An attacker can craft ASCII-armored OpenPGP data that contains an over-long radix64 line. It will be interpreted differently by GnuPG than by spec-conforming parsers. This enables format-confusion / polyglot attacks.
Description
Description
| Status | Assigned | Task | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Restricted Maniphest Task | ||||
| Resolved | • werner | T7905 Radix64 Line-Truncation Enabling Polyglot Attacks |
Event Timeline
Comment Actions
For someone who considers the rejection is the requirement of the spec., here is a change:
Comment Actions
We have seen wrong encodings quite often in the past and thus we won't apply the patch. After all the armor header is a different layer and could also be applied or removed by other software or tools. The integrity of an OpenPGP message does not depend on its concrete outer encoding.