So why are there different grades of failure? Why is "invalid packet" a less scary error message than "WARNING: message was not integrity protected" when both are equally bad things?
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Jan 15 2026
Jan 9 2026
Jan 7 2026
Right. And the MDC detects this and only if says okay you get a good decryption status back.
This warning shall only show up if a message was really modified and not in case of a simple truncation.
Jan 5 2026
Jan 2 2026
(Testing for now for better visibility. Real or Semi-real bugs with fixes are already set to Resolved)
The described attack is not easy to understand and as of today the
gpg.fail website seems to have the same content as the draft we
received on 2025-10-23. There it states:
Dec 30 2025
Dec 29 2025
Note using the output of --decrypt directly on the tty is a Bad Idea(tm). You won't cat arbitrary files to your tty for the same reason.
https://gnupg.org/blog/20251226-cleartext-signatures.html explains why we have cleartext signatures and how you properly use them. The suggestion of the reporters to remove them entirely is a no-go because there are too many systems (open source or in-house) which rely on that format. If properly used (i.e. using --output to get the signed text) there is no problem. Anyway the suggestion has always been to use detached signatures using two files or PGP/MIME).