If there's no objection to this in a few days, i'll go ahead and merge it to master.

branch dkg/fix-4952 contains this fix in an easily applicable form as 0db8c768843db3e85935b972f1ed9d1b98159c46

thanks!

Thanks for following up!

To be clear: marking this ticket wontfix means (among other things) that it is the GnuPG project's upstream position that:

OK, i've asked on gnupg-devel.

In T4883#133467, @werner wrote:

That option does the same as --disable-dirmngr which in trun has the same effect as disable-crl-checks

@werner wrote:

I see no difference between the last two example stanzas that show you running ../run-verify. Are they supposed to have different output?

I'm aware of the metadata leakage risks of OCSP, and i share your concerns about them.

If CRLs or OCSP are a MUST in a given profile, and the cert chain has OCSP but no CRL, it seems like that profile should then try OCSP, rather than failing.

I think what you're saying that there is *no way* to use GPGME in offline mode to validate x.509 certificates, and this is by design. Am I understanding that right?

Thanks for the quick fix, @werner!

I thought i'd try with other certificates. I started with the one from this website. It also fails to validate unless i supply --disable-crl-checks, apparently because the immediate issuer (the Let's Encrypt CA) doesn't offer CRLs, only OCSP responders. Perhaps --disable-crl-checks should be the default, or at least if there is no CRL available there shouldn't be a failure by default:

Aha, i can get it to say f if i use --disable-crl-checks:

i didn't know that, thanks. i'm now seeing i (which i think means "invalid") in the same configuration:

For reference, here's an error message from openssl smime when it is trying to verify an e-mail message with no embedded certificate at all (despite it knowing about the relevant certificate):

"log" and "lock" are easy typo/confusions to make, @aheinecke was just trying to understand your report better, since there wasn't much information in it.

@wiktor-k, "just extend the spec" doesn't necessarily work with existing clients, which might be surprised to find unexpected packets in the signature section of an e-mail. It seems more likely to me that they'd be able to handle (meaning: ignore) an unknown subpacket (as long as it's well-formed) than to handle additional packets. But all of these surmises require testing with existing clients, of course. Has anyone done any of that testing?

Ah, thanks for pointing out the subpacket option (i guess it could be hashed or unhashed). i don't think any of the subpackets currently defined in RFC4880 supports this use case -- but i guess you could mint a new one, or use a notation.

Hi @aheinecke, thanks for thinking about this, and thanks for tagging me here too. I'm definitely interested.

This is an important fix for a sensible S/MIME use case. Thanks for working on it!

Yes, i'd surmised that the ::::: lines are continuation lines of the error message. but why not just percent-escape the newline in the error message too? Where in the documentation of this API does it say to expect continuation lines of error messages? Is gpgconf expected to be used programmatically?

@Moonchild wrote:

using enigmail with the new version

I think you mean "mix", not "fix". right?

Sure, I personally know that GnuPG requires a homedir to operate.

i'd be unlikely to ship anything as /etc/gnupg/gpg.conf or /etc/gnupg/dirmngr.conf just because of the mess that admins have to deal with when shipped config files change.

I think this might be the same as T4820.

I think this is a great feature to have. Thanks for working on it, @aheinecke .

I've just pushed ad55de70930543c1681b11e4bd624be074122b23 onto branch dkg/fix-4855 as a proposed fix, to permit --trusted-key to accept a full 20-byte fingerprint.

In T4513#132770, @aheinecke wrote:

Werner could you maybe at least check for an internet connection, I don't know how to do it on Linux but on Windows it's easy because windows has API for that.

I've just tested this with GpgOL 2.4.6~beta3 as well, and while the i see the same issue :( (though the legacy display part is not shown, thanks to your fix of T4796).

Thanks! taking screenshots is definitely tedious. I just redid the screenshots for all the sample pgp/mime messages with GpgOL 2.4.6-beta3, and i can confirm that it looks like you've resolved the matter.

Avoiding a failure for older versions means that the test suite won't catch this particular bug if it is reintroduced in future versions. That seems suboptimal for me, but given the complexity of the dependency chain, i don't know how to solve it. I prefer just raising an error with older versions of GnuPG as with rMf2aeb2563ba2 , as this is a test of the json interface, which isn't in widespread use yet.

Changing back to wontfix given the wontfix resolution of T4826

This is not a problem for 2107 (when you and i are 6 feet under). it's a problem well before then for anything that has an expiration date of 2107 or later (as demonstrated by the legitimate example certificate here today).

This is a problem for gpgv and gpg as well. gpg reports:

It looks like at least for OpenPGP, the layer below GPGME is also broken for expiration dates in this time window (see T4826)

I don't mind a workaround that avoids an ABI/API fix as long as it defers actual failures until 2038.

I'm reopening this because i think users of these 32-bit platforms are going to run into issues before 2038 happens. Certs could appear expired before they are actually expired, for example, because of the wraparound time.

thanks for looking at this, @aheinecke ! if you or @werner know of any internal side effects where this does matter, it would be great to add a test that documents them.

(if you don't want to publish the full strace output here because you're concerned it might leak some information about your machine or your network, but you're ok sharing it with me personally, you can send it to me privately by e-mail, encrypted to the OpenPGP certificate with fingerprint C4BC2DDB38CCE96485EBE9C2F20691179038E5C6, and sent to one of the e-mail addresses associated with that certificate. please make a note here if you do that)

ok, that's deeply weird. i'm assuming that this machine has IPv4 connectivity. I have no idea why dirmngr would be returning EAFNOSUPPORT in that case.

branch dkg/fix-4821 contains a fix for this, in commit 414938cfedbdb97b83d00e8619dec9502096be22

in particular, c4cf527ea227edb468a84bf9b8ce996807bd6992 and f2aeb2563ba2f55eea7f52041e52062fdc839a64

The dkg/fix-4820 branch now has these two fixes.

For easier reference or searchability, the test error looks like this:

This appears to be a different error than above. here we see:

this looks to me like a problem with the TLS handshake -- it looks like this is a response coming from the TLS stack -- as rfc 8446 says, alert 49 is access_denied:

This is also https://bugs.debian.org/346241

thanks for the fix, @aheinecke ! can you post screenshots of the changes? or do you have a nightly build i could test?

In T4809#131931, @werner wrote:

BTW, the qualitybar is not shown by default, only if you configure sme of the extra password checks. We may even remove it completely because it leads to wrong assumption on why a passphrase is required.

@Rycky_Tigg cases 1, 2, and 3 that you document here each show the behavior that i would expect from pinentry-gnome3, given the definition of its Assuan-based API and its use of gcr-prompter. (i'm assuming that in case 3 the user just waited longer than the allowed timeout)

pinentry-gnome uses gcr's gcr_prompt_set_password_new to prompt for a new password, and ignores the SETQUALITYBAR assuan command.

It has now been over 6 months since the patches were available to fix this problem and they have not been adopted upstream.

@werner, i don't understand your last remark. what "required computations" do you think the proposed patches are "moving" from the server to the client?

fwiw, ensuring that overflow for either field results in ULONG_MAX (rather than wrapping around) would go a long way toward this problem being something that we can reasonably put off for another 50 years.

The most plausible fix to the Y2K38 problem on 32-bit machines is to simply move to a 64-bit time_t at the same time as any other major system-wide ABI break. However, if that ABI break doesn't also change the size of long to more than 32 bits, GPGME will remain unfixed in spite of any architectural correction.

Very few OpenPGP data signatures have an expiration time either, fwiw. I have never actually seen one in the wild, and no one that i know uses --ask-sig-expire or --default-sig-expire (it shows up in the cupt test suite and the apt test suite, but doesn't appear to be actually used by anything).

pinentry-tty is pretty fragile, and designed to be handled in a particular way. I strongly recommend a different workflow if you're using gpg secret key operations in a regular process. either: