(2) Update the documentation of default-cache-ttl zero value disabling caching.

Propagate encryption flags in other places

I don't understand why we need to remove the Context::EncryptFile flag. It seems wrong/error-prone to propagate all but one flag. The caller shouldn't have set this flag in the first place. In other words: Remove the & ~Context::EncryptFile.

There are two other methods that also take alwaysTrust as input and that should likely also propagate the other encryption flags.

I think we have another report on this in the tracker. The problem is indeed the ugly Windows time functions to print a string. Let me only remeber that untile a few years, Windows had the opinion that Germany is the the Westeuropäische Zeit, i.e. Portugal or the UK.

That is quite possible because we do not have a test system for RISC-V and the make release tarbegt is not abale to verify this.

I am going to do:
(1) Recover old behavior with max-cache-ttl = 0
(2) Update the documentation of default-cache-ttl zero value disabling caching.

In T7620#200845, @Saturneric wrote:

I think it would be much better if GnuPG automatically performed a key listing immediately after key generation when a smartcard is involved. This would allow GnuPG to detect the presence of the subkey on the card right away, rather than leaving it marked as a stub until the user manually lists keys.

I see that you generated the secret encryption subkey with backup. This means that the secret subkey is generated on your computer, then copied to the card, and then deleted from your computer. The deletion is the reason why the subkey is marked as stub. Only after listing the keys on the card gpg notices that the secret key is actually on the card.

I found more issues with the success, warning, and error icons we show in various places.

An easy solution seems to be to just tell the overlay to not be always on top. It still blocks the outlook window, but other windows can then be shown on top of it.

my win10 vm was also installed with german language

issues split into new tickets:

• T7644: Kleopatra: 'Show Audit Log' in signature verification needs two clicks to open
• T7645: Kleopatra: Encoding errors in signature verification audit log (timestamps)

If the file data is next to the file data.sig then Kleopatra should automatically use data.sig with data. If you run kleopatra --verify data.sig or start the verification by selecting data.sig in the Windows Explorer then Kleopatra does automatically use data (at least on Linux).

Note that screenshot was made with a gpg from the 2.2 branch.
And on a Windows VM which was (I'm quite sure) installed in German from the start.
In case it matters…

We are using the style already since quite some time for gpg4win-5. I keep this ticket open for now for further adjustments (e.g. removal of workarounds added for other styles).

I'm wondering how we display valid signatures with not certified certificates. Those should probably be white (because there's no problem with signature or certificate, but signatures of uncertified certificates are as good as no signature at all.)

In T6869#200687, @ikloecker wrote:

Most of the texts (most are proper sentences) lack a full stop. It's unclear whether this is a bug in the German translation or also in the original texts. This should be fixed.

I can't see any documentation that a value of 0 disables the cache. The user might have used some undefined behaviour. For example in the old code we did a housecleaning when we were idle but the new code uses a timer and another thread for flushing the cache. We could open a feature request to entire disable the cache but I bet that we will get a lot of new bug reports because users will then need to enter their passphrase too often for one operation.

i added single/valid/disabled and single/valid/revsubkey to the screenshot table:
https://dev.gnupg.org/T6869#200682

It's not my intention. I didn't know the feature of disabling caching by max-cache-ttl to 0.
Well, it's a regression if a user intends so.

btw, my clue was that in that last --check-sigs, if i used --debug-all i got this:

This affects certification-only primary keys when doing web-of-trust calculations.

works for me, thanks

In T6869#200695, @timegrid wrote:

so the non working automatic match of data.sig -> data is another bug?

You cannot trust any signatures made with a compromised key because the signature creation date can easily be forged.

Then why don't we add at least the red background (and maybe an X) instead of the warning sign symbol and no color?

Backported for VSD 3.3.x

so the non working automatic match of data.sig -> data is another bug?

You cannot trust any signatures made with a compromised key because the signature creation date can easily be forged.

In T6869#200687, @ikloecker wrote:

Most of the texts (most are proper sentences) lack a full stop. It's unclear whether this is a bug in the German translation or also in the original texts. This should be fixed.