The int-truncation change breaks other things. I noticed this by chance in the interactive mode due to warning noticed. Before we ever do such things again we need to have regression tests for setting preferences. Or manually check everything. Need to do a 2.5.16 tomorrow :-(

We need to explain and debunk this attack after its publication,

t-stringhelp change was pushed by rG8a95e963d53a: common: Fix the test of t-stringhelp.
For int-truncation, I pushed the change rGbcd87ea2b2da: misc: Validate the value on the use of strtol.

The problem is that a user may unintentionally use the suggested filename without checking that it does not harm to write to this file. It is better not to present a default name at all.

There are a lot of other ways to confuse the user. We can't fix them all because the whole purpose of a cleartext signature is to make it easy to use in legacy environments like an BBS. Modern systems use MIME to handle this in a more stringent specified way. For any use it is stongly suggested to check the actual signed data which is avaialable with the --output options. At least a sanitizing viewer should be used which filters out all escape characters (something like cat -v |less).

We have seen wrong encodings quite often in the past and thus we won't apply the patch. After all the armor header is a different layer and could also be applied or removed by other software or tools. The integrity of an OpenPGP message does not depend on its concrete outer encoding.

For someone who considers the rejection is the requirement of the spec., here is a change:

Here is a revised patch (hopefully the last one):

Here is a patch (revised since the email of mine):

For t-stringhelp.c, here is a fix.

For

openpgp_oid_from_str has a wrong memory-safety assumption

For Integer Overflow in literals_seen, I think that the claim is wrong.
When literals_seen becomes two, GnuPG stops processing to return an error.
It's not possible for GnuPG to keep processing.

For Integer Truncation of Arguments report, since the int value is limited to one-octet value, we could add check for the length of input when we use strtol.

We have fixed it but the commit also states:

I agree because the original purpose from the 90ies to enable the use of signed patch files in the Linux kernel community was never actually used and GnuPG stopped the distribution of patches from version to version many years ago. Thus I agree we should hide this option behind a compatibility flag.

Added a compatibility flag in: rGad0c6c33c3d6: gpg: Do not use a default when asking for another output filename.

Fixed in rG115d138ba599: gpg: Fix possible memory corruption in the armor parser.

Fixed in rGdb9705ef594d: gpg: Avoid potential downgrade to SHA1 in 3rd party key signatures.

Fixed in rG8abc320f2a75: gpg: Error out on unverified output for non-detached signatures.

This feature should be only enabled with a compatibility flag.

Mitigation would be: adding context validation in add_onepass_sig function, which checks WHAT of armored input.