My plan is to let --search-key be the same as locate-key but without local lookups, thus it will be the same as

Okay, if an attacker exactly hist that limit your case is valid. I see no easy fix here, though. What we can do is what is done on Unix file systems to give average users a disk full erroreven if there a few percent of the disk is free; root can use that extra space then. Revocation certificates would be what root is on Unix file systems.

That was pretty easy to reproduce thanks to your still not working server.

I somehow expected such a feature request ;-). However, I do not think that an automatic migration is is appropriate for the stable branch.

I did some manual tests using netcat and KS_FETCH to test the redirection.

I head the same idea when I read your configuration. Given that the advanced lookup was not reallydeployed (see T4590) I also expect that we will receive complains now that it works. Thus white listing any "openpgpkey." seems to me a reasonable easy solution.

Will be in 2.2.17

Oh dear, that happens if one is always on master. I simply forgot to cherry pick the change from master back in November.
Two commits, though.

I don't think so. The fallback mechnanism will still work and remove everything but valid self-signatures. This gives enough space to write the keyblock with the new revocation certificates. I am not sure about designated revokers in this case.

See https://sektioneins.de/en/blog/18-11-23-gnupg-wkd.html for details. In short they fear that companies using IP based security for internal services can be attacked via redirect request and in particular becuase that can happen in the background without the user noticing. I am not concerned but we had long lasting discussions also with protonmail about this and the result was that we need to have this protection. We do not know who requested and paid for the audit from SektionEins and they won't tell us.

I do not understand your problem: The keyserver does not carry or is willing to send you the requested key. Note that keyservers are for a year now under heady DoS attack and only a few are remaining. I will close this report, please re-open if you figure that it might be a bug in GnuPG.

Anything using CBC mode - ECC is just fine.

We need to rewrite the Location to avoid a CSRF attack. See fa1b1eaa4241ff3f0634c8bdf8591cbc7c464144

Thanks. You may want to ask on the mailing list gnupg-users to see whether someone else has had problems building on rawhide. Right now we do not have the time for individual support and thus I unfortunately need to prioritize this bug report down.

We need to know the issuers of the CRLs under question.

See also T4538 which we can only fix in 2.2 after we have checked that this does not break the VS-NfD approval.

Also pushed to 2.2. Right now I can't see what else can be done, so I change the status to testing.

Please share with us the OS used, the versions of the libtaries used and other configuration information.
Also please run again using "make check" without any extra options.

I implemented that in master. The first output is from an update of your key and the second from an insert of a new key.

As I said we do this with all GnuPG components. Pinentry is a bit of exception because it is an external package.
I have also had bug reports which later turned out that a wrong pinentry was used; I prefer to know eactly which pinentry is used. Regarding your concrete problem I suggested to add a note with the full name of the pinentry or to change the error message to something better understandable.

That won't be easy to debug unless we have intermediate debug values from the generating implementation. That IBM Encryption Facility looks partly similar in the command line options to gpg so I wonder whether it will be possible to get some debug output. @mrdave19: we can continue by private mail in case that is helpful for you (wk at g10code com)

Come on, if someone changes the software and breaks it, it is their's fault ant not ours. The whole thing on which keyserver and certificate to use as been discussed ad nausea in the past. Given all the problems with the keyservers I do not see a reason to change it right away to a state we had before. Keyserver code is pretty hard to test and has thus always been prone to regressions.

(See T4175 why this changed in 2.2.12.)

Even if you can't use it the option is still useful to avoid other kinds of DoS. As written in the comments it is not a full solution but it helps to side-step issues with key-signature. In particular for sites which do not have a need for them.
BTW, revocation certificates are still merged with the new option.

They can't agree on a common ciphersuite. The reason is that the server does not support any CBC mode. Which is a bad idea because CBC is still a very common cipher mode.

Okay, so the open task is to build gpgme with MSVC in a way that different libnames are used and that we can distribute them along our standard DLLs? Given the easy we can now ssh into Windows there won't be a need to Wine things.

That is probably not what you want but at least it allows to import your key

GnuPG invokes its components always with their absolute file name. We want to mitigate attacks where malware creates a pinentry wrapper somewhere in an improper set PATH.

I have mentioned it several times in the past that I would like to see the search by user id feature be removed from keyservers so that there is less incentive to use them as a perpetual and searchable database for maybe illegitimate data.

I see no need for this.

Confirmed; that looks like a regression.

We know that. The problem is that we can't simply switch to sqlite for key storage because it is common that dozens of gpg processes are accessing the key data base. At least at some points we need proper transactional behaviour and Sqlite implements that by talking a temporary copy of the database - not an option for large keyrings.

I know this problem very well and it let to the introduction the import filters. For example I can update my own key only using filters like

pinentry-gnome has no grab support. However, it needs to accept that option so that gpg-agent does not error out. We want to have the same global options for all pinentries. Whether they work depends on the pinentry and other parameters. For example when falling back to curses grab won't work in any pinentry.

Although sometimes useful, reports about recent changes to the repo should not be filed as a bug report. You may comment on the commit itself, though.

I see. Thus the problem is that IPWorksOpenPGP does not create proper OpenPGP private keys. I guess they use OpenSSL with their different CRT parameter style and do not convert them correctly. RFC-4880 says this in 5.5.3:

The secret key is this series of multiprecision integers:
o  MPI of RSA secret exponent d;
o  MPI of RSA secret prime value p;
o  MPI of RSA secret prime value q (p < q);
o  MPI of u, the multiplicative inverse of p, mod q.

@dkg: Please keep using slashes. The problem was that slashes are not allowed in git config keys. We use the branch name in some git config keys and thus they need to be mapped to soemthing different (ie. '-').

Andreas, I wonder on which grounds you assigned a CVE for this claimed side-channel attack. The mentioned paper is about an old RSA side-channel and not on AES. I would like to see more facts than the reference to a guy who knows PPC pretty well.

Which Libgcrypt version is used (gpg --version shows it).

I can't see any specific claim to the GPL. License 1 grants a royality free license for all open source implementations defined by the OSI. This includes the LGPL.
If you use Libgcrypt in non-open-source software you may get a free license using License 2.