gpg and gpgv treat signatures made over MD5 as unreliable, unless the
user supplies --allow-weak-digests to gpg. Signatures over any other
digest are considered acceptable.

Despite SHA-1 being a mandatory-to-implement digest algorithm in RFC
4880, the collision-resistance of SHA-1 is weaker than anyone would
like it to be.

Some operators of high-value targets that depend on OpenPGP signatures
may wish to require their signers to use a stronger digest algorithm
than SHA1, even if the OpenPGP ecosystem at large cannot deprecate
SHA1 entirely today.

The attached changeset adds a new "--weak-digest DIGEST" option for both gpg
and gpgv, which makes it straightforward for anyone to treat any
signature or certification made over the specified digest as
unreliable.

This option can be supplied multiple times if the operator wishes to
deprecate multiple digest algorithms, and will be ignored completely
if the operator supplies --allow-weak-digests (as before).

MD5 is still always considered weak, regardless of any further
--weak-digest options supplied.

This was posted to gnupg-devel at
https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2015-October/030383.html