If I want to use a public key for encrypting to and verifying signatures
from, I have to trust it. Fine. But to make gpg stop interrupting me with
stupid prompts that the key isn't fully trusted I have to ultimately
trust it. Meaning that I also have to accept signatures made with that
key on other people's signatures "as good as my own". But...
I DO NOT WANT THAT.
I want to verify its signatures on messages and I want to encrypt
messages to send to its owner and I want gpg to do that without
bitching. I do NOT necessarily ALSO want to accept its signatures "AS
GOOD AS MY OWN" on other people's keys. That is an entirely separate
decision. Yet gnupg requires that I combine the two.
This is simply unacceptable.
Tell me: How do I make this piece of software accept a public key for
encrypting to and verifying from --I know whose key it is, thank you--
without also accepting its signatures on other keys "as good as my own" AND
without changing the model to "always accept everything ultimately", which
is the same folly --and widely advocated-- on a grander scale? Well?
This sort of stupidity is one of those things that are holding
encryption back. Its use is so highfalutin' theoretical and yet
so mindbogglingly stupid that only cryptonerds love it. Everyone
else is left less or rather more baffled and flabberghasted at the
counterintuitive crap gn00pg is coughing up. Go fix already. Furrfu!