Ah, I understand the point (at least, partially); My understanding is: With FIPS mode, at the module boundary (== libgcrypt), it ensures that all cipher/digest/etc. operations are done under the standard compliance, and it is considered wrong (violation) when non-FIPS mode operation (such as SHA-1) and FIPS mode operation are mixed.

In RHEL, we do not have anything about PCT so the PCT requirement is not completely clear to me: https://git.centos.org/rpms/libgcrypt/blob/c8s/f/SOURCES

SUSE has patches and version 3235 of cavs_driver.pl, bud it seems that it doesn't support DSA with Q+HASHALGO yet.

Hmm, do we need a backport?

As a start, I applied your patches.

And... as long as I read the PCT patches, it is not needed to export those API to users.
It is only needed internally for PCT tests (at most).

I am considering API enhancement, for this task.

I went through the patches above + what I suggested in previous comments, tested everything against both upstream and libgcrypt in Fedora in FIPS mode. There were slight differences, some cases were already fixed in master, some needed to upstream some of our changes, but the result is 10 patches working in both FIPS and non-fips mode, hopefully enough annotated. If not, please, ask for clarifications.

I went through the OpenSSL drafts. The module boundary in OpenSSL will be separate fips.so object and only non-deprecated functions of OpenSSL 3.0 will be FIPS compliant. There is a global state, that will allow only approved algorithms and modes and there will be API to query the FIPS mode status using OSSL_PARAM_get* functions, but we still have some unknowns so I hope we will know more on the next meeting.

(OpenSSL for FIPS support is a bit tricky, which is described in README-FIPS.md in their distribution. It offers OpenSSL FIPS provider as shared library fips.so.)

Just FYI, NSS offers following API:

I have couple of references from libssh:

gniibe: Can you please check what openssl does exactly. The problem is that we currently have no permanent state for Libgcrypt (i.e. something stored on disk per user or even better global)

FWIW: Unfortunately everyone is moving to GCM, even Outlook. While GnuPG was evaluated by the German BSI we had discussions about this and their evaluators were wary about GCM due to its brittleness thus our use of OCB was very welcomed. OTOH, another approved product meanwhile comes with GCM for S/MIME and thus it seems thatGCM is accepted.

There is no point in questioning whether a couple of words change racism or any other human problems of these days. It will not.

I was so far testing with changes on top of our patches.

Right. The AES-GCM was not allowed in FIPS mode until recently and I think now it is acceptable only for certain protocols (TLS, SSH), which guarantee that the IV is handled "correctly". As mentioned by gniibe, the requirements is that one should not be able to set IV to any specific value. The IV should be incremented automatically inside of the library (with some mask length + some generator configuration), somehow similarly as it is done with openssl, which would probably requite a new API in libgcrypt.

With `/etc/gcrypt/fips_enabled/', make check fails by:

If I understand correctly, to conform FIPS, we need to ensure Key/IV pair uniqueness (See "Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3", Annex C. "C.H Key/IV Pair Uniqueness Requirements from SP 800-38D").
Use of the API to set IV by any value may be considered bad.

Update: still ./basic --fips fails (for me), because of GCM (18 errors).
Need to fix T4873: Enable AES GCM in FIPS mode.

Sorry, this is not acceptable to me. <rant>You don't change racism by avoid words which are may be connected to racism. Master is a term used for example to indicate that a person is proficient in her profession. Slave is (in theory) a historic term to describe, well slaves. That is humans who are non-free and are not allowed to control their lives - like the majority of humans these days - they are just called different and the methods of suppression are different than in the past. In fact a Roman slave (but not a medieval bondsman) had well defined and esteemed rights not something the majority of US citizen with a dark skin has in practice. Term abolished, racism abolished, works as good as freeing the US slaves in the 1856, the 1960, or still today. It did not work. Mr. Kings hope has not yet realized itself and is now maybe farther away than we all had hoped in the second half of the last century. Don't cover facts by changing words used in a very different context.</rant>

That crcalgo can be any digest algorithm and SHA256 seems best option to me.

Thank you for checking and for revised patch. I tested your patch and it works fine for the basic test up until this failure with the crcalgo:

basic: algo 316, crcalgo: 3, gcry_md_open failed: Invalid digest algorithm
basic: algo 317, crcalgo: 3, gcry_md_open failed: Invalid digest algorithm

These are GCRY_MD_SHAKE128 and GCRY_MD_SHAKE256, but the md used here is actually GCRY_MD_RMD160 which is hardcoded and not allowed in FIPS.

That reminds me that we we should replace libgcrypt's internal debug functions by those from gpgrt. We have a dependency for gpgrt anyway and thus we should avoid code duplication. Sure we will keep the existsing public functions but that is easy given that gpgrt comes with gpgrt_logv since 1.28 which we can make mandatory (currently libgcrypt requires 1.27 (from 2017, with 1.28 is from 2018)

I applied rC297d31294333: tests: Fix messages to STDERR when FIPS mode is enabled.. Please note that your intention to change check_digests is right, but your patch actually didn't; When a MD algo is not supported, gcry_md_test_algo returns != 0 (an error code), and it "continues" to next entry (before the change).

Thank you for your report.

With the planned new context aware pubkey functions we technically could do this change w/o an ABI break.

Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program:
https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf

In T5510#147840, @catenacyber wrote:

Got a new bug with regression range ccfa9f2c1427b40483984198c3df41f8057f69f8:6dfab8cfb94ccb485a15b13df3c499cbb06fddf2

curve=23 secp256r1
point=04555555ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff73a865e2e128733884fb82ce625ade822f7d8a59a4dcc09266966cf1bf082856
bignum=2020ff2020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020
nettle: 0 045549408909dd3e772d7d669f8fba2248d334b54be3d18833223d944a328948c76198ac3b29712256dcd9ce1a09471f04267684e1edd45910d61d0b7847db2d58
gcrypt: 0 047a6ec0df23082c8ce54c2b536d76b30464f4e1e690bb77665d298f05f0bee6806e7db3377141cc71ee30dcb8ffb7240bc3ecf29132ab5eb4ae03c067cea0d561

Got a new bug with regression range ccfa9f2c1427b40483984198c3df41f8057f69f8:6dfab8cfb94ccb485a15b13df3c499cbb06fddf2

Thanks a lot.

P192, P224, P256 and P384 are affected.

Is secp192r1 only curve that is giving wrong results?

Attached patch should fix the issue:

Thanks for reporting. There is two commits in that commit range, including https://dev.gnupg.org/rC9d909cb67e70fd792926ac1e2ab305b2cc96bc27 which adds fast reduction for NIST curves. So obviously something is wrong there. Is secp192r1 only curve that is giving wrong results?

This will not be fixed. Brainpool is a standard feature of Libgcrypt and thus this is a bug in the used Libgcrypt installation. Note that although I recently fixed a new regression test for this case, I do not think that it is a good idea to add extra code for a broken Libgcrypt.

Thanks werner. That helps us to know that such test failure is not a deep issue that would push us to not deliver this version of gnupg on AIX.

With the next release you will get only a warning:

gnupg-2.2/common/t-sexputil.c:467: test 0 failed: Unknown elliptic curve - ignored
This is likely due to a patched version of Libgcrypt with removed support for Brainpool curves

Sorry for the expired certificate.

Fix: "I Know so few about gnupg, thus I'm not sure I COULD add test cases, probably not. "

Hi,
The site now shows: "NET::ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID" and I have a limited access to the web page.
Thanks for you explanation. However, I now so few about gnupg, thus I'm not sure I cannot add test cases, probably not. I'll see later if we have to provide on AIX a behavior different than the one of RedHat. Meanwhile, about your last proposal, yes it would be very useful to detect the case, print a warning, and skip the test. That would be helpful. Moreover, if the test deals with smartcards, we do not have on AIX, thus this test is very probably not useful in our environment.

The thing is that I added a test for a new function which uses standard curves of Libgcrypt. But here we are again at the RedHat mess: They support the NIST curves but they removed support for Brainpool curves. Both are very similiar curves just different parameters. Brainpool is just in Europe out of fear that the NIST curves are rigged by the the NSA. Now, why RedHat removed Brainpool is probably just a legal dept thing who didn't have a clue. The tin foil hats probably see a different reason.

• a patch change within scd/apdu.c dealing with a call of: pcsc_connect() since code has changed between the 2 versions: may this be the cause of the failure? (Edited: hummm this patch seems no more required. And I have the same failure without it).

Hi Werner,

Supported curves should be listed by

gpg --list-config --with-colons curve

I am not sure about Fedora, but RedHat used to remove ECC support from Libgcrypt; GnuPG requires these curves. As long as you don't use ECC you things will work despite of this failed test. The test is new to check and does not anticipate a broken Libgcrypt.

That patch consists an ABI change. We might consider this for 1.10 but we can't do such a change in 1.9.

Thanks for the report. Will soon be fixed.

Some ideas:

• the someflags thing will probably just be a reserved parameter
• If DATA is not NULL but an MD is set the sign function should fail
• Should ownership of MD be moved to the CTX?

In an email from @werner couple days back, I got a suggestion that we could use hashing tied to the context, rather than this one-shot call tied only to digests. I circled back this suggestion to Stephan and he confirmed that it should be fine from the FIPS point of view so I am posting the suggested API here too:

ctx = gcry_pk_new (someflags)
md = gcry_md_open (...)
gcry_ctx_set_md (md);
gcry_pk_sign_ext (ctx, result, data, skey)
[...]
gcry_ctx_release (ctx);

OK. I think that the patch at SUSE is updated one which works.
As I understand correctly, this is a kind of very old patch, which intended to work around old libgcrypt limitation of RSA PSS.

I think that {D1476} is still a sketch (not real code which works). I would guess an intended use, but it's good to have concrete example program which uses the feature being added.

FWIW, there is also this newer patch: https://dev.gnupg.org/differential/diff/1476/
and SUSE seems to already use a modified API:
https://sources.suse.com/SUSE:Maintenance:15118/libgcrypt.SUSE_SLE-15_Update/26a8df5f96d27d6abca7bd7ba9b0def0/libgcrypt-FIPS-RSA-DSA-ECDSA-hashing-operation.patch

Our public key functions are stateless. For several reasons it would be good to have an option to keep some state (think pre-computations). Our gcry_ctx_t would be a perfect fit for this and it will allow us to join a pubkey function with for example a hash function.

Does the patch really work, or is it a sketch to describe the intended use?