I sued the done column because we have not assigned it to any milestone.
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Jan 5 2024
Fixed a long time ago.
With rG239c1fdc28dcd0dc7aa5341be7c966da2231642a we now have a socketdir keyword for gpgconf.ctl. man gpgconf and look for that file. Will be released with 2.4.4.
Jan 4 2024
Note that we now have also an option instead of the workaround from 2015
Jan 3 2024
Dec 27 2023
Dec 26 2023
GnuPG 2.2 and 2.4 now have --pcsc-shared option for a user who can control his action in detail.
So, closing this bug report.
Dec 20 2023
@aheinecke as promised, attached some test vectors:
Dec 19 2023
This has always worked on the client site since we implemented keyserver access.
I see no problem to return only revocation packets. Clients must verify them anyway against their public keys and the fingerprint makes this easy. Verification against a primary key delivered along the revocation is more or less useless because that primary key must anyway been looked up in the client's keyring and th local existance of a primary key is anyway required to ask a keyserver for a revocation.
The trick here is that during import gpg tracks those invalid signatures and then tries to apply them to other keys.
Appended. Yes, it is considered an invalid signature and ignored. Anyone can insert an invalid signature. The trick here is that during import gpg tracks those invalid signatures and then tries to apply them to other keys. The use case here is this:
If you need the fingerprint, why don't you take it from the revocation certificate - for many years it is in subpacket 33.
In T6900#180549, @andrewgdotcom wrote:Hi, Andre.
...
Thanks for the explanation. To me this sounds very reasonable and I think that I am starting to better understand your use case in Hockeypuck.
Having a test example key + the intended revocation update would help at least me to dig into it a bit and see how this might conflict with RFC4880.
I'm curious about the parsing implications of this bit:
Well, the quoted paragraph ended with a
Individual UID revocation sigs are not particularly useful, because they cannot be validated without the original UID. Such things are out of scope.
Hi,
so I talked to werner about this, and of course GnuPG accepts minimal revocations.
A revocation certificate. So that was my point. As he understood you, you wanted to revoke not the whole key but only a single user id but without the user id packet? Sorry I am not really the protocol expert. But for me a revoked key without any user ids sounds to me just like a "standard" revocation certificate revoking the whole key. And as said, that is well within the the Standard and accepted, and even used by GnuPG. E.g. in case of a keyrollover we attach such a minimal revocation certificate to WKD keys when we deliver key updates.
From a technical standpoint I think the most minimal revocations which are technically possible should be accepted and thus I endorse the feature request.
In any case this is technically required
Actually the public key is personalized data as much as a mail address. In any case this is technically required and users take an informed decisions when they distribute their public key to a site not controlled by them.
Dec 18 2023
Just to clarify, above ticket does not reflect my Opinion. It is a direct quote from a different ticket. It is my expert opinion that a combination of "Name <email> + Cryptographic Data" is not a personalised dataset since anyone can create it. But let us please not argue about that.
In T4393#180500, @andrewgdotcom wrote:Perhaps we need to open a new issue for this, to keep the discussion more focused?
@bernhard Following up on discussion elsewhere:
Dec 14 2023
Werner and Tobias are both correct. If a new subkey is generated from scratch then gpg uses the current time as key creation time and sets the expiration date (in the internal in-memory representation of a public key) to the key creation time plus the expiration value.
Sorry, I should have been more precise in my description of the problem. Specifically with --quick-addkey, gpg's behavior seems to be that the expiration, when given using seconds=... is treated as seconds from now.
Dec 13 2023
FWIW, when updating the expiration time gpg does this:
My explanation of gpgme's behavior was not quite correct: Specifically in the QGpgMEQuickJobs for creating (sub)keys, the API uses QDateTimes, which are then converted to seconds since epoch.
That's both not correct. gpg takes the expiration time in seconds since creation time. For a new key this is close to the corrent time but not really. For an prolonging an expiration, this is of course different - the creation time of the key needs to be taken in account. I recall that we once had a discussion and agreed to keep it at time after the creation of the key. This avoids problems with the expiration going negative.
Dec 12 2023
We could also use this for T6874: Kleopatra subkey management improvements
Dec 11 2023
I think this works as intended now with the new certify interface. Also if you grant a key full ownertrust as now is the only option the self certification automatically becomes valid so this then shows as certified.
Nov 23 2023
Nov 19 2023
Just my five cents:
Nov 17 2023
This is a generic parent task and does not require workboards for specific branches.
Nov 16 2023
Nov 14 2023
Nov 13 2023
Nov 10 2023
Nov 9 2023
So as a replacement for what we have in Kleopatra this would work.
Nov 3 2023
So with my ryzen 9 on tumbleweed:
Oct 31 2023
For a very long time i would have agreed with you. But i now understand the usecase. You misunderstand that feature just like i had. It is not about checksum verification or checking. It is for detecting changes in folder trees so that you know when to reencrypt and update your encrypted archive of that tree. Yes this could be done somewhere else but the usecase is valid for kleopatra.
I would rather like to see the checksum stuff be ripped out of Kleopatra into a simple standalone app. It's complete overkill to start the Kleopatra battleship if the user just wants to calculate or verify a checksum of a downloaded file. The UI of the checksum tool in Kleopatra is anyway still not accessible (T6099: Kleopatra: Make checksum verification accessible). How about we redesign the UI from scratch with accessibility in mind from the start?
The tobias/gpgsum branch in gnupg now contains my implementation of this. Together with the attached patches to kleopatra and libkleo, it can properly handle unicode filenames on windows. I'll put those patches up for review at KDE in the next days.
Oct 30 2023
works: my brainpool X509 testcertificate is shown as compliant
Oct 28 2023
Please excuse my question but this issue has been WIP for 8 months. I think it was forgotten a bit. Especially since we are not shipping Okular for general signing of PDF documents this issue might help as a stopgap for Smartcards which we do not yet support natively and reduce the pressure a bit to add more PKCS#15 smartcards which can currently be used with Adobe and Mozilla NSS through their proprietary PKCS#11 modules. So I would like to raise the priority for this a bit. But I don't think high is appropriate. That would be for werner to decide.
Oct 27 2023
A quick test shows that the latest patches allow to set and show an expiration date beyond 2038. A new VSD beta will soon be available to customers. And we should also think about getting a gpg4win bug fix release out.
Oct 26 2023
Will be in 2.4.4. GPGME 1.23.0 with support has been released.
Oct 25 2023
Oct 24 2023
T6536 has been fixed. With today's commits the Brainpool curves are now also flagged as compliant in gpgsm.
Oct 23 2023
Well, see my very first comment.
Oct 19 2023
yes, fixed
I think this was fixed with the fix for https://dev.gnupg.org/T6534
Oct 18 2023
Oct 16 2023
Needed changes in Kleopatra are tracked in T6761.
I am pretty sure that we have done everything in gnupg. Now if we only had a workboard for kleopatra.
Oct 13 2023
Well I have looked at this ticket and posted a comment. We should talk about if there is anything left to do or not. I suspect that the gpg side is done and I should open one (or probably better several) ticket(s) for the kleopatra side.
And yes in gpgsm.conf both the extensions are also marked with ignore-cert-extension.
While remembering this I added to our standard.conf (and for testing first to my local conf):
Oct 6 2023
Oct 5 2023
C++ bindings also done.
Core part done.
Form the Gnupg-2.2 commit rG936954a18a2df made sure that the hkps:// prefixing from kleopatra is ignored.
That has been done modulo the bug which existed for both versions, I fixed today (T6536)
Oct 2 2023
This was actually implemented in a similar way for T3490.
Sep 28 2023
Aha, so you know how to provoke us into action, good man ;-) Alright I give it high priority. No seriously, makes sense to have we'll see when we can fit it in. Needs an extension in our internal api so probably not in the next release but sooner rather then later.
Mmh or even select all expired keys and then refresh them.
Multi select makes this nontrivial. But I think only with multi select this would really be useful. But yes it is a nice item for the backlog. E.g. if you know that a company switched their mail domain you might want to refresh all the keys from that company and you could do that with filter + multi select and refresh.