I haven't tested it, but it looks good

Like this patch?

Here is an attempt of mine this week:

diff --git a/g10/call-agent.c b/g10/call-agent.c
index 5e13a3e52..8949fad17 100644
--- a/g10/call-agent.c
+++ b/g10/call-agent.c
@@ -3290,13 +3290,14 @@ confirm_status_cb (void *opaque, const char *line)
    message.  If FORCE is true the agent is advised not to ask for
    confirmation. */
 gpg_error_t
-agent_delete_key (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *hexkeygrip, const char *desc,
+agent_delete_key (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keygrip, const char *desc,
                   int force)
 {
   gpg_error_t err;
   char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
   struct default_inq_parm_s dfltparm;
   struct confirm_parm_s confirm_parm;
+  const char *keygrip2 = NULL;

Sorry for the ambiguity. The request was only about mentioning (bpX) for the first two choices, not to add more combinations.

Physical experiment feature support should better not be widely used.

Although it is technicall possible to use all combinations, we should limit in the menu them to those as listed above. Too many algorithms pose an interop problem. Thus we provide brainpool because it is required in Germany and the two IETF curves for the general internet (for those who are playing mitigation against against physical experiments).

Note: In vsd it must be restricted to the bp algorithms then

it does not make sense to have a workboard item for this parent ticket.

Tested with Gpg4win-5.0.0-beta479

That is a feature not a bug. Make also sense if your threat model is store-trafic-no-decrypt-later. If you can get the key you will also be abale to get the cleartext. Any nobody can remember a passphrase on par with the claimed Kyber security level.

Note that currently Kleopatra (gpg4win 5 beta) fails to delete the key, which might impact other operations. I'm currently trying to figure out, if some other bugs/quirks are a subsequent error or not.

Workaround is to use --with-keygrip and delete both <keygrip>.key files. Problem here is that one part may be on a smartcard or one part might be shared (although not allowed) with other keys.

Thank you for the report.

Thanks for reporting/requesting.

Well, I will re-use this as a feature request to add this feature. Workaround is to list the key with --with-keygrip and backup the ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/<keygrip>.key files.

Done in 1.11.1.

Reading https://openssl-library.org/files/blog/Request_to_Extend_IETF_WGLC_for_PQ_Key_Specifications.pdf ,
seed (with "S") is included in the private-key.

The commit rC23543b6c1497: Add mldsa_compute_keygrip and let private-key include "p". works well for me.

To support Dilithium, we need to extend data handling of libgcrypt.
I propose following changes:

• internal flag of PUBKEY_FLAG_BYTE_STRING to ask opaque MPI for data to be signed/verified.
• The format of data as: (data(raw)[(flags no-prefix)](value ...)[(label ...)][(random-override ...)]): message, context, and random. Optional no-prefix flag to ask specific way of signing, controlling the internal, for Known Answer Tests (siggen).

Looking the FIPS 204 document, using the following functions (API) is good:

Thank you again for the reactivity! Applied, everything seems to work just fine.