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diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog
index 53e4c8130..40049fe1c 100644
--- a/g10/ChangeLog
+++ b/g10/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6917 +1,6935 @@
+2002-10-02 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+ * import.c (import_secret_one): Check for an illegal (>110)
+ protection cipher when importing a secret key.
+
+ * keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Show a '#' for a
+ secret-parts-missing key.
+
+ * parse_packet.c (parse_key): Some comments.
+
+ * revoke.c (gen_revoke): Remove some debugging code.
+
+ * trustdb.c (verify_own_keys): Make trusted-key a non-deprecated
+ option again.
+
+ * seckey-cert.c (do_check): Don't give the IDEA warning unless the
+ cipher in question is in fact IDEA.
+
2002-10-01 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* import.c (import_one): Make sure that a newly imported key
starts with a clean ownertrust.
2002-10-01 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* getkey.c (get_pubkey_direct): New.
(merge_selfsigs_main): Use it here to look for an ultimately
trusted key. Using the full get_pubkey might lead to an
infinitive recursion.
2002-09-29 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Force the keyserver URI
scheme to lowercase to be case-insensitive.
2002-09-28 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* export.c (do_export_stream): Comment.
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Properly handle a
non-designated revocation import.
2002-09-26 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (set_homedir): New. Changed all direct assignments to use
this.
* gpgv.c (set_homedir): Ditto.
2002-09-25 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* Makefile.am: Link gpg with EGDLIBS (i.e. NETLIBS) as EGD uses
sockets. Remove the old NETLIBS variable since the keyserver
stuff is no longer internal.
2002-09-24 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* import.c (import_keys_stream): Fix compiler type warning.
* keyring.c (keyring_rebuild_cache), sig-check.c
(check_key_signature2), import.c (import, chk_self_sigs): Minor
language cleanups.
2002-09-23 Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de>
* main.h: Introduced fast-import as import option. Removed
fast as separate option from prototypes.
* import.c (parse_import_options): Added fast-import option.
(import_*): Removed fast as separate option.
* g10.c (main): Added option fast-import, removed old fast
as separate argument.
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Removed old fast as separate
argument.
2002-09-22 Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de>
* import.c (import_keys, import_keys_stream,
import_keys_internal): Added trustdb update/check to key import if
not fast-import and interactive set/no-auto-check-trustdb unset.
Avoided function clone by introducing import_keys_internal.
2002-09-19 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Properly handle line truncation.
Don't leak memory (~10-20 bytes) on searches.
(keyserver_search_prompt): Cleanup.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Show 1F direct key signatures
in --with-colons listing.
2002-09-16 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyedit.c (menu_addrevoker): The direct key signature for
revocation keys must be at least v4 to carry the revocation key
subpacket. Add a PGP 2.x warning for revocation keys.
2002-09-14 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* g10.c (check_permissions): Rearrange strings to make translating
easier (don't incorporate string parts).
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Make strings translatable.
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Make string translatable.
2002-09-13 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* getkey.c (check_revocation_keys): Move....
* main.h, sig-check.c (check_revocation_keys): to here. Also
return the signature_check error code rather than 0/1 and cache
the sig result.
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Divert to
check_revocation_keys if a revocation sig is made by someone other
than the pk owner.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Tidy.
2002-09-13 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (main) [__MINGW32__]: Activate oLoadExtension.
2002-09-12 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* Makefile.am, hkp.c, hkp.h, keyserver.c (keyserver_work): Remove
internal HKP support.
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Remove whitespace after keyserver
commands.
2002-09-10 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* exec.c (expand_args): Remove loop left over from earlier
implementation.
(exec_write): Missed one tick.
2002-09-10 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c, options.h: Removed option --emulate-checksum-bug.
* misc.c (checksum_u16_nobug): Removed.
(checksum_u16): Removed the bug emulation.
(checksum_mpi): Ditto.
(checksum_mpi_counted_nbits): Removed and replaced all calls
with checksum_mpi.
* parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): New.
(parse_key): Use it here to store it as an opaque MPI.
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Changed the v3 unprotection to the new
why to store these keys.
(protect_secret_key): Likewise.
* build-packet.c (do_secret_key): And changed the writing.
* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname, open_db): Use new macro MY_O_BINARY
to avoid silly ifdefs.
(open_db): Fallback to RDONLY so that gpg may be used from a
RO-medium.
* encode.c (encode_simple): Make sure we don't use an ESK packet
when we don't have a salt in the S2K.
* misc.c (pct_expando) <case f>: Make sure that LEN is initialized.
* exec.c (exec_finish): Use ticks to denote filenames in messages.
(make_tempdir, exec_write): Changed format of messages.
* keyserver.c (print_keyinfo): Release USERID in on error.
(keyserver_work) [!DISABLE_KEYSERVER_HELPERS]: Exclude the unused
code.
2002-09-09 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* parse-packet.c (make_attribute_uidname): Add new ar MAX_NAMELEN
for sanity checks. Changed both callers. Limit the size of an %s.
* options.skel: Comment lock-once out, so that this file does not
change anything when copied to a new home directory.
* openfile.c (try_make_homedir): Don't exit after copying the
option skeleton.
* options.h: Don't use a comma when declaring variables over more
than one line.
* mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): Check length of the session
key.
* hkp.c (dehtmlize): Use ascii_tolower to protect against weird
locales. Cast the argument for isspace for the sake of broken
HP/UXes.
(parse_hkp_index): s/ascii_memcasecmp/ascii_strncasecmp/.
* g10.c: Removed option --emulate-3des-s2k-bug.
* passphrase.c (hash_passphrase): Was used here.
* export.c (parse_export_options)
* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options)
* import.c (parse_import_options)
* g10.c (check_permissions): s/ascii_memcasecmp/ascii_strncasecmp/.
2002-09-09 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* g10.c (add_group): Use '=' to separate group name from group
members. Use a better error message for when no = is found.
* hkp.c (hkp_export): Use CRLF in headers.
2002-09-03 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* mainproc.c (print_pkenc_list): Don't increment the error counter
when printing the list of keys a message was encrypted to. This
would make gpg give a non-zero exit code even for completely valid
messages if the message was encrypted to more than one key that
the user owned.
2002-09-02 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (main): Try to set a default character set. Print the
used one in verbosity level 3.
* gpgv.c (main): Try to set a default character set.
* status.c, status.h (STATUS_IMPORT_OK): New.
* import.c (import_one,import_secret_one): Print new status.
2002-08-30 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Add new status code to indicate an
untrusted user. This (or a disabled key) fail with "unavailable
pubkey" (G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY).
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Fail if any recipient keys are
unusable.
* options.skel: The PGP LDAP keyserver is back. Use MIT keyserver
as a sample rather than cryptnet as cryptnet does not support
searching yet.
* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Fix error message
(preferences are userid/selfsig and not key specific).
2002-08-30 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): Changed the wording of a warning.
* encode.c (encode_simple,encode_crypt): Use new style CTB for
compressssed packets when using MDC. We need to do this so that
concatenated messages are properly decrypted. Old style
compression assumes that it is the last packet; given that we
can't determine the length in advance, the uncompressor does not
know where to start. Actually we should use the new CTB always
but this would break PGP 2 compatibility.
* parse-packet.c (parse): Special treatment for new style CTB
compressed packets.
* build-packet.c (do_mdc): Removed. Was not used.
(do_encrypted_mdc): Count in the version number and the MDC packet.
2002-08-28 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* sig-check.c (do_check_messages, do_check): Show keyid in error
messages.
* keyserver.c (print_keyinfo): More readable key listings for
--search-keys responses.
2002-08-26 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index, dehtmlize): Move HTML functionality into
new "dehtmlize" function. Remove HTML before trying to parse each
line from the keyserver. If the keyserver provides key type
information in the listing, use it.
2002-08-23 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* sig-check.c (do_check, do_check_messages): Emit the usual sig
warnings even for cached sigs. This also serves to protect
against missing a sig expiring while cached.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Don't check UID self-sigs twice.
2002-08-22 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* import.c (clean_subkeys, chk_self_sigs): Merge clean_subkeys
into chk_self_sigs. This improves efficiency as the same
signatures are not checked multiple times. Clarify when a subkey
is revoked (any revocation signature, even if it is dated before
the binding signature).
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_subkey): Subkey revocation comments.
* keylist.c (list_one): Stats are only for public key listings.
* g10.c (main), options.skel: Default should be include-revoked
for keyserver operations.
2002-08-21 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* import.c (import_print_stats): Print new non_imported counter
which is currently not used because we terminate on errors.
2002-08-20 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.skel: Document no-include-attributes for
keyserver-options.
* keylist.c, keyedit.c, keyserver.c, sign.c: Some TODOs and
comments.
* export.c (do_export_stream): Fix noop bug in exporting sensitive
revocation keys.
* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Comment out the option for
showing trust paths until it can be implemented.
2002-08-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* getkey.c (get_user_id_native): Renamed to ..
(get_user_id_printable): this. Filter out all dangerous
characters. Checked all usages.
(get_user_id_string_native): Renamed to..
(get_user_id_string_printable): this. Filter out all dangerous
characters. Checked all usages.
* keyedit.c (show_basic_key_info): New.
* keylist.c (print_fingerprint): New mode 3.
* import.c (import_one): Use new function to display the user ID.
2002-08-16 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* g10.c (main): Enable opt.interactive.
* import.c (import_one): Ask the user if the key shall be
imported when the interactive mode is used. Useful to extract
selected keys from a file.
2002-08-16 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* seckey-cert.c: Workaround to allow decryption of v3 keys created
with a bug in the mpi_get_secure_buffer.
2002-08-14 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index): Properly handle really large keys
(5 digit key length) in HKP searches.
2002-08-13 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* encode.c (encode_simple): Fix problem with using compression
algo 2 and symmetric compressed files.
* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): If we are not using a
MDC, compress even if a file is already compressed. This is to
help against the chosen ciphertext attack.
* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Fix requested algorithm bug
so the request succeeds even if the requested algorithm is not the
first found.
* cipher.c (write_header), encode.c (use_mdc, encode_simple,
encode_crypt, encrypt_filter), g10.c (main): Be more eager to use
a MDC. We use a MDC if the keys directly support it, if the keys
list AES (any) or TWOFISH anywhere in the prefs, or if the cipher
chosen does not have a 64 bit blocksize.
2002-08-08 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.skel: Some language tweaks, and remove the
load-extension section for random gatherers.
* keyring.c (create_tmp_file, rename_tmp_file): Create tmp files
with user-only permissions, but restore the original permissions
if the user has something special set.
* openfile.c (copy_options_file): Create new options file
(gpg.conf) with user-only permissions.
* keydb.c (keydb_add_resource): Create new keyrings with user-only
permissions.
* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Create new trustdbs with user-only
permissions.
2002-08-07 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* sig-check.c (signature_check2): Sanity check that the md has a
context for the hash that the sig is expecting. This can happen
if a onepass sig header does not match the actual sig, and also if
the clearsign "Hash:" header is missing or does not match the
actual sig.
* keyedit.c (menu_revsig): Properly show a uid is revoked without
restarting gpg. This is Debian bug 124219, though their supplied
patch will not do the right thing.
* main.h, tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname), misc.c (removed
check_permissions), keydb.c (keydb_add_resource), g10.c (main,
check_permissions): Significant reworking of the permission check
mechanism. The new behavior is to check everything in the homedir
by checking the homedir itself. If the user wants to put
(possibly shared) keyrings outside the homedir, they are not
checked. The options file and any extension files are checked
wherever they are, as well as their enclosing directories. This
is Debian bug 147760.
2002-08-06 Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de>
* g10.c (main): Use of EXTSEP_S in new gpg.conf string.
* openfile.c (copy_options_file): Ditto.
2002-08-06 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.h, g10.c (main), mainproc.c (proc_encrypted):
--ignore-mdc-error option to turn a MDC check error into a
warning.
* encode.c (encode_crypt), g10.c (main), sign.c (sign_file,
clearsign_file): Use the same --pgpX warning string everywhere to
ease translations.
* encode.c (write_pubkey_enc_from_list): Warn when using
--throw-keyid with --pgpX. Noted by Vedaal Nistar.
* revoke.c (export_minimal_pk, gen_desig_revoke, gen_revoke):
Export a minimal pk along with the revocation cert when in --pgpX
mode so that PGP can import it.
2002-08-06 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* options.skel: Changed comments.
* g10.c (main): Try to use "gpg.conf" as default option file.
* openfile.c (copy_options_file): Changed name of created file.
2002-08-02 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* Makefile.am (LDFLAGS): Removed DYNLINK_LDFLAGS.
2002-07-30 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.h, g10.c (main), mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Return a
decryption failed error if a MDC does not verify. Warn if a MDC
is not present (can disable via --no-mdc-warning).
* exec.c (exec_write), g10.c (main), keyserver.c
(keyserver_spawn): Use new DISABLE_KEYSERVER_PATH rather than
FIXED_EXEC_PATH.
2002-07-28 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* sig-check.c (do_check): Properly validate v4 sigs with no hashed
section at all.
2002-07-25 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Always allow to delete a key in batch mode
when specified by fingerprint. Suggested by Enzo Michelangeli.
2002-07-25 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyedit.c (menu_revsig): Change "revsig" to honor selected uids
so the user can revoke sigs from particular uids only.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't display expired uids in
--list-keys unless -v and not --list-sigs (just like revoked
uids).
* exec.c, export.c, import.c, keyedit.c, keyserver.c, misc.c:
"Warning" -> "WARNING"
2002-07-24 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* main.h, import.c (parse_import_options, fix_hkp_corruption,
import_one, delete_inv_parts), g10.c (main): New import-option
"repair-hkp-subkey-bug", which repairs as much as possible the HKP
mangling multiple subkeys bug. It is on by default for keyserver
receives, and off by default for regular --import.
* main.h, import.c (import, import_one, delete_inv_parts), hkp.c
(hkp_ask_import), keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Use keyserver
import options when doing keyserver receives.
* options.h, exec.h, exec.c (set_exec_path, exec_write), g10.c
(main), keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): If the user does not use
"exec-path", completely replace $PATH with GNUPG_LIBEXECDIR before
calling the keyserver helper. If the user does use "exec-path",
append GNUPG_LIBEXECDIR after the specified path.
2002-07-23 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* import.c (parse_import_options), export.c
(parse_export_options): Fix offset problem with reversed ("no-")
meanings.
* import.c (delete_inv_parts): Discard subkey signatures (0x18 and
0x28) if found in the userid section of the key.
* sig-check.c (signature_check2): Signatures made by invalid
subkeys (bad/missing binding sig) are also invalid.
* keylist.c (print_fingerprint): Show the primary as well as the
secondary key fingerprint in modes 1 & 2.
2002-07-22 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.h, main.h, g10.c (main), import.c
(parse_import_options, delete_inv_parts), keyserver.c
(parse_keyserver_options): add new --import-options option. The
only current flag is "allow-local-sigs".
* g10.c (main): Don't disable MDC in pgp7 mode.
* options.h, g10.c (main), keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options):
Remove old keyserver-option include-attributes now that there is
an export-option for the same thing.
* options.h, main.h, export.c (parse_export_options,
do_export_stream), g10.c (main): add new --export-options option.
Current flags are "include-non-rfc", "include-local-sigs",
"include-attributes", and "include-sensitive-revkeys".
* options.h, hkp.c (hkp_export), keyserver.c
(parse_keyserver_options, keyserver_spawn): try passing unknown
keyserver options to export options, and if successful, use them
when doing a keyserver --send-key.
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): We do not generate
SIGSUBPKT_PRIV_VERIFY_CACHE anymore.
* revoke.c (gen_desig_revoke): Lots more comments about including
sensitive revkeys along with the revocation sig itself.
* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options): Simpler implementation
that can skip one pass over the options.
2002-07-18 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_addrevoker): Allow specifying
"sensitive" as an argument to an addrevoker command. This sets
the 0x40 sensitive revoker flag.
* revoke.c (gen_desig_revoke): When generating a designated
revocation, include the direct key sig that contains the
designated revoker subpacket. This allows sensitive designated
revocation subpackets to be exported. Also indicate which
revokers are sensitive in the first place.
2002-07-17 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names_colon): The 0x40 class bit in
a designated revoker means "sensitive", not "local". It's
exportable under the right circumstances.
* main.h, options.h, export.c (do_export_stream), g10.c (main),
hkp.c (hkp_export), keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn: Add a flag to
skip attribute packets and their signatures while exporting. This
is to accomodate keyservers (pksd again) that choke on attributes.
Use keyserver-option "include-attributes" to control it. This
defaults to ON (i.e. don't skip).
2002-07-09 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.h, keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri, keyserver_spawn,
keyserver_work), hkp.c (hkp_ask_import, hkp_export, hkp_search):
Use a much more strict reading of RFC-2396 for the keyserver URIs.
Specifically, don't try and be smart about checking the value of
":port" so long as it is all digits, and properly handle opaque
data (those scheme specific parts that do not start with "//").
2002-07-04 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* photoid.c (get_default_photo_command, show_photos): Honor
FIXED_PHOTO_VIEWER and DISABLE_PHOTO_VIEWER.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Use --show-photos to show
photos when verifying a sig made by a key with a photo.
* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Properly parse a URI with no
:port section and an empty file path, but with a terminating '/'.
(keyserver_work): Honor DISABLE_KEYSERVER_HELPERS.
* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import): Display keyserver URI as a URI, but only
if verbose.
* exec.c, g10.c: USE_EXEC_PATH -> FIXED_EXEC_PATH
2002-07-03 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* exec.h, exec.c (set_exec_path, exec_write), g10.c (main): If
USE_EXEC_PATH is defined at compile time, use it to lock the
exec-path and not allow the user to change it.
2002-07-02 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.h, g10.c (main), keyserver.c (keyserver_refresh):
Maintain and use the original keyserver URI for cosmetics rather
than trying to recreate it when needed.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Properly disregard expired
uids. Make sure that the first uid listed is a real uid and not
an attribute (attributes should only be listed in the "aka"
section). When there are no valid textual userids, try for an
invalid textual userid before using any attribute uid.
2002-07-01 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.skel: Fix a few typos, clarify "group", and remove
sample photo viewers for Win32 since they are the defaults now.
* parse-packet.c (make_attribute_uidname), keylist.c
(dump_attribs): Fix two typecast warnings.
* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_attribute_subpkt), exec.c
(expand_args), mkdtemp.c (mkdtemp), photoid.c
(parse_image_header): Fix some signedness compiler warnings.
2002-07-01 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* photoid.c (get_default_photo_command): Also use __MINGW32__
instead of HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM.
* encode.c (encode_symmetric): Do not use the new encryption code.
2002-06-30 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* photoid.c: Use __MINGW32__ to include windows because
HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM is also set for OS/2 and plain DOS. Provide
constant missing in older mingw installations.
2002-06-21 Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de>
* g10.c [__riscos__]: Moved RISC OS specific stuff to util/riscos.c
and include/util.h.
* gpgv.c [__riscos__]: Likewise.
2002-06-20 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keydb.h, pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Allow passing a
suggested algorithm which will be used if available.
* encode.c (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter), sign.c (sign_file): Use
new select_algo_from_prefs feature to check if forcing an
algorithm would violate the recipient preferences.
* photoid.c (get_default_photo_command, show_photos): Use
different default viewers on different platforms. Currently we
have Win 9x, Win NT (2k, xp), Mac OSX, RISC OS, and "everybody
else". These are #ifdefs as much as possible to avoid clutter.
* g10.c (strusage, build_list), keyedit.c (show_prefs), main.h,
misc.c (compress_algo_to_string, check_compress_algo), pkclist.c
(algo_available), keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): New
algo_to_string and check functions for compress algorithms.
2002-06-20 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* misc.c (setsysinfo): Removed a #warning for Alpha's uniligedn
trap disabling - it is quite possible that this is a debug relict.
2002-06-20 Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de>
* g10.c [__riscos__]: Added image file system feature.
* gpgv.c [__riscos__]: Added image file system feature.
* photoid.c (show_photos) [__riscos__]: Set RISC OS filetype of
photo id according to MIME type.
2002-06-19 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index): Don't leak memory when failing out of a
bad HKP keyserver.
* g10.c (add_notation_data): Relax slightly the rules as to what
can go into a notation name - 2440 allows "@", for example.
2002-06-17 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* import.c (clean_subkeys, import_one): Only allow at most 1
binding sig and at most 1 revocation sig on a subkey, as per
2440:11.1.
* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index, hkp_search): Error if the keyserver
returns an unparseable HKP response.
2002-06-15 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names), keylist.c
(list_keyblock_print): Show "[expired]" before expired uids.
* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names_colon), mainproc.c
(list_node), keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Show flag 'e' for
expired user ids. Use "uat" for user attribute packets instead of
"uid". Also use '<count> <length>' rather than the fake user id
string on attributes.
* keygen.c (keygen_add_revkey): Remove unused code.
* misc.c (check_permissions): Check directory permissions
properly - they are not special files.
* pkclist.c (expand_id, expand_group, build_pk_list): When
expanding groups before building a pk list, inherit flags from the
original pre-expanded string.
* pubkey-enc.c (is_algo_in_prefs): Don't use prefs from expired
uids.
2002-06-14 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* free-packet.c (copy_signature): Properly copy a signature that
carries a revocation key on it.
* pkclist.c (expand_id, expand_group, build_pk_list): Groups now
work properly when used in the "Enter the user ID" prompt.
2002-06-14 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Display warning if a user
tries to show prefs on a v3 key with a v3 selfsig.
* kbnode.c (dump_kbnode): Show if a uid is expired.
* import.c (merge_blocks, import_revoke_cert): Show user ID
receiving a revocation certificate.
* free-packet.c (cmp_user_ids): Properly compare attribute ids.
* pkclist.c (expand_groups): Maintain the strlist flags while
expanding. Members of an expansion inherit their flags from the
expansion key.
* options.h, cipher.c (write_header), g10.c (main), keygen.c
(keygen_set_std_prefs): remove the personal_mdc flag. It no
longer serves a purpose now that the personal preference lists are
split into cipher/digest/zip.
2002-06-14 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* skclist.c (is_insecure): Implemented.
2002-06-12 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Properly handle PROGRAM responses
when they have a CRLF ending. Noted by Keith Ray.
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Handle CRLF endings from
keyserver helpers. Also don't leak the last line worth of memory
from the keyserver response.
* main.h, misc.c (deprecated_warning): New function to warn about
deprecated options and commands.
* g10.c (main), keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c
(parse_keyserver_uri): Use new deprecated function to warn about
honor-http-proxy, auto-key-retrieve, and x-broken-hkp.
2002-06-11 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* Makefile.am: link gpg with NETLIBS for the built-in HKP access.
2002-06-10 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.h, keyserver.c (keyserver_opts), g10.c (main): New
keyserver option "include-subkeys". This feature already existed,
but now can be turned off. It defaults to on.
* options.h, keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options,
keyserver_spawn): There are now enough options to justify making a
structure for the keyserver options rather than a page of
if-then-else-if-then-etc.
* getkey.c (merge_keys_and_selfsig, merge_selfsigs_main): Fix bug
in calculating key expiration dates.
2002-06-09 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keydb.h, getkey.c (get_user_id_native), import.c (import_one):
Display user ID while importing a key. Note this applies to both
--import and keyserver --recv-keys.
* exec.c (exec_finish): Log unnatural exit (core dump, killed
manually, etc) for fork/exec/pipe child processes.
2002-06-08 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* encode.c (encode_symmetric): Disable the compat flag
when the expert mode is enabled.
2002-06-07 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.skel, options.h, main.h, keydb.h, pkclist.c
(build_pk_list, expand_groups), g10.c (main, add_group): Add new
"group" command to allow one name to expand into multiple keys.
For simplicity, and to avoid potential loops, we only expand once
- you can't make an alias that points to an alias.
* main.h, g10.c (main), keygen.c (build_personal_digest_list):
Simplify the default digest list - there is really no need for the
other hashes since they will never be used after SHA-1 in the
list.
* options.skel, options.h, g10.c (main), hkp.c (hkp_ask_import,
hkp_export, hkp_search), keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options,
parse_keyserver_uri, keyserver_work, keyserver_refresh): Make the
"x-broken-hkp" keyserver scheme into keyserver-option
"broken-http-proxy". Move honor_http_proxy into
keyserver_options. Canonicalize the three variations of "hkp",
"x-hkp", and "x-broken-hkp" into "hkp".
2002-06-07 Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de>
* g10.c [__riscos__]: Added --attribute-file to do the same as
--attribute-fd, but with a filename not a fd as argument.
Added magic symbol for RISC OS to use different memory management.
* gpgv.c [__riscos__]: Added magic symbol for RISC OS to use
different memory management.
2002-06-06 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* main.h, g10.c (main), keygen.c (build_personal_digest_list): Put
in a default digest preference list consisting of SHA-1, followed
by every other installed digest except MD5. Note this is the same
as having no digest preference at all except for SHA-1 being
favored.
* options.h, g10.c (main), keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs),
pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Split
--personal-preference-list into three:
--personal-{cipher|digest|compress}-preferences. This allows a
user to set one without affecting another (i.e. setting only a
digest pref doesn't imply an empty cipher pref).
* exec.c (exec_read): This is a safer way of guessing the return
value of system(). Noted by Stefan Bellon.
2002-06-05 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index): Be more robust with keyservers
returning very unparseable responses.
* exec.c (exec_read): Catch and display an error when the remote
process exits unnaturally (i.e. segfault) so the user knows what
happened. Also fix exec_write stub which has a different number
of arguments now.
2002-06-05 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* encode.c (encode_simple): Ignore the new mode for RFC1991.
* mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): Better check for weird
keysizes.
2002-06-05 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* encode.c (encode_sesskey): New.
(encode_simple): Use it here. But by default we use the compat
mode which supress to generate encrypted session keys.
2002-06-05 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): New.
(proc_symkey_enc): Support for encrypted session keys.
2002-06-04 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* sign.c (hash_for, sign_file): When encrypting and signing at the
same time, consult the various hash prefs to pick a hash algorithm
to use. Pass in a 160-bit hint if any of the signing keys are
DSA.
* keydb.h, pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs, algo_available):
Pass a "hints" opaque pointer in to let the caller give hints as
to what algorithms would be acceptable. The only current hint is
for PREFTYPE_HASH to require a 160-bit hash for DSA. Change all
callers in encode.c (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter) and sign.c
(sign_file). If we settle on MD5 as the best algorithm based
solely on recepient keys and SHA1 is also a possibility, use SHA1
unless the user intentionally chose MD5. This is as per 2440:13.
* exec.c (make_tempdir): Fix duplicated filename problem.
2002-06-03 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* packet.h, parse-packet.c (enum_sig_subpkt): Report back from
enum_sig_subpkt when a subpacket is critical and change all
callers in keylist.c (show_policy_url, show_notation), mainproc.c
(print_notation_data), and pkclist.c (do_show_revocation_reason).
* keylist.c (show_policy_url, show_notation): Display if the
policy or notation is critical.
2002-06-03 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* main.h, g10.c (main), keylist.c (dump_attribs, set_attrib_fd,
list_keyblock_print, list_keyblock_colon), status.h, status.c
(get_status_string): New --attribute-fd feature to dump the
contents of attribute subpackets for frontends. If --status-fd is
also used, then a new status tag ATTRIBUTE is provided for each
subpacket.
* packet.h, getkey.c (fixup_uidnode, merge_selfsigs_main,
merge_selfsigs_subkey), parse-packet.c (setup_user_id): Keep track
of the expiration time of a user ID, and while we're at it, use
the expired flag from the selfsig rather than reparsing the
SIG_EXPIRE subpacket.
* photoid.c (generate_photo_id): When adding a new photo ID,
showing the photo for confirmation is not safe when noninteractive
since the "user" may not be able to dismiss a viewer window.
Noted by Timo Schulz.
2002-06-03 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.skel: Sample photo viewers for Win32.
* misc.c (pct_expando): Use the seckey for %k/%K if the pubkey is
not available.
* photoid.h, photoid.c (show_photos): Include the seckey in case a
user tries to view a photo on a secret key, and change all callers
in keyedit.c (menu_showphoto), keylist.c (list_keyblock_print),
and photoid.c (generate_photo_id).
2002-06-02 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* photoid.c (show_photos): Work properly when not called with a
public key.
2002-05-31 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy): Free unneeded buffer.
* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index): Properly handle the '&' character
(i.e. "&amp;") in HKP responses.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Fix reversed expiration time
check with self-sigs.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): When making a new self-sig on a v3 key,
make a v3 self-sig unless it is currently a v3 self-sig being
promoted to v4.
2002-05-31 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* pkclist.c (do_show_revocation_reason): Don't use capital
letters for non-interactive output.
(show_revocation_reason): Now it is global.
* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Show if the key has been revoked.
2002-05-30 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* sign.c (write_signature_packets, sign_file, clearsign_file,
sign_symencrypt_file): Make a v4 signature if a policy URL or
notation is set, unless v3 sigs are forced via rfc1991 or
force-v3-sigs. Also remove some doubled code and clarify an error
message (we don't sign in PGP2 mode - just detach-sign).
* parse-packet.c (parse_one_sig_subpkt): Add KS_FLAGS to the "any
size" section.
2002-05-29 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs, add_feature_mdc): Use "mdc" and
"no-mdc" in the prefs string to allow switching on and off the MDC
feature. This is needed to properly export a key from GnuPG for
use on PGP which does not support MDC - without this, MDC-capable
implementations will still try and generate MDCs which will break
PGP.
* keygen.c (keygen_get_std_prefs): Show "[mdc]" in prefs string if
it is enabled.
* options.h, g10.c (main), cipher.c (write_header), keygen.c
(keygen_set_std_prefs): For consistency, allow the user to specify
mdc/no-mdc in the --personal-preference-list. If disabled, it
acts just like --disable-mdc.
2002-05-29 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.h, exec.c: Add some debugging info, using the 1024 debug
flag.
* exec.c (win_system): New system()-like function for win32 that
does not return until the child process terminates. Of course,
this doesn't help if the process itself exits before it is
finished.
2002-05-29 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* encode.c (encode_simple): Intialize PKT when --no-literal is used.
* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names_colon): Renamed the record
for revocation keys to "rvk".
2002-05-27 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names_colon): New.
(show_key_with_all_names): Divert to new function when required.
Sanitize printing of revoker name.
2002-05-27 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Handle setting sig flags for
certain subpacket types (notation, policy url, exportable,
revocable). keyedit.c (sign_mk_attrib): Flags no longer need to
be set here.
* packet.h, parse-packet.c (parse_one_sig_subpkt), build-packet.c
(build_sig_subpkt): Call parse_one_sig_subpkt to sanity check
buffer lengths before building a sig subpacket.
2002-05-26 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy): Include secret key to enable %s
expandos, and pass notations through pct_expando as well.
* main.h, misc.c (pct_expando): Add %s and %S expandos for
signer's keyid.
2002-05-25 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* g10.c (strusage, build_list): Add compress algorithms to
--version list. Show algorithm numbers when --verbose --version
is done.
2002-05-22 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.h, main.h, keygen.c (keygen_set_set_prefs,
keygen_get_std_prefs, keygen_upd_std_prefs), keyedit.c
(keyedit_menu), g10.c (main), pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs):
Add --personal-preference-list which allows the user to factor in
their own preferred algorithms when the preference lists are
consulted. Obviously, this does not let the user violate a
recepient's preferences (and the RFC) - this only influences the
ranking of the agreed-on (and available) algorithms from the
recepients. Suggested by David Hollenberg.
* options.h, keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs), g10.c (main): Rename
--preference-list to --default-preference-list (as that is what it
really is), and make it a true default in that if the user selects
"default" they get this list and not the compiled-in list.
2002-05-22 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (main): Add missing LF in a info printout and made it
translatable. Noted by Michael Tokarev.
2002-05-21 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (main): Removed the undef of USE_SHM_COPROCESSING which
was erroneously introduced on 2002-01-09.
* signal.c (got_fatal_signal): Don't write the Nul to stderr.
Reported by David Hollenberg.
2002-05-18 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* main.h, g10.c (main), revoke.c (gen_desig_revoke): Generate a
designated revocation via --desig-revoke
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_addrevoker): New "addrevoker"
command to add a designated revoker to a key.
2002-05-17 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* gpgv.c: Add stub for get_ownertrust().
* g10.c (main): --allow-freeform-uid should be implied by
OpenPGP. Add --no-allow-freeform-uid.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Issue a warning when signing a
non-selfsigned uid.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): If a key has no selfsigs, and
allow-non-selfsigned-uid is not set, still try and make the key
valid by checking all uids for a signature from an ultimately
trusted key.
2002-05-16 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* main.h, keygen.c (keygen_add_revkey): Add revocation key
subpackets to a signature (callable by
make_keysig_packet). (write_direct_sig): Write a 1F direct key
signature. (parse_revocation_key): Parse a string in
algo:fpr:sensitive format into a revocation
key. (get_parameter_revkey, do_generate_keypair): Call above
functions when prompted from a batch key generation file.
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Allow multiple revocation key
subpackets in a single sig.
* keydb.h, getkey.c (get_seckey_byfprint): Same as
get_pubkey_byfprint, except for secret keys. We only know the
fingerprint of a revocation key, so this is needed to retrieve the
secret key needed to issue a revokation.
* packet.h, parse-packet.c (parse_signature, parse_revkeys): Split
revkey parsing off into a new function that can be used to reparse
after manipulating the revkey list.
* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Ability to make 1F direct key
signatures.
2002-05-15 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.skel: keyserver.pgp.com is gone, so list pgp.surfnet.nl
as a sample LDAP server instead.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Properly handle multiple
revocation keys in a single packet. Properly handle revocation
keys that are in out-of-order packets. Remove duplicates in
revocation key list.
2002-05-14 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* exec.c (make_tempdir) [MINGW32]: Added missing '\'.
2002-05-14 Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de>
* exec.c (make_tempdir): Make use of EXTSEP_S instead of hardcoded
dot as extension separator.
2002-05-13 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* photoid.c (show_photos): Use the long keyid as the filename for
the photo. Use the short keyid as the filename on 8.3 systems.
* exec.h, exec.c (make_tempdir, exec_write, exec_finish): Allow
caller to specify filename. This should make things easier on
windows and macs where the file extension is required, but a whole
filename is even better.
* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names, show_prefs): Show proper
prefs for a v4 key uid with no selfsig at all.
* misc.c (check_permissions): Don't check permissions on
non-normal files (pipes, character devices, etc.)
2002-05-11 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc): Avoid segv in case the parser
encountered an invalid packet.
* keyserver.c (keyserver_export): Get confirmation before sending
all keys.
2002-05-10 Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de>
* g10.c, hkp.c, keyedit.c, keyserver.c: Replaced all occurrances
of strcasecmp with ascii_strcasecmp and all occurrances of
strncasecmp with ascii_memcasecmp.
2002-05-10 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* packet.h, getkey.c (fixup_uidnode), keyedit.c (show_prefs): Show
assumed prefs for hash and compression as well as the cipher pref.
Show assumed prefs if there are no prefs at all on a v4
self-signed key.
* options.h, g10.c (main), sign.c (make_keysig_packet): New
--cert-digest-algo function to override the default key signing
hash algorithm.
2002-05-09 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Make sure the revocation key
list starts clean as this function may be called more than once
(e.g. from functions in --edit).
* g10.c, encode.c (encode_crypt), sign.c (sign_file,
sign_symencrypt_file): Make --compress-algo work like the
documentation says. It should be like --cipher-algo and
--digest-algo in that it can override the preferences calculation
and impose the setting the user wants. No --compress-algo setting
allows the usual preferences calculation to take place.
* main.h, compress.c (compress_filter): use new
DEFAULT_COMPRESS_ALGO define, and add a sanity check for compress
algo value.
2002-05-08 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): There is an assumed
compression preference for uncompressed data.
2002-05-07 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.h, g10.c (main), getkey.c (finish_lookup), pkclist.c
(algo_available): --pgp7, identical to --pgp6 except that it
permits a few algorithms that PGP 7 added: AES128, AES192, AES256,
and TWOFISH. Any more of these --pgpX flags, and it'll be time to
start looking at a generic --emulate-pgp X option.
* export.c (do_export_stream): Warn the user when exporting a
secret key if it or any of its secret subkeys are protected with
SHA1 while simple_sk_checksum is set.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Show when the SHA1 protection is
used in --list-packets.
* options.h, build-packet.c (do_comment), g10.c (main): Rename
--no-comment as --sk-comments/--no-sk-comments (--no-comment still
works) and make the default be --no-sk-comments.
2002-05-07 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keygen.c (get_parameter_algo): Never allow generation of the
deprecated RSA-E or RSA-S flavors of PGP RSA.
(ask_algo): Allow generation of RSA sign and encrypt in expert
mode. Don't allow ElGamal S+E unless in expert mode.
* helptext.c: Added entry keygen.algo.rsa_se.
2002-05-07 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): If --expert is set, allow re-signing a
uid to promote a v3 self-sig to a v4 one. This essentially
deletes the old v3 self-sig and replaces it with a v4 one.
* packet.h, parse-packet.c (parse_key), getkey.c
(merge_keys_and_selfsig, merge_selfsigs_main): a v3 key with a v4
self-sig must never let the v4 self-sig express a key expiration
time that extends beyond the original v3 expiration time.
2002-05-06 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): When making a self-signature via "sign"
don't ask about sig level or expiration, and include the usual
preferences and such for v4 self-sigs. (menu_set_preferences):
Convert uids from UTF8 to native before printing.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Convert uids from UTF8 to native before
printing. (menu_set_primary_uid): Show error if the user tries to
make a uid with a v3 self-sig primary.
2002-05-05 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* import.c (import_one): When merging with a key we already have,
don't let a key conflict (same keyid but different key) stop the
import: just skip the bad key and continue.
* exec.c (make_tempdir): Under Win32, don't try environment
variables for temp directories - GetTempDir tries environment
variables internally, and it's better not to second-guess it in
case MS adds some sort of temp dir handling to Windows at some
point.
2002-05-05 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc): Don't ask for a passphrase
in the list only mode.
2002-05-05 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyserver.c (keyserver_refresh): --refresh-keys implies
--merge-only so as not to import keys with keyids that match the
ones being refreshed. Noted by Florian Weimer.
2002-05-04 Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de>
* free-packet.c (copy_public_key): Don't call m_alloc(0), therefore
added consistency check for revkey and numrefkeys.
* getkey.c (check_revocation_keys): Added consistency check for
revkey and numrefkeys.
* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Likewise.
2002-05-03 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* photoid.c: Provide default image viewer for Win32.
* misc.c (pct_expando): %t means extension, not name ("jpg", not
"jpeg").
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn), photoid.c (show_photos), exec.h,
exec.c: Allow the caller to determine the temp file extension when
starting an exec_write and change all callers.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Nonrevocable key signatures cause an
automatic promotion to v4.
* exec.c: Provide stubs for exec_ functions when NO_EXEC is
defined.
2002-05-02 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* photoid.h, photoid.c (parse_image_header, image_type_to_string):
Useful functions to return data about an image.
* packet.h, parse-packet.c (make_attribute_uidname,
parse_attribute_subpkts, parse_attribute), photoid.h, photoid.c
(show_photos): Handle multiple images in a single attribute
packet.
* main.h, misc.c (pct_expando), sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy),
photoid.c (show_photos): Simpler expando code that does not
require using compile-time string sizes. Call
image_type_to_string to get image strings (i.e. "jpg",
"image/jpeg"). Change all callers.
* keyedit.c (menu_showphoto), keylist.c (list_keyblock_print):
Allow viewing multiple images within a single attribute packet.
* gpgv.c: Various stubs for link happiness.
2002-05-02 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt), keyedit.c (sign_uids),
options.h, sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy), g10.c (main,
add_notation_data, add_policy_url (new), check_policy_url
(removed)): Allow multiple policy URLs on a given signature.
Split "--notation-data" into "--cert-notation" and
"--sig-notation" so the user can set different policies for key
and data signing. For backwards compatibility, "--notation-data"
sets both, as before.
2002-05-02 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* options.skel: Removed the comment on trusted-keys because this
option is now deprecated.
2002-05-01 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyedit.c (menu_adduid): 2440bis04 says that multiple attribute
packets on a given key are legal.
* keyserver.c (keyserver_refresh): the fake v3 keyid hack applies
to "mailto" URLs as well since they are also served by pksd.
2002-04-29 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Added a copyright year for files changed this year.
2002-04-25 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c, options.h: New options --display, --ttyname, --ttytype,
--lc-ctype, --lc-messages to be used with future versions of the
gpg-agent.
* passphrase.c (agent_send_option,agent_send_all_options): New.
(agent_open): Send options to the agent.
* trustdb.c (update_ownertrust, clear_ownertrust): Do an explicit
do_sync because revalidation_mark does it only if when the
timestamp actually changes.
2002-04-23 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* main.h, keygen.c (do_generate_keypair), keylist.c
(print_signature_stats, list_all, list_one, list_keyblock,
list_keyblock_print, list_keyblock_colon): After generating a new
key, show the key information (name, keyid, fingerprint, etc.)
Also do not print uncheckable signatures (missing key..) in
--check-sigs. Print statistics (N missing keys, etc.) after
--check-sigs.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): When signing a key with an expiration
date on it, the "Do you want your signature to expire at the same
time?" question should default to YES.
2002-04-22 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* parse-packet.c (parse_plaintext), packet.h, plaintext.c
(handle_plaintext): Fix bug in handling literal packets with
zero-length data (no data was being confused with partial body
length).
* misc.c (pct_expando), options.skel: %t means extension ("jpg").
%T means MIME type ("image/jpeg").
* import.c (import_one): Only trigger trust update if the keyring
is actually changed.
* export.c (do_export_stream): Missing a m_free.
2002-04-22 Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de>
* keyid.c (expirestr_from_sk, expirestr_from_sig): Added _() to
string constant.
* exec.c (make_tempdir) [__riscos__]: Better placement of
temporary file.
2002-04-20 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keygen.c (generate_subkeypair): 2440bis04 adds that creating
subkeys on v3 keys is a MUST NOT.
* getkey.c (finish_lookup): The --pgp6 "use the primary key"
behavior should only apply while data signing and not encryption.
Noted by Roger Sondermann.
2002-04-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Put back 3DES because the RFC
says it is good form to do so.
2002-04-19 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyedit.c (menu_deluid): Only cause a trust update if we delete
a non-revoked user id.
* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import), keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options,
keyserver_spawn), options.h: Remove fast-import keyserver option
(no longer meaningful).
* g10.c (main), keyedit.c (sign_uids), options.h: Change
--default-check-level to --default-cert-check-level as it makes
clear what it operates on.
* g10.c (main): --pgp6 also implies --no-ask-sig-expire.
* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Comment.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids, keyedit_menu, menu_deluid, menu_delsig,
menu_expire, menu_revsig, menu_revkey): Only force a trustdb check
if we did something that changes it.
* g10.c: add "--auto-check-trustdb" to override a
"--no-auto-check-trustdb"
2002-04-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* tdbio.c (tdbio_write_nextcheck): Return a status whether the
stamp was actually changed.
* trustdb.c (revalidation_mark): Sync the changes. Removed the
sync operation done by its callers.
(get_validity): Add logic for maintaining a pending_check flag.
(clear_ownertrust): New.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Don't call revalidation_mark depending on
primary_pk.
(keyedit_menu): Call revalidation_mark after "trust".
(show_key_with_all_names): Print a warning on the wrong listed key
validity.
* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Clear the owenertrust information when
deleting a public key.
2002-04-18 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* seskey.c (encode_md_value): Print an error message if a wrong
digest algorithm is used with DSA. Changed all callers to cope
with a NULL return. Problem noted by Imad R. Faiad.
2002-04-18 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs): Properly handle nonrevocable
signatures that can expire. In short, the only thing that can
override an unexpired nonrevocable signature is another unexpired
nonrevocable signature.
* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Always use primary signing key for
signatures when --pgp6 is on since pgp6 and 7 do not understand
signatures made by signing subkeys.
2002-04-18 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* trustdb.c (validate_keys): Never schedule a nextcheck into the
past.
(validate_key_list): New arg curtime use it to set next_expire.
(validate_one_keyblock): Take the current time from the caller.
(clear_validity, reset_unconnected_keys): New.
(validate_keys): Reset all unconnected keys.
* getkey.c (premerge_public_with_secret): Fixed 0x12345678! syntax
for use with secret keys.
(lookup): Advance the searchmode after a search FIRST.
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Always calculate the old checksum for
use after unprotection.
* g10.c, options.skel: New option --no-escape-from. Made
--escape-from and --force-v3-sigs the default and removed them
from the options skeleton.
2002-04-16 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Support a SHA1 checksum as per
draft-rfc2440-bis04.
* packet.h (PKT_secret_key): Add field sha1chk.
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Check the SHA1 checksum
(protect_secret_key): And create it.
* build-packet.c (do_secret_key): Mark it as sha-1 protected.
* g10.c, options.h: New option --simple-sk-checksum.
2002-04-13 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Minor fix - signatures should
expire at their expiration time and not one second later.
* keygen.c (proc_parameter_file): Allow specifying preferences
string (i.e. "s5 s2 z1 z2", etc) in a batchmode key generation
file.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Print standard error message when
signing a revoked key (no new translation).
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs): Get the default set of key prefs from
the real (not attribute) primary uid.
2002-04-12 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Fix bug that allowed a key to be
selected twice in batch mode if one instance was the default
recipient and the other was an encrypt-to. Noted by Stefan
Bellon.
* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Show data in trust and regexp
sig subpackets.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Use new function real_uids_left to
prevent deleting the last real (i.e. non-attribute) uid. Again,
according to the attribute draft. (menu_showphoto): Make another
string translatable.
2002-04-11 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Delete subpackets from both
hashed and unhashed area on update. (find_subpkt): No longer
needed.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): With --pgp2 on, refuse to sign a v3 key
with a v4 signature. As usual, --expert overrides. Try to tweak
some strings to a closer match so they can all be translated in
one place. Use different helptext keys to allow different help
text for different questions.
* keygen.c (keygen_upd_std_prefs): Remove preferences from both
hashed and unhashed areas if they are not going to be used.
2002-04-10 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* misc.c (pct_expando), options.skel: Use %t to indicate type of a
photo ID (in this version, it's always "jpeg"). Also tweak string
expansion loop to minimize reallocs.
* mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Variable type fix.
* keyedit.c (menu_set_primary_uid): Differentiate between true
user IDs and attribute user IDs when making one of them primary.
That is, if we are making a user ID primary, we alter user IDs.
If we are making an attribute packet primary, we alter attribute
packets. This matches the language in the latest attribute packet
draft.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): No need for the empty string hack.
* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Only accept preferences from the
hashed segment of the self-sig.
2002-04-10 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* tdbio.c (migrate_from_v2): Fixed the offset to read the old
ownertrust value and only add entries to the table if we really
have a value.
2002-04-08 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* status.h, status.c (get_status_string): Add KEYEXPIRED, EXPSIG,
and EXPKEYSIG. Add "deprecated-use-keyexpired-instead" to
SIGEXPIRED.
* sig-check.c (do_check): Start transition from SIGEXPIRED to
KEYEXPIRED, since the actual event is signature verification by an
expired key and not an expired signature. (do_signature_check,
packet.h): Rename as signature_check2, make public, and change all
callers.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print, do_check_sig): Use status
EXPSIG for an expired, but good, signature. Add the expiration
time (or 0) to the VALIDSIG status line. Use status KEYEXPSIG for
a good signature from an expired key.
* g10.c (main): remove checks for no arguments now that argparse
does it.
2002-04-06 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keyring.c (keyring_get_keyblock): Disable the keylist mode here.
* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): Only test on compressed
files if a compress level was not explicity set.
* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Removed Blowfish and Twofish
from the list of default preferences, swapped the preferences of
RMD160 and SHA1. Don't include a preference to 3DES unless the
IDEA kludge gets used.
* free-packet.c (free_packet): call free_encrypted also for
PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC.
* compress.c (release_context): New.
(handle_compressed): Allocate the context and setup a closure to
release the context. This is required because there is no
guarabntee that the filter gets popped from the chain at the end
of the function. Problem noted by Timo and probably also the
cause for a couple of other reports.
(compress_filter): Use the release function if set.
* tdbio.c [__CYGWIN32__]: Don't rename ftruncate. Noted by
Disastry.
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Put parens around a bit test.
* exec.c (make_tempdir): Double backslash for TMP directory
creation under Windows. Better strlen the DIRSEP_S constants for
allocation measurements.
* decrypt.c (decrypt_messages): Release the passphrase aquired
by get_last_passphrase.
2002-04-02 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* Makefile.am (EXTRA_DIST): Removed OPTIONS an pubring.asc - they
are no longer of any use.
2002-04-03 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options): fix auto-key-retrieve to
actually work as a keyserver-option (noted by Roger Sondermann).
* keylist.c (reorder_keyblock): do not reorder the primary
attribute packet - the first user ID must be a genuine one.
2002-03-31 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Fix ownertrust display with
--with-colons.
* keygen.c (generate_user_id), photoid.c (generate_photo_id):
Properly initialize the user ID refcount. A few more "y/n" ->
"y/N" in photoid.c.
* keyedit.c (ask_revoke_sig): Warn the user if they are about to
revoke an expired sig (not a problem, but they should know). Also
tweak a few prompts to change "y/n" to "y/N", which is how most
other prompts are written.
* keyserver.c (keyserver_search_prompt): Control-d escapes the
keyserver search prompt.
* pkclist.c (show_revocation_reason & callers): If a subkey is
considered revoked solely because the parent key is revoked, print
the revocation reason from the parent key.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Allow revocation/expiration to apply
to a uid/key with no entry in the trustdb.
2002-03-29 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyserver.c (printunquoted): unquote backslashes from keyserver
searches
* hkp.c (write_quoted): quote backslashes from keyserver searches
2002-03-26 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keygen.c (ask_keysize): Removed the warning for key sizes > 1536.
2002-03-25 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Use 2 strings and not a %s so that
translations can be done the right way.
* helptext.c: Fixed small typo.
2002-03-23 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* import.c (append_uid, merge_sigs): it is okay to import
completely non-signed uids now (with --allow-non-selfsigned-uid).
* getkey.c (get_primary_uid, merge_selfsigs_main): do not choose
an attribute packet (i.e. photo) as primary uid. This prevents
oddities like "Good signature from [image of size 2671]". This is
still not perfect (one can still select an attribute packet as
primary in --edit), but is closer to the way the draft is going.
* g10.c (build_list): algorithms should include 110.
* g10.c (main): --pgp2 implies --no-ask-sig-expire and
--no-ask-cert-expire as those would cause a v4 sig/cert.
* armor.c (is_armor_header): be more lenient in what constitutes a
valid armor header (i.e. -----BEGIN blah blah-----) as some
Windows programs seem to add spaces at the end. --openpgp makes
it strict again.
2002-03-18 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyserver.c (keyserver_search_prompt): Properly handle a "no
keys found" case from the internal HKP code (external HKP is ok).
Also, make a COUNT -1 (i.e. streamed) keyserver response a little
more efficient.
* g10.c (main): Add --no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid
2002-03-17 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* g10.c (main): --openpgp implies --allow-non-selfsigned-uid.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): If none of the uids are primary
(because none are valid) then pick the first to be primary (but
still invalid). This is for cosmetics in case some display needs
to print a user ID from a non-selfsigned key. Also use
--allow-non-selfsigned-uid to make such a key valid and not
--always-trust. The key is *not* automatically trusted via
--allow-non-selfsigned-uid.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Make sure non-selfsigned uids
print [uncertain] on verification even though one is primary now.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs): If the main key is not valid, then
neither are the subkeys.
* import.c (import_one): Allow --allow-non-selfsigned-uid to work
on completely unsigned keys. Print the uids in UTF8. Remove
mark_non_selfsigned_uids_valid().
* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Show revocation key as
UTF8.
* sign.c (clearsign_file): Allow --not-dash-escaped to work with
v3 keys.
2002-03-14 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* main.h: Changed the default algorithms to CAST5 and SHA1.
2002-03-13 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* import.c (chk_self_sigs): Show which user ID a bad self-sig
(invald sig or unsupported public key algorithm) resides on.
* import.c (chk_self_sigs): any valid self-sig should mark a user
ID or subkey as valid - otherwise, an attacker could DoS the user
by inventing a bogus invalid self-signature.
2002-03-07 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* g10.c (main): make a few more strings translatable.
* options.h, options.skel, g10.c (main), gpgv.c, mainproc.c
(check_sig_and_print), keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options):
--auto-key-retrieve should really be a keyserver-option variable.
* import.c (revocation_present): new function to print a warning
if a key is imported that has been revoked by designated revoker,
but the designated revoker is not present to verify the
revocation. If keyserver-options auto-key-retrieve is set, try
and fetch the designated revoker from the keyserver.
* import.c (import_one): call revocation_present after importing a
new key. Note that this applies to --import, --recv-keys, and
--search-keys.
* keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c (keyserver_import_fprint):
import via fingerprint (for revocation keys).
* keyserver.c (keyserver_import_keyid): much simpler
implementation now that we're using KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC internally.
2002-03-04 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* revoke.c (gen_revoke): do not prompt for revocation reason for
v3 revocations (unless force-v4-certs is on) since they wouldn't
be used anyway.
* keyedit.c (menu_revsig): show the status of the sigs
(exportable? revocable?) to the user before prompting for which
sig to revoke. Also, make sure that local signatures get local
revocations.
* keyedit.c (ask_revoke_sig): remind the user which sigs are
local.
* g10.c (main): Add "exec-path" variable to override PATH for
execing programs.
* export.c (do_export_stream): properly check return code from
classify_user_id to catch unclassifiable keys.
2002-03-03 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): variable type tweak for RISC
OS (from Stefan)
2002-02-28 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* getkey.c (check_revocation_keys): New function to check a
revocation against a list of potential revocation keys. Note the
loop-breaking code here. This is to prevent blowing up if A is
B's revocation key, while B is also A's. Note also that this is
written so that a revoked revoker can still issue revocations:
i.e. If A revokes B, but A is revoked, B is still revoked. I'm
not completely convinced this is the proper behavior, but it
matches how PGP does it. It does at least have the advantage of
much simpler code - my first version of this had lots of loop
maintaining code so you could chain revokers many levels deep and
if D was revoked, C was not, which meant that B was, and so on.
It was sort of scary, actually.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add any revocation keys onto the
pk. This is particularly interesting since we normally only get
data from the most recent 1F signature, but you need multiple 1F
sigs to properly handle revocation keys (PGP does it this way, and
a revocation key could be marked "sensitive" and hence in a
different signature). Also, if a pk has a revocation key set,
check for revocation sigs that were not made by us - if made by a
valid revocation key, mark the pk revoked.
* packet.h, getkey.c (cache_public_key): do not cache key if
"dont_cache" is set. This allows the revocation key code to look
up a key and return information that may be inaccurate to prevent
loops without caching the fake data.
* packet.h, sig-check.c (do_signature_check): Record if a
signature was made by a revoked pk.
* packet.h, parse-packet.c (parse_one_sig_subpkt,
can_handle_critical, parse_signature): Get revocation key
information out of direct sigs.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): don't assume that the presence
of a 0x20 signature means the key is revoked. With revocation
keys, this may not be true if the revocation key is not around to
verify it or if verification failed. Also, 0x1F should get listed
as "sig", and not "unexpected signature class".
* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Add a flag for printing
revoker information and change all callers.
* import.c (merge_blocks): merge in any new direct key (0x1F)
sigs.
* import.c (import_revoke_cert): don't keep processing after a
revocation is rejected.
* import.c (delete_inv_parts): Allow importing a revocation
signature even if it was not issued by the key. This allows a
revocation key to issue it. Of course, the sig still needs to be
checked before we trust it.
* free-packet.c (copy_public_key): Include a new copy of the
revocation keys when duping a pk.
* free-packet.c (free_seckey_enc, release_public_key_parts): Free
any revocation keys that are attached to a sig or pk.
* export.c (do_export_stream): Do not export signatures with
"sensitive" revocation keys in them.
2002-02-27 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* export.c (do_export_stream): Do not include v3 keys in a
--export-secret-subkeys export.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): If a key isn't valid (say,
because of no self-signature), allow --always-trust to force it
valid so it can be trusted.
2002-02-25 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import), hkp.h, keyserver.c (all): treat key
lists internally as fingerprints when possible. All this is via
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC - no point in reinventing the wheel. This allows
the helper program to search the keyserver by fingerprint if
desired (and the keyserver supports it). Note that automatic
fingerprint promotion during refresh only applies to v4 keys as a
v4 fingerprint can be easily changed into a long or short key id,
and a v3 cannot.
* pubkey-enc.c, getkey.c, misc.c, main.h: Take two copies of
hextobyte() from pubkey-enc.c and getkey.c and make them into one
copy in misc.c.
2002-02-22 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyserver.c (keyserver_search_prompt): Detect a "no keys found"
case even if the helper program does not explicitly say how many
keys were found.
* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index): Bug fix - don't report non-revoked keys
as revoked in HKP key searches.
2002-02-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* parse-packet.c (parse_trust): Made parsing more robust.
2002-02-19 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index): Catch corruption in HKP index lines
(can be caused by broken or malicious keyservers).
* keyserver.c (keyserver_work): Add KEYSERVER_NOT_SUPPORTED for
unsupported actions (say, a keyserver that has no way to search,
or a readonly keyserver that has no way to add). Also add a
USE_EXTERNAL_HKP define to disable the internal HKP keyserver
code.
2002-02-14 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c: New option --no-use-agent.
* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Always print the warning for
unknown and undefined trust. Removed the did_add cruft. Reported
by Janusz A. Urbanowicz.
2002-02-11 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index): Bug fix - properly handle user IDs with
colons (":") in them while HKP searching.
2002-02-09 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* misc.c (pct_expando): More comments.
* keydb.h, sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy): Clarify what is a sig
and what is a cert. A sig has sigclass 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, or 0x40,
and everything else is a cert.
* g10.c (main), keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Add a "nrlsign" for
nonrevocable and local key signatures.
* g10.c (main): Add a --no-force-mdc to undo --force-mdc.
* options.h, g10.c (main), cipher.c (write_header): Add a knob to
--disable-mdc/--no-disable-mdc. Off by default, of course, but is
used in --pgp2 and --pgp6 modes.
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Allow specifying multiple users in
the "Enter the user ID" loop. Enter a blank line to stop. Show
each key+id as it is added.
* keylist.c (show_policy_url), mainproc.c (print_notation_data):
It is not illegal (though possibly silly) to have multiple policy
URLs in a given signature, so print all that are present.
* hkp.c (hkp_search): More efficient implementation of URL-ifying
code.
2002-02-04 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* main.h, misc.c (pct_expando): New function to generalize
%-expando processing in any arbitrary string.
* photoid.c (show_photo): Call the new pct_expando function rather
than expand strings internally.
* sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy): Show policy URLs and notations
when making a signature if show-policy/show-notation is on.
%-expand policy URLs during generation. This lets the user have
policy URLs of the form "http://notary.jabberwocky.com/keysign/%K"
which will generate a per-signature policy URL.
* main.h, keylist.c (show_policy_url, show_notation): Add amount
to indent so the same function can be used in key listings as well
as during sig generation. Change all callers.
2002-02-04 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyserver.c, options.h (parse_keyserver_options, keyidlist):
Workaround for the pksd and OKS keyserver bug that calculates v4
RSA keyids as if they were v3. The workaround/hack is to fetch
both the v4 (e.g. 99242560) and v3 (e.g. 68FDDBC7) keyids. This
only happens for key refresh while using the HKP scheme and the
refresh-add-fake-v3-keyids keyserver option must be set. This
should stay off by default.
2002-02-03 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Bug fix - do not append keys to
each other when --sending more than one.
2002-02-02 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.h, g10.c (main), keyedit.c (sign_uids), sign.c
(mk_notation_and_policy): Split "--set-policy-url" into
"--cert-policy-url" and "--sig-policy-url" so the user can set
different policies for key and data signing. For backwards
compatibility, "--set-policy-url" sets both, as before.
2002-01-30 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (main): --gen-random --armor does now output a base64
encoded string.
2002-01-28 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* g10.c (main), options.h, pkclist.c (algo_available): --pgp6
flag. This is not nearly as involved as --pgp2. In short, it
turns off force_mdc, turns on no_comment, escape_from, and
force_v3_sigs, and sets compression to 1. It also restricts the
user to IDEA (if present), 3DES, CAST5, MD5, SHA1, and RIPEMD160.
See the comments above algo_available() for lots of discussion on
why you would want to do this.
2002-01-27 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Comment
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Bug fix - when signing with multiple
secret keys at the same time, make sure each key gets the sigclass
prompt.
* exec.c (exec_finish): Close the iobuf and FILE before trying to
waitpid, so the remote process will get a SIGPIPE and exit. This
is only a factor when using a pipe to communicate.
* exec.c (exec_write): Disable cache-on-close of the fd iobuf (is
this right? Why is a fd iobuf cached at all?)
2002-01-26 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c, options.h: New option --gpg-agent-info
* passphrase.c (agent_open): Let it override the environment info.
* seckey-cert.c (check_secret_key): Always try 3 times when the
agent is enabled.
* options.skel: Describe --use-agent.
2002-01-24 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* pubkey-enc.c (is_algo_in_prefs, get_it): Only check preferences
against keys with v4 self sigs - there is really little point in
warning for every single non-IDEA message encrypted to an old key.
* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Only put in the fake IDEA
preference if --pgp2 is on.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print "Expired" for expired
but good signatures (this still prints "BAD" for expired but bad
signatures).
2002-01-23 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keygen.c (ask_keysize): Cosmetic: don't present a RSA signing
key as a "keypair" which can be 768 bits long (as RSA minimum is
1024).
* pubkey-enc.c (is_algo_in_prefs): Allow IDEA as a fake preference
for v3 keys with v3 selfsigs.
2002-01-22 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* packet.h, getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main), pkclist.c
(select_algo_from_prefs): Implement the fake IDEA preference as
per RFC2440:12.1. This doesn't mean that IDEA will be used (the
plugin may not be present), but it does mean that a v3 key with a
v3 selfsig has an implicit IDEA preference instead of 3DES. v3
keys with v4 selfsigs use preferences as normal.
* encode.c (encode_crypt): if select_algo_from_prefs fails, this
means that we could not find a cipher that both keys like. Since
all v4 keys have an implicit 3DES preference, this means there is
a v3 key with a v3 selfsig in the list. Use 3DES in this case as
it is the safest option (we know the v4 key can handle it, and
we'll just hope the v3 key is being used in an implementation that
can handle it). If --pgp2 is on, warn the user what we're doing
since it'll probably break PGP2 compatibility.
* g10.c (main): Do not force using IDEA for encrypted files in
--pgp2 mode - let the fake IDEA preference choose this for us for
better compatibility when encrypting to multiple keys, only some
of which are v3.
* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Put 3DES on the end of the
default cipher pref list (RFC2440: "...it is good form to place it
there explicitly."). If the user has the IDEA plugin installed,
put a preference for IDEA *after* 3DES to effectively disable its
use for everything except encrypting along with v3 keys.
* encode.c, g10.c, sign.c: Change the PGP2 warning line from
"... will not be usable ..." to "... may not be usable ..." as the
user could be using one of the enhanced PGP2 variations.
* helptext.c: Revise the sign_uid.class help text as suggested by
Stefan.
2002-01-20 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Add tryagain_text arg to be
used with the agent. Changed all callers.
(agent_get_passphrase): Likewise and send it to the agent
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): New arg tryagain_text.
(check_secret_key): Pass the string to do_check.
* keygen.c (ask_passphrase): Set the error text is required.
* keyedit.c (change_passphrase): Ditto.
* passphrase.c (agent_open): Disable opt.use_agent in case of a
problem with the agent.
(agent_get_passphrase): Ditto.
(passphrase_clear_cache): Ditto.
2002-01-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* passphrase.c (agent_open): Add support for the new Assuan based
gpg-agent. New arg to return the used protocol version.
(agent_get_passphrase): Implemented new protocol here.
(passphrase_clear_cache): Ditto.
(readline): New.
2002-01-15 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* encode.c (encode_crypt_files): Fail if --output is used.
* g10.c: New command --decrypt-files.
* decrypt.c (decrypt_messages): New.
2002-01-09 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* g10.c, misc.c, gpgv.c: move idea_cipher_warn to misc.c so gpgv.c
doesn't need a stub for it any longer.
* g10.c (get_temp_dir), main.h: no longer used (it's in exec.c now)
* g10.c (main), delkey.c (delete_keys), main.h : Allow
--delete-key (now --delete-keys, though --delete-key still works,
of course) to delete multiple keys in one go. This applies to
--delete-secret-key(s) and --delete-secret-and-public-key(s) as
well.
2002-01-09 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* encode.c (encode_crypt_files): Now it behaves like verify_files.
* g10.c (main): We don't need to check argc for encode_crypt_files
any longer.
2002-01-09 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* exec.c: Include windows.h for dosish systems.
2002-01-08 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* g10.c (main): New description for --encrypt-files.
2002-01-08 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (main): Must register the secring for encryption because
it is needed to figure out the default recipient. Reported by
Roger Sondermann.
2002-01-05 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyedit.c (menu_adduid): Require --expert before adding a photo
ID to a v3 key, and before adding a second photo ID to any key.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Don't allow adding photo IDs in
rfc1991 or pgp2 mode.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_subkey): Permit v3 subkeys. Believe it
or not, this is allowed by rfc 2440, and both PGP 6 and PGP 7 work
fine with them.
* g10.c, options.h, keyedit.c, sign.c: Move the "ask for
expiration" switch off of --expert, which was getting quite
overloaded, and onto ask-sig-expire and ask-cert-expire. Both
default to off.
* g10.c (main): Change the default compression algo to 1, to be
more OpenPGP compliant (PGP also uses this, so it'll help with
interoperability problems as well).
* encode.c (encode_crypt): Handle compression algo 2, since the
default is now 1.
* build-packet.c (build_attribute_subpkt): Fix off-by-one error.
2002-01-05 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (main): Do not register the secret keyrings for certain
commands.
* keydb.c (keydb_add_resource): Use access to test for keyring
existence. This avoids cached opened files which are bad under
RISC OS.
2002-01-04 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* sign.c (sign_file, sign_symencrypt_file): always use one-pass
packets unless rfc1991 is enabled. This allows a signature made
with a v3 key to work in PGP 6 and 7. Signatures made with v4
keys are unchanged.
* g10.c (main): Disallow non-detached signatures in PGP2 mode.
Move the "you must use files and not pipes" PGP2 warning up so all
the PGP2 stuff is together.
* encode.c (encode_simple): Use the actual filesize instead of
partial length packets in the internal literal packet from a
symmetric message. This breaks PGP5(?), but fixes PGP2, 6, and 7.
It's a decent tradeoff. Note there was only an issue with
old-style RFC1991 symmetric messages. 2440-style messages in 6
and 7 work with or without partial length packets.
2002-01-03 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* g10.c (main): Removed --no-default-check-level option, as it is
not consistent with other "default" options. Plus, it is the same
as saying --default-check-level 0.
* exec.c (exec_read): Disallow caching tempfile from child
process, as this keeps the file handle open and can cause unlink
problems on some platforms.
* keyserver.c (keyserver_search_prompt): Minor tweak - don't
bother to transform keyids into textual form if they're just going
to be transformed back to numbers.
2002-01-03 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* g10.c: New command --encrypt-files.
* verify.c (print_file_status): Removed the static because
encode_crypt_files also uses this function.
* main.h (print_files_status): New.
(encode_crypt_files): New.
* encode.c (encode_crypt_files): New.
2002-01-02 Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de>
* keyserver.c: Moved util.h include down in order to avoid
redefinition problems on RISC OS.
* keyring.c (keyring_lock): Only lock keyrings that are writable.
* keyring.c (keyring_update_keyblock): Close unused iobuf.
* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index, hkp_search) [__riscos__]: Changed
unsigned char* to char* because of compiler issues.
* exec.c (exec_finish) [__riscos__]: Invalidate close cache so
that file can be unlinked.
2001-12-28 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* g10.c (main): Use a different strlist to check extensions since
they need to be handled seperately now.
* misc.c,main.h (check_permissions): Properly handle permission
and ownership checks on files in the lib directory
(e.g. /usr/local/lib/gnupg), which are owned by root and are
world-readable, and change all callers to specify extension or
per-user file.
* photoid.c (show_photo), keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Bug fix -
don't call exec_finish if exec_write fails.
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Look for OPTIONS from the
keyserver helper - specifically, a "OUTOFBAND" option for the
email keyserver.
* mainproc.c (list_node), keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon),
import.c (delete_inv_parts), export.c (do_export_stream): Use
signature flags for exportability check rather than re-parsing the
subpacket.
* keyid.c, keydb.h (get_lsign_letter): No longer needed.
2001-12-27 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* exec.c (exec_finish): Show errors when temp files cannot be
deleted for whatever reason.
* exec.c (exec_read): Don't rely on WEXITSTATUS being present.
* exec.c (make_tempdir): Add temp file creator for win32. Don't
create an incoming temp file if the exec is write-only.
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Clean up error handling, for when
the spawn fails.
* photoid.c (show_photo): Clean up error handling.
* misc.c (check_permissions): Neaten.
2001-12-25 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* mkdtemp.c (mkdtemp): Add copyleft info and tweak the 'X' counter
to be a bit simpler.
* keyserver.c, photoid.c: Remove unused headers left over from
when the exec functions lived there.
2001-12-23 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* misc.c (check_permissions): Do not use it for W32 systems.
* tdbio.c (migrate_from_v2): Define ftruncate as chsize() for W32.
* mkdtemp.c: W32 support.
* photoid.c: Ditto.
* exec.c: Ditto.
2001-12-22 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* exec.c (make_tempdir): avoid compiler warning with const
* mkdtemp.c (mkdtemp): catch the empty ("") string case in case
someone repurposes mkdtemp at some point.
* photoid.c (generate_photo_id, show_photo): some type changes
from Stefan Bellon.
* exec.c (make_tempdir): handle Win32 systems, suggested by Timo
Schulz.
2001-12-22 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): i18n 2 strings.
2001-12-22 Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): Use is_file_compressed
to avoid to compress compressed files.
2001-12-22 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Removed some variables
declaration due to shadowing warnings.
* build-packet.c (build_attribute_subpkt): s/index/idx/ to avoid
compiler warnig due to index(3).
* getkey.c (get_ctx_handle): Use KEYDB_HANDLE as return value.
* keylist.c (list_one): Made resname const.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Allow "addphoto" only when --openpgp is
not used.
* options.skel: Changed one example photo viewer to qiv.
2001-12-21 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* Makefile.am: add exec.c, exec.h, photoid.c, and photoid.h
* build-packet.c (build_attribute_subpkt): new function to build
the raw attribute subpacket. Note that attribute subpackets have
the same format as signature subpackets.
* exec.c: new file with generic exec-a-program functionality.
Used by both photo IDs and keyserver helpers. This is pretty much
the same code that used to be keyserver specific, with some
changes to be usable generically.
* free-packet.c (free_attributes (new)): function to free an
attribute packet.
* gpgv.c: added stub show_photo
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_adduid, menu_showphoto): can add a
photo (calls generate_photo_id), or display a photo (calls
show_photo) from the --edit menu. New commands are "addphoto",
and "delphoto" (same as "deluid").
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): show photos during key list if
--show-photos enabled.
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): use the generic exec_xxx
functions to call keyserver helper.
* g10.c, options.h: three new options - --{no-}show-photos, and
--photo-viewer to give the command line to display a picture.
* options.skel: instructions for the photo viewer
* parse-packet.c (parse_user_id, setup_user_id (new)): common code
for both user IDs and attribute IDs moved to setup_user_id.
* parse-packet.c (make_attribute_uidname (new)): constructs a fake
"name" for attribute packets (e.g. "[image of size ...]")
* parse-packet.c (parse_attribute (replaces parse_photo_id),
parse_attribute_subpkts): Builds an array of individual
attributes. Currently only handles attribute image / type jpeg
subpackets.
* sign.c (hash_uid): Fix bug in signing attribute (formerly
photo_id) packets.
* packet.h, and callers: globally change "photo_id" to "attribute"
and add structures for attributes. The packet format is generic
attributes, even though the only attribute type thus far defined
is jpeg.
2001-12-21 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* parse-packet.c (can_handle_critical): Can handle critical
revocation subpackets now.
* trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs): Disregard revocations for
nonrevocable sigs. Note that this allows a newer revocable
signature to override an older nonrevocable signature.
* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): add a duration field and change all
callers. This makes make_keysig_packet closer to
write_signature_packets and removes some duplicated expiration
code.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_revsig, sign_uids,
sign_mk_attrib): Add nrsign command, don't allow revoking a
nonrevocable signature,
* g10.c (main): Add --nrsign option to nonrevocably sign a key
from the command line.
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt_from_sig): Comment to explain
the use of CRITICAL.
2001-12-21 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c. options.h : New option --show-keyring
* getkey.c (get_ctx_handle): New.
* keylist.c (list_one): Implement option here. By David Champion.
2001-12-20 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Use mkdtemp() to make temp
directory.
* mkdtemp.c: replacement function for those platforms that don't
have mkdtemp (make a temp directory securely).
2001-12-19 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* misc.c (check_permissions): New function to stat() and ensure
the permissions of GNUPGHOME and the files have safe permissions.
* keydb.c (keydb_add_resource): Check keyring permissions.
* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Check permissions of trustdb.gpg
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Disable keyserver schemes that
involve running external programs if the options file has unsafe
permissions or ownership.
* g10.c, options.h: New option --no-permission-warning to disable
the permission warning message(s). This also permits use of the
keyserver if it had been disabled (see above). Also check the
permissions/ownership of random_seed.
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): The new glibc prints a warning
when using mktemp() (the code was already secure, but the warning
was bound to cause confusion). Use a different implementation
based on get_random_bits() instead. Also try a few times to get
the temp dir before giving up.
2001-12-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c, passphrase.c [CYGWIN32]: Allow this as an alias for MINGW32.
2001-12-18 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* g10.c (idea_cipher_warn): Add a flag to show the warning always
or once per session and change all callers (show always except for
the secret key protection and unknown cipher from an encrypted
message errors). Also make the strings translatable.
* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Add the IDEA cipher warning if the user
tries to decrypt an IDEA encrypted message without the IDEA
plugin.
* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): More strict checking of the
keyserver URI. Specifically, fail if the ":port" section is
anything except a number between 1 and 65535.
2001-12-17 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyserver.c (print_keyinfo): No need to check for
control/illegal characters, as utf8_to_native does this for us.
* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Use generic IDEA warning.
* gpgv.c: add stub for idea_cipher_warn
* g10.c, hkp.c, keyserver.c: Fix capitalization and plural issues.
* encode.c (encode_crypt), sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file):
disable pgp2 mode after the message is no longer pgp2 compatible.
* g10.c (main): Tweak the PGP2.x IDEA warning to use the generic
warning, and not merely fail if the IDEA plugin isn't there.
* g10.c (main, idea_cipher_warn), keygen.c (set_one_pref),
seckey-cert.c (do_check): Add a generic IDEA warning for when the
IDEA plugin is not present. This pops up when the user uses
"--cipher-algo idea", when setpref is used to set a "S1"
preference, and when a secret key protected with IDEA is used.
2001-12-15 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Assert that we have dropped privs.
2001-12-13 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Check that the public key
algorithm is indeed usable for en/decryption. This avoid a
strange error message from pubkey_decrypt if for some reasons a
bad algorithm indentifier is passed.
2001-12-12 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* Fixed some types for portability. Noted by Stefan Bellon.
2001-12-11 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* hkp.c (hkp_export): Do not print possible control characters
from a keyserver response.
(parse_hkp_index): Made uid an unsigned char* because it is passed to
isspace().
(hkp_search): Ditto for the char* vars.
* g10.c (main): Print the IDEA warning also for -c and -se.
* g10.c (get_temp_dir): Assert that we have dropped privs
* encode.c (encode_crypt): Include the first key into the --pgp2
check.
2001-12-07 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* g10.c, options.h: New option --pgp2. This is identical to
"--rfc1991 --cipher-algo idea --compress-algo 1 --digest-algo md5
--force_v3_sigs" with the addition of an warning to advise the
user not to use a pipe (which would break pgp2 compatibility).
* encode.c (encode_crypt): warn if the user tries to encrypt to
any key that is not RSA and <= 2048 bits when the --pgp2 option is
used.
* sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file): When using --pgp2, make a v3
sig, and warn if the signature is made with a non-v3 key.
2001-12-05 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file, sign_symencrypt_file): Prompt
for sig expiration if --expert is set and --force-v3-sigs is not
set (v3 sigs cannot expire).
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): After checking a sig, print
expiration status. This causes a error return if the sig is
expired.
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt_from_sig): Include a critical
sig expiration subpacket if the sig is to expire.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not sign an expired key unless
--expert is set, in which case prompt. Also, offer to expire a
signature when the key the user is signing expires.
* keygen.c (ask_expire_interval): Add a value to determine whether
to prompt for a key or sig expiration and change all callers.
* keyid.c: New functions: expirestr_from_sig and
colon_expirestr_from_sig.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Show sig expiration date in the
--with-colons listing.
* sign.c (make_keysig_packet, write_signature_packets): Pass in an
optional timestamp for the signature packet, and change all
callers.
* keyedit.c (sign_mk_attrib): Include a critical expiration
subpacket in the signature if an expiration date is given.
2001-12-04 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): If the user tries to sign a
locally-signed key, allow the cert to be promoted to a full
exportable signature. This essentially deletes the old
non-exportable sig, and replaces it with a new exportable one.
2001-12-04 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Do not allow signing a revoked key
unless --expert is set, and ask even then.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not allow signing a revoked UID unless
--expert is set, and ask even then.
* g10.c, options.h : New option --expert
2001-11-16 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* Allow the user to select no compression via "--compress-algo 0"
on the command line.
* keyedit.c (show_prefs): Show compression preferences in the
long-form "showpref" style.
* keygen.c (set_one_pref): Permit setting a no-compression ("Z0")
preference.
* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Fix compression preference corruption
bug.
2001-12-02 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* g10.c: Add advisory --for-your-eyes-only option as per section
5.9 of 2440.
2001-12-05 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* Force a V4 sig if the user has a notation or policy URL set.
2001-12-04 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* g10.c: Add options --keyserver-options, --temp-directory, and
auto-key-retrieve (the opposite of no-auto-key-retrieve).
* hkp.c (hkp_search): New function to handle searching a HKP
keyserver for a key
* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import, hkp_export): Pretty large changes to make
them communicate via the generic functions in keyserver.c
* keyserver.c: new file with generic keyserver routines for
getting keys from a keyserver, sending keys to a keyserver, and
searching for keys on a keyserver. Calls the internal HKP stuff
in hkp.c for HKP keyserver functions. Other calls are handled by
an external program which is spawned and written to and read from
via pipes. Platforms that don't have pipes use temp files.
2001-11-20 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* options.h, g10.c: New options show-notation, no-show-notation,
default-check-level, no-default-check-level, show-policy-url,
no-show-policy-url.
* packet.h, sign.c (make_keysig_packet), parse-packet.c
(parse_signature), free-packet.c (free_seckey_enc): Fill in
structures for notation, policy, sig class, exportability, etc.
* keyedit.c, keylist.c (print_and_check_one_sig,
list_keyblock_print): Show flags in signature display for cert
details (class, local, notation, policy, revocable). If selected,
show the notation and policy url.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Prompt for and use different key sig
classes.
* helptext.c (helptexts): Add help text to explain different
key signature classes
2001-11-26 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs): Fix segfault from bad
initialization and fix reversed key signature expiration check.
2001-11-09 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* export.c (do_export_stream): Put all given names into a search
description and change the loop so that all matching names are
returned.
2001-11-08 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): To reduce the number of questions on the
MLs print the the name of cipher algorithm 1 with the error message.
* mainproc.c: Changed the way old rfc1991 encryption cipher is
selected. Based on a patch by W Lewis.
* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Allow to skip over keys, the non
working "show info" is now assigned to "i"
* trustdb.c (ask_ownertrust, validate_keys): Implement a real quit
here. Both are by David Shaw.
* trustdb.c (validate_keys): Make sure next_exipire is initialized.
* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Use SHA-1 with v4 RSA keys.
* g10.c, options.h : New option --[no-]froce-v4-certs.
* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Create v4 sigs on v4 keys even with
a v3 key. Use that new option. By David Shaw
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Allow to select "no reason".
By David Shaw.
* keyid.c (fingerprint_from_sk): Calculation of an v3 fpr was
plain wrong - nearly the same code in fingerprint_from_pk is correct.
* build-packet.c (do_secret_key): Added a few comments to the code.
2001-11-07 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (main): Print a warning when -r is used w/o encryption.
Suggested by Pascal Scheffers.
2001-10-23 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Changed helptext for showpref
command. Suggested by Reinhard Wobst.
* keyring.c (keyring_search): When marking the offtbl ready, take
into account that we may have more than one keyring.
2001-10-22 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* Makefile.am: Do not use OMIT_DEPENDENCIES
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Default is now to put all
types of subpackets into the hashed area and only list those which
should go into the unhashed area.
2001-10-18 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keydb.c (keydb_add_resource): Rearranged the way we keep track
of the resource. There will now be an entry for each keyring here
and not in keyring.c itself. Store a token to allow creation of a
keyring handle. Changed all functions to utilize this new design.
(keydb_locate_writable): Make a real implementation.
* keyring.c (next_kr): Removed and changed all callers to set the
resource directly from the one given with the handle.
(keyring_is_writable): New.
(keyring_rebuild_cache): Add an arg to pass the token from keydb.
2001-10-17 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keyring.c (keyring_search): Enabled word search mode but print a
warning that it is buggy.
2001-10-11 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import): No more need to set the port number for
the x-hkp scheme.
(hkp_export): Ditto.
2001-10-06 Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de>
* passphrase.c [__riscos__]: Disabled agent specific stuff.
* g10.c: New option --no-force-v3-sigs.
2001-10-04 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* export.c (do_export_stream): Do not push the compress filter
here because the context would run out of scope due to the
iobuf_close done by the caller.
(do_export): Do it here instead.
2001-09-28 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always use the primary key to sign keys.
* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Hack to return only the primary key if
a certification key has been requested.
* trustdb.c (cmp_kid_for_make_key_array): Renamed to
(validate_one_keyblock): this and changed arg for direct calling.
(make_key_array): Renamed to
(validate_one_keyblock): this and changed args for direct calling.
(mark_usable_uid_certs, validate_one_keyblock)
(validate_key_list): Add next_expire arg to keep track of
expiration times.
(validate_keys): Ditto for UTKs and write the stamp.
* tdbio.c (migrate_from_v2): Check return code of tbdio_sync.
* tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Do a tdbio_sync().
* keyring.c: Made the offtbl an global object.
2001-09-27 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Allow settin of ultimate trust.
* trustdb.c (mark_keyblock_seen): New.
(make_key_array): Use it to mark the subkeys too.
(validate_keys): Store validity for ultimatly trusted keys.
2001-09-26 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust, do_we_trust): Removed the
invocation of add_ownertrust. Minor changes to the wording.
(add_ownertrust, add_ownertrust_cb): Removed.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Allow to lookup the validity using a
subkey.
* trustdb.c (new_key_hash_table): Increased the table size to 1024
and changed the masks accordingly.
(validate): Changed stats printing.
(mark_usable_uid_certs): New.
(cmp_kid_for_make_key_array): Does now check the signatures and
figures out a usable one.
2001-09-25 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keyring.c (new_offset_item,release_offset_items)
(new_offset_hash_table, lookup_offset_hash_table)
(update_offset_hash_table, update_offset_hash_table_from_kb): New.
(keyring_search): Use a offset table to optimize search for
unknown keys.
(keyring_update_keyblock, keyring_insert_keyblock): Insert new
offsets.
* getkey.c (MAX_UNK_CACHE_ENTRIES): Removed the unknown keys
caching code.
* g10.c, options.h, import.c: Removed the entire
allow-secret-key-import stuff because the validity is now
controlled by other means.
* g10.c: New command --rebuild-keydb-caches.
* keydb.c (keydb_rebuild_caches): New.
* keyring.c (do_copy): Moved some code to
(create_tmp_file, rename_tmp_file, write_keyblock): new functions.
(keyring_rebuild_cache): New.
* packet.h (PKT_ring_trust): Add sigcache field.
* parse-packet.c (parse_trust): Parse sigcache.
* keyring.c (do_copy): Always insert a sigcache packet.
(keyring_get_keyblock): Copy the sigcache packet to the signature.
* sig-check.c (cache_sig_result): Renamed from
cache_selfsig_result. Changed implementation to use the flag bits
and changed all callers.
(mdc_kludge_check): Removed this unused code.
(do_check): Do not set the sig flags here.
* import.c (read_block): Make sure that ring_trust packets are
never imported.
* export.c (do_export_stream): and never export them.
* trustdb.c (make_key_array): Skip revoked and expired keys.
2001-09-24 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c, options.h: New option --no-auto-check-trustdb.
* keygen.c (do_generate_keypair): Set newly created keys to
ultimately trusted.
* tdbio.h, tdbio.c: Removed all support for records DIR, KEY, UID,
PREF, SIG, SDIR and CACH. Changed migration function to work
direct on the file.
(tdbio_read_nextcheck): New.
(tdbio_write_nextcheck): New.
2001-09-21 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Revamped the entire key validation system.
* trustdb.c: Complete rewrite. No more validation on demand,
removed some functions, adjusted to all callers to use the new
and much simpler interface. Does not use the LID anymore.
* tdbio.c, tdbio.h: Add new record types trust and valid. Wrote a
migration function to convert to the new trustdb layout.
* getkey.c (classify_user_id2): Do not allow the use of the "#"
prefix.
* keydb.h: Removed the TDBIDX mode add a skipfnc to the
descriptor.
* keyring.c (keyring_search): Implemented skipfnc.
* passphrase.c (agent_open): Add missing bracket. Include windows.h.
2001-09-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keylist.c (print_fingerprint): Renamed from fingerprint, made
global available. Added new arg to control the print style.
* mainproc.c (print_fingerprint): Removed.
* pkclist.c (print_fpr, fpr_info): Removed and changed callers to
use print_fingerprint.
* keyedit.c (show_fingerprint): Ditto.
* passphrase.c (writen, readn)
(agent_open, agent_close)
(agent_get_passphrase)
(passphrase_clear_cache): Support for W32. Contributed by Timo.
* import.c (import_one): Release keydb handles at 2 more places.
* keyring.c (keyring_release): Close the iobuf.
(keyring_get_keyblock): Init ret_kb to NULL and store error contidion.
* import.c (import_new_stats_handle): New.
(import_release_stats_handle): New.
(import_print_stats): Renamed from static fnc print_stats.
(import_keys, import_keys_stream): Add an optional status handle
arg and changed all callers.
* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import): Add an stats_handle arg and changed all
callers.
* mainproc.c (print_pkenc_list): Use print_utf8_string2().
2001-09-18 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c: New command --refresh-keys.
* hkp.c (hkp_refresh_keys): New. Contributed by Timo Schulz.
* parse-packet.c (parse): Stop on impossible packet lengths.
2001-09-17 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* mainproc.c (print_notation_data): Wrap notation data status lines
after 50 chars.
* mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Make option try-all-secrets work.
By disastry@saiknes.lv.
2001-09-14 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): List key server preferences
and show the revocable flag correctly. Contributed by David Shaw.
2001-09-09 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): No need to define another p.
* keylist.c (print_capabilities): s/used/use/ so that it
does not shadow a global.
* sign.c (sign_file): Renamed arg encrypt to encryptflag
* keygen.c: Replaced all "usage" by "use".
* misc.c (openpgp_pk_algo_usage): Ditto.
* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Renamed arg k to enc so that the later
defined k does not shadow it.
* parse-packet.c (parse_gpg_control): No need to define another i.
* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byfprint): Must use the enum values and not
the fprint_len.
* keyring.c (keyring_search): Removed a non-sense break. Both
bugs pointed out by Stefan.
2001-09-07 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* status.c, status.h: Added NO_RECP and ALREADY_SIGNED.
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Issue NO_RECP.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Added experimental ALREADY_SIGNED
* hkp.c (hkp_import): Use log_error. Bug reported by Neal H
Walfield.
* getkey.c (classify_user_id2): Change args to take the desc union
direct. It was a stupid idea to pass the individual fields of an
union to this function. Changed all callers.
(classify_user_id): Ditto and allow to pass NULL as the description.
2001-09-06 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Features flag is now a bit vector.
* keygen.c (add_feature_mdc): Ditto.
Revamped the entire key I/O code to be prepared for other ways of
key storages and to get rid of the existing shit. GDBM support has
gone.
* keydb.c: New
* keyring.c, keyring.h: New.
* ringedit.c: Removed. Moved some stuff to keyring.c
* getkey.c: Changed everything related to the key retrieving
functions which are now using the keydb_ functions.
(prepare_search, word_match_chars, word_match)
(prepare_word_match, compare_name): Moved to keyring.c
(get_pubkey_byname): Removed ctx arg and add ret_kdbhd
arg. Changed all callers.
(key_byname): Use get_pubkey_end to release the context and take
new ret_kbdhd arg. Changed all callers.
(classify_user_id2): Fill the 16 byte fingerprint up with 4 null
bytes not with zero bytes of value 4, tsss.
* import.c (import_one): Updated to use the new keydb interface.
(import_secret_one): Ditto.
(import_revoke_cert): Ditto.
* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Ditto.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Ditto.
(get_keyblock_byname): Removed.
* revoke.c (gen_revoke): Ditto.
* export.c (do_export_stream): Ditto.
* trustdb.c (update_trustdb): Ditto.
* g10.c, gpgv.c (main): Renamed add_keyblock_resource to
keydb_add_resource.
* Makefile.am: Added and removed files.
* keydb.h: Moved KBNODE typedef and MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN to
* global.h: this new header.
2001-09-03 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): Changed nread to size_t.
(passphrase_clear_cache): Ditto.
* keyid.c (mk_datestr): Avoid trigraphs.
(fingerprint_from_pk): Cache the keyid in the pk.
* options.h: Add opt.with_fingerprint so that we know whether the
corresponding options was used.
* g10.c (main): Set it here.
* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Always print fingerprint
when this option is used. Mixed a minor memory leak.
* status.c, status.h: New status INV_RECP.
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Issue this status.
2001-08-31 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* parse-packet.c (parse_key,parse_pubkeyenc)
(parse_signature): Return error on reading bad MPIs.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Always print the user ID even
if it is not bound by a signature. Use the primary UID in the
status messages and encode them in UTF-8
* status.c (write_status_text_and_buffer): New.
2001-08-30 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* packet.h (sigsubpkttype_t): Add SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES.
(PKT_public_key, PKT_user_id): Add a flag for it.
* parse-packet.c, build-packet.c: Add support for them.
* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode, merge_selfsigs): Set the MDC flags.
* keygen.c (add_feature_mdc): New.
(keygen_upd_std_prefs): Always set the MDC feature.
* keyedit.c (show_prefs): List the MDC flag
* pkclist.c (select_mdc_from_pklist): New.
* encode.c (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter): Test whether MDC
should be used.
* cipher.c (write_header): Set MDC use depending on the above test.
Print more status info.
* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Kludge to delete a secret key with no
public key available.
* ringedit.c (find_secret_keyblock_direct): New.
* getkey.c (seckey_available): Simplified.
* ringedit.c (cmp_seckey): Now compares the secret key against the
public key while ignoring all secret parts.
(keyring_search): Use a public key packet as arg. Allow to search
for subnkeys
(search): Likewise. Changed all callers.
(find_secret_keyblock_bypk): New.
(find_secret_keyblock_byname): First locate the pubkey and then
find the correponding secret key.
* parse-packet.c (parse): Renamed pkttype arg to onlykeypkts and
changed code accordingly. Changed all callers.
(search_packet): Removed pkttype arg.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): First locate the public key and then
try to locate a secret key.
* ringedit.c (locate_keyblock_by_fpr): Removed.
(locate_keyblock_by_keyid): Removed.
(find_keyblock_bysk): Removed.
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Print the keyid along with
the wrong sig class errors.
2001-08-24 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* sign.c (sign_file): Stripped the disabled comment packet code.
(sign_file, sign_symencrypt_file): Moved common code to ..
(write_onepass_sig_packets): .. this new function.
(sign_file, clearsign_file, sign_symencrypt_file): Moved common
code to
(write_signature_packets): this new function.
(write_signature_packets, make_keysig_packet)
(update_keysig_packet): Moved common code to
(hash_uid, hash_sigclass_to_magic): these new functions
(sign_file, sign_symencrypt_file): Moved common code to
(write_plaintext_packet): this new function.
2001-08-21 Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de>
* trustdb.c (query_trust_info): Changed trustlevel to signed int.
* g10.c [__riscos__]: Fixed handling of --use-agent --lock-multiple.
2001-08-20 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Keep track on whether we already
printed information about the used algorithm.
* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Removed the non-working IDEA hack
and print a message about the assumed algorithm.
* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Use the same algorithm as above.
(proc_symkey_enc): Print the algorithm, so that the user knows it
before entering the passphrase.
(proc_pubkey_enc, proc_pubkey_enc): Zero the DEK out.
* encode.c (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter): Ditto.
* g10.c: Allow for --sign --symmetric.
* sign.c (sign_and_symencrypt): New.
Applied patches from Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de> to support
RISC OS. Nearly all of these patches are identified by the
__riscos__ macro.
* compress.c: Added a couple of casts.
* g10.c [__riscos__]: Some patches and new options foo-file similar
to all foo-fd options.
* gpgv.c, openfile.c, ringedit.c, tdbio.c: Minor fixes. Mainly
replaced hardcoded path separators with EXTSEP_S like macros.
* passprase.c [__riscos__]: Disabled agent stuff
* trustdb.c (check_trust): Changed r_trustlevel to signed int to
avoid mismatch problems in pkclist.c
* pkclist.c (add_ownertrust): Ditto.
* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext) [__riscos__]: Print a note when
file can't be created.
* options.h [__riscos__]: Use an extern unless included from the
main module.
* signal.c (got_fatal_signal) [__riscos__]: Close all files.
2001-08-14 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keygen.c (ask_algo): New arg r_usage. Allow for RSA keys.
(gen_rsa): Enabled the code.
(do_create): Enabled RSA branch.
(parse_parameter_usage): New.
(proc_parameter_file): Handle usage parameter.
(read_parameter_file): Ditto.
(generate_keypair): Ditto.
(generate_subkeypair): Ditto.
(do_generate_keypair): Ditto.
(do_add_key_flags): New.
(keygen_add_std_prefs): Use the new function.
(keygen_add_key_flags_and_expire): New.
(write_selfsig, write_keybinding): Handle new usage arg.
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Make sure that key flags go
into the hashed area.
* keygen.c (write_uid): Initialize the reference cunter.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): No more need to update the trustdb for
preferences. Added calls to merge keblock.
* kbnode.c (dump_kbnode): Print some more flags.
2001-08-10 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Revamped the preference handling.
* packet.h (prefitem_t, preftype_t): New.
(PKT_public_key): Added a uid field.
(PKT_user_id): Added field to store preferences and a reference
counter.
* parse-packet.c (parse_user_id,parse_photo_id): Initialize them
* free-packet.c (free_user_id): Free them.
(copy_user_id): Removed.
(scopy_user_id): New.
(cmp_user_ids): Optimized for identical pointers.
(release_public_key_parts): Release the uid.
(copy_public_key_with_new_namehash): Removed.
(copy_prefs): New.
* keyedit.c (menu_adduid): Use the new shallow copy user id.
(show_prefs): Adjusted implementation.
(keyedit_menu): No more need to update the trustdb after changing
preferences.
* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Store preferences.
(find_by_name): Return a user id packet and remove namehash stuff.
(lookup): Removed the unused namehash stuff.
(finish_lookup): Added foundu arg.
(pk_from_block): Removed the namehash arg and changed all callers.
(merge_selfsigs): Copy prefs to all keys.
* trustdb.c (get_pref_data): Removed.
(is_algo_in_prefs): Removed.
(make_pref_record): Deleted and removed all class.
* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Adjusted for the new
preference implementation.
* pubkey-enc.c (is_algo_in_prefs): New.
(get_it): Use that new function.
2001-08-09 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Fixed calculation of
newarea->size.
* g10.c (main): New option "--preference-list"
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): New commands "setpref" and "updpref".
(menu_set_preferences): New.
* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): New.
(set_one_pref): New.
(check_zip_algo): New.
(keygen_get_std_prefs): New.
(keygen_upd_std_prefs): New
(keygen_add_std_prefs): Move the pref setting code into the above fnc.
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Updated the list of allowed
to update subpackets.
2001-08-08 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* packet.h (subpktarea_t): New.
(PKT_signature): Use that type for hashed_data and unhashed_data and
removed the _data prefix from those fields. Changed all users.
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Changed allocation for that.
(parse_sig_subpkt): Changed declaration
(enum_sig_subpkt): Ditto and changed implementation accordingly.
* free-packet.c (cp_subpktarea): Renamed from cp_data_block and
adjusted implementation. Changed caller.
* sig-check.c (mdc_kludge_check): Adjusted the hashing.
(do_check): Ditto.
* sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file, make_keysig_packet,
update_keysig_packet): Ditto.
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Partial rewrite.
(find_subpkt): Adjusted and made static.
(delete_sig_subpkt): Adjusted.
(do_signature): Ditto.
* keygen.c (ask_keysize): Do not print the notes about suggested
key sizes if just a DSA key is generated.
* trustdb.c (add_ultimate_key): s/log_error/log_info/ for
duplicated inserted trusted keys.
2001-08-07 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* sign.c (sleep): Redefine for W32.
* g10.c, options.h: Set new flag opt.no_homedir_creation when
--no-options is given.
* openfile.c (try_make_homedir): Don't create the homedir in that case.
2001-08-03 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* armor.c (armor_filter): Removed the default comment string
because it could get us in trouble due to translations using non
ascii characters.
2001-08-01 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Do not list revoked UIDs unless
in verbose mode and we do no signature listing.
* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Skip subkeys which are not yet valid.
* g10.c, options.h: New option --ignore-valid-from.
* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Added new sigversion argument to
allow the caller to force generation of required signature
version. Changed all callers. Suggested by Thomas Roessler.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Force v4 signature generation for local
sigs. Removed the check for local signature and pre-v4 keys.
2001-07-27 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Check that we are not trying to to a
lsign with a pre-v4 key. Bug noticed by Thomas Roessler.
2001-07-26 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* parse-packet.c (parse_photo_id): Reset all variables.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Removed checks on PHOTO_ID
because this is handled identically to a user ID.
2001-07-06 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* cipher.c (write_header): Don't use MDC with --rfc1991. Suggested
by disastry@saiknes.lv.
2001-07-05 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c, options.h: New option --preserve-permissions.
* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): Use it here
(keyring_copy): and here.
* trustdb.c (verify_own_keys): Be more silent on --quiet.
Suggested by Thomas Roessler.
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Ditto.
* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted, proc_tree): Ditto
* getkey.c (lookup): Ditto.
2001-07-04 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): Restore filename in case of error.
2001-06-25 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* kbnode.c (dump_kbnode): Print the signature timestamp.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): New menu point "primary".
(change_primary_uid_cb): New.
(menu_set_primary_uid): New.
* sign.c (update_keysig_packet): New.
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Put the primary UID flag into
the hashed area. Allow update of some more packets.
2001-06-15 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs): Exit gracefully when a secret key is
encountered. May happen if a secret key is in public keyring.
Reported by Francesco Potorti.
2001-06-12 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* getkey.c (compare_name): Use ascii_memistr(), ascii_memcasecmp()
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Use ascii_strcasecmp().
* armor.c (radix64_read): Use ascii_toupper().
* ringedit.c (do_bm_search): Ditto.
* keygen.c (read_parameter_file): Ditto.
* openfile.c (CMP_FILENAME): Ditto.
* g10.c (i18n_init): We can now use just LC_ALL.
2001-05-29 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keygen.c (generate_subkeypair): Print a warning if a subkey is
created on a v3 key. Suggested by Brian M. Carlson.
2001-05-27 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keyid.c (get_lsign_letter): New.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Use it here.
* mainproc.c (list_node): and here.
* getkey.c, packet.h, free-packet.c: Removed that useless key
created field; I dunno why I introducded this at all - the
creation time is always bound to the key packet and subject to
fingerprint calculation etc.
* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Add keycreated arg and use this
instead of the signature timestamp to calculate the
help_key_expire. Bug reported by David R. Bergstein.
(merge_selfsigs_main): Correct key expiration time calculation.
(merge_selfsigs_subkey): Ditto.
2001-05-25 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* revoke.c (gen_revoke): Add a cast to a tty_printf arg.
* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Ditto.
* keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig): Ditto.
(ask_revoke_sig): Ditto.
(menu_revsig): Ditto.
(check_all_keysigs): Removed unused arg.
2001-05-23 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (opts): Typo fix by Robert C. Ames.
2001-05-06 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* revoke.c: Small typo fix
2001-05-04 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* passphrase.c (passphrase_clear_cache): Shortcut if agent usage
is not enabled.
2001-05-01 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* passphrase.c (writen): Replaced ssize_t by int. Thanks to
to Robert Joop for reporting that SunOS 4.1.4 does not have it.
2001-04-28 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* getkey.c (merge_public_with_secret): pkttype was not set to subkey.
2001-04-27 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* skclist.c (build_sk_list): Changed one log_debug to log_info.
2001-04-25 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keyedit.c (show_prefs): Add a verbose mode.
(show_key_with_all_names): Pass verbose flag for special value of
with_pref.
(keyedit_menu): New command "showpref"
(show_key_with_all_names): Mark revoked uids and the primary key.
2001-04-24 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* getkey.c (get_primary_uid): Return a different string in case of
error and made it translatable.
* build-packet.c (do_secret_key): Ugly, we wrote a zero
instead of the computed ndays. Thanks to M Taylor for complaining
about a secret key import problem.
2001-04-23 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import): Allow to specify a port number for the
keyserver. Add a kudge to set the no_shutdown flag.
(hkp_export): Ditto.
* options.skel: Document the changes
2001-04-20 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* options.skel: Add some more comments.
2001-04-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keyid.c (mk_datestr): New. Handles negative times. We must do
this because Windoze segvs on negative times passed to gmtime().
Changed all datestr_from function to use this one.
* keyid.c, keyid.h (colon_strtime): New. To implement the
fixed-list-mode.
(colon_datestr_from_pk): New.
(colon_datestr_from_sk): New.
(colon_datestr_from_sig): New.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Use these functions here.
* mainproc.c (list_node): Ditto.
2001-04-18 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* openfile.c (open_sigfile): Fixed the handling of ".sign".
* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Use iobuf_get_real_fname.
Both are by Vincent Broman.
2001-04-14 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Removed check for !sig which is
pointless here. Thanks to Jan Niehusmann.
2001-04-10 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Use log_info instead of
log_error so that messed up keys do not let gpg return an error.
Suggested by Christian Kurz.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Do a fixup_uidnode only if we
have both, uid and sig. Thanks to M Taylor.
2001-04-05 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* armor.c (unarmor_pump_new,unarmor_pump_release): New.
(unarmor_pump): New.
* pipemode.c (pipemode_filter): Use the unarmor_pump to handle
armored or non-armored detached signatures. We can't use the
regular armor_filter becuase this does only chack for armored
signatures the very first time. In pipemode we may have a mix of
armored and binary detached signatures.
* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Do not print the "old style" notice when
this is a pipemode processes detached signature.
(proc_plaintext): Special handling of pipemode detached sigs.
* packet.h (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK): New.
* parse-packet.c (create_gpg_control): New.
* kbnode.c (dump_kbnode): Support it here.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Fixed the check for bad
sequences of multiple signatures.
(proc_plaintext): Add the marker packet.
(proc_tree): We can now check multiple detached signatures.
2001-04-02 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
The length of encrypted packets for blocksizes != 8 was not
correct encoded. I think this is a minor problem, because we
usually use partial length packets. Kudos to Kahil D. Jallad for
pointing this out.
* packet.h: Add extralen to PKT_encrypted.
* cipher.c (write_header): Set extralen.
* build-packet.c (do_encrypted): Use extralen instead of const 10.
(do_encrypted_mdc): Ditto.
* parse-packet.c (parse_encrypted): Set extralen to 0 because we
don't know it here.
2001-03-30 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* getkey.c (premerge_public_with_secret): Changed wording an add
the keyID to the info message.
2001-03-29 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* getkey.c (premerge_public_with_secret): Use log_info instead of
log_error when no secret key was found for a public one.
Fix the usage if the secret parts of a key are not available.
* openfile.c (ask_outfile_name): Trim spaces.
(open_outfile): Allow to enter an alternate filename. Thanks to
Stefan Bellon.
* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Ditto.
2001-03-28 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Allow direct key and subkey
revocation signature.
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Check direct key signatures.
Print the signature class along with an error.
2001-03-27 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* packet.h: Add a missing typedef to an enum. Thanks to Stefan Bellon.
* g10.c: New option --no-sig-create-check.
* sign.c (do_sign): Implement it here.
* g10.c: New option --no-sig-cache.
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Implement it here.
(cache_selfsig_result): and here.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Removed debugging stuff.
* getkey.c (cache_public_key): Made global.
* keygen.c (write_selfsig, write_keybinding): Cache the new key.
* getkey.c (key_byname): Add new arg secmode and changed all
callers to request explicitly the mode. Deriving this information
from the other supplied parameters does not work if neither pk nor
sk are supplied.
2001-03-25 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* packet.h (ctrlpkttype_t): New.
* mainproc.c (add_gpg_control,proc_plaintext,proc_tree): Use the
new enum values.
* pipemode.c (make_control): Ditto.
* armor.c (armor_filter): Ditto.
2001-03-24 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* sign.c (do_sign): Verify the signature right after creation.
2001-03-23 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* status.c, status.h (STATUS_UNEXPECTED): New.
* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): And emit it here.
2001-03-21 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* status.c: Add sys/types.h so that it runs on Ultrix. Reported
by Georg Schwarz.x
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Fixed generaton of packet
length header in case where 2 bytes headers are needed. Thanks to
Piotr Krukowiecki.
2001-03-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (main): the default keyring is no always used unless
--no-default-keyring is given.
* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): invalidate cache after file
creation.
2001-03-15 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keygen.c (ask_algo): Changed the warning of the ElGamal S+E Algo.
* keylist.c (print_capabilities): New.
(list_keyblock_colon): and use it here.
2001-03-13 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* main.c, options.h: New option --fixed_list_mode.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): use it here.
* getkey.c (merge_keys_and_selfsig): Divert merging of public keys
to the function used in key selection..
* keylist.c (is_uid_valid): Removed.
(list_keyblock): Splitted into ..
(list_keyblock_print, list_keyblock_colon): .. these.
functions. Changed them to use the flags set in the key lookup code.
(reorder_keyblock): New, so that primary user IDs are listed first.
* ringedit.c (keyring_copy): flush the new iobuf chaces before
rename or remove operations. This is mainly needed for W32.
* hkp.c [HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM]: Removed the disabled code because we
have now W32 socket support in ../util/http.c
* skclist.c (key_present_in_sk_list): New.
(is_duplicated_entry): New.
(build_sk_list): Check for duplicates and do that before unlocking.
2001-03-12 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* armor.c (parse_header_line): Removed double empty line check.
(parse_header_line): Replaced trim_trailing_ws with a counting
function so that we can adjust for the next read.
* options.skel: Fixed 3 typos. By Thomas Klausner. Replaced the
keyserver example by a better working server.
* parse-packet.c (parse_symkeyenc): Return Invalid_Packet on error.
(parse_pubkeyenc): Ditto.
(parse_onepass_sig): Ditto.
(parse_plaintext): Ditto.
(parse_encrypted): Ditto.
(parse_signature): Return error at other places too.
(parse_key): Ditto.
* g10.c (main): Set opt.list_packets to another value when invoked
with the --list-packets command.
* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): Don's stop processing when running
under --list-packets command.
* signal.c (do_sigaction): Removed.
(init_one_signal): New to replace the above. Needed to support
systems without sigactions. Suggested by Dave Dykstra.
(got_fatal_signal,init_signals): Use the above here.
(do_block): Use sigset() if sigprocmask() is not available.
* armor.c (parse_hash_header): Test on TIGER192, which is the
correct value as per rfc2440. By Edwin Woudt.
2001-03-08 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* misc.c: Include time.h. By James Troup.
* getkey.c: Re-enabled the unknown user Id and PK caches and
increased their sizes.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Set expire date and continue
processing even if we found a revoked key.
(merge_selfsigs_subkeys): Ditto.
* packet.h: Add an is_revoked flag to the user_id packet.
* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Set that flag here.
(merge_selfsigs_main): Fix so that the latest signature is used to
find the self-signature for an UID.
* parse-packet.c (parse_user_id): Zero out all fields.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print the primary user ID
according the the node flag and then all other non-revoked user IDs.
(is_uid_revoked): Removed; it is now handled by the key selection code.
Changed the year list of all copyright notices.
2001-03-07 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Print an info message only in verbose mode.
2001-03-05 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* packet.h: Replaced sigsubpkt_t value 101 by PRIV_VERIFY_CACHE.
We have never used the old value, so we can do this without any harm.
* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Ditto.
(parse_one_sig_subpkt): Parse that new sub packet.
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Removed the old one from the
hashed area.
(delete_sig_subpkt): New.
(build_sig_subpkt): Allow an update of that new subpkt.
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Add verification caching
(cache_selfsig_result): New.
* export.c (do_export_stream): Delete that sig subpkt before exporting.
* import.c (remove_bad_stuff): New.
(import): Apply that function to all imported data
2001-03-03 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* getkey.c: Introduced a new lookup context flag "exact" and used
it in all place where we once used primary.
(classify_user_id2): Replaced the old function and add an extra
argument to return whether an exact keyID has been requested.
(key_byname): Removed the unused ctx.primary flag
(get_seckey_byname2): Ditto.
(finish_lookup): Changed debugging output.
2001-03-02 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keylist.c (list_one): Remove the merge key calls.
2001-03-01 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Don't use it if we no specific usage
has been requested.
(merge_selfsigs_main): fix UID only if we have an signature.
(lookup): Return UNU_PUBKEY etc. instead of NO_PUBKEY if we found
a key but the requested usage does not allow this key.
* import.c (import_one): Take UNU_PUBKEY into account.
* mainproc.c (list_node): Ditto.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Ditto.
* keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig): Ditto.
2001-02-09 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* delkey.c (delete_key): Removed that silly assert which rendered
the whole new stuff meaningless.
2001-02-08 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* getkey.c (key_byname): It can happen that we have both, sk and pk
NULL, fix for that.
* parse-packet.c (parse_one_sig_subpkt): Add support for
primary_uid and key_flags.
(can_handle_critical): Ditto
* parse-packet.c (parse_encrypted): Fixed listing of pktlen for
MDC packets.
* getkey.c: Backported the version of this file from gpg 1.1. this
involved some changes in other files too.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear req_usage.
* skclist.c (build_sk_list): Use req_usage to pass the usage
information to the lookup function.
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Ditto.
* free-packet.c (copy_public_parts_to_secret_key): New.
* keydb.h: Add IS_* macros to check the sig_class.
* misc.c (openpgp_cipher_test_algo): New.
(openpgp_pk_test_algo): New.
(openpgp_pk_algo_usage): New.
(openpgp_md_test_algo): New.
* packet.h: Add a few fields to PKT_{public,secret}_key and
PKT_user_id.
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Use the new main_keyid field.
2001-02-04 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Catch error when we had problems to
parse the encrypted packet. By Timo.
2001-01-29 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (main): --batch does now set nogreeting.
* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Fixed delete-both functionality.
2001-01-22 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c: New command --delete-secret-and-public-key.
* delkey.c (delete_key): Add new arg allow_both.
(do_delete_key): Move most stuff from above to this new function.
2001-01-12 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Use MD5 when IDEA is installed
and we have no S2K.
* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Likewise
2001-01-11 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* sig-check.c (do_check): Print the signature key expire message
only in verbose mode and added the keyID.
2001-01-09 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* status.c, status.h: New status USERID_HINT.
(write_status_text): Replace LF and CR int text by C-escape sequence.
* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Fixed the NEED_PASSPHRASE
output. It does now always print 2 keyIDs. Emit the new
USERID_HINT.
2001-01-08 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c, options.h: New option --no-expensive-trust-checks.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Act on this option.
2001-01-04 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (main): Set homedir only in the pre-parsing phase and
replace backslashes in the W32 version.
2001-01-03 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* status.c, status.h : New status KEY_CREATED
* keygen.c (do_generate_keypair,generate_subkeypair): Emit it.
2000-12-28 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* signal.c (got_fatal_signal): Remove lockfiles here because the
atexit stuff does not work due to the use of raise. Suggested by
Peter Fales.
* gpgv.c (remove_lockfiles): New stub.
2000-12-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* status.c, status.h (cpr_get_no_help): New.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Use it here because we have our own
help list here.
2000-12-18 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* mainproc.c (print_failed_pkenc): Don't print the sometimes
confusing message about unavailabe secret key. Renamed ...
(print_pkenc_list): ... to this and introduced failed arg.
(proc_encrypted): Print the failed encryption keys and then
the one to be used.
(proc_pubkey_enc): Store also the key we are going to use.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Don't list revoked user IDs.
(is_uid_revoked): New.
2000-12-08 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* pipemode.c: Made the command work. Currently only for
non-armored detached signatures.
* mainproc.c (release_list): Reset the new pipemode vars.
(add_gpg_control): Handle the control packets for pipemode
* status.c, status.h: New stati {BEGIN,END}_STREAM.
2000-12-07 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c: New option --allow-secret-key-import.
* import.c (import_keys,import_keys_stream): Honor this option.
(import): New arg allow_secret and pass that arg down to ...
(import_secret_one): to this and print a warning if secret key
importing is not allowed.
2000-12-05 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* cipher.c (cipher_filter): Moved the end_encryption status ...
* encode.c (encode_simple,encode_crypt): to here
* sign.c (sign_file): and here.
* status.c (mywrite): Removed.
(get_status_string): Removed the LFs from the strings.
(set_status_fd,is_status_enabed,write_status_text,
write_status_buffer): Replaced all mywrite by stdio calls and use
fdopen to create a strem. This is needed to make things smoother
in the W32 version.
2000-12-04 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* import.c (merge_blocks): Increment n_sigs for revocations.
2000-11-30 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (main): Use iobuf_translate_file_handle for all options
with filehandles as arguments. This is function does some magic
for the W32 API.
* verify.c (verify_signatures): Add a comment rant about the
detached signature problem.
* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Issue an error if a detached signature
is assumed but a standard one was found.
* plaintext.c (hash_datafiles): Don't fall back to read signature
from stdin.
* openfile.c (open_sigfile): Print verbose message only if the
file could be accessed.
2000-11-24 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* passphrase.c [HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM]: Disabled all the agent stuff.
2000-11-16 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c: New option --use-agent
* passphrase.c (agent_open,agent_close): New.
(agent_get_passphrase,agent_clear_passphrase): New.
(passphrase_clear_cache): New.
(passphrase_to_dek): Use the agent here.
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Clear cached passphrases.
2000-11-15 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* status.c (write_status_text): Moved the big switch to ...
(get_status_string): ... new function.
(write_status_buffer): New.
* status.c (mywrite): New and replaced all write() by this.
* status.c, status.h: Add 3 status lcodes for notaions and policy.
* mainproc.c (print_notation_data): Do status output of notations.
2000-11-13 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* sign.c (clearsign_file): Use LF macro to print linefeed.
2000-11-11 Paul Eggert <eggert@twinsun.com>
Clean up the places in the code that incorrectly use "long" or
"unsigned long" for file offsets. The correct type to use is
"off_t". The difference is important on large-file hosts,
where "off_t" is longer than "long".
* keydb.h (struct keyblock_pos_struct.offset):
Use off_t, not ulong, for file offsets.
* packet.h (dbg_search_packet, dbg_copy_some_packets,
search_packet, copy_some_packets): Likewise.
* parse-packet.c (parse, dbg_search_packet, search_packet,
dbg_copy_some_packets, copy_some_packets): Likewise.
* ringedit.c (keyring_search): Likewise.
* parse-packet.c (parse): Do not use %lu to report file
offsets in error diagnostics; it's not portable.
* ringedit.c (keyring_search): Likewise.
2000-11-09 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (main): New option --enable-special-filenames.
2000-11-07 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c (main): New command --pipemode.
* pipemode.c: New.
2000-10-23 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* armor.c (armor_filter): Changed output of hdrlines, so that a CR
is emitted for DOS systems.
* keygen.c (read_parameter_file): Add a cast for isspace().
* status.c (myread): Use SIGINT instead of SIGHUP for DOS.
2000-10-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10.c: New option --ignore-crc-error
* armor.c (invalid_crc): New.
(radix64_read): Act on new option.
* openfile.c (try_make_homedir): Klaus Singvogel fixed a stupid
error introduced on Sep 6th.
2000-10-18 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* misc.c (print_cipher_algo_note): Don't print the note for AES.
Changed wording.
2000-10-16 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): Hack to fix the problem that
signatures are not detected when there is a MDC packet but no
compression packet.
* g10.c (print_hashline): New.
(print_mds): Use above func with --with-colons.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Detect multiple signatures
and don't verify them.
2000-10-14 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* mainproc.c (add_onepass_sig): There is an easier solution to the
error fixed yesterday; just check that we only have onepass
packets. However, the other solution provides an cleaner
interface and opens the path to get access to other information
from the armore headers.
(release_list): Reset some more variables.
2000-10-13 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* mainproc.c (add_gpg_control): New.
(do_proc_packets): use it.
(proc_plaintext): Changed logic to detect clearsigns.
(proc_tree): Check the cleartext sig with some new code.
* packet.h: New packet PKT_GPG_CONTROL.
* parse-packet.c (parse_gpg_control): New.
* misc.c (get_session_marker): New.
* armor.c (armor_filter): Replaced the faked 1-pass packet by the
new control packet.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Allow batchmode with a command_fd.
* status.c (my_read): New.
(do_get_from_fd): use it.
2000-10-12 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keygen.c (keygen_add_std_prefs): Add Rijndael to the prefs.
2000-10-07 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpgv.c: Add more stubs for ununsed code to make the binary smaller.
Wed Oct 4 15:50:18 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* sign.c (hash_for): New arg to take packet version in account, changed
call callers.
* gpgv.c: New.
* Makefile.am: Rearranged source files so that gpgv can be build with
at least files as possible.
Mon Sep 18 12:13:52 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* hkp.c (not_implemented): Print a notice for W32
Fri Sep 15 18:40:36 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* keygen.c (keygen_add_std_prefs): Changed order of preferences to
twofish, cast5, blowfish.
* pkclist.c (algo_available): Removed hack to disable Twofish.
Thu Sep 14 17:45:11 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Dump key flags. Print special
warning in case of faked ARRs.
* getkey.c (finsih_lookup): Hack so that for v4 RSA keys the subkey
is used for encryption.
Thu Sep 14 14:20:38 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* g10.c (main): Default S2K algorithms are now SHA1 and CAST5 - this
should solve a lot of compatibility problems with other OpenPGP
apps because those algorithms are SHOULD and not optional. The old
way to force it was by using the --openpgp option whith the drawback
that this would disable a couple of workarounds for PGP.
* g10.c (main): Don't set --quite along with --no-tty. By Frank Tobin.
* misc.c (disable_core_dump): Don't display a warning here but a return
a status value and ...
* g10.c (main): ...print warnining here. Suggested by Sam Roberts.
Wed Sep 13 18:12:34 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Allow to use "debug" on the secret key.
* ringedit.c (cmp_seckey): Fix for v4 RSA keys.
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Workaround for PGP 7 bug.
Wed Sep 6 17:55:47 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* misc.c (print_pubkey_algo_note): Do not print the RSA notice.
* sig-check.c (do_signature_check): Do not emit the RSA status message.
* pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Ditto.
* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): Fix for large files.
* sign.c (sign_file): Ditto.
Wed Sep 6 14:59:09 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* passphrase.c (hash_passphrase): Removed funny assert. Reported by
David Mathog.
* openfile.c (try_make_homedir): Changes for non-Posix systems.
* g10.c (main): Take the default homedir from macro.
* g10.c: The --trusted-key option is back.
* trustdb.c (verify_own_key): Handle this option.
(add_ultimate_key): Moved stuff from verify_own_key to this new func.
(register_trusted_key): New.
Fri Aug 25 16:05:38 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Print info about the ARR.
* openfile.c (overwrite_filep): Always return okay if the file is
called /dev/null.
(make_outfile_name): Add ".sign" to the list of know extensions.
(open_sigfile): Ditto.
Wed Aug 23 19:52:51 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* g10.c: New option --allow-freeform-uid. By Jeroen C. van Gelderen.
* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Implemented here.
Fri Aug 4 14:23:05 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* status.c (do_get_from_fd): Ooops, we used fd instead of opt.command_fd.
Thanks to Michael Tokarev.
Tue Aug 1 20:06:23 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* g10.c: New opttion --try-all-secrets on suggestion from Matthias Urlichs.
* pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Quite easy to implement here.
Thu Jul 27 17:33:04 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* g10.c: New option --merge-only. Suggested by Brendan O'Dea.
* import.c (import_one): Implemented it here
(import_secret_one): Ditto.
(print_stats): and give some stats.
Thu Jul 27 12:01:00 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* g10.c: New options --show-session-key and --override-session-key
* pubkey-enc.c (hextobyte): New.
(get_override_session_key): New.
* mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Add session-key stuff.
* status.h, status.c (STATUS_SESSION_KEY): New.
Thu Jul 27 10:02:38 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* g10.c (main): Use setmode(O_BINARY) for MSDOS while generating random bytes
(print_mds): Likewise for stdin.
* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Likewise for stdout.
Mon Jul 24 10:30:17 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* keyedit.c (menu_expire): expire date for primary key can be set again.
Wed Jul 19 11:26:43 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* keylist.c (is_uid_valid): New.
(list_keyblock): Print validity information for all user IDs. Note, this
has to be done at other places too; for now we have only minimal support.
Wed Jul 12 13:32:06 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* helptext.c, pkclist.c: s/superseeded/superseded/
Mon Jul 10 16:08:57 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* parse-packet.c (enum_sig_subpkt): Fixed testing on crtitical bit in case
of a NULL buffer. Reported by Peter Marschall.
Wed Jul 5 13:28:45 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* keyedit.c, keyid.c: Add some _()
* argparse.c: Changed the flag to suppress --version handling to also
suppress --help.
Wed Jun 28 11:54:44 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* armor.c (armor_filter): Set sigclass to 0 in case of non-dash-escaped
clearsig. This makes this mode work again.
* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Fixed handling of one-pass-sig packets in textmode.
Disabled the ugly workaround for PGP 5 - let's see whether thi breaks less
cases. Found by Ted Cabeen.
* options.h (DBG_HASHING): New. All commented md_start_debug are now
controlled by this debug option.
* sign.c (print_status_sig_created): New and called from 2 places.
* keygen.c (gen_rsa): New, but commented.
(ask_algo): Commented support for RSA.
* seckey-cert.c (protect_secret_key): Started to fix the code for v4 RSA
keys - it is not solved yet. However, we have time until, Sep 20th ;)
Wed Jun 14 12:27:09 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* status.c (init_shm_coprocessing): Changed the sequence of the get,attach
to cope with the changes in newer Linux kernels. This bug has been found
by <dmitri@advantrix.com> who also proposed this solution. Hopefully
this does not break gpg on to many systems.
* cipher.c (write_header): Protect the IV with the MDC too.
* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Likewise.
Fri Jun 9 10:09:52 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* g10.c: New options --no-auto-key-retrieve
* options.h (auto_key_retrieve): New.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Implemented that.
Wed Jun 7 19:19:09 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* sig-check.c (do_check): Use EMULATE_MDENCODE also on v4 packets.
Wed Jun 7 17:25:38 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* cipher.c (write_header): Use plain CFB mode for MDC encrypted packets.
* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Ditto.
Mon Jun 5 23:41:54 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* seskey.c (do_encode_md, encode_md_value): Add new arg v3compathack to work
around a bug in old versions.
* sig-check.c (do_check): use the aboved workaround when enabled.
* g10.c: New option --emulate-md-decode-bug
Mon Jun 5 12:37:43 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* build-packet.c (do_mdc): New.
(do_encrypted_mdc): Changed for the new proposal.
* parse-packet.c (parse_mdc): New.
(parse_encrypted): Fixed for the new proposal.
* packet.h (PKT_MDC): New.
* cipher.c (cipher_filter): Build the MDC packet here.
* g10.c (main): Enable --force-mdc.
* encr-data.c (mdc_decode_filter): Fixed for new MDC method
* options.h(rfc2440): New.
* g10.c (main): Changed the selected values for --openpgp to not include
optional algorithms.
Thu May 18 11:38:54 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Add a keyword arg to the prompt.
* status.c, status.h: Added 3 new status tokens.
* status.c (do_get_from_fd): New.
(cpr_enabled,cpr_get,cpr_get_hidden,cpr_kill_prompt,
cpr_get_answer_is_yes,cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit): Modified to work
with the new function.
* g10.c: Add new option --command-fd.
* status.c (progress_cb): New.
(set_status_fd): Register progress functions
Fri May 12 14:01:20 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* delkey.c (delete_key): Add 2 new status messages
* status.c, status.h (STATUS_DELETE_PROBLEM): New.
Fixed years of copyright in all source files.
Mon May 1 17:08:14 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* trustdb.c (propagate_validity): Fixed the bug that only one uid
gets fully trusted even when all are signed by an ultimate key.
Mon May 1 15:38:04 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* getkey.c (key_byname): Always returned a defined context. Fixed
a segv for invalid user id specifications. Reported by Walter Koch.
* getkey.c (get_user_id): I18ned "no user id" string. By Walter.
* pkclist.c (do_show_revocation_reason): Typo fixes.
* helptext.c: Ditto.
* armor.c (armor_filter): Fixed some CRLF issues. By Mike McEwan.
Fri Apr 14 19:37:08 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* pkclist.c (do_show_revocation_reason): New.
(show_revocation_reason): New and called at various places.
* g10.c (main): Fixed small typo.
* pkclist.c (do_we_trust): Act on always_trust but not for revoked
keys. Suggested by Chip Salzenberg.
* g10.c: New option --lock-never.
* ringedit.c (get_writable_keyblock_file): New.
* keygen.c (do_generate_keypair): Use this instead of the hardwired one.
* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Check that the email address is in the
correct field. Suggested by Christian Kurz.
Mon Apr 10 13:34:19 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): s/sbb/ssb/
Tue Mar 28 14:26:58 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* trustdb.c (verify_own_keys): Do not print warning about unprotected
key when in quiet mode.
Wed Mar 22 13:50:24 CET 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* mainproc.c (print_userid): Do UTF8 conversion before printing.
* import.c (import_one): Ditto.
(import_secret_one): Ditto.
(delete_inv_parts): Ditto.
Thu Mar 16 16:20:23 CET 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* keylist.c (print_key_data): Handle a NULL pk gracefully.
* getkey.c (merge_one_pk_and_selfsig): Fixed silly code for
getting the primary keys keyID but kept using the one from the
subkey.
* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Print a note for expired subkeys.
* getkey.c (has_expired): New.
(subkeys_expiretime): New.
(finish_lookup): Check for expired subkeys needed for encryption.
(merge_keys_and_selfsig): Fixed expiration date merging for subkeys.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Print expiration time for "sub".
(list_one): Add missing merging for public keys.
* mainproc.c (list_node): Ditto.
2000-03-14 13:49:38 Werner Koch (wk@habibti.openit.de)
* keygen.c (keyedit_menu): Do not allow to use certain commands
while the secret key is selected.
2000-03-09 12:53:09 Werner Koch (wk@habibti.openit.de)
* keygen.c (ask_expire_interval): Movede parsig to ...
(parse_expire_string): ... this new function. And some new control
commands.
(proc_parameter_file): Add expire date parsing.
(do_generate_keypair): Allow the use of specified output files.
2000-03-08 10:38:38 Werner Koch (wk@habibti.openit.de)
* keygen.c (ask_algo): Removed is_v4 return value and the commented
code to create Elg keys in a v3 packet. Removed the rounding
of key sizes here.
(do_create): Likewise removed arg v4_packet.
(gen_elg): Likewise removed arg version. Now rounding keysizes here.
(gen_dsa): Rounding keysize now here.
(release_parameter_list): New
(get_parameter*): New.
(proc_parameter_file): New.
(read_parameter_file): New.
(generate_keypair): Splitted. Now uses read_parameter_file when in
batch mode. Additional argument to specify a parameter file.
(do_generate_keypair): Main bulk of above fucntion and uses the
parameter list.
(do_create): Don't print long notice in batch mode.
* g10.c (main): Allow batched key generation.
Thu Mar 2 15:37:46 CET 2000 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Print a note about unknown cipher algos.
* g10.c (opts): Add a note to the help listing about the man page
and removed some options from the help listing.
* keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig): Use a new function to truncate
the output of the user ID. Suggested by Jan-Benedict Glaw.
Wed Feb 23 10:07:57 CET 2000 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* helptext.c: typo fix.
Thu Feb 17 13:39:32 CET 2000 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* revoke.c: Removed a bunch of commented code.
* packet.h (SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON): New.
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Support new sub packet.
* parse-packet.c (parse_one_sig_subpkt): Ditto.
(dump_sig_subpkt): Ditto.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): New.
(release_revocation_reason_info): New.
(revocation_reason_build_cb): New.
(gen_revoke): Ask for reason.
* main.h (struct revocation_reason_info): Add declaration.
* keyedit.c (menu_revsig): Add support for revocation reason.
(menu_revkey): Ditto.
(sign_uid_mk_attrib): Renamed to ...
(sign_mk_attrib): ... this, made static and add support for reasons.
Tue Feb 15 08:48:13 CET 2000 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* build-packet.c (build_packet): Fixed fixing of old comment packets.
* import.c (import_keys): Fixed importing from stdin when called with
nnames set to zero as it normally happens.
Mon Feb 14 14:30:20 CET 2000 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Add new arg r_expired.
(do_signature_check): New arg to pass it down to ...
(do_check): New arg r-expire which is set when the signature
has expired.
* trustdb.c (check_sig_record): Set SIGF_EXPIRED flag and set
the expiretime to zero so that thi signature will not be checked
anymore.
Fri Feb 11 17:44:40 CET 2000 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* g10.c (g10_exit): Update the random seed_file.
(main): Set the random seed file. New option --no-random-seed-file.
Thu Feb 10 17:39:44 CET 2000 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* keyedit.c (menu_expire): Fixed segv due to unitialized sub_pk.
By Rémi.
Thu Feb 10 11:39:41 CET 2000 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Don't print warnings in the middle of
regulat output lines. By Rémi.
* sig-check.c: Include options.h
Wed Feb 9 15:33:44 CET 2000 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* gpg.c: New option --ignore-time-conflict
* sig-check.c (do_check): Implemented this option.
* trustdb.c (check_trust): Ditto.
* sign.c (do_sign): Ditto.
* keygen.c (generate_subkeypair): Ditto.
* encode.c (encode_simple): use iobuf_cancel after open failure.
Reported by Huy Le.
Fri Jan 14 18:32:01 CET 2000 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* packet.h (STRING2KEY): Changed mode from byte to int.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Add the special GNU protection stuff
* build-packet.c (so_secret_key): Ditto.
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Ditto.
* keyedit.c (change_passphrase): Ditto.
* export.c (export_secsubkeys): New.
(do_export_stream): Hack to export the primary key using mode 1001.
* g10.c: New command --export-secret-subkeys
Thu Jan 13 19:31:58 CET 2000 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* armor.c (is_armored): Check for 1-pass-sig packets. Reported by
David Hallinan <hallinan@rtd.com>.
(armor_filter): Replaced one LF by the LF macro. Reported by
Wolfgang Redtenbacher.
Wed Jan 5 11:51:17 CET 2000 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* g10.c (main): Reset new global flag opt.pgp2_workarounds
when --openpgp is used.
* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Do the PGP2,5 workarounds only
when the global flag is set.
(proc_tree): Ditto.
* textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Ditto.
* armor.c (armor_filter): Ditto.
* g10.c: New option --list-only
* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Don't do it if opt.list_only is active.
(proc_pubkey_enc): Implement option.
* status.h, status.c ({BEGIN,END}_{EN,DE}CRYPTION): New.
* cipher.c (cipher_filter): New status outputs.
* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): New status outputs.
Fri Dec 31 14:08:15 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* armor.c (armor_filter): Made the "Comment:" header translatable.
* hkp.c (hkp_import): Make sure that the program does not return
success when there is a connection problem. Reported by Phillip Jones.
Sun Dec 19 15:22:26 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* armor.c (LF): Use this new macro at all places where a line LF
is needed. This way DOSish textfiles should be created when the
input data is also in dos mode.
* sign.c (LF): Ditto.
* textfilter.c (LF): Ditto.
(copy_clearsig_text): Disabled the forcing of CR,LF sequences
for DOS systems.
* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Fixes for line endings on DOS.
and react on a LF in cleartext.
* armor.c (fake_packet): Restore the original line ending after
removing trailing spaces.
* signal.c (got_fatal_signal): DOS fix.
Thu Dec 16 10:07:58 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* mainproc.c (print_failed_pkenc): Fix for unknown algorithm.
Found by fygrave@epr0.org.
Thu Dec 9 10:31:05 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* hkp.c: i18n the strings.
Sat Dec 4 15:32:20 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* trustdb.c (verify_key): Shortcut for ultimately trusted keys.
Sat Dec 4 12:30:28 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Validate the trust using the namehash
if this one has been set by the key lookup.
* g10.c: Add --delete-secret-key to the help page.
* openfile.c (copy_options_file): Made static.
(try_make_homedir): New.
* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): Use the try_make_hoemdir logic.
* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Likewise.
* keygen.c (generate_user_id): Use m_alloc_clear() here. We should
better use an allocation function specific to the user_id packet.
* keygen.c (keygen_add_std_prefs): Changed symmetric preferences
to include Blowfish again. This is due to it's better speed compared
to CAST5.
* g10.c (strusage): Print the home directory.
* armor.c (armor_filter): Take action on the cancel control msg.
* filter.h (armor_filter_context_t): Add cancel flag.
Mon Nov 29 21:52:11 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* g10.c: New option --fast-list-mode ..
* keylist.c (list_keyblock): .. and implemented.
* mainproc.c (list_node): Ditto.
* import.c (mark_non_selfsigned_uids_valid): Fixed the case that there
is a uid without any packet following.
Mon Nov 22 11:14:53 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Never enable the hash processing
when skip_verify is active.
* armor.c (parse_header_line): Stop parsing on a WS line too.
Suggested by Aric Cyr.
* tdbdump.c (HEXTOBIN): Changed the name of the argument, so that
traditional cpp don't mess up the macros. Suggested by Jos Backus.
* mainproc.c (list_node): Print the PK algo in the --with-colon mode.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Ditto.
* signal.c (got_fatal_signal): Found the reason why exit(8) did not
work - it is better to set the disposition back to default before
raising the signal. Print the notice on stderr always.
Fri Nov 12 20:33:19 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* g10.c (make_username): Swapped the logic.
* keylist.c (public_key_list): Now takes a STRLIST as arg and moved
the creation ot this list to the caller, so that he can copy with
UTF-conversion of user IDs. Changed all callers.
(secret_key_list): Likewise.
* getkey.c (get_user_id_string_native): New and ...
* encode.c (write_pubkey_enc_from_list): ... use it here.
* pubring.asc: Updated.
* packet.h (PKT_PHOTO_ID): New.
* parse-packet.c (parse_photo_id): New.
* build-packet.c (do_user_id: Handle photo IDs.
(build_packet): Change CTB for photo IDs
* free-packet.c (free_user_id): Release memory used for photo IDs
* sig-check.c (hash_uid_node): Handle photo IDs too.
* trustdb.c (print_uid_from_keyblock): Hash photo ID.
(make_uid_records): Ditto.
* getkey.c (find_by_name): Ditto.
* keyedit.c (show_prefs): Ditto.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Ditto.
Thu Oct 28 16:08:20 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* keygen.c (ask_expire_interval): Print a warning for systems
with a signed 32 time_t if the exiration time is beyoind 2038.
Fri Oct 8 20:40:50 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* ringedit.c (enum_keyblocks): The last fix way really stupid;
reverted and set rt to Unknown.
Fri Oct 8 20:32:01 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* ringedit.c (enum_keyblocks): Zero the entire kbpos out on open.
* g10.c (oEntropyDLL): Removed option.
(main): Made the warning on development versions more verbose.
* g10.c (oHonorHttpProxy): New option.
* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import,hkp_export): Implement this option.
* options.skel: Enable this option for new installations
Mon Oct 4 21:23:04 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* import.c (import_keys): Changed calling interface, adjusted caller.
(import): Moved printing of stats out ...
(print_stats): New. ... to here.
(import_keys_stream): Call stats print here.
(import_keys): Print stats as totals for all files.
* tdbio.h (DIRF_NEWKEYS): New
* tdbio.c (tdbio_dump_record): Print the new flag.
* trustdb.c (check_trust_record): New arg sigs_only. Adapted all
callers.
(do_update_trust_record): Removed recheck arg and add a new sigs_only
do we can later improve on the performance. Changed all callers too.
(check_trustdb): Evalutate the new flag and add a status output.
Do a check when the dir record has not been checked.
(build_cert_tree): Evaluate the new flag.
(check_trust): Ditto. Do a trust_record check, when the dir record
is not marked as checked.
(mark_fresh_keys): New.
(clear_lid_table): New.
(sync_trustdb): New.
* import.c (import_keys): Call sync_trustdb() after processing.
(import_keys_stream): Ditto.
* tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Ditto.
* import.c (import_revoke_cert): Notify the trust DB.
(do_update_trust_record): Use |= to set the REVOKED bit and not &=;
shame on me for this bad copy+paste introduced bug.
(do_we_trust): Add trustmask to allow revoked key override to work.
Chnaged are to allow return of a mofified trustlevel. Adapted the
one caller.
* g10.c: New options --emulate-3des-s2k-bug
* passphrase.c (hash_passphrase): Implemented above.
* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Check for standalone signatures.
(do_check_sig): Print a notice for a standalone revocation
(check_sig_and_print): Do not print an error for unchecked standalone
revocations.
Tue Sep 28 20:54:37 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.de>
* encode.c (encode_simple): Use new CTB when we don't have the
length of the file. This is somewhat strange as the comment above
indicates that this part is actually fixed for PGP 5 - maybe I simply
lost the source line, tsss.
* armor.c (armor_filter): Set a flag if no OpenPGP data has been found.
* verify.c (verify_signatures): Add an error helptext.
Thu Sep 23 19:24:30 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* openfile.c (open_outfile): Fixed the 8dot3 handling.
* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Print uid using utf8 func.
* delkey.c (delete_key): Ditto.
* pkclist.c (show_paths,do_edit_ownertrust,do_we_trust): Ditto
(do_we_trust_pre): Ditto.
* trustdb.c (print_user_id,check_uidsigs): Ditto.
* revoke.c (gen_revoke,ask_revoke_sig): Ditto.
Thu Sep 23 09:52:58 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* verify.c (print_file_status): New.
(verify_one_file): Moved status print to th new fnc. Add error status.
* status.c, status.h (STATUS_FILE_ERROR): New
Wed Sep 22 10:14:17 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* openfile.c (make_outfile_name): Use case-insenstive compare for
DOS systems. Add ".pgp" to the list of know extensions.
(open_outfile): For DOS systems try to replace the suffiy instead of
appending it.
* status.c, status.h: Add STATUS_FILE_{START,DONE}.
* verify.c (verify_one_file): Emit these new stati.
* sign.c (clearsign_file): Avoid duplicated Entries in the "Hash:"
line. Those headers are now only _not_ printed when there are
only old-style keys _and_ all hashs are MD5.
Mon Sep 20 12:24:41 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* verify.c (verify_files, ferify_one_file): New.
* g10.c: New command --verify-files
Fri Sep 17 12:56:42 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* g10.c: Add UK spelling as alias for armor options ;-)
* import.c (append_uid): Fixed a SEGV when there is no selfsig and
no subkey.
(merge_sigs): Ditto. Removed the assertion.
Wed Sep 15 16:22:17 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* g10.c: New option --entropy-dll-name
Mon Sep 13 10:51:29 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* signal.c (got_fatal_signal): Print message using write(2) and
only for development versions.
Mon Sep 6 19:59:08 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Use mkdir macro
* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): Ditto.
Fri Sep 3 10:04:45 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Skip keys set with --encrypt-to also
when asking for a key.
* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Make sure that we don't read a
second EOF in the read loop for partial length packets.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): print user ID as utf-8.
Thu Sep 2 16:40:55 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* import.c (merge_blocks): First add new subkeys, then merge subkey
certificates.
(merge_sigs): Don't merge subkey signatures here.
Wed Sep 1 15:30:44 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* keygen.c (ask_expire_interval): Fixed bug related to cpr_xx (tnx
Francis J. Lacoste).
Tue Aug 31 17:20:44 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* plaintext.c (do_hash): Hash CR,LF for a single CR.
(ask_for_detached_datafile): Changed arguments to be closer to
those of hash_datafiles and cleanup the code a bit.
* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Workaround for pgp5 textmode detached
signatures. Changed behavior of asking for data file to be the same
as with provided data files.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Use UTF8 print functions.
Mon Aug 30 20:38:33 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* import.c (chk_self_sigs): some s/log_error/log_info/ so that gpg
does not return an error if a key has some invalid packets.
* helptext.c: Fixed some typos and changed the way the
translation works. The english text is now the keyword for gettext
and not anymore the keyword supplied to the function. Done after
some discussion with Walter who thinks this is much easier for the
translators.
* misc.c (disable_core_dumps): Don't do it for DOSish systems.
* signal.c (signal_name): Bounds check on signum.
Wed Aug 4 10:34:18 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* pubring.asc: Updated.
* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre,check_signatures_trust): Do not print
the warning about --always_trust when --quiet is used.
* pkclist.c (fpr_info): New and called at several places.
* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): List revocation key contents.
Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Fixed typo in format string.
* trustdb.c (create_shadow_dir): Don't translate the error string.
* g10.c (main): Fixed spelling of user-id.
* getkey.c (find_by_name_pk,find_by_name_sk,
find_by_keyid,find_by_keyid_sk): Ditto and translate it.
* import.c (mark_non_selfsigned_uids_valid,delete_inv_parts): Ditto.
Mon Jul 26 01:01:39 CEST 1999 Michael Roth <mroth@nessie.de>
* g10.c, options.h: New options --no-literal and --set-filesize
* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): Support for the options
--no-literal and --set-filesize.
* sign.c (sign_file): ditto.
Fri Jul 23 13:53:03 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* ringedit.c (enum_keyblocks): Removed annoying error message in cases
when we have no keyring at all to enum.
* getkey.c (classify_user_id): Rewrote to relax the recognition of
keyIDs and fingerprints (Michael).
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print status NO_PUBKEY.
(print_failed_pkenc): Print status NO_SECKEY.
* import.c (mark_non_selfsigned_uids_valid): New.
* g10.c: New option --allow-non-selfsigned-uid.
* pkclist.c (print_fpr): New.
(do_we_trust_pre): Print the fpr before asking whether to use the key
anyway.
(do_edit_ownertrust): Likewise.
Thu Jul 22 20:03:03 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* ringedit.c (enum_keyblocks): Removed annoying error message in cases
when we have no keyring at all to enum.
* getkey.c (classify_user_id): Rewrote to relax the recognition of
keyIDs and fingerprints (Michael).
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print status NO_PUBKEY.
(print_failed_pkenc): Print status NO_SECKEY.
* import.c (mark_non_selfsigned_uids_valid): New.
* g10.c: New option --allow-non-selfsigned-uid.
Thu Jul 15 10:15:35 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* g10.c: New options --disable-{cipher,pubkey}-algo.
Wed Jul 14 19:42:08 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* status.h (STATUS_IMPORTED): New.
* import.c (import): Print some status information (Holger Schurig).
* g10.c (main): Make --no-greeting work again. Add a warning when
--force-mds is used.
Tue Jul 13 17:39:25 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Changed the way help works.
(build_pk_list): Implemented default recipient stuff.
* g10.c: New options --default-recipient[-self]
(main): Suppress greeting in most cases, entering a passphrase or
a missing value is not considered to be interactive use.
Merged --print-md and --print-mds; the latter is now obsolete.
Changed the way --gen-random works and documented it.
Changed the way --gen-prime works and add a man entry.
* g10.c (MAINTAINER_OPTIONS): Removed.
Mon Jul 12 18:45:57 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Add arg sign_mode and changed callers
* g10.c (main): New command --lsign-key.
Mon Jul 12 14:55:34 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* mainproc.c (kidlist_item): New.
(release_list): Release failed pk-enc-list.
(print_failed_pkenc): New
(proc_encrypted): Print info about failed PK enc.
* openfile.c (make_outfile_name): s/error/info/
* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Return an empty passphrase when
in batch mode and don't make the warning message fatal
* seckey-cert.c (check_secret_key): Try only once when in batch mode.
* g10.c (make_username): New.
Thu Jul 8 16:21:27 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* packet.h (PKT_ring_trust): New
* parse-packet.c (parse_trust): Store trust value
* build-packet (build_packet): Ignore ring trust packets.
* mainproc.c (add_ring_trust): New.
(list_node): Print "rtv" records.
* g10.c: New option --with-fingerprint.
* trustdb.c (verify_own_keys): Don't insert if we are dry running
(check_trust): Ditto.
Wed Jul 7 13:08:40 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* Makefile.am: Support for libtool.
* keygen.c (ask_expire_interval): Hack to allow for an expire date.
* trustdb.c (do_update_trust_record,update_trust_record): Splitted.
(check_trust_record): New.
(check_trust,build_cert_tree): Check the dir record as needed.
(upd_pref_record): Removed.
(make_pref_record): New.
(propagate_validity): Stop as soon as we have enough validity.
* tbdio.c (MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES_HARD): Increased the limit.
Fri Jul 2 11:45:54 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* g10.c (g10_exit): Dump random stats.
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature,check_key_signature2): Enhanced
version and wrapper for old function.
(do_signature_check,signature_check): Ditto.
Thu Jul 1 12:47:31 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Print a notice for disabled keys.
(enable_disable_keys): Add functionality
* pkclist.c (edit_ownertrust): preserve disabled state.
(build_pk_list): Skip disabled keys.
* trustdb.c (upd_one_ownertrust): Ditto.
(build_cert_tree): Mask the ownertrust.
(trust_letter): Mask the value.
(do_check): Take disabled flag into account.
* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Add a pubkey_algo arg and changed
all callers.
* g10.c (utf8_strings): 2 new options.
* trustdb.c (insert_trust_record_by_pk): New, replaces the next one.
(insert_trust_record): Now takes a keyblock as arg. Changed all
callers to use the appropritae function.
* openfile.c (ask_outfile_name): New.
* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Ask for filename if there is
no valid syntax. Don't use fname varbatim but filter it.
Tue Jun 29 21:44:25 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* trustdb.h (TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED): New.
* status.c (USE_CAPABILITIES): Capabilities support (Remi).
* tdbio.c : Added new fields to the DIR record.
(tdbio_write_record): Fixed the update of the hash tables.
(tdbio_delete_record): Drop the record from the hash tables.
(drop_from_hashtbl): New.
* status.c (cpr_get): Special online help mode.
* helptext.c ("keyedit.cmd"): Removed.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Use only help system.
(enable_disable_key): New bit doies not yet work.
Sat Jun 26 12:15:59 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* dearmor.c (enarmor_file): Fixed comment string.
* tdbdump.c (export_ownertrust): Text fix.
* tbio.c (tdbio_invalid): Ditto.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Made temp buffer larger.
* Makefile.am (install-data-local): Add missing backslashes
Tue Jun 15 12:21:08 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* g10.c (main): Made iterated+salted the default S2K method.
* Makefile.am (install-data-local): Use DESTDIR.
* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Emit missing-passphrase while in
batchmode.
* parse-packet.c (parse_pubkeyenc): Fixed a SEGV.
Mon Jun 14 21:18:54 CEST 1999 Michael Roth <mroth@nessie.de>
* g10.c: New options --openpgp, --no-tty, --emit-version,
--default-comment and --lock-multiple
Thu Jun 10 14:18:23 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* free-packet.c (free_encrypted): Fixed EOF case (Remi).
(free_plaintext): Ditto.
* helptext.c (keyedit.delsig.unknown): New (Remi).
* keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig): Add arg print_without_key and
changed all callers to make use of it (Remi):
Tue Jun 8 13:36:25 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* keylist.c (print_key_data): New and called elsewhere.
* g10.c: New option --with-key-data
Wed Jun 2 14:17:19 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Yet another bad hack to cope with
broken pgp2 created detached messages in textmode.
Tue Jun 1 16:01:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* openfile.c (make_outfile_name): New.
* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Outputfile is now the inputfile
without the suffix.
* g10.c: New option --use-embedded-filename
Mon May 31 19:41:10 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* g10.c (main): Fix for SHM init (Michael).
* compress.c, encr-data.c, mdfilter.c,
plaintext.c, free-packet.c: Speed patches (Rémi).
Thu May 27 09:40:55 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* status.c (cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit): New.
* keyedit.c (menu_delsig): New.
(check_all_keysigs): Splitted.
(print_and_check_one_sig): New.
Wed May 26 14:36:29 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Support large packets.
* parse-packet.c (enum_sig_subpkt): Replaces parse_sig_subpkt.
* mainproc.c (print_notation_data): Print all notation packets.
* g10.c (add_notation_data): Add a way to specify the critical flag.
(main): Add option --set-policy-url.
(check_policy_url): Basic checks.
* sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy): Replaces mk_notation.
* parse-packet.c (can_handle_critical): Moved decision whether we can
handle critical subpacket to an extra function.
Tue May 25 19:50:32 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* sign.c (sign_file): Always use compression algo 1 for signed
onyl file becuase we can´ be sure the the verifier supports other
algorithms.
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Support for notation data.
* sign.c (sign_file,clearsign_file,make_keysig_packet): Ditto.
(mk_notation): New.
* g10.c (add_notation_data): New and add option -N
* mainproc.c (print_notation_data): New.
(check_sig_and_print): Print any notation data of the signed text.
Sun May 23 14:20:22 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Print a warning and return
immediateley if opt.always_trust is true.
* g10.c (main): Corrected handling of no-default-keyring
* pkclist.c (algo_available): Disable Twofish until we have settled
how to do the MDC.
* hkp.c: Disable everything for mingw32
Sat May 22 22:47:26 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Add sig creation time to the
VALIDSIG status output. Add more info to the ERRSIG output.
* sig-check.c (signature_check): Add sig time after epoch to SIG_ID.
* import.c (import_one): Merge duplicate user IDs.
(collapse_uids): New.
* kbnode.c (move_kbnode): New.
(remove_kbnode): New.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Call collapse_uids.
* g10.c: new option --logger-fd.
* import.c: s/log_*_f/log_*/
Thu May 20 14:04:08 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* misc.c (pull_in_libs): do the volatile only for gcc
* sig-check (signature_check): Emit SIG_iD only for classes 0 and 1.
* armor.c (armor_filter): Add detection of PGP2 created clearsigs.
(fake_packet): A tab is not a WS for pgp2 - handle this.
* textfilter.c (len_without_trailing_chars): New.
(copy_clearsig_text): Add pgp2mode arg.
* sign.c (clearsign_file): pass old_style to the above fnc.
Wed May 19 16:04:30 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* g10.c: New option --interactive.
* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Add workaround for pgp2 bug
(do_check_sig): Ditto.
(proc_tree): Ditto.
* plaintext.c (do_hash): Ditto.
(hash_datafiles): Ditto, add an arg, changed all callers.
* mdfilter.c (md_filter): Add support for the alternate hash context.
Mon May 17 21:54:43 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* parse-packet.c (parse_encrypted): Support for PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC.
* build-packet.c (do_encrypted_mdc): Ditto.
* cipher.c (write_header): Add mdc hashing.
(cipher_filter): write out the hash.
* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): Add PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC.
* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Add mdc hashing.
(mdc_decode_filter): New.
* parse-packet.c (parse_sig_subpkt): Fixed stupid bug for subpkt
length calculation
(parse_signature): Fixed even more stupid bug.
Sat May 8 19:28:08 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* build-packet.c (do_signature): Removed MDC hack.
* encode.c (encode_crypt_mdc): Removed.
* mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Removed MDC hack.
(check_sig_and_print): Ditto.
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Ditto.
* sig-check.c (mdc_kludge_check): Ditto.
* free-packte.c (copy_signature, free_seckey_enc): Ditto.
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature,parse_key): Store data of
unknown algorithms with mpi_set_opaque inseatd of the old
faked data stuff.
(read_rest): Removed.
(read_rest2): Renamed to read_rest
* build-packet.c (write_fake_data): Use mpi_get_opaque.
* free-packet.c (cp_fake_data): Removed and cahnged all callers
to use mpi_copy.
(free_pubkey_enc,free_seckey_enc,release_public_key_parts,
release_secret_key_parts): Use mpi_free for opaque data.
Thu May 6 14:18:17 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* trustdb.c (check_trust): Check for revoked subkeys.
* pkclist.c (do_we_trust): Handled revoked subkeys.
(do_we_trust_pre): Ditto.
(check_signatures_trust): Ditto.
* build-packet.c (hash_public_key): Fix for ancient g10 keys.
* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): Return EOF if no data has been read.
* g10.c (main): Catch errors for default operation.
Thu Apr 29 12:29:22 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* sign.c (sign_file): Fixed hashing in case of no subpackets.
(clearsign_file): Ditto.
(make_keysig_packet): Ditto.
Wed Apr 28 13:03:03 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Add new command revkey.
* (menu_revkey): New.
Mon Apr 26 17:48:15 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Add the MDC hack.
* build-packet.c (do_signature): Ditto.
* free-packet.c (free_seckey_enc,copy_signature,cmp_signatures): Ditto.
* mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Ditto.
* sig-check.c (mdc_kludge_check): New.
* encode.c (encrypt_mdc_file): New.
* keyedit.c (check_all_keysigs): List revocations.
* (menu_revsig): New.
* sign (make_keysig_packet): Support for class 0x30.
Sun Apr 18 20:48:15 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Fixed the case that one key
has no preferences (Remi Guyomarch).
keylist.c (list_keyblock): ulti_hack to propagate trust to all uids.
Sun Apr 18 10:11:28 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Use real IV instead of a 0 one, so that
it works even if the length of the IV doesn't match the blocksize.
Removed the save_iv stuff.
(protect_secret_key): Likewise. Create the IV here.
* packet.h (PKT_secret_key): Increased size of IV field and add a
ivlen field.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Use the len protect.ivlen.
* build-packet.c (do_secret_key). Ditto.
* getkey.c (key_byname): Close keyblocks.
* Makefile.am (gpgm): Removed this
* g10.c: Merged gpg and gpgm
* import.c (import): Utilize option quiet.
* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Ditto.
* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource,keyring_copy): Ditto.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Add some batch support.
* g10.c (main): add call to tty_batchmode.
Fri Apr 9 12:26:25 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* status.c (write_status_text): Some more status codes.
* passphrase_to_dek (passphrase_to_dek): add a status code.
* seckey_cert.c (check_secret_key): Likewise.
* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Reverse the last changes
* cipher.c (write_header): Ditto.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Dropped kludge for ancient blowfish mode.
Thu Apr 8 09:35:53 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Add a new status output
* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Ditto.
* status.h status.c: Add new status tokens.
Wed Apr 7 20:51:39 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Fixes for 128 bit blocksize
* cipher.c (write_header): Ditto.
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Ditto.
(protect_secret_key). Ditto.
* misc.c (print_cipher_algo_note): Twofish is now a standard algo.
* keygen.c (do_create): Fixed spelling (Gaël Quéri)
(ask_keysize): Only allow keysizes up to 4096
* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): chmod newly created secrings.
* import.c (delete_inv_parts): Fixed accidently deleted subkeys.
Tue Apr 6 19:58:12 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* armor.c: Removed duped include (John Bley)
* mainproc.c: Ditto.
* build-packet.c (hash_public_key): Fixed hashing of the header.
* import.c (delete_inv_parts): Allow import of own non-exportable sigs.
Sat Mar 20 13:59:47 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* armor.c (fake_packet): Fix for not not-dash-escaped
Sat Mar 20 11:44:21 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* g10.c (main): Added command --recv-keys
* hkp.c (hkp_import): New.
Wed Mar 17 13:09:03 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* trustdb.c (check_trust): add new arg add_fnc and changed all callers.
(do_check): Ditto.
(verify_key): Ditto.
(propagate_validity): Use the new add_fnc arg.
(print_user_id): Add the FILE arg.
(propagate_ownertrust): New.
* pkclist.c (add_ownertrust_cb): New and changed the add_ownertrust
logic.
* getkey.c (get_keyblock_bylid): New.
* trustdb.c (print_uid_from_keyblock): New.
(dump_tn_tree_with_colons): New.
(list_trust_path): Add colon print mode.
* trustdb.c (insert_trust_record): Always use the primary key.
* encode.c (encode_simple): Added text_mode filter (Rémi Guyomarch)
(encode_crypt): Ditto.
* mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Added status ENC_TO.
* armor.c (armor_filter): Added status NODATA.
* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Always print NEED_PASSPHRASE
* seckey_cert.c (check_secret_key): Added BAD_PASS status.
* g10.c (main): Set g10_opt_homedir.
Sun Mar 14 19:34:36 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* keygen.c (do_create): Changed wording of the note (Hugh Daniel)
Thu Mar 11 16:39:46 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* tdbdump.c: New
* trustdb.c (walk_sigrecs,do_list_sigs,list_sigs,
list_records,list_trustdb,export_ownertrust,import_ownertrust): Moved
to tdbdump.c
(init_trustdb): renamed to setup_trustdb. Changed all callers.
(do_init_trustdb): renamed to init_trustdb().
* trustdb.c (die_invalid_db): replaced by tdbio_invalid.
* tdbio.c (tdbio_invalid): New.
* import.c (delete_inv_parts): Skip non exportable signatures.
* keyedit.c (sign_uid_mk_attrib): New.
(sign_uids): Add the local argument.
(keyedit_menu): New "lsign" command.
* trustdb.c (register_trusted_key): Removed this and all related stuff.
* g10.c (oTrustedKey): Removed option.
* tdbio.h (dir.valcheck): New trustdb field.
* tdbio.c: Add support for this field
(tdbio_read_modify_stamp): New.
(tdbio_write_modify_stamp): New.
* trustdb.c (do_check): Check against this field. Removed cache update.
(verify_key): Add cache update.
(upd_uid_record): Some functional changes.
(upd_cert_record): Ditto
Wed Mar 10 11:26:18 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Fixed segv in uid. Print 'u' as
validity of sks.
Mon Mar 8 20:47:17 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* getkey.c (classify_user_id): Add new mode 12 (#<lid>).
* seckey-cert.c (check_secret_key): replaced error by info.
* trustdb.c (query_trust_info): Add another arg, changed all callers.
(check_trust): Ditto.
(do_check): Ditto.
(verify_key): Handle namehash.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock): print trust info for user ids.
* sig-check.c (signature_check): Add sig-created to status output.
Tue Mar 2 16:44:57 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): New.
(clearsign): Removed.
* sign.c (clearsign_file): does not use textfiler anymore.
* keygen.c (ask_user_id): print a note about the used charset.
Tue Mar 2 10:38:42 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* sig-check.c (signature_check): sig-id now works for all algos.
* armor.c (armor_filter): Fixed armor bypassing.
Sun Feb 28 19:11:00 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Don't change the case of email addresses.
(has_invalid_email_chars): Adjusted.
* keylist.c (list_one): Really list serect keys (Remi Guyomarch)
* keyedit.c (menu_select_uid): Add some braces to make egcs happy.
(menu_select_key): Ditto.
* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): List sym-enc packets (Remi Guyomarch)
Fri Feb 26 17:55:41 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Return error if there are no recipients.
* sig-check.c (signature_check): New signature id feature.
* armor.c (make_radic64_string): New.
* mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): early check for seckey availability.
* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): print user id before asking.
* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource,get_keyblock_handle): Cleaner
handling of default resource.
Thu Feb 25 18:47:39 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* pkclist.c (algo_available): New.
(select_algo_from_prefs): Check whether algo is available.
* ringedit.c (keyring_copy): Take care of opt.dry_run.
(do_gdbm_store): Ditto.
* openfile.c (open_outfile). Ditto.
(copy_options_file): Ditto.
* trustdb.c (update_trustdb): Ditto.
(clear_trust_checked_flag): Ditto.
(update_trust_record): Ditto.
(insert_trust_record): Ditto.
Wed Feb 24 11:07:27 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* keylist.c (secret_key_list): Now really list the secret key.
* trustdb.c (do_init_trustdb): New. Init is now deferred.
Mon Feb 22 20:04:00 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* getkey.c (lookup_sk): Return G10ERR_NO_SECKEY and not x_PUBKEY.
Fri Feb 19 15:49:15 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): retrieve LID if not there.
* armor.c (fake_packet): Replaced ugly lineending handling.
* g10.c (oNoEncryptTo): New.
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Implemented this option.
* g10.c (main): Greeting is now printed to stderr and not to tty.
Use add_to_strlist() instead of direct coding.
* import.c (import): Use iobuf_push_filter2.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print all user ids
for good signatures.
* getkey.c (get_pubkeyblock): New.
* import.c (chk_self_sigs): Fixed SEGV for unbounded class 0x18 keys.
(delete_inv_parts): Delete special marked packets.
Tue Feb 16 14:10:02 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* g10.c (main): New option --encrypt-to
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Implemented encrypt-to.
* parse-packet.c (parse_user_id): Removed the hack to work with
utf-8 strings.
* g10.c (main): Install lockfile cleanup handler.
* tdbio.c (cleanup): Removed: this is now handled by dotlock.
Sat Feb 13 14:13:04 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Init lockhandle for a new trustdb
Wed Feb 10 17:15:39 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* g10.c (main): check for development version now in configure
* tdbio.c (tdbio_write_record): Add uid.validity
(tdbio_read_record) : Ditto.
(tdbio_dump_record) : Ditto.
* keygen.c (keygen_add_std_prefs): Replaced Blowfish by Twofish,
removed MD5 and Tiger.
* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Suppress warning about missing Blowfish
in preferences in certain cases.
* ringedit.c (lock_rentry,unlock_rentry): New.
* getkey.c (key_byname): Pass ret_kb down to lookup_xx.
* armor.c (armor_filter): No output of of empty comment lines.
Add option --no-version to suppress the output of the version string.
* getkey.c: Release the getkey context for auto context variables.
Sun Jan 24 18:16:26 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* getkey.c: Changed the internal design to allow simultaneous
lookup of multible user ids
(get_pubkey_bynames): New.
(get_seckey_bynames): New.
(get_seckey_next): New.
(get_seckey_end): New.
* keylist.c (list_one): Use the new functions.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock): add a newline for normal listings.
* g10.c (--recipient): New option name to replace --remote-user
Wed Jan 20 18:59:49 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* textfilter.c: Mostly rewritten
* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Use now text_filter semantics.
Tue Jan 19 19:34:58 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* export.c (export_pubkeys_stream): New.
(do_export_stream): New.
* g10.c (aSendKeys): New command.
* hkp.c (hkp_export): New.
* compress.c (do_uncompress): Hack for algo 1 and 1.1.3
Sun Jan 17 11:04:33 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* textfilter.c (text_filter): Now uses iobuf_read_line().
(read_line): Removed.
* armor.c (trim_trailing_spaces): Removed and replaced
by trim_trailing_ws from libutil
Sat Jan 16 12:03:27 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import): Use only the short keyid
Sat Jan 16 09:27:30 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* import.c (import_key_stream): New
(import): New, moved most of import_keys here.
* g10.c: New option --keyserver
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Hook to import a pubkey.
* pref.c pref.h : Removed
* hkp.c hkp.h: New
Wed Jan 13 14:10:15 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* armor.c (radix64_read): Print an error if a bad armor was detected.
Wed Jan 13 12:49:36 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* armor.c (radix64_read): Now handles malformed armors produced
by some buggy MUAs.
Tue Jan 12 11:17:18 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* ringedit.c (find_keyblock_bysk): New.
* skc_list.c (is_insecure): New.
(build_sk_list): usage check for insecure keys.
* import.c (chk_self_sigs): Add handling for subkeys.
(delete_inv_parts): Skip unsigned subkeys
* sig-check.c (do_check): Print info if the signature is older
than the key.
* keygen.c (generate_subkeypair): Fail on time warp.
* sign.c (do_sign): Ditto.
Sun Jan 10 15:10:02 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* armor.c (fake_packet): Fixed not-dash-escaped bug.
Sat Jan 9 16:02:23 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* sig-check.c (do_check): Output time diff on error
* status.c (STATUS_VALIDSIG): New.
(is_status_enabled): New.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Issue that status message.
* plaintext.c (special_md_putc): Removed
* armor.c (armor_filter): print error for truncated lines.
* free-packet.c (free_encrypted): Revomed call to set_block_mode.
(free_plaintext): Ditto.
Thu Jan 7 18:00:58 CET 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* pkclist.c (add_ownertrust): Fixed return value.
* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Disabled iobuf_set_limit and
iobuf_pop_filter stuff.
* compress.c (handle_compressed): Disabled iobuf_pop_filter.
* packet.h (PKT_secret_key): Add is_primary flag.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Set this flag.
* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Kludge to print the primary
keyid - changed the API: keyid must now hold 2 keyids.
* getkey.c (get_primary_seckey): New.
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): pass primary keyid to passphrase query
* tbdio.c (open_db): removed the atexit
(tdbio_set_dbname): and moved it to here.
* armor.c: Rewrote large parts.
Tue Dec 29 19:55:38 CET 1998 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* revoke.c (gen_revoke): Removed compression.
* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): special check for revoked keys
* trustdb.c (update_trust_record): Fixed revoke flag.
Tue Dec 29 14:41:47 CET 1998 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* misc.c (disable_core_dumps): Check for EINVAL (Atari)
* getkey (merge_one_pk_and_selfsig): Fixed search of expiredate.
(merge_keys_and_selfsig): Ditto.
* free-packet.c (cmp_public_keys): cmp expire only for v3 packets
(cmp_secret_keys): Ditto.
(cmp_public_secret_key): Ditto.
Wed Dec 23 17:12:24 CET 1998 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* armor.c (find_header): Reset not_dashed at every header
Wed Dec 23 13:18:14 CET 1998 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* pkclist.c (add_ownertrust): Refresh validity values.
* trustdb.c (enum_cert_paths_print): New arg refresh.
* ringedit.c: Fixed problems fix keyrings
* parse-packet.c (dbg_parse_packet): New debug functions.
* getkey.c (getkey_disable_caches): New.
* import.c (import_keys): Disable caches.
Thu Dec 17 18:31:15 CET 1998 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* misc.c (trap_unaligned): Only for glibc 1
* sign.c (write_dash_escaped): Now escapes "From " lines
* g10.c: New option --escape-from-lines
* trustdb.c (sort_tsl_list): New
(list_trust_path): Now prints sorted list.
(enum_cert_paths): Likewise.
(enum_cert_paths_print): New.
(print_paths): New printing format.
* pkclist.c (add_ownertrust): New arg quit.
(edit_ownertrust): New quit selection and does not query
the recipients ownertrust anymore.
(add_ownertrust): Print the ceritficate path.
Mon Dec 14 21:18:49 CET 1998 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Now checks for critical bit
(parse_sig_subpkt): Splitted.
(parse_one_sig_subpkt): New.
* sig-check.c (do_check): handle critical bit.
Sun Dec 13 14:10:56 CET 1998 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* pcklist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Preferences should
now work (lost the != ? )
Thu Dec 10 20:15:36 CET 1998 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* ringedit.c (gdbm_store): Fix for inserts
* g10.c (main): New option --export-all
* export.c (export_pubkeys): New arg.
(do_export): Now may skip old keys.
* status.c: Minor patches for Sun's cc
* keygen.c (ask_algo): Disabled v3 ElGamal choice, rearranged
the numbers. Add a warning question when a sign+encrypt key
is selected.
* g10.c (do_not_use_RSA): Removed.
* misc.c (print_pubkey_algo_note): New as replacement for the
do_not_use_RSA() and chnaged all callers.
(print_cipher_algo_note): New.
(print_hash_algo_note): New.
* cipher.c (write_header): Add a call to print_cipher_algo_note.
* seckey-cert.c (protect_secret_key): Ditto
* sign.c (do_sign): Add a call to print_digest_algo_note.
* getkey.c (get_long_user_id_string): New.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Changed the format of the
status output.
* encrypt.c (write_pubkey_enc_from_list): print used symmetric cipher.
* pkclist.c (do_we_trust): Changed a message.
Wed Dec 9 13:41:06 CET 1998 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* misc.c (trap_unaligned) [ALPHA]: Only if UAC_SIGBUS is defined.
* sign.c (write_dash_escaped): Add the forgotten patch by Brian Moore.
* compress.c (do_uncompress): Fixed the inflating bug.
Tue Dec 8 13:15:16 CET 1998 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* trustdb.c (upd_uid_record): Now uses the newest self-signature
(insert_trust_record): Now calls update with recheck set to true.
(register_trusted_key): New.
(verify_own_keys): Enhanced by list of trusted keys.
* g10.c (main): Print a warning when a devel version is used.
(main): New option --trusted-key
* import.c (merge_blocks): Fixed merging of new user ids and
added merging of subkeys.
(append_uid): Ditto.
(merge_keysig): New.
(append_key): New.
* getkey.c (merge_one_pk_and_selfsig): Get the expiration time
from the newest self-signature.
(merge_keys_and_selfsig): Ditto.
* free-packet.c (cmp_secret_key): New.
Fri Nov 27 21:37:41 CET 1998 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* g10.c: New option --lock-once
* tdbio.c (open_db): Add an atexit
(cleanup): New.
(tdbio_sync): Add locking.
(tdbio_end_transaction): Ditto.
(put_record_into_cache): Ditto.
* ringedit.c (keyring_copy): Ditto.
(cleanup): New.
(add_keyblock_resource): Add an atexit.
Fri Nov 27 15:30:24 CET 1998 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* armor.c (find_header): Another fix for clearsigs.
Fri Nov 27 12:39:29 CET 1998 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* status.c (display_help): Removed.
* helptext.c: New and removed the N_() from all cpr_gets.
Fri Nov 20 16:54:52 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (main): New option --not-dash-escaped
* sign.c (write_dashed_escaped): Ditto.
* armor.c (find_header): Support for NotDashEscaped header.
* getkey.c: print "disabled cache.." only if verbose is used.
Thu Nov 19 07:17:31 1998 Werner Koch <werner.koch@guug.de>
* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Fixed expire listing
* getkey.c (merge_keys_and_selfsig): Fixed expire calculation.
(merge_one_pk_and_selfsig): Ditto.
* keyedit.c (menu_expire). Ditto.
* keygen.c (keygen_add_key_expire): Ditto.
(ask_expire_interval): New and changed all local function to use
this instead.
(keygen_add_key_expire): Opaque should now be a public key;
changed all callers.
* parse.packet.c (parse): use skip_rest to skip packets.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): New arg for cmdline cmds.
Wed Nov 18 20:33:50 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* trustdb.c (check_trustdb): Now rechecks all gived userids.
(collect_paths): Some fixes.
(upd_pref_records): Skips empty items, evaluate all items.
* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Better listing of prefs.
(skip_packet): Now knows about marker packet
* g10.c: removed cmd "--edit-sig".
* pubring.asc: Updated.
Sat Nov 14 14:01:29 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (main): Changed syntax of --list-trust-path
* trustdb.c (list_trust_path): Replaced max_depth by
opt.max_cert_depth
Fri Nov 13 07:39:58 1998 Werner Koch <werner.koch@guug.de>
* trustdb.c (collect_paths): Removed a warning message.
(enum_trust_web): Removed.
(enum_cert_paths): New.
* pkclist.c (add_ownertrust): Changed to use enum_cert_paths.
(edit_ownertrust): Now list ceritficates on request.
(show_paths): New.
Wed Nov 11 18:05:44 1998 Werner Koch <werner.koch@guug.de>
* g10.c (main): New option --max-cert-depth
* tdbio.h: add new fields to ver and dir record.
* tdbio.c: read/write/dump of these fields.
(tdbio_db_matches_options): New.
* trustdb.c: replaced MAC_CERT_DEPTH by opt.max_cert_depth.
(do_check): cache validity and changed other functions
to reset the cached value.
* keylist.c (list_one): Now lists the ownertrust.
* mainproc.c (list_node): Ditto.
Tue Nov 10 10:08:59 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (g10_exit): Now looks at the new g10_errors_seen.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Sets g10_errors_seen.
* *.c : i18n many more strings.
* ringedit.c (locate_keyblock_by_keyid): Add HAVE_LIBGDBM
(locate_keyblock_by_fpr): Ditto.
* g10.c (main): removed unsused "int errors".
(main): Add new option --charset.
* g10.c (main): special message for the unix newbie.
Mon Nov 9 07:17:42 1998 Werner Koch <werner.koch@guug.de>
* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Kludge to prefere algo 16.
* trustdb.c (new_lid_table): Clear cached item.
* status.c (cpr_get_utf8): New.
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Uses this.
Sun Nov 8 17:20:39 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Why did I use strlen()-1
in the printf? - This truncated the TZ.
Sat Nov 7 15:57:28 1998 me,,, (wk@tobold)
* getkey.c (lookup): Changes to support a read_next.
(get_pubkey): Fixed a memory leak.
* keylist.c (list_one): Now lists all matching user IDs.
Tue Nov 3 16:19:21 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Now converted to UTF-8
* g10.c (main): Kludge for pgp clearsigs and textmode.
Fri Oct 30 16:40:39 1998 me,,, (wk@tobold)
* signal.c (block_all_signals): New.
(unblock_all_signals): New
* tdbio.c (tdbio_end_transaction): Now blocks all signals.
* trustdb.c (new_lid_table): Changed the representation of the
former local_lid_info stuff.
* trustdb.c (update_trust_record): Reorganized the whole thing.
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature): Now handles class 0x28
Wed Oct 28 18:56:33 1998 me,,, (wk@tobold)
* export.c (do_export): Takes care of the exportable sig flag.
Tue Oct 27 14:53:04 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* trustdb.c (update_trust_record): New "fast" parameter.
Sun Oct 25 19:32:05 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* openfile.c (copy_options_File): New.
* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): Creates options file
* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Ditto.
Sat Oct 24 14:10:53 1998 brian moore <bem@cmc.net>
* mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Don't release the DEK
(do_proc_packets): Ditto.
Fri Oct 23 06:49:38 1998 me,,, (wk@tobold)
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Comments are now allowed
* trustdb.c: Rewrote large parts.
Thu Oct 22 15:56:45 1998 Michael Roth (mroth@nessie.de)
* encode.c: (encode_simple): Only the plain filename without
a given directory is stored in generated packets.
(encode_crypt): Ditto.
* sign.c: (sign_file) Ditto.
Thu Oct 22 10:53:41 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* trustdb.c (update_trust_record): Add new optional arg.
* import.c (import_keys): Add statistics output
* trustdb.c (update_trustdb): Ditto.
(insert_trustdb): Ditto.
* tdbio.c (tdbio_begin_transaction): New.
(tdbio_end_transaction): New.
(tdbio_cancel_transaction): New.
* g10.c (main): New option --quit.
* trustdb.c (check_hint_sig): No tests for user-id w/o sig.
This caused an assert while checking the sigs.
* trustdb.c (upd_sig_record): Splitted into several functions.
* import.c (import_keys): New arg "fast".
* g10.c (main): New command --fast-import.
Wed Oct 21 18:19:36 1998 Michael Roth <mroth@nessie.de>
* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): Directory is now created.
* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): New info message.
Wed Oct 21 11:52:04 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* trustdb.c (update_trustdb): released keyblock in loop.
* keylist.c (list_block): New.
(list_all): Changed to use list_block.
* trustdb.c: Completed support for GDBM
* sign.c (only_old_style): Changed the way force_v3 is handled
(sign_file): Ditto.
(clearsign_file): Ditto.
* keygen.c (has_invalid_email_chars): Splitted into mailbox and
host part.
* keylist.c (list_one): Add a merge_keys_and_selfsig.
* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Ditto.
Sun Oct 18 11:49:03 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* sign.c (only_old_style): Add option force_v3_sigs
(sign_file): Fixed a bug in sig->version
(clearsign_file): Ditto.
* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): New
* keyedit.c (menu_expire): New.
* free-packet.c (cmp_signatures): New
Sat Oct 17 10:22:39 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* armor.c: changed output line length from 72 to 64.
* keyedit.c (fix_keyblock): New.
Fri Oct 16 10:24:47 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* trustdb.c: Rewrote most.
* tdbio.c: Add cache and generalized hash tables.
* options.h (ENABLE_COMMENT_PACKETS): New but undef'ed.
* encode.c, sign.c, keygen.c: Disabled comment packets.
* export.c (do_export): Comment packets are never exported,
except for those in the secret keyring.
* g10.c (main): Removed option do-no-export-rsa; should be
be replaced by a secpial tool.
* export.c (do_export): Removed the code for the above option.
* armor.c (find_header): Support for new only_keyblocks.
* import.c (import_keys): Only looks for keyblock armors.
* packet.h: replaced valid_days by expiredate and changed all users.
* build-packet.c (do_public_key): calculates valid-days
(do_secret_key): Ditto.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): expiredate is calucated from the
valid_period in v3 packets.
* keyid.c (do_fingerprint_md): calculates valid_dates.
* keygen.c (add_key_expire): fixed key expiration time for v4 packets.
* armor.c (find_header): A LF in the first 28 bytes
was skipped for non-armored data.
Thu Oct 8 11:35:51 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* armor.c (is_armored): Add test on old comment packets.
* tdbio.c (tdbio_search_dir_bypk): fixed memory leak.
* getkey.c: Changed the caching algorithms.
Wed Oct 7 19:33:28 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* kbnodes.c (unused_nodes): New.
Wed Oct 7 11:15:36 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Fixed a problem with SK which could caused
a save of an unprotected key.
(menu_adduid): Ditto.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Prefs are now correctly listed for
new user ids.
* trustdb.c (update_trust_record): New.
(insert_trust_record): Now makes use of update_trust_record.
Tue Oct 6 16:18:03 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* trustdb.c (read_record): replaces most of the tdbio_read_records.
(write_record): Ditto.
Sat Oct 3 11:01:21 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* keygen.c (ask_alogo): enable ElGamal enc-only only for addmode.
Wed Sep 30 10:15:33 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* import.c (import_one): Fixed update of wrong keyblock.
Tue Sep 29 08:32:08 1998 me,,, (wk@tobold)
* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Display note for special filename.
* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Suppress output of special file.
Mon Sep 28 12:57:12 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (verify_own_keys): Add warning if a key is not protected.
* passphrase (hash_passphrase): Fixed iterated+salted mode and
setup for keysizes > hashsize.
* g10.c (main): New options: --s2k-{cipher,digest,mode}.
Fri Sep 25 09:34:23 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c: Chnaged some help texts.
Tue Sep 22 19:34:39 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* passphrase.c (read_passphrase_from_fd): fixed bug for long
passphrases.
Mon Sep 21 11:28:05 1998 Werner Koch (wk@(none))
* getkey.c (lookup): Add code to use the sub key if the primary one
does not match the usage.
* armor.c (armor_filter): New error message: no valid data found.
(radix64_read): Changes to support multiple messages.
(i18n.h): New.
* mainproc.c (add_onepass_sig): bug fix.
Mon Sep 21 08:03:16 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* pkclist.c (do_we_trust): Add keyid to most messages.
* passphrase.c (read_passphrase_from_fd): New.
(have_static_passphrase): New
(get_passphrase_fd): Removed.
(set_passphrase_fd): Removed.
* g10.c (main): passphrase is now read here.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): "help" texts should now translate fine.
Mon Sep 21 06:40:02 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* encode.c (encode_simple): Now disables compression
when --rfc1991 is used.
(encode_crypt): Ditto.
Fri Sep 18 16:50:32 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* getkey.c (merge_key_and_selfsig): New.
Fri Sep 18 10:20:11 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Removed 3DES kludge.
* seskey.c (make_session_key): Fixed SERIOUS bug introduced
by adding the weak key detection code.
* sign.c (sign_file): Changed aremor header in certain cases.
Tue Sep 15 17:52:55 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Replaced ascime by asctimestamp.
Mon Sep 14 11:40:52 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* seskey.c (make_session_key): Now detects weak keys.
* trustdb (clear_trust_checked_flag): New.
* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Does no anymore suppress CR from
cleartext signed messages.
Sun Sep 13 12:54:29 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* trustdb.c (insert_trust_record): Fixed a stupid bug in the free
liunked list loops.
Sat Sep 12 15:49:16 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* status.c (remove_shmid): New.
(init_shm_comprocess): Now sets permission to the real uid.
Wed Sep 9 11:15:03 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* packet.h (PKT_pubkey_enc): New flah throw_keyid, and add logic to
implement it.
* g10.c (main): New Option --throw-keyid
* getkey.c (enum_secret_keys): Add new ar and changed all callers.
Tue Sep 8 20:04:09 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* delkey.c (delete_key): Moved from keyedit.c.
Mon Sep 7 16:37:52 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* build-packet.c (calc_length_header): New arg new_ctb to correctly
calculate the length of new style packets.
* armor.c (is_armored): Checks for symkey_enc packets.
* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): 3DEs substitute is now CAST5.
Tue Aug 11 17:54:50 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* build-packet.c (do_secret_key): Fixed handling of old keys.
* getkey.c (compare_name): Fixed exact and email matching
* openfile.c (open_outfile): Changed arguments and all callers.
Tue Aug 11 09:14:35 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* encode.c (encode_simple): Applied option set-filename and comment.
(encode_crypt): Ditto.
* sign.c (sign_file): Ditto.
* armor.c (armor_filter): Applied option comment.
* encode.c (encode_crypt): Moved init_packet to the begin.
(encode_simple): add an init_packet().
* comment (write_comment): Now enforces a hash sign as the 1st byte.
* import.c (import_one): Add explanation for "no user ids".
* compress.c (do_uncompress): Applied Brian Warner's patch to support
zlib 1.1.3 etc.
* trustdb.c (check_trust): Fixed a problem after inserting new keys.
* getkey (lookup): do not return the primary key if usage is given
(lookup_sk): Ditto and take usage into account.
* status.c (cpr_get_answer_is_yes): add display_help.
Mon Aug 10 10:11:28 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* getkey.c (lookup_sk): Now always returns the primary if arg
primary is true.
(lookup): Likewise.
(get_pubkey_byname): Now returns the primary key
(get_seckey_byname): Ditto.
Mon Aug 10 08:34:03 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* keyid.c (pubkey_letter): ELG_E is now a small g.
Sat Aug 8 17:26:12 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* openfile (overwrite_filep): Changed semantics and all callers.
Sat Aug 8 12:17:07 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* status.c (display_help): New.
Thu Aug 6 16:30:41 1998 Werner Koch,mobil,,, (wk@tobold)
* seskey.c (encode_session_key): Now uses get_random_bits().
Thu Aug 6 07:34:56 1998 Werner Koch,mobil,,, (wk@tobold)
* ringedit.c (keyring_copy): No more backupfiles for
secret keyrings and add additional warning in case of
a failed secret keyring operation.
Wed Aug 5 11:54:37 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (check_opts): Moved to main. Changed def_cipher_algo
semantics and chnaged all users.
* pubkey-enc.c (get_sssion_key): New informational output
about preferences.
* parse-packet.c (parse_symkeyenc): Fixed salted+iterated S2K
(parse_key): Ditto.
* build-packet.c (do_secret_key): Ditto.
(do_symkey_enc): Ditto.
Tue Aug 4 08:59:10 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* getkey.c (enum_secret_keys): Now returns only primary keys.
* getkey (lookup): Now sets the new namehash field.
* parse-packet.c (parse_sig_subpkt2): New.
* sign.c (sign_file): one-pass sigs are now emiited reverse.
Preference data is considered when selecting the compress algo.
Wed Jul 29 12:53:03 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* free-packet.c (copy_signature): New.
* keygen.c (generate_subkeypair): rewritten
* g10.c (aKeyadd): Removed option --add-key
Mon Jul 27 10:37:28 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Additional check on cipher blocksize.
(protect_secret_key): Ditto.
* encr-data.c: Support for other blocksizes.
* cipher.c (write_header): Ditto.
Fri Jul 24 16:47:59 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* kbnode.c (insert_kbnode): Changed semantics and all callers.
* keyedit.c : More or less a complete rewrite
Wed Jul 22 17:10:04 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* build-packet.c (write_sign_packet_header): New.
Tue Jul 21 14:37:09 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* import.c (import_one): Now creates a trustdb record.
* g10.c (main): New command --check-trustdb
Mon Jul 20 11:15:07 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* genkey.c (generate_keypair): Default key is now DSA with
encryption only ElGamal subkey.
Thu Jul 16 10:58:33 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* keyid.c (keyid_from_fingerprint): New.
* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byfprint): New.
Tue Jul 14 18:09:51 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* keyid.c (fingerprint_from_pk): Add argument and changed all callers.
(fingerprint_from_sk): Ditto.
Tue Jul 14 10:10:03 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Now returns create error if
the file could not be created or the user responded not to overwrite
the file.
* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Tries again if the file could not
be created to check the signature without output.
* misc.c (disable_core_dumps): New.
* g10.c (main): disable coredumps for gpg
* g10.c (MAINTAINER_OPTIONS): New to disable some options
Mon Jul 13 16:47:54 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* plaintext.c (hash_datafiles): New arg for better support of
detached sigs. Changed all callers.
* mainproc.c (proc_signature_packets): Ditto.
* g10.c (main): New option "compress-sigs"
* sig.c (sign_file): detached signatures are not anymore compressed
unless the option --compress-sigs is used.
Thu Jul 9 19:54:54 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* armor.c: Fixes to allow zero length cleartext signatures
Thu Jul 9 14:52:47 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (build_list): Now drops setuid.
(main): Changed the way keyrings and algorithms are registered .
Wed Jul 8 14:17:30 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* packet.h (PKT_public_key): Add field keyid.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Reset the above field.
* keyid.c (keyid_from_pk): Use above field as cache.
* tdbio.c, tdbio.h: New
* trustdb.c: Moved some functions to tdbio.c.
(print_keyid): New.
* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): New.
Wed Jul 8 10:45:28 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* plaintext.c (special_md_putc): New.
(handle_plaintext): add clearsig argument
* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): detection of clearsig
* sign.c (write_dased_escaped): Changed clearsig format
Tue Jul 7 18:56:19 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* armor.c (find_header): Now makes sure that there is only one
empty line for clearsigs, as this is what OP now says.
Mon Jul 6 13:09:07 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (main): New option default-secret-key
* getkey.c (get_seckey_byname): support for this option.
Mon Jul 6 09:03:49 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* getkey.c (add_keyring): Keyrings are now added to end of the
list of keyrings. The first added keyringwill be created.
(add_secret_keyring): Likewise.
* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): Files are created here.
* g10.c (aNOP): Removed
* getkey.c (lookup): Add checking of usage for name lookups
* packet.h (pubkey_usage): Add a field which may be used to store
usage capabilities.
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): getkey now called with usage arg.
* skclist.c (build_sk_list): Ditto.
* sign.c (clearsign_file): Fixed "Hash:" headers
Sat Jul 4 13:33:31 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* trustdb.c (list_ownertrust): New.
* g10.c (aListOwnerTrust): New.
* g10.c (def_pubkey_algo): Removed.
* trustdb.c (verify_private_data): Removed and also the call to it.
(sign_private_data): Removed.
Fri Jul 3 13:26:10 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (aEditKey): was aEditSig. Changed usage msg.
* keyedit.c: Done some i18n stuff.
* g10.c (do_not_use_RSA): New.
* sign.c (do_sign): Add call to above function.
* encode.c (write_pubkey_enc_from_list): Ditto.
Thu Jul 2 21:01:25 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* parse-packet.c: Now is able sto store data of unknown
algorithms.
* free-packet.c: Support for this.
* build-packet.c: Can write data of packet with unknown algos.
Thu Jul 2 11:46:36 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* parse-packet.c (parse): fixed 4 byte length header
Wed Jul 1 12:36:55 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* packet.h (new_ctb): New field for some packets
* build-packet.c (build_packet): Support for new_ctb
* parse-packet.c (parse): Ditto.
Mon Jun 29 12:54:45 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* packet.h: changed all "_cert" to "_key", "subcert" to "subkey".
* free-packet.c (free_packet): Removed memory leak for subkeys.
Sun Jun 28 18:32:27 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* import.c (import_keys): Renamed from import_pubkeys.
(import_secret_one): New.
* g10.c (aExportSecret): New.
* export.c (export_seckeys): New.
* parse-packet.c (parse_certificate): Cleaned up.
(parse_packet): Trust packets are now considered as unknown.
(parse_pubkey_warning): New.
Fri Jun 26 10:37:35 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* keygen.c (has_invalid_email_chars): New.
Wed Jun 24 16:40:22 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* armor.c (armor_filter): Now creates valid onepass_sig packets
with all detected hash algorithms.
* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Now uses the hash algos as specified
in the onepass_sig packets (if there are any)
Mon Jun 22 11:54:08 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): add arg to disable outout
* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): disable output when in sigs_only mode.
Thu Jun 18 13:17:27 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* keygen.c: Removed all rsa packet stuff, chnaged defaults
for key generation.
Sun Jun 14 21:28:31 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* misc.c (checksum_u16): Fixed a stupid bug which caused a
wrong checksum calculation for the secret key protection and
add a backward compatibility option.
* g10.c (main): Add option --emulate-checksum-bug.
Thu Jun 11 13:26:44 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* packet.h: Major changes to the structure of public key material
which is now stored in an array and not anaymore in a union of
algorithm specific structures. These is needed to make the system
more extendable and makes a lot of stuff much simpler. Changed
all over the system.
* dsa.c, rsa.c, elg.c: Removed.
Wed Jun 10 07:22:02 1998 Werner Koch,mobil,,, (wk@tobold)
* g10.c ("load-extension"): New option.
Mon Jun 8 22:23:37 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Removed cipher constants
(protect_secret_key): Ditto.
Fri May 29 10:00:28 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* trustdb.c (query_trust_info): New.
* keylist.c (list_one): Add output of trust info
* mainproc (list_node): ditto.
* g10.c (main): full trustdb init if -with-colons and any of the
key list modes.
Thu May 28 10:34:42 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* status.c (STATUS_RSA_OR_IDEA): New.
* sig-check.c (check_signature): Output special status message.
* pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Ditto.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Changed format of output.
* passpharse.c (passphrase_to_dek): Likewise.
Wed May 27 13:46:48 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (aListSecretKeys): New option --list-secret-keys
* keylist.c (std_key_list): Renamed to public_key_list.
(secret_key_list): New
(list_one, list_all): Add support for secret keys.
* getkey.c (get_secret_keyring): New.
* mainproc.c (list_node): Add option --with-colons for secret keys
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature): detection of selfsigs
* mainproc.c (list_node): fixed listing.
* g10.c (aListSecretKeys): New option --always-trust
* pkclist.c (do_we_trust): Override per option added
* status.c (write_status_text): Add a prefix to every output line.
Wed May 27 07:49:21 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10 (--compress-keys): New.
* options.h (compress_keys): New.
* export.c (export_pubkeys): Only compresses with the new option.
Tue May 26 11:24:33 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* passphrase.c (get_last_passphrase): New
(set_next_passphrase): New.
(passphrase_to_dek): add support for the above functions.
* keyedit.c (make_keysig_packet): Add sigclass 0x18,
changed all callers due to a new argument.
* keygen.c (write_keybinding): New
(generate_subkeypair): Add functionality
(ask_algo, ask_keysize, ask_valid_days): Broke out of generate_keypair
(ask_user_id, ask_passphrase): Ditto.
Thu May 21 11:26:13 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c,gpgd.c (main): Does now return an int, so that egcs does
not complain.
* armor.c (fake_packet): Removed erro message and add a noticed
that this part should be fixed.
* sign.c (sign_file): Compression now comes in front of encryption.
* encode.c (encode_simple): Ditto.
(encode_crypt): Ditto.
Tue May 19 16:18:19 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* armor.c (fake_packet): Changed assertion to log_error
Sat May 16 16:02:06 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* build-packet.c (build_packet): Add SUBKEY packets.
Fri May 15 17:57:23 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* sign.c (hash_for): New and used in all places here.
* main.h (DEFAULT_): new macros.
* g10.c (opt.def_digest_algo): Now set to 0
* compress.c (init_compress): Add support for algo 1
* options.h (def_compress_algo): New
* g10.c (main): New option --compress-algo
Fri May 15 13:23:59 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (print_mds): New feature to print only one hash,
chnaged formatting.
Thu May 14 15:36:24 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* misc.c (trap_unaligned) [__alpha__]: New
* g10.c (trap_unaligned): Add call to this to track down SIGBUS
on Alphas (to avoid the slow emulation code).
Wed May 13 11:48:27 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* build-packet.c (do_signature): Support for v4 pakets.
* keyedit.c (make_keysig_packet): Ditto.
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt_from_sig): New.
(build_sig_subpkt): New.
* elg.c (g10_elg_sign): removed keyid_from_skc.
* dsa.c (g10_dsa_sign): Ditto.
* rsa.c (g10_rsa_sign): Ditto.
* keyedit.c (make_keysig_packet): Add call to keyid_from_skc
* sign.c (clearsign_file): Support for v4 signatures.
(sign_file): Ditto.
Wed May 6 09:31:24 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* parse-packet.c (do_parse): add support for 5 byte length leader.
(parse_subpkt): Ditto.
* build-packet.c (write_new_header): Ditto.
* packet.h (SIGSUBPKT_): New constants.
* parse-packet.c (parse_sig_subpkt): Changed name, made global,
and arg to return packet length, chnaged all callers
Tue May 5 22:11:59 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* keygen.c (gen_dsa): New.
* build_packet.c (do_secret_cert): Support for DSA
Mon May 4 19:01:25 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* compress.c: doubled buffer sizes
* parse-packet.c (do_plaintext): now uses iobuf_read/write.
Mon May 4 09:35:53 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* seskey.c (encode_md_value): Add optional argument hash_algo,
changed all callers.
* passphrase.c (make_dek_from_passphrase): Removed
* (get_passhrase_hash): Changed name to passphrase_to_dek, add arg,
changed all callers.
* all: Introduced the new ELG identifier and added support for the
encryption only one (which is okay to use by GNUPG for signatures).
Sun May 3 17:50:26 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* packet.h (PKT_OLD_COMMENT): New name for type 16.
* parse-packet.c (parse_comment): Now uses type 61
Fri May 1 12:44:39 1998 Werner Koch,mobil,,, (wk@tobold)
* packet.h (count): Chnaged s2k count from byte to u32.
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Changed s2k algo 3 to 4, changed
reading of count.
* build-packet.c (do_secret_cert): ditto.
* parse-packet.c (parse_certificate): ditto.
* parse-packet.c (parse_symkeyenc): New.
* build-packet.c (do_symkey_enc): New.
Thu Apr 30 16:33:34 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* sign.c (clearsign_file): Fixed "Hash: " armor line.
Tue Apr 28 14:27:42 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* parse-packet.c (parse_subpkt): Some new types.
Mon Apr 27 12:53:59 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (main): Add option --skip-verify.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Ditto.
* g10.c (print_mds): Add output for Tiger.
* sign.c (sign_file): Now uses partial length headers if used
in canonical textmode (kludge to fix a bug).
* parse-packet.c (parse_certificate): Changed BLOWFISH id.
* pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Ditto.
* seskey.c (make_session_key): Ditto.
* seckey-cert.c (protect_secret_key,do_check): Add BLOWFISH160.
Fri Apr 24 17:38:48 1998 Werner Koch,mobil,,, (wk@tobold)
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature): Add sig-class 0x14..0x17
* keyedit.c (sign-key): Some changes to start with support of
the above new sig-classes.
Wed Apr 22 09:01:57 1998 Werner Koch,mobil,,, (wk@tobold)
* getkey.c (compare_name): add email matching
Tue Apr 21 16:17:12 1998 Werner Koch,mobil,,, (wk@tobold)
* armor.c (armor_filter): fixed missing last LF before CSUM.
Thu Apr 9 11:35:22 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): New; combines all the check functions
into one.
* sign.c: removed all key management functions
* keyedit.c: New.
Thu Apr 9 09:49:36 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* import.c (chk_self_sigs): Changed an error message.
Wed Apr 8 16:19:39 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* packet.h: packet structs now uses structs from the pubkey,
removed all copy operations from packet to pubkey structs.
Wed Apr 8 13:40:33 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* trustdb.c (verify_own_certs): Fixed "public key not found".
* getkey.c (key_byname): New, combines public and secret key search.
* pkclist.c (build_pkc_list): Add new arg usage, changed all callers.
* skclist.c (build_skc_list): Likewise.
* ringedit.c (find_keyblock, keyring_search2): Removed.
Wed Apr 8 09:47:21 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* sig-check.c (do_check): Applied small fix from Ulf Möller.
Tue Apr 7 19:28:07 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* cipher.c, encr-data.c, seckey-cert.c: Now uses cipher_xxxx
functions instead of blowfish_xxx or cast_xxx
Tue Apr 7 11:04:02 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* Makefile.am (g10maint.o): Changed the way it is created.
Mon Apr 6 11:17:08 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* misc.c: New.
* keygen.c (checksum,checksum_u16,checksum_mpi): Moved to misc.c
* seckey-cert.c: Kludge for wrong ELG checksum implementation.
Sat Apr 4 20:07:01 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* cipher.c (cipher_filter): Support for CAST5
* encr-data.c (decode_filter): Ditto.
(decrypt_data): Ditto.
* seskey.c (make_session_key): Ditto.
* seckey-cert.c (check_elg, check_dsa): Ditto,
(protect_secret_key): Ditto.
* pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Ditto.
* passphrase.c (hash_passphrase): Ditto.
Thu Apr 2 20:22:35 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* gpgd.c: New
Thu Apr 2 10:38:16 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* keygen.c (generate_keypair): Add valid_days stuff.
* trustdb.c (check_trust): Add check for valid_days.
Wed Apr 1 16:15:58 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* keygen.c (generate_keypair): Addional question whether the
selected large keysize is really needed.
Wed Apr 1 15:56:33 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* seckey-cert.c (protect_secret_key): merged protect_xxx to here.
Wed Apr 1 10:34:46 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* Makefile.am (g10maint.c): Changed creation rule, so that it works
on FreeBSD (missing CFLAGS).
* parse-packet.c (parse_subkey): Removed.
Thu Mar 19 15:22:36 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* ringedit.c (keyring_enum): Fixed problem with reading too
many packets. Add support to read secret keyrings.
* getkey.c (scan_keyring): Removed
(lookup): New to replace scan_keyring.
(scan_secret_keyring): Removed.
(lookup_skc): New.
Wed Mar 18 11:47:34 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* ringedit.c (enum_keyblocks): New read mode 11.
* keyid.c (elg_fingerprint_md): New and changed all other functions
to call this if the packet version is 4 or above.
Tue Mar 17 20:46:16 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* parse-packet.c (parse_certificate): Add listing support for subkeys.
Tue Mar 17 20:32:22 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* armor.c (is_armored): Allow marker packet.
Thu Mar 12 13:36:49 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* trustdb.c (check_trust): Checks timestamp of pubkey.
* sig-check. (do_check): Compares timestamps.
Tue Mar 10 17:01:56 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (main): Add call to init_signals.
* signal.c: New.
Mon Mar 9 12:43:42 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* dsa.c: New
* packet.h, free-packet.c, parse-packet.c : Add support for DSA
* sig-check.c, getkey.c, keyid.c, ringedit.c: Ditto.
* seckey-cert.c: Ditto.
* packet.h : Moved .digest_algo of signature packets to outer
structure. Changed all references
Sun Mar 8 13:06:42 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* openfile.c : Support for stdout filename "-".
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Enhanced status output:
* status.c (write_status_text): New.
Fri Mar 6 16:10:54 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* kbnode.c (clone_kbnode): Fixed private_flag.
* mainproc.c (list_node): Output of string "Revoked" as user-id.
Fri Mar 6 14:26:39 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (main): Add userids to "-kv" and cleaned up this stuff.
Fri Mar 6 12:45:58 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (main): Changed semantics of the list-... commands
and added a new one. Removed option "-d"
* decrypt.c: New.
* trustdb.c (init_trustdb): Autocreate directory only if it ends
in "/.gnupg".
Thu Mar 5 12:12:11 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): New. Common part of proc_packet.
(proc_signature_packets): special version to handle signature data.
* verify.c: New.
* g10.c (aVerify): New.
* plaintext.c (hash_datafiles): New.
* compress.c (handle_compressed): Add callback arg, changed caller.
Thu Mar 5 10:20:06 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c: Is nom the common source for gpg and gpgm
* g10maint.c: Removed
* Makefile.am: Add rule to build g10maint.c
Thu Mar 5 08:43:59 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (main): Changed the way clear text sigs are faked.
Wed Mar 4 19:47:37 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10maint.c (aMuttKeyList): New
* keylist.c: New.
Wed Mar 4 17:20:33 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname): Kludge to allow 0x prefix.
Tue Mar 3 13:46:55 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10maint.c (main): New option --gen-random.
Tue Mar 3 09:50:08 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (aDeleteSecretKey): New.
(aEditSig): Add option "--edit-key" as synonym for "--edit-sig".
(aDeleteSecretKey): New.
* getkey.c (seckey_available): New.
* sign.c (delete_key): Enhanced to delete secret keys, changed all
callers.
Mon Mar 2 21:23:48 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* pkc_list.c (build_pkc_list): Add interactive input of user ID.
Mon Mar 2 20:54:05 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): New.
(add_ownertrust): Add message.
* trustdb.c (enum_trust_web): Quick fix.
Mon Mar 2 13:50:53 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (main): New action aDeleteKey
* sign.c (delete_key): New.
Sun Mar 1 16:38:58 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* trustdb.c (do_check): No returns TRUST_UNDEFINED instead of
eof error.
Fri Feb 27 18:14:03 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* armor.c (find_header): Removed trailing CR on headers.
Fri Feb 27 18:02:48 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* ringedit.c (keyring_search) [MINGW32]: Open and close file here
because rename does not work on open files. Chnaged callers.
Fri Feb 27 16:43:11 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* sig-check.c (do_check): Add an md_enable.
* mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Use md_open in case of detached sig
(proc_tree): Take detached sigs into account.
Fri Feb 27 15:22:46 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (main): Make use of GNUPGHOME envvar.
* g10main.c (main): Ditto.
Wed Feb 25 11:40:04 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* plaintext.c (ask_for_detached_datafile): add opt.verbose to
info output.
* openfile.c (open_sigfile): Try also name ending in ".asc"
Wed Feb 25 08:41:00 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* keygen.c (generate_keypair): Fixed memory overflow.
Tue Feb 24 15:51:55 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* parse-packet.c (parse_certificate): Support for S2K.
* build-packet.c (do_secret_cert): Ditto.
* keygen.c (gen_elg): Ditto.
* seckey-cert.c (check_elg): Ditto
(protect_elg): Ditto.
* sign.c (chnage_passphrase): Ditto.
* passphrase.c (get_passphrase_hash): Support for a salt and
changed all callers.
(make_dek_from_passphrase): Ditto.
Tue Feb 24 12:30:56 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* build-packet.c (hash_public_cert): Disabled debug output.
Fri Feb 20 17:22:28 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* trustdb.c (init_trustdb) [MINGW32]: Removed 2nd mkdir arg.
(keyring_copy) [MINGW32]: Add a remove prior to the renames.
Wed Feb 18 18:39:02 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* Makefile.am (OMIT_DEPENDENCIES): New.
* rsa.c: Replaced log_bug by BUG.
Wed Feb 18 13:35:58 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Now uses hash_public_cert.
* parse-packet.c (parse_certificate): Removed hashing.
* packet.h (public_cert): Removed hash variable.
* free-packet.c (copy_public_cert, free_public_cert): Likewise.
* sig-check.c (check_key_signatures): Changed semantics.
Wed Feb 18 12:11:28 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* trustdb.c (do_check): Add handling for revocation certificates.
(build_sigrecs): Ditto.
(check_sigs): Ditto.
Wed Feb 18 09:31:04 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* armor.c (armor_filter): Add afx->hdrlines.
* revoke.c (gen_revoke): Add comment line.
* dearmor.c (enarmor_file): Ditto.
* sig-check.c (check_key_signature): Add handling for class 0x20.
* mainproc.c : Ditto.
Tue Feb 17 21:24:17 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* armor.c : Add header lines "...ARMORED FILE .."
* dearmor.c (enarmor_file): New.
* g10maint.c (main): New option "--enarmor"
Tue Feb 17 19:03:33 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* mainproc.c : Changed a lot, because the packets are now stored
a simple linlked list and not anymore in a complicatd tree structure.
Tue Feb 17 10:14:48 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* free_packet.c (cmp_public_certs): New.
(cmp_user_ids): New.
* kbnode.c (clone_kbnode): New.
(release_kbnode): Add clone support.
* ringedit.c (find_keyblock_bypkc): New.
* sign.c (remove_keysigs): Self signatures are now skipped,
changed arguments and all callers.
* import.c : Add functionality.
Tue Feb 17 09:31:40 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* options.h (homedir): New option.
* g10.c, g10maint.c, getkey.c, keygen.c, trustdb.c (opt.homedir): New.
* trustdb.c (init_trustdb): mkdir for hoem directory
(sign_private_data): Renamed "sig" to "g10.sig"
Mon Feb 16 20:02:03 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* kbnode.c (commit_kbnode): New.
(delete_kbnode): removed unused first arg. Changed all Callers.
* ringedit.c (keyblock_resource_name): New.
(get_keyblock_handle): NULL for filename returns default resource.
Mon Feb 16 19:38:48 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* sig-check.s (check_key_signature): Now uses the supplied
public key to check the signature and not any more the one
from the getkey.c
(do_check): New.
(check_signature): Most work moved to do_check.
Mon Feb 16 14:48:57 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* armor.c (find_header): Fixed another bug.
Mon Feb 16 12:18:34 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* getkey.c (scan_keyring): Add handling of compressed keyrings.
Mon Feb 16 10:44:51 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c, g10maint.c (strusage): Rewrote.
(build_list): New
Mon Feb 16 08:58:41 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* armor.c (use_armor): New.
Sat Feb 14 14:30:57 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Sigclass fix.
Sat Feb 14 14:16:33 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* armor.c (armor_filter): Changed version and comment string.
* encode.c, sign.c, keygen.c: Changed all comment packet strings.
Sat Feb 14 12:39:24 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (aGenRevoke): New command.
* revoke.c: New.
* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Add support for sigclass 0x20.
Fri Feb 13 20:18:14 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* ringedit.c (enum_keyblocks, keyring_enum): New.
Fri Feb 13 19:33:40 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* export.c: Add functionality.
* keygen.c (generate_keypair): Moved the leading comment behind the
key packet.
* kbnode.c (walk_kbnode): Fixed.
* g10.c (main): listing armored keys now work.
Fri Feb 13 16:17:43 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* parse-packet.c (parse_publickey, parse_signature): Fixed calls
to mpi_read used for ELG b.
Fri Feb 13 15:13:23 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* g10.c (main): changed formatting of help output.
Thu Feb 12 22:24:42 1998 Werner Koch (wk@frodo)
* pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): rewritten
Copyright 1998,1999,2000,2001,2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives
unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without
modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the
implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
diff --git a/g10/import.c b/g10/import.c
index f54f8d850..9f6b8936e 100644
--- a/g10/import.c
+++ b/g10/import.c
@@ -1,1789 +1,1796 @@
/* import.c
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "errors.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "memory.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "ttyio.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "keyserver-internal.h"
struct stats_s {
ulong count;
ulong no_user_id;
ulong imported;
ulong imported_rsa;
ulong n_uids;
ulong n_sigs;
ulong n_subk;
ulong unchanged;
ulong n_revoc;
ulong secret_read;
ulong secret_imported;
ulong secret_dups;
ulong skipped_new_keys;
ulong not_imported;
};
static int import( IOBUF inp, const char* fname,
struct stats_s *stats, unsigned int options );
static int read_block( IOBUF a, PACKET **pending_pkt, KBNODE *ret_root );
static void revocation_present(KBNODE keyblock);
static void remove_bad_stuff (KBNODE keyblock);
static int import_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
struct stats_s *stats, unsigned int options);
static int import_secret_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
struct stats_s *stats );
static int import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node,
struct stats_s *stats);
static int chk_self_sigs( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid );
static int delete_inv_parts( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
u32 *keyid, unsigned int options );
static int merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig,
KBNODE keyblock, u32 *keyid,
int *n_uids, int *n_sigs, int *n_subk );
static int append_uid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
static int append_key( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
static int merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
static int merge_keysigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
int
parse_import_options(char *str,unsigned int *options)
{
char *tok;
int hit=0;
struct
{
char *name;
unsigned int bit;
} import_opts[]=
{
{"allow-local-sigs",IMPORT_ALLOW_LOCAL_SIGS},
{"repair-hkp-subkey-bug",IMPORT_REPAIR_HKP_SUBKEY_BUG},
{"fast-import",IMPORT_FAST_IMPORT},
{NULL,0}
};
while((tok=strsep(&str," ,")))
{
int i,rev=0;
if(ascii_strncasecmp("no-",tok,3)==0)
{
rev=1;
tok+=3;
}
for(i=0;import_opts[i].name;i++)
{
if(ascii_strcasecmp(import_opts[i].name,tok)==0)
{
if(rev)
*options&=~import_opts[i].bit;
else
*options|=import_opts[i].bit;
hit=1;
break;
}
}
if(!hit && !import_opts[i].name)
return 0;
}
return hit;
}
void *
import_new_stats_handle (void)
{
return m_alloc_clear ( sizeof (struct stats_s) );
}
void
import_release_stats_handle (void *p)
{
m_free (p);
}
/****************
* Import the public keys from the given filename. Input may be armored.
* This function rejects all keys which are not validly self signed on at
* least one userid. Only user ids which are self signed will be imported.
* Other signatures are not checked.
*
* Actually this function does a merge. It works like this:
*
* - get the keyblock
* - check self-signatures and remove all userids and their signatures
* without/invalid self-signatures.
* - reject the keyblock, if we have no valid userid.
* - See whether we have this key already in one of our pubrings.
* If not, simply add it to the default keyring.
* - Compare the key and the self-signatures of the new and the one in
* our keyring. If they are different something weird is going on;
* ask what to do.
* - See whether we have only non-self-signature on one user id; if not
* ask the user what to do.
* - compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
* that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
* (consider looking at the timestamp and use the newest?)
* - Simply add the signature. Can't verify here because we may not have
* the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it
* into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey
* is used.
* - Proceed with next signature.
*
* Key revocation certificates have special handling.
*
*/
static int
import_keys_internal( IOBUF inp, char **fnames, int nnames,
void *stats_handle, unsigned int options )
{
int i, rc = 0;
struct stats_s *stats = stats_handle;
if (!stats)
stats = import_new_stats_handle ();
if (inp) {
rc = import( inp, "[stream]", stats, options);
}
else {
if( !fnames && !nnames )
nnames = 1; /* Ohh what a ugly hack to jump into the loop */
for(i=0; i < nnames; i++ ) {
const char *fname = fnames? fnames[i] : NULL;
IOBUF inp = iobuf_open(fname);
if( !fname )
fname = "[stdin]";
if( !inp )
log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
else {
rc = import( inp, fname, stats, options );
iobuf_close(inp);
if( rc )
log_error("import from `%s' failed: %s\n", fname,
g10_errstr(rc) );
}
if( !fname )
break;
}
}
if (!stats_handle) {
import_print_stats (stats);
import_release_stats_handle (stats);
}
/* If no fast import and we really added new keys or merged new
user ids, signatures or revocations, then update/check the
trustdb if the user specified by setting interactive or by
not setting no-auto-check-trustdb */
if (!(options&IMPORT_FAST_IMPORT) &&
(stats->imported || stats->n_uids ||
stats->n_sigs || stats->n_revoc)) {
if (opt.interactive)
update_trustdb();
else if (!opt.no_auto_check_trustdb)
check_trustdb();
}
return rc;
}
void
import_keys( char **fnames, int nnames,
void *stats_handle, unsigned int options )
{
import_keys_internal( NULL, fnames, nnames, stats_handle, options);
}
int
import_keys_stream( IOBUF inp, void *stats_handle, unsigned int options )
{
return import_keys_internal( inp, NULL, 0, stats_handle, options);
}
static int
import( IOBUF inp, const char* fname,
struct stats_s *stats, unsigned int options )
{
PACKET *pending_pkt = NULL;
KBNODE keyblock;
int rc = 0;
getkey_disable_caches();
if( !opt.no_armor ) { /* armored reading is not disabled */
armor_filter_context_t *afx = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *afx );
afx->only_keyblocks = 1;
iobuf_push_filter2( inp, armor_filter, afx, 1 );
}
while( !(rc = read_block( inp, &pending_pkt, &keyblock) )) {
remove_bad_stuff (keyblock);
if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
rc = import_one( fname, keyblock, stats, options );
else if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
rc = import_secret_one( fname, keyblock, stats );
else if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& keyblock->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
rc = import_revoke_cert( fname, keyblock, stats );
else {
log_info( _("skipping block of type %d\n"),
keyblock->pkt->pkttype );
}
release_kbnode(keyblock);
/* fixme: we should increment the not imported counter but this
does only make sense if we keep on going despite of errors. */
if( rc )
break;
if( !(++stats->count % 100) && !opt.quiet )
log_info(_("%lu keys processed so far\n"), stats->count );
}
if( rc == -1 )
rc = 0;
else if( rc && rc != G10ERR_INV_KEYRING )
log_error( _("error reading `%s': %s\n"), fname, g10_errstr(rc));
return rc;
}
void
import_print_stats (void *hd)
{
struct stats_s *stats = hd;
if( !opt.quiet ) {
log_info(_("Total number processed: %lu\n"), stats->count );
if( stats->skipped_new_keys )
log_info(_(" skipped new keys: %lu\n"),
stats->skipped_new_keys );
if( stats->no_user_id )
log_info(_(" w/o user IDs: %lu\n"), stats->no_user_id );
if( stats->imported || stats->imported_rsa ) {
log_info(_(" imported: %lu"), stats->imported );
if( stats->imported_rsa )
fprintf(stderr, " (RSA: %lu)", stats->imported_rsa );
putc('\n', stderr);
}
if( stats->unchanged )
log_info(_(" unchanged: %lu\n"), stats->unchanged );
if( stats->n_uids )
log_info(_(" new user IDs: %lu\n"), stats->n_uids );
if( stats->n_subk )
log_info(_(" new subkeys: %lu\n"), stats->n_subk );
if( stats->n_sigs )
log_info(_(" new signatures: %lu\n"), stats->n_sigs );
if( stats->n_revoc )
log_info(_(" new key revocations: %lu\n"), stats->n_revoc );
if( stats->secret_read )
log_info(_(" secret keys read: %lu\n"), stats->secret_read );
if( stats->secret_imported )
log_info(_(" secret keys imported: %lu\n"), stats->secret_imported );
if( stats->secret_dups )
log_info(_(" secret keys unchanged: %lu\n"), stats->secret_dups );
if( stats->not_imported )
log_info(_(" not imported: %lu\n"), stats->not_imported );
}
if( is_status_enabled() ) {
char buf[14*20];
sprintf(buf, "%lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu",
stats->count,
stats->no_user_id,
stats->imported,
stats->imported_rsa,
stats->unchanged,
stats->n_uids,
stats->n_subk,
stats->n_sigs,
stats->n_revoc,
stats->secret_read,
stats->secret_imported,
stats->secret_dups,
stats->skipped_new_keys,
stats->not_imported );
write_status_text( STATUS_IMPORT_RES, buf );
}
}
/****************
* Read the next keyblock from stream A.
* PENDING_PKT should be initialzed to NULL
* and not chnaged form the caller.
* Retunr: 0 = okay, -1 no more blocks or another errorcode.
*/
static int
read_block( IOBUF a, PACKET **pending_pkt, KBNODE *ret_root )
{
int rc;
PACKET *pkt;
KBNODE root = NULL;
int in_cert;
if( *pending_pkt ) {
root = new_kbnode( *pending_pkt );
*pending_pkt = NULL;
in_cert = 1;
}
else
in_cert = 0;
pkt = m_alloc( sizeof *pkt );
init_packet(pkt);
while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) {
if( rc ) { /* ignore errors */
if( rc != G10ERR_UNKNOWN_PACKET ) {
log_error("read_block: read error: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
rc = G10ERR_INV_KEYRING;
goto ready;
}
free_packet( pkt );
init_packet(pkt);
continue;
}
if( !root && pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
/* this is a revocation certificate which is handled
* in a special way */
root = new_kbnode( pkt );
pkt = NULL;
goto ready;
}
/* make a linked list of all packets */
switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
case PKT_COMPRESSED:
if( pkt->pkt.compressed->algorithm < 1
|| pkt->pkt.compressed->algorithm > 2 ) {
rc = G10ERR_COMPR_ALGO;
goto ready;
}
{
compress_filter_context_t *cfx = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *cfx );
cfx->algo = pkt->pkt.compressed->algorithm;
pkt->pkt.compressed->buf = NULL;
iobuf_push_filter2( a, compress_filter, cfx, 1 );
}
free_packet( pkt );
init_packet(pkt);
break;
case PKT_RING_TRUST:
/* skip those packets */
free_packet( pkt );
init_packet(pkt);
break;
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
if( in_cert ) { /* store this packet */
*pending_pkt = pkt;
pkt = NULL;
goto ready;
}
in_cert = 1;
default:
if( in_cert ) {
if( !root )
root = new_kbnode( pkt );
else
add_kbnode( root, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
pkt = m_alloc( sizeof *pkt );
}
init_packet(pkt);
break;
}
}
ready:
if( rc == -1 && root )
rc = 0;
if( rc )
release_kbnode( root );
else
*ret_root = root;
free_packet( pkt );
m_free( pkt );
return rc;
}
static void
remove_bad_stuff (KBNODE keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
/* delete the subpackets we used to use for the
verification cache */
delete_sig_subpkt (node->pkt->pkt.signature->unhashed,
SIGSUBPKT_PRIV_VERIFY_CACHE);
}
}
}
/* Walk through the subkeys on a pk to find if we have the HKP
disease: multiple subkeys with their binding sigs stripped, and the
sig for the first subkey placed after the last subkey. That is,
instead of "pk uid sig sub1 bind1 sub2 bind2 sub3 bind3" we have
"pk uid sig sub1 sub2 sub3 bind1". We can't do anything about sub2
and sub3, as they are already lost, but we can try and rescue sub1
by reordering the keyblock so that it reads "pk uid sig sub1 bind1
sub2 sub3". Returns TRUE if the keyblock was modified. */
static int
fix_hkp_corruption(KBNODE keyblock)
{
int changed=0,keycount=0;
KBNODE node,last=NULL,sknode=NULL;
/* First determine if we have the problem at all. Look for 2 or
more subkeys in a row, followed by a single binding sig. */
for(node=keyblock;node;last=node,node=node->next)
{
if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
keycount++;
if(!sknode)
sknode=node;
}
else if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class==0x18 &&
keycount>=2 && node->next==NULL)
{
/* We might have the problem, as this key has two subkeys in
a row without any intervening packets. */
/* Sanity check */
if(last==NULL)
break;
/* Temporarily attach node to sknode. */
node->next=sknode->next;
sknode->next=node;
last->next=NULL;
if(check_key_signature(keyblock,node,NULL))
{
/* Not a match, so undo the changes. */
sknode->next=node->next;
last->next=node;
node->next=NULL;
break;
}
else
{
sknode->flag |= 1; /* Mark it good so we don't need to
check it again */
changed=1;
break;
}
}
else
keycount=0;
}
return changed;
}
static void
print_import_ok (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk, unsigned int reason)
{
byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *s;
char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+30], *p;
size_t i, n;
sprintf (buf, "%u ", reason);
p = buf + strlen (buf);
if (pk)
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n);
else
fingerprint_from_sk (sk, array, &n);
s = array;
for (i=0; i < n ; i++, s++, p += 2)
sprintf (p, "%02X", *s);
write_status_text (STATUS_IMPORT_OK, buf);
}
/****************
* Try to import one keyblock. Return an error only in serious cases, but
* never for an invalid keyblock. It uses log_error to increase the
* internal errorcount, so that invalid input can be detected by programs
* which called g10.
*/
static int
import_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
struct stats_s *stats, unsigned int options )
{
PKT_public_key *pk;
PKT_public_key *pk_orig;
KBNODE node, uidnode;
KBNODE keyblock_orig = NULL;
u32 keyid[2];
int rc = 0;
int new_key = 0;
int mod_key = 0;
/* get the key and print some info about it */
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
if( !node )
BUG();
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
uidnode = find_next_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_USER_ID );
if( opt.verbose ) {
log_info( "pub %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_pk(pk) );
if( uidnode )
print_utf8_string( stderr, uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
putc('\n', stderr);
}
if( !uidnode ) {
log_error( _("key %08lX: no user ID\n"), (ulong)keyid[1]);
return 0;
}
if (opt.interactive) {
tty_printf ("\n");
show_basic_key_info (keyblock);
tty_printf ("\n");
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("import.okay",
"Do you want to import this key? (y/N) "))
return 0;
}
clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );
if((options&IMPORT_REPAIR_HKP_SUBKEY_BUG) && fix_hkp_corruption(keyblock))
log_info(_("key %08lX: HKP subkey corruption repaired\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
rc = chk_self_sigs( fname, keyblock , pk, keyid );
if( rc )
return rc== -1? 0:rc;
/* If we allow such a thing, mark unsigned uids as valid */
if( opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid )
for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next )
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & 1) )
{
char *user=utf8_to_native(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
node->flag |= 1;
log_info( _("key %08lX: accepted non self-signed user ID '%s'\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1],user);
m_free(user);
}
if( !delete_inv_parts( fname, keyblock, keyid, options ) ) {
if( !opt.quiet ) {
log_info( _("key %08lX: no valid user IDs\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
log_info(_("this may be caused by a missing self-signature\n"));
}
stats->no_user_id++;
return 0;
}
/* do we have this key already in one of our pubrings ? */
pk_orig = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk_orig );
rc = get_pubkey( pk_orig, keyid );
if( rc && rc != G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && rc != G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY ) {
log_error( _("key %08lX: public key not found: %s\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], g10_errstr(rc));
}
else if ( rc && opt.merge_only ) {
if( opt.verbose )
log_info( _("key %08lX: new key - skipped\n"), (ulong)keyid[1] );
rc = 0;
stats->skipped_new_keys++;
}
else if( rc ) { /* insert this key */
KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new (0);
rc = keydb_locate_writable (hd, NULL);
if (rc) {
log_error (_("no writable keyring found: %s\n"), g10_errstr (rc));
keydb_release (hd);
return G10ERR_GENERAL;
}
if( opt.verbose > 1 )
log_info (_("writing to `%s'\n"), keydb_get_resource_name (hd) );
rc = keydb_insert_keyblock (hd, keyblock );
if (rc)
log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc));
else
{
/* This should not be possible since we delete the
ownertrust when a key is deleted, but it can happen if
the keyring and trustdb are out of sync. It can also
be made to happen with the trusted-key command. */
clear_ownertrust (pk);
revalidation_mark ();
}
keydb_release (hd);
/* we are ready */
if( !opt.quiet ) {
char *p=get_user_id_printable (keyid);
log_info( _("key %08lX: public key \"%s\" imported\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1],p);
m_free(p);
}
if( is_status_enabled() ) {
char *us = get_long_user_id_string( keyid );
write_status_text( STATUS_IMPORTED, us );
m_free(us);
print_import_ok (pk,NULL, 1);
}
stats->imported++;
if( is_RSA( pk->pubkey_algo ) )
stats->imported_rsa++;
new_key = 1;
}
else { /* merge */
KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
int n_uids, n_sigs, n_subk;
/* Compare the original against the new key; just to be sure nothing
* weird is going on */
if( cmp_public_keys( pk_orig, pk ) ) {
log_error( _("key %08lX: doesn't match our copy\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
goto leave;
}
/* now read the original keyblock */
hd = keydb_new (0);
{
byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t an;
fingerprint_from_pk (pk_orig, afp, &an);
while (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)
afp[an++] = 0;
rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, afp);
}
if( rc ) {
log_error (_("key %08lX: can't locate original keyblock: %s\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], g10_errstr(rc));
keydb_release (hd);
goto leave;
}
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock_orig );
if (rc) {
log_error (_("key %08lX: can't read original keyblock: %s\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], g10_errstr(rc));
keydb_release (hd);
goto leave;
}
collapse_uids( &keyblock );
/* and try to merge the block */
clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock_orig );
clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );
n_uids = n_sigs = n_subk = 0;
rc = merge_blocks( fname, keyblock_orig, keyblock,
keyid, &n_uids, &n_sigs, &n_subk );
if( rc ) {
keydb_release (hd);
goto leave;
}
if( n_uids || n_sigs || n_subk ) {
mod_key = 1;
/* keyblock_orig has been updated; write */
rc = keydb_update_keyblock (hd, keyblock_orig);
if (rc)
log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc) );
else
revalidation_mark ();
/* we are ready */
if( !opt.quiet ) {
char *p=get_user_id_printable(keyid);
if( n_uids == 1 )
log_info( _("key %08lX: \"%s\" 1 new user ID\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], p);
else if( n_uids )
log_info( _("key %08lX: \"%s\" %d new user IDs\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], p, n_uids );
if( n_sigs == 1 )
log_info( _("key %08lX: \"%s\" 1 new signature\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], p);
else if( n_sigs )
log_info( _("key %08lX: \"%s\" %d new signatures\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], p, n_sigs );
if( n_subk == 1 )
log_info( _("key %08lX: \"%s\" 1 new subkey\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], p);
else if( n_subk )
log_info( _("key %08lX: \"%s\" %d new subkeys\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], p, n_subk );
m_free(p);
}
stats->n_uids +=n_uids;
stats->n_sigs +=n_sigs;
stats->n_subk +=n_subk;
if (is_status_enabled ())
print_import_ok (pk, NULL,
((n_uids?2:0)|(n_sigs?4:0)|(n_subk?8:0)));
}
else {
if (is_status_enabled ())
print_import_ok (pk, NULL, 0);
if( !opt.quiet ) {
char *p=get_user_id_printable(keyid);
log_info( _("key %08lX: \"%s\" not changed\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1],p);
m_free(p);
}
stats->unchanged++;
}
keydb_release (hd); hd = NULL;
}
leave:
release_kbnode( keyblock_orig );
free_public_key( pk_orig );
revocation_present(keyblock);
return rc;
}
/****************
* Ditto for secret keys. Handling is simpler than for public keys.
* We allow secret key importing only when allow is true, this is so
* that a secret key can not be imported accidently and thereby tampering
* with the trust calculation.
*/
static int
import_secret_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
struct stats_s *stats)
{
PKT_secret_key *sk;
KBNODE node, uidnode;
u32 keyid[2];
int rc = 0;
/* get the key and print some info about it */
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
if( !node )
BUG();
sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
uidnode = find_next_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_USER_ID );
if( opt.verbose ) {
log_info( "sec %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
nbits_from_sk( sk ),
pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_sk(sk) );
if( uidnode )
print_utf8_string( stderr, uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
putc('\n', stderr);
}
stats->secret_read++;
if( !uidnode ) {
log_error( _("key %08lX: no user ID\n"), (ulong)keyid[1]);
return 0;
}
+ if(sk->protect.algo>110)
+ {
+ log_error(_("key %08lX: secret key with invalid cipher %d "
+ "- skipped\n"),(ulong)keyid[1],sk->protect.algo);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );
/* do we have this key already in one of our secrings ? */
rc = seckey_available( keyid );
if( rc == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY && !opt.merge_only ) { /* simply insert this key */
KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new (1);
/* get default resource */
rc = keydb_locate_writable (hd, NULL);
if (rc) {
log_error (_("no default secret keyring: %s\n"), g10_errstr (rc));
keydb_release (hd);
return G10ERR_GENERAL;
}
rc = keydb_insert_keyblock (hd, keyblock );
if (rc)
log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc) );
keydb_release (hd);
/* we are ready */
if( !opt.quiet )
log_info( _("key %08lX: secret key imported\n"), (ulong)keyid[1]);
stats->secret_imported++;
if (is_status_enabled ())
print_import_ok (NULL, sk, 1|16);
}
else if( !rc ) { /* we can't merge secret keys */
log_error( _("key %08lX: already in secret keyring\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
stats->secret_dups++;
if (is_status_enabled ())
print_import_ok (NULL, sk, 16);
}
else
log_error( _("key %08lX: secret key not found: %s\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], g10_errstr(rc));
return rc;
}
/****************
* Import a revocation certificate; this is a single signature packet.
*/
static int
import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node, struct stats_s *stats )
{
PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
KBNODE onode, keyblock = NULL;
KEYDB_HANDLE hd = NULL;
u32 keyid[2];
int rc = 0;
assert( !node->next );
assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE );
assert( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 );
keyid[0] = node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0];
keyid[1] = node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1];
pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY ) {
log_info( _("key %08lX: no public key - "
"can't apply revocation certificate\n"), (ulong)keyid[1]);
rc = 0;
goto leave;
}
else if( rc ) {
log_error( _("key %08lX: public key not found: %s\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
/* read the original keyblock */
hd = keydb_new (0);
{
byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t an;
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, afp, &an);
while (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)
afp[an++] = 0;
rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, afp);
}
if (rc) {
log_error (_("key %08lX: can't locate original keyblock: %s\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock );
if (rc) {
log_error (_("key %08lX: can't read original keyblock: %s\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
/* it is okay, that node is not in keyblock because
* check_key_signature works fine for sig_class 0x20 in this
* special case. */
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL);
if( rc ) {
log_error( _("key %08lX: invalid revocation certificate"
": %s - rejected\n"), (ulong)keyid[1], g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
/* check whether we already have this */
for(onode=keyblock->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
else if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20
&& keyid[0] == onode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
&& keyid[1] == onode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] ) {
rc = 0;
goto leave; /* yes, we already know about it */
}
}
/* insert it */
insert_kbnode( keyblock, clone_kbnode(node), 0 );
/* and write the keyblock back */
rc = keydb_update_keyblock (hd, keyblock );
if (rc)
log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc) );
keydb_release (hd); hd = NULL;
/* we are ready */
if( !opt.quiet ) {
char *p=get_user_id_printable (keyid);
log_info( _("key %08lX: \"%s\" revocation certificate imported\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1],p);
m_free(p);
}
stats->n_revoc++;
revalidation_mark ();
leave:
keydb_release (hd);
release_kbnode( keyblock );
free_public_key( pk );
return rc;
}
/****************
* loop over the keyblock and check all self signatures.
* Mark all user-ids with a self-signature by setting flag bit 0.
* Mark all user-ids with an invalid self-signature by setting bit 1.
* This works also for subkeys, here the subkey is marked. Invalid or
* extra subkey sigs (binding or revocation) are marked for deletion.
*/
static int
chk_self_sigs( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid )
{
KBNODE n,knode=NULL;
PKT_signature *sig;
int rc;
u32 bsdate=0,rsdate=0;
KBNODE bsnode=NULL,rsnode=NULL;
for( n=keyblock; (n = find_next_kbnode(n, 0)); ) {
if(n->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
knode=n;
bsdate=0;
rsdate=0;
bsnode=NULL;
rsnode=NULL;
}
else if( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
continue;
sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] ) {
if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 ) {
KBNODE unode = find_prev_kbnode( keyblock, n, PKT_USER_ID );
if( !unode ) {
log_error( _("key %08lX: no user ID for signature\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
return -1; /* the complete keyblock is invalid */
}
/* If it hasn't been marked valid yet, keep trying */
if(!(unode->flag&1)) {
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, n, NULL);
if( rc )
{
char *p=utf8_to_native(unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
strlen(unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name),0);
log_info( rc == G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
_("key %08lX: unsupported public key "
"algorithm on user id \"%s\"\n"):
_("key %08lX: invalid self-signature "
"on user id \"%s\"\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1],p);
m_free(p);
}
else
unode->flag |= 1; /* mark that signature checked */
}
}
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 ) {
/* Note that this works based solely on the timestamps
like the rest of gpg. If the standard gets
revocation targets, this may need to be revised. */
if( !knode ) {
log_info( _("key %08lX: no subkey for subkey "
"binding signature\n"),(ulong)keyid[1]);
n->flag |= 4; /* delete this */
}
else {
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, n, NULL);
if( rc ) {
log_info( rc == G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
_("key %08lX: unsupported public key algorithm\n"):
_("key %08lX: invalid subkey binding\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
n->flag|=4;
}
else {
/* It's valid, so is it newer? */
if(sig->timestamp>=bsdate) {
knode->flag |= 1; /* the subkey is valid */
if(bsnode) {
bsnode->flag|=4; /* Delete the last binding
sig since this one is
newer */
log_info(_("key %08lX: removed multiple subkey "
"binding\n"),(ulong)keyid[1]);
}
bsnode=n;
bsdate=sig->timestamp;
}
else
n->flag|=4; /* older */
}
}
}
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 ) {
/* We don't actually mark the subkey as revoked right
now, so just check that the revocation sig is the
most recent valid one. Note that we don't care if
the binding sig is newer than the revocation sig.
See the comment in getkey.c:merge_selfsigs_subkey for
more */
if( !knode ) {
log_info( _("key %08lX: no subkey for subkey "
"revocation signature\n"),(ulong)keyid[1]);
n->flag |= 4; /* delete this */
}
else {
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, n, NULL);
if( rc ) {
log_info( rc == G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
_("key %08lX: unsupported public key algorithm\n"):
_("key %08lX: invalid subkey revocation\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
n->flag|=4;
}
else {
/* It's valid, so is it newer? */
if(sig->timestamp>=rsdate) {
if(rsnode) {
rsnode->flag|=4; /* Delete the last revocation
sig since this one is
newer */
log_info(_("key %08lX: removed multiple subkey "
"revocation signatures\n"),(ulong)keyid[1]);
}
rsnode=n;
rsdate=sig->timestamp;
}
else
n->flag|=4; /* older */
}
}
}
}
}
return 0;
}
/****************
* delete all parts which are invalid and those signatures whose
* public key algorithm is not available in this implemenation;
* but consider RSA as valid, because parse/build_packets knows
* about it.
* returns: true if at least one valid user-id is left over.
*/
static int
delete_inv_parts( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
u32 *keyid, unsigned int options)
{
KBNODE node;
int nvalid=0, uid_seen=0, subkey_seen=0;
for(node=keyblock->next; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
uid_seen = 1;
if( (node->flag & 2) || !(node->flag & 1) ) {
if( opt.verbose ) {
log_info( _("key %08lX: skipped user ID '"),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
print_utf8_string( stderr, node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
fputs("'\n", stderr );
}
delete_kbnode( node ); /* the user-id */
/* and all following packets up to the next user-id */
while( node->next
&& node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID
&& node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ){
delete_kbnode( node->next );
node = node->next;
}
}
else
nvalid++;
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
if( (node->flag & 2) || !(node->flag & 1) ) {
if( opt.verbose ) {
log_info( _("key %08lX: skipped subkey\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
}
delete_kbnode( node ); /* the subkey */
/* and all following signature packets */
while( node->next
&& node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
delete_kbnode( node->next );
node = node->next;
}
}
else
subkey_seen = 1;
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& check_pubkey_algo( node->pkt->pkt.signature->pubkey_algo)
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->pubkey_algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
delete_kbnode( node ); /* build_packet() can't handle this */
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE &&
!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable &&
!(options&IMPORT_ALLOW_LOCAL_SIGS) &&
seckey_available( node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid ) ) {
/* here we violate the rfc a bit by still allowing
* to import non-exportable signature when we have the
* the secret key used to create this signature - it
* seems that this makes sense */
log_info( _("key %08lX: non exportable signature "
"(class %02x) - skipped\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1],
node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class );
delete_kbnode( node );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
if( uid_seen ) {
log_error( _("key %08lX: revocation certificate "
"at wrong place - skipped\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
delete_kbnode( node );
}
else {
/* If the revocation cert is from a different key than
the one we're working on don't check it - it's
probably from a revocation key and won't be
verifiable with this key anyway. */
if(node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]==keyid[0] &&
node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]==keyid[1])
{
int rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL);
if( rc )
{
log_error( _("key %08lX: invalid revocation "
"certificate: %s - skipped\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], g10_errstr(rc));
delete_kbnode( node );
}
}
}
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE &&
(node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x18 ||
node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28) &&
!subkey_seen ) {
log_error( _("key %08lX: subkey signature "
"in wrong place - skipped\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
delete_kbnode( node );
}
else if( (node->flag & 4) ) /* marked for deletion */
delete_kbnode( node );
}
/* note: because keyblock is the public key, it is never marked
* for deletion and so keyblock cannot change */
commit_kbnode( &keyblock );
return nvalid;
}
/****************
* It may happen that the imported keyblock has duplicated user IDs.
* We check this here and collapse those user IDs together with their
* sigs into one.
* Returns: True if the keyblock hash changed.
*/
int
collapse_uids( KBNODE *keyblock )
{
KBNODE n, n2;
int in_uid;
int any=0;
u32 kid1;
restart:
for( n = *keyblock; n; n = n->next ) {
if( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
continue;
for( n2 = n->next; n2; n2 = n2->next ) {
if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& !cmp_user_ids( n->pkt->pkt.user_id,
n2->pkt->pkt.user_id ) ) {
/* found a duplicate */
any = 1;
if( !n2->next
|| n2->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| n2->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| n2->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
/* no more signatures: delete the user ID
* and start over */
remove_kbnode( keyblock, n2 );
}
else {
/* The simple approach: Move one signature and
* then start over to delete the next one :-( */
move_kbnode( keyblock, n2->next, n->next );
}
goto restart;
}
}
}
if( !any )
return 0;
restart_sig:
/* now we may have duplicate signatures on one user ID: fix this */
for( in_uid = 0, n = *keyblock; n; n = n->next ) {
if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
in_uid = 1;
else if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
in_uid = 0;
else if( in_uid ) {
n2 = n;
do {
KBNODE ncmp = NULL;
for( ; n2; n2 = n2->next ) {
if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
break;
if( n2->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
;
else if( !ncmp )
ncmp = n2;
else if( !cmp_signatures( ncmp->pkt->pkt.signature,
n2->pkt->pkt.signature )) {
remove_kbnode( keyblock, n2 );
goto restart_sig;
}
}
n2 = ncmp? ncmp->next : NULL;
} while( n2 );
}
}
if( (n = find_kbnode( *keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )) )
kid1 = keyid_from_pk( n->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL );
else if( (n = find_kbnode( *keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY )) )
kid1 = keyid_from_sk( n->pkt->pkt.secret_key, NULL );
else
kid1 = 0;
log_info(_("key %08lX: duplicated user ID detected - merged\n"),
(ulong)kid1);
return 1;
}
/* Check for a 0x20 revocation from a revocation key that is not
present. This gets called without the benefit of merge_xxxx so you
can't rely on pk->revkey and friends. */
static void
revocation_present(KBNODE keyblock)
{
KBNODE onode,inode;
PKT_public_key *pk=keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
for(onode=keyblock->next;onode;onode=onode->next)
{
/* If we reach user IDs, we're done. */
if(onode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
break;
if(onode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class==0x1F &&
onode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey)
{
int idx;
PKT_signature *sig=onode->pkt->pkt.signature;
for(idx=0;idx<sig->numrevkeys;idx++)
{
u32 keyid[2];
keyid_from_fingerprint(sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN,keyid);
for(inode=keyblock->next;inode;inode=inode->next)
{
/* If we reach user IDs, we're done. */
if(inode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
break;
if(inode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
inode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class==0x20 &&
inode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]==keyid[0] &&
inode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]==keyid[1])
{
/* Okay, we have a revocation key, and a
revocation issued by it. Do we have the key
itself? */
int rc;
rc=get_pubkey_byfprint(NULL,sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY || rc==G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY)
{
/* No, so try and get it */
if(opt.keyserver_scheme &&
opt.keyserver_options.auto_key_retrieve)
{
log_info(_("WARNING: key %08lX may be revoked: "
"fetching revocation key %08lX\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
keyserver_import_fprint(sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
/* Do we have it now? */
rc=get_pubkey_byfprint(NULL,
sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
}
if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY || rc==G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY)
log_info(_("WARNING: key %08lX may be revoked: "
"revocation key %08lX not present.\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
/****************
* compare and merge the blocks
*
* o compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
* that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
* o Simply add the signature. Can't verify here because we may not have
* the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it
* into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey
* is used.
* Note: We indicate newly inserted packets with flag bit 0
*/
static int
merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig, KBNODE keyblock,
u32 *keyid, int *n_uids, int *n_sigs, int *n_subk )
{
KBNODE onode, node;
int rc, found;
/* 1st: handle revocation certificates */
for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
/* check whether we already have this */
found = 0;
for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
else if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
== onode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
== onode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] ) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if( !found ) {
char *p=get_user_id_printable (keyid);
KBNODE n2 = clone_kbnode(node);
insert_kbnode( keyblock_orig, n2, 0 );
n2->flag |= 1;
++*n_sigs;
log_info(_("key %08lX: \"%s\" revocation certificate added\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1],p);
m_free(p);
}
}
}
/* 2nd: merge in any direct key (0x1F) sigs */
for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x1F ) {
/* check whether we already have this */
found = 0;
for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
else if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x1F
&& !cmp_signatures(onode->pkt->pkt.signature,
node->pkt->pkt.signature)) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if( !found ) {
KBNODE n2 = clone_kbnode(node);
insert_kbnode( keyblock_orig, n2, 0 );
n2->flag |= 1;
++*n_sigs;
log_info( _("key %08lX: direct key signature added\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
}
}
}
/* 3rd: try to merge new certificates in */
for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
if( !(onode->flag & 1) && onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) {
/* find the user id in the imported keyblock */
for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next )
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& !cmp_user_ids( onode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id ) )
break;
if( node ) { /* found: merge */
rc = merge_sigs( onode, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid );
if( rc )
return rc;
}
}
}
/* 4th: add new user-ids */
for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) {
/* do we have this in the original keyblock */
for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& !cmp_user_ids( onode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id ) )
break;
if( !onode ) { /* this is a new user id: append */
rc = append_uid( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
if( rc )
return rc;
++*n_uids;
}
}
}
/* 5th: add new subkeys */
for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
onode = NULL;
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
/* do we have this in the original keyblock? */
for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& !cmp_public_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
node->pkt->pkt.public_key ) )
break;
if( !onode ) { /* this is a new subkey: append */
rc = append_key( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
if( rc )
return rc;
++*n_subk;
}
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
/* do we have this in the original keyblock? */
for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
&& !cmp_secret_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.secret_key,
node->pkt->pkt.secret_key ) )
break;
if( !onode ) { /* this is a new subkey: append */
rc = append_key( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
if( rc )
return rc;
++*n_subk;
}
}
}
/* 6th: merge subkey certificates */
for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
if( !(onode->flag & 1)
&& ( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) ) {
/* find the subkey in the imported keyblock */
for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& !cmp_public_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
node->pkt->pkt.public_key ) )
break;
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
&& !cmp_secret_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.secret_key,
node->pkt->pkt.secret_key ) )
break;
}
if( node ) { /* found: merge */
rc = merge_keysigs( onode, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid );
if( rc )
return rc;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
/****************
* append the userid starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK.
*/
static int
append_uid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid )
{
KBNODE n, n_where=NULL;
assert(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
/* find the position */
for( n = keyblock; n; n_where = n, n = n->next ) {
if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
break;
}
if( !n )
n_where = NULL;
/* and append/insert */
while( node ) {
/* we add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
* one is released first */
n = clone_kbnode(node);
if( n_where ) {
insert_kbnode( n_where, n, 0 );
n_where = n;
}
else
add_kbnode( keyblock, n );
n->flag |= 1;
node->flag |= 1;
if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
++*n_sigs;
node = node->next;
if( node && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
break;
}
return 0;
}
/****************
* Merge the sigs from SRC onto DST. SRC and DST are both a PKT_USER_ID.
* (how should we handle comment packets here?)
*/
static int
merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid )
{
KBNODE n, n2;
int found=0;
assert(dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
assert(src->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
for(n=src->next; n && n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; n = n->next ) {
if( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
continue;
if( n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x18
|| n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28 )
continue; /* skip signatures which are only valid on subkeys */
found = 0;
for(n2=dst->next; n2 && n2->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; n2 = n2->next){
if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
== n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
== n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
<= n2->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class
== n2->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class ) {
found++;
break;
}
}
if( !found ) {
/* This signature is new or newer, append N to DST.
* We add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
* one is released first */
n2 = clone_kbnode(n);
insert_kbnode( dst, n2, PKT_SIGNATURE );
n2->flag |= 1;
n->flag |= 1;
++*n_sigs;
}
}
return 0;
}
/****************
* Merge the sigs from SRC onto DST. SRC and DST are both a PKT_xxx_SUBKEY.
*/
static int
merge_keysigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid )
{
KBNODE n, n2;
int found=0;
assert( dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY );
for(n=src->next; n ; n = n->next ) {
if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
break;
if( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
continue;
found = 0;
for(n2=dst->next; n2; n2 = n2->next){
if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
break;
if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
== n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
== n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
<= n2->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class
== n2->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class ) {
found++;
break;
}
}
if( !found ) {
/* This signature is new or newer, append N to DST.
* We add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
* one is released first */
n2 = clone_kbnode(n);
insert_kbnode( dst, n2, PKT_SIGNATURE );
n2->flag |= 1;
n->flag |= 1;
++*n_sigs;
}
}
return 0;
}
/****************
* append the subkey starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK.
* Mark all new and copied packets by setting flag bit 0.
*/
static int
append_key( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid )
{
KBNODE n;
assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY );
while( node ) {
/* we add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
* one is released first */
n = clone_kbnode(node);
add_kbnode( keyblock, n );
n->flag |= 1;
node->flag |= 1;
if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
++*n_sigs;
node = node->next;
if( node && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
break;
}
return 0;
}
diff --git a/g10/keylist.c b/g10/keylist.c
index 829b81249..1cea96a7a 100644
--- a/g10/keylist.c
+++ b/g10/keylist.c
@@ -1,1100 +1,1101 @@
/* keylist.c
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "errors.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "memory.h"
#include "photoid.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "ttyio.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "status.h"
static void list_all(int);
static void list_one( STRLIST names, int secret);
struct sig_stats
{
int inv_sigs;
int no_key;
int oth_err;
};
static FILE *attrib_fp=NULL;
/****************
* List the keys
* If list is NULL, all available keys are listed
*/
void
public_key_list( STRLIST list )
{
if( !list )
list_all(0);
else
list_one( list, 0 );
}
void
secret_key_list( STRLIST list )
{
if( !list )
list_all(1);
else /* List by user id */
list_one( list, 1 );
}
void
show_policy_url(PKT_signature *sig,int indent)
{
const byte *p;
size_t len;
int seq=0,crit;
while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_POLICY,&len,&seq,&crit)))
{
int i;
for(i=0;i<indent;i++)
putchar(' ');
/* This isn't UTF8 as it is a URL(?) */
if(crit)
printf(_("Critical signature policy: "));
else
printf(_("Signature policy: "));
print_string(stdout,p,len,0);
printf("\n");
}
}
void
show_notation(PKT_signature *sig,int indent)
{
const byte *p;
size_t len;
int seq=0,crit;
/* There may be multiple notations in the same sig. */
while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION,&len,&seq,&crit)))
if(len>=8)
{
int n1,n2,i;
n1=(p[4]<<8)|p[5];
n2=(p[6]<<8)|p[7];
if(8+n1+n2!=len)
{
log_info(_("WARNING: invalid notation data found\n"));
return;
}
for(i=0;i<indent;i++)
putchar(' ');
/* This is UTF8 */
if(crit)
printf(_("Critical signature notation: "));
else
printf(_("Signature notation: "));
print_utf8_string(stdout,p+8,n1);
printf("=");
if(*p&0x80)
print_utf8_string(stdout,p+8+n1,n2);
else
printf("[ %s ]",_("not human readable"));
printf("\n");
}
else
log_info(_("WARNING: invalid notation data found\n"));
}
static void
print_signature_stats(struct sig_stats *s)
{
if( s->inv_sigs == 1 )
tty_printf(_("1 bad signature\n") );
else if( s->inv_sigs )
tty_printf(_("%d bad signatures\n"), s->inv_sigs );
if( s->no_key == 1 )
tty_printf(_("1 signature not checked due to a missing key\n") );
else if( s->no_key )
tty_printf(_("%d signatures not checked due to missing keys\n"),s->no_key);
if( s->oth_err == 1 )
tty_printf(_("1 signature not checked due to an error\n") );
else if( s->oth_err )
tty_printf(_("%d signatures not checked due to errors\n"), s->oth_err );
}
static void
list_all( int secret )
{
KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
int rc=0;
const char *lastresname, *resname;
struct sig_stats stats;
memset(&stats,0,sizeof(stats));
hd = keydb_new (secret);
if (!hd)
rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
else
rc = keydb_search_first (hd);
if( rc ) {
if( rc != -1 )
log_error("keydb_search_first failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
goto leave;
}
lastresname = NULL;
do {
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
if (rc) {
log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
resname = keydb_get_resource_name (hd);
if (lastresname != resname ) {
int i;
printf("%s\n", resname );
for(i=strlen(resname); i; i-- )
putchar('-');
putchar('\n');
lastresname = resname;
}
merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
list_keyblock( keyblock, secret, opt.fingerprint,
opt.check_sigs?&stats:NULL);
release_kbnode( keyblock );
keyblock = NULL;
} while (!(rc = keydb_search_next (hd)));
if( rc && rc != -1 )
log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
if(opt.check_sigs && !opt.with_colons)
print_signature_stats(&stats);
leave:
release_kbnode (keyblock);
keydb_release (hd);
}
static void
list_one( STRLIST names, int secret )
{
int rc = 0;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
GETKEY_CTX ctx;
const char *resname;
char *keyring_str = N_("Keyring");
int i;
struct sig_stats stats;
memset(&stats,0,sizeof(stats));
/* fixme: using the bynames function has the disadvantage that we
* don't know wether one of the names given was not found. OTOH,
* this function has the advantage to list the names in the
* sequence as defined by the keyDB and does not duplicate
* outputs. A solution could be do test whether all given have
* been listed (this needs a way to use the keyDB search
* functions) or to have the search function return indicators for
* found names. Yet another way is to use the keydb search
* facilities directly. */
if( secret ) {
rc = get_seckey_bynames( &ctx, NULL, names, &keyblock );
if( rc ) {
log_error("error reading key: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
get_seckey_end( ctx );
return;
}
do {
if (opt.show_keyring) {
resname = keydb_get_resource_name (get_ctx_handle(ctx));
printf("%s: %s\n", keyring_str, resname);
for(i = strlen(resname) + strlen(keyring_str) + 2; i; i-- )
putchar('-');
putchar('\n');
}
list_keyblock( keyblock, 1, opt.fingerprint, NULL );
release_kbnode( keyblock );
} while( !get_seckey_next( ctx, NULL, &keyblock ) );
get_seckey_end( ctx );
}
else {
rc = get_pubkey_bynames( &ctx, NULL, names, &keyblock );
if( rc ) {
log_error("error reading key: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
get_pubkey_end( ctx );
return;
}
do {
if (opt.show_keyring) {
resname = keydb_get_resource_name (get_ctx_handle(ctx));
printf("%s: %s\n", keyring_str, resname);
for(i = strlen(resname) + strlen(keyring_str) + 2; i; i-- )
putchar('-');
putchar('\n');
}
list_keyblock( keyblock, 0, opt.fingerprint,
opt.check_sigs?&stats:NULL );
release_kbnode( keyblock );
} while( !get_pubkey_next( ctx, NULL, &keyblock ) );
get_pubkey_end( ctx );
}
if(opt.check_sigs && !opt.with_colons)
print_signature_stats(&stats);
}
static void
print_key_data( PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid )
{
int n = pk ? pubkey_get_npkey( pk->pubkey_algo ) : 0;
int i;
for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
printf("pkd:%d:%u:", i, mpi_get_nbits( pk->pkey[i] ) );
mpi_print(stdout, pk->pkey[i], 1 );
putchar(':');
putchar('\n');
}
}
static void
print_capabilities (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk, KBNODE keyblock)
{
unsigned int use = pk? pk->pubkey_usage : sk->pubkey_usage;
if ( use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC ) {
putchar ('e');
}
if ( use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG ) {
putchar ('s');
putchar ('c');
}
if ( keyblock ) { /* figure our the usable capabilities */
KBNODE k;
int enc=0, sign=0, cert=0;
for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if ( pk->is_valid && !pk->is_revoked && !pk->has_expired ) {
if ( pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC )
enc = 1;
if ( pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )
sign = cert = 1;
}
}
else if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
sk = k->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
if ( sk->is_valid && !sk->is_revoked && !sk->has_expired ) {
if ( sk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC )
enc = 1;
if ( sk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )
sign = cert = 1;
}
}
}
if (enc)
putchar ('E');
if (sign)
putchar ('S');
if (cert)
putchar ('C');
}
putchar(':');
}
static void dump_attribs(const PKT_user_id *uid,
PKT_public_key *pk,PKT_secret_key *sk)
{
int i;
if(!attrib_fp)
BUG();
for(i=0;i<uid->numattribs;i++)
{
if(is_status_enabled())
{
byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
char buf[(MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2)+90];
size_t j,n;
if(pk)
fingerprint_from_pk( pk, array, &n );
else if(sk)
fingerprint_from_sk( sk, array, &n );
else
BUG();
p = array;
for(j=0; j < n ; j++, p++ )
sprintf(buf+2*j, "%02X", *p );
sprintf(buf+strlen(buf)," %lu %u %u %u %lu %lu %u",
(ulong)uid->attribs[i].len,uid->attribs[i].type,i+1,
uid->numattribs,(ulong)uid->created,(ulong)uid->expiredate,
((uid->is_primary?0x01:0)|
(uid->is_revoked?0x02:0)|
(uid->is_expired?0x04:0)));
write_status_text(STATUS_ATTRIBUTE,buf);
}
fwrite(uid->attribs[i].data,uid->attribs[i].len,1,attrib_fp);
}
}
static void
list_keyblock_print ( KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int fpr, void *opaque )
{
int rc = 0;
KBNODE kbctx;
KBNODE node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
PKT_secret_key *sk;
u32 keyid[2];
int any=0;
struct sig_stats *stats=opaque;
/* get the keyid from the keyblock */
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, secret? PKT_SECRET_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
if( !node ) {
log_error("Oops; key lost!\n");
dump_kbnode( keyblock );
return;
}
if( secret ) {
pk = NULL;
sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
- printf("sec %4u%c/%08lX %s ", nbits_from_sk( sk ),
- pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
- (ulong)keyid[1],
- datestr_from_sk( sk ) );
+ printf("sec%c %4u%c/%08lX %s ", (sk->protect.s2k.mode==1001)?'#':' ',
+ nbits_from_sk( sk ),
+ pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
+ (ulong)keyid[1],
+ datestr_from_sk( sk ) );
}
else {
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
sk = NULL;
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
printf("pub %4u%c/%08lX %s ", nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid[1],
datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
}
for( kbctx=NULL; (node=walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0)) ; ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
if(attrib_fp && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data!=NULL)
dump_attribs(node->pkt->pkt.user_id,pk,sk);
/* don't list revoked or expired UIDS unless we are in
* verbose mode and signature listing has not been
* requested */
if ( !opt.verbose && !opt.list_sigs &&
(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked ||
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired ))
continue;
if( any )
printf("uid%*s", 28, "");
if ( node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
fputs ("[revoked] ", stdout);
if ( node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired )
fputs ("[expired] ", stdout);
print_utf8_string( stdout, node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
putchar('\n');
if( !any ) {
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk, keyid );
any = 1;
}
if(opt.show_photos && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs!=NULL)
show_photos(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,pk,sk);
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
u32 keyid2[2];
PKT_public_key *pk2 = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if( !any ) {
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 ); /* of the main key */
any = 1;
}
keyid_from_pk( pk2, keyid2 );
printf("sub %4u%c/%08lX %s", nbits_from_pk( pk2 ),
pubkey_letter( pk2->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid2[1],
datestr_from_pk( pk2 ) );
if( pk2->expiredate ) {
printf(_(" [expires: %s]"), expirestr_from_pk( pk2 ) );
}
putchar('\n');
if( fpr > 1 )
print_fingerprint( pk2, NULL, 0 );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk2, keyid2 );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
u32 keyid2[2];
PKT_secret_key *sk2 = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
if( !any ) {
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 ); /* of the main key */
any = 1;
}
keyid_from_sk( sk2, keyid2 );
printf("ssb %4u%c/%08lX %s\n", nbits_from_sk( sk2 ),
pubkey_letter( sk2->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid2[1],
datestr_from_sk( sk2 ) );
if( fpr > 1 )
print_fingerprint( NULL, sk2, 0 );
}
else if( opt.list_sigs && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int sigrc;
char *sigstr;
if( stats ) {
/*fflush(stdout);*/
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
switch( rc ) {
case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN: stats->inv_sigs++; sigrc = '-'; break;
case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY: stats->no_key++; continue;
default: stats->oth_err++; sigrc = '%'; break;
}
/* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has
the pk that issued it. See also
keyedit.c:print_and_check_one_sig */
}
else {
rc = 0;
sigrc = ' ';
}
if( !any ) { /* no user id, (maybe a revocation follows)*/
/* Check if the pk is really revoked - there could be a
0x20 sig packet there even if we are not revoked
(say, if a revocation key issued the packet, but the
revocation key isn't present to verify it.) */
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 && pk->is_revoked )
puts("[revoked]");
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
puts("[key binding]");
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 )
puts("[subkey revoked]");
else
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
any=1;
}
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x28
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
sigstr = "rev";
else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 )
sigstr = "sig";
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
sigstr = "sig";
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x1F )
sigstr = "sig";
else {
printf("sig "
"[unexpected signature class 0x%02x]\n",sig->sig_class );
continue;
}
fputs( sigstr, stdout );
printf("%c%c %c%c%c%c%c %08lX %s ",
sigrc,(sig->sig_class-0x10>0 &&
sig->sig_class-0x10<4)?'0'+sig->sig_class-0x10:' ',
sig->flags.exportable?' ':'L',
sig->flags.revocable?' ':'R',
sig->flags.policy_url?'P':' ',
sig->flags.notation?'N':' ',
sig->flags.expired?'X':' ',
(ulong)sig->keyid[1], datestr_from_sig(sig));
if( sigrc == '%' )
printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc) );
else if( sigrc == '?' )
;
else if ( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
size_t n;
char *p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
print_utf8_string( stdout, p, n );
m_free(p);
}
putchar('\n');
if(sig->flags.policy_url && opt.show_policy_url)
show_policy_url(sig,3);
if(sig->flags.notation && opt.show_notation)
show_notation(sig,3);
/* fixme: check or list other sigs here */
}
}
putchar('\n');
}
static void
list_keyblock_colon( KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int fpr )
{
int rc = 0;
KBNODE kbctx;
KBNODE node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
PKT_secret_key *sk;
u32 keyid[2];
int any=0;
int trustletter = 0;
int ulti_hack = 0;
/* get the keyid from the keyblock */
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, secret? PKT_SECRET_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
if( !node ) {
log_error("Oops; key lost!\n");
dump_kbnode( keyblock );
return;
}
if( secret ) {
pk = NULL;
sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
printf("sec:u:%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::",
nbits_from_sk( sk ),
sk->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_sk( sk ),
colon_strtime (sk->expiredate)
/* fixme: add LID here */ );
}
else {
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
sk = NULL;
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
fputs( "pub:", stdout );
trustletter = 0;
if ( !pk->is_valid )
putchar ('i');
else if ( pk->is_revoked )
putchar ('r');
else if ( pk->has_expired )
putchar ('e');
else if ( opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
;
else {
trustletter = get_validity_info ( pk, NULL );
if( trustletter == 'u' )
ulti_hack = 1;
putchar(trustletter);
}
printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:",
nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pk->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
if( pk->local_id )
printf("%lu", pk->local_id );
putchar(':');
if( !opt.fast_list_mode && !opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
putchar( get_ownertrust_info(pk) );
putchar(':');
}
if (opt.fixed_list_mode) {
/* do not merge the first uid with the primary key */
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk, keyid );
any = 1;
}
for( kbctx=NULL; (node=walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0)) ; ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
if(attrib_fp && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data!=NULL)
dump_attribs(node->pkt->pkt.user_id,pk,sk);
/*
* Fixme: We need a is_valid flag here too
*/
if( any ) {
char *str=node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid";
if ( node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
printf("%s:r::::::::",str);
else if ( node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired )
printf("%s:e::::::::",str);
else if ( opt.no_expensive_trust_checks ) {
printf("%s:::::::::",str);
}
else {
byte namehash[20];
if( pk && !ulti_hack ) {
if( node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
rmd160_hash_buffer( namehash,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
else
rmd160_hash_buffer( namehash,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
trustletter = get_validity_info( pk, namehash );
}
else
trustletter = 'u';
printf("%s:%c::::::::",str,trustletter);
}
}
if(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
printf("%u %lu",
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
else
print_string( stdout, node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ':' );
putchar(':');
if (any)
putchar('\n');
else {
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk, keyid );
any = 1;
}
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
u32 keyid2[2];
PKT_public_key *pk2 = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if( !any ) {
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 ); /* of the main key */
any = 1;
}
keyid_from_pk( pk2, keyid2 );
fputs ("sub:", stdout );
if ( !pk2->is_valid )
putchar ('i');
else if ( pk2->is_revoked )
putchar ('r');
else if ( pk2->has_expired )
putchar ('e');
else if ( opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
;
else {
printf("%c", trustletter );
}
printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:",
nbits_from_pk( pk2 ),
pk2->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid2[0],(ulong)keyid2[1],
colon_datestr_from_pk( pk2 ),
colon_strtime (pk2->expiredate)
/* fixme: add LID and ownertrust here */
);
if( pk->local_id ) /* use the local_id of the main key??? */
printf("%lu", pk->local_id );
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk2, NULL, NULL);
putchar('\n');
if( fpr > 1 )
print_fingerprint( pk2, NULL, 0 );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk2, keyid2 );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
u32 keyid2[2];
PKT_secret_key *sk2 = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
if( !any ) {
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 ); /* of the main key */
any = 1;
}
keyid_from_sk( sk2, keyid2 );
printf("ssb::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::::",
nbits_from_sk( sk2 ),
sk2->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid2[0],(ulong)keyid2[1],
colon_datestr_from_sk( sk2 ),
colon_strtime (sk2->expiredate)
/* fixme: add LID */ );
print_capabilities (NULL, sk2, NULL);
putchar ('\n');
if( fpr > 1 )
print_fingerprint( NULL, sk2, 0 );
}
else if( opt.list_sigs && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int sigrc;
char *sigstr;
if( !any ) { /* no user id, (maybe a revocation follows)*/
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 )
fputs("[revoked]:", stdout);
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
fputs("[key binding]:", stdout);
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 )
fputs("[subkey revoked]:", stdout);
else
putchar (':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
any=1;
}
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x28
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
sigstr = "rev";
else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 )
sigstr = "sig";
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
sigstr = "sig";
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x1F )
sigstr = "sig";
else {
printf ("sig::::::::::%02x%c:\n",
sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
continue;
}
if( opt.check_sigs ) {
fflush(stdout);
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
switch( rc ) {
case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN: sigrc = '-'; break;
case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
default: sigrc = '%'; break;
}
}
else {
rc = 0;
sigrc = ' ';
}
fputs( sigstr, stdout );
putchar(':');
if( sigrc != ' ' )
putchar(sigrc);
printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::", sig->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)sig->keyid[0],
(ulong)sig->keyid[1], colon_datestr_from_sig(sig),
colon_expirestr_from_sig(sig));
if( sigrc == '%' )
printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc) );
else if( sigrc == '?' )
;
else if ( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
size_t n;
char *p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
print_string( stdout, p, n, ':' );
m_free(p);
}
printf(":%02x%c:\n", sig->sig_class,sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
/* fixme: check or list other sigs here */
}
}
if( !any ) {/* oops, no user id */
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
}
}
/*
* Reorder the keyblock so that the primary user ID (and not attribute
* packet) comes first. Fixme: Replace this by a generic sort
* function. */
static void
reorder_keyblock (KBNODE keyblock)
{
KBNODE primary = NULL, primary0 = NULL, primary2 = NULL;
KBNODE last, node;
for (node=keyblock; node; primary0=node, node = node->next) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
!node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data &&
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary ) {
primary = primary2 = node;
for (node=node->next; node; primary2=node, node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
break;
}
}
break;
}
}
if ( !primary )
return; /* no primary key flag found (should not happen) */
for (last=NULL, node=keyblock; node; last = node, node = node->next) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
}
assert (node);
assert (last); /* the user ID is never the first packet */
assert (primary0); /* ditto (this is the node before primary) */
if ( node == primary )
return; /* already the first one */
last->next = primary;
primary0->next = primary2->next;
primary2->next = node;
}
void
list_keyblock( KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int fpr, void *opaque )
{
reorder_keyblock (keyblock);
if (opt.with_colons)
list_keyblock_colon (keyblock, secret, fpr );
else
list_keyblock_print (keyblock, secret, fpr, opaque );
}
/*
* standard function to print the finperprint.
* mode 0: as used in key listings, opt.with_colons is honored
* 1: print using log_info ()
* 2: direct use of tty
* 3: direct use of tty but only primary key.
* modes 1 and 2 will try and print both subkey and primary key fingerprints
*/
void
print_fingerprint (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk, int mode )
{
byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
size_t i, n;
FILE *fp;
const char *text;
int primary=0;
if(sk)
{
if(sk->main_keyid[0]==sk->keyid[0] && sk->main_keyid[1]==sk->keyid[1])
primary=1;
}
else
{
if(pk->main_keyid[0]==pk->keyid[0] && pk->main_keyid[1]==pk->keyid[1])
primary=1;
}
/* Just to be safe */
if(mode&0x80 && !primary)
{
log_error("primary key is not really primary!\n");
return;
}
mode&=~0x80;
if(!primary && (mode==1 || mode==2))
{
if(sk)
{
PKT_secret_key *primary_sk=m_alloc_clear(sizeof(*primary_sk));
get_seckey(primary_sk,sk->main_keyid);
print_fingerprint(NULL,primary_sk,mode|0x80);
free_secret_key(primary_sk);
}
else
{
PKT_public_key *primary_pk=m_alloc_clear(sizeof(*primary_pk));
get_pubkey(primary_pk,pk->main_keyid);
print_fingerprint(primary_pk,NULL,mode|0x80);
free_public_key(primary_pk);
}
}
if (mode == 1) {
fp = log_stream ();
if(primary)
text = _("Primary key fingerprint:");
else
text = _(" Subkey fingerprint:");
}
else if (mode == 2) {
fp = NULL; /* use tty */
/* Translators: this should fit into 24 bytes to that the fingerprint
* data is properly aligned with the user ID */
if(primary)
text = _(" Primary key fingerprint:");
else
text = _(" Subkey fingerprint:");
}
else if (mode == 3) {
fp = NULL; /* use tty */
text = _(" Key fingerprint =");
}
else {
fp = stdout;
text = _(" Key fingerprint =");
}
if (sk)
fingerprint_from_sk (sk, array, &n);
else
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n);
p = array;
if (opt.with_colons && !mode) {
fprintf (fp, "fpr:::::::::");
for (i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ )
fprintf (fp, "%02X", *p );
putc(':', fp);
}
else {
if (fp)
fputs (text, fp);
else
tty_printf ("%s", text);
if (n == 20) {
for (i=0; i < n ; i++, i++, p += 2 ) {
if (fp) {
if (i == 10 )
putc(' ', fp);
fprintf (fp, " %02X%02X", *p, p[1] );
}
else {
if (i == 10 )
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (" %02X%02X", *p, p[1]);
}
}
}
else {
for (i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ ) {
if (fp) {
if (i && !(i%8) )
putc (' ', fp);
fprintf (fp, " %02X", *p );
}
else {
if (i && !(i%8) )
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (" %02X", *p );
}
}
}
}
if (fp)
putc ('\n', fp);
else
tty_printf ("\n");
}
void set_attrib_fd(int fd)
{
static int last_fd=-1;
if ( fd != -1 && last_fd == fd )
return;
if ( attrib_fp && attrib_fp != stdout && attrib_fp != stderr )
fclose (attrib_fp);
attrib_fp = NULL;
if ( fd == -1 )
return;
if( fd == 1 )
attrib_fp = stdout;
else if( fd == 2 )
attrib_fp = stderr;
else
attrib_fp = fdopen( fd, "w" );
if( !attrib_fp ) {
log_fatal("can't open fd %d for attribute output: %s\n",
fd, strerror(errno));
}
last_fd = fd;
}
diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c
index a3b39505d..c50c8a2e8 100644
--- a/g10/parse-packet.c
+++ b/g10/parse-packet.c
@@ -1,2253 +1,2259 @@
/* parse-packet.c - read packets
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "packet.h"
#include "iobuf.h"
#include "mpi.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "memory.h"
#include "filter.h"
#include "photoid.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "i18n.h"
static int mpi_print_mode = 0;
static int list_mode = 0;
static int parse( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, int onlykeypkts,
off_t *retpos, int *skip, IOBUF out, int do_skip
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
,const char *dbg_w, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l
#endif
);
static int copy_packet( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, int pkttype,
unsigned long pktlen );
static void skip_packet( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen );
static void skip_rest( IOBUF inp, unsigned long pktlen );
static void *read_rest( IOBUF inp, size_t pktlen );
static int parse_symkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *packet );
static int parse_pubkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *packet );
static int parse_signature( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PKT_signature *sig );
static int parse_onepass_sig( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PKT_onepass_sig *ops );
static int parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
byte *hdr, int hdrlen, PACKET *packet );
static int parse_user_id( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *packet );
static int parse_attribute( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *packet );
static int parse_comment( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *packet );
static void parse_trust( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *packet );
static int parse_plaintext( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *packet, int new_ctb);
static int parse_compressed( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *packet, int new_ctb );
static int parse_encrypted( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *packet, int new_ctb);
static int parse_mdc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *packet, int new_ctb);
static int parse_gpg_control( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *packet );
static unsigned short
read_16(IOBUF inp)
{
unsigned short a;
a = iobuf_get_noeof(inp) << 8;
a |= iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
return a;
}
static unsigned long
read_32(IOBUF inp)
{
unsigned long a;
a = iobuf_get_noeof(inp) << 24;
a |= iobuf_get_noeof(inp) << 16;
a |= iobuf_get_noeof(inp) << 8;
a |= iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
return a;
}
int
set_packet_list_mode( int mode )
{
int old = list_mode;
list_mode = mode;
mpi_print_mode = DBG_MPI;
return old;
}
static void
unknown_pubkey_warning( int algo )
{
static byte unknown_pubkey_algos[256];
algo &= 0xff;
if( !unknown_pubkey_algos[algo] ) {
if( opt.verbose )
log_info(_("can't handle public key algorithm %d\n"), algo );
unknown_pubkey_algos[algo] = 1;
}
}
/****************
* Parse a Packet and return it in packet
* Returns: 0 := valid packet in pkt
* -1 := no more packets
* >0 := error
* Note: The function may return an error and a partly valid packet;
* caller must free this packet.
*/
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
int
dbg_parse_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l )
{
int skip, rc;
do {
rc = parse( inp, pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 0, "parse", dbg_f, dbg_l );
} while( skip );
return rc;
}
#else
int
parse_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt )
{
int skip, rc;
do {
rc = parse( inp, pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 0 );
} while( skip );
return rc;
}
#endif
/****************
* Like parse packet, but only return secret or public (sub)key packets.
*/
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
int
dbg_search_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, off_t *retpos, int with_uid,
const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l )
{
int skip, rc;
do {
rc = parse( inp, pkt, with_uid?2:1, retpos, &skip, NULL, 0, "search", dbg_f, dbg_l );
} while( skip );
return rc;
}
#else
int
search_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, off_t *retpos, int with_uid )
{
int skip, rc;
do {
rc = parse( inp, pkt, with_uid?2:1, retpos, &skip, NULL, 0 );
} while( skip );
return rc;
}
#endif
/****************
* Copy all packets from INP to OUT, thereby removing unused spaces.
*/
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
int
dbg_copy_all_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out,
const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l )
{
PACKET pkt;
int skip, rc=0;
do {
init_packet(&pkt);
} while( !(rc = parse( inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0, "copy", dbg_f, dbg_l )));
return rc;
}
#else
int
copy_all_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out )
{
PACKET pkt;
int skip, rc=0;
do {
init_packet(&pkt);
} while( !(rc = parse( inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0 )));
return rc;
}
#endif
/****************
* Copy some packets from INP to OUT, thereby removing unused spaces.
* Stop at offset STOPoff (i.e. don't copy packets at this or later offsets)
*/
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
int
dbg_copy_some_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, off_t stopoff,
const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l )
{
PACKET pkt;
int skip, rc=0;
do {
if( iobuf_tell(inp) >= stopoff )
return 0;
init_packet(&pkt);
} while( !(rc = parse( inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0,
"some", dbg_f, dbg_l )) );
return rc;
}
#else
int
copy_some_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, off_t stopoff )
{
PACKET pkt;
int skip, rc=0;
do {
if( iobuf_tell(inp) >= stopoff )
return 0;
init_packet(&pkt);
} while( !(rc = parse( inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0 )) );
return rc;
}
#endif
/****************
* Skip over N packets
*/
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
int
dbg_skip_some_packets( IOBUF inp, unsigned n,
const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l )
{
int skip, rc=0;
PACKET pkt;
for( ;n && !rc; n--) {
init_packet(&pkt);
rc = parse( inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 1, "skip", dbg_f, dbg_l );
}
return rc;
}
#else
int
skip_some_packets( IOBUF inp, unsigned n )
{
int skip, rc=0;
PACKET pkt;
for( ;n && !rc; n--) {
init_packet(&pkt);
rc = parse( inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 1 );
}
return rc;
}
#endif
/****************
* Parse packet. Set the variable skip points to 1 if the packet
* should be skipped; this is the case if either ONLYKEYPKTS is set
* and the parsed packet isn't one or the
* packet-type is 0, indicating deleted stuff.
* if OUT is not NULL, a special copymode is used.
*/
static int
parse( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, int onlykeypkts, off_t *retpos,
int *skip, IOBUF out, int do_skip
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
,const char *dbg_w, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l
#endif
)
{
int rc=0, c, ctb, pkttype, lenbytes;
unsigned long pktlen;
byte hdr[8];
int hdrlen;
int new_ctb = 0;
int with_uid = (onlykeypkts == 2);
*skip = 0;
assert( !pkt->pkt.generic );
if( retpos )
*retpos = iobuf_tell(inp);
if( (ctb = iobuf_get(inp)) == -1 ) {
rc = -1;
goto leave;
}
hdrlen=0;
hdr[hdrlen++] = ctb;
if( !(ctb & 0x80) ) {
log_error("%s: invalid packet (ctb=%02x)\n", iobuf_where(inp), ctb );
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
pktlen = 0;
new_ctb = !!(ctb & 0x40);
if( new_ctb ) {
pkttype = ctb & 0x3f;
if( (c = iobuf_get(inp)) == -1 ) {
log_error("%s: 1st length byte missing\n", iobuf_where(inp) );
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
if (pkttype == PKT_COMPRESSED) {
iobuf_set_partial_block_mode(inp, c & 0xff);
pktlen = 0;/* to indicate partial length */
}
else {
hdr[hdrlen++] = c;
if( c < 192 )
pktlen = c;
else if( c < 224 ) {
pktlen = (c - 192) * 256;
if( (c = iobuf_get(inp)) == -1 ) {
log_error("%s: 2nd length byte missing\n",
iobuf_where(inp) );
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
hdr[hdrlen++] = c;
pktlen += c + 192;
}
else if( c == 255 ) {
pktlen = (hdr[hdrlen++] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp)) << 24;
pktlen |= (hdr[hdrlen++] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp)) << 16;
pktlen |= (hdr[hdrlen++] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp)) << 8;
if( (c = iobuf_get(inp)) == -1 ) {
log_error("%s: 4 byte length invalid\n",
iobuf_where(inp) );
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
pktlen |= (hdr[hdrlen++] = c );
}
else { /* partial body length */
iobuf_set_partial_block_mode(inp, c & 0xff);
pktlen = 0;/* to indicate partial length */
}
}
}
else {
pkttype = (ctb>>2)&0xf;
lenbytes = ((ctb&3)==3)? 0 : (1<<(ctb & 3));
if( !lenbytes ) {
pktlen = 0; /* don't know the value */
if( pkttype != PKT_COMPRESSED )
iobuf_set_block_mode(inp, 1);
}
else {
for( ; lenbytes; lenbytes-- ) {
pktlen <<= 8;
pktlen |= hdr[hdrlen++] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
}
}
}
if (pktlen == 0xffffffff) {
/* with a some probability this is caused by a problem in the
* the uncompressing layer - in some error cases it just loops
* and spits out 0xff bytes. */
log_error ("%s: garbled packet detected\n", iobuf_where(inp) );
g10_exit (2);
}
if( out && pkttype ) {
if( iobuf_write( out, hdr, hdrlen ) == -1 )
rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
else
rc = copy_packet(inp, out, pkttype, pktlen );
goto leave;
}
if (with_uid && pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
;
else if( do_skip
|| !pkttype
|| (onlykeypkts && pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
&& pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
&& pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY ) ) {
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
*skip = 1;
rc = 0;
goto leave;
}
if( DBG_PACKET ) {
#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
log_debug("parse_packet(iob=%d): type=%d length=%lu%s (%s.%s.%d)\n",
iobuf_id(inp), pkttype, pktlen, new_ctb?" (new_ctb)":"",
dbg_w, dbg_f, dbg_l );
#else
log_debug("parse_packet(iob=%d): type=%d length=%lu%s\n",
iobuf_id(inp), pkttype, pktlen, new_ctb?" (new_ctb)":"" );
#endif
}
pkt->pkttype = pkttype;
rc = G10ERR_UNKNOWN_PACKET; /* default error */
switch( pkttype ) {
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
pkt->pkt.public_key = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *pkt->pkt.public_key );
rc = parse_key(inp, pkttype, pktlen, hdr, hdrlen, pkt );
break;
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
pkt->pkt.secret_key = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *pkt->pkt.secret_key );
rc = parse_key(inp, pkttype, pktlen, hdr, hdrlen, pkt );
break;
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
rc = parse_symkeyenc( inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt );
break;
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
rc = parse_pubkeyenc(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt );
break;
case PKT_SIGNATURE:
pkt->pkt.signature = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *pkt->pkt.signature );
rc = parse_signature(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt->pkt.signature );
break;
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG:
pkt->pkt.onepass_sig = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *pkt->pkt.onepass_sig );
rc = parse_onepass_sig(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt->pkt.onepass_sig );
break;
case PKT_USER_ID:
rc = parse_user_id(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt );
break;
case PKT_ATTRIBUTE:
pkt->pkttype = pkttype = PKT_USER_ID; /* we store it in the userID */
rc = parse_attribute(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
break;
case PKT_OLD_COMMENT:
case PKT_COMMENT:
rc = parse_comment(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
break;
case PKT_RING_TRUST:
parse_trust(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
rc = 0;
break;
case PKT_PLAINTEXT:
rc = parse_plaintext(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb );
break;
case PKT_COMPRESSED:
rc = parse_compressed(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb );
break;
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
rc = parse_encrypted(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb );
break;
case PKT_MDC:
rc = parse_mdc(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb );
break;
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL:
rc = parse_gpg_control(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt );
break;
default:
skip_packet(inp, pkttype, pktlen);
break;
}
leave:
if( !rc && iobuf_error(inp) )
rc = G10ERR_INV_KEYRING;
return rc;
}
static void
dump_hex_line( int c, int *i )
{
if( *i && !(*i%8) ) {
if( *i && !(*i%24) )
printf("\n%4d:", *i );
else
putchar(' ');
}
if( c == -1 )
printf(" EOF" );
else
printf(" %02x", c );
++*i;
}
static int
copy_packet( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen )
{
int n;
char buf[100];
if( iobuf_in_block_mode(inp) ) {
while( (n = iobuf_read( inp, buf, 100 )) != -1 )
if( iobuf_write(out, buf, n ) )
return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE; /* write error */
}
else if( !pktlen && pkttype == PKT_COMPRESSED ) {
log_debug("copy_packet: compressed!\n");
/* compressed packet, copy till EOF */
while( (n = iobuf_read( inp, buf, 100 )) != -1 )
if( iobuf_write(out, buf, n ) )
return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE; /* write error */
}
else {
for( ; pktlen; pktlen -= n ) {
n = pktlen > 100 ? 100 : pktlen;
n = iobuf_read( inp, buf, n );
if( n == -1 )
return G10ERR_READ_FILE;
if( iobuf_write(out, buf, n ) )
return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE; /* write error */
}
}
return 0;
}
static void
skip_packet( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen )
{
if( list_mode ) {
if( pkttype == PKT_MARKER )
fputs(":marker packet:\n", stdout );
else
printf(":unknown packet: type %2d, length %lu\n", pkttype, pktlen);
if( pkttype ) {
int c, i=0 ;
if( pkttype != PKT_MARKER )
fputs("dump:", stdout );
if( iobuf_in_block_mode(inp) ) {
while( (c=iobuf_get(inp)) != -1 )
dump_hex_line(c, &i);
}
else {
for( ; pktlen; pktlen-- )
dump_hex_line(iobuf_get(inp), &i);
}
putchar('\n');
return;
}
}
skip_rest(inp,pktlen);
}
static void
skip_rest( IOBUF inp, unsigned long pktlen )
{
if( iobuf_in_block_mode(inp) ) {
while( iobuf_get(inp) != -1 )
;
}
else {
for( ; pktlen; pktlen-- )
if( iobuf_get(inp) == -1 )
break;
}
}
static void *
read_rest( IOBUF inp, size_t pktlen )
{
byte *p;
int i;
if( iobuf_in_block_mode(inp) ) {
log_error("read_rest: can't store stream data\n");
p = NULL;
}
else {
p = m_alloc( pktlen );
for(i=0; pktlen; pktlen--, i++ )
p[i] = iobuf_get(inp);
}
return p;
}
static int
parse_symkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
{
PKT_symkey_enc *k;
int rc = 0;
int i, version, s2kmode, cipher_algo, hash_algo, seskeylen, minlen;
if( pktlen < 4 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( version != 4 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
if( pktlen > 200 ) { /* (we encode the seskeylen in a byte) */
log_error("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
cipher_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
s2kmode = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
hash_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
switch( s2kmode ) {
case 0: /* simple s2k */
minlen = 0;
break;
case 1: /* salted s2k */
minlen = 8;
break;
case 3: /* iterated+salted s2k */
minlen = 9;
break;
default:
log_error("unknown S2K %d\n", s2kmode );
goto leave;
}
if( minlen > pktlen ) {
log_error("packet with S2K %d too short\n", s2kmode );
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
seskeylen = pktlen - minlen;
k = packet->pkt.symkey_enc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *packet->pkt.symkey_enc
+ seskeylen - 1 );
k->version = version;
k->cipher_algo = cipher_algo;
k->s2k.mode = s2kmode;
k->s2k.hash_algo = hash_algo;
if( s2kmode == 1 || s2kmode == 3 ) {
for(i=0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
k->s2k.salt[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
}
if( s2kmode == 3 ) {
k->s2k.count = iobuf_get(inp); pktlen--;
}
k->seskeylen = seskeylen;
for(i=0; i < seskeylen && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
k->seskey[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
assert( !pktlen );
if( list_mode ) {
printf(":symkey enc packet: version %d, cipher %d, s2k %d, hash %d\n",
version, cipher_algo, s2kmode, hash_algo);
if( s2kmode == 1 || s2kmode == 3 ) {
printf("\tsalt ");
for(i=0; i < 8; i++ )
printf("%02x", k->s2k.salt[i]);
if( s2kmode == 3 )
printf(", count %lu\n", (ulong)k->s2k.count );
printf("\n");
}
}
leave:
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
return rc;
}
static int
parse_pubkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
{
unsigned int n;
int rc = 0;
int i, ndata;
PKT_pubkey_enc *k;
k = packet->pkt.pubkey_enc = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *packet->pkt.pubkey_enc);
if( pktlen < 12 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
k->version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( k->version != 2 && k->version != 3 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, k->version);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
k->keyid[0] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
k->keyid[1] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
k->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
k->throw_keyid = 0; /* only used as flag for build_packet */
if( list_mode )
printf(":pubkey enc packet: version %d, algo %d, keyid %08lX%08lX\n",
k->version, k->pubkey_algo, (ulong)k->keyid[0], (ulong)k->keyid[1]);
ndata = pubkey_get_nenc(k->pubkey_algo);
if( !ndata ) {
if( list_mode )
printf("\tunsupported algorithm %d\n", k->pubkey_algo );
unknown_pubkey_warning( k->pubkey_algo );
k->data[0] = NULL; /* no need to store the encrypted data */
}
else {
for( i=0; i < ndata; i++ ) {
n = pktlen;
k->data[i] = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0); pktlen -=n;
if( list_mode ) {
printf("\tdata: ");
mpi_print(stdout, k->data[i], mpi_print_mode );
putchar('\n');
}
if (!k->data[i])
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
}
}
leave:
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
return rc;
}
static void
dump_sig_subpkt( int hashed, int type, int critical,
const byte *buffer, size_t buflen, size_t length )
{
const char *p=NULL;
int i;
/* The CERT has warning out with explains how to use GNUPG to
* detect the ARRs - we print our old message here when it is a faked
* ARR and add an additional notice */
if ( type == SIGSUBPKT_ARR && !hashed ) {
printf("\tsubpkt %d len %u (additional recipient request)\n"
"WARNING: PGP versions > 5.0 and < 6.5.8 will automagically "
"encrypt to this key and thereby reveal the plaintext to "
"the owner of this ARR key. Detailed info follows:\n",
type, (unsigned)length );
}
printf("\t%s%ssubpkt %d len %u (", /*)*/
critical ? "critical ":"",
hashed ? "hashed ":"", type, (unsigned)length );
buffer++;
length--;
if( length > buflen ) {
printf("too short: buffer is only %u)\n", (unsigned)buflen );
return;
}
switch( type ) {
case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED:
if( length >= 4 )
printf("sig created %s", strtimestamp( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
if( length >= 4 )
printf("sig expires after %s",
strtimevalue( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
if( length )
printf("%sexportable", *buffer? "":"not ");
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST:
if(length!=2)
p="[invalid trust signature]";
else
printf("trust signature of level %d, amount %d",buffer[0],buffer[1]);
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP:
if(!length)
p="[invalid regexp]";
else
printf("regular expression: \"%s\"",buffer);
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE:
if( length )
printf("%srevocable", *buffer? "":"not ");
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
if( length >= 4 )
printf("key expires after %s",
strtimevalue( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
fputs("pref-sym-algos:", stdout );
for( i=0; i < length; i++ )
printf(" %d", buffer[i] );
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
fputs("revocation key: ", stdout );
if( length < 22 )
p = "[too short]";
else {
printf("c=%02x a=%d f=", buffer[0], buffer[1] );
for( i=2; i < length; i++ )
printf("%02X", buffer[i] );
}
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER:
if( length >= 8 )
printf("issuer key ID %08lX%08lX",
(ulong)buffer_to_u32(buffer),
(ulong)buffer_to_u32(buffer+4) );
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
{
fputs("notation: ", stdout );
if( length < 8 )
p = "[too short]";
else if( !(*buffer & 0x80) )
p = "[not human readable]";
else {
const byte *s = buffer;
size_t n1, n2;
n1 = (s[4] << 8) | s[5];
n2 = (s[6] << 8) | s[7];
s += 8;
if( 8+n1+n2 != length )
p = "[error]";
else {
print_string( stdout, s, n1, ')' );
putc( '=', stdout );
print_string( stdout, s+n1, n2, ')' );
}
}
}
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH:
fputs("pref-hash-algos:", stdout );
for( i=0; i < length; i++ )
printf(" %d", buffer[i] );
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR:
fputs("pref-zip-algos:", stdout );
for( i=0; i < length; i++ )
printf(" %d", buffer[i] );
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS:
fputs("key server preferences:",stdout);
for(i=0;i<length;i++)
printf(" %02X", buffer[i]);
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS:
p = "preferred key server";
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID:
p = "primary user ID";
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
fputs("policy: ", stdout );
print_string( stdout, buffer, length, ')' );
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
fputs ( "key flags:", stdout );
for( i=0; i < length; i++ )
printf(" %02X", buffer[i] );
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID:
p = "signer's user ID";
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON:
if( length ) {
printf("revocation reason 0x%02x (", *buffer );
print_string( stdout, buffer+1, length-1, ')' );
p = ")";
}
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_ARR:
fputs("Big Brother's key (ignored): ", stdout );
if( length < 22 )
p = "[too short]";
else {
printf("c=%02x a=%d f=", buffer[0], buffer[1] );
for( i=2; i < length; i++ )
printf("%02X", buffer[i] );
}
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES:
fputs ( "features:", stdout );
for( i=0; i < length; i++ )
printf(" %02x", buffer[i] );
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_PRIV_VERIFY_CACHE:
p = "obsolete verification cache";
break;
default: p = "?"; break;
}
printf("%s)\n", p? p: "");
}
/****************
* Returns: >= 0 offset into buffer
* -1 unknown type
* -2 unsupported type
* -3 subpacket too short
*/
int
parse_one_sig_subpkt( const byte *buffer, size_t n, int type )
{
switch( type ) {
case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
if(n < 22)
break;
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED:
case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
if( n < 4 )
break;
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
case SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS:
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH:
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR:
case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES:
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE:
if( !n )
break;
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER: /* issuer key ID */
if( n < 8 )
break;
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
if( n < 8 ) /* minimum length needed */
break;
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON:
if( !n )
break;
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID:
if ( n != 1 )
break;
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_PRIV_VERIFY_CACHE:
/* We used this in gpg 1.0.5 and 1.0.6 to cache signature
* verification results - it is no longer used.
* "GPG" 0x00 <mode> <stat>
* where mode == 1: valid data, stat == 0: invalid signature
* stat == 1: valid signature
* (because we use private data, we check our marker) */
if( n < 6 )
break;
if( buffer[0] != 'G' || buffer[1] != 'P'
|| buffer[2] != 'G' || buffer[3] )
return -2;
return 4;
default: return -1;
}
return -3;
}
static int
can_handle_critical( const byte *buffer, size_t n, int type )
{
switch( type ) {
case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
if( n >= 8 && (*buffer & 0x80) )
return 1; /* human readable is handled */
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED:
case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE:
case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER:/* issuer key ID */
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH:
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR:
case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID:
case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES:
case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY: /* Is it enough to show the policy? */
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
const byte *
enum_sig_subpkt( const subpktarea_t *pktbuf, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
size_t *ret_n, int *start, int *critical )
{
const byte *buffer;
int buflen;
int type;
int critical_dummy;
int offset;
size_t n;
int seq = 0;
int reqseq = start? *start: 0;
if(!critical)
critical=&critical_dummy;
if( !pktbuf || reqseq == -1 ) {
/* return some value different from NULL to indicate that
* there is no critical bit we do not understand. The caller
* will never use the value. Yes I know, it is an ugly hack */
return reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL? (const byte*)&pktbuf : NULL;
}
buffer = pktbuf->data;
buflen = pktbuf->len;
while( buflen ) {
n = *buffer++; buflen--;
if( n == 255 ) { /* 4 byte length header */
if( buflen < 4 )
goto too_short;
n = (buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16)
| (buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[3];
buffer += 4;
buflen -= 4;
}
else if( n >= 192 ) { /* 2 byte special encoded length header */
if( buflen < 2 )
goto too_short;
n = (( n - 192 ) << 8) + *buffer + 192;
buffer++;
buflen--;
}
if( buflen < n )
goto too_short;
type = *buffer;
if( type & 0x80 ) {
type &= 0x7f;
*critical = 1;
}
else
*critical = 0;
if( !(++seq > reqseq) )
;
else if( reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL ) {
if( *critical ) {
if( n-1 > buflen+1 )
goto too_short;
if( !can_handle_critical(buffer+1, n-1, type ) ) {
log_info(_("subpacket of type %d has critical bit set\n"),
type);
if( start )
*start = seq;
return NULL; /* this is an error */
}
}
}
else if( reqtype < 0 ) /* list packets */
dump_sig_subpkt( reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED,
type, *critical, buffer, buflen, n );
else if( type == reqtype ) { /* found */
buffer++;
n--;
if( n > buflen )
goto too_short;
if( ret_n )
*ret_n = n;
offset = parse_one_sig_subpkt(buffer, n, type );
switch( offset ) {
case -3:
log_error("subpacket of type %d too short\n", type);
return NULL;
case -2:
return NULL;
case -1:
BUG(); /* not yet needed */
default:
break;
}
if( start )
*start = seq;
return buffer+offset;
}
buffer += n; buflen -=n;
}
if( reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL )
return buffer; /* as value true to indicate that there is no */
/* critical bit we don't understand */
if( start )
*start = -1;
return NULL; /* end of packets; not found */
too_short:
log_error("buffer shorter than subpacket\n");
if( start )
*start = -1;
return NULL;
}
const byte *
parse_sig_subpkt (const subpktarea_t *buffer, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
size_t *ret_n)
{
return enum_sig_subpkt( buffer, reqtype, ret_n, NULL, NULL );
}
const byte *
parse_sig_subpkt2 (PKT_signature *sig, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
size_t *ret_n )
{
const byte *p;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, reqtype, ret_n );
if( !p )
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, reqtype, ret_n );
return p;
}
/* Find all revocation keys. Look in hashed area only. */
void parse_revkeys(PKT_signature *sig)
{
struct revocation_key *revkey;
int seq=0;
size_t len;
if(sig->sig_class!=0x1F)
return;
while((revkey=
(struct revocation_key *)enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,
SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY,
&len,&seq,NULL)))
{
if(len==sizeof(struct revocation_key) &&
(revkey->class&0x80)) /* 0x80 bit must be set */
{
sig->revkey=m_realloc(sig->revkey,
sizeof(struct revocation_key *)*(sig->numrevkeys+1));
sig->revkey[sig->numrevkeys]=revkey;
sig->numrevkeys++;
}
}
}
static int
parse_signature( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PKT_signature *sig )
{
int md5_len=0;
unsigned n;
int is_v4=0;
int rc=0;
int i, ndata;
if( pktlen < 16 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
goto leave;
}
sig->version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( sig->version == 4 )
is_v4=1;
else if( sig->version != 2 && sig->version != 3 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, sig->version);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
if( !is_v4 ) {
md5_len = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
}
sig->sig_class = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( !is_v4 ) {
sig->timestamp = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
sig->keyid[0] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
sig->keyid[1] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
}
sig->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
sig->digest_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
sig->flags.exportable=1;
sig->flags.revocable=1;
if( is_v4 ) { /* read subpackets */
n = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2; /* length of hashed data */
if( n > 10000 ) {
log_error("signature packet: hashed data too long\n");
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
if( n ) {
sig->hashed = m_alloc (sizeof (*sig->hashed) + n - 1 );
sig->hashed->size = n;
sig->hashed->len = n;
if( iobuf_read (inp, sig->hashed->data, n ) != n ) {
log_error ("premature eof while reading "
"hashed signature data\n");
rc = -1;
goto leave;
}
pktlen -= n;
}
n = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2; /* length of unhashed data */
if( n > 10000 ) {
log_error("signature packet: unhashed data too long\n");
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
if( n ) {
/* we add 8 extra bytes so that we have space for the signature
* status cache. Well we are wasting this if there is a cache
* packet already, but in the other case it avoids an realloc */
sig->unhashed = m_alloc (sizeof(*sig->unhashed) + n + 8 - 1 );
sig->unhashed->size = n + 8;
sig->unhashed->len = n;
if( iobuf_read(inp, sig->unhashed->data, n ) != n ) {
log_error("premature eof while reading "
"unhashed signature data\n");
rc = -1;
goto leave;
}
pktlen -= n;
}
}
if( pktlen < 5 ) { /* sanity check */
log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
sig->digest_start[0] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
sig->digest_start[1] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( is_v4 && sig->pubkey_algo ) { /*extract required information */
const byte *p;
/* set sig->flags.unknown_critical if there is a
* critical bit set for packets which we do not understand */
if( !parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL, NULL)
|| !parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL,
NULL) )
{
sig->flags.unknown_critical = 1;
}
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED, NULL );
if( !p )
log_error("signature packet without timestamp\n");
else
sig->timestamp = buffer_to_u32(p);
p = parse_sig_subpkt2( sig, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER, NULL );
if( !p )
log_error("signature packet without keyid\n");
else {
sig->keyid[0] = buffer_to_u32(p);
sig->keyid[1] = buffer_to_u32(p+4);
}
p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE,NULL);
if(p)
sig->expiredate=sig->timestamp+buffer_to_u32(p);
if(sig->expiredate && sig->expiredate<=make_timestamp())
sig->flags.expired=1;
p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_POLICY,NULL);
if(p)
sig->flags.policy_url=1;
p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION,NULL);
if(p)
sig->flags.notation=1;
p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE,NULL);
if(p && *p==0)
sig->flags.revocable=0;
/* We accept the exportable subpacket from either the hashed
or unhashed areas as older versions of gpg put it in the
unhashed area. In theory, anyway, we should never see this
packet off of a local keyring. */
p=parse_sig_subpkt2(sig,SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE,NULL);
if(p && *p==0)
sig->flags.exportable=0;
/* Find all revocation keys. */
if(sig->sig_class==0x1F)
parse_revkeys(sig);
}
if( list_mode ) {
printf(":signature packet: algo %d, keyid %08lX%08lX\n"
"\tversion %d, created %lu, md5len %d, sigclass %02x\n"
"\tdigest algo %d, begin of digest %02x %02x\n",
sig->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
sig->version, (ulong)sig->timestamp, md5_len, sig->sig_class,
sig->digest_algo,
sig->digest_start[0], sig->digest_start[1] );
if( is_v4 ) {
parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED, NULL );
parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_LIST_UNHASHED, NULL);
}
}
ndata = pubkey_get_nsig(sig->pubkey_algo);
if( !ndata ) {
if( list_mode )
printf("\tunknown algorithm %d\n", sig->pubkey_algo );
unknown_pubkey_warning( sig->pubkey_algo );
/* we store the plain material in data[0], so that we are able
* to write it back with build_packet() */
sig->data[0] = mpi_set_opaque(NULL, read_rest(inp, pktlen), pktlen );
pktlen = 0;
}
else {
for( i=0; i < ndata; i++ ) {
n = pktlen;
sig->data[i] = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 );
pktlen -=n;
if( list_mode ) {
printf("\tdata: ");
mpi_print(stdout, sig->data[i], mpi_print_mode );
putchar('\n');
}
if (!sig->data[i])
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
}
}
leave:
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
return rc;
}
static int
parse_onepass_sig( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PKT_onepass_sig *ops )
{
int version;
int rc = 0;
if( pktlen < 13 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( version != 3 ) {
log_error("onepass_sig with unknown version %d\n", version);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
ops->sig_class = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
ops->digest_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
ops->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
ops->keyid[0] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
ops->keyid[1] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
ops->last = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( list_mode )
printf(":onepass_sig packet: keyid %08lX%08lX\n"
"\tversion %d, sigclass %02x, digest %d, pubkey %d, last=%d\n",
(ulong)ops->keyid[0], (ulong)ops->keyid[1],
version, ops->sig_class,
ops->digest_algo, ops->pubkey_algo, ops->last );
leave:
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
return rc;
}
static MPI
read_protected_v3_mpi (IOBUF inp, unsigned long *length)
{
int c;
unsigned int nbits, nbytes;
unsigned char *buf, *p;
MPI val;
if (*length < 2)
{
log_error ("mpi too small\n");
return NULL;
}
if ((c=iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
return NULL;
--*length;
nbits = c << 8;
if ((c=iobuf_get(inp)) == -1)
return NULL;
--*length;
nbits |= c;
if (nbits > 16384)
{
log_error ("mpi too large (%u bits)\n", nbits);
return NULL;
}
nbytes = (nbits+7) / 8;
buf = p = m_alloc (2 + nbytes);
*p++ = nbits >> 8;
*p++ = nbits;
for (; nbytes && length; nbytes--, --*length)
*p++ = iobuf_get (inp);
if (nbytes)
{
log_error ("packet shorter tham mpi\n");
m_free (buf);
return NULL;
}
/* convert buffer into an opaque MPI */
val = mpi_set_opaque (NULL, buf, p-buf);
return val;
}
static int
parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
byte *hdr, int hdrlen, PACKET *pkt )
{
int i, version, algorithm;
unsigned n;
unsigned long timestamp, expiredate, max_expiredate;
int npkey, nskey;
int is_v4=0;
int rc=0;
version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY && version == '#' ) {
/* early versions of G10 use old PGP comments packets;
* luckily all those comments are started by a hash */
if( list_mode ) {
printf(":rfc1991 comment packet: \"" );
for( ; pktlen; pktlen-- ) {
int c;
c = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
if( c >= ' ' && c <= 'z' )
putchar(c);
else
printf("\\x%02x", c );
}
printf("\"\n");
}
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
return 0;
}
else if( version == 4 )
is_v4=1;
else if( version != 2 && version != 3 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
if( pktlen < 11 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
timestamp = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
if( is_v4 ) {
expiredate = 0; /* have to get it from the selfsignature */
max_expiredate = 0;
}
else {
unsigned short ndays;
ndays = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
if( ndays )
expiredate = timestamp + ndays * 86400L;
else
expiredate = 0;
max_expiredate=expiredate;
}
algorithm = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( list_mode )
printf(":%s key packet:\n"
"\tversion %d, algo %d, created %lu, expires %lu\n",
pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY? "public" :
pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY? "secret" :
pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY? "public sub" :
pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY? "secret sub" : "??",
version, algorithm, timestamp, expiredate );
if( pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
PKT_secret_key *sk = pkt->pkt.secret_key;
sk->timestamp = timestamp;
sk->expiredate = expiredate;
sk->max_expiredate = max_expiredate;
sk->hdrbytes = hdrlen;
sk->version = version;
sk->is_primary = pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY;
sk->pubkey_algo = algorithm;
sk->req_usage = 0;
sk->pubkey_usage = 0; /* not yet used */
}
else {
PKT_public_key *pk = pkt->pkt.public_key;
pk->timestamp = timestamp;
pk->expiredate = expiredate;
pk->max_expiredate = max_expiredate;
pk->hdrbytes = hdrlen;
pk->version = version;
pk->pubkey_algo = algorithm;
pk->req_usage = 0;
pk->pubkey_usage = 0; /* not yet used */
pk->is_revoked = 0;
pk->keyid[0] = 0;
pk->keyid[1] = 0;
}
nskey = pubkey_get_nskey( algorithm );
npkey = pubkey_get_npkey( algorithm );
if( !npkey ) {
if( list_mode )
printf("\tunknown algorithm %d\n", algorithm );
unknown_pubkey_warning( algorithm );
}
if( pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
PKT_secret_key *sk = pkt->pkt.secret_key;
byte temp[16];
if( !npkey ) {
sk->skey[0] = mpi_set_opaque( NULL,
read_rest(inp, pktlen), pktlen );
pktlen = 0;
goto leave;
}
for(i=0; i < npkey; i++ ) {
n = pktlen; sk->skey[i] = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
if( list_mode ) {
printf( "\tskey[%d]: ", i);
mpi_print(stdout, sk->skey[i], mpi_print_mode );
putchar('\n');
}
if (!sk->skey[i])
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
}
if (rc) /* one of the MPIs were bad */
goto leave;
sk->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
sk->protect.sha1chk = 0;
if( sk->protect.algo ) {
sk->is_protected = 1;
sk->protect.s2k.count = 0;
if( sk->protect.algo == 254 || sk->protect.algo == 255 ) {
if( pktlen < 3 ) {
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
sk->protect.sha1chk = (sk->protect.algo == 254);
sk->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+ /* Note that a sk->protect.algo > 110 is illegal, but
+ I'm not erroring on it here as otherwise there
+ would be no way to delete such a key. */
sk->protect.s2k.mode = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
/* check for the special GNU extension */
if( is_v4 && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 101 ) {
for(i=0; i < 4 && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
if( i < 4 || memcmp( temp, "GNU", 3 ) ) {
if( list_mode )
printf( "\tunknown S2K %d\n",
sk->protect.s2k.mode );
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
/* here we know that it is a gnu extension
* What follows is the GNU protection mode:
* All values have special meanings
* and they are mapped in the mode with a base of 1000.
*/
sk->protect.s2k.mode = 1000 + temp[3];
}
switch( sk->protect.s2k.mode ) {
case 1:
case 3:
for(i=0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
memcpy(sk->protect.s2k.salt, temp, 8 );
break;
}
switch( sk->protect.s2k.mode ) {
case 0: if( list_mode ) printf( "\tsimple S2K" );
break;
case 1: if( list_mode ) printf( "\tsalted S2K" );
break;
case 3: if( list_mode ) printf( "\titer+salt S2K" );
break;
case 1001: if( list_mode ) printf( "\tgnu-dummy S2K" );
break;
default:
if( list_mode )
printf( "\tunknown %sS2K %d\n",
sk->protect.s2k.mode < 1000? "":"GNU ",
sk->protect.s2k.mode );
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
if( list_mode ) {
printf(", algo: %d,%s hash: %d",
sk->protect.algo,
sk->protect.sha1chk?" SHA1 protection,"
:" simple checksum,",
sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo );
if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1
|| sk->protect.s2k.mode == 3 ) {
printf(", salt: ");
for(i=0; i < 8; i++ )
printf("%02x", sk->protect.s2k.salt[i]);
}
putchar('\n');
}
if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 3 ) {
if( pktlen < 1 ) {
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
sk->protect.s2k.count = iobuf_get(inp);
pktlen--;
if( list_mode )
printf("\tprotect count: %lu\n",
(ulong)sk->protect.s2k.count);
}
}
+ /* Note that a sk->protect.algo > 110 is illegal, but I'm
+ not erroring on it here as otherwise there would be no
+ way to delete such a key. */
else { /* old version; no S2K, so we set mode to 0, hash MD5 */
sk->protect.s2k.mode = 0;
sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
if( list_mode )
printf( "\tprotect algo: %d (hash algo: %d)\n",
sk->protect.algo, sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo );
}
/* It is really ugly that we don't know the size
* of the IV here in cases we are not aware of the algorithm.
* so a
* sk->protect.ivlen = cipher_get_blocksize(sk->protect.algo);
* won't work. The only solution I see is to hardwire it here.
* NOTE: if you change the ivlen above 16, don't forget to
* enlarge temp.
*/
switch( sk->protect.algo ) {
case 7: case 8: case 9: /* reserved for AES */
case 10: /* Twofish */
sk->protect.ivlen = 16;
break;
default:
sk->protect.ivlen = 8;
}
if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 )
sk->protect.ivlen = 0;
if( pktlen < sk->protect.ivlen ) {
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
for(i=0; i < sk->protect.ivlen && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
if( list_mode ) {
printf( "\tprotect IV: ");
for(i=0; i < sk->protect.ivlen; i++ )
printf(" %02x", temp[i] );
putchar('\n');
}
memcpy(sk->protect.iv, temp, sk->protect.ivlen );
}
else
sk->is_protected = 0;
/* It does not make sense to read it into secure memory.
* If the user is so careless, not to protect his secret key,
* we can assume, that he operates an open system :=(.
* So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect it. */
if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
/* better set some dummy stuff here */
sk->skey[npkey] = mpi_set_opaque(NULL, m_strdup("dummydata"), 10);
pktlen = 0;
}
else if( is_v4 && sk->is_protected ) {
/* ugly; the length is encrypted too, so we read all
* stuff up to the end of the packet into the first
* skey element */
sk->skey[npkey] = mpi_set_opaque(NULL,
read_rest(inp, pktlen), pktlen );
pktlen = 0;
if( list_mode ) {
printf("\tencrypted stuff follows\n");
}
}
else { /* v3 method: the mpi length is not encrypted */
for(i=npkey; i < nskey; i++ ) {
if ( sk->is_protected ) {
sk->skey[i] = read_protected_v3_mpi (inp, &pktlen);
if( list_mode )
printf( "\tskey[%d]: [encrypted]\n", i);
}
else {
n = pktlen;
sk->skey[i] = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 );
pktlen -=n;
if( list_mode ) {
printf( "\tskey[%d]: ", i);
mpi_print(stdout, sk->skey[i], mpi_print_mode );
putchar('\n');
}
}
if (!sk->skey[i])
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
}
if (rc)
goto leave;
sk->csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
if( list_mode ) {
printf("\tchecksum: %04hx\n", sk->csum);
}
}
}
else {
PKT_public_key *pk = pkt->pkt.public_key;
if( !npkey ) {
pk->pkey[0] = mpi_set_opaque( NULL,
read_rest(inp, pktlen), pktlen );
pktlen = 0;
goto leave;
}
for(i=0; i < npkey; i++ ) {
n = pktlen; pk->pkey[i] = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
if( list_mode ) {
printf( "\tpkey[%d]: ", i);
mpi_print(stdout, pk->pkey[i], mpi_print_mode );
putchar('\n');
}
if (!pk->pkey[i])
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
}
if (rc)
goto leave;
}
leave:
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
return rc;
}
/* Attribute subpackets have the same format as v4 signature
subpackets. This is not part of OpenPGP, but is done in several
versions of PGP nevertheless. */
int
parse_attribute_subpkts(PKT_user_id *uid)
{
size_t n;
int count=0;
struct user_attribute *attribs=NULL;
const byte *buffer=uid->attrib_data;
int buflen=uid->attrib_len;
byte type;
m_free(uid->attribs);
while(buflen)
{
n = *buffer++; buflen--;
if( n == 255 ) { /* 4 byte length header */
if( buflen < 4 )
goto too_short;
n = (buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16)
| (buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[3];
buffer += 4;
buflen -= 4;
}
else if( n >= 192 ) { /* 2 byte special encoded length header */
if( buflen < 2 )
goto too_short;
n = (( n - 192 ) << 8) + *buffer + 192;
buffer++;
buflen--;
}
if( buflen < n )
goto too_short;
attribs=m_realloc(attribs,(count+1)*sizeof(struct user_attribute));
memset(&attribs[count],0,sizeof(struct user_attribute));
type=*buffer;
buffer++;
buflen--;
n--;
attribs[count].type=type;
attribs[count].data=buffer;
attribs[count].len=n;
buffer+=n;
buflen-=n;
count++;
}
uid->attribs=attribs;
uid->numattribs=count;
return count;
too_short:
log_error("buffer shorter than attribute subpacket\n");
uid->attribs=attribs;
uid->numattribs=count;
return count;
}
static void setup_user_id(PACKET *packet)
{
packet->pkt.user_id->ref = 1;
packet->pkt.user_id->attribs = NULL;
packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_data = NULL;
packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_len = 0;
packet->pkt.user_id->is_primary = 0;
packet->pkt.user_id->is_revoked = 0;
packet->pkt.user_id->is_expired = 0;
packet->pkt.user_id->expiredate = 0;
packet->pkt.user_id->created = 0;
packet->pkt.user_id->help_key_usage = 0;
packet->pkt.user_id->help_key_expire = 0;
packet->pkt.user_id->prefs = NULL;
}
static int
parse_user_id( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
{
byte *p;
packet->pkt.user_id = m_alloc(sizeof *packet->pkt.user_id + pktlen);
packet->pkt.user_id->len = pktlen;
setup_user_id(packet);
p = packet->pkt.user_id->name;
for( ; pktlen; pktlen--, p++ )
*p = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
*p = 0;
if( list_mode ) {
int n = packet->pkt.user_id->len;
printf(":user ID packet: \"");
/* fixme: Hey why don't we replace this with print_string?? */
for(p=packet->pkt.user_id->name; n; p++, n-- ) {
if( *p >= ' ' && *p <= 'z' )
putchar(*p);
else
printf("\\x%02x", *p );
}
printf("\"\n");
}
return 0;
}
void
make_attribute_uidname(PKT_user_id *uid, size_t max_namelen)
{
assert ( max_namelen > 70 );
if(uid->numattribs<=0)
sprintf(uid->name,"[bad attribute packet of size %lu]",uid->attrib_len);
else if(uid->numattribs>1)
sprintf(uid->name,"[%d attributes of size %lu]",
uid->numattribs,uid->attrib_len);
else
{
/* Only one attribute, so list it as the "user id" */
if(uid->attribs->type==ATTRIB_IMAGE)
{
u32 len;
byte type;
if(parse_image_header(uid->attribs,&type,&len))
sprintf(uid->name,"[%.20s image of size %lu]",
image_type_to_string(type,1),(ulong)len);
else
sprintf(uid->name,"[invalid image]");
}
else
sprintf(uid->name,"[unknown attribute of size %lu]",
(ulong)uid->attribs->len);
}
uid->len = strlen(uid->name);
}
static int
parse_attribute( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
{
byte *p;
#define EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE 71
packet->pkt.user_id = m_alloc(sizeof *packet->pkt.user_id
+ EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE);
setup_user_id(packet);
packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_data = m_alloc(pktlen);
packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_len = pktlen;
p = packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_data;
for( ; pktlen; pktlen--, p++ )
*p = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
/* Now parse out the individual attribute subpackets. This is
somewhat pointless since there is only one currently defined
attribute type (jpeg), but it is correct by the spec. */
parse_attribute_subpkts(packet->pkt.user_id);
make_attribute_uidname(packet->pkt.user_id, EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE);
if( list_mode ) {
printf(":attribute packet: %s\n", packet->pkt.user_id->name );
}
return 0;
}
static int
parse_comment( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
{
byte *p;
packet->pkt.comment = m_alloc(sizeof *packet->pkt.comment + pktlen - 1);
packet->pkt.comment->len = pktlen;
p = packet->pkt.comment->data;
for( ; pktlen; pktlen--, p++ )
*p = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
if( list_mode ) {
int n = packet->pkt.comment->len;
printf(":%scomment packet: \"", pkttype == PKT_OLD_COMMENT?
"OpenPGP draft " : "" );
for(p=packet->pkt.comment->data; n; p++, n-- ) {
if( *p >= ' ' && *p <= 'z' )
putchar(*p);
else
printf("\\x%02x", *p );
}
printf("\"\n");
}
return 0;
}
static void
parse_trust( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *pkt )
{
int c;
if (pktlen)
{
c = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
pktlen--;
pkt->pkt.ring_trust = m_alloc( sizeof *pkt->pkt.ring_trust );
pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval = c;
pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache = 0;
if (!c && pktlen==1)
{
c = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
pktlen--;
/* we require that bit 7 of the sigcache is 0 (easier eof handling)*/
if ( !(c & 0x80) )
pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache = c;
}
if( list_mode )
printf(":trust packet: flag=%02x sigcache=%02x\n",
pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval,
pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache);
}
else
{
if( list_mode )
printf(":trust packet: empty\n");
}
skip_rest (inp, pktlen);
}
static int
parse_plaintext( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *pkt, int new_ctb )
{
int rc = 0;
int mode, namelen, partial=0;
PKT_plaintext *pt;
byte *p;
int c, i;
if( pktlen && pktlen < 6 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) too short (%lu)\n", pkttype, (ulong)pktlen);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
/* A packet length of zero indicates partial body length. A zero
data length isn't a zero length packet due to the header (mode,
name, etc), so this is accurate. */
if(pktlen==0)
partial=1;
mode = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); if( pktlen ) pktlen--;
namelen = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); if( pktlen ) pktlen--;
pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext = m_alloc(sizeof *pkt->pkt.plaintext + namelen -1);
pt->new_ctb = new_ctb;
pt->mode = mode;
pt->namelen = namelen;
pt->is_partial = partial;
if( pktlen ) {
for( i=0; pktlen > 4 && i < namelen; pktlen--, i++ )
pt->name[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
}
else {
for( i=0; i < namelen; i++ )
if( (c=iobuf_get(inp)) == -1 )
break;
else
pt->name[i] = c;
}
pt->timestamp = read_32(inp); if( pktlen) pktlen -= 4;
pt->len = pktlen;
pt->buf = inp;
pktlen = 0;
if( list_mode ) {
printf(":literal data packet:\n"
"\tmode %c, created %lu, name=\"",
mode >= ' ' && mode <'z'? mode : '?',
(ulong)pt->timestamp );
for(p=pt->name,i=0; i < namelen; p++, i++ ) {
if( *p >= ' ' && *p <= 'z' )
putchar(*p);
else
printf("\\x%02x", *p );
}
printf("\",\n\traw data: %lu bytes\n", (ulong)pt->len );
}
leave:
return rc;
}
static int
parse_compressed( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *pkt, int new_ctb )
{
PKT_compressed *zd;
/* pktlen is here 0, but data follows
* (this should be the last object in a file or
* the compress algorithm should know the length)
*/
zd = pkt->pkt.compressed = m_alloc(sizeof *pkt->pkt.compressed );
zd->algorithm = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
zd->len = 0; /* not used */
zd->new_ctb = new_ctb;
zd->buf = inp;
if( list_mode )
printf(":compressed packet: algo=%d\n", zd->algorithm);
return 0;
}
static int
parse_encrypted( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *pkt, int new_ctb )
{
int rc = 0;
PKT_encrypted *ed;
unsigned long orig_pktlen = pktlen;
ed = pkt->pkt.encrypted = m_alloc(sizeof *pkt->pkt.encrypted );
ed->len = pktlen;
/* we don't know the extralen which is (cipher_blocksize+2)
because the algorithm ist not specified in this packet.
However, it is only important to know this for some sanity
checks on the packet length - it doesn't matter that we can't
do it */
ed->extralen = 0;
ed->buf = NULL;
ed->new_ctb = new_ctb;
ed->mdc_method = 0;
if( pkttype == PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC ) {
/* fixme: add some pktlen sanity checks */
int version;
version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
if (orig_pktlen)
pktlen--;
if( version != 1 ) {
log_error("encrypted_mdc packet with unknown version %d\n",
version);
/*skip_rest(inp, pktlen); should we really do this? */
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
ed->mdc_method = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
}
if( orig_pktlen && pktlen < 10 ) { /* actually this is blocksize+2 */
log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
goto leave;
}
if( list_mode ) {
if( orig_pktlen )
printf(":encrypted data packet:\n\tlength: %lu\n", orig_pktlen);
else
printf(":encrypted data packet:\n\tlength: unknown\n");
if( ed->mdc_method )
printf("\tmdc_method: %d\n", ed->mdc_method );
}
ed->buf = inp;
pktlen = 0;
leave:
return rc;
}
static int
parse_mdc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *pkt, int new_ctb )
{
int rc = 0;
PKT_mdc *mdc;
byte *p;
mdc = pkt->pkt.mdc= m_alloc(sizeof *pkt->pkt.mdc );
if( list_mode )
printf(":mdc packet: length=%lu\n", pktlen);
if( !new_ctb || pktlen != 20 ) {
log_error("mdc_packet with invalid encoding\n");
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
p = mdc->hash;
for( ; pktlen; pktlen--, p++ )
*p = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
leave:
return rc;
}
/*
* This packet is internally generated by PGG (by armor.c) to
* transfer some information to the lower layer. To make sure that
* this packet is really a GPG faked one and not one comming from outside,
* we first check that tehre is a unique tag in it.
* The format of such a control packet is:
* n byte session marker
* 1 byte control type CTRLPKT_xxxxx
* m byte control data
*/
static int
parse_gpg_control( IOBUF inp,
int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
{
byte *p;
const byte *sesmark;
size_t sesmarklen;
int i;
if ( list_mode )
printf(":packet 63: length %lu ", pktlen);
sesmark = get_session_marker ( &sesmarklen );
if ( pktlen < sesmarklen+1 ) /* 1 is for the control bytes */
goto skipit;
for( i=0; i < sesmarklen; i++, pktlen-- ) {
if ( sesmark[i] != iobuf_get_noeof(inp) )
goto skipit;
}
if ( list_mode )
puts ("- gpg control packet");
packet->pkt.gpg_control = m_alloc(sizeof *packet->pkt.gpg_control
+ pktlen - 1);
packet->pkt.gpg_control->control = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
packet->pkt.gpg_control->datalen = pktlen;
p = packet->pkt.gpg_control->data;
for( ; pktlen; pktlen--, p++ )
*p = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
return 0;
skipit:
if ( list_mode ) {
int c;
i=0;
printf("- private (rest length %lu)\n", pktlen);
if( iobuf_in_block_mode(inp) ) {
while( (c=iobuf_get(inp)) != -1 )
dump_hex_line(c, &i);
}
else {
for( ; pktlen; pktlen-- )
dump_hex_line(iobuf_get(inp), &i);
}
putchar('\n');
}
skip_rest(inp,pktlen);
return G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
}
/* create a gpg control packet to be used internally as a placeholder */
PACKET *
create_gpg_control( ctrlpkttype_t type, const byte *data, size_t datalen )
{
PACKET *packet;
byte *p;
packet = m_alloc( sizeof *packet );
init_packet(packet);
packet->pkttype = PKT_GPG_CONTROL;
packet->pkt.gpg_control = m_alloc(sizeof *packet->pkt.gpg_control
+ datalen - 1);
packet->pkt.gpg_control->control = type;
packet->pkt.gpg_control->datalen = datalen;
p = packet->pkt.gpg_control->data;
for( ; datalen; datalen--, p++ )
*p = *data++;
return packet;
}
diff --git a/g10/revoke.c b/g10/revoke.c
index d90bcb581..b6e9e6398 100644
--- a/g10/revoke.c
+++ b/g10/revoke.c
@@ -1,715 +1,717 @@
/* revoke.c
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "errors.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "memory.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "ttyio.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "i18n.h"
struct revocation_reason_info {
int code;
char *desc;
};
int
revocation_reason_build_cb( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque )
{
struct revocation_reason_info *reason = opaque;
char *ud = NULL;
byte *buffer;
size_t buflen = 1;
if(!reason)
return 0;
if( reason->desc ) {
ud = native_to_utf8( reason->desc );
buflen += strlen(ud);
}
buffer = m_alloc( buflen );
*buffer = reason->code;
if( ud ) {
memcpy(buffer+1, ud, strlen(ud) );
m_free( ud );
}
build_sig_subpkt( sig, SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON, buffer, buflen );
m_free( buffer );
return 0;
}
/* Outputs a minimal pk (as defined by 2440) from a keyblock. A
minimal pk consists of the public key packet and a user ID. We try
and pick a user ID that has a uid signature, and include it if
possible. */
static int
export_minimal_pk(IOBUF out,KBNODE keyblock,
PKT_signature *revsig,PKT_signature *revkey)
{
KBNODE node;
PACKET pkt;
PKT_user_id *uid=NULL;
PKT_signature *selfsig=NULL;
u32 keyid[2];
int rc;
node=find_kbnode(keyblock,PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
if(!node)
{
log_error(_("key incomplete\n"));
return G10ERR_GENERAL;
}
keyid_from_pk(node->pkt->pkt.public_key,keyid);
pkt=*node->pkt;
rc=build_packet(out,&pkt);
if(rc)
{
log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
return rc;
}
init_packet(&pkt);
pkt.pkttype=PKT_SIGNATURE;
/* the revocation itself, if any. 2440 likes this to come first. */
if(revsig)
{
pkt.pkt.signature=revsig;
rc=build_packet(out,&pkt);
if(rc)
{
log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
return rc;
}
}
/* If a revkey in a 1F sig is present, include it too */
if(revkey)
{
pkt.pkt.signature=revkey;
rc=build_packet(out,&pkt);
if(rc)
{
log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
return rc;
}
}
while(!selfsig)
{
KBNODE signode;
node=find_next_kbnode(node,PKT_USER_ID);
if(!node)
{
/* We're out of user IDs - none were self-signed. */
if(uid)
break;
else
{
log_error(_("key %08lX incomplete\n"),(ulong)keyid[1]);
return G10ERR_GENERAL;
}
}
if(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
continue;
uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
signode=node;
while((signode=find_next_kbnode(signode,PKT_SIGNATURE)))
{
if(keyid[0]==signode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0] &&
keyid[1]==signode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] &&
IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature))
{
selfsig=signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
break;
}
}
}
pkt.pkttype=PKT_USER_ID;
pkt.pkt.user_id=uid;
rc=build_packet(out,&pkt);
if(rc)
{
log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
return rc;
}
if(selfsig)
{
pkt.pkttype=PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt.pkt.signature=selfsig;
rc=build_packet(out,&pkt);
if(rc)
{
log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
return rc;
}
}
return 0;
}
/****************
* Generate a revocation certificate for UNAME via a designated revoker
*/
int
gen_desig_revoke( const char *uname )
{
int rc = 0;
armor_filter_context_t afx;
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
PKT_signature *sig = NULL;
IOBUF out = NULL;
struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
KBNODE keyblock=NULL,node;
u32 keyid[2];
int i,any=0;
if( opt.batch ) {
log_error(_("sorry, can't do this in batch mode\n"));
return G10ERR_GENERAL;
}
memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
kdbhd = keydb_new (0);
classify_user_id (uname, &desc);
rc = desc.mode? keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1) : G10ERR_INV_USER_ID;
if (rc) {
log_error (_("key `%s' not found: %s\n"),uname, g10_errstr (rc));
goto leave;
}
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock );
if( rc ) {
log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
goto leave;
}
/* To parse the revkeys */
merge_keys_and_selfsig(keyblock);
/* get the key from the keyblock */
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
if( !node )
BUG ();
pk=node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk(pk,keyid);
/* Are we a designated revoker for this key? */
if(!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys)
BUG();
for(i=0;i<pk->numrevkeys;i++)
{
if(sk)
free_secret_key(sk);
sk=m_alloc_clear(sizeof(*sk));
rc=get_seckey_byfprint(sk,pk->revkey[i].fpr,MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
/* We have the revocation key */
if(!rc)
{
size_t n;
char *p;
u32 sk_keyid[2];
PKT_signature *revkey=NULL;
any=1;
keyid_from_sk(sk,sk_keyid);
tty_printf("\npub %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_pk(pk) );
p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
m_free(p);
tty_printf("\n\n");
tty_printf(_("To be revoked by:\n"));
tty_printf("\nsec %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
nbits_from_sk( sk ),
pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)sk_keyid[1], datestr_from_sk(sk) );
p = get_user_id( sk_keyid, &n );
tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
m_free(p);
tty_printf("\n");
if(pk->revkey[i].class&0x40)
tty_printf(_("(This is a sensitive revocation key)\n"));
tty_printf("\n");
if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("gen_desig_revoke.okay",
_("Create a revocation certificate for this key? ")) )
continue;
/* get the reason for the revocation (this is always v4) */
reason = ask_revocation_reason( 1, 0, 1 );
if( !reason )
continue;
rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
if( rc )
continue;
if( !opt.armor )
tty_printf(_("ASCII armored output forced.\n"));
if( (rc = open_outfile( NULL, 0, &out )) )
goto leave;
afx.what = 1;
afx.hdrlines = "Comment: A revocation certificate should follow\n";
iobuf_push_filter( out, armor_filter, &afx );
/* create it */
rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, pk, NULL, NULL, sk, 0x20, 0,
0, 0, 0,
revocation_reason_build_cb, reason );
if( rc ) {
log_error(_("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
/* Spit out a minimal pk as well, since otherwise there is
no way to know which key to attach this revocation to.
Also include the direct key signature that contains
this revocation key. We're allowed to include
sensitive revocation keys along with a revocation, as
this may be the only time the recipient has seen it.
Note that this means that if we have multiple different
sensitive revocation keys in a given direct key
signature, we're going to include them all here. This
is annoying, but the good outweighs the bad, since
without including this a sensitive revoker can't really
do their job. People should not include multiple
sensitive revocation keys in one signature: 2440 says
"Note that it may be appropriate to isolate this
subpacket within a separate signature so that it is not
combined with other subpackets that need to be
exported." -dms */
while(!revkey)
{
KBNODE signode;
signode=find_next_kbnode(node,PKT_SIGNATURE);
if(!signode)
break;
node=signode;
if(keyid[0]==signode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0] &&
keyid[1]==signode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] &&
IS_KEY_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature))
{
int j;
for(j=0;j<signode->pkt->pkt.signature->numrevkeys;j++)
{
if(pk->revkey[i].class==
signode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[j]->class &&
pk->revkey[i].algid==
signode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[j]->algid &&
memcmp(pk->revkey[i].fpr,
signode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[j]->fpr,
MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)==0)
{
revkey=signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
break;
}
}
}
}
if(!revkey)
BUG();
rc=export_minimal_pk(out,keyblock,sig,revkey);
if(rc)
goto leave;
/* and issue a usage notice */
tty_printf(_("Revocation certificate created.\n"));
break;
}
}
if(!any)
log_error(_("no revocation keys found for `%s'\n"),uname);
leave:
if( pk )
free_public_key( pk );
if( sk )
free_secret_key( sk );
if( sig )
free_seckey_enc( sig );
if( rc )
iobuf_cancel(out);
else
iobuf_close(out);
release_revocation_reason_info( reason );
return rc;
}
/****************
* Generate a revocation certificate for UNAME
*/
int
gen_revoke( const char *uname )
{
int rc = 0;
armor_filter_context_t afx;
PACKET pkt;
PKT_secret_key *sk; /* used as pointer into a kbnode */
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
PKT_signature *sig = NULL;
u32 sk_keyid[2];
IOBUF out = NULL;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL, pub_keyblock = NULL;
KBNODE node;
KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd;
struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
if( opt.batch ) {
log_error(_("sorry, can't do this in batch mode\n"));
return G10ERR_GENERAL;
}
memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
init_packet( &pkt );
/* search the userid:
* We don't want the whole getkey stuff here but the entire keyblock
*/
kdbhd = keydb_new (1);
classify_user_id (uname, &desc);
rc = desc.mode? keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1) : G10ERR_INV_USER_ID;
if (rc) {
log_error (_("secret key `%s' not found: %s\n"),
uname, g10_errstr (rc));
goto leave;
}
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock );
if( rc ) {
log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
goto leave;
}
/* get the keyid from the keyblock */
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
if( !node )
BUG ();
/* fixme: should make a function out of this stuff,
* it's used all over the source */
sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
keyid_from_sk( sk, sk_keyid );
tty_printf("\nsec %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
nbits_from_sk( sk ),
pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)sk_keyid[1], datestr_from_sk(sk) );
{
size_t n;
char *p = get_user_id( sk_keyid, &n );
tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
m_free(p);
tty_printf("\n");
}
pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
/* FIXME: We should get the public key direct from the secret one */
pub_keyblock=get_pubkeyblock(sk_keyid);
if(!pub_keyblock)
{
log_error(_("no corresponding public key: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
goto leave;
}
node=find_kbnode(pub_keyblock,PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
if(!node)
BUG();
pk=node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if( cmp_public_secret_key( pk, sk ) ) {
log_error(_("public key does not match secret key!\n") );
rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
goto leave;
}
tty_printf("\n");
if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("gen_revoke.okay",
_("Create a revocation certificate for this key? ")) ){
rc = 0;
goto leave;
}
if(sk->version>=4 || opt.force_v4_certs) {
/* get the reason for the revocation */
reason = ask_revocation_reason( 1, 0, 1 );
if( !reason ) { /* user decided to cancel */
rc = 0;
goto leave;
}
}
switch( is_secret_key_protected( sk ) ) {
case -1:
log_error(_("unknown protection algorithm\n"));
rc = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
break;
case 0:
tty_printf(_("NOTE: This key is not protected!\n"));
break;
default:
rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
break;
}
if( rc )
goto leave;
if( !opt.armor )
tty_printf(_("ASCII armored output forced.\n"));
if( (rc = open_outfile( NULL, 0, &out )) )
goto leave;
afx.what = 1;
afx.hdrlines = "Comment: A revocation certificate should follow\n";
iobuf_push_filter( out, armor_filter, &afx );
/* create it */
rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, pk, NULL, NULL, sk, 0x20, 0,
opt.force_v4_certs?4:0, 0, 0,
revocation_reason_build_cb, reason );
if( rc ) {
log_error(_("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
if(opt.pgp2 || opt.pgp6 || opt.pgp7)
{
- rc=export_minimal_pk(out,NULL /*pub_keyblock*/,sig,NULL);
+ /* Use a minimal pk for PGPx mode, since PGP can't import bare
+ revocation certificates. */
+ rc=export_minimal_pk(out,pub_keyblock,sig,NULL);
if(rc)
goto leave;
}
else
{
init_packet( &pkt );
pkt.pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt.pkt.signature = sig;
rc = build_packet( out, &pkt );
if( rc ) {
log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
goto leave;
}
}
/* and issue a usage notice */
tty_printf(_("Revocation certificate created.\n\n"
"Please move it to a medium which you can hide away; if Mallory gets\n"
"access to this certificate he can use it to make your key unusable.\n"
"It is smart to print this certificate and store it away, just in case\n"
"your media become unreadable. But have some caution: The print system of\n"
"your machine might store the data and make it available to others!\n"));
leave:
if( sig )
free_seckey_enc( sig );
release_kbnode( keyblock );
release_kbnode( pub_keyblock );
keydb_release (kdbhd);
if( rc )
iobuf_cancel(out);
else
iobuf_close(out);
release_revocation_reason_info( reason );
return rc;
}
struct revocation_reason_info *
ask_revocation_reason( int key_rev, int cert_rev, int hint )
{
int code=-1;
char *description = NULL;
struct revocation_reason_info *reason;
const char *text_0 = _("No reason specified");
const char *text_1 = _("Key has been compromised");
const char *text_2 = _("Key is superseded");
const char *text_3 = _("Key is no longer used");
const char *text_4 = _("User ID is no longer valid");
const char *code_text = NULL;
do {
m_free(description);
description = NULL;
tty_printf(_("Please select the reason for the revocation:\n"));
tty_printf( " 0 = %s\n", text_0 );
if( key_rev )
tty_printf(" 1 = %s\n", text_1 );
if( key_rev )
tty_printf(" 2 = %s\n", text_2 );
if( key_rev )
tty_printf(" 3 = %s\n", text_3 );
if( cert_rev )
tty_printf(" 4 = %s\n", text_4 );
tty_printf( " Q = %s\n", _("Cancel") );
if( hint )
tty_printf(_("(Probably you want to select %d here)\n"), hint );
while(code==-1) {
int n;
char *answer = cpr_get("ask_revocation_reason.code",
_("Your decision? "));
trim_spaces( answer );
cpr_kill_prompt();
if( *answer == 'q' || *answer == 'Q')
return NULL; /* cancel */
if( hint && !*answer )
n = hint;
else if(!isdigit( *answer ) )
n = -1;
else
n = atoi(answer);
m_free(answer);
if( n == 0 ) {
code = 0x00; /* no particular reason */
code_text = text_0;
}
else if( key_rev && n == 1 ) {
code = 0x02; /* key has been compromised */
code_text = text_1;
}
else if( key_rev && n == 2 ) {
code = 0x01; /* key is superseded */
code_text = text_2;
}
else if( key_rev && n == 3 ) {
code = 0x03; /* key is no longer used */
code_text = text_3;
}
else if( cert_rev && n == 4 ) {
code = 0x20; /* uid is no longer valid */
code_text = text_4;
}
else
tty_printf(_("Invalid selection.\n"));
}
tty_printf(_("Enter an optional description; "
"end it with an empty line:\n") );
for(;;) {
char *answer = cpr_get("ask_revocation_reason.text", "> " );
trim_trailing_ws( answer, strlen(answer) );
cpr_kill_prompt();
if( !*answer ) {
m_free(answer);
break;
}
{
char *p = make_printable_string( answer, strlen(answer), 0 );
m_free(answer);
answer = p;
}
if( !description )
description = m_strdup(answer);
else {
char *p = m_alloc( strlen(description) + strlen(answer) + 2 );
strcpy(stpcpy(stpcpy( p, description),"\n"),answer);
m_free(description);
description = p;
}
m_free(answer);
}
tty_printf(_("Reason for revocation: %s\n"), code_text );
if( !description )
tty_printf(_("(No description given)\n") );
else
tty_printf("%s\n", description );
} while( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("ask_revocation_reason.okay",
_("Is this okay? ")) );
reason = m_alloc( sizeof *reason );
reason->code = code;
reason->desc = description;
return reason;
}
void
release_revocation_reason_info( struct revocation_reason_info *reason )
{
if( reason ) {
m_free( reason->desc );
m_free( reason );
}
}
diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c
index d2d39dacf..d19ac683a 100644
--- a/g10/seckey-cert.c
+++ b/g10/seckey-cert.c
@@ -1,381 +1,382 @@
/* seckey-cert.c - secret key certificate packet handling
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "util.h"
#include "memory.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "mpi.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "status.h"
static int
do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text )
{
byte *buffer;
u16 csum=0;
int i, res;
unsigned nbytes;
if( sk->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
DEK *dek = NULL;
u32 keyid[4]; /* 4! because we need two of them */
CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd=NULL;
PKT_secret_key *save_sk;
if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
log_info(_("secret key parts are not available\n"));
return G10ERR_GENERAL;
}
if( sk->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_NONE )
BUG();
if( check_cipher_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) {
log_info(_("protection algorithm %d%s is not supported\n"),
sk->protect.algo,sk->protect.algo==1?" (IDEA)":"" );
- idea_cipher_warn(0);
+ if(sk->protect.algo==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)
+ idea_cipher_warn(0);
return G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO;
}
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
keyid[2] = keyid[3] = 0;
if( !sk->is_primary ) {
keyid[2] = sk->main_keyid[0];
keyid[3] = sk->main_keyid[1];
}
dek = passphrase_to_dek( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo, sk->protect.algo,
&sk->protect.s2k, 0, tryagain_text );
cipher_hd = cipher_open( sk->protect.algo,
CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1);
cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
m_free(dek);
save_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk );
cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
csum = 0;
if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
int ndata;
byte *p, *data;
u16 csumc = 0;
i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
assert( mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) );
p = mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndata );
if ( ndata > 1 )
csumc = p[ndata-2] << 8 | p[ndata-1];
data = m_alloc_secure( ndata );
cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, data, p, ndata );
mpi_free( sk->skey[i] ); sk->skey[i] = NULL ;
p = data;
if (sk->protect.sha1chk) {
/* This is the new SHA1 checksum method to detect
tampering with the key as used by the Klima/Rosa
attack */
sk->csum = 0;
csum = 1;
if( ndata < 20 )
log_error("not enough bytes for SHA-1 checksum\n");
else {
MD_HANDLE h = md_open (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1);
if (!h)
BUG(); /* algo not available */
md_write (h, data, ndata - 20);
md_final (h);
if (!memcmp (md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1),
data + ndata - 20, 20) ) {
/* digest does match. We have to keep the old
style checksum in sk->csum, so that the
test used for unprotected keys does work.
This test gets used when we are adding new
keys. */
sk->csum = csum = checksum (data, ndata-20);
}
md_close (h);
}
}
else {
if( ndata < 2 ) {
log_error("not enough bytes for checksum\n");
sk->csum = 0;
csum = 1;
}
else {
csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
sk->csum = data[ndata-2] << 8 | data[ndata-1];
if ( sk->csum != csum ) {
/* This is a PGP 7.0.0 workaround */
sk->csum = csumc; /* take the encrypted one */
}
}
}
/* must check it here otherwise the mpi_read_xx would fail
because the length may have an arbitrary value */
if( sk->csum == csum ) {
for( ; i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
nbytes = ndata;
sk->skey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(p, &nbytes, 1 );
ndata -= nbytes;
p += nbytes;
}
/* Note: at this point ndata should be 2 for a simple
checksum or 20 for the sha1 digest */
}
m_free(data);
}
else {
for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
byte *p;
int ndata;
unsigned int dummy;
assert (mpi_is_opaque (sk->skey[i]));
p = mpi_get_opaque (sk->skey[i], &ndata);
assert (ndata >= 2);
assert (ndata == ((p[0] << 8 | p[1]) + 7)/8 + 2);
buffer = m_alloc_secure (ndata);
cipher_sync (cipher_hd);
buffer[0] = p[0];
buffer[1] = p[1];
cipher_decrypt (cipher_hd, buffer+2, p+2, ndata-2);
csum += checksum (buffer, ndata);
mpi_free (sk->skey[i]);
dummy = ndata;
sk->skey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer (buffer, &dummy, 1);
assert (sk->skey[i]);
m_free (buffer);
/* csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]); */
}
}
cipher_close( cipher_hd );
/* now let's see whether we have used the right passphrase */
if( csum != sk->csum ) {
copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo );
free_secret_key( save_sk );
return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
}
/* the checksum may fail, so we also check the key itself */
res = pubkey_check_secret_key( sk->pubkey_algo, sk->skey );
if( res ) {
copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo );
free_secret_key( save_sk );
return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
}
free_secret_key( save_sk );
sk->is_protected = 0;
}
else { /* not protected, assume it is okay if the checksum is okay */
csum = 0;
for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
csum += checksum_mpi( sk->skey[i] );
}
if( csum != sk->csum )
return G10ERR_CHECKSUM;
}
return 0;
}
/****************
* Check the secret key
* Ask up to 3 (or n) times for a correct passphrase
*/
int
check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n )
{
int rc = G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
int i;
if( n < 1 )
n = (opt.batch && !opt.use_agent)? 1 : 3; /* use the default value */
for(i=0; i < n && rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS; i++ ) {
const char *tryagain = NULL;
if (i) {
tryagain = _("Invalid passphrase; please try again");
log_info (_("%s ...\n"), tryagain);
}
rc = do_check( sk, tryagain );
if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS && is_status_enabled() ) {
u32 kid[2];
char buf[50];
keyid_from_sk( sk, kid );
sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX", (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1]);
write_status_text( STATUS_BAD_PASSPHRASE, buf );
}
if( have_static_passphrase() )
break;
}
if( !rc )
write_status( STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE );
return rc;
}
/****************
* check whether the secret key is protected.
* Returns: 0 not protected, -1 on error or the protection algorithm
*/
int
is_secret_key_protected( PKT_secret_key *sk )
{
return sk->is_protected? sk->protect.algo : 0;
}
/****************
* Protect the secret key with the passphrase from DEK
*/
int
protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
{
int i,j, rc = 0;
byte *buffer;
unsigned nbytes;
u16 csum;
if( !dek )
return 0;
if( !sk->is_protected ) { /* okay, apply the protection */
CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd=NULL;
if( check_cipher_algo( sk->protect.algo ) )
rc = G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO; /* unsupport protection algorithm */
else {
print_cipher_algo_note( sk->protect.algo );
cipher_hd = cipher_open( sk->protect.algo,
CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1 );
if( cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ) )
log_info(_("WARNING: Weak key detected"
" - please change passphrase again.\n"));
sk->protect.ivlen = cipher_get_blocksize( sk->protect.algo );
assert( sk->protect.ivlen <= DIM(sk->protect.iv) );
if( sk->protect.ivlen != 8 && sk->protect.ivlen != 16 )
BUG(); /* yes, we are very careful */
randomize_buffer(sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen, 1);
cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
byte *bufarr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
unsigned narr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
unsigned nbits[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
int ndata=0;
byte *p, *data;
for(j=0, i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++, j++ ) {
assert( !mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) );
bufarr[j] = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[i], &narr[j], NULL );
nbits[j] = mpi_get_nbits( sk->skey[i] );
ndata += narr[j] + 2;
}
for( ; j < PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY; j++ )
bufarr[j] = NULL;
ndata += opt.simple_sk_checksum? 2 : 20; /* for checksum */
data = m_alloc_secure( ndata );
p = data;
for(j=0; j < PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY && bufarr[j]; j++ ) {
p[0] = nbits[j] >> 8 ;
p[1] = nbits[j];
p += 2;
memcpy(p, bufarr[j], narr[j] );
p += narr[j];
m_free(bufarr[j]);
}
if (opt.simple_sk_checksum) {
log_info (_("generating the deprecated 16-bit checksum"
" for secret key protection\n"));
csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
sk->csum = csum;
*p++ = csum >> 8;
*p++ = csum;
sk->protect.sha1chk = 0;
}
else {
MD_HANDLE h = md_open (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1);
if (!h)
BUG(); /* algo not available */
md_write (h, data, ndata - 20);
md_final (h);
memcpy (p, md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1), 20);
p += 20;
md_close (h);
sk->csum = csum = 0;
sk->protect.sha1chk = 1;
}
assert( p == data+ndata );
cipher_encrypt( cipher_hd, data, data, ndata );
for(i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
mpi_free( sk->skey[i] );
sk->skey[i] = NULL;
}
i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque(NULL, data, ndata );
}
else {
csum = 0;
for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
byte *data;
unsigned int nbits;
csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]);
buffer = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[i], &nbytes, NULL );
cipher_sync (cipher_hd);
assert ( !mpi_is_opaque (sk->skey[i]) );
data = m_alloc (nbytes+2);
nbits = mpi_get_nbits (sk->skey[i]);
assert (nbytes == (nbits + 7)/8);
data[0] = nbits >> 8;
data[1] = nbits;
cipher_encrypt (cipher_hd, data+2, buffer, nbytes);
m_free( buffer );
mpi_free (sk->skey[i]);
sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque (NULL, data, nbytes+2);
}
sk->csum = csum;
}
sk->is_protected = 1;
cipher_close( cipher_hd );
}
}
return rc;
}
diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c
index 85b7dbcb9..fe2ad34e3 100644
--- a/g10/trustdb.c
+++ b/g10/trustdb.c
@@ -1,1650 +1,1642 @@
/* trustdb.c
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "errors.h"
#include "iobuf.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "memory.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "tdbio.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
/*
* A structure to store key identification as well as some stuff needed
* for validation
*/
struct key_item {
struct key_item *next;
unsigned int ownertrust;
u32 kid[2];
};
typedef struct key_item **KeyHashTable; /* see new_key_hash_table() */
/*
* Structure to keep track of keys, this is used as an array wherre
* the item right after the last one has a keyblock set to NULL.
* Maybe we can drop this thing and replace it by key_item
*/
struct key_array {
KBNODE keyblock;
};
/* control information for the trust DB */
static struct {
int init;
int level;
char *dbname;
} trustdb_args;
/* some globals */
static struct key_item *user_utk_list; /* temp. used to store --trusted-keys */
static struct key_item *utk_list; /* all ultimately trusted keys */
static int pending_check_trustdb;
static int validate_keys (int interactive);
/**********************************************
************* some helpers *******************
**********************************************/
static struct key_item *
new_key_item (void)
{
struct key_item *k;
k = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *k);
return k;
}
static void
release_key_items (struct key_item *k)
{
struct key_item *k2;
for (; k; k = k2)
{
k2 = k->next;
m_free (k);
}
}
/*
* For fast keylook up we need a hash table. Each byte of a KeyIDs
* should be distributed equally over the 256 possible values (except
* for v3 keyIDs but we consider them as not important here). So we
* can just use 10 bits to index a table of 1024 key items.
* Possible optimization: Don not use key_items but other hash_table when the
* duplicates lists gets too large.
*/
static KeyHashTable
new_key_hash_table (void)
{
struct key_item **tbl;
tbl = m_alloc_clear (1024 * sizeof *tbl);
return tbl;
}
static void
release_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl)
{
int i;
if (!tbl)
return;
for (i=0; i < 1024; i++)
release_key_items (tbl[i]);
m_free (tbl);
}
/*
* Returns: True if the keyID is in the given hash table
*/
static int
test_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
{
struct key_item *k;
for (k = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)]; k; k = k->next)
if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
return 1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Add a new key to the hash table. The key is identified by its key ID.
*/
static void
add_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
{
struct key_item *k, *kk;
for (k = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)]; k; k = k->next)
if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
return; /* already in table */
kk = new_key_item ();
kk->kid[0] = kid[0];
kk->kid[1] = kid[1];
kk->next = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)];
tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)] = kk;
}
/*
* Release a key_array
*/
static void
release_key_array ( struct key_array *keys )
{
struct key_array *k;
if (keys) {
for (k=keys; k->keyblock; k++)
release_kbnode (k->keyblock);
m_free (keys);
}
}
/*********************************************
********** Initialization *****************
*********************************************/
/*
* Used to register extra ultimately trusted keys - this has to be done
* before initializing the validation module.
* FIXME: Should be replaced by a function to add those keys to the trustdb.
*/
void
register_trusted_key( const char *string )
{
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
struct key_item *k;
if (classify_user_id (string, &desc) != KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID ) {
log_error(_("`%s' is not a valid long keyID\n"), string );
return;
}
k = new_key_item ();
k->kid[0] = desc.u.kid[0];
k->kid[1] = desc.u.kid[1];
k->next = user_utk_list;
user_utk_list = k;
}
/*
* Helper to add a key to the global list of ultimately trusted keys.
* Retruns: true = inserted, false = already in in list.
*/
static int
add_utk (u32 *kid)
{
struct key_item *k;
for (k = utk_list; k; k = k->next)
{
if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
{
return 0;
}
}
k = new_key_item ();
k->kid[0] = kid[0];
k->kid[1] = kid[1];
k->ownertrust = TRUST_ULTIMATE;
k->next = utk_list;
utk_list = k;
if( opt.verbose > 1 )
log_info(_("key %08lX: accepted as trusted key\n"), (ulong)kid[1]);
return 1;
}
/****************
* Verify that all our secret keys are usable and put them into the utk_list.
*/
static void
verify_own_keys(void)
{
TRUSTREC rec;
ulong recnum;
int rc;
struct key_item *k;
- int hint_shown = 0;
if (utk_list)
return;
/* scan the trustdb to find all ultimately trusted keys */
for (recnum=1; !tdbio_read_record (recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ )
{
if ( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_TRUST
&& (rec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
{
byte *fpr = rec.r.trust.fingerprint;
int fprlen;
u32 kid[2];
/* Problem: We do only use fingerprints in the trustdb but
* we need the keyID here to indetify the key; we can only
* use that ugly hack to distinguish between 16 and 20
* butes fpr - it does not work always so we better change
* the whole validation code to only work with
* fingerprints */
fprlen = (!fpr[16] && !fpr[17] && !fpr[18] && !fpr[19])? 16:20;
keyid_from_fingerprint (fpr, fprlen, kid);
if (!add_utk (kid))
log_info(_("key %08lX occurs more than once in the trustdb\n"),
(ulong)kid[1]);
}
}
/* the --trusted-key option is again deprecated; however we automagically
* add those keys to the trustdb */
for (k = user_utk_list; k; k = k->next)
{
if ( add_utk (k->kid) )
{ /* not yet in trustDB as ultimately trusted */
PKT_public_key pk;
memset (&pk, 0, sizeof pk);
rc = get_pubkey (&pk, k->kid);
if (rc) {
log_info(_("key %08lX: no public key for trusted key - skipped\n"),
(ulong)k->kid[1] );
}
else {
update_ownertrust (&pk,
((get_ownertrust (&pk) & ~TRUST_MASK)
| TRUST_ULTIMATE ));
release_public_key_parts (&pk);
}
- if (!hint_shown)
- {
- log_info ("the --trusted-key option is now obsolete; "
- "use the --edit command instead.\n");
- log_info ("given keys will be marked as trusted\n");
- hint_shown = 1;
- }
- log_info ("key %08lX marked as ultimately trusted\n",
+ log_info (_("key %08lX marked as ultimately trusted\n"),
(ulong)k->kid[1]);
}
}
/* release the helper table table */
release_key_items (user_utk_list);
user_utk_list = NULL;
return;
}
/*********************************************
*********** TrustDB stuff *******************
*********************************************/
/*
* Read a record but die if it does not exist
*/
static void
read_record (ulong recno, TRUSTREC *rec, int rectype )
{
int rc = tdbio_read_record (recno, rec, rectype);
if (rc)
{
log_error(_("trust record %lu, req type %d: read failed: %s\n"),
recno, rec->rectype, g10_errstr(rc) );
tdbio_invalid();
}
if (rectype != rec->rectype)
{
log_error(_("trust record %lu is not of requested type %d\n"),
rec->recnum, rectype);
tdbio_invalid();
}
}
/*
* Write a record and die on error
*/
static void
write_record (TRUSTREC *rec)
{
int rc = tdbio_write_record (rec);
if (rc)
{
log_error(_("trust record %lu, type %d: write failed: %s\n"),
rec->recnum, rec->rectype, g10_errstr(rc) );
tdbio_invalid();
}
}
/*
* sync the TrustDb and die on error
*/
static void
do_sync(void)
{
int rc = tdbio_sync ();
if(rc)
{
log_error (_("trustdb: sync failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
g10_exit(2);
}
}
/****************
* Perform some checks over the trustdb
* level 0: only open the db
* 1: used for initial program startup
*/
int
setup_trustdb( int level, const char *dbname )
{
/* just store the args */
if( trustdb_args.init )
return 0;
trustdb_args.level = level;
trustdb_args.dbname = dbname? m_strdup(dbname): NULL;
return 0;
}
void
init_trustdb()
{
int rc=0;
int level = trustdb_args.level;
const char* dbname = trustdb_args.dbname;
if( trustdb_args.init )
return;
trustdb_args.init = 1;
if ( !level || level==1)
{
rc = tdbio_set_dbname( dbname, !!level );
if( !rc )
{
if( !level )
return;
/* verify that our own keys are in the trustDB
* or move them to the trustdb. */
verify_own_keys();
/* should we check whether there is no other ultimately trusted
* key in the database? */
}
}
else
BUG();
if( rc )
log_fatal("can't init trustdb: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
}
/***********************************************
************* Print helpers ****************
***********************************************/
/****************
* This function returns a letter for a trustvalue Trust flags
* are ignore.
*/
int
trust_letter (unsigned int value)
{
switch( (value & TRUST_MASK) )
{
case TRUST_UNKNOWN: return '-';
case TRUST_EXPIRED: return 'e';
case TRUST_UNDEFINED: return 'q';
case TRUST_NEVER: return 'n';
case TRUST_MARGINAL: return 'm';
case TRUST_FULLY: return 'f';
case TRUST_ULTIMATE: return 'u';
default: return 0;
}
}
/****************
* Recreate the WoT but do not ask for new ownertrusts. Special
* feature: In batch mode and without a forced yes, this is only done
* when a check is due. This can be used to run the check from a crontab
*/
void
check_trustdb ()
{
init_trustdb();
if (opt.batch && !opt.answer_yes)
{
ulong scheduled;
scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck ();
if (!scheduled)
{
log_info (_("no need for a trustdb check\n"));
return;
}
if (scheduled > make_timestamp ())
{
log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"),
strtimestamp (scheduled));
return;
}
}
validate_keys (0);
}
/*
* Recreate the WoT.
*/
void
update_trustdb()
{
init_trustdb();
validate_keys (1);
}
void
revalidation_mark (void)
{
init_trustdb();
/* we simply set the time for the next check to 1 (far back in 1970)
* so that a --update-trustdb will be scheduled */
if (tdbio_write_nextcheck (1))
do_sync ();
pending_check_trustdb = 1;
}
/***********************************************
*********** Ownertrust et al. ****************
***********************************************/
static int
read_trust_record (PKT_public_key *pk, TRUSTREC *rec)
{
int rc;
init_trustdb();
rc = tdbio_search_trust_bypk (pk, rec);
if (rc == -1)
return -1; /* no record yet */
if (rc)
{
log_error ("trustdb: searching trust record failed: %s\n",
g10_errstr (rc));
return rc;
}
if (rec->rectype != RECTYPE_TRUST)
{
log_error ("trustdb: record %lu is not a trust record\n",
rec->recnum);
return G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
}
return 0;
}
/****************
* Return the assigned ownertrust value for the given public key.
* The key should be the primary key.
*/
unsigned int
get_ownertrust ( PKT_public_key *pk)
{
TRUSTREC rec;
int rc;
rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
if (rc == -1)
return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* no record yet */
if (rc)
{
tdbio_invalid ();
return rc; /* actually never reached */
}
return rec.r.trust.ownertrust;
}
/*
* Same as get_ownertrust but return a trust letter instead of an value.
*/
int
get_ownertrust_info (PKT_public_key *pk)
{
unsigned int otrust;
int c;
otrust = get_ownertrust (pk);
c = trust_letter( (otrust & TRUST_MASK) );
if( !c )
c = '?';
return c;
}
/*
* Set the trust value of the given public key to the new value.
* The key should be a primary one.
*/
void
update_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int new_trust )
{
TRUSTREC rec;
int rc;
rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
if (!rc)
{
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("update ownertrust from %u to %u\n",
(unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust, new_trust );
if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust != new_trust)
{
rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust;
write_record( &rec );
revalidation_mark ();
do_sync ();
}
}
else if (rc == -1)
{ /* no record yet - create a new one */
size_t dummy;
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("insert ownertrust %u\n", new_trust );
memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec);
rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, rec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust;
write_record (&rec);
revalidation_mark ();
do_sync ();
rc = 0;
}
else
{
tdbio_invalid ();
}
}
/* Clear the ownertrust value. Return true if a changed actually happend. */
int
clear_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk)
{
TRUSTREC rec;
int rc;
rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
if (!rc)
{
if (DBG_TRUST)
log_debug ("clearing ownertrust (old value %u)\n",
(unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust);
if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust)
{
rec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0;
write_record( &rec );
revalidation_mark ();
do_sync ();
return 1;
}
}
else if (rc != -1)
{
tdbio_invalid ();
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Note: Caller has to do a sync
*/
static void
update_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, const byte *namehash,
int depth, int validity)
{
TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
int rc;
ulong recno;
rc = read_trust_record (pk, &trec);
if (rc && rc != -1)
{
tdbio_invalid ();
return;
}
if (rc == -1) /* no record yet - create a new one */
{
size_t dummy;
rc = 0;
memset (&trec, 0, sizeof trec);
trec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
trec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, trec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
trec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0;
}
/* locate an existing one */
recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
while (recno)
{
read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
if ( !memcmp (vrec.r.valid.namehash, namehash, 20) )
break;
recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
}
if (!recno) /* insert a new validity record */
{
memset (&vrec, 0, sizeof vrec);
vrec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
vrec.rectype = RECTYPE_VALID;
memcpy (vrec.r.valid.namehash, namehash, 20);
vrec.r.valid.next = trec.r.trust.validlist;
}
vrec.r.valid.validity = validity;
write_record (&vrec);
trec.r.trust.depth = depth;
trec.r.trust.validlist = vrec.recnum;
write_record (&trec);
}
/* reset validity for all user IDs. Caller must sync. */
static int
clear_validity (PKT_public_key *pk)
{
TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
int rc;
ulong recno;
int any = 0;
rc = read_trust_record (pk, &trec);
if (rc && rc != -1)
{
tdbio_invalid ();
return 0;
}
if (rc == -1) /* no record yet - no need to clerar it then ;-) */
return 0;
/* reset validity for all user IDs */
recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
while (recno)
{
read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
if ((vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK))
{
vrec.r.valid.validity &= ~TRUST_MASK;
write_record (&vrec);
any = 1;
}
recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
}
return any;
}
/***********************************************
********* Query trustdb values **************
***********************************************/
/*
* Return the validity information for PK. If the namehash is not
* NULL, the validity of the corresponsing user ID is returned,
* otherwise, a reasonable value for the entire key is returned.
*/
unsigned int
get_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, const byte *namehash)
{
static int did_nextcheck;
TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
int rc;
ulong recno;
unsigned int validity;
u32 kid[2];
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
init_trustdb ();
if (!did_nextcheck)
{
ulong scheduled;
did_nextcheck = 1;
scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck ();
if (scheduled && scheduled <= make_timestamp ())
{
if (opt.no_auto_check_trustdb)
{
pending_check_trustdb = 1;
log_info ("please do a --check-trustdb\n");
}
else
{
log_info (_("checking the trustdb\n"));
validate_keys (0);
}
}
}
keyid_from_pk (pk, kid);
if (pk->main_keyid[0] != kid[0] || pk->main_keyid[1] != kid[1])
{ /* this is a subkey - get the mainkey */
main_pk = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *main_pk);
rc = get_pubkey (main_pk, pk->main_keyid);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("error getting main key %08lX of subkey %08lX: %s\n",
(ulong)pk->main_keyid[1], (ulong)kid[1], g10_errstr(rc));
validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
goto leave;
}
}
else
main_pk = pk;
rc = read_trust_record (main_pk, &trec);
if (rc && rc != -1)
{
tdbio_invalid ();
return 0;
}
if (rc == -1) /* no record found */
{
validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
goto leave;
}
/* loop over all user IDs */
recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
validity = 0;
while (recno)
{
read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
if ( validity < (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK) )
validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
if ( namehash && !memcmp (vrec.r.valid.namehash, namehash, 20) )
break;
recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
}
if (recno) /* okay, use the user ID associated one */
validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
if ( (trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
validity |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
leave:
/* set some flags direct from the key */
if (main_pk->is_revoked)
validity |= TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED;
if (main_pk != pk && pk->is_revoked)
validity |= TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED;
/* Note: expiration is a trust value and not a flag - don't know why
* I initially designed it that way */
if (main_pk->has_expired || pk->has_expired)
validity = (validity & ~TRUST_MASK) | TRUST_EXPIRED;
if (pending_check_trustdb)
validity |= TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK;
if (main_pk != pk)
free_public_key (main_pk);
return validity;
}
int
get_validity_info (PKT_public_key *pk, const byte *namehash)
{
int trustlevel;
int c;
trustlevel = get_validity (pk, namehash);
if( trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED )
return 'd';
if( trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED )
return 'r';
c = trust_letter ( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) );
if( !c )
c = '?';
return c;
}
void
list_trust_path( const char *username )
{
}
/****************
* Enumerate all keys, which are needed to build all trust paths for
* the given key. This function does not return the key itself or
* the ultimate key (the last point in cerificate chain). Only
* certificate chains which ends up at an ultimately trusted key
* are listed. If ownertrust or validity is not NULL, the corresponding
* value for the returned LID is also returned in these variable(s).
*
* 1) create a void pointer and initialize it to NULL
* 2) pass this void pointer by reference to this function.
* Set lid to the key you want to enumerate and pass it by reference.
* 3) call this function as long as it does not return -1
* to indicate EOF. LID does contain the next key used to build the web
* 4) Always call this function a last time with LID set to NULL,
* so that it can free its context.
*
* Returns: -1 on EOF or the level of the returned LID
*/
int
enum_cert_paths( void **context, ulong *lid,
unsigned *ownertrust, unsigned *validity )
{
return -1;
}
/****************
* Print the current path
*/
void
enum_cert_paths_print( void **context, FILE *fp,
int refresh, ulong selected_lid )
{
return;
}
/****************************************
*********** NEW NEW NEW ****************
****************************************/
static int
ask_ownertrust (u32 *kid)
{
PKT_public_key *pk;
int rc;
int ot;
pk = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
rc = get_pubkey (pk, kid);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("public key %08lX not found: %s\n"),
(ulong)kid[1], g10_errstr(rc) );
return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
}
ot=edit_ownertrust(pk,0);
if(ot>0)
ot = get_ownertrust (pk);
else if(ot==0)
ot = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
else
ot = -1; /* quit */
free_public_key( pk );
return ot;
}
static void
mark_keyblock_seen (KeyHashTable tbl, KBNODE node)
{
for ( ;node; node = node->next )
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
u32 aki[2];
keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, aki);
add_key_hash_table (tbl, aki);
}
}
static void
dump_key_array (int depth, struct key_array *keys)
{
struct key_array *kar;
for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
{
KBNODE node = kar->keyblock;
u32 kid[2];
keyid_from_pk(node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:K::%c::::\n",
depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1], '?');
for (; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
int len = node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len;
if (len > 30)
len = 30;
printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:U:::%c:::",
depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1],
(node->flag & 4)? 'f':
(node->flag & 2)? 'm':
(node->flag & 1)? 'q':'-');
print_string (stdout, node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, len, ':');
putchar (':');
putchar ('\n');
}
}
}
}
static void
store_validation_status (int depth, KBNODE keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
byte namehash[20];
int status;
int any = 0;
for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if (node->flag & 4)
status = TRUST_FULLY;
else if (node->flag & 2)
status = TRUST_MARGINAL;
else if (node->flag & 1)
status = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
else
status = 0;
if (status)
{
if( uid->attrib_data )
rmd160_hash_buffer (namehash,uid->attrib_data,uid->attrib_len);
else
rmd160_hash_buffer (namehash, uid->name, uid->len );
update_validity (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
namehash, depth, status);
any = 1;
}
}
}
if (any)
do_sync ();
}
/*
* check whether the signature sig is in the klist k
*/
static struct key_item *
is_in_klist (struct key_item *k, PKT_signature *sig)
{
for (; k; k = k->next)
{
if (k->kid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && k->kid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
return k;
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Mark the signature of the given UID which are used to certify it.
* To do this, we first revmove all signatures which are not valid and
* from the remain ones we look for the latest one. If this is not a
* certification revocation signature we mark the signature by setting
* node flag bit 8. Note that flag bits 9 and 10 are used for internal
* purposes.
*/
static void
mark_usable_uid_certs (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE uidnode,
u32 *main_kid, struct key_item *klist,
u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
{
KBNODE node;
PKT_signature *sig;
/* first check all signatures */
for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next)
{
node->flag &= ~(1<<8 | 1<<9 | 1<<10);
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
break; /* ready */
if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
continue;
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (sig->keyid[0] == main_kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == main_kid[1])
continue; /* ignore self-signatures */
if (!IS_UID_SIG(sig) && !IS_UID_REV(sig))
continue; /* we only look at these signature classes */
if (!is_in_klist (klist, sig))
continue; /* no need to check it then */
if (check_key_signature (keyblock, node, NULL))
continue; /* ignore invalid signatures */
node->flag |= 1<<9;
}
/* reset the remaining flags */
for (; node; node = node->next)
node->flag &= ~(1<<8 | 1<<9 | 1 << 10);
/* kbnode flag usage: bit 9 is here set for signatures to consider,
* bit 10 will be set by the loop to keep track of keyIDs already
* processed, bit 8 will be set for the usable signatures */
/* for each cert figure out the latest valid one */
for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next)
{
KBNODE n, signode;
u32 kid[2];
u32 sigdate;
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
break;
if ( !(node->flag & (1<<9)) )
continue; /* not a node to look at */
if ( (node->flag & (1<<10)) )
continue; /* signature with a keyID already processed */
node->flag |= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
signode = node;
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
kid[0] = sig->keyid[0]; kid[1] = sig->keyid[1];
for (n=uidnode->next; n; n = n->next)
{
if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
break;
if ( !(n->flag & (1<<9)) )
continue;
if ( (n->flag & (1<<10)) )
continue; /* shortcut already processed signatures */
sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (kid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || kid[1] != sig->keyid[1])
continue;
n->flag |= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */
/* If signode is nonrevocable and unexpired and n isn't,
then take signode (skip). It doesn't matter which is
older: if signode was older then we don't want to take n
as signode is nonrevocable. If n was older then we're
automatically fine. */
if(((IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
!signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
(signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
(!(IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
!n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
(n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
continue;
/* If n is nonrevocable and unexpired and signode isn't,
then take n. Again, it doesn't matter which is older: if
n was older then we don't want to take signode as n is
nonrevocable. If signode was older then we're
automatically fine. */
if((!(IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
!signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
(signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
((IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
!n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
(n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
{
signode = n;
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
continue;
}
/* At this point, if it's newer, it goes in as the only
remaining possibilities are signode and n are both either
revocable or expired or both nonrevocable and unexpired.
If the timestamps are equal take the later ordered
packet, presuming that the key packets are hopefully in
their original order. */
if (sig->timestamp >= sigdate)
{
signode = n;
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
}
}
sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
if (IS_UID_SIG (sig))
{ /* this seems to be a usable one which is not revoked.
* Just need to check whether there is an expiration time,
* We do the expired certification after finding a suitable
* certification, the assumption is that a signator does not
* want that after the expiration of his certificate the
* system falls back to an older certification which has a
* different expiration time */
const byte *p;
u32 expire;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE, NULL );
expire = p? sig->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p) : 0;
if (expire==0 || expire > curtime )
{
signode->flag |= (1<<8); /* yeah, found a good cert */
if (expire && expire < *next_expire)
*next_expire = expire;
}
}
}
}
/*
* Return true if the key is signed by one of the keys in the given
* key ID list. User IDs with a valid signature are marked by node
* flags as follows:
* flag bit 0: There is at least one signature
* 1: There is marginal confidence that this is a legitimate uid
* 2: There is full confidence that this is a legitimate uid.
* 8: Used for internal purposes.
* 9: Ditto (in mark_usable_uid_certs())
* 10: Ditto (ditto)
* This function assumes that all kbnode flags are cleared on entry.
*/
static int
validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist,
u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
{
struct key_item *kr;
KBNODE node, uidnode=NULL;
PKT_public_key *pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
u32 main_kid[2];
int issigned=0, any_signed = 0, fully_count =0, marginal_count = 0;
keyid_from_pk(pk, main_kid);
for (node=kb; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
if (uidnode && issigned)
{
if (fully_count >= opt.completes_needed
|| marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
uidnode->flag |= 4;
else if (fully_count || marginal_count)
uidnode->flag |= 2;
uidnode->flag |= 1;
any_signed = 1;
}
uidnode = node;
issigned = 0;
fully_count = marginal_count = 0;
mark_usable_uid_certs (kb, uidnode, main_kid, klist,
curtime, next_expire);
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& (node->flag & (1<<8)) )
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
kr = is_in_klist (klist, sig);
if (kr)
{
if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
fully_count = opt.completes_needed;
else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY)
fully_count++;
else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL)
marginal_count++;
issigned = 1;
}
}
}
if (uidnode && issigned)
{
if (fully_count >= opt.completes_needed
|| marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
uidnode->flag |= 4;
else if (fully_count || marginal_count)
uidnode->flag |= 2;
uidnode->flag |= 1;
any_signed = 1;
}
return any_signed;
}
static int
search_skipfnc (void *opaque, u32 *kid)
{
return test_key_hash_table ((KeyHashTable)opaque, kid);
}
/*
* Scan all keys and return a key_array of all suitable keys from
* kllist. The caller has to pass keydb handle so that we don't use
* to create our own. Returns either a key_array or NULL in case of
* an error. No results found are indicated by an empty array.
* Caller hast to release the returned array.
*/
static struct key_array *
validate_key_list (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KeyHashTable visited,
struct key_item *klist, u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
{
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
struct key_array *keys = NULL;
size_t nkeys, maxkeys;
int rc;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
maxkeys = 1000;
keys = m_alloc ((maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys);
nkeys = 0;
rc = keydb_search_reset (hd);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("keydb_search_reset failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
m_free (keys);
return NULL;
}
memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
desc.skipfnc = search_skipfnc;
desc.skipfncvalue = visited;
rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1);
if (rc == -1)
{
keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
return keys;
}
if (rc)
{
log_error ("keydb_search_first failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
m_free (keys);
return NULL;
}
desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT; /* change mode */
do
{
PKT_public_key *pk;
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
m_free (keys);
return NULL;
}
if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
log_debug ("ooops: invalid pkttype %d encountered\n",
keyblock->pkt->pkttype);
dump_kbnode (keyblock);
release_kbnode(keyblock);
continue;
}
/* prepare the keyblock for further processing */
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
clear_kbnode_flags (keyblock);
pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (pk->has_expired || pk->is_revoked)
{
/* it does not make sense to look further at those keys */
mark_keyblock_seen (visited, keyblock);
}
else if (validate_one_keyblock (keyblock, klist, curtime, next_expire))
{
if (pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= curtime
&& pk->expiredate < *next_expire)
*next_expire = pk->expiredate;
if (nkeys == maxkeys) {
maxkeys += 1000;
keys = m_realloc (keys, (maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys);
}
keys[nkeys++].keyblock = keyblock;
/* this key is signed - don't check it again */
mark_keyblock_seen (visited, keyblock);
keyblock = NULL;
}
release_kbnode (keyblock);
keyblock = NULL;
}
while ( !(rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1)) );
if (rc && rc != -1)
{
log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
m_free (keys);
return NULL;
}
keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
return keys;
}
static void
reset_unconnected_keys (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KeyHashTable visited)
{
int rc;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
int count = 0, nreset = 0;
rc = keydb_search_reset (hd);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("keydb_search_reset failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
return;
}
memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
desc.skipfnc = search_skipfnc;
desc.skipfncvalue = visited;
rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1);
if (rc && rc != -1 )
log_error ("keydb_search_first failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
else if (!rc)
{
desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT; /* change mode */
do
{
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
break;
}
count++;
if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) /* paranoid assertion*/
{
nreset += clear_validity (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key);
release_kbnode (keyblock);
}
}
while ( !(rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1)) );
if (rc && rc != -1)
log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
}
if (opt.verbose)
log_info ("%d unconnected keys (%d trust records cleared)\n",
count, nreset);
do_sync ();
}
/*
* Run the key validation procedure.
*
* This works this way:
* Step 1: Find all ultimately trusted keys (UTK).
* mark them all as seen and put them into klist.
* Step 2: loop max_cert_times
* Step 3: if OWNERTRUST of any key in klist is undefined
* ask user to assign ownertrust
* Step 4: Loop over all keys in the keyDB which are not marked seen
* Step 5: if key is revoked or expired
* mark key as seen
* continue loop at Step 4
* Step 6: For each user ID of that key signed by a key in klist
* Calculate validity by counting trusted signatures.
* Set validity of user ID
* Step 7: If any signed user ID was found
* mark key as seen
* End Loop
* Step 8: Build a new klist from all fully trusted keys from step 6
* End Loop
* Ready
*
*/
static int
validate_keys (int interactive)
{
int rc = 0;
int quit=0;
struct key_item *klist = NULL;
struct key_item *k;
struct key_array *keys = NULL;
struct key_array *kar;
KEYDB_HANDLE kdb = NULL;
KBNODE node;
int depth;
int key_count;
int ot_unknown, ot_undefined, ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate;
KeyHashTable visited;
u32 start_time, next_expire;
start_time = make_timestamp ();
next_expire = 0xffffffff; /* set next expire to the year 2106 */
visited = new_key_hash_table ();
/* Fixme: Instead of always building a UTK list, we could just build it
* here when needed */
if (!utk_list)
{
log_info ("no ultimately trusted keys found\n");
goto leave;
}
/* mark all UTKs as visited and set validity to ultimate */
for (k=utk_list; k; k = k->next)
{
KBNODE keyblock;
PKT_public_key *pk;
keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (k->kid);
if (!keyblock)
{
log_error (_("public key of ultimately"
" trusted key %08lX not found\n"), (ulong)k->kid[1]);
continue;
}
mark_keyblock_seen (visited, keyblock);
pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
byte namehash[20];
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if( uid->attrib_data )
rmd160_hash_buffer (namehash,uid->attrib_data,uid->attrib_len);
else
rmd160_hash_buffer (namehash, uid->name, uid->len );
update_validity (pk, namehash, 0, TRUST_ULTIMATE);
}
}
if ( pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= start_time
&& pk->expiredate < next_expire)
next_expire = pk->expiredate;
release_kbnode (keyblock);
do_sync ();
}
klist = utk_list;
kdb = keydb_new (0);
for (depth=0; depth < opt.max_cert_depth; depth++)
{
/* See whether we should assign ownertrust values to the keys in
utk_list. */
ot_unknown = ot_undefined = ot_never = 0;
ot_marginal = ot_full = ot_ultimate = 0;
for (k=klist; k; k = k->next)
{
if (interactive && k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
k->ownertrust = ask_ownertrust (k->kid);
if (k->ownertrust == -1)
{
quit=1;
goto leave;
}
else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
ot_unknown++;
else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNDEFINED)
ot_undefined++;
else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_NEVER)
ot_never++;
else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL)
ot_marginal++;
else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY)
ot_full++;
else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
ot_ultimate++;
}
/* Find all keys which are signed by a key in kdlist */
keys = validate_key_list (kdb, visited, klist, start_time, &next_expire);
if (!keys)
{
log_error ("validate_key_list failed\n");
rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
goto leave;
}
for (key_count=0, kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++, key_count++)
;
/* Store the calculated valididation status somewhere */
if (opt.verbose > 1)
dump_key_array (depth, keys);
log_info (_("checking at depth %d signed=%d"
" ot(-/q/n/m/f/u)=%d/%d/%d/%d/%d/%d\n"),
depth, key_count, ot_unknown, ot_undefined,
ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate );
for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
store_validation_status (depth, kar->keyblock);
/* Build a new kdlist from all fully valid keys in KEYS */
if (klist != utk_list)
release_key_items (klist);
klist = NULL;
for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
{
for (node=kar->keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & 4))
{
k = new_key_item ();
keyid_from_pk (kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, k->kid);
k->ownertrust = get_ownertrust (kar->keyblock
->pkt->pkt.public_key);
k->next = klist;
klist = k;
break;
}
}
}
release_key_array (keys);
keys = NULL;
if (!klist)
break; /* no need to dive in deeper */
}
reset_unconnected_keys (kdb, visited);
leave:
keydb_release (kdb);
release_key_array (keys);
release_key_items (klist);
release_key_hash_table (visited);
if (!rc && !quit) /* mark trustDB as checked */
{
if (next_expire == 0xffffffff || next_expire < start_time )
tdbio_write_nextcheck (0);
else
{
tdbio_write_nextcheck (next_expire);
log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"),
strtimestamp (next_expire));
}
do_sync ();
pending_check_trustdb = 0;
}
return rc;
}

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Expires
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Storage Format
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