thanks, @werner!

Thanks for the fixes, @werner!

Other ways that gpgsm --quiet is not quiet:

I don't think the patch made elementary and ecore-x dev headers an absolute hard requirement; in particular, ./configure --disable-efl works fine to build pinentry without having these headers installed.

Thanks for the verification, @wltjr. I've pushed 19a18ba5fee049aac87b5114763095aaeb42430f to the master branch for future releases.

hm, actually, maybe the efl should be EFL in order to produce and substitute the EFL_CFLAGS and EFL_LIBS variables.

@wltjr maybe it needs ecore-x as well as elementary > 1.18 in the PKG_CHECK_MODULES line? oh, and looks like i screwed up and used > where i should have used >= sorry! fixing those would make the PKG_CHECK_MODULES line be:

I think you're saying "GnuPG will reject all subpackets marked with a critical flag unless there is a specific known semantic for *criticality* for that subpacket" Am I understanding that right? Is there a published list of criticality semantics that GnuPG is willing to accept? How do those semantics differ from standard semantics for the packet in question?

fwiw, i think a patch like this ought to work with reasonably-modern versions of autotools:

@wltjr maybe you could take a look at this?

RFC 4880 says:

See also https://gitlab.com/openpgp-wg/webkey-directory/-/issues/3 which is the same issue.

This ambiguity appears to be the cause of a recent epic (and to me, largely incomprehensible) thread on gnupg-users. It would be great to have the WKD guidance about fallback strategy be much more explicit. Any room for ambiguity here leads to different outcomes from different WKD clients, and quite a bit of confused discussion by their users.

We currently already ship:

I don't think this fix has made it into a release yet. Could we get a released version of gpgme that contains this fix?

on #debian-dpkg on IRC, Guillem Jover suggested that we might want to fix dpkg specfiles to use +self_spec: instead of *self_spec:.

I'm still not understanding what specifically should be fixed here. Sorry to be dense about it, but the range of options and configuration details that are different are pretty puzzling.

The same concern has been reported at https://bugs.debian.org/964033 -- if dirmngr is not going to follow the specification, it should at least document (and maybe warn?) about how it is divergent.

Can you characterize the failure when ipv6.disable=1 ? The straightforward failure (connect() fails with EHOSTUNREACH after a few seconds) should presumably be treated the same as if some other host happened to be offline. That should result in dirmngr failing over to the next available address for the configured keyserver, right?

I agree with you that a certificate with a lengthy expiration is not cryptographically sensible or wise, @bernhard -- i'd never want to produce such a certificate myself.

This appears to still be a problem, despite upgrading to libksba 1.4.0:

If there's no objection to this in a few days, i'll go ahead and merge it to master.

branch dkg/fix-4952 contains this fix in an easily applicable form as 0db8c768843db3e85935b972f1ed9d1b98159c46

thanks!

Thanks for following up!

To be clear: marking this ticket wontfix means (among other things) that it is the GnuPG project's upstream position that:

OK, i've asked on gnupg-devel.

In T4883#133467, @werner wrote:

That option does the same as --disable-dirmngr which in trun has the same effect as disable-crl-checks

@werner wrote:

I see no difference between the last two example stanzas that show you running ../run-verify. Are they supposed to have different output?

I'm aware of the metadata leakage risks of OCSP, and i share your concerns about them.

If CRLs or OCSP are a MUST in a given profile, and the cert chain has OCSP but no CRL, it seems like that profile should then try OCSP, rather than failing.

I think what you're saying that there is *no way* to use GPGME in offline mode to validate x.509 certificates, and this is by design. Am I understanding that right?

Thanks for the quick fix, @werner!

I thought i'd try with other certificates. I started with the one from this website. It also fails to validate unless i supply --disable-crl-checks, apparently because the immediate issuer (the Let's Encrypt CA) doesn't offer CRLs, only OCSP responders. Perhaps --disable-crl-checks should be the default, or at least if there is no CRL available there shouldn't be a failure by default:

Aha, i can get it to say f if i use --disable-crl-checks:

i didn't know that, thanks. i'm now seeing i (which i think means "invalid") in the same configuration:

For reference, here's an error message from openssl smime when it is trying to verify an e-mail message with no embedded certificate at all (despite it knowing about the relevant certificate):

"log" and "lock" are easy typo/confusions to make, @aheinecke was just trying to understand your report better, since there wasn't much information in it.

@wiktor-k, "just extend the spec" doesn't necessarily work with existing clients, which might be surprised to find unexpected packets in the signature section of an e-mail. It seems more likely to me that they'd be able to handle (meaning: ignore) an unknown subpacket (as long as it's well-formed) than to handle additional packets. But all of these surmises require testing with existing clients, of course. Has anyone done any of that testing?

Ah, thanks for pointing out the subpacket option (i guess it could be hashed or unhashed). i don't think any of the subpackets currently defined in RFC4880 supports this use case -- but i guess you could mint a new one, or use a notation.

Hi @aheinecke, thanks for thinking about this, and thanks for tagging me here too. I'm definitely interested.

This is an important fix for a sensible S/MIME use case. Thanks for working on it!

Yes, i'd surmised that the ::::: lines are continuation lines of the error message. but why not just percent-escape the newline in the error message too? Where in the documentation of this API does it say to expect continuation lines of error messages? Is gpgconf expected to be used programmatically?

@Moonchild wrote:

using enigmail with the new version

I think you mean "mix", not "fix". right?

Sure, I personally know that GnuPG requires a homedir to operate.

i'd be unlikely to ship anything as /etc/gnupg/gpg.conf or /etc/gnupg/dirmngr.conf just because of the mess that admins have to deal with when shipped config files change.

I think this might be the same as T4820.

I think this is a great feature to have. Thanks for working on it, @aheinecke .

I've just pushed ad55de70930543c1681b11e4bd624be074122b23 onto branch dkg/fix-4855 as a proposed fix, to permit --trusted-key to accept a full 20-byte fingerprint.

In T4513#132770, @aheinecke wrote:

Werner could you maybe at least check for an internet connection, I don't know how to do it on Linux but on Windows it's easy because windows has API for that.

I've just tested this with GpgOL 2.4.6~beta3 as well, and while the i see the same issue :( (though the legacy display part is not shown, thanks to your fix of T4796).

Thanks! taking screenshots is definitely tedious. I just redid the screenshots for all the sample pgp/mime messages with GpgOL 2.4.6-beta3, and i can confirm that it looks like you've resolved the matter.

Avoiding a failure for older versions means that the test suite won't catch this particular bug if it is reintroduced in future versions. That seems suboptimal for me, but given the complexity of the dependency chain, i don't know how to solve it. I prefer just raising an error with older versions of GnuPG as with rMf2aeb2563ba2 , as this is a test of the json interface, which isn't in widespread use yet.

Changing back to wontfix given the wontfix resolution of T4826

This is not a problem for 2107 (when you and i are 6 feet under). it's a problem well before then for anything that has an expiration date of 2107 or later (as demonstrated by the legitimate example certificate here today).

This is a problem for gpgv and gpg as well. gpg reports:

It looks like at least for OpenPGP, the layer below GPGME is also broken for expiration dates in this time window (see T4826)