Thu, Oct 17
GnuPG ships a non-PKI certificate, specifically to authenticate hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net. Now due to an implementation detail, this has been shown to potentially lead to authentication of other domains by this certificate, if a maintainer changes the default keyserver via the DIRMNGR_DEFAULT_KEYSERVER variable in configure.ac. Now arguably, this variable isn't exposed via ./configure, so it's not "officially" configurable - but evidently maintainers do want to change it. A trivial one-line patch was supplied to change the unintended and potentially security-problematic behavior into the (I believe) obviously intended one.
Tue, Oct 15
Mon, Sep 30
Sep 20 2019
$ gpg-connect-agent --dirmngr 'getinfo version' /bye
Can you check which dirmngr version you are running
gpg-connect-agent --dirmngr 'getinfo version' /bye
thanks for the dns explanation - IMHO, there should be added something about that in the wiki
When it does not work for you on http1 either, then I guess, it's really just some outdatedness of my gpg/dirmngr and this ticket can be closed.
It does not work either. Your problem is the use of a wildcard DNS for archlinux32.org:
The test above was with gpg master but I got the same result with current 2.2:
ok, I disabled it again. btw: why do we need openpgpkey.archlinux32.org in the cert? Is this standard or did I misconfigure something?
Thanks. Here is a dirmngr log:
Sep 19 2019
I set archlinux32.org back to http2 - so you can see for yourself, how gpg fails to retrieve the key for email@example.com
I believe, it means, that it may fall back to http1.1 - the documentation is not clear to me on this.
A simple test however shows, that at least curl has no problems to use http1.1 or http1.0 with the http2 enabled nginx.
Does your ngix configuration mean that there is no fallback to standard http?
Sep 12 2019
To implement / test the "not literally RFC compliant but in practice better" behavior let us call this now a wish and feature request as there are certificates in the wild other then intevation's and customers in large institutions run into that.
Aug 23 2019
Will be in 2.2.18
Aug 10 2019
WKD and DANE/OPENPGPKEY offer rather distinct properties. I'd be hard-pressed to say that one is "better" than the other without understanding the threat model and concerns of the evaluator:
Aug 6 2019
DNSSEC is a centralized CA system. Just different than the TLS one. Given that Certificate Transparency exists I'd say DNSSEC is less transparent than TLS. For example if you happen to have a .ly domain then the Libyan can silently control your signed zone. Given that there is no CT for DNSSEC they can do so selectively, for any connection they want. It wouldn't be the first problem with them.
Jul 16 2019
Just a note that we're now shipping this patch in debian unstable. It would be great if it was merged upstream.
I see. I am also mostly testing with ntbtls so I was wondering about the report. Thanks for reporting and fixing.
While I understand incorrectness, the risk in practice is not that high. So, I put this as "normal" priority.
Pushed the change to master as well as 2.2 branch.
Jul 15 2019
Jul 14 2019
Jul 11 2019
Is this really necessary to duplicate functionality that already is provided by Web Key Directory?
With NTBTLS, it seems it works correctly.
Jul 10 2019
I agree, many currently-shipped DNS client library implementations do not provide DNSSEC validity checks.
Sure it is not validated. Standard clients do not provide the system features to do that. That is one of the problems with DNSSEC adoption - it works only for servers in practice.
Ah, that makes sense, good catch. Seems this is just an issue of documentation, then.
Jul 4 2019
And of course, thanks for your fix.
Applied to both branches. I have run no tests myself, though.
Fix will be in 2.2.17
I tried to implement this but this is troublesome for other programs using the interface because a common patter is to use --search-keys to get a listing and then use --recv-key to import the keys - That won't work and will require changes to --recv-key too. Thus this change will not go into 2.2. Anyway, it is not dangerous to have --search-keys because the new default for import from keyservers will be to strip all key-signatures.
Jul 3 2019
I asked you to carry this to a mailing list and not re-open this task.