Given the recent problems with the keyservers, I expect that the keyserver feature will go away anyway and thus I do not think we will put any more effort into this. Thus I re-tag this as gpg 2.3.

And of course, thanks for your fix.

Applied to both branches. I have run no tests myself, though.

Fix will be in 2.2.17

Fix will be in 2.2.17.
See T4612 for the revocation case.

Re 1.: I don't view this as a bug. gpg prints stats on what it has been done and clearly it has processed a key. If it would have imported the key you would see another stat line telling about this. There was however a bug in the stats output which has been fixed.

I tried to implement this but this is troublesome for other programs using the interface because a common patter is to use --search-keys to get a listing and then use --recv-key to import the keys - That won't work and will require changes to --recv-key too. Thus this change will not go into 2.2. Anyway, it is not dangerous to have --search-keys because the new default for import from keyservers will be to strip all key-signatures.

Well, I mixed this up. On sending a a new key to the server export-minimal is used. Receiving a key uses keep-uid=REQUESTED and a 64k limit.

Because we use dot-locking in GnuPG and copy-update-write for keyrings. Granted: For gpgv this is not required but the code is identical to the gpg code and adding new code does not make much sense. After all gpgv is a stripped down version of gpg I once wrote for Debian. I see your use case but tehre are other ways to do this and thus anthing here has low priority.

We need random access and the name of the file. Thus a file descriptor is not sufficient.

Indeed we are in urgent need for a timestamping service. I was already pondering with the idea to integrate existing X.509 stamping services into OpenPGP signatures. Please write to gnupg-devel if you want to reach a wider audience. Unfortunately I need to abstain for getting involved in your project; there are too many other things to do.

One reason is that you may want to look at older key- or self-signatures which import-clean removes. I can imgine use cases where this has been used for something. People are ofteh doing inetresting things with standard tools.

I agree for keyserver imports. For all other imports this would be a severe regression and thus the wrong thing to do.

I asked you to carry this to a mailing list and not re-open this task.

My plan is to let --search-key be the same as locate-key but without local lookups, thus it will be the same as

Okay, if an attacker exactly hist that limit your case is valid. I see no easy fix here, though. What we can do is what is done on Unix file systems to give average users a disk full erroreven if there a few percent of the disk is free; root can use that extra space then. Revocation certificates would be what root is on Unix file systems.

That was pretty easy to reproduce thanks to your still not working server.

I somehow expected such a feature request ;-). However, I do not think that an automatic migration is is appropriate for the stable branch.

I did some manual tests using netcat and KS_FETCH to test the redirection.

I head the same idea when I read your configuration. Given that the advanced lookup was not reallydeployed (see T4590) I also expect that we will receive complains now that it works. Thus white listing any "openpgpkey." seems to me a reasonable easy solution.

Will be in 2.2.17

Oh dear, that happens if one is always on master. I simply forgot to cherry pick the change from master back in November.
Two commits, though.

I don't think so. The fallback mechnanism will still work and remove everything but valid self-signatures. This gives enough space to write the keyblock with the new revocation certificates. I am not sure about designated revokers in this case.

See https://sektioneins.de/en/blog/18-11-23-gnupg-wkd.html for details. In short they fear that companies using IP based security for internal services can be attacked via redirect request and in particular becuase that can happen in the background without the user noticing. I am not concerned but we had long lasting discussions also with protonmail about this and the result was that we need to have this protection. We do not know who requested and paid for the audit from SektionEins and they won't tell us.

I do not understand your problem: The keyserver does not carry or is willing to send you the requested key. Note that keyservers are for a year now under heady DoS attack and only a few are remaining. I will close this report, please re-open if you figure that it might be a bug in GnuPG.

Anything using CBC mode - ECC is just fine.

We need to rewrite the Location to avoid a CSRF attack. See fa1b1eaa4241ff3f0634c8bdf8591cbc7c464144

Thanks. You may want to ask on the mailing list gnupg-users to see whether someone else has had problems building on rawhide. Right now we do not have the time for individual support and thus I unfortunately need to prioritize this bug report down.

We need to know the issuers of the CRLs under question.

See also T4538 which we can only fix in 2.2 after we have checked that this does not break the VS-NfD approval.

Also pushed to 2.2. Right now I can't see what else can be done, so I change the status to testing.

Please share with us the OS used, the versions of the libtaries used and other configuration information.
Also please run again using "make check" without any extra options.

I implemented that in master. The first output is from an update of your key and the second from an insert of a new key.

As I said we do this with all GnuPG components. Pinentry is a bit of exception because it is an external package.
I have also had bug reports which later turned out that a wrong pinentry was used; I prefer to know eactly which pinentry is used. Regarding your concrete problem I suggested to add a note with the full name of the pinentry or to change the error message to something better understandable.

That won't be easy to debug unless we have intermediate debug values from the generating implementation. That IBM Encryption Facility looks partly similar in the command line options to gpg so I wonder whether it will be possible to get some debug output. @mrdave19: we can continue by private mail in case that is helpful for you (wk at g10code com)

Come on, if someone changes the software and breaks it, it is their's fault ant not ours. The whole thing on which keyserver and certificate to use as been discussed ad nausea in the past. Given all the problems with the keyservers I do not see a reason to change it right away to a state we had before. Keyserver code is pretty hard to test and has thus always been prone to regressions.

(See T4175 why this changed in 2.2.12.)

Even if you can't use it the option is still useful to avoid other kinds of DoS. As written in the comments it is not a full solution but it helps to side-step issues with key-signature. In particular for sites which do not have a need for them.
BTW, revocation certificates are still merged with the new option.

They can't agree on a common ciphersuite. The reason is that the server does not support any CBC mode. Which is a bad idea because CBC is still a very common cipher mode.

Okay, so the open task is to build gpgme with MSVC in a way that different libnames are used and that we can distribute them along our standard DLLs? Given the easy we can now ssh into Windows there won't be a need to Wine things.