

	@item --batch
	@itemx --no-batch
	@opindex batch
	@opindex no-batch
	Use batch mode. Never ask, do not allow interactive commands.
	@option{--no-batch} disables this option. Note that even with a
	filename given on the command line, gpg might still need to read from
	STDIN (in particular if gpg figures that the input is a
	detached signature and no data file has been specified). Thus if you
	do not want to feed data via STDIN, you should connect STDIN to
	g@file{/dev/null}.

	It is highly recommended to use this option along with the options
	@option{--status-fd} and @option{--with-colons} for any unattended use of
	@command{gpg}.

	@item --no-tty
	@opindex no-tty
	Make sure that the TTY (terminal) is never used for any output.
	This option is needed in some cases because GnuPG sometimes prints
	warnings to the TTY even if @option{--batch} is used.

	@item --yes
	@opindex yes
	Assume "yes" on most questions.

	@item --no
	@opindex no
	Assume "no" on most questions.


	@item --list-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex list-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	listing keys and signatures (that is, @option{--list-keys},
	@option{--check-signatures}, @option{--list-public-keys},
	@option{--list-secret-keys}, and the @option{--edit-key} functions).
	Options can be prepended with a @option{no-} (after the two dashes) to
	give the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex list-options:show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--check-signatures},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, and @option{--list-secret-keys} to
	display any photo IDs attached to the key. Defaults to no. See also
	@option{--photo-viewer}. Does not work with @option{--with-colons}:
	see @option{--attribute-fd} for the appropriate way to get photo data
	for scripts and other frontends.

	@item show-usage
	@opindex list-options:show-usage
	Show usage information for keys and subkeys in the standard key
	listing. This is a list of letters indicating the allowed usage for a
	key (@code{E}=encryption, @code{S}=signing, @code{C}=certification,
	@code{A}=authentication). Defaults to yes.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--check-signatures}
	listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	@option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the
	@option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex list-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of user IDs during key listings.
	Defaults to yes.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-unusable-subkeys
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-subkeys
	Show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-keyring
	@opindex list-options:show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-expire
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-expire
	Show signature expiration dates (if any) during
	@option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-subpackets
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-subpackets
	Include signature subpackets in the key listing. This option can take an
	optional argument list of the subpackets to list. If no argument is
	passed, list all subpackets. Defaults to no. This option is only
	meaningful when using @option{--with-colons} along with
	@option{--check-signatures}.

	@end table

	@item --verify-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex verify-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	verifying signatures. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give
	the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex verify-options:show-photos
	Display any photo IDs present on the key that issued the signature.
	Defaults to no. See also @option{--photo-viewer}.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the signature being verified. Defaults to yes.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	signature being verified. Defaults to IETF standard.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the signature being verified.
	Defaults to yes.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex verify-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of the user IDs on the key that issued
	the signature. Defaults to yes.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex verify-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs during signature verification.
	Defaults to no.

	@item show-primary-uid-only
	@opindex verify-options:show-primary-uid-only
	Show only the primary user ID during signature verification. That is
	all the AKA lines as well as photo Ids are not shown with the signature
	verification status.

	@item pka-lookups
	@opindex verify-options:pka-lookups
	Enable PKA lookups to verify sender addresses. Note that PKA is based
	on DNS, and so enabling this option may disclose information on when
	and what signatures are verified or to whom data is encrypted. This
	is similar to the "web bug" described for the @option{--auto-key-retrieve}
	option.

	@item pka-trust-increase
	@opindex verify-options:pka-trust-increase
	Raise the trust in a signature to full if the signature passes PKA
	validation. This option is only meaningful if pka-lookups is set.
	@end table

	@item --enable-large-rsa
	@itemx --disable-large-rsa
	@opindex enable-large-rsa
	@opindex disable-large-rsa
	With --generate-key and --batch, enable the creation of RSA secret keys as
	large as 8192 bit. Note: 8192 bit is more than is generally
	recommended. These large keys don't significantly improve security,
	but they are more expensive to use, and their signatures and
	certifications are larger. This option is only available if the
	binary was build with large-secmem support.

	@item --enable-dsa2
	@itemx --disable-dsa2
	@opindex enable-dsa2
	@opindex disable-dsa2
	Enable hash truncation for all DSA keys even for old DSA Keys up to
	1024 bit. This is also the default with @option{--openpgp}. Note
	that older versions of GnuPG also required this flag to allow the
	generation of DSA larger than 1024 bit.

	@item --photo-viewer @var{string}
	@opindex photo-viewer
	This is the command line that should be run to view a photo ID. "%i"
	will be expanded to a filename containing the photo. "%I" does the
	same, except the file will not be deleted once the viewer exits.
	Other flags are "%k" for the key ID, "%K" for the long key ID, "%f"
	for the key fingerprint, "%t" for the extension of the image type
	(e.g. "jpg"), "%T" for the MIME type of the image (e.g. "image/jpeg"),
	"%v" for the single-character calculated validity of the image being
	viewed (e.g. "f"), "%V" for the calculated validity as a string (e.g.
	"full"), "%U" for a base32 encoded hash of the user ID,
	and "%%" for an actual percent sign. If neither %i or %I are present,
	then the photo will be supplied to the viewer on standard input.

	The default viewer is "xloadimage -fork -quiet -title 'KeyID 0x%k'
	STDIN". Note that if your image viewer program is not secure, then
	executing it from GnuPG does not make it secure.

	@item --exec-path @var{string}
	@opindex exec-path
	@efindex PATH
	Sets a list of directories to search for photo viewers and keyserver
	helpers. If not provided, keyserver helpers use the compiled-in
	default directory, and photo viewers use the @code{PATH} environment
	variable.
	Note, that on W32 system this value is ignored when searching for
	keyserver helpers.

	@item --keyring @var{file}
	@opindex keyring
	Add @var{file} to the current list of keyrings. If @var{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory ("~/.gnupg" if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is not
	used).

	Note that this adds a keyring to the current list. If the intent is to
	use the specified keyring alone, use @option{--keyring} along with
	@option{--no-default-keyring}.

	If the option @option{--no-keyring} has been used no keyrings will
	be used at all.


	@item --secret-keyring @var{file}
	@opindex secret-keyring
	This is an obsolete option and ignored. All secret keys are stored in
	the @file{private-keys-v1.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory.

	@item --primary-keyring @var{file}
	@opindex primary-keyring
	Designate @var{file} as the primary public keyring. This means that
	newly imported keys (via @option{--import} or keyserver
	@option{--recv-from}) will go to this keyring.

	@item --trustdb-name @var{file}
	@opindex trustdb-name
	Use @var{file} instead of the default trustdb. If @var{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory (@file{~/.gnupg} if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is
	not used).

	@include opt-homedir.texi


	@item --display-charset @var{name}
	@opindex display-charset
	Set the name of the native character set. This is used to convert
	some informational strings like user IDs to the proper UTF-8 encoding.
	Note that this has nothing to do with the character set of data to be
	encrypted or signed; GnuPG does not recode user-supplied data. If
	this option is not used, the default character set is determined from
	the current locale. A verbosity level of 3 shows the chosen set.
	Valid values for @var{name} are:

	@table @asis

	@item iso-8859-1
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-1
	This is the Latin 1 set.

	@item iso-8859-2
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-2
	The Latin 2 set.

	@item iso-8859-15
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-15
	This is currently an alias for
	the Latin 1 set.

	@item koi8-r
	@opindex display-charset:koi8-r
	The usual Russian set (RFC-1489).

	@item utf-8
	@opindex display-charset:utf-8
	Bypass all translations and assume
	that the OS uses native UTF-8 encoding.
	@end table

	@item --utf8-strings
	@itemx --no-utf8-strings
	@opindex utf8-strings
	Assume that command line arguments are given as UTF-8 strings. The
	default (@option{--no-utf8-strings}) is to assume that arguments are
	encoded in the character set as specified by
	@option{--display-charset}. These options affect all following
	arguments. Both options may be used multiple times.

	@anchor{gpg-option --options}
	@item --options @var{file}
	@opindex options
	Read options from @var{file} and do not try to read them from the
	default options file in the homedir (see @option{--homedir}). This
	option is ignored if used in an options file.

	@item --no-options
	@opindex no-options
	Shortcut for @option{--options /dev/null}. This option is detected
	before an attempt to open an option file. Using this option will also
	prevent the creation of a @file{~/.gnupg} homedir.

	@item -z @var{n}
	@itemx --compress-level @var{n}
	@itemx --bzip2-compress-level @var{n}
	@opindex compress-level
	@opindex bzip2-compress-level
	Set compression level to @var{n} for the ZIP and ZLIB compression
	algorithms. The default is to use the default compression level of zlib
	(normally 6). @option{--bzip2-compress-level} sets the compression level
	for the BZIP2 compression algorithm (defaulting to 6 as well). This is a
	different option from @option{--compress-level} since BZIP2 uses a
	significant amount of memory for each additional compression level.
	@option{-z} sets both. A value of 0 for @var{n} disables compression.

	@item --bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	@opindex bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	Use a different decompression method for BZIP2 compressed files. This
	alternate method uses a bit more than half the memory, but also runs
	at half the speed. This is useful under extreme low memory
	circumstances when the file was originally compressed at a high
	@option{--bzip2-compress-level}.


	@item --mangle-dos-filenames
	@itemx --no-mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex no-mangle-dos-filenames
	Older version of Windows cannot handle filenames with more than one
	dot. @option{--mangle-dos-filenames} causes GnuPG to replace (rather
	than add to) the extension of an output filename to avoid this
	problem. This option is off by default and has no effect on non-Windows
	platforms.

	@item --ask-cert-level
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-level
	@opindex ask-cert-level
	When making a key signature, prompt for a certification level. If this
	option is not specified, the certification level used is set via
	@option{--default-cert-level}. See @option{--default-cert-level} for
	information on the specific levels and how they are
	used. @option{--no-ask-cert-level} disables this option. This option
	defaults to no.

	@item --default-cert-level @var{n}
	@opindex default-cert-level
	The default to use for the check level when signing a key.

	0 means you make no particular claim as to how carefully you verified
	the key.

	1 means you believe the key is owned by the person who claims to own
	it but you could not, or did not verify the key at all. This is
	useful for a "persona" verification, where you sign the key of a
	pseudonymous user.

	2 means you did casual verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint and checked the
	user ID on the key against a photo ID.

	3 means you did extensive verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint with the owner of the
	key in person, and that you checked, by means of a hard to forge
	document with a photo ID (such as a passport) that the name of the key
	owner matches the name in the user ID on the key, and finally that you
	verified (by exchange of email) that the email address on the key
	belongs to the key owner.

	Note that the examples given above for levels 2 and 3 are just that:
	examples. In the end, it is up to you to decide just what "casual"
	and "extensive" mean to you.

	This option defaults to 0 (no particular claim).

	@item --min-cert-level
	@opindex min-cert-level
	When building the trust database, treat any signatures with a
	certification level below this as invalid. Defaults to 2, which
	disregards level 1 signatures. Note that level 0 "no particular
	claim" signatures are always accepted.

	@item --trusted-key @var{long key ID}
	@opindex trusted-key
	Assume that the specified key (which must be given
	as a full 8 byte key ID) is as trustworthy as one of
	your own secret keys. This option is useful if you
	don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them)
	online but still want to be able to check the validity of a given
	recipient's or signator's key.

	@item --trust-model @{pgp\|classic\|tofu\|tofu+pgp\|direct\|always\|auto@}
	@opindex trust-model
	Set what trust model GnuPG should follow. The models are:

	@table @asis

	@item pgp
	@opindex trust-model:pgp
	This is the Web of Trust combined with trust signatures as used in PGP
	5.x and later. This is the default trust model when creating a new
	trust database.

	@item classic
	@opindex trust-model:classic
	This is the standard Web of Trust as introduced by PGP 2.

	@item tofu
	@opindex trust-model:tofu
	@anchor{trust-model-tofu}
	TOFU stands for Trust On First Use. In this trust model, the first
	time a key is seen, it is memorized. If later another key with a
	user id with the same email address is seen, both keys are marked as
	suspect. In that case, the next time either is used, a warning is
	displayed describing the conflict, why it might have occurred
	(either the user generated a new key and failed to cross sign the
	old and new keys, the key is forgery, or a man-in-the-middle attack
	is being attempted), and the user is prompted to manually confirm
	the validity of the key in question.

	Because a potential attacker is able to control the email address
	and thereby circumvent the conflict detection algorithm by using an
	email address that is similar in appearance to a trusted email
	address, whenever a message is verified, statistics about the number
	of messages signed with the key are shown. In this way, a user can
	easily identify attacks using fake keys for regular correspondents.

	When compared with the Web of Trust, TOFU offers significantly
	weaker security guarantees. In particular, TOFU only helps ensure
	consistency (that is, that the binding between a key and email
	address doesn't change). A major advantage of TOFU is that it
	requires little maintenance to use correctly. To use the web of
	trust properly, you need to actively sign keys and mark users as
	trusted introducers. This is a time-consuming process and anecdotal
	evidence suggests that even security-conscious users rarely take the
	time to do this thoroughly and instead rely on an ad-hoc TOFU
	process.

	In the TOFU model, policies are associated with bindings between
	keys and email addresses (which are extracted from user ids and
	normalized). There are five policies, which can be set manually
	using the @option{--tofu-policy} option. The default policy can be
	set using the @option{--tofu-default-policy} option.

	The TOFU policies are: @code{auto}, @code{good}, @code{unknown},
	@code{bad} and @code{ask}. The @code{auto} policy is used by
	default (unless overridden by @option{--tofu-default-policy}) and
	marks a binding as marginally trusted. The @code{good},
	@code{unknown} and @code{bad} policies mark a binding as fully
	trusted, as having unknown trust or as having trust never,
	respectively. The @code{unknown} policy is useful for just using
	TOFU to detect conflicts, but to never assign positive trust to a
	binding. The final policy, @code{ask} prompts the user to indicate
	the binding's trust. If batch mode is enabled (or input is
	inappropriate in the context), then the user is not prompted and the
	@code{undefined} trust level is returned.

	@item tofu+pgp
	@opindex trust-model:tofu+pgp
	This trust model combines TOFU with the Web of Trust. This is done
	by computing the trust level for each model and then taking the
	maximum trust level where the trust levels are ordered as follows:
	@code{unknown < undefined < marginal < fully < ultimate < expired <
	never}.

	By setting @option{--tofu-default-policy=unknown}, this model can be
	used to implement the web of trust with TOFU's conflict detection
	algorithm, but without its assignment of positive trust values,
	which some security-conscious users don't like.

	@item direct
	@opindex trust-model:direct
	Key validity is set directly by the user and not calculated via the
	Web of Trust. This model is solely based on the key and does
	not distinguish user IDs. Note that when changing to another trust
	model the trust values assigned to a key are transformed into
	ownertrust values, which also indicate how you trust the owner of
	the key to sign other keys.

	@item always
	@opindex trust-model:always
	Skip key validation and assume that used keys are always fully
	valid. You generally won't use this unless you are using some
	external validation scheme. This option also suppresses the
	"[uncertain]" tag printed with signature checks when there is no
	evidence that the user ID is bound to the key. Note that this
	trust model still does not allow the use of expired, revoked, or
	disabled keys.

	@item auto
	@opindex trust-model:auto
	Select the trust model depending on whatever the internal trust
	database says. This is the default model if such a database already
	exists.
	@end table

	@item --auto-key-locate @var{mechanisms}
	@itemx --no-auto-key-locate
	@opindex auto-key-locate
	GnuPG can automatically locate and retrieve keys as needed using this
	option. This happens when encrypting to an email address (in the
	"user@@example.com" form), and there are no "user@@example.com" keys
	on the local keyring. This option takes any number of the mechanisms
	listed below, in the order they are to be tried. Instead of listing
	the mechanisms as comma delimited arguments, the option may also be
	given several times to add more mechanism. The option
	@option{--no-auto-key-locate} or the mechanism "clear" resets the
	list. The default is "local,wkd".

	@table @asis

	@item cert
	Locate a key using DNS CERT, as specified in RFC-4398.

	@item pka
	Locate a key using DNS PKA.

	@item dane
	Locate a key using DANE, as specified
	in draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-05.txt.

	@item wkd
	Locate a key using the Web Key Directory protocol.

	@item ldap
	Using DNS Service Discovery, check the domain in question for any LDAP
	keyservers to use. If this fails, attempt to locate the key using the
	PGP Universal method of checking @samp{ldap://keys.(thedomain)}.

	@item keyserver
	Locate a key using whatever keyserver is defined using the
	@option{--keyserver} option.

	@item keyserver-URL
	In addition, a keyserver URL as used in the @option{--keyserver} option
	may be used here to query that particular keyserver.

	@item local
	Locate the key using the local keyrings. This mechanism allows the user to
	select the order a local key lookup is done. Thus using
	@samp{--auto-key-locate local} is identical to
	@option{--no-auto-key-locate}.

	@item nodefault
	This flag disables the standard local key lookup, done before any of the
	mechanisms defined by the @option{--auto-key-locate} are tried. The
	position of this mechanism in the list does not matter. It is not
	required if @code{local} is also used.

	@item clear
	Clear all defined mechanisms. This is useful to override
	mechanisms given in a config file.

	@end table


	@item --auto-key-retrieve
	@itemx --no-auto-key-retrieve
	@opindex auto-key-retrieve
	@opindex no-auto-key-retrieve
	These options enable or disable the automatic retrieving of keys from
	a keyserver when verifying signatures made by keys that are not on the
	local keyring. The default is @option{--no-auto-key-retrieve}.

	If the method "wkd" is included in the list of methods given to
	@option{auto-key-locate}, the signer's user ID is part of the
	signature, and the option @option{--disable-signer-uid} is not used,
	the "wkd" method may also be used to retrieve a key.

	Note that this option makes a "web bug" like behavior possible.
	Keyserver or Web Key Directory operators can see which keys you
	request, so by sending you a message signed by a brand new key (which
	you naturally will not have on your local keyring), the operator can
	tell both your IP address and the time when you verified the
	signature.

	@item --keyid-format @{none\|short\|0xshort\|long\|0xlong@}
	@opindex keyid-format
	Select how to display key IDs. "none" does not show the key ID at all
	but shows the fingerprint in a separate line. "short" is the
	traditional 8-character key ID. "long" is the more accurate (but less
	convenient) 16-character key ID. Add an "0x" to either to include an
	"0x" at the beginning of the key ID, as in 0x99242560. Note that this
	option is ignored if the option @option{--with-colons} is used.

	@item --keyserver @var{name}
	@opindex keyserver
	This option is deprecated - please use the @option{--keyserver} in
	@file{dirmngr.conf} instead.

	Use @var{name} as your keyserver. This is the server that
	@option{--receive-keys}, @option{--send-keys}, and @option{--search-keys}
	will communicate with to receive keys from, send keys to, and search for
	keys on. The format of the @var{name} is a URI:
	`scheme:[//]keyservername[:port]' The scheme is the type of keyserver:
	"hkp" for the HTTP (or compatible) keyservers, "ldap" for the LDAP
	keyservers, or "mailto" for the Graff email keyserver. Note that your
	particular installation of GnuPG may have other keyserver types
	available as well. Keyserver schemes are case-insensitive. After the
	keyserver name, optional keyserver configuration options may be
	provided. These are the same as the global @option{--keyserver-options}
	from below, but apply only to this particular keyserver.

	Most keyservers synchronize with each other, so there is generally no
	need to send keys to more than one server. The keyserver
	@code{hkp://keys.gnupg.net} uses round robin DNS to give a different
	keyserver each time you use it.

	@item --keyserver-options @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@opindex keyserver-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for the
	keyserver. Options can be prefixed with a `no-' to give the opposite
	meaning. Valid import-options or export-options may be used here as
	well to apply to importing (@option{--recv-key}) or exporting
	(@option{--send-key}) a key from a keyserver. While not all options
	are available for all keyserver types, some common options are:

	@table @asis

	@item include-revoked
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as revoked. Note that not all keyservers
	differentiate between revoked and unrevoked keys, and for such
	keyservers this option is meaningless. Note also that most keyservers do
	not have cryptographic verification of key revocations, and so turning
	this option off may result in skipping keys that are incorrectly marked
	as revoked.

	@item include-disabled
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as disabled. Note that this option is not
	used with HKP keyservers.

	@item auto-key-retrieve
	This is an obsolete alias for the option @option{auto-key-retrieve}.
	Please do not use it; it will be removed in future versions..

	@item honor-keyserver-url
	When using @option{--refresh-keys}, if the key in question has a preferred
	keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to refresh the key
	from. In addition, if auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature
	being verified has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred
	keyserver to fetch the key from. Note that this option introduces a
	"web bug": The creator of the key can see when the keys is
	refreshed. Thus this option is not enabled by default.

	@item honor-pka-record
	If @option{--auto-key-retrieve} is used, and the signature being
	verified has a PKA record, then use the PKA information to fetch
	the key. Defaults to "yes".

	@item include-subkeys
	When receiving a key, include subkeys as potential targets. Note that
	this option is not used with HKP keyservers, as they do not support
	retrieving keys by subkey id.

	@item timeout
	Tell the keyserver helper program how long (in seconds) to try and
	perform a keyserver action before giving up. Note that performing
	multiple actions at the same time uses this timeout value per action.
	For example, when retrieving multiple keys via @option{--receive-keys}, the
	timeout applies separately to each key retrieval, and not to the
	@option{--receive-keys} command as a whole. Defaults to 30 seconds.

	@item http-proxy=@var{value}
	This option is deprecated.
	Set the proxy to use for HTTP and HKP keyservers.
	This overrides any proxy defined in @file{dirmngr.conf}.

	@item verbose
	This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@item debug
	This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@item check-cert
	This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@item ca-cert-file
	This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@end table

	@item --completes-needed @var{n}
	@opindex compliant-needed
	Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 1).

	@item --marginals-needed @var{n}
	@opindex marginals-needed
	Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 3)

	@item --tofu-default-policy @{auto\|good\|unknown\|bad\|ask@}
	@opindex tofu-default-policy
	The default TOFU policy (defaults to @code{auto}). For more
	information about the meaning of this option, @pxref{trust-model-tofu}.

	@item --max-cert-depth @var{n}
	@opindex max-cert-depth
	Maximum depth of a certification chain (default is 5).

	@item --no-sig-cache
	@opindex no-sig-cache
	Do not cache the verification status of key signatures.
	Caching gives a much better performance in key listings. However, if
	you suspect that your public keyring is not safe against write
	modifications, you can use this option to disable the caching. It
	probably does not make sense to disable it because all kind of damage
	can be done if someone else has write access to your public keyring.

	@item --auto-check-trustdb
	@itemx --no-auto-check-trustdb
	@opindex auto-check-trustdb
	If GnuPG feels that its information about the Web of Trust has to be
	updated, it automatically runs the @option{--check-trustdb} command
	internally. This may be a time consuming
	process. @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} disables this option.

	@item --use-agent
	@itemx --no-use-agent
	@opindex use-agent
	This is dummy option. @command{@gpgname} always requires the agent.

	@item --gpg-agent-info
	@opindex gpg-agent-info
	This is dummy option. It has no effect when used with @command{@gpgname}.


	@item --agent-program @var{file}
	@opindex agent-program
	Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The
	default value is determined by running @command{gpgconf} with the
	option @option{--list-dirs}. Note that the pipe symbol (@code{\|}) is
	used for a regression test suite hack and may thus not be used in the
	file name.

	@item --dirmngr-program @var{file}
	@opindex dirmngr-program
	Specify a dirmngr program to be used for keyserver access. The
	default value is @file{@value{BINDIR}/dirmngr}.

	@item --disable-dirmngr
	Entirely disable the use of the Dirmngr.

	@item --no-autostart
	@opindex no-autostart
	Do not start the gpg-agent or the dirmngr if it has not yet been
	started and its service is required. This option is mostly useful on
	machines where the connection to gpg-agent has been redirected to
	another machines. If dirmngr is required on the remote machine, it
	may be started manually using @command{gpgconf --launch dirmngr}.

	@item --lock-once
	@opindex lock-once
	Lock the databases the first time a lock is requested
	and do not release the lock until the process
	terminates.

	@item --lock-multiple
	@opindex lock-multiple
	Release the locks every time a lock is no longer
	needed. Use this to override a previous @option{--lock-once}
	from a config file.

	@item --lock-never
	@opindex lock-never
	Disable locking entirely. This option should be used only in very
	special environments, where it can be assured that only one process
	is accessing those files. A bootable floppy with a stand-alone
	encryption system will probably use this. Improper usage of this
	option may lead to data and key corruption.

	@item --exit-on-status-write-error
	@opindex exit-on-status-write-error
	This option will cause write errors on the status FD to immediately
	terminate the process. That should in fact be the default but it never
	worked this way and thus we need an option to enable this, so that the
	change won't break applications which close their end of a status fd
	connected pipe too early. Using this option along with
	@option{--enable-progress-filter} may be used to cleanly cancel long
	running gpg operations.

	@item --limit-card-insert-tries @var{n}
	@opindex limit-card-insert-tries
	With @var{n} greater than 0 the number of prompts asking to insert a
	smartcard gets limited to N-1. Thus with a value of 1 gpg won't at
	all ask to insert a card if none has been inserted at startup. This
	option is useful in the configuration file in case an application does
	not know about the smartcard support and waits ad infinitum for an
	inserted card.

	@item --no-random-seed-file
	@opindex no-random-seed-file
	GnuPG uses a file to store its internal random pool over invocations.
	This makes random generation faster; however sometimes write operations
	are not desired. This option can be used to achieve that with the cost of
	slower random generation.

	@item --no-greeting
	@opindex no-greeting
	Suppress the initial copyright message.

	@item --no-secmem-warning
	@opindex no-secmem-warning
	Suppress the warning about "using insecure memory".

	@item --no-permission-warning
	@opindex permission-warning
	Suppress the warning about unsafe file and home directory (@option{--homedir})
	permissions. Note that the permission checks that GnuPG performs are
	not intended to be authoritative, but rather they simply warn about
	certain common permission problems. Do not assume that the lack of a
	warning means that your system is secure.

	Note that the warning for unsafe @option{--homedir} permissions cannot be
	suppressed in the gpg.conf file, as this would allow an attacker to
	place an unsafe gpg.conf file in place, and use this file to suppress
	warnings about itself. The @option{--homedir} permissions warning may only be
	suppressed on the command line.

	-@item --no-mdc-warning
	-@opindex no-mdc-warning
	-Suppress the warning about missing MDC integrity protection.
	-
	@item --require-secmem
	@itemx --no-require-secmem
	@opindex require-secmem
	Refuse to run if GnuPG cannot get secure memory. Defaults to no
	(i.e. run, but give a warning).


	@item --require-cross-certification
	@itemx --no-require-cross-certification
	@opindex require-cross-certification
	When verifying a signature made from a subkey, ensure that the cross
	certification "back signature" on the subkey is present and valid. This
	protects against a subtle attack against subkeys that can sign.
	Defaults to @option{--require-cross-certification} for
	@command{@gpgname}.

	@item --expert
	@itemx --no-expert
	@opindex expert
	Allow the user to do certain nonsensical or "silly" things like
	signing an expired or revoked key, or certain potentially incompatible
	things like generating unusual key types. This also disables certain
	warning messages about potentially incompatible actions. As the name
	implies, this option is for experts only. If you don't fully
	understand the implications of what it allows you to do, leave this
	off. @option{--no-expert} disables this option.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** KEY RELATED OPTIONS **********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Key related Options
	@subsection Key related options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -r
	@opindex recipient
	Encrypt for user id @var{name}. If this option or
	@option{--hidden-recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user-id
	unless @option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --hidden-recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -R
	@opindex hidden-recipient
	Encrypt for user ID @var{name}, but hide the key ID of this user's
	key. This option helps to hide the receiver of the message and is a
	limited countermeasure against traffic analysis. If this option or
	@option{--recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user ID unless
	@option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --recipient-file @var{file}
	@itemx -f
	@opindex recipient-file
	This option is similar to @option{--recipient} except that it
	encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the
	name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{@gpgname} assumes that
	the key in this file is fully valid.

	@item --hidden-recipient-file @var{file}
	@itemx -F
	@opindex hidden-recipient-file
	This option is similar to @option{--hidden-recipient} except that it
	encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the
	name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{@gpgname} assumes that
	the key in this file is fully valid.

	@item --encrypt-to @var{name}
	@opindex encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as an
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked
	user id. No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even
	disabled keys can be used.

	@item --hidden-encrypt-to @var{name}
	@opindex hidden-encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--hidden-recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as a hidden
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked user id.
	No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even disabled
	keys can be used.

	@item --no-encrypt-to
	@opindex no-encrypt-to
	Disable the use of all @option{--encrypt-to} and
	@option{--hidden-encrypt-to} keys.

	@item --group @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@opindex group
	Sets up a named group, which is similar to aliases in email programs.
	Any time the group name is a recipient (@option{-r} or
	@option{--recipient}), it will be expanded to the values
	specified. Multiple groups with the same name are automatically merged
	into a single group.

	The values are @code{key IDs} or fingerprints, but any key description
	is accepted. Note that a value with spaces in it will be treated as
	two different values. Note also there is only one level of expansion
	--- you cannot make an group that points to another group. When used
	from the command line, it may be necessary to quote the argument to
	this option to prevent the shell from treating it as multiple
	arguments.

	@item --ungroup @var{name}
	@opindex ungroup
	Remove a given entry from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --no-groups
	@opindex no-groups
	Remove all entries from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --local-user @var{name}
	@itemx -u
	@opindex local-user
	Use @var{name} as the key to sign with. Note that this option overrides
	@option{--default-key}.

	@item --sender @var{mbox}
	@opindex sender
	This option has two purposes. @var{mbox} must either be a complete
	user id with a proper mail address or just a mail address. When
	creating a signature this option tells gpg the user id of a key used
	to make a signature if the key was not directly specified by a user
	id. When verifying a signature the @var{mbox} is used to restrict the
	information printed by the TOFU code to matching user ids.

	@item --try-secret-key @var{name}
	@opindex try-secret-key
	For hidden recipients GPG needs to know the keys to use for trial
	decryption. The key set with @option{--default-key} is always tried
	first, but this is often not sufficient. This option allows setting more
	keys to be used for trial decryption. Although any valid user-id
	specification may be used for @var{name} it makes sense to use at least
	the long keyid to avoid ambiguities. Note that gpg-agent might pop up a
	pinentry for a lot keys to do the trial decryption. If you want to stop
	all further trial decryption you may use close-window button instead of
	the cancel button.

	@item --try-all-secrets
	@opindex try-all-secrets
	Don't look at the key ID as stored in the message but try all secret
	keys in turn to find the right decryption key. This option forces the
	behaviour as used by anonymous recipients (created by using
	@option{--throw-keyids} or @option{--hidden-recipient}) and might come
	handy in case where an encrypted message contains a bogus key ID.

	@item --skip-hidden-recipients
	@itemx --no-skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex no-skip-hidden-recipients
	During decryption skip all anonymous recipients. This option helps in
	the case that people use the hidden recipients feature to hide their
	own encrypt-to key from others. If one has many secret keys this
	may lead to a major annoyance because all keys are tried in turn to
	decrypt something which was not really intended for it. The drawback
	of this option is that it is currently not possible to decrypt a
	message which includes real anonymous recipients.


	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** INPUT AND OUTPUT *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Input and Output
	@subsection Input and Output

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --armor
	@itemx -a
	@opindex armor
	Create ASCII armored output. The default is to create the binary
	OpenPGP format.

	@item --no-armor
	@opindex no-armor
	Assume the input data is not in ASCII armored format.

	@item --output @var{file}
	@itemx -o @var{file}
	@opindex output
	Write output to @var{file}. To write to stdout use @code{-} as the
	filename.

	@item --max-output @var{n}
	@opindex max-output
	This option sets a limit on the number of bytes that will be generated
	when processing a file. Since OpenPGP supports various levels of
	compression, it is possible that the plaintext of a given message may be
	significantly larger than the original OpenPGP message. While GnuPG
	works properly with such messages, there is often a desire to set a
	maximum file size that will be generated before processing is forced to
	stop by the OS limits. Defaults to 0, which means "no limit".

	@item --chunk-size @var{n}
	@opindex chunk-size
	The AEAD encryption mode encrypts the data in chunks so that a
	receiving side can check for transmission errors or tampering at the
	end of each chunk and does not need to delay this until all data has
	been received. The used chunk size is 2^@var{n} byte. The lowest
	allowed value for @var{n} is 6 (64 byte) and the largest is 62 (4
	EiB). The default value for @var{n} is 30 which creates chunks not
	larger than 1 GiB.

	@item --input-size-hint @var{n}
	@opindex input-size-hint
	This option can be used to tell GPG the size of the input data in
	bytes. @var{n} must be a positive base-10 number. This option is
	only useful if the input is not taken from a file. GPG may use this
	hint to optimize its buffer allocation strategy. It is also used by
	the @option{--status-fd} line ``PROGRESS'' to provide a value for
	``total'' if that is not available by other means.

	@item --key-origin @var{string}[,@var{url}]
	@opindex key-origin
	gpg can track the origin of a key. Certain origins are implicitly
	known (e.g. keyserver, web key directory) and set. For a standard
	import the origin of the keys imported can be set with this option.
	To list the possible values use "help" for @var{string}. Some origins
	can store an optional @var{url} argument. That URL can appended to
	@var{string} after a comma.

	@item --import-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex import-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	importing keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item import-local-sigs
	Allow importing key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	@item keep-ownertrust
	Normally possible still existing ownertrust values of a key are
	cleared if a key is imported. This is in general desirable so that
	a formerly deleted key does not automatically gain an ownertrust
	values merely due to import. On the other hand it is sometimes
	necessary to re-import a trusted set of keys again but keeping
	already assigned ownertrust values. This can be achieved by using
	this option.

	@item repair-pks-subkey-bug
	During import, attempt to repair the damage caused by the PKS keyserver
	bug (pre version 0.9.6) that mangles keys with multiple subkeys. Note
	that this cannot completely repair the damaged key as some crucial data
	is removed by the keyserver, but it does at least give you back one
	subkey. Defaults to no for regular @option{--import} and to yes for
	keyserver @option{--receive-keys}.

	@item import-show
	@itemx show-only
	Show a listing of the key as imported right before it is stored.
	This can be combined with the option @option{--dry-run} to only look
	at keys; the option @option{show-only} is a shortcut for this
	combination. Note that suffixes like '#' for "sec" and "sbb" lines
	may or may not be printed.

	@item import-export
	Run the entire import code but instead of storing the key to the
	local keyring write it to the output. The export options
	@option{export-pka} and @option{export-dane} affect the output. This
	option can be used to remove all invalid parts from a key without the
	need to store it.

	@item merge-only
	During import, allow key updates to existing keys, but do not allow
	any new keys to be imported. Defaults to no.

	@item import-clean
	After import, compact (remove all signatures except the
	self-signature) any user IDs from the new key that are not usable.
	Then, remove any signatures from the new key that are not usable.
	This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are not present
	on the keyring. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key}
	command "clean" after import. Defaults to no.

	@item repair-keys. After import, fix various problems with the
	keys. For example, this reorders signatures, and strips duplicate
	signatures. Defaults to yes.

	@item import-minimal
	Import the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except
	the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the
	same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" after import.
	Defaults to no.

	@item restore
	@itemx import-restore
	Import in key restore mode. This imports all data which is usually
	skipped during import; including all GnuPG specific data. All other
	contradicting options are overridden.
	@end table

	@item --import-filter @{@var{name}=@var{expr}@}
	@itemx --export-filter @{@var{name}=@var{expr}@}
	@opindex import-filter
	@opindex export-filter
	These options define an import/export filter which are applied to the
	imported/exported keyblock right before it will be stored/written.
	@var{name} defines the type of filter to use, @var{expr} the
	expression to evaluate. The option can be used several times which
	then appends more expression to the same @var{name}.

	@noindent
	The available filter types are:

	@table @asis

	@item keep-uid
	This filter will keep a user id packet and its dependent packets in
	the keyblock if the expression evaluates to true.

	@item drop-subkey
	This filter drops the selected subkeys.
	Currently only implemented for --export-filter.

	@item drop-sig
	This filter drops the selected key signatures on user ids.
	Self-signatures are not considered.
	Currently only implemented for --import-filter.

	@end table

	For the syntax of the expression see the chapter "FILTER EXPRESSIONS".
	The property names for the expressions depend on the actual filter
	type and are indicated in the following table.

	The available properties are:

	@table @asis

	@item uid
	A string with the user id. (keep-uid)

	@item mbox
	The addr-spec part of a user id with mailbox or the empty string.
	(keep-uid)

	@item key_algo
	A number with the public key algorithm of a key or subkey packet.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item key_created
	@itemx key_created_d
	The first is the timestamp a public key or subkey packet was
	created. The second is the same but given as an ISO string,
	e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-subkey)

	@item primary
	Boolean indicating whether the user id is the primary one. (keep-uid)

	@item expired
	Boolean indicating whether a user id (keep-uid), a key (drop-subkey), or a
	signature (drop-sig) expired.

	@item revoked
	Boolean indicating whether a user id (keep-uid) or a key (drop-subkey) has
	been revoked.

	@item disabled
	Boolean indicating whether a primary key is disabled. (not used)

	@item secret
	Boolean indicating whether a key or subkey is a secret one.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item sig_created
	@itemx sig_created_d
	The first is the timestamp a signature packet was created. The
	second is the same but given as an ISO date string,
	e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-sig)

	@item sig_algo
	A number with the public key algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig)

	@item sig_digest_algo
	A number with the digest algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig)

	@end table

	@item --export-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex export-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	exporting keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item export-local-sigs
	Allow exporting key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	@item export-attributes
	Include attribute user IDs (photo IDs) while exporting. Not
	including attribute user IDs is useful to export keys that are going
	to be used by an OpenPGP program that does not accept attribute user
	IDs. Defaults to yes.

	@item export-sensitive-revkeys
	Include designated revoker information that was marked as
	"sensitive". Defaults to no.

	@c Since GnuPG 2.1 gpg-agent manages the secret key and thus the
	@c export-reset-subkey-passwd hack is not anymore justified. Such use
	@c cases may be implemented using a specialized secret key export
	@c tool.
	@c @item export-reset-subkey-passwd
	@c When using the @option{--export-secret-subkeys} command, this option resets
	@c the passphrases for all exported subkeys to empty. This is useful
	@c when the exported subkey is to be used on an unattended machine where
	@c a passphrase doesn't necessarily make sense. Defaults to no.

	@item backup
	@itemx export-backup
	Export for use as a backup. The exported data includes all data
	which is needed to restore the key or keys later with GnuPG. The
	format is basically the OpenPGP format but enhanced with GnuPG
	specific data. All other contradicting options are overridden.

	@item export-clean
	Compact (remove all signatures from) user IDs on the key being
	exported if the user IDs are not usable. Also, do not export any
	signatures that are not usable. This includes signatures that were
	issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. This option is
	the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "clean" before export
	except that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to
	no.

	@item export-minimal
	Export the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except the
	most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the same as
	running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" before export except
	that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to no.

	@item export-pka
	Instead of outputting the key material output PKA records suitable
	to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before each
	record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone file.

	@item export-dane
	Instead of outputting the key material output OpenPGP DANE records
	suitable to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before
	each record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone
	file.

	@end table

	@item --with-colons
	@opindex with-colons
	Print key listings delimited by colons. Note that the output will be
	encoded in UTF-8 regardless of any @option{--display-charset} setting. This
	format is useful when GnuPG is called from scripts and other programs
	as it is easily machine parsed. The details of this format are
	documented in the file @file{doc/DETAILS}, which is included in the GnuPG
	source distribution.

	@item --fixed-list-mode
	@opindex fixed-list-mode
	Do not merge primary user ID and primary key in @option{--with-colon}
	listing mode and print all timestamps as seconds since 1970-01-01.
	Since GnuPG 2.0.10, this mode is always used and thus this option is
	obsolete; it does not harm to use it though.

	@item --legacy-list-mode
	@opindex legacy-list-mode
	Revert to the pre-2.1 public key list mode. This only affects the
	human readable output and not the machine interface
	(i.e. @code{--with-colons}). Note that the legacy format does not
	convey suitable information for elliptic curves.

	@item --with-fingerprint
	@opindex with-fingerprint
	Same as the command @option{--fingerprint} but changes only the format
	of the output and may be used together with another command.

	@item --with-subkey-fingerprint
	@opindex with-subkey-fingerprint
	If a fingerprint is printed for the primary key, this option forces
	printing of the fingerprint for all subkeys. This could also be
	achieved by using the @option{--with-fingerprint} twice but by using
	this option along with keyid-format "none" a compact fingerprint is
	printed.

	@item --with-icao-spelling
	@opindex with-icao-spelling
	Print the ICAO spelling of the fingerprint in addition to the hex digits.

	@item --with-keygrip
	@opindex with-keygrip
	Include the keygrip in the key listings. In @code{--with-colons} mode
	this is implicitly enable for secret keys.

	@item --with-key-origin
	@opindex with-key-origin
	Include the locally held information on the origin and last update of
	a key in a key listing. In @code{--with-colons} mode this is always
	printed. This data is currently experimental and shall not be
	considered part of the stable API.

	@item --with-wkd-hash
	@opindex with-wkd-hash
	Print a Web Key Directory identifier along with each user ID in key
	listings. This is an experimental feature and semantics may change.

	@item --with-secret
	@opindex with-secret
	Include info about the presence of a secret key in public key listings
	done with @code{--with-colons}.

	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPENPGP OPTIONS **************
	@c *******************************************
	@node OpenPGP Options
	@subsection OpenPGP protocol specific options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -t, --textmode
	@itemx --no-textmode
	@opindex textmode
	Treat input files as text and store them in the OpenPGP canonical text
	form with standard "CRLF" line endings. This also sets the necessary
	flags to inform the recipient that the encrypted or signed data is text
	and may need its line endings converted back to whatever the local
	system uses. This option is useful when communicating between two
	platforms that have different line ending conventions (UNIX-like to Mac,
	Mac to Windows, etc). @option{--no-textmode} disables this option, and
	is the default.

	@item --force-v3-sigs
	@itemx --no-force-v3-sigs
	@item --force-v4-certs
	@itemx --no-force-v4-certs
	These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.1.

	@item --force-aead
	@opindex force-aead
	Force the use of AEAD encryption over MDC encryption. AEAD is a
	modern and faster way to do authenticated encrytion than the old MDC
	method. See also options @option{--aead-algo} and
	@option{--chunk-size}.

	This option requires the use of option @option{--rfc4880bis} to
	declare that a not yet standardized feature is used.

	@item --force-mdc
	@opindex force-mdc
	Force the use of encryption with a modification detection code. This
	is always used with the newer ciphers (those with a blocksize greater
	than 64 bits), or if all of the recipient keys indicate MDC support in
	their feature flags.

	@item --disable-mdc
	@opindex disable-mdc
	Disable the use of the modification detection code. Note that by
	using this option, the encrypted message becomes vulnerable to a
	message modification attack.

	@item --disable-signer-uid
	@opindex disable-signer-uid
	By default the user ID of the signing key is embedded in the data
	signature. As of now this is only done if the signing key has been
	specified with @option{local-user} using a mail address. This
	information can be helpful for verifier to locate the key; see
	option @option{--auto-key-retrieve}.

	@item --personal-cipher-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-cipher-preferences
	Set the list of personal cipher preferences to @var{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also
	used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command.

	@item --personal-aead-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-aead-preferences
	Set the list of personal AEAD preferences to @var{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also
	used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command.

	@item --personal-digest-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-digest-preferences
	Set the list of personal digest preferences to @var{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked digest algorithm in this list
	is also used when signing without encryption
	(e.g. @option{--clear-sign} or @option{--sign}).

	@item --personal-compress-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-compress-preferences
	Set the list of personal compression preferences to @var{string}.
	Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available
	algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This
	allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the
	recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that
	is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked compression
	algorithm in this list is also used when there are no recipient keys
	to consider (e.g. @option{--symmetric}).

	@item --s2k-cipher-algo @var{name}
	@opindex s2k-cipher-algo
	Use @var{name} as the cipher algorithm for symmetric encryption with
	a passphrase if @option{--personal-cipher-preferences} and
	@option{--cipher-algo} are not given. The default is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}.

	@item --s2k-digest-algo @var{name}
	@opindex s2k-digest-algo
	Use @var{name} as the digest algorithm used to mangle the passphrases
	for symmetric encryption. The default is SHA-1.

	@item --s2k-mode @var{n}
	@opindex s2k-mode
	Selects how passphrases for symmetric encryption are mangled. If
	@var{n} is 0 a plain passphrase (which is in general not recommended)
	will be used, a 1 adds a salt (which should not be used) to the
	passphrase and a 3 (the default) iterates the whole process a number
	of times (see @option{--s2k-count}).

	@item --s2k-count @var{n}
	@opindex s2k-count
	Specify how many times the passphrases mangling for symmetric
	encryption is repeated. This value may range between 1024 and
	65011712 inclusive. The default is inquired from gpg-agent. Note
	that not all values in the 1024-65011712 range are legal and if an
	illegal value is selected, GnuPG will round up to the nearest legal
	value. This option is only meaningful if @option{--s2k-mode} is set
	to the default of 3.


	@end table

	@c ***************************
	@c ***** Compliance ******
	@c ***************************
	@node Compliance Options
	@subsection Compliance options

	These options control what GnuPG is compliant to. Only one of these
	options may be active at a time. Note that the default setting of
	this is nearly always the correct one. See the INTEROPERABILITY WITH
	OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below before using one of these
	options.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --gnupg
	@opindex gnupg
	Use standard GnuPG behavior. This is essentially OpenPGP behavior
	(see @option{--openpgp}), but with some additional workarounds for common
	compatibility problems in different versions of PGP. This is the
	default option, so it is not generally needed, but it may be useful to
	override a different compliance option in the gpg.conf file.

	@item --openpgp
	@opindex openpgp
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict OpenPGP
	behavior. Use this option to reset all previous options like
	@option{--s2k-*}, @option{--cipher-algo}, @option{--digest-algo} and
	@option{--compress-algo} to OpenPGP compliant values. All PGP
	workarounds are disabled.

	@item --rfc4880
	@opindex rfc4880
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-4880
	behavior. Note that this is currently the same thing as
	@option{--openpgp}.

	@item --rfc4880bis
	@opindex rfc4880bis
	Enable experimental features from proposed updates to RFC-4880. This
	option can be used in addition to the other compliance options.
	Warning: The behavior may change with any GnuPG release and created
	keys or data may not be usable with future GnuPG versions.

	@item --rfc2440
	@opindex rfc2440
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-2440
	behavior.

	@item --pgp6
	@opindex pgp6
	Set up all options to be as PGP 6 compliant as possible. This
	restricts you to the ciphers IDEA (if the IDEA plugin is installed),
	3DES, and CAST5, the hashes MD5, SHA1 and RIPEMD160, and the
	compression algorithms none and ZIP. This also disables
	@option{--throw-keyids}, and making signatures with signing subkeys as PGP 6
	does not understand signatures made by signing subkeys.

	This option implies @option{--disable-mdc --escape-from-lines}.

	@item --pgp7
	@opindex pgp7
	Set up all options to be as PGP 7 compliant as possible. This is
	identical to @option{--pgp6} except that MDCs are not disabled, and the
	list of allowable ciphers is expanded to add AES128, AES192, AES256, and
	TWOFISH.

	@item --pgp8
	@opindex pgp8
	Set up all options to be as PGP 8 compliant as possible. PGP 8 is a lot
	closer to the OpenPGP standard than previous versions of PGP, so all
	this does is disable @option{--throw-keyids} and set
	@option{--escape-from-lines}. All algorithms are allowed except for the
	SHA224, SHA384, and SHA512 digests.

	@item --compliance @var{string}
	@opindex compliance
	This option can be used instead of one of the options above. Valid
	values for @var{string} are the above option names (without the double
	dash) and possibly others as shown when using "help" for @var{value}.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** ESOTERIC OPTIONS *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Esoteric Options
	@subsection Doing things one usually doesn't want to do

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -n
	@itemx --dry-run
	@opindex dry-run
	Don't make any changes (this is not completely implemented).

	@item --list-only
	@opindex list-only
	Changes the behaviour of some commands. This is like @option{--dry-run} but
	different in some cases. The semantic of this option may be extended in
	the future. Currently it only skips the actual decryption pass and
	therefore enables a fast listing of the encryption keys.

	@item -i
	@itemx --interactive
	@opindex interactive
	Prompt before overwriting any files.

	@item --debug-level @var{level}
	@opindex debug-level
	Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be
	a numeric value or by a keyword:

	@table @code
	@item none
	No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of
	the keyword.
	@item basic
	Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item advanced
	More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item expert
	Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item guru
	All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be
	used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is
	only enabled if the keyword is used.
	@end table

	How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not
	specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are
	however carefully selected to best aid in debugging.

	@item --debug @var{flags}
	@opindex debug
	Set debugging flags. All flags are or-ed and @var{flags} may be given
	in C syntax (e.g. 0x0042) or as a comma separated list of flag names.
	To get a list of all supported flags the single word "help" can be
	used.

	@item --debug-all
	@opindex debug-all
	Set all useful debugging flags.

	@item --debug-iolbf
	@opindex debug-iolbf
	Set stdout into line buffered mode. This option is only honored when
	given on the command line.

	@item --debug-set-iobuf-size @var{n}
	@opindex debug-iolbf
	Change the buffer size of the IOBUFs to @var{n} kilobyte. Using 0
	prints the current size. Note well: This is a maintainer only option
	and may thus be changed or removed at any time without notice.

	@item --faked-system-time @var{epoch}
	@opindex faked-system-time
	This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back or
	forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since the year
	1970. Alternatively @var{epoch} may be given as a full ISO time string
	(e.g. "20070924T154812").

	If you suffix @var{epoch} with an exclamation mark (!), the system time
	will appear to be frozen at the specified time.

	@item --enable-progress-filter
	@opindex enable-progress-filter
	Enable certain PROGRESS status outputs. This option allows frontends
	to display a progress indicator while gpg is processing larger files.
	There is a slight performance overhead using it.

	@item --status-fd @var{n}
	@opindex status-fd
	Write special status strings to the file descriptor @var{n}.
	See the file DETAILS in the documentation for a listing of them.

	@item --status-file @var{file}
	@opindex status-file
	Same as @option{--status-fd}, except the status data is written to file
	@var{file}.

	@item --logger-fd @var{n}
	@opindex logger-fd
	Write log output to file descriptor @var{n} and not to STDERR.

	@item --log-file @var{file}
	@itemx --logger-file @var{file}
	@opindex log-file
	Same as @option{--logger-fd}, except the logger data is written to
	file @var{file}. Use @file{socket://} to log to s socket.

	@item --attribute-fd @var{n}
	@opindex attribute-fd
	Write attribute subpackets to the file descriptor @var{n}. This is most
	useful for use with @option{--status-fd}, since the status messages are
	needed to separate out the various subpackets from the stream delivered
	to the file descriptor.

	@item --attribute-file @var{file}
	@opindex attribute-file
	Same as @option{--attribute-fd}, except the attribute data is written to
	file @var{file}.

	@item --comment @var{string}
	@itemx --no-comments
	@opindex comment
	Use @var{string} as a comment string in cleartext signatures and ASCII
	armored messages or keys (see @option{--armor}). The default behavior is
	not to use a comment string. @option{--comment} may be repeated multiple
	times to get multiple comment strings. @option{--no-comments} removes
	all comments. It is a good idea to keep the length of a single comment
	below 60 characters to avoid problems with mail programs wrapping such
	lines. Note that comment lines, like all other header lines, are not
	protected by the signature.

	@item --emit-version
	@itemx --no-emit-version
	@opindex emit-version
	Force inclusion of the version string in ASCII armored output. If
	given once only the name of the program and the major number is
	emitted, given twice the minor is also emitted, given thrice
	the micro is added, and given four times an operating system identification
	is also emitted. @option{--no-emit-version} (default) disables the version
	line.

	@item --sig-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@itemx --cert-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@itemx -N, --set-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@opindex sig-notation
	@opindex cert-notation
	@opindex set-notation
	Put the name value pair into the signature as notation data.
	@var{name} must consist only of printable characters or spaces, and
	must contain a '@@' character in the form keyname@@domain.example.com
	(substituting the appropriate keyname and domain name, of course). This
	is to help prevent pollution of the IETF reserved notation
	namespace. The @option{--expert} flag overrides the '@@'
	check. @var{value} may be any printable string; it will be encoded in
	UTF-8, so you should check that your @option{--display-charset} is set
	correctly. If you prefix @var{name} with an exclamation mark (!), the
	notation data will be flagged as critical
	(rfc4880:5.2.3.16). @option{--sig-notation} sets a notation for data
	signatures. @option{--cert-notation} sets a notation for key signatures
	(certifications). @option{--set-notation} sets both.

	There are special codes that may be used in notation names. "%k" will
	be expanded into the key ID of the key being signed, "%K" into the
	long key ID of the key being signed, "%f" into the fingerprint of the
	key being signed, "%s" into the key ID of the key making the
	signature, "%S" into the long key ID of the key making the signature,
	"%g" into the fingerprint of the key making the signature (which might
	be a subkey), "%p" into the fingerprint of the primary key of the key
	making the signature, "%c" into the signature count from the OpenPGP
	smartcard, and "%%" results in a single "%". %k, %K, and %f are only
	meaningful when making a key signature (certification), and %c is only
	meaningful when using the OpenPGP smartcard.

	@item --sig-policy-url @var{string}
	@itemx --cert-policy-url @var{string}
	@itemx --set-policy-url @var{string}
	@opindex sig-policy-url
	@opindex cert-policy-url
	@opindex set-policy-url
	Use @var{string} as a Policy URL for signatures (rfc4880:5.2.3.20). If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the policy URL packet will
	be flagged as critical. @option{--sig-policy-url} sets a policy url for
	data signatures. @option{--cert-policy-url} sets a policy url for key
	signatures (certifications). @option{--set-policy-url} sets both.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --sig-keyserver-url @var{string}
	@opindex sig-keyserver-url
	Use @var{string} as a preferred keyserver URL for data signatures. If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the keyserver URL packet
	will be flagged as critical.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --set-filename @var{string}
	@opindex set-filename
	Use @var{string} as the filename which is stored inside messages.
	This overrides the default, which is to use the actual filename of the
	file being encrypted. Using the empty string for @var{string}
	effectively removes the filename from the output.

	@item --for-your-eyes-only
	@itemx --no-for-your-eyes-only
	@opindex for-your-eyes-only
	Set the `for your eyes only' flag in the message. This causes GnuPG to
	refuse to save the file unless the @option{--output} option is given,
	and PGP to use a "secure viewer" with a claimed Tempest-resistant font
	to display the message. This option overrides @option{--set-filename}.
	@option{--no-for-your-eyes-only} disables this option.

	@item --use-embedded-filename
	@itemx --no-use-embedded-filename
	@opindex use-embedded-filename
	Try to create a file with a name as embedded in the data. This can be
	a dangerous option as it enables overwriting files. Defaults to no.

	@item --cipher-algo @var{name}
	@opindex cipher-algo
	Use @var{name} as cipher algorithm. Running the program with the
	command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. If
	this is not used the cipher algorithm is selected from the preferences
	stored with the key. In general, you do not want to use this option as
	it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option
	@option{--personal-cipher-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the
	same thing.

	@item --aead-algo @var{name}
	@opindex aead-algo
	Specify that the AEAD algorithm @var{name} is to be used. This is
	useful for symmetric encryption where no key preference are available
	to select the AEAD algorithm. Runing @command{@gpgname} with option
	@option{--version} shows the available AEAD algorithms. In general,
	you do not want to use this option as it allows you to violate the
	OpenPGP standard. The option @option{--personal-aead-preferences} is
	the safe way to accomplish the same thing.

	@item --digest-algo @var{name}
	@opindex digest-algo
	Use @var{name} as the message digest algorithm. Running the program
	with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported
	algorithms. In general, you do not want to use this option as it
	allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option
	@option{--personal-digest-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish
	the same thing.

	@item --compress-algo @var{name}
	@opindex compress-algo
	Use compression algorithm @var{name}. "zlib" is RFC-1950 ZLIB
	compression. "zip" is RFC-1951 ZIP compression which is used by PGP.
	"bzip2" is a more modern compression scheme that can compress some
	things better than zip or zlib, but at the cost of more memory used
	during compression and decompression. "uncompressed" or "none"
	disables compression. If this option is not used, the default
	behavior is to examine the recipient key preferences to see which
	algorithms the recipient supports. If all else fails, ZIP is used for
	maximum compatibility.

	ZLIB may give better compression results than ZIP, as the compression
	window size is not limited to 8k. BZIP2 may give even better
	compression results than that, but will use a significantly larger
	amount of memory while compressing and decompressing. This may be
	significant in low memory situations. Note, however, that PGP (all
	versions) only supports ZIP compression. Using any algorithm other
	than ZIP or "none" will make the message unreadable with PGP. In
	general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to
	violate the OpenPGP standard. The option
	@option{--personal-compress-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish
	the same thing.

	@item --cert-digest-algo @var{name}
	@opindex cert-digest-algo
	Use @var{name} as the message digest algorithm used when signing a
	key. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a
	list of supported algorithms. Be aware that if you choose an algorithm
	that GnuPG supports but other OpenPGP implementations do not, then some
	users will not be able to use the key signatures you make, or quite
	possibly your entire key.

	@item --disable-cipher-algo @var{name}
	@opindex disable-cipher-algo
	Never allow the use of @var{name} as cipher algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --disable-pubkey-algo @var{name}
	@opindex disable-pubkey-algo
	Never allow the use of @var{name} as public key algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --throw-keyids
	@itemx --no-throw-keyids
	@opindex throw-keyids
	Do not put the recipient key IDs into encrypted messages. This helps to
	hide the receivers of the message and is a limited countermeasure
	against traffic analysis.@footnote{Using a little social engineering
	anyone who is able to decrypt the message can check whether one of the
	other recipients is the one he suspects.} On the receiving side, it may
	slow down the decryption process because all available secret keys must
	be tried. @option{--no-throw-keyids} disables this option. This option
	is essentially the same as using @option{--hidden-recipient} for all
	recipients.

	@item --not-dash-escaped
	@opindex not-dash-escaped
	This option changes the behavior of cleartext signatures
	so that they can be used for patch files. You should not
	send such an armored file via email because all spaces
	and line endings are hashed too. You can not use this
	option for data which has 5 dashes at the beginning of a
	line, patch files don't have this. A special armor header
	line tells GnuPG about this cleartext signature option.

	@item --escape-from-lines
	@itemx --no-escape-from-lines
	@opindex escape-from-lines
	Because some mailers change lines starting with "From " to ">From " it
	is good to handle such lines in a special way when creating cleartext
	signatures to prevent the mail system from breaking the signature. Note
	that all other PGP versions do it this way too. Enabled by
	default. @option{--no-escape-from-lines} disables this option.

	@item --passphrase-repeat @var{n}
	@opindex passphrase-repeat
	Specify how many times @command{@gpgname} will request a new
	passphrase be repeated. This is useful for helping memorize a
	passphrase. Defaults to 1 repetition.

	@item --passphrase-fd @var{n}
	@opindex passphrase-fd
	Read the passphrase from file descriptor @var{n}. Only the first line
	will be read from file descriptor @var{n}. If you use 0 for @var{n},
	the passphrase will be read from STDIN. This can only be used if only
	one passphrase is supplied.

	Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the
	option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1
	the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}.

	@item --passphrase-file @var{file}
	@opindex passphrase-file
	Read the passphrase from file @var{file}. Only the first line will
	be read from file @var{file}. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, a passphrase stored in a file is
	of questionable security if other users can read this file. Don't use
	this option if you can avoid it.

	Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the
	option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1
	the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}.

	@item --passphrase @var{string}
	@opindex passphrase
	Use @var{string} as the passphrase. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, this is of very questionable
	security on a multi-user system. Don't use this option if you can
	avoid it.

	Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the
	option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1
	the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}.

	@item --pinentry-mode @var{mode}
	@opindex pinentry-mode
	Set the pinentry mode to @var{mode}. Allowed values for @var{mode}
	are:
	@table @asis
	@item default
	Use the default of the agent, which is @code{ask}.
	@item ask
	Force the use of the Pinentry.
	@item cancel
	Emulate use of Pinentry's cancel button.
	@item error
	Return a Pinentry error (``No Pinentry'').
	@item loopback
	Redirect Pinentry queries to the caller. Note that in contrast to
	Pinentry the user is not prompted again if he enters a bad password.
	@end table

	@item --no-symkey-cache
	@opindex no-symkey-cache
	Disable the passphrase cache used for symmetrical en- and decryption.
	This cache is based on the message specific salt value
	(cf. @option{--s2k-mode}).

	@item --request-origin @var{origin}
	@opindex request-origin
	Tell gpg to assume that the operation ultimately originated at
	@var{origin}. Depending on the origin certain restrictions are applied
	and the Pinentry may include an extra note on the origin. Supported
	values for @var{origin} are: @code{local} which is the default,
	@code{remote} to indicate a remote origin or @code{browser} for an
	operation requested by a web browser.

	@item --command-fd @var{n}
	@opindex command-fd
	This is a replacement for the deprecated shared-memory IPC mode.
	If this option is enabled, user input on questions is not expected
	from the TTY but from the given file descriptor. It should be used
	together with @option{--status-fd}. See the file doc/DETAILS in the source
	distribution for details on how to use it.

	@item --command-file @var{file}
	@opindex command-file
	Same as @option{--command-fd}, except the commands are read out of file
	@var{file}

	@item --allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@itemx --no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@opindex allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	Allow the import and use of keys with user IDs which are not
	self-signed. This is not recommended, as a non self-signed user ID is
	trivial to forge. @option{--no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid} disables.

	@item --allow-freeform-uid
	@opindex allow-freeform-uid
	Disable all checks on the form of the user ID while generating a new
	one. This option should only be used in very special environments as
	it does not ensure the de-facto standard format of user IDs.

	@item --ignore-time-conflict
	@opindex ignore-time-conflict
	GnuPG normally checks that the timestamps associated with keys and
	signatures have plausible values. However, sometimes a signature
	seems to be older than the key due to clock problems. This option
	makes these checks just a warning. See also @option{--ignore-valid-from} for
	timestamp issues on subkeys.

	@item --ignore-valid-from
	@opindex ignore-valid-from
	GnuPG normally does not select and use subkeys created in the future.
	This option allows the use of such keys and thus exhibits the
	pre-1.0.7 behaviour. You should not use this option unless there
	is some clock problem. See also @option{--ignore-time-conflict} for timestamp
	issues with signatures.

	@item --ignore-crc-error
	@opindex ignore-crc-error
	The ASCII armor used by OpenPGP is protected by a CRC checksum against
	transmission errors. Occasionally the CRC gets mangled somewhere on
	the transmission channel but the actual content (which is protected by
	the OpenPGP protocol anyway) is still okay. This option allows GnuPG
	to ignore CRC errors.

	@item --ignore-mdc-error
	@opindex ignore-mdc-error
	This option changes a MDC integrity protection failure into a warning.
	This can be useful if a message is partially corrupt, but it is
	necessary to get as much data as possible out of the corrupt message.
	However, be aware that a MDC protection failure may also mean that the
	message was tampered with intentionally by an attacker.

	@item --allow-weak-digest-algos
	@opindex allow-weak-digest-algos
	Signatures made with known-weak digest algorithms are normally
	rejected with an ``invalid digest algorithm'' message. This option
	allows the verification of signatures made with such weak algorithms.
	MD5 is the only digest algorithm considered weak by default. See also
	@option{--weak-digest} to reject other digest algorithms.

	@item --weak-digest @var{name}
	@opindex weak-digest
	Treat the specified digest algorithm as weak. Signatures made over
	weak digests algorithms are normally rejected. This option can be
	supplied multiple times if multiple algorithms should be considered
	weak. See also @option{--allow-weak-digest-algos} to disable
	rejection of weak digests. MD5 is always considered weak, and does
	not need to be listed explicitly.

	@item --no-default-keyring
	@opindex no-default-keyring
	Do not add the default keyrings to the list of keyrings. Note that
	GnuPG will not operate without any keyrings, so if you use this option
	and do not provide alternate keyrings via @option{--keyring} or
	@option{--secret-keyring}, then GnuPG will still use the default public or
	secret keyrings.

	@item --no-keyring
	@opindex no-keyring
	Do not add use any keyrings even if specified as options.

	@item --skip-verify
	@opindex skip-verify
	Skip the signature verification step. This may be
	used to make the decryption faster if the signature
	verification is not needed.

	@item --with-key-data
	@opindex with-key-data
	Print key listings delimited by colons (like @option{--with-colons}) and
	print the public key data.

	@item --list-signatures
	@opindex list-signatures
	@itemx --list-sigs
	@opindex list-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the signatures are listed too. This
	command has the same effect as using @option{--list-keys} with
	@option{--with-sig-list}. Note that in contrast to
	@option{--check-signatures} the key signatures are not verified. This
	command can be used to create a list of signing keys missing in the
	lcoal keyring; for example:

	@example
	gpg --list-sigs --with-colons USERID \| \
	awk -F: '$1=="sig" && $2=="?" @{if($13)@{print $13@}else@{print $5@}@}'
	@end example

	@item --fast-list-mode
	@opindex fast-list-mode
	Changes the output of the list commands to work faster; this is achieved
	by leaving some parts empty. Some applications don't need the user ID
	and the trust information given in the listings. By using this options
	they can get a faster listing. The exact behaviour of this option may
	change in future versions. If you are missing some information, don't
	use this option.

	@item --no-literal
	@opindex no-literal
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --set-filesize
	@opindex set-filesize
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --show-session-key
	@opindex show-session-key
	Display the session key used for one message. See
	@option{--override-session-key} for the counterpart of this option.

	We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing; however the user should have
	the freedom to decide whether to go to prison or to reveal the content
	of one specific message without compromising all messages ever
	encrypted for one secret key.

	You can also use this option if you receive an encrypted message which
	is abusive or offensive, to prove to the administrators of the
	messaging system that the ciphertext transmitted corresponds to an
	inappropriate plaintext so they can take action against the offending
	user.

	@item --override-session-key @var{string}
	@itemx --override-session-key-fd @var{fd}
	@opindex override-session-key
	Don't use the public key but the session key @var{string} respective
	the session key taken from the first line read from file descriptor
	@var{fd}. The format of this string is the same as the one printed
	by @option{--show-session-key}. This option is normally not used but
	comes handy in case someone forces you to reveal the content of an
	encrypted message; using this option you can do this without handing
	out the secret key. Note that using @option{--override-session-key}
	may reveal the session key to all local users via the global process
	table.

	@item --ask-sig-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-sig-expire
	@opindex ask-sig-expire
	When making a data signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-sig-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-sig-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-sig-expire
	@opindex default-sig-expire
	The default expiration time to use for signature expiration. Valid
	values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d
	(for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for
	example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an absolute
	date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --ask-cert-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-expire
	@opindex ask-cert-expire
	When making a key signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-cert-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-cert-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-cert-expire
	@opindex default-cert-expire
	The default expiration time to use for key signature expiration.
	Valid values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the
	letter d (for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years)
	(for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an
	absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --default-new-key-algo @var{string}
	@opindex default-new-key-algo @var{string}
	This option can be used to change the default algorithms for key
	generation. The @var{string} is similar to the arguments required for
	the command @option{--quick-add-key} but slighly different. For
	example the current default of @code{"rsa2048/cert,sign+rsa2048/encr"}
	(or @code{"rsa3072"}) can be changed to the value of what we currently
	call future default, which is @code{"ed25519/cert,sign+cv25519/encr"}.
	You need to consult the source code to learn the details. Note that
	the advanced key generation commands can always be used to specify a
	key algorithm directly.

	@item --allow-secret-key-import
	@opindex allow-secret-key-import
	This is an obsolete option and is not used anywhere.

	@item --allow-multiple-messages
	@item --no-allow-multiple-messages
	@opindex allow-multiple-messages
	Allow processing of multiple OpenPGP messages contained in a single file
	or stream. Some programs that call GPG are not prepared to deal with
	multiple messages being processed together, so this option defaults to
	no. Note that versions of GPG prior to 1.4.7 always allowed multiple
	messages.

	Warning: Do not use this option unless you need it as a temporary
	workaround!


	@item --enable-special-filenames
	@opindex enable-special-filenames
	This option enables a mode in which filenames of the form
	@file{-&n}, where n is a non-negative decimal number,
	refer to the file descriptor n and not to a file with that name.

	@item --no-expensive-trust-checks
	@opindex no-expensive-trust-checks
	Experimental use only.

	@item --preserve-permissions
	@opindex preserve-permissions
	Don't change the permissions of a secret keyring back to user
	read/write only. Use this option only if you really know what you are doing.

	@item --default-preference-list @var{string}
	@opindex default-preference-list
	Set the list of default preferences to @var{string}. This preference
	list is used for new keys and becomes the default for "setpref" in the
	edit menu.

	@item --default-keyserver-url @var{name}
	@opindex default-keyserver-url
	Set the default keyserver URL to @var{name}. This keyserver will be
	used as the keyserver URL when writing a new self-signature on a key,
	which includes key generation and changing preferences.

	@item --list-config
	@opindex list-config
	Display various internal configuration parameters of GnuPG. This option
	is intended for external programs that call GnuPG to perform tasks, and
	is thus not generally useful. See the file @file{doc/DETAILS} in the
	source distribution for the details of which configuration items may be
	listed. @option{--list-config} is only usable with
	@option{--with-colons} set.

	@item --list-gcrypt-config
	@opindex list-gcrypt-config
	Display various internal configuration parameters of Libgcrypt.

	@item --gpgconf-list
	@opindex gpgconf-list
	This command is similar to @option{--list-config} but in general only
	internally used by the @command{gpgconf} tool.

	@item --gpgconf-test
	@opindex gpgconf-test
	This is more or less dummy action. However it parses the configuration
	file and returns with failure if the configuration file would prevent
	@command{@gpgname} from startup. Thus it may be used to run a syntax check
	on the configuration file.

	@end table

	@c *******************************
	@c ***** Deprecated **********
	@c *******************************
	@node Deprecated Options
	@subsection Deprecated options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --show-photos
	@itemx --no-show-photos
	@opindex show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-signatures},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, @option{--list-secret-keys}, and verifying
	a signature to also display the photo ID attached to the key, if
	any. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. These options are deprecated. Use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-photos} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-photos} instead.

	@item --show-keyring
	@opindex show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. This option is deprecated: use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-keyring} instead.

	@item --always-trust
	@opindex always-trust
	Identical to @option{--trust-model always}. This option is deprecated.

	@item --show-notation
	@itemx --no-show-notation
	@opindex show-notation
	Show signature notations in the @option{--list-signatures} or @option{--check-signatures} listings
	as well as when verifying a signature with a notation in it. These
	options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-notation}
	and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-notation} instead.

	@item --show-policy-url
	@itemx --no-show-policy-url
	@opindex show-policy-url
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-signatures} or @option{--check-signatures}
	listings as well as when verifying a signature with a policy URL in
	it. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} instead.


	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* FILES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect files
	@node GPG Configuration
	@section Configuration files

	There are a few configuration files to control certain aspects of
	@command{@gpgname}'s operation. Unless noted, they are expected in the
	current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}).

	@table @file

	@item gpg.conf
	@efindex gpg.conf
	This is the standard configuration file read by @command{@gpgname} on
	startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes
	may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated. This default
	name may be changed on the command line (@pxref{gpg-option --options}).
	You should backup this file.

	@end table

	Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files
	into the directory @file{@value{SYSCONFSKELDIR}} so that
	newly created users start up with a working configuration.
	For existing users a small
	helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}).

	For internal purposes @command{@gpgname} creates and maintains a few other
	files; They all live in the current home directory (@pxref{option
	--homedir}). Only the @command{@gpgname} program may modify these files.


	@table @file
	@item ~/.gnupg
	@efindex ~/.gnupg
	This is the default home directory which is used if neither the
	environment variable @code{GNUPGHOME} nor the option
	@option{--homedir} is given.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg
	@efindex pubring.gpg
	The public keyring. You should backup this file.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the public keyring.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
	@efindex pubring.kbx
	The public keyring using a different format. This file is shared
	with @command{gpgsm}. You should backup this file.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx.lock
	The lock file for @file{pubring.kbx}.

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg
	@efindex secring.gpg
	A secret keyring as used by GnuPG versions before 2.1. It is not
	used by GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the secret keyring.

	@item ~/.gnupg/.gpg-v21-migrated
	@efindex .gpg-v21-migrated
	File indicating that a migration to GnuPG 2.1 has been done.

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg
	@efindex trustdb.gpg
	The trust database. There is no need to backup this file; it is better
	to backup the ownertrust values (@pxref{option --export-ownertrust}).

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the trust database.

	@item ~/.gnupg/random_seed
	@efindex random_seed
	A file used to preserve the state of the internal random pool.

	@item ~/.gnupg/openpgp-revocs.d/
	@efindex openpgp-revocs.d
	This is the directory where gpg stores pre-generated revocation
	certificates. The file name corresponds to the OpenPGP fingerprint of
	the respective key. It is suggested to backup those certificates and
	if the primary private key is not stored on the disk to move them to
	an external storage device. Anyone who can access theses files is
	able to revoke the corresponding key. You may want to print them out.
	You should backup all files in this directory and take care to keep
	this backup closed away.

	@end table

	Operation is further controlled by a few environment variables:

	@table @asis

	@item HOME
	@efindex HOME
	Used to locate the default home directory.

	@item GNUPGHOME
	@efindex GNUPGHOME
	If set directory used instead of "~/.gnupg".

	@item GPG_AGENT_INFO
	This variable is obsolete; it was used by GnuPG versions before 2.1.

	@item PINENTRY_USER_DATA
	@efindex PINENTRY_USER_DATA
	This value is passed via gpg-agent to pinentry. It is useful to convey
	extra information to a custom pinentry.

	@item COLUMNS
	@itemx LINES
	@efindex COLUMNS
	@efindex LINES
	Used to size some displays to the full size of the screen.

	@item LANGUAGE
	@efindex LANGUAGE
	Apart from its use by GNU, it is used in the W32 version to override the
	language selection done through the Registry. If used and set to a
	valid and available language name (@var{langid}), the file with the
	translation is loaded from
	@code{@var{gpgdir}/gnupg.nls/@var{langid}.mo}. Here @var{gpgdir} is the
	directory out of which the gpg binary has been loaded. If it can't be
	loaded the Registry is tried and as last resort the native Windows
	locale system is used.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* EXAMPLES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect examples
	@node GPG Examples
	@section Examples

	@table @asis

	@item gpg -se -r @code{Bob} @code{file}
	sign and encrypt for user Bob

	@item gpg --clear-sign @code{file}
	make a cleartext signature

	@item gpg -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature

	@item gpg -u 0x12345678 -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature with the key 0x12345678

	@item gpg --list-keys @code{user_ID}
	show keys

	@item gpg --fingerprint @code{user_ID}
	show fingerprint

	@item gpg --verify @code{pgpfile}
	@itemx gpg --verify @code{sigfile} [@code{datafile}]
	Verify the signature of the file but do not output the data unless
	requested. The second form is used for detached signatures, where
	@code{sigfile} is the detached signature (either ASCII armored or
	binary) and @code{datafile} are the signed data; if this is not given, the name of the
	file holding the signed data is constructed by cutting off the
	extension (".asc" or ".sig") of @code{sigfile} or by asking the user
	for the filename. If the option @option{--output} is also used the
	signed data is written to the file specified by that option; use
	@code{-} to write the signed data to stdout.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* USER ID **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect how to specify a user id
	@ifset isman
	@include specify-user-id.texi
	@end ifset

	@mansect filter expressions
	@chapheading FILTER EXPRESSIONS

	The options @option{--import-filter} and @option{--export-filter} use
	expressions with this syntax (square brackets indicate an optional
	part and curly braces a repetition, white space between the elements
	are allowed):

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	[lc] @{[@{flag@}] PROPNAME op VALUE [lc]@}
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	The name of a property (@var{PROPNAME}) may only consist of letters,
	digits and underscores. The description for the filter type
	describes which properties are defined. If an undefined property is
	used it evaluates to the empty string. Unless otherwise noted, the
	@var{VALUE} must always be given and may not be the empty string. No
	quoting is defined for the value, thus the value may not contain the
	strings @code{&&} or @code{\|\|}, which are used as logical connection
	operators. The flag @code{--} can be used to remove this restriction.

	Numerical values are computed as long int; standard C notation
	applies. @var{lc} is the logical connection operator; either
	@code{&&} for a conjunction or @code{\|\|} for a disjunction. A
	conjunction is assumed at the begin of an expression. Conjunctions
	have higher precedence than disjunctions. If @var{VALUE} starts with
	one of the characters used in any @var{op} a space after the
	@var{op} is required.

	@noindent
	The supported operators (@var{op}) are:

	@table @asis

	@item =~
	Substring must match.

	@item !~
	Substring must not match.

	@item =
	The full string must match.

	@item <>
	The full string must not match.

	@item ==
	The numerical value must match.

	@item !=
	The numerical value must not match.

	@item <=
	The numerical value of the field must be LE than the value.

	@item <
	The numerical value of the field must be LT than the value.

	@item >
	The numerical value of the field must be GT than the value.

	@item >=
	The numerical value of the field must be GE than the value.

	@item -le
	The string value of the field must be less or equal than the value.

	@item -lt
	The string value of the field must be less than the value.

	@item -gt
	The string value of the field must be greater than the value.

	@item -ge
	The string value of the field must be greater or equal than the value.

	@item -n
	True if value is not empty (no value allowed).

	@item -z
	True if value is empty (no value allowed).

	@item -t
	Alias for "PROPNAME != 0" (no value allowed).

	@item -f
	Alias for "PROPNAME == 0" (no value allowed).

	@end table

	@noindent
	Values for @var{flag} must be space separated. The supported flags
	are:

	@table @asis
	@item --
	@var{VALUE} spans to the end of the expression.
	@item -c
	The string match in this part is done case-sensitive.
	@end table

	The filter options concatenate several specifications for a filter of
	the same type. For example the four options in this example:

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	--import-option keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa"
	--import-option keep-uid="&& uid !~ Test"
	--import-option keep-uid="\|\| uid =~ Alpha"
	--import-option keep-uid="uid !~ Test"
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	@noindent
	which is equivalent to

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	--import-option \
	keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa" && uid !~ Test" \|\| uid =~ Alpha" && "uid !~ Test"
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	imports only the user ids of a key containing the strings "Alfa"
	or "Alpha" but not the string "test".

	@mansect trust values
	@ifset isman
	@include trust-values.texi
	@end ifset

	@mansect return value
	@chapheading RETURN VALUE

	The program returns 0 if everything was fine, 1 if at least
	a signature was bad, and other error codes for fatal errors.

	@mansect warnings
	@chapheading WARNINGS

	Use a good password for your user account and a good passphrase
	to protect your secret key. This passphrase is the weakest part of the
	whole system. Programs to do dictionary attacks on your secret keyring
	are very easy to write and so you should protect your "~/.gnupg/"
	directory very well.

	Keep in mind that, if this program is used over a network (telnet), it
	is very easy to spy out your passphrase!

	If you are going to verify detached signatures, make sure that the
	program knows about it; either give both filenames on the command line
	or use @samp{-} to specify STDIN.

	For scripted or other unattended use of @command{gpg} make sure to use
	the machine-parseable interface and not the default interface which is
	intended for direct use by humans. The machine-parseable interface
	provides a stable and well documented API independent of the locale or
	future changes of @command{gpg}. To enable this interface use the
	options @option{--with-colons} and @option{--status-fd}. For certain
	operations the option @option{--command-fd} may come handy too. See
	this man page and the file @file{DETAILS} for the specification of the
	interface. Note that the GnuPG ``info'' pages as well as the PDF
	version of the GnuPG manual features a chapter on unattended use of
	GnuPG. As an alternative the library @command{GPGME} can be used as a
	high-level abstraction on top of that interface.

	@mansect interoperability
	@chapheading INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS

	GnuPG tries to be a very flexible implementation of the OpenPGP
	standard. In particular, GnuPG implements many of the optional parts
	of the standard, such as the SHA-512 hash, and the ZLIB and BZIP2
	compression algorithms. It is important to be aware that not all
	OpenPGP programs implement these optional algorithms and that by
	forcing their use via the @option{--cipher-algo},
	@option{--digest-algo}, @option{--cert-digest-algo}, or
	@option{--compress-algo} options in GnuPG, it is possible to create a
	perfectly valid OpenPGP message, but one that cannot be read by the
	intended recipient.

	There are dozens of variations of OpenPGP programs available, and each
	supports a slightly different subset of these optional algorithms.
	For example, until recently, no (unhacked) version of PGP supported
	the BLOWFISH cipher algorithm. A message using BLOWFISH simply could
	not be read by a PGP user. By default, GnuPG uses the standard
	OpenPGP preferences system that will always do the right thing and
	create messages that are usable by all recipients, regardless of which
	OpenPGP program they use. Only override this safe default if you
	really know what you are doing.

	If you absolutely must override the safe default, or if the preferences
	on a given key are invalid for some reason, you are far better off using
	the @option{--pgp6}, @option{--pgp7}, or @option{--pgp8} options. These
	options are safe as they do not force any particular algorithms in
	violation of OpenPGP, but rather reduce the available algorithms to a
	"PGP-safe" list.

	@mansect bugs
	@chapheading BUGS

	On older systems this program should be installed as setuid(root). This
	is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents the
	operating system from writing memory pages (which may contain
	passphrases or other sensitive material) to disk. If you get no
	warning message about insecure memory your operating system supports
	locking without being root. The program drops root privileges as soon
	as locked memory is allocated.

	Note also that some systems (especially laptops) have the ability to
	``suspend to disk'' (also known as ``safe sleep'' or ``hibernate'').
	This writes all memory to disk before going into a low power or even
	powered off mode. Unless measures are taken in the operating system
	to protect the saved memory, passphrases or other sensitive material
	may be recoverable from it later.

	Before you report a bug you should first search the mailing list
	archives for similar problems and second check whether such a bug has
	already been reported to our bug tracker at @url{https://bugs.gnupg.org}.

	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* ************
	@c ************* UNATTENDED ************
	@c ************* ************
	@c *******************************************
	@manpause
	@node Unattended Usage of GPG
	@section Unattended Usage

	@command{@gpgname} is often used as a backend engine by other software. To help
	with this a machine interface has been defined to have an unambiguous
	way to do this. The options @option{--status-fd} and @option{--batch}
	are almost always required for this.

	@menu
	* Programmatic use of GnuPG:: Programmatic use of GnuPG
	* Ephemeral home directories:: Ephemeral home directories
	* The quick key manipulation interface:: The quick key manipulation interface
	* Unattended GPG key generation:: Unattended key generation
	@end menu


	@node Programmatic use of GnuPG
	@subsection Programmatic use of GnuPG

	Please consider using GPGME instead of calling @command{@gpgname}
	directly. GPGME offers a stable, backend-independent interface for
	many cryptographic operations. It supports OpenPGP and S/MIME, and
	also allows interaction with various GnuPG components.

	GPGME provides a C-API, and comes with bindings for C++, Qt, and
	Python. Bindings for other languages are available.

	@node Ephemeral home directories
	@subsection Ephemeral home directories

	Sometimes you want to contain effects of some operation, for example
	you want to import a key to inspect it, but you do not want this key
	to be added to your keyring. In earlier versions of GnuPG, it was
	possible to specify alternate keyring files for both public and secret
	keys. In modern GnuPG versions, however, we changed how secret keys
	are stored in order to better protect secret key material, and it was
	not possible to preserve this interface.

	The preferred way to do this is to use ephemeral home directories.
	This technique works across all versions of GnuPG.

	Create a temporary directory, create (or copy) a configuration that
	meets your needs, make @command{@gpgname} use this directory either
	using the environment variable @var{GNUPGHOME}, or the option
	@option{--homedir}. GPGME supports this too on a per-context basis,
	by modifying the engine info of contexts. Now execute whatever
	operation you like, import and export key material as necessary. Once
	finished, you can delete the directory. All GnuPG backend services
	that were started will detect this and shut down.

	@node The quick key manipulation interface
	@subsection The quick key manipulation interface

	Recent versions of GnuPG have an interface to manipulate keys without
	using the interactive command @option{--edit-key}. This interface was
	added mainly for the benefit of GPGME (please consider using GPGME,
	see the manual subsection ``Programmatic use of GnuPG''). This
	interface is described in the subsection ``How to manage your keys''.

	@node Unattended GPG key generation
	@subsection Unattended key generation

	The command @option{--generate-key} may be used along with the option
	@option{--batch} for unattended key generation. This is the most
	flexible way of generating keys, but it is also the most complex one.
	Consider using the quick key manipulation interface described in the
	previous subsection ``The quick key manipulation interface''.

	The parameters for the key are either read from stdin or given as a
	file on the command line. The format of the parameter file is as
	follows:

	@itemize @bullet
	@item Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 characters.
	@item UTF-8 encoding must be used to specify non-ASCII characters.
	@item Empty lines are ignored.
	@item Leading and trailing white space is ignored.
	@item A hash sign as the first non white space character indicates
	a comment line.
	@item Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign, the
	arguments are separated by white space from the keyword.
	@item Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon. Arguments
	are separated by white space.
	@item
	The first parameter must be @samp{Key-Type}; control statements may be
	placed anywhere.
	@item
	The order of the parameters does not matter except for @samp{Key-Type}
	which must be the first parameter. The parameters are only used for
	the generated keyblock (primary and subkeys); parameters from previous
	sets are not used. Some syntactically checks may be performed.
	@item
	Key generation takes place when either the end of the parameter file
	is reached, the next @samp{Key-Type} parameter is encountered or at the
	control statement @samp{%commit} is encountered.
	@end itemize

	@noindent
	Control statements:

	@table @asis

	@item %echo @var{text}
	Print @var{text} as diagnostic.

	@item %dry-run
	Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking).

	@item %commit
	Perform the key generation. Note that an implicit commit is done at
	the next @asis{Key-Type} parameter.

	@item %pubring @var{filename}
	Do not write the key to the default or commandline given keyring but
	to @var{filename}. This must be given before the first commit to take
	place, duplicate specification of the same filename is ignored, the
	last filename before a commit is used. The filename is used until a
	new filename is used (at commit points) and all keys are written to
	that file. If a new filename is given, this file is created (and
	overwrites an existing one).

	See the previous subsection ``Ephemeral home directories'' for a more
	robust way to contain side-effects.

	@item %secring @var{filename}
	This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	See the previous subsection ``Ephemeral home directories''.

	@item %ask-passphrase
	@itemx %no-ask-passphrase
	This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	@item %no-protection
	Using this option allows the creation of keys without any passphrase
	protection. This option is mainly intended for regression tests.

	@item %transient-key
	If given the keys are created using a faster and a somewhat less
	secure random number generator. This option may be used for keys
	which are only used for a short time and do not require full
	cryptographic strength. It takes only effect if used together with
	the control statement @samp{%no-protection}.

	@end table

	@noindent
	General Parameters:

	@table @asis

	@item Key-Type: @var{algo}
	Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the primary
	key. The algorithm must be capable of signing. This is a required
	parameter. @var{algo} may either be an OpenPGP algorithm number or a
	string with the algorithm name. The special value @samp{default} may
	be used for @var{algo} to create the default key type; in this case a
	@samp{Key-Usage} shall not be given and @samp{default} also be used
	for @samp{Subkey-Type}.

	@item Key-Length: @var{nbits}
	The requested length of the generated key in bits. The default is
	returned by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}.

	@item Key-Grip: @var{hexstring}
	This is optional and used to generate a CSR or certificate for an
	already existing key. Key-Length will be ignored when given.

	@item Key-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Space or comma delimited list of key usages. Allowed values are
	@samp{encrypt}, @samp{sign}, and @samp{auth}. This is used to
	generate the key flags. Please make sure that the algorithm is
	capable of this usage. Note that OpenPGP requires that all primary
	keys are capable of certification, so no matter what usage is given
	here, the @samp{cert} flag will be on. If no @samp{Key-Usage} is
	specified and the @samp{Key-Type} is not @samp{default}, all allowed
	usages for that particular algorithm are used; if it is not given but
	@samp{default} is used the usage will be @samp{sign}.

	@item Subkey-Type: @var{algo}
	This generates a secondary key (subkey). Currently only one subkey
	can be handled. See also @samp{Key-Type} above.

	@item Subkey-Length: @var{nbits}
	Length of the secondary key (subkey) in bits. The default is returned
	by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}.

	@item Subkey-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Key usage lists for a subkey; similar to @samp{Key-Usage}.

	@item Passphrase: @var{string}
	If you want to specify a passphrase for the secret key, enter it here.
	Default is to use the Pinentry dialog to ask for a passphrase.

	@item Name-Real: @var{name}
	@itemx Name-Comment: @var{comment}
	@itemx Name-Email: @var{email}
	The three parts of a user name. Remember to use UTF-8 encoding here.
	If you don't give any of them, no user ID is created.

	@item Expire-Date: @var{iso-date}\|(@var{number}[d\|w\|m\|y])
	Set the expiration date for the key (and the subkey). It may either
	be entered in ISO date format (e.g. "20000815T145012") or as number of
	days, weeks, month or years after the creation date. The special
	notation "seconds=N" is also allowed to specify a number of seconds
	since creation. Without a letter days are assumed. Note that there
	is no check done on the overflow of the type used by OpenPGP for
	timestamps. Thus you better make sure that the given value make
	sense. Although OpenPGP works with time intervals, GnuPG uses an
	absolute value internally and thus the last year we can represent is
	2105.

	@item Creation-Date: @var{iso-date}
	Set the creation date of the key as stored in the key information and
	which is also part of the fingerprint calculation. Either a date like
	"1986-04-26" or a full timestamp like "19860426T042640" may be used.
	The time is considered to be UTC. The special notation "seconds=N"
	may be used to directly specify a the number of seconds since Epoch
	(Unix time). If it is not given the current time is used.

	@item Preferences: @var{string}
	Set the cipher, hash, and compression preference values for this key.
	This expects the same type of string as the sub-command @samp{setpref}
	in the @option{--edit-key} menu.

	@item Revoker: @var{algo}:@var{fpr} [sensitive]
	Add a designated revoker to the generated key. Algo is the public key
	algorithm of the designated revoker (i.e. RSA=1, DSA=17, etc.)
	@var{fpr} is the fingerprint of the designated revoker. The optional
	@samp{sensitive} flag marks the designated revoker as sensitive
	information. Only v4 keys may be designated revokers.

	@item Keyserver: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter that specifies the preferred keyserver
	URL for the key.

	@item Handle: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter only used with the status lines
	KEY_CREATED and KEY_NOT_CREATED. @var{string} may be up to 100
	characters and should not contain spaces. It is useful for batch key
	generation to associate a key parameter block with a status line.

	@end table

	@noindent
	Here is an example on how to create a key in an ephemeral home directory:
	@smallexample
	$ export GNUPGHOME="$(mktemp -d)"
	$ cat >foo <<EOF
	%echo Generating a basic OpenPGP key
	Key-Type: DSA
	Key-Length: 1024
	Subkey-Type: ELG-E
	Subkey-Length: 1024
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	EOF
	$ @gpgname --batch --generate-key foo
	[...]
	$ @gpgname --list-secret-keys
	/tmp/tmp.0NQxB74PEf/pubring.kbx
	-------------------------------
	sec dsa1024 2016-12-16 [SCA]
	768E895903FC1C44045C8CB95EEBDB71E9E849D0
	uid [ultimate] Joe Tester (with stupid passphrase) <joe@@foo.bar>
	ssb elg1024 2016-12-16 [E]
	@end smallexample

	@noindent
	If you want to create a key with the default algorithms you would use
	these parameters:
	@smallexample
	%echo Generating a default key
	Key-Type: default
	Subkey-Type: default
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	@end smallexample




	@mansect see also
	@ifset isman
	@command{gpgv}(1),
	@command{gpgsm}(1),
	@command{gpg-agent}(1)
	@end ifset
	@include see-also-note.texi
	diff --git a/g10/cipher-cfb.c b/g10/cipher-cfb.c
	index 79b21bd8a..48927c558 100644
	--- a/g10/cipher-cfb.c
	+++ b/g10/cipher-cfb.c
	@@ -1,185 +1,185 @@
	/* cipher-cfb.c - Enciphering filter for the old CFB mode.
	* Copyright (C) 1998-2003, 2006, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 1998-2003, 2006, 2009, 2017 Werner koch
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0+
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <errno.h>

	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "../common/status.h"
	#include "../common/iobuf.h"
	#include "../common/util.h"
	#include "filter.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "../common/status.h"


	#define MIN_PARTIAL_SIZE 512


	static void
	write_header (cipher_filter_context_t *cfx, iobuf_t a)
	{
	gcry_error_t err;
	PACKET pkt;
	PKT_encrypted ed;
	byte temp[18];
	unsigned int blocksize;
	unsigned int nprefix;

	blocksize = openpgp_cipher_get_algo_blklen (cfx->dek->algo);
	if ( blocksize < 8 \|\| blocksize > 16 )
	log_fatal ("unsupported blocksize %u\n", blocksize);

	memset (&ed, 0, sizeof ed);
	ed.len = cfx->datalen;
	ed.extralen = blocksize + 2;
	ed.new_ctb = !ed.len;
	if (cfx->dek->use_mdc)
	{
	ed.mdc_method = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
	gcry_md_open (&cfx->mdc_hash, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 0);
	if (DBG_HASHING)
	gcry_md_debug (cfx->mdc_hash, "creatmdc");
	}
	- else if (!opt.no_mdc_warn)
	+ else
	{
	log_info ("WARNING: "
	"encrypting without integrity protection is dangerous\n");
	}

	write_status_printf (STATUS_BEGIN_ENCRYPTION, "%d %d",
	ed.mdc_method, cfx->dek->algo);

	init_packet (&pkt);
	pkt.pkttype = cfx->dek->use_mdc? PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC : PKT_ENCRYPTED;
	pkt.pkt.encrypted = &ed;
	if (build_packet( a, &pkt))
	log_bug ("build_packet(ENCR_DATA) failed\n");
	nprefix = blocksize;
	gcry_randomize (temp, nprefix, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM );
	temp[nprefix] = temp[nprefix-2];
	temp[nprefix+1] = temp[nprefix-1];
	print_cipher_algo_note (cfx->dek->algo);
	err = openpgp_cipher_open (&cfx->cipher_hd,
	cfx->dek->algo,
	GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
	(GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
	\| ((cfx->dek->use_mdc \|\| cfx->dek->algo >= 100)?
	0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC)));
	if (err)
	{
	/* We should never get an error here cause we already checked,
	* that the algorithm is available. */
	BUG();
	}

	/* log_hexdump ("thekey", cfx->dek->key, cfx->dek->keylen); */
	gcry_cipher_setkey (cfx->cipher_hd, cfx->dek->key, cfx->dek->keylen);
	gcry_cipher_setiv (cfx->cipher_hd, NULL, 0);
	/* log_hexdump ("prefix", temp, nprefix+2); */
	if (cfx->mdc_hash) /* Hash the "IV". */
	gcry_md_write (cfx->mdc_hash, temp, nprefix+2 );
	gcry_cipher_encrypt (cfx->cipher_hd, temp, nprefix+2, NULL, 0);
	gcry_cipher_sync (cfx->cipher_hd);
	iobuf_write (a, temp, nprefix+2);

	cfx->short_blklen_warn = (blocksize < 16);
	cfx->short_blklen_count = nprefix+2;

	cfx->wrote_header = 1;
	}


	/*
	* This filter is used to en/de-cipher data with a symmetric algorithm
	*/
	int
	cipher_filter_cfb (void *opaque, int control,
	iobuf_t a, byte buf, size_t ret_len)
	{
	cipher_filter_context_t *cfx = opaque;
	size_t size = *ret_len;
	int rc = 0;

	if (control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW) /* decrypt */
	{
	rc = -1; /* not yet used */
	}
	else if (control == IOBUFCTRL_FLUSH) /* encrypt */
	{
	log_assert (a);
	if (!cfx->wrote_header)
	write_header (cfx, a);
	if (cfx->mdc_hash)
	gcry_md_write (cfx->mdc_hash, buf, size);
	gcry_cipher_encrypt (cfx->cipher_hd, buf, size, NULL, 0);
	if (cfx->short_blklen_warn)
	{
	cfx->short_blklen_count += size;
	if (cfx->short_blklen_count > (150 * 1024 * 1024))
	{
	log_info ("WARNING: encrypting more than %d MiB with algorithm "
	"%s should be avoided\n", 150,
	openpgp_cipher_algo_name (cfx->dek->algo));
	cfx->short_blklen_warn = 0; /* Don't show again. */
	}
	}

	rc = iobuf_write (a, buf, size);
	}
	else if (control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE)
	{
	if (cfx->mdc_hash)
	{
	byte *hash;
	int hashlen = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (gcry_md_get_algo(cfx->mdc_hash));
	byte temp[22];

	log_assert (hashlen == 20);
	/* We must hash the prefix of the MDC packet here. */
	temp[0] = 0xd3;
	temp[1] = 0x14;
	gcry_md_putc (cfx->mdc_hash, temp[0]);
	gcry_md_putc (cfx->mdc_hash, temp[1]);

	gcry_md_final (cfx->mdc_hash);
	hash = gcry_md_read (cfx->mdc_hash, 0);
	memcpy(temp+2, hash, 20);
	gcry_cipher_encrypt (cfx->cipher_hd, temp, 22, NULL, 0);
	gcry_md_close (cfx->mdc_hash); cfx->mdc_hash = NULL;
	if (iobuf_write( a, temp, 22))
	log_error ("writing MDC packet failed\n");
	}

	gcry_cipher_close (cfx->cipher_hd);
	}
	else if (control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC)
	{
	mem2str (buf, "cipher_filter_cfb", *ret_len);
	}

	return rc;
	}
	diff --git a/g10/gpg.c b/g10/gpg.c
	index 75eeceb13..e718fe45e 100644
	--- a/g10/gpg.c
	+++ b/g10/gpg.c
	@@ -1,5584 +1,5582 @@
	/* gpg.c - The GnuPG utility (main for gpg)
	* Copyright (C) 1998-2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 1997-2017 Werner Koch
	* Copyright (C) 2015-2017 g10 Code GmbH
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <errno.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <ctype.h>
	#include <unistd.h>
	#ifdef HAVE_STAT
	#include <sys/stat.h> /* for stat() */
	#endif
	#include <fcntl.h>
	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	# ifdef HAVE_WINSOCK2_H
	# include <winsock2.h>
	# endif
	# include <windows.h>
	#endif

	#define INCLUDED_BY_MAIN_MODULE 1
	#include "gpg.h"
	#include <assuan.h>
	#include "../common/iobuf.h"
	#include "../common/util.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "../common/membuf.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "filter.h"
	#include "../common/ttyio.h"
	#include "../common/i18n.h"
	#include "../common/sysutils.h"
	#include "../common/status.h"
	#include "keyserver-internal.h"
	#include "exec.h"
	#include "../common/gc-opt-flags.h"
	#include "../common/asshelp.h"
	#include "call-dirmngr.h"
	#include "tofu.h"
	#include "../common/init.h"
	#include "../common/mbox-util.h"
	#include "../common/shareddefs.h"
	#include "../common/compliance.h"

	#if defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM) \|\| defined(__CYGWIN__)
	#define MY_O_BINARY O_BINARY
	#ifndef S_IRGRP
	# define S_IRGRP 0
	# define S_IWGRP 0
	#endif
	#else
	#define MY_O_BINARY 0
	#endif

	#ifdef __MINGW32__
	int _dowildcard = -1;
	#endif

	enum cmd_and_opt_values
	{
	aNull = 0,
	oArmor = 'a',
	aDetachedSign = 'b',
	aSym = 'c',
	aDecrypt = 'd',
	aEncr = 'e',
	oRecipientFile = 'f',
	oHiddenRecipientFile = 'F',
	oInteractive = 'i',
	aListKeys = 'k',
	oDryRun = 'n',
	oOutput = 'o',
	oQuiet = 'q',
	oRecipient = 'r',
	oHiddenRecipient = 'R',
	aSign = 's',
	oTextmodeShort= 't',
	oLocalUser = 'u',
	oVerbose = 'v',
	oCompress = 'z',
	oSetNotation = 'N',
	aListSecretKeys = 'K',
	oBatch = 500,
	oMaxOutput,
	oInputSizeHint,
	oChunkSize,
	oSigNotation,
	oCertNotation,
	oShowNotation,
	oNoShowNotation,
	aEncrFiles,
	aEncrSym,
	aDecryptFiles,
	aClearsign,
	aStore,
	aQuickKeygen,
	aFullKeygen,
	aKeygen,
	aSignEncr,
	aSignEncrSym,
	aSignSym,
	aSignKey,
	aLSignKey,
	aQuickSignKey,
	aQuickLSignKey,
	aQuickAddUid,
	aQuickAddKey,
	aQuickRevUid,
	aQuickSetExpire,
	aQuickSetPrimaryUid,
	aListConfig,
	aListGcryptConfig,
	aGPGConfList,
	aGPGConfTest,
	aListPackets,
	aEditKey,
	aDeleteKeys,
	aDeleteSecretKeys,
	aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys,
	aImport,
	aFastImport,
	aVerify,
	aVerifyFiles,
	aListSigs,
	aSendKeys,
	aRecvKeys,
	aLocateKeys,
	aSearchKeys,
	aRefreshKeys,
	aFetchKeys,
	aExport,
	aExportSecret,
	aExportSecretSub,
	aExportSshKey,
	aCheckKeys,
	aGenRevoke,
	aDesigRevoke,
	aPrimegen,
	aPrintMD,
	aPrintMDs,
	aCheckTrustDB,
	aUpdateTrustDB,
	aFixTrustDB,
	aListTrustDB,
	aListTrustPath,
	aExportOwnerTrust,
	aImportOwnerTrust,
	aDeArmor,
	aEnArmor,
	aGenRandom,
	aRebuildKeydbCaches,
	aCardStatus,
	aCardEdit,
	aChangePIN,
	aPasswd,
	aServer,
	aTOFUPolicy,

	oMimemode,
	oTextmode,
	oNoTextmode,
	oExpert,
	oNoExpert,
	oDefSigExpire,
	oAskSigExpire,
	oNoAskSigExpire,
	oDefCertExpire,
	oAskCertExpire,
	oNoAskCertExpire,
	oDefCertLevel,
	oMinCertLevel,
	oAskCertLevel,
	oNoAskCertLevel,
	oFingerprint,
	oWithFingerprint,
	oWithSubkeyFingerprint,
	oWithICAOSpelling,
	oWithKeygrip,
	oWithKeyScreening,
	oWithSecret,
	oWithWKDHash,
	oWithColons,
	oWithKeyData,
	oWithKeyOrigin,
	oWithTofuInfo,
	oWithSigList,
	oWithSigCheck,
	oAnswerYes,
	oAnswerNo,
	oKeyring,
	oPrimaryKeyring,
	oSecretKeyring,
	oShowKeyring,
	oDefaultKey,
	oDefRecipient,
	oDefRecipientSelf,
	oNoDefRecipient,
	oTrySecretKey,
	oOptions,
	oDebug,
	oDebugLevel,
	oDebugAll,
	oDebugIOLBF,
	oDebugSetIobufSize,
	oStatusFD,
	oStatusFile,
	oAttributeFD,
	oAttributeFile,
	oEmitVersion,
	oNoEmitVersion,
	oCompletesNeeded,
	oMarginalsNeeded,
	oMaxCertDepth,
	oLoadExtension,
	oCompliance,
	oGnuPG,
	oRFC2440,
	oRFC4880,
	oRFC4880bis,
	oOpenPGP,
	oPGP6,
	oPGP7,
	oPGP8,
	oDE_VS,
	oRFC2440Text,
	oNoRFC2440Text,
	oCipherAlgo,
	oAEADAlgo,
	oDigestAlgo,
	oCertDigestAlgo,
	oCompressAlgo,
	oCompressLevel,
	oBZ2CompressLevel,
	oBZ2DecompressLowmem,
	oPassphrase,
	oPassphraseFD,
	oPassphraseFile,
	oPassphraseRepeat,
	oPinentryMode,
	oCommandFD,
	oCommandFile,
	oQuickRandom,
	oNoVerbose,
	oTrustDBName,
	oNoSecmemWarn,
	oRequireSecmem,
	oNoRequireSecmem,
	oNoPermissionWarn,
	- oNoMDCWarn,
	oNoArmor,
	oNoDefKeyring,
	oNoKeyring,
	oNoGreeting,
	oNoTTY,
	oNoOptions,
	oNoBatch,
	oHomedir,
	oSkipVerify,
	oSkipHiddenRecipients,
	oNoSkipHiddenRecipients,
	oAlwaysTrust,
	oTrustModel,
	oForceOwnertrust,
	oSetFilename,
	oForYourEyesOnly,
	oNoForYourEyesOnly,
	oSetPolicyURL,
	oSigPolicyURL,
	oCertPolicyURL,
	oShowPolicyURL,
	oNoShowPolicyURL,
	oSigKeyserverURL,
	oUseEmbeddedFilename,
	oNoUseEmbeddedFilename,
	oComment,
	oDefaultComment,
	oNoComments,
	oThrowKeyids,
	oNoThrowKeyids,
	oShowPhotos,
	oNoShowPhotos,
	oPhotoViewer,
	oForceMDC,
	oNoForceMDC,
	oDisableMDC,
	oNoDisableMDC,
	oForceAEAD,
	oS2KMode,
	oS2KDigest,
	oS2KCipher,
	oS2KCount,
	oDisplayCharset,
	oNotDashEscaped,
	oEscapeFrom,
	oNoEscapeFrom,
	oLockOnce,
	oLockMultiple,
	oLockNever,
	oKeyServer,
	oKeyServerOptions,
	oImportOptions,
	oImportFilter,
	oExportOptions,
	oExportFilter,
	oListOptions,
	oVerifyOptions,
	oTempDir,
	oExecPath,
	oEncryptTo,
	oHiddenEncryptTo,
	oNoEncryptTo,
	oEncryptToDefaultKey,
	oLoggerFD,
	oLoggerFile,
	oUtf8Strings,
	oNoUtf8Strings,
	oDisableCipherAlgo,
	oDisablePubkeyAlgo,
	oAllowNonSelfsignedUID,
	oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID,
	oAllowFreeformUID,
	oNoAllowFreeformUID,
	oAllowSecretKeyImport,
	oEnableSpecialFilenames,
	oNoLiteral,
	oSetFilesize,
	oHonorHttpProxy,
	oFastListMode,
	oListOnly,
	oIgnoreTimeConflict,
	oIgnoreValidFrom,
	oIgnoreCrcError,
	oIgnoreMDCError,
	oShowSessionKey,
	oOverrideSessionKey,
	oOverrideSessionKeyFD,
	oNoRandomSeedFile,
	oAutoKeyRetrieve,
	oNoAutoKeyRetrieve,
	oUseAgent,
	oNoUseAgent,
	oGpgAgentInfo,
	oMergeOnly,
	oTryAllSecrets,
	oTrustedKey,
	oNoExpensiveTrustChecks,
	oFixedListMode,
	oLegacyListMode,
	oNoSigCache,
	oAutoCheckTrustDB,
	oNoAutoCheckTrustDB,
	oPreservePermissions,
	oDefaultPreferenceList,
	oDefaultKeyserverURL,
	oPersonalCipherPreferences,
	oPersonalAEADPreferences,
	oPersonalDigestPreferences,
	oPersonalCompressPreferences,
	oAgentProgram,
	oDirmngrProgram,
	oDisableDirmngr,
	oDisplay,
	oTTYname,
	oTTYtype,
	oLCctype,
	oLCmessages,
	oXauthority,
	oGroup,
	oUnGroup,
	oNoGroups,
	oStrict,
	oNoStrict,
	oMangleDosFilenames,
	oNoMangleDosFilenames,
	oEnableProgressFilter,
	oMultifile,
	oKeyidFormat,
	oExitOnStatusWriteError,
	oLimitCardInsertTries,
	oReaderPort,
	octapiDriver,
	opcscDriver,
	oDisableCCID,
	oRequireCrossCert,
	oNoRequireCrossCert,
	oAutoKeyLocate,
	oNoAutoKeyLocate,
	oAllowMultisigVerification,
	oEnableLargeRSA,
	oDisableLargeRSA,
	oEnableDSA2,
	oDisableDSA2,
	oAllowMultipleMessages,
	oNoAllowMultipleMessages,
	oAllowWeakDigestAlgos,
	oFakedSystemTime,
	oNoAutostart,
	oPrintPKARecords,
	oPrintDANERecords,
	oTOFUDefaultPolicy,
	oTOFUDBFormat,
	oDefaultNewKeyAlgo,
	oWeakDigest,
	oUnwrap,
	oOnlySignTextIDs,
	oDisableSignerUID,
	oSender,
	oKeyOrigin,
	oRequestOrigin,
	oNoSymkeyCache,

	oNoop
	};


	static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {

	ARGPARSE_group (300, N_("@Commands:\n ")),

	ARGPARSE_c (aSign, "sign", N_("make a signature")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aClearsign, "clear-sign", N_("make a clear text signature")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aClearsign, "clearsign", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDetachedSign, "detach-sign", N_("make a detached signature")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEncr, "encrypt", N_("encrypt data")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEncrFiles, "encrypt-files", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aSym, "symmetric", N_("encryption only with symmetric cipher")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aStore, "store", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDecrypt, "decrypt", N_("decrypt data (default)")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDecryptFiles, "decrypt-files", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aVerify, "verify" , N_("verify a signature")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aVerifyFiles, "verify-files" , "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListKeys, "list-keys", N_("list keys")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListKeys, "list-public-keys", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListSigs, "list-signatures", N_("list keys and signatures")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListSigs, "list-sigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aCheckKeys, "check-signatures",
	N_("list and check key signatures")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aCheckKeys, "check-sigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (oFingerprint, "fingerprint", N_("list keys and fingerprints")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListSecretKeys, "list-secret-keys", N_("list secret keys")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aKeygen, "generate-key",
	N_("generate a new key pair")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aKeygen, "gen-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickKeygen, "quick-generate-key" ,
	N_("quickly generate a new key pair")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickKeygen, "quick-gen-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickAddUid, "quick-add-uid",
	N_("quickly add a new user-id")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickAddUid, "quick-adduid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickAddKey, "quick-add-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickAddKey, "quick-addkey", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickRevUid, "quick-revoke-uid",
	N_("quickly revoke a user-id")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickRevUid, "quick-revuid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickSetExpire, "quick-set-expire",
	N_("quickly set a new expiration date")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickSetPrimaryUid, "quick-set-primary-uid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aFullKeygen, "full-generate-key" ,
	N_("full featured key pair generation")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aFullKeygen, "full-gen-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aGenRevoke, "generate-revocation",
	N_("generate a revocation certificate")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aGenRevoke, "gen-revoke", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteKeys,"delete-keys",
	N_("remove keys from the public keyring")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteSecretKeys, "delete-secret-keys",
	N_("remove keys from the secret keyring")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickSignKey, "quick-sign-key" ,
	N_("quickly sign a key")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aQuickLSignKey, "quick-lsign-key",
	N_("quickly sign a key locally")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aSignKey, "sign-key" ,N_("sign a key")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aLSignKey, "lsign-key" ,N_("sign a key locally")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEditKey, "edit-key" ,N_("sign or edit a key")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEditKey, "key-edit" ,"@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aPasswd, "change-passphrase", N_("change a passphrase")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aPasswd, "passwd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDesigRevoke, "generate-designated-revocation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDesigRevoke, "desig-revoke","@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aExport, "export" , N_("export keys") ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aSendKeys, "send-keys" , N_("export keys to a keyserver") ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aRecvKeys, "receive-keys" , N_("import keys from a keyserver") ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aRecvKeys, "recv-keys" , "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aSearchKeys, "search-keys" ,
	N_("search for keys on a keyserver") ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aRefreshKeys, "refresh-keys",
	N_("update all keys from a keyserver")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aLocateKeys, "locate-keys", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aFetchKeys, "fetch-keys" , "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aExportSecret, "export-secret-keys" , "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aExportSecretSub, "export-secret-subkeys" , "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aExportSshKey, "export-ssh-key", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aImport, "import", N_("import/merge keys")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aFastImport, "fast-import", "@"),
	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	ARGPARSE_c (aCardStatus, "card-status", N_("print the card status")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aCardEdit, "edit-card", N_("change data on a card")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aCardEdit, "card-edit", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aChangePIN, "change-pin", N_("change a card's PIN")),
	#endif
	ARGPARSE_c (aListConfig, "list-config", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListGcryptConfig, "list-gcrypt-config", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aGPGConfList, "gpgconf-list", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aGPGConfTest, "gpgconf-test", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListPackets, "list-packets","@"),

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	ARGPARSE_c (aExportOwnerTrust, "export-ownertrust", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aImportOwnerTrust, "import-ownertrust", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aUpdateTrustDB,"update-trustdb",
	N_("update the trust database")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aCheckTrustDB, "check-trustdb", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aFixTrustDB, "fix-trustdb", "@"),
	#endif

	ARGPARSE_c (aDeArmor, "dearmor", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aDeArmor, "dearmour", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEnArmor, "enarmor", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aEnArmor, "enarmour", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aPrintMD, "print-md", N_("print message digests")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aPrimegen, "gen-prime", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aGenRandom,"gen-random", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_c (aServer, "server", N_("run in server mode")),
	ARGPARSE_c (aTOFUPolicy, "tofu-policy",
	N_("\|VALUE\|set the TOFU policy for a key")),

	ARGPARSE_group (301, N_("@\nOptions:\n ")),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oArmor, "armor", N_("create ascii armored output")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oArmor, "armour", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "recipient", N_("\|USER-ID\|encrypt for USER-ID")),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oHiddenRecipient, "hidden-recipient", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipientFile, "recipient-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oHiddenRecipientFile, "hidden-recipient-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "remote-user", "@"), /* (old option name) */
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefRecipient, "default-recipient", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDefRecipientSelf, "default-recipient-self", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDefRecipient, "no-default-recipient", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTempDir, "temp-directory", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oExecPath, "exec-path", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oEncryptTo, "encrypt-to", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEncryptTo, "no-encrypt-to", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oHiddenEncryptTo, "hidden-encrypt-to", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEncryptToDefaultKey, "encrypt-to-default-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLocalUser, "local-user",
	N_("\|USER-ID\|use USER-ID to sign or decrypt")),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSender, "sender", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrySecretKey, "try-secret-key", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_i (oCompress, NULL,
	N_("\|N\|set compress level to N (0 disables)")),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oCompressLevel, "compress-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oBZ2CompressLevel, "bzip2-compress-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oBZ2DecompressLowmem, "bzip2-decompress-lowmem", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oMimemode, "mimemode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oTextmodeShort, NULL, "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oTextmode, "textmode", N_("use canonical text mode")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoTextmode, "no-textmode", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oExpert, "expert", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoExpert, "no-expert", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefSigExpire, "default-sig-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAskSigExpire, "ask-sig-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAskSigExpire, "no-ask-sig-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefCertExpire, "default-cert-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAskCertExpire, "ask-cert-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAskCertExpire, "no-ask-cert-expire", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oDefCertLevel, "default-cert-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oMinCertLevel, "min-cert-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAskCertLevel, "ask-cert-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAskCertLevel, "no-ask-cert-level", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oOutput, "output", N_("\|FILE\|write output to FILE")),
	ARGPARSE_p_u (oMaxOutput, "max-output", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oInputSizeHint, "input-size-hint", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oChunkSize, "chunk-size", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oVerbose, "verbose", N_("verbose")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oQuiet, "quiet", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoTTY, "no-tty", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oForceMDC, "force-mdc", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoForceMDC, "no-force-mdc", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableMDC, "disable-mdc", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDisableMDC, "no-disable-mdc", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oForceAEAD, "force-aead", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableSignerUID, "disable-signer-uid", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDryRun, "dry-run", N_("do not make any changes")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oInteractive, "interactive", N_("prompt before overwriting")),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oBatch, "batch", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAnswerYes, "yes", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAnswerNo, "no", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyring, "keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPrimaryKeyring, "primary-keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSecretKeyring, "secret-keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowKeyring, "show-keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultKey, "default-key", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyServer, "keyserver", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyServerOptions, "keyserver-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyOrigin, "key-origin", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oImportOptions, "import-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oImportFilter, "import-filter", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oExportOptions, "export-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oExportFilter, "export-filter", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oListOptions, "list-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oVerifyOptions, "verify-options", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplayCharset, "display-charset", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplayCharset, "charset", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oOptions, "options", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDebug, "debug", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDebugLevel, "debug-level", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugAll, "debug-all", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugIOLBF, "debug-iolbf", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_u (oDebugSetIobufSize, "debug-set-iobuf-size", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oStatusFD, "status-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oStatusFile, "status-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oAttributeFD, "attribute-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oAttributeFile, "attribute-file", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_i (oCompletesNeeded, "completes-needed", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oMarginalsNeeded, "marginals-needed", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oMaxCertDepth, "max-cert-depth", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrustedKey, "trusted-key", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLoadExtension, "load-extension", "@"), /* Dummy. */

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCompliance, "compliance", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "gnupg", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp2", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp6", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp7", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oGnuPG, "no-pgp8", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC2440, "rfc2440", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC4880, "rfc4880", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC4880bis, "rfc4880bis", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oOpenPGP, "openpgp", N_("use strict OpenPGP behavior")),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP6, "pgp6", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP7, "pgp7", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPGP8, "pgp8", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRFC2440Text, "rfc2440-text", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRFC2440Text, "no-rfc2440-text", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oS2KMode, "s2k-mode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oS2KDigest, "s2k-digest-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oS2KCipher, "s2k-cipher-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oS2KCount, "s2k-count", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCipherAlgo, "cipher-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oAEADAlgo, "aead-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDigestAlgo, "digest-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertDigestAlgo, "cert-digest-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCompressAlgo,"compress-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCompressAlgo, "compression-algo", "@"), /* Alias */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oThrowKeyids, "throw-keyids", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoThrowKeyids, "no-throw-keyids", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowPhotos, "show-photos", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoShowPhotos, "no-show-photos", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPhotoViewer, "photo-viewer", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSetNotation, "set-notation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSigNotation, "sig-notation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertNotation, "cert-notation", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_group (302, N_(
	"@\n(See the man page for a complete listing of all commands and options)\n"
	)),

	ARGPARSE_group (303, N_("@\nExamples:\n\n"
	" -se -r Bob [file] sign and encrypt for user Bob\n"
	" --clear-sign [file] make a clear text signature\n"
	" --detach-sign [file] make a detached signature\n"
	" --list-keys [names] show keys\n"
	" --fingerprint [names] show fingerprints\n")),

	/* More hidden commands and options. */
	ARGPARSE_c (aPrintMDs, "print-mds", "@"), /* old */
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	ARGPARSE_c (aListTrustDB, "list-trustdb", "@"),
	#endif

	/* Not yet used:
	ARGPARSE_c (aListTrustPath, "list-trust-path", "@"), */
	ARGPARSE_c (aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys,
	"delete-secret-and-public-keys", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aRebuildKeydbCaches, "rebuild-keydb-caches", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPassphrase, "passphrase", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oPassphraseFD, "passphrase-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPassphraseFile, "passphrase-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oPassphraseRepeat,"passphrase-repeat", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPinentryMode, "pinentry-mode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oRequestOrigin, "request-origin", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oCommandFD, "command-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCommandFile, "command-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oQuickRandom, "debug-quick-random", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoVerbose, "no-verbose", "@"),

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrustDBName, "trustdb-name", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAutoCheckTrustDB, "auto-check-trustdb", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutoCheckTrustDB, "no-auto-check-trustdb", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oForceOwnertrust, "force-ownertrust", "@"),
	#endif

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSecmemWarn, "no-secmem-warning", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequireSecmem, "require-secmem", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRequireSecmem, "no-require-secmem", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoPermissionWarn, "no-permission-warning", "@"),
	- ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoMDCWarn, "no-mdc-warning", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoArmor, "no-armor", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoArmor, "no-armour", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoDefKeyring, "no-default-keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoKeyring, "no-keyring", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoGreeting, "no-greeting", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoOptions, "no-options", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oHomedir, "homedir", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoBatch, "no-batch", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithColons, "with-colons", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithTofuInfo,"with-tofu-info", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeyData,"with-key-data", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSigList,"with-sig-list", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSigCheck,"with-sig-check", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_c (aListKeys, "list-key", "@"), /* alias */
	ARGPARSE_c (aListSigs, "list-sig", "@"), /* alias */
	ARGPARSE_c (aCheckKeys, "check-sig", "@"), /* alias */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oSkipVerify, "skip-verify", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oSkipHiddenRecipients, "skip-hidden-recipients", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSkipHiddenRecipients, "no-skip-hidden-recipients", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oDefCertLevel, "default-cert-check-level", "@"), /* old */
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAlwaysTrust, "always-trust", "@"),
	#endif
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTrustModel, "trust-model", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTOFUDefaultPolicy, "tofu-default-policy", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSetFilename, "set-filename", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oForYourEyesOnly, "for-your-eyes-only", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoForYourEyesOnly, "no-for-your-eyes-only", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSetPolicyURL, "set-policy-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSigPolicyURL, "sig-policy-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oCertPolicyURL, "cert-policy-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowPolicyURL, "show-policy-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoShowPolicyURL, "no-show-policy-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oSigKeyserverURL, "sig-keyserver-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowNotation, "show-notation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoShowNotation, "no-show-notation", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oComment, "comment", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDefaultComment, "default-comment", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoComments, "no-comments", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEmitVersion, "emit-version", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEmitVersion, "no-emit-version", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEmitVersion, "no-version", "@"), /* alias */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNotDashEscaped, "not-dash-escaped", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEscapeFrom, "escape-from-lines", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoEscapeFrom, "no-escape-from-lines", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oLockOnce, "lock-once", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oLockMultiple, "lock-multiple", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oLockNever, "lock-never", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oLoggerFD, "logger-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLoggerFile, "log-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLoggerFile, "logger-file", "@"), /* 1.4 compatibility. */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oUseEmbeddedFilename, "use-embedded-filename", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUseEmbeddedFilename, "no-use-embedded-filename", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oUtf8Strings, "utf8-strings", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUtf8Strings, "no-utf8-strings", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithFingerprint, "with-fingerprint", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSubkeyFingerprint, "with-subkey-fingerprint", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSubkeyFingerprint, "with-subkey-fingerprints", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithICAOSpelling, "with-icao-spelling", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeygrip, "with-keygrip", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeyScreening,"with-key-screening", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithSecret, "with-secret", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithWKDHash, "with-wkd-hash", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oWithKeyOrigin, "with-key-origin", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisableCipherAlgo, "disable-cipher-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisablePubkeyAlgo, "disable-pubkey-algo", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowNonSelfsignedUID, "allow-non-selfsigned-uid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID, "no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowFreeformUID, "allow-freeform-uid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowFreeformUID, "no-allow-freeform-uid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoLiteral, "no-literal", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_p_u (oSetFilesize, "set-filesize", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oFastListMode, "fast-list-mode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oFixedListMode, "fixed-list-mode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oLegacyListMode, "legacy-list-mode", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oListOnly, "list-only", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPrintPKARecords, "print-pka-records", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPrintDANERecords, "print-dane-records", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreTimeConflict, "ignore-time-conflict", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreValidFrom, "ignore-valid-from", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreCrcError, "ignore-crc-error", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oIgnoreMDCError, "ignore-mdc-error", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oShowSessionKey, "show-session-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oOverrideSessionKey, "override-session-key", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oOverrideSessionKeyFD, "override-session-key-fd", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRandomSeedFile, "no-random-seed-file", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAutoKeyRetrieve, "auto-key-retrieve", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutoKeyRetrieve, "no-auto-key-retrieve", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSigCache, "no-sig-cache", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oMergeOnly, "merge-only", "@" ),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowSecretKeyImport, "allow-secret-key-import", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oTryAllSecrets, "try-all-secrets", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableSpecialFilenames, "enable-special-filenames", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoExpensiveTrustChecks, "no-expensive-trust-checks", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oPreservePermissions, "preserve-permissions", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultPreferenceList, "default-preference-list", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultKeyserverURL, "default-keyserver-url", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCipherPreferences, "personal-cipher-preferences","@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalAEADPreferences, "personal-aead-preferences","@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalDigestPreferences, "personal-digest-preferences","@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCompressPreferences,
	"personal-compress-preferences", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oFakedSystemTime, "faked-system-time", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oWeakDigest, "weak-digest","@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oUnwrap, "unwrap", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oOnlySignTextIDs, "only-sign-text-ids", "@"),

	/* Aliases. I constantly mistype these, and assume other people do
	as well. */
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCipherPreferences, "personal-cipher-prefs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalAEADPreferences, "personal-aead-prefs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalDigestPreferences, "personal-digest-prefs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oPersonalCompressPreferences, "personal-compress-prefs", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oAgentProgram, "agent-program", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDirmngrProgram, "dirmngr-program", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableDirmngr, "disable-dirmngr", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDisplay, "display", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTTYname, "ttyname", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTTYtype, "ttytype", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLCctype, "lc-ctype", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLCmessages, "lc-messages","@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oXauthority, "xauthority", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oGroup, "group", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oUnGroup, "ungroup", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoGroups, "no-groups", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oStrict, "strict", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoStrict, "no-strict", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oMangleDosFilenames, "mangle-dos-filenames", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoMangleDosFilenames, "no-mangle-dos-filenames", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableProgressFilter, "enable-progress-filter", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oMultifile, "multifile", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oKeyidFormat, "keyid-format", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oExitOnStatusWriteError, "exit-on-status-write-error", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_i (oLimitCardInsertTries, "limit-card-insert-tries", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowMultisigVerification,
	"allow-multisig-verification", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableLargeRSA, "enable-large-rsa", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableLargeRSA, "disable-large-rsa", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableDSA2, "enable-dsa2", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableDSA2, "disable-dsa2", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowMultipleMessages, "allow-multiple-messages", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAllowMultipleMessages, "no-allow-multiple-messages", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oAllowWeakDigestAlgos, "allow-weak-digest-algos", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_s (oDefaultNewKeyAlgo, "default-new-key-algo", "@"),

	/* These two are aliases to help users of the PGP command line
	product use gpg with minimal pain. Many commands are common
	already as they seem to have borrowed commands from us. Now I'm
	returning the favor. */
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oLocalUser, "sign-with", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oRecipient, "user", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequireCrossCert, "require-backsigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oRequireCrossCert, "require-cross-certification", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRequireCrossCert, "no-require-backsigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoRequireCrossCert, "no-require-cross-certification", "@"),

	/* New options. Fixme: Should go more to the top. */
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oAutoKeyLocate, "auto-key-locate", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutoKeyLocate, "no-auto-key-locate", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoAutostart, "no-autostart", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoSymkeyCache, "no-symkey-cache", "@"),

	/* Dummy options with warnings. */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oUseAgent, "use-agent", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUseAgent, "no-use-agent", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oGpgAgentInfo, "gpg-agent-info", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oReaderPort, "reader-port", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (octapiDriver, "ctapi-driver", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (opcscDriver, "pcsc-driver", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableCCID, "disable-ccid", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oHonorHttpProxy, "honor-http-proxy", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_s (oTOFUDBFormat, "tofu-db-format", "@"),

	/* Dummy options. */
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "sk-comments", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-sk-comments", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "compress-keys", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "compress-sigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "force-v3-sigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-force-v3-sigs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "force-v4-certs", "@"),
	ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-force-v4-certs", "@"),
	+ ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-mdc-warning", "@"),

	ARGPARSE_end ()
	};


	/* The list of supported debug flags. */
	static struct debug_flags_s debug_flags [] =
	{
	{ DBG_PACKET_VALUE , "packet" },
	{ DBG_MPI_VALUE , "mpi" },
	{ DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE , "crypto" },
	{ DBG_FILTER_VALUE , "filter" },
	{ DBG_IOBUF_VALUE , "iobuf" },
	{ DBG_MEMORY_VALUE , "memory" },
	{ DBG_CACHE_VALUE , "cache" },
	{ DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE, "memstat" },
	{ DBG_TRUST_VALUE , "trust" },
	{ DBG_HASHING_VALUE, "hashing" },
	{ DBG_IPC_VALUE , "ipc" },
	{ DBG_CLOCK_VALUE , "clock" },
	{ DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE , "lookup" },
	{ DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE, "extprog" },
	{ 0, NULL }
	};


	#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
	#define ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS 1
	#else
	#define ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS 0
	#endif


	int g10_errors_seen = 0;

	static int utf8_strings = 0;
	static int maybe_setuid = 1;
	static unsigned int opt_set_iobuf_size;
	static unsigned int opt_set_iobuf_size_used;

	static char build_list( const char text, char letter,
	const char (mapf)(int), int (*chkf)(int) );
	static void set_cmd( enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd,
	enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd );
	static void print_mds( const char *fname, int algo );
	static void add_notation_data( const char *string, int which );
	static void add_policy_url( const char *string, int which );
	static void add_keyserver_url( const char *string, int which );
	static void emergency_cleanup (void);
	static void read_sessionkey_from_fd (int fd);


	static char *
	make_libversion (const char libname, const char (getfnc)(const char))
	{
	const char *s;
	char *result;

	if (maybe_setuid)
	{
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 0, 0); /* Drop setuid. */
	maybe_setuid = 0;
	}
	s = getfnc (NULL);
	result = xmalloc (strlen (libname) + 1 + strlen (s) + 1);
	strcpy (stpcpy (stpcpy (result, libname), " "), s);
	return result;
	}


	static int
	build_list_pk_test_algo (int algo)
	{
	/* Show only one "RSA" string. If RSA_E or RSA_S is available RSA
	is also available. */
	if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E
	\|\| algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S)
	return GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;

	return openpgp_pk_test_algo (algo);
	}

	static const char *
	build_list_pk_algo_name (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_pk_algo_name (algo);
	}

	static int
	build_list_cipher_test_algo (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo);
	}

	static const char *
	build_list_cipher_algo_name (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
	}

	static int
	build_list_aead_test_algo (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_aead_test_algo (algo);
	}

	static const char *
	build_list_aead_algo_name (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_aead_algo_name (algo);
	}

	static int
	build_list_md_test_algo (int algo)
	{
	/* By default we do not accept MD5 based signatures. To avoid
	confusion we do not announce support for it either. */
	if (algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5)
	return GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;

	return openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
	}

	static const char *
	build_list_md_algo_name (int algo)
	{
	return openpgp_md_algo_name (algo);
	}


	static const char *
	my_strusage( int level )
	{
	static char digests, pubkeys, ciphers, zips, aeads, ver_gcry;
	const char *p;

	switch( level ) {
	case 11: p = "@GPG@ (@GNUPG@)";
	break;
	case 13: p = VERSION; break;
	case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break;
	case 19: p = _("Please report bugs to <@EMAIL@>.\n"); break;

	case 20:
	if (!ver_gcry)
	ver_gcry = make_libversion ("libgcrypt", gcry_check_version);
	p = ver_gcry;
	break;

	#ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION
	case 25:
	p="NOTE: THIS IS A DEVELOPMENT VERSION!";
	break;
	case 26:
	p="It is only intended for test purposes and should NOT be";
	break;
	case 27:
	p="used in a production environment or with production keys!";
	break;
	#endif

	case 1:
	case 40: p =
	_("Usage: @GPG@ [options] [files] (-h for help)");
	break;
	case 41: p =
	_("Syntax: @GPG@ [options] [files]\n"
	"Sign, check, encrypt or decrypt\n"
	"Default operation depends on the input data\n");
	break;

	case 31: p = "\nHome: "; break;
	#ifndef __riscos__
	case 32: p = gnupg_homedir (); break;
	#else /* __riscos__ */
	case 32: p = make_filename(gnupg_homedir (), NULL); break;
	#endif /* __riscos__ */
	case 33: p = _("\nSupported algorithms:\n"); break;
	case 34:
	if (!pubkeys)
	pubkeys = build_list (_("Pubkey: "), 1,
	build_list_pk_algo_name,
	build_list_pk_test_algo );
	p = pubkeys;
	break;
	case 35:
	if( !ciphers )
	ciphers = build_list(_("Cipher: "), 'S',
	build_list_cipher_algo_name,
	build_list_cipher_test_algo );
	p = ciphers;
	break;
	case 36:
	if (!aeads)
	aeads = build_list ("AEAD: ", 'A',
	build_list_aead_algo_name,
	build_list_aead_test_algo);
	p = aeads;
	break;
	case 37:
	if( !digests )
	digests = build_list(_("Hash: "), 'H',
	build_list_md_algo_name,
	build_list_md_test_algo );
	p = digests;
	break;
	case 38:
	if( !zips )
	zips = build_list(_("Compression: "),'Z',
	compress_algo_to_string,
	check_compress_algo);
	p = zips;
	break;

	default: p = NULL;
	}
	return p;
	}


	static char *
	build_list (const char *text, char letter,
	const char * (mapf)(int), int (chkf)(int))
	{
	membuf_t mb;
	int indent;
	int i, j, len;
	int limit;
	const char *s;
	char *string;

	if (maybe_setuid)
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 0, 0); /* Drop setuid. */

	indent = utf8_charcount (text, -1);
	len = 0;
	init_membuf (&mb, 512);

	limit = (letter == 'A')? 4 : 110;
	for (i=0; i <= limit; i++ )
	{
	if (!chkf (i) && (s = mapf (i)))
	{
	if (mb.len - len > 60)
	{
	put_membuf_str (&mb, ",\n");
	len = mb.len;
	for (j=0; j < indent; j++)
	put_membuf_str (&mb, " ");
	}
	else if (mb.len)
	put_membuf_str (&mb, ", ");
	else
	put_membuf_str (&mb, text);

	put_membuf_str (&mb, s);
	if (opt.verbose && letter)
	{
	char num[20];
	if (letter == 1)
	snprintf (num, sizeof num, " (%d)", i);
	else
	snprintf (num, sizeof num, " (%c%d)", letter, i);
	put_membuf_str (&mb, num);
	}
	}
	}
	if (mb.len)
	put_membuf_str (&mb, "\n");
	put_membuf (&mb, "", 1);

	string = get_membuf (&mb, NULL);
	return xrealloc (string, strlen (string)+1);
	}


	static void
	wrong_args( const char *text)
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stderr, _("usage: %s [options] %s\n"), GPG_NAME, text);
	log_inc_errorcount ();
	g10_exit(2);
	}


	static char *
	make_username( const char *string )
	{
	char *p;
	if( utf8_strings )
	p = xstrdup(string);
	else
	p = native_to_utf8( string );
	return p;
	}


	static void
	set_opt_session_env (const char name, const char value)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;

	err = session_env_setenv (opt.session_env, name, value);
	if (err)
	log_fatal ("error setting session environment: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	}


	/* Setup the debugging. With a LEVEL of NULL only the active debug
	flags are propagated to the subsystems. With LEVEL set, a specific
	set of debug flags is set; thus overriding all flags already
	set. */
	static void
	set_debug (const char *level)
	{
	int numok = (level && digitp (level));
	int numlvl = numok? atoi (level) : 0;

	if (!level)
	;
	else if (!strcmp (level, "none") \|\| (numok && numlvl < 1))
	opt.debug = 0;
	else if (!strcmp (level, "basic") \|\| (numok && numlvl <= 2))
	opt.debug = DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE;
	else if (!strcmp (level, "advanced") \|\| (numok && numlvl <= 5))
	opt.debug = DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE\|DBG_TRUST_VALUE\|DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE;
	else if (!strcmp (level, "expert") \|\| (numok && numlvl <= 8))
	opt.debug = (DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE\|DBG_TRUST_VALUE\|DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE
	\|DBG_CACHE_VALUE\|DBG_LOOKUP\|DBG_FILTER_VALUE\|DBG_PACKET_VALUE);
	else if (!strcmp (level, "guru") \|\| numok)
	{
	opt.debug = ~0;
	/* Unless the "guru" string has been used we don't want to allow
	hashing debugging. The rationale is that people tend to
	select the highest debug value and would then clutter their
	disk with debug files which may reveal confidential data. */
	if (numok)
	opt.debug &= ~(DBG_HASHING_VALUE);
	}
	else
	{
	log_error (_("invalid debug-level '%s' given\n"), level);
	g10_exit (2);
	}

	if ((opt.debug & DBG_MEMORY_VALUE))
	memory_debug_mode = 1;
	if ((opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE))
	memory_stat_debug_mode = 1;
	if (DBG_MPI)
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 2);
	if (DBG_CRYPTO)
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 1);
	if ((opt.debug & DBG_IOBUF_VALUE))
	iobuf_debug_mode = 1;
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);

	if (opt.debug)
	parse_debug_flag (NULL, &opt.debug, debug_flags);

	if (opt_set_iobuf_size \|\| opt_set_iobuf_size_used)
	log_debug ("iobuf buffer size is %uk\n",
	iobuf_set_buffer_size (opt_set_iobuf_size));
	}


	/* We set the screen dimensions for UI purposes. Do not allow screens
	smaller than 80x24 for the sake of simplicity. */
	static void
	set_screen_dimensions(void)
	{
	#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	char *str;

	str=getenv("COLUMNS");
	if(str)
	opt.screen_columns=atoi(str);

	str=getenv("LINES");
	if(str)
	opt.screen_lines=atoi(str);
	#endif

	if(opt.screen_columns<80 \|\| opt.screen_columns>255)
	opt.screen_columns=80;

	if(opt.screen_lines<24 \|\| opt.screen_lines>255)
	opt.screen_lines=24;
	}


	/* Helper to open a file FNAME either for reading or writing to be
	used with --status-file etc functions. Not generally useful but it
	avoids the riscos specific functions and well some Windows people
	might like it too. Prints an error message and returns -1 on
	error. On success the file descriptor is returned. */
	static int
	open_info_file (const char *fname, int for_write, int binary)
	{
	#ifdef __riscos__
	return riscos_fdopenfile (fname, for_write);
	#elif defined (ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS)
	/* We can't allow these even when testing for a secured filename
	because files to be secured might not yet been secured. This is
	similar to the option file but in that case it is unlikely that
	sensitive information may be retrieved by means of error
	messages. */
	(void)fname;
	(void)for_write;
	(void)binary;
	return -1;
	#else
	int fd;

	if (binary)
	binary = MY_O_BINARY;

	/* if (is_secured_filename (fname)) */
	/* { */
	/* fd = -1; */
	/* gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); */
	/* } */
	/* else */
	/* { */
	do
	{
	if (for_write)
	fd = open (fname, O_CREAT \| O_TRUNC \| O_WRONLY \| binary,
	S_IRUSR \| S_IWUSR \| S_IRGRP \| S_IWGRP);
	else
	fd = open (fname, O_RDONLY \| binary);
	}
	while (fd == -1 && errno == EINTR);
	/* } */
	if ( fd == -1)
	log_error ( for_write? _("can't create '%s': %s\n")
	: _("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno));

	return fd;
	#endif
	}

	static void
	set_cmd( enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd, enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd )
	{
	enum cmd_and_opt_values cmd = *ret_cmd;

	if( !cmd \|\| cmd == new_cmd )
	cmd = new_cmd;
	else if( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aEncr )
	cmd = aSignEncr;
	else if( cmd == aEncr && new_cmd == aSign )
	cmd = aSignEncr;
	else if( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aSym )
	cmd = aSignSym;
	else if( cmd == aSym && new_cmd == aSign )
	cmd = aSignSym;
	else if( cmd == aSym && new_cmd == aEncr )
	cmd = aEncrSym;
	else if( cmd == aEncr && new_cmd == aSym )
	cmd = aEncrSym;
	else if (cmd == aSignEncr && new_cmd == aSym)
	cmd = aSignEncrSym;
	else if (cmd == aSignSym && new_cmd == aEncr)
	cmd = aSignEncrSym;
	else if (cmd == aEncrSym && new_cmd == aSign)
	cmd = aSignEncrSym;
	else if( ( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aClearsign )
	\|\| ( cmd == aClearsign && new_cmd == aSign ) )
	cmd = aClearsign;
	else {
	log_error(_("conflicting commands\n"));
	g10_exit(2);
	}

	*ret_cmd = cmd;
	}


	static void
	add_group(char *string)
	{
	char name,value;
	struct groupitem *item;

	/* Break off the group name */
	name=strsep(&string,"=");
	if(string==NULL)
	{
	log_error(_("no = sign found in group definition '%s'\n"),name);
	return;
	}

	trim_trailing_ws(name,strlen(name));

	/* Does this group already exist? */
	for(item=opt.grouplist;item;item=item->next)
	if(strcasecmp(item->name,name)==0)
	break;

	if(!item)
	{
	item=xmalloc(sizeof(struct groupitem));
	item->name=name;
	item->next=opt.grouplist;
	item->values=NULL;
	opt.grouplist=item;
	}

	/* Break apart the values */
	while ((value= strsep(&string," \t")))
	{
	if (*value)
	add_to_strlist2(&item->values,value,utf8_strings);
	}
	}


	static void
	rm_group(char *name)
	{
	struct groupitem item,last=NULL;

	trim_trailing_ws(name,strlen(name));

	for(item=opt.grouplist;item;last=item,item=item->next)
	{
	if(strcasecmp(item->name,name)==0)
	{
	if(last)
	last->next=item->next;
	else
	opt.grouplist=item->next;

	free_strlist(item->values);
	xfree(item);
	break;
	}
	}
	}


	/* We need to check three things.

	0) The homedir. It must be x00, a directory, and owned by the
	user.

	1) The options/gpg.conf file. Okay unless it or its containing
	directory is group or other writable or not owned by us. Disable
	exec in this case.

	2) Extensions. Same as #1.

	Returns true if the item is unsafe. */
	static int
	check_permissions (const char *path, int item)
	{
	#if defined(HAVE_STAT) && !defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)
	static int homedir_cache=-1;
	char tmppath,dir;
	struct stat statbuf,dirbuf;
	int homedir=0,ret=0,checkonly=0;
	int perm=0,own=0,enc_dir_perm=0,enc_dir_own=0;

	if(opt.no_perm_warn)
	return 0;

	log_assert(item==0 \|\| item==1 \|\| item==2);

	/* extensions may attach a path */
	if(item==2 && path[0]!=DIRSEP_C)
	{
	if(strchr(path,DIRSEP_C))
	tmppath=make_filename(path,NULL);
	else
	tmppath=make_filename(gnupg_libdir (),path,NULL);
	}
	else
	tmppath=xstrdup(path);

	/* If the item is located in the homedir, but isn't the homedir,
	don't continue if we already checked the homedir itself. This is
	to avoid user confusion with an extra options file warning which
	could be rectified if the homedir itself had proper
	permissions. */
	if(item!=0 && homedir_cache>-1
	&& !ascii_strncasecmp (gnupg_homedir (), tmppath,
	strlen (gnupg_homedir ())))
	{
	ret=homedir_cache;
	goto end;
	}

	/* It's okay if the file or directory doesn't exist */
	if(stat(tmppath,&statbuf)!=0)
	{
	ret=0;
	goto end;
	}

	/* Now check the enclosing directory. Theoretically, we could walk
	this test up to the root directory /, but for the sake of sanity,
	I'm stopping at one level down. */
	dir=make_dirname(tmppath);

	if(stat(dir,&dirbuf)!=0 \|\| !S_ISDIR(dirbuf.st_mode))
	{
	/* Weird error */
	ret=1;
	goto end;
	}

	xfree(dir);

	/* Assume failure */
	ret=1;

	if(item==0)
	{
	/* The homedir must be x00, a directory, and owned by the user. */

	if(S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode))
	{
	if(statbuf.st_uid==getuid())
	{
	if((statbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG\|S_IRWXO))==0)
	ret=0;
	else
	perm=1;
	}
	else
	own=1;

	homedir_cache=ret;
	}
	}
	else if(item==1 \|\| item==2)
	{
	/* The options or extension file. Okay unless it or its
	containing directory is group or other writable or not owned
	by us or root. */

	if(S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
	{
	if(statbuf.st_uid==getuid() \|\| statbuf.st_uid==0)
	{
	if((statbuf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP\|S_IWOTH))==0)
	{
	/* it's not writable, so make sure the enclosing
	directory is also not writable */
	if(dirbuf.st_uid==getuid() \|\| dirbuf.st_uid==0)
	{
	if((dirbuf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP\|S_IWOTH))==0)
	ret=0;
	else
	enc_dir_perm=1;
	}
	else
	enc_dir_own=1;
	}
	else
	{
	/* it's writable, so the enclosing directory had
	better not let people get to it. */
	if(dirbuf.st_uid==getuid() \|\| dirbuf.st_uid==0)
	{
	if((dirbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG\|S_IRWXO))==0)
	ret=0;
	else
	perm=enc_dir_perm=1; /* unclear which one to fix! */
	}
	else
	enc_dir_own=1;
	}
	}
	else
	own=1;
	}
	}
	else
	BUG();

	if(!checkonly)
	{
	if(own)
	{
	if(item==0)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on"
	" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else if(item==1)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on"
	" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on"
	" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	}
	if(perm)
	{
	if(item==0)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on"
	" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else if(item==1)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on"
	" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on"
	" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	}
	if(enc_dir_own)
	{
	if(item==0)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on"
	" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else if(item==1)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on"
	" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on"
	" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	}
	if(enc_dir_perm)
	{
	if(item==0)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on"
	" homedir '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else if(item==1)
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on"
	" configuration file '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	else
	log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on"
	" extension '%s'\n"),tmppath);
	}
	}

	end:
	xfree(tmppath);

	if(homedir)
	homedir_cache=ret;

	return ret;

	#else /!(HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)/
	(void)path;
	(void)item;
	return 0;
	#endif /!(HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)/
	}


	/* Print the OpenPGP defined algo numbers. */
	static void
	print_algo_numbers(int (*checker)(int))
	{
	int i,first=1;

	for(i=0;i<=110;i++)
	{
	if(!checker(i))
	{
	if(first)
	first=0;
	else
	es_printf (";");
	es_printf ("%d",i);
	}
	}
	}


	static void
	print_algo_names(int (checker)(int),const char (*mapper)(int))
	{
	int i,first=1;

	for(i=0;i<=110;i++)
	{
	if(!checker(i))
	{
	if(first)
	first=0;
	else
	es_printf (";");
	es_printf ("%s",mapper(i));
	}
	}
	}

	/* In the future, we can do all sorts of interesting configuration
	output here. For now, just give "group" as the Enigmail folks need
	it, and pubkey, cipher, hash, and compress as they may be useful
	for frontends. */
	static void
	list_config(char *items)
	{
	int show_all = !items;
	char *name = NULL;
	const char *s;
	struct groupitem *giter;
	int first, iter;

	if(!opt.with_colons)
	return;

	while(show_all \|\| (name=strsep(&items," ")))
	{
	int any=0;

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"group")==0)
	{
	for (giter = opt.grouplist; giter; giter = giter->next)
	{
	strlist_t sl;

	es_fprintf (es_stdout, "cfg:group:");
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, giter->name, strlen(giter->name),
	":", NULL);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);

	for(sl=giter->values; sl; sl=sl->next)
	{
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sl->d, strlen (sl->d),
	":;", NULL);
	if(sl->next)
	es_printf(";");
	}

	es_printf("\n");
	}

	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"version")==0)
	{
	es_printf("cfg:version:");
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, VERSION, strlen(VERSION), ":", NULL);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"pubkey")==0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:pubkey:");
	print_algo_numbers (build_list_pk_test_algo);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"pubkeyname")==0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:pubkeyname:");
	print_algo_names (build_list_pk_test_algo,
	build_list_pk_algo_name);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"cipher")==0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:cipher:");
	print_algo_numbers (build_list_cipher_test_algo);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if (show_all \|\| !ascii_strcasecmp (name,"ciphername"))
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:ciphername:");
	print_algo_names (build_list_cipher_test_algo,
	build_list_cipher_algo_name);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any = 1;
	}

	if(show_all
	\|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"digest")==0
	\|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"hash")==0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:digest:");
	print_algo_numbers (build_list_md_test_algo);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if (show_all
	\|\| !ascii_strcasecmp(name,"digestname")
	\|\| !ascii_strcasecmp(name,"hashname"))
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:digestname:");
	print_algo_names (build_list_md_test_algo,
	build_list_md_algo_name);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp(name,"compress")==0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:compress:");
	print_algo_numbers(check_compress_algo);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all \|\| ascii_strcasecmp (name, "compressname") == 0)
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:compressname:");
	print_algo_names (check_compress_algo,
	compress_algo_to_string);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if (show_all \|\| !ascii_strcasecmp(name,"ccid-reader-id"))
	{
	/* We ignore this for GnuPG 1.4 backward compatibility. */
	any=1;
	}

	if (show_all \|\| !ascii_strcasecmp (name,"curve"))
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:curve:");
	for (iter=0, first=1; (s = openpgp_enum_curves (&iter)); first=0)
	es_printf ("%s%s", first?"":";", s);
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	/* Curve OIDs are rarely useful and thus only printed if requested. */
	if (name && !ascii_strcasecmp (name,"curveoid"))
	{
	es_printf ("cfg:curveoid:");
	for (iter=0, first=1; (s = openpgp_enum_curves (&iter)); first = 0)
	{
	s = openpgp_curve_to_oid (s, NULL);
	es_printf ("%s%s", first?"":";", s? s:"[?]");
	}
	es_printf ("\n");
	any=1;
	}

	if(show_all)
	break;

	if(!any)
	log_error(_("unknown configuration item '%s'\n"),name);
	}
	}


	/* List options and default values in the GPG Conf format. This is a
	new tool distributed with gnupg 1.9.x but we also want some limited
	support in older gpg versions. The output is the name of the
	configuration file and a list of options available for editing by
	gpgconf. */
	static void
	gpgconf_list (const char *configfile)
	{
	char *configfile_esc = percent_escape (configfile, NULL);

	es_printf ("%s-%s.conf:%lu:\"%s\n",
	GPGCONF_NAME, GPG_NAME,
	GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT,
	configfile_esc ? configfile_esc : "/dev/null");
	es_printf ("verbose:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("quiet:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("keyserver:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("reader-port:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("default-key:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("encrypt-to:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("try-secret-key:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("auto-key-locate:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("auto-key-retrieve:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("log-file:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("debug-level:%lu:\"none:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT);
	es_printf ("group:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("compliance:%lu:\"%s:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT, "gnupg");
	es_printf ("default-new-key-algo:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("trust-model:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("disable-dirmngr:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("max-cert-depth:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("completes-needed:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
	es_printf ("marginals-needed:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);

	/* The next one is an info only item and should match the macros at
	the top of keygen.c */
	es_printf ("default_pubkey_algo:%lu:\"%s:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT,
	get_default_pubkey_algo ());

	xfree (configfile_esc);
	}


	static int
	parse_subpacket_list(char *list)
	{
	char *tok;
	byte subpackets[128],i;
	int count=0;

	if(!list)
	{
	/* No arguments means all subpackets */
	memset(subpackets+1,1,sizeof(subpackets)-1);
	count=127;
	}
	else
	{
	memset(subpackets,0,sizeof(subpackets));

	/* Merge with earlier copy */
	if(opt.show_subpackets)
	{
	byte *in;

	for(in=opt.show_subpackets;*in;in++)
	{
	if(in>127 \|\| in<1)
	BUG();

	if(!subpackets[*in])
	count++;
	subpackets[*in]=1;
	}
	}

	while((tok=strsep(&list," ,")))
	{
	if(!*tok)
	continue;

	i=atoi(tok);
	if(i>127 \|\| i<1)
	return 0;

	if(!subpackets[i])
	count++;
	subpackets[i]=1;
	}
	}

	xfree(opt.show_subpackets);
	opt.show_subpackets=xmalloc(count+1);
	opt.show_subpackets[count--]=0;

	for(i=1;i<128 && count>=0;i++)
	if(subpackets[i])
	opt.show_subpackets[count--]=i;

	return 1;
	}


	static int
	parse_list_options(char *str)
	{
	char subpackets=""; / something that isn't NULL */
	struct parse_options lopts[]=
	{
	{"show-photos",LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS,NULL,
	N_("display photo IDs during key listings")},
	{"show-usage",LIST_SHOW_USAGE,NULL,
	N_("show key usage information during key listings")},
	{"show-policy-urls",LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS,NULL,
	N_("show policy URLs during signature listings")},
	{"show-notations",LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show all notations during signature listings")},
	{"show-std-notations",LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show IETF standard notations during signature listings")},
	{"show-standard-notations",LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	NULL},
	{"show-user-notations",LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show user-supplied notations during signature listings")},
	{"show-keyserver-urls",LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS,NULL,
	N_("show preferred keyserver URLs during signature listings")},
	{"show-uid-validity",LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY,NULL,
	N_("show user ID validity during key listings")},
	{"show-unusable-uids",LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS,NULL,
	N_("show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings")},
	{"show-unusable-subkeys",LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS,NULL,
	N_("show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings")},
	{"show-keyring",LIST_SHOW_KEYRING,NULL,
	N_("show the keyring name in key listings")},
	{"show-sig-expire",LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE,NULL,
	N_("show expiration dates during signature listings")},
	{"show-sig-subpackets",LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS,NULL,
	NULL},
	{NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
	};

	/* C99 allows for non-constant initializers, but we'd like to
	compile everywhere, so fill in the show-sig-subpackets argument
	here. Note that if the parse_options array changes, we'll have
	to change the subscript here. */
	lopts[13].value=&subpackets;

	if(parse_options(str,&opt.list_options,lopts,1))
	{
	if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS)
	{
	/* Unset so users can pass multiple lists in. */
	opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS;
	if(!parse_subpacket_list(subpackets))
	return 0;
	}
	else if(subpackets==NULL && opt.show_subpackets)
	{
	/* User did 'no-show-subpackets' */
	xfree(opt.show_subpackets);
	opt.show_subpackets=NULL;
	}

	return 1;
	}
	else
	return 0;
	}


	/* Collapses argc/argv into a single string that must be freed */
	static char *
	collapse_args(int argc,char *argv[])
	{
	char *str=NULL;
	int i,first=1,len=0;

	for(i=0;i<argc;i++)
	{
	len+=strlen(argv[i])+2;
	str=xrealloc(str,len);
	if(first)
	{
	str[0]='\0';
	first=0;
	}
	else
	strcat(str," ");

	strcat(str,argv[i]);
	}

	return str;
	}


	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	static void
	parse_trust_model(const char *model)
	{
	if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"pgp")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_PGP;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"classic")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_CLASSIC;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"always")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_ALWAYS;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"direct")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_DIRECT;
	#ifdef USE_TOFU
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"tofu")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_TOFU;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"tofu+pgp")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_TOFU_PGP;
	#endif /USE_TOFU/
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"auto")==0)
	opt.trust_model=TM_AUTO;
	else
	log_error("unknown trust model '%s'\n",model);
	}
	#endif /NO_TRUST_MODELS/


	static int
	parse_tofu_policy (const char *policystr)
	{
	#ifdef USE_TOFU
	struct { const char *keyword; int policy; } list[] = {
	{ "auto", TOFU_POLICY_AUTO },
	{ "good", TOFU_POLICY_GOOD },
	{ "unknown", TOFU_POLICY_UNKNOWN },
	{ "bad", TOFU_POLICY_BAD },
	{ "ask", TOFU_POLICY_ASK }
	};
	int i;

	if (!ascii_strcasecmp (policystr, "help"))
	{
	log_info (_("valid values for option '%s':\n"), "--tofu-policy");
	for (i=0; i < DIM (list); i++)
	log_info (" %s\n", list[i].keyword);
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	for (i=0; i < DIM (list); i++)
	if (!ascii_strcasecmp (policystr, list[i].keyword))
	return list[i].policy;
	#endif /USE_TOFU/

	log_error (_("unknown TOFU policy '%s'\n"), policystr);
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("(use \"help\" to list choices)\n"));
	g10_exit (1);
	}


	static struct gnupg_compliance_option compliance_options[] =
	{
	{ "gnupg", oGnuPG },
	{ "openpgp", oOpenPGP },
	{ "rfc4880bis", oRFC4880bis },
	{ "rfc4880", oRFC4880 },
	{ "rfc2440", oRFC2440 },
	{ "pgp6", oPGP6 },
	{ "pgp7", oPGP7 },
	{ "pgp8", oPGP8 },
	{ "de-vs", oDE_VS }
	};


	/* Helper to set compliance related options. This is a separate
	* function so that it can also be used by the --compliance option
	* parser. */
	static void
	set_compliance_option (enum cmd_and_opt_values option)
	{
	switch (option)
	{
	case oRFC4880bis:
	opt.flags.rfc4880bis = 1;
	/* fall through. */
	case oOpenPGP:
	case oRFC4880:
	/* This is effectively the same as RFC2440, but with
	"--enable-dsa2 --no-rfc2440-text --escape-from-lines
	--require-cross-certification". */
	opt.compliance = CO_RFC4880;
	opt.flags.dsa2 = 1;
	opt.flags.require_cross_cert = 1;
	opt.rfc2440_text = 0;
	opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1;
	opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1;
	opt.escape_from = 1;
	opt.not_dash_escaped = 0;
	opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
	opt.def_aead_algo = 0;
	opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.cert_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.compress_algo = -1;
	opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
	opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
	opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;
	break;
	case oRFC2440:
	opt.compliance = CO_RFC2440;
	opt.flags.dsa2 = 0;
	opt.rfc2440_text = 1;
	opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1;
	opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1;
	opt.escape_from = 0;
	opt.not_dash_escaped = 0;
	opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
	opt.def_aead_algo = 0;
	opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.cert_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.compress_algo = -1;
	opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
	opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
	opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;
	break;
	case oPGP6: opt.compliance = CO_PGP6; break;
	case oPGP7: opt.compliance = CO_PGP7; break;
	case oPGP8: opt.compliance = CO_PGP8; break;
	case oGnuPG: opt.compliance = CO_GNUPG; break;

	case oDE_VS:
	set_compliance_option (oOpenPGP);
	opt.compliance = CO_DE_VS;
	opt.force_mdc = 1;
	opt.def_aead_algo = 0;
	/* Fixme: Change other options. */
	break;

	default:
	BUG ();
	}
	}






	/* This function called to initialized a new control object. It is
	assumed that this object has been zeroed out before calling this
	function. */
	static void
	gpg_init_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	ctrl->magic = SERVER_CONTROL_MAGIC;
	}


	/* This function is called to deinitialize a control object. It is
	not deallocated. */
	static void
	gpg_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	#ifdef USE_TOFU
	tofu_closedbs (ctrl);
	#endif
	gpg_dirmngr_deinit_session_data (ctrl);

	keydb_release (ctrl->cached_getkey_kdb);
	}


	char *
	get_default_configname (void)
	{
	char *configname = NULL;
	char *name = xstrdup (GPG_NAME EXTSEP_S "conf-" SAFE_VERSION);
	char *ver = &name[strlen (GPG_NAME EXTSEP_S "conf-")];

	do
	{
	if (configname)
	{
	char *tok;

	xfree (configname);
	configname = NULL;

	if ((tok = strrchr (ver, SAFE_VERSION_DASH)))
	*tok='\0';
	else if ((tok = strrchr (ver, SAFE_VERSION_DOT)))
	*tok='\0';
	else
	break;
	}

	configname = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), name, NULL);
	}
	while (access (configname, R_OK));

	xfree(name);

	if (! configname)
	configname = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (),
	GPG_NAME EXTSEP_S "conf", NULL);
	if (! access (configname, R_OK))
	{
	/* Print a warning when both config files are present. */
	char *p = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), "options", NULL);
	if (! access (p, R_OK))
	log_info (_("Note: old default options file '%s' ignored\n"), p);
	xfree (p);
	}
	else
	{
	/* Use the old default only if it exists. */
	char *p = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), "options", NULL);
	if (!access (p, R_OK))
	{
	xfree (configname);
	configname = p;
	}
	else
	xfree (p);
	}

	return configname;
	}

	int
	main (int argc, char **argv)
	{
	ARGPARSE_ARGS pargs;
	IOBUF a;
	int rc=0;
	int orig_argc;
	char **orig_argv;
	const char *fname;
	char *username;
	int may_coredump;
	strlist_t sl;
	strlist_t remusr = NULL;
	strlist_t locusr = NULL;
	strlist_t nrings = NULL;
	armor_filter_context_t *afx = NULL;
	int detached_sig = 0;
	FILE *configfp = NULL;
	char *configname = NULL;
	char *save_configname = NULL;
	char *default_configname = NULL;
	unsigned configlineno;
	int parse_debug = 0;
	int default_config = 1;
	int default_keyring = 1;
	int greeting = 0;
	int nogreeting = 0;
	char *logfile = NULL;
	int use_random_seed = 1;
	enum cmd_and_opt_values cmd = 0;
	const char *debug_level = NULL;
	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	const char *trustdb_name = NULL;
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	char *def_cipher_string = NULL;
	char *def_aead_string = NULL;
	char *def_digest_string = NULL;
	char *compress_algo_string = NULL;
	char *cert_digest_string = NULL;
	char *s2k_cipher_string = NULL;
	char *s2k_digest_string = NULL;
	char *pers_cipher_list = NULL;
	char *pers_aead_list = NULL;
	char *pers_digest_list = NULL;
	char *pers_compress_list = NULL;
	int eyes_only=0;
	int multifile=0;
	int pwfd = -1;
	int ovrseskeyfd = -1;
	int fpr_maybe_cmd = 0; /* --fingerprint maybe a command. */
	int any_explicit_recipient = 0;
	int default_akl = 1;
	int require_secmem = 0;
	int got_secmem = 0;
	struct assuan_malloc_hooks malloc_hooks;
	ctrl_t ctrl;

	static int print_dane_records;
	static int print_pka_records;


	#ifdef __riscos__
	opt.lock_once = 1;
	#endif /* __riscos__ */

	/* Please note that we may running SUID(ROOT), so be very CAREFUL
	when adding any stuff between here and the call to
	secmem_init() somewhere after the option parsing. */
	early_system_init ();
	gnupg_reopen_std (GPG_NAME);
	trap_unaligned ();
	gnupg_rl_initialize ();
	set_strusage (my_strusage);
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SUSPEND_SECMEM_WARN);
	log_set_prefix (GPG_NAME, GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PREFIX);

	/* Make sure that our subsystems are ready. */
	i18n_init();
	init_common_subsystems (&argc, &argv);

	/* Use our own logging handler for Libcgrypt. */
	setup_libgcrypt_logging ();

	/* Put random number into secure memory */
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_USE_SECURE_RNDPOOL);

	may_coredump = disable_core_dumps();

	gnupg_init_signals (0, emergency_cleanup);

	dotlock_create (NULL, 0); /* Register lock file cleanup. */

	/* Tell the compliance module who we are. */
	gnupg_initialize_compliance (GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_GPG);

	opt.autostart = 1;
	opt.session_env = session_env_new ();
	if (!opt.session_env)
	log_fatal ("error allocating session environment block: %s\n",
	strerror (errno));

	opt.command_fd = -1; /* no command fd */
	opt.compress_level = -1; /* defaults to standard compress level */
	opt.bz2_compress_level = -1; /* defaults to standard compress level */
	/* note: if you change these lines, look at oOpenPGP */
	opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
	opt.def_aead_algo = 0;
	opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.cert_digest_algo = 0;
	opt.compress_algo = -1; /* defaults to DEFAULT_COMPRESS_ALGO */
	opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
	opt.s2k_count = 0; /* Auto-calibrate when needed. */
	opt.s2k_cipher_algo = DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO;
	opt.completes_needed = 1;
	opt.marginals_needed = 3;
	opt.max_cert_depth = 5;
	opt.escape_from = 1;
	opt.flags.require_cross_cert = 1;
	opt.import_options = IMPORT_REPAIR_KEYS;
	opt.export_options = EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES;
	opt.keyserver_options.import_options = (IMPORT_REPAIR_KEYS
	\| IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG);
	opt.keyserver_options.export_options = EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES;
	opt.keyserver_options.options = KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD;
	opt.verify_options = (LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY
	\| VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS
	\| VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS
	\| VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS);
	opt.list_options = (LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY
	\| LIST_SHOW_USAGE);
	#ifdef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	opt.trust_model = TM_ALWAYS;
	#else
	opt.trust_model = TM_AUTO;
	#endif
	opt.tofu_default_policy = TOFU_POLICY_AUTO;
	opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 0;
	opt.min_cert_level = 2;
	set_screen_dimensions ();
	opt.keyid_format = KF_NONE;
	opt.def_sig_expire = "0";
	opt.def_cert_expire = "0";
	gnupg_set_homedir (NULL);
	opt.passphrase_repeat = 1;
	opt.emit_version = 0;
	opt.weak_digests = NULL;

	/* Check whether we have a config file on the command line. */
	orig_argc = argc;
	orig_argv = argv;
	pargs.argc = &argc;
	pargs.argv = &argv;
	pargs.flags= (ARGPARSE_FLAG_KEEP \| ARGPARSE_FLAG_NOVERSION);
	while( arg_parse( &pargs, opts) ) {
	if( pargs.r_opt == oDebug \|\| pargs.r_opt == oDebugAll )
	parse_debug++;
	else if (pargs.r_opt == oDebugIOLBF)
	es_setvbuf (es_stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
	else if( pargs.r_opt == oOptions ) {
	/* yes there is one, so we do not try the default one, but
	* read the option file when it is encountered at the commandline
	*/
	default_config = 0;
	}
	else if( pargs.r_opt == oNoOptions )
	{
	default_config = 0; /* --no-options */
	opt.no_homedir_creation = 1;
	}
	else if( pargs.r_opt == oHomedir )
	gnupg_set_homedir (pargs.r.ret_str);
	else if( pargs.r_opt == oNoPermissionWarn )
	opt.no_perm_warn=1;
	else if (pargs.r_opt == oStrict )
	{
	/* Not used */
	}
	else if (pargs.r_opt == oNoStrict )
	{
	/* Not used */
	}
	}

	#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
	if ( strchr (gnupg_homedir (), '\\') ) {
	char d, buf = xmalloc (strlen (gnupg_homedir ())+1);
	const char *s;
	for (d=buf, s = gnupg_homedir (); *s; s++)
	{
	d++ = s == '\\'? '/': *s;
	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	if (s[1] && IsDBCSLeadByte (*s))
	d++ = ++s;
	#endif
	}
	*d = 0;
	gnupg_set_homedir (buf);
	}
	#endif

	/* Initialize the secure memory. */
	if (!gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE, 0))
	got_secmem = 1;
	#if defined(HAVE_GETUID) && defined(HAVE_GETEUID)
	/* There should be no way to get to this spot while still carrying
	setuid privs. Just in case, bomb out if we are. */
	if ( getuid () != geteuid () )
	BUG ();
	#endif
	maybe_setuid = 0;

	/* Okay, we are now working under our real uid */

	/* malloc hooks go here ... */
	malloc_hooks.malloc = gcry_malloc;
	malloc_hooks.realloc = gcry_realloc;
	malloc_hooks.free = gcry_free;
	assuan_set_malloc_hooks (&malloc_hooks);
	assuan_set_gpg_err_source (GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT);
	setup_libassuan_logging (&opt.debug, NULL);

	/* Set default options which require that malloc stuff is ready. */
	additional_weak_digest ("MD5");
	parse_auto_key_locate ("local,wkd");

	/* Try for a version specific config file first */
	default_configname = get_default_configname ();
	if (default_config)
	configname = xstrdup (default_configname);

	argc = orig_argc;
	argv = orig_argv;
	pargs.argc = &argc;
	pargs.argv = &argv;
	pargs.flags= ARGPARSE_FLAG_KEEP;

	/* By this point we have a homedir, and cannot change it. */
	check_permissions (gnupg_homedir (), 0);

	next_pass:
	if( configname ) {
	if(check_permissions(configname,1))
	{
	/* If any options file is unsafe, then disable any external
	programs for keyserver calls or photo IDs. Since the
	external program to call is set in the options file, a
	unsafe options file can lead to an arbitrary program
	being run. */

	opt.exec_disable=1;
	}

	configlineno = 0;
	configfp = fopen( configname, "r" );
	if (configfp && is_secured_file (fileno (configfp)))
	{
	fclose (configfp);
	configfp = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	if( !configfp ) {
	if( default_config ) {
	if( parse_debug )
	log_info(_("Note: no default option file '%s'\n"),
	configname );
	}
	else {
	log_error(_("option file '%s': %s\n"),
	configname, strerror(errno) );
	g10_exit(2);
	}
	xfree(configname); configname = NULL;
	}
	if( parse_debug && configname )
	log_info(_("reading options from '%s'\n"), configname );
	default_config = 0;
	}

	while( optfile_parse( configfp, configname, &configlineno,
	&pargs, opts) )
	{
	switch( pargs.r_opt )
	{
	case aListConfig:
	case aListGcryptConfig:
	case aGPGConfList:
	case aGPGConfTest:
	set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
	/* Do not register a keyring for these commands. */
	default_keyring = -1;
	break;

	case aCheckKeys:
	case aListPackets:
	case aImport:
	case aFastImport:
	case aSendKeys:
	case aRecvKeys:
	case aSearchKeys:
	case aRefreshKeys:
	case aFetchKeys:
	case aExport:
	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	case aCardStatus:
	case aCardEdit:
	case aChangePIN:
	#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
	case aListKeys:
	case aLocateKeys:
	case aListSigs:
	case aExportSecret:
	case aExportSecretSub:
	case aExportSshKey:
	case aSym:
	case aClearsign:
	case aGenRevoke:
	case aDesigRevoke:
	case aPrimegen:
	case aGenRandom:
	case aPrintMD:
	case aPrintMDs:
	case aListTrustDB:
	case aCheckTrustDB:
	case aUpdateTrustDB:
	case aFixTrustDB:
	case aListTrustPath:
	case aDeArmor:
	case aEnArmor:
	case aSign:
	case aQuickSignKey:
	case aQuickLSignKey:
	case aSignKey:
	case aLSignKey:
	case aStore:
	case aQuickKeygen:
	case aQuickAddUid:
	case aQuickAddKey:
	case aQuickRevUid:
	case aQuickSetExpire:
	case aQuickSetPrimaryUid:
	case aExportOwnerTrust:
	case aImportOwnerTrust:
	case aRebuildKeydbCaches:
	set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
	break;

	case aKeygen:
	case aFullKeygen:
	case aEditKey:
	case aDeleteSecretKeys:
	case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys:
	case aDeleteKeys:
	case aPasswd:
	set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
	greeting=1;
	break;

	case aDetachedSign: detached_sig = 1; set_cmd( &cmd, aSign ); break;

	case aDecryptFiles: multifile=1; /* fall through */
	case aDecrypt: set_cmd( &cmd, aDecrypt); break;

	case aEncrFiles: multifile=1; /* fall through */
	case aEncr: set_cmd( &cmd, aEncr); break;

	case aVerifyFiles: multifile=1; /* fall through */
	case aVerify: set_cmd( &cmd, aVerify); break;

	case aServer:
	set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
	opt.batch = 1;
	break;

	case aTOFUPolicy:
	set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
	break;

	case oArmor: opt.armor = 1; opt.no_armor=0; break;
	case oOutput: opt.outfile = pargs.r.ret_str; break;

	case oMaxOutput: opt.max_output = pargs.r.ret_ulong; break;

	case oInputSizeHint:
	opt.input_size_hint = string_to_u64 (pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oChunkSize:
	opt.chunk_size = pargs.r.ret_int;
	break;

	case oQuiet: opt.quiet = 1; break;
	case oNoTTY: tty_no_terminal(1); break;
	case oDryRun: opt.dry_run = 1; break;
	case oInteractive: opt.interactive = 1; break;
	case oVerbose:
	opt.verbose++;
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS;
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS;
	break;

	case oBatch:
	opt.batch = 1;
	nogreeting = 1;
	break;

	case oUseAgent: /* Dummy. */
	break;

	case oNoUseAgent:
	obsolete_option (configname, configlineno, "no-use-agent");
	break;
	case oGpgAgentInfo:
	obsolete_option (configname, configlineno, "gpg-agent-info");
	break;
	case oReaderPort:
	obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, configlineno, "reader-port");
	break;
	case octapiDriver:
	obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, configlineno, "ctapi-driver");
	break;
	case opcscDriver:
	obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, configlineno, "pcsc-driver");
	break;
	case oDisableCCID:
	obsolete_scdaemon_option (configname, configlineno, "disable-ccid");
	break;
	case oHonorHttpProxy:
	obsolete_option (configname, configlineno, "honor-http-proxy");
	break;

	case oAnswerYes: opt.answer_yes = 1; break;
	case oAnswerNo: opt.answer_no = 1; break;
	case oKeyring: append_to_strlist( &nrings, pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oPrimaryKeyring:
	sl = append_to_strlist (&nrings, pargs.r.ret_str);
	sl->flags = KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_PRIMARY;
	break;
	case oShowKeyring:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-keyring",
	"--list-options ","show-keyring");
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_KEYRING;
	break;

	case oDebug:
	if (parse_debug_flag (pargs.r.ret_str, &opt.debug, debug_flags))
	{
	pargs.r_opt = ARGPARSE_INVALID_ARG;
	pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR;
	}
	break;

	case oDebugAll: opt.debug = ~0; break;
	case oDebugLevel: debug_level = pargs.r.ret_str; break;

	case oDebugIOLBF: break; /* Already set in pre-parse step. */

	case oDebugSetIobufSize:
	opt_set_iobuf_size = pargs.r.ret_ulong;
	opt_set_iobuf_size_used = 1;
	break;

	case oStatusFD:
	set_status_fd ( translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1) );
	break;
	case oStatusFile:
	set_status_fd ( open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 1, 0) );
	break;
	case oAttributeFD:
	set_attrib_fd ( translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1) );
	break;
	case oAttributeFile:
	set_attrib_fd ( open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 1, 1) );
	break;
	case oLoggerFD:
	log_set_fd (translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 1));
	break;
	case oLoggerFile:
	logfile = pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;

	case oWithFingerprint:
	opt.with_fingerprint = 1;
	opt.fingerprint++;
	break;
	case oWithSubkeyFingerprint:
	opt.with_subkey_fingerprint = 1;
	break;
	case oWithICAOSpelling:
	opt.with_icao_spelling = 1;
	break;
	case oFingerprint:
	opt.fingerprint++;
	fpr_maybe_cmd = 1;
	break;

	case oWithKeygrip:
	opt.with_keygrip = 1;
	break;

	case oWithKeyScreening:
	opt.with_key_screening = 1;
	break;

	case oWithSecret:
	opt.with_secret = 1;
	break;

	case oWithWKDHash:
	opt.with_wkd_hash = 1;
	break;

	case oWithKeyOrigin:
	opt.with_key_origin = 1;
	break;

	case oSecretKeyring:
	/* Ignore this old option. */
	break;

	case oOptions:
	/* config files may not be nested (silently ignore them) */
	if( !configfp ) {
	xfree(configname);
	configname = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
	goto next_pass;
	}
	break;
	case oNoArmor: opt.no_armor=1; opt.armor=0; break;

	case oNoDefKeyring:
	if (default_keyring > 0)
	default_keyring = 0;
	break;
	case oNoKeyring:
	default_keyring = -1;
	break;

	case oNoGreeting: nogreeting = 1; break;
	case oNoVerbose:
	opt.verbose = 0;
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose);
	opt.list_sigs=0;
	break;
	case oQuickRandom:
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_ENABLE_QUICK_RANDOM, 0);
	break;
	case oEmitVersion: opt.emit_version++; break;
	case oNoEmitVersion: opt.emit_version=0; break;
	case oCompletesNeeded: opt.completes_needed = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oMarginalsNeeded: opt.marginals_needed = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oMaxCertDepth: opt.max_cert_depth = pargs.r.ret_int; break;

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	case oTrustDBName: trustdb_name = pargs.r.ret_str; break;

	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	case oDefaultKey:
	sl = add_to_strlist (&opt.def_secret_key, pargs.r.ret_str);
	sl->flags = (pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT);
	if (configfp)
	sl->flags \|= PK_LIST_CONFIG;
	break;
	case oDefRecipient:
	if( *pargs.r.ret_str )
	{
	xfree (opt.def_recipient);
	opt.def_recipient = make_username(pargs.r.ret_str);
	}
	break;
	case oDefRecipientSelf:
	xfree(opt.def_recipient); opt.def_recipient = NULL;
	opt.def_recipient_self = 1;
	break;
	case oNoDefRecipient:
	xfree(opt.def_recipient); opt.def_recipient = NULL;
	opt.def_recipient_self = 0;
	break;
	case oNoOptions: opt.no_homedir_creation = 1; break; /* no-options */
	case oHomedir: break;
	case oNoBatch: opt.batch = 0; break;

	case oWithTofuInfo: opt.with_tofu_info = 1; break;

	case oWithKeyData: opt.with_key_data=1; /FALLTHRU/
	case oWithColons: opt.with_colons=':'; break;

	case oWithSigCheck: opt.check_sigs = 1; /FALLTHRU/
	case oWithSigList: opt.list_sigs = 1; break;

	case oSkipVerify: opt.skip_verify=1; break;

	case oSkipHiddenRecipients: opt.skip_hidden_recipients = 1; break;
	case oNoSkipHiddenRecipients: opt.skip_hidden_recipients = 0; break;

	case aListSecretKeys: set_cmd( &cmd, aListSecretKeys); break;

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	/* There are many programs (like mutt) that call gpg with
	--always-trust so keep this option around for a long
	time. */
	case oAlwaysTrust: opt.trust_model=TM_ALWAYS; break;
	case oTrustModel:
	parse_trust_model(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/
	case oTOFUDefaultPolicy:
	opt.tofu_default_policy = parse_tofu_policy (pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oTOFUDBFormat:
	obsolete_option (configname, configlineno, "tofu-db-format");
	break;

	case oForceOwnertrust:
	log_info(_("Note: %s is not for normal use!\n"),
	"--force-ownertrust");
	opt.force_ownertrust=string_to_trust_value(pargs.r.ret_str);
	if(opt.force_ownertrust==-1)
	{
	log_error("invalid ownertrust '%s'\n",pargs.r.ret_str);
	opt.force_ownertrust=0;
	}
	break;
	case oLoadExtension:
	/* Dummy so that gpg 1.4 conf files can work. Should
	eventually be removed. */
	break;

	case oCompliance:
	{
	int compliance = gnupg_parse_compliance_option
	(pargs.r.ret_str,
	compliance_options, DIM (compliance_options),
	opt.quiet);
	if (compliance < 0)
	g10_exit (1);
	set_compliance_option (compliance);
	}
	break;
	case oOpenPGP:
	case oRFC2440:
	case oRFC4880:
	case oRFC4880bis:
	case oPGP6:
	case oPGP7:
	case oPGP8:
	case oGnuPG:
	set_compliance_option (pargs.r_opt);
	break;

	case oRFC2440Text: opt.rfc2440_text=1; break;
	case oNoRFC2440Text: opt.rfc2440_text=0; break;

	case oSetFilename:
	if(utf8_strings)
	opt.set_filename = pargs.r.ret_str;
	else
	opt.set_filename = native_to_utf8(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oForYourEyesOnly: eyes_only = 1; break;
	case oNoForYourEyesOnly: eyes_only = 0; break;
	case oSetPolicyURL:
	add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0);
	add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,1);
	break;
	case oSigPolicyURL: add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0); break;
	case oCertPolicyURL: add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,1); break;
	case oShowPolicyURL:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-policy-url",
	"--list-options ","show-policy-urls");
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-policy-url",
	"--verify-options ","show-policy-urls");
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
	opt.verify_options\|=VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
	break;
	case oNoShowPolicyURL:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-policy-url",
	"--list-options ","no-show-policy-urls");
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-policy-url",
	"--verify-options ","no-show-policy-urls");
	opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
	opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
	break;
	case oSigKeyserverURL: add_keyserver_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0); break;
	case oUseEmbeddedFilename:
	opt.flags.use_embedded_filename=1;
	break;
	case oNoUseEmbeddedFilename:
	opt.flags.use_embedded_filename=0;
	break;
	case oComment:
	if(pargs.r.ret_str[0])
	append_to_strlist(&opt.comments,pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oDefaultComment:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,
	"--default-comment","--no-comments","");
	/* fall through */
	case oNoComments:
	free_strlist(opt.comments);
	opt.comments=NULL;
	break;
	case oThrowKeyids: opt.throw_keyids = 1; break;
	case oNoThrowKeyids: opt.throw_keyids = 0; break;
	case oShowPhotos:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-photos",
	"--list-options ","show-photos");
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-photos",
	"--verify-options ","show-photos");
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS;
	opt.verify_options\|=VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS;
	break;
	case oNoShowPhotos:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-photos",
	"--list-options ","no-show-photos");
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-photos",
	"--verify-options ","no-show-photos");
	opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS;
	opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS;
	break;
	case oPhotoViewer: opt.photo_viewer = pargs.r.ret_str; break;

	case oForceMDC: opt.force_mdc = 1; break;
	case oNoForceMDC: opt.force_mdc = 0; break;
	case oDisableMDC: opt.disable_mdc = 1; break;
	case oNoDisableMDC: opt.disable_mdc = 0; break;

	case oForceAEAD: opt.force_aead = 1; break;

	case oDisableSignerUID: opt.flags.disable_signer_uid = 1; break;

	case oS2KMode: opt.s2k_mode = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oS2KDigest: s2k_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oS2KCipher: s2k_cipher_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oS2KCount:
	if (pargs.r.ret_int)
	opt.s2k_count = encode_s2k_iterations (pargs.r.ret_int);
	else
	opt.s2k_count = 0; /* Auto-calibrate when needed. */
	break;

	case oRecipient:
	case oHiddenRecipient:
	case oRecipientFile:
	case oHiddenRecipientFile:
	/* Store the recipient. Note that we also store the
	* option as private data in the flags. This is achieved
	* by shifting the option value to the left so to keep
	* enough space for the flags. */
	sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
	sl->flags = (pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT);
	if (configfp)
	sl->flags \|= PK_LIST_CONFIG;
	if (pargs.r_opt == oHiddenRecipient
	\|\| pargs.r_opt == oHiddenRecipientFile)
	sl->flags \|= PK_LIST_HIDDEN;
	if (pargs.r_opt == oRecipientFile
	\|\| pargs.r_opt == oHiddenRecipientFile)
	sl->flags \|= PK_LIST_FROM_FILE;
	any_explicit_recipient = 1;
	break;

	case oEncryptTo:
	case oHiddenEncryptTo:
	/* Store an additional recipient. */
	sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
	sl->flags = ((pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT) \| PK_LIST_ENCRYPT_TO);
	if (configfp)
	sl->flags \|= PK_LIST_CONFIG;
	if (pargs.r_opt == oHiddenEncryptTo)
	sl->flags \|= PK_LIST_HIDDEN;
	break;

	case oNoEncryptTo:
	opt.no_encrypt_to = 1;
	break;
	case oEncryptToDefaultKey:
	opt.encrypt_to_default_key = configfp ? 2 : 1;
	break;

	case oTrySecretKey:
	add_to_strlist2 (&opt.secret_keys_to_try,
	pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings);
	break;

	case oMimemode: opt.mimemode = opt.textmode = 1; break;
	case oTextmodeShort: opt.textmode = 2; break;
	case oTextmode: opt.textmode=1; break;
	case oNoTextmode: opt.textmode=opt.mimemode=0; break;

	case oExpert: opt.expert = 1; break;
	case oNoExpert: opt.expert = 0; break;
	case oDefSigExpire:
	if(*pargs.r.ret_str!='\0')
	{
	if(parse_expire_string(pargs.r.ret_str)==(u32)-1)
	log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid signature expiration\n"),
	pargs.r.ret_str);
	else
	opt.def_sig_expire=pargs.r.ret_str;
	}
	break;
	case oAskSigExpire: opt.ask_sig_expire = 1; break;
	case oNoAskSigExpire: opt.ask_sig_expire = 0; break;
	case oDefCertExpire:
	if(*pargs.r.ret_str!='\0')
	{
	if(parse_expire_string(pargs.r.ret_str)==(u32)-1)
	log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid signature expiration\n"),
	pargs.r.ret_str);
	else
	opt.def_cert_expire=pargs.r.ret_str;
	}
	break;
	case oAskCertExpire: opt.ask_cert_expire = 1; break;
	case oNoAskCertExpire: opt.ask_cert_expire = 0; break;
	case oDefCertLevel: opt.def_cert_level=pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oMinCertLevel: opt.min_cert_level=pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oAskCertLevel: opt.ask_cert_level = 1; break;
	case oNoAskCertLevel: opt.ask_cert_level = 0; break;
	case oLocalUser: /* store the local users */
	sl = add_to_strlist2( &locusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
	sl->flags = (pargs.r_opt << PK_LIST_SHIFT);
	if (configfp)
	sl->flags \|= PK_LIST_CONFIG;
	break;
	case oSender:
	{
	char *mbox = mailbox_from_userid (pargs.r.ret_str);
	if (!mbox)
	log_error (_("\"%s\" is not a proper mail address\n"),
	pargs.r.ret_str);
	else
	{
	add_to_strlist (&opt.sender_list, mbox);
	xfree (mbox);
	}
	}
	break;
	case oCompress:
	/* this is the -z command line option */
	opt.compress_level = opt.bz2_compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int;
	break;
	case oCompressLevel: opt.compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oBZ2CompressLevel: opt.bz2_compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
	case oBZ2DecompressLowmem: opt.bz2_decompress_lowmem=1; break;
	case oPassphrase:
	set_passphrase_from_string(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oPassphraseFD:
	pwfd = translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 0);
	break;
	case oPassphraseFile:
	pwfd = open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 0, 1);
	break;
	case oPassphraseRepeat:
	opt.passphrase_repeat = pargs.r.ret_int;
	break;

	case oPinentryMode:
	opt.pinentry_mode = parse_pinentry_mode (pargs.r.ret_str);
	if (opt.pinentry_mode == -1)
	log_error (_("invalid pinentry mode '%s'\n"), pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oRequestOrigin:
	opt.request_origin = parse_request_origin (pargs.r.ret_str);
	if (opt.request_origin == -1)
	log_error (_("invalid request origin '%s'\n"), pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oCommandFD:
	opt.command_fd = translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 0);
	if (! gnupg_fd_valid (opt.command_fd))
	log_error ("command-fd is invalid: %s\n", strerror (errno));
	break;
	case oCommandFile:
	opt.command_fd = open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 0, 1);
	break;
	case oCipherAlgo:
	def_cipher_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oAEADAlgo:
	def_aead_string = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oDigestAlgo:
	def_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oCompressAlgo:
	/* If it is all digits, stick a Z in front of it for
	later. This is for backwards compatibility with
	versions that took the compress algorithm number. */
	{
	char *pt=pargs.r.ret_str;
	while(*pt)
	{
	if (!isascii (pt) \|\| !isdigit (pt))
	break;

	pt++;
	}

	if(*pt=='\0')
	{
	compress_algo_string=xmalloc(strlen(pargs.r.ret_str)+2);
	strcpy(compress_algo_string,"Z");
	strcat(compress_algo_string,pargs.r.ret_str);
	}
	else
	compress_algo_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
	}
	break;
	case oCertDigestAlgo:
	cert_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oNoSecmemWarn:
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM_WARN);
	break;

	case oRequireSecmem: require_secmem=1; break;
	case oNoRequireSecmem: require_secmem=0; break;
	case oNoPermissionWarn: opt.no_perm_warn=1; break;
	- case oNoMDCWarn: opt.no_mdc_warn=1; break;
	case oDisplayCharset:
	if( set_native_charset( pargs.r.ret_str ) )
	log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid character set\n"),
	pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oNotDashEscaped: opt.not_dash_escaped = 1; break;
	case oEscapeFrom: opt.escape_from = 1; break;
	case oNoEscapeFrom: opt.escape_from = 0; break;
	case oLockOnce: opt.lock_once = 1; break;
	case oLockNever:
	dotlock_disable ();
	break;
	case oLockMultiple:
	#ifndef __riscos__
	opt.lock_once = 0;
	#else /* __riscos__ */
	riscos_not_implemented("lock-multiple");
	#endif /* __riscos__ */
	break;
	case oKeyServer:
	{
	keyserver_spec_t keyserver;
	keyserver = parse_keyserver_uri (pargs.r.ret_str, 0);
	if (!keyserver)
	log_error (_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
	else
	{
	/* We only support a single keyserver. Later ones
	override earlier ones. (Since we parse the
	config file first and then the command line
	arguments, the command line takes
	precedence.) */
	if (opt.keyserver)
	free_keyserver_spec (opt.keyserver);
	opt.keyserver = keyserver;
	}
	}
	break;
	case oKeyServerOptions:
	if(!parse_keyserver_options(pargs.r.ret_str))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid keyserver options\n"),
	configname,configlineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid keyserver options\n"));
	}
	break;
	case oImportOptions:
	if(!parse_import_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.import_options,1))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid import options\n"),
	configname,configlineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid import options\n"));
	}
	break;
	case oImportFilter:
	rc = parse_and_set_import_filter (pargs.r.ret_str);
	if (rc)
	log_error (_("invalid filter option: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	break;
	case oExportOptions:
	if(!parse_export_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.export_options,1))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid export options\n"),
	configname,configlineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid export options\n"));
	}
	break;
	case oExportFilter:
	rc = parse_and_set_export_filter (pargs.r.ret_str);
	if (rc)
	log_error (_("invalid filter option: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	break;
	case oListOptions:
	if(!parse_list_options(pargs.r.ret_str))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid list options\n"),
	configname,configlineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid list options\n"));
	}
	break;
	case oVerifyOptions:
	{
	struct parse_options vopts[]=
	{
	{"show-photos",VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS,NULL,
	N_("display photo IDs during signature verification")},
	{"show-policy-urls",VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS,NULL,
	N_("show policy URLs during signature verification")},
	{"show-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show all notations during signature verification")},
	{"show-std-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show IETF standard notations during signature verification")},
	{"show-standard-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	NULL},
	{"show-user-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS,NULL,
	N_("show user-supplied notations during signature verification")},
	{"show-keyserver-urls",VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS,NULL,
	N_("show preferred keyserver URLs during signature verification")},
	{"show-uid-validity",VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY,NULL,
	N_("show user ID validity during signature verification")},
	{"show-unusable-uids",VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS,NULL,
	N_("show revoked and expired user IDs in signature verification")},
	{"show-primary-uid-only",VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY,NULL,
	N_("show only the primary user ID in signature verification")},
	{"pka-lookups",VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS,NULL,
	N_("validate signatures with PKA data")},
	{"pka-trust-increase",VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE,NULL,
	N_("elevate the trust of signatures with valid PKA data")},
	{NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
	};

	if(!parse_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.verify_options,vopts,1))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid verify options\n"),
	configname,configlineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid verify options\n"));
	}
	}
	break;
	case oTempDir: opt.temp_dir=pargs.r.ret_str; break;
	case oExecPath:
	if(set_exec_path(pargs.r.ret_str))
	log_error(_("unable to set exec-path to %s\n"),pargs.r.ret_str);
	else
	opt.exec_path_set=1;
	break;
	case oSetNotation:
	add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 0 );
	add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 1 );
	break;
	case oSigNotation: add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 0 ); break;
	case oCertNotation: add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 1 ); break;
	case oShowNotation:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-notation",
	"--list-options ","show-notations");
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-notation",
	"--verify-options ","show-notations");
	opt.list_options\|=LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
	opt.verify_options\|=VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
	break;
	case oNoShowNotation:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-notation",
	"--list-options ","no-show-notations");
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-notation",
	"--verify-options ","no-show-notations");
	opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
	opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
	break;
	case oUtf8Strings: utf8_strings = 1; break;
	case oNoUtf8Strings: utf8_strings = 0; break;
	case oDisableCipherAlgo:
	{
	int algo = string_to_cipher_algo (pargs.r.ret_str);
	gcry_cipher_ctl (NULL, GCRYCTL_DISABLE_ALGO, &algo, sizeof algo);
	}
	break;
	case oDisablePubkeyAlgo:
	{
	int algo = gcry_pk_map_name (pargs.r.ret_str);
	gcry_pk_ctl (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_ALGO, &algo, sizeof algo);
	}
	break;
	case oNoSigCache: opt.no_sig_cache = 1; break;
	case oAllowNonSelfsignedUID: opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1; break;
	case oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID: opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid=0; break;
	case oAllowFreeformUID: opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1; break;
	case oNoAllowFreeformUID: opt.allow_freeform_uid = 0; break;
	case oNoLiteral: opt.no_literal = 1; break;
	case oSetFilesize: opt.set_filesize = pargs.r.ret_ulong; break;
	case oFastListMode: opt.fast_list_mode = 1; break;
	case oFixedListMode: /* Dummy */ break;
	case oLegacyListMode: opt.legacy_list_mode = 1; break;
	case oPrintPKARecords: print_pka_records = 1; break;
	case oPrintDANERecords: print_dane_records = 1; break;
	case oListOnly: opt.list_only=1; break;
	case oIgnoreTimeConflict: opt.ignore_time_conflict = 1; break;
	case oIgnoreValidFrom: opt.ignore_valid_from = 1; break;
	case oIgnoreCrcError: opt.ignore_crc_error = 1; break;
	case oIgnoreMDCError: opt.ignore_mdc_error = 1; break;
	case oNoRandomSeedFile: use_random_seed = 0; break;

	case oAutoKeyRetrieve:
	opt.keyserver_options.options \|= KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE;
	break;
	case oNoAutoKeyRetrieve:
	opt.keyserver_options.options &= ~KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE;
	break;

	case oShowSessionKey: opt.show_session_key = 1; break;
	case oOverrideSessionKey:
	opt.override_session_key = pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oOverrideSessionKeyFD:
	ovrseskeyfd = translate_sys2libc_fd_int (pargs.r.ret_int, 0);
	break;
	case oMergeOnly:
	deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--merge-only",
	"--import-options ","merge-only");
	opt.import_options\|=IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY;
	break;
	case oAllowSecretKeyImport: /* obsolete */ break;
	case oTryAllSecrets: opt.try_all_secrets = 1; break;
	case oTrustedKey: register_trusted_key( pargs.r.ret_str ); break;

	case oEnableSpecialFilenames:
	enable_special_filenames ();
	break;

	case oNoExpensiveTrustChecks: opt.no_expensive_trust_checks=1; break;
	case oAutoCheckTrustDB: opt.no_auto_check_trustdb=0; break;
	case oNoAutoCheckTrustDB: opt.no_auto_check_trustdb=1; break;
	case oPreservePermissions: opt.preserve_permissions=1; break;
	case oDefaultPreferenceList:
	opt.def_preference_list = pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oDefaultKeyserverURL:
	{
	keyserver_spec_t keyserver;
	keyserver = parse_keyserver_uri (pargs.r.ret_str,1 );
	if (!keyserver)
	log_error (_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
	else
	free_keyserver_spec (keyserver);

	opt.def_keyserver_url = pargs.r.ret_str;
	}
	break;
	case oPersonalCipherPreferences:
	pers_cipher_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oPersonalAEADPreferences:
	pers_aead_list = pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oPersonalDigestPreferences:
	pers_digest_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oPersonalCompressPreferences:
	pers_compress_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;
	case oAgentProgram: opt.agent_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
	case oDirmngrProgram: opt.dirmngr_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
	case oDisableDirmngr: opt.disable_dirmngr = 1; break;
	case oWeakDigest:
	additional_weak_digest(pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oUnwrap:
	opt.unwrap_encryption = 1;
	break;
	case oOnlySignTextIDs:
	opt.only_sign_text_ids = 1;
	break;

	case oDisplay:
	set_opt_session_env ("DISPLAY", pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oTTYname:
	set_opt_session_env ("GPG_TTY", pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oTTYtype:
	set_opt_session_env ("TERM", pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;
	case oXauthority:
	set_opt_session_env ("XAUTHORITY", pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oLCctype: opt.lc_ctype = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
	case oLCmessages: opt.lc_messages = pargs.r.ret_str; break;

	case oGroup: add_group(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oUnGroup: rm_group(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
	case oNoGroups:
	while(opt.grouplist)
	{
	struct groupitem *iter=opt.grouplist;
	free_strlist(iter->values);
	opt.grouplist=opt.grouplist->next;
	xfree(iter);
	}
	break;

	case oStrict:
	case oNoStrict:
	/* Not used */
	break;

	case oMangleDosFilenames: opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 1; break;
	case oNoMangleDosFilenames: opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 0; break;
	case oEnableProgressFilter: opt.enable_progress_filter = 1; break;
	case oMultifile: multifile=1; break;
	case oKeyidFormat:
	if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"short")==0)
	opt.keyid_format=KF_SHORT;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"long")==0)
	opt.keyid_format=KF_LONG;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"0xshort")==0)
	opt.keyid_format=KF_0xSHORT;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"0xlong")==0)
	opt.keyid_format=KF_0xLONG;
	else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"none")==0)
	opt.keyid_format = KF_NONE;
	else
	log_error("unknown keyid-format '%s'\n",pargs.r.ret_str);
	break;

	case oExitOnStatusWriteError:
	opt.exit_on_status_write_error = 1;
	break;

	case oLimitCardInsertTries:
	opt.limit_card_insert_tries = pargs.r.ret_int;
	break;

	case oRequireCrossCert: opt.flags.require_cross_cert=1; break;
	case oNoRequireCrossCert: opt.flags.require_cross_cert=0; break;

	case oAutoKeyLocate:
	if (default_akl)
	{
	/* This is the first time --aito-key-locate is seen.
	* We need to reset the default akl. */
	default_akl = 0;
	release_akl();
	}
	if(!parse_auto_key_locate(pargs.r.ret_str))
	{
	if(configname)
	log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid auto-key-locate list\n"),
	configname,configlineno);
	else
	log_error(_("invalid auto-key-locate list\n"));
	}
	break;
	case oNoAutoKeyLocate:
	release_akl();
	break;

	case oKeyOrigin:
	if(!parse_key_origin (pargs.r.ret_str))
	log_error (_("invalid argument for option \"%.50s\"\n"),
	"--key-origin");
	break;

	case oEnableLargeRSA:
	#if SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE >= 65536
	opt.flags.large_rsa=1;
	#else
	if (configname)
	log_info("%s:%d: WARNING: gpg not built with large secure "
	"memory buffer. Ignoring enable-large-rsa\n",
	configname,configlineno);
	else
	log_info("WARNING: gpg not built with large secure "
	"memory buffer. Ignoring --enable-large-rsa\n");
	#endif /* SECMEM_BUFFER_SIZE >= 65536 */
	break;
	case oDisableLargeRSA: opt.flags.large_rsa=0;
	break;

	case oEnableDSA2: opt.flags.dsa2=1; break;
	case oDisableDSA2: opt.flags.dsa2=0; break;

	case oAllowMultisigVerification:
	case oAllowMultipleMessages:
	opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages=1;
	break;

	case oNoAllowMultipleMessages:
	opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages=0;
	break;

	case oAllowWeakDigestAlgos:
	opt.flags.allow_weak_digest_algos = 1;
	break;

	case oFakedSystemTime:
	{
	size_t len = strlen (pargs.r.ret_str);
	int freeze = 0;
	time_t faked_time;

	if (len > 0 && pargs.r.ret_str[len-1] == '!')
	{
	freeze = 1;
	pargs.r.ret_str[len-1] = '\0';
	}

	faked_time = isotime2epoch (pargs.r.ret_str);
	if (faked_time == (time_t)(-1))
	faked_time = (time_t)strtoul (pargs.r.ret_str, NULL, 10);
	gnupg_set_time (faked_time, freeze);
	}
	break;

	case oNoAutostart: opt.autostart = 0; break;
	case oNoSymkeyCache: opt.no_symkey_cache = 1; break;

	case oDefaultNewKeyAlgo:
	opt.def_new_key_algo = pargs.r.ret_str;
	break;

	case oNoop: break;

	default:
	if (configfp)
	pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_WARNING;
	else
	{
	pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR;
	/* The argparse fucntion calls a plain exit and thus
	* we need to print a status here. */
	write_status_failure ("option-parser",
	gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	}
	break;
	}
	}

	if (configfp)
	{
	fclose( configfp );
	configfp = NULL;
	/* Remember the first config file name. */
	if (!save_configname)
	save_configname = configname;
	else
	xfree(configname);
	configname = NULL;
	goto next_pass;
	}
	xfree(configname); configname = NULL;
	if (log_get_errorcount (0))
	{
	write_status_failure ("option-parser", gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	g10_exit(2);
	}

	/* The command --gpgconf-list is pretty simple and may be called
	directly after the option parsing. */
	if (cmd == aGPGConfList)
	{
	gpgconf_list (save_configname ? save_configname : default_configname);
	g10_exit (0);
	}
	xfree (save_configname);
	xfree (default_configname);

	if (print_dane_records)
	log_error ("invalid option \"%s\"; use \"%s\" instead\n",
	"--print-dane-records",
	"--export-options export-dane");
	if (print_pka_records)
	log_error ("invalid option \"%s\"; use \"%s\" instead\n",
	"--print-pks-records",
	"--export-options export-pka");
	if (log_get_errorcount (0))
	{
	write_status_failure ("option-checking", gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	g10_exit(2);
	}


	if( nogreeting )
	greeting = 0;

	if( greeting )
	{
	es_fprintf (es_stderr, "%s %s; %s\n",
	strusage(11), strusage(13), strusage(14) );
	es_fprintf (es_stderr, "%s\n", strusage(15) );
	}
	#ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION
	if (!opt.batch)
	{
	const char *s;

	if((s=strusage(25)))
	log_info("%s\n",s);
	if((s=strusage(26)))
	log_info("%s\n",s);
	if((s=strusage(27)))
	log_info("%s\n",s);
	}
	#endif

	/* FIXME: We should use logging to a file only in server mode;
	however we have not yet implemetyed that. Thus we try to get
	away with --batch as indication for logging to file
	required. */
	if (logfile && opt.batch)
	{
	log_set_file (logfile);
	log_set_prefix (NULL, GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PREFIX \| GPGRT_LOG_WITH_TIME \| GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PID);
	}

	if (opt.verbose > 2)
	log_info ("using character set '%s'\n", get_native_charset ());

	if( may_coredump && !opt.quiet )
	log_info(_("WARNING: program may create a core file!\n"));

	if (opt.flags.rfc4880bis)
	log_info ("WARNING: using experimental features from RFC4880bis!\n");
	else
	{
	opt.mimemode = 0; /* This will use text mode instead. */
	}

	if (eyes_only) {
	if (opt.set_filename)
	log_info(_("WARNING: %s overrides %s\n"),
	"--for-your-eyes-only","--set-filename");

	opt.set_filename="_CONSOLE";
	}

	if (opt.no_literal) {
	log_info(_("Note: %s is not for normal use!\n"), "--no-literal");
	if (opt.textmode)
	log_error(_("%s not allowed with %s!\n"),
	"--textmode", "--no-literal" );
	if (opt.set_filename)
	log_error(_("%s makes no sense with %s!\n"),
	eyes_only?"--for-your-eyes-only":"--set-filename",
	"--no-literal" );
	}


	if (opt.set_filesize)
	log_info(_("Note: %s is not for normal use!\n"), "--set-filesize");
	if( opt.batch )
	tty_batchmode( 1 );

	if (gnupg_faked_time_p ())
	{
	gnupg_isotime_t tbuf;

	log_info (_("WARNING: running with faked system time: "));
	gnupg_get_isotime (tbuf);
	dump_isotime (tbuf);
	log_printf ("\n");
	}

	/* Print a warning if an argument looks like an option. */
	if (!opt.quiet && !(pargs.flags & ARGPARSE_FLAG_STOP_SEEN))
	{
	int i;

	for (i=0; i < argc; i++)
	if (argv[i][0] == '-' && argv[i][1] == '-')
	log_info (_("Note: '%s' is not considered an option\n"), argv[i]);
	}


	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_RESUME_SECMEM_WARN);

	if(require_secmem && !got_secmem)
	{
	log_info(_("will not run with insecure memory due to %s\n"),
	"--require-secmem");
	write_status_failure ("option-checking", gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	g10_exit(2);
	}

	set_debug (debug_level);
	if (DBG_CLOCK)
	log_clock ("start");

	/* Do these after the switch(), so they can override settings. */
	if(PGP6)
	{
	/* That does not anymore work because we have no more support
	for v3 signatures. */
	opt.disable_mdc=1;
	opt.escape_from=1;
	opt.ask_sig_expire=0;
	}
	else if(PGP7)
	{
	/* That does not anymore work because we have no more support
	for v3 signatures. */
	opt.escape_from=1;
	opt.ask_sig_expire=0;
	}
	else if(PGP8)
	{
	opt.escape_from=1;
	}


	if( def_cipher_string ) {
	opt.def_cipher_algo = string_to_cipher_algo (def_cipher_string);
	xfree(def_cipher_string); def_cipher_string = NULL;
	if ( openpgp_cipher_test_algo (opt.def_cipher_algo) )
	log_error(_("selected cipher algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if (def_aead_string)
	{
	opt.def_aead_algo = string_to_aead_algo (def_aead_string);
	xfree (def_aead_string); def_aead_string = NULL;
	if (openpgp_aead_test_algo (opt.def_aead_algo))
	log_error(_("selected AEAD algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( def_digest_string ) {
	opt.def_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo (def_digest_string);
	xfree(def_digest_string); def_digest_string = NULL;
	if ( openpgp_md_test_algo (opt.def_digest_algo) )
	log_error(_("selected digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( compress_algo_string ) {
	opt.compress_algo = string_to_compress_algo(compress_algo_string);
	xfree(compress_algo_string); compress_algo_string = NULL;
	if( check_compress_algo(opt.compress_algo) )
	log_error(_("selected compression algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( cert_digest_string ) {
	opt.cert_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo (cert_digest_string);
	xfree(cert_digest_string); cert_digest_string = NULL;
	if (openpgp_md_test_algo(opt.cert_digest_algo))
	log_error(_("selected certification digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( s2k_cipher_string ) {
	opt.s2k_cipher_algo = string_to_cipher_algo (s2k_cipher_string);
	xfree(s2k_cipher_string); s2k_cipher_string = NULL;
	if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (opt.s2k_cipher_algo))
	log_error(_("selected cipher algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( s2k_digest_string ) {
	opt.s2k_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo (s2k_digest_string);
	xfree(s2k_digest_string); s2k_digest_string = NULL;
	if (openpgp_md_test_algo(opt.s2k_digest_algo))
	log_error(_("selected digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
	}
	if( opt.completes_needed < 1 )
	log_error(_("completes-needed must be greater than 0\n"));
	if( opt.marginals_needed < 2 )
	log_error(_("marginals-needed must be greater than 1\n"));
	if( opt.max_cert_depth < 1 \|\| opt.max_cert_depth > 255 )
	log_error(_("max-cert-depth must be in the range from 1 to 255\n"));
	if(opt.def_cert_level<0 \|\| opt.def_cert_level>3)
	log_error(_("invalid default-cert-level; must be 0, 1, 2, or 3\n"));
	if( opt.min_cert_level < 1 \|\| opt.min_cert_level > 3 )
	log_error(_("invalid min-cert-level; must be 1, 2, or 3\n"));
	switch( opt.s2k_mode ) {
	case 0:
	log_info(_("Note: simple S2K mode (0) is strongly discouraged\n"));
	break;
	case 1: case 3: break;
	default:
	log_error(_("invalid S2K mode; must be 0, 1 or 3\n"));
	}

	/* This isn't actually needed, but does serve to error out if the
	string is invalid. */
	if(opt.def_preference_list &&
	keygen_set_std_prefs(opt.def_preference_list,0))
	log_error(_("invalid default preferences\n"));

	if(pers_cipher_list &&
	keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_cipher_list,PREFTYPE_SYM))
	log_error(_("invalid personal cipher preferences\n"));

	if (pers_aead_list && keygen_set_std_prefs (pers_aead_list, PREFTYPE_AEAD))
	log_error(_("invalid personal AEAD preferences\n"));

	if(pers_digest_list &&
	keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_digest_list,PREFTYPE_HASH))
	log_error(_("invalid personal digest preferences\n"));

	if(pers_compress_list &&
	keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_compress_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP))
	log_error(_("invalid personal compress preferences\n"));

	/* Check chunk size. Please fix also the man page if you chnage
	* the default. The limits are given by the specs. */
	if (!opt.chunk_size)
	opt.chunk_size = 30; /* Default to 1 GiB chunks. */
	else if (opt.chunk_size < 6)
	{
	opt.chunk_size = 6;
	log_info (_("chunk size invalid - using %d\n"), opt.chunk_size);
	}
	else if (opt.chunk_size > 62)
	{
	opt.chunk_size = 62;
	log_info (_("chunk size invalid - using %d\n"), opt.chunk_size);
	}

	/* We don't support all possible commands with multifile yet */
	if(multifile)
	{
	char *cmdname;

	switch(cmd)
	{
	case aSign:
	cmdname="--sign";
	break;
	case aSignEncr:
	cmdname="--sign --encrypt";
	break;
	case aClearsign:
	cmdname="--clear-sign";
	break;
	case aDetachedSign:
	cmdname="--detach-sign";
	break;
	case aSym:
	cmdname="--symmetric";
	break;
	case aEncrSym:
	cmdname="--symmetric --encrypt";
	break;
	case aStore:
	cmdname="--store";
	break;
	default:
	cmdname=NULL;
	break;
	}

	if(cmdname)
	log_error(_("%s does not yet work with %s\n"),cmdname,"--multifile");
	}

	if( log_get_errorcount(0) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("option-postprocessing",
	gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	g10_exit (2);
	}

	if(opt.compress_level==0)
	opt.compress_algo=COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE;

	/* Check our chosen algorithms against the list of legal
	algorithms. */

	if(!GNUPG && !opt.flags.rfc4880bis)
	{
	const char *badalg=NULL;
	preftype_t badtype=PREFTYPE_NONE;

	if(opt.def_cipher_algo
	&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_SYM,opt.def_cipher_algo,NULL))
	{
	badalg = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (opt.def_cipher_algo);
	badtype = PREFTYPE_SYM;
	}
	else if(opt.def_aead_algo
	&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_AEAD, opt.def_aead_algo, NULL))
	{
	badalg = openpgp_aead_algo_name (opt.def_aead_algo);
	badtype = PREFTYPE_AEAD;
	}
	else if(opt.def_digest_algo
	&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_HASH,opt.def_digest_algo,NULL))
	{
	badalg = gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo);
	badtype = PREFTYPE_HASH;
	}
	else if(opt.cert_digest_algo
	&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_HASH,opt.cert_digest_algo,NULL))
	{
	badalg = gcry_md_algo_name (opt.cert_digest_algo);
	badtype = PREFTYPE_HASH;
	}
	else if(opt.compress_algo!=-1
	&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_ZIP,opt.compress_algo,NULL))
	{
	badalg = compress_algo_to_string(opt.compress_algo);
	badtype = PREFTYPE_ZIP;
	}

	if(badalg)
	{
	switch(badtype)
	{
	case PREFTYPE_SYM:
	log_info (_("cipher algorithm '%s'"
	" may not be used in %s mode\n"),
	badalg,
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	break;
	case PREFTYPE_AEAD:
	log_info (_("AEAD algorithm '%s'"
	" may not be used in %s mode\n"),
	badalg,
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	break;
	case PREFTYPE_HASH:
	log_info (_("digest algorithm '%s'"
	" may not be used in %s mode\n"),
	badalg,
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	break;
	case PREFTYPE_ZIP:
	log_info (_("compression algorithm '%s'"
	" may not be used in %s mode\n"),
	badalg,
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	break;
	default:
	BUG();
	}

	compliance_failure();
	}
	}

	/* Check our chosen algorithms against the list of allowed
	* algorithms in the current compliance mode, and fail hard if it
	* is not. This is us being nice to the user informing her early
	* that the chosen algorithms are not available. We also check
	* and enforce this right before the actual operation. */
	/* FIXME: We also need to check the AEAD algo. */
	if (opt.def_cipher_algo
	&& ! gnupg_cipher_is_allowed (opt.compliance,
	cmd == aEncr
	\|\| cmd == aSignEncr
	\|\| cmd == aEncrSym
	\|\| cmd == aSym
	\|\| cmd == aSignSym
	\|\| cmd == aSignEncrSym,
	opt.def_cipher_algo,
	GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_NONE))
	log_error (_("cipher algorithm '%s' may not be used in %s mode\n"),
	openpgp_cipher_algo_name (opt.def_cipher_algo),
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));

	if (opt.def_digest_algo
	&& ! gnupg_digest_is_allowed (opt.compliance,
	cmd == aSign
	\|\| cmd == aSignEncr
	\|\| cmd == aSignEncrSym
	\|\| cmd == aSignSym
	\|\| cmd == aClearsign,
	opt.def_digest_algo))
	log_error (_("digest algorithm '%s' may not be used in %s mode\n"),
	gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo),
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));

	/* Fail hard. */
	if (log_get_errorcount (0))
	{
	write_status_failure ("option-checking", gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	g10_exit (2);
	}

	/* Set the random seed file. */
	if( use_random_seed ) {
	char *p = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), "random_seed", NULL );
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_RANDOM_SEED_FILE, p);
	if (!access (p, F_OK))
	register_secured_file (p);
	xfree(p);
	}

	/* If there is no command but the --fingerprint is given, default
	to the --list-keys command. */
	if (!cmd && fpr_maybe_cmd)
	{
	set_cmd (&cmd, aListKeys);
	}


	if( opt.verbose > 1 )
	set_packet_list_mode(1);

	/* Add the keyrings, but not for some special commands. We always
	* need to add the keyrings if we are running under SELinux, this
	* is so that the rings are added to the list of secured files.
	* We do not add any keyring if --no-keyring has been used. */
	if (default_keyring >= 0
	&& (ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS
	\|\| (cmd != aDeArmor && cmd != aEnArmor && cmd != aGPGConfTest)))
	{
	if (!nrings \|\| default_keyring > 0) /* Add default ring. */
	keydb_add_resource ("pubring" EXTSEP_S GPGEXT_GPG,
	KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_DEFAULT);
	for (sl = nrings; sl; sl = sl->next )
	keydb_add_resource (sl->d, sl->flags);
	}
	FREE_STRLIST(nrings);

	if (opt.pinentry_mode == PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK)
	/* In loopback mode, never ask for the password multiple
	times. */
	{
	opt.passphrase_repeat = 0;
	}

	if (cmd == aGPGConfTest)
	g10_exit(0);


	if (pwfd != -1) /* Read the passphrase now. */
	read_passphrase_from_fd (pwfd);

	if (ovrseskeyfd != -1 ) /* Read the sessionkey now. */
	read_sessionkey_from_fd (ovrseskeyfd);

	fname = argc? *argv : NULL;

	if(fname && utf8_strings)
	opt.flags.utf8_filename=1;

	ctrl = xcalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl);
	gpg_init_default_ctrl (ctrl);

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	switch (cmd)
	{
	case aPrimegen:
	case aPrintMD:
	case aPrintMDs:
	case aGenRandom:
	case aDeArmor:
	case aEnArmor:
	case aListConfig:
	case aListGcryptConfig:
	break;
	case aFixTrustDB:
	case aExportOwnerTrust:
	rc = setup_trustdb (0, trustdb_name);
	break;
	case aListTrustDB:
	rc = setup_trustdb (argc? 1:0, trustdb_name);
	break;
	case aKeygen:
	case aFullKeygen:
	case aQuickKeygen:
	rc = setup_trustdb (1, trustdb_name);
	break;
	default:
	/* If we are using TM_ALWAYS, we do not need to create the
	trustdb. */
	rc = setup_trustdb (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS, trustdb_name);
	break;
	}
	if (rc)
	log_error (_("failed to initialize the TrustDB: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/

	switch (cmd)
	{
	case aStore:
	case aSym:
	case aSign:
	case aSignSym:
	case aClearsign:
	if (!opt.quiet && any_explicit_recipient)
	log_info (_("WARNING: recipients (-r) given "
	"without using public key encryption\n"));
	break;
	default:
	break;
	}


	/* Check for certain command whether we need to migrate a
	secring.gpg to the gpg-agent. */
	switch (cmd)
	{
	case aListSecretKeys:
	case aSign:
	case aSignEncr:
	case aSignEncrSym:
	case aSignSym:
	case aClearsign:
	case aDecrypt:
	case aSignKey:
	case aLSignKey:
	case aEditKey:
	case aPasswd:
	case aDeleteSecretKeys:
	case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys:
	case aQuickKeygen:
	case aQuickAddUid:
	case aQuickAddKey:
	case aQuickRevUid:
	case aQuickSetPrimaryUid:
	case aFullKeygen:
	case aKeygen:
	case aImport:
	case aExportSecret:
	case aExportSecretSub:
	case aGenRevoke:
	case aDesigRevoke:
	case aCardEdit:
	case aChangePIN:
	migrate_secring (ctrl);
	break;
	case aListKeys:
	if (opt.with_secret)
	migrate_secring (ctrl);
	break;
	default:
	break;
	}

	/* The command dispatcher. */
	switch( cmd )
	{
	case aServer:
	gpg_server (ctrl);
	break;

	case aStore: /* only store the file */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--store [filename]");
	if( (rc = encrypt_store(fname)) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("store", rc);
	log_error ("storing '%s' failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname),gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	break;
	case aSym: /* encrypt the given file only with the symmetric cipher */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--symmetric [filename]");
	if( (rc = encrypt_symmetric(fname)) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("symencrypt", rc);
	log_error (_("symmetric encryption of '%s' failed: %s\n"),
	print_fname_stdin(fname),gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	break;

	case aEncr: /* encrypt the given file */
	if(multifile)
	encrypt_crypt_files (ctrl, argc, argv, remusr);
	else
	{
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--encrypt [filename]");
	if( (rc = encrypt_crypt (ctrl, -1, fname, remusr, 0, NULL, -1)) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("encrypt", rc);
	log_error("%s: encryption failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	}
	break;

	case aEncrSym:
	/* This works with PGP 8 in the sense that it acts just like a
	symmetric message. It doesn't work at all with 2 or 6. It
	might work with 7, but alas, I don't have a copy to test
	with right now. */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--symmetric --encrypt [filename]");
	else if(opt.s2k_mode==0)
	log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --encrypt"
	" with --s2k-mode 0\n"));
	else if(PGP6 \|\| PGP7)
	log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --encrypt"
	" in %s mode\n"),
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	else
	{
	if( (rc = encrypt_crypt (ctrl, -1, fname, remusr, 1, NULL, -1)) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("encrypt", rc);
	log_error ("%s: encryption failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	}
	break;

	case aSign: /* sign the given file */
	sl = NULL;
	if( detached_sig ) { /* sign all files */
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	add_to_strlist( &sl, *argv );
	}
	else {
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--sign [filename]");
	if( argc ) {
	sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname));
	strcpy(sl->d, fname);
	}
	}
	if ((rc = sign_file (ctrl, sl, detached_sig, locusr, 0, NULL, NULL)))
	{
	write_status_failure ("sign", rc);
	log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aSignEncr: /* sign and encrypt the given file */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--sign --encrypt [filename]");
	if( argc ) {
	sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname));
	strcpy(sl->d, fname);
	}
	else
	sl = NULL;
	if ((rc = sign_file (ctrl, sl, detached_sig, locusr, 1, remusr, NULL)))
	{
	write_status_failure ("sign-encrypt", rc);
	log_error("%s: sign+encrypt failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aSignEncrSym: /* sign and encrypt the given file */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--symmetric --sign --encrypt [filename]");
	else if(opt.s2k_mode==0)
	log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --sign --encrypt"
	" with --s2k-mode 0\n"));
	else if(PGP6 \|\| PGP7)
	log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --sign --encrypt"
	" in %s mode\n"),
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	else
	{
	if( argc )
	{
	sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname));
	strcpy(sl->d, fname);
	}
	else
	sl = NULL;
	if ((rc = sign_file (ctrl, sl, detached_sig, locusr,
	2, remusr, NULL)))
	{
	write_status_failure ("sign-encrypt", rc);
	log_error("%s: symmetric+sign+encrypt failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	}
	break;

	case aSignSym: /* sign and conventionally encrypt the given file */
	if (argc > 1)
	wrong_args("--sign --symmetric [filename]");
	rc = sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl, fname, locusr);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_failure ("sign-symencrypt", rc);
	log_error("%s: sign+symmetric failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	break;

	case aClearsign: /* make a clearsig */
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--clear-sign [filename]");
	if( (rc = clearsign_file (ctrl, fname, locusr, NULL)) )
	{
	write_status_failure ("sign", rc);
	log_error("%s: clear-sign failed: %s\n",
	print_fname_stdin(fname), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	break;

	case aVerify:
	if (multifile)
	{
	if ((rc = verify_files (ctrl, argc, argv)))
	log_error("verify files failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	else
	{
	if ((rc = verify_signatures (ctrl, argc, argv)))
	log_error("verify signatures failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	if (rc)
	write_status_failure ("verify", rc);
	break;

	case aDecrypt:
	if (multifile)
	decrypt_messages (ctrl, argc, argv);
	else
	{
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--decrypt [filename]");
	if( (rc = decrypt_message (ctrl, fname) ))
	{
	write_status_failure ("decrypt", rc);
	log_error("decrypt_message failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	}
	break;

	case aQuickSignKey:
	case aQuickLSignKey:
	{
	const char *fpr;

	if (argc < 1)
	wrong_args ("--quick-[l]sign-key fingerprint [userids]");
	fpr = *argv++; argc--;
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++)
	append_to_strlist2 (&sl, *argv, utf8_strings);
	keyedit_quick_sign (ctrl, fpr, sl, locusr, (cmd == aQuickLSignKey));
	free_strlist (sl);
	}
	break;

	case aSignKey:
	if( argc != 1 )
	wrong_args("--sign-key user-id");
	/* fall through */
	case aLSignKey:
	if( argc != 1 )
	wrong_args("--lsign-key user-id");
	/* fall through */

	sl=NULL;

	if(cmd==aSignKey)
	append_to_strlist(&sl,"sign");
	else if(cmd==aLSignKey)
	append_to_strlist(&sl,"lsign");
	else
	BUG();

	append_to_strlist( &sl, "save" );
	username = make_username( fname );
	keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, sl, 0, 0 );
	xfree(username);
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aEditKey: /* Edit a key signature */
	if( !argc )
	wrong_args("--edit-key user-id [commands]");
	username = make_username( fname );
	if( argc > 1 ) {
	sl = NULL;
	for( argc--, argv++ ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	append_to_strlist( &sl, *argv );
	keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, sl, 0, 1 );
	free_strlist(sl);
	}
	else
	keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, NULL, 0, 1 );
	xfree(username);
	break;

	case aPasswd:
	if (argc != 1)
	wrong_args("--change-passphrase <user-id>");
	else
	{
	username = make_username (fname);
	keyedit_passwd (ctrl, username);
	xfree (username);
	}
	break;

	case aDeleteKeys:
	case aDeleteSecretKeys:
	case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	/* I'm adding these in reverse order as add_to_strlist2
	reverses them again, and it's easier to understand in the
	proper order :) */
	for( ; argc; argc-- )
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, argv[argc-1], utf8_strings );
	delete_keys (ctrl, sl,
	cmd==aDeleteSecretKeys, cmd==aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys);
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aCheckKeys:
	opt.check_sigs = 1; /* fall through */
	case aListSigs:
	opt.list_sigs = 1; /* fall through */
	case aListKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	public_key_list (ctrl, sl, 0);
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;
	case aListSecretKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	secret_key_list (ctrl, sl);
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;
	case aLocateKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for (; argc; argc--, argv++)
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	public_key_list (ctrl, sl, 1);
	free_strlist (sl);
	break;

	case aQuickKeygen:
	{
	const char x_algo, x_usage, *x_expire;

	if (argc < 1 \|\| argc > 4)
	wrong_args("--quick-generate-key USER-ID [ALGO [USAGE [EXPIRE]]]");
	username = make_username (fname);
	argv++, argc--;
	x_algo = "";
	x_usage = "";
	x_expire = "";
	if (argc)
	{
	x_algo = *argv++; argc--;
	if (argc)
	{
	x_usage = *argv++; argc--;
	if (argc)
	{
	x_expire = *argv++; argc--;
	}
	}
	}
	quick_generate_keypair (ctrl, username, x_algo, x_usage, x_expire);
	xfree (username);
	}
	break;

	case aKeygen: /* generate a key */
	if( opt.batch ) {
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--generate-key [parameterfile]");
	generate_keypair (ctrl, 0, argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, 0);
	}
	else {
	if (opt.command_fd != -1 && argc)
	{
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--generate-key [parameterfile]");

	opt.batch = 1;
	generate_keypair (ctrl, 0, argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, 0);
	}
	else if (argc)
	wrong_args ("--generate-key");
	else
	generate_keypair (ctrl, 0, NULL, NULL, 0);
	}
	break;

	case aFullKeygen: /* Generate a key with all options. */
	if (opt.batch)
	{
	if (argc > 1)
	wrong_args ("--full-generate-key [parameterfile]");
	generate_keypair (ctrl, 1, argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, 0);
	}
	else
	{
	if (argc)
	wrong_args("--full-generate-key");
	generate_keypair (ctrl, 1, NULL, NULL, 0);
	}
	break;

	case aQuickAddUid:
	{
	const char uid, newuid;

	if (argc != 2)
	wrong_args ("--quick-add-uid USER-ID NEW-USER-ID");
	uid = *argv++; argc--;
	newuid = *argv++; argc--;
	keyedit_quick_adduid (ctrl, uid, newuid);
	}
	break;

	case aQuickAddKey:
	{
	const char x_fpr, x_algo, x_usage, x_expire;

	if (argc < 1 \|\| argc > 4)
	wrong_args ("--quick-add-key FINGERPRINT [ALGO [USAGE [EXPIRE]]]");
	x_fpr = *argv++; argc--;
	x_algo = "";
	x_usage = "";
	x_expire = "";
	if (argc)
	{
	x_algo = *argv++; argc--;
	if (argc)
	{
	x_usage = *argv++; argc--;
	if (argc)
	{
	x_expire = *argv++; argc--;
	}
	}
	}
	keyedit_quick_addkey (ctrl, x_fpr, x_algo, x_usage, x_expire);
	}
	break;

	case aQuickRevUid:
	{
	const char uid, uidtorev;

	if (argc != 2)
	wrong_args ("--quick-revoke-uid USER-ID USER-ID-TO-REVOKE");
	uid = *argv++; argc--;
	uidtorev = *argv++; argc--;
	keyedit_quick_revuid (ctrl, uid, uidtorev);
	}
	break;

	case aQuickSetExpire:
	{
	const char x_fpr, x_expire;

	if (argc < 2)
	wrong_args ("--quick-set-exipre FINGERPRINT EXPIRE [SUBKEY-FPRS]");
	x_fpr = *argv++; argc--;
	x_expire = *argv++; argc--;
	keyedit_quick_set_expire (ctrl, x_fpr, x_expire, argv);
	}
	break;

	case aQuickSetPrimaryUid:
	{
	const char uid, primaryuid;

	if (argc != 2)
	wrong_args ("--quick-set-primary-uid USER-ID PRIMARY-USER-ID");
	uid = *argv++; argc--;
	primaryuid = *argv++; argc--;
	keyedit_quick_set_primary (ctrl, uid, primaryuid);
	}
	break;

	case aFastImport:
	opt.import_options \|= IMPORT_FAST; /* fall through */
	case aImport:
	import_keys (ctrl, argc? argv:NULL, argc, NULL,
	opt.import_options, opt.key_origin, opt.key_origin_url);
	break;

	/* TODO: There are a number of command that use this same
	"make strlist, call function, report error, free strlist"
	pattern. Join them together here and avoid all that
	duplicated code. */

	case aExport:
	case aSendKeys:
	case aRecvKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	if( cmd == aSendKeys )
	rc = keyserver_export (ctrl, sl );
	else if( cmd == aRecvKeys )
	rc = keyserver_import (ctrl, sl );
	else
	{
	export_stats_t stats = export_new_stats ();
	rc = export_pubkeys (ctrl, sl, opt.export_options, stats);
	export_print_stats (stats);
	export_release_stats (stats);
	}
	if(rc)
	{
	if(cmd==aSendKeys)
	{
	write_status_failure ("send-keys", rc);
	log_error(_("keyserver send failed: %s\n"),gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	else if(cmd==aRecvKeys)
	{
	write_status_failure ("recv-keys", rc);
	log_error (_("keyserver receive failed: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	else
	{
	write_status_failure ("export", rc);
	log_error (_("key export failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aExportSshKey:
	if (argc != 1)
	wrong_args ("--export-ssh-key <user-id>");
	rc = export_ssh_key (ctrl, argv[0]);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_failure ("export-ssh-key", rc);
	log_error (_("export as ssh key failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	break;

	case aSearchKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for (; argc; argc--, argv++)
	append_to_strlist2 (&sl, *argv, utf8_strings);
	rc = keyserver_search (ctrl, sl);
	if (rc)
	{
	write_status_failure ("search-keys", rc);
	log_error (_("keyserver search failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	free_strlist (sl);
	break;

	case aRefreshKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	rc = keyserver_refresh (ctrl, sl);
	if(rc)
	{
	write_status_failure ("refresh-keys", rc);
	log_error (_("keyserver refresh failed: %s\n"),gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aFetchKeys:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	rc = keyserver_fetch (ctrl, sl, opt.key_origin);
	if(rc)
	{
	write_status_failure ("fetch-keys", rc);
	log_error ("key fetch failed: %s\n",gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aExportSecret:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	{
	export_stats_t stats = export_new_stats ();
	export_seckeys (ctrl, sl, opt.export_options, stats);
	export_print_stats (stats);
	export_release_stats (stats);
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aExportSecretSub:
	sl = NULL;
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
	{
	export_stats_t stats = export_new_stats ();
	export_secsubkeys (ctrl, sl, opt.export_options, stats);
	export_print_stats (stats);
	export_release_stats (stats);
	}
	free_strlist(sl);
	break;

	case aGenRevoke:
	if( argc != 1 )
	wrong_args("--generate-revocation user-id");
	username = make_username(*argv);
	gen_revoke (ctrl, username );
	xfree( username );
	break;

	case aDesigRevoke:
	if (argc != 1)
	wrong_args ("--generate-designated-revocation user-id");
	username = make_username (*argv);
	gen_desig_revoke (ctrl, username, locusr);
	xfree (username);
	break;

	case aDeArmor:
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--dearmor [file]");
	rc = dearmor_file( argc? *argv: NULL );
	if( rc )
	{
	write_status_failure ("dearmor", rc);
	log_error (_("dearmoring failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	break;

	case aEnArmor:
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--enarmor [file]");
	rc = enarmor_file( argc? *argv: NULL );
	if( rc )
	{
	write_status_failure ("enarmor", rc);
	log_error (_("enarmoring failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	break;


	case aPrimegen:
	#if 0 /FIXME/
	{ int mode = argc < 2 ? 0 : atoi(*argv);

	if( mode == 1 && argc == 2 ) {
	mpi_print (es_stdout,
	generate_public_prime( atoi(argv[1]) ), 1);
	}
	else if( mode == 2 && argc == 3 ) {
	mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_elg_prime(
	0, atoi(argv[1]),
	atoi(argv[2]), NULL,NULL ), 1);
	}
	else if( mode == 3 && argc == 3 ) {
	MPI *factors;
	mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_elg_prime(
	1, atoi(argv[1]),
	atoi(argv[2]), NULL,&factors ), 1);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	mpi_print (es_stdout, factors[0], 1 ); /* print q */
	}
	else if( mode == 4 && argc == 3 ) {
	MPI g = mpi_alloc(1);
	mpi_print (es_stdout, generate_elg_prime(
	0, atoi(argv[1]),
	atoi(argv[2]), g, NULL ), 1);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	mpi_print (es_stdout, g, 1 );
	mpi_free (g);
	}
	else
	wrong_args("--gen-prime mode bits [qbits] ");
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	#endif
	wrong_args("--gen-prime not yet supported ");
	break;

	case aGenRandom:
	{
	int level = argc ? atoi(*argv):0;
	int count = argc > 1 ? atoi(argv[1]): 0;
	int endless = !count;

	if( argc < 1 \|\| argc > 2 \|\| level < 0 \|\| level > 2 \|\| count < 0 )
	wrong_args("--gen-random 0\|1\|2 [count]");

	while( endless \|\| count ) {
	byte *p;
	/* Wee need a multiple of 3, so that in case of
	armored output we get a correct string. No
	linefolding is done, as it is best to levae this to
	other tools */
	size_t n = !endless && count < 99? count : 99;

	p = gcry_random_bytes (n, level);
	#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
	setmode ( fileno(stdout), O_BINARY );
	#endif
	if (opt.armor) {
	char *tmp = make_radix64_string (p, n);
	es_fputs (tmp, es_stdout);
	xfree (tmp);
	if (n%3 == 1)
	es_putc ('=', es_stdout);
	if (n%3)
	es_putc ('=', es_stdout);
	} else {
	es_fwrite( p, n, 1, es_stdout );
	}
	xfree(p);
	if( !endless )
	count -= n;
	}
	if (opt.armor)
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	break;

	case aPrintMD:
	if( argc < 1)
	wrong_args("--print-md algo [files]");
	{
	int all_algos = (*argv=='' && !(*argv)[1]);
	int algo = all_algos? 0 : gcry_md_map_name (*argv);

	if( !algo && !all_algos )
	log_error(_("invalid hash algorithm '%s'\n"), *argv );
	else {
	argc--; argv++;
	if( !argc )
	print_mds(NULL, algo);
	else {
	for(; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	print_mds(*argv, algo);
	}
	}
	}
	break;

	case aPrintMDs: /* old option */
	if( !argc )
	print_mds(NULL,0);
	else {
	for(; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	print_mds(*argv,0);
	}
	break;

	#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
	case aListTrustDB:
	if( !argc )
	list_trustdb (ctrl, es_stdout, NULL);
	else {
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
	list_trustdb (ctrl, es_stdout, *argv );
	}
	break;

	case aUpdateTrustDB:
	if( argc )
	wrong_args("--update-trustdb");
	update_trustdb (ctrl);
	break;

	case aCheckTrustDB:
	/* Old versions allowed for arguments - ignore them */
	check_trustdb (ctrl);
	break;

	case aFixTrustDB:
	how_to_fix_the_trustdb ();
	break;

	case aListTrustPath:
	if( !argc )
	wrong_args("--list-trust-path <user-ids>");
	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) {
	username = make_username( *argv );
	list_trust_path( username );
	xfree(username);
	}
	break;

	case aExportOwnerTrust:
	if( argc )
	wrong_args("--export-ownertrust");
	export_ownertrust (ctrl);
	break;

	case aImportOwnerTrust:
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("--import-ownertrust [file]");
	import_ownertrust (ctrl, argc? *argv:NULL );
	break;
	#endif /!NO_TRUST_MODELS/

	case aRebuildKeydbCaches:
	if (argc)
	wrong_args ("--rebuild-keydb-caches");
	keydb_rebuild_caches (ctrl, 1);
	break;

	#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
	case aCardStatus:
	if (argc == 0)
	card_status (ctrl, es_stdout, NULL);
	else if (argc == 1)
	card_status (ctrl, es_stdout, *argv);
	else
	wrong_args ("--card-status [serialno]");
	break;

	case aCardEdit:
	if (argc) {
	sl = NULL;
	for (argc--, argv++ ; argc; argc--, argv++)
	append_to_strlist (&sl, *argv);
	card_edit (ctrl, sl);
	free_strlist (sl);
	}
	else
	card_edit (ctrl, NULL);
	break;

	case aChangePIN:
	if (!argc)
	change_pin (0,1);
	else if (argc == 1)
	change_pin (atoi (*argv),1);
	else
	wrong_args ("--change-pin [no]");
	break;
	#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/

	case aListConfig:
	{
	char *str=collapse_args(argc,argv);
	list_config(str);
	xfree(str);
	}
	break;

	case aListGcryptConfig:
	/* Fixme: It would be nice to integrate that with
	--list-config but unfortunately there is no way yet to have
	libgcrypt print it to an estream for further parsing. */
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_PRINT_CONFIG, stdout);
	break;

	case aTOFUPolicy:
	#ifdef USE_TOFU
	{
	int policy;
	int i;
	KEYDB_HANDLE hd;

	if (argc < 2)
	wrong_args ("--tofu-policy POLICY KEYID [KEYID...]");

	policy = parse_tofu_policy (argv[0]);

	hd = keydb_new ();
	if (! hd)
	{
	write_status_failure ("tofu-driver", gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	tofu_begin_batch_update (ctrl);

	for (i = 1; i < argc; i ++)
	{
	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
	kbnode_t kb;

	rc = classify_user_id (argv[i], &desc, 0);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("error parsing key specification '%s': %s\n"),
	argv[i], gpg_strerror (rc));
	write_status_failure ("tofu-driver", rc);
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	if (! (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID
	\|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID
	\|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
	\|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20
	\|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
	\|\| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_KEYGRIP))
	{
	log_error (_("'%s' does not appear to be a valid"
	" key ID, fingerprint or keygrip\n"),
	argv[i]);
	write_status_failure ("tofu-driver",
	gpg_error(GPG_ERR_GENERAL));
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	rc = keydb_search_reset (hd);
	if (rc)
	{
	/* This should not happen, thus no need to tranalate
	the string. */
	log_error ("keydb_search_reset failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	write_status_failure ("tofu-driver", rc);
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), argv[i],
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	write_status_failure ("tofu-driver", rc);
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &kb);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	write_status_failure ("tofu-driver", rc);
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, kb);
	if (tofu_set_policy (ctrl, kb, policy))
	{
	write_status_failure ("tofu-driver", rc);
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	release_kbnode (kb);
	}

	tofu_end_batch_update (ctrl);

	keydb_release (hd);
	}
	#endif /USE_TOFU/
	break;

	default:
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("WARNING: no command supplied."
	" Trying to guess what you mean ...\n"));
	/FALLTHRU/
	case aListPackets:
	if( argc > 1 )
	wrong_args("[filename]");
	/* Issue some output for the unix newbie */
	if (!fname && !opt.outfile
	&& gnupg_isatty (fileno (stdin))
	&& gnupg_isatty (fileno (stdout))
	&& gnupg_isatty (fileno (stderr)))
	log_info(_("Go ahead and type your message ...\n"));

	a = iobuf_open(fname);
	if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a)))
	{
	iobuf_close (a);
	a = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	if( !a )
	log_error(_("can't open '%s'\n"), print_fname_stdin(fname));
	else {

	if( !opt.no_armor ) {
	if( use_armor_filter( a ) ) {
	afx = new_armor_context ();
	push_armor_filter (afx, a);
	}
	}
	if( cmd == aListPackets ) {
	opt.list_packets=1;
	set_packet_list_mode(1);
	}
	rc = proc_packets (ctrl, NULL, a );
	if( rc )
	{
	write_status_failure ("-", rc);
	log_error ("processing message failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	iobuf_close(a);
	}
	break;
	}

	/* cleanup */
	gpg_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl);
	xfree (ctrl);
	release_armor_context (afx);
	FREE_STRLIST(remusr);
	FREE_STRLIST(locusr);
	g10_exit(0);
	return 8; /NEVER REACHED/
	}


	/* Note: This function is used by signal handlers!. */
	static void
	emergency_cleanup (void)
	{
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM );
	}


	void
	g10_exit( int rc )
	{
	/* If we had an error but not printed an error message, do it now.
	* Note that write_status_failure will never print a second failure
	* status line. */
	if (rc)
	write_status_failure ("gpg-exit", gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL));

	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_UPDATE_RANDOM_SEED_FILE);
	if (DBG_CLOCK)
	log_clock ("stop");

	if ( (opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE) )
	{
	keydb_dump_stats ();
	sig_check_dump_stats ();
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_MEMORY_STATS);
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_RANDOM_STATS);
	}
	if (opt.debug)
	gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_SECMEM_STATS );

	emergency_cleanup ();

	rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 : g10_errors_seen? 1 : 0;
	exit (rc);
	}


	/* Pretty-print hex hashes. This assumes at least an 80-character
	display, but there are a few other similar assumptions in the
	display code. */
	static void
	print_hex (gcry_md_hd_t md, int algo, const char *fname)
	{
	int i,n,count,indent=0;
	const byte *p;

	if (fname)
	indent = es_printf("%s: ",fname);

	if (indent>40)
	{
	es_printf ("\n");
	indent=0;
	}

	if (algo==DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160)
	indent += es_printf("RMD160 = ");
	else if (algo>0)
	indent += es_printf("%6s = ", gcry_md_algo_name (algo));
	else
	algo = abs(algo);

	count = indent;

	p = gcry_md_read (md, algo);
	n = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);

	count += es_printf ("%02X",*p++);

	for(i=1;i<n;i++,p++)
	{
	if(n==16)
	{
	if(count+2>79)
	{
	es_printf ("\n%*s",indent," ");
	count = indent;
	}
	else
	count += es_printf(" ");

	if (!(i%8))
	count += es_printf(" ");
	}
	else if (n==20)
	{
	if(!(i%2))
	{
	if(count+4>79)
	{
	es_printf ("\n%*s",indent," ");
	count=indent;
	}
	else
	count += es_printf(" ");
	}

	if (!(i%10))
	count += es_printf(" ");
	}
	else
	{
	if(!(i%4))
	{
	if (count+8>79)
	{
	es_printf ("\n%*s",indent," ");
	count=indent;
	}
	else
	count += es_printf(" ");
	}
	}

	count += es_printf("%02X",*p);
	}

	es_printf ("\n");
	}

	static void
	print_hashline( gcry_md_hd_t md, int algo, const char *fname )
	{
	int i, n;
	const byte *p;

	if ( fname )
	{
	for (p = fname; *p; p++ )
	{
	if ( p <= 32 \|\| p > 127 \|\| p == ':' \|\| p == '%' )
	es_printf ("%%%02X", *p );
	else
	es_putc (*p, es_stdout);
	}
	}
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	es_printf ("%d:", algo);
	p = gcry_md_read (md, algo);
	n = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
	for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ )
	es_printf ("%02X", *p);
	es_fputs (":\n", es_stdout);
	}


	static void
	print_mds( const char *fname, int algo )
	{
	estream_t fp;
	char buf[1024];
	size_t n;
	gcry_md_hd_t md;

	if (!fname)
	{
	fp = es_stdin;
	es_set_binary (fp);
	}
	else
	{
	fp = es_fopen (fname, "rb" );
	if (fp && is_secured_file (es_fileno (fp)))
	{
	es_fclose (fp);
	fp = NULL;
	gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
	}
	}
	if (!fp)
	{
	log_error("%s: %s\n", fname?fname:"[stdin]", strerror(errno) );
	return;
	}

	gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0);
	if (algo)
	gcry_md_enable (md, algo);
	else
	{
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_MD5))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_MD5);
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_RMD160))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_RMD160);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA224))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA224);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA256))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA256);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA384))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA384);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA512))
	gcry_md_enable (md, GCRY_MD_SHA512);
	}

	while ((n=es_fread (buf, 1, DIM(buf), fp)))
	gcry_md_write (md, buf, n);

	if (es_ferror(fp))
	log_error ("%s: %s\n", fname?fname:"[stdin]", strerror(errno));
	else
	{
	gcry_md_final (md);
	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	if ( algo )
	print_hashline (md, algo, fname);
	else
	{
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_MD5))
	print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_MD5, fname );
	print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_RMD160))
	print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_RMD160, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA224))
	print_hashline (md, GCRY_MD_SHA224, fname);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA256))
	print_hashline( md, GCRY_MD_SHA256, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA384))
	print_hashline ( md, GCRY_MD_SHA384, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA512))
	print_hashline ( md, GCRY_MD_SHA512, fname );
	}
	}
	else
	{
	if (algo)
	print_hex (md, -algo, fname);
	else
	{
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_MD5))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_MD5, fname);
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_RMD160))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_RMD160, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA224))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA224, fname);
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA256))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA256, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA384))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA384, fname );
	if (!gcry_md_test_algo (GCRY_MD_SHA512))
	print_hex (md, GCRY_MD_SHA512, fname );
	}
	}
	}
	gcry_md_close (md);

	if (fp != es_stdin)
	es_fclose (fp);
	}


	/****************
	* Check the supplied name,value string and add it to the notation
	* data to be used for signatures. which==0 for sig notations, and 1
	* for cert notations.
	*/
	static void
	add_notation_data( const char *string, int which )
	{
	struct notation *notation;

	notation=string_to_notation(string,utf8_strings);
	if(notation)
	{
	if(which)
	{
	notation->next=opt.cert_notations;
	opt.cert_notations=notation;
	}
	else
	{
	notation->next=opt.sig_notations;
	opt.sig_notations=notation;
	}
	}
	}

	static void
	add_policy_url( const char *string, int which )
	{
	unsigned int i,critical=0;
	strlist_t sl;

	if(*string=='!')
	{
	string++;
	critical=1;
	}

	for(i=0;i<strlen(string);i++)
	if( !isascii (string[i]) \|\| iscntrl(string[i]))
	break;

	if(i==0 \|\| i<strlen(string))
	{
	if(which)
	log_error(_("the given certification policy URL is invalid\n"));
	else
	log_error(_("the given signature policy URL is invalid\n"));
	}

	if(which)
	sl=add_to_strlist( &opt.cert_policy_url, string );
	else
	sl=add_to_strlist( &opt.sig_policy_url, string );

	if(critical)
	sl->flags \|= 1;
	}

	static void
	add_keyserver_url( const char *string, int which )
	{
	unsigned int i,critical=0;
	strlist_t sl;

	if(*string=='!')
	{
	string++;
	critical=1;
	}

	for(i=0;i<strlen(string);i++)
	if( !isascii (string[i]) \|\| iscntrl(string[i]))
	break;

	if(i==0 \|\| i<strlen(string))
	{
	if(which)
	BUG();
	else
	log_error(_("the given preferred keyserver URL is invalid\n"));
	}

	if(which)
	BUG();
	else
	sl=add_to_strlist( &opt.sig_keyserver_url, string );

	if(critical)
	sl->flags \|= 1;
	}


	static void
	read_sessionkey_from_fd (int fd)
	{
	int i, len;
	char *line;

	if (! gnupg_fd_valid (fd))
	log_fatal ("override-session-key-fd is invalid: %s\n", strerror (errno));

	for (line = NULL, i = len = 100; ; i++ )
	{
	if (i >= len-1 )
	{
	char *tmp = line;
	len += 100;
	line = xmalloc_secure (len);
	if (tmp)
	{
	memcpy (line, tmp, i);
	xfree (tmp);
	}
	else
	i=0;
	}
	if (read (fd, line + i, 1) != 1 \|\| line[i] == '\n')
	break;
	}
	line[i] = 0;
	log_debug ("seskey: %s\n", line);
	gpgrt_annotate_leaked_object (line);
	opt.override_session_key = line;
	}
	diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
	index 69de865e7..ea3721a4f 100644
	--- a/g10/mainproc.c
	+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
	@@ -1,2669 +1,2669 @@
	/* mainproc.c - handle packets
	* Copyright (C) 1998-2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 2013-2014 Werner Koch
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <time.h>

	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "../common/util.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "../common/iobuf.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "filter.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "../common/status.h"
	#include "../common/i18n.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "keyserver-internal.h"
	#include "photoid.h"
	#include "../common/mbox-util.h"
	#include "call-dirmngr.h"
	#include "../common/compliance.h"

	/* Put an upper limit on nested packets. The 32 is an arbitrary
	value, a much lower should actually be sufficient. */
	#define MAX_NESTING_DEPTH 32


	/* An object to build a list of keyid related info. */
	struct kidlist_item
	{
	struct kidlist_item *next;
	u32 kid[2];
	int pubkey_algo;
	int reason;
	};


	/*
	* Object to hold the processing context.
	*/
	typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX;
	struct mainproc_context
	{
	ctrl_t ctrl;
	struct mainproc_context anchor; / May be useful in the future. */
	PKT_public_key *last_pubkey;
	PKT_user_id *last_user_id;
	md_filter_context_t mfx;
	int sigs_only; /* Process only signatures and reject all other stuff. */
	int encrypt_only; /* Process only encryption messages. */

	/* Name of the file with the complete signature or the file with the
	detached signature. This is currently only used to deduce the
	file name of the data file if that has not been given. */
	const char *sigfilename;

	/* A structure to describe the signed data in case of a detached
	signature. */
	struct
	{
	/* A file descriptor of the signed data. Only used if not -1. */
	int data_fd;
	/* A list of filenames with the data files or NULL. This is only
	used if DATA_FD is -1. */
	strlist_t data_names;
	/* Flag to indicated that either one of the next previous fields
	is used. This is only needed for better readability. */
	int used;
	} signed_data;

	DEK *dek;
	int last_was_session_key;
	kbnode_t list; /* The current list of packets. */
	iobuf_t iobuf; /* Used to get the filename etc. */
	int trustletter; /* Temporary usage in list_node. */
	ulong symkeys; /* Number of symmetrically encrypted session keys. */
	struct kidlist_item pkenc_list; / List of encryption packets. */
	struct {
	unsigned int sig_seen:1; /* Set to true if a signature packet
	has been seen. */
	unsigned int data:1; /* Any data packet seen */
	unsigned int uncompress_failed:1;
	} any;
	};


	/* Local prototypes. */
	static int do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a);
	static void list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
	static void proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
	static int literals_seen;


	/* Functions. */


	void
	reset_literals_seen(void)
	{
	literals_seen = 0;
	}


	static void
	release_list( CTX c )
	{
	proc_tree (c, c->list);
	release_kbnode (c->list);
	while (c->pkenc_list)
	{
	struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
	xfree (c->pkenc_list);
	c->pkenc_list = tmp;
	}
	c->pkenc_list = NULL;
	c->list = NULL;
	c->any.data = 0;
	c->any.uncompress_failed = 0;
	c->last_was_session_key = 0;
	xfree (c->dek);
	c->dek = NULL;
	}


	static int
	add_onepass_sig (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	kbnode_t node;

	if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
	add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
	else /* Insert the first one. */
	c->list = node = new_kbnode (pkt);

	return 1;
	}


	static int
	add_gpg_control (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
	{
	/* New clear text signature.
	* Process the last one and reset everything */
	release_list(c);
	}

	if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
	add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
	else /* Insert the first one. */
	c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);

	return 1;
	}


	static int
	add_user_id (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	if (!c->list)
	{
	log_error ("orphaned user ID\n");
	return 0;
	}
	add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
	return 1;
	}


	static int
	add_subkey (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	if (!c->list)
	{
	log_error ("subkey w/o mainkey\n");
	return 0;
	}
	add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
	return 1;
	}


	static int
	add_ring_trust (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	if (!c->list)
	{
	log_error ("ring trust w/o key\n");
	return 0;
	}
	add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
	return 1;
	}


	static int
	add_signature (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	kbnode_t node;

	c->any.sig_seen = 1;
	if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list)
	{
	/* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
	* GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses
	* onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method
	* of prepending the signature to the data is
	* that it is not possible to make a signature from data read
	* from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */
	node = new_kbnode (pkt);
	c->list = node;
	return 1;
	}
	else if (!c->list)
	return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/
	else if (!c->list->pkt)
	BUG(); /* so nicht */

	/* Add a new signature node item at the end. */
	node = new_kbnode (pkt);
	add_kbnode (c->list, node);

	return 1;
	}

	static gpg_error_t
	symkey_decrypt_seskey (DEK dek, byte seskey, size_t slen)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
	unsigned int noncelen, keylen;
	enum gcry_cipher_modes ciphermode;

	if (dek->use_aead)
	{
	err = openpgp_aead_algo_info (dek->use_aead, &ciphermode, &noncelen);
	if (err)
	return err;
	}
	else
	{
	ciphermode = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB;
	noncelen = 0;
	}

	/* Check that the session key has a size of 16 to 32 bytes. */
	if ((dek->use_aead && (slen < (noncelen + 16 + 16)
	\|\| slen > (noncelen + 32 + 16)))
	\|\| (!dek->use_aead && (slen < 17 \|\| slen > 33)))
	{
	log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"),
	(int)slen);
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY);
	}

	err = openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, ciphermode, GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE);
	if (!err)
	err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
	if (!err)
	err = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, noncelen? seskey : NULL, noncelen);
	if (err)
	goto leave;

	if (dek->use_aead)
	{
	byte ad[4];

	ad[0] = (0xc0 \| PKT_SYMKEY_ENC);
	ad[1] = 5;
	ad[2] = dek->algo;
	ad[3] = dek->use_aead;
	err = gcry_cipher_authenticate (hd, ad, 4);
	if (err)
	goto leave;
	gcry_cipher_final (hd);
	keylen = slen - noncelen - 16;
	err = gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, seskey+noncelen, keylen, NULL, 0);
	if (err)
	goto leave;
	err = gcry_cipher_checktag (hd, seskey+noncelen+keylen, 16);
	if (err)
	goto leave;
	/* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
	* decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
	if (keylen > DIM(dek->key))
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
	goto leave;
	}
	dek->keylen = keylen;
	memcpy (dek->key, seskey + noncelen, dek->keylen);
	}
	else
	{
	gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, seskey, slen, NULL, 0 );
	/* Here we can only test whether the algo given in decrypted
	* session key is a valid OpenPGP algo. With 11 defined
	* symmetric algorithms we will miss 4.3% of wrong passphrases
	* here. The actual checking is done later during bulk
	* decryption; we can't bring this check forward easily. We
	* need to use the GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM so that we won't run into
	* the gnupg < 2.2 bug compatible case which would terminate the
	* process on GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO. Note that with AEAD (above)
	* we will have a reliable test here. */
	if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (seskey[0]))
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM);
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
	* decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
	keylen = slen-1;
	if (keylen > DIM(dek->key))
	{
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
	goto leave;
	}
	dek->algo = seskey[0];
	dek->keylen = keylen;
	memcpy (dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
	}

	/log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );/

	leave:
	gcry_cipher_close (hd);
	return err;
	}


	static void
	proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	PKT_symkey_enc *enc;

	enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
	if (!enc)
	log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n");
	else if(!c->dek)
	{
	int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
	const char *s = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
	const char *a = (enc->aead_algo ? openpgp_aead_algo_name (enc->aead_algo)
	/**/ : "CFB");

	if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo))
	{
	if (!opt.quiet)
	{
	if (enc->seskeylen)
	log_info (_("%s.%s encrypted session key\n"), s, a );
	else
	log_info (_("%s.%s encrypted data\n"), s, a );
	}
	}
	else
	log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d.%s\n"), algo, a);

	if (openpgp_md_test_algo (enc->s2k.hash_algo))
	{
	log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest"
	" algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo);
	s = NULL;
	}

	c->last_was_session_key = 2;
	if (!s \|\| opt.list_only)
	goto leave;

	if (opt.override_session_key)
	{
	c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
	if (get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key))
	{
	xfree (c->dek);
	c->dek = NULL;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, &enc->s2k, 0, 0, NULL, NULL);
	if (c->dek)
	{
	c->dek->symmetric = 1;
	c->dek->use_aead = enc->aead_algo;

	/* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric key
	comes before a public key in the message - if the
	user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is a
	chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen to
	be a valid one, which will make the returned dek
	appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that
	come later. */
	if (enc->seskeylen)
	{
	err = symkey_decrypt_seskey (c->dek,
	enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen);
	if (err)
	{
	log_info ("decryption of the symmetrically encrypted"
	" session key failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));
	if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
	&& gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM)
	log_fatal ("process terminated to be bug compatible"
	" with GnuPG <= 2.2\n");
	if (c->dek->s2k_cacheid[0])
	{
	if (opt.debug)
	log_debug ("cleared passphrase cached with ID:"
	" %s\n", c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
	passphrase_clear_cache (c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
	}
	xfree (c->dek);
	c->dek = NULL;
	}
	}
	else
	c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
	}
	}
	}

	leave:
	c->symkeys++;
	free_packet (pkt, NULL);
	}


	static void
	proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	PKT_pubkey_enc *enc;
	int result = 0;

	/* Check whether the secret key is available and store in this case. */
	c->last_was_session_key = 1;
	enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
	/printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );/
	/* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
	* function to check it. */
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("public key is %s\n"), keystr (enc->keyid));

	if (is_status_enabled())
	{
	char buf[50];
	/* FIXME: For ECC support we need to map the OpenPGP algo number
	to the Libgcrypt defined one. This is due a chicken-egg
	problem: We need to have code in Libgcrypt for a new
	algorithm so to implement a proposed new algorithm before the
	IANA will finally assign an OpenPGP identifier. */
	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
	(ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo);
	write_status_text (STATUS_ENC_TO, buf);
	}

	if (!opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key)
	{
	/* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
	* secure memory because it has already been passed on the
	* command line and the GCHQ knows about it. */
	c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
	result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
	if (result)
	{
	xfree (c->dek);
	c->dek = NULL;
	}
	}
	else if (enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E
	\|\| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
	\|\| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
	\|\| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E
	\|\| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL)
	{
	/* Note that we also allow type 20 Elgamal keys for decryption.
	There are still a couple of those keys in active use as a
	subkey. */

	/* FIXME: Store this all in a list and process it later so that
	we can prioritize what key to use. This gives a better user
	experience if wildcard keyids are used. */
	if (!c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
	\|\| opt.try_all_secrets
	\|\| have_secret_key_with_kid (enc->keyid)))
	{
	if(opt.list_only)
	result = GPG_ERR_MISSING_ACTION; /* fixme: Use better error code. */
	else
	{
	c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
	if ((result = get_session_key (ctrl, enc, c->dek)))
	{
	/* Error: Delete the DEK. */
	xfree (c->dek);
	c->dek = NULL;
	}
	}
	}
	else
	result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
	}
	else
	result = GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;

	if (1)
	{
	/* Store it for later display. */
	struct kidlist_item x = xmalloc (sizeof x);
	x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
	x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
	x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
	x->reason = result;
	x->next = c->pkenc_list;
	c->pkenc_list = x;

	if (!result && opt.verbose > 1)
	log_info (_("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n"));
	}

	free_packet(pkt, NULL);
	}


	/*
	* Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could
	* not decrypt.
	*/
	static void
	print_pkenc_list (ctrl_t ctrl, struct kidlist_item *list, int failed)
	{
	for (; list; list = list->next)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	const char *algstr;

	if (failed && !list->reason)
	continue;
	if (!failed && list->reason)
	continue;

	algstr = openpgp_pk_algo_name (list->pubkey_algo);
	pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);

	if (!algstr)
	algstr = "[?]";
	pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
	if (!get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, list->kid))
	{
	char *p;
	log_info (_("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
	nbits_from_pk (pk), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
	strtimestamp (pk->timestamp));
	p = get_user_id_native (ctrl, list->kid);
	log_printf (_(" \"%s\"\n"), p);
	xfree (p);
	}
	else
	log_info (_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"),
	algstr, keystr(list->kid));

	free_public_key (pk);

	if (gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
	{
	if (is_status_enabled())
	{
	char buf[20];
	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
	(ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1]);
	write_status_text (STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf);
	}
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_MISSING_ACTION)
	{
	/* Not tested for secret key due to --list-only mode. */
	}
	else if (list->reason)
	{
	log_info (_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (list->reason));
	write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", list->reason);
	}
	}
	}


	static void
	proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	int result = 0;

	if (!opt.quiet)
	{
	if (c->symkeys>1)
	log_info (_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"), c->symkeys);
	else if (c->symkeys == 1)
	log_info (_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n"));
	print_pkenc_list (c->ctrl, c->pkenc_list, 1 );
	print_pkenc_list (c->ctrl, c->pkenc_list, 0 );
	}

	/* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */

	write_status (STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION);

	/log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");/
	if (opt.list_only)
	result = -1;
	else if (!c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key)
	{
	int algo;
	STRING2KEY s2kbuf;
	STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
	int canceled;

	if (opt.override_session_key)
	{
	c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
	result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
	if (result)
	{
	xfree (c->dek);
	c->dek = NULL;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	/* Assume this is old style conventional encrypted data. */
	algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
	if (algo)
	log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
	openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
	else if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA))
	{
	algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
	if (!algo)
	algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
	log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
	"optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
	openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
	}
	else
	{
	algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
	if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo)
	{
	/* If no digest is given we assume SHA-1. */
	s2kbuf.mode = 0;
	s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
	s2k = &s2kbuf;
	}
	log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
	}

	c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, s2k, 0, 0, NULL, &canceled);
	if (c->dek)
	c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
	else if (canceled)
	result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CANCELED);
	else
	result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PASSPHRASE);
	}
	}
	else if (!c->dek)
	result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;

	/* Compute compliance with CO_DE_VS. */
	if (!result && is_status_enabled ()
	/* Symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption voids compliance. */
	&& (c->symkeys != !!c->pkenc_list )
	/* Overriding session key voids compliance. */
	&& !opt.override_session_key
	/* Check symmetric cipher. */
	&& gnupg_cipher_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, c->dek->algo,
	GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB))
	{
	struct kidlist_item *i;
	int compliant = 1;
	PKT_public_key pk = xmalloc (sizeof pk);

	if ( !(c->pkenc_list \|\| c->symkeys) )
	log_debug ("%s: where else did the session key come from?\n", __func__);

	/* Now check that every key used to encrypt the session key is
	* compliant. */
	for (i = c->pkenc_list; i && compliant; i = i->next)
	{
	memset (pk, 0, sizeof *pk);
	pk->pubkey_algo = i->pubkey_algo;
	if (get_pubkey (c->ctrl, pk, i->kid) != 0
	\|\| ! gnupg_pk_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, pk->pubkey_algo, pk->pkey,
	nbits_from_pk (pk), NULL))
	compliant = 0;
	release_public_key_parts (pk);
	}

	xfree (pk);

	if (compliant)
	write_status_strings (STATUS_DECRYPTION_COMPLIANCE_MODE,
	gnupg_status_compliance_flag (CO_DE_VS),
	NULL);

	}


	if (!result)
	result = decrypt_data (c->ctrl, c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );

	if (result == -1)
	;
	else if (!result
	&& !opt.ignore_mdc_error
	&& !pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method
	&& !pkt->pkt.encrypted->aead_algo
	&& openpgp_cipher_get_algo_blklen (c->dek->algo) != 8
	&& c->dek->algo != CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH)
	{
	/* The message has been decrypted but has no MDC despite that a
	modern cipher (blocklength != 64 bit, except for Twofish) is
	used and the option to ignore MDC errors is not used: To
	avoid attacks changing an MDC message to a non-MDC message,
	we fail here. */
	log_error (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
	if (opt.verbose > 1)
	log_info ("decryption forced to fail\n");
	write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
	}
	else if (!result \|\| (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
	&& !pkt->pkt.encrypted->aead_algo
	&& opt.ignore_mdc_error))
	{
	/* All is fine or for an MDC message the MDC failed but the
	* --ignore-mdc-error option is active. For compatibility
	* reasons we issue GOODMDC also for AEAD messages. */
	write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY);
	if (opt.verbose > 1)
	log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));

	if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->aead_algo)
	write_status (STATUS_GOODMDC);
	else if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result)
	write_status (STATUS_GOODMDC);
	- else if (!opt.no_mdc_warn)
	+ else
	log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
	\|\| gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_TRUNCATED)
	{
	glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
	log_error (_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
	write_status (STATUS_BADMDC);
	write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
	}
	else
	{
	if ((gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
	\|\| gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM
	\|\| gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO)
	&& *c->dek->s2k_cacheid != '\0')
	{
	if (opt.debug)
	log_debug ("cleared passphrase cached with ID: %s\n",
	c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
	passphrase_clear_cache (c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
	}
	glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
	write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
	log_error (_("decryption failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (result));
	/* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
	* ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK). */
	}

	xfree (c->dek);
	c->dek = NULL;
	free_packet (pkt, NULL);
	c->last_was_session_key = 0;
	write_status (STATUS_END_DECRYPTION);
	}


	static void
	proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
	{
	PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext;
	int any, clearsig, rc;
	kbnode_t n;

	literals_seen++;

	if (pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8))
	log_info (_("Note: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
	else if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name);

	free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
	if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0))
	BUG ();
	/* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1
	* and no armoring - Not yet tested
	* Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1
	* Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1??
	* See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09
	*/
	any = clearsig = 0;
	for (n=c->list; n; n = n->next )
	{
	if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
	{
	/* The onepass signature case. */
	if (n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo)
	{
	gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo);
	any = 1;
	}
	}
	else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
	&& n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
	{
	/* The clearsigned message case. */
	size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
	const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;

	/* Check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash. */
	if (datalen < 2)
	log_fatal ("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
	/* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
	* documents. */
	clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
	for (data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++)
	gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, *data);
	any = 1;
	break; /* Stop here as one-pass signature packets are not
	expected. */
	}
	else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	/* The SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use. */
	gcry_md_enable ( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo );
	any = 1;
	}
	}

	if (!any && !opt.skip_verify)
	{
	/* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case. It's not legal
	according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that often.
	There is no good way to specify what algorithms to use in
	that case, so these there are the historical answer. */
	gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160);
	gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1);
	}
	if (DBG_HASHING)
	{
	gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
	if (c->mfx.md2)
	gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
	}

	rc=0;

	if (literals_seen > 1)
	{
	log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n"));

	if (!opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages)
	{
	write_status_text (STATUS_ERROR, "proc_pkt.plaintext 89_BAD_DATA");
	log_inc_errorcount ();
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
	}
	}

	if (!rc)
	{
	/* It we are in --verify mode, we do not want to output the
	* signed text. However, if --output is also used we do what
	* has been requested and write out the signed data. */
	rc = handle_plaintext (pt, &c->mfx,
	(opt.outfp \|\| opt.outfile)? 0 : c->sigs_only,
	clearsig);
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EACCES && !c->sigs_only)
	{
	/* Can't write output but we hash it anyway to check the
	signature. */
	rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
	}
	}

	if (rc)
	log_error ("handle plaintext failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));

	free_packet (pkt, NULL);
	c->last_was_session_key = 0;

	/* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
	* This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences. */
	n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
	if (c->list)
	add_kbnode (c->list, n);
	else
	c->list = n;
	}


	static int
	proc_compressed_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info)
	{
	if ( ((CTX)info)->signed_data.used
	&& ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
	return proc_signature_packets_by_fd (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
	((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd);
	else
	return proc_signature_packets (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
	((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_names,
	((CTX)info)->sigfilename );
	}


	static int
	proc_encrypt_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info )
	{
	CTX c = info;
	return proc_encryption_packets (c->ctrl, info, a );
	}


	static int
	proc_compressed (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
	{
	PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed;
	int rc;

	/printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");/
	if (c->sigs_only)
	rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c);
	else if( c->encrypt_only )
	rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c);
	else
	rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, NULL, NULL);

	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA)
	{
	if (!c->any.uncompress_failed)
	{
	CTX cc;

	for (cc=c; cc; cc = cc->anchor)
	cc->any.uncompress_failed = 1;
	log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	}
	else if (rc)
	log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));

	free_packet (pkt, NULL);
	c->last_was_session_key = 0;
	return rc;
	}


	/*
	* Check the signature. If R_PK is not NULL a copy of the public key
	* used to verify the signature will be stored there, or NULL if not
	* found. Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code
	*/
	static int
	do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, int *is_selfsig,
	int is_expkey, int is_revkey, PKT_public_key **r_pk)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig;
	gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL;
	gcry_md_hd_t md2 = NULL;
	gcry_md_hd_t md_good = NULL;
	int algo, rc;

	if (r_pk)
	*r_pk = NULL;

	log_assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
	if (is_selfsig)
	*is_selfsig = 0;
	sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;

	algo = sig->digest_algo;
	rc = openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
	if (rc)
	return rc;

	if (sig->sig_class == 0x00)
	{
	if (c->mfx.md)
	{
	if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
	BUG ();
	}
	else /* detached signature */
	{
	/* check_signature() will enable the md. */
	if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
	BUG ();
	}
	}
	else if (sig->sig_class == 0x01)
	{
	/* How do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text
	in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */
	if (c->mfx.md)
	{
	if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
	BUG ();
	if (c->mfx.md2 && gcry_md_copy (&md2, c->mfx.md2))
	BUG ();
	}
	else /* detached signature */
	{
	log_debug ("Do we really need this here?");
	/* check_signature() will enable the md*/
	if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
	BUG ();
	if (gcry_md_open (&md2, 0, 0 ))
	BUG ();
	}
	}
	else if ((sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x18
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x1f
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x20
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x28
	\|\| sig->sig_class == 0x30)
	{
	if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	return check_key_signature (c->ctrl, c->list, node, is_selfsig);
	}
	else if (sig->sig_class == 0x20)
	{
	log_error (_("standalone revocation - "
	"use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n"));
	return GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
	}
	else
	{
	log_error ("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n", sig->sig_class);
	return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
	}
	}
	else
	return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;

	/* We only get here if we are checking the signature of a binary
	(0x00) or text document (0x01). */
	rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, r_pk);
	if (! rc)
	md_good = md;
	else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk2;

	rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey,
	r_pk? &pk2 : NULL);
	if (!rc)
	{
	md_good = md2;
	if (r_pk)
	{
	free_public_key (*r_pk);
	*r_pk = pk2;
	}
	}
	}

	if (md_good)
	{
	unsigned char *buffer = gcry_md_read (md_good, sig->digest_algo);
	sig->digest_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (map_md_openpgp_to_gcry (algo));
	memcpy (sig->digest, buffer, sig->digest_len);
	}

	gcry_md_close (md);
	gcry_md_close (md2);

	return rc;
	}


	static void
	print_userid (PACKET *pkt)
	{
	if (!pkt)
	BUG();

	if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	es_printf ("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype );
	return;
	}
	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	if (pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
	es_printf("%u %lu",
	pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
	pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
	else
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ":", NULL);
	}
	else
	print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
	}


	/*
	* List the keyblock in a user friendly way
	*/
	static void
	list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
	{
	if (!node)
	;
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	u32 keyid[2];

	keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
	if (pk->flags.primary)
	c->trustletter = (opt.fast_list_mode
	? 0
	: get_validity_info
	(c->ctrl,
	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	? node : NULL,
	pk, NULL));
	es_printf ("%s:", pk->flags.primary? "pub":"sub" );
	if (c->trustletter)
	es_putc (c->trustletter, es_stdout);
	es_printf (":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
	nbits_from_pk( pk ),
	pk->pubkey_algo,
	(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
	colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
	colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
	if (pk->flags.primary && !opt.fast_list_mode)
	es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (c->ctrl, pk, 1), es_stdout);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	else
	{
	print_key_line (c->ctrl, es_stdout, pk, 0);
	}

	if (opt.keyid_format == KF_NONE && !opt.with_colons)
	; /* Already printed. */
	else if ((pk->flags.primary && opt.fingerprint) \|\| opt.fingerprint > 1)
	print_fingerprint (c->ctrl, NULL, pk, 0);

	if (pk->flags.primary)
	{
	int kl = opt.keyid_format == KF_NONE? 0 : keystrlen ();

	/* Now list all userids with their signatures. */
	for (node = node->next; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	list_node (c, node );
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	if (opt.with_colons)
	es_printf ("%s:::::::::",
	node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
	else
	es_printf ("uid%*s",
	kl + (opt.legacy_list_mode? 9:11),
	"" );
	print_userid (node->pkt);
	if (opt.with_colons)
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	list_node(c, node );
	}
	}
	}
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
	{

	log_debug ("FIXME: No way to print secret key packets here\n");
	/* fixme: We may use a function to turn a secret key packet into
	a public key one and use that here. */
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	int is_selfsig = 0;
	int rc2 = 0;
	size_t n;
	char *p;
	int sigrc = ' ';

	if (!opt.verbose)
	return;

	if (sig->sig_class == 0x20 \|\| sig->sig_class == 0x30)
	es_fputs ("rev", es_stdout);
	else
	es_fputs ("sig", es_stdout);
	if (opt.check_sigs)
	{
	fflush (stdout);
	rc2 = do_check_sig (c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL, NULL);
	switch (gpg_err_code (rc2))
	{
	case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
	case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: sigrc = '-'; break;
	case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
	case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
	default: sigrc = '%'; break;
	}
	}
	else /* Check whether this is a self signature. */
	{
	u32 keyid[2];

	if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
	{
	keyid_from_pk (c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);

	if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
	is_selfsig = 1;
	}
	}

	if (opt.with_colons)
	{
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	if (sigrc != ' ')
	es_putc (sigrc, es_stdout);
	es_printf ("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
	(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
	colon_datestr_from_sig (sig),
	colon_expirestr_from_sig (sig));

	if (sig->trust_depth \|\| sig->trust_value)
	es_printf ("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);

	if (sig->trust_regexp)
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sig->trust_regexp,
	strlen (sig->trust_regexp), ":", NULL);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	}
	else
	es_printf ("%c %s %s ",
	sigrc, keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig));
	if (sigrc == '%')
	es_printf ("[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc2) );
	else if (sigrc == '?')
	;
	else if (is_selfsig)
	{
	if (opt.with_colons)
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	es_fputs (sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", es_stdout);
	if (opt.with_colons)
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	}
	else if (!opt.fast_list_mode)
	{
	p = get_user_id (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, &n, NULL);
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, p, n,
	opt.with_colons?":":NULL, NULL );
	xfree (p);
	}
	if (opt.with_colons)
	es_printf (":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	else
	log_error ("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype);
	}


	int
	proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
	{
	int rc;
	CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);

	c->ctrl = ctrl;
	c->anchor = anchor;
	rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
	xfree (c);

	return rc;
	}


	int
	proc_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a,
	strlist_t signedfiles, const char *sigfilename )
	{
	CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
	int rc;

	c->ctrl = ctrl;
	c->anchor = anchor;
	c->sigs_only = 1;

	c->signed_data.data_fd = -1;
	c->signed_data.data_names = signedfiles;
	c->signed_data.used = !!signedfiles;

	c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
	rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);

	/* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
	messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
	Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
	error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
	with an error. */
	if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
	{
	write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
	log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_DATA;
	}

	/* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
	so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
	if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
	c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;

	xfree (c);
	return rc;
	}


	int
	proc_signature_packets_by_fd (ctrl_t ctrl,
	void *anchor, iobuf_t a, int signed_data_fd )
	{
	int rc;
	CTX c;

	c = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *c);
	if (!c)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();

	c->ctrl = ctrl;
	c->anchor = anchor;
	c->sigs_only = 1;

	c->signed_data.data_fd = signed_data_fd;
	c->signed_data.data_names = NULL;
	c->signed_data.used = (signed_data_fd != -1);

	rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);

	/* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
	messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
	Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
	error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
	with an error. */
	if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
	{
	write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
	log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
	}

	/* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
	so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
	if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
	c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;

	xfree ( c );
	return rc;
	}


	int
	proc_encryption_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
	{
	CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
	int rc;

	c->ctrl = ctrl;
	c->anchor = anchor;
	c->encrypt_only = 1;
	rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
	xfree (c);
	return rc;
	}


	static int
	check_nesting (CTX c)
	{
	int level;

	for (level=0; c; c = c->anchor)
	level++;

	if (level > MAX_NESTING_DEPTH)
	{
	log_error ("input data with too deeply nested packets\n");
	write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "1");
	return GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA;
	}

	return 0;
	}


	static int
	do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a)
	{
	PACKET *pkt;
	struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx;
	int rc = 0;
	int any_data = 0;
	int newpkt;

	rc = check_nesting (c);
	if (rc)
	return rc;

	pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
	c->iobuf = a;
	init_packet(pkt);
	init_parse_packet (&parsectx, a);
	while ((rc=parse_packet (&parsectx, pkt)) != -1)
	{
	any_data = 1;
	if (rc)
	{
	free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
	/* Stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered
	* but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets. */
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
	&& opt.list_packets == 0)
	break;
	continue;
	}
	newpkt = -1;
	if (opt.list_packets)
	{
	switch (pkt->pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD:proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
	default: newpkt = 0; break;
	}
	}
	else if (c->sigs_only)
	{
	switch (pkt->pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
	case PKT_USER_ID:
	case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
	case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD:
	write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
	rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
	goto leave;

	case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
	default: newpkt = 0; break;
	}
	}
	else if (c->encrypt_only)
	{
	switch (pkt->pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
	case PKT_USER_ID:
	write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0");
	rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
	goto leave;

	case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
	default: newpkt = 0; break;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	switch (pkt->pkttype)
	{
	case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
	release_list (c);
	c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
	newpkt = 1;
	break;
	case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
	case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
	newpkt = add_subkey (c, pkt);
	break;
	case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
	case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
	case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust (c, pkt); break;
	default: newpkt = 0; break;
	}
	}

	if (rc)
	goto leave;

	/* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
	* I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
	* The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
	* packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right
	* when there is a compression packet between which adds just
	* an extra layer.
	* Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
	*/
	if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC)
	c->any.data = (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT);

	if (newpkt == -1)
	;
	else if (newpkt)
	{
	pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
	init_packet (pkt);
	}
	else
	free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
	}

	if (rc == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET)
	write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "3");

	if (any_data)
	rc = 0;
	else if (rc == -1)
	write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "2");


	leave:
	release_list (c);
	xfree(c->dek);
	free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
	deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx);
	xfree (pkt);
	free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
	return rc;
	}


	/* Helper for pka_uri_from_sig to parse the to-be-verified address out
	of the notation data. */
	static pka_info_t *
	get_pka_address (PKT_signature *sig)
	{
	pka_info_t *pka = NULL;
	struct notation nd,notation;

	notation=sig_to_notation(sig);

	for(nd=notation;nd;nd=nd->next)
	{
	if(strcmp(nd->name,"pka-address@gnupg.org")!=0)
	continue; /* Not the notation we want. */

	/* For now we only use the first valid PKA notation. In future
	we might want to keep additional PKA notations in a linked
	list. */
	if (is_valid_mailbox (nd->value))
	{
	pka = xmalloc (sizeof *pka + strlen(nd->value));
	pka->valid = 0;
	pka->checked = 0;
	pka->uri = NULL;
	strcpy (pka->email, nd->value);
	break;
	}
	}

	free_notation(notation);

	return pka;
	}


	/* Return the URI from a DNS PKA record. If this record has already
	be retrieved for the signature we merely return it; if not we go
	out and try to get that DNS record. */
	static const char *
	pka_uri_from_sig (CTX c, PKT_signature *sig)
	{
	if (!sig->flags.pka_tried)
	{
	log_assert (!sig->pka_info);
	sig->flags.pka_tried = 1;
	sig->pka_info = get_pka_address (sig);
	if (sig->pka_info)
	{
	char *url;
	unsigned char *fpr;
	size_t fprlen;

	if (!gpg_dirmngr_get_pka (c->ctrl, sig->pka_info->email,
	&fpr, &fprlen, &url))
	{
	if (fpr && fprlen == sizeof sig->pka_info->fpr)
	{
	memcpy (sig->pka_info->fpr, fpr, fprlen);
	if (url)
	{
	sig->pka_info->valid = 1;
	if (!*url)
	xfree (url);
	else
	sig->pka_info->uri = url;
	url = NULL;
	}
	}
	xfree (fpr);
	xfree (url);
	}
	}
	}
	return sig->pka_info? sig->pka_info->uri : NULL;
	}


	/* Return true if the AKL has the WKD method specified. */
	static int
	akl_has_wkd_method (void)
	{
	struct akl *akl;

	for (akl = opt.auto_key_locate; akl; akl = akl->next)
	if (akl->type == AKL_WKD)
	return 1;
	return 0;
	}


	/* Return the ISSUER fingerprint buffer and its lenbgth at R_LEN.
	* Returns NULL if not available. The returned buffer is valid as
	* long as SIG is not modified. */
	static const byte *
	issuer_fpr_raw (PKT_signature sig, size_t r_len)
	{
	const byte *p;
	size_t n;

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR, &n);
	if (p && n == 21 && p[0] == 4)
	{
	*r_len = n - 1;
	return p+1;
	}
	*r_len = 0;
	return NULL;
	}


	/* Return the ISSUER fingerprint string in human readbale format if
	* available. Caller must release the string. */
	/* FIXME: Move to another file. */
	char *
	issuer_fpr_string (PKT_signature *sig)
	{
	const byte *p;
	size_t n;

	p = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &n);
	return p? bin2hex (p, n, NULL) : NULL;
	}


	static void
	print_good_bad_signature (int statno, const char *keyid_str, kbnode_t un,
	PKT_signature *sig, int rc)
	{
	char *p;

	write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
	un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
	un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3,
	-1);

	if (un)
	p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
	else
	p = xstrdup ("[?]");

	if (rc)
	log_info (_("BAD signature from \"%s\""), p);
	else if (sig->flags.expired)
	log_info (_("Expired signature from \"%s\""), p);
	else
	log_info (_("Good signature from \"%s\""), p);

	xfree (p);
	}


	static int
	check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	const char *astr;
	int rc;
	int is_expkey = 0;
	int is_revkey = 0;
	char *issuer_fpr = NULL;
	PKT_public_key pk = NULL; / The public key for the signature or NULL. */
	int tried_ks_by_fpr;

	if (opt.skip_verify)
	{
	log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n"));
	return 0;
	}

	/* Check that the message composition is valid.
	*
	* Per RFC-2440bis (-15) allowed:
	*
	* S{1,n} -- detached signature.
	* S{1,n} P -- old style PGP2 signature
	* O{1,n} P S{1,n} -- standard OpenPGP signature.
	* C P S{1,n} -- cleartext signature.
	*
	*
	* O = One-Pass Signature packet.
	* S = Signature packet.
	* P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted \| Compressed \| Literal)
	* (Note that the current rfc2440bis draft also allows
	* for a signed message but that does not work as it
	* introduces ambiguities.)
	* We keep track of these packages using the marker packet
	* CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK.
	* C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures.
	*
	* We reject all other messages.
	*
	* Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of
	* each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently
	* introduce a bug here.
	*/
	{
	kbnode_t n;
	int n_onepass, n_sig;

	/* log_debug ("checking signature packet composition\n"); */
	/* dump_kbnode (c->list); */

	n = c->list;
	log_assert (n);
	if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
	{
	/* This is either "S{1,n}" case (detached signature) or
	"S{1,n} P" (old style PGP2 signature). */
	for (n = n->next; n; n = n->next)
	if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
	break;
	if (!n)
	; /* Okay, this is a detached signature. */
	else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
	&& (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
	== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK) )
	{
	if (n->next)
	goto ambiguous; /* We only allow one P packet. */
	}
	else
	goto ambiguous;
	}
	else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
	{
	/* This is the "O{1,n} P S{1,n}" case (standard signature). */
	for (n_onepass=1, n = n->next;
	n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG; n = n->next)
	n_onepass++;
	if (!n \|\| !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
	&& (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
	== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
	goto ambiguous;
	for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
	n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
	n_sig++;
	if (!n_sig)
	goto ambiguous;

	/* If we wanted to disallow multiple sig verification, we'd do
	something like this:

	if (n && !opt.allow_multisig_verification)
	goto ambiguous;

	However, now that we have --allow-multiple-messages, this
	can stay allowable as we can't get here unless multiple
	messages (i.e. multiple literals) are allowed. */

	if (n_onepass != n_sig)
	{
	log_info ("number of one-pass packets does not match "
	"number of signature packets\n");
	goto ambiguous;
	}
	}
	else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
	&& n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
	{
	/* This is the "C P S{1,n}" case (clear text signature). */
	n = n->next;
	if (!n \|\| !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
	&& (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
	== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
	goto ambiguous;
	for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
	n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
	n_sig++;
	if (n \|\| !n_sig)
	goto ambiguous;
	}
	else
	{
	ambiguous:
	log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n"));
	return 0;
	}
	}

	if (sig->signers_uid)
	write_status_buffer (STATUS_NEWSIG,
	sig->signers_uid, strlen (sig->signers_uid), 0);
	else
	write_status_text (STATUS_NEWSIG, NULL);

	astr = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( sig->pubkey_algo );
	issuer_fpr = issuer_fpr_string (sig);

	if (issuer_fpr)
	{
	log_info (_("Signature made %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
	log_info (_(" using %s key %s\n"),
	astr? astr: "?", issuer_fpr);

	}
	else if (!keystrlen () \|\| keystrlen () > 8)
	{
	log_info (_("Signature made %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
	log_info (_(" using %s key %s\n"),
	astr? astr: "?", keystr(sig->keyid));
	}
	else /* Legacy format. */
	log_info (_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"),
	asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?",
	keystr(sig->keyid));

	/* In verbose mode print the signers UID. */
	if (sig->signers_uid)
	log_info (_(" issuer \"%s\"\n"), sig->signers_uid);

	rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);

	/* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver. */
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks)
	{
	const byte *p;
	int seq = 0;
	size_t n;

	while ((p=enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
	{
	/* According to my favorite copy editor, in English grammar,
	you say "at" if the key is located on a web page, but
	"from" if it is located on a keyserver. I'm not going to
	even try to make two strings here :) */
	log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
	print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream(), p, n);
	log_printf ("\n");

	if (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
	&& opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL)
	{
	struct keyserver_spec *spec;

	spec = parse_preferred_keyserver (sig);
	if (spec)
	{
	int res;

	free_public_key (pk);
	pk = NULL;
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid,spec, 1);
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	if (!res)
	rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL,
	&is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
	free_keyserver_spec (spec);

	if (!rc)
	break;
	}
	}
	}
	}

	/* If the avove methods didn't work, our next try is to use the URI
	* from a DNS PKA record. */
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
	&& (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
	&& (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD))
	{
	const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig);

	if (uri)
	{
	/* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the
	fingerprint instead of the keyid. */
	int res;
	struct keyserver_spec *spec;

	spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1);
	if (spec)
	{
	free_public_key (pk);
	pk = NULL;
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, spec, 1);
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	free_keyserver_spec (spec);
	if (!res)
	rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
	}
	}
	}

	/* If the above methods didn't work, our next try is to locate
	* the key via its fingerprint from a keyserver. This requires
	* that the signers fingerprint is encoded in the signature. We
	* favor this over the WKD method (to be tried next), because an
	* arbitrary keyserver is less subject to web bug like monitoring. */
	tried_ks_by_fpr = 0;
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
	&& (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
	&& keyserver_any_configured (c->ctrl))
	{
	int res;
	const byte *p;
	size_t n;

	p = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &n);
	if (p)
	{
	/* v4 packet with a SHA-1 fingerprint. */
	free_public_key (pk);
	pk = NULL;
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	res = keyserver_import_fprint (c->ctrl, p, n, opt.keyserver, 1);
	tried_ks_by_fpr = 1;
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	if (!res)
	rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
	}
	}

	/* If the above methods didn't work, our next try is to retrieve the
	* key from the WKD. */
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
	&& (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
	&& !opt.flags.disable_signer_uid
	&& akl_has_wkd_method ()
	&& sig->signers_uid)
	{
	int res;

	free_public_key (pk);
	pk = NULL;
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	res = keyserver_import_wkd (c->ctrl, sig->signers_uid, 1, NULL, NULL);
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	/* Fixme: If the fingerprint is embedded in the signature,
	* compare it to the fingerprint of the returned key. */
	if (!res)
	rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
	}

	/* If the above methods did't work, our next try is to use a
	* keyserver. */
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
	&& (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
	&& !tried_ks_by_fpr
	&& keyserver_any_configured (c->ctrl))
	{
	int res;

	free_public_key (pk);
	pk = NULL;
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, opt.keyserver, 1);
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	if (!res)
	rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
	}

	if (!rc \|\| gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
	{
	kbnode_t un, keyblock;
	int count = 0;
	int statno;
	char keyid_str[50];
	PKT_public_key *mainpk = NULL;

	if (rc)
	statno = STATUS_BADSIG;
	else if (sig->flags.expired)
	statno = STATUS_EXPSIG;
	else if (is_expkey)
	statno = STATUS_EXPKEYSIG;
	else if(is_revkey)
	statno = STATUS_REVKEYSIG;
	else
	statno = STATUS_GOODSIG;

	/* FIXME: We should have the public key in PK and thus the
	* keyblock has already been fetched. Thus we could use the
	* fingerprint or PK itself to lookup the entire keyblock. That
	* would best be done with a cache. */
	keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (c->ctrl, sig->keyid);

	snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
	(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);

	/* Find and print the primary user ID along with the
	"Good\|Expired\|Bad signature" line. */
	for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
	{
	int valid;

	if (un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	mainpk = un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	continue;
	}
	if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
	continue;
	if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created)
	continue;
	if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked)
	continue;
	if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired)
	continue;
	if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary)
	continue;
	/* We want the textual primary user ID here */
	if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
	continue;

	log_assert (mainpk);

	/* Since this is just informational, don't actually ask the
	user to update any trust information. (Note: we register
	the signature later.) Because print_good_bad_signature
	does not print a LF we need to compute the validity
	before calling that function. */
	if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
	valid = get_validity (c->ctrl, keyblock, mainpk,
	un->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, 0);
	else
	valid = 0; /* Not used. */

	keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */

	print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);

	if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
	log_printf (" [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
	else
	log_printf ("\n");

	count++;
	}

	log_assert (mainpk);

	/* In case we did not found a valid textual userid above
	we print the first user id packet or a "[?]" instead along
	with the "Good\|Expired\|Bad signature" line. */
	if (!count)
	{
	/* Try for an invalid textual userid */
	for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
	{
	if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
	break;
	}

	/* Try for any userid at all */
	if (!un)
	{
	for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
	{
	if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	break;
	}
	}

	if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS \|\| !un)
	keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */

	print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);

	if (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS && un)
	log_printf (" %s",_("[uncertain]") );
	log_printf ("\n");
	}

	/* If we have a good signature and already printed
	* the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
	if (count
	&& !rc
	&& !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY))
	{
	char *p;
	for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
	{
	if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
	continue;
	if ((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked
	\|\| un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired)
	&& !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
	continue;
	/* Skip textual primary user ids which we printed above. */
	if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary
	&& !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
	continue;

	/* If this user id has attribute data, print that. */
	if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
	{
	dump_attribs (un->pkt->pkt.user_id, mainpk);

	if (opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
	show_photos (c->ctrl,
	un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
	un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
	mainpk ,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
	}

	p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
	log_info (_(" aka \"%s\""), p);
	xfree (p);

	if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
	{
	const char *valid;

	if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked)
	valid = _("revoked");
	else if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired)
	valid = _("expired");
	else
	/* Since this is just informational, don't
	actually ask the user to update any trust
	information. */
	valid = (trust_value_to_string
	(get_validity (c->ctrl, keyblock, mainpk,
	un->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, 0)));
	log_printf (" [%s]\n",valid);
	}
	else
	log_printf ("\n");
	}
	}

	/* For good signatures print notation data. */
	if (!rc)
	{
	if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS))
	show_policy_url (sig, 0, 1);
	else
	show_policy_url (sig, 0, 2);

	if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS))
	show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 1);
	else
	show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 2);

	if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS))
	show_notation
	(sig, 0, 1,
	(((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)
	+ ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0)));
	else
	show_notation (sig, 0, 2, 0);
	}

	/* For good signatures print the VALIDSIG status line. */
	if (!rc && is_status_enabled () && pk)
	{
	char pkhex[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];
	char mainpkhex[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];

	hexfingerprint (pk, pkhex, sizeof pkhex);
	hexfingerprint (mainpk, mainpkhex, sizeof mainpkhex);

	/* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below with
	bits for status flags (policy url, notation, etc.). */
	write_status_printf (STATUS_VALIDSIG,
	"%s %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X %s",
	pkhex,
	strtimestamp (sig->timestamp),
	(ulong)sig->timestamp,
	(ulong)sig->expiredate,
	sig->version, sig->pubkey_algo,
	sig->digest_algo,
	sig->sig_class,
	mainpkhex);
	}

	/* Print compliance warning for Good signatures. */
	if (!rc && pk && !opt.quiet
	&& !gnupg_pk_is_compliant (opt.compliance, pk->pubkey_algo,
	pk->pkey, nbits_from_pk (pk), NULL))
	{
	log_info (_("WARNING: This key is not suitable for signing"
	" in %s mode\n"),
	gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
	}

	/* For good signatures compute and print the trust information.
	Note that in the Tofu trust model this may ask the user on
	how to resolve a conflict. */
	if (!rc)
	{
	if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS))
	pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */
	rc = check_signatures_trust (c->ctrl, sig);
	}

	/* Print extra information about the signature. */
	if (sig->flags.expired)
	{
	log_info (_("Signature expired %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
	rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Need a better error here? */
	}
	else if (sig->expiredate)
	log_info (_("Signature expires %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));

	if (opt.verbose)
	{
	char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

	if (pk)
	pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf);
	else
	*pkstrbuf = 0;

	log_info (_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s%s%s\n"),
	sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"):
	sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"),
	gcry_md_algo_name (sig->digest_algo),
	*pkstrbuf?_(", key algorithm "):"", pkstrbuf);
	}

	/* Print final warnings. */
	if (!rc && !c->signed_data.used)
	{
	/* Signature is basically good but we test whether the
	deprecated command
	gpg --verify FILE.sig
	was used instead of
	gpg --verify FILE.sig FILE
	to verify a detached signature. If we figure out that a
	data file with a matching name exists, we print a warning.

	The problem is that the first form would also verify a
	standard signature. This behavior could be used to
	create a made up .sig file for a tarball by creating a
	standard signature from a valid detached signature packet
	(for example from a signed git tag). Then replace the
	sig file on the FTP server along with a changed tarball.
	Using the first form the verify command would correctly
	verify the signature but don't even consider the tarball. */
	kbnode_t n;
	char *dfile;

	dfile = get_matching_datafile (c->sigfilename);
	if (dfile)
	{
	for (n = c->list; n; n = n->next)
	if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
	break;
	if (n)
	{
	/* Not only signature packets in the tree thus this
	is not a detached signature. */
	log_info (_("WARNING: not a detached signature; "
	"file '%s' was NOT verified!\n"), dfile);
	}
	xfree (dfile);
	}
	}

	/* Compute compliance with CO_DE_VS. */
	if (pk && is_status_enabled ()
	&& gnupg_pk_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, pk->pubkey_algo, pk->pkey,
	nbits_from_pk (pk), NULL)
	&& gnupg_digest_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, sig->digest_algo))
	write_status_strings (STATUS_VERIFICATION_COMPLIANCE_MODE,
	gnupg_status_compliance_flag (CO_DE_VS),
	NULL);

	free_public_key (pk);
	pk = NULL;
	release_kbnode( keyblock );
	if (rc)
	g10_errors_seen = 1;
	if (opt.batch && rc)
	g10_exit (1);
	}
	else
	{
	write_status_printf (STATUS_ERRSIG, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d %s",
	(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
	sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo,
	sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp,
	gpg_err_code (rc),
	issuer_fpr? issuer_fpr:"-");
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
	{
	write_status_printf (STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, "%08lX%08lX",
	(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
	}
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED)
	log_error (_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
	}

	free_public_key (pk);
	xfree (issuer_fpr);
	return rc;
	}


	/*
	* Process the tree which starts at node
	*/
	static void
	proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
	{
	kbnode_t n1;
	int rc;

	if (opt.list_packets \|\| opt.list_only)
	return;

	/* We must skip our special plaintext marker packets here because
	they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in
	additional checks and skipping them here doesn't matter. */
	while (node
	&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
	&& node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)
	{
	node = node->next;
	}
	if (!node)
	return;

	c->trustletter = ' ';
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (c->ctrl, node);
	list_node (c, node);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	{
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (c->ctrl, node);
	list_node (c, node);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
	{
	/* Check all signatures. */
	if (!c->any.data)
	{
	int use_textmode = 0;

	free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
	/* Prepare to create all requested message digests. */
	rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0);
	if (rc)
	goto hash_err;

	/* Fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not the
	one-pass packet? */
	for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
	gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);

	if (n1 && n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01)
	use_textmode = 1;

	/* Ask for file and hash it. */
	if (c->sigs_only)
	{
	if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
	rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, NULL,
	c->signed_data.data_fd,
	use_textmode);
	else
	rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, NULL,
	c->signed_data.data_names,
	c->sigfilename,
	use_textmode);
	}
	else
	{
	rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
	iobuf_get_real_fname (c->iobuf),
	use_textmode);
	}

	hash_err:
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	return;
	}
	}
	else if (c->signed_data.used)
	{
	log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
	return;
	}

	for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
	check_sig_and_print (c, n1);

	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
	&& node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
	{
	/* Clear text signed message. */
	if (!c->any.data)
	{
	log_error ("cleartext signature without data\n");
	return;
	}
	else if (c->signed_data.used)
	{
	log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
	return;
	}

	for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
	check_sig_and_print (c, n1);

	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
	int multiple_ok = 1;

	n1 = find_next_kbnode (node, PKT_SIGNATURE);
	if (n1)
	{
	byte class = sig->sig_class;
	byte hash = sig->digest_algo;

	for (; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
	{
	/* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
	* different classes (we'd pretty much have to run a
	* different hash context for each), but if they are all
	* the same and it is detached signature, we make an
	* exception. Note that the old code also disallowed
	* multiple signatures if the digest algorithms are
	* different. We softened this restriction only for
	* detached signatures, to be on the safe side. */
	if (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class != class
	\|\| (c->any.data
	&& n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo != hash))
	{
	multiple_ok = 0;
	log_info (_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. "
	"Only the first will be checked.\n"));
	break;
	}
	}
	}

	if (sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01)
	{
	log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"), sig->sig_class);
	}
	else if (!c->any.data)
	{
	/* Detached signature */
	free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
	rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, sig->digest_algo, 0);
	if (rc)
	goto detached_hash_err;

	if (multiple_ok)
	{
	/* If we have and want to handle multiple signatures we
	* need to enable all hash algorithms for the context. */
	for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)); )
	if (!openpgp_md_test_algo (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo))
	gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md,
	map_md_openpgp_to_gcry
	(n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo));
	}

	if (RFC2440 \|\| RFC4880)
	; /* Strict RFC mode. */
	else if (sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
	&& sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
	&& sig->sig_class == 0x01)
	{
	/* Enable a workaround for a pgp5 bug when the detached
	* signature has been created in textmode. Note that we
	* do not implement this for multiple signatures with
	* different hash algorithms. */
	rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md2, sig->digest_algo, 0);
	if (rc)
	goto detached_hash_err;
	}

	/* Here we used to have another hack to work around a pgp
	* 2 bug: It worked by not using the textmode for detached
	* signatures; this would let the first signature check
	* (on md) fail but the second one (on md2), which adds an
	* extra CR would then have produced the "correct" hash.
	* This is very, very ugly hack but it may haved help in
	* some cases (and break others).
	* c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01)
	*/

	if (DBG_HASHING)
	{
	gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
	if (c->mfx.md2)
	gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
	}

	if (c->sigs_only)
	{
	if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
	rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
	c->signed_data.data_fd,
	(sig->sig_class == 0x01));
	else
	rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
	c->signed_data.data_names,
	c->sigfilename,
	(sig->sig_class == 0x01));
	}
	else
	{
	rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
	iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
	(sig->sig_class == 0x01));
	}

	detached_hash_err:
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	return;
	}
	}
	else if (c->signed_data.used)
	{
	log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
	return;
	}
	else if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"));

	if (multiple_ok)
	{
	for (n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
	check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
	}
	else
	check_sig_and_print (c, node);

	}
	else
	{
	dump_kbnode (c->list);
	log_error ("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n");
	dump_kbnode (node);
	}
	}
	diff --git a/g10/options.h b/g10/options.h
	index dab6e9f8b..09d4e4435 100644
	--- a/g10/options.h
	+++ b/g10/options.h
	@@ -1,411 +1,410 @@
	/* options.h
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
	* 2007, 2010, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 2015 g10 Code GmbH
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/
	#ifndef G10_OPTIONS_H
	#define G10_OPTIONS_H

	#include <sys/types.h>
	#include "../common/types.h"
	#include <stdint.h>
	#include "main.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "tofu.h"
	#include "../common/session-env.h"
	#include "../common/compliance.h"

	#ifndef EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	/* Norcraft can't cope with common symbols */
	#if defined (__riscos__) && !defined (INCLUDED_BY_MAIN_MODULE)
	#define EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE extern
	#else
	#define EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	#endif
	#endif

	/* Declaration of a keyserver spec type. The definition is found in
	../common/keyserver.h. */
	struct keyserver_spec;
	typedef struct keyserver_spec *keyserver_spec_t;


	/* Global options for GPG. */
	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	struct
	{
	int verbose;
	int quiet;
	unsigned debug;
	int armor;
	char *outfile;
	estream_t outfp; /* Hack, sometimes used in place of outfile. */
	off_t max_output;

	/* If > 0 a hint with the expected number of input data bytes. This
	* is not necessary an exact number but intended to be used for
	* progress info and to decide on how to allocate buffers. */
	uint64_t input_size_hint;

	/* The AEAD chunk size expressed as a power of 2. */
	int chunk_size;

	int dry_run;
	int autostart;
	int list_only;
	int mimemode;
	int textmode;
	int expert;
	const char *def_sig_expire;
	int ask_sig_expire;
	const char *def_cert_expire;
	int ask_cert_expire;
	int batch; /* run in batch mode */
	int answer_yes; /* answer yes on most questions */
	int answer_no; /* answer no on most questions */
	int check_sigs; /* check key signatures */
	int with_colons;
	int with_key_data;
	int with_icao_spelling; /* Print ICAO spelling with fingerprints. */
	int with_fingerprint; /* Option --with-fingerprint active. */
	int with_subkey_fingerprint; /* Option --with-subkey-fingerprint active. */
	int with_keygrip; /* Option --with-keygrip active. */
	int with_key_screening;/* Option --with-key-screening active. */
	int with_tofu_info; /* Option --with-tofu_info active. */
	int with_secret; /* Option --with-secret active. */
	int with_wkd_hash; /* Option --with-wkd-hash. */
	int with_key_origin; /* Option --with-key-origin. */
	int fingerprint; /* list fingerprints */
	int list_sigs; /* list signatures */
	int no_armor;
	int list_packets; /* Option --list-packets active. */
	int def_cipher_algo;
	int def_aead_algo;
	int force_mdc;
	int disable_mdc;
	int force_aead;
	int def_digest_algo;
	int cert_digest_algo;
	int compress_algo;
	int compress_level;
	int bz2_compress_level;
	int bz2_decompress_lowmem;
	strlist_t def_secret_key;
	char *def_recipient;
	int def_recipient_self;
	strlist_t secret_keys_to_try;

	/* A list of mail addresses (addr-spec) provided by the user with
	* the option --sender. */
	strlist_t sender_list;

	int def_cert_level;
	int min_cert_level;
	int ask_cert_level;
	int emit_version; /* 0 = none,
	1 = major only,
	2 = major and minor,
	3 = full version,
	4 = full version plus OS string. */
	int marginals_needed;
	int completes_needed;
	int max_cert_depth;
	const char *agent_program;
	const char *dirmngr_program;
	int disable_dirmngr;

	const char *def_new_key_algo;

	/* Options to be passed to the gpg-agent */
	session_env_t session_env;
	char *lc_ctype;
	char *lc_messages;

	int skip_verify;
	int skip_hidden_recipients;

	/* TM_CLASSIC must be zero to accommodate trustdbsg generated before
	we started storing the trust model inside the trustdb. */
	enum
	{
	TM_CLASSIC=0, TM_PGP=1, TM_EXTERNAL=2,
	TM_ALWAYS, TM_DIRECT, TM_AUTO, TM_TOFU, TM_TOFU_PGP
	} trust_model;
	enum tofu_policy tofu_default_policy;
	int force_ownertrust;
	enum gnupg_compliance_mode compliance;
	enum
	{
	KF_DEFAULT, KF_NONE, KF_SHORT, KF_LONG, KF_0xSHORT, KF_0xLONG
	} keyid_format;
	const char *set_filename;
	strlist_t comments;
	int throw_keyids;
	const char *photo_viewer;
	int s2k_mode;
	int s2k_digest_algo;
	int s2k_cipher_algo;
	unsigned char s2k_count; /* This is the encoded form, not the raw
	count */
	int not_dash_escaped;
	int escape_from;
	int lock_once;
	keyserver_spec_t keyserver; /* The list of configured keyservers. */
	struct
	{
	unsigned int options;
	unsigned int import_options;
	unsigned int export_options;
	char *http_proxy;
	} keyserver_options;
	int exec_disable;
	int exec_path_set;
	unsigned int import_options;
	unsigned int export_options;
	unsigned int list_options;
	unsigned int verify_options;
	const char *def_preference_list;
	const char *def_keyserver_url;
	prefitem_t *personal_cipher_prefs;
	prefitem_t *personal_aead_prefs;
	prefitem_t *personal_digest_prefs;
	prefitem_t *personal_compress_prefs;
	struct weakhash *weak_digests;
	int no_perm_warn;
	- int no_mdc_warn;
	char *temp_dir;
	int no_encrypt_to;
	int encrypt_to_default_key;
	int interactive;
	struct notation *sig_notations;
	struct notation *cert_notations;
	strlist_t sig_policy_url;
	strlist_t cert_policy_url;
	strlist_t sig_keyserver_url;
	strlist_t cert_subpackets;
	strlist_t sig_subpackets;
	int allow_non_selfsigned_uid;
	int allow_freeform_uid;
	int no_literal;
	ulong set_filesize;
	int fast_list_mode;
	int legacy_list_mode;
	int ignore_time_conflict;
	int ignore_valid_from;
	int ignore_crc_error;
	int ignore_mdc_error;
	int command_fd;
	const char *override_session_key;
	int show_session_key;

	const char *gpg_agent_info;
	int try_all_secrets;
	int no_expensive_trust_checks;
	int no_sig_cache;
	int no_auto_check_trustdb;
	int preserve_permissions;
	int no_homedir_creation;
	struct groupitem *grouplist;
	int mangle_dos_filenames;
	int enable_progress_filter;
	unsigned int screen_columns;
	unsigned int screen_lines;
	byte *show_subpackets;
	int rfc2440_text;

	/* If true, let write failures on the status-fd exit the process. */
	int exit_on_status_write_error;

	/* If > 0, limit the number of card insertion prompts to this
	value. */
	int limit_card_insert_tries;

	struct
	{
	/* If set, require an 0x19 backsig to be present on signatures
	made by signing subkeys. If not set, a missing backsig is not
	an error (but an invalid backsig still is). */
	unsigned int require_cross_cert:1;

	unsigned int use_embedded_filename:1;
	unsigned int utf8_filename:1;
	unsigned int dsa2:1;
	unsigned int allow_multiple_messages:1;
	unsigned int allow_weak_digest_algos:1;
	unsigned int large_rsa:1;
	unsigned int disable_signer_uid:1;
	/* Flag to enable experimental features from RFC4880bis. */
	unsigned int rfc4880bis:1;
	} flags;

	/* Linked list of ways to find a key if the key isn't on the local
	keyring. */
	struct akl
	{
	enum {
	AKL_NODEFAULT,
	AKL_LOCAL,
	AKL_CERT,
	AKL_PKA,
	AKL_DANE,
	AKL_WKD,
	AKL_LDAP,
	AKL_KEYSERVER,
	AKL_SPEC
	} type;
	keyserver_spec_t spec;
	struct akl *next;
	} *auto_key_locate;

	/* The value of --key-origin. See parse_key_origin(). */
	int key_origin;
	char *key_origin_url;

	int passphrase_repeat;
	int pinentry_mode;
	int request_origin;

	int unwrap_encryption;
	int only_sign_text_ids;

	int no_symkey_cache; /* Disable the cache used for --symmetric. */
	} opt;

	/* CTRL is used to keep some global variables we currently can't
	avoid. Future concurrent versions of gpg will put it into a per
	request structure CTRL. */
	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
	struct {
	int in_auto_key_retrieve; /* True if we are doing an
	auto_key_retrieve. */
	/* Hack to store the last error. We currently need it because the
	proc_packet machinery is not able to reliabale return error
	codes. Thus for the --server purposes we store some of the error
	codes here. FIXME! */
	gpg_error_t lasterr;
	} glo_ctrl;

	#define DBG_PACKET_VALUE 1 /* debug packet reading/writing */
	#define DBG_MPI_VALUE 2 /* debug mpi details */
	#define DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE 4 /* debug crypto handling */
	/* (may reveal sensitive data) */
	#define DBG_FILTER_VALUE 8 /* debug internal filter handling */
	#define DBG_IOBUF_VALUE 16 /* debug iobuf stuff */
	#define DBG_MEMORY_VALUE 32 /* debug memory allocation stuff */
	#define DBG_CACHE_VALUE 64 /* debug the caching */
	#define DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE 128 /* show memory statistics */
	#define DBG_TRUST_VALUE 256 /* debug the trustdb */
	#define DBG_HASHING_VALUE 512 /* debug hashing operations */
	#define DBG_IPC_VALUE 1024 /* debug assuan communication */
	#define DBG_CLOCK_VALUE 4096
	#define DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE 8192 /* debug the key lookup */
	#define DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE 16384 /* debug external program calls */

	/* Tests for the debugging flags. */
	#define DBG_PACKET (opt.debug & DBG_PACKET_VALUE)
	#define DBG_MPI (opt.debug & DBG_MPI_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CRYPTO (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE)
	#define DBG_FILTER (opt.debug & DBG_FILTER_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CACHE (opt.debug & DBG_CACHE_VALUE)
	#define DBG_TRUST (opt.debug & DBG_TRUST_VALUE)
	#define DBG_HASHING (opt.debug & DBG_HASHING_VALUE)
	#define DBG_IPC (opt.debug & DBG_IPC_VALUE)
	#define DBG_CLOCK (opt.debug & DBG_CLOCK_VALUE)
	#define DBG_LOOKUP (opt.debug & DBG_LOOKUP_VALUE)
	#define DBG_EXTPROG (opt.debug & DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE)

	/* FIXME: We need to check why we did not put this into opt. */
	#define DBG_MEMORY memory_debug_mode
	#define DBG_MEMSTAT memory_stat_debug_mode

	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE int memory_debug_mode;
	EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE int memory_stat_debug_mode;


	/* Compatibility flags. */
	#define GNUPG (opt.compliance==CO_GNUPG \|\| opt.compliance==CO_DE_VS)
	#define RFC2440 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC2440)
	#define RFC4880 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC4880)
	#define PGP6 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP6)
	#define PGP7 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP7)
	#define PGP8 (opt.compliance==CO_PGP8)
	#define PGPX (PGP6 \|\| PGP7 \|\| PGP8)

	/* Various option flags. Note that there should be no common string
	names between the IMPORT_ and EXPORT_ flags as they can be mixed in
	the keyserver-options option. */

	#define IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS (1<<0)
	#define IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG (1<<1)
	#define IMPORT_FAST (1<<2)
	#define IMPORT_SHOW (1<<3)
	#define IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY (1<<4)
	#define IMPORT_MINIMAL (1<<5)
	#define IMPORT_CLEAN (1<<6)
	#define IMPORT_NO_SECKEY (1<<7)
	#define IMPORT_KEEP_OWNERTTRUST (1<<8)
	#define IMPORT_EXPORT (1<<9)
	#define IMPORT_RESTORE (1<<10)
	#define IMPORT_REPAIR_KEYS (1<<11)
	#define IMPORT_DRY_RUN (1<<12)

	#define EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS (1<<0)
	#define EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES (1<<1)
	#define EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS (1<<2)
	#define EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD (1<<3)
	#define EXPORT_MINIMAL (1<<4)
	#define EXPORT_CLEAN (1<<5)
	#define EXPORT_PKA_FORMAT (1<<6)
	#define EXPORT_DANE_FORMAT (1<<7)
	#define EXPORT_BACKUP (1<<10)

	#define LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS (1<<0)
	#define LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS (1<<1)
	#define LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS (1<<2)
	#define LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS (1<<3)
	#define LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS (LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS\|LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)
	#define LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS (1<<4)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY (1<<5)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS (1<<6)
	#define LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS (1<<7)
	#define LIST_SHOW_KEYRING (1<<8)
	#define LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE (1<<9)
	#define LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS (1<<10)
	#define LIST_SHOW_USAGE (1<<11)

	#define VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS (1<<0)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS (1<<1)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS (1<<2)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS (1<<3)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS (VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS\|VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS (1<<4)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY (1<<5)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS (1<<6)
	#define VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS (1<<7)
	#define VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE (1<<8)
	#define VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY (1<<9)

	#define KEYSERVER_HTTP_PROXY (1<<0)
	#define KEYSERVER_TIMEOUT (1<<1)
	#define KEYSERVER_ADD_FAKE_V3 (1<<2)
	#define KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE (1<<3)
	#define KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL (1<<4)
	#define KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD (1<<5)


	#endif /G10_OPTIONS_H/

File Metadata

Mime Type: text/x-diff
Expires: Wed, Dec 3, 3:38 AM (1 d, 4 h)
Storage Engine: local-disk
Storage Format: Raw Data
Storage Handle: c4/c3/97f5411f1fd1d04cb9910163161e

No OneTemporaryActions

View Options

File Metadata

Event Timeline

No OneTemporary
Actions