The gnupg.org web site has a working SSL certificate, but is distributing
both code and sigs via insecure FTP.
(eg: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-2.0.27.tar.bz2 )
It is unreasonable to ask users to verify gpg signatures for gpg by using
gpg, and by choosing not to let us use SSL to get gpg in the first place is
effectively blocking security-minded people from being able to trust your
distro.
Your web site also says this:-
GnuPG distributions are signed. It is wise and more secure to check out for
their integrity.
But it does not distribute signatures over any secure channel either.
Your integrity page says this:
Using sha1sum
...check that the output matches the SHA-1 checksum reported on this site.
however, nowhere obvious on your web site are any SHA-1 checksums shown
This kind of sloppiness is not appropriate in the year 2015, and it suggests
that the level of care put into everything else inside GPG might not be the
kind of quality that users expect?