You can do a

This does not require org-feed.el as far as I can tell, but it does require components of current Org Mode HTML export and publishing features which do not appear to be available in the current gnupg.org website build system.

A more recent request for this feature has been made via the devel mailing list:

Hi Werner. Did you by any chance already find the time to look into the changes?

I looked into it a bit. As bulk import is highly inefficient copying the keyring lots and lots of times the migration of a keyring with 1000keys takes around 6 Minutes.

The use case that @Valodim and @dkg are thinking of probably is using a setup-code that humans use to transfer from one device do another to decrypt a symmetrically encrypted setup-package, this issue is linked from:

https://autocrypt.org/level1.html#setup-message-import

There was a second person asking for a list-packets feature to verify if a file is encrypted correctly at gnupg-devel.

I'm not a fan of memoryhole. To say my criticism in one sentence: "Memoryhole is trying to sell the hide of the boar before it has been hunted."

Ok, I understand it. Project tag changed :)

I also struggled to get two cards running at the same time. Host system is Fedora 26 with gnupg 2.2.4.

Will go into 2.2.5

Note that there is no standard for this. In particular the encoding of filenames with special characters are different in almost all implementations. I tried to find a common ground for our implementation.

Just to be clear I think this issue is valid and we should add more checksum tools in the future. But I would want them to use libgcrypt and confirm to the standard *sum command line arguments like -c.

Hi Werner,

This is a MUA thing. Do you ask whether we plan to add it to GpgOL?

See T3796

Sorry, we won't do this any time soon. We may even shut the Bitcoin thing down. I was too troublesome from a bookkeeping POV.

I don't think that -R is a good way to implement BCC - it would be better to encrypt it separately. But people may have different ideas on this.

No clue what their problem is, I have a few projects scanned by Coverity. Most are forks that I took over, but one is not really. Not sure why they took such issues here.

Okay. Thanks for the report. I once looked at Coverty but decided not to use it because of their rules which would not allow me to document and fix a possible security vulnerability without following their process. If there is a security problem I will fix it according to my schedule and not allow anyone to delay it.

After fighting with Coverity over a fork of pinentry that has EFL. I setup to have Coverity scan. Which found some like 22 defects. Coverity unable to identify that I have any affiliation, after I spent/wasted hours getting a build to upload to Coverity to scan. Just to fight with some unhelpful person basically standing in the way of FOSS project, a wonderful Mel Llaguno. Decided for security reasons I be denied ability to use Coverity to scan pinentry for defects, even in the EFL interface I made and am the author of. Which also means I cannot fix other issues with pinentry or aide further in development....

Sorry, I don't understand. Can you describe your use case in more detail?

You have a token with one spare key which you want to use for encryption and certification. And being able to replace the encryption subkey eventually.

Originally dirmngr was designed to be a system service for the reason that CRLs are not user specific. However, the majority of systems today are used by a single user and thus we dropped that feature when integrating dirmngr into gnupg.

a key that is signed as its own subkey, in a construct where the key and subkey have the same fingerprint? what ever could be a valid use case for such a scenario?

I can't see why this should be out-of-spec. In fact I did this my self several times to create keys from other keys.

Your welcome, I can remake another unified patch if need be. I was starting to prepare things to be a stand alone fork. Did an initial .travis.yml file, and initial stuff for Coverity. Though never did get a build uploaded to Coverity. Not sure if you have ever run pinentry through Coverity or other GnuPG stuff, may be a good idea just to see if it catches anything.

Thanks for the long explanation. I think it should go into pinentry proper. I will have a closer look on it.

@werner no problem with re-opening. I closed as it seemed it was not of interest or wanted. I wasn't get any responses like asking why it was left out of 1.1.0 release. To my knowledge other than preferences of GnuPG devs, changes to suit your needs, grabbing, libsecret, etc. It should be good to go without any issues. Thus I was waiting next release, assuming it was already committed . May have confused it with some other PR that was committed. But there should not be any outstanding issues preventing it from inclusion. If there are it was never relayed to me. It should be ready for inclusion, less any requested changes.

@werner no clue, I thought it was merged in at some point. I could have sworn something happened there. I went on advising others like the TQT interface assuming EFL was already added. I was shocked it was not when release came out and no explanation as to why it was excluded.

Oh yes, I should re-open this because we should keep on tracking the status - either for an included EFL version or an external version.

I have not followed this bug for the last 6 months and meanwhile @justus and @neal moved on to the pEp company and are not any longer available to work on this. Although, I made the last pinentry release I do no closely follow the development. What I noticed is that we still don't have an EFL based pinentry despite that I explained them several times that I would like to see EFL in pinentry proper. I can't remember what the Mike Blumenkrantz version is or that there have been two pending versions at all. The thread is pretty long and I have note read it in its full length.

Proceeding with a fork, and likely will remove other interfaces and just maintain another version of pinentry for EFL. Maybe renamed to pinentry-efl, and only have that and tty and curses interfaces in addition to EFL.

'bit commit',

@gniibe just checking – any news for 2.2 support? Should I reopen this bug or report a new one against 2.2?

Thanks for having a look :)

Thanks for the patch. The "fixme" indicates that I probably was just too lazy to add and test support.

I have attached a small patch to show this two additional key flags with "--list-keys":

Using an external process as an option is fine. However adding more dependencies to gnupg should be avoided.

So… Is there any interest in the approach I drafted in D442?

Okay, lets try with a default of 64. Note that for many concurrent ssh sessions you may also need the option --auto-expand-secmem which will come with Libgcrypt 1.8.2 and GnuPG 2.2.4

Debian has this with migrate-pubring-from-classic-gpg ( https://sources.debian.org/src/gnupg2/2.2.3-1/debian/migrate-pubring-from-classic-gpg/ )

Could we please merge it to the stable branch (2.2.3 does not have this patch yet) or it is not tested enough? Existing subkey sellection strategy doesn't play well with mail signing and affects GPGTools/GPGMail users as well as any other users with multiple signing subkeys. Thanks!

Moving on, I will just look to make a stand along project for efl-pinentry interface. I withdraw my previous submission. Welcome to resume and move forward with Mike Blumenkrantz version. Thanks!

Frankly, I doubt that this belongs into gpgme.

With Gpg4win 3.0 we registered associations for S/MIME and OpenPGP Files:

Not sure this should remain open. Months later a release was done excluding this. Originally mentioned on list in October 2016. Over a year later still not included. Very discouraging. I guess I can just see about having this external for myself. Shocking that FLTK and QTK see more usage than EFL which is part of Tizen OS. Clearly issues with either me, or EFL. Some reason it was excluded and being ignored. Seems nothing I can do either way. Oh well, I did all I could for months. On a very small contribution...

Kleopatra will only expose the values that are settable through gpgconf. Messing with preferred hash algorithms is nothing a user should do as the defaults are thought through and discussed. Mostly such changes come from bad recommendations. So the GUI / gpgconf does not offer this prominently as we don't want to create problems for users.

As GpgEX only queries a UI Server (GPA or Kleopatra) this is a Kleopatra or GPA problem.
With Gpg4win-3.0 Kleopatra got the option "Encrypt with password" in the file encryption dialog, which does symmetric encryption. GPA does not offer this but as Kleopatra is our main UI for GpgEX I think this feature request is done.

Somehow I expected such a report (too many open fds). We will need to replace our select based code by poll. However, I think this is more related to T3529.

THANK YOU! Once you push those changes, I'll see about back-porting the patches to Debian stable/Ubuntu LTS.

Thanks for your patches. I decided to do this similar but I need to take several branches in account.

The attached patches make the necessary changes to libgcrypt and gpg-agent. A word about my change to libgcrypt. Since all of the *_secure allocation operations were hardcoded to set xhint to zero, I simply replaced that hardcoded value with a static variable. In the patches I have some sample documentation for both changes. My scheme skills are quite old, so I did not write a test case.

Here is the test case that I wrote a while back (Follow-up to Crashes with gpg-agent 2.1.18). It is written with bash in mind and creates a stand-alone GNUPGHOME directory with a pinentry routine that supplies the password (I guess I could have preset the passphrase) and then starts 200 concurrent gpg decryption requests. With GPG 2.1.18 and up, this usually exposes the out of memory situation very fast.

To compute the key validity (trust) more information may be needed and we can only do that after the changes have been saved. Further, no-auto-chec-trustdb will anyway delay that computation until "gpg --check-trustdb" is run (e.g. by a cron job).

Not possible to replace it through config as we can't "check" like with sha1sum and the format differs.

In Kleopatra this should be possible through the Checksum definition config without any code changes. I'll look into it.

That is the same as a key generated from a passphrase. We have already have a task T169 for this. Thus I merge them.

This is intentional with the rationale being that users either want ascii armor for some reason for all their usecases or they don't want it.
And most users won't even know what ASCII Armor means (Adding "Armor" sounds like additional protection). So we moved this setting into configuration and renamed it.

So, to protect against this attack, the client needs to do both of the following:

Here are two examples:

@werner suggests using an ephemeral home directory. this is an important point.

@justus asked for examples.