Thanks. I applied all 4 patches to master and did one additional change to get --allow-old-cipher-algos straight.

I never tested the WSL stuff with gpg-agent but I use the standard OpenSSH based ssh server on Windows on a daily base. It is actually part of our release build chain. A recent problem I encountered was fixed in master with rG2469dc5aae and should be backported to 2.4. Might be related to your problem but I need to read your detailed bug report more closely.

Here's all of the above patches squashed into a single patch:

attached here is a series of 4 patches that reinforce that the last --compliance policy option (or equivalent option, like --rfc4880 or --gnupg) supercedes any earlier one.

sorry for the confusion in the initial report -- the policy compliance option is of course --compliance, and not --policy, and i just miswrote it in one line of the description above. I've corrected it now, and all the rest of the report is still as it was.

That gpg seems to be some other or patched software than the one from gnupg:

This issue occurs when using GPGME with multiple contexts and setting the OpenPGP engines to different GnuPG home paths. As you mentioned, it is crucial to let gpgconf know the correct home path so that it can locate the socket file used by gpg-agent and properly clean up all instances.

gpgconf assumes that there is only one of the daemons. In fact it can only work with one and that is the one daemon which listens on the socket. all daemon's do a self-check by trying to connect to themself and terminate if they realize that they are not anymore the owner of the socket. As long as a daemon is started by a gnupg component a file system lock is taken to avoid duplicate launching. However it a daemon is stared by other means this could lead to a race.

For command line, reported issues have been fixed; Confusions for wrong errors are gone, it correctly reports appropriate errors of:

• GPG_ERR_PIN_BLOCKED
• GPG_ERR_NO_RESET_CODE
• GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN

VS-Desktop-3.2.94.481-Beta: same as for the Gpg4win version.
And there is a hint if you enter "hkps://something" that this is not the right format (that is included in Gpg4win 4.4.0, too)

VSD-Beta-481: Encrypting/signing with gpgtar on the cli and decrypting/verifying with Kleopatra works

What is the status (or maybe better scope) of this ticket? Why was it set to the milestone 2.4.5?
I do not see any improvement in Kleopatra from Gpg4win 4.4 (with gpg 2.4.7) regarding the behavior when trying to unblock a card.

Reported gnupg channel on IRC.
An ascii armored file in question was: https://github.com/syncthing/syncthing/releases/download/v1.29.2/sha256sum.txt.asc

Fixed in: rGb1857a2836c9: gpg: Fix handling with no CRC armor.

When CHECKCRC == 0 (no CRC), ->any_data was not set, resulted

	no valid OpenPGP data found.

wrongly.

works in VS-Desktop-3.2.94.481-Beta

works with VS-Desktop-3.2.94.481-Beta

Fixed in: rE0f4fe2edf5e5: spawn: Care about closefrom/close call is interrupted.

@werner I read the code of gpgme/src/posix-io.c. I understand the two points:

• For the correctness sake, the possible interrupted closefrom should be handled.
• we can share the code with closefrom case and non-closefrom case.

works with VSD-beta-478

One year later, I also did translation work for kleo and libkleo, which are pushed by Andre.
So, closing this task.

Fixed in 2.5.3.

glad it was useful!

Tested with the VSD beta 478. Works

2.2 is end-of-life.
There was one actual typo fix which could be used for master, though. Thanks.

Got a simple fix for this which does two things:

1. Correctly act upon an error from the backup file writing
2. Print a warning note.

In T2169#196673, @werner wrote:

Shall we handle this with additional retry prompts, w/o a timeout? I think this makes sense because creating keys with a backup file and a passphrase is a manual task anyway.

There is a regression due to the regression fix in rGb30c15bf7c5336c4abb1f9dcd974cd77ba6c61a7 (from Dec 24 2015) or some related commits:

@gniibe: Please see gpgme/src/posix-io.c where we have this:

Thank you for your report.

Fixed in rA69069bc63e6b: Remove an declaration for an unused function.

Hm, this might also be relevant in GnuPG's codebase in common/exechelp-posix.c, which contains a copy of the same code (licensed differently).

Also works in VSD-beta-478

Backported for VSD 3.3

Note that that Beta uses a 64 bit Kleopatra but the GnuPG engine was accidentally build for 32 bit. This will be fixed with the next Beta. That might increase the confusion a bit.

GpgEX requires/uses Kleopatra so that only GnuPG would be left if you could deselect Kleopatra. And that's exactly what the simple installer installs because the simple installer is included in the Gpg4win installer.

FYI usually these are my install options:

No problem. I can stay on 4.4.x. Just thought I should give the beta a try and let you guys know.

Thanks for your feedback. Maybe the "minimal" install is missing a file. It's a beta version for a reason. We'll make sure to fix it for the stable release.

None. I just use the command line tools and always perform a "minimal" install. @aheinecke: I already tested it on cmd.exe. Same result. Also I do not have QT installed, or a QT_PLUGIN_PATH set up. The bottom line for me is still:

Change the encryption code to only allow 256 bit session keys with Kyber regardless of the preferences, iff --require-pqc-encryption is set. […] We could as well also encforce AES-256 also without that option.

What if we encrypt to several recipients, only some of them having a Kyber encryption key? Should we still enforce AES-256 in that case regardless of the preferences, and assume that by now everybody should support AES-256?

Love it! I think I am going to use “post-heffalump crypto” from now on. :D

But keep https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/heffalump_crypto.pdf in mind ;-)

I wrote it with PQC security level in mind which requires AES256 for the session key as well.

That is what I expected. Meanwhile I re-read the code and history and can tell that the comment is not correct. I wrote it with PQC security level in mind which requires AES256 for the session key as well. However, during the migration phase and as long as --require-pqc-encryption is not enable we should allow an AES-128 session key. This is for the rare case that encryption is also done for non pqc keys which don't have the AES-256 capability set.