Looks good to me on vsd-3.3.7-beta90.9 @ win10:

It is also shown in gpd-5.0.2:

I once creates this task, which is probably a duplicate now: T7954: Kleopatra: Highlight focused cell in tables

In general, we don't show the key IDs. User ID + creation date will almost always uniquely identify all keys. (And only the fingerprint truly identifies a key anyway.)

Seems I forgot to note that icon removal works when resetting to defaults. And the VSD related Categories are no longer shown in Gpg4win. Tested now with Gpg4win 5.0.2, but I believe it was already ok in 5.0.0.

If Tobias remembered correctly, then https://dev.gnupg.org/T7334#193396 still needs to be implemented.

ok, neither is a no-brainer, i see. But I would vote for the left to right order, i.e. the alternative you mention. This has the advantage that the card type is listed on the left side with which one can maybe better identify the card. In my example the type is "Yubico OpenPGP-v.3.4-card", I do not see the info that it is a Yubikey anywhere else. Therefore a blind user will only get that info up front if the left side is read first.

Maybe. EncryptionResult has a list of invalid recipients and I've changed the code to show the Retry dialog only if there's at least one invalid recipient.

Your suggestion sounds ok to me, maybe with a slight change for the message: "Failed to encrypt the notepad because at least on certificate could not be validated."

I tried to add the list of invalid recipients to the message box, but it seems that gpgsm stops the validation of the certificates at the first invalid recipient. I got only the first Bob certificate reported as invalid recipient when I tried to encrypt to both Bob certificates so that it doesn't make sense to list the (incomplete) list of invalid recipients. It also means that Kleopatra cannot update the invalid recipient certificates because it knows only of one invalid certificate.

Ideally the certificate would change, but Kleopatra has no idea that this certificate turned out to be not valid. In fact, Kleopatra doesn't even know that the encryption failed because of some certificate. It could have failed for any other reason (e.g. full disk). Kleopatra only knows that an error occurred and offers to retry with lower security. (I looked at GpgOL and it does the same.)

yes, basically it's what we want.

Current implementation for the case of an S/MIME certificate which turns out to be invalid when it's used for encryption. Is that what we want?

Before making subtickets for each application: I wonder if it is not all Kleopatra anyway? Isn't the security approval dialog basically Kleopatra?

The equivalent for invalid S/MIME certificates are not-certified *PGP certificates.
(Valid/invalid are not ideal as technical terms as they have a broad general meaning, too. I hope my usage here is correct ;-) It is what I gathered from an explanation given by Werner.)

Invalid certs (as stated in the status column in Kleopatra) are mainly S/MIME certs (e.g. with missing root cert, CRL check failed, etc). I haven't seen invalid pgp certs yet (might be e.g. very old ones with missing self signature).

Invalid and expired are different cases.

Issue 1) should be implemented as already described (on error -> dialog to retry with "always trust" flag)

@ebo and me talked about this and T6701: GpgOL: Use GPGME_ENCRYPT_ALWAYS_TRUST. We think, it's best to have a short meeting to discuss further changes.

Patch was merged upstream (KF 6.25): 332678d8a4f635d6938eb3e9ec03d845aa89697a