That is not a functional feature request and I see no value in chnaging data structures just for being up to the latest RFC. Actually the ASN.1 is not from an RFC but from a specific X.509 profile. For CMS most parsing is anyway done with handcrafted code.
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May 7 2019
May 6 2019
May 3 2019
Good to hear this request from someone else, this gives it more priority :-).
May 1 2019
+
Thanks, WK
But before, I have a dumb question-> I need to connect the wires first, isn't it?
++
Apr 30 2019
Put
log-file /somewhere/scd.log debug ipc,cardio verbose
into ~/.gnupg/scdaemon.conf and kill scdaemon. Then look at the output. I would suggest to first stop the pcscd so that GnuPG's internal CCID driver will be used. Make also sure that there is no a permission problem with the usb port. In case of a CCID (card reader protocol) problem a
debug-ccid-driver
in scdaemon.conf will also be helpful.
Apr 21 2019
This bug makes it impossible to use gpg-agent as ssh-agent for keys generated from gnupg.
(How should I understand what passphrase should I enter?)
The only way is to load them with ssh-add.
Apr 10 2019
One of the things that dirmngr has going for it is that it tracks the current network state, and it would be nice to be able to reuse that state across sessions. If an ephemeral keyring can't use a shared dirmngr, there are fewer arguments for having dirmngr in the first place, and people might be more justified in replacing it with things like https://gitlab.com/anarcat/scripts/blob/master/openpgp-key-get
Apr 9 2019
I don't anymore think this is a high priority request. BTW, A more real problem than several dirmngr instances is multi-user access to smartcards.
Apr 8 2019
Yep, I'd like that, too. Sadly G-Suite Sync does not support "PGP/MIME" which is the standardized format we need to put together a message with attachments in a Mail.
So for now we only have PGP/Inline support. See: T3545
Apr 5 2019
- If the original key origin is a KEYSERVER or WKD it is fine to fetch an update of the key from a keyserver/wkd without user interaction.
- if the key origin is file it can be assumed that the key has bee received hand to hand and thus the existence of that key should not be made public.
I did not yet implement the use of "key origin" in Enigmail. I don't believe that it adds much value, because I anyway need to track more details about autocrypt keys separately from the keyring (such as the peer-state).
does the proposed mail value indicate that the key was received over e-mail, or is it intended to have some more nuanced semantics?
I disagree that it's conceptionally the same, unless you also consider any key on an HTTP server to be "conceptionally the same" as WKD.
Conceptionally it is the same. You receive a key and start to use it, everything else is not a matter of gpg; in particular not the autocrypt protocol.
Certain origins do have special treatment but in general the key origin is meta data for the frontend.
I agree with you and GpgOL handles it that way so for me this would work. But I'm not actually implementing autocrypt, so I also added @patrick to the subscribers.
I've talked about using key-origin in Enigmail with him in Brussels and I would be interested what he thinks Enigmail might require and if gpg could be improved for that.
autocrypt is not different from attaching a file to a (signed) message as it has always been done. We have no special treatment for that in gpg. Certain origins do have special treatment but in general the key origin is meta data for the frontend. For example it allows us to update a key received from WKD when it has expired.
Hi,
if I don't misunderstand you, we already have that:
My interpretation of the key-origin is that it's basically up to the application what it does with the information. It is added information, like the TOFU history we can have. I don't necessarily think in terms of "trustworthyness".
Apr 4 2019
I'm a bit confused. The origin of Autocrypt keys is clearly different from keyservers ("ks"), why would they use the same value? I was aware that origin values are mapped to integers, but your description seems to imply that these integers have significant ordering in terms of trust. The documentation in the man page is a bit bare bones, but my interpretation of "key-origin" was that it simply stated the method of discovery for a key, leaving any implications of trust to the client. Is this incorrect?
@werner: what if the autocrypt header is in a dkim-signed message, and the dkim signature covers the autocrypt header, and the dkim signature is verifiable using dnssec? is it still the same as from a keyserver?
Receiving a key by mail should in general be considered unknown and is not more trustworthy than receiving a key from a keyserver. I would suggest that you use "ks-pref" for this purpose. That origin value has no special meaning in gnupg but is numerical ordered between keyserver and and DANE; gpgme currently maps it to keyserver level anyway.
Apr 3 2019
I implemented support for ECC and DSA public keys in poldi. Tested with ECC (curve 25519) key on Gnuk smartcard (Nitrokey Start).
Apr 2 2019
Apr 1 2019
Here's an ugly hack to make this work (patch based on v2.2.15).
Mar 30 2019
@vsrinu26f No worries, looks like we are on the same page :)
Sorry i think i blabbered without understanding context.
I wish gnupg natively supports creating backup cards. To be able to import
private key material to do another keyto card. And every time it moves that
to card and removes from gnupg.
For exactly same key material on tokens. Just before writing first token
backup .gnupg folder or export all key info. Do key to card. Delete .gnupg
folder and restore from backup and keytocard second token.
Mar 29 2019
Both tokens should have same material.
On the other hand if we want to track which token is used by having multiple unexpired signing subkeys and each token have its own subkey is a possible usecase where multiple admins have the tokens.
I think if we have to update one token then we have to update backup token as well if moved to new subkey.
@vsrinu26f Yes I'm using subkeys with YubiKey.
Sorry, ignore my comment if there is something with subkeys and you are
already using latest gnupg.
This is already implemented by yutaka.
Sorry for jumping in out of the blue but the idea of automatically selecting the available signing key sounds also very appealing to me.
Mar 24 2019
Mar 23 2019
Great. Let me know when the newest gpg4win is released.
fwiw, a comment over on T4422 contains a bash script that tries to force GnuPG to do its certificate/signature re-ordering. this doesn't produce anything canonical yet, but it's the closest i've come so far to getting GnuPG to do something repeatable with a certificate after merging (but even that is not quite stable).
Mar 21 2019
See also
https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2018-December/034131.html
for a first patch to implement this.
Mar 20 2019
werner wrote:
Great. Thank you.
We are aiming for this week.
When will the new gnupg program be released so I can install it?
Charles
Mar 19 2019
So where can I get the corrected file to install? I suppose I need the
new gpg4win, it hasn't been updated yet. If I need the signature or TAR
from your website how can I implement that?
Charles
Where can I get the new thing file to install?
Thanks! I've confirmed that it works for me.
Mar 18 2019
Mar 15 2019
The secret import code actually had a bug in that it silently imported the secret key anyway, so that after importing the public key the secret key showed up. That was not intended because we do not want to allow importing arbitrary keys or subkeys if the don't have a corresponding public (sub)key with the mandatory key-binding signature. This has now been fixed. A fix for the actual problem will come soon.
Mar 14 2019
In T4346#122371, @gouttegd wrote:Regarding the quality evaluation, several months ago I proposed to optionally delegate that task to an external tool (specified by a new gpg-agent option passphrase-checker). I posted a first draft as D442 and then submitted a proper patchset to gnupg-devel, but although @werner expressed interest it was never merged. I have just checked that the patchset still applies cleanly to both the master branch and the STABLE-BRANCH-2-2. I can re-submit it to the mailing list if needed.
Mar 13 2019
There is a solution for it:
Mar 12 2019
Reading through this issue and the related documentation: Thanks for writing this all down and adding links!
Ok. Let me know so I can try it out.
Yes, I think that if I see an import result with "secret-keys-read && w/o userId's" I can just do a second try.
Checking the OpenPGP specs again, there is actually an "exit" clause for this PGP bug. Or well, what I would consider to be a bug. A fix for this is not easy because it would require to detect this at an outer level (the ascii armor) which we don't do because gpg is build along a streaming concept as almost all Unix tools. What we can do is to allow import of a secret key in that PGP format iff a public key is already there. In practise this would mean to run the import two times and ignore the errors from the first import.
Mar 11 2019
See T4400.
Mar 8 2019
I meant the abbreviations. PGP is based on a code base dating back to 1992; for example we mostly used the term keyblock instead of certificate in the code.
Mar 7 2019
Those terms are not arbitrary, they are in the RFC.
Thanks. [I wonder why the looong established terms public-keyblock and key-signature must be replace by arbitrary new terms.]
Mar 6 2019
- TPK: transferable public key (an "OpenPGP certificate")
- TPS: Third-party signature (any certification within a TPK that is not made by the primary key, and is not a cross-sig made by a subkey over the primary)
TPK ?
TPS ?
In T4393#123047, @dkg wrote:i don't understand why "import-drop-uids" is useful --
i don't understand why "import-drop-uids" is useful -- it sounds to me like the functionality you're looking for is something more accurately named "accept-certs-without-uids". is that right?
Mar 5 2019
Something to add: This also affects deleted drafts. If I write a new email and decide to delete & not send it, Outlook saves the aborted draft in the trash without encryption.