In T6272#165067, @werner wrote:Actually I am not sure whether this is really a bug and that the fix is needed. What has been signed and verified is what gpg has seen and what --output has written. For example a line in the cleartext format may read "- From my " but what actually has been signed was "From my". If a line has been truncated --output will write only the truncated and thus verified data and not what was in the cleartext format.
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Nov 11 2022
Nov 11 2022
Sep 3 2022
Sep 3 2022
Sep 2 2022
Sep 2 2022
Jun 20 2022
Jun 20 2022
Closing in favor of D556.
When failing due to a bad packet in a detached signature, log the
packet's type.
Jun 18 2022
Jun 18 2022
DemiMarie edited reviewers for D555: g10: Disallow compressed signatures and certificates, added: • gniibe; removed: sergei, gp_ast.
DemiMarie added reviewers for D555: g10: Disallow compressed signatures and certificates: sergei, gp_ast.
DemiMarie removed a reviewer for D555: g10: Disallow compressed signatures and certificates: • werner.
Jun 17 2022
Jun 17 2022
Compressed packets in detached signatures and/or certificates have never been permitted by any version of the standard.
Sorry, there is no padding packet in OpenPGP. Please do no try to push ideas from that crypto-refresh-06 thing into GnuPG. We continue to follow the last draft with consesus, which is rfc4880bis-10.
Jun 16 2022
Jun 16 2022
In T6031#159248, @werner wrote:{please add comments instead of adding the description - a changed description makes it hard to understand follow up comments. I will change the title, though for clarity.]
DemiMarie edited projects for D555: g10: Disallow compressed signatures and certificates, added: gnupg; removed g10.
DemiMarie retitled D555: g10: Disallow compressed signatures and certificates from Disallow compressed signatures and certificates to g10: Disallow compressed signatures and certificates.
DemiMarie raised the priority of T6021: GPG misparses `--list-options=show-sig-subpackets="100"a` from Low to Needs Triage.
I will try, but it will likely be a while. In any case I believe you will need a Red Hat-family distro to trigger the bug; it happens when gpg trys to encrypt with a key that uses a public key algorithm libgcrypt does not support.
Reopening as it appears this issue was closed based on an incorrect understanding of what it is.
Reopening as gpg’s handling of the situation is very much suboptimal.
Closing as I believe this is a downstream bug.
DemiMarie updated the task description for T6031: Creating an overlong notation hits a fatal error..
Jun 15 2022
Jun 15 2022
Jun 13 2022
Jun 13 2022
Jun 10 2022
Jun 10 2022
The quotes are irrelevant because they are evaluated by the shell and don't make a difference here.
DemiMarie added a reviewer for D555: g10: Disallow compressed signatures and certificates: • werner.
Added missing context lines and replaced some tabs with spaces
For clarification, the strings I have provided are raw argv elements as would be passed to execve(), with quoting already removed.
DemiMarie renamed T6024: gpg-agent segfaults if it receives an invalid response to a KEYPARAM inquire from gpg-agent segfaults if it receives an invalid response to a KEYPARAMS inquire to gpg-agent segfaults if it receives an invalid response to a KEYPARAM inquire.
I am using GnuPG 2.3.4 on Fedora Linux. I am referring to --list-options=show-sig-subpackets="100"a (note the quotes). The bug is that the character after the trailing close quote is ignored, rather than being treated as an invalid option and causing an error. That is, I would expect show-sig-subpackets="100"a to be parsed as show-sig-subpackets="100",a or be an error.
gpg-agent --supervised being deprecated is highly surprising, especially because it works so well with systemd.
Jun 9 2022
Jun 9 2022
May 23 2022
May 23 2022
DemiMarie added a comment to T5975: Allow signature verification using specific RSA keys <2k in FIPS mode.
In T5975#158113, @werner wrote:I can imagine thar there are use cases for this. Thus I see no problems for the first part.
The second part is imho not a good idea. Libgcrypt is a building block for all kind of software and there are for sure legitimate reasons to use rsa512 (MCUs, short living keys, etc). Thus I think that the decision on the key size should be done by the software using libgcrypt.
May 22 2022
May 22 2022
I would be okay with GnuPG ignoring such packets, but I do not want verifying a signature or importing a key to activate the decompression code and its associated attack surface.
In T5993#158500, @werner wrote:This specificiation is a draft which has not even been discussed in the WG. In any case gpg won't implement this because it would break processing of existing data.