You are right, the new 3.4 cards support brainpool curves in addition to the nist curves.

If you mean OpenPGP Card v3 standard, no it did not support cv25519 ed25519, but some other curves up until v3.4. So if there is a specific specification bringing this feature, can you might refer to the specific version? Otherwise, I think this task is still valid.
I remember the problem being the card manufacturers that are not interesting in cv25519 (yet).

Support was added in version 3 card.

As for renaming "Change Reset Code" to "Set Reset Code", what about "Change PIN" and "Change Admin PIN"? Should they also be renamed? If not, why not? Is there no default reset code? Is there a way to find out whether the reset code has already been set (in which case "change" would be more appropriate than "set")?

You write

This does not work.

Can you be more specific? What doesn't work? Which OS, which version of Kleopatra, what smartcard are you using?

I though about this too but we need to take care about the logging functions of Libgcrypt which are intertwined with nPth (clamp function of libgpg-error).

{F1982353}

Thanks. I understand the situation. Basically, gpg-agent's computation is done by a single thread (in current implementation), although it accepts many requests simultaneously.

In T5137#139066, @werner wrote:

Note that you actually run 30 independent processes with gpg 1.4 but with gpg-agent there is just one process to handle the private key operations (decrypt). To utilize more cores you need to setup several GNUPGHOME with the same private keys.

In T5137#139064, @gniibe wrote:

I think that it is not gpg-agent but pinentry which causes millions of futex syscall errors.
For interactive use case, pinentry may be the point of contention.
I might be wrong if your key is not protected by passphrase.

If possible, please try adding arguments for gpg invocation: --pinentry-mode loopback --passphrase-file YOUR_FILE_FOR_PASSPHRASE
This can avoid the invocation of pinentry entirely.

I change this to a feature request: Allow several processes to run public key decryption using the same set of private keys.

I know these troubles.

Thanks for addressing this in master.

The feature (better cross compiling) was done in master.
We close this bug report as "Won't fix" since it will never been applied to 2.2.

In newer releases of libgpg-error, libksba, libassuan, libgcrypt, npth and ntbtls, we updated corresponding *.m4, so that we can use new gpgrt-config program only. And gpgrt-config command supports cross compiling and multiarch libraries.

FWIW, --enforce-passphrase-constraints does already work for symmetric-only encryption since 2.2.21 (rGae8b88c635424ef3). Thus this bug is actually a feature request to have a separate set of passphrase constraints option for symmetric-only mode.

Indeed we need to fix/enhance this to make testing of --quick-revoke-sig easier. See over at T5093

I recall that I had the same bug during development. Must have slipped in again - Good catch.

I have added support for this to gpgme (and gpgme++/qgpgme). See T5094.

By the way, --quick-sign-key after --quick-revoke-sig refuses to recertify the key. -> T4584

There is another problem: Even if the first certification was revoked, trying to add a new certification with --quick-sign-key fails because '"user id" was already signed by key ...'

I found a bug. To reproduce generate a new key, then sign it with another key and then try to quick-revoke the signatures. This fails with "Not signed by you."

On purpose. We actually allow user ids and gpg should somehow reflect this. As requested by you I changed it in the man page to what is suggested.

I've noticed an inconsistency between the command arguments in the man page and in the usage/error message.

The backend part is ready. Someone(tm) now needs to add it to gpgme. Extending the sign key API might be the best solution.

I was already considering this. I bet some people will view it as a bug if it is possible to add something other than a fingerprint. I'll change it in the man page.

Minor remark: I would change this (in the documentation) to

gpg --quick-revoke-sig fpr fpr-of-signing-key [names]

as for --quick-sign-key, --quick-add-key, and --quick-set-expire, even if USER IDs can be used instead of fingerprints. We shouldn't advertise the usage of USER IDs, if we prefer the users to use the fingerprints. I suggest to also change user-id to fpr in the documentation of --quick-add-uid and --quick-revoke-uid. Using USER IDs for identifying keys is ambiguous and errorprone (e.g. if non-ASCII characters get involved, which, incidentally, is the reason why I started to work on KMail).

gcc also warns about missing arguments and hopefully also if the arg for %n is not an int*.
You may need to enable these warnings which we do at least in maintainer-mode. On Windows some of the warnings might be wrong because mingw assumes the MS implementation.

Fair enough with regards to portability, and this is not a hill I will die on, but can you comment on the security concerns of using %n?

Nope %n works on all implementations I am aware of. It has to because it is part of even C90.

Hi Werner,

Sorry, it is entirely non-sense to ban useful printf features. Also note that we use our own printf implementation to avoid portability problems with for example "%zu". If you have a problem with any of the uses of "%n", please explain the problem.

Hello,
I finished the Italian translation of the GnuPg 2.2 file.
I need help, can you please update the source project with this translation? I am a beginner, unable to do this.
I attach files translated into Italian

We do have an Italian translation but it is quite outdated:

Hello Werner,

@werner can you confirm if the environment I provided will work with OpenSSH support fully implemented?

I am sorry, but I do not understand your request. Please give real commands as examples.
You known that you can always use --output FILENAME to force a certain file name?

I also don't want to leave my card in the reader authenticated for a full day, it just doesn't sound like a good practice to me. I also very often just forget about the card, so it just sits there, keys open for use.

Using a not yet existing directory is a security feature. The directory is created at a time the signature has not yet been verified and thus it would be too easy to trick a user into overwriting important data.

--locate-external-keys exists since 2.2.17 and ignores the local keys.

I will consider a -p option for gpgtar.

So, if there's no support for native OpenSSH yet, I'll wait for it. After it's supported, I should be able to get the scenery I described working, right?

Unfortunately you can't pass extra arguments.

@bvieira You need to set pinentry-mode=loopback for gpg program used in git.

Thanks for your reply, but it is an OPTIONAL feature. The annoying part is not deleting the files. Comparing hundreds of time stamps to ensure you are current on what you want encrypted vs. unencrypted files that are either under development and/or complete, and therefore ready for encryption. This frequently needed comparison takes a significant amount of time, and is prone to error. Any responsible user will ensure there are tested file backups to prevent catastrophic losses, or they can simply NOT use the option.

I'm actually trying to do the following:

In the meantime you can use [0]. I have tested with ssh key on yubikey and AuthenticationMethods publickey, win32-ssh (or ssh-portable, which is the new repository name) correctly works with gpg and pinentry is called. Despite it being called wsl, wsl environment is not required.

See also: T3506

I have removed that feature intentionally. There were some issues where encryption errors were not properly reported to Kleopatra and handled by Kleopatra. This could result in catastrophic data loss. I have fixed ~3 issues regarding to that and then decided that in our architecture we cannot absolutely guarantee that this never can happen and cannot happen in the future. We have resolved all the issues, but they could occur again.

In T3362#137094, @werner wrote:

There is not a lot of demand for this, thus we have not continued to think about it.

@gniibe: We could implement this on the card by extending our ugly hacks on the login-data DO, which are currently:

Everything up to a LF is considered a mailbox or account name.  If
the first LF is followed by DC4 (0x14) control sequence are
expected up to the next LF.  Control sequences are separated by FS
(0x18) and consist of key=value pairs.  There are two keys defined:

 F=<flags>

 Where FLAGS is a plain hexadecimal number representing flag values.
 The lsb is here the rightmost bit.  Defined flags bits are:

   Bit 0 = CHV1 and CHV2 are not synchronized
   Bit 1 = CHV2 has been set to the default PIN of "123456"
           (this implies that bit 0 is also set).

 P=<pinpad-request>

 Where PINPAD_REQUEST is in the format of: <n> or <n>,<m>.
 N for user PIN, M for admin PIN.  If M is missing it means M=N.
 0 means to force not to use pinpad.

A new 'C' flag maybe?

There is not a lot of demand for this, thus we have not continued to think about it.

In T3362#103156, @gniibe wrote:

@werner , I understand your poiont.

So, the best approach would be:
(1) Define some DO (Data-Object) or attribute/flag per key to control timeout or "force" by the card itself.
(2) Modify scdaemon so that it always ask authentication state to the card before doing crypto operation.
(3) Modify gpg frontend so that it shows those attribute/flag and setup.

Then, it is the card itself to control timeout or "force".

0.2.0 was just released with support for GCM. Tested against openpgpkeys.pm.me