Any volunteers to write a manual? ;-)

The flag has been implemented in 2.4 but as long as this version has no approval it does not make sense to do anything more. Let's re-open this task if we have a real request for this.

Here's mirroring script that is in place currently:

#!/bin/bash -e

@jukivili was so kind and does the mirroring now.

gpg-agent now supports READKEY --card command which creates stub file when it's not yet available on host computer.
It was implemented by rG82cbab906a3e: agent: Add --card option for READKEY.

Yes, --export creates the OpenPGP specified format.

We stopped maintaining GPA in favor of Kleopatra.

I mean what gpg --export gives Werner.

Do you mean the pubring.gpg format or the on-wire OpenPGP format; ie. what gpg --export gives?

Not if there are technical reasons to keep the address. BTW, you solution would not help because the fingerprint of key is personal data in the same way as a mail address.

Werner, according to GDPR if a user upload a key with it's name and email address he or she may be able in the future, to ask for removal of this information.
How is this going to happen, to a keyserver, accordingly to your suggestions?

Will go into 1.19.0

A tool can't make some thing GDPR compliant - this is all about policy and informed choice. There is actually no problem if you allow ppl to decide whether to upload personal information to a public service.

I changed the title of the issue to make it about adding the warning. I also think that is a good idea to avoid confusion / accidents.

Seeing that there are "groups" in Kleopatra, I read the docs, and they suggested that the groups are for addressing multiple recipients.

Settings -> Configure Groups.

Thank you.
Applied to both (master and 1.10).

This pretty much highlights a general problem of groups: If the distribution groups for the email client are managed independently from the certificate groups then there will inevitably be discrepancies. The obvious solution is the usage of groups managed by a central service for email addresses and certificates. (Or an encrypted mailing list service.)

Right, thanks for the review! Updated patches below.

Actually, the same issue is in the mac case, which I missed on first couple of reviews:

-  enum gcry_mac_algos alg = va_arg (arg_ptr, enum gcry_cipher_algos);
+  enum gcry_mac_algos alg = va_arg (arg_ptr, enum gcry_mac_algos);

Going through the code once more, there is one typo to be fixed:

+_gcry_fips_indicator_md (va_list arg_ptr)
+{
+  enum gcry_md_algos alg = va_arg (arg_ptr, enum gcry_cipher_algos);

should say

+_gcry_fips_indicator_md (va_list arg_ptr)
+{
+  enum gcry_md_algos alg = va_arg (arg_ptr, enum gcry_md_algos);

otherwise ack.

That's why I added some tags and also set me a reminder. We will try to get this into the next GPGME release we plan for this month.

@werner Seeing as you seem to be actively maintaining this project: is there any way to move this forward? This is breaking quite a few builds of development environments for my company and we are now applying similar patches ourselves but it would be nice to get this merged upstream.

(my example cert is 0x09BB0EEE)

Added SETQUALITYBAR support with some fixes for glitches when an error string was set. Wide characters seem to work OK.

We came to the same conclusion -- the SHAKE digests are not usable for sign/verify operations the way how it is implemented now. But it would be more clear if we would have explicit allow-list.

After consulting with our certs lab and studying the code I think SHAKE should not be a problem for now. All of the _gcry_digest_spec_shakeXXX seem to neither have an mdlen nor a read() function. pk_sign and pk_verify seem to both call md_read() which should fail because of the missing read function, kdf checks _gcry_md_get_algo_dlen() which should also disallow SHAKE.

I am closing this as a duplicate of T6117 even though it is not really a duplicate. But for me it does not make sense to keep this as a different issue because simplifying the dialog is directly related to making it more accessible.

Good catch. A similar problem might arise with SHA384 according to section D.R which states

One potential pitfall here is that SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256 must not be available for use in signature operations. That's because https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf section C.C disallows the use of SHAKE in higher-level algorithms:

These look good to me.

Right, we have received the same feedback from our cert lab but I haven't found time to update the bug yet. Here are the updated patches:

This marks GCRY_MD_CRC32, GCRY_MD_CRC24_RFC2440 and GCRY_MD_CRC32_RFC1510 as approved.

Added curses-repeat branch which needs testing for wide chars and other stuff in case i missed something

Oh sorry I only saw this now. We have "gpgme_set_offline" for this use case which disables CRL checks in the S/MIME case. It is more general because it also disables OCSP for example and might disable more online actions like fetching chain certificates etc.

Understood. I appreciate the time you took to analyse the issue. Thanks.

Indeed. The called function dates back to 2004. We really need to rework this and cache the value - it might be required to take the file_name into account.

@werner I saw the call in _gpgme_set_engine_info at line 452 https://dev.gnupg.org/source/gpgme/browse/master/src/engine.c$452 which I think leads down to _gpgme_get_program_version in version.c which does a spawn and uses no cache.

I had the same suspicion andIchecked the code. afaics all values are taken from a cache (see dirinfo.c). Thus no real overhead.

In T6369#167642, @werner wrote:

The context cloning should not be that expensive compared to invoking gpg. Thus let us first see how to speed up this in the common case.

That's what I was initially trying to do, but then I saw https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gpgme.git;a=blob;f=src/keylist.c;h=1c01bd42b8497932d218e4d525794ed98e712bf5;hb=HEAD#l1362 and I wasn't sure if I needed to copy that logic to avoid introducing any regressions.

If you got a limited list of, say, fingerprints, you should put them into an array and use gpgme_op_keylist_ext_start tolist only those keys. This will be much faster.

In T6369#167649, @ikloecker wrote:

Finally, what's your use case? gpgme_get_key() is meant to be used for getting individual keys. It's not meant to be used to get 1000 keys in a loop.

If you mean gcc optimization flags, then yes.

Finally, what's your use case? gpgme_get_key() is meant to be used for getting individual keys. It's not meant to be used to get 1000 keys in a loop.

Moreover, if you have performance problems on Windows, then it's not the best idea to strace the code on Linux.

Just asking the obvious: You are using an optimized release build for your benchmarks, right?

Benchmark script:

yeah, I'd guess it's creating a new gpg instance with it. strace shows extra clone/pipe/read/fcntl syscalls with the new context.

The context cloning should not be that expensive compared to invoking gpg. Thus let us first see how to speed up this in the common case.

Output of --show-configs should also be added as a button or directly visible when the selftest of Kleopatra fails.

I try experiment using Python PKCS#11 (https://python-pkcs11.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html)

• with SoftHSM https://github.com/opendnssec/SoftHSMv2
• with Scute

I concluded that (at first, for the initial try) it's not good to start this under scdaemon, because of two different abstractions for accessing the device (the way of scdaemon and the way of PKCS#11).
It's good to start with something like tpm2d. The goal would be integration into scdaemon or tpm2d.

Nobody stops you from removing any unwanted keys from the keyring. Nobody stops you from importing all keys to a temporary keyring (using a temporary GNUPGHOME), export only those keys you want in your proper keyring, import those in your proper keyring, and then ditch the temporary keyring (resp. GNUPGHOME). gpg doesn't stop you from doing any of this.

Well, I think it's a matter of taste what keys a user wants to have in which keyring. Some users want only the keys they actually use.
I think policy or the algorithm should not take the decision away from the user. "Free software for unfree users" doesn't make much sense. Maybe I'm just so old that I still think the computer should do what the user wants it to do, and not the other way around (which seems to be a current trend).

It does not matter what you have in you keyring. It does not harm to have arbitrary keys there.

See the the commit for a description of the changes.