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	diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi
	index b4997731f..4d7654ec7 100644
	--- a/doc/gpg.texi
	+++ b/doc/gpg.texi
	@@ -1,4518 +1,4518 @@
	@c Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
	@c 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	@c This is part of the GnuPG manual.
	@c For copying conditions, see the file gnupg.texi.

	@include defs.inc

	@node Invoking GPG
	@chapter Invoking GPG
	@cindex GPG command options
	@cindex command options
	@cindex options, GPG command


	@c Begin standard stuff
	@ifclear gpgtwohack
	@manpage gpg.1
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg
	\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
	@end ifset

	@mansect synopsis
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg
	.RB [ \-\-homedir
	.IR dir ]
	.RB [ \-\-options
	.IR file ]
	.RI [ options ]
	.I command
	.RI [ args ]
	@end ifset
	@end ifclear
	@c End standard stuff

	@c Begin gpg2 hack stuff
	@ifset gpgtwohack
	@manpage gpg2.1
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	\- OpenPGP encryption and signing tool
	@end ifset

	@mansect synopsis
	@ifset manverb
	.B gpg2
	.RB [ \-\-homedir
	.IR dir ]
	.RB [ \-\-options
	.IR file ]
	.RI [ options ]
	.I command
	.RI [ args ]
	@end ifset
	@end ifset
	@c End gpg2 hack stuff


	@mansect description
	@command{@gpgname} is the OpenPGP part of the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG). It
	is a tool to provide digital encryption and signing services using the
	OpenPGP standard. @command{@gpgname} features complete key management and
	all the bells and whistles you would expect from a full OpenPGP
	implementation.

	There are two main versions of GnuPG: GnuPG 1.x and GnuPG 2.x. GnuPG
	2.x supports modern encryption algorithms and thus should be preferred
	over GnuPG 1.x. You only need to use GnuPG 1.x if your platform
	doesn't support GnuPG 2.x, or you need support for some features that
	GnuPG 2.x has deprecated, e.g., decrypting data created with PGP-2
	keys.

	@ifclear gpgtwohack
	If you are looking for version 1 of GnuPG, you may find that version
	installed under the name @command{gpg1}.
	@end ifclear
	@ifset gpgtwohack
	In contrast to the standalone command @command{gpg} from GnuPG 1.x,
	the 2.x version is commonly installed under the name
	@command{@gpgname}.
	@end ifset

	@manpause

	@xref{Option Index}, for an index to @command{@gpgname}'s commands and options.
	@mancont

	@menu
	* GPG Commands:: List of all commands.
	* GPG Options:: List of all options.
	* GPG Configuration:: Configuration files.
	* GPG Examples:: Some usage examples.

	Developer information:
	* Unattended Usage of GPG:: Using @command{gpg} from other programs.
	@end menu

	@c * GPG Protocol:: The protocol the server mode uses.


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* COMMANDS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect commands
	@node GPG Commands
	@section Commands

	Commands are not distinguished from options except for the fact that
	only one command is allowed. Generally speaking, irrelevant options
	are silently ignored, and may not be checked for correctness.

	@command{@gpgname} may be run with no commands. In this case it will
	print a warning perform a reasonable action depending on the type of
	file it is given as input (an encrypted message is decrypted, a
	signature is verified, a file containing keys is listed, etc.).

	If you run into any problems, please add the option @option{--verbose}
	to the invocation to see more diagnostics.


	@menu
	* General GPG Commands:: Commands not specific to the functionality.
	* Operational GPG Commands:: Commands to select the type of operation.
	* OpenPGP Key Management:: How to manage your keys.
	@end menu


	@c *******************************************
	@c ******** GENERAL COMMANDS ***********
	@c *******************************************
	@node General GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands not specific to the function

	@table @gnupgtabopt
	@item --version
	@opindex version
	Print the program version and licensing information. Note that you
	cannot abbreviate this command.

	@item --help
	@itemx -h
	@opindex help
	Print a usage message summarizing the most useful command-line options.
	Note that you cannot arbitrarily abbreviate this command
	(though you can use its short form @option{-h}).

	@item --warranty
	@opindex warranty
	Print warranty information.

	@item --dump-options
	@opindex dump-options
	Print a list of all available options and commands. Note that you cannot
	abbreviate this command.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPERATIONAL COMMANDS *********
	@c *******************************************
	@node Operational GPG Commands
	@subsection Commands to select the type of operation


	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --sign
	@itemx -s
	@opindex sign
	Sign a message. This command may be combined with @option{--encrypt}
	(to sign and encrypt a message), @option{--symmetric} (to sign and
	symmetrically encrypt a message), or both @option{--encrypt} and
	@option{--symmetric} (to sign and encrypt a message that can be
	decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase). The signing key is
	chosen by default or can be set explicitly using the
	@option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key} options.

	@item --clear-sign
	@opindex clear-sign
	@itemx --clearsign
	@opindex clearsign
	Make a cleartext signature. The content in a cleartext signature is
	readable without any special software. OpenPGP software is only needed
	to verify the signature. cleartext signatures may modify end-of-line
	whitespace for platform independence and are not intended to be
	reversible. The signing key is chosen by default or can be set
	explicitly using the @option{--local-user} and @option{--default-key}
	options.


	@item --detach-sign
	@itemx -b
	@opindex detach-sign
	Make a detached signature.

	@item --encrypt
	@itemx -e
	@opindex encrypt
	Encrypt data to one or more public keys. This command may be combined
	with @option{--sign} (to sign and encrypt a message),
	@option{--symmetric} (to encrypt a message that can be decrypted using a
	secret key or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and
	@option{--symmetric} together (for a signed message that can be
	decrypted using a secret key or a passphrase). @option{--recipient}
	and related options specify which public keys to use for encryption.

	@item --symmetric
	@itemx -c
	@opindex symmetric
	Encrypt with a symmetric cipher using a passphrase. The default
	symmetric cipher used is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}, but may be chosen with the
	@option{--cipher-algo} option. This command may be combined with
	@option{--sign} (for a signed and symmetrically encrypted message),
	@option{--encrypt} (for a message that may be decrypted via a secret key
	or a passphrase), or @option{--sign} and @option{--encrypt} together
	(for a signed message that may be decrypted via a secret key or a
	passphrase). @command{@gpgname} caches the passphrase used for
	symmetric encryption so that a decrypt operation may not require that
	the user needs to enter the passphrase. The option
	@option{--no-symkey-cache} can be used to disable this feature.

	@item --store
	@opindex store
	Store only (make a simple literal data packet).

	@item --decrypt
	@itemx -d
	@opindex decrypt
	Decrypt the file given on the command line (or STDIN if no file
	is specified) and write it to STDOUT (or the file specified with
	@option{--output}). If the decrypted file is signed, the signature is also
	verified. This command differs from the default operation, as it never
	writes to the filename which is included in the file and it rejects
	files that don't begin with an encrypted message.

	@item --verify
	@opindex verify
	Assume that the first argument is a signed file and verify it without
	generating any output. With no arguments, the signature packet is
	read from STDIN. If only one argument is given, the specified file is
	expected to include a complete signature.

	With more than one argument, the first argument should specify a file
	with a detached signature and the remaining files should contain the
	signed data. To read the signed data from STDIN, use @samp{-} as the
	second filename. For security reasons, a detached signature will not
	read the signed material from STDIN if not explicitly specified.

	Note: If the option @option{--batch} is not used, @command{@gpgname}
	may assume that a single argument is a file with a detached signature,
	and it will try to find a matching data file by stripping certain
	suffixes. Using this historical feature to verify a detached
	signature is strongly discouraged; you should always specify the data file
	explicitly.

	Note: When verifying a cleartext signature, @command{@gpgname} verifies
	only what makes up the cleartext signed data and not any extra data
	outside of the cleartext signature or the header lines directly following
	the dash marker line. The option @code{--output} may be used to write
	out the actual signed data, but there are other pitfalls with this
	format as well. It is suggested to avoid cleartext signatures in
	favor of detached signatures.

	Note: Sometimes the use of the @command{gpgv} tool is easier than
	using the full-fledged @command{gpg} with this option. @command{gpgv}
	is designed to compare signed data against a list of trusted keys and
	returns with success only for a good signature. It has its own manual
	page.


	@item --multifile
	@opindex multifile
	This modifies certain other commands to accept multiple files for
	processing on the command line or read from STDIN with each filename on
	a separate line. This allows for many files to be processed at
	once. @option{--multifile} may currently be used along with
	@option{--verify}, @option{--encrypt}, and @option{--decrypt}. Note that
	@option{--multifile --verify} may not be used with detached signatures.

	@item --verify-files
	@opindex verify-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --verify}.

	@item --encrypt-files
	@opindex encrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --encrypt}.

	@item --decrypt-files
	@opindex decrypt-files
	Identical to @option{--multifile --decrypt}.

	@item --list-keys
	@itemx -k
	@itemx --list-public-keys
	@opindex list-keys
	List the specified keys. If no keys are specified, then all keys from
	the configured public keyrings are listed.

	Never use the output of this command in scripts or other programs.
	The output is intended only for humans and its format is likely to
	change. The @option{--with-colons} option emits the output in a
	stable, machine-parseable format, which is intended for use by scripts
	and other programs.

	@item --list-secret-keys
	@itemx -K
	@opindex list-secret-keys
	List the specified secret keys. If no keys are specified, then all
	known secret keys are listed. A @code{#} after the initial tags
	@code{sec} or @code{ssb} means that the secret key or subkey is
	currently not usable. We also say that this key has been taken
	offline (for example, a primary key can be taken offline by exporting
	the key using the command @option{--export-secret-subkeys}). A
	@code{>} after these tags indicate that the key is stored on a
	smartcard. See also @option{--list-keys}.

	@item --check-signatures
	@opindex check-signatures
	@itemx --check-sigs
	@opindex check-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the key signatures are verified and
	listed too. Note that for performance reasons the revocation status
	of a signing key is not shown. This command has the same effect as
	using @option{--list-keys} with @option{--with-sig-check}.

	The status of the verification is indicated by a flag directly
	following the "sig" tag (and thus before the flags described below. A
	"!" indicates that the signature has been successfully verified, a "-"
	denotes a bad signature and a "%" is used if an error occurred while
	checking the signature (e.g. a non supported algorithm). Signatures
	where the public key is not available are not listed; to see their
	keyids the command @option{--list-sigs} can be used.

	For each signature listed, there are several flags in between the
	signature status flag and keyid. These flags give additional
	information about each key signature. From left to right, they are
	the numbers 1-3 for certificate check level (see
	@option{--ask-cert-level}), "L" for a local or non-exportable
	signature (see @option{--lsign-key}), "R" for a nonRevocable signature
	(see the @option{--edit-key} command "nrsign"), "P" for a signature
	that contains a policy URL (see @option{--cert-policy-url}), "N" for a
	signature that contains a notation (see @option{--cert-notation}), "X"
	for an eXpired signature (see @option{--ask-cert-expire}), and the
	numbers 1-9 or "T" for 10 and above to indicate trust signature levels
	(see the @option{--edit-key} command "tsign").


	@item --locate-keys
	@itemx --locate-external-keys
	@opindex locate-keys
	@opindex locate-external-keys
	Locate the keys given as arguments. This command basically uses the
	same algorithm as used when locating keys for encryption and may thus
	be used to see what keys @command{@gpgname} might use. In particular
	external methods as defined by @option{--auto-key-locate} are used to
	locate a key if the arguments comain valid mail addresses. Only
	public keys are listed.

	The variant @option{--locate-external-keys} does not consider a
	locally existing key and can thus be used to force the refresh of a
	key via the defined external methods. If a fingerprint is given and
	and the methods defined by --auto-key-locate define LDAP servers, the
	key is fetched from these resources; defined non-LDAP keyservers are
	skipped.


	@item --show-keys
	@opindex show-keys
	This commands takes OpenPGP keys as input and prints information about
	them in the same way the command @option{--list-keys} does for locally
	stored key. In addition the list options @code{show-unusable-uids},
	@code{show-unusable-subkeys}, @code{show-notations} and
	@code{show-policy-urls} are also enabled. As usual for automated
	processing, this command should be combined with the option
	@option{--with-colons}.

	@item --fingerprint
	@opindex fingerprint
	List all keys (or the specified ones) along with their
	fingerprints. This is the same output as @option{--list-keys} but with
	the additional output of a line with the fingerprint. May also be
	combined with @option{--check-signatures}. If this
	command is given twice, the fingerprints of all secondary keys are
	listed too. This command also forces pretty printing of fingerprints
	if the keyid format has been set to "none".

	@item --list-packets
	@opindex list-packets
	List only the sequence of packets. This command is only useful for
	debugging. When used with option @option{--verbose} the actual MPI
	values are dumped and not only their lengths. Note that the output of
	this command may change with new releases.


	@item --edit-card
	@opindex edit-card
	@itemx --card-edit
	@opindex card-edit
	Present a menu to work with a smartcard. The subcommand "help" provides
	an overview on available commands. For a detailed description, please
	see the Card HOWTO at
	https://gnupg.org/documentation/howtos.html#GnuPG-cardHOWTO .

	@item --card-status
	@opindex card-status
	Show the content of the smart card.

	@item --change-pin
	@opindex change-pin
	Present a menu to allow changing the PIN of a smartcard. This
	functionality is also available as the subcommand "passwd" with the
	@option{--edit-card} command.

	@item --delete-keys @var{name}
	@opindex delete-keys
	Remove key from the public keyring. In batch mode either @option{--yes} is
	required or the key must be specified by fingerprint. This is a
	safeguard against accidental deletion of multiple keys. If the
	exclamation mark syntax is used with the fingerprint of a subkey only
	that subkey is deleted; if the exclamation mark is used with the
	fingerprint of the primary key the entire public key is deleted.

	@item --delete-secret-keys @var{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-keys
	Remove key from the secret keyring. In batch mode the key must be
	specified by fingerprint. The option @option{--yes} can be used to
	advise gpg-agent not to request a confirmation. This extra
	pre-caution is done because @command{@gpgname} can't be sure that the
	secret key (as controlled by gpg-agent) is only used for the given
	OpenPGP public key. If the exclamation mark syntax is used with the
	fingerprint of a subkey only the secret part of that subkey is
	deleted; if the exclamation mark is used with the fingerprint of the
	primary key only the secret part of the primary key is deleted.


	@item --delete-secret-and-public-key @var{name}
	@opindex delete-secret-and-public-key
	Same as @option{--delete-key}, but if a secret key exists, it will be
	removed first. In batch mode the key must be specified by fingerprint.
	The option @option{--yes} can be used to advise gpg-agent not to
	request a confirmation.

	@item --export
	@opindex export
	Either export all keys from all keyrings (default keyrings and those
	registered via option @option{--keyring}), or if at least one name is given,
	those of the given name. The exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the
	file given with option @option{--output}. Use together with
	@option{--armor} to mail those keys.

	@item --send-keys @var{keyIDs}
	@opindex send-keys
	Similar to @option{--export} but sends the keys to a keyserver.
	Fingerprints may be used instead of key IDs.
	Don't send your complete keyring to a keyserver --- select
	only those keys which are new or changed by you. If no @var{keyIDs}
	are given, @command{@gpgname} does nothing.

	Take care: Keyservers are by design write only systems and thus it is
	not possible to ever delete keys once they have been send to a
	keyserver.


	@item --export-secret-keys
	@itemx --export-secret-subkeys
	@opindex export-secret-keys
	@opindex export-secret-subkeys
	Same as @option{--export}, but exports the secret keys instead. The
	exported keys are written to STDOUT or to the file given with option
	@option{--output}. This command is often used along with the option
	@option{--armor} to allow for easy printing of the key for paper backup;
	however the external tool @command{paperkey} does a better job of
	creating backups on paper. Note that exporting a secret key can be a
	security risk if the exported keys are sent over an insecure channel.

	The second form of the command has the special property to render the
	secret part of the primary key useless; this is a GNU extension to
	OpenPGP and other implementations can not be expected to successfully
	import such a key. Its intended use is in generating a full key with
	an additional signing subkey on a dedicated machine. This command
	then exports the key without the primary key to the main machine.

	GnuPG may ask you to enter the passphrase for the key. This is
	required, because the internal protection method of the secret key is
	different from the one specified by the OpenPGP protocol.

	@item --export-ssh-key
	@opindex export-ssh-key
	This command is used to export a key in the OpenSSH public key format.
	It requires the specification of one key by the usual means and
	exports the latest valid subkey which has an authentication capability
	to STDOUT or to the file given with option @option{--output}. That
	output can directly be added to ssh's @file{authorized_key} file.

	By specifying the key to export using a key ID or a fingerprint
	suffixed with an exclamation mark (!), a specific subkey or the
	primary key can be exported. This does not even require that the key
	has the authentication capability flag set.

	@item --import
	@itemx --fast-import
	@opindex import
	Import/merge keys. This adds the given keys to the
	keyring. The fast version is currently just a synonym.

	There are a few other options which control how this command works.
	Most notable here is the @option{--import-options merge-only} option
	which does not insert new keys but does only the merging of new
	signatures, user-IDs and subkeys.

	@item --receive-keys @var{keyIDs}
	@opindex receive-keys
	@itemx --recv-keys @var{keyIDs}
	@opindex recv-keys
	Import the keys with the given @var{keyIDs} from a keyserver.

	@item --refresh-keys
	@opindex refresh-keys
	Request updates from a keyserver for keys that already exist on the
	local keyring. This is useful for updating a key with the latest
	signatures, user IDs, etc. Calling this with no arguments will refresh
	the entire keyring.

	@item --search-keys @var{names}
	@opindex search-keys
	Search the keyserver for the given @var{names}. Multiple names given
	here will be joined together to create the search string for the
	keyserver. Note that keyservers search for @var{names} in a different
	and simpler way than gpg does. The best choice is to use a mail
	address. Due to data privacy reasons keyservers may even not even
	allow searching by user id or mail address and thus may only return
	results when being used with the @option{--recv-key} command to
	search by key fingerprint or keyid.

	@item --fetch-keys @var{URIs}
	@opindex fetch-keys
	Retrieve keys located at the specified @var{URIs}. Note that different
	installations of GnuPG may support different protocols (HTTP, FTP,
	LDAP, etc.). When using HTTPS the system provided root certificates
	are used by this command.

	@item --update-trustdb
	@opindex update-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance. This command iterates over all keys and
	builds the Web of Trust. This is an interactive command because it may
	have to ask for the "ownertrust" values for keys. The user has to give
	an estimation of how far she trusts the owner of the displayed key to
	correctly certify (sign) other keys. GnuPG only asks for the ownertrust
	value if it has not yet been assigned to a key. Using the
	@option{--edit-key} menu, the assigned value can be changed at any time.

	@item --check-trustdb
	@opindex check-trustdb
	Do trust database maintenance without user interaction. From time to
	time the trust database must be updated so that expired keys or
	signatures and the resulting changes in the Web of Trust can be
	tracked. Normally, GnuPG will calculate when this is required and do it
	automatically unless @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} is set. This
	command can be used to force a trust database check at any time. The
	processing is identical to that of @option{--update-trustdb} but it
	skips keys with a not yet defined "ownertrust".

	For use with cron jobs, this command can be used together with
	@option{--batch} in which case the trust database check is done only if
	a check is needed. To force a run even in batch mode add the option
	@option{--yes}.

	@anchor{option --export-ownertrust}
	@item --export-ownertrust
	@opindex export-ownertrust
	Send the ownertrust values to STDOUT. This is useful for backup purposes
	as these values are the only ones which can't be re-created from a
	corrupted trustdb. Example:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	@gpgname{} --export-ownertrust > otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --import-ownertrust
	@opindex import-ownertrust
	Update the trustdb with the ownertrust values stored in @code{files} (or
	STDIN if not given); existing values will be overwritten. In case of a
	severely damaged trustdb and if you have a recent backup of the
	ownertrust values (e.g. in the file @file{otrust.txt}), you may re-create
	the trustdb using these commands:
	@c man:.RS
	@example
	cd ~/.gnupg
	rm trustdb.gpg
	@gpgname{} --import-ownertrust < otrust.txt
	@end example
	@c man:.RE


	@item --rebuild-keydb-caches
	@opindex rebuild-keydb-caches
	When updating from version 1.0.6 to 1.0.7 this command should be used
	to create signature caches in the keyring. It might be handy in other
	situations too.

	@item --print-md @var{algo}
	@itemx --print-mds
	@opindex print-md
	Print message digest of algorithm @var{algo} for all given files or STDIN.
	With the second form (or a deprecated "*" for @var{algo}) digests for all
	available algorithms are printed.

	@item --gen-random @var{0\|1\|2} @var{count}
	@opindex gen-random
	Emit @var{count} random bytes of the given quality level 0, 1 or 2. If
	@var{count} is not given or zero, an endless sequence of random bytes
	will be emitted. If used with @option{--armor} the output will be
	base64 encoded. PLEASE, don't use this command unless you know what
	you are doing; it may remove precious entropy from the system!

	@item --gen-prime @var{mode} @var{bits}
	@opindex gen-prime
	Use the source, Luke :-). The output format is subject to change
	with ant release.


	@item --enarmor
	@itemx --dearmor
	@opindex enarmor
	@opindex dearmor
	Pack or unpack an arbitrary input into/from an OpenPGP ASCII armor.
	This is a GnuPG extension to OpenPGP and in general not very useful.

	@item --unwrap
	@opindex unwrap
	This command is similar to @option{--decrypt} with the change that the
	output is not the usual plaintext but the original message with the
	decryption layer removed. Thus the output will be an OpenPGP data
	structure which often means a signed OpenPGP message. Note that this
	command may or may not remove a compression layer which is often found
	beneath the encryption layer.

	@item --tofu-policy @{auto\|good\|unknown\|bad\|ask@} @var{keys}
	@opindex tofu-policy
	Set the TOFU policy for all the bindings associated with the specified
	@var{keys}. For more information about the meaning of the policies,
	@pxref{trust-model-tofu}. The @var{keys} may be specified either by their
	fingerprint (preferred) or their keyid.

	@c @item --server
	@c @opindex server
	@c Run gpg in server mode. This feature is not yet ready for use and
	@c thus not documented.

	@end table


	@c ********************************************
	@c ***** KEY MANAGEMENT COMMANDS ********
	@c ********************************************
	@node OpenPGP Key Management
	@subsection How to manage your keys

	This section explains the main commands for key management.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --quick-generate-key @var{user-id} [@var{algo} [@var{usage} [@var{expire}]]]
	@itemx --quick-gen-key
	@opindex quick-generate-key
	@opindex quick-gen-key
	This is a simple command to generate a standard key with one user id.
	In contrast to @option{--generate-key} the key is generated directly
	without the need to answer a bunch of prompts. Unless the option
	@option{--yes} is given, the key creation will be canceled if the
	given user id already exists in the keyring.

	If invoked directly on the console without any special options an
	answer to a ``Continue?'' style confirmation prompt is required. In
	case the user id already exists in the keyring a second prompt to
	force the creation of the key will show up.

	If @var{algo} or @var{usage} are given, only the primary key is
	created and no prompts are shown. To specify an expiration date but
	still create a primary and subkey use ``default'' or
	``future-default'' for @var{algo} and ``default'' for @var{usage}.
	For a description of these optional arguments see the command
	@code{--quick-add-key}. The @var{usage} accepts also the value
	``cert'' which can be used to create a certification only primary key;
	the default is to a create certification and signing key.

	The @var{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date
	for the key. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO formats
	``YYYY-MM-DD'' or ``YYYYMMDDThhmmss'' are used. To make the key
	expire in N seconds, N days, N weeks, N months, or N years use
	``seconds=N'', ``Nd'', ``Nw'', ``Nm'', or ``Ny'' respectively. Not
	specifying a value, or using ``-'' results in a key expiring in a
	reasonable default interval. The values ``never'', ``none'' can be
	used for no expiration date.

	If this command is used with @option{--batch},
	@option{--pinentry-mode} has been set to @code{loopback}, and one of
	the passphrase options (@option{--passphrase},
	@option{--passphrase-fd}, or @option{--passphrase-file}) is used, the
	supplied passphrase is used for the new key and the agent does not ask
	for it. To create a key without any protection @code{--passphrase ''}
	may be used.

	To create an OpenPGP key from the keys available on the currently
	inserted smartcard, the special string ``card'' can be used for
	@var{algo}. If the card features an encryption and a signing key, gpg
	will figure them out and creates an OpenPGP key consisting of the
	usual primary key and one subkey. This works only with certain
	smartcards. Note that the interactive @option{--full-gen-key} command
	allows to do the same but with greater flexibility in the selection of
	the smartcard keys.

	Note that it is possible to create a primary key and a subkey using
	non-default algorithms by using ``default'' and changing the default
	parameters using the option @option{--default-new-key-algo}.

	@item --quick-set-expire @var{fpr} @var{expire} [*\|@var{subfprs}]
	@opindex quick-set-expire
	With two arguments given, directly set the expiration time of the
	primary key identified by @var{fpr} to @var{expire}. To remove the
	expiration time @code{0} can be used. With three arguments and the
	third given as an asterisk, the expiration time of all non-revoked and
	not yet expired subkeys are set to @var{expire}. With more than two
	arguments and a list of fingerprints given for @var{subfprs}, all
	non-revoked subkeys matching these fingerprints are set to
	@var{expire}.


	@item --quick-add-key @var{fpr} [@var{algo} [@var{usage} [@var{expire}]]]
	@opindex quick-add-key
	Directly add a subkey to the key identified by the fingerprint
	@var{fpr}. Without the optional arguments an encryption subkey is
	added. If any of the arguments are given a more specific subkey is
	added.

	@var{algo} may be any of the supported algorithms or curve names
	given in the format as used by key listings. To use the default
	algorithm the string ``default'' or ``-'' can be used. Supported
	algorithms are ``rsa'', ``dsa'', ``elg'', ``ed25519'', ``cv25519'',
	and other ECC curves. For example the string ``rsa'' adds an RSA key
	with the default key length; a string ``rsa4096'' requests that the
	key length is 4096 bits. The string ``future-default'' is an alias
	for the algorithm which will likely be used as default algorithm in
	future versions of gpg. To list the supported ECC curves the command
	@code{gpg --with-colons --list-config curve} can be used.

	Depending on the given @var{algo} the subkey may either be an
	encryption subkey or a signing subkey. If an algorithm is capable of
	signing and encryption and such a subkey is desired, a @var{usage}
	string must be given. This string is either ``default'' or ``-'' to
	keep the default or a comma delimited list (or space delimited list)
	of keywords: ``sign'' for a signing subkey, ``auth'' for an
	authentication subkey, and ``encr'' for an encryption subkey
	(``encrypt'' can be used as alias for ``encr''). The valid
	combinations depend on the algorithm.

	The @var{expire} argument can be used to specify an expiration date
	for the key. Several formats are supported; commonly the ISO formats
	``YYYY-MM-DD'' or ``YYYYMMDDThhmmss'' are used. To make the key
	expire in N seconds, N days, N weeks, N months, or N years use
	``seconds=N'', ``Nd'', ``Nw'', ``Nm'', or ``Ny'' respectively. Not
	specifying a value, or using ``-'' results in a key expiring in a
	reasonable default interval. The values ``never'', ``none'' can be
	used for no expiration date.

	@item --generate-key
	@opindex generate-key
	@itemx --gen-key
	@opindex gen-key
	Generate a new key pair using the current default parameters. This is
	the standard command to create a new key. In addition to the key a
	revocation certificate is created and stored in the
	@file{openpgp-revocs.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory.

	@item --full-generate-key
	@opindex full-generate-key
	@itemx --full-gen-key
	@opindex full-gen-key
	Generate a new key pair with dialogs for all options. This is an
	extended version of @option{--generate-key}.

	There is also a feature which allows you to create keys in batch
	mode. See the manual section ``Unattended key generation'' on how
	to use this.


	@item --generate-revocation @var{name}
	@opindex generate-revocation
	@itemx --gen-revoke @var{name}
	@opindex gen-revoke
	Generate a revocation certificate for the complete key. To only revoke
	a subkey or a key signature, use the @option{--edit} command.

	This command merely creates the revocation certificate so that it can
	be used to revoke the key if that is ever needed. To actually revoke
	a key the created revocation certificate needs to be merged with the
	key to revoke. This is done by importing the revocation certificate
	using the @option{--import} command. Then the revoked key needs to be
	published, which is best done by sending the key to a keyserver
	(command @option{--send-key}) and by exporting (@option{--export}) it
	to a file which is then send to frequent communication partners.


	@item --generate-designated-revocation @var{name}
	@opindex generate-designated-revocation
	@itemx --desig-revoke @var{name}
	@opindex desig-revoke
	Generate a designated revocation certificate for a key. This allows a
	user (with the permission of the keyholder) to revoke someone else's
	key.


	@item --edit-key
	@opindex edit-key
	Present a menu which enables you to do most of the key management
	related tasks. It expects the specification of a key on the command
	line.

	@c ****** Begin Edit-key Options ********
	@table @asis

	@item uid @var{n}
	@opindex keyedit:uid
	Toggle selection of user ID or photographic user ID with index @var{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item key @var{n}
	@opindex keyedit:key
	Toggle selection of subkey with index @var{n} or key ID @var{n}.
	Use @code{*} to select all and @code{0} to deselect all.

	@item sign
	@opindex keyedit:sign
	Make a signature on key of user @code{name}. If the key is not yet
	signed by the default user (or the users given with @option{-u}), the program
	displays the information of the key again, together with its
	fingerprint and asks whether it should be signed. This question is
	repeated for all users specified with
	@option{-u}.

	@item lsign
	@opindex keyedit:lsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-exportable and will
	therefore never be used by others. This may be used to make keys
	valid only in the local environment.

	@item nrsign
	@opindex keyedit:nrsign
	Same as "sign" but the signature is marked as non-revocable and can
	therefore never be revoked.

	@item tsign
	@opindex keyedit:tsign
	Make a trust signature. This is a signature that combines the notions
	of certification (like a regular signature), and trust (like the
	"trust" command). It is generally only useful in distinct communities
	or groups. For more information please read the sections
	``Trust Signature'' and ``Regular Expression'' in RFC-4880.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	Note that "l" (for local / non-exportable), "nr" (for non-revocable,
	and "t" (for trust) may be freely mixed and prefixed to "sign" to
	create a signature of any type desired.
	@c man:.RE

	If the option @option{--only-sign-text-ids} is specified, then any
	non-text based user ids (e.g., photo IDs) will not be selected for
	signing.

	@table @asis

	@item delsig
	@opindex keyedit:delsig
	Delete a signature. Note that it is not possible to retract a signature,
	once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In that case
	you better use @code{revsig}.

	@item revsig
	@opindex keyedit:revsig
	Revoke a signature. For every signature which has been generated by
	one of the secret keys, GnuPG asks whether a revocation certificate
	should be generated.

	@item check
	@opindex keyedit:check
	Check the signatures on all selected user IDs. With the extra
	option @code{selfsig} only self-signatures are shown.

	@item adduid
	@opindex keyedit:adduid
	Create an additional user ID.

	@item addphoto
	@opindex keyedit:addphoto
	Create a photographic user ID. This will prompt for a JPEG file that
	will be embedded into the user ID. Note that a very large JPEG will make
	for a very large key. Also note that some programs will display your
	JPEG unchanged (GnuPG), and some programs will scale it to fit in a
	dialog box (PGP).

	@item showphoto
	@opindex keyedit:showphoto
	Display the selected photographic user ID.

	@item deluid
	@opindex keyedit:deluid
	Delete a user ID or photographic user ID. Note that it is not
	possible to retract a user id, once it has been send to the public
	(i.e. to a keyserver). In that case you better use @code{revuid}.

	@item revuid
	@opindex keyedit:revuid
	Revoke a user ID or photographic user ID.

	@item primary
	@opindex keyedit:primary
	Flag the current user id as the primary one, removes the primary user
	id flag from all other user ids and sets the timestamp of all affected
	self-signatures one second ahead. Note that setting a photo user ID
	as primary makes it primary over other photo user IDs, and setting a
	regular user ID as primary makes it primary over other regular user
	IDs.

	@item keyserver
	@opindex keyedit:keyserver
	Set a preferred keyserver for the specified user ID(s). This allows
	other users to know where you prefer they get your key from. See
	@option{--keyserver-options honor-keyserver-url} for more on how this
	works. Setting a value of "none" removes an existing preferred
	keyserver.

	@item notation
	@opindex keyedit:notation
	Set a name=value notation for the specified user ID(s). See
	@option{--cert-notation} for more on how this works. Setting a value of
	"none" removes all notations, setting a notation prefixed with a minus
	sign (-) removes that notation, and setting a notation name (without the
	=value) prefixed with a minus sign removes all notations with that name.

	@item pref
	@opindex keyedit:pref
	List preferences from the selected user ID. This shows the actual
	preferences, without including any implied preferences.

	@item showpref
	@opindex keyedit:showpref
	More verbose preferences listing for the selected user ID. This shows
	the preferences in effect by including the implied preferences of 3DES
	(cipher), SHA-1 (digest), and Uncompressed (compression) if they are
	not already included in the preference list. In addition, the
	preferred keyserver and signature notations (if any) are shown.

	@item setpref @var{string}
	@opindex keyedit:setpref
	Set the list of user ID preferences to @var{string} for all (or just
	the selected) user IDs. Calling setpref with no arguments sets the
	preference list to the default (either built-in or set via
	@option{--default-preference-list}), and calling setpref with "none"
	as the argument sets an empty preference list. Use @command{@gpgname
	--version} to get a list of available algorithms. Note that while you
	can change the preferences on an attribute user ID (aka "photo ID"),
	GnuPG does not select keys via attribute user IDs so these preferences
	will not be used by GnuPG.

	When setting preferences, you should list the algorithms in the order
	which you'd like to see them used by someone else when encrypting a
	message to your key. If you don't include 3DES, it will be
	automatically added at the end. Note that there are many factors that
	go into choosing an algorithm (for example, your key may not be the
	only recipient), and so the remote OpenPGP application being used to
	send to you may or may not follow your exact chosen order for a given
	message. It will, however, only choose an algorithm that is present
	on the preference list of every recipient key. See also the
	INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below.

	@item addkey
	@opindex keyedit:addkey
	Add a subkey to this key.

	@item addcardkey
	@opindex keyedit:addcardkey
	Generate a subkey on a card and add it to this key.

	@item keytocard
	@opindex keyedit:keytocard
	Transfer the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey
	has been selected) to a smartcard. The secret key in the keyring will
	be replaced by a stub if the key could be stored successfully on the
	card and you use the save command later. Only certain key types may be
	transferred to the card. A sub menu allows you to select on what card
	to store the key. Note that it is not possible to get that key back
	from the card - if the card gets broken your secret key will be lost
	unless you have a backup somewhere.

	@item bkuptocard @var{file}
	@opindex keyedit:bkuptocard
	Restore the given @var{file} to a card. This command may be used to restore a
	backup key (as generated during card initialization) to a new card. In
	almost all cases this will be the encryption key. You should use this
	command only with the corresponding public key and make sure that the
	file given as argument is indeed the backup to restore. You should then
	select 2 to restore as encryption key. You will first be asked to enter
	the passphrase of the backup key and then for the Admin PIN of the card.

	@item keytotpm
	@opindex keyedit:keytotpm
	Transfer the selected secret subkey (or the primary key if no subkey
	has been selected) to TPM form. The secret key in the keyring will
	be replaced by the TPM representation of that key, which can only be
	read by the particular TPM that created it (so the keyfile now
	becomes locked to the laptop containing the TPM). Only certain key
	types may be transferred to the TPM (all TPM 2.0 systems are
	mandated to have the rsa2048 and nistp256 algorithms but newer TPMs
	may have more). Note that the key itself is not transferred into the
	TPM, merely encrypted by the TPM in-place, so if the keyfile is
	deleted, the key will be lost. Once transferred to TPM
	representation, the key file can never be converted back to non-TPM
	form and the key will die when the TPM does, so you should first
	have a backup on secure offline storage of the actual secret key
	file before conversion. It is essential to use the physical system
	TPM that you have rw permission on the TPM resource manager device
	(/dev/tpmrm0). Usually this means you must be a member of the tss
	group.

	@item delkey
	@opindex keyedit:delkey
	Remove a subkey (secondary key). Note that it is not possible to retract
	a subkey, once it has been send to the public (i.e. to a keyserver). In
	that case you better use @code{revkey}. Also note that this only
	deletes the public part of a key.

	@item revkey
	@opindex keyedit:revkey
	Revoke a subkey.

	@item expire
	@opindex keyedit:expire
	Change the key or subkey expiration time. If a subkey is selected, the
	expiration time of this subkey will be changed. With no selection, the
	key expiration of the primary key is changed.

	@item trust
	@opindex keyedit:trust
	Change the owner trust value for the key. This updates the trust-db
	immediately and no save is required.

	@item disable
	@itemx enable
	@opindex keyedit:disable
	@opindex keyedit:enable
	Disable or enable an entire key. A disabled key can not normally be
	used for encryption.

	@item addrevoker
	@opindex keyedit:addrevoker
	Add a designated revoker to the key. This takes one optional argument:
	"sensitive". If a designated revoker is marked as sensitive, it will
	not be exported by default (see export-options).

	@item passwd
	@opindex keyedit:passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key.

	@item toggle
	@opindex keyedit:toggle
	This is dummy command which exists only for backward compatibility.

	@item clean
	@opindex keyedit:clean
	Compact (by removing all signatures except the selfsig) any user ID
	that is no longer usable (e.g. revoked, or expired). Then, remove any
	signatures that are not usable by the trust calculations.
	Specifically, this removes any signature that does not validate, any
	signature that is superseded by a later signature, revoked signatures,
	and signatures issued by keys that are not present on the keyring.

	@item minimize
	@opindex keyedit:minimize
	Make the key as small as possible. This removes all signatures from
	each user ID except for the most recent self-signature.

	@item change-usage
	@opindex keyedit:change-usage
	Change the usage flags (capabilities) of the primary key or of
	subkeys. These usage flags (e.g. Certify, Sign, Authenticate,
	Encrypt) are set during key creation. Sometimes it is useful to
	have the opportunity to change them (for example to add
	Authenticate) after they have been created. Please take care when
	doing this; the allowed usage flags depend on the key algorithm.

	@item cross-certify
	@opindex keyedit:cross-certify
	Add cross-certification signatures to signing subkeys that may not
	currently have them. Cross-certification signatures protect against a
	subtle attack against signing subkeys. See
	@option{--require-cross-certification}. All new keys generated have
	this signature by default, so this command is only useful to bring
	older keys up to date.

	@item save
	@opindex keyedit:save
	Save all changes to the keyrings and quit.

	@item quit
	@opindex keyedit:quit
	Quit the program without updating the
	keyrings.
	@end table

	@c man:.RS
	The listing shows you the key with its secondary keys and all user
	IDs. The primary user ID is indicated by a dot, and selected keys or
	user IDs are indicated by an asterisk. The trust
	value is displayed with the primary key: "trust" is the assigned owner
	trust and "validity" is the calculated validity of the key. Validity
	values are also displayed for all user IDs.
	For possible values of trust, @pxref{trust-values}.
	@c man:.RE
	@c ****** End Edit-key Options ********

	@item --sign-key @var{name}
	@opindex sign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key. This is a shortcut version of
	the subcommand "sign" from @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --lsign-key @var{name}
	@opindex lsign-key
	Signs a public key with your secret key but marks it as
	non-exportable. This is a shortcut version of the subcommand "lsign"
	from @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --quick-sign-key @var{fpr} [@var{names}]
	@itemx --quick-lsign-key @var{fpr} [@var{names}]
	@opindex quick-sign-key
	@opindex quick-lsign-key
	Directly sign a key from the passphrase without any further user
	interaction. The @var{fpr} must be the verified primary fingerprint
	of a key in the local keyring. If no @var{names} are given, all
	useful user ids are signed; with given [@var{names}] only useful user
	ids matching one of these names are signed. By default, or if a name
	is prefixed with a '*', a case insensitive substring match is used.
	If a name is prefixed with a '=' a case sensitive exact match is done.

	The command @option{--quick-lsign-key} marks the signatures as
	non-exportable. If such a non-exportable signature already exists the
	@option{--quick-sign-key} turns it into a exportable signature. If
	you need to update an existing signature, for example to add or change
	notation data, you need to use the option @option{--force-sign-key}.

	This command uses reasonable defaults and thus does not provide the
	full flexibility of the "sign" subcommand from @option{--edit-key}.
	Its intended use is to help unattended key signing by utilizing a list
	of verified fingerprints.

	@item --quick-add-uid @var{user-id} @var{new-user-id}
	@opindex quick-add-uid
	This command adds a new user id to an existing key. In contrast to
	the interactive sub-command @code{adduid} of @option{--edit-key} the
	@var{new-user-id} is added verbatim with only leading and trailing
	white space removed, it is expected to be UTF-8 encoded, and no checks
	on its form are applied.

	@item --quick-revoke-uid @var{user-id} @var{user-id-to-revoke}
	@opindex quick-revoke-uid
	This command revokes a user ID on an existing key. It cannot be used
	to revoke the last user ID on key (some non-revoked user ID must
	remain), with revocation reason ``User ID is no longer valid''. If
	you want to specify a different revocation reason, or to supply
	supplementary revocation text, you should use the interactive
	sub-command @code{revuid} of @option{--edit-key}.

	@item --quick-revoke-sig @var{fpr} @var{signing-fpr} [@var{names}]
	@opindex quick-revoke-sig
	This command revokes the key signatures made by @var{signing-fpr} from
	the key specified by the fingerprint @var{fpr}. With @var{names}
	given only the signatures on user ids of the key matching any of the
	given names are affected (see @option{--quick-sign-key}). If a
	revocation already exists a notice is printed instead of creating a
	new revocation; no error is returned in this case. Note that key
	signature revocations may be superseded by a newer key signature and
	in turn again revoked.

	@item --quick-set-primary-uid @var{user-id} @var{primary-user-id}
	@opindex quick-set-primary-uid
	This command sets or updates the primary user ID flag on an existing
	key. @var{user-id} specifies the key and @var{primary-user-id} the
	user ID which shall be flagged as the primary user ID. The primary
	user ID flag is removed from all other user ids and the timestamp of
	all affected self-signatures is set one second ahead.


	@item --change-passphrase @var{user-id}
	@opindex change-passphrase
	@itemx --passwd @var{user-id}
	@opindex passwd
	Change the passphrase of the secret key belonging to the certificate
	specified as @var{user-id}. This is a shortcut for the sub-command
	@code{passwd} of the @option{--edit-key} menu. When using together with the
	option @option{--dry-run} this will not actually change the passphrase
	but check that the current passphrase is correct.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* OPTIONS **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect options
	@node GPG Options
	@section Option Summary

	@command{@gpgname} features a bunch of options to control the exact
	behaviour and to change the default configuration.

	@menu
	* GPG Configuration Options:: How to change the configuration.
	* GPG Key related Options:: Key related options.
	* GPG Input and Output:: Input and Output.
	* OpenPGP Options:: OpenPGP protocol specific options.
	* Compliance Options:: Compliance options.
	* GPG Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually doesn't want to do.
	* Deprecated Options:: Deprecated options.
	@end menu

	Long options can be put in an options file (default
	"~/.gnupg/gpg.conf"). Short option names will not work - for example,
	"armor" is a valid option for the options file, while "a" is not. Do not
	write the 2 dashes, but simply the name of the option and any required
	arguments. Lines with a hash ('#') as the first non-white-space
	character are ignored. Commands may be put in this file too, but that is
	not generally useful as the command will execute automatically with
	every execution of gpg.

	Please remember that option parsing stops as soon as a non-option is
	encountered, you can explicitly stop parsing by using the special option
	@option{--}.

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** CONFIGURATION OPTIONS ********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Configuration Options
	@subsection How to change the configuration

	These options are used to change the configuration and most of them
	are usually found in the option file.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --default-key @var{name}
	@opindex default-key
	Use @var{name} as the default key to sign with. If this option is not
	used, the default key is the first key found in the secret keyring.
	Note that @option{-u} or @option{--local-user} overrides this option.
	This option may be given multiple times. In this case, the last key
	for which a secret key is available is used. If there is no secret
	key available for any of the specified values, GnuPG will not emit an
	error message but continue as if this option wasn't given.

	@item --default-recipient @var{name}
	@opindex default-recipient
	Use @var{name} as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is
	not used and don't ask if this is a valid one. @var{name} must be
	non-empty.

	@item --default-recipient-self
	@opindex default-recipient-self
	Use the default key as default recipient if option @option{--recipient} is not
	used and don't ask if this is a valid one. The default key is the first
	one from the secret keyring or the one set with @option{--default-key}.

	@item --no-default-recipient
	@opindex no-default-recipient
	Reset @option{--default-recipient} and @option{--default-recipient-self}.
	Should not be used in an option file.

	@item -v, --verbose
	@opindex verbose
	Give more information during processing. If used
	twice, the input data is listed in detail.

	@item --no-verbose
	@opindex no-verbose
	Reset verbose level to 0. Should not be used in an option file.

	@item -q, --quiet
	@opindex quiet
	Try to be as quiet as possible. Should not be used in an option file.

	@item --batch
	@itemx --no-batch
	@opindex batch
	@opindex no-batch
	Use batch mode. Never ask, do not allow interactive commands.
	@option{--no-batch} disables this option. Note that even with a
	filename given on the command line, gpg might still need to read from
	STDIN (in particular if gpg figures that the input is a
	detached signature and no data file has been specified). Thus if you
	do not want to feed data via STDIN, you should connect STDIN to
	@file{/dev/null}.

	It is highly recommended to use this option along with the options
	@option{--status-fd} and @option{--with-colons} for any unattended use of
	@command{gpg}. Should not be used in an option file.

	@item --no-tty
	@opindex no-tty
	Make sure that the TTY (terminal) is never used for any output.
	This option is needed in some cases because GnuPG sometimes prints
	warnings to the TTY even if @option{--batch} is used.

	@item --yes
	@opindex yes
	Assume "yes" on most questions. Should not be used in an option file.

	@item --no
	@opindex no
	Assume "no" on most questions. Should not be used in an option file.


	@item --list-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex list-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	listing keys and signatures (that is, @option{--list-keys},
	@option{--check-signatures}, @option{--list-public-keys},
	@option{--list-secret-keys}, and the @option{--edit-key} functions).
	Options can be prepended with a @option{no-} (after the two dashes) to
	give the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex list-options:show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--check-signatures},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, and @option{--list-secret-keys} to
	display any photo IDs attached to the key. Defaults to no. See also
	@option{--photo-viewer}. Does not work with @option{--with-colons}:
	see @option{--attribute-fd} for the appropriate way to get photo data
	for scripts and other frontends.

	@item show-usage
	@opindex list-options:show-usage
	Show usage information for keys and subkeys in the standard key
	listing. This is a list of letters indicating the allowed usage for a
	key (@code{E}=encryption, @code{S}=signing, @code{C}=certification,
	@code{A}=authentication). Defaults to yes.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--check-signatures}
	listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex list-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	@option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex list-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the
	@option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex list-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of user IDs during key listings.
	Defaults to yes.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-unusable-subkeys
	@opindex list-options:show-unusable-subkeys
	Show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-keyring
	@opindex list-options:show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-expire
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-expire
	Show signature expiration dates (if any) during
	@option{--check-signatures} listings. Defaults to no.

	@item show-sig-subpackets
	@opindex list-options:show-sig-subpackets
	Include signature subpackets in the key listing. This option can take an
	optional argument list of the subpackets to list. If no argument is
	passed, list all subpackets. Defaults to no. This option is only
	meaningful when using @option{--with-colons} along with
	@option{--check-signatures}.

	@item show-only-fpr-mbox
	@opindex list-options:show-only-fpr-mbox
	For each user-id which has a valid mail address print
	only the fingerprint followed by the mail address.

	@item sort-sigs
	@opindex list-options:sort-sigs
	With --list-sigs and --check-sigs sort the signatures by keyID and
	creation time to make it easier to view the history of these
	signatures. The self-signature is also listed before other
	signatures. Defaults to yes.

	@end table

	@item --verify-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex verify-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options used when
	verifying signatures. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give
	the opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item show-photos
	@opindex verify-options:show-photos
	Display any photo IDs present on the key that issued the signature.
	Defaults to no. See also @option{--photo-viewer}.

	@item show-policy-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-policy-urls
	Show policy URLs in the signature being verified. Defaults to yes.

	@item show-notations
	@itemx show-std-notations
	@itemx show-user-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-std-notations
	@opindex verify-options:show-user-notations
	Show all, IETF standard, or user-defined signature notations in the
	signature being verified. Defaults to IETF standard.

	@item show-keyserver-urls
	@opindex verify-options:show-keyserver-urls
	Show any preferred keyserver URL in the signature being verified.
	Defaults to yes.

	@item show-uid-validity
	@opindex verify-options:show-uid-validity
	Display the calculated validity of the user IDs on the key that issued
	the signature. Defaults to yes.

	@item show-unusable-uids
	@opindex verify-options:show-unusable-uids
	Show revoked and expired user IDs during signature verification.
	Defaults to no.

	@item show-primary-uid-only
	@opindex verify-options:show-primary-uid-only
	Show only the primary user ID during signature verification. That is
	all the AKA lines as well as photo Ids are not shown with the signature
	verification status.

	@end table

	@item --enable-large-rsa
	@itemx --disable-large-rsa
	@opindex enable-large-rsa
	@opindex disable-large-rsa
	With --generate-key and --batch, enable the creation of RSA secret keys as
	large as 8192 bit. Note: 8192 bit is more than is generally
	recommended. These large keys don't significantly improve security,
	but they are more expensive to use, and their signatures and
	certifications are larger. This option is only available if the
	binary was build with large-secmem support.

	@item --enable-dsa2
	@itemx --disable-dsa2
	@opindex enable-dsa2
	@opindex disable-dsa2
	Enable hash truncation for all DSA keys even for old DSA Keys up to
	1024 bit. This is also the default with @option{--openpgp}. Note
	that older versions of GnuPG also required this flag to allow the
	generation of DSA larger than 1024 bit.

	@item --photo-viewer @var{string}
	@opindex photo-viewer
	This is the command line that should be run to view a photo ID. "%i"
	will be expanded to a filename containing the photo. "%I" does the
	same, except the file will not be deleted once the viewer exits.
	Other flags are "%k" for the key ID, "%K" for the long key ID, "%f"
	for the key fingerprint, "%t" for the extension of the image type
	(e.g. "jpg"), "%T" for the MIME type of the image (e.g. "image/jpeg"),
	"%v" for the single-character calculated validity of the image being
	viewed (e.g. "f"), "%V" for the calculated validity as a string (e.g.
	"full"), "%U" for a base32 encoded hash of the user ID,
	and "%%" for an actual percent sign. If neither %i or %I are present,
	then the photo will be supplied to the viewer on standard input.

	On Unix the default viewer is
	@code{xloadimage -fork -quiet -title 'KeyID 0x%k' STDIN}
	with a fallback to
	@code{display -title 'KeyID 0x%k' %i}
	and finally to
	@code{xdg-open %i}.
	On Windows
	@code{!ShellExecute 400 %i} is used; here the command is a meta
	command to use that API call followed by a wait time in milliseconds
	which is used to give the viewer time to read the temporary image file
	before gpg deletes it again. Note that if your image viewer program
	is not secure, then executing it from gpg does not make it secure.

	@item --exec-path @var{string}
	@opindex exec-path
	@efindex PATH
	Sets a list of directories to search for photo viewers If not provided
	photo viewers use the @code{PATH} environment variable.

	@item --keyring @var{file}
	@opindex keyring
	Add @var{file} to the current list of keyrings. If @var{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory ("~/.gnupg" if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is not
	used).

	Note that this adds a keyring to the current list. If the intent is to
	use the specified keyring alone, use @option{--keyring} along with
	@option{--no-default-keyring}.

	If the option @option{--no-keyring} has been used no keyrings will
	be used at all.


	@item --secret-keyring @var{file}
	@opindex secret-keyring
	This is an obsolete option and ignored. All secret keys are stored in
	the @file{private-keys-v1.d} directory below the GnuPG home directory.

	@item --primary-keyring @var{file}
	@opindex primary-keyring
	Designate @var{file} as the primary public keyring. This means that
	newly imported keys (via @option{--import} or keyserver
	@option{--recv-from}) will go to this keyring.

	@item --trustdb-name @var{file}
	@opindex trustdb-name
	Use @var{file} instead of the default trustdb. If @var{file} begins
	with a tilde and a slash, these are replaced by the $HOME directory. If
	the filename does not contain a slash, it is assumed to be in the GnuPG
	home directory (@file{~/.gnupg} if @option{--homedir} or $GNUPGHOME is
	not used).

	@include opt-homedir.texi


	@item --display-charset @var{name}
	@opindex display-charset
	Set the name of the native character set. This is used to convert some
	informational strings like user IDs to the proper UTF-8 encoding.
	Note that this has nothing to do with the character set of data to be
	encrypted or signed; GnuPG does not recode user-supplied data. If this
	option is not used, the default character set is determined from the
	current locale. A verbosity level of 3 shows the chosen set. This
	option should not be used on Windows. Valid values for @var{name}
	are:

	@table @asis

	@item iso-8859-1
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-1
	This is the Latin 1 set.

	@item iso-8859-2
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-2
	The Latin 2 set.

	@item iso-8859-15
	@opindex display-charset:iso-8859-15
	This is currently an alias for
	the Latin 1 set.

	@item koi8-r
	@opindex display-charset:koi8-r
	The usual Russian set (RFC-1489).

	@item utf-8
	@opindex display-charset:utf-8
	Bypass all translations and assume
	that the OS uses native UTF-8 encoding.
	@end table

	@item --utf8-strings
	@itemx --no-utf8-strings
	@opindex utf8-strings
	Assume that command line arguments are given as UTF-8 strings. The
	default (@option{--no-utf8-strings}) is to assume that arguments are
	encoded in the character set as specified by
	@option{--display-charset}. These options affect all following
	arguments. Both options may be used multiple times.
	This option should not be used in an option file.

	This option has no effect on Windows. There the internal used UTF-8
	encoding is translated for console input and output. The command line
	arguments are expected as Unicode and translated to UTF-8. Thus when
	calling this program from another, make sure to use the Unicode
	version of CreateProcess.

	@anchor{gpg-option --options}
	@item --options @var{file}
	@opindex options
	Read options from @var{file} and do not try to read them from the
	default options file in the homedir (see @option{--homedir}). This
	option is ignored if used in an options file.

	@item --no-options
	@opindex no-options
	Shortcut for @option{--options /dev/null}. This option is detected
	before an attempt to open an option file. Using this option will also
	prevent the creation of a @file{~/.gnupg} homedir.

	@item -z @var{n}
	@itemx --compress-level @var{n}
	@itemx --bzip2-compress-level @var{n}
	@opindex compress-level
	@opindex bzip2-compress-level
	Set compression level to @var{n} for the ZIP and ZLIB compression
	algorithms. The default is to use the default compression level of zlib
	(normally 6). @option{--bzip2-compress-level} sets the compression level
	for the BZIP2 compression algorithm (defaulting to 6 as well). This is a
	different option from @option{--compress-level} since BZIP2 uses a
	significant amount of memory for each additional compression level.
	@option{-z} sets both. A value of 0 for @var{n} disables compression.

	@item --bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	@opindex bzip2-decompress-lowmem
	Use a different decompression method for BZIP2 compressed files. This
	alternate method uses a bit more than half the memory, but also runs
	at half the speed. This is useful under extreme low memory
	circumstances when the file was originally compressed at a high
	@option{--bzip2-compress-level}.


	@item --mangle-dos-filenames
	@itemx --no-mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex mangle-dos-filenames
	@opindex no-mangle-dos-filenames
	Older version of Windows cannot handle filenames with more than one
	dot. @option{--mangle-dos-filenames} causes GnuPG to replace (rather
	than add to) the extension of an output filename to avoid this
	problem. This option is off by default and has no effect on non-Windows
	platforms.

	@item --ask-cert-level
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-level
	@opindex ask-cert-level
	When making a key signature, prompt for a certification level. If this
	option is not specified, the certification level used is set via
	@option{--default-cert-level}. See @option{--default-cert-level} for
	information on the specific levels and how they are
	used. @option{--no-ask-cert-level} disables this option. This option
	defaults to no.

	@item --default-cert-level @var{n}
	@opindex default-cert-level
	The default to use for the check level when signing a key.

	0 means you make no particular claim as to how carefully you verified
	the key.

	1 means you believe the key is owned by the person who claims to own
	it but you could not, or did not verify the key at all. This is
	useful for a "persona" verification, where you sign the key of a
	pseudonymous user.

	2 means you did casual verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint and checked the
	user ID on the key against a photo ID.

	3 means you did extensive verification of the key. For example, this
	could mean that you verified the key fingerprint with the owner of the
	key in person, and that you checked, by means of a hard to forge
	document with a photo ID (such as a passport) that the name of the key
	owner matches the name in the user ID on the key, and finally that you
	verified (by exchange of email) that the email address on the key
	belongs to the key owner.

	Note that the examples given above for levels 2 and 3 are just that:
	examples. In the end, it is up to you to decide just what "casual"
	and "extensive" mean to you.

	This option defaults to 0 (no particular claim).

	@item --min-cert-level
	@opindex min-cert-level
	When building the trust database, treat any signatures with a
	certification level below this as invalid. Defaults to 2, which
	disregards level 1 signatures. Note that level 0 "no particular
	claim" signatures are always accepted.

	@item --trusted-key @var{long key ID or fingerprint}
	@opindex trusted-key
	-Assume that the specified key (which must be given
	-as a full 8 byte key ID, a 20 byte, or 32 byte fingerprint)
	-is as trustworthy as one of
	-your own secret keys. This option is useful if you
	-don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them)
	+Assume that the specified key (which should be given as fingerprint)
	+is as trustworthy as one of your own secret keys. This option is
	+useful if you don't want to keep your secret keys (or one of them)
	online but still want to be able to check the validity of a given
	-recipient's or signator's key.
	+recipient's or signator's key. If the given key is not locally
	+available but an LDAP keyserver is configured the missing key is
	+imported from that server.

	@item --trust-model @{pgp\|classic\|tofu\|tofu+pgp\|direct\|always\|auto@}
	@opindex trust-model
	Set what trust model GnuPG should follow. The models are:

	@table @asis

	@item pgp
	@opindex trust-model:pgp
	This is the Web of Trust combined with trust signatures as used in PGP
	5.x and later. This is the default trust model when creating a new
	trust database.

	@item classic
	@opindex trust-model:classic
	This is the standard Web of Trust as introduced by PGP 2.

	@item tofu
	@opindex trust-model:tofu
	@anchor{trust-model-tofu}
	TOFU stands for Trust On First Use. In this trust model, the first
	time a key is seen, it is memorized. If later another key with a
	user id with the same email address is seen, both keys are marked as
	suspect. In that case, the next time either is used, a warning is
	displayed describing the conflict, why it might have occurred
	(either the user generated a new key and failed to cross sign the
	old and new keys, the key is forgery, or a man-in-the-middle attack
	is being attempted), and the user is prompted to manually confirm
	the validity of the key in question.

	Because a potential attacker is able to control the email address
	and thereby circumvent the conflict detection algorithm by using an
	email address that is similar in appearance to a trusted email
	address, whenever a message is verified, statistics about the number
	of messages signed with the key are shown. In this way, a user can
	easily identify attacks using fake keys for regular correspondents.

	When compared with the Web of Trust, TOFU offers significantly
	weaker security guarantees. In particular, TOFU only helps ensure
	consistency (that is, that the binding between a key and email
	address doesn't change). A major advantage of TOFU is that it
	requires little maintenance to use correctly. To use the web of
	trust properly, you need to actively sign keys and mark users as
	trusted introducers. This is a time-consuming process and anecdotal
	evidence suggests that even security-conscious users rarely take the
	time to do this thoroughly and instead rely on an ad-hoc TOFU
	process.

	In the TOFU model, policies are associated with bindings between
	keys and email addresses (which are extracted from user ids and
	normalized). There are five policies, which can be set manually
	using the @option{--tofu-policy} option. The default policy can be
	set using the @option{--tofu-default-policy} option.

	The TOFU policies are: @code{auto}, @code{good}, @code{unknown},
	@code{bad} and @code{ask}. The @code{auto} policy is used by
	default (unless overridden by @option{--tofu-default-policy}) and
	marks a binding as marginally trusted. The @code{good},
	@code{unknown} and @code{bad} policies mark a binding as fully
	trusted, as having unknown trust or as having trust never,
	respectively. The @code{unknown} policy is useful for just using
	TOFU to detect conflicts, but to never assign positive trust to a
	binding. The final policy, @code{ask} prompts the user to indicate
	the binding's trust. If batch mode is enabled (or input is
	inappropriate in the context), then the user is not prompted and the
	@code{undefined} trust level is returned.

	@item tofu+pgp
	@opindex trust-model:tofu+pgp
	This trust model combines TOFU with the Web of Trust. This is done
	by computing the trust level for each model and then taking the
	maximum trust level where the trust levels are ordered as follows:
	@code{unknown < undefined < marginal < fully < ultimate < expired <
	never}.

	By setting @option{--tofu-default-policy=unknown}, this model can be
	used to implement the web of trust with TOFU's conflict detection
	algorithm, but without its assignment of positive trust values,
	which some security-conscious users don't like.

	@item direct
	@opindex trust-model:direct
	Key validity is set directly by the user and not calculated via the
	Web of Trust. This model is solely based on the key and does
	not distinguish user IDs. Note that when changing to another trust
	model the trust values assigned to a key are transformed into
	ownertrust values, which also indicate how you trust the owner of
	the key to sign other keys.

	@item always
	@opindex trust-model:always
	Skip key validation and assume that used keys are always fully
	valid. You generally won't use this unless you are using some
	external validation scheme. This option also suppresses the
	"[uncertain]" tag printed with signature checks when there is no
	evidence that the user ID is bound to the key. Note that this
	trust model still does not allow the use of expired, revoked, or
	disabled keys.

	@item auto
	@opindex trust-model:auto
	Select the trust model depending on whatever the internal trust
	database says. This is the default model if such a database already
	exists. Note that a tofu trust model is not considered here and
	must be enabled explicitly.
	@end table


	@item --auto-key-locate @var{mechanisms}
	@itemx --no-auto-key-locate
	@opindex auto-key-locate
	GnuPG can automatically locate and retrieve keys as needed using this
	option. This happens when encrypting to an email address (in the
	"user@@example.com" form), and there are no "user@@example.com" keys
	on the local keyring. This option takes any number of the mechanisms
	listed below, in the order they are to be tried. Instead of listing
	the mechanisms as comma delimited arguments, the option may also be
	given several times to add more mechanism. The option
	@option{--no-auto-key-locate} or the mechanism "clear" resets the
	list. The default is "local,wkd".

	@table @asis

	@item cert
	Locate a key using DNS CERT, as specified in RFC-4398.

	@item dane
	Locate a key using DANE, as specified
	in draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-05.txt.

	@item wkd
	Locate a key using the Web Key Directory protocol.

	@item ldap
	Using DNS Service Discovery, check the domain in question for any LDAP
	keyservers to use. If this fails, attempt to locate the key using the
	PGP Universal method of checking @samp{ldap://keys.(thedomain)}.

	@item ntds
	Locate the key using the Active Directory (Windows only). This
	method also allows to search by fingerprint using the command
	@option{--locate-external-key}.

	@item keyserver
	Locate a key using a keyserver. This method also allows to search
	by fingerprint using the command @option{--locate-external-key} if
	any of the configured keyservers is an LDAP server.

	@item keyserver-URL
	In addition, a keyserver URL as used in the @command{dirmngr}
	configuration may be used here to query that particular keyserver.
	This method also allows to search by fingerprint using the command
	@option{--locate-external-key} if the URL specifies an LDAP server.

	@item local
	Locate the key using the local keyrings. This mechanism allows the user to
	select the order a local key lookup is done. Thus using
	@samp{--auto-key-locate local} is identical to
	@option{--no-auto-key-locate}.

	@item nodefault
	This flag disables the standard local key lookup, done before any of the
	mechanisms defined by the @option{--auto-key-locate} are tried. The
	position of this mechanism in the list does not matter. It is not
	required if @code{local} is also used.

	@item clear
	Clear all defined mechanisms. This is useful to override
	mechanisms given in a config file. Note that a @code{nodefault} in
	@var{mechanisms} will also be cleared unless it is given after the
	@code{clear}.

	@end table


	@item --auto-key-import
	@itemx --no-auto-key-import
	@opindex auto-key-import
	@opindex no-auto-key-import
	This is an offline mechanism to get a missing key for signature
	verification and for later encryption to this key. If this option is
	enabled and a signature includes an embedded key, that key is
	used to verify the signature and on verification success the key is
	imported. The default is @option{--no-auto-key-import}.

	On the sender (signing) site the option @option{--include-key-block}
	needs to be used to put the public part of the signing key as “Key
	Block subpacket” into the signature.

	@item --auto-key-retrieve
	@itemx --no-auto-key-retrieve
	@opindex auto-key-retrieve
	@opindex no-auto-key-retrieve
	These options enable or disable the automatic retrieving of keys from
	a keyserver when verifying signatures made by keys that are not on the
	local keyring. The default is @option{--no-auto-key-retrieve}.

	The order of methods tried to lookup the key is:

	1. If the option @option{--auto-key-import} is set and the signatures
	includes an embedded key, that key is used to verify the signature and
	on verification success that key is imported.

	2. If a preferred keyserver is specified in the signature and the
	option @option{honor-keyserver-url} is active (which is not the
	default), that keyserver is tried. Note that the creator of the
	signature uses the option @option{--sig-keyserver-url} to specify the
	preferred keyserver for data signatures.

	3. If the signature has the Signer's UID set (e.g. using
	@option{--sender} while creating the signature) a Web Key Directory
	(WKD) lookup is done. This is the default configuration but can be
	disabled by removing WKD from the auto-key-locate list or by using the
	option @option{--disable-signer-uid}.

	4. If any keyserver is configured and the Issuer Fingerprint is part
	of the signature (since GnuPG 2.1.16), the configured keyservers are
	tried.

	Note that this option makes a "web bug" like behavior possible.
	Keyserver or Web Key Directory operators can see which keys you
	request, so by sending you a message signed by a brand new key (which
	you naturally will not have on your local keyring), the operator can
	tell both your IP address and the time when you verified the
	signature.

	@item --keyid-format @{none\|short\|0xshort\|long\|0xlong@}
	@opindex keyid-format
	Select how to display key IDs. "none" does not show the key ID at all
	but shows the fingerprint in a separate line. "short" is the
	traditional 8-character key ID. "long" is the more accurate (but less
	convenient) 16-character key ID. Add an "0x" to either to include an
	"0x" at the beginning of the key ID, as in 0x99242560. Note that this
	option is ignored if the option @option{--with-colons} is used.

	@item --keyserver @var{name}
	@opindex keyserver
	This option is deprecated - please use the @option{--keyserver} in
	@file{dirmngr.conf} instead.

	Use @var{name} as your keyserver. This is the server that
	@option{--receive-keys}, @option{--send-keys}, and @option{--search-keys}
	will communicate with to receive keys from, send keys to, and search for
	keys on. The format of the @var{name} is a URI:
	`scheme:[//]keyservername[:port]' The scheme is the type of keyserver:
	"hkp"/"hkps" for the HTTP (or compatible) keyservers or "ldap"/"ldaps"
	for the LDAP keyservers. Note that your particular installation of
	GnuPG may have other keyserver types available as well. Keyserver
	schemes are case-insensitive. After the keyserver name, optional
	keyserver configuration options may be provided. These are the same as
	the global @option{--keyserver-options} from below, but apply only to
	this particular keyserver.

	Most keyservers synchronize with each other, so there is generally no
	need to send keys to more than one server. The keyserver
	@code{hkp://keys.gnupg.net} uses round robin DNS to give a different
	keyserver each time you use it.

	@item --keyserver-options @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@opindex keyserver-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for the
	keyserver. Options can be prefixed with a `no-' to give the opposite
	meaning. Valid import-options or export-options may be used here as
	well to apply to importing (@option{--recv-key}) or exporting
	(@option{--send-key}) a key from a keyserver. While not all options
	are available for all keyserver types, some common options are:

	@table @asis

	@item include-revoked
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as revoked. Note that not all keyservers
	differentiate between revoked and unrevoked keys, and for such
	keyservers this option is meaningless. Note also that most keyservers do
	not have cryptographic verification of key revocations, and so turning
	this option off may result in skipping keys that are incorrectly marked
	as revoked.

	@item include-disabled
	When searching for a key with @option{--search-keys}, include keys that
	are marked on the keyserver as disabled. Note that this option is not
	used with HKP keyservers.

	@item auto-key-retrieve
	This is an obsolete alias for the option @option{auto-key-retrieve}.
	Please do not use it; it will be removed in future versions..

	@item honor-keyserver-url
	When using @option{--refresh-keys}, if the key in question has a preferred
	keyserver URL, then use that preferred keyserver to refresh the key
	from. In addition, if auto-key-retrieve is set, and the signature
	being verified has a preferred keyserver URL, then use that preferred
	keyserver to fetch the key from. Note that this option introduces a
	"web bug": The creator of the key can see when the keys is
	refreshed. Thus this option is not enabled by default.

	@item include-subkeys
	When receiving a key, include subkeys as potential targets. Note that
	this option is not used with HKP keyservers, as they do not support
	retrieving keys by subkey id.

	@item timeout
	@itemx http-proxy=@var{value}
	@itemx verbose
	@itemx debug
	@itemx check-cert
	@item ca-cert-file
	These options have no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
	@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.

	@end table

	The default list of options is: "self-sigs-only, import-clean,
	repair-keys, repair-pks-subkey-bug, export-attributes". However, if
	the actual used source is an LDAP server "no-self-sigs-only" is
	assumed unless "self-sigs-only" has been explictly configured.


	@item --completes-needed @var{n}
	@opindex compliant-needed
	Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 1).

	@item --marginals-needed @var{n}
	@opindex marginals-needed
	Number of marginally trusted users to introduce a new
	key signer (defaults to 3)

	@item --tofu-default-policy @{auto\|good\|unknown\|bad\|ask@}
	@opindex tofu-default-policy
	The default TOFU policy (defaults to @code{auto}). For more
	information about the meaning of this option, @pxref{trust-model-tofu}.

	@item --max-cert-depth @var{n}
	@opindex max-cert-depth
	Maximum depth of a certification chain (default is 5).

	@item --no-sig-cache
	@opindex no-sig-cache
	Do not cache the verification status of key signatures.
	Caching gives a much better performance in key listings. However, if
	you suspect that your public keyring is not safe against write
	modifications, you can use this option to disable the caching. It
	probably does not make sense to disable it because all kind of damage
	can be done if someone else has write access to your public keyring.

	@item --auto-check-trustdb
	@itemx --no-auto-check-trustdb
	@opindex auto-check-trustdb
	If GnuPG feels that its information about the Web of Trust has to be
	updated, it automatically runs the @option{--check-trustdb} command
	internally. This may be a time consuming
	process. @option{--no-auto-check-trustdb} disables this option.

	@item --use-agent
	@itemx --no-use-agent
	@opindex use-agent
	This is dummy option. @command{@gpgname} always requires the agent.

	@item --gpg-agent-info
	@opindex gpg-agent-info
	This is dummy option. It has no effect when used with @command{@gpgname}.


	@item --agent-program @var{file}
	@opindex agent-program
	Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The
	default value is determined by running @command{gpgconf} with the
	option @option{--list-dirs}. Note that the pipe symbol (@code{\|}) is
	used for a regression test suite hack and may thus not be used in the
	file name.

	@item --dirmngr-program @var{file}
	@opindex dirmngr-program
	Specify a dirmngr program to be used for keyserver access. The
	default value is @file{@value{BINDIR}/dirmngr}.

	@item --disable-dirmngr
	Entirely disable the use of the Dirmngr.

	@item --no-autostart
	@opindex no-autostart
	Do not start the gpg-agent or the dirmngr if it has not yet been
	started and its service is required. This option is mostly useful on
	machines where the connection to gpg-agent has been redirected to
	another machines. If dirmngr is required on the remote machine, it
	may be started manually using @command{gpgconf --launch dirmngr}.

	@item --lock-once
	@opindex lock-once
	Lock the databases the first time a lock is requested
	and do not release the lock until the process
	terminates.

	@item --lock-multiple
	@opindex lock-multiple
	Release the locks every time a lock is no longer
	needed. Use this to override a previous @option{--lock-once}
	from a config file.

	@item --lock-never
	@opindex lock-never
	Disable locking entirely. This option should be used only in very
	special environments, where it can be assured that only one process
	is accessing those files. A bootable floppy with a stand-alone
	encryption system will probably use this. Improper usage of this
	option may lead to data and key corruption.

	@item --exit-on-status-write-error
	@opindex exit-on-status-write-error
	This option will cause write errors on the status FD to immediately
	terminate the process. That should in fact be the default but it never
	worked this way and thus we need an option to enable this, so that the
	change won't break applications which close their end of a status fd
	connected pipe too early. Using this option along with
	@option{--enable-progress-filter} may be used to cleanly cancel long
	running gpg operations.

	@item --limit-card-insert-tries @var{n}
	@opindex limit-card-insert-tries
	With @var{n} greater than 0 the number of prompts asking to insert a
	smartcard gets limited to N-1. Thus with a value of 1 gpg won't at
	all ask to insert a card if none has been inserted at startup. This
	option is useful in the configuration file in case an application does
	not know about the smartcard support and waits ad infinitum for an
	inserted card.

	@item --no-random-seed-file
	@opindex no-random-seed-file
	GnuPG uses a file to store its internal random pool over invocations.
	This makes random generation faster; however sometimes write operations
	are not desired. This option can be used to achieve that with the cost of
	slower random generation.

	@item --no-greeting
	@opindex no-greeting
	Suppress the initial copyright message.

	@item --no-secmem-warning
	@opindex no-secmem-warning
	Suppress the warning about "using insecure memory".

	@item --no-permission-warning
	@opindex permission-warning
	Suppress the warning about unsafe file and home directory (@option{--homedir})
	permissions. Note that the permission checks that GnuPG performs are
	not intended to be authoritative, but rather they simply warn about
	certain common permission problems. Do not assume that the lack of a
	warning means that your system is secure.

	Note that the warning for unsafe @option{--homedir} permissions cannot be
	suppressed in the gpg.conf file, as this would allow an attacker to
	place an unsafe gpg.conf file in place, and use this file to suppress
	warnings about itself. The @option{--homedir} permissions warning may only be
	suppressed on the command line.

	@item --require-secmem
	@itemx --no-require-secmem
	@opindex require-secmem
	Refuse to run if GnuPG cannot get secure memory. Defaults to no
	(i.e. run, but give a warning).


	@item --require-cross-certification
	@itemx --no-require-cross-certification
	@opindex require-cross-certification
	When verifying a signature made from a subkey, ensure that the cross
	certification "back signature" on the subkey is present and valid. This
	protects against a subtle attack against subkeys that can sign.
	Defaults to @option{--require-cross-certification} for
	@command{@gpgname}.

	@item --expert
	@itemx --no-expert
	@opindex expert
	Allow the user to do certain nonsensical or "silly" things like
	signing an expired or revoked key, or certain potentially incompatible
	things like generating unusual key types. This also disables certain
	warning messages about potentially incompatible actions. As the name
	implies, this option is for experts only. If you don't fully
	understand the implications of what it allows you to do, leave this
	off. @option{--no-expert} disables this option.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** KEY RELATED OPTIONS **********
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Key related Options
	@subsection Key related options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -r
	@opindex recipient
	Encrypt for user id @var{name}. If this option or
	@option{--hidden-recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user-id
	unless @option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --hidden-recipient @var{name}
	@itemx -R
	@opindex hidden-recipient
	Encrypt for user ID @var{name}, but hide the key ID of this user's
	key. This option helps to hide the receiver of the message and is a
	limited countermeasure against traffic analysis. If this option or
	@option{--recipient} is not specified, GnuPG asks for the user ID unless
	@option{--default-recipient} is given.

	@item --recipient-file @var{file}
	@itemx -f
	@opindex recipient-file
	This option is similar to @option{--recipient} except that it
	encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the
	name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{@gpgname} assumes that
	the key in this file is fully valid.

	@item --hidden-recipient-file @var{file}
	@itemx -F
	@opindex hidden-recipient-file
	This option is similar to @option{--hidden-recipient} except that it
	encrypts to a key stored in the given file. @var{file} must be the
	name of a file containing exactly one key. @command{@gpgname} assumes that
	the key in this file is fully valid.

	@item --encrypt-to @var{name}
	@opindex encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as an
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked
	user id. No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even
	disabled keys can be used.

	@item --hidden-encrypt-to @var{name}
	@opindex hidden-encrypt-to
	Same as @option{--hidden-recipient} but this one is intended for use in the
	options file and may be used with your own user-id as a hidden
	"encrypt-to-self". These keys are only used when there are other
	recipients given either by use of @option{--recipient} or by the asked user id.
	No trust checking is performed for these user ids and even disabled
	keys can be used.

	@item --no-encrypt-to
	@opindex no-encrypt-to
	Disable the use of all @option{--encrypt-to} and
	@option{--hidden-encrypt-to} keys.

	@item --group @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@opindex group
	Sets up a named group, which is similar to aliases in email programs.
	Any time the group name is a recipient (@option{-r} or
	@option{--recipient}), it will be expanded to the values
	specified. Multiple groups with the same name are automatically merged
	into a single group.

	The values are @code{key IDs} or fingerprints, but any key description
	is accepted. Note that a value with spaces in it will be treated as
	two different values. Note also there is only one level of expansion
	--- you cannot make an group that points to another group. When used
	from the command line, it may be necessary to quote the argument to
	this option to prevent the shell from treating it as multiple
	arguments.

	@item --ungroup @var{name}
	@opindex ungroup
	Remove a given entry from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --no-groups
	@opindex no-groups
	Remove all entries from the @option{--group} list.

	@item --local-user @var{name}
	@itemx -u
	@opindex local-user
	Use @var{name} as the key to sign with. Note that this option overrides
	@option{--default-key}.

	@item --sender @var{mbox}
	@opindex sender
	This option has two purposes. @var{mbox} must either be a complete
	user ID containing a proper mail address or just a plain mail address.
	The option can be given multiple times.

	When creating a signature this option tells gpg the signing key's user
	id used to make the signature and embeds that user ID into the created
	signature (using OpenPGP's ``Signer's User ID'' subpacket). If the
	option is given multiple times a suitable user ID is picked. However,
	if the signing key was specified directly by using a mail address
	(i.e. not by using a fingerprint or key ID) this option is used and
	the mail address is embedded in the created signature.

	When verifying a signature @var{mbox} is used to restrict the
	information printed by the TOFU code to matching user IDs. If the
	option is used and the signature contains a ``Signer's User ID''
	subpacket that information is is also used to restrict the printed
	information. Note that GnuPG considers only the mail address part of
	a User ID.

	If this option or the said subpacket is available the TRUST lines as
	printed by option @option{status-fd} correspond to the corresponding
	User ID; if no User ID is known the TRUST lines are computed directly
	on the key and do not give any information about the User ID. In the
	latter case it his highly recommended to scripts and other frontends
	to evaluate the VALIDSIG line, retrieve the key and print all User IDs
	along with their validity (trust) information.


	@item --try-secret-key @var{name}
	@opindex try-secret-key
	For hidden recipients GPG needs to know the keys to use for trial
	decryption. The key set with @option{--default-key} is always tried
	first, but this is often not sufficient. This option allows setting more
	keys to be used for trial decryption. Although any valid user-id
	specification may be used for @var{name} it makes sense to use at least
	the long keyid to avoid ambiguities. Note that gpg-agent might pop up a
	pinentry for a lot keys to do the trial decryption. If you want to stop
	all further trial decryption you may use close-window button instead of
	the cancel button.

	@item --try-all-secrets
	@opindex try-all-secrets
	Don't look at the key ID as stored in the message but try all secret
	keys in turn to find the right decryption key. This option forces the
	behaviour as used by anonymous recipients (created by using
	@option{--throw-keyids} or @option{--hidden-recipient}) and might come
	handy in case where an encrypted message contains a bogus key ID.

	@item --skip-hidden-recipients
	@itemx --no-skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex skip-hidden-recipients
	@opindex no-skip-hidden-recipients
	During decryption skip all anonymous recipients. This option helps in
	the case that people use the hidden recipients feature to hide their
	own encrypt-to key from others. If one has many secret keys this
	may lead to a major annoyance because all keys are tried in turn to
	decrypt something which was not really intended for it. The drawback
	of this option is that it is currently not possible to decrypt a
	message which includes real anonymous recipients.


	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** INPUT AND OUTPUT *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Input and Output
	@subsection Input and Output

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --armor
	@itemx -a
	@opindex armor
	Create ASCII armored output. The default is to create the binary
	OpenPGP format.

	@item --no-armor
	@opindex no-armor
	Assume the input data is not in ASCII armored format.

	@item --output @var{file}
	@itemx -o @var{file}
	@opindex output
	Write output to @var{file}. To write to stdout use @code{-} as the
	filename.

	@item --max-output @var{n}
	@opindex max-output
	This option sets a limit on the number of bytes that will be generated
	when processing a file. Since OpenPGP supports various levels of
	compression, it is possible that the plaintext of a given message may be
	significantly larger than the original OpenPGP message. While GnuPG
	works properly with such messages, there is often a desire to set a
	maximum file size that will be generated before processing is forced to
	stop by the OS limits. Defaults to 0, which means "no limit".

	@item --chunk-size @var{n}
	@opindex chunk-size
	The AEAD encryption mode encrypts the data in chunks so that a
	receiving side can check for transmission errors or tampering at the
	end of each chunk and does not need to delay this until all data has
	been received. The used chunk size is 2^@var{n} byte. The lowest
	allowed value for @var{n} is 6 (64 byte) and the largest is the
	default of 27 which creates chunks not larger than 128 MiB.

	@item --input-size-hint @var{n}
	@opindex input-size-hint
	This option can be used to tell GPG the size of the input data in
	bytes. @var{n} must be a positive base-10 number. This option is
	only useful if the input is not taken from a file. GPG may use this
	hint to optimize its buffer allocation strategy. It is also used by
	the @option{--status-fd} line ``PROGRESS'' to provide a value for
	``total'' if that is not available by other means.

	@item --key-origin @var{string}[,@var{url}]
	@opindex key-origin
	gpg can track the origin of a key. Certain origins are implicitly
	known (e.g. keyserver, web key directory) and set. For a standard
	import the origin of the keys imported can be set with this option.
	To list the possible values use "help" for @var{string}. Some origins
	can store an optional @var{url} argument. That URL can appended to
	@var{string} after a comma.

	@item --import-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex import-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	importing keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item import-local-sigs
	Allow importing key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	@item keep-ownertrust
	Normally possible still existing ownertrust values of a key are
	cleared if a key is imported. This is in general desirable so that
	a formerly deleted key does not automatically gain an ownertrust
	values merely due to import. On the other hand it is sometimes
	necessary to re-import a trusted set of keys again but keeping
	already assigned ownertrust values. This can be achieved by using
	this option.

	@item repair-pks-subkey-bug
	During import, attempt to repair the damage caused by the PKS keyserver
	bug (pre version 0.9.6) that mangles keys with multiple subkeys. Note
	that this cannot completely repair the damaged key as some crucial data
	is removed by the keyserver, but it does at least give you back one
	subkey. Defaults to no for regular @option{--import} and to yes for
	keyserver @option{--receive-keys}.

	@item import-show
	@itemx show-only
	Show a listing of the key as imported right before it is stored.
	This can be combined with the option @option{--dry-run} to only look
	at keys; the option @option{show-only} is a shortcut for this
	combination. The command @option{--show-keys} is another shortcut
	for this. Note that suffixes like '#' for "sec" and "sbb" lines
	may or may not be printed.

	@item import-export
	Run the entire import code but instead of storing the key to the
	local keyring write it to the output. The export option
	@option{export-dane} affect the output. This option can for example
	be used to remove all invalid parts from a key without the
	need to store it.

	@item merge-only
	During import, allow key updates to existing keys, but do not allow
	any new keys to be imported. Defaults to no.

	@item import-clean
	After import, compact (remove all signatures except the
	self-signature) any user IDs from the new key that are not usable.
	Then, remove any signatures from the new key that are not usable.
	This includes signatures that were issued by keys that are not present
	on the keyring. This option is the same as running the @option{--edit-key}
	command "clean" after import. Defaults to no.

	@item self-sigs-only
	Accept only self-signatures while importing a key. All other key
	signatures are skipped at an early import stage. This option can be
	used with @code{keyserver-options} to mitigate attempts to flood a
	key with bogus signatures from a keyserver. The drawback is that
	all other valid key signatures, as required by the Web of Trust are
	also not imported. Note that when using this option along with
	import-clean it suppresses the final clean step after merging the
	imported key into the existing key.

	@item repair-keys
	After import, fix various problems with the
	keys. For example, this reorders signatures, and strips duplicate
	signatures. Defaults to yes.

	@item bulk-import
	When used the keyboxd (option "use-keyboxd" in @file{common.conf})
	do the import within a single
	transaction. This is an experimental feature.

	@item import-minimal
	Import the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except
	the most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the
	same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" after import.
	Defaults to no.

	@item restore
	@itemx import-restore
	Import in key restore mode. This imports all data which is usually
	skipped during import; including all GnuPG specific data. All other
	contradicting options are overridden.
	@end table

	@item --import-filter @{@var{name}=@var{expr}@}
	@itemx --export-filter @{@var{name}=@var{expr}@}
	@opindex import-filter
	@opindex export-filter
	These options define an import/export filter which are applied to the
	imported/exported keyblock right before it will be stored/written.
	@var{name} defines the type of filter to use, @var{expr} the
	expression to evaluate. The option can be used several times which
	then appends more expression to the same @var{name}.

	@noindent
	The available filter types are:

	@table @asis

	@item keep-uid
	This filter will keep a user id packet and its dependent packets in
	the keyblock if the expression evaluates to true.

	@item drop-subkey
	This filter drops the selected subkeys.
	Currently only implemented for --export-filter.

	@item drop-sig
	This filter drops the selected key signatures on user ids.
	Self-signatures are not considered.
	Currently only implemented for --import-filter.

	@end table

	For the syntax of the expression see the chapter "FILTER EXPRESSIONS".
	The property names for the expressions depend on the actual filter
	type and are indicated in the following table.

	The available properties are:

	@table @asis

	@item uid
	A string with the user id. (keep-uid)

	@item mbox
	The addr-spec part of a user id with mailbox or the empty string.
	(keep-uid)

	@item key_algo
	A number with the public key algorithm of a key or subkey packet.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item key_created
	@itemx key_created_d
	The first is the timestamp a public key or subkey packet was
	created. The second is the same but given as an ISO string,
	e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-subkey)

	@item fpr
	The hexified fingerprint of the current subkey or primary key.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item primary
	Boolean indicating whether the user id is the primary one. (keep-uid)

	@item expired
	Boolean indicating whether a user id (keep-uid), a key (drop-subkey), or a
	signature (drop-sig) expired.

	@item revoked
	Boolean indicating whether a user id (keep-uid) or a key (drop-subkey) has
	been revoked.

	@item disabled
	Boolean indicating whether a primary key is disabled. (not used)

	@item secret
	Boolean indicating whether a key or subkey is a secret one.
	(drop-subkey)

	@item usage
	A string indicating the usage flags for the subkey, from the
	sequence ``ecsa?''. For example, a subkey capable of just signing
	and authentication would be an exact match for ``sa''. (drop-subkey)

	@item sig_created
	@itemx sig_created_d
	The first is the timestamp a signature packet was created. The
	second is the same but given as an ISO date string,
	e.g. "2016-08-17". (drop-sig)

	@item sig_algo
	A number with the public key algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig)

	@item sig_digest_algo
	A number with the digest algorithm of a signature packet. (drop-sig)

	@end table

	@item --export-options @var{parameters}
	@opindex export-options
	This is a space or comma delimited string that gives options for
	exporting keys. Options can be prepended with a `no-' to give the
	opposite meaning. The options are:

	@table @asis

	@item export-local-sigs
	Allow exporting key signatures marked as "local". This is not
	generally useful unless a shared keyring scheme is being used.
	Defaults to no.

	@item export-attributes
	Include attribute user IDs (photo IDs) while exporting. Not
	including attribute user IDs is useful to export keys that are going
	to be used by an OpenPGP program that does not accept attribute user
	IDs. Defaults to yes.

	@item export-sensitive-revkeys
	Include designated revoker information that was marked as
	"sensitive". Defaults to no.

	@c Since GnuPG 2.1 gpg-agent manages the secret key and thus the
	@c export-reset-subkey-passwd hack is not anymore justified. Such use
	@c cases may be implemented using a specialized secret key export
	@c tool.
	@c @item export-reset-subkey-passwd
	@c When using the @option{--export-secret-subkeys} command, this option resets
	@c the passphrases for all exported subkeys to empty. This is useful
	@c when the exported subkey is to be used on an unattended machine where
	@c a passphrase doesn't necessarily make sense. Defaults to no.

	@item backup
	@itemx export-backup
	Export for use as a backup. The exported data includes all data
	which is needed to restore the key or keys later with GnuPG. The
	format is basically the OpenPGP format but enhanced with GnuPG
	specific data. All other contradicting options are overridden.

	@item export-clean
	Compact (remove all signatures from) user IDs on the key being
	exported if the user IDs are not usable. Also, do not export any
	signatures that are not usable. This includes signatures that were
	issued by keys that are not present on the keyring. This option is
	the same as running the @option{--edit-key} command "clean" before export
	except that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to
	no.

	@item export-minimal
	Export the smallest key possible. This removes all signatures except the
	most recent self-signature on each user ID. This option is the same as
	running the @option{--edit-key} command "minimize" before export except
	that the local copy of the key is not modified. Defaults to no.

	@item export-dane
	Instead of outputting the key material output OpenPGP DANE records
	suitable to put into DNS zone files. An ORIGIN line is printed before
	each record to allow diverting the records to the corresponding zone
	file.

	@end table

	@item --with-colons
	@opindex with-colons
	Print key listings delimited by colons. Note that the output will be
	encoded in UTF-8 regardless of any @option{--display-charset} setting. This
	format is useful when GnuPG is called from scripts and other programs
	as it is easily machine parsed. The details of this format are
	documented in the file @file{doc/DETAILS}, which is included in the GnuPG
	source distribution.

	@item --fixed-list-mode
	@opindex fixed-list-mode
	Do not merge primary user ID and primary key in @option{--with-colon}
	listing mode and print all timestamps as seconds since 1970-01-01.
	Since GnuPG 2.0.10, this mode is always used and thus this option is
	obsolete; it does not harm to use it though.

	@item --legacy-list-mode
	@opindex legacy-list-mode
	Revert to the pre-2.1 public key list mode. This only affects the
	human readable output and not the machine interface
	(i.e. @code{--with-colons}). Note that the legacy format does not
	convey suitable information for elliptic curves.

	@item --with-fingerprint
	@opindex with-fingerprint
	Same as the command @option{--fingerprint} but changes only the format
	of the output and may be used together with another command.

	@item --with-subkey-fingerprint
	@opindex with-subkey-fingerprint
	If a fingerprint is printed for the primary key, this option forces
	printing of the fingerprint for all subkeys. This could also be
	achieved by using the @option{--with-fingerprint} twice but by using
	this option along with keyid-format "none" a compact fingerprint is
	printed.

	@item --with-icao-spelling
	@opindex with-icao-spelling
	Print the ICAO spelling of the fingerprint in addition to the hex digits.

	@item --with-keygrip
	@opindex with-keygrip
	Include the keygrip in the key listings. In @code{--with-colons} mode
	this is implicitly enable for secret keys.

	@item --with-key-origin
	@opindex with-key-origin
	Include the locally held information on the origin and last update of
	a key in a key listing. In @code{--with-colons} mode this is always
	printed. This data is currently experimental and shall not be
	considered part of the stable API.

	@item --with-wkd-hash
	@opindex with-wkd-hash
	Print a Web Key Directory identifier along with each user ID in key
	listings. This is an experimental feature and semantics may change.

	@item --with-secret
	@opindex with-secret
	Include info about the presence of a secret key in public key listings
	done with @code{--with-colons}.

	@end table

	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** OPENPGP OPTIONS **************
	@c *******************************************
	@node OpenPGP Options
	@subsection OpenPGP protocol specific options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -t, --textmode
	@itemx --no-textmode
	@opindex textmode
	Treat input files as text and store them in the OpenPGP canonical text
	form with standard "CRLF" line endings. This also sets the necessary
	flags to inform the recipient that the encrypted or signed data is text
	and may need its line endings converted back to whatever the local
	system uses. This option is useful when communicating between two
	platforms that have different line ending conventions (UNIX-like to Mac,
	Mac to Windows, etc). @option{--no-textmode} disables this option, and
	is the default.

	@item --force-v3-sigs
	@itemx --no-force-v3-sigs
	@item --force-v4-certs
	@itemx --no-force-v4-certs
	These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.1.

	@item --force-aead
	@opindex force-aead
	Force the use of AEAD encryption over MDC encryption. AEAD is a
	modern and faster way to do authenticated encryption than the old MDC
	method. See also options @option{--aead-algo} and
	@option{--chunk-size}.

	@item --force-mdc
	@itemx --disable-mdc
	@opindex force-mdc
	@opindex disable-mdc
	These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.2.8. The
	MDC is always used unless the keys indicate that an AEAD algorithm can
	be used in which case AEAD is used. But note: If the creation of a
	legacy non-MDC message is exceptionally required, the option
	@option{--rfc2440} allows for this.

	@item --disable-signer-uid
	@opindex disable-signer-uid
	By default the user ID of the signing key is embedded in the data signature.
	As of now this is only done if the signing key has been specified with
	@option{local-user} using a mail address, or with @option{sender}. This
	information can be helpful for verifier to locate the key; see option
	@option{--auto-key-retrieve}.

	@item --include-key-block
	@itemx --no-include-key-block
	@opindex include-key-block
	@opindex no-include-key-block
	This option is used to embed the actual signing key into a data
	signature. The embedded key is stripped down to a single user id and
	includes only the signing subkey used to create the signature as well
	as as valid encryption subkeys. All other info is removed from the
	key to keep it and thus the signature small. This option is the
	OpenPGP counterpart to the @command{gpgsm} option
	@option{--include-certs} and allows the recipient of a signed message
	to reply encrypted to the sender without using any online directories
	to lookup the key. The default is @option{--no-include-key-block}.
	See also the option @option{--auto-key-import}.

	@item --personal-cipher-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-cipher-preferences
	Set the list of personal cipher preferences to @var{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also
	used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command.

	@item --personal-aead-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-aead-preferences
	Set the list of personal AEAD preferences to @var{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also
	used for the @option{--symmetric} encryption command.

	@item --personal-digest-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-digest-preferences
	Set the list of personal digest preferences to @var{string}. Use
	@command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available algorithms,
	and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This allows the user
	to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key
	preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by
	all recipients. The most highly ranked digest algorithm in this list
	is also used when signing without encryption
	(e.g. @option{--clear-sign} or @option{--sign}).

	@item --personal-compress-preferences @var{string}
	@opindex personal-compress-preferences
	Set the list of personal compression preferences to @var{string}.
	Use @command{@gpgname --version} to get a list of available
	algorithms, and use @code{none} to set no preference at all. This
	allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the
	recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that
	is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked compression
	algorithm in this list is also used when there are no recipient keys
	to consider (e.g. @option{--symmetric}).

	@item --s2k-cipher-algo @var{name}
	@opindex s2k-cipher-algo
	Use @var{name} as the cipher algorithm for symmetric encryption with
	a passphrase if @option{--personal-cipher-preferences} and
	@option{--cipher-algo} are not given. The default is @value{GPGSYMENCALGO}.

	@item --s2k-digest-algo @var{name}
	@opindex s2k-digest-algo
	Use @var{name} as the digest algorithm used to mangle the passphrases
	for symmetric encryption. The default is SHA-1.

	@item --s2k-mode @var{n}
	@opindex s2k-mode
	Selects how passphrases for symmetric encryption are mangled. If
	@var{n} is 0 a plain passphrase (which is in general not recommended)
	will be used, a 1 adds a salt (which should not be used) to the
	passphrase and a 3 (the default) iterates the whole process a number
	of times (see @option{--s2k-count}).

	@item --s2k-count @var{n}
	@opindex s2k-count
	Specify how many times the passphrases mangling for symmetric
	encryption is repeated. This value may range between 1024 and
	65011712 inclusive. The default is inquired from gpg-agent. Note
	that not all values in the 1024-65011712 range are legal and if an
	illegal value is selected, GnuPG will round up to the nearest legal
	value. This option is only meaningful if @option{--s2k-mode} is set
	to the default of 3.


	@end table

	@c ***************************
	@c ***** Compliance ******
	@c ***************************
	@node Compliance Options
	@subsection Compliance options

	These options control what GnuPG is compliant to. Only one of these
	options may be active at a time. Note that the default setting of
	this is nearly always the correct one. See the INTEROPERABILITY WITH
	OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS section below before using one of these
	options.

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --gnupg
	@opindex gnupg
	Use standard GnuPG behavior. This is essentially OpenPGP behavior (see
	@option{--openpgp}), but with extension from the proposed update to
	OpenPGP and with some additional workarounds for common compatibility
	problems in different versions of PGP. This is the default option, so
	it is not generally needed, but it may be useful to override a
	different compliance option in the gpg.conf file.

	@item --openpgp
	@opindex openpgp
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict OpenPGP
	behavior. This option implies @option{--allow-old-cipher-algos}. Use
	this option to reset all previous options like @option{--s2k-*},
	@option{--cipher-algo}, @option{--digest-algo} and
	@option{--compress-algo} to OpenPGP compliant values. All PGP
	workarounds are disabled.

	@item --rfc4880
	@opindex rfc4880
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-4880
	behavior. This option implies @option{--allow-old-cipher-algos}.
	Note that this is currently the same thing as @option{--openpgp}.

	@item --rfc4880bis
	@opindex rfc4880bis
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict according to the
	proposed updates of RFC-4880.

	@item --rfc2440
	@opindex rfc2440
	Reset all packet, cipher and digest options to strict RFC-2440
	behavior. Note that by using this option encryption packets are
	created in a legacy mode without MDC protection. This is dangerous
	and should thus only be used for experiments. This option implies
	@option{--allow-old-cipher-algos}. See also option
	@option{--ignore-mdc-error}.

	@item --pgp6
	@opindex pgp6
	This option is obsolete; it is handled as an alias for @option{--pgp7}

	@item --pgp7
	@opindex pgp7
	Set up all options to be as PGP 7 compliant as possible. This allowed
	the ciphers IDEA, 3DES, CAST5,AES128, AES192, AES256, and TWOFISH.,
	the hashes MD5, SHA1 and RIPEMD160, and the compression algorithms
	none and ZIP. This option implies @option{--escape-from-lines} and
	disables @option{--throw-keyids},

	@item --pgp8
	@opindex pgp8
	Set up all options to be as PGP 8 compliant as possible. PGP 8 is a lot
	closer to the OpenPGP standard than previous versions of PGP, so all
	this does is disable @option{--throw-keyids} and set
	@option{--escape-from-lines}. All algorithms are allowed except for the
	SHA224, SHA384, and SHA512 digests.

	@item --compliance @var{string}
	@opindex compliance
	This option can be used instead of one of the options above. Valid
	values for @var{string} are the above option names (without the double
	dash) and possibly others as shown when using "help" for @var{value}.

	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ****** ESOTERIC OPTIONS *************
	@c *******************************************
	@node GPG Esoteric Options
	@subsection Doing things one usually doesn't want to do

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item -n
	@itemx --dry-run
	@opindex dry-run
	Don't make any changes (this is not completely implemented).

	@item --list-only
	@opindex list-only
	Changes the behaviour of some commands. This is like @option{--dry-run} but
	different in some cases. The semantic of this option may be extended in
	the future. Currently it only skips the actual decryption pass and
	therefore enables a fast listing of the encryption keys.

	@item -i
	@itemx --interactive
	@opindex interactive
	Prompt before overwriting any files.

	@item --debug-level @var{level}
	@opindex debug-level
	Select the debug level for investigating problems. @var{level} may be
	a numeric value or by a keyword:

	@table @code
	@item none
	No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of
	the keyword.
	@item basic
	Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item advanced
	More verbose debug messages. A value between 3 and 5 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item expert
	Even more detailed messages. A value between 6 and 8 may be used
	instead of the keyword.
	@item guru
	All of the debug messages you can get. A value greater than 8 may be
	used instead of the keyword. The creation of hash tracing files is
	only enabled if the keyword is used.
	@end table

	How these messages are mapped to the actual debugging flags is not
	specified and may change with newer releases of this program. They are
	however carefully selected to best aid in debugging.

	@item --debug @var{flags}
	@opindex debug
	Set debug flags. All flags are or-ed and @var{flags} may be given
	in C syntax (e.g. 0x0042) or as a comma separated list of flag names.
	To get a list of all supported flags the single word "help" can be
	used. This option is only useful for debugging and the behavior may
	change at any time without notice.

	@item --debug-all
	@opindex debug-all
	Set all useful debugging flags.

	@item --debug-iolbf
	@opindex debug-iolbf
	Set stdout into line buffered mode. This option is only honored when
	given on the command line.

	@item --debug-set-iobuf-size @var{n}
	@opindex debug-iolbf
	Change the buffer size of the IOBUFs to @var{n} kilobyte. Using 0
	prints the current size. Note well: This is a maintainer only option
	and may thus be changed or removed at any time without notice.

	@item --debug-allow-large-chunks
	@opindex debug-allow-large-chunks
	To facilitate in-memory decryption on the receiving site, the largest
	recommended chunk size is 128 MiB (@code{--chunk-size 27}). This
	option allows to specify a limit of up to 4 EiB (@code{--chunk-size
	62}) for experiments.

	@item --faked-system-time @var{epoch}
	@opindex faked-system-time
	This option is only useful for testing; it sets the system time back or
	forth to @var{epoch} which is the number of seconds elapsed since the year
	1970. Alternatively @var{epoch} may be given as a full ISO time string
	(e.g. "20070924T154812").

	If you suffix @var{epoch} with an exclamation mark (!), the system time
	will appear to be frozen at the specified time.

	@item --full-timestrings
	@opindex full-timestrings
	Change the format of printed creation and expiration times from just
	the date to the date and time. This is in general not useful and the
	same information is anyway available in @option{--with-colons} mode.
	These longer strings are also not well aligned with other printed
	data.

	@item --enable-progress-filter
	@opindex enable-progress-filter
	Enable certain PROGRESS status outputs. This option allows frontends
	to display a progress indicator while gpg is processing larger files.
	There is a slight performance overhead using it.

	@item --status-fd @var{n}
	@opindex status-fd
	Write special status strings to the file descriptor @var{n}.
	See the file DETAILS in the documentation for a listing of them.

	@item --status-file @var{file}
	@opindex status-file
	Same as @option{--status-fd}, except the status data is written to file
	@var{file}.

	@item --logger-fd @var{n}
	@opindex logger-fd
	Write log output to file descriptor @var{n} and not to STDERR.

	@item --log-file @var{file}
	@itemx --logger-file @var{file}
	@opindex log-file
	Same as @option{--logger-fd}, except the logger data is written to
	file @var{file}. Use @file{socket://} to log to s socket.

	@item --attribute-fd @var{n}
	@opindex attribute-fd
	Write attribute subpackets to the file descriptor @var{n}. This is most
	useful for use with @option{--status-fd}, since the status messages are
	needed to separate out the various subpackets from the stream delivered
	to the file descriptor.

	@item --attribute-file @var{file}
	@opindex attribute-file
	Same as @option{--attribute-fd}, except the attribute data is written to
	file @var{file}.

	@item --comment @var{string}
	@itemx --no-comments
	@opindex comment
	Use @var{string} as a comment string in cleartext signatures and ASCII
	armored messages or keys (see @option{--armor}). The default behavior is
	not to use a comment string. @option{--comment} may be repeated multiple
	times to get multiple comment strings. @option{--no-comments} removes
	all comments. It is a good idea to keep the length of a single comment
	below 60 characters to avoid problems with mail programs wrapping such
	lines. Note that comment lines, like all other header lines, are not
	protected by the signature.

	@item --emit-version
	@itemx --no-emit-version
	@opindex emit-version
	Force inclusion of the version string in ASCII armored output. If
	given once only the name of the program and the major number is
	emitted, given twice the minor is also emitted, given thrice
	the micro is added, and given four times an operating system identification
	is also emitted. @option{--no-emit-version} (default) disables the version
	line.

	@item --sig-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@itemx --cert-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@itemx -N, --set-notation @{@var{name}=@var{value}@}
	@opindex sig-notation
	@opindex cert-notation
	@opindex set-notation
	Put the name value pair into the signature as notation data.
	@var{name} must consist only of printable characters or spaces, and
	must contain a '@@' character in the form keyname@@domain.example.com
	(substituting the appropriate keyname and domain name, of course). This
	is to help prevent pollution of the IETF reserved notation
	namespace. The @option{--expert} flag overrides the '@@'
	check. @var{value} may be any printable string; it will be encoded in
	UTF-8, so you should check that your @option{--display-charset} is set
	correctly. If you prefix @var{name} with an exclamation mark (!), the
	notation data will be flagged as critical
	(rfc4880:5.2.3.16). @option{--sig-notation} sets a notation for data
	signatures. @option{--cert-notation} sets a notation for key signatures
	(certifications). @option{--set-notation} sets both.

	There are special codes that may be used in notation names. "%k" will
	be expanded into the key ID of the key being signed, "%K" into the
	long key ID of the key being signed, "%f" into the fingerprint of the
	key being signed, "%s" into the key ID of the key making the
	signature, "%S" into the long key ID of the key making the signature,
	"%g" into the fingerprint of the key making the signature (which might
	be a subkey), "%p" into the fingerprint of the primary key of the key
	making the signature, "%c" into the signature count from the OpenPGP
	smartcard, and "%%" results in a single "%". %k, %K, and %f are only
	meaningful when making a key signature (certification), and %c is only
	meaningful when using the OpenPGP smartcard.

	@item --known-notation @var{name}
	@opindex known-notation
	Adds @var{name} to a list of known critical signature notations. The
	effect of this is that gpg will not mark a signature with a critical
	signature notation of that name as bad. Note that gpg already knows
	by default about a few critical signatures notation names.

	@item --sig-policy-url @var{string}
	@itemx --cert-policy-url @var{string}
	@itemx --set-policy-url @var{string}
	@opindex sig-policy-url
	@opindex cert-policy-url
	@opindex set-policy-url
	Use @var{string} as a Policy URL for signatures (rfc4880:5.2.3.20). If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the policy URL packet will
	be flagged as critical. @option{--sig-policy-url} sets a policy url for
	data signatures. @option{--cert-policy-url} sets a policy url for key
	signatures (certifications). @option{--set-policy-url} sets both.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --sig-keyserver-url @var{string}
	@opindex sig-keyserver-url
	Use @var{string} as a preferred keyserver URL for data signatures. If
	you prefix it with an exclamation mark (!), the keyserver URL packet
	will be flagged as critical.

	The same %-expandos used for notation data are available here as well.

	@item --set-filename @var{string}
	@opindex set-filename
	Use @var{string} as the filename which is stored inside messages.
	This overrides the default, which is to use the actual filename of the
	file being encrypted. Using the empty string for @var{string}
	effectively removes the filename from the output.

	@item --for-your-eyes-only
	@itemx --no-for-your-eyes-only
	@opindex for-your-eyes-only
	Set the `for your eyes only' flag in the message. This causes GnuPG to
	refuse to save the file unless the @option{--output} option is given,
	and PGP to use a "secure viewer" with a claimed Tempest-resistant font
	to display the message. This option overrides @option{--set-filename}.
	@option{--no-for-your-eyes-only} disables this option.

	@item --use-embedded-filename
	@itemx --no-use-embedded-filename
	@opindex use-embedded-filename
	Try to create a file with a name as embedded in the data. This can be
	a dangerous option as it enables overwriting files. Defaults to no.
	Note that the option @option{--output} overrides this option.

	@item --cipher-algo @var{name}
	@opindex cipher-algo
	Use @var{name} as cipher algorithm. Running the program with the
	command @option{--version} yields a list of supported algorithms. If
	this is not used the cipher algorithm is selected from the preferences
	stored with the key. In general, you do not want to use this option as
	it allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option
	@option{--personal-cipher-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish the
	same thing.

	@item --aead-algo @var{name}
	@opindex aead-algo
	Specify that the AEAD algorithm @var{name} is to be used. This is
	useful for symmetric encryption where no key preference are available
	to select the AEAD algorithm. Running @command{@gpgname} with option
	@option{--version} shows the available AEAD algorithms. In general,
	you do not want to use this option as it allows you to violate the
	OpenPGP standard. The option @option{--personal-aead-preferences} is
	the safe way to accomplish the same thing.

	@item --digest-algo @var{name}
	@opindex digest-algo
	Use @var{name} as the message digest algorithm. Running the program
	with the command @option{--version} yields a list of supported
	algorithms. In general, you do not want to use this option as it
	allows you to violate the OpenPGP standard. The option
	@option{--personal-digest-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish
	the same thing.

	@item --compress-algo @var{name}
	@opindex compress-algo
	Use compression algorithm @var{name}. "zlib" is RFC-1950 ZLIB
	compression. "zip" is RFC-1951 ZIP compression which is used by PGP.
	"bzip2" is a more modern compression scheme that can compress some
	things better than zip or zlib, but at the cost of more memory used
	during compression and decompression. "uncompressed" or "none"
	disables compression. If this option is not used, the default
	behavior is to examine the recipient key preferences to see which
	algorithms the recipient supports. If all else fails, ZIP is used for
	maximum compatibility.

	ZLIB may give better compression results than ZIP, as the compression
	window size is not limited to 8k. BZIP2 may give even better
	compression results than that, but will use a significantly larger
	amount of memory while compressing and decompressing. This may be
	significant in low memory situations. Note, however, that PGP (all
	versions) only supports ZIP compression. Using any algorithm other
	than ZIP or "none" will make the message unreadable with PGP. In
	general, you do not want to use this option as it allows you to
	violate the OpenPGP standard. The option
	@option{--personal-compress-preferences} is the safe way to accomplish
	the same thing.

	@item --cert-digest-algo @var{name}
	@opindex cert-digest-algo
	Use @var{name} as the message digest algorithm used when signing a
	key. Running the program with the command @option{--version} yields a
	list of supported algorithms. Be aware that if you choose an
	algorithm that GnuPG supports but other OpenPGP implementations do
	not, then some users will not be able to use the key signatures you
	make, or quite possibly your entire key. Note also that a public key
	algorithm must be compatible with the specified digest algorithm; thus
	selecting an arbitrary digest algorithm may result in error messages
	from lower crypto layers or lead to security flaws.


	@item --disable-cipher-algo @var{name}
	@opindex disable-cipher-algo
	Never allow the use of @var{name} as cipher algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --disable-pubkey-algo @var{name}
	@opindex disable-pubkey-algo
	Never allow the use of @var{name} as public key algorithm.
	The given name will not be checked so that a later loaded algorithm
	will still get disabled.

	@item --throw-keyids
	@itemx --no-throw-keyids
	@opindex throw-keyids
	Do not put the recipient key IDs into encrypted messages. This helps to
	hide the receivers of the message and is a limited countermeasure
	against traffic analysis.@footnote{Using a little social engineering
	anyone who is able to decrypt the message can check whether one of the
	other recipients is the one he suspects.} On the receiving side, it may
	slow down the decryption process because all available secret keys must
	be tried. @option{--no-throw-keyids} disables this option. This option
	is essentially the same as using @option{--hidden-recipient} for all
	recipients.

	@item --not-dash-escaped
	@opindex not-dash-escaped
	This option changes the behavior of cleartext signatures
	so that they can be used for patch files. You should not
	send such an armored file via email because all spaces
	and line endings are hashed too. You can not use this
	option for data which has 5 dashes at the beginning of a
	line, patch files don't have this. A special armor header
	line tells GnuPG about this cleartext signature option.

	@item --escape-from-lines
	@itemx --no-escape-from-lines
	@opindex escape-from-lines
	Because some mailers change lines starting with "From " to ">From " it
	is good to handle such lines in a special way when creating cleartext
	signatures to prevent the mail system from breaking the signature. Note
	that all other PGP versions do it this way too. Enabled by
	default. @option{--no-escape-from-lines} disables this option.

	@item --passphrase-repeat @var{n}
	@opindex passphrase-repeat
	Specify how many times @command{@gpgname} will request a new
	passphrase be repeated. This is useful for helping memorize a
	passphrase. Defaults to 1 repetition; can be set to 0 to disable any
	passphrase repetition. Note that a @var{n} greater than 1 will pop up
	the pinentry window @var{n}+1 times even if a modern pinentry with
	two entry fields is used.

	@item --passphrase-fd @var{n}
	@opindex passphrase-fd
	Read the passphrase from file descriptor @var{n}. Only the first line
	will be read from file descriptor @var{n}. If you use 0 for @var{n},
	the passphrase will be read from STDIN. This can only be used if only
	one passphrase is supplied.

	Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the
	option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1
	the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}.

	@item --passphrase-file @var{file}
	@opindex passphrase-file
	Read the passphrase from file @var{file}. Only the first line will
	be read from file @var{file}. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, a passphrase stored in a file is
	of questionable security if other users can read this file. Don't use
	this option if you can avoid it.

	Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the
	option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1
	the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}.

	@item --passphrase @var{string}
	@opindex passphrase
	Use @var{string} as the passphrase. This can only be used if only one
	passphrase is supplied. Obviously, this is of very questionable
	security on a multi-user system. Don't use this option if you can
	avoid it.

	Note that since Version 2.0 this passphrase is only used if the
	option @option{--batch} has also been given. Since Version 2.1
	the @option{--pinentry-mode} also needs to be set to @code{loopback}.

	@item --pinentry-mode @var{mode}
	@opindex pinentry-mode
	Set the pinentry mode to @var{mode}. Allowed values for @var{mode}
	are:
	@table @asis
	@item default
	Use the default of the agent, which is @code{ask}.
	@item ask
	Force the use of the Pinentry.
	@item cancel
	Emulate use of Pinentry's cancel button.
	@item error
	Return a Pinentry error (``No Pinentry'').
	@item loopback
	Redirect Pinentry queries to the caller. Note that in contrast to
	Pinentry the user is not prompted again if he enters a bad password.
	@end table

	@item --no-symkey-cache
	@opindex no-symkey-cache
	Disable the passphrase cache used for symmetrical en- and decryption.
	This cache is based on the message specific salt value
	(cf. @option{--s2k-mode}).

	@item --request-origin @var{origin}
	@opindex request-origin
	Tell gpg to assume that the operation ultimately originated at
	@var{origin}. Depending on the origin certain restrictions are applied
	and the Pinentry may include an extra note on the origin. Supported
	values for @var{origin} are: @code{local} which is the default,
	@code{remote} to indicate a remote origin or @code{browser} for an
	operation requested by a web browser.

	@item --command-fd @var{n}
	@opindex command-fd
	This is a replacement for the deprecated shared-memory IPC mode.
	If this option is enabled, user input on questions is not expected
	from the TTY but from the given file descriptor. It should be used
	together with @option{--status-fd}. See the file doc/DETAILS in the source
	distribution for details on how to use it.

	@item --command-file @var{file}
	@opindex command-file
	Same as @option{--command-fd}, except the commands are read out of file
	@var{file}

	@item --allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@itemx --no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	@opindex allow-non-selfsigned-uid
	Allow the import and use of keys with user IDs which are not
	self-signed. This is not recommended, as a non self-signed user ID is
	trivial to forge. @option{--no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid} disables.

	@item --allow-freeform-uid
	@opindex allow-freeform-uid
	Disable all checks on the form of the user ID while generating a new
	one. This option should only be used in very special environments as
	it does not ensure the de-facto standard format of user IDs.

	@item --ignore-time-conflict
	@opindex ignore-time-conflict
	GnuPG normally checks that the timestamps associated with keys and
	signatures have plausible values. However, sometimes a signature
	seems to be older than the key due to clock problems. This option
	makes these checks just a warning. See also @option{--ignore-valid-from} for
	timestamp issues on subkeys.

	@item --ignore-valid-from
	@opindex ignore-valid-from
	GnuPG normally does not select and use subkeys created in the future.
	This option allows the use of such keys and thus exhibits the
	pre-1.0.7 behaviour. You should not use this option unless there
	is some clock problem. See also @option{--ignore-time-conflict} for timestamp
	issues with signatures.

	@item --ignore-crc-error
	@opindex ignore-crc-error
	The ASCII armor used by OpenPGP is protected by a CRC checksum against
	transmission errors. Occasionally the CRC gets mangled somewhere on
	the transmission channel but the actual content (which is protected by
	the OpenPGP protocol anyway) is still okay. This option allows GnuPG
	to ignore CRC errors.

	@item --ignore-mdc-error
	@opindex ignore-mdc-error
	This option changes a MDC integrity protection failure into a warning.
	It is required to decrypt old messages which did not use an MDC. It
	may also be useful if a message is partially garbled, but it is
	necessary to get as much data as possible out of that garbled message.
	Be aware that a missing or failed MDC can be an indication of an
	attack. Use with great caution; see also option @option{--rfc2440}.

	@item --allow-old-cipher-algos
	@opindex allow-old-cipher-algos
	Old cipher algorithms like 3DES, IDEA, or CAST5 encrypt data using
	blocks of 64 bits; modern algorithms use blocks of 128 bit instead.
	To avoid certain attack on these old algorithms it is suggested not to
	encrypt more than 150 MiByte using the same key. For this reason gpg
	does not allow the use of 64 bit block size algorithms for encryption
	unless this option is specified.

	@item --allow-weak-digest-algos
	@opindex allow-weak-digest-algos
	Signatures made with known-weak digest algorithms are normally
	rejected with an ``invalid digest algorithm'' message. This option
	allows the verification of signatures made with such weak algorithms.
	MD5 is the only digest algorithm considered weak by default. See also
	@option{--weak-digest} to reject other digest algorithms.

	@item --weak-digest @var{name}
	@opindex weak-digest
	Treat the specified digest algorithm as weak. Signatures made over
	weak digests algorithms are normally rejected. This option can be
	supplied multiple times if multiple algorithms should be considered
	weak. See also @option{--allow-weak-digest-algos} to disable
	rejection of weak digests. MD5 is always considered weak, and does
	not need to be listed explicitly.

	@item --allow-weak-key-signatures
	@opindex allow-weak-key-signatures
	To avoid a minor risk of collision attacks on third-party key
	signatures made using SHA-1, those key signatures are considered
	invalid. This options allows to override this restriction.

	@item --no-default-keyring
	@opindex no-default-keyring
	Do not add the default keyrings to the list of keyrings. Note that
	GnuPG will not operate without any keyrings, so if you use this option
	and do not provide alternate keyrings via @option{--keyring} or
	@option{--secret-keyring}, then GnuPG will still use the default public or
	secret keyrings.

	@item --no-keyring
	@opindex no-keyring
	Do not use any keyring at all. This overrides the default and all
	options which specify keyrings.

	@item --skip-verify
	@opindex skip-verify
	Skip the signature verification step. This may be
	used to make the decryption faster if the signature
	verification is not needed.

	@item --with-key-data
	@opindex with-key-data
	Print key listings delimited by colons (like @option{--with-colons}) and
	print the public key data.

	@item --list-signatures
	@opindex list-signatures
	@itemx --list-sigs
	@opindex list-sigs
	Same as @option{--list-keys}, but the signatures are listed too. This
	command has the same effect as using @option{--list-keys} with
	@option{--with-sig-list}. Note that in contrast to
	@option{--check-signatures} the key signatures are not verified. This
	command can be used to create a list of signing keys missing in the
	local keyring; for example:

	@example
	gpg --list-sigs --with-colons USERID \| \
	awk -F: '$1=="sig" && $2=="?" @{if($13)@{print $13@}else@{print $5@}@}'
	@end example

	@item --fast-list-mode
	@opindex fast-list-mode
	Changes the output of the list commands to work faster; this is achieved
	by leaving some parts empty. Some applications don't need the user ID
	and the trust information given in the listings. By using this options
	they can get a faster listing. The exact behaviour of this option may
	change in future versions. If you are missing some information, don't
	use this option.

	@item --no-literal
	@opindex no-literal
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --set-filesize
	@opindex set-filesize
	This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.

	@item --show-session-key
	@opindex show-session-key
	Display the session key used for one message. See
	@option{--override-session-key} for the counterpart of this option.

	We think that Key Escrow is a Bad Thing; however the user should have
	the freedom to decide whether to go to prison or to reveal the content
	of one specific message without compromising all messages ever
	encrypted for one secret key.

	You can also use this option if you receive an encrypted message which
	is abusive or offensive, to prove to the administrators of the
	messaging system that the ciphertext transmitted corresponds to an
	inappropriate plaintext so they can take action against the offending
	user.

	@item --override-session-key @var{string}
	@itemx --override-session-key-fd @var{fd}
	@opindex override-session-key
	Don't use the public key but the session key @var{string} respective
	the session key taken from the first line read from file descriptor
	@var{fd}. The format of this string is the same as the one printed by
	@option{--show-session-key}. This option is normally not used but
	comes handy in case someone forces you to reveal the content of an
	encrypted message; using this option you can do this without handing
	out the secret key. Note that using @option{--override-session-key}
	may reveal the session key to all local users via the global process
	table. Often it is useful to combine this option with
	@option{--no-keyring}.

	@item --ask-sig-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-sig-expire
	@opindex ask-sig-expire
	When making a data signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-sig-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-sig-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-sig-expire
	@opindex default-sig-expire
	The default expiration time to use for signature expiration. Valid
	values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the letter d
	(for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years) (for
	example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an absolute
	date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --ask-cert-expire
	@itemx --no-ask-cert-expire
	@opindex ask-cert-expire
	When making a key signature, prompt for an expiration time. If this
	option is not specified, the expiration time set via
	@option{--default-cert-expire} is used. @option{--no-ask-cert-expire}
	disables this option.

	@item --default-cert-expire
	@opindex default-cert-expire
	The default expiration time to use for key signature expiration.
	Valid values are "0" for no expiration, a number followed by the
	letter d (for days), w (for weeks), m (for months), or y (for years)
	(for example "2m" for two months, or "5y" for five years), or an
	absolute date in the form YYYY-MM-DD. Defaults to "0".

	@item --default-new-key-algo @var{string}
	@opindex default-new-key-algo @var{string}
	This option can be used to change the default algorithms for key
	generation. The @var{string} is similar to the arguments required for
	the command @option{--quick-add-key} but slightly different. For
	example the current default of @code{"rsa2048/cert,sign+rsa2048/encr"}
	(or @code{"rsa3072"}) can be changed to the value of what we currently
	call future default, which is @code{"ed25519/cert,sign+cv25519/encr"}.
	You need to consult the source code to learn the details. Note that
	the advanced key generation commands can always be used to specify a
	key algorithm directly.

	@item --no-auto-trust-new-key
	@opindex no-auto-trust-new-key
	When creating a new key the ownertrust of the new key is set to
	ultimate. This option disables this and the user needs to manually
	assign an ownertrust value.

	@item --force-sign-key
	@opindex force-sign-key
	This option modifies the behaviour of the commands
	@option{--quick-sign-key}, @option{--quick-lsign-key}, and the "sign"
	sub-commands of @option{--edit-key} by forcing the creation of a key
	signature, even if one already exists.

	@item --allow-secret-key-import
	@opindex allow-secret-key-import
	This is an obsolete option and is not used anywhere.

	@item --allow-multiple-messages
	@item --no-allow-multiple-messages
	These are obsolete options; they have no more effect since GnuPG 2.2.8.

	@item --enable-special-filenames
	@opindex enable-special-filenames
	This option enables a mode in which filenames of the form
	@file{-&n}, where n is a non-negative decimal number,
	refer to the file descriptor n and not to a file with that name.

	@item --no-expensive-trust-checks
	@opindex no-expensive-trust-checks
	Experimental use only.

	@item --preserve-permissions
	@opindex preserve-permissions
	Don't change the permissions of a secret keyring back to user
	read/write only. Use this option only if you really know what you are doing.

	@item --default-preference-list @var{string}
	@opindex default-preference-list
	Set the list of default preferences to @var{string}. This preference
	list is used for new keys and becomes the default for "setpref" in the
	@option{--edit-key} menu.

	@item --default-keyserver-url @var{name}
	@opindex default-keyserver-url
	Set the default keyserver URL to @var{name}. This keyserver will be
	used as the keyserver URL when writing a new self-signature on a key,
	which includes key generation and changing preferences.

	@item --list-config
	@opindex list-config
	Display various internal configuration parameters of GnuPG. This option
	is intended for external programs that call GnuPG to perform tasks, and
	is thus not generally useful. See the file @file{doc/DETAILS} in the
	source distribution for the details of which configuration items may be
	listed. @option{--list-config} is only usable with
	@option{--with-colons} set.

	@item --list-gcrypt-config
	@opindex list-gcrypt-config
	Display various internal configuration parameters of Libgcrypt.

	@item --gpgconf-list
	@opindex gpgconf-list
	This command is similar to @option{--list-config} but in general only
	internally used by the @command{gpgconf} tool.

	@item --gpgconf-test
	@opindex gpgconf-test
	This is more or less dummy action. However it parses the configuration
	file and returns with failure if the configuration file would prevent
	@command{@gpgname} from startup. Thus it may be used to run a syntax check
	on the configuration file.

	@c @item --use-only-openpgp-card
	@c @opindex use-only-openpgp-card
	@c Only access OpenPGP card's and no other cards. This is a hidden
	@c option which could be used in case an old use case required the
	@c OpenPGP card while several cards are available. This option might be
	@c removed if it turns out that nobody requires it.

	@item --chuid @var{uid}
	@opindex chuid
	Change the current user to @var{uid} which may either be a number or a
	name. This can be used from the root account to run gpg for
	another user. If @var{uid} is not the current UID a standard PATH is
	set and the envvar GNUPGHOME is unset. To override the latter the
	option @option{--homedir} can be used. This option has only an effect
	when used on the command line. This option has currently no effect at
	all on Windows.

	@end table

	@c *******************************
	@c ***** Deprecated **********
	@c *******************************
	@node Deprecated Options
	@subsection Deprecated options

	@table @gnupgtabopt

	@item --show-photos
	@itemx --no-show-photos
	@opindex show-photos
	Causes @option{--list-keys}, @option{--list-signatures},
	@option{--list-public-keys}, @option{--list-secret-keys}, and verifying
	a signature to also display the photo ID attached to the key, if
	any. See also @option{--photo-viewer}. These options are deprecated. Use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-photos} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-photos} instead.

	@item --show-keyring
	@opindex show-keyring
	Display the keyring name at the head of key listings to show which
	keyring a given key resides on. This option is deprecated: use
	@option{--list-options [no-]show-keyring} instead.

	@item --always-trust
	@opindex always-trust
	Identical to @option{--trust-model always}. This option is deprecated.

	@item --show-notation
	@itemx --no-show-notation
	@opindex show-notation
	Show signature notations in the @option{--list-signatures} or @option{--check-signatures} listings
	as well as when verifying a signature with a notation in it. These
	options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options [no-]show-notation}
	and/or @option{--verify-options [no-]show-notation} instead.

	@item --show-policy-url
	@itemx --no-show-policy-url
	@opindex show-policy-url
	Show policy URLs in the @option{--list-signatures} or @option{--check-signatures}
	listings as well as when verifying a signature with a policy URL in
	it. These options are deprecated. Use @option{--list-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} and/or @option{--verify-options
	[no-]show-policy-url} instead.


	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* FILES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect files
	@node GPG Configuration
	@section Configuration files

	There are a few configuration files to control certain aspects of
	@command{@gpgname}'s operation. Unless noted, they are expected in the
	current home directory (@pxref{option --homedir}).

	@table @file

	@item gpg.conf
	@efindex gpg.conf
	This is the standard configuration file read by @command{@gpgname} on
	startup. It may contain any valid long option; the leading two dashes
	may not be entered and the option may not be abbreviated. This default
	name may be changed on the command line (@pxref{gpg-option --options}).
	You should backup this file.

	@item common.conf
	@efindex common.conf
	This is an optional configuration file read by @command{@gpgname} on
	startup. It may contain options pertaining to all components of
	GnuPG. Its current main use is for the "use-keyboxd" option.

	@end table

	Note that on larger installations, it is useful to put predefined files
	into the directory @file{@value{SYSCONFSKELDIR}} so that
	newly created users start up with a working configuration.
	For existing users a small
	helper script is provided to create these files (@pxref{addgnupghome}).

	For internal purposes @command{@gpgname} creates and maintains a few other
	files; They all live in the current home directory (@pxref{option
	--homedir}). Only the @command{@gpgname} program may modify these files.


	@table @file
	@item ~/.gnupg
	@efindex ~/.gnupg
	This is the default home directory which is used if neither the
	environment variable @code{GNUPGHOME} nor the option
	@option{--homedir} is given.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg
	@efindex pubring.gpg
	The public keyring using a legacy format. You should backup this file.

	If this file is not available, @command{gpg} defaults to the new
	keybox format and creates a file @file{pubring.kbx} unless that file
	already exists in which case that file will also be used for OpenPGP
	keys.

	Note that in the case that both files, @file{pubring.gpg} and
	@file{pubring.kbx} exists but the latter has no OpenPGP keys, the
	legacy file @file{pubring.gpg} will be used. Take care: GnuPG
	versions before 2.1 will always use the file @file{pubring.gpg}
	because they do not know about the new keybox format. In the case
	that you have to use GnuPG 1.4 to decrypt archived data you should
	keep this file.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the public keyring.

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
	@efindex pubring.kbx
	The public keyring using the new keybox format. This file is shared
	with @command{gpgsm}. You should backup this file. See above for
	the relation between this file and it predecessor.

	To convert an existing @file{pubring.gpg} file to the keybox format, you
	first backup the ownertrust values, then rename @file{pubring.gpg} to
	@file{publickeys.backup}, so it won’t be recognized by any GnuPG version,
	run import, and finally restore the ownertrust values:

	@example
	$ cd ~/.gnupg
	$ gpg --export-ownertrust >otrust.lst
	$ mv pubring.gpg publickeys.backup
	$ gpg --import-options restore --import publickeys.backups
	$ gpg --import-ownertrust otrust.lst
	@end example

	@item ~/.gnupg/pubring.kbx.lock
	The lock file for @file{pubring.kbx}.

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg
	@efindex secring.gpg
	The legacy secret keyring as used by GnuPG versions before 2.1. It is not
	used by GnuPG 2.1 and later. You may want to keep it in case you
	have to use GnuPG 1.4 to decrypt archived data.

	@item ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the legacy secret keyring.

	@item ~/.gnupg/.gpg-v21-migrated
	@efindex .gpg-v21-migrated
	File indicating that a migration to GnuPG 2.1 has been done.

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg
	@efindex trustdb.gpg
	The trust database. There is no need to backup this file; it is better
	to backup the ownertrust values (@pxref{option --export-ownertrust}).

	@item ~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg.lock
	The lock file for the trust database.

	@item ~/.gnupg/random_seed
	@efindex random_seed
	A file used to preserve the state of the internal random pool.

	@item ~/.gnupg/openpgp-revocs.d/
	@efindex openpgp-revocs.d
	This is the directory where gpg stores pre-generated revocation
	certificates. The file name corresponds to the OpenPGP fingerprint of
	the respective key. It is suggested to backup those certificates and
	if the primary private key is not stored on the disk to move them to
	an external storage device. Anyone who can access these files is
	able to revoke the corresponding key. You may want to print them out.
	You should backup all files in this directory and take care to keep
	this backup closed away.

	@end table

	Operation is further controlled by a few environment variables:

	@table @asis

	@item HOME
	@efindex HOME
	Used to locate the default home directory.

	@item GNUPGHOME
	@efindex GNUPGHOME
	If set directory used instead of "~/.gnupg".

	@item GPG_AGENT_INFO
	This variable is obsolete; it was used by GnuPG versions before 2.1.

	@item PINENTRY_USER_DATA
	@efindex PINENTRY_USER_DATA
	This value is passed via gpg-agent to pinentry. It is useful to convey
	extra information to a custom pinentry.

	@item COLUMNS
	@itemx LINES
	@efindex COLUMNS
	@efindex LINES
	Used to size some displays to the full size of the screen.

	@item LANGUAGE
	@efindex LANGUAGE
	Apart from its use by GNU, it is used in the W32 version to override the
	language selection done through the Registry. If used and set to a
	valid and available language name (@var{langid}), the file with the
	translation is loaded from
	@code{@var{gpgdir}/gnupg.nls/@var{langid}.mo}. Here @var{gpgdir} is the
	directory out of which the gpg binary has been loaded. If it can't be
	loaded the Registry is tried and as last resort the native Windows
	locale system is used.

	@end table

	When calling the gpg-agent component @command{@gpgname} sends a set of
	environment variables to gpg-agent. The names of these variables can
	be listed using the command:

	@example
	gpg-connect-agent 'getinfo std_env_names' /bye \| awk '$1=="D" @{print $2@}'
	@end example



	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* EXAMPLES **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect examples
	@node GPG Examples
	@section Examples

	@table @asis

	@item gpg -se -r @code{Bob} @code{file}
	sign and encrypt for user Bob

	@item gpg --clear-sign @code{file}
	make a cleartext signature

	@item gpg -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature

	@item gpg -u 0x12345678 -sb @code{file}
	make a detached signature with the key 0x12345678

	@item gpg --list-keys @code{user_ID}
	show keys

	@item gpg --fingerprint @code{user_ID}
	show fingerprint

	@item gpg --verify @code{pgpfile}
	@itemx gpg --verify @code{sigfile} [@code{datafile}]
	Verify the signature of the file but do not output the data unless
	requested. The second form is used for detached signatures, where
	@code{sigfile} is the detached signature (either ASCII armored or
	binary) and @code{datafile} are the signed data; if this is not given, the name of the
	file holding the signed data is constructed by cutting off the
	extension (".asc" or ".sig") of @code{sigfile} or by asking the user
	for the filename. If the option @option{--output} is also used the
	signed data is written to the file specified by that option; use
	@code{-} to write the signed data to stdout.
	@end table


	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* **************
	@c ************* USER ID **************
	@c ************* **************
	@c *******************************************
	@mansect how to specify a user id
	@ifset isman
	@include specify-user-id.texi
	@end ifset

	@mansect filter expressions
	@chapheading FILTER EXPRESSIONS

	The options @option{--import-filter} and @option{--export-filter} use
	expressions with this syntax (square brackets indicate an optional
	part and curly braces a repetition, white space between the elements
	are allowed):

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	[lc] @{[@{flag@}] PROPNAME op VALUE [lc]@}
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	The name of a property (@var{PROPNAME}) may only consist of letters,
	digits and underscores. The description for the filter type
	describes which properties are defined. If an undefined property is
	used it evaluates to the empty string. Unless otherwise noted, the
	@var{VALUE} must always be given and may not be the empty string. No
	quoting is defined for the value, thus the value may not contain the
	strings @code{&&} or @code{\|\|}, which are used as logical connection
	operators. The flag @code{--} can be used to remove this restriction.

	Numerical values are computed as long int; standard C notation
	applies. @var{lc} is the logical connection operator; either
	@code{&&} for a conjunction or @code{\|\|} for a disjunction. A
	conjunction is assumed at the begin of an expression. Conjunctions
	have higher precedence than disjunctions. If @var{VALUE} starts with
	one of the characters used in any @var{op} a space after the
	@var{op} is required.

	@noindent
	The supported operators (@var{op}) are:

	@table @asis

	@item =~
	Substring must match.

	@item !~
	Substring must not match.

	@item =
	The full string must match.

	@item <>
	The full string must not match.

	@item ==
	The numerical value must match.

	@item !=
	The numerical value must not match.

	@item <=
	The numerical value of the field must be LE than the value.

	@item <
	The numerical value of the field must be LT than the value.

	@item >
	The numerical value of the field must be GT than the value.

	@item >=
	The numerical value of the field must be GE than the value.

	@item -le
	The string value of the field must be less or equal than the value.

	@item -lt
	The string value of the field must be less than the value.

	@item -gt
	The string value of the field must be greater than the value.

	@item -ge
	The string value of the field must be greater or equal than the value.

	@item -n
	True if value is not empty (no value allowed).

	@item -z
	True if value is empty (no value allowed).

	@item -t
	Alias for "PROPNAME != 0" (no value allowed).

	@item -f
	Alias for "PROPNAME == 0" (no value allowed).

	@end table

	@noindent
	Values for @var{flag} must be space separated. The supported flags
	are:

	@table @asis
	@item --
	@var{VALUE} spans to the end of the expression.
	@item -c
	The string match in this part is done case-sensitive.
	@end table

	The filter options concatenate several specifications for a filter of
	the same type. For example the four options in this example:

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	--import-filter keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa"
	--import-filter keep-uid="&& uid !~ Test"
	--import-filter keep-uid="\|\| uid =~ Alpha"
	--import-filter keep-uid="uid !~ Test"
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	@noindent
	which is equivalent to

	@c man:.RS
	@example
	--import-filter \
	keep-uid="uid =~ Alfa" && uid !~ Test" \|\| uid =~ Alpha" && "uid !~ Test"
	@end example
	@c man:.RE

	imports only the user ids of a key containing the strings "Alfa"
	or "Alpha" but not the string "test".

	@mansect trust values
	@ifset isman
	@include trust-values.texi
	@end ifset

	@mansect return value
	@chapheading RETURN VALUE

	The program returns 0 if there are no severe errors, 1 if at least a
	signature was bad, and other error codes for fatal errors.

	Note that signature verification requires exact knowledge of what has
	been signed and by whom it has been signed. Using only the return code
	is thus not an appropriate way to verify a signature by a script.
	Either make proper use or the status codes or use the @command{gpgv}
	tool which has been designed to make signature verification easy for
	scripts.

	@mansect warnings
	@chapheading WARNINGS

	Use a good password for your user account and make sure that all
	security issues are always fixed on your machine. Also employ
	diligent physical protection to your machine. Consider to use a good
	passphrase as a last resort protection to your secret key in the case
	your machine gets stolen. It is important that your secret key is
	never leaked. Using an easy to carry around token or smartcard with
	the secret key is often a advisable.

	If you are going to verify detached signatures, make sure that the
	program knows about it; either give both filenames on the command line
	or use @samp{-} to specify STDIN.

	For scripted or other unattended use of @command{gpg} make sure to use
	the machine-parseable interface and not the default interface which is
	intended for direct use by humans. The machine-parseable interface
	provides a stable and well documented API independent of the locale or
	future changes of @command{gpg}. To enable this interface use the
	options @option{--with-colons} and @option{--status-fd}. For certain
	operations the option @option{--command-fd} may come handy too. See
	this man page and the file @file{DETAILS} for the specification of the
	interface. Note that the GnuPG ``info'' pages as well as the PDF
	version of the GnuPG manual features a chapter on unattended use of
	GnuPG. As an alternative the library @command{GPGME} can be used as a
	high-level abstraction on top of that interface.

	@mansect interoperability
	@chapheading INTEROPERABILITY WITH OTHER OPENPGP PROGRAMS

	GnuPG tries to be a very flexible implementation of the OpenPGP
	standard. In particular, GnuPG implements many of the optional parts
	of the standard, such as the SHA-512 hash, and the ZLIB and BZIP2
	compression algorithms. It is important to be aware that not all
	OpenPGP programs implement these optional algorithms and that by
	forcing their use via the @option{--cipher-algo},
	@option{--digest-algo}, @option{--cert-digest-algo}, or
	@option{--compress-algo} options in GnuPG, it is possible to create a
	perfectly valid OpenPGP message, but one that cannot be read by the
	intended recipient.

	There are dozens of variations of OpenPGP programs available, and each
	supports a slightly different subset of these optional algorithms.
	For example, until recently, no (unhacked) version of PGP supported
	the BLOWFISH cipher algorithm. A message using BLOWFISH simply could
	not be read by a PGP user. By default, GnuPG uses the standard
	OpenPGP preferences system that will always do the right thing and
	create messages that are usable by all recipients, regardless of which
	OpenPGP program they use. Only override this safe default if you
	really know what you are doing.

	If you absolutely must override the safe default, or if the preferences
	on a given key are invalid for some reason, you are far better off using
	the @option{--pgp6}, @option{--pgp7}, or @option{--pgp8} options. These
	options are safe as they do not force any particular algorithms in
	violation of OpenPGP, but rather reduce the available algorithms to a
	"PGP-safe" list.

	@mansect bugs
	@chapheading BUGS

	On older systems this program should be installed as setuid(root). This
	is necessary to lock memory pages. Locking memory pages prevents the
	operating system from writing memory pages (which may contain
	passphrases or other sensitive material) to disk. If you get no
	warning message about insecure memory your operating system supports
	locking without being root. The program drops root privileges as soon
	as locked memory is allocated.

	Note also that some systems (especially laptops) have the ability to
	``suspend to disk'' (also known as ``safe sleep'' or ``hibernate'').
	This writes all memory to disk before going into a low power or even
	powered off mode. Unless measures are taken in the operating system
	to protect the saved memory, passphrases or other sensitive material
	may be recoverable from it later.

	Before you report a bug you should first search the mailing list
	archives for similar problems and second check whether such a bug has
	already been reported to our bug tracker at @url{https://bugs.gnupg.org}.

	@c *******************************************
	@c ************* ************
	@c ************* UNATTENDED ************
	@c ************* ************
	@c *******************************************
	@manpause
	@node Unattended Usage of GPG
	@section Unattended Usage

	@command{@gpgname} is often used as a backend engine by other software. To help
	with this a machine interface has been defined to have an unambiguous
	way to do this. The options @option{--status-fd} and @option{--batch}
	are almost always required for this.

	@menu
	* Programmatic use of GnuPG:: Programmatic use of GnuPG
	* Ephemeral home directories:: Ephemeral home directories
	* The quick key manipulation interface:: The quick key manipulation interface
	* Unattended GPG key generation:: Unattended key generation
	@end menu


	@node Programmatic use of GnuPG
	@subsection Programmatic use of GnuPG

	Please consider using GPGME instead of calling @command{@gpgname}
	directly. GPGME offers a stable, backend-independent interface for
	many cryptographic operations. It supports OpenPGP and S/MIME, and
	also allows interaction with various GnuPG components.

	GPGME provides a C-API, and comes with bindings for C++, Qt, and
	Python. Bindings for other languages are available.

	@node Ephemeral home directories
	@subsection Ephemeral home directories

	Sometimes you want to contain effects of some operation, for example
	you want to import a key to inspect it, but you do not want this key
	to be added to your keyring. In earlier versions of GnuPG, it was
	possible to specify alternate keyring files for both public and secret
	keys. In modern GnuPG versions, however, we changed how secret keys
	are stored in order to better protect secret key material, and it was
	not possible to preserve this interface.

	The preferred way to do this is to use ephemeral home directories.
	This technique works across all versions of GnuPG.

	Create a temporary directory, create (or copy) a configuration that
	meets your needs, make @command{@gpgname} use this directory either
	using the environment variable @var{GNUPGHOME}, or the option
	@option{--homedir}. GPGME supports this too on a per-context basis,
	by modifying the engine info of contexts. Now execute whatever
	operation you like, import and export key material as necessary. Once
	finished, you can delete the directory. All GnuPG backend services
	that were started will detect this and shut down.

	@node The quick key manipulation interface
	@subsection The quick key manipulation interface

	Recent versions of GnuPG have an interface to manipulate keys without
	using the interactive command @option{--edit-key}. This interface was
	added mainly for the benefit of GPGME (please consider using GPGME,
	see the manual subsection ``Programmatic use of GnuPG''). This
	interface is described in the subsection ``How to manage your keys''.

	@node Unattended GPG key generation
	@subsection Unattended key generation

	The command @option{--generate-key} may be used along with the option
	@option{--batch} for unattended key generation. This is the most
	flexible way of generating keys, but it is also the most complex one.
	Consider using the quick key manipulation interface described in the
	previous subsection ``The quick key manipulation interface''.

	The parameters for the key are either read from stdin or given as a
	file on the command line. The format of the parameter file is as
	follows:

	@itemize @bullet
	@item Text only, line length is limited to about 1000 characters.
	@item UTF-8 encoding must be used to specify non-ASCII characters.
	@item Empty lines are ignored.
	@item Leading and trailing white space is ignored.
	@item A hash sign as the first non white space character indicates
	a comment line.
	@item Control statements are indicated by a leading percent sign, the
	arguments are separated by white space from the keyword.
	@item Parameters are specified by a keyword, followed by a colon. Arguments
	are separated by white space.
	@item
	The first parameter must be @samp{Key-Type}; control statements may be
	placed anywhere.
	@item
	The order of the parameters does not matter except for @samp{Key-Type}
	which must be the first parameter. The parameters are only used for
	the generated keyblock (primary and subkeys); parameters from previous
	sets are not used. Some syntactically checks may be performed.
	@item
	Key generation takes place when either the end of the parameter file
	is reached, the next @samp{Key-Type} parameter is encountered or at the
	control statement @samp{%commit} is encountered.
	@end itemize

	@noindent
	Control statements:

	@table @asis

	@item %echo @var{text}
	Print @var{text} as diagnostic.

	@item %dry-run
	Suppress actual key generation (useful for syntax checking).

	@item %commit
	Perform the key generation. Note that an implicit commit is done at
	the next @asis{Key-Type} parameter.

	@item %pubring @var{filename}
	Do not write the key to the default or commandline given keyring but
	to @var{filename}. This must be given before the first commit to take
	place, duplicate specification of the same filename is ignored, the
	last filename before a commit is used. The filename is used until a
	new filename is used (at commit points) and all keys are written to
	that file. If a new filename is given, this file is created (and
	overwrites an existing one).

	See the previous subsection ``Ephemeral home directories'' for a more
	robust way to contain side-effects.

	@item %secring @var{filename}
	This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	See the previous subsection ``Ephemeral home directories''.

	@item %ask-passphrase
	@itemx %no-ask-passphrase
	This option is a no-op for GnuPG 2.1 and later.

	@item %no-protection
	Using this option allows the creation of keys without any passphrase
	protection. This option is mainly intended for regression tests.

	@item %transient-key
	If given the keys are created using a faster and a somewhat less
	secure random number generator. This option may be used for keys
	which are only used for a short time and do not require full
	cryptographic strength. It takes only effect if used together with
	the control statement @samp{%no-protection}.

	@end table

	@noindent
	General Parameters:

	@table @asis

	@item Key-Type: @var{algo}
	Starts a new parameter block by giving the type of the primary
	key. The algorithm must be capable of signing. This is a required
	parameter. @var{algo} may either be an OpenPGP algorithm number or a
	string with the algorithm name. The special value @samp{default} may
	be used for @var{algo} to create the default key type; in this case a
	@samp{Key-Usage} shall not be given and @samp{default} also be used
	for @samp{Subkey-Type}.

	@item Key-Length: @var{nbits}
	The requested length of the generated key in bits. The default is
	returned by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}.
	For ECC keys this parameter is ignored.

	@item Key-Curve: @var{curve}
	The requested elliptic curve of the generated key. This is a required
	parameter for ECC keys. It is ignored for non-ECC keys.

	@item Key-Grip: @var{hexstring}
	This is optional and used to generate a CSR or certificate for an
	already existing key. Key-Length will be ignored when given.

	@item Key-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Space or comma delimited list of key usages. Allowed values are
	@samp{encrypt}, @samp{sign}, and @samp{auth}. This is used to
	generate the key flags. Please make sure that the algorithm is
	capable of this usage. Note that OpenPGP requires that all primary
	keys are capable of certification, so no matter what usage is given
	here, the @samp{cert} flag will be on. If no @samp{Key-Usage} is
	specified and the @samp{Key-Type} is not @samp{default}, all allowed
	usages for that particular algorithm are used; if it is not given but
	@samp{default} is used the usage will be @samp{sign}.

	@item Subkey-Type: @var{algo}
	This generates a secondary key (subkey). Currently only one subkey
	can be handled. See also @samp{Key-Type} above.

	@item Subkey-Length: @var{nbits}
	Length of the secondary key (subkey) in bits. The default is returned
	by running the command @samp{@gpgname --gpgconf-list}.

	@item Subkey-Curve: @var{curve}
	Key curve for a subkey; similar to @samp{Key-Curve}.

	@item Subkey-Usage: @var{usage-list}
	Key usage lists for a subkey; similar to @samp{Key-Usage}.

	@item Passphrase: @var{string}
	If you want to specify a passphrase for the secret key, enter it here.
	Default is to use the Pinentry dialog to ask for a passphrase.

	@item Name-Real: @var{name}
	@itemx Name-Comment: @var{comment}
	@itemx Name-Email: @var{email}
	The three parts of a user name. Remember to use UTF-8 encoding here.
	If you don't give any of them, no user ID is created.

	@item Expire-Date: @var{iso-date}\|(@var{number}[d\|w\|m\|y])
	Set the expiration date for the key (and the subkey). It may either
	be entered in ISO date format (e.g. "20000815T145012") or as number of
	days, weeks, month or years after the creation date. The special
	notation "seconds=N" is also allowed to specify a number of seconds
	since creation. Without a letter days are assumed. Note that there
	is no check done on the overflow of the type used by OpenPGP for
	timestamps. Thus you better make sure that the given value make
	sense. Although OpenPGP works with time intervals, GnuPG uses an
	absolute value internally and thus the last year we can represent is
	2105.

	@item Creation-Date: @var{iso-date}
	Set the creation date of the key as stored in the key information and
	which is also part of the fingerprint calculation. Either a date like
	"1986-04-26" or a full timestamp like "19860426T042640" may be used.
	The time is considered to be UTC. The special notation "seconds=N"
	may be used to directly specify a the number of seconds since Epoch
	(Unix time). If it is not given the current time is used.

	@item Preferences: @var{string}
	Set the cipher, hash, and compression preference values for this key.
	This expects the same type of string as the sub-command @samp{setpref}
	in the @option{--edit-key} menu.

	@item Revoker: @var{algo}:@var{fpr} [sensitive]
	Add a designated revoker to the generated key. Algo is the public key
	algorithm of the designated revoker (i.e. RSA=1, DSA=17, etc.)
	@var{fpr} is the fingerprint of the designated revoker. The optional
	@samp{sensitive} flag marks the designated revoker as sensitive
	information. Only v4 keys may be designated revokers.

	@item Keyserver: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter that specifies the preferred keyserver
	URL for the key.

	@item Handle: @var{string}
	This is an optional parameter only used with the status lines
	KEY_CREATED and KEY_NOT_CREATED. @var{string} may be up to 100
	characters and should not contain spaces. It is useful for batch key
	generation to associate a key parameter block with a status line.

	@end table

	@noindent
	Here is an example on how to create a key in an ephemeral home directory:
	@smallexample
	$ export GNUPGHOME="$(mktemp -d)"
	$ cat >foo <<EOF
	%echo Generating a basic OpenPGP key
	Key-Type: DSA
	Key-Length: 1024
	Subkey-Type: ELG-E
	Subkey-Length: 1024
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	EOF
	$ @gpgname --batch --generate-key foo
	[...]
	$ @gpgname --list-secret-keys
	/tmp/tmp.0NQxB74PEf/pubring.kbx
	-------------------------------
	sec dsa1024 2016-12-16 [SCA]
	768E895903FC1C44045C8CB95EEBDB71E9E849D0
	uid [ultimate] Joe Tester (with stupid passphrase) <joe@@foo.bar>
	ssb elg1024 2016-12-16 [E]
	@end smallexample

	@noindent
	If you want to create a key with the default algorithms you would use
	these parameters:
	@smallexample
	%echo Generating a default key
	Key-Type: default
	Subkey-Type: default
	Name-Real: Joe Tester
	Name-Comment: with stupid passphrase
	Name-Email: joe@@foo.bar
	Expire-Date: 0
	Passphrase: abc
	# Do a commit here, so that we can later print "done" :-)
	%commit
	%echo done
	@end smallexample




	@mansect see also
	@ifset isman
	@command{gpgv}(1),
	@command{gpgsm}(1),
	@command{gpg-agent}(1)
	@end ifset
	@include see-also-note.texi
	diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c
	index 2d89fc4e5..48b2b602d 100644
	--- a/g10/getkey.c
	+++ b/g10/getkey.c
	@@ -1,4448 +1,4484 @@
	/* getkey.c - Get a key from the database
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
	* 2007, 2008, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 2015, 2016 g10 Code GmbH
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <ctype.h>

	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "../common/util.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "../common/iobuf.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "../common/i18n.h"
	#include "keyserver-internal.h"
	#include "call-agent.h"
	#include "objcache.h"
	#include "../common/host2net.h"
	#include "../common/mbox-util.h"
	#include "../common/status.h"

	#define MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES PK_UID_CACHE_SIZE
	#define MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES PK_UID_CACHE_SIZE

	#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES < 2
	#error We need the cache for key creation
	#endif

	/* Flags values returned by the lookup code. Note that the values are
	* directly used by the KEY_CONSIDERED status line. */
	#define LOOKUP_NOT_SELECTED (1<<0)
	#define LOOKUP_ALL_SUBKEYS_EXPIRED (1<<1) /* or revoked */


	/* A context object used by the lookup functions. */
	struct getkey_ctx_s
	{
	/* Part of the search criteria: whether the search is an exact
	search or not. A search that is exact requires that a key or
	subkey meet all of the specified criteria. A search that is not
	exact allows selecting a different key or subkey from the
	keyblock that matched the criteria. Further, an exact search
	returns the key or subkey that matched whereas a non-exact search
	typically returns the primary key. See finish_lookup for
	details. */
	int exact;

	/* Part of the search criteria: Whether the caller only wants keys
	with an available secret key. This is used by getkey_next to get
	the next result with the same initial criteria. */
	int want_secret;

	/* Part of the search criteria: The type of the requested key. A
	mask of PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG, PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC and PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT.
	If non-zero, then for a key to match, it must implement one of
	the required uses. */
	int req_usage;

	/* The database handle. */
	KEYDB_HANDLE kr_handle;

	/* Whether we should call xfree() on the context when the context is
	released using getkey_end()). */
	int not_allocated;

	/* This variable is used as backing store for strings which have
	their address used in ITEMS. */
	strlist_t extra_list;

	/* Hack to return the mechanism (AKL_foo) used to find the key. */
	int found_via_akl;

	/* Part of the search criteria: The low-level search specification
	as passed to keydb_search. */
	int nitems;
	/* This must be the last element in the structure. When we allocate
	the structure, we allocate it so that ITEMS can hold NITEMS. */
	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC items[1];
	};

	#if 0
	static struct
	{
	int any;
	int okay_count;
	int nokey_count;
	int error_count;
	} lkup_stats[21];
	#endif

	typedef struct keyid_list
	{
	struct keyid_list *next;
	byte fprlen;
	char fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	u32 keyid[2];
	} *keyid_list_t;


	#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
	typedef struct pk_cache_entry
	{
	struct pk_cache_entry *next;
	u32 keyid[2];
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	} *pk_cache_entry_t;
	static pk_cache_entry_t pk_cache;
	static int pk_cache_entries; /* Number of entries in pk cache. */
	static int pk_cache_disabled;
	#endif

	#if MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES < 5
	#error we really need the userid cache
	#endif

	static void merge_selfsigs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock);
	static int lookup (ctrl_t ctrl, getkey_ctx_t ctx, int want_secret,
	kbnode_t ret_keyblock, kbnode_t ret_found_key);
	static kbnode_t finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock,
	unsigned int req_usage, int want_exact,
	int want_secret, unsigned int *r_flags);
	static void print_status_key_considered (kbnode_t keyblock, unsigned int flags);


	#if 0
	static void
	print_stats ()
	{
	int i;
	for (i = 0; i < DIM (lkup_stats); i++)
	{
	if (lkup_stats[i].any)
	es_fprintf (es_stderr,
	"lookup stats: mode=%-2d ok=%-6d nokey=%-6d err=%-6d\n",
	i,
	lkup_stats[i].okay_count,
	lkup_stats[i].nokey_count, lkup_stats[i].error_count);
	}
	}
	#endif


	/* Cache a copy of a public key in the public key cache. PK is not
	* cached if caching is disabled (via getkey_disable_caches), if
	* PK->FLAGS.DONT_CACHE is set, we don't know how to derive a key id
	* from the public key (e.g., unsupported algorithm), or a key with
	* the key id is already in the cache.
	*
	* The public key packet is copied into the cache using
	* copy_public_key. Thus, any secret parts are not copied, for
	* instance.
	*
	* This cache is filled by get_pubkey and is read by get_pubkey and
	* get_pubkey_fast. */
	void
	cache_public_key (PKT_public_key * pk)
	{
	#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
	pk_cache_entry_t ce, ce2;
	u32 keyid[2];

	if (pk_cache_disabled)
	return;

	if (pk->flags.dont_cache)
	return;

	if (is_ELGAMAL (pk->pubkey_algo)
	\|\| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
	\|\| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
	\|\| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA
	\|\| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
	\|\| is_RSA (pk->pubkey_algo))
	{
	keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
	}
	else
	return; /* Don't know how to get the keyid. */

	for (ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next)
	if (ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1])
	{
	if (DBG_CACHE)
	log_debug ("cache_public_key: already in cache\n");
	return;
	}

	if (pk_cache_entries >= MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES)
	{
	int n;

	/* Remove the last 50% of the entries. */
	for (ce = pk_cache, n = 0; ce && n < pk_cache_entries/2; n++)
	ce = ce->next;
	if (ce && ce != pk_cache && ce->next)
	{
	ce2 = ce->next;
	ce->next = NULL;
	ce = ce2;
	for (; ce; ce = ce2)
	{
	ce2 = ce->next;
	free_public_key (ce->pk);
	xfree (ce);
	pk_cache_entries--;
	}
	}
	log_assert (pk_cache_entries < MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES);
	}
	pk_cache_entries++;
	ce = xmalloc (sizeof *ce);
	ce->next = pk_cache;
	pk_cache = ce;
	ce->pk = copy_public_key (NULL, pk);
	ce->keyid[0] = keyid[0];
	ce->keyid[1] = keyid[1];
	#endif
	}


	/* Return a const utf-8 string with the text "[User ID not found]".
	This function is required so that we don't need to switch gettext's
	encoding temporary. */
	static const char *
	user_id_not_found_utf8 (void)
	{
	static char *text;

	if (!text)
	text = native_to_utf8 (_("[User ID not found]"));
	return text;
	}




	/* Disable and drop the public key cache (which is filled by
	cache_public_key and get_pubkey). Note: there is currently no way
	to re-enable this cache. */
	void
	getkey_disable_caches ()
	{
	#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
	{
	pk_cache_entry_t ce, ce2;

	for (ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce2)
	{
	ce2 = ce->next;
	free_public_key (ce->pk);
	xfree (ce);
	}
	pk_cache_disabled = 1;
	pk_cache_entries = 0;
	pk_cache = NULL;
	}
	#endif
	/* fixme: disable user id cache ? */
	}


	/* Free a list of pubkey_t objects. */
	void
	pubkeys_free (pubkey_t keys)
	{
	while (keys)
	{
	pubkey_t next = keys->next;
	xfree (keys->pk);
	release_kbnode (keys->keyblock);
	xfree (keys);
	keys = next;
	}
	}


	static void
	pk_from_block (PKT_public_key *pk, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t found_key)
	{
	kbnode_t a = found_key ? found_key : keyblock;

	log_assert (a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY);

	copy_public_key (pk, a->pkt->pkt.public_key);
	}


	/* Specialized version of get_pubkey which retrieves the key based on
	* information in SIG. In contrast to get_pubkey PK is required. IF
	* FORCED_PK is not NULL, this public key is used and copied to PK. */
	gpg_error_t
	get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key pk, PKT_signature sig,
	PKT_public_key *forced_pk)
	{
	const byte *fpr;
	size_t fprlen;

	if (forced_pk)
	{
	copy_public_key (pk, forced_pk);
	return 0;
	}

	/* First try the ISSUER_FPR info. */
	fpr = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &fprlen);
	if (fpr && !get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, pk, NULL, fpr, fprlen))
	return 0;

	/* Fallback to use the ISSUER_KEYID. */
	return get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, sig->keyid);
	}


	/* Return the public key with the key id KEYID and store it at PK.
	* The resources in *PK should be released using
	* release_public_key_parts(). This function also stores a copy of
	* the public key in the user id cache (see cache_public_key).
	*
	* If PK is NULL, this function just stores the public key in the
	* cache and returns the usual return code.
	*
	* PK->REQ_USAGE (which is a mask of PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG,
	* PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC and PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT) is passed through to the
	* lookup function. If this is non-zero, only keys with the specified
	* usage will be returned. As such, it is essential that
	* PK->REQ_USAGE be correctly initialized!
	*
	* Returns 0 on success, GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY if there is no public key
	* with the specified key id, or another error code if an error
	* occurs.
	*
	* If the data was not read from the cache, then the self-signed data
	* has definitely been merged into the public key using
	* merge_selfsigs. */
	int
	get_pubkey (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key * pk, u32 * keyid)
	{
	int internal = 0;
	int rc = 0;

	#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
	if (pk)
	{
	/* Try to get it from the cache. We don't do this when pk is
	NULL as it does not guarantee that the user IDs are
	cached. */
	pk_cache_entry_t ce;
	for (ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next)
	{
	if (ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1])
	/* XXX: We don't check PK->REQ_USAGE here, but if we don't
	read from the cache, we do check it! */
	{
	copy_public_key (pk, ce->pk);
	return 0;
	}
	}
	}
	#endif
	/* More init stuff. */
	if (!pk)
	{
	internal++;
	pk = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pk);
	if (!pk)
	{
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	goto leave;
	}
	}


	/* Do a lookup. */
	{
	struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
	kbnode_t kb = NULL;
	kbnode_t found_key = NULL;

	memset (&ctx, 0, sizeof ctx);
	ctx.exact = 1; /* Use the key ID exactly as given. */
	ctx.not_allocated = 1;

	if (ctrl && ctrl->cached_getkey_kdb)
	{
	ctx.kr_handle = ctrl->cached_getkey_kdb;
	ctrl->cached_getkey_kdb = NULL;
	keydb_search_reset (ctx.kr_handle);
	}
	else
	{
	ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (!ctx.kr_handle)
	{
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	goto leave;
	}
	}
	ctx.nitems = 1;
	ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
	ctx.items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
	ctx.items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
	ctx.req_usage = pk->req_usage;
	rc = lookup (ctrl, &ctx, 0, &kb, &found_key);
	if (!rc)
	{
	pk_from_block (pk, kb, found_key);
	}
	getkey_end (ctrl, &ctx);
	release_kbnode (kb);
	}
	if (!rc)
	goto leave;

	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;

	leave:
	if (!rc)
	cache_public_key (pk);
	if (internal)
	free_public_key (pk);
	return rc;
	}


	+/* Same as get_pubkey but if the key was not found the function tries
	+ * to import it from LDAP. FIXME: We should not need this but swicth
	+ * to a fingerprint lookup. */
	+gpg_error_t
	+get_pubkey_with_ldap_fallback (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key pk, u32 keyid)
	+{
	+ gpg_error_t err;
	+
	+ err = get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, keyid);
	+ if (!err)
	+ return 0;
	+
	+ if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
	+ return err;
	+
	+ /* Note that this code does not handle the case for two readers
	+ * having both openpgp encryption keys. Only one will be tried. */
	+ if (opt.debug)
	+ log_debug ("using LDAP to find a public key\n");
	+ err = keyserver_import_keyid (ctrl, keyid,
	+ opt.keyserver, KEYSERVER_IMPORT_FLAG_LDAP);
	+ if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA
	+ \|\| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_KEYSERVER)
	+ {
	+ /* Dirmngr returns NO DATA is the selected keyserver
	+ * does not have the requested key. It returns NO
	+ * KEYSERVER if no LDAP keyservers are configured. */
	+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
	+ }
	+ if (err)
	+ return err;
	+
	+ return get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, keyid);
	+}
	+
	+
	/* Similar to get_pubkey, but it does not take PK->REQ_USAGE into
	* account nor does it merge in the self-signed data. This function
	* also only considers primary keys. It is intended to be used as a
	* quick check of the key to avoid recursion. It should only be used
	* in very certain cases. Like get_pubkey and unlike any of the other
	* lookup functions, this function also consults the user id cache
	* (see cache_public_key).
	*
	* Return the public key in PK. The resources in PK should be
	* released using release_public_key_parts(). */
	int
	get_pubkey_fast (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key * pk, u32 * keyid)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
	KBNODE keyblock;
	u32 pkid[2];

	log_assert (pk);
	#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
	{
	/* Try to get it from the cache */
	pk_cache_entry_t ce;

	for (ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next)
	{
	if (ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1]
	/* Only consider primary keys. */
	&& ce->pk->keyid[0] == ce->pk->main_keyid[0]
	&& ce->pk->keyid[1] == ce->pk->main_keyid[1])
	{
	if (pk)
	copy_public_key (pk, ce->pk);
	return 0;
	}
	}
	}
	#endif

	hd = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (!hd)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	rc = keydb_search_kid (hd, keyid);
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	keydb_release (hd);
	return GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
	}
	rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
	keydb_release (hd);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	return GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
	}

	log_assert (keyblock && keyblock->pkt
	&& keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);

	/* We return the primary key. If KEYID matched a subkey, then we
	return an error. */
	keyid_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, pkid);
	if (keyid[0] == pkid[0] && keyid[1] == pkid[1])
	copy_public_key (pk, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key);
	else
	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;

	release_kbnode (keyblock);

	/* Not caching key here since it won't have all of the fields
	properly set. */

	return rc;
	}


	/* Return the entire keyblock used to create SIG. This is a
	* specialized version of get_pubkeyblock.
	*
	* FIXME: This is a hack because get_pubkey_for_sig was already called
	* and it could have used a cache to hold the key. */
	kbnode_t
	get_pubkeyblock_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig)
	{
	const byte *fpr;
	size_t fprlen;
	kbnode_t keyblock;

	/* First try the ISSUER_FPR info. */
	fpr = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &fprlen);
	if (fpr && !get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, NULL, &keyblock, fpr, fprlen))
	return keyblock;

	/* Fallback to use the ISSUER_KEYID. */
	return get_pubkeyblock (ctrl, sig->keyid);
	}


	/* Return the key block for the key with key id KEYID or NULL, if an
	* error occurs. Use release_kbnode() to release the key block.
	*
	* The self-signed data has already been merged into the public key
	* using merge_selfsigs. */
	kbnode_t
	get_pubkeyblock (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 * keyid)
	{
	struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
	int rc = 0;
	KBNODE keyblock = NULL;

	memset (&ctx, 0, sizeof ctx);
	/* No need to set exact here because we want the entire block. */
	ctx.not_allocated = 1;
	ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (!ctx.kr_handle)
	return NULL;
	ctx.nitems = 1;
	ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
	ctx.items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
	ctx.items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
	rc = lookup (ctrl, &ctx, 0, &keyblock, NULL);
	getkey_end (ctrl, &ctx);

	return rc ? NULL : keyblock;
	}


	/* Return the public key with the key id KEYID iff the secret key is
	* available and store it at PK. The resources should be released
	* using release_public_key_parts().
	*
	* Unlike other lookup functions, PK may not be NULL. PK->REQ_USAGE
	* is passed through to the lookup function and is a mask of
	* PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG, PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC and PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT. Thus, it
	* must be valid! If this is non-zero, only keys with the specified
	* usage will be returned.
	*
	* Returns 0 on success. If a public key with the specified key id is
	* not found or a secret key is not available for that public key, an
	* error code is returned. Note: this function ignores legacy keys.
	* An error code is also return if an error occurs.
	*
	* The self-signed data has already been merged into the public key
	* using merge_selfsigs. */
	gpg_error_t
	get_seckey (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key pk, u32 keyid)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
	kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
	kbnode_t found_key = NULL;

	memset (&ctx, 0, sizeof ctx);
	ctx.exact = 1; /* Use the key ID exactly as given. */
	ctx.not_allocated = 1;
	ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (!ctx.kr_handle)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	ctx.nitems = 1;
	ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
	ctx.items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
	ctx.items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
	ctx.req_usage = pk->req_usage;
	err = lookup (ctrl, &ctx, 1, &keyblock, &found_key);
	if (!err)
	{
	pk_from_block (pk, keyblock, found_key);
	}
	getkey_end (ctrl, &ctx);
	release_kbnode (keyblock);

	if (!err)
	{
	if (!agent_probe_secret_key (/ctrl/NULL, pk))
	{
	release_public_key_parts (pk);
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
	}
	}

	return err;
	}


	/* Skip unusable keys. A key is unusable if it is revoked, expired or
	disabled or if the selected user id is revoked or expired. */
	static int
	skip_unusable (void opaque, u32 keyid, int uid_no)
	{
	ctrl_t ctrl = opaque;
	int unusable = 0;
	KBNODE keyblock;
	PKT_public_key *pk;

	keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (ctrl, keyid);
	if (!keyblock)
	{
	log_error ("error checking usability status of %s\n", keystr (keyid));
	goto leave;
	}

	pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	/* Is the key revoked or expired? */
	if (pk->flags.revoked \|\| pk->has_expired)
	unusable = 1;

	/* Is the user ID in question revoked or expired? */
	if (!unusable && uid_no)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int uids_seen = 0;

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *user_id = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	uids_seen ++;
	if (uids_seen != uid_no)
	continue;

	if (user_id->flags.revoked \|\| user_id->flags.expired)
	unusable = 1;

	break;
	}
	}

	/* If UID_NO is non-zero, then the keyblock better have at least
	that many UIDs. */
	log_assert (uids_seen == uid_no);
	}

	if (!unusable)
	unusable = pk_is_disabled (pk);

	leave:
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	return unusable;
	}


	/* Search for keys matching some criteria.

	If RETCTX is not NULL, then the constructed context is returned in
	*RETCTX so that getpubkey_next can be used to get subsequent
	results. In this case, getkey_end() must be used to free the
	search context. If RETCTX is not NULL, then RET_KDBHD must be
	NULL.

	If NAMELIST is not NULL, then a search query is constructed using
	classify_user_id on each of the strings in the list. (Recall: the
	database does an OR of the terms, not an AND.) If NAMELIST is
	NULL, then all results are returned.

	If PK is not NULL, the public key of the first result is returned
	in *PK. Note: PK->REQ_USAGE must be valid!!! If PK->REQ_USAGE is
	set, it is used to filter the search results. See the
	documentation for finish_lookup to understand exactly how this is
	used. Note: The self-signed data has already been merged into the
	public key using merge_selfsigs. Free *PK by calling
	release_public_key_parts (or, if PK was allocated using xfree, you
	can use free_public_key, which calls release_public_key_parts(PK)
	and then xfree(PK)).

	If WANT_SECRET is set, then only keys with an available secret key
	(either locally or via key registered on a smartcard) are returned.

	If INCLUDE_UNUSABLE is set, then unusable keys (see the
	documentation for skip_unusable for an exact definition) are
	skipped unless they are looked up by key id or by fingerprint.

	If RET_KB is not NULL, the keyblock is returned in *RET_KB. This
	should be freed using release_kbnode().

	If RET_KDBHD is not NULL, then the new database handle used to
	conduct the search is returned in *RET_KDBHD. This can be used to
	get subsequent results using keydb_search_next. Note: in this
	case, no advanced filtering is done for subsequent results (e.g.,
	WANT_SECRET and PK->REQ_USAGE are not respected).

	This function returns 0 on success. Otherwise, an error code is
	returned. In particular, GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY or GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY
	(if want_secret is set) is returned if the key is not found. */
	static int
	key_byname (ctrl_t ctrl, GETKEY_CTX *retctx, strlist_t namelist,
	PKT_public_key *pk,
	int want_secret, int include_unusable,
	KBNODE * ret_kb, KEYDB_HANDLE * ret_kdbhd)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	int n;
	strlist_t r;
	strlist_t namelist_expanded = NULL;
	GETKEY_CTX ctx;
	KBNODE help_kb = NULL;
	KBNODE found_key = NULL;

	if (retctx)
	{
	/* Reset the returned context in case of error. */
	log_assert (!ret_kdbhd); /* Not allowed because the handle is stored
	in the context. */
	*retctx = NULL;
	}
	if (ret_kdbhd)
	*ret_kdbhd = NULL;

	if (!namelist)
	/* No search terms: iterate over the whole DB. */
	{
	ctx = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *ctx);
	ctx->nitems = 1;
	ctx->items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
	if (!include_unusable)
	{
	ctx->items[0].skipfnc = skip_unusable;
	ctx->items[0].skipfncvalue = ctrl;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	namelist_expanded = expand_group (namelist, 1);
	namelist = namelist_expanded;

	/* Build the search context. */
	for (n = 0, r = namelist; r; r = r->next)
	n++;

	/* CTX has space for a single search term at the end. Thus, we
	need to allocate sizeof *CTX plus (n - 1) sizeof
	CTX->ITEMS. */
	ctx = xmalloc_clear (sizeof ctx + (n - 1) sizeof ctx->items);
	ctx->nitems = n;

	for (n = 0, r = namelist; r; r = r->next, n++)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;

	err = classify_user_id (r->d, &ctx->items[n], 1);

	if (ctx->items[n].exact)
	ctx->exact = 1;
	if (err)
	{
	xfree (ctx);
	rc = gpg_err_code (err); /* FIXME: remove gpg_err_code. */
	goto leave;
	}
	if (!include_unusable
	&& ctx->items[n].mode != KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID
	&& ctx->items[n].mode != KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID
	&& ctx->items[n].mode != KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR)
	{
	ctx->items[n].skipfnc = skip_unusable;
	ctx->items[n].skipfncvalue = ctrl;
	}
	}
	}

	ctx->want_secret = want_secret;
	ctx->kr_handle = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (!ctx->kr_handle)
	{
	rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	getkey_end (ctrl, ctx);
	goto leave;
	}

	if (!ret_kb)
	ret_kb = &help_kb;

	if (pk)
	{
	ctx->req_usage = pk->req_usage;
	}

	rc = lookup (ctrl, ctx, want_secret, ret_kb, &found_key);
	if (!rc && pk)
	{
	pk_from_block (pk, *ret_kb, found_key);
	}

	release_kbnode (help_kb);

	if (retctx) /* Caller wants the context. */
	{
	if (ctx->extra_list)
	{
	for (r=ctx->extra_list; r->next; r = r->next)
	;
	r->next = namelist_expanded;
	}
	else
	ctx->extra_list = namelist_expanded;
	namelist_expanded = NULL;
	*retctx = ctx;
	}
	else
	{
	if (ret_kdbhd)
	{
	*ret_kdbhd = ctx->kr_handle;
	ctx->kr_handle = NULL;
	}
	getkey_end (ctrl, ctx);
	}

	leave:
	free_strlist (namelist_expanded);
	return rc;
	}


	/* Find a public key identified by NAME.
	*
	* If name appears to be a valid RFC822 mailbox (i.e., email address)
	* and auto key lookup is enabled (mode != GET_PUBKEY_NO_AKL), then
	* the specified auto key lookup methods (--auto-key-lookup) are used
	* to import the key into the local keyring. Otherwise, just the
	* local keyring is consulted.
	*
	* MODE can be one of:
	* GET_PUBKEY_NORMAL - The standard mode
	* GET_PUBKEY_NO_AKL - The auto key locate functionality is
	* disabled and only the local key ring is
	* considered. Note: the local key ring is
	* consulted even if local is not in the
	* auto-key-locate option list!
	* GET_PUBKEY_NO_LOCAL - Only the auto key locate functionality is
	* used and no local search is done.
	*
	* If RETCTX is not NULL, then the constructed context is returned in
	* *RETCTX so that getpubkey_next can be used to get subsequent
	* results. In this case, getkey_end() must be used to free the
	* search context. If RETCTX is not NULL, then RET_KDBHD must be
	* NULL.
	*
	* If PK is not NULL, the public key of the first result is returned
	* in *PK. Note: PK->REQ_USAGE must be valid!!! PK->REQ_USAGE is
	* passed through to the lookup function and is a mask of
	* PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG, PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC and PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT. If this
	* is non-zero, only keys with the specified usage will be returned.
	* Note: The self-signed data has already been merged into the public
	* key using merge_selfsigs. Free *PK by calling
	* release_public_key_parts (or, if PK was allocated using xfree, you
	* can use free_public_key, which calls release_public_key_parts(PK)
	* and then xfree(PK)).
	*
	* NAME is a string, which is turned into a search query using
	* classify_user_id.
	*
	* If RET_KEYBLOCK is not NULL, the keyblock is returned in
	* *RET_KEYBLOCK. This should be freed using release_kbnode().
	*
	* If RET_KDBHD is not NULL, then the new database handle used to
	* conduct the search is returned in *RET_KDBHD. This can be used to
	* get subsequent results using keydb_search_next or to modify the
	* returned record. Note: in this case, no advanced filtering is done
	* for subsequent results (e.g., PK->REQ_USAGE is not respected).
	* Unlike RETCTX, this is always returned.
	*
	* If INCLUDE_UNUSABLE is set, then unusable keys (see the
	* documentation for skip_unusable for an exact definition) are
	* skipped unless they are looked up by key id or by fingerprint.
	*
	* This function returns 0 on success. Otherwise, an error code is
	* returned. In particular, GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY or GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY
	* (if want_secret is set) is returned if the key is not found. */
	int
	get_pubkey_byname (ctrl_t ctrl, enum get_pubkey_modes mode,
	GETKEY_CTX * retctx, PKT_public_key * pk,
	const char name, KBNODE ret_keyblock,
	KEYDB_HANDLE * ret_kdbhd, int include_unusable)
	{
	int rc;
	strlist_t namelist = NULL;
	struct akl *akl;
	int is_mbox, is_fpr;
	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC fprbuf;
	int nodefault = 0;
	int anylocalfirst = 0;
	int mechanism_type = AKL_NODEFAULT;


	/* If RETCTX is not NULL, then RET_KDBHD must be NULL. */
	log_assert (retctx == NULL \|\| ret_kdbhd == NULL);

	if (retctx)
	*retctx = NULL;

	/* Does NAME appear to be a mailbox (mail address)? */
	is_mbox = is_valid_mailbox (name);
	if (!is_mbox && *name == '<' && name[1] && name[strlen(name)-1]=='>'
	&& name[1] != '>'
	&& is_valid_mailbox_mem (name+1, strlen (name)-2))
	{
	/* The mailbox is in the form "<foo@example.org>" which is not
	* detected by is_valid_mailbox. Set the flag but keep name as
	* it is because the bracketed name is actual the better
	* specification for a local search and the other methods
	* extract the mail address anyway. */
	is_mbox = 1;
	}

	/* If we are called due to --locate-external-key Check whether NAME
	* is a fingerprint and then try to lookup that key by configured
	* method which support lookup by fingerprint. FPRBUF carries the
	* parsed fingerpint iff IS_FPR is true. */
	is_fpr = 0;
	if (!is_mbox && mode == GET_PUBKEY_NO_LOCAL)
	{
	if (!classify_user_id (name, &fprbuf, 1)
	&& fprbuf.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR)
	is_fpr = 1;
	}

	/* The auto-key-locate feature works as follows: there are a number
	* of methods to look up keys. By default, the local keyring is
	* tried first. Then, each method listed in the --auto-key-locate is
	* tried in the order it appears.
	*
	* This can be changed as follows:
	*
	* - if nodefault appears anywhere in the list of options, then
	* the local keyring is not tried first, or,
	*
	* - if local appears anywhere in the list of options, then the
	* local keyring is not tried first, but in the order in which
	* it was listed in the --auto-key-locate option.
	*
	* Note: we only save the search context in RETCTX if the local
	* method is the first method tried (either explicitly or
	* implicitly). */
	if (mode == GET_PUBKEY_NO_LOCAL)
	nodefault = 1; /* Auto-key-locate but ignore "local". */
	else if (mode != GET_PUBKEY_NO_AKL)
	{
	/* auto-key-locate is enabled. */

	/* nodefault is true if "nodefault" or "local" appear. */
	for (akl = opt.auto_key_locate; akl; akl = akl->next)
	if (akl->type == AKL_NODEFAULT \|\| akl->type == AKL_LOCAL)
	{
	nodefault = 1;
	break;
	}
	/* anylocalfirst is true if "local" appears before any other
	search methods (except "nodefault"). */
	for (akl = opt.auto_key_locate; akl; akl = akl->next)
	if (akl->type != AKL_NODEFAULT)
	{
	if (akl->type == AKL_LOCAL)
	anylocalfirst = 1;
	break;
	}
	}

	if (!nodefault)
	{
	/* "nodefault" didn't occur. Thus, "local" is implicitly the
	* first method to try. */
	anylocalfirst = 1;
	}

	if (mode == GET_PUBKEY_NO_LOCAL)
	{
	/* Force using the AKL. If IS_MBOX is not set this is the final
	* error code. */
	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
	}
	else if (nodefault && is_mbox)
	{
	/* Either "nodefault" or "local" (explicitly) appeared in the
	* auto key locate list and NAME appears to be an email address.
	* Don't try the local keyring. */
	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
	}
	else
	{
	/* Either "nodefault" and "local" don't appear in the auto key
	* locate list (in which case we try the local keyring first) or
	* NAME does not appear to be an email address (in which case we
	* only try the local keyring). In this case, lookup NAME in
	* the local keyring. */
	add_to_strlist (&namelist, name);
	rc = key_byname (ctrl, retctx, namelist, pk, 0,
	include_unusable, ret_keyblock, ret_kdbhd);
	}

	/* If the requested name resembles a valid mailbox and automatic
	retrieval has been enabled, we try to import the key. */
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
	&& mode != GET_PUBKEY_NO_AKL
	&& (is_mbox \|\| is_fpr))
	{
	/* NAME wasn't present in the local keyring (or we didn't try
	* the local keyring). Since the auto key locate feature is
	* enabled and NAME appears to be an email address, try the auto
	* locate feature. */
	for (akl = opt.auto_key_locate; akl; akl = akl->next)
	{
	unsigned char *fpr = NULL;
	size_t fpr_len;
	int did_akl_local = 0;
	int no_fingerprint = 0;
	const char *mechanism_string = "?";

	mechanism_type = akl->type;
	switch (mechanism_type)
	{
	case AKL_NODEFAULT:
	/* This is a dummy mechanism. */
	mechanism_string = "";
	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
	break;

	case AKL_LOCAL:
	if (mode == GET_PUBKEY_NO_LOCAL)
	{
	/* Note that we get here in is_fpr more, so there is
	* no extra check for it required. */
	mechanism_string = "";
	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
	}
	else
	{
	mechanism_string = "Local";
	did_akl_local = 1;
	if (retctx)
	{
	getkey_end (ctrl, *retctx);
	*retctx = NULL;
	}
	add_to_strlist (&namelist, name);
	rc = key_byname (ctrl, anylocalfirst ? retctx : NULL,
	namelist, pk, 0,
	include_unusable, ret_keyblock, ret_kdbhd);
	}
	break;

	case AKL_CERT:
	if (is_fpr)
	{
	mechanism_string = "";
	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
	}
	else
	{
	mechanism_string = "DNS CERT";
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	rc = keyserver_import_cert (ctrl, name, 0, &fpr, &fpr_len);
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	}
	break;

	case AKL_PKA:
	/* This is now obsolete. */
	break;

	case AKL_DANE:
	if (is_fpr)
	{
	mechanism_string = "";
	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
	break;
	}
	else
	{
	mechanism_string = "DANE";
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	rc = keyserver_import_cert (ctrl, name, 1, &fpr, &fpr_len);
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	}
	break;

	case AKL_WKD:
	if (is_fpr)
	{
	mechanism_string = "";
	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
	break;
	}
	else
	{
	mechanism_string = "WKD";
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	rc = keyserver_import_wkd (ctrl, name, 0, &fpr, &fpr_len);
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	}
	break;

	case AKL_LDAP:
	if (is_fpr)
	{
	mechanism_string = "";
	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
	break;
	}
	else
	{
	mechanism_string = "LDAP";
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	rc = keyserver_import_ldap (ctrl, name, &fpr, &fpr_len);
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	}
	break;

	case AKL_NTDS:
	mechanism_string = "NTDS";
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	if (is_fpr)
	rc = keyserver_import_fprint_ntds (ctrl,
	fprbuf.u.fpr, fprbuf.fprlen);
	else
	rc = keyserver_import_ntds (ctrl, name, &fpr, &fpr_len);
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	break;

	case AKL_KEYSERVER:
	/* Strictly speaking, we don't need to only use a valid
	* mailbox for the getname search, but it helps cut down
	* on the problem of searching for something like "john"
	* and getting a whole lot of keys back. */
	if (keyserver_any_configured (ctrl))
	{
	mechanism_string = "keyserver";
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	if (is_fpr)
	{
	rc = keyserver_import_fprint (ctrl,
	fprbuf.u.fpr, fprbuf.fprlen,
	opt.keyserver,
	KEYSERVER_IMPORT_FLAG_LDAP);
	/* Map error codes because Dirmngr returns NO
	* DATA if the keyserver does not have the
	* requested key. It returns NO KEYSERVER if no
	* LDAP keyservers are configured. */
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA
	\|\| gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_KEYSERVER)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
	}
	else
	{
	rc = keyserver_import_name (ctrl, name, &fpr, &fpr_len,
	opt.keyserver);
	}
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	}
	else
	{
	mechanism_string = "Unconfigured keyserver";
	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
	}
	break;

	case AKL_SPEC:
	{
	struct keyserver_spec *keyserver;

	mechanism_string = akl->spec->uri;
	keyserver = keyserver_match (akl->spec);
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	if (is_fpr)
	{
	rc = keyserver_import_fprint (ctrl,
	fprbuf.u.fpr, fprbuf.fprlen,
	opt.keyserver,
	KEYSERVER_IMPORT_FLAG_LDAP);
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA
	\|\| gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_KEYSERVER)
	rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
	}
	else
	{
	rc = keyserver_import_name (ctrl, name,
	&fpr, &fpr_len, keyserver);
	}
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	}
	break;
	}

	/* Use the fingerprint of the key that we actually fetched.
	* This helps prevent problems where the key that we fetched
	* doesn't have the same name that we used to fetch it. In
	* the case of CERT, this is an actual security
	* requirement as the URL might point to a key put in by an
	* attacker. By forcing the use of the fingerprint, we
	* won't use the attacker's key here. */
	if (!rc && (fpr \|\| is_fpr))
	{
	char fpr_string[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN * 2 + 1];

	if (is_fpr)
	{
	log_assert (fprbuf.fprlen <= MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
	bin2hex (fprbuf.u.fpr, fprbuf.fprlen, fpr_string);
	}
	else
	{
	log_assert (fpr_len <= MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
	bin2hex (fpr, fpr_len, fpr_string);
	}

	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info ("auto-key-locate found fingerprint %s\n",
	fpr_string);

	free_strlist (namelist);
	namelist = NULL;
	add_to_strlist (&namelist, fpr_string);
	}
	else if (!rc && !fpr && !did_akl_local)
	{ /* The acquisition method said no failure occurred, but
	* it didn't return a fingerprint. That's a failure. */
	no_fingerprint = 1;
	rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
	}
	xfree (fpr);
	fpr = NULL;

	if (!rc && !did_akl_local)
	{ /* There was no error and we didn't do a local lookup.
	* This means that we imported a key into the local
	* keyring. Try to read the imported key from the
	* keyring. */
	if (retctx)
	{
	getkey_end (ctrl, *retctx);
	*retctx = NULL;
	}
	rc = key_byname (ctrl, anylocalfirst ? retctx : NULL,
	namelist, pk, 0,
	include_unusable, ret_keyblock, ret_kdbhd);
	}
	if (!rc)
	{
	/* Key found. */
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("automatically retrieved '%s' via %s\n"),
	name, mechanism_string);
	break;
	}
	if ((gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
	\|\| opt.verbose \|\| no_fingerprint) && *mechanism_string)
	log_info (_("error retrieving '%s' via %s: %s\n"),
	name, mechanism_string,
	no_fingerprint ? _("No fingerprint") : gpg_strerror (rc));
	}
	}

	if (rc && retctx)
	{
	getkey_end (ctrl, *retctx);
	*retctx = NULL;
	}

	if (retctx && *retctx)
	{
	GETKEY_CTX ctx = *retctx;
	strlist_t sl;

	if (ctx->extra_list)
	{
	for (sl=ctx->extra_list; sl->next; sl = sl->next)
	;
	sl->next = namelist;
	}
	else
	ctx->extra_list = namelist;
	(*retctx)->found_via_akl = mechanism_type;
	}
	else
	free_strlist (namelist);

	return rc;
	}




	/* Comparison machinery for get_best_pubkey_byname. */

	/* First we have a struct to cache computed information about the key
	* in question. */
	struct pubkey_cmp_cookie
	{
	int valid; /* Is this cookie valid? */
	PKT_public_key key; /* The key. */
	PKT_user_id uid; / The matching UID packet. */
	unsigned int validity; /* Computed validity of (KEY, UID). */
	u32 creation_time; /* Creation time of the newest subkey
	capable of encryption. */
	};


	/* Then we have a series of helper functions. */
	static int
	key_is_ok (const PKT_public_key *key)
	{
	return (! key->has_expired && ! key->flags.revoked
	&& key->flags.valid && ! key->flags.disabled);
	}


	static int
	uid_is_ok (const PKT_public_key key, const PKT_user_id uid)
	{
	return key_is_ok (key) && ! uid->flags.revoked;
	}


	static int
	subkey_is_ok (const PKT_public_key *sub)
	{
	return ! sub->flags.revoked && sub->flags.valid && ! sub->flags.disabled;
	}

	/* Return true if KEYBLOCK has only expired encryption subkeys. Note
	* that the function returns false if the key has no encryption
	* subkeys at all or the subkeys are revoked. */
	static int
	only_expired_enc_subkeys (kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	kbnode_t node;
	PKT_public_key *sub;
	int any = 0;

	for (node = find_next_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY);
	node; node = find_next_kbnode (node, PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY))
	{
	sub = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	if (!(sub->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC))
	continue;

	if (!subkey_is_ok (sub))
	continue;

	any = 1;
	if (!sub->has_expired)
	return 0;
	}

	return any? 1 : 0;
	}

	/* Finally this function compares a NEW key to the former candidate
	* OLD. Returns < 0 if the old key is worse, > 0 if the old key is
	* better, == 0 if it is a tie. */
	static int
	pubkey_cmp (ctrl_t ctrl, const char name, struct pubkey_cmp_cookie old,
	struct pubkey_cmp_cookie *new, KBNODE new_keyblock)
	{
	kbnode_t n;

	if ((new->key.pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) == 0)
	new->creation_time = 0;
	else
	new->creation_time = new->key.timestamp;

	for (n = find_next_kbnode (new_keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY);
	n; n = find_next_kbnode (n, PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY))
	{
	PKT_public_key *sub = n->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	if ((sub->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) == 0)
	continue;

	if (! subkey_is_ok (sub))
	continue;

	if (sub->timestamp > new->creation_time)
	new->creation_time = sub->timestamp;
	}

	/* When new key has no encryption key, use OLD key. */
	if (new->creation_time == 0)
	return 1;

	for (n = find_next_kbnode (new_keyblock, PKT_USER_ID);
	n; n = find_next_kbnode (n, PKT_USER_ID))
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = n->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	char *mbox = mailbox_from_userid (uid->name, 0);
	int match = mbox ? strcasecmp (name, mbox) == 0 : 0;

	xfree (mbox);
	if (! match)
	continue;

	new->uid = scopy_user_id (uid);
	new->validity =
	get_validity (ctrl, new_keyblock, &new->key, uid, NULL, 0) & TRUST_MASK;
	new->valid = 1;

	if (! old->valid)
	return -1; /* No OLD key. */

	if (! uid_is_ok (&old->key, old->uid) && uid_is_ok (&new->key, uid))
	return -1; /* Validity of the NEW key is better. */

	if (new->validity != TRUST_EXPIRED && old->validity < new->validity)
	return -1; /* Validity of the NEW key is better. */
	if (old->validity == TRUST_EXPIRED && new->validity != TRUST_EXPIRED)
	return -1; /* Validity of the NEW key is better. */

	if (old->validity == new->validity && uid_is_ok (&new->key, uid)
	&& old->creation_time < new->creation_time)
	return -1; /* Both keys are of the same validity, but the
	NEW key is newer. */
	}

	/* Stick with the OLD key. */
	return 1;
	}


	/* This function works like get_pubkey_byname, but if the name
	* resembles a mail address, the results are ranked and only the best
	* result is returned. */
	gpg_error_t
	get_best_pubkey_byname (ctrl_t ctrl, enum get_pubkey_modes mode,
	GETKEY_CTX retctx, PKT_public_key pk,
	const char name, KBNODE ret_keyblock,
	int include_unusable)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	struct getkey_ctx_s *ctx = NULL;
	int is_mbox;
	int wkd_tried = 0;
	PKT_public_key pk0;

	log_assert (ret_keyblock != NULL);

	if (retctx)
	*retctx = NULL;

	memset (&pk0, 0, sizeof pk0);
	pk0.req_usage = pk? pk->req_usage : 0;

	is_mbox = is_valid_mailbox (name);
	if (!is_mbox && *name == '<' && name[1] && name[strlen(name)-1]=='>'
	&& name[1] != '>'
	&& is_valid_mailbox_mem (name+1, strlen (name)-2))
	{
	/* The mailbox is in the form "<foo@example.org>" which is not
	* detected by is_valid_mailbox. Set the flag but keep name as
	* it is because get_pubkey_byname does an is_valid_mailbox_mem
	* itself. */
	is_mbox = 1;
	}

	start_over:
	if (ctx) /* Clear in case of a start over. */
	{
	release_kbnode (*ret_keyblock);
	*ret_keyblock = NULL;
	getkey_end (ctrl, ctx);
	ctx = NULL;
	}
	err = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, mode,
	&ctx, &pk0, name, ret_keyblock,
	NULL, include_unusable);
	if (err)
	{
	goto leave;
	}

	/* If the keyblock was retrieved from the local database and the key
	* has expired, do further checks. However, we can do this only if
	* the caller requested a keyblock. */
	if (is_mbox && ctx && ctx->found_via_akl == AKL_LOCAL)
	{
	u32 now = make_timestamp ();
	int found;

	/* If the key has expired and its origin was the WKD then try to
	* get a fresh key from the WKD. We also try this if the key
	* has any only expired encryption subkeys. In case we checked
	* for a fresh copy in the last 3 hours we won't do that again.
	* Unfortunately that does not yet work because KEYUPDATE is
	* only updated during import iff the key has actually changed
	* (see import.c:import_one). */
	if (!wkd_tried && pk0.keyorg == KEYORG_WKD
	&& (pk0.keyupdate + 3*3600) < now
	&& (pk0.has_expired \|\| only_expired_enc_subkeys (*ret_keyblock)))
	{
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("checking for a fresh copy of an expired key via %s\n"),
	"WKD");
	wkd_tried = 1;
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
	found = !keyserver_import_wkd (ctrl, name, 0, NULL, NULL);
	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
	if (found)
	{
	release_public_key_parts (&pk0);
	goto start_over;
	}
	}
	}

	if (is_mbox && ctx)
	{
	/* Rank results and return only the most relevant key for encryption. */
	struct pubkey_cmp_cookie best = { 0 };
	struct pubkey_cmp_cookie new = { 0 };
	kbnode_t new_keyblock;

	copy_public_key (&new.key, &pk0);
	if (pubkey_cmp (ctrl, name, &best, &new, *ret_keyblock) >= 0)
	{
	release_public_key_parts (&new.key);
	free_user_id (new.uid);
	}
	else
	best = new;
	new.uid = NULL;

	while (getkey_next (ctrl, ctx, &new.key, &new_keyblock) == 0)
	{
	int diff = pubkey_cmp (ctrl, name, &best, &new, new_keyblock);
	release_kbnode (new_keyblock);
	if (diff < 0)
	{
	/* New key is better. */
	release_public_key_parts (&best.key);
	free_user_id (best.uid);
	best = new;
	}
	else if (diff > 0)
	{
	/* Old key is better. */
	release_public_key_parts (&new.key);
	free_user_id (new.uid);
	}
	else
	{
	/* A tie. Keep the old key. */
	release_public_key_parts (&new.key);
	free_user_id (new.uid);
	}
	new.uid = NULL;
	}

	getkey_end (ctrl, ctx);
	ctx = NULL;
	free_user_id (best.uid);
	best.uid = NULL;

	if (best.valid)
	{
	ctx = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof **retctx);
	if (! ctx)
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	else
	{
	ctx->kr_handle = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (! ctx->kr_handle)
	{
	err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
	xfree (ctx);
	ctx = NULL;
	if (retctx)
	*retctx = NULL;
	}
	else
	{
	u32 *keyid = pk_keyid (&best.key);
	ctx->exact = 1;
	ctx->nitems = 1;
	ctx->items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
	ctx->items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
	ctx->items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];

	release_kbnode (*ret_keyblock);
	*ret_keyblock = NULL;
	err = getkey_next (ctrl, ctx, NULL, ret_keyblock);
	}
	}

	if (pk)
	*pk = best.key;
	else
	release_public_key_parts (&best.key);
	release_public_key_parts (&pk0);
	}
	else
	{
	if (pk)
	*pk = pk0;
	else
	release_public_key_parts (&pk0);
	}
	}
	else
	{
	if (pk)
	*pk = pk0;
	else
	release_public_key_parts (&pk0);
	}

	if (err && ctx)
	{
	getkey_end (ctrl, ctx);
	ctx = NULL;
	}

	if (retctx && ctx)
	{
	*retctx = ctx;
	ctx = NULL;
	}

	leave:
	getkey_end (ctrl, ctx);
	return err;
	}



	/* Get a public key from a file.
	*
	* PK is the buffer to store the key. The caller needs to make sure
	* that PK->REQ_USAGE is valid. PK->REQ_USAGE is passed through to
	* the lookup function and is a mask of PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG,
	* PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC and PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT. If this is non-zero, only
	* keys with the specified usage will be returned.
	*
	* FNAME is the file name. That file should contain exactly one
	* keyblock.
	*
	* This function returns 0 on success. Otherwise, an error code is
	* returned. In particular, GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY is returned if the key
	* is not found.
	*
	* The self-signed data has already been merged into the public key
	* using merge_selfsigs. The caller must release the content of PK by
	* calling release_public_key_parts (or, if PK was malloced, using
	* free_public_key).
	*/
	gpg_error_t
	get_pubkey_fromfile (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key pk, const char fname)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	kbnode_t keyblock;
	kbnode_t found_key;
	unsigned int infoflags;

	err = read_key_from_file_or_buffer (ctrl, fname, NULL, 0, &keyblock);
	if (!err)
	{
	/* Warning: node flag bits 0 and 1 should be preserved by
	* merge_selfsigs. FIXME: Check whether this still holds. */
	merge_selfsigs (ctrl, keyblock);
	found_key = finish_lookup (keyblock, pk->req_usage, 0, 0, &infoflags);
	print_status_key_considered (keyblock, infoflags);
	if (found_key)
	pk_from_block (pk, keyblock, found_key);
	else
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY);
	}

	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	return err;
	}


	/* Return a public key from the buffer (BUFFER, BUFLEN). The key is
	* onlyretruned if it matches the keyid given in WANT_KEYID. On
	* success the key is stored at the caller provided PKBUF structure.
	* The caller must release the content of PK by calling
	* release_public_key_parts (or, if PKBUF was malloced, using
	* free_public_key). If R_KEYBLOCK is not NULL the full keyblock is
	* also stored there. */
	gpg_error_t
	get_pubkey_from_buffer (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pkbuf,
	const void buffer, size_t buflen, u32 want_keyid,
	kbnode_t *r_keyblock)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	kbnode_t keyblock;
	kbnode_t node;
	PKT_public_key *pk;

	if (r_keyblock)
	*r_keyblock = NULL;

	err = read_key_from_file_or_buffer (ctrl, NULL, buffer, buflen, &keyblock);
	if (!err)
	{
	merge_selfsigs (ctrl, keyblock);
	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL);
	if (pk->keyid[0] == want_keyid[0]
	&& pk->keyid[1] == want_keyid[1])
	break;
	}
	}
	if (node)
	copy_public_key (pkbuf, pk);
	else
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
	}

	if (!err && r_keyblock)
	*r_keyblock = keyblock;
	else
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	return err;
	}


	/* Lookup a key with the specified fingerprint.
	*
	* If PK is not NULL, the public key of the first result is returned
	* in *PK. Note: this function does an exact search and thus the
	* returned public key may be a subkey rather than the primary key.
	* Note: The self-signed data has already been merged into the public
	* key using merge_selfsigs. Free *PK by calling
	* release_public_key_parts (or, if PK was allocated using xfree, you
	* can use free_public_key, which calls release_public_key_parts(PK)
	* and then xfree(PK)).
	*
	* If PK->REQ_USAGE is set, it is used to filter the search results.
	* (Thus, if PK is not NULL, PK->REQ_USAGE must be valid!!!) See the
	* documentation for finish_lookup to understand exactly how this is
	* used.
	*
	* If R_KEYBLOCK is not NULL, then the first result's keyblock is
	* returned in *R_KEYBLOCK. This should be freed using
	* release_kbnode().
	*
	* FPRINT is a byte array whose contents is the fingerprint to use as
	* the search term. FPRINT_LEN specifies the length of the
	* fingerprint (in bytes). Currently, only 16, 20, and 32-byte
	* fingerprints are supported.
	*
	* FIXME: We should replace this with the _byname function. This can
	* be done by creating a userID conforming to the unified fingerprint
	* style. */
	int
	get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key pk, kbnode_t r_keyblock,
	const byte * fprint, size_t fprint_len)
	{
	int rc;

	if (r_keyblock)
	*r_keyblock = NULL;

	if (fprint_len == 32 \|\| fprint_len == 20 \|\| fprint_len == 16)
	{
	struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
	KBNODE kb = NULL;
	KBNODE found_key = NULL;

	memset (&ctx, 0, sizeof ctx);
	ctx.exact = 1;
	ctx.not_allocated = 1;
	/* FIXME: We should get the handle from the cache like we do in
	* get_pubkey. */
	ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (!ctx.kr_handle)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();

	ctx.nitems = 1;
	ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR;
	memcpy (ctx.items[0].u.fpr, fprint, fprint_len);
	ctx.items[0].fprlen = fprint_len;
	if (pk)
	ctx.req_usage = pk->req_usage;
	rc = lookup (ctrl, &ctx, 0, &kb, &found_key);
	if (!rc && pk)
	pk_from_block (pk, kb, found_key);
	if (!rc && r_keyblock)
	{
	*r_keyblock = kb;
	kb = NULL;
	}
	release_kbnode (kb);
	getkey_end (ctrl, &ctx);
	}
	else
	rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Oops */
	return rc;
	}


	/* This function is similar to get_pubkey_byfprint, but it doesn't
	* merge the self-signed data into the public key and subkeys or into
	* the user ids. It also doesn't add the key to the user id cache.
	* Further, this function ignores PK->REQ_USAGE.
	*
	* This function is intended to avoid recursion and, as such, should
	* only be used in very specific situations.
	*
	* Like get_pubkey_byfprint, PK may be NULL. In that case, this
	* function effectively just checks for the existence of the key. */
	gpg_error_t
	get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key * pk,
	const byte * fprint, size_t fprint_len)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	KBNODE keyblock;

	err = get_keyblock_byfprint_fast (ctrl,
	&keyblock, NULL, fprint, fprint_len, 0);
	if (!err)
	{
	if (pk)
	copy_public_key (pk, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key);
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	}

	return err;
	}


	/* This function is similar to get_pubkey_byfprint_fast but returns a
	* keydb handle at R_HD and the keyblock at R_KEYBLOCK. R_KEYBLOCK or
	* R_HD may be NULL. If LOCK is set the handle has been opend in
	* locked mode and keydb_disable_caching () has been called. On error
	* R_KEYBLOCK is set to NULL but R_HD must be released by the caller;
	* it may have a value of NULL, though. This allows to do an insert
	* operation on a locked keydb handle. */
	gpg_error_t
	get_keyblock_byfprint_fast (ctrl_t ctrl,
	kbnode_t r_keyblock, KEYDB_HANDLE r_hd,
	const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len, int lock)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
	kbnode_t keyblock;
	byte fprbuf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	int i;

	if (r_keyblock)
	*r_keyblock = NULL;
	if (r_hd)
	*r_hd = NULL;

	for (i = 0; i < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN && i < fprint_len; i++)
	fprbuf[i] = fprint[i];

	hd = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (!hd)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();

	if (lock)
	{
	err = keydb_lock (hd);
	if (err)
	{
	/* If locking did not work, we better don't return a handle
	* at all - there was a reason that locking has been
	* requested. */
	keydb_release (hd);
	return err;
	}
	keydb_disable_caching (hd);
	}

	/* For all other errors we return the handle. */
	if (r_hd)
	*r_hd = hd;

	err = keydb_search_fpr (hd, fprbuf, fprint_len);
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	if (!r_hd)
	keydb_release (hd);
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
	}
	err = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
	if (!r_hd)
	keydb_release (hd);
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
	}

	log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY);

	/* Not caching key here since it won't have all of the fields
	properly set. */

	if (r_keyblock)
	*r_keyblock = keyblock;
	else
	release_kbnode (keyblock);

	if (!r_hd)
	keydb_release (hd);

	return 0;
	}


	const char *
	parse_def_secret_key (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	KEYDB_HANDLE hd = NULL;
	strlist_t t;
	static int warned;

	for (t = opt.def_secret_key; t; t = t->next)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
	KBNODE kb;
	KBNODE node;

	err = classify_user_id (t->d, &desc, 1);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("secret key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),
	t->d, gpg_strerror (err));
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("(check argument of option '%s')\n"), "--default-key");
	continue;
	}

	if (! hd)
	{
	hd = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (!hd)
	return NULL;
	}
	else
	keydb_search_reset (hd);


	err = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL);
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	continue;

	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), t->d, gpg_strerror (err));
	t = NULL;
	break;
	}

	err = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &kb);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"),
	gpg_strerror (err));
	continue;
	}

	merge_selfsigs (ctrl, kb);

	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
	node = kb;
	do
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	/* Check if the key is valid. */
	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("not using %s as default key, %s",
	keystr_from_pk (pk), "revoked");
	continue;
	}
	if (pk->has_expired)
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("not using %s as default key, %s",
	keystr_from_pk (pk), "expired");
	continue;
	}
	if (pk_is_disabled (pk))
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("not using %s as default key, %s",
	keystr_from_pk (pk), "disabled");
	continue;
	}

	if (agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl, pk))
	{
	/* This is a valid key. */
	err = 0;
	break;
	}
	}
	while ((node = find_next_kbnode (node, PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)));

	release_kbnode (kb);
	if (err)
	{
	if (! warned && ! opt.quiet)
	{
	log_info (_("Warning: not using '%s' as default key: %s\n"),
	t->d, gpg_strerror (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY));
	print_reported_error (err, GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
	}
	}
	else
	{
	if (! warned && ! opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("using \"%s\" as default secret key for signing\n"),
	t->d);
	break;
	}
	}

	if (! warned && opt.def_secret_key && ! t)
	log_info (_("all values passed to '%s' ignored\n"),
	"--default-key");

	warned = 1;

	if (hd)
	keydb_release (hd);

	if (t)
	return t->d;
	return NULL;
	}


	/* Look up a secret key.
	*
	* If PK is not NULL, the public key of the first result is returned
	* in *PK. Note: PK->REQ_USAGE must be valid!!! If PK->REQ_USAGE is
	* set, it is used to filter the search results. See the
	* documentation for finish_lookup to understand exactly how this is
	* used. Note: The self-signed data has already been merged into the
	* public key using merge_selfsigs. Free *PK by calling
	* release_public_key_parts (or, if PK was allocated using xfree, you
	* can use free_public_key, which calls release_public_key_parts(PK)
	* and then xfree(PK)).
	*
	* If --default-key was set, then the specified key is looked up. (In
	* this case, the default key is returned even if it is considered
	* unusable. See the documentation for skip_unusable for exactly what
	* this means.)
	*
	* Otherwise, this initiates a DB scan that returns all keys that are
	* usable (see previous paragraph for exactly what usable means) and
	* for which a secret key is available.
	*
	* This function returns the first match. Additional results can be
	* returned using getkey_next. */
	gpg_error_t
	get_seckey_default (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	strlist_t namelist = NULL;
	int include_unusable = 1;


	const char *def_secret_key = parse_def_secret_key (ctrl);
	if (def_secret_key)
	add_to_strlist (&namelist, def_secret_key);
	else
	include_unusable = 0;

	err = key_byname (ctrl, NULL, namelist, pk, 1, include_unusable, NULL, NULL);

	free_strlist (namelist);

	return err;
	}



	/* Search for keys matching some criteria.
	*
	* If RETCTX is not NULL, then the constructed context is returned in
	* *RETCTX so that getpubkey_next can be used to get subsequent
	* results. In this case, getkey_end() must be used to free the
	* search context. If RETCTX is not NULL, then RET_KDBHD must be
	* NULL.
	*
	* If PK is not NULL, the public key of the first result is returned
	* in *PK. Note: PK->REQ_USAGE must be valid!!! If PK->REQ_USAGE is
	* set, it is used to filter the search results. See the
	* documentation for finish_lookup to understand exactly how this is
	* used. Note: The self-signed data has already been merged into the
	* public key using merge_selfsigs. Free *PK by calling
	* release_public_key_parts (or, if PK was allocated using xfree, you
	* can use free_public_key, which calls release_public_key_parts(PK)
	* and then xfree(PK)).
	*
	* If NAMES is not NULL, then a search query is constructed using
	* classify_user_id on each of the strings in the list. (Recall: the
	* database does an OR of the terms, not an AND.) If NAMES is
	* NULL, then all results are returned.
	*
	* If WANT_SECRET is set, then only keys with an available secret key
	* (either locally or via key registered on a smartcard) are returned.
	*
	* This function does not skip unusable keys (see the documentation
	* for skip_unusable for an exact definition).
	*
	* If RET_KEYBLOCK is not NULL, the keyblock is returned in
	* *RET_KEYBLOCK. This should be freed using release_kbnode().
	*
	* This function returns 0 on success. Otherwise, an error code is
	* returned. In particular, GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY or GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY
	* (if want_secret is set) is returned if the key is not found. */
	gpg_error_t
	getkey_bynames (ctrl_t ctrl, getkey_ctx_t retctx, PKT_public_key pk,
	strlist_t names, int want_secret, kbnode_t *ret_keyblock)
	{
	return key_byname (ctrl, retctx, names, pk, want_secret, 1,
	ret_keyblock, NULL);
	}


	/* Search for one key matching some criteria.
	*
	* If RETCTX is not NULL, then the constructed context is returned in
	* *RETCTX so that getpubkey_next can be used to get subsequent
	* results. In this case, getkey_end() must be used to free the
	* search context. If RETCTX is not NULL, then RET_KDBHD must be
	* NULL.
	*
	* If PK is not NULL, the public key of the first result is returned
	* in *PK. Note: PK->REQ_USAGE must be valid!!! If PK->REQ_USAGE is
	* set, it is used to filter the search results. See the
	* documentation for finish_lookup to understand exactly how this is
	* used. Note: The self-signed data has already been merged into the
	* public key using merge_selfsigs. Free *PK by calling
	* release_public_key_parts (or, if PK was allocated using xfree, you
	* can use free_public_key, which calls release_public_key_parts(PK)
	* and then xfree(PK)).
	*
	* If NAME is not NULL, then a search query is constructed using
	* classify_user_id on the string. In this case, even unusable keys
	* (see the documentation for skip_unusable for an exact definition of
	* unusable) are returned. Otherwise, if --default-key was set, then
	* that key is returned (even if it is unusable). If neither of these
	* conditions holds, then the first usable key is returned.
	*
	* If WANT_SECRET is set, then only keys with an available secret key
	* (either locally or via key registered on a smartcard) are returned.
	*
	* This function does not skip unusable keys (see the documentation
	* for skip_unusable for an exact definition).
	*
	* If RET_KEYBLOCK is not NULL, the keyblock is returned in
	* *RET_KEYBLOCK. This should be freed using release_kbnode().
	*
	* This function returns 0 on success. Otherwise, an error code is
	* returned. In particular, GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY or GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY
	* (if want_secret is set) is returned if the key is not found.
	*
	* FIXME: We also have the get_pubkey_byname function which has a
	* different semantic. Should be merged with this one. */
	gpg_error_t
	getkey_byname (ctrl_t ctrl, getkey_ctx_t retctx, PKT_public_key pk,
	const char name, int want_secret, kbnode_t ret_keyblock)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	strlist_t namelist = NULL;
	int with_unusable = 1;
	const char *def_secret_key = NULL;

	if (want_secret && !name)
	def_secret_key = parse_def_secret_key (ctrl);

	if (want_secret && !name && def_secret_key)
	add_to_strlist (&namelist, def_secret_key);
	else if (name)
	add_to_strlist (&namelist, name);
	else
	with_unusable = 0;

	err = key_byname (ctrl, retctx, namelist, pk, want_secret, with_unusable,
	ret_keyblock, NULL);

	/* FIXME: Check that we really return GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY if
	WANT_SECRET has been used. */

	free_strlist (namelist);

	return err;
	}


	/* Return the next search result.
	*
	* If PK is not NULL, the public key of the next result is returned in
	* *PK. Note: The self-signed data has already been merged into the
	* public key using merge_selfsigs. Free *PK by calling
	* release_public_key_parts (or, if PK was allocated using xmalloc, you
	* can use free_public_key, which calls release_public_key_parts(PK)
	* and then xfree(PK)).
	*
	* RET_KEYBLOCK can be given as NULL; if it is not NULL it the entire
	* found keyblock is returned which must be released with
	* release_kbnode. If the function returns an error NULL is stored at
	* RET_KEYBLOCK.
	*
	* The self-signed data has already been merged into the public key
	* using merge_selfsigs. */
	gpg_error_t
	getkey_next (ctrl_t ctrl, getkey_ctx_t ctx,
	PKT_public_key pk, kbnode_t ret_keyblock)
	{
	int rc; /* Fixme: Make sure this is proper gpg_error */
	KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
	KBNODE found_key = NULL;

	/* We need to disable the caching so that for an exact key search we
	won't get the result back from the cache and thus end up in an
	endless loop. The endless loop can occur, because the cache is
	used without respecting the current file pointer! */
	keydb_disable_caching (ctx->kr_handle);

	/* FOUND_KEY is only valid as long as RET_KEYBLOCK is. If the
	* caller wants PK, but not RET_KEYBLOCK, we need hand in our own
	* keyblock. */
	if (pk && ret_keyblock == NULL)
	ret_keyblock = &keyblock;

	rc = lookup (ctrl, ctx, ctx->want_secret,
	ret_keyblock, pk ? &found_key : NULL);
	if (!rc && pk)
	{
	log_assert (found_key);
	pk_from_block (pk, NULL, found_key);
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	}

	return rc;
	}


	/* Release any resources used by a key listing context. This must be
	* called on the context returned by, e.g., getkey_byname. */
	void
	getkey_end (ctrl_t ctrl, getkey_ctx_t ctx)
	{
	if (ctx)
	{
	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM

	/* FIXME: This creates a big regression for Windows because the
	* keyring is only released after the global ctrl is released.
	* So if an operation does a getkey and then tries to modify the
	* keyring it will fail on Windows with a sharing violation. We
	* need to modify all keyring write operations to also take the
	* ctrl and close the cached_getkey_kdb handle to make writing
	* work. See: GnuPG-bug-id: 3097 */
	(void)ctrl;
	keydb_release (ctx->kr_handle);

	#else /!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM/

	if (ctrl && !ctrl->cached_getkey_kdb)
	ctrl->cached_getkey_kdb = ctx->kr_handle;
	else
	keydb_release (ctx->kr_handle);

	#endif /!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM/

	free_strlist (ctx->extra_list);
	if (!ctx->not_allocated)
	xfree (ctx);
	}
	}



	/************************************************
	*********** Merging stuff ******************
	************************************************/

	/* Set the mainkey_id fields for all keys in KEYBLOCK. This is
	* usually done by merge_selfsigs but at some places we only need the
	* main_kid not a full merge. The function also guarantees that all
	* pk->keyids are computed. */
	void
	setup_main_keyids (kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	u32 kid[2], mainkid[2];
	kbnode_t kbctx, node;
	PKT_public_key *pk;

	if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	BUG ();
	pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;

	keyid_from_pk (pk, mainkid);
	for (kbctx=NULL; (node = walk_kbnode (keyblock, &kbctx, 0)); )
	{
	if (!(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY))
	continue;
	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keyid_from_pk (pk, kid); /* Make sure pk->keyid is set. */
	if (!pk->main_keyid[0] && !pk->main_keyid[1])
	{
	pk->main_keyid[0] = mainkid[0];
	pk->main_keyid[1] = mainkid[1];
	}
	}
	}


	/* KEYBLOCK corresponds to a public key block. This function merges
	* much of the information from the self-signed data into the public
	* key, public subkey and user id data structures. If you use the
	* high-level search API (e.g., get_pubkey) for looking up key blocks,
	* then you don't need to call this function. This function is
	* useful, however, if you change the keyblock, e.g., by adding or
	* removing a self-signed data packet. */
	void
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	if (!keyblock)
	;
	else if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	merge_selfsigs (ctrl, keyblock);
	else
	log_debug ("FIXME: merging secret key blocks is not anymore available\n");
	}


	static int
	parse_key_usage (PKT_signature * sig)
	{
	int key_usage = 0;
	const byte *p;
	size_t n;
	byte flags;

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS, &n);
	if (p && n)
	{
	/* First octet of the keyflags. */
	flags = *p;

	if (flags & 1)
	{
	key_usage \|= PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT;
	flags &= ~1;
	}

	if (flags & 2)
	{
	key_usage \|= PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
	flags &= ~2;
	}

	/* We do not distinguish between encrypting communications and
	encrypting storage. */
	if (flags & (0x04 \| 0x08))
	{
	key_usage \|= PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
	flags &= ~(0x04 \| 0x08);
	}

	if (flags & 0x20)
	{
	key_usage \|= PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH;
	flags &= ~0x20;
	}

	if (flags)
	key_usage \|= PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN;

	if (!key_usage)
	key_usage \|= PUBKEY_USAGE_NONE;
	}
	else if (p) /* Key flags of length zero. */
	key_usage \|= PUBKEY_USAGE_NONE;

	/* We set PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN to indicate that this key has a
	capability that we do not handle. This serves to distinguish
	between a zero key usage which we handle as the default
	capabilities for that algorithm, and a usage that we do not
	handle. Likewise we use PUBKEY_USAGE_NONE to indicate that
	key_flags have been given but they do not specify any usage. */

	return key_usage;
	}


	/* Apply information from SIGNODE (which is the valid self-signature
	* associated with that UID) to the UIDNODE:
	* - wether the UID has been revoked
	* - assumed creation date of the UID
	* - temporary store the keyflags here
	* - temporary store the key expiration time here
	* - mark whether the primary user ID flag hat been set.
	* - store the preferences
	*/
	static void
	fixup_uidnode (KBNODE uidnode, KBNODE signode, u32 keycreated)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	PKT_signature *sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
	const byte p, sym, aead, hash, *zip;
	size_t n, nsym, naead, nhash, nzip;

	sig->flags.chosen_selfsig = 1;/* We chose this one. */
	uid->created = 0; /* Not created == invalid. */
	if (IS_UID_REV (sig))
	{
	uid->flags.revoked = 1;
	return; /* Has been revoked. */
	}
	else
	uid->flags.revoked = 0;

	uid->expiredate = sig->expiredate;

	if (sig->flags.expired)
	{
	uid->flags.expired = 1;
	return; /* Has expired. */
	}
	else
	uid->flags.expired = 0;

	uid->created = sig->timestamp; /* This one is okay. */
	uid->selfsigversion = sig->version;
	/* If we got this far, it's not expired :) */
	uid->flags.expired = 0;

	/* Store the key flags in the helper variable for later processing. */
	uid->help_key_usage = parse_key_usage (sig);

	/* Ditto for the key expiration. */
	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
	if (p && buf32_to_u32 (p))
	uid->help_key_expire = keycreated + buf32_to_u32 (p);
	else
	uid->help_key_expire = 0;

	/* Set the primary user ID flag - we will later wipe out some
	* of them to only have one in our keyblock. */
	uid->flags.primary = 0;
	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL);
	if (p && *p)
	uid->flags.primary = 2;

	/* We could also query this from the unhashed area if it is not in
	* the hased area and then later try to decide which is the better
	* there should be no security problem with this.
	* For now we only look at the hashed one. */

	/* Now build the preferences list. These must come from the
	hashed section so nobody can modify the ciphers a key is
	willing to accept. */
	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM, &n);
	sym = p;
	nsym = p ? n : 0;
	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD, &n);
	aead = p;
	naead = p ? n : 0;
	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH, &n);
	hash = p;
	nhash = p ? n : 0;
	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR, &n);
	zip = p;
	nzip = p ? n : 0;
	if (uid->prefs)
	xfree (uid->prefs);
	n = nsym + naead + nhash + nzip;
	if (!n)
	uid->prefs = NULL;
	else
	{
	uid->prefs = xmalloc (sizeof (uid->prefs) (n + 1));
	n = 0;
	for (; nsym; nsym--, n++)
	{
	uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_SYM;
	uid->prefs[n].value = *sym++;
	}
	for (; naead; naead--, n++)
	{
	uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_AEAD;
	uid->prefs[n].value = *aead++;
	}
	for (; nhash; nhash--, n++)
	{
	uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_HASH;
	uid->prefs[n].value = *hash++;
	}
	for (; nzip; nzip--, n++)
	{
	uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_ZIP;
	uid->prefs[n].value = *zip++;
	}
	uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_NONE; /* End of list marker */
	uid->prefs[n].value = 0;
	}

	/* See whether we have the MDC feature. */
	uid->flags.mdc = 0;
	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, &n);
	if (p && n && (p[0] & 0x01))
	uid->flags.mdc = 1;

	/* See whether we have the AEAD feature. */
	uid->flags.aead = 0;
	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, &n);
	if (p && n && (p[0] & 0x02))
	uid->flags.aead = 1;

	/* And the keyserver modify flag. */
	uid->flags.ks_modify = 1;
	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS, &n);
	if (p && n && (p[0] & 0x80))
	uid->flags.ks_modify = 0;
	}

	static void
	sig_to_revoke_info (PKT_signature * sig, struct revoke_info *rinfo)
	{
	rinfo->date = sig->timestamp;
	rinfo->algo = sig->pubkey_algo;
	rinfo->keyid[0] = sig->keyid[0];
	rinfo->keyid[1] = sig->keyid[1];
	}


	/* Given a keyblock, parse the key block and extract various pieces of
	* information and save them with the primary key packet and the user
	* id packets. For instance, some information is stored in signature
	* packets. We find the latest such valid packet (since the user can
	* change that information) and copy its contents into the
	* PKT_public_key.
	*
	* Note that R_REVOKED may be set to 0, 1 or 2.
	*
	* This function fills in the following fields in the primary key's
	* keyblock:
	*
	* main_keyid (computed)
	* revkey / numrevkeys (derived from self signed key data)
	* flags.valid (whether we have at least 1 self-sig)
	* flags.maybe_revoked (whether a designed revoked the key, but
	* we are missing the key to check the sig)
	* selfsigversion (highest version of any valid self-sig)
	* pubkey_usage (derived from most recent self-sig or most
	* recent user id)
	* has_expired (various sources)
	* expiredate (various sources)
	*
	* See the documentation for fixup_uidnode for how the user id packets
	* are modified. In addition to that the primary user id's is_primary
	* field is set to 1 and the other user id's is_primary are set to 0.
	*/
	static void
	merge_selfsigs_main (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int *r_revoked,
	struct revoke_info *rinfo)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
	KBNODE k;
	u32 kid[2];
	u32 sigdate, uiddate, uiddate2;
	KBNODE signode, uidnode, uidnode2;
	u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
	unsigned int key_usage = 0;
	u32 keytimestamp = 0; /* Creation time of the key. */
	u32 key_expire = 0;
	int key_expire_seen = 0;
	byte sigversion = 0;

	*r_revoked = 0;
	memset (rinfo, 0, sizeof (*rinfo));

	/* Section 11.1 of RFC 4880 determines the order of packets within a
	* message. There are three sections, which must occur in the
	* following order: the public key, the user ids and user attributes
	* and the subkeys. Within each section, each primary packet (e.g.,
	* a user id packet) is followed by one or more signature packets,
	* which modify that packet. */

	/* According to Section 11.1 of RFC 4880, the public key must be the
	first packet. Note that parse_keyblock_image ensures that the
	first packet is the public key. */
	if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	BUG ();
	pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keytimestamp = pk->timestamp;

	keyid_from_pk (pk, kid);
	pk->main_keyid[0] = kid[0];
	pk->main_keyid[1] = kid[1];

	if (pk->version < 4)
	{
	/* Before v4 the key packet itself contains the expiration date
	* and there was no way to change it, so we start with the one
	* from the key packet. We do not support v3 keys anymore but
	* we keep the code in case a future key versions introduces a
	* hadr expire time again. */
	key_expire = pk->max_expiredate;
	key_expire_seen = 1;
	}

	/* First pass:
	*
	* - Find the latest direct key self-signature. We assume that the
	* newest one overrides all others.
	*
	* - Determine whether the key has been revoked.
	*
	* - Gather all revocation keys (unlike other data, we don't just
	* take them from the latest self-signed packet).
	*
	* - Determine max (sig[...]->version).
	*/

	/* Reset this in case this key was already merged. */
	xfree (pk->revkey);
	pk->revkey = NULL;
	pk->numrevkeys = 0;

	signode = NULL;
	sigdate = 0; /* Helper variable to find the latest signature. */

	/* According to Section 11.1 of RFC 4880, the public key comes first
	* and is immediately followed by any signature packets that modify
	* it. */
	for (k = keyblock;
	k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID
	&& k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_ATTRIBUTE
	&& k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
	k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == kid[1])
	{ /* Self sig. */

	if (check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, k, NULL))
	; /* Signature did not verify. */
	else if (IS_KEY_REV (sig))
	{
	/* Key has been revoked - there is no way to
	* override such a revocation, so we theoretically
	* can stop now. We should not cope with expiration
	* times for revocations here because we have to
	* assume that an attacker can generate all kinds of
	* signatures. However due to the fact that the key
	* has been revoked it does not harm either and by
	* continuing we gather some more info on that
	* key. */
	*r_revoked = 1;
	sig_to_revoke_info (sig, rinfo);
	}
	else if (IS_KEY_SIG (sig))
	{
	/* Add the indicated revocations keys from all
	* signatures not just the latest. We do this
	* because you need multiple 1F sigs to properly
	* handle revocation keys (PGP does it this way, and
	* a revocation key could be sensitive and hence in
	* a different signature). */
	if (sig->revkey)
	{
	int i;

	pk->revkey =
	xrealloc (pk->revkey, sizeof (struct revocation_key) *
	(pk->numrevkeys + sig->numrevkeys));

	for (i = 0; i < sig->numrevkeys; i++, pk->numrevkeys++)
	{
	pk->revkey[pk->numrevkeys].class
	= sig->revkey[i].class;
	pk->revkey[pk->numrevkeys].algid
	= sig->revkey[i].algid;
	pk->revkey[pk->numrevkeys].fprlen
	= sig->revkey[i].fprlen;
	memcpy (pk->revkey[pk->numrevkeys].fpr,
	sig->revkey[i].fpr, sig->revkey[i].fprlen);
	memset (pk->revkey[pk->numrevkeys].fpr
	+ sig->revkey[i].fprlen,
	0,
	sizeof (sig->revkey[i].fpr)
	- sig->revkey[i].fprlen);
	}
	}

	if (sig->timestamp >= sigdate)
	{ /* This is the latest signature so far. */

	if (sig->flags.expired)
	; /* Signature has expired - ignore it. */
	else
	{
	sigdate = sig->timestamp;
	signode = k;
	if (sig->version > sigversion)
	sigversion = sig->version;

	}
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}

	/* Remove dupes from the revocation keys. */
	if (pk->revkey)
	{
	int i, j, x, changed = 0;

	for (i = 0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++)
	{
	for (j = i + 1; j < pk->numrevkeys; j++)
	{
	if (memcmp (&pk->revkey[i], &pk->revkey[j],
	sizeof (struct revocation_key)) == 0)
	{
	/* remove j */

	for (x = j; x < pk->numrevkeys - 1; x++)
	pk->revkey[x] = pk->revkey[x + 1];

	pk->numrevkeys--;
	j--;
	changed = 1;
	}
	}
	}

	if (changed)
	pk->revkey = xrealloc (pk->revkey,
	pk->numrevkeys *
	sizeof (struct revocation_key));
	}

	/* SIGNODE is the direct key signature packet (sigclass 0x1f) with
	* the latest creation time. Extract some information from it. */
	if (signode)
	{
	/* Some information from a direct key signature take precedence
	* over the same information given in UID sigs. */
	PKT_signature *sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
	const byte *p;

	key_usage = parse_key_usage (sig);

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
	if (p && buf32_to_u32 (p))
	{
	key_expire = keytimestamp + buf32_to_u32 (p);
	key_expire_seen = 1;
	}

	/* Mark that key as valid: One direct key signature should
	* render a key as valid. */
	pk->flags.valid = 1;
	}

	/* Pass 1.5: Look for key revocation signatures that were not made
	* by the key (i.e. did a revocation key issue a revocation for
	* us?). Only bother to do this if there is a revocation key in the
	* first place and we're not revoked already. */

	if (!*r_revoked && pk->revkey)
	for (k = keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;

	if (IS_KEY_REV (sig) &&
	(sig->keyid[0] != kid[0] \|\| sig->keyid[1] != kid[1]))
	{
	int rc = check_revocation_keys (ctrl, pk, sig);
	if (rc == 0)
	{
	*r_revoked = 2;
	sig_to_revoke_info (sig, rinfo);
	/* Don't continue checking since we can't be any
	* more revoked than this. */
	break;
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
	pk->flags.maybe_revoked = 1;

	/* A failure here means the sig did not verify, was
	* not issued by a revocation key, or a revocation
	* key loop was broken. If a revocation key isn't
	* findable, however, the key might be revoked and
	* we don't know it. */

	/* Fixme: In the future handle subkey and cert
	* revocations? PGP doesn't, but it's in 2440. */
	}
	}
	}

	/* Second pass: Look at the self-signature of all user IDs. */

	/* According to RFC 4880 section 11.1, user id and attribute packets
	* are in the second section, after the public key packet and before
	* the subkey packets. */
	signode = uidnode = NULL;
	sigdate = 0; /* Helper variable to find the latest signature in one UID. */
	for (k = keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID \|\| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ATTRIBUTE)
	{ /* New user id packet. */

	/* Apply the data from the most recent self-signed packet to
	* the preceding user id packet. */
	if (uidnode && signode)
	{
	fixup_uidnode (uidnode, signode, keytimestamp);
	pk->flags.valid = 1;
	}

	/* Clear SIGNODE. The only relevant self-signed data for
	* UIDNODE follows it. */
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	uidnode = k;
	else
	uidnode = NULL;

	signode = NULL;
	sigdate = 0;
	}
	else if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && uidnode)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == kid[1])
	{
	if (check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, k, NULL))
	; /* signature did not verify */
	else if ((IS_UID_SIG (sig) \|\| IS_UID_REV (sig))
	&& sig->timestamp >= sigdate)
	{
	/* Note: we allow invalidation of cert revocations
	* by a newer signature. An attacker can't use this
	* because a key should be revoked with a key revocation.
	* The reason why we have to allow for that is that at
	* one time an email address may become invalid but later
	* the same email address may become valid again (hired,
	* fired, hired again). */

	sigdate = sig->timestamp;
	signode = k;
	signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig = 0;
	if (sig->version > sigversion)
	sigversion = sig->version;
	}
	}
	}
	}
	if (uidnode && signode)
	{
	fixup_uidnode (uidnode, signode, keytimestamp);
	pk->flags.valid = 1;
	}

	/* If the key isn't valid yet, and we have
	* --allow-non-selfsigned-uid set, then force it valid. */
	if (!pk->flags.valid && opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid)
	{
	if (opt.verbose)
	log_info (_("Invalid key %s made valid by"
	" --allow-non-selfsigned-uid\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk));
	pk->flags.valid = 1;
	}

	/* The key STILL isn't valid, so try and find an ultimately
	* trusted signature. */
	if (!pk->flags.valid)
	{
	uidnode = NULL;

	for (k = keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
	k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	uidnode = k;
	else if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && uidnode)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;

	if (sig->keyid[0] != kid[0] \|\| sig->keyid[1] != kid[1])
	{
	PKT_public_key *ultimate_pk;

	ultimate_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*ultimate_pk));

	/* We don't want to use the full get_pubkey to avoid
	* infinite recursion in certain cases. There is no
	* reason to check that an ultimately trusted key is
	* still valid - if it has been revoked the user
	* should also remove the ultimate trust flag. */
	if (get_pubkey_fast (ctrl, ultimate_pk, sig->keyid) == 0
	&& check_key_signature2 (ctrl,
	keyblock, k, ultimate_pk,
	NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) == 0
	&& get_ownertrust (ctrl, ultimate_pk) == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
	{
	free_public_key (ultimate_pk);
	pk->flags.valid = 1;
	break;
	}

	free_public_key (ultimate_pk);
	}
	}
	}
	}

	/* Record the highest selfsig version so we know if this is a v3 key
	* through and through, or a v3 key with a v4 selfsig somewhere.
	* This is useful in a few places to know if the key must be treated
	* as PGP2-style or OpenPGP-style. Note that a selfsig revocation
	* with a higher version number will also raise this value. This is
	* okay since such a revocation must be issued by the user (i.e. it
	* cannot be issued by someone else to modify the key behavior.) */

	pk->selfsigversion = sigversion;

	/* Now that we had a look at all user IDs we can now get some
	* information from those user IDs. */

	if (!key_usage)
	{
	/* Find the latest user ID with key flags set. */
	uiddate = 0; /* Helper to find the latest user ID. */
	for (k = keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
	k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	if (uid->help_key_usage
	&& (uid->created > uiddate \|\| (!uid->created && !uiddate)))
	{
	key_usage = uid->help_key_usage;
	uiddate = uid->created;
	}
	}
	}
	}

	if (!key_usage)
	{
	/* No key flags at all: get it from the algo. */
	key_usage = openpgp_pk_algo_usage (pk->pubkey_algo);
	}
	else
	{
	/* Check that the usage matches the usage as given by the algo. */
	int x = openpgp_pk_algo_usage (pk->pubkey_algo);
	if (x) /* Mask it down to the actual allowed usage. */
	key_usage &= x;
	}

	/* Whatever happens, it's a primary key, so it can certify. */
	pk->pubkey_usage = key_usage \| PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT;

	if (!key_expire_seen)
	{
	/* Find the latest valid user ID with a key expiration set.
	* This may be a different one than from usage computation above
	* because some user IDs may have no expiration date set. */
	uiddate = 0;
	for (k = keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
	k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	if (uid->help_key_expire
	&& (uid->created > uiddate \|\| (!uid->created && !uiddate)))
	{
	key_expire = uid->help_key_expire;
	uiddate = uid->created;
	}
	}
	}
	}

	/* Currently only the not anymore supported v3 keys have a maximum
	* expiration date, but future key versions may get this feature again. */
	if (key_expire == 0
	\|\| (pk->max_expiredate && key_expire > pk->max_expiredate))
	key_expire = pk->max_expiredate;

	pk->has_expired = key_expire >= curtime ? 0 : key_expire;
	pk->expiredate = key_expire;

	/* Fixme: we should see how to get rid of the expiretime fields but
	* this needs changes at other places too. */

	/* And now find the real primary user ID and delete all others. */
	uiddate = uiddate2 = 0;
	uidnode = uidnode2 = NULL;
	for (k = keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	if (uid->flags.primary)
	{
	if (uid->created > uiddate)
	{
	uiddate = uid->created;
	uidnode = k;
	}
	else if (uid->created == uiddate && uidnode)
	{
	/* The dates are equal, so we need to do a different
	* (and arbitrary) comparison. This should rarely,
	* if ever, happen. It's good to try and guarantee
	* that two different GnuPG users with two different
	* keyrings at least pick the same primary. */
	if (cmp_user_ids (uid, uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id) > 0)
	uidnode = k;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	if (uid->created > uiddate2)
	{
	uiddate2 = uid->created;
	uidnode2 = k;
	}
	else if (uid->created == uiddate2 && uidnode2)
	{
	if (cmp_user_ids (uid, uidnode2->pkt->pkt.user_id) > 0)
	uidnode2 = k;
	}
	}
	}
	}
	if (uidnode)
	{
	for (k = keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
	k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
	!k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	if (k != uidnode)
	uid->flags.primary = 0;
	}
	}
	}
	else if (uidnode2)
	{
	/* None is flagged primary - use the latest user ID we have,
	* and disambiguate with the arbitrary packet comparison. */
	uidnode2->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary = 1;
	}
	else
	{
	/* None of our uids were self-signed, so pick the one that
	* sorts first to be the primary. This is the best we can do
	* here since there are no self sigs to date the uids. */

	uidnode = NULL;

	for (k = keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
	k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
	{
	if (!uidnode)
	{
	uidnode = k;
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary = 1;
	continue;
	}
	else
	{
	if (cmp_user_ids (k->pkt->pkt.user_id,
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id) > 0)
	{
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary = 0;
	uidnode = k;
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary = 1;
	}
	else
	{
	/* just to be safe: */
	k->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary = 0;
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}


	/* Convert a buffer to a signature. Useful for 0x19 embedded sigs.
	* Caller must free the signature when they are done. */
	static PKT_signature *
	buf_to_sig (const byte * buf, size_t len)
	{
	PKT_signature *sig = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (PKT_signature));
	IOBUF iobuf = iobuf_temp_with_content (buf, len);
	int save_mode = set_packet_list_mode (0);

	if (parse_signature (iobuf, PKT_SIGNATURE, len, sig) != 0)
	{
	free_seckey_enc (sig);
	sig = NULL;
	}

	set_packet_list_mode (save_mode);
	iobuf_close (iobuf);

	return sig;
	}


	/* Use the self-signed data to fill in various fields in subkeys.
	*
	* KEYBLOCK is the whole keyblock. SUBNODE is the subkey to fill in.
	*
	* Sets the following fields on the subkey:
	*
	* main_keyid
	* flags.valid if the subkey has a valid self-sig binding
	* flags.revoked
	* flags.backsig
	* pubkey_usage
	* has_expired
	* expired_date
	*
	* On this subkey's most revent valid self-signed packet, the
	* following field is set:
	*
	* flags.chosen_selfsig
	*/
	static void
	merge_selfsigs_subkey (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t subnode)
	{
	PKT_public_key mainpk = NULL, subpk = NULL;
	PKT_signature *sig;
	KBNODE k;
	u32 mainkid[2];
	u32 sigdate = 0;
	KBNODE signode;
	u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
	unsigned int key_usage = 0;
	u32 keytimestamp = 0;
	u32 key_expire = 0;
	const byte *p;

	if (subnode->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	BUG ();
	mainpk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (mainpk->version < 4)
	return;/* (actually this should never happen) */
	keyid_from_pk (mainpk, mainkid);
	subpk = subnode->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	keytimestamp = subpk->timestamp;

	subpk->flags.valid = 0;
	subpk->flags.exact = 0;
	subpk->main_keyid[0] = mainpk->main_keyid[0];
	subpk->main_keyid[1] = mainpk->main_keyid[1];

	/* Find the latest key binding self-signature. */
	signode = NULL;
	sigdate = 0; /* Helper to find the latest signature. */
	for (k = subnode->next; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
	k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
	{
	sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
	if (sig->keyid[0] == mainkid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == mainkid[1])
	{
	if (check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, k, NULL))
	; /* Signature did not verify. */
	else if (IS_SUBKEY_REV (sig))
	{
	/* Note that this means that the date on a
	* revocation sig does not matter - even if the
	* binding sig is dated after the revocation sig,
	* the subkey is still marked as revoked. This
	* seems ok, as it is just as easy to make new
	* subkeys rather than re-sign old ones as the
	* problem is in the distribution. Plus, PGP (7)
	* does this the same way. */
	subpk->flags.revoked = 1;
	sig_to_revoke_info (sig, &subpk->revoked);
	/* Although we could stop now, we continue to
	* figure out other information like the old expiration
	* time. */
	}
	else if (IS_SUBKEY_SIG (sig) && sig->timestamp >= sigdate)
	{
	if (sig->flags.expired)
	; /* Signature has expired - ignore it. */
	else
	{
	sigdate = sig->timestamp;
	signode = k;
	signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig = 0;
	}
	}
	}
	}
	}

	/* No valid key binding. */
	if (!signode)
	return;

	sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
	sig->flags.chosen_selfsig = 1; /* So we know which selfsig we chose later. */

	key_usage = parse_key_usage (sig);
	if (!key_usage)
	{
	/* No key flags at all: get it from the algo. */
	key_usage = openpgp_pk_algo_usage (subpk->pubkey_algo);
	}
	else
	{
	/* Check that the usage matches the usage as given by the algo. */
	int x = openpgp_pk_algo_usage (subpk->pubkey_algo);
	if (x) /* Mask it down to the actual allowed usage. */
	key_usage &= x;
	}

	subpk->pubkey_usage = key_usage;

	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
	if (p && buf32_to_u32 (p))
	key_expire = keytimestamp + buf32_to_u32 (p);
	else
	key_expire = 0;

	subpk->has_expired = key_expire >= curtime ? 0 : key_expire;
	subpk->expiredate = key_expire;

	/* Algo doesn't exist. */
	if (openpgp_pk_test_algo (subpk->pubkey_algo))
	return;

	subpk->flags.valid = 1;

	/* Find the most recent 0x19 embedded signature on our self-sig. */
	if (!subpk->flags.backsig)
	{
	int seq = 0;
	size_t n;
	PKT_signature *backsig = NULL;

	sigdate = 0;

	/* We do this while() since there may be other embedded
	* signatures in the future. We only want 0x19 here. */

	while ((p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE,
	&n, &seq, NULL)))
	if (n > 3
	&& ((p[0] == 3 && p[2] == 0x19) \|\| (p[0] == 4 && p[1] == 0x19)))
	{
	PKT_signature *tempsig = buf_to_sig (p, n);
	if (tempsig)
	{
	if (tempsig->timestamp > sigdate)
	{
	if (backsig)
	free_seckey_enc (backsig);

	backsig = tempsig;
	sigdate = backsig->timestamp;
	}
	else
	free_seckey_enc (tempsig);
	}
	}

	seq = 0;

	/* It is safe to have this in the unhashed area since the 0x19
	* is located on the selfsig for convenience, not security. */
	while ((p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig, 0, SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE,
	&n, &seq, NULL)))
	if (n > 3
	&& ((p[0] == 3 && p[2] == 0x19) \|\| (p[0] == 4 && p[1] == 0x19)))
	{
	PKT_signature *tempsig = buf_to_sig (p, n);
	if (tempsig)
	{
	if (tempsig->timestamp > sigdate)
	{
	if (backsig)
	free_seckey_enc (backsig);

	backsig = tempsig;
	sigdate = backsig->timestamp;
	}
	else
	free_seckey_enc (tempsig);
	}
	}

	if (backsig)
	{
	/* At this point, backsig contains the most recent 0x19 sig.
	* Let's see if it is good. */

	/* 2==valid, 1==invalid, 0==didn't check */
	if (check_backsig (mainpk, subpk, backsig) == 0)
	subpk->flags.backsig = 2;
	else
	subpk->flags.backsig = 1;

	free_seckey_enc (backsig);
	}
	}
	}


	/* Merge information from the self-signatures with the public key,
	* subkeys and user ids to make using them more easy.
	*
	* See documentation for merge_selfsigs_main, merge_selfsigs_subkey
	* and fixup_uidnode for exactly which fields are updated. */
	static void
	merge_selfsigs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
	{
	KBNODE k;
	int revoked;
	struct revoke_info rinfo;
	PKT_public_key *main_pk;
	prefitem_t *prefs;
	unsigned int mdc_feature;
	unsigned int aead_feature;

	if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	{
	log_error ("expected public key but found secret key "
	"- must stop\n");
	/* We better exit here because a public key is expected at
	* other places too. FIXME: Figure this out earlier and
	* don't get to here at all */
	g10_exit (1);
	}
	BUG ();
	}

	merge_selfsigs_main (ctrl, keyblock, &revoked, &rinfo);

	/* Now merge in the data from each of the subkeys. */
	for (k = keyblock; k; k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	merge_selfsigs_subkey (ctrl, keyblock, k);
	}
	}

	main_pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (revoked \|\| main_pk->has_expired \|\| !main_pk->flags.valid)
	{
	/* If the primary key is revoked, expired, or invalid we
	* better set the appropriate flags on that key and all
	* subkeys. */
	for (k = keyblock; k; k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (!main_pk->flags.valid)
	pk->flags.valid = 0;
	if (revoked && !pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	pk->flags.revoked = revoked;
	memcpy (&pk->revoked, &rinfo, sizeof (rinfo));
	}
	if (main_pk->has_expired)
	{
	pk->has_expired = main_pk->has_expired;
	if (!pk->expiredate \|\| pk->expiredate > main_pk->expiredate)
	pk->expiredate = main_pk->expiredate;
	}
	}
	}
	return;
	}

	/* Set the preference list of all keys to those of the primary real
	* user ID. Note: we use these preferences when we don't know by
	* which user ID the key has been selected.
	* fixme: we should keep atoms of commonly used preferences or
	* use reference counting to optimize the preference lists storage.
	* FIXME: it might be better to use the intersection of
	* all preferences.
	* Do a similar thing for the MDC feature flag. */
	prefs = NULL;
	mdc_feature = aead_feature = 0;
	for (k = keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data
	&& k->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary)
	{
	prefs = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->prefs;
	mdc_feature = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.mdc;
	aead_feature = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.aead;
	break;
	}
	}
	for (k = keyblock; k; k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (pk->prefs)
	xfree (pk->prefs);
	pk->prefs = copy_prefs (prefs);
	pk->flags.mdc = mdc_feature;
	pk->flags.aead = aead_feature;
	}
	}
	}



	/* See whether the key satisfies any additional requirements specified
	* in CTX. If so, return the node of an appropriate key or subkey.
	* Otherwise, return NULL if there was no appropriate key.
	*
	* Note that we do not return a reference, i.e. the result must not be
	* freed using 'release_kbnode'.
	*
	* In case the primary key is not required, select a suitable subkey.
	* We need the primary key if PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT is set in REQ_USAGE or
	* we are in PGP7 mode and PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG is set in
	* REQ_USAGE.
	*
	* If any of PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG, PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC and PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT
	* are set in REQ_USAGE, we filter by the key's function. Concretely,
	* if PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG and PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT are set, then we only
	* return a key if it is (at least) either a signing or a
	* certification key.
	*
	* If REQ_USAGE is set, then we reject any keys that are not good
	* (i.e., valid, not revoked, not expired, etc.). This allows the
	* getkey functions to be used for plain key listings.
	*
	* Sets the matched key's user id field (pk->user_id) to the user id
	* that matched the low-level search criteria or NULL.
	*
	* If R_FLAGS is not NULL set certain flags for more detailed error
	* reporting. Used flags are:
	*
	* - LOOKUP_ALL_SUBKEYS_EXPIRED :: All Subkeys are expired or have
	* been revoked.
	* - LOOKUP_NOT_SELECTED :: No suitable key found
	*
	* This function needs to handle several different cases:
	*
	* 1. No requested usage and no primary key requested
	* Examples for this case are that we have a keyID to be used
	* for decryption or verification.
	* 2. No usage but primary key requested
	* This is the case for all functions which work on an
	* entire keyblock, e.g. for editing or listing
	* 3. Usage and primary key requested
	* FIXME
	* 4. Usage but no primary key requested
	* FIXME
	*
	*/
	static kbnode_t
	finish_lookup (kbnode_t keyblock, unsigned int req_usage, int want_exact,
	int want_secret, unsigned int *r_flags)
	{
	kbnode_t k;

	/* If WANT_EXACT is set, the key or subkey that actually matched the
	low-level search criteria. */
	kbnode_t foundk = NULL;
	/* The user id (if any) that matched the low-level search criteria. */
	PKT_user_id *foundu = NULL;

	u32 latest_date;
	kbnode_t latest_key;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	int req_prim;
	u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();

	if (r_flags)
	*r_flags = 0;

	#define USAGE_MASK (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG\|PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC\|PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT)
	req_usage &= USAGE_MASK;

	/* Request the primary if we're certifying another key, and also if
	* signing data while --pgp7 is on since pgp 7 do
	* not understand signatures made by a signing subkey. PGP 8 does. */
	req_prim = ((req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT)
	\|\| (PGP7 && (req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)));


	log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);

	/* For an exact match mark the primary or subkey that matched the
	low-level search criteria. */
	if (want_exact)
	{
	for (k = keyblock; k; k = k->next)
	{
	if ((k->flag & 1))
	{
	log_assert (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY);
	foundk = k;
	pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	pk->flags.exact = 1;
	break;
	}
	}
	}

	/* Get the user id that matched that low-level search criteria. */
	for (k = keyblock; k; k = k->next)
	{
	if ((k->flag & 2))
	{
	log_assert (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID);
	foundu = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	break;
	}
	}

	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("finish_lookup: checking key %08lX (%s)(req_usage=%x)\n",
	(ulong) keyid_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL),
	foundk ? "one" : "all", req_usage);

	if (!req_usage)
	{
	latest_key = foundk ? foundk : keyblock;
	goto found;
	}

	latest_date = 0;
	latest_key = NULL;
	/* Set LATEST_KEY to the latest (the one with the most recent
	* timestamp) good (valid, not revoked, not expired, etc.) subkey.
	*
	* Don't bother if we are only looking for a primary key or we need
	* an exact match and the exact match is not a subkey. */
	if (req_prim \|\| (foundk && foundk->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY))
	;
	else
	{
	kbnode_t nextk;
	int n_subkeys = 0;
	int n_revoked_or_expired = 0;
	int last_secret_key_avail = 0;

	/* Either start a loop or check just this one subkey. */
	for (k = foundk ? foundk : keyblock; k; k = nextk)
	{
	if (foundk)
	{
	/* If FOUNDK is not NULL, then only consider that exact
	key, i.e., don't iterate. */
	nextk = NULL;
	}
	else
	nextk = k->next;

	if (k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	continue;

	pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("\tchecking subkey %08lX\n",
	(ulong) keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL));

	if (!pk->flags.valid)
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("\tsubkey not valid\n");
	continue;
	}
	if (!((pk->pubkey_usage & USAGE_MASK) & req_usage))
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("\tusage does not match: want=%x have=%x\n",
	req_usage, pk->pubkey_usage);
	continue;
	}

	n_subkeys++;
	if (pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("\tsubkey has been revoked\n");
	n_revoked_or_expired++;
	continue;
	}
	if (pk->has_expired)
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("\tsubkey has expired\n");
	n_revoked_or_expired++;
	continue;
	}
	if (pk->timestamp > curtime && !opt.ignore_valid_from)
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("\tsubkey not yet valid\n");
	continue;
	}

	if (want_secret)
	{
	int secret_key_avail = agent_probe_secret_key (NULL, pk);

	if (!secret_key_avail)
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("\tno secret key\n");
	continue;
	}

	if (secret_key_avail > last_secret_key_avail)
	{
	/* Use this key. */
	last_secret_key_avail = secret_key_avail;
	latest_date = 0;
	}
	}

	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("\tsubkey might be fine\n");
	/* In case a key has a timestamp of 0 set, we make sure
	that it is used. A better change would be to compare
	">=" but that might also change the selected keys and
	is as such a more intrusive change. */
	if (pk->timestamp > latest_date \|\| (!pk->timestamp && !latest_date))
	{
	latest_date = pk->timestamp;
	latest_key = k;
	}
	}
	if (n_subkeys == n_revoked_or_expired && r_flags)
	*r_flags \|= LOOKUP_ALL_SUBKEYS_EXPIRED;
	}

	/* Check if the primary key is ok (valid, not revoke, not expire,
	* matches requested usage) if:
	*
	* - we didn't find an appropriate subkey and we're not doing an
	* exact search,
	*
	* - we're doing an exact match and the exact match was the
	* primary key, or,
	*
	* - we're just considering the primary key. */
	if ((!latest_key && !want_exact) \|\| foundk == keyblock \|\| req_prim)
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP && !foundk && !req_prim)
	log_debug ("\tno suitable subkeys found - trying primary\n");
	pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (!pk->flags.valid)
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("\tprimary key not valid\n");
	}
	else if (!((pk->pubkey_usage & USAGE_MASK) & req_usage))
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("\tprimary key usage does not match: "
	"want=%x have=%x\n", req_usage, pk->pubkey_usage);
	}
	else if (pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("\tprimary key has been revoked\n");
	}
	else if (pk->has_expired)
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("\tprimary key has expired\n");
	}
	else /* Okay. */
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("\tprimary key may be used\n");
	latest_key = keyblock;
	}
	}

	if (!latest_key)
	{
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("\tno suitable key found - giving up\n");
	if (r_flags)
	*r_flags \|= LOOKUP_NOT_SELECTED;
	return NULL; /* Not found. */
	}

	found:
	if (DBG_LOOKUP)
	log_debug ("\tusing key %08lX\n",
	(ulong) keyid_from_pk (latest_key->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL));

	if (latest_key)
	{
	pk = latest_key->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	free_user_id (pk->user_id);
	pk->user_id = scopy_user_id (foundu);
	}

	if (latest_key != keyblock && opt.verbose)
	{
	char *tempkeystr =
	xstrdup (keystr_from_pk (latest_key->pkt->pkt.public_key));
	log_info (_("using subkey %s instead of primary key %s\n"),
	tempkeystr, keystr_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key));
	xfree (tempkeystr);
	}

	cache_put_keyblock (keyblock);

	return latest_key ? latest_key : keyblock; /* Found. */
	}


	/* Print a KEY_CONSIDERED status line. */
	static void
	print_status_key_considered (kbnode_t keyblock, unsigned int flags)
	{
	char hexfpr[2*MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN + 1];
	kbnode_t node;
	char flagbuf[20];

	if (!is_status_enabled ())
	return;

	for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
	break;
	if (!node)
	{
	log_error ("%s: keyblock w/o primary key\n", __func__);
	return;
	}

	hexfingerprint (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, hexfpr, sizeof hexfpr);
	snprintf (flagbuf, sizeof flagbuf, " %u", flags);
	write_status_strings (STATUS_KEY_CONSIDERED, hexfpr, flagbuf, NULL);
	}



	/* A high-level function to lookup keys.
	*
	* This function builds on top of the low-level keydb API. It first
	* searches the database using the description stored in CTX->ITEMS,
	* then it filters the results using CTX and, finally, if WANT_SECRET
	* is set, it ignores any keys for which no secret key is available.
	*
	* Unlike the low-level search functions, this function also merges
	* all of the self-signed data into the keys, subkeys and user id
	* packets (see the merge_selfsigs for details).
	*
	* On success the key's keyblock is stored at *RET_KEYBLOCK, and the
	* specific subkey is stored at *RET_FOUND_KEY. Note that we do not
	* return a reference in *RET_FOUND_KEY, i.e. the result must not be
	* freed using 'release_kbnode', and it is only valid until
	* *RET_KEYBLOCK is deallocated. Therefore, if RET_FOUND_KEY is not
	* NULL, then RET_KEYBLOCK must not be NULL. */
	static int
	lookup (ctrl_t ctrl, getkey_ctx_t ctx, int want_secret,
	kbnode_t ret_keyblock, kbnode_t ret_found_key)
	{
	int rc;
	int no_suitable_key = 0;
	KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
	KBNODE found_key = NULL;
	unsigned int infoflags;

	log_assert (ret_found_key == NULL \|\| ret_keyblock != NULL);
	if (ret_keyblock)
	*ret_keyblock = NULL;

	for (;;)
	{
	rc = keydb_search (ctx->kr_handle, ctx->items, ctx->nitems, NULL);
	if (rc)
	break;

	/* If we are iterating over the entire database, then we need to
	* change from KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST, which does an implicit
	* reset, to KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT, which gets the next record. */
	if (ctx->nitems && ctx->items->mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST)
	ctx->items->mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;

	rc = keydb_get_keyblock (ctx->kr_handle, &keyblock);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto skip;
	}

	if (want_secret)
	{
	rc = agent_probe_any_secret_key (NULL, keyblock);
	if (gpg_err_code(rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
	goto skip; /* No secret key available. */
	if (rc)
	goto found; /* Unexpected error. */
	}

	/* Warning: node flag bits 0 and 1 should be preserved by
	* merge_selfsigs. */
	merge_selfsigs (ctrl, keyblock);
	found_key = finish_lookup (keyblock, ctx->req_usage, ctx->exact,
	want_secret, &infoflags);
	print_status_key_considered (keyblock, infoflags);
	if (found_key)
	{
	no_suitable_key = 0;
	goto found;
	}
	else
	{
	no_suitable_key = 1;
	}

	skip:
	/* Release resources and continue search. */
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	keyblock = NULL;
	/* The keyblock cache ignores the current "file position".
	* Thus, if we request the next result and the cache matches
	* (and it will since it is what we just looked for), we'll get
	* the same entry back! We can avoid this infinite loop by
	* disabling the cache. */
	keydb_disable_caching (ctx->kr_handle);
	}

	found:
	if (rc && gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	log_error ("keydb_search failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));

	if (!rc)
	{
	if (ret_keyblock)
	{
	ret_keyblock = keyblock; / Return the keyblock. */
	keyblock = NULL;
	}
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND && no_suitable_key)
	rc = want_secret? GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_SECKEY : GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY;
	else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	rc = want_secret? GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY : GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;

	release_kbnode (keyblock);

	if (ret_found_key)
	{
	if (! rc)
	*ret_found_key = found_key;
	else
	*ret_found_key = NULL;
	}

	return rc;
	}


	/* If a default key has been specified, return that key. If a card
	* based key is also available as indicated by FPR_CARD not being
	* NULL, return that key if suitable. */
	gpg_error_t
	get_seckey_default_or_card (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk,
	const byte *fpr_card, size_t fpr_len)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	strlist_t namelist = NULL;
	const char *def_secret_key;

	def_secret_key = parse_def_secret_key (ctrl);

	if (def_secret_key)
	add_to_strlist (&namelist, def_secret_key);
	else if (fpr_card)
	{
	err = get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, pk, NULL, fpr_card, fpr_len);
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
	{
	if (opt.debug)
	log_debug ("using LDAP to find public key for current card\n");
	err = keyserver_import_fprint (ctrl, fpr_card, fpr_len,
	opt.keyserver,
	KEYSERVER_IMPORT_FLAG_LDAP);
	if (!err)
	err = get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, pk, NULL, fpr_card, fpr_len);
	else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA
	\|\| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_KEYSERVER)
	{
	/* Dirmngr returns NO DATA is the selected keyserver
	* does not have the requested key. It returns NO
	* KEYSERVER if no LDAP keyservers are configured. */
	err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
	}
	}

	/* The key on card can be not suitable for requested usage. */
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY)
	fpr_card = NULL; /* Fallthrough as no card. */
	else
	return err; /* Success or other error. */
	}

	if (!fpr_card \|\| (def_secret_key && *def_secret_key
	&& def_secret_key[strlen (def_secret_key)-1] == '!'))
	{
	err = key_byname (ctrl, NULL, namelist, pk, 1, 0, NULL, NULL);
	}
	else
	{ /* Default key is specified and card key is also available. */
	kbnode_t k, keyblock = NULL;

	err = key_byname (ctrl, NULL, namelist, pk, 1, 0, &keyblock, NULL);
	if (err)
	goto leave;
	for (k = keyblock; k; k = k->next)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk_candidate;
	char fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];

	if (k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	&&k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	continue;

	pk_candidate = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (!pk_candidate->flags.valid)
	continue;
	if (!((pk_candidate->pubkey_usage & USAGE_MASK) & pk->req_usage))
	continue;
	fingerprint_from_pk (pk_candidate, fpr, NULL);
	if (!memcmp (fpr_card, fpr, fpr_len))
	{
	release_public_key_parts (pk);
	copy_public_key (pk, pk_candidate);
	break;
	}
	}
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	}

	leave:
	free_strlist (namelist);
	return err;
	}



	/*********************************************
	********* User ID printing helpers *****
	*********************************************/

	/* Return a string with a printable representation of the user_id.
	* this string must be freed by xfree. If R_NOUID is not NULL it is
	* set to true if a user id was not found; otherwise to false. */
	static char *
	get_user_id_string (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 * keyid, int mode)
	{
	char *name;
	unsigned int namelen;
	char *p;

	log_assert (mode != 2);

	name = cache_get_uid_bykid (keyid, &namelen);
	if (!name)
	{
	/* Get it so that the cache will be filled. */
	if (!get_pubkey (ctrl, NULL, keyid))
	name = cache_get_uid_bykid (keyid, &namelen);
	}

	if (name)
	{
	if (mode)
	p = xasprintf ("%08lX%08lX %.*s",
	(ulong) keyid[0], (ulong) keyid[1], namelen, name);
	else
	p = xasprintf ("%s %.*s", keystr (keyid), namelen, name);

	xfree (name);
	}
	else
	{
	if (mode)
	p = xasprintf ("%08lX%08lX [?]", (ulong) keyid[0], (ulong) keyid[1]);
	else
	p = xasprintf ("%s [?]", keystr (keyid));
	}

	return p;
	}


	char *
	get_user_id_string_native (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 * keyid)
	{
	char *p = get_user_id_string (ctrl, keyid, 0);
	char *p2 = utf8_to_native (p, strlen (p), 0);
	xfree (p);
	return p2;
	}


	char *
	get_long_user_id_string (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 * keyid)
	{
	return get_user_id_string (ctrl, keyid, 1);
	}


	/* Please try to use get_user_byfpr instead of this one. */
	char *
	get_user_id (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 keyid, size_t rn, int *r_nouid)
	{
	char *name;
	unsigned int namelen;

	if (r_nouid)
	*r_nouid = 0;

	name = cache_get_uid_bykid (keyid, &namelen);
	if (!name)
	{
	/* Get it so that the cache will be filled. */
	if (!get_pubkey (ctrl, NULL, keyid))
	name = cache_get_uid_bykid (keyid, &namelen);
	}

	if (!name)
	{
	name = xstrdup (user_id_not_found_utf8 ());
	namelen = strlen (name);
	if (r_nouid)
	*r_nouid = 1;
	}

	if (rn && name)
	*rn = namelen;
	return name;
	}


	/* Please try to use get_user_id_byfpr_native instead of this one. */
	char *
	get_user_id_native (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 *keyid)
	{
	size_t rn;
	char *p = get_user_id (ctrl, keyid, &rn, NULL);
	char *p2 = utf8_to_native (p, rn, 0);
	xfree (p);
	return p2;
	}


	/* Return the user id for a key designated by its fingerprint, FPR,
	which must be MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN bytes in size. Note: the
	returned string, which must be freed using xfree, may not be NUL
	terminated. To determine the length of the string, you must use
	RN. /
	static char *
	get_user_id_byfpr (ctrl_t ctrl, const byte fpr, size_t fprlen, size_t rn)
	{
	char *name;

	name = cache_get_uid_byfpr (fpr, fprlen, rn);
	if (!name)
	{
	/* Get it so that the cache will be filled. */
	if (!get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, NULL, NULL, fpr, fprlen))
	name = cache_get_uid_byfpr (fpr, fprlen, rn);
	}

	if (!name)
	{
	name = xstrdup (user_id_not_found_utf8 ());
	*rn = strlen (name);
	}

	return name;
	}

	/* Like get_user_id_byfpr, but convert the string to the native
	encoding. The returned string needs to be freed. Unlike
	get_user_id_byfpr, the returned string is NUL terminated. */
	char *
	get_user_id_byfpr_native (ctrl_t ctrl, const byte *fpr, size_t fprlen)
	{
	size_t rn;
	char *p = get_user_id_byfpr (ctrl, fpr, fprlen, &rn);
	char *p2 = utf8_to_native (p, rn, 0);
	xfree (p);
	return p2;
	}


	/* Return the database handle used by this context. The context still
	owns the handle. */
	KEYDB_HANDLE
	get_ctx_handle (GETKEY_CTX ctx)
	{
	return ctx->kr_handle;
	}

	static void
	free_akl (struct akl *akl)
	{
	if (! akl)
	return;

	if (akl->spec)
	free_keyserver_spec (akl->spec);

	xfree (akl);
	}

	void
	release_akl (void)
	{
	while (opt.auto_key_locate)
	{
	struct akl *akl2 = opt.auto_key_locate;
	opt.auto_key_locate = opt.auto_key_locate->next;
	free_akl (akl2);
	}
	}


	/* Returns true if the AKL is empty or has only the local method
	* active. */
	int
	akl_empty_or_only_local (void)
	{
	struct akl *akl;
	int any = 0;

	for (akl = opt.auto_key_locate; akl; akl = akl->next)
	if (akl->type != AKL_NODEFAULT && akl->type != AKL_LOCAL)
	{
	any = 1;
	break;
	}

	return !any;
	}


	/* Returns false on error. */
	int
	parse_auto_key_locate (const char *options_arg)
	{
	char *tok;
	char options, options_buf;

	options = options_buf = xstrdup (options_arg);
	while ((tok = optsep (&options)))
	{
	struct akl akl, check, *last = NULL;
	int dupe = 0;

	if (tok[0] == '\0')
	continue;

	akl = xmalloc_clear (sizeof (*akl));

	if (ascii_strcasecmp (tok, "clear") == 0)
	{
	xfree (akl);
	free_akl (opt.auto_key_locate);
	opt.auto_key_locate = NULL;
	continue;
	}
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (tok, "nodefault") == 0)
	akl->type = AKL_NODEFAULT;
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (tok, "local") == 0)
	akl->type = AKL_LOCAL;
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (tok, "ldap") == 0)
	akl->type = AKL_LDAP;
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (tok, "keyserver") == 0)
	akl->type = AKL_KEYSERVER;
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (tok, "cert") == 0)
	akl->type = AKL_CERT;
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (tok, "pka") == 0)
	akl->type = AKL_PKA;
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (tok, "dane") == 0)
	akl->type = AKL_DANE;
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (tok, "wkd") == 0)
	akl->type = AKL_WKD;
	else if (ascii_strcasecmp (tok, "ntds") == 0)
	akl->type = AKL_NTDS;
	else if ((akl->spec = parse_keyserver_uri (tok, 1)))
	akl->type = AKL_SPEC;
	else
	{
	free_akl (akl);
	xfree (options_buf);
	return 0;
	}

	/* We must maintain the order the user gave us */
	for (check = opt.auto_key_locate; check;
	last = check, check = check->next)
	{
	/* Check for duplicates */
	if (check->type == akl->type
	&& (akl->type != AKL_SPEC
	\|\| (akl->type == AKL_SPEC
	&& strcmp (check->spec->uri, akl->spec->uri) == 0)))
	{
	dupe = 1;
	free_akl (akl);
	break;
	}
	}

	if (!dupe)
	{
	if (last)
	last->next = akl;
	else
	opt.auto_key_locate = akl;
	}
	}

	xfree (options_buf);
	return 1;
	}



	/* The list of key origins. */
	static struct {
	const char *name;
	int origin;
	} key_origin_list[] =
	{
	{ "self", KEYORG_SELF },
	{ "file", KEYORG_FILE },
	{ "url", KEYORG_URL },
	{ "wkd", KEYORG_WKD },
	{ "dane", KEYORG_DANE },
	{ "ks-pref", KEYORG_KS_PREF },
	{ "ks", KEYORG_KS },
	{ "unknown", KEYORG_UNKNOWN }
	};

	/* Parse the argument for --key-origin. Return false on error. */
	int
	parse_key_origin (char *string)
	{
	int i;
	char *comma;

	comma = strchr (string, ',');
	if (comma)
	*comma = 0;

	if (!ascii_strcasecmp (string, "help"))
	{
	log_info (_("valid values for option '%s':\n"), "--key-origin");
	for (i=0; i < DIM (key_origin_list); i++)
	log_info (" %s\n", key_origin_list[i].name);
	g10_exit (1);
	}

	for (i=0; i < DIM (key_origin_list); i++)
	if (!ascii_strcasecmp (string, key_origin_list[i].name))
	{
	opt.key_origin = key_origin_list[i].origin;
	xfree (opt.key_origin_url);
	opt.key_origin_url = NULL;
	if (comma && comma[1])
	{
	opt.key_origin_url = xstrdup (comma+1);
	trim_spaces (opt.key_origin_url);
	}

	return 1;
	}

	if (comma)
	*comma = ',';
	return 0;
	}

	/* Return a string or "?" for the key ORIGIN. */
	const char *
	key_origin_string (int origin)
	{
	int i;

	for (i=0; i < DIM (key_origin_list); i++)
	if (key_origin_list[i].origin == origin)
	return key_origin_list[i].name;
	return "?";
	}



	/* Returns true if a secret key is available for the public key with
	key id KEYID; returns false if not. This function ignores legacy
	keys. Note: this is just a fast check and does not tell us whether
	the secret key is valid; this check merely indicates whether there
	is some secret key with the specified key id. */
	int
	have_secret_key_with_kid (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 *keyid)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd;
	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
	kbnode_t keyblock;
	kbnode_t node;
	int result = 0;

	kdbhd = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (!kdbhd)
	return 0;
	memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
	desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
	desc.u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
	desc.u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
	while (!result)
	{
	err = keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1, NULL);
	if (err)
	break;

	err = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
	break;
	}

	for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	/* Bit 0 of the flags is set if the search found the key
	using that key or subkey. Note: a search will only ever
	match a single key or subkey. */
	if ((node->flag & 1))
	{
	log_assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY);

	if (agent_probe_secret_key (NULL, node->pkt->pkt.public_key))
	result = 1; /* Secret key available. */
	else
	result = 0;

	break;
	}
	}
	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	}

	keydb_release (kdbhd);
	return result;
	}
	diff --git a/g10/keydb.h b/g10/keydb.h
	index ed58b9443..4703294f4 100644
	--- a/g10/keydb.h
	+++ b/g10/keydb.h
	@@ -1,582 +1,586 @@
	/* keydb.h - Key database
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
	* 2006, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	* Copyright (C) 2015, 2016 g10 Code GmbH
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#ifndef G10_KEYDB_H
	#define G10_KEYDB_H

	#include "../common/types.h"
	#include "../common/util.h"
	#include "packet.h"

	/* What qualifies as a certification (key-signature in contrast to a
	* data signature)? Note that a back signature is special and can be
	* made by key and data signatures capable subkeys.) */
	#define IS_CERT(s) (IS_KEY_SIG(s) \
	\|\| IS_UID_SIG(s) \
	\|\| IS_SUBKEY_SIG(s) \
	\|\| IS_KEY_REV(s) \
	\|\| IS_UID_REV(s) \
	\|\| IS_SUBKEY_REV(s) \
	\|\| IS_ATTST_SIGS(s) )
	#define IS_SIG(s) (!IS_CERT(s))
	#define IS_KEY_SIG(s) ((s)->sig_class == 0x1f)
	#define IS_UID_SIG(s) (((s)->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
	#define IS_ATTST_SIGS(s) ((s)->sig_class == 0x16)
	#define IS_SUBKEY_SIG(s) ((s)->sig_class == 0x18)
	#define IS_BACK_SIG(s) ((s)->sig_class == 0x19)
	#define IS_KEY_REV(s) ((s)->sig_class == 0x20)
	#define IS_UID_REV(s) ((s)->sig_class == 0x30)
	#define IS_SUBKEY_REV(s) ((s)->sig_class == 0x28)

	struct getkey_ctx_s;
	typedef struct getkey_ctx_s *GETKEY_CTX;
	typedef struct getkey_ctx_s *getkey_ctx_t;

	/****************
	* A Keyblock is all packets which form an entire certificate;
	* i.e. the public key, certificate, trust packets, user ids,
	* signatures, and subkey.
	*
	* This structure is also used to bind arbitrary packets together.
	*/

	struct kbnode_struct
	{
	kbnode_t next;
	PACKET *pkt;
	int flag; /* Local use during keyblock processing (not cloned).*/
	unsigned int tag; /* Ditto. */
	int private_flag;
	};

	#define is_deleted_kbnode(a) ((a)->private_flag & 1)
	#define is_cloned_kbnode(a) ((a)->private_flag & 2)


	/*
	* A structure to store key identification as well as some stuff
	* needed for key validation.
	*/
	struct key_item {
	struct key_item *next;
	unsigned int ownertrust,min_ownertrust;
	byte trust_depth;
	byte trust_value;
	char *trust_regexp;
	u32 kid[2];
	};


	/* Bit flags used with build_pk_list. */
	enum
	{
	PK_LIST_ENCRYPT_TO = 1, /* This is an encrypt-to recipient. */
	PK_LIST_HIDDEN = 2, /* This is a hidden recipient. */
	PK_LIST_CONFIG = 4, /* Specified via config file. */
	PK_LIST_FROM_FILE = 8 /* Take key from file with that name. */
	};

	/* To store private data in the flags the private data must be left
	* shifted by this value. */
	enum
	{
	PK_LIST_SHIFT = 4
	};


	/* Structure to hold a couple of public key certificates. */
	typedef struct pk_list PK_LIST; / Deprecated. */
	typedef struct pk_list *pk_list_t;
	struct pk_list
	{
	PK_LIST next;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	int flags; /* See PK_LIST_ constants. */
	};

	/* Structure to hold a list of secret key certificates. */
	typedef struct sk_list *SK_LIST;
	struct sk_list
	{
	SK_LIST next;
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	int mark; /* not used */
	};

	/* structure to collect all information which can be used to
	* identify a public key */
	typedef struct pubkey_find_info *PUBKEY_FIND_INFO;
	struct pubkey_find_info {
	u32 keyid[2];
	unsigned nbits;
	byte pubkey_algo;
	byte fingerprint[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
	char userid[1];
	};


	/* Helper type for preference functions. */
	struct pref_hint
	{
	int digest_length; /* We want at least this digest length. */
	int exact; /* We need to use exactly this length. */
	};


	/* Constants to describe from where a key was fetched or updated. */
	enum
	{
	KEYORG_UNKNOWN = 0,
	KEYORG_KS = 1, /* Public keyserver. */
	KEYORG_KS_PREF = 2, /* Preferred keysrver. */
	KEYORG_DANE = 3, /* OpenPGP DANE. */
	KEYORG_WKD = 4, /* Web Key Directory. */
	KEYORG_URL = 5, /* Trusted URL. */
	KEYORG_FILE = 6, /* Trusted file. */
	KEYORG_SELF = 7 /* We generated it. */
	};


	/*
	* Check whether the signature SIG is in the klist K.
	*/
	static inline struct key_item *
	is_in_klist (struct key_item k, PKT_signature sig)
	{
	for (; k; k = k->next)
	{
	if (k->kid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && k->kid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
	return k;
	}
	return NULL;
	}


	/-- call-keyboxd.c --/

	/* Release all open contexts to the keyboxd. */
	void gpg_keyboxd_deinit_session_data (ctrl_t ctrl);

	/* Create a new database handle. Returns NULL on error, sets ERRNO,
	* and prints an error diagnostic. */
	KEYDB_HANDLE keydb_new (ctrl_t ctrl);

	/* Release a keydb handle. */
	void keydb_release (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);

	/* Take a lock if we are not using the keyboxd. */
	gpg_error_t keydb_lock (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);

	/* Return the keyblock last found by keydb_search. */
	gpg_error_t keydb_get_keyblock (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, kbnode_t *ret_kb);

	/* Update the keyblock KB. */
	gpg_error_t keydb_update_keyblock (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd, kbnode_t kb);

	/* Insert a keyblock into one of the storage system. */
	gpg_error_t keydb_insert_keyblock (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, kbnode_t kb);

	/* Delete the currently selected keyblock. */
	gpg_error_t keydb_delete_keyblock (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);

	/* Clears the current search result and resets the handle's position. */
	gpg_error_t keydb_search_reset (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);

	/* Search the database for keys matching the search description. */
	gpg_error_t keydb_search (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc,
	size_t ndesc, size_t *descindex);



	/-- keydb.c --/

	#define KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_PRIMARY 2 /* The primary resource. */
	#define KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_DEFAULT 4 /* The default one. */
	#define KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_READONLY 8 /* Open in read only mode. */
	#define KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_GPGVDEF 16 /* Default file for gpgv. */

	/* Format a search term for debugging output. The caller must free
	the result. */
	char keydb_search_desc_dump (struct keydb_search_desc desc);

	/* Register a resource (keyring or keybox). */
	gpg_error_t keydb_add_resource (const char *url, unsigned int flags);

	/* Dump some statistics to the log. */
	void keydb_dump_stats (void);

	/* Set a flag on the handle to suppress use of cached results. This
	is required for updating a keyring and for key listings. Fixme:
	Using a new parameter for keydb_new might be a better solution. */
	void keydb_disable_caching (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);

	/* Save the last found state and invalidate the current selection. */
	void keydb_push_found_state (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);

	/* Restore the previous save state. */
	void keydb_pop_found_state (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);

	/* Return the file name of the resource. */
	const char *keydb_get_resource_name (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);

	/* Find the first writable resource. */
	gpg_error_t keydb_locate_writable (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);

	/* Rebuild the on-disk caches of all key resources. */
	void keydb_rebuild_caches (ctrl_t ctrl, int noisy);

	/* Return the number of skipped blocks (because they were to large to
	read from a keybox) since the last search reset. */
	unsigned long keydb_get_skipped_counter (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);

	/* Return the first non-legacy key in the database. */
	gpg_error_t keydb_search_first (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);

	/* Return the next key (not the next matching key!). */
	gpg_error_t keydb_search_next (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);

	/* This is a convenience function for searching for keys with a long
	key id. */
	gpg_error_t keydb_search_kid (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, u32 *kid);

	/* This is a convenience function for searching for keys by
	* fingerprint. */
	gpg_error_t keydb_search_fpr (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, const byte *fpr, size_t fprlen);


	/-- pkclist.c --/
	void show_revocation_reason (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, int mode );
	gpg_error_t check_signatures_trust (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
	PKT_public_key pk, PKT_signature sig);

	void release_pk_list (PK_LIST pk_list);
	int expand_id (const char id, strlist_t into, unsigned int flags);
	strlist_t expand_group (strlist_t input, int prepend_input);
	int build_pk_list (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list);
	gpg_error_t find_and_check_key (ctrl_t ctrl,
	const char *name, unsigned int use,
	int mark_hidden, int from_file,
	pk_list_t *pk_list_addr);

	int algo_available( preftype_t preftype, int algo,
	const struct pref_hint *hint );
	int select_algo_from_prefs( PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype,
	int request, const struct pref_hint *hint);
	int select_mdc_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list);
	aead_algo_t select_aead_from_pklist (pk_list_t pk_list);
	void warn_missing_aead_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list);
	void warn_missing_aes_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list);

	/-- skclist.c --/
	int random_is_faked (void);
	void release_sk_list( SK_LIST sk_list );
	gpg_error_t build_sk_list (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t locusr,
	SK_LIST *ret_sk_list, unsigned use);

	/-- passphrase.h --/
	int have_static_passphrase(void);
	const char *get_static_passphrase (void);
	void set_passphrase_from_string(const char *pass);
	void read_passphrase_from_fd( int fd );
	void passphrase_clear_cache (const char *cacheid);
	DEK passphrase_to_dek_ext(u32 keyid, int pubkey_algo,
	int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k, int mode,
	const char *tryagain_text,
	const char custdesc, const char custprompt,
	int *canceled);
	DEK passphrase_to_dek (int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY s2k,
	int create, int nocache,
	const char tryagain_text, int canceled);
	void set_next_passphrase( const char *s );
	char *get_last_passphrase(void);
	void next_to_last_passphrase(void);

	void emit_status_need_passphrase (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 *keyid,
	u32 *mainkeyid, int pubkey_algo);

	#define FORMAT_KEYDESC_NORMAL 0
	#define FORMAT_KEYDESC_IMPORT 1
	#define FORMAT_KEYDESC_EXPORT 2
	#define FORMAT_KEYDESC_DELKEY 3
	char *gpg_format_keydesc (ctrl_t ctrl,
	PKT_public_key *pk, int mode, int escaped);


	/-- getkey.c --/

	/* Cache a copy of a public key in the public key cache. */
	void cache_public_key( PKT_public_key *pk );

	/* Disable and drop the public key cache. */
	void getkey_disable_caches(void);

	/* Return the public key used for signature SIG and store it at PK. */
	gpg_error_t get_pubkey_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl,
	PKT_public_key pk, PKT_signature sig,
	PKT_public_key *forced_pk);

	/* Return the public key with the key id KEYID and store it at PK. */
	int get_pubkey (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key pk, u32 keyid);

	+/* Same as get_pubkey but with auto LDAP fetch. */
	+gpg_error_t get_pubkey_with_ldap_fallback (ctrl_t ctrl,
	+ PKT_public_key pk, u32 keyid);
	+
	/* Similar to get_pubkey, but it does not take PK->REQ_USAGE into
	account nor does it merge in the self-signed data. This function
	also only considers primary keys. */
	int get_pubkey_fast (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key pk, u32 keyid);

	/* Return the entire keyblock used to create SIG. This is a
	* specialized version of get_pubkeyblock. */
	kbnode_t get_pubkeyblock_for_sig (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig);

	/* Return the key block for the key with KEYID. */
	kbnode_t get_pubkeyblock (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 *keyid);

	/* A list used by get_pubkeys to gather all of the matches. */
	struct pubkey_s
	{
	struct pubkey_s *next;
	/* The key to use (either the public key or the subkey). */
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	kbnode_t keyblock;
	};
	typedef struct pubkey_s *pubkey_t;

	/* Free a list of public keys. */
	void pubkeys_free (pubkey_t keys);


	/* Mode flags for get_pubkey_byname. */
	enum get_pubkey_modes
	{
	GET_PUBKEY_NORMAL = 0,
	GET_PUBKEY_NO_AKL = 1,
	GET_PUBKEY_NO_LOCAL = 2
	};

	/* Find a public key identified by NAME. */
	int get_pubkey_byname (ctrl_t ctrl, enum get_pubkey_modes mode,
	GETKEY_CTX retctx, PKT_public_key pk,
	const char *name,
	KBNODE ret_keyblock, KEYDB_HANDLE ret_kdbhd,
	int include_unusable);

	/* Likewise, but only return the best match if NAME resembles a mail
	* address. */
	gpg_error_t get_best_pubkey_byname (ctrl_t ctrl, enum get_pubkey_modes mode,
	GETKEY_CTX retctx, PKT_public_key pk,
	const char name, KBNODE ret_keyblock,
	int include_unusable);

	/* Get a public key directly from file FNAME. */
	gpg_error_t get_pubkey_fromfile (ctrl_t ctrl,
	PKT_public_key pk, const char fname);

	/* Get a public key from a buffer. */
	gpg_error_t get_pubkey_from_buffer (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pkbuf,
	const void *buffer, size_t buflen,
	u32 want_keyid, kbnode_t r_keyblock);

	/* Return the public key with the key id KEYID iff the secret key is
	* available and store it at PK. */
	gpg_error_t get_seckey (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key pk, u32 keyid);

	/* Lookup a key with the specified fingerprint. */
	int get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key pk, kbnode_t r_keyblock,
	const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len);

	/* This function is similar to get_pubkey_byfprint, but it doesn't
	merge the self-signed data into the public key and subkeys or into
	the user ids. */
	gpg_error_t get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk,
	const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len);

	/* This function is similar to get_pubkey_byfprint, but it doesn't
	merge the self-signed data into the public key and subkeys or into
	the user ids. */
	gpg_error_t get_keyblock_byfprint_fast (ctrl_t ctrl,
	kbnode_t *r_keyblock,
	KEYDB_HANDLE *r_hd,
	const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len,
	int lock);


	/* Returns true if a secret key is available for the public key with
	key id KEYID. */
	int have_secret_key_with_kid (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 *keyid);

	/* Parse the --default-key parameter. Returns the last key (in terms
	of when the option is given) that is available. */
	const char *parse_def_secret_key (ctrl_t ctrl);

	/* Look up a secret key. */
	gpg_error_t get_seckey_default (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk);
	gpg_error_t get_seckey_default_or_card (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk,
	const byte *fpr, size_t fpr_len);

	/* Search for keys matching some criteria. */
	gpg_error_t getkey_bynames (ctrl_t ctrl,
	getkey_ctx_t retctx, PKT_public_key pk,
	strlist_t names, int want_secret,
	kbnode_t *ret_keyblock);

	/* Search for one key matching some criteria. */
	gpg_error_t getkey_byname (ctrl_t ctrl,
	getkey_ctx_t retctx, PKT_public_key pk,
	const char *name, int want_secret,
	kbnode_t *ret_keyblock);

	/* Return the next search result. */
	gpg_error_t getkey_next (ctrl_t ctrl, getkey_ctx_t ctx,
	PKT_public_key pk, kbnode_t ret_keyblock);

	/* Release any resources used by a key listing context. */
	void getkey_end (ctrl_t ctrl, getkey_ctx_t ctx);

	/* Return the database handle used by this context. The context still
	owns the handle. */
	KEYDB_HANDLE get_ctx_handle(GETKEY_CTX ctx);

	/* Enumerate some secret keys. */
	gpg_error_t enum_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, void *context, PKT_public_key pk);

	/* Set the mainkey_id fields for all keys in KEYBLOCK. */
	void setup_main_keyids (kbnode_t keyblock);

	/* This function merges information from the self-signed data into the
	data structures. */
	void merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock);

	char get_user_id_string_native (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 keyid);
	char get_long_user_id_string (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 keyid);
	char get_user_id (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 keyid, size_t rn, int r_nouid);
	char get_user_id_native (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 keyid);
	char get_user_id_byfpr_native (ctrl_t ctrl, const byte fpr, size_t fprlen);

	void release_akl(void);
	int akl_empty_or_only_local (void);
	int parse_auto_key_locate(const char *options);
	int parse_key_origin (char *string);
	const char *key_origin_string (int origin);

	/-- keyid.c --/
	int pubkey_letter( int algo );
	char pubkey_string (PKT_public_key pk, char *buffer, size_t bufsize);
	#define PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE 32
	u32 v3_keyid (gcry_mpi_t a, u32 *ki);
	void hash_public_key( gcry_md_hd_t md, PKT_public_key *pk );
	char format_keyid (u32 keyid, int format, char *buffer, int len);

	/* Return PK's keyid. The memory is owned by PK. */
	u32 pk_keyid (PKT_public_key pk);

	/* Return the keyid of the primary key associated with PK. The memory
	is owned by PK. */
	u32 pk_main_keyid (PKT_public_key pk);

	/* Order A and B. If A < B then return -1, if A == B then return 0,
	and if A > B then return 1. */
	static int GPGRT_ATTR_UNUSED
	keyid_cmp (const u32 a, const u32 b)
	{
	if (a[0] < b[0])
	return -1;
	if (a[0] > b[0])
	return 1;
	if (a[1] < b[1])
	return -1;
	if (a[1] > b[1])
	return 1;
	return 0;
	}

	/* Return whether PK is a primary key. */
	static int GPGRT_ATTR_UNUSED
	pk_is_primary (PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	return keyid_cmp (pk_keyid (pk), pk_main_keyid (pk)) == 0;
	}

	/* Copy the keyid in SRC to DEST and return DEST. */
	u32 keyid_copy (u32 dest, const u32 *src);

	size_t keystrlen(void);
	const char keystr(u32 keyid);
	const char keystr_with_sub (u32 main_kid, u32 *sub_kid);
	const char keystr_from_pk(PKT_public_key pk);
	const char keystr_from_pk_with_sub (PKT_public_key main_pk,
	PKT_public_key *sub_pk);

	/* Return PK's key id as a string using the default format. PK owns
	the storage. */
	const char pk_keyid_str (PKT_public_key pk);

	const char keystr_from_desc(KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc);
	u32 keyid_from_pk( PKT_public_key pk, u32 keyid );
	u32 keyid_from_sig (PKT_signature sig, u32 keyid );
	u32 keyid_from_fingerprint (ctrl_t ctrl, const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len,
	u32 *keyid);
	byte namehash_from_uid(PKT_user_id uid);
	unsigned nbits_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk );

	/* Convert an UTC TIMESTAMP into an UTC yyyy-mm-dd string. Return
	* that string. The caller should pass a buffer with at least a size
	* of MK_DATESTR_SIZE. */
	char mk_datestr (char buffer, size_t bufsize, u32 timestamp);
	#define MK_DATESTR_SIZE 11

	const char dateonlystr_from_pk (PKT_public_key pk);
	const char datestr_from_pk( PKT_public_key pk );
	const char dateonlystr_from_sig( PKT_signature sig );
	const char datestr_from_sig( PKT_signature sig );
	const char expirestr_from_pk( PKT_public_key pk );
	const char expirestr_from_sig( PKT_signature sig );
	const char revokestr_from_pk( PKT_public_key pk );
	const char usagestr_from_pk (PKT_public_key pk, int fill);
	const char *colon_strtime (u32 t);
	const char colon_datestr_from_pk (PKT_public_key pk);
	const char colon_datestr_from_sig (PKT_signature sig);
	const char colon_expirestr_from_sig (PKT_signature sig);
	byte fingerprint_from_pk( PKT_public_key pk, byte buf, size_t ret_len );
	void fpr20_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, byte array[20]);
	char hexfingerprint (PKT_public_key pk, char *buffer, size_t buflen);
	char format_hexfingerprint (const char fingerprint,
	char *buffer, size_t buflen);
	gpg_error_t keygrip_from_pk (PKT_public_key pk, unsigned char array);
	gpg_error_t hexkeygrip_from_pk (PKT_public_key pk, char *r_grip);


	/-- kbnode.c --/
	KBNODE new_kbnode( PACKET *pkt );
	KBNODE clone_kbnode( KBNODE node );
	void release_kbnode( KBNODE n );
	void delete_kbnode( KBNODE node );
	void add_kbnode( KBNODE root, KBNODE node );
	void insert_kbnode( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int pkttype );
	void move_kbnode( KBNODE *root, KBNODE node, KBNODE where );
	void remove_kbnode( KBNODE *root, KBNODE node );
	KBNODE find_prev_kbnode( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int pkttype );
	KBNODE find_next_kbnode( KBNODE node, int pkttype );
	KBNODE find_kbnode( KBNODE node, int pkttype );
	KBNODE walk_kbnode( KBNODE root, KBNODE *context, int all );
	void clear_kbnode_flags( KBNODE n );
	int commit_kbnode( KBNODE *root );
	void dump_kbnode( KBNODE node );

	#endif /G10_KEYDB_H/
	diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c
	index 0b9625ea6..43bce0769 100644
	--- a/g10/trustdb.c
	+++ b/g10/trustdb.c
	@@ -1,2289 +1,2289 @@
	/* trustdb.c
	* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
	* 2008, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
	*
	* This file is part of GnuPG.
	*
	* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
	* (at your option) any later version.
	*
	* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
	* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
	* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
	* GNU General Public License for more details.
	*
	* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
	* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
	*/

	#include <config.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <string.h>

	#include "gpg.h"
	#include "../common/status.h"
	#include "../common/iobuf.h"
	#include "../regexp/jimregexp.h"
	#include "keydb.h"
	#include "../common/util.h"
	#include "options.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "main.h"
	#include "../common/mbox-util.h"
	#include "../common/i18n.h"
	#include "tdbio.h"
	#include "trustdb.h"
	#include "tofu.h"
	#include "key-clean.h"

	static u32
	keyid_from_fpr20 (ctrl_t ctrl, const byte fpr, u32 keyid)
	{
	u32 dummy_keyid[2];
	int fprlen;

	if( !keyid )
	keyid = dummy_keyid;

	/* Problem: We do only use fingerprints in the trustdb but
	* we need the keyID here to indetify the key; we can only
	* use that ugly hack to distinguish between 16 and 20
	* bytes fpr - it does not work always so we better change
	* the whole validation code to only work with
	* fingerprints */
	fprlen = (!fpr[16] && !fpr[17] && !fpr[18] && !fpr[19])? 16:20;

	if (fprlen != 20)
	{
	/* This is special as we have to lookup the key first. */
	PKT_public_key pk;
	int rc;

	memset (&pk, 0, sizeof pk);
	rc = get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, &pk, NULL, fpr, fprlen);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_printhex (fpr, fprlen,
	"Oops: keyid_from_fingerprint: no pubkey; fpr:");
	keyid[0] = 0;
	keyid[1] = 0;
	}
	else
	keyid_from_pk (&pk, keyid);
	}
	else
	{
	keyid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (fpr+12);
	keyid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (fpr+16);
	}

	return keyid[1];
	}

	typedef struct key_item *KeyHashTable; / see new_key_hash_table() */

	/*
	* Structure to keep track of keys, this is used as an array wherre
	* the item right after the last one has a keyblock set to NULL.
	* Maybe we can drop this thing and replace it by key_item
	*/
	struct key_array
	{
	KBNODE keyblock;
	};


	/* Control information for the trust DB. */
	static struct
	{
	int init;
	int level;
	char *dbname;
	int no_trustdb;
	} trustdb_args;

	/* Some globals. */
	static struct key_item user_utk_list; / temp. used to store --trusted-keys */
	static struct key_item utk_list; / all ultimately trusted keys */

	static int pending_check_trustdb;

	static int validate_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, int interactive);


	/**********************************************
	*********** some helpers *****************
	**********************************************/

	static struct key_item *
	new_key_item (void)
	{
	struct key_item *k;

	k = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *k);
	return k;
	}

	static void
	release_key_items (struct key_item *k)
	{
	struct key_item *k2;

	for (; k; k = k2)
	{
	k2 = k->next;
	xfree (k->trust_regexp);
	xfree (k);
	}
	}

	#define KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE 1024

	/*
	* For fast keylook up we need a hash table. Each byte of a KeyID
	* should be distributed equally over the 256 possible values (except
	* for v3 keyIDs but we consider them as not important here). So we
	* can just use 10 bits to index a table of KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE key items.
	* Possible optimization: Do not use key_items but other hash_table when the
	* duplicates lists get too large.
	*/
	static KeyHashTable
	new_key_hash_table (void)
	{
	struct key_item **tbl;

	tbl = xmalloc_clear (KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE * sizeof *tbl);
	return tbl;
	}

	static void
	release_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl)
	{
	int i;

	if (!tbl)
	return;
	for (i=0; i < KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
	release_key_items (tbl[i]);
	xfree (tbl);
	}

	/*
	* Returns: True if the keyID is in the given hash table
	*/
	static int
	test_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
	{
	struct key_item *k;

	for (k = tbl[(kid[1] % KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE)]; k; k = k->next)
	if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
	return 1;
	return 0;
	}

	/*
	* Add a new key to the hash table. The key is identified by its key ID.
	*/
	static void
	add_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
	{
	int i = kid[1] % KEY_HASH_TABLE_SIZE;
	struct key_item k, kk;

	for (k = tbl[i]; k; k = k->next)
	if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
	return; /* already in table */

	kk = new_key_item ();
	kk->kid[0] = kid[0];
	kk->kid[1] = kid[1];
	kk->next = tbl[i];
	tbl[i] = kk;
	}

	/*
	* Release a key_array
	*/
	static void
	release_key_array ( struct key_array *keys )
	{
	struct key_array *k;

	if (keys) {
	for (k=keys; k->keyblock; k++)
	release_kbnode (k->keyblock);
	xfree (keys);
	}
	}


	/*********************************************
	******** Initialization ***************
	*********************************************/



	/*
	* Used to register extra ultimately trusted keys - this has to be done
	* before initializing the validation module.
	* FIXME: Should be replaced by a function to add those keys to the trustdb.
	*/
	static void
	tdb_register_trusted_keyid (u32 *keyid)
	{
	struct key_item *k;

	k = new_key_item ();
	k->kid[0] = keyid[0];
	k->kid[1] = keyid[1];
	k->next = user_utk_list;
	user_utk_list = k;
	}


	void
	tdb_register_trusted_key (const char *string)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
	u32 kid[2];

	err = classify_user_id (string, &desc, 1);
	if (!err)
	{
	if (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID)
	{
	tdb_register_trusted_keyid (desc.u.kid);
	return;
	}
	if (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR && desc.fprlen == 20)
	{
	kid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (desc.u.fpr+12);
	kid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (desc.u.fpr+16);
	tdb_register_trusted_keyid (kid);
	return;
	}
	if (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR && desc.fprlen == 32)
	{
	kid[0] = buf32_to_u32 (desc.u.fpr);
	kid[1] = buf32_to_u32 (desc.u.fpr+4);
	tdb_register_trusted_keyid (kid);
	return;
	}
	}
	log_error (_("'%s' is not a valid long keyID\n"), string );
	}


	/*
	* Helper to add a key to the global list of ultimately trusted keys.
	* Returns: true = inserted, false = already in list.
	*/
	static int
	add_utk (u32 *kid)
	{
	struct key_item *k;

	if (tdb_keyid_is_utk (kid))
	return 0;

	k = new_key_item ();
	k->kid[0] = kid[0];
	k->kid[1] = kid[1];
	k->ownertrust = TRUST_ULTIMATE;
	k->next = utk_list;
	utk_list = k;
	if( opt.verbose > 1 )
	log_info(_("key %s: accepted as trusted key\n"), keystr(kid));
	return 1;
	}


	/****************
	* Verify that all our secret keys are usable and put them into the utk_list.
	*/
	static void
	verify_own_keys (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	TRUSTREC rec;
	ulong recnum;
	int rc;
	struct key_item *k;

	if (utk_list)
	return;

	/* scan the trustdb to find all ultimately trusted keys */
	for (recnum=1; !tdbio_read_record (recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ )
	{
	if (rec.rectype == RECTYPE_TRUST
	&& (rec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
	{
	u32 kid[2];

	keyid_from_fpr20 (ctrl, rec.r.trust.fingerprint, kid);
	if (!add_utk (kid))
	log_info (_("key %s occurs more than once in the trustdb\n"),
	keystr(kid));
	}
	}

	/* Put any --trusted-key keys into the trustdb */
	for (k = user_utk_list; k; k = k->next)
	{
	if ( add_utk (k->kid) )
	{ /* not yet in trustDB as ultimately trusted */
	PKT_public_key pk;

	memset (&pk, 0, sizeof pk);
	- rc = get_pubkey (ctrl, &pk, k->kid);
	+ rc = get_pubkey_with_ldap_fallback (ctrl, &pk, k->kid);
	if (rc)
	log_info(_("key %s: no public key for trusted key - skipped\n"),
	keystr(k->kid));
	else
	{
	tdb_update_ownertrust
	(ctrl, &pk, ((tdb_get_ownertrust (ctrl, &pk, 0) & ~TRUST_MASK)
	\| TRUST_ULTIMATE ));
	release_public_key_parts (&pk);
	}

	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("key %s marked as ultimately trusted\n"),
	keystr(k->kid));
	}
	}

	/* release the helper table table */
	release_key_items (user_utk_list);
	user_utk_list = NULL;
	return;
	}

	/* Returns whether KID is on the list of ultimately trusted keys. */
	int
	tdb_keyid_is_utk (u32 *kid)
	{
	struct key_item *k;

	for (k = utk_list; k; k = k->next)
	if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
	return 1;

	return 0;
	}

	/* Return the list of ultimately trusted keys. */
	struct key_item *
	tdb_utks (void)
	{
	return utk_list;
	}

	/*********************************************
	********* TrustDB stuff *****************
	*********************************************/

	/*
	* Read a record but die if it does not exist
	*/
	static void
	read_record (ulong recno, TRUSTREC *rec, int rectype )
	{
	int rc = tdbio_read_record (recno, rec, rectype);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error(_("trust record %lu, req type %d: read failed: %s\n"),
	recno, rec->rectype, gpg_strerror (rc) );
	tdbio_invalid();
	}
	if (rectype != rec->rectype)
	{
	log_error(_("trust record %lu is not of requested type %d\n"),
	rec->recnum, rectype);
	tdbio_invalid();
	}
	}

	/*
	* Write a record and die on error
	*/
	static void
	write_record (ctrl_t ctrl, TRUSTREC *rec)
	{
	int rc = tdbio_write_record (ctrl, rec);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error(_("trust record %lu, type %d: write failed: %s\n"),
	rec->recnum, rec->rectype, gpg_strerror (rc) );
	tdbio_invalid();
	}
	}

	/*
	* sync the TrustDb and die on error
	*/
	static void
	do_sync(void)
	{
	int rc = tdbio_sync ();
	if(rc)
	{
	log_error (_("trustdb: sync failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	g10_exit(2);
	}
	}

	const char *
	trust_model_string (int model)
	{
	switch (model)
	{
	case TM_CLASSIC: return "classic";
	case TM_PGP: return "pgp";
	case TM_EXTERNAL: return "external";
	case TM_TOFU: return "tofu";
	case TM_TOFU_PGP: return "tofu+pgp";
	case TM_ALWAYS: return "always";
	case TM_DIRECT: return "direct";
	default: return "unknown";
	}
	}

	/****************
	* Perform some checks over the trustdb
	* level 0: only open the db
	* 1: used for initial program startup
	*/
	int
	setup_trustdb( int level, const char *dbname )
	{
	/* just store the args */
	if( trustdb_args.init )
	return 0;
	trustdb_args.level = level;
	trustdb_args.dbname = dbname? xstrdup(dbname): NULL;
	return 0;
	}

	void
	how_to_fix_the_trustdb ()
	{
	const char *name = trustdb_args.dbname;

	if (!name)
	name = "trustdb.gpg";

	log_info (_("You may try to re-create the trustdb using the commands:\n"));
	log_info (" cd %s\n", default_homedir ());
	log_info (" %s --export-ownertrust > otrust.tmp\n", GPG_NAME);
	#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
	log_info (" del %s\n", name);
	#else
	log_info (" rm %s\n", name);
	#endif
	log_info (" %s --import-ownertrust < otrust.tmp\n", GPG_NAME);
	log_info (_("If that does not work, please consult the manual\n"));
	}


	/* Initialize the trustdb. With NO_CREATE set a missing trustdb is
	* not an error and the function won't terminate the process on error;
	* in that case 0 is returned if there is a trustdb or an error code
	* if no trustdb is available. */
	gpg_error_t
	init_trustdb (ctrl_t ctrl, int no_create)
	{
	int level = trustdb_args.level;
	const char* dbname = trustdb_args.dbname;

	if( trustdb_args.init )
	return 0;

	trustdb_args.init = 1;

	if(level==0 \|\| level==1)
	{
	int rc = tdbio_set_dbname (ctrl, dbname, (!no_create && level),
	&trustdb_args.no_trustdb);
	if (no_create && trustdb_args.no_trustdb)
	{
	/* No trustdb found and the caller asked us not to create
	* it. Return an error and set the initialization state
	* back so that we always test for an existing trustdb. */
	trustdb_args.init = 0;
	return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOENT);
	}
	if (rc)
	log_fatal("can't init trustdb: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
	}
	else
	BUG();

	if(opt.trust_model==TM_AUTO)
	{
	/* Try and set the trust model off of whatever the trustdb says
	it is. */
	opt.trust_model=tdbio_read_model();

	/* Sanity check this ;) */
	if(opt.trust_model != TM_CLASSIC
	&& opt.trust_model != TM_PGP
	&& opt.trust_model != TM_TOFU_PGP
	&& opt.trust_model != TM_TOFU
	&& opt.trust_model != TM_EXTERNAL)
	{
	log_info(_("unable to use unknown trust model (%d) - "
	"assuming %s trust model\n"),opt.trust_model,"pgp");
	opt.trust_model = TM_PGP;
	}

	if(opt.verbose)
	log_info(_("using %s trust model\n"),
	trust_model_string (opt.trust_model));
	}

	if (opt.trust_model==TM_PGP \|\| opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC
	\|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
	{
	/* Verify the list of ultimately trusted keys and move the
	--trusted-keys list there as well. */
	if(level==1)
	verify_own_keys (ctrl);

	if(!tdbio_db_matches_options())
	pending_check_trustdb=1;
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/* Check whether we have a trust database, initializing it if
	necessary if the trust model is not 'always trust'. Returns true
	if we do have a usable trust database. */
	int
	have_trustdb (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	return !init_trustdb (ctrl, opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS);
	}


	/****************
	* Recreate the WoT but do not ask for new ownertrusts. Special
	* feature: In batch mode and without a forced yes, this is only done
	* when a check is due. This can be used to run the check from a crontab
	*/
	void
	check_trustdb (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);
	if (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC
	\|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU)
	{
	if (opt.batch && !opt.answer_yes)
	{
	ulong scheduled;

	scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck ();
	if (!scheduled)
	{
	log_info (_("no need for a trustdb check\n"));
	return;
	}

	if (scheduled > make_timestamp ())
	{
	log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"),
	strtimestamp (scheduled));
	return;
	}
	}

	validate_keys (ctrl, 0);
	}
	else
	log_info (_("no need for a trustdb check with '%s' trust model\n"),
	trust_model_string(opt.trust_model));
	}


	/*
	* Recreate the WoT.
	*/
	void
	update_trustdb (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);
	if (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC
	\|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU)
	validate_keys (ctrl, 1);
	else
	log_info (_("no need for a trustdb update with '%s' trust model\n"),
	trust_model_string(opt.trust_model));
	}

	void
	tdb_revalidation_mark (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);
	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	return;

	/* We simply set the time for the next check to 1 (far back in 1970)
	so that a --update-trustdb will be scheduled. */
	if (tdbio_write_nextcheck (ctrl, 1))
	do_sync ();
	pending_check_trustdb = 1;
	}

	int
	trustdb_pending_check(void)
	{
	return pending_check_trustdb;
	}

	/* If the trustdb is dirty, and we're interactive, update it.
	Otherwise, check it unless no-auto-check-trustdb is set. */
	void
	tdb_check_or_update (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	if (trustdb_pending_check ())
	{
	if (opt.interactive)
	update_trustdb (ctrl);
	else if (!opt.no_auto_check_trustdb)
	check_trustdb (ctrl);
	}
	}

	void
	read_trust_options (ctrl_t ctrl,
	byte trust_model, ulong created, ulong *nextcheck,
	byte marginals, byte completes, byte *cert_depth,
	byte *min_cert_level)
	{
	TRUSTREC opts;

	init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);
	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	memset (&opts, 0, sizeof opts);
	else
	read_record (0, &opts, RECTYPE_VER);

	if(trust_model)
	*trust_model=opts.r.ver.trust_model;
	if(created)
	*created=opts.r.ver.created;
	if(nextcheck)
	*nextcheck=opts.r.ver.nextcheck;
	if(marginals)
	*marginals=opts.r.ver.marginals;
	if(completes)
	*completes=opts.r.ver.completes;
	if(cert_depth)
	*cert_depth=opts.r.ver.cert_depth;
	if(min_cert_level)
	*min_cert_level=opts.r.ver.min_cert_level;
	}

	/***********************************************
	********* Ownertrust et al. **************
	***********************************************/

	static int
	read_trust_record (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key pk, TRUSTREC rec)
	{
	int rc;

	init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);
	rc = tdbio_search_trust_bypk (ctrl, pk, rec);
	if (rc)
	{
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	log_error ("trustdb: searching trust record failed: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (rc));
	return rc;
	}

	if (rec->rectype != RECTYPE_TRUST)
	{
	log_error ("trustdb: record %lu is not a trust record\n",
	rec->recnum);
	return GPG_ERR_TRUSTDB;
	}

	return 0;
	}


	/*
	* Return the assigned ownertrust value for the given public key. The
	* key should be the primary key. If NO_CREATE is set a missing
	* trustdb will not be created. This comes for example handy when we
	* want to print status lines (DECRYPTION_KEY) which carry ownertrust
	* values but we usually use --always-trust.
	*/
	unsigned int
	tdb_get_ownertrust (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, int no_create)
	{
	TRUSTREC rec;
	gpg_error_t err;

	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN;

	/* If the caller asked not to create a trustdb we call init_trustdb
	* directly and allow it to fail with an error code for a
	* non-existing trustdb. */
	if (no_create && init_trustdb (ctrl, 1))
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN;

	err = read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &rec);
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* no record yet */
	if (err)
	{
	tdbio_invalid ();
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* actually never reached */
	}

	return rec.r.trust.ownertrust;
	}


	unsigned int
	tdb_get_min_ownertrust (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, int no_create)
	{
	TRUSTREC rec;
	gpg_error_t err;

	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN;

	/* If the caller asked not to create a trustdb we call init_trustdb
	* directly and allow it to fail with an error code for a
	* non-existing trustdb. */
	if (no_create && init_trustdb (ctrl, 1))
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN;

	err = read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &rec);
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* no record yet */
	if (err)
	{
	tdbio_invalid ();
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* actually never reached */
	}

	return rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust;
	}


	/*
	* Set the trust value of the given public key to the new value.
	* The key should be a primary one.
	*/
	void
	tdb_update_ownertrust (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int new_trust )
	{
	TRUSTREC rec;
	gpg_error_t err;

	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	return;

	err = read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &rec);
	if (!err)
	{
	if (DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug ("update ownertrust from %u to %u\n",
	(unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust, new_trust );
	if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust != new_trust)
	{
	rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust;
	write_record (ctrl, &rec);
	tdb_revalidation_mark (ctrl);
	do_sync ();
	}
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{ /* no record yet - create a new one */
	if (DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug ("insert ownertrust %u\n", new_trust );

	memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec);
	rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum (ctrl);
	rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
	fpr20_from_pk (pk, rec.r.trust.fingerprint);
	rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust;
	write_record (ctrl, &rec);
	tdb_revalidation_mark (ctrl);
	do_sync ();
	}
	else
	{
	tdbio_invalid ();
	}
	}

	static void
	update_min_ownertrust (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 *kid, unsigned int new_trust)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	TRUSTREC rec;
	gpg_error_t err;

	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	return;

	pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
	err = get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, kid);
	if (err)
	{
	log_error (_("public key %s not found: %s\n"),
	keystr (kid), gpg_strerror (err));
	xfree (pk);
	return;
	}

	err = read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &rec);
	if (!err)
	{
	if (DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug ("key %08lX%08lX: update min_ownertrust from %u to %u\n",
	(ulong)kid[0],(ulong)kid[1],
	(unsigned int)rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust,
	new_trust );
	if (rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust != new_trust)
	{
	rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = new_trust;
	write_record (ctrl, &rec);
	tdb_revalidation_mark (ctrl);
	do_sync ();
	}
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{ /* no record yet - create a new one */
	if (DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug ("insert min_ownertrust %u\n", new_trust );

	memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec);
	rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum (ctrl);
	rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
	fpr20_from_pk (pk, rec.r.trust.fingerprint);
	rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = new_trust;
	write_record (ctrl, &rec);
	tdb_revalidation_mark (ctrl);
	do_sync ();
	}
	else
	{
	tdbio_invalid ();
	}

	free_public_key (pk);
	}


	/*
	* Clear the ownertrust and min_ownertrust values.
	*
	* Return: True if a change actually happened.
	*/
	int
	tdb_clear_ownertrusts (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	TRUSTREC rec;
	gpg_error_t err;

	init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);

	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	return 0;

	err = read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &rec);
	if (!err)
	{
	if (DBG_TRUST)
	{
	log_debug ("clearing ownertrust (old value %u)\n",
	(unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust);
	log_debug ("clearing min_ownertrust (old value %u)\n",
	(unsigned int)rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust);
	}
	if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust \|\| rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust)
	{
	rec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0;
	rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = 0;
	write_record (ctrl, &rec);
	tdb_revalidation_mark (ctrl);
	do_sync ();
	return 1;
	}
	}
	else if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	tdbio_invalid ();
	}
	return 0;
	}

	/*
	* Note: Caller has to do a sync
	*/
	static void
	update_validity (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid,
	int depth, int validity)
	{
	TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
	gpg_error_t err;
	ulong recno;

	namehash_from_uid(uid);

	err = read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &trec);
	if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	tdbio_invalid ();
	return;
	}
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	/* No record yet - create a new one. */
	memset (&trec, 0, sizeof trec);
	trec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum (ctrl);
	trec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
	fpr20_from_pk (pk, trec.r.trust.fingerprint);
	trec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0;
	}

	/* locate an existing one */
	recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
	while (recno)
	{
	read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
	if ( !memcmp (vrec.r.valid.namehash, uid->namehash, 20) )
	break;
	recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
	}

	if (!recno) /* insert a new validity record */
	{
	memset (&vrec, 0, sizeof vrec);
	vrec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum (ctrl);
	vrec.rectype = RECTYPE_VALID;
	memcpy (vrec.r.valid.namehash, uid->namehash, 20);
	vrec.r.valid.next = trec.r.trust.validlist;
	trec.r.trust.validlist = vrec.recnum;
	}
	vrec.r.valid.validity = validity;
	vrec.r.valid.full_count = uid->help_full_count;
	vrec.r.valid.marginal_count = uid->help_marginal_count;
	write_record (ctrl, &vrec);
	trec.r.trust.depth = depth;
	write_record (ctrl, &trec);
	}


	/***********************************************
	******* Query trustdb values ************
	***********************************************/

	/* Return true if key is disabled. Note that this is usually used via
	the pk_is_disabled macro. */
	int
	tdb_cache_disabled_value (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk)
	{
	gpg_error_t err;
	TRUSTREC trec;
	int disabled = 0;

	if (pk->flags.disabled_valid)
	return pk->flags.disabled;

	init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);

	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb)
	return 0; /* No trustdb => not disabled. */

	err = read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &trec);
	if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	tdbio_invalid ();
	goto leave;
	}
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	/* No record found, so assume not disabled. */
	goto leave;
	}

	if ((trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
	disabled = 1;

	/* Cache it for later so we don't need to look at the trustdb every
	time */
	pk->flags.disabled = disabled;
	pk->flags.disabled_valid = 1;

	leave:
	return disabled;
	}


	void
	tdb_check_trustdb_stale (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	static int did_nextcheck=0;

	init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);

	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb)
	return; /* No trustdb => can't be stale. */

	if (!did_nextcheck
	&& (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC
	\|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU))
	{
	ulong scheduled;

	did_nextcheck = 1;
	scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck ();
	if ((scheduled && scheduled <= make_timestamp ())
	\|\| pending_check_trustdb)
	{
	if (opt.no_auto_check_trustdb)
	{
	pending_check_trustdb = 1;
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("please do a --check-trustdb\n"));
	}
	else
	{
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("checking the trustdb\n"));
	validate_keys (ctrl, 0);
	}
	}
	}
	}

	/*
	* Return the validity information for KB/PK (at least one of them
	* must be non-NULL). This is the core of get_validity. If SIG is
	* not NULL, then the trust is being evaluated in the context of the
	* provided signature. This is used by the TOFU code to record
	* statistics.
	*/
	unsigned int
	tdb_get_validity_core (ctrl_t ctrl,
	kbnode_t kb,
	PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid,
	PKT_public_key *main_pk,
	PKT_signature *sig,
	int may_ask)
	{
	TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
	gpg_error_t err = 0;
	ulong recno;
	#ifdef USE_TOFU
	unsigned int tofu_validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	int free_kb = 0;
	#endif
	unsigned int validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;

	if (kb && pk)
	log_assert (keyid_cmp (pk_main_keyid (pk),
	pk_main_keyid (kb->pkt->pkt.public_key)) == 0);

	if (! pk)
	{
	log_assert (kb);
	pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	}

	#ifndef USE_TOFU
	(void)sig;
	(void)may_ask;
	#endif

	init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);

	/* If we have no trustdb (which also means it has not been created)
	and the trust-model is always, we don't know the validity -
	return immediately. If we won't do that the tdbio code would try
	to open the trustdb and run into a fatal error. */
	if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN;

	check_trustdb_stale (ctrl);

	if(opt.trust_model==TM_DIRECT)
	{
	/* Note that this happens BEFORE any user ID stuff is checked.
	The direct trust model applies to keys as a whole. */
	validity = tdb_get_ownertrust (ctrl, main_pk, 0);
	goto leave;
	}

	#ifdef USE_TOFU
	if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU \|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
	{
	kbnode_t n = NULL;
	strlist_t user_id_list = NULL;
	int done = 0;

	/* If the caller didn't supply a user id then use all uids. */
	if (! uid)
	{
	if (! kb)
	{
	kb = get_pubkeyblock (ctrl, main_pk->keyid);
	free_kb = 1;
	}
	n = kb;
	}

	if (DBG_TRUST && sig && sig->signers_uid)
	log_debug ("TOFU: only considering user id: '%s'\n",
	sig->signers_uid);

	while (!done && (uid \|\| (n = find_next_kbnode (n, PKT_USER_ID))))
	{
	PKT_user_id *user_id;
	int expired = 0;

	if (uid)
	{
	user_id = uid;
	/* If the caller specified a user id, then we only
	process the specified user id and are done after the
	first iteration. */
	done = 1;
	}
	else
	user_id = n->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	if (user_id->attrib_data)
	/* Skip user attributes. */
	continue;

	if (sig && sig->signers_uid)
	/* Make sure the UID matches. */
	{
	char *email = mailbox_from_userid (user_id->name, 0);
	if (!email \|\| !*email \|\| strcmp (sig->signers_uid, email) != 0)
	{
	if (DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug ("TOFU: skipping user id '%s', which does"
	" not match the signer's email ('%s')\n",
	email, sig->signers_uid);
	xfree (email);
	continue;
	}
	xfree (email);
	}

	/* If the user id is revoked or expired, then skip it. */
	if (user_id->flags.revoked \|\| user_id->flags.expired)
	{
	if (DBG_TRUST)
	{
	char *s;
	if (user_id->flags.revoked && user_id->flags.expired)
	s = "revoked and expired";
	else if (user_id->flags.revoked)
	s = "revoked";
	else
	s = "expire";

	log_debug ("TOFU: Ignoring %s user id (%s)\n",
	s, user_id->name);
	}

	if (user_id->flags.revoked)
	continue;

	expired = 1;
	}

	add_to_strlist (&user_id_list, user_id->name);
	user_id_list->flags = expired;
	}

	/* Process the user ids in the order they appear in the key
	block. */
	strlist_rev (&user_id_list);

	/* It only makes sense to observe any signature before getting
	the validity. This is because if the current signature
	results in a conflict, then we damn well want to take that
	into account. */
	if (sig)
	{
	err = tofu_register_signature (ctrl, main_pk, user_id_list,
	sig->digest, sig->digest_len,
	sig->timestamp, "unknown");
	if (err)
	{
	log_error ("TOFU: error registering signature: %s\n",
	gpg_strerror (err));

	tofu_validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	}
	}
	if (! err)
	tofu_validity = tofu_get_validity (ctrl, main_pk, user_id_list,
	may_ask);

	free_strlist (user_id_list);
	if (free_kb)
	release_kbnode (kb);
	}
	#endif /USE_TOFU/

	if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP
	\|\| opt.trust_model == TM_CLASSIC
	\|\| opt.trust_model == TM_PGP)
	{
	err = read_trust_record (ctrl, main_pk, &trec);
	if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	tdbio_invalid ();
	return 0;
	}
	if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	/* No record found. */
	validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	goto leave;
	}

	/* Loop over all user IDs */
	recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
	validity = 0;
	while (recno)
	{
	read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);

	if(uid)
	{
	/* If a user ID is given we return the validity for that
	user ID ONLY. If the namehash is not found, then
	there is no validity at all (i.e. the user ID wasn't
	signed). */
	if(memcmp(vrec.r.valid.namehash,uid->namehash,20)==0)
	{
	validity=(vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
	break;
	}
	}
	else
	{
	/* If no user ID is given, we take the maximum validity
	over all user IDs */
	if (validity < (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK))
	validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
	}

	recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
	}

	if ((trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
	{
	validity \|= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
	pk->flags.disabled = 1;
	}
	else
	pk->flags.disabled = 0;
	pk->flags.disabled_valid = 1;
	}

	leave:
	#ifdef USE_TOFU
	validity = tofu_wot_trust_combine (tofu_validity, validity);
	#else /!USE_TOFU/
	validity &= TRUST_MASK;

	if (validity == TRUST_NEVER)
	/* TRUST_NEVER trumps everything else. */
	validity \|= TRUST_NEVER;
	if (validity == TRUST_EXPIRED)
	/* TRUST_EXPIRED trumps everything but TRUST_NEVER. */
	validity \|= TRUST_EXPIRED;
	#endif /!USE_TOFU/

	if (opt.trust_model != TM_TOFU
	&& pending_check_trustdb)
	validity \|= TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK;

	return validity;
	}


	static void
	get_validity_counts (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key pk, PKT_user_id uid)
	{
	TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
	ulong recno;

	if(pk==NULL \|\| uid==NULL)
	BUG();

	namehash_from_uid(uid);

	uid->help_marginal_count=uid->help_full_count=0;

	init_trustdb (ctrl, 0);

	if(read_trust_record (ctrl, pk, &trec))
	return;

	/* loop over all user IDs */
	recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
	while (recno)
	{
	read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);

	if(memcmp(vrec.r.valid.namehash,uid->namehash,20)==0)
	{
	uid->help_marginal_count=vrec.r.valid.marginal_count;
	uid->help_full_count=vrec.r.valid.full_count;
	/* es_printf("Fetched marginal %d, full %d\n",uid->help_marginal_count,uid->help_full_count); */
	break;
	}

	recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
	}
	}

	void
	list_trust_path( const char *username )
	{
	(void)username;
	}

	/****************
	* Enumerate all keys, which are needed to build all trust paths for
	* the given key. This function does not return the key itself or
	* the ultimate key (the last point in cerificate chain). Only
	* certificate chains which ends up at an ultimately trusted key
	* are listed. If ownertrust or validity is not NULL, the corresponding
	* value for the returned LID is also returned in these variable(s).
	*
	* 1) create a void pointer and initialize it to NULL
	* 2) pass this void pointer by reference to this function.
	* Set lid to the key you want to enumerate and pass it by reference.
	* 3) call this function as long as it does not return -1
	* to indicate EOF. LID does contain the next key used to build the web
	* 4) Always call this function a last time with LID set to NULL,
	* so that it can free its context.
	*
	* Returns: -1 on EOF or the level of the returned LID
	*/
	int
	enum_cert_paths( void *context, ulong lid,
	unsigned ownertrust, unsigned validity )
	{
	(void)context;
	(void)lid;
	(void)ownertrust;
	(void)validity;
	return -1;
	}


	/****************
	* Print the current path
	*/
	void
	enum_cert_paths_print (void *context, FILE fp,
	int refresh, ulong selected_lid)
	{
	(void)context;
	(void)fp;
	(void)refresh;
	(void)selected_lid;
	}



	/****************************************
	********* NEW NEW NEW **************
	****************************************/

	static int
	ask_ownertrust (ctrl_t ctrl, u32 *kid, int minimum)
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk;
	int rc;
	int ot;

	pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
	rc = get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, kid);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error (_("public key %s not found: %s\n"),
	keystr(kid), gpg_strerror (rc) );
	return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
	}

	if(opt.force_ownertrust)
	{
	log_info("force trust for key %s to %s\n",
	keystr(kid),trust_value_to_string(opt.force_ownertrust));
	tdb_update_ownertrust (ctrl, pk, opt.force_ownertrust);
	ot=opt.force_ownertrust;
	}
	else
	{
	ot=edit_ownertrust (ctrl, pk, 0);
	if(ot>0)
	ot = tdb_get_ownertrust (ctrl, pk, 0);
	else if(ot==0)
	ot = minimum?minimum:TRUST_UNDEFINED;
	else
	ot = -1; /* quit */
	}

	free_public_key( pk );

	return ot;
	}


	static void
	mark_keyblock_seen (KeyHashTable tbl, KBNODE node)
	{
	for ( ;node; node = node->next )
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	\|\| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
	{
	u32 aki[2];

	keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, aki);
	add_key_hash_table (tbl, aki);
	}
	}


	static void
	dump_key_array (int depth, struct key_array *keys)
	{
	struct key_array *kar;

	for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
	{
	KBNODE node = kar->keyblock;
	u32 kid[2];

	keyid_from_pk(node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
	es_printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:K::%c::::\n",
	depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1], '?');

	for (; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	int len = node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len;

	if (len > 30)
	len = 30;
	es_printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:U:::%c:::",
	depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1],
	(node->flag & 4)? 'f':
	(node->flag & 2)? 'm':
	(node->flag & 1)? 'q':'-');
	es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	len, ":", NULL);
	es_putc (':', es_stdout);
	es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
	}
	}
	}
	}


	static void
	store_validation_status (ctrl_t ctrl, int depth,
	kbnode_t keyblock, KeyHashTable stored)
	{
	KBNODE node;
	int status;
	int any = 0;

	for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	{
	PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
	if (node->flag & 4)
	status = TRUST_FULLY;
	else if (node->flag & 2)
	status = TRUST_MARGINAL;
	else if (node->flag & 1)
	status = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
	else
	status = 0;

	if (status)
	{
	update_validity (ctrl, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
	uid, depth, status);

	mark_keyblock_seen(stored,keyblock);

	any = 1;
	}
	}
	}

	if (any)
	do_sync ();
	}


	/* Returns a sanitized copy of the regexp (which might be "", but not
	NULL). */
	/* Operator characters except '.' and backslash.
	See regex(7) on BSD. */
	#define REGEXP_OPERATOR_CHARS "^[$()\|*+?{"

	static char *
	sanitize_regexp(const char *old)
	{
	size_t start=0,len=strlen(old),idx=0;
	int escaped=0,standard_bracket=0;
	char new=xmalloc((len2)+1); /* enough to \-escape everything if we
	have to */

	/* There are basically two commonly-used regexps here. GPG and most
	versions of PGP use "<[^>]+[@.]example\.com>$" and PGP (9)
	command line uses "example.com" (i.e. whatever the user specifies,
	and we can't expect users know to use "\." instead of "."). So
	here are the rules: we're allowed to start with "<[^>]+[@.]" and
	end with ">$" or start and end with nothing. In between, the
	only legal regex character is ".", and everything else gets
	escaped. Part of the gotcha here is that some regex packages
	allow more than RFC-4880 requires. For example, 4880 has no "{}"
	operator, but GNU regex does. Commenting removes these operators
	from consideration. A possible future enhancement is to use
	commenting to effectively back off a given regex to the Henry
	Spencer syntax in 4880. -dshaw */

	/* Are we bracketed between "<[^>]+[@.]" and ">$" ? */
	if(len>=12 && strncmp(old,"<[^>]+[@.]",10)==0
	&& old[len-2]=='>' && old[len-1]=='$')
	{
	strcpy(new,"<[^>]+[@.]");
	idx=strlen(new);
	standard_bracket=1;
	start+=10;
	len-=2;
	}

	/* Walk the remaining characters and ensure that everything that is
	left is not an operational regex character. */
	for(;start<len;start++)
	{
	if(!escaped && old[start]=='\\')
	escaped=1;
	else if (!escaped && strchr (REGEXP_OPERATOR_CHARS, old[start]))
	new[idx++]='\\';
	else
	escaped=0;

	new[idx++]=old[start];
	}

	new[idx]='\0';

	/* Note that the (sub)string we look at might end with a bare "\".
	If it does, leave it that way. If the regexp actually ended with
	">$", then it was escaping the ">" and is fine. If the regexp
	actually ended with the bare "\", then it's an illegal regexp and
	regcomp should kick it out. */

	if(standard_bracket)
	strcat(new,">$");

	return new;
	}

	/* Used by validate_one_keyblock to confirm a regexp within a trust
	signature. Returns 1 for match, and 0 for no match or regex
	error. */
	static int
	check_regexp(const char expr,const char string)
	{
	int ret;
	char *regexp;

	regexp=sanitize_regexp(expr);

	{
	regex_t pat;

	ret=regcomp(&pat,regexp,REG_ICASE\|REG_EXTENDED);
	if(ret==0)
	{
	ret=regexec(&pat,string,0,NULL,0);
	regfree(&pat);
	}
	ret=(ret==0);
	}

	if(DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug("regexp '%s' ('%s') on '%s': %s\n",
	regexp,expr,string,ret?"YES":"NO");

	xfree(regexp);

	return ret;
	}

	/*
	* Return true if the key is signed by one of the keys in the given
	* key ID list. User IDs with a valid signature are marked by node
	* flags as follows:
	* flag bit 0: There is at least one signature
	* 1: There is marginal confidence that this is a legitimate uid
	* 2: There is full confidence that this is a legitimate uid.
	* 8: Used for internal purposes.
	* 9: Ditto (in mark_usable_uid_certs())
	* 10: Ditto (ditto)
	* This function assumes that all kbnode flags are cleared on entry.
	*/
	static int
	validate_one_keyblock (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t kb, struct key_item *klist,
	u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
	{
	struct key_item *kr;
	KBNODE node, uidnode=NULL;
	PKT_user_id *uid=NULL;
	PKT_public_key *pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	u32 main_kid[2];
	int issigned=0, any_signed = 0;

	keyid_from_pk(pk, main_kid);
	for (node=kb; node; node = node->next)
	{
	/* A bit of discussion here: is it better for the web of trust
	to be built among only self-signed uids? On the one hand, a
	self-signed uid is a statement that the key owner definitely
	intended that uid to be there, but on the other hand, a
	signed (but not self-signed) uid does carry trust, of a sort,
	even if it is a statement being made by people other than the
	key owner "through" the uids on the key owner's key. I'm
	going with the latter. However, if the user ID was
	explicitly revoked, or passively allowed to expire, that
	should stop validity through the user ID until it is
	resigned. -dshaw */

	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
	&& !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked
	&& !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired)
	{
	if (uidnode && issigned)
	{
	if (uid->help_full_count >= opt.completes_needed
	\|\| uid->help_marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
	uidnode->flag \|= 4;
	else if (uid->help_full_count \|\| uid->help_marginal_count)
	uidnode->flag \|= 2;
	uidnode->flag \|= 1;
	any_signed = 1;
	}
	uidnode = node;
	uid=uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;

	/* If the selfsig is going to expire... */
	if(uid->expiredate && uid->expiredate<*next_expire)
	*next_expire = uid->expiredate;

	issigned = 0;
	get_validity_counts (ctrl, pk, uid);
	mark_usable_uid_certs (ctrl, kb, uidnode, main_kid, klist,
	curtime, next_expire);
	}
	else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	&& (node->flag & (1<<8)) && uid)
	{
	/* Note that we are only seeing unrevoked sigs here */
	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;

	kr = is_in_klist (klist, sig);
	/* If the trust_regexp does not match, it's as if the sig
	did not exist. This is safe for non-trust sigs as well
	since we don't accept a regexp on the sig unless it's a
	trust sig. */
	if (kr && (!kr->trust_regexp
	\|\| !(opt.trust_model == TM_PGP
	\|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
	\|\| (uidnode
	&& check_regexp(kr->trust_regexp,
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name))))
	{
	/* Are we part of a trust sig chain? We always favor
	the latest trust sig, rather than the greater or
	lesser trust sig or value. I could make a decent
	argument for any of these cases, but this seems to be
	what PGP does, and I'd like to be compatible. -dms */
	if ((opt.trust_model == TM_PGP
	\|\| opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
	&& sig->trust_depth
	&& pk->trust_timestamp <= sig->timestamp)
	{
	unsigned char depth;

	/* If the depth on the signature is less than the
	chain currently has, then use the signature depth
	so we don't increase the depth beyond what the
	signer wanted. If the depth on the signature is
	more than the chain currently has, then use the
	chain depth so we use as much of the signature
	depth as the chain will permit. An ultimately
	trusted signature can restart the depth to
	whatever level it likes. */

	if (sig->trust_depth < kr->trust_depth
	\|\| kr->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
	depth = sig->trust_depth;
	else
	depth = kr->trust_depth;

	if (depth)
	{
	if(DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug ("trust sig on %s, sig depth is %d,"
	" kr depth is %d\n",
	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
	sig->trust_depth,
	kr->trust_depth);

	/* If we got here, we know that:

	this is a trust sig.

	it's a newer trust sig than any previous trust
	sig on this key (not uid).

	it is legal in that it was either generated by an
	ultimate key, or a key that was part of a trust
	chain, and the depth does not violate the
	original trust sig.

	if there is a regexp attached, it matched
	successfully.
	*/

	if (DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug ("replacing trust value %d with %d and "
	"depth %d with %d\n",
	pk->trust_value,sig->trust_value,
	pk->trust_depth,depth);

	pk->trust_value = sig->trust_value;
	pk->trust_depth = depth-1;

	/* If the trust sig contains a regexp, record it
	on the pk for the next round. */
	if (sig->trust_regexp)
	pk->trust_regexp = sig->trust_regexp;
	}
	}

	if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
	uid->help_full_count = opt.completes_needed;
	else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY)
	uid->help_full_count++;
	else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL)
	uid->help_marginal_count++;
	issigned = 1;
	}
	}
	}

	if (uidnode && issigned)
	{
	if (uid->help_full_count >= opt.completes_needed
	\|\| uid->help_marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
	uidnode->flag \|= 4;
	else if (uid->help_full_count \|\| uid->help_marginal_count)
	uidnode->flag \|= 2;
	uidnode->flag \|= 1;
	any_signed = 1;
	}

	return any_signed;
	}


	static int
	search_skipfnc (void opaque, u32 kid, int dummy_uid_no)
	{
	(void)dummy_uid_no;
	return test_key_hash_table ((KeyHashTable)opaque, kid);
	}


	/*
	* Scan all keys and return a key_array of all suitable keys from
	* klist. The caller has to pass keydb handle so that we don't use
	* to create our own. Returns either a key_array or NULL in case of
	* an error. No results found are indicated by an empty array.
	* Caller hast to release the returned array.
	*/
	static struct key_array *
	validate_key_list (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KeyHashTable full_trust,
	struct key_item klist, u32 curtime, u32 next_expire)
	{
	KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
	struct key_array *keys = NULL;
	size_t nkeys, maxkeys;
	int rc;
	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;

	maxkeys = 1000;
	keys = xmalloc ((maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys);
	nkeys = 0;

	rc = keydb_search_reset (hd);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_search_reset failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	xfree (keys);
	return NULL;
	}

	memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
	desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
	desc.skipfnc = search_skipfnc;
	desc.skipfncvalue = full_trust;
	rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL);
	if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
	return keys;
	}
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_search(first) failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto die;
	}

	desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT; /* change mode */
	do
	{
	PKT_public_key *pk;

	rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
	if (rc)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto die;
	}

	if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
	{
	log_debug ("ooops: invalid pkttype %d encountered\n",
	keyblock->pkt->pkttype);
	dump_kbnode (keyblock);
	release_kbnode(keyblock);
	continue;
	}

	/* prepare the keyblock for further processing */
	merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock);
	clear_kbnode_flags (keyblock);
	pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	if (pk->has_expired \|\| pk->flags.revoked)
	{
	/* it does not make sense to look further at those keys */
	mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock);
	}
	else if (validate_one_keyblock (ctrl, keyblock, klist,
	curtime, next_expire))
	{
	KBNODE node;

	if (pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= curtime
	&& pk->expiredate < *next_expire)
	*next_expire = pk->expiredate;

	if (nkeys == maxkeys) {
	maxkeys += 1000;
	keys = xrealloc (keys, (maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys);
	}
	keys[nkeys++].keyblock = keyblock;

	/* Optimization - if all uids are fully trusted, then we
	never need to consider this key as a candidate again. */

	for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & 4))
	break;

	if(node==NULL)
	mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock);

	keyblock = NULL;
	}

	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	keyblock = NULL;
	}
	while (!(rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL)));

	if (rc && gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
	{
	log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
	goto die;
	}

	keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
	return keys;

	die:
	keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
	release_key_array (keys);
	return NULL;
	}

	/* Caller must sync */
	static void
	reset_trust_records (ctrl_t ctrl)
	{
	TRUSTREC rec;
	ulong recnum;
	int count = 0, nreset = 0;

	for (recnum=1; !tdbio_read_record (recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ )
	{
	if(rec.rectype==RECTYPE_TRUST)
	{
	count++;
	if(rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust)
	{
	rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust=0;
	write_record (ctrl, &rec);
	}

	}
	else if(rec.rectype==RECTYPE_VALID
	&& ((rec.r.valid.validity&TRUST_MASK)
	\|\| rec.r.valid.marginal_count
	\|\| rec.r.valid.full_count))
	{
	rec.r.valid.validity &= ~TRUST_MASK;
	rec.r.valid.marginal_count=rec.r.valid.full_count=0;
	nreset++;
	write_record (ctrl, &rec);
	}

	}

	if (opt.verbose)
	{
	log_info (ngettext("%d key processed",
	"%d keys processed",
	count), count);
	log_printf (ngettext(" (%d validity count cleared)\n",
	" (%d validity counts cleared)\n",
	nreset), nreset);
	}
	}

	/*
	* Run the key validation procedure.
	*
	* This works this way:
	* Step 1: Find all ultimately trusted keys (UTK).
	* mark them all as seen and put them into klist.
	* Step 2: loop max_cert_times
	* Step 3: if OWNERTRUST of any key in klist is undefined
	* ask user to assign ownertrust
	* Step 4: Loop over all keys in the keyDB which are not marked seen
	* Step 5: if key is revoked or expired
	* mark key as seen
	* continue loop at Step 4
	* Step 6: For each user ID of that key signed by a key in klist
	* Calculate validity by counting trusted signatures.
	* Set validity of user ID
	* Step 7: If any signed user ID was found
	* mark key as seen
	* End Loop
	* Step 8: Build a new klist from all fully trusted keys from step 6
	* End Loop
	* Ready
	*
	*/
	static int
	validate_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, int interactive)
	{
	int rc = 0;
	int quit=0;
	struct key_item *klist = NULL;
	struct key_item *k;
	struct key_array *keys = NULL;
	struct key_array *kar;
	KEYDB_HANDLE kdb = NULL;
	KBNODE node;
	int depth;
	int ot_unknown, ot_undefined, ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate;
	KeyHashTable stored,used,full_trust;
	u32 start_time, next_expire;

	/* Make sure we have all sigs cached. TODO: This is going to
	require some architectural re-thinking, as it is agonizingly slow.
	Perhaps combine this with reset_trust_records(), or only check
	the caches on keys that are actually involved in the web of
	trust. */
	keydb_rebuild_caches (ctrl, 0);

	kdb = keydb_new (ctrl);
	if (!kdb)
	return gpg_error_from_syserror ();

	start_time = make_timestamp ();
	next_expire = 0xffffffff; /* set next expire to the year 2106 */
	stored = new_key_hash_table ();
	used = new_key_hash_table ();
	full_trust = new_key_hash_table ();

	reset_trust_records (ctrl);

	/* Fixme: Instead of always building a UTK list, we could just build it
	* here when needed */
	if (!utk_list)
	{
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("no ultimately trusted keys found\n"));
	goto leave;
	}

	/* mark all UTKs as used and fully_trusted and set validity to
	ultimate */
	for (k=utk_list; k; k = k->next)
	{
	KBNODE keyblock;
	PKT_public_key *pk;

	keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (ctrl, k->kid);
	if (!keyblock)
	{
	log_error (_("public key of ultimately"
	" trusted key %s not found\n"), keystr(k->kid));
	continue;
	}
	mark_keyblock_seen (used, keyblock);
	mark_keyblock_seen (stored, keyblock);
	mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock);
	pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
	for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
	update_validity (ctrl, pk, node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
	0, TRUST_ULTIMATE);
	}
	if ( pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= start_time
	&& pk->expiredate < next_expire)
	next_expire = pk->expiredate;

	release_kbnode (keyblock);
	do_sync ();
	}

	if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU)
	/* In the TOFU trust model, we only need to save the ultimately
	trusted keys. */
	goto leave;

	klist = utk_list;

	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info ("marginals needed: %d completes needed: %d trust model: %s\n",
	opt.marginals_needed, opt.completes_needed,
	trust_model_string (opt.trust_model));

	for (depth=0; depth < opt.max_cert_depth; depth++)
	{
	int valids=0,key_count;
	/* See whether we should assign ownertrust values to the keys in
	klist. */
	ot_unknown = ot_undefined = ot_never = 0;
	ot_marginal = ot_full = ot_ultimate = 0;
	for (k=klist; k; k = k->next)
	{
	int min=0;

	/* 120 and 60 are as per RFC2440 */
	if(k->trust_value>=120)
	min=TRUST_FULLY;
	else if(k->trust_value>=60)
	min=TRUST_MARGINAL;

	if(min!=k->min_ownertrust)
	update_min_ownertrust (ctrl, k->kid,min);

	if (interactive && k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
	{
	k->ownertrust = ask_ownertrust (ctrl, k->kid,min);

	if (k->ownertrust == (unsigned int)(-1))
	{
	quit=1;
	goto leave;
	}
	}

	/* This can happen during transition from an old trustdb
	before trust sigs. It can also happen if a user uses two
	different versions of GnuPG or changes the --trust-model
	setting. */
	if(k->ownertrust<min)
	{
	if(DBG_TRUST)
	log_debug("key %08lX%08lX:"
	" overriding ownertrust '%s' with '%s'\n",
	(ulong)k->kid[0],(ulong)k->kid[1],
	trust_value_to_string(k->ownertrust),
	trust_value_to_string(min));

	k->ownertrust=min;
	}

	if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
	ot_unknown++;
	else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNDEFINED)
	ot_undefined++;
	else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_NEVER)
	ot_never++;
	else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL)
	ot_marginal++;
	else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY)
	ot_full++;
	else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
	ot_ultimate++;

	valids++;
	}

	/* Find all keys which are signed by a key in kdlist */
	keys = validate_key_list (ctrl, kdb, full_trust, klist,
	start_time, &next_expire);
	if (!keys)
	{
	log_error ("validate_key_list failed\n");
	rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
	goto leave;
	}

	for (key_count=0, kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++, key_count++)
	;

	/* Store the calculated valididation status somewhere */
	if (opt.verbose > 1 && DBG_TRUST)
	dump_key_array (depth, keys);

	for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
	store_validation_status (ctrl, depth, kar->keyblock, stored);

	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("depth: %d valid: %3d signed: %3d"
	" trust: %d-, %dq, %dn, %dm, %df, %du\n"),
	depth, valids, key_count, ot_unknown, ot_undefined,
	ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate );

	/* Build a new kdlist from all fully valid keys in KEYS */
	if (klist != utk_list)
	release_key_items (klist);
	klist = NULL;
	for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
	{
	for (node=kar->keyblock; node; node = node->next)
	{
	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & 4))
	{
	u32 kid[2];

	/* have we used this key already? */
	keyid_from_pk (kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
	if(test_key_hash_table(used,kid)==0)
	{
	/* Normally we add both the primary and subkey
	ids to the hash via mark_keyblock_seen, but
	since we aren't using this hash as a skipfnc,
	that doesn't matter here. */
	add_key_hash_table (used,kid);
	k = new_key_item ();
	k->kid[0]=kid[0];
	k->kid[1]=kid[1];
	k->ownertrust =
	(tdb_get_ownertrust
	(ctrl, kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, 0)
	& TRUST_MASK);
	k->min_ownertrust = tdb_get_min_ownertrust
	(ctrl, kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, 0);
	k->trust_depth=
	kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_depth;
	k->trust_value=
	kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_value;
	if(kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_regexp)
	k->trust_regexp=
	xstrdup(kar->keyblock->pkt->
	pkt.public_key->trust_regexp);
	k->next = klist;
	klist = k;
	break;
	}
	}
	}
	}
	release_key_array (keys);
	keys = NULL;
	if (!klist)
	break; /* no need to dive in deeper */
	}

	leave:
	keydb_release (kdb);
	release_key_array (keys);
	if (klist != utk_list)
	release_key_items (klist);
	release_key_hash_table (full_trust);
	release_key_hash_table (used);
	release_key_hash_table (stored);
	if (!rc && !quit) /* mark trustDB as checked */
	{
	int rc2;

	if (next_expire == 0xffffffff \|\| next_expire < start_time )
	tdbio_write_nextcheck (ctrl, 0);
	else
	{
	tdbio_write_nextcheck (ctrl, next_expire);
	if (!opt.quiet)
	log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"),
	strtimestamp (next_expire));
	}

	rc2 = tdbio_update_version_record (ctrl);
	if (rc2)
	{
	log_error (_("unable to update trustdb version record: "
	"write failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc2));
	tdbio_invalid ();
	}

	do_sync ();
	pending_check_trustdb = 0;
	}

	return rc;
	}

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